diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/68855-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/68855-0.txt | 6285 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 6285 deletions
diff --git a/old/68855-0.txt b/old/68855-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 7c9f144..0000000 --- a/old/68855-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6285 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Chattanooga Campaign, by Michael -Hendrick Fitch - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: The Chattanooga Campaign - With especial reference to Wisconsin's participation therein - -Author: Michael Hendrick Fitch - -Release Date: August 28, 2022 [eBook #68855] - -Language: English - -Produced by: David E. Brown and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team - at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images - generously made available by The Internet Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CHATTANOOGA -CAMPAIGN *** - - - - - -THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN - - - - -[Illustration: THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN - -Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 260] - - - - - WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION: ORIGINAL PAPERS, NO. 4 - - THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN - - With especial reference to Wisconsin’s - participation therein - - BY MICHAEL HENDRICK FITCH - - LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OF THE TWENTY-FIRST WISCONSIN INFANTRY - - BREVET COLONEL OF VOLUNTEERS, AUTHOR OF “ECHOES - OF THE CIVIL WAR AS I HEAR THEM” - - - WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION - MARCH, 1911 - - - - - TWENTY-FIVE HUNDRED COPIES PRINTED - - Copyright, 1911 - THE WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION - (in behalf of the State of Wisconsin) - - -Opinions or errors of fact on the part of the respective authors of the -Commission’s publications (whether Reprints or Original Narratives) -have not been modified or corrected by the Commission. For all -statements, of whatever character, the Author alone is responsible. - -DEMOCRAT PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTER - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION ix - - INTRODUCTION xi - - THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN: - - Chapter I. The Preliminary Campaign 1 - Organization 11 - Organization of the Confederate Army 33 - The advance of the Union Army 39 - - Chapter II. The Chickamauga Campaign and Battle 51 - The Confederate line on September 20 95 - The Confederate attack upon the Union right 104 - Wisconsin troops at Chickamauga 126 - - Chapter III. The occupation and battles of Chattanooga 155 - The Battle of Lookout Mountain 194 - Wisconsin troops in the Battle of Missionary Ridge 225 - - INDEX 235 - - - - -MAPS - - - PAGE - - The Chattanooga Campaign _Frontispiece_ - - Chickamauga, September 19, 1863 82 - - Chickamauga, morning of September 20, 1863 98 - - The fatal order to Wood, at Chickamauga 112 - - Chickamauga, evening of September 20, 1863 114 - - Chattanooga and Vicinity, November, 1863 194 - - - - -WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION - - - (Organized under the provisions of Chapter 298, Laws of 1905, as - amended by Chapter 378, Laws of 1907 and Chapter 445, Laws of 1909) - - -FRANCIS E. McGOVERN - _Governor of Wisconsin_ - -CHARLES E. ESTABROOK - _Representing Department of Wisconsin, Grand Army of the Republic_ - -REUBEN G. THWAITES - _Superintendent of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin_ - -CARL RUSSELL FISH - _Professor of American History in the University of Wisconsin_ - -MATTHEW S. DUDGEON - _Secretary of the Wisconsin Library Commission_ - - _Chairman_, COMMISSIONER ESTABROOK - _Secretary and Editor_, COMMISSIONER THWAITES - _Committee on Publications_, COMMISSIONERS THWAITES AND FISH - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -After the battle of Gettysburg in the East, and the siege of Vicksburg -in the West, attention was riveted during the later summer and autumn -of 1863 on the campaign around Chattanooga. Seated on the heights along -the southern border of Tennessee, that city commanded highways running -through the very heart of the Confederacy. The result at Gettysburg -had demonstrated that no Southern army could invade the North; the -Union victory at Vicksburg determined that the Mississippi should run -unhindered to the sea. The battles of Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain, -and Missionary Ridge not only decided that Kentucky and Tennessee -should remain in the Union, but they opened the way for Sherman’s -advance on Atlanta and his March to the Sea, which cut the Confederacy -in two and made Lee’s surrender a necessity. - -The War between the States saw no more stubborn fighting than raged -on September 19th and 20th around the old Cherokee stronghold of -Chickamauga. Two months later, occurred the three days’ battle around -the hill city of Chattanooga. In all these events, the citizen soldiers -of Wisconsin played a conspicuous part, which is herein described by a -participant and student of these famous contests. In these battles the -reputations of officers were made and unmade, and from them emerged -the great generals who were to carry the Union arms to complete -victory--Thomas, Sherman, Sheridan, and Grant. - -Colonel Fitch, the author of this volume, began his service July 16, -1861, as Sergeant-Major of the Sixth Wisconsin; he was commissioned -First-Lieutenant in October following, and in the succeeding April -was appointed Adjutant of the Twenty-first; he became, in succession, -Major and Lieutenant-Colonel of that regiment, and in March, 1865, was -brevetted Colonel of Volunteers “for gallant and meritorious services -during the war.” He served chiefly with the Army of Potomac, Army -of Virginia, Army of Ohio, and Army of Cumberland. He commanded his -regiment from July 1, 1864; and on the March to the Sea; and in the -Carolinas headed a wing of the brigade, consisting of the Twenty-first -Wisconsin, the Forty-second Indiana, and the One Hundred-and-fourth -Illinois. Later, he was assigned to the command of the Second Brigade -of the Fourteenth Army Corps. He now lives at Pueblo, Colorado. - -The maps illustrating the text are adaptations from John Fiske’s _The -Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_ (Boston, 1900), which we are -permitted to use through the generosity of the publishers, Houghton -Mifflin Company. - -The Commission is also under obligations to the editorial staff of the -Wisconsin Historical Society for having seen the volume through the -press. The index was compiled by Dr. Louise Phelps Kellogg, a member of -that staff; the proof-reading has been the work chiefly of Misses Annie -A. Nunns and Daisy G. Beecroft. - - R. G. T. - WISCONSIN HISTORICAL LIBRARY - MARCH, 1911 - - - - -The Chattanooga Campaign - - - - -CHAPTER I - -_The Preliminary Campaign_ - - -The Union Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Major-General William -S. Rosecrans, was, in June, 1863, encamped at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, -thirty-two miles south of Nashville. It had been lying here since -January 5, 1863, having marched from the adjacent field of Stone’s -River. The Confederate Army of the Tennessee, was, at the same time, -in camp near Tullahoma, forty miles south of Murfreesboro. The -Confederates had been defeated at Stone’s River, and had fallen back to -Tullahoma at the same time the Union forces had taken up their camp at -Murfreesboro. - -I will designate the campaign of the latter army, beginning on June -23, 1863, by marching from Murfreesboro, as the “Chattanooga Campaign -of 1863.” The various engagements in that campaign, beginning with -Hoover’s[1] and Liberty gaps[2] on June 24, down to that of Missionary -Ridge, at Chattanooga, on November 25, are incidents of that campaign, -and necessary parts of it. A description of the campaign immediately -preceding, which started when General Rosecrans assumed command of the -army of the Cumberland at Bowling Green, Kentucky, in October, 1862, -and ended with the victory of the Union forces in the battle of Stone’s -River, and the occupation of Murfreesboro--would give a preliminary -historical setting. - -In fact, a full history of the Chattanooga campaign may well include -the entire movements of the army under General Buell, from October -1, 1862, when it marched out of Louisville, Kentucky, in pursuit of -Bragg’s army. The latter was then supposed to be in the vicinity of -Frankfort, the capital of that State, engaged in the inglorious -occupation of coercing the legislature to pass an ordinance of -secession. It was also trying to recruit its ranks from the young -citizens of Kentucky, and was restocking its commissary from the rich -farms of the blue-grass region. Buell found it, on October 8, at -Perryville, seventy-five miles southeast of Louisville. He drove it out -of Kentucky, and then marched to Bowling Green, on the railroad between -Louisville and Nashville, where in the same month he was superseded, as -commander, by Rosecrans. - -The Atlanta campaign, immediately following that of -Chattanooga--beginning on May 4, 1864, and ending in the capture of -Atlanta on September 8 of that year--gives a subsequent historical -setting: a connection in time as well as in space, to the operations -of the Army of the Cumberland in 1863. By referring to these several -important military campaigns of the war, the reader may obtain a -synchronous perspective of the most important events in the Middle -West, in the department occupied by that army. - -A larger setting can be given to this campaign for the capture of -Chattanooga, by framing it into the two military fields of the -Potomac on the east, and the Tennessee on the west. The Army of the -Potomac was opposed to General Lee’s forces. It operated generally -between Washington, D. C., and Richmond, Virginia, the latter being -the objective. At the time the Army of the Cumberland marched out of -Murfreesboro, Lee had taken advantage of the defeat of the army under -Hooker from May 1 to 3, 1863, at Chancellorsville, Virginia, and -invaded Maryland and Pennsylvania. He was decisively defeated in the -battle of Gettysburg, on July 3 following, by Major-General George C. -Meade, which closed his campaigning into the North. The old field north -of Richmond was reoccupied by the Army of the Potomac, then in command -of Meade, as successor to Hooker. It was the latter who, in October, -brought the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the Army of the Potomac to -the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga. - -On the west of the Army of the Cumberland, was the field of the Army -of the Tennessee. Its task was the opening of the Mississippi River. -At this time, General U. S. Grant was in command, and had his army -at Vicksburg. That stronghold surrendered to him on July 4. Thus the -great river was opened. This left the greater part of the Army of -the Tennessee free to cooperate in the autumn with the Army of the -Cumberland in the battles around Chattanooga; and from that date to -assist in the Atlanta campaign, and the March to the Sea, the following -year. - -It will thus be seen that victory crowned all three of the great -armies during the time of the Chattanooga campaign. The confidence and -discipline of the Union forces, increased at this time; the discovery, -by the governing powers at Washington, of those of the general officers -who displayed the most ability; the placing of such officers in the -command of the Union armies; and the gradual weakening of the secession -armies, were the principal factors contributing to the final end of -the war. The resulting campaigns of 1864 and the early part of 1865, -sufficed to crush the most powerful rebellion in history. - -During its long occupancy of Murfreesboro, the Army of the Cumberland -had been somewhat recruited; its equipment was restored to its former -condition; and it had also been very much improved, as well as -reorganized. During this time the formidable Fortress Rosecrans was -built at Murfreesboro, so that a small force might continue to hold the -place after the army moved on. This fort proved of great value during -the Hood campaign against Franklin and Nashville, in November and -December, 1864. Nashville had to be permanently occupied. In fact, the -line of railway running from Louisville through Kentucky and Tennessee -to Chattanooga, through Bowling Green, Nashville, Murfreesboro, -Tullahoma, and Bridgeport, formed the line for carrying supplies, as -well as the line of operations. This line, about three hundred and -forty miles long, had to be defended and kept open, as the Union Army -advanced. As part of it--if not the whole--lying in southern Kentucky -and Tennessee, was in the enemy’s country, it was necessary to build -and man as the army advanced, a line of forts and block houses, for the -protection of this railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga. - -By glancing at a good map, the reader can see the immense difficulty -involved in the maintenance and defense of this line of supplies -consisting of but a single-track railroad. The task required the -services of about a fourth of the entire army. The field of operations -contained no navigable rivers parallel with the line of advance, upon -which gunboats might assist the army in its conflicts with the enemy, -and by which the railroad could be assisted in carrying supplies. -Two somewhat important streams traversed the field, or rather ran at -right angles to it--the Cumberland, on which Nashville is located; -and the Tennessee, flowing past Chattanooga. These run westward from -the Cumberland Mountains, and for very small craft plying for limited -distances only, were navigable within the field of the Army of the -Cumberland. But they were of practically no use to the Union Army, -except at Chattanooga after its occupation--when for a time, supplies -were thus transported from Bridgeport and Stevenson pending the -repairing of the railway from those places. There were also two smaller -streams in southern Tennessee, running at right angles to the line of -operation, called the Duck and the Elk. It was necessary that the -Union commander consider these in his advance from Murfreesboro, for -they were fordable only in places, and not even there when floods were -rampant. They were bridged on the main wagon roads, but these bridges -were easily destroyed by the enemy. In its campaigns from Louisville, -Kentucky, to Chattanooga, the Army of the Cumberland did not have any -assistance from the navy. - -In this sketch, it is not necessary to give a tedious account of the -most difficult natural obstacles, such as streams, mountains, and -distances. These are apparent upon the study of any good map. But -mention must be made, that the Union Army faced a chain of mountains -lying between it and Chattanooga, at the northwestern edge of which -then lay the Confederate Army. This is the plateau of the Cumberland -Mountains, extending in a southwest direction from West Virginia to -northern Alabama, and covering what is known as East Tennessee. This -plateau is about 2,200 feet above tidewater. - -Chattanooga is the commercial gateway through which run both the -Tennessee River and the railways from north, east, and south. It -lies near the junction of the boundary line between Alabama and -Georgia, with the south line of Tennessee, at the eastern edge of the -Cumberland Mountains, where the Tennessee River, flowing westward, cuts -through the range. It is in a direct southeast line from Nashville. -The occupation of Chattanooga by the Union Army cut the Confederacy -asunder. Hence, the struggle for this position became a fierce one. It -cost both sides strenuous campaigns, an immense number of lives, and -the destruction of an incalculable amount of property. Its possession -by a Union Army was an inhibition of any serious Confederate invasion -into Middle Tennessee or Kentucky. The object of the Chattanooga -campaign was, therefore, the capture of that city; and ultimately, the -destruction of the Confederate Army. Should the capture of the city -be accomplished, but the army of the Confederate escape, Chattanooga -could be made the sub-base of a new campaign, which would effectually -dismember the Confederacy, and greatly hasten its downfall. Such was -the Union theory, and this actually occurred. - -Followed by the “March to the Sea,” the Atlanta campaign dismembered -the enemy’s domain and made possible the end of the war. Lee’s -surrender would not have occurred at the time it did (April, 1865), -if the homes of his soldiers in the Carolinas, Georgia, Tennessee, -and Alabama had not been invaded by the Western armies of the Union; -and his rear threatened by Sherman’s troops. These results were made -possible only by the capture and continued possession of Chattanooga. - -After Sherman had marched through Georgia and South Carolina, and -penetrated North Carolina, with a large part of the old Army of the -Cumberland and troops from other armies, thousands of Lee’s army -deserted, and lined the roads leading back to their homes. When -captured and paroled, as they were in immense numbers, by Sherman’s -“bummers,” they invariably said that they left Lee when Richmond was -abandoned; and would not longer fight for a Confederacy that could -not defend their homes. Love of home is greater than love of country; -unless the state or nation can protect the homes from invasion and -desecration, there is little incentive for its volunteers to fight for -the abstract principles of patriotism. - -A description of the contour of the field, from Murfreesboro to the -Chickamauga, would be only an interminable and profitless account; it -being a tangle of flat and rolling land, from Murfreesboro to the gaps -in the first hills, where the enemy was met; and thenceforth steep -mountains and deep valleys. But the grand strategy subsequently adopted -by Rosecrans, depended so entirely upon this contour, that when each -separate movement or battle shall hereafter be described, a somewhat -minute account of the country contiguous to that particular military -event will be given. - - -ORGANIZATION - -After the battle of Stone’s River and while lying at Murfreesboro, the -Army of the Cumberland was reorganized. As previously stated, Rosecrans -joined it as the successor of Buell, at Bowling Green, in October, -1862. Stone’s River was the army’s first battle under Rosecrans. In -that, the army was called the Fourteenth Corps, Department of the -Cumberland; and it was divided into three divisions--the centre, right, -and left wings. General George H. Thomas commanded the centre, General -Alexander McD. McCook the right, and General Thomas L. Crittenden -the left. In the new organization, the command was called the Army -of the Cumberland, and divided into three corps, the Fourteenth, the -Twentieth, and the Twenty-first. Thomas was assigned to the command of -the Fourteenth, General McCook to the Twentieth, and Crittenden to the -Twenty-first. - -Rosecrans came to the Army of the Cumberland with considerable -prestige. He was then forty-three years old, having graduated from West -Point in 1842. As brigadier-general he had gained the battle of Rich -Mountain, Virginia, in July, 1861; won the battle of Carnifex Ferry, -Virginia, in September of the same year; as commander of the Army of -the Mississippi was victorious in the battles of Iuka in September, -1862, and of Corinth in October following. He came to the Army of the -Cumberland with a record of unbroken successes behind him. He was -genial, and had untiring industry. His heart and head were devoted -to the Union cause. His troops saw him frequently. He was a lover of -approbation, and had the confidence of his generals, and the love of -his rank and file. The men affectionately nicknamed him “Old Rosy,” and -that was his usual cognomen with the whole army. He was a strategist of -high order. A study of his Chattanooga campaign will show his eminent -ability, in so maneuvering as to compel the enemy to fight in the open. -When an engagement was thus brought on, and the actual combat occurred, -he lacked (in those which he fought with the Army of the Cumberland) -the proper supervision of his line of battle. He too implicitly relied -upon his subordinates. During the whole of the Chattanooga campaign -his strategy was of the first order; but at both Stone’s River and -Chickamauga, the right of his line was too attenuated; in both -engagements, disaster occurred to this part of his troops. - -The chief of staff to Rosecrans was General James A. Garfield, who was -then thirty-one years old, brainy and very energetic. Although not a -graduate of West Point, he was possessed of decided military instincts. -Before the war he was an instructor in, and later president of, Hiram -College, Ohio; and later was a member of the Ohio Senate. Entering the -army as lieutenant-colonel of an Ohio regiment, he defeated Humphrey -Marshall in the battle of Middle Creek, Eastern Kentucky, January 10, -1862, and was that year promoted to be a brigadier-general. Able and -conscientious as an officer, he was perhaps rather too democratic and -academic to become a typical soldier. He became very nervous at the -delay in moving from Murfreesboro, and instituted an inquiry into -the reasons, both for and against an earlier advance on Tullahoma. A -majority of the subordinate generals in the Army of the Cumberland -supported General Rosecrans in his delay. Later on, notice will be -taken of Garfield’s service in the battle of Chickamauga, and his -retirement to a seat in Congress. - -Next to Rosecrans, the most important figure among the subordinate -commanders was Thomas. He was then forty-seven years old, and a -graduate of West Point in 1840. Between that time and the Civil War, -he served in the war with Mexico, and against the Indians in the West. -At the beginning of the War between the States he was major of the -Second Cavalry, of which Albert Sidney Johnston was colonel, Robert -E. Lee lieutenant-colonel, and William J. Hardee senior major. Thomas -was the only field officer of that regiment who remained loyal to -the Union. He was commissioned colonel of the regiment, reorganized -it, and during the first battle of Bull Run served in General -Patterson’s detachment, in the Shenandoah Valley. He was commissioned -brigadier-general in August, 1861, and was sent to Kentucky to serve -in the then Army of the Ohio (afterwards the Army of the Cumberland), -under General Robert Anderson of Fort Sumter fame. Thomas organized -the first real little army of that department at camp Dick Robinson, -Kentucky, between Danville and Lexington; and in January, 1862, with -this force defeated the Confederate troops under Zollicoffer, at Mill -Springs, Kentucky, on the Cumberland River. This force and this place -were then the extreme right of the Confederate line of defense, of -which Forts Donelson and Henry, in Tennessee, and Paducah, Kentucky, -constituted the left. This line was fortified, and extended through -Bowling Green. A month after General Thomas had turned its right at -Mill Springs, General Grant also turned its left, by capturing both -Forts Donelson and Henry. This necessitated the establishment of a new -Confederate line farther south, the evacuation of Kentucky, and the -eventual loss to the Confederates of Middle Tennessee. Just before the -battle of Perryville, Kentucky, the President offered General Thomas, -on September 29, 1862, the command of the Army of the Cumberland at -Louisville, but he declined it. Buell was in command of the army during -the battle of Perryville; after which he was superseded by Rosecrans. -Thomas was a soldier, pure and simple, having never resigned from the -army after his graduation from the Military Academy. He had shown great -ability in the recent battle of Stone’s River, as well as in every -position in which he was placed, prior to that battle. It will be -seen, further on, what important movements he directed in the battle -of Chickamauga, which saved the Army of the Cumberland from imminent -disaster. - -General McCook, who commanded the Twentieth Corps, belonged to the -younger class of West Point graduates, of which General Sheridan was -a type. He graduated in 1853, and was thirty-two years old in April, -1863. He was a handsome man, of striking presence, and commanded with -some dramatic effect. - -General Crittenden, commanding the Twenty-first Corps, was then a year -older than Rosecrans--forty-four years. He was not a graduate of West -Point, but had served as a volunteer in the Mexican War. He was a son -of U. S. Senator John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky. - -The Fourteenth Corps was made up of four divisions. These were -commanded respectively by Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau, -Major-General James S. Negley, Brigadier-General John M. Brannan, and -Major-General Joseph J. Reynolds. Each of these divisions contained -three brigades, and three light field batteries. The brigades were -generally composed of four regiments, but sometimes of five. - -The Twentieth Corps contained three divisions, commanded respectively -by Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis, Brigadier-General Richard W. -Johnson, and Major-General Philip H. Sheridan. These were made up of -brigades of four and five regiments of infantry and three batteries of -artillery. - -The Twenty-first Corps likewise was organized into three divisions, -commanded by Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood, Major-General John M. -Palmer, and Brigadier-General Horatio P. Van Cleve, each with three -brigades and several batteries. The artillery of each division of the -army was commanded by a chief of artillery. - -All of the cavalry were organized into a separate corps, commanded -by Major-General David S. Stanley. This was divided into two -divisions; the First was composed of two brigades, and commanded by -Brigadier-General Robert B. Mitchell; the Second, also of two brigades, -was commanded at first by Brigadier-General John B. Turchin. Prior to -the battle of Chickamauga, Turchin was assigned to an infantry brigade. -These cavalry brigades were much larger than the infantry brigades, for -they contained five or six regiments. Generally there was a battery -attached to each brigade of cavalry. - -On June 8, 1863, a reserve corps was organized, with Major-General -Gordon Granger in command. It contained three divisions, commanded by -Brigadier-General James D. Morgan, Brigadier-General Robert S. Granger, -and Brigadier-General Absalom Baird, respectively. The last-named was -afterwards transferred to the First Division, Fourteenth Corps, being -succeeded by General James B. Steedman. It was the duty of this reserve -corps to guard the communications in the rear of the army; but it was -also subject, in emergency, to be ordered to the front, as will be seen -further on--for example, when General Granger with three brigades, -marched from Bridgeport, Alabama, to Rossville Gap, Georgia, and -assisted very greatly in the battle of September 20, at Chickamauga. -In this reserve corps should also be included certain miscellaneous -troops, scattered in forts along the line of the Louisville & -Chattanooga railroad, such as Nashville, Clarksville, and Gallatin, -Tennessee. At this time Colonel Benjamin J. Sweet of the Twenty-first -Wisconsin Infantry was in command of the forces at Gallatin. He had -been wounded severely in the battle of Perryville, Kentucky, on October -8, 1862, and was not able to endure active service at the front. - -The First Brigade of the Third Division, reserve corps, was stationed -at Fort Donelson, Tennessee, and commanded by Colonel William P. Lyon, -of the Thirteenth Wisconsin Infantry, that regiment being a part -of the garrison. The First Wisconsin Cavalry, commanded by Colonel -Oscar H. LaGrange, was attached to the Second Brigade of the First -Division of the cavalry corps. Captain Lucius H. Drury, of the Third -Wisconsin Battery, was chief of artillery to the Third Division of the -Twenty-first Corps. - -This organization of the Army of the Cumberland remained substantially -the same, until after the battle of Chickamauga. Sometime in the latter -part of July, or first part of August, General Rousseau received -leave of absence, and General Absalom Baird was assigned on August 24 -to command the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps in his stead. -Baird remained in command of this division until after the battle of -Chickamauga, when Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau again took the -command. Rousseau was a loyal Kentuckian, who at the very beginning of -hostilities had raised a regiment for the service of the Union. He was -then forty-five years old and had served in the Mexican War. He was a -spectacular officer of great bravery, who is entitled to much credit -for his unflinching devotion to the Union, under circumstances which -made other men desert our cause. - -Major-General John M. Palmer of Illinois, a lawyer of eminence in his -State, was an officer of more than usual ability. He was not a West -Point graduate, and was forty-six years old. - -General Granger was then forty-two years old, a graduate of West Point -in the class of 1845, and had fought in the Mexican War. It will be -noticed that many of the general officers of the Army of the Cumberland -served in the Mexican War. The experience they then acquired in the -field, in actual campaigning, and by some of them in actual battle, -undoubtedly served to give to the Army of the Cumberland much of its -_esprit de corps_, and its general success in winning battles and -in holding the territory over which it marched. General Granger was -an unusually able and gallant officer. Later on, it will be told -what important service he rendered General Thomas in the battle of -Chickamauga. - -Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was then thirty-two years old. He -graduated at West Point, rather low in his class, in 1853. At the -outbreak of the war he was promoted to a captaincy. In May, 1862, -he was commissioned colonel of cavalry in the volunteer service, -and brigadier-general of volunteers July 1, 1862, being made a -major-general on December 31, 1862. He had commanded a division in the -battle of Perryville, Kentucky, in October, 1862, and was at Stone’s -River December 31, 1862, to January 3, 1863. He is entitled to this -special notice more for what he became, than for what he had done prior -to the Chattanooga campaign. He had as yet shown no extraordinary -ability as a commander. His age was the same as that of his corps -commander, General McCook, and they graduated in the same class at West -Point. - -Generals Absalom Baird, John M. Brannan, Jefferson C. Davis, Thomas J. -Wood, R. W. Johnson, and David S. Stanley were all officers of the old -regular army, soldiers by profession, whose minds were not distracted -from their duties in the field by politics or academic proclivities. -They were brave and always at the front, working for success with -military spirit. All of them served faithfully until the close of the -war. Davis, Wood, and Stanley afterwards commanded corps--commanded -them ably and with notably unassuming manners. There was no taint about -these officers of “playing to the galleries.” They were not expecting -applause, and did their work without brass bands or reporters to sound -their achievements to the country. Such were the officers of this great -central army. - -What of the musket bearers? Who were they? Where did they come from? -Were they soldiers by profession or merely citizens in arms for a -special purpose? I have already said that very many of the general -officers of the Army of the Cumberland were of the regular army. The -United States regular army was represented only, however, by one -brigade of the regular troops, namely, the Third Brigade of the First -Division of the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by Brigadier-General -John H. King. Thus almost the entire rank and file of the army were -volunteers. The regiments were filled and officered by the executives -of the different states. The men were mustered into the service of the -General Government as volunteers for three years or during the war. -These volunteers were citizens of the states, and each company elected -its officers among those who had originally enlisted as privates. The -musket bearers were men from all callings in life--farmers, mechanics, -merchants, teachers, students, and laborers. They were the voters -who made up the political divisions of the townships, counties, and -states, whose ultimate power lay in their voting franchise which they -shared with the men, who--for various reasons--remained at their homes -during the war. The volunteer-regiments which composed the Army of -the Cumberland were mostly from the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, -Michigan, Kentucky, Wisconsin, and Minnesota; Pennsylvania had three -infantry and two cavalry regiments; Missouri had two regiments, and -Kansas one; Tennessee was represented by several regiments. The great -bulk of the troops came, however, from the states north of the Ohio -River--the Northwest Territory. No drafted men in the army partook -in the Chattanooga Campaign of 1863. These volunteers sought the -service and understood what it involved. Very few of them knew what -regimentation meant, and the great majority had never before handled -a musket. But they were young and teachable. They readily learned the -drill, and became good marksmen. These soldiers realized very soon -that a clean musket, plenty of ammunition, and obedience to orders, -composed the military moral code of efficiency. By the laws of their -states, they were entitled to vote for officers and affairs at home, -and to have their votes counted, just as if they had been cast at home. -The soldiers received during the prolonged war as many furloughs -as were compatible with the exigencies at the front, and thus they -were occasionally enabled to visit the folks at home during their -strenuous service. The intelligence of the private soldier was often -superior to that of his officer. Nevertheless he obeyed faithfully -that officer’s commands, because he fully understood that discipline -could be maintained only by implicit obedience and the object of his -service, viz: the suppression of a rebellion be accomplished. Many of -these volunteers enlisted directly from the public schools, which they -were attending. They had been taught the history of their country; how -its independence from the tyranny of a foreign power had been gained -by the valor and patriotism of Washington and his volunteers, that -by the discipline and perseverance of the revolutionary soldiers the -sovereignty of a foreign king had been transferred to the citizens -of their native land; that a new foe was now trying to dismember the -nation, and that the corner stone of the Union was the principle, -that all power is derived from the people. These volunteers were -convinced that no power had the right to protect the maintenance and -perpetuation of slavery. They were soldiers therefore until the Union -was re-established; and they tacitly resolved to fight until slavery -was abolished. Such was the personnel of the Army of the Cumberland. - -Wisconsin was well and ably represented in this army by the following -organizations, viz: The First, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-first, and -Twenty-fourth volunteer infantry; the First Cavalry; and the Third, -Fifth, and Eighth light batteries. - -The First Wisconsin Infantry was a noted regiment in more than one -way. It served as the only three-months regiment from Wisconsin, and -was organized under President Lincoln’s first call for 75,000 men. It -was mustered out after the ninety days’ service August 21, 1861, and -reorganized under the second call for three years’ service. This second -mustering was completed October 19, 1861. The regiment proceeded from -Milwaukee to Louisville, Kentucky, and the volunteers served during -the next three years in the Army of the Cumberland. It was active in -various parts of Tennessee during the first year of its service, -marching as far as Bridgeport, Alabama, to which place it returned -during the campaign of Tullahoma. John C. Starkweather was its first -colonel. He was made commander of the brigade when it was reorganized -at Murfreesboro, and Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Bingham commanded the -regiment. This regiment had fought in both the battles of Perryville -and Stone’s River. It was assigned to the Second Brigade of the First -Division of the Fourteenth Corps. - -The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry was mustered into the service October 14, -1861, at Milwaukee. Alfred R. Chapin was its first colonel. Proceeding -to Louisville, Kentucky, it became part of the future Army of the -Cumberland, and advanced with General O. M. Mitchell’s forces to -Stevenson and Huntsville, Alabama, in the spring and summer of 1862. -The regiment returned to Louisville in September with Buell’s army -and engaged in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. When the -reorganization at Murfreesboro took place this regiment became a part -of Scribner’s Brigade of Rousseau’s Division of the Fourteenth Corps. -Almost side by side with the First and Twenty-first infantries, it -took part in all engagements. - -The Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was a Scandinavian regiment, and its -first colonel was Hans C. Heg. It was mustered into the service on -February 14, 1862, at Madison. It had taken part in the siege of Island -Number Ten. It did not join the Army of the Cumberland until just -before the battle of Perryville, in which it took active part, as in -the battle of Stone’s River. In the reorganization at Murfreesboro, it -became a part of the Third Brigade--and was commanded by its colonel, -Hans C. Heg, of the First Division, Twentieth Corps. - -The Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry was organized at Oshkosh, in -August, 1862, and on September 11, 1862, it joined the Army of the -Cumberland at Louisville, Kentucky. Benjamin J. Sweet was its first -colonel; he was so severely wounded in the battle of Perryville as -to be disabled for further field service. This regiment was brigaded -with the First Wisconsin Infantry at Louisville, and served also in -the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. At the time of the -reorganization at Murfreesboro it was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel -Harrison C. Hobart, and it was assigned to the Second Brigade of the -First Division of the Fourteenth Corps. - -The Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Infantry was mustered into the service -at Milwaukee, August 21, 1862. It proceeded to Louisville, where it -became a part of the Army of the Cumberland. This regiment engaged in -the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River, and was assigned to the -First Brigade, Third Division, Twentieth Corps in the reorganization at -Murfreesboro; its commander was Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore S. West. - -The First Wisconsin Cavalry was mustered into the service at Kenosha, -on March 8, 1862, with Edward Daniels as its first colonel. It was -sent to Benton Barracks, near St. Louis. There and in various parts of -Missouri its first year of service was performed. On June 14, 1863, -at Nashville, it was made a part of the Army of the Cumberland, with -which it was from that time identified until the close of its service. -This regiment’s activity in the Tullahoma campaign, the Chickamauga -campaign, and in pursuit of Confederate cavalry in the Sequatchie -Valley on October 2, 1863, and along the line of communication during -the battles around Chattanooga is mentioned in more appropriate places, -relating to the general movements of the army. It was commanded by -Colonel Oscar H. LaGrange, and assigned to the Second Brigade, First -Division, Cavalry Corps, during the reorganization. - -The Third Wisconsin Light Battery was mustered into the service at -Racine, Wisconsin, October 10, 1861. Lucius H. Drury was its first -captain. The regiment went first to Louisville, then to Nashville, -whence it marched with Buell’s army in order to reinforce General Grant -at Shiloh. It was engaged in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s -River. The regiment was assigned to the Third Brigade, Third Division -of the Twenty-first Corps, and was commanded by Lieutenant Courtland -Livingston. - -The Fifth Wisconsin Battery was mustered into the service at Racine, -October 1, 1861. Oscar F. Pinney was its first captain. March 16, -1862, it arrived at St. Louis. Afterwards it proceeded to New Madrid, -Missouri (on the Mississippi River), and became a part of General John -Pope’s army, in the reduction of Island Number Ten. It was also active -at the siege of Corinth, and marched about two hundred miles from Iuka, -Mississippi, to Nashville, Tennessee, where the regiment joined the -forces of General Buell. On the northward march in September, 1862, -these forces engaged in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River; -the service of the Fifth Wisconsin Battery was of the most active and -valuable kind. It was commanded by Captain George Q. Gardner, and was -assigned to the First Brigade, First Division, of the Twentieth Corps. - -The Eighth Wisconsin Battery was mustered into the service on January -8, 1862, and moved to St. Louis on March 8, 1862. Its first captain -was Stephen J. Carpenter. It formed a part of the force that moved to -Forts Leavenworth and Riley, Kansas, in April and May, 1862, whence it -moved to Columbus, Kentucky, and finally took part in the campaign at -Corinth and Iuka, Mississippi. From there it marched to Nashville, and -Louisville, engaging in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. It -was commanded by John D. McLean, lieutenant, and was assigned to the -Third Brigade, First Division of the Twentieth Corps. - - -ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY - -The Confederate Army which confronted the Army of the Cumberland on -June 24, 1863, was officially called the Army of the Tennessee. It was -divided into four corps--two of infantry and two of cavalry. General -Leonidas Polk commanded one infantry corps, and General William J. -Hardee the other. The cavalry corps were commanded by General Joseph -Wheeler, and General N. B. Forrest. In addition to the artillery, -attached to the regular corps, there was also a reserve artillery. In -General Bragg’s return of the “aggregate present” of his army in the -field on June 20, 1863, his figures are 55,070. His reserve troops were -not included in this statement; they were scattered throughout the -districts of Tennessee and northern Alabama. - -At this same date the return of the Army of the Cumberland was 71,409 -of all arms--exclusive of the reserve corps--as “aggregate present.” -It will be noticed later on, that the Confederates greatly increased -their numbers prior to the battle of Chickamauga, but that the Union -Army received no reinforcements; on the contrary, it lost heavily by -sickness as the army advanced. - -General Bragg was at that time forty-six years old. He had -distinguished himself in the Mexican War. He commanded the Confederate -Army in both the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. He did not -win either of these, having in both of them abandoned the field to the -Union forces. - -Perhaps the most distinguished officer in Bragg’s army was -Major-General John C. Breckenridge. He was more distinguished, however, -as a politician, than as a military leader. He was forty-two years old. -Before the war he had been a member of Congress, vice-president of the -United States, and in 1860 the presidential candidate of the Southern -democrats. At the breaking out of the war, he was a United States -Senator from Kentucky. He was a Confederate officer at Shiloh in April, -1862, and commanded the right wing of the Southern forces at Stone’s -River. - -General Leonidas Polk was fifty-seven years old in 1863. He was a -bishop of the Episcopal church. He graduated from West Point in 1827, -but resigned his commission in the army in the same year. He entered -the Confederate Army as a major-general, but was soon promoted to -lieutenant-general. - -General William J. Hardee was forty-seven years old at this time. -He graduated from West Point in the class of 1838. He served with -distinction in the Mexican War. He entered the Confederate service -as colonel, commanded a corps at Shiloh in 1862; was appointed -lieutenant-general in October, 1862; and commanded the left wing of the -Southern Army at Perryville. - -General Simon Bolivar Buckner, another officer in the Confederate Army, -was forty years old, and a West Pointer. He surrendered Fort Donelson -to General Grant in February, 1862. - -Of the two Confederate cavalry commanders, General Nathan B. Forrest -was by far the greater. He was a rough, uneducated man, but of great -force as a partisan leader. When Lord Wolseley was at the head of the -British Army, he said of Forrest that he was the ablest cavalry leader -that was produced by our War between the States. He was personally -brave, possessed a fine physique, and had sufficient magnetism to -inspire the soldiers of his command to great activity and endurance. -During the war twenty-nine horses were shot under him, and he took -active part in thirty-one encounters, it has been stated. He was -wounded several times. - -The rank and file of the Confederates were made up of the citizens -of the Southern states, in much the same manner that the Union -Army was composed of Northern citizens. They fought with a certain -fanaticism, for what they deemed their rights. It is singular, that -at the beginning of the war, so universal a desire to dissolve the -Union seized the great majority of the white people of the South, -although they might not be slave owners. They made most efficient -soldiers and suffered many hardships, unknown to the soldiers of the -Union Army. The martial temperament, inherited as well as acquired -through personal habits, was more predominant in the South than in the -North. The Southerners lived largely a country-life before the war; -they rode horseback, hunted with hounds, and had become more familiar -with firearms than the Northerners. The practice of duelling continued -longer with them than with the men of the North, who were not as -fiery tempered as those of the South. These traits made them soldiers -by nature; they liked to serve in the field, and were therefore -difficult to conquer. They seemed more lithe and active, than the -staid volunteers from the colder North. They have claimed, that they -were largely outnumbered; that is true in the aggregate, but not so -true on the firing line. The battles of Stone’s River and Chickamauga -illustrate these facts. The numbers in both armies were quite evenly -matched. During the last year of this war there was little difference -in the fighting qualities of the veteran regiments on both sides. The -rebellion was put down according to the rules of warfare, and whatever -that result may have cost in numbers, it was worth the price. Not every -revolt against authoritative power has been suppressed by superior -numbers, not even that of the thirteen colonies against England’s. -At first, the power of England seemed so overwhelming, that scarcely -any one expected that colonial independence could be gained. Foreign -nations did not believe that this rebellion could be suppressed, -notwithstanding the superiority in numbers of the Union Army. - -The wonderful thing about it is, that Lincoln persevered to the end, -against discouragements and disasters which seemed, at the time, to be -insurmountable. Fortunately there was no compromise, the rebellion was -simply crushed, no terms were made; and no promises given to embarrass -the reconstruction. Of course, it required large armies and grim -determination to reach the goal. The great fact is, not that the Union -armies outnumbered the Confederate forces, but that the Union itself -was restored. The war was merciless; all wars are. Mercy, pity, and -the extension of the hand of helpfulness came after the war was over, -not while it was going on. Each side did all it could to fight and win -its battles. The North had the larger number of citizens from which to -draw, and of course, availed itself of that advantage. The South would -have put larger armies into the field if it could have done so; it did -use every available man, however, and fought its best. The South might -have conquered the Union by overwhelming forces, could such have been -secured, but available men were lacking. At all events, the rebellion -was crushed by means of legitimate warfare, and the Union was restored. - - -THE ADVANCE OF THE UNION ARMY - -The Confederate Army, commanded by General Braxton Bragg, lay in -front of Tullahoma,[3] where Bragg had his headquarters. There -was a large entrenched camp at the junction of the Nashville & -Chattanooga railroad. This camp and the McMinnville branch was each -a secondary depot for commissary stores, while the base of supplies -was at Chattanooga. Its front was covered by the defiles of the Duck -River, a deep narrow stream edged by a rough range of hills, which -divides the “Barrens” from the lower level of Middle Tennessee. The -Manchester Pike passes through these hills at Hoover’s Gap, nineteen -miles south of Murfreesboro, ascending through a long and difficult -canon to the “Barrens”. The Wartrace road runs through Liberty Gap, -thirteen miles south of Murfreesboro and five miles west of Hoover’s. -There were other passes through these hills, but the enemy held all -of them. Bragg’s main position was in front of Shelbyville, about -twenty-eight miles southwest of Murfreesboro, and was strengthened -by a redan line extending from Horse Mountain, located a little to -the north of Shelbyville, to Duck River on the west, covered by a -line of abatis. The road from Murfreesboro to Shelbyville was through -Guy’s Gap, sixteen miles south of Murfreesboro. Polk’s corps was at -Shelbyville, Hardee’s held Hoover’s, Liberty, and Bellbuckle gaps, all -in the same range of hills. It was not wise to move directly against -the entrenched line at Shelbyville, therefore Rosecrans’s plan was to -turn the Confederate right and move on to the railroad bridge, across -Elk River, nine miles southeast of Tullahoma. To accomplish this, -it was necessary to make Bragg believe that the advance would be -by the Shelbyville route. The following dispositions were therefore -made: General Granger’s command was at Triune on June 23, fifteen -miles west of Murfreesboro; some infantry and cavalry advanced that -same day toward Woodbury seventeen miles to the east of Murfreesboro; -simultaneously Granger sent General Mitchell’s cavalry division on -the Eaglesville and Shelbyville Pike, seventeen miles southwest of -Murfreesboro, in order to make an attack on the enemy’s cavalry, and to -drive the enemy’s infantry guards on their main line. General Granger, -with his own infantry troops and Brannan’s division, moved--with ten -days rations--to Salem.[4] - -On June 24, Granger moved to Christiana, a small village a few miles -southwest of Murfreesboro, south of Salem, towards Shelbyville. On the -same day Palmer’s division, and a brigade of cavalry, were ordered -to move to the vicinity of Bradyville, fourteen miles southeast of -Murfreesboro; his advance columns were to seize the head of the -defile leading up to the “Barrens” by an obscure road to Manchester -thirty-five miles southeast, and by way of Lumley’s Stand seven miles -east of Hoover’s Gap. General Mitchell accomplished his work after a -sharp and gallant fight. McCook’s corps advanced on the Shelbyville -road, and turning to the left, six miles out, moved two divisions via -Millersburg, a small village eleven miles south of Murfreesboro. By -advancing on the road to Wartrace[5] he seized and held Liberty Gap. - -Five companies of the Thirty-ninth Indiana mounted infantry opened -the fight for Liberty Gap on June 24; they were followed by Willich’s -brigade. General R. W. Johnson, in his report[6] says: “Here I placed -at the disposal of General Willich a portion of the Second Brigade, -Colonel Miller commanding, who sent the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania -and the Twenty-ninth Indiana to the right of the Fifteenth Ohio, -then to change direction to the left, sweeping the hillside on which -the Confederates were posted. This movement was handsomely executed. -As soon as the change to the left had been made, General Willich -ordered his entire line forward. Under his own eye and management, the -Confederates were driven at every point, their camps and camp equipages -falling into our hands, and Liberty Gap was in our possession.” The -next morning Carlin’s and Post’s brigades of Davis’s division came to -Johnson’s support. The Confederates attacked quite fiercely, but were -repulsed, and finally retired. The enemy here was Cleburne’s division; -he reported a loss of 121. - -General Thomas advanced on the Manchester Pike with the Fourteenth -Corps in order to make an attempt to take possession of Hoover’s Gap. -Major-General Crittenden was to leave Van Cleve’s division of the -Twenty-first Corps at Murfreesboro, concentrate at Bradyville, fourteen -miles southeast of Murfreesboro, and there await orders. All these -movements were executed with success in the midst of a continuous rain, -which so softened the surface of the roads, as to render them next to -impassable. The advance of the Fourteenth Corps on Hoover’s Gap, June -24, was Wilder’s brigade of mounted infantry, of Reynolds’s division; -it was followed by the other two brigades of the same division. Wilder -struck the enemy’s pickets within two miles of his camp at Murfreesboro -and drove them through Hoover’s Gap to McBride’s Creek. The two rear -brigades moved up and occupied the Gap. Soon afterwards Wilder’s -brigade was attacked by a portion of Stewart’s division; this brought -the rest of Reynolds’s division, and eventually the regular brigade of -Rousseau’s division to his assistance. - -On June 25 and 26, Rousseau’s, Reynolds’s, and Brannan’s divisions -cooperated in an advance on the enemy; after a short resistance the -enemy fled to Fairfield, five miles southwest of Hoover’s Gap, towards -which place the Union pickets had advanced. - -The First and the Twenty-first Wisconsin infantry were actively -engaged at Hoover’s Gap, but suffered no casualties. The Seventy-ninth -Pennsylvania, in the same brigade, lost twelve men, one wounded. -General John T. Wilder’s brigade lost sixty-one men killed and wounded. - -On June 27, Gordon Granger captured Guy’s Gap and the same evening took -Shelbyville, the main Confederate Army having retreated. The Union -headquarters reached Manchester on June 27. Here the Fourteenth Corps -concentrated during the night. Part of McCook’s arrived on the 25th; -the rest of it did not reach Manchester before the night of the 29th. -The troops and animals were very jaded. Crittenden’s Twenty-first Corps -was considerably delayed. The troops encountered continuous rains and -bad roads, and the last division did not arrive at Manchester before -June 29, although an order to march there speedily was received on the -26th. On arrival it was badly worn out. - -The forces were at last concentrated on the enemy’s right flank, about -ten miles northeast of Tullahoma. During the incessant rain of June 30, -an effort was made to form them into position in anticipation of an -attack by the enemy. The wagons and horses could scarcely traverse the -ground, which was quite swampy. Fortunately the enemy’s forces suffered -likewise. What was trial and hardship to one of the armies--on account -of the weather--was equally detrimental to the other side. That army -which could overcome quickly and victoriously the climatic conditions, -had the best chances to win in the martial contest. In forming a line -at Manchester to resist an attack, the Fourteenth Corps occupied the -centre, with one division in reserve, the Twentieth Corps on the -right and the Twenty-first on the left. The last two corps had each -one division in reserve. The Union Army was on the right flank of the -Confederate line of defense, and of course expected to be attacked. But -it was not. - -In the meantime Stanley’s cavalry, supported by General Gordon -Granger’s infantry and all troops under Granger’s direction, had -attacked the enemy at Guy’s Gap--sixteen miles south of Murfreesboro -and five miles west of Liberty Gap--and had driven the Confederate -troops back to their entrenchments. Then, finding that the enemy’s -main army had fallen back, Stanley captured the gap by a direct and -flank movement with only three pieces of artillery. The cavalry -unexpectedly captured Shelbyville with a number of prisoners, a -quantity of arms, and the commissary stores. The reports of this -cavalry battle show the retreat of the enemy to Tullahoma forty miles -southeast of Murfreesboro, where it was supposed that he intended to -make a stand. But on July 1, General Thomas ascertained that the enemy -had retreated during the night from Tullahoma. Some Union divisions -occupied Tullahoma about noon that same day, while Rousseau’s and -Negley’s divisions pushed on by way of Spring Creek overtaking late in -the afternoon the rear guard, with which these divisions had a sharp -skirmish. - -On July 2, the pursuit was made by the Fourteenth and Twentieth -corps. The bridge over the Elk River had been burned by the enemy -while retreating. The stream had risen and the cavalry could barely -ford the river. On July 3, Sheridan’s and Davis’s divisions of the -Twentieth Corps, having succeeded in crossing the Elk River, pursued -the enemy to Cowan, on the Cumberland plateau, eighteen miles southeast -of Tullahoma. Here it was learned that the enemy had crossed the -mountains; and that only cavalry troops covered its retreat. Meanwhile -the Union Army halted to await needed supplies, which had to be hauled -by wagon from Murfreesboro over miserable roads. These supplies had to -be stored at the railway station, nearest to the probable battlefield; -and before the army could advance over the Cumberland plateau--where -a battle would probably soon ensue--the railway had to be repaired. -General Rosecrans in his official report says: “Thus ended a nine -days’ campaign, which drove the enemy from two fortified positions and -gave us possession of Middle Tennessee, conducted in one of the most -extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee at that period of the year, -over a soil that became almost a quicksand.”[7] He claims--perhaps -justly--that it was this extraordinary rain and bad roads, which -prevented his getting possession of the enemy’s communications, and -debarred him from forcing the Confederate Army to fight a disastrous -battle. He speaks very highly of James A. Garfield, his chief of staff, -saying: “He possesses the instincts and energy of a great commander.” - -The Union losses during the “Tullahoma Campaign”--thus named in the -official record--were as follows: 14 officers killed, and 26 wounded; -71 non-commissioned officers and privates killed, and 436 wounded; 13 -missing. Total, 85 killed, 462 wounded, and 13 missing. 1,634 prisoners -were taken, some artillery and small arms of very little value; 3,500 -sacks of corn and cornmeal were secured. - -On July 3, General Braxton Bragg sent the following dispatch -from Bridgeport, Alabama--twenty-eight miles directly west from -Chattanooga--to Richmond, Virginia: “Unable to obtain a general -engagement without sacrificing my communications, I have, after a -series of skirmishes, withdrawn the army to this river. It is now -coming down the mountains. I hear of no formidable pursuit.”[8] The -Confederate Army crossed the mountains to the Tennessee River and on -July 7, 1863, encamped near Chattanooga. The Union Army went into camp -along the northwestern base of the Cumberland plateau. The object of -the Army of the Cumberland for the ensuing campaign was Chattanooga; -the Tullahoma campaign was only a small part of the greater one which -had yet to take place. - -In the Tullahoma campaign the Tenth Wisconsin Infantry lost 3 enlisted -men, wounded, and the First Wisconsin Cavalry 2 enlisted men. All the -Wisconsin troops bore their full share of the fatigues of the campaign, -but only the losses mentioned were reported. - -There was one feature of the Tullahoma campaign that was very peculiar. -A part of the Union Army had the previous year passed over this same -region, while marching to the relief of Grant at Shiloh. Now returning -by the way of Chattanooga, where Buell had marched on his way back to -Louisville, they again came to this section of the country where the -inhabitants mostly sympathized with the South. They were surprised -and shocked in 1862 when the hated Yankees invaded their towns and -farms. The Confederate authorities told them, that another invasion -would never occur, that they could plant their crops and pursue their -business without fear. Therefore, when their country was again overrun -by the Union Army in 1863, their confidence in the Confederate generals -was quite shaken. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -_The Chickamauga Campaign and Battle_ - - -A distinguished Confederate general--speaking of the importance of the -city of Chattanooga to the Confederacy--said: “As long as we held it, -it was the closed doorway to the interior of our country. When it came -into your [the Union’s] hands the door stood open, and however rough -your progress in the interior might be, it still left you free to march -inside. I tell you that when your Dutch general Rosecrans commenced -his forward movement for the capture of Chattanooga we laughed him to -scorn; we believed that the black brow of Lookout Mountain would frown -him out of existence; that he would dash himself to pieces against the -many and vast natural barriers that rise all around Chattanooga; and -that then the northern people and the government at Washington would -perceive how hopeless were their efforts when they came to attack the -real South.” With regard to the claim that Chickamauga was a failure -for the Union arms, he said: “We would gladly have exchanged a dozen -of our previous victories for that one failure.” It is correctly said, -that even Richmond was but an outpost, until the success of the Union -armies--in the centre of the Confederacy--left Lee’s legions nowhere to -go, when they were expelled from Richmond.[9] This was accomplished or -made possible only by the operations of the Army of the Cumberland in -the Chattanooga Campaign of 1863. - -After the retreat of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee from the -region about Tullahoma, across the Cumberland Plateau to Chattanooga, -Rosecrans established his headquarters at Winchester, Tennessee.[10] He -began the repair of the railroad back to Murfreesboro and forward to -Stevenson, Alabama, ten miles southeast of Bridgeport and eight miles -north of the Tennessee River. The three corps were put into camp in -their normal order. The Twentieth Corps occupied the country adjacent -to Winchester; the Fourteenth Corps the region near to Decherd;[11] -the Twenty-first Corps occupied the country near McMinnville.[12] -Detachments were thrown forward as far as Stevenson. The campaign had -so far been mere child’s play, compared with what lay before the army -in the next movement against Chattanooga and the Confederate Army. The -straight line of the plateau is thirty miles across from Winchester -to the Tennessee River; the distance is perhaps forty miles by the -available roads. The railroad after reaching the summit of the plateau -followed down Big Crow Creek to Stevenson, then turned sharply up the -valley of the Tennessee, crossing the river at Bridgeport to the South -side; then winding among numerous hills, which constitute the south end -of the Sand Mountain, continued around the northern nose of Lookout -Mountain, close to the river bank, into Chattanooga. Bridgeport is -on the Tennessee River twenty-eight miles in a straight line west of -Chattanooga. Just opposite, towards the northern nose of Sand Mountain, -on the north side of the river, is the southern end of Walden’s Ridge -which extends northward from the river, and parallel with the plateau, -from which it is separated by the Sequatchie River and Valley. In -short the Cumberland Mountains are here a series of ridges and valleys -which run from northeast to southwest in a uniform trend, parallel -with each other. The Tennessee River rises in southwestern Virginia, -and runs between the Cumberland Plateau and Sand Mountain; but between -Chattanooga and Bridgeport it cuts a zigzag channel towards the west, -between Sand Mountain and Walden’s Ridge, which is the name given to -that portion of the ridge lying on the north of the river. What the -Army of the Cumberland intended to do was to cross the ridge, called -the Cumberland Plateau, then the river, and the Sand Mountain into -Lookout Valley and then the Lookout Ridge, in order to reach the -Chattanooga Valley south of Chattanooga. Such a movement would force -Bragg to march out of the city to defend his communications. These -ridges are all linked together at different places. Sand and Lookout at -Valley Head, Alabama; the Cumberland Plateau and Walden’s at the head -of Sequatchie Valley and River. Pigeon Mountain is a spur of Lookout -Ridge. Chattanooga is located on the south side of the river, between -the northern nose of Lookout and Missionary Ridge. The latter is a -separate and low ridge about three miles southeast of Chattanooga. -Without a map it will be difficult for the reader to perceive the -rugged and almost impassable field of operations, which General -Rosecrans faced, while his army lay at the northwestern base of the -Cumberland Plateau, waiting for suitable preparation for the intended -campaign. - -There was an alternative line of advance open to Rosecrans, namely to -cross the plateau into the Sequatchie Valley, or to march around the -head of the valley at Pikeville, then over Walden’s Ridge, and thus -attack Chattanooga directly from the north; or, to cross the river -above and to the east of Chattanooga, at the north end of Missionary -Ridge, that is, at the mouth of the Hiawassie River. This last route -would have exposed his line of retreat or communications, and he -therefore chose to operate at his right and enter into the valley south -of Chattanooga. - -Early in August the railroad was repaired to Stevenson and Bridgeport; -also the branch to Tracy City on the plateau. - -Sheridan’s division of the Twentieth Corps was pushed forward to -Stevenson and Bridgeport. The commissary and quartermaster-stores were -accumulated at Stevenson as rapidly as possible. By the 8th of August -these supplies were sufficient in quantity to justify a distribution of -them to the different commands, preparatory to an advance across the -river and over the difficult ridges, that lay at almost right angles to -the line of movement. The advance of the main army began August 16. - -The Fourteenth Corps crossed along the railroad line, or near to -it. Its advance was soon at Stevenson and some of it at Bridgeport. -The Twenty-first Corps--which formed the left of the army at -McMinnville--crossed by the way of Pelham, a small village on the -plateau, to Thurman’s in the Sequatchie Valley. Minty’s cavalry covered -the left flank by way of Pikeville, a village at the head of Sequatchie -Valley. The Twentieth Corps also came to Stevenson and its vicinity, -but by another route--to the right--than that taken by the Fourteenth, -namely, via Bellefont, ten miles southwest of Stevenson, and Caperton’s -Ferry, which is the river point nearest to Stevenson. - -All these crossings of the plateau were made without resistance by the -enemy, although there were small Confederate cavalry outlooks here -and there, which fell back when the Union troops appeared. It seemed -as if Bragg desired to have the Union Army advance as far as possible -from its base of supplies into the mountain gorges and over a long and -difficult line of communications. That course would afford him a better -chance, as his army being reinforced would be in better condition to -successfully attack and destroy the Union Army. - -In order to save the hauling of full forage for the animals, -General Rosecrans had delayed his movement until the corn should be -sufficiently ripe. No detail seemed wanting in the preparations for -the difficult campaign. Enough ammunition was provided for at least two -battles, and twenty-five days rations for the troops were hauled in -wagons. - -The Tennessee River had to be crossed by the different corps; in -order to conceal this movement and deceive the enemy at Chattanooga, -Hagen’s brigade of Palmer’s division, and Wagner’s of Wood’s of the -Twenty-first Corps, accompanied by Wilder’s mounted infantry of -Reynolds’s division, crossed Walden’s Ridge from the Sequatchie Valley -into the valley of the Tennessee. These troops made ostentatious -demonstrations upon Chattanooga from the north side of the river. -Wilder--with four guns of Lilly’s battery--appeared suddenly before -Chattanooga, threw some shells into the city, sunk the steamer -“Paint Rock,” lying at the city landing, then ascending the river, -feigned to examine the crossings, making frequent inquiry as to their -difficulty and the character of the country. On the other side of -the river east of Chattanooga, General Cleburne was sent by Bragg to -make preparations for defending the crossings against the supposed -advance of Rosecrans’s army. He fortified the ferry crossings. -General Buckner--who commanded in East Tennessee against the forces of -Burnside--expressed as his opinion on August 21, that General Rosecrans -would cross above the mouth of Hiawassie River--a stream flowing -northwards--and transfer his forces into Tennessee on its south bank, -some thirty-five miles northeast of Chattanooga. Buckner’s army was at -the point mentioned. - -Rosecrans’s intention was, however, to cross at Caperton’s Ferry--near -Bridgeport and not far from Stevenson--and at Shellmound; these places -are from twenty to forty miles below and to the west of Chattanooga. -On August 20 at daybreak, Heg’s brigade, of Davis’s division of the -Twentieth Corps, in which served the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry, -crossed in pontoon boats at Caperton’s Ferry, drove away the enemy’s -cavalry and occupied the southern bank. Here a twelve hundred feet -pontoon bridge was soon completed, and Davis’s division of the -Twentieth Corps, crossed and advanced to the foot of Sand Mountain, -preceded by cavalry. Johnson’s division of the same corps crossed -the following day on the same bridge. Sheridan’s division of the -Twentieth Corps crossed at Bridgeport on a bridge constructed by them -of pontoons and tressels; it was 2,700 feet long. Baird’s--formerly -Rousseau’s--and Negley’s divisions of the Fourteenth Corps followed -Sheridan’s division. The Twenty-first Corps marched down the Sequatchie -Valley and crossed at Battle Creek, nine miles up the river from -Bridgeport. Hazen’s, Wagner’s, and Wilder’s brigades were, as before -mentioned, in the Tennessee Valley to the north of Chattanooga, and -did not cross with their corps. The whole movement across the river -began on August 29 and ended on September 4. The Third brigade of Van -Cleve’s division of the Twenty-first Corps was left at McMinnville -as a garrison. The railway was protected by the reserve corps; the -Fourteenth Corps was ordered to concentrate in Lookout Valley and to -send immediate detachments to seize Cooper’s and Stevens’s gaps of -Lookout Mountain, the only passable routes to McLemore’s Cove, down -which runs the west Chickamauga Creek in a northeasterly direction, -towards Chattanooga. The Twentieth Corps was to move to Valley Head -at the head of Lookout Valley, and seize Winston’s Gap forty miles -south of Chattanooga. The Twenty-first Corps with the exception of -Hazen’s and Wagner’s infantry and Minty’s cavalry--which were still -north and east of Chattanooga--were to march to Wauhatchie, at the -lower end of Lookout Valley, near Lookout Mountain, and to communicate -with the Fourteenth Corps at Trenton in the same valley, and threaten -Chattanooga by way of the Tennessee River via the nose of Lookout -Mountain. The cavalry crossed at Caperton’s and at a ford near Island -Creek, in Lookout Valley, from which point they reconnoitered towards -Rome, Georgia, fifty-five miles south of Chattanooga, via Alpine. This -last mentioned hamlet is forty-two miles south of Chattanooga. In the -absence of Major-General Stanley--the chief of cavalry--its movements -were not prompt. If the reader will refer to a good topographical map -of the region around Chattanooga, he will see how sagacious these -movements were, and what grand strategy they displayed. The Army of the -Cumberland was stretched in line through the whole length of Lookout -Valley, between Sand Mountain and Lookout Mountain, on the south side -of the Tennessee River; it faced east towards the Chattanooga Valley, -with only one range between them and the Confederate line of retreat -and supplies; while on the northeast side of Chattanooga was a Union -force of several brigades to prevent any counter movement by the -Confederates upon the Union line of supplies. - -After crossing the Tennessee River, Rosecrans continued his feints to -make Bragg think that the real movement was the feigned one. He had -sent Wagner’s infantry, and Wilder’s and Minty’s cavalry brigades to -report to Hazen with a force amounting to about 7,000. Hazen caused the -enemy to believe that the whole army was there, intending to cross the -river above Chattanooga. This was done by extensive firings, marchings, -countermarchings, and by bugle calls, at widely separated points; while -Wilder moved his artillery continuously across openings in sight from -the opposite bank. - -The Confederates occupied in force the point of Lookout Mountain at -Chattanooga. To carry this by an attack of the Twenty-first Corps -seemed too risky; therefore the original movement was continued, -namely, against the line south of Chattanooga, over Lookout Ridge, -south of the point where it was held in force. The cavalry was ordered -to advance on the extreme right to Summerville, in Broomtown Valley, -a village eighteen miles south of Lafayette, Georgia. McCook was to -support this movement by a division thrown forward to the vicinity of -Alpine forty-two miles southwest of Chattanooga. These movements were -made on September 8 and 9. - -General Thomas crossed his corps over Frick’s, Cooper’s, and Stevens’s -gaps of Lookout Mountain, to McLemore’s Cove. - -These movements forced Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga on September 8. -Then Crittenden with the Twenty-first Corps and its trains marched -the same day around the point of Lookout and camped that night at -Rossville, at the gap through Missionary Ridge, five miles south of -Chattanooga. Through this gap runs the wagon road from Lafayette to -Chattanooga. - -General Rosecrans claimed to have evidence that Bragg was moving -towards Rome, and had therefore ordered Crittenden to hold Chattanooga -with one brigade, call all the troops of Hazen’s command across from -the north side of the river, an follow the enemy’s retreat vigorously. - -On September 11, Crittenden was ordered to advance as far as Ringgold, -but not farther, and to make a reconnoisance as far as Lee and -Gordon’s Mill.[13] Crittenden’s report as well as other evidence -convinced General Rosecrans that Bragg had only gone as far as -Lafayette--twenty-five miles south of Chattanooga--and then halted. -General Crittenden’s whole corps was therefore sent to Lee and Gordon’s -Mill, where he found Bragg’s rear guard. He was ordered to communicate -with General Thomas, who by that time had reached the eastern foot of -Lookout Mountain in McLemore’s Cove, at the eastern base of Stevens’s -gap. Wilder’s mounted brigade followed and covered the Twenty-first -Corps in its movements to Lee and Gordon’s Mill, and had a severe -fight with the enemy at Leet’s tan yard, five miles to the southeast. -Although Bragg made his headquarters at Lafayette in his retreat from -Chattanooga, his rear guard did not get beyond Lee and Gordon’s Mill. - -On September 10 Negley’s division of the Fourteenth Corps -marched--after having crossed the ridge--from the foot of Stevens’s -Gap, across McLemore’s Cove, towards Dug Gap in the Pigeon Mountains -and then directly towards Lafayette. Dug Gap is six miles west of -Lafayette. Negley found this gap heavily obstructed, but Baird’s -division came to his support on the morning of September 11. They -became convinced by some sharp skirmishing, which occurred on the 11th, -that the enemy’s forces were advancing; and therefore fell back from -Davis’s cross roads to a good position near the foot of Stevens’s Gap. -These two officers are entitled to great credit for their coolness and -skill in withdrawing their divisions from a very perilous trap. The -forces of the enemy would have been overwhelming in their immediate -front, if the Confederates had been more expeditious and made the -attack on the afternoon of September 10 or on the morning of the 11th. -Hindman, Buckner, and Cleburne, with several divisions were there, but -failed to cooperate in an attack at the right time. The obstructions -placed in the gap by the Confederates favored Negley and Baird. - -On September 12 Reynolds’s and Brannan’s divisions following over the -mountain closed up to Negley and Baird. Bragg’s army was at Lafayette, -near Dug Gap, in force. Having official information that Longstreet -was coming from Virginia with large reinforcements, and having already -received troops from Mississippi and the eastern part of Tennessee, -Bragg halted in his retreat. He was preparing to give battle to the -Union forces at the first good opportunity. - -Two divisions of Joseph E. Johnston’s troops from Mississippi and -Buckner’s Corps from Tennessee--where Burnside’s forces were--had -joined Bragg before he moved north from Lafayette to Chickamauga, where -he was joined by three divisions of Longstreet’s Corps from Virginia -on the 18th, if not earlier. At the same time Halleck, chief of the -army at Washington, D. C., telegraphed Rosecrans September 11, 1863, as -follows: “It is reported here by deserters that a part of Bragg’s army -is reinforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be -ascertained as early as possible.”[14] - -The fact stands out in bold relief, that the Confederate Government at -Richmond hastened reinforcements to General Bragg; while the Washington -Government sent none to Rosecrans, although Burnside was in the eastern -part of Tennessee with 16,000 troops, and was at that time at leisure. -Because the force, lately in his front, had reinforced Bragg at -Lafayette, Burnside did not obey Halleck’s order to join Rosecrans; on -the contrary, he drove Buckner’s force, which united with Bragg; thus -Burnside enabled Buckner’s men to take part against the Union Army in -the battle of Chickamauga. - -Bragg in his official report, says: “During the 9th it was ascertained -that a column, estimated at from 4,000 to 8,000 had crossed Lookout -Mountain into the cove by way of Cooper’s and Stevens’s gaps. Thrown -off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when in -reality we had concentrated opposite his center, and deceived by the -information, by deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy -pressed on his columns to intercept us, and thus exposed himself in -detail.”[15] He says further that he ordered Hindman, Cleburne, and -Buckner to join and attack the forces--Negley and Baird--at Davis’s -cross roads, near Dug Gap; but because Dug Gap was obstructed by -felled timber, which required twenty-four hours to remove, and because -Buckner, when he joined Hindman, wanted to change the plans, Negley -and Baird had been allowed to move back in a position not wise to -follow. Bragg drew Buckner, Hindman, and Cleburne back to Lafayette -and prepared to move in order to attack Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s -Mill. Polk’s and Walker’s corps were moved immediately in that -direction. - -The only Wisconsin troops in the affair at Dug Gap on September 10 -and 11 were the First, Tenth, and Twenty-first Infantry. Lieutenant -Robert J. Nickles of the First Wisconsin Infantry, aide to General J. -C. Starkweather, commanding the brigade, was killed when reconnoitering -alone the enemy’s skirmishers. This was the only casualty to the -Wisconsin troops. - -On September 12, General Leonidas Polk was ordered to attack Crittenden -the next day, at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. Polk would not attack however, -without reinforcements. Bragg spent the next five days getting his army -in position along the west Chickamauga Creek, and on its east side from -the north end of Pigeon Mountains to Reed’s Bridge. Brigadier-General -B. R. Johnson, who had been holding Ringgold on the east side of the -Chickamauga with one brigade, moved on the 18th to Reed’s Bridge on -the west Chickamauga; this caused his force to become the extreme -right of Bragg’s line. While Forrest’s and Pegram’s cavalry covered -the extreme right at Reed’s Bridge, Walker’s Corps formed on the left -of B. R. Johnson’s, opposite Alexander’s Bridge; Buckner’s was next -to Thedford’s Ford; Polk’s opposite Lee and Gordon’s Mill, and Hill’s -Corps was on the extreme left, near Glass’s Mill. Wheeler’s Cavalry -protected the left flank, and was ordered to annoy the troops in -McLemore’s Cove so much that Bragg’s movement would not be discovered. -With B. R. Johnson’s movement from Ringgold came two brigades--just -arrived from Mississippi--and three of Longstreet’s from Virginia. -The other two brigades from Virginia came on the 19th in time to -take active part, the Confederate Army being in position on the east -side of west Chickamauga Creek; and Crittenden’s Corps near Lee and -Gordon’s Mill on the west side. Bragg was finally ready for attack; -and on the night of the 17th issued his order of battle, namely, that -each body of troops should cross the creek at the nearest practicable -bridge or ford, turn to the left, and sweep up the Chickamauga towards -Lee and Gordon’s Mill. This would bring the troops upon the left -flank of Crittenden’s forces. Leonidas Polk was to attack in front, -across the stream, while Hill was ordered to prevent the Union forces -in McLemore’s Cove from reinforcing Crittenden. It will be seen -how Bragg’s plan of attack failed completely. The Chickamauga Creek -or River rises at the head of McLemore’s Cove, and runs northeast, -emptying into the Tennessee River about five miles above Chattanooga. -Therefore, to retreat to Chattanooga, or to cut off the Union Army from -it, the Confederate Army had to cross on the west side of Chickamauga. -The road from Lafayette to Chattanooga--on which the Confederates -marched--runs on the east side of and parallel with Pigeon Mountains -and the river, and crosses the river at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. The -road on which the Union troops at Stevens’s gap marched, runs down the -cove on the west side of the river and Pigeon Mountains, past Crawfish -Springs, near which it branches to McFarland’s Gap and to Kelly’s farm -on the Lafayette road, three miles north of Lee and Gordon’s; this -distance is about sixteen miles. The Pigeon Mountains dwindle away into -the level country some miles south of Lee and Gordon’s. - -The order of battle issued by Bragg on September 17, was not -immediately executed, on account of some resistance made by Wilder’s -mounted infantry and Minty’s cavalry at Reed’s and Alexander’s bridges. - -The activity of Minty and Wilder, and the bold front shown by the -troops of Crittenden at and about Lee and Gordon’s Mill, prevented -a serious attack by General Leonidas Polk, who was in front of that -position. These facts together with the affair at Dug Gap and the -presence of McCook’s Corps at Alpine caused the Confederate Army to -hesitate; thus General Rosecrans was given time to concentrate his -whole army--not Crittenden’s Corps only--at Chickamauga, across the -Lafayette road, between the Confederate Army and Chattanooga. Bragg’s -plan was to attack Crittenden’s left and rear, throwing it back upon -the centre--General Thomas’s--before Crittenden could be reinforced, -and then to thrust his army between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. -Rosecrans’s plan was to prevent such a disaster. Late in the afternoon -of September 18, the first Confederate troops crossed the Chickamauga -towards the west; this movement was still going on on the morning of -the 19th, when something unexpected happened to Bragg’s Army. - -About two-thirds of the Confederate Army had crossed and was facing -towards Lee and Gordon’s Mill, when at 9 o’clock a brisk engagement -commenced with Forrest’s cavalry on the right of the Confederate line -at Jay’s Mill, near Reed’s Bridge. - -While these movements of the Confederate Army were being inaugurated -from Lafayette down on the east side of Chickamauga, the Union Army, -at the foot of Stevens’s Gap in the cove and McCook’s Twentieth -Corps, twenty miles away near Alpine, had to get together and join -Crittenden’s Twenty-first Corps at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. - -While waiting to receive sufficient information to convince him that -Bragg had halted at Lafayette, Rosecrans had on September 11 or 12 -greatly widened the distance between his corps. It was a very dangerous -maneuver to face Bragg, and had a more enterprising general been in -command of the Confederate Army, the result would probably have been -fatal for the Union forces. General D. H. Hill says in a _Century -Magazine_ article, that Bragg was confused by the rapid movements of -the Union Corps; the presence of McCook’s Corps, south of Lafayette, at -Alpine, held Bragg for a while at that place. He was not well informed -as to the movements of Rosecrans’s Army.[16] - -Bragg, by failing to attack the detached Fourteenth Corps nearest -him in McLemore’s Cove, and afterwards to march towards the more -distant detached Twenty-first Corps at Lee and Gordon’s gave the Union -commander an opportunity to concentrate, and place his united army -across the road from Lafayette to Chattanooga, at Kelly’s farm between -Rossville and Lee and Gordon’s Mill. How was this movement done? - -While it took Bragg five days--from September 12 to 17--to concentrate -his army from Lafayette and Ringgold near Lee and Gordon’s, it required -the same length of time for McCook to march his corps from the vicinity -of Alpine to connect it with Thomas at the foot of Stevens’s Gap in -the cove. There was a distance of forty miles from flank to flank of -the Union Army, that is, from Alpine to Lee and Gordon’s. But McCook -marched fifty-seven miles by the route he took in order to connect with -Thomas. General Rosecrans in his official report says: “He [General -McCook] had, with great prudence, already moved his trains back to -the rear of Little River, on the mountain, but unfortunately, being -ignorant of the mountain road, moved down the mountain at Winston’s -Gap, down Lookout Valley to Cooper’s Gap, up the mountain, and down -again, closing up with General Thomas on the 17th.”[17] - -Looking back at this scattering of Rosecrans’s forces by the sending -of McCook’s Corps to Alpine--twenty miles southwest of Lafayette--one -can understand that such tactics were serious mistakes. General -Rosecrans thought himself justified for the movement upon the supposed -correctness of the information he had received, namely, that Bragg’s -Army was in full retreat towards Rome, Georgia. It is apparent, -however, that a reconnoisance of the cavalry to Alpine and Summerville -would have accomplished the same result as the corps of infantry -which was sent. The alternative before Rosecrans, when he discovered -the retreat of the Confederate Army, was to concentrate the Fourteenth -and Twentieth corps at Chattanooga, occupy Rossville Gap with a strong -outpost, well entrenched, and Lookout Mountain with another entrenched -detachment; he could then have waited for further developments. It -is hardly probable that Bragg would have attacked him after having -received his reinforcements, but would perhaps have fallen back on -his line of supplies at some point in the rear. Before that could -have occurred, however, the reinforcements that Rosecrans afterwards -received would have been able to protect his line of communications. - -By the evening of the 17th the Union troops were substantially within -supporting distance, but not yet in line to resist an attack by the -enemy upon Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s, but orders were immediately -given to move the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps towards the northeast, -down the west Chickamauga River, in order to cover the Lafayette road, -somewhere near Crittenden’s Corps. The position of the troops and -narrowness of the roads retarded the march. - -It must be kept in mind, that the movements which Rosecrans made after -he discovered that Bragg had halted at Lafayette, were for the purpose -of concentrating upon Chattanooga; and that the route Rosecrans took -after the junction of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps was perhaps -the shortest route he could take to Chattanooga, while he could -at the same time watch the enemy. He encountered Bragg’s force at -Chickamauga and was forced to fight there. This was, therefore, the -battle for Chattanooga. He gained his point--the military occupancy -of Chattanooga--but it required two battles to win it; those of -Chickamauga and the three days fight immediately around Chattanooga. - -During the 18th Minty’s cavalry, in position east of Reed’s Bridge, -was attacked by Bushrod Johnson’s troops coming from Ringgold, and -Wilder’s mounted infantry at Alexander’s, by Walker’s Corps. Both were -holding bridges, but were driven back into the Lafayette road. General -Rosecrans’s plan, as given in orders, was that General Thomas on his -way down the cove road passing Crawfish Springs, near the battlefield, -should post General Negley’s division there, relieving two divisions of -Crittenden’s Corps. With the remainder of his corps, he was to march by -way of Widow Glenn’s house to the Lafayette road, and take position at -Kelly’s farm, across this road. General Crittenden was to move Palmer’s -and Van Cleve’s divisions, relieved by Negley, to the left of his line, -and with them prolong his left, from the left of Wood’s division, so -as to cover that part of the Lafayette road, near Lee and Gordon’s. -McCook’s Corps was to follow General Thomas and take temporary position -at Crawfish Springs, protecting the right of the Union line, and to -keep his corps mainly in reserve. - -The cavalry was to close on McCook’s right, and to watch the crossings -of the Chickamauga in that region. - -The Union movements began on the morning of the 18th, but were so -slow, that McCook’s Corps only reached Pond Spring at dark, and -bivouaced there for the night. Crittenden’s two divisions reached -their positions on the Lafayette road near midnight. In view of the -accumulated evidence, that the enemy was crossing his forces over the -Chickamauga below Lee and Gordon’s on the 18th, General Thomas pushed -forward his corps, uninterruptedly during the night. He halted his -leading division--Negley’s--at the assigned position near Crawfish -Springs, where his corps rested for two hours at midnight and made -coffee. From there on Baird’s division was in the lead, and General -Thomas and staff rode with General Baird at the head of the column. -This was a weird night-march. The utmost secrecy was kept. If the -enemy--who was just across the river not far away--had discovered the -movement, he would perhaps also have marched in the night and occupied -the place for which General Thomas was aiming. General Hill’s Corps -and Wheeler’s Cavalry of the Confederate Army were on the east side -of the Chickamauga, in order to prevent the Fourteenth and Twentieth -corps from making this march. To deceive the enemy campfires were -left burning in the camps in the early evening; in fact all along the -road southwest of Crawfish Springs, frequent fires were kindled. -Soon after leaving Crawfish Springs the column deflected to the right -into an obscure cross-country road, which led to Kelly’s farm. Along -the windings of this road, some of the hardest fights of the 19th and -20th took place. A pond afterwards known as “bloody pond” was passed -soon after leaving Crawfish Springs; to the left, and a short distance -from this pond, General William H. Lytle was killed September 20. -Still further on was the place where the fatal blunder of the 20th -occurred--at about 11 a. m.--near Brotherton’s house; General T. J. -Wood, obeying his interpretation of an order from General Rosecrans, -having withdrawn from the line, let in Longstreet’s troops. - -This road runs almost entirely through thick hardwood timber, but about -half way between Crawfish Springs and Kelly’s farm, there was a little -dwelling in the midst of a clearing, known as Widow Glenn’s. Here the -next day, General Rosecrans lifted the name of the widow from the -depths of utter obscurity to the heights of national fame, by making -her home his headquarters. In fact, the whole region from Missionary -Ridge, on the left of the marching column as far as Rossville Gap (four -miles to the northwest) to the Chickamauga on the east, was densely -wooded and covered with heavy undergrowth. A few small farms scattered -through this woodland were tilled by the obscurest of backwoodsmen, who -lived in small log cabins or small frame buildings. Their names would -never have been known, even in Chattanooga nine miles away, had it not -been for the accidental fighting there of the greatest battle of the -west. Widow Glenn’s, Kelly’s farm, Snodgrass Hill, McDonald’s, Poe’s, -Brotherton’s, Dyer’s, Vittetoe’s, and Viniard’s were suddenly made -historical by the battle of Chickamauga. - -General George H. Thomas was a very sedate man. There was about him, at -all times, the very atmosphere of solid merit and reserved strength. -As he rode beside General Baird, attended by the two staff corps, -there was no indication that he was conscious of his high position. -His modesty was always conspicuous. No one in the long line of troops -stretching for miles behind could see in this unpretentious officer -the true hero of the coming conflict, who would be known in the future -as the “Rock of Chickamauga.” After Negley’s division was left in -position near Crawfish, there remained in the marching column the three -divisions of Baird, Brannan, and Reynolds. Baird’s and Brannan’s had -three brigades each, but Reynolds’s had only two; Wilder’s was mounted -and operated as cavalry, wherefore it was not always with its division. - -[Illustration: CHICKAMAUGA, SEPTEMBER 19, 1863 - -Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 266] - -About daylight on September 19, Baird’s division filed across the -Lafayette road near Kelly’s log house, stacked arms, and commenced -to prepare breakfast. Forrest’s Confederate cavalry lay at that time -in the neighborhood of Jay’s Mill, one mile to the east, near Reed’s -Bridge; Hood’s and Walker’s corps were further up, or west towards -Lee’s and Gordon’s and within a mile and a half of Crittenden’s left. -The stream was in many places easily fordable. The whole Confederate -Army was across the Chickamauga at sunrise with the exception of -Hindman’s, Breckenridge’s, and Cleburne’s divisions. Thomas made -temporary headquarters under a large tree by the roadside; while -waiting for the closing up of the rear division, he lay down on some -blankets, and told his aide not to let him sleep more than an hour. -General Gordon Granger, who commanded the reserve corps, had been -ordered by Rosecrans on September 13 to bring three brigades of this -corps--which happened then to be at Bridgeport, Alabama, guarding that -point of the Union line of supplies--to the Rossville Gap. His duty -was to guard the approaches from the south and east and to _generally -support the main army_. He moved with his usual energy and arrived at -the gap on September 14, although the distance is about thirty-five -miles. He brought with him two brigades of Steedman’s division, viz.: -Mitchell’s and Whittaker’s, and Daniel McCook’s brigades of James D. -Morgan’s division. Granger’s presence in the front of Rossville Gap -at McAffee’s Church with Whittaker’s brigade, and his sending Daniel -McCook’s and Mitchell’s brigades towards Jay’s Mill and Reed’s Bridge, -assisted greatly in postponing the crossing of the Confederate forces -until the 18th and thus preventing an attack on Crittenden’s left flank. - -On the morning of the 19th McCook’s brigade was bivouacing somewhere -near Reed’s Bridge. McCook rode over to where Thomas was, and said -hurriedly he must speak to him. He told General Thomas that a -Confederate brigade had crossed at Reed’s Bridge and that his (own) -brigade had then burned this bridge, thus this detached brigade -could be captured, if General Thomas would send forces enough to do -it. At that moment the head of Brannan’s division was approaching -in rear of the line of Baird’s division to take position on the -latter’s left. Thomas ordered Brannan to reconnoitre in that -direction with two brigades and to attack any force met. His advance -brigade--Croxton’s--encountered very soon Forrest’s cavalry, about -7:30 or 8 a. m. (some reports say 9 a. m.) and drove it more than half -a mile. “This vigorous movement disconcerted the plans of the enemy -to move on our left and opened the battle of the 19th September,” -says General Rosecrans in his official report.[18] Forrest was in -that place as a defense of Bragg’s right flank. The sudden musketry -of Croxton’s attack on Forrest far to the right of the Confederate -commanders startled them and gave them the first intimation, that -Bragg’s order did not meet the situation. - -General H. V. Boynton says that, at the time the isolated Confederate -brigade was reported as on the west side of Chickamauga, early in the -morning of September 19, two-thirds of the Confederate Army were on the -west side. - -It was 6:30 a. m. when Brannan left Kelly’s and moved north; he took -the Reed’s Bridge road for the capturing of the isolated brigade. It -was between 8 and 9 a. m., before the enemy was struck. - -General Forrest called immediately for assistance. Ector’s and Wilson’s -infantry brigades of Walker’s Corps returned down the stream and -drove Croxton. This brought Brannan with his two remaining brigades -forward; he in turn drove back the Confederate force. Brannan in his -report[19] says, that his troops came upon a strong force of the -enemy, consisting of two divisions instead of the supposed brigade. -Very soon Baird’s division was sent in on the right of Brannan; this at -first drove the Confederate force that was attacking Brannan, but in -turn it was attacked directly on its right flank and rear by Liddell’s -division, which threw it into temporary confusion. In the meantime -McCook’s Corps arrived on the field. R. W. Johnson’s division of that -corps was sent in, at noon, on Baird’s right; it struck Cheatham’s -division on its right flank, driving it back in confusion. Johnson’s -was overlapped and in immediate danger, when General John M. Palmer’s -division of Crittenden’s Corps, relieved the right of his division; -Crittenden had very wisely dispatched Palmer’s division toward the -sound of the firing and this burst upon the enemy. Palmer’s right was -soon overlapped when Van Cleve from Crittenden’s Corps came to the -rescue, but later in the day he also was beaten back. Then Reynolds’s -division of Thomas’s corps advanced on the left of Palmer’s division, -and two brigades of Van Cleve’s division came in on Palmer’s right. -Davis’s division of McCook’s Corps attacked most opportunely and drove -the enemy, but was compelled somewhat to give way. In this attack -Colonel Hans C. Heg of the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was mortally -wounded. In the meantime Crittenden’s remaining division under Wood -attacked the Confederates and turned the tide. Lee and Gordon’s Mill -was at that moment uncovered, all of Crittenden’s Corps having marched -towards the left. About 3 o’clock p. m. McCook was ordered to send -his remaining division (Sheridan’s) to support the line near Wood and -Davis, and to place Lytle’s brigade at Lee and Gordon’s as the extreme -right. This stayed the Confederate advance in that section. - -Lytle’s brigade was considered sufficient at that time to hold a point -against which Bragg was, at first, directing his whole force. This -point--at Lee and Gordon’s--was the left of the Union Army on the 18th; -at noon on the 19th it was the right. - -Negley’s division, which had been posted near Crawfish Springs the -night before, was then the only Union division which did not partake -in the battle at first, but arrived in accordance with orders on the -field about 4:30 p. m. He was ordered to the place, from which Van -Cleve had been driven, in order to attack; he drove the enemy steadily, -while Thomas was driving him on the Confederate right; these movements -continued until night. - -It can readily be perceived that the battle of the 19th was more or -less a haphazard fight, neither side being aware of the position of the -other. The undergrowth of the woods was so dense in most places, that -opposed sides could not perceive each other until they were within a -few yards, except by the firing. It was unfortunate that Rosecrans was -not present with Thomas, when the latter’s corps crossed the Lafayette -road. Before an attack was made, the Twenty-first Corps, being the -nearest one to the Fourteenth, should have been formed on the right -of the Fourteenth, both in a compact line, and with a brigade for -each division in reserve; and the Twentieth Corps--when it closed up -on the right of the Twenty-first in the same compact order--should -have advanced swiftly upon the Confederates, some of whom were still -crossing the river, and some with their right flanks to the Union line -of attack. It is possible that such an attack would have driven the -Confederates into the river in great confusion; but an attack by only -one division (Brannan’s) on Forrest’s cavalry beyond the Confederate -right flank, simply notified the Confederate commanders, and gave them -ample time to wheel their divisions into the proper direction, and -signalled them where to attack. General Rosecrans in his report does -not mention a night fight that occurred on the extreme Union left. In -fact, he says, there was no firing after dark. Just as it began to -grow dark, however, Cleburne’s division of Hill’s Corps arrived from -across the river. He boldly and characteristically marched through the -defeated and prostrated divisions of Walker and Cheatham, was joined by -two brigades of Cheatham’s division, Jackson’s, and Preston Smith’s, -and then attacked with great fierceness the Union troops under R. W. -Johnson and Baird; they covered Johnson’s front and lapped over on -Baird. It was too dark to recognize friend from foe, and it was more or -less a hand-to-hand contest. Finally the attack was repulsed, the Union -troops holding the field. The Confederate general, Preston Smith, and -two of his staff officers were killed. - -Some idea of the severity of the fighting on the 19th--the charging -and falling back of both sides; the difficulty in keeping alignments; -the impossibility of officers identifying friend or foe; the losing -of artillery batteries and single pieces, their recapture; and the -awful slaughter in both armies--can be obtained only by reading -official reports in serial numbers 50 and 51 of _Rebellion Records_. -Its intensity can be estimated from the following data. Breckenridge’s -division was not in the fight of September 19, but fought on the 20th -only; his loss in killed and wounded was 1,075. Cleburne was in the -night fight of the 19th, and was as active as Breckenridge on the 20th; -his loss was 1,743 in killed and wounded. The total difference of 668 -does not give an accurate comparison of the two days’ fighting, but -does give some idea of the awful slaughter. The battle of the 19th was -fought without breastworks; it was a square stand-up fight; nearly -every division engaged on both sides, first attacked, then drove its -opponent, and after falling back in some disorder, reformed, and again -advanced, until the day and part of the night were gone. - -The surgeon-general of the Union Army reported that about 4,500 wounded -were treated after this battle of the 19th. The loss in killed and -wounded must, therefore, have reached 6,000, but the Union reports do -not separate the losses of the 19th from the total. - -Late in the afternoon of the 19th, Brannan’s division was withdrawn -from the left and placed in reserve, or rather in echelon at the right -of Reynolds, near Brotherton’s house, at the right of Thomas’s line. - -During the night of the 19th the lines of both armies were readjusted. -That of the Union Army was drawn back. Palmer of Crittenden’s Corps and -Johnson of McCook’s, who had reported to General Thomas the day before, -were ordered to remain under his direction. He placed his troops in a -compact line--facing east with the Lafayette road in his rear--around -Kelly’s farm, but some distance in the woods. The divisions were in the -following order from left to right: Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, -and Brannan; Brannan was drawn back so far, however, that he could be -available as a reserve and at the same time close enough to advance -quickly to the front line. The right and left were both refused. -Baird had no reserve; but Johnson and Palmer had each a brigade in -reserve. Each division was formed in two lines, and both were protected -by hastily thrown up log breastworks. The artillery was in battery -between brigades; this line was not broken during the battle of the -20th. Reynolds’s line crossed the Lafayette road at Poe’s house, near -Brotherton’s, and from there to Lee and Gordon’s neither of the armies -was in possession of the road. Reynolds had Turchin’s brigade in line -and King’s in reserve. Baird’s left did not reach to the Lafayette -road. Kelly Field, which was a parallelogram about half a mile long -and a quarter of a mile wide, was the storm centre of battle during -September 20. Besides the immense fighting along the main line of log -works, there were five different charges, in rear of the main line from -the south to the north side by five different Union brigades. These -charges were made against the Confederate troops, which had turned on -the left of Baird’s line and gained his rear. The brigades of Stanley, -Van Derveer, Gross, Willich, and Turchin made these charges. - -The right of the Union line on the 20th--from Brannan’s right--was -neither compact nor protected. During the night of the 19th, or early -morning of the 20th, the four divisions of Sheridan, Davis, Wood, and -Van Cleve had been moved to the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge, -a mile or more from the Lafayette road, in order to cover the road -leading from Crawfish Springs to McFarland’s Gap, west of Rosecrans’s -headquarters. General Rosecrans says he rode the line about daylight, -and that he suggested certain changes to McCook, especially that he -keep close to the left, which was not done, however, in time to prevent -disaster. Negley of the Fourteenth Corps, who was in line on the right -adjoining Brannan, was ordered to proceed to Thomas’s left, but only -two brigades, John Beatty’s and Stanley’s, arrived, one at a time; both -were driven away by the enemy. John Beatty’s brigade--which at 8:30 -a. m. was placed on the left of Baird, so as to reach the Lafayette -road--was not fortified; its thin line was swept away at the first -attack by the enemy. Negley was expected to fill this gap with his -whole division, and Thomas sent request after request for Negley’s -division. There was so much re-adjustment going on at the wrong time, -and much of it not going on at any time in the troops under McCook and -Crittenden on the 20th, that it is difficult now to try to place them -up to 11 a. m. Wood, with his two brigades from the reserve, relieved -Negley’s two remaining brigades in the front line, next to Brannan’s -about 9:30 a. m., his brigade being a little withdrawn in echelon. This -was done to enable Negley to take position on Baird’s left. About 11 -a. m. Van Cleve marched to the rear of Wood and had his men lie down. -All these troops on the right--from Reynolds’s right to Sheridan’s the -extreme right of the Union Army--were very thinly drawn out, and did -no good in the day’s fight, with the exception of one full brigade -of Wood’s, namely, Harker’s, one regiment of Buell’s brigade, and a -few regiments from other divisions, which will be mentioned further -on. The troops had done excellent service the day before; but future -events will show that they seemed to be paralyzed, by not having been -well fortified and compactly placed the night before. This mistake had -been corrected to some extent, when the disaster came. On the 20th the -troops faced Longstreet, a most sagacious general, who was exceedingly -energetic in taking advantage of every defect of his opponent’s line -and every blunder in his maneuvers. - -McCook had Davis’s and Sheridan’s divisions still on his extreme right. -Crittenden had Van Cleve’s and Wood’s, although the latter was in the -early morning supposed to be in reserve. Wood came into the front line -as stated, but Van Cleve seems not to have found a place there on the -20th. - - -THE CONFEDERATE LINE ON SEPTEMBER 20 - -The Confederate line was in admirable formation on the morning of the -20th, at a distance of 400 to 1,000 yards east of the Lafayette road. -From its right to its left it may be described as follows: General -Leonidas Polk commanded the right wing which was formed as follows: -Forrest’s cavalry on the extreme right, 3,500 strong, a large part of -it dismounted; and next to him Breckenridge’s division. The cavalry and -two infantry brigades of Breckenridge’s extended beyond Baird’s left; -next in line came Cleburne’s division, in reserve behind Breckenridge -was Walker’s two divisions of five brigades. - -General Longstreet commanded the left wing of the Confederate Army. -This began at Cleburne’s left with Stewart’s division opposite -Palmer’s and Reynolds’s; then came B. R. Johnson’s opposite Brannan’s -and Wood’s; next in line came Hindman’s, just opposite to Davis, -and Sheridan’s, and in reserve behind Hindman’s was Preston’s. In -reserve behind B. R. Johnson’s were Law’s or Hood’s--until Hood was -wounded--and Kershaw’s five brigades in both. Cheatham’s five brigades -were in reserve behind Stewart’s right, but fought only the Union left, -both on the 19th and 20th. At 3:30 p. m. Cheatham went to the extreme -right of the Confederate Army. The strength of the whole Confederate -formation lay in its reserves; they were used with consummate ability. -The only reserves on the right wing of the Union Army at the time -of the Confederate assault was Van Cleve’s division--which as an -organized division did not fight on the 20th--and Wilder’s mounted -brigade. - -Longstreet had brought with him from Virginia two divisions of Hood’s -Corps--McLaws’s and Law’s. Of McLaws’s division only Kershaw’s and -Humphreys’s brigades arrived in time to take part in the battle of -Chickamauga. Law had three brigades in his division. These were -Robertson’s, Benning’s, and another, later commanded by Colonel James -L. Sheffield. - -Bushrod R. Johnson’s division belonged to Buckner’s Corps from East -Tennessee. Buckner’s Corps included also Stewart’s and Preston’s -divisions. These were not together during the battle, but were -presumably under direct command of General Longstreet. The condition -of Leonidas Polk’s old corps, was almost similar. Cheatham’s division -of five brigades, and Hindman’s of three brigades--of Polk’s former -corps--were separated, and operated in different parts of the field. -Daniel H. Hill’s Corps consisted of Cleburne’s and Breckenridge’s -divisions; these acted together, commanded by Hill in person. General -W. H. T. Walker’s Corps was composed of his old division, commanded -by General State Rights Gist, and Liddell’s division consisting of two -brigades--Govan’s and Walthall’s. - -[Illustration: CHICKAMAUGA, MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1863 - -Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 268] - -It will be understood that the Confederate forces were large, strongly -organized, well officered, and extremely well placed on the field. -Since falling back from Tullahoma the following reinforcements had -joined Bragg: Walker’s five brigades from Mississippi, Buckner’s six -brigades from East Tennessee, and Hood’s five brigades from Virginia, -besides a large amount of artillery. The coming of General Longstreet -from Virginia was a distinct assistance to the Confederate Army. He -was a genuine soldier of great ability, and capable of commanding his -soldiers, clearly shown when he handled the left Confederate wing on -the 20th. The contrast between him and Leonidas Polk was very much in -evidence on the 20th. Longstreet was exceedingly strong, while Polk was -very weak. The Confederate right overlapped the Union left and had the -Union right been as compactly drawn towards its left as it should have -been, the Confederate left would also have overlapped that flank. -The Confederate Army facing the Union forces on the morning of the -20th was made up of eleven divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry. -General Rosecrans had no cavalry on his left, and Wheeler’s Confederate -cavalry was at first on the east side of the Chickamauga and afterwards -on the west side, watching Mitchell’s Union horsemen near Crawfish -Springs. - -General Rosecrans had 141 regiments of infantry, 18 of cavalry, and -36 batteries. Bragg had 173 infantry regiments, 11 of cavalry--which -were dismounted and fought as infantry--28 cavalry regiments, and 50 -batteries. - -The Union front of battle on the morning of the 20th, was about two -and a half miles in length. Although Bragg had ordered the attack to -be commenced on his right at daylight, and to be continued towards the -left, yet it was 9:30 o’clock before Breckenridge advanced his three -brigades, Adams’s, Stovall’s, and Helm’s against the left of Baird’s -and John Beatty’s thin line beyond. Adams’s brigade on the right -crossed the Lafayette road, and Stovall struck Beatty. The latter had -to give way, but inflicted terrible punishment on the enemy. - -Part of Stovall’s brigade came against the regular brigade, but made no -impression. Helm, the left of Breckenridge’s line, attacked the right -of the regulars’, Scribner’s line. The Confederate line was shattered -and went to pieces. Helm, in bravely trying to rally his men was -killed; two of Helm’s colonels were also killed, and two others wounded. - -Adams’s brigade was gaining the rear of King, when Stanley’s brigade of -Negley’s long delayed division came into the Kelly field, and formed at -right angles with the road and the Union line swept to the north, past -King’s left, charged into the woods upon Adams’s brigade, and drove -it away. Sometime during their attacks Adams was wounded and taken -prisoner. Breckenridge’s attack was a failure, but the firing by the -infantry and the artillery was terrific while it lasted. Cleburne’s -division advanced while Breckenridge was still in the fight; his attack -covered part of Baird’s and Johnson’s. Cleburne was a very capable -officer; brave to the utmost; still his attack completely failed. -Polk’s brigade of that division assaulted Starkweather. With regard -to this attack Polk states in his official report[20] “My line from -right to left, soon became furiously engaged, the enemy pouring a most -destructive fire of canister and musketry into my advancing line--so -terrible indeed, that my line could not advance in face of it, but -lying down, partially protected by the crest of the hill, we continued -the fight for an hour and a half.” - -Cleburne states in his report[21] “Polk’s brigade and the right of -Wood’s encountered the heaviest artillery fire I have ever experienced. -I was now within short canister range of a line of log breastworks, and -a hurricane of shot and shell swept the woods from the unseen enemy in -my front.” This charge was also a failure, but most destructive to the -Confederates. Wood reported[22] a loss in his brigade of 96 killed and -680 wounded. The great disparity of the wounded, in comparison with the -killed, showed that the Confederate lines did not get very close to -the Union boys. The Union forces were so pleased with having repulsed -so forceful an attack, that they sent forward a strong skirmish line. -General Hill--who was forming from the reserves a stronger second -attack--paused, and concluded he would have to resist an attack from -the Union line. - -Walker’s reserve corps of two divisions of five brigades was therefore -moved forward and distributed along the broken points of the first -line. During the day successive charges were made from Palmer’s -position to the Union left, by ten Confederate brigades along the -Union line, which, however, they could not penetrate, nor could they -get very close to the breastworks. Colquitt, commander of one of -these brigades, fell as well as several of his officers, and General -Deshler of Cleburne’s division was killed. Govan of Walker’s troops -gained the rear of Baird’s division by marching around Baird’s left -and driving away the thin unprotected Union line at that point. This -second advance--which was actually another phase of the continuous -attack from 9:30 to nearly noon--had extended its right much further -beyond the Union left, and by a wide left wheel it had straddled -the Lafayette road. One brigade on the right of the road, another on -the left, boldly threw out skirmishers and advanced towards General -Reynolds’s rear, beyond the Kelly house. It was a very threatening and -dangerous situation. The Confederate line in front--from Baird around -to Brannan--opened a heavy fire upon the barricades. It looked for a -while, as if the movement would succeed in destroying the heretofore -invincible line of General Thomas’s troops; but Thomas saw every -movement and knew the weakness of the left beyond Baird. Brannan had -a reserve brigade--Fred Van Derveer’s--and this arrived just in time -to form in front of the Confederate brigades in the Kelly field. It -changed front under fire, charged the Confederate line, broke it, and -finally drove it clear of the Union left. Then the reserve brigade -returned to a point near the Kelly house. Van Derveer’s brigade had -come, at this time, with an order from General Rosecrans to Brannan, -to report his whole division to General Thomas. It was under the -supposition that Brannan had done so, that Rosecrans soon after -issued the fatal order to Wood to close up on Reynolds. But the enemy -had gained the line, where Beatty had before stood. Palmer sent his -reserve brigade (Grose’s), in accordance with General Thomas’s order; -his brigade formed double lines, and with cheers they charged into -the woods and the enemy was driven away. Then Barnes, of Van Cleve’s -division, was placed on or near the left; the Union left was henceforth -safe. - - -THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK UPON THE UNION RIGHT - -About 11 o’clock the successive attacks of the Confederate divisions -from the left to the right had reached Longstreet’s wing; they were -continued with a charge by Stewart upon Reynolds’s position; it -involved Hazen or Palmer, who had been transferred to the right of -Reynolds and to the left of Brannan. This was the beginning of the -general assault on the Union right, which came so near being disastrous -to General Rosecrans’s army. This attack of Stewart’s took place at the -time when Adams and Stovall of Breckenridge’s division were entering -the open Kelly field upon the Confederate right. General Stewart -acknowledges, in his report, that his charge was repulsed with great -slaughter. The division next to Stewart took up the assault. It was -Bushrod R. Johnson’s supported by Law and Kershaw. Just before this -attack an aide of General Thomas had come to General Rosecrans to ask -again for support on the left. In riding close to the line between -General Reynolds’s and General Brannan’s divisions he observed that -the latter--Brannan being in echelon with Reynolds--did not make a -continuous line, but a broken one. The position of General Brannan was -nevertheless just as effective, and perhaps more so, than if he had -been in the main line. General Thomas J. Wood’s division, which had -just replaced Negley’s division, was next to the right of Brannan but -in the main line; it joined, however, its left to Brannan’s right; -wherefore the aide reported to General Rosecrans that Reynolds’s right -was unprotected. Brannan had been ordered to go to General Thomas’s -left, but on account of being threatened with an attack on his front -he remained with two of his brigades, and sent Van Derveer’s, his -reserve brigade. Rosecrans dictated at once an order to Wood, “to close -upon Reynolds as fast as possible and support him.” Thereupon Wood -withdrew from the line, and marched to the rear of Brannan, just as -the Confederate charge, under B. R. Johnson, reached its old front. -Rosecrans issued his order to Wood supposing that Brannan had gone with -his whole division to the Kelly field. Brannan reported what action -he had taken, and that Reynolds had approved it. Rosecrans gave his -approval instantly; but the fatal order had been issued to Wood some -minutes before, and consequently his division was moving out, just -as the eight brigades made the attack. Longstreet had massed these -brigades opposite the Union centre. They were formed in three lines, -lapped over the right of Brannan and the left of Davis--whose division -was on the right of Wood--and moved close to the gap; they widened -the awful space left by Wood; the attack struck Wood’s rear brigade -(Buell’s) and shattered it. Brannan who was a very able commander threw -back his right, but lost a part of Connell’s brigade in this movement. -With great skill and considerable deliberation he re-established his -line on the Horse Shoe Ridge, near the Snodgrass house, on a line -nearly perpendicular to the one from which he had retreated. Although -Wood’s division was subjected to a heavy attack, he--with the aid of -General Thomas, who had just come from the left wing--succeeded in -establishing his remaining troops in prolongation of Brannan’s new -line, and in reaching towards, but not entirely, Reynolds’s right, -which retired slightly. Hazen’s brigade of Palmer’s division filled -up the gap between Reynolds and Wood, thus making the Union line -a nearly continuous one from Snodgrass Hill to the left of Baird, -where Barnes’s brigade had taken position. The shape of the line was -that of a very flattened crescent, with the convex side towards the -enemy; it was greatly shortened, however, by the losses of the 19th, -and the cutting off on the right of two whole divisions, Davis’s and -Sheridan’s, a part of Wood’s, and some of Van Cleve’s. These were now -beyond the Confederate line and were attacked by heavy forces while -on the march, driving them from the field. Negley with his remaining -brigade was caught in the gap from whence he drifted towards Brannan. -General H. V. Boynton said about this affair on this part of the field: -“Negley, gathering up much artillery, was ordered by General Thomas to -post it on the crest overlooking the field in front of Baird’s left, -but instead he took it to Brannan’s right. This was a good position -for it and it could have been of great service there later, when the -Confederate line made an advance to that point, but he retired with it -in haste toward Rossville, ordering all the artillery to follow him, -before he was attacked.” - -Jefferson C. Davis was a fine and brave officer. He had only two -brigades, Carlin’s and Heg’s; the latter was commanded by Martin, for -Colonel Heg had been mortally wounded the day before. These brigades -had done some wonderful fighting on the day before, when they were -greatly reduced. After the break they could not stand against the -Confederate charge, wherefore they drifted towards Rossville. Davis -and Sheridan were both on the move by the left flank closing up toward -the left, when the Confederate charge struck them. Van Cleve with -his remaining brigades in motion--Barnes had gone to the left--was -thrown into disorder by the rapid dash of some artillery through the -ranks, while a portion of them rallied with Wood. General Lytle of -the Sheridan brigade was killed while trying to rally his troops. -These divisions and brigades went back, together with Wilder’s mounted -brigade, carrying with them Generals Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden, -who at that time were to the right of the break. The line of their -retreat was through McFarland’s Gap in Missionary Ridge, south of -Rossville. These troops did not go further back than to Rossville, -but Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden kept on to Chattanooga. Boynton -says, that Sheridan’s division was in good order when it arrived -at Rossville. Davis tried his best to reform his troops near to -McFarland’s Gap; he did march them back to the field, but reached -it too late in the evening. In the neighborhood of the two gaps, -McFarland’s and Rossville, were some ten thousand fugitive troops; the -way was open for them to have been led either to the right or to the -left of the Union line. But who was there who had rank and authority -enough to lead them, while their army and corps commanders were still -further to the rear? James A. Garfield, Gates P. Thruston, chief of -McCook’s staff, Surgeons Gross and Perkins, medical directors of the -Fourteenth and Twentieth corps, rode back and joined General Thomas. -Sheridan was requested by Thruston, the adjutant-general and chief of -staff to General McCook, at McFarland’s Gap--by a message from General -Thomas--to march to the latter’s relief, but he insisted on marching -back to Rossville and from there taking the Lafayette road to the left -flank of the army.[23] This was a most out of the way road to the -battlefield. Sheridan wanted to report quickly to General Thomas when -the break occurred and was doing that by way of Rossville. It was dark -before he arrived near to the left; the Union troops had then begun the -backwood movement. - -After the second attack on the left by Walker’s and Hill’s corps, -Breckenridge again came in behind Baird, but was repulsed by Van -Derveer, Grose, and Willich. All was quiet on the left, while heavy -firing continued on the right, when General Thomas rode over to the -right to look at matters there. This occurred during the adjustment -after the break, and he placed what remained of Wood’s on the left of -Brannan, the latter having taken his position prior to that on Horse -Shoe Ridge. General Thomas did not return to the left until about 5:30 -p. m. - -There had been no intimation to the four commanders on the left--Baird, -Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds--that everything had not gone well with -the right. They could get no message from Thomas for two or three -hours. At this juncture, fearing another assault by the Confederate -lines, and supposing that Thomas had been cut off from them, Palmer, -Johnson, and Reynolds consulted with Baird and proposed that General -Palmer, as the senior and ranking officer, be placed in command of -their four divisions and march them off the field. General Baird -refusing to join them, prevented this calamity. Had this been done, -the Confederate right wing, confronting them, could have advanced -unimpeded in the rear of the Union troops on Snodgrass Hill, about -three-quarters of a mile directly in the rear of the Union left. -In view of what happened later in the evening with regard to the -successful falling back, it is not necessary to state what a probable -disaster General Baird prevented. - -[Illustration: THE FATAL ORDER TO WOOD, AT CHICKAMAUGA - -Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 270] - -Longstreet followed the drawing back of the Union right, by a right -wheel of his divisions, while keeping Preston’s division in reserve, -probably in order to be ready to repel quickly any attack upon his -left and rear by Davis, Sheridan, Wilder, or R. B. Mitchell. There was -no need to be alarmed, for no troops approached from that quarter. -He largely outflanked and outnumbered the right wing of Rosecrans. -General Garfield had brought an order to Thomas from Rosecrans to take -command of the army, which was left on the field, and to fall back -to Rossville, to form a new line, and to hold back the enemy from -Chattanooga. Thomas made his headquarters near the Snodgrass house and -directed all the movements of the Union forces for the rest of the day. -He determined to hold the present line at least until night, when -the retreat could be made with less danger. To meet the six triumphant -divisions of Longstreet, the available troops in line were Croxton’s -and part only of Connell’s brigades of Brannan’s division; Wood, with -only Harker’s brigade, and one regiment of Buell’s; his other regiments -seemed to have faded away, or been cut off in the break. With Wood’s -line were a part of John Beatty’s brigade, a part of Stanley’s, and the -Twenty-first Ohio of Sirwell’s: these were of Negley’s division, but -Negley was not with them. There were parts of the Ninth and Seventeenth -Kentucky, Forty-fourth Indiana, and Thirteenth Ohio of Van Cleve’s -division, but no division commander with them. - -The Forty-fourth Indiana of Dick’s brigade, and the Seventeenth -Kentucky of Beatty’s brigade, and both of Van Cleve’s--Barnes’s brigade -being still on the left--were the only regiments which deflected from -the fugitives, and fell in with Wood’s and Brannan’s line. - -[Illustration: CHICKAMAUGA, EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1863 - -Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 274] - -Longstreet’s troops attacked these fragments repeatedly with tremendous -force, but were repulsed with great loss. Finally one of Hindman’s -brigades gained a position on Brannan’s right and rear, without -opposition, for no troops were there to oppose them. Negley had held -that point earlier with ample artillery and infantry supports, but he -was then in Rossville. Just at this time, when disaster again seemed -inevitable, General Gordon Granger reported to General Thomas; having -marched his troops with the true instincts of a soldier from McAffee’s -church, in front of Rossville Gap facing Ringgold, to the sound of the -battle. Thomas ordered him to the right of Brannan. Two large brigades, -Whittaker’s and John G. Mitchell’s, were commanded by the gallant -General James B. Steedman; these formed in line, charged up the hill -against that brigade which had gained the flank of Croxton, and drove -it pell-mell back down the hill with great slaughter. At this time, -Van Derveer’s brigade came from the Kelly field, where it had done -such fine service. This brigade formed on Steedman’s left and joined -in the attack. When this combined force struck the enemy the musketry -firing was heavier than any before delivered. It lasted perhaps twenty -minutes. It was immediately in the rear of Baird’s division, on -the left, about three-fourths of a mile away; could not be seen on -account of the woods, but was heard, and it was terrific. Twice Hindman -reformed at a safe distance, and tried to recapture the hill, but being -overwhelmed, abandoned any future efforts; these brigades formed in -prolongation of Brannan’s right and fought until dark. While Sheridan -was marching on the west side of Missionary Ridge towards Rossville, -Granger was marching on the east side of it towards the battle, without -other orders than a general one, given days before to support the army. -They both must have heard the firing, and should have marched to it; -if these fugitive troops could have been brought on the field with a -competent commander, what would the result have been? How could they -keep away? Would not the Confederate Army--which was so nearly used -up--have been glad to fall back to Rome? - -Hindman, in his report[24] speaks in the following words of this -desperate contest on the Union right lasting over four hours, viz.: “I -have never known Federal troops to fight so well.” General Daniel H. -Hill, who commanded a Confederate corps on the army’s right, says in -an article on the battle of Chickamauga, that he never saw the dead -so thick anywhere as he did on the slopes of Snodgrass Hill after the -attacks by Longstreet’s several divisions.[25] - -General Garfield after returning from Rossville to the field, rode -long the lines of his old brigade, now Harker’s of Wood’s division, -cheered the men with muskets and gave by his presence the evidence -that others who did not come back from the rear could have done so. -Longstreet’s report states: “Hood’s column broke the enemy’s line near -the Brotherton house, and made it wheel to the right. In making this -movement Major-General Hood fell severely and it was feared mortally -wounded by a minie ball breaking his thigh.” Law succeeded Hood in -command. Longstreet continues as follows: “About three o’clock in the -afternoon I asked the commanding general for some of the troops of the -Right Wing, but was informed by him that they had been beaten back -so badly that they could be of no service to me.”[26] The figures of -losses on the two wings given later on will show that Bragg was right. - -The forces to resist the whole Confederate Army were but five divisions -in line. The rank and file of these divisions did not know of the -condition on the right, which was very fortunate; they stood and fought -therefore defensively, and with great confidence and bravery. - -The Union line, as now formed, consisted of Thomas’s original five -divisions and such troops as Wood’s one brigade (Harker’s), a fraction -of another (Buell’s) and fractions of regiments which had drifted in, -together with Steedman’s two brigades. It stood off the Confederate -Army until dark. An attack on General Thomas’s left--organized about -three o’clock--must be mentioned, however. It is supposed that this -was made in order to prevent any of the Union troops at that point -from being sent to the right. The attack was a general one and was -easily repulsed. The divisions of Breckenridge, Liddell, Armstrong’s -dismounted cavalry, and Forrest’s artillery across the Lafayette road, -were active. Willich made the fourth charge along the length of Kelly’s -field against these troops across the Lafayette road. At half after -five o’clock all was quiet on the Union left, and confidence filled the -hearts of the troops; but the attacks by Longstreet on the Union right -lasted another hour. - -Thomas had orders from Rosecrans to draw back to Rossville; Granger -wanted him to ignore the orders and hold the field; but Thomas would -not accede to such a request, and began the movement at half past five. -His line was solid and confident, but had very little ammunition, and -no rations. He was largely outnumbered and outflanked at both right and -left; by falling back to Rossville he would gain the fugitive troops, -whom he had been unable to induce to march back to this position; he -would also gain a stronger defensive line, which would better cover -the approaches to the city. He intended to start the movement so -early in the evening that he could get the troops in the proper roads -and directions before night, when darkness would protect them from -danger of attack during the march. Boynton says: “It was in no sense -a military retreat,” it was done “because Chattanooga, and not the -Chickamauga woods, was the objective of the campaign.” Still, it may -also be said, that the Confederate Army was the objective, and that its -destruction was of more importance than the occupation of the city. It -is quite certain that General Thomas would gladly have remained on the -field, if he had been confident that he could have destroyed Bragg’s -army the next day. He did not know at that time that it was badly used -up as later events proved and the movement backwards in the face of a -very vigilant foe, who was constantly advancing in almost full force, -would have been dangerous. - -The dispositions made by General George H. Thomas--before and after -he discovered the break in the Union right--were of the highest -military character; his plan of withdrawal to Rossville was equally -scientific. In his report he says, that after the arrival of Granger’s -forces and their effective attack on the enemy’s troops on the right -of Brannan, every assault of the enemy until nightfall was repulsed -in the most gallant style by the whole line. This was the result of -his skillful placing of troops, his constant watchfulness with regard -to the movements of the enemy, and the excellent counter movements by -the Union forces. But the real cause of the preservation of the army -was the masterful formation of the five divisions remaining under -General Thomas’s command on the morning of the 20th; they were formed -in compact, double lines, protected by log breastworks and had three -or four brigades in reserve; these lines required no re-adjustment and -were not penetrated. His watchfulness of the troops--of which many -formed under his own direction on Snodgrass Hill after the break on the -right--enabled him to point out instantly where they should go, when -Granger and Steedman appeared. Let it be remembered that he was at that -time unaware of the extent of the disaster on the right. In his report -he states, “General Garfield, chief of staff of General Rosecrans, -reached this position about 4 p. m., in company with Lieutenant-Colonel -Thruston, of McCook’s staff, and Captains Gaw and Barker, of my -staff, who had been sent to the rear to bring back the ammunition, if -possible. General Garfield gave me the first reliable information -that the right and centre of our army had been driven, and of its -condition at that time. I soon after received a dispatch from General -Rosecrans, directing me to assume command of all the forces, and, with -Crittenden and McCook, take a strong position, and assume a threatening -attitude at Rossville, sending the unorganized forces to Chattanooga -for reorganization, stating that he would examine the ground at -Chattanooga, and then join me; also that he had sent out rations and -ammunition to me at Rossville.”[27] - -General Thomas, of course, knew before Garfield reached him that -disaster of some kind had occurred on the right; but he did not know -its extent, neither did he know of the departure of the many troops -and high officers from the field. When he received this dispatch from -General Rosecrans he determined to fall back and immediately formulated -his plans. To enable the troops in line to hold the positions they -occupied until the proper time to fall back, he sent two aides to -distribute some ammunition--ten rounds to the man--which Granger had -brought with him. As soon as this was done he sent Captain Willard, -an aide, to direct the division commanders to be prepared to withdraw -their commands as soon as they received orders. At 5:30 p. m. Captain -Barker carried the order to Reynolds to commence the movement. Thomas -does not indicate in his report why he wanted Reynolds to commence the -movement, but it has been shown that his division was the one best -located for the work. A brigade of Confederate troops of Liddell’s -division occupied at that time the woods on the west of the Lafayette -road, between the Union right on Snodgrass Hill and the left around -the Kelly field. It was in the rear of both Union wings. Reynolds’s -position was at the head of these woods, and his troops could fire -into the Confederate lines without danger to the backs of the Union -soldiers. Under Thomas’s direction, Turchin’s brigade moved down the -Lafayette road, and filed to the left; when his rear had cleared -the road and faced to the right on the march, he threw his brigade -upon the Confederate forces and drove them in utter defeat entirely -beyond Baird’s left. This was the fifth charge made during the day -in the same direction along this road, in and adjacent to the Kelly -field. General Thomas posted Reynolds’s two brigades, Turchin’s and -Robinson’s--formerly King’s--together with Johnson’s reserve brigade -and General Willich’s on the ridge road west of the Lafayette road, -near the Mullis farm, in order to cover McFarland’s Gap. Thomas’s -report describes best what followed: “These dispositions being made, -I sent orders to Generals Wood, Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from -their positions. Johnson’s and Baird’s division were attacked at the -moment of retiring, but, by being prepared, retired without confusion -or any serious losses. General Palmer was attacked while retiring. -* * * I then proceeded to Rossville, accompanied by Generals Garfield -and Gordon Granger, and immediately prepared to place the troops in -position at that point.”[28] - -During Baird’s withdrawal he was heavily attacked by the enemy, and -lost a great many who were taken prisoners; some of these remained too -long behind the breastworks, others took a wrong direction in falling -back. The troops which had retreated to Rossville Gap during the day -were reorganized by their officers prior to the falling back of the -main army. Negley’s division was placed directly across the gap, and -the next morning Baird’s was placed behind it; the other divisions on -the right and left (on the crest of the ridge) were stationed with -Minty’s cavalry in front of the gap, about one mile and a half on the -Ringgold road. General R. B. Mitchell’s cavalry was on the Union right -covering McFarland’s Gap, and extending his right to the Chattanooga -Creek. McCook’s Corps was in line about a mile behind him. - -On September 21, General N. B. Forrest advanced at Rossville some -Confederate cavalry close enough to throw a shell or two into a Union -wagon train and Minty’s advance Union cavalry on the Ringgold road -had a little skirmish. But the Confederate Army was not advancing; -apparently it did not intend to attack the position at this point. -In fact, General Bragg did not know of the retirement of the Union -Army until the 21st, and he did not order an advance. The Confederate -Army lay still on the field during the 21st, and most of the 22nd. -Therefore General Thomas advised General Rosecrans to concentrate the -troops at Chattanooga, and this was done on the night of September -21, in a most admirable manner under Thomas’s direction. Brannan’s -division--in order to cover and protect the movement--was posted -half way between Rossville and Chattanooga. Nearly all the infantry -and artillery were in or around the city by 7 a. m. of the 22nd. The -different organizations were marched directly to positions previously -assigned them. - -Baird’s division (now Rousseau’s), with Minty’s cavalry still in rear -of it, brought up the rear, and did not arrive in the entrenchments -around the city until late in the evening of the 22nd. General -Rousseau, who was absent from early in August, joined the army again -at Rossville on September 21, and assumed command of his old division. -General Baird was later assigned to another division at Chattanooga. - -In the forenoon of the 22nd, Cheatham’s Confederate division marched -to the neighborhood of Chickamauga station, and took a road leading -thence to the top of Missionary Ridge; it was followed by the rest of -Polk’s Corps on the 23rd. On the same day, Hill’s and Longstreet’s -corps followed on different roads and slowly formed their line on top -of the ridge. Longstreet’s and Hill’s was thrown across the valley to -the foot of Lookout; their left was on the top of Lookout Mountain and -their right on the northeast nose of Missionary Ridge, abutting on the -Tennessee River, but the main line did not reach to the river. Their -camps were principally located in the Chickamauga Valley on the east -side of the ridge, where they were protected from observation by the -Union forces. - - -WISCONSIN TROOPS AT CHICKAMAUGA - -There were five infantry regiments from Wisconsin in the battle of -Chickamauga, viz.: the First, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-first, and -Twenty-fourth. The First and Twenty-first were parts of the Second -Brigade, commanded by General John C. Starkweather--formerly Colonel -of the First Wisconsin Infantry--of the First Division, commanded by -General Absalom Baird, of the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General -George H. Thomas. They were actively engaged near the extreme left on -both days of the battle. When Baird’s division on the morning of the -19th advanced from Kelly’s house on the Lafayette road, Starkweather’s -brigade was in reserve behind the other two brigades of the division. -His brigade was formed in two lines, the first composed of the First -Wisconsin on the right and the Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania on the -left, with the Fourth Indiana Battery between the two wings. The -Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry and Twenty-fourth Illinois Infantry -formed the rear line. Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Bingham commanded -the First, and Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison C. Hobart the Twenty-first. -Having advanced about a mile through the woods, driving the enemy’s -skirmishers, Starkweather moved to Thomas’s left by the order of the -General, in order to relieve Croxton’s brigade of Brannan’s division, -reported to be out of ammunition. General Starkweather seems to have no -sooner taken position here than the enemy attacked in such overwhelming -numbers as to force him back. He retreated to a ridge in the rear of -his left; leaving his battery temporarily in the possession of the -enemy. Very soon the enemy was struck on his flank and rear by General -Johnson’s division of McCook’s Corps and forced back; the battery was -then recovered. - -In reforming the lines late in the afternoon, Starkweather’s brigade -was placed on the left of Johnson’s division; it took part in the night -attack by the Confederate General Cleburne, and was under fire during -the whole of the battle of the 19th. On the morning of the 20th it -formed the right of Baird’s position in the woods east of the Kelly -field, and was in one of the most exposed positions; this brought it -again on the left of Johnson’s division. The Fourth Indiana Battery had -two guns in the centre of the brigade and two upon the left. General -Starkweather in his official report says: “This position was held and -retained during the whole day under repeated attacks from the enemy -in heavy columns supported with batteries, repulsing and driving the -enemy back from time to time; driving the enemy also back from the -extreme left with the artillery. * * * While holding this position the -ammunition of my first line was expended, and most of the second line, -together with all the ammunition of the battery, except three rounds -of canister.”[29] He retired with the rest of Baird’s division in the -evening of the 20th to Rossville, thence to Chattanooga on the 22nd. -In the retirement, Lieutenant-Colonel Hobart, eight other commissioned -officers, and 67 men of the Twenty-first Wisconsin were captured by the -enemy. The loss of the First Wisconsin was 188 killed, wounded, and -missing; the latter being 77. The officers killed were Captains Abner -O. Heald, and William S. Mitchell; Lieutenants James S. Richardson, and -Charles A. Searles. Of the Twenty-first the loss was 121, of these 76 -were missing. The First seems to have gone into the battle with 391, -and the Twenty-first with 369 men. - -The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry--commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John H. -Ely--was in Scribner’s brigade of Baird’s division. The history of its -fighting is almost identical with that of the First and Twenty-first. -On the 20th the Tenth Wisconsin Infantry was immediately on the -left of Starkweather. Colonel Ely, Major McKercher and several other -officers, together with a large number of men were captured in falling -back (by orders), on the evening of the 20th. They, by mistake, took -the wrong direction, going too far to the right, as they faced the -rear, and thus ran into the enemy. Its loss was a total of 211, but -145 of these were missing. Captain J. W. Roby, who made the report -says: “Monday morning September 21st we numbered three officers and 26 -men.” Lieutenant-Colonel Ely’s name appears among those killed; the -other officers killed were Captain George M. West and Lieutenant Robert -Rennie. - -The Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry served in the Third brigade, Davis’s -division of the Twentieth Corps. This brigade was commanded by Colonel -Hans C. Heg until he was killed on the 19th; and afterwards by Colonel -John A. Martin. This regiment fought most gallantly with Davis’s -division on the 19th, when, according to their official report, the -loss was 7 officers and 59 enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing. -It will be remembered that on the 20th General Davis’s division was -cut off on the right by the break at Wood’s division, and that it, -after some desultory fighting, retired to McFarland’s Gap. The total -loss of the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was 111, of which 55 men were -captured or missing. The officers killed were Colonel Hans C. Heg, -Captains Hans Hanson, Henry Hauff, John M. Johnson, and Lieutenant -Oliver Thompson. - -The Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Infantry was in General Lytle’s brigade -of the First Division of the Twentieth Corps. This regiment, with the -brigade to which it was attached, occupied the entrenchments at Lee -and Gordon’s Mill on the afternoon of the 19th, where it relieved -General Thomas J. Wood’s division; it remained here all afternoon under -a little artillery fire from the enemy, which did no harm, however. -At 3 a. m. on the 20th it went to a point near General Rosecrans’s -headquarters, near the Widow Glenn’s house; at 10:30 a. m. it double -quicked--under a terrific fire from the enemy--to the point where -General Lytle was killed; it fought here for thirty minutes driving -the enemy, but was soon outflanked by Hindman’s troops coming toward -its left flank from the celebrated break. The official report of its -commander (Major Carl Von Baumbach), from which the foregoing facts -are gleaned, says further: “We retreated in some disorder; but quickly -reformed on a hill some 400 yards to the rear. Our brave and gallant -commander, Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. West, being among the missing, I -assumed command.” This regiment bivouaced for the night at Rossville; -its loss was 3 officers and 69 men killed and wounded, and 20 missing; -Captain Gustavus Goldsmith was killed. The Major in his report makes -especial mention of Lieutenant Thomas E. Balding, acting adjutant, for -his gallant conduct. - -The First Wisconsin Cavalry--under command of Colonel Oscar H. -LaGrange--was a part of the Second Brigade, of Colonel Edward M. -McCook’s cavalry division. During the campaign, preceding the battle, -this regiment performed the usual duties of cavalry in reconnoitering, -picketing, leading in advance of the marching column of infantry, and -generally acting with the rest of the cavalry, as the eyes of the army. -On the 19th it was stationed on the right of the army to watch the -enemy’s cavalry, which kept on the east side of the Chickamauga in the -movement back to Rossville, and thence into Chattanooga, it protected -the trains and rear of the army. Its loss was 2 men wounded and 4 -missing. - -There were three Wisconsin light batteries with the Army of the -Cumberland, in the battle of Chickamauga: the Third, Fifth, and Eighth. -The Third Battery--commanded by Lieutenant Courtland Livingston--was -attached to Van Cleve’s division of Crittenden’s Corps. Captain L. H. -Drury of this battery, was chief of artillery of the division; he was -severely wounded in a skirmish several days before the battle. This -battery followed the fortunes of its division; but there seems to be no -definite report by its commanding officer. Its losses were 2 killed, 12 -wounded and 12 missing, out of an aggregate of 119. - -The Fifth Wisconsin Battery, commanded by Captain George Q. Gardner -was attached to the First Brigade, commanded by Colonel P. Sidney Post -of General Jefferson C. Davis’s division of the Twentieth Corps. This -brigade was guarding the supply train, and was not engaged in the -battle, and this battery had no losses. The brigade commander, in his -official report, commends Captain Gardner for great zeal and ability in -the management of the battery. - -The Eighth Wisconsin Battery--commanded by Lieutenant John D. -McLean--was attached to Colonel Heg’s brigade of Davis’s division of -McCook’s Twentieth Corps. The chief of artillery of Davis’s division -reports, that the movement of the artillery in the Chickamauga woods -was not deemed practicable; therefore, this battery did not become -engaged, and had no losses. - -The Chickamauga campaign proper was now ended. It formed the second -step in the campaign from Murfreesboro to Chattanooga; the Tullahoma -campaign being the first. It is true, the city was now occupied by the -Army of the Cumberland, but its possession was not secure as long as -the Confederate Army lay within two or three miles, and held the city’s -most available lines of supply by the river and the river road, between -Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Therefore, another conflict was necessary, -which would constitute the third step in the great campaign. An -account of that struggle will include the coming of reinforcements to -the Union Army; the opening of what the men in the ranks called, “the -cracker line;” the reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland; and -an account of the four battles of Wauhatchie, Orchard Knob, Lookout -Mountain, and Missionary Ridge. But before that is attempted, it -will be necessary to make some observations on the late battle of -Chickamauga. - -The Army of the Cumberland--or rather that part of it which now -occupied the city--was reduced by the Chickamauga battle to an -estimated aggregate of 35,000. This estimate excluded perhaps the -cavalry. Its total losses, killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the -Chickamauga campaign reached 13,615. A large number of sick, besides -the wounded, were in hospitals. But the Confederate losses were at -least 5,374 more than those of the Union Army. General Longstreet, in -his book, _From Manassas to Appomatox_, claims that the Confederate -force at Chickamauga was somewhat less than 60,000 men. The Confederate -records are so defective that it is largely an estimate to give -their numbers or losses. General H. V. Boynton estimates the number -at very much more than 60,000. There is no doubt that Bragg actually -outnumbered Rosecrans on the field by several thousand troops, perhaps -in the proportion of 60,000 to 50,000. - -The Union Army captured 2,003 prisoners, and lost 4,774. Of the latter -2,500 were wounded and left on the field when the army fell back to -Rossville. The terrible fighting which took place is shown by the -number of killed and wounded on each side. Longstreet says in his book, -that Bragg’s killed and wounded amounted to 16,986, but the official -returns make them about 1,100 less, or 15,881. The official returns -of the army give the Union losses of killed and wounded 11,338. The -Confederate loss was greater in killed and wounded than at Gettysburg; -and the largest the enemy had in a single battle. Attention is called -to the fact, that the numbers engaged at Gettysburg were about 80,000 -on each side; and that the battle lasted three days. - -The killed and wounded in some battles of the war are shown in the -following table: - - Union Confederate - Shiloh, Tenn. 10,162 9,735 - Second Bull Run 10,199 9,108 - Fredericksburg, Va. 10,884 4,664 - Chancellorsville, Va. 11,368 10,746 - Gettysburg, Pa. 17,567 15,298 - Chickamauga, Ga. 11,409 15,881 - Stone’s River 9,532 9,239 - Antietam, Md. 11,657 11,234 - -In every one of these battles the Union loss was greater than the -Confederate, except at Chickamauga; yet Shiloh, Gettysburg, and Stone’s -River are recorded as Union victories. The Confederate loss at Antietam -was much smaller than that given above, which includes Harper’s Ferry, -South Mountain, Crampton’s Gap, and Shepardstown. The prisoners -captured are excluded from the above list, because only the killed and -wounded indicate the intensity of the fighting. - -The Confederate’s large losses at Chickamauga show plainly the active -musketry of the Union troops, their good marksmanship, and the -difference (in the number of casualties) between making and receiving -attacks. On the second day the Union troops remained in line and -received the attacks of the Confederates. At Gettysburg the Union -forces did the same thing during the last two days. Those on the left -at Chickamauga were protected by breastworks, and suffered but little -loss on the 20th; while they inflicted very heavy punishment on the -Confederates; for instance, Hill’s Corps of the Confederate right lost -2,990 out of 8,894; Jackson’s brigade of Cheatham’s division lost 35 -per cent. of his force, and the losses in Govan’s brigade exceeded 50 -per cent. On the Union side Steedman, while attacking the Confederate -troops--which had gained an enfilading position and were about to -attack the right flank of Brannan--lost in this assault and in the -subsequent position which his troops occupied, 1,787 out of 3,700 -in about four hours. The loss is fearful, when assaults are made on -protected lines, or on points held with difficult approaches. On the -Confederate left Benning’s brigade of Hood’s division lost 56.6 per -cent.; Gregg’s brigade of B. R. Johnson’s lost 44.4 per cent. Taking -Longstreet’s estimate of 16,986 killed and wounded, and adding to it -the number of prisoners captured, namely, 2,003, the total Confederate -loss aggregates 18,989. It is officially established that the Union -loss was 11,338 in killed and wounded; its loss in prisoners was 4,774; -but 2,500 of them were wounded and were left on the battlefield. It -is reasonable to suppose that these wounded left on the field were -reported as wounded by their company officers, and are included in the -official returns of the 11,338. - -The historian will point out sharply the immense benefit to the Union -Army derived from the log works and the compact lines of the four -divisions under General Thomas on the 20th. The conclusion is a fair -one, that the whole line ought to have been similarly fortified; -there was ample supply of timber along the line to provide for such -protection. Of the five divisions under General Thomas’s command on -the 19th and on the 20th, Brannan’s was the only one which fought -both days without works; on the 19th none of them fought behind any -entrenchments, yet they fought against six Confederate divisions, viz.: -two of Walker’s corps, two of Cheatham’s, Cleburne’s, and Stewart’s. -On the 20th Brannan was on the right and did not fight any of the -Confederate troops, which Baird’s, Johnson’s, Palmer’s, Reynolds’s, -and his own divisions had fought on the 19th. Van Derveer’s brigade -of Brannan’s division made one charge, however, along the Kelly field, -against two brigades of Breckenridge’s; then returned to the right. -But it must be noticed that Breckenridge was not in the fight of the -19th. On the 20th Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds fought behind -breastworks all day the same divisions they had fought the day before -without breastworks, and also Breckenridge’s in addition. It is true -they were assisted a little by two brigades of Negley’s and one of Van -Cleve’s on the left of the breastworks. In addition to the Confederate -infantry divisions mentioned, there was also Forrest’s cavalry of -3,500, which would more than offset any assistance these four Union -divisions had received from other troops on the 20th. The following -table will show the losses in killed and wounded of the divisions on -both sides, with the exception of prisoners captured during the two -days of battle in and around the Kelly field. - -The figures are taken from the official returns: - - Union Confederate - Brannan--Three Brigades 1,977 Walker--Five Brigades 2,290 - Baird--Three Brigades 975 Cheatham--Five Brigades 1,843 - Johnson--Three Brigades 1,088 Cleburne--Three Brigades 1,743 - Palmer--Three Brigades 1,165 Stewart--Three Brigades 1,674 - Reynolds--Two Brigades 778 Breckenridge--Three Brigades 1,075 - ------ ------ - Total 5,983 Total 8,625 - -There were 14 Union brigades and 19 Confederate. It will be seen -that Brannan, who was not protected by works on the 20th, lost about -800 more than the highest loss of any of the Union divisions, which -were protected. That is a practical illustration of the value of the -precautions thus taken by the protected troops. Estimating Brannan’s -loss on the 20th at 900, his loss on the 19th would be 1,077. This -would reduce the total loss in the Union column above to 5,083. -Considering that the Confederate divisions mentioned above encountered -no other Union troops during the battle, except those five divisions -mentioned, it will be understood that the five Union divisions by -incurring a loss of 5,083 killed and wounded, inflicted a loss on the -enemy of 8,625. Forrest’s loss does not appear but should be added -to the latter; let this item be offset, however, by the losses to -Beatty’s Stanley’s and Barnes’s brigades in their assistance on the -left of Baird. - -We will make a similar comparison of the losses on the right of the -Union, and the left of the Confederate Army: - - Union - Steedman 1,174--Two Brigades - Sheridan 1,090 - Davis 944--Two Brigades - Wood 876--Two Brigades - Van Cleve 660 - Negley 496 - Brannan (estimate) 900 - ------ - Total 6,140 - - Confederate - Hood } - Hindman } Six Divisions, 6,881 (estimated) - Buckner } - Preston } - -The estimated Confederate loss given above has been made up in the -following manner. The official Confederate loss is given by Colonel W. -F. Fox in his _Regimental Losses in the Civil War_ as 15,881 killed and -wounded at Chickamauga, the Confederate loss of the troops opposed to -the above named Union divisions can be found by adding to 8,625--the -Confederate losses in the first table given above--the estimated loss -of the Confederate cavalry, probably enough to bring the figures to -9,000, and deducting that from 15,881, the total Confederate loss is -secured. The result makes 6, 881 killed and wounded--as given in the -last table--by the seven Union divisions mentioned above, at a cost to -the latter of 6,140 killed and wounded. Longstreet gives in his report -his loss at 7,594 killed and wounded; deducting Stewart’s loss from -this sum leaves 5,920 as the loss of the above mentioned Confederate -forces. This makes the contrast between the two tables still greater. - -These figures emphasize the deadly fighting in that great battle, -and they are more eloquent of the valor of American soldiers than -words of song or oratory. They emphasize also the value of defensive -breastworks, in comparison with fighting unprotected. - -The Union troops expended 2,650,000 musket cartridges in hitting the -15,881 Confederate killed and wounded; some of them were, however, -wounded by artillery. It appears as if it took about 150 infantry -cartridges to hit one man. The expenditure was 650,000 more cartridges -than at Stone’s River; but then 6,642 more of the Confederates were -struck at Chickamauga, which shows that the firing was much more -destructive. - -General Rosecrans states:[30] “The fight on the left after 2 p. m., -was that of the army. Never, in the history of this war at least have -troops fought with greater energy and determination. Bayonet charges, -often heard of but seldom seen, were repeatedly made by brigades and -regiments in several of our divisions.” - -At 2 p. m. on September 21, C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, -sent a dispatch from Chattanooga to the Secretary of War. It contained -the following statements: “Thomas, finding himself cut off from -Rosecrans and the right, at once brought his seven divisions into -position for independent fighting. Refusing both his right and left, -his line assumed the form of a horse-shoe posted along the slope and -crest of a partly wooded ridge. He was soon joined by Granger from -Rossville, with the brigade of McCook and division of Steedman, and -with these forces firmly maintained the fight till after dark. Our -troops were as immovable as the rocks they stood on. The enemy hurled -against them repeatedly the dense columns which had routed Davis and -Sheridan in the morning, but every onset was repulsed with dreadful -slaughter. Falling first on one and then another point of our lines, -for hours the rebels vainly sought to break them. Thomas seemed to have -filled every soldier with his own unconquerable firmness, and Granger, -his hat torn by bullets, raged like a lion wherever the contest was -hottest with the electrical courage of a Ney. * * * When night fell -this body of heroes stood on the same ground they had occupied in the -morning their spirit unbroken, but their numbers greatly diminished. -* * * The divisions of Wood, Johnson, Brannan, Palmer, Reynolds, and -Baird, which never broke at all, have lost very severely.”[31] He -should have added that they inflicted greater loss upon the enemy than -any of the other divisions. The discouraged spirit of the Confederate -Army at the close of the battle was sufficiently apparent when the -forces under Thomas’s command were able--after the arrival of General -Gordon Granger’s troops--to stop the enemy’s further successes. It is -evident that the fighting spirit was gone from Bragg’s army since, -although they discovered the falling back, they did not approach -Rossville Gap on the 21st with a considerable force, nor seriously -interfere in the backward movement to Chattanooga, not even trying to -capture a wagon, mule, or horse, although its great cavalry leader, -Forrest and his troopers, were in force close to Rossville Gap. It -was more paralyzed than the Union Army. General Daniel H. Hill, who -commanded a Confederate corps on the right in the battle, states in -the article referred to before: “There was no more splendid fighting -in ’61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than -was displayed in those bloody days of September, ’63. But it seems -to me that the _elan_ of the Southern soldier was never seen after -Chickamauga--that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone -forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two -of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. * * * He fought stoutly to -the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and -without the enthusiasm of hope. That ‘barren’ victory sealed the fate -of the Southern Confederacy.”[32] - -If the Army of the Cumberland accomplished so much at Chickamauga in -spite of certain mistakes, after having penetrated to the centre of the -Confederate territory, what might not have been done, if the right of -the Union line had been properly placed and protected during the night -of the 19th, and if the disastrous order to Wood had not been issued? -The withdrawal of Wood from the line--just before Bushrod Johnson -advanced against the centre--cost the Union fighting line 10,000 men, -and caused the withdrawal, some hours later, of the Union Army to -Rossville. Whether Wood interpreted that order correctly, the fact is -that the order should never have been issued. The movement of closing -in towards the left and of throwing the right further back, should have -been done hours before. One of Mitchell’s cavalry divisions should have -been placed on the Union left during the night of the 19th. - -It must be conceded that Brannan’s division was the most active in -the battle. It was well managed, but its loss in killed and wounded -was greater than that of any other Union division. Brannan lost in -killed and wounded 1,977, with 214 missing. His division fought bravely -under his skillful management, yet he was unprotected on both days. -Negley’s loss was 496 killed and wounded, the smallest loss of all. The -following officers went through the battle with great credit, viz.: -Generals Thomas, Granger, Steedman, Brannan, Baird, Johnson, Palmer, -Reynolds; and Brigade-Commanders Hazen, Harker, Van Derveer, Croxton, -Whittaker, John C. Mitchell, Willich, and Turchin. - -If a real soldier, like Longstreet, had been in command of the -Confederate right and had found upon advancing against the Union line, -that two brigades lengths extended beyond the Union left, he would -certainly have made more out of such a condition than did Breckenridge -or Leonidas Polk. - -General D. H. Hill, in his report[33] discusses the situation as -follows: “The important results effected by two brigades on the flank -proved that, had our army been moved under cover of the woods a mile -farther to the right, the whole Yankee position would have been turned -and an almost bloodless victory gained. A simple reconnoisance before -the battle would have shown the practicability of the movement and -the advantage to be gained by it.” Hill was in command on that flank -and should have acted in accordance with his understanding of the -situation, or at least reported the facts to his superior. This was -what Rosecrans was anxious about when he hastened troops from the right -to the left. If Sheridan could have reached Thomas before Longstreet -cut him off in the act of double-quicking toward the left flank, what -would have happened? - -General Thomas’s dispositions to protect his left showed military -genius of the highest order, and General Baird greatly assisted him in -this matter. This was only one instance, however, of General Thomas’s -many equally meritorious tactics in this great battle. He rose to the -highest point in the estimation of both officers and men. - -Both days’ fighting illustrates the fact that when troops are -outflanked or attacked in the rear, however brave they may be in other -positions relative to the enemy, they will as a rule go to pieces. It -was repeatedly shown on both sides, especially on the 19th, during -the battle, that the veteran troops as well as the new regiments, -would become disheartened and confused in such a position; many of the -regiments on the left during the second day, who did not flinch when -attacked in flank and rear on the day before, then went to pieces. - -The protected troops on the Union left fought through the entire day of -the 20th, entirely unconscious that they were frequently surrounded not -only in front and rear of their own line, but that the two flanks of -the army were only about three-fourths of a mile apart, although in the -morning they were two and a half miles apart. At noon the Union right -was contracted, and thrown back against the left. The order to retreat -late in evening of the 20th came as a surprise and shock to these -troops, who had been repulsing the enemy all day with comparative ease. -Thousands of musket bearers were so stiff and sore from the two days’ -conflict and the marches over the mountains during the preceding days, -that when a regiment lying down on the evening of the 20th attempted to -rise there was a distinct creaking of bones and an accompanying groan, -slight, but perceptible. Many of them while moving back to Rossville -at night, took the desperate chance of lying down for a nap in the -woods by the roadside, intending to rest for an hour or two and then -join their regiments again before daylight; but hundreds of these awoke -to find it was already daylight and many were captured by the enemy’s -cavalry. - -The Confederate Army itself did not advance from the battlefield until -the 23rd; only a small part leaving on the 22nd. The fact is that the -Confederate Army was much more used up than the Union Army; General -Bragg said to General Longstreet on the 20th that his troops upon -his right were used up.[34] The same Confederate troops which had -penetrated the line and driven Davis, Sheridan, and others from the -field, were so roughly handled by Brannan and Granger on Snodgrass -Hill that they could not be brought forward for another attack. The -slowness with which the Confederate Army moved to their positions -around Chattanooga proves that they were practically defeated. At the -time the orders were sent to the divisions behind the log works on -the left to prepare for withdrawal, their commanders sent word back -to General Thomas that there was no reason for them to retreat; they -had been, and were at that moment repulsing easily every assault. -They did not know of the disaster to the right, caused by Wood’s -withdrawal, nor did General Baird and his brigade commanders know of -the movements of either Union or Confederate forces until after the -retreat. Many writers have expressed the opinion that the Union Army -should not have retreated. But to a soldier who was present on the -field and knew the facts--such as the absence of the commander of the -army; his order sent from the far rear to fall back to Rossville; the -absence of ammunition and rations; the utterly exhausted condition of -the rank and file by the superhuman exertions of the two days’ fighting -and the preceding hard marching; the fear that if the Union Army -remained, the Confederate Army might yet wedge its way between it and -Chattanooga, the Union commander not being aware at that time of the -exhausted and discouraged condition of the Confederate Army--it seems -that the falling back in the way and at the time it did was the correct -thing. At least it seems as if Thomas had really nothing else to do -than to fall back when the order from General Rosecrans was received. -Had General Thomas been the commander of the army, it might have been -different. - -The Union cavalry did not properly cooperate with the other arms of the -Union forces. Forrest, with his large Confederate cavalry force, was -close to the right of the Confederate Army, and did fine service; the -force was equal to the infantry in number. Forrest should have been -opposed by a division of the Union cavalry. Only one cavalry brigade -was needed at Crawfish Springs; the other cavalry brigade together -with Wilder’s mounted infantry which closed up on the right of McCook, -should have given better service at a time when it was most needed. -This was not the fault of the cavalry commander, for he only obeyed -orders from his superiors. In a dispatch to General R. B. Mitchell, -the commander of the cavalry, at 7:15 p. m. September 20, General -Rosecrans said, “Had you been on our right today you could have charged -the enemy’s flank, and done much incalculable mischief.” Why was not -his cavalry as close to the Union right flank as Forrest’s was to -the Confederate right flank? Mitchell’s cavalry was too far away to -be effective, when disaster overtook the wing: it was supposed to be -protecting, but it was farther away from Snodgrass Hill on the right -than were the forces of Gordon Granger, at McAffee’s church on the -left. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -_The Occupation and Battles of Chattanooga_ - - -When the Army of the Cumberland fell back from Chickamauga and -Rossville to Chattanooga, the first and most important thing to do -was to quickly fortify against attack. The troops marched directly to -the places assigned them, and when all were in place, the lines half -encircled the city, both flanks terminating at the river. McCook was on -the right, Thomas next, and Crittenden on the left. The troops began -at once the work of throwing up the ordinary entrenchments; these were -from time to time strengthened until satisfactory. Two forts had been -partially completed by the enemy; these were finished and occupied by -both artillery and infantry. The army was drawn in close around the -city; the point of Lookout Mountain and its slopes beyond Chattanooga -Creek were left to the enemy. This gave the Confederate Army command of -the river, the rail and wagon roads (parallel with the river), between -Chattanooga, Bridgeport, and Stevenson. The only other practicable road -to the bases of supplies was over Walden’s Ridge on the north side -of the river, a distance of 60 miles by wagon; thus it became very -difficult to furnish more than half or three-quarters rations to the -men, and only very little forage could be furnished to the animals. The -road mentioned was so steep and bad that a team of four or six mules -would consume almost the entire load of feed in bringing the load and -in returning for another. - -General Bragg deemed the occupancy of his main line along Missionary -Ridge--across the valley to Lookout Mountain, thence on the south side -of the river by small detachments at different points--to Bridgeport -sufficient to starve out the army in Chattanooga. Meanwhile he sent -Wheeler’s cavalry to the north side, in order to raid the line of -supplies. Wheeler burned 300 wagons in the Sequatchie Valley and went -on north doing what damage he could. Fearing that Bragg might follow -Longstreet’s advice and cross the river east of Chattanooga with a -large part of his army, Rosecrans soon completed an inside works of -circumvallation by which ten thousand men might be able to hold the -city, while he might be obliged to protect his base of supplies by -marching the rest of his army to meet such a situation. That Bragg -did not undertake an enterprise of this character was further proof -of the used-up condition of his army, the result of the late battle -of Chickamauga. Bragg’s reasoning regarding his ability to starve the -forces in the city was good only on the supposition that the Government -at Washington would fail to send sufficient reinforcements to protect -the rear, and to raise “The Siege of Chattanooga;” it was not more -than a semi-siege, however, and has been so called by some authors. -If Bragg’s army had occupied both sides of the river and practically -surrounded the city, as the German troops surrounded Paris in the -Franco-German War of 1871, then it could have been called a siege. Of -course the situation of the Union Army was critical, not only here -in the fortified city, but ever since it crossed the Tennessee River -during the campaign preceding the battle of Chickamauga. As before -mentioned, General Rosecrans estimated on September 23, 1863, that he -had about 35,000 troops in the entrenchments; the cavalry and Wilder’s -brigade of mounted infantry were then on the north side of the river -and guarded the crossings for a considerable distance, both above and -below. Union reinforcements had been ordered both from the east and -from the west; but Burnside, who commanded in East Tennessee, was -asking at the same time for help at Knoxville, instead of being able -to send any succor to Rosecrans. Before the battle of Chickamauga -reinforcements had been ordered from the Army of the Tennessee--at -that time on or near the Mississippi at Memphis--and from Burnside, -but none had arrived. After the great battle and the falling back -of Rosecrans, the commander did not need to urge the President and -Secretary of War to be convinced, that unless they really desired to -lose Tennessee and all that had so far been gained in the department of -the Cumberland, other troops must be sent with the greatest celerity. -Two corps from the Army of the Potomac were ordered to the battlefield; -the Eleventh commanded by General O. O. Howard, and the Twelfth under -General H. W. Slocum; both under the command of General Joseph Hooker. -General W. T. Sherman was also to reinforce the Union Army with the -Fifteenth Corps, and one division of the Seventeenth from the Army of -the Tennessee. In the meantime every exertion was made by the troops -present to hold the city at all hazards. When Wheeler captured and -burned the 300 wagons near Anderson’s cross roads, in the Sequatchie -Valley, Colonel E. M. McCook with the First Wisconsin Cavalry, the -Second and Fourth Indiana cavalry and a section of artillery started -from Bridgeport up the Sequatchie Valley. Retarded by an incessant -rain, he was in time to see the smoke only of the burning wagons; he -made a charge and drove a detachment of the enemy’s troops past the -fire upon their main body. He followed this Confederate division--which -was commanded vigorously by Martin and Wheeler--out of the valley, -captured a number of soldiers and 800 mules and saved some of the -wagons. Wheeler reached McMinnville in time to capture the garrison and -burn the supplies. He was off toward Murfreesboro before the arrival -of Crook and his command, who had taken up the pursuit. The Union -cavalry corps, commanded by R. B. Mitchell, with McCook’s division, -joined Crook at Murfreesboro and saved that place from capture. They -followed Wheeler so persistently and fought him so successfully that -they prevented the destruction of the railroad, but were unable to -save the telegraph lines. Wheeler crossed back at Rogersville to the -south of the Tennessee; Mitchell followed and captured at that point a -large amount of Confederate cotton and destroyed it. Mitchell prevented -the Confederate advance to Winchester and Decherd after having heard -at Huntsville, Alabama, that Roddey’s Confederate cavalry was moving -towards these cities, having been forced to recross the river. Bragg’s -intention was to destroy Rosecrans’s communications and to force him to -abandon Chattanooga. The maintenance of the railroad back to Nashville -was of vital importance to the Union Army. Wheeler’s loss on this raid -was according to the estimate of General Crook, 2,000 men and 6 pieces -of artillery. These fatalities made the Confederate commander more -cautious. Crook’s loss was only 14 killed and 97 wounded. Wheeler’s -raid and the Union pursuit, are specimens of the kind of warfare -which cavalry are expected to make, showing the terrible destruction -of men and horses, the untiring marches, and watchfulness necessary -in a field so extensive and difficult as that of the department of -Cumberland. It would have been much more economical and effective, if -the War Department had previously protected the railway with sufficient -infantry, as it now intended to do, than to protect it by an ordinary -force of cavalry. The Department did adopt the plan of protecting the -railway with infantry, when Hooker came with a division; this mode was -most effectively used also in 1864. - -Although the railroad from Nashville to Stevenson was being maintained -and supplies were accumulated at the latter city, yet the necessity -of hauling supplies by wagons over such an extended and precipitous -road as the one over Walden’s Ridge, and the destruction of so many -wagons by Wheeler, told heavily on the devoted troops in the entrenched -city. The rains were heavy and continuous during the early part of -October, making the roads almost impassable in some places. The trips -to Bridgeport seemed gradually to lengthen, the mules became thinner, -and so the rations had to be reduced from time to time, until men, -horses, and mules were in very sore straits. The artillery horses -and all extra horses of mounted officers, that had not already died -from starvation, were sent back to Bridgeport or Stevenson to be kept -there until the strain could be relieved sometime in the indefinite -future. Yet no thought of retreat or surrender entered the minds of the -devoted soldiers. The fact that the army in the surrounding hills was -in a worse condition--too weak to take any advantage of the situation -by aggressive movements, except those abortive cavalry raids in the -rear--undoubtedly saved the Union Army from destruction. - -In the early part of October, General Hooker arrived at Nashville with -the Eleventh and Twelfth corps. They were stationed along the railroad -to Bridgeport. The corps had come to Nashville by railroad, but were -without transportation, therefore did not supply all the relief needed -at Chattanooga. What was absolutely necessary was the restoration of -rail transportation from Stevenson to Chattanooga, and not exclusively -the protection of the railroad from the north to Bridgeport. Sufficient -reinforcements were also needed in order to enable the Union Army -to attack and destroy or drive back the enemy, who was in too close -proximity for safety; and therefore the first thing to be considered, -after the Union troops were properly fortified, was to plan means by -which the cooperation of these eastern reinforcements could be made -available. In preliminary preparation for this, a steamboat which had -been captured at Chattanooga, had been repaired and another was being -built at Bridgeport. Rosecrans ordered Hooker to bring to Bridgeport -all his command, with the exception of what was needed to protect the -railroad from Nashville to the Tennessee River. He started also the -construction of pontoons for a bridge, at some point over the river -below Chattanooga, where his troops might have to cross in order to -meet Hooker’s forces coming from Bridgeport, and also in order to -shorten the road down the river. General W. F. Smith (“Baldy Smith”) -had lately been appointed chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. -General Rosecrans ordered him to reconnoiter the river near Williams’s -Island, a few miles below the points of Lookout Mountain, expecting -to make of that island a steamer landing and supply depot. This last -order was issued October 19, and on that same day General Rosecrans was -relieved from the command of the Army; and General George H. Thomas -assumed command. - -Prior to this date, on October 9, a complete reorganization of the Army -of the Cumberland had been made. Many of the regiments and brigades -had been so reduced in numbers by the late battle and by sickness, -that consolidation of brigades became imperative. Besides, in order -to maintain efficiency in the army and proper discipline, a weeding -out among the general officers became a necessity. Ever since the -close of fighting at Chickamauga, there had been an undercurrent of -feeling among the majority of the officers, that certain ones, who had -failed to meet the emergencies which arose during that battle, could -not continue in command, without decided detriment to the future -operations of the army. In compliance with the President’s order of -September 28, the Twentieth and Twenty-First corps were consolidated -and called the Fourth Corps. This new corps was placed under the -command of General Gordon Granger who had particularly distinguished -himself at Chickamauga. The reserve corps was made a part of the -Fourteenth Corps. Each corps was composed of three divisions and each -division of three brigades. The following short dispatch sent to the -Secretary of War by C. A. Dana, gives a very concise and interesting -statement of what was done: - -“Fourth Corps: First Division, Palmer; First Brigade, Cruft, nine -regiments, 2,044 men; Second Brigade, Whittaker, eight regiments, 2,035 -men; Third Brigade, Colonel Grose, eight regiments, 1,968 men. Second -Division, Sheridan; First Brigade, F. T. Sherman, ten regiments, 2,385 -men; Second Brigade, Wagner, eight regiments, 2,188 men; Third Brigade, -Harker, 2,026 men. Third Division, Wood; First Brigade, Willich, nine -regiments, 2,069 men; Second Brigade, Hazen, nine regiments, 2,195 -men; Third Brigade, Samuel Beatty, eight regiments, 2,222 men. - -“Fourteenth Corps: First Division, Rousseau; First Brigade, Carlin, -nine regiments, 2,072 men; Second Brigade, King, four regiments of -regulars and four regiments of volunteers, 2,070 men; Third Brigade, -Starkweather, eight regiments, 2,214 men. Second Division, J. C. Davis; -First Brigade, J. D. Morgan, five regiments, 2,214 men [this brigade -had been in the reserve and did not take part in the late battle]; -Second Brigade, John Beatty, seven regiments, 2,460 men; Third Brigade, -Daniel McCook, six regiments, 2,099 men [this brigade had few losses in -the late battle]. Third Division, Baird; First Brigade, Turchin, seven -regiments, 2,175 men; Second Brigade, Van Derveer, seven regiments, -2,116 men; Third Brigade, Croxton, seven regiments, 2,165 men.” - -Those detachments of the reserve corps which still remained along -the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad beyond Bridgeport, were not -included. The garrison at Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Battle Creek, -under General J. D. Morgan, as above stated, were however included. -The State of Tennessee was divided into two districts, the northern, -commanded by General Robert S. Granger with headquarters at Nashville, -and the southern under General R. W. Johnson with headquarters at -Stevenson. - -General L. H. Rousseau superseded General R. S. Granger at Nashville, -in November, prior to the battles. General Starkweather relieved -Johnson at Stevenson after the battle, the latter having been assigned -in Rousseau’s place, as commander of the First Division of the -Fourteenth Corps. - -In the reorganization of the army the Wisconsin troops were distributed -as follows: The First and Twenty-First Infantry remained in -Starkweather’s Third Brigade of the First Division of the Fourteenth -Corps; the Tenth Infantry in the First Brigade of the same division -which was commanded by General W. P. Carlin. The Twenty-fourth Infantry -was in the First Brigade of Sheridan’s Division, commanded by Colonel -F. T. Sherman; the Fifteenth Infantry in Willich’s Brigade of Wood’s -Division, of the Fourth Corps. The Fifth Battery was attached to -Davis’s Division of the Fourteenth Corps; the Third, Eighth and Tenth, -and Company A of the First Wisconsin Heavy Artillery were assigned -to the Second Division of the Artillery Reserve. The Eleventh and -Twelfth corps were not reorganized prior to the battles; the Third and -Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry remained in the same organization in -which they were in the Army of the Potomac--viz.: the Third in Ruger’s -Third Brigade of the First Division (Williams’s) of the Twelfth Corps; -the Twenty-sixth in the Second Brigade of the Third Division of the -Eleventh Corps. - -When General Thomas became commander of the Army of the Cumberland, -General John M. Palmer was made commander in his place of the -Fourteenth Corps, and General Charles Cruft was assigned to the command -of the First Division of the Fourth Corps, in place of Palmer. - -General James A. Garfield, chief of staff, had been elected member of -Congress from his district in Ohio; he left in order to assume his -duties and General J. J. Reynolds had been appointed chief of staff -in his place. General John M. Brannan was made chief of artillery. -These, with General W. F. Smith as chief engineer, greatly added to the -strength of the headquarters staff. - -This order of the President--which affected these local changes in the -Army of the Cumberland--was followed by a much greater consolidation on -a very much broader scale. The Army of the Tennessee--then in western -Tennessee and northern Mississippi--was placed under command of General -W. T. Sherman, who was on his way with a portion of it to Chattanooga -in order to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland. The Army of the -Ohio, under General A. E. Burnside, was at Knoxville. These three -armies had not before had a commander in common under whose orders they -could be made to cooperate. A commander-in-chief at Washington had so -far been unable to accomplish this very necessary cooperation. The -Tennessee River ran through the fields of operations of all the three -armies--less directly in the field of the Army of the Tennessee--and -the preceding lack of unity in movements jeopardized the ultimate -object of all their campaigns, namely: the re-establishment of the -former relation between the states in rebellion and the general -government. On this account the President established the Military -Division of the Mississippi, with Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant in -command. This was a virtual consolidation of the three armies; their -cooperation in that wide field was henceforth perfect. Subsequent -events showed the wisdom of this order. The Confederates never won -another battle in this department; and in fourteen months after the -organization of one command there existed no organized Confederate -force in this field, worthy of notice. There were only detachments here -and there, like Forrest’s rangers in the early spring of 1865, until -General James H. Wilson’s cavalry raid put an end to all resistance. - -After its reorganization, the Army of the Cumberland was composed -of the Fourth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth corps, and three -divisions of cavalry. Had General Sheridan been placed in command of -the combined cavalry, his subsequent career shows that its efficiency -would have been greatly improved; but all the changes, that might have -been beneficial, could not be thought of at once. The pending events in -this department developed some pre-eminent officers, who were indeed -very much needed; they became masterful factors in the early downfall -of the rebellion, both in the east and in the west; Sheridan was one of -these; others were Grant, Thomas, and Sherman. - -Grant reached his new command by way of Louisville, Kentucky, where he -met the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, who brought with him the -order of October 18, as well as General Grant’s commission. Grant sent -from Louisville the following telegram to Thomas, “Hold Chattanooga -at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible. Please inform me -how long your present supplies will last, and the prospect for keeping -them up.” General Thomas answered: “Two hundred and four thousand -four hundred and sixty-two rations in storehouses; ninety thousand to -arrive tomorrow, and all the trains were loaded which had arrived at -Bridgeport up to the 16th--probably three hundred wagons. _I will hold -the town till we starve._” - -On October 19, Thomas ordered General Hooker to carry out the former -orders of General Rosecrans, namely to concentrate his forces at -Bridgeport, in order to move them to Chattanooga. - -General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the evening of October 23, -one month after the Union troops had taken possession of the city. -On the 24th he went to Brown’s Ferry in company with Thomas and W. -F. Smith, the chief engineer; at once he recognized the necessity -and possibility of the scheme, initiated by General Rosecrans, but -conceived and planned by W. F. Smith, of placing a pontoon bridge -there and of obtaining a hold on the south side of the river at that -point, and he ordered its execution; much had already been done toward -preparing for it. General Smith was given full power to complete the -plan. The river at Chattanooga runs almost directly west opposite -the city, but soon it curves to the north and then it turns to the -south with quite a sharp bend at the foot of Lookout Mountain, from -where the river runs directly north, forming a narrow and perfect -peninsula directly opposite or west of the city. This peninsula widens -slightly at its southern end and forms a perfect shape of a human -foot; hence it is called “Moccasin Point.” Brown’s Ferry is directly -west of the city, on the western point of the neck of this peninsula, -some miles below Lookout. It is only about a mile in direct line to -Brown’s Ferry from the northern end of the bridge, at the foot of -Cameron Hill in the western outskirts of the city. From Brown’s Ferry -the river continues north, and passes Williams Island; five or more -miles from the ferry, it makes another sharp turn to the south at the -foot of Walden’s Ridge; in the course of six or seven miles from this -northern bend it flows tortuously past Kelly’s Ferry. The peninsula -thus formed, is the northern nose of Raccoon Mountain. From Brown’s -to Kelly’s Ferry is about five miles in direct line somewhat to the -southwest, and, as said before, it is one mile across to Chattanooga. -It is about five miles from Cameron Hill bridge to Brown’s Ferry, -but from where the boats for the Brown’s Ferry bridge subsequently -started, it is about nine miles, and to Kelly’s Ferry more than -fifteen, perhaps twenty miles. These figures show the value to the -transportation, of obtaining unobstructed access to Kelly’s Ferry as a -landing for steamboats bringing supplies from Bridgeport across Brown’s -Ferry, when it should come into possession of the Union Army by the -advance of Hooker, until the railroad could be repaired or put into -working order from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. The movement of troops -which accomplished this, also, gave the army a lodgment on the south -side of the river, to meet, and assist, Hooker’s forces coming from -Bridgeport, thus breaking the Confederate hold upon the river road to -Bridgeport. Under General Smith’s orders and supervision, the plans -were successfully carried out. Two flatboats and fifty pontoons, with -cars, were prepared. In these, 1,500 men under Hazen passed down the -river nine miles, and close to the Confederate pickets. They were to -land at different points in sections, the places having been pointed -out previously to the officers in command. On account of the darkness -fires were kept burning opposite these places, so that the different -sections could land at the proper points. The remainder of Turchin’s -and Hazen’s brigades--from which the men in the boats were taken--and -their batteries, were marched across the peninsula, and posted out of -sight in the woods, near Brown’s Ferry on the north side of the river. - -The infantry troops were to cross in the boats, as soon as the men -under Hazen landed on the south side, and recross to the north side. -The artillery was to move into position as soon as the boats landed, -in order to cover a retreat in case of disaster. The equipment for the -pontoon bridge was also in place and ready for use. The boats commenced -to float at 3 a. m. October 27, and they were not discovered by the -enemy until 5 a. m., when the first section had landed; a portion of -the second section, which did not land in the proper place, was fired -on by the enemy’s picket, calling forth an attack by the picket-reserve -of the enemy. But the Union troops on the north side of the ferry -crossed rapidly in the boats, pushed forward to the top of the ridge, -and in two hours they protected themselves sufficiently with timber -and abatis to hold the _tête de pont_. On the 27th the bridge was -completed at 4:30 p. m.; the work was done under some shelling from -Lookout Point. Captain P. V. Fox of the First Michigan Engineers was -the skillful superintendent of the bridge building. Twenty beeves, -six pontoons, a barge and about 2,000 bushels of corn fell into the -hands of the Union troops. The Union loss was 6 killed, 23 wounded, -and 9 missing. Six prisoners were taken from the Confederates and 6 -were killed; how many were wounded is not known. While the bridge was -being laid, General Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport on a pontoon -bridge, and was marching up towards Chattanooga. At 3 p. m. on the -28th, his head of column reached Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley, at the -junction of the railroad from Bridgeport, with the branch from Trenton -up the valley. The wagon road from here to Brown’s Ferry runs about -four miles, along the western base of a ridge, which here and there -has deep depressions; through one of these the railroad continued to -Chattanooga, around the nose of Lookout, close to the river; through -another the wagon road runs. General Hooker had with him Howard’s -Eleventh Corps, and Geary’s division of the Twelfth, with the exception -of one regiment left at the bridge at Bridgeport, one at Whiteside’s -and one at Shellmound; the latter two places being on the railroad -between Bridgeport and Chattanooga. - -The First Division of the Twelfth Corps, (Williams), had been left to -guard the railroad from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport. In Ruger’s brigade -of this division was the Third Wisconsin Infantry, commanded by Colonel -William Hawley. This regiment had been mustered into the service on -June 29, 1861, and had been serving with the Army of the Potomac -since that date until now, when it became a part of the Army of the -Cumberland. In the Second Brigade of the Third Division, (Schurz) of -the Eleventh Corps was the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry, commanded -by Captain Frederick C. Winkler, who was appointed Major November -17, 1863. It was exclusively a German regiment, and was mustered in -at Milwaukee on August 17, 1862. On the following October 6, it left -Wisconsin for the Army of the Potomac, in which it served until it -became a part of the Eleventh Corps under Howard and Hooker of the Army -of the Cumberland. - -Hooker’s advance troops, under General Howard, camped that night -within a mile or so of Brown’s Ferry, where they opened communication -with the troops there. Geary’s division was in the rear and camped -near Wauhatchie, three miles from Howard’s troops; thus the road -from Wauhatchie to Kelly’s Ferry--three miles to the northwest of -Wauhatchie--was controlled. About 1 a. m. on the 29th, Geary was -heavily attacked by a part of Longstreet’s troops, but not before he -had his division in line for defense. Howard was ordered to double -quick his nearest division, under command of General Carl Schurz, to -Geary’s relief. Before proceeding far, it was fired upon from the -near hills on the division’s left, but at long range. The firing -produced no great injury to Schurz’s troops. Howard detached one -brigade to deploy on these hills, and pushed on with the other; in the -meantime Steinwehr’s division, also of Howard’s, came up. Then it was -discovered that another hill, in the rear of Schurz was also occupied -by the enemy. Smith’s brigade charged it and carried it with the -bayonet against three times its number. - -Hooker says, “No troops ever rendered more brilliant service. The -name of their valiant commander is Colonel Orlando Smith of the -Seventy-third Ohio Infantry. * * * For almost three hours, without -assistance Geary repelled the repeated attacks of vastly superior -numbers, and in the end drove them ingloriously from the field.” Thus -the Lookout Valley was secured, and new communications were opened. -The loss to General Hooker’s command was 416. Longstreet practically -conceded that the Union commander had succeeded in opening this new -line of communication, but spoke lightly of it. Whittaker’s and John -G. Mitchell’s brigades were subsequently moved over to this region. -The steamboat at Chattanooga passed down on the night of the 28th; -thereafter two steamboats (one had been built at Bridgeport), made -regular trips with supplies from Bridgeport to Kelly’s Ferry. Good -roads were made from Chattanooga via Brown’s to Kelly’s Ferry and the -railroad from Bridgeport towards the east was being repaired. There was -no shortage of rations or forage after these rapid preparations were -commenced to attack the enemy in his strong positions around the city. -Hope and confidence had always inspired the Army of the Cumberland; -the rank and file had never despaired; now, they took the lead in -anticipating that the end was in sight; success in battle depends very -much on the condition of the human body and the enthusiasm of the -spirit. - -The feeble and ineffectual efforts of Longstreet to prevent the opening -of the river, and the advance of Hooker’s troops, opened the eyes of -all the general officers of the Army of the Cumberland to the weakness -of the Confederate Army, both in the ranks and among the officers. -General Longstreet, in his official report of the battle of Wauhatchie, -attributes his defeat to the jealousy of brigade officers.[35] The -Confederate troops, making the attack on General Geary, were withdrawn -from the east side of Lookout, but they returned immediately before -daylight on the night of the attack. General Longstreet gave reasons -for this action; he showed that it was not good military tactics to -keep a large force on that side of the mountain, where its only line of -retreat was around the slope of Lookout; if it were defeated, it would -be exposed to the fire of the Union troops at and opposite Chattanooga. -These reasons were sound and foreshadowed the ease with which Hooker’s -forces, on November 24, drove the enemy so easily and captured Lookout -Mountain. It was after this defeat, that Bragg (for reasons unknown), -sent Longstreet’s Corps toward Knoxville to assist in defeating -Burnside. Bragg hoped that it could be returned in time to assist in -the battle, that he knew must be fought at Chattanooga. Longstreet took -with him the two divisions of McLaws and Hood, and Alexander’s cavalry. -Wheeler’s cavalry passed him on the road; it was supposed to do certain -things that it failed to do. Longstreet recommended that Bragg’s army -should be drawn back in a strong position behind the Chickamauga, after -the departure of Longstreet’s troops in November; his reason for this -recommendation was, that in its present position it could be reached -in twenty minutes by the Union Army. Bragg seemed to be blind, however, -to the events so rapidly transpiring in Chattanooga; he did not seem -to realize that the troops Longstreet had fought at Wauhatchie, were -reinforcements from the East to the Union Army. - -In the meantime the Confederate batteries on Lookout Mountain and -Missionary Ridge sent an occasional artillery shot into the Union -lines. The pickets of the two armies held their lines close to each -other in the valley and watched each other’s movements, firing whenever -a soldier on his beat became visible. There being no good reason for -this desultory and ineffectual warfare, an agreement was finally -reached, that the pickets should fire only when advances of troops -became apparent; henceforth, an officer could with impunity ride along -the picket line in plain view of the opposite pickets. - -As soon as Grant became aware of Longstreet’s departure for East -Tennessee, he prepared for an attack on Bragg’s army in order to keep -him from detaching more troops against Burnside and to compel him to -return those already sent. He ordered General Thomas to assault the -north end of Missionary Ridge; the order was given November 7; but on -account of the utter lack of animals--caused not only by the great loss -in the recent battles, but also by the death of a large number from -starvation since the occupation of the city--it was finally decided by -Grant, Thomas, and Smith, that nothing but a defensive attitude would -be feasible until General Sherman’s forces could arrive. The necessity -for aggressive operations, on account of Bragg’s boldness in taking -such a desperate chance as to send a large force commanded by his -ablest general away from his weak little army, increased the activity -of the Union Army in its preparation for battle, and thus was opened -a way for the relief of Burnside; the hope was that he could hold out -until help arrived. - -It is to be presumed, that Bragg had implicit confidence that the Union -Army would not dare to attack such a strong position as Bragg’s army -then held. General Grant at once wrote the facts of the situation to -Burnside and urged him to maintain his attitude at Knoxville, until -a battle could be fought at Chattanooga and a detachment sent to his -assistance. Not waiting for Sherman, he formulated his plans; and thus -knew before the latter’s arrival, just where he should place Sherman, -what his part of the attack should be, and that he should march -immediately on his approach directly to the north end of Missionary -Ridge. Grant planned furthermore that Hooker should attack Lookout -Mountain from his position in Lookout Valley; the one should attack the -right of the Confederate Army and the other the left. Sherman arrived -at Bridgeport, with his leading division, on November 15. Arriving at -Chattanooga ahead of his troops, he with Grant, Thomas, and Smith, -looked over the entire situation and learned how, and by what route, he -could reach his point of attack. It had become apparent to the Union -commanders, that Bragg’s line did not reach the immediate river hills, -at the north end of Missionary Ridge, but was deflected to the east, -along the third hill to the south of the river, with a deep depression -between it and the next hill to the north. This made necessary a much -stronger position than the supposed location at Bragg’s right flank, -and stronger forces and dispositions were needed. Grant announced his -plan to his generals on the 18th and expected the attacks could be made -on the 21st; a rain storm delayed, however, the arrival of Sherman’s -troops. When they did arrive at Brown’s Ferry the high water had broken -the bridge, which delayed the crossing. When the bridge was repaired, -Sherman crossed it in plain view of the enemy’s signal station on the -point of Lookout Mountain; he marched into the woods behind a series of -hills on the north side of the river; these hills concealed his march -all the way to the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, where Davis’s division -of the Fourteenth Corps had been placed to cover his movement, and to -protect the bridge there, after Sherman’s troops had again crossed to -the south side. The crossing at the Chickamauga was also protected by -artillery, placed on the heights north of the river. After crossing at -the mouth of the Chickamauga, Sherman was to follow Missionary Ridge as -far as the railroad tunnel. This seemed to be the principal point of -attack; the plan further contemplated that all the forces available -should be converged toward General Sherman’s position. Therefore -Howard’s Eleventh Corps was taken from Hooker’s position and replaced -by Whittaker’s and Grose’s brigades of the Fourth Corps; the Eleventh -Corps was placed on the left of the Army of the Cumberland south of the -river, looking towards Sherman’s position perhaps four miles further -east. Thomas was to cooperate by moving his troops to his left, so -that he could join with Sherman’s right, when the latter should push -the Confederate forces back to the tunnel. The combined forces should -then advance against the enemy, with the object in view of sweeping the -Confederate Army into the south Chickamauga Creek, which runs on the -opposite side of Missionary Ridge. General Hooker was to hold Lookout -Valley with Geary’s division and the two brigades of Whittaker and -Grose, and Howard’s corps was to be in readiness to act with either -Sherman or Thomas, as circumstances should dictate. The plan was a fine -one, because, if that flank could be defeated, the Confederate line of -retreat could be easily cut off. - -Colonel Long with his brigade of cavalry moved to Sherman’s left. When -Sherman should sweep the ridge, he was ordered to cross the Chickamauga -and raid the rear of the Confederate Army. This attack was to begin -on the 22nd, but was postponed on account of the fact that two of -Sherman’s divisions had not been able to cross Brown’s Ferry bridge, on -account of a break. To avoid any further delay, Thomas suggested that -Howard’s Corps be sent to General Sherman in place of the two delayed -divisions, and that the latter be ordered to report to General Hooker, -whose combined forces should immediately attack Lookout Mountain in -order to divert the attention of the enemy from Sherman’s contemplated -attack; this suggestion was in part approved by General Grant. - -A singular thing happened on November 22. General Ewing’s division -of Sherman’s troops had come into Lookout Valley at Trenton from -Bridgeport; Bragg’s rear was thus threatened. The movement of some -of Bragg’s troops to avert this calamity together with the former -withdrawal of Longstreet’s Corps for Knoxville, produced the -impression in the Confederate Army, that the whole was going to fall -back. Deserters who came into the Union line reported this impression. -Bragg also notified the Union commander to remove all non-combatants -from the city; this was on the 20th. General Grant ordered Thomas to -make a reconnoisance in front of Chattanooga in order to test the truth -of this report, and to find out whether Bragg was really falling back, -and if so, Thomas should prevent him from doing it undisturbed. The -Army of the Cumberland was nearest to the enemy and in readiness to -do this with the most celerity. It seems that General Bragg had such -confidence in the strength of his position on the top of Missionary -Ridge, about 500 feet high, that he was willing not only to send away -Longstreet, but actually started other forces to follow him. The latter -he recalled, however, in time to take part in the battle. He supposed, -and with good reason, that Missionary Ridge could not be taken by -assault; and even if Lookout should become untenable on account of -the capture of the valley of Chattanooga, he would be safe in his -entrenchments on Missionary Ridge. This must have been his conclusion, -and he must have known that the Army of the Cumberland was receiving -considerable reinforcements. Bragg’s lines were altogether too long. -When the object of holding Lookout Mountain no longer existed, after -the reopening of the river and railroad route to Bridgeport, he should -have withdrawn from there and from Chattanooga Valley; he should either -have concentrated on Missionary Ridge or taken Longstreet’s advice -and fallen back to Dalton, behind the second ridge, southeast of -Chattanooga, where he was finally driven. - -Fortunately for the success of the Union movements, Bragg did not do -the things that an abler general would have done. He stood stolidly -in his original line along its whole length until the opening of the -battle of Missionary Ridge. It has been stated, that Bragg expected -Grant when he discovered the departure of Longstreet for East -Tennessee, would send forces to support Burnside. - -In pursuance of the order to make a reconnoisance, Thomas ordered -Granger, who commanded the Fourth Corps, to advance a division of his -corps towards Orchard Knob November 23, about noon. This elevation of -land is located about half way between the city and Missionary Ridge, -at the left of Thomas’s line. Between the Union line and this knob was -a growth of trees and bushes. These concealed the formation of the -troops for a while only from the enemy. Wood’s division was deployed -in front of Fort Wood. Sheridan’s division formed next on the right -and rear of Wood. Howard’s Corps was massed in the rear of these two -divisions. General Baird’s division fell, in echelon, at the right -of Sheridan. General Johnson’s division (formerly Rousseau’s) of the -Fourteenth Corps stood with arms in the entrenchments, ready to move -in any direction. This really placed the latter in echelon with Baird. -It is said the enemy looked upon these movements as a parade for -display or to obtain wood for fires, when seeing them from the top of -Missionary Ridge. The Confederates had a line of rifle-pits along the -base of Orchard Knob, following Citico Creek for a mile or more. - -With Willich’s and Hazen’s brigades in front and Beatty’s in reserve, -General Wood moved forward about 2 p. m. His troops pushed back easily -whatever was in their front. Willich struck Orchard Knob squarely on -his front, and soon captured it, clearing it of the enemy’s lines. -Hazen met more resistance from the Confederates who were perhaps more -numerous or better fighters, although the hill he attacked was not so -high as Orchard Knob. He carried the hill, however, and captured the -Twenty-eighth Alabama Regiment and its flag. This advanced line gave -a good position for further advances, and was held; the rest of the -troops on the right moving up to and extending the line far to the -right. General Wood fortified his line over Orchard Knob, and General -Howard formed his corps on its left. The summit of this Knob gave -a splendid outlook over the field between it and Missionary Ridge, -and gave a fine view of the ridge itself. It afforded an opportunity -for Grant and Thomas to view later on the whole subsequent movements -against the enemy. General Wood lost 125 men killed and wounded in this -battle of Orchard Knob. The Fifteenth Wisconsin of Willich’s brigade -took part in this engagement; its losses were not reported until after -the battle of the 25th, when its commander reported 6 men slightly -wounded in both engagements. Wood occupied this position until 3:15 -p. m. on the 25th, when he moved forward with the rest of the army to -the assault on Missionary Ridge. Bridge’s Illinois Battery occupied an -epaulment in Wood’s line on Orchard Knob. - -The taking of Orchard Knob had a most important bearing on the attack -that General Hooker made on Lookout Mountain the next day. It caused -Bragg to withdraw Walker’s division from that point to strengthen his -right, which Bragg thought to be menaced by this advance to Orchard -Knob. These troops prolonged Bragg’s line towards Sherman’s front but -did not reach it. The Confederate general, Stevenson, signalled from -the top of Lookout to Bragg that night that if an attack was intended -by Grant, it would be delivered on Lookout Mountain. This is what -actually occurred. Another of Sherman’s divisions crossed Brown’s Ferry -on the 23rd; the bridge was again broken, however, leaving Osterhaus’s -division still on the left bank. This gave General Sherman only three -divisions besides General Davis’s of the Fourteenth Corps, with which -to operate at the designated place on Missionary Ridge. General Thomas -informed General Hooker of the proximity of Osterhaus’s troops and -directed, that if they did not get over to Sherman, he should have them -join him and “take the point of Lookout Mountain.” This division was at -that time in command of General Charles R. Woods, one of its brigade -commanders. How sagacious was General Thomas in seeing immediately the -advantage that should be taken of a mere accident, like the breaking of -a pontoon bridge! It looks as though Thomas had made this suggestion -to Hooker, without having beforehand a distinct understanding with -General Grant; for he told General Hooker later, that Grant still hoped -Woods’s (Osterhaus’s) division could cross in time to participate in -Sherman’s movement, but if it could not the mountain should be taken -if practicable. Hooker, finding that there was little possibility of -the bridge being quickly repaired, made preparations for the advance -against the mountain. It will be observed further on, that this -accident resulted in modifying the original plans very materially, -as the taking of Orchard Knob had already done. The left of Bragg’s -line was turned, but not his right; this movement was a result of the -accidents to the Brown’s Ferry pontoon bridge. General Grant showed his -broad mind in this affair as well as in other changes he made in his -original plan, at a later date. - -[Illustration: CHATTANOOGA AND VICINITY, NOVEMBER, 1863 - -Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 288] - - -THE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN - -At 4 p. m. on November 24, 1863, one of the most spectacular battles of -the war commenced. General Hooker’s force consisted of the following: -Osterhaus’s division of the Fifteenth Corps, Cruft’s (formerly -Palmer’s) of the Fourth; Geary’s of the Twelfth--with the exception of -such regiments from the last two divisions as were required to protect -the communications with Bridgeport and Kelly’s Ferry; battery K of the -First Ohio, and battery I of the First New York of the Eleventh Corps, -having sufficient horses for but one battery; a part of the Second -Kentucky Cavalry, and Company K of the Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry. The -aggregate number of this force was 9,681. The foregoing statement of -the forces is taken from General Hooker’s official report[36], which -is remarkably well written, clear in statement and full of essential -facts. “At this time the enemy’s pickets formed a continuous line along -the right bank of Lookout Creek, with the reserves in the valley, while -his main force was encamped in a hollow half way up the slope of the -mountain. The summit itself was held by three brigades of Stevenson’s -division, and those were comparatively safe, as the only means of -access from the next [that is, from the valley in which Hooker’s troops -were located] for a distance of 20 miles up the valley was by two or -three trails, admitting to the passage of but 1 man at a time; and even -these trails were held at the top by rebel pickets.” - -The top of Lookout Mountain at this point consists of a perpendicular -crest, or palisade of rocks which rises out of the main body of the -mountain about a hundred feet. From the foot of this crest the mountain -slopes by a gradual descent but with a very broken surface on all sides -to the valleys on the east, west, and to the river on the north. An -army could operate on this slope only below the crest, from the west -to the east, or on the side of Chattanooga, around the northern slope, -under the crest. Hooker’s army did not cross the top of the crest; -but by taking the slope, the Confederate troops occupying the top, -were forced to retreat by the only wagon road reaching to the top -on the Chattanooga side. The slope on that side is less precipitous -than on the west side where Hooker was. At the foot of the slope on -the Chattanooga side flows the Chattanooga Creek and on the west side -Lookout Creek, both flowing north, practically parallel with the trend -of the mountain, and emptying into the Tennessee River, which runs -west at the foot of the northern slope. Hooker continues his report -as follows: “On the northern slope midway between the summit and the -Tennessee, a plateau or belt of arable land, encircles the crest. -There, a continuous line of earth-works had been thrown up, while -redoubts, redans, and pits appeared lower down the slope to repel an -assault from the direction of the river.” - -Geary commenced his movements as instructed, crossed the creek at 8 -o’clock a. m., “captured the entire picket of 42 men posted to defend -it, marched directly up the mountain until his right rested on the -palisades, and headed down the valley.” The Confederate Walthall was in -command of the troops immediately opposed to Geary, and Moore’s brigade -near the Craven house on the eastern, or northeastern slope. General -Stevenson was there in command of all the Confederate troops on the -mountain. He placed sharpshooters along the western edge of the crest, -and wherever there was depression enough, the artillery by raising the -trails of the gun carriages did some execution until Geary’s troops -reached the foot of the palisades. The Confederate troops located -on the western slope, moved into position, facing Lookout Creek, in -order to prevent the Union troops crossing at the bridge; but this -disposition subjected them to a flank enfilading fire from Geary’s -troops. The other Union troops moved up the Creek, crossed behind -Geary’s line, and joined on his left. The batteries had been placed on -elevated points, so as to enfilade the route by which the enemy had to -march down the slope, and on other points, by which the Confederates -had to retreat if they were driven back. The Union line advanced, the -artillery opened. The rout of the enemy was complete, many prisoners -were taken, and many were killed and wounded. At noon when Geary’s -advance rounded the northern slope, his flags were plainly visible from -Chattanooga. There had been a fog all morning, which greatly favored -Hooker’s movements, preventing the Confederates on top of the crest -from directing their shots satisfactorily. As the Union flags appeared -on the sky line of the northern slope, and were visible at Chattanooga, -this fog settled down upon the lower stretches of the slope and -revealed the Confederate lines badly broken and in flight with the -compact ranks of the Union soldiers triumphantly advancing with flags -flying and muskets glistening in the sun. It was a glorious sight to -the Union troops, then in line in front of the works at Chattanooga. -The picture presented was a “battle above the clouds,” for the fog -obscured all that part of the mountain which was below the conquering -lines of Hooker. General Stevenson says in his report, with regard -to this affair: “Finding that the fog was becoming so dense that the -troops on the northern part of the mountain [meaning Pettus’s brigade -on the crest] could not see the enemy moving upon Walthall, I gave -orders for Pettus with my only disposable force to move down and report -to Brigadier-General Jackson. He started at 12:30 o’clock and reached -the scene of action a little past 1 o’clock. * * * This position was -held by Moore, Walthall, and Pettus until about 8 p. m.”[37] - -Stevenson had six brigades in his command; four of these took part -in the fight on the mountain, the other two were placed between -Chattanooga Creek and the road up the slope, in order to guard the -line of retreat on the east side of the mountain against any advance -from Chattanooga. Stevenson reports, that he lost only 380 in his -three brigades; he does not state the number of troops he had on the -mountain. Hooker rested at 2 o’clock p. m. after passing the point. The -settling down of the fog shut off his view of the Chattanooga Valley -and prevented his seeing sufficiently the topography to justify him -in advancing down into the valley that same evening. He formed his -lines on the eastern slope; his right was at the palisades, and his -left was near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. This line he fortified, -and reported the fact to the department commander. In this position -he enfiladed the enemy’s line in the Chattanooga Valley, and also had -communication across the mouth of the creek with the Union forces in -the city. At 5:15 p. m. General Carlin’s brigade of Johnson’s division -of the Fourteenth Corps, reported to General Hooker after having -crossed the mouth of the creek by ferry; he was placed on the right of -the line relieving Geary’s troops, which were almost exhausted with -fatigue. During the night the enemy withdrew entirely, leaving behind -20,000 rations, and the camp and garrison equipage of three brigades. -General Thomas reported, that Hooker captured 500 or 600 prisoners. The -Eighth Kentucky Infantry scaled the crest about daylight on the 25th -and hoisted the United States flag amid wild and prolonged cheers from -the whole army. - -At ten o’clock a. m. on the 25th, leaving two regiments to hold the -mountain, Hooker started towards Rossville, across Chattanooga Creek -and the valley, with Osterhaus’s division of the Fifteenth Corps -in the lead. Thus the left of the Confederate Army was completely -turned, while the right still held its own. Hooker was too far from -the Confederate line of retreat to menace it. To have turned the -right first would have been better. Hooker was delayed four hours by -a destroyed bridge in crossing Chattanooga Creek. The Tenth Wisconsin -Infantry of Carlin’s brigade of Johnson’s division of the Fourteenth -Corps participated in this engagement; it was detached from the -brigade, and held a fort south of the Crutchfield house on the east -side of the mountain; its losses were not reported. - -While these operations were occurring on Lookout Mountain under the -command of Hooker, Sherman advanced across the Tennessee River at -the mouth of the Chickamauga with three divisions of the Army of the -Tennessee, and one division (Davis’s) of the Army of the Cumberland, -on the morning of the 24th, against the other or extreme right wing -of the Confederate line on Missionary Ridge. He advanced and formed -his lines on the north end of the ridge; a brigade of Howard’s Corps -moved to the left at 9 a. m. on the same day and communicated with -Sherman about noon. Later Howard joined Sherman with his two divisions -and formed on his right. Carlin’s brigade rejoined his division on the -25th, which was then in the valley half way to Missionary Ridge and on -the right of Thomas’s line. Palmer’s and Granger’s corps were held in -readiness by Thomas to advance to the foot of the ridge, as soon as -Hooker should get into position at Rossville. It was after 2 p. m. that -General Hooker effected a crossing of Chattanooga Creek and advanced -as above stated. At noon General Sherman was heavily engaged with -the enemy in his position, and finding it to be very strong was not -making any headway against it. General Baird was, therefore, ordered to -march his division within supporting distance of Sherman, and to move -promptly. - -He reported to Sherman, but the latter told him he could not find room -for him and could not make use of his troops. General Baird marched -back a distance of about two miles, and arrived at the left of General -Thomas’s line at 2:30 p. m.; he was ordered to fall in on the left of -Wood, the left division of Grangers Fourth Corps. - -It will be well at this time to take a rapid view of the entire lines -of the Union and the Confederate armies, as they stood facing each -other, arms in hand, at 3 o’clock p. m. on November 25, 1863, just -before they grappled in a struggle for life and death, and for the -permanent possession of the stronghold of the Middle West. So many -changes having occurred in the previous three or four days in the Union -Army, and equally as many and more important changes occurring on the -Confederate side, makes it necessary to pause, just before describing -the great spectacular battle of Missionary Ridge, and try to get at -least a bird’s-eye view of the position of the numerous divisions and -corps. - -General Osterhaus had again taken command of his own division, -relieving General Charles R. Woods; General Cruft, and General Geary -were near enough with their troops to the ridge at Rossville to form -the extreme right of the Union line. There was an interval between -Geary’s left and Johnson’s right, where Carlin stood after coming -from Lookout. Johnson had only two brigades, Carlin on the right, and -Stoughton (John H. King’s successor) on the left; Starkweather had been -left in the works around the city. Hooker’s and Thomas’s troops were -without reserves. Sheridan’s three brigades, F. T. Sherman’s, Harkers’s -and Wagner’s were next to the left of Johnson; then Wood’s three -brigades, Hazen’s, Willich’s, and Beatty’s; the latter appeared in two -lines, being the last in Thomas’s section, and forming the left flank -of the line; and then Baird’s three brigades, Turchin’s, Van Derveer’s -and Phelps’s. - -A mile and a half to the left of General Thomas’s line lay Sherman’s -right flank, with no troops in the interval. The latter’s line -was composed from right to left of the following brigades, viz.: -Buschbeck’s, Ewing’s Matthies’s, Corse’s and A. Smith’s; Raum, was -behind Matthies, and two brigades of J. E. Smith’s were in reserve -behind the centre. Behind this line, a half mile in the fortified line -lay from left to right the brigades of Loomis, Cockerill, Alexander, -and Lightburn, and Schurz’s division. Sherman thus had six divisions. -The Confederate line from its right, which faced Sherman, was as -follows by divisions: Cleburne, Stevenson, Gist, Cheatham, Anderson, -Bate, and Stewart. Stewart held the left of Bragg’s line, and his -troops were the first to encounter those of Hooker on their way to -Rossville from Lookout Mountain. General Hardee commanded the right -wing, consisting of the following four divisions: Cheatham, Cleburne, -Stevenson, and Walker; General Breckenridge was in charge of the left -wing, which was composed of Bate, Stewart, and Anderson. Cheatham’s -division faced Baird, Anderson’s Wood; Bate’s Sheridan, and Stewart’s -Johnson. Cleburne’s division reached the front of Sherman’s line on -the afternoon of the 24th while marching from the Confederates’ left. -Before the fight of the 25th occurred, Cheatham’s, Stevenson’s, and -Walker’s divisions had prolonged Bragg’s line to within three-quarters -of a mile of the tunnel; Smith’s brigade of Cleburne’s division held -Tunnel Hill on the 25th against Sherman; the rest of the division was -not heavily engaged, but it had the assistance of Brown’s and Cumming’s -brigades of Stevenson’s division, and Maney’s of Walker’s. Tunnel -Hill was not captured by Sherman’s troops until after the retreat of -these Confederate forces on the evening of the 25th, the result of the -successful assault in the centre by Thomas. - -The whole Confederate line on the left across the Chattanooga Valley -was abandoned; Stewart withdrew to the top of the ridge before Hooker -reached Rossville. It must be noticed, that General Thomas’s line -in the centre, contained only four divisions of the Army of the -Cumberland, namely two of the Fourth Corps, and two of the Fourteenth; -one division (Davis’s) of the Fourteenth Corps was with Sherman on the -left, and one (Cruft’s) was with Hooker on the right. Hooker had three -divisions and Sherman six. - -Starkweather’s brigade of Johnson’s division was left to hold the -original works around Chattanooga; and did so during the assault of the -rest of the troops upon Missionary Ridge. - -At 1 p. m. on the 12th, C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, who -was in Chattanooga, sent this dispatch to the Secretary of War at -Washington, “In our front here [meaning Thomas’s front], Confederate -rifle-pits are fully manned, preventing Thomas gaining ridge.” At -4:30 p. m. he sent another dispatch showing how misleading the former -dispatch was: “Glory to God. The day is decisively ours. Missionary -Ridge has just been carried by a magnificent charge of Thomas’s troops, -and rebels routed.” The reader must not lay much stress on the time -given, at which the various movements were made; this is a mere guess -in most instances. Seldom did an officer think of looking at his watch, -at the moment any orders were given to make an important movement. -The original Army of the Cumberland, referred to by Dana, were the -troops General Grant thought would not fight, because they had been so -roughly handled at Chickamauga.[38] It was quite a natural conclusion. -The entire Union Army was in line at about 3:30 p. m., ready for any -commands which might be given by Grant, Thomas, Sherman and Hooker. -The array of soldiers in the Union ranks from the three armies, those -of the Potomac, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, was formidable, -commanded by such heroes as Grant, Thomas, Sherman, Hooker, Sheridan, -and Howard. Thomas’s four divisions had about 18,000 in rank and file, -Hooker’s about 9,000, and Sherman’s about 24,000. - -It is not likely that Bragg had more than 30,000; but his position -was sufficiently strong to almost equal Grant’s advantage in numbers. -The Confederate Army was concentrated on a 500 feet ridge, which had -a very steep and rough surface, sloping towards the Union lines at an -angle of about forty-five degrees. This ridge had a fortified line on -the top, manned by veteran infantry and artillery, and a thinner line -of infantry at its foot in a series of deep rifle-pits; in front of -the latter was a swarm of skirmishers. The army was still in command -of Braxton Bragg, a commander of great experience; and of two wing -commanders, Hardee a veteran of the old regular army, and Breckenridge -a former vice-president of the United States. Its division commanders -were, as a rule, soldiers of the old regular United States Army, and -were very capable officers. That army had two months before (or thought -it had) won the battle of Chickamauga, and it was now fighting--at -least in the centre where Thomas’s troops faced them--the same troops -they claimed to have defeated a short time ago. It had every advantage -of position at this time, and it had success in the past to fire -the hearts of its soldiers, and arouse in them confidence in their -ability to hurl back their old foe, who had the audacity to assault so -formidable a stronghold. - -Standing on any of the Union forts at Chattanooga, especially on Fort -Negley or Fort Wood, or better still on Orchard Knob, where Grant and -Thomas remained during the 25th, one would have not only a rear view -of the Union Army as it stood, but also a front view of most of the -Confederate force. From the top of Missionary Ridge, where Bragg had -his headquarters, the whole panorama was magnificent. The lines of -blue, and their array of glittering muskets, could be seen from there -in front. The backs of the troops were turned on Chattanooga. “Their -faces were to the foe.” Bragg had a view of them which Grant and Thomas -missed, and if he could have had an hour undisturbed by the conflicting -emotions aroused in him by the pending conflict, if he could have -watched through his field-glass the valorous mien, the confident air, -and the evident determination of these veteran soldiers, to “feed fat -the ancient grudge” against the old foes they had met at Mill Springs, -Perryville, Stone’s River, and Chickamauga, he would surely have -read in these characteristics the doom of the defeat which an hour -later overwhelmed him and his little army, and from which it never -sufficiently recovered to win another battle. Had he been half as much -of a philosopher, as he was a soldier, he would have foreseen, what -afterwards was expressed by one of his ablest generals (D. H. Hill), -that the holding of Chattanooga “sealed the fate of the confederacy.” - -The living, moving lines of soldiers, presented to the view of the -two opposing commanders, stationed at vantage points above the valley -in which the Union Army was then formed, although a most interesting -picture, was more impressive because of its background of magnificent -mountains, rivers, and hills. On the west rose great Lookout Mountain, -1,500 feet above the level of the valley; while across the valley, -east of Lookout, Missionary Ridge stretched from the north to the -South, rising 500 feet and crowned by the lines of grey soldiers, every -movement of whom could be seen from Orchard Knob. - -General Grant’s most excellent plan on the 24th was that Thomas’s -troops should bear to the left, join with the right of Sherman after -his forces had advanced to the tunnel, through which the railroad from -Chattanooga to East Tennessee ran, and together they should make an -assault with the whole union line. Thomas’s troops were in line until -3:30 p. m. on the 25th, waiting for Sherman to capture the hill over -the tunnel. General Sherman had begun the fight early in the morning -of the 25th by advancing Corse’s brigade; the latter moved down the -southern slope of the second hill which had been gained the day -before, and under a galling fire advanced against Cleburne’s fortified -position. This position was very strong, however, and Corse could not -drive the enemy from the hill. Then other brigades were brought up, -but they did not succeed in loosening Cleburne’s firm hold. General -Grant observing this from Orchard Knob sent the rest of Howard’s Corps -to Sherman’s aid at 10 a. m. Howard had two divisions, Steinwehr’s and -Schurz’s. It was evident, that Bragg endeavored most vigorously to keep -Sherman from turning his right. Had Sherman succeeded in his effort, he -would have been in Bragg’s rear and able to menace his line of retreat -at Chickamauga station, which was immediately in the rear of the right -flank. There was no evidence, however, that Bragg was weakening his -lines in front of Thomas; although he had already sent the forces, -which Hooker had defeated the day before on Lookout, to his right wing; -and these proved to be amply able to hold so strong a natural fortress -without any further reinforcements. When General Sherman received -Howard’s two divisions, he renewed his efforts to take Tunnel Hill; he -made a charge and received one in return, which broke some of John E. -Smith’s brigades. - -It appears that Grant did not contemplate any attack by Thomas on the -centre, when he at noon ordered Baird to report to Sherman; for with -Baird’s he had already detached nearly half of Thomas’s troops to -Sherman and Hooker. With Baird gone, Thomas had only eight brigades -to Sherman’s seven divisions; General Hooker had seven brigades as -far from General Thomas’s right, as General Sherman’s were from the -latter’s left. - -General Grant and General Thomas were together when these orders were -given on the 25th; they were in accordance with Grant’s original -plan, that Bragg’s defeat should be accomplished by Sherman’s turning -the enemy’s right. Grant must therefore have consulted with Thomas -concerning this maneuver. Whether General Thomas expressed his opinion -on the 25th with regard to making the attack in some other place than -at Sherman’s line, is not known; but it will be seen, that the success -of the day pivoted around Thomas, because of the invincible position -of the enemy at Tunnel Hill, and the valor of the old Army of the -Cumberland. This is no disparagement to General Grant’s original idea; -his plans were generally correct and successful, and this one was fine -in conception, but it shows definitely, that the “best laid schemes, -o’mice and men, gang aft a’gley.” - -General Grant boldly made his third deviation from his original outline -planned for the battle. Seeing the improbability of Sherman advancing -his present line to join with Thomas’s left, as contemplated, he -ordered an independent assault by Thomas’s troops alone; this order -was given at 3 p. m. This section of the Union line was covered by two -lines of skirmishers; and was confronted by something less than four -divisions of the enemy, namely, a part of Stewart’s on the Confederate -left, which was facing Hooker’s line under General Breckenridge’s -personal direction. The signal for the advance was to be six shots -from a battery (perhaps Bridge’s), on Orchard Knob. General Grant’s -report will best tell what occurred, viz.: “Thomas was accordingly -directed to move forward his troops, constituting our center, * * * -with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy -supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle-pits at -the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines, on -the rifle-pits with a view to carry the top of the ridge. These troops -moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the -ridge like bees from a hive--stopped but a moment until the whole -were in line--and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to -left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy, -without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley of grape -and canister from near thirty pieces of artillery and musketry from -still well-filled rifle-pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver, -however, was seen in all that long line of brave men. Their progress -was steadily onward until the summit was in their possession.”[39] - -When the summit was reached by the Union troops, the scene of confusion -and flight of the Confederate forces, down the eastern slope of the -ridge, was wonderful to behold. - -General Thomas in his report,[40] says: “Our troops advancing steadily -in a continuous line, the enemy, seized with panic, abandoned the works -at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to the crest, where -they were closely followed by our troops, who, apparently inspired -by the impulse of victory, carried the hill simultaneously at six -different points, and so closely upon the heels of the enemy, that many -of them were taken prisoners in the trenches. We captured all their -cannon and ammunition before they could be removed or destroyed.” - -In the meantime Hooker was advancing toward Thomas’s right with his -line stretched across the ridge, at right angles to it. Stewart’s -troops, seeing their left threatened by Hooker, tried to escape down -the eastern slope toward Ringgold, but encountering there Osterhaus’s -troops, moved northward along the base; here they ran into Johnson’s -division, and more than a thousand were captured. After General Baird’s -division had gained the summit, Stewart wheeled his division to the -left, across the crest, and advanced toward the troops, resisting -General Sherman. He had not advanced far before he met Cheatham’s -forces in line across the crest; the contest here lasted until after -dark. During the night all the Confederate forces retreated across the -Chickamauga, burned the bridges, and continued their flight to Taylor’s -Ridge, near Ringgold, the nearest heights across the Chickamauga -Valley, sixteen miles in a straight line southeast. General Sheridan, -after halting a few moments on top of the ridge to reform his troops, -pushed on to Chickamauga Creek; he captured 300 prisoners, 13 cannon, -and a train of 12 wagons. - -Mr. C. A. Dana sent a dispatch to the Secretary of War at 10 a. m. -November 26, which contained the following paragraph: “The storming of -the ridge by our troops was one of the greatest miracles in military -history. No man who climbs the ascent by any of the roads that wind -along its front can believe that 18,000 men were moved up its broken -and crumbling face unless it was his fortune to witness the deed. It -seems as awful as a visible interposition of God. Neither Grant, nor -Thomas intended it. Their orders were to carry the rifle-pits along -the base of the ridge, and capture their occupants; but when this was -accomplished, the unaccountable spirit of the troops bore them bodily -up those impracticable steeps, over the bristling rifle-pits on the -crest, and the thirty cannon enfilading every gully.” - -General Grant says in his report that he intended the lines should be -readjusted and ascend the ridge if they were successful at the base. -The reports of the corps and division commanders indicate that some of -them misunderstood the orders. The men advanced without special orders, -however, when they found the position at the foot of the ridge too much -exposed to the plunging fire of the enemy. In some instances they were -even called back to the foot after proceeding part way up the hill. -The assault was made, however, and was so successful, that no one was -court-martialed; no one was bold enough to repudiate the responsibility -for its initiation. General Grant did not hesitate to modify his -original plans from time to time, when inevitable circumstances showed -him that some other movement than the one laid down was essential to -success. This characteristic is the quality of a great general. - -The artillery also under command of General Brannan did fine service -during the assault. The large guns in Forts Wood, Sherman, Cheatham, -and battery Rousseau directed their fire first upon the Confederate -line at the foot of the ridge, as did four light batteries in front -of Chattanooga. When the Union line was ascending the ridge, this -artillery turned their shots to the entrenched Confederate line on top. -The enemy’s artillery and musketry seemed largely to have over-shot the -Union lines; the records do not show that the Union troops suffered -as heavy losses during the time they were under fire, as the enemy’s -apparently advantageous position would warrant. It is also probable -that the audacity of the blue coats in assaulting the top of the ridge -surprised the Confederates and induced nervousness, wild shooting, -terror, confusion, and flight. - -The Union troops did not advance up the ridge as if on parade; but -conformed more or less to the contour of the ground; the line appeared -to an onlooker as a zigzag one; but the standards were always where -they ought to be, and there were no stragglers. They did not fire -their muskets to any extent while advancing, although they received -a constant wild fire from the enemy. It was an assault by the musket -bearers, and it is not likely they received many orders from their -officers. As soon as the Union troops gained the crest at one point, -although it appeared as if the six different points were gained -simultaneously, it greatly assisted the rest of the troops, who were -so near the crest. The Confederates began to fall back as soon as the -first Union troops gained the top. General Bragg tried to send his -troops from a less threatened point to one more in danger, but his -attempt failed, because his men saw better than he seemed to do that -all was lost when one point was carried. This observation applies -only of course to the isolated line on the right and left of Bragg’s -headquarters, which was attacked by General Thomas’s troops. His troops -further to the right, beyond an unoccupied space--such as Cheatham’s -division--were not affected that way, because they turned on left -wheel, and attacked Baird’s division on the crest. - -The Union troops, which were called back to the foot of the ridge by -those officers who thought their orders carried them only thus far, -caused Bragg to believe that they had been repulsed by the fire of -his troops; he rode along his line congratulating them, when he was -informed that his line was broken further to the right, and the Union -forces had crowned the ridge. The victory was gained too late in the -evening to ensure an effective pursuit. The enemy had all night, after -crossing the Chickamauga, in which to move undisturbed his troops and -wagon trains; he made the distance between himself and the pursuing -force as great as possible before morning. General Grant was apparently -justified in waiting for Hooker to arrive at Rossville before he -ordered Thomas’s advance, but he was not justified in waiting so long -as he did for Sherman’s expected capture of Tunnel Hill. Yet who could -hope or believe that Thomas’s troops could successfully assault so -formidable a position as they did? Hooker was delayed four hours in -crossing Chattanooga Creek. If Grant had sent Howard’s Corps at 10 a. m. -on the 25th to Rossville in Hooker’s place, instead of sending it -to Sherman, and as soon as it was in position, ordered Thomas, Howard, -and Sherman to advance in unison, the same result would have occurred -at one or two o’clock as was secured much later, and then the four and -a half or five hours of daylight would have been sufficient to injure -the Confederate Army very greatly before it could have crossed the -Chickamauga. But it is very easy to look back and criticise. On the -battlefield there may be reasons, apparent to a commander, why these -supposable movements could not be made that are not so palpable to a -historian, who may lose sight of all the complex situations, the inside -knowledge of the commander, and his fearful responsibility to the -country. - -The pursuit was taken up on the morning of the 26th by General Hooker’s -troops and Palmer’s Fourteenth Corps. Hooker attacked the enemy in a -strong position at Ringgold Gap on Taylor’s Ridge; he lost heavily -without inflicting corresponding injury on the enemy. The Fourth -Corps was marched back to the city on the morning of the 26th to make -preparations for the relief of Burnside at Knoxville. - -On the 27th, the pursuit was abandoned at Ringgold, twenty-three miles -by rail south of Chattanooga. General Grant telegraphed from that place -at 2 p. m. to General Halleck at Washington, D. C.: “I am not prepared -to continue pursuit further.” The official reports neither give the -strength of the Union Army nor of the Confederate Army. At the time of -the attack on Missionary Ridge the Union Army outnumbered largely the -Confederate Army. A large part of this disparity in numbers was offset -by the extraordinarily strong position of the Confederate forces, -and the fact that the Union Army was the aggressor. Could Bragg have -commanded the resources that Grant did, he would have gladly availed -himself of them in order to outnumber the Union Army; no false notions -of chivalry prevented either army from availing itself of any great -advantage in battle, which is habitually taken where war is waged. The -Confederate boast at the beginning of the war that one Confederate -could out-fight five Yankees--as all northern troops were called by the -Confederates--was rather incompatible with their complaint after the -war, that they were crushed only by weight of numbers. - -Military skill will sometimes win battles against numbers; this was not -the case in the battles around Chattanooga, however. Bragg does not -give his losses in his official report; but he lost to the Union Army -in prisoners 6,142 men, 42 pieces of artillery, 69 gun carriages, and -7,000 stands of small arms. He destroyed much other material before and -during his flight. - -The Union less was 5,286 killed and wounded, and 330 missing. -These losses seem small compared with other battles of less -importance--Chickamauga for instance; but it must be remembered that -the sacrifice for the continued possession of Chattanooga by the Union -Army includes also all the losses of the conflicts of the Tullahoma -campaign, of Chickamauga, Wauhatchie, Lookout Mountain, Orchard Knob, -and Missionary Ridge. When it is considered how much these battles -meant, in their causal effect on the final suppression of the -rebellion itself, their value becomes apparent. - - -WISCONSIN TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE - -Wisconsin’s part in the battle of Missionary Ridge was important and -honorable. The First and Twenty-first Infantry were in Starkweather’s -brigade of Johnson’s division. This brigade had lost heavily at -Chickamauga; it was assigned to remain in Chattanooga in order to hold -the works, while the army was assaulting the ridge. This duty was -cheerfully and thoroughly done, although it deprived the brigade of the -glory of charging up the ridge. - -The Tenth Infantry remained on detached duty holding a fort south of -the Crutchfield house, on the side of Lookout Mountain, and did not -ascend the ridge. - -The Fifteenth Infantry was attached to Willich’s brigade of Wood’s -division of Granger’s fourth corps; it was commanded by Captain John A. -Gordon. In the ascent of the ridge it was in the reserve line of the -brigade, therefore its loss was nominal; the entire loss during the -battles was 6 men wounded. General Willich speaks of the regiment in -high terms in his report. It consisted only of 130 men. - -Before coming to the Army of the Cumberland the Fifteenth Infantry had -distinguished itself. On October 19, 1862, Major Quincy McNeill of the -Second Illinois Cavalry wrote to the Governor of Wisconsin, from Island -Number Ten, that there was no braver man in the service than Captain -John A. Gordon. - -The Eighteenth Infantry came with Sherman’s troops of the Army of the -Tennessee; it was commanded by Colonel Gabriel Bouck and attached -to the First Brigade (Alexander’s), of the Second Division (General -John E. Smith’s), of the Seventeenth Corps. This infantry regiment -was engaged with Sherman’s troops on the extreme left; its losses are -not reported. It was organized at Milwaukee in February, 1862, and -was mustered in March. It proceeded to Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, -and became a part of the Army of the Tennessee on April 5, 1862. This -regiment was heavily engaged in the battle at that place on April -6; also in the battle of Corinth and other engagements prior to its -coming to Chattanooga. The Eighteenth Infantry was noted for the size -of its men; it was said that Company G of this regiment averaged by -actual weight 160 pounds to the man. At the battle of Pittsburg Landing -on April 6, 1862, this regiment was in the left brigade of General -Prentiss’s division; it was then commanded by its first colonel, J. -S. Alban. It formed for battle only thirty rods from its tents, and -fifteen minutes later the Confederate line was upon it. The enemy -outflanked and overpowered it; Alban was wounded, and carried from the -field, dying soon afterwards; the Lieutenant-Colonel was also wounded -and Major Crane was killed. All this occurred one week after the -regiment left its camp of organization in Wisconsin. Captain Gabriel -Bouck, Company E, Second Wisconsin Infantry was made Colonel of the -Eighteenth on April 22, 1862. - -The Twenty-fourth Infantry was attached to Francis T. Sherman’s Brigade -of Sheridan’s division of the Fourth Corps, and was commanded by Major -Carl Von Baumbach. His official report is a vivid account of how the -top of the ridge was gained, “My regiment advanced in admirable line -of battle up to the first pits of the enemy. Upon reaching the first -line, the men were pretty much exhausted, and unable to move for some -time. In about five minutes, however, we moved over the first pits -of the enemy, but after advancing beyond the first line, the line of -battle was not regular. The men took advantage of all obstacles, in -the way, for shelter, and thus advanced toward the top of the ridge. -The fighting was fierce and severe, but owing to the formation of the -ground my men were able to screen themselves partially, from the deadly -volleys, that were being hurled at us, at every step of our advance. In -the course of the ascent my men had to rest several times on account -of exhaustion. But at length we succeeded in gaining the crest of the -ridge, after two hours steady fighting * * * I would most respectfully -mention Adjutant Arthur McArthur, Jr., for his bravery. When the color -sergeant was exhausted he carried the flag in front of the regiment, -cheering the men to follow him up the ridge.” - -The loss of the Twenty-fourth is given as 31 killed and wounded. -Captain Howard Greene and Lieutenant Robert J. Chivas were killed. -Captain Richard H. Austin and Lieutenant Thomas E. Balding were -wounded. Major Von Baumbach commended especially the bravery of the -latter two. - -The Twenty-sixth Infantry, still in the second brigade of Schurz’s -division of the Eleventh Corps, was commanded by Major F. C. Winkler; -this regiment followed the movements of its brigade and on November 25, -was with Sherman on the extreme left. Its losses are not reported. - -The Third, Eighth, and Tenth light batteries were in the First Brigade -of the Second Division of the artillery reserve. Company C of the first -heavy artillery was in the Second Brigade of the same division. - -The Eighth Battery did excellent service on the evening of the 24th, -when Carlin’s brigade crossed Chattanooga Creek at its mouth and joined -Hooker. Lieutenant O. German, commanding the battery, placed two -sections near the mouth of the creek on its right bank, and shelled the -Confederate position and the road up the east of the mountain. On the -25th, after the infantry had taken Missionary Ridge it ascended to the -crest. Losses, none. - -The Fifth Battery was part of the artillery which was so placed as -to cover the pontoon bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, where -Sherman’s troops crossed on the 24th. - -The Twelfth Battery was placed on a hill near the location of the Fifth -Battery. - -The Sixth and Twelfth batteries were attached officially to the Second -Division of the Seventeenth Corps; therefore they were on the left with -Sherman during the 25th. Their losses are not reported. - -There is no report from the Tenth Battery, which was stationed -at Harrison’s Landing, about twelve miles up the river, east of -Chattanooga; a section of this battery reported to Colonel Eli Long (of -the cavalry) at Calhoun, Tennessee. - -Battery C of the First Regiment of Wisconsin Heavy Artillery was -mustered in October 1, 1863; it was sent directly to Chattanooga and -assigned to Fort Wood. - -The Sixth Wisconsin Battery was mustered into service at Racine, -Wisconsin, October 2, 1861. It did not leave the State until March -15, 1862, when it went to St. Louis. It took part in the siege of -Island Number Ten, the siege and battle of Corinth, and the siege of -Vicksburg. This battery came to Chattanooga with the Fifteenth Corps -under Sherman. - -The Tenth Wisconsin Light Battery was mustered into the service -at Milwaukee on February 10, 1862, with Captain Yates V. Beebe as -commander. It left the State March 18 and went to St. Louis. From there -it joined the Army of the Tennessee and took part in the battle of -Corinth. On September 14, 1862, it arrived at Nashville, and took part -in the battle of Stone’s River. It did active duty in various locations -until the date of the battles around Chattanooga. - -The Twelfth Wisconsin Battery was organized and equipped at Jefferson -Barracks, Missouri. It did service in both Tennessee and Mississippi -until coming to Chattanooga with General Sherman. - -The Army of the Cumberland--as reorganized prior to the battles around -Chattanooga--with General Thomas in command, was now in permanent -possession of Chattanooga. The Confederate Army took up its winter -quarters at Dalton, Georgia, on the railway twenty-eight miles -southeast of Chattanooga, across two mountain ranges. The assignment of -General Grant as commander of the Division of the Mississippi--giving -him command of all the forces, operating in the States of Kentucky, -Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi--which so greatly -contributed to the victories in the battles around Chattanooga, insured -also the permanent holding of that city. - -Whatever was accomplished by Rosecrans during the four months of the -campaign, beginning on June 23 at Murfreesboro, and ending on October -19, 1863 at Chattanooga, was done by him and his Army of the Cumberland -alone. He could not get any cooperation from the East or West. The -President and General Halleck at Washington, seemed to be in earnest -by the wording of their dispatches, as published in the _Rebellion -Record_, in urging and commanding Burnside in east Tennessee and the -Army of the Tennessee on the Mississippi to join with Rosecrans prior -to the battle of Chickamauga; for reasons not apparent to the reader -of present history, no reinforcements came. It is pathetic to read the -official record of those days, which gives an account of the struggles, -the marches, the battles, the sacrifices, the patient endurance by the -musket bearers of extreme fatigue, and the cheerfulness with which the -soldiers endured all. They faced death without a thought of their real -heroism. To one who went through the campaign and came out alive and -unwounded it is incomprehensible, that all did not die. - -It is true other armies, such as those of the Potomac, the Tennessee, -and the one in Missouri had campaigns at the same time and were -equally exposed to the hazards of war; but none of them marched over a -territory so mountainous and so difficult; none of them fought battles -in so perilous a region or with more deadly effect, than the soldiers -in the battle of Chickamauga. Had the Union Army been really defeated -and had it lost Chattanooga, the army could hardly have recovered -from the disaster, without the quick aid of large reinforcements, -which were too far away at that time to be available in an emergency. -Burnside was besieged at Knoxville, and the Army of the Tennessee so -far away, that it took weeks to get it to Chattanooga. It will be -of great interest to the future student of the military history of -the War between the States to follow the subsequent campaigns of the -Western armies after Grant became commander-in-chief, and Sherman was -assigned to the command in the West, with headquarters at Chattanooga. -He will apprehend how all the armies worked together, and how soon -the rebellion itself was crushed, although its soldiers fought to the -bitter end. - - - - -INDEX - - -[Armies, Battles, Corps, Creeks, Forts, Gaps, Islands, Losses, -Mountains, Rivers, and Wars are grouped under those respective heads; -Regiments are grouped under the caption of their respective States.] - - Adams, Gen. Daniel W., at Chickamauga, 99, 100, 104. - - Alabama, 8-10; - troops in, 33, 232; - 28th Infantry, 191. - - Alexander, Col. E. Porter, at Knoxville, 181. - - Alexander, Col. Jesse I., at Missionary Ridge, 205, 226. - - Alexander’s Bridge, near Chickamauga, 69, 72, 77. - - Alpine (Ga.), 61, 63, 72-75. - - Anderson, Gen. Patton, at Missionary Ridge, 205. - - Anderson, Gen. Robert, in Kentucky, 15. - - Anderson’s Cross Roads (Tenn.), 159. - - ARMIES-- - Cumberland, 1, 3, 5, 8, 13, 15, 164, 177, 178, 201, 206-208, 226, - 232; - organization, 12, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28; - commander, 16; - reorganized, 164, 169, 170, 231; - reinforced, 135, 189; - retreats, 155; - at Murfreesboro, 4, 5, 11; - in Chickamauga campaign, 52-154; - at Chattanooga, 186; - courage of, 22, 180, 214; - personnel, 25-27, 33. - Mississippi, 12. - Ohio, 15, 169. - Potomac, 4, 158, 177, 178, 208, 233. - Tennessee (Confederate), 1, 33; - organized, 33-39; - in Chickamauga campaign, 52-154; - on Missionary Ridge, 202-222. - Tennessee (Union), 4, 5, 158, 159, 169, 201, 208, 226, 231-233. - - Armstrong, Gen. Frank C., at Chickamauga, 117. - - Atlanta (Ga.), capture, 3, 5, 10. - - Austin, Capt. Richard H., wounded, 229. - - - Baird, Gen. Absalom, of regular army, 23; - commands division, 19, 21, 166; - in Chickamauga campaign, 60, 65, 66, 68; - at battle of Chickamauga, 79, 81-103, 107, 108, 111, 112, 115, 122, - 126-129, 139-142, 145, 152; - withdraws, 123, 125, 129; - at Rossville, 124; - Orchard Knob, 190; - Missionary Ridge, 202-205, 213, 216, 221; - commended, 148, 149. - - Balding, Lieut. Thomas E., 132; - wounded, 229. - - Barker, Capt. John D., aide to Thomas, 120, 122. - - Barnes, Gen. Sidney M., at Chickamauga, 104, 107, 109, 113, 142. - - Bate, Gen. William B., at Missionary Ridge, 205. - - Battle Creek (Tenn.), 60, 167. - - BATTLES-- - Antietam, 137. - Bull Run, 15, 137. - Carnifex Ferry, 12. - Chancellorsville, 4, 137. - Chickamauga, mentioned, 14, 17, 19-21, 30, 34, 37, 81, 126, 157, - 207, 224, 233; - not a failure, 52; - described, 67-124; - criticized, 13, 135-150. - Corinth, 12, 32, 227, 231. - Crampton’s Gap, 137. - Dug Gap, 65-69. - Fredericksburg, 137. - Gettysburg, 4, 136-138. - Guy’s Gap, 44, 46. - Harper’s Ferry, 137. - Hoover’s Gap, 2, 43, 44. - Island Number Ten, 29, 32. - Iuka, 12. - Leet’s Tanyard, 65. - Liberty Gap, 2, 42, 43. - Lookout Mountain, mentioned, 135, 181, 212, 224; - described, 192-201. - Middle Creek, 14. - Mill Springs, 15, 16, 210. - Missionary Ridge, mentioned, 2, 135, 189, 192, 193; - described, 201-222. - Orchard Knob, mentioned, 135, 224; - described, 189-194. - Perryville, 3, 16, 20, 22, 28-35, 210. - Pittsburg Landing, 226, 227. - Rich Mountain, 12. - Ringgold Gap, 222, 223. - Shepardstown, 137. - Shiloh, 31, 34, 35, 50, 137. - South Mountain, 137. - Stone’s River, 1, 2, 11, 13, 16, 22, 28-37, 137, 144, 210, 231. - Vicksburg, 5. - Tunnel Hill, 185, 186, 206, 211-214, 221. - Wauhatchie, mentioned, 135, 224; - described, 176-182. - - Baumbach. See Von Baumbach. - - Beatty, Gen. John, at Chickamauga, 93, 99, 104, 113, 142; - at Chattanooga, 166. - - Beatty, Gen. Samuel, at Chattanooga, 166; - at Orchard Knob, 190; - at Missionary Ridge, 204. - - Beebe, Capt. Yates V., commands battery, 231. - - Bellefont (Ala.), 57. - - Benning, Gen. Henry L., at Chickamauga, 97, 138. - - Benton Barracks (Mo.), 30. - - Bingham, Col. George B., in Tullahoma campaign, 28; - at Chickamauga, 127. - - Bloody Pond, at Chickamauga, 80. - - Bouck, Col. Gabriel, commands regiment, 226, 227. - - Bowling Green (Ky.), 2, 3, 6, 11, 16. - - Boynton, Gen. H. V., cited, 85, 108, 109, 118, 136. - - Bradyville (Tenn.), 41, 43. - - Bragg, Gen. Braxton, Confederate commander, 2, 33, 34; - at Tullahoma, 39, 40; - at Chattanooga, 54, 55; - plans, 57, 183, 189; - evacuates Chattanooga, 63, 64, 67; - at Lafayette, 65, 66, 68; - reinforced, 66, 67, 76, 98; - at Chickamauga, 58, 62, 69-80, 85, 87, 99, 116, 117, 119; - size of army, 136; - after Chickamauga, 124, 146, 151, 156-161; - line near Chattanooga, 181-194; - at Missionary Ridge, 205-213, 220-224; - reports, 49, 67. - - Brannan, Gen. John M., of regular army, 23; - commands division, 17, 24, 66; - in Tullahoma campaign, 41; - at Chickamauga, 82-96, 103-115, 119, 127, 138-142, 151; - withdraws, 123, 125; - chief of artillery, 169; - at Missionary Ridge, 219; - commended, 148; - reports, 85, 86. - - Breckenridge, Gen. John C., at Chickamauga, 82, 90, 96-100, 104, 110, - 117, 140, 141, 148; - Missionary Ridge, 205, 209, 214; - characterized, 34, 35. - - Bridge, Lyman, commands Illinois battery, 192, 214. - - Bridgeport (Ala.), railway junction, 6, 7, 28, 52-54, 56, 59, 60, 159, - 162, 163, 166, 171-174, 176, 177, 180, 184, 187, 189, 194; - supply station, 134; - road to, 156; - steamboat at, 179; - Bragg at, 19, 49; - Gordon, 83; - garrisoned, 167; - troops cross at, 176. - - Broomtown Valley (Ala.), 63. - - Brotherton, ----, house near Chickamauga, 80, 81, 91, 92, 116. - - Brown, Gen. John C., at Missionary Ridge, 206. - - Brown’s Ferry (Tenn.), fortified, 172-176; - captured, 178; - bridge at, 179, 185, 187, 192, 194. - - Buckner, Gen. Simon B., in East Tennessee, 59; - reinforces Bragg, 60, 67, 70; - in Chickamauga campaign, 66, 68; - at Chickamauga, 97, 98, 142; - characterized, 35. - - Buel, C. C., and Johnson, Robert U., _Battles and Leaders of Civil - War_, 74, 116, 147. - - Buell, Gen. D. C., Confederate officer, 2, 3, 11, 16, 28, 31, 32; - at Chattanooga, 50. - - Buell, Gen. George P., at Chickamauga, 106, 113, 117. - - Burnside, Gen. Ambrose E., in East Tennessee, 59, 66, 67, 158, 232, - 234; - at Knoxville, 169, 181-184, 189, 223. - - Buschbeck, Col. Adolphus, at Missionary Ridge, 204. - - - Calhoun (Tenn.), 230. - - Cameron Hill, at Chattanooga, 173. - - Camp Dick Robinson (Ky.), 15. - - Caperton’s Ferry (Ala.), location, 57, 59; - crossed, 60, 61. - - Carlin, Gen. William P., commands brigade, 43, 201; - at Chickamauga, 108; - Chattanooga, 166, 167; - Lookout Mountain, 200; - Missionary Ridge, 202, 204. - - Carpenter, Capt. Stephen J., commands battery, 32. - - _Century Magazine_, cited, 74. - - Chapin, Col. Alfred R., commands regiment, 28. - - Chattanooga (Tenn.), location, 55; - importance of, 3, 7-9, 39, 51, 71, 119, 134; - railway terminus, 6, 177; - in 1862, 50; - held by Confederates, 49, 52-54, 58, 63; - evacuated, 63; - Union army - enters, 64; - Union troops at, 72, 76, 77, 109, 112, 135, 181, 188, 200, 210, 219, - 225, 227, 230, 231, 234; - troops withdraw to, 125, 129, 133, 146, 152; - siege of, 156-163; - steamboat built, 179; - Union forts at, 209; - battles near, 2, 5, 31, 155-234; - permanently occupied, 232; - Rosecrans retires to, 121; - reports from, 144, 210. - - Chattanooga Valley, 54, 188, 189, 199-201, 206. - - Cheatham, Gen. Benjamin F., at Chickamauga, 86, 89, 96, 97, 138, 139, - 141; - advances, 125; - at Missionary Ridge, 205, 217, 220. - - Chickamauga campaign, 51-154. See also Battles: Chickamauga. - - Chickamauga Station, 125, 212. - - Chickamauga Valley, topography, 11, 126, 217. See also Creeks: - Chickamauga. - - Chivas, Lieut. Robert J., killed, 229. - - Christiana (Tenn.), 41. - - Cincinnati _Gazette_, cited, 52. - - Clarksville (Tenn.), 20. - - Cleburne, Gen. Patrick R., commands division, 43; - in Chickamauga campaign, 58, 66, 68; - at battle of Chickamauga, 82, 89, 90, 96, 97, 100-102, 128, 139, - 141; - at Missionary Ridge, 205, 212; - report, 101; - characterized, 100. - - Cockerill, Col. Joseph R., at Missionary Ridge, 205. - - Columbus (Ky.), 32. - - Connell, Col. John M., at Chickamauga, 106, 113. - - Colquitt, Gen. Peyton H., killed, 102. - - CORPS-- - 4th, formation, 165, 170; - officers, 168; - at Missionary Ridge, 186, 203, 206; - Orchard Knob, 189, 190; - Lookout Mountain, 194; - Chattanooga, 222; - Wisconsin troops in, 168, 225, 227. - 11th, comes to Chattanooga, 159, 170; - at Nashville, 162; - Wauhatchie, 177, 178; - Orchard Knob, 190, 191; - Missionary Ridge, 186, 187; - Wisconsin troops in, 168, 177, 178, 229. - 12th, reinforces Chattanooga, 159, 170; - at Nashville, 162; - Wauhatchie, 177, 178; - Lookout Mountain, 194; - Wisconsin troops in, 168, 177. - 14th, formation, 12, 17, 19; - commanders, 12, 168; - officers of, 21, 24; - medical director, 110; - in Tullahoma campaign, 43-47; - at Decherd, 53; - advances, 56, 57, 60, 65, 76; - at Chickamauga, 76-79, 86, 88; - reorganized, 165, 166, 170; - at Orchard Knob, 190, 191; - Lookout Mountain, 200; - Missionary Ridge, 185, 193, 206; - pursues enemy, 222; - Wisconsin troops in, 28, 30, 127, 167, 168, 201. - 15th, reinforces Chattanooga, 159; - at Lookout Mountain, 194, 201; - Wisconsin troops in, 231. - 17th, portion sent to Chattanooga, 159; - Wisconsin troops in, 226, 230. - 20th, formation, 12, 18; - commander, 17, 23; - medical director, 110; - in Tullahoma campaign, 46, 47; - at Winchester, 53; - Alpine, 74, 75; - advances, 56-61, 76; - at Chickamauga, 73, 76-79, 86-88; - Wisconsin troops in, 29, 30, 32, 33, 59, 130, 131, 133, 134; - merged in 4th Corps, 165. - 21st, formation, 12, 18; - commander, 17; - in Tullahoma campaign, 43, 45, 46; - at McMinnville, 53; - advances, 56-64; - at Chickamauga, 70, 73, 74, 78, 86-88; - Wisconsin troops in, 31, 133; - merged in 4th Corps, 165. - Cavalry, 18, 31. - Reserve, 19, 83, 165. - For Confederate Corps, see names of commanders. - - Corse, Col. John M., at Missionary Ridge, 204, 211, 212. - - Cowan (Tenn.), 47. - - Crane, Maj. Josiah W., killed, 227. - - Craven, ----, house on Lookout Mountain, 197. - - Crawfish Springs (Ga.), 71, 78-80, 82, 87, 93, 99, 153. - - CREEKS-- - Big Crow, 53. - Chattanooga, 124, 155, 196, 199-202, 222, 229. - Chickamauga, 60, 64, 66, 69, 70, 73, 76, 81, 82, 119, 133, 181, 185, - 201; - described, 71; - crossed, 72, 78, 79, 85, 99, 187, 230; - retreat across, 217, 221, 222. - Citico, 190. - Island, 61. - Lookout, 195-197. - McBride’s, 44. - South Chickamauga, 186. - - Crittenden, Senator John, son of, 17. - - Crittenden, Gen. Thomas L., commands division, 12; - at Hoover’s Gap, 43; - in Tullahoma campaign, 45; - Chickamauga campaign, 63, 64, 68, 69; - at battle of Chickamauga, 70, 72, 73, 76, 78, 82, 84, 86, 87, 91, - 94, 95, 109, 121, 133; - at Chattanooga, 155; - characterized, 17. - - Crook, Gen. George, cavalry raid, 160, 161. - - Croxton, Gen. John T., at Chickamauga, 84, 85, 113, 114, 127; - at Chattanooga, 166; - commended, 148. - - Cruft, Gen. Charles, at Chattanooga, 165, 168; - Lookout Mountain, 194; - Missionary Ridge, 201, 203, 206. - - Crutchfield, ----, house on Lookout Mountain, 201, 225. - - Cumming, Gen. Alfred, at Missionary Ridge, 206. - - - Dalton (Ga.), Confederates at, 189, 232. - - Dana, C. A., assistant secretary of war, reports, 144, 145, 165, 207, - 217. - - Daniels, Col. Edward, cavalry officer, 30. - - Danville (Ky.), 15. - - Davis, Gen. Jefferson C., of regular army, 23; - commands division, 18; - in Tullahoma campaign, 43, 47; - Chickamauga campaign, 59; - battle of Chickamauga, 86, 87, 93, 95, 96, 106, 107, 109, 111, - 130-134, 142, 145, 151; - at Chattanooga, 166, 168; - Missionary Ridge, 185, 193, 201, 206; - characterized, 108. - - Davis’s Cross Roads (Ga.), 65, 68. - - Decherd (Tenn.), 52, 53, 160. - - Deshler, Gen. James, killed, 102. - - Dick, Gen. George F., at Chickamauga, 113. - - Drury, Capt. Lucius H., chief of artillery, 20, 31; - wounded, 133. - - Dyer, ----, house near Chickamauga, 81. - - - Eaglesville (Tenn.), 41. - - Ector, Gen. Matthew D., at Chickamauga, 85. - - Ely, Col. John H., at Chickamauga, 129; - captured, 130. - - Ewing, Gen. Hugh, at Trenton, 187; - Missionary Ridge, 204. - - - Fairfield (Tenn.), 44. - - Forrest, Gen. Nathan B., cavalry commander, 33; - raiding, 69, 146, 170; - in Chickamauga campaign, 69; - at battle of Chickamauga, 73, 82-85, 89, 95, 117, 140, 141, 153, - 154; - Rossville, 124; - characterized, 35, 36. - - FORTS: - Cheatham, 219; - Donelson, 16, 20, 35; - Henry, 16; - Leavenworth, 32; - Negley, 209; - Riley, 32; - Rosecrans, 6; - Sherman, 219; - Sumter, 15; - Wood, 190, 209, 219, 230. - - Fox, Capt. P. V., builds bridge, 176. - - Fox, Col. W. F., _Regimental Losses in Civil War_, 142. - - Frankfort (Ky.), 2. - - Franklin (Tenn.), 6. - - Furay, W. S., war correspondent, 51, 52. - - - Gallatin (Tenn.), 20. - - GAPS: - Bellbuckle, 40. - Cooper’s, 60, 63, 68, 75. - Crampton’s, 137. - Dug, 65, 66, 68, 72. See also Battles: Dug Gap. - Frick’s, 63. - Guy’s, 40, 44, 46. - Hoover’s, 2, 40, 42, 43. - Liberty, 2, 40, 42, 46. - McFarland’s, 71, 93, 109, 110, 123, 124, 131. - Rossville, 19, 76, 81, 83, 109, 114, 124, 146. - Ringgold, 222. - Stevens’s, 60, 63-65, 68, 71-74. - Winston’s, 61, 75. - - Gardner, Capt. George Q., commands Wisconsin battery, 32, 133, 134. - - Garfield, Gen. James A., at Chickamauga, 110, 112, 115, 120, 123; - leaves army, 168, 169; - commended, 48; - characterized, 13, 14. - - Gaw, Capt. W. B., at Chickamauga, 120. - - Geary, Gen. John W., at Wauhatchie, 177, 178, 180; - Lookout Mountain, 186, 194, 196-198, 200; - Missionary Ridge, 201-204. - - Georgia, boundary, 9; - soldiers from, 10; - Union troops in, 146, 232. - - German, Lieut. Obadiah, at Missionary Ridge, 229. - - Gist, Gen. State Rights, at Chickamauga, 98; - Missionary Ridge, 205. - - Glass’s Mill (Ga.), 70. - - Glenn, Widow ----, house near Chickamauga, 78-81, 131. - - Goldsmith, Capt. Gustavus, killed, 132. - - Gordon. See Lee and Gordon’s Mill. - - Gordon, Capt. John A., 225, 226. - - Govan, Gen. Daniel C, at Chickamauga, 98, 102, 138. - - Granger, Gen. Gordon, commands reserve, 19; - in Tullahoma campaign, 41, 44, 46; - at Chickamauga, 83, 114, 115, 118, 119, 121, 144, 151, 154; - withdraws, 123; - commended, 145, 148; - commands corps, 165; - at Orchard Knob, 189, 190; - Missionary Ridge, 202, 203, 225; - characterized, 21, 22. - - Granger, Gen. Robert S., commands brigade, 19; - at Nashville, 167. - - Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., at Vicksburg, 4, 5; - Shiloh, 31, 50; - captures Fort Donelson, 16, 35; - takes command at Chattanooga, 170-172, 207, 232; - plans, 182, 183, 185-189, 193, 194, 211-214, 218, 221, 222; - watches battle, 191; - at Missionary Ridge, 208-212; - reports, 215, 223; - commander-in-chief, 234; - genius of, 219. - - Greene, Capt. Howard, killed, 229. - - Gregg, Gen. David M., at Chickamauga, 138. - - Grose, Col. William, at Chickamauga, 93, 104, 111; - Chattanooga, 165; - Lookout Mountain, 186. - - Gross, Surgeon Ferdinand H., at Chickamauga, 110. - - - Halleck, Gen. H. W., commander-in-chief, 66, 67, 223, 232. - - Hanson, Capt. Hans, killed, 131. - - Hardee, Gen. William J., before the war, 15; - commands corps, 34, 40; - at Missionary Ridge, 205, 208; - characterized, 35. - - Harker, Gen. Charles G., at Chickamauga, 94, 113, 116, 117; - Chattanooga, 165; - Missionary Ridge, 204; - commended, 148. - - Harrison’s Landing (Tenn.), 230. - - Hauff, Capt. Henry, killed, 131. - - Hawley, Col. William, of Third Wisconsin, 177. - - Hazen, Gen. William B., in Chickamauga campaign, 58, 60, 61, 62, 64; - at battle of Chickamauga, 104, 107; - at Chattanooga, 166; - Brown’s Ferry, 174, 175; - Orchard Knob, 190, 191; - Missionary Ridge, 204; - commended, 148. - - Heald, Capt. Abner O., killed, 129. - - Heg, Col. Hans C., brigade commander, 29; - at Chickamauga, 59, 134; - killed, 87, 108, 130, 131. - - Helm, Gen. Ben Hardin, at Chickamauga, 99; - killed, 100. - - Hill, Gen. Daniel H., at Chickamauga, 70, 79, 89, 97, 102, 110, 116, - 126, 138; - cited, 73, 74, 146-149, 210. - - Hindman, Gen. Thomas C., in Chickamauga campaign, 66, 68; - at Chickamauga battle, 82, 96, 97, 113, 115, 132, 142; - report, 115, 116. - - Hiram College (Ohio), instructor, 14. - - Hobart, Col. Harrison C., commands regiment, 30; - at Chickamauga, 127; - captured, 129. - - Hood, Gen. John B., Confederate officer, 6; - at Chickamauga, 82, 96-98, 116, 138, 142; - wounded, 116; - at Knoxville, 181. - - Hooker, Gen. Joseph, at Chancellorsville, 4; - reinforces Chattanooga, 159, 161-163; - brings troops, 172, 174, 176; - at Wauhatchie, 177-180; - Lookout Mountain, 181, 184, 186, 187, 192-200, 212; - pursues Confederates, 201-208, 222; - at Missionary Ridge, 213, 214; - report, 186, 187. - - Howard, Gen. O. O., reinforces Chattanooga, 159; - at Wauhatchie, 177, 178; - Orchard Knob, 190, 191; - Missionary Ridge, 186, 187, 202, 208, 212, 222. - - Humphreys, Gen. Benjamin, at Chickamauga, 97. - - Huntsville (Ala.), 28, 160. - - - Illinois, troops from, 25; - 24th Infantry, 127; - 2nd Cavalry, 226; - 15th Cavalry, 194. - - Indiana, troops from, 25; - 29th Infantry, 42; - 39th Infantry, 42; - 44th Infantry, 114; - 2nd Cavalry, 159; - 4th Cavalry, 159; - 4th Battery, 127, 128. - - ISLANDS: - Number Ten, 29, 32, 226, 231; - Williams, 164, 173. - - Iuka (Miss.), 32. - - - Jackson, Gen. John K., at Chickamauga, 89, 138; - Lookout Mountain, 199. - - Jay’s Mill (Ga.), 73, 82, 83. - - Jefferson Barracks (Mo.), 231. - - Johnson, Gen. Bushrod R., Confederate officer, 69, 70; - at Chickamauga, 96, 97, 105, 106, 138, 147. - - Johnson, Capt. John M., killed, 131. - - Johnson, Gen. Richard W., commands division, 18, 43, 59, 201, 206, - 225; - of regular army, 23; - at Chickamauga, 86, 89, 91, 92, 100, 111, 128, 139-141, 145; - withdraws, 123; - at Stevenson, 167; - Orchard Knob, 190; - Lookout Mountain, 200; - Missionary Ridge, 204, 205; - commended, 148; - report, 42. - - Johnson, Robert U. See Buel and Johnson. - - Johnston, Gen. Albert S., Confederate officer, 15. - - Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., reinforces Bragg, 66. - - - Kansas, forts in, 32; - troops from, 25. - - Kelly’s farm, at Chickamauga, 71, 74, 78, 80-82, 85, 91, 92, 100, 103, - 105, 106, 114, 118, 122, 127, 128, 140; - charges at, 93, 122, 123. - - Kelly’s Ferry (Tenn.), 173, 174, 178-180, 194. - - Kenosha, troops from, 30. - - Kentucky, troops in, 15, 232; - troops from, 3, 25; - 8th Infantry, 200; - 9th Infantry, 113; - 17th Infantry, 113; - 2nd cavalry, 194; - senator, 34; - railroad through, 6; - Confederates evacuate, 16. - - Kershaw, Gen. Joseph B., at Chickamauga, 96, 97, 105. - - King, Gen. John H., brigade commander, 24; - at Chickamauga, 92, 100, 123; - Chattanooga, 166; - successor, 204. - - Knoxville (Tenn.), operations at, 158, 169, 184, 187, 189, 234; - Burnside at, 223. - - - Lafayette (Ga.), 63; - Bragg retreats to, 64-67, 71-74, 77; - road from, 72, 76, 78, 79, 82, 88, 91-95, 99, 103, 110, 118, 122, - 123, 127. - - LaGrange, Col. Oscar H., commands cavalry, 20, 31; - at Chickamauga, 132. - - Law, Gen. Evander M., at Chickamauga, 96, 97, 105, 116. - - Lee, Gen. Robert E., 4; - before the war, 15; - in Virginia, 67; - surrenders, 10, 52. - - Lee and Gordon’s Mill, at Chickamauga, 64, 65, 68-79, 82, 87, 92, 131. - - Leet’s Tanyard (Tenn.), skirmish at, 65. - - Lexington (Ky.), 15. - - Liddell, Gen. St. John R., at Chickamauga, 86, 98, 117, 122. - - Lightburn, Gen. Joseph A. J., at Missionary Ridge, 205. - - Lilly, Capt. Eli, artillery officer, 58. - - Lincoln, President Abraham, call for troops, 27; - orders, 165, 169, 170, 232; - persistence, 38. - - Livingston, Lieut. Courtland, commands battery, 31; - at Chickamauga, 133. - - Long, Col. Eli, cavalry officer, 187, 230. - - Longstreet, Gen. James, reinforces Bragg, 66, 70, 80; - advances, 126; - at Chickamauga, 95-98, 104, 106, 112, 113, 116, 118, 143, 148, 149; - Wauhatchie, 178-182; - advises Bragg, 156, 189; - goes to Knoxville, 181, 182, 187, 189; - estimates losses, 138; - reports, 116, 151, 180, 181; - _From Manassas to Appomatox_, 135, 136. - - Lookout Valley, Union army in, 54, 60-62, 75, 176; - opened, 179, 184, 186, 187; - Confederates in, 195. - - Loomis, Col. John M., at Missionary Ridge, 205. - - LOSSES: - in Tullahoma campaign, 48, 49; - at Chickamauga, 135-137, 141-144, 148; - at Missionary Ridge, 224. - - Louisville (Ky.), Union troops at, 2, 3, 6, 8, 16, 27-29, 31, 50; - Grant at, 171. - - Louisville and Chattanooga Railroad, 20. - - Lumley’s Stand (Tenn.), 42. - - Lyon, Col. William P., commands regiment, 20. - - Lytle, Gen. William H., at Chickamauga, 87; - killed, 80, 109, 131. - - - McAffee’s Church, at Chickamauga, 83, 114, 154. - - McArthur, Adj. Arthur Jr., commended, 228. - - McCook, Gen. Alexander D., commands division, 12, 45, 63, 72, 74; - in Tullahoma campaign, 42; - at Chickamauga, 73-75, 78, 86, 87, 91-95, 109, 110, 121, 128, 153; - Rossville, 124; - Chattanooga, 155; - staff-officer of, 120; - characterized, 17, 23. - - McCook, Gen. Daniel, at Chickamauga, 83, 84, 144; - Chattanooga, 144. - - McCook, Col. Edward M., at Chickamauga, 132; - cavalry raid, 159, 160. - - McDonald, ----, house near Chickamauga, 81. - - McKercher, Maj. Duncan, captured, 130. - - McLaws, Gen. Lafayette, at Chickamauga, 97; - Knoxville, 181. - - McLean, Lieut. John D., artillery officer, 33; - at Chickamauga, 134. - - McLemore’s Cove, near Chickamauga, 60, 63-65, 68, 70-75, 78. - - McMinnville (Tenn.), railroad junction, 39, 53, 56, 60; - captured, 159. - - McNeill, Maj. Quincy, at Island Number Ten, 226. - - Manchester (Tenn.), pikeroad to, 39; - operations near, 42-46. - - Maney, Gen. George, at Missionary Ridge, 206. - - Marshall, Gen. Humphrey, Confederate officer, 14. - - Martin, Gen. John A., replaces Heg, 108, 130. - - Martin, Gen. William T., cavalry officer, 159. - - Maryland, Confederates invade, 4. - - Matthies, Gen. Charles L., at Missionary Ridge, 204. - - Meade, Gen. George C., at Gettysburg, 4. - - Memphis (Tenn.), troops from, 158. - - Michigan, troops from, 25; - 1st Engineers, 176. - - Mill Springs (Ky.), 15, 16. - - Miller, Col. J. McClelland, at Liberty Gap, 42. - - Millersburg (Tenn.), 42. - - Milwaukee, troops muster at, 27, 28, 30, 177, 226, 231. - - Minnesota, troops from, 25. - - Minty, Gen. Robert H. G., in Chickamauga campaign, 57, 61, 62; - at battle of Chickamauga, 72, 77; - withdraws, 125; - at Rossville, 124. - - Mississippi, troops from, 66, 70, 98; - troops in, 169, 231; - Union troops, 232. - - Missouri, troops from, 25; - Wisconsin troops in, 30; - Union army, 233. - - Mitchell, Gen. John G., at Chickamauga, 114; - Wauhatchie, 179; - commended, 148. - - Mitchell, Gen. O. M., in Alabama, 28. - - Mitchell, Gen. Robert B., cavalry officer, 18, 41, 42; - at Chickamauga, 83, 99, 112, 147, 153, 154; - Rossville, 124; - raiding, 160. - - Mitchell, Capt. William S., killed, 129. - - Moccasin Point, fortified, 173. - - Moore, Gen. John C., at Lookout Mountain, 197, 199. - - Morgan, Gen. James D., commands division, 19; - at Chickamauga, 83; - Chattanooga, 166, 167. - - MOUNTAINS-- - Cumberland, 7-9, 47-49, 52-55. - Horse, 40. - Horseshoe Ridge, 107, 111. - Lookout, 51-55, 60, 62, 76, 155, 156, 172, 173, 176, 204, 205, 211, - 225; - crossed, 63, 64, 68; - Confederates on, 63, 126, 180-185, 187-189, 192-194; - described, 195, 196. - See also Battles: Lookout Mountain. - Missionary Ridge, 55, 56, 63, 81, 93, 109, 115, 126, 156, 182-186, - 190, 209, 211, 230; - Confederates on, 188-191. - See also Battles: Missionary Ridge. - Pigeon, 55, 65, 69, 71. - Raccoon, 173. - Sand, 53-55, 59, 62. - Taylor’s Ridge, 217, 222. - Walden’s Ridge, 54, 55, 58, 156, 161, 173. - - Mullis, ----, farm near Chickamauga, 123. - - Murfreesboro (Tenn.), Union troops at, 1, 2, 4-8, 11, 14, 28-30, 39, - 44, 232; - advance from, 46-48, 134; - railroad centre, 6, 52, 160. - - - Nashville (Tenn.), troops at, 20, 30-32, 231; - railroad terminus, 3, 6, 9, 160-163. - - Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, 3, 9, 166. - - Negley, Gen. James S., takes command, 17; - in Tullahoma campaign, 47; - Chickamauga, 60, 65, 66, 68; - at battle of Chickamauga, 78, 79, 82, 87, 93, 94, 100, 105, 107, - 108, 113, 114, 140, 142, 148; - Rossville, 124; - report, 110. - - New Madrid (Mo.), 31. - - New York, 1st Infantry, 194. - - Nickles, Lieut. Robert J., killed, 69. - - North Carolina, invaded, 10. - - Northwest Territory, troops from, 25. - - - Ohio, troops from, 14, 25; - 1st Infantry, 194; - 13th Infantry, 113; - 15th Infantry, 42; - 21st Infantry, 113; - 73d Infantry, 179; - representative in Congress, 168. - - Orchard Knob, captured, 190, 192, 194; - vantage point, 209, 211, 212; - battery on, 214. - See also Battles: Orchard Knob. - - Oshkosh, troops from, 29. - - Osterhaus, Gen. Peter J., crosses the Tennessee, 192, 193; - at Lookout Mountain, 194; - Missionary Ridge, 203, 216; - pursues enemy, 201. - - - Paducah (Ky.), 16. - - “Paint Rock,” steamboat, 58. - - Palmer, Gen. John M., commands division, 18, 58, 194; - in Tullahoma campaign, 41; - at Chickamauga, 78, 86, 91, 92, 96, 102, 104, 107, 111, 139-141, - 145; - withdraws, 123; - commended, 148; - promoted, 168; - at Chattanooga, 165; - Missionary Ridge, 202; - pursues enemy, 222; - characterized, 21. - - Patterson, Gen. Robert, 15. - - Pegram, Gen. John, in Chickamauga campaign, 69. - - Pelham (Tenn.), 57. - - Pennsylvania, Confederates invade, 4; - troops from, 25; - 77th Infantry, 42; - 79th Infantry, 44, 127. - - Perkins, Surgeon Jabez, at Chickamauga, 110. - - Pettus, Gen. Edmund W., at Lookout Mountain, 199. - - Phelps, Col. Edward H., at Missionary Ridge, 204. - - Pikeville (Tenn.), 55. - - Pinney, Capt. Oscar F., 31. - - Pittsburg Landing, 226. - - Poe, ----, house near Chickamauga, 81, 92. - - Polk, Gen. Leonidas, commands corps, 33, 40, 68, 69; - at Chickamauga, 70, 72, 95, 97-100, 148; - advances, 126; - characterized, 35. - - Pond Spring (Ga.), 78. - - Pope, Gen. John, at Island Number Ten, 32. - - Post, Col. Philip Sidney, in Tullahoma campaign, 43; - at Chickamauga, 133. - - Prentiss, Gen. B. M., 227. - - Preston, Gen. William, at Chickamauga, 96, 97, 112, 142. - - - Racine, troops from, 31, 231. - - Raum, Col. Green B., at Missionary Ridge, 204. - - _Rebellion Records_, cited, 42, 48, 49, 67, 75, 84, 85, 90, 101, 115, - 117, 121, 123, 129, 144, 145, 148, 151, 180, 195, 215, 216, 232. - - Reed’s Bridge, near Chickamauga, 69, 72, 73, 76, 82-85. - - Rennie, Lieut. Robert, killed, 130. - - Reynolds, Gen. Joseph J., commands division, 17, 44; - in Tullahoma campaign, 44; - Chickamauga campaign, 58, 66; - at battle of Chickamauga, 82, 86, 91-96, 103-107, 111, 139-141, 145; - withdraws, 122, 123; - made chief of staff, 166; - commended, 148. - - Richardson, Lieut. James S., killed, 129. - - Richmond (Va.), 4, 10, 49, 52, 67. - - Ringgold (Ga.), 64, 69, 70, 74, 77, 114, 216, 217, 223; - road from, 124. - - RIVERS-- - Cumberland, 7, 15. - Duck, 7, 39, 40. - Elk, 7, 40, 47. - Hiawassie, 56, 59. - Little, 75. - Mississippi, 4, 31, 158, 232. - Ohio, 25. - Sequatchie, 54, 55. - Tennessee, 7-9, 52-54, 71, 126, 196; - described, 54; - valley of, 58; - bends, 172; - bridged, 163; - crossed, 19, 59-62, 157, 160, 176, 201; - Confederates command, 155, 156; - armies on, 169. - - Robertson, Gen. Jerome B., at Chickamauga, 97. - - Robinson, Col. Milton S., at Chickamauga, 123. - - Roby, Capt. J. W., at Chickamauga, 130. - - Roddey, Gen. Philip D., cavalry leader, 160. - - Rogersville (Ala.), 160. - - Rome (Ga.), 61, 64, 75, 115. - - Rosecrans, Gen. William S., commands army, 1-3, 14, 16; - characterized, 12, 13; - plans, 11, 13, 40, 51, 57; - at Winchester, 52; - in Chickamauga campaign, 55, 58, 59, 62, 64, 67; - orders, 83, 103, 104, 106, 118, 152, 153, 172; - at battle of Chickamauga, 72-80, 88, 93, 99, 104, 109, 112, 120, - 121, 131, 136, 144, 149, 154; - retreats to Chattanooga, 125; - defends Chattanooga, 157, 158, 160; - reinforced, 158, 159; - relieved, 164; - results, 232; - reports, 48, 84, 89, 144. - - Rossville (Ga.), Union troops at, 19, 63, 76; - during battle of Chickamauga, 108, 109, 112, 114-116, 118; - withdrawal to, 119, 121, 123, 129, 132, 133, 136, 147, 151, 152, - 155; - abandoned, 125; - advance from, 144; - in Chattanooga campaign, 201-206; - Hooker at, 221, 222. - See also Gaps: Rossville. - - Rousseau, Gen. Lovell H., commands division, 17, 28, 44, 47, 190; - on furlough, 21; - rejoins army, 125; - at Chattanooga, 166; - Nashville, 167. - - Rousseau Battery, 219. - - Ruger, Gen. Thomas H., at Chattanooga, 168; - guarding railway, 177. - - - St. Louis, Wisconsin troops at, 31, 32, 231. - - Salem (Tenn.), 41. - - Scandinavians, as Wisconsin soldiers, 29. - - Schurz, Gen. Carl, at Wauhatchie, 177, 178; - Missionary Ridge, 205, 212, 229. - - Scribner, Gen. Benjamin F., commands brigade, 28; - at Chickamauga, 100, 129. - - Searles, Lieut. Charles A., killed, 129. - - Sequatchie Valley, described, 31; - troops in, 54, 55, 57, 58, 60; - raided, 156, 159. - - Sheffield, Col. James L., at Chickamauga, 97. - - Shelbyville (Tenn.), 40, 42; - captured, 44, 46. - - Shellmound (Tenn.), 59, 177. - - Shenandoah Valley, war in, 15. - - Sheridan, Gen. Philip H., West Point graduate, 17; - commands division, 47, 56, 60; - at Chickamauga, 87, 93-96, 107-111, 115, 142, 145, 149, 151; - Chattanooga, 165, 167; - Orchard Knob, 190, 217; - Missionary Ridge, 204, 205, 208, 227; - commended, 170, 171; - characterized, 22. - - Sherman, Col. Francis T., at Chattanooga, 165, 167; - Missionary Ridge, 204, 227. - - Sherman, Gen. William T., reinforces Chattanooga, 159, 183-185, 187; - commands Western army, 169, 234; - at Chattanooga, 231; - Tunnel Hill, 206, 211, 213, 221; - Missionary Ridge, 186, 187, 192, 193, 201-205, 208, 212-214, 217, - 222, 226, 229, 230; - March to the Sea, 5, 10; - commended, 171; - _Memoirs_, 207. - - Sirwell, Col. William, at Chickamauga, 113. - - Slocum, Gen. H. W., reinforces Rosecrans, 159. - - Smith, Gen. A., at Missionary Ridge, 204. - - Smith, Gen. James A., at Missionary Ridge, 205. - - Smith, Gen. John E., at Missionary Ridge, 204, 213, 226. - - Smith, Col. Orlando, at Wauhatchie, 179. - - Smith, Gen. Preston, at Chickamauga, 89; - killed, 90. - - Smith, Gen. W. F., chief engineer, 164, 169, 172, 174, 183, 184. - - Snodgrass, ----, house near Chickamauga, 107, 112, 116. - - Snodgrass Hill, battle at, 81, 120, 122, 151, 154. - - South Carolina, invaded, 10. - - Stanley, Gen. David S., commands cavalry, 18, 46; - of regular army, 23; - on furlough, 61; - at Chickamauga, 93, 100, 113. - - Stanley, Col. Timothy R., at Chickamauga, 142. - - Stanton, Edwin M., secretary of war, 171, 217. - - Starkweather, Col. John C., brigade commander, 28, 69; - at Chickamauga, 101, 126-130; - at Chattanooga, 166, 204, 206, 225; - Stevenson, 167; - report, 128, 129. - - Steedman, Gen. James B., commands division, 19; - at Chickamauga, 83, 114, 117, 120, 138, 142, 144; - commended, 148. - - Steinwehr, Gen. Adolph von, at Wauhatchie, 188; - Missionary Ridge, 212. - - Stevenson, Gen. Carter L., on Lookout Mountain, 192, 195, 197, 199; - at Missionary Ridge, 205, 206; - report, 198, 199. - - Stevenson (Ala.), railroad junction, 28, 52, 53, 56, 59; - supplies at, 7, 161-163; - garrison, 57, 166; - road to, 156; - headquarters, 167. - - Stewart, Gen. A. P., Confederate officer, 44; - at Chickamauga, 96, 97, 104, 105, 139, 141, 143; - Missionary Ridge, 205, 206, 214, 216, 217. - - Stoughton, Gen. William L., at Missionary Ridge, 204. - - Stovall, Gen. Marcellus A., at Chickamauga, 99, 100, 104. - - Summerville (Ga.), 63, 75. - - Sweet, Col. Benjamin J., 20; - wounded, 29. - - - Tennessee, actions in, 27; - in two districts, 167; - barrens of, 39-41; - railway in, 6; - forts, 16; - Union troops, 169, 231, 232; - troops from, 10, 25, 66. - - Thedford’s Ford (Ga.), 70. - - Thomas, Gen. George H., commands corps, 12, 63, 64; - in Tullahoma campaign, 43, 47; - at Chickamauga, 22, 72, 74, 75, 78, 79, 82-84, 88, 91-94, 103-117, - 120, 121, 127; - denominated “Rock of Chickamauga”, 82; - protects his corps, 139; - withstands attacks, 144-146; - withdraws, 112, 118-126, 152, 153; - at Chattanooga, 155, 232; - commands army, 164, 168; - besieged, 171, 172; - plans for advance, 183, 184, 186, 187, 193, 218; - reconnoisance, 188, 189; - at Orchard Knob, 190, 191; - Missionary Ridge, 202-215, 220-222; - reports, 119-121, 123, 200, 216; - commended, 148, 149, 171; - characterized, 14, 15, 81. - - Thompson, Lieut. Oliver, killed, 121. - - Thruston, Gen. Gates P., at Chickamauga, 110, 122. - - Thurman’s (Tenn.), 57. - - Tracy City (Tenn.), 56. - - Trenton (Ga.), troops at, 61, 176, 187. - - Triune (Tenn.), 41. - - Tullahoma (Tenn.), 1, 6; - advance toward, 14; - fighting near, 45, 47; - Bragg at, 52, 53, 98; - campaign for, 28, 30, 39-50, 134, 224. - - Turchin, Gen. John B., commands cavalry, 18, 19; - at Chickamauga, 92, 93; - withdraws, 122, 123; - at Chattanooga, 166; - Brown’s Ferry, 175; - Missionary Ridge, 204; - commended, 148. - - - Valley Head (Ala.), 55, 61. - - Van Cleve, Gen. Horatio P., commands division, 18, 60; - in Tullahoma campaign, 43; - at Chickamauga, 78, 86, 88, 93-95, 97, 104, 107-109, 113, 133, 140, - 142. - - Van Derveer, Col. Ferdinand, at Chickamauga, 93, 103, 106, 111, 114, - 140; - Chattanooga, 166; - Missionary Ridge, 204; - commended, 148. - - Van Horne, Thomas B., _Army of the Cumberland_, 110. - - Vicksburg (Miss.), siege of, 231. - - Viniard, ----, house near Chickamauga, 81. - - Virginia, troops from, 54, 66, 70, 78. - - Vittetoe, ----, house near Chickamauga, 81. - - Von Baumbach, Maj. Carl, at Chickamauga, 132; - Missionary Ridge, 227-229. - - - Wagner, Gen. George D., in Chickamauga campaign, 58, 60-62; - at Chattanooga, 165; - Missionary Ridge, 204. - - Walker, Gen. W. H. T., Confederate officer, 68, 69; - at Chickamauga, 77, 82, 85, 89, 96-98, 102, 110, 139, 141; - Lookout Mountain, 192; - Missionary Ridge, 205, 206. - - Walthall, Gen. Edward C., at Chickamauga, 98; - Lookout Mountain, 197, 199. - - WARS: - Mexican, 15, 17, 21, 34, 35; - Indian, 15. - - Wartrace (Tenn.), 40, 42. - - Washington (D. C.), orders from, 4, 67. - - Wauhatchie (Tenn.), 61; - action at, 176-180. - - West, Captain George M., killed, 130. - - West, Col. Theodore S., commands regiment, 30; - at Chickamauga, 132. - - West Point (N. Y.) Military Academy, graduates, 12, 15-17, 21-23, 35. - - West Virginia, troops in, 8. - - Wheeler, Gen. Joseph, cavalry commander, 33, 181; - at Chickamauga, 70, 79, 99; - raiding, 156, 159-161. - - Whiteside (Tenn.), 177. - - Whittaker, Gen. Walter C., at Chickamauga, 83, 114; - Chattanooga, 165; - Wauhatchie, 179; - Lookout Mountain, 186; - commended, 148. - - Wilder, Gen. John T., brigade commander, 44; - in Tullahoma campaign, 43, 44; - Chickamauga campaign, 58, 60, 62, 64; - at battle of Chickamauga, 72, 77, 82, 97, 109, 111, 153; - at Chattanooga, 158. - - Willard, Capt. J. P., aide to Thomas, 122. - - Williams, Gen. Alpheus S., at Chattanooga, 168; - guarding railway, 177. - - Willich, Gen. August, in Tullahoma campaign, 42, 43; - at Chickamauga, 93, 111, 118; - withdraws, 123; - at Chattanooga, 164, 165; - Orchard Knob, 190, 191; - Missionary Ridge, 204, 225, 226; - commended, 148. - - Wilson, Col. Claudius C., at Chickamauga, 85. - - Wilson, Gen. James H., cavalry raid, 170. - - Winchester (Tenn.), 52, 53, 160. - - Winkler, Maj. Frederick C., commands regiment, 177; - at Missionary Ridge, 229. - - Wisconsin, troops from, 25; - in army of Cumberland, 27-33; - in Tullahoma campaign, 44, 50; - at Dug Gap, 69; - Chickamauga, 126-134; - reinforce Chattanooga, 177, 178; - at Missionary Ridge, 225-232; - 1st Infantry, 27-29, 44, 69, 126-129, 167, 225; - 2nd infantry, 227; - 3rd Infantry, 168, 177; - 10th Infantry, 27-29, 50, 69, 126, 129, 130, 167, 201, 225; - 13th Infantry, 20; - 15th Infantry, 27, 29, 59, 87, 126, 130, 131, 167, 191, 192, 225, - 226; - 18th Infantry, 226, 227; - 21st Infantry, 20, 27, 29, 30, 44, 69, 126-129, 167, 225; - 24th Infantry, 27, 30, 126, 131, 132, 167, 227-229; - 26th Infantry, 168, 177, 178, 229; - 1st Cavalry, 20, 27, 30, 50, 132, 133, 159; - 1st Heavy Artillery, 168, 230; - 3rd Battery, 20, 27, 31, 133, 168, 229; - 5th Battery, 27, 31, 32, 133, 168, 230; - 6th Battery, 230, 231; - 8th Battery, 32, 33, 133, 134, 168, 229, 230; - 10th Battery, 168, 229-231; - 12th Battery, 230, 231. - - Wolseley, Field-Marshal Sir G. J., Viscount, commends American - officer, 36. - - Wood, Gen. S. A. M., at Chickamauga, 101. - - Wood, Gen. Thomas J., of regular army, 23; - commands divisions, 18, 58; - at Chickamauga, 80, 87, 93-96, 104-107, 109, 111, 113, 116, 117, - 131, 142, 145, 147, 152; - withdraws, 123; - at Chattanooga, 165, 168; - Orchard Knob, 190-192; - Missionary Ridge, 203-205, 225. - - Woodbury (Tenn.), 41. - - Woods, Gen. Charles R., at Lookout Mountain, 193; - relieved, 203. - - - Zollicoffer, Gen. Felix K., 15. - - - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Nineteen miles southeast of Murfreesboro. - -[2] Thirteen miles south of Murfreesboro, five west of Hoover’s Gap. - -[3] Forty miles south of Murfreesboro. - -[4] A small village, but a few miles southwest of Murfreesboro. - -[5] A village eight miles east of Shelbyville, on the railroad. - -[6] _Rebellion Records_, Serial No. 34, p. 483. - -[7] _Rebellion Records_, Serial No. 34; p. 408. - -[8] _Ibid._, p. 584. - -[9] The above quotations are taken from some letters of W. S. Furay, a -former war correspondent, published in the Cincinnati _Gazette_ of 1888. - -[10] Sixteen miles southeast of Tullahoma, near Decherd. - -[11] Thirteen miles southeast of Tullahoma on railway. - -[12] Forty miles southeast of Murfreesboro and thirty-five miles -northeast of Tullahoma. - -[13] Lee and Gordon’s Mill is twelve miles south of Chattanooga, on -the Chickamauga River, where the Lafayette and Chattanooga wagon -road crosses that stream. Ringgold is fifteen miles southeast of -Chattanooga, on the east of Chickamauga, and is a railway station. - -[14] _Rebellion Records_, Serial No. 52, p. 530. In General Halleck’s -report (_Id._, Serial No. 50, p. 34), he says, that the abandonment of -Chattanooga without defense gave plausibility to these reports by spies -and deserters, that Lee was being reinforced from Bragg. - -[15] _Id._, Serial No. 51, p. 27. - -[16] See Robert U. Johnson and C. C. Buel (eds.), _Battles and Leaders -of the Civil War_ (N. Y., 1884-87), vol. 3. - -[17] _Rebellion Records_, Serial No. 50, p. 54. - -[18] Rosecrans’s report in _Rebellion Records_, Serial No. 50, p. 56. - -[19] _Ibid._, p. 400. - -[20] _Id._, Serial No. 51, p. 177. - -[21] _Ibid._, p. 154. - -[22] _Ibid._, p. 162. - -[23] See General Thruston’s report in Thomas Budd Van Horne, _History -of the Army of the Cumberland_ (Cincinnati, 1875), vol. i, p. 373; also -General Negley’s statement, p. 376. - -[24] _Rebellion Records_, Serial No. 51, p. 305. - -[25] See _Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_, vol. 3. - -[26] _Rebellion Records_, Serial No. 51, p. 289. - -[27] _Id._, Serial No. 50, p. 253. - -[28] _Ibid._, p. 254. - -[29] _Rebellion Records_, Serial No. 50, p. 301. - -[30] _Ibid._, p. 60. - -[31] _Ibid._, p. 194. - -[32] See _Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_, vol. 3, p. 662. - -[33] _Rebellion Records_, Serial No. 51, p. 143. - -[34] See General Longstreet’s report in _Ibid._, p. 287. - -[35] _Rebellion Records_, Serial No. 51, p. 287. - -[36] _Id._, Serial No. 55, p. 315. - -[37] _Ibid._, p. 720. - -[38] _Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, by himself_ (N. Y., 1875), -vol. 1, p. 362. - -[39] _Rebellion Records_, Serial No. 55, p. 34. - -[40] _Ibid._, p. 96. - - - - -TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES: - - - Italicized text is surrounded by underscores: _italics_. - - Obvious typographical errors have been corrected. - - Inconsistencies in hyphenation have been standardized. - - Archaic or variant spelling has been retained. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following -the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use -of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for -copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very -easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation -of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project -Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away--you may -do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected -by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark -license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country other than the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where - you are located before using this eBook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm website -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that: - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of -the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the Foundation as set -forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, -Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up -to date contact information can be found at the Foundation's website -and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without -widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our website which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This website includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |