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} - div.tnotes { padding-left:1em;padding-right:1em;background-color:#E3E4FA; - border:1px solid silver; margin:1em 5% 0 5%; text-align: justify; } - .blackletter { font-family: "Old English Text MT", Gothic, serif; } - .epubonly {visibility: hidden; display: none; } - .htmlonly {visibility: visible; display: inline; } - .x-ebookmaker .htmlonly { visibility: hidden; display: none; } - .x-ebookmaker .epubonly { visibility: visible; display: inline; } - ins.correction { text-decoration:none; border-bottom: thin dotted gray; } - .quote { font-size: 95%; margin-top: 1.0em; margin-bottom: 1.0em; } - .linegroup .group { margin: 0em auto; } - </style> - </head> - <body> -<p style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Science and the modern world, by Alfred North Whitehead</p> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Science and the modern world</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:0; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em;'>Lowell Lectures 1925</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Alfred North Whitehead</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: July 25, 2022 [eBook #68611]</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</p> - <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em; text-align:left'>Produced by: KD Weeks, Steve Mattern and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)</p> -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD ***</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> -<div class='tnotes'> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div>Transcriber’s Note:</div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c001'>Footnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they -are referenced, and are linked for ease of reference.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please -see the transcriber’s <a href='#endnote'>note</a> at the end of this text -for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered -during its preparation.</p> - -<div class='htmlonly'> - -<p class='c001'>Any corrections are indicated using an <ins class='correction' title='original'>underline</ins> -highlight. Placing the cursor over the correction will produce the -original text in a small popup.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The blank cover image has been enhanced with information from the title -page.</p> - -<div class='figcenter id001'> -<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' class='ig001' /> -</div> - -</div> -<div class='epubonly'> - -<p class='c001'>Any corrections are indicated as hyperlinks, which will navigate the -reader to the corresponding entry in the corrections table in the -note at the end of the text.</p> - -</div> - -</div> -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> -<div> - <h1 class='c002'>SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD</h1> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c000'> - <div><span class='large'>LOWELL LECTURES, 1925</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> - -<div class='figcenter id002'> -<img src='images/i002.jpg' alt='' class='ig001' /> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div>THE MACMILLAN COMPANY</div> - <div><span class='small'>NEW YORK . BOSTON . CHICAGO . DALLAS</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>ATLANTA . SAN FRANCISCO</span></div> - <div class='c000'>CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS</div> - <div><span class='small'>LONDON</span></div> - <div class='c000'>MACMILLAN & CO., <span class='sc'>Ltd.</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>BOMBAY . CALCUTTA . MADRAS</span></div> - <div class='c000'>THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, <span class='sc'>Ltd.</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>TORONTO</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div><span class='xlarge'>SCIENCE</span></div> - <div><span class='xlarge'>AND THE MODERN WORLD</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c003'> - <div>LOWELL LECTURES, 1925</div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c003'> - <div>BY</div> - <div><span class='large'>ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>F.R.S., Sc.D. (Cambridge), Hon. D.Sc. (Manchester),</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews)</span></div> - <div class='c000'><span class='small'>FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>AND PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c004'> - <div><span class="blackletter">New York</span></div> - <div><span class='large'>THE MACMILLAN COMPANY</span></div> - <div>1925</div> - <div><span class='small'><i>All rights reserved</i></span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c003'> - <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_I'>I</span><span class='sc'>Copyright, 1925.</span></div> - <div><span class='sc'>By</span> THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.</div> - </div> -</div> - -<hr class='c005' /> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div>Set up and printed.</div> - <div>Published October, 1925.</div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c004'> - <div>PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY</div> - <div>THE FERRIS PRINTING COMPANY</div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c004'> - <div>TO</div> - <div>MY COLLEAGUES,</div> - <div>PAST AND PRESENT,</div> - <div>WHOSE FRIENDSHIP IS INSPIRATION.</div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='chapter'> - <h2 class='c006'>TABLE OF CONTENTS</h2> -</div> - -<table class='table0' summary=''> -<colgroup> -<col width='12%' /> -<col width='79%' /> -<col width='7%' /> -</colgroup> - <tr> - <td class='c007'><span class='small'>CHAPTER</span></td> - <td class='c008'> </td> - <td class='c009'><span class='small'>PAGE</span></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>I.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Origins of Modern Science</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_1'>1</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>II.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Mathematics as an Element in the History of Thought</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_28'>28</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>III.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Century of Genius</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_55'>55</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>IV.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Eighteenth Century</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_80'>80</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>V.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Romantic Reaction</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_105'>105</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>VI.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Nineteenth Century</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_134'>134</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>VII.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Relativity</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_160'>160</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>VIII.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Quantum Theory</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_181'>181</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>IX.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Science and Philosophy</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_193'>193</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>X.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Abstraction</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_219'>219</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>XI.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>God</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_242'>242</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>XII.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Religion and Science</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_252'>252</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>XIII.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Requisites for Social Progress</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_270'>270</a></td> - </tr> -</table> -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_ix'>ix</span> - <h2 id='PREFACE' class='c006'>PREFACE</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The present book embodies a study of some aspects of -Western culture during the past three centuries, in so -far as it has been influenced by the development of -science. This study has been guided by the conviction -that the mentality of an epoch springs from the -view of the world which is, in fact, dominant in the -educated sections of the communities in question. -There may be more than one such scheme, corresponding -to cultural divisions. The various human interests -which suggest cosmologies, and also are influenced by -them, are science, aesthetics, ethics, religion. In every -age each of these topics suggests a view of the world. -In so far as the same set of people are swayed by all, -or more than one, of these interests, their effective -outlook will be the joint production from these -sources. But each age has it dominant preoccupation; -and, during the three centuries in question, the cosmology -derived from science has been asserting itself -at the expense of older points of view with their origins -elsewhere. Men can be provincial in time, as well as -in place. We may ask ourselves whether the scientific -mentality of the modern world in the immediate past -is not a successful example of such provincial -limitation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Philosophy, in one of its functions, is the critic of -cosmologies. It is its function to harmonise, refashion, -and justify divergent intuitions as to the nature of -things. It has to insist on the scrutiny of the ultimate -ideas, and on the retention of the whole of the evidence -<span class='pageno' id='Page_x'>x</span>in shaping our cosmological scheme. Its business is -to render explicit, and—so far as may be—efficient, a -process which otherwise is unconsciously performed -without rational tests.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Bearing this in mind, I have avoided the introduction -of a variety of abstruse detail respecting scientific -advance. What is wanted, and what I have striven -after, is a sympathetic study of main ideas as seen from -the inside. If my view of the function of philosophy -is correct, it is the most effective of all the intellectual -pursuits. It builds cathedrals before the workmen -have moved a stone, and it destroys them before the -elements have worn down their arches. It is the architect -of the buildings of the spirit, and it is also their -solvent:—and the spiritual precedes the material. -Philosophy works slowly. Thoughts lie dormant for -ages; and then, almost suddenly as it were, mankind -finds that they have embodied themselves in institutions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This book in the main consists of a set of eight -Lowell Lectures delivered in the February of 1925. -These lectures with some slight expansion, and the -subdivision of one lecture into Chapters VII and -VIII, are here printed as delivered. But some additional -matter has been added, so as to complete the -thought of the book on a scale which could not be -included within that lecture course. Of this new -matter, the second chapter—‘Mathematics as an Element -in the History of Thought’—was delivered as a -lecture before the Mathematical Society of Brown -University, Providence, R. I.; and the twelfth chapter—‘Religion -and Science’—formed an address delivered -in the Phillips Brooks House at Harvard, and -<span class='pageno' id='Page_xi'>xi</span>is to be published in the August number of the <cite>Atlantic -Monthly</cite> of this year (1925). The tenth and -eleventh chapters—‘Abstraction’ and ‘God’—are additions -which now appear for the first time. But the -book represents one train of thought, and the antecedent -utilisation of some of its contents is a subsidiary -point.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There has been no occasion in the text to make -detailed reference to Lloyd Morgan’s <cite>Emergent Evolution</cite> -or to Alexander’s <cite>Space, Time and Deity</cite>. It -will be obvious to readers that I have found them very -suggestive. I am especially indebted to Alexander’s -great work. The wide scope of the present book -makes it impossible to acknowledge in detail the various -sources of information or of ideas. The book is -the product of thought and reading in past years, -which were not undertaken with any anticipation of -utilisation for the present purpose. Accordingly it -would now be impossible for me to give reference to -my sources for details, even if it were desirable so to -do. But there is no need: the facts which are relied -upon are simple and well known. On the philosophical -side, any consideration of epistemology has been -entirely excluded. It would have been impossible to -discuss that topic without upsetting the whole balance -of the work. The key to the book is the sense -of the overwhelming importance of a prevalent -philosophy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>My most grateful thanks are due to my colleague -Mr. Raphael Demos for reading the proofs and for -the suggestion of many improvements in expression.</p> - -<div class='lg-container-l c011'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>Harvard University,</div> - <div class='line in2'>June 29, 1925.</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_1'>1</span><span class='xxlarge'>SCIENCE AND THE MODERN</span></div> - <div><span class='xxlarge'>WORLD</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='chapter'> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER I <br /> <br /> THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The progress of civilisation is not wholly a uniform -drift towards better things. It may perhaps wear this -aspect if we map it on a scale which is large enough. -But such broad views obscure the details on which -rest our whole understanding of the process. New -epochs emerge with comparative suddenness, if we -have regard to the scores of thousands of years -throughout which the complete history extends. Secluded -races suddenly take their places in the main -stream of events: technological discoveries transform -the mechanism of human life: a primitive art quickly -flowers into full satisfaction of some aesthetic craving: -great religions in their crusading youth spread -through the nations the peace of Heaven and the -sword of the Lord.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The sixteenth century of our era saw the disruption -of Western Christianity and the rise of modern -science. It was an age of ferment. Nothing was settled, -though much was opened—new worlds and new -ideas. In science, Copernicus and Vesalius may be -chosen as representative figures: they typify the new -cosmology and the scientific emphasis on direct observation. -Giordano Bruno was the martyr; but the -cause for which he suffered was not that of science, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_2'>2</span>but that of free imaginative speculation. His death -in the year 1600 ushered in the first century of modern -science in the strict sense of the term. In his execution -there was an unconscious symbolism: for the subsequent -tone of scientific thought has contained distrust -of his type of general speculativeness. The -Reformation, for all its importance, may be considered -as a domestic affair of the European races. Even the -Christianity of the East viewed it with profound disengagement. -Furthermore, such disruptions are no -new phenomena in the history of Christianity or of -other religions. When we project this great revolution -upon the whole history of the Christian Church, -we cannot look upon it as introducing a new principle -into human life. For good or for evil, it was a great -transformation of religion; but it was not the coming -of religion. It did not itself claim to be so. Reformers -maintained that they were only restoring what had -been forgotten.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is quite otherwise with the rise of modern science. -In every way it contrasts with the contemporary religious -movement. The Reformation was a popular uprising, -and for a century and a half drenched Europe -in blood. The beginnings of the scientific movement -were confined to a minority among the intellectual -élite. In a generation which saw the Thirty Years’ -War and remembered Alva in the Netherlands, the -worst that happened to men of science was that Galileo -suffered an honourable detention and a mild reproof, -before dying peacefully in his bed. The way in which -the persecution of Galileo has been remembered is a -tribute to the quiet commencement of the most intimate -change in outlook which the human race had yet encountered. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_3'>3</span>Since a babe was born in a manger, it -may be doubted whether so great a thing has happened -with so little stir.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The thesis which these lectures will illustrate is -that this quiet growth of science has practically recoloured -our mentality so that modes of thought which -in former times were exceptional, are now broadly -spread through the educated world. This new colouring -of ways of thought had been proceeding slowly -for many ages in the European peoples. At last it -issued in the rapid development of science; and has -thereby strengthened itself by its most obvious application. -The new mentality is more important even -than the new science and the new technology. It has -altered the metaphysical presuppositions and the -imaginative contents of our minds; so that now the old -stimuli provoke a new response. Perhaps my metaphor -of a new colour is too strong. What I mean is -just that slightest change of tone which yet makes all -the difference. This is exactly illustrated by a sentence -from a published letter of that adorable genius, -William James. When he was finishing his great -treatise on the <cite>Principles of Psychology</cite>, he wrote to -his brother Henry James, ‘I have to forge every sentence -in the teeth of irreducible and stubborn facts.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>This new tinge to modern minds is a vehement and -passionate interest in the relation of general principles -to irreducible and stubborn facts. All the world over -and at all times there have been practical men, absorbed -in ‘irreducible and stubborn facts’: all the -world over and at all times there have been men of -philosophic temperament who have been absorbed in -the weaving of general principles. It is this union of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_4'>4</span>passionate interest in the detailed facts with equal -devotion to abstract generalisation which forms the -novelty in our present society. Previously it had -appeared sporadically and as if by chance. This -balance of mind has now become part of the tradition -which infects cultivated thought. It is the salt which -keeps life sweet. The main business of universities -is to transmit this tradition as a widespread inheritance -from generation to generation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Another contrast which singles out science from -among the European movements of the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries, is its universality. Modern -science was born in Europe, but its home is the whole -world. In the last two centuries there has been a long -and confused impact of Western modes upon the civilisation -of Asia. The wise men of the East have been -puzzling, and are puzzling, as to what may be the -regulative secret of life which can be passed from -West to East without the wanton destruction of their -own inheritance which they so rightly prize. More -and more it is becoming evident that what the West -can most readily give to the East is its science and its -scientific outlook. This is transferable from country -to country, and from race to race, wherever there is a -rational society.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this course of lectures I shall not discuss the -details of scientific discovery. My theme is the energising -of a state of mind in the modern world, its -broad generalisations, and its impact upon other -spiritual forces. There are two ways of reading history, -forwards and backwards. In the history of -thought, we require both methods. A climate of -opinion—to use the happy phrase of a seventeenth -<span class='pageno' id='Page_5'>5</span>century writer—requires for its understanding the -consideration of its antecedents and its issues. Accordingly -in this lecture I shall consider some of the antecedents -of our modern approach to the investigation -of nature.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the first place, there can be no living science -unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in -the existence of an <em>Order of Things</em>, and, in particular, -of an <em>Order of Nature</em>. I have used the word <em>instinctive</em> -advisedly. It does not matter what men say in -words, so long as their activities are controlled by -settled instincts. The words may ultimately destroy -the instincts. But until this has occurred, words do -not count. This remark is important in respect to the -history of scientific thought. For we shall find that -since the time of Hume, the fashionable scientific philosophy -has been such as to deny the rationality of -science. This conclusion lies upon the surface of -Hume’s philosophy. Take, for example, the following -passage from Section IV of his <cite>Inquiry Concerning -Human Understanding</cite>:</p> - -<div class='quote'> - -<p class='c001'>“In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. -It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause; and the first -invention or conception of it, <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>à priori</i></span>, must be entirely arbitrary.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='c012'>If the cause in itself discloses no information as to -the effect, so that the first invention of it must be -<em>entirely</em> arbitrary, it follows at once that science is -impossible, except in the sense of establishing <em>entirely -arbitrary</em> connections which are not warranted by anything -intrinsic to the natures either of causes or effects. -Some variant of Hume’s philosophy has generally -prevailed among men of science. But scientific faith -<span class='pageno' id='Page_6'>6</span>has risen to the occasion, and has tacitly removed the -philosophic mountain.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In view of this strange contradiction in scientific -thought, it is of the first importance to consider the -antecedents of a faith which is impervious to the demand -for a consistent rationality. We have therefore -to trace the rise of the instinctive faith that there is an -Order of Nature which can be traced in every detailed -occurrence.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Of course we all share in this faith, and we therefore -believe that the reason for the faith is our apprehension -of its truth. But the formation of a general -idea—such as the idea of the Order of Nature—, and -the grasp of its importance, and the observation of its -exemplification in a variety of occasions are by no -means the necessary consequences of the truth of the -idea in question. Familiar things happen, and mankind -does not bother about them. It requires a very -unusual mind to undertake the analysis of the obvious. -Accordingly I wish to consider the stages in which -this analysis became explicit, and finally became unalterably -impressed upon the educated minds of Western -Europe.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Obviously, the main recurrences of life are too -insistent to escape the notice of the least rational of -humans; and even before the dawn of rationality, they -have impressed themselves upon the instincts of animals. -It is unnecessary to labour the point, that in -broad outline certain general states of nature recur, -and that our very natures have adapted themselves to -such repetitions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But there is a complementary fact which is equally -true and equally obvious:—nothing ever really recurs -<span class='pageno' id='Page_7'>7</span>in exact detail. No two days are identical, no two -winters. What has gone, has gone forever. Accordingly -the practical philosophy of mankind has been -to expect the broad recurrences, and to accept the -details as emanating from the inscrutable womb of -things, beyond the ken of rationality. Men expected -the sun to rise, but the wind bloweth where it listeth.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Certainly from the classical Greek civilisation onwards -there have been men, and indeed groups of men, -who have placed themselves beyond this acceptance of -an ultimate irrationality. Such men have endeavoured -to explain all phenomena as the outcome of an -order of things which extends to every detail. Geniuses -such as Aristotle, or Archimedes, or Roger -Bacon, must have been endowed with the full scientific -mentality, which instinctively holds that all things -great and small are conceivable as exemplifications of -general principles which reign throughout the natural -order.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But until the close of the Middle Ages the general -educated public did not feel that intimate conviction, -and that detailed interest, in such an idea, so as to -lead to an unceasing supply of men, with ability and -opportunity adequate to maintain a coordinated search -for the discovery of these hypothetical principles. -Either people were doubtful about the existence of -such principles, or were doubtful about any success -in finding them, or took no interest in thinking about -them, or were oblivious to their practical importance -when found. For whatever reason, search was languid, -if we have regard to the opportunities of a high -civilisation and the length of time concerned. Why -did the pace suddenly quicken in the sixteenth and -<span class='pageno' id='Page_8'>8</span>seventeenth centuries? At the close of the Middle -Ages a new mentality discloses itself. Invention stimulated -thought, thought quickened physical speculation, -Greek manuscripts disclosed what the ancients -had discovered. Finally although in the year 1500 -Europe knew less than Archimedes who died in the -year 212 B. C., yet in the year 1700, Newton’s <cite>Principia</cite> -had been written and the world was well started -on the modern epoch.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There have been great civilisations in which the -peculiar balance of mind required for science has -only fitfully appeared and has produced the feeblest -result. For example, the more we know of Chinese -art, of Chinese literature, and of the Chinese philosophy -of life, the more we admire the heights to -which that civilization attained. For thousands of -years, there have been in China acute and learned men -patiently devoting their lives to study. Having regard -to the span of time, and to the population concerned, -China forms the largest volume of civilisation -which the world has seen. There is no reason to -doubt the intrinsic capacity of individual Chinamen -for the pursuit of science. And yet Chinese science is -practically negligible. There is no reason to believe -that China if left to itself would have ever produced -any progress in science. The same may be said of -India. Furthermore, if the Persians had enslaved -the Greeks, there is no definite ground for belief that -science would have flourished in Europe. The Romans -showed no particular originality in that line. Even -as it was, the Greeks, though they founded the movement, -did not sustain it with the concentrated interest -which modern Europe has shown. I am not alluding -<span class='pageno' id='Page_9'>9</span>to the last few generations of the European peoples on -both sides of the ocean; I mean the smaller Europe -of the Reformation period, distracted as it was with -wars and religious disputes. Consider the world of -the eastern Mediterranean, from Sicily to western -Asia, during the period of about 1400 years from the -death of Archimedes [in 212 B. C.] to the irruption of -the Tartars. There were wars and revolutions and -large changes of religion: but nothing much worse -than the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries -throughout Europe. There was a great and -wealthy civilisation, Pagan, Christian, Mahometan. -In that period a great deal was added to science. But -on the whole the progress was slow and wavering; -and, except in mathematics, the men of the Renaissance -practically started from the position which -Archimedes had reached. There had been some -progress in medicine and some progress in astronomy. -But the total advance was very little compared -to the marvellous success of the seventeenth -century. For example, compare the progress of scientific -knowledge from the year 1560, just before the -births of Galileo and of Kepler, up to the year 1700, -when Newton was in the height of his fame, with the -progress in the ancient period, already mentioned, -exactly ten times as long.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Nevertheless, Greece was the mother of Europe; -and it is to Greece that we must look in order to find -the origin of our modern ideas. We all know that on -the eastern shores of the Mediterranean there was a -very flourishing school of Ionian philosophers, deeply -interested in theories concerning nature. Their ideas -have been transmitted to us, enriched by the genius -<span class='pageno' id='Page_10'>10</span>of Plato and Aristotle. But, with the exception of -Aristotle, and it is a large exception, this school of -thought had not attained to the complete scientific -mentality. In some ways, it was better. The Greek -genius was philosophical, lucid and logical. The -men of this group were primarily asking philosophical -questions. What is the substratum of nature? Is it -fire, or earth, or water, or some combination of any -two, or of all three? Or is it a mere flux, not reducible -to some static material? Mathematics interested -them mightily. They invented its generality, analysed -its premises, and made notable discoveries of theorems -by a rigid adherence to deductive reasoning. Their -minds were infected with an eager generality. They -demanded clear, bold ideas, and strict reasoning from -them. All this was excellent; it was genius; it was -ideal preparatory work. But it was not science as we -understand it. The patience of minute observation -was not nearly so prominent. Their genius was not so -apt for the state of imaginative muddled suspense -which precedes successful inductive generalisation. -They were lucid thinkers and bold reasoners.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Of course there were exceptions, and at the very -top: for example, Aristotle and Archimedes. Also -for patient observation, there were the astronomers. -There was a mathematical lucidity about the stars, -and a fascination about the small numerable band of -run-a-way planets.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Every philosophy is tinged with the colouring of -some secret imaginative background, which never -emerges explicitly into its trains of reasoning. The -Greek view of nature, at least that cosmology transmitted -from them to later ages, was essentially dramatic. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_11'>11</span>It is not necessarily wrong for this reason: -but it was overwhelmingly dramatic. It thus conceived -nature as articulated in the way of a work of -dramatic art, for the exemplification of general ideas -converging to an end. Nature was differentiated so -as to provide its proper end for each thing. There -was the centre of the universe as the end of motion -for those things which are heavy, and the celestial -spheres as the end of motion for those things whose -natures lead them upwards. The celestial spheres -were for things which are impassible and ingenerable, -the lower regions for things impassible and generable. -Nature was a drama in which each thing played its -part.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I do not say that this is a view to which Aristotle -would have subscribed without severe reservations, in -fact without the sort of reservations which we ourselves -would make. But it was the view which subsequent -Greek thought extracted from Aristotle and -passed on to the Middle Ages. The effect of such an -imaginative setting for nature was to damp down the -historical spirit. For it was the end which seemed -illuminating, so why bother about the beginning? The -Reformation and the scientific movement were two -aspects of the historical revolt which was the dominant -intellectual movement of the later Renaissance. -The appeal to the origins of Christianity, and Francis -Bacon’s appeal to efficient causes as against final -causes, were two sides of one movement of thought. -Also for this reason Galileo and his adversaries were -at hopeless cross purposes, as can be seen from his -<cite>Dialogues on the Two Systems of the World</cite>.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Galileo keeps harping on how things happen, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_12'>12</span>whereas his adversaries had a complete theory as to -why things happen. Unfortunately the two theories -did not bring out the same results. Galileo insists -upon ‘irreducible and stubborn facts,’ and Simplicius, -his opponent, brings forward reasons, completely satisfactory, -at least to himself. It is a great mistake to -conceive this historical revolt as an appeal to reason. -On the contrary, it was through and through an -anti-intellectualist movement. It was the return to -the contemplation of brute fact; and it was based on a -recoil from the inflexible rationality of medieval -thought. In making this statement I am merely summarising -what at the time the adherents of the old -régime themselves asserted. For example, in the fourth -book of Father Paul Sarpi’s <cite>History of the Council -of Trent</cite>, you will find that in the year 1551 the -Papal Legates who presided over the Council ordered: -‘That the Divines ought to confirm their opinions with -the holy Scripture, Traditions of the Apostles, sacred -and approved Councils, and by the Constitutions and -Authorities of the holy Fathers; that they ought to -use brevity, and avoid superfluous and unprofitable -questions, and perverse contentions.... This order -did not please the Italian Divines; who said it was a -novity, and a condemning of School-Divinity, which, -in all difficulties, <em>useth reason</em>, and because it was not -lawful [<i>i.e.</i>, by this decree] to treat as St. Thomas -[Aquinas], St. Bonaventure, and other famous men -did.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is impossible not to feel sympathy with these -Italian divines, maintaining the lost cause of unbridled -rationalism. They were deserted on all hands. -The Protestants were in full revolt against them. The -<span class='pageno' id='Page_13'>13</span>Papacy failed to support them, and the Bishops of the -Council could not even understand them. For a few -sentences below the foregoing quotation, we read: -‘Though many complained here-of [<i>i.e.</i>, of the Decree], -yet it prevailed but little, because generally the -Fathers [<i>i.e.</i>, the Bishops] desired to hear men speak -with intelligible terms, not abstrusely, as in the matter -of Justification, and others already handled.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>Poor belated medievalists! When they used reason -they were not even intelligible to the ruling powers -of their epoch. It will take centuries before stubborn -facts are reducible by reason, and meanwhile the -pendulum swings slowly and heavily to the extreme of -the historical method.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Forty-three years after the Italian divines had written -this memorial, Richard Hooker in his famous -<cite>Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity</cite> makes exactly the same -complaint of his Puritan adversaries.<a id='r1' /><a href='#f1' class='c013'><sup>[1]</sup></a> Hooker’s balanced -thought—from which the appellation ‘The Judicious -Hooker’ is derived—, and his diffuse style, -which is the vehicle of such thought, make his writings -singularly unfit for the process of summarising by a -short, pointed quotation. But, in the section referred -to, he reproaches his opponents with <cite>Their Disparagement -of Reason</cite>; and in support of his own position -definitely refers to ‘The greatest amongst the school-divines,’ -by which designation I presume that he refers -to St. Thomas Aquinas.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f1'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r1'>1</a>. <i>Cf.</i> Book III, Section VIII.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>Hooker’s <cite>Ecclesiastical Polity</cite> was published just -before Sarpi’s <cite>Council of Trent</cite>. Accordingly there -was complete independence between the two works. -But both the Italian divines of 1551, and Hooker at -<span class='pageno' id='Page_14'>14</span>the end of that century testify to the anti-rationalist -trend of thought at that epoch, and in this respect contrast -their own age with the epoch of scholasticism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This reaction was undoubtedly a very necessary corrective -to the unguarded rationalism of the Middle -Ages. But reactions run to extremes. Accordingly, -although one outcome of this reaction was the birth -of modern science, yet we must remember that science -thereby inherited the bias of thought to which it owes -its origin.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The effect of Greek dramatic literature was many-sided -so far as concerns the various ways in which it -indirectly affected medieval thought. The pilgrim -fathers of the scientific imagination as it exists today, -are the great tragedians of ancient Athens, Aeschylus, -Sophocles, Euripides. Their vision of fate, remorseless -and indifferent, urging a tragic incident to its -inevitable issue, is the vision possessed by science. Fate -in Greek Tragedy becomes the order of nature in -modern thought. The absorbing interest in the particular -heroic incidents, as an example and a verification -of the workings of fate, reappears in our epoch -as concentration of interest on the crucial experiments. -It was my good fortune to be present at the meeting of -the Royal Society in London when the Astronomer -Royal for England announced that the photographic -plates of the famous eclipse, as measured by his colleagues -in Greenwich Observatory, had verified the -prediction of Einstein that rays of light are bent as -they pass in the neighbourhood of the sun. The whole -atmosphere of tense interest was exactly that of the -Greek drama: we were the chorus commenting on the -decree of destiny as disclosed in the development of a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_15'>15</span>supreme incident. There was dramatic quality in the -very staging:—the traditional ceremonial, and in the -background the picture of Newton to remind us that -the greatest of scientific generalisations was now, after -more than two centuries, to receive its first modification. -Nor was the personal interest wanting: a great -adventure in thought had at length come safe to shore.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Let me here remind you that the essence of dramatic -tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity -of the remorseless working of things. This inevitableness -of destiny can only be illustrated in terms of -human life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. -For it is only by them that the futility of escape -can be made evident in the drama. This remorseless -inevitableness is what pervades scientific thought. -The laws of physics are the decrees of fate.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The conception of the moral order in the Greek -plays was certainly not a discovery of the dramatists. -It must have passed into the literary tradition from -the general serious opinion of the times. But in finding -this magnificent expression, it thereby deepened -the stream of thought from which it arose. The spectacle -of a moral order was impressed upon the imagination -of classical civilisation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The time came when that great society decayed, and -Europe passed into the Middle Ages. The direct -influence of Greek literature vanished. But the concept -of the moral order and of the order of nature had -enshrined itself in the Stoic philosophy. For example, -Lecky in his <cite>History of European Morals</cite> tells us -‘Seneca maintains that the Divinity has determined -all things by an inexorable law of destiny, which He -has decreed, but which He Himself obeys.’ But the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_16'>16</span>most effective way in which the Stoics influenced the -mentality of the Middle Ages was by the diffused -sense of order which arose from Roman law. Again -to quote Lecky, ‘The Roman legislation was in a two-fold -manner the child of philosophy. It was in the -first place formed upon the philosophical model, for, -instead of being a mere empirical system adjusted to -the existing requirements of society, it laid down -abstract principles of right to which it endeavoured -to conform; and, in the next place, these principles -were borrowed directly from Stoicism.’ In spite of -the actual anarchy throughout large regions in Europe -after the collapse of the Empire, the sense of legal -order always haunted the racial memories of the Imperial -populations. Also the Western Church was -always there as a living embodiment of the traditions -of Imperial rule.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is important to notice that this legal impress upon -medieval civilisation was not in the form of a few -wise precepts which should permeate conduct. It -was the conception of a definite articulated system -which defines the legality of the detailed structure of -social organism, and of the detailed way in which -it should function. There was nothing vague. It -was not a question of admirable maxims, but of definite -procedure to put things right and to keep them -there. The Middle Ages formed one long training -of the intellect of Western Europe in the sense of -order. There may have been some deficiency in respect -to practice. But the idea never for a moment -lost its grip. It was preëminently an epoch of orderly -thought, rationalist through and through. The very -anarchy quickened the sense for coherent system; just -<span class='pageno' id='Page_17'>17</span>as the modern anarchy of Europe has stimulated the -intellectual vision of a League of Nations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But for science something more is wanted than a -general sense of the order in things. It needs but a -sentence to point out how the habit of definite exact -thought was implanted in the European mind by the -long dominance of scholastic logic and scholastic -divinity. The habit remained after the philosophy -had been repudiated, the priceless habit of looking for -an exact point and of sticking to it when found. Galileo -owes more to Aristotle than appears on the surface -of his <cite>Dialogues</cite>: he owes to him his clear head and his -analytic mind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I do not think, however, that I have even yet -brought out the greatest contribution of medievalism -to the formation of the scientific movement. I mean -the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence -can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly -definite manner, exemplifying general principles. -Without this belief the incredible labours of scientists -would be without hope. It is this instinctive conviction, -vividly poised before the imagination, which is -the motive power of research:—that there is a secret, -a secret which can be unveiled. How has this conviction -been so vividly implanted on the European mind?</p> - -<p class='c001'>When we compare this tone of thought in Europe -with the attitude of other civilisations when left to -themselves, there seems but one source for its origin. -It must come from the medieval insistence on the rationality -of God, conceived as with the personal energy -of Jehovah and with the rationality of a Greek philosopher. -Every detail was supervised and ordered: -the search into nature could only result in the vindication -<span class='pageno' id='Page_18'>18</span>of the faith in rationality. Remember that I -am not talking of the explicit beliefs of a few individuals. -What I mean is the impress on the European -mind arising from the unquestioned faith of centuries. -By this I mean the instinctive tone of thought and not -a mere creed of words.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In Asia, the conceptions of God were of a being who -was either too arbitrary or too impersonal for such -ideas to have much effect on instinctive habits of mind. -Any definite occurrence might be due to the fiat of an -irrational despot, or might issue from some impersonal, -inscrutable origin of things. There was not the -same confidence as in the intelligible rationality of a -personal being. I am not arguing that the European -trust in the scrutability of nature was logically justified -even by its own theology. My only point is to -understand how it arose. My explanation is that the -faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently -to the development of modern scientific theory, -is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But science is not merely the outcome of instinctive -faith. It also requires an active interest in the simple -occurrences of life for their own sake.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This qualification ‘for their own sake’ is important. -The first phase of the Middle Ages was an age of symbolism. -It was an age of vast ideas, and of primitive -technique. There was little to be done with nature, -except to coin a hard living from it. But there were -realms of thought to be explored, realms of philosophy -and realms of theology. Primitive art could symbolise -those ideas which filled all thoughtful minds. The -first phase of medieval art has a haunting charm beyond -<span class='pageno' id='Page_19'>19</span>compare: its own intrinsic quality is enhanced by -the fact that its message, which stretched beyond art’s -own self-justification of aesthetic achievement, was the -symbolism of things lying behind nature itself. In -this symbolic phase, medieval art energised in nature -as its medium, but pointed to another world.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In order to understand the contrast between these -early Middle Ages and the atmosphere required by the -scientific mentality, we should compare the sixth century -in Italy with the sixteenth century. In both centuries -the Italian genius was laying the foundations of -a new epoch. The history of the three centuries preceding -the earlier period, despite the promise for the -future introduced by the rise of Christianity, is overwhelmingly -infected by the sense of the decline of -civilisation. In each generation something has been -lost. As we read the records, we are haunted by the -shadow of the coming barbarism. There are great -men, with fine achievements in action or in thought. -But their total effect is merely for some short time to -arrest the general decline. In the sixth century we -are, so far as Italy is concerned, at the lowest point of -the curve. But in that century every action is laying -the foundation for the tremendous rise of the new -European civilisation. In the background the Byzantine -Empire, under Justinian, in three ways determined -the character of the early Middle Ages in Western -Europe. In the first place, its armies, under Belisarius -and Narses, cleared Italy from the Gothic -domination. In this way, the stage was freed for the -exercise of the old Italian genius for creating organisations -which shall be protective of ideals of cultural -<span class='pageno' id='Page_20'>20</span>activity. It is impossible not to sympathise with the -Goths: yet there can be no doubt but that a thousand -years of the Papacy were infinitely more valuable for -Europe than any effects derivable from a well-established -Gothic kingdom of Italy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the second place, the codification of the Roman -law established the ideal of legality which dominated -the sociological thought of Europe in the succeeding -centuries. Law is both an engine for government, and -a condition restraining <a id='corr20.10'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='givernment'>government</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_20.10'><ins class='correction' title='givernment'>government</ins></a></span>. The canon law -of the Church, and the civil law of the State, owe -to Justinian’s lawyers their influence on the development -of Europe. They established in the Western -mind the ideal that an authority should be at once -lawful, and law-enforcing, and should in itself exhibit -a rationally adjusted system of organisation. The sixth -century in Italy gave the initial exhibition of the way -in which the impress of these ideas was fostered by -contact with the Byzantine Empire.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thirdly, in the non-political spheres of art and -learning Constantinople exhibited a standard of realised -achievement which, partly by the impulse to direct -imitation, and partly by the indirect inspiration arising -from the mere knowledge that such things existed, -acted as a perpetual spur to Western culture. The -wisdom of the Byzantines, as it stood in the imagination -of the first phase of medieval mentality, and the -wisdom of the Egyptians as it stood in the imagination -of the early Greeks, played analogous rôles. -Probably the actual knowledge of these respective wisdoms -was, in either case, about as much as was good -for the recipients. They knew enough to know the -sort of standards which are attainable, and not enough -<span class='pageno' id='Page_21'>21</span>to be fettered by static and traditional ways of thought. -Accordingly, in both cases men went ahead on their -own and did better. No account of the rise of the -European scientific mentality can omit some notice of -this influence of the Byzantine civilisation in the background. -In the sixth century there is a crisis in the -history of the relations between the Byzantines and the -West; and this crisis is to be contrasted with the influence -of Greek literature on European thought in the -fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The two outstanding -men, who in the Italy of the sixth century laid the -foundations of the future, were St. Benedict and Gregory -the Great. By reference to them, we can at once -see how absolutely in ruins was the approach to the -scientific mentality which had been attained by the -Greeks. We are at the zero point of scientific temperature. -But the life-work of Gregory and of Benedict -contributed elements to the reconstruction of -Europe which secured that this reconstruction, when -it arrived, should include a more effective scientific -mentality than that of the ancient world. The Greeks -were over-theoretical. For them science was an offshoot -of philosophy. Gregory and Benedict were -practical men, with an eye for the importance of ordinary -things; and they combined this practical temperament -with their religious and cultural activities. -In particular, we owe it to St. Benedict that the monasteries -were the homes of practical agriculturalists, -as well as of saints and of artists and of men of learning. -The alliance of science with technology, by which -learning is kept in contact <a id='corr21.31'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='wtih'>with</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_21.31'><ins class='correction' title='wtih'>with</ins></a></span> irreducible and stubborn -facts, owes much to the practical bent of the early -Benedictines. Modern science derives from Rome as -<span class='pageno' id='Page_22'>22</span>well as from Greece, and this Roman strain explains -its gain in an energy of thought kept closely in contact -with the world of facts.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But the influence of this contact between the monasteries -and the facts of nature showed itself first in -art. The rise of Naturalism in the later Middle Ages -was the entry into the European mind of the final -ingredient necessary for the rise of science. It was the -rise of interest in natural objects, and in natural occurrences, -for their own sakes. The natural foliage of a -district was sculptured in out-of-the-way spots of the -later buildings, merely as exhibiting delight in those -familiar objects. The whole atmosphere of every art -exhibited a direct joy in the apprehension of the things -which lie around us. The craftsmen who executed the -late medieval decorative sculpture, Giotto, Chaucer, -Wordsworth, Walt Whitman, and, at the present day, -the New England poet Robert Frost, are all akin to -each other in this respect. The simple immediate -facts are the topics of interest, and these reappear in -the thought of science as the ‘irreducible stubborn -facts.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>The mind of Europe was now prepared for its new -venture of thought. It is unnecessary to tell in detail -the various incidents which marked the rise of science: -the growth of wealth and leisure; the expansion of -universities; the invention of printing; the taking of -Constantinople; Copernicus; Vasco da Gama; Columbus; -the telescope. The soil, the climate, the seeds, -were there, and the forest grew. Science has never -shaken off the impress of its origin in the historical -revolt of the later Renaissance. It has remained predominantly -an anti-rationalistic movement, based upon -<span class='pageno' id='Page_23'>23</span>a naïve faith. What reasoning it has wanted, has been -borrowed from mathematics which is a surviving relic -of Greek rationalism, following the deductive method. -Science repudiates philosophy. In other words, it has -never cared to justify its faith or to explain its meanings; -and has remained blandly indifferent to its refutation -by Hume.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Of course the historical revolt was fully justified. -It was wanted. It was more than wanted: it was an -absolute necessity for healthy progress. The world -required centuries of contemplation of irreducible and -stubborn facts. It is difficult for men to do more than -one thing at a time, and that was the sort of thing they -had to do after the rationalistic orgy of the Middle -Ages. It was a very sensible reaction; but it was not -a protest on behalf of reason.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is, however, a Nemesis which waits upon -those who deliberately avoid avenues of knowledge. -Oliver Cromwell’s cry echoes down the ages, ‘My -brethren, by the bowels of Christ I beseech you, bethink -you that you may be mistaken.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>The progress of science has now reached a turning -point. The stable foundations of physics have broken -up: also for the first time physiology is asserting itself -as an effective body of knowledge, as distinct from a -scrap-heap. The old foundations of scientific thought -are becoming unintelligible. Time, space, matter, -material, ether, electricity, mechanism, organism, configuration, -structure, pattern, function, all require reinterpretation. -What is the sense of talking about a -mechanical explanation when you do not know what -you mean by mechanics?</p> - -<p class='c001'>The truth is that science started its modern career -<span class='pageno' id='Page_24'>24</span>by taking over ideas derived from the weakest side of -the philosophies of Aristotle’s successors. In some -respects it was a happy choice. It enabled the knowledge -of the seventeenth century to be formularised so -far as physics and chemistry were concerned, with a -completeness which has lasted to the present time. But -the progress of biology and psychology has probably -been checked by the uncritical assumption of half-truths. -If science is not to degenerate into a medley -of <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>ad hoc</i></span> hypotheses, it must become philosophical -and must enter upon a thorough criticism of its own -foundations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the succeeding lectures of this course, I shall trace -the successes and the failures of the particular conceptions -of cosmology with which the European intellect -has clothed itself in the last three centuries. General -climates of opinion persist for periods of about two -to three generations, that is to say, for periods of sixty -to a hundred years. There are also shorter waves of -thought, which play on the surface of the tidal movement. -We shall find, therefore, transformations in the -European outlook, slowly modifying the successive -centuries. There persists, however, throughout the -whole period the fixed scientific cosmology which presupposes -the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute -matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux -of configurations. In itself such a material is senseless, -valueless, purposeless. It just does what it does do, -following a fixed routine imposed by external relations -which do not spring from the nature of its being. -It is this assumption that I call ‘scientific materialism.’ -Also it is an assumption which I shall challenge as -<span class='pageno' id='Page_25'>25</span>being entirely unsuited to the scientific situation at -which we have now arrived. It is not wrong, if properly -construed. If we confine ourselves to certain -types of facts, abstracted from the complete circumstances -in which they occur, the materialistic assumption -expresses these facts to perfection. But when we -pass beyond the abstraction, either by more subtle employment -of our senses, or by the request for meanings -and for coherence of thoughts, the scheme breaks -down at once. The narrow efficiency of the scheme -was the very cause of its supreme methodological success. -For it directed attention to just those groups of -facts which, in the state of knowledge then existing, -required investigation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The success of the scheme has adversely affected the -various currents of European thought. The historical -revolt was anti-rationalistic, because the rationalism -of the scholastics required a sharp correction by -contact with brute fact. But the revival of philosophy -in the hands of Descartes and his successors was entirely -coloured in its development by the acceptance of -the scientific cosmology at its face value. The success -of their ultimate ideas confirmed scientists in their -refusal to modify them as the result of an enquiry into -their rationality. Every philosophy was bound in -some way or other to swallow them whole. Also the -example of science affected other regions of thought. -The historical revolt has thus been exaggerated into -the exclusion of philosophy from its proper rôle of -harmonising the various abstractions of methodological -thought. Thought is abstract; and the intolerant -use of abstractions is the major vice of the intellect. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_26'>26</span>This vice is not wholly corrected by the recurrence to -concrete experience. For after all, you need only attend -to those aspects of your concrete experience which -lie within some limited scheme. There are two methods -for the purification of ideas. One of them is dispassionate -observation by means of the bodily senses. -But observation is selection. Accordingly, it is difficult -to transcend a scheme of abstraction whose success -is sufficiently wide. The other method is by comparing -the various schemes of abstraction which are -well founded in our various types of experience. This -comparison takes the form of satisfying the demands -of the Italian scholastic divines whom Paul Sarpi -mentioned. They asked that <em>reason</em> should be used. -Faith in reason is the trust that the ultimate natures of -things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere -arbitrariness. It is the faith that at the base of things -we shall not find mere arbitrary mystery. The faith -in the order of nature which has made possible the -growth of science is a particular example of a deeper -faith. This faith cannot be justified by any inductive -generalisation. It springs from direct inspection of -the nature of things as disclosed in our own immediate -present experience. There is no parting from your -own shadow. To experience this faith is to know that -in being ourselves we are more than ourselves: to know -that our experience, dim and fragmentary as it is, yet -sounds the utmost depths of reality: to know that detached -details merely in order to be themselves demand -that they should find themselves in a system of things: -to know that this system includes the harmony of logical -rationality, and the harmony of aesthetic achievement: -<span class='pageno' id='Page_27'>27</span>to know that, while the harmony of logic lies -upon the universe as an iron necessity, the aesthetic -harmony stands before it as a living ideal moulding -the general flux in its broken progress towards finer, -subtler issues.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_28'>28</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER II <br /> <br /> MATHEMATICS AS AN ELEMENT IN <br /> THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The science of Pure Mathematics, in its modern developments, -may claim to be the most original creation -of the human spirit. Another claimant for this position -is music. But we will put aside all rivals, and -consider the ground on which such a claim can be -made for mathematics. The originality of mathematics -consists in the fact that in mathematical science -connections between things are exhibited which, apart -from the agency of human reason, are extremely unobvious. -Thus the ideas, now in the minds of contemporary -mathematicians, lie very remote from any notions -which can be immediately derived by perception -through the senses; unless indeed it be perception -stimulated and guided by antecedent mathematical -knowledge. This is the thesis which I proceed to -exemplify.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Suppose we project our imaginations backwards -through many thousands of years, and endeavour to -realise the simple-mindedness of even the greatest intellects -in those early societies. Abstract ideas which -to us are immediately obvious must have been, for -them, matters only of the most dim apprehension. -For example take the question of number. We think -of the number ‘five’ as applying to appropriate groups -<span class='pageno' id='Page_29'>29</span>of any entities whatsoever—to five fishes, five children, -five apples, five days. Thus in considering the relations -of the number ‘five’ to the number ‘three,’ we are -thinking of two groups of things, one with five members -and the other with three members. But we are -entirely abstracting from any consideration of any -particular entities, or even of any particular sorts -of entities, which go to make up the membership -of either of the two groups. We are merely thinking -of those relationships between those two groups -which are entirely independent of the individual -essences of any of the members of either group. -This is a very remarkable feat of abstraction; and -it must have taken ages for the human race to rise -to it. During a long period, groups of fishes will -have been compared to each other in respect to -their multiplicity, and groups of days to each other. -But the first man who noticed the analogy between -a group of seven fishes and a group of seven days -made a notable advance in the history of thought. -He was the first man who entertained a concept belonging -to the science of pure mathematics. At that -moment it must have been impossible for him to divine -the complexity and subtlety of these abstract mathematical -ideas which were waiting for discovery. Nor -could he have guessed that these notions would exert -a widespread fascination in each succeeding generation. -There is an erroneous literary tradition which -represents the love of mathematics as a monomania -confined to a few eccentrics in each generation. But -be this as it may, it would have been impossible to -anticipate the pleasure derivable from a type of abstract -thinking which had no counterpart in the then-existing -<span class='pageno' id='Page_30'>30</span>society. Thirdly, the tremendous future effect -of mathematical knowledge on the lives of men, on -their daily avocations, on their habitual thoughts, on -the organization of society, must have been even more -completely shrouded from the foresight of those early -thinkers. Even now there is a very wavering grasp -of the true position of mathematics as an element in -the history of thought. I will not go so far as to say -that to construct a history of thought without profound -study of the mathematical ideas of successive -epochs is like omitting Hamlet from the play which -is named after him. That would be claiming too -much. But it is certainly analogous to cutting out -the part of Ophelia. This simile is singularly exact. -For Ophelia is quite essential to the play, she is very -charming,—and a little mad. Let us grant that the -pursuit of mathematics is a divine madness of the -human spirit, a refuge from the goading urgency of -contingent happenings.</p> - -<p class='c001'>When we think of mathematics, we have in our -mind a science devoted to the exploration of number, -quantity, geometry, and in modern times also including -investigation into yet more abstract concepts of -order, and into analogous types of purely logical relations. -The point of mathematics is that in it we have -always got rid of the particular instance, and even of -any particular sorts of entities. So that for example, -no mathematical truths apply merely to fish, or merely -to stones, or merely to colours. So long as you are -dealing with pure mathematics, you are in the realm of -complete and absolute abstraction. All you assert is, -that reason insists on the admission that, if any entities -whatever have any relations which satisfy such-and-such -<span class='pageno' id='Page_31'>31</span>purely abstract conditions, then they must have -other relations which satisfy other purely abstract conditions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Mathematics is thought moving in the sphere of -complete abstraction from any particular instance of -what it is talking about. So far is this view of mathematics -from being obvious, that we can easily assure -ourselves that it is not, even now, generally understood. -For example, it is habitually thought that the -certainty of mathematics is a reason for the certainty -of our geometrical knowledge of the space of the -physical universe. This is a delusion which has vitiated -much philosophy in the past, and some philosophy -in the present. This question of geometry is a test -case of some urgency. There are certain alternative -sets of purely abstract conditions possible for the relationships -of groups of unspecified entities, which I -will call <em>geometrical conditions</em>. I give them this -name because of their general analogy to those conditions, -which we believe to hold respecting the particular -geometrical relations of things observed by us in -our direct perception of nature. So far as our observations -are concerned, we are not quite accurate -enough to be certain of the exact conditions regulating -the things we come across in nature. But we can by a -slight stretch of hypothesis identify these observed -conditions with some one set of the purely abstract -geometrical conditions. In doing so, we make a particular -determination of the group of unspecified entities -which are the <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>relata</i></span> in the abstract science. In -the pure mathematics of geometrical relationships, -we say that, if <em>any</em> group of entities enjoy <em>any</em> relationships -among its members satisfying <em>this</em> set of abstract -<span class='pageno' id='Page_32'>32</span>geometrical conditions, then such-and-such additional -abstract conditions must also hold for such relationships. -But when we come to physical space, we say -that some definitely observed group of physical entities -enjoys some definitely observed relationships -among its members which do satisfy this above-mentioned -set of abstract geometrical conditions. We -thence conclude that the additional relationships -which we concluded to hold in <em>any</em> such case, must -therefore hold in <em>this particular</em> case.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The certainty of mathematics depends upon its complete -abstract generality. But we can have no <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>à priori</i></span> -certainty that we are right in believing that the observed -entities in the concrete universe form a particular -instance of what falls under our general reasoning. -To take another example from arithmetic. It is a -general abstract truth of pure mathematics that any -group of forty entities can be subdivided into two -groups of twenty entities. We are therefore justified -in concluding that a particular group of apples which -we believe to contain forty members can be subdivided -into two groups of apples of which each contains -twenty members. But there always remains the possibility -that we have miscounted the big group; so that, -when we come in practice to subdivide it, we shall -find that one of the two heaps has an apple too few or -an apple too many.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, in criticising an argument based upon -the application of mathematics to particular matters -of fact, there are always three processes to be kept -perfectly distinct in our minds. We must first scan -the purely mathematical reasoning to make sure that -there are no mere slips in it—no casual illogicalities -<span class='pageno' id='Page_33'>33</span>due to mental failure. Any mathematician knows -from bitter experience that, in first elaborating a train -of reasoning, it is very easy to commit a slight error -which yet makes all the difference. But when a piece -of mathematics has been revised, and has been before -the expert world for some time, the chance of a casual -error is almost negligible. The next process is to make -quite certain of all the abstract conditions which have -been presupposed to hold. This is the determination -of the abstract premises from which the mathematical -reasoning proceeds. This is a matter of considerable -difficulty. In the past quite remarkable oversights -have been made, and have been accepted by generations -of the greatest mathematicians. The chief danger -is that of oversight, namely, tacitly to introduce -some condition, which it is natural for us to presuppose, -but which in fact need not always be holding. -There is another opposite oversight in this connection -which does not lead to error, but only to lack of simplification. -It is very easy to think that more postulated -conditions are required than is in fact the case. -In other words, we may think that some abstract postulate -is necessary which is in fact capable of being -proved from the other postulates that we have already -on hand. The only effects of this excess of -abstract postulates are to diminish our aesthetic pleasure -in the mathematical reasoning, and to give us -more trouble when we come to the third process of -criticism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This third process of criticism is that of verifying -that our abstract postulates hold for the particular case -in question. It is in respect to this process of verification -for the particular case that all the trouble arises. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_34'>34</span>In some simple instances, such as the counting of forty -apples, we can with a little care arrive at practical -certainty. But in general, with more complex instances, -complete certainty is unattainable. Volumes, -libraries of volumes, have been written on the subject. -It is the battle ground of rival philosophers. There -are two distinct questions involved. There are particular -definite things observed, and we have to make -sure that the relations between these things really do -obey certain definite exact abstract conditions. There -is great room for error here. The exact observational -methods of science are all contrivances for limiting -these erroneous conclusions as to direct matters of fact. -But another question arises. The things directly observed -are, almost always, only samples. We want to -conclude that the abstract conditions, which hold for -the samples, also hold for all other entities which, for -some reason or other, appear to us to be of the same -sort. This process of reasoning from the sample to -the whole species is Induction. The theory of Induction -is the despair of philosophy—and yet all our activities -are based upon it. Anyhow, in criticising a -mathematical conclusion as to a particular matter of -fact, the real difficulties consist in finding out the -abstract assumptions involved, and in estimating the -evidence for their applicability to the particular case -in hand.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It often happens, therefore, that in criticising a -learned book of applied mathematics, or a memoir, -one’s whole trouble is with the first chapter, or even -with the first page. For it is there, at the very outset, -where the author will probably be found to slip in his -assumptions. Farther, the trouble is not with what the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_35'>35</span>author does say, but with what he does not say. Also -it is not with what he knows he has assumed, but with -what he has unconsciously assumed. We do not doubt -the author’s honesty. It is his perspicacity which we -are criticising. Each generation criticises the unconscious -assumptions made by its parents. It may assent -to them, but it brings them out in the open.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The history of the development of language illustrates -this point. It is a history of the progressive -analysis of ideas. Latin and Greek were inflected -languages. This means that they express an unanalyzed -complex of ideas by the mere modification of a -word; whereas in English, for example, we use prepositions -and auxiliary verbs to drag into the open the -whole bundle of ideas involved. For certain forms of -literary art,—though not always—the compact absorption -of auxiliary ideas into the main word may be an -advantage. But in a language such as English there -is the overwhelming gain in explicitness. This increased -explicitness is a more complete exhibition of -the various abstractions involved in the complex idea -which is the meaning of the sentence.</p> - -<p class='c001'>By comparison with language, we can now see what -is the function in thought which is performed by pure -mathematics. It is a resolute attempt to go the whole -way in the direction of complete analysis, so as to -separate the elements of mere matter of fact from the -purely abstract conditions which they exemplify.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The habit of such analysis enlightens every act of -the functioning of the human mind. It first (by isolating -it) emphasizes the direct aesthetic appreciation -of the content of experience. This direct appreciation -means an apprehension of what this experience is in -<span class='pageno' id='Page_36'>36</span>itself in its own particular essence, including its immediate -concrete values. This is a question of direct -experience, dependent upon sensitive subtlety. There -is then the abstraction of the particular entities involved, -viewed in themselves, and as apart from that -particular occasion of experience in which we are -then apprehending them. Lastly there is the further -apprehension of the absolutely general conditions satisfied -by the particular relations of those entities as in -that experience. These conditions gain their generality -from the fact that they are expressible without -reference to those particular relations or to those particular -relata which occur in that particular occasion -of experience. They are conditions which might hold -for an indefinite variety of other occasions, involving -other entities and other relations between them. Thus -these conditions are perfectly general because they -refer to no particular occasion, and to no particular -entities (such as green, or blue, or trees) which enter -into a variety of occasions, and to no particular relationships -between such entities.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is, however, a limitation to be made to the -generality of mathematics; it is a qualification which -applies equally to all general statements. No statement, -except one, can be made respecting any remote -occasion which enters into no relationship with the -immediate occasion so as to form a constitutive element -of the essence of that immediate occasion. By -the ‘immediate occasion’ I mean that occasion which -involves as an ingredient the individual act of judgment -in question. The one excepted statement is,—If -anything out of relationship, then complete ignorance -as to it. Here by ‘ignorance,’ I mean <em>ignorance</em>; -<span class='pageno' id='Page_37'>37</span>accordingly no advice can be given as to how to expect -it, or to treat it, in ‘practice’ or in any other way. -Either we know something of the remote occasion by -the cognition which is itself an element of the immediate -occasion, or we know nothing. Accordingly the -full universe, disclosed for every variety of experience, -is a universe in which every detail enters into its -proper relationship with the immediate occasion. The -generality of mathematics is the most complete generality -consistent with the community of occasions -which constitutes our metaphysical situation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is further to be noticed that the particular entities -require these general conditions for their ingression -into any occasions; but the same general conditions -may be required by many types of particular -entities. This fact, that the general conditions transcend -any one set of particular entities, is the ground -for the entry into mathematics, and into mathematical -logic, of the notion of the ‘variable.’ It is by the -employment of this notion that general conditions are -investigated without any specification of particular -entities. This irrelevance of the particular entities -has not been generally understood: for example, the -shape-iness of shapes, <i>e.g.</i>, circularity and sphericity -and cubicality as in actual experience, do not enter -into the geometrical reasoning.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The exercise of logical reason is always concerned -with these absolutely general conditions. In its broadest -sense, the discovery of mathematics is the discovery -that the totality of these general abstract conditions, -which are concurrently applicable to the relationships -among the entities of any one concrete occasion, -are themselves inter-connected in the manner of a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_38'>38</span>pattern with a key to it. This pattern of relationships -among general abstract conditions is imposed alike on -external reality, and on our abstract representations of -it, by the general necessity that every thing must be -just its own individual self, with its own individual -way of differing from everything else. This is nothing -else than the necessity of abstract logic, which is the -presupposition involved in the very fact of interrelated -existence as disclosed in each immediate occasion -of experience.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The key to the pattern means this fact:—that from -a select set of those general conditions, exemplified in -any one and the same occasion, a pattern involving an -infinite variety of other such conditions, also exemplified -in the same occasion, can be developed by the -pure exercise of abstract logic. Any such select set is -called the set of postulates, or premises, from which -the reasoning proceeds. The reasoning is nothing else -than the exhibition of the whole pattern of general -conditions involved in the pattern derived from the -selected postulates.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The harmony of the logical reason, which divines -the complete pattern as involved in the postulates, is -the most general aesthetic property arising from the -mere fact of concurrent existence in the unity of one -occasion. Wherever there is a unity of occasion there -is thereby established an aesthetic relationship between -the general conditions involved in that occasion. This -aesthetic relationship is that which is divined in the -exercise of rationality. Whatever falls within that -relationship is thereby exemplified in that occasion; -whatever falls without that relationship is thereby excluded -from exemplification in that occasion. The -<span class='pageno' id='Page_39'>39</span>complete pattern of general conditions, thus exemplified, -is determined by any one of many select sets of -these conditions. These key sets are sets of equivalent -postulates. This reasonable harmony of being, which -is required for the unity of a complex occasion, together -with the completeness of the realisation (in that -occasion) of all that is involved in its logical harmony, -is the primary article of metaphysical doctrine. -It means that for things to be together involves that -they are reasonably together. This means that thought -can penetrate into every occasion of fact, so that by -comprehending its key conditions, the whole complex -of its pattern of conditions lies open before it. It -comes to this:—provided we know something which is -perfectly general about the elements in any occasion, -we can then know an indefinite number of other -equally general concepts which must also be exemplified -in that same occasion. The logical harmony involved -in the unity of an occasion is both exclusive -and inclusive. The occasion must exclude the inharmonious, -and it must include the harmonious.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Pythagoras was the first man who had any grasp -of the full sweep of this general principle. He lived -in the sixth century before Christ. Our knowledge -of him is fragmentary. But we know some points -which establish his greatness in the history of thought. -He insisted on the importance of the utmost generality -in reasoning, and he divined the importance of number -as an aid to the construction of any representation -of the conditions involved in the order of nature. -We know also that he studied geometry, and discovered -the general proof of the remarkable theorem -about right-angled triangles. The formation of the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_40'>40</span>Pythagorean Brotherhood, and the mysterious rumours -as to its rites and its influence, afford some evidence -that Pythagoras divined, however dimly, the -possible importance of mathematics in the formation -of science. On the side of philosophy he started a -discussion which has agitated thinkers ever since. -He asked, ‘What is the status of mathematical entities, -such as numbers for example, in the realm of things?’ -The number ‘two,’ for example, is in some sense exempt -from the flux of time and the necessity of position -in space. Yet it is involved in the real world. -The same considerations apply to geometrical notions—to -circular shape, for example. Pythagoras is said -to have taught that the mathematical entities, such as -numbers and shapes, were the ultimate stuff out of -which the real entities of our perceptual experience -are constructed. As thus boldly stated, the idea seems -crude, and indeed silly. But undoubtedly, he had hit -upon a philosophical notion of considerable importance; -a notion which has a long history, and which -has moved the minds of men, and has even entered into -Christian theology. About a thousand years separate -the Athanasian Creed from Pythagoras, and about two -thousand four hundred years separate Pythagoras -from Hegel. Yet for all these distances in time, the -importance of definite number in the constitution of -the Divine Nature, and the concept of the real world -as exhibiting the evolution of an idea, can both be -traced back to the train of thought set going by -Pythagoras.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The importance of an individual thinker owes something -to chance. For it depends upon the fate of his -ideas in the minds of his successors. In this respect -<span class='pageno' id='Page_41'>41</span>Pythagoras was fortunate. His philosophical speculations -reach us through the mind of Plato. The -Platonic world of ideas is the refined, revised form of -the Pythagorean doctrine that number lies at the base -of the real world. Owing to the Greek mode of representing -numbers by patterns of dots, the notions of -number and of geometrical configuration are less separated -than with us. Also Pythagoras, without doubt, -included the shape-iness of shape, which is an impure -mathematical entity. So to-day, when Einstein and his -followers proclaim that physical facts, such as gravitation, -are to be construed as exhibitions of local -peculiarities of spatio-temporal properties, they are -following the pure Pythagorean tradition. In a sense, -Plato and Pythagoras stand nearer to modern physical -science than does Aristotle. The two former were -mathematicians, whereas Aristotle was the son of a -doctor, though of course he was not thereby ignorant -of mathematics. The practical counsel to be derived -from Pythagoras, is to measure, and thus to express -quality in terms of numerically determined quantity. -But the biological sciences, then and till our own time, -have been overwhelmingly classificatory. Accordingly, -Aristotle by his Logic throws the emphasis on -classification. The popularity of Aristotelian Logic -retarded the advance of physical science throughout -the Middle Ages. If only the schoolmen had measured -instead of classifying, how much they might have -learnt!</p> - -<p class='c001'>Classification is a halfway house between the immediate -concreteness of the individual thing and the -complete abstraction of mathematical notions. The -species take account of the specific character, and the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_42'>42</span>genera of the generic character. But in the procedure -of relating mathematical notions to the facts of nature, -by counting, by measurement, and by geometrical relations, -and by types of order, the rational contemplation -is lifted from the incomplete abstractions involved -in definite species and genera, to the complete, -abstractions of mathematics. Classification is necessary. -But unless you can progress from classification -to mathematics, your reasoning will not take you very -far.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Between the epoch which stretches from Pythagoras -to Plato and the epoch comprised in the seventeenth -century of the modern world nearly two thousand -years elapsed. In this long interval mathematics -had made immense strides. Geometry had gained -the study of conic sections and trigonometry; the -method of exhaustion had almost anticipated the -integral calculus; and above all the Arabic arithmetical -notation and algebra had been contributed by -Asiatic thought. But the progress was on technical -lines. Mathematics, as a formative element in the -development of philosophy, never, during this long -period, recovered from its deposition at the hands of -Aristotle. Some of the old ideas derived from the -Pythagorean-Platonic epoch lingered on, and can be -traced among the Platonic influences which shaped -the first period of evolution of Christian theology. -But philosophy received no fresh inspiration from -the steady advance of mathematical science. In the -seventeenth century the influence of Aristotle was at -its lowest, and mathematics recovered the importance -of its earlier period. It was an age of great physicists -and great philosophers; and the physicists and philosophers -<span class='pageno' id='Page_43'>43</span>were alike mathematicians. The exception of -John Locke should be made; although he was greatly -influenced by the Newtonian circle of the Royal -Society. In the age of Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, -Newton, and Leibniz, mathematics was an influence of -the first magnitude in the formation of philosophic -ideas. But the mathematics, which now emerged into -prominence, was a very different science from the -mathematics of the earlier epoch. It had gained in -generality, and had started upon its almost incredible -modern career of piling subtlety of generalization -upon subtlety of generalization; and of finding, with -each growth of complexity, some new application, -either to physical science, or to philosophic thought. -The Arabic notation had equipped the science with -almost perfect technical efficiency in the manipulation -of numbers. This relief from a struggle with -arithmetical details (as instanced, for example, in the -Egyptian arithmetic of B. C. 1600) gave room for a -development which had already been faintly anticipated -in later Greek mathematics. Algebra now came -upon the scene, and algebra is a generalisation of -arithmetic. In the same way as the notion of number -abstracted from reference to any one particular set -of entities, so in algebra abstraction is made from the -notion of any particular numbers. Just as the number -‘5’ refers impartially to any group of five entities, so -in algebra the letters are used to refer impartially to -any number, with the proviso that each letter is to -refer to the same number throughout the same context -of its employment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This usage was first employed in equations, which -are methods of asking complicated arithmetical questions. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_44'>44</span>In this connection, the letters representing -numbers were termed ‘unknowns.’ But equations -soon suggested a new idea, that, namely, of a function -of one or more general symbols, these symbols being -letters representing any numbers. In this employment -the algebraic letters are called the ‘arguments’ -of the function, or sometimes they are called the ‘variables.’ -Then, for instance, if an angle is represented -by an algebraical letter, as standing for its numerical -measure in terms of a given unit, Trigonometry is -absorbed into this new algebra. Algebra thus develops -into the general science of analysis in which -we consider the properties of various functions of -undetermined arguments. Finally the particular functions, -such as the trigonometrical functions, and the -logarithmic functions, and the algebraic functions, -are generalised into the idea of ‘any function.’ Too -large a generalisation leads to mere barrenness. It is -the large generalisation, limited by a happy particularity, -which is the fruitful conception. For instance -the idea of any <em>continuous</em> function, whereby the limitation -of continuity is introduced, is the fruitful idea -which has led to most of the important applications. -This rise of algebraic analysis was concurrent with -Descartes’ discovery of analytical geometry, and then -with the invention of the infinitesimal calculus by -Newton and Leibniz. Truly, Pythagoras, if he could -have foreseen the issue of the train of thought which -he had set going would have felt himself fully justified -in his brotherhood with its excitement of mysterious -rites.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The point which I now want to make is that this -dominance of the idea of functionality in the abstract -<span class='pageno' id='Page_45'>45</span>sphere of mathematics found itself reflected in the -order of nature under the guise of mathematically -expressed laws of nature. Apart from this progress -of mathematics, the seventeenth century developments -of science would have been impossible. Mathematics -supplied the background of imaginative thought with -which the men of science approached the observation -of nature. Galileo produced formulae, Descartes -produced formulae, Huyghens produced formulae, -Newton produced formulae.</p> - -<p class='c001'>As a particular example of the effect of the abstract -development of mathematics upon the science of those -times, consider the notion of periodicity. The general -recurrences of things are very obvious in our ordinary -experience. Days recur, lunar phases recur, the seasons -of the year recur, rotating bodies recur to their -old positions, beats of the heart recur, breathing recurs. -On every side, we are met by recurrence. Apart from -recurrence, knowledge would be impossible; for nothing -could be referred to our past experience. Also, -apart from some regularity of recurrence, measurement -would be impossible. In our experience, as we -gain the idea of exactness, recurrence is fundamental.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the theory -of periodicity took a fundamental place in science. -Kepler divined a law connecting the major axes of the -planetary orbits with the periods in which the planets -respectively described their orbits: Galileo observed -the periodic vibrations of pendulums: Newton explained -sound as being due to the disturbance of air -by the passage through it of periodic waves of condensation -and rarefaction: Huyghens explained light as -being due to the transverse waves of vibration of a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_46'>46</span>subtle ether: Mersenne connected the period of the -vibration of a violin string with its density, tension, -and length. The birth of modern physics depended -upon the application of the abstract idea of periodicity -to a variety of concrete instances. But this would have -been impossible, unless mathematicians had already -worked out in the abstract the various abstract ideas -which cluster round the notions of periodicity. The -science of trigonometry arose from that of the relations -of the angles of a right-angled triangle, to the ratios -between the sides and hypotenuse of the triangle. -Then, under the influence of the newly discovered -mathematical science of the analysis of functions, it -broadened out into the study of the simple abstract -periodic functions which these ratios exemplify. Thus -trigonometry became completely abstract; and in thus -becoming abstract, it became useful. It illuminated -the underlying analogy between sets of utterly diverse -physical phenomena; and at the same time it supplied -the weapons by which any one such set could have its -various features analysed and related to each other.<a id='r2' /><a href='#f2' class='c013'><sup>[2]</sup></a></p> - -<p class='c001'>Nothing is more impressive than the fact that, as -mathematics withdrew increasingly into the upper -regions of ever greater extremes of abstract thought, -it returned back to earth with a corresponding growth -of importance for the analysis of concrete fact. The -history of the seventeenth century science reads as -though it were some vivid dream of Plato or Pythagoras. -In this characteristic the seventeenth century -was only the forerunner of its successors.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f2'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r2'>2</a>. For a more detailed consideration of the nature and function -of pure mathematics <i>cf.</i> my <cite>Introduction to Mathematics</cite>, Home -University Library, Williams and Norgate, London.</p> -</div> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_47'>47</span>The paradox is now fully established that the utmost -abstractions are the true weapons with which to -control our thought of concrete fact. As the result -of the prominence of mathematicians in the seventeenth -century, the eighteenth century was mathematically -minded, more especially where French influence -predominated. An exception must be made of -the English empiricism derived from Locke. Outside -France, Newton’s direct influence on philosophy is -best seen in Kant, and not in Hume.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the nineteenth century, the general influence of -mathematics waned. The romantic movement in -literature, and the idealistic movement in philosophy -were not the products of mathematical minds. Also, -even in science, the growth of geology, of zoology, and -of the biological sciences generally, was in each case -entirely disconnected from any reference to mathematics. -The chief scientific excitement of the century -was the Darwinian theory of evolution. Accordingly, -mathematicians were in the background, so far as the -general thought of that age was concerned. But this -does not mean that mathematics was being neglected, -or even that it was uninfluential. During the nineteenth -century pure mathematics made almost as -much progress as during all the preceding centuries -from Pythagoras onwards. Of course progress was -easier, because the technique had been perfected. But -allowing for that, the change in mathematics between -the years 1800 and 1900 is very remarkable. If we -add in the previous hundred years, and take the two -centuries preceding the present time, one is almost -tempted to date the foundation of mathematics somewhere -in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_48'>48</span>The period of the discovery of the elements stretches -from Pythagoras to Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, -and the developed science has been created during the -last two hundred and fifty years. This is not a boast -as to the superior genius of the modern world; for it is -harder to discover the elements than to develop the -science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Throughout the nineteenth century, the influence of -the science was its influence on dynamics and physics, -and thence derivatively on engineering and chemistry. -It is difficult to overrate its indirect influence -on human life through the medium of these sciences. -But there was no direct influence of mathematics -upon the general thought of the age.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In reviewing this rapid sketch of the influence of -mathematics throughout European history, we see -that it had two great periods of direct influence upon -general thought, both periods lasting for about two -hundred years. The first period was that stretching -from Pythagoras to Plato, when the possibility of the -science, and its general character, first dawned upon -the Grecian thinkers. The second period comprised -the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of our modern -epoch. Both periods had certain common characteristics. -In the earlier, as in the later period, the -general categories of thought in many spheres of human -interest, were in a state of disintegration. In the -age of Pythagoras, the unconscious Paganism, with -its traditional clothing of beautiful ritual and of magical -rites, was passing into a new phase under two -influences. There were waves of religious enthusiasm, -seeking direct enlightenment into the secret depths of -being; and at the opposite pole, there was the awakening -<span class='pageno' id='Page_49'>49</span>of critical analytical thought, probing with cool -dispassionateness into ultimate meanings. In both -influences, so diverse in their outcome, there was one -common element—an awakened curiosity, and a movement -towards the reconstruction of traditional ways. -The pagan mysteries may be compared to the Puritan -reaction and to the Catholic reaction; critical -scientific interest was alike in both epochs, though -with minor differences of substantial importance.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In each age, the earlier stages were placed in -periods of rising prosperity, and of new opportunities. -In this respect, they differed from the period of gradual -declension in the second and third centuries when -Christianity was advancing to the conquest of the -Roman world. It is only in a period, fortunate both -in its opportunities for disengagement from the immediate -pressure of circumstances, and in its eager -curiosity, that the Age-Spirit can undertake any direct -revision of those final abstractions which lie hidden -in the more concrete concepts from which the serious -thought of an age takes its start. In the rare periods -when this task can be undertaken, mathematics becomes -relevant to philosophy. For mathematics is -the science of the most complete abstractions to which -the human mind can attain.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The parallel between the two epochs must not be -pressed too far. The modern world is larger and -more complex than the ancient civilization round the -shores of the Mediterranean, or even than that of the -Europe which sent Columbus and the Pilgrim Fathers -across the ocean. We cannot now explain our age -by some simple formula which becomes dominant -and will then be laid to rest for a thousand years. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_50'>50</span>Thus the temporary submergence of the mathematical -mentality from the time of Rousseau onwards appears -already to be at an end. We are entering upon an -age of reconstruction, in religion, in science, and in -political thought. Such ages, if they are to avoid mere -ignorant oscillation between extremes, must seek truth -in its ultimate depths. There can be no vision of this -depth of truth apart from a philosophy which takes -full account of those ultimate abstractions, whose interconnections -it is the business of mathematics to -explore.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In order to explain exactly how mathematics is -gaining in general importance at the present time, let -us start from a particular scientific perplexity and -consider the notions to which we are naturally led by -some attempt to unravel its difficulties. At present -physics is troubled by the quantum theory. I need not -now explain<a id='r3' /><a href='#f3' class='c013'><sup>[3]</sup></a> what this theory is, to those who are not -already familiar with it. But the point is that one -of the most hopeful lines of explanation is to assume -that an electron does not continuously traverse its -path in space. The alternative notion as to its mode -of existence is that it appears at a series of discrete -positions in space which it occupies for successive -durations of time. It is as though an automobile -moving at the average rate of thirty miles an hour -along a road, did not traverse the road continuously; -but appeared successively at the successive milestones, -remaining for two minutes at each milestone.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f3'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r3'>3</a>. <i>Cf.</i> Chapter VIII.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>In the first place there is required the purely technical -use of mathematics to determine whether this -conception does in fact explain the many perplexing -<span class='pageno' id='Page_51'>51</span>characteristics of the quantum theory. If the notion -survives this test, undoubtedly physics will adopt it. -So far the question is purely one for mathematics and -physical science to settle between them, on the basis -of mathematical calculations and physical observations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But now a problem is handed over to the philosophers. -This discontinuous existence in space, thus assigned -to electrons, is very unlike the continuous existence -of material entities which we habitually assume -as obvious. The electron seems to be borrowing -the character which some people have assigned -to the Mahatmas of Tibet. These electrons, with the -correlative protons, are now conceived as being the -fundamental entities out of which the material bodies -of ordinary experience are composed. Accordingly, -if this explanation is allowed, we have to revise all our -notions of the ultimate character of material existence. -For when we penetrate to these final entities, this -startling discontinuity of spatial existence discloses -itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is no difficulty in explaining the paradox, if -we consent to apply to the apparently steady undifferentiated -endurance of matter the same principles as -those now accepted for sound and light. A steadily -sounding note is explained as the outcome of vibrations -in the air: a steady colour is explained as the -outcome of vibrations in ether. If we explain the -steady endurance of matter on the same principle, we -shall conceive each primordial element as a vibratory -ebb and flow of an underlying energy, or activity. -Suppose we keep to the physical idea of energy: then -each primordial element will be an organized system -<span class='pageno' id='Page_52'>52</span>of vibratory streaming of energy. Accordingly there -will be a definite period associated with each element; -and within that period the stream-system will sway -from one stationary maximum to another stationary -maximum,—or, taking a metaphor from the ocean -tides, the system will sway from one high tide to another -high tide. This system, forming the primordial -element, is nothing at any instant. It requires its whole -period in which to manifest itself. In an analogous -way, a note of music is nothing at an instant, but it -also requires its whole period in which to manifest -itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, in asking where the primordial element -is, we must settle on its average position at the -centre of each period. If we divide time into smaller -elements, the vibratory system as one electronic entity -has no existence. The path in space of such a -vibratory entity—where the entity is <em>constituted by</em> -the vibrations—must be represented by a series of detached -positions in space, analogously to the automobile -which is found at successive milestones and at -nowhere between.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We first must ask whether there is any evidence to -associate the quantum theory with vibration. This -question is immediately answered in the affirmative. -The whole theory centres round the radiant energy -from an atom, and is intimately associated with the -periods of the radiant wave-systems. It seems, therefore, -that the hypothesis of essentially vibratory existence -is the most hopeful way of explaining the paradox -of the discontinuous orbit.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the second place, a new problem is now placed -before philosophers and physicists, if we entertain the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_53'>53</span>hypothesis that the ultimate elements of matter are in -their essence vibratory. By this I mean that apart -from being a periodic system, such an element would -have no existence. With this hypothesis we have to -ask, what are the ingredients which form the vibratory -organism. We have already got rid of the matter -with its appearance of undifferentiated endurance. -Apart from some metaphysical compulsion, there is no -reason to provide another more subtle stuff to take the -place of the matter which has just been explained -away. The field is now open for the introduction of -some new doctrine of organism which may take the -place of the materialism with which, since the seventeenth -century, science has saddled philosophy. It -must be remembered that the physicists’ energy is obviously -an abstraction. The concrete fact, which is -the organism, must be a complete expression of the -character of a real occurrence. Such a displacement -of scientific materialism, if it ever takes place, cannot -fail to have important consequences in every field of -thought.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Finally, our last reflection must be, that we have in -the end come back to a version of the doctrine of old -Pythagoras, from whom mathematics, and mathematical -physics, took their rise. He discovered the importance -of dealing with abstractions; and in particular -directed attention to number as characterizing the -periodicities of notes of music. The importance of -the abstract idea of periodicity was thus present at the -very beginning both of mathematics and of European -philosophy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the seventeenth century, the birth of modern -science required a new mathematics, more fully -<span class='pageno' id='Page_54'>54</span>equipped for the purpose of analysing the characteristics -of vibratory existence. And now in the twentieth -century we find physicists largely engaged in analysing -the periodicities of atoms. Truly, Pythagoras in -founding European philosophy and European mathematics, -endowed them with the luckiest of lucky -guesses—or, was it a flash of divine genius, penetrating -to the inmost nature of things?</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_55'>55</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER III <br /> <br /> THE CENTURY OF GENIUS</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The previous chapters were devoted to the antecedent -conditions which prepared the soil for the scientific -outburst of the seventeenth century. They traced the -various elements of thought and instinctive belief, -from their first efflorescence in the classical civilisation -of the ancient world, through the transformations -which they underwent in the Middle Ages, up to the -historical revolt of the sixteenth century. Three -main factors arrested attention,—the rise of mathematics, -the instinctive belief in a detailed order of -nature, and the unbridled rationalism of the thought -of the later Middle Ages. By this rationalism I mean -the belief that the avenue to truth was predominantly -through a metaphysical analysis of the nature of -things, which would thereby determine how things -acted and functioned. The historical revolt was the -definite abandonment of this method in favour of the -study of the empirical facts of antecedents and consequences. -In religion, it meant the appeal to the -origins of Christianity; and in science it meant the -appeal to experiment and the inductive method of -reasoning.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A brief, and sufficiently accurate, description of the -intellectual life of the European races during the succeeding -two centuries and a quarter up to our own -times is that they have been living upon the accumulated -<span class='pageno' id='Page_56'>56</span>capital of ideas provided for them by the genius -of the seventeenth century. The men of this epoch -inherited a ferment of ideas attendant upon the historical -revolt of the sixteenth century, and they bequeathed -formed systems of thought touching every -aspect of human life. It is the one century which consistently, -and throughout the whole range of human -activities, provided intellectual genius adequate for -the greatness of its occasions. The crowded stage of -this hundred years is indicated by the coincidences -which mark its literary annals. At its dawn Bacon’s -<cite>Advancement of Learning</cite> and Cervantes’ <cite>Don Quixote</cite> -were published in the same year (1605), as though -the epoch would introduce itself with a forward and -a backward glance. The first quarto edition of <cite>Hamlet</cite> -appeared in the preceding year, and a slightly variant -edition in the same year. Finally Shakespeare -and Cervantes died on the same day, April 23, 1616. -In the spring of this same year Harvey is believed to -have first expounded his theory of the circulation of -the blood in a course of lectures before the College of -Physicians in London. Newton was born in the year -that Galileo died (1642), exactly one hundred years -after the publication of Copernicus’ <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>De Revolutionibus</cite></span>. -One year earlier Descartes published his <span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><cite>Meditationes</cite></span> -and two years later his <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>Principia Philosophiae</cite></span>. -There simply was not time for the century to -space out nicely its notable events concerning men of -genius.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I cannot now enter upon a chronicle of the various -stages of intellectual advance included within this -epoch. It is too large a topic for one lecture, and -would obscure the ideas which it is my purpose to -<span class='pageno' id='Page_57'>57</span>develop. A mere rough catalogue of some names will -be sufficient, names of men who published to the world -important work within these limits of time: Francis -Bacon, Harvey, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, -Huyghens, Boyle, Newton, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz. -I have limited the list to the sacred number of twelve, -a number much too small to be properly representative. -For example, there is only one Italian there, -whereas Italy could have filled the list from its own -ranks. Again Harvey is the only biologist, and also -there are too many Englishmen. This latter defect -is partly due to the fact that the lecturer is English, -and that he is lecturing to an audience which, equally -with him, owns this English century. If he had been -Dutch, there would have been too many Dutchmen; -if Italian, too many Italians; and if French, too many -Frenchmen. The unhappy Thirty Years’ War was -devastating Germany; but every other country looks -back to this century as an epoch which witnessed some -culmination of its genius. Certainly this was a great -period of English thought; as at a later time Voltaire -impressed upon France.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The omission of physiologists, other than Harvey, -also requires explanation. There were, of course, -great advances in biology within the century, chiefly -associated with Italy and the University of Padua. -But my purpose is to trace the philosophic outlook, -derived from science and presupposed by science, and -to estimate some of its effects on the general climate -of each age. Now the scientific <a id='corr57.30'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='philosopy'>philosophy</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_57.30'><ins class='correction' title='philosopy'>philosophy</ins></a></span> of this age -was dominated by physics; so as to be the most obvious -rendering, in terms of general ideas, of the state of -physical knowledge of that age and of the two succeeding -<span class='pageno' id='Page_58'>58</span>centuries. As a matter of fact, these concepts are -very unsuited to biology; and set for it an insoluble -problem of matter and life and organism, with which -biologists are now wrestling. But the science of living -organisms is only now coming to a growth adequate to -impress its conceptions upon philosophy. The last -half century before the present time has witnessed unsuccessful -attempts to impress biological notions upon -the materialism of the seventeenth century. However -this success be estimated, it is certain that the root -ideas of the seventeenth century were derived from the -school of thought which produced Galileo, Huyghens -and Newton, and not from the physiologists of Padua. -One unsolved problem of thought, so far as it derives -from this period, is to be formulated thus: Given configurations -of matter with locomotion in space as assigned -by physical laws, to account for living organisms.</p> - -<p class='c001'>My discussion of the epoch will be best introduced -by a quotation from Francis Bacon, which forms the -opening of Section (or ‘Century’) IX of his <cite>Natural -History</cite>, I mean his <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>Silva Silvarum</cite></span>. We are told in -the contemporary memoir by his chaplain, Dr. Rawley, -that this work was composed in the last five years -of his life, so it must be dated between 1620 and 1626. -The quotation runs thus:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though -they have no sense, yet they have perception; for when -one body is applied to another, there is a kind of election -to embrace that which is agreeable, and to exclude -or expel that which is ingrate; and whether the body -be alterant or altered, evermore a perception precedeth -operation; for else all bodies would be like one -<span class='pageno' id='Page_59'>59</span>to another. And sometimes this perception, in some -kind of bodies, is far more subtile than sense; so that -sense is but a dull thing in comparison of it: we see a -weatherglass will find the least difference of the -weather in heat or cold, when we find it not. And this -perception is sometimes at a distance, as well as upon -the touch; as when the loadstone draweth iron; or -flame naphtha of Babylon, a great distance off. It is -therefore a subject of a very noble enquiry, to enquire -of the more subtile perceptions; for it is another key -to open nature, as well as the sense; and sometimes -better. And besides, it is a principal means of natural -divination; for that which in these perceptions -appeareth early, in the great effects cometh long -after.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are a great many points of interest about this -quotation, some of which will emerge into importance -in succeeding lectures. In the first place, note the -careful way in which Bacon discriminates between -<em>perception</em>, or <em>taking account of</em>, on the one hand, and -<em>sense</em>, or <em>cognitive experience</em>, on the other hand. In -this respect Bacon is outside the physical line of -thought which finally dominated the century. Later -on, people thought of passive matter which was operated -on externally by forces. I believe Bacon’s line -of thought to have expressed a more fundamental -truth than do the materialistic concepts which were -then being shaped as adequate for physics. We are -now so used to the materialistic way of looking at -things, which has been rooted in our literature by the -genius of the seventeenth century, that it is with some -difficulty that we understand the possibility of another -mode of approach to the problems of nature.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_60'>60</span>In the particular instance of the quotation which -I have just made, the whole passage and the context in -which it is embedded, are permeated through and -through by the experimental method, that is to say, by -attention to ‘irreducible and stubborn facts’, and by -the inductive method of eliciting general laws. Another -unsolved problem which has been bequeathed -to us by the seventeenth century is the rational justification -of this method of Induction. The explicit -realisation of the antithesis between the deductive rationalism -of the scholastics and the inductive observational -methods of the moderns must chiefly be ascribed -to Bacon; though, of course, it was implicit in the -mind of Galileo and of all the men of science of those -times. But Bacon was one of the earliest of the whole -group, and also had the most direct apprehension of -the full extent of the intellectual revolution which was -in progress. Perhaps the man who most completely -anticipated both Bacon and the whole modern point -of view was the artist Leonardo Da Vinci, who lived -almost exactly a century before Bacon. Leonardo -also illustrates the theory which I was advancing in -my last lecture, that the rise of naturalistic art was an -important ingredient in the formation of our scientific -mentality. Indeed, Leonardo was more completely -a man of science than was Bacon. The practice -of naturalistic art is more akin to the practice of -physics, chemistry and biology than is the practice -of law. We all remember the saying of Bacon’s contemporary, -Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation -of the blood, that Bacon ‘wrote of science like a Lord -Chancellor.’ But at the beginning of the modern -period Da Vinci and Bacon stand together as illustrating -<span class='pageno' id='Page_61'>61</span>the various strains which have combined to -form the modern world, namely, legal mentality and -the patient observational habits of the naturalistic -artists.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the passage which I have quoted from Bacon’s -writings there is no explicit mention of the method -of inductive reasoning. It is unnecessary for me to -prove to you by any quotations that the enforcement -of the importance of this method, and of the importance, -to the welfare of mankind, of the secrets of nature -to be thus discovered, was one of the main themes -to which Bacon devoted himself in his writings. Induction -has proved to be a somewhat more complex -process than Bacon anticipated. He had in his mind -the belief that with a sufficient care in the collection -of instances the general law would stand out of itself. -We know now, and probably Harvey knew then, that -this is a very inadequate account of the processes -which issue in scientific generalisations. But when -you have made all the requisite deductions, Bacon -remains as one of the great builders who constructed -the mind of the modern world.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The special difficulties raised by induction emerged -in the eighteenth century, as the result of Hume’s criticism. -But Bacon was one of the prophets of the -historical revolt, which deserted the method of -unrelieved rationalism, and rushed into the other extreme -of basing all fruitful knowledge upon inference -from particular occasions in the past to particular -occasions in the future. I do not wish to throw any -doubt upon the validity of induction, when it has been -properly guarded. My point is, that the very baffling -task of applying reason to elicit the general characteristics -<span class='pageno' id='Page_62'>62</span>of the immediate occasion, as set before us in -direct cognition, is a necessary preliminary, if we are -to justify induction; unless indeed we are content to -base it upon our vague instinct that of course it is all -right. Either there is something about the immediate -occasion which affords knowledge of the past and the -future, or we are reduced to utter scepticism as to -memory and induction. It is impossible to over-emphasise -the point that the key to the process of induction, -as used either in science or in our ordinary -life, is to be found in the right understanding of the -immediate occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness. -It is in respect to our grasp of the character of -these occasions in their concreteness that the modern -developments of physiology and of psychology are of -critical importance. I shall illustrate this point in my -subsequent lectures. We find ourselves amid insoluble -difficulties when we substitute for this concrete occasion -a mere abstract in which we only consider material -objects in a flux of configurations in time and space. -It is quite obvious that such objects can tell us only -that they are where they are.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, we must recur to the method of the -school-divinity as explained by the Italian medievalists -whom I quoted in the first lecture. We must -observe the immediate occasion, and <em>use reason</em> to -elicit a general description of its nature. Induction -presupposes metaphysics. In other words, it rests -upon an antecedent rationalism. You cannot have a -rational justification for your appeal to history till -your metaphysics has assured you that there <em>is</em> a history -to appeal to; and likewise your conjectures as to -the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that -<span class='pageno' id='Page_63'>63</span>there <em>is</em> a future already subjected to some determinations. -The difficulty is to make sense of either of these -ideas. But unless you have done so, you have made -nonsense of induction.</p> - -<p class='c001'>You will observe that I do not hold Induction to be -in its essence the derivation of general laws. It is the -divination of some characteristics of a particular future -from the known characteristics of a particular -past. The wider assumption of general laws holding -for all cognisable occasions appears a very unsafe -addendum to attach to this limited knowledge. All -we can ask of the present occasion is that it shall determine -a particular community of occasions, which -are in some respects mutually qualified by reason of -their inclusion within that same community. That -community of occasions considered in physical science -is the set of happenings which fit on to each other—as -we say—in a common space-time, so that we can -trace the transitions from one to the other. Accordingly, -we refer to <em>the</em> common space-time indicated in -our immediate occasion of knowledge. Inductive reasoning -proceeds from the particular occasion to the -particular community of occasions, and from the particular -community to relations between particular occasions -within that community. Until we have taken -into account other scientific concepts, it is impossible -to carry the discussion of induction further than this -preliminary conclusion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The third point to notice about this quotation from -Bacon is the purely qualitative character of the statements -made in it. In this respect Bacon completely -missed the tonality which lay behind the success of -seventeenth century science. Science was becoming, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_64'>64</span>and has remained, primarily quantitative. Search for -measurable elements among your phenomena, and -then search for relations between these measures of -physical quantities. Bacon ignores this rule of science. -For example, in the quotation given he speaks of action -at a distance; but he is thinking qualitatively and -not quantitatively. We cannot ask that he should anticipate -his younger contemporary Galileo, or his -distant successor Newton. But he gives no hint that -there should be a search for quantities. Perhaps he -was misled by the current logical doctrines which had -come down from Aristotle. For, in effect, these doctrines -said to the physicist ‘<em>classify</em>’ when they should -have said ‘<em>measure</em>.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>By the end of the century physics had been founded -on a satisfactory basis of measurement. The final and -adequate exposition was given by Newton. The common -measurable element of <em>mass</em> was discerned as -characterising all bodies in different amounts. Bodies -which are apparently identical in substance, shape, -and size have very approximately the same mass: the -closer the identity, the nearer the equality. The force -acting on a body, whether by touch or by action at a -distance, was [in effect] defined as being equal to the -mass of the body multiplied by the rate of change of -the body’s velocity, so far as this rate of change is -produced by that force. In this way the force is discerned -by its effect on the motion of the body. The -question now arises whether this conception of the -magnitude of a force leads to the discovery of simple -quantitative laws involving the alternative determination -of forces by circumstances of the configuration of -substances and of their physical characters. The Newtonian -<span class='pageno' id='Page_65'>65</span>conception has been brilliantly successful in -surviving this test throughout the whole modern -period. Its first triumph was the law of gravitation. -Its cumulative triumph has been the whole development -of dynamical astronomy, of engineering, and -of physics.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This subject of the formation of the three laws of -motion and of the law of gravitation deserves critical -attention. The whole development of thought -occupied exactly two generations. It commenced with -Galileo and ended with Newton’s <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>Principia</cite></span>; and -Newton was born in the year that Galileo died. Also -the lives of Descartes and Huyghens fall within the -period occupied by these great terminal figures. The -issue of the combined labours of these four men has -some right to be considered as the greatest single intellectual -success which mankind has achieved. In -estimating its size, we must consider the completeness -of its range. It constructs for us a vision of the material -universe, and it enables us to calculate the minutest -detail of a particular occurrence. Galileo took -the first step in hitting on the right line of thought. -He noted that the critical point to attend to was not -the motion of bodies but the changes of their motions. -Galileo’s discovery is formularised by Newton in his -first law of motion:—“Every body continues in its -state of rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, -except so far as it may be compelled by force to -change that state.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>This formula contains the repudiation of a belief -which had blocked the progress of physics for two -thousand years. It also deals with a fundamental -concept which is essential to scientific theory; I mean, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_66'>66</span>the concept of an ideally isolated system. This conception -embodies a fundamental character of things, -without which science, or indeed any knowledge on -the part of finite intellects, would be impossible. The -‘isolated’ system is not a solipsist system, apart from -which there would be nonentity. It is isolated as -within the universe. This means that there are truths -respecting this system which require reference only to -the remainder of things by way of a uniform systematic -scheme of relationships. Thus the conception of an -isolated system is not the conception of substantial independence -from the remainder of things, but of freedom -from casual contingent dependence upon detailed -items within the rest of the universe. Further, this -freedom from casual dependence is required only in -respect to certain abstract characteristics which attach -to the isolated system, and not in respect to the system -in its full concreteness.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The first law of motion asks what is to be said of -a dynamically isolated system so far as concerns its -motion as a whole, abstracting from its orientation and -its internal arrangement of parts. Aristotle said that -you must conceive such a system to be at rest. Galileo -added that the state of rest is only a particular case, -and that the general statement is ‘either in a state of -rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line.’ Accordingly, -an Aristotelean would conceive the forces -arising from the reaction of alien bodies as being -quantitatively measurable in terms of the velocity they -sustain, and as directively determined by the direction -of that velocity; while the Galilean would direct attention -to the magnitude of the acceleration and to its -<span class='pageno' id='Page_67'>67</span>direction. This difference is illustrated by contrasting -Kepler and Newton. They both speculated as to -the forces sustaining the planets in their orbits. Kepler -looked for tangential forces pushing the planets -along, whereas Newton looked for radial forces diverting -the directions of the planets’ motions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Instead of dwelling upon the mistake which Aristotle -made, it is more profitable to emphasise the justification -which he had for it, if we consider the obvious -facts of our experience. All the motions which -enter into our normal everyday experience cease unless -they are evidently sustained from the outside. -Apparently, therefore, the sound empiricist must devote -his attention to this question of the sustenance of -motion. We here hit upon one of the dangers of unimaginative -empiricism. The seventeenth century exhibits -another example of this same danger; and, of -all people in the world, Newton fell into it. Huyghens -had produced the wave theory of light. But this -theory failed to account for the most obvious facts -about light as in our ordinary experience, namely, that -shadows cast by obstructing objects are defined by -rectilinear rays. Accordingly, Newton rejected this -theory and adopted the corpuscular theory which -completely explained shadows. Since then both theories -have had their periods of triumph. At the present -moment the scientific world is seeking for a combination -of the two. These examples illustrate the -danger of refusing to entertain an idea because of its -failure to explain one of the most obvious facts in the -subject matter in question. If you have had your attention -directed to the novelties in thought in your -<span class='pageno' id='Page_68'>68</span>own lifetime, you will have observed that almost all -really new ideas have a certain aspect of foolishness -when they are first produced.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Returning to the laws of motion, it is noticeable -that no reason was produced in the seventeenth century -for the Galilean as distinct from the Aristotelian -position. It was an ultimate fact. When in the course -of these lectures we come to the modern period, we -shall see that the theory of relativity throws complete -light on this question; but only by rearranging -our whole ideas as to space and time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It remained for Newton to direct attention to <em>mass</em> -as a physical quantity inherent in the nature of a material -body. Mass remained permanent during all -changes of motion. But the proof of the permanence -of mass amid chemical transformations had to wait for -Lavoisier, a century later. Newton’s next task was to -find some estimate of the magnitude of the alien force -in terms of the mass of the body and of its acceleration. -He here had a stroke of luck. For, from the point of -view of a mathematician, the simplest possible law, -namely the product of the two, proved to be the successful -one. Again the modern relativity theory modifies -this extreme simplicity. But luckily for science the -delicate experiments of the physicists of to-day were -not then known, or even possible. Accordingly, the -world was given the two centuries which it required -in order to digest Newton’s laws of motion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Having regard to this triumph, can we wonder that -scientists placed their ultimate principles upon a materialistic -basis, and thereafter ceased to worry about -philosophy? We shall grasp the course of thought, if -we understand exactly what this basis is, and what -<span class='pageno' id='Page_69'>69</span>difficulties it finally involves. When you are criticising -the philosophy of an epoch, do not chiefly direct -your attention to those intellectual positions which its -exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend. There -will be some fundamental assumptions which adherents -of all the variant systems within the epoch unconsciously -presuppose. Such assumptions appear so -obvious that people do not know what they are assuming -because no other way of <a id='corr69.9'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='puttings'>putting</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_69.9'><ins class='correction' title='puttings'>putting</ins></a></span> things has -ever occurred to them. With these assumptions a certain -limited number of types of philosophic systems -are possible, and this group of systems constitutes the -philosophy of the epoch.</p> - -<p class='c001'>One such assumption underlies the whole philosophy -of nature during the modern period. It is embodied -in the conception which is supposed to express -the most concrete aspect of nature. The Ionian philosophers -asked, What is nature made of? The answer -is couched in terms of stuff, or matter, or material,—the -particular name chosen is indifferent—which -has the property of simple location in space and -time, or, if you adopt the more modern ideas, in space-time. -What I mean by matter, or material, is anything -which has this property of <em>simple location</em>. By -simple location I mean one major characteristic which -refers equally both to space and to time, and other -minor characteristics which are diverse as between -space and time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The characteristic common both to space and time -is that material can be said to be <em>here</em> in space and -<em>here</em> in time, or <em>here</em> in space-time, in a perfectly definite -sense which does not require for its explanation -any reference to other regions of space-time. Curiously -<span class='pageno' id='Page_70'>70</span>enough this character of simple location holds whether -we look on a region of space-time as determined absolutely -or relatively. For if a region is merely a way -of indicating a certain set of relations to other entities, -then this characteristic, which I call simple location, -is that material can be said to have just these relations -of position to the other entities without requiring -for its explanation any reference to other regions constituted -by analogous relations of position to the same -entities. In fact, as soon as you have settled, however -you do settle, what you mean by a definite place in -space-time, you can adequately state the relation of a -particular material body to space-time by saying that -it is just there, in that place; and, so far as simple location -is concerned, there is nothing more to be said on -the subject.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are, however, some subordinate explanations -to be made which bring in the minor characteristics -which I have already mentioned. First, as regards -time, if material has existed during any period, it has -equally been in existence during any portion of that -period. In other words, dividing the time does not divide -the material. Secondly, in respect to space, -dividing the volume does divide the material. Accordingly, -if material exists throughout a volume, -there will be less of that material distributed through -any definite half of that volume. It is from this property -that there arises our notion of density at a point -of space. Anyone who talks about density is not assimilating -time and space to the extent that some extremists -of the modern school of relativists very rashly -desire. For the division of time functions, in respect -<span class='pageno' id='Page_71'>71</span>to material, quite differently from the division of -space.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Furthermore, this fact that the material is indifferent -to the division of time leads to the conclusion that -the lapse of time is an accident, rather than of the -essence, of the material. The material is fully itself -in any sub-period however short. Thus the transition -of time has nothing to do with the character of the -material. The material is equally itself at an instant -of time. Here an instant of time is conceived as in -itself without transition, since the temporal transition -is the succession of instants.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The answer, therefore, which the seventeenth century -gave to the ancient question of the Ionian thinkers, -‘What is the world made of?’ was that the world -is a succession of instantaneous configurations of matter,—or -of material, if you wish to include stuff more -subtle than ordinary matter, the ether for example.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We cannot wonder that science rested content with -this assumption as to the fundamental elements of nature. -The great forces of nature, such as gravitation, -were entirely determined by the configurations of -masses. Thus the configurations determined their own -changes, so that the circle of scientific thought was -completely closed. This is the famous mechanistic -theory of nature, which has reigned supreme ever -since the seventeenth century. It is the orthodox creed -of physical science. Furthermore, the creed justified -itself by the pragmatic test. It worked. Physicists -took no more interest in philosophy. They emphasized -the anti-rationalism of the Historical Revolt. But -the difficulties of this theory of materialistic mechanism -<span class='pageno' id='Page_72'>72</span>very soon became apparent. The history of -thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is -governed by the fact that the world had got hold of a -general idea which it could neither live with nor live -without.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This simple location of instantaneous material configurations -is what Bergson has protested against, so -far as it concerns time and so far as it is taken to be -the fundamental fact of concrete nature. He calls it -a distortion of nature due to the intellectual ‘spatialisation’ -of things. I agree with Bergson in his protest: -but I do not agree that such distortion is a vice necessary -to the intellectual apprehension of nature. I -shall in subsequent lectures endeavour to show that -this spatialisation is the expression of more concrete -facts under the guise of very abstract logical constructions. -There is an error; but it is merely the accidental -error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete. It -is an example of what I will call the ‘Fallacy of Misplaced -Concreteness.’ This fallacy is the occasion of -great confusion in philosophy. It is not necessary for -the intellect to fall into the trap, though in this example -there has been a very general tendency to do so.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is at once evident that the concept of simple location -is going to make great difficulties for induction. -For, if in the location of configurations of matter -throughout a stretch of time there is no inherent reference -to any other times, past or future, it immediately -follows that nature within any period does not -refer to nature at any other period. Accordingly, induction -is not based on anything which can be observed -as inherent in nature. Thus we cannot look to -nature for the justification of our belief in any law -<span class='pageno' id='Page_73'>73</span>such as the law of gravitation. In other words, the -order of nature cannot be justified by the mere observation -of nature. For there is nothing in the present -fact which inherently refers either to the past or -to the future. It looks, therefore, as though memory, -as well as induction, would fail to find any justification -within nature itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I have been anticipating the course of future -thought, and have been repeating Hume’s argument. -This train of thought follows so immediately from -the consideration of simple location, that we cannot -wait for the eighteenth century before considering it. -The only wonder is that the world did in fact wait -for Hume before noting the difficulty. Also it illustrates -the anti-rationalism of the scientific public that, -when Hume did appear, it was only the religious implications -of his philosophy which attracted attention. -This was because the clergy were in principle rationalists, -whereas the men of science were content with a -simple faith in the order of nature. Hume himself -remarks, no doubt scoffingly, ‘Our holy religion is -founded on faith.’ This attitude satisfied the Royal -Society but not the Church. It also satisfied Hume -and has satisfied subsequent empiricists.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is another presupposition of thought which -must be put beside the theory of simple location. I -mean the two correlative categories of Substance and -quality. There is, however this difference. There -were different theories as to the adequate description -of the status of space. But whatever its status, no one -had any doubt but that the connection with space enjoyed -by entities, which are said to be in space, is that -of simple location. We may put this shortly by saying -<span class='pageno' id='Page_74'>74</span>that it was tacitly assumed that space is the locus -of simple locations. Whatever is in space is <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>simpliciter</i></span> -in some definite portion of space. But in respect -to substance and quality the leading minds of the seventeenth -century were definitely perplexed; though, -with their usual genius, they at once constructed a -theory which was adequate for their immediate purposes.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Of course, substance and quality, as well as simple -location, are the most natural ideas for the human -mind. It is the way in which we think of things, and -without these ways of thinking we could not get our -ideas straight for daily use. There is no doubt about -this. The only question is, How concretely are we -thinking when we consider nature under these conceptions? -My point will be, that we are presenting ourselves -with simplified editions of immediate matters -of fact. When we examine the primary elements of -these simplified editions, we shall find that they are in -truth only to be justified as being elaborate logical -constructions of a high degree of abstraction. Of -course, as a point of individual psychology, we get at -the ideas by the rough and ready method of suppressing -what appear to be irrelevant details. But when -we attempt to justify this suppression of irrelevance, -we find that, though there are entities left corresponding -to the entities we talk about, yet these entities are -of a high degree of abstraction.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus I hold that substance and quality afford another -instance of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. -Let us consider how the notions of substance and -quality arise. We observe an object as an entity with -certain characteristics. Furthermore, each individual -<span class='pageno' id='Page_75'>75</span>entity is apprehended through its characteristics. For -example, we observe a body; there is something about -it which we note. Perhaps, it is hard, and blue, and -round, and noisy. We observe something which possesses -these qualities: apart from these qualities we do -not observe anything at all. Accordingly, the entity -is the substratum, or substance, of which we predicate -qualities. Some of the qualities are essential, so that -apart from them the entity would not be itself; while -other qualities are accidental and changeable. In -respect to material bodies, the qualities of having a -quantitative mass, and of simple location somewhere, -were held by John Locke at the close of the seventeenth -century to be essential qualities. Of course, the -location was changeable, and the unchangeability of -mass was merely an experimental fact except for some -extremists.</p> - -<p class='c001'>So far, so good. But when we pass to blueness and -noisiness a new situation has to be faced. In the first -place, the body may not be always blue, or noisy. We -have already allowed for this by our theory of accidental -qualities, which for the moment we may -accept as adequate. But in the second place, the seventeenth -century exposed a real difficulty. The great -physicists elaborated transmission theories of light -and sound, based upon their materialistic views of -nature. There were two hypotheses as to light: either -it was transmitted by the vibratory waves of a materialistic -ether, or—according to Newton—it was transmitted -by the motion of incredibly small corpuscles -of some subtle matter. We all know that the wave -theory of Huyghens held the field during the nineteenth -century, and that at present physicists are endeavouring -<span class='pageno' id='Page_76'>76</span>to explain some obscure circumstances -attending radiation by a combination of both theories. -But whatever theory you choose, there is no light or -colour as a fact in external nature. There is merely -motion of material. Again, when the light enters your -eyes and falls on the retina, there is merely motion of -material. Then your nerves are affected and your -brain is affected, and again this is merely motion of -material. The same line of argument holds for sound, -substituting waves in the air for waves in the ether, -and ears for eyes.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We then ask in what sense are blueness and noisiness -qualities of the body. By analogous reasoning, we also -ask in what sense is its scent a quality of the rose.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Galileo considered this question, and at once -pointed out that, apart from eyes, ears, or noses, there -would be no colours, sounds, or smells. Descartes and -Locke elaborated a theory of primary and secondary -qualities. For example, Descartes in his ‘Sixth Meditation’ -says:<a id='r4' /><a href='#f4' class='c013'><sup>[4]</sup></a> “And indeed, as I perceive different -sorts of colours, sounds, odours, tastes, heat, hardness, -etc., I safely conclude that there are in the bodies -from which the diverse perceptions of the senses proceed, -certain varieties corresponding to them, although, -perhaps, not in reality like them;....”</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f4'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r4'>4</a>. Translation by Professor John Veitch.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>Also in his <cite>Principles of Philosophy</cite>, he says: -“That by our senses we know nothing of external objects -beyond their figure [or situation], magnitude, -and motion.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Locke, writing with a knowledge of Newtonian -dynamics, places mass among the primary qualities -of bodies. In short, he elaborates a theory of primary -<span class='pageno' id='Page_77'>77</span>and secondary qualities in accordance with the -state of physical science at the close of the seventeenth -century. The primary qualities are the essential -qualities of substances whose spatio-temporal relationships -constitute nature. The orderliness of these relationships -<a id='corr77.6'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='constitute'>constitutes</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_77.6'><ins class='correction' title='constitute'>constitutes</ins></a></span> nature. The orderliness of these -relationships constitutes the order of nature. The occurrences -of nature are in some way apprehended by -minds, which are associated with living bodies. Primarily, -the mental apprehension is aroused by the occurrences -in certain parts of the correlated body, the -occurrences in the brain, for instance. But the mind -in apprehending also experiences sensations which, -properly speaking, are qualities of the mind alone. -These sensations are projected by the mind so as to -clothe appropriate bodies in external nature. Thus -the bodies are perceived as with qualities which in -reality do not belong to them, qualities which in fact -are purely the offspring of the mind. Thus nature gets -credit which should in truth be reserved for ourselves: -the rose for its scent: the nightingale for his song: and -the sun for his radiance. The poets are entirely mistaken. -They should address their lyrics to themselves, -and should turn them into odes of self-congratulation -on the excellency of the human mind. Nature is a -dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the -hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly.</p> - -<p class='c001'>However you disguise it, this is the practical outcome -of the characteristic scientific philosophy which -closed the seventeenth century.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the first place, we must note its astounding efficiency -as a system of concepts for the organisation of -scientific research. In this respect, it is fully worthy -<span class='pageno' id='Page_78'>78</span>of the genius of the century which produced it. It -has held its own as the guiding principle of scientific -studies ever since. It is still reigning. Every university -in the world organises itself in accordance with -it. No alternative system of organising the pursuit of -scientific truth has been suggested. It is not only reigning, -but it is without a rival.</p> - -<p class='c001'>And yet—it is quite unbelievable. This conception -of the universe is surely framed in terms of high abstractions, -and the paradox only arises because we -have mistaken our abstractions for concrete realities.</p> - -<p class='c001'>No picture, however generalised, of the achievements -of scientific thought in this century can omit the -advance in mathematics. Here as elsewhere the genius -of the epoch made itself evident. Three great -Frenchmen, Descartes, Desargues, Pascal, initiated -the modern period in geometry. Another Frenchman, -Fermat, laid the foundations of modern analysis, and -all but perfected the methods of the differential calculus. -Newton and Leibniz, between them, actually -did create the differential calculus as a practical -method of mathematical reasoning. When the century -ended, mathematics as an instrument for application -to physical problems was well established in something -of its modern proficiency. Modern pure mathematics, -if we except geometry, was in its infancy, and -had given no signs of the astonishing growth it was to -make in the nineteenth century. But the mathematical -physicist had appeared, bringing with him the -type of mind which was to rule the scientific world in -the next century. It was to be the age of ‘Victorious -Analysis.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>The seventeenth century had finally produced a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_79'>79</span>scheme of scientific thought framed by mathematicians, -for the use of mathematicians. The great characteristic -of the mathematical mind is its capacity for -dealing with abstractions; and for eliciting from them -clear-cut demonstrative trains of reasoning, entirely -satisfactory so long as it is those abstractions which -you want to think about. The enormous success of -the scientific abstractions, yielding on the one hand -<em>matter</em> with its <em>simple location</em> in space and time, and -on the other hand <em>mind</em>, perceiving, suffering, reasoning, -but not interfering, has foisted onto philosophy -the task of accepting them as the most concrete rendering -of fact.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thereby, modern philosophy has been ruined. It -has oscillated in a complex manner between three extremes. -There are the dualists, who accept matter -and mind as on equal basis, and the two varieties of -monists, those who put mind inside matter, and those -who put matter inside mind. But this juggling with -abstractions can never overcome the inherent confusion -introduced by the ascription of <em>misplaced concreteness</em> -to the scientific scheme of the seventeenth -century.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_80'>80</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER IV <br /> <br /> THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>In so far as the intellectual climates of different -epochs can be contrasted, the eighteenth century in -Europe was the complete antithesis to the Middle -Ages. The contrast is symbolised by the difference between -the cathedral of Chartres and the Parisian salons, -where D’Alembert conversed with Voltaire. The -Middle Ages were haunted with the desire to rationalise -the infinite: the men of the eighteenth century -rationalised the social life of modern communities, -and based their sociological theories on an appeal to -the facts of nature. The earlier period was the age of -faith, based upon reason. In the later period, they let -sleeping dogs lie: it was the age of reason, based upon -faith. To illustrate my meaning:—St. Anselm would -have been distressed if he had failed to find a convincing -argument for the existence of God, and on this -argument he based his edifice of faith, whereas Hume -based his <cite>Dissertation on the Natural History of -Religion</cite> upon his faith in the order of nature. In -comparing these epochs it is well to remember that -reason can err, and that faith may be misplaced.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In my previous lecture I traced the evolution, during -the seventeenth century, of the scheme of scientific -ideas which has dominated thought ever since. It -involves a fundamental duality, with <em>material</em> on the -one hand, and on the other hand <em>mind</em>. In between -<span class='pageno' id='Page_81'>81</span>there lie the concepts of life, organism, function, instantaneous -reality, interaction, order of nature, -which collectively form the Achilles heel of the whole -system.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I also expressed my conviction that if we desired -to obtain a more fundamental expression of the concrete -character of natural fact, the element in this -scheme which we should first criticise is the concept -of <em>simple location</em>. In view therefore of the importance -which this idea will assume in these lectures, I -will repeat the meaning which I have attached to this -phrase. To say that a bit of matter has <em>simple location</em> -means that, in expressing its spatio-temporal relations, -it is adequate to state that it is where it is, in a -definite finite region of space, and throughout a definite -finite duration of time, apart from any essential -reference of the relations of that bit of matter to other -regions of space and to other durations of time. Again, -this concept of simple location is independent of the -controversy between the absolutist and the relativist -views of space or of time. So long as any theory of -space, or of time, can give a meaning, either absolute -or relative, to the idea of a definite region of space, -and of a definite duration of time, the idea of simple -location has a perfectly definite meaning. This idea -is the very foundation of the seventeenth century -scheme of nature. Apart from it, the scheme is incapable -of expression. I shall argue that among the -primary elements of nature as apprehended in our -immediate experience, there is no element whatever -which possesses this character of simple location. It -does not follow, however, that the science of the seventeenth -century was simply wrong. I hold that by a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_82'>82</span>process of constructive abstraction we can arrive at -abstractions which are the simply-located bits of material, -and at other abstractions which are the minds -included in the scientific scheme. Accordingly, the -real error is an example of what I have termed: The -Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The advantage of confining attention to a definite -group of abstractions, is that you confine your thoughts -to clear-cut definite things, with clear-cut definite relations. -Accordingly, if you have a logical head, you -can deduce a variety of conclusions respecting the relationships -between these abstract entities. Furthermore, -if the abstractions are well-founded, that is to -say, if they do not abstract from everything that is important -in experience, the scientific thought which -confines itself to these abstractions will arrive at a -variety of important truths relating to our experience -of nature. We all know those clear-cut trenchant intellects, -immovably encased in a hard shell of abstractions. -They hold you to their abstractions by the -sheer grip of personality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group -of abstractions, however well-founded, is that, by the -nature of the case, you have abstracted from the remainder -of things. In so far as the excluded things -are important in your experience, your modes of -thought are not fitted to deal with them. You cannot -think without abstractions; accordingly, it is of the -utmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising -your <em>modes</em> of abstraction. It is here that philosophy -finds its niche as essential to the healthy progress -of society. It is the critic of abstractions. A civilisation -which cannot burst through its current abstractions -<span class='pageno' id='Page_83'>83</span>is doomed to sterility after a very limited period -of progress. An active school of philosophy is quite -as important for the locomotion of ideas, as is an active -school of railway engineers for the locomotion of -fuel.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Sometimes it happens that the service rendered by -philosophy is entirely obscured by the astonishing success -of a scheme of abstractions in expressing the dominant -interests of an epoch. This is exactly what happened -during the eighteenth century. <span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><i>Les philosophes</i></span> -were not philosophers. They were men of genius, -clear-headed and acute, who applied the seventeenth -century group of scientific abstractions to the analysis -of the unbounded universe. Their triumph, in respect -to the circle of ideas mainly interesting to their -contemporaries, was overwhelming. Whatever did -not fit into their scheme was ignored, derided, disbelieved. -Their hatred of Gothic architecture symbolises -their lack of sympathy with dim perspectives. -It was the age of reason, healthy, manly, upstanding -reason; but, of one-eyed reason, deficient in its vision -of depth. We cannot overrate the debt of gratitude -which we owe to these men. For a thousand years -Europe had been a prey to intolerant, intolerable visionaries. -The common sense of the eighteenth century, -its grasp of the obvious facts of human suffering, -and of the obvious demands of human nature, acted on -the world like a bath of moral cleansing. Voltaire -must have the credit, that he hated injustice, he hated -cruelty, he hated senseless repression, and he hated -hocus-pocus. Furthermore, when he saw them, he -knew them. In these supreme virtues, he was typical -of his century, on its better side. But if men cannot -<span class='pageno' id='Page_84'>84</span>live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants. -The age had its limitations; yet we cannot -understand the passion with which some of its main -positions are still defended, especially in the schools -of science, unless we do full justice to its positive -achievements. The seventeenth century scheme of concepts -was proving a perfect instrument for research.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This triumph of materialism was chiefly in the -sciences of rational dynamics, physics, and chemistry. -So far as dynamics and physics were concerned, -progress was in the form of direct developments of the -main ideas of the previous epoch. Nothing fundamentally -new was introduced, but there was an immense -detailed development. Special case after special -case was unravelled. It was as though the very -Heavens were being opened, on a set plan. In the second -half of the century, Lavoisier practically founded -chemistry on its present basis. He introduced into -it the principle that no material is lost or gained in -any chemical transformations. This was the last success -of materialistic thought, which has not ultimately -proved to be double-edged. Chemical science now -only waited for the atomic theory, in the next century.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this century the notion of the mechanical explanation -of all the processes of nature finally hardened -into a dogma of science. The notion won through on -its merits by reason of an almost miraculous series of -triumphs achieved by the mathematical physicists, -culminating in the <span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><cite>Méchanique Analytique</cite></span> of Lagrange, -which was published in 1787. Newton’s -<span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>Principia</cite></span> was published in 1687, so that exactly one -hundred years separates the two great books. This -century contains the first period of mathematical physics -<span class='pageno' id='Page_85'>85</span>of the modern type. The publication of Clerk -Maxwell’s <cite>Electricity and Magnetism</cite> in 1873 marks -the close of the second period. Each of these three -books introduces new horizons of thought affecting -everything which comes after them.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In considering the various topics to which mankind -has bent its systematic thought, it is impossible not -to be struck with the unequal distribution of ability -among the different fields. In almost all subjects there -are a few outstanding names. For it requires genius -to create a subject as a distinct topic for thought. But -in the case of many topics, after a good beginning very -relevant to its immediate occasion, the subsequent development -appears as a weak series of flounderings, so -that the whole subject gradually loses its grip on the -evolution of thought. It was far otherwise with mathematical -physics. The more you study this subject, the -more you will find yourself astonished by the almost -incredible triumphs of intellect which it exhibits. The -great mathematical physicists of the eighteenth and -first few years of the nineteenth century, most of them -French, are a case in point: Maupertuis, Clairaut, -D’Alembert, Lagrange, Laplace, Fourier, form a series -of names, such that each recalls to mind some -achievement of the first rank. When Carlyle, as the -mouthpiece of the subsequent Romantic Age, scoffingly -terms the period the Age of Victorious Analysis, -and mocks at Maupertuis as a ‘sublimish -gentleman in a white periwig,’ he only exhibits the -narrow side of the Romanticists whom he is then -voicing.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is impossible to explain intelligently, in a short -time and without technicalities, the details of the progress -<span class='pageno' id='Page_86'>86</span>made by this school. I will, however, endeavour -to explain the main point of a joint achievement of -Maupertuis and Lagrange. Their results, in conjunction -with some subsequent mathematical methods due -to two great German mathematicians of the first half -of the nineteenth century, Gauss and Riemann, have -recently proved themselves to be the preparatory work -necessary for the new ideas which Herz and Einstein -have introduced into mathematical physics. Also they -inspired some of the best ideas in Clerk Maxwell’s -treatise, already mentioned in this lecture.</p> - -<p class='c001'>They aimed at discovering something more fundamental -and more general than Newton’s laws of motion -which were discussed in the previous lecture. -They wanted to find some wider ideas, and in the case -of Lagrange some more general means of mathematical -exposition. It was an ambitious enterprise, and -they were completely successful. Maupertuis lived -in the first half of the eighteenth century, and Lagrange’s -active life lay in its second half. We find in -Maupertuis a tinge of the theologic age which preceded -his birth. He started with the idea that the -whole path of a material particle between any limits -of time must achieve some perfection worthy of the -providence of God. There are two points of interest -in this motive principle. In the first place, it illustrates -the thesis which I was urging in my first lecture -that the way in which the medieval church had impressed -on Europe the notion of the detailed providence -of a rational personal God was one of the factors -by which the trust in the order of nature had -been generated. In the second place, though we are -now all convinced that such modes of thought are of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_87'>87</span>no direct use in detailed scientific enquiry, Maupertuis’ -success in this particular case shows that almost -any idea which jogs you out of your current abstractions -may be better than nothing. In the present case -what the idea in question did for Maupertuis was to -lead him to enquire what general property of the path -as a whole could be deduced from Newton’s laws of -motion. Undoubtedly this was a very sensible procedure -whatever one’s theological notions. Also his -general idea led him to conceive that the property -found would be a quantitative sum, such that any -slight deviation from the path would increase it. In -this supposition he was generalising Newton’s first -law of motion. For an isolated particle takes the -shortest route with uniform velocity. So Maupertuis -conjectured that a particle travelling through a field -of force would realise the least possible amount of -some quantity. He discovered such a quantity and -called it the integral action between the time limits -considered. In modern phraseology it is the sum -through successive small lapses of time of the difference -between the kinetic and potential energies of the -particle at each successive instant. This action, therefore, -has to do with the interchange between the energy -arising from motion and the energy arising from -position. Maupertuis had discovered the famous -theorem of least action. Maupertuis was not quite of -the first rank in comparison with such a man as Lagrange. -In his hands and in those of his immediate -successors, his principle did not assume any dominating -importance. Lagrange put the same question on -a wider basis so as to make its answer relevant to -actual procedure in the development of dynamics. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_88'>88</span>His Principle of Virtual Work as applied to systems -in motion is in effect Maupertuis’ principle conceived -as applying at each instant of the path of the system. -But Lagrange saw further than Maupertuis. He -grasped that he had gained a method of stating dynamical -truths in a way which is perfectly indifferent -to the particular methods of measurement employed -in fixing the positions of the various parts of the system. -Accordingly, he went on to deduce equations -of motion which are equally applicable whatever -quantitative measurements have been made, provided -that they are adequate to fix positions. The beauty -and almost divine simplicity of these equations is such -that these formulae are worthy to rank with those -mysterious symbols which in ancient times were held -directly to indicate the Supreme Reason at the base of -all things. Later Herz—inventor of electromagnetic -waves—based mechanics on the idea of every particle -traversing the shortest path open to it under the circumstances -constraining its motion; and finally Einstein, -by the use of the geometrical theories of Gauss -and Riemann, showed that these circumstances could -be construed as being inherent in the character of -space-time itself. Such, in barest outline, is the story -of dynamics from Galileo to Einstein.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Meanwhile Galvani and Volta lived and made their -electric discoveries; and the biological sciences slowly -gathered their material, but still waited for dominating -ideas. Psychology, also, was beginning to disengage -itself from its dependence on general philosophy. -This independent growth of psychology was the ultimate -result of its invocation by John Locke as a critic -of metaphysical licence. All the sciences dealing with -<span class='pageno' id='Page_89'>89</span>life were still in an elementary observational stage, in -which classification and direct description were dominant. -So far the scheme of abstractions was adequate -to the occasion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the realm of practice, the age which produced -enlightened rulers, such as the Emperor Joseph of the -House of Hapsburg, Frederick the Great, Walpole, -the great Lord Chatham, George Washington, cannot -be said to have failed. Especially when to these rulers, -it adds the invention of parliamentary cabinet -government in England, of federal presidential government -in the United States, and of the humanitarian -principles of the French Revolution. Also in technology -it produced the steam-engine, and thereby -ushered in a new era of civilisation. Undoubtedly, as -a practical age the eighteenth century was a success. -If you had asked one of the wisest and most typical -of its ancestors, who just saw its commencement, I -mean John Locke, what he expected from it, he would -hardly have pitched his hopes higher than its actual -achievements.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In developing a criticism of the scientific scheme -of the eighteenth century, I must first give my main -reason for ignoring nineteenth century idealism—I -am speaking of the philosophic idealism which finds -the ultimate meaning of reality in mentality that is -fully cognitive. This idealistic school, as hitherto -developed, has been too much divorced from the scientific -outlook. It has swallowed the scientific scheme -in its entirety as being the only rendering of the facts -of nature, and has then explained it as being an idea -in the ultimate mentality. In the case of absolute -idealism, the world of nature is just one of the ideas, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_90'>90</span>somehow differentiating the unity of the Absolute: -in the case of pluralistic idealism involving monadic -mentalities, this world is the greatest common measure -of the various ideas which differentiate the various -mental unities of the various monads. But, -however you take it, these idealistic schools have conspicuously -failed to connect, in any organic fashion, -the fact of nature with their idealistic philosophies. -So far as concerns what will be said in these lectures, -your ultimate outlook may be realistic or idealistic. -My point is that a further stage of provisional realism -is required in which the scientific scheme is recast, -and founded upon the ultimate concept of <em>organism</em>.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In outline, my procedure is to start from the analysis -of the status of space and of time, or in modern -phraseology, the status of space-time. There are two -characters of either. Things are separated by space, -and are separated by time: but they are also together -in space, and together in time, even if they be not contemporaneous. -I will call these characters the -‘<em>separative</em>’ and the ‘<em>prehensive</em>’ characters of space-time. -There is yet a third character of space-time. -Everything which is in space receives a definite limitation -of some sort, so that in a sense it has just that -shape which it does have and no other, also in some -sense it is just in this place and in no other. Analogously -for time, a thing endures during a certain period, -and through no other period. I will call this the -‘<em>modal</em>’ character of space-time. It is evident that -the modal character taken by itself gives rise to the -idea of simple location. But it must be conjoined -with the separative and prehensive characters.</p> - -<p class='c001'>For simplicity of thought, I will first speak of space -<span class='pageno' id='Page_91'>91</span>only, and will afterwards extend the same treatment to -time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The volume is the most concrete element of space. -But the separative character of space, analyses a volume -into sub-volumes, and so on indefinitely. Accordingly, -taking the separative character in isolation, we -should infer that a volume is a mere multiplicity of -non-voluminous elements, of points in fact. But it is -the unity of volume which is the ultimate fact of experience, -for example, the voluminous space of this -hall. This hall as a mere multiplicity of points is a -construction of the logical imagination.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, the prime fact is the prehensive unity -of volume, and this unity is mitigated or limited by -the separated unities of the innumerable contained -parts. We have a prehensive unity, which is yet held -apart as an aggregate of contained parts. But the -prehensive unity of the volume is not the unity of a -mere logical aggregate of parts. The parts form an -ordered aggregate, in the sense that each part is something -from the standpoint of every other part, and -also from the same standpoint every other part is -something in relation to it. Thus if A and B and C -are volumes of space, B has an aspect from the standpoint -of A, and so has C, and so has the relationship -of B and C. This aspect of B from A is of the essence -of A. The volumes of space have no independent -existence. They are only entities as within the -totality; you cannot extract them from their environment -without destruction of their very essence. -Accordingly, I will say that the aspect of B from A -is the <em>mode</em> in which B enters into the composition of -A. This is the modal character of space, that the prehensive -<span class='pageno' id='Page_92'>92</span>unity of A is the prehension into unity of the -aspects of all other volumes from the standpoint of A. -The shape of a volume is the formula from which the -totality of its aspects can be derived. Thus the shape -of a volume is more abstract than its aspects. It is -evident that I can use Leibniz’s language, and say that -every volume mirrors in itself every other volume in -space.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Exactly analogous considerations hold with respect -to durations in time. An instant of time, without duration, -is an imaginative logical construction. Also each -duration of time mirrors in itself all temporal durations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But in two ways I have introduced a false simplicity. -In the first place, I should have conjoined space -and time, and conducted my explanation in respect -to four-dimensional regions of space-time. I have -nothing to add in the way of explanation. In your -minds, substitute such four-dimensional regions for -the spatial volumes of the previous explanations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Secondly, my explanation has involved itself in a -vicious circle. For I have made the prehensive unity -of the region A to consist of the prehensive unification -of the modal presences in A of other regions. This -difficulty arises because space-time cannot in reality -be considered as a self-subsistent entity. It is an abstraction, -and its explanation requires reference to -that from which it has been extracted. Space-time is -the specification of certain general characters of events -and of their mutual ordering. This recurrence to concrete -fact brings me back to the eighteenth century, -and indeed to Francis Bacon in the seventeenth century. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_93'>93</span>We have to consider the development in those -epochs, of the criticism of the reigning scientific -scheme.</p> - -<p class='c001'>No epoch is homogeneous; whatever you may have -assigned as the dominant note of a considerable period, -it will always be possible to produce men, and -great men, belonging to the same time, who exhibit -themselves as antagonistic to the tone of their age. -This is certainly the case with the eighteenth century. -For example, the names of John Wesley and of -Rousseau must have occurred to you while I was -drawing the character of that time. But I do not -want to speak of them, or of others. The man, whose -ideas I must consider at some length, is Bishop Berkeley. -Quite at the commencement of the epoch, he -made all the right criticisms, at least in principle. It -would be untrue to say that he produced no effect. He -was a famous man. The wife of George II was one -of the few queens who, in any country, have been -clever enough, and wise enough, to patronise learning -judiciously; accordingly, Berkeley was made a bishop, -in days when bishops in Great Britain were relatively -far greater men than they are now. Also, what was -more important than his bishopric, Hume studied -him, and developed one side of his philosophy in a -way which might have disturbed the ghost of the -great ecclesiastic. Then Kant studied Hume. So, to -say that Berkeley was uninfluential during the century, -would certainly be absurd. But all the same, he -failed to affect the main stream of scientific thought. -It flowed on as if he had never written. Its general -success made it impervious to criticism, then and since. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_94'>94</span>The world of science has always remained perfectly -satisfied with its peculiar abstractions. They work, -and that is sufficient for it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The point before us is that this scientific field of -thought is now, in the twentieth century, too narrow -for the concrete facts which are before it for analysis. -This is true even in physics, and is more especially -urgent in the biological sciences. Thus, in order to -understand the difficulties of modern scientific thought -and also its reactions on the modern world, we should -have in our minds some conception of a wider field of -abstraction, a more concrete analysis, which shall -stand nearer to the complete concreteness of our intuitive -experience. Such an analysis should find in -itself a niche for the concepts of matter and spirit, -as abstractions in terms of which much of our physical -experience can be interpreted. It is in the search -for this wider basis for scientific thought that Berkeley -is so important. He launched his criticism shortly -after the schools of Newton and Locke had completed -their work, and laid his finger exactly on the weak -spots which they had left. I do not propose to consider -either the subjective idealism which has been -derived from him, or the schools of development -which trace their descent from Hume and Kant respectively. -My point will be that—whatever the final -metaphysics you may adopt—there is another line of -development embedded in Berkeley, pointing to -the analysis which we are in search of. Berkeley overlooked -it, partly by reason of the over-intellectualism -of philosophers, and partly by his haste to have recourse -to an idealism with its objectivity grounded in -the mind of God. You will remember that I have -<span class='pageno' id='Page_95'>95</span>already stated that the key of the problem lies in the -notion of simple location. Berkeley, in effect, criticises -this notion. He also raises the question, What -do we mean by things being realised in the world of -nature?</p> - -<p class='c001'>In Sections 23 and 24 of his <cite>Principles of Human -Knowledge</cite>, Berkeley gives his answer to this latter -question. I will quote some detached sentences from -those Sections:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier -than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, -or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive -them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty -in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more -than framing in your mind certain ideas which you -call books and trees, and at the same time omitting -to frame the idea of any one that may perceive -them?...”</p> - -<p class='c001'>“When we do our utmost to conceive the existence -of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating -our own ideas. But the mind <em>taking no notice -of itself</em>, is deluded to think it can and does conceive -bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, -though at the same time they are apprehended by or -exist in itself....”</p> - -<p class='c001'>“24. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into -our thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to -understand what is meant by the <em>absolute existence of -sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind</em>. -To me it is evident those words mark out either a -direct contradiction, or else nothing at all....”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Again there is a very remarkable passage in Section -10, of the fourth Dialogue of Berkeley’s <cite>Alciphron</cite>. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_96'>96</span>I have already quoted it, at greater length, in my <cite>Principles -of Natural Knowledge</cite>:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“<i>Euphranor.</i> Tell me, Alciphron, can you discern -the doors, window and battlements of that same castle?</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Alciphron.</i> I cannot. At this distance it seems only -a small round tower.</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Euph.</i> But I, who have been at it, know that it is -no small round tower, but a large square building with -battlements and turrets, which it seems you do not see.</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Alc</i>. What will you infer from thence?</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Euph.</i> I would infer that the very object which -you strictly and properly perceive by sight is not that -thing which is several miles distant.</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Alc.</i> Why so?</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Euph.</i> Because a little round object is one thing, -and a great square object is another. Is it not so?...”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Some analogous examples concerning a planet and -a cloud are then cited in the dialogue, and this passage -finally concludes with:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“<i>Euphranor.</i> Is it not plain, therefore, that neither -the castle, the planet, nor the cloud, <i>which you see -here</i>, are those real ones which you suppose exist at a -distance?”</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is made explicit in the first passage, already -quoted, that Berkeley himself adopts an extreme idealistic -interpretation. For him mind is the only absolute -reality, and the unity of nature is the unity of -ideas in the mind of God. Personally, I think that -Berkeley’s solution of the metaphysical problem raises -difficulties not less than those which he points out as -arising from a realistic interpretation of the scientific -scheme. There is, however, another possible line of -thought, which enables us to adopt anyhow an attitude -<span class='pageno' id='Page_97'>97</span>of provisional realism, and to widen the scientific -scheme in a way which is useful for science -itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I recur to the passage from Francis Bacon’s <cite>Natural -History</cite>, already quoted in the previous lecture:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though -they have no sense, yet they have perception: ... -and whether the body be alterant or altered, evermore -a perception precedeth operation; for else all bodies -would be alike one to another....”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also in the previous lecture I construed <em>perception</em> -(as used by Bacon) as meaning <em>taking account</em> of the -essential character of the thing perceived, and I construed -<em>sense</em> as meaning <em>cognition</em>. We certainly do -take account of things of which at the time we have no -explicit cognition. We can even have a cognitive -memory of the taking account, without having had a -contemporaneous cognition. Also, as Bacon points -out by his statement, “... for else all bodies would -be alike one to another,” it is evidently some element -of the essential character which we take account of, -namely something on which diversity is founded and -not mere bare logical diversity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The word ‘<em>perceive</em>’ is, in our common usage, shot -through and through with the notion of cognitive apprehension. -So is the word ‘<em>apprehension</em>’, even with -the adjective <em>cognitive</em> omitted. I will use the word -‘<em>prehension</em>’ for <em>uncognitive apprehension</em>: by this I -mean <em>apprehension</em> which may or or may not be cognitive. -Now take Euphranor’s last remark:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the castle, the -planet, nor the cloud, <em>which you see here</em>, are those -real ones which you suppose exist at distance?” Accordingly, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_98'>98</span>there is a prehension, <em>here</em> in this place, of -things which have a reference to <em>other</em> places.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Now go back to Berkeley’s sentences, quoted from -his <cite>Principles of Human Knowledge</cite>. He contends -that what constitutes the realisation of natural entities -is the being perceived within the unity of mind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We can substitute the concept, that the realisation is -a gathering of things into the unity of a prehension; -and that what is thereby realised is the prehension, -and not the things. This unity of a prehension defines -itself as a <em>here</em> and a <em>now</em>, and the things so gathered -into the grasped unity have essential reference to other -places and other times. For Berkeley’s <em>mind</em>, I substitute -a process of prehensive unification. In order -to make intelligible this concept of the progressive -realisation of natural occurrences, considerable expansion -is required, and confrontation with its actual implications -in terms of concrete experience. This will -be the task of the subsequent lectures. In the first -place, note that the idea of simple location has gone. -The things which are grasped into a realised unity, -here and now, are not the castle, the cloud, and the -planet simply in themselves; but they are the -castle, the cloud, and the planet from the standpoint, -in space and time, of the prehensive unification. -In other words, it is the perspective of -the castle over there from the standpoint of -the unification here. It is, therefore, aspects of the -castle, the cloud, and the planet which are grasped into -unity here. You will remember that the idea of perspectives -is quite familiar in philosophy. It was introduced -by Leibniz, in the notion of his monads -mirroring perspectives of the universe. I am using -<span class='pageno' id='Page_99'>99</span>the same notion, only I am toning down his monads -into the unified events in space and time. In some -ways, there is a greater analogy with Spinoza’s modes; -that is why I use the terms ‘<em>mode</em>’ and ‘<em>modal</em>.’ In the -analogy with Spinoza, his one substance is for me the -one underlying activity of realisation individualising -itself in an interlocked plurality of modes. Thus, -concrete fact is process. Its primary analysis is into -underlying activity of prehension, and into realised -prehensive events. Each event is an individual matter -of fact issuing from an individualisation of the substrate -activity. But individualisation does not mean -substantial independence.</p> - -<p class='c001'>An entity of which we become aware in sense perception -is the terminus of our act of perception. I -will call such an entity, a ‘<em>sense-object</em>’. For example, -green of a definite shade is a sense-object; so is -a sound of definite quality and pitch; and so is a -definite scent; and a definite quality of touch. The -way in which such an entity is related to space during -a definite lapse of time is complex. I will say -that a sense-object has ‘<em>ingression</em>’ into space-time. -The cognitive perception of a sense-object is the -awareness of the prehensive unification (into a standpoint -A) of various modes of various sense-objects, -including the sense-object in question. The standpoint -A is, of course, a region of space-time; that is to -say, it is a volume of space through a duration of time. -But as one entity, this standpoint is a unit of realised -experience. A mode of a sense-object at A (as abstracted -from the sense-object whose relationship to A -the mode is conditioning) is the aspect from A of -some other region B. Thus the sense-object is present -<span class='pageno' id='Page_100'>100</span>in A with the mode of location in B. Thus if green be -the sense-object in question, green is not simply at A -where it is being perceived, nor is it simply at B where -it is perceived as located; but it is present at A with -the mode of location in B. There is no particular -mystery about this. You have only got to look into -a mirror and to see the image in it of some green -leaves behind your back. For you at A there will be -green; but not green simply at A where you are. The -green at A will be green with the mode of having location -at the image of the leaf behind the mirror. Then -turn round and look at the leaf. You are now perceiving -the green in the same way as you did before, -except that now the green has the mode of being -located in the actual leaf. I am merely describing -what we do perceive: we are aware of green as being -one element in a prehensive unification of sense-objects; -each sense-object, and among them green, -having its particular mode, which is expressible as -location elsewhere. There are various types of modal -location. For example, sound is voluminous: it fills -a hall, and so sometimes does diffused colour. But -the modal location of a colour may be that of being -the remote boundary of a volume, as for example the -colours on the walls of a room. Thus primarily space-time -is the locus of the modal ingression of sense-objects. -This is the reason why space and time (if -for simplicity we disjoin them) are given in their entireties. -For each volume of space, or each lapse of -time, includes in its essence aspects of all volumes of -space, or of all lapses of time. The difficulties of -philosophy in respect to space and time are founded -on the error of considering them as primarily the loci -<span class='pageno' id='Page_101'>101</span>of simple locations. Perception is simply the cognition -of prehensive unification; or more shortly, perception -is cognition of prehension. The actual world -is a manifold of prehensions; and a ‘prehension’ is a -‘prehensive occasion’; and a prehensive occasion is the -most concrete finite entity, conceived as what it is in -itself and for itself, and not as from its aspect in the -essence of another such occasion. Prehensive unification -might be said to have simple location in its volume -A. But this would be a mere tautology. For -space and time are simply abstractions from the totality -of prehensive unifications as mutually patterned in -each other. Thus a prehension has simple location at -the volume A in the same way as that in which a -man’s face fits on to the smile which spreads over it. -There is, so far as we have gone, more sense in saying -that an act of perception has simple location; for it -may be conceived as being simply at the cognised prehension.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are more entities involved in nature than the -mere sense-objects, so far considered. But, allowing -for the necessity of revision consequent on a more complete -point of view, we can frame our answer to Berkeley’s -question as to the character of the reality to be -assigned to nature. He states it to be the reality of -ideas in mind. A complete metaphysic which has attained -to some notion of mind, and to some notion of -ideas, may perhaps ultimately adopt that view. It is -unnecessary for the purpose of these lectures to ask -such a fundamental question. We can be content with -a provisional realism in which nature is conceived as -a complex of prehensive unifications. Space and time -exhibit the general scheme of interlocked relations of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_102'>102</span>these prehensions. You cannot tear any one of them -out of its context. Yet each one of them within its -context has all the reality that attaches to the whole -complex. Conversely, the totality has the same reality -as each prehension; for each prehension unifies the -modalities to be ascribed, from its standpoint, to every -part of the whole. A prehension is a process of unifying. -Accordingly, nature is a process of expansive -development, necessarily transitional from prehension -to prehension. What is achieved is thereby passed -beyond, but it is also retained as having aspects of itself -present to prehensions which lie beyond it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus nature is a structure of evolving processes. -The reality is the process. It is nonsense to ask if the -colour red is real. The colour red is ingredient in the -process of realisation. The realities of nature are the -prehensions in nature, that is to say, the events in -nature.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Now that we have cleared space and time from the -taint of simple location, we may partially abandon -the awkward term prehension. This term was introduced -to signify the essential unity of an event, -namely, the event as one entity, and not as a mere assemblage -of parts or of ingredients. It is necessary to -understand that space-time is nothing else than a -system of pulling together of assemblages into unities. -But the word <em>event</em> just means one of these spatio-temporal -unities. Accordingly, it may be used instead -of the term ‘prehension’ as meaning the thing prehended.</p> - -<p class='c001'>An event has contemporaries. This means that an -event mirrors within itself the modes of its contemporaries -as a display of immediate achievement. An -<span class='pageno' id='Page_103'>103</span>event has a past. This means that an event mirrors -within itself the modes of its predecessors, as memories -which are fused into its own content. An event has a -future. This means that an event mirrors within itself -such aspects as the future throws back onto the present, -or, in other words, as the present has determined concerning -the future. Thus an event has anticipation:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“The prophetic soul</div> - <div class='line'>Of the wide world dreaming on things to come.” [cvii]</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>These conclusions are essential for any form of realism. -For there is in the world for our cognisance, -memory of the past, immediacy of realisation, and indication -of things to come.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this sketch of an analysis more concrete than that -of the scientific scheme of thought, I have started from -our own psychological field, as it stands for our cognition. -I take it for what it claims to be: the self-knowledge -of our bodily event. I mean the total -event, and not the inspection of the details of the body. -This self-knowledge discloses a prehensive unification -of modal presences of entities beyond itself. I generalise -by the use of the principle that this total bodily -event is on the same level as all other events, except -for an unusual complexity and stability of inherent -pattern. The strength of the theory of materialistic -mechanism has been the demand, that no arbitrary -breaks be introduced into nature, to eke out the collapse -of an explanation. I accept this principle. But -if you start from the immediate facts of our psychological -experience, as surely an empiricist should begin, -you are at once led to the organic conception of nature -of which the description has been commenced in this -lecture.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_104'>104</span>It is the defect of the eighteenth century scientific -scheme that it provides none of the elements which -compose the immediate psychological experiences of -mankind. Nor does it provide any elementary trace -of the organic unity of a whole, from which the organic -unities of electrons, protons, molecules, and living -bodies can emerge. According to that scheme, -there is no reason in the nature of things why portions -of material should have any physical relations to each -other. Let us grant that we cannot hope to be able to -discern the laws of nature to be necessary. But we -can hope to see that it is necessary that there should be -an order of nature. The concept of the order of -nature is bound up with the concept of nature as -the locus of organisms in process of development.</p> - -<div class='quote'> - -<p class='c001'><span class='sc'>Note.</span> In connection with the latter portion of this chapter a -sentence from Descartes’ ‘Reply to Objections ... against the -Meditations’ is interesting:—“Hence the idea of the sun will be -the sun itself existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists -in the sky, but objectively, <i>i.e.</i>, in the way in which objects are wont -to exist in the mind; and this mode of being is truly much less -perfect than that in which things exist outside the mind, but it is -not on that account mere nothing, as I have already said.” [Reply -to Objections I, Translation by Haldane and Ross, vol. ii, p. 10.] -I find difficulty in reconciling this theory of ideas (with which I -agree) with other parts of the Cartesian philosophy.</p> - -</div> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_105'>105</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER V <br /> <br /> THE ROMANTIC REACTION</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>My last lecture described the influence upon the eighteenth -century of the narrow and efficient scheme of -scientific concepts which it had inherited from its -predecessor. That scheme was the product of a mentality -which found the Augustinian theology extremely -congenial. The Protestant Calvinism and the -Catholic Jansenism exhibited man as helpless to co-operate -with Irresistible Grace: the contemporary -scheme of science exhibited man as helpless to co-operate -with the irresistable mechanism of nature. -The mechanism of God and the mechanism of matter -were the monstrous issues of limited metaphysics and -clear logical intellect. Also the seventeenth century -had genius, and cleared the world of muddled thought. -The eighteenth century continued the work of clearance, -with ruthless efficiency. The scientific scheme -has lasted longer than the theological scheme. Mankind -soon lost interest in Irresistible Grace; but it -quickly appreciated the competent engineering which -was due to science. Also in the first quarter of the -eighteenth century, George Berkeley launched his -philosophical criticism against the whole basis of the -system. He failed to disturb the dominant current -of thought. In my last lecture I developed a parallel -line of argument, which would lead to a system of -thought basing nature upon the concept of organism, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_106'>106</span>and not upon the concept of matter. In the present -lecture, I propose in the first place to consider how the -concrete educated thought of men has viewed this -opposition of mechanism and organism. It is in literature -that the concrete outlook of humanity receives -its expression. Accordingly it is to literature that we -must look, particularly in its more concrete forms, -namely in poetry and in drama, if we hope to discover -the inward thoughts of a generation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We quickly find that the Western peoples exhibit -on a colossal scale a peculiarity which is popularly -supposed to be more especially characteristic of the -Chinese. Surprise is often expressed that a Chinaman -can be of two religions, a Confucian for some occasions -and a Buddhist for other occasions. Whether -this is true of China I do not know; nor do I know -whether, if true, these two attitudes are really inconsistent. -But there can be no doubt that an analogous -fact is true of the West, and that the two attitudes involved -are inconsistent. A scientific realism, based on -mechanism, is conjoined with an unwavering belief -in the world of men and of the higher animals as being -composed of self-determining organisms. This radical -inconsistency at the basis of modern thought accounts -for much that is half-hearted and wavering in our -civilisation. It would be going too far to say that it -distracts thought. It enfeebles it, by reason of the -inconsistency lurking in the background. After all, -the men of the Middle Ages were in pursuit of an -excellency of which we have nearly forgotten the -existence. They set before themselves the ideal of the -attainment of a harmony of the understanding. We -are content with superficial orderings from diverse -<span class='pageno' id='Page_107'>107</span>arbitrary starting points. For instance, the enterprises -produced by the individualistic energy of the European -peoples presupposes physical actions directed to -final causes. But the science which is employed in -their development is based on a philosophy which asserts -that physical causation is supreme, and which -disjoins the physical cause from the final end. It is -not popular to dwell on the absolute contradiction -here involved. It is the fact, however you gloze it -over with phrases. Of course, we find in the eighteenth -century Paley’s famous argument, that mechanism -presupposes a God who is the author of nature. But -even before Paley put the argument into its final form, -Hume had written the retort, that the God whom you -will find will be the sort of God who makes that -mechanism. In other words, that mechanism can, at -most, presuppose a mechanic, and not merely <em>a</em> mechanic -but <em>its</em> mechanic. The only way of mitigating -mechanism is by the discovery that it is not -mechanism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>When we leave apologetic theology, and come to -ordinary literature, we find, as we might expect, that -the scientific outlook is in general simply ignored. So -far as the mass of literature is concerned, science might -never have been heard of. Until recently nearly all -writers have been soaked in classical and renaissance -literature. For the most part, neither philosophy nor -science interested them, and their minds were trained -to ignore it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are exceptions to this sweeping statement; -and, even if we confine ourselves to English literature, -they concern some of the greatest names; also the -indirect influence of science has been considerable.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_108'>108</span>A side light on this distracting inconsistency in modern -thought is obtained by examining some of those -great serious poems in English literature, whose general -scale gives them a didactic character. The relevant -poems are Milton’s <cite>Paradise Lost</cite>, Pope’s <cite>Essay -on Man</cite>, Wordsworth’s <cite>Excursion</cite>, Tennyson’s <cite>In Memoriam</cite>. -Milton, though he is writing after the Restoration, -voices the theological aspect of the earlier -portion of his century, untouched by the influence of -the scientific materialism. Pope’s poem represents the -effect on popular thought of the intervening sixty -years which includes the first period of assured triumph -for the scientific movement. Wordsworth in -his whole being expresses a conscious reaction against -the mentality of the eighteenth century. This mentality -means nothing else than the acceptance of the -scientific ideas at their full face value. Wordsworth -was not bothered by any intellectual antagonism. What -moved him was a moral repulsion. He felt that something -had been left out, and that what had been left -out comprised everything that was most important. -Tennyson is the mouthpiece of the attempts of the -waning romantic movement in the second quarter of -the nineteenth century to come to terms with science. -By this time the two elements in modern thought had -disclosed their fundamental divergence by their jarring -interpretations of the course of nature and the -life of man. Tennyson stands in this poem as the -perfect example of the distraction which I have already -mentioned. There are opposing visions of the -world, and both of them command his assent by appeals -to ultimate intuitions from which there seems -no escape. Tennyson goes to the heart of the difficulty. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_109'>109</span>It is the problem of mechanism which appalls -him,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“‘The stars,’ she whispers, ‘blindly run.’”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>This line states starkly the whole philosophic problem -implicit in the poem. Each molecule blindly runs. -The human body is a collection of molecules. Therefore, -the human body blindly runs, and therefore there -can be no individual responsibility for the actions of -the body. If you once accept that the molecule is definitely -determined to be what it is, independently of -any determination by reason of the total organism of -the body, and if you further admit that the blind run -is settled by the general mechanical laws, there can be -no escape from this conclusion. But mental experiences -are derivative from the actions of the body, including -of course its internal behaviour. Accordingly, -the sole function of the mind is to have at least some -of its experiences settled for it, and to add such others -as may be open to it independently of the body’s motions, -internal and external.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are then two possible theories as to the mind. -You can either deny that it can supply for itself any -experiences other than those provided for it by the -body, or you can admit them.</p> - -<p class='c001'>If you refuse to admit the additional experiences, -then all individual moral responsibility is swept away. -If you do admit them, then a human being may be responsible -for the state of his mind though he has no -responsibility for the actions of his body. The enfeeblement -of thought in the modern world is illustrated -by the way in which this plain issue is avoided -in Tennyson’s poem. There is something kept in the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_110'>110</span>background, a skeleton in the cupboard. He touches -on almost every religious and scientific problem, but -carefully avoids more than a passing allusion to this -one.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This very problem was in full debate at the date of -the poem. John Stuart Mill was maintaining his doctrine -of determinism. In this doctrine volitions are -determined by motives, and motives are expressible in -terms of antecedent conditions including states of mind -as well as states of the body.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is obvious that this doctrine affords no escape -from the dilemma presented by a thoroughgoing -mechanism. For if the volition affects the state of the -body, then the molecules in the body do not blindly -run. If the volition does not affect the state -of the body, the mind is still left in its uncomfortable -position.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Mill’s doctrine is generally accepted, especially -among scientists, as though in some way it allowed -you to accept the extreme doctrine of materialistic -mechanism, and yet mitigated its unbelievable consequences. -It does nothing of the sort. Either the bodily -molecules blindly run, or they do not. If they do -blindly run, the mental states are irrelevant in discussing -the bodily actions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I have stated the arguments concisely, because in -truth the issue is a very simple one. Prolonged discussion -is merely a source of confusion. The question -as to the metaphysical status of molecules does not -come in. The statement that they are mere formulae -has no bearing on the argument. For presumably the -formulae mean something. If they mean nothing, -the whole mechanical doctrine is likewise without -<span class='pageno' id='Page_111'>111</span>meaning, and the question drops. But if the formulae -mean anything, the argument applies to exactly what -they do mean. The traditional way of evading the -difficulty—other than the simple way of ignoring it—is -to have recourse to some form of what is now termed -‘vitalism.’ This doctrine is really a compromise. It -allows a free run to mechanism throughout the whole -of inanimate nature, and holds that the mechanism is -partially mitigated within living bodies. I feel that -this theory is an unsatisfactory compromise. The gap -between living and dead matter is too vague and problematical -to bear the weight of such an arbitrary assumption, -which involves an essential dualism somewhere.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The doctrine which I am maintaining is that the -whole concept of materialism only applies to very -abstract entities, the products of logical discernment. -The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that -the plan of the <em>whole</em> influences the very characters -of the various subordinate organisms which enter into -it. In the case of an animal, the mental states enter -into the plan of the total organism and thus modify -the plans of the successive subordinate organisms until -the ultimate smallest organisms, such as electrons, are -reached. Thus an electron within a living body is -different from an electron outside it, by reason of the -plan of the body. The electron blindly runs either -within or without the body; but it runs within the -body in accordance with its character within the body; -that is to say, in accordance with the general plan of -the body, and this plan includes the mental state. But -this principle of modification is perfectly general -throughout nature, and represents no property peculiar -<span class='pageno' id='Page_112'>112</span>to living bodies. In subsequent lectures it will be -explained that this doctrine involves the abandonment -of the traditional scientific materialism, and the substitution -of an alternative doctrine of organism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I shall not discuss Mill’s determinism, as it lies -outside the scheme of these lectures. The foregoing -discussion has been directed to secure that either determinism -or free will shall have some relevance, unhampered -by the difficulties introduced by materialistic -mechanism, or by the compromise of vitalism. I -would term the doctrine of these lectures, the theory -of <em>organic mechanism</em>. In this theory, the molecules -may blindly run in accordance with the general laws, -but the molecules differ in their intrinsic characters -according to the general organic plans of the situations -in which they find themselves.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The discrepancy between the materialistic mechanism -of science and the moral intuitions, which are presupposed -in the concrete affairs of life, only gradually -assumed its true importance as the centuries advanced. -The different tones of the successive epochs to which -the poems, already mentioned, belong are curiously reflected -in their opening passages. Milton ends his -introduction with the prayer,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“That to the height of this great argument</div> - <div class='line'>I may assert eternal Providence,</div> - <div class='line'>And justify the ways of God to men.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>To judge from many modern writers on Milton, we -might imagine that the <cite>Paradise Lost</cite> and the <cite>Paradise -Regained</cite> were written as a series of experiments in -blank verse. This was certainly not Milton’s view of -his work. To ‘justify the ways of God to men’ was -<span class='pageno' id='Page_113'>113</span>very much his main object. He recurs to the same -idea in the <cite>Samson Agonistes</cite>,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Just are the ways of God</div> - <div class='line'>And justifiable to men;”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>We note the assured volume of confidence, untroubled -by the coming scientific avalanche. The actual date -of the publication of the <cite>Paradise Lost</cite> lies just beyond -the epoch to which it belongs. It is the swansong -of a passing world of untroubled certitude.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A comparison between Pope’s <cite>Essay on Man</cite> and -the <cite>Paradise Lost</cite> exhibits the change of tone in English -thought in the fifty or sixty years which separate -the age of Milton from the age of Pope. Milton addresses -his poem to God, Pope’s poem is addressed to -Lord Bolingbroke,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Awake, my St. John! leave all meaner things</div> - <div class='line'>To low ambition and the pride of kings.</div> - <div class='line'>Let us (since life can little more supply</div> - <div class='line'>Than just to look about us and to die)</div> - <div class='line'>Expatiate free o’er all this scene of man;</div> - <div class='line'>A mighty maze! but not without a plan;”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>Compare the jaunty assurance of Pope,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“A mighty maze! but not without a plan.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>with Milton’s</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Just are the ways of God</div> - <div class='line'>And justifiable to men;”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>But the real point to notice is that Pope as well as -Milton was untroubled by the great perplexity which -haunts the modern world. The clue which Milton -followed was to dwell on the ways of God in dealings -with man. Two generations later we find Pope -<span class='pageno' id='Page_114'>114</span>equally confident that the enlightened methods of -modern science provided a plan adequate as a map -of the ‘mighty maze.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>Wordsworth’s <cite>Excursion</cite> is the next English poem -on the same subject. A prose preface tells us that it is a -fragment of a larger projected work, described as ‘A -philosophical poem containing views of Man, Nature, -and Society.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>Very characteristically the poem begins with the -line,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“’Twas summer, and the sun had mounted high:”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>Thus the romantic reaction started neither with God -nor with Lord Bolingbroke, but with nature. We are -here witnessing a conscious reaction against the whole -tone of the eighteenth century. That century approached -nature with the abstract analysis of science, -whereas Wordsworth opposes to the scientific abstractions -his full concrete experience.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A generation of religious revival and of scientific -advance lies between the <cite>Excursion</cite> and Tennyson’s -<cite>In Memoriam</cite>. The earlier poets had solved the perplexity -by ignoring it. That course was not open to -Tennyson. Accordingly his poem begins thus:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Strong Son of God, immortal Love,</div> - <div class='line'>Whom we, that have not seen Thy face,</div> - <div class='line'>By faith, and faith alone, embrace,</div> - <div class='line'>Believing where we cannot prove;”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>The note of perplexity is struck at once. The nineteenth -century has been a perplexed century, in a sense -which is not true of any of its predecessors of the modern -period. In the earlier times there were opposing -camps, bitterly at variance on questions which they -<span class='pageno' id='Page_115'>115</span>deemed fundamental. But, except for a few stragglers, -either camp was whole-hearted. The importance of -Tennyson’s poem lies in the fact that it exactly expressed -the character of its period. Each individual -was divided against himself. In the earlier times, the -deep thinkers were the clear thinkers,—Descartes, -Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz. They knew exactly what -they meant and said it. In the nineteenth century, some -of the deeper thinkers among theologians and philosophers -were muddled thinkers. Their assent was -claimed by incompatible doctrines; and their efforts -at reconciliation produced inevitable confusion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Matthew Arnold, even more than Tennyson, was -the poet who expressed this mood of individual distraction -which was so characteristic of this century. -Compare with <cite>In Memoriam</cite> the closing lines of Arnold’s -<cite>Dover Beach</cite>:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“And we are here as on a darkling plain</div> - <div class='line'>Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,</div> - <div class='line'>Where ignorant armies clash by night.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>Cardinal Newman in his <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>Apologia pro Vitâ Suâ</cite></span> mentions -it as a peculiarity of Pusey, the great Anglican -ecclesiastic, “He was haunted by no intellectual perplexities.” -In this respect Pusey recalls Milton, Pope, -Wordsworth, as in contrast with Tennyson, Clough, -Matthew Arnold, and Newman himself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>So far as concerns English literature we find, as -might be anticipated, the most interesting criticism -of the thoughts of science among the leaders of the -romantic reaction which accompanied and succeeded -the epoch of the French Revolution. In English literature, -the deepest thinkers of this school were Coleridge, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_116'>116</span>Wordsworth, and Shelley. Keats is an example -of literature untouched by science. We may neglect -Coleridge’s attempt at an explicit philosophical formulation. -It was influential in his own generation; but -in these lectures it is my object only to mention those -elements of the thought of the past which stand for -all time. Even with this limitation, only a selection is -possible. For our purposes Coleridge is only important -by his influence on Wordsworth. Thus Wordsworth -and Shelley remain.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Wordsworth was passionately absorbed in nature. -It has been said of Spinoza, that he was drunk with -God. It is equally true that Wordsworth was drunk -with nature. But he was a thoughtful, well-read -man, with philosophical interests, and sane even to -the point of prosiness. In addition, he was a -genius. He weakens his evidence by his dislike of -science. We all remember his scorn of the poor man -whom he somewhat hastily accuses of peeping and -botanising on his mother’s grave. Passage after passage -could be quoted from him, expressing this repulsion. -In this respect, his characteristic thought -can be summed up in his phrase, ‘We murder to dissect.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this latter passage, he discloses the intellectual -basis of his criticism of science. He alleges against -science its absorption in abstractions. His consistent -theme is that the important facts of nature elude the -scientific method. It is important therefore to ask, -what Wordsworth found in nature that failed to receive -expression in science. I ask this question in the interest -of science itself; for one main position in these -lectures is a protest against the idea that the abstractions -<span class='pageno' id='Page_117'>117</span>of science are irreformable and unalterable. Now -it is emphatically not the case that Wordsworth hands -over inorganic matter to the mercy of science, and -concentrates on the faith that in the living organism -there is some element that science cannot analyse. Of -course he recognises, what no one doubts, that in some -sense living things are different from lifeless things. -But that is not his main point. It is the brooding -presence of the hills which haunts him. His theme -is nature <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>in solido</i></span>, that is to say, he dwells on that -mysterious presence of surrounding things, which imposes -itself on any separate element that we set up -as an individual for its own sake. He always grasps -the whole of nature as involved in the tonality of -the particular instance. That is why he laughs with -the daffodils, and finds in the primrose “thoughts too -deep for terms.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Wordsworth’s greatest poem is, by far, the first -book of <cite>The Prelude</cite>. It is pervaded by this sense -of the haunting presences of nature. A series of magnificent -passages, too long for quotation, express this -idea. Of course, Wordsworth is a poet writing a -poem, and is not concerned with dry philosophical -statements. But it would hardly be possible to express -more clearly a feeling for nature, as exhibiting -entwined prehensive unities, each suffused with modal -presences of others:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Ye Presences of Nature in the sky</div> - <div class='line'>And on the earth! Ye Visions of the hills!</div> - <div class='line'>And Souls of lonely places! can I think</div> - <div class='line'>A vulgar hope was yours when ye employed</div> - <div class='line'>Such ministry, when ye through many a year</div> - <div class='line'>Haunting me thus among my boyish sports,</div> - <div class='line'><span class='pageno' id='Page_118'>118</span>On caves and trees, upon the woods and hills,</div> - <div class='line'>Impressed upon all forms the characters</div> - <div class='line'>Of danger or desire; and thus did make</div> - <div class='line'>The surface of the universal earth</div> - <div class='line'>With triumph and delight, with hope and fear,</div> - <div class='line'>Work like a sea?...”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>In thus citing Wordsworth, the point which I wish -to make is that we forget how strained and paradoxical -is the view of nature which modern science imposes -on our thoughts. Wordsworth, to the height -of genius, expresses the concrete facts of our apprehension, -facts which are distorted in the scientific -analysis. Is it not possible that the standardised concepts -of science are only valid within narrow limitations, -perhaps too narrow for science itself?</p> - -<p class='c001'>Shelley’s attitude to science was at the opposite pole -to that of Wordsworth. He loved it, and is never -tired of expressing in poetry the thoughts which it -suggests. It symbolises to him joy, and peace, and -illumination. What the hills were to the youth of -Wordsworth, a chemical laboratory was to Shelley. -It is unfortunate that Shelley’s literary critics have, -in this respect, so little of Shelley in their own mentality. -They tend to treat as a casual oddity of Shelley’s -nature what was, in fact, part of the main structure -of his mind, permeating his poetry through and -through. If Shelley had been born a hundred years -later, the twentieth century would have seen a Newton -among chemists.</p> - -<p class='c001'>For the sake of estimating the value of Shelley’s -evidence it is important to realise this absorption of -his mind in scientific ideas. It can be illustrated by -lyric after lyric. I will choose one poem only, the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_119'>119</span>fourth act of his <cite>Prometheus Unbound</cite>. The Earth -and the Moon converse together in the language of accurate -science. Physical experiments guide his imagery. -For example, the Earth’s exclamation,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“The vaporous exultation not to be confined!”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>is the poetic transcript of ‘the expansive force of -gases,’ as it is termed in books on science. Again, take -the Earth’s stanza,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“I spin beneath my pyramid of night,</div> - <div class='line'>Which points into the heavens,—dreaming delight,</div> - <div class='line'>Murmuring victorious joy in my enchanted sleep;</div> - <div class='line'>As a youth lulled in love-dreams faintly sighing,</div> - <div class='line'>Under the shadow of his beauty lying,</div> - <div class='line'>Which round his rest a watch of light and warmth doth keep.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>This stanza could only have been written by someone -with a definite geometrical diagram before his -inward eye—a diagram which it has often been my -business to demonstrate to mathematical classes. As -evidence, note especially the last line which gives -poetical imagery to the light surrounding night’s -pyramid. This idea could not occur to anyone without -the diagram. But the whole poem and other -poems are permeated with touches of this kind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Now the poet, so sympathetic with science, so absorbed -in its ideas, can simply make nothing of the -doctrine of secondary qualities which is fundamental -to its concepts. For Shelley nature retains its beauty -and its colour. Shelley’s nature is in its essence a -nature of organisms, functioning with the full content -of our perceptual experience. We are so used to -ignoring the implications of orthodox scientific doctrine, -that it is difficult to make evident the criticism -<span class='pageno' id='Page_120'>120</span>upon it which is thereby implied. If anybody could -have treated it seriously, Shelley would have done so.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Furthermore Shelley is entirely at one with Wordsworth -as to the interfusing of the Presence in nature. -Here is the opening stanza of his poem entitled <cite>Mont -Blanc</cite>:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“The everlasting universe of Things</div> - <div class='line'>Flows through the Mind, and rolls its rapid waves,</div> - <div class='line'>Now dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloom—</div> - <div class='line'>Now lending splendour, where from secret springs</div> - <div class='line'>The source of human thought its tribute brings</div> - <div class='line'>Of waters,—with a sound but half its own,</div> - <div class='line'>Such as a feeble brook will oft assume</div> - <div class='line'>In the wild woods, among the Mountains lone,</div> - <div class='line'>Where waterfalls around it leap for ever,</div> - <div class='line'>Where woods and winds contend, and a vast river</div> - <div class='line'>Over its rocks ceaselessly bursts and raves.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>Shelley has written these lines with explicit reference -to some form of idealism, Kantian or Berkeleyan -or Platonic. But however you construe him, he is -here an emphatic witness to a prehensive unification -as constituting the very being of nature.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Berkeley, Wordsworth, Shelley are representative -of the intuitive refusal seriously to accept the abstract -materialism of science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is an interesting difference in the treatment of -nature by Wordsworth and by Shelley, which brings -forward the exact questions we have got to think about. -Shelley thinks of nature as changing, dissolving, -transforming as it were at a fairy’s touch. The leaves -fly before the West Wind</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Like ghosts from an enchanter fleeing.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>In his poem <cite>The Cloud</cite> it is the transformations of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_121'>121</span>water which excite his imagination. The subject of -the poem is the endless, eternal, elusive change of -things:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“I change but I cannot die.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>This is one aspect of nature, its elusive change: a -change not merely to be expressed by locomotion, but -a change of inward character. This is where Shelley -places his emphasis, on the change of what cannot die.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Wordsworth was born among hills; hills mostly -barren of trees, and thus showing the minimum of -change with the seasons. He was haunted by the -enormous permanences of nature. For him change is -an incident which shoots across a background of endurance,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Breaking the silence of the seas</div> - <div class='line'>Among the farthest Hebrides.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>Every scheme for the analysis of nature has to face -these two facts, <em>change</em> and <em>endurance</em>. There is yet -a third fact to be placed by it, <em>eternality</em>, I will call it. -The mountain endures. But when after ages it has -been worn away, it has gone. If a replica arises, it is -yet a new mountain. A colour is eternal. It haunts -time like a spirit. It comes and it goes. But where -it comes, it is the same colour. It neither survives nor -does it live. It appears when it is wanted. The mountain -has to time and space a different relation from -that which colour has. In the previous lecture, I was -chiefly considering the relation to space-time of things -which, in my sense of the term, are eternal. It was -necessary to do so before we can pass to the consideration -of the things which endure.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also we must recollect the basis of our procedure. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_122'>122</span>I hold that philosophy is the critic of abstractions. -Its function is the double one, first of harmonising -them by assigning to them their right relative status -as abstractions, and secondly of completing them by -direct comparison with more concrete intuitions of -the universe, and thereby promoting the formation of -more complete schemes of thought. It is in respect to -this comparison that the testimony of great poets is of -such importance. Their survival is evidence that they -express deep intuitions of mankind penetrating into -what is universal in concrete fact. Philosophy is not -one among the sciences with its own little scheme of -abstractions which it works away at perfecting and -improving. It is the survey of sciences, with the special -objects of their harmony, and of their completion. -It brings to this task, not only the evidence of the separate -sciences, but also its own appeal to concrete experience. -It confronts the sciences with concrete fact.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The literature of the nineteenth century, especially -its English poetic literature, is a witness to the discord -between the aesthetic intuitions of mankind and the -mechanism of science. Shelley brings vividly before -us the elusiveness of the eternal objects of sense as they -haunt the change which infects underlying organisms. -Wordsworth is the poet of nature as being the field of -enduring permanences carrying within themselves a -message of tremendous significance. The eternal objects -are also there for him,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“The light that never was, on sea or land.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>Both Shelley and Wordsworth emphatically bear witness -that nature cannot be divorced from its aesthetic -values; and that these values arise from the cumulation, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_123'>123</span>in some sense, of the brooding presence of the -whole onto its various parts. Thus we gain from the -poets the doctrine that a philosophy of nature must -concern itself at least with these five notions: change, -value, eternal objects, endurance, organism, interfusion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We see that the literary romantic movement at -the beginning of the nineteenth century, just as much -as Berkeley’s philosophical idealistic movement a -hundred years earlier, refused to be confined within -the materialistic concepts of the orthodox scientific -theory. We know also that when in these lectures we -come to the twentieth century, we shall find a movement -in science itself to reorganise its concepts, driven -thereto by its own intrinsic development.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is, however, impossible to proceed until we have -settled whether this refashioning of ideas is to be -carried out on an objectivist basis or on a subjectivist -basis. By a subjectivist basis I mean the belief that -the nature of our immediate experience is the outcome -of the perceptive peculiarities of the subject enjoying -the experience. In other words, I mean that -for this theory what is perceived is not a partial -vision of a complex of things generally independent -of that act of cognition; but that it merely is the expression -of the individual peculiarities of the cognitive -act. Accordingly what is common to the multiplicity -of cognitive acts is the ratiocination connected -with them. Thus, though there is a common world of -thought associated with our sense-perceptions, there -is no common world to think about. What we do -think about is a common conceptual world applying -indifferently to our individual experiences which are -<span class='pageno' id='Page_124'>124</span>strictly personal to ourselves. Such a conceptual world -will ultimately find its complete expression in the -equations of applied mathematics. This is the extreme -subjectivist position. There is of course the -half-way house of those who believe that our perceptual -experience does tell us of a common objective -world; but that the things perceived are merely the -outcome for us of this world, and are not <em>in themselves</em> -elements in the common world itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also there is the objectivist position. This creed is -that the actual elements perceived by our senses are <em>in -themselves</em> the elements of a common world; and that -this world is a complex of things, including indeed -our acts of cognition, but transcending them. According -to this point of view the things experienced are to -be distinguished from our knowledge of them. So -far as there is dependence, the <em>things</em> pave the way for -the <em>cognition</em>, rather than <em>vice versa</em>. But the point -is that the actual things experienced enter into a common -world which transcends knowledge, though it -includes knowledge. The intermediate subjectivists -would hold that the things experienced only indirectly -enter into the common world by reason of -their dependence on the subject who is cognising. The -objectivist holds that the things experienced and the -cognisant subject enter into the common world on -equal terms. In these lectures I am giving the outline -of what I consider to be the essentials of an objectivist -philosophy adapted to the requirement of science and -to the concrete experience of mankind. Apart from -the detailed criticism of the difficulties raised by subjectivism -in any form, my broad reasons for distrusting -it are three in number. One reason arises from -<span class='pageno' id='Page_125'>125</span>the direct interrogation of our perceptive experience. -It appears from this interrogation that we are <em>within</em> -a world of colours, sounds, and other sense-objects, related -in space and time to enduring objects such as -stones, trees, and human bodies. We seem to be ourselves -elements of this world in the same sense as are -the other things which we perceive. But the subjectivist, -even the moderate intermediate subjectivist, -makes this world, as thus described, depend on us, in -a way which directly traverses our naïve experience. -I hold that the ultimate appeal is to naïve experience -and that is why I lay such stress on the evidence of -poetry. My point is, that in our sense-experience we -know away from and beyond our own personality; -whereas the subjectivist holds that in such experience -we merely know about our own personality. Even -the intermediate subjectivist places our personality between -the world we know of and the common world -which he admits. The world we know of is for him -the internal strain of our personality under the stress -of the common world which lies behind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>My second reason for distrusting subjectivism is -based on the particular content of experience. Our -historical knowledge tells us of ages in the past when, -so far as we can see, no living being existed on earth. -Again it also tells us of countless star-systems, whose -detailed history remains beyond our ken. Consider -even the moon and the earth. What is going on -within the interior of the earth, and on the far side of -the moon! Our perceptions lead us to infer that there -is something happening in the stars, something happening -within the earth, and something happening -on the far side of the moon. Also they tell us that in -<span class='pageno' id='Page_126'>126</span>remote ages there were things happening. But all -these things which it appears certainly happened, are -either unknown in detail, or else are reconstructed by -inferential evidence. In the face of this content of -our personal experience, it is difficult to believe that -the experienced world is an attribute of our own personality. -My third reason is based upon the instinct for -action. Just as sense-perception seems to give knowledge -of what lies beyond individuality, so action seems -to issue in an instinct for self-transcendence. The activity -passes beyond self into the known transcendent -world. It is here that final ends are of importance. -For it is not activity urged from behind, which passes -out into the veiled world of the intermediate subjectivist. -It is activity directed to determinate ends in -the known world; and yet it is activity transcending -self and it is activity within the known world. It -follows therefore that the world, as known, transcends -the subject which is cognisant of it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The subjectivist position has been popular among -those who have been engaged in giving a philosophical -interpretation to the recent theories of relativity in -physical science. The dependence of the world of -sense on the individual percipient seems an easy mode -of expressing the meanings involved. Of course, with -the exception of those who are content with themselves -as forming the entire universe, solitary amid nothing, -everyone wants to struggle back to some sort of objectivist -position. I do not understand how a common -world of thought can be established in the absence of -a common world of sense. I will not argue this point -in detail; but in the absence of a transcendence of -thought, or a transcendence of the world of sense, it -<span class='pageno' id='Page_127'>127</span>is difficult to see how the subjectivist is to divest himself -of his solitariness. Nor does the intermediate subjectivist -appear to get any help from his unknown -world in the background.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The distinction between realism and idealism does -not coincide with that between objectivism and subjectivism. -Both realists and idealists can start from -an objective standpoint. They may both agree that -the world disclosed in sense-perception is a common -world, transcending the individual percipient. But -the objective idealist, when he comes to analyse what -the reality of this world involves, finds that cognitive -mentality is in some way inextricably concerned in -every detail. This position the realist denies. Accordingly -these two classes of objectivists do not part -company till they have arrived at the ultimate problem -of metaphysics. There is a great deal which they -share in common. This is why, in my last lecture, I -said that I adopted a position of provisional realism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the past, the objectivist position has been distorted -by the supposed necessity of accepting the classical -scientific materialism, with its doctrine of simple -location. This has necessitated the doctrine of secondary -and primary qualities. Thus the secondary -qualities, such as the sense-objects, are dealt with -on subjectivist principles. This is a half-hearted position -which falls an easy prey to subjectivist criticism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>If we are to include the secondary qualities in the -common world, a very drastic reorganisation of our -fundamental concepts is necessary. It is an evident -fact of experience that our apprehensions of the external -world depend absolutely on the occurrences -within the human body. By playing appropriate -<span class='pageno' id='Page_128'>128</span>tricks on the body a man can be got to perceive, or -not to perceive, almost anything. Some people express -themselves as though bodies, brains, and nerves -were the only real things in an entirely imaginary -world. In other words, they treat bodies on objectivist -principles, and the rest of the world on subjectivist -principles. This will not do; especially, when we -remember that it is the experimenter’s perception of -another person’s body which is in question as evidence.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But we have to admit that the body is the organism -whose states regulate our cognisance of the world. The -unity of the perceptual field therefore must be a unity -of bodily experience. In being aware of the bodily -experience, we must thereby be aware of aspects of the -whole spatio-temporal world as mirrored within the -bodily life. This is the solution of the problem which -I gave in my last lecture. I will not repeat myself -now, except to remind you that my theory involves -the entire abandonment of the notion that simple location -is the primary way in which things are involved -in space-time. In a certain sense, everything is everywhere -at all times. For every location involves an -aspect of itself in every other location. Thus every -spatio-temporal standpoint mirrors the world.</p> - -<p class='c001'>If you try to imagine this doctrine in terms of our -conventional views of space and time, which presuppose -simple location, it is a great paradox. But if -you think of it in terms of our naïve experience, it is -a mere transcript of the obvious facts. You are in a -certain place perceiving things. Your perception -takes place where you are, and is entirely dependent -on how your body is functioning. But this functioning -of the body in one place, exhibits for your cognisance -<span class='pageno' id='Page_129'>129</span>an aspect of the distant environment, fading -away into the general knowledge that there are things -beyond. If this cognisance conveys knowledge of a -transcendent world, it must be because the event which -is the bodily life unifies in itself aspects of the universe.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This is a doctrine extremely consonant with the -vivid expression of personal experience which we find -in the nature-poetry of imaginative writers such as -Wordsworth or Shelley. The brooding, immediate -presences of things are an obsession to Wordsworth. -What the theory does do is to edge cognitive mentality -away from being the necessary substratum of the -unity of experience. That unity is now placed in the -unity of an event. Accompanying this unity, there -may or there may not be cognition.</p> - -<p class='c001'>At this point we come back to the great question -which was posed before us by our examination of the -evidence afforded by the poetic insight of Wordsworth -and Shelley. This single question has expanded into -a group of questions. What are enduring things, as -distinguished from the eternal objects, such as colour -and shape? How are they possible? What is their -status and meaning in the universe? It comes to this: -What is the status of the enduring stability of the -order of nature? There is the summary answer, -which refers nature to some greater reality standing -behind it. This reality occurs in the history -of thought under many names, The Absolute, Brahma, -The Order of Heaven, God. The delineation of final -metaphysical truth is no part of this lecture. My -point is that any summary conclusion jumping from -our conviction of the existence of such an order of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_130'>130</span>nature to the easy assumption that there is an ultimate -reality which, in some unexplained way, is to be -appealed to for the removal of perplexity, constitutes -the great refusal of rationality to assert its rights. We -have to search whether nature does not in its very -being show itself as self-explanatory. By this I mean, -that the sheer statement, of what things are, may contain -elements explanatory of why things are. Such -elements may be expected to refer to depths beyond -anything which we can grasp with a clear apprehension. -In a sense, all explanation must end in an ultimate -arbitrariness. My demand is, that the ultimate -arbitrariness of matter of fact from which our formulation -starts should disclose the same general principles -of reality, which we dimly discern as stretching -away into regions beyond our explicit powers of discernment. -Nature exhibits itself as exemplifying a -philosophy of the evolution of organisms subject to -determinate conditions. Examples of such conditions -are the dimensions of space, the laws of nature, the -determinate enduring entities, such as atoms and electrons, -which exemplify these laws. But the very nature -of these entities, the very nature of their spatiality -and temporality, should exhibit the arbitrariness of -these conditions as the outcome of a wider evolution -beyond nature itself, and within which nature is but -a limited mode.</p> - -<p class='c001'>One all-pervasive fact, inherent in the very character -of what is real is the transition of things, the -passage one to another. This passage is not a mere -linear procession of discrete entities. However we -fix a determinate entity, there is always a narrower -determination of something which is presupposed in -<span class='pageno' id='Page_131'>131</span>our first choice. Also there is always a wider determination -into which our first choice fades by transition -beyond itself. The general aspect of nature is -that of evolutionary expansiveness. These unities, -which I call events, are the emergence into actuality -of something. How are we to characterise the something -which thus emerges? The name ‘<em>event</em>’ given -to such a unity, draws attention to the inherent transitoriness, -combined with the actual unity. But this -abstract word cannot be sufficient to characterise what -the fact of the reality of an event is in itself. A moment’s -thought shows us that no one idea can in itself -be sufficient. For every idea which finds its significance -in each event must represent something which -contributes to what realisation is in itself. Thus no one -word can be adequate. But conversely, nothing must -be left out. Remembering the poetic rendering of -our concrete experience, we see at once that the element -of value, of being valuable, of having value, of -being an end in itself, of being something which is for -its own sake, must not be omitted in any account of an -event as the most concrete actual something. ‘Value’ -is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event. -Value is an element which permeates through and -through the poetic view of nature. We have only to -transfer to the very texture of realisation in itself that -value which we recognise so readily in terms of human -life. This is the secret of Wordsworth’s worship of -nature. Realization therefore is in itself the attainment -of value. But there is no such thing as mere -value. Value is the outcome of limitation. The definite -finite entity is the selected mode which is the shaping -of attainment; apart from such shaping into -<span class='pageno' id='Page_132'>132</span>individual matter of fact there is no attainment. The -mere fusion of all that there is would be the nonentity -of indefiniteness. The salvation of reality is its obstinate, -irreducible, matter-of-fact entities, which are -limited to be no other than themselves. Neither -science, nor art, nor creative action can tear itself -away from obstinate, irreducible, limited facts. The -endurance of things has its significance in the self-retention -of that which imposes itself as a definite attainment -for its own sake. That which endures is -limited, obstructive, intolerant, infecting its environment -with its own aspects. But it is not self-sufficient. -The aspects of all things enter into its very nature. -It is only itself as drawing together into its own limitation -the larger whole in which it finds itself. Conversely -it is only itself by lending its aspects to this -same environment in which it finds itself. The problem -of evolution is the development of enduring harmonies -of enduring shapes of value, which merge -into higher attainments of things beyond themselves. -Aesthetic attainment is interwoven in the texture of -realisation. The endurance of an entity represents the -attainment of a limited aesthetic success, though if we -look beyond it to its external effects, it may represent -an aesthetic failure. Even within itself, it may represent -the conflict between a lower success and a higher -failure. The conflict is the presage of disruption.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The further discussion of the nature of enduring -objects and of the conditions they require will be -relevant to the consideration of the doctrine of evolution -which dominated the latter half of the nineteenth -century. The point which in this lecture I have -endeavoured to make clear is that the nature-poetry of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_133'>133</span>the romantic revival was a protest on behalf of the -organic view of nature, and also a protest against the -exclusion of value from the essence of matter of fact. -In this aspect of it, the romantic movement may be -conceived as a revival of Berkeley’s protest which had -been launched a hundred years earlier. The romantic -reaction was a protest on behalf of value.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_134'>134</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER VI <br /> <br /> THE NINETEENTH CENTURY</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>My previous lecture was occupied with the comparison -of the nature-poetry of the romantic movement -in England with the materialistic scientific philosophy -inherited from the eighteenth century. It noted the -entire disagreement of the two movements of thought. -The lecture also continued the endeavour to outline -an objectivist philosophy, capable of bridging the -gap between science and that fundamental intuition of -mankind which finds its expression in poetry and its -practical exemplification in the presuppositions of -daily life. As the nineteenth century passed on, the -romantic movement died down. It did not die away, -but it lost its clear unity of tidal stream, and dispersed -itself into many estuaries as it coalesced with other -human interests. The faith of the century was derived -from three sources: one source was the romantic -movement, showing itself in religious revival, in art, -and in political aspiration: another source was the -gathering advance of science which opened avenues of -thought: the third source was the advance in technology -which completely changed the conditions of -human life.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Each of these springs of faith had its origin in the -previous period. The French Revolution itself was -the first child of romanticism in the form in which it -<span class='pageno' id='Page_135'>135</span>tinged Rousseau. James Watt obtained his patent for -his steam-engine in 1769. The scientific advance was -the glory of France and of French influence, throughout -the same century.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also even during this earlier period, the streams -interacted, coalesced, and antagonised each other. But -it was not until the nineteenth century that the threefold -movement came to that full development and -peculiar balance characteristic of the sixty years following -the battle of Waterloo.</p> - -<p class='c001'>What is peculiar and new to the century, differentiating -it from all its predecessors, is its technology. -It was not merely the introduction of some great isolated -inventions. It is impossible not to feel that -something more than that was involved. For example, -writing was a greater invention than the steam-engine. -But in tracing the continuous history of the growth of -writing we find an immense difference from that of -the steam-engine. We must, of course, put aside minor -and sporadic anticipations of both; and confine attention -to the periods of their effective elaboration. The -scale of time is so absolutely disparate. For the steam-engine, -we may give about a hundred years; for writing, -the time period is of the order of a thousand years. -Further, when writing was finally popularised, the -world was not then expecting the next step in technology. -The process of change was slow, unconscious, -and unexpected.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the nineteenth century, the process became quick, -conscious, and expected. The earlier half of the century -was the period in which this new attitude to -change was first established and enjoyed. It was a -peculiar period of hope, in the sense in which, sixty -<span class='pageno' id='Page_136'>136</span>or seventy years later, we can now detect a note of -disillusionment, or at least of anxiety.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The greatest invention of the nineteenth century -was the invention of the method of invention. A new -method entered into life. In order to understand our -epoch, we can neglect all the details of change, such -as railways, telegraphs, radios, spinning machines, -synthetic dyes. We must concentrate on the method -in itself; that is the real novelty, which has broken up -the foundations of the old civilisation. The prophecy -of Francis Bacon has now been fulfilled; and man, -who at times dreamt of himself as a little lower than -the angels, has submitted to become the servant and -the minister of nature. It still remains to be seen -whether the same actor can play both parts.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The whole change has arisen from the new scientific -information. Science, conceived not so much in -its principles as in its results, is an obvious storehouse -of ideas for utilisation. But, if we are to understand -what happened during the century, the analogy of a -mine is better than that of a storehouse. Also, it is a -great mistake to think that the bare scientific idea is -the required invention, so that it has only to be picked -up and used. An intense period of imaginative design -lies between. One element in the new method is just -the discovery of how to set about bridging the gap -between the scientific ideas, and the ultimate product. -It is a process of disciplined attack upon one difficulty -after another.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The possibilities of modern technology were first in -practice realised in England, by the energy of a prosperous -middle class. Accordingly, the industrial revolution -started there. But the Germans explicitly realised -<span class='pageno' id='Page_137'>137</span>the methods by which the deeper veins in the -mine of science could be reached. They abolished -haphazard methods of scholarship. In their technological -schools and universities progress did not have -to wait for the occasional genius, or the occasional -lucky thought. Their feats of scholarship during the -nineteenth century were the admiration of the world. -This discipline of knowledge applies beyond technology -to pure science, and beyond science to general -scholarship. It represents the change from amateurs -to professionals.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There have always been people who devoted their -lives to definite regions of thought. In particular, -lawyers and the clergy of the Christian churches form -obvious examples of such specialism. But the full -self-conscious realisation of the power of professionalism -in knowledge in all its departments, and of the way -to produce the professionals, and of the importance of -knowledge to the advance of technology, and of the -methods by which abstract knowledge can be connected -with technology, and of the boundless possibilities -of technological advance,—the realisation of -all these things was first completely attained in the -nineteenth century; and among the various countries, -chiefly in Germany.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the past human life was lived in a bullock cart; -in the future it will be lived in an aeroplane; and the -change of speed amounts to a difference in quality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The transformation of the field of knowledge, -which has been thus effected, has not been wholly a -gain. At least, there are dangers implicit in it, although -the increase of efficiency is undeniable. The -discussion of various effects on social life arising from -<span class='pageno' id='Page_138'>138</span>the new situation is reserved for my last lecture. For -the present it is sufficient to note that this novel situation -of disciplined progress is the setting within -which the thought of the century developed.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the period considered four great novel ideas were -introduced into theoretical science. Of course, it is -possible to show good cause for increasing my list far -beyond the number <em>four</em>. But I am keeping to ideas -which, if taken in their broadest signification, are vital -to modern attempts at reconstructing the foundations -of physical science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Two of these ideas are antithetical, and I will consider -them together. We are not concerned with details, -but with ultimate influences on thought. One -of the ideas is that of a field of physical activity pervading -all space, even where there is an apparent -vacuum. This notion had occurred to many people, -under many forms. We remember the medieval axiom, -nature abhors a vacuum. Also, Descartes’ vortices -at one time, in the seventeenth century, seemed -as if established among scientific assumptions. Newton -believed that gravitation was caused by something -happening in a medium. But, on the whole, in the -eighteenth century nothing was made of any of these -ideas. The passage of light was explained in Newton’s -fashion by the flight of minute corpuscles, which of -course left room for a vacuum. Mathematical physicists -were far too busy deducing the consequences of -the theory of gravitation to bother much about the -causes; nor did they know where to look, if they had -troubled themselves over the question. There were -speculations, but their importance was not great. Accordingly, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_139'>139</span>when the nineteenth century opened, the -notion of physical occurrences pervading all space -held no effective place in science. It was revived from -two sources. The undulatory theory of light triumphed, -thanks to Thomas Young and Fresnel. This -demands that there shall be something throughout -space which can undulate. Accordingly, the ether -was produced, as a sort of all pervading subtle material. -Again the theory of electromagnetism finally, -in Clerk Maxwell’s hands, assumed a shape in -which it demanded that there should be electromagnetic -occurrences throughout all space. Maxwell’s -complete theory was not shaped until the eighteen-seventies. -But it had been prepared for by many -great men, Ampère, Oersted, Faraday. In accordance -with the current materialistic outlook, these electromagnetic -occurrences also required a material in -which to happen. So again the ether was requisitioned. -Then Maxwell, as the immediate first-fruits -of his theory, demonstrated that the waves of light -were merely waves of his electromagnetic occurrences. -Accordingly, the theory of electromagnetism swallowed -up the theory of light. It was a great simplification, -and no one doubts its truth. But it had one -unfortunate effect so far as materialism was concerned. -For, whereas quite a simple sort of elastic ether sufficed -for light when taken by itself, the electromagnetic -ether has to be endowed with just those properties -necessary for the production of the electromagnetic -occurrences. In fact, it becomes a mere name -for the material which is postulated to underlie these -occurrences. If you do not happen to hold the metaphysical -<span class='pageno' id='Page_140'>140</span>theory which makes you postulate such an -ether, you can discard it. For it has no independent -vitality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus in the seventies of the last century, some main -physical sciences were established on a basis which -presupposed the idea of <em>continuity</em>. On the other -hand, the idea of <em>atomicity</em> had been introduced by -John Dalton, to complete Lavoisier’s work on the -foundation of chemistry. This is the second great -notion. Ordinary matter was conceived as atomic: -electromagnetic effects were conceived as arising from -a continuous field.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There was no contradiction. In the first place, the -notions are antithetical; but, apart from special embodiments, -are not logically contradictory. Secondly, -they were applied to different regions of science, one -to chemistry, and the other to electromagnetism. -And, as yet, there were but faint signs of coalescence -between the two.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The notion of matter as atomic has a long history. -Democritus and Lucretius will at once occur to your -minds. In speaking of these ideas as novel, I merely -mean <em>relatively novel</em>, having regard to the settlement -of ideas which formed the efficient basis of -science throughout the eighteenth century. In considering -the history of thought, it is necessary to distinguish -the real stream, determining a period, from -ineffectual thoughts casually entertained. In the -eighteenth century every well-educated man read Lucretius, -and entertained ideas about atoms. But John -Dalton made them efficient in the stream of science; -and in this function of efficiency atomicity was a new -idea.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_141'>141</span>The influence of atomicity was not limited to chemistry. -The living cell is to biology what the electron -and the proton are to physics. Apart from cells and -from aggregates of cells there are no biological phenomena. -The cell theory was introduced into biology -contemporaneously with, and independently of, Dalton’s -atomic theory. The two theories are independent -exemplifications of the same idea of ‘atomism.’ The -biological cell theory was a gradual growth, and a -mere list of dates and names illustrates the fact that -the biological sciences, as effective schemes of thought, -are barely one hundred years old. Bichât in 1801 -elaborated a tissue theory: Johannes Müller in 1835 -described ‘cells’ and demonstrated facts concerning -their nature and relations: Schleiden in 1838 and -Schwann in 1839 finally established their fundamental -character. Thus by 1840 both biology and chemistry -were established on an atomic basis. The final triumph -of atomism had to wait for the arrival of electrons -at the end of the century. The importance of -the imaginative background is illustrated by the fact -that nearly half a century after Dalton had done his -work, another chemist, Louis Pasteur, carried over -these same ideas of atomicity still further into the -region of biology. The cell theory and Pasteur’s work -were in some respects more revolutionary than that of -Dalton. For they introduced the notion of <em>organism</em> -into the world of minute beings. There had been a -tendency to treat the atom as an ultimate entity, capable -only of external relations. This attitude of mind -was breaking down under the influence of Mendeleef’s -periodic law. But Pasteur showed the decisive importance -of the idea of organism at the stage of infinitesimal -<span class='pageno' id='Page_142'>142</span>magnitude. The astronomers had shown -us how big is the universe. The chemists and biologists -teach us how small it is. There is in modern -scientific practice a famous standard of length. It is -rather small: to obtain it, you must divide a centimetre -into one hundred million parts, and take one -of them. Pasteur’s organisms are a good deal bigger -than this length. In connection with atoms, we now -know that there are organisms for which such distances -are uncomfortably great.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The remaining pair of new ideas to be ascribed to -this epoch are both of them connected with the notion -of transition or change. They are the doctrine of the -conservation of energy, and the doctrine of evolution.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The doctrine of energy has to do with the notion -of quantitative permanence underlying change. The -doctrine of evolution has to do with the emergence of -novel organisms as the outcome of change. The theory -of energy lies in the province of physics. The theory -of evolution lies mainly in the province of biology, -although it had previously been touched upon by Kant -and Laplace in connection with the formation of suns -and planets.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The convergent effect of the new power for scientific -advance, which resulted from these four ideas, -transformed the middle period of the century into an -orgy of scientific triumph. Clear-sighted men, of the -sort who are so clearly wrong, now proclaimed that -the secrets of the physical universe were finally -disclosed. If only you ignored everything which refused -to come into line, your powers of explanation -were unlimited. On the other side, muddle-headed -men muddled themselves into the most indefensible -<span class='pageno' id='Page_143'>143</span>positions. Learned dogmatism, conjoined with ignorance -of the crucial facts, suffered a heavy defeat from -the scientific advocates of new ways. Thus to the excitement -derived from technological revolution, there -was now added the excitement arising from the vistas -disclosed by scientific theory. Both the material and -the spiritual bases of social life were in process of -transformation. When the century entered upon its -last quarter, its three sources of inspiration, the romantic, -the technological, and the scientific had done -their work.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Then, almost suddenly, a pause occurred; and in -its last twenty years the century closed with one of -the dullest stages of thought since the time of the First -Crusade. It was an echo of the eighteenth century, -lacking Voltaire and the reckless grace of the French -aristocrats. The period was efficient, dull, and half-hearted. -It celebrated the triumph of the professional -man.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But looking backwards upon this time of pause, we -can now discern signs of change. In the first place, -the modern conditions of systematic research prevent -absolute stagnation. In every branch of science, there -was effective progress, indeed rapid progress, although -it was confined somewhat strictly within the -accepted ideas of each branch. It was an age of successful -scientific orthodoxy, undisturbed by much -thought beyond the conventions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the second place, we can now see that the adequacy -of scientific materialism as a scheme of thought -for the use of science was endangered. The conservation -of energy provided a new type of quantitative -permanence. It is true that energy could be construed -<span class='pageno' id='Page_144'>144</span>as something subsidiary to matter. But, anyhow, -the notion of <em>mass</em> was losing its unique preeminence -as being the one final permanent quantity. -Later on, we find the relations of mass and energy inverted; -so that mass now becomes the name for a -quantity of energy considered in relation to some of its -dynamical effects. This train of thought leads to the -notion of energy being fundamental, thus displacing -matter from that position. But energy is merely the -name for the quantitative aspect of a structure of happenings; -in short, it depends on the notion of the -functioning of an organism. The question is, can we -define an organism without recurrence to the concept -of matter in simple location? We must, later on, consider -this point in more detail.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The same relegation of matter to the background -occurs in connection with the electromagnetic fields. -The modern theory presupposes happenings in that -field which are divorced from immediate dependence -upon matter. It is usual to provide an ether as a substratum. -But the ether does not really enter into the -theory. Thus again the notion of material loses its -fundamental position. Also, the atom is transforming -itself into an organism; and finally the evolution -theory is nothing else than the analysis of the conditions -for the formation and survival of various types -of organisms. In truth, one most significant fact of -this later period is the advance in biological sciences. -These sciences are essentially sciences concerning organisms. -During the epoch in question, and indeed -also at the present moment, the prestige of the more -perfect scientific form belongs to the physical sciences. -Accordingly, biology apes the manners of physics. It -<span class='pageno' id='Page_145'>145</span>is orthodox to hold, that there is nothing in biology -but what is physical mechanism under somewhat complex -circumstances.</p> - -<p class='c001'>One difficulty in this position is the present confusion -as to the foundational concepts of physical science. -This same difficulty also attaches to the opposed doctrine -of vitalism. For, in this later theory, the fact -of mechanism is accepted—I mean, mechanism based -upon materialism—and an additional vital control is -introduced to explain the actions of living bodies. It -cannot be too clearly understood that the various -physical laws which appear to apply to the behaviour -of atoms are not mutually consistent as at present -formulated. The appeal to mechanism on behalf of -biology was in its origin an appeal to the well-attested -self-consistent physical concepts as expressing the basis -of all natural phenomena. But at present there is no -such system of concepts.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Science is taking on a new aspect which is neither -purely physical, nor purely biological. It is becoming -the study of organisms. Biology is the study of -the larger organisms; whereas physics is the study of -the smaller organisms. There is another difference -between the two divisions of science. The organisms -of biology include as ingredients the smaller organisms -of physics; but there is at present no evidence -that the smaller of the physical organisms can be analysed -into component organisms. It may be so. But -anyhow we are faced with the question as to whether -there are not primary organisms which are incapable -of further analysis. It seems very unlikely that there -should be any infinite regress in nature. Accordingly, -a theory of science which discards materialism must -<span class='pageno' id='Page_146'>146</span>answer the question as to the character of these primary -entities. There can be only one answer on this -basis. We must start with the event as the ultimate -unit of natural occurrence. An event has to do with -all that there is, and in particular with all other events. -This interfusion of events is effected by the aspects -of those eternal objects, such as colours, sounds, scents, -geometrical characters, which are required for nature -and are not emergent from it. Such an eternal -object will be an ingredient of one event under the -guise, or aspect, of qualifying another event. There -is a reciprocity of aspects, and there are patterns of -aspects. Each event corresponds to two such patterns; -namely, the pattern of aspects of other events -which it grasps into its own unity, and the pattern of -its aspects which other events severally grasp into their -unities. Accordingly, a non-materialistic philosophy -of nature will identify a primary organism as being -the emergence of some particular pattern as grasped -in the unity of a real event. Such a pattern will also -include the aspects of the event in question as grasped -in other events, whereby those other events receive a -modification, or partial determination. There is thus -an intrinsic and an extrinsic reality of an event, -namely, the event as in its own prehension, and the -event as in the prehension of other events. The concept -of an organism includes, therefore, the concept -of the interaction of organisms. The ordinary scientific -ideas of transmission and continuity are, relatively -speaking, details concerning the empirically observed -characters of these patterns throughout space and -time. The position here maintained is that the relationships -of an event are internal, so far as concerns -<span class='pageno' id='Page_147'>147</span>the event itself; that is to say, that they are constitutive -of what the event is in itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also in the previous lecture, we arrived at the notion -that an actual event is an achievement for its own -sake, a grasping of diverse entities into a value by -reason of their real togetherness in that pattern, to the -exclusion of other entities. It is not the mere logical -togetherness of merely diverse things. For in that case, -to modify Bacon’s words, “all eternal objects would -be alike one to another.” This reality means that each -intrinsic essence, that is to say, what each eternal object -is in itself, becomes relevant to the one limited -value emergent in the guise of the event. But values -differ in importance. Thus though each event is -necessary for the community of events, the weight of -its contribution is determined by something intrinsic -in itself. We have now to discuss what that property -is. Empirical observation shows that it is the property -which we may call indifferently <em>retention</em>, <em>endurance</em> -or <em>reiteration</em>. This property amounts to the recovery, -on behalf of value amid the transitoriness of -reality, of the self-identity which is also enjoyed by -the primary eternal objects. The reiteration of a particular -shape (or formation) of value within an event -occurs when the event as a whole repeats some shape -which is also exhibited by each one of a succession of -its parts. Thus however you analyse the event according -to the flux of its parts through time, there is the -same thing-for-its-own-sake standing before you. Thus -the event, in its own intrinsic reality, mirrors in itself, -as derived from its own parts, aspects of the same patterned -value as it realises in its complete self. It thus -realises itself under the guise of an enduring individual -<span class='pageno' id='Page_148'>148</span>entity, with a life history contained within itself. -Furthermore, the extrinsic reality of such an event, as -mirrored in other events, takes this same form of an -enduring individuality; only in this case, the individuality -is implanted as a reiteration of aspects of itself -in the alien events composing the environment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The total temporal duration of such an event bearing -an enduring pattern, constitutes its specious present. -Within this specious present the event realises -itself as a totality, and also in so doing realises itself -as grouping together a number of aspects of its own -temporal parts. One and the same pattern is realised -in the total event, and is exhibited by each of these -various parts through an aspect of each part grasped -into the togetherness of the total event. Also, the earlier -life-history of the same pattern is exhibited by its -aspects in this total event. There is, thus, in this event -a memory of the antecedent life-history of its own -dominant pattern, as having formed an element of -value in its own antecedent environment. This concrete -prehension, from within, of the life-history of -an enduring fact is analysable into two abstractions, of -which one is the enduring entity which has emerged -as a real matter of fact to be taken account of by other -things, and the other is the individualised embodiment -of the underlying energy of realisation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The consideration of the general flux of events leads -to this analysis into an underlying eternal energy in -whose nature there stands an envisagement of the -realm of all eternal objects. Such an envisagement is -the ground of the individualised thoughts which -emerge as thought-aspects grasped within the life-history -of the subtler and more complex enduring patterns. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_149'>149</span>Also in the nature of the eternal activity there -must stand an envisagement of all values to be obtained -by a real togetherness of eternal objects, as -envisaged in ideal situations. Such ideal situations, -apart from any reality, are devoid of intrinsic value, -but are valuable as elements in purpose. The individualised -prehension into individual events of aspects -of these ideal situations takes the form of individualised -thoughts, and as such has intrinsic value. Thus -value arises because there is now a real togetherness -of the ideal aspects, as in thought, with the actual -aspects, as in process of occurrence. Accordingly no -value is to be ascribed to the underlying activity as -divorced from the matter-of-fact events of the real -world.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Finally, to sum up this train of thought, the underlying -activity, as conceived apart from the fact of -realisation, has three types of envisagement. These -are: first, the envisagement of eternal objects; secondly, -the envisagement of possibilities of value in -respect to the synthesis of eternal objects; and lastly, -the envisagement of the actual matter of fact which -must enter into the total situation which is achievable -by the addition of the future. But in abstraction -from actuality, the eternal activity is divorced from -value. For the actuality is the value. The individual -perception arising from enduring objects will vary in -its individual depth and width according to the way -in which the pattern dominates its own route. It -may represent the faintest ripple differentiating the -general substrate energy; or, in the other extreme, it -may rise to conscious thought, which includes poising -before self-conscious judgment the abstract possibilities -<span class='pageno' id='Page_150'>150</span>of value inherent in various situations of ideal togetherness. -The intermediate cases will group round -the individual perception as envisaging (without self-consciousness) -that one immediate possibility of attainment -which represents the closest analogy to its -own immediate past, having regard to the actual aspects -which are there for prehension. The laws of -physics represent the harmonised adjustment of development -which results from this unique principle -of determination. Thus dynamics is dominated by -a principle of least action, whose detailed character -has to be learnt from observation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The atomic material entities which are considered -in physical science are merely these individual enduring -entities, conceived in abstraction from everything -except what concerns their mutual interplay in determining -each other’s historical routes of life-history. -Such entities are partially formed by the inheritance -of aspects from their own past. But they are also -partially formed by the aspects of other events forming -their environments. The laws of physics are the -laws declaring how the entities mutually react among -themselves. For physics these laws are arbitrary, because -that science has abstracted from what the entities -are in themselves. We have seen that this fact -of what the entities are in themselves is liable to modification -by their environments. Accordingly, the assumption -that no modification of these laws is to be -looked for in environments, which have any striking -difference from the environments for which the laws -have been observed to hold, is very unsafe. The -physical entities may be modified in very essential -ways, so far as these laws are concerned. It is even -<span class='pageno' id='Page_151'>151</span>possible that they may be developed into individualities -of more fundamental types, with wider embodiment -of envisagement. Such envisagement might -reach to the attainment of the poising of alternative -values with exercise of choice lying outside the physical -laws, and expressible only in terms of purpose. -Apart from such remote possibilities, it remains an -immediate deduction that an individual entity, whose -own life-history is a part within the life-history of -some larger, deeper, more complete pattern, is liable to -have aspects of that larger pattern dominating its own -being, and to experience modifications of that larger -pattern reflected in itself as modifications of its own -being. This is the theory of organic mechanism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>According to this theory the evolution of laws of -nature is concurrent with the evolution of enduring -pattern. For the general state of the universe, as it -now is, partly determines the very essences of the -entities whose modes of functioning these laws express. -The general principle is that in a new environment -there is an evolution of the old entities into new forms.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This rapid outline of a thoroughgoing organic -theory of nature enables us to understand the chief -requisites of the doctrine of evolution. The main -work, proceeding during this pause at the end of the -nineteenth century, was the absorption of this doctrine -as guiding the methodology of all branches of science. -By a blindness which is almost judicial as being a -penalty affixed to hasty, superficial thinking, many -religious thinkers opposed the new doctrine; although, -in truth, a thoroughgoing evolutionary philosophy -is inconsistent with materialism. The aboriginal -stuff, or material, from which a materialistic philosophy -<span class='pageno' id='Page_152'>152</span>starts is incapable of evolution. This material -is in itself the ultimate substance. Evolution, on the -materialistic theory, is reduced to the rôle of being -another word for the description of the changes of -the external relations between portions of matter. -There is nothing to evolve, because one set of external -relations is as good as any other set of external relations. -There can merely be change, purposeless and -unprogressive. But the whole point of the modern -doctrine is the evolution of the complex organisms -from antecedent states of less complex organisms. The -doctrine thus cries aloud for a conception of organism -as fundamental for nature. It also requires an underlying -activity—a substantial activity—expressing itself -in individual embodiments, and evolving in achievements -of organism. The organism is a unit of emergent -value, a real fusion of the characters of eternal -objects, emerging for its own sake.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus in the process of analysing the character of -nature in itself, we find that the emergence of organisms -depends on a selective activity which is akin -to purpose. The point is that the enduring organisms -are now the outcome of evolution; and that, beyond -these organisms, there is nothing else that endures. -On the materialistic theory, there is material—such -as matter or electricity—which endures. On the organic -theory, the only endurances are structures of -activity, and the structures are evolved.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Enduring things are thus the outcome of a temporal -process; whereas eternal things are the elements required -for the very being of the process. We can give -a precise definition of endurance in this way: Let -an event A be pervaded by an enduring structural -<span class='pageno' id='Page_153'>153</span>pattern. Then A can be exhaustively subdivided into -a temporal succession of events. Let B be any part -of A, which is obtained by picking out any one of the -events belonging to a series which thus subdivides A. -Then the enduring pattern is a pattern of aspects -within the complete pattern prehended into the unity -of A, and it is also a pattern within the complete pattern -prehended into the unity of any temporal slice of -A, such as B. For example, a molecule is a pattern -exhibited in an event of one minute, and of any second -of that minute. It is obvious that such an enduring -pattern may be of more, or of less, importance. It -may express some slight fact connecting the underlying -activities thus individualised; or it may express -some very close connection. If the pattern which -endures is merely derived from the direct aspects of -the external environment, mirrored in the standpoints -of the various parts, then the endurance is an extrinsic -fact of slight importance. But if the enduring pattern -is wholly derived from the direct aspects of the -various temporal sections of the event in question, then -the endurance is an important intrinsic fact. It expresses -a certain unity of character uniting the underlying -individualised activities. There is then an -enduring object with a certain unity for itself and for -the rest of nature. Let us use the term physical endurance -to express endurance of this type. Then -physical endurance is the process of continuously inheriting -a certain identity of character transmitted -throughout a historical route of events. This character -belongs to the whole route, and to every event -of the route. This is the exact property of material. -If it has existed for ten minutes, it has existed during -<span class='pageno' id='Page_154'>154</span>every minute of the ten minutes, and during every -second of every minute. Only if you take <em>material</em> -to be fundamental, this property of endurance is an -arbitrary fact at the base of the order of nature; but -if you take <em>organism</em> to be fundamental, this property -is the result of evolution.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It looks at first sight, as if a physical object, with -its process of inheritance from itself, were independent -of the environment. But such a conclusion is -not justified. For let B and C be two successive slices -in the life of such an object, such that C succeeds B. -Then the enduring pattern in C is inherited from B, -and from other analogous antecedent parts of its life. -It is transmitted through B to C. But what is transmitted -to C is the complete pattern of aspects derived -from such events as B. These complete patterns include -the influence of the environment on B, and on -the other antecedent parts of the life of the object. -Thus the complete aspects of the antecedent life are -inherited as the partial pattern which endures -throughout all the various periods of the life. Thus -a favourable environment is essential to the maintenance -of a physical object.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Nature, as we know it, comprises enormous permanences. -There are the permanences of ordinary -matter. The molecules within the oldest rocks known -to geologists may have existed unchanged for over a -thousand million years, not only unchanged in themselves, -but unchanged in their relative dispositions to -each other. In that length of time the number of -pulsations of a molecule vibrating with the frequency -of yellow sodium light would be about 16.3 × 10<sup>22</sup> = -<span class='pageno' id='Page_155'>155</span>163,000 × (10<sup>6</sup>)³. Until recently, an atom was apparently -indestructible. We know better now. But -the indestructible atom has been succeeded by the apparently -indestructible electron and the indestructible -proton.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Another fact to be explained is the great similarity -of these practically indestructible objects. All electrons -are very similar to each other. We need not -outrun the evidence, and say that they are identical; -but our powers of observation cannot detect any differences. -Analogously, all hydrogen nuclei are -alike. Also we note the great numbers of these analogous -objects. There are throngs of them. It seems -as though a certain similarity were a favourable condition -for endurance. Common sense also suggests -this conclusion. If organisms are to survive, they -must work together.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, the key to the mechanism of evolution -is the necessity for the evolution of a favourable -environment, conjointly with the evolution of any -specific type of enduring organisms of great permanence. -Any physical object which by its influence -deteriorates its environment, commits suicide.</p> - -<p class='c001'>One of the simplest ways of evolving a favourable -environment concurrently with the development of -the individual organism, is that the influence of each -organism on the environment should be favourable -to the <em>endurance</em> of other organisms of the same type. -Further, if the organism also favours the <em>development</em> -of other organisms of the same type, you have -then obtained a mechanism of evolution adapted to -produce the observed state of large multitudes of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_156'>156</span>analogous entities, with high powers of endurance. -For the environment automatically develops with the -species, and the species with the environment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The first question to ask is, whether there is any -direct evidence for such a mechanism for the evolution -of enduring organisms. In surveying nature, we -must remember that there are not only basic organisms -whose ingredients are merely aspects of eternal -objects. There are also organisms of organisms. -Suppose for the moment and for the sake of simplicity, -we assume, without any evidence, that electrons and -hydrogen nuclei are such basic organisms. Then the -atoms, and the molecules, are organisms of a higher -type, which also represent a compact definite organic -unity. But when we come to the larger aggregations -of matter, the organic unity fades into the background. -It appears to be but faint and elementary. It is there; -but the pattern is vague and indecisive. It is a mere -aggregation of effects. When we come to living beings, -the definiteness of pattern is recovered, and the -organic character again rises into prominence. Accordingly, -the characteristic laws of inorganic matter -are mainly the statistical averages resulting from -confused aggregates. So far are they from throwing -light on the ultimate nature of things, that they blur -and obliterate the individual characters of the individual -organisms. If we wish to throw light upon the -facts relating to organisms, we must study either the -individual molecules and electrons, or the individual -living beings. In between we find comparative confusion. -Now the difficulty of studying the individual -molecule is that we know so little about its life history. -We cannot keep an individual under continuous -<span class='pageno' id='Page_157'>157</span>observation. In general, we deal with them in -large aggregates. So far as individuals are concerned, -sometimes with difficulty a great experimenter throws, -so to speak, a flash light on one of them, and just -observes one type of instantaneous effect. Accordingly, -the history of the functioning of individual -molecules, or electrons, is largely hidden from us.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But in the case of living beings, we can trace the -history of individuals. We now find exactly the -mechanism which is here demanded. In the first -place, there is the propagation of the species from -members of the same species. There is also the careful -provision of the favourable environment for the -endurance of the family, the race, or the seed in the -fruit.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is evident, however, that I have explained the -evolutionary mechanism in terms which are far too -simple. We find associated species of living things, -providing for each other a favourable environment. -Thus just as the members of the same species mutually -favour each other, so do members of associated -species. We find the rudimentary fact of association -in the existence of the two species, electrons -and hydrogen nuclei. The simplicity of the dual -association, and the apparent absence of competition -from other antagonistic species accounts for the massive -endurance which we find among them.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are thus two sides to the machinery involved -in the development of nature. On one side, there is -a given environment with organisms adapting themselves -to it. The scientific materialism of the epoch -in question emphasised this aspect. From this point -of view, there is a given amount of material, and only -<span class='pageno' id='Page_158'>158</span>a limited number of organisms can take advantage -of it. The givenness of the environment dominates -everything. Accordingly, the last words of science -appeared to be the Struggle for Existence, and Natural -Selection. Darwin’s own writings are for all -time a model of refusal to go beyond the direct evidence, -and of careful retention of every possible hypothesis. -But those virtues were not so conspicuous -in his followers, and still less in his camp-followers. -The imagination of European sociologists and publicists -was stained by exclusive attention to this aspect -of conflicting interests. The idea prevailed that there -was a peculiar strong-minded realism in discarding -ethical considerations in the determination of the conduct -of commercial and national interests.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The other side of the evolutionary machinery, the -neglected side, is expressed by the word <em>creativeness</em>. -The organisms can create their own environment. -For this purpose, the single organism is almost helpless. -The adequate forces require societies of <a id='corr157.20'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='co-operating'>coöperating</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_157.20'><ins class='correction' title='co-operating'>coöperating</ins></a></span> -organisms. But with such coöperation and -in proportion to the effort put forward, the environment -has a plasticity which alters the whole ethical -aspect of evolution.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the immediate past, and at present, a muddled -state of mind is prevalent. The increased plasticity -of the environment for mankind, resulting from the -advances in scientific technology, is being construed in -terms of habits of thought which find their justification -in the theory of a fixed environment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The riddle of the universe is not so simple. There -is the aspect of permanence in which a given type of -attainment is endlessly repeated for its own sake; and -<span class='pageno' id='Page_159'>159</span>there is the aspect of transition to other things,—it -may be of higher worth, and it may be of lower worth. -Also there are its aspects of struggle and of friendly -help. But romantic ruthlessness is no nearer to real -politics, than is romantic self-abnegation.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_160'>160</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER VII <br /> <br /> RELATIVITY</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>In the previous lectures of this course we have considered -the antecedent conditions which led up to -the scientific movement, and have traced the progress -of thought from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. -In the nineteenth century this history falls into -three parts, so far as it is to be grouped around science. -These <a id='corr160.8'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='divisons'>divisions</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_160.8'><ins class='correction' title='divisons'>divisions</ins></a></span> are, the contact between the romantic -movement and science, the development of -technology and physics in the earlier part of the -century, and lastly the theory of evolution combined -with the general advance of the biological sciences.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The dominating note of the whole period of three -centuries is that the doctrine of materialism afforded -an adequate basis for the concepts of science. It was -practically unquestioned. When undulations were -wanted, an ether was supplied, in order to perform -the duties of an undulatory material. To show the -full assumption thus involved, I have sketched in outline -an alternative doctrine of an organic theory of -nature. In the last lecture it was pointed out that -the biological developments, the doctrine of evolution, -the doctrine of energy, and the molecular theories -were rapidly undermining the adequacy of the orthodox -materialism. But until the close of the century -no one drew that conclusion. Materialism reigned -supreme.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_161'>161</span>The note of the present epoch is that so many complexities -have developed regarding material, space, -time, and energy, that the simple security of the old -orthodox assumptions has vanished. It is obvious -that they will not do as Newton left them, or even -as Clerk Maxwell left them. There must be a reorganization. -The new situation in the thought of to-day -arises from the fact that scientific theory is outrunning -common sense. The settlement as inherited -by the eighteenth century was a triumph of organised -common sense. It had got rid of medieval phantasies, -and of Cartesian vortices. As a result it gave full -reign to its anti-rationalistic tendencies derived from -the historical revolt of the Reformation period. It -grounded itself upon what every plain man could see -with his own eyes, or with a microscope of moderate -power. It measured the obvious things to be measured, -and it generalised the obvious things to be generalised. -For example, it generalised the ordinary -notions of weight and massiveness. The eighteenth -century opened with the quiet confidence that at last -nonsense had been got rid of. To-day we are at the -opposite pole of thought. Heaven knows what seeming -nonsense may not to-morrow be demonstrated -truth. We have recaptured some of the tone of the -early nineteenth century, only on a higher imaginative -level.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The reason why we are on a higher imaginative -level is not because we have finer imagination, but -because we have better instruments. In science, the -most important thing that has happened during the -last forty years is the advance in instrumental design. -This advance is partly due to a few men of genius -<span class='pageno' id='Page_162'>162</span>such as Michelson and the German opticians. It is -also due to the progress of technological processes of -manufacture, particularly in the region of metallurgy. -The designer has now at his disposal a variety of material -of differing physical properties. He can thus -depend upon obtaining the material he desires; and -it can be ground to the shapes he desires, within very -narrow limits of tolerance. These instruments have -put thought onto a new level. A fresh instrument -serves the same purpose as foreign travel; it shows -things in unusual combinations. The gain is more -than a mere addition; it is a transformation. The -advance in experimental ingenuity is, perhaps, also -due to the larger proportion of national ability which -now flows into scientific pursuits. Anyhow, whatever -be the cause, subtle and ingenious experiments -have abounded within the last generation. The result -is, that a great deal of information has been accumulated -in regions of nature very far removed from the -ordinary experience of mankind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Two famous experiments, one devised by Galileo -at the outset of the scientific movement, and the other -by Michelson with the aid of his famous interferometer, -first carried out in 1881, and repeated in 1887 -and 1905, illustrate the assertions I have made. Galileo -dropped heavy bodies from the top of the leaning -tower of Pisa, and demonstrated that bodies of different -weights, if released simultaneously, would reach -the earth together. So far as experimental skill, and -delicacy of apparatus were concerned, this experiment -could have been made at any time within the -preceding five thousand years. The ideas involved -merely concerned weight and speed of travel, ideas -<span class='pageno' id='Page_163'>163</span>which are familiar in ordinary life. The whole set -of ideas might have been familiar to the family of -King Minos of Crete, as they dropped pebbles into -the sea from high battlements rising from the shore. -We cannot too carefully realise that science started -with the organisation of ordinary experiences. It -was in this way that it coalesced so readily with the -anti-rationalistic bias of the historical revolt. It -was not asking for ultimate meanings. It confined -itself to investigating the connections regulating the -succession of obvious occurrences.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Michelson’s experiment could not have been made -earlier than it was. It required the general advance -in technology, and Michelson’s experimental genius. -It concerns the determination of the earth’s motion -through the ether, and it assumes that light consists -of waves of vibration advancing at a fixed rate -through the ether in any direction. Also, of course, -the earth is moving through the ether, and Michelson’s -apparatus is moving with the earth. In the centre of -the apparatus a ray of light is divided so that one -half-ray goes in one direction <em>along</em> the apparatus -through a given distance, and is reflected back to the -centre by a mirror in the apparatus. The other half-ray -goes the same distance <em>across</em> the apparatus in a -direction at right angles to the former ray, and it also -is reflected back to the centre. These reunited rays -are then reflected onto a screen in the apparatus. If -precautions are taken, you will see interference bands; -namely bands of blackness where the crests of the -waves of one ray have filled up the troughs of the -other rays, owing to a minute difference in the lengths -of paths of the two half-rays, up to certain parts -<span class='pageno' id='Page_164'>164</span>of the screens. These differences in length will be -affected by the motion of the earth. For it is the -lengths of the paths in the ether which count. Thus, -since the apparatus is moving with the earth, the path -of one half-ray will be disturbed by the motion in a -different manner from the path of the other half-ray. -Think of yourself as moving in a railway carriage, -first along the train and then across the train; -and mark out your paths on the railway track which in -this analogy corresponds to the ether. Now the motion -of the earth is very slow compared to that of -light. Thus in the analogy you must think of the -train almost at a standstill, and of yourself as moving -very quickly.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the experiment this effect of the earth’s motion -would affect the positions on the screen of the interference -bands. Also if you turn the apparatus round, -through a right-angle, the effect of the earth’s motion -on the two half-rays will be interchanged, and the -positions of the interference bands would be shifted. -We can calculate the small shift which should result -owing to the earth’s motion round the sun. Also to -this effect, we have to add that due to the sun’s motion -through the ether. The delicacy of the instrument -can be tested, and it can be proved that these -effects of shifting are large enough to be observed by -it. Now the point is, that nothing was observed. -There was no shifting as you turned the instrument -round.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The conclusion is either that the earth is always -stationary in the ether, or that there is something -wrong with the fundamental principles on which the -interpretation of the experiment relies. It is obvious -<span class='pageno' id='Page_165'>165</span>that, in this experiment, we are very far away from -the thoughts and the games of the children of King -Minos. The ideas of an ether, of waves in it, of -interference, of the motion of the earth through the -ether, and of Michelson’s interferometer, are remote -from ordinary experience. But remote as they are, -they are simple and obvious compared to the accepted -explanation of the nugatory result of the experiment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The ground of the explanation is that the ideas of -space and of time employed in science are too simple-minded, -and must be modified. This conclusion is a -direct challenge to common sense, because the earlier -science had only refined upon the ordinary notions of -ordinary people. Such a radical reorganization of -ideas would not have been adopted, unless it had -also been supported by many other observations which -we need not enter upon. Some form of the relativity -theory seems to be the simplest way of explaining a -large number of facts which otherwise would each -require some <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>ad hoc</i></span> explanation. The theory, therefore, -does not merely depend upon the experiments -which led to its origination.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The central point of the explanation is that every -instrument, such as Michelson’s apparatus as used in -the experiment, necessarily records the velocity of -light as having one and the same definite speed relatively -to it. I mean that an interferometer in a -comet and an interferometer on the earth would necessarily -bring out the velocity of light, relatively to -themselves, as at the same value. This is an obvious -paradox, since the light moves with a definite velocity -through the ether. Accordingly two bodies, the -earth and the comet, moving with unequal velocities -<span class='pageno' id='Page_166'>166</span>through the ether, might be expected to have different -velocities relatively to rays of light. For example, -consider two cars on a road, moving at ten and twenty -miles an hour respectively, and being passed by another -car at fifty miles an hour. The rapid car will -pass one of the two cars at the relative velocity of -forty miles per hour, and the other at the rate of -thirty miles per hour. The allegation as to light is -that, if we substituted a ray of light for the rapid -car, the velocity of the light along the roadway would -be exactly the same as its velocity relatively to either -of the two cars which it overtakes. The velocity of -light is immensely large, being about three hundred -thousand kilometres per second. We must have notions -as to space and time such that just this velocity -has this peculiar character. It follows that all our -notions of relative velocity must be recast. But -these notions are the immediate outcome of our habitual -notions as to space and time. So we come back -to the position, that there has been something overlooked -in the current expositions of what we mean -by space and of what we mean by time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Now our habitual fundamental assumption is that -there is a unique meaning to be given to space and -a unique meaning to be given to time, so that whatever -meaning is given to spatial relations in respect -to the instrument on the earth, the same meaning -must be given to them in respect to the instrument on -the comet, and the same meaning for an instrument at -rest in the ether. In the theory of relativity, this is -denied. As far as concerns space, there is no difficulty -in agreeing, if you think of the obvious facts of relative -motion. But even here the change in meaning has to -<span class='pageno' id='Page_167'>167</span>go further than would be sanctioned by common sense. -Also the same demand is made for time; so that the -relative dating of events and the lapses of time between -them are to be reckoned as different for the -instrument on the earth, for the instrument in the -comet, and for the instrument at rest in the ether. -This is a greater strain on our credulity. We need -not probe the question further than the conclusion -that for the earth and for the comet spatiality and -temporality are each to have different meanings amid -different conditions, such as those presented by the -earth and the comet. Accordingly velocity has different -meanings for the two bodies. Thus the modern -scientific assumption is that if anything has the speed -of light by reference to any one meaning of space -and time, then it has the same speed according to any -other meaning of space and time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This is a heavy blow at the classical scientific materialism, -which presupposes a definite present instant -at which all matter is simultaneously real. In the -modern theory there is no such unique present instant. -You can find a meaning for the notion of the simultaneous -instant throughout all nature, but it will be -a different meaning for different notions of temporality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There has been a tendency to give an extreme subjectivist -interpretation to this new doctrine. I mean -that the relativity of space and time has been construed -as though it were dependent on the choice of -the observer. It is perfectly legitimate to bring in -the observer, if he facilitates explanations. But it is -the observer’s body that we want, and not his mind. -Even this body is only useful as an example of a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_168'>168</span>very familiar form of apparatus. On the whole, it -is better to concentrate attention on Michelson’s interferometer, -and to leave Michelson’s body and -Michelson’s mind out of the picture. The question -is, why did the interferometer have black bands on -its screen, and why did not these bands slightly shift -as the instrument turned. The new relativity associates -space and time with an intimacy not hitherto contemplated; -and presupposes that their separation in -concrete fact can be achieved by alternative modes -of abstraction, yielding alternative meanings. But -each mode of abstraction is directing attention to -something which is in nature; and thereby is isolating -it for the purpose of contemplation. The fact relevant -to experiment, is the relevance of the interferometer -to just one among the many alternative systems of -these spatio-temporal relations which hold between -natural entities.</p> - -<p class='c001'>What we must now ask of philosophy is to give -us an interpretation of the status in nature of space -and time, so that the possibility of alternative meanings -is preserved. These lectures are not suited for -the elaboration of details; but there is no difficulty in -pointing out where to look for the origin of the discrimination -between space and time. I am presupposing -the organic theory of nature, which I have -outlined as a basis for a thoroughgoing objectivism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>An event is the grasping into unity of a pattern of -aspects. The effectiveness of an event beyond itself -arises from the aspects of itself which go to form -the prehended unities of other events. Except for -the systematic aspects of geometrical shape, this effectiveness -is trivial, if the mirrored pattern attaches -<span class='pageno' id='Page_169'>169</span>merely to the event as one whole. If the pattern -endures throughout the successive parts of the event, -and also exhibits itself in the whole, so that the event -is the life history of the pattern, then in virtue of -that enduring pattern the event gains in external effectiveness. -For its own effectiveness is reënforced -by the analogous aspects of all its successive parts. -The event constitutes a patterned value with a permanence -inherent throughout its own parts; and by -reason of this inherent endurance the event is important -for the modification of its environment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is in this endurance of pattern that time differentiates -itself from space. The pattern is spatially -<em>now</em>; and this temporal determination constitutes -its relation to each partial event. For it is reproduced -in this temporal succession of these spatial -parts of its own life. I mean that this particular -rule of temporal order allows the pattern to be reproduced -in each temporal slice of its history. So to -speak, each enduring object discovers in nature and -requires from nature a principle discriminating space -from time. Apart from the fact of an enduring pattern -this principle might be there, but it would be -latent and trivial. Thus the importance of space as -against time, and of time as against space, has developed -with the development of enduring organisms. -Enduring objects are significant of a differentiation of -space from time in respect to the patterns ingredient -within events; and conversely the differentiation of -space from time in the patterns ingredient within -events expresses the patience of the community of -events for enduring objects. There might be the community -without objects, but there could not be the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_170'>170</span>enduring objects without the community with its -peculiar patience for them.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is very necessary that this point should not be -misunderstood. Endurance means that a pattern -which is exhibited in the prehension of one event is -also exhibited in the prehension of those of its parts -which are discriminated by a certain rule. It is not -true that any part of the whole event will yield the -same pattern as does the whole. For example, consider -the total bodily pattern exhibited in the life of -a human body during one minute. One of the thumbs -during the same minute is part of the whole bodily -event. But the pattern of this part is the pattern -of the thumb, and is not the pattern of the whole -body. Thus endurance requires a definite rule for -obtaining the parts. In the above example, we know -at once what the rule is: You must take the life of -the whole body during any portion of that same minute; -for example, during a second or a tenth of a -second. In other words, the meaning of endurance -presupposes a meaning for the lapse of time within -the spatio-temporal continuum.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The question now arises whether all enduring objects -discover the same principle of differentiation -of space from time; or even whether at different stages -of its own life-history one object may not vary in its -spatio-temporal discrimination. Up till a few years -ago, everyone unhesitatingly assumed that there was -only one such principle to be discovered. Accordingly, -in dealing with one object, time would have -exactly the same meaning in reference to endurance -as in dealing with the endurance of another object. -It would also follow then that spatial relations would -<span class='pageno' id='Page_171'>171</span>have one unique meaning. But now it seems that the -observed effectiveness of objects can only be explained -by assuming that objects in a state of motion relatively -to each other are utilising, for their endurance, meanings -of space and of time which are not identical from -one object to another. Every enduring object is to -be conceived as at rest in its own proper space, and in -motion throughout any space defined in a way which -is not that inherent in its peculiar endurance. If -two objects are mutually at rest, they are utilising -the same meanings of space and of time for the purposes -of expressing their endurance; if in relative motion, -the spaces and times differ. It follows that, if -we can conceive a body at one stage of its life history -as in motion relatively to itself at another stage, then -the body at these two stages is utilising diverse meanings -of space, and correlatively diverse meanings of -time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In an organic philosophy of nature there is nothing -to decide between the old hypothesis of the uniqueness -of the time discrimination and the new hypothesis -of its multiplicity. It is purely a matter for evidence -drawn from observations.<a id='r5' /><a href='#f5' class='c013'><sup>[5]</sup></a></p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f5'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r5'>5</a>. <i>Cf.</i> my <cite>Principles of Natural Knowledge</cite>, Sec. 52:3.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>In an earlier lecture, I said that an event had contemporaries. -It is an interesting question whether, -on the new hypothesis, such a statement can be made -without the qualification of a reference to a definite -space-time system. It is possible to do so, in the sense -that in <em>some</em> time-system or other the two events are -simultaneous. In other time-systems the two contemporary -events will not be simultaneous, though they -may overlap. Analogously one event will precede another -<span class='pageno' id='Page_172'>172</span>without qualification, if in <em>every</em> time-system -this precedence occurs. It is evident that if we start -from a given event A, other events in general are -divided into two sets, namely, those which without -qualification are contemporaneous with A and those -which either precede or succeed A. But there will -be a set left over, namely, those events which bound -the two sets. There we have a critical case. You -will remember that we have a critical velocity to -account for, namely the theoretical velocity of light -<span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>in vacuo</i></span>.<a id='r6' /><a href='#f6' class='c013'><sup>[6]</sup></a> Also you will remember that the utilisation -of different spatio-temporal systems means the -relative motion of objects. When we analyse this -critical relation of a special set of events to any given -event A, we find the explanation of the critical velocity -which we require. I am suppressing all details. It -is evident that exactness of statement must be introduced -by the introduction of points, and lines, and -instants. Also that the origin of geometry requires -discussion; for example, the measurement of lengths, -the straightness of lines, and the flatness of planes, and -perpendicularity. I have endeavoured to carry out -these investigations in some earlier books, under the -heading of the theory of extensive abstraction; but -they are too technical for the present occasion.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f6'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r6'>6</a>. This is not the velocity of light in a gravitational field or in a -medium of molecules and electrons.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>If there be no one definite meaning to the geometrical -relations of distance, it is evident that the law of -gravitation needs restatement. For the formula expressing -that law is that two particles attract each other -in proportion to the product of their masses and the -inverse square of their distances. This enunciation -<span class='pageno' id='Page_173'>173</span>tacitly assumes that there is one definite meaning to be -ascribed to the instant at which the attraction is considered, -and also one definite meaning to be ascribed -to <em>distance</em>. But distance is a purely spatial notion, -so that in the new doctrine, there are an indefinite -number of such meanings according to the space-time -system which you adopt. If the two particles are relatively -at rest, then we might be content with the space-time -systems which they are both utilising. Unfortunately -this suggestion gives no hint as to procedure -when they are not mutually at rest. It is, therefore, -necessary to reformulate the law in a way which does -not presuppose any particular space-time system. Einstein -has done this. Naturally the result is more complicated. -He introduced into mathematical physics -certain methods of pure mathematics which render -the formulae independent of the particular systems -of measurement adopted. The new formula introduces -various small effects which are absent in Newton’s -law. But for the major effects Newton’s law -and Einstein’s law agree. Now these extra effects -of Einstein’s law serve to explain irregularities of the -planet Mercury’s orbit which by Newton’s law were -inexplicable. This is a strong confirmation of the new -theory. Curiously enough, there is more than one -alternative formula, based on the new theory of multiple -space-time systems, having the property of embodying -Newton’s law and in addition of explaining -the peculiarities of Mercury’s motion. The only -method of selection between them is to wait for experimental -evidence respecting those effects on which -the formulae differ. Nature is probably quite indifferent -to the aesthetic preferences of mathematicians.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_174'>174</span>It only remains to add that Einstein would probably -reject the theory of multiple space-time systems which -I have been expounding to you. He would interpret -his formula in terms of contortions in space-time -which alter the invariance theory for measure properties, -and of the proper times of each historical -route. His mode of statement has the greater mathematical -simplicity, and only allows of one law of -gravitation, excluding the alternatives. But, for myself, -I cannot reconcile it with the given facts of our -experience as to simultaneity, and spatial arrangement. -There are also other difficulties of a more abstract -character.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The theory of the relationship between events at -which we have now arrived is based first upon the -doctrine that the relatednesses of an event are all internal -relations, so far as concerns that event, though -not necessarily so far as concerns the other relata. For -example, the eternal objects, thus involved, are externally -related to events. This internal relatedness is -the reason why an event can be found only just where -it is and how it is,—that is to say, in just one definite -set of relationships. For each relationship enters into -the essence of the event; so that, apart from that relationship, -the event would not be itself. This is what -is meant by the very notion of internal relations. It -has been usual, indeed universal, to hold that spatio-temporal -relationships are external. This doctrine -is what is here denied.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The conception of internal relatedness involves the -analysis of the event into two factors, one the underlying -substantial activity of individualisation, and the -other the complex of aspects—that is to say, the complex -<span class='pageno' id='Page_175'>175</span>of relatednesses as entering into the essence of the -given event—which are unified by this individualised -activity. In other words, the concept of internal relations -requires the concept of substance as the activity -synthesising the relationships into its emergent character. -The event is what it is, by reason of the unification -in itself of a multiplicity of relationships. The -general scheme of these mutual relationships is an -abstraction which presupposes each event as an independent -entity, which it is not, and asks what remnant -of these formative relationships is then left in the guise -of external relationships. The scheme of relationships -as thus impartially expressed becomes the scheme of a -complex of events variously related as wholes to parts -and as joint parts within some one whole. Even here, -the internal relationship forces itself on our attention; -for the part evidently is constitutive of the whole. -Also an isolated event which has lost its status in any -complex of events is equally excluded by the very -nature of an event. So the whole is evidently constitutive -of the part. Thus the internal character of -the relationship really shows through this impartial -scheme of abstract external relations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But this exhibition of the actual universe as extensive -and divisible has left out the distinction between -space and time. It has in fact left out the process of -realisation, which is the adjustment of the synthetic -activities by virtue of which the various events become -their realised selves. This adjustment is thus the adjustment -of the underlying active substances whereby -these substances exhibit themselves as the individualisations -or modes of Spinoza’s one substance. This adjustment -is what introduces temporal process.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_176'>176</span>Thus, in some sense, time, in its character of the -adjustment of the process of synthetic realisation, extends -<a id='corr176.3'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='beyonds'>beyond</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_176.3'><ins class='correction' title='beyonds'>beyond</ins></a></span> the spatio-temporal continuum of nature.<a id='r7' /><a href='#f7' class='c013'><sup>[7]</sup></a> -There is no necessity that temporal process, in -this sense, should be constituted by one single series -of linear succession. Accordingly, in order to satisfy -the present demands of scientific hypothesis, we introduce -the metaphysical hypothesis that this is not the -case. We do assume (basing ourselves upon direct -observation), however, that temporal process of realisation -can be analysed into a group of linear serial -processes. Each of these linear series is a space-time -system. In support of this assumption of definite serial -processes, we appeal: (1) to the immediate presentation -through the senses of an extended universe -beyond ourselves and <em>simultaneous</em> with ourselves, (2) -to the intellectual apprehension of a meaning to the -question which asks what is <em>now immediately happening</em> -in regions beyond the cognisance of our senses, -(3) to the analysis of what is involved in the <em>endurance</em> -of emergent objects. This endurance of objects -involves the display of a pattern as now realised. This -display is the display of a pattern as inherent in an -event, but also as exhibiting a temporal slice of nature -as lending aspects to eternal objects (or, equally, of -eternal objects as lending aspects to events). The -pattern is spatialised in a whole duration for the benefit -of the event into whose essence the pattern enters. -The event is part of the duration, <i>i.e.</i>, is part of what -is exhibited in the aspects inherent in itself; and conversely -the duration is the whole of nature simultaneous -with the event, in that sense of simultaneity. Thus -<span class='pageno' id='Page_177'>177</span>an event in realising itself displays a pattern, and this -pattern requires a definite duration determined by a -definite meaning of simultaneity. Each such meaning -of simultaneity relates the pattern as thus displayed to -one definite space-time system. The actuality of the -space-time systems is constituted by the <a id='corr177.6'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='realization'>realisation</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_177.6'><ins class='correction' title='realization'>realisation</ins></a></span> of -pattern; but it is inherent in the general scheme of -events as constituting its patience for the temporal -process of realisation.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f7'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r7'>7</a>. <i>Cf.</i> my <cite>Concept of Nature</cite>, Ch. III.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>Notice that the pattern requires a duration involving -a definite lapse of time, and not merely an instantaneous -moment. Such a moment is more abstract, in -that it merely denotes a certain relation of contiguity -between the concrete events. Thus a duration is spatialised; -and by ‘spatialised’ is meant that the duration -is the field for the realised pattern constituting the -character of the event. A duration, as the field of the -pattern realised in the actualisation of one of its contained -events, is an epoch, <i>i.e.</i>, an arrest. Endurance -is the repetition of the pattern in successive events. -Thus endurance requires a succession of durations, -each exhibiting the pattern. In this account ‘time’ -has been separated from ‘extension’ and from the ‘divisibility’ -which arises from the character of spatio-temporal -<a id='corr177.25'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='‘of'>extension’</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_177.25'><ins class='correction' title='‘of'>extension’</ins></a></span>. Accordingly we must not proceed -to conceive time as another form of extensiveness. -Time is sheer succession of epochal durations. -But the entities which succeed each other in this account -are durations. The duration is that which is -required for the realisation of a pattern in the given -event. Thus the divisibility and extensiveness is -within the given duration. The epochal duration is -not realised <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>via</i></span> its <em>successive</em> divisible parts, but is -<span class='pageno' id='Page_178'>178</span>given <em>with</em> its parts. In this way, the objection which -Zeno might make to the joint validity of two passages -from Kant’s <cite>Critique of Pure Reason</cite> is met by abandoning -the earlier of the two passages. I refer to -passages from the section ‘Of the Axioms of Intuition’; -the earlier from the subsection on <i>Extensive -Quantity</i>, and the latter from the subsection on <i>Intensive -Quantity</i> where considerations respecting quantity -in general, extensive and intensive, are summed up. -The earlier passage runs thus:<a id='r8' /><a href='#f8' class='c013'><sup>[8]</sup></a></p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f8'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r8'>8</a>. Max Müller’s translation.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>“I call an extensive quantity that in which the representation -of the whole is rendered possible by the -representation of its parts, <em>and therefore necessarily -preceded by it</em>.<a id='r9' /><a href='#f9' class='c013'><sup>[9]</sup></a> I cannot represent to myself any line, -however small it may be, without drawing it in -thought, that is, without producing all its parts one -after the other, starting from a given point, and thus, -first of all, drawing its intuition. The same applies to -every, even the smallest portion of time. I can only -think in it the successive progress from one moment to -another, thus producing in the end, by all the portions -of time, and their addition, a definite quantity of -time.”</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f9'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r9'>9</a>. Italics mine, and also in the second passage.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>The second passage runs thus:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“This peculiar property of quantities that no part -of them is the smallest possible part (no part indivisible) -is called continuity. Time and space are quanta -continua, because there is no part of them that is not -enclosed between limits (points and moments), <em>no -part that is not itself again a space or a time. Space -consists of spaces only, time of times. Points and moments -<span class='pageno' id='Page_179'>179</span>are only limits</em>, mere places of limitation, and as -places <em>presupposing always</em> those intuitions which they -are meant to limit or to determine. Mere places or -parts that might be given before space or time, could -never be compounded into space or time.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>I am in complete agreement with the second extract -if ‘time and space’ is the extensive continuum; but -it is inconsistent with its predecessor. For Zeno would -object that a vicious infinite regress is involved. Every -part of time involves some smaller part of itself, and -so on. Also this series regresses backwards ultimately -to nothing; since the initial moment is without duration -and merely marks the relation of contiguity to an -earlier time. Thus time is impossible, if the two extracts -are both adhered to. I accept the later, and -reject the earlier, passage. Realisation is the becoming -of time in the field of extension. Extension is the -complex of events, <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>quâ</i></span> their potentialities. In realisation -the potentiality becomes actuality. But the -potential pattern requires a duration; and the duration -must be exhibited as an epochal whole, by the realisation -of the pattern. Thus time is the succession of elements -in themselves divisible and contiguous. A -duration, in becoming temporal, thereby incurs realisation -in respect to some enduring object. Temporalisation -is realisation. Temporalisation is not another -continuous process. It is an atomic succession. -Thus time is atomic (<i>i.e.</i>, epochal), though what is -temporalised is divisible. This doctrine follows from -the doctrine of events, and of the nature of enduring -objects. In the next chapter we must consider its -relevance to the quantum theory of recent science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is to be noted that this doctrine of the epochal -<span class='pageno' id='Page_180'>180</span>character of time does not depend on the modern doctrine -of relativity, and holds equally—and indeed, -more simply—if this doctrine be abandoned. It does -depend on the analysis of the intrinsic character of an -event, considered as the most concrete finite entity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In reviewing this argument, note first that the second -quotation from Kant, on which it is based, does not -depend on any peculiar Kantian doctrine. The latter -of the two is in agreement with Plato as against -Aristotle.<a id='r10' /><a href='#f10' class='c013'><sup>[10]</sup></a> In the second place, the argument assumes -that Zeno understated his argument. He should have -urged it against the current notion of time in itself, -and not against motion, which involves relations -between time and space. For, what becomes has duration. -But no duration can become until a smaller -duration (part of the former) has antecedently come -into being [Kant’s earlier statement]. The same argument -applies to this smaller duration, and so on. Also -the infinite regress of these durations converges to -nothing—and even on the Aristotelian view there is -no first moment. Accordingly time would be an irrational -notion. Thirdly, in the epochal theory Zeno’s -difficulty is met by conceiving temporalisation as the -realisation of a complete organism. This organism is -an event holding in its essence its spatio-temporal relationships -(both within itself, and beyond itself) -throughout the spatio-temporal continuum.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f10'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r10'>10</a>. <i>Cf.</i> ‘Euclid in Greek,’ by Sir T. L. Heath, Camb. Univ. Press, -in a note on Points.</p> -</div> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_181'>181</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER VIII <br /> <br /> THE QUANTUM THEORY</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The theory of relativity has justly excited a great -amount of public attention. But, for all its importance, -it has not been the topic which has chiefly absorbed -the recent interest of physicists. Without question -that position is held by the quantum theory. The -point of interest in this theory is that, according to it, -some effects which appear essentially capable of gradual -increase or gradual diminution are in reality to be -increased or decreased only by certain definite jumps. -It is as though you could walk at three miles per hour -or at four miles per hour, but not at three and a half -miles per hour.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The effects in question are concerned with the radiation -of light from a molecule which has been excited -by some collision. Light consists of waves of vibration -in the electromagnetic field. After a complete -wave has passed a given point everything at that point -is restored to its original state and is ready for the next -wave which follows on. Picture to yourselves the -waves on the ocean, and reckon from crest to crest of -successive waves. The number of waves which pass a -given point in one second is called the frequency of -that system of waves. A system of light-waves of -definite frequency corresponds to a definite colour in -the spectrum. Now a molecule, when excited, vibrates -<span class='pageno' id='Page_182'>182</span>with a certain number of definite frequencies. In -other words, there are a definite set of modes of vibration -of the molecule, and each mode of vibration has -one definite frequency. Each mode of vibration can -stir up in the electromagnetic field waves of its own -frequency. These waves carry away the energy of the -vibration; so that finally (when such waves are in -being) the molecule loses the energy of its excitement -and the waves cease. Thus a molecule can radiate -light of certain definite colours, that is to say, of certain -definite frequencies.</p> - -<p class='c001'>You would think that each mode of vibration could -be excited to any intensity, so that the energy carried -away by light of that frequency could be of any -amount. But this is not the case. There appear to be -certain minimum amounts of energy which cannot be -subdivided. The case is analogous to that of a citizen -of the United States who, in paying his debts in -the currency of his country, cannot subdivide a cent -so as to correspond to some minute subdivision of the -goods obtained. The cent corresponds to the minimum -quantity of the light energy, and the goods obtained -correspond to the energy of the exciting cause. -This exciting cause is either strong enough to procure -the emission of one cent of energy, or fails to procure -the emission of any energy whatsoever. In any case -the molecule will only emit an integral number of -cents of energy. There is a further peculiarity which -we can illustrate by bringing an Englishman onto the -scene. He pays his debts in English currency, and his -smallest unit is a farthing which differs in value from -the cent. The farthing is in fact about half a cent, -to a very rough approximation. In the molecule, different -<span class='pageno' id='Page_183'>183</span>modes of vibration have different frequencies. -Compare each mode to a nation. One mode corresponds -to the United States, and another mode corresponds -to England. One mode can only radiate its -energy <a id='corr183.5'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='is'>in</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_183.5'><ins class='correction' title='is'>in</ins></a></span> an integral number of cents, so that a cent -of energy is the least it can pay out; whereas the other -mode can only radiate its energy in an integral number -of farthings, so that a farthing of energy is the -least that it can pay out. Also a rule can be found to -tell us the relative value of the cent of energy of one -mode to the farthing of energy of another mode. The -rule is childishly simple: Each smallest coin of energy -has a value in strict proportion to the frequency belonging -to that mode. By this rule, and comparing -farthings with cents, the frequency of an American -would be about twice that of an Englishman. In other -words, the American would do about twice as many -things in a second as an Englishman. I must leave -you to judge whether this corresponds to the reputed -characters of the two nations. Also I suggest that -there are merits attaching to both ends of the solar -spectrum. Sometimes you want red light and sometimes -violet light.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There has been, I hope, no great difficulty in comprehending -what the quantum theory asserts about -molecules. The perplexity arises from the effort to -fit the theory into the current scientific picture of -what is going on in the molecule or atom.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It has been the basis of the materialistic theory, that -the happenings of nature are to be explained in terms -of the locomotion of material. In accordance with -this principle, the waves of light were explained in -terms of the locomotion of a material ether, and the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_184'>184</span>internal happenings of a molecule are now explained -in terms of the locomotion of separate material parts. -In respect to waves of light, the material ether has retreated -to an indeterminate position in the background, -and is rarely talked about. But the principle -is unquestioned as regards its application to the atom. -For example a neutral hydrogen atom is assumed -to consist of at least two lumps of material; one lump -is the nucleus consisting of a material called positive -electricity, and the other is a single electron which is -negative electricity. The nucleus shows signs of being -complex, and of being subdivisible into smaller lumps, -some of positive electricity and others electronic. The -assumption is, that whatever vibration takes place in -the atom is to be attributed to the vibratory locomotion -of some bit of material, detachable from the remainder. -The difficulty with the quantum theory is that, -on this hypothesis, we have to picture the atom as providing -a limited number of definite grooves, which are -the sole tracks along which vibration can take place, -whereas the classical scientific picture provides none -of these grooves. The quantum theory wants trolley-cars -with a limited number of routes, and the scientific -picture provides horses galloping over prairies. The -result is that the physical doctrine of the atom has got -into a state which is strongly suggestive of the epicycles -of astronomy before Copernicus.</p> - -<p class='c001'>On the organic theory of nature there are two sorts -of vibrations which radically differ from each other. -There is vibratory locomotion, and there is vibratory -organic deformation; and the conditions for the two -types of change are of a different character. In other -words, there is vibratory locomotion of a given pattern -<span class='pageno' id='Page_185'>185</span>as one whole, and there is vibratory change of -pattern.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A complete organism in the organic theory is what -corresponds to a bit of material on the materialistic -theory. There will be a primary genus, comprising -a number of species of organisms, such that each primary -organism, belonging to a species of the primary -genus, is not decomposable into subordinate organisms. -I will call any organism of the primary genus a primate. -There may be different species of primates.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It must be kept in mind that we are dealing with the -abstractions of physics. Accordingly, we are not -thinking of what a primate is in itself, as a pattern -arising from the prehension of the concrete aspects; -nor are we thinking of what a primate is for its environment, -in respect to its concrete aspects prehended -therein. We are thinking of these various aspects -merely in so far as their effects on patterns and on locomotion -are expressible in spatio-temporal terms. -Accordingly, in the language of physics, the aspects -of a primate are merely its contributions to the electromagnetic -field. This is in fact exactly what we know -of electrons and protons. An electron for us is merely -the pattern of its aspects in its environment, so far as -those aspects are relevant to the electromagnetic field.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Now in discussing the theory of relativity, we saw -that the relative motion of two primates means simply -that their organic patterns are utilising diverse space-time -systems. If two primates do not continue either -mutually at rest, or mutually in uniform relative motion, -at least one of them is changing its intrinsic space-time -system. The laws of motion express the conditions -under which these changes of space-time systems -<span class='pageno' id='Page_186'>186</span>are effected. The conditions for vibratory <em>locomotion</em> -are founded upon these general laws of motion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But it is possible that certain species of primates are -apt to go to pieces under conditions which lead them -to effect changes of space-time systems. Such species -would only experience a long range of endurance, if -they had succeeded in forming a favourable association -among primates of different species, such that in -this association the tendency to collapse is neutralised -by the environment of the association. We can imagine -the atomic nucleus as composed of a large number -of primates of differing species, and perhaps with -many primates of the same species, the whole association -being such as to favour stability. An example -of such an association is afforded by the association of -a positive nucleus with negative electrons to obtain a -neutral atom. The neutral atom is thereby shielded -from any electric field which would otherwise produce -changes in the space-time system of the atom.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The requirements of physics now suggest an idea -which is very consonant with the organic philosophical -theory. I put it in the form of a question: Has -our organic theory of endurance been tainted by the -materialistic theory in so far as it assumes without -question that endurance must mean undifferentiated -sameness throughout the life-history concerned? Perhaps -you noticed that (in a previous chapter) I used -the word ‘reiteration’ as a synonym of ‘endurance.’ -It obviously is not quite synonymous in its meaning; -and now I want to suggest that <em>reiteration</em> where it -differs from <em>endurance</em> is more nearly what the organic -theory requires. The difference is very analogous -to that between the Galileans and the Aristotelians: -<span class='pageno' id='Page_187'>187</span>Aristotle said ‘rest’ where Galileo added ‘or uniform -motion in a straight line.’ Thus in the organic -theory, a pattern need not endure in undifferentiated -sameness through time. The pattern may be essentially -one of aesthetic contrasts requiring a lapse of time -for its unfolding. A tune is an example of such a -pattern. Thus the endurance of the pattern now means -the reiteration of its succession of contrasts. This is -obviously the most general notion of endurance on -the organic theory, and ‘reiteration’ is perhaps the -word which expresses it with most directness. But -when we translate this notion into the abstractions of -physics, it at once becomes the technical notion of -‘vibration.’ This vibration is not the vibratory locomotion: -it is the vibration of organic deformation. -There are certain indications in modern physics that -for the rôle of corpuscular organisms at the base of -the physical field, we require vibratory entities. Such -corpuscles would be the corpuscles detected as expelled -from the nuclei of atoms, which then dissolve -into waves of light. We may conjecture that such a -corpuscular body has no great stability of endurance, -when in isolation. Accordingly, an unfavourable environment -leading to rapid changes in its proper -space-time system, that is to say, an environment jolting -it into violent accelerations, causes the corpuscles -to go to pieces and dissolve into light-waves of the -same period of vibration.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A proton, and perhaps an electron, would be an -association of such primates, superposed on each other, -with their frequencies and spatial dimensions so arranged -as to promote the stability of the complex organism, -when jolted into accelerations of locomotion. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_188'>188</span>The conditions for stability would give the associations -of periods possible for protons. The expulsion -of a primate would come from a jolt which leads the -proton either to settle down into an alternative association, -or to generate a new primate by the aid of -the energy received.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A primate must be associated with a definite frequency -of vibratory organic deformation so that when -it goes to pieces it dissolves into light waves of the -same frequency, which then carry off all its average -energy. It is quite easy (as a particular hypothesis) -to imagine stationary vibrations of the electromagnetic -field of definite frequency, and directed radially to and -from a centre, which, in accordance with the accepted -electromagnetic laws, would consist of a vibratory -spherical nucleus satisfying one set of conditions and -a vibratory external field satisfying another set of conditions. -This is an example of vibratory organic -deformation. Further [on this particular hypothesis], -there are two ways of determining the subsidiary conditions -so as to satisfy the ordinary requirements of -mathematical physics. The total energy, according -to one of these ways, would satisfy the quantum condition; -so that it consists of an integral number of -units or cents, which are such that the cent of energy -of any primate is proportional to its frequency. I -have not worked out the conditions for stability or -for a stable association. I have mentioned the particular -hypothesis by way of showing by example that -the organic theory of nature affords possibilities for -the reconsideration of ultimate physical laws, which -are not open to the opposed materialistic theory.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this particular hypothesis of vibratory primates, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_189'>189</span>the Maxwellian equations are supposed to hold -throughout all space, including the interior of a proton. -They express the laws governing the vibratory -production and absorption of energy. The whole process -for each primate issues in a certain average energy -characteristic of the primate, and proportional to its -mass. In fact the energy is the mass. There are -vibratory radial streams of energy, both without and -within a primate. Within the primate, there are vibratory -distributions of electric density. On the materialistic -theory such density marks the presence of -material: on the organic theory of vibration, it marks -the vibratory production of energy. Such production -is restricted to the interior of the primate.</p> - -<p class='c001'>All science must start with some assumptions as to -the ultimate analysis of the facts with which it deals. -These assumptions are justified partly by their adherence -to the types of occurrence of which we are -directly conscious, and partly by their success in representing -the observed facts with a certain generality, -devoid of <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>ad hoc</i></span> suppositions. The general theory of -the vibration of primates, which I have outlined, is -merely given as an example of the sort of possibilities -which the organic theory leaves open for physical -science. The point is that it adds the possibility of -organic deformation to that of mere locomotion. -Light waves form one great example of organic deformation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>At any epoch the assumptions of a science are giving -way, when they exhibit symptoms of the epicyclic state -from which astronomy was rescued in the sixteenth -century. Physical science is now exhibiting such symptoms. -In order to reconsider its foundations, it must -<span class='pageno' id='Page_190'>190</span>recur to a more concrete view of the character of real -things, and must conceive its fundamental notions as -abstractions derived from this direct intuition. It is -in this way that it surveys the general possibilities of -revision which are open to it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The discontinuities introduced by the quantum -theory require revision of physical concepts in order -to meet them. In particular, it has been pointed out -that some theory of discontinuous existence is required. -What is asked from such a theory, is that -an orbit of an electron can be regarded as a series of -detached positions, and not as a continuous line.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The theory of a primate or a vibrating pattern, -given above, together with the distinction between -temporality and extensiveness in the previous chapter, -yields exactly this result. It will be remembered that -the continuity of the complex of events arises from the -relationships of extensiveness; whereas the temporality -arises from the realisation in a subject-event of a -pattern which requires for its display that the whole -of a duration be spatialised (<i>i.e.</i>, arrested), as given by -its aspects in the event. Thus realization proceeds <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>viâ</i></span> -a succession of epochal durations; and the continuous -transition, <i>i.e.</i>, the organic deformation, is within the -duration which is already given. The vibratory organic -deformation is in fact the reiteration of the pattern. -One complete period defines the duration required for -the complete pattern. Thus the primate is realised -atomically in a succession of durations, each duration -to be measured from one maximum to another. -Accordingly, so far as the primate as one enduring -whole entity is to be taken account of, it is to be assigned -to these durations successively. If it is considered -<span class='pageno' id='Page_191'>191</span>as one thing, its orbit is to be diagrammatically -exhibited by a series of detached dots. Thus the locomotion -of the primate is discontinuous in space and -time. If we go below the quanta of time which are -the successive vibratory periods of the primate, we -find a succession of vibratory electromagnetic fields, -each stationary in the space-time of its own duration. -Each of these fields exhibits a single complete period -of the electromagnetic vibration which constitutes -the primate. This vibration is not to be thought of -as the becoming of reality; it is what the primate is in -one of its discontinuous realisations. Also the successive -durations in which the primate is realised are contiguous; -it follows that the life history of the primate -can be exhibited as being the continuous development -of occurrences in the electromagnetic field. But these -occurrences enter into realisation as whole atomic -blocks, occupying definite periods of time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is no need to conceive that time is atomic in -the sense that all patterns must be realised in the same -successive durations. In the first place, even if the -periods were the same in the case of two primates, -the durations of realisation may not be the same. In -other words, the two primates may be out of phase. -Also if the periods are different, the atomism of any -one duration of one primate is necessarily subdivided -by the boundary moments of durations of the other -primate.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The laws of the locomotion of primates express -under what conditions any primate will change its -space-time system.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is unnecessary to pursue this conception further. -The justification of the concept of vibratory existence -<span class='pageno' id='Page_192'>192</span>must be purely experimental. The point illustrated -by this example is that the cosmological outlook, -which is here adopted, is perfectly consistent with the -demands for discontinuity which have been urged -from the side of physics. Also if this concept of temporalisation -as a successive realisation of epochal durations -be adopted, the difficulty of Zeno is evaded. The -particular form, which has been given here to this -concept, is purely for that purpose of illustration and -must necessarily require recasting before it can be -adapted to the results of experimental physics.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_193'>193</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER IX <br /> <br /> SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>In the present lecture, it is my object to consider some -reactions of science upon the stream of philosophic -thought during the modern centuries with which we -are concerned. I shall make no attempt to compress -a history of modern philosophy within the limits of -one lecture. We shall merely consider some contacts -between science and philosophy, in so far as they lie -within the scheme of thought which it is the purpose -of these lectures to develop. For this reason the whole -of the great German idealistic movement will be ignored, -as being out of effective touch with its contemporary -science so far as reciprocal modification -of concepts is concerned. Kant, from whom this movement -took its rise, was saturated with Newtonian -physics, and with the ideas of the great French physicists—such -as Clairaut,<a id='r11' /><a href='#f11' class='c013'><sup>[11]</sup></a> for instance—who developed -the Newtonian ideas. But the philosophers who developed -the Kantian school of thought, or who transformed -<span class='pageno' id='Page_194'>194</span>it into Hegelianism, either lacked Kant’s background -of scientific knowledge, or lacked his potentiality -of becoming a great physicist if philosophy had -not absorbed his main energies.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f11'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r11'>11</a>. <i>Cf.</i> the curious evidence of Kant’s scientific reading in the -<cite>Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic, Second Analogy -of Experience</cite>, where he refers to the phenomenon of capillary action. -This is an unnecessarily complex illustration; a book resting -on a table would have equally well sufficed. But the subject had -just been adequately treated for the first time by Clairaut in an appendix -to his <cite>Figure of the Earth</cite>. Kant evidently had read this -appendix, and his mind was full of it.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>The origin of modern philosophy is analogous to -that of science, and is contemporaneous. The general -trend of its development was settled in the seventeenth -century, partly at the hands of the same men who established -the scientific principles. This settlement of -purpose followed upon a transitional period dating -from the fifteenth century. There was in fact a general -movement of European mentality, which carried -along with its stream, religion, science and philosophy. -It may shortly be characterised as being the -direct recurrence to the original sources of Greek inspiration -on the part of men whose spiritual shape -had been derived from inheritance from the Middle -Ages. There was therefore no revival of Greek mentality. -Epochs do not rise from the dead. The principles -of aesthetics and of reason, which animated -the Greek civilisation, were reclothed in a modern -mentality. Between the two there lay other religions, -other systems of law, other anarchies, and other racial -inheritances, dividing the living from the dead.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Philosophy is peculiarly sensitive to such differences. -For, whereas you can make a replica of an -ancient statue, there is no possible replica of an ancient -state of mind. There can be no nearer approximation -than that which a masquerade bears to real -life. There may be understanding of the past, but -there is a difference between the modern and the ancient -reactions to the same stimuli.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the particular case of philosophy, the distinction -<span class='pageno' id='Page_195'>195</span>in tonality lies on the surface. Modern philosophy -is tinged with subjectivism, as against the objective -attitude of the ancients. The same change is to -be seen in religion. In the early history of the <a id='corr195.4'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='Christion'>Christian</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_195.4'><ins class='correction' title='Christion'>Christian</ins></a></span> -Church, the theological interest centred in discussions -on the nature of God, the meaning of the Incarnation, -and apocalyptic <a id='corr195.7'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='forecastes'>forecasts</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_195.7'><ins class='correction' title='forecastes'>forecasts</ins></a></span> of the ultimate -fate of the world. At the Reformation, the Church -was torn asunder by dissension as to the individual -experiences of believers in respect to justification. The -individual subject of experience had been substituted -for the total drama of all reality. Luther asked, ‘How -am I justified?’; modern philosophers have asked, -‘How do I have knowledge?’ The emphasis lies upon -the subject of experience. This change of standpoint -is the work of Christianity in its pastoral aspect of -shepherding the company of believers. For century -after century it insisted upon the infinite worth of the -individual human soul. Accordingly, to the instinctive -egotism of physical desires, it has superadded an -instinctive feeling of justification for an egotism of -intellectual outlook. Every human being is the natural -guardian of his own importance. Without a -doubt, this modern direction of attention emphasises -truths of the highest value. For example, in the field -of practical life, it has abolished slavery, and has impressed -upon the popular imagination the primary -rights of mankind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Descartes, in his <cite>Discourse on Method</cite>, and in his -<cite>Meditations</cite>, discloses with great clearness the general -conceptions which have since influenced modern philosophy. -There is a subject receiving experience: in -the <cite>Discourse</cite> this subject is always mentioned in the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_196'>196</span>first person, that is to say, as being Descartes himself. -Descartes starts with himself as being a mentality, -which in virtue of its consciousness of its own inherent -presentations of sense and of thought, is thereby conscious -of its own existence as a unit entity. The subsequent -history of philosophy revolves round the Cartesian -formulation of the primary datum. The ancient -world takes its stand upon the drama of the -Universe, the modern world upon the inward drama -of the Soul. Descartes, in his <cite>Meditations</cite>, expressly -grounds the existence of this inward drama upon the -possibility of error. There may be no correspondence -with objective fact, and thus there must be a soul with -activities whose reality is purely derivative from -itself. For example, here is a quotation<a id='r12' /><a href='#f12' class='c013'><sup>[12]</sup></a> from <cite>Meditation -II</cite>: “But it will be said that these presentations -are false, and that I am dreaming. Let it be so. At -all events it is certain that I seem to see light, hear -a noise, and feel heat; this cannot be false, and this is -what in me is properly called perceiving (sentire), -which is nothing else than thinking. From this I -begin to know what I am with somewhat greater clearness -and distinctness than heretofore.” Again in -<cite>Meditation III</cite>: “...; for, as I before remarked, although -the things which I perceive or imagine are -perhaps nothing at all apart from me, I am nevertheless -assured that those modes of consciousness which I -call perceptions and imaginations, in as far only as -they are modes of consciousness, exist in me.”</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f12'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r12'>12</a>. Quoted from Veitch’s translation.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>The objectivism of the medieval and the ancient -worlds passed over into science. Nature is there conceived -as for itself, with its own mutual reactions. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_197'>197</span>Under the recent influence of relativity, there has -been a tendency towards subjectivist formulations. -But, apart from this recent exception, nature, in -scientific thought, has had its laws formulated without -any reference to dependence on individual observers. -There is, however, this difference between the -older and the later attitudes towards science. The -anti-rationalism of the moderns has checked any attempt -to harmonise the ultimate concepts of science -with ideas drawn from a more concrete survey of the -whole of reality. The material, the space, the time, -the various laws concerning the transition of material -configurations, are taken as ultimate stubborn facts, -not to be tampered with.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The effect of this antagonism to philosophy has been -equally unfortunate both for philosophy and for -science. In this lecture we are concerned with philosophy. -Philosophers are rationalists. They are seeking -to go behind stubborn and irreducible facts: they -wish to explain in the light of universal principles -the mutual reference between the various details entering -into the flux of things. Also, they seek such -principles as will eliminate mere arbitrariness; so that, -whatever portion of fact is assumed or given, the existence -of the remainder of things shall satisfy some -demand of rationality. They demand meaning. In -the words of Henry Sidgwick<a id='r13' /><a href='#f13' class='c013'><sup>[13]</sup></a>—“It is the primary -aim of philosophy to unify completely, bring into clear -coherence, all departments of rational thought, and -this aim cannot be realised by any philosophy that -leaves out of its view the important body of judgments -and reasonings which form the subject matter of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_198'>198</span>ethics.” Accordingly, the bias towards history on -the part of the physical and social sciences with their -refusal to rationalise below some ultimate mechanism, -has pushed philosophy out of the effective currents -of modern life. It has lost its proper rôle as a constant -critic of partial formulations. It has retreated -into the subjectivist sphere of mind, by reason of its -expulsion by science from the objectivist sphere of -matter. Thus the evolution of thought in the seventeenth -century coöperated with the enhanced sense -of individual personality derived from the Middle -Ages. We see Descartes taking his stand upon his own -ultimate mind, which his philosophy assures him of; -and asking about its relations to the ultimate matter—exemplified, -in the second <cite>Meditation</cite>, by the human -body and a lump of wax—which his science assumes. -There is Aaron’s rod, and the magicians’ serpents; -and the only question for philosophy is, which swallows -which; or whether, as Descartes thought, they -all lived happily together. In this stream of thought -are to be found Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant. Two -great names lie outside this list, Spinoza and Leibniz. -But there is a certain isolation of both of them in respect -to their philosophical influence so far as science -is concerned; as though they had strayed to extremes -which lie outside the boundaries of safe philosophy, -Spinoza by retaining older ways of thought, and Leibniz -by the novelty of his monads.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f13'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r13'>13</a>. <i>Cf.</i> <cite>Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir</cite>, Appendix I.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>The history of philosophy runs curiously parallel -to that of science. In the case of both, the seventeenth -century set the stage for its two successors. But with -the twentieth century a new act commences. It is an -exaggeration to attribute a general change in a climate -<span class='pageno' id='Page_199'>199</span>of thought to any one piece of writing, or to any one -author. No doubt Descartes only expressed definitely -and in decisive form what was already in the air of -his period. Analogously, in attributing to William -James the inauguration of a new stage in philosophy, -we should be neglecting other influences of his time. -But, admitting this, there still remains a certain fitness -in contrasting his essay, <cite>Does Consciousness Exist</cite>, -published in 1904, with Descartes’ <cite>Discourse on -Method</cite>, published in 1637. James clears the stage of -the old paraphernalia; or rather he entirely alters its -lighting. Take for example these two sentences from -his essay: “To deny plumply that ‘consciousness’ exists -seems so absurd on the face of it—for undeniably -‘thoughts’ do exist—that I fear some readers will follow -me no farther. Let me then immediately explain -that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an -entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does -stand for a function.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>The scientific materialism and the Cartesian Ego -were both challenged at the same moment, one by -science and the other by philosophy, as represented by -William James with his psychological antecedents; -and the double challenge marks the end of a period -which lasted for about two hundred and fifty years. -Of course, ‘matter’ and ‘consciousness’ both express -something so evident in ordinary experience that any -philosophy must provide some things which answer -to their respective meanings. But the point is that, -in respect to both of them, the seventeenth century -settlement was infected with a presupposition which is -now challenged. James denies that consciousness is -an entity, but admits that it is a function. The discrimination -<span class='pageno' id='Page_200'>200</span>between an entity and a function is therefore -vital to the understanding of the challenge which -James is advancing against the older modes of -thought. In the essay in question, the character which -James assigns to consciousness is fully discussed. But -he does not unambiguously explain what he means by -the notion of an entity, which he refuses to apply to -consciousness. In the sentence which immediately -follows the one which I have already quoted, he says:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality -of being, contrasted with that of which material objects -are made, out of which our thoughts of them are -made; but there is a function in experience which -thoughts perform, and for the performance of which -this quality of being is invoked. That function is -<em>knowing</em>. ‘Consciousness’ is supposed necessary to explain -the fact that things not only are, but get reported, -are known.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus James is denying that consciousness is a -‘stuff.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>The term ‘entity,’ or even that of ‘stuff,’ does not -fully tell its own tale. The notion of ‘entity’ is so -general that it may be taken to mean anything that -can be thought about. You cannot think of mere -nothing; and the something which is an object of -thought may be called an entity. In this sense, a -function is an entity. Obviously, this is not what James -had in his mind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In agreement with the organic theory of nature -which I have been tentatively putting forward in these -lectures, I shall for my own purposes construe James -as denying exactly what Descartes asserts in his <cite>Discourse</cite> -and his <cite>Meditations</cite>. Descartes discriminates -<span class='pageno' id='Page_201'>201</span>two species of entities, <em>matter</em> and <em>soul</em>. The essence -of matter is spatial extension; the essence of soul is its -cogitation, in the full sense which Descartes assigns to -the word ‘<span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>cogitare</i></span>.’ For example, in Section Fifty-three -of Part I of his <cite>Principles of Philosophy</cite>, he -enunciates: “That of every substance there is one principal -attribute, as thinking of the mind, extension of -the body.” In the earlier, Fifty-first Section, Descartes -states: “By substance we can conceive nothing else -than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in -need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence.” -Furthermore, later on, Descartes says: “For example, -because any substance which ceases to endure ceases -also to exist, duration is not distinct from substance -except in thought;....” Thus we conclude that, for -Descartes, minds and bodies exist in such a way as to -stand in need of nothing beyond themselves individually -(God only excepted, as being the foundation of -all things); that both minds and bodies endure, because -without endurance they would cease to exist; -that spatial extension is the essential attribute of -bodies; and that cogitation is the essential attribute of -minds.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is difficult to praise too highly the genius exhibited -by Descartes in the complete sections of his <cite>Principles</cite> -which deal with these questions. It is worthy -of the century in which he writes, and of the clearness -of the French intellect. Descartes in his distinction -between time and duration, and in his way of grounding -time upon motion, and in his close relation between -matter and extension, anticipates, as far as it -was possible at his epoch, modern notions suggested -by the doctrine of relativity, or by some aspects of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_202'>202</span>Bergson’s doctrine of the generation of things. But -the fundamental principles are so set out as to presuppose -independently existing substances with simple -location in a community of temporal durations, and, -in the case of bodies, with simple location in the community -of spatial extensions. Those principles lead -straight to the theory of a materialistic, mechanistic nature, -surveyed by cogitating minds. After the close -of the seventeenth century, science took charge of the -materialistic nature, and philosophy took charge of the -cogitating minds. Some schools of philosophy admitted -an ultimate dualism; and the various idealistic -schools claimed that nature was merely the chief example -of the cogitations of minds. But all schools -admitted the Cartesian analysis of the ultimate elements -of nature. I am excluding Spinoza and Leibniz -from these statements as to the main stream of modern -philosophy, as derivative from Descartes; though of -course they were influenced by him, and in their turn -influenced philosophers. I am thinking mainly of -the effective contacts between science and philosophy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This <a id='corr202.21'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='divison'>division</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_202.21'><ins class='correction' title='divison'>division</ins></a></span> of territory between science and philosophy -was not a simple business; and in fact it illustrated -the weakness of the whole cut-and-dried presupposition -upon which it rested. We are aware of -nature as an interplay of bodies, colours, sounds, scents, -tastes, touches and other various bodily feelings, displayed -as in space, in patterns of mutual separation -by intervening volumes, and of individual shape. -Also the whole is a flux, changing with the lapse of -time. This systematic totality is disclosed to us as -one complex of things. But the seventeenth century -dualism cuts straight across it. The objective world -<span class='pageno' id='Page_203'>203</span>of science was confined to mere spatial material with -simple location in space and time, and subjected to -definite rules as to its locomotion. The subjective -world of philosophy annexed the colours, sounds, -scents, tastes, touches, bodily feelings, as forming the -subjective content of the cogitations of the individual -minds. Both worlds shared in the general flux; but -time, as measured, is assigned by Descartes to the -cogitations of the observer’s mind. There is obviously -one fatal weakness to this scheme. The cogitations of -mind exhibit themselves as holding up entities, such as -colours for instance, before the mind as the termini -of contemplation. But in this theory these colours are, -after all, merely the furniture of the mind. Accordingly, -the mind seems to be confined to its own private -world of cogitations. The subject-object conformation -of experience in its entirety lies within the mind -as one of its private passions. This conclusion from -the Cartesian data is the starting point from which -Berkeley, Hume, and Kant developed their respective -systems. And, antecedently to them, it was the -point upon which Locke concentrated as being the -vital question. Thus the question as to how any knowledge -is obtained of the truly objective world of science -becomes a problem of the first magnitude. Descartes -states that the objective body is perceived by the intellect. -He says (<cite>Meditation II</cite>): “I must, therefore, -admit that I cannot even comprehend by imagination -what the piece of wax is, and that it is the mind alone -which perceives it. I speak of one piece in particular; -for, as to wax in general, this is still more evident. -But what is the piece of wax that can be perceived -only by the mind?... The perception of it is -<span class='pageno' id='Page_204'>204</span>neither an act of sight, of touch, nor of imagination, -and never was either of these, though it might formerly -seem so, but is simply an <em>intuition</em> (<span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>inspectio</i></span>) of -the mind,....” It must be noted that the Latin word -‘inspectio’ is associated in its classical use with the -notion of theory as opposed to practice.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The two great preoccupations of modern philosophy -now lie clearly before us. The study of mind divides -into psychology, or the study of mental functionings -as considered in themselves and in their mutual relations, -and into epistemology, or the theory of the -knowledge of a common objective world. In other -words, there is the study of the cogitations, <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>quâ</i></span> passions -of the mind, and their study <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>quâ</i></span> leading to an -inspection (<em>intuition</em>) of an objective world. This is -a very uneasy division, giving rise to a host of perplexities -whose consideration has occupied the intervening -centuries.</p> - -<p class='c001'>As long as men thought in terms of physical notions -for the objective world and of mentality for the -subjective world, the setting out of the problem, as -achieved by Descartes, sufficed as a starting point. -But the balance has been upset by the rise of physiology. -In the seventeenth century men passed from -the study of physics to the study of philosophy. Towards -the end of the nineteenth century, notably in -Germany, men passed from the study of physiology to -the study of psychology. The change in tone has been -decisive. Of course, in the earlier period the intervention -of the human body was fully considered, for -example, by Descartes in Part V of the ‘<cite>Discourse on -Method</cite>.’ But the physiological instinct had not been -developed. In considering the human body, Descartes -<span class='pageno' id='Page_205'>205</span>thought with the outfit of a physicist; whereas the -modern psychologists are clothed with the mentalities -of medical physiologists. The career of William -James is an example of this change in standpoint. He -also possessed the clear, incisive genius which could -state in a flash the exact point at issue.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The reason why I have put Descartes and James in -close juxtaposition is now evident. Neither philosopher -finished an epoch by a final solution of a problem. -Their great merit is of the opposite sort. They -each of them open an epoch by their clear formulation -of terms in which thought could profitably express -itself at particular stages of knowledge, one for -the seventeenth century, the other for the twentieth -century. In this respect, they are both to be contrasted -with St. Thomas Aquinas, who expressed the -culmination of Aristotelian scholasticism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In many ways neither Descartes nor James were -the most characteristic philosophers of their respective -epochs. I should be disposed to ascribe these -positions to Locke and to Bergson respectively, at -least so far as concerns their relations to the science -of their times. Locke developed the lines of thought -which kept philosophy on the move; for example he -emphasized the appeal to psychology. He initiated -the age of epoch-making enquiries into urgent problems -of limited scope. Undoubtedly, in so doing, he -infected philosophy with something of the anti-rationalism -of science. But the very groundwork of a -fruitful methodology is to start from those clear postulates -which must be held to be ultimate so far as -concerns the occasion in question. The criticism of -such methodological postulates is thus reserved for -<span class='pageno' id='Page_206'>206</span>another opportunity. Locke discovered that the philosophical -situation bequeathed by Descartes involved -the problems of epistemology and psychology.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Bergson introduced into philosophy the organic -conceptions of physiological science. He has most -completely moved away from the static materialism of -the seventeenth century. His protest against spatialisation -is a protest against taking the Newtonian conception -of nature as being anything except a high -abstraction. His so-called anti-intellectualism should -be construed in this sense. In some respects he recurs -to Descartes; but the recurrence is accompanied with -an instinctive grasp of modern biology.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is another reason for associating Locke and -Bergson. The germ of an organic theory of nature is -to be found in Locke. His most recent expositor, Professor -Gibson,<a id='r14' /><a href='#f14' class='c013'><sup>[14]</sup></a> states that Locke’s way of conceiving -the identity of self-consciousness ‘like that of a living -organism, involves a genuine transcending of the -mechanical view of nature and of mind, embodied in -the composition theory.’ But it is to be noticed that -in the first place Locke wavers in his grasp of this -position; and in the second place, what is more important -still, he only applies his idea to self-consciousness. -The physiological attitude has not yet established -itself. The effect of physiology was to put mind back -into nature. The neurologist traces first the effect of -stimuli along the bodily nerves, then integration at -nerve centres, and finally the rise of a projective reference -beyond the body with a resulting motor efficacy -in renewed nervous excitement. In biochemistry, the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_207'>207</span>delicate adjustment of the chemical composition of the -parts to the preservation of the whole organism is -detected. Thus the mental cognition is seen as the -reflective experience of a totality, reporting for itself -what it is in itself as one unit occurrence. This unit -is the integration of the sum of its partial happenings, -but it is not their numerical aggregate. It has its -own unity as an event. This total unity, considered -as an entity for its own sake, is the prehension into -unity of the patterned aspects of the universe of -events. Its knowledge of itself arises from its own -relevance to the things of which it prehends the -aspects. It knows the world as a system of mutual -relevance, and thus sees itself as mirrored in other -things. These other things include more especially -the various parts of its own body.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f14'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r14'>14</a>. <i>Cf.</i> his book, <cite>Locke’s Theory of Knowledge and its Historical -Relations</cite>, Camb. Univ. Press, 1917.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>It is important to discriminate the bodily pattern, -which endures, from the bodily event, which is pervaded -by the enduring pattern, and from the parts of -the bodily event. The parts of the bodily event are -themselves pervaded by their own enduring patterns, -which form elements in the bodily pattern. The parts -of the body are really portions of the environment of -the total bodily event, but so related that their mutual -aspects, each in the other, are peculiarly effective in -modifying the pattern of either. This arises from -the intimate character of the relation of whole to -part. Thus the body is a portion of the environment -for the part, and the part is a portion of the environment -for the body; only they are peculiarly sensitive, -each to modifications of the other. This sensitiveness -is so arranged that the part adjusts itself to preserve -the stability of the pattern of the body. It is a particular -<span class='pageno' id='Page_208'>208</span>example of the favourable environment shielding -the organism. The relation of part to whole has -the special reciprocity associated with the notion of -organism, in which the part is for the whole; but this -relation reigns throughout nature and does not start -with the special case of the higher organisms.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Further, viewing the question as a matter of chemistry, -there is no need to construe the actions of each -molecule in a living body by its exclusive particular -reference to the pattern of the complete living organism. -It is true that each molecule is affected by the -aspect of this pattern as mirrored in it, so as to be -otherwise than what it would have been if placed elsewhere. -In the same way, under some circumstances -an electron may be a sphere, and under other circumstances -an egg-shaped volume. The mode of approach -to the problem, so far as science is concerned, is merely -to ask if molecules exhibit in living bodies properties -which are not to be observed amid inorganic surroundings. -In the same way, in a magnetic field soft iron -exhibits magnetic properties which are in abeyance -elsewhere. The prompt self-preservative actions of -living bodies, and our experience of the physical actions -of our bodies following the determinations of -will, suggest the modification of molecules in the body -as the result of the total pattern. It seems possible -that there may be physical laws expressing the modification -of the ultimate basic organisms when they -form part of higher organisms with adequate compactness -of pattern. It would, however, be entirely in -consonance with the empirically observed action of -environments, if the direct effects of aspects as between -the whole body and its parts were negligible. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_209'>209</span>We should expect transmission. In this way the modification -of total pattern would transmit itself by means -of a series of modifications of a descending series of -parts, so that finally the modification of the cell -changes its aspect in the molecule, thus effecting a -corresponding alteration in the molecule,—or in some -subtler entity. Thus the question for physiology is the -question of the physics of molecules in cells of different -characters.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We can now see the relation of psychology to physiology -and to physics. The private psychological field -is merely the event considered from its own standpoint. -The unity of this field is the unity of the event. -But it is the event as one entity, and not the event as -a sum of parts. The relations of the parts, to each -other and to the whole, are their aspects, each in the -other. A body for an external observer is the aggregate -of the aspects for him of the body as a whole, and -also of the body as a sum of parts. For the external -observer the aspects of shape and of sense-objects are -dominant, at least for cognition. But we must also -allow for the possibility that we can detect in ourselves -direct aspects of the mentalities of higher organisms. -The claim that the cognition of alien mentalities -must necessarily be by means of indirect inferences -from aspects of shape and of sense-objects is -wholly unwarranted by this philosophy of organism. -The fundamental principle is that whatever merges -into actuality, implants its aspects in every individual -event.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Further, even for self-cognition, the aspects of the -parts of our own bodies partly take the form of aspects -of shape, and of sense-objects. But that part of the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_210'>210</span>bodily event, in respect to which the cognitive mentality -is associated, is for itself the unit psychological -field. Its ingredients are not referent to the event -itself; they are aspects of what lies beyond that event. -Thus the self-knowledge inherent in the bodily event -is the knowledge of itself as a complex unity, whose -ingredients involve all reality beyond itself, restricted -under the limitation of its pattern of aspects. Thus -we know ourselves as a function of unification of a -plurality of things which are other than ourselves. -Cognition discloses an event as being an activity, organising -a real togetherness of alien things. But this -psychological field does not depend on its cognition; -so that this field is still a unit event as abstracted from -its self-cognition.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, consciousness will be the function of -knowing. But what is known is already a prehension -of aspects of the one real universe. These aspects -are aspects of other events as mutually modifying, -each the others. In the pattern of aspects they stand -in their pattern of mutual relatedness.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The aboriginal data in terms of which the pattern -weaves itself are the aspects of shapes, of sense-objects, -and of other eternal objects whose self-identity is not -dependent on the flux of things. Wherever such objects -have ingression into the general flux, they interpret -events, each to the other. They are here in the -perceiver; but, as perceived by him, they convey for -him something of the total flux which is beyond himself. -The subject-object relation takes its origin in -the double rôle of these eternal objects. They are -modifications of the subject, but only in their character -<span class='pageno' id='Page_211'>211</span>of conveying aspects of other subjects in the community -of the universe. Thus no individual subject can -have independent reality, since it is a prehension of -limited aspects of subjects other than itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The technical phrase ‘subject-object’ is a bad term -for the fundamental situation disclosed in experience. -It is really reminiscent of the Aristotelian ‘subject-predicate.’ -It already presupposes the metaphysical -doctrine of diverse subjects qualified by their private -predicates. This is the doctrine of subjects with private -worlds of experience. If this be granted, there -is no escape from solipsism. The point is that the -phrase ‘subject-object’ indicates a fundamental entity -underlying the objects. Thus the ‘objects,’ as thus -conceived, are merely the ghosts of Aristotelian predicates. -The primary situation disclosed in cognitive -experience is ‘ego-object amid objects.’ By this I -mean that the primary fact is an impartial world transcending -the ‘here-now’ which marks the ego-object, -and transcending the ‘now’ which is the spatial world -of simultaneous realisation. It is a world also including -the actuality of the past, and the limited potentiality -of the future, together with the complete world of -abstract potentiality, the realm of eternal objects, -which transcends, and finds exemplification in and -comparison with, the actual course of realisation. The -ego-object, as consciousness here-now, is conscious of -its experient essence as constituted by its internal relatedness -to the world of realities, and to the world of -ideas. But the ego-object, in being thus constituted, -is within the world of realities, and exhibits itself as -an organism requiring the ingression of ideas for the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_212'>212</span>purpose of this status among realities. This question -of consciousness must be reserved for treatment on -another occasion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The point to be made for the purposes of the present -discussion is that a philosophy of nature as organic -must start at the opposite end to that requisite for a -materialistic philosophy. The materialistic starting -point is from independently existing substances, matter -and mind. The matter suffers modifications of -its external relations of locomotion, and the mind -suffers modifications of its contemplated objects. -There are, in this materialistic theory, two sorts of independent -substances, each qualified by their appropriate -passions. The organic starting point is from -the analysis of process as the realisation of events disposed -in an interlocked community. The event is -the unit of things real. The emergent enduring pattern -is the stabilisation of the emergent achievement -so as to become a fact which retains its identity -throughout the process. It will be noted that endurance -is not primarily the property of enduring beyond -itself, but of enduring within itself. I mean that endurance -is the property of finding its pattern reproduced -in the temporal parts of the total event. It is -in this sense that a total event carries an enduring -pattern. There is an intrinsic value identical for the -whole and for its succession of parts. Cognition is -the emergence, into some measure of individualised -reality, of the general substratum of activity, poising -before itself possibility, actuality, and purpose.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is equally possible to arrive at this organic conception -of the world if we start from the fundamental -notions of modern physics, instead of, as above, from -<span class='pageno' id='Page_213'>213</span>psychology and physiology. In fact by reason of my -own studies in mathematics and mathematical physics, -I did in fact arrive at my convictions in this way. -Mathematical physics presumes in the first place an -electromagnetic field of activity pervading space and -time. The laws which condition this field are nothing -else than the conditions observed by the general activity -of the flux of the world, as it individualises -itself in the events. In physics, there is an abstraction. -The science ignores what anything is in <a id='corr213.10'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='iself'>itself</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_213.10'><ins class='correction' title='iself'>itself</ins></a></span>. -Its entities are merely considered in respect to their -extrinsic reality, that is to say, in respect to their aspects -in other things. But the abstraction reaches -even further than that; for it is only the aspects in -other things, as modifying the spatio-temporal specifications -of the life histories of those other things, which -count. The intrinsic reality of the observer comes in: -I mean what the observer is for himself is appealed to. -For example, the fact that he will see red or blue -enters into scientific statements. But the red which -the observer sees does not in truth enter into science. -What is relevant is merely the bare diversity of the -observer’s red experiences from all of his other experiences. -Accordingly, the intrinsic character of the -observer is merely relevant in order to fix the self-identical -individuality of the physical entities. These -entities are only considered as agencies in fixing the -routes in space and in time of the life histories of -enduring entities.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The phraseology of physics is derived from the -materialistic ideas of the seventeenth century. But -we find that, even in its extreme abstraction, what it -is really presupposing is the organic theory of aspects -<span class='pageno' id='Page_214'>214</span>as explained above. First, consider any event in -empty space where the word ‘empty’ means devoid -of electrons, or protons, or of any other form of electric -charge. Such an event has three rôles in physics. In -the first place, it is the actual scene of an adventure -of energy, either as its <em>habitat</em> or as the locus of a -particular stream of energy: anyhow, in this rôle the -energy is there, either as located in space during the -time considered, or as streaming through space.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In its second rôle, the event is a necessary link in -the pattern of transmission, by which the character -of every event receives some modification from the -character of every other event.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In its third rôle, the event is the repository of a -possibility, as to what would happen to an electric -charge, either by way of deformation or of locomotion, -if it should have happened to be there.</p> - -<p class='c001'>If we modify our assumption by considering an -event which includes in itself a portion of the life-history -of an electric charge, then the analysis of its -three rôles still remains; except that the possibility -embodied in the third rôle is now transformed into -an actuality. In this replacement of possibility by -actuality, we obtain the distinction between empty and -occupied events.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Recurring to the empty events, we note the deficiency -in them of individuality of intrinsic content. -Considering the first rôle of an empty event, as being -a <em>habitat</em> of energy, we note that there is no individual -discrimination of an individual bit of energy, either -as statically located, or as an element in the stream. -There is simply a quantitative determination of activity, -without individualisation of the activity in itself. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_215'>215</span>This lack of individualisation is still more evident in -the second and third rôles. An empty event is something -in itself, but it fails to realise a stable individuality -of content. So far as its content is concerned, -the empty event is one realised element in a general -scheme of organised activity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Some qualification is required when the empty -event is the scene of the transmission of a definite -train of recurrent wave-forms. There is now a definite -pattern which remains permanent in the event. -We find here the first faint trace of enduring individuality. -But it is individuality without the faintest -capture of originality: for it is merely a permanence -arising solely from the implication of the event in a -larger scheme of patterning.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Turning now to the examination of an occupied -event, the electron has a determinate individuality. -It can be traced throughout its life-history through a -variety of events. A collection of electrons, together -with the analogous atomic charges of positive electricity, -forms a body such as we ordinarily perceive. -The simplest body of this kind is a molecule, and a -set of molecules forms a lump of ordinary matter, such -as a chair, or a stone. Thus a charge of electricity is -the mark of individuality of content, as additional -to the individuality of an event in itself. This individuality -of content is the strong point of the materialistic -doctrine.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It can, however, be equally well explained on the -theory of organism. When we look into the function -of the electric charge, we note that its rôle is to mark -the origination of a pattern which is transmitted -through space and time. It is the key of some particular -<span class='pageno' id='Page_216'>216</span>pattern. For example, the field of force in -any event is to be constructed by attention to the adventures -of electrons and protons, and so also are the -streams and distributions of energy. Further, the -electric waves find their origin in the vibratory adventures -of these charges. Thus the transmitted pattern -is to be conceived as the flux of aspects throughout -space and time derived from the life history of -the atomic charge. The individualisation of the -charge arises by a conjunction of two characters, in -the first place by the continued identity of its mode -of functioning as a key for the determination of a -diffusion of pattern; and, in the second place, by the -unity and continuity of its life history.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We may conclude, therefore, that the organic -theory represents directly what physics actually does -assume respecting its ultimate entities. We also notice -the complete futility of these entities, if they are conceived -as fully concrete individuals. So far as physics -is concerned, they are wholly occupied in moving each -other about, and they have no reality outside this -function. In particular for physics, there is no intrinsic -reality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is obvious that the basing of philosophy upon the -presupposition of organism must be traced back to -Leibniz.<a id='r15' /><a href='#f15' class='c013'><sup>[15]</sup></a> His monads are for him the ultimately -real entities. But he retained the Cartesian substances -with their qualifying passions, as also equally -expressing for him the final characterisation of real -things. Accordingly for him there was no concrete -reality of internal relations. He had therefore on -<span class='pageno' id='Page_217'>217</span>his hands two distinct points of view. One was that -the final real entity is an organising activity, fusing -ingredients into a unity, so that this unity is the reality. -The other point of view is that the final real entities -are substances supporting qualities. The first point of -view depends upon the acceptance of internal relations -binding together all reality. The latter is inconsistent -with the reality of such relations. To combine these -two points of view, his monads were therefore windowless; -and their passions merely mirrored the universe -by the divine arrangement of a preëstablished -harmony. This system thus presupposed an aggregate -of independent entities. He did not discriminate -the event, as the unit of experience, from the enduring -organism as its stabilisation into importance, and -from the cognitive organism as expressing an increased -completeness of individualisation. Nor did -he admit the many-termed relations, relating sense-data -to various events in diverse ways. These many-termed -relations are in fact the perspectives which -Leibniz does admit, but only on the condition that -they are purely qualities of the organising monads. -The difficulty really arises from the unquestioned acceptance -of the notion of simple location as fundamental -for space and time, and from the acceptance -of the notion of independent individual substance as -fundamental for a real entity. The only road open -to Leibniz was thus the same as that later taken by -Berkeley [in a prevalent interpretation of his meaning], -namely an appeal to a <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>Deux ex machinâ</i></span> who -was capable of rising superior to the difficulties of -metaphysics.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f15'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r15'>15</a>. <i>Cf.</i> Bertrand Russell, <cite>The Philosophy of Leibniz</cite>, for the suggestion -of this line of thought.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>In the same way as Descartes introduced the tradition -<span class='pageno' id='Page_218'>218</span>of thought which kept subsequent philosophy in -some measure of contact with the scientific movement, -so Leibniz introduced the alternative tradition that -the entities, which are the ultimate actual things, are -in some sense procedures of organisation. This tradition -has been the foundation of the great achievements -of German philosophy. Kant reflected the two -traditions, one upon the other. Kant was a scientist, -but the schools derivative from Kant have had but -slight effect on the mentality of the scientific world. -It should be the task of the philosophical schools of -this century to bring together the two streams into -an expression of the world-picture derived from science, -and thereby end the divorce of science from the -affirmations of our aesthetic and ethical experiences.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_219'>219</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER X <br /> <br /> ABSTRACTION</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>In the previous chapters I have been examining the -reactions of the scientific movement upon the deeper -issues which have occupied modern thinkers. No -one man, no limited society of men, and no one epoch -can think of everything at once. Accordingly for -the sake of eliciting the various impacts of science -upon thought, the topic has been treated historically. -In this retrospect I have kept in mind that the ultimate -issue of the whole story is the patent dissolution -of the comfortable scheme of scientific materialism -which has dominated the three centuries under -review. Accordingly various schools of criticism of -the dominant opinions have been stressed; and I have -endeavoured to outline an alternative cosmological -doctrine, which shall be wide enough to include what -is fundamental both for science and for its critics. -In this alternative scheme, the notion of material, as -fundamental, has been replaced by that of organic -synthesis. But the approach has always been from -the consideration of the actual intricacies of scientific -thought, and of the peculiar perplexities which it -suggests.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the present chapter, and in the immediately succeeding -chapter, we will forget the peculiar problems -of modern science, and will put ourselves at the standpoint -of a dispassionate consideration of the nature -of things, antecedently to any special investigation -<span class='pageno' id='Page_220'>220</span>into their details. Such a standpoint is termed ‘metaphysical.’ -Accordingly those readers who find metaphysics, -even in two slight chapters, irksome, will do -well to proceed at once to the Chapter on ‘Religion -and Science,’ which resumes the topic of the impact -of science on modern thought.</p> - -<p class='c001'>These metaphysical chapters are purely descriptive. -Their justification is to be sought, (i) in our direct -knowledge of the actual occasions which compose our -immediate experience, and (ii) in their success as -forming a basis for harmonising our systematised accounts -of various types of experience, and (iii) in their -success as providing the concepts in terms of which -an epistemology can be framed. By (iii) I mean -that an account of the general character of what we -know must enable us to frame an account of how -knowledge is possible as an adjunct within things -known.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In any occasion of cognition, that which is known -is an actual occasion of experience, as diversified<a id='r16' /><a href='#f16' class='c013'><sup>[16]</sup></a> by -reference to a realm of entities which transcend that -immediate occasion in that they have analogous or -different connections with other occasions of experience. -For example a definite shade of red may, in -the immediate occasion, be implicated with the shape -of sphericity in some definite way. But that shade -of red, and that spherical shape, exhibit themselves -as transcending that occasion, in that either of them -has other relationships to other occasions. Also, -apart from the actual occurrence of the same things -in other occasions, every actual occasion is set within -a realm of alternative interconnected entities. This -<span class='pageno' id='Page_221'>221</span>realm is disclosed by all the untrue propositions which -can be predicated significantly of that occasion. It is -the realm of alternative suggestions, whose foothold -in actuality transcends each actual occasion. The real -relevance of untrue propositions for each actual occasion -is disclosed by art, romance, and by criticism -in reference to ideals. It is the foundation of the -metaphysical position which I am maintaining that -the understanding of actuality requires a reference -to ideality. The two realms are intrinsically inherent -in the total metaphysical situation. The truth that -some proposition respecting an actual occasion is untrue -may express the vital truth as to the aesthetic -achievement. It expresses the ‘great refusal’ which -is its primary characteristic. An event is decisive -in proportion to the importance (for it) of its untrue -propositions: their relevance to the event cannot be -dissociated from what the event is in itself by way -of achievement. These transcendent entities have been -termed ‘universals.’ I prefer to use the term ‘eternal -objects,’ in order to disengage myself from presuppositions -which cling to the former term owing to -its prolonged philosophical history. Eternal objects -are thus, in their nature, abstract. By ‘abstract’ I -mean that what an eternal object is in itself—that is -to say, its essence—is comprehensible without reference -to some one particular occasion of experience. -To be abstract is to transcend particular concrete occasions -of actual happening. But to transcend an -actual occasion does not mean being disconnected -from it. On the contrary, I hold that each eternal -object has its own proper connection with each such -occasion, which I term its mode of ingression into -<span class='pageno' id='Page_222'>222</span>that occasion. Thus an eternal object is to be comprehended -by acquaintance with (i) its particular -individuality, (ii) its general relationships to other -eternal objects as apt for realisation in actual occasions, -and (iii) the general principle which expresses -its ingression in particular actual occasions.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f16'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r16'>16</a>. <i>Cf.</i> my <cite>Principles of Natural Knowledge</cite>, Ch. V, Sec. 13.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>These three headings express two principles. The -first principle is that each eternal object is an individual -which, in its own peculiar fashion, is what -it is. This particular individuality is the individual -essence of the object, and cannot be described otherwise -than as being itself. Thus the individual essence -is merely the essence considered in respect to its -uniqueness. Further, the essence of an eternal object -is merely the eternal object considered as adding its -own unique contribution to each actual occasion. This -unique contribution is identical for all such occasions -in respect to the fact that the object in all modes of -ingression is just its identical self. But it varies from -one occasion to another in respect to the differences -of its modes of ingression. Thus the metaphysical -status of an eternal object is that of a possibility for -an actuality. Every actual occasion is defined as to -its character by how these possibilities are actualised -for that occasion. Thus actualisation is a selection -among possibilities. More accurately, it is a selection -issuing in a gradation of possibilities in respect to -their realisation in that occasion. This conclusion -brings us to the second metaphysical principle: An -eternal object, considered as an abstract entity, cannot -be divorced from its reference to other eternal -objects, and from its reference to actuality generally; -though it is disconnected from its actual modes of ingression -<span class='pageno' id='Page_223'>223</span>into definitive actual occasions. This principle -is expressed by the statement that each eternal object -has a ‘relational essence.’ This relational essence -determines how it is possible for the object to have -ingression into actual occasions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In other words: If <i>A</i> be an eternal object, then -what <i>A</i> is in itself involves <i>A’s</i> status in the universe, -and <i>A</i> cannot be divorced from this status. In the -essence of <i>A</i> there stands a determinateness as to the -relationships of <i>A</i> to other eternal objects, and an -indeterminateness as to the relationships of <i>A</i> to -actual occasions. Since the relationships of <i>A</i> to other -eternal objects stand determinately in the essence of -<i>A</i>, it follows that they are internal relations. I mean -by this that these relationships are constitutive of <i>A</i>; -for an entity which stands in internal relations has -no being as an entity not in these relations. In other -words, once with internal relations, always with internal -relations. The internal relationships of <i>A</i> -conjointly form its significance.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Again an entity cannot stand in external relations -unless in its essence there stands an indeterminateness -which is its patience for such external relations. The -meaning of the term ‘possibility’ as applied to <i>A</i> is -simply that there stands in the essence of <i>A</i> a patience -for relationships to actual occasions. The relationships -of <i>A</i> to an actual occasion are simply how the -eternal relationships of <i>A</i> to other eternal objects are -graded as to their realisation in that occasion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus the general principle which expresses <i>A’s</i> -ingression in the particular actual occasion α is the indeterminateness -which stands in the essence of <i>A</i> as -to its ingression into α, and is the determinateness -<span class='pageno' id='Page_224'>224</span>which stands in the essence of α as to the ingression -of <i>Α</i> into α. Thus the synthetic prehension, which -is α, is the solution of the indeterminateness of <i>Α</i> into -the determinateness of α. Accordingly the relationship -between <i>Α</i> and α is external as regards <i>Α</i>, and -is internal as regards α. Every actual occasion α is -the solution of all modalities into actual categorical -ingressions: truth and falsehood take the place of -possibility. The complete ingression of <i>Α</i> into α is -expressed by all the true propositions which are about -both <i>Α</i> and α, and also—it may be—about other things.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The determinate relatedness of the eternal object <i>Α</i> -to every other eternal object is how <i>Α</i> is systematically -and by the necessity of its nature related to every other -eternal object. Such relatedness represents a possibility -for realisation. But a relationship is a fact -which concerns all the implicated relata, and cannot -be isolated as if involving only one of the relata. Accordingly -there is a general fact of systematic mutual -relatedness which is inherent in the character of possibility. -The realm of eternal objects is properly described -as a ‘realm,’ because each eternal object has -its status in this general systematic complex of mutual -relatedness.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In respect to the ingression of <i>Α</i> into an actual -occasion α, the mutual relationships of <i>Α</i> to other -eternal objects, as thus graded in realisation, require -for their expression a reference to the status of <i>Α</i> -and of the other eternal objects in the spatio-temporal -relationship. Also this status is not expressible (for -this purpose) without a reference to the status of α -and of other actual occasions in the same spatio-temporal -relationship. Accordingly the spatio-temporal -<span class='pageno' id='Page_225'>225</span>relationship, in terms of which the actual -course of events is to be expressed, is nothing else -than a selective limitation within the general systematic -relationships among eternal objects. By ‘limitation,’ -as applied to the spatio-temporal continuum, I -mean those matter-of-fact determinations—such as -the three dimensions of space, and the four dimensions -of the spatio-temporal continuum—which are -inherent in the actual course of events, but which -present themselves as arbitrary in respect to a more -abstract possibility. The consideration of these general -limitations at the base of actual things, as distinct -from the limitations peculiar to each actual occasion, -will be more fully resumed in the chapter on -‘God.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>Further, the status of all possibility in reference to -actuality requires a reference to this spatio-temporal -continuum. In any particular consideration of a -possibility we may conceive this continuum to be -transcended. But in so far as there is any definite -reference to actuality, the definite <em>how</em> of transcendence -of that spatio-temporal continuum is required. -Thus primarily the spatio-temporal continuum -is a locus of relational possibility, selected -from the more general realm of systematic relationship. -This limited locus of relational possibility -expresses one limitation of possibility inherent in -the general system of the process of realisation. -Whatever possibility is generally coherent with that -system falls within this limitation. Also whatever is -abstractedly possible in relation to the general course -of events—as distinct from the particular limitations -introduced by particular occasions—pervades the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_226'>226</span>spatio-temporal continuum in every alternative spatial -situation and at all alternative times.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Fundamentally, the spatio-temporal continuum is -the general system of relatedness of all possibilities, -in so far as that system is limited by its relevance to -the general fact of actuality. Also it is inherent in the -nature of possibility that it should include this relevance -to actuality. For possibility is that in which -there stands achievability, abstracted from achievement.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It has already been emphasised that an actual occasion -is to be conceived as a limitation; and that this -process of limitation can be still further characterised -as a gradation. This characteristic of an actual occasion -(α, say) requires further elucidation: An indeterminateness -stands in the essence of any eternal object -(<i>Α</i>, say). The actual occasion α synthesises in itself -every eternal object; and, in so doing, it includes the -<em>complete</em> determinate relatedness of <i>Α</i> to every other -eternal object, or set of eternal objects. This synthesis -is a limitation of realisation but <em>not</em> of content. -Each relationship preserves its inherent self-identity. -But grades of entry into this synthesis are inherent in -each actual occasion, such as α. These grades can be -expressed only as relevance of value. This relevance -of value varies—as comparing different occasions—in -grade from the inclusion of the individual essence -of <i>Α</i> as an element in the aesthetic synthesis (in some -grade of inclusion) to the lowest grade which is the -exclusion of the individual essence of <i>Α</i> as an element -in the aesthetic synthesis. In so far as it stands in -this lowest grade, every determinate relationship of <i>Α</i> -is merely ingredient in the occasion in respect to the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_227'>227</span>determinate <em>how</em> this relationship is an unfulfilled -alternative, not contributing any aesthetic value, except -as forming an element in the systematic substratum -of unfulfilled content. In a higher grade, it -may remain unfulfilled, but be aesthetically relevant.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus <i>A</i>, conceived merely in respect to its relationships -to other eternal objects, is ‘<i>A</i> conceived as -<em>not-being</em>’; where ‘not-being’ means ‘abstracted from -the determinate fact of inclusions in, and exclusions -from, actual events.’ Also ‘<i>A</i> as <em>not-being</em> in respect -to a definite occasion α’ means that <i>A</i> in all its determinate -relationships is excluded from α. Again -‘<i>A</i> as <em>being</em> in respect to α’ means that <i>A</i> in some of -its determinate relationships is included in α. But -there can be no occasion which includes <i>A</i> in all its -determinate relationships; for some of these relationships -are contraries. Thus, in regard to excluded -relationships, <i>A</i> will be <em>not-being</em> in α, even when in -regard to other relationships <i>A</i> will be <em>being</em> in α. In -this sense, every occasion is a synthesis of <em>being</em> and -<em>not-being</em>. Furthermore, though some eternal objects -are synthesised in an occasion α merely <em>quâ not-being</em>, -each eternal object which is synthesised <em>quâ -being</em> is also synthesised <em>quâ not-being</em>. ‘<em>Being</em>’ here -means ‘individually effective in the aesthetic synthesis.’ -Also the ‘aesthetic synthesis’ is the ‘experient -synthesis’ viewed as self-creative, under the -limitations laid upon it by its internal relatedness to -all other actual occasions. We thus conclude—what -has already been stated above—that the general fact -of the synthetic prehension of all eternal objects into -every occasion wears the double aspect of the indeterminate -relatedness of each eternal object to occasions -<span class='pageno' id='Page_228'>228</span>generally, and of its determinate relatedness to -each particular occasion. This statement summarises -the account of how external relations are possible. But -the account depends upon disengaging the spatio-temporal -continuum from its mere implication in actual -occasions—according to the usual explanation—and -upon exhibiting it in its origin from the general -nature of abstract possibility, as limited by the general -character of the actual course of events.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The difficulty which arises in respect to internal -relations is to explain how any particular truth is -possible. In so far as there are internal relations, -everything must depend upon everything else. But if -this be the case, we cannot know about anything till -we equally know everything else. Apparently, therefore, -we are under the necessity of saying everything -at once. This supposed necessity is palpably untrue. -Accordingly it is incumbent on us to explain how -there can be internal relations, seeing that we admit -finite truths.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Since actual occasions are selections from the realm -of possibilities, the ultimate explanation of how actual -occasions have the general character which they do -have, must lie in an analysis of the general character -of the realm of possibility.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The <em>analytical character</em> of the realm of eternal objects -is the primary metaphysical truth concerning it. -By this character it is meant that the status of any -eternal object <i>A</i> in this realm is capable of analysis -into an indefinite number of subordinate relationships -of limited scope. For example if <i>B</i> and <i>C</i> are two -other eternal objects, then there is some perfectly definite -relationship <i>R(A, B, C)</i> which involves <i>A, B, C</i> -<span class='pageno' id='Page_229'>229</span>only, as to require the mention of no other definite -eternal objects in the capacity of relata. Of course, -the relationship <i>R(A, B, C)</i> may involve subordinate -relationships which are themselves eternal objects, and -<i>R(A, B, C)</i> is also itself an eternal object. Also there -will be other relationships which in the same sense -involve only <i>A, B, C</i>. We have now to examine how, -having regard to the internal relatedness of eternal -objects, this limited relationship <i>R(A, B, C)</i> is -possible.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The reason for the existence of finite relationships -in the realm of eternal objects is that relationships of -these objects among themselves are entirely unselective, -and are systematically complete. We are discussing -possibility; so that every relationship which is -possible is thereby in the realm of possibility. Every -such relationship of each eternal object is founded -upon the perfectly definite status of that object as a -relatum in the general scheme of relationships. This -definite status is what I have termed the ‘relational -essence’ of the object. This relational essence is determinable -by reference to that object alone, and does -not require reference to any other objects, except those -which are specifically involved in its individual essence -when that essence is complex (as will be explained -immediately). The meaning of the words -‘any’ and ‘some’ springs from this principle—that is -to say, the meaning of the ‘variable’ in logic. The -whole principle is that a particular determination can -be made of the <em>how</em> of some definite relationship of a -definite eternal object <i>A</i> to a definite finite number <i>n</i> -of other eternal objects, <em>without</em> any determination of -the other <i>n</i> objects, X₁, X₂, ... Xₙ, except that they -<span class='pageno' id='Page_230'>230</span>have, each of them, the requisite status to play their -respective parts in that multiple relationship. This -principle depends on the fact that the relational essence -of an eternal object is not unique to that object. -The mere relational essence of each eternal object determines -the complete uniform scheme of relational -essences, since each object stands internally in all its -possible relationships. Thus the realm of possibility -provides a uniform scheme of relationships among -finite sets of eternal objects; and all eternal objects -stand in all such relationships, so far as the status of -each permits.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly the relationships (as in possibility) do -not involve the individual essences of the eternal objects; -they involve <em>any</em> eternal objects as relata, subject -to the proviso that these relata have the requisite -relational essences. [It is this proviso which, automatically -and by the nature of the case, limits the -‘any’ of the phrase ‘any eternal objects.’] This principle -is the principle of the <em>Isolation of Eternal Objects</em> -in the realm of possibility. The eternal objects -are isolated, because their relationships as possibilities -are expressible without reference to their respective -individual essences. In contrast to the realm of possibility, -the inclusion of eternal objects within an actual -occasion means that in respect to some of their possible -relationships there is a togetherness of their individual -essences. This realised togetherness is the achievement -of an emergent value defined—or, shaped—by -the definite eternal relatedness in respect to which the -real togetherness is achieved. Thus the eternal relatedness -is the form—the εἶδος—; the emergent -actual occasion is the <em>superject</em> of informed value; -<span class='pageno' id='Page_231'>231</span>value, as abstracted from any particular superject, is -the abstract matter—the ὕλη—which is common to -all actual occasions; and the synthetic activity which -prehends valueless possibility into superjicient informed -value is the substantial activity. This substantial -activity is that which is omitted in any -analysis of the static factors in the metaphysical situation. -The analysed elements of the situation are the -attributes of the substantial activity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The difficulty inherent in the concept of finite internal -relations among eternal objects is thus evaded -by two metaphysical principles, (i) that the relationships -of any eternal object <i>A</i>, considered as constitutive -of <i>A</i>, merely involve other eternal objects as bare -relata without reference to their individual essences, -and (ii) that the divisibility of the general relationship -of <i>A</i> into a multiplicity of finite relationships of -<i>A</i> stands therefore in the essence of that eternal object. -The second principle obviously depends upon the first. -To understand <i>A</i> is to understand the <em>how</em> of a general -scheme of relationship. This scheme of relationship -does not require the individual uniqueness of the -other relata for its comprehension. This scheme also -discloses itself as being analysable into a multiplicity -of limited relationships which have their own individuality -and yet at the same time presupposes the -total relationship within possibility. In respect to -actuality there is first the general limitation of relationships, -which reduces this general unlimited scheme -to the four dimensional spatio-temporal scheme. This -spatio-temporal scheme is, so to speak, the greatest common -measure of the schemes of relationship (as limited -by actuality) inherent in all the eternal objects. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_232'>232</span>By this it is meant that, <em>how</em> select relationships of an -eternal object (<i>A</i>) are realised in any actual occasion, -is always explicable by expressing the status of <i>A</i> in -respect to this spatio-temporal scheme, and by expressing -in this scheme the relationship of the actual occasion -to other actual occasions. A definite finite relationship -involving the definite eternal objects of a -limited set of such objects is itself an eternal object: -it is those eternal objects as in that relationship. I will -call such an eternal object ‘complex.’ The eternal -objects which are the relata in a complex eternal object -will be called the ‘components’ of that eternal -object. Also if any of these relata are themselves complex, -their components will be called ‘derivative components’ -of the original complex object. Also the -components of derivative components will also be -called derivative components of the original object. -Thus the complexity of an eternal object means its -analysability into a relationship of component eternal -objects. Also the analysis of the general scheme of -relatedness of eternal objects means its exhibition as -a multiplicity of complex eternal objects. An eternal -object, such as a definite shade of green, which cannot -be analysed into a relationship of components, will be -called ‘simple.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>We can now explain how the analytical character -of the realm of eternal objects allows of an analysis -of that realm into grades.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the lowest grade of eternal objects are to be -placed those objects whose individual essences are -simple. This is the grade of zero complexity. Next -consider any set of such objects, finite or infinite as -to the number of its members. For example, consider -<span class='pageno' id='Page_233'>233</span>the set of three eternal objects <i>A, B, C</i>, of which none -is complex. Let us write <i>R(A, B, C)</i> for some definite -possible relatedness of <i>A, B, C</i>. To take a simple example, -<i>A, B, C</i> may be three definite colours with the -spatio-temporal relatedness to each other of three -faces of a regular tetrahedron, anywhere at any time. -Then <i>R(A, B, C)</i> is another eternal object of the lowest -complex grade. Analogously there are eternal objects -of successively higher grades. In respect to any -complex eternal object, <i>S(D₁, D₂, ... Dₙ)</i>, the -eternal objects <i>D₁, ... Dₙ</i>, whose individual essences -are constitutive of the individual essence of -<i>S(D₁, ... Dₙ)</i>, are called the components of -<i>S(D₁, ... Dₙ)</i>. It is obvious that the grade of complexity -to be ascribed to <i>S(D₁, ... Dₙ)</i> is to be -taken as one above the highest grade of complexity -to be found among its components.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is thus an analysis of the realm of possibility -into simple eternal objects, and into various grades of -complex eternal objects. A complex eternal object -is an abstract situation. There is a double sense of -‘abstraction,’ in regard to the abstraction of <em>definite</em> -eternal objects, <i>i.e.</i>, non-mathematical abstraction. -There is abstraction from actuality, and abstraction -from possibility. For example, <i>A</i> and <i>R(A, B, C)</i> -are both abstractions from the realm of possibility. -Note that <i>A</i> must mean <i>A</i> in all its possible relationships, -and among them <i>R(A, B, C)</i>. Also <i>R(A, B, C)</i> -means <i>R(A, B, C)</i> in all its relationships. But this -meaning of <i>R(A, B, C)</i> excludes other relationships -into which <i>A</i> can enter. Hence <i>A</i> as in <i>R(A, B, C)</i> -is more abstract than <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>A simpliciter</i></span>. Thus as we pass -from the grade of simple eternal objects to higher and -<span class='pageno' id='Page_234'>234</span>higher grades of complexity, we are indulging in -higher grades of abstraction from the realm of possibility.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We can now conceive the successive stages of a definite -progress towards some assigned mode of abstraction -from the realm of possibility, involving a progress -(in thought) through successive grades of increasing -complexity. I will call any such route of progress -‘an abstractive hierarchy.’ Any abstractive hierarchy, -finite or infinite, is based upon some definite group of -simple eternal objects. This group will be called the -‘base’ of the hierarchy. Thus the base of an abstractive -hierarchy is a set of objects of zero complexity. -The formal definition of an abstractive hierarchy is -as follows:</p> - -<p class='c001'>An ‘abstractive hierarchy based upon <i>g</i>,’ where <i>g</i> is -a group of simple eternal objects, is a set of eternal -objects which satisfy the following conditions,</p> - -<p class='c001'>(i) the members of <i>g</i> belong to it, and are the only -simple eternal objects in the hierarchy,</p> - -<p class='c001'>(ii) the components of any complex eternal object -in the hierarchy are also members of the hierarchy, -and</p> - -<p class='c001'>(iii) any set of eternal objects belonging to the -hierarchy, whether all of the same grade or whether -differing among themselves as to grade, are jointly -among the components or derivative components of -at least one eternal object which also belongs to the -hierarchy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is to be noticed that the components of an eternal -object are necessarily of a lower grade of complexity -than itself. Accordingly any member of such a hierarchy, -which is of the first grade of complexity, can -<span class='pageno' id='Page_235'>235</span>have as components only members of the group <i>g</i>; -and any member of the second grade can have as components -only members of the first grade, and members -of <i>g</i>; and so on for the higher grades.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The third condition to be satisfied by an abstractive -hierarchy will be called the condition of connexity. -Thus an abstractive hierarchy springs from -its base; it includes every successive grade from its -base either indefinitely onwards, or to its maximum -grade; and it is ‘connected’ by the reappearance (in a -higher grade) of any set of its members belonging to -lower grades, in the function of a set of components -or derivative components of at least one member of -the hierarchy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>An abstractive hierarchy is called ‘finite’ if it stops -at a finite grade of complexity. It is called ‘infinite’ -if it includes members belonging respectively to all -degrees of complexity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is to be noted that the base of an abstractive hierarchy -may contain any number of members, finite or -infinite. Further, the infinity of the number of the -members of the base has nothing to do with the question -as to whether the hierarchy be finite or infinite.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A finite abstractive hierarchy will, by definition, -possess a grade of maximum complexity. It is characteristic -of this grade that a member of it is a component -of no other eternal object belonging to any -grade of the hierarchy. Also it is evident that this -grade of maximum complexity must possess only one -member; for otherwise the condition of connexity -would not be satisfied. Conversely any complex -eternal object defines a finite abstractive hierarchy to -be discovered by a process of analysis. This complex -<span class='pageno' id='Page_236'>236</span>eternal object from which we start will be called the -‘vertex’ of the abstractive hierarchy: it is the sole -member of the grade of maximum complexity. In -the first stage of the analysis we obtain the components -of the vertex. These components may be of varying -complexity; but there must be among them at least -one member whose complexity is of a grade one lower -than that of the vertex. A grade which is one lower -than that of a given eternal object will be called the -‘proximate grade’ for that object. We take then those -components of the vertex which belong to its proximate -grade; and as the second stage we analyse them -into their components. Among these components -there must be some belonging to the proximate grade -for the objects thus analysed. Add to them the components -of the vertex which also belong to this grade -of ‘second proximation’ from the vertex; and, at the -third stage analyse as before. We thus find objects -belonging to the grade of third proximation from the -vertex; and we add to them the components belonging -to this grade, which have been left over from the -preceding stages of the analysis. We proceed in this -way through successive stages, till we reach the grade -of simple objects. This grade forms the base of the -hierarchy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is to be noted that in dealing with hierarchies -we are entirely within the realm of possibility. Accordingly -the eternal objects are devoid of real togetherness: -they remain within their ‘isolation.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>The logical instrument which Aristotle used for -the analysis of actual fact into more abstract elements -was that of classification into species and genera. This -instrument has its overwhelmingly important application -<span class='pageno' id='Page_237'>237</span>for science in its preparatory stages. But its -use in metaphysical description distorts the true vision -of the metaphysical situation. The use of the term -‘universal’ is intimately connected with this Aristotelian -analysis: the term has been broadened of late; -but still it suggests that classificatory analysis. For -this reason I have avoided it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In any actual occasion α, there will be a group <i>g</i> -of simple eternal objects which are ingredient in that -group in the most concrete mode. This complete ingredience -in an occasion, so as to yield the most complete -fusion of individual essence with other eternal -objects in the formation of the individual emergent -occasion, is evidently of its own kind and cannot be defined -in terms of anything else. But it has a peculiar -characteristic which necessarily attaches to it. This -characteristic is that there is an <em>infinite</em> abstractive -hierarchy based upon <i>g</i> which is such that all its members -are equally involved in this complete inclusion -in α.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The existence of such an infinite abstractive hierarchy -is what is meant by the statement that it is impossible -to complete the description of an actual occasion -by means of concepts. I will call this infinite abstractive -hierarchy which is associated with α ‘the -associated hierarchy of α.’ It is also what is meant -by the notion of the connectedness of an actual occasion. -This connectedness of an occasion is necessary -for its synthetic unity and for its intelligibility. There -is a connected hierarchy of concepts applicable to the -occasion, including concepts of all degrees of complexity. -Also in the actual occasion, the individual -essences of the eternal objects involved in these complex -<span class='pageno' id='Page_238'>238</span>concepts achieve an aesthetic synthesis, productive -of the occasion as an experience for its own sake. -This associated hierarchy is the shape, or pattern, or -form, of the occasion in so far as the occasion is constituted -of what enters into its full realisation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Some confusion of thought has been caused by the -fact that abstraction from possibility runs in the opposite -direction to an abstraction from actuality, so -far as degree of abstractness is concerned. For evidently -in describing an actual occasion α, we are -nearer to the total concrete fact when we describe α -by predicating of it some member of its associated -hierarchy, which is of a high grade of complexity. -We have then said more about α. Thus, with a high -grade of complexity we gain in approach to the full -concreteness of α, and with a low grade we lose in -this approach. Accordingly the simple eternal objects -represent the extreme of abstraction from an -actual occasion; whereas simple eternal objects represent -the minimum of abstraction from the realm of -possibility. It will, I think, be found that, when a -high degree of abstraction is spoken of, abstraction -from the realm of possibility is what is usually meant—in -other words, an elaborate logical construction.</p> - -<p class='c001'>So far I have merely been considering an actual -occasion on the side of its full concreteness. It is this -side of the occasion in virtue of which it is an event in -nature. But a natural event, in this sense of the term, -is only an abstraction from a complete actual occasion. -A complete occasion includes that which in -cognitive experience takes the form of memory, anticipation, -imagination, and thought. These elements -in an experient occasion are also modes of inclusion -<span class='pageno' id='Page_239'>239</span>of complex eternal objects in the synthetic prehension, -as elements in the emergent value. They differ from -the concreteness of full inclusion. In a sense this difference -is inexplicable; for each mode of inclusion -is of its own kind, not to be explained in terms of anything -else. But there is a common difference which -discriminates these modes of inclusion from the full -concrete ingression which has been discussed. This -<span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>differentia</i></span> is <em>abruptness</em>. By ‘abruptness’ I mean that -what is remembered, or anticipated, or imagined, or -thought, is exhausted by a finite complex concept. In -each case there is one finite eternal object prehended -within the occasion as the vertex of a finite hierarchy. -This breaking off from an actual illimitability is what -in any occasion marks off that which is termed mental -from that which belongs to the physical event to which -the mental functioning is referred.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In general there seems to be some loss of vividness -in the apprehension of the eternal objects concerned: -for example, Hume speaks of ‘faint copies.’ But this -faintness seems to be a very unsafe ground for differentiation. -Often things realised in thought are more -vivid than the same things in inattentive physical experience. -But the things apprehended as mental are -always subject to the condition that we come to a stop -when we attempt to explore ever higher grades of -complexity in their realised relationships. We always -find that we have thought of just this—whatever it -may be—and of no more. There is a limitation which -breaks off the finite concept from the higher grades of -illimitable complexity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus an actual occasion is a prehension of one infinite -hierarchy (its associated hierarchy) together -<span class='pageno' id='Page_240'>240</span>with various finite hierarchies. The synthesis into -the occasion of the infinite hierarchy is according to -its specific mode of realisation, and that of the finite -hierarchies is according to various other specific modes -of realisation. There is one metaphysical principle -which is essential for the rational coherence of this -account of the general character of an experient occasion. -I call this principle, ‘The Translucency of -Realisation.’ By this I mean that any eternal object -is just itself in whatever mode of realisation it is involved. -There can be no distortion of the individual -essence without thereby producing a different eternal -object. In the essence of each eternal object there -stands an indeterminateness which expresses its indifferent -patience for any mode of ingression into any actual -occasion. Thus in cognitive experience, there -can be the cognition of the same eternal object as in -the same occasion having ingression with implication -in more than one grade of realisation. Thus the translucency -of realisation, and the possible multiplicity of -modes of ingression into the same occasion, together -form the foundation for the correspondence theory of -truth.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this account of an actual occasion in terms of -its connection with the realm of eternal objects, we -have gone back to the train of thought in our second -chapter, where the nature of mathematics was discussed. -The idea, ascribed to Pythagoras, has been -amplified, and put forward as the first chapter in -metaphysics. The next chapter is concerned with the -puzzling fact that there is an actual course of events -which is in itself a limited fact, in that metaphysically -speaking it might have been otherwise. But other -<span class='pageno' id='Page_241'>241</span>metaphysical investigations are omitted; for example, -epistemology, and the classification of some elements -in the unfathomable wealth of the field of possibility. -This last topic brings metaphysics in sight of the special -topics of the various sciences.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_242'>242</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER XI <br /> <br /> GOD</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>Aristotle found it necessary to complete his metaphysics -by the introduction of a Prime Mover—God. -This, for two reasons, is an important fact in the history -of metaphysics. In the first place if we are to -accord to anyone the position of the greatest metaphysician, -having regard to genius of insight, to general -equipment in knowledge, and to the stimulus of his -metaphysical ancestry, we must choose Aristotle. Secondly, -in his consideration of this metaphysical question -he was entirely dispassionate; and he is the last -European metaphysician of first rate importance for -whom this claim can be made. After Aristotle, ethical -and religious interests began to influence metaphysical -conclusions. The Jews dispersed, first willingly -and then forcibly, and the Judaic-Alexandrian school -arose. Then Christianity closely followed by Mahometanism, -intervened. The Greek gods who surrounded -Aristotle were subordinate metaphysical entities, well -within nature. Accordingly on the subject of his -Prime Mover, he would have no motive, except to -follow his metaphysical train of thought whithersoever -it led him. It did not lead him very far towards -the production of a God available for religious purposes. -It may be doubted whether any properly general -metaphysics can ever, without the illicit introduction -<span class='pageno' id='Page_243'>243</span>of other considerations, get much further than -Aristotle. But his conclusion does represent a first -step without which no evidence on a narrower experiential -basis can be of much avail in shaping the -conception. For nothing, within any limited type of -experience, can give intelligence to shape our ideas -of any entity at the base of all actual things, unless -the general character of things requires that there be -such an entity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The phrase, Prime Mover, warns us that Aristotle’s -thought was enmeshed in the details of an erroneous -physics and an erroneous cosmology. In Aristotle’s -physics special causes were required to sustain the motions -of material things. These could easily be fitted -into his system, provided that the general cosmic motions -could be sustained. For then in relation to the -general working system, each thing could be provided -with its true end. Hence the necessity for a Prime -Mover who sustains the motions of the spheres on -which depend the adjustment of things. To-day we -repudiate the Aristotelian physics and the Aristotelian -cosmology, so that the exact form of the above argument -manifestly fails. But if our general metaphysics -is in any way similar to that outlined in the previous -chapter, an analogous metaphysical problem arises -which can be solved only in an analogous fashion. In -the place of Aristotle’s God as Prime Mover, we require -God as the Principle of Concretion. This position -can be substantiated only by the discussion -of the general implication of the course of actual -occasions,—that is to say, of the process of realisation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We conceive actuality as in essential relation to an -<span class='pageno' id='Page_244'>244</span>unfathomable possibility. Eternal objects inform actual -occasions with hierarchic patterns, included and -excluded in every variety of discrimination. Another -view of the same truth is that every actual occasion is -a limitation imposed on possibility, and that by virtue -of this limitation the particular value of that shaped -togetherness of things emerges. In this way we express -how a single occasion is to be viewed in terms -of possibility, and how possibility is to be viewed in -terms of a single actual occasion. But there are no -single occasions, in the sense of isolated occasions. Actuality -is through and through togetherness—togetherness -of otherwise isolated eternal objects, and togetherness -of all actual occasions. It is my task in this chapter -to describe the unity of actual occasions. The -previous chapter centered its interest in the abstract: -the present chapter deals with the concrete, <i>i.e.</i>, that -which has grown together.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Consider an occasion α:—we have to enumerate -how other actual occasions are in α, in the sense that -their relationships with α are constitutive of the essence -of α. What α is in itself, is that it is a unit -of realised experience; accordingly we ask how other -occasions are in the experience which is α. Also for -the present I am excluding cognitive experience. The -complete answer to this question is, that the relationships -among actual occasions are as unfathomable in -their variety of type as are those among eternal objects -in the realm of abstraction. But there are fundamental -types of such relationships in terms of which the -whole complex variety can find its description.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A preliminary for the understanding of these types -of entry (of one occasion into the essence of another) -<span class='pageno' id='Page_245'>245</span>is to note that they are involved in the modes of realisation -of abstractive hierarchies, discussed in the -previous chapter. The spatio-temporal relationships, -involved in those hierarchies as realised in α, have -all a definition in terms of α and of the occasions entrant -in α. Thus the entrant occasions lend their -aspects to the hierarchies, and thereby convert spatio-temporal -modalities into categorical determinations; -and the hierarchies lend their forms to the occasions -and thereby limit the entrant occasions to being entrant -only under those forms. Thus in the same way (as -seen in the previous chapter) that every occasion is a -synthesis of all eternal objects under the limitation of -gradations of actuality, so every occasion is a synthesis -of all occasions under the limitation of gradations of -types of entry. Each occasion synthesises the totality -of content under its own limitations of mode.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In respect to these types of internal relationship between -α and other occasions, these other occasions (as -constitutive of α) can be classified in many alternative -ways. These are all concerned with different -definitions of past, present, and future. It has been -usual in philosophy to assume that these various definitions -must necessarily be equivalent. The present -state of opinion in physical science conclusively shows -that this assumption is without metaphysical justification, -even <a id='corr245.27'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='although'>though</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_245.27'><ins class='correction' title='although'>though</ins></a></span> any such discrimination may be -found to be unnecessary for physical science. This -question has already been dealt with in the chapter on -Relativity. But the physical theory of relativity -touches only the fringe of the various theories which -are metaphysically tenable. It is important for my -argument to insist upon the unbounded freedom -<span class='pageno' id='Page_246'>246</span>within which the actual is a unique categorical determination.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Every actual occasion exhibits itself as a process: -it is a becomingness. In so disclosing itself, it places -itself as one among a multiplicity of other occasions, -without which it could not be itself. It also defines -itself as a particular individual achievement, focussing -in its limited way an unbounded realm of eternal -objects.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Any one occasion α issues from other occasions -which collectively form its <em>past</em>. It displays for itself -other occasions which collectively form its <em>present</em>. -It is in respect to its associated hierarchy, as displayed -in this immediate present, that an occasion finds its -own originality. It is that display which is its own -contribution to the output of actuality. It may be -conditioned, and even completely determined by the -past from which it issues. But its display in the present -under those conditions is what directly emerges -from its prehensive activity. The occasion α also -holds within itself an indetermination in the form of -a future, which has partial determination by reason of -its inclusion in α and also has determinate spatio-temporal -relatedness to α and to actual occasions of the -past from α and of the present for α.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This future is a synthesis in α of eternal objects as -not-being and as requiring the passage from α to -other individualisations (with determinate spatio-temporal -relations to α) in which not-being becomes -being.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is also in α what, in the previous chapter, I -have termed the ‘abrupt’ realisation of finite eternal -objects. This abrupt realisation requires <em>either</em> a reference -<span class='pageno' id='Page_247'>247</span>of the basic objects of the finite hierarchy to -determinate occasions other than α (as their situations), -in past, present, future; <em>or</em> requires a realisation -of these eternal objects in determinate relationships, -but under the aspect of exemption from inclusion in -the spatio-temporal scheme of relatedness between actual -occasions. This abrupt synthesis of eternal objects -in each occasion is the inclusion in actuality of -the analytical character of the realm of eternality. -This inclusion has those limited gradations of actuality -which characterise every occasion by reason of its -essential limitation. It is this realised extension of -eternal relatedness beyond the mutual relatedness of -the actual occasions, which prehends into each occasion -the full sweep of eternal relatedness. I term this -abrupt realisation the ‘graded envisagement’ which -each occasion prehends into its synthesis. This graded -envisagement is how the actual includes what (in one -sense) is not-being as a positive factor in its own -achievement. It is the source of error, of truth, of -art, of ethics, and of religion. By it, fact is confronted -with alternatives.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This general concept, of an event as a process whose -outcome is a unit of experience, points to the analysis -of an event into (i) substantial activity, (ii) conditioned -potentialities which are there for synthesis, and -(iii) the achieved outcome of the synthesis. The unity -of all actual occasions forbids the analysis of substantial -activities into independent entities. Each individual -activity is nothing but the mode in which the -general activity is individualised by the imposed conditions. -The envisagement which enters into the synthesis -is also a character which conditions the synthesising -<span class='pageno' id='Page_248'>248</span>activity. The general activity is not an entity -in the sense in which occasions or eternal objects are -entities. It is a general metaphysical character which -underlies all occasions, in a particular mode for each -occasion. There is nothing with which to compare it: -it is Spinoza’s one infinite substance. Its attributes -are its character of individualisation into a multiplicity -of modes, and the realm of eternal objects which -are variously synthesised in these modes. Thus eternal -possibility and modal differentiation into individual -multiplicity are the attributes of the one substance. In -fact each general element of the metaphysical situation -is an attribute of the substantial activity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Yet another element in the metaphysical situation -is disclosed by the consideration that the general attribute -of modality is limited. This element must -rank as an attribute of the substantial activity. In its -nature each mode is limited, so as not to be other -modes. But, beyond these limitations of particulars, -the general modal individualisation is limited in two -ways: In the first place it is an actual course of -events, which might be otherwise so far as concerns -eternal possibility, but <em>is</em> that course. This limitation -takes three forms, (i) the special logical relations -which all events must conform to, (ii) the selection of -relationships to which the events do conform, and (iii) -the particularity which infects the course even within -those general relationships of logic and causation. -Thus this first limitation is a limitation of antecedent -selection. So far as the general metaphysical situation -is concerned, there might have been an indiscriminate -modal pluralism apart from logical or other -limitation. But there could not then have been these -<span class='pageno' id='Page_249'>249</span>modes, for each mode represents a synthesis of actualities -which are limited to conform to a standard. -We here come to the second way of limitation. Restriction -is the price of value. There cannot be value -without antecedent standards of value, to discriminate -the acceptance or rejection of what is before the envisaging -mode of activity. Thus there is an antecedent -limitation among values, introducing contraries, -grades, and oppositions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>According to this argument the fact that there is a -process of actual occasions, and the fact that the occasions -are the emergence of values which require such -limitation, both require that the course of events should -have developed amid an antecedent limitation composed -of conditions, particularisation, and standards -of value.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus as a further element in the metaphysical situation, -there is required a principle of limitation. Some -particular <em>how</em> is necessary, and some particularisation -in the <em>what</em> of matter of fact is necessary. The -only alternative to this admission, is to deny the reality -of actual occasions. Their apparent irrational limitation -must be taken as a proof of illusion and we must -look for reality behind the scene. If we reject this -alternative behind the scene, we must provide a -ground for limitation which stands among the attributes -of the substantial activity. This attribute -provides the limitation for which no reason can be -given: for all reason flows from it. God is the ultimate -limitation, and His existence is the ultimate -irrationality. For no reason can be given for just -that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose. -God is not concrete, but He is the ground for -<span class='pageno' id='Page_250'>250</span>concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the -nature of God, because that nature is the ground of -rationality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this argument the point to notice is, that what -is metaphysically indeterminate has nevertheless to -be categorically determinate. We have come to the -limit of rationality. For there is a categorical limitation -which does not spring from any metaphysical -reason. There is a metaphysical need for a principle -of determination, but there can be no metaphysical -reason for what is determined. If there were such a -reason, there would be no need for any further principle: -for metaphysics would already have provided -the determination. The general principle of empiricism -depends upon the doctrine that there is a principle -of concretion which is not discoverable by abstract -reason. What further can be known about -God must be sought in the region of particular experiences, -and therefore rests on an empirical basis. -In respect to the interpretation of these experiences, -mankind have differed profoundly. He has been -named respectively, Jehovah, Allah, Brahma, Father -in Heaven, Order of Heaven, First Cause, Supreme -Being, Chance. Each name corresponds to a system -of thought derived from the experiences of those who -have used it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Among medieval and modern philosophers, anxious -to establish the religious significance of God, an unfortunate -habit has prevailed of paying to Him metaphysical -compliments. He has been conceived as the -foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate -activity. If this conception be adhered to, there -can be no alternative except to discern in Him the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_251'>251</span>origin of all evil as well as of all good. He is then -the supreme author of the play, and to Him must -therefore be ascribed its shortcomings as well as its -success. If He be conceived as the supreme ground -for limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide -the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason -‘within her dominions supreme.’</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_252'>252</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER XII <br /> <br /> RELIGION AND SCIENCE</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The difficulty in approaching the question of the relations -between Religion and Science is, that its elucidation -requires that we have in our minds some clear -idea of what we mean by either of the terms, ‘religion’ -and ‘science.’ Also I wish to speak in the most general -way possible, and to keep in the background any comparison -of particular creeds, scientific or religious. -We have got to understand the type of connection -which exists between the two spheres, and then to -draw some definite conclusions respecting the existing -situation which at present confronts the world.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The <em>conflict</em> between religion and science is what -naturally occurs to our minds when we think of this -subject. It seems as though, during the last half-century, -the results of science and the beliefs of religion -had come into a position of frank disagreement, -from which there can be no escape, except by abandoning -either the clear teaching of science, or the -clear teaching of religion. This conclusion has been -urged by controversialists on either side. Not by all -controversialists, of course, but by those trenchant -intellects which every controversy calls out into the -open.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The distress of sensitive minds, and the zeal for -truth, and the sense of the importance of the issues, -must command our sincerest sympathy. When we -<span class='pageno' id='Page_253'>253</span>consider what religion is for mankind, and what science -is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future -course of history depends upon the decision of this -generation as to the relations between them. We -have here the two strongest general forces (apart from -the mere impulse of the various senses) which influence -men, and they seem to be set one against the -other—the force of our religious intuitions, and the -force of our impulse to accurate observation and -logical deduction.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A great English statesman once advised his countrymen -to use large-scale maps, as a preservative against -alarms, panics, and general misunderstanding of the -true relations between nations. In the same way in -dealing with the clash between permanent elements -of human nature, it is well to map our history on a -large scale, and to disengage ourselves from our immediate -absorption in the present conflicts. When -we do this, we immediately discover two great facts. -In the first place, there has always been a conflict between -religion and science; and in the second place, -both religion and science have always been in a state -of continual development. In the early days of -Christianity, there was a general belief among Christians -that the world was coming to an end in the lifetime -of people then living. We can make only indirect -inferences as to how far this belief was authoritatively -proclaimed; but it is certain that it was widely -held, and that it formed an impressive part of the -popular religious doctrine. The belief proved itself -to be mistaken, and Christian doctrine adjusted itself -to the change. Again in the early Church individual -theologians very confidently deduced from the Bible -<span class='pageno' id='Page_254'>254</span>opinions concerning the nature of the physical universe. -In the year A. D. 535, a monk named Cosmas<a id='r17' /><a href='#f17' class='c013'><sup>[17]</sup></a> -wrote a book which he entitled, <cite>Christian Topography</cite>. -He was a travelled man who had visited India -and Ethiopia; and finally he lived in a monastery at -Alexandria, which was then a great centre of culture. -In this book, basing himself upon the direct meaning -of Biblical texts as construed by him in a literal fashion, -he denied the existence of the antipodes, and -asserted that the world is a flat parallelogram whose -length is double its breadth.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f17'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r17'>17</a>. <i>Cf.</i> Lecky’s <cite>The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe</cite>, -Ch. III.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>In the seventeenth century the doctrine of the motion -of the earth was condemned by a Catholic tribunal. -A hundred years ago the extension of time -demanded by geological science distressed religious -people, Protestant and Catholic. And to-day the doctrine -of evolution is an equal stumbling-block. These -are only a few instances illustrating a general fact.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But all our ideas will be in a wrong perspective if -we think that this recurring perplexity was confined -to contradictions between religion and science; and -that in these controversies religion was always -wrong, and that science was always right. The true -facts of the case are very much more complex, and -refuse to be summarised in these simple terms.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Theology itself exhibits exactly the same character -of gradual development, arising from an aspect of -conflict between its own proper ideas. This fact is -a commonplace to theologians, but is often obscured -in the stress of controversy. I do not wish to overstate -my case; so I will confine myself to Roman -<span class='pageno' id='Page_255'>255</span>Catholic writers. In the seventeenth century a learned -Jesuit, Father Petavius, showed that the theologians -of the first three centuries of Christianity made use -of phrases and statements which since the fifth century -would be condemned as heretical. Also Cardinal -Newman devoted a treatise to the discussion of the -development of doctrine. He wrote it before he became -a great Roman Catholic ecclesiastic; but -throughout his life, it was never retracted and continually -reissued.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Science is even more changeable than theology. -No man of science could subscribe without qualification -to Galileo’s beliefs, or to Newton’s beliefs, or to -all his own scientific beliefs of ten years ago.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In both regions of thought, additions, distinctions, -and modifications have been introduced. So that -now, even when the same assertion is made to-day as -was made a thousand, or fifteen hundred years ago, -it is made subject to limitations or expansions of -meaning, which were not contemplated at the earlier -epoch. We are told by logicians that a proposition -must be either true or false, and that there is no -middle term. But in practice, we may know that a -proposition expresses an important truth, but that -it is subject to limitations and qualifications which at -present remain undiscovered. It is a general feature -of our knowledge, that we are insistently aware of -important truths; and yet that the only formulations -of these truths which we are able to make presuppose -a general standpoint of conceptions which may have -to be modified. I will give you two illustrations, -both from science: Galileo said that the earth moves -and that the sun is fixed; the Inquisition said that the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_256'>256</span>earth is fixed and the sun moves; and Newtonian astronomers, -adopting an absolute theory of space, said -that both the sun and the earth move. But now we -say that any one of these three statements is equally -true, provided that you have fixed your sense of ‘rest’ -and ‘motion’ in the way required by the statement -adopted. At the date of Galileo’s controversy with -the Inquisition, Galileo’s way of stating the facts was, -beyond question, the fruitful procedure for the sake -of scientific research. But in itself it was not more -true than the formulation of the Inquisition. But -at that time the modern concepts of relative motion -were in nobody’s mind; so that the statements were -made in ignorance of the qualifications required for -their more perfect truth. Yet this question of the -motions of the earth and the sun expresses a real fact -in the universe; and all sides had got hold of important -truths concerning it. But with the knowledge -of those times, the truths appeared to be inconsistent.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Again I will give you another example taken from -the state of modern physical science. Since the time -of Newton and Huyghens in the seventeenth century -there have been two theories as to the physical nature -of light. Newton’s theory was that a beam of light -consists of a stream of very minute particles, or -corpuscles, and that we have the sensation of light -when these corpuscles strike the retinas of our eyes. -Huyghens’ theory was that light consists of very -minute waves of trembling in an all-pervading ether, -and that these waves are travelling along a beam of -light. The two theories are contradictory. In the -eighteenth century Newton’s theory was believed, in -<span class='pageno' id='Page_257'>257</span>the nineteenth century Huyghens’ theory was believed. -To-day there is one large group of phenomena which -can be explained only on the wave theory, and another -large group which can be explained only on the corpuscular -theory. Scientists have to leave it at that, -and wait for the future, in the hope of attaining some -wider vision which reconciles both.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We should apply these same principles to the questions -in which there is a variance between science -and religion. We would believe nothing in either -sphere of thought which does not appear to us to -be certified by solid reasons based upon the critical -research either of ourselves or of competent authorities. -But granting that we have honestly taken this -precaution, a clash between the two on points of detail -where they overlap should not lead us hastily -to abandon doctrines for which we have solid evidence. -It may be that we are more interested in -one set of doctrines than in the other. But, if we -have any sense of perspective and of the history -of thought, we shall wait and refrain from mutual -anathemas.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We should wait: but we should not wait passively, -or in despair. The clash is a sign that there are -wider truths and finer perspectives within which a -reconciliation of a deeper religion and a more subtle -science will be found.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In one sense, therefore, the conflict between science -and religion is a slight matter which has been -unduly emphasised. A mere logical contradiction -cannot in itself point to more than the necessity of -some readjustments, possibly of a very minor character -on both sides. Remember the widely different -<span class='pageno' id='Page_258'>258</span>aspects of events which are dealt with in science -and in religion respectively. Science is concerned -with the general conditions which are observed to -regulate physical phenomena; whereas religion is -wholly wrapped up in the contemplation of moral -and aesthetic values. On the one side there is the -law of gravitation, and on the other the contemplation -of the beauty of holiness. What one side sees, -the other misses; and vice versa.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Consider, for example, the lives of John Wesley -and of Saint Francis of Assisi. For physical science -you have in these lives merely ordinary examples of -the operation of the principles of physiological chemistry, -and of the dynamics of nervous reactions: for -religion you have lives of the most profound significance -in the history of the world. Can you be -surprised that, in the absence of a perfect and complete -phrasing of the principles of science and of -the principles of religion which apply to these specific -cases, the accounts of these lives from these divergent -standpoints should involve discrepancies? It would -be a miracle if it were not so.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It would, however, be missing the point to think -that we need not trouble ourselves about the conflict -between science and religion. In an intellectual age -there can be no active interest which puts aside all -hope of a vision of the harmony of truth. To acquiesce -in discrepancy is destructive of candour, and of -moral cleanliness. It belongs to the self-respect of -intellect to pursue every tangle of thought to its final -unravelment. If you check that impulse, you will -get no religion and no science from an awakened -thoughtfulness. The important question is, In what -<span class='pageno' id='Page_259'>259</span>spirit are we going to face the issue? There we come -to something absolutely vital.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A clash of doctrines is not a disaster—it is an opportunity. -I will explain my meaning by some illustrations -from science. The weight of an atom of -nitrogen was well known. Also it was an established -scientific doctrine that the average weight of such -atoms in any considerable mass will be always the -same. Two experimenters, the late Lord Rayleigh and -the late Sir William Ramsay, found that if they obtained -nitrogen by two different methods, each equally -effective for that purpose, they always observed a persistent -slight difference between the average weights -of the atoms in the two cases. Now I ask you, -would it have been rational of these men to have -despaired because of this conflict between chemical -theory and scientific observation? Suppose that for -some reason the chemical doctrine had been highly -prized throughout some district as the foundation of -its social order:—would it have been wise, would it -have been candid, would it have been moral, to forbid -the disclosure of the fact that the experiments produced -discordant results? Or, on the other hand, -should Sir William Ramsay and Lord Rayleigh have -proclaimed that chemical theory was now a detected -delusion? We see at once that either of these ways -would have been a method of facing the issue in an -entirely wrong spirit. What Rayleigh and Ramsay -did do was this: They at once perceived that they -had hit upon a line of investigation which would disclose -some subtlety of chemical theory that had -hitherto eluded observation. The discrepancy was -not a disaster: it was an opportunity to increase the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_260'>260</span>sweep of chemical knowledge. You all know the end -of the story: finally argon was discovered, a new -chemical element which had lurked undetected, mixed -with the nitrogen. But the story has a sequel which -forms my second illustration. This discovery drew -attention to the importance of observing accurately -minute differences in chemical substances as obtained -by different methods. Further researches of the most -careful accuracy were undertaken. Finally another -physicist, F. W. Aston, working in the Cavendish -Laboratory at Cambridge in England, discovered that -even the same element might assume two or more distinct -forms, termed <em>isotopes</em>, and that the law of the -constancy of average atomic weight holds for each of -these forms, but as between the different isotopes differs -slightly. The research has effected a great stride -in the power of chemical theory, far transcending in -importance the discovery of argon from which it -originated. The moral of these stories lies on the surface, -and I will leave to you their application to the -case of religion and science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In formal logic, a contradiction is the signal of a -defeat: but in the evolution of real knowledge it -marks the first step in progress towards a victory. -This is one great reason for the utmost toleration of -variety of opinion. Once and forever, this duty of -toleration has been summed up in the words, ‘Let both -grow together until the harvest.’ The failure of -Christians to act up to this precept, of the highest -authority, is one of the curiosities of religious history. -But we have not yet exhausted the discussion of the -moral temper required for the pursuit of truth. There -are short cuts leading merely to an illusory success. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_261'>261</span>It is easy enough to find a theory, logically harmonious -and with important applications in the region of -fact, provided that you are content to disregard half -your evidence. Every age produces people with clear -logical intellects, and with the most praiseworthy -grasp of the importance of some sphere of human experience, -who have elaborated, or inherited, a scheme -of thought which exactly fits those experiences which -claim their interest. Such people are apt resolutely -to ignore, or to explain away, all evidence which -confuses their scheme with contradictory instances. -What they cannot fit in is for them nonsense. An -unflinching determination to take the whole evidence -into account is the only method of preservation against -the fluctuating extremes of fashionable opinion. This -advice seems so easy, and is in fact so difficult to -follow.</p> - -<p class='c001'>One reason for this difficulty is that we cannot think -first and act afterwards. From the moment of birth -we are immersed in action, and can only fitfully guide -it by taking thought. We have, therefore, in various -spheres of experience to adopt those ideas which seem -to work within those spheres. It is absolutely necessary -to trust to ideas which are generally adequate, -even though we know that there are subtleties and distinctions -beyond our ken. Also apart from the necessities -of action, we cannot even keep before our minds -the whole evidence except under the guise of doctrines -which are incompletely harmonised. We cannot -think in terms of an indefinite multiplicity of -detail; our evidence can acquire its proper importance -only if it comes before us marshalled by general -ideas. These ideas we inherit—they form the tradition -<span class='pageno' id='Page_262'>262</span>of our civilisation. Such traditional ideas are -never static. They are either fading into meaningless -formulae, or are gaining power by the new lights -thrown by a more delicate apprehension. They are -transformed by the urge of critical reason, by the -vivid evidence of emotional experience, and by the -cold certainties of scientific perception. One fact is -certain, you cannot keep them still. No generation -can merely reproduce its ancestors. You may preserve -the life in a flux of form, or preserve the form -amid an ebb of life. But you cannot permanently -enclose the same life in the same mould.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The present state of religion among the European -races illustrates the statements which I have been -making. The phenomena are mixed. There have -been reactions and revivals. But on the whole, during -many generations, there has been a gradual decay -of religious influence in European civilisation. Each -revival touches a lower peak than its predecessor, and -each period of slackness a lower depth. The average -curve marks a steady fall in religious tone. In some -countries the interest in religion is higher than in -others. But in those countries where the interest is -relatively high, it still falls as the generations pass. -Religion is tending to degenerate into a decent formula -wherewith to embellish a comfortable life. A great -historical movement on this scale results from the -convergence of many causes. I wish to suggest two -of them which lie within the scope of this chapter -for consideration.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the first place for over two centuries religion -has been on the defensive, and on a weak defensive. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_263'>263</span>The period has been one of unprecedented intellectual -progress. In this way a series of novel situations have -been produced for thought. Each such occasion has -found the religious thinkers unprepared. Something, -which has been proclaimed to be vital, has finally, -after struggle, distress, and anathema, been modified -and otherwise interpreted. The next generation of -religious apologists then congratulates the religious -world on the deeper insight which has been gained. -The result of the continued repetition of this undignified -retreat, during many generations, has at last -almost entirely destroyed the intellectual authority -of religious thinkers. Consider this contrast: when -Darwin or Einstein proclaim theories which modify -our ideas, it is a triumph for science. We do not go -about saying that there is another defeat for science, -because its old ideas have been abandoned. We know -that another step of scientific insight has been gained.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Religion will not regain its old power until it can -face change in the same spirit as does science. Its -principles may be eternal, but the expression of those -principles requires continual development. This evolution -of religion is in the main a disengagement of -its own proper ideas from the adventitious notions -which have crept into it by reason of the expression of -its own ideas in terms of the imaginative picture of the -world entertained in previous ages. Such a release -of religion from the bonds of imperfect science is -all to the good. It stresses its own genuine message. -The great point to be kept in mind is that normally -an advance in science will show that statements of -various religious beliefs require some sort of modification. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_264'>264</span>It may be that they have to be expanded or -explained, or indeed entirely restated. If the religion -is a sound expression of truth, this modification will -only exhibit more adequately the exact point which is -of importance. This process is a gain. In so far, -therefore, as any religion has any contact with physical -facts, it is to be expected that the point of view of -those facts must be continually modified as scientific -knowledge advances. In this way, the exact relevance -of these facts for religious thought will grow more -and more clear. The progress of science must result -in the unceasing modification of religious thought, to -the great advantage of religion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The religious controversies of the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries put theologians into a most unfortunate -state of mind. They were always attacking -and defending. They pictured themselves as the -garrison of a fort surrounded by hostile forces. All -such pictures express half-truths. That is why they -are so popular. But they are dangerous. This particular -picture fostered a pugnacious party spirit -which really expresses an ultimate lack of faith. They -dared not modify, because they shirked the task of -disengaging their spiritual message from the associations -of a particular imagery.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Let me explain myself by an example. In the early -medieval times, Heaven was in the sky, and Hell was -underground; volcanoes were the jaws of Hell. I do -not assert that these beliefs entered into the official -formulations: but they did enter into the popular -understanding of the general doctrines of Heaven -and Hell. These notions were what everyone thought -to be implied by the doctrine of the future state. They -<span class='pageno' id='Page_265'>265</span>entered into the explanations of the most influential -exponents of Christian belief. For example, they -occur in the <cite>Dialogues</cite> of Pope Gregory,<a id='r18' /><a href='#f18' class='c013'><sup>[18]</sup></a> the Great, -a man whose high official position is surpassed only -by the magnitude of his services to humanity. I am -not saying what we ought to believe about the future -state. But whatever be the right doctrine, in this -instance the clash between religion and science, -which has relegated the earth to the position of a -second-rate planet attached to a second-rate sun, has -been greatly to the benefit of the spirituality of religion -by dispersing these medieval fancies.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f18'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r18'>18</a>. <i>Cf.</i> Gregorovius’ <cite>History of Rome in the Middle Ages</cite>, Book -III, Ch. III, Vol. II, English Trans.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>Another way of looking at this question of the -evolution of religious thought is to note that any -verbal form of statement which has been before the -world for some time discloses ambiguities; and that -often such ambiguities strike at the very heart of the -meaning. The effective sense in which a doctrine has -been held in the past cannot be determined by the -mere logical analysis of verbal statements, made in -ignorance of the logical trap. You have to take into -account the whole reaction of human nature to the -scheme of thought. This reaction is of a mixed character, -including elements of emotion derived from -our lower natures. It is here that the impersonal -criticism of science and of philosophy comes to the -aid of religious evolution. Example after example -can be given of this motive force in development. -For example, the logical difficulties inherent in the -doctrine of the moral cleansing of human nature by -the power of religion rent Christianity in the days -<span class='pageno' id='Page_266'>266</span>of Pelagius and Augustine—that is to say, at the beginning -of the fifth century. Echoes of that controversy -still linger in theology.</p> - -<p class='c001'>So far, my point has been this: that religion is the -expression of one type of fundamental experiences of -mankind: that religious thought develops into an increasing -accuracy of expression, disengaged from adventitious -imagery: that the interaction between religion -and science is one great factor in promoting -this development.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I now come to my second reason for the modern -fading of interest in religion. This involves the ultimate -question which I stated in my opening sentences. -We have to know what we mean by religion. -The churches, in their presentation of their answers -to this query, have put forward aspects of religion -which are expressed in terms either suited to the emotional -reactions of bygone times or directed to excite -modern emotional interests of a nonreligious character. -What I mean under the first heading is that -religious appeal is directed partly to excite that instinctive -fear of the wrath of a tyrant which was -inbred in the unhappy populations of the arbitrary -empires of the ancient world, and in particular to -excite that fear of an all-powerful arbitrary tyrant -behind the unknown forces of nature. This appeal to -the ready instinct of brute fear is losing its force. -It lacks any directness of response, because modern -science and modern conditions of life have taught us -to meet occasions of apprehension by a critical analysis -of their causes and conditions. Religion is the reaction -of human nature to its search for God. The presentation -of God under the aspect of power awakens -<span class='pageno' id='Page_267'>267</span>every modern instinct of critical reaction. This is -fatal; for religion collapses unless its main positions -command immediacy of assent. In this respect the -old phraseology is at variance with the psychology of -modern civilisations. This change in psychology is -largely due to science, and is one of the chief ways in -which the advance of science has weakened the hold -of the old religious forms of expression. The nonreligious -motive which has entered into modern religious -thought is the desire for a comfortable organisation -of modern society. Religion has been presented -as valuable for the ordering of life. Its claims have -been rested upon its function as a sanction to right -conduct. Also the purpose of right conduct quickly -degenerates into the formation of pleasing social relations. -We have here a subtle degradation of religious -ideas, following upon their gradual purification under -the influence of keener ethical intuitions. Conduct is -a by-product of religion—an inevitable by-product, -but not the main point. Every great religious teacher -has revolted against the presentation of religion as a -mere sanction of rules of conduct. Saint Paul denounced -the Law, and Puritan divines spoke of the -filthy rags of righteousness. The insistence upon -rules of conduct marks the ebb of religious fervour. -Above and beyond all things, the religious life is not -a research after comfort. I must now state, in all -diffidence, what I conceive to be the essential character -of the religious spirit.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Religion is the vision of something which stands -beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate -things; something which is real, and yet waiting -to be realised; something which is a remote possibility, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_268'>268</span>and yet the greatest of present facts; something -that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet -eludes apprehension; something whose possession is -the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something -which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The immediate reaction of human nature to the -religious vision is worship. Religion has emerged -into human experience mixed with the crudest fancies -of barbaric imagination. Gradually, slowly, steadily -the vision recurs in history under nobler form and -with clearer expression. It is the one element in -human experience which persistently shows an upward -trend. It fades and then recurs. But when it -renews its force, it recurs with an added richness and -purity of content. The fact of the religious vision, -and its history of persistent expansion, is our one -ground for optimism. Apart from it, human life is -a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a mass of -pain and misery, a bagatelle of transient experience.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The vision claims nothing but worship; and worship -is a surrender to the claim for assimilation, urged -with the motive force of mutual love. The vision -never overrules. It is always there, and it has the -power of love presenting the one purpose whose fulfilment -is eternal harmony. Such order as we find in -nature is never force—it presents itself as the one -harmonious adjustment of complex detail. Evil is -the brute motive force of fragmentary purpose, disregarding -the eternal vision. Evil is overruling, retarding, -hurting. The power of God is the worship -He inspires. That religion is strong which in its -ritual and its modes of thought evokes an apprehension -<span class='pageno' id='Page_269'>269</span>of the commanding vision. The worship of God -is not a rule of safety—it is an adventure of the spirit, -a flight after the unattainable. The death of religion -comes with the repression of the high hope of -adventure.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_270'>270</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER XIII <br /> <br /> REQUISITES FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>It has been the purpose of these lectures to analyse -the reactions of science in forming that background -of instinctive ideas which control the activities of -successive generations. Such a background takes the -form of a certain vague philosophy as to the last word -about things, when all is said. The three centuries, -which form the epoch of modern science, have revolved -round the ideas of <em>God</em>, <em>mind</em>, <em>matter</em>, and -also of <em>space</em> and <em>time</em> in their characters of expressing -<em>simple location</em> for matter. Philosophy has on -the whole emphasised <em>mind</em>, and has thus been out of -touch with science during the two latter centuries. -But it is creeping back into its old importance owing -to the rise of psychology and its alliance with physiology. -Also, this rehabilitation of philosophy has been -facilitated by the recent breakdown of the seventeenth -century settlement of the principles of physical science. -But, until that collapse, science seated itself -securely upon the concepts of matter, space, time, and -latterly, of energy. Also there were arbitrary laws -of nature determining locomotion. They were empirically -observed, but for some obscure reason were -known to be universal. Anyone who in practice or -theory disregarded them was denounced with unsparing -vigour. This position on the part of scientists -was pure bluff, if one may credit them with believing -<span class='pageno' id='Page_271'>271</span>their own statements. For their current philosophy -completely failed to justify the assumption that the -immediate knowledge inherent in any present occasion -throws any light either on its past, or its future.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I have also sketched an alternative philosophy of -science in which <em>organism</em> takes the place of <em>matter</em>. -For this purpose, the mind involved in the materialist -theory dissolves into a function of organism. The -psychological field then exhibits what an event is in -itself. Our bodily event is an unusually complex -type of organism and consequently includes cognition. -Further, space and time, in their most concrete signification, -become the locus of events. An organism -is the realisation of a definite shape of value. The -emergence of some actual value depends on limitation -which excludes neutralising cross-lights. Thus -an event is a matter of fact which by reason of its -limitation is a value for itself; but by reason of its -very nature it also requires the whole universe in order -to be itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Importance depends on endurance. Endurance is -the retention through time of an achievement of -value. What endures is identity of pattern, self-inherited. -Endurance requires the favourable -environment. The whole of science revolves round -this question of enduring organisms.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The general influence of science at the present -moment can be analysed under the headings: General -Conceptions Respecting the Universe, Technological -Applications, Professionalism in Knowledge, Influence -of Biological Doctrines on the Motives of Conduct. -I have endeavoured in the preceding lectures -to give a glimpse of these points. It lies within the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_272'>272</span>scope of this concluding lecture to consider the reaction -of science upon some problems confronting -civilised societies.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The general conceptions introduced by science into -modern thought cannot be separated from the philosophical -situation as expressed by Descartes. I mean -the assumption of bodies and minds as independent -individual substances, each existing in its own right -apart from any necessary reference to each other. -Such a conception was very concordant with the individualism -which had issued from the moral discipline -of the Middle Ages. But, though the easy reception -of the idea is thus explained, the derivation in itself -rests upon a confusion, very natural but none the less -unfortunate. The moral discipline had emphasized -the intrinsic value of the individual entity. This emphasis -had put the notions of the individual and of its -experiences into the foreground of thought. At this -point the confusion commences. The emergent individual -value of each entity is transformed into the independent -substantial existence of each entity, which -is a very different notion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I do not mean to say that Descartes made this logical, -or rather illogical, transition, in the form of explicit -reasoning. Far from it. What he did, was -first to concentrate upon his own conscious experiences, -as being facts within the independent world of -his own mentality. He was led to speculate in this -way by the current emphasis upon the individual value -of his total self. He implicitly transformed this -emergent individual value, inherent in the very fact of -his own reality, into a private world of passions, or -modes, of independent substance.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_273'>273</span>Also the independence ascribed to bodily substances -carried them away from the realm of values altogether. -They degenerated into a mechanism entirely -valueless, except as suggestive of an external ingenuity. -The heavens had lost the glory of God. This state -of mind is illustrated in the recoil of Protestantism -from aesthetic effects dependent upon a material -medium. It was taken to lead to an ascription of value -to what is in itself valueless. This recoil was already -in full strength antecedently to Descartes. Accordingly, -the Cartesian scientific doctrine of bits of matter, -bare of intrinsic value, was merely a formulation, -in explicit terms, of a doctrine which was current before -its entrance into scientific thought or Cartesian -philosophy. Probably this doctrine was latent in the -scholastic philosophy, but it did not lead to its consequences -till it met with the mentality of northern -Europe in the sixteenth century. But science, as -equipped by Descartes, gave stability and intellectual -status to a point of view which has had very mixed -effects upon the moral presuppositions of modern communities. -Its good effects arose from its efficiency as a -method for scientific researches within those limited -regions which were then best suited for exploration. -The result was a general clearing of the European -mind away from the stains left upon it by the hysteria -of remote barbaric ages. This was all to the good, and -was most completely exemplified in the eighteenth -century.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But in the nineteenth century, when society was -undergoing transformation into the manufacturing -system, the bad effects of these doctrines have been -very fatal. The doctrine of minds, as independent -<span class='pageno' id='Page_274'>274</span>substances, leads directly not merely to private worlds -of experience, but also to private worlds of morals. -The moral intuitions can be held to apply only to the -strictly private world of psychological experience. -Accordingly, self-respect, and the making the most of -your own individual opportunities, together constituted -the efficient morality of the leaders among the -industrialists of that period. The western world is -now suffering from the limited moral outlook of the -three previous generations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also the assumption of the bare valuelessness of -mere matter led to a lack of reverence in the treatment -of natural or artistic beauty. Just when the urbanisation -of the western world was entering upon its <a id='corr274.14'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='stake'>state</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_274.14'><ins class='correction' title='stake'>state</ins></a></span> -of rapid development, and when the most delicate, -anxious consideration of the aesthetic qualities of the -new material environment was requisite, the doctrine -of the irrelevance of such ideas was at its height. In -the most advanced industrial countries, art was -treated as a frivolity. A striking example of this state -of mind in the middle of the nineteenth century is to -be seen in London where the marvellous beauty of the -estuary of the Thames, as it curves through the city, -is wantonly defaced by the Charing Cross railway -bridge, constructed apart from any reference to -aesthetic values.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The two evils are: one, the ignoration of the true -relation of each organism to its environment; and the -other, the habit of ignoring the intrinsic worth of the -environment which must be allowed its weight in any -consideration of final ends.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Another great fact confronting the modern world is -the discovery of the method of training professionals, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_275'>275</span>who specialise in particular regions of thought and -thereby progressively add to the sum of knowledge -within their respective limitations of subject. In consequence -of the success of this professionalising of -knowledge, there are two points to be kept in mind, -which differentiate our present age from the past. -In the first place, the rate of progress is such that -an individual human being, of ordinary length of life, -will be called upon to face novel situations which find -no parallel in his past. The fixed person for the fixed -duties, who in older societies was such a godsend, in -the future will be a public danger. In the second -place, the modern professionalism in knowledge -works in the opposite direction so far as the intellectual -sphere is concerned. The modern chemist is -likely to be weak in zoology, weaker still in his general -knowledge of the Elizabethan drama, and completely -ignorant of the principles of rhythm in English -versification. It is probably safe to ignore his -knowledge of ancient history. Of course I am speaking -of general tendencies; for chemists are no worse -than engineers, or mathematicians, or classical scholars. -Effective knowledge is professionalised knowledge, -supported by a restricted acquaintance with -useful subjects subservient to it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This situation has its dangers. It produces minds in -a groove. Each profession makes progress, but it is -progress in its own groove. Now to be mentally in -a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of abstractions. -The groove prevents straying across country, -and the abstraction abstracts from something to -which no further attention is paid. But there is no -groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension -<span class='pageno' id='Page_276'>276</span>of human life. Thus in the modern -world, the celibacy of the medieval learned class has -been replaced by a celibacy of the intellect which is -divorced from the concrete contemplation of the complete -facts. Of course, no one is merely a mathematician, -or merely a lawyer. People have lives outside -their professions or their businesses. But the point -is the restraint of serious thought within a groove. -The remainder of life is treated superficially, with -the imperfect categories of thought derived from one -profession.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The dangers arising from this aspect of professionalism -are great, particularly in our democratic -societies. The directive force of reason is weakened. -The leading intellects lack balance. They see this -set of circumstances, or that set; but not both sets together. -The task of <a id='corr276.17'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='coödination'>coördination</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_276.17'><ins class='correction' title='coödination'>coördination</ins></a></span> is left to those who -lack either the force or the character to succeed in -some definite career. In short, the specialised functions -of the community are performed better and more -progressively, but the generalised direction lacks -vision. The progressiveness in detail only adds to -the danger produced by the feebleness of coördination.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This criticism of modern life applies throughout, -in whatever sense you construe the meaning of a community. -It holds if you apply it to a nation, a city, a -district, an institution, a family, or even to an individual. -There is a development of particular abstractions, -and a contraction of concrete appreciation. The -whole is lost in one of its aspects. It is not necessary -for my point that I should maintain that our directive -wisdom, either as individuals or as communities, is -<span class='pageno' id='Page_277'>277</span>less now than in the past. Perhaps it has slightly improved. -But the novel pace of progress requires a -greater force of direction if disasters are to be -avoided. The point is that the discoveries of the nineteenth -century were in the direction of professionalism, -so that we are left with no expansion of wisdom -and with greater need of it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Wisdom is the fruit of a balanced development. It -is this balanced growth of individuality which it -should be the aim of education to secure. The most -useful discoveries for the immediate future would -concern the furtherance of this aim without detriment -to the necessary intellectual professionalism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>My own criticism of our traditional educational -methods is that they are far too much occupied with -intellectual analysis, and with the acquirement of -formularised information. What I mean is, that we -neglect to strengthen habits of concrete appreciation -of the individual facts in their full interplay of -emergent values, and that we merely emphasise abstract -formulations which ignore this aspect of the -interplay of diverse values.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In every country the problem of the balance of the -general and specialist education is under consideration. -I cannot speak with first-hand knowledge of any -country but my own. I know that there, among practical -educationalists, there is considerable dissatisfaction -with the existing practice. Also, the adaptation -of the whole system to the needs of a democratic community -is very far from being solved. I do not think -that the secret of the solution lies in terms of the antithesis -between thoroughness in special knowledge and -general knowledge of a slighter character. The make-weight -<span class='pageno' id='Page_278'>278</span>which balances the thoroughness of the specialist -intellectual training should be of a radically -different kind from purely intellectual analytical -knowledge. At present our education combines a -thorough study of a few abstractions, with a slighter -study of a larger number of abstractions. We are too -exclusively bookish in our scholastic routine. The -general training should aim at eliciting our concrete -apprehensions, and should satisfy the itch of youth to -be doing something. There should be some analysis -even here, but only just enough to illustrate the ways -of thinking in diverse spheres. In the Garden of Eden -Adam saw the animals before he named them: in the -traditional system, children named the animals before -they saw them.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is no easy single solution of the practical difficulties -of education. We can, however, guide ourselves -by a certain simplicity in its general theory. -The student should concentrate within a limited field. -Such concentration should include all practical and intellectual -acquirements requisite for that concentration. -This is the ordinary procedure; and, in respect to it, -I should be inclined even to increase the facilities for -concentration rather than to diminish them. With the -concentration there are associated certain subsidiary -studies, such as languages for science. Such a scheme -of professional training should be directed to a clear -end congenial to the student. It is not necessary to -elaborate the qualifications of these statements. Such -a training must, of course, have the width requisite -for its end. But its design should not be complicated -by the consideration of other ends. This professional -training can only touch one side of education. Its -<span class='pageno' id='Page_279'>279</span>centre of gravity lies in the intellect, and its chief tool -is the printed book. The centre of gravity of the -other side of training should lie in intuition without -an analytical divorce from the total environment. Its -object is immediate apprehension with the minimum -of eviscerating analysis. The type of generality, -which above all is wanted, is the appreciation of variety -of value. I mean an aesthetic growth. There -is something between the gross specialised values of -the mere practical man, and the thin specialised values -of the mere scholar. Both types have missed something; -and if you add together the two sets of values, -you do not obtain the missing elements. What is -wanted is an appreciation of the infinite variety of -vivid values achieved by an organism in its proper -environment. When you understand all about the -sun and all about the atmosphere and all about the -rotation of the earth, you may still miss the radiance -of the sunset. There is no substitute for the direct -perception of the concrete achievement of a thing in -its actuality. We want concrete fact with a high light -thrown on what is relevant to its preciousness.</p> - -<p class='c001'>What I mean is art <a id='corr279.22'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='(and'>and</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_279.22'><ins class='correction' title='(and'>and</ins></a></span> aesthetic education. It -is, however, art in such a general sense of the term -that I hardly like to call it by that name. Art is a -special example. What we want is to draw out habits -of aesthetic apprehension. According to the metaphysical -doctrine which I have been developing, to -do so is to increase the depth of individuality. The -analysis of reality indicates the two factors, activity -emerging into individualised aesthetic value. Also -the emergent value is the measure of the individualisation -of the activity. We must foster the creative -<span class='pageno' id='Page_280'>280</span>initiative towards the maintenance of objective values. -You will not obtain the apprehension without the initiative, -or the initiative without the apprehension. -As soon as you get towards the concrete, you cannot -exclude action. Sensitiveness without impulse spells -decadence, and impulse without sensitiveness spells -brutality. I am using the word “sensitiveness” in its -most general signification, so as to include apprehension -of what lies beyond oneself; that is to say, sensitiveness -to all the facts of the case. Thus “art” in -the general sense which I require is any selection by -which the concrete facts are so arranged as to elicit -attention to particular values which are realisable by -them. For example, the mere disposing of the human -body and the eyesight so as to get a good view of a -sunset is a simple form of artistic selection. The habit -of art is the habit of enjoying vivid values.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But, in this sense, art concerns more than sunsets. -A factory, with its machinery, its community of operatives, -its social service to the general population, its -dependence upon organising and designing genius, its -potentialities as a source of wealth to the holders of -its stock is an organism exhibiting a variety of vivid -values. What we want to train is the habit of apprehending -such an organism in its completeness. It is -very arguable that the science of political economy, as -studied in its first period after the death of Adam -Smith (1790), did more harm than good. It destroyed -many economic fallacies, and taught how to -think about the economic revolution then in progress. -But it riveted on men a certain set of abstractions -which were disastrous in their influence on modern -mentality. It de-humanised industry. This is only -<span class='pageno' id='Page_281'>281</span>one example of a general danger inherent in modern -science. Its methodological procedure is exclusive -and intolerant, and rightly so. It fixes attention on a -definite group of abstractions, neglects everything -else, and elicits every scrap of information and theory -which is relevant to what it has retained. This -method is triumphant, provided that the abstractions -are judicious. But, however triumphant, the triumph -is within limits. The neglect of these limits leads to -disastrous oversights. The anti-rationalism of science -is partly justified, as a preservation of its useful -methodology; it is partly mere irrational prejudice. -Modern professionalism is the training of minds to -conform to the methodology. The historical revolt -of the seventeenth century, and the earlier reaction -towards naturalism, were examples of transcending -the abstractions which fascinated educated society in -the Middle Ages. These early ages had an ideal of -rationalism, but they failed in its pursuit. For they -neglected to note that the methodology of reasoning -requires the limitations involved in the abstract. Accordingly, -the true rationalism must always transcend -itself by recurrence to the concrete in search of inspiration. -A self-satisfied rationalism is in effect a -form of anti-rationalism. It means an arbitrary halt -at a particular set of abstractions. This was the case -with science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are two principles inherent in the very nature -of things, recurring in some particular embodiments -whatever field we explore—the spirit of change, -and the spirit of conservation. There can be nothing -real without both. Mere change without conservation -is a passage from nothing to nothing. Its final -<span class='pageno' id='Page_282'>282</span>integration yields mere transient non-entity. Mere -conservation without change cannot conserve. For -after all, there is a flux of circumstance, and the -freshness of being evaporates under mere repetition. -The character of existent reality is composed of organisms -enduring through the flux of things. The -low type of organisms have achieved a self-identity -dominating their whole physical life. Electrons, -molecules, crystals, belong to this type. They exhibit -a massive and complete sameness. In the higher -types, where life appears, there is greater complexity. -Thus, though there is a complex, enduring pattern, -it has retreated into deeper recesses of the total fact. -In a sense, the self-identity of a human being is more -abstract than that of a crystal. It is the life of the -spirit. It relates rather to the individualisation of the -creative activity; so that the changing circumstances -received from the environment, are differentiated -from the living personality, and are thought of as -forming its perceived field. In truth, the field of -perception and the perceiving mind are abstractions -which, in the concrete, combine into the successive -bodily events. The psychological field, as restricted -to sense-objects and passing emotions, is the minor -permanence, barely rescued from the nonentity of -mere change; and the mind is the major permanence, -permeating that complete field, whose endurance is -the living soul. But the soul would wither without -fertilisation from its transient experiences. The secret -of the higher organisms lies in their two grades of -permanences. By this means the freshness of the environment -is absorbed into the permanence of the soul. -The changing environment is no longer, by reason of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_283'>283</span>its variety, an enemy to the endurance of the organism. -The pattern of the higher organism has retreated into -the recesses of the individualised activity. It has become -a uniform way of dealing with circumstances; -and this way is only strengthened by having a proper -variety of circumstances to deal with.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This fertilisation of the soul is the reason for the -necessity of art. A static value, however serious and -important, becomes unendurable by its appalling -monotony of endurance. The soul cries aloud for release -into change. It suffers the agonies of claustrophobia. -The transitions of humour, wit, irreverence, -play, sleep, and—above all—of art are necessary for -it. Great art is the arrangement of the environment -so as to provide for the soul vivid, but transient, -values. Human beings require something which absorbs -them for a time, something out of the routine -which they can stare at. But you cannot subdivide -life, except in the abstract analysis of thought. Accordingly, -the great art is more than a transient refreshment. -It is something which adds to the -permanent richness of the soul’s self-attainment. It -justifies itself both by its immediate enjoyment, and -also by its discipline of the inmost being. Its discipline -is not distinct from enjoyment, but by reason of -it. It transforms the soul into the permanent realisation -of values extending beyond its former self. This -element of transition in art is shown by the restlessness -exhibited in its history. An epoch gets saturated -by the masterpieces of any one style. Something new -must be discovered. The human being wanders on. -Yet there is a balance in things. Mere change before -the attainment of adequacy of achievement, either in -<span class='pageno' id='Page_284'>284</span>quality or output, is destructive of greatness. But the -importance of a living art, which moves on and yet -leaves its permanent mark, can hardly be exaggerated.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In regard to the aesthetic needs of civilised society -the reactions of science have so far been unfortunate. -Its materialistic basis has directed attention to <em>things</em> -as opposed to <em>values</em>. The antithesis is a false one, -if taken in a concrete sense. But it is valid at the -abstract level of ordinary thought. This misplaced -emphasis coalesced with the abstractions of political -economy, which are in fact the abstractions in terms -of which commercial affairs are carried on. Thus -all thought concerned with social organisation expressed -itself in terms of material things and of capital. -Ultimate values were excluded. They were -politely bowed to, and then handed over to the clergy -to be kept for Sundays. A creed of competitive business -morality was evolved, in some respects curiously -high; but entirely devoid of consideration for the -value of human life. The workmen were conceived -as mere hands, drawn from the pool of labour. To -God’s question, men gave the answer of Cain—“Am I -my brother’s keeper?”; and they incurred Cain’s guilt. -This was the atmosphere in which the industrial -revolution was accomplished in England, and to a -large extent elsewhere. The internal history of England -during the last half century has been an endeavour -slowly and painfully to undo the evils wrought in -the first stage of the new epoch. It may be that civilisation -will never recover from the bad climate which -enveloped the introduction of machinery. This climate -pervaded the whole commercial system of the -progressive northern European races. It was partly -<span class='pageno' id='Page_285'>285</span>the result of the aesthetic errors of Protestantism and -partly the result of scientific materialism, and partly -the result of the natural greed of mankind, and partly -the result of the abstractions of political economy. -An illustration of my point is to be found in Macaulay’s -Essay criticising Southey’s <cite>Colloquies on Society</cite>. -It was written in 1830. Now Macaulay was a very -favourable example of men living at that date, or at -any date. He had genius; he was kind-hearted, honourable, -and a reformer. This is the extract:—“We -are told, that our age has invented atrocities beyond -the imagination of our fathers; that society has been -brought into a state compared with which extermination -would be a blessing; and all because the dwellings -of cotton-spinners are naked and rectangular. -Mr. Southey has found out a way he tells us, in which -the effects of manufactures and agriculture may be -compared. And what is this way? To stand on a -hill, to look at a cottage and a factory, and to see -which is the prettier.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Southey seems to have said many silly things in -his book; but, so far as this extract is concerned, he -could make a good case for himself if he returned to -earth after the lapse of nearly a century. The evils -of the early industrial system are now a commonplace -of knowledge. The point which I am insisting -on is the stone-blind eye with which even the best -men of that time regarded the importance of aesthetics -in a nation’s life. I do not believe that we have -as yet nearly achieved the right estimate. A contributory -cause, of substantial efficacy to produce this -disastrous error, was the scientific creed that matter -in motion is the one concrete reality in nature; so -<span class='pageno' id='Page_286'>286</span>that aesthetic values form an adventitious, irrelevant -addition.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is another side to this picture of the possibilities -of decadence. At the present moment a discussion -is raging as to the future of civilisation in the -novel circumstances of rapid scientific and technological -advance. The evils of the future have been -diagnosed in various ways, the loss of religious faith, -the malignant use of material power, the degradation -attending a differential birth rate favouring the lower -types of humanity, the suppression of aesthetic creativeness. -Without doubt, these are all evils, dangerous -and threatening. But they are not new. From -the dawn of history, mankind has always been losing -its religious faith, has always suffered from the malignant -use of material power, has always suffered from -the infertility of its best intellectual types, has always -witnessed the periodical decadence of art. In the -reign of the Egyptian king, Tutankhamen, there was -raging a desperate religious struggle between Modernists -and Fundamentalists; the cave pictures exhibit -a phase of delicate aesthetic achievement as superseded -by a period of comparative vulgarity; the religious -leaders, the great thinkers, the great poets and -authors, the whole clerical caste in the Middle Ages, -have been notably infertile; finally, if we attend to -what actually has happened in the past, and disregard -romantic visions of democracies, aristocracies, kings, -generals, armies, and merchants, material power has -generally been wielded with blindness, obstinacy and -selfishness, often with brutal malignancy. And yet, -mankind has progressed. Even if you take a tiny oasis -of peculiar excellence, the type of modern man who -<span class='pageno' id='Page_287'>287</span>would have most chance of happiness in ancient -Greece at its best period is probably (as now) an -average professional heavy-weight boxer, and not an -average Greek scholar from Oxford or Germany. -Indeed, the main use of the Oxford scholar would -have been his capability of writing an ode in glorification -of the boxer. Nothing does more harm in unnerving -men for their duties in the present, than the -attention devoted to the points of excellence in the -past as compared with the average failure of the -present day.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But, after all, there have been real periods of decadence; -and at the present time, as at other epochs, -society is decaying, and there is need for preservative -action. Professionals are not new to the world. But -in the past, professionals have formed unprogressive -castes. The point is that professionalism has now -been mated with progress. The world is now faced -with a self-evolving system, which it cannot stop. -There are dangers and advantages in this situation. -It is obvious that the gain in material power affords -opportunity for social betterment. If mankind can -rise to the occasion, there lies in front a golden age of -beneficent creativeness. But material power in itself -is ethically neutral. It can equally well work in the -wrong direction. The problem is not how to produce -great men, but how to produce great societies. The -great society will put up the men for the occasions. -The materialistic philosophy emphasised the given -quantity of material, and thence derivatively the given -nature of the environment. It thus operated most -unfortunately upon the social conscience of mankind. -For it directed almost exclusive attention to the aspect -<span class='pageno' id='Page_288'>288</span>of struggle for existence in a fixed environment. To a -large extent the environment is fixed, and to this extent -there is a struggle for existence. It is folly to -look at the universe through rose-tinted spectacles. -We must admit the struggle. The question is, who is -to be eliminated. In so far as we are educators, we -have to have clear ideas upon that point; for it settles -the type to be produced and the practical ethics to -be inculcated.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But during the last three generations, the exclusive -direction of attention to this aspect of things has been -a disaster of the first magnitude. The watchwords of -the nineteenth century have been, struggle for existence, -competition, class warfare, commercial antagonism -between nations, military warfare. The struggle -for existence has been construed into the gospel of hate. -The full conclusion to be drawn from a philosophy of -evolution is fortunately of a more balanced character. -Successful organisms modify their environment. Those -organisms are successful which modify their environments -so as to assist each other. This law is exemplified -in nature on a vast scale. For example, the -North American Indians accepted their environment, -with the result that a scanty population barely succeeded -in maintaining themselves over the whole -continent. The European races when they arrived in -the same continent pursued an opposite policy. They -at once coöperated in modifying their environment. -The result is that a population more than twenty times -that of the Indian population now occupies the same -territory, and the continent is not yet full. Again, -there are associations of different species which mutually -<a id='corr288.33'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='coöoperate'>coöperate</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_288.33'><ins class='correction' title='coöoperate'>coöperate</ins></a></span>. This differentiation of species is -<span class='pageno' id='Page_289'>289</span>exhibited in the simplest physical entities, such as the -association between electrons and positive nuclei, and -in the whole realm of animate nature. The trees in a -Brazilian forest depend upon the association of various -species of organisms, each of which is mutually -dependent on the other species. A single tree by -itself is dependent upon all the adverse chances of -shifting circumstances. The wind stunts it: the variations -in temperature check its foliage: the rains -denude its soil: its leaves are blown away and are -lost for the purpose of fertilisation. You may obtain -individual specimens of fine trees either in exceptional -circumstances, or where human cultivation has intervened. -But in nature the normal way in which trees -flourish is by their association in a forest. Each tree -may lose something of its individual perfection of -growth, but they mutually assist each other in preserving -the conditions for survival. The soil is preserved -and shaded; and the microbes necessary for -its fertility are neither scorched, nor frozen, nor -washed away. A forest is the triumph of the organisation -of mutually dependent species. Further a -species of microbes which kills the forest, also exterminates -itself. Again the two sexes exhibit the -same advantage of differentiation. In the history of -the world, the prize has not gone to those species -which specialised in methods of violence, or even in -defensive armour. In fact, nature began with producing -animals encased in hard shells for defence -against the ills of life. It also experimented in size. -But smaller animals, without external armour, warm-blooded, -sensitive, and alert, have cleared these monsters -off the face of the earth. Also, the lions and -<span class='pageno' id='Page_290'>290</span>tigers are not the successful species. There is something -in the ready use of force which defeats its own -object. Its main defect is that it bars <a id='corr290.3'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='coöoperation'>coöperation</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_290.3'><ins class='correction' title='coöoperation'>coöperation</ins></a></span>. -Every organism requires an environment of friends, -partly to shield it from violent changes, and partly -to supply it with its wants. The Gospel of Force is -incompatible with a social life. By <em>force</em>, I mean -<em>antagonism</em> in its most general sense.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Almost equally dangerous is the Gospel of Uniformity. -The differences between the nations and -races of mankind are required to preserve the conditions -under which higher development is possible. -One main factor in the upward trend of animal life -has been the power of wandering. Perhaps this is -why the armour-plated monsters fared badly. They -could not wander. Animals wander into new conditions. -They have to adapt themselves or die. Mankind -has wandered from the trees to the plains, from -the plains to the seacoast, from climate to climate, -from continent to continent, and from habit of life -to habit of life. When man ceases to wander, he will -cease to ascend in the scale of being. Physical wandering -is still important, but greater still is the power -of man’s spiritual adventures—adventures of thought, -adventures of passionate feeling, adventures of -aesthetic experience. A diversification among human -communities is essential for the provision of the incentive -and material for the Odyssey of the human -spirit. Other nations of different habits are not -enemies: they are godsends. Men require of their -neighbours something sufficiently akin to be understood, -something sufficiently different to provoke attention, -and something great enough to command -<span class='pageno' id='Page_291'>291</span>admiration. We must not expect, however, all the -virtues. We should even be satisfied if there is something -odd enough to be interesting.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Modern science has imposed on humanity the necessity -for wandering. Its progressive thought and its -progressive technology make the transition through -time, from generation to generation, a true migration -into uncharted seas of adventure. The very benefit of -wandering is that it is dangerous and needs skill to -avert evils. We must expect, therefore, that the -future will disclose dangers. It is the business of the -future to be dangerous; and it is among the merits of -science that it equips the future for its duties. The -prosperous middle classes, who ruled the nineteenth -century, placed an excessive value upon placidity of -existence. They refused to face the necessities for -social reform imposed by the new industrial system, -and they are now refusing to face the necessities for -intellectual reform imposed by the new knowledge. -The middle class pessimism over the future of the -world comes from a confusion between civilisation -and security. In the immediate future there will be -less security than in the immediate past, less stability. -It must be admitted that there is a degree of instability -which is inconsistent with civilisation. But, on the -whole, the great ages have been unstable ages.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I have endeavoured in these lectures to give a record -of a great adventure in the region of thought. It -was shared in by all the races of western Europe. It -developed with the slowness of a mass movement. -Half a century is its unit of time. The tale is the -epic of an episode in the manifestation of reason. -It tells how a particular direction of reason emerges -<span class='pageno' id='Page_292'>292</span>in a race by the long preparation of antecedent epochs, -how after its birth its subject-matter gradually unfolds -itself, how it attains its triumphs, how its influence -moulds the very springs of action of mankind, -and finally how at its moment of supreme success its -limitations disclose themselves and call for a renewed -exercise of the creative imagination. The moral of -the tale is the power of reason, its decisive influence -on the life of humanity. The great conquerors, from -Alexander to Caesar, and from Caesar to Napoleon, -influenced profoundly the lives of subsequent generations. -But the total effect of this influence shrinks to -insignificance, if compared to the entire transformation -of human habits and human mentality produced -by the long line of men of thought from Thales to the -present day, men individually powerless, but ultimately -the rulers of the world.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_293'>293</span> - <h2 class='c006'>INDEX</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The numbers refer to pages; and ‘<i>e.s.</i>’ stands for ‘<i>et seqq.</i>’, where the -reference is to the succeeding pages of the chapter in question.</p> - -<ul class='index'> - <li class='c017'>Abruptness (in Ingression), <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Absolute, The, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Abstract, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Abstraction, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Abstraction (in Mathematics), <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Abstractive Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Acceleration, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Actualisation, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Adam Smith, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Aeschylus, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Alexander, S., <i><a href='#PREFACE'>preface</a></i>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Algebra, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Alva, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Ampère, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Analytical Character (Eternal Objects), <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Anselm, St., <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>‘Any,’ 229.</li> - <li class='c017'>Aquinas, Thomas, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Arabic Arithmetical Notation, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Archimedes, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Arguments (of functions), <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Aristotle, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>; <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>; <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Arnold, Matthew, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Art, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Art, Medieval, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Aspect, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>; <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Associated Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Aston, F. W., <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Atom, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Augustine, Saint, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Bacon, Francis, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>; <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Bacon, Roger, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Base of Abstractive Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Being, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Belisarius, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Benedict, Saint, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_294'>294</span>Bergson, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>; <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Berkeley, George, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Bichât, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Biology, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Bonaventure, Saint, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Boyle, Robert, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Brown University, <i><a href='#PREFACE'>Preface</a></i>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Bruno, Giordano, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Byzantine Empire, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Carlyle, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Cervantes, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Change, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Chaucer, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>China, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Clairaut, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Classification, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Clough, A. H., <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Cognition, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Coleridge, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Columbus, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Complex Eternal Objects, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Components, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Conic Sections, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Connexity (of a Hierarchy), <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Connectedness (of an occasion), <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Conservation of Energy, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Continuity, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Copernicus, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Cosmas, <a href='#Page_254'>254</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Cromwell, Oliver, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>D’Alembert, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Dalton, John, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Da Vinci, Leonardo, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Darwin, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Democritus, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Demos, R., <i><a href='#PREFACE'>Preface</a></i>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Density, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_295'>295</span>Desargues, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Descartes, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>; <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>; <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>; <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>; <a href='#Page_195'>195</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_272'>272</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Determinism, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Differential Calculus, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Discontinuous Existence, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>; <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Distance, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Divinity, Scholastic, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Divisibility, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Education, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Egyptians, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Einstein, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>; <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Electron, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Empty Events, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Endurance, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>; <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Endurance, Vibratory, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Energy, Physical, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Environment, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Envisagement, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Epochs, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Epochal Durations, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Essence, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Eternal Objects, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Ether, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Euripides, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Event, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>; <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Evolution, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>; <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Exhaustion, Method of, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Extension, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Extensive Quantity, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>External Relations, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Extrinsic Reality, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Faraday, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Fate, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Fermat, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Finite Abstractive Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Form, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Force, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Fourier, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Francis of Assisi, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Frederick, the Great, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Frequency, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Fresnel, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Frost, Robert, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_296'>296</span>Future, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Galileo, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>; <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>; <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Galvani, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Gauss, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Geometry, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>George II, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Germany, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Gibson, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>God, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>; <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Gradation of Envisagement, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Gravitation, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Greece, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Gregorovius, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Giotto, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Gregory, The Great, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Harvey, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Heath, Sir T. L., <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Hegel, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Herz, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Historical Revolt, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Hooker, Richard, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Hume, <a href='#Page_5'>5</a>, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>; <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Huyghens, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>; <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_256'>256</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Idealism, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>; <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Immediate Occasion, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Individual Essence, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Induction, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>; <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Infinite Abstractive Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Ingression, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Integral Calculus, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Internal Relations, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>; <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Intrinsic Reality, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Invention, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Ionian Philosophers, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Irresistible Grace, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Isolated Systems, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Isolation of Eternal Objects, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Isotopes, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Italy, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>James, Henry, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>James, William, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>; <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Joseph, Hapsburgh Emperor, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Justinian, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Kant, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>; <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>; <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Kepler, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_297'>297</span>Lagrange, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Laplace, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Lavoisier, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Law, Roman, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Laws of Nature, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Least Action, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Lecky, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_254'>254</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Leibniz, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>; <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Life, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Limitation, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Lloyd Morgan, <i><a href='#PREFACE'>Preface</a></i>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Location, Simple, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Locke, John, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>; <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Locomotion, Vibratory, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Logic, Abstract, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Logic, Scholastic, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Lucretius, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Macaulay, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Milton, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Mind, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Mass, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Mathematics, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>; <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Mathematics, Applied, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Matter, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Matter (philosophical), <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Maupertuis, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Max Müller, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Maxwell, Clerk, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Mechanical Explanation, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Mechanism, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Mechanistic Theory, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Memory, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Mersenne, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Michelson, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Mill, John Stuart, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Modal Character of Space, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Modal Limitation, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Mode, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Moral Responsibility, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Motion, Laws of, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Müller, Johannes, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Narses, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Natural Selection, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Naturalism in Art, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Newman, John Henry, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_298'>298</span>Newton, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>; <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>; <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Not-Being, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Objectivism, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Occasions, Community of, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Occupied Events, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Oersted, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Order of Nature, <a href='#Page_5'>5</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Organic Mechanism, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Organism, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>; <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>; <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Padua, University of, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Paley, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Papacy, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Pascal, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Past, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Pasteur, Louis, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Pelagius, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Perception, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Periodic Law (Mendeleëf), <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Periodicity, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Perspective, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Petavius, <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Philosophy, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Physical Field, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Physics, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Plato, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>; <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Pope, Alexander, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Possibility, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Prehension, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Prehensive Character of Space, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Present, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Primary Qualities, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Primate, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Prime Mover, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Primordial Element, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Process, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Professionalism, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Proton, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Psychology, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Pusey, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Pythagoras, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Quality, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Quantum Theory, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>; <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Rationalism, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Ramsay, Sir William, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_299'>299</span>Rawley, Dr., <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Rayleigh, Lord, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Realism, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Reformation, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Reiteration, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>; <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Relational Essence, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Relativity, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>; <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Retention, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Riemann, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Romans, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Roman Law, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Rome, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Rousseau, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Royal Society, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Russell, Bertrand, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Sarpi, Paul, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Schleiden, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Schwann, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Scientific Materialism, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Scientific Movement, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Secondary Qualities, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Seneca, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Sense-Object, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Separative Character of Space, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Shakespeare, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Shape, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Shelley, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Sidgwick, Henry, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Simple Eternal Objects, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Simple Location, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>; <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_217'>217</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Simultaneity, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>‘Some,’ <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Southey, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Space, Physical, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Spatialisation, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Specious Present, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Spinoza, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Sophocles, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Standpoint, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Stoicism, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Struggle for Existence, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_300'>300</span>Subjectivism, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Substance, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Substantial Activity, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Superject, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Synthetic Prehension, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Technology, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Temporalisation, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Tennyson, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Time, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Tragedy, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Translucency of Realisation, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Trent, Council of, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Trigonometry, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>True Propositions, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Unknowns (in Mathematics), <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Universals, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Untrue Propositions, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Value, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Variable, The, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Vasco da Gama, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Velocity, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Vertex of Abstractive Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Vesalius, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Vibration, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Vibratory Organic Deformation, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Virtual Work, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Vitalism, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Volta, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Voltaire, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>; <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Walpole, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Washington, George, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Watt, James, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Wesley, John, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Whitman, Walt, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Wordsworth, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>; <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Young, Thomas, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Zeno, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> -<p class='c001'><a id='endnote'></a></p> -<div class='tnotes'> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div><span class='large'>Transcriber’s Note</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c001'>The printer employed the diaeresis in words like ‘coördination’ or -‘coöperation’. On p. 157, the first syllable of ‘coöperating’ fell -on the line break, and the word was hyphenated as ‘co-operating’, since -the diaeresis was not needed. The word has been joined here and the -diaeresis employed as ‘coöperating’.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The following words appear both with and without a hyphen: to-day, -non-entity, half-way, inter-connected, non-entity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and -are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.</p> - -<table class='table1' summary=''> -<colgroup> -<col width='8%' /> -<col width='73%' /> -<col width='17%' /> -</colgroup> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_20.10'></a><a href='#corr20.10'>20.10</a></td> - <td class='c008'>restraining g[i/o]vernment.</td> - <td class='c018'>Replaced.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_21.31'></a><a href='#corr21.31'>21.31</a></td> - <td class='c008'>is kept in contact w[ti/it]h</td> - <td class='c018'>Transposed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_57.30'></a><a href='#corr57.30'>57.30</a></td> - <td class='c008'>Now the scientific philosop[h]y</td> - <td class='c018'>Inserted.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_69.9'></a><a href='#corr69.9'>69.9</a></td> - <td class='c008'>no other way of putting[s] things</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_77.6'></a><a href='#corr77.6'>77.6</a></td> - <td class='c008'>these relationships constitute[s] nature.</td> - <td class='c018'>Added.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_157.20'></a><a href='#corr157.20'>157.20</a></td> - <td class='c008'>societies of c[o-/ö]perating organisms.</td> - <td class='c018'>Replaced.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_160.8'></a><a href='#corr160.8'>160.8</a></td> - <td class='c008'>These divis[i]ons are</td> - <td class='c018'>Inserted.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_176.3'></a><a href='#corr176.3'>176.3</a></td> - <td class='c008'>extends beyond[s] the spatio-temporal continuum</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_177.6'></a><a href='#corr177.6'>177.6</a></td> - <td class='c008'>by the reali[z/s]ation of pattern</td> - <td class='c018'>Consistency.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_177.25'></a><a href='#corr177.25'>177.25</a></td> - <td class='c008'>character of spatio-temporal [of ]extension</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_183.5'></a><a href='#corr183.5'>183.5</a></td> - <td class='c008'>radiate its energy i[s/n] an integral number</td> - <td class='c018'>Replaced.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_195.4'></a><a href='#corr195.4'>195.4</a></td> - <td class='c008'>history of the Christi[o/a]n Church</td> - <td class='c018'>Replaced.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_195.7'></a><a href='#corr195.7'>195.7</a></td> - <td class='c008'>apocalyptic forecast[e]s</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_202.21'></a><a href='#corr202.21'>202.21</a></td> - <td class='c008'>This divis[i]on of territory</td> - <td class='c018'>Inserted.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_213.10'></a><a href='#corr213.10'>213.10</a></td> - <td class='c008'>what anything is in i[t]self.</td> - <td class='c018'>Inserted.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_245.27'></a><a href='#corr245.27'>245.27</a></td> - <td class='c008'>even [al]though any such discrimination</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_274.14'></a><a href='#corr274.14'>274.14</a></td> - <td class='c008'>its sta[k/t]e of rapid development</td> - <td class='c018'>Replaced.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_276.17'></a><a href='#corr276.17'>276.17</a></td> - <td class='c008'>The task of coö[r]dination is left</td> - <td class='c018'>Inserted.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_279.22'></a><a href='#corr279.22'>279.22</a></td> - <td class='c008'>What I mean is art [(]and aesthetic education.</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_288.33'></a><a href='#corr288.33'>288.33</a></td> - <td class='c008'>mutually coö[o]perate.</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_290.3'></a><a href='#corr290.3'>290.3</a></td> - <td class='c008'>it bars coö[o]peration.</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> -</table> - -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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