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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2327eef --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #68611 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68611) diff --git a/old/68611-0.txt b/old/68611-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 3fbe21c..0000000 --- a/old/68611-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8761 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Science and the modern world, by -Alfred North Whitehead - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Science and the modern world - Lowell Lectures 1925 - -Author: Alfred North Whitehead - -Release Date: July 25, 2022 [eBook #68611] - -Language: English - -Produced by: KD Weeks, Steve Mattern and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCIENCE AND THE MODERN -WORLD *** - - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - Transcriber’s Note: - -This version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects. -Italics are delimited with the ‘_’ character as _italic_. Superscripted -characters are prefixed with ‘^’ and delimited by ‘{ }’. - -Footnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are -referenced. - -Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please -see the transcriber’s note at the end of this text for details regarding -the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD - - LOWELL LECTURES, 1925 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -[Illustration] - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - NEW YORK . BOSTON . CHICAGO . DALLAS - ATLANTA . SAN FRANCISCO - - CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS - LONDON - - MACMILLAN & CO., LTD. - BOMBAY . CALCUTTA . MADRAS - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, LTD. - TORONTO - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - SCIENCE - AND THE MODERN WORLD - - - - - LOWELL LECTURES, 1925 - - - - - BY - ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD - F.R.S., Sc.D. (Cambridge), Hon. D.Sc. (Manchester), - Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews) - - FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE - AND PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY - - - - - - - - - =New York= - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - 1925 - _All rights reserved_ - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - COPYRIGHT, 1925. - BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. - - --- - - Set up and printed. - Published October, 1925. - - - - - - - - - PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY - THE FERRIS PRINTING COMPANY - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - TO - MY COLLEAGUES, - PAST AND PRESENT, - WHOSE FRIENDSHIP IS INSPIRATION. - - - - - TABLE OF CONTENTS - - - CHAPTER PAGE - - I. THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE 1 - - II. MATHEMATICS AS AN ELEMENT IN THE HISTORY OF 28 - THOUGHT - - III. THE CENTURY OF GENIUS 55 - - IV. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 80 - - V. THE ROMANTIC REACTION 105 - - VI. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 134 - - VII. RELATIVITY 160 - - VIII. THE QUANTUM THEORY 181 - - IX. SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 193 - - X. ABSTRACTION 219 - - XI. GOD 242 - - XII. RELIGION AND SCIENCE 252 - - XIII. REQUISITES FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS 270 - - - - - PREFACE - - -The present book embodies a study of some aspects of Western culture -during the past three centuries, in so far as it has been influenced by -the development of science. This study has been guided by the conviction -that the mentality of an epoch springs from the view of the world which -is, in fact, dominant in the educated sections of the communities in -question. There may be more than one such scheme, corresponding to -cultural divisions. The various human interests which suggest -cosmologies, and also are influenced by them, are science, aesthetics, -ethics, religion. In every age each of these topics suggests a view of -the world. In so far as the same set of people are swayed by all, or -more than one, of these interests, their effective outlook will be the -joint production from these sources. But each age has it dominant -preoccupation; and, during the three centuries in question, the -cosmology derived from science has been asserting itself at the expense -of older points of view with their origins elsewhere. Men can be -provincial in time, as well as in place. We may ask ourselves whether -the scientific mentality of the modern world in the immediate past is -not a successful example of such provincial limitation. - -Philosophy, in one of its functions, is the critic of cosmologies. It is -its function to harmonise, refashion, and justify divergent intuitions -as to the nature of things. It has to insist on the scrutiny of the -ultimate ideas, and on the retention of the whole of the evidence in -shaping our cosmological scheme. Its business is to render explicit, -and—so far as may be—efficient, a process which otherwise is -unconsciously performed without rational tests. - -Bearing this in mind, I have avoided the introduction of a variety of -abstruse detail respecting scientific advance. What is wanted, and what -I have striven after, is a sympathetic study of main ideas as seen from -the inside. If my view of the function of philosophy is correct, it is -the most effective of all the intellectual pursuits. It builds -cathedrals before the workmen have moved a stone, and it destroys them -before the elements have worn down their arches. It is the architect of -the buildings of the spirit, and it is also their solvent:—and the -spiritual precedes the material. Philosophy works slowly. Thoughts lie -dormant for ages; and then, almost suddenly as it were, mankind finds -that they have embodied themselves in institutions. - -This book in the main consists of a set of eight Lowell Lectures -delivered in the February of 1925. These lectures with some slight -expansion, and the subdivision of one lecture into Chapters VII and -VIII, are here printed as delivered. But some additional matter has -been added, so as to complete the thought of the book on a scale which -could not be included within that lecture course. Of this new matter, -the second chapter—‘Mathematics as an Element in the History of -Thought’—was delivered as a lecture before the Mathematical Society of -Brown University, Providence, R. I.; and the twelfth chapter—‘Religion -and Science’—formed an address delivered in the Phillips Brooks House -at Harvard, and is to be published in the August number of the -_Atlantic Monthly_ of this year (1925). The tenth and eleventh -chapters—‘Abstraction’ and ‘God’—are additions which now appear for -the first time. But the book represents one train of thought, and the -antecedent utilisation of some of its contents is a subsidiary point. - -There has been no occasion in the text to make detailed reference to -Lloyd Morgan’s _Emergent Evolution_ or to Alexander’s _Space, Time and -Deity_. It will be obvious to readers that I have found them very -suggestive. I am especially indebted to Alexander’s great work. The wide -scope of the present book makes it impossible to acknowledge in detail -the various sources of information or of ideas. The book is the product -of thought and reading in past years, which were not undertaken with any -anticipation of utilisation for the present purpose. Accordingly it -would now be impossible for me to give reference to my sources for -details, even if it were desirable so to do. But there is no need: the -facts which are relied upon are simple and well known. On the -philosophical side, any consideration of epistemology has been entirely -excluded. It would have been impossible to discuss that topic without -upsetting the whole balance of the work. The key to the book is the -sense of the overwhelming importance of a prevalent philosophy. - -My most grateful thanks are due to my colleague Mr. Raphael Demos for -reading the proofs and for the suggestion of many improvements in -expression. - - Harvard University, - June 29, 1925. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - SCIENCE AND THE MODERN - WORLD - - - - - CHAPTER I - - THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE - - -The progress of civilisation is not wholly a uniform drift towards -better things. It may perhaps wear this aspect if we map it on a scale -which is large enough. But such broad views obscure the details on which -rest our whole understanding of the process. New epochs emerge with -comparative suddenness, if we have regard to the scores of thousands of -years throughout which the complete history extends. Secluded races -suddenly take their places in the main stream of events: technological -discoveries transform the mechanism of human life: a primitive art -quickly flowers into full satisfaction of some aesthetic craving: great -religions in their crusading youth spread through the nations the peace -of Heaven and the sword of the Lord. - -The sixteenth century of our era saw the disruption of Western -Christianity and the rise of modern science. It was an age of ferment. -Nothing was settled, though much was opened—new worlds and new ideas. In -science, Copernicus and Vesalius may be chosen as representative -figures: they typify the new cosmology and the scientific emphasis on -direct observation. Giordano Bruno was the martyr; but the cause for -which he suffered was not that of science, but that of free imaginative -speculation. His death in the year 1600 ushered in the first century of -modern science in the strict sense of the term. In his execution there -was an unconscious symbolism: for the subsequent tone of scientific -thought has contained distrust of his type of general speculativeness. -The Reformation, for all its importance, may be considered as a domestic -affair of the European races. Even the Christianity of the East viewed -it with profound disengagement. Furthermore, such disruptions are no new -phenomena in the history of Christianity or of other religions. When we -project this great revolution upon the whole history of the Christian -Church, we cannot look upon it as introducing a new principle into human -life. For good or for evil, it was a great transformation of religion; -but it was not the coming of religion. It did not itself claim to be so. -Reformers maintained that they were only restoring what had been -forgotten. - -It is quite otherwise with the rise of modern science. In every way it -contrasts with the contemporary religious movement. The Reformation was -a popular uprising, and for a century and a half drenched Europe in -blood. The beginnings of the scientific movement were confined to a -minority among the intellectual élite. In a generation which saw the -Thirty Years’ War and remembered Alva in the Netherlands, the worst that -happened to men of science was that Galileo suffered an honourable -detention and a mild reproof, before dying peacefully in his bed. The -way in which the persecution of Galileo has been remembered is a tribute -to the quiet commencement of the most intimate change in outlook which -the human race had yet encountered. Since a babe was born in a manger, -it may be doubted whether so great a thing has happened with so little -stir. - -The thesis which these lectures will illustrate is that this quiet -growth of science has practically recoloured our mentality so that modes -of thought which in former times were exceptional, are now broadly -spread through the educated world. This new colouring of ways of thought -had been proceeding slowly for many ages in the European peoples. At -last it issued in the rapid development of science; and has thereby -strengthened itself by its most obvious application. The new mentality -is more important even than the new science and the new technology. It -has altered the metaphysical presuppositions and the imaginative -contents of our minds; so that now the old stimuli provoke a new -response. Perhaps my metaphor of a new colour is too strong. What I mean -is just that slightest change of tone which yet makes all the -difference. This is exactly illustrated by a sentence from a published -letter of that adorable genius, William James. When he was finishing his -great treatise on the _Principles of Psychology_, he wrote to his -brother Henry James, ‘I have to forge every sentence in the teeth of -irreducible and stubborn facts.’ - -This new tinge to modern minds is a vehement and passionate interest in -the relation of general principles to irreducible and stubborn facts. -All the world over and at all times there have been practical men, -absorbed in ‘irreducible and stubborn facts’: all the world over and at -all times there have been men of philosophic temperament who have been -absorbed in the weaving of general principles. It is this union of -passionate interest in the detailed facts with equal devotion to -abstract generalisation which forms the novelty in our present society. -Previously it had appeared sporadically and as if by chance. This -balance of mind has now become part of the tradition which infects -cultivated thought. It is the salt which keeps life sweet. The main -business of universities is to transmit this tradition as a widespread -inheritance from generation to generation. - -Another contrast which singles out science from among the European -movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is its -universality. Modern science was born in Europe, but its home is the -whole world. In the last two centuries there has been a long and -confused impact of Western modes upon the civilisation of Asia. The wise -men of the East have been puzzling, and are puzzling, as to what may be -the regulative secret of life which can be passed from West to East -without the wanton destruction of their own inheritance which they so -rightly prize. More and more it is becoming evident that what the West -can most readily give to the East is its science and its scientific -outlook. This is transferable from country to country, and from race to -race, wherever there is a rational society. - -In this course of lectures I shall not discuss the details of scientific -discovery. My theme is the energising of a state of mind in the modern -world, its broad generalisations, and its impact upon other spiritual -forces. There are two ways of reading history, forwards and backwards. -In the history of thought, we require both methods. A climate of -opinion—to use the happy phrase of a seventeenth century writer—requires -for its understanding the consideration of its antecedents and its -issues. Accordingly in this lecture I shall consider some of the -antecedents of our modern approach to the investigation of nature. - -In the first place, there can be no living science unless there is a -widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an _Order of -Things_, and, in particular, of an _Order of Nature_. I have used the -word _instinctive_ advisedly. It does not matter what men say in words, -so long as their activities are controlled by settled instincts. The -words may ultimately destroy the instincts. But until this has occurred, -words do not count. This remark is important in respect to the history -of scientific thought. For we shall find that since the time of Hume, -the fashionable scientific philosophy has been such as to deny the -rationality of science. This conclusion lies upon the surface of Hume’s -philosophy. Take, for example, the following passage from Section IV of -his _Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding_: - - “In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It - could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause; and the first - invention or conception of it, _à priori_, must be entirely - arbitrary.” - -If the cause in itself discloses no information as to the effect, so -that the first invention of it must be _entirely_ arbitrary, it follows -at once that science is impossible, except in the sense of establishing -_entirely arbitrary_ connections which are not warranted by anything -intrinsic to the natures either of causes or effects. Some variant of -Hume’s philosophy has generally prevailed among men of science. But -scientific faith has risen to the occasion, and has tacitly removed the -philosophic mountain. - -In view of this strange contradiction in scientific thought, it is of -the first importance to consider the antecedents of a faith which is -impervious to the demand for a consistent rationality. We have therefore -to trace the rise of the instinctive faith that there is an Order of -Nature which can be traced in every detailed occurrence. - -Of course we all share in this faith, and we therefore believe that the -reason for the faith is our apprehension of its truth. But the formation -of a general idea—such as the idea of the Order of Nature—, and the -grasp of its importance, and the observation of its exemplification in a -variety of occasions are by no means the necessary consequences of the -truth of the idea in question. Familiar things happen, and mankind does -not bother about them. It requires a very unusual mind to undertake the -analysis of the obvious. Accordingly I wish to consider the stages in -which this analysis became explicit, and finally became unalterably -impressed upon the educated minds of Western Europe. - -Obviously, the main recurrences of life are too insistent to escape the -notice of the least rational of humans; and even before the dawn of -rationality, they have impressed themselves upon the instincts of -animals. It is unnecessary to labour the point, that in broad outline -certain general states of nature recur, and that our very natures have -adapted themselves to such repetitions. - -But there is a complementary fact which is equally true and equally -obvious:—nothing ever really recurs in exact detail. No two days are -identical, no two winters. What has gone, has gone forever. Accordingly -the practical philosophy of mankind has been to expect the broad -recurrences, and to accept the details as emanating from the inscrutable -womb of things, beyond the ken of rationality. Men expected the sun to -rise, but the wind bloweth where it listeth. - -Certainly from the classical Greek civilisation onwards there have been -men, and indeed groups of men, who have placed themselves beyond this -acceptance of an ultimate irrationality. Such men have endeavoured to -explain all phenomena as the outcome of an order of things which extends -to every detail. Geniuses such as Aristotle, or Archimedes, or Roger -Bacon, must have been endowed with the full scientific mentality, which -instinctively holds that all things great and small are conceivable as -exemplifications of general principles which reign throughout the -natural order. - -But until the close of the Middle Ages the general educated public did -not feel that intimate conviction, and that detailed interest, in such -an idea, so as to lead to an unceasing supply of men, with ability and -opportunity adequate to maintain a coordinated search for the discovery -of these hypothetical principles. Either people were doubtful about the -existence of such principles, or were doubtful about any success in -finding them, or took no interest in thinking about them, or were -oblivious to their practical importance when found. For whatever reason, -search was languid, if we have regard to the opportunities of a high -civilisation and the length of time concerned. Why did the pace suddenly -quicken in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? At the close of the -Middle Ages a new mentality discloses itself. Invention stimulated -thought, thought quickened physical speculation, Greek manuscripts -disclosed what the ancients had discovered. Finally although in the year -1500 Europe knew less than Archimedes who died in the year 212 B. C., -yet in the year 1700, Newton’s _Principia_ had been written and the -world was well started on the modern epoch. - -There have been great civilisations in which the peculiar balance of -mind required for science has only fitfully appeared and has produced -the feeblest result. For example, the more we know of Chinese art, of -Chinese literature, and of the Chinese philosophy of life, the more we -admire the heights to which that civilization attained. For thousands of -years, there have been in China acute and learned men patiently devoting -their lives to study. Having regard to the span of time, and to the -population concerned, China forms the largest volume of civilisation -which the world has seen. There is no reason to doubt the intrinsic -capacity of individual Chinamen for the pursuit of science. And yet -Chinese science is practically negligible. There is no reason to believe -that China if left to itself would have ever produced any progress in -science. The same may be said of India. Furthermore, if the Persians had -enslaved the Greeks, there is no definite ground for belief that science -would have flourished in Europe. The Romans showed no particular -originality in that line. Even as it was, the Greeks, though they -founded the movement, did not sustain it with the concentrated interest -which modern Europe has shown. I am not alluding to the last few -generations of the European peoples on both sides of the ocean; I mean -the smaller Europe of the Reformation period, distracted as it was with -wars and religious disputes. Consider the world of the eastern -Mediterranean, from Sicily to western Asia, during the period of about -1400 years from the death of Archimedes [in 212 B. C.] to the irruption -of the Tartars. There were wars and revolutions and large changes of -religion: but nothing much worse than the wars of the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries throughout Europe. There was a great and wealthy -civilisation, Pagan, Christian, Mahometan. In that period a great deal -was added to science. But on the whole the progress was slow and -wavering; and, except in mathematics, the men of the Renaissance -practically started from the position which Archimedes had reached. -There had been some progress in medicine and some progress in astronomy. -But the total advance was very little compared to the marvellous success -of the seventeenth century. For example, compare the progress of -scientific knowledge from the year 1560, just before the births of -Galileo and of Kepler, up to the year 1700, when Newton was in the -height of his fame, with the progress in the ancient period, already -mentioned, exactly ten times as long. - -Nevertheless, Greece was the mother of Europe; and it is to Greece that -we must look in order to find the origin of our modern ideas. We all -know that on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean there was a very -flourishing school of Ionian philosophers, deeply interested in theories -concerning nature. Their ideas have been transmitted to us, enriched by -the genius of Plato and Aristotle. But, with the exception of Aristotle, -and it is a large exception, this school of thought had not attained to -the complete scientific mentality. In some ways, it was better. The -Greek genius was philosophical, lucid and logical. The men of this group -were primarily asking philosophical questions. What is the substratum of -nature? Is it fire, or earth, or water, or some combination of any two, -or of all three? Or is it a mere flux, not reducible to some static -material? Mathematics interested them mightily. They invented its -generality, analysed its premises, and made notable discoveries of -theorems by a rigid adherence to deductive reasoning. Their minds were -infected with an eager generality. They demanded clear, bold ideas, and -strict reasoning from them. All this was excellent; it was genius; it -was ideal preparatory work. But it was not science as we understand it. -The patience of minute observation was not nearly so prominent. Their -genius was not so apt for the state of imaginative muddled suspense -which precedes successful inductive generalisation. They were lucid -thinkers and bold reasoners. - -Of course there were exceptions, and at the very top: for example, -Aristotle and Archimedes. Also for patient observation, there were the -astronomers. There was a mathematical lucidity about the stars, and a -fascination about the small numerable band of run-a-way planets. - -Every philosophy is tinged with the colouring of some secret imaginative -background, which never emerges explicitly into its trains of reasoning. -The Greek view of nature, at least that cosmology transmitted from them -to later ages, was essentially dramatic. It is not necessarily wrong for -this reason: but it was overwhelmingly dramatic. It thus conceived -nature as articulated in the way of a work of dramatic art, for the -exemplification of general ideas converging to an end. Nature was -differentiated so as to provide its proper end for each thing. There was -the centre of the universe as the end of motion for those things which -are heavy, and the celestial spheres as the end of motion for those -things whose natures lead them upwards. The celestial spheres were for -things which are impassible and ingenerable, the lower regions for -things impassible and generable. Nature was a drama in which each thing -played its part. - -I do not say that this is a view to which Aristotle would have -subscribed without severe reservations, in fact without the sort of -reservations which we ourselves would make. But it was the view which -subsequent Greek thought extracted from Aristotle and passed on to the -Middle Ages. The effect of such an imaginative setting for nature was to -damp down the historical spirit. For it was the end which seemed -illuminating, so why bother about the beginning? The Reformation and the -scientific movement were two aspects of the historical revolt which was -the dominant intellectual movement of the later Renaissance. The appeal -to the origins of Christianity, and Francis Bacon’s appeal to efficient -causes as against final causes, were two sides of one movement of -thought. Also for this reason Galileo and his adversaries were at -hopeless cross purposes, as can be seen from his _Dialogues on the Two -Systems of the World_. - -Galileo keeps harping on how things happen, whereas his adversaries had -a complete theory as to why things happen. Unfortunately the two -theories did not bring out the same results. Galileo insists upon -‘irreducible and stubborn facts,’ and Simplicius, his opponent, brings -forward reasons, completely satisfactory, at least to himself. It is a -great mistake to conceive this historical revolt as an appeal to reason. -On the contrary, it was through and through an anti-intellectualist -movement. It was the return to the contemplation of brute fact; and it -was based on a recoil from the inflexible rationality of medieval -thought. In making this statement I am merely summarising what at the -time the adherents of the old régime themselves asserted. For example, -in the fourth book of Father Paul Sarpi’s _History of the Council of -Trent_, you will find that in the year 1551 the Papal Legates who -presided over the Council ordered: ‘That the Divines ought to confirm -their opinions with the holy Scripture, Traditions of the Apostles, -sacred and approved Councils, and by the Constitutions and Authorities -of the holy Fathers; that they ought to use brevity, and avoid -superfluous and unprofitable questions, and perverse contentions.... -This order did not please the Italian Divines; who said it was a novity, -and a condemning of School-Divinity, which, in all difficulties, _useth -reason_, and because it was not lawful [_i.e._, by this decree] to treat -as St. Thomas [Aquinas], St. Bonaventure, and other famous men did.’ - -It is impossible not to feel sympathy with these Italian divines, -maintaining the lost cause of unbridled rationalism. They were deserted -on all hands. The Protestants were in full revolt against them. The -Papacy failed to support them, and the Bishops of the Council could not -even understand them. For a few sentences below the foregoing quotation, -we read: ‘Though many complained here-of [_i.e._, of the Decree], yet it -prevailed but little, because generally the Fathers [_i.e._, the -Bishops] desired to hear men speak with intelligible terms, not -abstrusely, as in the matter of Justification, and others already -handled.’ - -Poor belated medievalists! When they used reason they were not even -intelligible to the ruling powers of their epoch. It will take centuries -before stubborn facts are reducible by reason, and meanwhile the -pendulum swings slowly and heavily to the extreme of the historical -method. - -Forty-three years after the Italian divines had written this memorial, -Richard Hooker in his famous _Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity_ makes -exactly the same complaint of his Puritan adversaries.[1] Hooker’s -balanced thought—from which the appellation ‘The Judicious Hooker’ is -derived—, and his diffuse style, which is the vehicle of such thought, -make his writings singularly unfit for the process of summarising by a -short, pointed quotation. But, in the section referred to, he reproaches -his opponents with _Their Disparagement of Reason_; and in support of -his own position definitely refers to ‘The greatest amongst the -school-divines,’ by which designation I presume that he refers to St. -Thomas Aquinas. - -Footnote 1: - - _Cf._ Book III, Section VIII. - -Hooker’s _Ecclesiastical Polity_ was published just before Sarpi’s -_Council of Trent_. Accordingly there was complete independence between -the two works. But both the Italian divines of 1551, and Hooker at the -end of that century testify to the anti-rationalist trend of thought at -that epoch, and in this respect contrast their own age with the epoch of -scholasticism. - -This reaction was undoubtedly a very necessary corrective to the -unguarded rationalism of the Middle Ages. But reactions run to extremes. -Accordingly, although one outcome of this reaction was the birth of -modern science, yet we must remember that science thereby inherited the -bias of thought to which it owes its origin. - -The effect of Greek dramatic literature was many-sided so far as -concerns the various ways in which it indirectly affected medieval -thought. The pilgrim fathers of the scientific imagination as it exists -today, are the great tragedians of ancient Athens, Aeschylus, Sophocles, -Euripides. Their vision of fate, remorseless and indifferent, urging a -tragic incident to its inevitable issue, is the vision possessed by -science. Fate in Greek Tragedy becomes the order of nature in modern -thought. The absorbing interest in the particular heroic incidents, as -an example and a verification of the workings of fate, reappears in our -epoch as concentration of interest on the crucial experiments. It was my -good fortune to be present at the meeting of the Royal Society in London -when the Astronomer Royal for England announced that the photographic -plates of the famous eclipse, as measured by his colleagues in Greenwich -Observatory, had verified the prediction of Einstein that rays of light -are bent as they pass in the neighbourhood of the sun. The whole -atmosphere of tense interest was exactly that of the Greek drama: we -were the chorus commenting on the decree of destiny as disclosed in the -development of a supreme incident. There was dramatic quality in the -very staging:—the traditional ceremonial, and in the background the -picture of Newton to remind us that the greatest of scientific -generalisations was now, after more than two centuries, to receive its -first modification. Nor was the personal interest wanting: a great -adventure in thought had at length come safe to shore. - -Let me here remind you that the essence of dramatic tragedy is not -unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of -things. This inevitableness of destiny can only be illustrated in terms -of human life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is -only by them that the futility of escape can be made evident in the -drama. This remorseless inevitableness is what pervades scientific -thought. The laws of physics are the decrees of fate. - -The conception of the moral order in the Greek plays was certainly not a -discovery of the dramatists. It must have passed into the literary -tradition from the general serious opinion of the times. But in finding -this magnificent expression, it thereby deepened the stream of thought -from which it arose. The spectacle of a moral order was impressed upon -the imagination of classical civilisation. - -The time came when that great society decayed, and Europe passed into -the Middle Ages. The direct influence of Greek literature vanished. But -the concept of the moral order and of the order of nature had enshrined -itself in the Stoic philosophy. For example, Lecky in his _History of -European Morals_ tells us ‘Seneca maintains that the Divinity has -determined all things by an inexorable law of destiny, which He has -decreed, but which He Himself obeys.’ But the most effective way in -which the Stoics influenced the mentality of the Middle Ages was by the -diffused sense of order which arose from Roman law. Again to quote -Lecky, ‘The Roman legislation was in a two-fold manner the child of -philosophy. It was in the first place formed upon the philosophical -model, for, instead of being a mere empirical system adjusted to the -existing requirements of society, it laid down abstract principles of -right to which it endeavoured to conform; and, in the next place, these -principles were borrowed directly from Stoicism.’ In spite of the actual -anarchy throughout large regions in Europe after the collapse of the -Empire, the sense of legal order always haunted the racial memories of -the Imperial populations. Also the Western Church was always there as a -living embodiment of the traditions of Imperial rule. - -It is important to notice that this legal impress upon medieval -civilisation was not in the form of a few wise precepts which should -permeate conduct. It was the conception of a definite articulated system -which defines the legality of the detailed structure of social organism, -and of the detailed way in which it should function. There was nothing -vague. It was not a question of admirable maxims, but of definite -procedure to put things right and to keep them there. The Middle Ages -formed one long training of the intellect of Western Europe in the sense -of order. There may have been some deficiency in respect to practice. -But the idea never for a moment lost its grip. It was preëminently an -epoch of orderly thought, rationalist through and through. The very -anarchy quickened the sense for coherent system; just as the modern -anarchy of Europe has stimulated the intellectual vision of a League of -Nations. - -But for science something more is wanted than a general sense of the -order in things. It needs but a sentence to point out how the habit of -definite exact thought was implanted in the European mind by the long -dominance of scholastic logic and scholastic divinity. The habit -remained after the philosophy had been repudiated, the priceless habit -of looking for an exact point and of sticking to it when found. Galileo -owes more to Aristotle than appears on the surface of his _Dialogues_: -he owes to him his clear head and his analytic mind. - -I do not think, however, that I have even yet brought out the greatest -contribution of medievalism to the formation of the scientific movement. -I mean the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be -correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, -exemplifying general principles. Without this belief the incredible -labours of scientists would be without hope. It is this instinctive -conviction, vividly poised before the imagination, which is the motive -power of research:—that there is a secret, a secret which can be -unveiled. How has this conviction been so vividly implanted on the -European mind? - -When we compare this tone of thought in Europe with the attitude of -other civilisations when left to themselves, there seems but one source -for its origin. It must come from the medieval insistence on the -rationality of God, conceived as with the personal energy of Jehovah and -with the rationality of a Greek philosopher. Every detail was supervised -and ordered: the search into nature could only result in the vindication -of the faith in rationality. Remember that I am not talking of the -explicit beliefs of a few individuals. What I mean is the impress on the -European mind arising from the unquestioned faith of centuries. By this -I mean the instinctive tone of thought and not a mere creed of words. - -In Asia, the conceptions of God were of a being who was either too -arbitrary or too impersonal for such ideas to have much effect on -instinctive habits of mind. Any definite occurrence might be due to the -fiat of an irrational despot, or might issue from some impersonal, -inscrutable origin of things. There was not the same confidence as in -the intelligible rationality of a personal being. I am not arguing that -the European trust in the scrutability of nature was logically justified -even by its own theology. My only point is to understand how it arose. -My explanation is that the faith in the possibility of science, -generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory, -is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology. - -But science is not merely the outcome of instinctive faith. It also -requires an active interest in the simple occurrences of life for their -own sake. - -This qualification ‘for their own sake’ is important. The first phase of -the Middle Ages was an age of symbolism. It was an age of vast ideas, -and of primitive technique. There was little to be done with nature, -except to coin a hard living from it. But there were realms of thought -to be explored, realms of philosophy and realms of theology. Primitive -art could symbolise those ideas which filled all thoughtful minds. The -first phase of medieval art has a haunting charm beyond compare: its own -intrinsic quality is enhanced by the fact that its message, which -stretched beyond art’s own self-justification of aesthetic achievement, -was the symbolism of things lying behind nature itself. In this symbolic -phase, medieval art energised in nature as its medium, but pointed to -another world. - -In order to understand the contrast between these early Middle Ages and -the atmosphere required by the scientific mentality, we should compare -the sixth century in Italy with the sixteenth century. In both centuries -the Italian genius was laying the foundations of a new epoch. The -history of the three centuries preceding the earlier period, despite the -promise for the future introduced by the rise of Christianity, is -overwhelmingly infected by the sense of the decline of civilisation. In -each generation something has been lost. As we read the records, we are -haunted by the shadow of the coming barbarism. There are great men, with -fine achievements in action or in thought. But their total effect is -merely for some short time to arrest the general decline. In the sixth -century we are, so far as Italy is concerned, at the lowest point of the -curve. But in that century every action is laying the foundation for the -tremendous rise of the new European civilisation. In the background the -Byzantine Empire, under Justinian, in three ways determined the -character of the early Middle Ages in Western Europe. In the first -place, its armies, under Belisarius and Narses, cleared Italy from the -Gothic domination. In this way, the stage was freed for the exercise of -the old Italian genius for creating organisations which shall be -protective of ideals of cultural activity. It is impossible not to -sympathise with the Goths: yet there can be no doubt but that a thousand -years of the Papacy were infinitely more valuable for Europe than any -effects derivable from a well-established Gothic kingdom of Italy. - -In the second place, the codification of the Roman law established the -ideal of legality which dominated the sociological thought of Europe in -the succeeding centuries. Law is both an engine for government, and a -condition restraining government. The canon law of the Church, and the -civil law of the State, owe to Justinian’s lawyers their influence on -the development of Europe. They established in the Western mind the -ideal that an authority should be at once lawful, and law-enforcing, and -should in itself exhibit a rationally adjusted system of organisation. -The sixth century in Italy gave the initial exhibition of the way in -which the impress of these ideas was fostered by contact with the -Byzantine Empire. - -Thirdly, in the non-political spheres of art and learning Constantinople -exhibited a standard of realised achievement which, partly by the -impulse to direct imitation, and partly by the indirect inspiration -arising from the mere knowledge that such things existed, acted as a -perpetual spur to Western culture. The wisdom of the Byzantines, as it -stood in the imagination of the first phase of medieval mentality, and -the wisdom of the Egyptians as it stood in the imagination of the early -Greeks, played analogous rôles. Probably the actual knowledge of these -respective wisdoms was, in either case, about as much as was good for -the recipients. They knew enough to know the sort of standards which are -attainable, and not enough to be fettered by static and traditional ways -of thought. Accordingly, in both cases men went ahead on their own and -did better. No account of the rise of the European scientific mentality -can omit some notice of this influence of the Byzantine civilisation in -the background. In the sixth century there is a crisis in the history of -the relations between the Byzantines and the West; and this crisis is to -be contrasted with the influence of Greek literature on European thought -in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The two outstanding men, who -in the Italy of the sixth century laid the foundations of the future, -were St. Benedict and Gregory the Great. By reference to them, we can at -once see how absolutely in ruins was the approach to the scientific -mentality which had been attained by the Greeks. We are at the zero -point of scientific temperature. But the life-work of Gregory and of -Benedict contributed elements to the reconstruction of Europe which -secured that this reconstruction, when it arrived, should include a more -effective scientific mentality than that of the ancient world. The -Greeks were over-theoretical. For them science was an offshoot of -philosophy. Gregory and Benedict were practical men, with an eye for the -importance of ordinary things; and they combined this practical -temperament with their religious and cultural activities. In particular, -we owe it to St. Benedict that the monasteries were the homes of -practical agriculturalists, as well as of saints and of artists and of -men of learning. The alliance of science with technology, by which -learning is kept in contact with irreducible and stubborn facts, owes -much to the practical bent of the early Benedictines. Modern science -derives from Rome as well as from Greece, and this Roman strain explains -its gain in an energy of thought kept closely in contact with the world -of facts. - -But the influence of this contact between the monasteries and the facts -of nature showed itself first in art. The rise of Naturalism in the -later Middle Ages was the entry into the European mind of the final -ingredient necessary for the rise of science. It was the rise of -interest in natural objects, and in natural occurrences, for their own -sakes. The natural foliage of a district was sculptured in -out-of-the-way spots of the later buildings, merely as exhibiting -delight in those familiar objects. The whole atmosphere of every art -exhibited a direct joy in the apprehension of the things which lie -around us. The craftsmen who executed the late medieval decorative -sculpture, Giotto, Chaucer, Wordsworth, Walt Whitman, and, at the -present day, the New England poet Robert Frost, are all akin to each -other in this respect. The simple immediate facts are the topics of -interest, and these reappear in the thought of science as the -‘irreducible stubborn facts.’ - -The mind of Europe was now prepared for its new venture of thought. It -is unnecessary to tell in detail the various incidents which marked the -rise of science: the growth of wealth and leisure; the expansion of -universities; the invention of printing; the taking of Constantinople; -Copernicus; Vasco da Gama; Columbus; the telescope. The soil, the -climate, the seeds, were there, and the forest grew. Science has never -shaken off the impress of its origin in the historical revolt of the -later Renaissance. It has remained predominantly an anti-rationalistic -movement, based upon a naïve faith. What reasoning it has wanted, has -been borrowed from mathematics which is a surviving relic of Greek -rationalism, following the deductive method. Science repudiates -philosophy. In other words, it has never cared to justify its faith or -to explain its meanings; and has remained blandly indifferent to its -refutation by Hume. - -Of course the historical revolt was fully justified. It was wanted. It -was more than wanted: it was an absolute necessity for healthy progress. -The world required centuries of contemplation of irreducible and -stubborn facts. It is difficult for men to do more than one thing at a -time, and that was the sort of thing they had to do after the -rationalistic orgy of the Middle Ages. It was a very sensible reaction; -but it was not a protest on behalf of reason. - -There is, however, a Nemesis which waits upon those who deliberately -avoid avenues of knowledge. Oliver Cromwell’s cry echoes down the ages, -‘My brethren, by the bowels of Christ I beseech you, bethink you that -you may be mistaken.’ - -The progress of science has now reached a turning point. The stable -foundations of physics have broken up: also for the first time -physiology is asserting itself as an effective body of knowledge, as -distinct from a scrap-heap. The old foundations of scientific thought -are becoming unintelligible. Time, space, matter, material, ether, -electricity, mechanism, organism, configuration, structure, pattern, -function, all require reinterpretation. What is the sense of talking -about a mechanical explanation when you do not know what you mean by -mechanics? - -The truth is that science started its modern career by taking over ideas -derived from the weakest side of the philosophies of Aristotle’s -successors. In some respects it was a happy choice. It enabled the -knowledge of the seventeenth century to be formularised so far as -physics and chemistry were concerned, with a completeness which has -lasted to the present time. But the progress of biology and psychology -has probably been checked by the uncritical assumption of half-truths. -If science is not to degenerate into a medley of _ad hoc_ hypotheses, it -must become philosophical and must enter upon a thorough criticism of -its own foundations. - -In the succeeding lectures of this course, I shall trace the successes -and the failures of the particular conceptions of cosmology with which -the European intellect has clothed itself in the last three centuries. -General climates of opinion persist for periods of about two to three -generations, that is to say, for periods of sixty to a hundred years. -There are also shorter waves of thought, which play on the surface of -the tidal movement. We shall find, therefore, transformations in the -European outlook, slowly modifying the successive centuries. There -persists, however, throughout the whole period the fixed scientific -cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute -matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux of -configurations. In itself such a material is senseless, valueless, -purposeless. It just does what it does do, following a fixed routine -imposed by external relations which do not spring from the nature of its -being. It is this assumption that I call ‘scientific materialism.’ Also -it is an assumption which I shall challenge as being entirely unsuited -to the scientific situation at which we have now arrived. It is not -wrong, if properly construed. If we confine ourselves to certain types -of facts, abstracted from the complete circumstances in which they -occur, the materialistic assumption expresses these facts to perfection. -But when we pass beyond the abstraction, either by more subtle -employment of our senses, or by the request for meanings and for -coherence of thoughts, the scheme breaks down at once. The narrow -efficiency of the scheme was the very cause of its supreme -methodological success. For it directed attention to just those groups -of facts which, in the state of knowledge then existing, required -investigation. - -The success of the scheme has adversely affected the various currents of -European thought. The historical revolt was anti-rationalistic, because -the rationalism of the scholastics required a sharp correction by -contact with brute fact. But the revival of philosophy in the hands of -Descartes and his successors was entirely coloured in its development by -the acceptance of the scientific cosmology at its face value. The -success of their ultimate ideas confirmed scientists in their refusal to -modify them as the result of an enquiry into their rationality. Every -philosophy was bound in some way or other to swallow them whole. Also -the example of science affected other regions of thought. The historical -revolt has thus been exaggerated into the exclusion of philosophy from -its proper rôle of harmonising the various abstractions of -methodological thought. Thought is abstract; and the intolerant use of -abstractions is the major vice of the intellect. This vice is not wholly -corrected by the recurrence to concrete experience. For after all, you -need only attend to those aspects of your concrete experience which lie -within some limited scheme. There are two methods for the purification -of ideas. One of them is dispassionate observation by means of the -bodily senses. But observation is selection. Accordingly, it is -difficult to transcend a scheme of abstraction whose success is -sufficiently wide. The other method is by comparing the various schemes -of abstraction which are well founded in our various types of -experience. This comparison takes the form of satisfying the demands of -the Italian scholastic divines whom Paul Sarpi mentioned. They asked -that _reason_ should be used. Faith in reason is the trust that the -ultimate natures of things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere -arbitrariness. It is the faith that at the base of things we shall not -find mere arbitrary mystery. The faith in the order of nature which has -made possible the growth of science is a particular example of a deeper -faith. This faith cannot be justified by any inductive generalisation. -It springs from direct inspection of the nature of things as disclosed -in our own immediate present experience. There is no parting from your -own shadow. To experience this faith is to know that in being ourselves -we are more than ourselves: to know that our experience, dim and -fragmentary as it is, yet sounds the utmost depths of reality: to know -that detached details merely in order to be themselves demand that they -should find themselves in a system of things: to know that this system -includes the harmony of logical rationality, and the harmony of -aesthetic achievement: to know that, while the harmony of logic lies -upon the universe as an iron necessity, the aesthetic harmony stands -before it as a living ideal moulding the general flux in its broken -progress towards finer, subtler issues. - - - - - CHAPTER II - - MATHEMATICS AS AN ELEMENT IN - THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT - - -The science of Pure Mathematics, in its modern developments, may claim -to be the most original creation of the human spirit. Another claimant -for this position is music. But we will put aside all rivals, and -consider the ground on which such a claim can be made for mathematics. -The originality of mathematics consists in the fact that in mathematical -science connections between things are exhibited which, apart from the -agency of human reason, are extremely unobvious. Thus the ideas, now in -the minds of contemporary mathematicians, lie very remote from any -notions which can be immediately derived by perception through the -senses; unless indeed it be perception stimulated and guided by -antecedent mathematical knowledge. This is the thesis which I proceed to -exemplify. - -Suppose we project our imaginations backwards through many thousands of -years, and endeavour to realise the simple-mindedness of even the -greatest intellects in those early societies. Abstract ideas which to us -are immediately obvious must have been, for them, matters only of the -most dim apprehension. For example take the question of number. We think -of the number ‘five’ as applying to appropriate groups of any entities -whatsoever—to five fishes, five children, five apples, five days. Thus -in considering the relations of the number ‘five’ to the number ‘three,’ -we are thinking of two groups of things, one with five members and the -other with three members. But we are entirely abstracting from any -consideration of any particular entities, or even of any particular -sorts of entities, which go to make up the membership of either of the -two groups. We are merely thinking of those relationships between those -two groups which are entirely independent of the individual essences of -any of the members of either group. This is a very remarkable feat of -abstraction; and it must have taken ages for the human race to rise to -it. During a long period, groups of fishes will have been compared to -each other in respect to their multiplicity, and groups of days to each -other. But the first man who noticed the analogy between a group of -seven fishes and a group of seven days made a notable advance in the -history of thought. He was the first man who entertained a concept -belonging to the science of pure mathematics. At that moment it must -have been impossible for him to divine the complexity and subtlety of -these abstract mathematical ideas which were waiting for discovery. Nor -could he have guessed that these notions would exert a widespread -fascination in each succeeding generation. There is an erroneous -literary tradition which represents the love of mathematics as a -monomania confined to a few eccentrics in each generation. But be this -as it may, it would have been impossible to anticipate the pleasure -derivable from a type of abstract thinking which had no counterpart in -the then-existing society. Thirdly, the tremendous future effect of -mathematical knowledge on the lives of men, on their daily avocations, -on their habitual thoughts, on the organization of society, must have -been even more completely shrouded from the foresight of those early -thinkers. Even now there is a very wavering grasp of the true position -of mathematics as an element in the history of thought. I will not go so -far as to say that to construct a history of thought without profound -study of the mathematical ideas of successive epochs is like omitting -Hamlet from the play which is named after him. That would be claiming -too much. But it is certainly analogous to cutting out the part of -Ophelia. This simile is singularly exact. For Ophelia is quite essential -to the play, she is very charming,—and a little mad. Let us grant that -the pursuit of mathematics is a divine madness of the human spirit, a -refuge from the goading urgency of contingent happenings. - -When we think of mathematics, we have in our mind a science devoted to -the exploration of number, quantity, geometry, and in modern times also -including investigation into yet more abstract concepts of order, and -into analogous types of purely logical relations. The point of -mathematics is that in it we have always got rid of the particular -instance, and even of any particular sorts of entities. So that for -example, no mathematical truths apply merely to fish, or merely to -stones, or merely to colours. So long as you are dealing with pure -mathematics, you are in the realm of complete and absolute abstraction. -All you assert is, that reason insists on the admission that, if any -entities whatever have any relations which satisfy such-and-such purely -abstract conditions, then they must have other relations which satisfy -other purely abstract conditions. - -Mathematics is thought moving in the sphere of complete abstraction from -any particular instance of what it is talking about. So far is this view -of mathematics from being obvious, that we can easily assure ourselves -that it is not, even now, generally understood. For example, it is -habitually thought that the certainty of mathematics is a reason for the -certainty of our geometrical knowledge of the space of the physical -universe. This is a delusion which has vitiated much philosophy in the -past, and some philosophy in the present. This question of geometry is a -test case of some urgency. There are certain alternative sets of purely -abstract conditions possible for the relationships of groups of -unspecified entities, which I will call _geometrical conditions_. I give -them this name because of their general analogy to those conditions, -which we believe to hold respecting the particular geometrical relations -of things observed by us in our direct perception of nature. So far as -our observations are concerned, we are not quite accurate enough to be -certain of the exact conditions regulating the things we come across in -nature. But we can by a slight stretch of hypothesis identify these -observed conditions with some one set of the purely abstract geometrical -conditions. In doing so, we make a particular determination of the group -of unspecified entities which are the _relata_ in the abstract science. -In the pure mathematics of geometrical relationships, we say that, if -_any_ group of entities enjoy _any_ relationships among its members -satisfying _this_ set of abstract geometrical conditions, then -such-and-such additional abstract conditions must also hold for such -relationships. But when we come to physical space, we say that some -definitely observed group of physical entities enjoys some definitely -observed relationships among its members which do satisfy this -above-mentioned set of abstract geometrical conditions. We thence -conclude that the additional relationships which we concluded to hold in -_any_ such case, must therefore hold in _this particular_ case. - -The certainty of mathematics depends upon its complete abstract -generality. But we can have no _à priori_ certainty that we are right in -believing that the observed entities in the concrete universe form a -particular instance of what falls under our general reasoning. To take -another example from arithmetic. It is a general abstract truth of pure -mathematics that any group of forty entities can be subdivided into two -groups of twenty entities. We are therefore justified in concluding that -a particular group of apples which we believe to contain forty members -can be subdivided into two groups of apples of which each contains -twenty members. But there always remains the possibility that we have -miscounted the big group; so that, when we come in practice to subdivide -it, we shall find that one of the two heaps has an apple too few or an -apple too many. - -Accordingly, in criticising an argument based upon the application of -mathematics to particular matters of fact, there are always three -processes to be kept perfectly distinct in our minds. We must first scan -the purely mathematical reasoning to make sure that there are no mere -slips in it—no casual illogicalities due to mental failure. Any -mathematician knows from bitter experience that, in first elaborating a -train of reasoning, it is very easy to commit a slight error which yet -makes all the difference. But when a piece of mathematics has been -revised, and has been before the expert world for some time, the chance -of a casual error is almost negligible. The next process is to make -quite certain of all the abstract conditions which have been presupposed -to hold. This is the determination of the abstract premises from which -the mathematical reasoning proceeds. This is a matter of considerable -difficulty. In the past quite remarkable oversights have been made, and -have been accepted by generations of the greatest mathematicians. The -chief danger is that of oversight, namely, tacitly to introduce some -condition, which it is natural for us to presuppose, but which in fact -need not always be holding. There is another opposite oversight in this -connection which does not lead to error, but only to lack of -simplification. It is very easy to think that more postulated conditions -are required than is in fact the case. In other words, we may think that -some abstract postulate is necessary which is in fact capable of being -proved from the other postulates that we have already on hand. The only -effects of this excess of abstract postulates are to diminish our -aesthetic pleasure in the mathematical reasoning, and to give us more -trouble when we come to the third process of criticism. - -This third process of criticism is that of verifying that our abstract -postulates hold for the particular case in question. It is in respect to -this process of verification for the particular case that all the -trouble arises. In some simple instances, such as the counting of forty -apples, we can with a little care arrive at practical certainty. But in -general, with more complex instances, complete certainty is -unattainable. Volumes, libraries of volumes, have been written on the -subject. It is the battle ground of rival philosophers. There are two -distinct questions involved. There are particular definite things -observed, and we have to make sure that the relations between these -things really do obey certain definite exact abstract conditions. There -is great room for error here. The exact observational methods of science -are all contrivances for limiting these erroneous conclusions as to -direct matters of fact. But another question arises. The things directly -observed are, almost always, only samples. We want to conclude that the -abstract conditions, which hold for the samples, also hold for all other -entities which, for some reason or other, appear to us to be of the same -sort. This process of reasoning from the sample to the whole species is -Induction. The theory of Induction is the despair of philosophy—and yet -all our activities are based upon it. Anyhow, in criticising a -mathematical conclusion as to a particular matter of fact, the real -difficulties consist in finding out the abstract assumptions involved, -and in estimating the evidence for their applicability to the particular -case in hand. - -It often happens, therefore, that in criticising a learned book of -applied mathematics, or a memoir, one’s whole trouble is with the first -chapter, or even with the first page. For it is there, at the very -outset, where the author will probably be found to slip in his -assumptions. Farther, the trouble is not with what the author does say, -but with what he does not say. Also it is not with what he knows he has -assumed, but with what he has unconsciously assumed. We do not doubt the -author’s honesty. It is his perspicacity which we are criticising. Each -generation criticises the unconscious assumptions made by its parents. -It may assent to them, but it brings them out in the open. - -The history of the development of language illustrates this point. It is -a history of the progressive analysis of ideas. Latin and Greek were -inflected languages. This means that they express an unanalyzed complex -of ideas by the mere modification of a word; whereas in English, for -example, we use prepositions and auxiliary verbs to drag into the open -the whole bundle of ideas involved. For certain forms of literary -art,—though not always—the compact absorption of auxiliary ideas into -the main word may be an advantage. But in a language such as English -there is the overwhelming gain in explicitness. This increased -explicitness is a more complete exhibition of the various abstractions -involved in the complex idea which is the meaning of the sentence. - -By comparison with language, we can now see what is the function in -thought which is performed by pure mathematics. It is a resolute attempt -to go the whole way in the direction of complete analysis, so as to -separate the elements of mere matter of fact from the purely abstract -conditions which they exemplify. - -The habit of such analysis enlightens every act of the functioning of -the human mind. It first (by isolating it) emphasizes the direct -aesthetic appreciation of the content of experience. This direct -appreciation means an apprehension of what this experience is in itself -in its own particular essence, including its immediate concrete values. -This is a question of direct experience, dependent upon sensitive -subtlety. There is then the abstraction of the particular entities -involved, viewed in themselves, and as apart from that particular -occasion of experience in which we are then apprehending them. Lastly -there is the further apprehension of the absolutely general conditions -satisfied by the particular relations of those entities as in that -experience. These conditions gain their generality from the fact that -they are expressible without reference to those particular relations or -to those particular relata which occur in that particular occasion of -experience. They are conditions which might hold for an indefinite -variety of other occasions, involving other entities and other relations -between them. Thus these conditions are perfectly general because they -refer to no particular occasion, and to no particular entities (such as -green, or blue, or trees) which enter into a variety of occasions, and -to no particular relationships between such entities. - -There is, however, a limitation to be made to the generality of -mathematics; it is a qualification which applies equally to all general -statements. No statement, except one, can be made respecting any remote -occasion which enters into no relationship with the immediate occasion -so as to form a constitutive element of the essence of that immediate -occasion. By the ‘immediate occasion’ I mean that occasion which -involves as an ingredient the individual act of judgment in question. -The one excepted statement is,—If anything out of relationship, then -complete ignorance as to it. Here by ‘ignorance,’ I mean _ignorance_; -accordingly no advice can be given as to how to expect it, or to treat -it, in ‘practice’ or in any other way. Either we know something of the -remote occasion by the cognition which is itself an element of the -immediate occasion, or we know nothing. Accordingly the full universe, -disclosed for every variety of experience, is a universe in which every -detail enters into its proper relationship with the immediate occasion. -The generality of mathematics is the most complete generality consistent -with the community of occasions which constitutes our metaphysical -situation. - -It is further to be noticed that the particular entities require these -general conditions for their ingression into any occasions; but the same -general conditions may be required by many types of particular entities. -This fact, that the general conditions transcend any one set of -particular entities, is the ground for the entry into mathematics, and -into mathematical logic, of the notion of the ‘variable.’ It is by the -employment of this notion that general conditions are investigated -without any specification of particular entities. This irrelevance of -the particular entities has not been generally understood: for example, -the shape-iness of shapes, _e.g._, circularity and sphericity and -cubicality as in actual experience, do not enter into the geometrical -reasoning. - -The exercise of logical reason is always concerned with these absolutely -general conditions. In its broadest sense, the discovery of mathematics -is the discovery that the totality of these general abstract conditions, -which are concurrently applicable to the relationships among the -entities of any one concrete occasion, are themselves inter-connected in -the manner of a pattern with a key to it. This pattern of relationships -among general abstract conditions is imposed alike on external reality, -and on our abstract representations of it, by the general necessity that -every thing must be just its own individual self, with its own -individual way of differing from everything else. This is nothing else -than the necessity of abstract logic, which is the presupposition -involved in the very fact of interrelated existence as disclosed in each -immediate occasion of experience. - -The key to the pattern means this fact:—that from a select set of those -general conditions, exemplified in any one and the same occasion, a -pattern involving an infinite variety of other such conditions, also -exemplified in the same occasion, can be developed by the pure exercise -of abstract logic. Any such select set is called the set of postulates, -or premises, from which the reasoning proceeds. The reasoning is nothing -else than the exhibition of the whole pattern of general conditions -involved in the pattern derived from the selected postulates. - -The harmony of the logical reason, which divines the complete pattern as -involved in the postulates, is the most general aesthetic property -arising from the mere fact of concurrent existence in the unity of one -occasion. Wherever there is a unity of occasion there is thereby -established an aesthetic relationship between the general conditions -involved in that occasion. This aesthetic relationship is that which is -divined in the exercise of rationality. Whatever falls within that -relationship is thereby exemplified in that occasion; whatever falls -without that relationship is thereby excluded from exemplification in -that occasion. The complete pattern of general conditions, thus -exemplified, is determined by any one of many select sets of these -conditions. These key sets are sets of equivalent postulates. This -reasonable harmony of being, which is required for the unity of a -complex occasion, together with the completeness of the realisation (in -that occasion) of all that is involved in its logical harmony, is the -primary article of metaphysical doctrine. It means that for things to be -together involves that they are reasonably together. This means that -thought can penetrate into every occasion of fact, so that by -comprehending its key conditions, the whole complex of its pattern of -conditions lies open before it. It comes to this:—provided we know -something which is perfectly general about the elements in any occasion, -we can then know an indefinite number of other equally general concepts -which must also be exemplified in that same occasion. The logical -harmony involved in the unity of an occasion is both exclusive and -inclusive. The occasion must exclude the inharmonious, and it must -include the harmonious. - -Pythagoras was the first man who had any grasp of the full sweep of this -general principle. He lived in the sixth century before Christ. Our -knowledge of him is fragmentary. But we know some points which establish -his greatness in the history of thought. He insisted on the importance -of the utmost generality in reasoning, and he divined the importance of -number as an aid to the construction of any representation of the -conditions involved in the order of nature. We know also that he studied -geometry, and discovered the general proof of the remarkable theorem -about right-angled triangles. The formation of the Pythagorean -Brotherhood, and the mysterious rumours as to its rites and its -influence, afford some evidence that Pythagoras divined, however dimly, -the possible importance of mathematics in the formation of science. On -the side of philosophy he started a discussion which has agitated -thinkers ever since. He asked, ‘What is the status of mathematical -entities, such as numbers for example, in the realm of things?’ The -number ‘two,’ for example, is in some sense exempt from the flux of time -and the necessity of position in space. Yet it is involved in the real -world. The same considerations apply to geometrical notions—to circular -shape, for example. Pythagoras is said to have taught that the -mathematical entities, such as numbers and shapes, were the ultimate -stuff out of which the real entities of our perceptual experience are -constructed. As thus boldly stated, the idea seems crude, and indeed -silly. But undoubtedly, he had hit upon a philosophical notion of -considerable importance; a notion which has a long history, and which -has moved the minds of men, and has even entered into Christian -theology. About a thousand years separate the Athanasian Creed from -Pythagoras, and about two thousand four hundred years separate -Pythagoras from Hegel. Yet for all these distances in time, the -importance of definite number in the constitution of the Divine Nature, -and the concept of the real world as exhibiting the evolution of an -idea, can both be traced back to the train of thought set going by -Pythagoras. - -The importance of an individual thinker owes something to chance. For it -depends upon the fate of his ideas in the minds of his successors. In -this respect Pythagoras was fortunate. His philosophical speculations -reach us through the mind of Plato. The Platonic world of ideas is the -refined, revised form of the Pythagorean doctrine that number lies at -the base of the real world. Owing to the Greek mode of representing -numbers by patterns of dots, the notions of number and of geometrical -configuration are less separated than with us. Also Pythagoras, without -doubt, included the shape-iness of shape, which is an impure -mathematical entity. So to-day, when Einstein and his followers proclaim -that physical facts, such as gravitation, are to be construed as -exhibitions of local peculiarities of spatio-temporal properties, they -are following the pure Pythagorean tradition. In a sense, Plato and -Pythagoras stand nearer to modern physical science than does Aristotle. -The two former were mathematicians, whereas Aristotle was the son of a -doctor, though of course he was not thereby ignorant of mathematics. The -practical counsel to be derived from Pythagoras, is to measure, and thus -to express quality in terms of numerically determined quantity. But the -biological sciences, then and till our own time, have been -overwhelmingly classificatory. Accordingly, Aristotle by his Logic -throws the emphasis on classification. The popularity of Aristotelian -Logic retarded the advance of physical science throughout the Middle -Ages. If only the schoolmen had measured instead of classifying, how -much they might have learnt! - -Classification is a halfway house between the immediate concreteness of -the individual thing and the complete abstraction of mathematical -notions. The species take account of the specific character, and the -genera of the generic character. But in the procedure of relating -mathematical notions to the facts of nature, by counting, by -measurement, and by geometrical relations, and by types of order, the -rational contemplation is lifted from the incomplete abstractions -involved in definite species and genera, to the complete, abstractions -of mathematics. Classification is necessary. But unless you can progress -from classification to mathematics, your reasoning will not take you -very far. - -Between the epoch which stretches from Pythagoras to Plato and the epoch -comprised in the seventeenth century of the modern world nearly two -thousand years elapsed. In this long interval mathematics had made -immense strides. Geometry had gained the study of conic sections and -trigonometry; the method of exhaustion had almost anticipated the -integral calculus; and above all the Arabic arithmetical notation and -algebra had been contributed by Asiatic thought. But the progress was on -technical lines. Mathematics, as a formative element in the development -of philosophy, never, during this long period, recovered from its -deposition at the hands of Aristotle. Some of the old ideas derived from -the Pythagorean-Platonic epoch lingered on, and can be traced among the -Platonic influences which shaped the first period of evolution of -Christian theology. But philosophy received no fresh inspiration from -the steady advance of mathematical science. In the seventeenth century -the influence of Aristotle was at its lowest, and mathematics recovered -the importance of its earlier period. It was an age of great physicists -and great philosophers; and the physicists and philosophers were alike -mathematicians. The exception of John Locke should be made; although he -was greatly influenced by the Newtonian circle of the Royal Society. In -the age of Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, Newton, and Leibniz, mathematics -was an influence of the first magnitude in the formation of philosophic -ideas. But the mathematics, which now emerged into prominence, was a -very different science from the mathematics of the earlier epoch. It had -gained in generality, and had started upon its almost incredible modern -career of piling subtlety of generalization upon subtlety of -generalization; and of finding, with each growth of complexity, some new -application, either to physical science, or to philosophic thought. The -Arabic notation had equipped the science with almost perfect technical -efficiency in the manipulation of numbers. This relief from a struggle -with arithmetical details (as instanced, for example, in the Egyptian -arithmetic of B. C. 1600) gave room for a development which had already -been faintly anticipated in later Greek mathematics. Algebra now came -upon the scene, and algebra is a generalisation of arithmetic. In the -same way as the notion of number abstracted from reference to any one -particular set of entities, so in algebra abstraction is made from the -notion of any particular numbers. Just as the number ‘5’ refers -impartially to any group of five entities, so in algebra the letters are -used to refer impartially to any number, with the proviso that each -letter is to refer to the same number throughout the same context of its -employment. - -This usage was first employed in equations, which are methods of asking -complicated arithmetical questions. In this connection, the letters -representing numbers were termed ‘unknowns.’ But equations soon -suggested a new idea, that, namely, of a function of one or more general -symbols, these symbols being letters representing any numbers. In this -employment the algebraic letters are called the ‘arguments’ of the -function, or sometimes they are called the ‘variables.’ Then, for -instance, if an angle is represented by an algebraical letter, as -standing for its numerical measure in terms of a given unit, -Trigonometry is absorbed into this new algebra. Algebra thus develops -into the general science of analysis in which we consider the properties -of various functions of undetermined arguments. Finally the particular -functions, such as the trigonometrical functions, and the logarithmic -functions, and the algebraic functions, are generalised into the idea of -‘any function.’ Too large a generalisation leads to mere barrenness. It -is the large generalisation, limited by a happy particularity, which is -the fruitful conception. For instance the idea of any _continuous_ -function, whereby the limitation of continuity is introduced, is the -fruitful idea which has led to most of the important applications. This -rise of algebraic analysis was concurrent with Descartes’ discovery of -analytical geometry, and then with the invention of the infinitesimal -calculus by Newton and Leibniz. Truly, Pythagoras, if he could have -foreseen the issue of the train of thought which he had set going would -have felt himself fully justified in his brotherhood with its excitement -of mysterious rites. - -The point which I now want to make is that this dominance of the idea of -functionality in the abstract sphere of mathematics found itself -reflected in the order of nature under the guise of mathematically -expressed laws of nature. Apart from this progress of mathematics, the -seventeenth century developments of science would have been impossible. -Mathematics supplied the background of imaginative thought with which -the men of science approached the observation of nature. Galileo -produced formulae, Descartes produced formulae, Huyghens produced -formulae, Newton produced formulae. - -As a particular example of the effect of the abstract development of -mathematics upon the science of those times, consider the notion of -periodicity. The general recurrences of things are very obvious in our -ordinary experience. Days recur, lunar phases recur, the seasons of the -year recur, rotating bodies recur to their old positions, beats of the -heart recur, breathing recurs. On every side, we are met by recurrence. -Apart from recurrence, knowledge would be impossible; for nothing could -be referred to our past experience. Also, apart from some regularity of -recurrence, measurement would be impossible. In our experience, as we -gain the idea of exactness, recurrence is fundamental. - -In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the theory of periodicity -took a fundamental place in science. Kepler divined a law connecting the -major axes of the planetary orbits with the periods in which the planets -respectively described their orbits: Galileo observed the periodic -vibrations of pendulums: Newton explained sound as being due to the -disturbance of air by the passage through it of periodic waves of -condensation and rarefaction: Huyghens explained light as being due to -the transverse waves of vibration of a subtle ether: Mersenne connected -the period of the vibration of a violin string with its density, -tension, and length. The birth of modern physics depended upon the -application of the abstract idea of periodicity to a variety of concrete -instances. But this would have been impossible, unless mathematicians -had already worked out in the abstract the various abstract ideas which -cluster round the notions of periodicity. The science of trigonometry -arose from that of the relations of the angles of a right-angled -triangle, to the ratios between the sides and hypotenuse of the -triangle. Then, under the influence of the newly discovered mathematical -science of the analysis of functions, it broadened out into the study of -the simple abstract periodic functions which these ratios exemplify. -Thus trigonometry became completely abstract; and in thus becoming -abstract, it became useful. It illuminated the underlying analogy -between sets of utterly diverse physical phenomena; and at the same time -it supplied the weapons by which any one such set could have its various -features analysed and related to each other.[2] - -Nothing is more impressive than the fact that, as mathematics withdrew -increasingly into the upper regions of ever greater extremes of abstract -thought, it returned back to earth with a corresponding growth of -importance for the analysis of concrete fact. The history of the -seventeenth century science reads as though it were some vivid dream of -Plato or Pythagoras. In this characteristic the seventeenth century was -only the forerunner of its successors. - -Footnote 2: - - For a more detailed consideration of the nature and function of pure - mathematics _cf._ my _Introduction to Mathematics_, Home University - Library, Williams and Norgate, London. - -The paradox is now fully established that the utmost abstractions are -the true weapons with which to control our thought of concrete fact. As -the result of the prominence of mathematicians in the seventeenth -century, the eighteenth century was mathematically minded, more -especially where French influence predominated. An exception must be -made of the English empiricism derived from Locke. Outside France, -Newton’s direct influence on philosophy is best seen in Kant, and not in -Hume. - -In the nineteenth century, the general influence of mathematics waned. -The romantic movement in literature, and the idealistic movement in -philosophy were not the products of mathematical minds. Also, even in -science, the growth of geology, of zoology, and of the biological -sciences generally, was in each case entirely disconnected from any -reference to mathematics. The chief scientific excitement of the century -was the Darwinian theory of evolution. Accordingly, mathematicians were -in the background, so far as the general thought of that age was -concerned. But this does not mean that mathematics was being neglected, -or even that it was uninfluential. During the nineteenth century pure -mathematics made almost as much progress as during all the preceding -centuries from Pythagoras onwards. Of course progress was easier, -because the technique had been perfected. But allowing for that, the -change in mathematics between the years 1800 and 1900 is very -remarkable. If we add in the previous hundred years, and take the two -centuries preceding the present time, one is almost tempted to date the -foundation of mathematics somewhere in the last quarter of the -seventeenth century. The period of the discovery of the elements -stretches from Pythagoras to Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, and the -developed science has been created during the last two hundred and fifty -years. This is not a boast as to the superior genius of the modern -world; for it is harder to discover the elements than to develop the -science. - -Throughout the nineteenth century, the influence of the science was its -influence on dynamics and physics, and thence derivatively on -engineering and chemistry. It is difficult to overrate its indirect -influence on human life through the medium of these sciences. But there -was no direct influence of mathematics upon the general thought of the -age. - -In reviewing this rapid sketch of the influence of mathematics -throughout European history, we see that it had two great periods of -direct influence upon general thought, both periods lasting for about -two hundred years. The first period was that stretching from Pythagoras -to Plato, when the possibility of the science, and its general -character, first dawned upon the Grecian thinkers. The second period -comprised the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of our modern epoch. -Both periods had certain common characteristics. In the earlier, as in -the later period, the general categories of thought in many spheres of -human interest, were in a state of disintegration. In the age of -Pythagoras, the unconscious Paganism, with its traditional clothing of -beautiful ritual and of magical rites, was passing into a new phase -under two influences. There were waves of religious enthusiasm, seeking -direct enlightenment into the secret depths of being; and at the -opposite pole, there was the awakening of critical analytical thought, -probing with cool dispassionateness into ultimate meanings. In both -influences, so diverse in their outcome, there was one common element—an -awakened curiosity, and a movement towards the reconstruction of -traditional ways. The pagan mysteries may be compared to the Puritan -reaction and to the Catholic reaction; critical scientific interest was -alike in both epochs, though with minor differences of substantial -importance. - -In each age, the earlier stages were placed in periods of rising -prosperity, and of new opportunities. In this respect, they differed -from the period of gradual declension in the second and third centuries -when Christianity was advancing to the conquest of the Roman world. It -is only in a period, fortunate both in its opportunities for -disengagement from the immediate pressure of circumstances, and in its -eager curiosity, that the Age-Spirit can undertake any direct revision -of those final abstractions which lie hidden in the more concrete -concepts from which the serious thought of an age takes its start. In -the rare periods when this task can be undertaken, mathematics becomes -relevant to philosophy. For mathematics is the science of the most -complete abstractions to which the human mind can attain. - -The parallel between the two epochs must not be pressed too far. The -modern world is larger and more complex than the ancient civilization -round the shores of the Mediterranean, or even than that of the Europe -which sent Columbus and the Pilgrim Fathers across the ocean. We cannot -now explain our age by some simple formula which becomes dominant and -will then be laid to rest for a thousand years. Thus the temporary -submergence of the mathematical mentality from the time of Rousseau -onwards appears already to be at an end. We are entering upon an age of -reconstruction, in religion, in science, and in political thought. Such -ages, if they are to avoid mere ignorant oscillation between extremes, -must seek truth in its ultimate depths. There can be no vision of this -depth of truth apart from a philosophy which takes full account of those -ultimate abstractions, whose interconnections it is the business of -mathematics to explore. - -In order to explain exactly how mathematics is gaining in general -importance at the present time, let us start from a particular -scientific perplexity and consider the notions to which we are naturally -led by some attempt to unravel its difficulties. At present physics is -troubled by the quantum theory. I need not now explain[3] what this -theory is, to those who are not already familiar with it. But the point -is that one of the most hopeful lines of explanation is to assume that -an electron does not continuously traverse its path in space. The -alternative notion as to its mode of existence is that it appears at a -series of discrete positions in space which it occupies for successive -durations of time. It is as though an automobile moving at the average -rate of thirty miles an hour along a road, did not traverse the road -continuously; but appeared successively at the successive milestones, -remaining for two minutes at each milestone. - -Footnote 3: - - _Cf._ Chapter VIII. - -In the first place there is required the purely technical use of -mathematics to determine whether this conception does in fact explain -the many perplexing characteristics of the quantum theory. If the notion -survives this test, undoubtedly physics will adopt it. So far the -question is purely one for mathematics and physical science to settle -between them, on the basis of mathematical calculations and physical -observations. - -But now a problem is handed over to the philosophers. This discontinuous -existence in space, thus assigned to electrons, is very unlike the -continuous existence of material entities which we habitually assume as -obvious. The electron seems to be borrowing the character which some -people have assigned to the Mahatmas of Tibet. These electrons, with the -correlative protons, are now conceived as being the fundamental entities -out of which the material bodies of ordinary experience are composed. -Accordingly, if this explanation is allowed, we have to revise all our -notions of the ultimate character of material existence. For when we -penetrate to these final entities, this startling discontinuity of -spatial existence discloses itself. - -There is no difficulty in explaining the paradox, if we consent to apply -to the apparently steady undifferentiated endurance of matter the same -principles as those now accepted for sound and light. A steadily -sounding note is explained as the outcome of vibrations in the air: a -steady colour is explained as the outcome of vibrations in ether. If we -explain the steady endurance of matter on the same principle, we shall -conceive each primordial element as a vibratory ebb and flow of an -underlying energy, or activity. Suppose we keep to the physical idea of -energy: then each primordial element will be an organized system of -vibratory streaming of energy. Accordingly there will be a definite -period associated with each element; and within that period the -stream-system will sway from one stationary maximum to another -stationary maximum,—or, taking a metaphor from the ocean tides, the -system will sway from one high tide to another high tide. This system, -forming the primordial element, is nothing at any instant. It requires -its whole period in which to manifest itself. In an analogous way, a -note of music is nothing at an instant, but it also requires its whole -period in which to manifest itself. - -Accordingly, in asking where the primordial element is, we must settle -on its average position at the centre of each period. If we divide time -into smaller elements, the vibratory system as one electronic entity has -no existence. The path in space of such a vibratory entity—where the -entity is _constituted by_ the vibrations—must be represented by a -series of detached positions in space, analogously to the automobile -which is found at successive milestones and at nowhere between. - -We first must ask whether there is any evidence to associate the quantum -theory with vibration. This question is immediately answered in the -affirmative. The whole theory centres round the radiant energy from an -atom, and is intimately associated with the periods of the radiant -wave-systems. It seems, therefore, that the hypothesis of essentially -vibratory existence is the most hopeful way of explaining the paradox of -the discontinuous orbit. - -In the second place, a new problem is now placed before philosophers and -physicists, if we entertain the hypothesis that the ultimate elements of -matter are in their essence vibratory. By this I mean that apart from -being a periodic system, such an element would have no existence. With -this hypothesis we have to ask, what are the ingredients which form the -vibratory organism. We have already got rid of the matter with its -appearance of undifferentiated endurance. Apart from some metaphysical -compulsion, there is no reason to provide another more subtle stuff to -take the place of the matter which has just been explained away. The -field is now open for the introduction of some new doctrine of organism -which may take the place of the materialism with which, since the -seventeenth century, science has saddled philosophy. It must be -remembered that the physicists’ energy is obviously an abstraction. The -concrete fact, which is the organism, must be a complete expression of -the character of a real occurrence. Such a displacement of scientific -materialism, if it ever takes place, cannot fail to have important -consequences in every field of thought. - -Finally, our last reflection must be, that we have in the end come back -to a version of the doctrine of old Pythagoras, from whom mathematics, -and mathematical physics, took their rise. He discovered the importance -of dealing with abstractions; and in particular directed attention to -number as characterizing the periodicities of notes of music. The -importance of the abstract idea of periodicity was thus present at the -very beginning both of mathematics and of European philosophy. - -In the seventeenth century, the birth of modern science required a new -mathematics, more fully equipped for the purpose of analysing the -characteristics of vibratory existence. And now in the twentieth century -we find physicists largely engaged in analysing the periodicities of -atoms. Truly, Pythagoras in founding European philosophy and European -mathematics, endowed them with the luckiest of lucky guesses—or, was it -a flash of divine genius, penetrating to the inmost nature of things? - - - - - CHAPTER III - - THE CENTURY OF GENIUS - - -The previous chapters were devoted to the antecedent conditions which -prepared the soil for the scientific outburst of the seventeenth -century. They traced the various elements of thought and instinctive -belief, from their first efflorescence in the classical civilisation of -the ancient world, through the transformations which they underwent in -the Middle Ages, up to the historical revolt of the sixteenth century. -Three main factors arrested attention,—the rise of mathematics, the -instinctive belief in a detailed order of nature, and the unbridled -rationalism of the thought of the later Middle Ages. By this rationalism -I mean the belief that the avenue to truth was predominantly through a -metaphysical analysis of the nature of things, which would thereby -determine how things acted and functioned. The historical revolt was the -definite abandonment of this method in favour of the study of the -empirical facts of antecedents and consequences. In religion, it meant -the appeal to the origins of Christianity; and in science it meant the -appeal to experiment and the inductive method of reasoning. - -A brief, and sufficiently accurate, description of the intellectual life -of the European races during the succeeding two centuries and a quarter -up to our own times is that they have been living upon the accumulated -capital of ideas provided for them by the genius of the seventeenth -century. The men of this epoch inherited a ferment of ideas attendant -upon the historical revolt of the sixteenth century, and they bequeathed -formed systems of thought touching every aspect of human life. It is the -one century which consistently, and throughout the whole range of human -activities, provided intellectual genius adequate for the greatness of -its occasions. The crowded stage of this hundred years is indicated by -the coincidences which mark its literary annals. At its dawn Bacon’s -_Advancement of Learning_ and Cervantes’ _Don Quixote_ were published in -the same year (1605), as though the epoch would introduce itself with a -forward and a backward glance. The first quarto edition of _Hamlet_ -appeared in the preceding year, and a slightly variant edition in the -same year. Finally Shakespeare and Cervantes died on the same day, April -23, 1616. In the spring of this same year Harvey is believed to have -first expounded his theory of the circulation of the blood in a course -of lectures before the College of Physicians in London. Newton was born -in the year that Galileo died (1642), exactly one hundred years after -the publication of Copernicus’ _De Revolutionibus_. One year earlier -Descartes published his _Meditationes_ and two years later his -_Principia Philosophiae_. There simply was not time for the century to -space out nicely its notable events concerning men of genius. - -I cannot now enter upon a chronicle of the various stages of -intellectual advance included within this epoch. It is too large a topic -for one lecture, and would obscure the ideas which it is my purpose to -develop. A mere rough catalogue of some names will be sufficient, names -of men who published to the world important work within these limits of -time: Francis Bacon, Harvey, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, -Huyghens, Boyle, Newton, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz. I have limited the -list to the sacred number of twelve, a number much too small to be -properly representative. For example, there is only one Italian there, -whereas Italy could have filled the list from its own ranks. Again -Harvey is the only biologist, and also there are too many Englishmen. -This latter defect is partly due to the fact that the lecturer is -English, and that he is lecturing to an audience which, equally with -him, owns this English century. If he had been Dutch, there would have -been too many Dutchmen; if Italian, too many Italians; and if French, -too many Frenchmen. The unhappy Thirty Years’ War was devastating -Germany; but every other country looks back to this century as an epoch -which witnessed some culmination of its genius. Certainly this was a -great period of English thought; as at a later time Voltaire impressed -upon France. - -The omission of physiologists, other than Harvey, also requires -explanation. There were, of course, great advances in biology within the -century, chiefly associated with Italy and the University of Padua. But -my purpose is to trace the philosophic outlook, derived from science and -presupposed by science, and to estimate some of its effects on the -general climate of each age. Now the scientific philosophy of this age -was dominated by physics; so as to be the most obvious rendering, in -terms of general ideas, of the state of physical knowledge of that age -and of the two succeeding centuries. As a matter of fact, these concepts -are very unsuited to biology; and set for it an insoluble problem of -matter and life and organism, with which biologists are now wrestling. -But the science of living organisms is only now coming to a growth -adequate to impress its conceptions upon philosophy. The last half -century before the present time has witnessed unsuccessful attempts to -impress biological notions upon the materialism of the seventeenth -century. However this success be estimated, it is certain that the root -ideas of the seventeenth century were derived from the school of thought -which produced Galileo, Huyghens and Newton, and not from the -physiologists of Padua. One unsolved problem of thought, so far as it -derives from this period, is to be formulated thus: Given configurations -of matter with locomotion in space as assigned by physical laws, to -account for living organisms. - -My discussion of the epoch will be best introduced by a quotation from -Francis Bacon, which forms the opening of Section (or ‘Century’) IX of -his _Natural History_, I mean his _Silva Silvarum_. We are told in the -contemporary memoir by his chaplain, Dr. Rawley, that this work was -composed in the last five years of his life, so it must be dated between -1620 and 1626. The quotation runs thus: - -“It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, -yet they have perception; for when one body is applied to another, there -is a kind of election to embrace that which is agreeable, and to exclude -or expel that which is ingrate; and whether the body be alterant or -altered, evermore a perception precedeth operation; for else all bodies -would be like one to another. And sometimes this perception, in some -kind of bodies, is far more subtile than sense; so that sense is but a -dull thing in comparison of it: we see a weatherglass will find the -least difference of the weather in heat or cold, when we find it not. -And this perception is sometimes at a distance, as well as upon the -touch; as when the loadstone draweth iron; or flame naphtha of Babylon, -a great distance off. It is therefore a subject of a very noble enquiry, -to enquire of the more subtile perceptions; for it is another key to -open nature, as well as the sense; and sometimes better. And besides, it -is a principal means of natural divination; for that which in these -perceptions appeareth early, in the great effects cometh long after.” - -There are a great many points of interest about this quotation, some of -which will emerge into importance in succeeding lectures. In the first -place, note the careful way in which Bacon discriminates between -_perception_, or _taking account of_, on the one hand, and _sense_, or -_cognitive experience_, on the other hand. In this respect Bacon is -outside the physical line of thought which finally dominated the -century. Later on, people thought of passive matter which was operated -on externally by forces. I believe Bacon’s line of thought to have -expressed a more fundamental truth than do the materialistic concepts -which were then being shaped as adequate for physics. We are now so used -to the materialistic way of looking at things, which has been rooted in -our literature by the genius of the seventeenth century, that it is with -some difficulty that we understand the possibility of another mode of -approach to the problems of nature. - -In the particular instance of the quotation which I have just made, the -whole passage and the context in which it is embedded, are permeated -through and through by the experimental method, that is to say, by -attention to ‘irreducible and stubborn facts’, and by the inductive -method of eliciting general laws. Another unsolved problem which has -been bequeathed to us by the seventeenth century is the rational -justification of this method of Induction. The explicit realisation of -the antithesis between the deductive rationalism of the scholastics and -the inductive observational methods of the moderns must chiefly be -ascribed to Bacon; though, of course, it was implicit in the mind of -Galileo and of all the men of science of those times. But Bacon was one -of the earliest of the whole group, and also had the most direct -apprehension of the full extent of the intellectual revolution which was -in progress. Perhaps the man who most completely anticipated both Bacon -and the whole modern point of view was the artist Leonardo Da Vinci, who -lived almost exactly a century before Bacon. Leonardo also illustrates -the theory which I was advancing in my last lecture, that the rise of -naturalistic art was an important ingredient in the formation of our -scientific mentality. Indeed, Leonardo was more completely a man of -science than was Bacon. The practice of naturalistic art is more akin to -the practice of physics, chemistry and biology than is the practice of -law. We all remember the saying of Bacon’s contemporary, Harvey, the -discoverer of the circulation of the blood, that Bacon ‘wrote of science -like a Lord Chancellor.’ But at the beginning of the modern period Da -Vinci and Bacon stand together as illustrating the various strains which -have combined to form the modern world, namely, legal mentality and the -patient observational habits of the naturalistic artists. - -In the passage which I have quoted from Bacon’s writings there is no -explicit mention of the method of inductive reasoning. It is unnecessary -for me to prove to you by any quotations that the enforcement of the -importance of this method, and of the importance, to the welfare of -mankind, of the secrets of nature to be thus discovered, was one of the -main themes to which Bacon devoted himself in his writings. Induction -has proved to be a somewhat more complex process than Bacon anticipated. -He had in his mind the belief that with a sufficient care in the -collection of instances the general law would stand out of itself. We -know now, and probably Harvey knew then, that this is a very inadequate -account of the processes which issue in scientific generalisations. But -when you have made all the requisite deductions, Bacon remains as one of -the great builders who constructed the mind of the modern world. - -The special difficulties raised by induction emerged in the eighteenth -century, as the result of Hume’s criticism. But Bacon was one of the -prophets of the historical revolt, which deserted the method of -unrelieved rationalism, and rushed into the other extreme of basing all -fruitful knowledge upon inference from particular occasions in the past -to particular occasions in the future. I do not wish to throw any doubt -upon the validity of induction, when it has been properly guarded. My -point is, that the very baffling task of applying reason to elicit the -general characteristics of the immediate occasion, as set before us in -direct cognition, is a necessary preliminary, if we are to justify -induction; unless indeed we are content to base it upon our vague -instinct that of course it is all right. Either there is something about -the immediate occasion which affords knowledge of the past and the -future, or we are reduced to utter scepticism as to memory and -induction. It is impossible to over-emphasise the point that the key to -the process of induction, as used either in science or in our ordinary -life, is to be found in the right understanding of the immediate -occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness. It is in respect to our -grasp of the character of these occasions in their concreteness that the -modern developments of physiology and of psychology are of critical -importance. I shall illustrate this point in my subsequent lectures. We -find ourselves amid insoluble difficulties when we substitute for this -concrete occasion a mere abstract in which we only consider material -objects in a flux of configurations in time and space. It is quite -obvious that such objects can tell us only that they are where they are. - -Accordingly, we must recur to the method of the school-divinity as -explained by the Italian medievalists whom I quoted in the first -lecture. We must observe the immediate occasion, and _use reason_ to -elicit a general description of its nature. Induction presupposes -metaphysics. In other words, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism. -You cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history till -your metaphysics has assured you that there _is_ a history to appeal to; -and likewise your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of -knowledge that there _is_ a future already subjected to some -determinations. The difficulty is to make sense of either of these -ideas. But unless you have done so, you have made nonsense of induction. - -You will observe that I do not hold Induction to be in its essence the -derivation of general laws. It is the divination of some characteristics -of a particular future from the known characteristics of a particular -past. The wider assumption of general laws holding for all cognisable -occasions appears a very unsafe addendum to attach to this limited -knowledge. All we can ask of the present occasion is that it shall -determine a particular community of occasions, which are in some -respects mutually qualified by reason of their inclusion within that -same community. That community of occasions considered in physical -science is the set of happenings which fit on to each other—as we say—in -a common space-time, so that we can trace the transitions from one to -the other. Accordingly, we refer to _the_ common space-time indicated in -our immediate occasion of knowledge. Inductive reasoning proceeds from -the particular occasion to the particular community of occasions, and -from the particular community to relations between particular occasions -within that community. Until we have taken into account other scientific -concepts, it is impossible to carry the discussion of induction further -than this preliminary conclusion. - -The third point to notice about this quotation from Bacon is the purely -qualitative character of the statements made in it. In this respect -Bacon completely missed the tonality which lay behind the success of -seventeenth century science. Science was becoming, and has remained, -primarily quantitative. Search for measurable elements among your -phenomena, and then search for relations between these measures of -physical quantities. Bacon ignores this rule of science. For example, in -the quotation given he speaks of action at a distance; but he is -thinking qualitatively and not quantitatively. We cannot ask that he -should anticipate his younger contemporary Galileo, or his distant -successor Newton. But he gives no hint that there should be a search for -quantities. Perhaps he was misled by the current logical doctrines which -had come down from Aristotle. For, in effect, these doctrines said to -the physicist ‘_classify_’ when they should have said ‘_measure_.’ - -By the end of the century physics had been founded on a satisfactory -basis of measurement. The final and adequate exposition was given by -Newton. The common measurable element of _mass_ was discerned as -characterising all bodies in different amounts. Bodies which are -apparently identical in substance, shape, and size have very -approximately the same mass: the closer the identity, the nearer the -equality. The force acting on a body, whether by touch or by action at a -distance, was [in effect] defined as being equal to the mass of the body -multiplied by the rate of change of the body’s velocity, so far as this -rate of change is produced by that force. In this way the force is -discerned by its effect on the motion of the body. The question now -arises whether this conception of the magnitude of a force leads to the -discovery of simple quantitative laws involving the alternative -determination of forces by circumstances of the configuration of -substances and of their physical characters. The Newtonian conception -has been brilliantly successful in surviving this test throughout the -whole modern period. Its first triumph was the law of gravitation. Its -cumulative triumph has been the whole development of dynamical -astronomy, of engineering, and of physics. - -This subject of the formation of the three laws of motion and of the law -of gravitation deserves critical attention. The whole development of -thought occupied exactly two generations. It commenced with Galileo and -ended with Newton’s _Principia_; and Newton was born in the year that -Galileo died. Also the lives of Descartes and Huyghens fall within the -period occupied by these great terminal figures. The issue of the -combined labours of these four men has some right to be considered as -the greatest single intellectual success which mankind has achieved. In -estimating its size, we must consider the completeness of its range. It -constructs for us a vision of the material universe, and it enables us -to calculate the minutest detail of a particular occurrence. Galileo -took the first step in hitting on the right line of thought. He noted -that the critical point to attend to was not the motion of bodies but -the changes of their motions. Galileo’s discovery is formularised by -Newton in his first law of motion:—“Every body continues in its state of -rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, except so far as it may -be compelled by force to change that state.” - -This formula contains the repudiation of a belief which had blocked the -progress of physics for two thousand years. It also deals with a -fundamental concept which is essential to scientific theory; I mean, the -concept of an ideally isolated system. This conception embodies a -fundamental character of things, without which science, or indeed any -knowledge on the part of finite intellects, would be impossible. The -‘isolated’ system is not a solipsist system, apart from which there -would be nonentity. It is isolated as within the universe. This means -that there are truths respecting this system which require reference -only to the remainder of things by way of a uniform systematic scheme of -relationships. Thus the conception of an isolated system is not the -conception of substantial independence from the remainder of things, but -of freedom from casual contingent dependence upon detailed items within -the rest of the universe. Further, this freedom from casual dependence -is required only in respect to certain abstract characteristics which -attach to the isolated system, and not in respect to the system in its -full concreteness. - -The first law of motion asks what is to be said of a dynamically -isolated system so far as concerns its motion as a whole, abstracting -from its orientation and its internal arrangement of parts. Aristotle -said that you must conceive such a system to be at rest. Galileo added -that the state of rest is only a particular case, and that the general -statement is ‘either in a state of rest, or of uniform motion in a -straight line.’ Accordingly, an Aristotelean would conceive the forces -arising from the reaction of alien bodies as being quantitatively -measurable in terms of the velocity they sustain, and as directively -determined by the direction of that velocity; while the Galilean would -direct attention to the magnitude of the acceleration and to its -direction. This difference is illustrated by contrasting Kepler and -Newton. They both speculated as to the forces sustaining the planets in -their orbits. Kepler looked for tangential forces pushing the planets -along, whereas Newton looked for radial forces diverting the directions -of the planets’ motions. - -Instead of dwelling upon the mistake which Aristotle made, it is more -profitable to emphasise the justification which he had for it, if we -consider the obvious facts of our experience. All the motions which -enter into our normal everyday experience cease unless they are -evidently sustained from the outside. Apparently, therefore, the sound -empiricist must devote his attention to this question of the sustenance -of motion. We here hit upon one of the dangers of unimaginative -empiricism. The seventeenth century exhibits another example of this -same danger; and, of all people in the world, Newton fell into it. -Huyghens had produced the wave theory of light. But this theory failed -to account for the most obvious facts about light as in our ordinary -experience, namely, that shadows cast by obstructing objects are defined -by rectilinear rays. Accordingly, Newton rejected this theory and -adopted the corpuscular theory which completely explained shadows. Since -then both theories have had their periods of triumph. At the present -moment the scientific world is seeking for a combination of the two. -These examples illustrate the danger of refusing to entertain an idea -because of its failure to explain one of the most obvious facts in the -subject matter in question. If you have had your attention directed to -the novelties in thought in your own lifetime, you will have observed -that almost all really new ideas have a certain aspect of foolishness -when they are first produced. - -Returning to the laws of motion, it is noticeable that no reason was -produced in the seventeenth century for the Galilean as distinct from -the Aristotelian position. It was an ultimate fact. When in the course -of these lectures we come to the modern period, we shall see that the -theory of relativity throws complete light on this question; but only by -rearranging our whole ideas as to space and time. - -It remained for Newton to direct attention to _mass_ as a physical -quantity inherent in the nature of a material body. Mass remained -permanent during all changes of motion. But the proof of the permanence -of mass amid chemical transformations had to wait for Lavoisier, a -century later. Newton’s next task was to find some estimate of the -magnitude of the alien force in terms of the mass of the body and of its -acceleration. He here had a stroke of luck. For, from the point of view -of a mathematician, the simplest possible law, namely the product of the -two, proved to be the successful one. Again the modern relativity theory -modifies this extreme simplicity. But luckily for science the delicate -experiments of the physicists of to-day were not then known, or even -possible. Accordingly, the world was given the two centuries which it -required in order to digest Newton’s laws of motion. - -Having regard to this triumph, can we wonder that scientists placed -their ultimate principles upon a materialistic basis, and thereafter -ceased to worry about philosophy? We shall grasp the course of thought, -if we understand exactly what this basis is, and what difficulties it -finally involves. When you are criticising the philosophy of an epoch, -do not chiefly direct your attention to those intellectual positions -which its exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend. There will -be some fundamental assumptions which adherents of all the variant -systems within the epoch unconsciously presuppose. Such assumptions -appear so obvious that people do not know what they are assuming because -no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them. With these -assumptions a certain limited number of types of philosophic systems are -possible, and this group of systems constitutes the philosophy of the -epoch. - -One such assumption underlies the whole philosophy of nature during the -modern period. It is embodied in the conception which is supposed to -express the most concrete aspect of nature. The Ionian philosophers -asked, What is nature made of? The answer is couched in terms of stuff, -or matter, or material,—the particular name chosen is indifferent—which -has the property of simple location in space and time, or, if you adopt -the more modern ideas, in space-time. What I mean by matter, or -material, is anything which has this property of _simple location_. By -simple location I mean one major characteristic which refers equally -both to space and to time, and other minor characteristics which are -diverse as between space and time. - -The characteristic common both to space and time is that material can be -said to be _here_ in space and _here_ in time, or _here_ in space-time, -in a perfectly definite sense which does not require for its explanation -any reference to other regions of space-time. Curiously enough this -character of simple location holds whether we look on a region of -space-time as determined absolutely or relatively. For if a region is -merely a way of indicating a certain set of relations to other entities, -then this characteristic, which I call simple location, is that material -can be said to have just these relations of position to the other -entities without requiring for its explanation any reference to other -regions constituted by analogous relations of position to the same -entities. In fact, as soon as you have settled, however you do settle, -what you mean by a definite place in space-time, you can adequately -state the relation of a particular material body to space-time by saying -that it is just there, in that place; and, so far as simple location is -concerned, there is nothing more to be said on the subject. - -There are, however, some subordinate explanations to be made which bring -in the minor characteristics which I have already mentioned. First, as -regards time, if material has existed during any period, it has equally -been in existence during any portion of that period. In other words, -dividing the time does not divide the material. Secondly, in respect to -space, dividing the volume does divide the material. Accordingly, if -material exists throughout a volume, there will be less of that material -distributed through any definite half of that volume. It is from this -property that there arises our notion of density at a point of space. -Anyone who talks about density is not assimilating time and space to the -extent that some extremists of the modern school of relativists very -rashly desire. For the division of time functions, in respect to -material, quite differently from the division of space. - -Furthermore, this fact that the material is indifferent to the division -of time leads to the conclusion that the lapse of time is an accident, -rather than of the essence, of the material. The material is fully -itself in any sub-period however short. Thus the transition of time has -nothing to do with the character of the material. The material is -equally itself at an instant of time. Here an instant of time is -conceived as in itself without transition, since the temporal transition -is the succession of instants. - -The answer, therefore, which the seventeenth century gave to the ancient -question of the Ionian thinkers, ‘What is the world made of?’ was that -the world is a succession of instantaneous configurations of matter,—or -of material, if you wish to include stuff more subtle than ordinary -matter, the ether for example. - -We cannot wonder that science rested content with this assumption as to -the fundamental elements of nature. The great forces of nature, such as -gravitation, were entirely determined by the configurations of masses. -Thus the configurations determined their own changes, so that the circle -of scientific thought was completely closed. This is the famous -mechanistic theory of nature, which has reigned supreme ever since the -seventeenth century. It is the orthodox creed of physical science. -Furthermore, the creed justified itself by the pragmatic test. It -worked. Physicists took no more interest in philosophy. They emphasized -the anti-rationalism of the Historical Revolt. But the difficulties of -this theory of materialistic mechanism very soon became apparent. The -history of thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is -governed by the fact that the world had got hold of a general idea which -it could neither live with nor live without. - -This simple location of instantaneous material configurations is what -Bergson has protested against, so far as it concerns time and so far as -it is taken to be the fundamental fact of concrete nature. He calls it a -distortion of nature due to the intellectual ‘spatialisation’ of things. -I agree with Bergson in his protest: but I do not agree that such -distortion is a vice necessary to the intellectual apprehension of -nature. I shall in subsequent lectures endeavour to show that this -spatialisation is the expression of more concrete facts under the guise -of very abstract logical constructions. There is an error; but it is -merely the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete. -It is an example of what I will call the ‘Fallacy of Misplaced -Concreteness.’ This fallacy is the occasion of great confusion in -philosophy. It is not necessary for the intellect to fall into the trap, -though in this example there has been a very general tendency to do so. - -It is at once evident that the concept of simple location is going to -make great difficulties for induction. For, if in the location of -configurations of matter throughout a stretch of time there is no -inherent reference to any other times, past or future, it immediately -follows that nature within any period does not refer to nature at any -other period. Accordingly, induction is not based on anything which can -be observed as inherent in nature. Thus we cannot look to nature for the -justification of our belief in any law such as the law of gravitation. -In other words, the order of nature cannot be justified by the mere -observation of nature. For there is nothing in the present fact which -inherently refers either to the past or to the future. It looks, -therefore, as though memory, as well as induction, would fail to find -any justification within nature itself. - -I have been anticipating the course of future thought, and have been -repeating Hume’s argument. This train of thought follows so immediately -from the consideration of simple location, that we cannot wait for the -eighteenth century before considering it. The only wonder is that the -world did in fact wait for Hume before noting the difficulty. Also it -illustrates the anti-rationalism of the scientific public that, when -Hume did appear, it was only the religious implications of his -philosophy which attracted attention. This was because the clergy were -in principle rationalists, whereas the men of science were content with -a simple faith in the order of nature. Hume himself remarks, no doubt -scoffingly, ‘Our holy religion is founded on faith.’ This attitude -satisfied the Royal Society but not the Church. It also satisfied Hume -and has satisfied subsequent empiricists. - -There is another presupposition of thought which must be put beside the -theory of simple location. I mean the two correlative categories of -Substance and quality. There is, however this difference. There were -different theories as to the adequate description of the status of -space. But whatever its status, no one had any doubt but that the -connection with space enjoyed by entities, which are said to be in -space, is that of simple location. We may put this shortly by saying -that it was tacitly assumed that space is the locus of simple locations. -Whatever is in space is _simpliciter_ in some definite portion of space. -But in respect to substance and quality the leading minds of the -seventeenth century were definitely perplexed; though, with their usual -genius, they at once constructed a theory which was adequate for their -immediate purposes. - -Of course, substance and quality, as well as simple location, are the -most natural ideas for the human mind. It is the way in which we think -of things, and without these ways of thinking we could not get our ideas -straight for daily use. There is no doubt about this. The only question -is, How concretely are we thinking when we consider nature under these -conceptions? My point will be, that we are presenting ourselves with -simplified editions of immediate matters of fact. When we examine the -primary elements of these simplified editions, we shall find that they -are in truth only to be justified as being elaborate logical -constructions of a high degree of abstraction. Of course, as a point of -individual psychology, we get at the ideas by the rough and ready method -of suppressing what appear to be irrelevant details. But when we attempt -to justify this suppression of irrelevance, we find that, though there -are entities left corresponding to the entities we talk about, yet these -entities are of a high degree of abstraction. - -Thus I hold that substance and quality afford another instance of the -fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Let us consider how the notions of -substance and quality arise. We observe an object as an entity with -certain characteristics. Furthermore, each individual entity is -apprehended through its characteristics. For example, we observe a body; -there is something about it which we note. Perhaps, it is hard, and -blue, and round, and noisy. We observe something which possesses these -qualities: apart from these qualities we do not observe anything at all. -Accordingly, the entity is the substratum, or substance, of which we -predicate qualities. Some of the qualities are essential, so that apart -from them the entity would not be itself; while other qualities are -accidental and changeable. In respect to material bodies, the qualities -of having a quantitative mass, and of simple location somewhere, were -held by John Locke at the close of the seventeenth century to be -essential qualities. Of course, the location was changeable, and the -unchangeability of mass was merely an experimental fact except for some -extremists. - -So far, so good. But when we pass to blueness and noisiness a new -situation has to be faced. In the first place, the body may not be -always blue, or noisy. We have already allowed for this by our theory of -accidental qualities, which for the moment we may accept as adequate. -But in the second place, the seventeenth century exposed a real -difficulty. The great physicists elaborated transmission theories of -light and sound, based upon their materialistic views of nature. There -were two hypotheses as to light: either it was transmitted by the -vibratory waves of a materialistic ether, or—according to Newton—it was -transmitted by the motion of incredibly small corpuscles of some subtle -matter. We all know that the wave theory of Huyghens held the field -during the nineteenth century, and that at present physicists are -endeavouring to explain some obscure circumstances attending radiation -by a combination of both theories. But whatever theory you choose, there -is no light or colour as a fact in external nature. There is merely -motion of material. Again, when the light enters your eyes and falls on -the retina, there is merely motion of material. Then your nerves are -affected and your brain is affected, and again this is merely motion of -material. The same line of argument holds for sound, substituting waves -in the air for waves in the ether, and ears for eyes. - -We then ask in what sense are blueness and noisiness qualities of the -body. By analogous reasoning, we also ask in what sense is its scent a -quality of the rose. - -Galileo considered this question, and at once pointed out that, apart -from eyes, ears, or noses, there would be no colours, sounds, or smells. -Descartes and Locke elaborated a theory of primary and secondary -qualities. For example, Descartes in his ‘Sixth Meditation’ says:[4] -“And indeed, as I perceive different sorts of colours, sounds, odours, -tastes, heat, hardness, etc., I safely conclude that there are in the -bodies from which the diverse perceptions of the senses proceed, certain -varieties corresponding to them, although, perhaps, not in reality like -them;....” - -Footnote 4: - - Translation by Professor John Veitch. - -Also in his _Principles of Philosophy_, he says: “That by our senses we -know nothing of external objects beyond their figure [or situation], -magnitude, and motion.” - -Locke, writing with a knowledge of Newtonian dynamics, places mass among -the primary qualities of bodies. In short, he elaborates a theory of -primary and secondary qualities in accordance with the state of physical -science at the close of the seventeenth century. The primary qualities -are the essential qualities of substances whose spatio-temporal -relationships constitute nature. The orderliness of these relationships -constitutes nature. The orderliness of these relationships constitutes -the order of nature. The occurrences of nature are in some way -apprehended by minds, which are associated with living bodies. -Primarily, the mental apprehension is aroused by the occurrences in -certain parts of the correlated body, the occurrences in the brain, for -instance. But the mind in apprehending also experiences sensations -which, properly speaking, are qualities of the mind alone. These -sensations are projected by the mind so as to clothe appropriate bodies -in external nature. Thus the bodies are perceived as with qualities -which in reality do not belong to them, qualities which in fact are -purely the offspring of the mind. Thus nature gets credit which should -in truth be reserved for ourselves: the rose for its scent: the -nightingale for his song: and the sun for his radiance. The poets are -entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves, and -should turn them into odes of self-congratulation on the excellency of -the human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, -colourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly. - -However you disguise it, this is the practical outcome of the -characteristic scientific philosophy which closed the seventeenth -century. - -In the first place, we must note its astounding efficiency as a system -of concepts for the organisation of scientific research. In this -respect, it is fully worthy of the genius of the century which produced -it. It has held its own as the guiding principle of scientific studies -ever since. It is still reigning. Every university in the world -organises itself in accordance with it. No alternative system of -organising the pursuit of scientific truth has been suggested. It is not -only reigning, but it is without a rival. - -And yet—it is quite unbelievable. This conception of the universe is -surely framed in terms of high abstractions, and the paradox only arises -because we have mistaken our abstractions for concrete realities. - -No picture, however generalised, of the achievements of scientific -thought in this century can omit the advance in mathematics. Here as -elsewhere the genius of the epoch made itself evident. Three great -Frenchmen, Descartes, Desargues, Pascal, initiated the modern period in -geometry. Another Frenchman, Fermat, laid the foundations of modern -analysis, and all but perfected the methods of the differential -calculus. Newton and Leibniz, between them, actually did create the -differential calculus as a practical method of mathematical reasoning. -When the century ended, mathematics as an instrument for application to -physical problems was well established in something of its modern -proficiency. Modern pure mathematics, if we except geometry, was in its -infancy, and had given no signs of the astonishing growth it was to make -in the nineteenth century. But the mathematical physicist had appeared, -bringing with him the type of mind which was to rule the scientific -world in the next century. It was to be the age of ‘Victorious -Analysis.’ - -The seventeenth century had finally produced a scheme of scientific -thought framed by mathematicians, for the use of mathematicians. The -great characteristic of the mathematical mind is its capacity for -dealing with abstractions; and for eliciting from them clear-cut -demonstrative trains of reasoning, entirely satisfactory so long as it -is those abstractions which you want to think about. The enormous -success of the scientific abstractions, yielding on the one hand -_matter_ with its _simple location_ in space and time, and on the other -hand _mind_, perceiving, suffering, reasoning, but not interfering, has -foisted onto philosophy the task of accepting them as the most concrete -rendering of fact. - -Thereby, modern philosophy has been ruined. It has oscillated in a -complex manner between three extremes. There are the dualists, who -accept matter and mind as on equal basis, and the two varieties of -monists, those who put mind inside matter, and those who put matter -inside mind. But this juggling with abstractions can never overcome the -inherent confusion introduced by the ascription of _misplaced -concreteness_ to the scientific scheme of the seventeenth century. - - - - - CHAPTER IV - - THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY - - -In so far as the intellectual climates of different epochs can be -contrasted, the eighteenth century in Europe was the complete antithesis -to the Middle Ages. The contrast is symbolised by the difference between -the cathedral of Chartres and the Parisian salons, where D’Alembert -conversed with Voltaire. The Middle Ages were haunted with the desire to -rationalise the infinite: the men of the eighteenth century rationalised -the social life of modern communities, and based their sociological -theories on an appeal to the facts of nature. The earlier period was the -age of faith, based upon reason. In the later period, they let sleeping -dogs lie: it was the age of reason, based upon faith. To illustrate my -meaning:—St. Anselm would have been distressed if he had failed to find -a convincing argument for the existence of God, and on this argument he -based his edifice of faith, whereas Hume based his _Dissertation on the -Natural History of Religion_ upon his faith in the order of nature. In -comparing these epochs it is well to remember that reason can err, and -that faith may be misplaced. - -In my previous lecture I traced the evolution, during the seventeenth -century, of the scheme of scientific ideas which has dominated thought -ever since. It involves a fundamental duality, with _material_ on the -one hand, and on the other hand _mind_. In between there lie the -concepts of life, organism, function, instantaneous reality, -interaction, order of nature, which collectively form the Achilles heel -of the whole system. - -I also expressed my conviction that if we desired to obtain a more -fundamental expression of the concrete character of natural fact, the -element in this scheme which we should first criticise is the concept of -_simple location_. In view therefore of the importance which this idea -will assume in these lectures, I will repeat the meaning which I have -attached to this phrase. To say that a bit of matter has _simple -location_ means that, in expressing its spatio-temporal relations, it is -adequate to state that it is where it is, in a definite finite region of -space, and throughout a definite finite duration of time, apart from any -essential reference of the relations of that bit of matter to other -regions of space and to other durations of time. Again, this concept of -simple location is independent of the controversy between the absolutist -and the relativist views of space or of time. So long as any theory of -space, or of time, can give a meaning, either absolute or relative, to -the idea of a definite region of space, and of a definite duration of -time, the idea of simple location has a perfectly definite meaning. This -idea is the very foundation of the seventeenth century scheme of nature. -Apart from it, the scheme is incapable of expression. I shall argue that -among the primary elements of nature as apprehended in our immediate -experience, there is no element whatever which possesses this character -of simple location. It does not follow, however, that the science of the -seventeenth century was simply wrong. I hold that by a process of -constructive abstraction we can arrive at abstractions which are the -simply-located bits of material, and at other abstractions which are the -minds included in the scientific scheme. Accordingly, the real error is -an example of what I have termed: The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. - -The advantage of confining attention to a definite group of -abstractions, is that you confine your thoughts to clear-cut definite -things, with clear-cut definite relations. Accordingly, if you have a -logical head, you can deduce a variety of conclusions respecting the -relationships between these abstract entities. Furthermore, if the -abstractions are well-founded, that is to say, if they do not abstract -from everything that is important in experience, the scientific thought -which confines itself to these abstractions will arrive at a variety of -important truths relating to our experience of nature. We all know those -clear-cut trenchant intellects, immovably encased in a hard shell of -abstractions. They hold you to their abstractions by the sheer grip of -personality. - -The disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group of abstractions, -however well-founded, is that, by the nature of the case, you have -abstracted from the remainder of things. In so far as the excluded -things are important in your experience, your modes of thought are not -fitted to deal with them. You cannot think without abstractions; -accordingly, it is of the utmost importance to be vigilant in critically -revising your _modes_ of abstraction. It is here that philosophy finds -its niche as essential to the healthy progress of society. It is the -critic of abstractions. A civilisation which cannot burst through its -current abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very limited period -of progress. An active school of philosophy is quite as important for -the locomotion of ideas, as is an active school of railway engineers for -the locomotion of fuel. - -Sometimes it happens that the service rendered by philosophy is entirely -obscured by the astonishing success of a scheme of abstractions in -expressing the dominant interests of an epoch. This is exactly what -happened during the eighteenth century. _Les philosophes_ were not -philosophers. They were men of genius, clear-headed and acute, who -applied the seventeenth century group of scientific abstractions to the -analysis of the unbounded universe. Their triumph, in respect to the -circle of ideas mainly interesting to their contemporaries, was -overwhelming. Whatever did not fit into their scheme was ignored, -derided, disbelieved. Their hatred of Gothic architecture symbolises -their lack of sympathy with dim perspectives. It was the age of reason, -healthy, manly, upstanding reason; but, of one-eyed reason, deficient in -its vision of depth. We cannot overrate the debt of gratitude which we -owe to these men. For a thousand years Europe had been a prey to -intolerant, intolerable visionaries. The common sense of the eighteenth -century, its grasp of the obvious facts of human suffering, and of the -obvious demands of human nature, acted on the world like a bath of moral -cleansing. Voltaire must have the credit, that he hated injustice, he -hated cruelty, he hated senseless repression, and he hated hocus-pocus. -Furthermore, when he saw them, he knew them. In these supreme virtues, -he was typical of his century, on its better side. But if men cannot -live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants. The age -had its limitations; yet we cannot understand the passion with which -some of its main positions are still defended, especially in the schools -of science, unless we do full justice to its positive achievements. The -seventeenth century scheme of concepts was proving a perfect instrument -for research. - -This triumph of materialism was chiefly in the sciences of rational -dynamics, physics, and chemistry. So far as dynamics and physics were -concerned, progress was in the form of direct developments of the main -ideas of the previous epoch. Nothing fundamentally new was introduced, -but there was an immense detailed development. Special case after -special case was unravelled. It was as though the very Heavens were -being opened, on a set plan. In the second half of the century, -Lavoisier practically founded chemistry on its present basis. He -introduced into it the principle that no material is lost or gained in -any chemical transformations. This was the last success of materialistic -thought, which has not ultimately proved to be double-edged. Chemical -science now only waited for the atomic theory, in the next century. - -In this century the notion of the mechanical explanation of all the -processes of nature finally hardened into a dogma of science. The notion -won through on its merits by reason of an almost miraculous series of -triumphs achieved by the mathematical physicists, culminating in the -_Méchanique Analytique_ of Lagrange, which was published in 1787. -Newton’s _Principia_ was published in 1687, so that exactly one hundred -years separates the two great books. This century contains the first -period of mathematical physics of the modern type. The publication of -Clerk Maxwell’s _Electricity and Magnetism_ in 1873 marks the close of -the second period. Each of these three books introduces new horizons of -thought affecting everything which comes after them. - -In considering the various topics to which mankind has bent its -systematic thought, it is impossible not to be struck with the unequal -distribution of ability among the different fields. In almost all -subjects there are a few outstanding names. For it requires genius to -create a subject as a distinct topic for thought. But in the case of -many topics, after a good beginning very relevant to its immediate -occasion, the subsequent development appears as a weak series of -flounderings, so that the whole subject gradually loses its grip on the -evolution of thought. It was far otherwise with mathematical physics. -The more you study this subject, the more you will find yourself -astonished by the almost incredible triumphs of intellect which it -exhibits. The great mathematical physicists of the eighteenth and first -few years of the nineteenth century, most of them French, are a case in -point: Maupertuis, Clairaut, D’Alembert, Lagrange, Laplace, Fourier, -form a series of names, such that each recalls to mind some achievement -of the first rank. When Carlyle, as the mouthpiece of the subsequent -Romantic Age, scoffingly terms the period the Age of Victorious -Analysis, and mocks at Maupertuis as a ‘sublimish gentleman in a white -periwig,’ he only exhibits the narrow side of the Romanticists whom he -is then voicing. - -It is impossible to explain intelligently, in a short time and without -technicalities, the details of the progress made by this school. I will, -however, endeavour to explain the main point of a joint achievement of -Maupertuis and Lagrange. Their results, in conjunction with some -subsequent mathematical methods due to two great German mathematicians -of the first half of the nineteenth century, Gauss and Riemann, have -recently proved themselves to be the preparatory work necessary for the -new ideas which Herz and Einstein have introduced into mathematical -physics. Also they inspired some of the best ideas in Clerk Maxwell’s -treatise, already mentioned in this lecture. - -They aimed at discovering something more fundamental and more general -than Newton’s laws of motion which were discussed in the previous -lecture. They wanted to find some wider ideas, and in the case of -Lagrange some more general means of mathematical exposition. It was an -ambitious enterprise, and they were completely successful. Maupertuis -lived in the first half of the eighteenth century, and Lagrange’s active -life lay in its second half. We find in Maupertuis a tinge of the -theologic age which preceded his birth. He started with the idea that -the whole path of a material particle between any limits of time must -achieve some perfection worthy of the providence of God. There are two -points of interest in this motive principle. In the first place, it -illustrates the thesis which I was urging in my first lecture that the -way in which the medieval church had impressed on Europe the notion of -the detailed providence of a rational personal God was one of the -factors by which the trust in the order of nature had been generated. In -the second place, though we are now all convinced that such modes of -thought are of no direct use in detailed scientific enquiry, Maupertuis’ -success in this particular case shows that almost any idea which jogs -you out of your current abstractions may be better than nothing. In the -present case what the idea in question did for Maupertuis was to lead -him to enquire what general property of the path as a whole could be -deduced from Newton’s laws of motion. Undoubtedly this was a very -sensible procedure whatever one’s theological notions. Also his general -idea led him to conceive that the property found would be a quantitative -sum, such that any slight deviation from the path would increase it. In -this supposition he was generalising Newton’s first law of motion. For -an isolated particle takes the shortest route with uniform velocity. So -Maupertuis conjectured that a particle travelling through a field of -force would realise the least possible amount of some quantity. He -discovered such a quantity and called it the integral action between the -time limits considered. In modern phraseology it is the sum through -successive small lapses of time of the difference between the kinetic -and potential energies of the particle at each successive instant. This -action, therefore, has to do with the interchange between the energy -arising from motion and the energy arising from position. Maupertuis had -discovered the famous theorem of least action. Maupertuis was not quite -of the first rank in comparison with such a man as Lagrange. In his -hands and in those of his immediate successors, his principle did not -assume any dominating importance. Lagrange put the same question on a -wider basis so as to make its answer relevant to actual procedure in the -development of dynamics. His Principle of Virtual Work as applied to -systems in motion is in effect Maupertuis’ principle conceived as -applying at each instant of the path of the system. But Lagrange saw -further than Maupertuis. He grasped that he had gained a method of -stating dynamical truths in a way which is perfectly indifferent to the -particular methods of measurement employed in fixing the positions of -the various parts of the system. Accordingly, he went on to deduce -equations of motion which are equally applicable whatever quantitative -measurements have been made, provided that they are adequate to fix -positions. The beauty and almost divine simplicity of these equations is -such that these formulae are worthy to rank with those mysterious -symbols which in ancient times were held directly to indicate the -Supreme Reason at the base of all things. Later Herz—inventor of -electromagnetic waves—based mechanics on the idea of every particle -traversing the shortest path open to it under the circumstances -constraining its motion; and finally Einstein, by the use of the -geometrical theories of Gauss and Riemann, showed that these -circumstances could be construed as being inherent in the character of -space-time itself. Such, in barest outline, is the story of dynamics -from Galileo to Einstein. - -Meanwhile Galvani and Volta lived and made their electric discoveries; -and the biological sciences slowly gathered their material, but still -waited for dominating ideas. Psychology, also, was beginning to -disengage itself from its dependence on general philosophy. This -independent growth of psychology was the ultimate result of its -invocation by John Locke as a critic of metaphysical licence. All the -sciences dealing with life were still in an elementary observational -stage, in which classification and direct description were dominant. So -far the scheme of abstractions was adequate to the occasion. - -In the realm of practice, the age which produced enlightened rulers, -such as the Emperor Joseph of the House of Hapsburg, Frederick the -Great, Walpole, the great Lord Chatham, George Washington, cannot be -said to have failed. Especially when to these rulers, it adds the -invention of parliamentary cabinet government in England, of federal -presidential government in the United States, and of the humanitarian -principles of the French Revolution. Also in technology it produced the -steam-engine, and thereby ushered in a new era of civilisation. -Undoubtedly, as a practical age the eighteenth century was a success. If -you had asked one of the wisest and most typical of its ancestors, who -just saw its commencement, I mean John Locke, what he expected from it, -he would hardly have pitched his hopes higher than its actual -achievements. - -In developing a criticism of the scientific scheme of the eighteenth -century, I must first give my main reason for ignoring nineteenth -century idealism—I am speaking of the philosophic idealism which finds -the ultimate meaning of reality in mentality that is fully cognitive. -This idealistic school, as hitherto developed, has been too much -divorced from the scientific outlook. It has swallowed the scientific -scheme in its entirety as being the only rendering of the facts of -nature, and has then explained it as being an idea in the ultimate -mentality. In the case of absolute idealism, the world of nature is just -one of the ideas, somehow differentiating the unity of the Absolute: in -the case of pluralistic idealism involving monadic mentalities, this -world is the greatest common measure of the various ideas which -differentiate the various mental unities of the various monads. But, -however you take it, these idealistic schools have conspicuously failed -to connect, in any organic fashion, the fact of nature with their -idealistic philosophies. So far as concerns what will be said in these -lectures, your ultimate outlook may be realistic or idealistic. My point -is that a further stage of provisional realism is required in which the -scientific scheme is recast, and founded upon the ultimate concept of -_organism_. - -In outline, my procedure is to start from the analysis of the status of -space and of time, or in modern phraseology, the status of space-time. -There are two characters of either. Things are separated by space, and -are separated by time: but they are also together in space, and together -in time, even if they be not contemporaneous. I will call these -characters the ‘_separative_’ and the ‘_prehensive_’ characters of -space-time. There is yet a third character of space-time. Everything -which is in space receives a definite limitation of some sort, so that -in a sense it has just that shape which it does have and no other, also -in some sense it is just in this place and in no other. Analogously for -time, a thing endures during a certain period, and through no other -period. I will call this the ‘_modal_’ character of space-time. It is -evident that the modal character taken by itself gives rise to the idea -of simple location. But it must be conjoined with the separative and -prehensive characters. - -For simplicity of thought, I will first speak of space only, and will -afterwards extend the same treatment to time. - -The volume is the most concrete element of space. But the separative -character of space, analyses a volume into sub-volumes, and so on -indefinitely. Accordingly, taking the separative character in isolation, -we should infer that a volume is a mere multiplicity of non-voluminous -elements, of points in fact. But it is the unity of volume which is the -ultimate fact of experience, for example, the voluminous space of this -hall. This hall as a mere multiplicity of points is a construction of -the logical imagination. - -Accordingly, the prime fact is the prehensive unity of volume, and this -unity is mitigated or limited by the separated unities of the -innumerable contained parts. We have a prehensive unity, which is yet -held apart as an aggregate of contained parts. But the prehensive unity -of the volume is not the unity of a mere logical aggregate of parts. The -parts form an ordered aggregate, in the sense that each part is -something from the standpoint of every other part, and also from the -same standpoint every other part is something in relation to it. Thus if -A and B and C are volumes of space, B has an aspect from the standpoint -of A, and so has C, and so has the relationship of B and C. This aspect -of B from A is of the essence of A. The volumes of space have no -independent existence. They are only entities as within the totality; -you cannot extract them from their environment without destruction of -their very essence. Accordingly, I will say that the aspect of B from A -is the _mode_ in which B enters into the composition of A. This is the -modal character of space, that the prehensive unity of A is the -prehension into unity of the aspects of all other volumes from the -standpoint of A. The shape of a volume is the formula from which the -totality of its aspects can be derived. Thus the shape of a volume is -more abstract than its aspects. It is evident that I can use Leibniz’s -language, and say that every volume mirrors in itself every other volume -in space. - -Exactly analogous considerations hold with respect to durations in time. -An instant of time, without duration, is an imaginative logical -construction. Also each duration of time mirrors in itself all temporal -durations. - -But in two ways I have introduced a false simplicity. In the first -place, I should have conjoined space and time, and conducted my -explanation in respect to four-dimensional regions of space-time. I have -nothing to add in the way of explanation. In your minds, substitute such -four-dimensional regions for the spatial volumes of the previous -explanations. - -Secondly, my explanation has involved itself in a vicious circle. For I -have made the prehensive unity of the region A to consist of the -prehensive unification of the modal presences in A of other regions. -This difficulty arises because space-time cannot in reality be -considered as a self-subsistent entity. It is an abstraction, and its -explanation requires reference to that from which it has been extracted. -Space-time is the specification of certain general characters of events -and of their mutual ordering. This recurrence to concrete fact brings me -back to the eighteenth century, and indeed to Francis Bacon in the -seventeenth century. We have to consider the development in those -epochs, of the criticism of the reigning scientific scheme. - -No epoch is homogeneous; whatever you may have assigned as the dominant -note of a considerable period, it will always be possible to produce -men, and great men, belonging to the same time, who exhibit themselves -as antagonistic to the tone of their age. This is certainly the case -with the eighteenth century. For example, the names of John Wesley and -of Rousseau must have occurred to you while I was drawing the character -of that time. But I do not want to speak of them, or of others. The man, -whose ideas I must consider at some length, is Bishop Berkeley. Quite at -the commencement of the epoch, he made all the right criticisms, at -least in principle. It would be untrue to say that he produced no -effect. He was a famous man. The wife of George II was one of the few -queens who, in any country, have been clever enough, and wise enough, to -patronise learning judiciously; accordingly, Berkeley was made a bishop, -in days when bishops in Great Britain were relatively far greater men -than they are now. Also, what was more important than his bishopric, -Hume studied him, and developed one side of his philosophy in a way -which might have disturbed the ghost of the great ecclesiastic. Then -Kant studied Hume. So, to say that Berkeley was uninfluential during the -century, would certainly be absurd. But all the same, he failed to -affect the main stream of scientific thought. It flowed on as if he had -never written. Its general success made it impervious to criticism, then -and since. The world of science has always remained perfectly satisfied -with its peculiar abstractions. They work, and that is sufficient for -it. - -The point before us is that this scientific field of thought is now, in -the twentieth century, too narrow for the concrete facts which are -before it for analysis. This is true even in physics, and is more -especially urgent in the biological sciences. Thus, in order to -understand the difficulties of modern scientific thought and also its -reactions on the modern world, we should have in our minds some -conception of a wider field of abstraction, a more concrete analysis, -which shall stand nearer to the complete concreteness of our intuitive -experience. Such an analysis should find in itself a niche for the -concepts of matter and spirit, as abstractions in terms of which much of -our physical experience can be interpreted. It is in the search for this -wider basis for scientific thought that Berkeley is so important. He -launched his criticism shortly after the schools of Newton and Locke had -completed their work, and laid his finger exactly on the weak spots -which they had left. I do not propose to consider either the subjective -idealism which has been derived from him, or the schools of development -which trace their descent from Hume and Kant respectively. My point will -be that—whatever the final metaphysics you may adopt—there is another -line of development embedded in Berkeley, pointing to the analysis which -we are in search of. Berkeley overlooked it, partly by reason of the -over-intellectualism of philosophers, and partly by his haste to have -recourse to an idealism with its objectivity grounded in the mind of -God. You will remember that I have already stated that the key of the -problem lies in the notion of simple location. Berkeley, in effect, -criticises this notion. He also raises the question, What do we mean by -things being realised in the world of nature? - -In Sections 23 and 24 of his _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Berkeley -gives his answer to this latter question. I will quote some detached -sentences from those Sections: - -“23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine -trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and -nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty -in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your -mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time -omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them?...” - -“When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we -are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind _taking -no notice of itself_, is deluded to think it can and does conceive -bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same -time they are apprehended by or exist in itself....” - -“24. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, to -know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant by the -_absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the -mind_. To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct -contradiction, or else nothing at all....” - -Again there is a very remarkable passage in Section 10, of the fourth -Dialogue of Berkeley’s _Alciphron_. I have already quoted it, at greater -length, in my _Principles of Natural Knowledge_: - -“_Euphranor._ Tell me, Alciphron, can you discern the doors, window and -battlements of that same castle? - -_Alciphron._ I cannot. At this distance it seems only a small round -tower. - -_Euph._ But I, who have been at it, know that it is no small round -tower, but a large square building with battlements and turrets, which -it seems you do not see. - -_Alc_. What will you infer from thence? - -_Euph._ I would infer that the very object which you strictly and -properly perceive by sight is not that thing which is several miles -distant. - -_Alc._ Why so? - -_Euph._ Because a little round object is one thing, and a great square -object is another. Is it not so?...” - -Some analogous examples concerning a planet and a cloud are then cited -in the dialogue, and this passage finally concludes with: - -“_Euphranor._ Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the castle, the -planet, nor the cloud, _which you see here_, are those real ones which -you suppose exist at a distance?” - -It is made explicit in the first passage, already quoted, that Berkeley -himself adopts an extreme idealistic interpretation. For him mind is the -only absolute reality, and the unity of nature is the unity of ideas in -the mind of God. Personally, I think that Berkeley’s solution of the -metaphysical problem raises difficulties not less than those which he -points out as arising from a realistic interpretation of the scientific -scheme. There is, however, another possible line of thought, which -enables us to adopt anyhow an attitude of provisional realism, and to -widen the scientific scheme in a way which is useful for science itself. - -I recur to the passage from Francis Bacon’s _Natural History_, already -quoted in the previous lecture: - -“It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, -yet they have perception: ... and whether the body be alterant or -altered, evermore a perception precedeth operation; for else all bodies -would be alike one to another....” - -Also in the previous lecture I construed _perception_ (as used by Bacon) -as meaning _taking account_ of the essential character of the thing -perceived, and I construed _sense_ as meaning _cognition_. We certainly -do take account of things of which at the time we have no explicit -cognition. We can even have a cognitive memory of the taking account, -without having had a contemporaneous cognition. Also, as Bacon points -out by his statement, “... for else all bodies would be alike one to -another,” it is evidently some element of the essential character which -we take account of, namely something on which diversity is founded and -not mere bare logical diversity. - -The word ‘_perceive_’ is, in our common usage, shot through and through -with the notion of cognitive apprehension. So is the word -‘_apprehension_’, even with the adjective _cognitive_ omitted. I will -use the word ‘_prehension_’ for _uncognitive apprehension_: by this I -mean _apprehension_ which may or or may not be cognitive. Now take -Euphranor’s last remark: - -“Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the castle, the planet, nor -the cloud, _which you see here_, are those real ones which you suppose -exist at distance?” Accordingly, there is a prehension, _here_ in this -place, of things which have a reference to _other_ places. - -Now go back to Berkeley’s sentences, quoted from his _Principles of -Human Knowledge_. He contends that what constitutes the realisation of -natural entities is the being perceived within the unity of mind. - -We can substitute the concept, that the realisation is a gathering of -things into the unity of a prehension; and that what is thereby realised -is the prehension, and not the things. This unity of a prehension -defines itself as a _here_ and a _now_, and the things so gathered into -the grasped unity have essential reference to other places and other -times. For Berkeley’s _mind_, I substitute a process of prehensive -unification. In order to make intelligible this concept of the -progressive realisation of natural occurrences, considerable expansion -is required, and confrontation with its actual implications in terms of -concrete experience. This will be the task of the subsequent lectures. -In the first place, note that the idea of simple location has gone. The -things which are grasped into a realised unity, here and now, are not -the castle, the cloud, and the planet simply in themselves; but they are -the castle, the cloud, and the planet from the standpoint, in space and -time, of the prehensive unification. In other words, it is the -perspective of the castle over there from the standpoint of the -unification here. It is, therefore, aspects of the castle, the cloud, -and the planet which are grasped into unity here. You will remember that -the idea of perspectives is quite familiar in philosophy. It was -introduced by Leibniz, in the notion of his monads mirroring -perspectives of the universe. I am using the same notion, only I am -toning down his monads into the unified events in space and time. In -some ways, there is a greater analogy with Spinoza’s modes; that is why -I use the terms ‘_mode_’ and ‘_modal_.’ In the analogy with Spinoza, his -one substance is for me the one underlying activity of realisation -individualising itself in an interlocked plurality of modes. Thus, -concrete fact is process. Its primary analysis is into underlying -activity of prehension, and into realised prehensive events. Each event -is an individual matter of fact issuing from an individualisation of the -substrate activity. But individualisation does not mean substantial -independence. - -An entity of which we become aware in sense perception is the terminus -of our act of perception. I will call such an entity, a -‘_sense-object_’. For example, green of a definite shade is a -sense-object; so is a sound of definite quality and pitch; and so is a -definite scent; and a definite quality of touch. The way in which such -an entity is related to space during a definite lapse of time is -complex. I will say that a sense-object has ‘_ingression_’ into -space-time. The cognitive perception of a sense-object is the awareness -of the prehensive unification (into a standpoint A) of various modes of -various sense-objects, including the sense-object in question. The -standpoint A is, of course, a region of space-time; that is to say, it -is a volume of space through a duration of time. But as one entity, this -standpoint is a unit of realised experience. A mode of a sense-object at -A (as abstracted from the sense-object whose relationship to A the mode -is conditioning) is the aspect from A of some other region B. Thus the -sense-object is present in A with the mode of location in B. Thus if -green be the sense-object in question, green is not simply at A where it -is being perceived, nor is it simply at B where it is perceived as -located; but it is present at A with the mode of location in B. There is -no particular mystery about this. You have only got to look into a -mirror and to see the image in it of some green leaves behind your back. -For you at A there will be green; but not green simply at A where you -are. The green at A will be green with the mode of having location at -the image of the leaf behind the mirror. Then turn round and look at the -leaf. You are now perceiving the green in the same way as you did -before, except that now the green has the mode of being located in the -actual leaf. I am merely describing what we do perceive: we are aware of -green as being one element in a prehensive unification of sense-objects; -each sense-object, and among them green, having its particular mode, -which is expressible as location elsewhere. There are various types of -modal location. For example, sound is voluminous: it fills a hall, and -so sometimes does diffused colour. But the modal location of a colour -may be that of being the remote boundary of a volume, as for example the -colours on the walls of a room. Thus primarily space-time is the locus -of the modal ingression of sense-objects. This is the reason why space -and time (if for simplicity we disjoin them) are given in their -entireties. For each volume of space, or each lapse of time, includes in -its essence aspects of all volumes of space, or of all lapses of time. -The difficulties of philosophy in respect to space and time are founded -on the error of considering them as primarily the loci of simple -locations. Perception is simply the cognition of prehensive unification; -or more shortly, perception is cognition of prehension. The actual world -is a manifold of prehensions; and a ‘prehension’ is a ‘prehensive -occasion’; and a prehensive occasion is the most concrete finite entity, -conceived as what it is in itself and for itself, and not as from its -aspect in the essence of another such occasion. Prehensive unification -might be said to have simple location in its volume A. But this would be -a mere tautology. For space and time are simply abstractions from the -totality of prehensive unifications as mutually patterned in each other. -Thus a prehension has simple location at the volume A in the same way as -that in which a man’s face fits on to the smile which spreads over it. -There is, so far as we have gone, more sense in saying that an act of -perception has simple location; for it may be conceived as being simply -at the cognised prehension. - -There are more entities involved in nature than the mere sense-objects, -so far considered. But, allowing for the necessity of revision -consequent on a more complete point of view, we can frame our answer to -Berkeley’s question as to the character of the reality to be assigned to -nature. He states it to be the reality of ideas in mind. A complete -metaphysic which has attained to some notion of mind, and to some notion -of ideas, may perhaps ultimately adopt that view. It is unnecessary for -the purpose of these lectures to ask such a fundamental question. We can -be content with a provisional realism in which nature is conceived as a -complex of prehensive unifications. Space and time exhibit the general -scheme of interlocked relations of these prehensions. You cannot tear -any one of them out of its context. Yet each one of them within its -context has all the reality that attaches to the whole complex. -Conversely, the totality has the same reality as each prehension; for -each prehension unifies the modalities to be ascribed, from its -standpoint, to every part of the whole. A prehension is a process of -unifying. Accordingly, nature is a process of expansive development, -necessarily transitional from prehension to prehension. What is achieved -is thereby passed beyond, but it is also retained as having aspects of -itself present to prehensions which lie beyond it. - -Thus nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the -process. It is nonsense to ask if the colour red is real. The colour red -is ingredient in the process of realisation. The realities of nature are -the prehensions in nature, that is to say, the events in nature. - -Now that we have cleared space and time from the taint of simple -location, we may partially abandon the awkward term prehension. This -term was introduced to signify the essential unity of an event, namely, -the event as one entity, and not as a mere assemblage of parts or of -ingredients. It is necessary to understand that space-time is nothing -else than a system of pulling together of assemblages into unities. But -the word _event_ just means one of these spatio-temporal unities. -Accordingly, it may be used instead of the term ‘prehension’ as meaning -the thing prehended. - -An event has contemporaries. This means that an event mirrors within -itself the modes of its contemporaries as a display of immediate -achievement. An event has a past. This means that an event mirrors -within itself the modes of its predecessors, as memories which are fused -into its own content. An event has a future. This means that an event -mirrors within itself such aspects as the future throws back onto the -present, or, in other words, as the present has determined concerning -the future. Thus an event has anticipation: - - “The prophetic soul - Of the wide world dreaming on things to come.” [cvii] - -These conclusions are essential for any form of realism. For there is in -the world for our cognisance, memory of the past, immediacy of -realisation, and indication of things to come. - -In this sketch of an analysis more concrete than that of the scientific -scheme of thought, I have started from our own psychological field, as -it stands for our cognition. I take it for what it claims to be: the -self-knowledge of our bodily event. I mean the total event, and not the -inspection of the details of the body. This self-knowledge discloses a -prehensive unification of modal presences of entities beyond itself. I -generalise by the use of the principle that this total bodily event is -on the same level as all other events, except for an unusual complexity -and stability of inherent pattern. The strength of the theory of -materialistic mechanism has been the demand, that no arbitrary breaks be -introduced into nature, to eke out the collapse of an explanation. I -accept this principle. But if you start from the immediate facts of our -psychological experience, as surely an empiricist should begin, you are -at once led to the organic conception of nature of which the description -has been commenced in this lecture. - -It is the defect of the eighteenth century scientific scheme that it -provides none of the elements which compose the immediate psychological -experiences of mankind. Nor does it provide any elementary trace of the -organic unity of a whole, from which the organic unities of electrons, -protons, molecules, and living bodies can emerge. According to that -scheme, there is no reason in the nature of things why portions of -material should have any physical relations to each other. Let us grant -that we cannot hope to be able to discern the laws of nature to be -necessary. But we can hope to see that it is necessary that there should -be an order of nature. The concept of the order of nature is bound up -with the concept of nature as the locus of organisms in process of -development. - - NOTE. In connection with the latter portion of this chapter a sentence - from Descartes’ ‘Reply to Objections ... against the Meditations’ is - interesting:—“Hence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself - existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky, - but objectively, _i.e._, in the way in which objects are wont to exist - in the mind; and this mode of being is truly much less perfect than - that in which things exist outside the mind, but it is not on that - account mere nothing, as I have already said.” [Reply to Objections I, - Translation by Haldane and Ross, vol. ii, p. 10.] I find difficulty in - reconciling this theory of ideas (with which I agree) with other parts - of the Cartesian philosophy. - - - - - CHAPTER V - - THE ROMANTIC REACTION - - -My last lecture described the influence upon the eighteenth century of -the narrow and efficient scheme of scientific concepts which it had -inherited from its predecessor. That scheme was the product of a -mentality which found the Augustinian theology extremely congenial. The -Protestant Calvinism and the Catholic Jansenism exhibited man as -helpless to co-operate with Irresistible Grace: the contemporary scheme -of science exhibited man as helpless to co-operate with the irresistable -mechanism of nature. The mechanism of God and the mechanism of matter -were the monstrous issues of limited metaphysics and clear logical -intellect. Also the seventeenth century had genius, and cleared the -world of muddled thought. The eighteenth century continued the work of -clearance, with ruthless efficiency. The scientific scheme has lasted -longer than the theological scheme. Mankind soon lost interest in -Irresistible Grace; but it quickly appreciated the competent engineering -which was due to science. Also in the first quarter of the eighteenth -century, George Berkeley launched his philosophical criticism against -the whole basis of the system. He failed to disturb the dominant current -of thought. In my last lecture I developed a parallel line of argument, -which would lead to a system of thought basing nature upon the concept -of organism, and not upon the concept of matter. In the present lecture, -I propose in the first place to consider how the concrete educated -thought of men has viewed this opposition of mechanism and organism. It -is in literature that the concrete outlook of humanity receives its -expression. Accordingly it is to literature that we must look, -particularly in its more concrete forms, namely in poetry and in drama, -if we hope to discover the inward thoughts of a generation. - -We quickly find that the Western peoples exhibit on a colossal scale a -peculiarity which is popularly supposed to be more especially -characteristic of the Chinese. Surprise is often expressed that a -Chinaman can be of two religions, a Confucian for some occasions and a -Buddhist for other occasions. Whether this is true of China I do not -know; nor do I know whether, if true, these two attitudes are really -inconsistent. But there can be no doubt that an analogous fact is true -of the West, and that the two attitudes involved are inconsistent. A -scientific realism, based on mechanism, is conjoined with an unwavering -belief in the world of men and of the higher animals as being composed -of self-determining organisms. This radical inconsistency at the basis -of modern thought accounts for much that is half-hearted and wavering in -our civilisation. It would be going too far to say that it distracts -thought. It enfeebles it, by reason of the inconsistency lurking in the -background. After all, the men of the Middle Ages were in pursuit of an -excellency of which we have nearly forgotten the existence. They set -before themselves the ideal of the attainment of a harmony of the -understanding. We are content with superficial orderings from diverse -arbitrary starting points. For instance, the enterprises produced by the -individualistic energy of the European peoples presupposes physical -actions directed to final causes. But the science which is employed in -their development is based on a philosophy which asserts that physical -causation is supreme, and which disjoins the physical cause from the -final end. It is not popular to dwell on the absolute contradiction here -involved. It is the fact, however you gloze it over with phrases. Of -course, we find in the eighteenth century Paley’s famous argument, that -mechanism presupposes a God who is the author of nature. But even before -Paley put the argument into its final form, Hume had written the retort, -that the God whom you will find will be the sort of God who makes that -mechanism. In other words, that mechanism can, at most, presuppose a -mechanic, and not merely _a_ mechanic but _its_ mechanic. The only way -of mitigating mechanism is by the discovery that it is not mechanism. - -When we leave apologetic theology, and come to ordinary literature, we -find, as we might expect, that the scientific outlook is in general -simply ignored. So far as the mass of literature is concerned, science -might never have been heard of. Until recently nearly all writers have -been soaked in classical and renaissance literature. For the most part, -neither philosophy nor science interested them, and their minds were -trained to ignore it. - -There are exceptions to this sweeping statement; and, even if we confine -ourselves to English literature, they concern some of the greatest -names; also the indirect influence of science has been considerable. - -A side light on this distracting inconsistency in modern thought is -obtained by examining some of those great serious poems in English -literature, whose general scale gives them a didactic character. The -relevant poems are Milton’s _Paradise Lost_, Pope’s _Essay on Man_, -Wordsworth’s _Excursion_, Tennyson’s _In Memoriam_. Milton, though he is -writing after the Restoration, voices the theological aspect of the -earlier portion of his century, untouched by the influence of the -scientific materialism. Pope’s poem represents the effect on popular -thought of the intervening sixty years which includes the first period -of assured triumph for the scientific movement. Wordsworth in his whole -being expresses a conscious reaction against the mentality of the -eighteenth century. This mentality means nothing else than the -acceptance of the scientific ideas at their full face value. Wordsworth -was not bothered by any intellectual antagonism. What moved him was a -moral repulsion. He felt that something had been left out, and that what -had been left out comprised everything that was most important. Tennyson -is the mouthpiece of the attempts of the waning romantic movement in the -second quarter of the nineteenth century to come to terms with science. -By this time the two elements in modern thought had disclosed their -fundamental divergence by their jarring interpretations of the course of -nature and the life of man. Tennyson stands in this poem as the perfect -example of the distraction which I have already mentioned. There are -opposing visions of the world, and both of them command his assent by -appeals to ultimate intuitions from which there seems no escape. -Tennyson goes to the heart of the difficulty. It is the problem of -mechanism which appalls him, - - “‘The stars,’ she whispers, ‘blindly run.’” - -This line states starkly the whole philosophic problem implicit in the -poem. Each molecule blindly runs. The human body is a collection of -molecules. Therefore, the human body blindly runs, and therefore there -can be no individual responsibility for the actions of the body. If you -once accept that the molecule is definitely determined to be what it is, -independently of any determination by reason of the total organism of -the body, and if you further admit that the blind run is settled by the -general mechanical laws, there can be no escape from this conclusion. -But mental experiences are derivative from the actions of the body, -including of course its internal behaviour. Accordingly, the sole -function of the mind is to have at least some of its experiences settled -for it, and to add such others as may be open to it independently of the -body’s motions, internal and external. - -There are then two possible theories as to the mind. You can either deny -that it can supply for itself any experiences other than those provided -for it by the body, or you can admit them. - -If you refuse to admit the additional experiences, then all individual -moral responsibility is swept away. If you do admit them, then a human -being may be responsible for the state of his mind though he has no -responsibility for the actions of his body. The enfeeblement of thought -in the modern world is illustrated by the way in which this plain issue -is avoided in Tennyson’s poem. There is something kept in the -background, a skeleton in the cupboard. He touches on almost every -religious and scientific problem, but carefully avoids more than a -passing allusion to this one. - -This very problem was in full debate at the date of the poem. John -Stuart Mill was maintaining his doctrine of determinism. In this -doctrine volitions are determined by motives, and motives are -expressible in terms of antecedent conditions including states of mind -as well as states of the body. - -It is obvious that this doctrine affords no escape from the dilemma -presented by a thoroughgoing mechanism. For if the volition affects the -state of the body, then the molecules in the body do not blindly run. If -the volition does not affect the state of the body, the mind is still -left in its uncomfortable position. - -Mill’s doctrine is generally accepted, especially among scientists, as -though in some way it allowed you to accept the extreme doctrine of -materialistic mechanism, and yet mitigated its unbelievable -consequences. It does nothing of the sort. Either the bodily molecules -blindly run, or they do not. If they do blindly run, the mental states -are irrelevant in discussing the bodily actions. - -I have stated the arguments concisely, because in truth the issue is a -very simple one. Prolonged discussion is merely a source of confusion. -The question as to the metaphysical status of molecules does not come -in. The statement that they are mere formulae has no bearing on the -argument. For presumably the formulae mean something. If they mean -nothing, the whole mechanical doctrine is likewise without meaning, and -the question drops. But if the formulae mean anything, the argument -applies to exactly what they do mean. The traditional way of evading the -difficulty—other than the simple way of ignoring it—is to have recourse -to some form of what is now termed ‘vitalism.’ This doctrine is really a -compromise. It allows a free run to mechanism throughout the whole of -inanimate nature, and holds that the mechanism is partially mitigated -within living bodies. I feel that this theory is an unsatisfactory -compromise. The gap between living and dead matter is too vague and -problematical to bear the weight of such an arbitrary assumption, which -involves an essential dualism somewhere. - -The doctrine which I am maintaining is that the whole concept of -materialism only applies to very abstract entities, the products of -logical discernment. The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so -that the plan of the _whole_ influences the very characters of the -various subordinate organisms which enter into it. In the case of an -animal, the mental states enter into the plan of the total organism and -thus modify the plans of the successive subordinate organisms until the -ultimate smallest organisms, such as electrons, are reached. Thus an -electron within a living body is different from an electron outside it, -by reason of the plan of the body. The electron blindly runs either -within or without the body; but it runs within the body in accordance -with its character within the body; that is to say, in accordance with -the general plan of the body, and this plan includes the mental state. -But this principle of modification is perfectly general throughout -nature, and represents no property peculiar to living bodies. In -subsequent lectures it will be explained that this doctrine involves the -abandonment of the traditional scientific materialism, and the -substitution of an alternative doctrine of organism. - -I shall not discuss Mill’s determinism, as it lies outside the scheme of -these lectures. The foregoing discussion has been directed to secure -that either determinism or free will shall have some relevance, -unhampered by the difficulties introduced by materialistic mechanism, or -by the compromise of vitalism. I would term the doctrine of these -lectures, the theory of _organic mechanism_. In this theory, the -molecules may blindly run in accordance with the general laws, but the -molecules differ in their intrinsic characters according to the general -organic plans of the situations in which they find themselves. - -The discrepancy between the materialistic mechanism of science and the -moral intuitions, which are presupposed in the concrete affairs of life, -only gradually assumed its true importance as the centuries advanced. -The different tones of the successive epochs to which the poems, already -mentioned, belong are curiously reflected in their opening passages. -Milton ends his introduction with the prayer, - - “That to the height of this great argument - I may assert eternal Providence, - And justify the ways of God to men.” - -To judge from many modern writers on Milton, we might imagine that the -_Paradise Lost_ and the _Paradise Regained_ were written as a series of -experiments in blank verse. This was certainly not Milton’s view of his -work. To ‘justify the ways of God to men’ was very much his main object. -He recurs to the same idea in the _Samson Agonistes_, - - “Just are the ways of God - And justifiable to men;” - -We note the assured volume of confidence, untroubled by the coming -scientific avalanche. The actual date of the publication of the -_Paradise Lost_ lies just beyond the epoch to which it belongs. It is -the swansong of a passing world of untroubled certitude. - -A comparison between Pope’s _Essay on Man_ and the _Paradise Lost_ -exhibits the change of tone in English thought in the fifty or sixty -years which separate the age of Milton from the age of Pope. Milton -addresses his poem to God, Pope’s poem is addressed to Lord Bolingbroke, - - “Awake, my St. John! leave all meaner things - To low ambition and the pride of kings. - Let us (since life can little more supply - Than just to look about us and to die) - Expatiate free o’er all this scene of man; - A mighty maze! but not without a plan;” - -Compare the jaunty assurance of Pope, - - “A mighty maze! but not without a plan.” - -with Milton’s - - “Just are the ways of God - And justifiable to men;” - -But the real point to notice is that Pope as well as Milton was -untroubled by the great perplexity which haunts the modern world. The -clue which Milton followed was to dwell on the ways of God in dealings -with man. Two generations later we find Pope equally confident that the -enlightened methods of modern science provided a plan adequate as a map -of the ‘mighty maze.’ - -Wordsworth’s _Excursion_ is the next English poem on the same subject. A -prose preface tells us that it is a fragment of a larger projected work, -described as ‘A philosophical poem containing views of Man, Nature, and -Society.’ - -Very characteristically the poem begins with the line, - - “’Twas summer, and the sun had mounted high:” - -Thus the romantic reaction started neither with God nor with Lord -Bolingbroke, but with nature. We are here witnessing a conscious -reaction against the whole tone of the eighteenth century. That century -approached nature with the abstract analysis of science, whereas -Wordsworth opposes to the scientific abstractions his full concrete -experience. - -A generation of religious revival and of scientific advance lies between -the _Excursion_ and Tennyson’s _In Memoriam_. The earlier poets had -solved the perplexity by ignoring it. That course was not open to -Tennyson. Accordingly his poem begins thus: - - “Strong Son of God, immortal Love, - Whom we, that have not seen Thy face, - By faith, and faith alone, embrace, - Believing where we cannot prove;” - -The note of perplexity is struck at once. The nineteenth century has -been a perplexed century, in a sense which is not true of any of its -predecessors of the modern period. In the earlier times there were -opposing camps, bitterly at variance on questions which they deemed -fundamental. But, except for a few stragglers, either camp was -whole-hearted. The importance of Tennyson’s poem lies in the fact that -it exactly expressed the character of its period. Each individual was -divided against himself. In the earlier times, the deep thinkers were -the clear thinkers,—Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz. They knew -exactly what they meant and said it. In the nineteenth century, some of -the deeper thinkers among theologians and philosophers were muddled -thinkers. Their assent was claimed by incompatible doctrines; and their -efforts at reconciliation produced inevitable confusion. - -Matthew Arnold, even more than Tennyson, was the poet who expressed this -mood of individual distraction which was so characteristic of this -century. Compare with _In Memoriam_ the closing lines of Arnold’s _Dover -Beach_: - - “And we are here as on a darkling plain - Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, - Where ignorant armies clash by night.” - -Cardinal Newman in his _Apologia pro Vitâ Suâ_ mentions it as a -peculiarity of Pusey, the great Anglican ecclesiastic, “He was haunted -by no intellectual perplexities.” In this respect Pusey recalls Milton, -Pope, Wordsworth, as in contrast with Tennyson, Clough, Matthew Arnold, -and Newman himself. - -So far as concerns English literature we find, as might be anticipated, -the most interesting criticism of the thoughts of science among the -leaders of the romantic reaction which accompanied and succeeded the -epoch of the French Revolution. In English literature, the deepest -thinkers of this school were Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Shelley. Keats -is an example of literature untouched by science. We may neglect -Coleridge’s attempt at an explicit philosophical formulation. It was -influential in his own generation; but in these lectures it is my object -only to mention those elements of the thought of the past which stand -for all time. Even with this limitation, only a selection is possible. -For our purposes Coleridge is only important by his influence on -Wordsworth. Thus Wordsworth and Shelley remain. - -Wordsworth was passionately absorbed in nature. It has been said of -Spinoza, that he was drunk with God. It is equally true that Wordsworth -was drunk with nature. But he was a thoughtful, well-read man, with -philosophical interests, and sane even to the point of prosiness. In -addition, he was a genius. He weakens his evidence by his dislike of -science. We all remember his scorn of the poor man whom he somewhat -hastily accuses of peeping and botanising on his mother’s grave. Passage -after passage could be quoted from him, expressing this repulsion. In -this respect, his characteristic thought can be summed up in his phrase, -‘We murder to dissect.’ - -In this latter passage, he discloses the intellectual basis of his -criticism of science. He alleges against science its absorption in -abstractions. His consistent theme is that the important facts of nature -elude the scientific method. It is important therefore to ask, what -Wordsworth found in nature that failed to receive expression in science. -I ask this question in the interest of science itself; for one main -position in these lectures is a protest against the idea that the -abstractions of science are irreformable and unalterable. Now it is -emphatically not the case that Wordsworth hands over inorganic matter to -the mercy of science, and concentrates on the faith that in the living -organism there is some element that science cannot analyse. Of course he -recognises, what no one doubts, that in some sense living things are -different from lifeless things. But that is not his main point. It is -the brooding presence of the hills which haunts him. His theme is nature -_in solido_, that is to say, he dwells on that mysterious presence of -surrounding things, which imposes itself on any separate element that we -set up as an individual for its own sake. He always grasps the whole of -nature as involved in the tonality of the particular instance. That is -why he laughs with the daffodils, and finds in the primrose “thoughts -too deep for terms.” - -Wordsworth’s greatest poem is, by far, the first book of _The Prelude_. -It is pervaded by this sense of the haunting presences of nature. A -series of magnificent passages, too long for quotation, express this -idea. Of course, Wordsworth is a poet writing a poem, and is not -concerned with dry philosophical statements. But it would hardly be -possible to express more clearly a feeling for nature, as exhibiting -entwined prehensive unities, each suffused with modal presences of -others: - - “Ye Presences of Nature in the sky - And on the earth! Ye Visions of the hills! - And Souls of lonely places! can I think - A vulgar hope was yours when ye employed - Such ministry, when ye through many a year - Haunting me thus among my boyish sports, - On caves and trees, upon the woods and hills, - Impressed upon all forms the characters - Of danger or desire; and thus did make - The surface of the universal earth - With triumph and delight, with hope and fear, - Work like a sea?...” - -In thus citing Wordsworth, the point which I wish to make is that we -forget how strained and paradoxical is the view of nature which modern -science imposes on our thoughts. Wordsworth, to the height of genius, -expresses the concrete facts of our apprehension, facts which are -distorted in the scientific analysis. Is it not possible that the -standardised concepts of science are only valid within narrow -limitations, perhaps too narrow for science itself? - -Shelley’s attitude to science was at the opposite pole to that of -Wordsworth. He loved it, and is never tired of expressing in poetry the -thoughts which it suggests. It symbolises to him joy, and peace, and -illumination. What the hills were to the youth of Wordsworth, a chemical -laboratory was to Shelley. It is unfortunate that Shelley’s literary -critics have, in this respect, so little of Shelley in their own -mentality. They tend to treat as a casual oddity of Shelley’s nature -what was, in fact, part of the main structure of his mind, permeating -his poetry through and through. If Shelley had been born a hundred years -later, the twentieth century would have seen a Newton among chemists. - -For the sake of estimating the value of Shelley’s evidence it is -important to realise this absorption of his mind in scientific ideas. It -can be illustrated by lyric after lyric. I will choose one poem only, -the fourth act of his _Prometheus Unbound_. The Earth and the Moon -converse together in the language of accurate science. Physical -experiments guide his imagery. For example, the Earth’s exclamation, - - “The vaporous exultation not to be confined!” - -is the poetic transcript of ‘the expansive force of gases,’ as it is -termed in books on science. Again, take the Earth’s stanza, - - “I spin beneath my pyramid of night, - Which points into the heavens,—dreaming delight, - Murmuring victorious joy in my enchanted sleep; - As a youth lulled in love-dreams faintly sighing, - Under the shadow of his beauty lying, - Which round his rest a watch of light and warmth doth keep.” - -This stanza could only have been written by someone with a definite -geometrical diagram before his inward eye—a diagram which it has often -been my business to demonstrate to mathematical classes. As evidence, -note especially the last line which gives poetical imagery to the light -surrounding night’s pyramid. This idea could not occur to anyone without -the diagram. But the whole poem and other poems are permeated with -touches of this kind. - -Now the poet, so sympathetic with science, so absorbed in its ideas, can -simply make nothing of the doctrine of secondary qualities which is -fundamental to its concepts. For Shelley nature retains its beauty and -its colour. Shelley’s nature is in its essence a nature of organisms, -functioning with the full content of our perceptual experience. We are -so used to ignoring the implications of orthodox scientific doctrine, -that it is difficult to make evident the criticism upon it which is -thereby implied. If anybody could have treated it seriously, Shelley -would have done so. - -Furthermore Shelley is entirely at one with Wordsworth as to the -interfusing of the Presence in nature. Here is the opening stanza of his -poem entitled _Mont Blanc_: - - “The everlasting universe of Things - Flows through the Mind, and rolls its rapid waves, - Now dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloom— - Now lending splendour, where from secret springs - The source of human thought its tribute brings - Of waters,—with a sound but half its own, - Such as a feeble brook will oft assume - In the wild woods, among the Mountains lone, - Where waterfalls around it leap for ever, - Where woods and winds contend, and a vast river - Over its rocks ceaselessly bursts and raves.” - -Shelley has written these lines with explicit reference to some form of -idealism, Kantian or Berkeleyan or Platonic. But however you construe -him, he is here an emphatic witness to a prehensive unification as -constituting the very being of nature. - -Berkeley, Wordsworth, Shelley are representative of the intuitive -refusal seriously to accept the abstract materialism of science. - -There is an interesting difference in the treatment of nature by -Wordsworth and by Shelley, which brings forward the exact questions we -have got to think about. Shelley thinks of nature as changing, -dissolving, transforming as it were at a fairy’s touch. The leaves fly -before the West Wind - - “Like ghosts from an enchanter fleeing.” - -In his poem _The Cloud_ it is the transformations of water which excite -his imagination. The subject of the poem is the endless, eternal, -elusive change of things: - - “I change but I cannot die.” - -This is one aspect of nature, its elusive change: a change not merely to -be expressed by locomotion, but a change of inward character. This is -where Shelley places his emphasis, on the change of what cannot die. - -Wordsworth was born among hills; hills mostly barren of trees, and thus -showing the minimum of change with the seasons. He was haunted by the -enormous permanences of nature. For him change is an incident which -shoots across a background of endurance, - - “Breaking the silence of the seas - Among the farthest Hebrides.” - -Every scheme for the analysis of nature has to face these two facts, -_change_ and _endurance_. There is yet a third fact to be placed by it, -_eternality_, I will call it. The mountain endures. But when after ages -it has been worn away, it has gone. If a replica arises, it is yet a new -mountain. A colour is eternal. It haunts time like a spirit. It comes -and it goes. But where it comes, it is the same colour. It neither -survives nor does it live. It appears when it is wanted. The mountain -has to time and space a different relation from that which colour has. -In the previous lecture, I was chiefly considering the relation to -space-time of things which, in my sense of the term, are eternal. It was -necessary to do so before we can pass to the consideration of the things -which endure. - -Also we must recollect the basis of our procedure. I hold that -philosophy is the critic of abstractions. Its function is the double -one, first of harmonising them by assigning to them their right relative -status as abstractions, and secondly of completing them by direct -comparison with more concrete intuitions of the universe, and thereby -promoting the formation of more complete schemes of thought. It is in -respect to this comparison that the testimony of great poets is of such -importance. Their survival is evidence that they express deep intuitions -of mankind penetrating into what is universal in concrete fact. -Philosophy is not one among the sciences with its own little scheme of -abstractions which it works away at perfecting and improving. It is the -survey of sciences, with the special objects of their harmony, and of -their completion. It brings to this task, not only the evidence of the -separate sciences, but also its own appeal to concrete experience. It -confronts the sciences with concrete fact. - -The literature of the nineteenth century, especially its English poetic -literature, is a witness to the discord between the aesthetic intuitions -of mankind and the mechanism of science. Shelley brings vividly before -us the elusiveness of the eternal objects of sense as they haunt the -change which infects underlying organisms. Wordsworth is the poet of -nature as being the field of enduring permanences carrying within -themselves a message of tremendous significance. The eternal objects are -also there for him, - - “The light that never was, on sea or land.” - -Both Shelley and Wordsworth emphatically bear witness that nature cannot -be divorced from its aesthetic values; and that these values arise from -the cumulation, in some sense, of the brooding presence of the whole -onto its various parts. Thus we gain from the poets the doctrine that a -philosophy of nature must concern itself at least with these five -notions: change, value, eternal objects, endurance, organism, -interfusion. - -We see that the literary romantic movement at the beginning of the -nineteenth century, just as much as Berkeley’s philosophical idealistic -movement a hundred years earlier, refused to be confined within the -materialistic concepts of the orthodox scientific theory. We know also -that when in these lectures we come to the twentieth century, we shall -find a movement in science itself to reorganise its concepts, driven -thereto by its own intrinsic development. - -It is, however, impossible to proceed until we have settled whether -this refashioning of ideas is to be carried out on an objectivist -basis or on a subjectivist basis. By a subjectivist basis I mean the -belief that the nature of our immediate experience is the outcome of -the perceptive peculiarities of the subject enjoying the experience. -In other words, I mean that for this theory what is perceived is not a -partial vision of a complex of things generally independent of that -act of cognition; but that it merely is the expression of the -individual peculiarities of the cognitive act. Accordingly what is -common to the multiplicity of cognitive acts is the ratiocination -connected with them. Thus, though there is a common world of thought -associated with our sense-perceptions, there is no common world to -think about. What we do think about is a common conceptual world -applying indifferently to our individual experiences which are -strictly personal to ourselves. Such a conceptual world will -ultimately find its complete expression in the equations of applied -mathematics. This is the extreme subjectivist position. There is of -course the half-way house of those who believe that our perceptual -experience does tell us of a common objective world; but that the -things perceived are merely the outcome for us of this world, and are -not _in themselves_ elements in the common world itself. - -Also there is the objectivist position. This creed is that the actual -elements perceived by our senses are _in themselves_ the elements of a -common world; and that this world is a complex of things, including -indeed our acts of cognition, but transcending them. According to this -point of view the things experienced are to be distinguished from our -knowledge of them. So far as there is dependence, the _things_ pave the -way for the _cognition_, rather than _vice versa_. But the point is that -the actual things experienced enter into a common world which transcends -knowledge, though it includes knowledge. The intermediate subjectivists -would hold that the things experienced only indirectly enter into the -common world by reason of their dependence on the subject who is -cognising. The objectivist holds that the things experienced and the -cognisant subject enter into the common world on equal terms. In these -lectures I am giving the outline of what I consider to be the essentials -of an objectivist philosophy adapted to the requirement of science and -to the concrete experience of mankind. Apart from the detailed criticism -of the difficulties raised by subjectivism in any form, my broad reasons -for distrusting it are three in number. One reason arises from the -direct interrogation of our perceptive experience. It appears from this -interrogation that we are _within_ a world of colours, sounds, and other -sense-objects, related in space and time to enduring objects such as -stones, trees, and human bodies. We seem to be ourselves elements of -this world in the same sense as are the other things which we perceive. -But the subjectivist, even the moderate intermediate subjectivist, makes -this world, as thus described, depend on us, in a way which directly -traverses our naïve experience. I hold that the ultimate appeal is to -naïve experience and that is why I lay such stress on the evidence of -poetry. My point is, that in our sense-experience we know away from and -beyond our own personality; whereas the subjectivist holds that in such -experience we merely know about our own personality. Even the -intermediate subjectivist places our personality between the world we -know of and the common world which he admits. The world we know of is -for him the internal strain of our personality under the stress of the -common world which lies behind. - -My second reason for distrusting subjectivism is based on the particular -content of experience. Our historical knowledge tells us of ages in the -past when, so far as we can see, no living being existed on earth. Again -it also tells us of countless star-systems, whose detailed history -remains beyond our ken. Consider even the moon and the earth. What is -going on within the interior of the earth, and on the far side of the -moon! Our perceptions lead us to infer that there is something happening -in the stars, something happening within the earth, and something -happening on the far side of the moon. Also they tell us that in remote -ages there were things happening. But all these things which it appears -certainly happened, are either unknown in detail, or else are -reconstructed by inferential evidence. In the face of this content of -our personal experience, it is difficult to believe that the experienced -world is an attribute of our own personality. My third reason is based -upon the instinct for action. Just as sense-perception seems to give -knowledge of what lies beyond individuality, so action seems to issue in -an instinct for self-transcendence. The activity passes beyond self into -the known transcendent world. It is here that final ends are of -importance. For it is not activity urged from behind, which passes out -into the veiled world of the intermediate subjectivist. It is activity -directed to determinate ends in the known world; and yet it is activity -transcending self and it is activity within the known world. It follows -therefore that the world, as known, transcends the subject which is -cognisant of it. - -The subjectivist position has been popular among those who have been -engaged in giving a philosophical interpretation to the recent theories -of relativity in physical science. The dependence of the world of sense -on the individual percipient seems an easy mode of expressing the -meanings involved. Of course, with the exception of those who are -content with themselves as forming the entire universe, solitary amid -nothing, everyone wants to struggle back to some sort of objectivist -position. I do not understand how a common world of thought can be -established in the absence of a common world of sense. I will not argue -this point in detail; but in the absence of a transcendence of thought, -or a transcendence of the world of sense, it is difficult to see how the -subjectivist is to divest himself of his solitariness. Nor does the -intermediate subjectivist appear to get any help from his unknown world -in the background. - -The distinction between realism and idealism does not coincide with that -between objectivism and subjectivism. Both realists and idealists can -start from an objective standpoint. They may both agree that the world -disclosed in sense-perception is a common world, transcending the -individual percipient. But the objective idealist, when he comes to -analyse what the reality of this world involves, finds that cognitive -mentality is in some way inextricably concerned in every detail. This -position the realist denies. Accordingly these two classes of -objectivists do not part company till they have arrived at the ultimate -problem of metaphysics. There is a great deal which they share in -common. This is why, in my last lecture, I said that I adopted a -position of provisional realism. - -In the past, the objectivist position has been distorted by the supposed -necessity of accepting the classical scientific materialism, with its -doctrine of simple location. This has necessitated the doctrine of -secondary and primary qualities. Thus the secondary qualities, such as -the sense-objects, are dealt with on subjectivist principles. This is a -half-hearted position which falls an easy prey to subjectivist -criticism. - -If we are to include the secondary qualities in the common world, a very -drastic reorganisation of our fundamental concepts is necessary. It is -an evident fact of experience that our apprehensions of the external -world depend absolutely on the occurrences within the human body. By -playing appropriate tricks on the body a man can be got to perceive, or -not to perceive, almost anything. Some people express themselves as -though bodies, brains, and nerves were the only real things in an -entirely imaginary world. In other words, they treat bodies on -objectivist principles, and the rest of the world on subjectivist -principles. This will not do; especially, when we remember that it is -the experimenter’s perception of another person’s body which is in -question as evidence. - -But we have to admit that the body is the organism whose states regulate -our cognisance of the world. The unity of the perceptual field therefore -must be a unity of bodily experience. In being aware of the bodily -experience, we must thereby be aware of aspects of the whole -spatio-temporal world as mirrored within the bodily life. This is the -solution of the problem which I gave in my last lecture. I will not -repeat myself now, except to remind you that my theory involves the -entire abandonment of the notion that simple location is the primary way -in which things are involved in space-time. In a certain sense, -everything is everywhere at all times. For every location involves an -aspect of itself in every other location. Thus every spatio-temporal -standpoint mirrors the world. - -If you try to imagine this doctrine in terms of our conventional views -of space and time, which presuppose simple location, it is a great -paradox. But if you think of it in terms of our naïve experience, it is -a mere transcript of the obvious facts. You are in a certain place -perceiving things. Your perception takes place where you are, and is -entirely dependent on how your body is functioning. But this functioning -of the body in one place, exhibits for your cognisance an aspect of the -distant environment, fading away into the general knowledge that there -are things beyond. If this cognisance conveys knowledge of a -transcendent world, it must be because the event which is the bodily -life unifies in itself aspects of the universe. - -This is a doctrine extremely consonant with the vivid expression of -personal experience which we find in the nature-poetry of imaginative -writers such as Wordsworth or Shelley. The brooding, immediate presences -of things are an obsession to Wordsworth. What the theory does do is to -edge cognitive mentality away from being the necessary substratum of the -unity of experience. That unity is now placed in the unity of an event. -Accompanying this unity, there may or there may not be cognition. - -At this point we come back to the great question which was posed before -us by our examination of the evidence afforded by the poetic insight of -Wordsworth and Shelley. This single question has expanded into a group -of questions. What are enduring things, as distinguished from the -eternal objects, such as colour and shape? How are they possible? What -is their status and meaning in the universe? It comes to this: What is -the status of the enduring stability of the order of nature? There is -the summary answer, which refers nature to some greater reality standing -behind it. This reality occurs in the history of thought under many -names, The Absolute, Brahma, The Order of Heaven, God. The delineation -of final metaphysical truth is no part of this lecture. My point is that -any summary conclusion jumping from our conviction of the existence of -such an order of nature to the easy assumption that there is an ultimate -reality which, in some unexplained way, is to be appealed to for the -removal of perplexity, constitutes the great refusal of rationality to -assert its rights. We have to search whether nature does not in its very -being show itself as self-explanatory. By this I mean, that the sheer -statement, of what things are, may contain elements explanatory of why -things are. Such elements may be expected to refer to depths beyond -anything which we can grasp with a clear apprehension. In a sense, all -explanation must end in an ultimate arbitrariness. My demand is, that -the ultimate arbitrariness of matter of fact from which our formulation -starts should disclose the same general principles of reality, which we -dimly discern as stretching away into regions beyond our explicit powers -of discernment. Nature exhibits itself as exemplifying a philosophy of -the evolution of organisms subject to determinate conditions. Examples -of such conditions are the dimensions of space, the laws of nature, the -determinate enduring entities, such as atoms and electrons, which -exemplify these laws. But the very nature of these entities, the very -nature of their spatiality and temporality, should exhibit the -arbitrariness of these conditions as the outcome of a wider evolution -beyond nature itself, and within which nature is but a limited mode. - -One all-pervasive fact, inherent in the very character of what is real -is the transition of things, the passage one to another. This passage is -not a mere linear procession of discrete entities. However we fix a -determinate entity, there is always a narrower determination of -something which is presupposed in our first choice. Also there is always -a wider determination into which our first choice fades by transition -beyond itself. The general aspect of nature is that of evolutionary -expansiveness. These unities, which I call events, are the emergence -into actuality of something. How are we to characterise the something -which thus emerges? The name ‘_event_’ given to such a unity, draws -attention to the inherent transitoriness, combined with the actual -unity. But this abstract word cannot be sufficient to characterise what -the fact of the reality of an event is in itself. A moment’s thought -shows us that no one idea can in itself be sufficient. For every idea -which finds its significance in each event must represent something -which contributes to what realisation is in itself. Thus no one word can -be adequate. But conversely, nothing must be left out. Remembering the -poetic rendering of our concrete experience, we see at once that the -element of value, of being valuable, of having value, of being an end in -itself, of being something which is for its own sake, must not be -omitted in any account of an event as the most concrete actual -something. ‘Value’ is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an -event. Value is an element which permeates through and through the -poetic view of nature. We have only to transfer to the very texture of -realisation in itself that value which we recognise so readily in terms -of human life. This is the secret of Wordsworth’s worship of nature. -Realization therefore is in itself the attainment of value. But there is -no such thing as mere value. Value is the outcome of limitation. The -definite finite entity is the selected mode which is the shaping of -attainment; apart from such shaping into individual matter of fact there -is no attainment. The mere fusion of all that there is would be the -nonentity of indefiniteness. The salvation of reality is its obstinate, -irreducible, matter-of-fact entities, which are limited to be no other -than themselves. Neither science, nor art, nor creative action can tear -itself away from obstinate, irreducible, limited facts. The endurance of -things has its significance in the self-retention of that which imposes -itself as a definite attainment for its own sake. That which endures is -limited, obstructive, intolerant, infecting its environment with its own -aspects. But it is not self-sufficient. The aspects of all things enter -into its very nature. It is only itself as drawing together into its own -limitation the larger whole in which it finds itself. Conversely it is -only itself by lending its aspects to this same environment in which it -finds itself. The problem of evolution is the development of enduring -harmonies of enduring shapes of value, which merge into higher -attainments of things beyond themselves. Aesthetic attainment is -interwoven in the texture of realisation. The endurance of an entity -represents the attainment of a limited aesthetic success, though if we -look beyond it to its external effects, it may represent an aesthetic -failure. Even within itself, it may represent the conflict between a -lower success and a higher failure. The conflict is the presage of -disruption. - -The further discussion of the nature of enduring objects and of the -conditions they require will be relevant to the consideration of the -doctrine of evolution which dominated the latter half of the nineteenth -century. The point which in this lecture I have endeavoured to make -clear is that the nature-poetry of the romantic revival was a protest on -behalf of the organic view of nature, and also a protest against the -exclusion of value from the essence of matter of fact. In this aspect of -it, the romantic movement may be conceived as a revival of Berkeley’s -protest which had been launched a hundred years earlier. The romantic -reaction was a protest on behalf of value. - - - - - CHAPTER VI - - THE NINETEENTH CENTURY - - -My previous lecture was occupied with the comparison of the -nature-poetry of the romantic movement in England with the materialistic -scientific philosophy inherited from the eighteenth century. It noted -the entire disagreement of the two movements of thought. The lecture -also continued the endeavour to outline an objectivist philosophy, -capable of bridging the gap between science and that fundamental -intuition of mankind which finds its expression in poetry and its -practical exemplification in the presuppositions of daily life. As the -nineteenth century passed on, the romantic movement died down. It did -not die away, but it lost its clear unity of tidal stream, and dispersed -itself into many estuaries as it coalesced with other human interests. -The faith of the century was derived from three sources: one source was -the romantic movement, showing itself in religious revival, in art, and -in political aspiration: another source was the gathering advance of -science which opened avenues of thought: the third source was the -advance in technology which completely changed the conditions of human -life. - -Each of these springs of faith had its origin in the previous period. -The French Revolution itself was the first child of romanticism in the -form in which it tinged Rousseau. James Watt obtained his patent for his -steam-engine in 1769. The scientific advance was the glory of France and -of French influence, throughout the same century. - -Also even during this earlier period, the streams interacted, coalesced, -and antagonised each other. But it was not until the nineteenth century -that the threefold movement came to that full development and peculiar -balance characteristic of the sixty years following the battle of -Waterloo. - -What is peculiar and new to the century, differentiating it from all its -predecessors, is its technology. It was not merely the introduction of -some great isolated inventions. It is impossible not to feel that -something more than that was involved. For example, writing was a -greater invention than the steam-engine. But in tracing the continuous -history of the growth of writing we find an immense difference from that -of the steam-engine. We must, of course, put aside minor and sporadic -anticipations of both; and confine attention to the periods of their -effective elaboration. The scale of time is so absolutely disparate. For -the steam-engine, we may give about a hundred years; for writing, the -time period is of the order of a thousand years. Further, when writing -was finally popularised, the world was not then expecting the next step -in technology. The process of change was slow, unconscious, and -unexpected. - -In the nineteenth century, the process became quick, conscious, and -expected. The earlier half of the century was the period in which this -new attitude to change was first established and enjoyed. It was a -peculiar period of hope, in the sense in which, sixty or seventy years -later, we can now detect a note of disillusionment, or at least of -anxiety. - -The greatest invention of the nineteenth century was the invention of -the method of invention. A new method entered into life. In order to -understand our epoch, we can neglect all the details of change, such as -railways, telegraphs, radios, spinning machines, synthetic dyes. We must -concentrate on the method in itself; that is the real novelty, which has -broken up the foundations of the old civilisation. The prophecy of -Francis Bacon has now been fulfilled; and man, who at times dreamt of -himself as a little lower than the angels, has submitted to become the -servant and the minister of nature. It still remains to be seen whether -the same actor can play both parts. - -The whole change has arisen from the new scientific information. -Science, conceived not so much in its principles as in its results, is -an obvious storehouse of ideas for utilisation. But, if we are to -understand what happened during the century, the analogy of a mine is -better than that of a storehouse. Also, it is a great mistake to think -that the bare scientific idea is the required invention, so that it has -only to be picked up and used. An intense period of imaginative design -lies between. One element in the new method is just the discovery of how -to set about bridging the gap between the scientific ideas, and the -ultimate product. It is a process of disciplined attack upon one -difficulty after another. - -The possibilities of modern technology were first in practice realised -in England, by the energy of a prosperous middle class. Accordingly, the -industrial revolution started there. But the Germans explicitly realised -the methods by which the deeper veins in the mine of science could be -reached. They abolished haphazard methods of scholarship. In their -technological schools and universities progress did not have to wait for -the occasional genius, or the occasional lucky thought. Their feats of -scholarship during the nineteenth century were the admiration of the -world. This discipline of knowledge applies beyond technology to pure -science, and beyond science to general scholarship. It represents the -change from amateurs to professionals. - -There have always been people who devoted their lives to definite -regions of thought. In particular, lawyers and the clergy of the -Christian churches form obvious examples of such specialism. But the -full self-conscious realisation of the power of professionalism in -knowledge in all its departments, and of the way to produce the -professionals, and of the importance of knowledge to the advance of -technology, and of the methods by which abstract knowledge can be -connected with technology, and of the boundless possibilities of -technological advance,—the realisation of all these things was first -completely attained in the nineteenth century; and among the various -countries, chiefly in Germany. - -In the past human life was lived in a bullock cart; in the future it -will be lived in an aeroplane; and the change of speed amounts to a -difference in quality. - -The transformation of the field of knowledge, which has been thus -effected, has not been wholly a gain. At least, there are dangers -implicit in it, although the increase of efficiency is undeniable. The -discussion of various effects on social life arising from the new -situation is reserved for my last lecture. For the present it is -sufficient to note that this novel situation of disciplined progress is -the setting within which the thought of the century developed. - -In the period considered four great novel ideas were introduced into -theoretical science. Of course, it is possible to show good cause for -increasing my list far beyond the number _four_. But I am keeping to -ideas which, if taken in their broadest signification, are vital to -modern attempts at reconstructing the foundations of physical science. - -Two of these ideas are antithetical, and I will consider them together. -We are not concerned with details, but with ultimate influences on -thought. One of the ideas is that of a field of physical activity -pervading all space, even where there is an apparent vacuum. This notion -had occurred to many people, under many forms. We remember the medieval -axiom, nature abhors a vacuum. Also, Descartes’ vortices at one time, in -the seventeenth century, seemed as if established among scientific -assumptions. Newton believed that gravitation was caused by something -happening in a medium. But, on the whole, in the eighteenth century -nothing was made of any of these ideas. The passage of light was -explained in Newton’s fashion by the flight of minute corpuscles, which -of course left room for a vacuum. Mathematical physicists were far too -busy deducing the consequences of the theory of gravitation to bother -much about the causes; nor did they know where to look, if they had -troubled themselves over the question. There were speculations, but -their importance was not great. Accordingly, when the nineteenth century -opened, the notion of physical occurrences pervading all space held no -effective place in science. It was revived from two sources. The -undulatory theory of light triumphed, thanks to Thomas Young and -Fresnel. This demands that there shall be something throughout space -which can undulate. Accordingly, the ether was produced, as a sort of -all pervading subtle material. Again the theory of electromagnetism -finally, in Clerk Maxwell’s hands, assumed a shape in which it demanded -that there should be electromagnetic occurrences throughout all space. -Maxwell’s complete theory was not shaped until the eighteen-seventies. -But it had been prepared for by many great men, Ampère, Oersted, -Faraday. In accordance with the current materialistic outlook, these -electromagnetic occurrences also required a material in which to happen. -So again the ether was requisitioned. Then Maxwell, as the immediate -first-fruits of his theory, demonstrated that the waves of light were -merely waves of his electromagnetic occurrences. Accordingly, the theory -of electromagnetism swallowed up the theory of light. It was a great -simplification, and no one doubts its truth. But it had one unfortunate -effect so far as materialism was concerned. For, whereas quite a simple -sort of elastic ether sufficed for light when taken by itself, the -electromagnetic ether has to be endowed with just those properties -necessary for the production of the electromagnetic occurrences. In -fact, it becomes a mere name for the material which is postulated to -underlie these occurrences. If you do not happen to hold the -metaphysical theory which makes you postulate such an ether, you can -discard it. For it has no independent vitality. - -Thus in the seventies of the last century, some main physical sciences -were established on a basis which presupposed the idea of _continuity_. -On the other hand, the idea of _atomicity_ had been introduced by John -Dalton, to complete Lavoisier’s work on the foundation of chemistry. -This is the second great notion. Ordinary matter was conceived as -atomic: electromagnetic effects were conceived as arising from a -continuous field. - -There was no contradiction. In the first place, the notions are -antithetical; but, apart from special embodiments, are not logically -contradictory. Secondly, they were applied to different regions of -science, one to chemistry, and the other to electromagnetism. And, as -yet, there were but faint signs of coalescence between the two. - -The notion of matter as atomic has a long history. Democritus and -Lucretius will at once occur to your minds. In speaking of these ideas -as novel, I merely mean _relatively novel_, having regard to the -settlement of ideas which formed the efficient basis of science -throughout the eighteenth century. In considering the history of -thought, it is necessary to distinguish the real stream, determining a -period, from ineffectual thoughts casually entertained. In the -eighteenth century every well-educated man read Lucretius, and -entertained ideas about atoms. But John Dalton made them efficient in -the stream of science; and in this function of efficiency atomicity was -a new idea. - -The influence of atomicity was not limited to chemistry. The living cell -is to biology what the electron and the proton are to physics. Apart -from cells and from aggregates of cells there are no biological -phenomena. The cell theory was introduced into biology contemporaneously -with, and independently of, Dalton’s atomic theory. The two theories are -independent exemplifications of the same idea of ‘atomism.’ The -biological cell theory was a gradual growth, and a mere list of dates -and names illustrates the fact that the biological sciences, as -effective schemes of thought, are barely one hundred years old. Bichât -in 1801 elaborated a tissue theory: Johannes Müller in 1835 described -‘cells’ and demonstrated facts concerning their nature and relations: -Schleiden in 1838 and Schwann in 1839 finally established their -fundamental character. Thus by 1840 both biology and chemistry were -established on an atomic basis. The final triumph of atomism had to wait -for the arrival of electrons at the end of the century. The importance -of the imaginative background is illustrated by the fact that nearly -half a century after Dalton had done his work, another chemist, Louis -Pasteur, carried over these same ideas of atomicity still further into -the region of biology. The cell theory and Pasteur’s work were in some -respects more revolutionary than that of Dalton. For they introduced the -notion of _organism_ into the world of minute beings. There had been a -tendency to treat the atom as an ultimate entity, capable only of -external relations. This attitude of mind was breaking down under the -influence of Mendeleef’s periodic law. But Pasteur showed the decisive -importance of the idea of organism at the stage of infinitesimal -magnitude. The astronomers had shown us how big is the universe. The -chemists and biologists teach us how small it is. There is in modern -scientific practice a famous standard of length. It is rather small: to -obtain it, you must divide a centimetre into one hundred million parts, -and take one of them. Pasteur’s organisms are a good deal bigger than -this length. In connection with atoms, we now know that there are -organisms for which such distances are uncomfortably great. - -The remaining pair of new ideas to be ascribed to this epoch are both of -them connected with the notion of transition or change. They are the -doctrine of the conservation of energy, and the doctrine of evolution. - -The doctrine of energy has to do with the notion of quantitative -permanence underlying change. The doctrine of evolution has to do with -the emergence of novel organisms as the outcome of change. The theory of -energy lies in the province of physics. The theory of evolution lies -mainly in the province of biology, although it had previously been -touched upon by Kant and Laplace in connection with the formation of -suns and planets. - -The convergent effect of the new power for scientific advance, which -resulted from these four ideas, transformed the middle period of the -century into an orgy of scientific triumph. Clear-sighted men, of the -sort who are so clearly wrong, now proclaimed that the secrets of the -physical universe were finally disclosed. If only you ignored everything -which refused to come into line, your powers of explanation were -unlimited. On the other side, muddle-headed men muddled themselves into -the most indefensible positions. Learned dogmatism, conjoined with -ignorance of the crucial facts, suffered a heavy defeat from the -scientific advocates of new ways. Thus to the excitement derived from -technological revolution, there was now added the excitement arising -from the vistas disclosed by scientific theory. Both the material and -the spiritual bases of social life were in process of transformation. -When the century entered upon its last quarter, its three sources of -inspiration, the romantic, the technological, and the scientific had -done their work. - -Then, almost suddenly, a pause occurred; and in its last twenty years -the century closed with one of the dullest stages of thought since the -time of the First Crusade. It was an echo of the eighteenth century, -lacking Voltaire and the reckless grace of the French aristocrats. The -period was efficient, dull, and half-hearted. It celebrated the triumph -of the professional man. - -But looking backwards upon this time of pause, we can now discern signs -of change. In the first place, the modern conditions of systematic -research prevent absolute stagnation. In every branch of science, there -was effective progress, indeed rapid progress, although it was confined -somewhat strictly within the accepted ideas of each branch. It was an -age of successful scientific orthodoxy, undisturbed by much thought -beyond the conventions. - -In the second place, we can now see that the adequacy of scientific -materialism as a scheme of thought for the use of science was -endangered. The conservation of energy provided a new type of -quantitative permanence. It is true that energy could be construed as -something subsidiary to matter. But, anyhow, the notion of _mass_ was -losing its unique preeminence as being the one final permanent quantity. -Later on, we find the relations of mass and energy inverted; so that -mass now becomes the name for a quantity of energy considered in -relation to some of its dynamical effects. This train of thought leads -to the notion of energy being fundamental, thus displacing matter from -that position. But energy is merely the name for the quantitative aspect -of a structure of happenings; in short, it depends on the notion of the -functioning of an organism. The question is, can we define an organism -without recurrence to the concept of matter in simple location? We must, -later on, consider this point in more detail. - -The same relegation of matter to the background occurs in connection -with the electromagnetic fields. The modern theory presupposes -happenings in that field which are divorced from immediate dependence -upon matter. It is usual to provide an ether as a substratum. But the -ether does not really enter into the theory. Thus again the notion of -material loses its fundamental position. Also, the atom is transforming -itself into an organism; and finally the evolution theory is nothing -else than the analysis of the conditions for the formation and survival -of various types of organisms. In truth, one most significant fact of -this later period is the advance in biological sciences. These sciences -are essentially sciences concerning organisms. During the epoch in -question, and indeed also at the present moment, the prestige of the -more perfect scientific form belongs to the physical sciences. -Accordingly, biology apes the manners of physics. It is orthodox to -hold, that there is nothing in biology but what is physical mechanism -under somewhat complex circumstances. - -One difficulty in this position is the present confusion as to the -foundational concepts of physical science. This same difficulty also -attaches to the opposed doctrine of vitalism. For, in this later theory, -the fact of mechanism is accepted—I mean, mechanism based upon -materialism—and an additional vital control is introduced to explain the -actions of living bodies. It cannot be too clearly understood that the -various physical laws which appear to apply to the behaviour of atoms -are not mutually consistent as at present formulated. The appeal to -mechanism on behalf of biology was in its origin an appeal to the -well-attested self-consistent physical concepts as expressing the basis -of all natural phenomena. But at present there is no such system of -concepts. - -Science is taking on a new aspect which is neither purely physical, nor -purely biological. It is becoming the study of organisms. Biology is the -study of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the study of the -smaller organisms. There is another difference between the two divisions -of science. The organisms of biology include as ingredients the smaller -organisms of physics; but there is at present no evidence that the -smaller of the physical organisms can be analysed into component -organisms. It may be so. But anyhow we are faced with the question as to -whether there are not primary organisms which are incapable of further -analysis. It seems very unlikely that there should be any infinite -regress in nature. Accordingly, a theory of science which discards -materialism must answer the question as to the character of these -primary entities. There can be only one answer on this basis. We must -start with the event as the ultimate unit of natural occurrence. An -event has to do with all that there is, and in particular with all other -events. This interfusion of events is effected by the aspects of those -eternal objects, such as colours, sounds, scents, geometrical -characters, which are required for nature and are not emergent from it. -Such an eternal object will be an ingredient of one event under the -guise, or aspect, of qualifying another event. There is a reciprocity of -aspects, and there are patterns of aspects. Each event corresponds to -two such patterns; namely, the pattern of aspects of other events which -it grasps into its own unity, and the pattern of its aspects which other -events severally grasp into their unities. Accordingly, a -non-materialistic philosophy of nature will identify a primary organism -as being the emergence of some particular pattern as grasped in the -unity of a real event. Such a pattern will also include the aspects of -the event in question as grasped in other events, whereby those other -events receive a modification, or partial determination. There is thus -an intrinsic and an extrinsic reality of an event, namely, the event as -in its own prehension, and the event as in the prehension of other -events. The concept of an organism includes, therefore, the concept of -the interaction of organisms. The ordinary scientific ideas of -transmission and continuity are, relatively speaking, details concerning -the empirically observed characters of these patterns throughout space -and time. The position here maintained is that the relationships of an -event are internal, so far as concerns the event itself; that is to say, -that they are constitutive of what the event is in itself. - -Also in the previous lecture, we arrived at the notion that an actual -event is an achievement for its own sake, a grasping of diverse -entities into a value by reason of their real togetherness in that -pattern, to the exclusion of other entities. It is not the mere -logical togetherness of merely diverse things. For in that case, to -modify Bacon’s words, “all eternal objects would be alike one to -another.” This reality means that each intrinsic essence, that is to -say, what each eternal object is in itself, becomes relevant to the -one limited value emergent in the guise of the event. But values -differ in importance. Thus though each event is necessary for the -community of events, the weight of its contribution is determined by -something intrinsic in itself. We have now to discuss what that -property is. Empirical observation shows that it is the property which -we may call indifferently _retention_, _endurance_ or _reiteration_. -This property amounts to the recovery, on behalf of value amid the -transitoriness of reality, of the self-identity which is also enjoyed -by the primary eternal objects. The reiteration of a particular shape -(or formation) of value within an event occurs when the event as a -whole repeats some shape which is also exhibited by each one of a -succession of its parts. Thus however you analyse the event according -to the flux of its parts through time, there is the same -thing-for-its-own-sake standing before you. Thus the event, in its own -intrinsic reality, mirrors in itself, as derived from its own parts, -aspects of the same patterned value as it realises in its complete -self. It thus realises itself under the guise of an enduring -individual entity, with a life history contained within itself. -Furthermore, the extrinsic reality of such an event, as mirrored in -other events, takes this same form of an enduring individuality; only -in this case, the individuality is implanted as a reiteration of -aspects of itself in the alien events composing the environment. - -The total temporal duration of such an event bearing an enduring -pattern, constitutes its specious present. Within this specious present -the event realises itself as a totality, and also in so doing realises -itself as grouping together a number of aspects of its own temporal -parts. One and the same pattern is realised in the total event, and is -exhibited by each of these various parts through an aspect of each part -grasped into the togetherness of the total event. Also, the earlier -life-history of the same pattern is exhibited by its aspects in this -total event. There is, thus, in this event a memory of the antecedent -life-history of its own dominant pattern, as having formed an element of -value in its own antecedent environment. This concrete prehension, from -within, of the life-history of an enduring fact is analysable into two -abstractions, of which one is the enduring entity which has emerged as a -real matter of fact to be taken account of by other things, and the -other is the individualised embodiment of the underlying energy of -realisation. - -The consideration of the general flux of events leads to this analysis -into an underlying eternal energy in whose nature there stands an -envisagement of the realm of all eternal objects. Such an envisagement -is the ground of the individualised thoughts which emerge as -thought-aspects grasped within the life-history of the subtler and more -complex enduring patterns. Also in the nature of the eternal activity -there must stand an envisagement of all values to be obtained by a real -togetherness of eternal objects, as envisaged in ideal situations. Such -ideal situations, apart from any reality, are devoid of intrinsic value, -but are valuable as elements in purpose. The individualised prehension -into individual events of aspects of these ideal situations takes the -form of individualised thoughts, and as such has intrinsic value. Thus -value arises because there is now a real togetherness of the ideal -aspects, as in thought, with the actual aspects, as in process of -occurrence. Accordingly no value is to be ascribed to the underlying -activity as divorced from the matter-of-fact events of the real world. - -Finally, to sum up this train of thought, the underlying activity, as -conceived apart from the fact of realisation, has three types of -envisagement. These are: first, the envisagement of eternal objects; -secondly, the envisagement of possibilities of value in respect to the -synthesis of eternal objects; and lastly, the envisagement of the actual -matter of fact which must enter into the total situation which is -achievable by the addition of the future. But in abstraction from -actuality, the eternal activity is divorced from value. For the -actuality is the value. The individual perception arising from enduring -objects will vary in its individual depth and width according to the way -in which the pattern dominates its own route. It may represent the -faintest ripple differentiating the general substrate energy; or, in the -other extreme, it may rise to conscious thought, which includes poising -before self-conscious judgment the abstract possibilities of value -inherent in various situations of ideal togetherness. The intermediate -cases will group round the individual perception as envisaging (without -self-consciousness) that one immediate possibility of attainment which -represents the closest analogy to its own immediate past, having regard -to the actual aspects which are there for prehension. The laws of -physics represent the harmonised adjustment of development which results -from this unique principle of determination. Thus dynamics is dominated -by a principle of least action, whose detailed character has to be -learnt from observation. - -The atomic material entities which are considered in physical science -are merely these individual enduring entities, conceived in abstraction -from everything except what concerns their mutual interplay in -determining each other’s historical routes of life-history. Such -entities are partially formed by the inheritance of aspects from their -own past. But they are also partially formed by the aspects of other -events forming their environments. The laws of physics are the laws -declaring how the entities mutually react among themselves. For physics -these laws are arbitrary, because that science has abstracted from what -the entities are in themselves. We have seen that this fact of what the -entities are in themselves is liable to modification by their -environments. Accordingly, the assumption that no modification of these -laws is to be looked for in environments, which have any striking -difference from the environments for which the laws have been observed -to hold, is very unsafe. The physical entities may be modified in very -essential ways, so far as these laws are concerned. It is even possible -that they may be developed into individualities of more fundamental -types, with wider embodiment of envisagement. Such envisagement might -reach to the attainment of the poising of alternative values with -exercise of choice lying outside the physical laws, and expressible only -in terms of purpose. Apart from such remote possibilities, it remains an -immediate deduction that an individual entity, whose own life-history is -a part within the life-history of some larger, deeper, more complete -pattern, is liable to have aspects of that larger pattern dominating its -own being, and to experience modifications of that larger pattern -reflected in itself as modifications of its own being. This is the -theory of organic mechanism. - -According to this theory the evolution of laws of nature is concurrent -with the evolution of enduring pattern. For the general state of the -universe, as it now is, partly determines the very essences of the -entities whose modes of functioning these laws express. The general -principle is that in a new environment there is an evolution of the old -entities into new forms. - -This rapid outline of a thoroughgoing organic theory of nature enables -us to understand the chief requisites of the doctrine of evolution. The -main work, proceeding during this pause at the end of the nineteenth -century, was the absorption of this doctrine as guiding the methodology -of all branches of science. By a blindness which is almost judicial as -being a penalty affixed to hasty, superficial thinking, many religious -thinkers opposed the new doctrine; although, in truth, a thoroughgoing -evolutionary philosophy is inconsistent with materialism. The aboriginal -stuff, or material, from which a materialistic philosophy starts is -incapable of evolution. This material is in itself the ultimate -substance. Evolution, on the materialistic theory, is reduced to the -rôle of being another word for the description of the changes of the -external relations between portions of matter. There is nothing to -evolve, because one set of external relations is as good as any other -set of external relations. There can merely be change, purposeless and -unprogressive. But the whole point of the modern doctrine is the -evolution of the complex organisms from antecedent states of less -complex organisms. The doctrine thus cries aloud for a conception of -organism as fundamental for nature. It also requires an underlying -activity—a substantial activity—expressing itself in individual -embodiments, and evolving in achievements of organism. The organism is a -unit of emergent value, a real fusion of the characters of eternal -objects, emerging for its own sake. - -Thus in the process of analysing the character of nature in itself, we -find that the emergence of organisms depends on a selective activity -which is akin to purpose. The point is that the enduring organisms are -now the outcome of evolution; and that, beyond these organisms, there is -nothing else that endures. On the materialistic theory, there is -material—such as matter or electricity—which endures. On the organic -theory, the only endurances are structures of activity, and the -structures are evolved. - -Enduring things are thus the outcome of a temporal process; whereas -eternal things are the elements required for the very being of the -process. We can give a precise definition of endurance in this way: Let -an event A be pervaded by an enduring structural pattern. Then A can be -exhaustively subdivided into a temporal succession of events. Let B be -any part of A, which is obtained by picking out any one of the events -belonging to a series which thus subdivides A. Then the enduring pattern -is a pattern of aspects within the complete pattern prehended into the -unity of A, and it is also a pattern within the complete pattern -prehended into the unity of any temporal slice of A, such as B. For -example, a molecule is a pattern exhibited in an event of one minute, -and of any second of that minute. It is obvious that such an enduring -pattern may be of more, or of less, importance. It may express some -slight fact connecting the underlying activities thus individualised; or -it may express some very close connection. If the pattern which endures -is merely derived from the direct aspects of the external environment, -mirrored in the standpoints of the various parts, then the endurance is -an extrinsic fact of slight importance. But if the enduring pattern is -wholly derived from the direct aspects of the various temporal sections -of the event in question, then the endurance is an important intrinsic -fact. It expresses a certain unity of character uniting the underlying -individualised activities. There is then an enduring object with a -certain unity for itself and for the rest of nature. Let us use the term -physical endurance to express endurance of this type. Then physical -endurance is the process of continuously inheriting a certain identity -of character transmitted throughout a historical route of events. This -character belongs to the whole route, and to every event of the route. -This is the exact property of material. If it has existed for ten -minutes, it has existed during every minute of the ten minutes, and -during every second of every minute. Only if you take _material_ to be -fundamental, this property of endurance is an arbitrary fact at the base -of the order of nature; but if you take _organism_ to be fundamental, -this property is the result of evolution. - -It looks at first sight, as if a physical object, with its process of -inheritance from itself, were independent of the environment. But such a -conclusion is not justified. For let B and C be two successive slices in -the life of such an object, such that C succeeds B. Then the enduring -pattern in C is inherited from B, and from other analogous antecedent -parts of its life. It is transmitted through B to C. But what is -transmitted to C is the complete pattern of aspects derived from such -events as B. These complete patterns include the influence of the -environment on B, and on the other antecedent parts of the life of the -object. Thus the complete aspects of the antecedent life are inherited -as the partial pattern which endures throughout all the various periods -of the life. Thus a favourable environment is essential to the -maintenance of a physical object. - -Nature, as we know it, comprises enormous permanences. There are the -permanences of ordinary matter. The molecules within the oldest rocks -known to geologists may have existed unchanged for over a thousand -million years, not only unchanged in themselves, but unchanged in their -relative dispositions to each other. In that length of time the number -of pulsations of a molecule vibrating with the frequency of yellow -sodium light would be about 16.3 × 10^{22} = 163,000 × (10^6)³. Until -recently, an atom was apparently indestructible. We know better now. But -the indestructible atom has been succeeded by the apparently -indestructible electron and the indestructible proton. - -Another fact to be explained is the great similarity of these -practically indestructible objects. All electrons are very similar to -each other. We need not outrun the evidence, and say that they are -identical; but our powers of observation cannot detect any differences. -Analogously, all hydrogen nuclei are alike. Also we note the great -numbers of these analogous objects. There are throngs of them. It seems -as though a certain similarity were a favourable condition for -endurance. Common sense also suggests this conclusion. If organisms are -to survive, they must work together. - -Accordingly, the key to the mechanism of evolution is the necessity for -the evolution of a favourable environment, conjointly with the evolution -of any specific type of enduring organisms of great permanence. Any -physical object which by its influence deteriorates its environment, -commits suicide. - -One of the simplest ways of evolving a favourable environment -concurrently with the development of the individual organism, is that -the influence of each organism on the environment should be favourable -to the _endurance_ of other organisms of the same type. Further, if the -organism also favours the _development_ of other organisms of the same -type, you have then obtained a mechanism of evolution adapted to produce -the observed state of large multitudes of analogous entities, with high -powers of endurance. For the environment automatically develops with the -species, and the species with the environment. - -The first question to ask is, whether there is any direct evidence for -such a mechanism for the evolution of enduring organisms. In surveying -nature, we must remember that there are not only basic organisms whose -ingredients are merely aspects of eternal objects. There are also -organisms of organisms. Suppose for the moment and for the sake of -simplicity, we assume, without any evidence, that electrons and hydrogen -nuclei are such basic organisms. Then the atoms, and the molecules, are -organisms of a higher type, which also represent a compact definite -organic unity. But when we come to the larger aggregations of matter, -the organic unity fades into the background. It appears to be but faint -and elementary. It is there; but the pattern is vague and indecisive. It -is a mere aggregation of effects. When we come to living beings, the -definiteness of pattern is recovered, and the organic character again -rises into prominence. Accordingly, the characteristic laws of inorganic -matter are mainly the statistical averages resulting from confused -aggregates. So far are they from throwing light on the ultimate nature -of things, that they blur and obliterate the individual characters of -the individual organisms. If we wish to throw light upon the facts -relating to organisms, we must study either the individual molecules and -electrons, or the individual living beings. In between we find -comparative confusion. Now the difficulty of studying the individual -molecule is that we know so little about its life history. We cannot -keep an individual under continuous observation. In general, we deal -with them in large aggregates. So far as individuals are concerned, -sometimes with difficulty a great experimenter throws, so to speak, a -flash light on one of them, and just observes one type of instantaneous -effect. Accordingly, the history of the functioning of individual -molecules, or electrons, is largely hidden from us. - -But in the case of living beings, we can trace the history of -individuals. We now find exactly the mechanism which is here demanded. -In the first place, there is the propagation of the species from members -of the same species. There is also the careful provision of the -favourable environment for the endurance of the family, the race, or the -seed in the fruit. - -It is evident, however, that I have explained the evolutionary mechanism -in terms which are far too simple. We find associated species of living -things, providing for each other a favourable environment. Thus just as -the members of the same species mutually favour each other, so do -members of associated species. We find the rudimentary fact of -association in the existence of the two species, electrons and hydrogen -nuclei. The simplicity of the dual association, and the apparent absence -of competition from other antagonistic species accounts for the massive -endurance which we find among them. - -There are thus two sides to the machinery involved in the development of -nature. On one side, there is a given environment with organisms -adapting themselves to it. The scientific materialism of the epoch in -question emphasised this aspect. From this point of view, there is a -given amount of material, and only a limited number of organisms can -take advantage of it. The givenness of the environment dominates -everything. Accordingly, the last words of science appeared to be the -Struggle for Existence, and Natural Selection. Darwin’s own writings are -for all time a model of refusal to go beyond the direct evidence, and of -careful retention of every possible hypothesis. But those virtues were -not so conspicuous in his followers, and still less in his -camp-followers. The imagination of European sociologists and publicists -was stained by exclusive attention to this aspect of conflicting -interests. The idea prevailed that there was a peculiar strong-minded -realism in discarding ethical considerations in the determination of the -conduct of commercial and national interests. - -The other side of the evolutionary machinery, the neglected side, is -expressed by the word _creativeness_. The organisms can create their own -environment. For this purpose, the single organism is almost helpless. -The adequate forces require societies of coöperating organisms. But with -such coöperation and in proportion to the effort put forward, the -environment has a plasticity which alters the whole ethical aspect of -evolution. - -In the immediate past, and at present, a muddled state of mind is -prevalent. The increased plasticity of the environment for mankind, -resulting from the advances in scientific technology, is being construed -in terms of habits of thought which find their justification in the -theory of a fixed environment. - -The riddle of the universe is not so simple. There is the aspect of -permanence in which a given type of attainment is endlessly repeated for -its own sake; and there is the aspect of transition to other things,—it -may be of higher worth, and it may be of lower worth. Also there are its -aspects of struggle and of friendly help. But romantic ruthlessness is -no nearer to real politics, than is romantic self-abnegation. - - - - - CHAPTER VII - - RELATIVITY - - -In the previous lectures of this course we have considered the -antecedent conditions which led up to the scientific movement, and have -traced the progress of thought from the seventeenth to the nineteenth -century. In the nineteenth century this history falls into three parts, -so far as it is to be grouped around science. These divisions are, the -contact between the romantic movement and science, the development of -technology and physics in the earlier part of the century, and lastly -the theory of evolution combined with the general advance of the -biological sciences. - -The dominating note of the whole period of three centuries is that the -doctrine of materialism afforded an adequate basis for the concepts of -science. It was practically unquestioned. When undulations were wanted, -an ether was supplied, in order to perform the duties of an undulatory -material. To show the full assumption thus involved, I have sketched in -outline an alternative doctrine of an organic theory of nature. In the -last lecture it was pointed out that the biological developments, the -doctrine of evolution, the doctrine of energy, and the molecular -theories were rapidly undermining the adequacy of the orthodox -materialism. But until the close of the century no one drew that -conclusion. Materialism reigned supreme. - -The note of the present epoch is that so many complexities have -developed regarding material, space, time, and energy, that the simple -security of the old orthodox assumptions has vanished. It is obvious -that they will not do as Newton left them, or even as Clerk Maxwell left -them. There must be a reorganization. The new situation in the thought -of to-day arises from the fact that scientific theory is outrunning -common sense. The settlement as inherited by the eighteenth century was -a triumph of organised common sense. It had got rid of medieval -phantasies, and of Cartesian vortices. As a result it gave full reign to -its anti-rationalistic tendencies derived from the historical revolt of -the Reformation period. It grounded itself upon what every plain man -could see with his own eyes, or with a microscope of moderate power. It -measured the obvious things to be measured, and it generalised the -obvious things to be generalised. For example, it generalised the -ordinary notions of weight and massiveness. The eighteenth century -opened with the quiet confidence that at last nonsense had been got rid -of. To-day we are at the opposite pole of thought. Heaven knows what -seeming nonsense may not to-morrow be demonstrated truth. We have -recaptured some of the tone of the early nineteenth century, only on a -higher imaginative level. - -The reason why we are on a higher imaginative level is not because we -have finer imagination, but because we have better instruments. In -science, the most important thing that has happened during the last -forty years is the advance in instrumental design. This advance is -partly due to a few men of genius such as Michelson and the German -opticians. It is also due to the progress of technological processes of -manufacture, particularly in the region of metallurgy. The designer has -now at his disposal a variety of material of differing physical -properties. He can thus depend upon obtaining the material he desires; -and it can be ground to the shapes he desires, within very narrow limits -of tolerance. These instruments have put thought onto a new level. A -fresh instrument serves the same purpose as foreign travel; it shows -things in unusual combinations. The gain is more than a mere addition; -it is a transformation. The advance in experimental ingenuity is, -perhaps, also due to the larger proportion of national ability which now -flows into scientific pursuits. Anyhow, whatever be the cause, subtle -and ingenious experiments have abounded within the last generation. The -result is, that a great deal of information has been accumulated in -regions of nature very far removed from the ordinary experience of -mankind. - -Two famous experiments, one devised by Galileo at the outset of the -scientific movement, and the other by Michelson with the aid of his -famous interferometer, first carried out in 1881, and repeated in 1887 -and 1905, illustrate the assertions I have made. Galileo dropped heavy -bodies from the top of the leaning tower of Pisa, and demonstrated that -bodies of different weights, if released simultaneously, would reach the -earth together. So far as experimental skill, and delicacy of apparatus -were concerned, this experiment could have been made at any time within -the preceding five thousand years. The ideas involved merely concerned -weight and speed of travel, ideas which are familiar in ordinary life. -The whole set of ideas might have been familiar to the family of King -Minos of Crete, as they dropped pebbles into the sea from high -battlements rising from the shore. We cannot too carefully realise that -science started with the organisation of ordinary experiences. It was in -this way that it coalesced so readily with the anti-rationalistic bias -of the historical revolt. It was not asking for ultimate meanings. It -confined itself to investigating the connections regulating the -succession of obvious occurrences. - -Michelson’s experiment could not have been made earlier than it was. It -required the general advance in technology, and Michelson’s experimental -genius. It concerns the determination of the earth’s motion through the -ether, and it assumes that light consists of waves of vibration -advancing at a fixed rate through the ether in any direction. Also, of -course, the earth is moving through the ether, and Michelson’s apparatus -is moving with the earth. In the centre of the apparatus a ray of light -is divided so that one half-ray goes in one direction _along_ the -apparatus through a given distance, and is reflected back to the centre -by a mirror in the apparatus. The other half-ray goes the same distance -_across_ the apparatus in a direction at right angles to the former ray, -and it also is reflected back to the centre. These reunited rays are -then reflected onto a screen in the apparatus. If precautions are taken, -you will see interference bands; namely bands of blackness where the -crests of the waves of one ray have filled up the troughs of the other -rays, owing to a minute difference in the lengths of paths of the two -half-rays, up to certain parts of the screens. These differences in -length will be affected by the motion of the earth. For it is the -lengths of the paths in the ether which count. Thus, since the apparatus -is moving with the earth, the path of one half-ray will be disturbed by -the motion in a different manner from the path of the other half-ray. -Think of yourself as moving in a railway carriage, first along the train -and then across the train; and mark out your paths on the railway track -which in this analogy corresponds to the ether. Now the motion of the -earth is very slow compared to that of light. Thus in the analogy you -must think of the train almost at a standstill, and of yourself as -moving very quickly. - -In the experiment this effect of the earth’s motion would affect the -positions on the screen of the interference bands. Also if you turn the -apparatus round, through a right-angle, the effect of the earth’s motion -on the two half-rays will be interchanged, and the positions of the -interference bands would be shifted. We can calculate the small shift -which should result owing to the earth’s motion round the sun. Also to -this effect, we have to add that due to the sun’s motion through the -ether. The delicacy of the instrument can be tested, and it can be -proved that these effects of shifting are large enough to be observed by -it. Now the point is, that nothing was observed. There was no shifting -as you turned the instrument round. - -The conclusion is either that the earth is always stationary in the -ether, or that there is something wrong with the fundamental principles -on which the interpretation of the experiment relies. It is obvious -that, in this experiment, we are very far away from the thoughts and the -games of the children of King Minos. The ideas of an ether, of waves in -it, of interference, of the motion of the earth through the ether, and -of Michelson’s interferometer, are remote from ordinary experience. But -remote as they are, they are simple and obvious compared to the accepted -explanation of the nugatory result of the experiment. - -The ground of the explanation is that the ideas of space and of time -employed in science are too simple-minded, and must be modified. This -conclusion is a direct challenge to common sense, because the earlier -science had only refined upon the ordinary notions of ordinary people. -Such a radical reorganization of ideas would not have been adopted, -unless it had also been supported by many other observations which we -need not enter upon. Some form of the relativity theory seems to be the -simplest way of explaining a large number of facts which otherwise would -each require some _ad hoc_ explanation. The theory, therefore, does not -merely depend upon the experiments which led to its origination. - -The central point of the explanation is that every instrument, such as -Michelson’s apparatus as used in the experiment, necessarily records the -velocity of light as having one and the same definite speed relatively -to it. I mean that an interferometer in a comet and an interferometer on -the earth would necessarily bring out the velocity of light, relatively -to themselves, as at the same value. This is an obvious paradox, since -the light moves with a definite velocity through the ether. Accordingly -two bodies, the earth and the comet, moving with unequal velocities -through the ether, might be expected to have different velocities -relatively to rays of light. For example, consider two cars on a road, -moving at ten and twenty miles an hour respectively, and being passed by -another car at fifty miles an hour. The rapid car will pass one of the -two cars at the relative velocity of forty miles per hour, and the other -at the rate of thirty miles per hour. The allegation as to light is -that, if we substituted a ray of light for the rapid car, the velocity -of the light along the roadway would be exactly the same as its velocity -relatively to either of the two cars which it overtakes. The velocity of -light is immensely large, being about three hundred thousand kilometres -per second. We must have notions as to space and time such that just -this velocity has this peculiar character. It follows that all our -notions of relative velocity must be recast. But these notions are the -immediate outcome of our habitual notions as to space and time. So we -come back to the position, that there has been something overlooked in -the current expositions of what we mean by space and of what we mean by -time. - -Now our habitual fundamental assumption is that there is a unique -meaning to be given to space and a unique meaning to be given to time, -so that whatever meaning is given to spatial relations in respect to the -instrument on the earth, the same meaning must be given to them in -respect to the instrument on the comet, and the same meaning for an -instrument at rest in the ether. In the theory of relativity, this is -denied. As far as concerns space, there is no difficulty in agreeing, if -you think of the obvious facts of relative motion. But even here the -change in meaning has to go further than would be sanctioned by common -sense. Also the same demand is made for time; so that the relative -dating of events and the lapses of time between them are to be reckoned -as different for the instrument on the earth, for the instrument in the -comet, and for the instrument at rest in the ether. This is a greater -strain on our credulity. We need not probe the question further than the -conclusion that for the earth and for the comet spatiality and -temporality are each to have different meanings amid different -conditions, such as those presented by the earth and the comet. -Accordingly velocity has different meanings for the two bodies. Thus the -modern scientific assumption is that if anything has the speed of light -by reference to any one meaning of space and time, then it has the same -speed according to any other meaning of space and time. - -This is a heavy blow at the classical scientific materialism, which -presupposes a definite present instant at which all matter is -simultaneously real. In the modern theory there is no such unique -present instant. You can find a meaning for the notion of the -simultaneous instant throughout all nature, but it will be a different -meaning for different notions of temporality. - -There has been a tendency to give an extreme subjectivist interpretation -to this new doctrine. I mean that the relativity of space and time has -been construed as though it were dependent on the choice of the -observer. It is perfectly legitimate to bring in the observer, if he -facilitates explanations. But it is the observer’s body that we want, -and not his mind. Even this body is only useful as an example of a very -familiar form of apparatus. On the whole, it is better to concentrate -attention on Michelson’s interferometer, and to leave Michelson’s body -and Michelson’s mind out of the picture. The question is, why did the -interferometer have black bands on its screen, and why did not these -bands slightly shift as the instrument turned. The new relativity -associates space and time with an intimacy not hitherto contemplated; -and presupposes that their separation in concrete fact can be achieved -by alternative modes of abstraction, yielding alternative meanings. But -each mode of abstraction is directing attention to something which is in -nature; and thereby is isolating it for the purpose of contemplation. -The fact relevant to experiment, is the relevance of the interferometer -to just one among the many alternative systems of these spatio-temporal -relations which hold between natural entities. - -What we must now ask of philosophy is to give us an interpretation of -the status in nature of space and time, so that the possibility of -alternative meanings is preserved. These lectures are not suited for the -elaboration of details; but there is no difficulty in pointing out where -to look for the origin of the discrimination between space and time. I -am presupposing the organic theory of nature, which I have outlined as a -basis for a thoroughgoing objectivism. - -An event is the grasping into unity of a pattern of aspects. The -effectiveness of an event beyond itself arises from the aspects of -itself which go to form the prehended unities of other events. Except -for the systematic aspects of geometrical shape, this effectiveness is -trivial, if the mirrored pattern attaches merely to the event as one -whole. If the pattern endures throughout the successive parts of the -event, and also exhibits itself in the whole, so that the event is the -life history of the pattern, then in virtue of that enduring pattern the -event gains in external effectiveness. For its own effectiveness is -reënforced by the analogous aspects of all its successive parts. The -event constitutes a patterned value with a permanence inherent -throughout its own parts; and by reason of this inherent endurance the -event is important for the modification of its environment. - -It is in this endurance of pattern that time differentiates itself from -space. The pattern is spatially _now_; and this temporal determination -constitutes its relation to each partial event. For it is reproduced in -this temporal succession of these spatial parts of its own life. I mean -that this particular rule of temporal order allows the pattern to be -reproduced in each temporal slice of its history. So to speak, each -enduring object discovers in nature and requires from nature a principle -discriminating space from time. Apart from the fact of an enduring -pattern this principle might be there, but it would be latent and -trivial. Thus the importance of space as against time, and of time as -against space, has developed with the development of enduring organisms. -Enduring objects are significant of a differentiation of space from time -in respect to the patterns ingredient within events; and conversely the -differentiation of space from time in the patterns ingredient within -events expresses the patience of the community of events for enduring -objects. There might be the community without objects, but there could -not be the enduring objects without the community with its peculiar -patience for them. - -It is very necessary that this point should not be misunderstood. -Endurance means that a pattern which is exhibited in the prehension of -one event is also exhibited in the prehension of those of its parts -which are discriminated by a certain rule. It is not true that any part -of the whole event will yield the same pattern as does the whole. For -example, consider the total bodily pattern exhibited in the life of a -human body during one minute. One of the thumbs during the same minute -is part of the whole bodily event. But the pattern of this part is the -pattern of the thumb, and is not the pattern of the whole body. Thus -endurance requires a definite rule for obtaining the parts. In the above -example, we know at once what the rule is: You must take the life of the -whole body during any portion of that same minute; for example, during a -second or a tenth of a second. In other words, the meaning of endurance -presupposes a meaning for the lapse of time within the spatio-temporal -continuum. - -The question now arises whether all enduring objects discover the same -principle of differentiation of space from time; or even whether at -different stages of its own life-history one object may not vary in its -spatio-temporal discrimination. Up till a few years ago, everyone -unhesitatingly assumed that there was only one such principle to be -discovered. Accordingly, in dealing with one object, time would have -exactly the same meaning in reference to endurance as in dealing with -the endurance of another object. It would also follow then that spatial -relations would have one unique meaning. But now it seems that the -observed effectiveness of objects can only be explained by assuming that -objects in a state of motion relatively to each other are utilising, for -their endurance, meanings of space and of time which are not identical -from one object to another. Every enduring object is to be conceived as -at rest in its own proper space, and in motion throughout any space -defined in a way which is not that inherent in its peculiar endurance. -If two objects are mutually at rest, they are utilising the same -meanings of space and of time for the purposes of expressing their -endurance; if in relative motion, the spaces and times differ. It -follows that, if we can conceive a body at one stage of its life history -as in motion relatively to itself at another stage, then the body at -these two stages is utilising diverse meanings of space, and -correlatively diverse meanings of time. - -In an organic philosophy of nature there is nothing to decide between -the old hypothesis of the uniqueness of the time discrimination and the -new hypothesis of its multiplicity. It is purely a matter for evidence -drawn from observations.[5] - -Footnote 5: - - _Cf._ my _Principles of Natural Knowledge_, Sec. 52:3. - -In an earlier lecture, I said that an event had contemporaries. It is an -interesting question whether, on the new hypothesis, such a statement -can be made without the qualification of a reference to a definite -space-time system. It is possible to do so, in the sense that in _some_ -time-system or other the two events are simultaneous. In other -time-systems the two contemporary events will not be simultaneous, -though they may overlap. Analogously one event will precede another -without qualification, if in _every_ time-system this precedence occurs. -It is evident that if we start from a given event A, other events in -general are divided into two sets, namely, those which without -qualification are contemporaneous with A and those which either precede -or succeed A. But there will be a set left over, namely, those events -which bound the two sets. There we have a critical case. You will -remember that we have a critical velocity to account for, namely the -theoretical velocity of light _in vacuo_.[6] Also you will remember that -the utilisation of different spatio-temporal systems means the relative -motion of objects. When we analyse this critical relation of a special -set of events to any given event A, we find the explanation of the -critical velocity which we require. I am suppressing all details. It is -evident that exactness of statement must be introduced by the -introduction of points, and lines, and instants. Also that the origin of -geometry requires discussion; for example, the measurement of lengths, -the straightness of lines, and the flatness of planes, and -perpendicularity. I have endeavoured to carry out these investigations -in some earlier books, under the heading of the theory of extensive -abstraction; but they are too technical for the present occasion. - -Footnote 6: - - This is not the velocity of light in a gravitational field or in a - medium of molecules and electrons. - -If there be no one definite meaning to the geometrical relations of -distance, it is evident that the law of gravitation needs restatement. -For the formula expressing that law is that two particles attract each -other in proportion to the product of their masses and the inverse -square of their distances. This enunciation tacitly assumes that there -is one definite meaning to be ascribed to the instant at which the -attraction is considered, and also one definite meaning to be ascribed -to _distance_. But distance is a purely spatial notion, so that in the -new doctrine, there are an indefinite number of such meanings according -to the space-time system which you adopt. If the two particles are -relatively at rest, then we might be content with the space-time systems -which they are both utilising. Unfortunately this suggestion gives no -hint as to procedure when they are not mutually at rest. It is, -therefore, necessary to reformulate the law in a way which does not -presuppose any particular space-time system. Einstein has done this. -Naturally the result is more complicated. He introduced into -mathematical physics certain methods of pure mathematics which render -the formulae independent of the particular systems of measurement -adopted. The new formula introduces various small effects which are -absent in Newton’s law. But for the major effects Newton’s law and -Einstein’s law agree. Now these extra effects of Einstein’s law serve to -explain irregularities of the planet Mercury’s orbit which by Newton’s -law were inexplicable. This is a strong confirmation of the new theory. -Curiously enough, there is more than one alternative formula, based on -the new theory of multiple space-time systems, having the property of -embodying Newton’s law and in addition of explaining the peculiarities -of Mercury’s motion. The only method of selection between them is to -wait for experimental evidence respecting those effects on which the -formulae differ. Nature is probably quite indifferent to the aesthetic -preferences of mathematicians. - -It only remains to add that Einstein would probably reject the theory of -multiple space-time systems which I have been expounding to you. He -would interpret his formula in terms of contortions in space-time which -alter the invariance theory for measure properties, and of the proper -times of each historical route. His mode of statement has the greater -mathematical simplicity, and only allows of one law of gravitation, -excluding the alternatives. But, for myself, I cannot reconcile it with -the given facts of our experience as to simultaneity, and spatial -arrangement. There are also other difficulties of a more abstract -character. - -The theory of the relationship between events at which we have now -arrived is based first upon the doctrine that the relatednesses of an -event are all internal relations, so far as concerns that event, though -not necessarily so far as concerns the other relata. For example, the -eternal objects, thus involved, are externally related to events. This -internal relatedness is the reason why an event can be found only just -where it is and how it is,—that is to say, in just one definite set of -relationships. For each relationship enters into the essence of the -event; so that, apart from that relationship, the event would not be -itself. This is what is meant by the very notion of internal relations. -It has been usual, indeed universal, to hold that spatio-temporal -relationships are external. This doctrine is what is here denied. - -The conception of internal relatedness involves the analysis of the -event into two factors, one the underlying substantial activity of -individualisation, and the other the complex of aspects—that is to say, -the complex of relatednesses as entering into the essence of the given -event—which are unified by this individualised activity. In other words, -the concept of internal relations requires the concept of substance as -the activity synthesising the relationships into its emergent character. -The event is what it is, by reason of the unification in itself of a -multiplicity of relationships. The general scheme of these mutual -relationships is an abstraction which presupposes each event as an -independent entity, which it is not, and asks what remnant of these -formative relationships is then left in the guise of external -relationships. The scheme of relationships as thus impartially expressed -becomes the scheme of a complex of events variously related as wholes to -parts and as joint parts within some one whole. Even here, the internal -relationship forces itself on our attention; for the part evidently is -constitutive of the whole. Also an isolated event which has lost its -status in any complex of events is equally excluded by the very nature -of an event. So the whole is evidently constitutive of the part. Thus -the internal character of the relationship really shows through this -impartial scheme of abstract external relations. - -But this exhibition of the actual universe as extensive and divisible -has left out the distinction between space and time. It has in fact left -out the process of realisation, which is the adjustment of the synthetic -activities by virtue of which the various events become their realised -selves. This adjustment is thus the adjustment of the underlying active -substances whereby these substances exhibit themselves as the -individualisations or modes of Spinoza’s one substance. This adjustment -is what introduces temporal process. - -Thus, in some sense, time, in its character of the adjustment of the -process of synthetic realisation, extends beyond the spatio-temporal -continuum of nature.[7] There is no necessity that temporal process, in -this sense, should be constituted by one single series of linear -succession. Accordingly, in order to satisfy the present demands of -scientific hypothesis, we introduce the metaphysical hypothesis that -this is not the case. We do assume (basing ourselves upon direct -observation), however, that temporal process of realisation can be -analysed into a group of linear serial processes. Each of these linear -series is a space-time system. In support of this assumption of definite -serial processes, we appeal: (1) to the immediate presentation through -the senses of an extended universe beyond ourselves and _simultaneous_ -with ourselves, (2) to the intellectual apprehension of a meaning to the -question which asks what is _now immediately happening_ in regions -beyond the cognisance of our senses, (3) to the analysis of what is -involved in the _endurance_ of emergent objects. This endurance of -objects involves the display of a pattern as now realised. This display -is the display of a pattern as inherent in an event, but also as -exhibiting a temporal slice of nature as lending aspects to eternal -objects (or, equally, of eternal objects as lending aspects to events). -The pattern is spatialised in a whole duration for the benefit of the -event into whose essence the pattern enters. The event is part of the -duration, _i.e._, is part of what is exhibited in the aspects inherent -in itself; and conversely the duration is the whole of nature -simultaneous with the event, in that sense of simultaneity. Thus an -event in realising itself displays a pattern, and this pattern requires -a definite duration determined by a definite meaning of simultaneity. -Each such meaning of simultaneity relates the pattern as thus displayed -to one definite space-time system. The actuality of the space-time -systems is constituted by the realisation of pattern; but it is inherent -in the general scheme of events as constituting its patience for the -temporal process of realisation. - -Footnote 7: - - _Cf._ my _Concept of Nature_, Ch. III. - -Notice that the pattern requires a duration involving a definite lapse -of time, and not merely an instantaneous moment. Such a moment is more -abstract, in that it merely denotes a certain relation of contiguity -between the concrete events. Thus a duration is spatialised; and by -‘spatialised’ is meant that the duration is the field for the realised -pattern constituting the character of the event. A duration, as the -field of the pattern realised in the actualisation of one of its -contained events, is an epoch, _i.e._, an arrest. Endurance is the -repetition of the pattern in successive events. Thus endurance requires -a succession of durations, each exhibiting the pattern. In this account -‘time’ has been separated from ‘extension’ and from the ‘divisibility’ -which arises from the character of spatio-temporal extension’. -Accordingly we must not proceed to conceive time as another form of -extensiveness. Time is sheer succession of epochal durations. But the -entities which succeed each other in this account are durations. The -duration is that which is required for the realisation of a pattern in -the given event. Thus the divisibility and extensiveness is within the -given duration. The epochal duration is not realised _via_ its -_successive_ divisible parts, but is given _with_ its parts. In this -way, the objection which Zeno might make to the joint validity of two -passages from Kant’s _Critique of Pure Reason_ is met by abandoning the -earlier of the two passages. I refer to passages from the section ‘Of -the Axioms of Intuition’; the earlier from the subsection on _Extensive -Quantity_, and the latter from the subsection on _Intensive Quantity_ -where considerations respecting quantity in general, extensive and -intensive, are summed up. The earlier passage runs thus:[8] - -Footnote 8: - - Max Müller’s translation. - -“I call an extensive quantity that in which the representation of the -whole is rendered possible by the representation of its parts, _and -therefore necessarily preceded by it_.[9] I cannot represent to myself -any line, however small it may be, without drawing it in thought, that -is, without producing all its parts one after the other, starting from a -given point, and thus, first of all, drawing its intuition. The same -applies to every, even the smallest portion of time. I can only think in -it the successive progress from one moment to another, thus producing in -the end, by all the portions of time, and their addition, a definite -quantity of time.” - -Footnote 9: - - Italics mine, and also in the second passage. - -The second passage runs thus: - -“This peculiar property of quantities that no part of them is the -smallest possible part (no part indivisible) is called continuity. Time -and space are quanta continua, because there is no part of them that is -not enclosed between limits (points and moments), _no part that is not -itself again a space or a time. Space consists of spaces only, time of -times. Points and moments are only limits_, mere places of limitation, -and as places _presupposing always_ those intuitions which they are -meant to limit or to determine. Mere places or parts that might be given -before space or time, could never be compounded into space or time.” - -I am in complete agreement with the second extract if ‘time and space’ -is the extensive continuum; but it is inconsistent with its predecessor. -For Zeno would object that a vicious infinite regress is involved. Every -part of time involves some smaller part of itself, and so on. Also this -series regresses backwards ultimately to nothing; since the initial -moment is without duration and merely marks the relation of contiguity -to an earlier time. Thus time is impossible, if the two extracts are -both adhered to. I accept the later, and reject the earlier, passage. -Realisation is the becoming of time in the field of extension. Extension -is the complex of events, _quâ_ their potentialities. In realisation the -potentiality becomes actuality. But the potential pattern requires a -duration; and the duration must be exhibited as an epochal whole, by the -realisation of the pattern. Thus time is the succession of elements in -themselves divisible and contiguous. A duration, in becoming temporal, -thereby incurs realisation in respect to some enduring object. -Temporalisation is realisation. Temporalisation is not another -continuous process. It is an atomic succession. Thus time is atomic -(_i.e._, epochal), though what is temporalised is divisible. This -doctrine follows from the doctrine of events, and of the nature of -enduring objects. In the next chapter we must consider its relevance to -the quantum theory of recent science. - -It is to be noted that this doctrine of the epochal character of time -does not depend on the modern doctrine of relativity, and holds -equally—and indeed, more simply—if this doctrine be abandoned. It does -depend on the analysis of the intrinsic character of an event, -considered as the most concrete finite entity. - -In reviewing this argument, note first that the second quotation from -Kant, on which it is based, does not depend on any peculiar Kantian -doctrine. The latter of the two is in agreement with Plato as against -Aristotle.[10] In the second place, the argument assumes that Zeno -understated his argument. He should have urged it against the current -notion of time in itself, and not against motion, which involves -relations between time and space. For, what becomes has duration. But no -duration can become until a smaller duration (part of the former) has -antecedently come into being [Kant’s earlier statement]. The same -argument applies to this smaller duration, and so on. Also the infinite -regress of these durations converges to nothing—and even on the -Aristotelian view there is no first moment. Accordingly time would be an -irrational notion. Thirdly, in the epochal theory Zeno’s difficulty is -met by conceiving temporalisation as the realisation of a complete -organism. This organism is an event holding in its essence its -spatio-temporal relationships (both within itself, and beyond itself) -throughout the spatio-temporal continuum. - -Footnote 10: - - _Cf._ ‘Euclid in Greek,’ by Sir T. L. Heath, Camb. Univ. Press, in a - note on Points. - - - - - CHAPTER VIII - - THE QUANTUM THEORY - - -The theory of relativity has justly excited a great amount of public -attention. But, for all its importance, it has not been the topic which -has chiefly absorbed the recent interest of physicists. Without question -that position is held by the quantum theory. The point of interest in -this theory is that, according to it, some effects which appear -essentially capable of gradual increase or gradual diminution are in -reality to be increased or decreased only by certain definite jumps. It -is as though you could walk at three miles per hour or at four miles per -hour, but not at three and a half miles per hour. - -The effects in question are concerned with the radiation of light from a -molecule which has been excited by some collision. Light consists of -waves of vibration in the electromagnetic field. After a complete wave -has passed a given point everything at that point is restored to its -original state and is ready for the next wave which follows on. Picture -to yourselves the waves on the ocean, and reckon from crest to crest of -successive waves. The number of waves which pass a given point in one -second is called the frequency of that system of waves. A system of -light-waves of definite frequency corresponds to a definite colour in -the spectrum. Now a molecule, when excited, vibrates with a certain -number of definite frequencies. In other words, there are a definite set -of modes of vibration of the molecule, and each mode of vibration has -one definite frequency. Each mode of vibration can stir up in the -electromagnetic field waves of its own frequency. These waves carry away -the energy of the vibration; so that finally (when such waves are in -being) the molecule loses the energy of its excitement and the waves -cease. Thus a molecule can radiate light of certain definite colours, -that is to say, of certain definite frequencies. - -You would think that each mode of vibration could be excited to any -intensity, so that the energy carried away by light of that frequency -could be of any amount. But this is not the case. There appear to be -certain minimum amounts of energy which cannot be subdivided. The case -is analogous to that of a citizen of the United States who, in paying -his debts in the currency of his country, cannot subdivide a cent so as -to correspond to some minute subdivision of the goods obtained. The cent -corresponds to the minimum quantity of the light energy, and the goods -obtained correspond to the energy of the exciting cause. This exciting -cause is either strong enough to procure the emission of one cent of -energy, or fails to procure the emission of any energy whatsoever. In -any case the molecule will only emit an integral number of cents of -energy. There is a further peculiarity which we can illustrate by -bringing an Englishman onto the scene. He pays his debts in English -currency, and his smallest unit is a farthing which differs in value -from the cent. The farthing is in fact about half a cent, to a very -rough approximation. In the molecule, different modes of vibration have -different frequencies. Compare each mode to a nation. One mode -corresponds to the United States, and another mode corresponds to -England. One mode can only radiate its energy in an integral number of -cents, so that a cent of energy is the least it can pay out; whereas the -other mode can only radiate its energy in an integral number of -farthings, so that a farthing of energy is the least that it can pay -out. Also a rule can be found to tell us the relative value of the cent -of energy of one mode to the farthing of energy of another mode. The -rule is childishly simple: Each smallest coin of energy has a value in -strict proportion to the frequency belonging to that mode. By this rule, -and comparing farthings with cents, the frequency of an American would -be about twice that of an Englishman. In other words, the American would -do about twice as many things in a second as an Englishman. I must leave -you to judge whether this corresponds to the reputed characters of the -two nations. Also I suggest that there are merits attaching to both ends -of the solar spectrum. Sometimes you want red light and sometimes violet -light. - -There has been, I hope, no great difficulty in comprehending what the -quantum theory asserts about molecules. The perplexity arises from the -effort to fit the theory into the current scientific picture of what is -going on in the molecule or atom. - -It has been the basis of the materialistic theory, that the happenings -of nature are to be explained in terms of the locomotion of material. In -accordance with this principle, the waves of light were explained in -terms of the locomotion of a material ether, and the internal happenings -of a molecule are now explained in terms of the locomotion of separate -material parts. In respect to waves of light, the material ether has -retreated to an indeterminate position in the background, and is rarely -talked about. But the principle is unquestioned as regards its -application to the atom. For example a neutral hydrogen atom is assumed -to consist of at least two lumps of material; one lump is the nucleus -consisting of a material called positive electricity, and the other is a -single electron which is negative electricity. The nucleus shows signs -of being complex, and of being subdivisible into smaller lumps, some of -positive electricity and others electronic. The assumption is, that -whatever vibration takes place in the atom is to be attributed to the -vibratory locomotion of some bit of material, detachable from the -remainder. The difficulty with the quantum theory is that, on this -hypothesis, we have to picture the atom as providing a limited number of -definite grooves, which are the sole tracks along which vibration can -take place, whereas the classical scientific picture provides none of -these grooves. The quantum theory wants trolley-cars with a limited -number of routes, and the scientific picture provides horses galloping -over prairies. The result is that the physical doctrine of the atom has -got into a state which is strongly suggestive of the epicycles of -astronomy before Copernicus. - -On the organic theory of nature there are two sorts of vibrations which -radically differ from each other. There is vibratory locomotion, and -there is vibratory organic deformation; and the conditions for the two -types of change are of a different character. In other words, there is -vibratory locomotion of a given pattern as one whole, and there is -vibratory change of pattern. - -A complete organism in the organic theory is what corresponds to a bit -of material on the materialistic theory. There will be a primary genus, -comprising a number of species of organisms, such that each primary -organism, belonging to a species of the primary genus, is not -decomposable into subordinate organisms. I will call any organism of the -primary genus a primate. There may be different species of primates. - -It must be kept in mind that we are dealing with the abstractions of -physics. Accordingly, we are not thinking of what a primate is in -itself, as a pattern arising from the prehension of the concrete -aspects; nor are we thinking of what a primate is for its environment, -in respect to its concrete aspects prehended therein. We are thinking of -these various aspects merely in so far as their effects on patterns and -on locomotion are expressible in spatio-temporal terms. Accordingly, in -the language of physics, the aspects of a primate are merely its -contributions to the electromagnetic field. This is in fact exactly what -we know of electrons and protons. An electron for us is merely the -pattern of its aspects in its environment, so far as those aspects are -relevant to the electromagnetic field. - -Now in discussing the theory of relativity, we saw that the relative -motion of two primates means simply that their organic patterns are -utilising diverse space-time systems. If two primates do not continue -either mutually at rest, or mutually in uniform relative motion, at -least one of them is changing its intrinsic space-time system. The laws -of motion express the conditions under which these changes of space-time -systems are effected. The conditions for vibratory _locomotion_ are -founded upon these general laws of motion. - -But it is possible that certain species of primates are apt to go to -pieces under conditions which lead them to effect changes of space-time -systems. Such species would only experience a long range of endurance, -if they had succeeded in forming a favourable association among primates -of different species, such that in this association the tendency to -collapse is neutralised by the environment of the association. We can -imagine the atomic nucleus as composed of a large number of primates of -differing species, and perhaps with many primates of the same species, -the whole association being such as to favour stability. An example of -such an association is afforded by the association of a positive nucleus -with negative electrons to obtain a neutral atom. The neutral atom is -thereby shielded from any electric field which would otherwise produce -changes in the space-time system of the atom. - -The requirements of physics now suggest an idea which is very consonant -with the organic philosophical theory. I put it in the form of a -question: Has our organic theory of endurance been tainted by the -materialistic theory in so far as it assumes without question that -endurance must mean undifferentiated sameness throughout the -life-history concerned? Perhaps you noticed that (in a previous chapter) -I used the word ‘reiteration’ as a synonym of ‘endurance.’ It obviously -is not quite synonymous in its meaning; and now I want to suggest that -_reiteration_ where it differs from _endurance_ is more nearly what the -organic theory requires. The difference is very analogous to that -between the Galileans and the Aristotelians: Aristotle said ‘rest’ where -Galileo added ‘or uniform motion in a straight line.’ Thus in the -organic theory, a pattern need not endure in undifferentiated sameness -through time. The pattern may be essentially one of aesthetic contrasts -requiring a lapse of time for its unfolding. A tune is an example of -such a pattern. Thus the endurance of the pattern now means the -reiteration of its succession of contrasts. This is obviously the most -general notion of endurance on the organic theory, and ‘reiteration’ is -perhaps the word which expresses it with most directness. But when we -translate this notion into the abstractions of physics, it at once -becomes the technical notion of ‘vibration.’ This vibration is not the -vibratory locomotion: it is the vibration of organic deformation. There -are certain indications in modern physics that for the rôle of -corpuscular organisms at the base of the physical field, we require -vibratory entities. Such corpuscles would be the corpuscles detected as -expelled from the nuclei of atoms, which then dissolve into waves of -light. We may conjecture that such a corpuscular body has no great -stability of endurance, when in isolation. Accordingly, an unfavourable -environment leading to rapid changes in its proper space-time system, -that is to say, an environment jolting it into violent accelerations, -causes the corpuscles to go to pieces and dissolve into light-waves of -the same period of vibration. - -A proton, and perhaps an electron, would be an association of such -primates, superposed on each other, with their frequencies and spatial -dimensions so arranged as to promote the stability of the complex -organism, when jolted into accelerations of locomotion. The conditions -for stability would give the associations of periods possible for -protons. The expulsion of a primate would come from a jolt which leads -the proton either to settle down into an alternative association, or to -generate a new primate by the aid of the energy received. - -A primate must be associated with a definite frequency of vibratory -organic deformation so that when it goes to pieces it dissolves into -light waves of the same frequency, which then carry off all its average -energy. It is quite easy (as a particular hypothesis) to imagine -stationary vibrations of the electromagnetic field of definite -frequency, and directed radially to and from a centre, which, in -accordance with the accepted electromagnetic laws, would consist of a -vibratory spherical nucleus satisfying one set of conditions and a -vibratory external field satisfying another set of conditions. This is -an example of vibratory organic deformation. Further [on this particular -hypothesis], there are two ways of determining the subsidiary conditions -so as to satisfy the ordinary requirements of mathematical physics. The -total energy, according to one of these ways, would satisfy the quantum -condition; so that it consists of an integral number of units or cents, -which are such that the cent of energy of any primate is proportional to -its frequency. I have not worked out the conditions for stability or for -a stable association. I have mentioned the particular hypothesis by way -of showing by example that the organic theory of nature affords -possibilities for the reconsideration of ultimate physical laws, which -are not open to the opposed materialistic theory. - -In this particular hypothesis of vibratory primates, the Maxwellian -equations are supposed to hold throughout all space, including the -interior of a proton. They express the laws governing the vibratory -production and absorption of energy. The whole process for each primate -issues in a certain average energy characteristic of the primate, and -proportional to its mass. In fact the energy is the mass. There are -vibratory radial streams of energy, both without and within a primate. -Within the primate, there are vibratory distributions of electric -density. On the materialistic theory such density marks the presence of -material: on the organic theory of vibration, it marks the vibratory -production of energy. Such production is restricted to the interior of -the primate. - -All science must start with some assumptions as to the ultimate analysis -of the facts with which it deals. These assumptions are justified partly -by their adherence to the types of occurrence of which we are directly -conscious, and partly by their success in representing the observed -facts with a certain generality, devoid of _ad hoc_ suppositions. The -general theory of the vibration of primates, which I have outlined, is -merely given as an example of the sort of possibilities which the -organic theory leaves open for physical science. The point is that it -adds the possibility of organic deformation to that of mere locomotion. -Light waves form one great example of organic deformation. - -At any epoch the assumptions of a science are giving way, when they -exhibit symptoms of the epicyclic state from which astronomy was rescued -in the sixteenth century. Physical science is now exhibiting such -symptoms. In order to reconsider its foundations, it must recur to a -more concrete view of the character of real things, and must conceive -its fundamental notions as abstractions derived from this direct -intuition. It is in this way that it surveys the general possibilities -of revision which are open to it. - -The discontinuities introduced by the quantum theory require revision of -physical concepts in order to meet them. In particular, it has been -pointed out that some theory of discontinuous existence is required. -What is asked from such a theory, is that an orbit of an electron can be -regarded as a series of detached positions, and not as a continuous -line. - -The theory of a primate or a vibrating pattern, given above, together -with the distinction between temporality and extensiveness in the -previous chapter, yields exactly this result. It will be remembered that -the continuity of the complex of events arises from the relationships of -extensiveness; whereas the temporality arises from the realisation in a -subject-event of a pattern which requires for its display that the whole -of a duration be spatialised (_i.e._, arrested), as given by its aspects -in the event. Thus realization proceeds _viâ_ a succession of epochal -durations; and the continuous transition, _i.e._, the organic -deformation, is within the duration which is already given. The -vibratory organic deformation is in fact the reiteration of the pattern. -One complete period defines the duration required for the complete -pattern. Thus the primate is realised atomically in a succession of -durations, each duration to be measured from one maximum to another. -Accordingly, so far as the primate as one enduring whole entity is to be -taken account of, it is to be assigned to these durations successively. -If it is considered as one thing, its orbit is to be diagrammatically -exhibited by a series of detached dots. Thus the locomotion of the -primate is discontinuous in space and time. If we go below the quanta of -time which are the successive vibratory periods of the primate, we find -a succession of vibratory electromagnetic fields, each stationary in the -space-time of its own duration. Each of these fields exhibits a single -complete period of the electromagnetic vibration which constitutes the -primate. This vibration is not to be thought of as the becoming of -reality; it is what the primate is in one of its discontinuous -realisations. Also the successive durations in which the primate is -realised are contiguous; it follows that the life history of the primate -can be exhibited as being the continuous development of occurrences in -the electromagnetic field. But these occurrences enter into realisation -as whole atomic blocks, occupying definite periods of time. - -There is no need to conceive that time is atomic in the sense that all -patterns must be realised in the same successive durations. In the first -place, even if the periods were the same in the case of two primates, -the durations of realisation may not be the same. In other words, the -two primates may be out of phase. Also if the periods are different, the -atomism of any one duration of one primate is necessarily subdivided by -the boundary moments of durations of the other primate. - -The laws of the locomotion of primates express under what conditions any -primate will change its space-time system. - -It is unnecessary to pursue this conception further. The justification -of the concept of vibratory existence must be purely experimental. The -point illustrated by this example is that the cosmological outlook, -which is here adopted, is perfectly consistent with the demands for -discontinuity which have been urged from the side of physics. Also if -this concept of temporalisation as a successive realisation of epochal -durations be adopted, the difficulty of Zeno is evaded. The particular -form, which has been given here to this concept, is purely for that -purpose of illustration and must necessarily require recasting before it -can be adapted to the results of experimental physics. - - - - - CHAPTER IX - - SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY - - -In the present lecture, it is my object to consider some reactions of -science upon the stream of philosophic thought during the modern -centuries with which we are concerned. I shall make no attempt to -compress a history of modern philosophy within the limits of one -lecture. We shall merely consider some contacts between science and -philosophy, in so far as they lie within the scheme of thought which it -is the purpose of these lectures to develop. For this reason the whole -of the great German idealistic movement will be ignored, as being out of -effective touch with its contemporary science so far as reciprocal -modification of concepts is concerned. Kant, from whom this movement -took its rise, was saturated with Newtonian physics, and with the ideas -of the great French physicists—such as Clairaut,[11] for instance—who -developed the Newtonian ideas. But the philosophers who developed the -Kantian school of thought, or who transformed it into Hegelianism, -either lacked Kant’s background of scientific knowledge, or lacked his -potentiality of becoming a great physicist if philosophy had not -absorbed his main energies. - -Footnote 11: - - _Cf._ the curious evidence of Kant’s scientific reading in the - _Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic, Second Analogy of - Experience_, where he refers to the phenomenon of capillary action. - This is an unnecessarily complex illustration; a book resting on a - table would have equally well sufficed. But the subject had just been - adequately treated for the first time by Clairaut in an appendix to - his _Figure of the Earth_. Kant evidently had read this appendix, and - his mind was full of it. - -The origin of modern philosophy is analogous to that of science, and is -contemporaneous. The general trend of its development was settled in the -seventeenth century, partly at the hands of the same men who established -the scientific principles. This settlement of purpose followed upon a -transitional period dating from the fifteenth century. There was in fact -a general movement of European mentality, which carried along with its -stream, religion, science and philosophy. It may shortly be -characterised as being the direct recurrence to the original sources of -Greek inspiration on the part of men whose spiritual shape had been -derived from inheritance from the Middle Ages. There was therefore no -revival of Greek mentality. Epochs do not rise from the dead. The -principles of aesthetics and of reason, which animated the Greek -civilisation, were reclothed in a modern mentality. Between the two -there lay other religions, other systems of law, other anarchies, and -other racial inheritances, dividing the living from the dead. - -Philosophy is peculiarly sensitive to such differences. For, whereas you -can make a replica of an ancient statue, there is no possible replica of -an ancient state of mind. There can be no nearer approximation than that -which a masquerade bears to real life. There may be understanding of the -past, but there is a difference between the modern and the ancient -reactions to the same stimuli. - -In the particular case of philosophy, the distinction in tonality lies -on the surface. Modern philosophy is tinged with subjectivism, as -against the objective attitude of the ancients. The same change is to be -seen in religion. In the early history of the Christian Church, the -theological interest centred in discussions on the nature of God, the -meaning of the Incarnation, and apocalyptic forecasts of the ultimate -fate of the world. At the Reformation, the Church was torn asunder by -dissension as to the individual experiences of believers in respect to -justification. The individual subject of experience had been substituted -for the total drama of all reality. Luther asked, ‘How am I justified?’; -modern philosophers have asked, ‘How do I have knowledge?’ The emphasis -lies upon the subject of experience. This change of standpoint is the -work of Christianity in its pastoral aspect of shepherding the company -of believers. For century after century it insisted upon the infinite -worth of the individual human soul. Accordingly, to the instinctive -egotism of physical desires, it has superadded an instinctive feeling of -justification for an egotism of intellectual outlook. Every human being -is the natural guardian of his own importance. Without a doubt, this -modern direction of attention emphasises truths of the highest value. -For example, in the field of practical life, it has abolished slavery, -and has impressed upon the popular imagination the primary rights of -mankind. - -Descartes, in his _Discourse on Method_, and in his _Meditations_, -discloses with great clearness the general conceptions which have since -influenced modern philosophy. There is a subject receiving experience: -in the _Discourse_ this subject is always mentioned in the first person, -that is to say, as being Descartes himself. Descartes starts with -himself as being a mentality, which in virtue of its consciousness of -its own inherent presentations of sense and of thought, is thereby -conscious of its own existence as a unit entity. The subsequent history -of philosophy revolves round the Cartesian formulation of the primary -datum. The ancient world takes its stand upon the drama of the Universe, -the modern world upon the inward drama of the Soul. Descartes, in his -_Meditations_, expressly grounds the existence of this inward drama upon -the possibility of error. There may be no correspondence with objective -fact, and thus there must be a soul with activities whose reality is -purely derivative from itself. For example, here is a quotation[12] from -_Meditation II_: “But it will be said that these presentations are -false, and that I am dreaming. Let it be so. At all events it is certain -that I seem to see light, hear a noise, and feel heat; this cannot be -false, and this is what in me is properly called perceiving (sentire), -which is nothing else than thinking. From this I begin to know what I am -with somewhat greater clearness and distinctness than heretofore.” Again -in _Meditation III_: “...; for, as I before remarked, although the -things which I perceive or imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from -me, I am nevertheless assured that those modes of consciousness which I -call perceptions and imaginations, in as far only as they are modes of -consciousness, exist in me.” - -Footnote 12: - - Quoted from Veitch’s translation. - -The objectivism of the medieval and the ancient worlds passed over into -science. Nature is there conceived as for itself, with its own mutual -reactions. Under the recent influence of relativity, there has been a -tendency towards subjectivist formulations. But, apart from this recent -exception, nature, in scientific thought, has had its laws formulated -without any reference to dependence on individual observers. There is, -however, this difference between the older and the later attitudes -towards science. The anti-rationalism of the moderns has checked any -attempt to harmonise the ultimate concepts of science with ideas drawn -from a more concrete survey of the whole of reality. The material, the -space, the time, the various laws concerning the transition of material -configurations, are taken as ultimate stubborn facts, not to be tampered -with. - -The effect of this antagonism to philosophy has been equally unfortunate -both for philosophy and for science. In this lecture we are concerned -with philosophy. Philosophers are rationalists. They are seeking to go -behind stubborn and irreducible facts: they wish to explain in the light -of universal principles the mutual reference between the various details -entering into the flux of things. Also, they seek such principles as -will eliminate mere arbitrariness; so that, whatever portion of fact is -assumed or given, the existence of the remainder of things shall satisfy -some demand of rationality. They demand meaning. In the words of Henry -Sidgwick[13]—“It is the primary aim of philosophy to unify completely, -bring into clear coherence, all departments of rational thought, and -this aim cannot be realised by any philosophy that leaves out of its -view the important body of judgments and reasonings which form the -subject matter of ethics.” Accordingly, the bias towards history on the -part of the physical and social sciences with their refusal to -rationalise below some ultimate mechanism, has pushed philosophy out of -the effective currents of modern life. It has lost its proper rôle as a -constant critic of partial formulations. It has retreated into the -subjectivist sphere of mind, by reason of its expulsion by science from -the objectivist sphere of matter. Thus the evolution of thought in the -seventeenth century coöperated with the enhanced sense of individual -personality derived from the Middle Ages. We see Descartes taking his -stand upon his own ultimate mind, which his philosophy assures him of; -and asking about its relations to the ultimate matter—exemplified, in -the second _Meditation_, by the human body and a lump of wax—which his -science assumes. There is Aaron’s rod, and the magicians’ serpents; and -the only question for philosophy is, which swallows which; or whether, -as Descartes thought, they all lived happily together. In this stream of -thought are to be found Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant. Two great names lie -outside this list, Spinoza and Leibniz. But there is a certain isolation -of both of them in respect to their philosophical influence so far as -science is concerned; as though they had strayed to extremes which lie -outside the boundaries of safe philosophy, Spinoza by retaining older -ways of thought, and Leibniz by the novelty of his monads. - -Footnote 13: - - _Cf._ _Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir_, Appendix I. - -The history of philosophy runs curiously parallel to that of science. In -the case of both, the seventeenth century set the stage for its two -successors. But with the twentieth century a new act commences. It is an -exaggeration to attribute a general change in a climate of thought to -any one piece of writing, or to any one author. No doubt Descartes only -expressed definitely and in decisive form what was already in the air of -his period. Analogously, in attributing to William James the -inauguration of a new stage in philosophy, we should be neglecting other -influences of his time. But, admitting this, there still remains a -certain fitness in contrasting his essay, _Does Consciousness Exist_, -published in 1904, with Descartes’ _Discourse on Method_, published in -1637. James clears the stage of the old paraphernalia; or rather he -entirely alters its lighting. Take for example these two sentences from -his essay: “To deny plumply that ‘consciousness’ exists seems so absurd -on the face of it—for undeniably ‘thoughts’ do exist—that I fear some -readers will follow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that -I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist -most emphatically that it does stand for a function.” - -The scientific materialism and the Cartesian Ego were both challenged at -the same moment, one by science and the other by philosophy, as -represented by William James with his psychological antecedents; and the -double challenge marks the end of a period which lasted for about two -hundred and fifty years. Of course, ‘matter’ and ‘consciousness’ both -express something so evident in ordinary experience that any philosophy -must provide some things which answer to their respective meanings. But -the point is that, in respect to both of them, the seventeenth century -settlement was infected with a presupposition which is now challenged. -James denies that consciousness is an entity, but admits that it is a -function. The discrimination between an entity and a function is -therefore vital to the understanding of the challenge which James is -advancing against the older modes of thought. In the essay in question, -the character which James assigns to consciousness is fully discussed. -But he does not unambiguously explain what he means by the notion of an -entity, which he refuses to apply to consciousness. In the sentence -which immediately follows the one which I have already quoted, he says: - -“There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted -with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts -of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts -perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is -invoked. That function is _knowing_. ‘Consciousness’ is supposed -necessary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get -reported, are known.” - -Thus James is denying that consciousness is a ‘stuff.’ - -The term ‘entity,’ or even that of ‘stuff,’ does not fully tell its own -tale. The notion of ‘entity’ is so general that it may be taken to mean -anything that can be thought about. You cannot think of mere nothing; -and the something which is an object of thought may be called an entity. -In this sense, a function is an entity. Obviously, this is not what -James had in his mind. - -In agreement with the organic theory of nature which I have been -tentatively putting forward in these lectures, I shall for my own -purposes construe James as denying exactly what Descartes asserts in his -_Discourse_ and his _Meditations_. Descartes discriminates two species -of entities, _matter_ and _soul_. The essence of matter is spatial -extension; the essence of soul is its cogitation, in the full sense -which Descartes assigns to the word ‘_cogitare_.’ For example, in -Section Fifty-three of Part I of his _Principles of Philosophy_, he -enunciates: “That of every substance there is one principal attribute, -as thinking of the mind, extension of the body.” In the earlier, -Fifty-first Section, Descartes states: “By substance we can conceive -nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need -of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence.” Furthermore, later -on, Descartes says: “For example, because any substance which ceases to -endure ceases also to exist, duration is not distinct from substance -except in thought;....” Thus we conclude that, for Descartes, minds and -bodies exist in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond -themselves individually (God only excepted, as being the foundation of -all things); that both minds and bodies endure, because without -endurance they would cease to exist; that spatial extension is the -essential attribute of bodies; and that cogitation is the essential -attribute of minds. - -It is difficult to praise too highly the genius exhibited by Descartes -in the complete sections of his _Principles_ which deal with these -questions. It is worthy of the century in which he writes, and of the -clearness of the French intellect. Descartes in his distinction between -time and duration, and in his way of grounding time upon motion, and in -his close relation between matter and extension, anticipates, as far as -it was possible at his epoch, modern notions suggested by the doctrine -of relativity, or by some aspects of Bergson’s doctrine of the -generation of things. But the fundamental principles are so set out as -to presuppose independently existing substances with simple location in -a community of temporal durations, and, in the case of bodies, with -simple location in the community of spatial extensions. Those principles -lead straight to the theory of a materialistic, mechanistic nature, -surveyed by cogitating minds. After the close of the seventeenth -century, science took charge of the materialistic nature, and philosophy -took charge of the cogitating minds. Some schools of philosophy admitted -an ultimate dualism; and the various idealistic schools claimed that -nature was merely the chief example of the cogitations of minds. But all -schools admitted the Cartesian analysis of the ultimate elements of -nature. I am excluding Spinoza and Leibniz from these statements as to -the main stream of modern philosophy, as derivative from Descartes; -though of course they were influenced by him, and in their turn -influenced philosophers. I am thinking mainly of the effective contacts -between science and philosophy. - -This division of territory between science and philosophy was not a -simple business; and in fact it illustrated the weakness of the whole -cut-and-dried presupposition upon which it rested. We are aware of -nature as an interplay of bodies, colours, sounds, scents, tastes, -touches and other various bodily feelings, displayed as in space, in -patterns of mutual separation by intervening volumes, and of individual -shape. Also the whole is a flux, changing with the lapse of time. This -systematic totality is disclosed to us as one complex of things. But the -seventeenth century dualism cuts straight across it. The objective world -of science was confined to mere spatial material with simple location in -space and time, and subjected to definite rules as to its locomotion. -The subjective world of philosophy annexed the colours, sounds, scents, -tastes, touches, bodily feelings, as forming the subjective content of -the cogitations of the individual minds. Both worlds shared in the -general flux; but time, as measured, is assigned by Descartes to the -cogitations of the observer’s mind. There is obviously one fatal -weakness to this scheme. The cogitations of mind exhibit themselves as -holding up entities, such as colours for instance, before the mind as -the termini of contemplation. But in this theory these colours are, -after all, merely the furniture of the mind. Accordingly, the mind seems -to be confined to its own private world of cogitations. The -subject-object conformation of experience in its entirety lies within -the mind as one of its private passions. This conclusion from the -Cartesian data is the starting point from which Berkeley, Hume, and Kant -developed their respective systems. And, antecedently to them, it was -the point upon which Locke concentrated as being the vital question. -Thus the question as to how any knowledge is obtained of the truly -objective world of science becomes a problem of the first magnitude. -Descartes states that the objective body is perceived by the intellect. -He says (_Meditation II_): “I must, therefore, admit that I cannot even -comprehend by imagination what the piece of wax is, and that it is the -mind alone which perceives it. I speak of one piece in particular; for, -as to wax in general, this is still more evident. But what is the piece -of wax that can be perceived only by the mind?... The perception of it -is neither an act of sight, of touch, nor of imagination, and never was -either of these, though it might formerly seem so, but is simply an -_intuition_ (_inspectio_) of the mind,....” It must be noted that the -Latin word ‘inspectio’ is associated in its classical use with the -notion of theory as opposed to practice. - -The two great preoccupations of modern philosophy now lie clearly before -us. The study of mind divides into psychology, or the study of mental -functionings as considered in themselves and in their mutual relations, -and into epistemology, or the theory of the knowledge of a common -objective world. In other words, there is the study of the cogitations, -_quâ_ passions of the mind, and their study _quâ_ leading to an -inspection (_intuition_) of an objective world. This is a very uneasy -division, giving rise to a host of perplexities whose consideration has -occupied the intervening centuries. - -As long as men thought in terms of physical notions for the objective -world and of mentality for the subjective world, the setting out of the -problem, as achieved by Descartes, sufficed as a starting point. But the -balance has been upset by the rise of physiology. In the seventeenth -century men passed from the study of physics to the study of philosophy. -Towards the end of the nineteenth century, notably in Germany, men -passed from the study of physiology to the study of psychology. The -change in tone has been decisive. Of course, in the earlier period the -intervention of the human body was fully considered, for example, by -Descartes in Part V of the ‘_Discourse on Method_.’ But the -physiological instinct had not been developed. In considering the human -body, Descartes thought with the outfit of a physicist; whereas the -modern psychologists are clothed with the mentalities of medical -physiologists. The career of William James is an example of this change -in standpoint. He also possessed the clear, incisive genius which could -state in a flash the exact point at issue. - -The reason why I have put Descartes and James in close juxtaposition is -now evident. Neither philosopher finished an epoch by a final solution -of a problem. Their great merit is of the opposite sort. They each of -them open an epoch by their clear formulation of terms in which thought -could profitably express itself at particular stages of knowledge, one -for the seventeenth century, the other for the twentieth century. In -this respect, they are both to be contrasted with St. Thomas Aquinas, -who expressed the culmination of Aristotelian scholasticism. - -In many ways neither Descartes nor James were the most characteristic -philosophers of their respective epochs. I should be disposed to ascribe -these positions to Locke and to Bergson respectively, at least so far as -concerns their relations to the science of their times. Locke developed -the lines of thought which kept philosophy on the move; for example he -emphasized the appeal to psychology. He initiated the age of -epoch-making enquiries into urgent problems of limited scope. -Undoubtedly, in so doing, he infected philosophy with something of the -anti-rationalism of science. But the very groundwork of a fruitful -methodology is to start from those clear postulates which must be held -to be ultimate so far as concerns the occasion in question. The -criticism of such methodological postulates is thus reserved for another -opportunity. Locke discovered that the philosophical situation -bequeathed by Descartes involved the problems of epistemology and -psychology. - -Bergson introduced into philosophy the organic conceptions of -physiological science. He has most completely moved away from the static -materialism of the seventeenth century. His protest against -spatialisation is a protest against taking the Newtonian conception of -nature as being anything except a high abstraction. His so-called -anti-intellectualism should be construed in this sense. In some respects -he recurs to Descartes; but the recurrence is accompanied with an -instinctive grasp of modern biology. - -There is another reason for associating Locke and Bergson. The germ of -an organic theory of nature is to be found in Locke. His most recent -expositor, Professor Gibson,[14] states that Locke’s way of conceiving -the identity of self-consciousness ‘like that of a living organism, -involves a genuine transcending of the mechanical view of nature and of -mind, embodied in the composition theory.’ But it is to be noticed that -in the first place Locke wavers in his grasp of this position; and in -the second place, what is more important still, he only applies his idea -to self-consciousness. The physiological attitude has not yet -established itself. The effect of physiology was to put mind back into -nature. The neurologist traces first the effect of stimuli along the -bodily nerves, then integration at nerve centres, and finally the rise -of a projective reference beyond the body with a resulting motor -efficacy in renewed nervous excitement. In biochemistry, the delicate -adjustment of the chemical composition of the parts to the preservation -of the whole organism is detected. Thus the mental cognition is seen as -the reflective experience of a totality, reporting for itself what it is -in itself as one unit occurrence. This unit is the integration of the -sum of its partial happenings, but it is not their numerical aggregate. -It has its own unity as an event. This total unity, considered as an -entity for its own sake, is the prehension into unity of the patterned -aspects of the universe of events. Its knowledge of itself arises from -its own relevance to the things of which it prehends the aspects. It -knows the world as a system of mutual relevance, and thus sees itself as -mirrored in other things. These other things include more especially the -various parts of its own body. - -Footnote 14: - - _Cf._ his book, _Locke’s Theory of Knowledge and its Historical - Relations_, Camb. Univ. Press, 1917. - -It is important to discriminate the bodily pattern, which endures, from -the bodily event, which is pervaded by the enduring pattern, and from -the parts of the bodily event. The parts of the bodily event are -themselves pervaded by their own enduring patterns, which form elements -in the bodily pattern. The parts of the body are really portions of the -environment of the total bodily event, but so related that their mutual -aspects, each in the other, are peculiarly effective in modifying the -pattern of either. This arises from the intimate character of the -relation of whole to part. Thus the body is a portion of the environment -for the part, and the part is a portion of the environment for the body; -only they are peculiarly sensitive, each to modifications of the other. -This sensitiveness is so arranged that the part adjusts itself to -preserve the stability of the pattern of the body. It is a particular -example of the favourable environment shielding the organism. The -relation of part to whole has the special reciprocity associated with -the notion of organism, in which the part is for the whole; but this -relation reigns throughout nature and does not start with the special -case of the higher organisms. - -Further, viewing the question as a matter of chemistry, there is no need -to construe the actions of each molecule in a living body by its -exclusive particular reference to the pattern of the complete living -organism. It is true that each molecule is affected by the aspect of -this pattern as mirrored in it, so as to be otherwise than what it would -have been if placed elsewhere. In the same way, under some circumstances -an electron may be a sphere, and under other circumstances an egg-shaped -volume. The mode of approach to the problem, so far as science is -concerned, is merely to ask if molecules exhibit in living bodies -properties which are not to be observed amid inorganic surroundings. In -the same way, in a magnetic field soft iron exhibits magnetic properties -which are in abeyance elsewhere. The prompt self-preservative actions of -living bodies, and our experience of the physical actions of our bodies -following the determinations of will, suggest the modification of -molecules in the body as the result of the total pattern. It seems -possible that there may be physical laws expressing the modification of -the ultimate basic organisms when they form part of higher organisms -with adequate compactness of pattern. It would, however, be entirely in -consonance with the empirically observed action of environments, if the -direct effects of aspects as between the whole body and its parts were -negligible. We should expect transmission. In this way the modification -of total pattern would transmit itself by means of a series of -modifications of a descending series of parts, so that finally the -modification of the cell changes its aspect in the molecule, thus -effecting a corresponding alteration in the molecule,—or in some subtler -entity. Thus the question for physiology is the question of the physics -of molecules in cells of different characters. - -We can now see the relation of psychology to physiology and to physics. -The private psychological field is merely the event considered from its -own standpoint. The unity of this field is the unity of the event. But -it is the event as one entity, and not the event as a sum of parts. The -relations of the parts, to each other and to the whole, are their -aspects, each in the other. A body for an external observer is the -aggregate of the aspects for him of the body as a whole, and also of the -body as a sum of parts. For the external observer the aspects of shape -and of sense-objects are dominant, at least for cognition. But we must -also allow for the possibility that we can detect in ourselves direct -aspects of the mentalities of higher organisms. The claim that the -cognition of alien mentalities must necessarily be by means of indirect -inferences from aspects of shape and of sense-objects is wholly -unwarranted by this philosophy of organism. The fundamental principle is -that whatever merges into actuality, implants its aspects in every -individual event. - -Further, even for self-cognition, the aspects of the parts of our own -bodies partly take the form of aspects of shape, and of sense-objects. -But that part of the bodily event, in respect to which the cognitive -mentality is associated, is for itself the unit psychological field. Its -ingredients are not referent to the event itself; they are aspects of -what lies beyond that event. Thus the self-knowledge inherent in the -bodily event is the knowledge of itself as a complex unity, whose -ingredients involve all reality beyond itself, restricted under the -limitation of its pattern of aspects. Thus we know ourselves as a -function of unification of a plurality of things which are other than -ourselves. Cognition discloses an event as being an activity, organising -a real togetherness of alien things. But this psychological field does -not depend on its cognition; so that this field is still a unit event as -abstracted from its self-cognition. - -Accordingly, consciousness will be the function of knowing. But what is -known is already a prehension of aspects of the one real universe. These -aspects are aspects of other events as mutually modifying, each the -others. In the pattern of aspects they stand in their pattern of mutual -relatedness. - -The aboriginal data in terms of which the pattern weaves itself are the -aspects of shapes, of sense-objects, and of other eternal objects whose -self-identity is not dependent on the flux of things. Wherever such -objects have ingression into the general flux, they interpret events, -each to the other. They are here in the perceiver; but, as perceived by -him, they convey for him something of the total flux which is beyond -himself. The subject-object relation takes its origin in the double rôle -of these eternal objects. They are modifications of the subject, but -only in their character of conveying aspects of other subjects in the -community of the universe. Thus no individual subject can have -independent reality, since it is a prehension of limited aspects of -subjects other than itself. - -The technical phrase ‘subject-object’ is a bad term for the fundamental -situation disclosed in experience. It is really reminiscent of the -Aristotelian ‘subject-predicate.’ It already presupposes the -metaphysical doctrine of diverse subjects qualified by their private -predicates. This is the doctrine of subjects with private worlds of -experience. If this be granted, there is no escape from solipsism. The -point is that the phrase ‘subject-object’ indicates a fundamental entity -underlying the objects. Thus the ‘objects,’ as thus conceived, are -merely the ghosts of Aristotelian predicates. The primary situation -disclosed in cognitive experience is ‘ego-object amid objects.’ By this -I mean that the primary fact is an impartial world transcending the -‘here-now’ which marks the ego-object, and transcending the ‘now’ which -is the spatial world of simultaneous realisation. It is a world also -including the actuality of the past, and the limited potentiality of the -future, together with the complete world of abstract potentiality, the -realm of eternal objects, which transcends, and finds exemplification in -and comparison with, the actual course of realisation. The ego-object, -as consciousness here-now, is conscious of its experient essence as -constituted by its internal relatedness to the world of realities, and -to the world of ideas. But the ego-object, in being thus constituted, is -within the world of realities, and exhibits itself as an organism -requiring the ingression of ideas for the purpose of this status among -realities. This question of consciousness must be reserved for treatment -on another occasion. - -The point to be made for the purposes of the present discussion is that -a philosophy of nature as organic must start at the opposite end to that -requisite for a materialistic philosophy. The materialistic starting -point is from independently existing substances, matter and mind. The -matter suffers modifications of its external relations of locomotion, -and the mind suffers modifications of its contemplated objects. There -are, in this materialistic theory, two sorts of independent substances, -each qualified by their appropriate passions. The organic starting point -is from the analysis of process as the realisation of events disposed in -an interlocked community. The event is the unit of things real. The -emergent enduring pattern is the stabilisation of the emergent -achievement so as to become a fact which retains its identity throughout -the process. It will be noted that endurance is not primarily the -property of enduring beyond itself, but of enduring within itself. I -mean that endurance is the property of finding its pattern reproduced in -the temporal parts of the total event. It is in this sense that a total -event carries an enduring pattern. There is an intrinsic value identical -for the whole and for its succession of parts. Cognition is the -emergence, into some measure of individualised reality, of the general -substratum of activity, poising before itself possibility, actuality, -and purpose. - -It is equally possible to arrive at this organic conception of the world -if we start from the fundamental notions of modern physics, instead of, -as above, from psychology and physiology. In fact by reason of my own -studies in mathematics and mathematical physics, I did in fact arrive at -my convictions in this way. Mathematical physics presumes in the first -place an electromagnetic field of activity pervading space and time. The -laws which condition this field are nothing else than the conditions -observed by the general activity of the flux of the world, as it -individualises itself in the events. In physics, there is an -abstraction. The science ignores what anything is in itself. Its -entities are merely considered in respect to their extrinsic reality, -that is to say, in respect to their aspects in other things. But the -abstraction reaches even further than that; for it is only the aspects -in other things, as modifying the spatio-temporal specifications of the -life histories of those other things, which count. The intrinsic reality -of the observer comes in: I mean what the observer is for himself is -appealed to. For example, the fact that he will see red or blue enters -into scientific statements. But the red which the observer sees does not -in truth enter into science. What is relevant is merely the bare -diversity of the observer’s red experiences from all of his other -experiences. Accordingly, the intrinsic character of the observer is -merely relevant in order to fix the self-identical individuality of the -physical entities. These entities are only considered as agencies in -fixing the routes in space and in time of the life histories of enduring -entities. - -The phraseology of physics is derived from the materialistic ideas of -the seventeenth century. But we find that, even in its extreme -abstraction, what it is really presupposing is the organic theory of -aspects as explained above. First, consider any event in empty space -where the word ‘empty’ means devoid of electrons, or protons, or of any -other form of electric charge. Such an event has three rôles in physics. -In the first place, it is the actual scene of an adventure of energy, -either as its _habitat_ or as the locus of a particular stream of -energy: anyhow, in this rôle the energy is there, either as located in -space during the time considered, or as streaming through space. - -In its second rôle, the event is a necessary link in the pattern of -transmission, by which the character of every event receives some -modification from the character of every other event. - -In its third rôle, the event is the repository of a possibility, as to -what would happen to an electric charge, either by way of deformation or -of locomotion, if it should have happened to be there. - -If we modify our assumption by considering an event which includes in -itself a portion of the life-history of an electric charge, then the -analysis of its three rôles still remains; except that the possibility -embodied in the third rôle is now transformed into an actuality. In this -replacement of possibility by actuality, we obtain the distinction -between empty and occupied events. - -Recurring to the empty events, we note the deficiency in them of -individuality of intrinsic content. Considering the first rôle of an -empty event, as being a _habitat_ of energy, we note that there is no -individual discrimination of an individual bit of energy, either as -statically located, or as an element in the stream. There is simply a -quantitative determination of activity, without individualisation of the -activity in itself. This lack of individualisation is still more evident -in the second and third rôles. An empty event is something in itself, -but it fails to realise a stable individuality of content. So far as its -content is concerned, the empty event is one realised element in a -general scheme of organised activity. - -Some qualification is required when the empty event is the scene of the -transmission of a definite train of recurrent wave-forms. There is now a -definite pattern which remains permanent in the event. We find here the -first faint trace of enduring individuality. But it is individuality -without the faintest capture of originality: for it is merely a -permanence arising solely from the implication of the event in a larger -scheme of patterning. - -Turning now to the examination of an occupied event, the electron has a -determinate individuality. It can be traced throughout its life-history -through a variety of events. A collection of electrons, together with -the analogous atomic charges of positive electricity, forms a body such -as we ordinarily perceive. The simplest body of this kind is a molecule, -and a set of molecules forms a lump of ordinary matter, such as a chair, -or a stone. Thus a charge of electricity is the mark of individuality of -content, as additional to the individuality of an event in itself. This -individuality of content is the strong point of the materialistic -doctrine. - -It can, however, be equally well explained on the theory of organism. -When we look into the function of the electric charge, we note that its -rôle is to mark the origination of a pattern which is transmitted -through space and time. It is the key of some particular pattern. For -example, the field of force in any event is to be constructed by -attention to the adventures of electrons and protons, and so also are -the streams and distributions of energy. Further, the electric waves -find their origin in the vibratory adventures of these charges. Thus the -transmitted pattern is to be conceived as the flux of aspects throughout -space and time derived from the life history of the atomic charge. The -individualisation of the charge arises by a conjunction of two -characters, in the first place by the continued identity of its mode of -functioning as a key for the determination of a diffusion of pattern; -and, in the second place, by the unity and continuity of its life -history. - -We may conclude, therefore, that the organic theory represents directly -what physics actually does assume respecting its ultimate entities. We -also notice the complete futility of these entities, if they are -conceived as fully concrete individuals. So far as physics is concerned, -they are wholly occupied in moving each other about, and they have no -reality outside this function. In particular for physics, there is no -intrinsic reality. - -It is obvious that the basing of philosophy upon the presupposition of -organism must be traced back to Leibniz.[15] His monads are for him the -ultimately real entities. But he retained the Cartesian substances with -their qualifying passions, as also equally expressing for him the final -characterisation of real things. Accordingly for him there was no -concrete reality of internal relations. He had therefore on his hands -two distinct points of view. One was that the final real entity is an -organising activity, fusing ingredients into a unity, so that this unity -is the reality. The other point of view is that the final real entities -are substances supporting qualities. The first point of view depends -upon the acceptance of internal relations binding together all reality. -The latter is inconsistent with the reality of such relations. To -combine these two points of view, his monads were therefore windowless; -and their passions merely mirrored the universe by the divine -arrangement of a preëstablished harmony. This system thus presupposed an -aggregate of independent entities. He did not discriminate the event, as -the unit of experience, from the enduring organism as its stabilisation -into importance, and from the cognitive organism as expressing an -increased completeness of individualisation. Nor did he admit the -many-termed relations, relating sense-data to various events in diverse -ways. These many-termed relations are in fact the perspectives which -Leibniz does admit, but only on the condition that they are purely -qualities of the organising monads. The difficulty really arises from -the unquestioned acceptance of the notion of simple location as -fundamental for space and time, and from the acceptance of the notion of -independent individual substance as fundamental for a real entity. The -only road open to Leibniz was thus the same as that later taken by -Berkeley [in a prevalent interpretation of his meaning], namely an -appeal to a _Deux ex machinâ_ who was capable of rising superior to the -difficulties of metaphysics. - -Footnote 15: - - _Cf._ Bertrand Russell, _The Philosophy of Leibniz_, for the - suggestion of this line of thought. - -In the same way as Descartes introduced the tradition of thought which -kept subsequent philosophy in some measure of contact with the -scientific movement, so Leibniz introduced the alternative tradition -that the entities, which are the ultimate actual things, are in some -sense procedures of organisation. This tradition has been the foundation -of the great achievements of German philosophy. Kant reflected the two -traditions, one upon the other. Kant was a scientist, but the schools -derivative from Kant have had but slight effect on the mentality of the -scientific world. It should be the task of the philosophical schools of -this century to bring together the two streams into an expression of the -world-picture derived from science, and thereby end the divorce of -science from the affirmations of our aesthetic and ethical experiences. - - - - - CHAPTER X - - ABSTRACTION - - -In the previous chapters I have been examining the reactions of the -scientific movement upon the deeper issues which have occupied modern -thinkers. No one man, no limited society of men, and no one epoch can -think of everything at once. Accordingly for the sake of eliciting the -various impacts of science upon thought, the topic has been treated -historically. In this retrospect I have kept in mind that the ultimate -issue of the whole story is the patent dissolution of the comfortable -scheme of scientific materialism which has dominated the three centuries -under review. Accordingly various schools of criticism of the dominant -opinions have been stressed; and I have endeavoured to outline an -alternative cosmological doctrine, which shall be wide enough to include -what is fundamental both for science and for its critics. In this -alternative scheme, the notion of material, as fundamental, has been -replaced by that of organic synthesis. But the approach has always been -from the consideration of the actual intricacies of scientific thought, -and of the peculiar perplexities which it suggests. - -In the present chapter, and in the immediately succeeding chapter, we -will forget the peculiar problems of modern science, and will put -ourselves at the standpoint of a dispassionate consideration of the -nature of things, antecedently to any special investigation into their -details. Such a standpoint is termed ‘metaphysical.’ Accordingly those -readers who find metaphysics, even in two slight chapters, irksome, will -do well to proceed at once to the Chapter on ‘Religion and Science,’ -which resumes the topic of the impact of science on modern thought. - -These metaphysical chapters are purely descriptive. Their justification -is to be sought, (i) in our direct knowledge of the actual occasions -which compose our immediate experience, and (ii) in their success as -forming a basis for harmonising our systematised accounts of various -types of experience, and (iii) in their success as providing the -concepts in terms of which an epistemology can be framed. By (iii) I -mean that an account of the general character of what we know must -enable us to frame an account of how knowledge is possible as an adjunct -within things known. - -In any occasion of cognition, that which is known is an actual occasion -of experience, as diversified[16] by reference to a realm of entities -which transcend that immediate occasion in that they have analogous or -different connections with other occasions of experience. For example a -definite shade of red may, in the immediate occasion, be implicated with -the shape of sphericity in some definite way. But that shade of red, and -that spherical shape, exhibit themselves as transcending that occasion, -in that either of them has other relationships to other occasions. Also, -apart from the actual occurrence of the same things in other occasions, -every actual occasion is set within a realm of alternative -interconnected entities. This realm is disclosed by all the untrue -propositions which can be predicated significantly of that occasion. It -is the realm of alternative suggestions, whose foothold in actuality -transcends each actual occasion. The real relevance of untrue -propositions for each actual occasion is disclosed by art, romance, and -by criticism in reference to ideals. It is the foundation of the -metaphysical position which I am maintaining that the understanding of -actuality requires a reference to ideality. The two realms are -intrinsically inherent in the total metaphysical situation. The truth -that some proposition respecting an actual occasion is untrue may -express the vital truth as to the aesthetic achievement. It expresses -the ‘great refusal’ which is its primary characteristic. An event is -decisive in proportion to the importance (for it) of its untrue -propositions: their relevance to the event cannot be dissociated from -what the event is in itself by way of achievement. These transcendent -entities have been termed ‘universals.’ I prefer to use the term -‘eternal objects,’ in order to disengage myself from presuppositions -which cling to the former term owing to its prolonged philosophical -history. Eternal objects are thus, in their nature, abstract. By -‘abstract’ I mean that what an eternal object is in itself—that is to -say, its essence—is comprehensible without reference to some one -particular occasion of experience. To be abstract is to transcend -particular concrete occasions of actual happening. But to transcend an -actual occasion does not mean being disconnected from it. On the -contrary, I hold that each eternal object has its own proper connection -with each such occasion, which I term its mode of ingression into that -occasion. Thus an eternal object is to be comprehended by acquaintance -with (i) its particular individuality, (ii) its general relationships to -other eternal objects as apt for realisation in actual occasions, and -(iii) the general principle which expresses its ingression in particular -actual occasions. - -Footnote 16: - - _Cf._ my _Principles of Natural Knowledge_, Ch. V, Sec. 13. - -These three headings express two principles. The first principle is that -each eternal object is an individual which, in its own peculiar fashion, -is what it is. This particular individuality is the individual essence -of the object, and cannot be described otherwise than as being itself. -Thus the individual essence is merely the essence considered in respect -to its uniqueness. Further, the essence of an eternal object is merely -the eternal object considered as adding its own unique contribution to -each actual occasion. This unique contribution is identical for all such -occasions in respect to the fact that the object in all modes of -ingression is just its identical self. But it varies from one occasion -to another in respect to the differences of its modes of ingression. -Thus the metaphysical status of an eternal object is that of a -possibility for an actuality. Every actual occasion is defined as to its -character by how these possibilities are actualised for that occasion. -Thus actualisation is a selection among possibilities. More accurately, -it is a selection issuing in a gradation of possibilities in respect to -their realisation in that occasion. This conclusion brings us to the -second metaphysical principle: An eternal object, considered as an -abstract entity, cannot be divorced from its reference to other eternal -objects, and from its reference to actuality generally; though it is -disconnected from its actual modes of ingression into definitive actual -occasions. This principle is expressed by the statement that each -eternal object has a ‘relational essence.’ This relational essence -determines how it is possible for the object to have ingression into -actual occasions. - -In other words: If _A_ be an eternal object, then what _A_ is in itself -involves _A’s_ status in the universe, and _A_ cannot be divorced from -this status. In the essence of _A_ there stands a determinateness as to -the relationships of _A_ to other eternal objects, and an -indeterminateness as to the relationships of _A_ to actual occasions. -Since the relationships of _A_ to other eternal objects stand -determinately in the essence of _A_, it follows that they are internal -relations. I mean by this that these relationships are constitutive of -_A_; for an entity which stands in internal relations has no being as an -entity not in these relations. In other words, once with internal -relations, always with internal relations. The internal relationships of -_A_ conjointly form its significance. - -Again an entity cannot stand in external relations unless in its essence -there stands an indeterminateness which is its patience for such -external relations. The meaning of the term ‘possibility’ as applied to -_A_ is simply that there stands in the essence of _A_ a patience for -relationships to actual occasions. The relationships of _A_ to an actual -occasion are simply how the eternal relationships of _A_ to other -eternal objects are graded as to their realisation in that occasion. - -Thus the general principle which expresses _A’s_ ingression in the -particular actual occasion α is the indeterminateness which stands in -the essence of _A_ as to its ingression into α, and is the -determinateness which stands in the essence of α as to the ingression of -_Α_ into α. Thus the synthetic prehension, which is α, is the solution -of the indeterminateness of _Α_ into the determinateness of α. -Accordingly the relationship between _Α_ and α is external as regards -_Α_, and is internal as regards α. Every actual occasion α is the -solution of all modalities into actual categorical ingressions: truth -and falsehood take the place of possibility. The complete ingression of -_Α_ into α is expressed by all the true propositions which are about -both _Α_ and α, and also—it may be—about other things. - -The determinate relatedness of the eternal object _Α_ to every other -eternal object is how _Α_ is systematically and by the necessity of its -nature related to every other eternal object. Such relatedness -represents a possibility for realisation. But a relationship is a fact -which concerns all the implicated relata, and cannot be isolated as if -involving only one of the relata. Accordingly there is a general fact of -systematic mutual relatedness which is inherent in the character of -possibility. The realm of eternal objects is properly described as a -‘realm,’ because each eternal object has its status in this general -systematic complex of mutual relatedness. - -In respect to the ingression of _Α_ into an actual occasion α, the -mutual relationships of _Α_ to other eternal objects, as thus graded in -realisation, require for their expression a reference to the status of -_Α_ and of the other eternal objects in the spatio-temporal -relationship. Also this status is not expressible (for this purpose) -without a reference to the status of α and of other actual occasions in -the same spatio-temporal relationship. Accordingly the spatio-temporal -relationship, in terms of which the actual course of events is to be -expressed, is nothing else than a selective limitation within the -general systematic relationships among eternal objects. By ‘limitation,’ -as applied to the spatio-temporal continuum, I mean those matter-of-fact -determinations—such as the three dimensions of space, and the four -dimensions of the spatio-temporal continuum—which are inherent in the -actual course of events, but which present themselves as arbitrary in -respect to a more abstract possibility. The consideration of these -general limitations at the base of actual things, as distinct from the -limitations peculiar to each actual occasion, will be more fully resumed -in the chapter on ‘God.’ - -Further, the status of all possibility in reference to actuality -requires a reference to this spatio-temporal continuum. In any -particular consideration of a possibility we may conceive this continuum -to be transcended. But in so far as there is any definite reference to -actuality, the definite _how_ of transcendence of that spatio-temporal -continuum is required. Thus primarily the spatio-temporal continuum is a -locus of relational possibility, selected from the more general realm of -systematic relationship. This limited locus of relational possibility -expresses one limitation of possibility inherent in the general system -of the process of realisation. Whatever possibility is generally -coherent with that system falls within this limitation. Also whatever is -abstractedly possible in relation to the general course of events—as -distinct from the particular limitations introduced by particular -occasions—pervades the spatio-temporal continuum in every alternative -spatial situation and at all alternative times. - -Fundamentally, the spatio-temporal continuum is the general system of -relatedness of all possibilities, in so far as that system is limited by -its relevance to the general fact of actuality. Also it is inherent in -the nature of possibility that it should include this relevance to -actuality. For possibility is that in which there stands achievability, -abstracted from achievement. - -It has already been emphasised that an actual occasion is to be -conceived as a limitation; and that this process of limitation can be -still further characterised as a gradation. This characteristic of an -actual occasion (α, say) requires further elucidation: An -indeterminateness stands in the essence of any eternal object (_Α_, -say). The actual occasion α synthesises in itself every eternal object; -and, in so doing, it includes the _complete_ determinate relatedness of -_Α_ to every other eternal object, or set of eternal objects. This -synthesis is a limitation of realisation but _not_ of content. Each -relationship preserves its inherent self-identity. But grades of entry -into this synthesis are inherent in each actual occasion, such as α. -These grades can be expressed only as relevance of value. This relevance -of value varies—as comparing different occasions—in grade from the -inclusion of the individual essence of _Α_ as an element in the -aesthetic synthesis (in some grade of inclusion) to the lowest grade -which is the exclusion of the individual essence of _Α_ as an element in -the aesthetic synthesis. In so far as it stands in this lowest grade, -every determinate relationship of _Α_ is merely ingredient in the -occasion in respect to the determinate _how_ this relationship is an -unfulfilled alternative, not contributing any aesthetic value, except as -forming an element in the systematic substratum of unfulfilled content. -In a higher grade, it may remain unfulfilled, but be aesthetically -relevant. - -Thus _A_, conceived merely in respect to its relationships to other -eternal objects, is ‘_A_ conceived as _not-being_’; where ‘not-being’ -means ‘abstracted from the determinate fact of inclusions in, and -exclusions from, actual events.’ Also ‘_A_ as _not-being_ in respect to -a definite occasion α’ means that _A_ in all its determinate -relationships is excluded from α. Again ‘_A_ as _being_ in respect to α’ -means that _A_ in some of its determinate relationships is included in -α. But there can be no occasion which includes _A_ in all its -determinate relationships; for some of these relationships are -contraries. Thus, in regard to excluded relationships, _A_ will be -_not-being_ in α, even when in regard to other relationships _A_ will be -_being_ in α. In this sense, every occasion is a synthesis of _being_ -and _not-being_. Furthermore, though some eternal objects are -synthesised in an occasion α merely _quâ not-being_, each eternal object -which is synthesised _quâ being_ is also synthesised _quâ not-being_. -‘_Being_’ here means ‘individually effective in the aesthetic -synthesis.’ Also the ‘aesthetic synthesis’ is the ‘experient synthesis’ -viewed as self-creative, under the limitations laid upon it by its -internal relatedness to all other actual occasions. We thus -conclude—what has already been stated above—that the general fact of the -synthetic prehension of all eternal objects into every occasion wears -the double aspect of the indeterminate relatedness of each eternal -object to occasions generally, and of its determinate relatedness to -each particular occasion. This statement summarises the account of how -external relations are possible. But the account depends upon -disengaging the spatio-temporal continuum from its mere implication in -actual occasions—according to the usual explanation—and upon exhibiting -it in its origin from the general nature of abstract possibility, as -limited by the general character of the actual course of events. - -The difficulty which arises in respect to internal relations is to -explain how any particular truth is possible. In so far as there are -internal relations, everything must depend upon everything else. But if -this be the case, we cannot know about anything till we equally know -everything else. Apparently, therefore, we are under the necessity of -saying everything at once. This supposed necessity is palpably untrue. -Accordingly it is incumbent on us to explain how there can be internal -relations, seeing that we admit finite truths. - -Since actual occasions are selections from the realm of possibilities, -the ultimate explanation of how actual occasions have the general -character which they do have, must lie in an analysis of the general -character of the realm of possibility. - -The _analytical character_ of the realm of eternal objects is the -primary metaphysical truth concerning it. By this character it is meant -that the status of any eternal object _A_ in this realm is capable of -analysis into an indefinite number of subordinate relationships of -limited scope. For example if _B_ and _C_ are two other eternal objects, -then there is some perfectly definite relationship _R(A, B, C)_ which -involves _A, B, C_ only, as to require the mention of no other definite -eternal objects in the capacity of relata. Of course, the relationship -_R(A, B, C)_ may involve subordinate relationships which are themselves -eternal objects, and _R(A, B, C)_ is also itself an eternal object. Also -there will be other relationships which in the same sense involve only -_A, B, C_. We have now to examine how, having regard to the internal -relatedness of eternal objects, this limited relationship _R(A, B, C)_ -is possible. - -The reason for the existence of finite relationships in the realm of -eternal objects is that relationships of these objects among themselves -are entirely unselective, and are systematically complete. We are -discussing possibility; so that every relationship which is possible is -thereby in the realm of possibility. Every such relationship of each -eternal object is founded upon the perfectly definite status of that -object as a relatum in the general scheme of relationships. This -definite status is what I have termed the ‘relational essence’ of the -object. This relational essence is determinable by reference to that -object alone, and does not require reference to any other objects, -except those which are specifically involved in its individual essence -when that essence is complex (as will be explained immediately). The -meaning of the words ‘any’ and ‘some’ springs from this principle—that -is to say, the meaning of the ‘variable’ in logic. The whole principle -is that a particular determination can be made of the _how_ of some -definite relationship of a definite eternal object _A_ to a definite -finite number _n_ of other eternal objects, _without_ any determination -of the other _n_ objects, X1, X2, ... Xn, except that they have, each of -them, the requisite status to play their respective parts in that -multiple relationship. This principle depends on the fact that the -relational essence of an eternal object is not unique to that object. -The mere relational essence of each eternal object determines the -complete uniform scheme of relational essences, since each object stands -internally in all its possible relationships. Thus the realm of -possibility provides a uniform scheme of relationships among finite sets -of eternal objects; and all eternal objects stand in all such -relationships, so far as the status of each permits. - -Accordingly the relationships (as in possibility) do not involve the -individual essences of the eternal objects; they involve _any_ eternal -objects as relata, subject to the proviso that these relata have the -requisite relational essences. [It is this proviso which, automatically -and by the nature of the case, limits the ‘any’ of the phrase ‘any -eternal objects.’] This principle is the principle of the _Isolation of -Eternal Objects_ in the realm of possibility. The eternal objects are -isolated, because their relationships as possibilities are expressible -without reference to their respective individual essences. In contrast -to the realm of possibility, the inclusion of eternal objects within an -actual occasion means that in respect to some of their possible -relationships there is a togetherness of their individual essences. This -realised togetherness is the achievement of an emergent value -defined—or, shaped—by the definite eternal relatedness in respect to -which the real togetherness is achieved. Thus the eternal relatedness is -the form—the εἶδος—; the emergent actual occasion is the _superject_ of -informed value; value, as abstracted from any particular superject, is -the abstract matter—the ὕλη—which is common to all actual occasions; and -the synthetic activity which prehends valueless possibility into -superjicient informed value is the substantial activity. This -substantial activity is that which is omitted in any analysis of the -static factors in the metaphysical situation. The analysed elements of -the situation are the attributes of the substantial activity. - -The difficulty inherent in the concept of finite internal relations -among eternal objects is thus evaded by two metaphysical principles, (i) -that the relationships of any eternal object _A_, considered as -constitutive of _A_, merely involve other eternal objects as bare relata -without reference to their individual essences, and (ii) that the -divisibility of the general relationship of _A_ into a multiplicity of -finite relationships of _A_ stands therefore in the essence of that -eternal object. The second principle obviously depends upon the first. -To understand _A_ is to understand the _how_ of a general scheme of -relationship. This scheme of relationship does not require the -individual uniqueness of the other relata for its comprehension. This -scheme also discloses itself as being analysable into a multiplicity of -limited relationships which have their own individuality and yet at the -same time presupposes the total relationship within possibility. In -respect to actuality there is first the general limitation of -relationships, which reduces this general unlimited scheme to the four -dimensional spatio-temporal scheme. This spatio-temporal scheme is, so -to speak, the greatest common measure of the schemes of relationship (as -limited by actuality) inherent in all the eternal objects. By this it is -meant that, _how_ select relationships of an eternal object (_A_) are -realised in any actual occasion, is always explicable by expressing the -status of _A_ in respect to this spatio-temporal scheme, and by -expressing in this scheme the relationship of the actual occasion to -other actual occasions. A definite finite relationship involving the -definite eternal objects of a limited set of such objects is itself an -eternal object: it is those eternal objects as in that relationship. I -will call such an eternal object ‘complex.’ The eternal objects which -are the relata in a complex eternal object will be called the -‘components’ of that eternal object. Also if any of these relata are -themselves complex, their components will be called ‘derivative -components’ of the original complex object. Also the components of -derivative components will also be called derivative components of the -original object. Thus the complexity of an eternal object means its -analysability into a relationship of component eternal objects. Also the -analysis of the general scheme of relatedness of eternal objects means -its exhibition as a multiplicity of complex eternal objects. An eternal -object, such as a definite shade of green, which cannot be analysed into -a relationship of components, will be called ‘simple.’ - -We can now explain how the analytical character of the realm of eternal -objects allows of an analysis of that realm into grades. - -In the lowest grade of eternal objects are to be placed those objects -whose individual essences are simple. This is the grade of zero -complexity. Next consider any set of such objects, finite or infinite as -to the number of its members. For example, consider the set of three -eternal objects _A, B, C_, of which none is complex. Let us write _R(A, -B, C)_ for some definite possible relatedness of _A, B, C_. To take a -simple example, _A, B, C_ may be three definite colours with the -spatio-temporal relatedness to each other of three faces of a regular -tetrahedron, anywhere at any time. Then _R(A, B, C)_ is another eternal -object of the lowest complex grade. Analogously there are eternal -objects of successively higher grades. In respect to any complex eternal -object, _S(D1, D2, ... Dn)_, the eternal objects _D1, ... Dn_, whose -individual essences are constitutive of the individual essence of _S(D1, -... Dn)_, are called the components of _S(D1, ... Dn)_. It is obvious -that the grade of complexity to be ascribed to _S(D1, ... Dn)_ is to be -taken as one above the highest grade of complexity to be found among its -components. - -There is thus an analysis of the realm of possibility into simple -eternal objects, and into various grades of complex eternal objects. A -complex eternal object is an abstract situation. There is a double sense -of ‘abstraction,’ in regard to the abstraction of _definite_ eternal -objects, _i.e._, non-mathematical abstraction. There is abstraction from -actuality, and abstraction from possibility. For example, _A_ and _R(A, -B, C)_ are both abstractions from the realm of possibility. Note that -_A_ must mean _A_ in all its possible relationships, and among them -_R(A, B, C)_. Also _R(A, B, C)_ means _R(A, B, C)_ in all its -relationships. But this meaning of _R(A, B, C)_ excludes other -relationships into which _A_ can enter. Hence _A_ as in _R(A, B, C)_ is -more abstract than _A simpliciter_. Thus as we pass from the grade of -simple eternal objects to higher and higher grades of complexity, we are -indulging in higher grades of abstraction from the realm of possibility. - -We can now conceive the successive stages of a definite progress towards -some assigned mode of abstraction from the realm of possibility, -involving a progress (in thought) through successive grades of -increasing complexity. I will call any such route of progress ‘an -abstractive hierarchy.’ Any abstractive hierarchy, finite or infinite, -is based upon some definite group of simple eternal objects. This group -will be called the ‘base’ of the hierarchy. Thus the base of an -abstractive hierarchy is a set of objects of zero complexity. The formal -definition of an abstractive hierarchy is as follows: - -An ‘abstractive hierarchy based upon _g_,’ where _g_ is a group of -simple eternal objects, is a set of eternal objects which satisfy the -following conditions, - -(i) the members of _g_ belong to it, and are the only simple eternal -objects in the hierarchy, - -(ii) the components of any complex eternal object in the hierarchy are -also members of the hierarchy, and - -(iii) any set of eternal objects belonging to the hierarchy, whether all -of the same grade or whether differing among themselves as to grade, are -jointly among the components or derivative components of at least one -eternal object which also belongs to the hierarchy. - -It is to be noticed that the components of an eternal object are -necessarily of a lower grade of complexity than itself. Accordingly any -member of such a hierarchy, which is of the first grade of complexity, -can have as components only members of the group _g_; and any member of -the second grade can have as components only members of the first grade, -and members of _g_; and so on for the higher grades. - -The third condition to be satisfied by an abstractive hierarchy will be -called the condition of connexity. Thus an abstractive hierarchy springs -from its base; it includes every successive grade from its base either -indefinitely onwards, or to its maximum grade; and it is ‘connected’ by -the reappearance (in a higher grade) of any set of its members belonging -to lower grades, in the function of a set of components or derivative -components of at least one member of the hierarchy. - -An abstractive hierarchy is called ‘finite’ if it stops at a finite -grade of complexity. It is called ‘infinite’ if it includes members -belonging respectively to all degrees of complexity. - -It is to be noted that the base of an abstractive hierarchy may contain -any number of members, finite or infinite. Further, the infinity of the -number of the members of the base has nothing to do with the question as -to whether the hierarchy be finite or infinite. - -A finite abstractive hierarchy will, by definition, possess a grade of -maximum complexity. It is characteristic of this grade that a member of -it is a component of no other eternal object belonging to any grade of -the hierarchy. Also it is evident that this grade of maximum complexity -must possess only one member; for otherwise the condition of connexity -would not be satisfied. Conversely any complex eternal object defines a -finite abstractive hierarchy to be discovered by a process of analysis. -This complex eternal object from which we start will be called the -‘vertex’ of the abstractive hierarchy: it is the sole member of the -grade of maximum complexity. In the first stage of the analysis we -obtain the components of the vertex. These components may be of varying -complexity; but there must be among them at least one member whose -complexity is of a grade one lower than that of the vertex. A grade -which is one lower than that of a given eternal object will be called -the ‘proximate grade’ for that object. We take then those components of -the vertex which belong to its proximate grade; and as the second stage -we analyse them into their components. Among these components there must -be some belonging to the proximate grade for the objects thus analysed. -Add to them the components of the vertex which also belong to this grade -of ‘second proximation’ from the vertex; and, at the third stage analyse -as before. We thus find objects belonging to the grade of third -proximation from the vertex; and we add to them the components belonging -to this grade, which have been left over from the preceding stages of -the analysis. We proceed in this way through successive stages, till we -reach the grade of simple objects. This grade forms the base of the -hierarchy. - -It is to be noted that in dealing with hierarchies we are entirely -within the realm of possibility. Accordingly the eternal objects are -devoid of real togetherness: they remain within their ‘isolation.’ - -The logical instrument which Aristotle used for the analysis of actual -fact into more abstract elements was that of classification into species -and genera. This instrument has its overwhelmingly important application -for science in its preparatory stages. But its use in metaphysical -description distorts the true vision of the metaphysical situation. The -use of the term ‘universal’ is intimately connected with this -Aristotelian analysis: the term has been broadened of late; but still it -suggests that classificatory analysis. For this reason I have avoided -it. - -In any actual occasion α, there will be a group _g_ of simple eternal -objects which are ingredient in that group in the most concrete mode. -This complete ingredience in an occasion, so as to yield the most -complete fusion of individual essence with other eternal objects in the -formation of the individual emergent occasion, is evidently of its own -kind and cannot be defined in terms of anything else. But it has a -peculiar characteristic which necessarily attaches to it. This -characteristic is that there is an _infinite_ abstractive hierarchy -based upon _g_ which is such that all its members are equally involved -in this complete inclusion in α. - -The existence of such an infinite abstractive hierarchy is what is meant -by the statement that it is impossible to complete the description of an -actual occasion by means of concepts. I will call this infinite -abstractive hierarchy which is associated with α ‘the associated -hierarchy of α.’ It is also what is meant by the notion of the -connectedness of an actual occasion. This connectedness of an occasion -is necessary for its synthetic unity and for its intelligibility. There -is a connected hierarchy of concepts applicable to the occasion, -including concepts of all degrees of complexity. Also in the actual -occasion, the individual essences of the eternal objects involved in -these complex concepts achieve an aesthetic synthesis, productive of the -occasion as an experience for its own sake. This associated hierarchy is -the shape, or pattern, or form, of the occasion in so far as the -occasion is constituted of what enters into its full realisation. - -Some confusion of thought has been caused by the fact that abstraction -from possibility runs in the opposite direction to an abstraction from -actuality, so far as degree of abstractness is concerned. For evidently -in describing an actual occasion α, we are nearer to the total concrete -fact when we describe α by predicating of it some member of its -associated hierarchy, which is of a high grade of complexity. We have -then said more about α. Thus, with a high grade of complexity we gain in -approach to the full concreteness of α, and with a low grade we lose in -this approach. Accordingly the simple eternal objects represent the -extreme of abstraction from an actual occasion; whereas simple eternal -objects represent the minimum of abstraction from the realm of -possibility. It will, I think, be found that, when a high degree of -abstraction is spoken of, abstraction from the realm of possibility is -what is usually meant—in other words, an elaborate logical construction. - -So far I have merely been considering an actual occasion on the side of -its full concreteness. It is this side of the occasion in virtue of -which it is an event in nature. But a natural event, in this sense of -the term, is only an abstraction from a complete actual occasion. A -complete occasion includes that which in cognitive experience takes the -form of memory, anticipation, imagination, and thought. These elements -in an experient occasion are also modes of inclusion of complex eternal -objects in the synthetic prehension, as elements in the emergent value. -They differ from the concreteness of full inclusion. In a sense this -difference is inexplicable; for each mode of inclusion is of its own -kind, not to be explained in terms of anything else. But there is a -common difference which discriminates these modes of inclusion from the -full concrete ingression which has been discussed. This _differentia_ is -_abruptness_. By ‘abruptness’ I mean that what is remembered, or -anticipated, or imagined, or thought, is exhausted by a finite complex -concept. In each case there is one finite eternal object prehended -within the occasion as the vertex of a finite hierarchy. This breaking -off from an actual illimitability is what in any occasion marks off that -which is termed mental from that which belongs to the physical event to -which the mental functioning is referred. - -In general there seems to be some loss of vividness in the apprehension -of the eternal objects concerned: for example, Hume speaks of ‘faint -copies.’ But this faintness seems to be a very unsafe ground for -differentiation. Often things realised in thought are more vivid than -the same things in inattentive physical experience. But the things -apprehended as mental are always subject to the condition that we come -to a stop when we attempt to explore ever higher grades of complexity in -their realised relationships. We always find that we have thought of -just this—whatever it may be—and of no more. There is a limitation which -breaks off the finite concept from the higher grades of illimitable -complexity. - -Thus an actual occasion is a prehension of one infinite hierarchy (its -associated hierarchy) together with various finite hierarchies. The -synthesis into the occasion of the infinite hierarchy is according to -its specific mode of realisation, and that of the finite hierarchies is -according to various other specific modes of realisation. There is one -metaphysical principle which is essential for the rational coherence of -this account of the general character of an experient occasion. I call -this principle, ‘The Translucency of Realisation.’ By this I mean that -any eternal object is just itself in whatever mode of realisation it is -involved. There can be no distortion of the individual essence without -thereby producing a different eternal object. In the essence of each -eternal object there stands an indeterminateness which expresses its -indifferent patience for any mode of ingression into any actual -occasion. Thus in cognitive experience, there can be the cognition of -the same eternal object as in the same occasion having ingression with -implication in more than one grade of realisation. Thus the translucency -of realisation, and the possible multiplicity of modes of ingression -into the same occasion, together form the foundation for the -correspondence theory of truth. - -In this account of an actual occasion in terms of its connection with -the realm of eternal objects, we have gone back to the train of thought -in our second chapter, where the nature of mathematics was discussed. -The idea, ascribed to Pythagoras, has been amplified, and put forward as -the first chapter in metaphysics. The next chapter is concerned with the -puzzling fact that there is an actual course of events which is in -itself a limited fact, in that metaphysically speaking it might have -been otherwise. But other metaphysical investigations are omitted; for -example, epistemology, and the classification of some elements in the -unfathomable wealth of the field of possibility. This last topic brings -metaphysics in sight of the special topics of the various sciences. - - - - - CHAPTER XI - - GOD - - -Aristotle found it necessary to complete his metaphysics by the -introduction of a Prime Mover—God. This, for two reasons, is an -important fact in the history of metaphysics. In the first place if we -are to accord to anyone the position of the greatest metaphysician, -having regard to genius of insight, to general equipment in knowledge, -and to the stimulus of his metaphysical ancestry, we must choose -Aristotle. Secondly, in his consideration of this metaphysical question -he was entirely dispassionate; and he is the last European metaphysician -of first rate importance for whom this claim can be made. After -Aristotle, ethical and religious interests began to influence -metaphysical conclusions. The Jews dispersed, first willingly and then -forcibly, and the Judaic-Alexandrian school arose. Then Christianity -closely followed by Mahometanism, intervened. The Greek gods who -surrounded Aristotle were subordinate metaphysical entities, well within -nature. Accordingly on the subject of his Prime Mover, he would have no -motive, except to follow his metaphysical train of thought whithersoever -it led him. It did not lead him very far towards the production of a God -available for religious purposes. It may be doubted whether any properly -general metaphysics can ever, without the illicit introduction of other -considerations, get much further than Aristotle. But his conclusion does -represent a first step without which no evidence on a narrower -experiential basis can be of much avail in shaping the conception. For -nothing, within any limited type of experience, can give intelligence to -shape our ideas of any entity at the base of all actual things, unless -the general character of things requires that there be such an entity. - -The phrase, Prime Mover, warns us that Aristotle’s thought was enmeshed -in the details of an erroneous physics and an erroneous cosmology. In -Aristotle’s physics special causes were required to sustain the motions -of material things. These could easily be fitted into his system, -provided that the general cosmic motions could be sustained. For then in -relation to the general working system, each thing could be provided -with its true end. Hence the necessity for a Prime Mover who sustains -the motions of the spheres on which depend the adjustment of things. -To-day we repudiate the Aristotelian physics and the Aristotelian -cosmology, so that the exact form of the above argument manifestly -fails. But if our general metaphysics is in any way similar to that -outlined in the previous chapter, an analogous metaphysical problem -arises which can be solved only in an analogous fashion. In the place of -Aristotle’s God as Prime Mover, we require God as the Principle of -Concretion. This position can be substantiated only by the discussion of -the general implication of the course of actual occasions,—that is to -say, of the process of realisation. - -We conceive actuality as in essential relation to an unfathomable -possibility. Eternal objects inform actual occasions with hierarchic -patterns, included and excluded in every variety of discrimination. -Another view of the same truth is that every actual occasion is a -limitation imposed on possibility, and that by virtue of this -limitation the particular value of that shaped togetherness of things -emerges. In this way we express how a single occasion is to be viewed -in terms of possibility, and how possibility is to be viewed in terms -of a single actual occasion. But there are no single occasions, in the -sense of isolated occasions. Actuality is through and through -togetherness—togetherness of otherwise isolated eternal objects, and -togetherness of all actual occasions. It is my task in this chapter to -describe the unity of actual occasions. The previous chapter centered -its interest in the abstract: the present chapter deals with the -concrete, _i.e._, that which has grown together. - -Consider an occasion α:—we have to enumerate how other actual occasions -are in α, in the sense that their relationships with α are constitutive -of the essence of α. What α is in itself, is that it is a unit of -realised experience; accordingly we ask how other occasions are in the -experience which is α. Also for the present I am excluding cognitive -experience. The complete answer to this question is, that the -relationships among actual occasions are as unfathomable in their -variety of type as are those among eternal objects in the realm of -abstraction. But there are fundamental types of such relationships in -terms of which the whole complex variety can find its description. - -A preliminary for the understanding of these types of entry (of one -occasion into the essence of another) is to note that they are involved -in the modes of realisation of abstractive hierarchies, discussed in the -previous chapter. The spatio-temporal relationships, involved in those -hierarchies as realised in α, have all a definition in terms of α and of -the occasions entrant in α. Thus the entrant occasions lend their -aspects to the hierarchies, and thereby convert spatio-temporal -modalities into categorical determinations; and the hierarchies lend -their forms to the occasions and thereby limit the entrant occasions to -being entrant only under those forms. Thus in the same way (as seen in -the previous chapter) that every occasion is a synthesis of all eternal -objects under the limitation of gradations of actuality, so every -occasion is a synthesis of all occasions under the limitation of -gradations of types of entry. Each occasion synthesises the totality of -content under its own limitations of mode. - -In respect to these types of internal relationship between α and other -occasions, these other occasions (as constitutive of α) can be -classified in many alternative ways. These are all concerned with -different definitions of past, present, and future. It has been usual in -philosophy to assume that these various definitions must necessarily be -equivalent. The present state of opinion in physical science -conclusively shows that this assumption is without metaphysical -justification, even though any such discrimination may be found to be -unnecessary for physical science. This question has already been dealt -with in the chapter on Relativity. But the physical theory of relativity -touches only the fringe of the various theories which are metaphysically -tenable. It is important for my argument to insist upon the unbounded -freedom within which the actual is a unique categorical determination. - -Every actual occasion exhibits itself as a process: it is a -becomingness. In so disclosing itself, it places itself as one among a -multiplicity of other occasions, without which it could not be itself. -It also defines itself as a particular individual achievement, focussing -in its limited way an unbounded realm of eternal objects. - -Any one occasion α issues from other occasions which collectively form -its _past_. It displays for itself other occasions which collectively -form its _present_. It is in respect to its associated hierarchy, as -displayed in this immediate present, that an occasion finds its own -originality. It is that display which is its own contribution to the -output of actuality. It may be conditioned, and even completely -determined by the past from which it issues. But its display in the -present under those conditions is what directly emerges from its -prehensive activity. The occasion α also holds within itself an -indetermination in the form of a future, which has partial determination -by reason of its inclusion in α and also has determinate spatio-temporal -relatedness to α and to actual occasions of the past from α and of the -present for α. - -This future is a synthesis in α of eternal objects as not-being and as -requiring the passage from α to other individualisations (with -determinate spatio-temporal relations to α) in which not-being becomes -being. - -There is also in α what, in the previous chapter, I have termed the -‘abrupt’ realisation of finite eternal objects. This abrupt realisation -requires _either_ a reference of the basic objects of the finite -hierarchy to determinate occasions other than α (as their situations), -in past, present, future; _or_ requires a realisation of these eternal -objects in determinate relationships, but under the aspect of exemption -from inclusion in the spatio-temporal scheme of relatedness between -actual occasions. This abrupt synthesis of eternal objects in each -occasion is the inclusion in actuality of the analytical character of -the realm of eternality. This inclusion has those limited gradations of -actuality which characterise every occasion by reason of its essential -limitation. It is this realised extension of eternal relatedness beyond -the mutual relatedness of the actual occasions, which prehends into each -occasion the full sweep of eternal relatedness. I term this abrupt -realisation the ‘graded envisagement’ which each occasion prehends into -its synthesis. This graded envisagement is how the actual includes what -(in one sense) is not-being as a positive factor in its own achievement. -It is the source of error, of truth, of art, of ethics, and of religion. -By it, fact is confronted with alternatives. - -This general concept, of an event as a process whose outcome is a unit -of experience, points to the analysis of an event into (i) substantial -activity, (ii) conditioned potentialities which are there for synthesis, -and (iii) the achieved outcome of the synthesis. The unity of all actual -occasions forbids the analysis of substantial activities into -independent entities. Each individual activity is nothing but the mode -in which the general activity is individualised by the imposed -conditions. The envisagement which enters into the synthesis is also a -character which conditions the synthesising activity. The general -activity is not an entity in the sense in which occasions or eternal -objects are entities. It is a general metaphysical character which -underlies all occasions, in a particular mode for each occasion. There -is nothing with which to compare it: it is Spinoza’s one infinite -substance. Its attributes are its character of individualisation into a -multiplicity of modes, and the realm of eternal objects which are -variously synthesised in these modes. Thus eternal possibility and modal -differentiation into individual multiplicity are the attributes of the -one substance. In fact each general element of the metaphysical -situation is an attribute of the substantial activity. - -Yet another element in the metaphysical situation is disclosed by the -consideration that the general attribute of modality is limited. This -element must rank as an attribute of the substantial activity. In its -nature each mode is limited, so as not to be other modes. But, beyond -these limitations of particulars, the general modal individualisation is -limited in two ways: In the first place it is an actual course of -events, which might be otherwise so far as concerns eternal possibility, -but _is_ that course. This limitation takes three forms, (i) the special -logical relations which all events must conform to, (ii) the selection -of relationships to which the events do conform, and (iii) the -particularity which infects the course even within those general -relationships of logic and causation. Thus this first limitation is a -limitation of antecedent selection. So far as the general metaphysical -situation is concerned, there might have been an indiscriminate modal -pluralism apart from logical or other limitation. But there could not -then have been these modes, for each mode represents a synthesis of -actualities which are limited to conform to a standard. We here come to -the second way of limitation. Restriction is the price of value. There -cannot be value without antecedent standards of value, to discriminate -the acceptance or rejection of what is before the envisaging mode of -activity. Thus there is an antecedent limitation among values, -introducing contraries, grades, and oppositions. - -According to this argument the fact that there is a process of actual -occasions, and the fact that the occasions are the emergence of values -which require such limitation, both require that the course of events -should have developed amid an antecedent limitation composed of -conditions, particularisation, and standards of value. - -Thus as a further element in the metaphysical situation, there is -required a principle of limitation. Some particular _how_ is necessary, -and some particularisation in the _what_ of matter of fact is necessary. -The only alternative to this admission, is to deny the reality of actual -occasions. Their apparent irrational limitation must be taken as a proof -of illusion and we must look for reality behind the scene. If we reject -this alternative behind the scene, we must provide a ground for -limitation which stands among the attributes of the substantial -activity. This attribute provides the limitation for which no reason can -be given: for all reason flows from it. God is the ultimate limitation, -and His existence is the ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be -given for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose. -God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No -reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the -ground of rationality. - -In this argument the point to notice is, that what is metaphysically -indeterminate has nevertheless to be categorically determinate. We have -come to the limit of rationality. For there is a categorical limitation -which does not spring from any metaphysical reason. There is a -metaphysical need for a principle of determination, but there can be no -metaphysical reason for what is determined. If there were such a reason, -there would be no need for any further principle: for metaphysics would -already have provided the determination. The general principle of -empiricism depends upon the doctrine that there is a principle of -concretion which is not discoverable by abstract reason. What further -can be known about God must be sought in the region of particular -experiences, and therefore rests on an empirical basis. In respect to -the interpretation of these experiences, mankind have differed -profoundly. He has been named respectively, Jehovah, Allah, Brahma, -Father in Heaven, Order of Heaven, First Cause, Supreme Being, Chance. -Each name corresponds to a system of thought derived from the -experiences of those who have used it. - -Among medieval and modern philosophers, anxious to establish the -religious significance of God, an unfortunate habit has prevailed of -paying to Him metaphysical compliments. He has been conceived as the -foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity. If -this conception be adhered to, there can be no alternative except to -discern in Him the origin of all evil as well as of all good. He is then -the supreme author of the play, and to Him must therefore be ascribed -its shortcomings as well as its success. If He be conceived as the -supreme ground for limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide -the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason ‘within her dominions -supreme.’ - - - - - CHAPTER XII - - RELIGION AND SCIENCE - - -The difficulty in approaching the question of the relations between -Religion and Science is, that its elucidation requires that we have in -our minds some clear idea of what we mean by either of the terms, -‘religion’ and ‘science.’ Also I wish to speak in the most general way -possible, and to keep in the background any comparison of particular -creeds, scientific or religious. We have got to understand the type of -connection which exists between the two spheres, and then to draw some -definite conclusions respecting the existing situation which at present -confronts the world. - -The _conflict_ between religion and science is what naturally occurs to -our minds when we think of this subject. It seems as though, during the -last half-century, the results of science and the beliefs of religion -had come into a position of frank disagreement, from which there can be -no escape, except by abandoning either the clear teaching of science, or -the clear teaching of religion. This conclusion has been urged by -controversialists on either side. Not by all controversialists, of -course, but by those trenchant intellects which every controversy calls -out into the open. - -The distress of sensitive minds, and the zeal for truth, and the sense -of the importance of the issues, must command our sincerest sympathy. -When we consider what religion is for mankind, and what science is, it -is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon -the decision of this generation as to the relations between them. We -have here the two strongest general forces (apart from the mere impulse -of the various senses) which influence men, and they seem to be set one -against the other—the force of our religious intuitions, and the force -of our impulse to accurate observation and logical deduction. - -A great English statesman once advised his countrymen to use large-scale -maps, as a preservative against alarms, panics, and general -misunderstanding of the true relations between nations. In the same way -in dealing with the clash between permanent elements of human nature, it -is well to map our history on a large scale, and to disengage ourselves -from our immediate absorption in the present conflicts. When we do this, -we immediately discover two great facts. In the first place, there has -always been a conflict between religion and science; and in the second -place, both religion and science have always been in a state of -continual development. In the early days of Christianity, there was a -general belief among Christians that the world was coming to an end in -the lifetime of people then living. We can make only indirect inferences -as to how far this belief was authoritatively proclaimed; but it is -certain that it was widely held, and that it formed an impressive part -of the popular religious doctrine. The belief proved itself to be -mistaken, and Christian doctrine adjusted itself to the change. Again in -the early Church individual theologians very confidently deduced from -the Bible opinions concerning the nature of the physical universe. In -the year A. D. 535, a monk named Cosmas[17] wrote a book which he -entitled, _Christian Topography_. He was a travelled man who had visited -India and Ethiopia; and finally he lived in a monastery at Alexandria, -which was then a great centre of culture. In this book, basing himself -upon the direct meaning of Biblical texts as construed by him in a -literal fashion, he denied the existence of the antipodes, and asserted -that the world is a flat parallelogram whose length is double its -breadth. - -Footnote 17: - - _Cf._ Lecky’s _The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe_, Ch. - III. - -In the seventeenth century the doctrine of the motion of the earth was -condemned by a Catholic tribunal. A hundred years ago the extension of -time demanded by geological science distressed religious people, -Protestant and Catholic. And to-day the doctrine of evolution is an -equal stumbling-block. These are only a few instances illustrating a -general fact. - -But all our ideas will be in a wrong perspective if we think that this -recurring perplexity was confined to contradictions between religion and -science; and that in these controversies religion was always wrong, and -that science was always right. The true facts of the case are very much -more complex, and refuse to be summarised in these simple terms. - -Theology itself exhibits exactly the same character of gradual -development, arising from an aspect of conflict between its own proper -ideas. This fact is a commonplace to theologians, but is often obscured -in the stress of controversy. I do not wish to overstate my case; so I -will confine myself to Roman Catholic writers. In the seventeenth -century a learned Jesuit, Father Petavius, showed that the theologians -of the first three centuries of Christianity made use of phrases and -statements which since the fifth century would be condemned as -heretical. Also Cardinal Newman devoted a treatise to the discussion of -the development of doctrine. He wrote it before he became a great Roman -Catholic ecclesiastic; but throughout his life, it was never retracted -and continually reissued. - -Science is even more changeable than theology. No man of science could -subscribe without qualification to Galileo’s beliefs, or to Newton’s -beliefs, or to all his own scientific beliefs of ten years ago. - -In both regions of thought, additions, distinctions, and modifications -have been introduced. So that now, even when the same assertion is made -to-day as was made a thousand, or fifteen hundred years ago, it is made -subject to limitations or expansions of meaning, which were not -contemplated at the earlier epoch. We are told by logicians that a -proposition must be either true or false, and that there is no middle -term. But in practice, we may know that a proposition expresses an -important truth, but that it is subject to limitations and -qualifications which at present remain undiscovered. It is a general -feature of our knowledge, that we are insistently aware of important -truths; and yet that the only formulations of these truths which we are -able to make presuppose a general standpoint of conceptions which may -have to be modified. I will give you two illustrations, both from -science: Galileo said that the earth moves and that the sun is fixed; -the Inquisition said that the earth is fixed and the sun moves; and -Newtonian astronomers, adopting an absolute theory of space, said that -both the sun and the earth move. But now we say that any one of these -three statements is equally true, provided that you have fixed your -sense of ‘rest’ and ‘motion’ in the way required by the statement -adopted. At the date of Galileo’s controversy with the Inquisition, -Galileo’s way of stating the facts was, beyond question, the fruitful -procedure for the sake of scientific research. But in itself it was not -more true than the formulation of the Inquisition. But at that time the -modern concepts of relative motion were in nobody’s mind; so that the -statements were made in ignorance of the qualifications required for -their more perfect truth. Yet this question of the motions of the earth -and the sun expresses a real fact in the universe; and all sides had got -hold of important truths concerning it. But with the knowledge of those -times, the truths appeared to be inconsistent. - -Again I will give you another example taken from the state of modern -physical science. Since the time of Newton and Huyghens in the -seventeenth century there have been two theories as to the physical -nature of light. Newton’s theory was that a beam of light consists of a -stream of very minute particles, or corpuscles, and that we have the -sensation of light when these corpuscles strike the retinas of our eyes. -Huyghens’ theory was that light consists of very minute waves of -trembling in an all-pervading ether, and that these waves are travelling -along a beam of light. The two theories are contradictory. In the -eighteenth century Newton’s theory was believed, in the nineteenth -century Huyghens’ theory was believed. To-day there is one large group -of phenomena which can be explained only on the wave theory, and another -large group which can be explained only on the corpuscular theory. -Scientists have to leave it at that, and wait for the future, in the -hope of attaining some wider vision which reconciles both. - -We should apply these same principles to the questions in which there is -a variance between science and religion. We would believe nothing in -either sphere of thought which does not appear to us to be certified by -solid reasons based upon the critical research either of ourselves or of -competent authorities. But granting that we have honestly taken this -precaution, a clash between the two on points of detail where they -overlap should not lead us hastily to abandon doctrines for which we -have solid evidence. It may be that we are more interested in one set of -doctrines than in the other. But, if we have any sense of perspective -and of the history of thought, we shall wait and refrain from mutual -anathemas. - -We should wait: but we should not wait passively, or in despair. The -clash is a sign that there are wider truths and finer perspectives -within which a reconciliation of a deeper religion and a more subtle -science will be found. - -In one sense, therefore, the conflict between science and religion is a -slight matter which has been unduly emphasised. A mere logical -contradiction cannot in itself point to more than the necessity of some -readjustments, possibly of a very minor character on both sides. -Remember the widely different aspects of events which are dealt with in -science and in religion respectively. Science is concerned with the -general conditions which are observed to regulate physical phenomena; -whereas religion is wholly wrapped up in the contemplation of moral and -aesthetic values. On the one side there is the law of gravitation, and -on the other the contemplation of the beauty of holiness. What one side -sees, the other misses; and vice versa. - -Consider, for example, the lives of John Wesley and of Saint Francis of -Assisi. For physical science you have in these lives merely ordinary -examples of the operation of the principles of physiological chemistry, -and of the dynamics of nervous reactions: for religion you have lives of -the most profound significance in the history of the world. Can you be -surprised that, in the absence of a perfect and complete phrasing of the -principles of science and of the principles of religion which apply to -these specific cases, the accounts of these lives from these divergent -standpoints should involve discrepancies? It would be a miracle if it -were not so. - -It would, however, be missing the point to think that we need not -trouble ourselves about the conflict between science and religion. In an -intellectual age there can be no active interest which puts aside all -hope of a vision of the harmony of truth. To acquiesce in discrepancy is -destructive of candour, and of moral cleanliness. It belongs to the -self-respect of intellect to pursue every tangle of thought to its final -unravelment. If you check that impulse, you will get no religion and no -science from an awakened thoughtfulness. The important question is, In -what spirit are we going to face the issue? There we come to something -absolutely vital. - -A clash of doctrines is not a disaster—it is an opportunity. I will -explain my meaning by some illustrations from science. The weight of an -atom of nitrogen was well known. Also it was an established scientific -doctrine that the average weight of such atoms in any considerable mass -will be always the same. Two experimenters, the late Lord Rayleigh and -the late Sir William Ramsay, found that if they obtained nitrogen by two -different methods, each equally effective for that purpose, they always -observed a persistent slight difference between the average weights of -the atoms in the two cases. Now I ask you, would it have been rational -of these men to have despaired because of this conflict between chemical -theory and scientific observation? Suppose that for some reason the -chemical doctrine had been highly prized throughout some district as the -foundation of its social order:—would it have been wise, would it have -been candid, would it have been moral, to forbid the disclosure of the -fact that the experiments produced discordant results? Or, on the other -hand, should Sir William Ramsay and Lord Rayleigh have proclaimed that -chemical theory was now a detected delusion? We see at once that either -of these ways would have been a method of facing the issue in an -entirely wrong spirit. What Rayleigh and Ramsay did do was this: They at -once perceived that they had hit upon a line of investigation which -would disclose some subtlety of chemical theory that had hitherto eluded -observation. The discrepancy was not a disaster: it was an opportunity -to increase the sweep of chemical knowledge. You all know the end of the -story: finally argon was discovered, a new chemical element which had -lurked undetected, mixed with the nitrogen. But the story has a sequel -which forms my second illustration. This discovery drew attention to the -importance of observing accurately minute differences in chemical -substances as obtained by different methods. Further researches of the -most careful accuracy were undertaken. Finally another physicist, F. W. -Aston, working in the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge in England, -discovered that even the same element might assume two or more distinct -forms, termed _isotopes_, and that the law of the constancy of average -atomic weight holds for each of these forms, but as between the -different isotopes differs slightly. The research has effected a great -stride in the power of chemical theory, far transcending in importance -the discovery of argon from which it originated. The moral of these -stories lies on the surface, and I will leave to you their application -to the case of religion and science. - -In formal logic, a contradiction is the signal of a defeat: but in the -evolution of real knowledge it marks the first step in progress towards -a victory. This is one great reason for the utmost toleration of variety -of opinion. Once and forever, this duty of toleration has been summed up -in the words, ‘Let both grow together until the harvest.’ The failure of -Christians to act up to this precept, of the highest authority, is one -of the curiosities of religious history. But we have not yet exhausted -the discussion of the moral temper required for the pursuit of truth. -There are short cuts leading merely to an illusory success. It is easy -enough to find a theory, logically harmonious and with important -applications in the region of fact, provided that you are content to -disregard half your evidence. Every age produces people with clear -logical intellects, and with the most praiseworthy grasp of the -importance of some sphere of human experience, who have elaborated, or -inherited, a scheme of thought which exactly fits those experiences -which claim their interest. Such people are apt resolutely to ignore, or -to explain away, all evidence which confuses their scheme with -contradictory instances. What they cannot fit in is for them nonsense. -An unflinching determination to take the whole evidence into account is -the only method of preservation against the fluctuating extremes of -fashionable opinion. This advice seems so easy, and is in fact so -difficult to follow. - -One reason for this difficulty is that we cannot think first and act -afterwards. From the moment of birth we are immersed in action, and can -only fitfully guide it by taking thought. We have, therefore, in various -spheres of experience to adopt those ideas which seem to work within -those spheres. It is absolutely necessary to trust to ideas which are -generally adequate, even though we know that there are subtleties and -distinctions beyond our ken. Also apart from the necessities of action, -we cannot even keep before our minds the whole evidence except under the -guise of doctrines which are incompletely harmonised. We cannot think in -terms of an indefinite multiplicity of detail; our evidence can acquire -its proper importance only if it comes before us marshalled by general -ideas. These ideas we inherit—they form the tradition of our -civilisation. Such traditional ideas are never static. They are either -fading into meaningless formulae, or are gaining power by the new lights -thrown by a more delicate apprehension. They are transformed by the urge -of critical reason, by the vivid evidence of emotional experience, and -by the cold certainties of scientific perception. One fact is certain, -you cannot keep them still. No generation can merely reproduce its -ancestors. You may preserve the life in a flux of form, or preserve the -form amid an ebb of life. But you cannot permanently enclose the same -life in the same mould. - -The present state of religion among the European races illustrates the -statements which I have been making. The phenomena are mixed. There have -been reactions and revivals. But on the whole, during many generations, -there has been a gradual decay of religious influence in European -civilisation. Each revival touches a lower peak than its predecessor, -and each period of slackness a lower depth. The average curve marks a -steady fall in religious tone. In some countries the interest in -religion is higher than in others. But in those countries where the -interest is relatively high, it still falls as the generations pass. -Religion is tending to degenerate into a decent formula wherewith to -embellish a comfortable life. A great historical movement on this scale -results from the convergence of many causes. I wish to suggest two of -them which lie within the scope of this chapter for consideration. - -In the first place for over two centuries religion has been on the -defensive, and on a weak defensive. The period has been one of -unprecedented intellectual progress. In this way a series of novel -situations have been produced for thought. Each such occasion has found -the religious thinkers unprepared. Something, which has been proclaimed -to be vital, has finally, after struggle, distress, and anathema, been -modified and otherwise interpreted. The next generation of religious -apologists then congratulates the religious world on the deeper insight -which has been gained. The result of the continued repetition of this -undignified retreat, during many generations, has at last almost -entirely destroyed the intellectual authority of religious thinkers. -Consider this contrast: when Darwin or Einstein proclaim theories which -modify our ideas, it is a triumph for science. We do not go about saying -that there is another defeat for science, because its old ideas have -been abandoned. We know that another step of scientific insight has been -gained. - -Religion will not regain its old power until it can face change in the -same spirit as does science. Its principles may be eternal, but the -expression of those principles requires continual development. This -evolution of religion is in the main a disengagement of its own proper -ideas from the adventitious notions which have crept into it by reason -of the expression of its own ideas in terms of the imaginative picture -of the world entertained in previous ages. Such a release of religion -from the bonds of imperfect science is all to the good. It stresses its -own genuine message. The great point to be kept in mind is that normally -an advance in science will show that statements of various religious -beliefs require some sort of modification. It may be that they have to -be expanded or explained, or indeed entirely restated. If the religion -is a sound expression of truth, this modification will only exhibit more -adequately the exact point which is of importance. This process is a -gain. In so far, therefore, as any religion has any contact with -physical facts, it is to be expected that the point of view of those -facts must be continually modified as scientific knowledge advances. In -this way, the exact relevance of these facts for religious thought will -grow more and more clear. The progress of science must result in the -unceasing modification of religious thought, to the great advantage of -religion. - -The religious controversies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries -put theologians into a most unfortunate state of mind. They were always -attacking and defending. They pictured themselves as the garrison of a -fort surrounded by hostile forces. All such pictures express -half-truths. That is why they are so popular. But they are dangerous. -This particular picture fostered a pugnacious party spirit which really -expresses an ultimate lack of faith. They dared not modify, because they -shirked the task of disengaging their spiritual message from the -associations of a particular imagery. - -Let me explain myself by an example. In the early medieval times, Heaven -was in the sky, and Hell was underground; volcanoes were the jaws of -Hell. I do not assert that these beliefs entered into the official -formulations: but they did enter into the popular understanding of the -general doctrines of Heaven and Hell. These notions were what everyone -thought to be implied by the doctrine of the future state. They entered -into the explanations of the most influential exponents of Christian -belief. For example, they occur in the _Dialogues_ of Pope Gregory,[18] -the Great, a man whose high official position is surpassed only by the -magnitude of his services to humanity. I am not saying what we ought to -believe about the future state. But whatever be the right doctrine, in -this instance the clash between religion and science, which has -relegated the earth to the position of a second-rate planet attached to -a second-rate sun, has been greatly to the benefit of the spirituality -of religion by dispersing these medieval fancies. - -Footnote 18: - - _Cf._ Gregorovius’ _History of Rome in the Middle Ages_, Book III, Ch. - III, Vol. II, English Trans. - -Another way of looking at this question of the evolution of religious -thought is to note that any verbal form of statement which has been -before the world for some time discloses ambiguities; and that often -such ambiguities strike at the very heart of the meaning. The effective -sense in which a doctrine has been held in the past cannot be determined -by the mere logical analysis of verbal statements, made in ignorance of -the logical trap. You have to take into account the whole reaction of -human nature to the scheme of thought. This reaction is of a mixed -character, including elements of emotion derived from our lower natures. -It is here that the impersonal criticism of science and of philosophy -comes to the aid of religious evolution. Example after example can be -given of this motive force in development. For example, the logical -difficulties inherent in the doctrine of the moral cleansing of human -nature by the power of religion rent Christianity in the days of -Pelagius and Augustine—that is to say, at the beginning of the fifth -century. Echoes of that controversy still linger in theology. - -So far, my point has been this: that religion is the expression of one -type of fundamental experiences of mankind: that religious thought -develops into an increasing accuracy of expression, disengaged from -adventitious imagery: that the interaction between religion and science -is one great factor in promoting this development. - -I now come to my second reason for the modern fading of interest in -religion. This involves the ultimate question which I stated in my -opening sentences. We have to know what we mean by religion. The -churches, in their presentation of their answers to this query, have put -forward aspects of religion which are expressed in terms either suited -to the emotional reactions of bygone times or directed to excite modern -emotional interests of a nonreligious character. What I mean under the -first heading is that religious appeal is directed partly to excite that -instinctive fear of the wrath of a tyrant which was inbred in the -unhappy populations of the arbitrary empires of the ancient world, and -in particular to excite that fear of an all-powerful arbitrary tyrant -behind the unknown forces of nature. This appeal to the ready instinct -of brute fear is losing its force. It lacks any directness of response, -because modern science and modern conditions of life have taught us to -meet occasions of apprehension by a critical analysis of their causes -and conditions. Religion is the reaction of human nature to its search -for God. The presentation of God under the aspect of power awakens every -modern instinct of critical reaction. This is fatal; for religion -collapses unless its main positions command immediacy of assent. In this -respect the old phraseology is at variance with the psychology of modern -civilisations. This change in psychology is largely due to science, and -is one of the chief ways in which the advance of science has weakened -the hold of the old religious forms of expression. The nonreligious -motive which has entered into modern religious thought is the desire for -a comfortable organisation of modern society. Religion has been -presented as valuable for the ordering of life. Its claims have been -rested upon its function as a sanction to right conduct. Also the -purpose of right conduct quickly degenerates into the formation of -pleasing social relations. We have here a subtle degradation of -religious ideas, following upon their gradual purification under the -influence of keener ethical intuitions. Conduct is a by-product of -religion—an inevitable by-product, but not the main point. Every great -religious teacher has revolted against the presentation of religion as a -mere sanction of rules of conduct. Saint Paul denounced the Law, and -Puritan divines spoke of the filthy rags of righteousness. The -insistence upon rules of conduct marks the ebb of religious fervour. -Above and beyond all things, the religious life is not a research after -comfort. I must now state, in all diffidence, what I conceive to be the -essential character of the religious spirit. - -Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and -within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, -and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote possibility, -and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to -all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession -is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the -ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest. - -The immediate reaction of human nature to the religious vision is -worship. Religion has emerged into human experience mixed with the -crudest fancies of barbaric imagination. Gradually, slowly, steadily the -vision recurs in history under nobler form and with clearer expression. -It is the one element in human experience which persistently shows an -upward trend. It fades and then recurs. But when it renews its force, it -recurs with an added richness and purity of content. The fact of the -religious vision, and its history of persistent expansion, is our one -ground for optimism. Apart from it, human life is a flash of occasional -enjoyments lighting up a mass of pain and misery, a bagatelle of -transient experience. - -The vision claims nothing but worship; and worship is a surrender to the -claim for assimilation, urged with the motive force of mutual love. The -vision never overrules. It is always there, and it has the power of love -presenting the one purpose whose fulfilment is eternal harmony. Such -order as we find in nature is never force—it presents itself as the one -harmonious adjustment of complex detail. Evil is the brute motive force -of fragmentary purpose, disregarding the eternal vision. Evil is -overruling, retarding, hurting. The power of God is the worship He -inspires. That religion is strong which in its ritual and its modes of -thought evokes an apprehension of the commanding vision. The worship of -God is not a rule of safety—it is an adventure of the spirit, a flight -after the unattainable. The death of religion comes with the repression -of the high hope of adventure. - - - - - CHAPTER XIII - - REQUISITES FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS - - -It has been the purpose of these lectures to analyse the reactions of -science in forming that background of instinctive ideas which control -the activities of successive generations. Such a background takes the -form of a certain vague philosophy as to the last word about things, -when all is said. The three centuries, which form the epoch of modern -science, have revolved round the ideas of _God_, _mind_, _matter_, and -also of _space_ and _time_ in their characters of expressing _simple -location_ for matter. Philosophy has on the whole emphasised _mind_, and -has thus been out of touch with science during the two latter centuries. -But it is creeping back into its old importance owing to the rise of -psychology and its alliance with physiology. Also, this rehabilitation -of philosophy has been facilitated by the recent breakdown of the -seventeenth century settlement of the principles of physical science. -But, until that collapse, science seated itself securely upon the -concepts of matter, space, time, and latterly, of energy. Also there -were arbitrary laws of nature determining locomotion. They were -empirically observed, but for some obscure reason were known to be -universal. Anyone who in practice or theory disregarded them was -denounced with unsparing vigour. This position on the part of scientists -was pure bluff, if one may credit them with believing their own -statements. For their current philosophy completely failed to justify -the assumption that the immediate knowledge inherent in any present -occasion throws any light either on its past, or its future. - -I have also sketched an alternative philosophy of science in which -_organism_ takes the place of _matter_. For this purpose, the mind -involved in the materialist theory dissolves into a function of -organism. The psychological field then exhibits what an event is in -itself. Our bodily event is an unusually complex type of organism and -consequently includes cognition. Further, space and time, in their most -concrete signification, become the locus of events. An organism is the -realisation of a definite shape of value. The emergence of some actual -value depends on limitation which excludes neutralising cross-lights. -Thus an event is a matter of fact which by reason of its limitation is a -value for itself; but by reason of its very nature it also requires the -whole universe in order to be itself. - -Importance depends on endurance. Endurance is the retention through time -of an achievement of value. What endures is identity of pattern, -self-inherited. Endurance requires the favourable environment. The whole -of science revolves round this question of enduring organisms. - -The general influence of science at the present moment can be analysed -under the headings: General Conceptions Respecting the Universe, -Technological Applications, Professionalism in Knowledge, Influence of -Biological Doctrines on the Motives of Conduct. I have endeavoured in -the preceding lectures to give a glimpse of these points. It lies within -the scope of this concluding lecture to consider the reaction of science -upon some problems confronting civilised societies. - -The general conceptions introduced by science into modern thought cannot -be separated from the philosophical situation as expressed by Descartes. -I mean the assumption of bodies and minds as independent individual -substances, each existing in its own right apart from any necessary -reference to each other. Such a conception was very concordant with the -individualism which had issued from the moral discipline of the Middle -Ages. But, though the easy reception of the idea is thus explained, the -derivation in itself rests upon a confusion, very natural but none the -less unfortunate. The moral discipline had emphasized the intrinsic -value of the individual entity. This emphasis had put the notions of the -individual and of its experiences into the foreground of thought. At -this point the confusion commences. The emergent individual value of -each entity is transformed into the independent substantial existence of -each entity, which is a very different notion. - -I do not mean to say that Descartes made this logical, or rather -illogical, transition, in the form of explicit reasoning. Far from it. -What he did, was first to concentrate upon his own conscious -experiences, as being facts within the independent world of his own -mentality. He was led to speculate in this way by the current emphasis -upon the individual value of his total self. He implicitly transformed -this emergent individual value, inherent in the very fact of his own -reality, into a private world of passions, or modes, of independent -substance. - -Also the independence ascribed to bodily substances carried them away -from the realm of values altogether. They degenerated into a mechanism -entirely valueless, except as suggestive of an external ingenuity. The -heavens had lost the glory of God. This state of mind is illustrated in -the recoil of Protestantism from aesthetic effects dependent upon a -material medium. It was taken to lead to an ascription of value to what -is in itself valueless. This recoil was already in full strength -antecedently to Descartes. Accordingly, the Cartesian scientific -doctrine of bits of matter, bare of intrinsic value, was merely a -formulation, in explicit terms, of a doctrine which was current before -its entrance into scientific thought or Cartesian philosophy. Probably -this doctrine was latent in the scholastic philosophy, but it did not -lead to its consequences till it met with the mentality of northern -Europe in the sixteenth century. But science, as equipped by Descartes, -gave stability and intellectual status to a point of view which has had -very mixed effects upon the moral presuppositions of modern communities. -Its good effects arose from its efficiency as a method for scientific -researches within those limited regions which were then best suited for -exploration. The result was a general clearing of the European mind away -from the stains left upon it by the hysteria of remote barbaric ages. -This was all to the good, and was most completely exemplified in the -eighteenth century. - -But in the nineteenth century, when society was undergoing -transformation into the manufacturing system, the bad effects of these -doctrines have been very fatal. The doctrine of minds, as independent -substances, leads directly not merely to private worlds of experience, -but also to private worlds of morals. The moral intuitions can be held -to apply only to the strictly private world of psychological experience. -Accordingly, self-respect, and the making the most of your own -individual opportunities, together constituted the efficient morality of -the leaders among the industrialists of that period. The western world -is now suffering from the limited moral outlook of the three previous -generations. - -Also the assumption of the bare valuelessness of mere matter led to a -lack of reverence in the treatment of natural or artistic beauty. Just -when the urbanisation of the western world was entering upon its state -of rapid development, and when the most delicate, anxious consideration -of the aesthetic qualities of the new material environment was -requisite, the doctrine of the irrelevance of such ideas was at its -height. In the most advanced industrial countries, art was treated as a -frivolity. A striking example of this state of mind in the middle of the -nineteenth century is to be seen in London where the marvellous beauty -of the estuary of the Thames, as it curves through the city, is wantonly -defaced by the Charing Cross railway bridge, constructed apart from any -reference to aesthetic values. - -The two evils are: one, the ignoration of the true relation of each -organism to its environment; and the other, the habit of ignoring the -intrinsic worth of the environment which must be allowed its weight in -any consideration of final ends. - -Another great fact confronting the modern world is the discovery of the -method of training professionals, who specialise in particular regions -of thought and thereby progressively add to the sum of knowledge within -their respective limitations of subject. In consequence of the success -of this professionalising of knowledge, there are two points to be kept -in mind, which differentiate our present age from the past. In the first -place, the rate of progress is such that an individual human being, of -ordinary length of life, will be called upon to face novel situations -which find no parallel in his past. The fixed person for the fixed -duties, who in older societies was such a godsend, in the future will be -a public danger. In the second place, the modern professionalism in -knowledge works in the opposite direction so far as the intellectual -sphere is concerned. The modern chemist is likely to be weak in zoology, -weaker still in his general knowledge of the Elizabethan drama, and -completely ignorant of the principles of rhythm in English -versification. It is probably safe to ignore his knowledge of ancient -history. Of course I am speaking of general tendencies; for chemists are -no worse than engineers, or mathematicians, or classical scholars. -Effective knowledge is professionalised knowledge, supported by a -restricted acquaintance with useful subjects subservient to it. - -This situation has its dangers. It produces minds in a groove. Each -profession makes progress, but it is progress in its own groove. Now to -be mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of -abstractions. The groove prevents straying across country, and the -abstraction abstracts from something to which no further attention is -paid. But there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the -comprehension of human life. Thus in the modern world, the celibacy of -the medieval learned class has been replaced by a celibacy of the -intellect which is divorced from the concrete contemplation of the -complete facts. Of course, no one is merely a mathematician, or merely a -lawyer. People have lives outside their professions or their businesses. -But the point is the restraint of serious thought within a groove. The -remainder of life is treated superficially, with the imperfect -categories of thought derived from one profession. - -The dangers arising from this aspect of professionalism are great, -particularly in our democratic societies. The directive force of reason -is weakened. The leading intellects lack balance. They see this set of -circumstances, or that set; but not both sets together. The task of -coördination is left to those who lack either the force or the character -to succeed in some definite career. In short, the specialised functions -of the community are performed better and more progressively, but the -generalised direction lacks vision. The progressiveness in detail only -adds to the danger produced by the feebleness of coördination. - -This criticism of modern life applies throughout, in whatever sense you -construe the meaning of a community. It holds if you apply it to a -nation, a city, a district, an institution, a family, or even to an -individual. There is a development of particular abstractions, and a -contraction of concrete appreciation. The whole is lost in one of its -aspects. It is not necessary for my point that I should maintain that -our directive wisdom, either as individuals or as communities, is less -now than in the past. Perhaps it has slightly improved. But the novel -pace of progress requires a greater force of direction if disasters are -to be avoided. The point is that the discoveries of the nineteenth -century were in the direction of professionalism, so that we are left -with no expansion of wisdom and with greater need of it. - -Wisdom is the fruit of a balanced development. It is this balanced -growth of individuality which it should be the aim of education to -secure. The most useful discoveries for the immediate future would -concern the furtherance of this aim without detriment to the necessary -intellectual professionalism. - -My own criticism of our traditional educational methods is that they are -far too much occupied with intellectual analysis, and with the -acquirement of formularised information. What I mean is, that we neglect -to strengthen habits of concrete appreciation of the individual facts in -their full interplay of emergent values, and that we merely emphasise -abstract formulations which ignore this aspect of the interplay of -diverse values. - -In every country the problem of the balance of the general and -specialist education is under consideration. I cannot speak with -first-hand knowledge of any country but my own. I know that there, among -practical educationalists, there is considerable dissatisfaction with -the existing practice. Also, the adaptation of the whole system to the -needs of a democratic community is very far from being solved. I do not -think that the secret of the solution lies in terms of the antithesis -between thoroughness in special knowledge and general knowledge of a -slighter character. The make-weight which balances the thoroughness of -the specialist intellectual training should be of a radically different -kind from purely intellectual analytical knowledge. At present our -education combines a thorough study of a few abstractions, with a -slighter study of a larger number of abstractions. We are too -exclusively bookish in our scholastic routine. The general training -should aim at eliciting our concrete apprehensions, and should satisfy -the itch of youth to be doing something. There should be some analysis -even here, but only just enough to illustrate the ways of thinking in -diverse spheres. In the Garden of Eden Adam saw the animals before he -named them: in the traditional system, children named the animals before -they saw them. - -There is no easy single solution of the practical difficulties of -education. We can, however, guide ourselves by a certain simplicity in -its general theory. The student should concentrate within a limited -field. Such concentration should include all practical and intellectual -acquirements requisite for that concentration. This is the ordinary -procedure; and, in respect to it, I should be inclined even to increase -the facilities for concentration rather than to diminish them. With the -concentration there are associated certain subsidiary studies, such as -languages for science. Such a scheme of professional training should be -directed to a clear end congenial to the student. It is not necessary to -elaborate the qualifications of these statements. Such a training must, -of course, have the width requisite for its end. But its design should -not be complicated by the consideration of other ends. This professional -training can only touch one side of education. Its centre of gravity -lies in the intellect, and its chief tool is the printed book. The -centre of gravity of the other side of training should lie in intuition -without an analytical divorce from the total environment. Its object is -immediate apprehension with the minimum of eviscerating analysis. The -type of generality, which above all is wanted, is the appreciation of -variety of value. I mean an aesthetic growth. There is something between -the gross specialised values of the mere practical man, and the thin -specialised values of the mere scholar. Both types have missed -something; and if you add together the two sets of values, you do not -obtain the missing elements. What is wanted is an appreciation of the -infinite variety of vivid values achieved by an organism in its proper -environment. When you understand all about the sun and all about the -atmosphere and all about the rotation of the earth, you may still miss -the radiance of the sunset. There is no substitute for the direct -perception of the concrete achievement of a thing in its actuality. We -want concrete fact with a high light thrown on what is relevant to its -preciousness. - -What I mean is art and aesthetic education. It is, however, art in such -a general sense of the term that I hardly like to call it by that name. -Art is a special example. What we want is to draw out habits of -aesthetic apprehension. According to the metaphysical doctrine which I -have been developing, to do so is to increase the depth of -individuality. The analysis of reality indicates the two factors, -activity emerging into individualised aesthetic value. Also the emergent -value is the measure of the individualisation of the activity. We must -foster the creative initiative towards the maintenance of objective -values. You will not obtain the apprehension without the initiative, or -the initiative without the apprehension. As soon as you get towards the -concrete, you cannot exclude action. Sensitiveness without impulse -spells decadence, and impulse without sensitiveness spells brutality. I -am using the word “sensitiveness” in its most general signification, so -as to include apprehension of what lies beyond oneself; that is to say, -sensitiveness to all the facts of the case. Thus “art” in the general -sense which I require is any selection by which the concrete facts are -so arranged as to elicit attention to particular values which are -realisable by them. For example, the mere disposing of the human body -and the eyesight so as to get a good view of a sunset is a simple form -of artistic selection. The habit of art is the habit of enjoying vivid -values. - -But, in this sense, art concerns more than sunsets. A factory, with its -machinery, its community of operatives, its social service to the -general population, its dependence upon organising and designing genius, -its potentialities as a source of wealth to the holders of its stock is -an organism exhibiting a variety of vivid values. What we want to train -is the habit of apprehending such an organism in its completeness. It is -very arguable that the science of political economy, as studied in its -first period after the death of Adam Smith (1790), did more harm than -good. It destroyed many economic fallacies, and taught how to think -about the economic revolution then in progress. But it riveted on men a -certain set of abstractions which were disastrous in their influence on -modern mentality. It de-humanised industry. This is only one example of -a general danger inherent in modern science. Its methodological -procedure is exclusive and intolerant, and rightly so. It fixes -attention on a definite group of abstractions, neglects everything else, -and elicits every scrap of information and theory which is relevant to -what it has retained. This method is triumphant, provided that the -abstractions are judicious. But, however triumphant, the triumph is -within limits. The neglect of these limits leads to disastrous -oversights. The anti-rationalism of science is partly justified, as a -preservation of its useful methodology; it is partly mere irrational -prejudice. Modern professionalism is the training of minds to conform to -the methodology. The historical revolt of the seventeenth century, and -the earlier reaction towards naturalism, were examples of transcending -the abstractions which fascinated educated society in the Middle Ages. -These early ages had an ideal of rationalism, but they failed in its -pursuit. For they neglected to note that the methodology of reasoning -requires the limitations involved in the abstract. Accordingly, the true -rationalism must always transcend itself by recurrence to the concrete -in search of inspiration. A self-satisfied rationalism is in effect a -form of anti-rationalism. It means an arbitrary halt at a particular set -of abstractions. This was the case with science. - -There are two principles inherent in the very nature of things, -recurring in some particular embodiments whatever field we explore—the -spirit of change, and the spirit of conservation. There can be nothing -real without both. Mere change without conservation is a passage from -nothing to nothing. Its final integration yields mere transient -non-entity. Mere conservation without change cannot conserve. For after -all, there is a flux of circumstance, and the freshness of being -evaporates under mere repetition. The character of existent reality is -composed of organisms enduring through the flux of things. The low type -of organisms have achieved a self-identity dominating their whole -physical life. Electrons, molecules, crystals, belong to this type. They -exhibit a massive and complete sameness. In the higher types, where life -appears, there is greater complexity. Thus, though there is a complex, -enduring pattern, it has retreated into deeper recesses of the total -fact. In a sense, the self-identity of a human being is more abstract -than that of a crystal. It is the life of the spirit. It relates rather -to the individualisation of the creative activity; so that the changing -circumstances received from the environment, are differentiated from the -living personality, and are thought of as forming its perceived field. -In truth, the field of perception and the perceiving mind are -abstractions which, in the concrete, combine into the successive bodily -events. The psychological field, as restricted to sense-objects and -passing emotions, is the minor permanence, barely rescued from the -nonentity of mere change; and the mind is the major permanence, -permeating that complete field, whose endurance is the living soul. But -the soul would wither without fertilisation from its transient -experiences. The secret of the higher organisms lies in their two grades -of permanences. By this means the freshness of the environment is -absorbed into the permanence of the soul. The changing environment is no -longer, by reason of its variety, an enemy to the endurance of the -organism. The pattern of the higher organism has retreated into the -recesses of the individualised activity. It has become a uniform way of -dealing with circumstances; and this way is only strengthened by having -a proper variety of circumstances to deal with. - -This fertilisation of the soul is the reason for the necessity of art. A -static value, however serious and important, becomes unendurable by its -appalling monotony of endurance. The soul cries aloud for release into -change. It suffers the agonies of claustrophobia. The transitions of -humour, wit, irreverence, play, sleep, and—above all—of art are -necessary for it. Great art is the arrangement of the environment so as -to provide for the soul vivid, but transient, values. Human beings -require something which absorbs them for a time, something out of the -routine which they can stare at. But you cannot subdivide life, except -in the abstract analysis of thought. Accordingly, the great art is more -than a transient refreshment. It is something which adds to the -permanent richness of the soul’s self-attainment. It justifies itself -both by its immediate enjoyment, and also by its discipline of the -inmost being. Its discipline is not distinct from enjoyment, but by -reason of it. It transforms the soul into the permanent realisation of -values extending beyond its former self. This element of transition in -art is shown by the restlessness exhibited in its history. An epoch gets -saturated by the masterpieces of any one style. Something new must be -discovered. The human being wanders on. Yet there is a balance in -things. Mere change before the attainment of adequacy of achievement, -either in quality or output, is destructive of greatness. But the -importance of a living art, which moves on and yet leaves its permanent -mark, can hardly be exaggerated. - -In regard to the aesthetic needs of civilised society the reactions of -science have so far been unfortunate. Its materialistic basis has -directed attention to _things_ as opposed to _values_. The antithesis is -a false one, if taken in a concrete sense. But it is valid at the -abstract level of ordinary thought. This misplaced emphasis coalesced -with the abstractions of political economy, which are in fact the -abstractions in terms of which commercial affairs are carried on. Thus -all thought concerned with social organisation expressed itself in terms -of material things and of capital. Ultimate values were excluded. They -were politely bowed to, and then handed over to the clergy to be kept -for Sundays. A creed of competitive business morality was evolved, in -some respects curiously high; but entirely devoid of consideration for -the value of human life. The workmen were conceived as mere hands, drawn -from the pool of labour. To God’s question, men gave the answer of -Cain—“Am I my brother’s keeper?”; and they incurred Cain’s guilt. This -was the atmosphere in which the industrial revolution was accomplished -in England, and to a large extent elsewhere. The internal history of -England during the last half century has been an endeavour slowly and -painfully to undo the evils wrought in the first stage of the new epoch. -It may be that civilisation will never recover from the bad climate -which enveloped the introduction of machinery. This climate pervaded the -whole commercial system of the progressive northern European races. It -was partly the result of the aesthetic errors of Protestantism and -partly the result of scientific materialism, and partly the result of -the natural greed of mankind, and partly the result of the abstractions -of political economy. An illustration of my point is to be found in -Macaulay’s Essay criticising Southey’s _Colloquies on Society_. It was -written in 1830. Now Macaulay was a very favourable example of men -living at that date, or at any date. He had genius; he was kind-hearted, -honourable, and a reformer. This is the extract:—“We are told, that our -age has invented atrocities beyond the imagination of our fathers; that -society has been brought into a state compared with which extermination -would be a blessing; and all because the dwellings of cotton-spinners -are naked and rectangular. Mr. Southey has found out a way he tells us, -in which the effects of manufactures and agriculture may be compared. -And what is this way? To stand on a hill, to look at a cottage and a -factory, and to see which is the prettier.” - -Southey seems to have said many silly things in his book; but, so far as -this extract is concerned, he could make a good case for himself if he -returned to earth after the lapse of nearly a century. The evils of the -early industrial system are now a commonplace of knowledge. The point -which I am insisting on is the stone-blind eye with which even the best -men of that time regarded the importance of aesthetics in a nation’s -life. I do not believe that we have as yet nearly achieved the right -estimate. A contributory cause, of substantial efficacy to produce this -disastrous error, was the scientific creed that matter in motion is the -one concrete reality in nature; so that aesthetic values form an -adventitious, irrelevant addition. - -There is another side to this picture of the possibilities of decadence. -At the present moment a discussion is raging as to the future of -civilisation in the novel circumstances of rapid scientific and -technological advance. The evils of the future have been diagnosed in -various ways, the loss of religious faith, the malignant use of material -power, the degradation attending a differential birth rate favouring the -lower types of humanity, the suppression of aesthetic creativeness. -Without doubt, these are all evils, dangerous and threatening. But they -are not new. From the dawn of history, mankind has always been losing -its religious faith, has always suffered from the malignant use of -material power, has always suffered from the infertility of its best -intellectual types, has always witnessed the periodical decadence of -art. In the reign of the Egyptian king, Tutankhamen, there was raging a -desperate religious struggle between Modernists and Fundamentalists; the -cave pictures exhibit a phase of delicate aesthetic achievement as -superseded by a period of comparative vulgarity; the religious leaders, -the great thinkers, the great poets and authors, the whole clerical -caste in the Middle Ages, have been notably infertile; finally, if we -attend to what actually has happened in the past, and disregard romantic -visions of democracies, aristocracies, kings, generals, armies, and -merchants, material power has generally been wielded with blindness, -obstinacy and selfishness, often with brutal malignancy. And yet, -mankind has progressed. Even if you take a tiny oasis of peculiar -excellence, the type of modern man who would have most chance of -happiness in ancient Greece at its best period is probably (as now) an -average professional heavy-weight boxer, and not an average Greek -scholar from Oxford or Germany. Indeed, the main use of the Oxford -scholar would have been his capability of writing an ode in -glorification of the boxer. Nothing does more harm in unnerving men for -their duties in the present, than the attention devoted to the points of -excellence in the past as compared with the average failure of the -present day. - -But, after all, there have been real periods of decadence; and at the -present time, as at other epochs, society is decaying, and there is need -for preservative action. Professionals are not new to the world. But in -the past, professionals have formed unprogressive castes. The point is -that professionalism has now been mated with progress. The world is now -faced with a self-evolving system, which it cannot stop. There are -dangers and advantages in this situation. It is obvious that the gain in -material power affords opportunity for social betterment. If mankind can -rise to the occasion, there lies in front a golden age of beneficent -creativeness. But material power in itself is ethically neutral. It can -equally well work in the wrong direction. The problem is not how to -produce great men, but how to produce great societies. The great society -will put up the men for the occasions. The materialistic philosophy -emphasised the given quantity of material, and thence derivatively the -given nature of the environment. It thus operated most unfortunately -upon the social conscience of mankind. For it directed almost exclusive -attention to the aspect of struggle for existence in a fixed -environment. To a large extent the environment is fixed, and to this -extent there is a struggle for existence. It is folly to look at the -universe through rose-tinted spectacles. We must admit the struggle. The -question is, who is to be eliminated. In so far as we are educators, we -have to have clear ideas upon that point; for it settles the type to be -produced and the practical ethics to be inculcated. - -But during the last three generations, the exclusive direction of -attention to this aspect of things has been a disaster of the first -magnitude. The watchwords of the nineteenth century have been, struggle -for existence, competition, class warfare, commercial antagonism between -nations, military warfare. The struggle for existence has been construed -into the gospel of hate. The full conclusion to be drawn from a -philosophy of evolution is fortunately of a more balanced character. -Successful organisms modify their environment. Those organisms are -successful which modify their environments so as to assist each other. -This law is exemplified in nature on a vast scale. For example, the -North American Indians accepted their environment, with the result that -a scanty population barely succeeded in maintaining themselves over the -whole continent. The European races when they arrived in the same -continent pursued an opposite policy. They at once coöperated in -modifying their environment. The result is that a population more than -twenty times that of the Indian population now occupies the same -territory, and the continent is not yet full. Again, there are -associations of different species which mutually coöperate. This -differentiation of species is exhibited in the simplest physical -entities, such as the association between electrons and positive nuclei, -and in the whole realm of animate nature. The trees in a Brazilian -forest depend upon the association of various species of organisms, each -of which is mutually dependent on the other species. A single tree by -itself is dependent upon all the adverse chances of shifting -circumstances. The wind stunts it: the variations in temperature check -its foliage: the rains denude its soil: its leaves are blown away and -are lost for the purpose of fertilisation. You may obtain individual -specimens of fine trees either in exceptional circumstances, or where -human cultivation has intervened. But in nature the normal way in which -trees flourish is by their association in a forest. Each tree may lose -something of its individual perfection of growth, but they mutually -assist each other in preserving the conditions for survival. The soil is -preserved and shaded; and the microbes necessary for its fertility are -neither scorched, nor frozen, nor washed away. A forest is the triumph -of the organisation of mutually dependent species. Further a species of -microbes which kills the forest, also exterminates itself. Again the two -sexes exhibit the same advantage of differentiation. In the history of -the world, the prize has not gone to those species which specialised in -methods of violence, or even in defensive armour. In fact, nature began -with producing animals encased in hard shells for defence against the -ills of life. It also experimented in size. But smaller animals, without -external armour, warm-blooded, sensitive, and alert, have cleared these -monsters off the face of the earth. Also, the lions and tigers are not -the successful species. There is something in the ready use of force -which defeats its own object. Its main defect is that it bars -coöperation. Every organism requires an environment of friends, partly -to shield it from violent changes, and partly to supply it with its -wants. The Gospel of Force is incompatible with a social life. By -_force_, I mean _antagonism_ in its most general sense. - -Almost equally dangerous is the Gospel of Uniformity. The differences -between the nations and races of mankind are required to preserve the -conditions under which higher development is possible. One main factor -in the upward trend of animal life has been the power of wandering. -Perhaps this is why the armour-plated monsters fared badly. They could -not wander. Animals wander into new conditions. They have to adapt -themselves or die. Mankind has wandered from the trees to the plains, -from the plains to the seacoast, from climate to climate, from continent -to continent, and from habit of life to habit of life. When man ceases -to wander, he will cease to ascend in the scale of being. Physical -wandering is still important, but greater still is the power of man’s -spiritual adventures—adventures of thought, adventures of passionate -feeling, adventures of aesthetic experience. A diversification among -human communities is essential for the provision of the incentive and -material for the Odyssey of the human spirit. Other nations of different -habits are not enemies: they are godsends. Men require of their -neighbours something sufficiently akin to be understood, something -sufficiently different to provoke attention, and something great enough -to command admiration. We must not expect, however, all the virtues. We -should even be satisfied if there is something odd enough to be -interesting. - -Modern science has imposed on humanity the necessity for wandering. Its -progressive thought and its progressive technology make the transition -through time, from generation to generation, a true migration into -uncharted seas of adventure. The very benefit of wandering is that it is -dangerous and needs skill to avert evils. We must expect, therefore, -that the future will disclose dangers. It is the business of the future -to be dangerous; and it is among the merits of science that it equips -the future for its duties. The prosperous middle classes, who ruled the -nineteenth century, placed an excessive value upon placidity of -existence. They refused to face the necessities for social reform -imposed by the new industrial system, and they are now refusing to face -the necessities for intellectual reform imposed by the new knowledge. -The middle class pessimism over the future of the world comes from a -confusion between civilisation and security. In the immediate future -there will be less security than in the immediate past, less stability. -It must be admitted that there is a degree of instability which is -inconsistent with civilisation. But, on the whole, the great ages have -been unstable ages. - -I have endeavoured in these lectures to give a record of a great -adventure in the region of thought. It was shared in by all the races of -western Europe. It developed with the slowness of a mass movement. Half -a century is its unit of time. The tale is the epic of an episode in the -manifestation of reason. It tells how a particular direction of reason -emerges in a race by the long preparation of antecedent epochs, how -after its birth its subject-matter gradually unfolds itself, how it -attains its triumphs, how its influence moulds the very springs of -action of mankind, and finally how at its moment of supreme success its -limitations disclose themselves and call for a renewed exercise of the -creative imagination. The moral of the tale is the power of reason, its -decisive influence on the life of humanity. The great conquerors, from -Alexander to Caesar, and from Caesar to Napoleon, influenced profoundly -the lives of subsequent generations. But the total effect of this -influence shrinks to insignificance, if compared to the entire -transformation of human habits and human mentality produced by the long -line of men of thought from Thales to the present day, men individually -powerless, but ultimately the rulers of the world. - - - - - INDEX - -The numbers refer to pages; and ‘_e.s._’ stands for ‘_et seqq._’, where -the reference is to the succeeding pages of the chapter in question. - - Abruptness (in Ingression), 239. - Absolute, The, 129. - Abstract, 221. - Abstraction, 233, _e.s._ - Abstraction (in Mathematics), 28, _e.s._ - Abstractive Hierarchy, 234, _e.s._ - Acceleration, 66. - Actualisation, 222. - Adam Smith, 280. - Aeschylus, 14. - Alexander, S., _preface_. - Algebra, 42, 44. - Alva, 2. - Ampère, 139. - Analytical Character (Eternal Objects), 228. - Anselm, St., 80. - ‘Any,’ 229. - Aquinas, Thomas, 12, 13, 205. - Arabic Arithmetical Notation, 42. - Archimedes, 7, 8, 9, 10. - Arguments (of functions), 44. - Aristotle, 7, _e.s._; 41, 42; 64, _e.s._; 180, 187; 236, _e.s._ - Arnold, Matthew, 115. - Art, 279, _e.s._ - Art, Medieval, 18, _e.s._ - Aspect, 98; 146, _e.s._ - Associated Hierarchy, 237. - Aston, F. W., 260. - Atom, 140, 144. - Augustine, Saint, 266. - - Bacon, Francis, 11; 56, _e.s._; 92, 136. - Bacon, Roger, 7. - Base of Abstractive Hierarchy, 235. - Being, 227. - Belisarius, 19. - Benedict, Saint, 21. - Bergson, 72; 202, _e.s._ - Berkeley, George, 93, _e.s._; 105, 120, 198. - Bichât, 141. - Biology, 58, 88, 144. - Bonaventure, Saint, 12. - Boyle, Robert, 57. - Brown University, _Preface_. - Bruno, Giordano, 1. - Byzantine Empire, 19. - - Carlyle, 85. - Cervantes, 56. - Change, 121. - Chaucer, 22. - China, 8, 106. - Clairaut, 85, 193. - Classification, 41, _e.s._ - Clough, A. H., 115. - Cognition, 97. - Coleridge, 115, 116. - Columbus, 22, 49. - Complex Eternal Objects, 232. - Components, 232. - Conic Sections, 42. - Connexity (of a Hierarchy), 235. - Connectedness (of an occasion), 237. - Conservation of Energy, 142, _e.s._ - Continuity, 140. - Copernicus, 1, 22, 56, 184. - Cosmas, 254. - Cromwell, Oliver, 23. - - D’Alembert, 80, 85. - Dalton, John, 140, 141. - Da Vinci, Leonardo, 60. - Darwin, 263. - Democritus, 140. - Demos, R., _Preface_. - Density, 70, 189. - Desargues, 78. - Descartes, 25; 43, _e.s._; 56, 57; 104; 115; 195, _e.s._; 272. - Determinism, 110. - Differential Calculus, 78. - Discontinuous Existence, 51; 190, _e.s._ - Distance, 173. - Divinity, Scholastic, 17. - Divisibility, 177. - - Education, 277, _e.s._ - Egyptians, 20, 43. - Einstein, 14, 41, 86, 88; 173, _e.s._; 263. - Electron, 50, _e.s._; 111, _e.s._; 185, _e.s._ - Empty Events, 214. - Endurance, 121; 147, _e.s._; 169, _e.s._; 186, _e.s._; 212. - Endurance, Vibratory, 51. - Energy, Physical, 51, _e.s._ - Environment, 155, _e.s._ - Envisagement, 148, _e.s._ - Epochs, 177. - Epochal Durations, 192. - Essence, 175. - Eternal Objects, 121, _e.s._; 146, _e.s._; 221, _e.s._ - Ether, 184. - Euripides, 14. - Event, 102; 168, _e.s._ - Evolution, 130; 142, _e.s._ - Exhaustion, Method of, 42. - Extension, 177. - Extensive Quantity, 178. - External Relations, 223, _e.s._ - Extrinsic Reality, 146. - - Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness, 72, _e.s._; 82. - Faraday, 139. - Fate, 14. - Fermat, 78. - Finite Abstractive Hierarchy, 235. - Form, 230. - Force, 64, _e.s._ - Fourier, 85. - Francis of Assisi, 258. - Frederick, the Great, 89. - Frequency, 181, _e.s._ - Fresnel, 139. - Frost, Robert, 22. - Future, 245, _e.s._ - - Galileo, 2, _e.s._; 43, 45; 56, _e.s._; 88, 162, 187; 255, _e.s._ - Galvani, 88. - Gauss, 86, 88. - Geometry, 31, _e.s._ - George II, 93. - Germany, 57. - Gibson, 206. - God, 17, 86, 129; 242, _e.s._ - Gradation of Envisagement, 247. - Gravitation, 65, 172. - Greece, 8, _e.s._ - Gregorovius, 265. - Giotto, 22. - Gregory, The Great, 21, 265. - - Harvey, 56, 57. - Heath, Sir T. L., 180. - Hegel, 40. - Herz, 86, 88. - Historical Revolt, 11, _e.s._; 55, 150. - Hooker, Richard, 13. - Hume, 5, 47, 61, 73; 80, _e.s._; 107, 198. - Huyghens, 45; 57, _e.s._; 256. - - Idealism, 89; 127, _e.s._ - Immediate Occasion, 36, _e.s._; 62. - Individual Essence, 222, _e.s._ - Induction, 34; 60, _e.s._ - Infinite Abstractive Hierarchy, 235. - Ingression, 99, _e.s._; 222. - Integral Calculus, 42. - Internal Relations, 175; 223, _e.s._ - Intrinsic Reality, 146. - Invention, 136, _e.s._ - Ionian Philosophers, 9. - Irresistible Grace, 105. - Isolated Systems, 66. - Isolation of Eternal Objects, 230. - Isotopes, 260. - Italy, 57. - - James, Henry, 3. - James, William, 3; 199, _e.s._ - Joseph, Hapsburgh Emperor, 89. - Justinian, 19, 20. - - Kant, 47; 93, _e.s._; 116, 142, 178; 193, _e.s._ - Kepler, 9, 45, 57, 67. - - Lagrange, 84, _e.s._ - Laplace, 85, 142. - Lavoisier, 84, 146. - Law, Roman, 16. - Laws of Nature, 45, 150. - Least Action, 87, 150. - Lecky, 15, 16, 254. - Leibniz, 43, 44, 48, 57, 92, 115; 198, _e.s._ - Life, 58. - Limitation, 225, _e.s._ - Lloyd Morgan, _Preface_. - Location, Simple, 69, _e.s._; 81, _e.s._; 95. - Locke, John, 43, 47; 57, _e.s._; 89, 94, 115, 198. - Locomotion, Vibratory, 184, _e.s._ - Logic, Abstract, 37, _e.s._ - Logic, Scholastic, 17. - Lucretius, 140. - - Macaulay, 285. - Milton, 108, _e.s._ - Mind, 79. - Mass, 64, _e.s._; 144. - Mathematics, 10, 23; 28, _e.s._ - Mathematics, Applied, 34, _e.s._ - Matter, 24, 94, 58, 144. - Matter (philosophical), 231. - Maupertuis, 85, _e.s._ - Max Müller, 178. - Maxwell, Clerk, 85, _e.s._; 139, _e.s._; 161. - Mechanical Explanation, 23. - Mechanism, 107, _e.s._ - Mechanistic Theory, 71. - Memory, 73. - Mersenne, 46. - Michelson, 162, _e.s._ - Mill, John Stuart, 110. - Modal Character of Space, 90, _e.s._ - Modal Limitation, 248, _e.s._ - Mode, 99. - Moral Responsibility, 109, _e.s._ - Motion, Laws of, 65, _e.s._ - Müller, Johannes, 141. - - Narses, 19. - Natural Selection, 158. - Naturalism in Art, 22. - Newman, John Henry, 115, 255. - Newton, 8, 9, 15; 43, _e.s._; 58, _e.s._; 84, _e.s._; 161; 255, _e.s._ - Not-Being, 227. - - Objectivism, 124, _e.s._ - Occasions, Community of, 63. - Occupied Events, 215. - Oersted, 139. - Order of Nature, 5, _e.s._; 39, _e.s._; 55. - Organic Mechanism, 112, 151. - Organism, 51, _e.s._; 58, 90; 105, _e.s._; 111, _e.s._; 145; 185, - _e.s._; 209. - - Padua, University of, 57, 58. - Paley, 107. - Papacy, 13, 20. - Pascal, 57, 78. - Past, 245, _e.s._ - Pasteur, Louis, 141, _e.s._ - Pelagius, 266. - Perception, 101. - Periodic Law (Mendeleëf), 141. - Periodicity, 45, _e.s._ - Perspective, 98. - Petavius, 255. - Philosophy, 122. - Physical Field, 138. - Physics, 57. - Plato, 10; 41, _e.s._; 180. - Pope, Alexander, 108, _e.s._ - Possibility, 223. - Prehension, 97, _e.s._; 207. - Prehensive Character of Space, 90, _e.s._ - Present, 245, _e.s._ - Primary Qualities, 76. - Primate, 185, _e.s._ - Prime Mover, 242, _e.s._ - Primordial Element, 51, _e.s._ - Process, 102. - Professionalism, 271, _e.s._ - Proton, 51, _e.s._; 185, _e.s._ - Psychology, 88, 103. - Pusey, 115. - Pythagoras, 39, _e.s._; 240. - - Quality, 73, _e.s._ - Quantum Theory, 50; 181, _e.s._ - - Rationalism, 12, _e.s._; 55. - Ramsay, Sir William, 259. - Rawley, Dr., 58. - Rayleigh, Lord, 259. - Realism, 127, _e.s._ - Reformation, 11. - Reiteration, 147; 186, _e.s._ - Relational Essence, 223, _e.s._ - Relativity, 68; 165, _e.s._ - Retention, 147. - Riemann, 86, 88. - Romans, 8. - Roman Law, 20. - Rome, 21. - Rousseau, 50, 93, 135. - Royal Society, 43, 73. - Russell, Bertrand, 216. - - Sarpi, Paul, 12, 26. - Schleiden, 141. - Schwann, 141. - Scientific Materialism, 24, 25. - Scientific Movement, 11. - Secondary Qualities, 76, 127. - Seneca, 15. - Sense-Object, 99. - Separative Character of Space, 90, _e.s._ - Shakespeare, 56. - Shape, 92. - Shelley, 116, _e.s._ - Sidgwick, Henry, 197. - Simple Eternal Objects, 232. - Simple Location, 69, _e.s._; 81, _e.s._; 95; 127, _e.s._; 217. - Simultaneity, 174. - ‘Some,’ 229. - Southey, 285. - Space, Physical, 32. - Spatialisation, 72, 175, 206. - Specious Present, 148. - Spinoza, 43, 57, 99, 115, 116, 175, 198, 248. - Sophocles, 14. - Standpoint, 99, _e.s._ - Stoicism, 16. - Struggle for Existence, 158. - Subjectivism, 123, _e.s._ - Substance, 73, _e.s._; 175. - Substantial Activity, 152, 174, 231. - Superject, 230. - Synthetic Prehension, 224, _e.s._ - - Technology, 135, _e.s._ - Temporalisation, 179. - Tennyson, 108, _e.s._ - Time, 169, _e.s._ - Tragedy, 15. - Translucency of Realisation, 240. - Trent, Council of, 12. - Trigonometry, 42. - True Propositions, 224. - - Unknowns (in Mathematics), 44. - Universals, 221. - Untrue Propositions, 221. - - Value, 123, _e.s._; 226, 249. - Variable, The, 37, _e.s._; 229. - Vasco da Gama, 22. - Velocity, 64, _e.s._; 165, _e.s._ - Vertex of Abstractive Hierarchy, 236. - Vesalius, 1. - Vibration, 186, _e.s._ - Vibratory Organic Deformation, 184, _e.s._ - Virtual Work, 88. - Vitalism, 111, _e.s._; 145. - Volta, 88. - Voltaire, 57; 80, _e.s._; 143. - - Walpole, 89. - Washington, George, 89. - Watt, James, 135. - Wesley, John, 93. - Whitman, Walt, 22. - Wordsworth, 22; 108, _e.s._ - - Young, Thomas, 139. - - Zeno, 178, 179, 192. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - Transcriber’s Note - -The printer employed the diaeresis in words like ‘coördination’ or -‘coöperation’. On p. 157, the first syllable of ‘coöperating’ fell on -the line break, and the word was hyphenated as ‘co-operating’, since the -diaeresis was not needed. The word has been joined here and the -diaeresis employed as ‘coöperating’. - -The following words appear both with and without a hyphen: to-day, -non-entity, half-way, inter-connected, non-entity. - -Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and -are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original. - - 20.10 restraining g[i/o]vernment. Replaced. - 21.31 is kept in contact w[ti/it]h Transposed. - 57.30 Now the scientific philosop[h]y Inserted. - 69.9 no other way of putting[s] things Removed. - 77.6 these relationships constitute[s] nature. Added. - 157.20 societies of c[o-/ö]perating organisms. Replaced. - 160.8 These divis[i]ons are Inserted. - 176.3 extends beyond[s] the spatio-temporal continuum Removed. - 177.6 by the reali[z/s]ation of pattern Consistency. - 177.25 character of spatio-temporal [of ]extension Removed. - 183.5 radiate its energy i[s/n] an integral number Replaced. - 195.4 history of the Christi[o/a]n Church Replaced. - 195.7 apocalyptic forecast[e]s Removed. - 202.21 This divis[i]on of territory Inserted. - 213.10 what anything is in i[t]self. Inserted. - 245.27 even [al]though any such discrimination Removed. - 274.14 its sta[k/t]e of rapid development Replaced. - 276.17 The task of coö[r]dination is left Inserted. - 279.22 What I mean is art [(]and aesthetic education. Removed. - 288.33 mutually coö[o]perate. Removed. - 290.3 it bars coö[o]peration. 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font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Science and the modern world, by Alfred North Whitehead</p> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Science and the modern world</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:0; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em;'>Lowell Lectures 1925</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Alfred North Whitehead</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: July 25, 2022 [eBook #68611]</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</p> - <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em; text-align:left'>Produced by: KD Weeks, Steve Mattern and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)</p> -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD ***</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> -<div class='tnotes'> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div>Transcriber’s Note:</div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c001'>Footnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they -are referenced, and are linked for ease of reference.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please -see the transcriber’s <a href='#endnote'>note</a> at the end of this text -for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered -during its preparation.</p> - -<div class='htmlonly'> - -<p class='c001'>Any corrections are indicated using an <ins class='correction' title='original'>underline</ins> -highlight. Placing the cursor over the correction will produce the -original text in a small popup.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The blank cover image has been enhanced with information from the title -page.</p> - -<div class='figcenter id001'> -<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' class='ig001' /> -</div> - -</div> -<div class='epubonly'> - -<p class='c001'>Any corrections are indicated as hyperlinks, which will navigate the -reader to the corresponding entry in the corrections table in the -note at the end of the text.</p> - -</div> - -</div> -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> -<div> - <h1 class='c002'>SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD</h1> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c000'> - <div><span class='large'>LOWELL LECTURES, 1925</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> - -<div class='figcenter id002'> -<img src='images/i002.jpg' alt='' class='ig001' /> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div>THE MACMILLAN COMPANY</div> - <div><span class='small'>NEW YORK . BOSTON . CHICAGO . DALLAS</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>ATLANTA . SAN FRANCISCO</span></div> - <div class='c000'>CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS</div> - <div><span class='small'>LONDON</span></div> - <div class='c000'>MACMILLAN & CO., <span class='sc'>Ltd.</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>BOMBAY . CALCUTTA . MADRAS</span></div> - <div class='c000'>THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, <span class='sc'>Ltd.</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>TORONTO</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div><span class='xlarge'>SCIENCE</span></div> - <div><span class='xlarge'>AND THE MODERN WORLD</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c003'> - <div>LOWELL LECTURES, 1925</div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c003'> - <div>BY</div> - <div><span class='large'>ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>F.R.S., Sc.D. (Cambridge), Hon. D.Sc. (Manchester),</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews)</span></div> - <div class='c000'><span class='small'>FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE</span></div> - <div><span class='small'>AND PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c004'> - <div><span class="blackletter">New York</span></div> - <div><span class='large'>THE MACMILLAN COMPANY</span></div> - <div>1925</div> - <div><span class='small'><i>All rights reserved</i></span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c003'> - <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_I'>I</span><span class='sc'>Copyright, 1925.</span></div> - <div><span class='sc'>By</span> THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.</div> - </div> -</div> - -<hr class='c005' /> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div>Set up and printed.</div> - <div>Published October, 1925.</div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c004'> - <div>PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY</div> - <div>THE FERRIS PRINTING COMPANY</div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> -<div class='nf-center c004'> - <div>TO</div> - <div>MY COLLEAGUES,</div> - <div>PAST AND PRESENT,</div> - <div>WHOSE FRIENDSHIP IS INSPIRATION.</div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='chapter'> - <h2 class='c006'>TABLE OF CONTENTS</h2> -</div> - -<table class='table0' summary=''> -<colgroup> -<col width='12%' /> -<col width='79%' /> -<col width='7%' /> -</colgroup> - <tr> - <td class='c007'><span class='small'>CHAPTER</span></td> - <td class='c008'> </td> - <td class='c009'><span class='small'>PAGE</span></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>I.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Origins of Modern Science</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_1'>1</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>II.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Mathematics as an Element in the History of Thought</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_28'>28</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>III.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Century of Genius</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_55'>55</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>IV.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Eighteenth Century</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_80'>80</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>V.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Romantic Reaction</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_105'>105</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>VI.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Nineteenth Century</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_134'>134</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>VII.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Relativity</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_160'>160</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>VIII.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>The Quantum Theory</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_181'>181</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>IX.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Science and Philosophy</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_193'>193</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>X.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Abstraction</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_219'>219</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>XI.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>God</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_242'>242</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>XII.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Religion and Science</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_252'>252</a></td> - </tr> - <tr><td> </td></tr> - <tr> - <td class='c007'>XIII.</td> - <td class='c008'><span class='sc'>Requisites for Social Progress</span></td> - <td class='c009'><a href='#Page_270'>270</a></td> - </tr> -</table> -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_ix'>ix</span> - <h2 id='PREFACE' class='c006'>PREFACE</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The present book embodies a study of some aspects of -Western culture during the past three centuries, in so -far as it has been influenced by the development of -science. This study has been guided by the conviction -that the mentality of an epoch springs from the -view of the world which is, in fact, dominant in the -educated sections of the communities in question. -There may be more than one such scheme, corresponding -to cultural divisions. The various human interests -which suggest cosmologies, and also are influenced by -them, are science, aesthetics, ethics, religion. In every -age each of these topics suggests a view of the world. -In so far as the same set of people are swayed by all, -or more than one, of these interests, their effective -outlook will be the joint production from these -sources. But each age has it dominant preoccupation; -and, during the three centuries in question, the cosmology -derived from science has been asserting itself -at the expense of older points of view with their origins -elsewhere. Men can be provincial in time, as well as -in place. We may ask ourselves whether the scientific -mentality of the modern world in the immediate past -is not a successful example of such provincial -limitation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Philosophy, in one of its functions, is the critic of -cosmologies. It is its function to harmonise, refashion, -and justify divergent intuitions as to the nature of -things. It has to insist on the scrutiny of the ultimate -ideas, and on the retention of the whole of the evidence -<span class='pageno' id='Page_x'>x</span>in shaping our cosmological scheme. Its business is -to render explicit, and—so far as may be—efficient, a -process which otherwise is unconsciously performed -without rational tests.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Bearing this in mind, I have avoided the introduction -of a variety of abstruse detail respecting scientific -advance. What is wanted, and what I have striven -after, is a sympathetic study of main ideas as seen from -the inside. If my view of the function of philosophy -is correct, it is the most effective of all the intellectual -pursuits. It builds cathedrals before the workmen -have moved a stone, and it destroys them before the -elements have worn down their arches. It is the architect -of the buildings of the spirit, and it is also their -solvent:—and the spiritual precedes the material. -Philosophy works slowly. Thoughts lie dormant for -ages; and then, almost suddenly as it were, mankind -finds that they have embodied themselves in institutions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This book in the main consists of a set of eight -Lowell Lectures delivered in the February of 1925. -These lectures with some slight expansion, and the -subdivision of one lecture into Chapters VII and -VIII, are here printed as delivered. But some additional -matter has been added, so as to complete the -thought of the book on a scale which could not be -included within that lecture course. Of this new -matter, the second chapter—‘Mathematics as an Element -in the History of Thought’—was delivered as a -lecture before the Mathematical Society of Brown -University, Providence, R. I.; and the twelfth chapter—‘Religion -and Science’—formed an address delivered -in the Phillips Brooks House at Harvard, and -<span class='pageno' id='Page_xi'>xi</span>is to be published in the August number of the <cite>Atlantic -Monthly</cite> of this year (1925). The tenth and -eleventh chapters—‘Abstraction’ and ‘God’—are additions -which now appear for the first time. But the -book represents one train of thought, and the antecedent -utilisation of some of its contents is a subsidiary -point.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There has been no occasion in the text to make -detailed reference to Lloyd Morgan’s <cite>Emergent Evolution</cite> -or to Alexander’s <cite>Space, Time and Deity</cite>. It -will be obvious to readers that I have found them very -suggestive. I am especially indebted to Alexander’s -great work. The wide scope of the present book -makes it impossible to acknowledge in detail the various -sources of information or of ideas. The book is -the product of thought and reading in past years, -which were not undertaken with any anticipation of -utilisation for the present purpose. Accordingly it -would now be impossible for me to give reference to -my sources for details, even if it were desirable so to -do. But there is no need: the facts which are relied -upon are simple and well known. On the philosophical -side, any consideration of epistemology has been -entirely excluded. It would have been impossible to -discuss that topic without upsetting the whole balance -of the work. The key to the book is the sense -of the overwhelming importance of a prevalent -philosophy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>My most grateful thanks are due to my colleague -Mr. Raphael Demos for reading the proofs and for -the suggestion of many improvements in expression.</p> - -<div class='lg-container-l c011'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>Harvard University,</div> - <div class='line in2'>June 29, 1925.</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_1'>1</span><span class='xxlarge'>SCIENCE AND THE MODERN</span></div> - <div><span class='xxlarge'>WORLD</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<div class='chapter'> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER I <br /> <br /> THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The progress of civilisation is not wholly a uniform -drift towards better things. It may perhaps wear this -aspect if we map it on a scale which is large enough. -But such broad views obscure the details on which -rest our whole understanding of the process. New -epochs emerge with comparative suddenness, if we -have regard to the scores of thousands of years -throughout which the complete history extends. Secluded -races suddenly take their places in the main -stream of events: technological discoveries transform -the mechanism of human life: a primitive art quickly -flowers into full satisfaction of some aesthetic craving: -great religions in their crusading youth spread -through the nations the peace of Heaven and the -sword of the Lord.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The sixteenth century of our era saw the disruption -of Western Christianity and the rise of modern -science. It was an age of ferment. Nothing was settled, -though much was opened—new worlds and new -ideas. In science, Copernicus and Vesalius may be -chosen as representative figures: they typify the new -cosmology and the scientific emphasis on direct observation. -Giordano Bruno was the martyr; but the -cause for which he suffered was not that of science, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_2'>2</span>but that of free imaginative speculation. His death -in the year 1600 ushered in the first century of modern -science in the strict sense of the term. In his execution -there was an unconscious symbolism: for the subsequent -tone of scientific thought has contained distrust -of his type of general speculativeness. The -Reformation, for all its importance, may be considered -as a domestic affair of the European races. Even the -Christianity of the East viewed it with profound disengagement. -Furthermore, such disruptions are no -new phenomena in the history of Christianity or of -other religions. When we project this great revolution -upon the whole history of the Christian Church, -we cannot look upon it as introducing a new principle -into human life. For good or for evil, it was a great -transformation of religion; but it was not the coming -of religion. It did not itself claim to be so. Reformers -maintained that they were only restoring what had -been forgotten.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is quite otherwise with the rise of modern science. -In every way it contrasts with the contemporary religious -movement. The Reformation was a popular uprising, -and for a century and a half drenched Europe -in blood. The beginnings of the scientific movement -were confined to a minority among the intellectual -élite. In a generation which saw the Thirty Years’ -War and remembered Alva in the Netherlands, the -worst that happened to men of science was that Galileo -suffered an honourable detention and a mild reproof, -before dying peacefully in his bed. The way in which -the persecution of Galileo has been remembered is a -tribute to the quiet commencement of the most intimate -change in outlook which the human race had yet encountered. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_3'>3</span>Since a babe was born in a manger, it -may be doubted whether so great a thing has happened -with so little stir.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The thesis which these lectures will illustrate is -that this quiet growth of science has practically recoloured -our mentality so that modes of thought which -in former times were exceptional, are now broadly -spread through the educated world. This new colouring -of ways of thought had been proceeding slowly -for many ages in the European peoples. At last it -issued in the rapid development of science; and has -thereby strengthened itself by its most obvious application. -The new mentality is more important even -than the new science and the new technology. It has -altered the metaphysical presuppositions and the -imaginative contents of our minds; so that now the old -stimuli provoke a new response. Perhaps my metaphor -of a new colour is too strong. What I mean is -just that slightest change of tone which yet makes all -the difference. This is exactly illustrated by a sentence -from a published letter of that adorable genius, -William James. When he was finishing his great -treatise on the <cite>Principles of Psychology</cite>, he wrote to -his brother Henry James, ‘I have to forge every sentence -in the teeth of irreducible and stubborn facts.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>This new tinge to modern minds is a vehement and -passionate interest in the relation of general principles -to irreducible and stubborn facts. All the world over -and at all times there have been practical men, absorbed -in ‘irreducible and stubborn facts’: all the -world over and at all times there have been men of -philosophic temperament who have been absorbed in -the weaving of general principles. It is this union of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_4'>4</span>passionate interest in the detailed facts with equal -devotion to abstract generalisation which forms the -novelty in our present society. Previously it had -appeared sporadically and as if by chance. This -balance of mind has now become part of the tradition -which infects cultivated thought. It is the salt which -keeps life sweet. The main business of universities -is to transmit this tradition as a widespread inheritance -from generation to generation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Another contrast which singles out science from -among the European movements of the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries, is its universality. Modern -science was born in Europe, but its home is the whole -world. In the last two centuries there has been a long -and confused impact of Western modes upon the civilisation -of Asia. The wise men of the East have been -puzzling, and are puzzling, as to what may be the -regulative secret of life which can be passed from -West to East without the wanton destruction of their -own inheritance which they so rightly prize. More -and more it is becoming evident that what the West -can most readily give to the East is its science and its -scientific outlook. This is transferable from country -to country, and from race to race, wherever there is a -rational society.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this course of lectures I shall not discuss the -details of scientific discovery. My theme is the energising -of a state of mind in the modern world, its -broad generalisations, and its impact upon other -spiritual forces. There are two ways of reading history, -forwards and backwards. In the history of -thought, we require both methods. A climate of -opinion—to use the happy phrase of a seventeenth -<span class='pageno' id='Page_5'>5</span>century writer—requires for its understanding the -consideration of its antecedents and its issues. Accordingly -in this lecture I shall consider some of the antecedents -of our modern approach to the investigation -of nature.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the first place, there can be no living science -unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in -the existence of an <em>Order of Things</em>, and, in particular, -of an <em>Order of Nature</em>. I have used the word <em>instinctive</em> -advisedly. It does not matter what men say in -words, so long as their activities are controlled by -settled instincts. The words may ultimately destroy -the instincts. But until this has occurred, words do -not count. This remark is important in respect to the -history of scientific thought. For we shall find that -since the time of Hume, the fashionable scientific philosophy -has been such as to deny the rationality of -science. This conclusion lies upon the surface of -Hume’s philosophy. Take, for example, the following -passage from Section IV of his <cite>Inquiry Concerning -Human Understanding</cite>:</p> - -<div class='quote'> - -<p class='c001'>“In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. -It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause; and the first -invention or conception of it, <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>à priori</i></span>, must be entirely arbitrary.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='c012'>If the cause in itself discloses no information as to -the effect, so that the first invention of it must be -<em>entirely</em> arbitrary, it follows at once that science is -impossible, except in the sense of establishing <em>entirely -arbitrary</em> connections which are not warranted by anything -intrinsic to the natures either of causes or effects. -Some variant of Hume’s philosophy has generally -prevailed among men of science. But scientific faith -<span class='pageno' id='Page_6'>6</span>has risen to the occasion, and has tacitly removed the -philosophic mountain.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In view of this strange contradiction in scientific -thought, it is of the first importance to consider the -antecedents of a faith which is impervious to the demand -for a consistent rationality. We have therefore -to trace the rise of the instinctive faith that there is an -Order of Nature which can be traced in every detailed -occurrence.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Of course we all share in this faith, and we therefore -believe that the reason for the faith is our apprehension -of its truth. But the formation of a general -idea—such as the idea of the Order of Nature—, and -the grasp of its importance, and the observation of its -exemplification in a variety of occasions are by no -means the necessary consequences of the truth of the -idea in question. Familiar things happen, and mankind -does not bother about them. It requires a very -unusual mind to undertake the analysis of the obvious. -Accordingly I wish to consider the stages in which -this analysis became explicit, and finally became unalterably -impressed upon the educated minds of Western -Europe.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Obviously, the main recurrences of life are too -insistent to escape the notice of the least rational of -humans; and even before the dawn of rationality, they -have impressed themselves upon the instincts of animals. -It is unnecessary to labour the point, that in -broad outline certain general states of nature recur, -and that our very natures have adapted themselves to -such repetitions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But there is a complementary fact which is equally -true and equally obvious:—nothing ever really recurs -<span class='pageno' id='Page_7'>7</span>in exact detail. No two days are identical, no two -winters. What has gone, has gone forever. Accordingly -the practical philosophy of mankind has been -to expect the broad recurrences, and to accept the -details as emanating from the inscrutable womb of -things, beyond the ken of rationality. Men expected -the sun to rise, but the wind bloweth where it listeth.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Certainly from the classical Greek civilisation onwards -there have been men, and indeed groups of men, -who have placed themselves beyond this acceptance of -an ultimate irrationality. Such men have endeavoured -to explain all phenomena as the outcome of an -order of things which extends to every detail. Geniuses -such as Aristotle, or Archimedes, or Roger -Bacon, must have been endowed with the full scientific -mentality, which instinctively holds that all things -great and small are conceivable as exemplifications of -general principles which reign throughout the natural -order.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But until the close of the Middle Ages the general -educated public did not feel that intimate conviction, -and that detailed interest, in such an idea, so as to -lead to an unceasing supply of men, with ability and -opportunity adequate to maintain a coordinated search -for the discovery of these hypothetical principles. -Either people were doubtful about the existence of -such principles, or were doubtful about any success -in finding them, or took no interest in thinking about -them, or were oblivious to their practical importance -when found. For whatever reason, search was languid, -if we have regard to the opportunities of a high -civilisation and the length of time concerned. Why -did the pace suddenly quicken in the sixteenth and -<span class='pageno' id='Page_8'>8</span>seventeenth centuries? At the close of the Middle -Ages a new mentality discloses itself. Invention stimulated -thought, thought quickened physical speculation, -Greek manuscripts disclosed what the ancients -had discovered. Finally although in the year 1500 -Europe knew less than Archimedes who died in the -year 212 B. C., yet in the year 1700, Newton’s <cite>Principia</cite> -had been written and the world was well started -on the modern epoch.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There have been great civilisations in which the -peculiar balance of mind required for science has -only fitfully appeared and has produced the feeblest -result. For example, the more we know of Chinese -art, of Chinese literature, and of the Chinese philosophy -of life, the more we admire the heights to -which that civilization attained. For thousands of -years, there have been in China acute and learned men -patiently devoting their lives to study. Having regard -to the span of time, and to the population concerned, -China forms the largest volume of civilisation -which the world has seen. There is no reason to -doubt the intrinsic capacity of individual Chinamen -for the pursuit of science. And yet Chinese science is -practically negligible. There is no reason to believe -that China if left to itself would have ever produced -any progress in science. The same may be said of -India. Furthermore, if the Persians had enslaved -the Greeks, there is no definite ground for belief that -science would have flourished in Europe. The Romans -showed no particular originality in that line. Even -as it was, the Greeks, though they founded the movement, -did not sustain it with the concentrated interest -which modern Europe has shown. I am not alluding -<span class='pageno' id='Page_9'>9</span>to the last few generations of the European peoples on -both sides of the ocean; I mean the smaller Europe -of the Reformation period, distracted as it was with -wars and religious disputes. Consider the world of -the eastern Mediterranean, from Sicily to western -Asia, during the period of about 1400 years from the -death of Archimedes [in 212 B. C.] to the irruption of -the Tartars. There were wars and revolutions and -large changes of religion: but nothing much worse -than the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries -throughout Europe. There was a great and -wealthy civilisation, Pagan, Christian, Mahometan. -In that period a great deal was added to science. But -on the whole the progress was slow and wavering; -and, except in mathematics, the men of the Renaissance -practically started from the position which -Archimedes had reached. There had been some -progress in medicine and some progress in astronomy. -But the total advance was very little compared -to the marvellous success of the seventeenth -century. For example, compare the progress of scientific -knowledge from the year 1560, just before the -births of Galileo and of Kepler, up to the year 1700, -when Newton was in the height of his fame, with the -progress in the ancient period, already mentioned, -exactly ten times as long.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Nevertheless, Greece was the mother of Europe; -and it is to Greece that we must look in order to find -the origin of our modern ideas. We all know that on -the eastern shores of the Mediterranean there was a -very flourishing school of Ionian philosophers, deeply -interested in theories concerning nature. Their ideas -have been transmitted to us, enriched by the genius -<span class='pageno' id='Page_10'>10</span>of Plato and Aristotle. But, with the exception of -Aristotle, and it is a large exception, this school of -thought had not attained to the complete scientific -mentality. In some ways, it was better. The Greek -genius was philosophical, lucid and logical. The -men of this group were primarily asking philosophical -questions. What is the substratum of nature? Is it -fire, or earth, or water, or some combination of any -two, or of all three? Or is it a mere flux, not reducible -to some static material? Mathematics interested -them mightily. They invented its generality, analysed -its premises, and made notable discoveries of theorems -by a rigid adherence to deductive reasoning. Their -minds were infected with an eager generality. They -demanded clear, bold ideas, and strict reasoning from -them. All this was excellent; it was genius; it was -ideal preparatory work. But it was not science as we -understand it. The patience of minute observation -was not nearly so prominent. Their genius was not so -apt for the state of imaginative muddled suspense -which precedes successful inductive generalisation. -They were lucid thinkers and bold reasoners.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Of course there were exceptions, and at the very -top: for example, Aristotle and Archimedes. Also -for patient observation, there were the astronomers. -There was a mathematical lucidity about the stars, -and a fascination about the small numerable band of -run-a-way planets.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Every philosophy is tinged with the colouring of -some secret imaginative background, which never -emerges explicitly into its trains of reasoning. The -Greek view of nature, at least that cosmology transmitted -from them to later ages, was essentially dramatic. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_11'>11</span>It is not necessarily wrong for this reason: -but it was overwhelmingly dramatic. It thus conceived -nature as articulated in the way of a work of -dramatic art, for the exemplification of general ideas -converging to an end. Nature was differentiated so -as to provide its proper end for each thing. There -was the centre of the universe as the end of motion -for those things which are heavy, and the celestial -spheres as the end of motion for those things whose -natures lead them upwards. The celestial spheres -were for things which are impassible and ingenerable, -the lower regions for things impassible and generable. -Nature was a drama in which each thing played its -part.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I do not say that this is a view to which Aristotle -would have subscribed without severe reservations, in -fact without the sort of reservations which we ourselves -would make. But it was the view which subsequent -Greek thought extracted from Aristotle and -passed on to the Middle Ages. The effect of such an -imaginative setting for nature was to damp down the -historical spirit. For it was the end which seemed -illuminating, so why bother about the beginning? The -Reformation and the scientific movement were two -aspects of the historical revolt which was the dominant -intellectual movement of the later Renaissance. -The appeal to the origins of Christianity, and Francis -Bacon’s appeal to efficient causes as against final -causes, were two sides of one movement of thought. -Also for this reason Galileo and his adversaries were -at hopeless cross purposes, as can be seen from his -<cite>Dialogues on the Two Systems of the World</cite>.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Galileo keeps harping on how things happen, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_12'>12</span>whereas his adversaries had a complete theory as to -why things happen. Unfortunately the two theories -did not bring out the same results. Galileo insists -upon ‘irreducible and stubborn facts,’ and Simplicius, -his opponent, brings forward reasons, completely satisfactory, -at least to himself. It is a great mistake to -conceive this historical revolt as an appeal to reason. -On the contrary, it was through and through an -anti-intellectualist movement. It was the return to -the contemplation of brute fact; and it was based on a -recoil from the inflexible rationality of medieval -thought. In making this statement I am merely summarising -what at the time the adherents of the old -régime themselves asserted. For example, in the fourth -book of Father Paul Sarpi’s <cite>History of the Council -of Trent</cite>, you will find that in the year 1551 the -Papal Legates who presided over the Council ordered: -‘That the Divines ought to confirm their opinions with -the holy Scripture, Traditions of the Apostles, sacred -and approved Councils, and by the Constitutions and -Authorities of the holy Fathers; that they ought to -use brevity, and avoid superfluous and unprofitable -questions, and perverse contentions.... This order -did not please the Italian Divines; who said it was a -novity, and a condemning of School-Divinity, which, -in all difficulties, <em>useth reason</em>, and because it was not -lawful [<i>i.e.</i>, by this decree] to treat as St. Thomas -[Aquinas], St. Bonaventure, and other famous men -did.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is impossible not to feel sympathy with these -Italian divines, maintaining the lost cause of unbridled -rationalism. They were deserted on all hands. -The Protestants were in full revolt against them. The -<span class='pageno' id='Page_13'>13</span>Papacy failed to support them, and the Bishops of the -Council could not even understand them. For a few -sentences below the foregoing quotation, we read: -‘Though many complained here-of [<i>i.e.</i>, of the Decree], -yet it prevailed but little, because generally the -Fathers [<i>i.e.</i>, the Bishops] desired to hear men speak -with intelligible terms, not abstrusely, as in the matter -of Justification, and others already handled.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>Poor belated medievalists! When they used reason -they were not even intelligible to the ruling powers -of their epoch. It will take centuries before stubborn -facts are reducible by reason, and meanwhile the -pendulum swings slowly and heavily to the extreme of -the historical method.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Forty-three years after the Italian divines had written -this memorial, Richard Hooker in his famous -<cite>Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity</cite> makes exactly the same -complaint of his Puritan adversaries.<a id='r1' /><a href='#f1' class='c013'><sup>[1]</sup></a> Hooker’s balanced -thought—from which the appellation ‘The Judicious -Hooker’ is derived—, and his diffuse style, -which is the vehicle of such thought, make his writings -singularly unfit for the process of summarising by a -short, pointed quotation. But, in the section referred -to, he reproaches his opponents with <cite>Their Disparagement -of Reason</cite>; and in support of his own position -definitely refers to ‘The greatest amongst the school-divines,’ -by which designation I presume that he refers -to St. Thomas Aquinas.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f1'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r1'>1</a>. <i>Cf.</i> Book III, Section VIII.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>Hooker’s <cite>Ecclesiastical Polity</cite> was published just -before Sarpi’s <cite>Council of Trent</cite>. Accordingly there -was complete independence between the two works. -But both the Italian divines of 1551, and Hooker at -<span class='pageno' id='Page_14'>14</span>the end of that century testify to the anti-rationalist -trend of thought at that epoch, and in this respect contrast -their own age with the epoch of scholasticism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This reaction was undoubtedly a very necessary corrective -to the unguarded rationalism of the Middle -Ages. But reactions run to extremes. Accordingly, -although one outcome of this reaction was the birth -of modern science, yet we must remember that science -thereby inherited the bias of thought to which it owes -its origin.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The effect of Greek dramatic literature was many-sided -so far as concerns the various ways in which it -indirectly affected medieval thought. The pilgrim -fathers of the scientific imagination as it exists today, -are the great tragedians of ancient Athens, Aeschylus, -Sophocles, Euripides. Their vision of fate, remorseless -and indifferent, urging a tragic incident to its -inevitable issue, is the vision possessed by science. Fate -in Greek Tragedy becomes the order of nature in -modern thought. The absorbing interest in the particular -heroic incidents, as an example and a verification -of the workings of fate, reappears in our epoch -as concentration of interest on the crucial experiments. -It was my good fortune to be present at the meeting of -the Royal Society in London when the Astronomer -Royal for England announced that the photographic -plates of the famous eclipse, as measured by his colleagues -in Greenwich Observatory, had verified the -prediction of Einstein that rays of light are bent as -they pass in the neighbourhood of the sun. The whole -atmosphere of tense interest was exactly that of the -Greek drama: we were the chorus commenting on the -decree of destiny as disclosed in the development of a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_15'>15</span>supreme incident. There was dramatic quality in the -very staging:—the traditional ceremonial, and in the -background the picture of Newton to remind us that -the greatest of scientific generalisations was now, after -more than two centuries, to receive its first modification. -Nor was the personal interest wanting: a great -adventure in thought had at length come safe to shore.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Let me here remind you that the essence of dramatic -tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity -of the remorseless working of things. This inevitableness -of destiny can only be illustrated in terms of -human life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. -For it is only by them that the futility of escape -can be made evident in the drama. This remorseless -inevitableness is what pervades scientific thought. -The laws of physics are the decrees of fate.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The conception of the moral order in the Greek -plays was certainly not a discovery of the dramatists. -It must have passed into the literary tradition from -the general serious opinion of the times. But in finding -this magnificent expression, it thereby deepened -the stream of thought from which it arose. The spectacle -of a moral order was impressed upon the imagination -of classical civilisation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The time came when that great society decayed, and -Europe passed into the Middle Ages. The direct -influence of Greek literature vanished. But the concept -of the moral order and of the order of nature had -enshrined itself in the Stoic philosophy. For example, -Lecky in his <cite>History of European Morals</cite> tells us -‘Seneca maintains that the Divinity has determined -all things by an inexorable law of destiny, which He -has decreed, but which He Himself obeys.’ But the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_16'>16</span>most effective way in which the Stoics influenced the -mentality of the Middle Ages was by the diffused -sense of order which arose from Roman law. Again -to quote Lecky, ‘The Roman legislation was in a two-fold -manner the child of philosophy. It was in the -first place formed upon the philosophical model, for, -instead of being a mere empirical system adjusted to -the existing requirements of society, it laid down -abstract principles of right to which it endeavoured -to conform; and, in the next place, these principles -were borrowed directly from Stoicism.’ In spite of -the actual anarchy throughout large regions in Europe -after the collapse of the Empire, the sense of legal -order always haunted the racial memories of the Imperial -populations. Also the Western Church was -always there as a living embodiment of the traditions -of Imperial rule.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is important to notice that this legal impress upon -medieval civilisation was not in the form of a few -wise precepts which should permeate conduct. It -was the conception of a definite articulated system -which defines the legality of the detailed structure of -social organism, and of the detailed way in which -it should function. There was nothing vague. It -was not a question of admirable maxims, but of definite -procedure to put things right and to keep them -there. The Middle Ages formed one long training -of the intellect of Western Europe in the sense of -order. There may have been some deficiency in respect -to practice. But the idea never for a moment -lost its grip. It was preëminently an epoch of orderly -thought, rationalist through and through. The very -anarchy quickened the sense for coherent system; just -<span class='pageno' id='Page_17'>17</span>as the modern anarchy of Europe has stimulated the -intellectual vision of a League of Nations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But for science something more is wanted than a -general sense of the order in things. It needs but a -sentence to point out how the habit of definite exact -thought was implanted in the European mind by the -long dominance of scholastic logic and scholastic -divinity. The habit remained after the philosophy -had been repudiated, the priceless habit of looking for -an exact point and of sticking to it when found. Galileo -owes more to Aristotle than appears on the surface -of his <cite>Dialogues</cite>: he owes to him his clear head and his -analytic mind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I do not think, however, that I have even yet -brought out the greatest contribution of medievalism -to the formation of the scientific movement. I mean -the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence -can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly -definite manner, exemplifying general principles. -Without this belief the incredible labours of scientists -would be without hope. It is this instinctive conviction, -vividly poised before the imagination, which is -the motive power of research:—that there is a secret, -a secret which can be unveiled. How has this conviction -been so vividly implanted on the European mind?</p> - -<p class='c001'>When we compare this tone of thought in Europe -with the attitude of other civilisations when left to -themselves, there seems but one source for its origin. -It must come from the medieval insistence on the rationality -of God, conceived as with the personal energy -of Jehovah and with the rationality of a Greek philosopher. -Every detail was supervised and ordered: -the search into nature could only result in the vindication -<span class='pageno' id='Page_18'>18</span>of the faith in rationality. Remember that I -am not talking of the explicit beliefs of a few individuals. -What I mean is the impress on the European -mind arising from the unquestioned faith of centuries. -By this I mean the instinctive tone of thought and not -a mere creed of words.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In Asia, the conceptions of God were of a being who -was either too arbitrary or too impersonal for such -ideas to have much effect on instinctive habits of mind. -Any definite occurrence might be due to the fiat of an -irrational despot, or might issue from some impersonal, -inscrutable origin of things. There was not the -same confidence as in the intelligible rationality of a -personal being. I am not arguing that the European -trust in the scrutability of nature was logically justified -even by its own theology. My only point is to -understand how it arose. My explanation is that the -faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently -to the development of modern scientific theory, -is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But science is not merely the outcome of instinctive -faith. It also requires an active interest in the simple -occurrences of life for their own sake.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This qualification ‘for their own sake’ is important. -The first phase of the Middle Ages was an age of symbolism. -It was an age of vast ideas, and of primitive -technique. There was little to be done with nature, -except to coin a hard living from it. But there were -realms of thought to be explored, realms of philosophy -and realms of theology. Primitive art could symbolise -those ideas which filled all thoughtful minds. The -first phase of medieval art has a haunting charm beyond -<span class='pageno' id='Page_19'>19</span>compare: its own intrinsic quality is enhanced by -the fact that its message, which stretched beyond art’s -own self-justification of aesthetic achievement, was the -symbolism of things lying behind nature itself. In -this symbolic phase, medieval art energised in nature -as its medium, but pointed to another world.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In order to understand the contrast between these -early Middle Ages and the atmosphere required by the -scientific mentality, we should compare the sixth century -in Italy with the sixteenth century. In both centuries -the Italian genius was laying the foundations of -a new epoch. The history of the three centuries preceding -the earlier period, despite the promise for the -future introduced by the rise of Christianity, is overwhelmingly -infected by the sense of the decline of -civilisation. In each generation something has been -lost. As we read the records, we are haunted by the -shadow of the coming barbarism. There are great -men, with fine achievements in action or in thought. -But their total effect is merely for some short time to -arrest the general decline. In the sixth century we -are, so far as Italy is concerned, at the lowest point of -the curve. But in that century every action is laying -the foundation for the tremendous rise of the new -European civilisation. In the background the Byzantine -Empire, under Justinian, in three ways determined -the character of the early Middle Ages in Western -Europe. In the first place, its armies, under Belisarius -and Narses, cleared Italy from the Gothic -domination. In this way, the stage was freed for the -exercise of the old Italian genius for creating organisations -which shall be protective of ideals of cultural -<span class='pageno' id='Page_20'>20</span>activity. It is impossible not to sympathise with the -Goths: yet there can be no doubt but that a thousand -years of the Papacy were infinitely more valuable for -Europe than any effects derivable from a well-established -Gothic kingdom of Italy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the second place, the codification of the Roman -law established the ideal of legality which dominated -the sociological thought of Europe in the succeeding -centuries. Law is both an engine for government, and -a condition restraining <a id='corr20.10'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='givernment'>government</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_20.10'><ins class='correction' title='givernment'>government</ins></a></span>. The canon law -of the Church, and the civil law of the State, owe -to Justinian’s lawyers their influence on the development -of Europe. They established in the Western -mind the ideal that an authority should be at once -lawful, and law-enforcing, and should in itself exhibit -a rationally adjusted system of organisation. The sixth -century in Italy gave the initial exhibition of the way -in which the impress of these ideas was fostered by -contact with the Byzantine Empire.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thirdly, in the non-political spheres of art and -learning Constantinople exhibited a standard of realised -achievement which, partly by the impulse to direct -imitation, and partly by the indirect inspiration arising -from the mere knowledge that such things existed, -acted as a perpetual spur to Western culture. The -wisdom of the Byzantines, as it stood in the imagination -of the first phase of medieval mentality, and the -wisdom of the Egyptians as it stood in the imagination -of the early Greeks, played analogous rôles. -Probably the actual knowledge of these respective wisdoms -was, in either case, about as much as was good -for the recipients. They knew enough to know the -sort of standards which are attainable, and not enough -<span class='pageno' id='Page_21'>21</span>to be fettered by static and traditional ways of thought. -Accordingly, in both cases men went ahead on their -own and did better. No account of the rise of the -European scientific mentality can omit some notice of -this influence of the Byzantine civilisation in the background. -In the sixth century there is a crisis in the -history of the relations between the Byzantines and the -West; and this crisis is to be contrasted with the influence -of Greek literature on European thought in the -fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The two outstanding -men, who in the Italy of the sixth century laid the -foundations of the future, were St. Benedict and Gregory -the Great. By reference to them, we can at once -see how absolutely in ruins was the approach to the -scientific mentality which had been attained by the -Greeks. We are at the zero point of scientific temperature. -But the life-work of Gregory and of Benedict -contributed elements to the reconstruction of -Europe which secured that this reconstruction, when -it arrived, should include a more effective scientific -mentality than that of the ancient world. The Greeks -were over-theoretical. For them science was an offshoot -of philosophy. Gregory and Benedict were -practical men, with an eye for the importance of ordinary -things; and they combined this practical temperament -with their religious and cultural activities. -In particular, we owe it to St. Benedict that the monasteries -were the homes of practical agriculturalists, -as well as of saints and of artists and of men of learning. -The alliance of science with technology, by which -learning is kept in contact <a id='corr21.31'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='wtih'>with</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_21.31'><ins class='correction' title='wtih'>with</ins></a></span> irreducible and stubborn -facts, owes much to the practical bent of the early -Benedictines. Modern science derives from Rome as -<span class='pageno' id='Page_22'>22</span>well as from Greece, and this Roman strain explains -its gain in an energy of thought kept closely in contact -with the world of facts.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But the influence of this contact between the monasteries -and the facts of nature showed itself first in -art. The rise of Naturalism in the later Middle Ages -was the entry into the European mind of the final -ingredient necessary for the rise of science. It was the -rise of interest in natural objects, and in natural occurrences, -for their own sakes. The natural foliage of a -district was sculptured in out-of-the-way spots of the -later buildings, merely as exhibiting delight in those -familiar objects. The whole atmosphere of every art -exhibited a direct joy in the apprehension of the things -which lie around us. The craftsmen who executed the -late medieval decorative sculpture, Giotto, Chaucer, -Wordsworth, Walt Whitman, and, at the present day, -the New England poet Robert Frost, are all akin to -each other in this respect. The simple immediate -facts are the topics of interest, and these reappear in -the thought of science as the ‘irreducible stubborn -facts.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>The mind of Europe was now prepared for its new -venture of thought. It is unnecessary to tell in detail -the various incidents which marked the rise of science: -the growth of wealth and leisure; the expansion of -universities; the invention of printing; the taking of -Constantinople; Copernicus; Vasco da Gama; Columbus; -the telescope. The soil, the climate, the seeds, -were there, and the forest grew. Science has never -shaken off the impress of its origin in the historical -revolt of the later Renaissance. It has remained predominantly -an anti-rationalistic movement, based upon -<span class='pageno' id='Page_23'>23</span>a naïve faith. What reasoning it has wanted, has been -borrowed from mathematics which is a surviving relic -of Greek rationalism, following the deductive method. -Science repudiates philosophy. In other words, it has -never cared to justify its faith or to explain its meanings; -and has remained blandly indifferent to its refutation -by Hume.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Of course the historical revolt was fully justified. -It was wanted. It was more than wanted: it was an -absolute necessity for healthy progress. The world -required centuries of contemplation of irreducible and -stubborn facts. It is difficult for men to do more than -one thing at a time, and that was the sort of thing they -had to do after the rationalistic orgy of the Middle -Ages. It was a very sensible reaction; but it was not -a protest on behalf of reason.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is, however, a Nemesis which waits upon -those who deliberately avoid avenues of knowledge. -Oliver Cromwell’s cry echoes down the ages, ‘My -brethren, by the bowels of Christ I beseech you, bethink -you that you may be mistaken.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>The progress of science has now reached a turning -point. The stable foundations of physics have broken -up: also for the first time physiology is asserting itself -as an effective body of knowledge, as distinct from a -scrap-heap. The old foundations of scientific thought -are becoming unintelligible. Time, space, matter, -material, ether, electricity, mechanism, organism, configuration, -structure, pattern, function, all require reinterpretation. -What is the sense of talking about a -mechanical explanation when you do not know what -you mean by mechanics?</p> - -<p class='c001'>The truth is that science started its modern career -<span class='pageno' id='Page_24'>24</span>by taking over ideas derived from the weakest side of -the philosophies of Aristotle’s successors. In some -respects it was a happy choice. It enabled the knowledge -of the seventeenth century to be formularised so -far as physics and chemistry were concerned, with a -completeness which has lasted to the present time. But -the progress of biology and psychology has probably -been checked by the uncritical assumption of half-truths. -If science is not to degenerate into a medley -of <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>ad hoc</i></span> hypotheses, it must become philosophical -and must enter upon a thorough criticism of its own -foundations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the succeeding lectures of this course, I shall trace -the successes and the failures of the particular conceptions -of cosmology with which the European intellect -has clothed itself in the last three centuries. General -climates of opinion persist for periods of about two -to three generations, that is to say, for periods of sixty -to a hundred years. There are also shorter waves of -thought, which play on the surface of the tidal movement. -We shall find, therefore, transformations in the -European outlook, slowly modifying the successive -centuries. There persists, however, throughout the -whole period the fixed scientific cosmology which presupposes -the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute -matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux -of configurations. In itself such a material is senseless, -valueless, purposeless. It just does what it does do, -following a fixed routine imposed by external relations -which do not spring from the nature of its being. -It is this assumption that I call ‘scientific materialism.’ -Also it is an assumption which I shall challenge as -<span class='pageno' id='Page_25'>25</span>being entirely unsuited to the scientific situation at -which we have now arrived. It is not wrong, if properly -construed. If we confine ourselves to certain -types of facts, abstracted from the complete circumstances -in which they occur, the materialistic assumption -expresses these facts to perfection. But when we -pass beyond the abstraction, either by more subtle employment -of our senses, or by the request for meanings -and for coherence of thoughts, the scheme breaks -down at once. The narrow efficiency of the scheme -was the very cause of its supreme methodological success. -For it directed attention to just those groups of -facts which, in the state of knowledge then existing, -required investigation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The success of the scheme has adversely affected the -various currents of European thought. The historical -revolt was anti-rationalistic, because the rationalism -of the scholastics required a sharp correction by -contact with brute fact. But the revival of philosophy -in the hands of Descartes and his successors was entirely -coloured in its development by the acceptance of -the scientific cosmology at its face value. The success -of their ultimate ideas confirmed scientists in their -refusal to modify them as the result of an enquiry into -their rationality. Every philosophy was bound in -some way or other to swallow them whole. Also the -example of science affected other regions of thought. -The historical revolt has thus been exaggerated into -the exclusion of philosophy from its proper rôle of -harmonising the various abstractions of methodological -thought. Thought is abstract; and the intolerant -use of abstractions is the major vice of the intellect. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_26'>26</span>This vice is not wholly corrected by the recurrence to -concrete experience. For after all, you need only attend -to those aspects of your concrete experience which -lie within some limited scheme. There are two methods -for the purification of ideas. One of them is dispassionate -observation by means of the bodily senses. -But observation is selection. Accordingly, it is difficult -to transcend a scheme of abstraction whose success -is sufficiently wide. The other method is by comparing -the various schemes of abstraction which are -well founded in our various types of experience. This -comparison takes the form of satisfying the demands -of the Italian scholastic divines whom Paul Sarpi -mentioned. They asked that <em>reason</em> should be used. -Faith in reason is the trust that the ultimate natures of -things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere -arbitrariness. It is the faith that at the base of things -we shall not find mere arbitrary mystery. The faith -in the order of nature which has made possible the -growth of science is a particular example of a deeper -faith. This faith cannot be justified by any inductive -generalisation. It springs from direct inspection of -the nature of things as disclosed in our own immediate -present experience. There is no parting from your -own shadow. To experience this faith is to know that -in being ourselves we are more than ourselves: to know -that our experience, dim and fragmentary as it is, yet -sounds the utmost depths of reality: to know that detached -details merely in order to be themselves demand -that they should find themselves in a system of things: -to know that this system includes the harmony of logical -rationality, and the harmony of aesthetic achievement: -<span class='pageno' id='Page_27'>27</span>to know that, while the harmony of logic lies -upon the universe as an iron necessity, the aesthetic -harmony stands before it as a living ideal moulding -the general flux in its broken progress towards finer, -subtler issues.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_28'>28</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER II <br /> <br /> MATHEMATICS AS AN ELEMENT IN <br /> THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The science of Pure Mathematics, in its modern developments, -may claim to be the most original creation -of the human spirit. Another claimant for this position -is music. But we will put aside all rivals, and -consider the ground on which such a claim can be -made for mathematics. The originality of mathematics -consists in the fact that in mathematical science -connections between things are exhibited which, apart -from the agency of human reason, are extremely unobvious. -Thus the ideas, now in the minds of contemporary -mathematicians, lie very remote from any notions -which can be immediately derived by perception -through the senses; unless indeed it be perception -stimulated and guided by antecedent mathematical -knowledge. This is the thesis which I proceed to -exemplify.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Suppose we project our imaginations backwards -through many thousands of years, and endeavour to -realise the simple-mindedness of even the greatest intellects -in those early societies. Abstract ideas which -to us are immediately obvious must have been, for -them, matters only of the most dim apprehension. -For example take the question of number. We think -of the number ‘five’ as applying to appropriate groups -<span class='pageno' id='Page_29'>29</span>of any entities whatsoever—to five fishes, five children, -five apples, five days. Thus in considering the relations -of the number ‘five’ to the number ‘three,’ we are -thinking of two groups of things, one with five members -and the other with three members. But we are -entirely abstracting from any consideration of any -particular entities, or even of any particular sorts -of entities, which go to make up the membership -of either of the two groups. We are merely thinking -of those relationships between those two groups -which are entirely independent of the individual -essences of any of the members of either group. -This is a very remarkable feat of abstraction; and -it must have taken ages for the human race to rise -to it. During a long period, groups of fishes will -have been compared to each other in respect to -their multiplicity, and groups of days to each other. -But the first man who noticed the analogy between -a group of seven fishes and a group of seven days -made a notable advance in the history of thought. -He was the first man who entertained a concept belonging -to the science of pure mathematics. At that -moment it must have been impossible for him to divine -the complexity and subtlety of these abstract mathematical -ideas which were waiting for discovery. Nor -could he have guessed that these notions would exert -a widespread fascination in each succeeding generation. -There is an erroneous literary tradition which -represents the love of mathematics as a monomania -confined to a few eccentrics in each generation. But -be this as it may, it would have been impossible to -anticipate the pleasure derivable from a type of abstract -thinking which had no counterpart in the then-existing -<span class='pageno' id='Page_30'>30</span>society. Thirdly, the tremendous future effect -of mathematical knowledge on the lives of men, on -their daily avocations, on their habitual thoughts, on -the organization of society, must have been even more -completely shrouded from the foresight of those early -thinkers. Even now there is a very wavering grasp -of the true position of mathematics as an element in -the history of thought. I will not go so far as to say -that to construct a history of thought without profound -study of the mathematical ideas of successive -epochs is like omitting Hamlet from the play which -is named after him. That would be claiming too -much. But it is certainly analogous to cutting out -the part of Ophelia. This simile is singularly exact. -For Ophelia is quite essential to the play, she is very -charming,—and a little mad. Let us grant that the -pursuit of mathematics is a divine madness of the -human spirit, a refuge from the goading urgency of -contingent happenings.</p> - -<p class='c001'>When we think of mathematics, we have in our -mind a science devoted to the exploration of number, -quantity, geometry, and in modern times also including -investigation into yet more abstract concepts of -order, and into analogous types of purely logical relations. -The point of mathematics is that in it we have -always got rid of the particular instance, and even of -any particular sorts of entities. So that for example, -no mathematical truths apply merely to fish, or merely -to stones, or merely to colours. So long as you are -dealing with pure mathematics, you are in the realm of -complete and absolute abstraction. All you assert is, -that reason insists on the admission that, if any entities -whatever have any relations which satisfy such-and-such -<span class='pageno' id='Page_31'>31</span>purely abstract conditions, then they must have -other relations which satisfy other purely abstract conditions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Mathematics is thought moving in the sphere of -complete abstraction from any particular instance of -what it is talking about. So far is this view of mathematics -from being obvious, that we can easily assure -ourselves that it is not, even now, generally understood. -For example, it is habitually thought that the -certainty of mathematics is a reason for the certainty -of our geometrical knowledge of the space of the -physical universe. This is a delusion which has vitiated -much philosophy in the past, and some philosophy -in the present. This question of geometry is a test -case of some urgency. There are certain alternative -sets of purely abstract conditions possible for the relationships -of groups of unspecified entities, which I -will call <em>geometrical conditions</em>. I give them this -name because of their general analogy to those conditions, -which we believe to hold respecting the particular -geometrical relations of things observed by us in -our direct perception of nature. So far as our observations -are concerned, we are not quite accurate -enough to be certain of the exact conditions regulating -the things we come across in nature. But we can by a -slight stretch of hypothesis identify these observed -conditions with some one set of the purely abstract -geometrical conditions. In doing so, we make a particular -determination of the group of unspecified entities -which are the <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>relata</i></span> in the abstract science. In -the pure mathematics of geometrical relationships, -we say that, if <em>any</em> group of entities enjoy <em>any</em> relationships -among its members satisfying <em>this</em> set of abstract -<span class='pageno' id='Page_32'>32</span>geometrical conditions, then such-and-such additional -abstract conditions must also hold for such relationships. -But when we come to physical space, we say -that some definitely observed group of physical entities -enjoys some definitely observed relationships -among its members which do satisfy this above-mentioned -set of abstract geometrical conditions. We -thence conclude that the additional relationships -which we concluded to hold in <em>any</em> such case, must -therefore hold in <em>this particular</em> case.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The certainty of mathematics depends upon its complete -abstract generality. But we can have no <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>à priori</i></span> -certainty that we are right in believing that the observed -entities in the concrete universe form a particular -instance of what falls under our general reasoning. -To take another example from arithmetic. It is a -general abstract truth of pure mathematics that any -group of forty entities can be subdivided into two -groups of twenty entities. We are therefore justified -in concluding that a particular group of apples which -we believe to contain forty members can be subdivided -into two groups of apples of which each contains -twenty members. But there always remains the possibility -that we have miscounted the big group; so that, -when we come in practice to subdivide it, we shall -find that one of the two heaps has an apple too few or -an apple too many.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, in criticising an argument based upon -the application of mathematics to particular matters -of fact, there are always three processes to be kept -perfectly distinct in our minds. We must first scan -the purely mathematical reasoning to make sure that -there are no mere slips in it—no casual illogicalities -<span class='pageno' id='Page_33'>33</span>due to mental failure. Any mathematician knows -from bitter experience that, in first elaborating a train -of reasoning, it is very easy to commit a slight error -which yet makes all the difference. But when a piece -of mathematics has been revised, and has been before -the expert world for some time, the chance of a casual -error is almost negligible. The next process is to make -quite certain of all the abstract conditions which have -been presupposed to hold. This is the determination -of the abstract premises from which the mathematical -reasoning proceeds. This is a matter of considerable -difficulty. In the past quite remarkable oversights -have been made, and have been accepted by generations -of the greatest mathematicians. The chief danger -is that of oversight, namely, tacitly to introduce -some condition, which it is natural for us to presuppose, -but which in fact need not always be holding. -There is another opposite oversight in this connection -which does not lead to error, but only to lack of simplification. -It is very easy to think that more postulated -conditions are required than is in fact the case. -In other words, we may think that some abstract postulate -is necessary which is in fact capable of being -proved from the other postulates that we have already -on hand. The only effects of this excess of -abstract postulates are to diminish our aesthetic pleasure -in the mathematical reasoning, and to give us -more trouble when we come to the third process of -criticism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This third process of criticism is that of verifying -that our abstract postulates hold for the particular case -in question. It is in respect to this process of verification -for the particular case that all the trouble arises. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_34'>34</span>In some simple instances, such as the counting of forty -apples, we can with a little care arrive at practical -certainty. But in general, with more complex instances, -complete certainty is unattainable. Volumes, -libraries of volumes, have been written on the subject. -It is the battle ground of rival philosophers. There -are two distinct questions involved. There are particular -definite things observed, and we have to make -sure that the relations between these things really do -obey certain definite exact abstract conditions. There -is great room for error here. The exact observational -methods of science are all contrivances for limiting -these erroneous conclusions as to direct matters of fact. -But another question arises. The things directly observed -are, almost always, only samples. We want to -conclude that the abstract conditions, which hold for -the samples, also hold for all other entities which, for -some reason or other, appear to us to be of the same -sort. This process of reasoning from the sample to -the whole species is Induction. The theory of Induction -is the despair of philosophy—and yet all our activities -are based upon it. Anyhow, in criticising a -mathematical conclusion as to a particular matter of -fact, the real difficulties consist in finding out the -abstract assumptions involved, and in estimating the -evidence for their applicability to the particular case -in hand.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It often happens, therefore, that in criticising a -learned book of applied mathematics, or a memoir, -one’s whole trouble is with the first chapter, or even -with the first page. For it is there, at the very outset, -where the author will probably be found to slip in his -assumptions. Farther, the trouble is not with what the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_35'>35</span>author does say, but with what he does not say. Also -it is not with what he knows he has assumed, but with -what he has unconsciously assumed. We do not doubt -the author’s honesty. It is his perspicacity which we -are criticising. Each generation criticises the unconscious -assumptions made by its parents. It may assent -to them, but it brings them out in the open.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The history of the development of language illustrates -this point. It is a history of the progressive -analysis of ideas. Latin and Greek were inflected -languages. This means that they express an unanalyzed -complex of ideas by the mere modification of a -word; whereas in English, for example, we use prepositions -and auxiliary verbs to drag into the open the -whole bundle of ideas involved. For certain forms of -literary art,—though not always—the compact absorption -of auxiliary ideas into the main word may be an -advantage. But in a language such as English there -is the overwhelming gain in explicitness. This increased -explicitness is a more complete exhibition of -the various abstractions involved in the complex idea -which is the meaning of the sentence.</p> - -<p class='c001'>By comparison with language, we can now see what -is the function in thought which is performed by pure -mathematics. It is a resolute attempt to go the whole -way in the direction of complete analysis, so as to -separate the elements of mere matter of fact from the -purely abstract conditions which they exemplify.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The habit of such analysis enlightens every act of -the functioning of the human mind. It first (by isolating -it) emphasizes the direct aesthetic appreciation -of the content of experience. This direct appreciation -means an apprehension of what this experience is in -<span class='pageno' id='Page_36'>36</span>itself in its own particular essence, including its immediate -concrete values. This is a question of direct -experience, dependent upon sensitive subtlety. There -is then the abstraction of the particular entities involved, -viewed in themselves, and as apart from that -particular occasion of experience in which we are -then apprehending them. Lastly there is the further -apprehension of the absolutely general conditions satisfied -by the particular relations of those entities as in -that experience. These conditions gain their generality -from the fact that they are expressible without -reference to those particular relations or to those particular -relata which occur in that particular occasion -of experience. They are conditions which might hold -for an indefinite variety of other occasions, involving -other entities and other relations between them. Thus -these conditions are perfectly general because they -refer to no particular occasion, and to no particular -entities (such as green, or blue, or trees) which enter -into a variety of occasions, and to no particular relationships -between such entities.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is, however, a limitation to be made to the -generality of mathematics; it is a qualification which -applies equally to all general statements. No statement, -except one, can be made respecting any remote -occasion which enters into no relationship with the -immediate occasion so as to form a constitutive element -of the essence of that immediate occasion. By -the ‘immediate occasion’ I mean that occasion which -involves as an ingredient the individual act of judgment -in question. The one excepted statement is,—If -anything out of relationship, then complete ignorance -as to it. Here by ‘ignorance,’ I mean <em>ignorance</em>; -<span class='pageno' id='Page_37'>37</span>accordingly no advice can be given as to how to expect -it, or to treat it, in ‘practice’ or in any other way. -Either we know something of the remote occasion by -the cognition which is itself an element of the immediate -occasion, or we know nothing. Accordingly the -full universe, disclosed for every variety of experience, -is a universe in which every detail enters into its -proper relationship with the immediate occasion. The -generality of mathematics is the most complete generality -consistent with the community of occasions -which constitutes our metaphysical situation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is further to be noticed that the particular entities -require these general conditions for their ingression -into any occasions; but the same general conditions -may be required by many types of particular -entities. This fact, that the general conditions transcend -any one set of particular entities, is the ground -for the entry into mathematics, and into mathematical -logic, of the notion of the ‘variable.’ It is by the -employment of this notion that general conditions are -investigated without any specification of particular -entities. This irrelevance of the particular entities -has not been generally understood: for example, the -shape-iness of shapes, <i>e.g.</i>, circularity and sphericity -and cubicality as in actual experience, do not enter -into the geometrical reasoning.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The exercise of logical reason is always concerned -with these absolutely general conditions. In its broadest -sense, the discovery of mathematics is the discovery -that the totality of these general abstract conditions, -which are concurrently applicable to the relationships -among the entities of any one concrete occasion, -are themselves inter-connected in the manner of a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_38'>38</span>pattern with a key to it. This pattern of relationships -among general abstract conditions is imposed alike on -external reality, and on our abstract representations of -it, by the general necessity that every thing must be -just its own individual self, with its own individual -way of differing from everything else. This is nothing -else than the necessity of abstract logic, which is the -presupposition involved in the very fact of interrelated -existence as disclosed in each immediate occasion -of experience.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The key to the pattern means this fact:—that from -a select set of those general conditions, exemplified in -any one and the same occasion, a pattern involving an -infinite variety of other such conditions, also exemplified -in the same occasion, can be developed by the -pure exercise of abstract logic. Any such select set is -called the set of postulates, or premises, from which -the reasoning proceeds. The reasoning is nothing else -than the exhibition of the whole pattern of general -conditions involved in the pattern derived from the -selected postulates.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The harmony of the logical reason, which divines -the complete pattern as involved in the postulates, is -the most general aesthetic property arising from the -mere fact of concurrent existence in the unity of one -occasion. Wherever there is a unity of occasion there -is thereby established an aesthetic relationship between -the general conditions involved in that occasion. This -aesthetic relationship is that which is divined in the -exercise of rationality. Whatever falls within that -relationship is thereby exemplified in that occasion; -whatever falls without that relationship is thereby excluded -from exemplification in that occasion. The -<span class='pageno' id='Page_39'>39</span>complete pattern of general conditions, thus exemplified, -is determined by any one of many select sets of -these conditions. These key sets are sets of equivalent -postulates. This reasonable harmony of being, which -is required for the unity of a complex occasion, together -with the completeness of the realisation (in that -occasion) of all that is involved in its logical harmony, -is the primary article of metaphysical doctrine. -It means that for things to be together involves that -they are reasonably together. This means that thought -can penetrate into every occasion of fact, so that by -comprehending its key conditions, the whole complex -of its pattern of conditions lies open before it. It -comes to this:—provided we know something which is -perfectly general about the elements in any occasion, -we can then know an indefinite number of other -equally general concepts which must also be exemplified -in that same occasion. The logical harmony involved -in the unity of an occasion is both exclusive -and inclusive. The occasion must exclude the inharmonious, -and it must include the harmonious.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Pythagoras was the first man who had any grasp -of the full sweep of this general principle. He lived -in the sixth century before Christ. Our knowledge -of him is fragmentary. But we know some points -which establish his greatness in the history of thought. -He insisted on the importance of the utmost generality -in reasoning, and he divined the importance of number -as an aid to the construction of any representation -of the conditions involved in the order of nature. -We know also that he studied geometry, and discovered -the general proof of the remarkable theorem -about right-angled triangles. The formation of the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_40'>40</span>Pythagorean Brotherhood, and the mysterious rumours -as to its rites and its influence, afford some evidence -that Pythagoras divined, however dimly, the -possible importance of mathematics in the formation -of science. On the side of philosophy he started a -discussion which has agitated thinkers ever since. -He asked, ‘What is the status of mathematical entities, -such as numbers for example, in the realm of things?’ -The number ‘two,’ for example, is in some sense exempt -from the flux of time and the necessity of position -in space. Yet it is involved in the real world. -The same considerations apply to geometrical notions—to -circular shape, for example. Pythagoras is said -to have taught that the mathematical entities, such as -numbers and shapes, were the ultimate stuff out of -which the real entities of our perceptual experience -are constructed. As thus boldly stated, the idea seems -crude, and indeed silly. But undoubtedly, he had hit -upon a philosophical notion of considerable importance; -a notion which has a long history, and which -has moved the minds of men, and has even entered into -Christian theology. About a thousand years separate -the Athanasian Creed from Pythagoras, and about two -thousand four hundred years separate Pythagoras -from Hegel. Yet for all these distances in time, the -importance of definite number in the constitution of -the Divine Nature, and the concept of the real world -as exhibiting the evolution of an idea, can both be -traced back to the train of thought set going by -Pythagoras.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The importance of an individual thinker owes something -to chance. For it depends upon the fate of his -ideas in the minds of his successors. In this respect -<span class='pageno' id='Page_41'>41</span>Pythagoras was fortunate. His philosophical speculations -reach us through the mind of Plato. The -Platonic world of ideas is the refined, revised form of -the Pythagorean doctrine that number lies at the base -of the real world. Owing to the Greek mode of representing -numbers by patterns of dots, the notions of -number and of geometrical configuration are less separated -than with us. Also Pythagoras, without doubt, -included the shape-iness of shape, which is an impure -mathematical entity. So to-day, when Einstein and his -followers proclaim that physical facts, such as gravitation, -are to be construed as exhibitions of local -peculiarities of spatio-temporal properties, they are -following the pure Pythagorean tradition. In a sense, -Plato and Pythagoras stand nearer to modern physical -science than does Aristotle. The two former were -mathematicians, whereas Aristotle was the son of a -doctor, though of course he was not thereby ignorant -of mathematics. The practical counsel to be derived -from Pythagoras, is to measure, and thus to express -quality in terms of numerically determined quantity. -But the biological sciences, then and till our own time, -have been overwhelmingly classificatory. Accordingly, -Aristotle by his Logic throws the emphasis on -classification. The popularity of Aristotelian Logic -retarded the advance of physical science throughout -the Middle Ages. If only the schoolmen had measured -instead of classifying, how much they might have -learnt!</p> - -<p class='c001'>Classification is a halfway house between the immediate -concreteness of the individual thing and the -complete abstraction of mathematical notions. The -species take account of the specific character, and the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_42'>42</span>genera of the generic character. But in the procedure -of relating mathematical notions to the facts of nature, -by counting, by measurement, and by geometrical relations, -and by types of order, the rational contemplation -is lifted from the incomplete abstractions involved -in definite species and genera, to the complete, -abstractions of mathematics. Classification is necessary. -But unless you can progress from classification -to mathematics, your reasoning will not take you very -far.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Between the epoch which stretches from Pythagoras -to Plato and the epoch comprised in the seventeenth -century of the modern world nearly two thousand -years elapsed. In this long interval mathematics -had made immense strides. Geometry had gained -the study of conic sections and trigonometry; the -method of exhaustion had almost anticipated the -integral calculus; and above all the Arabic arithmetical -notation and algebra had been contributed by -Asiatic thought. But the progress was on technical -lines. Mathematics, as a formative element in the -development of philosophy, never, during this long -period, recovered from its deposition at the hands of -Aristotle. Some of the old ideas derived from the -Pythagorean-Platonic epoch lingered on, and can be -traced among the Platonic influences which shaped -the first period of evolution of Christian theology. -But philosophy received no fresh inspiration from -the steady advance of mathematical science. In the -seventeenth century the influence of Aristotle was at -its lowest, and mathematics recovered the importance -of its earlier period. It was an age of great physicists -and great philosophers; and the physicists and philosophers -<span class='pageno' id='Page_43'>43</span>were alike mathematicians. The exception of -John Locke should be made; although he was greatly -influenced by the Newtonian circle of the Royal -Society. In the age of Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, -Newton, and Leibniz, mathematics was an influence of -the first magnitude in the formation of philosophic -ideas. But the mathematics, which now emerged into -prominence, was a very different science from the -mathematics of the earlier epoch. It had gained in -generality, and had started upon its almost incredible -modern career of piling subtlety of generalization -upon subtlety of generalization; and of finding, with -each growth of complexity, some new application, -either to physical science, or to philosophic thought. -The Arabic notation had equipped the science with -almost perfect technical efficiency in the manipulation -of numbers. This relief from a struggle with -arithmetical details (as instanced, for example, in the -Egyptian arithmetic of B. C. 1600) gave room for a -development which had already been faintly anticipated -in later Greek mathematics. Algebra now came -upon the scene, and algebra is a generalisation of -arithmetic. In the same way as the notion of number -abstracted from reference to any one particular set -of entities, so in algebra abstraction is made from the -notion of any particular numbers. Just as the number -‘5’ refers impartially to any group of five entities, so -in algebra the letters are used to refer impartially to -any number, with the proviso that each letter is to -refer to the same number throughout the same context -of its employment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This usage was first employed in equations, which -are methods of asking complicated arithmetical questions. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_44'>44</span>In this connection, the letters representing -numbers were termed ‘unknowns.’ But equations -soon suggested a new idea, that, namely, of a function -of one or more general symbols, these symbols being -letters representing any numbers. In this employment -the algebraic letters are called the ‘arguments’ -of the function, or sometimes they are called the ‘variables.’ -Then, for instance, if an angle is represented -by an algebraical letter, as standing for its numerical -measure in terms of a given unit, Trigonometry is -absorbed into this new algebra. Algebra thus develops -into the general science of analysis in which -we consider the properties of various functions of -undetermined arguments. Finally the particular functions, -such as the trigonometrical functions, and the -logarithmic functions, and the algebraic functions, -are generalised into the idea of ‘any function.’ Too -large a generalisation leads to mere barrenness. It is -the large generalisation, limited by a happy particularity, -which is the fruitful conception. For instance -the idea of any <em>continuous</em> function, whereby the limitation -of continuity is introduced, is the fruitful idea -which has led to most of the important applications. -This rise of algebraic analysis was concurrent with -Descartes’ discovery of analytical geometry, and then -with the invention of the infinitesimal calculus by -Newton and Leibniz. Truly, Pythagoras, if he could -have foreseen the issue of the train of thought which -he had set going would have felt himself fully justified -in his brotherhood with its excitement of mysterious -rites.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The point which I now want to make is that this -dominance of the idea of functionality in the abstract -<span class='pageno' id='Page_45'>45</span>sphere of mathematics found itself reflected in the -order of nature under the guise of mathematically -expressed laws of nature. Apart from this progress -of mathematics, the seventeenth century developments -of science would have been impossible. Mathematics -supplied the background of imaginative thought with -which the men of science approached the observation -of nature. Galileo produced formulae, Descartes -produced formulae, Huyghens produced formulae, -Newton produced formulae.</p> - -<p class='c001'>As a particular example of the effect of the abstract -development of mathematics upon the science of those -times, consider the notion of periodicity. The general -recurrences of things are very obvious in our ordinary -experience. Days recur, lunar phases recur, the seasons -of the year recur, rotating bodies recur to their -old positions, beats of the heart recur, breathing recurs. -On every side, we are met by recurrence. Apart from -recurrence, knowledge would be impossible; for nothing -could be referred to our past experience. Also, -apart from some regularity of recurrence, measurement -would be impossible. In our experience, as we -gain the idea of exactness, recurrence is fundamental.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the theory -of periodicity took a fundamental place in science. -Kepler divined a law connecting the major axes of the -planetary orbits with the periods in which the planets -respectively described their orbits: Galileo observed -the periodic vibrations of pendulums: Newton explained -sound as being due to the disturbance of air -by the passage through it of periodic waves of condensation -and rarefaction: Huyghens explained light as -being due to the transverse waves of vibration of a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_46'>46</span>subtle ether: Mersenne connected the period of the -vibration of a violin string with its density, tension, -and length. The birth of modern physics depended -upon the application of the abstract idea of periodicity -to a variety of concrete instances. But this would have -been impossible, unless mathematicians had already -worked out in the abstract the various abstract ideas -which cluster round the notions of periodicity. The -science of trigonometry arose from that of the relations -of the angles of a right-angled triangle, to the ratios -between the sides and hypotenuse of the triangle. -Then, under the influence of the newly discovered -mathematical science of the analysis of functions, it -broadened out into the study of the simple abstract -periodic functions which these ratios exemplify. Thus -trigonometry became completely abstract; and in thus -becoming abstract, it became useful. It illuminated -the underlying analogy between sets of utterly diverse -physical phenomena; and at the same time it supplied -the weapons by which any one such set could have its -various features analysed and related to each other.<a id='r2' /><a href='#f2' class='c013'><sup>[2]</sup></a></p> - -<p class='c001'>Nothing is more impressive than the fact that, as -mathematics withdrew increasingly into the upper -regions of ever greater extremes of abstract thought, -it returned back to earth with a corresponding growth -of importance for the analysis of concrete fact. The -history of the seventeenth century science reads as -though it were some vivid dream of Plato or Pythagoras. -In this characteristic the seventeenth century -was only the forerunner of its successors.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f2'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r2'>2</a>. For a more detailed consideration of the nature and function -of pure mathematics <i>cf.</i> my <cite>Introduction to Mathematics</cite>, Home -University Library, Williams and Norgate, London.</p> -</div> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_47'>47</span>The paradox is now fully established that the utmost -abstractions are the true weapons with which to -control our thought of concrete fact. As the result -of the prominence of mathematicians in the seventeenth -century, the eighteenth century was mathematically -minded, more especially where French influence -predominated. An exception must be made of -the English empiricism derived from Locke. Outside -France, Newton’s direct influence on philosophy is -best seen in Kant, and not in Hume.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the nineteenth century, the general influence of -mathematics waned. The romantic movement in -literature, and the idealistic movement in philosophy -were not the products of mathematical minds. Also, -even in science, the growth of geology, of zoology, and -of the biological sciences generally, was in each case -entirely disconnected from any reference to mathematics. -The chief scientific excitement of the century -was the Darwinian theory of evolution. Accordingly, -mathematicians were in the background, so far as the -general thought of that age was concerned. But this -does not mean that mathematics was being neglected, -or even that it was uninfluential. During the nineteenth -century pure mathematics made almost as -much progress as during all the preceding centuries -from Pythagoras onwards. Of course progress was -easier, because the technique had been perfected. But -allowing for that, the change in mathematics between -the years 1800 and 1900 is very remarkable. If we -add in the previous hundred years, and take the two -centuries preceding the present time, one is almost -tempted to date the foundation of mathematics somewhere -in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_48'>48</span>The period of the discovery of the elements stretches -from Pythagoras to Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, -and the developed science has been created during the -last two hundred and fifty years. This is not a boast -as to the superior genius of the modern world; for it is -harder to discover the elements than to develop the -science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Throughout the nineteenth century, the influence of -the science was its influence on dynamics and physics, -and thence derivatively on engineering and chemistry. -It is difficult to overrate its indirect influence -on human life through the medium of these sciences. -But there was no direct influence of mathematics -upon the general thought of the age.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In reviewing this rapid sketch of the influence of -mathematics throughout European history, we see -that it had two great periods of direct influence upon -general thought, both periods lasting for about two -hundred years. The first period was that stretching -from Pythagoras to Plato, when the possibility of the -science, and its general character, first dawned upon -the Grecian thinkers. The second period comprised -the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of our modern -epoch. Both periods had certain common characteristics. -In the earlier, as in the later period, the -general categories of thought in many spheres of human -interest, were in a state of disintegration. In the -age of Pythagoras, the unconscious Paganism, with -its traditional clothing of beautiful ritual and of magical -rites, was passing into a new phase under two -influences. There were waves of religious enthusiasm, -seeking direct enlightenment into the secret depths of -being; and at the opposite pole, there was the awakening -<span class='pageno' id='Page_49'>49</span>of critical analytical thought, probing with cool -dispassionateness into ultimate meanings. In both -influences, so diverse in their outcome, there was one -common element—an awakened curiosity, and a movement -towards the reconstruction of traditional ways. -The pagan mysteries may be compared to the Puritan -reaction and to the Catholic reaction; critical -scientific interest was alike in both epochs, though -with minor differences of substantial importance.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In each age, the earlier stages were placed in -periods of rising prosperity, and of new opportunities. -In this respect, they differed from the period of gradual -declension in the second and third centuries when -Christianity was advancing to the conquest of the -Roman world. It is only in a period, fortunate both -in its opportunities for disengagement from the immediate -pressure of circumstances, and in its eager -curiosity, that the Age-Spirit can undertake any direct -revision of those final abstractions which lie hidden -in the more concrete concepts from which the serious -thought of an age takes its start. In the rare periods -when this task can be undertaken, mathematics becomes -relevant to philosophy. For mathematics is -the science of the most complete abstractions to which -the human mind can attain.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The parallel between the two epochs must not be -pressed too far. The modern world is larger and -more complex than the ancient civilization round the -shores of the Mediterranean, or even than that of the -Europe which sent Columbus and the Pilgrim Fathers -across the ocean. We cannot now explain our age -by some simple formula which becomes dominant -and will then be laid to rest for a thousand years. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_50'>50</span>Thus the temporary submergence of the mathematical -mentality from the time of Rousseau onwards appears -already to be at an end. We are entering upon an -age of reconstruction, in religion, in science, and in -political thought. Such ages, if they are to avoid mere -ignorant oscillation between extremes, must seek truth -in its ultimate depths. There can be no vision of this -depth of truth apart from a philosophy which takes -full account of those ultimate abstractions, whose interconnections -it is the business of mathematics to -explore.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In order to explain exactly how mathematics is -gaining in general importance at the present time, let -us start from a particular scientific perplexity and -consider the notions to which we are naturally led by -some attempt to unravel its difficulties. At present -physics is troubled by the quantum theory. I need not -now explain<a id='r3' /><a href='#f3' class='c013'><sup>[3]</sup></a> what this theory is, to those who are not -already familiar with it. But the point is that one -of the most hopeful lines of explanation is to assume -that an electron does not continuously traverse its -path in space. The alternative notion as to its mode -of existence is that it appears at a series of discrete -positions in space which it occupies for successive -durations of time. It is as though an automobile -moving at the average rate of thirty miles an hour -along a road, did not traverse the road continuously; -but appeared successively at the successive milestones, -remaining for two minutes at each milestone.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f3'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r3'>3</a>. <i>Cf.</i> Chapter VIII.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>In the first place there is required the purely technical -use of mathematics to determine whether this -conception does in fact explain the many perplexing -<span class='pageno' id='Page_51'>51</span>characteristics of the quantum theory. If the notion -survives this test, undoubtedly physics will adopt it. -So far the question is purely one for mathematics and -physical science to settle between them, on the basis -of mathematical calculations and physical observations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But now a problem is handed over to the philosophers. -This discontinuous existence in space, thus assigned -to electrons, is very unlike the continuous existence -of material entities which we habitually assume -as obvious. The electron seems to be borrowing -the character which some people have assigned -to the Mahatmas of Tibet. These electrons, with the -correlative protons, are now conceived as being the -fundamental entities out of which the material bodies -of ordinary experience are composed. Accordingly, -if this explanation is allowed, we have to revise all our -notions of the ultimate character of material existence. -For when we penetrate to these final entities, this -startling discontinuity of spatial existence discloses -itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is no difficulty in explaining the paradox, if -we consent to apply to the apparently steady undifferentiated -endurance of matter the same principles as -those now accepted for sound and light. A steadily -sounding note is explained as the outcome of vibrations -in the air: a steady colour is explained as the -outcome of vibrations in ether. If we explain the -steady endurance of matter on the same principle, we -shall conceive each primordial element as a vibratory -ebb and flow of an underlying energy, or activity. -Suppose we keep to the physical idea of energy: then -each primordial element will be an organized system -<span class='pageno' id='Page_52'>52</span>of vibratory streaming of energy. Accordingly there -will be a definite period associated with each element; -and within that period the stream-system will sway -from one stationary maximum to another stationary -maximum,—or, taking a metaphor from the ocean -tides, the system will sway from one high tide to another -high tide. This system, forming the primordial -element, is nothing at any instant. It requires its whole -period in which to manifest itself. In an analogous -way, a note of music is nothing at an instant, but it -also requires its whole period in which to manifest -itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, in asking where the primordial element -is, we must settle on its average position at the -centre of each period. If we divide time into smaller -elements, the vibratory system as one electronic entity -has no existence. The path in space of such a -vibratory entity—where the entity is <em>constituted by</em> -the vibrations—must be represented by a series of detached -positions in space, analogously to the automobile -which is found at successive milestones and at -nowhere between.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We first must ask whether there is any evidence to -associate the quantum theory with vibration. This -question is immediately answered in the affirmative. -The whole theory centres round the radiant energy -from an atom, and is intimately associated with the -periods of the radiant wave-systems. It seems, therefore, -that the hypothesis of essentially vibratory existence -is the most hopeful way of explaining the paradox -of the discontinuous orbit.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the second place, a new problem is now placed -before philosophers and physicists, if we entertain the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_53'>53</span>hypothesis that the ultimate elements of matter are in -their essence vibratory. By this I mean that apart -from being a periodic system, such an element would -have no existence. With this hypothesis we have to -ask, what are the ingredients which form the vibratory -organism. We have already got rid of the matter -with its appearance of undifferentiated endurance. -Apart from some metaphysical compulsion, there is no -reason to provide another more subtle stuff to take the -place of the matter which has just been explained -away. The field is now open for the introduction of -some new doctrine of organism which may take the -place of the materialism with which, since the seventeenth -century, science has saddled philosophy. It -must be remembered that the physicists’ energy is obviously -an abstraction. The concrete fact, which is -the organism, must be a complete expression of the -character of a real occurrence. Such a displacement -of scientific materialism, if it ever takes place, cannot -fail to have important consequences in every field of -thought.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Finally, our last reflection must be, that we have in -the end come back to a version of the doctrine of old -Pythagoras, from whom mathematics, and mathematical -physics, took their rise. He discovered the importance -of dealing with abstractions; and in particular -directed attention to number as characterizing the -periodicities of notes of music. The importance of -the abstract idea of periodicity was thus present at the -very beginning both of mathematics and of European -philosophy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the seventeenth century, the birth of modern -science required a new mathematics, more fully -<span class='pageno' id='Page_54'>54</span>equipped for the purpose of analysing the characteristics -of vibratory existence. And now in the twentieth -century we find physicists largely engaged in analysing -the periodicities of atoms. Truly, Pythagoras in -founding European philosophy and European mathematics, -endowed them with the luckiest of lucky -guesses—or, was it a flash of divine genius, penetrating -to the inmost nature of things?</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_55'>55</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER III <br /> <br /> THE CENTURY OF GENIUS</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The previous chapters were devoted to the antecedent -conditions which prepared the soil for the scientific -outburst of the seventeenth century. They traced the -various elements of thought and instinctive belief, -from their first efflorescence in the classical civilisation -of the ancient world, through the transformations -which they underwent in the Middle Ages, up to the -historical revolt of the sixteenth century. Three -main factors arrested attention,—the rise of mathematics, -the instinctive belief in a detailed order of -nature, and the unbridled rationalism of the thought -of the later Middle Ages. By this rationalism I mean -the belief that the avenue to truth was predominantly -through a metaphysical analysis of the nature of -things, which would thereby determine how things -acted and functioned. The historical revolt was the -definite abandonment of this method in favour of the -study of the empirical facts of antecedents and consequences. -In religion, it meant the appeal to the -origins of Christianity; and in science it meant the -appeal to experiment and the inductive method of -reasoning.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A brief, and sufficiently accurate, description of the -intellectual life of the European races during the succeeding -two centuries and a quarter up to our own -times is that they have been living upon the accumulated -<span class='pageno' id='Page_56'>56</span>capital of ideas provided for them by the genius -of the seventeenth century. The men of this epoch -inherited a ferment of ideas attendant upon the historical -revolt of the sixteenth century, and they bequeathed -formed systems of thought touching every -aspect of human life. It is the one century which consistently, -and throughout the whole range of human -activities, provided intellectual genius adequate for -the greatness of its occasions. The crowded stage of -this hundred years is indicated by the coincidences -which mark its literary annals. At its dawn Bacon’s -<cite>Advancement of Learning</cite> and Cervantes’ <cite>Don Quixote</cite> -were published in the same year (1605), as though -the epoch would introduce itself with a forward and -a backward glance. The first quarto edition of <cite>Hamlet</cite> -appeared in the preceding year, and a slightly variant -edition in the same year. Finally Shakespeare -and Cervantes died on the same day, April 23, 1616. -In the spring of this same year Harvey is believed to -have first expounded his theory of the circulation of -the blood in a course of lectures before the College of -Physicians in London. Newton was born in the year -that Galileo died (1642), exactly one hundred years -after the publication of Copernicus’ <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>De Revolutionibus</cite></span>. -One year earlier Descartes published his <span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><cite>Meditationes</cite></span> -and two years later his <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>Principia Philosophiae</cite></span>. -There simply was not time for the century to -space out nicely its notable events concerning men of -genius.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I cannot now enter upon a chronicle of the various -stages of intellectual advance included within this -epoch. It is too large a topic for one lecture, and -would obscure the ideas which it is my purpose to -<span class='pageno' id='Page_57'>57</span>develop. A mere rough catalogue of some names will -be sufficient, names of men who published to the world -important work within these limits of time: Francis -Bacon, Harvey, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, -Huyghens, Boyle, Newton, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz. -I have limited the list to the sacred number of twelve, -a number much too small to be properly representative. -For example, there is only one Italian there, -whereas Italy could have filled the list from its own -ranks. Again Harvey is the only biologist, and also -there are too many Englishmen. This latter defect -is partly due to the fact that the lecturer is English, -and that he is lecturing to an audience which, equally -with him, owns this English century. If he had been -Dutch, there would have been too many Dutchmen; -if Italian, too many Italians; and if French, too many -Frenchmen. The unhappy Thirty Years’ War was -devastating Germany; but every other country looks -back to this century as an epoch which witnessed some -culmination of its genius. Certainly this was a great -period of English thought; as at a later time Voltaire -impressed upon France.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The omission of physiologists, other than Harvey, -also requires explanation. There were, of course, -great advances in biology within the century, chiefly -associated with Italy and the University of Padua. -But my purpose is to trace the philosophic outlook, -derived from science and presupposed by science, and -to estimate some of its effects on the general climate -of each age. Now the scientific <a id='corr57.30'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='philosopy'>philosophy</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_57.30'><ins class='correction' title='philosopy'>philosophy</ins></a></span> of this age -was dominated by physics; so as to be the most obvious -rendering, in terms of general ideas, of the state of -physical knowledge of that age and of the two succeeding -<span class='pageno' id='Page_58'>58</span>centuries. As a matter of fact, these concepts are -very unsuited to biology; and set for it an insoluble -problem of matter and life and organism, with which -biologists are now wrestling. But the science of living -organisms is only now coming to a growth adequate to -impress its conceptions upon philosophy. The last -half century before the present time has witnessed unsuccessful -attempts to impress biological notions upon -the materialism of the seventeenth century. However -this success be estimated, it is certain that the root -ideas of the seventeenth century were derived from the -school of thought which produced Galileo, Huyghens -and Newton, and not from the physiologists of Padua. -One unsolved problem of thought, so far as it derives -from this period, is to be formulated thus: Given configurations -of matter with locomotion in space as assigned -by physical laws, to account for living organisms.</p> - -<p class='c001'>My discussion of the epoch will be best introduced -by a quotation from Francis Bacon, which forms the -opening of Section (or ‘Century’) IX of his <cite>Natural -History</cite>, I mean his <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>Silva Silvarum</cite></span>. We are told in -the contemporary memoir by his chaplain, Dr. Rawley, -that this work was composed in the last five years -of his life, so it must be dated between 1620 and 1626. -The quotation runs thus:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though -they have no sense, yet they have perception; for when -one body is applied to another, there is a kind of election -to embrace that which is agreeable, and to exclude -or expel that which is ingrate; and whether the body -be alterant or altered, evermore a perception precedeth -operation; for else all bodies would be like one -<span class='pageno' id='Page_59'>59</span>to another. And sometimes this perception, in some -kind of bodies, is far more subtile than sense; so that -sense is but a dull thing in comparison of it: we see a -weatherglass will find the least difference of the -weather in heat or cold, when we find it not. And this -perception is sometimes at a distance, as well as upon -the touch; as when the loadstone draweth iron; or -flame naphtha of Babylon, a great distance off. It is -therefore a subject of a very noble enquiry, to enquire -of the more subtile perceptions; for it is another key -to open nature, as well as the sense; and sometimes -better. And besides, it is a principal means of natural -divination; for that which in these perceptions -appeareth early, in the great effects cometh long -after.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are a great many points of interest about this -quotation, some of which will emerge into importance -in succeeding lectures. In the first place, note the -careful way in which Bacon discriminates between -<em>perception</em>, or <em>taking account of</em>, on the one hand, and -<em>sense</em>, or <em>cognitive experience</em>, on the other hand. In -this respect Bacon is outside the physical line of -thought which finally dominated the century. Later -on, people thought of passive matter which was operated -on externally by forces. I believe Bacon’s line -of thought to have expressed a more fundamental -truth than do the materialistic concepts which were -then being shaped as adequate for physics. We are -now so used to the materialistic way of looking at -things, which has been rooted in our literature by the -genius of the seventeenth century, that it is with some -difficulty that we understand the possibility of another -mode of approach to the problems of nature.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_60'>60</span>In the particular instance of the quotation which -I have just made, the whole passage and the context in -which it is embedded, are permeated through and -through by the experimental method, that is to say, by -attention to ‘irreducible and stubborn facts’, and by -the inductive method of eliciting general laws. Another -unsolved problem which has been bequeathed -to us by the seventeenth century is the rational justification -of this method of Induction. The explicit -realisation of the antithesis between the deductive rationalism -of the scholastics and the inductive observational -methods of the moderns must chiefly be ascribed -to Bacon; though, of course, it was implicit in the -mind of Galileo and of all the men of science of those -times. But Bacon was one of the earliest of the whole -group, and also had the most direct apprehension of -the full extent of the intellectual revolution which was -in progress. Perhaps the man who most completely -anticipated both Bacon and the whole modern point -of view was the artist Leonardo Da Vinci, who lived -almost exactly a century before Bacon. Leonardo -also illustrates the theory which I was advancing in -my last lecture, that the rise of naturalistic art was an -important ingredient in the formation of our scientific -mentality. Indeed, Leonardo was more completely -a man of science than was Bacon. The practice -of naturalistic art is more akin to the practice of -physics, chemistry and biology than is the practice -of law. We all remember the saying of Bacon’s contemporary, -Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation -of the blood, that Bacon ‘wrote of science like a Lord -Chancellor.’ But at the beginning of the modern -period Da Vinci and Bacon stand together as illustrating -<span class='pageno' id='Page_61'>61</span>the various strains which have combined to -form the modern world, namely, legal mentality and -the patient observational habits of the naturalistic -artists.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the passage which I have quoted from Bacon’s -writings there is no explicit mention of the method -of inductive reasoning. It is unnecessary for me to -prove to you by any quotations that the enforcement -of the importance of this method, and of the importance, -to the welfare of mankind, of the secrets of nature -to be thus discovered, was one of the main themes -to which Bacon devoted himself in his writings. Induction -has proved to be a somewhat more complex -process than Bacon anticipated. He had in his mind -the belief that with a sufficient care in the collection -of instances the general law would stand out of itself. -We know now, and probably Harvey knew then, that -this is a very inadequate account of the processes -which issue in scientific generalisations. But when -you have made all the requisite deductions, Bacon -remains as one of the great builders who constructed -the mind of the modern world.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The special difficulties raised by induction emerged -in the eighteenth century, as the result of Hume’s criticism. -But Bacon was one of the prophets of the -historical revolt, which deserted the method of -unrelieved rationalism, and rushed into the other extreme -of basing all fruitful knowledge upon inference -from particular occasions in the past to particular -occasions in the future. I do not wish to throw any -doubt upon the validity of induction, when it has been -properly guarded. My point is, that the very baffling -task of applying reason to elicit the general characteristics -<span class='pageno' id='Page_62'>62</span>of the immediate occasion, as set before us in -direct cognition, is a necessary preliminary, if we are -to justify induction; unless indeed we are content to -base it upon our vague instinct that of course it is all -right. Either there is something about the immediate -occasion which affords knowledge of the past and the -future, or we are reduced to utter scepticism as to -memory and induction. It is impossible to over-emphasise -the point that the key to the process of induction, -as used either in science or in our ordinary -life, is to be found in the right understanding of the -immediate occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness. -It is in respect to our grasp of the character of -these occasions in their concreteness that the modern -developments of physiology and of psychology are of -critical importance. I shall illustrate this point in my -subsequent lectures. We find ourselves amid insoluble -difficulties when we substitute for this concrete occasion -a mere abstract in which we only consider material -objects in a flux of configurations in time and space. -It is quite obvious that such objects can tell us only -that they are where they are.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, we must recur to the method of the -school-divinity as explained by the Italian medievalists -whom I quoted in the first lecture. We must -observe the immediate occasion, and <em>use reason</em> to -elicit a general description of its nature. Induction -presupposes metaphysics. In other words, it rests -upon an antecedent rationalism. You cannot have a -rational justification for your appeal to history till -your metaphysics has assured you that there <em>is</em> a history -to appeal to; and likewise your conjectures as to -the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that -<span class='pageno' id='Page_63'>63</span>there <em>is</em> a future already subjected to some determinations. -The difficulty is to make sense of either of these -ideas. But unless you have done so, you have made -nonsense of induction.</p> - -<p class='c001'>You will observe that I do not hold Induction to be -in its essence the derivation of general laws. It is the -divination of some characteristics of a particular future -from the known characteristics of a particular -past. The wider assumption of general laws holding -for all cognisable occasions appears a very unsafe -addendum to attach to this limited knowledge. All -we can ask of the present occasion is that it shall determine -a particular community of occasions, which -are in some respects mutually qualified by reason of -their inclusion within that same community. That -community of occasions considered in physical science -is the set of happenings which fit on to each other—as -we say—in a common space-time, so that we can -trace the transitions from one to the other. Accordingly, -we refer to <em>the</em> common space-time indicated in -our immediate occasion of knowledge. Inductive reasoning -proceeds from the particular occasion to the -particular community of occasions, and from the particular -community to relations between particular occasions -within that community. Until we have taken -into account other scientific concepts, it is impossible -to carry the discussion of induction further than this -preliminary conclusion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The third point to notice about this quotation from -Bacon is the purely qualitative character of the statements -made in it. In this respect Bacon completely -missed the tonality which lay behind the success of -seventeenth century science. Science was becoming, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_64'>64</span>and has remained, primarily quantitative. Search for -measurable elements among your phenomena, and -then search for relations between these measures of -physical quantities. Bacon ignores this rule of science. -For example, in the quotation given he speaks of action -at a distance; but he is thinking qualitatively and -not quantitatively. We cannot ask that he should anticipate -his younger contemporary Galileo, or his -distant successor Newton. But he gives no hint that -there should be a search for quantities. Perhaps he -was misled by the current logical doctrines which had -come down from Aristotle. For, in effect, these doctrines -said to the physicist ‘<em>classify</em>’ when they should -have said ‘<em>measure</em>.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>By the end of the century physics had been founded -on a satisfactory basis of measurement. The final and -adequate exposition was given by Newton. The common -measurable element of <em>mass</em> was discerned as -characterising all bodies in different amounts. Bodies -which are apparently identical in substance, shape, -and size have very approximately the same mass: the -closer the identity, the nearer the equality. The force -acting on a body, whether by touch or by action at a -distance, was [in effect] defined as being equal to the -mass of the body multiplied by the rate of change of -the body’s velocity, so far as this rate of change is -produced by that force. In this way the force is discerned -by its effect on the motion of the body. The -question now arises whether this conception of the -magnitude of a force leads to the discovery of simple -quantitative laws involving the alternative determination -of forces by circumstances of the configuration of -substances and of their physical characters. The Newtonian -<span class='pageno' id='Page_65'>65</span>conception has been brilliantly successful in -surviving this test throughout the whole modern -period. Its first triumph was the law of gravitation. -Its cumulative triumph has been the whole development -of dynamical astronomy, of engineering, and -of physics.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This subject of the formation of the three laws of -motion and of the law of gravitation deserves critical -attention. The whole development of thought -occupied exactly two generations. It commenced with -Galileo and ended with Newton’s <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>Principia</cite></span>; and -Newton was born in the year that Galileo died. Also -the lives of Descartes and Huyghens fall within the -period occupied by these great terminal figures. The -issue of the combined labours of these four men has -some right to be considered as the greatest single intellectual -success which mankind has achieved. In -estimating its size, we must consider the completeness -of its range. It constructs for us a vision of the material -universe, and it enables us to calculate the minutest -detail of a particular occurrence. Galileo took -the first step in hitting on the right line of thought. -He noted that the critical point to attend to was not -the motion of bodies but the changes of their motions. -Galileo’s discovery is formularised by Newton in his -first law of motion:—“Every body continues in its -state of rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, -except so far as it may be compelled by force to -change that state.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>This formula contains the repudiation of a belief -which had blocked the progress of physics for two -thousand years. It also deals with a fundamental -concept which is essential to scientific theory; I mean, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_66'>66</span>the concept of an ideally isolated system. This conception -embodies a fundamental character of things, -without which science, or indeed any knowledge on -the part of finite intellects, would be impossible. The -‘isolated’ system is not a solipsist system, apart from -which there would be nonentity. It is isolated as -within the universe. This means that there are truths -respecting this system which require reference only to -the remainder of things by way of a uniform systematic -scheme of relationships. Thus the conception of an -isolated system is not the conception of substantial independence -from the remainder of things, but of freedom -from casual contingent dependence upon detailed -items within the rest of the universe. Further, this -freedom from casual dependence is required only in -respect to certain abstract characteristics which attach -to the isolated system, and not in respect to the system -in its full concreteness.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The first law of motion asks what is to be said of -a dynamically isolated system so far as concerns its -motion as a whole, abstracting from its orientation and -its internal arrangement of parts. Aristotle said that -you must conceive such a system to be at rest. Galileo -added that the state of rest is only a particular case, -and that the general statement is ‘either in a state of -rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line.’ Accordingly, -an Aristotelean would conceive the forces -arising from the reaction of alien bodies as being -quantitatively measurable in terms of the velocity they -sustain, and as directively determined by the direction -of that velocity; while the Galilean would direct attention -to the magnitude of the acceleration and to its -<span class='pageno' id='Page_67'>67</span>direction. This difference is illustrated by contrasting -Kepler and Newton. They both speculated as to -the forces sustaining the planets in their orbits. Kepler -looked for tangential forces pushing the planets -along, whereas Newton looked for radial forces diverting -the directions of the planets’ motions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Instead of dwelling upon the mistake which Aristotle -made, it is more profitable to emphasise the justification -which he had for it, if we consider the obvious -facts of our experience. All the motions which -enter into our normal everyday experience cease unless -they are evidently sustained from the outside. -Apparently, therefore, the sound empiricist must devote -his attention to this question of the sustenance of -motion. We here hit upon one of the dangers of unimaginative -empiricism. The seventeenth century exhibits -another example of this same danger; and, of -all people in the world, Newton fell into it. Huyghens -had produced the wave theory of light. But this -theory failed to account for the most obvious facts -about light as in our ordinary experience, namely, that -shadows cast by obstructing objects are defined by -rectilinear rays. Accordingly, Newton rejected this -theory and adopted the corpuscular theory which -completely explained shadows. Since then both theories -have had their periods of triumph. At the present -moment the scientific world is seeking for a combination -of the two. These examples illustrate the -danger of refusing to entertain an idea because of its -failure to explain one of the most obvious facts in the -subject matter in question. If you have had your attention -directed to the novelties in thought in your -<span class='pageno' id='Page_68'>68</span>own lifetime, you will have observed that almost all -really new ideas have a certain aspect of foolishness -when they are first produced.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Returning to the laws of motion, it is noticeable -that no reason was produced in the seventeenth century -for the Galilean as distinct from the Aristotelian -position. It was an ultimate fact. When in the course -of these lectures we come to the modern period, we -shall see that the theory of relativity throws complete -light on this question; but only by rearranging -our whole ideas as to space and time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It remained for Newton to direct attention to <em>mass</em> -as a physical quantity inherent in the nature of a material -body. Mass remained permanent during all -changes of motion. But the proof of the permanence -of mass amid chemical transformations had to wait for -Lavoisier, a century later. Newton’s next task was to -find some estimate of the magnitude of the alien force -in terms of the mass of the body and of its acceleration. -He here had a stroke of luck. For, from the point of -view of a mathematician, the simplest possible law, -namely the product of the two, proved to be the successful -one. Again the modern relativity theory modifies -this extreme simplicity. But luckily for science the -delicate experiments of the physicists of to-day were -not then known, or even possible. Accordingly, the -world was given the two centuries which it required -in order to digest Newton’s laws of motion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Having regard to this triumph, can we wonder that -scientists placed their ultimate principles upon a materialistic -basis, and thereafter ceased to worry about -philosophy? We shall grasp the course of thought, if -we understand exactly what this basis is, and what -<span class='pageno' id='Page_69'>69</span>difficulties it finally involves. When you are criticising -the philosophy of an epoch, do not chiefly direct -your attention to those intellectual positions which its -exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend. There -will be some fundamental assumptions which adherents -of all the variant systems within the epoch unconsciously -presuppose. Such assumptions appear so -obvious that people do not know what they are assuming -because no other way of <a id='corr69.9'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='puttings'>putting</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_69.9'><ins class='correction' title='puttings'>putting</ins></a></span> things has -ever occurred to them. With these assumptions a certain -limited number of types of philosophic systems -are possible, and this group of systems constitutes the -philosophy of the epoch.</p> - -<p class='c001'>One such assumption underlies the whole philosophy -of nature during the modern period. It is embodied -in the conception which is supposed to express -the most concrete aspect of nature. The Ionian philosophers -asked, What is nature made of? The answer -is couched in terms of stuff, or matter, or material,—the -particular name chosen is indifferent—which -has the property of simple location in space and -time, or, if you adopt the more modern ideas, in space-time. -What I mean by matter, or material, is anything -which has this property of <em>simple location</em>. By -simple location I mean one major characteristic which -refers equally both to space and to time, and other -minor characteristics which are diverse as between -space and time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The characteristic common both to space and time -is that material can be said to be <em>here</em> in space and -<em>here</em> in time, or <em>here</em> in space-time, in a perfectly definite -sense which does not require for its explanation -any reference to other regions of space-time. Curiously -<span class='pageno' id='Page_70'>70</span>enough this character of simple location holds whether -we look on a region of space-time as determined absolutely -or relatively. For if a region is merely a way -of indicating a certain set of relations to other entities, -then this characteristic, which I call simple location, -is that material can be said to have just these relations -of position to the other entities without requiring -for its explanation any reference to other regions constituted -by analogous relations of position to the same -entities. In fact, as soon as you have settled, however -you do settle, what you mean by a definite place in -space-time, you can adequately state the relation of a -particular material body to space-time by saying that -it is just there, in that place; and, so far as simple location -is concerned, there is nothing more to be said on -the subject.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are, however, some subordinate explanations -to be made which bring in the minor characteristics -which I have already mentioned. First, as regards -time, if material has existed during any period, it has -equally been in existence during any portion of that -period. In other words, dividing the time does not divide -the material. Secondly, in respect to space, -dividing the volume does divide the material. Accordingly, -if material exists throughout a volume, -there will be less of that material distributed through -any definite half of that volume. It is from this property -that there arises our notion of density at a point -of space. Anyone who talks about density is not assimilating -time and space to the extent that some extremists -of the modern school of relativists very rashly -desire. For the division of time functions, in respect -<span class='pageno' id='Page_71'>71</span>to material, quite differently from the division of -space.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Furthermore, this fact that the material is indifferent -to the division of time leads to the conclusion that -the lapse of time is an accident, rather than of the -essence, of the material. The material is fully itself -in any sub-period however short. Thus the transition -of time has nothing to do with the character of the -material. The material is equally itself at an instant -of time. Here an instant of time is conceived as in -itself without transition, since the temporal transition -is the succession of instants.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The answer, therefore, which the seventeenth century -gave to the ancient question of the Ionian thinkers, -‘What is the world made of?’ was that the world -is a succession of instantaneous configurations of matter,—or -of material, if you wish to include stuff more -subtle than ordinary matter, the ether for example.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We cannot wonder that science rested content with -this assumption as to the fundamental elements of nature. -The great forces of nature, such as gravitation, -were entirely determined by the configurations of -masses. Thus the configurations determined their own -changes, so that the circle of scientific thought was -completely closed. This is the famous mechanistic -theory of nature, which has reigned supreme ever -since the seventeenth century. It is the orthodox creed -of physical science. Furthermore, the creed justified -itself by the pragmatic test. It worked. Physicists -took no more interest in philosophy. They emphasized -the anti-rationalism of the Historical Revolt. But -the difficulties of this theory of materialistic mechanism -<span class='pageno' id='Page_72'>72</span>very soon became apparent. The history of -thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is -governed by the fact that the world had got hold of a -general idea which it could neither live with nor live -without.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This simple location of instantaneous material configurations -is what Bergson has protested against, so -far as it concerns time and so far as it is taken to be -the fundamental fact of concrete nature. He calls it -a distortion of nature due to the intellectual ‘spatialisation’ -of things. I agree with Bergson in his protest: -but I do not agree that such distortion is a vice necessary -to the intellectual apprehension of nature. I -shall in subsequent lectures endeavour to show that -this spatialisation is the expression of more concrete -facts under the guise of very abstract logical constructions. -There is an error; but it is merely the accidental -error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete. It -is an example of what I will call the ‘Fallacy of Misplaced -Concreteness.’ This fallacy is the occasion of -great confusion in philosophy. It is not necessary for -the intellect to fall into the trap, though in this example -there has been a very general tendency to do so.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is at once evident that the concept of simple location -is going to make great difficulties for induction. -For, if in the location of configurations of matter -throughout a stretch of time there is no inherent reference -to any other times, past or future, it immediately -follows that nature within any period does not -refer to nature at any other period. Accordingly, induction -is not based on anything which can be observed -as inherent in nature. Thus we cannot look to -nature for the justification of our belief in any law -<span class='pageno' id='Page_73'>73</span>such as the law of gravitation. In other words, the -order of nature cannot be justified by the mere observation -of nature. For there is nothing in the present -fact which inherently refers either to the past or -to the future. It looks, therefore, as though memory, -as well as induction, would fail to find any justification -within nature itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I have been anticipating the course of future -thought, and have been repeating Hume’s argument. -This train of thought follows so immediately from -the consideration of simple location, that we cannot -wait for the eighteenth century before considering it. -The only wonder is that the world did in fact wait -for Hume before noting the difficulty. Also it illustrates -the anti-rationalism of the scientific public that, -when Hume did appear, it was only the religious implications -of his philosophy which attracted attention. -This was because the clergy were in principle rationalists, -whereas the men of science were content with a -simple faith in the order of nature. Hume himself -remarks, no doubt scoffingly, ‘Our holy religion is -founded on faith.’ This attitude satisfied the Royal -Society but not the Church. It also satisfied Hume -and has satisfied subsequent empiricists.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is another presupposition of thought which -must be put beside the theory of simple location. I -mean the two correlative categories of Substance and -quality. There is, however this difference. There -were different theories as to the adequate description -of the status of space. But whatever its status, no one -had any doubt but that the connection with space enjoyed -by entities, which are said to be in space, is that -of simple location. We may put this shortly by saying -<span class='pageno' id='Page_74'>74</span>that it was tacitly assumed that space is the locus -of simple locations. Whatever is in space is <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>simpliciter</i></span> -in some definite portion of space. But in respect -to substance and quality the leading minds of the seventeenth -century were definitely perplexed; though, -with their usual genius, they at once constructed a -theory which was adequate for their immediate purposes.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Of course, substance and quality, as well as simple -location, are the most natural ideas for the human -mind. It is the way in which we think of things, and -without these ways of thinking we could not get our -ideas straight for daily use. There is no doubt about -this. The only question is, How concretely are we -thinking when we consider nature under these conceptions? -My point will be, that we are presenting ourselves -with simplified editions of immediate matters -of fact. When we examine the primary elements of -these simplified editions, we shall find that they are in -truth only to be justified as being elaborate logical -constructions of a high degree of abstraction. Of -course, as a point of individual psychology, we get at -the ideas by the rough and ready method of suppressing -what appear to be irrelevant details. But when -we attempt to justify this suppression of irrelevance, -we find that, though there are entities left corresponding -to the entities we talk about, yet these entities are -of a high degree of abstraction.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus I hold that substance and quality afford another -instance of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. -Let us consider how the notions of substance and -quality arise. We observe an object as an entity with -certain characteristics. Furthermore, each individual -<span class='pageno' id='Page_75'>75</span>entity is apprehended through its characteristics. For -example, we observe a body; there is something about -it which we note. Perhaps, it is hard, and blue, and -round, and noisy. We observe something which possesses -these qualities: apart from these qualities we do -not observe anything at all. Accordingly, the entity -is the substratum, or substance, of which we predicate -qualities. Some of the qualities are essential, so that -apart from them the entity would not be itself; while -other qualities are accidental and changeable. In -respect to material bodies, the qualities of having a -quantitative mass, and of simple location somewhere, -were held by John Locke at the close of the seventeenth -century to be essential qualities. Of course, the -location was changeable, and the unchangeability of -mass was merely an experimental fact except for some -extremists.</p> - -<p class='c001'>So far, so good. But when we pass to blueness and -noisiness a new situation has to be faced. In the first -place, the body may not be always blue, or noisy. We -have already allowed for this by our theory of accidental -qualities, which for the moment we may -accept as adequate. But in the second place, the seventeenth -century exposed a real difficulty. The great -physicists elaborated transmission theories of light -and sound, based upon their materialistic views of -nature. There were two hypotheses as to light: either -it was transmitted by the vibratory waves of a materialistic -ether, or—according to Newton—it was transmitted -by the motion of incredibly small corpuscles -of some subtle matter. We all know that the wave -theory of Huyghens held the field during the nineteenth -century, and that at present physicists are endeavouring -<span class='pageno' id='Page_76'>76</span>to explain some obscure circumstances -attending radiation by a combination of both theories. -But whatever theory you choose, there is no light or -colour as a fact in external nature. There is merely -motion of material. Again, when the light enters your -eyes and falls on the retina, there is merely motion of -material. Then your nerves are affected and your -brain is affected, and again this is merely motion of -material. The same line of argument holds for sound, -substituting waves in the air for waves in the ether, -and ears for eyes.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We then ask in what sense are blueness and noisiness -qualities of the body. By analogous reasoning, we also -ask in what sense is its scent a quality of the rose.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Galileo considered this question, and at once -pointed out that, apart from eyes, ears, or noses, there -would be no colours, sounds, or smells. Descartes and -Locke elaborated a theory of primary and secondary -qualities. For example, Descartes in his ‘Sixth Meditation’ -says:<a id='r4' /><a href='#f4' class='c013'><sup>[4]</sup></a> “And indeed, as I perceive different -sorts of colours, sounds, odours, tastes, heat, hardness, -etc., I safely conclude that there are in the bodies -from which the diverse perceptions of the senses proceed, -certain varieties corresponding to them, although, -perhaps, not in reality like them;....”</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f4'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r4'>4</a>. Translation by Professor John Veitch.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>Also in his <cite>Principles of Philosophy</cite>, he says: -“That by our senses we know nothing of external objects -beyond their figure [or situation], magnitude, -and motion.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Locke, writing with a knowledge of Newtonian -dynamics, places mass among the primary qualities -of bodies. In short, he elaborates a theory of primary -<span class='pageno' id='Page_77'>77</span>and secondary qualities in accordance with the -state of physical science at the close of the seventeenth -century. The primary qualities are the essential -qualities of substances whose spatio-temporal relationships -constitute nature. The orderliness of these relationships -<a id='corr77.6'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='constitute'>constitutes</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_77.6'><ins class='correction' title='constitute'>constitutes</ins></a></span> nature. The orderliness of these -relationships constitutes the order of nature. The occurrences -of nature are in some way apprehended by -minds, which are associated with living bodies. Primarily, -the mental apprehension is aroused by the occurrences -in certain parts of the correlated body, the -occurrences in the brain, for instance. But the mind -in apprehending also experiences sensations which, -properly speaking, are qualities of the mind alone. -These sensations are projected by the mind so as to -clothe appropriate bodies in external nature. Thus -the bodies are perceived as with qualities which in -reality do not belong to them, qualities which in fact -are purely the offspring of the mind. Thus nature gets -credit which should in truth be reserved for ourselves: -the rose for its scent: the nightingale for his song: and -the sun for his radiance. The poets are entirely mistaken. -They should address their lyrics to themselves, -and should turn them into odes of self-congratulation -on the excellency of the human mind. Nature is a -dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the -hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly.</p> - -<p class='c001'>However you disguise it, this is the practical outcome -of the characteristic scientific philosophy which -closed the seventeenth century.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the first place, we must note its astounding efficiency -as a system of concepts for the organisation of -scientific research. In this respect, it is fully worthy -<span class='pageno' id='Page_78'>78</span>of the genius of the century which produced it. It -has held its own as the guiding principle of scientific -studies ever since. It is still reigning. Every university -in the world organises itself in accordance with -it. No alternative system of organising the pursuit of -scientific truth has been suggested. It is not only reigning, -but it is without a rival.</p> - -<p class='c001'>And yet—it is quite unbelievable. This conception -of the universe is surely framed in terms of high abstractions, -and the paradox only arises because we -have mistaken our abstractions for concrete realities.</p> - -<p class='c001'>No picture, however generalised, of the achievements -of scientific thought in this century can omit the -advance in mathematics. Here as elsewhere the genius -of the epoch made itself evident. Three great -Frenchmen, Descartes, Desargues, Pascal, initiated -the modern period in geometry. Another Frenchman, -Fermat, laid the foundations of modern analysis, and -all but perfected the methods of the differential calculus. -Newton and Leibniz, between them, actually -did create the differential calculus as a practical -method of mathematical reasoning. When the century -ended, mathematics as an instrument for application -to physical problems was well established in something -of its modern proficiency. Modern pure mathematics, -if we except geometry, was in its infancy, and -had given no signs of the astonishing growth it was to -make in the nineteenth century. But the mathematical -physicist had appeared, bringing with him the -type of mind which was to rule the scientific world in -the next century. It was to be the age of ‘Victorious -Analysis.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>The seventeenth century had finally produced a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_79'>79</span>scheme of scientific thought framed by mathematicians, -for the use of mathematicians. The great characteristic -of the mathematical mind is its capacity for -dealing with abstractions; and for eliciting from them -clear-cut demonstrative trains of reasoning, entirely -satisfactory so long as it is those abstractions which -you want to think about. The enormous success of -the scientific abstractions, yielding on the one hand -<em>matter</em> with its <em>simple location</em> in space and time, and -on the other hand <em>mind</em>, perceiving, suffering, reasoning, -but not interfering, has foisted onto philosophy -the task of accepting them as the most concrete rendering -of fact.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thereby, modern philosophy has been ruined. It -has oscillated in a complex manner between three extremes. -There are the dualists, who accept matter -and mind as on equal basis, and the two varieties of -monists, those who put mind inside matter, and those -who put matter inside mind. But this juggling with -abstractions can never overcome the inherent confusion -introduced by the ascription of <em>misplaced concreteness</em> -to the scientific scheme of the seventeenth -century.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_80'>80</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER IV <br /> <br /> THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>In so far as the intellectual climates of different -epochs can be contrasted, the eighteenth century in -Europe was the complete antithesis to the Middle -Ages. The contrast is symbolised by the difference between -the cathedral of Chartres and the Parisian salons, -where D’Alembert conversed with Voltaire. The -Middle Ages were haunted with the desire to rationalise -the infinite: the men of the eighteenth century -rationalised the social life of modern communities, -and based their sociological theories on an appeal to -the facts of nature. The earlier period was the age of -faith, based upon reason. In the later period, they let -sleeping dogs lie: it was the age of reason, based upon -faith. To illustrate my meaning:—St. Anselm would -have been distressed if he had failed to find a convincing -argument for the existence of God, and on this -argument he based his edifice of faith, whereas Hume -based his <cite>Dissertation on the Natural History of -Religion</cite> upon his faith in the order of nature. In -comparing these epochs it is well to remember that -reason can err, and that faith may be misplaced.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In my previous lecture I traced the evolution, during -the seventeenth century, of the scheme of scientific -ideas which has dominated thought ever since. It -involves a fundamental duality, with <em>material</em> on the -one hand, and on the other hand <em>mind</em>. In between -<span class='pageno' id='Page_81'>81</span>there lie the concepts of life, organism, function, instantaneous -reality, interaction, order of nature, -which collectively form the Achilles heel of the whole -system.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I also expressed my conviction that if we desired -to obtain a more fundamental expression of the concrete -character of natural fact, the element in this -scheme which we should first criticise is the concept -of <em>simple location</em>. In view therefore of the importance -which this idea will assume in these lectures, I -will repeat the meaning which I have attached to this -phrase. To say that a bit of matter has <em>simple location</em> -means that, in expressing its spatio-temporal relations, -it is adequate to state that it is where it is, in a -definite finite region of space, and throughout a definite -finite duration of time, apart from any essential -reference of the relations of that bit of matter to other -regions of space and to other durations of time. Again, -this concept of simple location is independent of the -controversy between the absolutist and the relativist -views of space or of time. So long as any theory of -space, or of time, can give a meaning, either absolute -or relative, to the idea of a definite region of space, -and of a definite duration of time, the idea of simple -location has a perfectly definite meaning. This idea -is the very foundation of the seventeenth century -scheme of nature. Apart from it, the scheme is incapable -of expression. I shall argue that among the -primary elements of nature as apprehended in our -immediate experience, there is no element whatever -which possesses this character of simple location. It -does not follow, however, that the science of the seventeenth -century was simply wrong. I hold that by a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_82'>82</span>process of constructive abstraction we can arrive at -abstractions which are the simply-located bits of material, -and at other abstractions which are the minds -included in the scientific scheme. Accordingly, the -real error is an example of what I have termed: The -Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The advantage of confining attention to a definite -group of abstractions, is that you confine your thoughts -to clear-cut definite things, with clear-cut definite relations. -Accordingly, if you have a logical head, you -can deduce a variety of conclusions respecting the relationships -between these abstract entities. Furthermore, -if the abstractions are well-founded, that is to -say, if they do not abstract from everything that is important -in experience, the scientific thought which -confines itself to these abstractions will arrive at a -variety of important truths relating to our experience -of nature. We all know those clear-cut trenchant intellects, -immovably encased in a hard shell of abstractions. -They hold you to their abstractions by the -sheer grip of personality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group -of abstractions, however well-founded, is that, by the -nature of the case, you have abstracted from the remainder -of things. In so far as the excluded things -are important in your experience, your modes of -thought are not fitted to deal with them. You cannot -think without abstractions; accordingly, it is of the -utmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising -your <em>modes</em> of abstraction. It is here that philosophy -finds its niche as essential to the healthy progress -of society. It is the critic of abstractions. A civilisation -which cannot burst through its current abstractions -<span class='pageno' id='Page_83'>83</span>is doomed to sterility after a very limited period -of progress. An active school of philosophy is quite -as important for the locomotion of ideas, as is an active -school of railway engineers for the locomotion of -fuel.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Sometimes it happens that the service rendered by -philosophy is entirely obscured by the astonishing success -of a scheme of abstractions in expressing the dominant -interests of an epoch. This is exactly what happened -during the eighteenth century. <span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><i>Les philosophes</i></span> -were not philosophers. They were men of genius, -clear-headed and acute, who applied the seventeenth -century group of scientific abstractions to the analysis -of the unbounded universe. Their triumph, in respect -to the circle of ideas mainly interesting to their -contemporaries, was overwhelming. Whatever did -not fit into their scheme was ignored, derided, disbelieved. -Their hatred of Gothic architecture symbolises -their lack of sympathy with dim perspectives. -It was the age of reason, healthy, manly, upstanding -reason; but, of one-eyed reason, deficient in its vision -of depth. We cannot overrate the debt of gratitude -which we owe to these men. For a thousand years -Europe had been a prey to intolerant, intolerable visionaries. -The common sense of the eighteenth century, -its grasp of the obvious facts of human suffering, -and of the obvious demands of human nature, acted on -the world like a bath of moral cleansing. Voltaire -must have the credit, that he hated injustice, he hated -cruelty, he hated senseless repression, and he hated -hocus-pocus. Furthermore, when he saw them, he -knew them. In these supreme virtues, he was typical -of his century, on its better side. But if men cannot -<span class='pageno' id='Page_84'>84</span>live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants. -The age had its limitations; yet we cannot -understand the passion with which some of its main -positions are still defended, especially in the schools -of science, unless we do full justice to its positive -achievements. The seventeenth century scheme of concepts -was proving a perfect instrument for research.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This triumph of materialism was chiefly in the -sciences of rational dynamics, physics, and chemistry. -So far as dynamics and physics were concerned, -progress was in the form of direct developments of the -main ideas of the previous epoch. Nothing fundamentally -new was introduced, but there was an immense -detailed development. Special case after special -case was unravelled. It was as though the very -Heavens were being opened, on a set plan. In the second -half of the century, Lavoisier practically founded -chemistry on its present basis. He introduced into -it the principle that no material is lost or gained in -any chemical transformations. This was the last success -of materialistic thought, which has not ultimately -proved to be double-edged. Chemical science now -only waited for the atomic theory, in the next century.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this century the notion of the mechanical explanation -of all the processes of nature finally hardened -into a dogma of science. The notion won through on -its merits by reason of an almost miraculous series of -triumphs achieved by the mathematical physicists, -culminating in the <span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><cite>Méchanique Analytique</cite></span> of Lagrange, -which was published in 1787. Newton’s -<span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>Principia</cite></span> was published in 1687, so that exactly one -hundred years separates the two great books. This -century contains the first period of mathematical physics -<span class='pageno' id='Page_85'>85</span>of the modern type. The publication of Clerk -Maxwell’s <cite>Electricity and Magnetism</cite> in 1873 marks -the close of the second period. Each of these three -books introduces new horizons of thought affecting -everything which comes after them.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In considering the various topics to which mankind -has bent its systematic thought, it is impossible not -to be struck with the unequal distribution of ability -among the different fields. In almost all subjects there -are a few outstanding names. For it requires genius -to create a subject as a distinct topic for thought. But -in the case of many topics, after a good beginning very -relevant to its immediate occasion, the subsequent development -appears as a weak series of flounderings, so -that the whole subject gradually loses its grip on the -evolution of thought. It was far otherwise with mathematical -physics. The more you study this subject, the -more you will find yourself astonished by the almost -incredible triumphs of intellect which it exhibits. The -great mathematical physicists of the eighteenth and -first few years of the nineteenth century, most of them -French, are a case in point: Maupertuis, Clairaut, -D’Alembert, Lagrange, Laplace, Fourier, form a series -of names, such that each recalls to mind some -achievement of the first rank. When Carlyle, as the -mouthpiece of the subsequent Romantic Age, scoffingly -terms the period the Age of Victorious Analysis, -and mocks at Maupertuis as a ‘sublimish -gentleman in a white periwig,’ he only exhibits the -narrow side of the Romanticists whom he is then -voicing.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is impossible to explain intelligently, in a short -time and without technicalities, the details of the progress -<span class='pageno' id='Page_86'>86</span>made by this school. I will, however, endeavour -to explain the main point of a joint achievement of -Maupertuis and Lagrange. Their results, in conjunction -with some subsequent mathematical methods due -to two great German mathematicians of the first half -of the nineteenth century, Gauss and Riemann, have -recently proved themselves to be the preparatory work -necessary for the new ideas which Herz and Einstein -have introduced into mathematical physics. Also they -inspired some of the best ideas in Clerk Maxwell’s -treatise, already mentioned in this lecture.</p> - -<p class='c001'>They aimed at discovering something more fundamental -and more general than Newton’s laws of motion -which were discussed in the previous lecture. -They wanted to find some wider ideas, and in the case -of Lagrange some more general means of mathematical -exposition. It was an ambitious enterprise, and -they were completely successful. Maupertuis lived -in the first half of the eighteenth century, and Lagrange’s -active life lay in its second half. We find in -Maupertuis a tinge of the theologic age which preceded -his birth. He started with the idea that the -whole path of a material particle between any limits -of time must achieve some perfection worthy of the -providence of God. There are two points of interest -in this motive principle. In the first place, it illustrates -the thesis which I was urging in my first lecture -that the way in which the medieval church had impressed -on Europe the notion of the detailed providence -of a rational personal God was one of the factors -by which the trust in the order of nature had -been generated. In the second place, though we are -now all convinced that such modes of thought are of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_87'>87</span>no direct use in detailed scientific enquiry, Maupertuis’ -success in this particular case shows that almost -any idea which jogs you out of your current abstractions -may be better than nothing. In the present case -what the idea in question did for Maupertuis was to -lead him to enquire what general property of the path -as a whole could be deduced from Newton’s laws of -motion. Undoubtedly this was a very sensible procedure -whatever one’s theological notions. Also his -general idea led him to conceive that the property -found would be a quantitative sum, such that any -slight deviation from the path would increase it. In -this supposition he was generalising Newton’s first -law of motion. For an isolated particle takes the -shortest route with uniform velocity. So Maupertuis -conjectured that a particle travelling through a field -of force would realise the least possible amount of -some quantity. He discovered such a quantity and -called it the integral action between the time limits -considered. In modern phraseology it is the sum -through successive small lapses of time of the difference -between the kinetic and potential energies of the -particle at each successive instant. This action, therefore, -has to do with the interchange between the energy -arising from motion and the energy arising from -position. Maupertuis had discovered the famous -theorem of least action. Maupertuis was not quite of -the first rank in comparison with such a man as Lagrange. -In his hands and in those of his immediate -successors, his principle did not assume any dominating -importance. Lagrange put the same question on -a wider basis so as to make its answer relevant to -actual procedure in the development of dynamics. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_88'>88</span>His Principle of Virtual Work as applied to systems -in motion is in effect Maupertuis’ principle conceived -as applying at each instant of the path of the system. -But Lagrange saw further than Maupertuis. He -grasped that he had gained a method of stating dynamical -truths in a way which is perfectly indifferent -to the particular methods of measurement employed -in fixing the positions of the various parts of the system. -Accordingly, he went on to deduce equations -of motion which are equally applicable whatever -quantitative measurements have been made, provided -that they are adequate to fix positions. The beauty -and almost divine simplicity of these equations is such -that these formulae are worthy to rank with those -mysterious symbols which in ancient times were held -directly to indicate the Supreme Reason at the base of -all things. Later Herz—inventor of electromagnetic -waves—based mechanics on the idea of every particle -traversing the shortest path open to it under the circumstances -constraining its motion; and finally Einstein, -by the use of the geometrical theories of Gauss -and Riemann, showed that these circumstances could -be construed as being inherent in the character of -space-time itself. Such, in barest outline, is the story -of dynamics from Galileo to Einstein.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Meanwhile Galvani and Volta lived and made their -electric discoveries; and the biological sciences slowly -gathered their material, but still waited for dominating -ideas. Psychology, also, was beginning to disengage -itself from its dependence on general philosophy. -This independent growth of psychology was the ultimate -result of its invocation by John Locke as a critic -of metaphysical licence. All the sciences dealing with -<span class='pageno' id='Page_89'>89</span>life were still in an elementary observational stage, in -which classification and direct description were dominant. -So far the scheme of abstractions was adequate -to the occasion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the realm of practice, the age which produced -enlightened rulers, such as the Emperor Joseph of the -House of Hapsburg, Frederick the Great, Walpole, -the great Lord Chatham, George Washington, cannot -be said to have failed. Especially when to these rulers, -it adds the invention of parliamentary cabinet -government in England, of federal presidential government -in the United States, and of the humanitarian -principles of the French Revolution. Also in technology -it produced the steam-engine, and thereby -ushered in a new era of civilisation. Undoubtedly, as -a practical age the eighteenth century was a success. -If you had asked one of the wisest and most typical -of its ancestors, who just saw its commencement, I -mean John Locke, what he expected from it, he would -hardly have pitched his hopes higher than its actual -achievements.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In developing a criticism of the scientific scheme -of the eighteenth century, I must first give my main -reason for ignoring nineteenth century idealism—I -am speaking of the philosophic idealism which finds -the ultimate meaning of reality in mentality that is -fully cognitive. This idealistic school, as hitherto -developed, has been too much divorced from the scientific -outlook. It has swallowed the scientific scheme -in its entirety as being the only rendering of the facts -of nature, and has then explained it as being an idea -in the ultimate mentality. In the case of absolute -idealism, the world of nature is just one of the ideas, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_90'>90</span>somehow differentiating the unity of the Absolute: -in the case of pluralistic idealism involving monadic -mentalities, this world is the greatest common measure -of the various ideas which differentiate the various -mental unities of the various monads. But, -however you take it, these idealistic schools have conspicuously -failed to connect, in any organic fashion, -the fact of nature with their idealistic philosophies. -So far as concerns what will be said in these lectures, -your ultimate outlook may be realistic or idealistic. -My point is that a further stage of provisional realism -is required in which the scientific scheme is recast, -and founded upon the ultimate concept of <em>organism</em>.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In outline, my procedure is to start from the analysis -of the status of space and of time, or in modern -phraseology, the status of space-time. There are two -characters of either. Things are separated by space, -and are separated by time: but they are also together -in space, and together in time, even if they be not contemporaneous. -I will call these characters the -‘<em>separative</em>’ and the ‘<em>prehensive</em>’ characters of space-time. -There is yet a third character of space-time. -Everything which is in space receives a definite limitation -of some sort, so that in a sense it has just that -shape which it does have and no other, also in some -sense it is just in this place and in no other. Analogously -for time, a thing endures during a certain period, -and through no other period. I will call this the -‘<em>modal</em>’ character of space-time. It is evident that -the modal character taken by itself gives rise to the -idea of simple location. But it must be conjoined -with the separative and prehensive characters.</p> - -<p class='c001'>For simplicity of thought, I will first speak of space -<span class='pageno' id='Page_91'>91</span>only, and will afterwards extend the same treatment to -time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The volume is the most concrete element of space. -But the separative character of space, analyses a volume -into sub-volumes, and so on indefinitely. Accordingly, -taking the separative character in isolation, we -should infer that a volume is a mere multiplicity of -non-voluminous elements, of points in fact. But it is -the unity of volume which is the ultimate fact of experience, -for example, the voluminous space of this -hall. This hall as a mere multiplicity of points is a -construction of the logical imagination.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, the prime fact is the prehensive unity -of volume, and this unity is mitigated or limited by -the separated unities of the innumerable contained -parts. We have a prehensive unity, which is yet held -apart as an aggregate of contained parts. But the -prehensive unity of the volume is not the unity of a -mere logical aggregate of parts. The parts form an -ordered aggregate, in the sense that each part is something -from the standpoint of every other part, and -also from the same standpoint every other part is -something in relation to it. Thus if A and B and C -are volumes of space, B has an aspect from the standpoint -of A, and so has C, and so has the relationship -of B and C. This aspect of B from A is of the essence -of A. The volumes of space have no independent -existence. They are only entities as within the -totality; you cannot extract them from their environment -without destruction of their very essence. -Accordingly, I will say that the aspect of B from A -is the <em>mode</em> in which B enters into the composition of -A. This is the modal character of space, that the prehensive -<span class='pageno' id='Page_92'>92</span>unity of A is the prehension into unity of the -aspects of all other volumes from the standpoint of A. -The shape of a volume is the formula from which the -totality of its aspects can be derived. Thus the shape -of a volume is more abstract than its aspects. It is -evident that I can use Leibniz’s language, and say that -every volume mirrors in itself every other volume in -space.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Exactly analogous considerations hold with respect -to durations in time. An instant of time, without duration, -is an imaginative logical construction. Also each -duration of time mirrors in itself all temporal durations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But in two ways I have introduced a false simplicity. -In the first place, I should have conjoined space -and time, and conducted my explanation in respect -to four-dimensional regions of space-time. I have -nothing to add in the way of explanation. In your -minds, substitute such four-dimensional regions for -the spatial volumes of the previous explanations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Secondly, my explanation has involved itself in a -vicious circle. For I have made the prehensive unity -of the region A to consist of the prehensive unification -of the modal presences in A of other regions. This -difficulty arises because space-time cannot in reality -be considered as a self-subsistent entity. It is an abstraction, -and its explanation requires reference to -that from which it has been extracted. Space-time is -the specification of certain general characters of events -and of their mutual ordering. This recurrence to concrete -fact brings me back to the eighteenth century, -and indeed to Francis Bacon in the seventeenth century. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_93'>93</span>We have to consider the development in those -epochs, of the criticism of the reigning scientific -scheme.</p> - -<p class='c001'>No epoch is homogeneous; whatever you may have -assigned as the dominant note of a considerable period, -it will always be possible to produce men, and -great men, belonging to the same time, who exhibit -themselves as antagonistic to the tone of their age. -This is certainly the case with the eighteenth century. -For example, the names of John Wesley and of -Rousseau must have occurred to you while I was -drawing the character of that time. But I do not -want to speak of them, or of others. The man, whose -ideas I must consider at some length, is Bishop Berkeley. -Quite at the commencement of the epoch, he -made all the right criticisms, at least in principle. It -would be untrue to say that he produced no effect. He -was a famous man. The wife of George II was one -of the few queens who, in any country, have been -clever enough, and wise enough, to patronise learning -judiciously; accordingly, Berkeley was made a bishop, -in days when bishops in Great Britain were relatively -far greater men than they are now. Also, what was -more important than his bishopric, Hume studied -him, and developed one side of his philosophy in a -way which might have disturbed the ghost of the -great ecclesiastic. Then Kant studied Hume. So, to -say that Berkeley was uninfluential during the century, -would certainly be absurd. But all the same, he -failed to affect the main stream of scientific thought. -It flowed on as if he had never written. Its general -success made it impervious to criticism, then and since. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_94'>94</span>The world of science has always remained perfectly -satisfied with its peculiar abstractions. They work, -and that is sufficient for it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The point before us is that this scientific field of -thought is now, in the twentieth century, too narrow -for the concrete facts which are before it for analysis. -This is true even in physics, and is more especially -urgent in the biological sciences. Thus, in order to -understand the difficulties of modern scientific thought -and also its reactions on the modern world, we should -have in our minds some conception of a wider field of -abstraction, a more concrete analysis, which shall -stand nearer to the complete concreteness of our intuitive -experience. Such an analysis should find in -itself a niche for the concepts of matter and spirit, -as abstractions in terms of which much of our physical -experience can be interpreted. It is in the search -for this wider basis for scientific thought that Berkeley -is so important. He launched his criticism shortly -after the schools of Newton and Locke had completed -their work, and laid his finger exactly on the weak -spots which they had left. I do not propose to consider -either the subjective idealism which has been -derived from him, or the schools of development -which trace their descent from Hume and Kant respectively. -My point will be that—whatever the final -metaphysics you may adopt—there is another line of -development embedded in Berkeley, pointing to -the analysis which we are in search of. Berkeley overlooked -it, partly by reason of the over-intellectualism -of philosophers, and partly by his haste to have recourse -to an idealism with its objectivity grounded in -the mind of God. You will remember that I have -<span class='pageno' id='Page_95'>95</span>already stated that the key of the problem lies in the -notion of simple location. Berkeley, in effect, criticises -this notion. He also raises the question, What -do we mean by things being realised in the world of -nature?</p> - -<p class='c001'>In Sections 23 and 24 of his <cite>Principles of Human -Knowledge</cite>, Berkeley gives his answer to this latter -question. I will quote some detached sentences from -those Sections:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier -than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, -or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive -them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty -in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more -than framing in your mind certain ideas which you -call books and trees, and at the same time omitting -to frame the idea of any one that may perceive -them?...”</p> - -<p class='c001'>“When we do our utmost to conceive the existence -of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating -our own ideas. But the mind <em>taking no notice -of itself</em>, is deluded to think it can and does conceive -bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, -though at the same time they are apprehended by or -exist in itself....”</p> - -<p class='c001'>“24. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into -our thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to -understand what is meant by the <em>absolute existence of -sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind</em>. -To me it is evident those words mark out either a -direct contradiction, or else nothing at all....”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Again there is a very remarkable passage in Section -10, of the fourth Dialogue of Berkeley’s <cite>Alciphron</cite>. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_96'>96</span>I have already quoted it, at greater length, in my <cite>Principles -of Natural Knowledge</cite>:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“<i>Euphranor.</i> Tell me, Alciphron, can you discern -the doors, window and battlements of that same castle?</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Alciphron.</i> I cannot. At this distance it seems only -a small round tower.</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Euph.</i> But I, who have been at it, know that it is -no small round tower, but a large square building with -battlements and turrets, which it seems you do not see.</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Alc</i>. What will you infer from thence?</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Euph.</i> I would infer that the very object which -you strictly and properly perceive by sight is not that -thing which is several miles distant.</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Alc.</i> Why so?</p> - -<p class='c001'><i>Euph.</i> Because a little round object is one thing, -and a great square object is another. Is it not so?...”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Some analogous examples concerning a planet and -a cloud are then cited in the dialogue, and this passage -finally concludes with:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“<i>Euphranor.</i> Is it not plain, therefore, that neither -the castle, the planet, nor the cloud, <i>which you see -here</i>, are those real ones which you suppose exist at a -distance?”</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is made explicit in the first passage, already -quoted, that Berkeley himself adopts an extreme idealistic -interpretation. For him mind is the only absolute -reality, and the unity of nature is the unity of -ideas in the mind of God. Personally, I think that -Berkeley’s solution of the metaphysical problem raises -difficulties not less than those which he points out as -arising from a realistic interpretation of the scientific -scheme. There is, however, another possible line of -thought, which enables us to adopt anyhow an attitude -<span class='pageno' id='Page_97'>97</span>of provisional realism, and to widen the scientific -scheme in a way which is useful for science -itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I recur to the passage from Francis Bacon’s <cite>Natural -History</cite>, already quoted in the previous lecture:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though -they have no sense, yet they have perception: ... -and whether the body be alterant or altered, evermore -a perception precedeth operation; for else all bodies -would be alike one to another....”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also in the previous lecture I construed <em>perception</em> -(as used by Bacon) as meaning <em>taking account</em> of the -essential character of the thing perceived, and I construed -<em>sense</em> as meaning <em>cognition</em>. We certainly do -take account of things of which at the time we have no -explicit cognition. We can even have a cognitive -memory of the taking account, without having had a -contemporaneous cognition. Also, as Bacon points -out by his statement, “... for else all bodies would -be alike one to another,” it is evidently some element -of the essential character which we take account of, -namely something on which diversity is founded and -not mere bare logical diversity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The word ‘<em>perceive</em>’ is, in our common usage, shot -through and through with the notion of cognitive apprehension. -So is the word ‘<em>apprehension</em>’, even with -the adjective <em>cognitive</em> omitted. I will use the word -‘<em>prehension</em>’ for <em>uncognitive apprehension</em>: by this I -mean <em>apprehension</em> which may or or may not be cognitive. -Now take Euphranor’s last remark:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the castle, the -planet, nor the cloud, <em>which you see here</em>, are those -real ones which you suppose exist at distance?” Accordingly, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_98'>98</span>there is a prehension, <em>here</em> in this place, of -things which have a reference to <em>other</em> places.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Now go back to Berkeley’s sentences, quoted from -his <cite>Principles of Human Knowledge</cite>. He contends -that what constitutes the realisation of natural entities -is the being perceived within the unity of mind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We can substitute the concept, that the realisation is -a gathering of things into the unity of a prehension; -and that what is thereby realised is the prehension, -and not the things. This unity of a prehension defines -itself as a <em>here</em> and a <em>now</em>, and the things so gathered -into the grasped unity have essential reference to other -places and other times. For Berkeley’s <em>mind</em>, I substitute -a process of prehensive unification. In order -to make intelligible this concept of the progressive -realisation of natural occurrences, considerable expansion -is required, and confrontation with its actual implications -in terms of concrete experience. This will -be the task of the subsequent lectures. In the first -place, note that the idea of simple location has gone. -The things which are grasped into a realised unity, -here and now, are not the castle, the cloud, and the -planet simply in themselves; but they are the -castle, the cloud, and the planet from the standpoint, -in space and time, of the prehensive unification. -In other words, it is the perspective of -the castle over there from the standpoint of -the unification here. It is, therefore, aspects of the -castle, the cloud, and the planet which are grasped into -unity here. You will remember that the idea of perspectives -is quite familiar in philosophy. It was introduced -by Leibniz, in the notion of his monads -mirroring perspectives of the universe. I am using -<span class='pageno' id='Page_99'>99</span>the same notion, only I am toning down his monads -into the unified events in space and time. In some -ways, there is a greater analogy with Spinoza’s modes; -that is why I use the terms ‘<em>mode</em>’ and ‘<em>modal</em>.’ In the -analogy with Spinoza, his one substance is for me the -one underlying activity of realisation individualising -itself in an interlocked plurality of modes. Thus, -concrete fact is process. Its primary analysis is into -underlying activity of prehension, and into realised -prehensive events. Each event is an individual matter -of fact issuing from an individualisation of the substrate -activity. But individualisation does not mean -substantial independence.</p> - -<p class='c001'>An entity of which we become aware in sense perception -is the terminus of our act of perception. I -will call such an entity, a ‘<em>sense-object</em>’. For example, -green of a definite shade is a sense-object; so is -a sound of definite quality and pitch; and so is a -definite scent; and a definite quality of touch. The -way in which such an entity is related to space during -a definite lapse of time is complex. I will say -that a sense-object has ‘<em>ingression</em>’ into space-time. -The cognitive perception of a sense-object is the -awareness of the prehensive unification (into a standpoint -A) of various modes of various sense-objects, -including the sense-object in question. The standpoint -A is, of course, a region of space-time; that is to -say, it is a volume of space through a duration of time. -But as one entity, this standpoint is a unit of realised -experience. A mode of a sense-object at A (as abstracted -from the sense-object whose relationship to A -the mode is conditioning) is the aspect from A of -some other region B. Thus the sense-object is present -<span class='pageno' id='Page_100'>100</span>in A with the mode of location in B. Thus if green be -the sense-object in question, green is not simply at A -where it is being perceived, nor is it simply at B where -it is perceived as located; but it is present at A with -the mode of location in B. There is no particular -mystery about this. You have only got to look into -a mirror and to see the image in it of some green -leaves behind your back. For you at A there will be -green; but not green simply at A where you are. The -green at A will be green with the mode of having location -at the image of the leaf behind the mirror. Then -turn round and look at the leaf. You are now perceiving -the green in the same way as you did before, -except that now the green has the mode of being -located in the actual leaf. I am merely describing -what we do perceive: we are aware of green as being -one element in a prehensive unification of sense-objects; -each sense-object, and among them green, -having its particular mode, which is expressible as -location elsewhere. There are various types of modal -location. For example, sound is voluminous: it fills -a hall, and so sometimes does diffused colour. But -the modal location of a colour may be that of being -the remote boundary of a volume, as for example the -colours on the walls of a room. Thus primarily space-time -is the locus of the modal ingression of sense-objects. -This is the reason why space and time (if -for simplicity we disjoin them) are given in their entireties. -For each volume of space, or each lapse of -time, includes in its essence aspects of all volumes of -space, or of all lapses of time. The difficulties of -philosophy in respect to space and time are founded -on the error of considering them as primarily the loci -<span class='pageno' id='Page_101'>101</span>of simple locations. Perception is simply the cognition -of prehensive unification; or more shortly, perception -is cognition of prehension. The actual world -is a manifold of prehensions; and a ‘prehension’ is a -‘prehensive occasion’; and a prehensive occasion is the -most concrete finite entity, conceived as what it is in -itself and for itself, and not as from its aspect in the -essence of another such occasion. Prehensive unification -might be said to have simple location in its volume -A. But this would be a mere tautology. For -space and time are simply abstractions from the totality -of prehensive unifications as mutually patterned in -each other. Thus a prehension has simple location at -the volume A in the same way as that in which a -man’s face fits on to the smile which spreads over it. -There is, so far as we have gone, more sense in saying -that an act of perception has simple location; for it -may be conceived as being simply at the cognised prehension.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are more entities involved in nature than the -mere sense-objects, so far considered. But, allowing -for the necessity of revision consequent on a more complete -point of view, we can frame our answer to Berkeley’s -question as to the character of the reality to be -assigned to nature. He states it to be the reality of -ideas in mind. A complete metaphysic which has attained -to some notion of mind, and to some notion of -ideas, may perhaps ultimately adopt that view. It is -unnecessary for the purpose of these lectures to ask -such a fundamental question. We can be content with -a provisional realism in which nature is conceived as -a complex of prehensive unifications. Space and time -exhibit the general scheme of interlocked relations of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_102'>102</span>these prehensions. You cannot tear any one of them -out of its context. Yet each one of them within its -context has all the reality that attaches to the whole -complex. Conversely, the totality has the same reality -as each prehension; for each prehension unifies the -modalities to be ascribed, from its standpoint, to every -part of the whole. A prehension is a process of unifying. -Accordingly, nature is a process of expansive -development, necessarily transitional from prehension -to prehension. What is achieved is thereby passed -beyond, but it is also retained as having aspects of itself -present to prehensions which lie beyond it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus nature is a structure of evolving processes. -The reality is the process. It is nonsense to ask if the -colour red is real. The colour red is ingredient in the -process of realisation. The realities of nature are the -prehensions in nature, that is to say, the events in -nature.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Now that we have cleared space and time from the -taint of simple location, we may partially abandon -the awkward term prehension. This term was introduced -to signify the essential unity of an event, -namely, the event as one entity, and not as a mere assemblage -of parts or of ingredients. It is necessary to -understand that space-time is nothing else than a -system of pulling together of assemblages into unities. -But the word <em>event</em> just means one of these spatio-temporal -unities. Accordingly, it may be used instead -of the term ‘prehension’ as meaning the thing prehended.</p> - -<p class='c001'>An event has contemporaries. This means that an -event mirrors within itself the modes of its contemporaries -as a display of immediate achievement. An -<span class='pageno' id='Page_103'>103</span>event has a past. This means that an event mirrors -within itself the modes of its predecessors, as memories -which are fused into its own content. An event has a -future. This means that an event mirrors within itself -such aspects as the future throws back onto the present, -or, in other words, as the present has determined concerning -the future. Thus an event has anticipation:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“The prophetic soul</div> - <div class='line'>Of the wide world dreaming on things to come.” [cvii]</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>These conclusions are essential for any form of realism. -For there is in the world for our cognisance, -memory of the past, immediacy of realisation, and indication -of things to come.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this sketch of an analysis more concrete than that -of the scientific scheme of thought, I have started from -our own psychological field, as it stands for our cognition. -I take it for what it claims to be: the self-knowledge -of our bodily event. I mean the total -event, and not the inspection of the details of the body. -This self-knowledge discloses a prehensive unification -of modal presences of entities beyond itself. I generalise -by the use of the principle that this total bodily -event is on the same level as all other events, except -for an unusual complexity and stability of inherent -pattern. The strength of the theory of materialistic -mechanism has been the demand, that no arbitrary -breaks be introduced into nature, to eke out the collapse -of an explanation. I accept this principle. But -if you start from the immediate facts of our psychological -experience, as surely an empiricist should begin, -you are at once led to the organic conception of nature -of which the description has been commenced in this -lecture.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_104'>104</span>It is the defect of the eighteenth century scientific -scheme that it provides none of the elements which -compose the immediate psychological experiences of -mankind. Nor does it provide any elementary trace -of the organic unity of a whole, from which the organic -unities of electrons, protons, molecules, and living -bodies can emerge. According to that scheme, -there is no reason in the nature of things why portions -of material should have any physical relations to each -other. Let us grant that we cannot hope to be able to -discern the laws of nature to be necessary. But we -can hope to see that it is necessary that there should be -an order of nature. The concept of the order of -nature is bound up with the concept of nature as -the locus of organisms in process of development.</p> - -<div class='quote'> - -<p class='c001'><span class='sc'>Note.</span> In connection with the latter portion of this chapter a -sentence from Descartes’ ‘Reply to Objections ... against the -Meditations’ is interesting:—“Hence the idea of the sun will be -the sun itself existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists -in the sky, but objectively, <i>i.e.</i>, in the way in which objects are wont -to exist in the mind; and this mode of being is truly much less -perfect than that in which things exist outside the mind, but it is -not on that account mere nothing, as I have already said.” [Reply -to Objections I, Translation by Haldane and Ross, vol. ii, p. 10.] -I find difficulty in reconciling this theory of ideas (with which I -agree) with other parts of the Cartesian philosophy.</p> - -</div> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_105'>105</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER V <br /> <br /> THE ROMANTIC REACTION</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>My last lecture described the influence upon the eighteenth -century of the narrow and efficient scheme of -scientific concepts which it had inherited from its -predecessor. That scheme was the product of a mentality -which found the Augustinian theology extremely -congenial. The Protestant Calvinism and the -Catholic Jansenism exhibited man as helpless to co-operate -with Irresistible Grace: the contemporary -scheme of science exhibited man as helpless to co-operate -with the irresistable mechanism of nature. -The mechanism of God and the mechanism of matter -were the monstrous issues of limited metaphysics and -clear logical intellect. Also the seventeenth century -had genius, and cleared the world of muddled thought. -The eighteenth century continued the work of clearance, -with ruthless efficiency. The scientific scheme -has lasted longer than the theological scheme. Mankind -soon lost interest in Irresistible Grace; but it -quickly appreciated the competent engineering which -was due to science. Also in the first quarter of the -eighteenth century, George Berkeley launched his -philosophical criticism against the whole basis of the -system. He failed to disturb the dominant current -of thought. In my last lecture I developed a parallel -line of argument, which would lead to a system of -thought basing nature upon the concept of organism, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_106'>106</span>and not upon the concept of matter. In the present -lecture, I propose in the first place to consider how the -concrete educated thought of men has viewed this -opposition of mechanism and organism. It is in literature -that the concrete outlook of humanity receives -its expression. Accordingly it is to literature that we -must look, particularly in its more concrete forms, -namely in poetry and in drama, if we hope to discover -the inward thoughts of a generation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We quickly find that the Western peoples exhibit -on a colossal scale a peculiarity which is popularly -supposed to be more especially characteristic of the -Chinese. Surprise is often expressed that a Chinaman -can be of two religions, a Confucian for some occasions -and a Buddhist for other occasions. Whether -this is true of China I do not know; nor do I know -whether, if true, these two attitudes are really inconsistent. -But there can be no doubt that an analogous -fact is true of the West, and that the two attitudes involved -are inconsistent. A scientific realism, based on -mechanism, is conjoined with an unwavering belief -in the world of men and of the higher animals as being -composed of self-determining organisms. This radical -inconsistency at the basis of modern thought accounts -for much that is half-hearted and wavering in our -civilisation. It would be going too far to say that it -distracts thought. It enfeebles it, by reason of the -inconsistency lurking in the background. After all, -the men of the Middle Ages were in pursuit of an -excellency of which we have nearly forgotten the -existence. They set before themselves the ideal of the -attainment of a harmony of the understanding. We -are content with superficial orderings from diverse -<span class='pageno' id='Page_107'>107</span>arbitrary starting points. For instance, the enterprises -produced by the individualistic energy of the European -peoples presupposes physical actions directed to -final causes. But the science which is employed in -their development is based on a philosophy which asserts -that physical causation is supreme, and which -disjoins the physical cause from the final end. It is -not popular to dwell on the absolute contradiction -here involved. It is the fact, however you gloze it -over with phrases. Of course, we find in the eighteenth -century Paley’s famous argument, that mechanism -presupposes a God who is the author of nature. But -even before Paley put the argument into its final form, -Hume had written the retort, that the God whom you -will find will be the sort of God who makes that -mechanism. In other words, that mechanism can, at -most, presuppose a mechanic, and not merely <em>a</em> mechanic -but <em>its</em> mechanic. The only way of mitigating -mechanism is by the discovery that it is not -mechanism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>When we leave apologetic theology, and come to -ordinary literature, we find, as we might expect, that -the scientific outlook is in general simply ignored. So -far as the mass of literature is concerned, science might -never have been heard of. Until recently nearly all -writers have been soaked in classical and renaissance -literature. For the most part, neither philosophy nor -science interested them, and their minds were trained -to ignore it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are exceptions to this sweeping statement; -and, even if we confine ourselves to English literature, -they concern some of the greatest names; also the -indirect influence of science has been considerable.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_108'>108</span>A side light on this distracting inconsistency in modern -thought is obtained by examining some of those -great serious poems in English literature, whose general -scale gives them a didactic character. The relevant -poems are Milton’s <cite>Paradise Lost</cite>, Pope’s <cite>Essay -on Man</cite>, Wordsworth’s <cite>Excursion</cite>, Tennyson’s <cite>In Memoriam</cite>. -Milton, though he is writing after the Restoration, -voices the theological aspect of the earlier -portion of his century, untouched by the influence of -the scientific materialism. Pope’s poem represents the -effect on popular thought of the intervening sixty -years which includes the first period of assured triumph -for the scientific movement. Wordsworth in -his whole being expresses a conscious reaction against -the mentality of the eighteenth century. This mentality -means nothing else than the acceptance of the -scientific ideas at their full face value. Wordsworth -was not bothered by any intellectual antagonism. What -moved him was a moral repulsion. He felt that something -had been left out, and that what had been left -out comprised everything that was most important. -Tennyson is the mouthpiece of the attempts of the -waning romantic movement in the second quarter of -the nineteenth century to come to terms with science. -By this time the two elements in modern thought had -disclosed their fundamental divergence by their jarring -interpretations of the course of nature and the -life of man. Tennyson stands in this poem as the -perfect example of the distraction which I have already -mentioned. There are opposing visions of the -world, and both of them command his assent by appeals -to ultimate intuitions from which there seems -no escape. Tennyson goes to the heart of the difficulty. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_109'>109</span>It is the problem of mechanism which appalls -him,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“‘The stars,’ she whispers, ‘blindly run.’”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>This line states starkly the whole philosophic problem -implicit in the poem. Each molecule blindly runs. -The human body is a collection of molecules. Therefore, -the human body blindly runs, and therefore there -can be no individual responsibility for the actions of -the body. If you once accept that the molecule is definitely -determined to be what it is, independently of -any determination by reason of the total organism of -the body, and if you further admit that the blind run -is settled by the general mechanical laws, there can be -no escape from this conclusion. But mental experiences -are derivative from the actions of the body, including -of course its internal behaviour. Accordingly, -the sole function of the mind is to have at least some -of its experiences settled for it, and to add such others -as may be open to it independently of the body’s motions, -internal and external.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are then two possible theories as to the mind. -You can either deny that it can supply for itself any -experiences other than those provided for it by the -body, or you can admit them.</p> - -<p class='c001'>If you refuse to admit the additional experiences, -then all individual moral responsibility is swept away. -If you do admit them, then a human being may be responsible -for the state of his mind though he has no -responsibility for the actions of his body. The enfeeblement -of thought in the modern world is illustrated -by the way in which this plain issue is avoided -in Tennyson’s poem. There is something kept in the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_110'>110</span>background, a skeleton in the cupboard. He touches -on almost every religious and scientific problem, but -carefully avoids more than a passing allusion to this -one.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This very problem was in full debate at the date of -the poem. John Stuart Mill was maintaining his doctrine -of determinism. In this doctrine volitions are -determined by motives, and motives are expressible in -terms of antecedent conditions including states of mind -as well as states of the body.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is obvious that this doctrine affords no escape -from the dilemma presented by a thoroughgoing -mechanism. For if the volition affects the state of the -body, then the molecules in the body do not blindly -run. If the volition does not affect the state -of the body, the mind is still left in its uncomfortable -position.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Mill’s doctrine is generally accepted, especially -among scientists, as though in some way it allowed -you to accept the extreme doctrine of materialistic -mechanism, and yet mitigated its unbelievable consequences. -It does nothing of the sort. Either the bodily -molecules blindly run, or they do not. If they do -blindly run, the mental states are irrelevant in discussing -the bodily actions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I have stated the arguments concisely, because in -truth the issue is a very simple one. Prolonged discussion -is merely a source of confusion. The question -as to the metaphysical status of molecules does not -come in. The statement that they are mere formulae -has no bearing on the argument. For presumably the -formulae mean something. If they mean nothing, -the whole mechanical doctrine is likewise without -<span class='pageno' id='Page_111'>111</span>meaning, and the question drops. But if the formulae -mean anything, the argument applies to exactly what -they do mean. The traditional way of evading the -difficulty—other than the simple way of ignoring it—is -to have recourse to some form of what is now termed -‘vitalism.’ This doctrine is really a compromise. It -allows a free run to mechanism throughout the whole -of inanimate nature, and holds that the mechanism is -partially mitigated within living bodies. I feel that -this theory is an unsatisfactory compromise. The gap -between living and dead matter is too vague and problematical -to bear the weight of such an arbitrary assumption, -which involves an essential dualism somewhere.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The doctrine which I am maintaining is that the -whole concept of materialism only applies to very -abstract entities, the products of logical discernment. -The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that -the plan of the <em>whole</em> influences the very characters -of the various subordinate organisms which enter into -it. In the case of an animal, the mental states enter -into the plan of the total organism and thus modify -the plans of the successive subordinate organisms until -the ultimate smallest organisms, such as electrons, are -reached. Thus an electron within a living body is -different from an electron outside it, by reason of the -plan of the body. The electron blindly runs either -within or without the body; but it runs within the -body in accordance with its character within the body; -that is to say, in accordance with the general plan of -the body, and this plan includes the mental state. But -this principle of modification is perfectly general -throughout nature, and represents no property peculiar -<span class='pageno' id='Page_112'>112</span>to living bodies. In subsequent lectures it will be -explained that this doctrine involves the abandonment -of the traditional scientific materialism, and the substitution -of an alternative doctrine of organism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I shall not discuss Mill’s determinism, as it lies -outside the scheme of these lectures. The foregoing -discussion has been directed to secure that either determinism -or free will shall have some relevance, unhampered -by the difficulties introduced by materialistic -mechanism, or by the compromise of vitalism. I -would term the doctrine of these lectures, the theory -of <em>organic mechanism</em>. In this theory, the molecules -may blindly run in accordance with the general laws, -but the molecules differ in their intrinsic characters -according to the general organic plans of the situations -in which they find themselves.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The discrepancy between the materialistic mechanism -of science and the moral intuitions, which are presupposed -in the concrete affairs of life, only gradually -assumed its true importance as the centuries advanced. -The different tones of the successive epochs to which -the poems, already mentioned, belong are curiously reflected -in their opening passages. Milton ends his -introduction with the prayer,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“That to the height of this great argument</div> - <div class='line'>I may assert eternal Providence,</div> - <div class='line'>And justify the ways of God to men.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>To judge from many modern writers on Milton, we -might imagine that the <cite>Paradise Lost</cite> and the <cite>Paradise -Regained</cite> were written as a series of experiments in -blank verse. This was certainly not Milton’s view of -his work. To ‘justify the ways of God to men’ was -<span class='pageno' id='Page_113'>113</span>very much his main object. He recurs to the same -idea in the <cite>Samson Agonistes</cite>,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Just are the ways of God</div> - <div class='line'>And justifiable to men;”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>We note the assured volume of confidence, untroubled -by the coming scientific avalanche. The actual date -of the publication of the <cite>Paradise Lost</cite> lies just beyond -the epoch to which it belongs. It is the swansong -of a passing world of untroubled certitude.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A comparison between Pope’s <cite>Essay on Man</cite> and -the <cite>Paradise Lost</cite> exhibits the change of tone in English -thought in the fifty or sixty years which separate -the age of Milton from the age of Pope. Milton addresses -his poem to God, Pope’s poem is addressed to -Lord Bolingbroke,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Awake, my St. John! leave all meaner things</div> - <div class='line'>To low ambition and the pride of kings.</div> - <div class='line'>Let us (since life can little more supply</div> - <div class='line'>Than just to look about us and to die)</div> - <div class='line'>Expatiate free o’er all this scene of man;</div> - <div class='line'>A mighty maze! but not without a plan;”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>Compare the jaunty assurance of Pope,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“A mighty maze! but not without a plan.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>with Milton’s</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Just are the ways of God</div> - <div class='line'>And justifiable to men;”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>But the real point to notice is that Pope as well as -Milton was untroubled by the great perplexity which -haunts the modern world. The clue which Milton -followed was to dwell on the ways of God in dealings -with man. Two generations later we find Pope -<span class='pageno' id='Page_114'>114</span>equally confident that the enlightened methods of -modern science provided a plan adequate as a map -of the ‘mighty maze.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>Wordsworth’s <cite>Excursion</cite> is the next English poem -on the same subject. A prose preface tells us that it is a -fragment of a larger projected work, described as ‘A -philosophical poem containing views of Man, Nature, -and Society.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>Very characteristically the poem begins with the -line,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“’Twas summer, and the sun had mounted high:”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>Thus the romantic reaction started neither with God -nor with Lord Bolingbroke, but with nature. We are -here witnessing a conscious reaction against the whole -tone of the eighteenth century. That century approached -nature with the abstract analysis of science, -whereas Wordsworth opposes to the scientific abstractions -his full concrete experience.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A generation of religious revival and of scientific -advance lies between the <cite>Excursion</cite> and Tennyson’s -<cite>In Memoriam</cite>. The earlier poets had solved the perplexity -by ignoring it. That course was not open to -Tennyson. Accordingly his poem begins thus:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Strong Son of God, immortal Love,</div> - <div class='line'>Whom we, that have not seen Thy face,</div> - <div class='line'>By faith, and faith alone, embrace,</div> - <div class='line'>Believing where we cannot prove;”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>The note of perplexity is struck at once. The nineteenth -century has been a perplexed century, in a sense -which is not true of any of its predecessors of the modern -period. In the earlier times there were opposing -camps, bitterly at variance on questions which they -<span class='pageno' id='Page_115'>115</span>deemed fundamental. But, except for a few stragglers, -either camp was whole-hearted. The importance of -Tennyson’s poem lies in the fact that it exactly expressed -the character of its period. Each individual -was divided against himself. In the earlier times, the -deep thinkers were the clear thinkers,—Descartes, -Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz. They knew exactly what -they meant and said it. In the nineteenth century, some -of the deeper thinkers among theologians and philosophers -were muddled thinkers. Their assent was -claimed by incompatible doctrines; and their efforts -at reconciliation produced inevitable confusion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Matthew Arnold, even more than Tennyson, was -the poet who expressed this mood of individual distraction -which was so characteristic of this century. -Compare with <cite>In Memoriam</cite> the closing lines of Arnold’s -<cite>Dover Beach</cite>:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“And we are here as on a darkling plain</div> - <div class='line'>Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,</div> - <div class='line'>Where ignorant armies clash by night.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>Cardinal Newman in his <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><cite>Apologia pro Vitâ Suâ</cite></span> mentions -it as a peculiarity of Pusey, the great Anglican -ecclesiastic, “He was haunted by no intellectual perplexities.” -In this respect Pusey recalls Milton, Pope, -Wordsworth, as in contrast with Tennyson, Clough, -Matthew Arnold, and Newman himself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>So far as concerns English literature we find, as -might be anticipated, the most interesting criticism -of the thoughts of science among the leaders of the -romantic reaction which accompanied and succeeded -the epoch of the French Revolution. In English literature, -the deepest thinkers of this school were Coleridge, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_116'>116</span>Wordsworth, and Shelley. Keats is an example -of literature untouched by science. We may neglect -Coleridge’s attempt at an explicit philosophical formulation. -It was influential in his own generation; but -in these lectures it is my object only to mention those -elements of the thought of the past which stand for -all time. Even with this limitation, only a selection is -possible. For our purposes Coleridge is only important -by his influence on Wordsworth. Thus Wordsworth -and Shelley remain.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Wordsworth was passionately absorbed in nature. -It has been said of Spinoza, that he was drunk with -God. It is equally true that Wordsworth was drunk -with nature. But he was a thoughtful, well-read -man, with philosophical interests, and sane even to -the point of prosiness. In addition, he was a -genius. He weakens his evidence by his dislike of -science. We all remember his scorn of the poor man -whom he somewhat hastily accuses of peeping and -botanising on his mother’s grave. Passage after passage -could be quoted from him, expressing this repulsion. -In this respect, his characteristic thought -can be summed up in his phrase, ‘We murder to dissect.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this latter passage, he discloses the intellectual -basis of his criticism of science. He alleges against -science its absorption in abstractions. His consistent -theme is that the important facts of nature elude the -scientific method. It is important therefore to ask, -what Wordsworth found in nature that failed to receive -expression in science. I ask this question in the interest -of science itself; for one main position in these -lectures is a protest against the idea that the abstractions -<span class='pageno' id='Page_117'>117</span>of science are irreformable and unalterable. Now -it is emphatically not the case that Wordsworth hands -over inorganic matter to the mercy of science, and -concentrates on the faith that in the living organism -there is some element that science cannot analyse. Of -course he recognises, what no one doubts, that in some -sense living things are different from lifeless things. -But that is not his main point. It is the brooding -presence of the hills which haunts him. His theme -is nature <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>in solido</i></span>, that is to say, he dwells on that -mysterious presence of surrounding things, which imposes -itself on any separate element that we set up -as an individual for its own sake. He always grasps -the whole of nature as involved in the tonality of -the particular instance. That is why he laughs with -the daffodils, and finds in the primrose “thoughts too -deep for terms.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Wordsworth’s greatest poem is, by far, the first -book of <cite>The Prelude</cite>. It is pervaded by this sense -of the haunting presences of nature. A series of magnificent -passages, too long for quotation, express this -idea. Of course, Wordsworth is a poet writing a -poem, and is not concerned with dry philosophical -statements. But it would hardly be possible to express -more clearly a feeling for nature, as exhibiting -entwined prehensive unities, each suffused with modal -presences of others:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Ye Presences of Nature in the sky</div> - <div class='line'>And on the earth! Ye Visions of the hills!</div> - <div class='line'>And Souls of lonely places! can I think</div> - <div class='line'>A vulgar hope was yours when ye employed</div> - <div class='line'>Such ministry, when ye through many a year</div> - <div class='line'>Haunting me thus among my boyish sports,</div> - <div class='line'><span class='pageno' id='Page_118'>118</span>On caves and trees, upon the woods and hills,</div> - <div class='line'>Impressed upon all forms the characters</div> - <div class='line'>Of danger or desire; and thus did make</div> - <div class='line'>The surface of the universal earth</div> - <div class='line'>With triumph and delight, with hope and fear,</div> - <div class='line'>Work like a sea?...”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>In thus citing Wordsworth, the point which I wish -to make is that we forget how strained and paradoxical -is the view of nature which modern science imposes -on our thoughts. Wordsworth, to the height -of genius, expresses the concrete facts of our apprehension, -facts which are distorted in the scientific -analysis. Is it not possible that the standardised concepts -of science are only valid within narrow limitations, -perhaps too narrow for science itself?</p> - -<p class='c001'>Shelley’s attitude to science was at the opposite pole -to that of Wordsworth. He loved it, and is never -tired of expressing in poetry the thoughts which it -suggests. It symbolises to him joy, and peace, and -illumination. What the hills were to the youth of -Wordsworth, a chemical laboratory was to Shelley. -It is unfortunate that Shelley’s literary critics have, -in this respect, so little of Shelley in their own mentality. -They tend to treat as a casual oddity of Shelley’s -nature what was, in fact, part of the main structure -of his mind, permeating his poetry through and -through. If Shelley had been born a hundred years -later, the twentieth century would have seen a Newton -among chemists.</p> - -<p class='c001'>For the sake of estimating the value of Shelley’s -evidence it is important to realise this absorption of -his mind in scientific ideas. It can be illustrated by -lyric after lyric. I will choose one poem only, the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_119'>119</span>fourth act of his <cite>Prometheus Unbound</cite>. The Earth -and the Moon converse together in the language of accurate -science. Physical experiments guide his imagery. -For example, the Earth’s exclamation,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“The vaporous exultation not to be confined!”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c016'>is the poetic transcript of ‘the expansive force of -gases,’ as it is termed in books on science. Again, take -the Earth’s stanza,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“I spin beneath my pyramid of night,</div> - <div class='line'>Which points into the heavens,—dreaming delight,</div> - <div class='line'>Murmuring victorious joy in my enchanted sleep;</div> - <div class='line'>As a youth lulled in love-dreams faintly sighing,</div> - <div class='line'>Under the shadow of his beauty lying,</div> - <div class='line'>Which round his rest a watch of light and warmth doth keep.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>This stanza could only have been written by someone -with a definite geometrical diagram before his -inward eye—a diagram which it has often been my -business to demonstrate to mathematical classes. As -evidence, note especially the last line which gives -poetical imagery to the light surrounding night’s -pyramid. This idea could not occur to anyone without -the diagram. But the whole poem and other -poems are permeated with touches of this kind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Now the poet, so sympathetic with science, so absorbed -in its ideas, can simply make nothing of the -doctrine of secondary qualities which is fundamental -to its concepts. For Shelley nature retains its beauty -and its colour. Shelley’s nature is in its essence a -nature of organisms, functioning with the full content -of our perceptual experience. We are so used to -ignoring the implications of orthodox scientific doctrine, -that it is difficult to make evident the criticism -<span class='pageno' id='Page_120'>120</span>upon it which is thereby implied. If anybody could -have treated it seriously, Shelley would have done so.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Furthermore Shelley is entirely at one with Wordsworth -as to the interfusing of the Presence in nature. -Here is the opening stanza of his poem entitled <cite>Mont -Blanc</cite>:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“The everlasting universe of Things</div> - <div class='line'>Flows through the Mind, and rolls its rapid waves,</div> - <div class='line'>Now dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloom—</div> - <div class='line'>Now lending splendour, where from secret springs</div> - <div class='line'>The source of human thought its tribute brings</div> - <div class='line'>Of waters,—with a sound but half its own,</div> - <div class='line'>Such as a feeble brook will oft assume</div> - <div class='line'>In the wild woods, among the Mountains lone,</div> - <div class='line'>Where waterfalls around it leap for ever,</div> - <div class='line'>Where woods and winds contend, and a vast river</div> - <div class='line'>Over its rocks ceaselessly bursts and raves.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>Shelley has written these lines with explicit reference -to some form of idealism, Kantian or Berkeleyan -or Platonic. But however you construe him, he is -here an emphatic witness to a prehensive unification -as constituting the very being of nature.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Berkeley, Wordsworth, Shelley are representative -of the intuitive refusal seriously to accept the abstract -materialism of science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is an interesting difference in the treatment of -nature by Wordsworth and by Shelley, which brings -forward the exact questions we have got to think about. -Shelley thinks of nature as changing, dissolving, -transforming as it were at a fairy’s touch. The leaves -fly before the West Wind</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Like ghosts from an enchanter fleeing.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>In his poem <cite>The Cloud</cite> it is the transformations of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_121'>121</span>water which excite his imagination. The subject of -the poem is the endless, eternal, elusive change of -things:</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“I change but I cannot die.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>This is one aspect of nature, its elusive change: a -change not merely to be expressed by locomotion, but -a change of inward character. This is where Shelley -places his emphasis, on the change of what cannot die.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Wordsworth was born among hills; hills mostly -barren of trees, and thus showing the minimum of -change with the seasons. He was haunted by the -enormous permanences of nature. For him change is -an incident which shoots across a background of endurance,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“Breaking the silence of the seas</div> - <div class='line'>Among the farthest Hebrides.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>Every scheme for the analysis of nature has to face -these two facts, <em>change</em> and <em>endurance</em>. There is yet -a third fact to be placed by it, <em>eternality</em>, I will call it. -The mountain endures. But when after ages it has -been worn away, it has gone. If a replica arises, it is -yet a new mountain. A colour is eternal. It haunts -time like a spirit. It comes and it goes. But where -it comes, it is the same colour. It neither survives nor -does it live. It appears when it is wanted. The mountain -has to time and space a different relation from -that which colour has. In the previous lecture, I was -chiefly considering the relation to space-time of things -which, in my sense of the term, are eternal. It was -necessary to do so before we can pass to the consideration -of the things which endure.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also we must recollect the basis of our procedure. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_122'>122</span>I hold that philosophy is the critic of abstractions. -Its function is the double one, first of harmonising -them by assigning to them their right relative status -as abstractions, and secondly of completing them by -direct comparison with more concrete intuitions of -the universe, and thereby promoting the formation of -more complete schemes of thought. It is in respect to -this comparison that the testimony of great poets is of -such importance. Their survival is evidence that they -express deep intuitions of mankind penetrating into -what is universal in concrete fact. Philosophy is not -one among the sciences with its own little scheme of -abstractions which it works away at perfecting and -improving. It is the survey of sciences, with the special -objects of their harmony, and of their completion. -It brings to this task, not only the evidence of the separate -sciences, but also its own appeal to concrete experience. -It confronts the sciences with concrete fact.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The literature of the nineteenth century, especially -its English poetic literature, is a witness to the discord -between the aesthetic intuitions of mankind and the -mechanism of science. Shelley brings vividly before -us the elusiveness of the eternal objects of sense as they -haunt the change which infects underlying organisms. -Wordsworth is the poet of nature as being the field of -enduring permanences carrying within themselves a -message of tremendous significance. The eternal objects -are also there for him,</p> - -<div class='lg-container-b c014'> - <div class='linegroup'> - <div class='group'> - <div class='line'>“The light that never was, on sea or land.”</div> - </div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c015'>Both Shelley and Wordsworth emphatically bear witness -that nature cannot be divorced from its aesthetic -values; and that these values arise from the cumulation, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_123'>123</span>in some sense, of the brooding presence of the -whole onto its various parts. Thus we gain from the -poets the doctrine that a philosophy of nature must -concern itself at least with these five notions: change, -value, eternal objects, endurance, organism, interfusion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We see that the literary romantic movement at -the beginning of the nineteenth century, just as much -as Berkeley’s philosophical idealistic movement a -hundred years earlier, refused to be confined within -the materialistic concepts of the orthodox scientific -theory. We know also that when in these lectures we -come to the twentieth century, we shall find a movement -in science itself to reorganise its concepts, driven -thereto by its own intrinsic development.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is, however, impossible to proceed until we have -settled whether this refashioning of ideas is to be -carried out on an objectivist basis or on a subjectivist -basis. By a subjectivist basis I mean the belief that -the nature of our immediate experience is the outcome -of the perceptive peculiarities of the subject enjoying -the experience. In other words, I mean that -for this theory what is perceived is not a partial -vision of a complex of things generally independent -of that act of cognition; but that it merely is the expression -of the individual peculiarities of the cognitive -act. Accordingly what is common to the multiplicity -of cognitive acts is the ratiocination connected -with them. Thus, though there is a common world of -thought associated with our sense-perceptions, there -is no common world to think about. What we do -think about is a common conceptual world applying -indifferently to our individual experiences which are -<span class='pageno' id='Page_124'>124</span>strictly personal to ourselves. Such a conceptual world -will ultimately find its complete expression in the -equations of applied mathematics. This is the extreme -subjectivist position. There is of course the -half-way house of those who believe that our perceptual -experience does tell us of a common objective -world; but that the things perceived are merely the -outcome for us of this world, and are not <em>in themselves</em> -elements in the common world itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also there is the objectivist position. This creed is -that the actual elements perceived by our senses are <em>in -themselves</em> the elements of a common world; and that -this world is a complex of things, including indeed -our acts of cognition, but transcending them. According -to this point of view the things experienced are to -be distinguished from our knowledge of them. So -far as there is dependence, the <em>things</em> pave the way for -the <em>cognition</em>, rather than <em>vice versa</em>. But the point -is that the actual things experienced enter into a common -world which transcends knowledge, though it -includes knowledge. The intermediate subjectivists -would hold that the things experienced only indirectly -enter into the common world by reason of -their dependence on the subject who is cognising. The -objectivist holds that the things experienced and the -cognisant subject enter into the common world on -equal terms. In these lectures I am giving the outline -of what I consider to be the essentials of an objectivist -philosophy adapted to the requirement of science and -to the concrete experience of mankind. Apart from -the detailed criticism of the difficulties raised by subjectivism -in any form, my broad reasons for distrusting -it are three in number. One reason arises from -<span class='pageno' id='Page_125'>125</span>the direct interrogation of our perceptive experience. -It appears from this interrogation that we are <em>within</em> -a world of colours, sounds, and other sense-objects, related -in space and time to enduring objects such as -stones, trees, and human bodies. We seem to be ourselves -elements of this world in the same sense as are -the other things which we perceive. But the subjectivist, -even the moderate intermediate subjectivist, -makes this world, as thus described, depend on us, in -a way which directly traverses our naïve experience. -I hold that the ultimate appeal is to naïve experience -and that is why I lay such stress on the evidence of -poetry. My point is, that in our sense-experience we -know away from and beyond our own personality; -whereas the subjectivist holds that in such experience -we merely know about our own personality. Even -the intermediate subjectivist places our personality between -the world we know of and the common world -which he admits. The world we know of is for him -the internal strain of our personality under the stress -of the common world which lies behind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>My second reason for distrusting subjectivism is -based on the particular content of experience. Our -historical knowledge tells us of ages in the past when, -so far as we can see, no living being existed on earth. -Again it also tells us of countless star-systems, whose -detailed history remains beyond our ken. Consider -even the moon and the earth. What is going on -within the interior of the earth, and on the far side of -the moon! Our perceptions lead us to infer that there -is something happening in the stars, something happening -within the earth, and something happening -on the far side of the moon. Also they tell us that in -<span class='pageno' id='Page_126'>126</span>remote ages there were things happening. But all -these things which it appears certainly happened, are -either unknown in detail, or else are reconstructed by -inferential evidence. In the face of this content of -our personal experience, it is difficult to believe that -the experienced world is an attribute of our own personality. -My third reason is based upon the instinct for -action. Just as sense-perception seems to give knowledge -of what lies beyond individuality, so action seems -to issue in an instinct for self-transcendence. The activity -passes beyond self into the known transcendent -world. It is here that final ends are of importance. -For it is not activity urged from behind, which passes -out into the veiled world of the intermediate subjectivist. -It is activity directed to determinate ends in -the known world; and yet it is activity transcending -self and it is activity within the known world. It -follows therefore that the world, as known, transcends -the subject which is cognisant of it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The subjectivist position has been popular among -those who have been engaged in giving a philosophical -interpretation to the recent theories of relativity in -physical science. The dependence of the world of -sense on the individual percipient seems an easy mode -of expressing the meanings involved. Of course, with -the exception of those who are content with themselves -as forming the entire universe, solitary amid nothing, -everyone wants to struggle back to some sort of objectivist -position. I do not understand how a common -world of thought can be established in the absence of -a common world of sense. I will not argue this point -in detail; but in the absence of a transcendence of -thought, or a transcendence of the world of sense, it -<span class='pageno' id='Page_127'>127</span>is difficult to see how the subjectivist is to divest himself -of his solitariness. Nor does the intermediate subjectivist -appear to get any help from his unknown -world in the background.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The distinction between realism and idealism does -not coincide with that between objectivism and subjectivism. -Both realists and idealists can start from -an objective standpoint. They may both agree that -the world disclosed in sense-perception is a common -world, transcending the individual percipient. But -the objective idealist, when he comes to analyse what -the reality of this world involves, finds that cognitive -mentality is in some way inextricably concerned in -every detail. This position the realist denies. Accordingly -these two classes of objectivists do not part -company till they have arrived at the ultimate problem -of metaphysics. There is a great deal which they -share in common. This is why, in my last lecture, I -said that I adopted a position of provisional realism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the past, the objectivist position has been distorted -by the supposed necessity of accepting the classical -scientific materialism, with its doctrine of simple -location. This has necessitated the doctrine of secondary -and primary qualities. Thus the secondary -qualities, such as the sense-objects, are dealt with -on subjectivist principles. This is a half-hearted position -which falls an easy prey to subjectivist criticism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>If we are to include the secondary qualities in the -common world, a very drastic reorganisation of our -fundamental concepts is necessary. It is an evident -fact of experience that our apprehensions of the external -world depend absolutely on the occurrences -within the human body. By playing appropriate -<span class='pageno' id='Page_128'>128</span>tricks on the body a man can be got to perceive, or -not to perceive, almost anything. Some people express -themselves as though bodies, brains, and nerves -were the only real things in an entirely imaginary -world. In other words, they treat bodies on objectivist -principles, and the rest of the world on subjectivist -principles. This will not do; especially, when we -remember that it is the experimenter’s perception of -another person’s body which is in question as evidence.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But we have to admit that the body is the organism -whose states regulate our cognisance of the world. The -unity of the perceptual field therefore must be a unity -of bodily experience. In being aware of the bodily -experience, we must thereby be aware of aspects of the -whole spatio-temporal world as mirrored within the -bodily life. This is the solution of the problem which -I gave in my last lecture. I will not repeat myself -now, except to remind you that my theory involves -the entire abandonment of the notion that simple location -is the primary way in which things are involved -in space-time. In a certain sense, everything is everywhere -at all times. For every location involves an -aspect of itself in every other location. Thus every -spatio-temporal standpoint mirrors the world.</p> - -<p class='c001'>If you try to imagine this doctrine in terms of our -conventional views of space and time, which presuppose -simple location, it is a great paradox. But if -you think of it in terms of our naïve experience, it is -a mere transcript of the obvious facts. You are in a -certain place perceiving things. Your perception -takes place where you are, and is entirely dependent -on how your body is functioning. But this functioning -of the body in one place, exhibits for your cognisance -<span class='pageno' id='Page_129'>129</span>an aspect of the distant environment, fading -away into the general knowledge that there are things -beyond. If this cognisance conveys knowledge of a -transcendent world, it must be because the event which -is the bodily life unifies in itself aspects of the universe.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This is a doctrine extremely consonant with the -vivid expression of personal experience which we find -in the nature-poetry of imaginative writers such as -Wordsworth or Shelley. The brooding, immediate -presences of things are an obsession to Wordsworth. -What the theory does do is to edge cognitive mentality -away from being the necessary substratum of the -unity of experience. That unity is now placed in the -unity of an event. Accompanying this unity, there -may or there may not be cognition.</p> - -<p class='c001'>At this point we come back to the great question -which was posed before us by our examination of the -evidence afforded by the poetic insight of Wordsworth -and Shelley. This single question has expanded into -a group of questions. What are enduring things, as -distinguished from the eternal objects, such as colour -and shape? How are they possible? What is their -status and meaning in the universe? It comes to this: -What is the status of the enduring stability of the -order of nature? There is the summary answer, -which refers nature to some greater reality standing -behind it. This reality occurs in the history -of thought under many names, The Absolute, Brahma, -The Order of Heaven, God. The delineation of final -metaphysical truth is no part of this lecture. My -point is that any summary conclusion jumping from -our conviction of the existence of such an order of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_130'>130</span>nature to the easy assumption that there is an ultimate -reality which, in some unexplained way, is to be -appealed to for the removal of perplexity, constitutes -the great refusal of rationality to assert its rights. We -have to search whether nature does not in its very -being show itself as self-explanatory. By this I mean, -that the sheer statement, of what things are, may contain -elements explanatory of why things are. Such -elements may be expected to refer to depths beyond -anything which we can grasp with a clear apprehension. -In a sense, all explanation must end in an ultimate -arbitrariness. My demand is, that the ultimate -arbitrariness of matter of fact from which our formulation -starts should disclose the same general principles -of reality, which we dimly discern as stretching -away into regions beyond our explicit powers of discernment. -Nature exhibits itself as exemplifying a -philosophy of the evolution of organisms subject to -determinate conditions. Examples of such conditions -are the dimensions of space, the laws of nature, the -determinate enduring entities, such as atoms and electrons, -which exemplify these laws. But the very nature -of these entities, the very nature of their spatiality -and temporality, should exhibit the arbitrariness of -these conditions as the outcome of a wider evolution -beyond nature itself, and within which nature is but -a limited mode.</p> - -<p class='c001'>One all-pervasive fact, inherent in the very character -of what is real is the transition of things, the -passage one to another. This passage is not a mere -linear procession of discrete entities. However we -fix a determinate entity, there is always a narrower -determination of something which is presupposed in -<span class='pageno' id='Page_131'>131</span>our first choice. Also there is always a wider determination -into which our first choice fades by transition -beyond itself. The general aspect of nature is -that of evolutionary expansiveness. These unities, -which I call events, are the emergence into actuality -of something. How are we to characterise the something -which thus emerges? The name ‘<em>event</em>’ given -to such a unity, draws attention to the inherent transitoriness, -combined with the actual unity. But this -abstract word cannot be sufficient to characterise what -the fact of the reality of an event is in itself. A moment’s -thought shows us that no one idea can in itself -be sufficient. For every idea which finds its significance -in each event must represent something which -contributes to what realisation is in itself. Thus no one -word can be adequate. But conversely, nothing must -be left out. Remembering the poetic rendering of -our concrete experience, we see at once that the element -of value, of being valuable, of having value, of -being an end in itself, of being something which is for -its own sake, must not be omitted in any account of an -event as the most concrete actual something. ‘Value’ -is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event. -Value is an element which permeates through and -through the poetic view of nature. We have only to -transfer to the very texture of realisation in itself that -value which we recognise so readily in terms of human -life. This is the secret of Wordsworth’s worship of -nature. Realization therefore is in itself the attainment -of value. But there is no such thing as mere -value. Value is the outcome of limitation. The definite -finite entity is the selected mode which is the shaping -of attainment; apart from such shaping into -<span class='pageno' id='Page_132'>132</span>individual matter of fact there is no attainment. The -mere fusion of all that there is would be the nonentity -of indefiniteness. The salvation of reality is its obstinate, -irreducible, matter-of-fact entities, which are -limited to be no other than themselves. Neither -science, nor art, nor creative action can tear itself -away from obstinate, irreducible, limited facts. The -endurance of things has its significance in the self-retention -of that which imposes itself as a definite attainment -for its own sake. That which endures is -limited, obstructive, intolerant, infecting its environment -with its own aspects. But it is not self-sufficient. -The aspects of all things enter into its very nature. -It is only itself as drawing together into its own limitation -the larger whole in which it finds itself. Conversely -it is only itself by lending its aspects to this -same environment in which it finds itself. The problem -of evolution is the development of enduring harmonies -of enduring shapes of value, which merge -into higher attainments of things beyond themselves. -Aesthetic attainment is interwoven in the texture of -realisation. The endurance of an entity represents the -attainment of a limited aesthetic success, though if we -look beyond it to its external effects, it may represent -an aesthetic failure. Even within itself, it may represent -the conflict between a lower success and a higher -failure. The conflict is the presage of disruption.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The further discussion of the nature of enduring -objects and of the conditions they require will be -relevant to the consideration of the doctrine of evolution -which dominated the latter half of the nineteenth -century. The point which in this lecture I have -endeavoured to make clear is that the nature-poetry of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_133'>133</span>the romantic revival was a protest on behalf of the -organic view of nature, and also a protest against the -exclusion of value from the essence of matter of fact. -In this aspect of it, the romantic movement may be -conceived as a revival of Berkeley’s protest which had -been launched a hundred years earlier. The romantic -reaction was a protest on behalf of value.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_134'>134</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER VI <br /> <br /> THE NINETEENTH CENTURY</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>My previous lecture was occupied with the comparison -of the nature-poetry of the romantic movement -in England with the materialistic scientific philosophy -inherited from the eighteenth century. It noted the -entire disagreement of the two movements of thought. -The lecture also continued the endeavour to outline -an objectivist philosophy, capable of bridging the -gap between science and that fundamental intuition of -mankind which finds its expression in poetry and its -practical exemplification in the presuppositions of -daily life. As the nineteenth century passed on, the -romantic movement died down. It did not die away, -but it lost its clear unity of tidal stream, and dispersed -itself into many estuaries as it coalesced with other -human interests. The faith of the century was derived -from three sources: one source was the romantic -movement, showing itself in religious revival, in art, -and in political aspiration: another source was the -gathering advance of science which opened avenues of -thought: the third source was the advance in technology -which completely changed the conditions of -human life.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Each of these springs of faith had its origin in the -previous period. The French Revolution itself was -the first child of romanticism in the form in which it -<span class='pageno' id='Page_135'>135</span>tinged Rousseau. James Watt obtained his patent for -his steam-engine in 1769. The scientific advance was -the glory of France and of French influence, throughout -the same century.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also even during this earlier period, the streams -interacted, coalesced, and antagonised each other. But -it was not until the nineteenth century that the threefold -movement came to that full development and -peculiar balance characteristic of the sixty years following -the battle of Waterloo.</p> - -<p class='c001'>What is peculiar and new to the century, differentiating -it from all its predecessors, is its technology. -It was not merely the introduction of some great isolated -inventions. It is impossible not to feel that -something more than that was involved. For example, -writing was a greater invention than the steam-engine. -But in tracing the continuous history of the growth of -writing we find an immense difference from that of -the steam-engine. We must, of course, put aside minor -and sporadic anticipations of both; and confine attention -to the periods of their effective elaboration. The -scale of time is so absolutely disparate. For the steam-engine, -we may give about a hundred years; for writing, -the time period is of the order of a thousand years. -Further, when writing was finally popularised, the -world was not then expecting the next step in technology. -The process of change was slow, unconscious, -and unexpected.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the nineteenth century, the process became quick, -conscious, and expected. The earlier half of the century -was the period in which this new attitude to -change was first established and enjoyed. It was a -peculiar period of hope, in the sense in which, sixty -<span class='pageno' id='Page_136'>136</span>or seventy years later, we can now detect a note of -disillusionment, or at least of anxiety.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The greatest invention of the nineteenth century -was the invention of the method of invention. A new -method entered into life. In order to understand our -epoch, we can neglect all the details of change, such -as railways, telegraphs, radios, spinning machines, -synthetic dyes. We must concentrate on the method -in itself; that is the real novelty, which has broken up -the foundations of the old civilisation. The prophecy -of Francis Bacon has now been fulfilled; and man, -who at times dreamt of himself as a little lower than -the angels, has submitted to become the servant and -the minister of nature. It still remains to be seen -whether the same actor can play both parts.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The whole change has arisen from the new scientific -information. Science, conceived not so much in -its principles as in its results, is an obvious storehouse -of ideas for utilisation. But, if we are to understand -what happened during the century, the analogy of a -mine is better than that of a storehouse. Also, it is a -great mistake to think that the bare scientific idea is -the required invention, so that it has only to be picked -up and used. An intense period of imaginative design -lies between. One element in the new method is just -the discovery of how to set about bridging the gap -between the scientific ideas, and the ultimate product. -It is a process of disciplined attack upon one difficulty -after another.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The possibilities of modern technology were first in -practice realised in England, by the energy of a prosperous -middle class. Accordingly, the industrial revolution -started there. But the Germans explicitly realised -<span class='pageno' id='Page_137'>137</span>the methods by which the deeper veins in the -mine of science could be reached. They abolished -haphazard methods of scholarship. In their technological -schools and universities progress did not have -to wait for the occasional genius, or the occasional -lucky thought. Their feats of scholarship during the -nineteenth century were the admiration of the world. -This discipline of knowledge applies beyond technology -to pure science, and beyond science to general -scholarship. It represents the change from amateurs -to professionals.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There have always been people who devoted their -lives to definite regions of thought. In particular, -lawyers and the clergy of the Christian churches form -obvious examples of such specialism. But the full -self-conscious realisation of the power of professionalism -in knowledge in all its departments, and of the way -to produce the professionals, and of the importance of -knowledge to the advance of technology, and of the -methods by which abstract knowledge can be connected -with technology, and of the boundless possibilities -of technological advance,—the realisation of -all these things was first completely attained in the -nineteenth century; and among the various countries, -chiefly in Germany.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the past human life was lived in a bullock cart; -in the future it will be lived in an aeroplane; and the -change of speed amounts to a difference in quality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The transformation of the field of knowledge, -which has been thus effected, has not been wholly a -gain. At least, there are dangers implicit in it, although -the increase of efficiency is undeniable. The -discussion of various effects on social life arising from -<span class='pageno' id='Page_138'>138</span>the new situation is reserved for my last lecture. For -the present it is sufficient to note that this novel situation -of disciplined progress is the setting within -which the thought of the century developed.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the period considered four great novel ideas were -introduced into theoretical science. Of course, it is -possible to show good cause for increasing my list far -beyond the number <em>four</em>. But I am keeping to ideas -which, if taken in their broadest signification, are vital -to modern attempts at reconstructing the foundations -of physical science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Two of these ideas are antithetical, and I will consider -them together. We are not concerned with details, -but with ultimate influences on thought. One -of the ideas is that of a field of physical activity pervading -all space, even where there is an apparent -vacuum. This notion had occurred to many people, -under many forms. We remember the medieval axiom, -nature abhors a vacuum. Also, Descartes’ vortices -at one time, in the seventeenth century, seemed -as if established among scientific assumptions. Newton -believed that gravitation was caused by something -happening in a medium. But, on the whole, in the -eighteenth century nothing was made of any of these -ideas. The passage of light was explained in Newton’s -fashion by the flight of minute corpuscles, which of -course left room for a vacuum. Mathematical physicists -were far too busy deducing the consequences of -the theory of gravitation to bother much about the -causes; nor did they know where to look, if they had -troubled themselves over the question. There were -speculations, but their importance was not great. Accordingly, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_139'>139</span>when the nineteenth century opened, the -notion of physical occurrences pervading all space -held no effective place in science. It was revived from -two sources. The undulatory theory of light triumphed, -thanks to Thomas Young and Fresnel. This -demands that there shall be something throughout -space which can undulate. Accordingly, the ether -was produced, as a sort of all pervading subtle material. -Again the theory of electromagnetism finally, -in Clerk Maxwell’s hands, assumed a shape in -which it demanded that there should be electromagnetic -occurrences throughout all space. Maxwell’s -complete theory was not shaped until the eighteen-seventies. -But it had been prepared for by many -great men, Ampère, Oersted, Faraday. In accordance -with the current materialistic outlook, these electromagnetic -occurrences also required a material in -which to happen. So again the ether was requisitioned. -Then Maxwell, as the immediate first-fruits -of his theory, demonstrated that the waves of light -were merely waves of his electromagnetic occurrences. -Accordingly, the theory of electromagnetism swallowed -up the theory of light. It was a great simplification, -and no one doubts its truth. But it had one -unfortunate effect so far as materialism was concerned. -For, whereas quite a simple sort of elastic ether sufficed -for light when taken by itself, the electromagnetic -ether has to be endowed with just those properties -necessary for the production of the electromagnetic -occurrences. In fact, it becomes a mere name -for the material which is postulated to underlie these -occurrences. If you do not happen to hold the metaphysical -<span class='pageno' id='Page_140'>140</span>theory which makes you postulate such an -ether, you can discard it. For it has no independent -vitality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus in the seventies of the last century, some main -physical sciences were established on a basis which -presupposed the idea of <em>continuity</em>. On the other -hand, the idea of <em>atomicity</em> had been introduced by -John Dalton, to complete Lavoisier’s work on the -foundation of chemistry. This is the second great -notion. Ordinary matter was conceived as atomic: -electromagnetic effects were conceived as arising from -a continuous field.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There was no contradiction. In the first place, the -notions are antithetical; but, apart from special embodiments, -are not logically contradictory. Secondly, -they were applied to different regions of science, one -to chemistry, and the other to electromagnetism. -And, as yet, there were but faint signs of coalescence -between the two.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The notion of matter as atomic has a long history. -Democritus and Lucretius will at once occur to your -minds. In speaking of these ideas as novel, I merely -mean <em>relatively novel</em>, having regard to the settlement -of ideas which formed the efficient basis of -science throughout the eighteenth century. In considering -the history of thought, it is necessary to distinguish -the real stream, determining a period, from -ineffectual thoughts casually entertained. In the -eighteenth century every well-educated man read Lucretius, -and entertained ideas about atoms. But John -Dalton made them efficient in the stream of science; -and in this function of efficiency atomicity was a new -idea.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_141'>141</span>The influence of atomicity was not limited to chemistry. -The living cell is to biology what the electron -and the proton are to physics. Apart from cells and -from aggregates of cells there are no biological phenomena. -The cell theory was introduced into biology -contemporaneously with, and independently of, Dalton’s -atomic theory. The two theories are independent -exemplifications of the same idea of ‘atomism.’ The -biological cell theory was a gradual growth, and a -mere list of dates and names illustrates the fact that -the biological sciences, as effective schemes of thought, -are barely one hundred years old. Bichât in 1801 -elaborated a tissue theory: Johannes Müller in 1835 -described ‘cells’ and demonstrated facts concerning -their nature and relations: Schleiden in 1838 and -Schwann in 1839 finally established their fundamental -character. Thus by 1840 both biology and chemistry -were established on an atomic basis. The final triumph -of atomism had to wait for the arrival of electrons -at the end of the century. The importance of -the imaginative background is illustrated by the fact -that nearly half a century after Dalton had done his -work, another chemist, Louis Pasteur, carried over -these same ideas of atomicity still further into the -region of biology. The cell theory and Pasteur’s work -were in some respects more revolutionary than that of -Dalton. For they introduced the notion of <em>organism</em> -into the world of minute beings. There had been a -tendency to treat the atom as an ultimate entity, capable -only of external relations. This attitude of mind -was breaking down under the influence of Mendeleef’s -periodic law. But Pasteur showed the decisive importance -of the idea of organism at the stage of infinitesimal -<span class='pageno' id='Page_142'>142</span>magnitude. The astronomers had shown -us how big is the universe. The chemists and biologists -teach us how small it is. There is in modern -scientific practice a famous standard of length. It is -rather small: to obtain it, you must divide a centimetre -into one hundred million parts, and take one -of them. Pasteur’s organisms are a good deal bigger -than this length. In connection with atoms, we now -know that there are organisms for which such distances -are uncomfortably great.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The remaining pair of new ideas to be ascribed to -this epoch are both of them connected with the notion -of transition or change. They are the doctrine of the -conservation of energy, and the doctrine of evolution.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The doctrine of energy has to do with the notion -of quantitative permanence underlying change. The -doctrine of evolution has to do with the emergence of -novel organisms as the outcome of change. The theory -of energy lies in the province of physics. The theory -of evolution lies mainly in the province of biology, -although it had previously been touched upon by Kant -and Laplace in connection with the formation of suns -and planets.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The convergent effect of the new power for scientific -advance, which resulted from these four ideas, -transformed the middle period of the century into an -orgy of scientific triumph. Clear-sighted men, of the -sort who are so clearly wrong, now proclaimed that -the secrets of the physical universe were finally -disclosed. If only you ignored everything which refused -to come into line, your powers of explanation -were unlimited. On the other side, muddle-headed -men muddled themselves into the most indefensible -<span class='pageno' id='Page_143'>143</span>positions. Learned dogmatism, conjoined with ignorance -of the crucial facts, suffered a heavy defeat from -the scientific advocates of new ways. Thus to the excitement -derived from technological revolution, there -was now added the excitement arising from the vistas -disclosed by scientific theory. Both the material and -the spiritual bases of social life were in process of -transformation. When the century entered upon its -last quarter, its three sources of inspiration, the romantic, -the technological, and the scientific had done -their work.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Then, almost suddenly, a pause occurred; and in -its last twenty years the century closed with one of -the dullest stages of thought since the time of the First -Crusade. It was an echo of the eighteenth century, -lacking Voltaire and the reckless grace of the French -aristocrats. The period was efficient, dull, and half-hearted. -It celebrated the triumph of the professional -man.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But looking backwards upon this time of pause, we -can now discern signs of change. In the first place, -the modern conditions of systematic research prevent -absolute stagnation. In every branch of science, there -was effective progress, indeed rapid progress, although -it was confined somewhat strictly within the -accepted ideas of each branch. It was an age of successful -scientific orthodoxy, undisturbed by much -thought beyond the conventions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the second place, we can now see that the adequacy -of scientific materialism as a scheme of thought -for the use of science was endangered. The conservation -of energy provided a new type of quantitative -permanence. It is true that energy could be construed -<span class='pageno' id='Page_144'>144</span>as something subsidiary to matter. But, anyhow, -the notion of <em>mass</em> was losing its unique preeminence -as being the one final permanent quantity. -Later on, we find the relations of mass and energy inverted; -so that mass now becomes the name for a -quantity of energy considered in relation to some of its -dynamical effects. This train of thought leads to the -notion of energy being fundamental, thus displacing -matter from that position. But energy is merely the -name for the quantitative aspect of a structure of happenings; -in short, it depends on the notion of the -functioning of an organism. The question is, can we -define an organism without recurrence to the concept -of matter in simple location? We must, later on, consider -this point in more detail.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The same relegation of matter to the background -occurs in connection with the electromagnetic fields. -The modern theory presupposes happenings in that -field which are divorced from immediate dependence -upon matter. It is usual to provide an ether as a substratum. -But the ether does not really enter into the -theory. Thus again the notion of material loses its -fundamental position. Also, the atom is transforming -itself into an organism; and finally the evolution -theory is nothing else than the analysis of the conditions -for the formation and survival of various types -of organisms. In truth, one most significant fact of -this later period is the advance in biological sciences. -These sciences are essentially sciences concerning organisms. -During the epoch in question, and indeed -also at the present moment, the prestige of the more -perfect scientific form belongs to the physical sciences. -Accordingly, biology apes the manners of physics. It -<span class='pageno' id='Page_145'>145</span>is orthodox to hold, that there is nothing in biology -but what is physical mechanism under somewhat complex -circumstances.</p> - -<p class='c001'>One difficulty in this position is the present confusion -as to the foundational concepts of physical science. -This same difficulty also attaches to the opposed doctrine -of vitalism. For, in this later theory, the fact -of mechanism is accepted—I mean, mechanism based -upon materialism—and an additional vital control is -introduced to explain the actions of living bodies. It -cannot be too clearly understood that the various -physical laws which appear to apply to the behaviour -of atoms are not mutually consistent as at present -formulated. The appeal to mechanism on behalf of -biology was in its origin an appeal to the well-attested -self-consistent physical concepts as expressing the basis -of all natural phenomena. But at present there is no -such system of concepts.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Science is taking on a new aspect which is neither -purely physical, nor purely biological. It is becoming -the study of organisms. Biology is the study of -the larger organisms; whereas physics is the study of -the smaller organisms. There is another difference -between the two divisions of science. The organisms -of biology include as ingredients the smaller organisms -of physics; but there is at present no evidence -that the smaller of the physical organisms can be analysed -into component organisms. It may be so. But -anyhow we are faced with the question as to whether -there are not primary organisms which are incapable -of further analysis. It seems very unlikely that there -should be any infinite regress in nature. Accordingly, -a theory of science which discards materialism must -<span class='pageno' id='Page_146'>146</span>answer the question as to the character of these primary -entities. There can be only one answer on this -basis. We must start with the event as the ultimate -unit of natural occurrence. An event has to do with -all that there is, and in particular with all other events. -This interfusion of events is effected by the aspects -of those eternal objects, such as colours, sounds, scents, -geometrical characters, which are required for nature -and are not emergent from it. Such an eternal -object will be an ingredient of one event under the -guise, or aspect, of qualifying another event. There -is a reciprocity of aspects, and there are patterns of -aspects. Each event corresponds to two such patterns; -namely, the pattern of aspects of other events -which it grasps into its own unity, and the pattern of -its aspects which other events severally grasp into their -unities. Accordingly, a non-materialistic philosophy -of nature will identify a primary organism as being -the emergence of some particular pattern as grasped -in the unity of a real event. Such a pattern will also -include the aspects of the event in question as grasped -in other events, whereby those other events receive a -modification, or partial determination. There is thus -an intrinsic and an extrinsic reality of an event, -namely, the event as in its own prehension, and the -event as in the prehension of other events. The concept -of an organism includes, therefore, the concept -of the interaction of organisms. The ordinary scientific -ideas of transmission and continuity are, relatively -speaking, details concerning the empirically observed -characters of these patterns throughout space and -time. The position here maintained is that the relationships -of an event are internal, so far as concerns -<span class='pageno' id='Page_147'>147</span>the event itself; that is to say, that they are constitutive -of what the event is in itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also in the previous lecture, we arrived at the notion -that an actual event is an achievement for its own -sake, a grasping of diverse entities into a value by -reason of their real togetherness in that pattern, to the -exclusion of other entities. It is not the mere logical -togetherness of merely diverse things. For in that case, -to modify Bacon’s words, “all eternal objects would -be alike one to another.” This reality means that each -intrinsic essence, that is to say, what each eternal object -is in itself, becomes relevant to the one limited -value emergent in the guise of the event. But values -differ in importance. Thus though each event is -necessary for the community of events, the weight of -its contribution is determined by something intrinsic -in itself. We have now to discuss what that property -is. Empirical observation shows that it is the property -which we may call indifferently <em>retention</em>, <em>endurance</em> -or <em>reiteration</em>. This property amounts to the recovery, -on behalf of value amid the transitoriness of -reality, of the self-identity which is also enjoyed by -the primary eternal objects. The reiteration of a particular -shape (or formation) of value within an event -occurs when the event as a whole repeats some shape -which is also exhibited by each one of a succession of -its parts. Thus however you analyse the event according -to the flux of its parts through time, there is the -same thing-for-its-own-sake standing before you. Thus -the event, in its own intrinsic reality, mirrors in itself, -as derived from its own parts, aspects of the same patterned -value as it realises in its complete self. It thus -realises itself under the guise of an enduring individual -<span class='pageno' id='Page_148'>148</span>entity, with a life history contained within itself. -Furthermore, the extrinsic reality of such an event, as -mirrored in other events, takes this same form of an -enduring individuality; only in this case, the individuality -is implanted as a reiteration of aspects of itself -in the alien events composing the environment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The total temporal duration of such an event bearing -an enduring pattern, constitutes its specious present. -Within this specious present the event realises -itself as a totality, and also in so doing realises itself -as grouping together a number of aspects of its own -temporal parts. One and the same pattern is realised -in the total event, and is exhibited by each of these -various parts through an aspect of each part grasped -into the togetherness of the total event. Also, the earlier -life-history of the same pattern is exhibited by its -aspects in this total event. There is, thus, in this event -a memory of the antecedent life-history of its own -dominant pattern, as having formed an element of -value in its own antecedent environment. This concrete -prehension, from within, of the life-history of -an enduring fact is analysable into two abstractions, of -which one is the enduring entity which has emerged -as a real matter of fact to be taken account of by other -things, and the other is the individualised embodiment -of the underlying energy of realisation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The consideration of the general flux of events leads -to this analysis into an underlying eternal energy in -whose nature there stands an envisagement of the -realm of all eternal objects. Such an envisagement is -the ground of the individualised thoughts which -emerge as thought-aspects grasped within the life-history -of the subtler and more complex enduring patterns. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_149'>149</span>Also in the nature of the eternal activity there -must stand an envisagement of all values to be obtained -by a real togetherness of eternal objects, as -envisaged in ideal situations. Such ideal situations, -apart from any reality, are devoid of intrinsic value, -but are valuable as elements in purpose. The individualised -prehension into individual events of aspects -of these ideal situations takes the form of individualised -thoughts, and as such has intrinsic value. Thus -value arises because there is now a real togetherness -of the ideal aspects, as in thought, with the actual -aspects, as in process of occurrence. Accordingly no -value is to be ascribed to the underlying activity as -divorced from the matter-of-fact events of the real -world.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Finally, to sum up this train of thought, the underlying -activity, as conceived apart from the fact of -realisation, has three types of envisagement. These -are: first, the envisagement of eternal objects; secondly, -the envisagement of possibilities of value in -respect to the synthesis of eternal objects; and lastly, -the envisagement of the actual matter of fact which -must enter into the total situation which is achievable -by the addition of the future. But in abstraction -from actuality, the eternal activity is divorced from -value. For the actuality is the value. The individual -perception arising from enduring objects will vary in -its individual depth and width according to the way -in which the pattern dominates its own route. It -may represent the faintest ripple differentiating the -general substrate energy; or, in the other extreme, it -may rise to conscious thought, which includes poising -before self-conscious judgment the abstract possibilities -<span class='pageno' id='Page_150'>150</span>of value inherent in various situations of ideal togetherness. -The intermediate cases will group round -the individual perception as envisaging (without self-consciousness) -that one immediate possibility of attainment -which represents the closest analogy to its -own immediate past, having regard to the actual aspects -which are there for prehension. The laws of -physics represent the harmonised adjustment of development -which results from this unique principle -of determination. Thus dynamics is dominated by -a principle of least action, whose detailed character -has to be learnt from observation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The atomic material entities which are considered -in physical science are merely these individual enduring -entities, conceived in abstraction from everything -except what concerns their mutual interplay in determining -each other’s historical routes of life-history. -Such entities are partially formed by the inheritance -of aspects from their own past. But they are also -partially formed by the aspects of other events forming -their environments. The laws of physics are the -laws declaring how the entities mutually react among -themselves. For physics these laws are arbitrary, because -that science has abstracted from what the entities -are in themselves. We have seen that this fact -of what the entities are in themselves is liable to modification -by their environments. Accordingly, the assumption -that no modification of these laws is to be -looked for in environments, which have any striking -difference from the environments for which the laws -have been observed to hold, is very unsafe. The -physical entities may be modified in very essential -ways, so far as these laws are concerned. It is even -<span class='pageno' id='Page_151'>151</span>possible that they may be developed into individualities -of more fundamental types, with wider embodiment -of envisagement. Such envisagement might -reach to the attainment of the poising of alternative -values with exercise of choice lying outside the physical -laws, and expressible only in terms of purpose. -Apart from such remote possibilities, it remains an -immediate deduction that an individual entity, whose -own life-history is a part within the life-history of -some larger, deeper, more complete pattern, is liable to -have aspects of that larger pattern dominating its own -being, and to experience modifications of that larger -pattern reflected in itself as modifications of its own -being. This is the theory of organic mechanism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>According to this theory the evolution of laws of -nature is concurrent with the evolution of enduring -pattern. For the general state of the universe, as it -now is, partly determines the very essences of the -entities whose modes of functioning these laws express. -The general principle is that in a new environment -there is an evolution of the old entities into new forms.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This rapid outline of a thoroughgoing organic -theory of nature enables us to understand the chief -requisites of the doctrine of evolution. The main -work, proceeding during this pause at the end of the -nineteenth century, was the absorption of this doctrine -as guiding the methodology of all branches of science. -By a blindness which is almost judicial as being a -penalty affixed to hasty, superficial thinking, many -religious thinkers opposed the new doctrine; although, -in truth, a thoroughgoing evolutionary philosophy -is inconsistent with materialism. The aboriginal -stuff, or material, from which a materialistic philosophy -<span class='pageno' id='Page_152'>152</span>starts is incapable of evolution. This material -is in itself the ultimate substance. Evolution, on the -materialistic theory, is reduced to the rôle of being -another word for the description of the changes of -the external relations between portions of matter. -There is nothing to evolve, because one set of external -relations is as good as any other set of external relations. -There can merely be change, purposeless and -unprogressive. But the whole point of the modern -doctrine is the evolution of the complex organisms -from antecedent states of less complex organisms. The -doctrine thus cries aloud for a conception of organism -as fundamental for nature. It also requires an underlying -activity—a substantial activity—expressing itself -in individual embodiments, and evolving in achievements -of organism. The organism is a unit of emergent -value, a real fusion of the characters of eternal -objects, emerging for its own sake.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus in the process of analysing the character of -nature in itself, we find that the emergence of organisms -depends on a selective activity which is akin -to purpose. The point is that the enduring organisms -are now the outcome of evolution; and that, beyond -these organisms, there is nothing else that endures. -On the materialistic theory, there is material—such -as matter or electricity—which endures. On the organic -theory, the only endurances are structures of -activity, and the structures are evolved.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Enduring things are thus the outcome of a temporal -process; whereas eternal things are the elements required -for the very being of the process. We can give -a precise definition of endurance in this way: Let -an event A be pervaded by an enduring structural -<span class='pageno' id='Page_153'>153</span>pattern. Then A can be exhaustively subdivided into -a temporal succession of events. Let B be any part -of A, which is obtained by picking out any one of the -events belonging to a series which thus subdivides A. -Then the enduring pattern is a pattern of aspects -within the complete pattern prehended into the unity -of A, and it is also a pattern within the complete pattern -prehended into the unity of any temporal slice of -A, such as B. For example, a molecule is a pattern -exhibited in an event of one minute, and of any second -of that minute. It is obvious that such an enduring -pattern may be of more, or of less, importance. It -may express some slight fact connecting the underlying -activities thus individualised; or it may express -some very close connection. If the pattern which -endures is merely derived from the direct aspects of -the external environment, mirrored in the standpoints -of the various parts, then the endurance is an extrinsic -fact of slight importance. But if the enduring pattern -is wholly derived from the direct aspects of the -various temporal sections of the event in question, then -the endurance is an important intrinsic fact. It expresses -a certain unity of character uniting the underlying -individualised activities. There is then an -enduring object with a certain unity for itself and for -the rest of nature. Let us use the term physical endurance -to express endurance of this type. Then -physical endurance is the process of continuously inheriting -a certain identity of character transmitted -throughout a historical route of events. This character -belongs to the whole route, and to every event -of the route. This is the exact property of material. -If it has existed for ten minutes, it has existed during -<span class='pageno' id='Page_154'>154</span>every minute of the ten minutes, and during every -second of every minute. Only if you take <em>material</em> -to be fundamental, this property of endurance is an -arbitrary fact at the base of the order of nature; but -if you take <em>organism</em> to be fundamental, this property -is the result of evolution.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It looks at first sight, as if a physical object, with -its process of inheritance from itself, were independent -of the environment. But such a conclusion is -not justified. For let B and C be two successive slices -in the life of such an object, such that C succeeds B. -Then the enduring pattern in C is inherited from B, -and from other analogous antecedent parts of its life. -It is transmitted through B to C. But what is transmitted -to C is the complete pattern of aspects derived -from such events as B. These complete patterns include -the influence of the environment on B, and on -the other antecedent parts of the life of the object. -Thus the complete aspects of the antecedent life are -inherited as the partial pattern which endures -throughout all the various periods of the life. Thus -a favourable environment is essential to the maintenance -of a physical object.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Nature, as we know it, comprises enormous permanences. -There are the permanences of ordinary -matter. The molecules within the oldest rocks known -to geologists may have existed unchanged for over a -thousand million years, not only unchanged in themselves, -but unchanged in their relative dispositions to -each other. In that length of time the number of -pulsations of a molecule vibrating with the frequency -of yellow sodium light would be about 16.3 × 10<sup>22</sup> = -<span class='pageno' id='Page_155'>155</span>163,000 × (10<sup>6</sup>)³. Until recently, an atom was apparently -indestructible. We know better now. But -the indestructible atom has been succeeded by the apparently -indestructible electron and the indestructible -proton.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Another fact to be explained is the great similarity -of these practically indestructible objects. All electrons -are very similar to each other. We need not -outrun the evidence, and say that they are identical; -but our powers of observation cannot detect any differences. -Analogously, all hydrogen nuclei are -alike. Also we note the great numbers of these analogous -objects. There are throngs of them. It seems -as though a certain similarity were a favourable condition -for endurance. Common sense also suggests -this conclusion. If organisms are to survive, they -must work together.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, the key to the mechanism of evolution -is the necessity for the evolution of a favourable -environment, conjointly with the evolution of any -specific type of enduring organisms of great permanence. -Any physical object which by its influence -deteriorates its environment, commits suicide.</p> - -<p class='c001'>One of the simplest ways of evolving a favourable -environment concurrently with the development of -the individual organism, is that the influence of each -organism on the environment should be favourable -to the <em>endurance</em> of other organisms of the same type. -Further, if the organism also favours the <em>development</em> -of other organisms of the same type, you have -then obtained a mechanism of evolution adapted to -produce the observed state of large multitudes of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_156'>156</span>analogous entities, with high powers of endurance. -For the environment automatically develops with the -species, and the species with the environment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The first question to ask is, whether there is any -direct evidence for such a mechanism for the evolution -of enduring organisms. In surveying nature, we -must remember that there are not only basic organisms -whose ingredients are merely aspects of eternal -objects. There are also organisms of organisms. -Suppose for the moment and for the sake of simplicity, -we assume, without any evidence, that electrons and -hydrogen nuclei are such basic organisms. Then the -atoms, and the molecules, are organisms of a higher -type, which also represent a compact definite organic -unity. But when we come to the larger aggregations -of matter, the organic unity fades into the background. -It appears to be but faint and elementary. It is there; -but the pattern is vague and indecisive. It is a mere -aggregation of effects. When we come to living beings, -the definiteness of pattern is recovered, and the -organic character again rises into prominence. Accordingly, -the characteristic laws of inorganic matter -are mainly the statistical averages resulting from -confused aggregates. So far are they from throwing -light on the ultimate nature of things, that they blur -and obliterate the individual characters of the individual -organisms. If we wish to throw light upon the -facts relating to organisms, we must study either the -individual molecules and electrons, or the individual -living beings. In between we find comparative confusion. -Now the difficulty of studying the individual -molecule is that we know so little about its life history. -We cannot keep an individual under continuous -<span class='pageno' id='Page_157'>157</span>observation. In general, we deal with them in -large aggregates. So far as individuals are concerned, -sometimes with difficulty a great experimenter throws, -so to speak, a flash light on one of them, and just -observes one type of instantaneous effect. Accordingly, -the history of the functioning of individual -molecules, or electrons, is largely hidden from us.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But in the case of living beings, we can trace the -history of individuals. We now find exactly the -mechanism which is here demanded. In the first -place, there is the propagation of the species from -members of the same species. There is also the careful -provision of the favourable environment for the -endurance of the family, the race, or the seed in the -fruit.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is evident, however, that I have explained the -evolutionary mechanism in terms which are far too -simple. We find associated species of living things, -providing for each other a favourable environment. -Thus just as the members of the same species mutually -favour each other, so do members of associated -species. We find the rudimentary fact of association -in the existence of the two species, electrons -and hydrogen nuclei. The simplicity of the dual -association, and the apparent absence of competition -from other antagonistic species accounts for the massive -endurance which we find among them.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are thus two sides to the machinery involved -in the development of nature. On one side, there is -a given environment with organisms adapting themselves -to it. The scientific materialism of the epoch -in question emphasised this aspect. From this point -of view, there is a given amount of material, and only -<span class='pageno' id='Page_158'>158</span>a limited number of organisms can take advantage -of it. The givenness of the environment dominates -everything. Accordingly, the last words of science -appeared to be the Struggle for Existence, and Natural -Selection. Darwin’s own writings are for all -time a model of refusal to go beyond the direct evidence, -and of careful retention of every possible hypothesis. -But those virtues were not so conspicuous -in his followers, and still less in his camp-followers. -The imagination of European sociologists and publicists -was stained by exclusive attention to this aspect -of conflicting interests. The idea prevailed that there -was a peculiar strong-minded realism in discarding -ethical considerations in the determination of the conduct -of commercial and national interests.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The other side of the evolutionary machinery, the -neglected side, is expressed by the word <em>creativeness</em>. -The organisms can create their own environment. -For this purpose, the single organism is almost helpless. -The adequate forces require societies of <a id='corr157.20'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='co-operating'>coöperating</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_157.20'><ins class='correction' title='co-operating'>coöperating</ins></a></span> -organisms. But with such coöperation and -in proportion to the effort put forward, the environment -has a plasticity which alters the whole ethical -aspect of evolution.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the immediate past, and at present, a muddled -state of mind is prevalent. The increased plasticity -of the environment for mankind, resulting from the -advances in scientific technology, is being construed in -terms of habits of thought which find their justification -in the theory of a fixed environment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The riddle of the universe is not so simple. There -is the aspect of permanence in which a given type of -attainment is endlessly repeated for its own sake; and -<span class='pageno' id='Page_159'>159</span>there is the aspect of transition to other things,—it -may be of higher worth, and it may be of lower worth. -Also there are its aspects of struggle and of friendly -help. But romantic ruthlessness is no nearer to real -politics, than is romantic self-abnegation.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_160'>160</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER VII <br /> <br /> RELATIVITY</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>In the previous lectures of this course we have considered -the antecedent conditions which led up to -the scientific movement, and have traced the progress -of thought from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. -In the nineteenth century this history falls into -three parts, so far as it is to be grouped around science. -These <a id='corr160.8'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='divisons'>divisions</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_160.8'><ins class='correction' title='divisons'>divisions</ins></a></span> are, the contact between the romantic -movement and science, the development of -technology and physics in the earlier part of the -century, and lastly the theory of evolution combined -with the general advance of the biological sciences.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The dominating note of the whole period of three -centuries is that the doctrine of materialism afforded -an adequate basis for the concepts of science. It was -practically unquestioned. When undulations were -wanted, an ether was supplied, in order to perform -the duties of an undulatory material. To show the -full assumption thus involved, I have sketched in outline -an alternative doctrine of an organic theory of -nature. In the last lecture it was pointed out that -the biological developments, the doctrine of evolution, -the doctrine of energy, and the molecular theories -were rapidly undermining the adequacy of the orthodox -materialism. But until the close of the century -no one drew that conclusion. Materialism reigned -supreme.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_161'>161</span>The note of the present epoch is that so many complexities -have developed regarding material, space, -time, and energy, that the simple security of the old -orthodox assumptions has vanished. It is obvious -that they will not do as Newton left them, or even -as Clerk Maxwell left them. There must be a reorganization. -The new situation in the thought of to-day -arises from the fact that scientific theory is outrunning -common sense. The settlement as inherited -by the eighteenth century was a triumph of organised -common sense. It had got rid of medieval phantasies, -and of Cartesian vortices. As a result it gave full -reign to its anti-rationalistic tendencies derived from -the historical revolt of the Reformation period. It -grounded itself upon what every plain man could see -with his own eyes, or with a microscope of moderate -power. It measured the obvious things to be measured, -and it generalised the obvious things to be generalised. -For example, it generalised the ordinary -notions of weight and massiveness. The eighteenth -century opened with the quiet confidence that at last -nonsense had been got rid of. To-day we are at the -opposite pole of thought. Heaven knows what seeming -nonsense may not to-morrow be demonstrated -truth. We have recaptured some of the tone of the -early nineteenth century, only on a higher imaginative -level.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The reason why we are on a higher imaginative -level is not because we have finer imagination, but -because we have better instruments. In science, the -most important thing that has happened during the -last forty years is the advance in instrumental design. -This advance is partly due to a few men of genius -<span class='pageno' id='Page_162'>162</span>such as Michelson and the German opticians. It is -also due to the progress of technological processes of -manufacture, particularly in the region of metallurgy. -The designer has now at his disposal a variety of material -of differing physical properties. He can thus -depend upon obtaining the material he desires; and -it can be ground to the shapes he desires, within very -narrow limits of tolerance. These instruments have -put thought onto a new level. A fresh instrument -serves the same purpose as foreign travel; it shows -things in unusual combinations. The gain is more -than a mere addition; it is a transformation. The -advance in experimental ingenuity is, perhaps, also -due to the larger proportion of national ability which -now flows into scientific pursuits. Anyhow, whatever -be the cause, subtle and ingenious experiments -have abounded within the last generation. The result -is, that a great deal of information has been accumulated -in regions of nature very far removed from the -ordinary experience of mankind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Two famous experiments, one devised by Galileo -at the outset of the scientific movement, and the other -by Michelson with the aid of his famous interferometer, -first carried out in 1881, and repeated in 1887 -and 1905, illustrate the assertions I have made. Galileo -dropped heavy bodies from the top of the leaning -tower of Pisa, and demonstrated that bodies of different -weights, if released simultaneously, would reach -the earth together. So far as experimental skill, and -delicacy of apparatus were concerned, this experiment -could have been made at any time within the -preceding five thousand years. The ideas involved -merely concerned weight and speed of travel, ideas -<span class='pageno' id='Page_163'>163</span>which are familiar in ordinary life. The whole set -of ideas might have been familiar to the family of -King Minos of Crete, as they dropped pebbles into -the sea from high battlements rising from the shore. -We cannot too carefully realise that science started -with the organisation of ordinary experiences. It -was in this way that it coalesced so readily with the -anti-rationalistic bias of the historical revolt. It -was not asking for ultimate meanings. It confined -itself to investigating the connections regulating the -succession of obvious occurrences.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Michelson’s experiment could not have been made -earlier than it was. It required the general advance -in technology, and Michelson’s experimental genius. -It concerns the determination of the earth’s motion -through the ether, and it assumes that light consists -of waves of vibration advancing at a fixed rate -through the ether in any direction. Also, of course, -the earth is moving through the ether, and Michelson’s -apparatus is moving with the earth. In the centre of -the apparatus a ray of light is divided so that one -half-ray goes in one direction <em>along</em> the apparatus -through a given distance, and is reflected back to the -centre by a mirror in the apparatus. The other half-ray -goes the same distance <em>across</em> the apparatus in a -direction at right angles to the former ray, and it also -is reflected back to the centre. These reunited rays -are then reflected onto a screen in the apparatus. If -precautions are taken, you will see interference bands; -namely bands of blackness where the crests of the -waves of one ray have filled up the troughs of the -other rays, owing to a minute difference in the lengths -of paths of the two half-rays, up to certain parts -<span class='pageno' id='Page_164'>164</span>of the screens. These differences in length will be -affected by the motion of the earth. For it is the -lengths of the paths in the ether which count. Thus, -since the apparatus is moving with the earth, the path -of one half-ray will be disturbed by the motion in a -different manner from the path of the other half-ray. -Think of yourself as moving in a railway carriage, -first along the train and then across the train; -and mark out your paths on the railway track which in -this analogy corresponds to the ether. Now the motion -of the earth is very slow compared to that of -light. Thus in the analogy you must think of the -train almost at a standstill, and of yourself as moving -very quickly.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the experiment this effect of the earth’s motion -would affect the positions on the screen of the interference -bands. Also if you turn the apparatus round, -through a right-angle, the effect of the earth’s motion -on the two half-rays will be interchanged, and the -positions of the interference bands would be shifted. -We can calculate the small shift which should result -owing to the earth’s motion round the sun. Also to -this effect, we have to add that due to the sun’s motion -through the ether. The delicacy of the instrument -can be tested, and it can be proved that these -effects of shifting are large enough to be observed by -it. Now the point is, that nothing was observed. -There was no shifting as you turned the instrument -round.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The conclusion is either that the earth is always -stationary in the ether, or that there is something -wrong with the fundamental principles on which the -interpretation of the experiment relies. It is obvious -<span class='pageno' id='Page_165'>165</span>that, in this experiment, we are very far away from -the thoughts and the games of the children of King -Minos. The ideas of an ether, of waves in it, of -interference, of the motion of the earth through the -ether, and of Michelson’s interferometer, are remote -from ordinary experience. But remote as they are, -they are simple and obvious compared to the accepted -explanation of the nugatory result of the experiment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The ground of the explanation is that the ideas of -space and of time employed in science are too simple-minded, -and must be modified. This conclusion is a -direct challenge to common sense, because the earlier -science had only refined upon the ordinary notions of -ordinary people. Such a radical reorganization of -ideas would not have been adopted, unless it had -also been supported by many other observations which -we need not enter upon. Some form of the relativity -theory seems to be the simplest way of explaining a -large number of facts which otherwise would each -require some <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>ad hoc</i></span> explanation. The theory, therefore, -does not merely depend upon the experiments -which led to its origination.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The central point of the explanation is that every -instrument, such as Michelson’s apparatus as used in -the experiment, necessarily records the velocity of -light as having one and the same definite speed relatively -to it. I mean that an interferometer in a -comet and an interferometer on the earth would necessarily -bring out the velocity of light, relatively to -themselves, as at the same value. This is an obvious -paradox, since the light moves with a definite velocity -through the ether. Accordingly two bodies, the -earth and the comet, moving with unequal velocities -<span class='pageno' id='Page_166'>166</span>through the ether, might be expected to have different -velocities relatively to rays of light. For example, -consider two cars on a road, moving at ten and twenty -miles an hour respectively, and being passed by another -car at fifty miles an hour. The rapid car will -pass one of the two cars at the relative velocity of -forty miles per hour, and the other at the rate of -thirty miles per hour. The allegation as to light is -that, if we substituted a ray of light for the rapid -car, the velocity of the light along the roadway would -be exactly the same as its velocity relatively to either -of the two cars which it overtakes. The velocity of -light is immensely large, being about three hundred -thousand kilometres per second. We must have notions -as to space and time such that just this velocity -has this peculiar character. It follows that all our -notions of relative velocity must be recast. But -these notions are the immediate outcome of our habitual -notions as to space and time. So we come back -to the position, that there has been something overlooked -in the current expositions of what we mean -by space and of what we mean by time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Now our habitual fundamental assumption is that -there is a unique meaning to be given to space and -a unique meaning to be given to time, so that whatever -meaning is given to spatial relations in respect -to the instrument on the earth, the same meaning -must be given to them in respect to the instrument on -the comet, and the same meaning for an instrument at -rest in the ether. In the theory of relativity, this is -denied. As far as concerns space, there is no difficulty -in agreeing, if you think of the obvious facts of relative -motion. But even here the change in meaning has to -<span class='pageno' id='Page_167'>167</span>go further than would be sanctioned by common sense. -Also the same demand is made for time; so that the -relative dating of events and the lapses of time between -them are to be reckoned as different for the -instrument on the earth, for the instrument in the -comet, and for the instrument at rest in the ether. -This is a greater strain on our credulity. We need -not probe the question further than the conclusion -that for the earth and for the comet spatiality and -temporality are each to have different meanings amid -different conditions, such as those presented by the -earth and the comet. Accordingly velocity has different -meanings for the two bodies. Thus the modern -scientific assumption is that if anything has the speed -of light by reference to any one meaning of space -and time, then it has the same speed according to any -other meaning of space and time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This is a heavy blow at the classical scientific materialism, -which presupposes a definite present instant -at which all matter is simultaneously real. In the -modern theory there is no such unique present instant. -You can find a meaning for the notion of the simultaneous -instant throughout all nature, but it will be -a different meaning for different notions of temporality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There has been a tendency to give an extreme subjectivist -interpretation to this new doctrine. I mean -that the relativity of space and time has been construed -as though it were dependent on the choice of -the observer. It is perfectly legitimate to bring in -the observer, if he facilitates explanations. But it is -the observer’s body that we want, and not his mind. -Even this body is only useful as an example of a -<span class='pageno' id='Page_168'>168</span>very familiar form of apparatus. On the whole, it -is better to concentrate attention on Michelson’s interferometer, -and to leave Michelson’s body and -Michelson’s mind out of the picture. The question -is, why did the interferometer have black bands on -its screen, and why did not these bands slightly shift -as the instrument turned. The new relativity associates -space and time with an intimacy not hitherto contemplated; -and presupposes that their separation in -concrete fact can be achieved by alternative modes -of abstraction, yielding alternative meanings. But -each mode of abstraction is directing attention to -something which is in nature; and thereby is isolating -it for the purpose of contemplation. The fact relevant -to experiment, is the relevance of the interferometer -to just one among the many alternative systems of -these spatio-temporal relations which hold between -natural entities.</p> - -<p class='c001'>What we must now ask of philosophy is to give -us an interpretation of the status in nature of space -and time, so that the possibility of alternative meanings -is preserved. These lectures are not suited for -the elaboration of details; but there is no difficulty in -pointing out where to look for the origin of the discrimination -between space and time. I am presupposing -the organic theory of nature, which I have -outlined as a basis for a thoroughgoing objectivism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>An event is the grasping into unity of a pattern of -aspects. The effectiveness of an event beyond itself -arises from the aspects of itself which go to form -the prehended unities of other events. Except for -the systematic aspects of geometrical shape, this effectiveness -is trivial, if the mirrored pattern attaches -<span class='pageno' id='Page_169'>169</span>merely to the event as one whole. If the pattern -endures throughout the successive parts of the event, -and also exhibits itself in the whole, so that the event -is the life history of the pattern, then in virtue of -that enduring pattern the event gains in external effectiveness. -For its own effectiveness is reënforced -by the analogous aspects of all its successive parts. -The event constitutes a patterned value with a permanence -inherent throughout its own parts; and by -reason of this inherent endurance the event is important -for the modification of its environment.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is in this endurance of pattern that time differentiates -itself from space. The pattern is spatially -<em>now</em>; and this temporal determination constitutes -its relation to each partial event. For it is reproduced -in this temporal succession of these spatial -parts of its own life. I mean that this particular -rule of temporal order allows the pattern to be reproduced -in each temporal slice of its history. So to -speak, each enduring object discovers in nature and -requires from nature a principle discriminating space -from time. Apart from the fact of an enduring pattern -this principle might be there, but it would be -latent and trivial. Thus the importance of space as -against time, and of time as against space, has developed -with the development of enduring organisms. -Enduring objects are significant of a differentiation of -space from time in respect to the patterns ingredient -within events; and conversely the differentiation of -space from time in the patterns ingredient within -events expresses the patience of the community of -events for enduring objects. There might be the community -without objects, but there could not be the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_170'>170</span>enduring objects without the community with its -peculiar patience for them.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is very necessary that this point should not be -misunderstood. Endurance means that a pattern -which is exhibited in the prehension of one event is -also exhibited in the prehension of those of its parts -which are discriminated by a certain rule. It is not -true that any part of the whole event will yield the -same pattern as does the whole. For example, consider -the total bodily pattern exhibited in the life of -a human body during one minute. One of the thumbs -during the same minute is part of the whole bodily -event. But the pattern of this part is the pattern -of the thumb, and is not the pattern of the whole -body. Thus endurance requires a definite rule for -obtaining the parts. In the above example, we know -at once what the rule is: You must take the life of -the whole body during any portion of that same minute; -for example, during a second or a tenth of a -second. In other words, the meaning of endurance -presupposes a meaning for the lapse of time within -the spatio-temporal continuum.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The question now arises whether all enduring objects -discover the same principle of differentiation -of space from time; or even whether at different stages -of its own life-history one object may not vary in its -spatio-temporal discrimination. Up till a few years -ago, everyone unhesitatingly assumed that there was -only one such principle to be discovered. Accordingly, -in dealing with one object, time would have -exactly the same meaning in reference to endurance -as in dealing with the endurance of another object. -It would also follow then that spatial relations would -<span class='pageno' id='Page_171'>171</span>have one unique meaning. But now it seems that the -observed effectiveness of objects can only be explained -by assuming that objects in a state of motion relatively -to each other are utilising, for their endurance, meanings -of space and of time which are not identical from -one object to another. Every enduring object is to -be conceived as at rest in its own proper space, and in -motion throughout any space defined in a way which -is not that inherent in its peculiar endurance. If -two objects are mutually at rest, they are utilising -the same meanings of space and of time for the purposes -of expressing their endurance; if in relative motion, -the spaces and times differ. It follows that, if -we can conceive a body at one stage of its life history -as in motion relatively to itself at another stage, then -the body at these two stages is utilising diverse meanings -of space, and correlatively diverse meanings of -time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In an organic philosophy of nature there is nothing -to decide between the old hypothesis of the uniqueness -of the time discrimination and the new hypothesis -of its multiplicity. It is purely a matter for evidence -drawn from observations.<a id='r5' /><a href='#f5' class='c013'><sup>[5]</sup></a></p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f5'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r5'>5</a>. <i>Cf.</i> my <cite>Principles of Natural Knowledge</cite>, Sec. 52:3.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>In an earlier lecture, I said that an event had contemporaries. -It is an interesting question whether, -on the new hypothesis, such a statement can be made -without the qualification of a reference to a definite -space-time system. It is possible to do so, in the sense -that in <em>some</em> time-system or other the two events are -simultaneous. In other time-systems the two contemporary -events will not be simultaneous, though they -may overlap. Analogously one event will precede another -<span class='pageno' id='Page_172'>172</span>without qualification, if in <em>every</em> time-system -this precedence occurs. It is evident that if we start -from a given event A, other events in general are -divided into two sets, namely, those which without -qualification are contemporaneous with A and those -which either precede or succeed A. But there will -be a set left over, namely, those events which bound -the two sets. There we have a critical case. You -will remember that we have a critical velocity to -account for, namely the theoretical velocity of light -<span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>in vacuo</i></span>.<a id='r6' /><a href='#f6' class='c013'><sup>[6]</sup></a> Also you will remember that the utilisation -of different spatio-temporal systems means the -relative motion of objects. When we analyse this -critical relation of a special set of events to any given -event A, we find the explanation of the critical velocity -which we require. I am suppressing all details. It -is evident that exactness of statement must be introduced -by the introduction of points, and lines, and -instants. Also that the origin of geometry requires -discussion; for example, the measurement of lengths, -the straightness of lines, and the flatness of planes, and -perpendicularity. I have endeavoured to carry out -these investigations in some earlier books, under the -heading of the theory of extensive abstraction; but -they are too technical for the present occasion.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f6'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r6'>6</a>. This is not the velocity of light in a gravitational field or in a -medium of molecules and electrons.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>If there be no one definite meaning to the geometrical -relations of distance, it is evident that the law of -gravitation needs restatement. For the formula expressing -that law is that two particles attract each other -in proportion to the product of their masses and the -inverse square of their distances. This enunciation -<span class='pageno' id='Page_173'>173</span>tacitly assumes that there is one definite meaning to be -ascribed to the instant at which the attraction is considered, -and also one definite meaning to be ascribed -to <em>distance</em>. But distance is a purely spatial notion, -so that in the new doctrine, there are an indefinite -number of such meanings according to the space-time -system which you adopt. If the two particles are relatively -at rest, then we might be content with the space-time -systems which they are both utilising. Unfortunately -this suggestion gives no hint as to procedure -when they are not mutually at rest. It is, therefore, -necessary to reformulate the law in a way which does -not presuppose any particular space-time system. Einstein -has done this. Naturally the result is more complicated. -He introduced into mathematical physics -certain methods of pure mathematics which render -the formulae independent of the particular systems -of measurement adopted. The new formula introduces -various small effects which are absent in Newton’s -law. But for the major effects Newton’s law -and Einstein’s law agree. Now these extra effects -of Einstein’s law serve to explain irregularities of the -planet Mercury’s orbit which by Newton’s law were -inexplicable. This is a strong confirmation of the new -theory. Curiously enough, there is more than one -alternative formula, based on the new theory of multiple -space-time systems, having the property of embodying -Newton’s law and in addition of explaining -the peculiarities of Mercury’s motion. The only -method of selection between them is to wait for experimental -evidence respecting those effects on which -the formulae differ. Nature is probably quite indifferent -to the aesthetic preferences of mathematicians.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_174'>174</span>It only remains to add that Einstein would probably -reject the theory of multiple space-time systems which -I have been expounding to you. He would interpret -his formula in terms of contortions in space-time -which alter the invariance theory for measure properties, -and of the proper times of each historical -route. His mode of statement has the greater mathematical -simplicity, and only allows of one law of -gravitation, excluding the alternatives. But, for myself, -I cannot reconcile it with the given facts of our -experience as to simultaneity, and spatial arrangement. -There are also other difficulties of a more abstract -character.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The theory of the relationship between events at -which we have now arrived is based first upon the -doctrine that the relatednesses of an event are all internal -relations, so far as concerns that event, though -not necessarily so far as concerns the other relata. For -example, the eternal objects, thus involved, are externally -related to events. This internal relatedness is -the reason why an event can be found only just where -it is and how it is,—that is to say, in just one definite -set of relationships. For each relationship enters into -the essence of the event; so that, apart from that relationship, -the event would not be itself. This is what -is meant by the very notion of internal relations. It -has been usual, indeed universal, to hold that spatio-temporal -relationships are external. This doctrine -is what is here denied.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The conception of internal relatedness involves the -analysis of the event into two factors, one the underlying -substantial activity of individualisation, and the -other the complex of aspects—that is to say, the complex -<span class='pageno' id='Page_175'>175</span>of relatednesses as entering into the essence of the -given event—which are unified by this individualised -activity. In other words, the concept of internal relations -requires the concept of substance as the activity -synthesising the relationships into its emergent character. -The event is what it is, by reason of the unification -in itself of a multiplicity of relationships. The -general scheme of these mutual relationships is an -abstraction which presupposes each event as an independent -entity, which it is not, and asks what remnant -of these formative relationships is then left in the guise -of external relationships. The scheme of relationships -as thus impartially expressed becomes the scheme of a -complex of events variously related as wholes to parts -and as joint parts within some one whole. Even here, -the internal relationship forces itself on our attention; -for the part evidently is constitutive of the whole. -Also an isolated event which has lost its status in any -complex of events is equally excluded by the very -nature of an event. So the whole is evidently constitutive -of the part. Thus the internal character of -the relationship really shows through this impartial -scheme of abstract external relations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But this exhibition of the actual universe as extensive -and divisible has left out the distinction between -space and time. It has in fact left out the process of -realisation, which is the adjustment of the synthetic -activities by virtue of which the various events become -their realised selves. This adjustment is thus the adjustment -of the underlying active substances whereby -these substances exhibit themselves as the individualisations -or modes of Spinoza’s one substance. This adjustment -is what introduces temporal process.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_176'>176</span>Thus, in some sense, time, in its character of the -adjustment of the process of synthetic realisation, extends -<a id='corr176.3'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='beyonds'>beyond</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_176.3'><ins class='correction' title='beyonds'>beyond</ins></a></span> the spatio-temporal continuum of nature.<a id='r7' /><a href='#f7' class='c013'><sup>[7]</sup></a> -There is no necessity that temporal process, in -this sense, should be constituted by one single series -of linear succession. Accordingly, in order to satisfy -the present demands of scientific hypothesis, we introduce -the metaphysical hypothesis that this is not the -case. We do assume (basing ourselves upon direct -observation), however, that temporal process of realisation -can be analysed into a group of linear serial -processes. Each of these linear series is a space-time -system. In support of this assumption of definite serial -processes, we appeal: (1) to the immediate presentation -through the senses of an extended universe -beyond ourselves and <em>simultaneous</em> with ourselves, (2) -to the intellectual apprehension of a meaning to the -question which asks what is <em>now immediately happening</em> -in regions beyond the cognisance of our senses, -(3) to the analysis of what is involved in the <em>endurance</em> -of emergent objects. This endurance of objects -involves the display of a pattern as now realised. This -display is the display of a pattern as inherent in an -event, but also as exhibiting a temporal slice of nature -as lending aspects to eternal objects (or, equally, of -eternal objects as lending aspects to events). The -pattern is spatialised in a whole duration for the benefit -of the event into whose essence the pattern enters. -The event is part of the duration, <i>i.e.</i>, is part of what -is exhibited in the aspects inherent in itself; and conversely -the duration is the whole of nature simultaneous -with the event, in that sense of simultaneity. Thus -<span class='pageno' id='Page_177'>177</span>an event in realising itself displays a pattern, and this -pattern requires a definite duration determined by a -definite meaning of simultaneity. Each such meaning -of simultaneity relates the pattern as thus displayed to -one definite space-time system. The actuality of the -space-time systems is constituted by the <a id='corr177.6'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='realization'>realisation</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_177.6'><ins class='correction' title='realization'>realisation</ins></a></span> of -pattern; but it is inherent in the general scheme of -events as constituting its patience for the temporal -process of realisation.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f7'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r7'>7</a>. <i>Cf.</i> my <cite>Concept of Nature</cite>, Ch. III.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>Notice that the pattern requires a duration involving -a definite lapse of time, and not merely an instantaneous -moment. Such a moment is more abstract, in -that it merely denotes a certain relation of contiguity -between the concrete events. Thus a duration is spatialised; -and by ‘spatialised’ is meant that the duration -is the field for the realised pattern constituting the -character of the event. A duration, as the field of the -pattern realised in the actualisation of one of its contained -events, is an epoch, <i>i.e.</i>, an arrest. Endurance -is the repetition of the pattern in successive events. -Thus endurance requires a succession of durations, -each exhibiting the pattern. In this account ‘time’ -has been separated from ‘extension’ and from the ‘divisibility’ -which arises from the character of spatio-temporal -<a id='corr177.25'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='‘of'>extension’</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_177.25'><ins class='correction' title='‘of'>extension’</ins></a></span>. Accordingly we must not proceed -to conceive time as another form of extensiveness. -Time is sheer succession of epochal durations. -But the entities which succeed each other in this account -are durations. The duration is that which is -required for the realisation of a pattern in the given -event. Thus the divisibility and extensiveness is -within the given duration. The epochal duration is -not realised <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>via</i></span> its <em>successive</em> divisible parts, but is -<span class='pageno' id='Page_178'>178</span>given <em>with</em> its parts. In this way, the objection which -Zeno might make to the joint validity of two passages -from Kant’s <cite>Critique of Pure Reason</cite> is met by abandoning -the earlier of the two passages. I refer to -passages from the section ‘Of the Axioms of Intuition’; -the earlier from the subsection on <i>Extensive -Quantity</i>, and the latter from the subsection on <i>Intensive -Quantity</i> where considerations respecting quantity -in general, extensive and intensive, are summed up. -The earlier passage runs thus:<a id='r8' /><a href='#f8' class='c013'><sup>[8]</sup></a></p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f8'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r8'>8</a>. Max Müller’s translation.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>“I call an extensive quantity that in which the representation -of the whole is rendered possible by the -representation of its parts, <em>and therefore necessarily -preceded by it</em>.<a id='r9' /><a href='#f9' class='c013'><sup>[9]</sup></a> I cannot represent to myself any line, -however small it may be, without drawing it in -thought, that is, without producing all its parts one -after the other, starting from a given point, and thus, -first of all, drawing its intuition. The same applies to -every, even the smallest portion of time. I can only -think in it the successive progress from one moment to -another, thus producing in the end, by all the portions -of time, and their addition, a definite quantity of -time.”</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f9'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r9'>9</a>. Italics mine, and also in the second passage.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>The second passage runs thus:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“This peculiar property of quantities that no part -of them is the smallest possible part (no part indivisible) -is called continuity. Time and space are quanta -continua, because there is no part of them that is not -enclosed between limits (points and moments), <em>no -part that is not itself again a space or a time. Space -consists of spaces only, time of times. Points and moments -<span class='pageno' id='Page_179'>179</span>are only limits</em>, mere places of limitation, and as -places <em>presupposing always</em> those intuitions which they -are meant to limit or to determine. Mere places or -parts that might be given before space or time, could -never be compounded into space or time.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>I am in complete agreement with the second extract -if ‘time and space’ is the extensive continuum; but -it is inconsistent with its predecessor. For Zeno would -object that a vicious infinite regress is involved. Every -part of time involves some smaller part of itself, and -so on. Also this series regresses backwards ultimately -to nothing; since the initial moment is without duration -and merely marks the relation of contiguity to an -earlier time. Thus time is impossible, if the two extracts -are both adhered to. I accept the later, and -reject the earlier, passage. Realisation is the becoming -of time in the field of extension. Extension is the -complex of events, <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>quâ</i></span> their potentialities. In realisation -the potentiality becomes actuality. But the -potential pattern requires a duration; and the duration -must be exhibited as an epochal whole, by the realisation -of the pattern. Thus time is the succession of elements -in themselves divisible and contiguous. A -duration, in becoming temporal, thereby incurs realisation -in respect to some enduring object. Temporalisation -is realisation. Temporalisation is not another -continuous process. It is an atomic succession. -Thus time is atomic (<i>i.e.</i>, epochal), though what is -temporalised is divisible. This doctrine follows from -the doctrine of events, and of the nature of enduring -objects. In the next chapter we must consider its -relevance to the quantum theory of recent science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is to be noted that this doctrine of the epochal -<span class='pageno' id='Page_180'>180</span>character of time does not depend on the modern doctrine -of relativity, and holds equally—and indeed, -more simply—if this doctrine be abandoned. It does -depend on the analysis of the intrinsic character of an -event, considered as the most concrete finite entity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In reviewing this argument, note first that the second -quotation from Kant, on which it is based, does not -depend on any peculiar Kantian doctrine. The latter -of the two is in agreement with Plato as against -Aristotle.<a id='r10' /><a href='#f10' class='c013'><sup>[10]</sup></a> In the second place, the argument assumes -that Zeno understated his argument. He should have -urged it against the current notion of time in itself, -and not against motion, which involves relations -between time and space. For, what becomes has duration. -But no duration can become until a smaller -duration (part of the former) has antecedently come -into being [Kant’s earlier statement]. The same argument -applies to this smaller duration, and so on. Also -the infinite regress of these durations converges to -nothing—and even on the Aristotelian view there is -no first moment. Accordingly time would be an irrational -notion. Thirdly, in the epochal theory Zeno’s -difficulty is met by conceiving temporalisation as the -realisation of a complete organism. This organism is -an event holding in its essence its spatio-temporal relationships -(both within itself, and beyond itself) -throughout the spatio-temporal continuum.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f10'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r10'>10</a>. <i>Cf.</i> ‘Euclid in Greek,’ by Sir T. L. Heath, Camb. Univ. Press, -in a note on Points.</p> -</div> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_181'>181</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER VIII <br /> <br /> THE QUANTUM THEORY</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The theory of relativity has justly excited a great -amount of public attention. But, for all its importance, -it has not been the topic which has chiefly absorbed -the recent interest of physicists. Without question -that position is held by the quantum theory. The -point of interest in this theory is that, according to it, -some effects which appear essentially capable of gradual -increase or gradual diminution are in reality to be -increased or decreased only by certain definite jumps. -It is as though you could walk at three miles per hour -or at four miles per hour, but not at three and a half -miles per hour.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The effects in question are concerned with the radiation -of light from a molecule which has been excited -by some collision. Light consists of waves of vibration -in the electromagnetic field. After a complete -wave has passed a given point everything at that point -is restored to its original state and is ready for the next -wave which follows on. Picture to yourselves the -waves on the ocean, and reckon from crest to crest of -successive waves. The number of waves which pass a -given point in one second is called the frequency of -that system of waves. A system of light-waves of -definite frequency corresponds to a definite colour in -the spectrum. Now a molecule, when excited, vibrates -<span class='pageno' id='Page_182'>182</span>with a certain number of definite frequencies. In -other words, there are a definite set of modes of vibration -of the molecule, and each mode of vibration has -one definite frequency. Each mode of vibration can -stir up in the electromagnetic field waves of its own -frequency. These waves carry away the energy of the -vibration; so that finally (when such waves are in -being) the molecule loses the energy of its excitement -and the waves cease. Thus a molecule can radiate -light of certain definite colours, that is to say, of certain -definite frequencies.</p> - -<p class='c001'>You would think that each mode of vibration could -be excited to any intensity, so that the energy carried -away by light of that frequency could be of any -amount. But this is not the case. There appear to be -certain minimum amounts of energy which cannot be -subdivided. The case is analogous to that of a citizen -of the United States who, in paying his debts in -the currency of his country, cannot subdivide a cent -so as to correspond to some minute subdivision of the -goods obtained. The cent corresponds to the minimum -quantity of the light energy, and the goods obtained -correspond to the energy of the exciting cause. -This exciting cause is either strong enough to procure -the emission of one cent of energy, or fails to procure -the emission of any energy whatsoever. In any case -the molecule will only emit an integral number of -cents of energy. There is a further peculiarity which -we can illustrate by bringing an Englishman onto the -scene. He pays his debts in English currency, and his -smallest unit is a farthing which differs in value from -the cent. The farthing is in fact about half a cent, -to a very rough approximation. In the molecule, different -<span class='pageno' id='Page_183'>183</span>modes of vibration have different frequencies. -Compare each mode to a nation. One mode corresponds -to the United States, and another mode corresponds -to England. One mode can only radiate its -energy <a id='corr183.5'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='is'>in</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_183.5'><ins class='correction' title='is'>in</ins></a></span> an integral number of cents, so that a cent -of energy is the least it can pay out; whereas the other -mode can only radiate its energy in an integral number -of farthings, so that a farthing of energy is the -least that it can pay out. Also a rule can be found to -tell us the relative value of the cent of energy of one -mode to the farthing of energy of another mode. The -rule is childishly simple: Each smallest coin of energy -has a value in strict proportion to the frequency belonging -to that mode. By this rule, and comparing -farthings with cents, the frequency of an American -would be about twice that of an Englishman. In other -words, the American would do about twice as many -things in a second as an Englishman. I must leave -you to judge whether this corresponds to the reputed -characters of the two nations. Also I suggest that -there are merits attaching to both ends of the solar -spectrum. Sometimes you want red light and sometimes -violet light.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There has been, I hope, no great difficulty in comprehending -what the quantum theory asserts about -molecules. The perplexity arises from the effort to -fit the theory into the current scientific picture of -what is going on in the molecule or atom.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It has been the basis of the materialistic theory, that -the happenings of nature are to be explained in terms -of the locomotion of material. In accordance with -this principle, the waves of light were explained in -terms of the locomotion of a material ether, and the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_184'>184</span>internal happenings of a molecule are now explained -in terms of the locomotion of separate material parts. -In respect to waves of light, the material ether has retreated -to an indeterminate position in the background, -and is rarely talked about. But the principle -is unquestioned as regards its application to the atom. -For example a neutral hydrogen atom is assumed -to consist of at least two lumps of material; one lump -is the nucleus consisting of a material called positive -electricity, and the other is a single electron which is -negative electricity. The nucleus shows signs of being -complex, and of being subdivisible into smaller lumps, -some of positive electricity and others electronic. The -assumption is, that whatever vibration takes place in -the atom is to be attributed to the vibratory locomotion -of some bit of material, detachable from the remainder. -The difficulty with the quantum theory is that, -on this hypothesis, we have to picture the atom as providing -a limited number of definite grooves, which are -the sole tracks along which vibration can take place, -whereas the classical scientific picture provides none -of these grooves. The quantum theory wants trolley-cars -with a limited number of routes, and the scientific -picture provides horses galloping over prairies. The -result is that the physical doctrine of the atom has got -into a state which is strongly suggestive of the epicycles -of astronomy before Copernicus.</p> - -<p class='c001'>On the organic theory of nature there are two sorts -of vibrations which radically differ from each other. -There is vibratory locomotion, and there is vibratory -organic deformation; and the conditions for the two -types of change are of a different character. In other -words, there is vibratory locomotion of a given pattern -<span class='pageno' id='Page_185'>185</span>as one whole, and there is vibratory change of -pattern.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A complete organism in the organic theory is what -corresponds to a bit of material on the materialistic -theory. There will be a primary genus, comprising -a number of species of organisms, such that each primary -organism, belonging to a species of the primary -genus, is not decomposable into subordinate organisms. -I will call any organism of the primary genus a primate. -There may be different species of primates.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It must be kept in mind that we are dealing with the -abstractions of physics. Accordingly, we are not -thinking of what a primate is in itself, as a pattern -arising from the prehension of the concrete aspects; -nor are we thinking of what a primate is for its environment, -in respect to its concrete aspects prehended -therein. We are thinking of these various aspects -merely in so far as their effects on patterns and on locomotion -are expressible in spatio-temporal terms. -Accordingly, in the language of physics, the aspects -of a primate are merely its contributions to the electromagnetic -field. This is in fact exactly what we know -of electrons and protons. An electron for us is merely -the pattern of its aspects in its environment, so far as -those aspects are relevant to the electromagnetic field.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Now in discussing the theory of relativity, we saw -that the relative motion of two primates means simply -that their organic patterns are utilising diverse space-time -systems. If two primates do not continue either -mutually at rest, or mutually in uniform relative motion, -at least one of them is changing its intrinsic space-time -system. The laws of motion express the conditions -under which these changes of space-time systems -<span class='pageno' id='Page_186'>186</span>are effected. The conditions for vibratory <em>locomotion</em> -are founded upon these general laws of motion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But it is possible that certain species of primates are -apt to go to pieces under conditions which lead them -to effect changes of space-time systems. Such species -would only experience a long range of endurance, if -they had succeeded in forming a favourable association -among primates of different species, such that in -this association the tendency to collapse is neutralised -by the environment of the association. We can imagine -the atomic nucleus as composed of a large number -of primates of differing species, and perhaps with -many primates of the same species, the whole association -being such as to favour stability. An example -of such an association is afforded by the association of -a positive nucleus with negative electrons to obtain a -neutral atom. The neutral atom is thereby shielded -from any electric field which would otherwise produce -changes in the space-time system of the atom.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The requirements of physics now suggest an idea -which is very consonant with the organic philosophical -theory. I put it in the form of a question: Has -our organic theory of endurance been tainted by the -materialistic theory in so far as it assumes without -question that endurance must mean undifferentiated -sameness throughout the life-history concerned? Perhaps -you noticed that (in a previous chapter) I used -the word ‘reiteration’ as a synonym of ‘endurance.’ -It obviously is not quite synonymous in its meaning; -and now I want to suggest that <em>reiteration</em> where it -differs from <em>endurance</em> is more nearly what the organic -theory requires. The difference is very analogous -to that between the Galileans and the Aristotelians: -<span class='pageno' id='Page_187'>187</span>Aristotle said ‘rest’ where Galileo added ‘or uniform -motion in a straight line.’ Thus in the organic -theory, a pattern need not endure in undifferentiated -sameness through time. The pattern may be essentially -one of aesthetic contrasts requiring a lapse of time -for its unfolding. A tune is an example of such a -pattern. Thus the endurance of the pattern now means -the reiteration of its succession of contrasts. This is -obviously the most general notion of endurance on -the organic theory, and ‘reiteration’ is perhaps the -word which expresses it with most directness. But -when we translate this notion into the abstractions of -physics, it at once becomes the technical notion of -‘vibration.’ This vibration is not the vibratory locomotion: -it is the vibration of organic deformation. -There are certain indications in modern physics that -for the rôle of corpuscular organisms at the base of -the physical field, we require vibratory entities. Such -corpuscles would be the corpuscles detected as expelled -from the nuclei of atoms, which then dissolve -into waves of light. We may conjecture that such a -corpuscular body has no great stability of endurance, -when in isolation. Accordingly, an unfavourable environment -leading to rapid changes in its proper -space-time system, that is to say, an environment jolting -it into violent accelerations, causes the corpuscles -to go to pieces and dissolve into light-waves of the -same period of vibration.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A proton, and perhaps an electron, would be an -association of such primates, superposed on each other, -with their frequencies and spatial dimensions so arranged -as to promote the stability of the complex organism, -when jolted into accelerations of locomotion. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_188'>188</span>The conditions for stability would give the associations -of periods possible for protons. The expulsion -of a primate would come from a jolt which leads the -proton either to settle down into an alternative association, -or to generate a new primate by the aid of -the energy received.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A primate must be associated with a definite frequency -of vibratory organic deformation so that when -it goes to pieces it dissolves into light waves of the -same frequency, which then carry off all its average -energy. It is quite easy (as a particular hypothesis) -to imagine stationary vibrations of the electromagnetic -field of definite frequency, and directed radially to and -from a centre, which, in accordance with the accepted -electromagnetic laws, would consist of a vibratory -spherical nucleus satisfying one set of conditions and -a vibratory external field satisfying another set of conditions. -This is an example of vibratory organic -deformation. Further [on this particular hypothesis], -there are two ways of determining the subsidiary conditions -so as to satisfy the ordinary requirements of -mathematical physics. The total energy, according -to one of these ways, would satisfy the quantum condition; -so that it consists of an integral number of -units or cents, which are such that the cent of energy -of any primate is proportional to its frequency. I -have not worked out the conditions for stability or -for a stable association. I have mentioned the particular -hypothesis by way of showing by example that -the organic theory of nature affords possibilities for -the reconsideration of ultimate physical laws, which -are not open to the opposed materialistic theory.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this particular hypothesis of vibratory primates, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_189'>189</span>the Maxwellian equations are supposed to hold -throughout all space, including the interior of a proton. -They express the laws governing the vibratory -production and absorption of energy. The whole process -for each primate issues in a certain average energy -characteristic of the primate, and proportional to its -mass. In fact the energy is the mass. There are -vibratory radial streams of energy, both without and -within a primate. Within the primate, there are vibratory -distributions of electric density. On the materialistic -theory such density marks the presence of -material: on the organic theory of vibration, it marks -the vibratory production of energy. Such production -is restricted to the interior of the primate.</p> - -<p class='c001'>All science must start with some assumptions as to -the ultimate analysis of the facts with which it deals. -These assumptions are justified partly by their adherence -to the types of occurrence of which we are -directly conscious, and partly by their success in representing -the observed facts with a certain generality, -devoid of <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>ad hoc</i></span> suppositions. The general theory of -the vibration of primates, which I have outlined, is -merely given as an example of the sort of possibilities -which the organic theory leaves open for physical -science. The point is that it adds the possibility of -organic deformation to that of mere locomotion. -Light waves form one great example of organic deformation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>At any epoch the assumptions of a science are giving -way, when they exhibit symptoms of the epicyclic state -from which astronomy was rescued in the sixteenth -century. Physical science is now exhibiting such symptoms. -In order to reconsider its foundations, it must -<span class='pageno' id='Page_190'>190</span>recur to a more concrete view of the character of real -things, and must conceive its fundamental notions as -abstractions derived from this direct intuition. It is -in this way that it surveys the general possibilities of -revision which are open to it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The discontinuities introduced by the quantum -theory require revision of physical concepts in order -to meet them. In particular, it has been pointed out -that some theory of discontinuous existence is required. -What is asked from such a theory, is that -an orbit of an electron can be regarded as a series of -detached positions, and not as a continuous line.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The theory of a primate or a vibrating pattern, -given above, together with the distinction between -temporality and extensiveness in the previous chapter, -yields exactly this result. It will be remembered that -the continuity of the complex of events arises from the -relationships of extensiveness; whereas the temporality -arises from the realisation in a subject-event of a -pattern which requires for its display that the whole -of a duration be spatialised (<i>i.e.</i>, arrested), as given by -its aspects in the event. Thus realization proceeds <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>viâ</i></span> -a succession of epochal durations; and the continuous -transition, <i>i.e.</i>, the organic deformation, is within the -duration which is already given. The vibratory organic -deformation is in fact the reiteration of the pattern. -One complete period defines the duration required for -the complete pattern. Thus the primate is realised -atomically in a succession of durations, each duration -to be measured from one maximum to another. -Accordingly, so far as the primate as one enduring -whole entity is to be taken account of, it is to be assigned -to these durations successively. If it is considered -<span class='pageno' id='Page_191'>191</span>as one thing, its orbit is to be diagrammatically -exhibited by a series of detached dots. Thus the locomotion -of the primate is discontinuous in space and -time. If we go below the quanta of time which are -the successive vibratory periods of the primate, we -find a succession of vibratory electromagnetic fields, -each stationary in the space-time of its own duration. -Each of these fields exhibits a single complete period -of the electromagnetic vibration which constitutes -the primate. This vibration is not to be thought of -as the becoming of reality; it is what the primate is in -one of its discontinuous realisations. Also the successive -durations in which the primate is realised are contiguous; -it follows that the life history of the primate -can be exhibited as being the continuous development -of occurrences in the electromagnetic field. But these -occurrences enter into realisation as whole atomic -blocks, occupying definite periods of time.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is no need to conceive that time is atomic in -the sense that all patterns must be realised in the same -successive durations. In the first place, even if the -periods were the same in the case of two primates, -the durations of realisation may not be the same. In -other words, the two primates may be out of phase. -Also if the periods are different, the atomism of any -one duration of one primate is necessarily subdivided -by the boundary moments of durations of the other -primate.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The laws of the locomotion of primates express -under what conditions any primate will change its -space-time system.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is unnecessary to pursue this conception further. -The justification of the concept of vibratory existence -<span class='pageno' id='Page_192'>192</span>must be purely experimental. The point illustrated -by this example is that the cosmological outlook, -which is here adopted, is perfectly consistent with the -demands for discontinuity which have been urged -from the side of physics. Also if this concept of temporalisation -as a successive realisation of epochal durations -be adopted, the difficulty of Zeno is evaded. The -particular form, which has been given here to this -concept, is purely for that purpose of illustration and -must necessarily require recasting before it can be -adapted to the results of experimental physics.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_193'>193</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER IX <br /> <br /> SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>In the present lecture, it is my object to consider some -reactions of science upon the stream of philosophic -thought during the modern centuries with which we -are concerned. I shall make no attempt to compress -a history of modern philosophy within the limits of -one lecture. We shall merely consider some contacts -between science and philosophy, in so far as they lie -within the scheme of thought which it is the purpose -of these lectures to develop. For this reason the whole -of the great German idealistic movement will be ignored, -as being out of effective touch with its contemporary -science so far as reciprocal modification -of concepts is concerned. Kant, from whom this movement -took its rise, was saturated with Newtonian -physics, and with the ideas of the great French physicists—such -as Clairaut,<a id='r11' /><a href='#f11' class='c013'><sup>[11]</sup></a> for instance—who developed -the Newtonian ideas. But the philosophers who developed -the Kantian school of thought, or who transformed -<span class='pageno' id='Page_194'>194</span>it into Hegelianism, either lacked Kant’s background -of scientific knowledge, or lacked his potentiality -of becoming a great physicist if philosophy had -not absorbed his main energies.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f11'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r11'>11</a>. <i>Cf.</i> the curious evidence of Kant’s scientific reading in the -<cite>Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic, Second Analogy -of Experience</cite>, where he refers to the phenomenon of capillary action. -This is an unnecessarily complex illustration; a book resting -on a table would have equally well sufficed. But the subject had -just been adequately treated for the first time by Clairaut in an appendix -to his <cite>Figure of the Earth</cite>. Kant evidently had read this -appendix, and his mind was full of it.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>The origin of modern philosophy is analogous to -that of science, and is contemporaneous. The general -trend of its development was settled in the seventeenth -century, partly at the hands of the same men who established -the scientific principles. This settlement of -purpose followed upon a transitional period dating -from the fifteenth century. There was in fact a general -movement of European mentality, which carried -along with its stream, religion, science and philosophy. -It may shortly be characterised as being the -direct recurrence to the original sources of Greek inspiration -on the part of men whose spiritual shape -had been derived from inheritance from the Middle -Ages. There was therefore no revival of Greek mentality. -Epochs do not rise from the dead. The principles -of aesthetics and of reason, which animated -the Greek civilisation, were reclothed in a modern -mentality. Between the two there lay other religions, -other systems of law, other anarchies, and other racial -inheritances, dividing the living from the dead.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Philosophy is peculiarly sensitive to such differences. -For, whereas you can make a replica of an -ancient statue, there is no possible replica of an ancient -state of mind. There can be no nearer approximation -than that which a masquerade bears to real -life. There may be understanding of the past, but -there is a difference between the modern and the ancient -reactions to the same stimuli.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the particular case of philosophy, the distinction -<span class='pageno' id='Page_195'>195</span>in tonality lies on the surface. Modern philosophy -is tinged with subjectivism, as against the objective -attitude of the ancients. The same change is to -be seen in religion. In the early history of the <a id='corr195.4'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='Christion'>Christian</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_195.4'><ins class='correction' title='Christion'>Christian</ins></a></span> -Church, the theological interest centred in discussions -on the nature of God, the meaning of the Incarnation, -and apocalyptic <a id='corr195.7'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='forecastes'>forecasts</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_195.7'><ins class='correction' title='forecastes'>forecasts</ins></a></span> of the ultimate -fate of the world. At the Reformation, the Church -was torn asunder by dissension as to the individual -experiences of believers in respect to justification. The -individual subject of experience had been substituted -for the total drama of all reality. Luther asked, ‘How -am I justified?’; modern philosophers have asked, -‘How do I have knowledge?’ The emphasis lies upon -the subject of experience. This change of standpoint -is the work of Christianity in its pastoral aspect of -shepherding the company of believers. For century -after century it insisted upon the infinite worth of the -individual human soul. Accordingly, to the instinctive -egotism of physical desires, it has superadded an -instinctive feeling of justification for an egotism of -intellectual outlook. Every human being is the natural -guardian of his own importance. Without a -doubt, this modern direction of attention emphasises -truths of the highest value. For example, in the field -of practical life, it has abolished slavery, and has impressed -upon the popular imagination the primary -rights of mankind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Descartes, in his <cite>Discourse on Method</cite>, and in his -<cite>Meditations</cite>, discloses with great clearness the general -conceptions which have since influenced modern philosophy. -There is a subject receiving experience: in -the <cite>Discourse</cite> this subject is always mentioned in the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_196'>196</span>first person, that is to say, as being Descartes himself. -Descartes starts with himself as being a mentality, -which in virtue of its consciousness of its own inherent -presentations of sense and of thought, is thereby conscious -of its own existence as a unit entity. The subsequent -history of philosophy revolves round the Cartesian -formulation of the primary datum. The ancient -world takes its stand upon the drama of the -Universe, the modern world upon the inward drama -of the Soul. Descartes, in his <cite>Meditations</cite>, expressly -grounds the existence of this inward drama upon the -possibility of error. There may be no correspondence -with objective fact, and thus there must be a soul with -activities whose reality is purely derivative from -itself. For example, here is a quotation<a id='r12' /><a href='#f12' class='c013'><sup>[12]</sup></a> from <cite>Meditation -II</cite>: “But it will be said that these presentations -are false, and that I am dreaming. Let it be so. At -all events it is certain that I seem to see light, hear -a noise, and feel heat; this cannot be false, and this is -what in me is properly called perceiving (sentire), -which is nothing else than thinking. From this I -begin to know what I am with somewhat greater clearness -and distinctness than heretofore.” Again in -<cite>Meditation III</cite>: “...; for, as I before remarked, although -the things which I perceive or imagine are -perhaps nothing at all apart from me, I am nevertheless -assured that those modes of consciousness which I -call perceptions and imaginations, in as far only as -they are modes of consciousness, exist in me.”</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f12'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r12'>12</a>. Quoted from Veitch’s translation.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>The objectivism of the medieval and the ancient -worlds passed over into science. Nature is there conceived -as for itself, with its own mutual reactions. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_197'>197</span>Under the recent influence of relativity, there has -been a tendency towards subjectivist formulations. -But, apart from this recent exception, nature, in -scientific thought, has had its laws formulated without -any reference to dependence on individual observers. -There is, however, this difference between the -older and the later attitudes towards science. The -anti-rationalism of the moderns has checked any attempt -to harmonise the ultimate concepts of science -with ideas drawn from a more concrete survey of the -whole of reality. The material, the space, the time, -the various laws concerning the transition of material -configurations, are taken as ultimate stubborn facts, -not to be tampered with.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The effect of this antagonism to philosophy has been -equally unfortunate both for philosophy and for -science. In this lecture we are concerned with philosophy. -Philosophers are rationalists. They are seeking -to go behind stubborn and irreducible facts: they -wish to explain in the light of universal principles -the mutual reference between the various details entering -into the flux of things. Also, they seek such -principles as will eliminate mere arbitrariness; so that, -whatever portion of fact is assumed or given, the existence -of the remainder of things shall satisfy some -demand of rationality. They demand meaning. In -the words of Henry Sidgwick<a id='r13' /><a href='#f13' class='c013'><sup>[13]</sup></a>—“It is the primary -aim of philosophy to unify completely, bring into clear -coherence, all departments of rational thought, and -this aim cannot be realised by any philosophy that -leaves out of its view the important body of judgments -and reasonings which form the subject matter of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_198'>198</span>ethics.” Accordingly, the bias towards history on -the part of the physical and social sciences with their -refusal to rationalise below some ultimate mechanism, -has pushed philosophy out of the effective currents -of modern life. It has lost its proper rôle as a constant -critic of partial formulations. It has retreated -into the subjectivist sphere of mind, by reason of its -expulsion by science from the objectivist sphere of -matter. Thus the evolution of thought in the seventeenth -century coöperated with the enhanced sense -of individual personality derived from the Middle -Ages. We see Descartes taking his stand upon his own -ultimate mind, which his philosophy assures him of; -and asking about its relations to the ultimate matter—exemplified, -in the second <cite>Meditation</cite>, by the human -body and a lump of wax—which his science assumes. -There is Aaron’s rod, and the magicians’ serpents; -and the only question for philosophy is, which swallows -which; or whether, as Descartes thought, they -all lived happily together. In this stream of thought -are to be found Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant. Two -great names lie outside this list, Spinoza and Leibniz. -But there is a certain isolation of both of them in respect -to their philosophical influence so far as science -is concerned; as though they had strayed to extremes -which lie outside the boundaries of safe philosophy, -Spinoza by retaining older ways of thought, and Leibniz -by the novelty of his monads.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f13'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r13'>13</a>. <i>Cf.</i> <cite>Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir</cite>, Appendix I.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>The history of philosophy runs curiously parallel -to that of science. In the case of both, the seventeenth -century set the stage for its two successors. But with -the twentieth century a new act commences. It is an -exaggeration to attribute a general change in a climate -<span class='pageno' id='Page_199'>199</span>of thought to any one piece of writing, or to any one -author. No doubt Descartes only expressed definitely -and in decisive form what was already in the air of -his period. Analogously, in attributing to William -James the inauguration of a new stage in philosophy, -we should be neglecting other influences of his time. -But, admitting this, there still remains a certain fitness -in contrasting his essay, <cite>Does Consciousness Exist</cite>, -published in 1904, with Descartes’ <cite>Discourse on -Method</cite>, published in 1637. James clears the stage of -the old paraphernalia; or rather he entirely alters its -lighting. Take for example these two sentences from -his essay: “To deny plumply that ‘consciousness’ exists -seems so absurd on the face of it—for undeniably -‘thoughts’ do exist—that I fear some readers will follow -me no farther. Let me then immediately explain -that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an -entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does -stand for a function.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>The scientific materialism and the Cartesian Ego -were both challenged at the same moment, one by -science and the other by philosophy, as represented by -William James with his psychological antecedents; -and the double challenge marks the end of a period -which lasted for about two hundred and fifty years. -Of course, ‘matter’ and ‘consciousness’ both express -something so evident in ordinary experience that any -philosophy must provide some things which answer -to their respective meanings. But the point is that, -in respect to both of them, the seventeenth century -settlement was infected with a presupposition which is -now challenged. James denies that consciousness is -an entity, but admits that it is a function. The discrimination -<span class='pageno' id='Page_200'>200</span>between an entity and a function is therefore -vital to the understanding of the challenge which -James is advancing against the older modes of -thought. In the essay in question, the character which -James assigns to consciousness is fully discussed. But -he does not unambiguously explain what he means by -the notion of an entity, which he refuses to apply to -consciousness. In the sentence which immediately -follows the one which I have already quoted, he says:</p> - -<p class='c001'>“There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality -of being, contrasted with that of which material objects -are made, out of which our thoughts of them are -made; but there is a function in experience which -thoughts perform, and for the performance of which -this quality of being is invoked. That function is -<em>knowing</em>. ‘Consciousness’ is supposed necessary to explain -the fact that things not only are, but get reported, -are known.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus James is denying that consciousness is a -‘stuff.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>The term ‘entity,’ or even that of ‘stuff,’ does not -fully tell its own tale. The notion of ‘entity’ is so -general that it may be taken to mean anything that -can be thought about. You cannot think of mere -nothing; and the something which is an object of -thought may be called an entity. In this sense, a -function is an entity. Obviously, this is not what James -had in his mind.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In agreement with the organic theory of nature -which I have been tentatively putting forward in these -lectures, I shall for my own purposes construe James -as denying exactly what Descartes asserts in his <cite>Discourse</cite> -and his <cite>Meditations</cite>. Descartes discriminates -<span class='pageno' id='Page_201'>201</span>two species of entities, <em>matter</em> and <em>soul</em>. The essence -of matter is spatial extension; the essence of soul is its -cogitation, in the full sense which Descartes assigns to -the word ‘<span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>cogitare</i></span>.’ For example, in Section Fifty-three -of Part I of his <cite>Principles of Philosophy</cite>, he -enunciates: “That of every substance there is one principal -attribute, as thinking of the mind, extension of -the body.” In the earlier, Fifty-first Section, Descartes -states: “By substance we can conceive nothing else -than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in -need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence.” -Furthermore, later on, Descartes says: “For example, -because any substance which ceases to endure ceases -also to exist, duration is not distinct from substance -except in thought;....” Thus we conclude that, for -Descartes, minds and bodies exist in such a way as to -stand in need of nothing beyond themselves individually -(God only excepted, as being the foundation of -all things); that both minds and bodies endure, because -without endurance they would cease to exist; -that spatial extension is the essential attribute of -bodies; and that cogitation is the essential attribute of -minds.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is difficult to praise too highly the genius exhibited -by Descartes in the complete sections of his <cite>Principles</cite> -which deal with these questions. It is worthy -of the century in which he writes, and of the clearness -of the French intellect. Descartes in his distinction -between time and duration, and in his way of grounding -time upon motion, and in his close relation between -matter and extension, anticipates, as far as it -was possible at his epoch, modern notions suggested -by the doctrine of relativity, or by some aspects of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_202'>202</span>Bergson’s doctrine of the generation of things. But -the fundamental principles are so set out as to presuppose -independently existing substances with simple -location in a community of temporal durations, and, -in the case of bodies, with simple location in the community -of spatial extensions. Those principles lead -straight to the theory of a materialistic, mechanistic nature, -surveyed by cogitating minds. After the close -of the seventeenth century, science took charge of the -materialistic nature, and philosophy took charge of the -cogitating minds. Some schools of philosophy admitted -an ultimate dualism; and the various idealistic -schools claimed that nature was merely the chief example -of the cogitations of minds. But all schools -admitted the Cartesian analysis of the ultimate elements -of nature. I am excluding Spinoza and Leibniz -from these statements as to the main stream of modern -philosophy, as derivative from Descartes; though of -course they were influenced by him, and in their turn -influenced philosophers. I am thinking mainly of -the effective contacts between science and philosophy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This <a id='corr202.21'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='divison'>division</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_202.21'><ins class='correction' title='divison'>division</ins></a></span> of territory between science and philosophy -was not a simple business; and in fact it illustrated -the weakness of the whole cut-and-dried presupposition -upon which it rested. We are aware of -nature as an interplay of bodies, colours, sounds, scents, -tastes, touches and other various bodily feelings, displayed -as in space, in patterns of mutual separation -by intervening volumes, and of individual shape. -Also the whole is a flux, changing with the lapse of -time. This systematic totality is disclosed to us as -one complex of things. But the seventeenth century -dualism cuts straight across it. The objective world -<span class='pageno' id='Page_203'>203</span>of science was confined to mere spatial material with -simple location in space and time, and subjected to -definite rules as to its locomotion. The subjective -world of philosophy annexed the colours, sounds, -scents, tastes, touches, bodily feelings, as forming the -subjective content of the cogitations of the individual -minds. Both worlds shared in the general flux; but -time, as measured, is assigned by Descartes to the -cogitations of the observer’s mind. There is obviously -one fatal weakness to this scheme. The cogitations of -mind exhibit themselves as holding up entities, such as -colours for instance, before the mind as the termini -of contemplation. But in this theory these colours are, -after all, merely the furniture of the mind. Accordingly, -the mind seems to be confined to its own private -world of cogitations. The subject-object conformation -of experience in its entirety lies within the mind -as one of its private passions. This conclusion from -the Cartesian data is the starting point from which -Berkeley, Hume, and Kant developed their respective -systems. And, antecedently to them, it was the -point upon which Locke concentrated as being the -vital question. Thus the question as to how any knowledge -is obtained of the truly objective world of science -becomes a problem of the first magnitude. Descartes -states that the objective body is perceived by the intellect. -He says (<cite>Meditation II</cite>): “I must, therefore, -admit that I cannot even comprehend by imagination -what the piece of wax is, and that it is the mind alone -which perceives it. I speak of one piece in particular; -for, as to wax in general, this is still more evident. -But what is the piece of wax that can be perceived -only by the mind?... The perception of it is -<span class='pageno' id='Page_204'>204</span>neither an act of sight, of touch, nor of imagination, -and never was either of these, though it might formerly -seem so, but is simply an <em>intuition</em> (<span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>inspectio</i></span>) of -the mind,....” It must be noted that the Latin word -‘inspectio’ is associated in its classical use with the -notion of theory as opposed to practice.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The two great preoccupations of modern philosophy -now lie clearly before us. The study of mind divides -into psychology, or the study of mental functionings -as considered in themselves and in their mutual relations, -and into epistemology, or the theory of the -knowledge of a common objective world. In other -words, there is the study of the cogitations, <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>quâ</i></span> passions -of the mind, and their study <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>quâ</i></span> leading to an -inspection (<em>intuition</em>) of an objective world. This is -a very uneasy division, giving rise to a host of perplexities -whose consideration has occupied the intervening -centuries.</p> - -<p class='c001'>As long as men thought in terms of physical notions -for the objective world and of mentality for the -subjective world, the setting out of the problem, as -achieved by Descartes, sufficed as a starting point. -But the balance has been upset by the rise of physiology. -In the seventeenth century men passed from -the study of physics to the study of philosophy. Towards -the end of the nineteenth century, notably in -Germany, men passed from the study of physiology to -the study of psychology. The change in tone has been -decisive. Of course, in the earlier period the intervention -of the human body was fully considered, for -example, by Descartes in Part V of the ‘<cite>Discourse on -Method</cite>.’ But the physiological instinct had not been -developed. In considering the human body, Descartes -<span class='pageno' id='Page_205'>205</span>thought with the outfit of a physicist; whereas the -modern psychologists are clothed with the mentalities -of medical physiologists. The career of William -James is an example of this change in standpoint. He -also possessed the clear, incisive genius which could -state in a flash the exact point at issue.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The reason why I have put Descartes and James in -close juxtaposition is now evident. Neither philosopher -finished an epoch by a final solution of a problem. -Their great merit is of the opposite sort. They -each of them open an epoch by their clear formulation -of terms in which thought could profitably express -itself at particular stages of knowledge, one for -the seventeenth century, the other for the twentieth -century. In this respect, they are both to be contrasted -with St. Thomas Aquinas, who expressed the -culmination of Aristotelian scholasticism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In many ways neither Descartes nor James were -the most characteristic philosophers of their respective -epochs. I should be disposed to ascribe these -positions to Locke and to Bergson respectively, at -least so far as concerns their relations to the science -of their times. Locke developed the lines of thought -which kept philosophy on the move; for example he -emphasized the appeal to psychology. He initiated -the age of epoch-making enquiries into urgent problems -of limited scope. Undoubtedly, in so doing, he -infected philosophy with something of the anti-rationalism -of science. But the very groundwork of a -fruitful methodology is to start from those clear postulates -which must be held to be ultimate so far as -concerns the occasion in question. The criticism of -such methodological postulates is thus reserved for -<span class='pageno' id='Page_206'>206</span>another opportunity. Locke discovered that the philosophical -situation bequeathed by Descartes involved -the problems of epistemology and psychology.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Bergson introduced into philosophy the organic -conceptions of physiological science. He has most -completely moved away from the static materialism of -the seventeenth century. His protest against spatialisation -is a protest against taking the Newtonian conception -of nature as being anything except a high -abstraction. His so-called anti-intellectualism should -be construed in this sense. In some respects he recurs -to Descartes; but the recurrence is accompanied with -an instinctive grasp of modern biology.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is another reason for associating Locke and -Bergson. The germ of an organic theory of nature is -to be found in Locke. His most recent expositor, Professor -Gibson,<a id='r14' /><a href='#f14' class='c013'><sup>[14]</sup></a> states that Locke’s way of conceiving -the identity of self-consciousness ‘like that of a living -organism, involves a genuine transcending of the -mechanical view of nature and of mind, embodied in -the composition theory.’ But it is to be noticed that -in the first place Locke wavers in his grasp of this -position; and in the second place, what is more important -still, he only applies his idea to self-consciousness. -The physiological attitude has not yet established -itself. The effect of physiology was to put mind back -into nature. The neurologist traces first the effect of -stimuli along the bodily nerves, then integration at -nerve centres, and finally the rise of a projective reference -beyond the body with a resulting motor efficacy -in renewed nervous excitement. In biochemistry, the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_207'>207</span>delicate adjustment of the chemical composition of the -parts to the preservation of the whole organism is -detected. Thus the mental cognition is seen as the -reflective experience of a totality, reporting for itself -what it is in itself as one unit occurrence. This unit -is the integration of the sum of its partial happenings, -but it is not their numerical aggregate. It has its -own unity as an event. This total unity, considered -as an entity for its own sake, is the prehension into -unity of the patterned aspects of the universe of -events. Its knowledge of itself arises from its own -relevance to the things of which it prehends the -aspects. It knows the world as a system of mutual -relevance, and thus sees itself as mirrored in other -things. These other things include more especially -the various parts of its own body.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f14'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r14'>14</a>. <i>Cf.</i> his book, <cite>Locke’s Theory of Knowledge and its Historical -Relations</cite>, Camb. Univ. Press, 1917.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>It is important to discriminate the bodily pattern, -which endures, from the bodily event, which is pervaded -by the enduring pattern, and from the parts of -the bodily event. The parts of the bodily event are -themselves pervaded by their own enduring patterns, -which form elements in the bodily pattern. The parts -of the body are really portions of the environment of -the total bodily event, but so related that their mutual -aspects, each in the other, are peculiarly effective in -modifying the pattern of either. This arises from -the intimate character of the relation of whole to -part. Thus the body is a portion of the environment -for the part, and the part is a portion of the environment -for the body; only they are peculiarly sensitive, -each to modifications of the other. This sensitiveness -is so arranged that the part adjusts itself to preserve -the stability of the pattern of the body. It is a particular -<span class='pageno' id='Page_208'>208</span>example of the favourable environment shielding -the organism. The relation of part to whole has -the special reciprocity associated with the notion of -organism, in which the part is for the whole; but this -relation reigns throughout nature and does not start -with the special case of the higher organisms.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Further, viewing the question as a matter of chemistry, -there is no need to construe the actions of each -molecule in a living body by its exclusive particular -reference to the pattern of the complete living organism. -It is true that each molecule is affected by the -aspect of this pattern as mirrored in it, so as to be -otherwise than what it would have been if placed elsewhere. -In the same way, under some circumstances -an electron may be a sphere, and under other circumstances -an egg-shaped volume. The mode of approach -to the problem, so far as science is concerned, is merely -to ask if molecules exhibit in living bodies properties -which are not to be observed amid inorganic surroundings. -In the same way, in a magnetic field soft iron -exhibits magnetic properties which are in abeyance -elsewhere. The prompt self-preservative actions of -living bodies, and our experience of the physical actions -of our bodies following the determinations of -will, suggest the modification of molecules in the body -as the result of the total pattern. It seems possible -that there may be physical laws expressing the modification -of the ultimate basic organisms when they -form part of higher organisms with adequate compactness -of pattern. It would, however, be entirely in -consonance with the empirically observed action of -environments, if the direct effects of aspects as between -the whole body and its parts were negligible. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_209'>209</span>We should expect transmission. In this way the modification -of total pattern would transmit itself by means -of a series of modifications of a descending series of -parts, so that finally the modification of the cell -changes its aspect in the molecule, thus effecting a -corresponding alteration in the molecule,—or in some -subtler entity. Thus the question for physiology is the -question of the physics of molecules in cells of different -characters.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We can now see the relation of psychology to physiology -and to physics. The private psychological field -is merely the event considered from its own standpoint. -The unity of this field is the unity of the event. -But it is the event as one entity, and not the event as -a sum of parts. The relations of the parts, to each -other and to the whole, are their aspects, each in the -other. A body for an external observer is the aggregate -of the aspects for him of the body as a whole, and -also of the body as a sum of parts. For the external -observer the aspects of shape and of sense-objects are -dominant, at least for cognition. But we must also -allow for the possibility that we can detect in ourselves -direct aspects of the mentalities of higher organisms. -The claim that the cognition of alien mentalities -must necessarily be by means of indirect inferences -from aspects of shape and of sense-objects is -wholly unwarranted by this philosophy of organism. -The fundamental principle is that whatever merges -into actuality, implants its aspects in every individual -event.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Further, even for self-cognition, the aspects of the -parts of our own bodies partly take the form of aspects -of shape, and of sense-objects. But that part of the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_210'>210</span>bodily event, in respect to which the cognitive mentality -is associated, is for itself the unit psychological -field. Its ingredients are not referent to the event -itself; they are aspects of what lies beyond that event. -Thus the self-knowledge inherent in the bodily event -is the knowledge of itself as a complex unity, whose -ingredients involve all reality beyond itself, restricted -under the limitation of its pattern of aspects. Thus -we know ourselves as a function of unification of a -plurality of things which are other than ourselves. -Cognition discloses an event as being an activity, organising -a real togetherness of alien things. But this -psychological field does not depend on its cognition; -so that this field is still a unit event as abstracted from -its self-cognition.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly, consciousness will be the function of -knowing. But what is known is already a prehension -of aspects of the one real universe. These aspects -are aspects of other events as mutually modifying, -each the others. In the pattern of aspects they stand -in their pattern of mutual relatedness.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The aboriginal data in terms of which the pattern -weaves itself are the aspects of shapes, of sense-objects, -and of other eternal objects whose self-identity is not -dependent on the flux of things. Wherever such objects -have ingression into the general flux, they interpret -events, each to the other. They are here in the -perceiver; but, as perceived by him, they convey for -him something of the total flux which is beyond himself. -The subject-object relation takes its origin in -the double rôle of these eternal objects. They are -modifications of the subject, but only in their character -<span class='pageno' id='Page_211'>211</span>of conveying aspects of other subjects in the community -of the universe. Thus no individual subject can -have independent reality, since it is a prehension of -limited aspects of subjects other than itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The technical phrase ‘subject-object’ is a bad term -for the fundamental situation disclosed in experience. -It is really reminiscent of the Aristotelian ‘subject-predicate.’ -It already presupposes the metaphysical -doctrine of diverse subjects qualified by their private -predicates. This is the doctrine of subjects with private -worlds of experience. If this be granted, there -is no escape from solipsism. The point is that the -phrase ‘subject-object’ indicates a fundamental entity -underlying the objects. Thus the ‘objects,’ as thus -conceived, are merely the ghosts of Aristotelian predicates. -The primary situation disclosed in cognitive -experience is ‘ego-object amid objects.’ By this I -mean that the primary fact is an impartial world transcending -the ‘here-now’ which marks the ego-object, -and transcending the ‘now’ which is the spatial world -of simultaneous realisation. It is a world also including -the actuality of the past, and the limited potentiality -of the future, together with the complete world of -abstract potentiality, the realm of eternal objects, -which transcends, and finds exemplification in and -comparison with, the actual course of realisation. The -ego-object, as consciousness here-now, is conscious of -its experient essence as constituted by its internal relatedness -to the world of realities, and to the world of -ideas. But the ego-object, in being thus constituted, -is within the world of realities, and exhibits itself as -an organism requiring the ingression of ideas for the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_212'>212</span>purpose of this status among realities. This question -of consciousness must be reserved for treatment on -another occasion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The point to be made for the purposes of the present -discussion is that a philosophy of nature as organic -must start at the opposite end to that requisite for a -materialistic philosophy. The materialistic starting -point is from independently existing substances, matter -and mind. The matter suffers modifications of -its external relations of locomotion, and the mind -suffers modifications of its contemplated objects. -There are, in this materialistic theory, two sorts of independent -substances, each qualified by their appropriate -passions. The organic starting point is from -the analysis of process as the realisation of events disposed -in an interlocked community. The event is -the unit of things real. The emergent enduring pattern -is the stabilisation of the emergent achievement -so as to become a fact which retains its identity -throughout the process. It will be noted that endurance -is not primarily the property of enduring beyond -itself, but of enduring within itself. I mean that endurance -is the property of finding its pattern reproduced -in the temporal parts of the total event. It is -in this sense that a total event carries an enduring -pattern. There is an intrinsic value identical for the -whole and for its succession of parts. Cognition is -the emergence, into some measure of individualised -reality, of the general substratum of activity, poising -before itself possibility, actuality, and purpose.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is equally possible to arrive at this organic conception -of the world if we start from the fundamental -notions of modern physics, instead of, as above, from -<span class='pageno' id='Page_213'>213</span>psychology and physiology. In fact by reason of my -own studies in mathematics and mathematical physics, -I did in fact arrive at my convictions in this way. -Mathematical physics presumes in the first place an -electromagnetic field of activity pervading space and -time. The laws which condition this field are nothing -else than the conditions observed by the general activity -of the flux of the world, as it individualises -itself in the events. In physics, there is an abstraction. -The science ignores what anything is in <a id='corr213.10'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='iself'>itself</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_213.10'><ins class='correction' title='iself'>itself</ins></a></span>. -Its entities are merely considered in respect to their -extrinsic reality, that is to say, in respect to their aspects -in other things. But the abstraction reaches -even further than that; for it is only the aspects in -other things, as modifying the spatio-temporal specifications -of the life histories of those other things, which -count. The intrinsic reality of the observer comes in: -I mean what the observer is for himself is appealed to. -For example, the fact that he will see red or blue -enters into scientific statements. But the red which -the observer sees does not in truth enter into science. -What is relevant is merely the bare diversity of the -observer’s red experiences from all of his other experiences. -Accordingly, the intrinsic character of the -observer is merely relevant in order to fix the self-identical -individuality of the physical entities. These -entities are only considered as agencies in fixing the -routes in space and in time of the life histories of -enduring entities.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The phraseology of physics is derived from the -materialistic ideas of the seventeenth century. But -we find that, even in its extreme abstraction, what it -is really presupposing is the organic theory of aspects -<span class='pageno' id='Page_214'>214</span>as explained above. First, consider any event in -empty space where the word ‘empty’ means devoid -of electrons, or protons, or of any other form of electric -charge. Such an event has three rôles in physics. In -the first place, it is the actual scene of an adventure -of energy, either as its <em>habitat</em> or as the locus of a -particular stream of energy: anyhow, in this rôle the -energy is there, either as located in space during the -time considered, or as streaming through space.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In its second rôle, the event is a necessary link in -the pattern of transmission, by which the character -of every event receives some modification from the -character of every other event.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In its third rôle, the event is the repository of a -possibility, as to what would happen to an electric -charge, either by way of deformation or of locomotion, -if it should have happened to be there.</p> - -<p class='c001'>If we modify our assumption by considering an -event which includes in itself a portion of the life-history -of an electric charge, then the analysis of its -three rôles still remains; except that the possibility -embodied in the third rôle is now transformed into -an actuality. In this replacement of possibility by -actuality, we obtain the distinction between empty and -occupied events.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Recurring to the empty events, we note the deficiency -in them of individuality of intrinsic content. -Considering the first rôle of an empty event, as being -a <em>habitat</em> of energy, we note that there is no individual -discrimination of an individual bit of energy, either -as statically located, or as an element in the stream. -There is simply a quantitative determination of activity, -without individualisation of the activity in itself. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_215'>215</span>This lack of individualisation is still more evident in -the second and third rôles. An empty event is something -in itself, but it fails to realise a stable individuality -of content. So far as its content is concerned, -the empty event is one realised element in a general -scheme of organised activity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Some qualification is required when the empty -event is the scene of the transmission of a definite -train of recurrent wave-forms. There is now a definite -pattern which remains permanent in the event. -We find here the first faint trace of enduring individuality. -But it is individuality without the faintest -capture of originality: for it is merely a permanence -arising solely from the implication of the event in a -larger scheme of patterning.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Turning now to the examination of an occupied -event, the electron has a determinate individuality. -It can be traced throughout its life-history through a -variety of events. A collection of electrons, together -with the analogous atomic charges of positive electricity, -forms a body such as we ordinarily perceive. -The simplest body of this kind is a molecule, and a -set of molecules forms a lump of ordinary matter, such -as a chair, or a stone. Thus a charge of electricity is -the mark of individuality of content, as additional -to the individuality of an event in itself. This individuality -of content is the strong point of the materialistic -doctrine.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It can, however, be equally well explained on the -theory of organism. When we look into the function -of the electric charge, we note that its rôle is to mark -the origination of a pattern which is transmitted -through space and time. It is the key of some particular -<span class='pageno' id='Page_216'>216</span>pattern. For example, the field of force in -any event is to be constructed by attention to the adventures -of electrons and protons, and so also are the -streams and distributions of energy. Further, the -electric waves find their origin in the vibratory adventures -of these charges. Thus the transmitted pattern -is to be conceived as the flux of aspects throughout -space and time derived from the life history of -the atomic charge. The individualisation of the -charge arises by a conjunction of two characters, in -the first place by the continued identity of its mode -of functioning as a key for the determination of a -diffusion of pattern; and, in the second place, by the -unity and continuity of its life history.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We may conclude, therefore, that the organic -theory represents directly what physics actually does -assume respecting its ultimate entities. We also notice -the complete futility of these entities, if they are conceived -as fully concrete individuals. So far as physics -is concerned, they are wholly occupied in moving each -other about, and they have no reality outside this -function. In particular for physics, there is no intrinsic -reality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is obvious that the basing of philosophy upon the -presupposition of organism must be traced back to -Leibniz.<a id='r15' /><a href='#f15' class='c013'><sup>[15]</sup></a> His monads are for him the ultimately -real entities. But he retained the Cartesian substances -with their qualifying passions, as also equally -expressing for him the final characterisation of real -things. Accordingly for him there was no concrete -reality of internal relations. He had therefore on -<span class='pageno' id='Page_217'>217</span>his hands two distinct points of view. One was that -the final real entity is an organising activity, fusing -ingredients into a unity, so that this unity is the reality. -The other point of view is that the final real entities -are substances supporting qualities. The first point of -view depends upon the acceptance of internal relations -binding together all reality. The latter is inconsistent -with the reality of such relations. To combine these -two points of view, his monads were therefore windowless; -and their passions merely mirrored the universe -by the divine arrangement of a preëstablished -harmony. This system thus presupposed an aggregate -of independent entities. He did not discriminate -the event, as the unit of experience, from the enduring -organism as its stabilisation into importance, and -from the cognitive organism as expressing an increased -completeness of individualisation. Nor did -he admit the many-termed relations, relating sense-data -to various events in diverse ways. These many-termed -relations are in fact the perspectives which -Leibniz does admit, but only on the condition that -they are purely qualities of the organising monads. -The difficulty really arises from the unquestioned acceptance -of the notion of simple location as fundamental -for space and time, and from the acceptance -of the notion of independent individual substance as -fundamental for a real entity. The only road open -to Leibniz was thus the same as that later taken by -Berkeley [in a prevalent interpretation of his meaning], -namely an appeal to a <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>Deux ex machinâ</i></span> who -was capable of rising superior to the difficulties of -metaphysics.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f15'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r15'>15</a>. <i>Cf.</i> Bertrand Russell, <cite>The Philosophy of Leibniz</cite>, for the suggestion -of this line of thought.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>In the same way as Descartes introduced the tradition -<span class='pageno' id='Page_218'>218</span>of thought which kept subsequent philosophy in -some measure of contact with the scientific movement, -so Leibniz introduced the alternative tradition that -the entities, which are the ultimate actual things, are -in some sense procedures of organisation. This tradition -has been the foundation of the great achievements -of German philosophy. Kant reflected the two -traditions, one upon the other. Kant was a scientist, -but the schools derivative from Kant have had but -slight effect on the mentality of the scientific world. -It should be the task of the philosophical schools of -this century to bring together the two streams into -an expression of the world-picture derived from science, -and thereby end the divorce of science from the -affirmations of our aesthetic and ethical experiences.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_219'>219</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER X <br /> <br /> ABSTRACTION</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>In the previous chapters I have been examining the -reactions of the scientific movement upon the deeper -issues which have occupied modern thinkers. No -one man, no limited society of men, and no one epoch -can think of everything at once. Accordingly for -the sake of eliciting the various impacts of science -upon thought, the topic has been treated historically. -In this retrospect I have kept in mind that the ultimate -issue of the whole story is the patent dissolution -of the comfortable scheme of scientific materialism -which has dominated the three centuries under -review. Accordingly various schools of criticism of -the dominant opinions have been stressed; and I have -endeavoured to outline an alternative cosmological -doctrine, which shall be wide enough to include what -is fundamental both for science and for its critics. -In this alternative scheme, the notion of material, as -fundamental, has been replaced by that of organic -synthesis. But the approach has always been from -the consideration of the actual intricacies of scientific -thought, and of the peculiar perplexities which it -suggests.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the present chapter, and in the immediately succeeding -chapter, we will forget the peculiar problems -of modern science, and will put ourselves at the standpoint -of a dispassionate consideration of the nature -of things, antecedently to any special investigation -<span class='pageno' id='Page_220'>220</span>into their details. Such a standpoint is termed ‘metaphysical.’ -Accordingly those readers who find metaphysics, -even in two slight chapters, irksome, will do -well to proceed at once to the Chapter on ‘Religion -and Science,’ which resumes the topic of the impact -of science on modern thought.</p> - -<p class='c001'>These metaphysical chapters are purely descriptive. -Their justification is to be sought, (i) in our direct -knowledge of the actual occasions which compose our -immediate experience, and (ii) in their success as -forming a basis for harmonising our systematised accounts -of various types of experience, and (iii) in their -success as providing the concepts in terms of which -an epistemology can be framed. By (iii) I mean -that an account of the general character of what we -know must enable us to frame an account of how -knowledge is possible as an adjunct within things -known.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In any occasion of cognition, that which is known -is an actual occasion of experience, as diversified<a id='r16' /><a href='#f16' class='c013'><sup>[16]</sup></a> by -reference to a realm of entities which transcend that -immediate occasion in that they have analogous or -different connections with other occasions of experience. -For example a definite shade of red may, in -the immediate occasion, be implicated with the shape -of sphericity in some definite way. But that shade -of red, and that spherical shape, exhibit themselves -as transcending that occasion, in that either of them -has other relationships to other occasions. Also, -apart from the actual occurrence of the same things -in other occasions, every actual occasion is set within -a realm of alternative interconnected entities. This -<span class='pageno' id='Page_221'>221</span>realm is disclosed by all the untrue propositions which -can be predicated significantly of that occasion. It is -the realm of alternative suggestions, whose foothold -in actuality transcends each actual occasion. The real -relevance of untrue propositions for each actual occasion -is disclosed by art, romance, and by criticism -in reference to ideals. It is the foundation of the -metaphysical position which I am maintaining that -the understanding of actuality requires a reference -to ideality. The two realms are intrinsically inherent -in the total metaphysical situation. The truth that -some proposition respecting an actual occasion is untrue -may express the vital truth as to the aesthetic -achievement. It expresses the ‘great refusal’ which -is its primary characteristic. An event is decisive -in proportion to the importance (for it) of its untrue -propositions: their relevance to the event cannot be -dissociated from what the event is in itself by way -of achievement. These transcendent entities have been -termed ‘universals.’ I prefer to use the term ‘eternal -objects,’ in order to disengage myself from presuppositions -which cling to the former term owing to -its prolonged philosophical history. Eternal objects -are thus, in their nature, abstract. By ‘abstract’ I -mean that what an eternal object is in itself—that is -to say, its essence—is comprehensible without reference -to some one particular occasion of experience. -To be abstract is to transcend particular concrete occasions -of actual happening. But to transcend an -actual occasion does not mean being disconnected -from it. On the contrary, I hold that each eternal -object has its own proper connection with each such -occasion, which I term its mode of ingression into -<span class='pageno' id='Page_222'>222</span>that occasion. Thus an eternal object is to be comprehended -by acquaintance with (i) its particular -individuality, (ii) its general relationships to other -eternal objects as apt for realisation in actual occasions, -and (iii) the general principle which expresses -its ingression in particular actual occasions.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f16'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r16'>16</a>. <i>Cf.</i> my <cite>Principles of Natural Knowledge</cite>, Ch. V, Sec. 13.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>These three headings express two principles. The -first principle is that each eternal object is an individual -which, in its own peculiar fashion, is what -it is. This particular individuality is the individual -essence of the object, and cannot be described otherwise -than as being itself. Thus the individual essence -is merely the essence considered in respect to its -uniqueness. Further, the essence of an eternal object -is merely the eternal object considered as adding its -own unique contribution to each actual occasion. This -unique contribution is identical for all such occasions -in respect to the fact that the object in all modes of -ingression is just its identical self. But it varies from -one occasion to another in respect to the differences -of its modes of ingression. Thus the metaphysical -status of an eternal object is that of a possibility for -an actuality. Every actual occasion is defined as to -its character by how these possibilities are actualised -for that occasion. Thus actualisation is a selection -among possibilities. More accurately, it is a selection -issuing in a gradation of possibilities in respect to -their realisation in that occasion. This conclusion -brings us to the second metaphysical principle: An -eternal object, considered as an abstract entity, cannot -be divorced from its reference to other eternal -objects, and from its reference to actuality generally; -though it is disconnected from its actual modes of ingression -<span class='pageno' id='Page_223'>223</span>into definitive actual occasions. This principle -is expressed by the statement that each eternal object -has a ‘relational essence.’ This relational essence -determines how it is possible for the object to have -ingression into actual occasions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In other words: If <i>A</i> be an eternal object, then -what <i>A</i> is in itself involves <i>A’s</i> status in the universe, -and <i>A</i> cannot be divorced from this status. In the -essence of <i>A</i> there stands a determinateness as to the -relationships of <i>A</i> to other eternal objects, and an -indeterminateness as to the relationships of <i>A</i> to -actual occasions. Since the relationships of <i>A</i> to other -eternal objects stand determinately in the essence of -<i>A</i>, it follows that they are internal relations. I mean -by this that these relationships are constitutive of <i>A</i>; -for an entity which stands in internal relations has -no being as an entity not in these relations. In other -words, once with internal relations, always with internal -relations. The internal relationships of <i>A</i> -conjointly form its significance.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Again an entity cannot stand in external relations -unless in its essence there stands an indeterminateness -which is its patience for such external relations. The -meaning of the term ‘possibility’ as applied to <i>A</i> is -simply that there stands in the essence of <i>A</i> a patience -for relationships to actual occasions. The relationships -of <i>A</i> to an actual occasion are simply how the -eternal relationships of <i>A</i> to other eternal objects are -graded as to their realisation in that occasion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus the general principle which expresses <i>A’s</i> -ingression in the particular actual occasion α is the indeterminateness -which stands in the essence of <i>A</i> as -to its ingression into α, and is the determinateness -<span class='pageno' id='Page_224'>224</span>which stands in the essence of α as to the ingression -of <i>Α</i> into α. Thus the synthetic prehension, which -is α, is the solution of the indeterminateness of <i>Α</i> into -the determinateness of α. Accordingly the relationship -between <i>Α</i> and α is external as regards <i>Α</i>, and -is internal as regards α. Every actual occasion α is -the solution of all modalities into actual categorical -ingressions: truth and falsehood take the place of -possibility. The complete ingression of <i>Α</i> into α is -expressed by all the true propositions which are about -both <i>Α</i> and α, and also—it may be—about other things.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The determinate relatedness of the eternal object <i>Α</i> -to every other eternal object is how <i>Α</i> is systematically -and by the necessity of its nature related to every other -eternal object. Such relatedness represents a possibility -for realisation. But a relationship is a fact -which concerns all the implicated relata, and cannot -be isolated as if involving only one of the relata. Accordingly -there is a general fact of systematic mutual -relatedness which is inherent in the character of possibility. -The realm of eternal objects is properly described -as a ‘realm,’ because each eternal object has -its status in this general systematic complex of mutual -relatedness.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In respect to the ingression of <i>Α</i> into an actual -occasion α, the mutual relationships of <i>Α</i> to other -eternal objects, as thus graded in realisation, require -for their expression a reference to the status of <i>Α</i> -and of the other eternal objects in the spatio-temporal -relationship. Also this status is not expressible (for -this purpose) without a reference to the status of α -and of other actual occasions in the same spatio-temporal -relationship. Accordingly the spatio-temporal -<span class='pageno' id='Page_225'>225</span>relationship, in terms of which the actual -course of events is to be expressed, is nothing else -than a selective limitation within the general systematic -relationships among eternal objects. By ‘limitation,’ -as applied to the spatio-temporal continuum, I -mean those matter-of-fact determinations—such as -the three dimensions of space, and the four dimensions -of the spatio-temporal continuum—which are -inherent in the actual course of events, but which -present themselves as arbitrary in respect to a more -abstract possibility. The consideration of these general -limitations at the base of actual things, as distinct -from the limitations peculiar to each actual occasion, -will be more fully resumed in the chapter on -‘God.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>Further, the status of all possibility in reference to -actuality requires a reference to this spatio-temporal -continuum. In any particular consideration of a -possibility we may conceive this continuum to be -transcended. But in so far as there is any definite -reference to actuality, the definite <em>how</em> of transcendence -of that spatio-temporal continuum is required. -Thus primarily the spatio-temporal continuum -is a locus of relational possibility, selected -from the more general realm of systematic relationship. -This limited locus of relational possibility -expresses one limitation of possibility inherent in -the general system of the process of realisation. -Whatever possibility is generally coherent with that -system falls within this limitation. Also whatever is -abstractedly possible in relation to the general course -of events—as distinct from the particular limitations -introduced by particular occasions—pervades the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_226'>226</span>spatio-temporal continuum in every alternative spatial -situation and at all alternative times.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Fundamentally, the spatio-temporal continuum is -the general system of relatedness of all possibilities, -in so far as that system is limited by its relevance to -the general fact of actuality. Also it is inherent in the -nature of possibility that it should include this relevance -to actuality. For possibility is that in which -there stands achievability, abstracted from achievement.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It has already been emphasised that an actual occasion -is to be conceived as a limitation; and that this -process of limitation can be still further characterised -as a gradation. This characteristic of an actual occasion -(α, say) requires further elucidation: An indeterminateness -stands in the essence of any eternal object -(<i>Α</i>, say). The actual occasion α synthesises in itself -every eternal object; and, in so doing, it includes the -<em>complete</em> determinate relatedness of <i>Α</i> to every other -eternal object, or set of eternal objects. This synthesis -is a limitation of realisation but <em>not</em> of content. -Each relationship preserves its inherent self-identity. -But grades of entry into this synthesis are inherent in -each actual occasion, such as α. These grades can be -expressed only as relevance of value. This relevance -of value varies—as comparing different occasions—in -grade from the inclusion of the individual essence -of <i>Α</i> as an element in the aesthetic synthesis (in some -grade of inclusion) to the lowest grade which is the -exclusion of the individual essence of <i>Α</i> as an element -in the aesthetic synthesis. In so far as it stands in -this lowest grade, every determinate relationship of <i>Α</i> -is merely ingredient in the occasion in respect to the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_227'>227</span>determinate <em>how</em> this relationship is an unfulfilled -alternative, not contributing any aesthetic value, except -as forming an element in the systematic substratum -of unfulfilled content. In a higher grade, it -may remain unfulfilled, but be aesthetically relevant.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus <i>A</i>, conceived merely in respect to its relationships -to other eternal objects, is ‘<i>A</i> conceived as -<em>not-being</em>’; where ‘not-being’ means ‘abstracted from -the determinate fact of inclusions in, and exclusions -from, actual events.’ Also ‘<i>A</i> as <em>not-being</em> in respect -to a definite occasion α’ means that <i>A</i> in all its determinate -relationships is excluded from α. Again -‘<i>A</i> as <em>being</em> in respect to α’ means that <i>A</i> in some of -its determinate relationships is included in α. But -there can be no occasion which includes <i>A</i> in all its -determinate relationships; for some of these relationships -are contraries. Thus, in regard to excluded -relationships, <i>A</i> will be <em>not-being</em> in α, even when in -regard to other relationships <i>A</i> will be <em>being</em> in α. In -this sense, every occasion is a synthesis of <em>being</em> and -<em>not-being</em>. Furthermore, though some eternal objects -are synthesised in an occasion α merely <em>quâ not-being</em>, -each eternal object which is synthesised <em>quâ -being</em> is also synthesised <em>quâ not-being</em>. ‘<em>Being</em>’ here -means ‘individually effective in the aesthetic synthesis.’ -Also the ‘aesthetic synthesis’ is the ‘experient -synthesis’ viewed as self-creative, under the -limitations laid upon it by its internal relatedness to -all other actual occasions. We thus conclude—what -has already been stated above—that the general fact -of the synthetic prehension of all eternal objects into -every occasion wears the double aspect of the indeterminate -relatedness of each eternal object to occasions -<span class='pageno' id='Page_228'>228</span>generally, and of its determinate relatedness to -each particular occasion. This statement summarises -the account of how external relations are possible. But -the account depends upon disengaging the spatio-temporal -continuum from its mere implication in actual -occasions—according to the usual explanation—and -upon exhibiting it in its origin from the general -nature of abstract possibility, as limited by the general -character of the actual course of events.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The difficulty which arises in respect to internal -relations is to explain how any particular truth is -possible. In so far as there are internal relations, -everything must depend upon everything else. But if -this be the case, we cannot know about anything till -we equally know everything else. Apparently, therefore, -we are under the necessity of saying everything -at once. This supposed necessity is palpably untrue. -Accordingly it is incumbent on us to explain how -there can be internal relations, seeing that we admit -finite truths.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Since actual occasions are selections from the realm -of possibilities, the ultimate explanation of how actual -occasions have the general character which they do -have, must lie in an analysis of the general character -of the realm of possibility.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The <em>analytical character</em> of the realm of eternal objects -is the primary metaphysical truth concerning it. -By this character it is meant that the status of any -eternal object <i>A</i> in this realm is capable of analysis -into an indefinite number of subordinate relationships -of limited scope. For example if <i>B</i> and <i>C</i> are two -other eternal objects, then there is some perfectly definite -relationship <i>R(A, B, C)</i> which involves <i>A, B, C</i> -<span class='pageno' id='Page_229'>229</span>only, as to require the mention of no other definite -eternal objects in the capacity of relata. Of course, -the relationship <i>R(A, B, C)</i> may involve subordinate -relationships which are themselves eternal objects, and -<i>R(A, B, C)</i> is also itself an eternal object. Also there -will be other relationships which in the same sense -involve only <i>A, B, C</i>. We have now to examine how, -having regard to the internal relatedness of eternal -objects, this limited relationship <i>R(A, B, C)</i> is -possible.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The reason for the existence of finite relationships -in the realm of eternal objects is that relationships of -these objects among themselves are entirely unselective, -and are systematically complete. We are discussing -possibility; so that every relationship which is -possible is thereby in the realm of possibility. Every -such relationship of each eternal object is founded -upon the perfectly definite status of that object as a -relatum in the general scheme of relationships. This -definite status is what I have termed the ‘relational -essence’ of the object. This relational essence is determinable -by reference to that object alone, and does -not require reference to any other objects, except those -which are specifically involved in its individual essence -when that essence is complex (as will be explained -immediately). The meaning of the words -‘any’ and ‘some’ springs from this principle—that is -to say, the meaning of the ‘variable’ in logic. The -whole principle is that a particular determination can -be made of the <em>how</em> of some definite relationship of a -definite eternal object <i>A</i> to a definite finite number <i>n</i> -of other eternal objects, <em>without</em> any determination of -the other <i>n</i> objects, X₁, X₂, ... Xₙ, except that they -<span class='pageno' id='Page_230'>230</span>have, each of them, the requisite status to play their -respective parts in that multiple relationship. This -principle depends on the fact that the relational essence -of an eternal object is not unique to that object. -The mere relational essence of each eternal object determines -the complete uniform scheme of relational -essences, since each object stands internally in all its -possible relationships. Thus the realm of possibility -provides a uniform scheme of relationships among -finite sets of eternal objects; and all eternal objects -stand in all such relationships, so far as the status of -each permits.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Accordingly the relationships (as in possibility) do -not involve the individual essences of the eternal objects; -they involve <em>any</em> eternal objects as relata, subject -to the proviso that these relata have the requisite -relational essences. [It is this proviso which, automatically -and by the nature of the case, limits the -‘any’ of the phrase ‘any eternal objects.’] This principle -is the principle of the <em>Isolation of Eternal Objects</em> -in the realm of possibility. The eternal objects -are isolated, because their relationships as possibilities -are expressible without reference to their respective -individual essences. In contrast to the realm of possibility, -the inclusion of eternal objects within an actual -occasion means that in respect to some of their possible -relationships there is a togetherness of their individual -essences. This realised togetherness is the achievement -of an emergent value defined—or, shaped—by -the definite eternal relatedness in respect to which the -real togetherness is achieved. Thus the eternal relatedness -is the form—the εἶδος—; the emergent -actual occasion is the <em>superject</em> of informed value; -<span class='pageno' id='Page_231'>231</span>value, as abstracted from any particular superject, is -the abstract matter—the ὕλη—which is common to -all actual occasions; and the synthetic activity which -prehends valueless possibility into superjicient informed -value is the substantial activity. This substantial -activity is that which is omitted in any -analysis of the static factors in the metaphysical situation. -The analysed elements of the situation are the -attributes of the substantial activity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The difficulty inherent in the concept of finite internal -relations among eternal objects is thus evaded -by two metaphysical principles, (i) that the relationships -of any eternal object <i>A</i>, considered as constitutive -of <i>A</i>, merely involve other eternal objects as bare -relata without reference to their individual essences, -and (ii) that the divisibility of the general relationship -of <i>A</i> into a multiplicity of finite relationships of -<i>A</i> stands therefore in the essence of that eternal object. -The second principle obviously depends upon the first. -To understand <i>A</i> is to understand the <em>how</em> of a general -scheme of relationship. This scheme of relationship -does not require the individual uniqueness of the -other relata for its comprehension. This scheme also -discloses itself as being analysable into a multiplicity -of limited relationships which have their own individuality -and yet at the same time presupposes the -total relationship within possibility. In respect to -actuality there is first the general limitation of relationships, -which reduces this general unlimited scheme -to the four dimensional spatio-temporal scheme. This -spatio-temporal scheme is, so to speak, the greatest common -measure of the schemes of relationship (as limited -by actuality) inherent in all the eternal objects. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_232'>232</span>By this it is meant that, <em>how</em> select relationships of an -eternal object (<i>A</i>) are realised in any actual occasion, -is always explicable by expressing the status of <i>A</i> in -respect to this spatio-temporal scheme, and by expressing -in this scheme the relationship of the actual occasion -to other actual occasions. A definite finite relationship -involving the definite eternal objects of a -limited set of such objects is itself an eternal object: -it is those eternal objects as in that relationship. I will -call such an eternal object ‘complex.’ The eternal -objects which are the relata in a complex eternal object -will be called the ‘components’ of that eternal -object. Also if any of these relata are themselves complex, -their components will be called ‘derivative components’ -of the original complex object. Also the -components of derivative components will also be -called derivative components of the original object. -Thus the complexity of an eternal object means its -analysability into a relationship of component eternal -objects. Also the analysis of the general scheme of -relatedness of eternal objects means its exhibition as -a multiplicity of complex eternal objects. An eternal -object, such as a definite shade of green, which cannot -be analysed into a relationship of components, will be -called ‘simple.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>We can now explain how the analytical character -of the realm of eternal objects allows of an analysis -of that realm into grades.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the lowest grade of eternal objects are to be -placed those objects whose individual essences are -simple. This is the grade of zero complexity. Next -consider any set of such objects, finite or infinite as -to the number of its members. For example, consider -<span class='pageno' id='Page_233'>233</span>the set of three eternal objects <i>A, B, C</i>, of which none -is complex. Let us write <i>R(A, B, C)</i> for some definite -possible relatedness of <i>A, B, C</i>. To take a simple example, -<i>A, B, C</i> may be three definite colours with the -spatio-temporal relatedness to each other of three -faces of a regular tetrahedron, anywhere at any time. -Then <i>R(A, B, C)</i> is another eternal object of the lowest -complex grade. Analogously there are eternal objects -of successively higher grades. In respect to any -complex eternal object, <i>S(D₁, D₂, ... Dₙ)</i>, the -eternal objects <i>D₁, ... Dₙ</i>, whose individual essences -are constitutive of the individual essence of -<i>S(D₁, ... Dₙ)</i>, are called the components of -<i>S(D₁, ... Dₙ)</i>. It is obvious that the grade of complexity -to be ascribed to <i>S(D₁, ... Dₙ)</i> is to be -taken as one above the highest grade of complexity -to be found among its components.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is thus an analysis of the realm of possibility -into simple eternal objects, and into various grades of -complex eternal objects. A complex eternal object -is an abstract situation. There is a double sense of -‘abstraction,’ in regard to the abstraction of <em>definite</em> -eternal objects, <i>i.e.</i>, non-mathematical abstraction. -There is abstraction from actuality, and abstraction -from possibility. For example, <i>A</i> and <i>R(A, B, C)</i> -are both abstractions from the realm of possibility. -Note that <i>A</i> must mean <i>A</i> in all its possible relationships, -and among them <i>R(A, B, C)</i>. Also <i>R(A, B, C)</i> -means <i>R(A, B, C)</i> in all its relationships. But this -meaning of <i>R(A, B, C)</i> excludes other relationships -into which <i>A</i> can enter. Hence <i>A</i> as in <i>R(A, B, C)</i> -is more abstract than <span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>A simpliciter</i></span>. Thus as we pass -from the grade of simple eternal objects to higher and -<span class='pageno' id='Page_234'>234</span>higher grades of complexity, we are indulging in -higher grades of abstraction from the realm of possibility.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We can now conceive the successive stages of a definite -progress towards some assigned mode of abstraction -from the realm of possibility, involving a progress -(in thought) through successive grades of increasing -complexity. I will call any such route of progress -‘an abstractive hierarchy.’ Any abstractive hierarchy, -finite or infinite, is based upon some definite group of -simple eternal objects. This group will be called the -‘base’ of the hierarchy. Thus the base of an abstractive -hierarchy is a set of objects of zero complexity. -The formal definition of an abstractive hierarchy is -as follows:</p> - -<p class='c001'>An ‘abstractive hierarchy based upon <i>g</i>,’ where <i>g</i> is -a group of simple eternal objects, is a set of eternal -objects which satisfy the following conditions,</p> - -<p class='c001'>(i) the members of <i>g</i> belong to it, and are the only -simple eternal objects in the hierarchy,</p> - -<p class='c001'>(ii) the components of any complex eternal object -in the hierarchy are also members of the hierarchy, -and</p> - -<p class='c001'>(iii) any set of eternal objects belonging to the -hierarchy, whether all of the same grade or whether -differing among themselves as to grade, are jointly -among the components or derivative components of -at least one eternal object which also belongs to the -hierarchy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is to be noticed that the components of an eternal -object are necessarily of a lower grade of complexity -than itself. Accordingly any member of such a hierarchy, -which is of the first grade of complexity, can -<span class='pageno' id='Page_235'>235</span>have as components only members of the group <i>g</i>; -and any member of the second grade can have as components -only members of the first grade, and members -of <i>g</i>; and so on for the higher grades.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The third condition to be satisfied by an abstractive -hierarchy will be called the condition of connexity. -Thus an abstractive hierarchy springs from -its base; it includes every successive grade from its -base either indefinitely onwards, or to its maximum -grade; and it is ‘connected’ by the reappearance (in a -higher grade) of any set of its members belonging to -lower grades, in the function of a set of components -or derivative components of at least one member of -the hierarchy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>An abstractive hierarchy is called ‘finite’ if it stops -at a finite grade of complexity. It is called ‘infinite’ -if it includes members belonging respectively to all -degrees of complexity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is to be noted that the base of an abstractive hierarchy -may contain any number of members, finite or -infinite. Further, the infinity of the number of the -members of the base has nothing to do with the question -as to whether the hierarchy be finite or infinite.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A finite abstractive hierarchy will, by definition, -possess a grade of maximum complexity. It is characteristic -of this grade that a member of it is a component -of no other eternal object belonging to any -grade of the hierarchy. Also it is evident that this -grade of maximum complexity must possess only one -member; for otherwise the condition of connexity -would not be satisfied. Conversely any complex -eternal object defines a finite abstractive hierarchy to -be discovered by a process of analysis. This complex -<span class='pageno' id='Page_236'>236</span>eternal object from which we start will be called the -‘vertex’ of the abstractive hierarchy: it is the sole -member of the grade of maximum complexity. In -the first stage of the analysis we obtain the components -of the vertex. These components may be of varying -complexity; but there must be among them at least -one member whose complexity is of a grade one lower -than that of the vertex. A grade which is one lower -than that of a given eternal object will be called the -‘proximate grade’ for that object. We take then those -components of the vertex which belong to its proximate -grade; and as the second stage we analyse them -into their components. Among these components -there must be some belonging to the proximate grade -for the objects thus analysed. Add to them the components -of the vertex which also belong to this grade -of ‘second proximation’ from the vertex; and, at the -third stage analyse as before. We thus find objects -belonging to the grade of third proximation from the -vertex; and we add to them the components belonging -to this grade, which have been left over from the -preceding stages of the analysis. We proceed in this -way through successive stages, till we reach the grade -of simple objects. This grade forms the base of the -hierarchy.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It is to be noted that in dealing with hierarchies -we are entirely within the realm of possibility. Accordingly -the eternal objects are devoid of real togetherness: -they remain within their ‘isolation.’</p> - -<p class='c001'>The logical instrument which Aristotle used for -the analysis of actual fact into more abstract elements -was that of classification into species and genera. This -instrument has its overwhelmingly important application -<span class='pageno' id='Page_237'>237</span>for science in its preparatory stages. But its -use in metaphysical description distorts the true vision -of the metaphysical situation. The use of the term -‘universal’ is intimately connected with this Aristotelian -analysis: the term has been broadened of late; -but still it suggests that classificatory analysis. For -this reason I have avoided it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In any actual occasion α, there will be a group <i>g</i> -of simple eternal objects which are ingredient in that -group in the most concrete mode. This complete ingredience -in an occasion, so as to yield the most complete -fusion of individual essence with other eternal -objects in the formation of the individual emergent -occasion, is evidently of its own kind and cannot be defined -in terms of anything else. But it has a peculiar -characteristic which necessarily attaches to it. This -characteristic is that there is an <em>infinite</em> abstractive -hierarchy based upon <i>g</i> which is such that all its members -are equally involved in this complete inclusion -in α.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The existence of such an infinite abstractive hierarchy -is what is meant by the statement that it is impossible -to complete the description of an actual occasion -by means of concepts. I will call this infinite abstractive -hierarchy which is associated with α ‘the -associated hierarchy of α.’ It is also what is meant -by the notion of the connectedness of an actual occasion. -This connectedness of an occasion is necessary -for its synthetic unity and for its intelligibility. There -is a connected hierarchy of concepts applicable to the -occasion, including concepts of all degrees of complexity. -Also in the actual occasion, the individual -essences of the eternal objects involved in these complex -<span class='pageno' id='Page_238'>238</span>concepts achieve an aesthetic synthesis, productive -of the occasion as an experience for its own sake. -This associated hierarchy is the shape, or pattern, or -form, of the occasion in so far as the occasion is constituted -of what enters into its full realisation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Some confusion of thought has been caused by the -fact that abstraction from possibility runs in the opposite -direction to an abstraction from actuality, so -far as degree of abstractness is concerned. For evidently -in describing an actual occasion α, we are -nearer to the total concrete fact when we describe α -by predicating of it some member of its associated -hierarchy, which is of a high grade of complexity. -We have then said more about α. Thus, with a high -grade of complexity we gain in approach to the full -concreteness of α, and with a low grade we lose in -this approach. Accordingly the simple eternal objects -represent the extreme of abstraction from an -actual occasion; whereas simple eternal objects represent -the minimum of abstraction from the realm of -possibility. It will, I think, be found that, when a -high degree of abstraction is spoken of, abstraction -from the realm of possibility is what is usually meant—in -other words, an elaborate logical construction.</p> - -<p class='c001'>So far I have merely been considering an actual -occasion on the side of its full concreteness. It is this -side of the occasion in virtue of which it is an event in -nature. But a natural event, in this sense of the term, -is only an abstraction from a complete actual occasion. -A complete occasion includes that which in -cognitive experience takes the form of memory, anticipation, -imagination, and thought. These elements -in an experient occasion are also modes of inclusion -<span class='pageno' id='Page_239'>239</span>of complex eternal objects in the synthetic prehension, -as elements in the emergent value. They differ from -the concreteness of full inclusion. In a sense this difference -is inexplicable; for each mode of inclusion -is of its own kind, not to be explained in terms of anything -else. But there is a common difference which -discriminates these modes of inclusion from the full -concrete ingression which has been discussed. This -<span lang="la" xml:lang="la"><i>differentia</i></span> is <em>abruptness</em>. By ‘abruptness’ I mean that -what is remembered, or anticipated, or imagined, or -thought, is exhausted by a finite complex concept. In -each case there is one finite eternal object prehended -within the occasion as the vertex of a finite hierarchy. -This breaking off from an actual illimitability is what -in any occasion marks off that which is termed mental -from that which belongs to the physical event to which -the mental functioning is referred.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In general there seems to be some loss of vividness -in the apprehension of the eternal objects concerned: -for example, Hume speaks of ‘faint copies.’ But this -faintness seems to be a very unsafe ground for differentiation. -Often things realised in thought are more -vivid than the same things in inattentive physical experience. -But the things apprehended as mental are -always subject to the condition that we come to a stop -when we attempt to explore ever higher grades of -complexity in their realised relationships. We always -find that we have thought of just this—whatever it -may be—and of no more. There is a limitation which -breaks off the finite concept from the higher grades of -illimitable complexity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus an actual occasion is a prehension of one infinite -hierarchy (its associated hierarchy) together -<span class='pageno' id='Page_240'>240</span>with various finite hierarchies. The synthesis into -the occasion of the infinite hierarchy is according to -its specific mode of realisation, and that of the finite -hierarchies is according to various other specific modes -of realisation. There is one metaphysical principle -which is essential for the rational coherence of this -account of the general character of an experient occasion. -I call this principle, ‘The Translucency of -Realisation.’ By this I mean that any eternal object -is just itself in whatever mode of realisation it is involved. -There can be no distortion of the individual -essence without thereby producing a different eternal -object. In the essence of each eternal object there -stands an indeterminateness which expresses its indifferent -patience for any mode of ingression into any actual -occasion. Thus in cognitive experience, there -can be the cognition of the same eternal object as in -the same occasion having ingression with implication -in more than one grade of realisation. Thus the translucency -of realisation, and the possible multiplicity of -modes of ingression into the same occasion, together -form the foundation for the correspondence theory of -truth.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this account of an actual occasion in terms of -its connection with the realm of eternal objects, we -have gone back to the train of thought in our second -chapter, where the nature of mathematics was discussed. -The idea, ascribed to Pythagoras, has been -amplified, and put forward as the first chapter in -metaphysics. The next chapter is concerned with the -puzzling fact that there is an actual course of events -which is in itself a limited fact, in that metaphysically -speaking it might have been otherwise. But other -<span class='pageno' id='Page_241'>241</span>metaphysical investigations are omitted; for example, -epistemology, and the classification of some elements -in the unfathomable wealth of the field of possibility. -This last topic brings metaphysics in sight of the special -topics of the various sciences.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_242'>242</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER XI <br /> <br /> GOD</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>Aristotle found it necessary to complete his metaphysics -by the introduction of a Prime Mover—God. -This, for two reasons, is an important fact in the history -of metaphysics. In the first place if we are to -accord to anyone the position of the greatest metaphysician, -having regard to genius of insight, to general -equipment in knowledge, and to the stimulus of his -metaphysical ancestry, we must choose Aristotle. Secondly, -in his consideration of this metaphysical question -he was entirely dispassionate; and he is the last -European metaphysician of first rate importance for -whom this claim can be made. After Aristotle, ethical -and religious interests began to influence metaphysical -conclusions. The Jews dispersed, first willingly -and then forcibly, and the Judaic-Alexandrian school -arose. Then Christianity closely followed by Mahometanism, -intervened. The Greek gods who surrounded -Aristotle were subordinate metaphysical entities, well -within nature. Accordingly on the subject of his -Prime Mover, he would have no motive, except to -follow his metaphysical train of thought whithersoever -it led him. It did not lead him very far towards -the production of a God available for religious purposes. -It may be doubted whether any properly general -metaphysics can ever, without the illicit introduction -<span class='pageno' id='Page_243'>243</span>of other considerations, get much further than -Aristotle. But his conclusion does represent a first -step without which no evidence on a narrower experiential -basis can be of much avail in shaping the -conception. For nothing, within any limited type of -experience, can give intelligence to shape our ideas -of any entity at the base of all actual things, unless -the general character of things requires that there be -such an entity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The phrase, Prime Mover, warns us that Aristotle’s -thought was enmeshed in the details of an erroneous -physics and an erroneous cosmology. In Aristotle’s -physics special causes were required to sustain the motions -of material things. These could easily be fitted -into his system, provided that the general cosmic motions -could be sustained. For then in relation to the -general working system, each thing could be provided -with its true end. Hence the necessity for a Prime -Mover who sustains the motions of the spheres on -which depend the adjustment of things. To-day we -repudiate the Aristotelian physics and the Aristotelian -cosmology, so that the exact form of the above argument -manifestly fails. But if our general metaphysics -is in any way similar to that outlined in the previous -chapter, an analogous metaphysical problem arises -which can be solved only in an analogous fashion. In -the place of Aristotle’s God as Prime Mover, we require -God as the Principle of Concretion. This position -can be substantiated only by the discussion -of the general implication of the course of actual -occasions,—that is to say, of the process of realisation.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We conceive actuality as in essential relation to an -<span class='pageno' id='Page_244'>244</span>unfathomable possibility. Eternal objects inform actual -occasions with hierarchic patterns, included and -excluded in every variety of discrimination. Another -view of the same truth is that every actual occasion is -a limitation imposed on possibility, and that by virtue -of this limitation the particular value of that shaped -togetherness of things emerges. In this way we express -how a single occasion is to be viewed in terms -of possibility, and how possibility is to be viewed in -terms of a single actual occasion. But there are no -single occasions, in the sense of isolated occasions. Actuality -is through and through togetherness—togetherness -of otherwise isolated eternal objects, and togetherness -of all actual occasions. It is my task in this chapter -to describe the unity of actual occasions. The -previous chapter centered its interest in the abstract: -the present chapter deals with the concrete, <i>i.e.</i>, that -which has grown together.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Consider an occasion α:—we have to enumerate -how other actual occasions are in α, in the sense that -their relationships with α are constitutive of the essence -of α. What α is in itself, is that it is a unit -of realised experience; accordingly we ask how other -occasions are in the experience which is α. Also for -the present I am excluding cognitive experience. The -complete answer to this question is, that the relationships -among actual occasions are as unfathomable in -their variety of type as are those among eternal objects -in the realm of abstraction. But there are fundamental -types of such relationships in terms of which the -whole complex variety can find its description.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A preliminary for the understanding of these types -of entry (of one occasion into the essence of another) -<span class='pageno' id='Page_245'>245</span>is to note that they are involved in the modes of realisation -of abstractive hierarchies, discussed in the -previous chapter. The spatio-temporal relationships, -involved in those hierarchies as realised in α, have -all a definition in terms of α and of the occasions entrant -in α. Thus the entrant occasions lend their -aspects to the hierarchies, and thereby convert spatio-temporal -modalities into categorical determinations; -and the hierarchies lend their forms to the occasions -and thereby limit the entrant occasions to being entrant -only under those forms. Thus in the same way (as -seen in the previous chapter) that every occasion is a -synthesis of all eternal objects under the limitation of -gradations of actuality, so every occasion is a synthesis -of all occasions under the limitation of gradations of -types of entry. Each occasion synthesises the totality -of content under its own limitations of mode.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In respect to these types of internal relationship between -α and other occasions, these other occasions (as -constitutive of α) can be classified in many alternative -ways. These are all concerned with different -definitions of past, present, and future. It has been -usual in philosophy to assume that these various definitions -must necessarily be equivalent. The present -state of opinion in physical science conclusively shows -that this assumption is without metaphysical justification, -even <a id='corr245.27'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='although'>though</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_245.27'><ins class='correction' title='although'>though</ins></a></span> any such discrimination may be -found to be unnecessary for physical science. This -question has already been dealt with in the chapter on -Relativity. But the physical theory of relativity -touches only the fringe of the various theories which -are metaphysically tenable. It is important for my -argument to insist upon the unbounded freedom -<span class='pageno' id='Page_246'>246</span>within which the actual is a unique categorical determination.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Every actual occasion exhibits itself as a process: -it is a becomingness. In so disclosing itself, it places -itself as one among a multiplicity of other occasions, -without which it could not be itself. It also defines -itself as a particular individual achievement, focussing -in its limited way an unbounded realm of eternal -objects.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Any one occasion α issues from other occasions -which collectively form its <em>past</em>. It displays for itself -other occasions which collectively form its <em>present</em>. -It is in respect to its associated hierarchy, as displayed -in this immediate present, that an occasion finds its -own originality. It is that display which is its own -contribution to the output of actuality. It may be -conditioned, and even completely determined by the -past from which it issues. But its display in the present -under those conditions is what directly emerges -from its prehensive activity. The occasion α also -holds within itself an indetermination in the form of -a future, which has partial determination by reason of -its inclusion in α and also has determinate spatio-temporal -relatedness to α and to actual occasions of the -past from α and of the present for α.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This future is a synthesis in α of eternal objects as -not-being and as requiring the passage from α to -other individualisations (with determinate spatio-temporal -relations to α) in which not-being becomes -being.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is also in α what, in the previous chapter, I -have termed the ‘abrupt’ realisation of finite eternal -objects. This abrupt realisation requires <em>either</em> a reference -<span class='pageno' id='Page_247'>247</span>of the basic objects of the finite hierarchy to -determinate occasions other than α (as their situations), -in past, present, future; <em>or</em> requires a realisation -of these eternal objects in determinate relationships, -but under the aspect of exemption from inclusion in -the spatio-temporal scheme of relatedness between actual -occasions. This abrupt synthesis of eternal objects -in each occasion is the inclusion in actuality of -the analytical character of the realm of eternality. -This inclusion has those limited gradations of actuality -which characterise every occasion by reason of its -essential limitation. It is this realised extension of -eternal relatedness beyond the mutual relatedness of -the actual occasions, which prehends into each occasion -the full sweep of eternal relatedness. I term this -abrupt realisation the ‘graded envisagement’ which -each occasion prehends into its synthesis. This graded -envisagement is how the actual includes what (in one -sense) is not-being as a positive factor in its own -achievement. It is the source of error, of truth, of -art, of ethics, and of religion. By it, fact is confronted -with alternatives.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This general concept, of an event as a process whose -outcome is a unit of experience, points to the analysis -of an event into (i) substantial activity, (ii) conditioned -potentialities which are there for synthesis, and -(iii) the achieved outcome of the synthesis. The unity -of all actual occasions forbids the analysis of substantial -activities into independent entities. Each individual -activity is nothing but the mode in which the -general activity is individualised by the imposed conditions. -The envisagement which enters into the synthesis -is also a character which conditions the synthesising -<span class='pageno' id='Page_248'>248</span>activity. The general activity is not an entity -in the sense in which occasions or eternal objects are -entities. It is a general metaphysical character which -underlies all occasions, in a particular mode for each -occasion. There is nothing with which to compare it: -it is Spinoza’s one infinite substance. Its attributes -are its character of individualisation into a multiplicity -of modes, and the realm of eternal objects which -are variously synthesised in these modes. Thus eternal -possibility and modal differentiation into individual -multiplicity are the attributes of the one substance. In -fact each general element of the metaphysical situation -is an attribute of the substantial activity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Yet another element in the metaphysical situation -is disclosed by the consideration that the general attribute -of modality is limited. This element must -rank as an attribute of the substantial activity. In its -nature each mode is limited, so as not to be other -modes. But, beyond these limitations of particulars, -the general modal individualisation is limited in two -ways: In the first place it is an actual course of -events, which might be otherwise so far as concerns -eternal possibility, but <em>is</em> that course. This limitation -takes three forms, (i) the special logical relations -which all events must conform to, (ii) the selection of -relationships to which the events do conform, and (iii) -the particularity which infects the course even within -those general relationships of logic and causation. -Thus this first limitation is a limitation of antecedent -selection. So far as the general metaphysical situation -is concerned, there might have been an indiscriminate -modal pluralism apart from logical or other -limitation. But there could not then have been these -<span class='pageno' id='Page_249'>249</span>modes, for each mode represents a synthesis of actualities -which are limited to conform to a standard. -We here come to the second way of limitation. Restriction -is the price of value. There cannot be value -without antecedent standards of value, to discriminate -the acceptance or rejection of what is before the envisaging -mode of activity. Thus there is an antecedent -limitation among values, introducing contraries, -grades, and oppositions.</p> - -<p class='c001'>According to this argument the fact that there is a -process of actual occasions, and the fact that the occasions -are the emergence of values which require such -limitation, both require that the course of events should -have developed amid an antecedent limitation composed -of conditions, particularisation, and standards -of value.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Thus as a further element in the metaphysical situation, -there is required a principle of limitation. Some -particular <em>how</em> is necessary, and some particularisation -in the <em>what</em> of matter of fact is necessary. The -only alternative to this admission, is to deny the reality -of actual occasions. Their apparent irrational limitation -must be taken as a proof of illusion and we must -look for reality behind the scene. If we reject this -alternative behind the scene, we must provide a -ground for limitation which stands among the attributes -of the substantial activity. This attribute -provides the limitation for which no reason can be -given: for all reason flows from it. God is the ultimate -limitation, and His existence is the ultimate -irrationality. For no reason can be given for just -that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose. -God is not concrete, but He is the ground for -<span class='pageno' id='Page_250'>250</span>concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the -nature of God, because that nature is the ground of -rationality.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In this argument the point to notice is, that what -is metaphysically indeterminate has nevertheless to -be categorically determinate. We have come to the -limit of rationality. For there is a categorical limitation -which does not spring from any metaphysical -reason. There is a metaphysical need for a principle -of determination, but there can be no metaphysical -reason for what is determined. If there were such a -reason, there would be no need for any further principle: -for metaphysics would already have provided -the determination. The general principle of empiricism -depends upon the doctrine that there is a principle -of concretion which is not discoverable by abstract -reason. What further can be known about -God must be sought in the region of particular experiences, -and therefore rests on an empirical basis. -In respect to the interpretation of these experiences, -mankind have differed profoundly. He has been -named respectively, Jehovah, Allah, Brahma, Father -in Heaven, Order of Heaven, First Cause, Supreme -Being, Chance. Each name corresponds to a system -of thought derived from the experiences of those who -have used it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Among medieval and modern philosophers, anxious -to establish the religious significance of God, an unfortunate -habit has prevailed of paying to Him metaphysical -compliments. He has been conceived as the -foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate -activity. If this conception be adhered to, there -can be no alternative except to discern in Him the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_251'>251</span>origin of all evil as well as of all good. He is then -the supreme author of the play, and to Him must -therefore be ascribed its shortcomings as well as its -success. If He be conceived as the supreme ground -for limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide -the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason -‘within her dominions supreme.’</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_252'>252</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER XII <br /> <br /> RELIGION AND SCIENCE</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The difficulty in approaching the question of the relations -between Religion and Science is, that its elucidation -requires that we have in our minds some clear -idea of what we mean by either of the terms, ‘religion’ -and ‘science.’ Also I wish to speak in the most general -way possible, and to keep in the background any comparison -of particular creeds, scientific or religious. -We have got to understand the type of connection -which exists between the two spheres, and then to -draw some definite conclusions respecting the existing -situation which at present confronts the world.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The <em>conflict</em> between religion and science is what -naturally occurs to our minds when we think of this -subject. It seems as though, during the last half-century, -the results of science and the beliefs of religion -had come into a position of frank disagreement, -from which there can be no escape, except by abandoning -either the clear teaching of science, or the -clear teaching of religion. This conclusion has been -urged by controversialists on either side. Not by all -controversialists, of course, but by those trenchant -intellects which every controversy calls out into the -open.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The distress of sensitive minds, and the zeal for -truth, and the sense of the importance of the issues, -must command our sincerest sympathy. When we -<span class='pageno' id='Page_253'>253</span>consider what religion is for mankind, and what science -is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future -course of history depends upon the decision of this -generation as to the relations between them. We -have here the two strongest general forces (apart from -the mere impulse of the various senses) which influence -men, and they seem to be set one against the -other—the force of our religious intuitions, and the -force of our impulse to accurate observation and -logical deduction.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A great English statesman once advised his countrymen -to use large-scale maps, as a preservative against -alarms, panics, and general misunderstanding of the -true relations between nations. In the same way in -dealing with the clash between permanent elements -of human nature, it is well to map our history on a -large scale, and to disengage ourselves from our immediate -absorption in the present conflicts. When -we do this, we immediately discover two great facts. -In the first place, there has always been a conflict between -religion and science; and in the second place, -both religion and science have always been in a state -of continual development. In the early days of -Christianity, there was a general belief among Christians -that the world was coming to an end in the lifetime -of people then living. We can make only indirect -inferences as to how far this belief was authoritatively -proclaimed; but it is certain that it was widely -held, and that it formed an impressive part of the -popular religious doctrine. The belief proved itself -to be mistaken, and Christian doctrine adjusted itself -to the change. Again in the early Church individual -theologians very confidently deduced from the Bible -<span class='pageno' id='Page_254'>254</span>opinions concerning the nature of the physical universe. -In the year A. D. 535, a monk named Cosmas<a id='r17' /><a href='#f17' class='c013'><sup>[17]</sup></a> -wrote a book which he entitled, <cite>Christian Topography</cite>. -He was a travelled man who had visited India -and Ethiopia; and finally he lived in a monastery at -Alexandria, which was then a great centre of culture. -In this book, basing himself upon the direct meaning -of Biblical texts as construed by him in a literal fashion, -he denied the existence of the antipodes, and -asserted that the world is a flat parallelogram whose -length is double its breadth.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f17'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r17'>17</a>. <i>Cf.</i> Lecky’s <cite>The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe</cite>, -Ch. III.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>In the seventeenth century the doctrine of the motion -of the earth was condemned by a Catholic tribunal. -A hundred years ago the extension of time -demanded by geological science distressed religious -people, Protestant and Catholic. And to-day the doctrine -of evolution is an equal stumbling-block. These -are only a few instances illustrating a general fact.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But all our ideas will be in a wrong perspective if -we think that this recurring perplexity was confined -to contradictions between religion and science; and -that in these controversies religion was always -wrong, and that science was always right. The true -facts of the case are very much more complex, and -refuse to be summarised in these simple terms.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Theology itself exhibits exactly the same character -of gradual development, arising from an aspect of -conflict between its own proper ideas. This fact is -a commonplace to theologians, but is often obscured -in the stress of controversy. I do not wish to overstate -my case; so I will confine myself to Roman -<span class='pageno' id='Page_255'>255</span>Catholic writers. In the seventeenth century a learned -Jesuit, Father Petavius, showed that the theologians -of the first three centuries of Christianity made use -of phrases and statements which since the fifth century -would be condemned as heretical. Also Cardinal -Newman devoted a treatise to the discussion of the -development of doctrine. He wrote it before he became -a great Roman Catholic ecclesiastic; but -throughout his life, it was never retracted and continually -reissued.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Science is even more changeable than theology. -No man of science could subscribe without qualification -to Galileo’s beliefs, or to Newton’s beliefs, or to -all his own scientific beliefs of ten years ago.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In both regions of thought, additions, distinctions, -and modifications have been introduced. So that -now, even when the same assertion is made to-day as -was made a thousand, or fifteen hundred years ago, -it is made subject to limitations or expansions of -meaning, which were not contemplated at the earlier -epoch. We are told by logicians that a proposition -must be either true or false, and that there is no -middle term. But in practice, we may know that a -proposition expresses an important truth, but that -it is subject to limitations and qualifications which at -present remain undiscovered. It is a general feature -of our knowledge, that we are insistently aware of -important truths; and yet that the only formulations -of these truths which we are able to make presuppose -a general standpoint of conceptions which may have -to be modified. I will give you two illustrations, -both from science: Galileo said that the earth moves -and that the sun is fixed; the Inquisition said that the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_256'>256</span>earth is fixed and the sun moves; and Newtonian astronomers, -adopting an absolute theory of space, said -that both the sun and the earth move. But now we -say that any one of these three statements is equally -true, provided that you have fixed your sense of ‘rest’ -and ‘motion’ in the way required by the statement -adopted. At the date of Galileo’s controversy with -the Inquisition, Galileo’s way of stating the facts was, -beyond question, the fruitful procedure for the sake -of scientific research. But in itself it was not more -true than the formulation of the Inquisition. But -at that time the modern concepts of relative motion -were in nobody’s mind; so that the statements were -made in ignorance of the qualifications required for -their more perfect truth. Yet this question of the -motions of the earth and the sun expresses a real fact -in the universe; and all sides had got hold of important -truths concerning it. But with the knowledge -of those times, the truths appeared to be inconsistent.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Again I will give you another example taken from -the state of modern physical science. Since the time -of Newton and Huyghens in the seventeenth century -there have been two theories as to the physical nature -of light. Newton’s theory was that a beam of light -consists of a stream of very minute particles, or -corpuscles, and that we have the sensation of light -when these corpuscles strike the retinas of our eyes. -Huyghens’ theory was that light consists of very -minute waves of trembling in an all-pervading ether, -and that these waves are travelling along a beam of -light. The two theories are contradictory. In the -eighteenth century Newton’s theory was believed, in -<span class='pageno' id='Page_257'>257</span>the nineteenth century Huyghens’ theory was believed. -To-day there is one large group of phenomena which -can be explained only on the wave theory, and another -large group which can be explained only on the corpuscular -theory. Scientists have to leave it at that, -and wait for the future, in the hope of attaining some -wider vision which reconciles both.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We should apply these same principles to the questions -in which there is a variance between science -and religion. We would believe nothing in either -sphere of thought which does not appear to us to -be certified by solid reasons based upon the critical -research either of ourselves or of competent authorities. -But granting that we have honestly taken this -precaution, a clash between the two on points of detail -where they overlap should not lead us hastily -to abandon doctrines for which we have solid evidence. -It may be that we are more interested in -one set of doctrines than in the other. But, if we -have any sense of perspective and of the history -of thought, we shall wait and refrain from mutual -anathemas.</p> - -<p class='c001'>We should wait: but we should not wait passively, -or in despair. The clash is a sign that there are -wider truths and finer perspectives within which a -reconciliation of a deeper religion and a more subtle -science will be found.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In one sense, therefore, the conflict between science -and religion is a slight matter which has been -unduly emphasised. A mere logical contradiction -cannot in itself point to more than the necessity of -some readjustments, possibly of a very minor character -on both sides. Remember the widely different -<span class='pageno' id='Page_258'>258</span>aspects of events which are dealt with in science -and in religion respectively. Science is concerned -with the general conditions which are observed to -regulate physical phenomena; whereas religion is -wholly wrapped up in the contemplation of moral -and aesthetic values. On the one side there is the -law of gravitation, and on the other the contemplation -of the beauty of holiness. What one side sees, -the other misses; and vice versa.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Consider, for example, the lives of John Wesley -and of Saint Francis of Assisi. For physical science -you have in these lives merely ordinary examples of -the operation of the principles of physiological chemistry, -and of the dynamics of nervous reactions: for -religion you have lives of the most profound significance -in the history of the world. Can you be -surprised that, in the absence of a perfect and complete -phrasing of the principles of science and of -the principles of religion which apply to these specific -cases, the accounts of these lives from these divergent -standpoints should involve discrepancies? It would -be a miracle if it were not so.</p> - -<p class='c001'>It would, however, be missing the point to think -that we need not trouble ourselves about the conflict -between science and religion. In an intellectual age -there can be no active interest which puts aside all -hope of a vision of the harmony of truth. To acquiesce -in discrepancy is destructive of candour, and of -moral cleanliness. It belongs to the self-respect of -intellect to pursue every tangle of thought to its final -unravelment. If you check that impulse, you will -get no religion and no science from an awakened -thoughtfulness. The important question is, In what -<span class='pageno' id='Page_259'>259</span>spirit are we going to face the issue? There we come -to something absolutely vital.</p> - -<p class='c001'>A clash of doctrines is not a disaster—it is an opportunity. -I will explain my meaning by some illustrations -from science. The weight of an atom of -nitrogen was well known. Also it was an established -scientific doctrine that the average weight of such -atoms in any considerable mass will be always the -same. Two experimenters, the late Lord Rayleigh and -the late Sir William Ramsay, found that if they obtained -nitrogen by two different methods, each equally -effective for that purpose, they always observed a persistent -slight difference between the average weights -of the atoms in the two cases. Now I ask you, -would it have been rational of these men to have -despaired because of this conflict between chemical -theory and scientific observation? Suppose that for -some reason the chemical doctrine had been highly -prized throughout some district as the foundation of -its social order:—would it have been wise, would it -have been candid, would it have been moral, to forbid -the disclosure of the fact that the experiments produced -discordant results? Or, on the other hand, -should Sir William Ramsay and Lord Rayleigh have -proclaimed that chemical theory was now a detected -delusion? We see at once that either of these ways -would have been a method of facing the issue in an -entirely wrong spirit. What Rayleigh and Ramsay -did do was this: They at once perceived that they -had hit upon a line of investigation which would disclose -some subtlety of chemical theory that had -hitherto eluded observation. The discrepancy was -not a disaster: it was an opportunity to increase the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_260'>260</span>sweep of chemical knowledge. You all know the end -of the story: finally argon was discovered, a new -chemical element which had lurked undetected, mixed -with the nitrogen. But the story has a sequel which -forms my second illustration. This discovery drew -attention to the importance of observing accurately -minute differences in chemical substances as obtained -by different methods. Further researches of the most -careful accuracy were undertaken. Finally another -physicist, F. W. Aston, working in the Cavendish -Laboratory at Cambridge in England, discovered that -even the same element might assume two or more distinct -forms, termed <em>isotopes</em>, and that the law of the -constancy of average atomic weight holds for each of -these forms, but as between the different isotopes differs -slightly. The research has effected a great stride -in the power of chemical theory, far transcending in -importance the discovery of argon from which it -originated. The moral of these stories lies on the surface, -and I will leave to you their application to the -case of religion and science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In formal logic, a contradiction is the signal of a -defeat: but in the evolution of real knowledge it -marks the first step in progress towards a victory. -This is one great reason for the utmost toleration of -variety of opinion. Once and forever, this duty of -toleration has been summed up in the words, ‘Let both -grow together until the harvest.’ The failure of -Christians to act up to this precept, of the highest -authority, is one of the curiosities of religious history. -But we have not yet exhausted the discussion of the -moral temper required for the pursuit of truth. There -are short cuts leading merely to an illusory success. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_261'>261</span>It is easy enough to find a theory, logically harmonious -and with important applications in the region of -fact, provided that you are content to disregard half -your evidence. Every age produces people with clear -logical intellects, and with the most praiseworthy -grasp of the importance of some sphere of human experience, -who have elaborated, or inherited, a scheme -of thought which exactly fits those experiences which -claim their interest. Such people are apt resolutely -to ignore, or to explain away, all evidence which -confuses their scheme with contradictory instances. -What they cannot fit in is for them nonsense. An -unflinching determination to take the whole evidence -into account is the only method of preservation against -the fluctuating extremes of fashionable opinion. This -advice seems so easy, and is in fact so difficult to -follow.</p> - -<p class='c001'>One reason for this difficulty is that we cannot think -first and act afterwards. From the moment of birth -we are immersed in action, and can only fitfully guide -it by taking thought. We have, therefore, in various -spheres of experience to adopt those ideas which seem -to work within those spheres. It is absolutely necessary -to trust to ideas which are generally adequate, -even though we know that there are subtleties and distinctions -beyond our ken. Also apart from the necessities -of action, we cannot even keep before our minds -the whole evidence except under the guise of doctrines -which are incompletely harmonised. We cannot -think in terms of an indefinite multiplicity of -detail; our evidence can acquire its proper importance -only if it comes before us marshalled by general -ideas. These ideas we inherit—they form the tradition -<span class='pageno' id='Page_262'>262</span>of our civilisation. Such traditional ideas are -never static. They are either fading into meaningless -formulae, or are gaining power by the new lights -thrown by a more delicate apprehension. They are -transformed by the urge of critical reason, by the -vivid evidence of emotional experience, and by the -cold certainties of scientific perception. One fact is -certain, you cannot keep them still. No generation -can merely reproduce its ancestors. You may preserve -the life in a flux of form, or preserve the form -amid an ebb of life. But you cannot permanently -enclose the same life in the same mould.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The present state of religion among the European -races illustrates the statements which I have been -making. The phenomena are mixed. There have -been reactions and revivals. But on the whole, during -many generations, there has been a gradual decay -of religious influence in European civilisation. Each -revival touches a lower peak than its predecessor, and -each period of slackness a lower depth. The average -curve marks a steady fall in religious tone. In some -countries the interest in religion is higher than in -others. But in those countries where the interest is -relatively high, it still falls as the generations pass. -Religion is tending to degenerate into a decent formula -wherewith to embellish a comfortable life. A great -historical movement on this scale results from the -convergence of many causes. I wish to suggest two -of them which lie within the scope of this chapter -for consideration.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In the first place for over two centuries religion -has been on the defensive, and on a weak defensive. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_263'>263</span>The period has been one of unprecedented intellectual -progress. In this way a series of novel situations have -been produced for thought. Each such occasion has -found the religious thinkers unprepared. Something, -which has been proclaimed to be vital, has finally, -after struggle, distress, and anathema, been modified -and otherwise interpreted. The next generation of -religious apologists then congratulates the religious -world on the deeper insight which has been gained. -The result of the continued repetition of this undignified -retreat, during many generations, has at last -almost entirely destroyed the intellectual authority -of religious thinkers. Consider this contrast: when -Darwin or Einstein proclaim theories which modify -our ideas, it is a triumph for science. We do not go -about saying that there is another defeat for science, -because its old ideas have been abandoned. We know -that another step of scientific insight has been gained.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Religion will not regain its old power until it can -face change in the same spirit as does science. Its -principles may be eternal, but the expression of those -principles requires continual development. This evolution -of religion is in the main a disengagement of -its own proper ideas from the adventitious notions -which have crept into it by reason of the expression of -its own ideas in terms of the imaginative picture of the -world entertained in previous ages. Such a release -of religion from the bonds of imperfect science is -all to the good. It stresses its own genuine message. -The great point to be kept in mind is that normally -an advance in science will show that statements of -various religious beliefs require some sort of modification. -<span class='pageno' id='Page_264'>264</span>It may be that they have to be expanded or -explained, or indeed entirely restated. If the religion -is a sound expression of truth, this modification will -only exhibit more adequately the exact point which is -of importance. This process is a gain. In so far, -therefore, as any religion has any contact with physical -facts, it is to be expected that the point of view of -those facts must be continually modified as scientific -knowledge advances. In this way, the exact relevance -of these facts for religious thought will grow more -and more clear. The progress of science must result -in the unceasing modification of religious thought, to -the great advantage of religion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The religious controversies of the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries put theologians into a most unfortunate -state of mind. They were always attacking -and defending. They pictured themselves as the -garrison of a fort surrounded by hostile forces. All -such pictures express half-truths. That is why they -are so popular. But they are dangerous. This particular -picture fostered a pugnacious party spirit -which really expresses an ultimate lack of faith. They -dared not modify, because they shirked the task of -disengaging their spiritual message from the associations -of a particular imagery.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Let me explain myself by an example. In the early -medieval times, Heaven was in the sky, and Hell was -underground; volcanoes were the jaws of Hell. I do -not assert that these beliefs entered into the official -formulations: but they did enter into the popular -understanding of the general doctrines of Heaven -and Hell. These notions were what everyone thought -to be implied by the doctrine of the future state. They -<span class='pageno' id='Page_265'>265</span>entered into the explanations of the most influential -exponents of Christian belief. For example, they -occur in the <cite>Dialogues</cite> of Pope Gregory,<a id='r18' /><a href='#f18' class='c013'><sup>[18]</sup></a> the Great, -a man whose high official position is surpassed only -by the magnitude of his services to humanity. I am -not saying what we ought to believe about the future -state. But whatever be the right doctrine, in this -instance the clash between religion and science, -which has relegated the earth to the position of a -second-rate planet attached to a second-rate sun, has -been greatly to the benefit of the spirituality of religion -by dispersing these medieval fancies.</p> - -<div class='footnote' id='f18'> -<p class='c001'><a href='#r18'>18</a>. <i>Cf.</i> Gregorovius’ <cite>History of Rome in the Middle Ages</cite>, Book -III, Ch. III, Vol. II, English Trans.</p> -</div> -<p class='c001'>Another way of looking at this question of the -evolution of religious thought is to note that any -verbal form of statement which has been before the -world for some time discloses ambiguities; and that -often such ambiguities strike at the very heart of the -meaning. The effective sense in which a doctrine has -been held in the past cannot be determined by the -mere logical analysis of verbal statements, made in -ignorance of the logical trap. You have to take into -account the whole reaction of human nature to the -scheme of thought. This reaction is of a mixed character, -including elements of emotion derived from -our lower natures. It is here that the impersonal -criticism of science and of philosophy comes to the -aid of religious evolution. Example after example -can be given of this motive force in development. -For example, the logical difficulties inherent in the -doctrine of the moral cleansing of human nature by -the power of religion rent Christianity in the days -<span class='pageno' id='Page_266'>266</span>of Pelagius and Augustine—that is to say, at the beginning -of the fifth century. Echoes of that controversy -still linger in theology.</p> - -<p class='c001'>So far, my point has been this: that religion is the -expression of one type of fundamental experiences of -mankind: that religious thought develops into an increasing -accuracy of expression, disengaged from adventitious -imagery: that the interaction between religion -and science is one great factor in promoting -this development.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I now come to my second reason for the modern -fading of interest in religion. This involves the ultimate -question which I stated in my opening sentences. -We have to know what we mean by religion. -The churches, in their presentation of their answers -to this query, have put forward aspects of religion -which are expressed in terms either suited to the emotional -reactions of bygone times or directed to excite -modern emotional interests of a nonreligious character. -What I mean under the first heading is that -religious appeal is directed partly to excite that instinctive -fear of the wrath of a tyrant which was -inbred in the unhappy populations of the arbitrary -empires of the ancient world, and in particular to -excite that fear of an all-powerful arbitrary tyrant -behind the unknown forces of nature. This appeal to -the ready instinct of brute fear is losing its force. -It lacks any directness of response, because modern -science and modern conditions of life have taught us -to meet occasions of apprehension by a critical analysis -of their causes and conditions. Religion is the reaction -of human nature to its search for God. The presentation -of God under the aspect of power awakens -<span class='pageno' id='Page_267'>267</span>every modern instinct of critical reaction. This is -fatal; for religion collapses unless its main positions -command immediacy of assent. In this respect the -old phraseology is at variance with the psychology of -modern civilisations. This change in psychology is -largely due to science, and is one of the chief ways in -which the advance of science has weakened the hold -of the old religious forms of expression. The nonreligious -motive which has entered into modern religious -thought is the desire for a comfortable organisation -of modern society. Religion has been presented -as valuable for the ordering of life. Its claims have -been rested upon its function as a sanction to right -conduct. Also the purpose of right conduct quickly -degenerates into the formation of pleasing social relations. -We have here a subtle degradation of religious -ideas, following upon their gradual purification under -the influence of keener ethical intuitions. Conduct is -a by-product of religion—an inevitable by-product, -but not the main point. Every great religious teacher -has revolted against the presentation of religion as a -mere sanction of rules of conduct. Saint Paul denounced -the Law, and Puritan divines spoke of the -filthy rags of righteousness. The insistence upon -rules of conduct marks the ebb of religious fervour. -Above and beyond all things, the religious life is not -a research after comfort. I must now state, in all -diffidence, what I conceive to be the essential character -of the religious spirit.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Religion is the vision of something which stands -beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate -things; something which is real, and yet waiting -to be realised; something which is a remote possibility, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_268'>268</span>and yet the greatest of present facts; something -that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet -eludes apprehension; something whose possession is -the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something -which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The immediate reaction of human nature to the -religious vision is worship. Religion has emerged -into human experience mixed with the crudest fancies -of barbaric imagination. Gradually, slowly, steadily -the vision recurs in history under nobler form and -with clearer expression. It is the one element in -human experience which persistently shows an upward -trend. It fades and then recurs. But when it -renews its force, it recurs with an added richness and -purity of content. The fact of the religious vision, -and its history of persistent expansion, is our one -ground for optimism. Apart from it, human life is -a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a mass of -pain and misery, a bagatelle of transient experience.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The vision claims nothing but worship; and worship -is a surrender to the claim for assimilation, urged -with the motive force of mutual love. The vision -never overrules. It is always there, and it has the -power of love presenting the one purpose whose fulfilment -is eternal harmony. Such order as we find in -nature is never force—it presents itself as the one -harmonious adjustment of complex detail. Evil is -the brute motive force of fragmentary purpose, disregarding -the eternal vision. Evil is overruling, retarding, -hurting. The power of God is the worship -He inspires. That religion is strong which in its -ritual and its modes of thought evokes an apprehension -<span class='pageno' id='Page_269'>269</span>of the commanding vision. The worship of God -is not a rule of safety—it is an adventure of the spirit, -a flight after the unattainable. The death of religion -comes with the repression of the high hope of -adventure.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_270'>270</span> - <h2 class='c006'>CHAPTER XIII <br /> <br /> REQUISITES FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>It has been the purpose of these lectures to analyse -the reactions of science in forming that background -of instinctive ideas which control the activities of -successive generations. Such a background takes the -form of a certain vague philosophy as to the last word -about things, when all is said. The three centuries, -which form the epoch of modern science, have revolved -round the ideas of <em>God</em>, <em>mind</em>, <em>matter</em>, and -also of <em>space</em> and <em>time</em> in their characters of expressing -<em>simple location</em> for matter. Philosophy has on -the whole emphasised <em>mind</em>, and has thus been out of -touch with science during the two latter centuries. -But it is creeping back into its old importance owing -to the rise of psychology and its alliance with physiology. -Also, this rehabilitation of philosophy has been -facilitated by the recent breakdown of the seventeenth -century settlement of the principles of physical science. -But, until that collapse, science seated itself -securely upon the concepts of matter, space, time, and -latterly, of energy. Also there were arbitrary laws -of nature determining locomotion. They were empirically -observed, but for some obscure reason were -known to be universal. Anyone who in practice or -theory disregarded them was denounced with unsparing -vigour. This position on the part of scientists -was pure bluff, if one may credit them with believing -<span class='pageno' id='Page_271'>271</span>their own statements. For their current philosophy -completely failed to justify the assumption that the -immediate knowledge inherent in any present occasion -throws any light either on its past, or its future.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I have also sketched an alternative philosophy of -science in which <em>organism</em> takes the place of <em>matter</em>. -For this purpose, the mind involved in the materialist -theory dissolves into a function of organism. The -psychological field then exhibits what an event is in -itself. Our bodily event is an unusually complex -type of organism and consequently includes cognition. -Further, space and time, in their most concrete signification, -become the locus of events. An organism -is the realisation of a definite shape of value. The -emergence of some actual value depends on limitation -which excludes neutralising cross-lights. Thus -an event is a matter of fact which by reason of its -limitation is a value for itself; but by reason of its -very nature it also requires the whole universe in order -to be itself.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Importance depends on endurance. Endurance is -the retention through time of an achievement of -value. What endures is identity of pattern, self-inherited. -Endurance requires the favourable -environment. The whole of science revolves round -this question of enduring organisms.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The general influence of science at the present -moment can be analysed under the headings: General -Conceptions Respecting the Universe, Technological -Applications, Professionalism in Knowledge, Influence -of Biological Doctrines on the Motives of Conduct. -I have endeavoured in the preceding lectures -to give a glimpse of these points. It lies within the -<span class='pageno' id='Page_272'>272</span>scope of this concluding lecture to consider the reaction -of science upon some problems confronting -civilised societies.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The general conceptions introduced by science into -modern thought cannot be separated from the philosophical -situation as expressed by Descartes. I mean -the assumption of bodies and minds as independent -individual substances, each existing in its own right -apart from any necessary reference to each other. -Such a conception was very concordant with the individualism -which had issued from the moral discipline -of the Middle Ages. But, though the easy reception -of the idea is thus explained, the derivation in itself -rests upon a confusion, very natural but none the less -unfortunate. The moral discipline had emphasized -the intrinsic value of the individual entity. This emphasis -had put the notions of the individual and of its -experiences into the foreground of thought. At this -point the confusion commences. The emergent individual -value of each entity is transformed into the independent -substantial existence of each entity, which -is a very different notion.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I do not mean to say that Descartes made this logical, -or rather illogical, transition, in the form of explicit -reasoning. Far from it. What he did, was -first to concentrate upon his own conscious experiences, -as being facts within the independent world of -his own mentality. He was led to speculate in this -way by the current emphasis upon the individual value -of his total self. He implicitly transformed this -emergent individual value, inherent in the very fact of -his own reality, into a private world of passions, or -modes, of independent substance.</p> - -<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_273'>273</span>Also the independence ascribed to bodily substances -carried them away from the realm of values altogether. -They degenerated into a mechanism entirely -valueless, except as suggestive of an external ingenuity. -The heavens had lost the glory of God. This state -of mind is illustrated in the recoil of Protestantism -from aesthetic effects dependent upon a material -medium. It was taken to lead to an ascription of value -to what is in itself valueless. This recoil was already -in full strength antecedently to Descartes. Accordingly, -the Cartesian scientific doctrine of bits of matter, -bare of intrinsic value, was merely a formulation, -in explicit terms, of a doctrine which was current before -its entrance into scientific thought or Cartesian -philosophy. Probably this doctrine was latent in the -scholastic philosophy, but it did not lead to its consequences -till it met with the mentality of northern -Europe in the sixteenth century. But science, as -equipped by Descartes, gave stability and intellectual -status to a point of view which has had very mixed -effects upon the moral presuppositions of modern communities. -Its good effects arose from its efficiency as a -method for scientific researches within those limited -regions which were then best suited for exploration. -The result was a general clearing of the European -mind away from the stains left upon it by the hysteria -of remote barbaric ages. This was all to the good, and -was most completely exemplified in the eighteenth -century.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But in the nineteenth century, when society was -undergoing transformation into the manufacturing -system, the bad effects of these doctrines have been -very fatal. The doctrine of minds, as independent -<span class='pageno' id='Page_274'>274</span>substances, leads directly not merely to private worlds -of experience, but also to private worlds of morals. -The moral intuitions can be held to apply only to the -strictly private world of psychological experience. -Accordingly, self-respect, and the making the most of -your own individual opportunities, together constituted -the efficient morality of the leaders among the -industrialists of that period. The western world is -now suffering from the limited moral outlook of the -three previous generations.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Also the assumption of the bare valuelessness of -mere matter led to a lack of reverence in the treatment -of natural or artistic beauty. Just when the urbanisation -of the western world was entering upon its <a id='corr274.14'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='stake'>state</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_274.14'><ins class='correction' title='stake'>state</ins></a></span> -of rapid development, and when the most delicate, -anxious consideration of the aesthetic qualities of the -new material environment was requisite, the doctrine -of the irrelevance of such ideas was at its height. In -the most advanced industrial countries, art was -treated as a frivolity. A striking example of this state -of mind in the middle of the nineteenth century is to -be seen in London where the marvellous beauty of the -estuary of the Thames, as it curves through the city, -is wantonly defaced by the Charing Cross railway -bridge, constructed apart from any reference to -aesthetic values.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The two evils are: one, the ignoration of the true -relation of each organism to its environment; and the -other, the habit of ignoring the intrinsic worth of the -environment which must be allowed its weight in any -consideration of final ends.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Another great fact confronting the modern world is -the discovery of the method of training professionals, -<span class='pageno' id='Page_275'>275</span>who specialise in particular regions of thought and -thereby progressively add to the sum of knowledge -within their respective limitations of subject. In consequence -of the success of this professionalising of -knowledge, there are two points to be kept in mind, -which differentiate our present age from the past. -In the first place, the rate of progress is such that -an individual human being, of ordinary length of life, -will be called upon to face novel situations which find -no parallel in his past. The fixed person for the fixed -duties, who in older societies was such a godsend, in -the future will be a public danger. In the second -place, the modern professionalism in knowledge -works in the opposite direction so far as the intellectual -sphere is concerned. The modern chemist is -likely to be weak in zoology, weaker still in his general -knowledge of the Elizabethan drama, and completely -ignorant of the principles of rhythm in English -versification. It is probably safe to ignore his -knowledge of ancient history. Of course I am speaking -of general tendencies; for chemists are no worse -than engineers, or mathematicians, or classical scholars. -Effective knowledge is professionalised knowledge, -supported by a restricted acquaintance with -useful subjects subservient to it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This situation has its dangers. It produces minds in -a groove. Each profession makes progress, but it is -progress in its own groove. Now to be mentally in -a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of abstractions. -The groove prevents straying across country, -and the abstraction abstracts from something to -which no further attention is paid. But there is no -groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension -<span class='pageno' id='Page_276'>276</span>of human life. Thus in the modern -world, the celibacy of the medieval learned class has -been replaced by a celibacy of the intellect which is -divorced from the concrete contemplation of the complete -facts. Of course, no one is merely a mathematician, -or merely a lawyer. People have lives outside -their professions or their businesses. But the point -is the restraint of serious thought within a groove. -The remainder of life is treated superficially, with -the imperfect categories of thought derived from one -profession.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The dangers arising from this aspect of professionalism -are great, particularly in our democratic -societies. The directive force of reason is weakened. -The leading intellects lack balance. They see this -set of circumstances, or that set; but not both sets together. -The task of <a id='corr276.17'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='coödination'>coördination</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_276.17'><ins class='correction' title='coödination'>coördination</ins></a></span> is left to those who -lack either the force or the character to succeed in -some definite career. In short, the specialised functions -of the community are performed better and more -progressively, but the generalised direction lacks -vision. The progressiveness in detail only adds to -the danger produced by the feebleness of coördination.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This criticism of modern life applies throughout, -in whatever sense you construe the meaning of a community. -It holds if you apply it to a nation, a city, a -district, an institution, a family, or even to an individual. -There is a development of particular abstractions, -and a contraction of concrete appreciation. The -whole is lost in one of its aspects. It is not necessary -for my point that I should maintain that our directive -wisdom, either as individuals or as communities, is -<span class='pageno' id='Page_277'>277</span>less now than in the past. Perhaps it has slightly improved. -But the novel pace of progress requires a -greater force of direction if disasters are to be -avoided. The point is that the discoveries of the nineteenth -century were in the direction of professionalism, -so that we are left with no expansion of wisdom -and with greater need of it.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Wisdom is the fruit of a balanced development. It -is this balanced growth of individuality which it -should be the aim of education to secure. The most -useful discoveries for the immediate future would -concern the furtherance of this aim without detriment -to the necessary intellectual professionalism.</p> - -<p class='c001'>My own criticism of our traditional educational -methods is that they are far too much occupied with -intellectual analysis, and with the acquirement of -formularised information. What I mean is, that we -neglect to strengthen habits of concrete appreciation -of the individual facts in their full interplay of -emergent values, and that we merely emphasise abstract -formulations which ignore this aspect of the -interplay of diverse values.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In every country the problem of the balance of the -general and specialist education is under consideration. -I cannot speak with first-hand knowledge of any -country but my own. I know that there, among practical -educationalists, there is considerable dissatisfaction -with the existing practice. Also, the adaptation -of the whole system to the needs of a democratic community -is very far from being solved. I do not think -that the secret of the solution lies in terms of the antithesis -between thoroughness in special knowledge and -general knowledge of a slighter character. The make-weight -<span class='pageno' id='Page_278'>278</span>which balances the thoroughness of the specialist -intellectual training should be of a radically -different kind from purely intellectual analytical -knowledge. At present our education combines a -thorough study of a few abstractions, with a slighter -study of a larger number of abstractions. We are too -exclusively bookish in our scholastic routine. The -general training should aim at eliciting our concrete -apprehensions, and should satisfy the itch of youth to -be doing something. There should be some analysis -even here, but only just enough to illustrate the ways -of thinking in diverse spheres. In the Garden of Eden -Adam saw the animals before he named them: in the -traditional system, children named the animals before -they saw them.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is no easy single solution of the practical difficulties -of education. We can, however, guide ourselves -by a certain simplicity in its general theory. -The student should concentrate within a limited field. -Such concentration should include all practical and intellectual -acquirements requisite for that concentration. -This is the ordinary procedure; and, in respect to it, -I should be inclined even to increase the facilities for -concentration rather than to diminish them. With the -concentration there are associated certain subsidiary -studies, such as languages for science. Such a scheme -of professional training should be directed to a clear -end congenial to the student. It is not necessary to -elaborate the qualifications of these statements. Such -a training must, of course, have the width requisite -for its end. But its design should not be complicated -by the consideration of other ends. This professional -training can only touch one side of education. Its -<span class='pageno' id='Page_279'>279</span>centre of gravity lies in the intellect, and its chief tool -is the printed book. The centre of gravity of the -other side of training should lie in intuition without -an analytical divorce from the total environment. Its -object is immediate apprehension with the minimum -of eviscerating analysis. The type of generality, -which above all is wanted, is the appreciation of variety -of value. I mean an aesthetic growth. There -is something between the gross specialised values of -the mere practical man, and the thin specialised values -of the mere scholar. Both types have missed something; -and if you add together the two sets of values, -you do not obtain the missing elements. What is -wanted is an appreciation of the infinite variety of -vivid values achieved by an organism in its proper -environment. When you understand all about the -sun and all about the atmosphere and all about the -rotation of the earth, you may still miss the radiance -of the sunset. There is no substitute for the direct -perception of the concrete achievement of a thing in -its actuality. We want concrete fact with a high light -thrown on what is relevant to its preciousness.</p> - -<p class='c001'>What I mean is art <a id='corr279.22'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='(and'>and</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_279.22'><ins class='correction' title='(and'>and</ins></a></span> aesthetic education. It -is, however, art in such a general sense of the term -that I hardly like to call it by that name. Art is a -special example. What we want is to draw out habits -of aesthetic apprehension. According to the metaphysical -doctrine which I have been developing, to -do so is to increase the depth of individuality. The -analysis of reality indicates the two factors, activity -emerging into individualised aesthetic value. Also -the emergent value is the measure of the individualisation -of the activity. We must foster the creative -<span class='pageno' id='Page_280'>280</span>initiative towards the maintenance of objective values. -You will not obtain the apprehension without the initiative, -or the initiative without the apprehension. -As soon as you get towards the concrete, you cannot -exclude action. Sensitiveness without impulse spells -decadence, and impulse without sensitiveness spells -brutality. I am using the word “sensitiveness” in its -most general signification, so as to include apprehension -of what lies beyond oneself; that is to say, sensitiveness -to all the facts of the case. Thus “art” in -the general sense which I require is any selection by -which the concrete facts are so arranged as to elicit -attention to particular values which are realisable by -them. For example, the mere disposing of the human -body and the eyesight so as to get a good view of a -sunset is a simple form of artistic selection. The habit -of art is the habit of enjoying vivid values.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But, in this sense, art concerns more than sunsets. -A factory, with its machinery, its community of operatives, -its social service to the general population, its -dependence upon organising and designing genius, its -potentialities as a source of wealth to the holders of -its stock is an organism exhibiting a variety of vivid -values. What we want to train is the habit of apprehending -such an organism in its completeness. It is -very arguable that the science of political economy, as -studied in its first period after the death of Adam -Smith (1790), did more harm than good. It destroyed -many economic fallacies, and taught how to -think about the economic revolution then in progress. -But it riveted on men a certain set of abstractions -which were disastrous in their influence on modern -mentality. It de-humanised industry. This is only -<span class='pageno' id='Page_281'>281</span>one example of a general danger inherent in modern -science. Its methodological procedure is exclusive -and intolerant, and rightly so. It fixes attention on a -definite group of abstractions, neglects everything -else, and elicits every scrap of information and theory -which is relevant to what it has retained. This -method is triumphant, provided that the abstractions -are judicious. But, however triumphant, the triumph -is within limits. The neglect of these limits leads to -disastrous oversights. The anti-rationalism of science -is partly justified, as a preservation of its useful -methodology; it is partly mere irrational prejudice. -Modern professionalism is the training of minds to -conform to the methodology. The historical revolt -of the seventeenth century, and the earlier reaction -towards naturalism, were examples of transcending -the abstractions which fascinated educated society in -the Middle Ages. These early ages had an ideal of -rationalism, but they failed in its pursuit. For they -neglected to note that the methodology of reasoning -requires the limitations involved in the abstract. Accordingly, -the true rationalism must always transcend -itself by recurrence to the concrete in search of inspiration. -A self-satisfied rationalism is in effect a -form of anti-rationalism. It means an arbitrary halt -at a particular set of abstractions. This was the case -with science.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There are two principles inherent in the very nature -of things, recurring in some particular embodiments -whatever field we explore—the spirit of change, -and the spirit of conservation. There can be nothing -real without both. Mere change without conservation -is a passage from nothing to nothing. Its final -<span class='pageno' id='Page_282'>282</span>integration yields mere transient non-entity. Mere -conservation without change cannot conserve. For -after all, there is a flux of circumstance, and the -freshness of being evaporates under mere repetition. -The character of existent reality is composed of organisms -enduring through the flux of things. The -low type of organisms have achieved a self-identity -dominating their whole physical life. Electrons, -molecules, crystals, belong to this type. They exhibit -a massive and complete sameness. In the higher -types, where life appears, there is greater complexity. -Thus, though there is a complex, enduring pattern, -it has retreated into deeper recesses of the total fact. -In a sense, the self-identity of a human being is more -abstract than that of a crystal. It is the life of the -spirit. It relates rather to the individualisation of the -creative activity; so that the changing circumstances -received from the environment, are differentiated -from the living personality, and are thought of as -forming its perceived field. In truth, the field of -perception and the perceiving mind are abstractions -which, in the concrete, combine into the successive -bodily events. The psychological field, as restricted -to sense-objects and passing emotions, is the minor -permanence, barely rescued from the nonentity of -mere change; and the mind is the major permanence, -permeating that complete field, whose endurance is -the living soul. But the soul would wither without -fertilisation from its transient experiences. The secret -of the higher organisms lies in their two grades of -permanences. By this means the freshness of the environment -is absorbed into the permanence of the soul. -The changing environment is no longer, by reason of -<span class='pageno' id='Page_283'>283</span>its variety, an enemy to the endurance of the organism. -The pattern of the higher organism has retreated into -the recesses of the individualised activity. It has become -a uniform way of dealing with circumstances; -and this way is only strengthened by having a proper -variety of circumstances to deal with.</p> - -<p class='c001'>This fertilisation of the soul is the reason for the -necessity of art. A static value, however serious and -important, becomes unendurable by its appalling -monotony of endurance. The soul cries aloud for release -into change. It suffers the agonies of claustrophobia. -The transitions of humour, wit, irreverence, -play, sleep, and—above all—of art are necessary for -it. Great art is the arrangement of the environment -so as to provide for the soul vivid, but transient, -values. Human beings require something which absorbs -them for a time, something out of the routine -which they can stare at. But you cannot subdivide -life, except in the abstract analysis of thought. Accordingly, -the great art is more than a transient refreshment. -It is something which adds to the -permanent richness of the soul’s self-attainment. It -justifies itself both by its immediate enjoyment, and -also by its discipline of the inmost being. Its discipline -is not distinct from enjoyment, but by reason of -it. It transforms the soul into the permanent realisation -of values extending beyond its former self. This -element of transition in art is shown by the restlessness -exhibited in its history. An epoch gets saturated -by the masterpieces of any one style. Something new -must be discovered. The human being wanders on. -Yet there is a balance in things. Mere change before -the attainment of adequacy of achievement, either in -<span class='pageno' id='Page_284'>284</span>quality or output, is destructive of greatness. But the -importance of a living art, which moves on and yet -leaves its permanent mark, can hardly be exaggerated.</p> - -<p class='c001'>In regard to the aesthetic needs of civilised society -the reactions of science have so far been unfortunate. -Its materialistic basis has directed attention to <em>things</em> -as opposed to <em>values</em>. The antithesis is a false one, -if taken in a concrete sense. But it is valid at the -abstract level of ordinary thought. This misplaced -emphasis coalesced with the abstractions of political -economy, which are in fact the abstractions in terms -of which commercial affairs are carried on. Thus -all thought concerned with social organisation expressed -itself in terms of material things and of capital. -Ultimate values were excluded. They were -politely bowed to, and then handed over to the clergy -to be kept for Sundays. A creed of competitive business -morality was evolved, in some respects curiously -high; but entirely devoid of consideration for the -value of human life. The workmen were conceived -as mere hands, drawn from the pool of labour. To -God’s question, men gave the answer of Cain—“Am I -my brother’s keeper?”; and they incurred Cain’s guilt. -This was the atmosphere in which the industrial -revolution was accomplished in England, and to a -large extent elsewhere. The internal history of England -during the last half century has been an endeavour -slowly and painfully to undo the evils wrought in -the first stage of the new epoch. It may be that civilisation -will never recover from the bad climate which -enveloped the introduction of machinery. This climate -pervaded the whole commercial system of the -progressive northern European races. It was partly -<span class='pageno' id='Page_285'>285</span>the result of the aesthetic errors of Protestantism and -partly the result of scientific materialism, and partly -the result of the natural greed of mankind, and partly -the result of the abstractions of political economy. -An illustration of my point is to be found in Macaulay’s -Essay criticising Southey’s <cite>Colloquies on Society</cite>. -It was written in 1830. Now Macaulay was a very -favourable example of men living at that date, or at -any date. He had genius; he was kind-hearted, honourable, -and a reformer. This is the extract:—“We -are told, that our age has invented atrocities beyond -the imagination of our fathers; that society has been -brought into a state compared with which extermination -would be a blessing; and all because the dwellings -of cotton-spinners are naked and rectangular. -Mr. Southey has found out a way he tells us, in which -the effects of manufactures and agriculture may be -compared. And what is this way? To stand on a -hill, to look at a cottage and a factory, and to see -which is the prettier.”</p> - -<p class='c001'>Southey seems to have said many silly things in -his book; but, so far as this extract is concerned, he -could make a good case for himself if he returned to -earth after the lapse of nearly a century. The evils -of the early industrial system are now a commonplace -of knowledge. The point which I am insisting -on is the stone-blind eye with which even the best -men of that time regarded the importance of aesthetics -in a nation’s life. I do not believe that we have -as yet nearly achieved the right estimate. A contributory -cause, of substantial efficacy to produce this -disastrous error, was the scientific creed that matter -in motion is the one concrete reality in nature; so -<span class='pageno' id='Page_286'>286</span>that aesthetic values form an adventitious, irrelevant -addition.</p> - -<p class='c001'>There is another side to this picture of the possibilities -of decadence. At the present moment a discussion -is raging as to the future of civilisation in the -novel circumstances of rapid scientific and technological -advance. The evils of the future have been -diagnosed in various ways, the loss of religious faith, -the malignant use of material power, the degradation -attending a differential birth rate favouring the lower -types of humanity, the suppression of aesthetic creativeness. -Without doubt, these are all evils, dangerous -and threatening. But they are not new. From -the dawn of history, mankind has always been losing -its religious faith, has always suffered from the malignant -use of material power, has always suffered from -the infertility of its best intellectual types, has always -witnessed the periodical decadence of art. In the -reign of the Egyptian king, Tutankhamen, there was -raging a desperate religious struggle between Modernists -and Fundamentalists; the cave pictures exhibit -a phase of delicate aesthetic achievement as superseded -by a period of comparative vulgarity; the religious -leaders, the great thinkers, the great poets and -authors, the whole clerical caste in the Middle Ages, -have been notably infertile; finally, if we attend to -what actually has happened in the past, and disregard -romantic visions of democracies, aristocracies, kings, -generals, armies, and merchants, material power has -generally been wielded with blindness, obstinacy and -selfishness, often with brutal malignancy. And yet, -mankind has progressed. Even if you take a tiny oasis -of peculiar excellence, the type of modern man who -<span class='pageno' id='Page_287'>287</span>would have most chance of happiness in ancient -Greece at its best period is probably (as now) an -average professional heavy-weight boxer, and not an -average Greek scholar from Oxford or Germany. -Indeed, the main use of the Oxford scholar would -have been his capability of writing an ode in glorification -of the boxer. Nothing does more harm in unnerving -men for their duties in the present, than the -attention devoted to the points of excellence in the -past as compared with the average failure of the -present day.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But, after all, there have been real periods of decadence; -and at the present time, as at other epochs, -society is decaying, and there is need for preservative -action. Professionals are not new to the world. But -in the past, professionals have formed unprogressive -castes. The point is that professionalism has now -been mated with progress. The world is now faced -with a self-evolving system, which it cannot stop. -There are dangers and advantages in this situation. -It is obvious that the gain in material power affords -opportunity for social betterment. If mankind can -rise to the occasion, there lies in front a golden age of -beneficent creativeness. But material power in itself -is ethically neutral. It can equally well work in the -wrong direction. The problem is not how to produce -great men, but how to produce great societies. The -great society will put up the men for the occasions. -The materialistic philosophy emphasised the given -quantity of material, and thence derivatively the given -nature of the environment. It thus operated most -unfortunately upon the social conscience of mankind. -For it directed almost exclusive attention to the aspect -<span class='pageno' id='Page_288'>288</span>of struggle for existence in a fixed environment. To a -large extent the environment is fixed, and to this extent -there is a struggle for existence. It is folly to -look at the universe through rose-tinted spectacles. -We must admit the struggle. The question is, who is -to be eliminated. In so far as we are educators, we -have to have clear ideas upon that point; for it settles -the type to be produced and the practical ethics to -be inculcated.</p> - -<p class='c001'>But during the last three generations, the exclusive -direction of attention to this aspect of things has been -a disaster of the first magnitude. The watchwords of -the nineteenth century have been, struggle for existence, -competition, class warfare, commercial antagonism -between nations, military warfare. The struggle -for existence has been construed into the gospel of hate. -The full conclusion to be drawn from a philosophy of -evolution is fortunately of a more balanced character. -Successful organisms modify their environment. Those -organisms are successful which modify their environments -so as to assist each other. This law is exemplified -in nature on a vast scale. For example, the -North American Indians accepted their environment, -with the result that a scanty population barely succeeded -in maintaining themselves over the whole -continent. The European races when they arrived in -the same continent pursued an opposite policy. They -at once coöperated in modifying their environment. -The result is that a population more than twenty times -that of the Indian population now occupies the same -territory, and the continent is not yet full. Again, -there are associations of different species which mutually -<a id='corr288.33'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='coöoperate'>coöperate</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_288.33'><ins class='correction' title='coöoperate'>coöperate</ins></a></span>. This differentiation of species is -<span class='pageno' id='Page_289'>289</span>exhibited in the simplest physical entities, such as the -association between electrons and positive nuclei, and -in the whole realm of animate nature. The trees in a -Brazilian forest depend upon the association of various -species of organisms, each of which is mutually -dependent on the other species. A single tree by -itself is dependent upon all the adverse chances of -shifting circumstances. The wind stunts it: the variations -in temperature check its foliage: the rains -denude its soil: its leaves are blown away and are -lost for the purpose of fertilisation. You may obtain -individual specimens of fine trees either in exceptional -circumstances, or where human cultivation has intervened. -But in nature the normal way in which trees -flourish is by their association in a forest. Each tree -may lose something of its individual perfection of -growth, but they mutually assist each other in preserving -the conditions for survival. The soil is preserved -and shaded; and the microbes necessary for -its fertility are neither scorched, nor frozen, nor -washed away. A forest is the triumph of the organisation -of mutually dependent species. Further a -species of microbes which kills the forest, also exterminates -itself. Again the two sexes exhibit the -same advantage of differentiation. In the history of -the world, the prize has not gone to those species -which specialised in methods of violence, or even in -defensive armour. In fact, nature began with producing -animals encased in hard shells for defence -against the ills of life. It also experimented in size. -But smaller animals, without external armour, warm-blooded, -sensitive, and alert, have cleared these monsters -off the face of the earth. Also, the lions and -<span class='pageno' id='Page_290'>290</span>tigers are not the successful species. There is something -in the ready use of force which defeats its own -object. Its main defect is that it bars <a id='corr290.3'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='coöoperation'>coöperation</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_290.3'><ins class='correction' title='coöoperation'>coöperation</ins></a></span>. -Every organism requires an environment of friends, -partly to shield it from violent changes, and partly -to supply it with its wants. The Gospel of Force is -incompatible with a social life. By <em>force</em>, I mean -<em>antagonism</em> in its most general sense.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Almost equally dangerous is the Gospel of Uniformity. -The differences between the nations and -races of mankind are required to preserve the conditions -under which higher development is possible. -One main factor in the upward trend of animal life -has been the power of wandering. Perhaps this is -why the armour-plated monsters fared badly. They -could not wander. Animals wander into new conditions. -They have to adapt themselves or die. Mankind -has wandered from the trees to the plains, from -the plains to the seacoast, from climate to climate, -from continent to continent, and from habit of life -to habit of life. When man ceases to wander, he will -cease to ascend in the scale of being. Physical wandering -is still important, but greater still is the power -of man’s spiritual adventures—adventures of thought, -adventures of passionate feeling, adventures of -aesthetic experience. A diversification among human -communities is essential for the provision of the incentive -and material for the Odyssey of the human -spirit. Other nations of different habits are not -enemies: they are godsends. Men require of their -neighbours something sufficiently akin to be understood, -something sufficiently different to provoke attention, -and something great enough to command -<span class='pageno' id='Page_291'>291</span>admiration. We must not expect, however, all the -virtues. We should even be satisfied if there is something -odd enough to be interesting.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Modern science has imposed on humanity the necessity -for wandering. Its progressive thought and its -progressive technology make the transition through -time, from generation to generation, a true migration -into uncharted seas of adventure. The very benefit of -wandering is that it is dangerous and needs skill to -avert evils. We must expect, therefore, that the -future will disclose dangers. It is the business of the -future to be dangerous; and it is among the merits of -science that it equips the future for its duties. The -prosperous middle classes, who ruled the nineteenth -century, placed an excessive value upon placidity of -existence. They refused to face the necessities for -social reform imposed by the new industrial system, -and they are now refusing to face the necessities for -intellectual reform imposed by the new knowledge. -The middle class pessimism over the future of the -world comes from a confusion between civilisation -and security. In the immediate future there will be -less security than in the immediate past, less stability. -It must be admitted that there is a degree of instability -which is inconsistent with civilisation. But, on the -whole, the great ages have been unstable ages.</p> - -<p class='c001'>I have endeavoured in these lectures to give a record -of a great adventure in the region of thought. It -was shared in by all the races of western Europe. It -developed with the slowness of a mass movement. -Half a century is its unit of time. The tale is the -epic of an episode in the manifestation of reason. -It tells how a particular direction of reason emerges -<span class='pageno' id='Page_292'>292</span>in a race by the long preparation of antecedent epochs, -how after its birth its subject-matter gradually unfolds -itself, how it attains its triumphs, how its influence -moulds the very springs of action of mankind, -and finally how at its moment of supreme success its -limitations disclose themselves and call for a renewed -exercise of the creative imagination. The moral of -the tale is the power of reason, its decisive influence -on the life of humanity. The great conquerors, from -Alexander to Caesar, and from Caesar to Napoleon, -influenced profoundly the lives of subsequent generations. -But the total effect of this influence shrinks to -insignificance, if compared to the entire transformation -of human habits and human mentality produced -by the long line of men of thought from Thales to the -present day, men individually powerless, but ultimately -the rulers of the world.</p> - -<div class='chapter'> - <span class='pageno' id='Page_293'>293</span> - <h2 class='c006'>INDEX</h2> -</div> - -<p class='c010'>The numbers refer to pages; and ‘<i>e.s.</i>’ stands for ‘<i>et seqq.</i>’, where the -reference is to the succeeding pages of the chapter in question.</p> - -<ul class='index'> - <li class='c017'>Abruptness (in Ingression), <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Absolute, The, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Abstract, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Abstraction, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Abstraction (in Mathematics), <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Abstractive Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Acceleration, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Actualisation, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Adam Smith, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Aeschylus, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Alexander, S., <i><a href='#PREFACE'>preface</a></i>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Algebra, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Alva, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Ampère, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Analytical Character (Eternal Objects), <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Anselm, St., <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>‘Any,’ 229.</li> - <li class='c017'>Aquinas, Thomas, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Arabic Arithmetical Notation, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Archimedes, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Arguments (of functions), <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Aristotle, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>; <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>; <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Arnold, Matthew, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Art, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Art, Medieval, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Aspect, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>; <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Associated Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Aston, F. W., <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Atom, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Augustine, Saint, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Bacon, Francis, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>; <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Bacon, Roger, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Base of Abstractive Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Being, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Belisarius, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Benedict, Saint, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_294'>294</span>Bergson, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>; <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Berkeley, George, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Bichât, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Biology, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Bonaventure, Saint, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Boyle, Robert, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Brown University, <i><a href='#PREFACE'>Preface</a></i>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Bruno, Giordano, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Byzantine Empire, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Carlyle, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Cervantes, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Change, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Chaucer, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>China, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Clairaut, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Classification, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Clough, A. H., <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Cognition, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Coleridge, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Columbus, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Complex Eternal Objects, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Components, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Conic Sections, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Connexity (of a Hierarchy), <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Connectedness (of an occasion), <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Conservation of Energy, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Continuity, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Copernicus, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Cosmas, <a href='#Page_254'>254</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Cromwell, Oliver, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>D’Alembert, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Dalton, John, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Da Vinci, Leonardo, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Darwin, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Democritus, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Demos, R., <i><a href='#PREFACE'>Preface</a></i>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Density, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_295'>295</span>Desargues, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Descartes, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>; <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>; <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>; <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>; <a href='#Page_195'>195</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_272'>272</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Determinism, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Differential Calculus, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Discontinuous Existence, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>; <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Distance, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Divinity, Scholastic, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Divisibility, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Education, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Egyptians, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Einstein, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>; <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Electron, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Empty Events, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Endurance, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>; <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Endurance, Vibratory, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Energy, Physical, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Environment, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Envisagement, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Epochs, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Epochal Durations, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Essence, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Eternal Objects, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Ether, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Euripides, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Event, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>; <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Evolution, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>; <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Exhaustion, Method of, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Extension, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Extensive Quantity, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>External Relations, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Extrinsic Reality, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Faraday, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Fate, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Fermat, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Finite Abstractive Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Form, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Force, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Fourier, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Francis of Assisi, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Frederick, the Great, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Frequency, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Fresnel, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Frost, Robert, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_296'>296</span>Future, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Galileo, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>; <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>; <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Galvani, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Gauss, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Geometry, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>George II, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Germany, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Gibson, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>God, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>; <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Gradation of Envisagement, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Gravitation, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Greece, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Gregorovius, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Giotto, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Gregory, The Great, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Harvey, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Heath, Sir T. L., <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Hegel, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Herz, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Historical Revolt, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Hooker, Richard, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Hume, <a href='#Page_5'>5</a>, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>; <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Huyghens, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>; <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_256'>256</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Idealism, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>; <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Immediate Occasion, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Individual Essence, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Induction, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>; <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Infinite Abstractive Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Ingression, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Integral Calculus, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Internal Relations, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>; <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Intrinsic Reality, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Invention, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Ionian Philosophers, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Irresistible Grace, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Isolated Systems, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Isolation of Eternal Objects, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Isotopes, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Italy, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>James, Henry, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>James, William, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>; <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Joseph, Hapsburgh Emperor, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Justinian, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Kant, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>; <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>; <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Kepler, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_297'>297</span>Lagrange, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Laplace, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Lavoisier, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Law, Roman, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Laws of Nature, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Least Action, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Lecky, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_254'>254</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Leibniz, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>; <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Life, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Limitation, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Lloyd Morgan, <i><a href='#PREFACE'>Preface</a></i>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Location, Simple, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Locke, John, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>; <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Locomotion, Vibratory, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Logic, Abstract, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Logic, Scholastic, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Lucretius, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Macaulay, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Milton, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Mind, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Mass, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Mathematics, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>; <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Mathematics, Applied, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Matter, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Matter (philosophical), <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Maupertuis, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Max Müller, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Maxwell, Clerk, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Mechanical Explanation, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Mechanism, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Mechanistic Theory, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Memory, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Mersenne, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Michelson, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Mill, John Stuart, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Modal Character of Space, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Modal Limitation, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Mode, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Moral Responsibility, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Motion, Laws of, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Müller, Johannes, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Narses, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Natural Selection, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Naturalism in Art, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Newman, John Henry, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_298'>298</span>Newton, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>; <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>; <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Not-Being, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Objectivism, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Occasions, Community of, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Occupied Events, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Oersted, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Order of Nature, <a href='#Page_5'>5</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Organic Mechanism, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Organism, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>; <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>; <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Padua, University of, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Paley, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Papacy, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Pascal, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Past, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Pasteur, Louis, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Pelagius, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Perception, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Periodic Law (Mendeleëf), <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Periodicity, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Perspective, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Petavius, <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Philosophy, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Physical Field, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Physics, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Plato, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>; <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Pope, Alexander, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Possibility, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Prehension, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Prehensive Character of Space, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Present, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Primary Qualities, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Primate, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Prime Mover, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Primordial Element, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Process, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Professionalism, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Proton, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Psychology, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Pusey, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Pythagoras, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Quality, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Quantum Theory, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>; <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Rationalism, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Ramsay, Sir William, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_299'>299</span>Rawley, Dr., <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Rayleigh, Lord, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Realism, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Reformation, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Reiteration, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>; <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Relational Essence, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Relativity, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>; <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Retention, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Riemann, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Romans, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Roman Law, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Rome, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Rousseau, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Royal Society, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Russell, Bertrand, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Sarpi, Paul, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Schleiden, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Schwann, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Scientific Materialism, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Scientific Movement, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Secondary Qualities, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Seneca, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Sense-Object, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Separative Character of Space, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Shakespeare, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Shape, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Shelley, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Sidgwick, Henry, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Simple Eternal Objects, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Simple Location, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>; <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_217'>217</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Simultaneity, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>‘Some,’ <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Southey, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Space, Physical, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Spatialisation, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Specious Present, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Spinoza, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Sophocles, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Standpoint, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Stoicism, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Struggle for Existence, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'><span class='pageno' id='Page_300'>300</span>Subjectivism, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Substance, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Substantial Activity, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Superject, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Synthetic Prehension, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Technology, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Temporalisation, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Tennyson, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Time, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Tragedy, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Translucency of Realisation, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Trent, Council of, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Trigonometry, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>True Propositions, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Unknowns (in Mathematics), <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Universals, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Untrue Propositions, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Value, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Variable, The, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Vasco da Gama, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Velocity, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Vertex of Abstractive Hierarchy, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Vesalius, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Vibration, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Vibratory Organic Deformation, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> - <li class='c017'>Virtual Work, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Vitalism, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Volta, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Voltaire, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>; <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <i>e.s.</i>; <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Walpole, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Washington, George, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Watt, James, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Wesley, John, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Whitman, Walt, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - <li class='c017'>Wordsworth, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>; <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <i>e.s.</i></li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Young, Thomas, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.</li> -</ul> -<ul class='index c000'> - <li class='c017'>Zeno, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<div class='pbb'> - <hr class='pb c000' /> -</div> -<p class='c001'><a id='endnote'></a></p> -<div class='tnotes'> - -<div class='nf-center-c0'> - <div class='nf-center'> - <div><span class='large'>Transcriber’s Note</span></div> - </div> -</div> - -<p class='c001'>The printer employed the diaeresis in words like ‘coördination’ or -‘coöperation’. On p. 157, the first syllable of ‘coöperating’ fell -on the line break, and the word was hyphenated as ‘co-operating’, since -the diaeresis was not needed. The word has been joined here and the -diaeresis employed as ‘coöperating’.</p> - -<p class='c001'>The following words appear both with and without a hyphen: to-day, -non-entity, half-way, inter-connected, non-entity.</p> - -<p class='c001'>Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and -are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.</p> - -<table class='table1' summary=''> -<colgroup> -<col width='8%' /> -<col width='73%' /> -<col width='17%' /> -</colgroup> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_20.10'></a><a href='#corr20.10'>20.10</a></td> - <td class='c008'>restraining g[i/o]vernment.</td> - <td class='c018'>Replaced.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_21.31'></a><a href='#corr21.31'>21.31</a></td> - <td class='c008'>is kept in contact w[ti/it]h</td> - <td class='c018'>Transposed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_57.30'></a><a href='#corr57.30'>57.30</a></td> - <td class='c008'>Now the scientific philosop[h]y</td> - <td class='c018'>Inserted.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_69.9'></a><a href='#corr69.9'>69.9</a></td> - <td class='c008'>no other way of putting[s] things</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_77.6'></a><a href='#corr77.6'>77.6</a></td> - <td class='c008'>these relationships constitute[s] nature.</td> - <td class='c018'>Added.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_157.20'></a><a href='#corr157.20'>157.20</a></td> - <td class='c008'>societies of c[o-/ö]perating organisms.</td> - <td class='c018'>Replaced.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_160.8'></a><a href='#corr160.8'>160.8</a></td> - <td class='c008'>These divis[i]ons are</td> - <td class='c018'>Inserted.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_176.3'></a><a href='#corr176.3'>176.3</a></td> - <td class='c008'>extends beyond[s] the spatio-temporal continuum</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_177.6'></a><a href='#corr177.6'>177.6</a></td> - <td class='c008'>by the reali[z/s]ation of pattern</td> - <td class='c018'>Consistency.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_177.25'></a><a href='#corr177.25'>177.25</a></td> - <td class='c008'>character of spatio-temporal [of ]extension</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_183.5'></a><a href='#corr183.5'>183.5</a></td> - <td class='c008'>radiate its energy i[s/n] an integral number</td> - <td class='c018'>Replaced.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_195.4'></a><a href='#corr195.4'>195.4</a></td> - <td class='c008'>history of the Christi[o/a]n Church</td> - <td class='c018'>Replaced.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_195.7'></a><a href='#corr195.7'>195.7</a></td> - <td class='c008'>apocalyptic forecast[e]s</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_202.21'></a><a href='#corr202.21'>202.21</a></td> - <td class='c008'>This divis[i]on of territory</td> - <td class='c018'>Inserted.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_213.10'></a><a href='#corr213.10'>213.10</a></td> - <td class='c008'>what anything is in i[t]self.</td> - <td class='c018'>Inserted.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_245.27'></a><a href='#corr245.27'>245.27</a></td> - <td class='c008'>even [al]though any such discrimination</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_274.14'></a><a href='#corr274.14'>274.14</a></td> - <td class='c008'>its sta[k/t]e of rapid development</td> - <td class='c018'>Replaced.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_276.17'></a><a href='#corr276.17'>276.17</a></td> - <td class='c008'>The task of coö[r]dination is left</td> - <td class='c018'>Inserted.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_279.22'></a><a href='#corr279.22'>279.22</a></td> - <td class='c008'>What I mean is art [(]and aesthetic education.</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_288.33'></a><a href='#corr288.33'>288.33</a></td> - <td class='c008'>mutually coö[o]perate.</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class='c008'><a id='c_290.3'></a><a href='#corr290.3'>290.3</a></td> - <td class='c008'>it bars coö[o]peration.</td> - <td class='c018'>Removed.</td> - </tr> -</table> - -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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