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If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: The Case Against Evolution - -Author: George Barry O'Toole - -Release Date: July 26, 2022 [eBook #68574] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Tim Lindell, Les Galloway and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CASE AGAINST -EVOLUTION *** - - - Transcriber’s Notes - -Obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected. Variations -in hyphenation have been standardised but all other spelling, -punctuation and accents remains unchanged. - -Italics are represented thus _italic_, bold thus =bold=. - -A reference to Monism as “destructive of culture, etc.” in the index -to page 450, which does not exist, has been changed to 350. - -The repetition of section titles on consecutive pages has been removed. - - - - - THE CASE AGAINST EVOLUTION - - - [publisher’s monogram] - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO · DALLAS - ATLANTA · SAN FRANCISCO - - MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED - LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA - MELBOURNE - - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. - TORONTO - - - THE CASE AGAINST - EVOLUTION - - BY - - GEORGE BARRY O’TOOLE, PH. D., S.T.D. - - PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AND PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF PHILOSOPHY, - ST. VINCENT ARCHABBEY; PROFESSOR OF ANIMAL - BIOLOGY, SETON HILL COLLEGE - - New York - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - - 1926 - - _All rights reserved_ - - - COPYRIGHT, 1925, - BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. - - Set up and electrotyped. - Published April, 1925. - - Reprinted February, 1926. - - - _Printed in the United States of America by_ - J. J. LITTLE AND IVES COMPANY, NEW YORK - - - - - TO MY MOTHER - - - - - ADDENDA - - -NOTE TO PAGE 23.— - -As a result of recent investigations on the sex chromosomes and -chromosome numbers in mammals, Theophilus S. Painter reaches the -conclusions that polyploidy cannot be invoked to explain evolution -within this class. After giving a table of chromosome numbers for 7 out -of the 9 eutherian orders, Painter concludes: “The facts recorded above -are of especial interest in that they indicate a unity of chromosome -composition above the marsupial level and effectively dispose of the -suggestion that extensive polyploidy may have occurred within this -subclass. - -“In the marsupials the chromosome number is a low one and in the -opossum is 22. At first sight it might appear that the eutherian -condition might have arisen from this by tetraploidy. There are two -objections, however. In the first place the bulk of the chromatin -in marsupials is about the same as in the eutheria, using the sex -chromosome as our measure. In the second place, polyploidy could -scarcely occur successfully in animals with X-Y sex chromosomes, as -most mammals possess, because of the complication occurring in the -sex chromosome balance” (_Science_, April 17, 1925, p. 424). As the -X-Y type of sex chromosomes occurs widely not only among vertebrates, -but also among insects, nematodes, and echinoderms, Painter’s latter -objection excludes evolution by polyploidy from a large portion of the -animal kingdom. - - -NOTE TO PAGE 90.— - -Especially reprehensible, in this respect, are the reconstructions of -the Pithecanthropus, the Eoanthropus, and other alleged pitheco-human -links modeled by McGregor and others. These imaginative productions, -in which cranial fragments are arbitrarily completed and fancifully -overlayed with a veneering of human features, have no scientific -value or justification. It is consoling, therefore, to note that -the great French palæontologist, Marcelin Boule, in his recent book -“Les Hommes Fossiles” (Paris, 1921), has entered a timely protest -against the appearance of such reconstructions in serious scientific -works. “Dubois and Manouvrier,” he says, “have given reconstructions -of the skull and even of the head (of the Pithecanthropus). These -attempts made by medical men, are much too hypothetical, because we -do not possess a single element for the reconstruction of the basis -of the brain case, or of the jawbones. We are surprised to see that a -great palæontologist, Osborn, publishes efforts of this kind. Dubois -proceeded still farther in the realm of imagination when he exhibited -at the universal exposition of Paris a plastic and painted reproduction -of the Pithecanthropus” (_op. cit._, p. 105). And elsewhere he remarks: -“Some true savants have published portraits, covered with flesh and -hair, not only of the Neandertal Man, whose skeleton is known well -enough today, but also of the Man of Piltdown, whose remnants are so -fragmentary; of the Man of Heidelberg, of whom we have only the lower -jawbone; of the Pithecanthropus, of whom there exists only a piece of -the cranium and ... two teeth. Such reproductions may have their place -in works of the lowest popularization. But they very much deface the -books, though otherwise valuable, into which they are introduced.” -... “Men of science—and of conscience—know the difficulties of such -attempts too well to regard them as anything more than a pastime” (_op. -cit._, p. 227). - - -NOTE TO PAGE 342.— - -A fourth possibility is suggested by the case of the so-called skull -of the Galley Hill Man, of whose importance as a prehistoric link Sir -Arthur Keith held a very high opinion, but which has since turned out -to be no skull at all, but merely an odd-shaped piece of stone. - - - - - CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - FOREWORD xi - - - PART I—EVOLUTION IN GENERAL - - CHAPTER - - I THE PRESENT CRISIS IN EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT 1 - - II HOMOLOGY AND ITS EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION 31 - - III FOSSIL PEDIGREES 66 - - - PART II—THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINS - - I THE ORIGIN OF LIFE 131 - - II THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SOUL 189 - - III THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN BODY 268 - - AFTERWORD 349 - - GLOSSARY - - INDEX TO AUTHORS - - INDEX OF SUBJECTS - - - - - FOREWORD - - -The literature on the subject of evolution has already attained such -vast dimensions that any attempt to add to it has the appearance of -being both superfluous and presumptuous. It is, however, in the fact -that the generality of modern works are frankly partisan in their -treatment of this theme that the publication of the present work finds -justification. - -For the philosophers and scientists of the day evolution is evidently -something which admits of no debate and which must be maintained at -all costs. These thinkers are too intent upon making out a plausible -case for the theory to take anything more than the mildest interest in -the facts opposed to it. If they advert to them at all, it is always -to minimize, and never to accentuate, their antagonistic force. For -the moment, at any rate, the minds of scientific writers are closed to -unfavorable, and open only to favorable, evidence, so that one must -look elsewhere than in their pages for adequate presentation of the -case against evolution. - -The present work aims at setting forth the side of the question -which it is now the fashion to suppress. It refuses to be bound by -the convention which prescribes that evolution shall be leniently -criticized. It proceeds, in fact, upon the opposite assumption, namely, -that a genuinely scientific theory ought not to stand in need of -indulgence, but should be able, on the contrary, to endure the acid -test of merciless criticism. - -Evolution has been termed a “necessary hypothesis.” We have no quarrel -with the phrase, provided it really means evolution as an hypothesis, -and not evolution as a dogma. For, obviously, the problem of a gradual -differentiation of organic species cannot even be investigated upon -the fixistic assumption, inasmuch as this assumption destroys the -problem at the very outset. Unless we assume the possibility, at least, -that modern species of plants and animals may have been the product of -a gradual process, there is no problem to investigate. It is, however, -a far cry from the possibility to the actuality; and the mere fact that -an hypothesis is necessary as an incentive to investigation does not -by any means imply that the result of the investigation will be the -vindication of its inspirational hypothesis. On the contrary, research -often results in the overthrow of the very hypothesis which led to its -inception. We can, therefore, quite readily admit the necessity of -evolution as an hypothesis, while rejecting its necessity as a dogma. - -Assent to evolution as a dogma is advocated not only by materialists, -who see in evolutionary cosmogony proof positive of their monism and -the complete overthrow of the idea of Creation, but also by certain -Catholic scientists, who seem to fear that religion may become involved -in the anticipated ruin of fixism. Thus all resistance to the theory -of evolution is deprecated by Father Wasmann and Canon Dorlodot on the -assumption that the ultimate triumph of this theory is inevitable, -and that failure to make provision for this eventuality will lead to -just such another blunder as theologians of the sixteenth century -made in connection with the Copernican theory. Recollection of the -Galileo incident is, doubtless, salutary, in so far as it suggests -the wisdom of caution and the imperative necessity of close contact -with ascertained facts, but a consideration of this sort is no warrant -whatever for an uncritical acceptance of what still remains unverified. -History testifies that verification followed close upon the heels of -the initial proposal of the heliocentric theory, but the whole trend -of scientific discovery has been to destroy, rather than to confirm, -all definite formulations of the evolutional theory, in spite of the -immense erudition expended in revising them. - -There is, in brief, no parity at all between Transformism and the -Copernican theory. Among other points of difference, Tuccimei notes -especially the following: “The Copernican system,” he remarks, -“explains _that which is_, whereas evolution attempts to explain _that -which was_; it enters, in other words, into the problem of origins, an -insoluble problem in the estimation of many illustrious evolutionists, -according to whom no experimental verification is possible, given -the processes and factors in conjunction with which the theory was -proposed. But what is of still greater significance for those who -desire to see a parallelism between the two theories is the fact -that the Copernican system became, with the discoveries of Newton, a -demonstrated thesis, scarcely fifty years after the death of Galileo; -the theory of evolution, on the other hand, is at the present day no -longer able to hold its own even as an hypothesis, so numerous are its -incoherencies and the objections to it raised by its own partisans.” -(“La Decadenza di una Teoria,” 1908, p. 11.) - -The prospect, then, of a renewal of the Galileo episode is exceedingly -remote. Far more imminent to the writer seems the danger that the -well-intentioned rescuers of religion may be obliged to perform a -most humiliating _volte face_, after having accepted all too hastily -a doctrine favored only for the time being in scientific circles. It -is, in fact, by no means inconceivable that the scientific world will -eventually discard the now prevalent dogma of evolution. In that case -those who have seen fit to reconcile religion with evolution will have -the questionable pleasure of unreconciling it in response to this -reversal of scientific opinion. - -On the whole, the safest attitude toward evolution is the agnostic -one. It commits us to no uncertain position. It does not compromise -our intellectual sincerity by requiring us to accept the dogmatism -of scientific orthodoxy as a substitute for objective evidence. It -precludes the possible embarrassment of having to unsay what we -formerly said. And last, but not least, it is the attitude of simple -truth; for the truest thing that Science is, or ever will be, able to -say concerning the problem of organic origins is that she knows nothing -about it. - -In the present work, we shall endeavor to show that Evolution has long -since degenerated into a dogma, which is believed in spite of the -facts, and not on account of them. The first three chapters deal with -the theory in general, discussing in turn its genetical, morphological, -and geological aspects. The last three chapters are devoted to the -problem of origins, and treat of the genesis of life, of the human -soul, and of the human body, respectively. - -While this book is in no sense a work of “popular science,” I have -sought to broaden its scope and interest by combining the scientific -with the philosophic viewpoint. Certain portions of the text are -unavoidably technical, but there is much, besides, that the general -reader will be able to follow without difficulty. Students, especially -of biology, geology, and experimental psychology, may use it to -advantage as supplementary reading in connection with their textbooks. - -I wish to acknowledge herewith my indebtedness to the Editor of the -_Catholic Educational Review_, Rev. George Johnson, Ph. D., to whose -suggestion and encouragement the inception of this work was largely -due. I desire also to express my sincere appreciation of the services -rendered in the revision of the manuscript by the Rev. Edward Wenstrup, -O.S.B., Professor of Zoölogy, St. Vincent College, Pennsylvania. - - BARRY O’TOOLE. - - ST. VINCENT ARCHABBEY, - January 30, 1925. - - - - - PART I - - EVOLUTION IN GENERAL - - - - - CHAPTER I - - THE PRESENT CRISIS IN EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT - - -Three prominent men, a scientist, a publicist, and an orator, have -recently made pronouncements on the theory of Evolution. The trio, of -course, to whom allusion is made, are Bateson, Wells, and Bryan. As -a result of their utterances, there has been a general reawakening -of interest in the problem to which they drew attention. Again and -again, in popular as well as scientific publications, men are raising -and answering the question: “Is Darwinism dead?” Manifold and various -are the answers given, but none of them appears to take the form -of an unqualified affirmation or negation. Some reply by drawing a -distinction between Darwinism, as a synonym for the theory of evolution -in general, and Darwinism, in the sense of the particular form of that -theory which had Darwin for its author. Modern research, they assure -us, has not affected the former, but has necessitated a revision of -ideas with respect to the latter. There are other forms of evolution -besides Darwinism, and, as a matter of fact, not Darwin, but Lamarck -was the originator of the scientific theory of evolution. Others, -though imitating the prudence of the first group in their avoidance of -a categorical answer, prefer to reply by means of a distinction based -upon their interpretation of the realities of the problem rather than -upon any mere terminological consideration. - -Of the second group, some, like Osborn, distinguish between the _law_ -of evolution and the theoretical _explanations_ of this law proposed by -individual scientists. The existence of the law itself, they insist, is -not open to question; it is only with respect to hypotheses explanatory -of the aforesaid law that doubt and disagreement exist. The obvious -objection to such a solution is that, if evolution is really a law of -nature, it ought to be reducible to some clear-cut mathematical formula -comparable to the formulations of the laws of constant, multiple, and -reciprocal proportion in chemistry, or of the laws of segregation, -assortment, and linkage in genetics. Assuming, then, that it is a -genuine law, how is it that today no one ventures to formulate this -evolutional law in definite and quantitative terms? - -Others, comprising, perhaps, a majority, prefer to distinguish between -the _fact_ and the _causes_ of evolution. Practically all scientists, -they aver, agree in accepting evolution as an established fact; it is -only with reference to the agencies of evolution that controversy and -uncertainty are permissible. To this contention one may justly reply -that, by all the canons of linguistic usage, a fact is an observed or -experienced event, and that hitherto no one in the past or present -has ever been privileged to witness with his senses even so elemental -a phenomenon in the evolutionary process as the actual origin of a -new and genuine organic species. If, however, the admission be made -that the term “fact” is here used in an untechnical sense to denote -an inferred event postulated for the purpose of interpreting certain -natural phenomena, then the statement that the majority of modern -scientists agree as to the “fact” of evolution may be allowed to stand, -with no further comment than to note that the formidable number and -prestige of the advocates fail to intimidate us. Considerations of this -sort are wholly irrelevant, for in science no less than in philosophy -authority is worth as much as its arguments and no more. - -The limited knowledge of the facts possessed by the biologists of -the nineteenth century left their imaginations perilously unfettered -and permitted them to indulge in a veritable orgy of theorizing. Now, -however, that the trail blazed by the great Augustinian Abbot, Mendel, -has been rediscovered, work of real value is being done with the seed -pan, the incubator, the microtome, etc., and the wings of irresponsible -speculation are clipped. Recent advances in this new field of Mendelian -genetics have made it possible to subject to critical examination -all that formerly went under the name of “experimental evidence” of -evolution. Even with respect to the inferential or circumstantial -evidence from palæontology, the enormous deluge of fossils unearthed -by the tireless zeal of modern investigators has annihilated, by its -sheer complexity, the hasty generalizations and facile simplifications -of a generation ago, forcing the adoption of a more critical -attitude. Formerly, a graded series of fossil genera sufficed for -the construction of a “palæontological pedigree”; now, the worker in -this field demands that the chain of descent shall be constructed -with species, instead of genera, for links—“Not till we have linked -species into lineages, can we group them into genera.” (F. A. Bather, -_Science_, Sept. 17, 1920, p. 264.) This remarkable progress in -scientific studies has tended to precipitate the crisis in evolutionary -thought, which we propose to consider in the present chapter. Before -doing so, however, it will be of advantage to formulate a clear -statement of the problem at issue. - -Evolution, or transformism, as it is more properly called, may be -defined as the theory which regards the present species of plants and -animals as modified descendants of earlier forms of life. Nowadays, -therefore, the principal use of the term evolution is to denote the -developmental theory of organic species. It is, however, a word of many -senses. In the eighteenth century, for example, it was employed in a -sense at variance with the present usage, that is, to designate the -non-developmental theory of embryological encasement or preformation -as opposed to the developmental theory of epigenesis. According -to the theory of encasement, the adult organism did not arise by -the generation of new parts (epigenesis), but by a mere “unfolding” -(_evolutio_) of preëxistent parts. At present, however, evolution is -used as a synonym for transformism, though it has other meanings, -besides, being sometimes used to signify the formation of inorganic -nature as well as the transformation of organic species. - -Evolution, in the sense of transformism, is opposed to fixism, the -older theory of Linné, according to whom no _specific_ change is -possible in plants and animals, all organisms being assumed to have -persisted in essential sameness of type from the dawn of organic life -down to the present day. The latter theory admits the possibility of -environmentally-induced modifications, which are non-germinal and -therefore non-inheritable. It also admits the possibility of germinal -changes of the varietal, as opposed to the specific, order, but it -maintains that all such changes are confined within the limits of the -species, and that the boundaries of an organic species are impassable. -Transformism, on the contrary, affirms the possibility of specific -change, and assumes that the boundaries of organic species have -actually been traversed. - -What, then, is an organic species? It may be defined as a group of -organisms endowed with the _hardihood_ necessary to survive and -propagate themselves under natural conditions (_i.e._ in the wild -state), exhibiting a common inheritable type, differing from one -another by no major germinal difference, perfectly interfertile with -one another, but _sexually incompatible_ with members of an alien -specific group, in such wise that they produce hybrids wholly, or -partially, sterile, when crossed with organisms outside their own -specific group. - -David Starr Jordan has wisely called attention to the requisite of -viability and survival under natural conditions. “A species,” he says, -“is not merely a form or group of individuals distinguished from other -groups by definable features. A complete definition involves longevity. -A species is a kind of animal or plant which has run the gauntlet -of the ages and persisted.... A form is not a species until it has -‘stood.’” (_Science_, Oct. 20, 1922, p. 448.) - -Sexual (gametic) incompatibility as a criterion of specific -distinction, presupposes the bisexual or biparental mode of -reproduction, namely, syngamy, and is therefore chiefly applicable -to the metista, although, if the view tentatively proposed by the -protozoölogist, E. A. Minchin, be correct, it would also be applicable -to the protista. According to this view, no protist type is a -true species, unless it is maintained by syngamy (_i.e._ bisexual -reproduction)—“Not until syngamy was acquired,” says Minchin, “could -true species exist among the Protista.” (“An Introduction to the Study -of the Protozoa,” p. 141.) - -To return, however, to the metista, the horse (_Equus caballus_) and -the ass (_Equus asinus_) represent two distinct species under a common -genus. This is indicated by the fact that the mule, which is the hybrid -offspring of their cross, is entirely sterile, producing no offspring -whatever, when mated with ass, horse, or mule. Such total sterility, -however, is not essential to the proof of specific differentiation; it -suffices that the hybrid be less fertile than its parents. As early as -1686, sterility (total or partial) of the hybrid was laid down by John -Ray as the fundamental criterion of specific distinction. Hence Bateson -complains that Darwinian philosophy flagrantly “ignored the chief -attribute of species first pointed out by John Ray that the product of -their crosses is frequently sterile in a greater or lesser degree.” -(_Science_, Jan. 20, 1922, p. 58.) - -Accordingly, the sameness of type required in members of the same -species refers rather to the genotype, that is, the sum-total of -internal hereditary factors latent in the germ, than to the phenotype, -that is, the expressed somatic characters, viz. the color, structure, -size, weight, and all other perceptible properties, in terms of which a -given plant or animal is described. Thus it sometimes happens that two -distinct species, like the pear-tree and the apple-tree, resemble each -other more closely, as regards their external or somatic characters, -than two varieties belonging to one and the same species. Nevertheless, -the pear-tree and the apple-tree are so unlike in their germinal -(genetic) composition that they cannot even be crossed. - -According to all theories of transformism, new species arise through -the transformation of old species, and hence evolutionists are at -one in affirming the occurrence of specific change. When it comes, -however, to assigning the agencies or factors, which are supposed to -have brought about this transmutation of organic species, there is a -wide divergence of opinion. The older systems of transformism, namely, -Lamarckism and Darwinism, ascribed the modification of organic species -to the operation of the external factors of the environment, while the -later school of orthogenesis attributed it to the exclusive operation -of factors residing within the organism itself. - -Lamarckism, for example, made the formation of organs a response to -external conditions imposed by the environment. The elephant, according -to this view, being maladjusted to its environment by reason of its -clumsy bulk, developed a trunk by using its nose to compensate for -its lack of pliancy and agility. Here the use or function precedes -the organ and molds the latter to its need. Darwinism agrees with -Lamarckism in making the environment the chief arbiter of modification. -Its explanation of the elephant’s trunk, however, is negative rather -than positive. This animal, it tells us, developed a trunk, because -failure to vary in that useful direction would have been penalized by -extermination. - -Wilson presents, in a very graphic manner, the appalling problem -which confronts evolutionists who seek to explain the adaptations of -organisms by means of environmental factors. Referring, apparently, to -Henderson’s “Fitness of the Environment,” he says: “It has been urged -in a recent valuable work ... that fitness is a reciprocal relation, -involving the environment no less than the organism. This is both -a true and suggestive thought; but does it not leave the naturalist -floundering amid the same old quicksands? The historical problem -with which he has to deal must be grappled at closer quarters. He is -everywhere confronted with specific devices in the organism that must -have arisen long after the conditions of environment to which they -are adjusted. Animals that live in water are provided with gills. -Were this all, we could probably muddle along with the notion that -gills are no more than lucky accidents. But we encounter a sticking -point in the fact that gills are so often accompanied by a variety of -ingenious devices, such as reservoirs, tubes, valves, pumps, strainers, -scrubbing brushes, and the like, that are obviously tributary to the -main function of breathing. Given water, asks the naturalist, how has -all this come into existence and been perfected? The question is an -inevitable product of our common sense.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for -1915, p. 405.) - -Impressed with the difficulty of accounting for the phenomena of -organic adaptation by means of the far too general and unspecific -influence of the environment, the orthogenetic school of transformism -inaugurated by Nägeli, Eimer, and Kölliker repudiated this explanation, -and sought to explain organic evolution on the sole basis of internal -factors, such as “directive principles,” or germinal determinants. -According to this conception, the elephant first developed his trunk -under the drive of some internal agency, and afterwards sought out an -environment in which the newly-developed trunk would be useful. In -other words, orthogenesis makes the organ precede the function, and is -therefore the exact reverse of Lamarckism. - -Evolutionists in general, as we have said, regard our present plants -and animals as the modified progeny of earlier forms, understanding -by “modified” that which is the product of a trans-specific, -as distinguished from a varietal or intra-specific, change. To -substantiate the claim that changes of specific magnitude have actually -taken place, they appeal to two principal kinds of evidence, namely: -(a) empirical evidence based on such variations as are now observed -to occur among living organisms; (b) inferential evidence, which -aposterioristically deduces the common ancestry of allied organic -types from their resemblances and their sequence in geological time. -Hence, if we omit as negligible certain subsidiary arguments, the -whole evidence for organic evolution may be summed up under three -heads: (1) the genetic evidence grounded on the facts of variation; -(2) the zoölogical evidence based on homology, that is, on structural -resemblance together with all further resemblances (physiological and -embryological), which such similarity entails; (3) the palæontological -evidence which rests on the gradual approximation of fossil types to -modern types, when the former are ranged in a series corresponding to -the alleged chronological order of their occurrence in the geological -strata. It is the bearing of recent genetical research upon the first -of these three lines of evidence that we propose to examine in the -present chapter, an objective to which a brief and rather eclectic -historical survey of evolutionary thought appears to offer the easiest -avenue of approach. - -While many bizarre speculations on the subject of transformism had -been hazarded in centuries prior to the nineteenth, the history -of this conception, as a scientific hypothesis, dates from the -publication of Lamarck’s “Philosophie Zoologique” in 1809. According -to Lamarck, organic species are changed as a result of the _indirect_ -influence of the external conditions of life. A change in environment -forces a change of habit on the part of the animal. A change in the -animal’s habits results in adaptation, that is, in the development or -suppression of organs through use or disuse. The adaptation, therefore, -thus acquired was not directly imposed by the environment, but only -indirectly—that is, through the mediation of habit. Once acquired -by the individual animal, however, the adaptation was, so Lamarck -thought, taken up by the process of inheritance and perpetuated by -being transmitted to the animal’s offspring. The net result would be a -progressive differentiation of species due to this indirect influence -of a varying environment. - -Such was the theory of Lamarck, and it is sound and plausible in all -respects save one, namely, the unwarranted assumption that acquired -adaptations are inheritable, since these, to quote the words of the -Harvard zoölogist, G. H. Parker, “are as a matter of fact just the -class of changes in favor of the inheritance of which there is the -least evidence.” (“Biology and Social Problems,” 1914, p. 103.) - -The next contribution to the philosophy of transformism was made by -Charles Darwin, when, in the year 1859, he published his celebrated -“Origin of Species.” In this work, the English naturalist bases the -evolution of organic species upon the assumed spontaneous tendency -of organisms to vary minutely from their normal type in every -possible direction. This spontaneous variability gives rise to slight -variations, some of which are advantageous, others disadvantageous to -the organism. The enormous fecundity of organisms multiplies them in -excess of the available food supply, and more, accordingly, are born -than can possibly survive. In the ensuing competition or struggle for -existence, individuals favorably modified survive and propagate their -kind, those unfavorably modified perish without progeny. This process -of elimination Darwin termed natural selection. Only individuals -favored by it were privileged to propagate their kind, and thus it -happened that these minute variations of a useful character were seized -upon and perpetuated “by the strong principle of _inheritance_.” In -this way, these slight but useful modifications would tend gradually -to accumulate from generation to generation in the direction favored -by “natural selection,” until, by the ensuing summation of innumerable -minor differences verging in the same direction, a major difference -would be produced. The end-result would be a progressive _divergence_ -of posterity from the common ancestral type, whence they originally -sprang, ending in a multiplicity of new forms or species, all differing -to a greater or lesser extent from the primitive type. The contrary -hypothesis of a possible _convergence_ of two originally diverse types -towards eventual similarity Darwin rejected as an extremely improbable -explanation of the observed resemblance of organic forms, which, not -without reason, he thought it more credible to ascribe to their assumed -divergence from a common ancestral type. - -Such was the scheme of evolution elaborated by Charles Darwin. His -hypothesis leaves the origin of variations an unsolved mystery. It -assumes what has never been proved, namely, the efficacy of “natural -selection.” It rests on what has been definitely disproved by factual -evidence, namely, the inheritability of the slight variations, now -called fluctuations, which, not being transmitted even, by the -hereditary process, cannot possibly accumulate from generation to -generation, as Darwin imagined. Moreover, fluctuations owe their -origin to variability in the external conditions of life (_e.g._ in -temperature, moisture, altitude, exposure, soil, food, etc.), being -due to the _direct_ influence or pressure of the environment, and not -to any spontaneous tendency within the organism itself. Hence Darwin -erred no less with respect to the spontaneity, than with respect to the -inheritability and summation, of his “slight variations.” - -The subsequent history of Lamarckian and Darwinian Transformism is -briefly told. That both should pass into the discard was inevitable, -but, thanks to repeated revisions undertaken by loyal adherents, their -demise was somewhat retarded. In vain, however, did the Neo-Darwinians -attempt to do for Darwinism what the Neo-Lamarckians had as futilely -striven to do for Lamarckism. The revisers succeeded only in -precipitating a lethal duel between these two rival systems, which -has proved disastrous to both. The controversy begun in 1891 between -Herbert Spencer and August Weismann marked the climax of this fatal -conflict. - -Spencer refused to see any value whatever in Darwin’s principle of -natural selection, while other Neo-Lamarckians, less extreme, were -content to relegate it to the status of a subordinate factor in -evolution. Darwin had considered it “the most important means of -modification,” but it is safe to say that no modern biologist attaches -very much importance to natural selection as a means of accounting for -the differences which mark off one species from another. In fact, if -natural selection has enjoyed, or still continues to enjoy, any vogue -at all, it is not due to its value in natural science (which, for all -practical intents and purposes, is nil), but solely to its appeal as -“mechanistic solution”; for nothing further is needed to commend it to -modern thinkers infected with what Wasmann calls _Theophobia_. Natural -selection, in making the organism a product of the concurrence of blind -forces unguided by Divine intelligence, a mere fortuitous result, and -not the realization of purpose, has furnished the agnostic with a -miserable pretext for omitting God from his attempted explanation of -the universe. “Here is the knot,” exclaims Du Bois-Reymond, “here the -great difficulty that tortures the intellect which would understand the -world. Whoever does not place all activity wholesale under the sway of -Epicurean chance, whoever gives only his little finger to teleology, -will inevitably arrive at Paley’s discarded ‘Natural Theology,’ and -so much the more necessarily, the more clearly he thinks and the -more independent his judgment.... The possibility, ever so distant, -of banishing from nature its seeming purpose, and putting a blind -necessity everywhere in the place of final causes, appears, therefore, -as one of the greatest advances in the world of thought, from which -a new era will be dated in the treatment of these problems. To have -somewhat eased the torture of the intellect which ponders over the -world-problem will, as long as philosophical naturalists exist, be -Charles Darwin’s greatest title to glory.” (_Darwin versus Galiani_, -“Reden,” Vol. I, p. 211.) - -But however indispensable the selection principle may be to a -philosophy which proposes to banish the Creator from creation, its -scientific insolvency has become so painfully apparent that biologists -have lost all confidence in its power to solve the problem of organic -origins. It is recognized, for example, that natural selection would -suppress, rather than promote, development, seeing that organs -have utility only in the state of perfection and are destitute of -selection-value while in the imperfect state of transition. Again, the -specific differences that diversify the various types of plants and -animals are notoriously deficient in selection-value, and therefore the -present differentiation of species cannot be accounted for by means of -the principle of natural selection. Finally, unless one is prepared -to make the preposterous assumption that the environment is a telic -mechanism expressly designed for shaping organisms, he is under logical -necessity of admitting that the influence of natural selection cannot -be anything else than purely destructive. There is, as Wilson points -out, no aprioristic ground for supposing that natural selection could -do anything more than maintain the _status quo_, and as for factual -proofs of its effectiveness in a positive sense, they are wholly -wanting. Professor Caullery of the Sorbonne, in his Harvard lecture -of Feb. 24, 1916, assures us that, “since the time of Darwin, natural -selection has remained a purely speculative idea and that no one has -been able to show its efficacy in concrete indisputable examples.” - -Considerations of this sort induced not only Neo-Lamarckians, but -many non-partisans as well, to take the field against the Darwinian -Selection Principle. Thus Spencer’s caustic attack became a forerunner -of others, and eminent biologists, like Fleischmann, Driesch, T. H. -Morgan, and Bateson, have in turn poured the vials of their satire -upon the attempts of Neo-Darwinians to rehabilitate the philosophy -of natural selection. Wm. Bateson warns those, who persist in their -credulity with reference to the Darwinian account of organic teleology, -that they “will be wise henceforth to base this faith frankly on the -impregnable rock of superstition and to abstain from direct appeals -to natural fact.” This admonition forms the conclusion of a scathing -criticism of what he styles the “fustian of Victorian philosophy.” -“In the face of what we know,” it runs, “of the distribution of -variability in nature, the scope claimed for natural selection must -be greatly reduced. The doctrine of the survival of the fittest is -undeniable so long as it is applied to the organism as a whole, but to -attempt by this principle to find value in all definiteness of parts -and functions, and in the name of science to see fitness everywhere, -is mere eighteenth century optimism. Yet it was in its application to -the parts, to the details of specific difference, to the spots on the -peacock’s tail, to the coloring of an orchid flower, and hosts of such -examples, that the potency of natural selection was urged with greatest -emphasis. Shorn of these pretensions the doctrine of the survival of -favored races is a truism, helping scarcely at all to account for the -diversity of species. Tolerance plays almost as considerable a part. -By these admissions the last shred of that teleological fustian with -which Victorian philosophy loved to clothe the theory of evolution is -destroyed.” (_Heredity_, “Presidential Address to Brit. Ass’n. for -Advanc. of Science,” Aug. 14, 1914.) Nor is this all. The Darwinian -Selection Principle is reproached with having retarded the progress -of science. It is justly accused of having discouraged profound and -painstaking analysis by putting into currency its shallow and spurious -solution of biological problems. “Too often in the past,” says Edmund -Wilson, “the facile formulas of natural selection have been made use of -to carry us lightly over the surface of unsuspected depths that would -have richly repaid serious exploration.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for -1915, p. 406.) - -In retaliation for the destructive criticism of natural selection, -the Neo-Darwinians have proceeded to pulverize the Lamarckian tenet -concerning the inheritability of acquired adaptations. Weismann, having -laid down his classic distinction between the _soma_ (comprising the -vegetative or tissue cells in contact with the environment) and the -_germ_ (_i.e._ the sequestered reproductive cells or gametes, which are -sheltered from environmental vicissitudes), showed that the Lamarckian -assumption that a change in the somatic cells (which constitute the -organism of the individual) is registered in the germ cells (which -constitute the vehicle of racial inheritance), is supported neither -by _a priori_ probability nor by any facts of observation. Germ cells -give rise by division to somatic or tissue cells, but the converse is -not true; for, once a cell has become differentiated and specialized -into a tissue cell, it can never again give rise by division to germ -cells, but only to other tissue cells of its own kind. Hence the -possibility of a change in the tissue being transmitted to the germ -has no antecedent probability in its favor. Neither is it grounded on -the facts of observation. Bodily mutilations of the parent are not -transmitted to the offspring. The child of a blacksmith is not born -with a more developed right arm than that of a tailor’s child. When -the ovaries from a white rabbit are grafted into a black rabbit, whose -own ovaries have been previously removed, the latter, if mated to a -white male, will produce spotlessly white young. Hence the offspring -inherit the characters of the germ track of the white female, whence -the ovaries were derived, without being influenced in the least by the -pigmented somatic cells of the nurse-body (_i.e._ the black female), -into which the ovaries were grafted. Kammerer’s experiments, in which -young salamanders were found to exhibit at birth the coloration, which -their parents had acquired through the action of sunlight, fail to -convince, because, in this case, the bodies of the parents are not -sufficiently impervious to light to preclude its direct action upon -the gametes while in the reproductive organs of the parents. Hence we -cannot be sure but that the coloration of the offspring derived from -these gametes is due to the direct agency of sunlight rather than to -the intermediate influence of the modified somatic cells upon the germ -plasm. - -The same objection holds true of the recent experiments, in which -the germ cells have been modified by modifying the interior medium -or internal environment by means of antibodies and hormones. No -one doubts the possibility of influencing heredity by a direct -modification of the germ cells, especially when, as is always the -case in these experiments, the modification produced is destructive -rather than constructive. The experiments, therefore, of Prof. M. -F. Guyer of Wisconsin University, in which a germinally-transmitted -eye defect was produced by injecting pregnant female rabbits with -an antilens serum derived from fowls immunized to the crystalline -lens of rabbits as antigen, are beside the mark. To demonstrate -the Lamarckian thesis one must furnish evidence of a constructive -addition to inheritance by means of prior somatic acquisition. The -transmission of defects artificially produced is not so much a process -of inheritance (transmission of type) as rather one of degeneracy -(failure to equate the parental type).[1] Commenting on Guyer’s -suggestion that an organism capable of producing antibodies that are -germinally-destructive, may also be able to produce constructive -bodies, Prof. Edwin S. Goodrich says: “The real weakness of the theory -is that it does not escape from the fundamental objections we have -already put forward as fatal to Lamarckism. If an effect has been -produced, either the supposed constructive substance was present from -the first, as an ordinary internal environmental condition necessary -for the normal development of the character, or it must have been -introduced from without by the application of a new stimulus. The same -objection does not apply to the destructive effect. No one doubts that -if a factor could be destroyed by a hot needle or picked out with a -fine forceps the effect of the operation would persist throughout -subsequent generations.” (_Science_, Dec. 2, 1921, p. 535.) - - [1] A good definition of degeneracy is that of A. F. Tredgold, - who says: “I venture to define degeneracy as ‘a retrograde - condition of the individual resulting from a pathological - variation of the germ cell.’” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1918, - p. 548.) - -But in demonstrating against the Neo-Lamarckians that somatic -modifications unrepresented in the germ plasm could have no -significance in the process of racial evolution, Weismann had _proved -too much_. His argument was no less telling against Darwinism than -it was against Lamarckism. Darwin’s “individual differences” or -“slight variations,” now spoken of as fluctuations, were quite as -unrepresented and unrecorded in the germ cells as Lamarck’s “acquired -adaptations.” There can be no “summation of individual differences” -for the simple reason that fluctuations have no germinal basis and -are therefore uninheritable—“We must bear in mind the fact,” says -Prof. Edmund Wilson, “that Darwin often failed to distinguish between -non-inheritable fluctuations and hereditary mutations of small degree.” -(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1915, p. 406.) Fluctuations, as we have -seen, are due to variability in the environmental conditions, _e.g._ -in access to soil nutrients, etc. As an instance of fluctuational -variation the seeds of the ragweed may be cited. Normally these -seeds have six spines, but around this average there is considerable -fluctuation in individual seeds, some having as many as nine spines -and others no more than one. Yet the plants reared from nine-spine -seeds, even when similarly mated, show no greater tendency to produce -nine-spine seeds than do plants reared from one-spine seeds. - -To meet the difficulty presented by the non-inheritability of the -Lamarckian adaptation and the Darwinian fluctuation, De Vries -substituted for them those rare and abruptly-appearing inheritable -variations, which he called mutations[2] and regarded as elementary -steps in the evolutionary process. This new version of transformism -was announced by De Vries in 1901, and more fully explained in his -“Die Mutations-Theorie” (Leipzig, 1902-1903). Renner has shown that De -Vries’ new forms of Œnothera were cases of complex hybridization rather -than real mutants, as the forms produced by mutation are now called. -Nevertheless, the work of Morgan, Bateson, and others leaves little -doubt as to the actual occurrence of _factorial_ mutants, while Dr. -Albert F. Blakeslee has demonstrated the existence of _chromosomal_ -mutants. When unqualified, the term mutant usually denotes the -factorial mutant, which arises from a change in one or more of the -concatenated genes (hereditary factors) of a single chromosome (nuclear -thread) in the germinal (_i.e._ gametic) complex. All such changes -are called factorial mutations. They are hereditarily transmissible, -and affect the somatic characters of the race permanently, although, -in rare cases, such as that of the bar-eyed Drosophila mutant, the -phenomenon of _reversion_ has been observed. The chromosomal mutant, -on the contrary, is not due to changes in the single factors or genes, -but to duplication of one or more entire chromosomes (linkage-groups) -in the gametic complex. Like the factorial mutant, it produces a -permanent and heritable modification. The increase in nuclear material -involved in chromosomal mutation (_i.e._ duplication) seems to cause a -proportionate increase in the cytoplasmic mass of the single somatic -cells, which manifests itself in the phenotype as giantism. De -Vries’ _Œnothera gigas_ is a chromosomal mutant illustrative of this -phenomenon. Besides the foregoing, there is the _pseudomutant_ produced -by the factorial recombination, which results from a _crossover_, -_i.e._ an exchange of genes or factors between two germinal chromosomes -of the same synaptic pair. This reciprocal transfer of genes from one -homologous chromosome to another happens, in a certain percentage of -cases, during synapsis. The percentage can be artificially increased by -exposing young female hybrids to special conditions of temperature. - - [2] The term mutation had been used long before and in a - similar sense by the German palæontologist Waagen, who employed - it to designate the variations of a specific type that succeed - one another in successive strata, a thing which rarely occurs. - (Cf. Waagen’s _Die Formenreihe des Ammonites subradiatus_, - Geognost. paläont. Beitr., Berlin, 1869.) - -If these new mutant forms could be regarded as genuine new species, -then the fact that such variations are heritable and come within the -range of actual observation, would constitute the long-sought empirical -proof of the reality of evolution. Consciously or subconsciously, -however, De Vries recognized that this was not the case; for he refers -to mutants as “elementary species,” and does not venture to present -them as authentic organic species. - -The factorial mutant answers neither the endurance test nor the -intersterility test of a genuine species. It would, doubtless, be -going too far to regard all such mutant forms as examples of germinal -degeneracy, but it cannot be denied that all of them, when compared -to the wild type, are in the direction of unfitness, none of them -being viable and prosperous under the severe conditions obtaining in -the wild state. Bateson, who seems to regard all mutant characters as -recessive and due to germinal loss, declares: “Even in Drosophila, -where hundreds of genetically distinct factors have been identified, -very few new dominants, that is to say positive additions, have been -seen, and I am assured that none of them are of a class which could be -expected to be viable under natural conditions. I understand even that -none are certainly viable in the homozygous state.” (Toronto Address, -_Science_, Jan. 20, 1922, p. 59.) “Garden or greenhouse products,” -says D. S. Jordan, “are immensely interesting and instructive, but -they throw little light on the origin of species. To call them species -is like calling dress-parade cadets ‘soldiers.’ I have heard this -definition of a soldier, ‘one that has stood.’ It is easy to trick out -a group of boys to look like soldiers, but you can not define them as -such until they have ‘stood.’” (_Science_, Oct. 20, 1922.) In a word, -factorial mutants, owing, as they do, their survival exclusively to -the protection of artificial conditions, could never become the hardy -pioneers of new species. - -Bateson insists that the mutational variation represents a change of -loss. “Almost all that we have seen,” he says, “are variations in -which we recognize that elements have been lost.” (_Science_, Jan. -20, 1922, p. 59.) In his Address to the British Association (1914), -he cites numerous examples tending to show that mutant characters are -but diminutions or intensifications of characters pre-existent in the -wild or normal stock, all of which are explicable as effects of the -loss (total or partial) of either positive, or inhibitive (epistatic) -hereditary factors (genes). One of these instances illustrating the -subtractive nature of the factorial mutation is that of the Primula -“Coral King,” a salmon-colored mutant, which was suddenly given off -by a red variety of Primula called “Crimson King.” Such a mutation -is obviously based on the loss of a germinal factor for color. The -loss, however, is sometimes partial rather than total, as instanced in -the case of the purple-edged Picotee sweet pea, which arose from the -wholly purple wild variety by fractionation of the genetic factor for -purple pigment. Even where the mutational variation appears to be one -of gain, as happens when a positive character appears _de novo_ in the -phenotype, or when a dilute parental character is intensified in the -offspring, it is, nevertheless, interpretable as a result of germinal -loss, the loss, namely, total or partial, of a genetic inhibitor. Such -inhibitive genes or factors are known to exist. Bateson has shown, -for example, that the whiteness of White Leghorn chickens is due, not -to the absence of color-factors, but to the presence of a genetic -inhibitor—“The white of White Leghorns,” he says, “is not, as white -in nature often is, due to the loss of the color elements, but to the -action of something which inhibits their expression.” (Address to the -Brit. Ass’n., Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1915, p. 368.) Thus the sudden -appearance in the offspring of a character not visibly represented in -the parents may be due, not to germinal acquisition, but the loss of -an inhibitory gene, whose elimination allows the somatic character -previously suppressed by it to appear. Hence Bateson concludes: “In -spite of seeming perversity, therefore, we have to admit that there is -no evolutionary change which in the present state of our knowledge we -can positively declare to be not due to loss.” (_Loc. cit._, p. 375.) - -Another consideration, which disqualifies the factorial mutant for the -rôle of a new species, is its failure to pass the test of interspecific -sterility. When individuals from two distinct species are crossed, -the offspring of the cross is either completely sterile, as instanced -in the mule, or at least partially so. But when, for example, the -sepia-eyed mutant of the vinegar fly is back-crossed with the red-eyed -wild type, whence it originally sprang, the product of the cross is -a red-eyed hybrid, which is perfectly fertile with other sepia-wild -hybrids, with wild flies, and with sepia mutants. This proves that -the sepia-eyed mutant has departed, so to speak, only a varietal, -and not a specific, distance away from the parent stock. Ordinary -or factorial mutation does not, therefore, as De Vries imagined, -produce new species. These mutants do, indeed, meet the requirement of -permanent transmissibility, for their distinctive characters cannot -be obliterated by any amount of crossing. Nevertheless, the factorial -mutation falls short of being an empirical proof of evolution, because -it is a varietal, and not a specific, change. In other words, factorial -mutants are new varieties and not new species. Only a heritable change -based on germinal acquisition of sufficient magnitude to produce -gametic incompatibility between the variant and the parent type would -constitute direct evidence of the transmutation of species, provided, -of course, that the variant were also capable of survival under the -natural conditions of the wild state. - -In his Toronto address of December 28, 1921, Wm. Bateson announced -the failure of De Vries’ Mutation Theory, when he said: “But that -particular and essential bit of the theory of evolution, which is -concerned with the origin and nature of species remains utterly -mysterious. We no longer feel as we used to do, that the process of -variation, now contemporaneously occurring, is the beginning of a work -which needs merely the element of time for its completion; for even -time cannot complete that which has not yet begun. The conclusion in -which we were brought up that species are a product of a summation of -variations ignored the chief attribute of species first pointed out by -John Ray that the product of their crosses is frequently sterile in -greater or less degree. Huxley, very early in the debate, pointed out -this grave defect in the evidence, but before breeding researches had -been made on a large scale no one felt the objection to be serious. -Extended work might be trusted to supply the deficiency. It has not -done so, and the significance of the negative evidence can no longer be -denied.... - -“If species have a common origin where did they pick up the ingredients -which produce this sexual incompatibility? Almost certainly it is a -variation in which something has been added. We have come to see that -variations can very commonly—I do not say always—be distinguished as -positive and negative.... Now we have no difficulty in finding evidence -of variation by loss, but variations by addition are rarities, even -if there are any such which must be so accounted. The variations to -which interspecific sterility is due are obviously variations in which -something is apparently added to the stock of ingredients. It is one of -the common experiences of the breeder that when a hybrid is partially -sterile, and from it any fertile offspring can be obtained, the -sterility, once lost, disappears. This has been the history of many, -perhaps most, of our cultivated plants of hybrid origin. - -“The production of an indubitably sterile hybrid from completely -fertile parents which has arisen under critical observation is the -event for which we wait. Until this event is witnessed, our knowledge -of evolution is incomplete in a vital respect. From time to time such -an observation is published, but none has yet survived criticism.” -(_Science_, Jan. 20, 1922, pp. 58, 59.) - -But what of the chromosomal mutant? For our knowledge of this type -of mutation we are largely indebted to Blakeslee’s researches and -experiments on the Jimson weed (_Datura stramonium_). According to -Blakeslee, chromosomal mutants result from duplication, or from -reduction, of the chromosomes, and they are classified as _balanced_ or -_unbalanced_ types according as all, or only some, of the chromosomal -linkage-groups are similarly doubled or reduced. If only one of the -homologous chromosomes of a synaptic pair is doubled, the mutant -is termed a _triploid_ form. It is balanced when one homologous -chromosome is doubled in every synaptic pair, but if one or more -chromosomes be added to, or subtracted from, this balanced triploid -complex, the mutant is termed an unbalanced triploid. When all the -chromosomes of the normal diploid complex are uniformly doubled, we -have a balanced _tetraploid_ race. The subtraction or addition of -one or more chromosomes in the case of a balanced tetraploid complex -renders it an unbalanced tetraploid mutant. The retention in somatic -cells of the haploid number of chromosomes characteristic of gametes -and gametophytes gives a balanced _haploid_ mutant, from which hitherto -no unbalanced haploids have been obtained. The normal diploid type and -the balanced tetraploid type are said to constitute an _even_ balance, -while balanced triploids and haploids constitute an _odd_ balance. The -odd balances and all the unbalanced mutants are largely sterile. Thus, -for example, more than 80% of the pollen of the haploid mutant is bad. -“The normal Jimson Weed,” says Blakeslee, “is diploid (2n) with a total -of 24 chromosomes in somatic cells. In previous papers the finding of -tetraploids (4n) with 48 chromosomes and triploids (3n) with 36 was -reported, as well as unbalanced mutants with 25 chromosomes represented -by the formula (2n + 1). The finding of two haploid or 1n plants, which -we are now able to report, adds a new chromosomal type to the balanced -series of mutants in _Datura_. This series now stands: 1n, 2n, 3n, 4n. -Since a series of unbalanced mutants has been obtained from each of -the other balanced types by the addition or subtraction of one or more -chromosomes, it is possible that a similar series of unbalanced mutants -may be obtainable from our new haploid plants, despite the great -unbalance which would thereby result.” (_Science_, June 16, 1923, p. -646.) The haploid mutant, of which Blakeslee speaks, has, of course, 12 -unpaired chromosomes in its somatic cells. - -The balanced triploid is, like the haploid mutant, largely sterile, -and is only obtainable by crossing the tetraploid race with the normal -diploid plant. Since, then, the product of the cross of the diploid -and tetraploid races is sterile, the tetraploid race fulfills the -sterility test of a distinct species. Whether or not it fulfills -the endurance test of survival under natural condition is doubtful, -inasmuch as diploid Daturas are about three times as prolific as the -tetraploid race. Moreover, as Blakeslee himself confessed in a lecture -at Woods Hole attended by the present writer in the summer of 1923, the -origin of a balanced tetraploid form from the normal diploid type by -simultaneous duplication of all the chromosomes in the diploid complex, -is an event that has yet to be witnessed. Nor is any gradual transition -from the diploid to the tetraploid race, by way of unbalanced types -and triploids, conceivable, seeing that such forms are too sterile -to maintain themselves, and are, in fact, incapable of transmitting -their own type in the absence of artificial intervention. There are, -it is true, some instances, in which diploid and tetraploid races -and species occur together in cultivation and in nature. In certain -cases, this tetraploidy is merely apparent, being due to fragmentation -of the chromosomes; in other cases, it is really due to chromosomal -duplication, giving rise to genuine tetraploid forms. The question -is often hard to decide, the mere number of the chromosomes being -not, in itself, a safe criterion. Of the actual origin, however, of -tetraploid from diploid races we have as yet no observational evidence. -Hence Blakeslee’s researches on the chromosomal mutant have so far -failed to furnish experimental proof of the origin of a genuine new -species. Besides, waiving all other considerations, the limits within -which chromosomal duplication is possible are of necessity so narrow, -that, at best, this phenomenon can only be invoked to explain a very -small range of variation. In fact, it is doubtful whether haploidy, -triploidy, and tetraploidy have any important bearing whatever upon the -problem of the origin of species. (See Addenda.) - -The mutation, then, in so far as we have experimental knowledge of it, -does not fulfill requirements of a specific change. It cannot even be -regarded as an _elementary step_ in the direction of such a change. -With this admission, De-Vriesianism becomes obsolete, descending like -its predecessors, Lamarckism and Darwinism, into the charnel-house of -discarded systems whose value is historic, but no longer scientific. -When we enquire into the reason of this common demise of all the -classic systems of transformism, we find it to reside in the progress -of the new science of Mendelian genetics, whose foundations were laid -by an Augustinian monk of the nineteenth century. Six years after -the appearance of Darwin’s “Origin of Species,” Gregor Johann Mendel -published a short paper entitled “Versuche über Pflanzen-hybriden,” -which, unnoticed at the time by a scientific world preoccupied with -Darwinian fantasies, was destined, on its coming to light at the -beginning of the present century, to administer the final _coup de -grace_ to all the elaborate schemes of evolution that had preceded or -followed its initial publication. It took half a century, however, -before the dust of Darwinian sensationalism subsided sufficiently, to -permit the “rediscovery” of Mendel’s solid and genuine contribution -to biological science. But the Prälat of the abbey at Brünn never -lived to see the day of his triumph. The true genius of his century, -he died unhonored and unsung, a pretender being crowned in his stead. -For Coulter says of Darwin: “He died April 19, 1882, probably the most -honored scientific man in the world.” (_Evolution_, 1916, p. 35.) - -Within the small dimensions of the paper, of which we have spoken, -Mendel had compressed the results of years of carefully conceived and -accurately executed experimentation reduced to precise statistical -form and interpreted with a penetrating sagacity of the highest order. -It is no exaggeration to say that his discovery has revolutionized -the science of biology, giving it, for the first time, mathematical -formulas comparable to those of chemistry. His two laws of inheritance, -namely, the law of segregation and the law of independent assortment -of characters, have, as previously intimated, become the basis of the -new science of Genetics. His analysis of biparental reproduction has -interpreted for us the cytological phenomena of synapsis, meiosis, and -syngamy, has explained for us the instability of hybrids, has placed -Weismann’s speculations concerning the autonomy and continuity of the -germ plasm on a firm basis of experimental fact, has clarified all our -notions respecting the mode and range of hereditary transmission, and -has, in a word, opened our eyes to that new and hitherto unexplored -realm of nature which Bateson calls “the world of gametes.” - -Efforts have been made to construct systems of transformism along -Mendelian lines, but none of them has met with notable success. -Lotsy, for example, sought to explain all variation on the basis of -the rearrangement of preëxistent genetic factors brought about by -crossing. But such a solution of the problem is very unsatisfactory. -In the first place, the generality of hybrid (heterozygous) forms are -ruled out on the score of instability. The phenotype of hybrids is -directly dependent, not on the genes themselves, but on the diploid -combination of genes contained in the zygote. This combination, -however, is always dissolved in the process of gamete-formation, by the -segregative reduction division which occurs in the reproductive organs -of the hybrid. Hybrids, therefore, do not _breed true_, if propagated -by sexual reproduction. To maintain constancy of type in hybrids, one -must resort to somatogenic reproduction (_i.e._ vegetative growth from -stems, etc.). Certain violets, in fact, as well as blackberries, are -maintained in a state of constant hybridism by means of this sort of -reproduction, even in nature. In the case of _balanced lethals_ (_i.e._ -factors causing death in the pure or homozygous state), the hybrid -phenotype may be maintained even by sexual reproduction, inasmuch as -all the pure (homozygous) offspring are non-viable. Two lethals are -said to be balanced, when they occur, the first in one and the second -in the other homologous chromosome of the same synaptic pair. “Such a -factorial situation would maintain a state of constant heterozygosis, -the fixed hybridism of an impure species ... the hybrid will breed true -until the relative position of the lethals are changed by a crossover, -or the genetical constitution in these respects is altered by a -mutation.” (Davis, _Science_, Feb. 3, 1922, p. 111.) As is evident, -however, the condition of balanced lethals involves a considerable -reduction in fertility. - -Hybridization, moreover, is successful between varieties of the same -species rather than between distinct species. Interspecific crosses -are in some cases entirely unproductive, in other cases productive -of wholly-sterile, hybrids, and in still other cases productive of -semisterile hybrids. When semisterile hybrids are obtainable from an -interspecific cross, the phenotype can be kept constant by somatogenic -reproduction, but, as we shall see in a later chapter, this kind of -reproduction does not counteract senescence, and stock thus propagated -usually plays out within a determinate period. Finally, the mixture -of incompatible germinal elements involved in an interspecific cross -tends to produce forms, which are subnormal in their viability and -vitality. The conclusions of Goodspeed and Clausen are the following: -“(1) As a consequence of modern Mendelian developments, the Mendelian -factors may be considered as making up a reaction system, the elements -of which exhibit more or less specific relations to one another; (2) -strictly Mendelian results are to be expected only when the contrast is -between factor differences within a common Mendelian reaction system -as is ordinarily the case in varietal hybrids; (3) when distinct -reaction systems are involved, as in species crosses, the phenomena -must be viewed in the light of a contrast between systems rather than -between specific factor differences, and the results will depend upon -the degree of mutual compatibility displayed between the specific -elements of the two systems.” (_Amer. Nat._, 51 (1917), p. 99.) To -these conclusions may be added the pertinent observation of Bradley -Moore Davis: “Of particular import,” he says, “is the expectation -that lethals most frequently owe their presence to the heterozygous -condition since the mixing of diverse germ plasms seems likely to lead -to the breaking down of delicate and vital adjustments in proportion -relative to the degree of protoplasmic confusion, and this means -chemical and physical disturbance.” (_Science_, Feb. 3, 1923, p. 111.) - -But crossing produces, in the second filial generation (F₂), pure -(homozygous) as well as hybrid (heterozygous) forms.⅖ In some cases -these pure forms are new, the phenotype being different from that -of either pure grandparent. Such a result is produced by _random -assortment_ of the chromosomes in gamete and zygote formation, and -occurs when the genes for two or more pairs of contrasted characters -are located in different chromosome pairs. The phenomenon is formulated -in Mendel’s Second Law, the law of independent assortment. The novelty, -however, of the true-breeding forms thus produced is not absolute, -but relative. There is no origination of new hereditary factors. It -is simply a recombination of the old genes of different stocks, the -genes themselves undergoing no intrinsic alteration. The combination -is new, but not the elements combined. In addition to chromosomal -recombination, we have factorial recombination by means of crossovers. -This, too, can produce new and true-breeding forms of a fixed nature, -but here, likewise, it is the combination, and not the elements -combined, which is new. The “new” forms thus produced are called, as we -have seen, pseudomutants. When pseudomutations, that is, crossovers, -occur in conjunction with the condition of balanced lethals, they -closely simulate genuine factorial mutations. This is exemplified in -the case of De Vries’ _Œnothera Lamarckiana_, which is the product of -a crossover supervening upon a situation of balanced lethals. In cases -of this kind, the crossover releases hitherto suppressed recessive -characters, giving the appearance of real mutation. “The workers with -Drosophila,” says Davis, “seem inclined to believe that much of the -phenomena simulating mutation in their material is in reality the -appearance of characters set free by the breaking of lethal adjustments -which held the characters latent. Well-known workers have arrived at -similar conclusions for _Œnothera_ material and are not content to -accept as evidence of mutations the behavior of _Lamarckiana_ and some -other forms when they throw their marked variants.” (_Science_, Feb. 3, -1922, p. 111.) - -The new forms, however, resulting from random assortment and crossovers -cannot be regarded as new species. “Analysis,” says Bateson, “has -revealed hosts of transferable characters. Their combinations suffice -to supply in abundance series of types which might pass for new -species, and certainly would be so classed if they were met with in -nature. Yet critically tested, we find that they are not distinct -species and we have no reason to suppose any accumulation of characters -of the same order would culminate in the production of distinct -species. Specific difference therefore must be regarded as probably -attaching to the base upon which these transferables are implanted, of -which we know absolutely nothing at all. Nothing that we have witnessed -in the contemporary world can colorably be interpreted as providing the -sort of evidence required.” (_Science_, Jan. 20, 1922, pp. 59, 60.) - -Anyone thoroughly acquainted with the results of genetical analysis and -research will find it impossible to escape the conviction that there -is no such thing as experimental evidence for evolution. In spite of -the enormous advances made in the fields of genetics and cytology, -the problem of the origin of species is, scientifically speaking, -as mysterious as ever. No variation of which we have experience is -interpretable as the transmutation of a specific type, and David Starr -Jordan voices an inevitable conclusion when he says: “None of the -created ‘new species’ of plant or animal I know of would last five -years in the open, nor is there the slightest evidence that any new -species of field or forest or ocean ever originated from mutation, -discontinuous variation, or hybridization.” (_Science_, Oct. 20, 1922, -p. 448.) - -“In any case,” as Professor Caullery tells us in his Harvard lecture -on the “Problem of Evolution,” “we do not see in the facts emerging -from Mendelism, how evolution, in the sense that morphology suggests, -can have come about. And it comes to pass that some of the biologists -of greatest authority in the study of Mendelian heredity are led, with -regard to evolution, either to a more or less complete agnosticism, -or to the expression of ideas quite opposed to those of the preceding -generation; ideas which would almost take us back to creationism.” -(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1916, p. 334.) It is, of course, impossible -within the limits of a single chapter to convey any adequate impression -of all that Mendel’s epoch-making achievement portends, but what -has been said is sufficient to give some idea of the acuteness of -the crisis through which the theory of organic evolution is passing -as a result of his discovery. In its classic forms of Lamarckism, -Darwinism and De-Vriesianism, the survival of the theory is out of the -question. Whether or not it can be rehabilitated in any form whatever -is a matter open to doubt. Transfixed by the innumerable spears of -modern objections, its extremity calls to mind the plight of the Lion -of Lucerne. Possibly, it is destined to find a rescuer in some great -genius of the future, but of one thing, at least, we may be perfectly -certain, namely, that, even if rejuvenated, it will never again resume -the lineaments traced by Charles Darwin. In the face of this certainty, -it is almost pitiful to hear the die-hards of Darwinism bolstering up a -lost cause with the wretched quibble that, though natural selection has -been discredited as an explanation of the differentiation of species, -Darwinism “in its essentials” survives intact. For, if there is any -feature which, beyond all else, deserves to be called an essential of -Darwin’s system, surely it is natural selection. For Darwin it was “the -most important” agency of transformation (cf. “Origin of Species,” -6th ed., p. 5). Apart from his hypothesis of the summation through -inheritance of slight variations (“fluctuations”), now completely -demolished by the new science of genetics, it represented his sole -contribution to the philosophy of transformism. It alone distinguishes -Darwinism from Lamarckism, its prototype. Without it the “Origin of -Species” would be Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. With it -Darwin’s fame should stand or fall. Therefore, since Darwin erred in -making it “the most important means of modification,” Darwinism is -dead, and no grief of mourners can resuscitate the corpse. “Through -the last fifty years,” says Bateson, “this theme of the natural -selection of favored races has been developed and expounded in writings -innumerable. Favored races certainly can replace others. The argument -is sound, but we are doubtful of its value. For us that debate stands -adjourned. We go to Darwin for his incomparable collection of facts. -We would fain emulate his scholarship, his width, and his power of -exposition, but to us he speaks no more with philosophical authority. -We read his scheme of evolution as we would those of Lucretius or -of Lamarck, delighting in their simplicity and their courage.” -(_Heredity_, Presid. Add. to British Assoc. for Advanc. of Science, -Smith. Inst. Rpt. for 1915, p. 365.) - - - - - CHAPTER II - - HOMOLOGY AND ITS EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION - - -The recent revival of interest in the problem of evolution seems to -have called forth two very opposite expressions of opinion from those -who profess to represent Catholic thought on this subject. M. Henri -de Dorlodot, in his “Le Darwinisme,” appears in the rôle of an ardent -admirer of Darwin and an enthusiastic advocate of the doctrine of -Transformism. The contrary attitude is adopted by Mr. Alfred McCann, -whose “God—or Gorilla” is bitterly antagonistic not only to Darwinism -but to any form whatever of the theory of Transformism. Both of these -works possess merits which it would be unjust to overlook. Dorlodot -deserves credit for having shown conclusively that there is absolutely -nothing in the Scriptures, or in Patristic tradition, or in Catholic -theology, or in the philosophy of the Schools, which conflicts with -our acceptance of organic evolution as an hypothesis explanatory of -certain biological facts. In like manner, it must be acknowledged that, -even after a liberal discount has been made in penalty of its bias and -scientific inaccuracy, Mr. McCann’s book still contains a formidable -residue of serious objections, which the friends of evolution will -probably find it more convenient to sidestep than to answer. - -Unfortunately, however, neither of these writers maintains that -balanced mental poise which one likes to see in the defenders of -Catholic truth. Dorlodot seems too profoundly impressed with the -desirability of occupying a popular position to do impartial justice -to the problem at issue, and his anxiety to keep in step with the -majority blinds him apparently to the flaws of that “Darwinism” -which he praises. Had he been content with a simple demarcation of -negative limits, there would be no ground for complaint. But, when -he goes so far as to bestow unmerited praise upon the author of the -mechanistic “Origin of Species” and the materialistic “Descent of -Man”; when, by confounding Darwinism with evolution, he consents -to that historical injustice which allows Darwin to play Jacob to -Lamarck’s Esau, and which leaves the original genius of Mendel in -obscurity while it accords the limelight of fame to the unoriginal -expounder of a borrowed conception; when, by means of the sophistry of -anachronism, he speciously endeavors to bring the speculations of an -Augustine or an Aquinas into alignment with those of the ex-divinity -student of Cambridge; when he assumes that Fixism is so evidently wrong -that its claims are unworthy of consideration, whereas Transformism -is so evidently right that we can dispense with the formality of -examining its credentials; when, in a word, he expresses himself not -merely in the sense, but in the very stereotyped cant phrases of a -dead philosophy, we realize, with regret, that his conclusions are -based, not on any reasoned analysis of the evidence, but solely upon -the dogmatism of scientific orthodoxy, that his thought is cast in -antiquated molds, and that for him, apparently, the sixty-five years -of discovery and disillusionment, which have intervened since the -publication of the “Origin of Species,” have passed in vain. - -But, if Dorlodot represents the extreme of uncritical approval, Mr. -McCann represents the opposite, and no less reprehensible, extreme of -biased antagonism, that is neither fair in method nor conciliatory in -tone. Instead of adhering to the time-honored practice of Catholic -controversialists, which is rather to overstate than to understate the -argument of an adversary, Mr. McCann tends, at times, to minimize, in -his restatement, the force of an opponent’s reasoning. He frequently -belittles with mere flippant sneer, and is only too ready to question -the good faith of those who do not share his convictions. Thus, when -McCann ridicules Wells and accuses him of pure romancing, because the -latter speaks of certain hairy “wild women” of the Caves, he himself -seems to be ignorant of the fact that a palæolithic etching has been -found representing a woman so covered with hair that she had no need of -other apparel (the bas-relief from Laugerie-Basse carved on reindeer -palm—cf. Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1909, p. 540 and Plate 2). - -Mr. McCann may object, with truth, that this is far from being a -proof that the primitive representatives of the human race were hairy -individuals, but the fact suffices, at least, to acquit Mr. Wells of -the charge of unscrupulous invention. Hence, while we have no wish -to excuse the lamentable lack of scientific conscientiousness so -manifestly apparent in the writings of popularizers of evolution, like -Wells, Osborn, and Haeckel, nevertheless common justice, not to speak -of charity, constrains us to presume that, occasionally at least, their -departures from the norm of objective fact were due to ordinary human -fallibility or to the mental blindness induced by preconceptions, -rather than to any deliberate intent to deceive. And we feel ourselves -impelled to make this allowance for unconscious inaccuracy all the -more readily that we are confronted with the necessity of extending -the selfsame indulgence to Mr. McCann himself. Thus we find that the -seventh illustration in “God—or Gorilla” (opposite p. 56) bears the -legend: “Skeletons of man and _chimpanzee_ compared,” when, in point -of fact, the ape skeleton in question is not that of a chimpanzee -(_Troglodytes niger_) at all, but of an Orang-utan (_Simia satyrus_), -as the reader may verify for himself by consulting Plate VI of the -English version of Wasmann’s “Modern Biology,” where the identical -illustration appears above its proper title: “Skeleton of an adult -Orang-utan.” Since the error is repeated in the index of illustrations -and in the legend of the third illustration of the appendix, it is -impossible, in this instance, to shift the responsibility from Mr. -McCann to the printer. In any case, it is sincerely to be hoped that -this, and several other infelicitous errors will be rectified in the -next edition of “God—or Gorilla.” - -In the next chapter we shall have occasion to refer again to Dorlodot’s -book. For the present, however, his work need not concern us, while -in that of Mr. McCann we single out but one point as germane to our -subject, namely, the latter’s inadequate rebuttal of the evolutionary -argument from homology. The futility of his method, which consists in -matching insignificant differences against preponderant resemblances, -and in exclaiming with ironic incredulity: “Note extraordinary -resemblances!” becomes painfully evident, so soon as proper -presentation enables us to appreciate the true force of the argument he -is striving to refute. _Functionally_ the foot of a Troglodyte ape may -be a “hand,” but _structurally_ it is the homologue of the human foot, -and not of the human hand; nor is this homology effectually disposed -of by stressing the dissimilarity of the hallux, whilst one remains -discreetly reticent concerning the similarity of the calcaneum. For -two reasons, therefore, the irrelevance of Mr. McCann’s reply is of -special interest here: (1) because it illustrates concretely the danger -of rendering a refutation inconsequential and inept by failing to plumb -the full depth of the difficulty one is seeking to solve; (2) because -it shows that it is vain to attempt to remove man’s body from the scope -of this argument by citing the inconsiderable structural differences -which distinguish him from the ape, so that, unless the argument from -homology proves upon closer scrutiny to be inherently _inconclusive_, -its applicability to the human body is a foregone conclusion, and -implies with irresistible logic the common ancestry of men and apes. - -Such are the reflections suggested by the meager measure of justice -which Mr. McCann accords to the strongest zoölogical evidence in favor -of evolution, and they contain in germ a feasible program for the -present chapter, which, accordingly, will address itself: first, to the -task of ascertaining the true significance of homology in the abstract -as well as the full extent of its application in the concrete; second, -to that of determining with critical precision its intrinsic value as -an argument for the theory of transmutation. - -_Homology_ is a technical term used by the systematists of botany, -zoölogy and comparative anatomy to signify basic structural similarity -as distinguished from superficial functional similarity, the latter -being termed _analogy_. Organisms are said to exemplify the phenomenon -of homology when, beneath a certain amount of external diversity, they -possess in common a group of correlated internal resemblances of such a -nature that the organisms possessing them appear to be constructed upon -the same fundamental plan. In cases of this kind, the basic similarity -is frequently masked by a veneer of unlikeness, and it is only below -this shallow surface of divergence that we find evidences of the -identical structure or common type. - -Thus organs of different animals are said to be homologous when they -are composed of like parts arranged in similar relation to one another. -Homologous organs correspond bone for bone and tissue for tissue, so -that each component of the one finds its respective counterpart in -the other. The organs in question may be functionally specialized -and externally differentiated for quite different purposes, but the -superficial diversity serves only to emphasize, by contrast, the -underlying identity of structure which persists intact beneath it. -Thus, for example, the wing of a pigeon, the flipper of a whale, the -foreleg of a cat, and the arm of a man are organs differing widely in -function as well as outward appearance, but they are called homologous, -none the less, because they all exhibit the same basic plan, being -composed of similar bones similarly disposed with respect to one -another. - -Organs, on the other hand, are called analogous which, though -fundamentally unlike in structure, are, nevertheless, superficially -modified and specialized for one and the same function. The wing of -a bird and the wing of an insect furnish a trite instance of such -analogy. Functionally they subserve the same purpose, but structurally -they bear no relation to each other. In like manner, though both are -devoted to the same function, there exists between the leg of a man and -the leg of a spider a fundamental disparity in structure. - -At times, specialization for the selfsame function involves the -emergence of a similar modification or uniform structural adaptation -from a substrate of basic dissimilarity. In these instances of parallel -modifications appearing on the surface of divergent types, we have -something more than mere functional resemblance. Structure is likewise -involved, albeit superficially, in the modification which brings -about this external uniformity. In such cases, analogy is spoken of -as _convergence_, a phenomenon of which the mole and the mole-cricket -constitute a typical example. The burrowing legs of the insect are, -so far as outward appearance goes, the exact replica on a smaller -scale of those of the mole, though, fundamentally, their structure is -quite unlike, the mole being built on the endoskeletal plan of the -vertebrates, whereas the mole-cricket is constructed on the exoskeletal -plan characteristic of the arthropods. Speaking of the first pair of -legs of the mole-cricket, Thomas Hunt Morgan says: “By their use the -mole-cricket makes a burrow near the surface of the ground, similar -to, but of course much smaller than, that made by the mole. In both -of these cases the adaptation is the more obvious, because, while the -leg of the mole is formed on the same general plan as that of other -vertebrates, and the leg of the mole-cricket has the same fundamental -structure as that of other insects, yet in both cases the details of -structure and the general proportions have been so altered that the -leg is fitted for entirely different purposes from those to which the -legs of other vertebrates and other insects are put.” (Quoted by Dwight -in “Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist,” p. 235.) In the analogies of -convergence, therefore, we have the exact converse of the phenomenon so -often encountered in connection with homology. The latter exhibits a -contrast between basic identity and superficial diversity, the former a -contrast between superficial convergence and fundamental divergence. - -Now the extreme importance of homology is manifest from the fact that -the taxonomists of zoölogy and botany have found it to be the most -satisfactory basis for a scientific classification of animals and -plants. In both of these sciences, organisms are arranged in groups -according as they possess in common certain points of resemblance -whereby they may be referred to this, or that, general type. The -resemblance is most complete between members of the same species, which -do not differ from one another by any major difference, though they may -exhibit certain minor differences justifying their subdivision into -varieties or races. These morphological considerations, however, must, -in the case of an organic species, be supplemented by the additional -physiological criteria of perfect sexual compatibility and normal -viability, as we have already had occasion to note in the previous -chapter. When organisms, though distinguished from one another by -some major difference, agree, notwithstanding, in the main elements -of structure, the several species to which they belong are grouped -under a common genus, and similarly genera are grouped into families. -A _relative_ major difference, such as a difference in the size of -the teeth, suffices for the segregation of a new species, while an -_absolute_ difference, such as a difference in the number of teeth or -the possession of an additional organ, suffices for the segregation of -a new genus. In practice, however, the classifications of systematists -are often very arbitrary, and we find the latter divided into two -factions, the “lumpers” who wish to reduce the number of systematic -groups and the “splitters” who have a passion for breaking up larger -groups into smaller ones on the basis of tenuous differences. Above -the families are the orders, and they, in turn, are assembled in still -larger groups called classes, until finally we reach the phyla or -branches, which are the supreme categories into which the plant and -animal kingdoms are divided. As we ascend the scale of classification, -the points of resemblance between the organisms classified are -constantly decreasing in number, while the points of difference -increase apace. Hence, whereas members of the same species have very -much in common, members of the same phylum have very little in common, -and members of different phyla show such structural disparity that -further correlation on the basis of similarities becomes impossible -(in the sense, at least, of a reliable and consistent scheme of -classification), all efforts to relate the primary phyla to one another -in a satisfactory manner having proved abortive. - -Within the confines of each phylum, however, homology is the basic -principle of classification. But the scientist is not content to note -the bare fact of its existence. He seeks an explanation, he wishes to -know the _raison d’être_ of homology. Innumerable threads of similarity -run through the woof of divergence, and the question arises: How can -we account for the coëxistence of this woof of diversity with a warp -of similarity? Certainly, if called upon to explain the similarity -existent between members of one and the same species, even the man in -the street would resort instinctively to the principle of inheritance -and the assumption of common ancestry, exclaiming: “Like sire, like -son!” It is a notorious fact that children resemble their parents, -and since members of the same species are sexually compatible and -perfectly interfertile, there is no difficulty whatever in the way of -accepting the presumption of descent from common ancestral stock as a -satisfactory solution of the problem of specific resemblance. Now, it -is precisely this selfsame principle of heredity which the Transformist -invokes to account for generic, no less than for specific, similarity. -In fact, he presses it further still, and professes to see therein -the explanation of the resemblances observed between members of the -different families, orders, and classes, which systematists group -under a common phylum. This, of course, amounts to a bold extension of -the principle of inheritance far beyond the barriers of interspecific -sterility to remote applications that exceed all possibility of -experimental verification. Transformists answer this difficulty, -however, by contending that the period, during which the human race -has existed, has been, geologically speaking, all too brief, and -characterized by environmental conditions much too uniform, to afford -us a favorable opportunity for ascertaining the extreme limits to which -the genetic process may possibly extend; and, even apart from this -consideration, they say, racial development (phylogeny) may be, like -embryological development (ontogeny) an irreversible process, in which -case no recurrence whatever of its past phenomena are to be expected in -our times. - -Be that as it may, the evolutionist interprets the resemblances of -homology as surviving vestiges of an ancient ancestral type, which -have managed to persist in the descendants notwithstanding the -transformations wrought in the latter by the process of progressive -divergence. Moreover, just as the existence of a common ancestor is -inferred from the _fact_ of resemblance, so the relative position -in time of the common ancestor is inferred from the _degree_ of -resemblance. The common ancestor of forms closely allied is assumed to -have been proximate, that of forms but distantly resembling each other -is thought to have been remote. Thus the common ancestor of species -grouped under the same genus is supposed to have been less remote -than the common ancestor of all the genera grouped under one family. -The same reasoning is applied, _mutatis mutandis_, to the ancestry of -families, orders and classes. - -The logic of such inferences may be questioned, but there is no -blinking the fact that, in practice, the genetic explanation of -homology is assumed by scientists to be the only reasonable one -possible. In fact, so strong is their confidence in the necessity of -admitting a solution of this kind, that they do not hesitate to make it -part and parcel of the definition of homology itself. For instance, on -page 130 of Woodruff’s “Foundations of Biology” (1922), we are informed -that homology signifies “a fundamental similarity of structure based on -descent from a common antecedent form.” The Yale professor, however, -has been outdone in this respect by Professor Calkins of Columbia, who -discards the anatomical definition altogether and substitutes, in lieu -thereof, its evolutionary interpretation. “When organs have the same -ancestry,” he says, “that is, when they come from some common part of -an ancestral type, they are said to be homologous.” (“Biology,” p. -165.) In short, F. A. Bather is using a consecrated formula culled from -the modern biological creed when he says: “The old form of diagnosis -was _per genus et differentiam_. The new form is _per proavum et -modificationem_.” (_Science_, Sept. 17, 1920, p. 259.) - -A moment’s reflection, however, will make it clear that, in thus -confounding the definition proper with its theoretical interpretation, -the modern biologist is guilty of a logical atrocity. Homology, after -all, is a simple anatomical fact, which can be quite adequately -defined in terms of observation; nor is the definition improved in -the least by having its factual elements diluted with explanatory -theory. On the contrary, the definition is decidedly weakened by such -redundancy. And as for those who insist on defining homology in terms -of atavistic assumption instead of structural affinity, their procedure -is tantamount to defining the clear by means of the obscure, an actual -effect by means of a possible cause. Moreover, this attempt to load -the dice in favor of Transformism by tampering with the definition of -homology ends by defeating its own purpose. For, if homology is to -serve as a legitimate argument for evolution, then obviously evolution -must not be included in its definition; otherwise, the conclusion is -anticipated in the premise, the question is begged, and the argument -itself rendered a vicious circle. - -Having formed a sufficiently clear conception of homology as a -static fact, we are now in a position to consider the problem of its -causality with reference to the solution proposed by evolutionists. -Transmutation, they tell us, results from the interaction of a -twofold process, namely, the conservative and similifying process -called _inheritance_, and progressive and diversifying process known -as _variation_. Inheritance by transmitting the ancestral likeness -tends to bring about uniformity. Variation by diverting old currents -into new channels adjust organisms to new situations and brings about -modification. Homology, therefore, is the effect of inheritance, while -adaptedness or modification is the product of variation. - -As here used, the term inheritance denotes something more than a mere -recurrence of parental characters in the offspring. It signifies a -process of genuine transmission from generation to generation. Strictly -speaking, it is not the _characters_, such as coloration, shape, size, -chemical composition, structural type, and functional specificity, that -are “inherited,” but rather the hereditary _factors_ or chromosomal -_genes_, which are actually transmitted, and of which the characters -are but an external expression or manifestation. Hence, it is scarcely -accurate to speak of “inherited,” as distinguished from “acquired,” -characters. As a matter of fact, all somatic characters are joint -products of the interaction of germinal and environmental factors. -Consequently, the external character would be affected no less by a -change in the environmental factors than by a change in the germinal -factors. In a word, somatic characters are not the exclusive expression -of the genetic factors, but are equally dependent upon environmental -influence, and hence it is only to the extent that these characters -are indicative of the specific constitution of the germ plasm that -we may speak of them as “inherited,” remembering that what is really -transmitted to the offspring is a complex of genes or germinal -factors, and not the characters themselves. The sense is, therefore, -that “inherited” characters are manifestative of what is contained -in the germ plasm, whereas “acquired” characters have no specific -germinal basis, but are a resultant of the interaction between the -somatic cells and the environment. In modern terminology, as we have -seen, the aggregate of germinal factors transmitted in the process of -reproduction is called the genotype, while the aggregate of somatic -characters which manifest these germinal factors externally is spoken -of as the phenotype. Only the genotype is transmitted, the phenotype -being the subsequent product of the interplay of genetic factors and -environmental stimuli, dependent upon, and expressive of, both. - -Variation, therefore, may be based upon a change in the germ plasm, -or in the environment, or in both. If it rests exclusively upon an -extraordinary change in the environmental conditions, the resulting -modification is non-inheritable, and will disappear so soon as the -exceptional environmental stimulus that evoked it is withdrawn. If, -on the contrary, it is based upon a germinal change, it will manifest -itself, even under ordinary, i.e. unchanged or uniform environmental -influence. In this case, the modification is inheritable in the sense -that it is the specific effect of a transmissible germinal factor, -which has undergone alteration. - -As we have seen in the foregoing chapter, there are three kinds of -germinal change which result in “inheritable” modifications. The -first is called factorial mutation, and is initiated by an alteration -occurring in one or more of the chromosomal genes. The second is called -chromosomal mutation, and is caused by duplication (or reduction) of -the chromosomes. The third may be termed recombination, one type of -which results from the crossover or exchange of genes between pairing -chromosomes (“pseudomutation”), the other from random assortment in -accordance with the Mendelian law of the independence of allelomorphic -pairs. This so-called “random assortment of the chromosomes” is the -result of the shuffling and free deals of the chromosomal cards of -heredity which take place twice in the life-cycle of organisms: -viz. first, in the process of gametic reduction (meiosis); second, -in the chance meeting of variously-constituted sperms and eggs in -fertilization. A mischance of the first of these “free deals” is -bewailed in the following snatch from a parody belonging to the Woods -Hole anthology. - - “Oh chromosomes, my chromosomes, - How sad is my condition! - My grandsire’s gift for writing well - Has gone to some lost polar cell - And so I write this doggerel, - I cannot do much better.” - -These kinds of variation, however, in so far as they fall within the -range of actual observation, are confined within the limits of the -organic species. Intra-specific variation, however, will not suffice. -To account for the adaptive modifications superimposed upon underlying -structural identity, Transformism is obliged to assume the possibility -of trans-specific variation. Yet in none of the foregoing processes of -variation do we find a valid factual basis for this assumption. - -Factorial mutation, for instance, waiving its failure to produce -naturally-viable forms, or to meet the physiological sterility test -of a new species, admits of interpretation as a change of loss due -to the “dropping out” of a gene from the germinal complex. Bateson’s -conception of evolution as a process consisting in the gradual loss of -inhibitive genes, whose elimination releases suppressed potentialities, -seems rather incredible. Many will be inclined to see in Castle’s -facetious epigram a _reductio ad absurdum_ of Bateson’s suggestion; -for, according to the latter’s view, as the Harvard professor remarks, -we should have to regard _man_ as _a simplified amœba_. Certainly, -it seems nothing short of a contradiction to ascribe the progressive -complication of the phenotype to a simplification of the genotype by -loss. - -On the other hand, not only is there no experimental evidence of a -germinal change by positive acquisition, that is, by the addition of -genes, but it is hard to conceive how such a change could come about. -“At first,” admits Bateson, “it may seem rank absurdity to suppose -that the primordial form or forms of protoplasm could have contained -complexity enough to produce the divers types of life.” “But,” he -asks, “is it easier to imagine that these powers could have been -conveyed by extrinsic addition? Of what nature could these additions -be? Additions of material can not surely be in question. We are told -that salts of iron in the soil may turn a pink hydrangea blue. The -iron cannot be passed on to the next generation. How can iron multiply -itself? The power to assimilate iron is all that can be transmitted. A -disease-producing organism like the pebrine of silkworms can in a very -few cases be passed on through the germ cells. But it does not become -part of the invaded host, and we can not conceive it taking part in the -geometrically ordered processes of segregation. These illustrations -may seem too gross; but what refinement will meet the requirements of -the problem, that the thing introduced must be, as the living organism -itself is, capable of multiplication and of subordinating itself in a -definite system of segregation?” (_Heredity_, Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for -1915, p. 373.) - -Nor can we agree with Prof. T. H. Morgan’s contention that the -foregoing difficulty of Bateson has been solved by the discovery of -the chromosomal mutation. All unbalanced chromosomal mutants are -subnormal in their viability and vitality, not to speak of their marked -sterility. Haploidy represents a regressive, rather than a progressive, -step. The triploid mutant is sterile. The tetraploid race of Daturas -is inferior in fertility to the normal diploid plant. The origin of -balanced tetraploidy from diploidy must be presumed, since it has never -been observed. Moreover, tetraploidy represents only quantitative, and -not qualitative, progress. The increased mass of the nucleus produces -an enlargement of the cytoplasm, the result of which is giantism. This -effect, however, is not specific; for giant and normal races possessing -each the same number of chromosomes are known to exist in nature. Hence -giantism may be due to other causes besides chromosomal duplication. -The only effect of this doubling is a reinforcement and intensification -of the former effect of the genetic factors, their specificity -remaining unchanged. Double doses are substituted for single doses of -the factors, but nothing really new is added. Morgan himself recognizes -that this mere repetition of identical genes is insufficient, and that -their multiplication must be qualitative as well as numerical, to -answer the specifications of a progressive step in evolution. Hence he -suggests that the chromosomal mutation is subsequently supplemented by -appropriate factorial mutation. Once this supposition is made, however, -all the objections we have mentioned in connection with factorial -mutation (_e.g._ the subnormality of its products, its intra-specific -nature, etc.) return to plague the speculator, and, in addition to -these, he is confronted with the new difficulty of explaining how the -redundance of duplicate genes can be removed and replaced by coördinate -differentiation in their respective specificities. Now we have no -factual evidence whatever of such a solidaric redifferentiation of the -germinal factors, that would modify harmoniously the composition and -rôle of each and every gene in the factorial complex. Nor is there -any possibility whatever of accounting for this telic superregulation -of the germinal regulators upon a purely mechanistic basis. How can -the ultimate chemical determinants of heredity be thus redetermined? -Consequently, although there is gametic incompatibility between diploid -races and the tetraploid races, which are said to have arisen from -the former, we are not, nevertheless, warranted, by what has been -experimentally verified, in regarding tetraploid races as new species, -or as progressive steps in the process of organic evolution. - -To conclude, therefore, we have experimental verification of the -efficacy of the similifying process said to have been at work in -evolution, namely, inheritance. The same, however, cannot be said of -the correlative diversifying process of trans-specific variation, which -is said to have superficially modified old structures into new species. -The latter process, accordingly, is but a pure postulate of science -known to us only through the effect hypothetically assigned to it, -namely, the adaptive modification. - -The adaptation, however, of which there is question here is not to be -confounded with the “acquired adaptation” of Lamarckian fame; for, -unlike the latter, it is an inheritable modification rooted in the germ -plasm. Adaptations of this sort do, indeed, adjust the organism to -its external environment, but they are innate and not acquired. Hence -they are often spoken of as _preadaptations_; for they precede, in a -sense, the organism’s contact with the environing element to which -they adjust it. They may possibly, it is true, have been acquired in -the distant past, but they have now a specific germinal foundation, -and no one was ever privileged to witness their initial production _de -novo_. The whale, for example, though fundamentally a warm-blooded -mammal, is superficially a fish, by reason of such a preadaptation -to its marine environment. Preadaptation is of common occurrence, -especially among parasites, symbiotes, commensals, and inquilines. -Wasmann cites innumerable instances of beetles and flies so profoundly -modified, in accommodation to their mode of life as guests in termite -nests, that the systematist hesitates to classify them under any of the -accepted orders of insects. Here the adaptive modification so disturbs -the underlying homology as to make of these creatures taxonomical -ambiguities. In the case of _Termitomyia_, he tells us, “the whole -development of the individual has been so modified that it resembles -that of a viviparous mammal rather than that of a fly.” (“The Problem -of Evolution,” pp. 14, 15.) - -Such modifications, however, amount to major, and not merely minor, -differences. We are not dealing, therefore, with varietal distinctions -here, but with specific, generic, and even ordinal differences. With -reference to the phenomenon of adaptive modification,[3] three things, -consequently, are worthy of note: (1) it has the semblance of being -adventitious to the underlying structural uniformity; (2) it is of -such magnitude that it cannot be ascribed to variation within the -species; (3) it has been appropriated by the hereditary process, in the -sense that it is now an “inherited” character based on the transmission -of specific germinal factors. - - [3] It may be remarked, in passing, that experimental genetics - and mutation furnish no clue to the origin of adaptive - characters. The Lamarckian idea alone gives promise in this - direction. Orthogenesis leaves unsolved the mystery of - preadaptation; yet only orthogenetic systems of evolution can - be constructed on the basis of genetical facts. “Mutations - and Mendelism,” says Kellogg, “may explain the origin of new - species in some measure, but they do not explain adaptation in - the slightest degree.” (_Atlantic Monthly_, April, 1924, pp. - 488, 489.) We have seen in the previous chapter that they are - impotent to explain in _any_ measure the origin of new species. - -Now it is claimed that for the occurrence of this kind of modification -in conjunction with homology only one rational explanation is -possible, and that explanation is evolution. If this contention be a -sound one, and Dorlodot, who claims certitude for the evolutionary -solution, insists that it is such, then, in the name of sheer -logical consistency, but one course lies open to us. We cannot stop -at Wasmann’s comma,[4] we must press on to the very end of the -evolutionary sentence and sing with the choristers of Woods Hole: - - [4] Rev. Erich Wasmann, S. J., accepts the evolutionary - inference from homology as regards _plants_ and _animals_. When - it comes to _man_, however, he attempts to draw the line, and - argues painstakingly against the assumption of a bestial origin - of the human body. - - “It’s a long way from Amphioxus, - It’s a long way to us; - It’s a long way from Amphioxus, - To the meanest human cuss. - Good-bye fins and gill slits; - Welcome skin and hair. - It’s a long, long way from Amphioxus, - But we came from there.” - -In this predicament it will not do, as we shall see presently, to adopt -Mr. McCann’s expedient of balancing anatomical differences against -anatomical resemblances. To do so is to court certain and ignominious -defeat. We must, therefore, examine the argument dispassionately. If it -be solid, we must accept it and give it general application. If it be -unsound, we must detect its flaws and expose them. Intellectual honesty -allows us no alternative! - -Moreover, in weighing the argument from organic homology we must not -lose sight of the two important considerations previously stressed: -(1) that the inference of common ancestry in the case of homologous -forms is based, not upon this or that particular likeness, but upon an -entire group of coördinated resemblances; (2) that the resemblances -involved are not exterior similarities, but deep-seated structural -uniformities perfectly compatible with diversities of a superficial and -functional character. “Nothing,” says Dr. W. W. Keen, “could be more -unlike externally than the flipper of a whale and the arm of a man. -Yet you find in the flipper the shoulderblade, humerus, radius, ulna, -and a hand with the bones of four fingers masked in a mitten of skin.” -(_Science_, June 9, 1922, p. 605.) - -In fact, the resemblances may, in certain instances, be so deeply -submerged that they no longer appear in the adult organism at all and -are only in evidence during a transitory phase of the embryological -process. In such cases, the embryo or larva exhibits, at a particular -stage, traces of a uniformity completely obliterated from the adult -form. In short, though frequently presented as a distinct argument, -embryological similarity, together with all else of value that can -still be salvaged from the wreck of the Müller-Haeckel Law of Embryonic -Recapitulation, is, at bottom, identical with the general evolutionary -argument from homology. In the latter argument we are directed to -look beneath the modified surface of the adult organism for surviving -vestiges of the ancestral type. In the former, we are bidden to go -deeper still, to the extent, that is, of descending into the very -embryological process itself, in order to discover lingering traces -of the ancestral likeness, which, though now utterly deleted from the -transformed adult, are yet partially persistent in certain embryonic -phases. - -In sectioning a larval specimen of the fly-like termite-guest known -as _Termitoxenia Heimi_, Father Wasmann came across a typical -exemplification of this embryological atavism. In the adult insect, a -pair of oar-like appendages replace the wings characteristic of the -_Diptera_ (flies). These appendages are organs of exudation, which -elaborate a secretion whereof the termites are very fond, and thereby -render their possessors welcome guests in the nests of their hosts. The -appendages, therefore, though now undoubtedly inherited characters, -are the specific means by which these inquilines are adapted to their -peculiar environment and mode of life among the termites. Moreover, the -organs in question not only differ from wings functionally, but, in the -adult, they bear no structural resemblance whatever to the wings of -flies. Nevertheless, on examining his sections of the above-mentioned -specimen, Wasmann found a developmental stage of brief duration during -which wing veins appeared in the posterior branches of the embryonic -appendages. Now, assuming that Wasmann’s technique was faultless, -his specimen normal, and his interpretation correct, it is rather -difficult to avoid his conclusion that we have here, in this transitory -larval phase, the last surviving vestige of ancestral wings now wholly -obliterated from the adult type, that, consequently, this wingless -termite guest is genetically related to the winged _Diptera_, and that -we must see in the appendages aboriginal wings diverted from their -primitive function and respecialized for the quite different purpose of -serving as organs of exudation, (cf. “Modern Biology,” p. 385.) Indeed, -phenomena of this kind seem to admit of no other explanation than the -atavistic one. It should be remembered, however, that Wasmann does not -appear to have verified the observation in more than one specimen, -and that a larger number of representative specimens would have to be -accurately sectioned, strained, examined and interpreted, before any -reliable conclusion could be drawn.[5] - - [5] This transitory lymphatic, or tracheal venation appearing - in the appendages at the stenogastric stage may not have the - particular significance that Father Wasmann assigns. Such - venation, even if vestigial and aborted, need not necessarily - be a vestige of former _wing_ venation. To demonstrate the - validity of the atavistic interpretation, all other possible - interpretations would have to be definitively excluded. - -Such, in its most general aspect, is the atavistic solution of the -problem presented by the homology of types. In it, similarity and -diversity are harmoniously reconciled, in the sense that they affect, -respectively, different structural, or different developmental, levels. -It is futile, therefore, to look for contradictions where they do not -exist. In a word, the attempt to create opposition between a group of -basic and correlated uniformities, on the one hand, and some particular -external difference, on the other, is not only abortive, but absolutely -irrelevant as well. The reason is obvious. Only when likeness is -associated with unlikeness is it an argument for Transmutation. -Likeness alone would demonstrate Immutability by indicating a process -of pure inheritance as distinguished from the process of variation. -Hence evolutionists do not merely concede the coëxistence of diversity -with similarity, they gladly welcome this fact as vitally necessary to -their contention. - -Now it is precisely this point which Mr. McCann, like many other -critics of evolution, fails utterly to apprehend. Consequently, his -efforts to extricate the human foot from the toils of simian homology -are entirely unavailing. To offset the force of the argument in -question, it is by no means sufficient, as he apparently imagines, to -point to the fact that, unlike the hallux of the ape, the great toe in -man is non-opposable (cf. “God—or Gorilla,” pp. 183, 184, and legends -under cuts opposite pp. 184 and 318). The evolutionist will reply -at once that the non-opposability of man’s great toe is correlated -with the specialization of the human foot for progression only, as -distinguished from prehension; while, in the ape, whose foot has -retained both the progressive and the prehensile function, the hallux -is naturally opposable in adaptation to the animal’s arboreal habits. -He will then call attention to the undeniable fact that, despite these -adaptational differences, the bones in the foot of a Troglodyte ape -are, bone for bone, the counterparts of the bones in the human foot -and not of those in the human hand. He will readily concede, that, -so far as function and adaptedness go, this simian foot is a “hand,” -but he will not fail to point out that it is, at the same time, a -_heeled_ hand equipped with a calcaneum, a talus, a navicular, a -cuboid, and all other structural elements requisite to ally it to -the human foot and distinguish it from the human hand. In fact, Mr. -McCann’s own photographs of the gorilla skeleton show these features -quite distinctly, though he himself, for some reason or other, fails -to speak of them. It is to be feared, however, that his adversaries -may not take a charitable view of his reticence concerning the simian -heel, but may be inclined to characterize his silence as “discreet,” -all the more so, that he himself has uncomplimentarily credited them -with similar discretions in their treatment of unmanageable facts. -In short, Mr. McCann’s case against homology resembles the Homeric -hero, Achilles, in being vulnerable at the “heel.” At all events, the -homology itself is an undeniable fact, and it is vain to tilt against -this fact in the name of adaptational adjustments like “opposability” -and “non-opposability.” Since, therefore, our author has failed to -prove that this feature is too radical to be classed as an adaptive -modification, our only hope of exempting the human skeleton from the -application of the argument in question is to show that argument itself -is inconsequential. - -Mr. McCann’s predicament resembles that of the unlucky disputant, who -having allowed a questionable major to pass unchallenged, strives to -retrieve his mistake by picking flaws in a flawless minor. As Dwight -has well said of the human body, “it differs in degree only from that -of apes and monkeys,” and “if we compare the individual bones with -those of apes we cannot fail to see the correspondence.” (“Thoughts -of a Catholic Anatomist,” p. 149.) In short, there exists no valid -anatomical consideration whatever to justify us in subtracting the -human frame from the extension of the general conclusion deduced from -homology. Whosoever, therefore, sees in the homology of organic forms -conclusive evidence of descent from a common ancestor, cannot, without -grave inconsistency, reject the doctrine of the bestial origin of man. -He may still, it is true, exclude the human mind or soul from the -evolutionary account of origins, but, if homology is, in any sense, a -sound argument for common descent, the evolutionary origin of the human -body is a foregone conclusion, and none of the anatomical “differences -in degree” will avail to spare us the humiliation of sharing with the -ape a common family-tree. It remains for us, then, to reëxamine the -argument critically for the purpose of determining as precisely as -possible its adequacy as a genuine demonstration. - -To begin with, it must be frankly acknowledged that here the theory -of transformism is, to all appearances, upon very strong ground. Its -first strategic advantage over the theory of immutability consists in -the fact that, unlike the latter, its attitude towards the problem is -positive and not negative. When challenged to explain the structural -uniformities observed in organic Nature, the theory of immutability is -mute, because it knows of no second causes or natural agencies adequate -to account for the facts. It can only account for homology by ascribing -the phenomenon exclusively to the unity of the First Cause, and, while -this may, of course, be the true and sole explanation, to assume it -is tantamount to removing the problem altogether from the province of -natural science. Hence it is not to be wondered at that scientists -prefer the theory of transformism, which by assigning intermediate -causes between the First Cause and the ultimate effects, vindicates -the problem of organic origins for natural science, in assuming the -phenomena to be proximately explicable by means of natural agencies. -Asked whether he believes that God created the now exclusively arboreal -Sloth (_Bradypus_) in a tree, the most uncompromising defender of -fixism will hesitate to reply in the affirmative. Yet, in this case, -what is nowadays, at least, an inherited preadaptation, dedicates the -animal irrevocably to tree-life, and makes its survival upon the ground -impossible. - -Analogous preadaptations occur in conjunction with the phenomena of -parasitism, symbiosis and commensalism, all of which offer instances -of otherwise disparate and unrelated organisms that are inseparably -bound together, in some apparently capricious and fortuitous respect, -by a preadaptation of the one to the other. Parasites, guests, or -symbiotes, as the case may be, they are now indissolubly wedded to -some determinate species of host by reason of an appropriate and -congenital adjustment. For all that, however, the association seems -to be a contingent one, and it appears incredible that the associates -were always united, as at present, by bonds of reciprocal advantage, -mutual dependence, or one-sided exploitation. Yet the basis of the -relationship is in each case a now inherited adaptation, which, if it -does not represent the primitive condition of the race, must at some -time have been acquired. For phenomena such as these, orthogenesis, -which makes an organ the exclusive product of internal factors, -conceiving it as a preformed mechanism that subsequently selects a -suitable function, has no satisfactory explanation. Lamarckism, which -asserts the priority of function and makes the environment mold the -organ, is equally inacceptable, in that it flouts experience and -ignores the now demonstrated existence of internal hereditary factors. -But, if between these two extremes some evolutionary _via media_ could -be found, one must confess that it would offer the only conceivable -“natural explanation” of preadaptation.[6] All this, of course, is pure -speculation, but it serves to show that here, at any rate, the theory -of Transformism occupies a position from which it cannot easily be -dislodged. - - [6] Vernon Kellogg has expressed this same view in a recent - article, though he frankly admits that it is an as yet - unrealized desideratum. “Altogether,” he says, “it must be - fairly confessed that evolutionists would welcome the discovery - of the actual possibility and the mechanism of transferring - into the heredity of organisms such adaptive changes as can - be acquired by individuals in their lifetime. It would give - them an explanation of evolution, especially of adaptation, - much more satisfactory than any other explanation at present - claiming the acceptance of biologists.” (_Atlantic Monthly_, - April, 1924, p. 488.) - -But, besides the advantage of being able to offer a “natural -explanation” of the association of homology with adaptation, -Transformism enjoys the additional advantage of being able to make -the imagination its partisan by means of a visual appeal. Such an -appeal is always more potent than that of pure logic stripped of -sensuous imagery. When it comes to vividness and persuasiveness, the -syllogism is no match for the object-lesson. Retinal impressions have -a hypnotic influence that is not readily exorcised by considerations -of an abstract order—“_Segnius irritant demissa per aurem, Quam quae -sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus_,” says Horace, in the “Ars Poetica.” -Philosophers may distinguish between the magnetic appeal of a graphic -presentation and the logical cogency of the doctrine so presented, -but there is no denying that, in practice, imagination is often -mistaken for reason and persuasion for conviction. Be that as it may, -the ordinary method of bringing home to the student the evolutionary -significance of homology is certainly one that utilizes to the full all -the advantages of visual presentation. Given a class of impressionable -premedics and coeds; given an instructor’s table with skeletons of a -man, a flamingo, an ape and a dog hierarchically arranged thereon; -given an instructor sufficiently versed in comparative osteology to -direct attention to the points in which the skeletons concur: and there -can be no doubt whatever as to the psychological result. The student -forms spontaneously the notion of a common vertebrate type, and the -instructor assures him that this “general type” is not, as it would -be with respect to other subject matter, a mere universal idea with -no formal existence outside the mind, but rather a venerable family -likeness, posed for originally by a single pair of ancestors (or -could it possibly have been, by one self-fertilizing hermaphrodite?) -and recopied from generation to generation, with certain variations -on the original theme, by the hand of an artist called Heredity. -This explanation may be true, but logically consequential it is not. -However, if the dialectic is poor, the pedagogy is beyond reproach, -and the solution proposed has in its favor the fact that it accords -well with the student’s limited experience. He is aware of the -truism that children resemble their parents. Why look for more -recondite explanations when one so obvious is at hand? The atavistic -theory gratifies his instinct for simplification, and, if he be of a -mechanistic turn of mind, the alternative conception of creationism -is quite intolerable. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that -the “inference” of common descent from the data of homology is not -a ratiocination at all, it is only a simple apprehension, a mere -abstraction of similarity from similars—“_Unde quaecumque inveniuntur -convenire in aliqua intentione intellecta_,” says Aquinas, “_voluerunt -quod convenirent in una re_.” (_In lib. II sent._, _dist._ 17, _q. -I_, _a._ 1) Philosophy tells us that the oneness of the universal is -conceptual and not at all extramental or real, but the transformist -insists that the universal types of Zoölogy and Botany are endowed with -real as well as logical unity, that real unity being the unity of the -common ancestor. - -Certainly, from the standpoint of practical effectiveness, the -evolutionary argument leaves little to be desired. The presentation is -graphic and the solution simple. But for the critic, to whom logical -sequence is of more moment than psychological appeal, this is not -enough. To withstand the gnawing tooth of Time and the remorseless -probing of corrosive human reason, theories must rest on something -sounder than a mirage of visual imagery! - - Tell me where is fancy bred, - Or in the heart or in the head? - How begot, how nourished? - Reply, reply. - It is engendered in the eyes, - With gazing fed; and fancy dies - In the cradle where it lies. - -But is it fair thus to characterize the “common ancestors” of -Transformism as figments which, like all other abstractions, have no -extramental existence apart from the concrete objects whence they -were conceived? To be sure, their claim to be real entities cannot be -substantiated by direct observation or experiment, and so a factual -proof is out of the question. Man, the late-comer, not having been -present at the birth of organic forms, can give no reliable testimony -regarding their parentage. In like manner, no _a priori_ proof from the -process of inheritance is available, because heredity, as revealed to -us by the experimental science of Genetics, can account for specific -resemblances only, and cannot be invoked, at present, as an empirically -tested explanation for generic, ordinal, or phyletic resemblances. It -has still to be demonstrated experimentally that the hereditary process -is transcendental to limits imposed by specific differentiation. -There remains, however, the _a posteriori_ argument, which interprets -homology and adaptation as univocal effects ascribable to no other -agency than the dual process of inheritance and variation. What are we -to think of this argument? Does it generate certainty in the mind, or -merely probability? - -A moment’s reflection will bring to light the preliminary flaw of -incomplete enumeration of possibilities. To suppose that inheritance -alone can account for structural resemblance is an unwarranted -assumption. Without a doubt, there are other similifying influences at -work in Nature besides inheritance. True, inheritance is one possible -explanation of the similarity of organisms, but it is not the _only_ -one. Even among the chemical elements of inorganic nature we find -analogous uniformities or “family traits,” which, in the absence of -any reproductive process whatever, we cannot possibly attribute to -inheritance. Mendeléeff’s discovery of the periodicity of the elements, -arranged in the order of their atomic weights, is well-known. At -each interval of an octave, a succession of chemical types, similar -to those of the preceding octave, recur. Hence elements appearing in -the same vertical column of the Periodic Table have many properties -in common and exhibit what may be called a family resemblance. Now, -we have in the process of atomic disintegration, as observed in -radioactive elements and interpreted by the electronic theory of atomic -structure, a reasonably satisfactory basis upon which to account for -the existence of these inorganic uniformities. Here analogous chemical -constitution, produced in accordance with a general law, results in -uniformity that implies a similar, rather than an identical, cause. The -hypothesis of parallelistic derivation from similar independent origins -accounts quite as well for the observed uniformities as does the -hypothesis of divergent derivation from a single common origin. Why, -then, should we lean so heavily on the already overtaxed principle of -inheritance, when parallelism is as much a possibility in the organic -world as it is an actuality in the inorganic world? - -As to the contrast here drawn between inheritance and other similifying -factors, it is hardly necessary to remark that we are speaking of -inheritance as defined in terms of Mendelian experiment and cytological -observation. In the so-called chemical theory of inheritance, the -distinction would be meaningless and the contrast would not exist. -Ehrlich’s disciple, Adami, sets aside all self-propagating germinal -determinants, like the chromomeres, in favor of a hypothetical -“biophoric molecule,” which is to be conceived as a benzine-like -ring bristling with sidechains. Around this determining core the -future organism is built up in definite specificity, as an arch is -constructed about a template. Adami has merely applied Paul Ehrlich’s -ideas concerning metabolism and immunity to the question of heredity, -commandeering for this purpose the latter’s entire toolkit of -receptors, haptophores, amboceptors, etc., as though this grotesque -paraphernalia of crude and clumsy mechanical symbols (which look -for all the world like the wrenches of a machinist, or the lifters -used by the cook to remove hot lids from the kitchen range) could -throw any valuable light whatsoever on the exceedingly complex, and -manifestly vital, phenomenon of inheritance. It does not even deserve -to be called a chemical theory, for, as Starling correctly remarks -concerning Ehrlich’s conception, “though chemical in form,” it is not -so in reality, because “it does not explain the phenomenon by reference -to the known laws of chemistry.” (Cf. _Physiology_, ed. of 1920, -p. 1084.) In a word, the theory of heredity, which seeks to strip -inheritance of its uniqueness as a vital process by identifying it with -the more general physicochemical processes occurring in the organism, -is a groundless speculation, that, far from explaining, flouts the very -observational data which it pretends to elucidate. _Kurz und gut!_ -to requite the mechanist, Schäfer, with his own Danielesque phrase, -here, as elsewhere, the mechanists have succeeded in extracting from -the facts, not what the facts themselves proclaim, but what preëxisted -in their own highly-cultured imaginations so well-stocked with cogs, -cranks, ball bearings, and other æsthetic imagery emanating from -polytechnic schools and factories. - -But in arguing from the existence of parallelism in the inorganic -world to its possibility in the organic world, we are less liable -to displease the mechanists than those other extremists, the -neo-vitalists, who will be prone to deny all parity between living, and -inanimate, matter. Fortunately, we are in a position to appease the -scruples of the latter by referring to the facts of _convergence_ as -universally accepted evidence that the phenomenon of parallelism occurs -in animate, no less than inanimate, nature. Admitting, therefore, that -the laws of organic morphology are of a higher order than those which -regulate atomic, molecular, and multimolecular structure, these facts -attest, nevertheless, that parallelisms arise in organisms of separate -ancestry which are due, not to heredity, but to the uniform action -of universal morphogenetic forces. Hence general laws can be invoked -to account for organic uniformities with the same right that they -are invoked to account for resemblances existing between the various -members of a chemical “family” like the Halogens. And why should this -not be so? Organisms have much in common that transcends any possible -scheme of evolution and that cannot be brought into alignment with the -position arbitrarily assigned them in the evolutionary family-tree. -They all originate as single cells. Their common means of growth and -reproduction is mitotic cell division. This leads to the production -of a _somatella_, among the protista, and of a _soma_ differentiated -by histogenesis into two or three primary tissues, among the metista. -All these fundamental processes are strikingly uniform throughout -the entire plant and animal world. In these universal properties of -living matter, therefore, we have a common basis for general structural -and organizational laws, which, though irreducible to the “common -ancestors” of Transformism, is quite adequate to account for both the -homologies and analogies of living matter. Accept this basis of general -laws regulating the development of living matter, and there is no -difficulty in seeing why the problems posed by exposure to analogous -environmental conditions are solved in parallel fashion by organisms, -irrespective of whether they are nearly, or distantly, related in the -sense of morphology. Transformism, on the other hand, can only account -for homology at the expense of convergence, and for convergence at the -expense of homology. So far as a common ancestral basis is concerned, -the two kinds of resemblance are, from the very nature of the case, -irreducible phenomena. - -It is only, in fact, by surrendering the principle that similarity -entails community of origin, and by falling back on the suggested -common basis of general laws, that Transformism makes room in its -system for the troublesome facts of convergence. “It might be -reiterated in passing,” says Dwight, “that this ‘convergence’ business -is a very ticklish one. We have been taught almost word for word -that resemblance implies relationship, or almost predicates it; but -according to this doctrine it has nothing to do with it whatever.” -(“Thoughts of a Cath. Anat.,” p. 190.) And in a subsequent chapter -he says: “No very deep knowledge of comparative anatomy is needed -for us to know that very similar adaptations for particular purposes -are found in very diverse animals. The curious low grade mammal, -the _Ornithorhynchus_, with a hairy coat and the bill of a duck, is -a familiar instance. We all know that the whales have the general -form of the fish, although they are mammals, and going more into -details we know that the whale’s flipper is on the same general plan -as that of the ancient saurians.... The origin of the eye, according -to evolutionary doctrines, has been a very difficult problem, which -gets worse rather than better the more you do for it. Even if we could -persuade ourselves that certain cells blundered along by the lucky -mating of individuals in whom they were a bit better developed than in -the others till they came to form a most complicated organ of sight, it -would be a sufficient tax on our credulity to believe that this could -come off successfully in some extraordinary lucky species; but that it -should have turned out so well with all kinds of vertebrates is really -too much to ask us to swallow. But this is not all: eyes are very -widely spread among different classes of invertebrates. More wonderful -still, the eyes of certain molluscs and crustacea are on stalks, and -this is found also in various and very different families of fishes. -How did this happen? Was it by way of descent from the molluscs or the -crustacea? If not, how could chance have brought about such a similar -result in diverse forms?” (_Op. cit._, pp. 233-236.) - -It may be objected that the resemblances of convergence are superficial -analogies, not to be confounded with fundamental homologies. This -contention may be disputed; for, as we shall see in the next chapter, -there are cases where the convergence is admittedly radical, and -not merely superficial. The distinction, moreover, between shallow -and basic characters is somewhat arbitrary, and its validity is -often questionable. When the skeletal homology that relates the -amphibia to the mammals, for instance, is traced to the root of the -vertebrate family tree, we find it all but disappearing in a primitive -Amphioxus-like chordate, whose so-called skeleton contains no trace of -bone or cartilage. Hence, if we go back far enough, the homologies of -today become the convergences of a geological yesterday, and we find -the vertebrate type of skeleton arising independently in reptiles, -mammals, amphibia, and fishes. - -Again, there are times when convergent analogies appear to be more -representative of the common racial heritage than the underlying -structure itself, tempting the evolutionist to fly in the face of -the orthodox interpretation, which rigidly rules out analogy in -favor of homology, and refuses to accept the eloquent testimony -of a remarkable resemblance merely because of a slight technical -discrepancy in the structural substrate. A large pinching claw, or -chela, for example, occurs in two organisms belonging to the phylum -of the arthropods, namely, the lobster and the African scorpion. Both -chelæ are practically identical in structure, but, unfortunately, the -chela of the lobster arises from a different appendage than that from -which the scorpion’s chela emerges. If they arose from corresponding -appendages, they would be pronounced “homologous organs” and acclaimed, -without hesitation, as strong evidence in favor of the common origin -of all the arthropods. In proof of this, we call attention to the -importance attached to the adaptations affecting homologous bones in -fossil “horses.” As it is, however, the two chelæ are analogous, and -not homologous, organs. Hence, technically speaking, the two chelæ are -utterly unrelated structures. To the eye of common sense, however, the -likeness appears to be far more important than the difference, and the -average person will be inclined to view the resemblance as evidence of -a community of type. In fact, the tendency to discard superficial, and -to retain only fundamental, uniformities, is dangerous to the theory of -Transformism. When we confine our attention to what is really basic, we -find that the resemblances become so generalized and widespread that -specific conclusions as to descent become impossible, and we lose all -sense of direction in a clueless labyrinth of innumerable, yet mutually -contradictory, possibilities. - -Finally, it may be noted in passing that, though it is customary -with evolutionists to regard homologous characters as the tenaciously -persistent heritage of primeval days, and to look upon adaptational -characters as adventitious and accessory to the aforesaid primitive -heritage, the supposedly older and more fundamental characters fail to -give, by the manifestation of greater fixity, any empirical evidence -whatever of their being more deeply or firmly rooted in the hereditary -process than the presumably newer adaptational characters. We have, -therefore, no experimental warrant for appropriating homologous, -rather than adaptational, characters to the process of inheritance. -“It is sometimes asserted,” says Goodrich, “that old-established -characters are inherited, and that newly begotten ones are not, or are -less constant, in their reappearance. This statement will not bear -critical examination. For, on the one hand, it has been conclusively -shown by experimental breeding that the newest characters may be -inherited as constantly as the most ancient.... While, on the other -hand, few characters in plants can be older than the green color -due to chlorophyll, yet it is sufficient to cut off the light from -a germinating seed for the greenness to fail to appear. Again, ever -since Devonian times vertebrates have inherited paired eyes; yet, -as Professor Stockard has shown, if a little magnesium chloride is -added to the sea water in which the eggs of the fish _Fundulus_ are -developing, they will give rise to embryos with one median cyclopean -eye! Nor is the suggestion any happier that the, so to speak, more -deep-seated and fundamental characters are more constantly inherited -than the trivial or superficial. A glance at the organisms around -us, or the slightest experimental trial, soon convinces us that the -apparently least important character may reappear as constantly as -the most fundamental. But while an organism may live without some -trivial character, it can rarely do so when a fundamental character is -absent, hence such incomplete individuals are seldom met in Nature.” -(_Science_, Dec. 2, 1921, p. 530.) - -But, whether it be upon, or beneath, the surface, similitude of _any -kind_ suffices to establish our contention that inheritance is not the -only similifying influence present in organisms, and that resemblance -is perfectly compatible with independence of ancestry. We have, -therefore, an alternative for inheritance in the explanation of organic -uniformities, and by the admission of this alternative, which, for the -rest, is factually attested by the universally acknowledged phenomena -of convergence, the inference of common descent from structural -resemblance is shorn of the last remnant of its demonstrative force, as -an _a posteriori_ argument. - -But a still more serious objection to the evolutionary interpretation -of homology and preadaptation arises from its intrinsic _incoherency_. -Evolution, as previously stated, is assumed to be the resultant of -a twofold process, namely, _inheritance_ and _variation_. The first -is a conservative and similifying process, which transmits. The -second is a progressive and diversifying process, which diverts. -To the former process are due the uniformities of homology, to -the latter the deviations of adaptation. Upon the admission of -evolutionists themselves, however, neither of these processes behaves -in a manner consistent with its general nature, and both of them -are flagrantly unfaithful to the principal rôles assigned to them. -Nowadays the hereditary process transmits _adaptational_, as well -as _homologous_, characters. If, then, adaptational characters are -more recent than homologous characters, there must have been a time -when inheritance ceased to _similify_ and become a _diversifying_ -process by transmitting what it did not receive from the previous -generation. There were times when, not content with simply reiterating -the past, it began to divert former tendencies into novel channels. -In other words, inheritance becomes dualized into a paradoxical -process, which both perpetuates the old and appropriates the new. -The same inconsistency is manifest in the process of variation, -which capriciously produces _convergent_, no less than _divergent_, -adaptations. In two fundamentally identical structures, like the wing -of a bird and the foreleg of a cat, variation is said to have produced -diverse adaptations. In two fundamentally diverse structures, like -the head of an octopus and the head of a frog, variation is said to -have produced an identical adaptation, namely, the vertebrate type of -eye. It appears, therefore, that the essentially diversifying process -of variation can become, on occasion, a simplifying process, which, -instead of solving environmental problems in an original manner, -prefers to employ uniform and standardized solutions, and to cling to -its old stereotyped methods. Inheritance similifies and diversifies, -variation converges and diverges. It is futile to attempt to reduce -either of these protean processes to a condition that even approximates -consistency. The evolutionist blows hot and cold with the same breath. -Verily, his god is Proteus, or the double-headed Janus! - -_Summa summarum_: The evolutionary argument from homology is defective -in three important respects: (1) in its lack of experimental -confirmation; (2) in its incomplete enumeration of the disjunctive -possibilities; (3) in its inability to construct a scheme of -transmutation that synthesizes inheritance and variation in a logically -coherent, and factually substantiated formula. The first two defects -are not necessarily fatal to the argument as such. Though they destroy -its pretensions to conclusiveness, they do not preclude the fulfilment -of the moderate claim made in its behalf by Prof. T. H. Morgan, who -says: “In this sense (_i.e._, as previously stated) the argument from -comparative anatomy, while not a demonstration, carries with it, I -think, a high degree of probability.” (“A Critique of the Theory of -Evolution,” p. 14.) The third defect is more serious. The apparently -irreducible antagonism which the evolutionary assumption introduces -between inheritance and variation has been sensed even by the adherents -of transformism themselves, and they have searched in vain for a -formula, which, without sacrificing the facts, would bring into concord -the respective rôles of these discordant factors. “It follows,” says -Osborn, “as an unprejudiced conclusion from our present evidence that -upon Weismann’s principle we can explain inheritance but not evolution, -while with Lamarck’s principle and Darwin’s selection principle we -can explain evolution, but not, at present, inheritance. Disprove -Lamarck’s principle and we must assume that there is some third factor -in evolution of which we are ignorant.” (_Popular Science Monthly_, -Jan., 1905.) The point is well taken, and unless, as Osborn suggests, -there is a _tertium quid_ by means of which the discord can be resolved -into ultimate harmony, we see no way of liberating the theory of -Transmutation from this embarrassing dilemma. - - - - - CHAPTER III - - FOSSIL PEDIGREES - - “_By dint of such great efforts we succeeded only in piecing - together genial romances more or less historical._”—B. Grassi, - Prof. of Comparative Anatomy, Univ. of Rome, “La vita” (1906), - p. 227. - - - § 1. =The Argument in the Abstract= - -The palæontological argument for evolution is based upon the observed -gradual approximation in type of the earlier forms of life, as -represented by the fossils still preserved in successive geological -strata, to the later forms of life, as represented by the contemporary -species constituting our present flora and fauna. Here the observed -distribution in time supplements and confirms the argument drawn from -mere structural affinity. Here we are no longer dealing with the -spatial gradation of contemporary forms, arranged on a basis of greater -or lesser similarity (the gradation whence the zoölogist derives his -argument for evolution), but with a temporal gradation, which is -simultaneously a morphological series and an historical record. The -lower sedimentary rocks contain specimens of organic life very unlike -modern species, but, the higher we ascend in the geological strata, -the more closely do the fossil forms resemble our present organisms. -In fact, the closeness of resemblance is directly proportional to the -proximity in time, and this seems to create a presumption that the -later forms of life are the modified descendants of the earlier forms. -Considered in the abstract, at least, such an argument is obviously -more formidable than the purely anatomical argument based on the -degrees of structural affinity observable in contemporary forms. It -ought, therefore, to be extremely persuasive, provided, of course, -it proceeds in rigorous accord with indubitably established facts and -rules out relentlessly the alloy of uncritical assumptions. - -Here, likewise, we find the theory of transformism asserting its -superiority over the theory of immutability, on the ground that -evolutionism can furnish a natural explanation for the gradational -distribution of fossil types in the geological strata, whereas the -theory of permanence resorts, it is said, to a supernaturalism -of reiterated “new creations” alternating with “catastrophic -exterminations.” Now, if this claim is valid, and it can be shown -conclusively that fixism is inevitably committed to a postulate of -superfluously numerous “creations,” then the latter theory is shorn -of all right to consideration by Occam’s Razor: _Entia non sunt -multiplicanda sine ratione._ It is rather difficult to conceive of the -Creator as continually blotting out, and rewriting, the history of -creation, as ruthlessly exterminating the organisms of one age, only -to repopulate the earth subsequently with species differing but little -from their extinct predecessors—_ad quid perditio haec_? Such procedure -hardly comports with the continuity, regularity and irrevisable -perfection to be expected in the works of that Divine Wisdom, which -“reacheth ... from end to end mightily and disposeth all things -sweetly” (_Wisdom_, viii; 1), which “ordereth all things in measure, -and number and weight.” (_Wis._ xi; 21.) - -Following the lead of other evolutionists, Wasmann has striven to -saddle fixism with the fatuity of periodic catastrophism and “creation -on the installment plan.” But even Cuvier, who is credited with -having originated the theory of catastrophism, did not go to the -absurd extreme of hypothecating reiterated creations, but sought -to explain the repopulation of the earth after each catastrophe -by means of migrations from distant regions unaffected by the -catastrophe. Historically, too, fixism has had its uniformitarian, as -well as its catastrophic, versions. In fact, Huxley classifies both -uniformitarianism and catastrophism as fixistic systems, when he -says: “I find three more or less contradictory systems of geologic -thought ... standing side by side in Britain. I shall call one of them -Catastrophism, another Uniformitarianism, the third Evolutionism.” -(“Lay Sermons,” p. 229.) Obviously, then, fixism is separable from -the hypothesis of repeated catastrophes alternating with repeated -“creations.” Stated in proper terms, it is at one with evolutionism -in rejecting as undemonstrated and improbable the postulate of -reiterated cataclysms. It freely acknowledges that, in the absence -of positive evidence of their occurrence, the presumption is against -extraordinary events, like wholesale catastrophes. It sanctions -the uniformitarian tenet that ordinary cosmic processes are to be -preferred to exceptional ones as a basis of geological explanation, -and it repudiates as unscientific any recourse to the unusual or -the miraculous in accounting for natural phenomena. Its sole point -of disagreement with evolutionism is its refusal to admit organic -changes of _specific_ magnitude. It does, however, admit germinal -changes of _varietal_ magnitude. It also recognizes that the external -characters of the phenotype are the joint product of germinal factors -and environmental stimuli, and admits, in consequence, the possibility -of purely _somatic changes_ of considerable profundity being induced -by widespread and persistent alterations in environmental conditions. -Like Darwin, the uniformitarian fixist ascribes the origination of -organic life to a single vivifying act on the part of the Creator, an -act, however, that was _formative_ rather than _creative_, because the -primal forms of life, whether few or many, were all evolved through -Divine influence from preëxistent inorganic matter. Unlike Darwin, he -ascribes the continuation of organic life to generative processes that -were univocal (_generationes univocae_), and not gradually-equivocal -(_generationes paulatim aequivocae_). In the next chapter, we shall see -that, in attributing the initial formation of species to a Divine act, -neither Darwin nor the creationists exposed themselves to the charge of -explaining the “natural” by means of the “miraculous.” And, as for the -process by which living forms were continued upon earth, the univocal -reproductive process upheld by fixism is more manifestly a natural -process than the gradually-equivocal generation of variable inheritance -hypothecated by the theory of transmutation. The sole matter of dispute -between the two views is whether the life-cycles of organisms are -circles or spirals. - -But all this, it will be said, is purely negative. Merely to refrain -from any recourse to the extraordinary or the supernatural is by no -means sufficient. “Natural explanations” must be explanatory as well -as natural. Unless there be a simplification, a reduction of plurality -to unity, a resolution of many particular problems into a common -general problem, we have no explanation worthy of the name. Granting, -therefore, that uniformitarian fixism does not recur to the anomalous -or the miraculous, it still lies open to the charge of failing in its -function as an explanation, because it multiplies origins in both space -and time. Transformism, on the contrary, is said to elucidate matters, -inasmuch as it unifies origins spatially and temporally. - -That transformism successfully plausibleizes a unification of origins -in space, is true only in a limited and relative sense. The most -that can be said for the assumption, that resemblances rest on the -principle of common inheritance, is that it permits of a numerical -reduction of origins, but this numerical reduction will, by an -intrinsic necessity, always fall short of absolute unification. The -monophyletic derivation of all organic forms from one primordial cell -or protoblast is a fantastic dream, for which, from the very nature -of things, natural science does not, and can not, furnish even the -semblance of an objective basis. The ground is cut from under our feet, -the moment we attempt to extend the principle of descent outside the -limits of an organic phylum. The sole basis of inference is a group -of uniformities, and, unless these uniformities predominate over the -diversities, there can be no rational application of the principle of -transformism. Hence, the hypothesis, that organisms are consanguineous -notwithstanding their differences, loses all value as a solution -at the point where resemblances are outweighed by diversities. The -transmutation assumed to have taken place must be never so complete as -to have obliterated all recognizable vestiges of the common ancestral -type. “Whenever,” says Driesch, “the theory that, in spite of their -diversities, the organisms are related by blood, is to be really useful -for explanation, it must necessarily be assumed in every case that -the steps of change, which have led the specific form A to become the -specific form B, have been such as only to change in part that original -form A. That is to say: the similarities between A and B must never be -overshadowed by their diversities.” (“Science and Philosophy of the -Organism,” v. I, p. 254.) When, therefore, the reverse is true and -diversities are prevalent over uniformities, we are left without clue -or compass in the midst of a labyrinth of innumerable possibilities. -Such are the limits imposed by the very nature of the evidence itself, -and the scientists, who transgress these limits, by attempting to -correlate the primary phyla, are on a par with those unconvincible -geniuses, who continually besiege the Patent Office with schemes ever -new and weird for realizing the chimera of “perpetual motion.” - -Thus scientific transformism is unable to simplify the problem beyond a -certain irreducible plurality of forms, lesser only in degree than the -plurality postulated by fixism. This being the case, the attempts of -Wasmann and Dorlodot to prune the works of Creation with Occam’s Razor -are not only presumptuous, but precarious as well. _Qui nimis probat, -nihil probat!_ If it be unworthy of God to multiply organic origins -in space, then monophyletic descent is the only possible alternative, -and polyphyletic transformism falls under the same condemnation as -fixism. Yet the polyphyletic theory of descent is that to which both -Wasmann and Dorlodot subscribe, as it is, likewise, the only kind of -transformism which science can ever hope to plausibleize. Besides, too -close a shave with Occam’s Razor would eliminate creation altogether, -since all theologians cheerfully admit that it was the result of a free -and unnecessary act on the part of God. When we apply our _rationes -convenientiae_ to the Divine operations, we must not make the mistake -of applying them to the Divine action itself instead of the created -effects of that action. We may be competent to discern disorder and -irregularity in finite things, but we are wholly incompetent to -prescribe rules for Divine conduct. To say that God is constrained -by His infinite Wisdom to indirect, rather than direct, production, -or that He must evolve a variety of forms out of living, rather than -non-living, matter, is to be guilty of ridiculous anthropomorphism. -There is no _a priori_ reason, founded upon the Divine attributes, -which restricts God’s creative action to the production of this, or -that, number of primordial organisms, or which obliges him to endow -primitive organisms with the power of transmutation. - -But the fact that these _rationes convenientiae_ fail to establish -the _a priori_ necessity of a unification of organic origins in -space, does not imply that they are without value in suggesting the -unification of organic origins in time. Order and regularity are not -excluded by spatial multiplicity, but they may easily be excluded by -the incongruities of an irregular succession of events. Indeterminism -and chance are, indeed, inseparable from the course of Nature. There is -in matter an unlimited potentiality, incommensurate with the limited -efficacy of natural agencies. Hence it evades the absolute control of -all finite factors and forces. But the anomalies and irregularities, -which are contingent upon the limitation or frustration of second -causes unable to impose an iron necessity upon evasive matter, are -not referable to the First Cause, but rather to the finite efficacy -of second causes. Such anomalies in natural processes, consequently, -are not inconsistent with infinite wisdom and power on the part of -the Creator. If, on the contrary, the anomaly occurs, not in the form -of an accidental frustration of a natural agency, but in the form -of an intrusive “new creation,” the irregularity in question would -then be referable to the Creator Himself, and such derogations of -order are inadmissible, except as manifestations of the supernatural. -In fact, the abrupt and capricious insertion of a “new creation” -into an order already constituted, say, for instance, the sudden -introduction of Angiosperms in the Comanchian period, or of mammals in -the Tertiary, would be out of harmony with both reason and revelation. -Unless there is a positive reason for supposing the contrary, we must -presume that, subsequent to the primordial constitution of things, -the Divine influence upon the world has been concurrent rather than -revolutionizing. Hence a theory of origins, compatible with the -simultaneous “creation” of primal organisms, is decidedly preferable -to a theory, which involves successive “creations” at random. That -transformism dispenses with the need of assuming a succession of -“creative” acts, is perfectly obvious, and, unless fixism can emulate -its rival system in this respect, it cannot expect to receive serious -attention. - -But once fixism assumes the simultaneousness of organic origins, -it encounters, in the absence of modern organic types from ancient -geological strata, a new and formidable difficulty. Cuvier’s theory -of numerous catastrophes followed by wholesale migrations of the -forms, which had escaped extinction, is tantamount to an appeal to the -extraordinary and the improbable for purposes of explanation, and this, -as we have seen, is an expedient, which natural science is justified -in refusing to sanction. Nor does the appeal to the incompleteness of -the geological record offer a more satisfactory solution. It is tax -enough, as we shall see, upon our credulity, when the transformist -seeks to account thereby for the absence of intermediate types, but -to account in this fashion for the absence of palæozoic Angiosperms -and mammals is asking us to believe the all-but-incredible. It would -not, therefore, be advisable for the fixist to appropriate the line of -defense suggested for him by Bateson—“It has been asked how do you -_know_ for instance that there were no mammals in Palæozoic times? May -there not have been mammals somewhere on the earth though no vestige of -them has come down to us? We may feel confident there were no mammals -then, but are we sure? In very ancient rocks most of the great orders -of animals are represented. The absence of the others might by no great -stress of imagination be ascribed to accidental circumstances.” But the -sudden rise of the Angiosperms in the early part of the Mesozoic era is -an instance of _de novo_ origin that is not so easily explained away. -Hence Bateson continues: “Happily, however, there is one example of -which we can be sure. There were no Angiosperms—that is to say ‘higher -plants’ with protected seeds—in the carboniferous epoch. Of that age we -have abundant remains of a worldwide and rich flora. The Angiosperms -are cosmopolitan. By their means of dispersal they must immediately -have become so. Their remains are very readily preserved. If they -had been in existence on the earth in carboniferous times they must -have been present with the carboniferous plants, and must have been -preserved with them. Hence we may be sure that they did appear on earth -since those times. We are not certain, using certain in the strict -sense, that Angiosperms are the lineal descendants of the carboniferous -plants, but it is much easier to believe that they are than that they -are not.” (_Science_, Jan. 20, 1922, p. 58.) - -It would thus appear, that not all the organic types of either the -plant, or the animal, kingdom are of equal antiquity, and that the -belated rise of unprecedented forms has the status of an approximate -certainty, wherewith every theory of origins must inevitably reckon. -How, then, is the fixist to reconcile this successive appearance of -organisms with the simultaneous “creation” advocated by St. Augustine -and St. Thomas of Aquin? Unless there be some other gradual process -besides transmutation, to bridge the interval between the creative -fiat and the eventual appearance of modern types, there seems to be no -escape from the dilemma. - -This brings us to St. Augustine’s theory of the evolution of organic -life from inorganic matter, which Dorlodot sophistically construes -as supporting the theory of descent. According to St. Augustine, for -whose view the Angelic Doctor expressed a deliberate preference, the -creation of the corporeal world was the result of a single creative -act, having an immediate effect in the case of minerals, and a remote -or postponed effect in the case of plants and animals (cf. “De Genesi -ad litteram,” lib. V, c. 5). Living beings, therefore, were created, -not in actuality, but in germ. God imparted to the elements the -power of producing the various plants and animals in their proper -time and place. Hence living beings were created causally rather -than formally, by the establishment of causal mechanisms or natural -agencies especially ordained to bring about the initial formation of -the ancestral forms of life. The Divine act initiating these “natural -processes” (_rationes seminales, rationes causales_) in inorganic, and -not in living, matter, was instantaneous, but the processes, which -terminated in the formation of plants and animals, in their appointed -time and place, were in themselves gradual and successive. Thus by an -influx of Divine power the earth was made pregnant with the promise -of every form of life—“_Sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic ipse -mundus est gravidus causis nascentium._” (Augustine, lib. III, “de -Trinitate,” c. 9.) - -By reason of this doctrine, the Louvain professor claims that -St. Augustine was an evolutionist, and so, indeed, he was, if by -evolution is meant a gradual production of organisms from inorganic -matter. But if, on the contrary, by evolution is meant a progressive -differentiation and multiplication of organic species by transmutation -of preëxistent forms of life, or, in other words, if evolution is taken -in its usual sense as synonym for transformism, then nothing could -be more absurdly anachronistic than to ascribe the doctrine to St. -Augustine. The subject of the gradual process postulated by the latter -was, not living, but _inorganic_, matter, and the process was conceived -as leading to the _formation_, and not the transformation, of species. -The idea of variable inheritance did not occur to St. Augustine, and he -conceived organisms, once they were in existence, as being propagated -exclusively by univocal reproduction (_generatio univoca_). It is the -fixist, therefore, rather than the transformist, who is entitled to -exploit the Augustinian hypothesis. In fact, it is only the vicious -ambiguity and unlimited elasticity of the term evolution, which avail -to extenuate the astounding confusion of ideas and total lack of -historic sense, that can bracket together under a common term the -ideology of Darwin and the view of St. Augustine. - - - § 2. The Argument in the Concrete - -But it is our task to criticize the theory of transformism, and not to -throw a life-line to fixism, by advocating gradual formation of species -as the only feasible alternative to gradual transformation of species. -Perhaps, this particular life-line will not be appreciated any way; -for the fixist may, not without reason, prefer to rest his case on the -contention that the intrinsic _time-value_ of geological formations is -far too problematic for certain conclusions of any sort. In maintaining -this position, he will have the support of some present-day geologists, -and can point, as we shall see, to facts that seem to bear out his -contention. In fact, the cogency of the palæontological argument -appears to be at its maximum in the abstract, and to evaporate the -moment we carry it into the concrete. The lute seems perfect, until we -begin to play thereon, and then we discover certain rifts that mar the -effect. It is to these rifts that our attention must now be turned. - -The first and most obvious flaw, in the evolutionary interpretation -of fossil series, is the confounding of succession with filiation. -Thinkers, from time immemorial, have commented on the deep chasm -of distinction, which divides historical from causal sequence, and -philosophers have never ceased to inveigh against the sophistical -snare of: _Post hoc, ergo propter hoc._ That one form of life has -been subsequent in time to another form of life is, in itself, no -proof of descent. “Let us suppose,” says Bather, “all written records -to be swept away, and an attempt made to reconstruct English history -from coins. We could set out our monarchs in true order, and we might -suspect that the throne was hereditary; but if on that assumption -we were to make James I, the son of Elizabeth—well, but that’s -just what palæontologists are constantly doing. The famous diagram -of the Evolution of the Horse which Huxley used in his American -lectures has had to be corrected in the light of the fuller evidence -recently tabulated in a handsome volume by Prof. H. F. Osborn and -his coadjutors. _Palæotherium_, which Huxley regarded as a direct -ancestor of the horse, is now held to be only a collateral, as the -last of the Tudors were collateral ancestors of the Stuarts. The later -_Ancitherium_ must be eliminated from the true line as a side branch—a -Young Pretender. Sometimes an apparent succession is due to immigration -of a distant relative from some other region—‘The glorious House of -Hanover and Protestant Succession.’ It was, you will remember, by such -migrations that Cuvier explained the renewal of life when a previous -fauna had become extinct. He admitted succession but not descent.” -(_Science_, Sept. 17, 1920, p. 261.) - -But, if succession does not imply descent, descent, at least, implies -succession, and the fact that succession is the necessary corollary of -descent, may be used as a corrective for the erroneous allocations made -by neontologists on the basis of purely morphological considerations. -The _priority_ of a type is the _sine qua non_ condition of its -being accepted as _ancestral_. It is always embarrassing when, as -sometimes happens, a “descendant” turns out to be older than, or even -coëval with, his “ancestor.” If, however, the historical position of -a form can be made to coincide with its anatomical pretensions to -ancestry, then the inference of descent attains to a degree of logical -respectability that is impossible in the case of purely zoölogical -evidence. Recent years have witnessed a more drastic application of the -historical test to morphological speculations, and the result has been -a wholesale revision of former notions concerning phylogeny. “I could -easily,” says Bather, “occupy the rest of this hour by discussing the -profound changes wrought by this conception on our classification. It -is not that orders and classes hitherto unknown have been discovered, -not that some erroneous allocations have been corrected, but the whole -basis of our system is being shifted. So long as we were dealing with -a horizontal section across the tree of life—that is to say, with -an assemblage of approximately contemporaneous forms—or even with a -number of such horizontal sections, so long were we confined to simple -description. Any attempt to frame a causal connection was bound to be -speculative.” (_Ibidem_, p. 258.) Whether zoölogists will take kindly -to this “shifting of the whole basis” of classification, remains to be -seen. Personally, we think they would be very ill-advised to exchange -the solid observational basis of homology for the scanty facts and -fanciful interpretations of palæontologists. - -The second stumbling block in the path of Transformism is the -occurrence of convergence. We have seen that, in the palæontological -argument, descent is inferred conjointly from similarity and -succession, and that, in the abstract, this argument is very -persuasive. One of the concrete phenomena, however, that tend to make -it inconsequential, is the undoubted occurrence of convergence. Prof. -H. Woods of Cambridge, in the Introduction to the 5th edition of his -“Palæontology” (1919), speaks of three kinds of convergence (cf., -pp. 14, 15, 16), which, as a matter of convenience, we may term the -parallelistic, the radical, and the adaptational, types of convergence. -A brief description of each type will serve to elucidate its nature and -its significance: - -(1) Parallelistic convergence implies the appearance of parallel -modifications in the homologous parts of organisms regarded as -diverging from common stock in two distinct collateral lines, that -were independent at the time of the appearance in both of the said -parallel modifications. Speaking of the fossil cœlenterates known as -_Graptolites_, Professor Woods says: “In some genera the hydrothecæ -of different species show great variety of form, those of one species -being often much more like those of a species belonging to another -genus than to other species of the same genus.” (“Palæontology,” 5th -ed., 1919, p. 69.) As another instance of this phenomenon, the case -of the fossil ungulates of South America, spoken of as _Litopterna_, -may be cited, and the case is peculiarly interesting because of its -bearing on that _pièce de résistance_ of palæontological evidence, -the Pedigree of the Horse. “The second family of Litopterna,” says -Wm. B. Scott, “the Proterotheriidæ, were remarkable for their many -deceptive resemblances to horses. Even though those who contend that -the Litopterna should be included in the Perissodactyla should prove to -be in the right, there can be no doubt that the proterotheres were not -closely related to the horses, but formed a most striking illustration -of the independent acquisition of similar characters through parallel -or convergent development. The family was not represented in the -Pleistocene, having died out before that epoch, and the latest known -members of it lived in the upper Pliocene.... Not that this remarkable -character was due to grotesque proportions; on the contrary, they -looked far more like the ordinary ungulates of the northern hemisphere -than did any of their South American contemporaries; it is precisely -this resemblance that is so notable.... The feet were three-toed, -except in one genus (_Thoatherium_) in which they were single-toed, and -nearly or quite the whole weight was carried upon the median digit, the -laterals being mere dew-claws. The shape of the hoofs and the whole -appearance of the foot was surprisingly like those of the three-toed -horses, but there were certain structural differences of such great -importance, in my judgment, as to forbid the reference of these -animals, not merely to the horses, but even to the perissodactyls.” (“A -History of Land Mammals in the Western Hemisphere,” p. 499.) - -For this sort of parallelism, the Lamarckian and Darwinian types of -evolution by addition can offer no rational explanation. It could, -perhaps, be accounted for upon the Batesonian hypothesis of evolution -by loss of inhibition, that is to say, the coincident appearance of -convergent characters in collateral lines might be interpreted as -being due to a parallel loss in both lines of the inhibitive genes, -which had suppressed the convergent feature in the primitive or common -stock. We say that the convergence _might_ be so interpreted, because -the interpretation in question would, at best, be merely optional -and not at all necessary; for in the third, or adaptational, type of -convergence, we shall see instances of parallel modifications occurring -in completely independent races, whose morphology and history alike -exclude all possibility of hereditary connection between them. Hence, -even in the present case, nothing constrains us to accept the genetic -interpretation. - -(2) Radical convergence, which Woods styles heterogenetic homœomorphy, -is described by him as follows: “Sometimes two groups of individuals -resemble each other so closely that they might be regarded as belonging -to the same genus or even to _the same species_ (italics mine), but -they have descended from different ancestors since they are found to -differ in development (ontogeny) or in their palæontological history; -this phenomenon, of forms belonging to different stocks approaching -one another in character, is known as convergence or heterogenetic -homœomorphy, and may occur at the same geological period or at widely -separated intervals. Thus the form of oyster known as _Gryphaea_ has -originated independently from oysters of the ordinary type in the Lias, -in the Oölites, and again in the Chalk; these forms found at different -horizons closely resemble one another and have usually been regarded as -belonging to one genus (_Gryphaea_), but they have no direct genetic -connection with one another.” (“Palæontology,” 5th ed., 1919, p. 15.) -Comment is almost superfluous. If even _specific_ resemblance is no -proof of common origin, then what right have we to interpret any -resemblance whatever in this sense? With such an admission, the whole -bottom drops out of the evolutionary argument. When the theory of -descent is forced to account for heterogenetic resemblance at expense -of all likelihood and consistency, when it cannot save itself except by -blowing hot and cold with one breath, one is tempted to exclaim: “Oh, -why bother with it!” - -(3) Adaptational convergence is the occurrence of parallel -modifications due to analogous specialization in unrelated forms, -whose phylogeny has been obviously diverse. “Also, animals belonging -to quite distinct groups,” says Woods, “may, when living under similar -conditions, come to resemble one another owing to the development of -adaptive modifications, though they do not really approach one another -in essential characters; thus analogous or parallel modifications may -occur in independent groups—such are the resemblances between flying -reptiles (_Ornithosaurs_) and birds, and between sharks, icthyosaurs -and dolphins.” (_Op. cit._, p. 16.) As this type of convergence has -been discussed in a previous article, with reference to the mole and -mole-cricket, it need not detain us further. - -All these types of convergence, but especially the second type, are -factual evidence of the compatibility of resemblance with independent -origin, and the fact of their occurrence tends to undermine the -certainty of the phylogenetic inferences based on fossil evidence; -all the more so, that, thanks to its bad state of preservation, and -the impossibility of dissection, even superficial resemblances may -give rise to false interpretations. And, as for the cases of radical -convergence, there is no denying that they strike at the very heart of -the theory of descent. - -The third difficulty for Transformism arises from the discontinuity -of the geological record. It was one of the very first discrepancies -to be discovered between evolutionary expectation and the actual -results of research. The earliest explorations revealed a state of -affairs, that subsequent investigations have failed to remedy: on -the one hand, namely, a notable absence of intermediate species to -bridge the gaps between the fossil genera, and on the other hand, -the sudden and simultaneous appearance of numerous new and allied -types unheralded by transitional forms. Since Darwin had stressed the -gradualness of transmutation, the investigators expected to find the -transitional means more numerous than the terminal extremes, and were -surprised to find, in the real record of the past, the exact reverse -of their anticipation. They found that the classes and families of -animals and plants had always been as widely separated and as sharply -differentiated as they are today, and that they had always formed -distinct systems, unconnected by transitional links. The hypothetical -“generalized types,” supposed to combine the features of two or three -families, have never been found, and most probably never will be; -for it is all but certain that they never existed. Occasionally, it -is true, palæontologists have discovered isolated types, which they -interpreted as annectant forms, but a single pier does not make a -bridge, and only too often it chanced that the so-called annectant -type, though satisfactory from the morphological standpoint, was more -recent than the two groups, to which it was supposed to be ancestral. -But it will make matters plainer, if we illustrate what is meant by the -discontinuity or incompleteness of the fossil record, by reference to -some concrete series, such as the so-called Pedigree of the Horse. - -Whenever a series of fossils, arranged in the order of their historical -sequence, exhibits a gradation of increasing resemblance to the latest -form, with which the series terminates, such a series is called a -palæontological pedigree, and is said to represent so many stages in -the racial development or phylogeny of the respective modern type. The -classical example of this sort of “pedigree” is that of the Horse. -It is, perhaps, one of the most complete among fossil “genealogies,” -and yet, as has been frequently pointed out, it is, as it stands, -extremely incomplete. Modern representatives of the _Equidae_, namely, -the horse, the ass and the zebra, belong to a common genus, and are -separated from one another by differences which are merely specific, -but the differences which separate the various forms, that compose -the “pedigree of the Horse,” are generic. We have, to borrow Gerard’s -simile, nothing more than the piers of the evolutionary bridge, without -the arches, and we do not know whether there ever were any arches. -There is, indeed, a sort of progression, _e.g._, from the four-toed -to a one-toed type, so that the morphological gradation does, in some -degree, coincide with temporal succession. But, on the other hand, the -fossil forms, interpreted as stages in the phylogeny of the Horse, are -separated from one another by gaps so enormous, that, in the absence -of intermediate species to bridge the intervals, it is practically -impossible, particularly in the light of our experimental knowledge -of Genetics, to conceive of any transition between them. Nor is this -all. The difficulty is increased tenfold, when we attempt to relate the -_Equidae_ to other mammalian groups. Fossil ungulates appear suddenly -and contemporaneously in the Tertiary of North America, South America -and Europe, without any transitional precursors, to connect them with -the hypothetical proto-mammalian stock, and to substantiate their -collaterality with other mammalian stocks. - -To all such difficulties the evolutionist replies by alleging the -incompleteness of the geological record, and modern handbooks -on palæontology devote many pages to the task of explaining why -incompleteness of the fossil record is just what we should expect, -especially in the case of terrestrial animals. The reasons which -they assign are convincing, but this particular mode of solving the -difficulty is a rather precarious one. Evolutionists should not -forget that, in sacrificing the substantial completeness of the -record to account for the absence of intermediate species, they are -simultaneously destroying its value as a proof of the relative position -of organic types in time. Yet this, as we have seen, is precisely the -feature of greatest strategic value in the palæontological “evidence” -for evolution. We must have absolute _certainty_ that the reputed -“ancestor” was in existence prior to the appearance of the alleged -“descendant,” or the peculiar force of the palæontological argument -is lost. It would be preposterous for the progeny to be prior to, -or even coëval with, the progenitor, and so we must be quite sure -that what we call “posterity” is really posterior in time. Now the -sole argument that palæontology can adduce for the posteriority of -one organic type as compared with another is the negative evidence -of its non-occurrence, or rather of its non-discovery, in an earlier -geological formation. The lower strata do not, so far as is known, -contain the type in question, and so it is concluded that this -particular form had no earlier history. Such an inference, as is -clear, is not only liable to be upset by later discoveries, but has -the additional disadvantage of implicitly assuming the substantial -completeness of the fossil record, whereas the absence of intermediate -species is only explicable by means of the assumed incompleteness of -the selfsame record. The evolutionist is thus placed in the dilemma -of choosing between a substantially complete, and a substantially -incomplete, record. Which of the alternatives, he elects, matters very -little; but he must abide by the consequences of his decision, he -cannot eat his cake and have it. - -When the evolutionist appeals to the facts of palæontology, it goes -without saying that he does so in the hope of showing that the -differences, which divide modern species of plants and animals, -diminish as we go backward in time, until the stage of identity is -reached in the unity of a common ancestral type. Hence from the very -nature of the argument, which he is engaged in constructing, he is -compelled to resort to intermediate types as evidence of the continuity -of allied species with the hypothetical ancestor, or common type, -whence they are said to have diverged. Now, even supposing that his -efforts in this direction were attended with a complete measure of -success, evidence of this kind would not of itself, as we shall see, -suffice to demonstrate the common origin of the extremes, between -which a perfect series of intergradent types can be shown to mediate. -Unquestionably, however, unless such a series of intergradent fossil -species can be adduced as evidence of the assumed transition, the -presumption is totally against the hypothesis of transformism. - -Now, as a matter of fact, the geological record rarely offers any -evidence of the existence in the past of intermediate species. For -those, who have implicit confidence in the _time-value_ of geological -“formations,” there are indications of a general advance from lower to -higher forms, but, even so, there is little to show that this seeming -progress is to be interpreted as an increasing divergence from common -ancestral types. With but few exceptions, the fossil record fails to -show any trace of transitional links. Yet pedigrees made up of diverse -genera are poor evidence for filiation or genetic continuity, so long -as no intermediate species can be found to bridge the chasm of generic -difference. By intermediate species, we do not mean the fabulous -“generalized type.” Annectants of this kind are mere abstractions, -which have never existed, and never could have existed. We refer rather -to actual fossil types separated from one another by differences not -greater than specific; for “not until we have linked species into -lineages,” can fossil pedigrees lay claim to serious attention. - -But let us suppose the case for evolution to be ideally favorable, and -assume that in every instance we possessed a perfect gradation of forms -between two extremes, such, for example, as occurs in the Ammonite -series, even then we would be far from having a true demonstration of -the point at issue. Bateson has called our attention to the danger of -confounding sterile and instable _hybrids_ with intergradent species. -“Examine,” he says, “any two thoroughly distinct species which meet -each other in their distribution, as for instance, _Lychnis diurna_ -and _vespertina_ do. In areas of overlap are many intermediate forms. -These used to be taken to be transitional steps, and the specific -distinctness of _vespertina_ and _diurna_ was on that account -questioned. Once it is known that these supposed intergrades are merely -mongrels between the two species the transition from one to the other -is practically beyond our powers of imagination to conceive. If both -these can survive, why has their common parent perished? Why, when -they cross, do they not reconstruct it instead of producing partially -sterile hybrids? I take this example to show how entirely the facts -were formerly misrepresented.” (_Heredity_, Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for -1915, p. 369.) - -Similarly, T. H. Morgan has shown, with reference to _mutants_, -the fallacy of inferring common descent from the phenomenon of -intergradence, and what holds true for a series of intergradent mutants -would presumably also hold true of a series of intergradent species, -could such a series be found and critically distinguished from hybrid -and mutational intermediates. In short, the Darwinian deduction of -common origin from the existence of intergradence must now be regarded -as a thoroughly discredited argument. “Because we can often arrange -the series of structures in a line extending from the very simple -to the more complex, we are apt to become unduly impressed by this -fact and conclude that if we found the complete series we should find -all the intermediate steps and that they have arisen in the order -of their complexity. This conclusion is not necessarily correct.” -(“A Critique of the Theory of Evolution,” p. 9.) Having cited such -a series of gradational mutations ranging between the long-winged, -and completely wingless condition, in the case of the Vinegar Fly -(_Drosophila melanogaster_), as well as two similar graded series based -on pigmentation and eye color, he concludes: “These types, with the -fluctuations that occur within each type, furnish a complete series of -gradations; yet historically they have arisen independently of each -other. Many changes in eye color have appeared. As many as thirty or -more races differing in eye color are now maintained in our cultures. -Some of them are so similar that they can scarcely be separated from -each other. It is easily possible beginning with the darkest eye color, -sepia, which is a deep brown, to pick out a perfectly graded series -ending with pure white eyes. But such a serial arrangement would give -a totally false idea of the way the different types have arisen; and -any conclusion based on the existence of such a series might very well -be entirely erroneous, for the fact that such a series exists bears -no relation to the order in which its members have appeared.” (_Op. -cit._, pp. 12, 13.) Such facts must give us pause in attaching undue -importance to phenomena like the occurrence of a gradual complication -of sutures in the Chalk Ammonites, particularly as parallel series -of perfectly similar sutures occurs “by convergence” in the fossil -Ceratites, which have no genetic connection with the Ammonites. (Cf. -Woods’ “Palæontology,” 5th ed., p. 16.) - -But, if even mutational and specific intergradents are not sufficient -evidence of common ancestry, what shall we say of a discontinuous -series, whose links are separate genera, orders, or even classes, -instead of species. Even the most enthusiastic transformist is forced -to admit the justice of our insistence that the gaps which separate the -members of a series must be reduced from differences of the generic, -to differences of the specific, order, before that series can command -any respect as hypothetical “genealogy.” “You will have observed,” says -F. A. Bather, “that the precise methods of the modern palæontologist, -on which this proof is based, are very different from the slap-dash -conclusions of forty years ago. The discovery of _Archæopteryx_, for -instance, was thought to prove the evolution of birds from reptiles. -No doubt it rendered that conclusion extremely probable, especially -if the major promise—that evolution was the method—were assumed. But -the fact of evolution is precisely what men were then trying to prove. -These jumpings from class to class or from era to era, by aid of a few -isolated stepping-stones, were what Bacon calls anticipations “hasty -and premature but very effective, because as they are collected from a -few instances, and mostly from those which are of familiar occurrence, -they immediately dazzle the intellect and fill the imagination.” (_Nov. -Org._, I, 28.) No secure step was taken until the modern palæontologist -began to affiliate mutation with mutation and species with species, -working his way back, literally inch by inch, through a single small -group of strata. Only thus could he base on the laboriously collected -facts a single true interpretation; and to those who preferred the -broad path of generality his interpretations seemed, as Bacon says -they always “must seem, harsh and discordant—almost like mysteries of -faith.” ... Thus by degrees we reject the old slippery stepping-stones -that so often toppled us into the stream, and, foot by foot, we build -a secure bridge over the waters of ignorance.” (_Science_, Sept. 17, -1920, pp. 263, 264.) - -We cannot share Bather’s confidence in the security of a bridge -composed of even linked species. Let such a series be never so perfect, -let the gradation be never so minute, as it might conceivably be -made, when not merely distinct species, but also hybrids, mutants -and fluctuants are available as stopgaps, the bare fact of such -intergradation tells nothing whatever concerning the problem of -genetical origin and specific relationship. The species-by-species -method does, however, represent the very minimum of requirement imposed -upon the palæontologist, who professes to construct a fossil pedigree. -But, when all is said and done, such a method, even at its best, -falls considerably short of the mark. However perfectly intergradent -a series of fossils may be, the fact remains that these petrified -remnants of former life cannot be subjected to breeding tests, and -that, in the consequent absence of genetical experimentation, we have -no means of determining the real bearing of these facts upon the -problem of interspecific relationship. Only the _somatic_ characters -of extinct floras and faunas have been conserved in the rock record of -the past, and even these are often rendered dubious, as we shall see -presently, by their imperfect state of preservation. Now, it is solely -in conjunction with breeding experiments, that somatic characters can -give us any insight into the nature of the _germinal constitution_ -of an organism, which, after all, is the cardinal consideration upon -which the whole question of interspecific relationship hinges. All -inferences, therefore, regarding the descent of fossil forms are -irremediably speculative and conjectural. When we are dealing with -living forms, we can always check up the inferences based on somatic -characteristics by means of genetical experiments, and in so doing -we have found that it is as unsafe to judge of an organism from the -exclusive standpoint of its external characters as it is to judge of -a book by the cover; for, apart from the check of breeding tests, it -is impossible to say just which somatic characters are genetically -significant, and which are not. Forms externally alike may be so -unlike in germinal constitution as to be sexually incompatible; forms -externally unlike may be readily crossed without any discernible -diminution of fertility. “Who could have foreseen,” exclaims Bateson, -“that the apple and the pear—so like each other that their botanical -differences are evasive—could not be crossed together, though -species of _Antirrhinum_ (Snapdragon) so totally unlike each other -as _majus_ and _molle_ can be hybridized, as Baur has shown, without -a sign of impaired fertility?” (_Heredity_, Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for -1915, p. 370.) We cannot distinguish between alleged specific, and -merely mutational (varietal), change, nor between hybridizations and -factorial, chromosomal, or pseudo-, mutations, solely on the basis -of such external characters as are preserved for us in fossils. It -is impossible, therefore, to demonstrate trans-specific variation by -any evidence that Palæontology can supply. The palæontologist (_pace_ -Osborn) is utterly incompetent to pass judgment on the problem of -interspecific relationship. As Bateson remarks: “In discussing the -physiological problem of interspecific relationship evidence of a more -stringent character is now required; and a naturalist acquainted with -genetical discoveries would be as reluctant to draw conclusions as to -the specific relationship of a series of fossils as a chemist would be -to pronounce on the nature of a series of unknown compounds from an -inspection of them in a row of bottles.” (_Science_, April 17, 1922, -p. 373.) “When the modern student of variation and heredity,” says T. -H. Morgan, “looks over the different ‘continuous’ series, from which -certain ‘laws’ and ‘principles’ have been deduced, he is struck by two -facts: that the gaps, in some cases, are enormous as compared with the -single changes with which he is familiar, and (what is more important) -that they involve numerous parts in many ways. The geneticist says to -the palæontologist, since you do not know, and from the nature of your -case can never know, whether your differences are due to one change or -to a thousand, you cannot with certainty tell us anything about the -hereditary units which have made the process of evolution possible.” -(_Op. cit._, pp. 26, 27.) And without accurate knowledge on this -subject, we may add, there is no possibility of demonstrating specific -change or genetic relationship in the case of any given fossil. - -In our discussion of the third defect in the fossil “evidence,” -allusion was made to a fourth, namely, its imperfect state of -preservation. The stone record of bygone days has been so defaced by -the metamorphism of rocks, by the solvent action of percolating waters, -by erosion, weathering and other factors of destruction, that, like a -faded manuscript, it becomes, even apart from its actual _lacunae_, -exceedingly difficult to decipher. So unsatisfactory, indeed, is the -condition of the partially obliterated facts that human curiosity, -piqued at their baffling ambiguity, calls upon human imagination -to supply what observation itself fails to reveal. Nor does the -invitation remain unheeded. Romance hastens to the rescue of uncertain -Science, with an impressive display of “reconstructed fossils,” and -the hesitation of critical caution is superseded by the dogmatism of -arbitrary assumption. Scattered fragments of fossilized bones are -integrated into skeletons and clothed by the magic of creative fancy -with an appropriate musculature and flesh, reënacting for us the -marvelous vision of Ezekiel: “And the bones came together, each one to -its joint. And I beheld and, lo, there were sinews upon them, and the -flesh came upon them: and the skin was stretched over them.” (Chap. -XXXVII, 7, 8.) “It is also true,” says Osborn (who, like Haeckel, -evinces a veritable mania for “retouching” incomplete facts), “that -we know the mode of origin of the human species; our knowledge of -human evolution has reached a point not only where a number of links -are thoroughly known but the characters of the missing links can be -very clearly predicated.” (_Science_, Feb. 24, 1922.) We will not -dispute his contention; for it is perfectly true, that, in each and -every case, all the missing details can be so exactly predicated that -the resulting description might well put to shame the account of a -contemporary eyewitness. The only difficulty is that such predication -is the fruit of pure imagination. Scientific reconstructions, whether -in the literary, plastic, or pictorial, form, are no more scientific -than historical novels are historical. Both are the outcome of a -psychological weakness in the human makeup, namely, its craving for a -“finished picture”—a craving, however, that is never gratified save at -the expense of the fragmentary basis of objective fact.[7] - - [7] See Addenda. - -In calling into question, however, the scientific value of the -so-called “scientific reconstruction,” so far as its pretensions to -precision and finality are concerned, it is not our intention to -discredit those tentative restorations based upon Cuvier’s Law of -Correlation, provided they profess to be no more than provisional -approximations. Many of the structural features of organisms are -physiologically interdependent, and there is frequently a close -correlation among organs and organ-systems, between which no causal -connection or direct physiological dependence is demonstrable. In -virtue of this principle, one structural feature may connote another, -in which case it would be legitimate to supply by inference any -missing structure implied in the actual existence of its respective -correlative. But if any one imagines that the law of correlation -enables a scientist to restore the lost integrity of fossil types -with any considerable degree of accuracy and finality, he greatly -overestimates the scope of the principle in question. At best it is -nothing more than an empirical generalization, which must not be -pressed to an extent unwarranted by the inductive process, that first -established it. “Certain relations of structure,” says Bather, “as -of cloven hoofs and horns with a ruminant stomach, were observed, but -as Cuvier himself insisted, the laws based on such facts were purely -empirical.” (_Science_, Sept. 17, 1920, p. 258.) The palæontologist, -then, is justified in making use of correlation for the purpose of -reconstructing a whole animal out of a few fragmentary remains, but to -look for anything like photographic precision in such “restorations” of -extinct forms is to manifest a more or less complete ignorance of the -nature and scope of the empirical laws, upon which they are based. - -The imprudence of taking these “reconstructions” of extinct forms -too seriously, however, is inculcated not merely by theoretical -considerations, but by experience as well. Even in the case of the -mammoth, a comparatively recent form, whose skeletal remains had -been preserved more completely and perfectly than those of other -fossil types, the discovery of a complete carcass buried in the ice -of the Siberian “taiga” on the Beresovka river showed the existing -restorations to be false in important respects. All, without exception, -stood in need of revision, proving, once and for all, the inadequacy -of fossil remains as a basis for exact reconstruction. E. Pfizenmayer, -a member of the investigating expedition, comments on the fact as -follows: “In the light of our present knowledge of the mammoth, -and especially of its exterior, the various existing attempts at a -restoration need important corrections. Apart from the many fanciful -sketches intended to portray the exterior of the animal, all the more -carefully made restorations show the faults of the skeleton, hitherto -regarded as typical, on which they are based, especially the powerful -semicircular and upward-curved tusks, the long tail, etc. - -“As these false conceptions of the exterior of the mammoth, both -written and in the form of pictures, are contained in all zoölogical -and palæontological textbooks, and even in scientific monographs, it -seems necessary to construct a more nearly correct picture, based on -our present knowledge. I have ventured on this task, because as a -member of the latest expedition for mammoth remains, I was permitted -not only to become acquainted with this newest find while still in its -place of deposit and to take part in exhuming it, but also to visit -the zoölogical museum of St. Petersburg, which is so rich in mammoth -remains, for the purpose of studying the animal more in detail.” -(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1906, pp. 321, 322.) The example is but -one of many, which serve to emphasize not merely the inadequacy of -the generality of palæontological restorations, but also the extreme -difficulty which the palæontologist experiences in interpreting aright -the partially effaced record of a vanished past. - -The fifth and most critical flaw in the fossil “evidence” for evolution -is to be found in the anomalies of the actual distribution of fossils -in time. It is the boast of evolutionary Palæontology that it is able -to enhance the cogency of the argument from mere structural resemblance -by showing, that, of two structurally allied forms, one is more ancient -than the other, and may, therefore, be presumed to be ancestral to the -later form. Antecedence in time is the _sine qua non_ qualification -of a credible ancestor, and, unless the relative priority of certain -organic types, as compared with others, can be established with -absolute certainty, the whole palæontological argument collapses, and -the boast of evolutionary geology becomes an empty vaunt. - -Whenever the appearance of a so-called annectant type is antedated by -that of the two forms, which it is supposed to connect, this fact is, -naturally, a deathblow to its claim of being the “common ancestor,” -even though, from a purely morphological standpoint, it should -possess all the requisites of an ancestral type. Commenting upon the -statement that a certain genus “is a truly annectant form uniting the -Melocrinidae and the Platycrinidae,” Bather takes exception as follows: -“The genus in question appeared, so far as we know, rather late in the -Lower Carboniferous, whereas both Platycrinidae and Melocrinidae were -already established in Middle Silurian time. How is it possible that -the far later form should unite these two ancient families? Even a -_mésalliance_ is inconceivable.” (_Science_, Sept. 17, 1920, p. 260.) - -Certainty, therefore, with respect to the comparative antiquity of -the fossiliferous strata is the indispensable presupposition of any -palæontological argument attempting to show that there is a gradual -approximation of ancient, to modern, types. Yet, of all scientific -methods of reckoning, none is less calculated to inspire confidence, -none less safeguarded from the abuses of subjectivism and arbitrary -interpretation, than that by which the relative age of the sedimentary -rocks is determined! - -In order to date the strata of any given series with reference to -one another, the palæontologist starts with the principle that, in -an undisturbed area, the deeper sediments have been deposited at an -earlier period than the overlying strata. Such a criterion, however, -is obviously restricted in its application to local areas, and is -available only at regions of outcrop, where a vertical section of the -strata is visibly exposed. To trace the physical continuity, however, -of the strata (if such continuity there be) from one continent to -another, or even across a single continent, is evidently out of -the question. Hence, to correlate the sedimentary rocks of a given -region with those of another region far distant from the former, -some criterion other than stratigraphy is required. To supply this -want, recourse has been had to _index fossils_, which have now -come into general use as age-markers and means of stratigraphical -correlation, where the criterion of _superposition_ is either absent -or inapplicable. Certain fossil types are assumed to be infallibly -indicative of certain stratigraphical horizons. In fact, when it -comes to a decision as to the priority or posteriority of a given -geological formation, index fossils constitute the court of last -appeal, and even the evidences of actual stratigraphical sequence and -of physical texture itself are always discounted and explained away, -whenever they chance to conflict with the presumption that certain -fossil forms are typical of certain geological periods. If, for -example, the superposed rock contains fossils alleged to be typical -of an “earlier” stratigraphic horizon than that to which the fossils -of the subjacent rock belong, the former is pronounced to be “older,” -despite the fact that the actual stratigraphic order conveys the -opposite impression. “We still regard fossils,” says J. W. Judd, “as -the ‘medals of creation,’ and certain types of life we take to be as -truly characteristic of definite periods as the coins which bear the -image and superscription of a Roman emperor or of a Saxon king.” (Cf. -Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1912, p. 356.) Thus it comes to pass, in the -last analysis, that fossils, on the one hand, are dated according to -the consecutive strata, in which they occur, and strata, on the other -hand, are dated according to the fossils which they contain. - -Such procedure, if not actually tantamount to a _vicious circle_, -is, to say the least, in imminent danger of becoming so. For, even -assuming the so-called empirical generalization, that makes certain -fossils typical of certain definitely-aged geological “formations,” to -be based upon induction sufficiently complete and analytic to insure -certainty, at least, in the majority of instances, and taking it for -granted that we are dealing with a case, where the actual evidence of -stratigraphy is not in open conflict with that of the index fossils, -who does not see that such a system of chronology lends itself only -too readily to manipulation of the most arbitrary kind, whenever the -pet preconceptions of the evolutionary chronologist are at stake? How, -then, can we be sure, in a given case, that a verdict based exclusively -on the “evidence” of index fossils will be reliably _objective_? It is -to be expected that the evolutionist will refrain from the temptation -to give himself the benefit of every doubt? Will there not be an -almost irresistible tendency on the part of the convinced transformist -to revise the age of any deposit, which happens to contain fossils -that, according to his theory, ought not to occur at the time hitherto -assigned? - -The citation of a concrete example will serve to make our meaning -clear. A series of fresh-water strata occur in India known as the -Siwalik beds. The formation in question was originally classed -as Miocene. Later on, however, as a result, presumably, of the -embarrassing discovery of the genus _Equus_ among the fossils of -the Upper Siwalik beds, Wm. Blanford saw fit to mend matters by -distinguishing the Upper, from the Lower, beds and assigning the -former (which contain fossil horses) to the Pliocene period. The title -Miocene being restricted by this ingenious step to beds destitute -of equine remains, namely the Nahun, or Lower Siwalik, deposits, -all danger of the horse proving to be older than his ancestors -was happily averted. A mere shifting of the conventional labels, -apparently, was amply sufficient to render groundless the fear, to -which Professor A. Sedgwick had given expression in the following -terms: “The genus _Equus_ appears in the upper Siwalik beds, which -have been ascribed to the Miocene age.... If _Equus_ really existed -in the Upper Miocene, it was antecedent to some of its supposed -ancestors.” (“Students’ Textbook of Zoölogy,” p. 599.) Evidently, the -Horse must reconcile himself perforce to the pedigree assigned to him -by the American Museum of Natural History; for he is to be given but -scant opportunity of escaping it. This classic genealogy has already -entailed far too great an expenditure of time, money and erudition to -permit of any reconsideration; and should it chance, in the ironic -perversity of things, that the Horse has been so inconsiderate as to -leave indubitable traces of himself in any formation earlier than -the Pliocene, it goes without saying that the formation in question -will at once be dated ahead, in order to secure for the “ancestors” -that priority which is their due. An elastic criterion like the index -fossil is admirably adapted for readjustments of this sort, and the -evolutionist who uses it need never fear defeat. The game he plays can -never be a losing one, because he gives no other terms than: Heads I -win, tails you lose. - -In setting forth the foregoing difficulties, we have purposely -refrained from challenging the cardinal dogma of orthodox palæontology -concerning the unimpeachable time-value of index fossils as -age-markers. The force of these considerations, therefore, must be -acknowledged even by the most fanatical adherents of the aforesaid -dogma. Our forbearance in this instance, however, must not be construed -as a confession that the dogma in question is really unassailable. On -the contrary, not only is it not invulnerable, but there are many and -weighty reasons for rejecting it lock, stock, and barrel. - -The palæontological dogma, to which we refer, is reducible to the -following tenets: (1) The earth is swathed with fossiliferous strata, -in much the same fashion that an onion is covered with a succession of -coats, and these strata are universal over the whole globe, occurring -always in the same invariable order and characterized not by any -peculiar uniformity of external appearance, physical texture, or -mineral composition, but solely by peculiar groups of fossil types, -which enable us to distinguish between strata of different ages and -to correlate the strata of one continent with their counterparts in -another continent—“Even the minuter divisions,” says Scott, “the -substages and zones of the European Jura, are applicable to the -classification of the South American beds.” (“Introduction to Geology,” -p. 681.) (2) In determining the relative age of a given geological -formation, its characteristic fossils form the exclusive basis of -decision, and all other considerations, whether lithological or -stratigraphic, are subordinated to this—“The character of the rocks,” -says H. S. Williams, “their composition or their mineral contents have -nothing to do with settling the question as to the particular system -to which the new rocks belong. The fossils alone are the means of -correlation.” (“Geological Biology,” pp. 37, 38.) - -To those habituated to the common notion that stratigraphical sequence -is the foremost consideration in deciding the comparative age of rocks, -the following statement of Sir Archibald Geikie will come as a distinct -shock: “We may even demonstrate,” he avers, “that in some mountainous -ground the strata have been turned completely upside down, if we can -show that the fossils in what are now the uppermost layers ought -properly to lie underneath those in the beds below them.” (“Textbook,” -ed. of 1903, p. 837.) In fact, the palæontologist, H. A. Nicholson, -lays it down as a general principle that, wherever the physical -evidence (founded on stratigraphy and lithology) is at variance with -the biological evidence (founded on the presence of typical fossil -organisms), the latter must prevail and the former must be ignored: “It -may even be said,” he tells us, “that in any case where there should -appear to be a clear and decisive discordance between the physical and -the palæontological evidence as to the age of a given series of beds, -it is the former that is to be distrusted rather than the latter.” -(“Ancient Life History of the Earth,” p. 40.) - -George McCready Price, Professor of Geology at a denominational college -in Kansas, devotes more than fifty pages of his recent work, “The New -Geology” (1923), to an intensely destructive criticism of this dogma of -the supremacy of fossil evidence as a means of determining the relative -age of strata. To cite Price as an “authority” would, of course, be -futile. All orthodox geologists have long since anathematized him, and -outlawed him from respectable geological society. Charles Schuchert -of Yale refers to him as “a fundamentalist harboring a geological -nightmare.” (_Science_, May 30, 1924, p. 487.) Arthur M. Miller of -Kentucky University speaks of him as “the man who, while a member of no -scientific body and absolutely unknown in scientific circles, has ... -had the effrontery to style himself a ‘geologist.’” (_Science_, June -30, 1922, pp. 702, 703.) Miller, however, is just enough to admit that -he is well-informed on his subject, and that he possesses the gift of -persuasive presentation. “He shows,” says Miller, “a wide familiarity -with geological literature, quoting largely from the most eminent -authorities in this country and in Europe. Any one reading these -writings of Price, which possess a certain charm of literary style, -and indicate on the part of the author a gift of popular presentation -which makes one regret that it had not been devoted to a more laudable -purpose, must constantly marvel at the character of mind of the man who -can so go into the literature of the subject and still continue to hold -such preposterous opinions.” (_Loc. cit._, p. 702.) - -In the present instance, however, our interest centers, not on the -unimportant question of his official status in geological circles, -but exclusively on the objective validity of his argument against the -chronometric value of the index fossil. All citations, therefore, from -his work will be supported, in the sequel, by collateral testimony -from other authors of recognized standing. It is possible, of course, -to inject irrelevant issues. Price, for example, follows Sir Henry -Howorth in his endeavor to substitute an aqueous catastrophe for the -glaciation of the Quaternary Ice Age, and he adduces many interesting -facts to justify his preference for a deluge. But this is neither -here nor there; for we are not concerned with the merits of his “new -catastrophism.” It is his opportune revival in modern form of the -forgotten, but extremely effective, objection raised by Huxley and -Spencer against the alleged universality of synchronously deposited -fossiliferous sediments, that constitutes our sole preoccupation here. -It is Price’s merit to have shown that, in the light of recently -discovered facts, such as “deceptive conformities” and “overthrusts,” -this objection is far graver than it was when first formulated by the -authors in question. - -Mere snobbery and abuse is not a sufficient answer to a difficulty -of this nature, and we regret that men, like Schuchert, have replied -with more anger than logic. The orthodox geologist seems unnecessarily -petulant, whenever he is called upon to verify or substantiate the -foundational principles of lithic chronology. One frequently hears him -make the excuse that “geology has its own peculiar method of proof.” To -claim exemption, however, from the universal criterions of criticism -and logic is a subterfuge wholly unworthy of a genuine science, and, if -Price insists on discussing a subject, which the orthodox geologist -prefers to suppress, it is the latter, and not the former, who is -really reactionary. - -Price begins by stating the issue in the form of a twofold question: -(1) How can we be sure, with respect to a given fauna (or flora), say -the Cambrian, that at one time it monopolized our globe to the complete -exclusion of all other typical faunas (or floras), say the Devonian, -or the Tertiary, of which it is assumed that they could not, by any -stretch of imagination, have been contemporaneous, on either land or -sea, with the aforesaid “older” fauna (or flora)? (2) Do the formations -(rocks containing fossils) universally occur in such a rigidly -invariable order of sequence with respect to one another, as to warrant -our being sure of the starting-point in the time-scale, or to justify -us in projecting any given local order of succession into distant -localities, for purposes of chronological correlation? - -His response to the first of these questions constitutes what may be -called an aprioristic refutation of the orthodox view, by placing -the evolutionary palæontologist in the trilemma: (a) of making the -awkward confession that, except within limited local areas, he has no -means whatever of distinguishing between a geographical distribution -of coëval fossil forms among various habitats and a chronological -distribution of fossils among sediments deposited at different times; -(b) or of denying the possibility of geographical distribution in the -past, by claiming dogmatically that the world during Cambrian times, -for example, was totally unlike the modern world, of which alone we -have experimental knowledge, inasmuch as it was then destitute of -zoölogical provinces, districts, zones, and other habitats peculiar to -various types of fauna, so that the whole world formed but one grand -habitat, extending over land and sea, for a limited group of organisms -made up exclusively of the lower types of life; (c) or of reviving -the discredited onion-coat theory of Abraham Werner under a revised -biological form, which asserts that the whole globe is enveloped with -fossiliferous rather than mineral strata, whose order of succession -being everywhere the same enables us to discriminate with precision -and certainty between cases of distribution in time and cases of -distribution in space. - -In his response to the second question, Professor Price adduces -numerous factual arguments, which show that the invariable order of -sequence postulated by the theory of the time-value of index fossils, -not only finds no confirmation in the actual or concrete sequences -of fossiliferous rocks, but is often directly contradicted thereby. -“Older” rocks may occur above “younger” rocks, the “youngest” may -occur in immediate succession to the “oldest,” Tertiary rocks may be -crystalline, consolidated, and “old in appearance,” while Cambrian -and even pre-Cambrian rocks sometimes occur in a soft, incoherent -condition, that gives them the physical appearance of being as young -as Pleistocene formations. These exceptions and objections to the -“invariable order” of the fossiliferous strata accumulate from day to -day, and it is only by means of Procrustean tactics of the most drastic -sort that the facts can be brought into any semblance of harmony with -the current dogmas, which base geology upon evolution rather than -evolution upon geology. - -Price, then, proposes for serious consideration the possibility that -Cretaceous dinosaurs and even Tertiary mammals may have been living on -the land at the same time that the Cambrian graptolites and trilobites -were living in the seas. “Who,” he exclaims, “will have the hardihood, -the real dogmatism to affirm in a serious way that Cambrian animals -and seaweeds were for a long time the only forms of life existing -anywhere on earth?” Should we, nevertheless, make bold enough to aver -that for countless centuries a mere few of the lower forms of life -monopolized our globe, as one universal habitat unpartitioned into -particular biological provinces or zones, we are thereupon confronted -with two equally unwelcome alternatives. We must either fly in the -face of experience and legitimate induction by denying the existence -in the past of anything analogous to our present-day geographical -distribution of plants and animals into various biological provinces, -or be prepared to show by what infallible criterion we are enabled -to distinguish between synchronously deposited formations indicative -of a geographical distribution according to regional diversity, and -consecutively deposited formations indicative of comparative antiquity. - -The former alternative does not merit any consideration whatever. -The latter, as we shall presently see, involves us in an assumption, -for which no defense either aprioristic or factual is available. We -can, indeed, distinguish between spatial, and temporal, distribution -within the narrow limits of a single locality by using the criterion -of superposition; for in regions of outcrop, where one sedimentary -rock overlies another, the obvious presumption is that the upper rock -was deposited at a later date than the lower rock. But the criterion -of superposition is not available for the correlation of strata in -localities so distant from each other that no physical evidence of -stratigraphic continuity is discernible. Moreover the induction, which -projects any local order of stratigraphical sequence into far distant -localities on the sole basis of fossil taxonomy, is logically unsound -and leads to conclusions at variance with the actual facts. Hence the -alleged time-value of index fossils becomes essentially problematic, -and affords no basis whatever for scientific certainty. - -As previously stated, the sequence of strata is visible only in regions -of outcrop, and nowhere are we able to see more than mere parts of two -or, at most, three systems associated together in a single locality. -Moreover, each set of beds is of limited areal extent, and the limits -are frequently visible to the eye of the observer. In any case, their -visible extent is necessarily limited. It is impossible, therefore, to -correlate the strata of one continent with those of another continent -by tracing stratigraphic continuity. Hence, in comparing particular -horizons of various ages and in distinguishing them from other horizons -over large areas, we are obliged to substitute induction for direct -observation. Scientific induction, however, is only valid when it -rests upon some universal uniformity or invariable sequence of nature. -Hence, to be specific, the assumption that the time-scale based on the -European classification of fossiliferous strata is applicable to the -entire globe as a whole, is based on the further assumption that we are -sure of the universality of fossiliferous stratification over the face -of the earth, and that, as a matter of fact, fossils are always and -everywhere found in the same order of invariable sequence. - -But this is tantamount to reviving, under what Spencer calls “a -transcendental form,” the exploded “onion-coat” hypothesis of Werner -(1749-1817). Werner conceived the terrestrial globe as encircled -with successive mineral envelopes, basing his scheme of universal -stratification upon that order of sequence among rocks, which he had -observed within the narrow confines of his native district in Germany. -His hypothesis, after leading many scientists astray, was ultimately -discredited and laughed out of existence. For it finally became evident -to all observers that Werner’s scheme did not fit the facts, and men -were able to witness with their own eyes the simultaneous deposition, -in separate localities, of sediments which differed radically in -their mineral contents and texture. Thus it came to pass that this -classification of strata according to their mineral nature and physical -appearance lost all value as an absolute time-scale, while the theory -itself was relegated to the status of a curious and amusing episode in -the history of scientific fiascos. - -Thanks, however, to Wm. Smith and to Cuvier, the discarded onion-coat -hypothesis did not perish utterly, but was rehabilitated and bequeathed -to us in a new and more subtle form. Werner’s fundamental idea of -the universality of a given kind of deposit was retained, but his -mineral strata were replaced by fossiliferous strata, the lithological -onion-coats of Werner being superseded by the biological onion-coats -of our modern theory. The geologist of today discounts physical -appearance, and classifies strata according to their fossil, rather -than their mineral, contents, but he stands committed to the same old -postulate of universal deposits. He has no hesitation in synchronizing -such widely-scattered formations as the Devonian deposits of New -York State, England, Germany, and South America. He pieces them all -together as parts of a single system of rocks. He has no misgiving as -to the universal applicability of the European scheme of stratigraphic -classification, but assures us, in the words of the geologist, Wm. B. -Scott, that: “Even the minuter divisions, the subdivisions and zones of -the European Jura, are applicable to the classification of the South -American beds.” (“Introduction to Geology,” p. 681f.) The limestone and -sandstone strata of Werner are now things of the past, but, in their -stead, we have, to quote the criticism of Herbert Spencer, “groups of -formations which everywhere succeed each other in a given order, and -are severally everywhere of the same age. Though it may not be asserted -that these successive systems are universal, yet it seems to be tacitly -assumed that they are so.... Though probably no competent geologist -would contend that the European classification of strata is applicable -to the globe as a whole, yet most, if not all geologists, write as -though it were so.... Must we not say that though the onion-coat -hypothesis is dead, its spirit is traceable, under a transcendental -form, even in the conclusions of its antagonists.” (“Illustrations of -Universal Progress,” pp. 329-380, ed. of 1890.) - -But overlooking, for the moment, the mechanical absurdity involved in -the notion of a regular succession of universal layers of sediment, -and conceding, for the sake of argument, that the substitution of -fossiliferous, for lithological, strata may conceivably have remedied -the defects of Werner’s geological time-scale, let us confine ourselves -to the one question, which, after all, is of prime importance, whether, -namely, without the aid of Procrustean tactics, the actual facts -of geology can be brought into alignment with the doctrine of an -invariable order of succession among fossil types, and its sequel, -the intrinsic time-value of index fossils. The question, in other -words, is whether or not a reliable time-scale can be based on the -facts of fossiliferous stratification as they are observed to exist in -the concrete. Price’s answer is negative, and he formulates several -empirical laws to express the concrete facts, on which he bases his -contention. The laws and facts to which he appeals may be summarized as -follows: - -1. The concrete facts of geology do not warrant our singling out any -fossiliferous deposit as unquestionably the oldest, and hence we have -no reliable _starting-point_ for our time-scale, because: - -(_a_) We may lay it down as an empirical law that “any kind of -fossiliferous rock (even the ‘youngest’), that is, strata belonging to -any of the systems or other subdivisions, may rest directly upon the -Archæan or primitive crystalline rocks, without any other so-called -‘younger’ strata intervening; also these rocks, Permian, Cretaceous, -Tertiary, or whatever thus reposing directly on the Archæan may be -themselves crystalline or wholly metamorphic in texture. And this -applies not alone to small points of contact, but to large areas.” - -(_b_) Conversely: any kind of fossiliferous strata (even the “oldest”) -may not only constitute the surface rocks over wide areas,[8] but may -consist of loose, unconsolidated materials, thus in both position and -texture resembling the “late” Tertiaries or the Pleistocene—“In some -regions, notably in the Baltic province and in parts of the United -States,” says John Allen Howe, alluding to the Cambrian rocks around -the Baltic Sea and in Wisconsin, “the rocks still retain their -original horizontality of deposition, the muds are scarcely indurated, -and the sands are incoherent.” (Encycl. Brit., vol. V, p. 86.) - - [8] “It is a common occurrence,” says Charles Schuchert, “on - the Canadian Shield to find the Archæozoic formations overlain - by the most recent Pleistocene glacial deposits, and even - these may be absent. It appears as if in such places no rocks - had been deposited, either by the sea or by the forces of the - land, since Archæozoic time, and yet geologists know that the - shield has been variously covered by sheets of sediments formed - at sundry times in the Proterozoic, Palæozoic, and, to a more - limited extent, in the Mesozoic.” (“Textbook of Geology,” ed. - of 1920, II, p. 569.) It may be remarked that, when geologists - “know” such things, they know them in spite of the facts! - -A large number of striking instances are cited by Price to substantiate -the foregoing rule and its converse. The impression left is that not -only is the starting-point of the time-scale in doubt, but that, if -we were to judge the age of the rocks by their physical appearance -and position, we could not accept the conventional verdicts of -modern geology, which makes fossil evidence prevail over every other -consideration. - -2. When two contiguous strata are parallel to each other, and -there is no indication of disturbance in the lower bed, nor any -evidence of erosion along the plane of contact, the two beds are -said to exhibit conformity, and this is ordinarily interpreted -by geologists as a sign that the upper bed has been laid down in -immediate sequence to the lower, and that there has been a substantial -continuity of deposition, with no long interval during which the -lower bed was exposed as surface to the agents of erosion. When -such a conformity exists, as it frequently does, between a “recent” -stratum, above, and what is said (according to the testimony of the -fossils) to be a very “ancient” stratum, below, and though the two -are so alike lithologically as to be mistaken for one and the same -formation, nevertheless, such a conformity is termed a “non-evident -disconformity,” or “deceptive conformity,” implying that, inasmuch -as the “lost interval,” representing, perhaps, a lapse of “several -million years,” is entirely unrecorded by any intervening deposition, -or any erosion, or any disturbance of the lower bed, we should not -have suspected that so great a hiatus had intervened, were it not for -the testimony of the fossils. Price cites innumerable examples, and -sums them up in the general terms of the following empirical law: -“Any sort of fossiliferous formation may occur on top of any other -‘older’ fossiliferous formation, with all the physical evidences of -perfect conformity, just as if these alleged incongruous or mismated -formations had in reality followed one another in quick succession.” - -A quotation from Schuchert’s “Textbook of Geology,” (1920), may be -given by way of illustration: “The imperfection,” we read, “of the -geologic column is greatest in the interior of North America and more -so in the north than in the south. This imperfection is in many places -very marked, since an entire period or several periods may be absent. -With such great breaks in the local sections the natural assumption -is that these gaps are easily seen in the sequence of the strata, -but in many places the beds lie in such perfect conformity upon one -another that the breaks are not noticeable by the eye and can be -proved to exist only by the entombed fossils on each side of a given -bedding plane.... Stratigraphers are, as a rule, now fully aware of the -imperfections in the geologic record, but the rocks of two unrelated -formations may rest upon each other with such absolute conformability -as to be completely deceptive. For instance, in the Bear Grass quarries -at Louisville, Ky., a face of limestone is exposed in which the -absolute conformability of the beds can be traced for nearly a mile, -and yet within 5 feet of vertical thickness is found a Middle Silurian -coral bed overlain by another coral zone of Middle Devonian. The -parting between these two zones is like that between any two limestone -beds, but this insignificant line represents a stratigraphic hiatus -the equivalent of the last third of Silurian and the first of Devonian -time. But such disconformities are by no means rare, in fact are very -common throughout the wide central basin area of North America.” (_Op. -cit._, II, pp. 586-588.) - -In such cases, the stratigraphical relations give no hint of any -enormous gap at the line of contact. On the contrary, there is -every evidence of unbroken sequence, and the physical appearances -are as if these supposed “geological epochs” had never occurred -in the localities, of which there is question. Everything points -to the conclusion that the alleged long intervals of time between -such perfectly conformable, and, often, lithologically identical, -formations are a pure fiction elaborated for the purpose of bolstering -up the dogma of the universal applicability of the European -classification of fossiliferous rocks. Why not take the facts as we -find them? Why resort to tortuous explanations for the mere purpose of -saving an arbitrary time-scale? Why insist on a definite time-value -for fossils, when it drives us to the extremity of discrediting the -objective evidence of physical facts in deference to the preconceptions -of orthodox geology? Were it not for theoretical considerations, these -stratigraphic facts would be taken at their face value, and the need -of saving the reputation of the fossil as an infallible time index is -not sufficiently imperative to warrant so drastic a revision of the -physical evidence. - -3. The third class of facts militating against the time-value of -index fossils, are what Price describes as “deceptive conformities -turned upside down,” and what orthodox geology tries to explain away -as “thrusts,” “thrust faults,” “overthrusts,” “low-angle faulting,” -etc.[9] In instances of this kind we find the accepted order of the -fossiliferous strata reversed in such a way that the “younger” strata -are conformably overlain by “older” strata, and the “older” strata are -sometimes interbedded between “younger” strata. “In many places all -over the world,” says Price, “fossils have been found in a relative -order which was formerly thought to be utterly impossible. That is, -the fossils have been found in the ‘wrong’ order, and on such a scale -that there can be no mistake about it. For when an area 500 miles long -and from 20 to 50 miles wide is found with Palæozoic rocks on top, -or composing the mountains, and with Cretaceous beds underneath, or -composing the valleys, and running under these mountains all around, -as in the case of the Glacier National Park and the southern part of -Alberta, the old notion about the exact and invariable order of the -fossils has to be given up entirely.” - - [9] Thus, to explain away “wrong sequences” of fossils, Heim - and Rothpletz postulate the great Glaurus overthrust in the - Alps, Geikie the great overthrust in Scotland, McConnell, - Campbell, and Willis a great overthrust along the eastern - front of the Rockies in Montana and Alberta, while Hayes - recognizes numerous overthrusts in the southern Appalachians. - “The deciphering of such great displacements,” says Pirrson, - speaking of thrust faults, “is one of the greatest triumphs of - modern geological research.” (“Textbook of Geology,” 1920, I, - p. 367.) Desperate measures are evidently justifiable, when it - is a question of saving the time-value of fossils! - -Price formulates his third law as follows: “Any fossiliferous -formation, ‘old’ or ‘young,’ may occur conformably on any other -fossiliferous formation, ‘younger’ or ‘older.’” The corollary of this -empirical law is that we are no longer justified in regarding any -fossils as intrinsically older than other fossils, and that our present -classification of fossiliferous strata has a _taxonomic_, rather than a -_historical_, value. - -Low-angle faulting is the phenomenon devised by geologists to meet -the difficulty of “inverted sequence,” when all other explanations -fail. Immense mountain masses are said to have been detached from -their roots and pushed horizontally over the surface (without -disturbing it in the least), until they came finally to rest in -perfect conformity upon “younger” strata, so that the plane of -slippage ended by being indistinguishable from an ordinary horizontal -bedding plane. These gigantic “overthrusts” or “thrust faults” are a -rather unique phenomenon. Normal faulting is always at a high angle -closely approaching the vertical, but “thrust faults” are at a low -angle closely approximating the horizontal, and there is enormous -displacement along the plane of slippage. The huge mountain masses are -said to have been first lifted up and then thrust horizontally for -vast distances, sometimes for hundreds of miles, over the face of the -land, being thus pushed over on top of “younger” rocks, so as to repose -upon the latter in a relation of perfectly conformable superposition. -R. G. McConnell, of the Canadian Survey, comments on the remarkable -similarity between these alleged “thrust planes” and ordinary -stratification planes, and he is at a loss to know why the surface -soil was not disturbed by the huge rock masses which slid over it for -such great distances. Speaking of the Bow River Gap, he says: “The -fault plane here is nearly horizontal, and the two formations, viewed -from the valley appear to succeed one another conformably,” and then -having noted that the underlying Cretaceous shales are “very soft,” he -adds that they “have suffered little by the sliding of the limestones -over them.” (_An. Rpt. 1886_, part D., pp. 33, 34, 84.) _Credat Iudaeus -Apella, non ego!_ - -Schuchert describes the Alpine overthrust as follows: “The movement -was both vertical and thrusting from the south and southeast, from -the southern portion of Tethys, elevating and folding the Tertiary -and older strata of the northern areas of this mediterranean into -overturned, recumbent, and nearly horizontal folds, and pushing the -southern or Lepontine Alps about 60 miles to the northward into the -Helvetic region. Erosion has since carved up these overthrust sheets, -leaving remnants lying on foundations which belong to a more northern -portion of the ancient sea. Most noted of these residuals of overthrust -masses is the Matterhorn, a mighty mountain without roots, a stranger -in a foreign geologic environment,” (Pirsson & Schuchert’s “Textbook of -Geology,” 1920, II, p. 924.) - -With such a convenient device as the “overthrust” at his disposal, it -is hard to see how any possible concrete sequence of fossiliferous -strata could contradict the preconceptions of an evolutionary -geologist. The hypotheses and assumptions involved, however, are so -tortuous and incredible, that nothing short of fanatical devotion to -the theory of transformism can render them acceptable. “Examples,” -says Price, “of strata in the ‘wrong’ order were first reported from -the Alps nearly half a century ago. Since that time, whole armfuls -of learned treatises in German, in French, and in English have been -written to explain the wonderful conditions there found. The diagrams -that have been drawn to account for the strange order of the strata -are worthy to rank with the similar ones by the Ptolemaic astronomers -picturing the cycles and epicycles required to explain the peculiar -behavior of the heavenly bodies in accordance with the geocentric -theory of the universe then prevailing.... In Scandinavia, a district -some 1,120 miles long by 80 miles wide is alleged to have been pushed -horizontally eastward ‘at least 86 miles.’ (Schuchert.) In Northern -China, one of these upside down areas is reported by the Carnegie -Research Expedition to be 500 miles long.” (“The New Geology,” 1923, -pp. 633, 634.) - -Nor are the epicyclic subterfuges of the evolutionary geologist -confined to “deceptive conformities” and “overthrusts.” His inventive -genius has hit upon other methods of explaining away inconvenient -facts. When, for example, “younger” fossils are found interbedded with -“older” fossils, and the discrepancy in time is not too great, he rids -himself of the difficulty of their premature appearance by calling -them a “pioneer colony.” Similarly, when a group of “characteristic” -fossils occur in one age, skip another “age,” and recur in a third, -he recognizes the possibility of “recurrent faunas,” some of these -faunas having as many as five successive “recurrences.” Clearly, the -assumption of gradual approximation and the dogma that the lower -preceded the higher forms of life are things to be saved at all costs, -and it is a foregone conclusion that no facts will be suffered to -conflict with these irrevisable articles of evolutionary faith. “What -is the use,” exclaims Price, “of pretending that we are investigating -a problem of natural science, if we already know beforehand that the -lower and more generalized forms of animals and plants came into -existence first, and the higher and the more specialized came only long -afterwards, and that specimens of all these successive types have been -pigeonholed in the rocks in order to help us illustrate this wonderful -truth?” (_Op. cit._, pp. 667, 668.) - -The predominance of extinct species in certain formations is said to -be an independent argument of their great age. Most of the species of -organisms found as fossils in Cambrian, Ordovician, and Silurian rocks -are extinct, whereas modern types abound in Cretaceous and Tertiary -rocks. Hence it is claimed that the former must be vastly older than -the latter. But this argument gratuitously assumes the substantial -perfection of the stone record of ancient life and unwarrantedly -excludes the possibility of a sudden impoverishment of the world’s -flora and fauna as the result of a sweeping catastrophe, of which our -present species are the fortunate survivors. Now the fact that certain -floras and faunas skip entire systems of rocks to reappear only in -later formations is proof positive that the record of ancient life is -far from being complete, and we have in the abundant fossil remains of -tropical plants and animals, found in what are now the frozen arctic -regions, unmistakable evidence of a sudden catastrophic change by -which a once genial climate “was abruptly terminated. For carcasses of -the Siberian elephants were frozen so suddenly and so completely that -the flesh has remained untainted.” (Dana.) Again, the mere _fact_ of -extinction tells us nothing about the _time_ of the extinction. For -this we are obliged to fall back on the index fossil whose inherent -time-value is based on the theory of evolution and not on stratigraphy. -Hence the argument from extinct species is not an independent argument. - -To sum up, therefore, the aprioristic evolutional series of fossils -is not a genuine time-scale. The only safe criterion of comparative -age is that of stratigraphic superposition, and this is inapplicable -outside of limited local areas.[10] The index fossil is a reliable -basis for the chronological correlation of beds only in case one is -already convinced on other grounds of the actuality of evolution, but -for the unbiased inquirer it is destitute of any inherent time-value. -In other words, we can no longer be sure that a given formation is -old merely because it happens to contain Cambrian fossils, nor that a -rock is young merely because it chances to contain Tertiary fossils. -Our present classification of rocks according to their fossil contents -is purely arbitrary and artificial, being tantamount to nothing more -than a mere taxonomical classification of the forms of ancient life on -our globe, irrespective of their comparative antiquity. This scheme -of classification is, indeed, universally applicable, and places can -usually be found in it for new fossiliferous strata, whenever and -wherever discovered. Its universal applicability, however, is due not -to any prevalent order of invariable sequence among fossiliferous -strata, but solely to the fact that the laws of biological taxonomy -and ecology are universal laws which transcend spatial and temporal -limitation. If a scheme of taxonomy is truly scientific, all forms of -life, whether extant or extinct, will fit into it quite readily. - - [10] “All that geology can prove,” says Huxley, “is local order - of succession.” (“Discourses Biological and Geological,” pp. - 279-288.) - -The anomalies of spatial distribution constitute a sixth difficulty -for transformistic palæontology. In constructing a phylogeny the -most diverse and widely-separated regions are put under tribute to -furnish the requisite fossils, no heed being paid to what are now -at any rate impassable geographical barriers, not to speak of the -climatic and environmental limitations which restrict the migrations -of non-cosmopolitan species within the boundaries of narrow habitats. -Hypothetical lineages of a modern form of life are frequently -constructed from fossil remains found in two or more continents -separated from one another by immense distances and vast oceanic -expanses. When taxed with failure to plausibleize this procedure, -the evolutionist meets the difficulty by hypothecating wholesale and -devious migrations to and fro, and by raising up alleged land bridges -to accommodate plants and animals in their suppositional migrations -from one continent to another, etc. - -The European horse, with his so-called ancestry interred, partly in -the Tertiary deposits of Europe, but mostly in those of North America, -is a typical instance of these anomalies in geographical distribution. -It would, of course, be preposterous to suppose that two independent -lines of descent could have fortuitously terminated in the production -of one and the same type, namely, the genus _Equus_. Moreover, to admit -for a moment that the extinct American _Equus_ and the extant European -_Equus_ had converged by similar stages from distinct origins would be -equivalent, as we have seen, to a surrender of the basic postulate that -structural similarity rests on the principle of inheritance. Nothing -remains, therefore, but to hypothecate a Tertiary land bridge between -Europe and North America. - -Modern geologists, however, are beginning to resent these arbitrary -interferences with their science in the interest of biological -theories. Land bridges, they rightly insist, should be demonstrated by -means of positive geological evidence and not by the mere exigencies of -a hypothetical genealogy. Whosoever postulates a land bridge between -continents should be able to adduce solid reasons, and to assign a -mechanism capable of accomplishing the five-mile uplift necessary to -bring a deep-sea bottom to the surface of the hydrosphere. Such an -idea is extravagant and not to be easily entertained in our day, when -geologists are beginning to understand the principle of _isostasy_. -To-day, the crust of the earth, that is, the entire surface of the -lithosphere, is conceived as being constituted of earth columns, -all of which rest with equal weight upon the level of complete -compensation, which exists at a depth of some 76 miles below land -surfaces. At this depth viscous flows and undertows of the earth take -place, compensating all differences of gravitational stress. Hence the -materials constituting a mountain column are thought to be less dense -than those constituting the surrounding lowland columns, and for this -reason the mountains are buoyed up above the surrounding landscape. The -columns under ocean bottoms, on the contrary, are thought to consist -of heavy materials like basalt, which tend to depress the column. To -raise a sea floor, therefore, some means of producing a dilatation of -these materials would have to be available. Arthur B. Coleman called -attention to this difficulty in his Presidential Address to the -Geological Society of America (December 29, 1915), and we cannot do -better than quote his own statement of the matter here: - -“Admitting,” he says, “that in the beginning the lithosphere bulged -up in places, so as to form continents, and sagged in other places, -so as to form ocean beds, there are interesting problems presented as -to the permanence of land and seas. All will admit marginal changes -affecting large areas, but these encroachments of the sea on the -continents and the later retreats may be of quite a subordinate kind, -not implying an interchange of deep-sea bottoms and land surfaces. -The essential permanence of continents and oceans has been firmly -held by many geologists, notably Dana among the older ones, and seems -reasonable; but there are geologists, especially palæontologists, who -display great recklessness in rearranging land and sea. The trend of a -mountain range, or the convenience of a running bird, or a marsupial -afraid to wet his feet seems sufficient warrant for hoisting up any sea -bottom to connect continent with continent. A Gondwana Land arises in -place of an Indian Ocean and sweeps across to South America, so that a -spore-bearing plant can follow up an ice age; or an Atlantis ties New -England to Old England to help out the migrations of a shallow-water -fauna; or a ‘Lost Land of Agulhas’ joins South Africa and India. - -“It is curious to find these revolutionary suggestions made at a -time when geodesists are demonstrating that the earth’s crust over -large areas, and perhaps everywhere, approaches a state of isostatic -equilibrium, and that isostatic compensation is probably complete at a -depth of only 76 miles” ... and (having noted the difference of density -that must exist between the continental, and submarine, earth columns) -Coleman would have us bear in mind “that to transform great areas of -sea bottom into land it would be necessary either to expand the rock -beneath by several per cent or to replace heavy rock, such as basalt, -by lighter materials, such as granite. There is no obvious way in which -the rock beneath a sea bottom can be expanded enough to lift it 20,000 -feet, as would be necessary in parts of the Indian Ocean, to form a -Gondwana land; so one must assume that light rocks replace heavy ones -beneath a million square miles of ocean floor. Even with unlimited -time, it is hard to imagine a mechanism that could do the work, and -no convincing geological evidence can be brought forward to show that -such a thing ever took place.... The distribution of plants and animals -should be arranged for by other means than by the wholesale elevation -of ocean beds to make dry land bridges for them.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. -for 1916, pp. 269-271.) - -A seventh anomaly of palæontological phylogeny is what may be described -as contrariety of direction. We are asked to believe, for example, that -in mammals racial development resulted in dimensional increase. The -primitive ancestor of mammoths, mastodons, and elephants is alleged to -have been the _Moeritherium_, “a small tapirlike form, from the Middle -Eocene Qasr-el-Sagha beds of the Fayûm in Egypt.... _Moeritherium_ -measured about 3½ feet in height.” (Lull: Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for -1908, pp. 655, 656.) The ancestor of the modern horse, we are told, -was “a little animal less than a foot in height, known as _Eohippus_, -from the rocks of the Eocene age.” (Woodruff: “Foundations of Biology,” -p. 361.) In the case of insects, on the other hand, we are asked to -believe the exact reverse, namely, that racial development brought -about dimensional reduction. “In the middle of the Upper Carboniferous -periods,” says Anton Handlirsch, “the forest swamps were populated -with cockroaches about as long as a finger, dragonfly-like creatures -with a wing spread of about 2½ feet, while insects that resemble our -May flies were as big as a hand.” (“Die fossilen Insekten, und die -Phylogenie der recenten Formen,” 1908, L. c., p. 1150.) Contrasting one -of these giant palæozoic dragonflies, _Meganeura monyi_ Brongn., with -the largest of modern dragonflies, _Aeschna grandis_ L., Chetverikov -exclaims with reference to the latter: “What a pitiful pigmy it is and -its specific name (_grandis_) sounds like such a mockery.” (Smithson. -Inst. Rpt. for 1918, p. 446.) Chetverikov, it is true, proposes a -teleological reason for this progressive diminution, but the fact -remains that for dysteleological evolutionism, which dispenses with -the postulate of a Providential coördination and regulation of natural -agencies, this _diminuendo_ of the “evolving” insects stands in -irreconcilable opposition to the _crescendo_ of the “evolving” mammals, -and constitutes a difficulty which a purely mechanistic philosophy can -never surmount. - -Not to prolong excessively this already protracted enumeration of -discrepancies between fossil fact and evolutionary assumption, we -shall mention, as an eighth and final difficulty, the indubitable -persistence of _unchanged_ organic types from the earliest geological -epochs down to the present time. This phenomenon is all the more -wonderful in view of the fact that the decision as to which are to be -the “older” and which the “younger” strata rests with the evolutionary -geologist, who is naturally disinclined to admit the antiquity of -strata containing modern types, and whose position as arbiter enables -him to date formations aprioristically, according to the exigencies of -the transformistic theory. Using, as he does, the absence of modern -types as an express criterion of age, and having, as it were, his pick -among the various fossiliferous deposits, one would expect him to be -eminently successful in eliminating from the stratigraphic groups -selected for senior honors all strata containing fossil types identical -with modern forms. Since, however, even the most ingenious sort of -geological gerrymandering fails to make this elimination complete, we -must conclude that the evidence for persistence of type is inescapable -and valid under any assumption. - -When we speak of persistent types, we mean generic and specific, -rather than phyletic, types, although it is assuredly true that the -persistence of the great phyla, from their abrupt and contemporaneous -appearance in Cambrian and pre-Cambrian rocks down to the present day, -constitutes a grave difficulty for progressive evolution in general -and monophyletic evolution in particular. All the great invertebrate -types, such as the protozoa, the annelida, the brachiopoda, and large -crustaceans called eurypterids, are found in rocks of the Proterozoic -group, despite the damaged condition of the Archæan record, while -in the Cambrian they are represented by a great profusion of forms. -“The Lower Cambrian species,” says Dana, “have not the simplicity of -structure that would naturally be looked for in the earliest Palæozoic -life. They are perfect of their kind and highly specialized structures. -No steps from simple kinds leading up to them have been discovered; no -line from the protozoans up to corals, echinoderms, or worms, or from -either of these groups up to brachiopods, mollusks, trilobites, or -other crustaceans. This appearance of abruptness in the introduction -of Cambrian life is one of the striking facts made known by geology.” -(“Manual,” p. 487.) Thus, as we go backward in time, we find the great -organic phyla retaining their identity and showing no tendency to -converge towards a common origin in one or a few ancestral types. For -this reason, as we shall see presently, geologists are beginning to -relegate the evolutionary process to unknown depths below the explored -portion of the “geological column.” What may lurk in these unfathomed -profundities, it is, of course, impossible to say, but, if we are to -judge by that part of the column which is actually exposed to view, -there is no indication whatever of a steady progression from lower, to -higher, degrees of organization, and it takes all the imperturbable -idealism of a scientific doctrinaire to discern in such random, abrupt, -and unrelated “origins” any evidence of what Blackwelder styles “a -slow but steady increase in complexity of structure and in function.” -(_Science_, Jan. 27, 1922, p. 90.) - -But, while the permanence of phyletic types excludes progress, that -of generic and specific types excludes change, and hence it is in -the latter phenomenon, especially, that the theory of transformism -encounters a formidable difficulty. Palæobotany furnishes numerous -examples of the persistence of unchanged plant forms. Ferns identical -with the modern genus _Marattia_ occur in rocks of the Palæozoic group. -Cycads indistinguishable from the extant genera _Zamia_ and _Cycas_ are -found in strata belonging to the Triassic system, etc., etc. - -The same is true of animal types. In all the phyla some genera and -even species have persisted unchanged from the oldest strata down to -the present day. Among the Protozoa, for example, we have the genus -_Globigerina_ (one of the Foraminifera), some modern species of which -are identical with those found in the Cretaceous. To quote the words -of the Protozoologist, Charles A. Kofoid: “The Protozoa are found -in the oldest fossiliferous rocks and the genera of _Radiolaria_ -therein conform rather closely to genera living today, while the -fossil _Dinoflagellata_ of the flints of Delitzsch are scarcely -distinguishable from species living in the modern seas. The striking -similarities of the most ancient fossil Protozoa to recent ones afford -some ground for the inference that the Protozoa living today differ but -little from those when life was young.” (_Science_, April 6, 1923, p. -397.) - -The Metazoa offer similar examples of persistence. Among the -Cœlenterata, we have the genus _Springopora_, whose representatives -from the Carboniferous limestones closely resemble some of the -present-day reef builders of the East Indies. Species of the brachiopod -genera _Lingula_ and _Crania_ occurring in the Cambrian rocks are -indistinguishable from species living today, while two other modern -genera of the Brachiopoda, namely, _Rhynchonella_ and _Discina_, -are represented among the fossils found in Mesozoic formations. -_Terebratulina striata_, a fossil species of brachiopod occurring in -the rocks belonging to the Cretaceous system, is identical with our -modern species _Terebratulina caput serpentis_. Among the Mollusca such -genera as _Arca_, _Nucula_, _Lucina_, _Astarte_, and _Nautilus_ have -had a continuous existence since the Silurian, while the genera _Lima_ -and _Pecten_ can be traced to the Permian. One genus _Pleurotomaria_ -goes back to pre-Cambrian times. As to Tertiary fossils, Woods informs -us that “in some of the later Cainozoic formations as many as 90 per -cent of the species of mollusks are still living.” (“Palæontology,” -1st ed., p. 2.) Among the Echinodermata, two genera, _Cidaris_ (a -sea urchin) and _Pentacrinus_ (a crinoid) may be mentioned as being -persistent since the Triassic (“oldest” system of the Mesozoic group). -Among the Arthropoda, the horseshoe crab _Limulus polyphemus_ has -had a continuous existence since the Lias (_i.e._ the lowest series -of the Jurassic system). Even among the Vertebrata we have instances -of persistence. The extant Australian genus _Ceratodus_, a Dipnoan, -has been in existence since the Triassic. Among the fossils of the -Jurassic (middle system of the Mesozoic group), _Sharks_, _Rays_, and -_Chimaeroids_ occur in practically modern forms, while some of the -so-called “ganoids” are extremely similar to our present sturgeons and -gar pikes—“Some of the Jurassic fishes approximate the teleosts so -closely that it seems arbitrary to call them ganoids.” (Scott.) - -The instances of persistence enumerated above are those acknowledged by -evolutionary palæontologists themselves. This list could be extended -somewhat by the addition of several other examples, but even so, it -would still be small and insufficient to tip the scales decisively -in favor of fixism. On the other hand, we must not forget that the -paucity of this list is due in large measure to the fact that our -present method of classifying fossiliferous strata was deliberately -framed with a view to excluding formations containing modern types -from the category of “ancient” beds. Moreover, orthodox palæontology -has minimized the facts of persistence to an extent unwarranted even -by its own premises. As the following considerations indicate, the -actual number of persistent types is far greater, even according to the -evolutionary time-scale, than the figure commonly assigned. - -First of all, we must take into account the deplorable, if not -absolutely dishonest, practice, which is in vogue, of inventing new -names for the fossil duplicates of modern species, in order to mask or -obscure an identity which conflicts with evolutionary preconceptions. -When a given formation fails to fit into the accepted scheme by -reason of its fossil anachronisms, or when, to quote the words of -Price, “species are found in kinds of rock where they are not at all -expected, and where, according to the prevailing theories, it is -quite incredible that they should be found ... the not very honorable -expedient is resorted to of inventing a new name, specific or even -generic, to disguise and gloss over the strange similarity between them -and the others which have already been assigned to wholly different -formations.” (“The New Geology,” p. 291.) The same observation is -made by Heilprin. “It is practically certain,” says the latter, “that -numerous forms of life, exhibiting no distinctive characters of their -own, are constituted into distinct species for no other reason than -that they occur in formations widely separated from those holding -their nearest kin.” (“Geographical and Geological Distribution of -Animals,” pp. 183, 184.) An instance of this practice occurs in the -foregoing list, where a fossil brachiopod identical with a modern -species receives the new specific name “_striata_.” Its influence is -also manifest in the previously quoted apology of Scott for calling -teleost-like fish “ganoids.” - -We must also take into account the imperfection of the fossil record, -which is proved by the fact that most of the acknowledged “persistent -types” listed above “skip” whole systems and even groups of “later” -rocks (which are said to represent enormous intervals of time), only -to reappear, at last, in modern times. It is evident that their -existence has been continuous, and yet they are not represented in the -intervening strata. Clearly, then, the fossil record is imperfect, and -we must conclude that many of our modern types actually did exist in -the remote past, without, however, leaving behind any vestige of their -former presence. - -Again, we must frankly confess our profound ignorance with respect to -the total number and kinds of species living in our modern seas. Hence -our conventional distinction between “extinct” and “extant” species has -only a provisory value. Future discoveries will unquestionably force -us to admit that many of the species now classed as “extinct” are in -reality living forms, which must be added to our list of “persistent -types.” “It is by no means improbable,” says Heilprin, “that many of -the older genera, now recognized as distinct by reason of our imperfect -knowledge concerning their true relationships, have in reality -representatives in the modern sea.” (_Op. cit._ pp. 203, 204.) - -Finally, the whole of our present taxonomy of plants and animals, both -living and fossil, stands badly in need of revision. Systematists, -as we have seen in the second chapter, base their classifications -mainly on what they regard as basic or homologous structures, in -contradistinction to superficial or adaptive characters. Both kinds -of structure, however, are purely somatic, and somatic characters, -as previously observed, are not, by themselves, a safe criterion for -discriminating between varieties and species. In the light of recent -genetical research, we cannot avoid recognizing that there has been -far too much “splitting” of organic groups on the basis of differences -that are purely fluctuational, or, at most, mutational. Moreover, -the distinction between homologous and adaptive structures is often -arbitrary and largely a matter of personal opinion, especially when -numerous specimens are not available. What the “Cambridge Natural -History” says in allusion to the Asteroidea is of general application. -“While there is considerable agreement,” we read, “amongst authorities -as to the number of families, or minor divisions of unequivocal -relationship, to be found in the class Asteroidea, there has been -great uncertainty both as to the number and limits of the orders -into which the class should be divided, and also as to the limits of -the various species. The difficulty about the species is by no means -confined to the group Echinodermata; in all cases where the attempt -is made to determine species by an examination of a few specimens -of unknown age there is bound to be uncertainty; the more so, as it -becomes increasingly evident that there is no sharp line to be drawn -between local varieties and species. In Echinodermata, however, there -is the additional difficulty that the acquisition of ripe genital cells -does not necessarily mark the termination of growth; the animals can -continue to grow and at the same time slightly alter their characters. -For this reason many of the species described may be merely immature -forms.... - -“The disputes, however, as to the number of orders included in the -Asteroidea proceed from a different cause. The attempt to construct -detailed phylogenies involves the assumption that one set of -structures, which we take as the mark of the class, has remained -constant, whilst the others which are regarded as adaptive, may have -developed twice or thrice. As the two sets of structures are about -of equal importance it will be seen to what an enormous extent the -personal equation enters in the determination of these questions.” -(_Op. cit._, vol. I, pp. 459, 460.) - -In dealing with fossil forms, these difficulties of the taxonomist -are intensified: (1) by the sparse, badly-preserved, and fragmentary -character of fossil remains; (2) by the fact that here breeding -experiments are impossible, and hence the diagnosis based on external -characters cannot be supplemented by a diagnosis of the germinal -factors. Fossil taxonomy is, in consequence, extremely arbitrary and -unreliable. Many fossil forms classed as distinct species, or even -as distinct genera, may be nothing more than fluctuants, mutants, -hybrids, or immature stages of well-known species living today. -Again, many fossils mistaken for distinct species are but different -stages in the life-history of a single species, a mistake, which is -unavoidable, when specimens are few and the age of the specimens -unknown. The great confusion engendered in the classification of -the hydrozoa by nineteenth-century ignorance of the alternation of -hydroid and medusoid generations is a standing example of the danger -of classifying forms without a complete knowledge of the entire -life-cycle. When due allowance is made for mutation, hybridization, -metagenesis, polymorphism, age and metamorphosis, the number of -distinct fossil species will undergo considerable shrinkage. Nor must -we overlook the possibility of environmentally-induced modifications. -Many organisms, such as mollusks, undergo profound alteration as a -result of some important, and, perhaps, relatively permanent, change in -their environmental conditions, though such alterations affect only the -phenotype, and do not involve a corresponding change in the specific -genotype, _i.e._ the germinal constitution of the race. - -In the degree that these considerations are taken into account the -number of “extinct” fossil species will diminish and the number of -“persistent” species will increase. This is a consummation devoutly to -be wished for, but it means that hundreds of thousands of described -species must needs be reviewed for the purpose of weeding out the -duplicates, and who will have the knowledge, the courage, or even the -span of life, necessary to accomplish so gigantic a task? - -But so far as the practical purposes of our argument are concerned, the -accepted list of persistent types needs no amplification. It suffices, -as it stands, to establish the central fact (which, for the rest, -is admitted by everyone) that some generic and even specific types -have remained unchanged throughout the enormous lapse of time which -has intervened between the deposition of the oldest strata and the -advent of the present age. Our current theories, far from diminishing -the significance of this fact, tend to intensify it by computing the -duration of such persistence in millions, rather than in thousands, of -years. Now, whatever one’s views may be on the subject of transformism, -this prolonged permanence of certain genera and species is an -indubitable _fact_, which is utterly irreconcilable with a _universal -law_ of organic evolution. The theory of transformism is impotent -to explain an exception so palpable as this; for persistence and -transmutation cannot be subsumed under one and the same principle. That -which accounts for change cannot account for _unchange_. Yet unchange -is an observed fact, while the change, in this case, is an inferred -hypothesis. Hence, even if we accept the principle of transformism, -there will always be scope for the principle of permanence. The -extraordinary tenacity of type manifested by persistent genera and -species is a phenomenon deserving of far more careful study and -investigation than the evolutionally-minded scientist of today deigns -to bestow upon it. To the latter it may seem of little consequence, -but, to the genuine scientist, the actual persistence of types should -be of no less interest than their possible variability. - -With these reflections, our criticism of the palæontological argument -terminates. The enumeration of its various deficiencies was not -intended as a refutation. To disprove the theory of organic evolution -is a feat beyond our power to accomplish. We can only adduce negative -evidence, whose scope is to show that the various evolutionary -arguments are inconsequential or inconclusive. We cannot rob the -theory of its intrinsic possibility, and sheer justice compels us to -confess that certain facts, like those of symbiotic preadaptation, -lend themselves more readily to a transformistic, than to a fixistic, -interpretation. On the other hand, nothing is gained by ignoring -flaws so obvious and glaring as those which mar the cogency of -palæontological “evidence.” The man who would gloss them over is -no true friend either of Science or of the scientific theory of -Evolution! They represent so many real problems to be frankly faced -and fully solved, before the palæontological argument can become a -genuine demonstration. But until such time as a demonstration of this -sort is forthcoming, the evolutionist must not presume to cram his -unsubstantiated theory down our reasonably reluctant throats. To accept -as certain what remains unproved, is to compromise our intellectual -sincerity. True certainty, which rests on the recognition of objective -necessity, will never be attainable so long as difficulties that sap -the very base of evolutionary argumentation are left unanswered; and, -as for those who, in the teeth of discordant factual evidence, profess, -nevertheless, to have certainty regarding the “fact” of evolution, we -can only say that such persons cannot have a very high or exacting -conception of what scientific certainty really means. - -For the rest, it cannot even be said that the palæontological record -furnishes good circumstantial evidence that our globe has been the -scene of a process of organic evolution. In fact, so utterly at -variance with this view is the total impression conveyed by the -visible portion of the geological column, that the modern geologist -proposes, as we have seen, to probe depths beneath its lowest strata -for traces of that alleged transmutation, which higher horizons do -not reveal. There are six to eight thick terranes below the Cambrian, -we are told, and igneous masses that were formerly supposed to be -basal have turned out to be intrusions into sedimentary accumulations, -all of which, of course, is fortunate for the theory of organic -evolution, as furnishing it with a sadly needed new court of appeal. -The bottom, so to speak, has dropped out of the geological column, -and Prof. T. C. Chamberlin announces the fact as follows: “The sharp -division into two parts, a lifeless igneous base and a sedimentary -fossiliferous superstructure, has given place to the general concept -of continuity with merely minor oscillations in times and regions of -major activity. Life has been traced much below the Cambrian, but -its record is very imperfect. The recent discoveries of more ample -and varied life in the lower Palæozoic, particularly the Cambrian, -implies, under current evolutional philosophy, a very great downward -extension of life. In the judgment of some biologists and geologists, -this extension probably reaches below all the pre-Cambrian terranes -as yet recognized, though this pre-Cambrian extension is great. The -‘Azoic’ bottom has retired to depths unknown. This profoundly changes -the life aspect of the ‘column.’” (_Science_, Feb. 8, 1924, p. 128.) -All this is doubtless true, but such an appeal, from the known to the -unknown, from the actual to the possible, is not far-removed from a -confession of scientific insolvency. Life must, of course, have had -an earlier history than that recorded in the pre-Cambrian rocks. But -even supposing that some portion of an earlier record should become -accessible to us, it could not be expected to throw much light on the -problem of organic origins. Most of the primordial sediments have long -since been sapped and engulfed by fiery magmas, while terranes less -deep have, in all probability, been so metamorphosed that every trace -of their fossil contents has perished. The sub-Archæan beginnings of -life will thus remain shrouded forever in a mystery, which we have -no prospect of penetrating. Hence it is the exposed portion of the -geological column which continues and will continue to be our sole -source of information, and it is preëminently on this basis that the -evolutionary issue will have to be decided. - -Yet what could be more enigmatic than the rock record as it stands? -For in nature it possesses none of that idealized integrity and -coherence, with which geology has invested it for the purpose of -making it understandable. Rather it is a mighty chaos of scattered -and fragmentary fossiliferous formations, whose baffling complexity, -discontinuity, and ambiguity tax the ingenuity of the most sagacious -interpreters. Transformism is the key to one possible synthesis, which -might serve to unify that intricate mass of facts, but it is idle to -pretend that this theory is the unique and necessary corollary of -the facts as we find them. The palæontological argument is simply a -theoretical construction which presupposes evolution instead of proving -it. Its classic pedigrees of the horse, the camel, and the elephant -are only credible when we have assumed the “fact” of evolution, and -even then, solely upon condition that they claim to approximate, -rather than assign, the actual ancestry of the animals in question. -In palæontology, as in the field of zoölogy, evolution is not a -conclusion, but an interpretation. In palæontology, otherwise than -in the field of genetics, evolution is not amenable to the check of -experimental tests, because here it deals not with that which is, but -with that which _was_. Here the sole objective basis is the mutilated -and partially obliterated record of a march of events, which no one -has observed and which will never be repeated. These obscure and -fragmentary vestiges of a vanished past, by reason of their very -incompleteness, lend themselves quite readily to all sorts of theories -and all sorts of speculations. Of the “Stone Book of the Universe” -we may say with truth that which Oliver Wendell Holmes says of the -privately-interpreted Bible, namely, that its readers take from it the -same views which they had previously brought to it. “I am, however, -thoroughly persuaded,” say the late Yves Delage, “that one is or is not -a transformist, not so much for reasons deduced from natural history, -as for motives based on personal philosophic opinions. If there existed -some other scientific hypothesis besides that of descent to explain -the origin of species, many transformists would abandon their present -opinion as not being sufficiently demonstrated.... If one takes his -stand upon the exclusive ground of the facts, it must be acknowledged -that the formation of one species from another species has not been -demonstrated at all.” (“L’herédité et les grands problèmes de la -biologie générale,” Paris, 1903, pp. 204, 322.) - - - - - II - - THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINS - - - - - CHAPTER I - - THE ORIGIN OF LIFE - - - § 1. The Theory of Spontaneous Generation - -Strictly speaking, the theory of Transformism is not concerned with the -initial production of organic species, but rather with the subsequent -differentiation and multiplication of such species by transmutation -of the original forms. This technical sense, however, is embalmed -only in the term transformism and not in its synonym evolution. The -signification of the latter term is less definite. It may be used -to denote any sort of development or origination of one thing from -another. Hence the problem of the formation of organic species is -frequently merged with the problem of the transformation of species -under the common title of evolution. - -This extension of the evolutionary concept, in its widest sense, to the -problem of the origin of life on our globe is known as the hypothesis -of abiogenesis or spontaneous generation. It regards inorganic matter -as the source of organic life not merely in the sense of a _passive -cause_, out of which the primordial forms of life were produced, but -in the sense of an _active cause_ inasmuch as it ascribes the origin -of life to the exclusive agency of dynamic principles inherent in -inorganic matter, namely, the physicochemical energies that are native -to mineral matter. Life, in other words, is assumed to have arisen -spontaneously, that is, by means of a synthesis and convergence of -forces resident in inorganic matter, and not through the intervention -of any exterior agency. - -The protagonists of spontaneous generation, therefore, assert not -merely a passive, but an active, evolution of living, from lifeless -matter. As to the fact of the origin of the primal organisms from -inorganic matter, there is no controversy whatever. All agree that, at -some time or other, the primordial plants and animals emanated from -inorganic matter. The sole point of dispute is whether they arose from -inorganic matter by active evolution or simply by passive evolution. -The passive evolution of mineral matter into plants and animals is an -everyday occurrence. The grass assimilates the nitrates of the soil, -and is, in turn, assimilated by the sheep, whose flesh becomes the food -of man, and mineral substance is thus finally transformed into human -substance. In the course of metabolic processes, the inorganic molecule -may doff its mineral type and don, in succession, the specificities of -plant, animal, and human protoplasm; and this transition from lower -to higher degrees of perfection may be termed an evolution. It is -an ascent of matter from the lowermost grade of an inert substance, -through the intermediate grades of vegetative and animal life, up -to the culminating and ultimate term of material perfection, in -the partial constitution of a human nature and personality, in the -concurrence as a coagent in vegetative and sensile functions, and -in the indirect participation, as instrument, in the higher psychic -functions of rational thought and volition. - -At the present time, the inorganic world is clearly the exclusive -source of all the matter found in living beings. All living beings -construct their bodies out of inorganic substances in the process of -nutrition, and render back to the inorganic world, by dissimilation and -death, whatever they have taken from it. We must conclude, therefore, -the matter of the primordial organisms was likewise derived from the -inorganic world. But we are not warranted in concluding that this -process of derivation was an active evolution. On the contrary, all -evidence is against the supposition that brute matter is able to evolve -of itself into living matter. It can, indeed, be transformed into -plants, animals, and men through the action of an appropriate external -agent (_i.e._ solely through the agency of the living organism), but -it cannot acquire the perfections of living matter by means of its -own inherent powers. It cannot vitalize, or sensitize, itself through -the unaided activity of its own physicochemical energies. Only when -it comes under the superior influence of preëxistent life can it -ascend to higher degrees of entitive perfection. It does not become -of itself life, sensibility, and intelligence. It must first be drawn -into communion with what is already alive, before it can acquire life -and sensibility, or share indirectly in the honors of intelligence (as -the substrate of the cerebral imagery whence the human mind abstracts -its conceptual thought). Apart from this unique influence, inorganic -matter is impotent to raise itself in the scale of existence, but, if -captured, molded, and transmuted by a living being, it may progress to -the point of forming with the human soul one single nature, one single -substance, one single person. The evolution of matter exemplified in -organic metabolism is obviously passive, and such an evolution of -the primal organisms out of non-living matter even the opponents of -the hypothesis of spontaneous generation concede. But spontaneous -generation implies an active evolution of the living from the lifeless, -and this is the point around which the controversy wages. It would, of -course, be utterly irrational to deny to the Supreme Lord and Author of -Life the power of vivifying matter previously inanimate and inert, and -hence the origin of organic life from inorganic matter by a formative -(not creative) act of the Creator is the conclusion to which the denial -of abiogenesis logically leads. - -The hypothesis of spontaneous generation is far older than the theory -of transformism. It goes back to the Greek predecessors of Aristotle, -at least, and may be of far greater antiquity. It was based, as is well -known, upon an erroneous interpretation of natural facts, which was -universally accepted up to the close of the 17th century. As we can -do no more than recount a few outstanding incidents of its long and -interesting history here, the reader is referred to the VII chapter of -Wasmann’s “Modern Biology” and the VIII chapter of Windle’s “Vitalism -and Scholasticism” for the details which we are obliged to omit. - - - § 2. The Law of Genetic Continuity— - -From time immemorial the sudden appearance of maggots in putrescent -meat had been a matter of common knowledge, and the ancients were -misled into regarding the phenomenon as an instance of a _de novo_ -origin of life from dead matter. The error in question persisted until -the year 1698, when it was decisively disproved by a simple experiment -of the Italian physician Francesco Redi. He protected the meat from -flies by means of gauze. Under these conditions, no maggots appeared -in the meat, while the flies, unable to reach the meat, deposited -their eggs on the gauze. Thus it became apparent that the maggots were -larval flies, which emerged from fertilized eggs previously deposited -in decaying meat by female flies. Antonio Vallisnieri, another -Italian, showed that the fruit-fly had a similar life-history. As a -result of these discoveries, Redi rejected the theory of spontaneous -generation and formulated the first article of the Law of Genetic Vital -Continuity: _Omne vivum ex vivo_. - -Meanwhile, the first researches conducted by means of the newly -invented compound microscope disclosed what appeared to be fresh -evidence in favor of the discarded hypothesis. The unicellular -organisms known as infusoria were found to appear suddenly in hay -infusions, and their abrupt appearance was ascribed to spontaneous -generation. Towards the end of the 18th century, however, a Catholic -priest named Lazzaro Spallanzani refuted this new argument by -sterilizing the infusions with heat and by sealing the containers as -protection against contamination by floating spores or cysts. After -the infusions had been boiled for a sufficient time and then sealed, -no organisms could be found in them, no matter how long they were kept. -We now know that protozoa and protophytes do not originate _de novo_ in -infusions. Their sudden appearance in cultures is due to the deposition -of spores or cysts from the air, etc. - -The possibility that the non-germination of life in sterilized -infusions kept in sealed containers might be due to the absence of -oxygen, removed by boiling and excluded by sealing, left open a -single loophole, of which the 19th century defenders of abiogenesis -proceeded to avail themselves. Pasteur, however, by employing -sterilized cultures, which he aerated with filtered air exclusively, -succeeded in depriving his opponents of this final refuge, and -thereby completely demolished the last piece of evidence in favor -of spontaneous generation. Prof. Wm. Sydney Thayer, in an address -delivered at the Sorbonne, May 22, 1923, gives the following account -of Pasteur’s experiments in this field: “Then, naturally (1860-1876) -came the famous studies on spontaneous generation undertaken against -the advice of his doubting masters, Biot and Dumas. On the basis of -careful and well-conceived experiments he demonstrated the universal -presence of bacteria in air, water, dust; he showed the variation in -different regions of the bacterial content of the air; he demonstrated -the permanent sterility of media protected from contamination, and he -insisted on the inevitable derivation of every living organism from -one of its kind. ‘No,’ he said, ‘there is no circumstance known today -which justifies us in affirming that microscopic organisms have come -into the world, without parents like themselves. Those who made this -assertion have been the playthings of illusions or ill-made experiments -invalidated by errors which they have not been able to appreciate or -to avoid.’ In the course of these experiments he demonstrated the -necessity of reliable methods of sterilization for instruments or -culture media, of exposure for half an hour to moist heat at 120° or to -dry air at 180°. And behold! our modern procedures of sterilization -and the basis of antiseptic surgery.” (_Science_, Dec. 14, 1923, p. -477.) Pasteur brought to a successful completion the work of Redi and -Spallanzani. Henceforth spontaneous generation was deprived of all -countenance in the realm of biological fact. - -Meanwhile, the cytologists and embryologists of the last century -were adding article after article to the law of genetic cellular -continuity, thus forging link by link the fatal chain of severance -that inexorably debars abiogenesis from the domain of natural science. -With the formulation of the great Cell Theory by Schleiden and Schwann -(1838-1839), it became clear that the cell is the fundamental unit -of organization in the world of living matter. It has proved to be, -at once, the simplest organism capable of independent existence and -the basic unit of structure and function in all the more complex -forms of life. The protists (unicellular protozoans and protophytes) -consist each of a single cell, and no simpler type of organism is -known to science. The cell is the building brick out of which the -higher organisms or metists (_i.e._ the multicellular and tissued -metazoans and metaphytes) are constructed, and all multicellular -organisms are, at one time or other in their career, reduced to the -simplicity of a single cell (_v.g._ in the zygote and spore stages). -The somatic or tissue cells, which are associated in the metists to -form one organic whole, are of the same essential type as germ cells -and unicellular organisms, although the parallelism is more close -between the unicellular organism and the germ cell. The germ cell, like -the protist, is equipped with all the potentialities of life, whereas -tissue cells are specialized for one function rather than another. The -protist is a generalized and physiologically-balanced cell, one which -performs all the vital functions, and in which the suppression of one -function leads to the destruction of all the rest; while the tissue -cell is a specialized and physiologically-unbalanced cell limited to -a single function, with the other vital functions in abeyance (though -capable of manifesting themselves under certain circumstances). -Normally, therefore, the tissue cell is functionally incomplete, a part -and not a whole, whereas the protist is an independent individual, -being, at once, the highest type of cell and the lowest type of -organism. - -According to the classic definition of Franz Leydig and Max Schultze, -the cell is a mass of protoplasm containing a nucleus, both protoplasm -and nucleus arising through division of the corresponding elements of -a preëxistent cell. In this form the definition is quite general and -applies to all cells, whether tissue cells, germ cells, or unicellular -organisms. Moreover, it embodies two principles which still further -determine the law of genetic cellular continuity, namely: _Omnis -cellula ex cellula_, enunciated by Virchow in 1855, and Flemming’s -principle: _Omnis nucleus ex nucleo_, proclaimed in 1882. In this way, -Cytology supplemented Redi’s formula that every living being is from -a preëxistent living being, by adding two more articles, namely, that -every living cell is from a preëxistent cell, and every new cellular -nucleus is derived by division from a preëxistent cellular nucleus. Now -neither the nucleus nor the cell-body (the cytoplasm or extranuclear -area of the cell) is capable of an independent existence. The -cytoplasm of the severed nerve fibre, when it fails to reëstablish its -connection with the neuron nucleus, degenerates. The enucleated amœba, -though capable of such vital functions as depend upon destructive -metabolism, can do nothing which involves constructive metabolism, and -is, therefore, doomed to perish. The sperm cell, which is a nucleus -that has sloughed off most of its cytoplasm, disintegrates, unless -it regains a haven in the cytoplasm of the egg. Life, accordingly, -cannot subsist in a unit more simply organized than the cell. No -organism lives which is simpler than the cell, and the origin of all -higher forms of life is reducible, as we shall see, to the origin of -the cell. Consequently, new life can originate in no other way than -by a process of cell-division. All generation or reproduction of new -life is dependent upon the division of the cell-body and nucleus of a -preëxistent living cell. - -Haeckel, it is true, has attempted to question the status of the cell -as the simplest of organisms, by alleging the existence of cytodes -(non-nucleated cells) among the bacteria and the blue-green algæ. -Further study, however, has shown that bacteria and blue-green algæ -have a distributed nucleus, like that of certain ciliates, such as -_Dileptus gigas_ and _Trachelocerca_. In such forms the entire cell -body is filled with scattered granules of chromatin called chromioles, -and this diffuse type of nucleus seems to be the counterpart of the -concentrated nuclei found in the generality of cells. At any rate, -there is a temporary aggregation of the chromioles at critical stages -in the life-cycle (such as cell-division), and these scattered -chromatin granules undergo division, although their distribution to -the daughter-cells is not as regular as that obtaining in mitosis. All -this is strongly suggestive of their nuclear nature, and cells with -distributed nuclei cannot, therefore, be classified as cytodes. In -fact, the polynuclear condition is by no means uncommon. _Paramœcium -aurelia_, for example, has a macronucleus and a micronucleus, and -the _Uroleptus mobilis_ has eight macronuclei and from two to four -micronuclei. The difference between the polynuclear and diffuse -condition seems to be relatively unimportant. In fact, the distributed -nucleus differs from the morphological nucleus mainly in the absence -of a confining membrane. From the functional standpoint, the two -structures are identical. Hence the possession of a nucleus or its -equivalent is, to all appearances, a universal characteristic of cells. -Haeckel’s “cytodes” have proved to be purely imaginary entities. The -verdict of modern cytologists is that Shultze’s definition of the cell -must stand, and that the status of the cell as the simplest of organic -units capable of independent existence is established beyond the -possibility of prudent doubt. - -With the progressive refinement of microscopic technique, it has become -apparent that the law of genetic continuity applies not merely to the -cell as a whole and to its major parts, the nucleus and the cell-body, -but also to the minor components or organelles, which are seen to -be individually self-perpetuating by means of growth and division. -The typical cell nucleus, as is well known, is a spherical vesicle -containing a semisolid, diphasic network of basichromatin (formerly -“chromatin”) and oxychromatin (linin) suspended in more fluid medium -or ground called nuclear sap. When the cell is about to divide, the -basichromatin resolves itself into a definite number of short threads -called chromosomes. Now, Boveri found that, in the normal process of -cell-division known as mitosis, these nuclear threads or chromosomes -are each split lengthwise and divided into two exactly equivalent -halves, the resulting halves being distributed in equal number to the -two daughter-cells produced by the division of the original cell. -Hence, in the year 1903, Boveri added a fourth article to the law of -genetic vital continuity, namely: _Omne chromosoma ex chromosomate_. - -But the law in question applies to cytoplasmic as well as nuclear -components. In physical appearance, the cell-body or cytoplasm -resembles an emulsion with a clear semiliquid external phase called -hyaloplasm and an internal phase consisting mainly of large spheres -called macrosomes and minute particles called microsomes, all of which, -together with numerous other formed bodies, are suspended in the clear -hyaloplasm (hyaline ground-substance). Now certain of these cytoplasmic -components have long been known to be _self-perpetuating_ by means -of growth and division, maintaining their continuity from cell to -cell. The plastids of plant cells, for example, divide at the time of -cell-division, although their distribution to the daughter-cells does -not appear to be as definite and regular as that which obtains in the -case of the chromosomes. Similarly, the centrioles or division-foci -of animal cells are self-propagating by division, but here the -distribution to the daughter-cells is exactly equivalent and not at -random as in the case of plastids. In the light of recent research -it looks as though two other types of cytoplasmic organelles must be -added to the list of cellular components, which are individually -self-perpetuating by growth and division, namely, the chondriosomes -and the Golgi bodies—“both mitochondria and Golgi bodies are able to -assimilate, grow, and divide in the cytoplasm.” (Gatenby.) Wilson is -of opinion that the law of genetic continuity may have to be extended -even to those minute granules and particles of the cytosome, which were -formerly thought to arise _de novo_ in the apparently structureless -hyaloplasm. Speaking of the emulsified appearance of the starfish and -sea urchin eggs, he tells us that their protoplasm shows “a structure -somewhat like that of an emulsion, consisting of innumerable spheroidal -bodies suspended in a clear continuous basis or hyaloplasm. These -bodies are of two general orders of magnitude, namely: larger spheres -or macrosomes rather closely crowded and fairly uniform in size, and -much smaller microsomes irregularly scattered between the macrosomes, -and among these are still smaller granules that graduate in size -down to the limit of vision with any power (_i.e._ of microscope) -we may employ.” (_Science_, March 9, 1923, p. 282.) Now, the limit -of microscopic vision by the use of the highest-power oil-immersion -objectives is one-half the length of the shortest waves of visible -light, that is, about 200 submicrons (the submicron being one millionth -of a millimeter). Particles whose diameter is less than this cannot -reflect a wave of light, and are, therefore, invisible so far as the -microscope is concerned. By the aid of the ultramicroscope, however, -we are enabled to see the halos formed by particles not more than four -submicrons in diameter, which, however, represents the limit of the -ultramicroscope, and is the diameter hypothetically assigned to the -protein multimolecule. Since, therefore, we find the particles in the -protoplasm of the cell body graduating all the way down to the limit -of this latter instrument, and since on the very limit of microscopic -vision we find such minute particles as the centrioles “capable of -self-perpetuation by growth and division, and of enlargement to form -much larger bodies,” we cannot ignore the possibility that the -ultramicroscopic particles may have the same powers and may be the -sources or “formative foci” of the larger formed bodies, which were -hitherto thought to arise _de novo_. - -Certainly, pathology, as we shall see, tells us of ultramicroscopic -disease-germs, which are capable of reproduction and maintenance of a -specific type, and experimental genetics makes us aware of a linear -alignment of submicroscopic genes in the nuclear chromosomes, each -gene undergoing periodic division and perpetual transmission from -generation to generation. The cytologist, therefore, to quote the words -of Wilson, “cannot resist the evidence that the appearance of a simple -homogeneous colloidal substance is deceptive; that it is in reality a -complex, heterogeneous, or polyphasic system. He finds it difficult to -escape the conclusion, therefore, that the visible and the invisible -components of the protoplasmic system differ only in their size and -degree of dispersion; that they belong to a single continuous series, -and that the visible structure of protoplasm may give us a rough -magnified picture of the invisible.” (_Ibidem_, p. 283.) - -It would seem, therefore, that we must restore to honor, as the fifth -article of the law of cellular continuity, the formula, which Richard -Altmann enunciated on purely speculative grounds in 1892, but which -the latest research is beginning to place on a solid factual basis, -namely: _Omne granulum ex granulo_. “For my part,” says the great -cytologist, Wilson, “I am disposed to accept the probability that -many of these particles, as if they were submicroscopical plastids, -may have a persistent identity, perpetuating themselves by growth and -multiplication without loss of their specific individual type.” And -he adds that the facts revealed by experimental embryology (_e.g._, -the existence of differentiated zones of specific composition in -the cytoplasm of certain eggs) “drive us to the conclusion that the -submicroscopical components of the hyaloplasm are segregated and -distributed according to an ordered system.” (_Ibidem_, p. 283.) -The structure of the cell has often been likened to a heterogeneous -solution, that is, to a complex polyphasic colloidal system, but this -power of perpetual division and orderly assortment possessed by the -cell as a whole and by its single components is the unique property -of the living protoplasmic system, and is never found in any of the -colloidal systems known to physical chemistry, be they organic or -inorganic. - -Cells, then, originate solely by division of preëxistent cells and even -the minor components of the cellular system originate in like fashion, -namely: by division of their respective counterparts in the preëxistent -living cell. Here we have the sum and substance of the fivefold law of -genetic continuity, whose promulgation has relegated the hypothesis -of spontaneous generation to the realms of empty speculation. Waiving -the possibility of an _a priori_ argument, by which abiogenesis might -be positively excluded, there remains this one consideration, which -alone is scientifically significant, that, so far as observation goes -and induction can carry us, the living cell has absolute need of a -vital origin and can never originate by the exclusive agency of the -physicochemical forces native to inorganic matter. If organic life -exists in simpler terms than the cell, science knows nothing of it, and -no observed process, simple or complicated, of inorganic nature, nor -any artificial synthesis of the laboratory, however ingenious, has ever -succeeded in duplicating the wonders of the simplest living cell. - - - § 3. Chemical Theories of the Origin of Life - -In fact, the very notion of a chemical synthesis of living matter -is founded on a misconception. It would, indeed, be rash to set -limits to the chemist’s power of synthesizing organic compounds, but -living protoplasm is not a single chemical compound. Rather it is -a complex system of compounds, enzymes and organelles, coördinated -and integrated into an organized whole by a persistent principle of -unity and finality. Organic life, to say nothing at all of its unique -dynamics, is a morphological as well as a chemical problem; and, -while it is conceivable that the chemist might synthesize all the -compounds found in dead protoplasm, to reproduce a single detail of -the ultramicroscopic structure of a living cell lies wholly beyond his -power and province. “Long ago,” says Wilson (in the already quoted -address on the “Physical Basis of Life”), “it became perfectly plain -that what we call protoplasm is not chemically a single substance. It -is a mixture of many substances, a mixture in high degree complex, the -seat of varied and incessant transformations, yet one which somehow -holds fast for countless generations to its own specific type. The -evidence from every source demonstrates that the cell is a complex -organism, a microcosm, a living system.” (_Science_, March 9, 1923, p. -278.) - -With the chemist, analysis must precede synthesis, and it is only after -a structural formula has been determined by means of quantitative -analysis supplemented by analogy and comparison, that a given compound -can be successfully synthesized. But living protoplasm and its -structures elude such analysis. Intravitous staining is inadequate even -as a means of qualitative analysis, and tests of a more drastic nature -destroy the life and organization, which they seek to analyze. “With -one span,” says Amé Pictet, Professor of Chemistry at the University -of Geneva, “we will now bridge the entire distance separating the -first products of plant assimilation from its final product, namely, -living matter. And it should be understood at the outset that I employ -this term ‘living matter’ only as an abbreviation, and to avoid long -circumlocution. You should not, in reality, attribute life to matter -itself; it has not, it cannot have both living molecules and dead -molecules. Life requires an organization, which is that of cellular -structure, but it remains, in contradistinction to it, outside the -domain of strict chemistry. It is none the less true that the content -of a living cell must differ in its chemical nature from the content of -a dead cell. It is entirely from this point of view that the phenomenon -of life pertains to my subject.... A living cell, both in its chemical -composition and in its morphological structure, is an organism of -extraordinary complexity. The protoplasm that it incloses is a mixture -of very diverse substances. But if there be set aside on the one hand -those substances which are in the process of assimilation and on the -other those which are the by-products of nutrition, and which are in -the process of elimination, there remain the protein or albuminous -substances, and these must be considered, if not the essential factor -of life, at least the theater of its manifestations.... Chemistry, -however, is totally ignorant, or nearly so, of the constitution of -living albumen, for chemical methods of investigation at the very -outset kill the living cell. The slightest rise in temperature, -contact with the solvent, the very powerful effect of even the mildest -reactions cause the transformation that needs to be prevented, and the -chemist has nothing left but dead albumen.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for -1916, pp. 208, 209.) - -Chemical analysis associated with physical analysis by means of the -polariscope, spectroscope, x-rays, ultramicroscope, etc. is extremely -useful in determining the structure of inorganic units like the atom -and the molecule. Both, too, throw valuable light on the problem of the -structure of non-living multimolecules such as the crystal units of -crystalloids and the ultramicrons of colloids, but they furnish no clue -to the submicroscopical morphology of the living cell. Such methods do -not enable us to examine anything more than the “physical substrate” -of life, and that, only after it has been radically altered; for it -is not the same after life has flown. At all events, the integrating -principle, the formative determinant, which binds the components of -living protoplasm into a unitary system, which makes of them a single -totality instead of a mere sum or fortuitous aggregate of disparate -and uncoördinated factors, and which gives to them a determinate and -persistent specificity that can hold its own amid a perpetual fluxion -of matter and continual flow of energy, this is forever inaccessible to -the chemist, and constitutes a phenomenon of which the inorganic world -affords no parallel. - -With these facts in mind, we can hardly fail to be amused whenever -certain simple chemical reactions obtained _in vitro_ are hailed as -“clue to the origin of life.” When it was found, for instance, that, -under certain conditions, an aldehyde (probably formaldehyde) is -formed in a colloidal solution of chlorophyll in water, if exposed to -sunlight, the discovery gave rise to Bach’s formaldehyde-hypothesis; -for Alexis Bach saw in this reaction “a first step in the origin of -life.” As formaldehyde readily undergoes aldol condensation into -a syrupy fluid called formose, when a dilute aqueous solution of -formaldehyde is saturated with calcium hydroxide and allowed to -stand for several days, there was no difficulty in conceiving the -transition from formaldehyde to the carbohydrates; for formose is a -mixture containing several hexose sugars, and Fischer has succeeded in -isolating therefrom acrose, a simple sugar having the same formula as -glucose, namely: C₆H₁₂O₆. Glyceraldehyde undergoes a similar -condensation. In view of these facts, carbohydrate-production in green -plants was interpreted as a photosynthesis of these substances from -water and carbon dioxide, with chlorophyll acting a sensitizer to -absorb the radiant energy necessary for the reaction. The first step in -the process was thought to be a reduction of carbonic acid to formic -acid and then to formaldehyde, the latter being at once condensed into -glucose, which in turn was supposed to be dehydrated and polymerized -into starch. From the carbohydrates thus formed and the nitrates of the -soil the plant could then synthesize proteins, while oxidation of the -carbohydrates into fatty acids would lead to the formation of fats. -Hence Bach regarded the formation of formaldehyde in the presence of -water, carbon dioxide, chlorophyll, and sunlight as the “first step in -the production of life.” Bateson, however, does not find the suggestion -a very helpful one, and evaluates it at its true worth in the following -contemptuous aside: “We should be greatly helped,” he says, “by -some indication as to whether the origin of life has been single or -multiple.” Modern opinion is, perhaps, inclined to the multiple theory, -but we have no real evidence. Indeed, the problem still stands outside -the range of scientific investigation, and when we hear the spontaneous -formation of formaldehyde mentioned as a possible first step in -the origin of life, we think of Harry Lauder in the character of a -Glasgow schoolboy pulling out his treasures from his pocket—“That’s a -wassher—for makkin’ motor cars.” (“Presidential Address,” cf. Smithson. -Inst. Rpt. for 1915, p. 375.) - -Bach, moreover, takes it for granted that the formation of formaldehyde -is really the first step in the synthesis performed by the green plant, -and he claims that formaldehyde is formed when carbon dioxide is passed -through a solution of a salt of uranium in the presence of sunlight. -Fenton makes a similar claim in the case of magnesium, asserting that -traces of formaldehyde are discernible when metallic magnesium is -immersed in water saturated with carbon dioxide. But at present it -begins to look as though the spontaneous formation and condensation of -formaldehyde had nothing to do with the process that actually occurs -in green plants. Certain chemists, while admitting that an aldehyde -is formed when chlorophyll, water, and air are brought together in -the presence of sunlight, deny that the aldehyde in question is -formaldehyde, and they also draw attention to the fact that this -aldehyde may be formed in an atmosphere entirely destitute of carbon -dioxide. In fact, the researches conducted by Willstätter and Stoll, -and later (in 1916) by Jörgensen and Kidd tend to discredit the common -notion that carbohydrate-production in plants is the result of a direct -union of water and carbon dioxide. Botany textbooks still continue to -parrot the traditional view. We cannot any longer, however, be sure but -that the term photosynthesis may be a misnomer. - -Carbohydrate-formation in plants seems to be more analogous to -carbohydrate-formation in animals than was formerly thought to be the -case. In animals, as is well known, glycogen or animal starch is formed -not by direct synthesis, but by deämination and reduction of proteins. -In a similar way, it is thought that the production of carbohydrates -in plants may be due to a breaking down of the phytyl ester in -chlorophyll, the chromogen group functioning (under the action of -light) alternately as a dissociating enzyme in the formation of sugars -and a synthesizing enzyme in the reconstruction of chlorophyll. Phytol -is an unsaturated alcohol obtained when chlorophyll is saponified by -means of caustic alkalis. Its formula is C₂₀H₃₉OH, and chlorophyll -consists of a chromogen group containing magnesium (MgN₄C₃₂H₃₀O) united -to a diester of phytyl and methyl alcohols. - -Experimental results are at variance with the theory that chlorophyll -acts as a sensitizer in bringing about a reduction of carbonic -acid, after the analogy of eosin, which in the presence of light -accelerates the decomposition of silver salts on photographic plates. -Willstätter found that, when a colloidal solution of the pure extract -of chlorophyll in water is exposed to sunlight and an atmosphere -consisting of carbon dioxide exclusively, no formaldehyde is formed, -but the chlorophyll is changed into yellow phæophytin owing to the -removal of the magnesium from the chromogen group by the action of the -carbonic acid. Jörgensen, on the other hand, discovered that in an -atmosphere of pure oxygen, formaldehyde is formed, apparently by the -splitting off and reduction of the phytyl ester of chlorophyll. Soon, -however, the formaldehyde is oxidized to formic acid, which replaces -the chlorophyllic magnesium with hydrogen, thus causing the green -chlorophyll to degenerate into yellow phæophytin and finally to lose -its color altogether. The dissociation of the chromogen group may be -due to the fact that the reaction takes place _in vitro_, and may not -occur in the living plant. At all events, it would seem that plants, -like animals, manufacture carbohydrates by a destructive rather than a -constructive process, and that water and carbon dioxide serve rather -as materials for the regeneration of chlorophyll than as materials out -of which sugars are directly synthesized. - -A new theory has been proposed by Dr. Oskar Baudisch, who seems to -have sensed the irrelevance of the formaldehyde hypothesis, and to -have sought another solution in connection with the chromogen group of -chlorophyll. He finds a more promising starting-point in formaldoxime, -which, he claims, readily unites with such metals as magnesium and iron -and with formaldehyde, in the presence of light containing ultra-violet -rays, to form organic compounds analogous to the chromogen complexes -in chlorophyll and hæmoglobin. Oximes are compounds formed by the -condensation of one molecule of an aldehyde with one molecule of -hydroxylamine (NH₂OH) and the elimination of a molecule of water. Hence -Dr. Baudisch imagines that, given formaldoxime (H₂C:N·OH), magnesium, -and ultra-violet rays, we might expect a spontaneous formation of -chlorophyll leading eventually to the production of organic life. “It -is his theory that life may have been caused through the direct action -of sunlight upon water, air, and carbon dioxide in the ancient geologic -past when, he believes, sunlight was more intense and contained -more ultra-violet light and the air contained more water vapor and -carbon dioxide than at the present time.” (_Science_, April 6, 1923, -Supplement XII.) - -This is the old Spencerian evasion, the fatuous appeal to “conditions -unlike those we know,” the unverified and unverifiable assumption -that an unknown past must have been more favorable to spontaneous -generation than the known present. In archæozoic times, the temperature -was higher, the partial pressure of atmospheric carbon dioxide -greater, the percentage of ultra-violet rays in sunlight larger. -Such contentions are interesting, if true, but, for all that, they -may, “like the flowers that bloom in the spring,” have nothing to do -with the case. Nature does not, and the laboratory cannot, reproduce -the conditions which are said to have brought about the spontaneous -generation of formaldoxime and its progressive transmutation into -phycocyanin, chlorophyll and the blue-green algæ. What value, then, -have these conjectures? If it be the function of natural science to -discount actualities in favor of possibilities, to draw arguments from -ignorance, and to accept the absence of disproof as a substitute for -demonstration, then the expedient of invoking the unknown in support -of a speculation is scientifically legitimate. But, if the methods of -science are observation and induction, if it proceeds according to the -principle of the uniformity of nature, and does not utterly belie its -claim of resting upon factual realities rather than the figments of -fancy, then all this hypothecation, which is so flagrantly at variance -with the actual data of experience and the unmistakable trend of -inductive reasoning, is not science at all, but sheer credulity and -superstition. - -When we ask by what right men of science presume to lift the veil of -mystery from a remote past, which no one has observed, we are told that -the justification of this procedure is the principle of the uniformity -of nature or the invariability of natural laws. Nature’s laws are the -same yesterday, today, and forever. Hence the scientist, who wishes -to penetrate into the unknown past, has only to “prolong the methods -of nature from the present into the past.” (Tyndall.) If we reject -the soundness of this principle, we automatically cut ourselves off -from all certainty regarding that part of the world’s history which -antecedes human observation. Either nature’s laws change, or they do -not. If they never change, then Spontaneous Generation is quite as -much excluded from the past as it is from the present. If, however, as -Hamann and Fechner explicitly maintain, nature’s laws do change, then, -obviously, no knowledge whatever is possible respecting the past, since -it is solely upon the assumption of the immutable constancy of such -laws that we can venture to reconstruct prehistory. - -The puerile notion that the synthesis of organic substances in the -laboratory furnishes a clue to the origin of organic life on earth is -due to a confusion of organic, with living and organized, substances. -It is only in the production of organic substances that the chemist -can vie with the plant or animal. These are lifeless and unorganized -carbon compounds, which are termed organic because they are elaborated -by living organisms as a metaplastic by-product of their metabolism. -Such substances, however, are not to be confounded with animate matter, -_e.g._ a living cell and its organelles, or even with organized matter, -_e.g._ dead protoplasm. These the chemist cannot duplicate; for -vitality and organization, as we have seen, are things that elude both -his analysis and his synthesis. Even with respect to the production of -organic substances, the parallelism between the living cell and the -chemical laboratory is far from being a perfect one. Speaking of the -metaplastic or organic products of cells, Benjamin Moore says: “Most -of these are so complex that they have not yet been synthesized by the -organic chemist; nay, even of those that have been synthesized, it may -be remarked that all proof is wanting that the syntheses have been -carried out in identically the same fashion and by the employment of -the same forms of energy in the case of the cell as in the chemist’s -laboratory. The conditions in the cell are widely different, and at the -temperature of the cell and with such chemical materials as are at hand -in the cell no such organic syntheses have been artificially carried -out by the forms of energy extraneous to living tissue.” (“Recent -Advances in Physiology and Bio-Chemistry,” p. 10.) Be that as it may, -however, the prospect of a laboratory synthesis of an organic substance -like chlorophyll affords no ground whatever for expecting a chemical -synthesis of living matter. The chlorophyllic tail is inadequate to -the task of wagging the dog of organic life. In this connection, Yves -Delage’s sarcastic comment on Schaaffhausen’s theory is worthy of -recall. The latter had suggested (in 1892) that life was initiated by a -chemical reaction, in which water, air, and mineral salts united under -the influence of light and heat to produce a colorless _Protococcus_, -which subsequently acquired chlorophyll and became a _Protococcus -viridis_. “If the affair is so simple,” writes Delage, “why does -not the author produce a few specimens of this _protococcus_ in his -laboratory? We will gladly supply him with the necessary chlorophyll.” -(“La structure du protoplasma et les théories sur l’hérédité,” p. 402.) - -Another consideration, which never appears to trouble the visionaries -who propound theories of this sort, is the fact that the inert elements -and blind forces of inorganic nature are, if left to themselves, -utterly impotent to duplicate even so much as the feats of the -chemical laboratory, to say nothing at all of the more wonderful -achievements possible only to living organisms. In the laboratory, -the physicochemical forces of the mineral world are coördinated, -regulated, and directed by the guiding intelligence of the chemist. -In that heterogeneous conglomerate, which we call brute matter, no -such guiding principle exists, and the only possible automatic results -are those which the fortuitous concurrence of blind factors avails to -produce. Chance of this kind may vie with art in the production of -relatively simple combinations or systems, but where the conditions are -as complex as those, which the synthesis of chlorophyll presupposes, -chance is impotent and regulation absolutely imperative. How much more -is this true, when there is question of the production of an effect -so complicatedly telic as the living organism! “I venture to think,” -says Sir William Tilden, in a letter to the London _Times_ (Sept. 10, -1912), “that no chemist will be prepared to suggest a process by which, -from the interaction of such materials (viz., inorganic substances), -anything approaching a substance of the nature of a proteid could be -formed or, if by a complex series of changes a compound of this kind -were conceivably produced, that it would present the characters of -living protoplasm.” In the concluding sentence of his letter, the -great chemist seems to deprecate even the discussion of a chemical -synthesis of living matter, whether spontaneous or artificial. “Far -be it from any man of science,” he says, “to affirm that any given set -of phenomena is not a fit subject of inquiry and that there is any -limit to what may be revealed in answer to systematic and well-directed -investigation. In the present instance, however, it appears to me that -this is not a field for the chemist nor one in which chemistry is -likely to afford any assistance whatever.” In any case, the idea that a -chaos of unassorted elements and undirected forces could succeed where -the skill of the chemist fails is preposterous. No known or conceivable -process, or group of processes, at work in inorganic nature, is equal -to the task. Chance is an explanation only for minds insensible to the -beauty and order of organic life. - -Darwin inoculated biological science with this Epicurean metaphysics, -when, in his “Origin of Species,” he ascribed discriminating and -selective powers of great delicacy and precision to the blind factors -of a heterogeneous and variable environment. He compared natural -selection to artificial selection, and in so doing, he was led -astray by a false implication of his own analogy—“I have called this -principle,” he says, “by which each slight variation, if useful, is -preserved, by the term natural selection, in order to mark its relation -to man’s power of selection.” (“Origin of Species,” 6th ed., c. III, -p. 58.) Having likened the unintelligent and fortuitous selection -and elimination exercised by the environment to the intelligent and -purposive selection and elimination practiced by animal breeders and -horticulturists, he pressed the analogy to the unwarranted extent of -attributing to a blind, lifeless, and impersonal aggregate of minerals, -liquids, and gases superhuman powers of discretion. To preserve -even the semblance of parity, he ought first to have expurgated the -process of artificial selection by getting rid of the element of -human intelligence, which lurks therein, and vitiates its parallelism -with the unconscious and purposeless havoc wrought at random by the -blind and uncoördinated agencies of the environment. If inorganic -nature were a vast and multifarious mold, a preformed sieve with -holes of different sizes, a separator for sorting coins of various -denominations, Darwin’s idea would be, in some degree, defensible, but -this would only transfer the problem of cosmic order and intelligence -from the organism to the environment. As a matter of fact, the -mechanism of the environment is far too _simple_ in its structure -and too _general_ in its influence to account for the complexities -and specificities of organisms, that is, for the morphology and -specific differences of plants and animals. Hence the selective work -of the environment is negligible in the positive sense, and consists, -for the most part, in a tendency to eliminate the abnormal and the -subnormal. On the other hand, the environment as well as the organism -is fundamentally teleological, and the environmental mechanism, though -simple and general, is nevertheless expressly preadapted for the -maintenance of organic life. Henderson, the bio-chemist of Harvard, has -shown conclusively, in his “Fitness of the Environment” (1913), that -the environment itself has been expressly selected with this finality -in view, and that the inorganic world, while not the active cause, is, -nevertheless, the preördained complement of organic life. - -Simple constructions may, indeed, be due to pure accident as well -as deliberate art, inasmuch as they presuppose but few and easy -conditions. Complex constructions, on the contrary, provided they be -systematic and not chaotic, are not producible by accident, but only -by art, because they require numerous and complicated conditions. -Operating individually, the unconscious factors of inorganic nature -can produce simple and homogeneous constructions such as crystals. -Operating in uncoördinated concurrence with one another, these blind -and unrelated agencies produce complex chaotic formations such as -mountains and islands, mere heterogeneous conglomerates, destitute -of any determinate size, shape, or symmetry, constructions in which -every single item and detail is the result of factors each of -which is independent of the other. In short, the efficacy of the -unconscious and uncoordinated physicochemical factors of inorganic -nature is limited to fortuitous results, which serve no purpose, -embody no intelligible law, convey no meaning nor idea, and afford -no æsthetic satisfaction, being mere aggregates or sums rather than -natural units and real totalities. But it does not extend to the -production of complex systematic formations such as living organisms -or human artefacts. Left to itself, therefore, inorganic nature might -conceivably duplicate the simplest artefacts such as the chipped flints -of the savage, and it might also construct a complex heterogeneous -chaos of driftwood, mud, and sand like the Great Raft of the Red River, -but it would be utterly impotent to construct a complicated telic -system comparable to an animal, a clock, or even an organic compound, -like chlorophyll. - -In this connection, it is curious to note how extremely myopic the -scientific materialist can be, when there is question of recognizing -a manifestation of Divine intelligence in the stupendous teleology of -the living organism, and how incredibly lynx-eyed he becomes, when -there is question of detecting evidences of human intelligence in the -eoliths alleged to have been the implements of a “Tertiary Man.” In -the latter case, he is never at a loss to determine the precise degree -of chipping, at which an eolith ceases to be interpretable as the -fortuitous product of unconscious processes, and points infallibly to -the intelligent authorship of man, but he grows strangely obtuse to -the psychic implications of teleology, when it comes to explaining the -symmetry of a starfish or the beauty of a Bird of Paradise. - -In conclusion, it is clear that the hypothesis of a spontaneous -origin of organic life from inorganic matter has in its favor neither -factual evidence nor aprioristic probability, but is, on the contrary, -ruled out of court by the whole force of the scientific principle of -induction. To recapitulate, there are no subcellular organisms, and -all cellular organisms (which is the same as saying, all organisms), -be they unicellular or multicellular, originate exclusively by -reproduction, that is, by generation from living parents of the same -organic type or species. This is the law of genetic vital continuity, -which, by the way, Aristotle had formulated long before Harvey, when -he said: “It appears that all living beings come from a germ, and the -germ from parents.” (“De Generatione Animalium,” lib. I, cap. 17.) All -reproduction, however, is reducible to a process of cell-division. That -such is the case with unicellular organisms is evident from the very -definition of a cell. That it is also true of multicellular organisms -can be shown by a review of the various forms of reproduction occurring -among plants and animals. - - - § 4. =Reproduction and Rejuvenation= - -Reproduction, the sole means by which the torch of life is relayed -from generation to generation, the exclusive process by which -living individuals arise and races are perpetuated, consists in the -separation of a germ from the parent organism as a physical basis for -the development of a new organism. The germ thus separated may be -many-celled or one-celled, as we shall see presently, but the separated -cells, be they one or many, have their common and exclusive source in -the process of mitotic cell-division. In a few cases, this divisional -power or energy of the cell seems to be perennial by virtue of an -inherent inexhaustibility. In most cases, however, it is perennial by -virtue of a restorative process involving nuclear reorganization. In -the former cases, which are exceptional, the cellular stream of life -appears to flow onward forever with steady current, but as a general -rule it ebbs and flows in cycles, which involve a periodic rise -and fall of divisional energy. The phenomena of the life-cycle are -characteristic of most, perhaps all, organisms. The complete life-cycle -consists of three phases or periods, namely: an adolescent period of -high vitality, a mature period of balanced metabolism, and a senescent -period of decline. Each life-cycle begins with the germination of the -new organism and terminates with its death, and it is reproduction -which constitutes the connecting link between one life-cycle and -another. - -Reproduction, as previously intimated, is mainly of two kinds, namely: -somatogenic reproduction, which is less general and confined to the -metists, and cytogenic reproduction, which is common to metists and -protists, and which is the ordinary method by which new organisms -originate. Reproduction is termed somatogenic, when the germ separated -from the body of the parent consists of a whole mass of somatic or -tissue cells not expressly set aside and specialized for reproductive -purposes. Reproduction is termed cytogenic, when the germ separated -from the parent or parents consists of a single cell (_e.g._ a spore, -gamete, or zygote) dedicated especially to reproductive purposes. - -Cytogenic reproduction may be either nonsexual (agamic) or sexual, -according as the cell which constitutes the germ is an agamete or -a gamete. An agamete is a germ cell not specialized for union with -another complementary cell, or, in other words, it is a reproductive -cell incapable of syngamy, _e.g._ a spore. A gamete, on the other hand, -is a reproductive cell (germ cell) specialized for the production of a -zygote (a synthetic or diploid germ cell) by union with a complementary -cell, _e.g._ an egg, or a sperm. - -Nonsexual cytogenic reproduction is of three kinds, according to the -nature of the agamete. When a unicellular organism gives rise to two -new individuals by simple cell-division, we have fissiparation or -binary fission. When a small cell or bud is formed and separated by -division from a larger parent cell, we have budding (gemmation) or -unequal fission. When the nucleus of the parent cell divides many -times to form a number of daughter-nuclei, which then partition the -cytoplasm of the parent cell among themselves so as to form a large -number of reproductive cells called spores, we have what is known -as sporulation or multiple fission. The first and second kind of -nonsexual reproduction are confined to the protists, but the third -kind (sporulation) also occurs among the metists. - -Sexual cytogenic reproduction is based upon gametes or mating germ -cells. Since complementary gametes are specialized for union with each -other to form a single synthetic cell, the zygote, the number of their -nuclear threads or chromosomes is reduced to one half (the _haploid -number_) at the time of maturation, so that the somatic or tissue cells -of the parent organism have double the number (the _diploid number_) -of chromosomes present in the reduced or mature gametes. Hence, when -the gametes unite to form a zygote, summation is prevented and the -diploid number of chromosomes characteristic of the given species of -plant or animal is simply restored by the process of syngamy or union. -The process by which the number of chromosomes is reduced in gametes is -called _meiosis_, and, among the metists, it is distinct from syngamy, -which, in their case, is a separate process called fertilization. Among -the protists, we have, besides fertilization, another type of syngamy -called conjugation, which combines meiosis with fertilization. - -In sexual reproduction, we have three kinds of gametes, namely: -isogametes, anisogametes, and heterogametes. In the type of sexual -reproduction known as isogamy, the complementary gametes are exactly -alike both in size and shape. There is no division of labor between -them. Each of the fusing gametes is equally fitted for the double -function which they must perform, namely, the kinetic function, which -enables them to reach each other and unite by means of movement, -and the trophic function which consists in laying up a store of -food for the sustenance of the developing embryo. In anisogamy, the -complementary gametes are alike in shape, but unlike in size, and -here we have the beginning of that division of labor, upon which the -difference of gender or sex is based. The larger or female gamete is -called a macrogamete. It is specialized for the trophic rather than -the kinetic function, being rendered more inert by having a large -amount of yolk or nutrient material stored up within it. The smaller -or male gamete is called a microgamete. It is specialized for the -kinetic function, since it contains less yolk and is the more agile of -the two. In anisogamy, however, the division of labor is not complete, -because both functions are still retained by either gamete, albeit -in differing measure. In the heterogamy, the differentiation between -the male and female gametes is complete, and they differ from each -other in structure as well as size. The larger or female gamete has -no motor apparatus and retains only the trophic function. The kinetic -function is sacrificed to the task of storing up a food supply for the -embryo. Such a gamete is called a hypergamete or egg. The smaller or -male gamete is known, in this case, as a hypogamete or sperm. It has a -motor apparatus, but no stored-up nutrients, and has even sloughed off -most of its cytoplasm, in its exclusive specialization for the motor -function. In heterogamy, accordingly, the division of labor is complete. - -We may distinguish two principal kinds of sexual reproduction, namely: -unisexual reproduction and bisexual reproduction. When a single gamete -such as an unfertilized egg gives rise (with, or without, chromosomal -reduction) to a new organism, we have unisexual reproduction or -parthenogenesis. Parthenogenesis from a reduced egg gives rise to an -organism having only the haploid number of chromosomes, as is the case -with the drone or male bee, but unreduced eggs give rise to organisms -having the diploid number of chromosomes. Parthenogenesis, as we shall -see presently, can, in some cases, be induced by artificial means. -When reproduction takes place from a zygote or diploid germ cell -formed by the union of two gametes, we have what is known as bisexual -reproduction or syngamy. It is, perhaps, permissible to distinguish a -third or intermediate kind of sexual reproduction, for which we might -coin the term autosexual. What we refer to as autosexual reproduction -is usually known as autogamy, and occurs when a diploid nucleus is -formed in a germ cell by the union (or, we might say, reunion) of -two daughter-nuclei derived from the same mother-nucleus. Autogamy -occurs not only among the protists (_e. g._ _Amœba albida_), but also -among the metists, as is the case with the brine shrimp, _Artemia -salina_, in which the diploid number of chromosomes is restored -after reduction by a reunion of the nucleus of the second polar body -with the reduced nucleus of the egg. Autogamy is somewhat akin to -kleistogamy, which occurs among hermaphroditic metists of both the -plant and animal kingdoms. The violet is a well-known example. In -kleistogamy or self-fertilization, the zygote is formed by the union of -two gametes derived from the same parent organism. Strictly speaking, -however, kleistogamy is not autogamy, but syngamy, and must, therefore, -be classed as bisexual reproduction. It is, of course, necessarily -confined to hermaphrodites. - -Loeb’s experiments in artificial parthenogenesis have been -sensationally misinterpreted by some as an artificial production of -life. What Jacques Loeb really did was to initiate development in an -unfertilized egg by the use of chemical and physical excitants. The -writer has repeated these experiments with the unfertilized eggs of the -common sea urchin, _Arbacia punctulata_, using very dilute butyric acid -and hypertonic sea water as stimulants. Cleavage had started within an -hour and a half after the completion of the aforesaid treatment, and -the eggs were in the gastrula stage by the following morning (9 hours -later). In three days, good specimens of the larval stage known as the -pluteus could be found swimming in the normal sea water to which the -eggs had been transferred from the hypertonic solution. Since mature -sea urchin eggs undergo reduction before insemination takes place, -the larval sea urchins arising from these artificially activated -eggs had the reduced or haploid number of chromosomes instead of the -diploid number possessed by normal larvæ arising from eggs activated -by the sperm. For, in fertilization, the sperm not only activates the -egg, but is also the means of securing biparental inheritance, by -contributing its quota of chromosomes to the zygotic complex. Hence, -it is only in the former function, _i. e._ of initiating cleavage in -the egg, that a chemical excitant can replace the sperm. In any case, -it is evident that these experiments do not constitute an exception -to the law of genetic cellular continuity. The artificially activated -egg comes from the ovaries of a living female sea urchin, and in this -there is small consolation for the exponent of abiogenesis. The terse -comment of an old Irish Jesuit sizes up the situation very aptly: “The -Blue Flame Factory,” he said, “has announced another discovery of the -secret of life. A scientist made an egg and hatched an egg. The only -unfortunate thing was that the egg he hatched was not the egg he made.” -How an experiment of this sort could be interpreted as an artificial -production of life is a mystery. The only plausible explanation is that -given by Professor Wilson, who traces it to the popular superstition -that the egg is a lifeless substrate, which is animated by the sperm. -The idea owes its origin to the spermists of the 17th century, who -defended this doctrine against the older school of preformationists -known as ovists. It is now, however, an embryological commonplace that -egg and sperm are both equally cellular, equally protoplasmic, and -equally vital. - -The phenomena of the life-cycle in organisms find their explanation in -what, perhaps, is inherent in all living matter, namely, a tendency to -involution and senescence. This tendency, in the absence of a remedial -process of rejuvenation, leads inevitably to death. Living matter seems -to “run down” like a clock, and to stand in similar need of a periodic -“rewinding.” This reinvigoration of protoplasm is accomplished by means -of several different types of nuclear reorganization. Since no nuclear -reorganization occurs in somatogenic reproduction, there seem to be -limits to this type of propagation. Plants, like the potato and the -apple, cannot be propagated indefinitely by means of tubers, shoots, -stems, etc. The stock plays out in time, and, ever and anon, recourse -must be had to seedlings. Hence a process of nuclear reorganization -seems, in most cases, at least, to be essential for the restoration of -vitality and the continuance of life. Whether this need of periodic -renewal is absolutely universal, we cannot say. The banana has been -propagated for over a century by the somatogenic method, and there -are a few other instances in which there appears to be no limit to -this type of reproduction. Nevertheless, the tendency to decline is -so common among living beings that the rare exceptions serve only to -confirm (if they do not follow) the general rule. - -In cytogenic reproduction three kinds of rejuvenation by means of -nuclear reorganization are known: (1) amphimixis or syngamy; (2) -automixis or autogamy; (3) endomixis. In amphimixis or syngamy, two -gametic (haploid) nuclei of different parental lineage are commingled -to form the diploid nucleus of the zygote, which is consequently of -biparental origin. In automixis or autogamy, two reduced or haploid -nuclei of the same parental lineage unite to form a diploid nucleus, -the uniting nuclei being daughter-nuclei derived from a common parent -nucleus. In endomixis, the nucleus of the exhausted cell disintegrates -and fuses with the cytoplasm, out of which it is reformed or -reconstructed as the germinal nucleus of a rejuvenated cellular series. -Endomixis occurs as a periodic phenomenon among the protists, and it -appears to be homologous with parthenogenesis among metists. In certain -ciliates, like the Paramœcium, endomixis and syngamy are facultative -methods of rejuvenation. This has been proved most conclusively -by Professor Calkins’ work on _Uroleptus mobilis_, an organism in -which both endomixis and conjugation are amenable to experimental -control. Nonsexual reproduction in this protozoan (by binary fission) -is attended with a gradual weakening of metabolic activity, which -increases with each successive generation. The initial rate of division -and metabolic energy can, however, be restored either by conjugation -(of two individuals), or by endomixis, which takes place (in a single -individual) during encystment. The race, however, inevitably dies -out, if both encystment and conjugation are prevented. Even in such -protists as do not exhibit the phenomenon of nuclear reorganization -through sexual reproduction, Kofoid points to the phenomenon of -alternating periods of rest and rapid cell-division as evidence that -some process of periodically-recurrent nuclear organization must exist -in the organisms, which do not conjugate. This process of nuclear -reorganization manifested by periodic spurts of renewed divisional -energy is, according to Kofoid, a more primitive mode of rejuvenation -than endomixis. “The phenomenon of endomixis,” he says, “appears to be -somewhat more like that of parthenogenesis than a more primitive form -of nuclear reorganization.” (_Science_, April 6, 1923, p. 403.) At all -events, it seems safe to conclude that the tendency to senescence is -pretty general among living organisms, and that this tendency, unless -counteracted by a periodic reorganization of the nuclear genes, results -inevitably in the deterioration and final extinction of the race. - -In this inexhaustible power of self-renewal inherent in all forms -of organic life, the mechanist and the upholder of abiogenesis -encounter an insuperable difficulty. In inorganic nature, where the -perpetual-motion device is a chimera, and the law of entropy reigns -in unchallenged supremacy, nothing analogous to it can be found. The -activity of all non-living units of nature, from the hydrogen atom -to the protein multimolecule, is rigidly determined by the principle -of the degradation of energy. The inorganic unit cannot operate -otherwise than by externalizing and dissipating irreparably its own -energy-content. Nor is its reconstruction and replenishment with energy -ever again possible except through the wasteful expenditure of energy -borrowed from some more richly endowed inorganic unit. In order to pay -Paul a little, Peter must be robbed of much. Wheresoever atoms are -built up into complex endothermic molecules, the constructive process -is rigidly dependent upon the administration thereto of external -energy, which in the process of absorption must of necessity fall from -a higher level of intensity. And when the energy thus absorbed by the -complex molecule is again set free by combustion, it is degraded to a -still lower potential, from which, without external intervention, it -can never rise again to its former plane of intensity. The phenomena -of radioactivity tell the same tale. All the heavier atoms, at least, -are constantly disintegrating with a concomitant discharge of energy. -There is no compensating process, however, enabling such an atom to -re-integrate and recharge itself at stated intervals; and, once it -has broken down into its component protons and electrons, “not all -the king’s horses nor all the king’s men can ever put Humpty-Dumpty -together again.” In a word, none of the inorganic units of the mineral -world exhibits that wonderful power of autonomous recuperation which -a unicellular ciliate manifests when it rejuvenates itself by means -of endomixis. The inorganic world knows of no constructive process -comparable to this. It is only in living beings that we find what -James Ward describes as the “tendency to disturb existing equilibria, -to reverse the dissipative processes which prevail throughout the -inanimate world, to store and build up where they are ever scattering -and pulling down, the tendency to conserve individual existence against -antagonistic forces, to grow and to progress, not inertly taking the -easier way but seemingly striving for the best, retaining every vantage -secured, and working for new ones.” (“On the Conservation of Energy,” -I, p. 285.) - -Summing up, then, we have seen that the reproductive process, whereby -the metists or multicellular organism originate, resolves itself -ultimately into a process of cell-division. The same is true of the -protists or unicellular organisms. For all cells, whether they be -protists, germ cells, or somatic cells, originate in but one way, and -that is, from a preëxistent living cell by means of cell-division. -Neither experimentation nor observation has succeeded in revealing so -much as a single exception to the universal law of genetic cellular -continuity, and the hypothesis of spontogenesis is outlawed, in -consequence, by the logic of scientific induction. Even the hope that -future research may bring about an amelioration of its present status -is entirely unwarranted in view of the manifest dynamic superiority -of the living organism as compared with any of the inert units of the -inorganic world. “Whatever position we take on this question,” says -Edmund B. Wilson, in the conclusion of his work on the Cell, “the same -difficulty is encountered; namely, the origin of that coördinated -fitness, that power of active adjustment between internal and external -relations, which, as so many eminent biological thinkers have insisted, -overshadows every manifestation of life. The nature and origin of this -power is the fundamental problem of biology. When, after removing -the lens of the eye in the larval salamander, we see it restored in -perfect and typical form by regeneration from the posterior layer of -the iris, we behold an adaptive response to changed conditions of which -the organism can have no antecedent experience either ontogenetic or -phylogenetic, and one of so marvelous a character that we are made -to realize, as by a flash how far we still are from a solution of -this problem.” Then, after discussing the attempt of evolutionists to -bridge the enormous gap that separates living, from lifeless nature, -he continues: “But when all these admissions are made, and when the -conserving action (_sic_) of natural selection is in the fullest degree -recognized, we cannot close our eyes to two facts: first, that we are -utterly ignorant of the manner in which the idioplasm of the germ cell -can so respond to the influence of the environment as to call forth -an adaptive variation; and second, that the study of the cell has on -the whole seemed to widen rather than to narrow the enormous gap that -separates even the lowest forms of life from the inorganic world.” -(“The Cell,” 2nd edit., pp. 433, 434.) - - - § 5. A “New” Theory of Abiogenesis - -Since true science is out of sympathy with baseless conjectures and -gratuitous assumptions, one would scarcely expect to find scientists -opposing the inductive trend of the known facts by preferring mere -possibilities (if they are even such) to solid actualities. As a matter -of fact, however, there are not a few who obstinately refuse to abandon -preconceptions for which they can find no factual justification. The -bio-chemist, Benjamin Moore, while conceding the bankruptcy of the -old theory of spontaneous generation, which looked for a _de novo_ -origin of living cells in sterilized cultures, has, nevertheless, -the hardihood to propose what he is pleased to term a _new_ one. -Impressed by the credulity of Charlton Bastian and the autocratic tone -of Schäfer, he sets out to defend as plausible the hypothesis that -the origination of life from inert matter may be a contemporaneous, -perhaps, daily, phenomenon, going on continually, but invisible to us, -because its initial stages take place in the submicroscopic world. -By the time life has emerged into the visible world, it has already -reached the stage at which the law of genetic continuity prevails, -but at stages of organization, which lie below the limit of the -microscope, it is not impossible, he thinks, that abiogenesis may -occur. To plausibleize this conjecture, he notes that the cell is a -natural unit composed of molecules as a molecule is a natural unit -composed of atoms. He further notes, that, in addition to the cell, -there is in nature another unit higher than the monomolecule, namely, -the _multimolecule_ occurring in both crystalloids and colloids. -The monomolecule consists of atoms held together by atomic valence, -whereas the multimolecule consists of molecules whose atomic valence -is completely saturated, and which are, consequently, held together by -what is now known as _molecular_ or _residual valence_. Moore cites -the crystal units of sodium bromide and sodium iodide as instances of -multimolecules. The crystal unit of ordinary salt, sodium chloride, is -an ordinary monomolecule, with the formula NaCl. In the case of the -former salts the crystal units consist of multimolecules of the formula -NaB·(H₂O)₂ and NaI·(H₂O)₂, the water of crystallization not being -mechanically confined in the crystals, but combined with the respective -salt in the exact ratio of two molecules of water to one of the salt. -Judged by all chemical tests, such as heat of formation, the law of -combination in fixed ratios, the manifestation of selective affinity, -etc., the multimolecule is quite as much entitled to be considered a -natural unit as is the monomolecule. - -But it is not in the crystalloidal multimolecule, but in the larger -and more complex multimolecule of colloids (viscid substances like -gum arabic, gelatine, agar-agar, white of egg, etc.), that Moore -professes to see a sort of intermediate between the cell and inorganic -units. Such colloids form with a dispersing medium (like water) an -emulsion, in which the dispersed particles, known as ultramicrons or -“solution aggregates,” are larger than monomolecules. It is among -these multimolecules of colloids that Moore would have us search for -a transitional link connecting the cell with the inorganic world. -Borrowing Herbert Spencer’s dogma of the complication of homogeneity -into heterogeneity, he asserts that such colloidal multimolecules -would tend to become more and more complex, and consequently more and -more instable, so that their instability would gradually approach the -chronic instability or constant state of metabolic fluxion manifest in -living organisms. The end-result would be a living unit more simply -organized than the cell, and evolution seizing upon this submicroscopic -unit would, in due time, transform it into cellular life of every -variety and kind. _Ce n’est que le premier pas qui coûte!_ - -It should be noted that this so-called law is a mere vague formula -like the “law” of natural selection and the “law” of evolution. The -facts which it is alleged to express are not cited, and its terms -are far from being quantitative. It is certainly not a law in the -sense of Arrhénius, who says: “Quantitative formulation, that is, -the establishing of a connection, expressed by a formula, between -different quantitatively measurable magnitudes, is the peculiar feature -of a law.” (“Theories of Chemistry,” Price’s translation, p. 3.) Now, -chemistry, as an exact science, has no lack of laws of this kind, but -no branch of chemistry, whether physical, organic, or inorganic, knows -of any _law of complexity_, that can be stated in either quantitative, -or descriptive, terms. We will, however, let Moore speak for himself: - -“It may then be summed up as a general law universal in its application -to all matter, ... a law which might be called the Law of Complexity, -that matter so far as its energy environment will permit tends to -assume more and more complex forms in labile equilibrium. Atoms, -molecules, colloids, and living organisms, arise as a result of the -operations of this law, and in the higher regions of complexity it -induces organic evolution and all the many thousands of living forms.... - -“In this manner we can conceive that the hiatus between non-living and -living things can be bridged over, and there awakens in our minds the -conception of a kind of spontaneous production of life of a different -order from the old. The territory of this spontaneous generation of -life lies not at the level of bacteria, or animalculæ, springing forth -into life from dead organic matter, but at a level of life lying deeper -than anything the microscope can reveal, and possessing a lower unit -than the living cell, as we form our concept of it from the tissues of -higher animals and plants. - -“In the future, the stage at which colloids begin to be able to -deal with external energy forms, such as light, and build up in -chemical complexity, will yield a new unit of life opening a vista of -possibilities as magnificent as that which the establishment of the -cell as a unit gave, with the development of the microscope, about a -century ago.” (“Origin and Nature of Life,” pp. 188-190.) - -Having heard out a rhapsody of this sort, one may be pardoned a little -impatience at such a travesty on science. Again we have the appeal from -realities to fancies, from the seen to unseen. Moore sees no reason -to doubt and is therefore quite sure that an unverified occurrence -is taking place “at a level of life lying deeper than anything the -microscope can reveal.” The unknown is a veritable paradise for -irresponsible speculation and phantasy. It is well, however, to keep -one’s feet on the _terra firma_ of ascertained facts and to make one’s -ignorance a motive for caution rather than an incentive to reckless -dogmatizing. - -To begin with, it is not to a single dispersed particle or ultramicron -that protoplasm has been likened, but to an emulsion, comprising both -the dispersed particles and the dispersing medium, or, in other words, -to the colloidal system as a whole. Moreover, even there the analogy -is far from being perfect, and is confined exclusively, as Wilson has -pointed out, to a rough similarity of structure and appearance. The -colloidal system is obviously a mere _aggregate_ and not a _natural -unit_ like the cell, and its dispersed particles (ultramicrons) do -not multiply and perpetuate themselves by growth and division as do -the living components or formed bodies of the cell. As for the single -ultramicron or multimolecule of a colloidal solution, it may, indeed, -be a natural unit, but it only resembles the cell in the sense that, -like the latter, it is a complex of constituent molecules. Here, -however, all resemblance ceases; for the ultramicron does not display -the typically vital power of self-perpetuation by growth and division, -which, as we have seen, is characteristic not only of the cell as a -whole, but of its single components or organelles. Certainly, the -distinctive phenomena of colloidal systems cannot be interpreted as -processes of multiplication. There is nothing suggestive of this vital -phenomenon in the reversal of phase, which is caused by the addition -of electrolytes to oil emulsions, or in gelation, which is caused by -a change of temperature in certain hydrophilic colloids. Thus the -addition of the salt of a bivalent cation (_e.g._ CaCl₂ or BaCl₂) -to an oil-in-water emulsion (if soap is used as the emulsifier) will -cause the external or continuous phase (water) to become the internal -or discontinuous phase. Vice versa, a water-in-oil emulsion can be -reversed into an oil-in-water emulsion, under the same conditions, -by the addition of the salt of a monovalent cation (_e. g._ NaOH). -Solutions of hydrophilic colloids, like gelatine or agar-agar, can -be made to “set” from the semifluid state of a hydrosol into the -semisolid state of a hydrogel, by lowering the temperature, after -which the opposite effect can be brought about by again raising the -temperature. In white of egg, however, once gelation has taken place, -through the agency of heat, it is impossible to reconvert the “gel” -into a “sol” (solution). In such phenomena, it is, perhaps, possible -to see a certain parallelism with some processes taking place in the -cell, _e. g._ the osmotic processes of absorption and excretion, but to -construe them as evidence of propagation by growth and division would -be preposterous. - -Nor is the subterfuge of relegating the question to the obscurity -of the submicroscopic world of any avail; for, as a matter of -fact, submicroscopic organisms actually do exist, and manage, -precisely by virtue of this uniquely vital power of multiplication -or reproductivity, to give indirect testimony of their invisible -existence. The microörganisms, for example, which cause the disease -known as Measles are so minute that they pass through the pores -of a porcelain filter, and are invisible to the highest powers of -the microscope. Nevertheless, they can be bred in the test tube -cultures of the bacteriologist, where they propagate themselves for -generations without losing the definite specificity, which make -them capable of producing distinctive pathological effects in the -organisms of higher animals, including man. Each of these invisible -disease germs communicates but one disease, with symptoms that are -perfectly characteristic and definite. Moreover, they are specific in -their choice of a host, and will not infect any and every organism -promiscuously. Finally, they never arise _de novo_ in a healthy -host, but must always be transmitted from a diseased to a healthy -individual. The microscopist is tantalized, to quote the words of -Wilson, “with visions of disease germs which no eye has yet seen, -so minute as to pass through a fine filter, yet beyond a doubt -self-perpetuating and of specific type.” (_Science_, March 9, 1923, -p. 283.) Submicroscopic dimensions, therefore, are no obstacle to -the manifestation of such vital properties as reproduction, genetic -continuity, and typical specificity; and we must conclude that, if -any of the ultramicrons of colloids possessed them, their minute size -would not debar them from manifesting the fact. As it is, they fail to -show any vital quality, whereas the submicroscopic disease germs give -evidence of possessing all the characteristics of visible cells. - -In fine, the radical difference between inorganic units, like atoms, -molecules, and multimolecules, and living units, like protozoans and -metazoans, is so obvious that it is universally admitted. Not all, -however, are in accord when it comes to assigning the fundamental -reason for the difference in question. Benjamin Moore postulates a -unique physical energy, peculiar to living organisms and responsible -for all distinctively vital manifestations. This unique form of energy, -unlike all other forms, he calls “biotic energy,” denying at the same -time that it is a vital force. (Cf. _op. cit._, pp. 224-226.) Moore -seems to be desirous of dressing up vitalism in the verbal vesture of -mechanism. He wants the game, without the name. But, if his “biotic -energy” is unlike all other forms of energy, it ought not to parade -under the same name, but should frankly call itself a “vital force.” -Somewhat similar in nature is Osborn’s suggestion that the peculiar -properties of living protoplasm may be due to the presence of a -unique chemical element called Bion. (Cf. “The Origin and Evolution -of Life,” 1917, p. 6.) Now, a chemical element unlike other chemical -elements is not a chemical element at all. Osborn’s Bion, like Moore’s -biotic energy, ought, by all means, to make up its mind definitely on -Hamlet’s question of “to be, or not to be.” The policy of “It is, and -it is not,” is not likely to win the approval of either mechanists or -vitalists. - - - § 6. Hylomorphism versus Mechanism and Neo-vitalism - -Mechanism and Neo-vitalism represent two extreme solutions of this -problem of accounting for the difference between living and lifeless -matter. Strictly speaking, it is an abuse of language to refer to -mechanism as a solution at all. Its first pretense at solving the -problem is to deny that there is any problem. But facts are facts and -cannot be disposed of in this summary fashion. Forced, therefore, to -face the actual fact of the uniqueness of living matter, mechanists -concede the inadequacy of their physicochemical analogies, but -obstinately refuse to admit the legitimacy of any other kind of -explanation. Confronted with realities, which simply must have _some_ -explanation, they prefer to leave them unexplained by their own theory -than have them explained by any other. They recognize the difference -between a living animal and a dead animal (small credit to them for -their perspicacity!), but deny that there is anything present in the -former which is not present in the latter. - -Neo-vitalism, on the other hand, is, at least, an attempt at solving -the problem in the positive sense. It ascribes the unique activities of -living organisms to the operation of a superphysical and superchemical -energy or force resident in living matter. This unique dynamic -principle is termed _vital force_. It is not an entitive nor a static -principle, but belongs to the category of efficient or active causes, -being variously described as an agent, energy, or force. To speak -precisely, the term agent denotes an active being or substance; the -term energy denotes the proximate ground in the agent of a specific -activity; while the term force denotes the activity or free, kinetic, -or activated phase of a given energy. In practice, however, these -terms are often used interchangeably. Thus Driesch, who, like all -other Neo-vitalists, makes the vital principle a dynamic factor -rather than an entitive principle, refers to the vital principle as a -“non-material,” “non-spatial” _agent_, though the term _energy_ would -be more precise. To this active or dynamic vital principle Driesch -gives a name, which he borrowed from Aristotle, that is, _entelechy_. -In so doing, however, he perverted, as he himself confesses, the true -Aristotelian sense of the term in question: “The term,” he says, -“... is not here used in the proper Aristotelian sense.” (“History and -Theory of Vitalism,” p. 203.) His admission is quite correct. At the -critical point, Driesch, for all his praise of Aristotle, deserts -the Stagirite and goes over to the camp of Plato, Descartes, and the -Neo-vitalists! - -Driesch’s definition is as follows: “Entelechy is an agent _sui -generis_, non-material and non-spatial, but acting ‘into’ space.” -(_Op. cit._, p. 204.) Aristotle’s use of the term in this connection -is quite different. He uses it, for example, in a static, rather than -a dynamic, sense: “The term ‘entelechy,’” he says, “is used in two -senses; in one it answers to knowledge, in the other to the exercise of -knowledge. Clearly in this case it is analogous to knowledge.” (“Peri -Psyches,” Bk. II, c. 1.) Knowledge, however, is only a _second_ or -static _entelechy_. Hence, in order to narrow the sense still further -Aristotle refers to the _soul_ as a _first_ entelechy, by which he -designates a purely _entitive_ principle, that is, a constituent of -being or substance (cf. _op. cit._ _ibidem_). The _first_, or entitive, -entelechy, therefore, is to be distinguished from all secondary -entelechies, whether of the _dynamic_ order corresponding to kinetic -energy or force, or of the _static_ order corresponding to potential -energy. Neither is it an _agent_, because it is only a partial -constituent of the total agent, that is, of the total active being or -substance. Hence, generally speaking, _that which acts_ (the agent) -is not entelechy, but the total composite of entelechy and matter, -_first entelechy_ being consubstantial with matter and not a separate -existent or being. In fine, according to Aristotelian philosophy, -entelechy (that is, “first” or “prime” entelechy) is not an agent nor -an energy nor a force. In other words, it is totally removed from the -category of efficient or active causes. The second difference between -Driesch and Aristotle with respect to the use of the term entelechy -lies in the fact that Driesch uses it as a synonym for the soul or -vital principle, whereas, according to Aristotle, _entelechy is common -to the non-living units of inorganic nature as well as the living -units_ (organisms) _of the organic world_. All vital principles or -souls are entelechies, but not all entelechies are vital principles. -All material beings or substances, whether living or lifeless, are -reducible, in the last analysis, to two consubstantial principles or -complementary constituents, namely, entelechy and matter. Entelechy -is the binding, type-determining principle, the source of unification -and specification, which makes of a given natural unit (such as a -molecule or a protozoan) a single and determinate whole. Matter is -the determinable and potentially-multiple element, the principle of -divisibility and quantification, which can enter indifferently into the -composition of this or that natural unit, and which owes its actual -unity and specificity to the entelechy which here and now informs -it. It is entelechy which makes a chemical element distinct from its -isobare, a chemical compound distinct from its isomer, a paramœcium -distinct from an amœba, a maple distinct from an oak, and a bear -distinct from a tiger. - -The molecular entelechy finds expression in what the organic chemist -and the stereochemist understand by valence, that is, the static aspect -of valence considered as the structural principle of a molecule. -Hence it is entelechy which makes a molecule of urea [O:C:(NH₂)₂] -an entirely different substance from its isomer ammonium cyanate -[NH₄·O·C:N], although the material substrate of each of these molecular -units consists of precisely the same number and kinds of atoms. -Similarly, it is the atomic entelechy which gives to the isotopes of -Strontium chemical properties different from those of the isotopes of -Rubidium, although the mass and corpuscular (electronic and protonic) -composition of their respective atoms are identical. It is the vital -entelechy or soul, which causes a fragment cut from a Stentor to -regenerate its specific protoplasmic architecture instead of the type -which would be regenerated from a similar fragment cut from another -ciliate such as Dileptus. - -In all the tridimensional units of nature, both living and non-living, -the hylomorphic analysis of Aristotle recognizes an essential dualism -of matter and entelechy. Hence it is not in the presence and absence -of an entelechy (as Driesch contends) that living organisms differ -from inorganic units. The sole difference between these two classes of -units is one of autonomy and inertia. The inorganic unit is inert, not -in the sense that it is destitute of energy, but in the sense that it -is incapable of self-regulation and rigidly dependent upon external -factors for the utilization of its own energy-content. The living -unit, on the other hand, is endowed with dynamic autonomy. Though -dependent, in a general way, upon environmental factors for the energy -which it utilizes, nevertheless the determinate form and direction of -its activity is not imposed in all its specificity by the aforesaid -environmental factors. The living being possesses a certain degree of -independence with respect to these external forces. It is autonomous -with a special law of immanent finality or reflexive orientation, by -which all the elements and energies of the living unit are made to -converge upon one and the same central result, namely, the maintenance -and development of the organism both in its capacity as an individual -and in its capacity as the generative source of its racial type. - -The entelechies of the inert units of inorganic nature turn the -forces of these units in an _outward direction_, so that they are -incapable of operating upon themselves, of modifying themselves, or -of regulating themselves. They are only capable of operating upon -other units outside themselves, and in so doing they irreparably -externalize their energy-contents. All physicochemical action is -_transitive_ or _communicable_ in character, whereas vital action -is of the _reflexive_ or _immanent_ type. Mechanical action, for -example, is intermolar (_i.e._ an exchange between large masses of -inorganic matter); physical action is intermolecular; chemical action -is interatomic; while in radioactive and electrical phenomena we have -intercorpuscular action. Hence all the forms of activity native to the -inorganic world are reducible to _interaction_ between discontinuous -and unequally energized masses or particles. Always it is a case of -one mass or particle operating upon another mass or particle distinct -from, and spatially external to, itself. The effect or positive change -produced by the action is received into another unit distinct from the -agent or active unit, which can never become the receptive subject of -the effect generated by its own activity. The living being, on the -contrary, is capable of operating upon itself, so that what is modified -by the action is not outside the agent but within it. The reader does -not modify the book, but modifies himself by his reading. The blade -of grass can nourish not only a horse, but its very self, whereas a -molecule of sodium nitrate is impotent to nourish itself, and can -only nourish a subject other than itself, such as the blade of grass. -Here the active source and receptive subject of the action is one and -the same unit, namely, the living organism, which can operate upon -itself in the interest of its own perfection. In chemical synthesis -two substances interact to produce a third, but in vital assimilation -one substance is incorporated into another without the production of -a third. Thus hydrogen unites with oxygen to produce water. But in -the case of assimilation the reaction may be expressed thus: Living -protoplasm plus external nutriment equals living protoplasm increased -in quantity but unchanged in specificity. Addition or subtraction -alters the nature of the inorganic unit, but does not change the nature -of the living unit. In chemical change, entelechy is the variant and -matter is the constant, but in metabolic change, matter is the variant -and entelechy the constant. “Living beings,” says Henderson, “preserve, -or tend to preserve, an ideal form, while through them flows a steady -stream of energy and matter which is ever changing, yet momentarily -molded by life; organized, in short.” (“Fitness of the Environment,” -1913, pp. 23, 24.) The living unit maintains its own specific type -amid a constant flux of matter and flow of energy. It subjugates the -alien substances of the inorganic world, eliminates their mineral -entelechies and utilizes their components and energies for its own -purposes. The soul or vital entelechy, therefore, is more powerful than -the entelechies of inorganic units which it supplants. It turns the -forces of living matter _inward_, so that the living organism becomes -capable of _self-regulation_ and of striving for the attainment of -self-perfection. It is this _reflexive orientation_ of all energies -towards self-perfection that is the unique characteristic of the living -being, and not the nature of the energies themselves. The energies by -which vital functions are executed are the ordinary physicochemical -energies, but it is the vital entelechy or soul which elevates them -to a higher plane of efficiency and renders them capable of reflexive -or vital action. There is, in short, no such thing as a special vital -force. The radical difference between living and non-living units does -not consist in the possession or non-possession of an entelechy, nor -yet in the peculiar nature of the forces displayed in the execution of -vital functions, but solely in the orientation of these forces towards -an inner finality. - - - § 7. The Definition of Life - -Life, then, may be defined as the capacity of reflexive or -self-perfective action. In any action, we may distinguish four things: -(1) the agent, or source of the action; (2) the activity or internal -determination differentiating the agent in the active state from the -selfsame agent in the inactive state; (3) the patient or receptive -subject; (4) the effect or change produced in the patient by the -agent. Let us suppose that a boy named Tom kicks a door. Here Tom is -the agent, the muscular contraction in his leg is the activity, the -door is the patient or recipient, while the dent produced in the door -is the effect or change of which the action is a production. In this -action, the effect is produced not in the cause or agent, but in a -patient outside of, and distinct from, the agent, and the otherness of -cause and effect is consequently complete. Such an action is termed -transitive, which is the characteristic type of physicochemical action. -In another class of actions, however, (those, namely, that are peculiar -to living beings) the otherness of cause and effect is only partial -and relative. When the agent becomes ultimately the recipient of the -effect or modification wrought by its own activity, that is, when -the positive change produced by the action remains within the agent -itself, the action is called immanent or reflexive action. Since, -however, action and passion are opposites, they can coëxist in the same -subject only upon condition that said subject is differentiated into -partial otherness, that is, organized into a plurality of distinct and -dissimilar parts or components, one of which may act upon another. -Hence only the organized unit or organism, which combines unity or -continuity of substance with multiplicity and dissimilarity of parts -is capable of immanent action. The inorganic unit is capable only of -transitive action, whose effect is produced in an exterior subject -really distinct from the agent. The living unit or organism, however, -is capable of both transitive action and immanent (reflexive) action. -In such functions as thought and sensation, the living agent modifies -itself and not an exterior patient. In the nutritive or metabolic -function the living being perfects itself by assimilating external -substances to itself. It develops, organizes, repairs, and multiplies -itself, holding its own and perpetuating its type from generation to -generation. - -Life, accordingly, is the capacity of tending through any form of -reflexive action to an ulterior perfection of the agent itself. -This capacity of an agent to operate of, and upon, itself for the -acquisition of some perfection exceeding its natural equilibrial state -is the distinctive attribute of the living being. Left to itself, the -inorganic unit tends exclusively to conservation or to loss, never -to positive acquisition in excess of equilibrial exigencies; what -it acquires it owes exclusively to the action of external factors. -The living unit, on the contrary, strives in its vital operations to -acquire something for itself, so that what it gets it owes to itself -and not (except in a very general sense) to the action of external -factors. All the actions of the living unit, both upon itself and upon -external matter, result sooner or later in the acquisition on the part -of the agent of a positive perfection exceeding and transcending the -mere exigencies of equilibration. The inorganic agent, on the contrary, -when in the state of tension, tends only to return to the equilibrial -state by alienation or expenditure of its energy; otherwise, it -tends merely to conserve, by virtue of inertia, the state of rest or -motion impressed upon it from without. In the chemical changes of -inorganic units, the tendency to loss is even more in evidence. Such -changes disrupt the integrity of the inorganic unit and dissipate its -energy-content, and the unit cannot be reconstructed and recharged, -except at the expense of a more richly endowed inorganic unit. The -living organism, however, as we see in the case of the paramæcium -undergoing endomixis, is capable of counteracting exhaustion by -recharging itself. - -The difference between transitive and reflexive action is not an -accidental difference of _degree_, but an essential difference of -_kind_. In reflexive actions, the source of the action and the -recipient of the effect or modification produced by it are one and the -same substantial unit or being. In transitive actions, the receptive -subject of the positive change is an alien unit distinct from the -unit, which puts forth the action. Hence a reflexive action is not -an action which is _less_ transitive; it is an action which is _not -at all_ transitive, but intransitive. The difference, therefore, -between the living organism, which is capable of both reflexive and -transitive action, and the inorganic unit, which is only capable -of transitive action, is _radical_ and _essential_. This being the -case, an evolutionary transition from an inert multimolecule to a -reflexively-operating cell or cytode, becomes inconceivable. Evolution -might, at the very most, bring about intensifications and combinations -of the transitive agencies of the physicochemical world, but never -the _volte face_, which would be necessary to reverse the centrifugal -orientation of forces characteristic of the inorganic unit into the -centripetal orientation of forces which makes the living unit capable -of self-perfective action, self-regulation, and self-renewal. The idea, -therefore, of a spontaneous derivation of living units from lifeless -colloidal multimolecules must be rejected, not merely because it finds -no support in the facts of experience, but also because it is excluded -by aprioristic considerations. - - - § 8. An Inevitable Corollary - -But, if inorganic matter is impotent to vitalize itself by means of its -native physicochemical forces, the inevitable alternative is that the -initial production of organisms from inorganic matter was due to the -action of some supermaterial agency. Certain scientists, like Henderson -of Harvard, while admitting the incredibility of abiogenesis, prefer -to avoid open conflict with mechanism and materialism by declaring -their neutrality. “But while biophysicists like Professor Schäfer,” -says Henderson, “follow Spencer in assuming a gradual evolution of the -organic from the inorganic, biochemists are more than ever unable to -perceive how such a process is possible, and without taking any final -stand prefer to let the riddle rest.” (“Fitness of the Environment,” -p. 310, footnote.) Not to take a decisive stand on this question, -however, is tantamount to making a compromise with what is illogical -and unscientific; for both logic and the inductive trend of biological -facts are arrayed against the hypothesis of spontaneous generation. - -In the first place, it is manifest that organic life is neither -self-explanatory nor eternal. Hence it must have had its origin in the -action of some external agency. Life as it exists today depends upon -the precedence of numerous unbroken chains of consecutive cells that -extend backward into a remote past. It is, however, a logical necessity -to put an end to this retrogradation of the antecedents upon which the -actual existence of our present organisms depends. The infinite cannot -be spanned by finite steps; the periodic life-process could not be -relayed through an unlimited temporal distance; and a cellular series -which never started would never arrive. Moreover, we do not account for -the existence of life by extending the cellular series interminably -backward. Each cell in such a series is derived from a predecessor, -and, consequently, no cell in the series is self-explanatory. When it -comes to accounting for its own existence, each cell is a zero in the -way of explanation, and adding zeros together indefinitely will never -give us a positive total. Each cell refers us to its predecessor for -the explanation of why it exists, and none contains within itself the -sufficient explanation of its own existence. Hence increasing even to -infinity the number of these cells (which fail to explain themselves) -will give us nothing else but a zero in the way of explanation. If, -therefore, the primordial cause from which these cellular chains are -suspended is not the agency of the physicochemical forces of inorganic -nature, it follows that the first active cause of life must have been a -_supermaterial_ and _extramundane agency_, namely, the Living God and -Author of Life. - -As a matter of fact, no one denies that life has had a beginning on -our globe. The physicist teaches that a beginning of our entire solar -system is implied in the law of the degradation of energy, and various -attempts have been made to determine the time of this beginning. -The older calculations were based on the rate of solar radiation; -the more recent ones, however, are based on quantitative estimates -of the disintegration products of radioactive elements. Similarly, -the geologist and the astronomer propound theories of a gradual -constitution of the cosmic environment, which organic life requires -for its support, and all such theories imply a _de novo_ origin or -beginning of life in the universe. Thus the old _nebular hypothesis_ of -Laplace postulated a hot origin of our solar system incompatible with -the coëxistence of organic life, which, as the experiments of Pasteur -and others have shown, is destroyed, in all cases, at a temperature -just above 45° Centigrade (113° Fahrenheit). Even the enzymes or -organic catalysts, which are essential for bio-chemical processes, -are destroyed at a temperature between 60° and 70° Centigrade. This -excludes the possibility of the contemporaneousness of protoplasm -and inorganic matter, and points to a beginning of life in our solar -system. Moreover, independently of this theory, the geologist sees -in the primitive crystalline rocks (granites, diorites, basalts, -etc.) and in the extant magmas of volcanoes evidences of an azoic -age, during which temperatures incompatible with the survival of even -the blue-green algæ or the most resistent bacterial spores must have -prevailed over the surface of the globe. In fact, it is generally -recognized by geologists that the igneous or pyrogenic rocks, which -contain no fossils, preceded the sedimentary or fossiliferous rocks. -The new _planetesimal hypothesis_, it is true, is said to be compatible -with a cold origin of the universe. Nevertheless, this theory assumes -a very gradual condensation of our cosmos out of dispersed gases and -star dust, whereas life demands as the _sine qua non_ condition of its -existence a differentiated environment consisting of a lithosphere, a -hydrosphere, and an atmosphere. Hence, it is clear that life did not -originate until such an appropriate environment was an accomplished -fact. All theories of cosmogony, therefore, point to a beginning of -life subsequent to the constitution of the inorganic world. - -Now, it is impossible for organic life to antecede itself. If, -therefore, it has had a beginning in the world, it must have had a -first active cause distinct from itself; and the active cause, in -question, must, consequently, have been either something intrinsic, or -something extrinsic, to inorganic matter. The hypothesis, however, of -a spontaneous origin of life through the agency of forces intrinsic -to inorganic matter is scientifically untenable. Hence it follows that -life originated through the action of an immaterial or spiritual agent, -namely, God, seeing that there is no other assignable agency capable of -bringing about the initial production of life from lifeless matter. - - - § 9. Futile Evasions - -Many and various are the efforts made to escape this issue. One group -of scientists, for example, attempt to rid themselves of the difficulty -by diverting our attention from the problem of a beginning of organic -life in the universe to the problem of its translation to a new -habitat. This legerdemain has resulted in the theories of _cosmozoa_ -or _panspermia_, according to which life originates in a favorable -environment, not by reason of spontaneous generation, but by reason -of importation from other worlds. This view has been presented in two -forms: (1) the “meteorite” theory, which represents the older view -held by Thomson and Helmholtz; (2) the more recent theory of “cosmic -panspermia” advocated by Svante Arrhénius, with H. E. Richter and F. -J. Cohn as precursors. Sir Wm. Thompson suggested that life might have -been salvaged from the ruins of other worlds and carried to our own by -means of meteorites or fragments thrown off from life-bearing planets -that had been destroyed by a catastrophic collision. These meteorites -discharged from bursting planets might carry germs to distant planets -like the earth, causing them to become covered with vegetation. Against -this theory stands the fatal objection that the transit of a meteorite -from the nearest stellar system to our own would require an interval -of 60,000,000 years. It is incredible that life could be maintained -through such an enormous lapse of time. Even from the nearest planet -to our earth the duration of the journey would be 150 years. Besides, -meteorites are heated to incandescence while passing through the -atmosphere, and any seeds they might contain would perish by reason of -the heat thus generated, not to speak of the terrific impact, which -terminates the voyage of a meteorite. - -Arrhénius suggests a method by which microörganisms might be conveyed -through intersidereal space with far greater dispatch and without any -mineral vehicle such as a meteorite. He notes that particles of cosmic -dust leave the sun as a coronal atmosphere and are propelled through -intervening space by the pressure of radiation until they reach the -higher atmosphere of the earth (viz. at a height of 100 kilometers from -the surface of the latter), where they become the electrically charged -dust particles of polar auroras (_v.g._ the aurora borealis). The motor -force, in this case, is the same as that which moves the vanes of a -Crookes’ radiometer. Lebedeff has verified Clerk-Maxwell’s conceptions -of this force and has demonstrated its reality by experiments. It is -calculated that in the immediate vicinity of a luminous surface like -that of the sun the pressure exerted by radiation upon an exposed -surface would be nearly two milligrams per square centimeter. On -a nontransparent particle having a diameter of 1.5 microns, the -pressure of radiation would just counterbalance the force of universal -gravitation, while on particles whose diameter was 0.16 of a micron, -the pressure of radiation would be ten times as great as the pull of -gravitation. Now bacterial spores having a diameter of O.3 to O.2 of a -micron are known to bacteriologists, and the ultramicroscope reveals -the presence of germs not more than O.1 of a micron in size.[11] Hence -it is conceivable that germs of such dimensions might be wafted -to limits of our atmosphere, and might then be transported by the -pressure of radiation to distant planets or stellar systems, provided, -of course, they could escape the germicidal action of oxidation, -desiccation, ultra-violet rays, etc. Arrhénius calculates that their -journey from the earth to Mars would, under such circumstances, occupy -a period of only 20 days. Within 80 days they could reach Jupiter, -and they might arrive at Neptune on the confines of our solar system -after an interval of 3 weeks. The transit to the constellation of the -Centaur, which contains the solar system nearest to our own (the one, -namely, whose central sun is the star Alpha), would require 9,000 years. - - [11] Recently, by means of photography with short-length light - waves, the bacteria of “Foot-and-mouth disease,” invisible to - the highest power microscope, have been revealed as rods about - 100 submicrons (_i.e._ O.1 micron, or O.0001 millimeter) in - length. (_cf._ _Science_, May 30, 1924, Supplement X.) Germs - of this dimension could be as easily transported by radiation - as the alleged electrically charged stardust in the aurora - borealis. It may be of interest, however, to note, in this - connection, that the most recent theory of the aurora borealis - discards stardust in favor of nitrogen snow. Lars Vegard, a - Norwegian professor, ascribes the peculiar greenish tint in the - Northern Lights to the action of solar radiations on nitrogen - snow, which he assumes to exist at an altitude of more than - 60 miles above the earth. When he condensed crystals of solid - nitrogen on a copper plate by freezing with liquid hydrogen, - he found that these crystals, after bombardment with cathode - rays, emit a light of green color, which gives the same strong - green spectrum line as the spectrum of the aurora. As the - solid nitrogen evaporates, it begins to emit the reddish light - characteristic of nitrogen gas. This phenomenon would explain - the changes of color that occur in the aurora borealis. (_cf._ - _Science_, April 18, 1924, Suppl. X.) - -Arrhénius’ theory, however, that “life is an eternal rebeginning” -explains nothing and leaves us precisely where we were. In the -metaphysical as well as the scientific sense, it is an evasion and -not a solution. To the logical necessity of putting an end to the -retrogradation of the subalternate conditions, upon which the realities -of the present depend for their actual existence, we have already -adverted. Moreover, the reasons which induce the scientist to postulate -a beginning of life in our world are not based on any distinctive -peculiarity of that world, but are universally applicable, it being -established by the testimony of the spectroscope that other worlds are -not differently constituted than our own. Hence Schäfer voices the -general attitude of scientific men when he says: “But the acceptance -of such theories of the arrival of life on earth does not bring us any -nearer to a conception of its actual mode of origin; on the contrary, -it merely serves to banish the investigation of the question to -some conveniently inaccessible corner of the universe and leaves us -in the unsatisfactory condition of affirming not only that we have -no knowledge as to the mode of origin of life—which is unfortunately -true—but that we never can acquire such knowledge—which it is to be -hoped is not true. Knowing what we know, and believing what we believe, -... we are, I think (without denying the possibility of the existence -of life in other parts of the universe), justified in regarding these -cosmic theories as inherently improbable.” (Dundee Address of 1912, cf. -Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1912, p. 503.) - -Dismissing, therefore, all evasions of this sort, we may regard as -scientifically established the conclusion that, so far as our knowledge -goes, inorganic nature lacks the means of self-vivification, and that -no inanimate matter can become living matter without first coming -under the influence of matter previously alive. Given, therefore, -that the conditions favorable to life did not always prevail in our -cosmos, it follows that life had a beginning, for which we are obliged -to account by some postulate other than abiogenesis. This conclusion -seems inescapable for those who concede the scientific absurdity of -spontaneous generation, but, by some weird freak of logic, not only -is it escaped, but the very opposite conclusion is reached through -reasoning, which the exponents are pleased to term philosophical, as -distinguished from scientific, argumentation. The plight of these -“hard-headed worshippers of fact,” who plume themselves on their -contempt for “metaphysics,” is sad indeed. Worsted in the experimental -field, they appeal the case from the court of facts to that aprioristic -philosophy. “Physic of metaphysic begs defence, and metaphysic calls -for aid on sense!” - -Life, they contend, either had no beginning or it must have begun -in our world as the product of spontaneous generation. But all the -scientific theories of cosmogony exclude the former alternative. -Consequently, not only is it not absurd to admit spontaneous -generation, but, on the contrary, it is absurd not to admit it. It -is in this frame of mind that August Weismann is induced to confide -to us “that spontaneous generation, in spite of all the vain attempts -to demonstrate it, remains for me a logical necessity.” (“Essays,” p. -34, Poulton’s Transl.) The presupposition latent in all such logic is, -of course, the assumption that nothing but matter exists; for, if the -possibility of the existence of a supermaterial agency is conceded, -then obviously we are not compelled by _logical necessity_ to ascribe -the initial production of organic life to the exclusive agency of the -physicochemical energies inherent in inorganic matter. Weismann should -demonstrate his suppressed premise that matter coincides with reality -and that spiritual is a synonym for nonexistent. Until such time as -this unverified and unverifiable affirmation is substantiated, the -philosophical proof for abiogenesis is not an argument at all, it is -dogmatism pure and simple. - -But, they protest, “To deny spontaneous generation is to proclaim -a miracle” (Nägeli), and natural science cannot have recourse to -“miracles” in explaining natural phenomena. For the “scientist,” -miracles are always absurd as contradicting the uniformity of nature, -and to recur to them for the solution of a scientific problem is, -to put it mildly, distinctly out of the question. Hence Haeckel -regards spontaneous generation as more than demonstrated by the bare -consideration that no alternative remains except the unspeakable -scientific blasphemy implied in superstitious terms like “miracle,” -“creation,” and “supernatural.” For a “thinking man,” the mere mention -of these abhorrent words is, or ought to be, argument enough. “If -we do not accept the hypothesis of spontaneous generation,” Haeckel -expostulates, “we must have recourse to the miracle of a _supernatural -creation_.” (Italics his—“History of Creation,” I, p. 348, Lankester’s -Transl.) It would be a difficult matter, indeed, to cram more blunders -into one short sentence! We will not, and need not, undertake to defend -the supernatural here. Suffice it to say, that the initiation of life -in inorganic matter by the Author of Life would not be a creation, nor -a miracle, nor a phenomenon pertaining to the supernatural order. - -The principle of the minimum forbids us to postulate the superfluous, -and a creative act would be superfluous in the production of the first -organisms. Inorganic nature contains all the material elements found in -living organisms, and all organisms, in fact, derive their matter from -the inorganic world. If, therefore, they are thus dependent _in their -continuance_ upon a supply of matter administered by the inorganic -world, it is to be presumed that they were likewise dependent on that -source of matter _in their first origin_. In other words, the material -substrata of the first organisms were not produced anew, but derived -from the elements of the inorganic world. Hence they were not created, -but formed out of preëxistent matter. A _creative_ act would involve -_total_ production, and exclude the preëxistence of the constituent -material under a different form. A _formative_ act, on the contrary, is -a _partial_ production, which presupposes the material _out of which_ a -given thing is to be made. Hence the Divine act, whereby organic life -was first educed from the passive potentiality of inorganic matter, was -formative and not creative. Elements preëxistent in the inorganic world -were combined and intrinsically modified by impressing upon them a new -specification, which raised them in the entitive and dynamic scale, and -integrated them into units capable of self-regulation and reflexive -action. This modification, however, was intrinsic to the matter -involved and nothing was injected into matter from without. Obviously, -therefore, the production of the first organisms was not a creation, -but a formation. - -Still less was it a miracle; for a miracle is a visible interposition -in the course of nature by a power superior to the powers of nature. A -given effect, therefore, is termed miraculous with express reference -to some existing natural agency, whose efficacy it, in some way, -exceeds. If there existed in inorganic nature some natural process -of self-vivification, then any Divine interposition to produce -life independently of this natural agency, would be a miraculous -intervention. As a matter of fact, however, inorganic nature is -destitute of this power of self-vitalization, and consequently no -natural agency was superseded or overridden by the initial imparting -of life to lifeless matter. Life was not ordained to originate in any -other way. Given, therefore, this impotence of inorganic nature, it -follows that an initial vivification of matter by Divine power was -demanded by the very nature of things. The Divine action did not come -into competition, as it were, with existing natural agencies, but was -put forth in response to the exigencies of nature itself. It cannot, -therefore, be regarded as miraculous. - -Nor, finally, is there any warrant for regarding such an initial -vivification of matter as supernatural. Only that is supernatural which -transcends the nature, powers, and exigencies of all things created -or creatable. But, as we have seen, if life was to exist at all, a -primal animation of inanimate matter by Divine power was demanded -by the very nature of things. Here the Divine action put forth in -response to an exigency of nature and terminated in the constitution -of living nature itself. Now, the effect of a Divine action, by which -the natures of things are initially constituted, plainly pertains to -the order of nature, and has nothing to do with the supernatural. Hence -the primordial constitution by Divine power of living nature was not a -supernatural, but a purely natural, event. - - - - - CHAPTER II - - THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SOUL - - - § 1. Matter and Spirit - -We live in an age in which scientific specialization is stressed as the -most important means of advancing the interests of human knowledge; and -specialism, by reason of its many triumphs, seems to have deserved, in -large measure, the prestige which it now enjoys. It has, however, the -distinct disadvantage of fostering provincialism and separatism. This -lopsided learning of the single track mind is a condition that verges -on paranoia, leads to naïve contempt for all knowledge not reducible to -its own set of formulæ, and portends, in the near future, a Babel-like -confusion of tongues. In fact, the need of a corrective is beginning -to be felt in many quarters. This corrective can be none other than -the general and synthetic science of philosophy; it is philosophy -alone that can furnish a common ground and break down the barriers of -exclusiveness which immure the special sciences within the minds of -experts. - -Scientists readily admit the advantage of philosophy in theory, but in -practice their approval is far from being unqualified. A subservient -philosophy, which accepts without hesitation all the current dogmas -of contemporary science, is one thing, and a critical philosophy -venturing to apply the canons of logic to so-called scientific proof -is quite another. Philosophy of the latter type is promptly informed -that it has no right to any opinion whatever, and that only the -scientific specialist is qualified to speak on such subjects. But the -disqualification, which is supposed to arise from lack of special -knowledge, is just as promptly forgotten, when there is question of -philosophy in the rôle of a pliant sycophant, and the works of a Wells -or a van Loon are lauded to the skies, despite the glaring examples of -scientific inaccuracy and ignorance, in which they abound. - -This partiality is sometimes carried to a degree that makes it -perfectly preposterous. Thus it is by no means an infrequent thing to -find scientists dismissing, as unworthy of a hearing, a philosopher -like Hans Driesch, who spent the major portion of his life in -biological research, and combined the technical discipline of a -scientist with the mental discipline of a logician. The chemist, H. -E. Armstrong, for instance, sees in the mere label “philosopher” a -sufficient reason for barring his testimony. “Philosophers,” jeers -the chemist, with flippant irrelevance, “must go to school and study -in the purlieus of experimental science, if they desire to speak with -authority on these matters.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1912, p. 528.) -Such is his comment on Driesch, yet Driesch did nothing at all, if he -did not do far more than Armstrong prescribes as a prerequisite for -authoritative speaking. In James Harvey Robinson, on the contrary, we -have an example of the tendency of scientists to coddle philosophers -who assume a docile, deferential, and submissive attitude towards -every generalization propounded in the name of natural science. In -sheer gratitude for his uncritical acquiescence, his incapacitation -as a nonspecialist is considerately overlooked, and he can confess, -without the slightest danger of discrediting his own utterances: “I am -not ... a biologist or palæontologist. But I have had the privilege -of consorting familiarly with some of the very best representatives -of those who have devoted their lives to the patient study of the -matters involved in this controversy. I think I quite understand -their attitude.” (_Harper’s Magazine,_ June, 1922, p. 68.) By his own -testimony he is a scientific amateur, but this does not, in the least, -prevent him from “speaking with authority” or from being lionized in -scientific circles as an evolutionary “defender of the faith.” Clearly, -it is the nature of their respective views, and not the possession or -absence of technical knowledge, which makes Robinson a favorite, and -Driesch a _persona non grata_, with “the very best representatives” -of contemporary science. “Science,” says a writer in the _Atlantic -Monthly_ (Oct., 1915), “has turned all philosophy out of doors except -that which clings to its skirts; it has thrown contempt on all learning -that does not depend upon it; and it has bribed the sketches by giving -us immense material comforts.” - -Here, however, we are concerned with the fact, rather than the justice, -of this discrimination which the scientific world makes between -philosopher and philosopher. Certain it is that Robinson has received -no end of encomiums from scientists, who apparently lack the literary -gifts to expound their own philosophy, and that his claim to represent -the views of a large and influential section of the scientific world -is, in all probability, entirely correct. It is this manifest approval -of scientific men which lends especial interest to the remarks of -this scientific dilettante, and we shall quote them as expressing the -prevalent scientific view on the origin of man, a view which, with but -slight variations, has persisted from the time of Darwin down to the -present day. - -“The recognition,” says Robinson, “that mankind is a species of animal, -is, like other important discoveries, illuminating.” (_Science_, July -28, 1922, p. 74.) To refer to the recognition of man’s animality as -a _discovery_ is a conceit too stupid for mere words to castigate. -Surely, there was no need of the profound research or delicate -precision of modern science to detect the all too obvious similarity -existing between man and beast. Mankind did not have to await the -advent of an “enlightened” nineteenth, or twentieth century to be -assured of the truth of a commonplace so trite and palpable. Even the -“benighted” scholastics of medieval infamy had wit enough to define man -as a rational animal. Indeed, it would be a libel on human intelligence -to suppose that anyone, in the whole history of human thought, was ever -sufficiently fatuous to dispute the patent fact that man is a sentient -organism compounded of flesh, blood, bone, and sinew like the brute. -The “discovery” that man is a species of animal dates from the year one -of human existence, and it is now high time for the novelty of this -discovery to be worn off. - -Even as a difficulty against human superiority and immortality, the -“recognition” is by no means recent. We find it squarely faced in -a book of the Old Testament, the entire book being devoted to the -solution of the difficulty in question. “I said in my heart concerning -the estate of the sons of men ... that they might see they are -themselves beasts. For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth -beasts; even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth so dieth the -other; yea, they have all one breath; so that man hath no preeminence -above a beast; for all is vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the -dust, and all return to dust. Who knoweth the spirit of man whether it -goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast whether it goeth downward to -the earth?” (_Ecclesiastes_, III: 18-21.) The sacred writer insists -that, so far as the body is concerned, man and the brute stand on the -same level; but what of the human soul? Is it, he asks, resolvable into -matter like the soul of a beast, or is it a supermaterial principle -destined, not for time, but for eternity? At the close of the book, the -conclusion is reached that the latter alternative is the true solution -of the riddle of human nature—“the dust returneth to the earth whence -it was, and the spirit returneth to God who gave it.” (Ch. XII, v. 7.) - -Centuries, therefore, before the Christian era, this problem was -formulated by Ecclesiastes, the Jew, and also, as we shall presently -see, by Aristotle, the coryphæus of Greek philosophy. Nay, from time -immemorial man, contrasting his aspirations after immortality with -the spectacle of corporal death, has appreciated to the full the -significance of his own animality. Never was there question of whether -man is, or is not, just as thoroughly an animal as any beast, but -rather of whether, his animal nature being unhesitatingly conceded, -we are not, none the less, forced to recognize in him, over and above -this, the existence of a spiritual mind or soul, differentiating -him from the brute and constituting him a being unique, despite the -unmistakable homologies discernible between bestial organisms and the -human body. Everywhere and always mankind as a whole have manifested, -by the universal and uniquely human practice of burying the dead, their -unswerving and indomitable conviction that man is spirit as well as -flesh, an animal, indeed, yet animated by something not present in the -animal, namely, a spiritual soul, deathless and indestructible, capable -of surviving the decay of the organism and of persisting throughout -eternity. - -But, if the human mind or soul is spiritual, it is clear that it cannot -be a product of organic evolution, any more than it can be a product of -parental generation. On the contrary, each and every human soul must -be an immediate creation of the Author of Nature, not evolved from the -internal potentiality of matter, but infused into matter from without. -The human soul is created in organized matter, but not from it. Nor -can the Divine action, in this case, be regarded as a supernatural -interposition; for it supplements, rather than supersedes, the natural -process of reproduction; and, since it is not in matter to produce -spirit, a creative act is demanded by the very nature of things. - -Evolution is nothing more nor less than a transmutation of matter, -and a transmutation of matter cannot terminate in the annihilation of -matter and the constitution of non-matter or spirit. If nothing of the -_terminus a quo_ persists in the final product, we have substitution, -and not transmutation. The evolution of matter, therefore, cannot -progress to a point where all materiality is eliminated. Hence, -whatever proceeds from matter, either as an emanation or an action, -will, of necessity, be material. It should be noted, however, that by -material we do not mean corporeal; for material denotes not merely -matter itself, but everything that intrinsically depends on matter. -The term, therefore, is wider in its sense than corporeal, because -it comprises, besides matter, all the properties, energies, and -activities of matter. Hence whatever is incapable of existence and -activity apart from matter (whether ponderable or imponderable) belongs -to the material, as distinguished from the spiritual, order of things. -The soul of a brute, for example, is not matter, but it is material, -nevertheless, because it is totally dependent on the matter of the -organism, apart from which it has neither existence nor activity of its -own. - -In the constitution of the sentient or animal soul, matter reaches -the _culmination of its passive evolution_. True, its inherent -physicochemical forces do not suffice to bring about this consummation, -wherewith its internal potentiality is exhausted. Nevertheless, the -emergence of an animal soul from matter is conceivable, given an agency -competent to educe it from the intrinsic potentiality of matter; -for, in the last analysis, the animal soul is simply an internal -modification of matter itself. But, if spirit is that which exists, or -is, at least, capable of existence, apart from matter, it goes without -saying that spirit is neither _derivable_ from, nor _resolvable_ into, -matter of any kind. Consequently, it cannot be evolved from matter, -but must be produced in matter by creation (_i.e._ total production). -_To make the human mind or soul a product of evolution is equivalent -to a denial of its spirituality_, because it implies that the human -soul like that of the brute, is inherent in the potentiality of matter, -and is therefore a purely material principle, totally dependent on -the matter, of which it is a perfection. Between such a soul and the -sentient principle present in the beast, there would be no essential -difference of kind, but only an accidental difference of degree; and -this is precisely what Darwin and his successors have spared no effort -to demonstrate. James Harvey Robinson is refreshingly frank on this -subject, and we will therefore let him be spokesman for those who are -more reticent: - -“It is the extraordinarily illuminating discovery (_sic_) of man’s -animalhood rather than evolution in general that troubles the routine -mind. Many are willing to admit that it looks as if life had developed -on the earth slowly, in successive stages; this they can regard as a -merely curious fact and of no great moment if only man can be defended -as an honorable exception. The fact that we have an animal body may -also be conceded, but surely man must have a soul and a mind altogether -distinct and unique from the very beginning bestowed on him by the -Creator and setting him off an immeasurable distance from any mere -animal. But whatever may be the religious and poetic significance of -this compromise it is becoming less and less tenable as a scientific -and historic truth. The _facts_ indicate that man’s _mind_ is quite as -clearly of animal extraction as his body.” (_Science_, July 28, 1922, -p. 95—italics his.) - -This language has, at least, the merit of being unambiguous, and leaves -us in no uncertainty as to where the writer stands. It discloses, -likewise, the animus which motivates his peculiar interest in -transformistic theories. If evolution were incapable of being exploited -in behalf of materialistic philosophy, Mr. Robinson, we may be sure, -would soon lose interest in the theory, and would once more align -himself with the company, which he has so inappropriately deserted, -namely, “the routine minds” that regard evolution “as a merely curious -fact of no great moment.” Be that as it may, his final appeal is to -the “facts,” and it is to the facts, accordingly, that we shall go; -but they will not be the irrelevant “facts” of anatomy, physiology, -and palæontology. Sciences such as these confine their attention to -the external manifestations of human life, and can tell us nothing of -man’s inner consciousness. It does not, therefore, devolve upon them -to pronounce final judgment upon the origin of _man_. For that which -is the distinguishing characteristic of man is not his animal nature, -that he shares in common with the brute, but his rational nature, which -alone differentiates him from “a beast that wants discourse of reason.” -We cannot settle the question as to whether or not man’s _mind_ is -“of animal extraction” by comparing his _body_ with the bodies of -irrational vertebrates. To institute the requisite comparison between -the rational mentality of man and the purely sentient consciousness of -irrational animals falls within the exclusive competence of psychology, -which studies the internal manifestations of life as they are presented -to the intuition of consciousness, rather than biology, which studies -life according to such of its manifestations as are perceptible to the -external senses. Hence it is within the domain of psychology alone, -that man can be studied on his distinctively human, or rational, side, -and it is to this science, accordingly, that we must turn in our search -for facts that are germane to the problem of the origin of man and -the genesis of the human mind. How little, indeed, does he know of -human nature, whose knowledge of it is confined to man’s insignificant -anatomy and biology, and who knows nothing of the triumphs of human -genius in literature, art, science, architecture, music, and a thousand -other fields! Psychology alone can evaluate these marvels, and no other -science can be of like assistance in solving the problem of whether man -is, or is not, unique among all his fellows of the animal kingdom. - - - § 2. The Science of the Soul - -As a distinct science, psychology owes its origin to Aristotle, whose -“_Peri Psyches_” is, in all probability, the first formal treatise on -the subject. Through his father, Nichomachus, who was court physician -to Philip of Macedon, he became acquainted, at an early age, with -biological lore in the form of such medical botany, anatomy, and -physiology as were commonly known in prescientific days. Subsequently, -his celebrated pupil, Alexander the Great, placed at his disposal a -vast library, together with extensive opportunities for biological -research. This enabled the philosopher to criticize and summarize the -observations and speculations of his predecessors in the field, and -to improve upon them by means of personal reflection and research. In -writing his psychology, he was naturally forced to proceed on the basis -of the facts discoverable by internal experience (introspection) and -unaided external observation. Of such facts as are only accessible by -means of instrumentation and systematic experimentation, he could, of -course, know nothing, since their exploration awaited the advent of -modern mechanical and optical inventions. But the factual foundation -of his treatise, though not extensive, was solid, so far as it went, -and his selection, analysis, and evaluation of the materials at hand -was so accurate and judicious, that the broad outlines of his system -have been vindicated by the test of time, and all the results of -modern experimental research fit, with surprising facility, into the -framework of his generalizations, revision being nowhere necessary -save in nonessentials and minor details. Wilhelm Wundt, the Father of -Experimental Psychology, pays him the following tribute: “The results -of my labors do not square with the materialistic hypothesis, nor do -they with the dualism of Plato or Descartes. It is only the animism -of Aristotle which, by combining psychology with biology, results as -a plausible metaphysical conclusion from Experimental Psychology.” -(“Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie,” 4te Auflage, II, C. 23, -S. 633.) - -Literally translated, the title of Aristotle’s work signifies a -_treatise concerning the soul_. It set a precedent for the scholastic -doctors of the thirteenth century, and _de anima_ became with them a -technical designation for all works dealing with this theme. In the -sixteenth century the selfsame usage was embalmed in the Greek term -psychology, which was coined with a view to rendering the elliptic -Latin title by means of a single word. Melanchthon is credited with -having originated the term, which, in its original use as well as its -etymology, denoted a science of the _psyche_ or soul. - -Towards the close of the seventeenth century, however, the meaning of -the term in question began to undergo a marvelous evolution, of which -the end is not yet. The process was initiated by Descartes, under whose -auspices psychology was changed from a science of the _soul_ into a -science of the _mind_. Then, under the influence of Hume and Kant, the -_noumenal mind_ disappeared, leaving only _phenomenal consciousness_. -Recently, with the advent of Watson, even consciousness itself has -been discarded and psychology has become a science of _behavior_. -And here, for the time being, at any rate, the process has come to a -stop, just one step short of complete nihilism. Woodworth quotes the -following waggish comment: “First psychology lost its soul, then it -lost its mind, then it lost consciousness; it still has behavior of -a kind.” (“Psychology, the Science of Mental Life,” p. 2, footnote.) -This gradual degeneration of psychology from animism into behaviorism -is one of the greatest ironies in the history of human thought. All -of this, however, was latent in the corrosive Cartesian principle of -“scientific doubt.” _Facilis descensus Averni!_ It is easy to question -the validity of this or that kind of human knowledge, but difficult to -arrest, or even foresee, the consequences which the remorseless logic -of scepticism portends. - -Disintegration set in, as has been said, when Descartes substituted -his _psychophysical dualism_ of _mind_ and _matter_ for Aristotle’s -_hylomorphic dualism_ of _soul_ and _body_. The French philosopher, -in an appendix to his “Meditations,” which dates from 1670, expressly -rejects the Aristotelian term of soul or _psyche_, and announces his -preference for mind or spirit, in the following words: “The substance -in which thought immediately resides is here called mind (mens, -esprit). I here speak, however, of mens (mind) rather than anima -(soul), for the latter is equivocal, being frequently applied to denote -what is material” (“Reply to the Second Objections,” p. 86). Henceforth -psychology ceased to be a science of the soul, and became, instead, a -science of the mind. - -Descartes, one must bear in mind, divided the universe into two great -realms of being, namely: the conscious and the unconscious, the -_psychic_ world of mind and the _physical_ world of matter, unextended -substance which thinks and extended substance which moves. In man -these two substantial principles were conceived as being united by the -tenuous link of mere contact, the spirit or mind remaining separate -from, and unmingled with, its material partner, the body. The main -trouble with this dualism is that it draws the line of demarcation -at the wrong place. Reason and sense-consciousness are bracketed -together above the line as being equally spiritual; physiological -processes and processes purely physicochemical are coupled below the -line as being equally mechanical. Now, when a brain-function such -as sense-perception is introduced, like another Trojan Horse, into -the citadel of spiritualism, it is a comparatively easy task for -materialism to storm and sack that citadel by demonstrating with a -thousand neuro-physiological facts that all sensory functions are -rigidly correlated with neurological processes, that they are, in -short, functions of the nervous system, and therefore purely material -in nature. On the other hand, once we retreat from the trench of -distinction between the processes of unconscious or vegetative life -and the physicochemical processes of the inorganic world, that moment -we have lost the strategic position in the conflict with mechanism, -and nothing avails to stay its triumphant onrush. Hence, from first to -last, it is perfectly clear that the treacherous psychophysical dualism -of Descartes has done far more harm to the cause of spiritualism than -all the assaults of materialism. There is a Latin maxim which says: -_Extrema sese tangunt_—“Extremes come in contact with each other.” The -ultraspiritualism of Descartes by confounding spiritual, with organic -consciousness, leads by the most direct route to the opposite extreme -of crass materialism. - -Aristotle’s dualism of matter and form, which is but a physical -application of his transcendental dualism of potency (_dynamis_) and -act (_entelechy_), is very different from the Cartesian dualism of the -physical and the psychic. According to the Aristotelian view, as we -have seen in the last chapter, all the physical entities or substantial -units of nature (both living and inorganic) are fundamentally _dual_ -in their essence, each consisting of a definitive principle called -entelechy and a plastic principle called matter. Entelechy is the -integrating determinant, the source of the unit’s coherence and -of its differentiation from units of another type. Matter is the -determinable and quantifying factor, in virtue of which the unit is -potentially-multiple and endowed with mass. In the electro-chemical -reactions of non-living substances (synthesis, analysis, and -transmutation), entelechy is the variant and matter is the constant; -in the metabolic activities of living substances (assimilation and -dissimilation), matter is the variant and entelechy is the constant. -This persistent entelechy of the living unit or organism is what -Aristotle terms the _psyche_ or soul. The latter, therefore, may -be defined as the vital principle or primary source of life in the -organism. - -But in using such terms as “soul” and “vital principle” we are -employing expressions against which not merely rabid mechanists, -but many conservative biologists as well, see fit to protest. The -opposition of the latter, however, is found on closer scrutiny to be -_nominal_ rather than _real_. It is the _name_ which offends; they have -no objection to the _thing signified_. Wilson, to cite a pertinent -example, rejects as meaningless all such terms as “vital principle,” -“soul,” etc. “They are words,” he avers, “that have been written into -certain spaces that are otherwise blank in our record of knowledge, -and as far as I can see no more than this.” (“Biology,” p. 23, 1908.) -Yet he himself affirms again and again the existence of the reality -which these terms (understood in their Aristotelian sense) denote. -In discussing the relation of the tissue cell to the multicellular -body, for instance, he speaks of “a formative power pervading the -growing mass as a whole.” (“The Cell,” 2nd ed., p. 59), and, in his -recent lecture on the “Physical Basis of Life,” he makes allusion -to “the integrating and unifying principle in the vital processes.” -(_Science_, March 9, 1923, p. 284.) It would seem, therefore, that -Wilson’s aversion to such terms as soul and vital principle is based -on the _dynamic_ sense assigned to them by the neo-vitalists, who, as -we have seen, regard the vital principle as a force _sui generis_ or -a _unique agent_, which operates intrusively among physicochemical -factors in the rôle of an active or efficient cause of vital functions. -That such is really the case, appears from his rhetorical question: -“Shall we then join hands with the neo-vitalists in referring the -unifying and regulatory principle to the _operation_ of an unknown -power, a directive _force_, an archæus, an entelechy or a soul?” (_Loc. -cit._, p. 285—italics mine.) The objection, however, does not apply -to these terms used in their Aristotelian sense. In the philosophy of -the Stagirite, the soul, like all other entelechies, is a cause in the -_entitive_, but not in the _dynamic_, order of things. Its efficacy is -_formal_, not _efficient_. It is not an agent, but a specifying type. -The organism must be integrated, specified, and existent _before_ it -can operate, and hence its integration and specification by the soul -is prior to all vital activity. The soul is a constituent of being -and not an immediate principle of action. The soul is not even an -entity (in the sense of a complete and separate being), but rather an -incomplete entity or constituent of an entity. It takes a complete -entity to be an agent, and the soul or vital entelechy is not an -independent existent, which is somehow inserted into the organism, -but an incomplete being which has no existence of its own, but only -coexistence, in the composite that it forms with the organism. Nor is -there any such thing as a special vital force resident in the organism. -The executive factors in all vital operations of the organic order are -the physicochemical energies, which are native to matter in general. -These forces, as we have seen, receive a reflexive orientation and are -elevated to a higher plane of efficiency by reason of their association -with an entelechy superior to the binding and type-determining -principles present in inorganic units, but they are not supplanted or -superseded by a new executive force. Wilson’s fear, therefore, that -the experimental analysis of life is discouraged by vitalism, inasmuch -as this conception _subtracts something from the efficiency of the -physicochemical forces_, is groundless in the case of hylomorphic -vitalism, but is well-founded in the case of such systems as the -neo-vitalism of Driesch and the spiritualism of Descartes. - -Summing up, therefore, we may say that the soul, like other -entelechies, is consubstantial with its material substrate, the body. -True it is more autonomous than are the inflexible entelechies of -inorganic nature, inasmuch as it is independent of any given atom, -molecule, or cell in the organic aggregate. Such a degree of freedom, -for example, is not possessed by the most complex molecules, which show -no other flexibility than tautomerism, even this small readjustment -involving a change in their specificity. But this autonomy does not -preclude the essential dependence of the soul upon the body. Generally -speaking, the soul is incapable of existence apart from its total -substrate, the organism. We say, _generally speaking_, because, as -previously intimated, an exception must be made in the case of the -_human soul_, which, being, as we shall see, a self-subsistent and -spiritual entelechy, is by itself, apart from its material substrate, -a sufficient subject of existence, and is therefore capable of -surviving the dissolution of its complementary principle, the organism. -Nevertheless, even in man, the soul forms one substance with the -organism, and the organism participates as a coëfficient factor in -all his vital functions, both physiological and psychic, excluding -only the _superorganic_ or _spiritual_ functions of rational thought -and volition, whose agent and recipient is the _soul alone_. In man, -then, soul and body unite to form a single substance, a single nature, -and a single person. Apart from the body, the human soul is, indeed, -a complete entity, in the sense that it is capable of subsistence -(independent existence), but, in another sense, it is not a complete -entity, because apart from the body it cannot constitute a complete -nature or complete personality. It is this essential incompleteness of -the discarnate human soul that forms the natural basis of the Christian -doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead. - -Here, however, it is important to note the difference between the -hylomorphic spiritualism of Aristotle and the psychophysical -spiritualism of Descartes. By the latter _all_ conscious or physic -functions are regarded as spiritual. The former, however, recognizes -the fundamental difference which exists between the lower or -animal, and the higher or rational functions of our conscious life. -Sense-perception and sensual emotion belong to the former class, and -must be regarded as _organic_ functions, whose agent and subject is -neither the soul alone nor the organism alone, but the soul-informed -organism or substantial composite of body and soul. Rational thinking -and willing, on the contrary, are classified as _superorganic_ or -_spiritual_ functions, inasmuch as they exclude the coägency of the -organism and have the soul alone for their active cause and receptive -subject. - -The soul, in fine, is the formal principle or primary source of the -threefold life in man, namely, the metabolic life, which man shares -with plants, the sentient life, which he shares with animals, and the -rational life, which is uniquely human. The human soul is often spoken -of as the mind. In their dictionary sense, both terms denote one and -the same reality, namely, the human entelechy or vital principle in -man, but the connotation of these terms is different. The term soul -signifies the vital principle in so far as it is the primary source -of every kind of life in man, that is, vegetative, sentient, and -rational. The term mind, however, connoting conscious rather than -unconscious life, signifies the vital principle in so far as it is the -root and ground of our conscious life (both sentient and rational). -Here, however, the distinction is of no great moment, and the terms -may be regarded as synonymous. The definitions which we have given -are, of course, blasphemous in the ears of our modern neo-Kantian -phenomenalists, whose preference is for a _functional_, rather than a -_substantial_, mind or soul; but we will pay our respects to them later. - -It is clear, however, from what has been said, that, for evidences of -the superiority and spirituality of the human soul, we must recur, -not to the external manifestations of our nutritive life, but to -the internal manifestations of our conscious life. The latter are -wholly inaccessible to the external senses and perceptible only to the -intuition of consciousness, introspection, or internal experience, -as it is variously called. All our self-knowledge rests on the basis -of introspection, and without it the science of psychology would be -impossible. In fact, not only psychology, but the physical sciences -as well, depend for their validity on the testimony of consciousness; -for the external world is only knowable to the extent that it enters -the domain of our consciousness. Recently, as we have seen, a tendency -to discredit internal experience has arisen among materialistic -extremists. This “tendency,” to quote the words of Keyser, “most -notably represented by the behaviorist school of psychologists (like -Professor Watson, for example), is manifest in the distrust of -introspections as a means of knowledge of mental phenomena and in the -growing dependence of psychology upon external observation of animal -and human behavior and upon physiological experiment, as if matter -were regarded ‘as something much more solid and indubitable than -mind’ (Bertrand Russell).”—C. J. Keyser, _Science_, Nov. 25, 1921, -p. 520. Since, however, all our knowledge depends on the validity of -consciousness, such a tendency is suicidal and destructive of all -science, whether physical or psychological. The attempts, therefore, of -mechanists, like Loeb, and behaviorists, like Watson, to dispense with -consciousness overreach themselves. For how can the mechanists _know_ -that there are such things as tropisms, tactisms, or reaction-systems, -how can the behaviorist _study_ such things as “situations,” -“adjustments,” and S-R-bonds, how can the materialist _become aware_ -of the existence of molecules and atoms, except through the medium of -their own conscious or psychic states? States of matter can be known -only by means of states of mind, and the former, therefore, cannot -be any more real than the latter. “What, after all,” asks Cardinal -Mercier, “is a fact of nature if the mind has not seized, examined, -and assimilated it? True, the information of consciousness is often -precarious. For this reason we do well to aid and control it by -scientific apparatus. These apparatus, however, can only aid, never -supplant, introspection. The telescope does not replace the eye, but -extends its vision.” (“Relation of Exp. Psych. to Philosophy,” pp. 40, -41—Trans. of Wirth.) - - - § 3. The Nature of the Human Soul - -Now our inner consciousness bears unmistakable witness to the existence -within us of an abiding subject of our thoughts, feelings, and desires. -In biology, the soul is revealed to us as a binding-principle, that -obstructs dissolution of the organism, and a persistent type that -maintains its identity amid an incessant flux of matter and flow -of energy. Clearer still is testimony of introspective psychology, -which reveals all our psychic activities and states as successive -modifications of this permanent “I,” “self,” “personality,” or “mind,” -according as we choose to express it. Human language proves this -most forcibly; for the intramental facts and data of our conscious -life simply cannot be so much as intelligibly expressed, much less, -defined, or differentiated from the extramental facts of the physical -world, without using terms that include a reference to this selfsame -persistent subject of thought, feeling, and volition. Even inveterate -phenomenalists, like Wundt, James, and Titchener, are obliged to -submit to this inexorable linguistic law, in common with their -unscientific brethren, the generality of mankind, although they do -so only after futile attempts at a “scientific revision” of grammar, -and with much grumbling over the “barbarous conceptions” of the -gross-headed aborigines who invented human language. Be that as it -may, no formulation of mental facts is possible except in terms that -either denote or connote this permanent source and ground of human -thought and feeling, as is apparent, for example, from such phrases -as: “_I_ think,” “_I_ wish,” “_I_ hear”; “_mental_ states” (_i. e._ of -the mind); _psychic_ functions (_i. e._ of the psyche); _subjective_ -idealism (_i. e._ of the subject); a _conscious_ act (from _con-scire_: -“to know along with,” because in conscious acts the subject is known -along with the object). The phenomenalists occasionally succeed, in -their “most precise” passages, in omitting to mention the person, -knower, or thinker behind thought, but they do so only at the cost of -substituting _personal pronouns_, and of thus bringing back through -the window what they have just ejected by way of the door. Our -consciousness, therefore, makes us invincibly aware of the _existence_ -of a superficially variable, but radically unchangeable, subject of -our mental life. It does not, however, tell us anything concerning the -_nature_ of this primary ground of thought, whether, for example, it is -identical with the cerebral cortex, or something distinct therefrom, -whether it is phenomenal or substantial, dynamic or entitive, spiritual -or material. To decide these questions the unanalyzed factual data of -internal experience do not suffice, but they do suffice to establish -the reality of the ego or subject of thought. Later we shall see that -the analysis of these data, when taken in conjunction with other facts, -forces us to predicate of the soul such attributes as substantiality, -simplicity, and spirituality, but here they are cited solely for their -factual force and not for their logical implications. - -The phenomenalistic schools of Interactionism and Psychophysical -Parallelism deny the _substantiality_ of the soul, and seek to resolve -it into sourceless and subjectless processes. A phenomenal mind or -soul, however, could not be the primary ground of mental life, for the -simple reason that phenomena presuppose a supporting medium (otherwise -they would be self-maintaining, and therefore, substantial). Now that -which presupposes cannot be a primary principle, but only a secondary, -or tertiary principle. Consequently, a functional mind could not be -the primary and irreducible ground of mental life, but only that _of -which_ it is a function, whether that something is a material, or a -spiritual substance. For the present, we are not interested in the -nature of this ultimate substrate, we are content with the fact that -it really exists. Phenomenalists (like Wundt, Paulsen, and James) -are very inconsistent when they admit material molecules as the -extended substrate of extramental or physical phenomena, while denying -the existence of the mind or ego as the inextended substrate of -intramental or psychic phenomena. All substance, whether material or -spiritual, is inaccessible to the senses. Even material substrates are -manifested only by their phenomena, being in themselves supersensible -and “metaphysical.” If, then, the human understanding is inerrant in -ascribing a material substrate to extramental phenomena, then it is -equally inerrant in attributing to intramental phenomena the intimate -substrate called mind, whether this substrate be a spiritual substance, -or a material substance like the substrate of physical phenomena -and that of organic life. As a matter of fact, the Psychophysical -Parallelists actually do reduce mental phenomena to a material -substrate (viz. the cerebral cortex). Their phenomenalism, which we -will refute presently, is but a disingenuous attempt to gloss over -their fundamental materialism. At all events, they are willing to admit -an ultimate substantial ground of thought and volition, provided it is -not claimed that this substrate is of a spiritual nature. The _bare -existence_ of some substrate, however, is all that we assert, for the -present. - -Before leaving this topic, we wish to call attention to the fact that -the subject of thought and desire is _active_ as well as _passive_. -Mind, in other words, is not merely a persistent medium wherein passive -mental states are maintained, but an active and synthetic principle -as well. Mental processes, like those of judgment, reasoning, and -recognition, require a unitary and unifying principle, which actively -examines and compares our impressions and thoughts, in order to discern -their relations to one another and to itself. Materialistic psychology, -in spite of the plain testimony of consciousness, is all for ignoring -the mind in its _active rôle_ as the percipient of the identities and -discrepancies of thought, and for regarding mind as a mere complex of -mental states or transient flux of fleeting imagery. It is well, then, -to bear in mind the indubitable facts of internal experience, to which -Cardinal Mercier calls attention. “English psychology,” he observes, -“had attempted a kind of anatomy of consciousness. It made all consist -in passive sensations or impressions. These impressions came together, -fused, dissociated under the guidance of certain laws, principally -those of similarity and dissimilarity. The whole process was entirely -passive without the intervention of any active subject. It was -psychology without a soul. Now that things are being examined a little -more closely, psychologists find that there are a lot of conscious -states that are without the slightest doubt active on the part of the -subject. There are a number of mental states upon which the subject -brings his _attention_ to bear, and attention (from _ad-tendere_) -means activity. Ordinarily we do not know the intensity of a sensation -without _comparing_ it with another preceding one. This work of -comparison, or, as the English call it, discrimination, is necessarily -_activity_. The Associationists had confounded the fact of coëxistence -with the perception of similarity or dissimilarity. Supposing even -that the coëxistence of two mental states were entirely passive, it -still remains true that the notion of their similarity or dissimilarity -requires an _act of perception_. It is absolutely impossible to -conceive psychical life without an _active subject_ which _perceives_ -itself as living, _notes_ the impressions it receives, _compares_ its -acts, _associates_ and _dissociates_ them; in a word, there can be -no psychology without a perceiving subject which psychologists call -_esprit_, or with the English, ‘mind.’” (_Op. cit._, pp. 52-54—italics -his.) - -The conflict between phenomenalism and the clear testimony of -consciousness is summed up in the following words of T. Fontaine: “If -all things are phenomena, then we ourselves can be nothing more than -events unknown to one another; in order, then, that such events may -appear to us united, so that we may be able to declare their succession -within us, it is necessary that something else besides them should -exist; and this something else, this link that binds them together, -this principle that is conscious of their succession, can be nothing -else than a non-event or non-phenomenon, namely, a substance, an ego -substantially distinct from sensations.” (“La sensation et la pensée,” -p. 23.) - -For the phenomenalists, mind is but a collective term for the -phenomenal series of our transitory thoughts and feelings. With -Wundt, they discard the substantial or entitive soul for a dynamic or -functional one, “_die aktuelle Seele_.” (Cf. Grundz. der Phys. Psych., -ed. 5th, III, p. 758 _et seq._) Thought antecedes itself by becoming -its own thinker; for Titchener tells us: “The passing thought would -seem to be the thinker.” (“Pr. of Psych.,” I, p. 342.) We do not think, -but thought thinks; John does not walk, but walking walks; aeroplanes -do not fly, but flight flies; air does not vibrate, but vibration -vibrates. The phenomenalist _objectivates his subjective abstractions_, -divorces processes from their agents, and substantializes phenomena. -The source of his error is a confusion of the ideal, with the real, -order of things. Because it is possible for us _to consider_ a thought -apart from any determinate thinker, by means of a mental abstraction, -he very falsely concludes that it is possible for a thought _to exist_ -without a concrete thinker. It would be obviously absurd to suppose -that the so-called Grignard reaction could occur without definite -reactants, merely because we can think of it without specifying any -particular kind of _alkyl halide_; it would be preposterous to infer, -from the fact that vibration can be considered independently of any -concrete medium such as air, water, or ether, that therefore a pure -vibration can exist without any vibrating medium; and it is equally -absurd to project an abstraction like subjectless thought into the -realm of existent reality. Abstractions are ideal entities of the mind; -they can have no real existence outside the domain of thought. Hence -to assign a real or extralogical existence to actions, modalities, and -properties, in isolation from the concrete subjects, to which they -belong, is a procedure that is not legitimate in any other world than -Alice’s Wonderland, where, we are told, the Cheshire Cat left behind -his notorious grin long after his benign countenance had faded from -view. His faceless grin is a fitting comment on the neo-Kantian folly -of those who, as L. Chiesa says, “speak of phenomena without substance, -of sensations without subject, of thoughts without the Ego, to which -they belong, imitating in this way the poets, who personify honor, -virtue, beauty, etc. Now all this proceeds exclusively from a confusion -of the subjective abstraction with the reality, and from the assumption -that the phenomenon, for example, exists without substance, because we -are able (by means of abstraction) to consider the former independently -of the latter.” (“La Base del Realismo,” p. 39.) In other words, the -mind is capable of separating (representatively, of course, and not -physically) its own phenomena from itself, but this is no warrant for -transferring the abstractions thus formed from the ideal, to the real, -order of things. - -So much for the soul’s substantiality, but it is a _simple_, as -well as a substantial, principle, that is to say, it is inextended, -uncompounded, incorporeal, and not dispersed into quantitative parts -or particles. In other words, it is not a composite of constituent -elements or complex of integral parts, but something really distinct -from the body and pertaining to a different order of reality than -matter. This, as we have seen, does not necessarily mean that it -is immaterial, in the sense of being intrinsically independent of -matter. In a word, simplicity does not involve spirituality (absolute -immateriality). Not only plant and animal souls, but even mineral -entelechies, are simple, in the negative sense of excluding extension, -corporeality and dispersal into quantitative parts, but they are, none -the less, intrinsically dependent on matter and are therefore material -principles. - -That the soul or vital entelechy is really distinct from its material -substrate is apparent from the perennial process of metabolism enacted -in the living organism. In this process, matter is the variant and -entelechy or specific type is the constant. Hence the two principles -are not only distinct, but separable. Moreover, the soul’s rôle as a -binding-principle that obstructs dissolution is incompatible with its -dispersal into quantitative parts; for such a principle, far from being -able to bind, would require binding itself, and could not, therefore, -be the primary source of unification in the organism. Finally, the soul -must be incorporeal; since, if it were a corporeal mass, it could not -be “a formative power pervading the growing mass as a whole” (Wilson); -for this would involve the penetration of one body by another. -Consequently, the soul is a simple, inextended, incorporeal reality -undispersed into quantitative parts. - -Introspective psychology bears witness to the same truth; for -consciousness reinforced by memory attests _the substantial permanence -of our personal identity_. We both think and regulate our practical -conduct in accordance with this sense of unchanging personal identity. -All recognition of the past means simply this, that we perceive the -substantial identity of our present, with our past, selves throughout -all the experiences and vicissitudes of life. There is an inmost core -of our being which is unchanging and which remains always identical -with itself, in spite of the flow of thought and the metabolic changes -of the life-cycle. It is this that gives us the sense of being -always identically the same person, from infancy to maturity, and -from maturity to old age. It is this that constitutes the thread of -continuity which links our yesterdays with today, and makes us morally -responsible for all the deliberate deeds of a lifetime. Courts of law -do not acquit a criminal because he is in a different frame of mind -from that which induced him to commit murder, nor do they excuse him on -the score that metabolism has made him a different mass of flesh from -that which perpetrated the crime. Such philosophies as phenomenalism -and materialism are purely academic. Even their advocates dare not -reduce them to consistent practice in everyday life. - -Nor can the cases of _alternating personalities_ be adduced as -counterevidence. In the first place, these cases are psychopathic -and not normal. In the second, they are due, not to a modification -of _personality itself_, but to a modification in the _perception of -personality_. Since this perception is, as we shall see, extrinsically -dependent on cerebral imagery, any neuropathic affection is liable -to modify the perception of personality by seriously disturbing -the imagery, on which it depends. But (_pace_ Wundt and James) the -perception of personality is one thing, and personality itself quite -another. Perception does not produce its objects, but presupposes -them, and self-perception is no exception to this rule. Introspection, -therefore, does not create our personality, but reveals and represents -it. If then to the intuition of consciousness our personality appears -as an unchanging principle that remains always substantially identical -with itself, it follows that this perception must be terminated by -something more durable than a flux of transient molecules or a stream -of fleeting thought. Unless this perceptive act has for its object some -unitary and uniformly persistent reality distinct from our composite, -corruptible bodies, and not identified with our transitory thoughts, -this sense of permanent personal identity would be utterly impossible. -Materialism, which recognizes nothing more in man than a decaying -organism, a mere vortex of fluent molecules, is at a loss to account -for our consciousness of being always the same person. Phenomenalism, -which identifies mind or self with the “thought-stream,” is equally -impotent to account for this sense of our abiding sameness. - -James’ attempt at a phenomenalistic explanation of the persistent -continuity of self, on the assumption that each passing thought knows -its receding predecessor and becomes known, in turn, by its successor, -is puerile. To pass over other flaws, this absurd theory encounters an -insuperable difficulty in _sleep_, which interrupts, for a considerable -interval, the flow of conscious thought. Thought is a transient -reality, which passes, so far as its actuality is concerned, and can -only remain in the form of a permanent effect. Unless, therefore, there -were some _persistent medium_ in which the last waking thought could -leave a permanent vestige of itself, the process of relaying the past -could never be resumed, and we would lose our personal identity every -twenty-four hours. The mind, or subject of thought, then, must be an -abiding and unitary principle distinct from our composite bodies, and -from our manifold and fleeting thoughts. - -Finally, to the two foregoing attributes of the human soul -(substantiality and simplicity), we must add a third and crowning -attribute, namely, _spirituality_. It is this, and this alone, that -differentiates the human from the bestial soul, which latter is but -an incomplete complement of matter, incapable of existence apart from -matter, and doomed to perish with the dissolution of the organism, as -the cylindrical form of a candle perishes with the consumption of the -wax by the flame. - -All the psychic activities of the brute, such as sensation, -object-perception, imagination, associative memory, sensual emotion, -etc., are organic functions of the sensitivo-nervous type. In -all of them the agent and recipient is not the soul alone, but -the psycho-organic composite of soul and organism, that is, the -soul-informed sensory and central neurons of the cerebrospinal system. -The sensory neurons are nerve cells that transmit centerward the -excitations of physical stimuli received by the external sense organs -or receptors, in which their axon-fibers terminate. These receptors -and sensory neurons are extended material organs proportioned and -specialized for receiving physical impressions from external bodies, -either directly through surface-contact with the bodies themselves -or their derivative particles (_e.g._ in touch, taste and smell), or -indirectly through surface-contact with an extended vibrant medium such -as air, water, or ether (_e.g._ in hearing and sight). The central -neurons of the cerebral cortex are, as it were, the tablets, upon which -the excitations transmitted thither by the sensory neurons, record the -extended neurograms that constitute the physical basis of the concrete -imagery of memory and imagination. Interior senses, then, like memory -and imagination, merely continue and combine what was preëxistent in -the exterior senses. Their composite imagery is rigidly proportioned -to the extended neurograms imprinted on the cerebral neurons, and -these neurograms, in turn, are determined both qualitatively and -quantitatively by the physical impressions received by the receptors, -and these impressions, finally, are exactly proportioned to the action -of the material stimuli in contact with the receptors. Thus the -composite images of imagination as well as those of direct perception -are proportioned to the underlying neurograms of the cortex and -correspond exactly, as regards quality, intensity, and extensity, to -the original stimulus affecting the external receptors. Hence men born -blind can never imagine color, nor can men born deaf ever imagine -sound. An inextended principle, such as the discarnate soul, cannot -receive or record impressions from extended vibrant media, or from -extended corporeal masses. For this the soul requires the intrinsic -coöperation of material receptors. Now, the highest cognitive and -appetitive functions of the brute (_e.g._ sense-perception and emotion) -are, as has been stated, of the sensitivo-nervous or psycho-organic -type, that is, they are functions in which the material organism -intimately coöperates; brute animals give no indication of having so -much as a single function, which proceeds from the soul alone and -which is not communicated to the organism. Hence the bestial soul is -“totally immersed” in matter; as regards both operation and existence, -it is “intrinsically dependent” upon its material complement, the -organism. It never operates save in conjunction with the latter, and -its _sole reason for existence_ is adequately summed up in saying that -it exists, not for its own sake, but merely _to vivify and sensitize -the organism_. Consequently, the brute soul, though inextended and -incorporeal, belongs, not to the spiritual, but to the material, order -of things. - -Is the human soul equally material in nature, or does it belong to the -spiritual category of being? The state of the question has long since -been formulated for us by Aristotle: “A further difficulty,” he says, -“arises as to whether all attributes of the soul are also shared by -that which has the soul or whether any of them are peculiar to the soul -itself: a problem which it is imperative, and yet by no means easy, to -solve. It would appear that in most cases it neither acts nor is acted -upon apart from the body: as, _e.g._, in anger, courage, desire, and -sensation in general. Thought, if anything, would seem to be peculiar -to the soul. Yet if thought is a sort of imagination, or something not -independent of imagination, it will follow that not even thought is -independent of the body. If, then, there be any functions or affections -of the soul that are peculiar to it, it will be possible for the soul -to be separated from the body: if, on the other hand, there is nothing -peculiar to it, the soul will not be capable of separate existence.” -(“Peri Psyches,” Bk. I, chap. I, 9.) We shall see that the human -soul has certain operations which it discharges independently of the -intrinsic coägency of the organism, _e.g._, abstract thought (not to be -confounded with the concrete imagery of the imagination) and deliberate -volition (to be distinguished from the urge of the sensual appetite). -Hence, over and above the organic functions, which it discharges in -conjunction with the material organism, the human soul has superorganic -functions, of which it is itself, in its own right, the exclusive agent -and recipient. In other words, it exists _for its own sake_ and not -merely to perfect the body. - -The Aristotelian argument for the spirituality of the human soul -consists in the application of a self-evident principle or axiom to -certain facts of internal experience. The axiom in question is the -following: “The nature of an agent is revealed by its action”; or, -to phrase it somewhat differently: “Every being operates after the -same manner that it exists.” The factual data, to which reference is -made, are man’s higher psychic functions, in which the soul alone -is the active cause and receptive subject, namely: the rational or -superorganic functions of thinking and willing. The argument may be -formulated thus: Every agent exists after the same manner that it -operates. But in rational cognition and volition the soul acts without -the co-agency of the material organism. Therefore the human soul can -exist without the coexistence of the material organism. But this is -tantamount to saying that it is a spiritual reality irreducible to -matter and incapable of derivation from matter. For we define that -as spiritual, which exists, or is, at least, capable of existing, -without matter. Consequently, the human soul is a supermaterial and -immortal principle, which does not need the body to maintain itself in -existence, and can, on that account, survive the death and dissolution -of its material complement, the organism. Such a reality, as we -have seen, cannot be a product of evolution, but can only come into -existence by way of creation. - -The axiom, that activity is the expression or manifestation of the -entity which underlies it, needs but little elucidation. In the -genesis of human knowledge, the dynamic is prior to both the static -and the entitive. We deduce the nature of the cause from the changes -or effects that it produces. Action, in short, is the primary datum -upon which our knowledge of being rests. It is the spectrum of solar -light emitted by them, which enables us to determine the nature of -the chemical elements present in the distant Sun. It is the reaction -of an unknown compound with a test reagent that furnishes the chemist -with a clue to its composition and structure. It is the special type -of tissue degeneration caused by the specific toxin engendered by an -invisible disease germ that enables the pathologists to identify the -latter, etc., etc. So much for the axiom. Regarding the psychological -facts, a more lengthy exposition is required. To begin with, there -is _prima facie_ evidence against the contention that the higher -psychic functions in man are independent of the organism. Injury and -degeneration of the cerebral cortex result (very often, at least) in -insanity and idiocy. Reason, therefore, is in some way dependent upon -the organism. Babies, too, are incapable of rational thought until -such a time as the nervous system is fully developed. Obviously, -then, rational functions cannot be spiritual, inasmuch as they are not -independent of the organism. - -This time-honored objection of materialists is based on a -misapprehension. It falsely assumes that spirituality excludes _every_ -kind of dependence upon a material organism, and that our assertion -of the soul’s independence of matter is an unqualified assertion. -This, however, is far from being the case. It is only _intrinsic_ -(subjective), and not _extrinsic_ (objective), independence of the -organism which is here affirmed. An analogy from the sense of sight -will serve to make clear the meaning of this distinction. In the act -of seeing a tree, for example, our sight is dependent upon a twofold -corporeal element, namely, the _eye_ and the _tree_. It is dependent -upon the eye as upon a corporeal element intrinsic to the visual sense, -the eye being a constituent part of the agent and subject of vision; -for it is not the soul alone which sees, but rather the soul-informed -retina and neurons of the psycho-organic composite. The eye enters as -an essential ingredient into the intimate constitution of the visual -sense. It is a _constituent part_ of the _specific cause_ of vision, -and it can therefore be said with perfect propriety that the _eye -sees_. Such dependence upon a material element is called intrinsic or -subjective dependence, and is utterly incompatible with spirituality on -the part of that which is thus dependent. But the dependence of sight -upon an external corporeal factor, like a tree or any other visible -object, is of quite a different nature. Here the corporeal element is -outside of the seeing subject and does not enter as an ingredient into -the composition of the principal and specific agent of vision. True the -tree, which is seen, is coïnstrumental as a provoking stimulus and an -objective exemplar, but its concurrence is of an extrinsic nature, not -to be confounded with the intrinsic co-agency of the eye in the act of -vision. Hence, in no sense whatever can the tree be said to see; for -the tree is merely an object, not the principal and specific cause, -of vision. When the dependence of an agent upon a corporeal element -is of this sort, it is termed extrinsic or objective dependence. Such -dependence upon a material element is _perfectly compatible with -spirituality_, which does, indeed, exclude all materiality from the -specific agent and subject of a psychic act, but does not necessarily -exclude materiality from the object contemplated in such an act. Hence -the fact that the thinking soul must abstract its rational concepts -from the concrete imagery of a cerebral sense, like the imagination, -in no wise detracts from its spirituality, because the dependence of -abstract thought upon such imagery is objective or extrinsic, and not -subjective or intrinsic. - -Psychologists of the sensationalist school have striven to obscure -the fundamental distinction which exists between rational thought and -the concomitant cerebral imagery. It is, however, far too manifest -to escape attention, as the healthy reaction of the modern school of -Würzburg indicates. “It cost me great resolution,” says Dr. F. E. -Schultze, a member of this school, “to say, that, on the basis of -immediate experiment, appearances and sensible apprehensions are not -the only things that can be experienced. But finally I had to resign -myself to my fate.” (“Beitrag zur Psychologie des Zeitbewusstseins,” p. -277.) - -But thought is not only distinct from imagery, often there is marked -contrast between the two, both as regards subjective, and objective, -characters. Thus our thought may be perfectly clear, precise, and -pertinent, while the accompanying imagery is obscure, fragmentary, -and irrelevant. “What enters into consciousness so fragmentarily, so -sporadically, so very accidentally as our mental images,” exclaims Karl -Bühler (also of Würzburg), “can not be looked upon as the well-knitted, -continuous content of our thinking.” (_Archiv. für die ges. Psychol._, -9, 1907, p. 317.) The same contrast exists with respect to their -objective characters. Imagination represents by means of one and the -same image what reason represents by means of two distinct concepts, -_e.g._ an oasis and a mirage; and, _vice versa_, reason represents -under the single general concept of a rose objects that imagination -is forced to represent by means of two distinct images, _e.g._, a -yellow, and a white rose. Imagery depicts only the superficial or -exterior properties of an object, whereas thought penetrates beneath -the phenomenal surface to interior properties and supersensible -relationships. The sensory percept apprehends the existence of a fact, -while the rational concept analyzes its nature. Hence sense-perception -is concerned with the _reality of existence_, while thought is -concerned with the _reality of essence_. - -Certain American psychologists employ the term _imageless thought_ -to designate abstract concepts. The expression is liable to be -misunderstood. It should not be construed as excluding all concomitance -and concurrence of sensible imagery, in relation to the process of -thought. What is really meant is that sensible appearances do not make -up the sum-total of our internal experiences, but that we are also -aware of mental acts and states which are not reducible to imagery. -In other words, we experience thought; and thought and imagery, -though concomitant, are not commensurable. The clarity and coherence -of thought does not depend on the clarity or germaneness of the -accompanying imagery, nor is it ever adequately translatable into terms -of that imagery. Thus the universal triangle of geometry, which is not -right, nor oblique, nor isosceles, neither scalene nor equilateral, -neither large nor small, neither here nor there, neither now nor then, -is not visualizable in terms of concrete imagery, although we are -clearly conscious of its significance in geometrical demonstrations. -Imagery differs according to the person, one man being a visualist, -another an audist, another a tactualist, another a motor-verbalist, -etc. But thought is the same in all, and consequently it is thought, -and not imagery, which we convey by means of speech. Helen Keller, -whose imagery is mainly motor and tactile, can exchange views with an -audist or visualist on the subject of geometry, even though the amount -of imagery which she has in common with such persons is negligible. -“_Eine Bedeutung_,” says Bühler, “_kann man überhaupt nicht vorstellen, -sondern nur wissen_,” and Binet, in the last sentence of his “L’Étude -expérimentale de l’intelligence,” formulates the following conclusion: -“Finally—and this is the main fact, fruitful in consequences for the -philosophers—the entire logic of thought escapes our imagery.” - -Nevertheless, thought does not originate in the total absence of -imagery, but requires a minimal substrate of sensible images, upon -which it is objectively, if not subjectively, dependent. The nature -of this objective dependence is explained by the Scholastic theory -concerning the origin of concepts. According to this theory, the -genesis of our general and abstract knowledge is as follows: (1) We -begin with sense-perception, say of boats differing in shape, size, -color, material, location, etc. (2) Imagination and sense-memory retain -the composite and concrete imagery synthesized or integrated from the -impressions of the separate external senses and representing the boats -in all their factual particularity, individuality, and materiality, -as existent here and now, or there and then, as constructed of such -and such material (_e.g._, of wood, or steel, or iron, or concrete), -as having determinate sizes, shapes, and tonnages, as painted white, -or gray, or green, as propelled by oar, or sail, or turbine, etc. (3) -Then the _active intellect_ exerts its abstractive influence upon this -concrete imagery, accentuating the essential features which are common -to all, and suppressing the individuating features which are peculiar -to this or that boat, so that the essence of a boat may appear to the -_cognitive intellect_ without its concomitant individuation—the essence -of a boat being, in this way, isolated from the peculiarities thereof -and its various qualities from their subject (representatively, of -course, and not physically). (4) The imagery thus predisposed, being -no longer immersed in matter, but dematerialized by the dispositive -action of the active intellect, becomes coïnstrumental with the -latter in producing a determination in the cognitive intellect. (5) -Upon receiving this determination, the cognitive intellect, which -has hitherto been, as it were, a blank tablet with nothing written -upon it, reacts to express the essence or nature of a boat by means -of a spiritual representation or concept—the abstractive act of the -active intellect is _dispositive_, inasmuch as it _presents_ what -is common to all the boats perceived without their differentiating -peculiarities; the abstractive act of the cognitive intellect, -however, is _cognitive_, inasmuch as it _considers_ the essence of a -boat without considering its individuation. Such is the abstractive -process by which our general and abstract concepts are formed. From a -comparison of two concepts of this sort the process of judgment arises, -and from the comparison of two concepts with a third arises the process -of mediate inference or reasoning. Volition, too, is consequent upon -conception, and hence an act of the will (our rational appetite), such -as the desire of sailing in a boat, entails the preëxistence of some -conceptual knowledge of the nature of a boat. Volition, therefore, -presupposes thought, and thought presupposes imagination, which -supplies the sensible imagery that undergoes the aforesaid process -of analysis or abstraction. Such imagery, however, is a function of -the cerebral cortex, and, for this reason, the normal exercise of the -imagination presupposes the cerebral cortex in a normal physiological -condition; and anything that disturbs this normal condition of the -cortex will directly disturb the imagery of the imagination, and -therefore indirectly impede the normal exercise of conceptual thought, -which is abstracted from such imagery. Hence it is clear that the -activity of both the intellect and the will is objectively dependent -upon the organic activity of the imagination, and, in consequence, -_indirectly_ dependent upon the physiological condition of the cerebral -cortex, which is the organ of the imagination. Since, however, this -dependence is objective rather than subjective, it does not, as we have -seen, conflict with the spirituality of rational thought. - -The nature of conceptual thought is such as to exclude the -participation of matter as a constituent of its specific agent -and receptive subject. The objects of a cerebral sense like the -imagination are endowed with extension, color, shape, volume, mass, -temperature, and other physical properties, in virtue of which they -can set up vibrations in an extended medium or modify an extended -organ by immediate physical contact. But, while imagination makes -us conscious of objects capable of stimulating extended material -organs, the objects, of which we are conscious in abstract thinking, -are divested of all the sensible properties, extension, and specific -energies, which would enable them to modify a material neuron, or -produce a physical impression upon a material receptor of any kind -whatever. Between an extended material receptor, like a sense-organ or -a cerebral neuron, and the nondimensional, dematerialized object or -content of an abstract thought, like science, heroism, or morality, -there is no conceivable proportion. How can a material organ be -affected by what is supersensible, unextended, imponderable, invisible, -intangible, and uncircumscribed by the limitations of space and time? -Extended receptors are necessary for picking up the vibrations of a -tridimensional medium (like air or ether), and they are, likewise, -essential for the reception of impressions produced by surface-contact -with an exterior corporeal mass. In short, sensory neurons are needed -to receive and transmit inward the quantitative and measurable -excitations of the material stimuli of the external world, and central -neurons are required as tablets upon which these incoming excitations -may imprint _extended neurograms_, that are proportionate in intensity -and extensity to the external stimulus apprehended, and that underlie -and determine the concrete imagery (of which they are the physical -basis). But when it comes to perceiving and representing the _meaning_ -of duty, truth, error, cause, effect, psychology, means, end, entity, -logarithms, etc., our mind can derive no benefit from the coöperation -of a material organ. In such thinking we are conscious of that which -could not make an impression nor leave a record upon material receptors -like neurons. To employ a material organ for the purpose of perceiving -abstract essences and qualities would be as futile and pointless as an -attempt to stop a nondimensional, unextended, intangible baseball with -a catcher’s glove. Hence the services of material centers and receptors -may be dispensed with, so far as rational thought is concerned. -Rational thought cannot utilize the intrinsic coägency of the organism, -and it is therefore a superorganic or spiritual function. - -That conceptual thought is in no wise communicated to the organism, -but subjected in the spiritual soul alone, is likewise apparent from -the data furnished by introspection. The conceiving mind apprehends -even material objects according to an abstract or spiritualized mode -of representation. In other words, in conceiving material objects -we expurgate them of their materiality and material conditions, -endowing them with a dematerialized mode of mental existence which -they could never have, if subjected in their own physical matter, or -in the organized matter of the cerebral cortex. Thus, in forming our -concept of a material object like a boat, we spiritualize the boat -by separating (representatively, of course, and not physically) its -nature or essence from the determinate matter (_e.g._, wood, or steel) -of which it is made, and by divesting it of the material and concrete -conditions which define not only its physical existence outside of -us, but also its imaginal existence within us as a concrete image -in our imagination. In other words, we isolate the type or form of -a given object from its material substrate and liberate it from the -limiting material and concrete individuation, which confine it to a -single material subject and localize it definitely in space and time. -Now, it is axiomatic that whatever is received is received according -to the nature of the receiver. Water, for example, assumes the form -of the receptacle into which it is poured, and a picture painted -upon canvas is necessarily extended according to the extension of -the canvas. If, therefore, our intellect endows even the material -objects, which it perceives, with a dematerialized or spiritualized -mode of representation, it follows that the intellect itself is a -spiritual power and not an organic sense immersed in concretifying -and individualizing matter. Certainly, this ideal or spiritualized -mode of existence does not emanate from the material object without -nor yet from its vicarious material image in our organic imagination -(which, in point of fact, is absolutely impotent to imagine anything -except concrete, singular things in all their determinate individuation -and quantification). Thought, then, with its _abstract mode of -presentation_, cannot, like imagery, be subjected in the animated or -soul-informed cortex, but must have the spiritual mind alone as its -receptive subject. Our abstract or dematerialized mode of conceiving -material objects is a subjective character of thought, proceeding from, -and manifesting, the spirituality of the human mind, which represents -even material objects in a manner that accords with its own spiritual -nature. - -But it is not only in the process of abstraction, but also in that -of _reflection_, that rational thought manifests its superorganic or -spiritual character. The human mind knows that it knows and understands -that it understands, thinks of its own thoughts and of itself as -the agent and subject of its thinking. It is conscious of its own -conscious acts, that is to say, it reflects upon itself and its own -acts, becoming an object to itself. The thinking ego becomes an -object of observation on the part of the thinking ego, which acquires -self-knowledge by this process of reflective thought. In introspection, -that which observes is identical with that which is observed. Now such -a capacity of self-observation cannot reside in matter, cannot be -spatially commensurate with a material organ nor inseparably attached -thereto. It is possible only to an immaterial or spiritual principle, -devoid of mass and extension, and not subject to the law of the -impenetrability of matter. In virtue of the law of impenetrability, -no two material particles, no two bodies, no two integral parts of the -same body, can occupy one and the same place. One part of a body can, -indeed, act on another part extrinsic to itself; but one and the same -part or particle cannot act upon itself. To become at once observed -and observer, a material organ would have to split itself in two, so -that the part watched could be distinct from, and spatially external -to, the part watching. The power of perfect reflection, therefore, must -reside in the spiritual soul, and cannot be bound to, and coëxtensive -with, a material organ. Only in this supposition can there be a return -of the subject upon and into itself, only in this supposition can -there be that identification of observed and observer implied by the -process of reflection. H. Gründer, in his “Psychology without a Soul,” -gives a graphic _reductio ad absurdum_ of the contrary assumption: -“A fairy tale,” he says, “tells of a knight who was beheaded by his -victorious foe. But, strange to relate, the vanquished knight rose to -his feet, seized his severed head and bore it off, as in triumph. The -most remarkable part, however, of the story is that with a last effort -of gallantry he took his own head, and—kissed its brow. The climax of -this fairy tale is no more absurd than the assumption that a material -organ can know itself and philosophize on itself. Only if we admit with -the scholastics a simple soul intrinsically independent of any bodily -organism, can we explain the possibility of perfect psychological -reflexion.” (_Cf._ pp. 193, 194.) - -For the rest the impossibility of introspection on the part of a -material organ is so evident that the materialists themselves freely -concede it, and being unwilling to admit the spirituality of the human -intellect, they are forced to resort to the disingenuous expedient -of denying the _fact_ of reflection on the part of the human mind. -“It is obvious,” says Auguste Comte, “that by an invincible necessity -the human mind can observe directly all phenomena except its own. We -understand that a man can observe himself as a moral agent, because -in that case he can watch himself under the action of the passions -which animate him, precisely because the organs that are the seat -of those passions are distinct from those that are destined for the -functions of observation.... But it is manifestly impossible to observe -intellectual phenomena whilst they are being produced. The individual -thinking cannot divide himself in two, so that one half may think -and the other watch the process. Since the organ observing and the -one to be observed are identical, there can be no self-observation.” -(“Cours de philosophie positive,” lière leçon.) But an argument is -of no avail against a fact, and, as a matter of fact, we do reflect. -It is by introspection or reflective thought that we discriminate -between our present and our past thoughts, and become conscious of our -own consciousness. Our intellect even reflects upon its own act of -reflection, and so on indefinitely, so that, unless we are prepared -to accept the absurd alternative of an infinite series of thinkers, -we have no choice but to identify the subject knowing with the -subject known. That our intellect is conscious of its own operations -and attentive to its own thoughts, is an evident fact of internal -experience, and it is preposterous to tilt against facts by means -of syllogisms. When Zeno concocted his aprioristic “proof” of the -impossibility of translatory movement, his sophism was refuted by the -simple process of walking—_solvitur ambulando_. In like manner, the -Comtean sophism concerning the impossibility of reflection is refuted -by the simple act of mental reflection—_solvitur reflectendo_. For the -rest, we readily concede Comte’s contention that an organ is incapable -of reflection or self-observation, but we deny his tacit assumption -that our cognitive powers are _all_ of the organic type. Our intellect, -which attends to its own phenomena, thinks of its own thought and -reasons upon its own reasoning, cannot be bound to, or coextensive -with, a material organ, but must be free from any corporeal organ and -rooted in a spiritual principle. In a word, reflective thought is a -superorganic function expressing the spiritual nature of the human mind. - -Another proof of the superorganic nature of the human intellect as -compared with sentiency, both exterior and interior, is one adduced by -Aristotle himself: “But that the impassivity of the sense,” he says, -“is different from that of intellect is clear if we look at the sense -organs and at sense. The sense loses its power to perceive, if the -sensible object has been too intense; thus it cannot hear sound after -very loud noises, and after too powerful colors or odors it can neither -see nor smell. But the intellect, when it has been thinking on an -object of intense thought, is not less, but even more, able to think of -inferior objects. For sense-perception is not independent of the body, -whereas the intellect is.” (“Peri Psyches,” Bk. III, Ch. iv, 5.) - -This temporary incapacitation of the senses consequent upon powerful -stimulation is a common experience embalmed in such popular expressions -as “a deafening noise,” “a blinding flash,” “a dazzling light,” “a -numbing pain,” etc. Weber’s law of the differential threshold tells -us that the intensity of sensation does not increase in the same -proportion as that of the stimulus. On the contrary, the more intense -the previous stimulus has been, the greater must be the increment -added to the subsequent stimulus before it can produce a perceptible -increase in the intensity of sensation. In short, stimulation of the -senses temporarily decreases their sensitivity with reference to -supervening stimuli. The reason for this momentary loss of the power to -react normally is evidently due to the organic nature of the senses. -Their activity entails a definite and rigidly proportionate process -of destructive metabolism in their bodily substrate, the organism. In -other words, the exercise of sense-perception involves a commensurate -process of decomposition in the neural tissue, which must afterwards -be compensated by a corresponding assimilation of nutrient material, -before the sense can again react with its pristine vigor. This process -of recuperation requires time and temporarily inhibits the reactive -power of the sense in question, the duration of this repair work being -determined by the amount of neural decomposition caused by the reaction -of the sense to the previous stimulus. When, therefore, a weaker -stimulus supervenes in immediate succession to a stronger one, the -sense is incapable of perceiving it. All organic activity, in short, -such as sense-perception and imagination, is rigidly regulated by the -metabolic law of waste and repair. - -With the intellect, however, the case is quite different. The intellect -is neither debilitated nor stupefied by the discovery of truths that -are exceptionally profound, or unusually abstruse, or strikingly -evident; nor is it temporarily incapacitated thereby from understanding -simpler, easier, or less evident truths. On the contrary, the more -comprehensive, the more penetrating, the more perspicuous, the more -sublime our intellectual vision is, so much the more is our intellect -invigorated and enthused in its pursuit of truth, and its knowledge -of the highest truths renders it not less, but more, apt for the -understanding of simple and ordinary truths. Obviously, then, the -intellect is not bound to a corruptible organ like the senses, but has -for its subject a spiritual principle that is intrinsically independent -of the organism. - -In opposition to this contention, it may be urged that a prolonged -exercise of intellectual activity results in the condition commonly -known as brain-fag. But this fatigue of the brain is not, as a matter -of fact, the _direct_ effect of intellectual activity; rather it is the -direct effect of the activity of the imagination, and only _indirectly_ -the effect of intellectual thought. The intellect, as we have seen, -requires a constant flow of associated and aptly coördinated imagery -as the substrate of its contemplation. Now, the imagination, which -supplies this imagery, is a cerebral sense, whose activity is directly -proportionate to, and commensurate with, the metabolic processes at -work in the cortical cells. Its exercise is directly dependent upon -the energy released by the decomposition of the cerebral substance. -Prolonged activity of the imagination, therefore, involves the -destruction of a considerable amount of the cortical substance, and -results in temporary incapacitation or paralysis of the imagination, -which must then be compensated by a process of repair in the cortical -neurons, before the imagination can resume its normal mode of -functioning. Brain-fag, then, is due to the activity of the imagination -rather than that of the intellect. That such is the case appears from -the fact that after the initial exertion, which results from the -imagination being forced to assemble an appropriate and systematized -display of illustrative imagery as subject-matter for the contemplation -of the intellect, the latter is henceforth enabled to proceed with ease -along the path of a given science, its further progress being smooth -and unhampered. Once the preliminary work imposed upon the imagination -is finished, the sense of effort ceases and intellectual investigation -and study may subsequently reach the highest degrees of concentration -and intensity, without involving corresponding degrees of fatigue or -depression on the part of the cerebral imagination, just as, conversely -speaking, the activity of the cerebral imagination may reach degrees -of intensity extreme enough to induce brain-fag in psychic operations -wherein the concomitant intellectual activity is reduced to a minimum, -_e. g._, in the task of memorizing a poem, or recitation. Here, in the -all but complete absence of intellectual activity, the same fatigue -results as that induced by a prolonged period of analytic study or -investigation, in which imaginative activity and rational thinking are -concomitant. The point to be noted, in this latter case, is that the -intellect does not show the same dependence upon the physiological -vicissitudes as the imagination. The imagery of our imagination, being -rigidly correlated with the metabolic processes of waste and repair -at work in the cerebral cortex, manifests correspondingly variable -degrees of intensity and integrity, but the intensity of thought is -not dependent upon this alternation of excitation and inhibition in -the cortex. Hence, while the concomitant imagery is fitful, sporadic, -and fragmentary, intellectual thought itself is steady, lucid, -and continuous. The intensity of thought does not vary with the -fluctuations of neural metabolism, and may reach a maximum without -involving corresponding fatigue in the brain. The brain-fag, therefore, -which results from study does not correspond to the height of our -intellectual vision, but is due to the intensity of the concomitant -imaginative process. - -The intellect, therefore, is not subject to the metabolic laws -which rigidly regulate organic functions like sense-perception -and imagination. Man’s capacity for logical thought is frequently -unaffected by the decline of the organism which sets in after maturity. -All organic functions, however, such as sight, hearing, sense-memory, -are impaired in exact proportion to the deterioration of the organism, -which is the inevitable sequel of old age. The intellectual powers, on -the contrary, remain unimpaired, so long as the cortex is sound enough -to furnish the required minimum of imagery, upon which intellectual -activity is objectively dependent. There are, in fact, many cases on -record where men have remained perfectly sane and rational, despite the -fact that notable portions of the cerebral cortex had been destroyed by -accident or disease (_e. g._, tumors). Intellectual thought, therefore, -is a superorganic function, having its source in a spiritual principle -and not in a corruptible organ. - -Such is the spiritualism of Aristotle. That this conception differs -profoundly from the ultraspiritualism of Descartes, it is scarcely -necessary to remark. The position assumed by the latter was always -untenable, but it is now, more than ever, indefensible in the face -of that overwhelming avalanche of facts whereby modern physiological -psychology demonstrates the close interdependence and correlation -existent between psychic and organic states. Such facts are exploited -by materialists as arguments against spiritualism, though it is evident -that they have force only against Cartesian spiritualism, and are -bereft of all relevance with respect to Aristotelian spiritualism, -which they leave utterly intact and unscathed. In the latter system, -sense-perception, imagination, and emotion are acknowledged to be -directly dependent on the organism. Again, spiritual functions like -thinking and willing are regarded as objectively or extrinsically -dependent upon the imagination, which, in turn, is directly dependent -on a material organ, namely: the brain. Hence even the rational -operations of the mind are indirectly dependent upon the cerebral -cortex. The spiritualism of Aristotle, therefore, by reason of its -doctrine concerning the direct dependence of the lower, and the -indirect dependence of the higher, psychic functions upon the material -organism, is able to absorb into its own system all the supposedly -hostile facts amassed by Materialism, thereby rendering them futile -and inconsequential as arguments against the spirituality of the human -soul. In confronting this philosophy, the materialistic scientist finds -himself disarmed and impotent, and it is not to be wondered at, that, -after indulging in certain abusive epithets and a few cant phrases, -such as “metaphysics” or “medieval” (invaluable words!), he prudently -retires from the lists without venturing to so much as break a lance in -defense of his favorite dogma, that nothing is spiritual, because all -is matter. In this predicament, the Cartesian caricature proves a boon -to the materialist, as furnishing him with the adversary he prefers, -a man of straw, and enabling him to demonstrate his paltry tin-sword -prowess. Of a truth, Descartes performed an inestimable service for -these modern “assassins of the soul,” when he relieved them of the -necessity of crossing swords with the hylomorphic dualism of Aristotle -by the substitution of a far less formidable antagonist, namely, the -psychophysical dualism of mind and matter. - -The proofs advanced, in the previous pages, for the spirituality of -the human soul are based upon the superorganic function of rational -thought. A parallel series of arguments can be drawn from the -superorganic function of rational volition. The cognitive intellect -has for its necessary sequel the appetitive will, which may be defined -as spiritual tendency inclining us toward that which the intellect -apprehends as good. The objects of such volition are frequently -abstract and immaterial ideals transcendent to the sphere of concrete -and material goods, _e. g._, virtue, glory, religion, etc. The will of -man, moreover, is free, in the sense that it can choose among various -motives, and is not compelled to follow the line of least resistance, -as is the electric current when passing through a shunt of steel and -copper wire. Like the self-knowing intellect, the self-determining -will is capable of reflective action, that is, it can will to will. -Having its own actions within its own control, it is itself the -principal cause of its own decisions, and thus becomes responsible for -its conduct, wherever its choice has been conscious and deliberate. -External actions, which escape the control of the will, and even -internal actions of the will itself, which are indeliberate, are not -free and do not entail responsibility. Our courts of law and our whole -legal system rests on the recognition of man’s full responsibility for -his deliberate voluntary acts. The distinction between premeditated -murder, which is punished, and unpremeditated homicide, which is not, -is purely moral, and not physical, depending for its validity upon the -fact of human freedom. It is this exemption from physical determinism, -that makes man a moral agent, subject to duties, amenable to moral -suasion, and capable of merit or demerit. Finally, the will of man -is insatiable, invincible, and inexhaustible. The aspirations of the -will are boundless, whereas our animal appetites are easily cloyed by -gratification. There is no freezing point for human courage. The animal -or sensual appetites wear out and decline with old age, but virtue and -will-power do not necessarily diminish with the gradual deterioration -of the material organism. Willing, therefore, is a superorganic or -spiritual function. Activity which is bound to a material organ cannot -tend towards supersensible ideals, cannot escape physical determinism, -cannot achieve the reflective feat of spurring itself to action, cannot -avoid exhaustion, cannot elude rigid regulation by the laws of organic -metabolism. For this reason, the brute, whose psychic functions are -of the organic type exclusively, is destitute of freedom, morality, -and responsibility. Deliberate volition, therefore, like conceptual -thought, has its source and subject in man’s spiritual soul, and is not -a function of the material organism.[12] - - [12] To develop the argument drawn from rational volition - for the spirituality of the human soul would carry us too - far afield. Those who wish to pursue the subject further - may consult Chapter VIII of Gründer’s monograph entitled - “Psychology without a Soul,” also his monograph on “Free Will.” - - G. H. Parker of Harvard, though admitting the fact of human - freedom, tries to explain it away in terms of materialism. The - following is the description which he gives of his theory: “It - is a materialist view which, however, recognizes in certain - types of organized matter a degree of free action consistent - with human behavior and the resultant responsibility.” - (_Science_, June 13, 1924, p. 520.) Freedom, in other words, - “emerges” from matter having a peculiar “type of organization.” - - This view must be interpreted in the light of the philosophy - of “Emergent Evolution,” which Parker holds in common with C. - Lloyd Morgan and R. W. Sellars. The philosophy in question - recognizes in nature an ascending scale of more and more - complexly organized units, starting with protons and electrons, - at the bottom, and culminating in the human organism, at the - top. At each higher level of this cosmic scale we find higher - units formed by coalescence of the simpler units of a lower - level. These higher units, however, are _something more_ than - a mere summation of the lower units; for, in addition to - _additive_ properties that can be predicted from a knowledge - of the components, they exhibit genuinely _new_ properties - which, not being mere sums of the properties of the component - units, are unpredictable on that basis. Given, for example, the - weight of two volumes of hydrogen and one volume of oxygen, we - could predict an _additive_ property such as the _weight_ of - the compound, _i.e._ the water, formed by their combination. - Other properties, of the compound, however, such as liquidity, - are not foreshadowed by the properties of the component - gases. Similarly, the weight of carbon disulphid (CS₂) is - an additive function of the combining weights of sulphur and - carbon, but the other properties of this mobile liquid are - not predictable on the basis of the properties of sulphur and - carbon. Hence _two_ kinds of properties are distinguished: (1) - _additive_ (quantitative) properties called _resultants_, which - are predictable; (2) _specificative_ (qualitative) properties - called _emergents_, which are unprecedented and unpredictable. - Freedom and intelligence, accordingly, are pronounced to be - _emergents_ of matter organized to that degree of complexity - which we find in man. - - This dualism of resultance and emergence is merely a new - verbal vesture for the hylomorphic dualism of Aristotle. The - _additive_ properties (_resultants_) are based on _matter_, - which is the principle of _continuity_. The _specificative_ - (constituitive or qualitative) properties called emergents - are rooted in _entelechy_ (form), which is the principle of - _novelty_. In fact, entelechy (form) itself is _an emergent of - matter_ just as the specificative properties are _emergents_ - of matter, with the sole difference that _entelechy_ is - _the primary emergent_ of matter, whereas the specificative - or qualitative properties are _secondary emergents_. For - in Aristotelian philosophy, entelechy is not, as it is in - Neo-vitalism, “an alien principle inserted into matter” - abruptly and capriciously “at the level of life,” but a - _primary emergent_ and _constituent_ of matter both living - and non-living. In fine, entelechy is an _emergent_ of matter - in all the units of nature from the simplest atom to the - most complex plant or animal organism. The only entelechy, - which is not an _emergent_, but an _insert_ into matter, is - the _spiritual human soul_. Neither the human soul nor the - _superorganic_ functions rooted in it, namely, abstraction, - reflection, and election, are _emergents_. Here we have - _novelty without continuity_, and therefore not _emergence_ - (eduction), but _insertion_ (infusion). - - In his “Emergent Evolution,” 1923, Lloyd Morgan lays it down - as axiomatic that _emergence involves continuity_—“There - may often be resultants,” he says, “without emergence; but - there are no emergents that do not involve resultant effects - also. Resultants give quantitative continuity which underlies - new constitutive steps in emergence.” (_Op. cit._, p. 5.) - Now our proofs for human spirituality consist precisely in - the _complete exclusion of quantitative continuity_ between - _organic_ functions (_e. g._ sensation) and _superorganic_ - functions (_e. g._ conceptual thought and free volition). - Hence, by the very axiom which Morgan himself formulates, - the human soul and its _superorganic functions_ are excluded - from the category of material _emergents_. If there can be no - emergence without quantitative continuity, then the human soul - is not an _emergent from_, but an _insert into_, matter. _Free - choice_, too, it is needless to say, is not an _emergent of - matter_, but an _expression of the supermaterial nature of the - human soul_. So much for the new-old dualism of emergence and - resultance. - -Two additional facts may be cited as bringing into strong relief -the basic contrast existing between the higher or rational, and the -lower or animal psychosis in man. The first is the occurrence of -irreconcilable opposition or conflict. The imagination, for example, -antagonizes the intellect by visualizing as an extended speck of chalk -or charcoal the mathematical point, which the intellect conceives -as destitute of extension and every other property except position. -Similarly, the effort of our rational will to be faithful to duty -and to uphold ideals is antagonized by the sensual impulses of the -animal appetite, which seek immediate gratification at the expense of -remote considerations that are higher. Such antagonism is incompatible -with any identification of the warring factors, that is, of our -rational, with our sentient, functions; for, wherever opposition is in -evidence, there _a fortiori_ a real distinction must be recognized. -The understanding and the will, therefore, differ radically from sense -and sensual appetite. The second significant fact is the domination -exerted by reason and will over the cognitive and appetitive functions -of the organic or sentient order. Our intellect criticizes, evaluates -and corrects the data of sense-perception, it discriminates between -objective percepts and illusions and hallucinations, it distinguishes -dreams from realities, it associates and dissociates imagery for -purposes of comparison, contrast, illustration, or analysis. Moreover, -it not only shows its superiority to sense by supervising, revising, -and appraising the data of sentient experience, but it manifests its -discontent at the inaccuracy and limitation of sense by the invention -and use of instrumentation (_e. g._ ear trumpets, spectacles, -microscopes, telescopes, spectroscopes, polariscopes, periscopes, -etc.) to remedy the defects or increase the range of sense-perception, -etc. This phenomenon is without parallel among brute animals, and is -a patent manifestation of the superiority of human psychology. In -like manner, the will demonstrates its preeminence over the organic -or animal appetite, by exerting supreme control over the passions and -impulses of our lower nature. In fact, it is able to bridle and repress -the impulses of sensuality even in the immediate presence of sensible -stimuli that would irresistibly determine the brute to a gratification -of its animal lusts; and it can force the struggling and reluctant -flesh to undergo a crucifixion for supersensible motives that make -no appeal to the beast. The understanding and the will, therefore, -are essentially superior to the organic psychosis that they control, -namely, the sentient consciousness and sensual appetite, which we share -in common with the brute, but which, in the latter, give no evidence -whatever of rational or moral control. - - - § 4. Darwinian Anthropomorphism - -The spiritual mind of man represents an eminence to which evolving -matter can never attain. This, then, is the hill that must needs be -laid low, if the path of Darwinian materialism is to be a smooth one. -There is, therefore, nothing very surprising in the fact that Darwin -and his followers, from Huxley down to Robinson, have done all in -their power to obscure and belittle the psychological differences -between man and the brute. The objective of their strategy is twofold, -namely, the _brutalization of man_ and its converse, the _humanization -of the brute_. The ascent will be easier to imagine, if man can be -depressed, and the brute raised, to levels that are not far apart. -To this end, the Darwinian zealots have, on the one hand, spared no -pains to minimize the superiority and dignity of human reason by the -dissemination of sensistic associationism, psychophysical parallelism, -and various other forms of “psychology without a soul”; and they have -striven, on the other hand, to exalt to the utmost the psychic powers -of the brute by means of a crude and credulous anthropomorphism, which, -for all its scientific pretensions, is quite indistinguishable from the -naïveté of the author of “Black Beauty”[13] and the sentimentality of -S. P. C. A. fanatics, vegetarians, anti-vivisectionists, etc. The first -of these tendencies we have already discussed, the second remains to be -considered. - - [13] Title of a horse’s autobiography by Anna Sewall, the - horse’s _alter ego_. - -When it comes to anthropomorphizing the brute, Darwin has not been -outdistanced by the most reckless of his disciples. Three entire -chapters of the “Descent of Man” are filled with this “vulgar -psychology” (as Wundt so aptly styles it). It is the sum and substance -of the entire fabric of argumentation, which he erects in support of -his thesis that “the difference in mind between man and the higher -animals is certainly one of degree and not of kind.” (_Cf._ _op. -cit._, chs. III-V.) Haeckel, Huxley, and Clifford attained to equal -proficiency in the sport. Subsequent philosophers parroted their bold -metaphors and smart aphorisms, and the game went on merrily till -the close of the century. Then a badly needed reaction set in under -the auspices of Wundt, Lloyd Morgan, and Thorndike, who insisted on -abandoning this naïve impressionism in favor of more critical methods. - -In his “Vorlesungen über die Menschen und Tierseele” (cf. 2nd ed., p. -370), Wundt proclaims his rupture with the impressionistic school in -the following terms: “The one great defect of this popular psychology -is that it does not take mental processes for what they show themselves -to be to a direct and unprejudiced view, but imports into them the -reflections of the observer about them. The necessary consequence for -animal psychology is that the mental actions of animals, from the -lowest to the highest, are interpreted as acts of the understanding. -If any vital manifestation of the organism is capable of possible -derivation from a series of reflections and inferences, that is taken -as sufficient proof that these reflections and inferences actually led -up to it. And, indeed, in the absence of a careful analysis of our -subjective perceptions we can hardly avoid this conclusion. Logical -reflection is the logical process most familiar to us, because we -discover its presence when we think about any object whatsoever. So -that for popular psychology mental life in general is dissolved in -the medium of logical reflection. The question whether there are not -perhaps other mental processes of a simpler nature is not asked at -all, for the one reason that whenever self-observation is required, it -discovers this reflective process in the human consciousness. The same -idea is applied to feelings, impulses, and voluntary actions which are -regarded, if not as acts of intelligence, still as effective states -which belong to the intellectual sphere. - -“This mistake, then, springs from ignorance of exact psychological -methods. It is unfortunately rendered worse by the inclination of -animal psychologists to see the intellectual achievements of animals -in the most brilliant light.... Unbridled by scientific criticism the -imagination of the observer ascribes phænomena in perfectly good faith -to motives which are entirely of its own invention. The facts reported -may be wholly true; the interpretation of the psychologist, innocently -woven in with his account of them, puts them from first to last in a -totally wrong light. You will find a proof of this on nearly every page -of the works on animal psychology.” (English Translation by Creighton & -Titchener, p. 341.) - -Wundt’s warning against taking at their face value popular, or even -so-called scientific, accounts of wonderful feats performed by animals -is very salutary. The danger of subjective humanization of bestial -conduct is always imminent. We are unavoidably obliged to employ -the analogy of our own animal nature and sentient consciousness as -our principal clue to an understanding of brute psychology, but we -must beware of pressing this analogy based on our own consciousness -to the uncritical extreme of interpreting in terms of our highest -psychic operations animal behavior that, in itself, admits of a far -simpler explanation. According to the principle of the minimum, it is -unscientific to assume in a given agent the presence of anything that -is not rigidly required for the explanation of its observed phenomena. -We must refrain, therefore, from reading into the consciousness of an -animal what is not really there. We must abstain from transporting -our own viewpoint and personality into a brute, by imagining, with -Darwin, that we discern a “sense of humor,” or a “high degree of -self-complacency” in some pet animal, like a dog. In general, we can -rest assured that animals are quite innocent of the motivation we -ascribe to them. All their manifestations of the psychic order are -adequately explicable in terms of sensory experience, associative -memory, instinct, and the various automatisms of their innate and -conditioned reflexes. There is no ground whatever for supposing the -brute to possess the superorganic power of understanding commonly known -as _intelligence_. - -Etymologically speaking, the abstract term “intelligence,” together -with the corresponding concrete term “intellect,” is derived from the -Latin: _intus-legere_, signifying to “read within,” the fitness of the -term being based upon the fact that the intellect can penetrate beneath -the outer appearances of things to _inner_ aspects and relations, -which are hidden from the senses. In its proper and most general -usage, intelligence denotes a cognoscitive power of abstraction and -generalization, which, by means of conceptual comparison, discovers the -supersensible relationships existent between the realities conceived, -in such wise as to apprehend substances beneath phenomena, causes -behind effects, and remote ends beyond proximate means. - -Certain animal psychologists, however, refuse to reserve the -prerogative of intelligence for man. Bouvier’s “La Vie Psychique des -Insectes” (1918), for example, contains the following statement: -“Choice of a remarkably intellectual nature, is even more noticeable -in the instinctive manifestations of individual memory. The animal, -endowed with well-developed senses and nervous system, not only -reacts to new necessities by new acts, but associates the stored -up impressions of new sensations and thereby appropriately directs -its further activities. Thus, by an intelligent process, new habits -are established, which by heredity become part of the patrimony of -instinct, modifying the latter and constituting elements essential -to its evolution. Of these instincts acquired through an intelligent -apprenticeship Forel was led to say that they are reasoning made -automatic, and it is to them particularly that we may apply the idea -of certain biologists that instincts are habits which have become -hereditary and automatic.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1918, p. 454.) - -It is extremely doubtful, however, whether Bouvier is here using the -term intelligence in its proper sense. Indeed, his words convey the -impression that what he means by intelligence is an _ability to profit -by experience_. Now, ability to profit by experience may, under one -set of circumstances, involve the power of logical reflection and -inference, while, under another set of circumstances, it may imply -nothing more than the power of associative memory. In the latter case, -the facts are explicable without any recourse to psychic powers of -a superorganic nature, and, in point of fact, it often happens that -the very zoöpsychologists, who insist on attributing this sort of -“intelligence” to brutes, are most emphatic in denying that brutes are -endowed with _reason_. In any case, it is unfortunate that the word -intelligence is now used in two entirely different senses. This new and -improper sense, being unrelated to the etymology, and out of harmony -with the accepted use of the term, serves only to engender a confusion -of ideas. It should be suppressed, in order to avoid misunderstandings. - -That men should be deluded, however, into crediting animals with -“intelligence” (properly so-called) is not at all surprising, when -we reflect on the source of this misapprehension; for we find -combined in the animal two important factors, whose association -closely simulates intelligence, namely, _sentient consciousness_ -and _unconscious teleology_. Now teleology is not _inherent_ or -_subjective_ intelligence, but rather an _objective expression_ and -_product_ of intelligence. It exists in unconscious mechanisms like -phonographs and adding machines, and it is, likewise, manifest in -unconscious organisms like plants. Here, however, there is no danger of -confounding it with conscious intelligence, because machines and plants -do not possess consciousness in any form whatever. But in animals, -on the contrary, teleology is intimately associated with sentient -consciousness. Here the teleological automatisms of instinct are not -wholly blind and mechanical, but are guided by sense-perception and -associative memory. It is this combination of teleology with sentient -“discernment” (as Fabre styles it) that conveys the illusory impression -of a conscious intelligence. Careful analysis, however, of the facts, -in conjunction with judicious experiments, will, in every instance, -enable the observer to distinguish between this deceptive semblance -of intelligence and that inherent rational power of abstraction, -classification, and inference which is the unique prerogative of the -human being. A genuine intelligence of this sort need not be invoked to -explain any of the phenomena of brute psychology. All of them, from the -highest to the lowest, are explicable in terms of the sensitivo-nervous -functions. To illustrate the truth of this statement let us cite a few -typical examples of animal behavior, that are sometimes regarded as -manifestations of intelligent or rational consciousness on the part of -the brute. - -Animals, it is pointed out, learn by experience. The tiny chick that -has been stung by a wasp, for instance, learns to avoid such noxious -creatures for the future. This is, indeed, “learning by experience.” -Obviously, however, it does not consist in an inference of a new truth -from an old truth. On the contrary, it amounts to nothing more than -a mere association of imagery, formed in accordance with the _law of -contiguity in time_, sanctioned by the animal’s sensual appetite, and -persistently conserved in its sentient memory. A bond of association is -formed between the visual image of the wasp and the immediately ensuing -sensation of pain. Thereafter the wasp and the pain are associated in -a single complex, which the sensile memory of the animal permanently -retains. We are dealing with a mere _association of contiguity_, -and nothing further is required to explain the future avoidance of -wasps by the chick. The abilities acquired by animals through the -trial and error method are to be explained in the same way. A horse -confined within an enclosure, for example, seeks egress to the fresh -grass of the pasture. The fact that repeated exits through the gate -of the enclosure have associated the image of its own access to the -pasture with the particular spot where the gate is located induces -it to approach the gate. Its quest, however, is balked by the fact -that the gate is closed and latched. Thereupon, it begins to chafe -under the urge of frustrated appetite. Certain actions ensue, some -spontaneous and others merely reflex movements. It paws the ground, -prances about, and rubs its nose against the gate. Its futile efforts -to pass through the closed gate continue indefinitely and aimlessly, -until, by some lucky accident, its nose happens to strike against the -latch and lift it sufficiently to release the gate. This causes the -gate to swing ajar, and the horse rushes out to food and freedom. By -the law of contiguity, the vision of free egress through the gate is -thereafter firmly associated in the horse’s sense-memory with the -final sensation experienced in its nose just prior to the advent -of the agreeable eventuation of its prolonged efforts. Henceforth -the animal will be able to release itself from the enclosure by -repeating the concatenated series of acts that memory associates with -the pleasurable result. On the second occasion, however, the more -remote of its futile acts will have been forgotten, and the process -of opening the gate will occupy less time, though probably a certain -amount of useless pawing and rubbing will still persist. Gradually, -however, the number of inefficacious actions will diminish, until, -after many repetitions of the experience, only those actions which -directly issue in the desirable result will remain in the chain of -impressions retained by memory, all others being eliminated. For, by -a teleological law, making for economy of effort, all impressions -not immediately and constantly connected with the gratification of -animal appetites tend to be inhibited. Pawlow’s experiments on dogs -show that impressions which coincide in time with such gratification -tend to be recalled by a return of the appetitive impulse, but are -soon disconnected from such association and inhibited, if they recur -independently of the recurrence of gratification. For this reason, -the horse tends to remember more vividly those actions which are more -closely connected with the pleasurable result, and, as its superfluous -actions are gradually suppressed by a protective process of inhibition, -it gradually comes to run through the series of actions necessary to -open the gate with considerable accuracy and dispatch. - -The point to be noted, however, is that the horse does not -_discursively analyze_ this concatenated series of associated -stimulators and actions; for, let the concrete circumstances be changed -never so little, the horse will at once lose its laboriously acquired -ability to open the gate. Such, for example, will be the result, if the -position of the gate be transferred to another part of the enclosure. -The horse, therefore, is incapable of adapting its acquired ability to -new conditions. It can only rehearse the original series in all its -initial concreteness and stereotyped specificity; and it must, whenever -the circumstances are changed, begin once more at the beginning, and -rearrive by trial and error at its former solution of the problem. The -reason is that the horse merely _senses_, but does not _understand_, -its own solution of the problem. The sense, however, cannot abstract -from the here and now. Consequently, the human infant of two summers is -enabled by its dawning intelligence to _adapt old means to new ends_, -but the ten-year-old horse cannot adjust its abilities to the slightest -change in the concrete conditions surrounding the original acquisition -of a useful habit. The cognitive powers of an animal are confined to -the sphere of concrete singularity, it has no power to abstract or -generalize. - -The selfsame observation applies to the tricks which animals “learn” -through human training. Their sensitive memory is very receptive and -retentive. Hence, by means of a judicious alternation of “rewards” and -“penalties” (_e.g._ of sugar and the whip), a man can, as it were, -inscribe his own thoughts on the tablets of the brute’s memory, in such -a way as to force the latter to form habits that appear to rest upon a -basis of intelligence. And so, indeed, they do, but the intelligence is -that of the trainer and not that of the animal, which is as destitute -of intrinsic intelligence as is a talking phonograph, upon whose -records a man can inscribe his thoughts far more efficiently than he -can write them in terms of the neurographic imagery of the canine, -equine, or simian memory. - -The trained monkey always renders back without change the original -lesson imparted by its human trainer. The lesson as first received -becomes an immutable reaction-basis for the future. With a school -child, however, the case is quite different. It does, indeed, receive -“an historical basis of reaction,” when the teacher illustrates the -process of multiplication by means of an example on the blackboard. -But it does not receive this information passively and render it back -in the original stereotyped form. On the contrary, it analyzes the -information received, and is able thereafter to reapply the analyzed -information to new problems differing in specificity from the problem -that the teacher originally worked out on the blackboard. The human -pupil does not, like the monkey or the phonograph, render back what -it has received in unaltered specificity. His reaction differs from -its original passive basis. To borrow the words of Driesch, he “uses -this basis, but he is not bound to it as it is. He dissolves the -combined specificities that have created the basis.” (“The Problem of -Individuality,” pp. 27, 28.) The brute, therefore, cannot “learn,” -or “be taught” in the sense of intellectual comprehension and -enlightenment. “We see,” says John Burroughs somewhere, “that the caged -bird or beast does not reason because no strength of bar or wall can -convince it that it cannot escape. It cannot be convinced because it -has no faculties that are convinced by evidence. It continues to dash -itself against the bars not until it is convinced, but until it is -exhausted. Then slowly a new habit is formed, the cage habit. When we -train an animal to do stunts, we do not teach it or enlighten it in any -proper sense, but we compel it to form new habits.” - -Human beings, however, can be _taught_ and _enlightened_ under the most -adverse circumstances. Even those unfortunates are susceptible to it, -who, like Laura Bridgman, Helen Keller, Martha Obrecht, Marie Heurtin, -and others, have been blind and deaf and dumb from infancy or birth. -With nearly all the light of sensibility extinguished, there was, -nevertheless, latent within them something of which a perfectly normal -ape, for all the integrity of its senses, is essentially destitute, -namely, the superorganic power of reason. Reason, however, is -extrinsically dependent on organic sensibility, and, consequently, “the -gates of their souls” were closed to human converse, until such a time -as the patient kindness and ingenuity of their educators devised means -of reciprocal communication on a basis of tactile signals. Thereupon -they revealed an intelligence perfectly akin to that of their rescuers. -Years of similar education, however, would be futile in the case of an -ape. The “gates of the soul” would never open, because the ape has no -rational soul, to which the most ingenious trainer might gain access, -in which respect it differs fundamentally from even the lowest savage. -A being that lacks reason may be _trained_ by means of instruction, but -it can never be _enlightened_ by it. - -Another consideration, that is occasionally urged in proof of bestial -intelligence, is the fact that birds, mammals, and even insects -communicate with one another by means of sounds or equivalent signals, -which are sometimes remarkably diversified in quality and consequent -efficacy. “Since fowls,” writes Darwin, “give distinct warnings for -danger on the ground, or in the sky, from hawks ..., may not some -unusually wise ape-like animal have imitated the growl of a beast of -prey, and thus told his fellow monkeys the nature of the expected -danger? This would have been a first step in the formation of a -language.” (“Descent of Man,” 2nd ed., ch. III, pp. 122, 123.) This is -saltatory logic with a vengeance! Darwin leaps at one bound across the -entire chasm between irrationality and rationality, without pausing -to build even the semblance of a bridge. Given an animal with the -foresight and inventiveness requisite to employ onomatopœia for the -_purpose_ of specifying the _nature_ of an expected _danger_, in the -_interest_ of its fellows, and we need not trouble ourselves further -about plausibleizing any transition; for so “unusually wise” an ape -is already well across the gap that separates reason from unreason, -and far on its way towards the performance of all the feats of which -reason is capable. After swallowing the camel of so much progress, it -would be straining at a gnat to deny such a paragon of simian genius -the mere power of articulate speech. Of course, if imagination rather -than logic, is to be the dominant consideration in science, there is -no difficulty in imagining animals to be capable of thinking or doing -anything we choose to ascribe to them, as witness _Æsop’s Fables_. -But, if sober and critical judgment be in order, then, evidently, from -the simple fact that an animal has diversified cries manifestative -of different emotions or degrees of emotion (_e.g._ of fear or rage) -and capable of arousing similar emotions in other animals of the -same species, it by no means follows that such an irrational animal -can _adapt a means to an end_ by using mimicry _in order to give -notification_ of approaching danger, and _to specify the nature of the -danger_ in question. - -This stupid anthropomorphism arises from Darwin’s failure to appreciate -the fundamental distinction that exists between the “language” of -animals, which is indicative, emotional, and inarticulate, and human -language, which is descriptive, conceptual, and articulate. Brute -animals, under the stress of a determinate passion or emotion, give -vent impulsively and unpremeditatedly to instinctive cries indicative -of their peculiar emotional state. Moreover, these emotionalized sounds -are capable of arousing kindred emotions in the breasts of other -animals of the same species, since organisms of the same species are -syntonic with (_i.e._ attuned to) one another. Hence these reflex or -instinctive cries have, no doubt, a teleological value, inasmuch as -they serve to protect the race by inciting a peculiar flight-reaction -in those that are not in immediate contact with the fear-inspiring -object. This so-called warning, however, is given without reflection or -intention on the part of the frightened animal, and is simply sensed, -but not interpreted, by the other animals that receive it. - -This premised, it is easy to discriminate between bestial and human -language. The former is not articulate, that is to say, the sounds of -which it is composed have not been elaborated by analysis and synthesis -into phonetic elements and grammatical forms. In the second place, it -is emotional and not conceptual, because it is manifestative of the -emotions or passions (which are functions of the organic or sensual -appetite), and not of rational concepts. In the third place, it is -indicative, that is, it merely signalizes a determinate emotional -state, as a thermometer indicates the temperature, or a barometer -the atmospheric pressure. It is not, therefore, descriptive, in the -sense of being selected and arranged in syntactic sequence for the -express purpose of making others realize one’s own experiences. The -rational language of man, on the contrary, is not emotional. Only a -negligible portion of the human vocabulary is made up of emotional -interjections. It consists, for the most part, of sounds descriptive of -thought, to express which an elaborate system of vowels and consonants -are discriminated and articulated on the basis of social agreement, -the result being a conventional vocal code invented and used for the -express purpose of conveying, not emotions or imagery, but general and -abstract concepts. - - - § 5. The True Significance of Instinct - -A third class of facts commonly cited as evidence of bestial -intelligence are the remarkable phenomena of _instinct_.[14] The beaver -acts as though it were acquainted with the principles of hydraulics -and engineering, when it maintains the water at the height requisite -to submerge the entrance to its dwelling by building a dam of mud, -logs, and sticks across the stream at a point below the site of its -habitation. The predatory wasp _Pompilius_ is endowed with surgical -art, that suggests a knowledge of anatomy, inasmuch as it first disarms -and afterwards paralyzes its formidable prey, the _Lycosa_ or black -Tarantula. Another predatory wasp, the _Stizus ruficornis_, disables -Mantids in a similar fashion. One of the American Pompilids, the black -wasp _Priocnemis flavicornis_, is an adept in the art of navigation, -since it adopts the principle of the French hydroglissia (an air-driven -boat which skims the water under the propulsion of an aeroplane -propeller). This insect tows a huge black spider several times its own -size and too heavy to be carried, propelling its prey with buzzing -wings along the open waterway, and leaving behind a miniature wake -like that of a steamer. It thus avoids the obstacles of the dense -vegetation, and saves time and energy in transporting the huge carcass -of its paralyzed quarry to the haven of its distant burrow. Spiders -like the _Epeira_, for example, are endowed with the mathematical -ability of constructing their webs on the patterns of the logarithmic -spiral of Jacques Bernouilli (1654-1705), a curve which it took _man_ -centuries to discover. The dog infested with parasitic tapeworms -(_Taenia_) evinces a seeming knowledge of pharmaceutics, seeing that it -will avidly devour Common Wormwood (_Artemisia absynthium_), an herb -which it never touches otherwise. - - [14] J. Henri Fabre and Erich Wasmann, S.J., have formulated - very sound and critical views on the subject of instinct. The - works of these authors are now available in English. (_Cf._ - de Mattos’ translation of the _Souvenirs etymologiques_: “The - Mason Bees,” Ch. VII; “The Bramble Bees,” Ch. VI; “The Hunting - Wasps,” Chs. IX, X, XX; _cf._ also Wasmann’s _Instinct and - Intelligence_, and _Psychology of Ants and of Higher Animals_, - Engl. translation by Gummersbach.) - -In all these cases, however, as we have previously remarked, the -illusion of intelligence is due to the combination of teleology or -objective purposiveness with sentient consciousness. But teleology -is nothing more than a material expression of intelligence, not to -be confounded with subjective intelligence, which is its causal -principle. When the cells of the iris of the eye of a larval salamander -regenerate the lens in its typical perfection, after the latter has -been experimentally destroyed, we behold a process that is objectively, -but not subjectively, intelligent. In like manner the instinctive -acts of an animal are teleological or objectively purposive, but do -not proceed from an intelligence _inherent in the animal_, any more -than the intelligent soliloquy delivered by a phonograph proceeds -from a conscious intelligence inherent in the disc. In the animal, -sentient consciousness is associated with this teleology or objective -purposiveness, but such consciousness is only aware of what can be -sensed, and is, therefore, _unconscious of purpose_, that is, of the -supersensible link, which connects a means with an end. “Instinct,” -to cite the words of Wm. James, “is usually defined as the faculty of -acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight -of the ends, and without previous education in the performance.” -(“Principles of Psychology,” vol. II, c. xxiv, p. 383.) Hence the -unconscious and objective purposiveness, which the human mind discerns -in the instinctive behavior of brutes, is manifestative, not of an -intelligence within the animal itself, but only of the infinite -intelligence of the First Cause or Creator, Who imposed these laws -replete with wisdom upon the animal kingdom, and of the finite -intelligence of man, who is capable of recognizing the Divine purpose -expressed, not only in the instincts of animals, but in all the telic -phenomena of nature. Such marvels are not the fortuitous result of -uncoördinated contingencies. Behind these correlated teleologies -of the visible universe there is a Supreme Intelligence, which has -“ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.” (_Wisdom_: -XI, 21.) “And this universal geometry,” says Fabre, in allusion to the -mathematics of the Epeira’s web, “tells of an Universal Geometrician, -whose divine compass has measured all things. I prefer that, as an -explanation of the logarithmic curve of the Ammonite and the Epeira, -to the Worm screwing up the tip of its tail. It may not perhaps be in -accordance with latter-day teaching, but it takes a loftier flight.” -(“Life of the Spider,” p. 400.) - -But, though the teleology of instinct is wonderful in the extreme, the -element of psychic regulation is so subordinate and restricted, that, -far from postulating _intelligent_ control, certain scientists go so -far as to deny even _sentient_ control, in the case of instinctive -behavior. Animals, in their opinion, are nothing more than “reflex -machines,” a view which coincides with that of Descartes, who regarded -animals as unconscious automatons. “The instincts,” says Pawlow, “are -also reflexes but more complex.” (_Science_, Nov. 9, 1923, p. 359.) The -late Jacques Loeb was a protagonist of the view that instincts are -simply _metachronic chain-reflexes_, in which one elementary process -releases another, each preceding phase terminating in the production -of the succeeding phase, until the entire gamut of concatenated arcs -has been traversed. Hence, John B. Watson, the Behaviorist disciple -of Loeb, defines instinct as “a combination of congenital responses -unfolding serially under appropriate stimulation.” - -But, if Darwinian anthropomorphism sins by excess, Loeb’s mechanism -sins by defect, and fails to account for the indubitable variability of -instinctive behavior. For, however fixed and stereotyped such behavior -may be, it manifests unmistakable adaptation to external circumstances -and emergencies, as well as subordination to the general physiological -condition of the organism, phenomena that exclude the idea of fatal -predetermination according to the fixed pattern of a determinate series -of reflex arcs. As Jennings has shown, synaptic coördination in the -neural mechanism cannot be more than a partial factor in determining -serial responses. The state of the organism as a whole must also be -taken into account. (Cf. “Behavior of the Lower Organisms,” p. 251.) -Thus an earthworm may turn to the right simply because it has just -turned to the left, but this so-called “chain-reflex” does not involve -an invariable and inevitable sequence of events, since the earthworm -may turn twice or thrice to the left, before the second reaction of -turning to the right comes into play. Any animal, when sated, will -react differently to a food stimulus than it will when it is starved, -by reason of its altered organic condition. We have something more, -therefore, to reckon with than a mere system of reflexes released by a -simple physical stimulus. - -The second type of variability manifested by instinct is its capacity -for complex and continuous adjustment to variable environmental -circumstances. Thus predatory animals, such as wasps, crabs, spiders, -and carnivorous mammals, accommodate themselves appropriately and -uninterruptedly to the changing and unforeseeable movements of the -prey they are engaged in stalking, giving evidence in this way of the -regulation of their hunting instincts by sensory impressions. Whether -this element of psychic control is based upon object-perception, -or simple sensation, and whether it involves a sensual impulse, or -is merely sensori-motor, we have, naturally, no direct means of -ascertaining. But the presence of some sort of sensory regulation is -evident enough, _e.g._ in the prompt and unerring flight of vultures -to distant carrion. Moreover, there is a close analogy between our -sense organs and those of an animal. Particularly, in the case of the -higher animals, the resemblance of the sense organs and nervous system -to our own is extremely close, so much so that even the localization -of sensory and motor centers in the brain is practically identical in -dogs, apes, and men. Moreover, the animals make analogous use of their -sense organs, orientating them and accommodating them for perception, -and using them to inspect strange objects, etc., _e.g._ they turn -their eyes, prick up their ears, snuff the wind, etc. Again, analogous -motor and emotional effects result from the stimulation of their sense -organs, and brutes make emotional displays of anger, exultation, fear, -etc., similar to our own. Hence it is to be presumed that they have -similar sensuous experiences. The analogy, however, must not be pressed -further than the external manifestations warrant. With brute animals, -the manifestations in question are confined exclusively to phenomena of -the sensuous order. - -Another indication of sensory control is found in the repair-work -performed by animals endowed with the constructive instinct. C. F. -Schroeder, for instance, experimenting on certain caterpillars, found -that they repaired their weaving, whenever it was disturbed by the -experimenter. Fabre, too, discovered that a Mason-bee would plaster -up holes or clefts marring the integrity of its cell, provided that -the bee was actually engaged in the process of plastering at the time, -and provided that the experimenter inflicted the damage at the level, -and within the area, of the construction work on which the bee was -then engaged. In a word, if the damage inflicted could be repaired by -a simple continuation or extension of its actual work of the moment, -the bee was able to cope with the emergency. There are other ways, -too, in which the animal adapts its constructive instincts to external -circumstance. Fabre tells us that the Bramble-bee _Osmia_, which builds -a train of partitioned cells in snail shells or in hollow reeds, will -victual first and then plaster in a partition, if the reed be narrow, -but will first plaster a partition, and then introduce honey and -pollen through a hole left unclosed in the partition, whenever the -reed is of greater diameter. This reversal of the procedure according -to the exigencies of the external situation does not suggest the -chain-reflex of Loeb. (Cf. “The Bramble-Bee,” pp. 214-217.) Another -kind of adaptation of instinct to external circumstances consists in -the economical omission of the initial step of a serial construction, -in cases where the environmental conditions provide a ready-made -equivalent. “The silkworm,” says Driesch, “is said not to form its -web of silk if it is cultivated in a box containing tulle, and some -species of bees which normally construct tunnels do not do so if they -find one ready made in the ground, they then only perform their second -instinctive act: separating the tunnel into single cells.” (“Science & -Phil. of the Organism,” vol. II, p. 47.) - -Driesch’s analysis of the constructive instinct shows that these -facts of adaptation or regulation fit in with the idea of sensory -control rather than with that of a chain-reflex. In the supposition -that the successive stages of instinctive construction are due to a -chain-reflex, consisting of a series of elementary motor reactions -_a_, _b_, _c_, etc., in which _a_ produces the external work A and, -on terminating, releases _b_, which, in turn, produces external work -B and releases _c_, etc., clearly _b_ could never appear before _a_, -and the sight of A ready-made would not inhibit _a_, nor would the -removal of A defer the advent of _b_. In other words, regulation -would be impossible. But, if we suppose that not the elemental act -_a_, but rather the sensory perception of A, the first state of the -external construction, is the stimulus to _b_ and, consequently, to the -production of the second state of construction B, then we understand -why _b_ is released independently of _a_, when, for example, an -insect discovers a ready-made substitute for A, the initial step in -its construction, and we also understand why, in cases of accidental -damage resulting in the total or partial removal of A, the reaction -_b_ is deferred and the reaction _a_ prolonged, until the repair or -reconstruction of A is complete; for, in this supposition, the addition -of A will inhibit _a_ and release _b_, whereas the subtraction of A -will inhibit the appearance of _b_ and consequently defer B, until the -state of construction A, the sight of which is the stimulus to _b_, is -complete. The fact of regulation, therefore, entails _sensory_ control -of the serial responses involved in the constructive instinct. Hence, -as H. P. Weld of Cornell expresses it: “We may safely assume that even -in the lowest forms of animal life some sort of sensory experience -releases the (instinctive) disposition and to an extent determines the -subsequent course of action.” (Encycl. Am., v. 15, p. 168.) - -But it would be going to the opposite extreme to interpret these -adjustments of instinct to external contingencies as evidence of -_intelligent_ regulation. The animal’s ability, for example, to -repair accidental damage to a construction, which instinct impels -it to build, is rigidly limited to repairs that can be accomplished -by a simple continuation of the actual and normal occupation of -the moment. If, however, the damage affects an already completed -portion of the instinctive structure, and its present occupation is -capable of continuance, the animal is impotent to relinquish this -actual occupation of the moment, in order to cope with the emergency. -Suppose, for illustration, that the instinctive operations _a_ and _b_ -are finished and the animal is in the _c_-stage of its instinctive -performance, then, if the damage is inflicted in the A-portion of the -structure, and _c_ can be continued independently of A, the animal -cannot relinquish _c_ and return to _a_, in order to restore the -marred integrity of A. This shows that the animal is guided, in its -repair-work, by _sense_, which is bound to the here and now, and not -by intelligence, which is an abstractive faculty that emancipates from -the actual and concrete present, and enables the possessor to hark back -to the past of its performance, should necessity require. Thus Fabre -found that the Mason-bee, after it had turned from building to the -foraging of honey and pollen, would no longer repair holes pricked in -its cell, but suffered the latter to become a veritable vessel of the -Danaïdes, which it vainly strove to fill with its liquid provender. -Though the holes affected portions extremely close to the topmost -layer of masonry, and although it frequently sounded and explored -these unaccustomed holes with its antennæ, it took no steps to check -the escape of the honey and pollen by recurring to its mason craft of -earlier stages. And, finally, when it did resume the plasterer’s trade -in constructing a lid for the cell, it would spare no mortar to plug -the gaping breaches in the walls of its cell, but deposited its egg in -a chamber drained of honey, and then proceeded to perform the useless -work of closing with futile diligence _only the topmost aperture_ in -this much perforated dwelling. Obviously, therefore, the bee failed -to perceive the connection which existed between these breaches and -the escape of the honey, and it was unable to apply its instinctive -building skill to _new uses_ by abstraction from the definite -connection, in which the latter is normally operative. - -Sense, therefore, and not intelligence, is the regulatory principle -of instinct. To recognize causal and telic relationships is the -prerogative of a superorganic intelligence. The transcendental link -by which a useful means is referred to an ulterior end is something -that cannot be _sensed_, but only _understood_. An animal, therefore, -acts _toward_ an end, not _on account of_ an end. Nature, however, -has compensated for this ignorance by implanting in each species of -animal a special teleological disposition, by reason of which objects -and actions, which are, under normal conditions, objectively useful -to the individual, or the species, become invested for the animal -with a subjective aspect of agreeableness, while objects and actions, -which are normally harmful, are invested with a subjective aspect -of repulsiveness. The qualities of serviceableness and pleasantness -_happen_, so far as the animal is concerned, to be united in one -and the same concrete object or action, but the animal is only -aware of the pleasantness, which appeals to its senses, and not of -the serviceableness, which does not. Thus, in the example already -cited, the dog suffering from tapeworms eats the herb known as Common -Wormwood, not because it is aware of the remedial efficacy of the herb, -but simply because the odor and flavor of the plant appeal to the -animal in its actual morbid condition, ceasing to do so, however, when -the latter regains the state of health. How different is the action -of the man whose blood is infected with malarial parasites and who -takes quinine, not because the bitter taste of the alkaloid appeals -to his palate, but solely because he has his future cure explicitly -in view! “Finally,” says Weld, “the more we learn about instincts the -more apparent it becomes that the situations from which they proceed -are meaningful, but we need not suppose that the organism is aware of -the meaning. The chick in the egg feels (we may only guess as to its -nature) a vague discomfort, and the complicated reaction by which it -makes its egress from the shell is released.” (Encycl. Am., v. 15, p. -169.) - -Recapitulating, then, we may define instinct as a psycho-organic -propensity, not acquired by education or experience, but congenital -by inheritance and identical in all members of the same zoölogical -species, having as its physical basis the specific nervous organization -of the animal and as its psychic basis a teleological coördination -of the cognitive, emotional, and motor functions, in virtue of -which, given the proper physiological state of the organism and the -presence of an appropriate environmental stimulus, an animal, without -consciousness of purpose, is impelled to the inception, and regulated -in the performance, of complicated behavior which is sensually -gratifying and, under normal circumstances, simultaneously beneficial -to the individual, or the race. - -Instinctive acts are performed without previous experience or training -on the part of the animal, and are, nevertheless, at least in the -majority of cases, _perfect in their first performance_. A few, like -the pecking-instinct of young chickens, are slightly improvable through -sentient experience, _e.g._ the young chick, at first undiscriminating -in the choice of the particles which it picks up, learns later by -associative memory to distinguish what is tasty and edible from what -is disagreeable and inedible, but, for the most part, the perfection -of instinctive acts is independent of prior experience. Hence instinct -is entirely different from human reason, which, in the solution of -problems, is compelled to begin with reflection upon the data furnished -by previous experience, or education. The animal, however, in its -instinctive operations, without pausing to investigate, deliberate, -or calculate, proceeds unhesitatingly on the very first occasion -to a prompt and perfect solution of its problems. Hence, without -study, consultation, planning, or previous apprenticeship of any -sort, and in the complete absence of experimental knowledge, that -might serve as matter for reflection or as a basis for inference, the -animal is able to solve intricate problems in engineering, geometry, -anatomy, pharmaceutics, etc., which the combined intelligence of -mankind required centuries upon centuries of schooling, research, and -reflection in order to solve. Of two things, therefore, one: either -these actions do not proceed from an intelligent principle inherent in -the animal; or they do, and in that case we are compelled to recognize -in brute animals _an intelligence superior to our own_, because they -accomplish deftly and without effort ingenious feats that human -reason cannot duplicate, save clumsily and at the price of prolonged -discipline and incessant drudgery. “Perhaps the strongest reason,” says -an anonymous writer, “for not regarding the activities of instinct -as intelligent is that in such enormously complex sequences of action -as, for instance, the emperor moth carries out in the preparing of an -escape-opening for itself on its completing the larval and passing -into the imago state, the intelligence needed would be so great that -it could not be limited to this single activity, and yet it is so -limited.”[15] - - [15] Cf. Nelson’s Encyclopedia, v. 6, p. 452. - -Intelligence is essentially a _generalizing_ and _abstracting_ power; -hence, from its very nature, it could not be _limited to a single -activity_. Bestial instincts, however, though frequently so amazingly -complex and ingeniously purposive as to seem the fruit of profound -meditation, are, nevertheless, confined exclusively to this or that -determinate ability. They operate within narrow and preëstablished -grooves, from which they never swerve to any appreciable degree, -being but little modifiable or perfectible by experience. Bees always -construct hexagonal cells, spiders stick to the logarithmic spiral, -and beavers never attempt to put their engineering skill to new uses. -Instincts have but little pliancy, their regularity and uniformity -being such as to make the instinctive abilities definitely predictable -in the case of any given species of animal. Now, the distinctive mark -of intelligence is _versatility_, that is, aptitude for many things -without determinate restriction to this or that. A man who is expert -in one art may, by reason of his intelligence, be equally proficient -in a dozen others. The biologist may be a competent chemist, and the -astronomer an excellent physicist. Michel Angelo was a sculptor, a -frescoer, a painter, an anatomist, an engineer, and an architect, -while Leonardo da Vinci had even more arts to his credit. To predict -before birth the precise form that a man’s ability will take is an -impossibility. Certain aptitudes, such as a musical gift, are no doubt -inherited, but it is an inheritance which imposes no rigid necessity -upon inheriter; since he is free to neglect this native talent, and to -develop others for which he has no special innate aptitude. With man, -the fashion in clothing and the styles of architecture vary from day -to day. The brute, however, never emerges from the rut of instinct, -and each generation of a given animal species monotonously reproduces -the history of the previous generation. Man, on the contrary, is -capable of indefinite _progress_, as the march of human cultures -and civilizations shows. Gregarious animals are restricted by their -instincts to determinate types of aggregation, as we see in the case of -ants and bees. Hence these insect communities are unacquainted with our -sanguinary revolutions which overturn monarchies in favor of republics, -or set up dictatorships in place of democracies; for, fortunately or -unfortunately, as one may choose to regard it, man is not limited to -one form of government rather than another. - -Animals, then, notwithstanding their wonderful instincts, are -deficient in precisely that quality which is the unique criterion of -intelligence, namely, versatility. Each species has but one stereotyped -ability, outside of which it is woefully stupid and inefficient. “So -long,” says Fabre, “as its circumstances are normal the insect’s -actions are calculated most rationally in view of the object to be -attained” (“The Mason-Bees,” p. 167), but let the circumstances -cease to be normal, let them vary never so little from those which -ordinarily obtain, and the animal is helpless, while its instinctive -predisposition becomes, not merely futile, but often positively -detrimental. Thus the instinct, which should, in the normal course of -events, guide night-flying moths to the white flowers that contain -the life-sustaining nectar of their nocturnal banquets, proves -their undoing, when they come into contact with the white lights of -artificial illumination. In fact, the fatal fondness of the moth for -the candle flame has become in all languages a proverb for the folly of -courting one’s own destruction. - -The animal may employ an exquisitely efficient method in accomplishing -its instinctive work, but is absolutely impotent to apply this -ingenious method to more than one determinate purpose. Man, however, -is not so restricted. He varies at will both his aims and his -methods. He can adapt the _same means_ (a pocketknife, for instance) -to _different ends_, and, conversely, he can obtain the _same end_ -by the use of _different means_ (_e.g._ communicate by mail, or -telegraph, or radio). Man, in a word, is _emancipated from limitation -to the singular and the concrete_ by virtue of his unique prerogative, -reason, or intelligence, the power that enables him _to generalize -from the particular and to abstract from the concrete_. This is -the secret of his unlimited versatility. This is the basis of his -capacity for progress. This is the root of his freedom; for his -will seeks happiness in general, happiness in the abstract, and is -not, therefore, compelled to choose any particular form or concrete -embodiment of happiness, such as this or that style of architecture, -this or that form of government, this or that kind of clothing, etc., -etc. Teleology is but a material expression of intelligence, and may, -therefore, occur in things destitute of intelligence, but versatility -is the inseparable concomitant and infallible sign of an inherent and -autonomous intelligence. Lacking this quality, instinct, however telic, -is obviously not intelligence. - -Another indication of the fact that no intelligence lies behind -the instinctive behavior of brutes is manifest from their evident -_unconsciousness of purpose_. That the animal is ignorant of the -purpose implied in its own instinctive actions appears from the fact -that it will carry out these operations with futile diligence and -exactitude, even when, through accident, the purpose is conspicuously -absent. Thus the hen deprived of her eggs will, nevertheless, continue -the now futile process of incubation for twenty-one days, or longer, -despite the fact that her obstinacy in maintaining the straw of the -empty nest at a temperature of 104° F. serves no useful purpose -whatever. She cannot but sense the absence of the eggs; she has not, -however, the intelligence to realize that incubation without eggs is -vain. The connection between the latter and the former is something -that mere sense cannot apprehend. Hence the hen is not troubled by -the purposelessness of her performance. Fabre gives many examples -of this futile persistence in instinctive operations, despite their -complete frustration. Alluding to the outcome of his experiments on -the Mason-wasp _Pelapaeus_, he says: “The Mason bees, the Caterpillar -of the Great Peacock Moth, and many others, when subjected to similar -tests, are guilty of the same illogical behaviour: they continue, in -the normal order, their series of industrious actions, though accident -has now rendered them all useless. Just like millstones unable to cease -revolving though there be no corn left to grind, let them once be given -the compelling power and they will continue to perform their task -despite its futility.” (“Bramble Bees,” pp. 192, 193.) - -The instance cited by Dr. H. D. Schmidt is an excellent illustration -of this inability of an animal to appreciate either the utility or -futility of its instinctive behavior. Having described the instinct -of squirrels to bury nuts by ramming them into the ground with their -teeth, and then using their paws to cover them with earth, he continues -as follows: “Now, as regards the young squirrel, which, of course, -never had been present at the burial of a nut, I observed that, after -having eaten a number of hickory nuts to appease its appetite, it -would take one between its teeth, then sit upright and listen in all -directions. Finding all right, it would scratch upon the smooth blanket -on which I was playing with it as if to make a hole, then hammer with -the nut between its teeth upon the blanket, and finally perform all the -motions required to fill up a hole—_in the air_; after which it would -jump away, leaving the nut, of course, uncovered.” (_Transactions of -the Am. Neurological Ass’n_, 1875, vol. I, p. 129—italics his.) This -whole pantomime of purposeless gesticulations, from the useless “Stop, -look and listen!” down to the final desertion of the uncovered nut, is -overwhelming evidence of the fact that the brute is destitute of any -rational faculty capable of recognizing the telic aspect of its own -instinctive conduct. - -The claim is sometimes made that certain forms of animal behavior -are not unconsciously, but _consciously_, telic. Bouvier, for -example, claims that in the rare cases of the _use of tools_ among -the Arthropoda, we have evidence of the existence of intelligent -inventiveness of a rudimentary kind. Thus the crab _Melia_ carries a -sea-anemone in its chela as a weapon wherewith to sting its prey into a -condition of paralysis. The leaf-cutting ants of India and Brazil use -their own thread-spinning larvæ as tools for cementing together the -materials out of which their nests are constructed. The predatory wasp -_Ammophila urnaria_ uses a pebble to tamp the filling of its burrow. -According to the Wheelers (cf. _Science_, May 30, 1924, p. 486), the -hunting wasp _Sphex_ (_Ammophila_) _gryphus_ (Sm.) makes similar use -of a pebble. As Bouvier notes, however, this use of tools appears “to -be rather exceptional ..., showing itself only in the primitive state -consisting of the use of foreign bodies as implements.” (Smithson. -Inst. Rpt. for 1918, p. 456.) Moreover, the animals in question -are limited to a concretely determinate kind of tool, which their -environment supplies ready-made. Such a use of implements _does not -presuppose any power of abstraction and generalization_. In fact, the -presence of such a power is expressly excluded by the consideration -that the animal’s so-called “inventiveness” is confined exclusively to -_one particularized manifestation_. - -At times the behavior of animals so closely simulates the consciously -telic or intelligent conduct of men, that only severely critical -methods enable us to discriminate between them. An experiment, which -Erich Wasmann, S.J., performed upon ants will serve to illustrate this -point. In one of his glass nests, Father Wasmann constructed an island -of sand surrounded by a moat filled with water. He then removed from -their “nursery” a certain number of the ant larvæ and placed them on -the island. Thereupon the ants were observed to build a bridge of sand -across the moat “for the purpose,” apparently, of rescuing the marooned -larvæ. Such behavior seemed to imply an intelligent ordination of a -means to an end. Wasmann’s second experiment, however, proved this -inference to be wholly unwarranted; for, when he excavated a hole in -the sand of the nest and filled it with water, the ants, stimulated -by what to them was the disagreeable dampness of the marginal sand, -were impelled to perform the reflex act of kicking about in the sand. -This impulse persisted until all traces of the hole, the dampness and -the water had been buried under a carpet of drier sand. Then, and then -only, was the aforesaid impulse inhibited. Applying these results to -the interpretation of the first experiment, we see that the “building -of a bridge” in the first experiment was not intentional, but merely -an accidental result of a kicking-reflex, with damp sand acting as -a stimulator. Once the moat was bridged, however, the ants happened -to find the larvæ, and were then impelled by instinct to carry the -larvæ to their proper place in the nest. To see in such an incident a -planned and premeditated rescue of the marooned larvæ would be grossly -anthropomorphic. Nevertheless, had only the first experiment been -performed, such an anthropomorphic interpretation would have seemed -fully justified, and it was only by an appropriate variation of the -conditions of the original experiment that this false interpretation -could be definitively excluded. - -Consciously telic behavior is distinguishable from unconsciously -telic conduct only to the extent that it implies an agent endowed -with the power of abstraction. Unless an agent can vary radically the -specificity of the procedure, whereby it attains a given end, the -purposiveness of its behavior is no evidence of its intelligence. -“Among animals,” says Bergson, “invention is never more than a -variation on the theme of routine. Locked up as it is within the habits -of its species, the animal succeeds no doubt in broadening these by -individual initiative; but its escape from automatism is momentary -only, just long enough to create a new automatism; the gates of its -prison close as soon as they are opened; dragging the chain merely -lengthens it. Only with man does consciousness break the chain.” (Cf. -Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1918, p. 457.) - -In vain, then, do our Darwinian humanizers of the brute exalt instinct -at the expense of intelligence. Their attempt to reduce to a difference -of degree the difference of kind that separates the irrational from -the rational, fails all along the line. Indeed, far from being able to -account for the appearance of intelligence in the world, transformistic -theories are impotent to account for so much as the development of -instinct, all forms of the evolutionary theory, the Lamarckian, the -Darwinian, the De-Vriesian, etc., being equally inadequate to the task -of explaining the origin of animal instincts. - -The complex instinctive behavior of predatory wasps, for example, is -absolutely essential for the preservation of their respective races, -and yet these indispensable instincts are completely useless in any -other than the _perfect state_. From their very nature, therefore, -they do not admit of _gradual development_. The law of all, or none, -holds here. “Instinct developed by degrees,” says Fabre, “is flagrantly -impossible. The art of preparing the larva’s provisions allows none -but masters, and suffers no apprentices; the Wasp must excel in it -from the outset or leave the thing alone.” (“The Hunting Wasps,” p. -403.) To be useful at all, the instinctive operation must possess an -indivisible perfection, which cannot be partitioned into degrees. -The _Pompilius_ (_Calicurgus_), for instance, must, under penalty of -instant death, take the preliminary precaution to sting into inaction -the ganglion that controls the poison forceps of her formidable prey, -the Black Tarantula (_Lycosa_), before she proceeds to paralyze it -by stabbing its thoracic ganglion. The slightest imperfection or -shortcoming in her surgery would be irretrievably disastrous. Such an -instinct never existed in an imperfect form. The first wasp to possess -it must have been an expert, or she would never have lived to serve the -limp body of the huge spider as living provender for her tiny grub. -“The first to come to grips with the Tarantula,” says Fabre, “had an -unerring knowledge of her dangerous surgery. The least hesitation, the -slightest speculation, and she was lost. The first teacher would also -have been the last, with no disciples to take up her art and perfect -it.” (“Bramble Bees,” p. 354.) - -Another hunting wasp, the Hairy Ammophila, subdues a large caterpillar -into a state of coma by pricking with its sting nine of the ventral -ganglia, while it spares the cervical ganglion, merely compressing -the latter with its mandibles, so as not to destroy life altogether. -This nice discrimination rules out Loeb’s hypothesis of a so-called -“chemotaxis.” As a result of this elaborate surgical operation, the -power of movement is suppressed in every segment, and the tiny larva -of the wasp emerging from the egg laid on the ventral surface of the -caterpillar can devour this huge living, but motionless, victim in -peace and safety. Dead meat would not agree with the larva, and any -movement of the caterpillar would be fatal to the delicate grub. To -eliminate these contingencies, the Wasp’s surgery must be perfect -from the very outset. “There is,” says Fabre, “no _via media_, no -half success. Either the caterpillar is treated according to rule and -the Wasp and its family is perpetuated; or else the victim is only -partially paralyzed and the Wasp’s offspring dies in the egg. Yielding -to the inexorable logic of things, we will have to admit that the -first Hairy Ammophila, after capturing a Grey Worm to feed her larva, -operated on the patient by the exact method in use today.” (“The -Hunting Wasps,” pp. 403, 404.) - -Certain meticulous critics of our day cite the fact of the diffusion -of the poison as indicating that the surgery of the hunting wasps need -not be so perfectly accommodated to the nervous system of their prey, -and they attempt in this way to discredit Fabre as having failed to -take the occurrence of diffusion into account. A careful reading of -his works, however, will serve to vindicate him in this respect. In a -chapter on the poison of the bee, for instance, we read: “The local -effect is diffused. This diffusion, which might well take place in the -victims of the predatory insects, plays no part in the latter’s method -of operation. The egg, which will be laid immediately afterwards, -demands the complete inertia of the prey from the outset. Hence all the -nerve-centers that govern locomotion must be numbed instantaneously -by the virus.” (“Bramble Bees,” p. 347.) Bouvier, therefore, very -justly remarks: “After all, when Fabre’s work is examined there is no -trouble in seeing that none of these details escaped him. He never -disputed the paralytic action of the poison inoculated by the insect, -and the wonderful researches by the Peckhams on the Pompilids, which -hunt Lycosids, have clearly established the fact that the thrusts of -the sting given by the predatory insect produce two different kinds -of paralysis, one functional, and often temporary, resulting from the -action of the venom, the other structural and persistent, produced by -the dart which more or less injures the nervous centers.” (Smithson. -Inst. Rpt. for 1916, p. 594.) - -In the case of predatory insects, therefore, the instinct must be -_perfect at the outset_, or survival is impossible. For the origin -of such instincts, Darwinism, which stresses the _gradualness_ of -evolutionary progress, has no explanation that will hold water. -Lamarckism, which sees in _acquired habits_ transmitted by inheritance, -the origin of instinct, the “memory of the race,” is equally at a -loss to account for these instincts. The formation of habits requires -_practice_ and _repetition_. The predatory insect must be perfect at -the start, and yet it only exercises its remarkable instinct _once a -year_. Where is the practice and reiteration requisite for canalizing -its nervous system into the conduction-paths of habit? How did one -particular set of rarely performed acts happen to gain precedence over -all others, and to be alone successful in stamping themselves indelibly -upon the nerve plasm as habits, and upon the germ plasm as instincts? -De-Vriesianism, which would make the acquisition and perfecting of -instinct dependent upon the rare and accidental contingency of a -_fortuitous mutation_, is even more objectionable. These instincts are -vital to the insect. If their acquisition and improvement depend upon -the lucky chance of a series of favorable mutations, its prospects of -survival are nil; for it cannot afford to wait at all. “In order to -live,” says Fabre, “we all require the conditions that enable us to -live: this is a truth worthy of the famous axioms of La Palice. The -predatory insects live by their talent. If they do not possess it to -perfection, their race is lost.” (“Bramble Bees,” p. 364.) - -Recently, there has been a revival of Lamarckism hitherto regarded -as defunct. Guyer, Kammerer, and Pawlow profess to find factual -justification for it, and Bouvier adopts it in his “La vie psychique -des insectes” (1918), to account for the origin of instinct. Of the -alleged facts of Kammerer and Guyer, we have spoken in a previous -chapter. Here we shall content ourselves with few remarks on the -experiments of Ivan Pawlow, as being especially relevant to the subject -under consideration. The Russian physiologist has experimented on -white mice, and claims that the mice of the fifth generation learned -to answer a dinner bell in the space of five lessons, whereas their -ancestors of the first generation had required a hundred lessons to -answer the same signal. Hence he concludes: “The latest experiments ... -show that conditioned reflexes, _i.e._, the highest nervous activity, -are inherited.” (_Science_, Nov. 9, 1923, p. 360.) His results, -however, do not tally with those recently obtained by E. C. MacDowell -of the Carnegie Institution, by H. G. Bragg, and by E. M. Vicari of -Columbia. MacDowell found that white rats trained in a circular maze -did not improve in their susceptibility to training from generation to -generation. “Children from trained parents,” he says, “or from trained -parents and grandparents, take as long to learn the maze habit as the -first generation used.” (_Science_, March 28, 1924, p. 303.) Having -cited the similar results of Bragg, who experimented with white mice, -he concludes: “The results are in full accord with those given above; -they indicate that the training of the ancestors did not facilitate the -learning of the descendants.” (_Ibidem._) E. M. Vicari, using a simple -maze and white rats, obtained the same results. “It seems clear,” she -says, “that the latter generations have not been aided by the training -of their ancestors.” (_Ibidem._) - -Bouvier’s conception, then, that the automatisms of instinct originate -as automatisms of acquired habit, the latter being appropriated -by inheritance, still stands in need of reliable experimental -confirmation. Moreover, a theory of this sort could never account, -as Weismann points out, for such phenomena as the specific instincts -of worker bees, which are _excluded from propagation_. Nor can the -theory explain, as originating in acquired _habit_, those instinctive -operations of enormous complexity, like the complicated method of -emergence employed by the larva of the emperor moth, which only occur -_once in a lifetime_, and could not, therefore, fasten themselves on -the organism as a _habit_. - -An evolutionary origin of instinct, however, though extremely -improbable, is, at any rate, not absolutely inconceivable. Its -teleology, as we have seen, does not imply inherent intelligence, but -is explicable as an innate law involving appropriate coördination -of the sensory, emotional, and motor functions, all of which are -intrinsically dependent on the organism. But intelligence, as we -have seen, is a superorganic power, having its source in a spiritual -principle, that, from the very nature of things, cannot be evolved from -matter. Human reason, therefore, owes its origin, not to any evolution -of the human body, but to the creation of the human soul, which is the -source and subject of that unique prerogative of man, namely: the power -of abstract thought. - - - - - CHAPTER III - - THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN BODY - - -In an article published August 31, 1895, in the _New York Freeman’s -Journal_, the late Rev. J. A. Zahm gave expression to the following -opinion: “The evolution of the body of man from some inferior animal -and its subsequent endowment in this body by God of a rational soul is -antagonistic to no dogma of faith and may be shown to be in harmony -with the teachings of St. Thomas.” The scriptural and theological -aspect of this view need not concern us here, our sole purpose being -to evaluate it from a purely scientific standpoint. Once evolutionary -thought takes cognizance of the fact that the human soul is a spiritual -principle underivable from mere matter, once it acknowledges the -immediate creation of the human soul, and professes to do no more -than account for the origin of man’s animal _body_, that moment is it -shorn of its materialistic implications; but what, we may ask, are the -foundations of such an hypothesis in the realm of scientific fact? - -The writer must confess that he cannot fathom the mentality of those -who accept the evolutionary explanation, so far as plant and animal -organisms are concerned, but proceed to draw the line when it comes to -applying it to the human body. For if one (to borrow Du Bois-Reymond’s -expression) “gives so much as his little finger to” the evolutional -argument from organic homology, he must end, in so far as he is -consistent, in acknowledging as incontestable its obvious application -to man. The only choice which sound logic can sanction is between -fixism and a thoroughgoing system of transformism, which does not -exempt the human body from the scope of the evolutionary explanation. -Indeed, the theory of evolution itself stands or falls upon this issue; -for, if structures so strikingly similar as the skeletons of a man -and an ape, respectively, have originated from two distinct ancestral -stocks, then in no case at all is the inference of common descent -from structural resemblance a legitimate procedure. In other words, -if the homologies existent between the human and simian organisms are -explicable on some other basis than that of common ancestry, then -all organic homologies are so explicable, and the whole evolutionary -argument collapses. - - - § 1. Two Theories of Descent - -Two theories have been formulated regarding the alleged bestial -origin of the human body: (1) the theory of lineal descent from some -known species (living or fossil) of ape or monkey; (2) the theory of -collateral descent from a hypothetical bestial ancestor common to apes -and men. The theory of lineal descent is that to which Darwin himself -stands committed. This theory, however, soon fell into disrepute among -scientists, who came to prefer the theory of collateral descent, -although signs of a return to the older theory are not wanting in our -day. At all events, Darwin came out flatly in favor of the monkey -origin of man. This, it is true, has been indignantly denied by loyal -partisans anxious to exonerate their idol from the reproach of having -advanced a crude and now obsolete theory of human descent. But Darwin’s -own words speak for themselves: “The Simiadae,” he says, “then branched -off into two great stems, the New World and Old World monkeys; and from -the latter, at a remote period of time, Man, the wonder and glory of -the Universe, proceeded.” (“Descent of Man,” 2nd ed., ch. VI, pp. 220, -221.) Note that he does not say “probably”; his language is not the -language of hypothesis, but of categorical affirmation. - -The theory, however, which is most generally favored at the present -time holds that, assuming the universality of the evolutionary -process, all existing types must be of equal antiquity, and none prior -or ancestral to any other. Hence it regards man, not as the direct -descendant of any known type of ape, but as the offspring of an as yet -undiscovered Tertiary ancestor, from which men and apes have diverged -in two distinct lines of descent. “_Monkeys, apes, and men_,” says -Conklin, “_have descended from some common but at present extinct -ancestor_. Existing apes and monkeys are collateral relatives of man -but not his ancestors; his cousins but not his parents.... The human -branch diverged from the anthropoid stock not less than two million -years ago, and since that time man has been evolving in the direction -represented by existing human races, while the apes have been evolving -in the direction represented by existing anthropoids. During all this -time men and apes have been growing more and more unlike and conversely -the farther back we go, the more we should find them converging until -they meet in a common stock which should be intermediate between these -two stocks.” (“Evolution and the Bible,” pp. 12, 13—italics his.) - -Barnum Brown’s recent discovery of three jaws of the fossil ape -_Dryopithecus_ in the Siwalik Hills of India has, as previously -intimated, resulted in a return on the part of certain scientists, -_e.g._ Wm. K. Gregory and Dudley J. Morton, to views that more nearly -approximate those of Charles Darwin. According to these men, the fossil -anthropoid _Dryopithecus_ is to be regarded as the common ancestor of -men, chimpanzees, and gorillas. (Cf. _Science_, April 25, 1924, Suppl. -XII.) - -Many considerations, however, militate against the direct derivation -of man’s bodily frame from any known species of ape, whether living -or fossil. Dana has pointed out that, as regards the mechanism of -locomotion, man belongs to a more primitive type than the ape. -The earliest and lowest type of vertebrates are the fish, and -these, according to the above-mentioned author, are _urosthenic_ -(tail-strong), inasmuch as they propel themselves by means of their -tails. Next in point of organization and time came the _merosthenic_ -vertebrates, which have their strength concentrated in the hind-limbs, -_e.g._ reptiles like the dinosaurs. In the last place come the -_prosthenic_ vertebrates, whose strength is concentrated in the -fore-limbs, _e.g._ the carnivora and apes. Now man belongs to the -_merosthenic_ type, and his mode of progression, therefore, is more -primitive than that of apes, which are _prosthenic_, all anthropoid -apes, such as the gorilla, the chimpanzee, the orang-utan and the -gibbon having longer fore-limbs than hind-limbs. - -The striking anatomical differences between apes and men, though not -of sufficient importance to exclude the possibility of collateral -relationship, are so many solid arguments against the theory of -direct descent. We will content ourselves with a mere enumeration of -these differences. In the ape, the cranium has a protruding muzzle -and powerful jaws equipped with projecting canine teeth, but the -brain-case is comparatively small; in man, on the contrary, the facial -development is insignificant and the teeth are small and vertical, -while the brain-case is enormous in size, having at least twice the -capacity of that of an ape. “The face of man,” to quote Ranke, “slides, -as it were, down from the forehead and appears as an appendix to the -front half of the skull. But the gorilla’s face, on the contrary, -protrudes from the skull, which in turn slides almost entirely backward -from the face. By a cross-cut one may sever the whole face from the -skull, except a very small part near the sockets, without being forced -to open up the interior of the skull. It is only on account of its -protruding, strongly developed lower parts that the skull-cap of the -animal can simulate a kind of human face.” (“Der Mensch,” vol. II, -p. 401.) These differences may be summarized by saying that the head -of the ape is specialized for mastication and defense, whereas the -head of man is specialized for psychic functions. Again, as we have -seen, the fore-limbs of the ape are long, and its hind-limbs short, -the extremities of both the latter and the former being specialized -primarily for prehension and only secondarily for progression. This -is due to the ape’s adaptation to arboreal life. In man, however, -the arms are short and specialized for prehension alone, while the -legs are long and terminate in broad plantigrade feet specialized for -progression alone. Man, consequently, is not adapted to arboreal life. -In the ape, the spine has a single curve, and the occipital foramen -(the aperture through which the spinal cord enters the brain-case) -is eccentrically located in the floor of the cranial box; in man, -the spine has a double curve, and the occipital foramen is centrally -located, both features being in adaptation to the upright posture -peculiar to man—“_die zentralle Lage dieser Oeffnung_,” says Ranke -alluding to the occipital foramen of man, “_in der Schädelbasis ist -für den Menschenschädel im Unterschied gegen den Tierschädel eine in -hohem Masse typische_.” (“Der Mensch,” vol. I, p. 378.) In the ape, -therefore, the vertebræ have an adaptation producing convexity of the -back, precluding a normal upright posture, and enforcing progression -on all fours. It has, moreover, powerful muscles at the back of the -neck to carry the head in the horizontal position necessitated by this -mode of progression. In man “the skull has the occipital condyles -placed within the middle fifth, in adaptation to the vertical position -of the spine” (Nicholson), the spinal cord enters the cranial box at -a perpendicular, and the head balances on the spinal column as on a -pivot, all of which ensures the erect posture and bipedal progression -in man. There are, moreover, no neck muscles to support the head in any -other than the vertical position. There are many other differences, -besides: the ape, for example, has no chin, while in man there is a -marked mental protuberance; man has a slender waist, but the ape has a -barrel-like torso without any waist; the ape has huge bony ridges for -the attachment of muscles, _e.g._ the sagittal crest, the superciliary -ridges, etc., while in man such features are practically absent. - -Ranke has given a very good summary of the chief anatomical differences -between man and the anthropoid apes: “The gorilla’s head leaning -forward, hangs down from the spinal column, and his chinless snout, -equipped with powerful teeth, touches the breastbone. Man’s head -is round, and resting on a free neck, balances unrestrained upon -the spinal column. The gorilla’s body, without a waist, swells out -barrel-shaped, and when straightened up finds no sufficient support on -the pelvis; the back-bone, tailless as in man, but almost straight, -loses itself without nape or neck formation properly so-called in the -rear part of the head and without protuberance of the gluteal region -in the flat thighs. Man’s body is slightly molded, like an hour-glass, -the chest and abdomen meeting to form a waist where they are narrowest; -the abdominal viscera are perfectly supported in the pelvis as in a -plate; and elegance is decidedly gained by the double S-line, which, -curving alternately convex and concave, passes from the crown through -the neck and nape, down the back to the base of the spine and the -gluteal region. The normal position of the gorilla shows us a plump, -bear-like trunk, carried by short, crooked legs and by arms which serve -as crutches and touch the ground with the knuckles of the turned-in -fingers. The posture of the body is perfectly straight in man, it rests -on the legs as on columns when he stands upright, and his hands hang -down on both sides always ready for use. The gorilla is thickly covered -with hair, while man’s body on the whole is naked.” (_Op. cit._, vol. -II, p. 213.) - -In conclusion, we may say that, while there is a general resemblance -between the human body and that of an anthropoid ape, there is, -likewise, a particular divergence—“there is no bone, be it ever so -small, nay, not even the smallest particle of a bone, in which the -general agreement in structure and function would pass over into real -identity.” (Ranke, _op. cit._, vol. I, p. 437.) Hence Virchow declares -that “the differences between man and monkey are so wide that almost -any fragment is sufficient to diagnose them.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for -1889, p. 566.) These differences are so considerable as to preclude the -possibility of a _direct_ genealogical connection between man and any -known type of ape or monkey—“The testimony of comparative anatomy,” to -quote Bumüller, “is decidedly against the theory of man’s descent from -the ape.” (“Mensch oder Affe?” p. 59.) Ranke has somewhere called man -a brain-animal, and this sums up the chief difference, which marks off -the human body from all bestial organisms. In the ape the brain weighs -only 100th part of the weight of its body, whereas in man the brain has -a weight equivalent to the 37th part of the weight of the human body. -The cranial capacity of the largest apes ranges from 500 to 600 c.cm., -while the average cranial capacity in man is 1500 c.cm. Moreover, the -human brain is far more extensively convoluted within the brain-case -than that of an ape, so much so that the surface or cortical area of -the human brain is four times as great as that of the ape’s brain. -Thus Wundt, in his “Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie,” cites -H. Wagner as assigning to man a brain surface of from 2,196 to 1,877 -sq. cm., but a cortical area of only 535 sq. cm. in the case of an -orang-outang. (Cf. English Translation by Titchener, vol. I, p. 286.) - -Another difficulty in the way of the Darwinian theory of direct -descent is the fact that the best counterparts of human anatomy -are not found united in any one species of ape or monkey, but are -scattered throughout a large number of species. “Returning to the -old discussion,” says Thomas Dwight, “as to which ape can boast of -the closest resemblance to man, Kohlbrugge brings before us Aeby’s -forgotten book on the skull of man and apes. His measurements show that -the form nearest to man among apes is the gibbon, or long-armed ape, -but that the South American monkey _Crysothrix_ is nearer still. Aeby -recognized what modern anatomists have forgotten or wilfully ignored: -that any system of descent is inadequate which does not recognize that -the type of man is not in any one organ, but in all the physical and -psychological features. He declared that while we are far from having -this universal knowledge, we have learned enough about the various -parts of the body to make it impossible for us to sketch any plan -of descent. ‘It almost seems as if every part had its own line of -descent, different from that of others.’ ... Kohlbrugge now introduces -Haacke, who denies any relationship between man and apes, the latter -being instances of one-sided development. He even dares to declare -anyone who speaks of an intermediate form between man and apes to be -ignorant of the laws of development governing the race history of -mammals. He believes man came from some lemuroid form, which may have -descended from the insectivora.” (“Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist,” -pp. 188-190.) - -All known types, then, of apes and monkeys are too specialized to have -been in the direct line of human descent. Man, as Kohlbrugge ironically -remarks, appears to have come from an ancestor much more like himself -than any species of ape we know of. Moreover, no species of apes or -monkeys monopolizes the honors of closest resemblance to man. In many -points, the South American monkeys, though more primitive than the -anthropoid apes, are more similar to man than the latter. - - - § 2. Embryological Resemblances - -Much has been made of the so-called biogenetic law as an argument -for the bestial origin of mankind. This theory of the embryological -recapitulation of racial history was first formulated by Fritz Müller. -Haeckel, however, was the one who exploited it most extensively, -and who exalted it to the status of “the fundamental law of -biogenesis.”[16] The latter’s statement of the principle is as follows: -“_Die Ontogenesis ist die Palingenesis der Phylogenesis_.”—Ontogeny -(the development of the individual) is a recapitulation of phylogeny -(the development of the race). For a long time this law was received -with uncritical credulity by the scientific world, but enthusiasm -diminished when more careful studies made it clear that the line of -descent suggested by embryology did not agree with what was inferred -from comparative anatomy and the sequence of fossil forms. Besides, -it was manifest that certain organs in embryos were distinctively -_embryonic_ and could never have functioned in adult forms, _e.g._ the -yolk sac and the amnion. “It was recognized,” says T. H. Morgan, “that -many embryonic stages could not possibly represent ancestral animals. A -young fish with a huge yolk sac attached could scarcely ever have led a -happy, free life as an adult individual. Such stages were interpreted, -however, as _embryonic_ additions to the original ancestral type. The -embryo had done something on its own account. In some animals the -young have structures that attach them to the mother, as does the -placenta of mammals. In other cases the young develop membranes about -themselves—like the amnion of the chick and the mammal—that would have -shut off an adult animal from all intercourse with the outside world. -Hundreds of such embryonic structures are known to embryologists. These -were explained as adaptations and as falsifications of the ancestral -records.” (“Critique of the Theory of Evolution,” pp. 16, 17.) - - [16] Haeckel’s “Biogenetisches Grundgesetz,” which he - formulates thus: “_Die Ontogenie (Keimesgeschichte) ist eine - kurze Wiederholung der Phylogenie (Stammesgeschichte)_,” 1874. - -The result has been that this so-called law has fallen into general -disrepute among scientists, especially as a means of reconstructing -the phylogeny of modern organisms. It is recognized, of course, that -comparative embryology can furnish embryological homologies analogous -to the homologies of comparative anatomy, but it is now generally -acknowledged that the view, which regards the embryological process -as an abridged repetition of the various states through which the -species has passed in its evolutionary career must be definitively -abandoned, and that, as a general law of organic development, the -biogenetic principle has been thoroughly discredited. “This law,” says -Karl Vogt of Geneva, “which I long held as well-founded, is absolutely -and radically false. Attentive study of embryology shows us, in fact, -that embryos have their own conditions suitable to themselves, and very -different from those of adults.” (Quoted by Quatrefages De Breau, in -his “Les Emules de Darwin,” vol. II, p. 13.) “There can no longer be -question,” says Prof. M. Caullery of the Sorbonne, “of systematically -regarding individual development as a repetition of the history of the -stock. This conclusion results from the very progress made under the -inspiration received from this imaginary law, the law of biogenesis.” -(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1916, p. 325.) - -This collapse of the biogenetic law has tumbled into ruins the -elaborate superstructure of genealogy which Haeckel had reared upon it. -His series of thirty stages extending from the fictitious “cytodes” -up to man, inclusively, is even more worthless today than it was when -Du Bois-Reymond made his ironic comment: “Man’s pedigree, as drawn up -by Haeckel, is worth about as much as is that of Homer’s heroes for -critical historians.” (_Revue Scientifique_, 1877, I, p. 1101.) Haeckel -tried in vain to save his discredited law by means of the expedient -of _cænogenesis_, that is, “the falsification of the ancestral record -(palingenesis).” That Nature should be guilty of “falsification” is an -hypothesis not to be lightly entertained, and it is more credible, as -Wasmann remarks, to assume that Haeckel, and not Nature, is the real -falsifier, inasmuch as he has misrepresented Nature in his “fundamental -biogenetic law.” Cænogenesis is a very convenient device. One can -alternate at will between _cænogenesis_ and _palingenesis_, just -as, in comparative anatomy, one can alternate capriciously between -_convergence_ and _homology_, on the general understanding of its -being a case of: “Heads, I win; tails, you lose”—certainly, there is -no _objective_ consideration to restrain us in such procedure. “Such -weapons as Cænogenesis and Convergence,” says Kohlbrugge (in his “Die -Morphologische Abstammung des Menschen,” 1908) “are unfortunately so -shaped that anyone can use them when they suit him, or throw them -aside when they do not. They show, therefore, in the prettiest way the -uncertainty even now of the construction of the theory of descent. -As soon as we go into details it leaves us in the lurch; it was only -while our knowledge was small that everything seemed to fit together -in most beautiful order.” (Quoted by Dwight in “Thoughts of a Catholic -Anatomist,” p. 187.) - -It is undeniable, indeed, that in many cases the young of higher -animals pass through stages in which they bear at least a superficial -resemblance to adult stages in inferior and less complex organisms. -Obviously, however, there cannot be any direct derivation of the -_embryonic_ features of one organism from the _adult_ characters of -another organism. This preposterous implication of the Müller-Haeckel -Law must, as Morgan points out, be entirely eliminated, before it -can merit serious consideration. Referring to the spiral cleavage -exhibited by annelid, planarian and molluscan eggs, Morgan says: -“It has been found that the cleavage pattern has the same general -arrangement in the early stages of flat worms, annelids and molluscs. -Obviously these stages have never been adult ancestors, and obviously -if their resemblance has any meaning at all, it is that each group has -retained the same general plan of cleavage possessed by their common -ancestor.... Perhaps someone will say, ‘Well! is not this all that -we have contended for! Have you not reached the old conclusion in a -roundabout way?’ I think not. To my mind there is a wide difference -between the old statement that the higher animals living today have the -original adult stages telescoped into their embryos, and the statement -that the resemblance between certain characters in the embryos of -higher animals and corresponding stages in the embryos of lower animals -is most plausibly explained by the assumption that they have descended -from the same ancestors, and that their common structures are embryonic -survivals.” (_Op. cit._, pp. 22, 23.) - -After this admission, however, nothing remains of the law of -“recapitulation” except simple embryological homology comparable, in -every sense, to adult homology, and adding nothing essentially new -to the latter argument for evolution. It is, therefore, ridiculous -for evolutionists to speak of _branchial_ (gill) arches and clefts in -man. The visceral or pharyngeal arches and grooves appearing in the -human embryo are unquestionably homologous with the genuine branchial -arches and clefts in a fish embryo. In the latter, however, the grooves -become real clefts through perforation, while the arches become the -lamellæ of the permanent gills, thus adapting the animal to aquatic -respiration. It is, accordingly, perfectly legitimate to refer to these -embryonic structures in the young fish as gill arches and gill clefts. -In man, however, the corresponding embryonic structures develop into -the oral cavity, auditory meatus, ossicles of the ear, the mandible, -the lower lip, the tongue, the cheek, the hyoid bone, the styloid -process, the thymus, the thyroid and tracheal cartilages, etc. There is -no perforation of the grooves, and the arches develop into something -quite different than branchial lamellæ. Hence the correct name for -these structures in the human embryo is _pharyngeal_ (visceral) arches -and grooves, their superficial resemblance to the embryonic structures -in the fish embryo being no justification for calling them branchial. -In short, the mere fact that certain embryonic structures in the -young fish (homologous to the pharyngeal arches and grooves in the -human embryo) develop into the permanent gills of the adult fish, is -no more significant than the association of homology with divergent -preadaptations, which is of quite general occurrence among adult -vertebrate types. In all such cases, we have instances of fundamentally -identical structures, diverted, as it were, to entirely different -purposes or functions (_e.g._ the arm of a man and the flipper of a -whale). Hence the argument drawn from embryological homology is no -more cogent than the argument drawn from the homologies of comparative -anatomy, which we have already discussed in a previous chapter. The -misuse of the term _branchial_, to prejudge matters in their own -favor, is in keeping with the customary policy of evolutionists. It is -intended, naturally, to convey the impression that man, in the course -of his evolution, has passed through a fish-like stage. At bottom, -however, it is nothing more than a verbal subterfuge, that need not -detain us further. - -The theory of embryological recapitulation is often applied to man, -with a view to establishing the doctrine of his bestial ancestry. We -have seen one instance of this application, and we shall consider -one other, for the purpose of illustrating more fully the principles -involved. The claim is made by evolutionists, that man must have -passed through a fish or amphibian stage, because, in common with all -other mammals, he exhibits, during his embryological development, a -typical fish (or, if you prefer, amphibian) kidney, which subsequently -atrophies, only to be replaced by the characteristic mammalian kidney. -The human embryo, therefore, repeats the history of our race, which -must have passed through a fish-like stage in the remote past. In -consequence of this phenomenon, therefore, it is inferred that man must -have had fish-like ancestors. Let us pause, however, to analyze the -facts upon which this inference is based. - -In annelids, like the earthworm, the nephridia or excretory tubules -are arranged segmentally, one pair to each somite. In vertebrates, -however, the nephridial tubules, instead of developing in regular -sequence from before backwards, develop in three batches, one behind -the other, the anterior batch being called the _pronephros_, the middle -one, the _mesonephros_ and the posterior one, the _metanephros_. This, -according to J. Graham Kerr, holds true not only of the amniotic -vertebrates (reptiles, birds, and mammals) but also, with a certain -reservation, of the anamniotic vertebrates (fishes and amphibians). -“In many of the lower Vertebrates,” says this author, “there is no -separation between the mesonephros and metanephros, the two forming one -continuous structure which acts as the functional kidney. Such a type -of renal organ consisting of the series of tubules corresponding to -mesonephros together with metanephros may conveniently be termed the -opisthonephros.” (“Textbook of Embryology,” II—Vertebrata, p. 221.) If -we accept this view, it is not quite accurate to regard the mesonephros -in man as a homologue of the _opisthonephros_ of a fish, seeing that -the latter is composed not only of mesonephridia (mesonephric tubules), -but also of metanephridia (metanephric tubules). A brief description -of the three nephridial systems of vertebrate embryos will serve to -further clarify their interrelationship. - -(1) _The pronephric system_: This consists of a collection of tubules -called the pronephros, and a pronephric duct leading to the cloaca, -or terminal portion of the alimentary canal. The pronephros is a -functional organ in the frog tadpole and other larval amphibia. It -is also found in a few teleosts, where it is said to persist as a -functional organ in the adult. In other fishes, however, and in all -higher forms the pronephros atrophies and becomes reduced to a few -rudiments.[17] - - [17] The objection may be raised that a purely embryonic organ - like the pronephros, which is functional in but few vertebrate - adults and which originates in vertebrate embryos only to - undergo atrophy, can have no other explanation than that of - “recapitulation.” The objection, however, fails to take into - account the possibility of the organ being serviceable to - the _embryo_, in which it may be a provisory solution of the - excretory problem and not a vestige of past ancestry. - -(2) _The mesonephric system_: This consists of a collection of -nephridial tubules called the mesonephros (Wolffian body). The tubules -of the mesonephros do not develop any duct of their own, but utilize -the posterior portion of the pronephric duct, the said tubules becoming -secondarily connected with this duct in a region posterior to the -pronephridia (tubules of the pronephros). The pronephric tubules -together with the anterior portion of the pronephric duct then atrophy, -while the persisting posterior portion of this duct receives the name -of mesonephric or Wolffian duct. The duct in question still terminates -in the cloaca, and serves, in the male, the combined function of a -urinary and spermatic duct; but, in the female, a special oviduct (the -Müllerian duct) is superadded because of the large size of the eggs to -be transmitted, the Wolffian or mesonephric duct subserving only the -urinary function. The mesonephros is functional in mammalian embryos, -but atrophies and disappears coincidently with the development of the -permanent kidney. The same is true of amniotic vertebrates generally, -except that in the case of reptiles the mesonephros persists for a -few months after hatching in the adult, the definitive kidney of the -adult being reinforced during that interval by the still functional -mesonephros. In anamniotic vertebrates, however, no separation exists -between the mesonephros and the metanephros, the two forming one -continuous structure, the opisthonephros, which acts as the functional -kidney of the adult. - -(3) _The metanephric system_: In the amniotic vertebrates the -mesonephros and metanephros are distinct, the former being functional -in embryos and in adult reptiles (for a few months after hatching), -while the metanephros becomes the definitive kidney of the adult. The -metanephros is a collection of nephridial tubules provided with a -special urinary duct called the ureter, which empties into the bladder -(not the cloaca). The Wolffian or mesonephric duct is retained as a -sperm duct in the male (of amniotic vertebrates), but becomes vestigial -in the female. Only a certain number of the nephridial tubules of the -embryonic metanephros are taken over to form part of the permanent or -adult kidney (in mammals, birds, and reptiles). - -If, then, as we have previously observed, we follow Kerr in regarding -the fish kidney, not as a simple mesonephros, but as an opisthonephros -(_i.e._ a combination of mesonephros and metanephros), there is no -warrant for interpreting the embryonic mesonephros of man and mammals -generally as the fish-kidney stage. But waiving this consideration, and -assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fish kidney is a perfect -homologue of the human mesonephros, the mere fact of the adoption by -the human embryo of a temporary solution of its excretory problem -similar to the permanent solution of that problem adopted by the fish, -would not, of itself, imply the common ancestry of men and fishes. -Such a coincidence would be fully explicable as a case of convergent -adaptation occurring in the interest of embryonic economy. - -It is, indeed, a well-known fact that larval and embryonic organisms -are often obliged to defer temporarily the construction of the more -complex structures of adult life, and to improvise simpler substitutes -for use until such a time as they have accumulated a sufficient reserve -of energy and materials to complete the work of their more elaborate -adult organization. The young starfish, for example, arising as it does -from an egg but scantily supplied with yolk, is forced, from the very -outset, to shift for itself, in coping with the food-getting problem. -Under stress of this necessity, it economizes its slender resources -by constructing the extremely simple digestive and motor apparatus -characteristic of the larva in its bilaterally-symmetrical _Bipinnaria_ -stage, and postponing the development of the radially-symmetrical -structure characteristic of the adult stage, until it has stored up the -wherewithal to complete its metamorphosis. - -From this viewpoint, there is no difficulty in understanding why -_temporary_ solutions of the excretory problem should precede the -_definitive_ solution of this problem in mammalian embryos. The problem -of excretion is urgent from the outset, and its demands increase with -the growth of the embryo. It is only natural, then, that a series of -improvised structures should be resorted to, in a case of this kind; -and, since these temporary solutions of the excretory problem must, -of necessity, be as simple as possible, it should not be in the least -surprising to find them coinciding with the permanent solutions adopted -by inferior organisms less complexly organized than the mammals. -Hence the bare fact of resemblance between the transitory embryonic -kidney of a mammal and the permanent adult kidney of a fish would -have no atavistic significance. We know of innumerable cases in which -an identical adaptation occurs in genetically unrelated organisms. -The cephalopod mollusc _Nautilus_, for example, solves the problem -of light-perception in the identical manner in which it is solved by -the vertebrates. This mollusc has the perfect vertebrate type of eye, -including the lens and all other parts down to the minutest detail. -The fact, however, that the mollusc solves its problem by using the -stereotyped solution found in vertebrates rather than by developing a -compound eye analogous to the type found among arthropods, is wholly -destitute of genetic significance. In fact, the genetic interpretation -is positively rejected by the evolutionists, who interpret the -occurrence of similar eyes in molluscs and vertebrates as an instance -of “accidental convergence.” Even assuming, then, what Kerr denies, -namely, a perfect parallelism between the mesonephros of the human -embryo and the permanent kidney of an adult fish, the alleged fact that -the human embryo temporarily adopts the same type of solution for its -excretory problem as the one permanently employed by the fish would not -in itself be a proof of our descent from a fish-like ancestor. - -In fact, not only is embryological homology of no greater value -than adult homology as an argument for evolution, but it is, on -the contrary, considerably inferior to the latter, as regards -cogency. _Differentiation_ pertains to the final or _adult_ stage of -organisms. Embryonic structures, inasmuch as they are undeveloped and -undifferentiated, present for that very reason an appearance of crude -and superficial similarity. “Most of what is generally ascribed to -the action of the so-called biogenetic law,” says T. Garbowski, “is -erroneously ascribed to it, since all things that are undeveloped and -incomplete must be more or less alike.” (“Morphogenetische Studien,” -Jena, 1903.) When we consider the fact that the metazoa have all a -similar unicellular origin, are subject to uniform morphogenetic laws, -and are frequently exposed to analogous environmental conditions -demanding similar adaptations, it is not at all surprising that -they should present many points of resemblance (both in their -embryonic and their adult morphology) which are not referable to any -particular line of descent. At all events, these resemblances are -far too general in their extension to enable us to specify the type -of ancestor responsible therefor. More especially is this true of -embryological homologies, which are practically valueless as basis for -reconstructing the phylogeny of any type. “That certain phenomena,” -says Oskar Hertwig, “recur with great regularity and uniformity in -the development of different species of animals, is due chiefly to the -fact that under all circumstances they supply the necessary condition -under which alone the next higher stage in ontogeny (embryological -development) can be produced.” (“Allgemeine Biologie,” 1906, p. -595.) The same author, therefore, proposes to revamp Haeckel’s -“biogenetisches Grundgesetz” as follows: “We must leave out the words -‘recapitulation of forms of extinct ancestors’ and substitute for them -‘repetition of forms regularly occurring in organic development, and -advancing from the simple to the more complex.’” (_Op. cit._, p. 593.) - -Finally, when applied to the problem of man’s alleged genetic -connection with the ape, the biogenetic principle proves the exact -reverse of what the Darwinians desire; for as a matter of fact the -young apes resemble man much more closely in the shape of the skull -and facial features than do the adult animals. Inasmuch, therefore, as -the ape, in its earlier development, reveals a more marked resemblance -to man than is present in its later stages, it follows, according -to the “biogenetic law,” that man is the ancestor of the ape. This, -however, is inadmissible, seeing that the ape is by no means a more -recent type than man. Consequently, as applied to man, the Haeckelian -principle leads to a preposterous conclusion, and thereby manifests -its worthlessness as a clue to phylogeny. Julius Kollmann, it is true, -gives serious attention to this likeness between young apes and men, -and makes it the basis of his scheme of human evolution. “Kollmann,” -says Dwight, “starts from the fact that the head of a young ape is very -much more like that of a child than the head of an old ape is like that -of a man. He holds that the likeness of the skull of a very young ape -is so great that there must be a family relationship. He believes that -some differentiation, some favorable variation, must occur in the body -of the mother and so a somewhat higher skull is transmitted to the -offspring and is perpetuated. Concerning which Kohlbrugge remarks that -‘thus the first men were developed, not from the adult, but from the -embryonic forms of the anthropoids whose more favorable form of skull -they managed to preserve in further growth.’ ... Schwalbe makes the -telling criticism of these views of Kollmann that much the same thing -might be said of the heads of embryonic animals in general that is said -of those of apes, and that thus mammals might be said to have come from -a more man-like ancestor.” (_Op. cit._, pp. 186, 187.) All of which -goes to show that the “biogenetic law” is more misleading than helpful -in settling the question of human phylogeny. - - - § 3. Rudimentary Organs - -Darwin attached great importance to the existence in man of so-called -rudimentary organs, which he regarded as convincing evidence of man’s -descent from the lower forms of animal life. Nineteenth century -science, being ignorant of the functional purpose served by many -organs, arbitrarily pronounced them to be useless organs, and chose, -in consequence, to regard them all as the atrophied and (wholly or -partially) functionless remnants of organs that were formerly developed -and fully functional in remote ancestors of the race. Darwin borrowed -this argument from Lamarck. It may be stated thus: Undeveloped and -functionless organs are atrophied organs. But atrophy is the result of -disuse. Now disuse presupposes former use. Consequently, rudimentary -organs were at one time developed and functioning, viz. in the remote -ancestors of the race. Since, therefore, these selfsame organs are -developed and functional in the lower forms of life, it follows that -the higher forms, in which these organs are reduced and functionless, -are descended from forms similar to those in which said organs are -developed and fully functional. - -This argument, however, fairly bristles with assumptions that are not -only wholly unwarranted, but utterly at variance with actual facts. -In the first place, it wrongly assumes that all reduced organs are -functionless, and, conversely, that all functionless organs are -atrophied or reduced. Facts, however, prove the contrary; for we find -frequent instances of reduced organs which function, and, _vice versa_, -of well-developed organs which are functionless. The tail, for example, -in cats, dogs, and certain Catarrhine monkeys, though it discharges -neither the prehensile function that makes it useful in the Platyrrhine -monkey, nor the protective function that makes it useful to horses and -cattle in warding off flies, is, nevertheless, despite its inutility -or absence of function, a quite fully developed organ. Conversely, the -reduced or undeveloped fin-like wings of the penguin are by no means -functionless, since they enable this bird to swim through the water -with great facility. - -To save his argument from this antagonism of the facts, Darwin resorts -to the ingenious expedient of distinguishing between _rudimentary_ -organs and _nascent_ organs. Rudimentary organs are undeveloped organs, -which are wholly, or partially, useless. They have had a past, but have -no future. Nascent organs, on the contrary, are undeveloped organs, -which “are of high service to their possessors” (“Descent of Man,” -ch. I, p. 28, 2nd ed.). They “are capable of further development” -(_ibidem_), and have, therefore, a future before them. He gives the -following examples of rudimentary organs: “Rudimentary organs ... -are either quite useless, such as teeth which never cut through the -gums, or almost useless, such as the wings of an ostrich, which serve -merely as sails.” (“Origin of Species,” 6th ed., ch. XIV, p. 469.) -As an example of a nascent organ, he gives the mammary glands of the -oviparous Duckbill: “The mammary glands of the Ornithorhynchus may be -considered, in comparison with the udders of a cow, as in a nascent -condition.” (_Op. cit._, ch. XIV, p. 470.) - -Darwin admits that it is hard to apply this distinction in the -concrete: “It is, however, often difficult to distinguish between -rudimentary and nascent organs; for we can judge only by analogy -whether a part is capable of further development, in which case alone -it deserves to be called nascent.” (_Op. cit._, ch. XIV, p. 469.) -For Darwin “judging by analogy” meant judging on the assumption that -evolution has really taken place; for he describes rudimentary organs -as being “of such slight service that we can hardly suppose that they -were developed under the conditions which now exist.” (“Descent of -Man,” ch. I, p. 29.) - -He is somewhat perplexed about applying this distinction to the -penguin: “The wing of the penguin,” he admits, “is of high service, -acting as a fin; it may, therefore, represent the nascent state: not -that I believe this to be the case; it is more probably a reduced -organ, modified for a new function.” (“Origin of Species,” 6th ed., ch. -XIV, pp. 469, 470.) In other words, there is scarcely any objective -consideration by which the validity of this distinction can be checked -up in practice. Like homology and convergence, like palingenesis and -cænogensis, the distinction between rudimentary and nascent organs is -a convenient device, which can be arbitrarily manipulated according to -the necessities of a preconceived theory. It is “scientific” sanction -for the privilege of blowing hot and cold with the same breath. - -The assumption that atrophy and reduction are the inevitable -consequence of disuse, or diminution of use, in so far as this -decreases the flow of nourishing blood to unexercised parts, is -certainly erroneous. Yet Darwin made it the premise of his argument -from so-called rudimentary organs. “The term ‘disuse’ does not relate,” -he informs us, “merely to lessened action of muscles, but includes a -diminished flow of blood to the part or organ, from being subjected -to fewer alternations of pressure, or from being in any way less -habitually active.” (“Origin of Species,” 6th ed., p. 469.) As a matter -of fact, however, we have many instances in which use has failed to -develop and disuse to reduce organs in certain types of animals. As -an example in point, we may cite the case of right-handedness among -human beings. From time immemorial, the generality of mankind have -consistently used the right hand in preference to the left, without -any atrophy or reduction of the left hand, or over-development of the -right hand, resulting from this racial practice. “The superiority of -one hand,” says G. Elliot Smith, “is as old as mankind.” (Smithson. -Inst. Rpt. for 1912, p. 570.) It is true that only about 6,000 years -of human existence are known to history, but, if one accepts the most -conservative estimates of glaciologists, man has had a much longer -prehistory, the lowest estimates for the age of man being approximately -30,000 years. Thus W. J. Sollas tells us that the Glacial period, in -which man first appeared, came to an end about 7,000 years ago, and -that the men buried at Chapelle-aux-Saints in France lived about 25,000 -years ago. His figures agree with those of C. F. Wright, who bases -his calculations on the Niagara Gorge. The Niagara River is one of -the postglacial streams, and the time required to cut its gorge has -been calculated as 7,000 years. Gerard De Geer, the Swedish scientist, -gives 20,000 years ago as the end of glacial and the commencement of -recent or postglacial time. He bases his estimates on the sediments of -the Yoldia Sea in Sweden. His method consists in the actual counting -of certain seasonally-laminated clay layers, presumably left behind -by the receding ice sheet of the continental glacier. The melting is -registered by annual deposition, in which the thinner layers of finer -sand from the winter flows alternate with thicker layers of coarser -material from the summer flows. In warm years, the layers are thicker, -in colder years they are thinner, so that these laminated Pleistocene -clays constitute a thermographic as well as a chronological record. De -Geer began his study of Pleistocene clays in 1878, and in 1920 he led -an expedition to the United States, for the purpose of extending his -researches. (Cf. _Science_, Sept. 24, 1920, pp. 284-286.) At that time, -he claimed to have worked out the chronology of the past 12,000 years. -His figure of 20,000 years for postglacial time, while very displeasing -to that reckless foe of scientific caution and conservatism, Henry -Fairfield Osborn, tallies very well with the estimates of Sollas and -Wright. H. Obermaier, basing his computation on Croll’s theory that -glaciation is caused by variations in the eccentricity of the earth’s -orbit about the sun, which would bring about protracted winters in the -hemisphere having winter, when the earth was farthest from the sun -(with consequent accumulation of ice), gives 30,000 years ago as the -date of the first appearance of man on earth. Father Hugues Obermaier, -it may be noted, like Abbé Henri Breuil, is one of the foremost -authorities on the subject of prehistoric Man. Both are Catholic -priests. - -All such computations of the age of man are, of course, uncertain and -theoretical. Evolutionists calculate it in hundreds of thousands, -and even millions, of years. After giving such a table of recklessly -tremendous figures, Osborn has the hypocritical meticulosity to add -that, for the sake of _precision_ (save the mark!) the nineteen hundred -and some odd years of the Christian era should be added to his figures. -But, even according to the most conservative scientific estimates, -as we have seen, man is said to have been in existence for 30,000 -years, and the prevalence of right-handedness among men is as old as -the human race. One would expect, then, to find modern man equipped -with a gigantic right arm and a dwarfed left arm. In other words, man -should exhibit a condition comparable to that of a lobster, which has -one large and one small chela. Yet, in spite of the fact that the -comparative inaction of the human left hand is supposed to have endured -throughout a period of, at least, 30,000 years, this state of affairs -has not resulted in the faintest trace of atrophy or retrogression. -Bones, muscles, tendons, ligaments, nerves, blood vessels, and all -parts are of equal size in both arms and both hands. Excessive exercise -may overdevelop the musculature of the right arm, but this is an -individual and acquired adaptation, which is never transmitted to -the offspring, _e.g._ the child of a blacksmith does not inherit the -muscular hypertrophy of his father. Disuse, therefore, has not the -efficacy which Lamarck and Darwin ascribed to it. - -In fine, it must be recognized, once for all, that organisms are -not-molded on a Lamarckian basis of use, nor yet on a Darwinian -basis of selected utility. Expediency, in other words, is not the -sole governing principle of the organic world. Neither instinctive -habitude nor the struggle for existence succeeds in forcing structural -adaptation of a predictable nature. Animals with different organic -structure have the same instincts, _e.g._ monkeys with, and without, -prehensile tails alike dwell in trees; while animals having the same -organic structure may have different instincts, _e.g._ the rabbit, -which burrows, and the hare, which does not, are practically identical -in anatomical structure. Again, some animals are highly specialized for -a function, which other animals perform without specialized organs, as -is instanced in the case of moles, which possess a special burrowing -apparatus, and prairie-dogs, which burrow without a specialized -apparatus. Any system of evolution, which ignores the internal or -hereditary factors of organic life and strives to explain all in terms -of the environmental factors, encounters an insuperable obstacle in -this remorseless resistance of conflicting facts. - -Another flaw in the Darwinian argument from rudimentary organs is -that it confounds, in many cases, _apparent_, with _real_ inutility -(or absence of function). Darwin and his followers frequently argued -out of their ignorance, and falsely concluded that an organ was -destitute of a function, merely because _they_ had failed to discover -its utility. Large numbers, accordingly, of highly serviceable organs -were catalogued as vestigial or rudimentary, simply because nineteenth -century science did not comprehend their indubitable utility. With the -advance of present-day physiology, this list of “useless organs” is -being rapidly depleted, so that the scientific days of the rudimentary -organ appear to be numbered. At any rate, in arbitrarily pronouncing -many important and functioning organs to be useless vestiges of a -former stage in the history of the race, the Darwinians were not the -friends of Science, but rather its reactionary enemies, inasmuch as -they sought to discourage further investigation by their dogmatic -decision that there was no function to be found. In so doing, however, -they were merely exploiting the ignorance of their times in the -interest of a preconceived theory, which whetted their appetite for -discovering, at all costs, the presence in man of functionless organs. - -Their anxiety in this direction led them to consider the whole group -of organs constituting a most important regulatory and coördinative -system in man and other vertebrates as so many useless vestigial -organs. This system is called the _cryptorhetic system_ and is made of -internally-secreting, ductless glands, now called _endocrine glands_. -These glands generate and instill into the blood stream certain -chemical substances called _hormones_, which, diffusing in the blood, -produce immediate stimulatory, and remote metabolic effects on special -organs distant from the endocrine gland, in which the particular -hormone is elaborated. As examples of such endocrine glands, we may -mention the pineal gland (epiphysis), the pituitary body (hypophysis), -the thyroid glands, the parathyroids, the islelets of Langerhans, the -adrenal bodies (suprarenal capsules), and the interstitial cells of the -gonads. The importance of these alleged useless organs is now known to -be paramount. Death, for instance, will immediately ensue in man and -other animals, upon extirpation of the adrenal bodies. - -The late Robert Wiedersheim, it will be remembered, declared the -pineal gland or epiphysis to be the surviving vestige of a “third -eye” inherited from a former ancestor, in whom it opened between the -parietal bones of the skull, like the median or _pineal eye_ of certain -lizards, the socket of which is the parietal foramen formed in the -interparietal suture. If the argument is based on homology alone, -then the coincidence in position between the human epiphysis and the -median optic nerve of the lizards in question has the ordinary force -of the evolutionary argument from homology. But when one attempts to -reduce the epiphysis to the status of a useless vestigial rudiment, -he is in open conflict with facts; for the pineal body is, in reality, -an endocrine gland generating and dispersing a hormone, which is -very important for the regulation of growth in general and of sexual -development in particular. Hence this tiny organ in the diencephalic -roof, no larger than a grain of wheat, is not a functionless rudiment, -but an important functioning organ of the cryptorhetic system. We have -no ground, therefore, on this score for inferring that our pineal gland -functioned in former ancestors as a median eye comparable to that of -the cyclops Polyphemus of Homeric fame. - -In like manner, the pituitary body or hypophysis, which in man is a -small organ about the size of a cherry, situated at the base of the -brain, buried in the floor of the skull, and lying just behind the -optic chiasma, was formerly rated as a rudimentary organ. It was, in -fact, regarded as the vestigial remnant of a former connection between -the neural and alimentary canals, reminiscent of the invertebrate -stage. “The phylogenetic explanation of this organ generally accepted,” -says Albert P. Mathews, “is that formerly the neural canal connected -at this point with the alimentary canal. A probable and almost the -only explanation of this, though an explanation almost universally -rejected by zoölogists, is that of Gaskell, who has maintained that -the vertebrate alimentary canal is a new structure, and that the old -invertebrate canal is the present neural canal. The infundibulum, -on this view, would correspond to the old invertebrate œsophagus, -the ventricle of the thalamus to the invertebrate stomach, and the -canal originally connected posteriorly with the anus. The anterior -lobe of the pituitary body could then correspond to some glandular -adjunct of the invertebrate canal, and the nervous part to a portion -of the original circumœsophageal nervous ring of the invertebrates.” -(“Physiological Chemistry,” 2nd ed., 1916, pp. 641, 642.) - -This elaborate piece of evolutionary contortion calls for no comment -here. We are only interested in the fact that this wild and weird -speculation was originally inspired by the false assumption that -the hypophysis was a functionless organ. As a matter of fact, it -is the source of two important hormones. The one generated in its -anterior lobe is _tethelin_, a metabolic hormone, which promotes the -growth of the body in general and of the bony tissue in particular. -Hypertrophy and overfunction of this gland produces giantism, or -acromegaly (enlargement of hands, feet, and skull), while atrophy and -underfunction of the anterior lobe results in infantilism, acromikria -(diminution of extremities, _i. e._ hands, feet, head), obesity, and -genital dystrophy (_i. e._ suppression of secondary sexual characters). -The posterior lobe of the pituitary body constitutes, with the _pars -intermedia_, a second endocrine gland, which generates a stimulatory -hormone called _pituitrin_. This hormone stimulates unstriated muscle -to contract, and thereby regulates the discharge of secretions from -various glands of the body, _e. g._ the mammary glands, bladder, -etc. Hence the hypophysis, far from being a useless organ, is an -indispensable one. Moreover, it is an integral and important part of -the cryptorhetic system. - -The same story may be repeated of the thyroid glands. These consist -of two lobes located on either side of the windpipe, just below the -larynx (Adam’s apple), and joined together across the windpipe by a -narrow band or isthmus of their own substance. Gaskell homologized -them with a gland in scorpions, and Mathew says that, if his surmise -is correct, “the thyroid represents an accessory sexual organ of the -invertebrate.” (_Op. cit._, p. 654.) They are, however, endocrine -glands, that generate a hormone known as _thyroxin_, which regulates -the body-temperature, growth of the body in general, and of the nervous -system in particular, etc., etc. Atrophy or extirpation of these glands -causes cretinism in the young and myxoedema in adults. Without a -sufficient supply of this hormone, the normal exercise of mental powers -in human beings is impossible. The organ, therefore, is far from being -a useless vestige of what was formerly useful. - -George Howard Parker, the Zoölogist of Harvard, sums up the case -against the Darwinian interpretation of the endocrine glands as -follows: “The extent to which hormones control the body is only just -beginning to be appreciated. For a long time anatomists have recognized -in the higher animals, including man, a number of so-called ductless -glands, such as the thyroid gland, the pineal gland, the hypophysis, -the adrenal bodies, and so forth. These have often been passed over as -unimportant functionless organs whose presence was to be explained as -an inheritance from some remote ancestor. But such a conception is far -from correct. If the thyroids are removed from a dog, death follows in -from one to four weeks. If the adrenal bodies are excised, the animal -dies in from two to three days. Such results show beyond doubt that at -least some of these organs are of vital importance, and more recent -studies have demonstrated that most of them produce substances which -have all the properties of hormones.” (“Biology and Social Problems,” -1914, pp. 43, 44.) - -Even the _vermiform appendix_ of the cæcum, which since Darwin’s time -has served as a classic example of a rudimentary organ in man, is, in -reality, not a functionless organ. Darwin, however, was of opinion -that it was not only useless, but positively harmful. “With respect to -the alimentary canal,” he says, “I have met with an account of only a -single rudiment, namely, the vermiform appendage of the cæcum. ... Not -only is it useless, but it is sometimes the cause of death, of which -fact I have lately heard two instances. This is due to small hard -bodies, such as seeds, entering the passage and causing inflammation.” -(“Descent of Man,” 2nd ed., ch. I, pp. 39, 40.) The idea that seeds -cause appendicitis is, of course, an exploded superstition, the hard -bodies sometimes found in the appendix being fecal concretions and not -seeds—“The old idea,” says Dr. John B. Deaver, “that foreign bodies, -such as grape seeds, are the cause of the disease, has been disproved.” -(Encycl. Americana, vol. 2, p. 76.) What is more germane to the point -at issue, however, is that Darwin erred in denying the utility of the -vermiform appendix. For, although this organ does not discharge in man -the important function which its homologue discharges in grain-eating -birds and also in herbivorous mammals, it subserves the secondary -function of lubricating the intestines by means of a secretion from its -muciparous glands. - -Darwin gives the _semilunar fold_ as another instance of a vestigial -organ, claiming that it is a persistent rudiment of a former third -eyelid or _membrana nictitans_, such as we find in birds. “The -nictitating membrane, or third eyelid,” he says, “with its accessory -muscles and other structures, is especially well developed in birds, -and is of much functional importance to them, as it can be rapidly -drawn across the whole eyeball. It is found in some reptiles and -amphibians, and in certain fishes as in sharks. It is fairly well -developed in the two lower divisions of the mammalian series, namely, -in the monotremata and marsupials, and in some higher mammals, as in -the walrus. But in man, the quadrumana, and most other mammals, it -exists, as is admitted by all anatomists, as a mere rudiment, called -the semilunar fold.” (_Op. cit._, ch. I, pp. 35, 36.) Here Darwin is -certainly wrong about his facts; for the so-called third eyelid is -not well developed in the two lower divisions of the mammalian series -(_i.e._ the monotremes and the marsupials) nor in any other mammalian -type. “With but few exceptions,” says Remy Perrier, “the third eyelid -is not so complete as among the birds; (in the mammals) it never -covers the entire eye. For the rest, it is not really perceptible -except in certain types, like the dog, the ruminants, and, still more -so, the horse. In the rest (of the mammals) it is less developed.” -(“Elements d’anatomie comparée,” Paris, 1893, p. 1137.) Moreover, -Darwin’s suggestion leaves us at sea as to the ancestor, from whom -our “rudimentary third eyelid” has been inherited. His mention of -birds as having a well developed third eyelid is not very helpful, -because all evolutionists agree in excluding the birds from our line of -descent. The reptiles are more promising candidates for the position -of ancestors, but, as no trace of a third eyelid could possibly be -left behind in the imperfect record of the fossiliferous rocks (soft -parts like this having but slight chance of preservation), we do not -really _know_ whether the palæozoic reptiles possessed this particular -feature, or not. Nor can we argue from analogy and induction, because -not _all_ modern reptiles are equipped with third eyelids. Hence the -particular group of palæozoic reptiles, which are supposed to have been -our progenitors, may not have possessed any third eyelid to bequeath to -us in the reduced and rudimentary form of the plica semilunaris. If it -be replied, that they _must_ have had this feature, because otherwise -we would have no ancestor from whom we could inherit our semilunar -fold, it is obvious that such argumentation assumes the very point -which it ought to prove, namely: the actuality of evolution. Rudiments -are supposed to be a proof for evolution, and not, _vice versa_, -evolution a proof for rudiments. - -Finally, the basic assumption of Darwin that the semilunar fold is -destitute of function is incorrect; for this crescent-shaped fold -situated in the inner or nasal corner of the eye of man and other -mammals serves to regulate the flow of the lubricating lacrimal fluid -(which we call tears). True this function is secondary compared with -the more important function discharged by the nictitating membrane in -birds. In the latter, the third eyelid is a pearly-white (sometimes -transparent) membrane placed internal to the real eyelids, on the -inner side of the eye, over whose surface it can be drawn like a -curtain to shield the organ from excessive light, or irritating dust; -nevertheless, the regulation of the flow of lacrimal humor is a real -function, and it is therefore entirely false to speak of the semilunar -fold as a functionless rudiment. - -The _coccyx_ is likewise cited by Darwin as an example of an inherited -rudiment in man. “In man,” he says, “the os coccyx, together with -certain other vertebræ hereafter to be described, though functionless -as a tail, plainly represents this part in other vertebrate animals.” -(_Op. cit._, ch. I, p. 42.) That it serves no purpose _as a tail_, -may be readily admitted, but that it serves no purpose _whatever_, is -quite another matter. As a matter of fact, it serves for the attachment -of several small muscles, whose functioning would be impossible in the -absence of this bone. Darwin himself concedes this; for he confesses -that the four vertebræ of the coccyx “are furnished with some small -muscles.” (_Ibidem._) We may, therefore, admit the homology between the -human coccyx and the tails of other vertebrates, without being forced -to regard the latter as a useless vestigial organ. It may be objected -that the attachment of these muscles might have been provided for in -a manner more in harmony with our ideas of symmetry. To this we reply -that Helmholtz criticized the human eye for similar reasons, when he -said that he would remand to his workshop for correction an optical -instrument so flawed with defects as the human eye. But, after all, -it was by the use of these selfsame imperfect eyes that Helmholtz was -enabled to detect the flaws of which he complained. When man shall -have fully fathomed the difficulties and obstructions with which -organic morphogeny has to contend in performing its wonderful work, -and shall have arrived at an elementary knowledge of the general laws -of morphogenetic mechanics, he will be more inclined to admire than -to criticize. It is a mistake to imagine that the finite works of the -Creator must be perfect from _every_ viewpoint. It suffices that they -are perfect with respect to the particular _purpose_ which they serve, -and this purpose must not be narrowly estimated from the standpoint of -the created work itself, but from that of its position in the universal -scheme of creation. All such partial views as the Helmholtzian one are -false views. - -Another consideration which Darwin and his partisans have failed -to take into account is the possibility of an _ontogenetic_, as -well as a phylogenetic, explanation of rudimentary organs. That is -to say, rudimentary organs might, so far as _a priori_ reasons are -concerned, be the now useless vestiges of organs formerly developed -and functional _in the fœtus_, and need not necessarily be interpreted -as traces of organs that functioned formerly in remote racial -ancestors. That there should be such things as special fœtal organs, -which atrophy in later adult life, is a possibility that ought not to -excite surprise. During its uterine existence, the fœtus is subject -to peculiar conditions of life, very different from those which -prevail in the case of adult organisms—_e.g._ respiration and the -digestive process are suspended, and there is a totally different kind -of circulation. What, then, more natural than that the fœtus should -require special organs to adapt it to these special conditions of -uterine life? Such organs, while useful and functional in the earlier -stages of embryonic development, will, so soon as birth and maturity -introduce new conditions of life, become superfluous, and therefore -doomed, in the interest of organic economy, to ultimate atrophy and -degeneration, until nothing is left of them but vestigial remnants. - -The thymus may be cited as a probable instance of such an organ. -This organ, which is located in front of the heart and behind the -breastbone, in the region between the two lungs, consists, at the -period of its greatest development in man, of a two-lobed structure, -5 cm. long and 4 cm. wide, with a thickness of 6 mm. and a maximum -weight of 35 grams. It is supplied with numerous lymphoid cells, which -are aggregated to form lymphoid follicles (_cf._ Gray’s “Anatomy,” -20th ed., 1918, pp. 1273, 1274; Burton-Opitz’ “Physiology,” 1920, -p. 964). This organ is a transitory one, well developed at birth, -but degenerating, according to some authors, after the second year -of life (_cf._ Starling’s “Physiology,” 3rd ed., 1920, p. 1245); -according to others, however, not until the period of full maturity, -namely, puberty. (_Cf._ Gray’s “Anatomy,” _loc. cit._) W. H. Howell -cites both opinions, without venturing to decide the matter (_cf._ -his “Physiology,” 8th ed., 1921, pp. 869, 870). It was at one time -classified as a rudimentary or functionless organ. Later on, however, -it was thought by certain observers to be an endocrine gland, yielding -a secretion important for the growth of young mammals. This took it -out of the class of useless vestigial organs, but the recent discovery -that it is indispensable to birds as furnishing a secretion necessary -for the formation of the tertiary envelopes (egg membrane and shell) -of their eggs, has tended to revive the idea of its being a vestigial -organ inherited from the lower vertebrates. - -Thus Dr. Oscar Riddle, while admitting that the thymus gland in -man has some influence on the growth of the bones, contends that -the newly-discovered function of this gland in birds is much more -important, since without it none of the vertebrates, excepting mammals, -could reproduce their young. “It thus becomes clear,” he says, “that -though the thymus is almost without use in the human being, it is in -fact a sort of ‘mother of the race.’ The higher animals could not have -come into existence without it. For even while our ancestors lived in -the water, it was the thymus of these ancestors which made possible the -production of the egg-envelopes within which the young were cradled and -protected until they were ready for an independent life.” (_Science_, -Dec. 28, 1923, Suppl. XIII, XIV.) - -This conclusion, however, is far too hasty. For, even if we disregard -as negligible the minor function, that Riddle assigns to the thymus -in man, there remains another possibility, which H. H. Wilder takes -into account, namely, that the thymus may, in certain cases, be -a temporary substitute for the lymphatic vessels. Having called -attention to certain determinate channels found in some of the lower -vertebrates, he tells us that these “can well be utilized as adjuncts -of the lymphatic system until their function can be supplied by -definite lymphatic vessels.” He then resumes his discussion of the -lymph nodules in mammals as follows: “Aside from the solitary and -aggregated nodules, both of which appear to be centers of origin of -lymphocytes, there are numerous other places in which the cellular -constituents of the blood are developed. Many of these, as in the case -of the aggregated nodules of the intestines, are developed within -the wall of the alimentary canal and are therefore endodermic in -origin. These include the tonsils, the _thymus_, and thyroid glands, -the associated epithelial bodies, and, perhaps, the spleen.... In -their function as formative nidi for the cellular elements of the -blood these organs form physiologically important auxiliaries to the -vascular system as a whole, but belong elsewhere in their anatomical -developmental affinities.” (“History of the Human Body,” 2nd ed., 1923, -p. 395—italics mine.) - -This being the case, it is much more reasonable to interpret the thymus -as an ontogenetic (embryonic), rather than a phylogenetic (racial) -rudiment. It has been observed that, in the case of reptiles which -lack definite lymphatic glands (which function in man as formative -centers of lymphocytes or white blood corpuscles), the thymus is -extraordinarily developed and abounds in lymphoid cells. It has also -been observed that the formation of lymphocytes in the lymphatic -glands is regulated by the digestive process; for, after digestion, -the activity of these glands increases and the formation of leucocytes -is accelerated. Since, then, the lymphatic glands appear to require -the stimulus of the digestive process to incite them to action, it -is clear that in the fœtus, which lacks the digestive process, the -lymphatic glands will not be stimulated to action, and that the task -of furnishing lymphocytes will devolve upon the thymus. After birth, -the digestive process commences and the lymphatic glands become active -in response to this stimulus. As the function of forming lymphocytes -is transferred from the thymus to the lymphatic glands, the former is -gradually deprived of its importance, and, in the interest of organic -economy, it begins to atrophy, until, at the end of the child’s second -year, or, at latest, when the child has reached sexual maturity, -nothing but a reduced vestige remains of this once functional organ. -“The thymus,” says Starling, “forms two large masses in the anterior -mediastinum which in man grow up to the second year of life and then -rapidly diminish, so that only traces are to be found at puberty. It -contains a large amount of lymphatic tissue and is therefore often -associated with the lymphatic glands as the seat of the formation of -lymph corpuscles.... In certain cases of arrested development or of -general weakness in young people, the thymus has been found to be -persistent.” (“Physiology,” 3rd ed., 1920, p. 1245.) - -In the light of these facts, it is utterly unreasonable to regard the -thymus as a practically useless rudiment inherited from the lower -vertebrates. “That they have an important function in the young -animal,” says Albert Mathews, “can hardly be doubted.” (“Physiological -Chemistry,” 1916, p. 675.) In fact, the peculiar nature of their -development in the young and their atrophy in the adult forces such a -conclusion upon us. The thymus, therefore, is, in all probability, an -ontogenetic, and not a phylogenetic, rudiment. It might conceivably be -exploited as a biogenetic recapitulation of a reptilian stage in man, -just as the so-called fish-kidney of the human embryo is exploited for -evolutionary interpretation. The principles by which such a view may be -refuted have been given previously. But, in any case, it is folly to -interpret the thymus as a rudiment in the racial, rather than embryonic -sense. Moreover, the possibility of an ontogenetic interpretation -of rudiments must not be restricted to the thymus, but must be -accepted as a general and legitimate alternative for the phylogenetic -interpretation. - -In the last place, it remains for us to consider the Darwinian -argument, based upon so-called rudimentary organs, from the standpoint -of the science of genetics. Darwin, as we have remarked elsewhere, -was ignorant of the non-inheritability of those inconstant individual -variations now known as fluctuations. He was somewhat perplexed, when -Professor L. Meyer pointed out the extreme variability in position -of the “projecting point” on the margin of the human ear, but he -still clung to his original contention that this “blunt point” was a -surviving vestige of the apex of the pointed ears found in donkeys and -horses, etc. “Nevertheless,” he says, “in some cases my original view, -that the points are vestiges of the tips of formerly erect and pointed -ears, still seems to be probable.” (“Descent of Man,” 2nd ed., ch. I, -p. 34.) Darwin, as Ranke points out, was mistaken in homologizing his -famous “tubercule” with the apex of bestial ears. “The acute extremity -of the pointed animal ear,” says this author, “does not correspond to -this prominence designated by Darwin, but to the vertex of the helix.” -(“Der Mensch,” II, p. 39.) The feature in question is, moreover, a mere -fluctuation due to the degree of development attained by the cartilage: -hence its variability in different human beings. In very extreme cases, -fluctuations of this sort, may be important enough to constitute an -_anomaly_, and, as anomalies are often interpreted as atavisms and -reversions to a primitive type, it may be well to advert to this -subject here. - -Dwight has an excellent chapter on anatomical variations and anomalies. -(_Cf._ “Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist,” 1911, ch. IX.) He tells us -that “a thigh bone a little more bent, an ear a little more pointed, -a nose a little more projecting ... a little more or a little less -of anything you please—this is variation.” “An anatomical anomaly,” -he says, “is some peculiarity of any part of the body which cannot -be expressed in terms of more or less, but is distinctly new.” He -divides the latter into two classes, namely: those which consist in the -repetition of one or more elements in a series, _e.g._ the occurrence -of supernumerary legs in an insect, and those which consist in the -suppression of one or more elements in a series, _e.g._ the occurrence -of eleven pairs of ribs in a man. Variations and anomalies are -fluctuational or mutational, according as they are based on changes in -the soma alone, or on changes in the germ plasm. Variations, however, -are more likely to be non-inheritable fluctuations, and anomalies to -be inheritable mutations. We shall speak of the latter presently. In -the meantime we may note that the main trouble with interpreting these -anatomical irregularities as “reversive” or “atavistic” is that they -would connect man with all sorts of quite impossible lines of descent. -“In my early days of anatomy,” says Dwight, “I thought that I must -be very ignorant, because I could not understand how the occasional -appearance in man of a peculiarity of some animal outside of any -conceivable line of descent could be called a reversion, as it soon -became the custom to call it.... It was only later that I grasped the -fact that the reason I could not understand these things was that there -was nothing to understand. It was sham science from beginning to end.” -(_Op. cit._, p. 209.) By way of anomaly, almost any human peculiarity -can occur in animals, and, conversely, any bestial peculiarity in -man, but the resemblance to man of an animal outside of the alleged -line of human descent represents a grave difficulty for the theory of -evolution, and not an argument in its favor. - -The human body is certainly not a _mosaic of heterogenetic organs_, -_i.e._ a complex of structures inherited from any and every sort of -animal, whether extant or extinct; for such a vast number and variety -of ancestors could not possibly have coöperated to produce man. Prof. -D. Carazzi, in his Address of Inauguration in the Chair of Zoölogy -and Comparative Anatomy at the University of Padua, Jan. 20, 1906, -excoriated with scathing irony the sham Darwinian science, of which -Dwight complains. “But even in the serious works of pure science,” says -the Italian zoölogist, “we read, for example, that the over-development -of the postauricular muscles sometimes observed in man is an atavistic -reminiscence of the muscles of the helix of the ear of the horse and -the ass. And so far so good, because it gives evidence of great modesty -in recognizing as our ancestors those well-deserving and long-eared -quadrupeds. But this is not all; there appear at times in a woman one -or more anomalous mammary glands below the pectoral ones; and here, -too, they insist on explaining the anomaly as a reversion to type, -that is, as an atavistic reminiscence of the numerous mammary glands -possessed by different lower mammals; the bitch, for example.... - -“But the supernumerary mammary glands are not a reversion to type; -anomalous mammary glands may appear upon the median line, upon -the deltoid, and even upon the knee, regions far-distant from the -‘milk-line.’ So with regard to the postauricular muscles we must -say that according to the laws of Darwinism the cases of anomalous -development are not interpretable as reversions to type. All these -features are not phylogenetic reminiscences, but anomalies of -development, of such a nature that, if we should wish to make use of -them for establishing the line of human descent, we would have to say -that man descends from the swine, from the solipeds and even from the -cetaceans, returning, namely, to the old conception of lineal descent, -that is, to Buffon’s idea of the concatenation of creatures.” (“Teorie -e critiche nella moderna biologia,” 1906.) - -Darwin’s doctrine, however, on the origin and significance of -rudimentary organs has been damaged by genetic analysis in a yet -more serious fashion. In fact, with the discovery that anomalous -_suppression_ and anomalous _duplication_ of organs may result from -_factorial mutation_, this Darwinian conception received what is -tantamount to its deathblow. Darwin, it will be remembered, was -convinced that the regression of organs was brought about by “increased -disuse controlled by natural selection.” (Cf. “Origin of Species,” 6th -ed., ch. V.) Such phenomena, he thought, as the suppression of wings -in the Apteryx and the reduction of wings in running birds, arose from -their “inhabiting ocean islands,” where they “have not been exposed to -the attacks of beasts, and consequently lost the power of using their -wings for flight.” (“Descent of Man,” 6th ed., ch. I, p. 32.) In some -cases, he believed that disuse and natural selection had coöperated -_ex aequo_ to produce results of this nature, _e.g._ the reduction of -the eyes in the mole and in Ctenomys; for this reduction, he claims, -has some selection-value, inasmuch as reduction of the eyes, adhesion -of the lids, and covering with hair tends to protect the unused and -useless eye against inflammation. In other cases, however, he is -inclined to discount the idea that suppression of organs is an “effect -of long-continued disuse,” and to regard the phenomenon as “wholly, or -mainly, due to natural selection,” _e.g._ in the case of the wingless -beetles of the island of Madeira. “For during successive generations,” -he reasons, “each individual beetle which flew least, either from its -wings having been ever so little less developed or from indolent habit, -will have had the best chance of surviving from not being blown out -to sea; and, on the other hand, those beetles which most readily took -to flight would oftenest have been blown to sea, and thus destroyed.” -In a third class of instances, however, he assigns the principal rôle -to disuse, _e.g._ in the case of the blind animals “which inhabit -the caves of Carniola and Kentucky, because,” as he tells us, “it is -difficult to imagine that eyes, though useless, could be injurious -to animals living in darkness.” Hence he concludes that, as the -obliteration of eyes has no selection-value, under the circumstances -prevailing in dark caves, “their loss may be attributed to disuse.” -(Cf. “Origin of Species,” 6th ed., ch. V, pp. 128-133.) - -Morgan’s comment on these elaborate speculations of Darwin is very -caustic and concise. Referring to factorial mutations, which give rise -to races of flies having _supernumerary_ and _vestigial_ organs, he -says: “In contrast to the last case, where a character is doubled, is -the next one in which the eyes are lost. This change took place at a -single step. All the flies of this stock, however, cannot be said to be -eyeless, since many of them show pieces of eye—indeed the variation is -so wide that the eye may even appear like a normal eye unless carefully -examined. Formerly we were taught that eyeless animals arose in caves. -This case shows that they may also arise suddenly in glass milk -bottles, by a change in a single factor. - -“I may recall in this connection that wingless flies also arose in -our cultures by a single mutation. We used to be told that wingless -insects occurred on desert islands because those insects that had the -best developed wings were blown out to sea. Whether this is true or -not, I will not pretend to say, but at any rate wingless insects may -also arise, not through a slow process of elimination, but at a single -step.” (“A Critique of the Theory of Evolution,” 1916, pp. 66, 67.) - -In directing attention to the fact that a permanent and inheritable -reduction of organs to the vestigial state can result from mutation, -we do not, of course, intend to exclude the possible occurrence of -somatic atrophy due to lack of exercise rather than to germinal change. -Thus the blind species of animals in caves may, in some instances, -be persistently blind, because of the persistent darkness of the -environment in which they live, and not by reason of any inherited -factor for blindness. Darwin gives one such instance, namely, that -of the cave rat _Neotoma_. To test such cases, the blind animals -would have to be bred in an illuminated environment. If, under this -condition, they failed to develop normal eyes, the blindness would be -due to a germinal factor, and would be inherited in an illumined, no -less than a dark, environment. - -In any case, a mutation which suppresses a character is not, as we -have seen, a specific change, but merely one of the varietal order, -which does not result in the production of a genuine new species. The -factorial mutant with a vestigial wing or eye belongs to the same -species as its wild or normal parent stock. Moreover, neither disuse -nor natural selection has the slightest power to induce mutations -of this kind. If mutation be the cause of the blindness of cave -animals, then their presence in such caves must be accounted for by -supposing that they migrated thither because they found in the cave a -most suitable environment for safety, foraging, etc. Darkness alone, -however, could never induce germinal, but, at most, merely somatic -blindness. The Lamarckian factor of disuse and the Darwinian factor of -selection have been definitely discredited as agents which could bring -about hereditarily-transmissible modifications. - - - § 4. Fossil Links - -All efforts, then, to establish, by means of anatomical and -embryological homologies, the lineal descent of man from any known -type of monkey or ape have ended in ignominious failure. Comparative -anatomy and embryology can, at most, only furnish grounds for extremely -vague and indefinite speculations regarding the descent of man, but -they can never become a basis for specific conclusions with respect -to the phylogeny of _Homo sapiens_. Every known form of ape, whether -extant or extinct, is, as we have seen, far too specialized in its -adaptation to arboreal life to pass muster as a feasible ancestor. The -only conceivable manner in which the human body could be related to -simian stock is by way of collateral descent, and the only means of -proving such descent is to adduce a series of intermediate fossil types -connecting modern men and modern apes with this alleged common ancestor -of both. “The ascent (_sic_) of man as one of the Primates,” says Henry -Fairfield Osborn, “was parallel with that of the families of apes. Man -has a long line of ancestry of his own, perhaps two million or more -years in length. He is not descended from any known form of ape either -living or fossil.” (_The Ill. London News_, Jan. 8, 1921, p. 40.) - -This theory of a hypothetical primate ancestor of man, which is -supposed to have inhabited the earth during the earlier part of the -Tertiary period, and to have presented a more man-like appearance than -any known type of ape, was first propounded by Karl Snell in 1863. It -was popularized at the beginning of the present century by Klaatsch, -who saw in it a means of escape from the absurdities and perplexities -of the theory of lineal descent—“the less,” says the latter, “an ape -has changed from its original form, just so much the more human it -appears.” This saying is revamped by Kohlbrugge to read: “Man comes -from an original form much more like himself than any existing ape.” -Kohlbrugge’s comment is as follows: “The line of descent of man thus -receives on the side of the primates a quite different form from its -previous-one. Such new hypotheses as those of Hubrecht and Klaatsch -seem, therefore, fortunate for nature-philosophers, because evolution -always failed us when we compared known forms in their details, and led -us only to confusion. But if one works with such distant hypothetical -ancestors, one escapes much disillusioning.” (Quoted by Dwight, _op. -cit._, p. 195.) - -One thing, at any rate, is certain, namely: that we do not possess any -fossils of this primitive “large brained, erectly walking primate,” -who is alleged to have roamed the earth during the eocene or oligocene -epoch. The Foxhall Man, whose culture Osborn ascribes to the Upper -Pliocene, is far too recent, and, what is worse, far too intelligent, -to be this Tertiary Ancestor. The _Pithecanthropus erectus_, likewise, -is excluded for reasons which we shall presently consider. Meanwhile, -let it be noted, that we have Osborn’s assurance for the fact that we -are descended from a brainy and upright oligocene ancestor, as yet, -however, undiscovered. - -But the situation is more hopeful, if we hark back to a still more -remote period, whose remains are so scarce and fragmentary, as to -eliminate the possibility of embarrassment arising from intractable -details. “Back of this,” says Osborn, “ ... was a prehuman arboreal -stage.” (_Loc. cit._) Here, then, we are back again in the same old rut -of tree-climbing simian ancestry, whence we thought to have escaped -by abandoning the theory of lineal descent; and, before we have time -to speculate upon how we got there, Prof. Wm. Gregory of the American -Museum is summoned by Osborn to present us with specimens of this -prehuman arboreal stage. This expert, it would seem, favored up till -the year 1923 the fossil jaw of the _Propliopithecus_ as representing -the common root, whence the human race diverged, on one side, and the -races of anthropoid apes, on the other. (Cf. Osborn’s _Museum-leaflet_ -of 1923 on “The Hall of the Age of Man,” p. 29.) On April 14, 1923, -however, Gregory announced the deposition of _Propliopithecus_ and -the enthronement of the jaw of _Dryopithecus_. This sudden accession -of _Dryopithecus_ to the post of common ancestor of apes and men was -due to the discovery by Dr. Barnum Brown of three fossil jaws of -_Dryopithecus_ in the Miocene deposits of the Siwalik beds in northern -India. By some rapturous coincidence, the three jaws in question happen -to come from three successive “horizons,” and to be representative -of just three different stages in the evolution of _Dryopithecus_. -Doctor Gregory finds, moreover, that the patterns of the minute cracks -and furrows on the surviving molar teeth correspond to those on the -surface of the enamels of modern ape and human teeth. Hence, with -that ephemeral infallibility, which is characteristic of authorities -like Doctor Gregory, and which is proof against all discouragement -by reason of past blunders, the one who told us but a year ago that -the cusps of all the teeth of _Propliopithecus_ “are exactly such -as would be expected in the common starting point for the divergent -lines leading to the gibbons, to the higher apes, and to man” (_loc. -cit._), now tells us that both we and the apes have inherited our teeth -from _Dryopithecus_, who had heretofore remained neglected on the -side-lines. In 1923, apparently, Dr. Gregory was unimpressed with the -crown patterns of _Dryopithecus_, whose jaw he then excluded from the -direct human line. (Cf. _Museum-leaflet_, p. 5.) Now, however, that -the new discoveries have brought _Dryopithecus_ into the limelight, -and, particularly because these jaws were found in _Miocene_ deposits, -Gregory has shifted his favor from _Propliopithecus_ to _Dryopithecus_. -(Cf. _Science_, April 25, 1924, suppl. XIII.) - -When palæontologists are obliged to do a _volte face_ of this sort, -one ought not to scoff. One ought to be an optimist, and eschew above -all the spirit of the English statesman, who, on hearing a learned -lecture by Pearson on the question of whether Man was descended from -hylobatic, or troglodytic stock, was guilty of the following piece -of impatience: “I am not particularly interested in the descent of -man ... this scientific pursuit of the dead bones of the past does -not seem to me a very useful way of spending life. I am accustomed -to this mode of study; learned volumes have been written in Sanscrit -to explain the conjunction of the two vowels ‘a’ and ‘u’. It is very -learned, very ingenious, but not very helpful.... I am not concerned -with my genealogy so much as with my future. Our intellects can be more -advantageously employed than in finding our diversity from the ape.... -There may be no spirit, no soul; there is no proof of their existence. -If that is so, let us do away with shams and live like animals. If, on -the other hand, there is a soul to be looked after, let us all strain -our nerves to the task; there is no use in digging into the sands of -time for the skeletons of the past; build your man for the future.” -(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1921, pp. 432, 433.) It is to be hoped, -however, that this reactionary spirit is confined to the few, and -that the accession of this new primitive ancestor will be hailed with -general satisfaction. At any rate, we can wish him well, and trust that -the fossilized jaw of _Dryopithecus_ will not lose caste so speedily as -that of _Propliopithecus_. - -_Propliopithecus_, or _Dryopithecus_? Hylobatic, or troglodytic -affinities? Such questions are scarcely the pivots on which the -world is turned! Nevertheless, we rejoice that Doctor Gregory has -again settled the former problem (provisorily, at least) to his own -satisfaction. More important, however, than that of the dentition of -_Dryopithecus_, is the crucial question of whether or not Palæontology -is able to furnish evidence of man’s genetic continuity with this -primitive pithecoid root. Certainly, no effort has been spared to -procure the much desired proofs of our reputed bestial ancestry. The -Tertiary deposits of Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and the oceanic -islands have been diligently ransacked for fossil facts that would -be susceptible to an evolutionary interpretation. The aprioristic -criterion that all large-brained men are recent, and all small-brained -men with recessive chins are necessarily ancient, has always been -employed in evaluating the fossil evidence. Notwithstanding all -endeavors, however, to bring about the consummation so devoutly -desired, the facts discovered not only fail to support the theory of -collateral descent, but actually militate against it. For assuming that -man and the anthropoid apes constitute two distinct lines of evolution -branching out from common Tertiary or pre-Tertiary stock, palæontology -should be able to show numerous intermediate fossil forms, not alone -for the lateral branch of the apes, but also, and especially, for the -lateral line connecting modern men with the common root of the primate -tree. But it is precisely in this latter respect that the fossil -evidence for collateral descent fails most egregiously. Palæontology -knows of many fossil genera and species of apes and lemurs, that might -conceivably represent links in a genetic chain connecting modern -monkeys with Tertiary stock, but it has yet to discover so much as a -single fossil species, much less a fossil genus, intermediate between -man, as we know him, and this alleged Tertiary ancestor common to apes -and men. - -Not even catastrophism can be invoked to save this irremediable -situation; for any catastrophe that would have swept away the human -links would likewise have swept away the ape links. The presence of -many genera and species of fossil apes, in contrast to the absence -of any fossil genus or species of man distinct from _Homo sapiens_, -is irreconcilable with the theory of collateral descent. Such is the -dilemma proposed to the upholders of this theory by Wasmann, in the -10th chapter of his “Die Moderne Biologie” (3rd edition, 1906), a -dilemma, from which, as we shall see, their every attempt to extricate -themselves has failed most signally. - -“But what,” asked Wasmann, “has palæontology to say concerning this -question? It tells us that, up to the present, no connecting link -between man and the ape has been found; and, indeed, according to -the theory of Klaatsch, it is absurd to speak of a link of direct -connection between these two forms, but it tells us much more than -this. It shows us, on the basis of the results of the most recent -research, that we know the genealogical tree of the various apes, a -tree very rich in species, which extends from the present as far back -as the hypothetical primitive form assigned to the earliest part of -the Tertiary period; and, in fact, in Zittel’s work, “Grundzüge der -Paläontologie” (1895), not less than thirty genera of fossil Pro-simiæ -and eighteen genera of genuine fossil apes are enumerated, the which -have been entombed in those strata of the earth that intervene between -the Lower Eocene and the Alluvial epoch, but between this hypothetical -primitive form and man of the present time we do not find a single -connecting link. _The entire genealogical tree of man does not show so -much as one fossil genus, or even one fossil species._” (_Op. cit._, -italics his.) A brief consideration of the principal fossil remains, in -which certain palæontologists profess to see evidence of a transition -between man and the primitive pithecoid stock, will serve to verify -Wasmann’s statement, and will reveal the fact that all the alleged -connecting links are distinctly human, or purely simian, or merely -mismated combinations of human and simian remains. - -(1) _Pithecanthropus erectus_: In 1891 Eugène Dubois, a Dutch army -surgeon, discovered in Java, at Trinil, in the Ngawa district of -the Madiun Residency, a calvarium (skull-cap), 2 upper molars and a -femur, in the central part of an old river bed. The four fragments, -however, were not all found in the same year, because the advent of -the rainy season compelled him to suspend the work of excavation. -“The teeth,” to quote Dubois himself, “were distant from the skull -from one to, at most, three meters; the femur was fifteen meters (50 -feet) away.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1898, p. 447.) Dubois judged -the lapilli stratum, in which the bones were found, to be older than -the Pleistocene, and older, perhaps, than the most recent zones of the -_Pliocene_ series. “The Trinil ape-man,” says Osborn, “ ... is the -first of the conundrums of human ancestry. Is the Trinil race prehuman -or not?” (_Loc. cit._, p. 40.) Certainly, Lower Pleistocene, or Upper -Pliocene represents too late a time for the appearance of the upright -primate, whence we are said to have sprung. Even Miocene would be too -late a date for our alleged divergence from the primitive arboreal -stock. - -Of the capacity of the calvarium, Dubois says: “I found the -above-mentioned cavity measured 550 c.cm. The cast of the cavity of -the Neanderthal skull taken to the same plane measures 750 c.cm.” -(_Loc. cit._, p. 450, footnote.) His first estimate of the total -cranial capacity of _Pithecanthropus_ was 1000 c.cm., but, later on, -when he decided to reconstruct the skull on the basis of the cranium -of a gibbon (_Hylobates agilis_) rather than that of a chimpanzee -(_Troglodytes niger_), he reduced his estimate of the cranial capacity -to 900 c.cm. Recently, it is rumored, he has increased the latter -estimate, as a sequel to his having removed by means of a dentist’s -tool all the siliceous matter adhering to the skull-cap. As regards -shape, the calvarium seems to resemble most closely the cranial vault -of gibbon. This similarity, as we have seen, led Dubois to reconstruct -the skull on hylobatic lines—“the skull of Hylobates agilis,” says -Dubois, “ ... strikingly resembles that of Pithecanthropus.” (_Loc. -cit._, p. 450, footnote.) The craniologist Macnamara, it is true, -claims that the skull-cap most closely approximates the Troglodyte -type. Speaking of the calvarium of Pithecanthropus, the latter says: -“The cranium of an average adult male chimpanzee and the Java cranium -are so closely related that I believe them to belong to the same family -of animals—_i.e._ to the true apes.” (_Archiv. für Anthropologie_, -XXVIII, 1903, pp. 349-360.) The large cranial capacity, however, -would seem to favor Dubois’ interpretation, seeing that gibbons have, -in proportion to their bodies, twice as large a brain as the huge -Troglodyte apes, namely, the chimpanzee and the gorilla. The maximum -cranial capacity for any ape is from 500 to 600 c.cm. Hence, with 900 -c.cm. of cranial capacity estimated by Dubois, the Pithecanthropus -stands midway between the ape and the Neanderthal Man, a human -dwarf, whose cranial capacity Huxley estimated at 1,236 c.cm. This -consideration, however, does not of itself entitle the Pithecanthropus -to be regarded as a connecting link between man and the anthropoid -apes. In all such comparisons, it is the _relative_, and not the -_absolute_, size of the brain, which is important. The elephant for -example, has as large a brain as a man, but the elephant’s brain -is small, in comparison to its huge body. The brain of a mouse is -insignificant, as regards absolute size, but, considered in relation to -the size of the mouse’s body, it is as large as, if not larger than, -that of an elephant, and hence the elephant, for all the absolute -magnitude of its brain, is no more “intelligent” than a mouse. As -we have already seen, man’s brain is unique, not for its absolute -size, but for its weight and enormous cortical surface, considered -with reference to the comparatively small organism controlled by the -brain in question. It is this excess in size which manifests the -specialization of the human brain for psychic functions. The Weddas, -a dwarf race of Ceylon, have a far smaller cranial capacity than the -Neanderthal Man, their average cranial capacity being 960 c.cm., but -they are _human pigmies_, whereas the Pithecanthropus, according to -Richard Hertwig, was a _giant ape_. “The fragments,” says Hertwig, -“were regarded by some as belonging to a connecting link between apes -and man, _Pithecanthropus erectus Dubois_; by others they were thought -to be the remains of genuine apes, and by others those of genuine -men. The opinion that is most probably correct is that the fragments -belonged to an anthropoid ape of extraordinary size and enormous -cranial capacity.” (“Lehrbuch der Zoologie,” 7th ed.) - -Prof. J. H. McGregor essays to make a gradational series out of -conjectural brain casts of a large ape, the Pithecanthropus and the -Neanderthal Man, in the ratio of 6: 9: 12, this ratio being based -upon the estimated cranial capacities of the skulls in question. -In a previous chapter, we have seen that such symmetrically graded -series have little force as an argument for common descent. In the -present instance, however, the gradation gives a wrong impression of -the real state of affairs. If Doctor McGregor had taken into account -the all-important consideration of relative size, he would not have -been able to construct this misleading series. This consideration, -however, did not escape Dubois himself, and in his paper of Dec. 14, -1896, before the Berlin Anthropological Society, he confessed that a -gigantic ape of hylobatic type would have a cranial capacity close to -that of Pithecanthropus, even if we suppose it to have been no taller -than a man. (Cf. Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1898, p. 350.) The admission -is all the more significant in view of the fact that Dubois was then -endeavoring to exclude the possibility of regarding Pithecanthropus as -an anthropoid ape. - -The teeth, according to Dubois, are unlike the teeth of either -men or apes, but according to Virchow and Hrdlička, they are more -ape-like than human. The femur, though unquestionably man-like, might -conceivably belong to an ape of the gibbon type, inasmuch as the -upright posture is more normal to the long-armed gibbon than to any -other anthropoid ape, and its thighbone, for this reason, bears the -closest resemblance to that of man. According to the “Text-Book of -Zoölogy” by Parker and Haswell, the gibbon is the only ape that can -walk erectly, which it does, not like other apes, with the fore-limbs -used as crutches, but balanced exclusively upon its hind-limbs, with -its long arms dangling to the ground—“The Gibbons can walk in an -upright position without the assistance of the fore-limbs; in the -others, though, in progression on the surface of the ground, the -body may be held in a semi-erect position with the weight resting on -the hind-limbs, yet the assistance of the long fore-limbs acting as -crutches is necessary to enable the animal to swing itself along.” -(_Op. cit._, 3rd ed., 1921, vol. II, p. 494.) The Javanese femur is -rounder than in man, and is, in this, as well as other respects, more -akin to the thighbone of the gibbon. “After examining hundreds of -human femora,” says Dubois, “Manouvrier could find only two that had -a somewhat similar shape. It is therefore a very rare form in man. -With the gibbon a similar form normally occurs.” (_Loc. cit._, pp. -456, 457.) Whether the thighbone really belonged to an erectly walking -animal has not yet been definitely settled. To decide this matter, it -would be necessary to apply the Walkhoff x-ray method, which determines -the mode of progression from the arrangement of the bone fibers in -frontal, or other, sections from the femur. This test, however, has -not hitherto been made. Nor should the significance of the fact that -the thighbone was found at a distance of some _fifty feet away_ from -the skull-cap be overlooked, seeing that this fact destroys, once and -for all, any possibility of _certainty_ that both belonged to the same -animal. - -In conclusion, therefore, we may say that the remains of -Pithecanthropus are so scanty, fragmentary, and doubtful, as to -preclude a reliable verdict on their true significance. As Virchow -pointed out, the determination of their correct taxonomic position is -impossible, in the absence of a complete skeleton. Meanwhile, the most -probable opinion is that they represent the remains of a giant ape of -the hylobatic type. In other words, the Pithecanthropus belongs to the -genealogical tree of the apes, and not to that of man. In fact, he -has been excluded from the direct line of human descent by Schwalbe, -Alsberg, Kollmann, Haacke, Hubrecht, Klaatsch, and all the foremost -protagonists of the theory of collateral descent. (Cf. Dwight, _op. -cit._, ch. VIII.) Professor McGregor’s series consisting of an ape, the -Pithecanthropus, Homo neanderthalensis, and the Crô-Magnon Man fails -as an argument, not only for the general reason we have discussed in -our third chapter, but also for two special reasons, namely: (1) that -he completely ignores the chronological question of the comparative -age of the fossils in his series, and (2) that he has neglected to -take into account the consideration of the body-brain ratio. For as -Prof. G. Grant MacCurdy puts it, “We must distinguish between relative -(cranial) capacity and absolute capacity.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for -1909, p. 575.) In justice to Professor McGregor, however, it should be -noted that he proposes his interpretation in a purely provisory and -tentative sense, and does not dogmatize after the fashion of Osborn and -Gregory. - -After the year 1896, Dubois appears to have withdrawn the relics of -Pithecanthropus from further inspection on the part of scientific -men, and to have kept them securely locked up in his safe at -Haarlem, Holland. (Cf. _Science_, June 15, 1923, suppl. VIII.) -Since all existing casts of the skull-cap of Pithecanthropus are -inaccurate, according to the measurements originally given by Dubois, -anthropologists were anxious to have access to bones, in order to -verify his figures and to obtain better casts. (Cf. Hrdlička, Smithson. -Inst. Rpt. for 1913, p. 498.) His obstinate refusal, therefore, to -place the Javanese remains at the disposal of scientists was bitterly -resented by the latter. Some of them accused him of having become -“reactionary” and “orthodox” in his later years, and others went so -far as to impugn his good faith in the matter of the discovery. (Cf. -W. H. Ballou’s article, _North American Review_, April, 1922.) A -writer in _Science_ says: “It has been rumored that he was influenced -by religious bigotry” and refers to the bones as a “skeleton in the -closet.” (Cf. _loc. cit._) Dubois’ own explanation, however, was -that he wished to publish his own finds first. Recently, he seems to -have yielded to pressure in the matter, since he permitted Hrdlička, -McGregor, and others to examine the fragments of Pithecanthropus. (Cf. -_Science_, Aug. 17, 1923, Suppl. VIII.) Meanwhile, too, his opinion -has changed with reference to these bones, which he now regards as -the remains of a large ape of the hylobatic type, and not of a form -intermediate between men and apes. This opinion is, in all likelihood, -the correct one. - -(2) _The Heidelberg Man_: In a quarry near Mauer in the Elsenz Valley, -Germany, on Oct. 21, 1907, a workman engaged in excavating drove his -shovel into a fossilized human jaw, severing it into two pieces. Herr -Joseph Rösch, the owner of the quarry, immediately telegraphed the news -of the find to Prof. Otto Schoetensack of the neighboring University -of Heidelberg. The Professor arrived on the scene the following day, -and “once he got hold of the specimen, he would no more let it out of -his possession.” (Cf. Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1913, p. 510.) He took -it back with him to Heidelberg, where he cleaned and repaired it. The -crowns of four of the teeth broken by the workman’s shovel were never -recovered. The Heidelberg jaw was found at a depth of about 79 feet -below the surface (24.1 meters). Fossil bones of Elephas antiquus, -Rhinoceros etruscus, Felis leo fossilis, etc., are said to have been -discovered at the same level. The layer in which it was found has been -classed by some as Middle Pleistocene, by others as Early Quaternary; -for “there seems to be some uncertainty as to the exact subdivision of -the period to which it should be attributed.” (Hrdlička, _loc. cit._, -p. 516.) No other part of the skeleton except the jaw was discovered. - -The teeth are of the normal human pattern, being small and vertical. -Prof. Arthur Keith says they have the same shape as those of the -specimen found at Spy. The jaw has an ape-like appearance, due to -the extreme recessiveness of the chin. It is also remarkable for its -massiveness and the broadness of the ascending rami. Its anomalous -character is indicated by the manifest disproportion between the -powerful jaw and the insignificant teeth. “One is impressed,” says -Prof. George Grant MacCurdy of Yale, “by the relative smallness of -the teeth as compared with the massive jaw in the case of _Homo -heidelbergensis_.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1909, p. 570.) “Why so -massive a jaw,” says the late Professor Dwight, former anatomist at -Harvard, “should have such inefficient teeth is hard to explain, for -the very strength of the jaw implies the fitness of corresponding -teeth. Either it is an anomaly or the jaw of some aberrant species of -ape.” (_Op. cit._, p. 164.) This fact alone destroys its evidential -force; for, by way of anomaly, almost any sort of feature can appear in -apes and men, that is, human characters in apes and simian characters -in man. “Thus it is certain,” says Dwight, “that animal features of -the most diverse kinds appear in man apparently without rhyme or -reason, and also that they appear in precisely the same way in animals -far removed from those in which they are normal. It is hopeless to -try to account for them by inheritance; and to call them instances of -convergence does not help matters.” (_Op. cit._, pp. 230, 231.) - -Kramberger, however, claims that, with the exception of the -extremely recessive chin, the features of the Heidelberg jaw are -approximated by those which are normal in the modern Eskimo skull. -(Cf. _Sitzungbericht der Preuss. Akad. der Wissenschaften_, 1909.) -Prof. J. H. McGregor holds similar views. He claims that the greater -use of the jaw in uncivilized peoples, who must masticate tough foods, -tends to accentuate and increase the recessiveness of the chin. It -is also possible that the backward sloping of the chin may have been -intensified in certain primitive races or varieties of the human -species as a result of factorial mutation. We would not, however, be -justified in segregating a distinct human species on the basis of minor -differences, such as the protuberance or recessiveness of chins. On -the whole, we are hopelessly at sea with reference to the significance -of the Heidelberg mandible. Taxonomic allocation must be grounded on -something more than a jaw, otherwise it amounts to nothing more than a -piece of capricious speculation. - -(3) _Eoanthropus Dawsoni_: Dec. 18, 1912, is memorable with -evolutionary anthropologists as the day on which Charles Dawson -announced his discovery of the famous Dawn Man. The period of discovery -extended from the years prior to 1911 up to Aug. 30, 1913, when the -canine tooth was found by Father Teilhard de Chardin. The locality -was Piltdown Common, Sussex, in England. The fragments recovered were -an imperfect cranium, part of the mandible, and the above-mentioned -canine tooth. The stratified Piltdown gravel, which Dawson assigns to -the Lower Pleistocene or Glacial epoch, had been much disturbed by -workmen, “who were digging the gravel for small repairs.” (Dawson.) -The discoverer first found a fragment of a parietal bone. Then several -years later, after the gravels had been considerably rainwashed, he -recovered other fragments of the skull. All parts of the skeletal -remains are said to have been found within a radius of several yards -from the site of the initial discovery. The skull was reconstructed by -Dr. A. Smith Woodward and deposited in the British Museum of Natural -History at South Kensington. Eoliths were found in the same gravel as -the skull. - -Of the skull, according to Woodward, four parts remain, which, however, -were integrated from nine fragments of bone. “The human remains,” he -says, “comprise the greater part of a brain-case and one ramus of -the mandible, with two lower molars.” Of Woodward’s reconstruction, -Keith tells us that “an approach to symmetry and a correct adjustment -of parts came only after many experimental reconstructions” (cf. -“Antiquity of Man,” p. 364), and he also remarks that, when Woodward -undertook to “replace the missing points of the jaws, the incisor -and canine teeth, he followed simian rather than human lines.” (_Op. -cit._, p. 324.) Here we may be permitted to observe that, even apart -from the distorting influence of preconceived theories, this business -of reconstruction is a rather dubious procedure. The absence of parts -and the inevitable modification introduced by the use of cement -employed to make the fragments cohere make accurate reconstruction -an impossibility. The fact that Woodward assigned to the _lower_ jaw -a tooth which Gerrit Miller of the United States Museum assigns to -the _upper_ jaw, may well give pause to those credulous persons, who -believe that palæontologists can reliably reconstruct a whole cranium -or skeleton from the minutest fragments. Sometimes, apparently, the -“experts” are at sea even over so simple a question as the proper -allocation of a tooth. - -Woodward, however, was fully satisfied with his own artistic work on -Eoanthropus; for he says: “While the skull, indeed, is evidently human, -only approaching a lower grade in certain characters of the brain, in -the attachment for the neck, the extent of the temporal muscles and -in the probable size of the face, the mandible appears to be almost -precisely that of an ape, with nothing human except the molar teeth.” -(Cf. Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1913, pp. 505, 506.) Of the cranial -capacity Woodward gives the following estimate: “The capacity of the -brain-case cannot, of course, be exactly determined; but measurements -both by millet seed and water show that it must have been at least -1,070 cc., while a consideration of the missing parts suggests that -it may have been a little more (note the parsimoniousness of this -concession!). It therefore agrees closely with the capacity of the -Gibraltar skull, as determined by Professor Keith, and equals that of -the lowest skulls of the existing Australians. It is much below the -Mousterian skulls from Spy and La Chapelle-aux-Saints.” (_Loc. cit._, -p. 505.) - -Where Doctor Woodward came to grief, however, was in his failure to -discern the obvious disproportion between the mismated cranium and -mandible. As a matter of fact, the mandible is older than the skull -and belongs to a fossil ape, whereas the cranium is more recent and -is conspicuously human. Woodward, however, was blissfully unconscious -of this mésalliance. What there is of the lower jaw, he assures us, -“shows the same mineralized condition as the skull” and “corresponds -sufficiently well in size to be referred to the same individual without -any hesitation.” (_Loc. cit._, p. 506.) - -For this he was roundly taken to task by Prof. David Waterston in an -address delivered by the latter before the London Geological Society, -Dec., 1912. _Nature_, the English scientific weekly, reports this -criticism as follows: “To refer the mandible and the cranium to the -same individual would be equivalent to articulating a chimpanzee -foot with the bones of a human thigh and leg.” Prof. J. H. McGregor -of Columbia, though he followed Woodward in modeling the head of -Eoanthropus now exhibited in “The Hall of the Age of Man,” told the -writer that he believed the jaw and the skull to be misfits. Recently, -Hrdlička has come out strongly for the separation of the mandible -from the cranium, insisting that the former is _older_ and on the -order of the jaw of the fossil ape _Dryopithecus_, while the skull -is less antique and indubitably human. The following abstract of -Hrdlička’s view is given in _Science_, May 4, 1923: “Dr. Hrdlička,” -we read, “holds that the Piltdown jaw is much older than the skull -found near it and to which it had been supposed to belong.” (Cf. -suppl. X.) Hrdlička asserts that, from the standpoint of dentition, -there is a striking resemblance between the Piltdown jaw and that of -the extinct ape _Dryopithecus rhenanus_. He comments, in fact, on -“the close relation of the Piltdown molars to some of the Miocene or -early Pliocene human-like teeth of this fossil ape.” (_Ibidem._) Still -other authorities, however, have claimed that the jaw was that of a -chimpanzee. - -To conclude, therefore, the Eoanthropus Dawsoni is an invention, and -not a discovery, an artistic creation, not a specimen. Anyone can -combine a simian mandible with a human cranium, and, if the discovery -of a connecting link entails no more than this, then there is no reason -why evidence of human evolution should not be turned out wholesale. - -(4) _The Neanderthal Man_ (No. 1): The remains of the famous -Neanderthal Man were found in August, 1856, by two laborers at work -in the Feldhofer Grotte, a small cave about 100 feet from the Düssel -river, near Hochdal in Germany. This cave is located at the entrance -of the Neanderthal gorge in Westphalia, at a height of 60 feet above -the bottom of the valley. No competent scientist, however, saw the -bones _in situ_. Both the bones and the loam, in which they were -entombed, had been thrown out of the cave and partly precipitated into -the ravine, long before the scientists arrived. Indeed, the scientific -discoverer, Dr. C. Fuhlrott, did not come upon the scene until several -weeks later. It was then too late to determine the age of the bones -geologically and stratigraphically, and no petrigraphic examination of -the loam was made. The cave, which is about 25 meters above the level -of the river, communicates by crevices with the surface, so that it -is possible that the bones and the loam, which covered the floor of -the cave, may have been washed in from without. Fuhlrott recovered a -skull-cap, two femurs, both humeri, both ulnæ (almost complete), the -right radius, the left pelvic bone, a fragment of the right scapula, -five pieces of rib, and the right clavicle. (Cf. Hugues Obermaier’s -article, Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1906, pp. 394, 395.) “Whether they -(the bones) were really in the Alluvial loam,” says Virchow, “no one -saw.... The whole importance of the Neanderthal skull consists in -the honor ascribed to it from the very beginning, of having rested -in the Alluvial loam, which was formed at the time of the early -mammals.” (Quoted by Ranke, “Der Mensch,” II, p. 485.) We know nothing, -therefore, regarding the age of the fragmentary skeleton; for, as -Obermaier says: “It is certain that its exact age is in no way defined, -either geologically or stratigraphically.” (_Loc. cit._, p. 395.) - -The remains are no less enigmatic from the anthropological standpoint. -For while no doubt has been raised as to their human character, -they have given rise to at least a dozen conflicting opinions. Thus -Professor Clemont of Bonn pronounced the remains in question to be -those of a Mongolian Cossack shot by snipers in 1814, and cast by his -slayers into the Feldhofer Grotte. The same verdict had been given by -L. Meyer in 1864. C. Carter Blake (1864) and Karl Vogt (1863) declared -the skull to be that of an idiot. J. Barnard Davis (1864) claimed that -it had been artificially deformed by early obliteration of the cranial -sutures. Pruner-Bey (1863) said that it was the skull of an ancient -Celt or German; R. Wagner (1864), that it belonged to an ancient -Hollander; Rudolf Virchow, that the remains were those of a primitive -Frieslander. Prof. G. Schwalbe of Strassburg erected it into a new -_genus_ of the _Anthropidæ_ in 1901. In 1904, however, he repented of -his rashness and contented himself with calling it a distinct human -_species_, namely, _Homo primigenius_, in contradistinction to _Homo -sapiens_ (modern man). As we shall see presently, however, it is not a -distinct species, but, at most, an ancient _variety_ or _subspecies_ -(race) of the species _Homo sapiens_, differing from modern Europeans -only in the degree that Polynesians, Mongolians, and Hottentots differ -from them, that is, within the limits of the one and only human -species. Other opinions might be cited (cf. Hrdlička, Smithson. Inst. -Rpt. for 1913, p. 518, and H. Muckermann’s “Darwinism and Evolution,” -1906, pp. 63, 64), but the number and variety of the foregoing bear -ample testimony to the uncertain and ambiguous character of the remains. - -The skull is that of a low, perhaps, degenerate, type of humanity. The -facial and basal parts of the skull are missing. Hence we are not sure -of the prognathism shown in McGregor’s reconstruction. The skull has, -however, a retreating forehead, prominent brow ridges and a sloping -occiput. Yet, in spite of the fact that it is of a very low type, it -is indubitably human. “In no sense,” says Huxley, “can the Neanderthal -bones be regarded as the remains of a human being intermediate between -men and apes.” (“Evidence of Man’s Place in Nature,” Humb. ed., p. -253.) D. Schaaffhausen makes the same confession—“In making this -discovery,” he owns, “we have not found the missing link.” (“Der -Neanderthaler Fund,” p. 49.) The cranial capacity of the Neanderthal -skull, as we have seen, is 1,236 c.cm., which is practically the same -as that of the average European woman of today. In size it exceeds, -but in shape it resembles, the dolichocephalic skull of the modern -Australian, being itself a dolichocephalic cranium. Huxley called -attention to this resemblance, and Macnamara, after comparing it with -a large number of such skulls, reaches this conclusion: “The average -cranial capacity of these selected 36 skulls (namely, of Australian -and Tasmanian blacks) is even less than that of the Neanderthal group, -but in shape some of these two groups are closely related.” (_Archiv. -für Anthropologie_, XXVIII, 1903, p. 358.) Schwalbe’s opinion that the -Neanderthal Man constitutes a distinct species, though its author has -since abandoned it (cf. Wasmann’s “Modern Biology,” Eng. ed., 1910, p. -506), will be considered later, viz. after we have discussed the Men of -Spy, Krapina and Le Moustier, all of whom have been assigned to the -Neanderthal group. - -(5) _Neanderthal Man_ (No. 2): This specimen is said to be more recent -than No. 1. Its discoverers were Rautert, Klaatsch, and Koenen. It -consists of a human skeleton without a skull. It was found buried in -the loess at a depth of 50 centimeters. This loess had been washed -into the ruined cave, where the relics were found, subsequently to its -deposition on the plateau above. The bones were most probably washed -into the cave along with the loess, which fills the remnant of the -destroyed cave. The upper plateau of the region is covered with the -same loess. The site of the second discovery was 200 meters to the west -of the Neanderthal Cave (_i.e._ the Feldhofer Grotte). The bones were -either washed into the broken cave, or buried there later. We have no -indication whatever of their age. - -(6) _The Man of La Naulette_: In 1866, André Dupont found in the -cavern of La Naulette, valley of the Lesse, Belgium, a fossil lower -jaw, or rather, the fragment of a lower jaw, associated with remains -of the mammoth and rhinoceros. The fragment was sufficient to show the -dentition, and to indicate the absence of a chin. “Its kinship with the -man of Neanderthal,” remarks Professor MacCurdy very naïvely, “whose -lower jaw could not be found, was evident. It tended to legitimatize -the latter, which hitherto had failed of general recognition.” -(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1909, p. 572.) - -(7) _The Men of Spy_: In June of 1886 two nearly complete skeletons, -probably of a woman and a man, were discovered by Messrs. Marcel -de Puydt and Maximin Lohest in a terrace fronting a cave at Spy in -the Province of Namur, Belgium, 47½ feet above the shallow bed of -the stream Orneau. The bones were found at a depth of 13 feet below -the surface of the terrace. The remains were associated with bones -of the rhinoceros (_Rhinoceros tichorhinus_), the mammoth (_Elephas -primigenius_), and the great bear (_Ursus spelaeus_). There were also -stone implements indicating Mousterian industry, and the position of -one of the skeletons shows that the bodies were buried by friends. -The present valley of the Orneau was almost completely formed at the -time of the burial. The exact age of the bones cannot be determined -nor can these cave deposits be correlated with the river drift and the -loess. The cultural evidences are said to be Mousterian, and Mousterian -culture is assigned by Obermaier to the Fourth, or last, Glacial period. - -Prof. Julien Fraipont of the University of Liége announced the -discovery of these palæolithic skeletons Aug. 16, 1886. Skeleton No. -1 has weaker bones and is thought to be that of a woman; No. 2 shows -signs of strong musculature and is evidently that of a man. Of No. 1 -we have the cranial vault, two portions of the upper jaw (with five -molars and four other teeth), a nearly complete mandible with all the -teeth, a left clavicle, a right humerus, the shaft of the left humerus, -a left radius, the heads of two ulnæ, a nearly complete right femur, -a complete left tibia, and the right os calcis. Of No. 2 we have the -vault of the skull, two portions of the maxilla with teeth, loose teeth -belonging to lower jaw, fragments of the scapulæ, the left clavicle, -imperfect humeri, the shaft of the right radius, a left femur, the -left os calcis, and the left astragalus. The separation of the bones, -however, is not yet satisfactory. The jaw of No. 1 is well-preserved, -except in the region of the coronoids and condyles, which makes any -position we may give it more or less arbitrary. The skull of this -specimen is almost the replica of the Neanderthal skull, except that -the forehead is lower and more sloping. But No. 1 has a trace of chin -prominence and in this it resembles modern skulls. No. 2 has a higher -forehead and the cranial vault is higher and more spacious. - -In both skeletons the radius and femur show a peculiar curvature, -and in both, too, the arms and legs must have been very short. Hence -the men of Spy are described as having been only partially erect, -and as having had bowed thighs and bent knees. The source of this -modification, however, is not a surviving pithecoid atavism, but a -non-inheritable adaptation acquired through the habitual attitude or -posture maintained in stalking game—“Now we know,” says Dwight, “that -this feature, which is certainly an ape-like one, implies simply -that the race was one of those with the habit of ‘squatting,’ which -implies that the body hangs from the knees, not touching the ground -for hours together. As a matter of course we look for this in savage -tribes.” (“Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist,” p. 168.) The same may -be said of the receding chin, which, as we have seen, is also an -acquired adaptation. The same, finally, is true of the prominent brow -ridges, which are not pithecoid, but are, as Klaatsch has pointed out, -related to the size of the eye sockets, and consequently the result -of an adaptation of early palæolithic man to the life of a hunter, a -natural sequel of the very marked development of his sense of sight. -Similar brow ridges, though not quite so prominent, occur among modern -Australian blacks. - -Nor are the remains as typically Neanderthaloid as Keith and others -(who wish to see in palæolithic men a distinct human species) could -desire. No. 1, as we have seen, though almost a replica of the -Neanderthal skull-cap, has a trace of chin prominence in the mandible. -No. 2, though the chin is recessive, has a higher forehead and higher -and more spacious cranial vault than the Neanderthal Man. “On the -whole,” says Hrdlička, “it may be said that No. 2, while in some -respects still very primitive, represents morphologically a decided -step from the Neanderthaloid to the present-day type of the human -cranium.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1913, p. 525.) - -(8) _The Men of Krapina_: In the cave, or rather rock shelter, of -Krapina, in northern Croatia, beside the small stream Kaprinica which -now flows 82 feet below the cave, K. Gorjanovič-Kramberger, Professor -of geology and palæontology at the University of Zagreb, found, in -the year 1899, ten or twelve skulls in fragments, a large number of -teeth, and many other defective parts of skeletons. All told, they -represent at least fourteen different individuals. The bones are in -a bad state of preservation, and show traces of burning, some of them -being calcined. The bones were associated with objects of Mousterian -industry, and bones of extinct animals such as _Rhinoceros merckii_, -_Ursus spelaeus_, _Bos primigenius_, etc. The aforesaid Rhinoceros is -an older type than the _Rhinoceros tichorhinus_ associated with the men -of Spy, and implies a hot climate, wherein the _Rhinoceros merckii_ -managed to persist for a longer time than in the north. Hence the -remains are thought to belong to the last Interglacial period. - -In general, the bones show the same racial characteristics as those of -Neanderthal and Spy, though they are said to be of a perceptibly more -modern type than the latter. They were men of short stature and strong -muscular development. “The crania,” says Hrdlička, “were of good size -externally, but the brain cavities were probably below the present -average. The vault of the skull was of good length and at the same -time fairly broad, so that the cephalic index, at least in some of the -individuals, was more elevated than usual in the crania of early man.” -(_Loc. cit._, pp. 530, 531.) The reader must take Hrdlička’s use of -the word “usual” with “the grain of salt” necessitated in view of the -scanty number of specimens whence such inductive generalizations are -derived. The pronounced and complete supraorbital arcs characteristic -of the Neanderthaloid type occur in this group also, though in a less -marked manner. The stone implements are evidence of the intelligence of -these men. - -(9) _The Le Moustier Man_: This specimen, _Homo mousteriensis -Hauseri_, was found by Prof. O. Hauser in the “lower Moustier Cave” -at Le Moustier in the valley of the Vézère, Department of Dordogne in -France, during the March of 1908. It consists of the complete skull -and other skeletal parts of a youth of about 15 years. At this age, -the sex cannot be determined from the bones alone. Obermaier assigns -these bones to the Fourth Glacial period. Prof. George Grant MacCurdy’s -anthropological evaluation is the following: “The race characters ... -are not so distinct (_i.e._ at the age of 15 years) as they would be at -full maturity; but they point unmistakably to the type of Neanderthal, -Spy, and Krapina—the so-called _Homo primigenius_ which now also -becomes _Homo mousteriensis_. It was a rather stocky type, robust and -of a low stature. The arms and legs were relatively short, especially -the forearm and from the knee down, as is the case among the Eskimo. -Ape-like characters are noticeable in the curvature of the radius and -of the femur, the latter being also rounder in section than is the case -with _Homo sapiens_. In the retreating forehead, prominent brow ridges, -and prognathism (_i.e._ projection of the jaws) it is approached to -some extent by the modern Australian. The industry associated with -this skeleton is that typical of the Mousterian epoch.” (_Loc. cit._, -p. 573.) As we have already seen, the so-called ape-like features are -simply acquired adaptations to the hunter’s life, and, if inheritable -characters, they do not exceed the limits of a varietal mutation. -That the Mousterian men were endowed with the same intelligence as -ourselves, appears from the evidences of solemn burial which surround -the remains of this youth of 15 years, and prove, as Klaatsch points -out, that these men of the Glacial period were persuaded of their -own immortality. The head reclined on a pillow of earth, which still -retains the impression of the youth’s cheek, the body having been laid -on its side. Around the corpse are the best examples of the stone -implements of the period, the parents having buried their choicest -possession with the corpse of their son. - -(10) _The La Chapelle Man_: On August 3, 1908, the Abbés J. and A. -Bouyssonie and L. Bardon, assisted by Paul Bouyssonie (a younger -brother of the first two), discovered palæolithic human remains, -which are also assigned to the Neanderthal group. The locality -of the discovery was the village of La Chapelle-aux-Saints, 22 -kilometers south of the town of Brive, in the department of Corrèze, -in southern France. In the side of a moderate elevation, 200 yards -south of the aforesaid village, and beyond the left bank of a small -stream, the Sourdoire, there is a cave now known as the Cave of -La Chapelle-aux-Saints. It was here, on the above-mentioned date, -that the priests discovered the bones of a human skeleton surrounded -by unmistakable evidences of solemn burial. “The body lay on its -back, with the head to the westward, the latter being surrounded by -stones.... About the body were many flakes of quartz and flint, some -fragments of ochre, broken animal bones, etc.” (Hrdlička.) Another -token of burial is the rectangular pit, in which the remains were -found. It is sunk to a depth of 30 to 40 centimeters in the floor of -the cavern. - -“They (the remains) were covered,” says Prof. G. G. MacCurdy, “by a -deposit intact 30 to 40 centimeters thick, consisting of a magma of -bone, of stone implements, and of clay. The stone implements belong to -a pure Mousterian industry. While some pieces suggest a vague survival -of Acheulian implements (_i.e._ from the cool latter half of the Third -Interglacial period), others presage the coming of the Aurignacian -(close of last Glacial period). Directly over the human skull were the -foot bones, still in connection, of a bison—proof that the piece had -been placed there with the flesh still on, and proof, too, that the -deposit had not been disturbed. Two hearths were noted also, and the -fact that there were no implements of bone, the industry differing in -this respect from that of La Quina and Petit-Puymoyen (Charente), as -well as at Wildkirchli, Switzerland. - -“The human bones include the cranium and lower jaw (broken, but the -pieces nearly all present and easily replaced in exact position), a -few vertebræ and long bones, several ribs, phalanges, and metacarpals, -clavicle, astragalus, calcaneum, parts of scaphoid, ilium, and sacrum. -The ensemble denotes an individual of the male sex whose height was -about 1.60 meters. The condition of the sutures and of the jaws proves -the skull to be that of an old man. The cranium is dolichocephalic, -with an index of 75. It is said to be flatter in the frontal region -than those of Neanderthal and Spy.” (_Loc. cit._, p. 574.) - -The associated remains of fossil animals comprise the horse, reindeer, -bison, _Rhinoceros tichorinus_, etc., and, according to Hrdlička, -“indicate that the deposits date from somewhere near the middle of the -glacial epoch.” (_Loc. cit._, p. 539.) The discoverers turned over the -skeleton to Marcellin Boule of the Paris Museum of Natural History -for cleaning and reconstruction. It is the _first instance_ of a -palæolithic man, in which _the basal parts_ of the skull, including the -foramen magnum, were recovered. Professor Boule estimates the cranial -capacity as being something between 1,600 and 1,620 c.cm. He found the -lower part of the face to be prognathic, but not excessively so, the -vault like the Neanderthal cranium, but larger, the occiput broad and -protruding, the supraorbital arch prominent and complete, the nasal -process broad, the forehead low, and the mandible stout and chinless, -though not sloping backward at the symphysis. - -Alluding to the rectangular burial pit in the cave, Hrdlička remarks: -“The depression was clearly made by the primitive inhabitants or -visitors of the cave for the body and the whole represents very -plainly a regular burial, the most ancient intentional burial thus far -discovered.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1913, p. 539.) - -The specimens of Neanderthal, Spy, La Naulette, Krapina, Le Moustier -and La Chapelle, as we have seen, are the principal remains said to -represent the Neanderthal type, which, according to Keith and others, -is a distinct human species. As Aurignacian Man (assigned to the close -of the “Old Stone Age,” or Glacial epoch), including the Grimaldi or -Negroid as well as the Crô-Magnon type, are universally acknowledged -to belong to the species _Homo sapiens_, we need not discuss them -here. The same holds true, _a fortiori_, of Neolithic races such as -the Solutreans and the Magdalenians. The main issue for the present is -whether or not the Neanderthal type represents a _distinct species_ of -human being. - -Anent this question, Professor MacCurdy has the following: “Boule -estimated the capacity of the Chapelle-aux-Saints skull according to -the formulæ of Manouvrier, of Lee, and of Beddoe, obtaining results -that varied between 1,570 and 1,750 cubic centimeters. By the use of -millet and of shot an average capacity of 1,626 was obtained. Judging -from these figures the capacity of the crania of Neanderthal and Spy -has been underestimated by Schaaffhausen, Huxley, and Schwalbe. By its -cranial capacity, therefore, the Neanderthal race belongs easily in -the class of _Homo sapiens_. But we must distinguish between relative -capacity and absolute capacity. In modern man, where the transverse -and antero-posterior diameters are the same as in the skull of La -Chapelle-aux-Saints, the vertical diameter would be much greater, which -would increase the capacity to 1,800 cubic centimeters and even to -1,900 cubic centimeters. Such voluminous modern crania are very rare. -Thus Bismarck, with horizontal cranial diameters scarcely greater than -in the man of La Chapelle-aux-Saints, is said to have had a cranial -capacity of 1,965 cubic centimeters.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1909, -p. 575.) - -As for the structural features which are alleged to constitute a -_specific difference_ between the Neanderthal type and modern man, -_v.g._ the prominent brow ridges, prognathism, retreating forehead, -receding chin, etc., all of these occur, albeit in a lesser degree, in -modern Australian blacks, who are universally acknowledged to belong -to the species _Homo sapiens_. Moreover, there is much _fluctuation_, -as Kramberger has shown from the examination of an enormous number -of modern and fossil skulls, in both the Neanderthal and the modern -type; that is to say, Neanderthaloid features occur in modern skulls -and, conversely, modern features occur in the skulls of _Homo -neanderthalensis_ (cf. “Biolog. Zentralblatt,” 1905, p. 810; and -Wasmann’s “Modern Biology,” Eng. ed., pp. 472, 473). - -All the differences between modern and palæolithic man are explicable, -partly upon the basis of _acquired adaptation_, inasmuch as the -primitive mode of life pursued by the latter entailed the formation -of body-modifying habits very different from our present customs -and habits (viz. those of our modern civilized life). But these -modifications, not being inheritable, passed away with the passing of -the habits that gave rise to them. In part, however, the differences -may be due to heritable _mutations_, which gave rise to new _races_ or -_varieties_ or _subspecies_, such as Indo-Europeans, Mongolians, and -Negroes. And, if the evolutionary palæontologist insists on magnifying -characters that are well within the scope of mere factorial mutation -into a specific difference, we shall reply, with Bateson and Morgan, -by denying his competence to pronounce on taxonomic questions, without -consulting the verdict of the geneticist. Without breeding tests, -the criterions of intersterility and longevity cannot be applied, -and breeding tests are impossible in the case of fossils. As for an -_a priori_ verdict, no modern geneticist, if called upon to give his -opinion, would concede that the differences which divide the modern and -the Neanderthal types of men exceed the limits of factorial mutations, -or of natural varieties within the same species. Here, then, it is -a case of the wish being father to the thought. So anxious are the -materialistic evolutionists to secure evidence of a connection between -man and the brute, that no pretext is too insignificant to serve as -warrant for recognizing an “intermediate species.” - -Even waiving this point, however, there is no evidence at all that the -Neanderthal type is ancestral to the Crô-Magnon type. Both of these -races must have migrated into Europe from the east or the south, and -we have no proof whatever of genetic relationship between them. True, -attempts have been made to capitalize the fact that the Neanderthal -race was represented by specimens discovered in what were alleged to -be the older deposits of the Glacial epoch, but we have seen that -the evidences of antiquity are very precarious in the case of these -Neanderthaloid skeletons. Time-scales based on extinct species and -characteristic stone implements, etc., are always satisfactory to -evolutionists, because they can _date_ their fossils and archæological -cultures _according to the theory of evolution_, but, for one whose -confidence in the “reality” of evolution is not so great, these -palæontological chronometers are open to grave suspicion. - -If the horizon levels are not too finely graded, the difficulty -of accepting such a time-scale is not excessive. Hence we might -be prepared to accept the chronometric value of the division of -fossiliferous rocks into Groups, such as the Palæozoic, the Mesozoic, -and the Cænozoic, even though we are assured by Grabau that this -time-scale is “based on the changes of life, with the result that -fossils alone determine whether a formation belongs to one or the -other of these great divisions” (“Principles of Stratigraphy,” p. -1103), but when it comes to projecting an elaborate scheme of levels -or horizons into Pleistocene deposits on the dubious basis of index -fossils and “industries,” our credulity is not equal to the demands -that are made upon it. And this is particularly true with reference -to fossil men. Man has the geologically unfortunate habit of _burying -his dead_. Other fossils have been entombed on the spot where they -died, and therefore belong where we find them. But it is otherwise with -man. In Hilo, Hawaii, the writer heard of a Kanaka, who was buried -to a depth of 80 feet, having stipulated this sort of burial through -a special disposition in his will. His purpose, in so doing, was to -preclude the possibility of his bones ever being disturbed by a plough -or other instrument. Nor have we any right to assume that indications -of burial will always be present in a case of this nature. We may, on -the contrary, assume it as a general rule that human remains are always -more recent than the formations in which they are found. - -Be that as it may, the evidences for the antiquity of the -Neanderthaloid man prove, at most, that he was prior to the Crô-Magnon -man in Europe, but they do not prove that the former was prior to the -latter absolutely. Things may, for all we know, have been just the -reverse in Asia. Hence we have no ground for regarding the Man of -Neanderthal as ancestral to the race of artists, who frescoed the caves -of France and Spain. In fact, to the unprejudiced mind the Neanderthal -type conveys the impression of a race on the downward path of -degeneration rather than an embodiment of the promise of better things. -“There is another view,” says Dwight, “ ... though it is so at variance -with the Zeitgeist that little is heard of it. May it not be that many -low forms of man, archaic as well as contemporary, are degenerate -races? We are told everything about progress; but decline is put aside. -It is impossible to construct a tolerable scheme of ascent among the -races of man; but cannot dark points be made light by this theory of -degeneration? One of the most obscure, and to me most attractive of -questions, is the wiping out of old civilizations. That it has occurred -repeatedly, and on very extensive scales, is as certain as any fact in -history. Why is it not reasonable to believe that bodily degeneration -took place in those fallen from a higher estate, who, half-starved and -degraded, returned to savagery? Moreover, the workings of the soul -would be hampered by a degenerating brain. For my part I believe the -Neanderthal man to be a specimen of a race, not arrested in its upward -climb, but thrown down from a higher position.” (_Op. cit._, pp. 169, -170.) - -The view, however, that the Neanderthaloid type had degenerated from -a previous higher human type was not at all in accord with the then -prevalent opinion that this type was far more ancient than any other. -And Dwight himself admitted the force of the “objection ... that the -Neanderthal race was an excessively old one and that skeletons of the -higher race which, according to the view which I have offered, must -have existed at the same time as the degenerate ones, are still to be -discovered.” (_Op. cit._, p. 170.) In fact, the Neanderthal ancestry -of the present human race was so generally accepted that, in the very -year in which Dwight’s book appeared, Sir Arthur Keith declared: “The -Neanderthal type represents the stock from which all modern races have -arisen.” Time, however, as Dr. James Walsh remarked (_America_, Dec. -15, 1917, pp. 230, 231), has triumphantly vindicated the expectations -of Professor Dwight. For in his latest book, “The Antiquity of Man” -(1916), Sir Arthur Keith has a chapter of Conclusions, in which the -following recantation appears: “We were compelled to admit,” he owns, -“that men of the modern type had been in existence long before the -Neanderthal type.” - -But, even if it were true that savagery preceded civilization in -Europe, such could not have been the case everywhere; for it is -certain that civilization and culture of a comparatively high order -were imported into Europe before the close of the Old Stone Age. The -Hungarian Lake-dwellings show that culture of a high type existed -in the New Stone Age. These two ages are regarded as prehistoric in -Europe, though in America the Stone Age belongs to history. It is -also possible that in Europe much of the Stone Age was coëval with -the history of civilized nations, and that it may be coincident with, -instead of prior to, the Bronze Age, which seems to have begun in -Egypt, and which belongs unquestionably to history. And here we may -be permitted to remark that history gives the lie to the evolutionary -conceit that civilized man has arisen from a primitive state of -barbarism. History begins almost contemporaneously in many different -centers, such as Egypt, Babylonia, Chaldea, China, and Crete, about -5,000 or 6,000 years ago, and, as far back as history goes, we find -the record of high civilizations existing side by side with a coëval -barbarism. Barbarism is historically a state of degeneration and -stagnation, and history knows of no instance of a people sunk in -barbarism elevating itself by its own efforts to higher stages of -civilization. Always civilization has been imposed upon barbarians -from without. Savages, so far as history knows them, have never become -civilized, save through the intervention of some contemporary civilized -nation. History is one long refutation of the Darwinian theory of -constant and inevitable progress. The progress of civilization is not -subsequent, but prior, or parallel, to the retrogression of barbarism. - -That savagery and barbarism represent a _degenerate_, rather than -a _primitive_, state, is proved by the fact that savage tribes, in -general, despite their brutish degradation, possess languages too -perfectly elaborated and systematized to be accounted for by the mental -attainments of the men who now use them, languages which testify -unmistakably to the superior intellectual and cultural level of their -civilized ancestors, to whom the initial construction of such marvelous -means of communication was due. “It is indeed one of the paradoxes -of linguistic science,” says Dr. Edwin Sapir, in a lecture delivered -April 1, 1911, at the University of Pennsylvania, “that some of the -most complexly organized languages are spoken by so-called primitive -peoples, while, on the other hand, not a few languages of relatively -simple structure are found among peoples of considerable advance in -culture. Relatively to the modern inhabitants of England, to cite but -one instance out of an indefinitely large number, the Eskimos must be -considered as rather limited in cultural development. Yet there is just -as little doubt that in complexity of form the Eskimo language goes far -beyond English. I wish merely to indicate that, however we may indulge -in speaking of primitive man, of a primitive language in the true sense -of the word we find nowhere a trace.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1912, -p. 573.) Pierre Duponceau makes a similar observation with reference -to the logical and orderly organization of the Indian languages: “The -dialects of the Indian tribes,” he says, “appear to be the work of -philosophers rather than of savages.” (Cited by F. A. Tholuck, “Verm. -Schr.,” ii, p. 260.) - -It was considerations of this sort which led the great philologist Max -Müller to ridicule Darwin’s conception of primitive man as a savage. -“As far as we can trace the footsteps of man,” he writes, “even on the -lowest strata of history, we see that the Divine gift of a sound and -sober intellect belonged to him from the very first; and the idea of -humanity emerging slowly from the depths of an animal brutality can -never be maintained again in our century. The earliest work of art -wrought by the human mind—more ancient than any literary document, and -prior even to the first whisperings of tradition—the human language, -forms one uninterrupted chain, from the first dawn of history down -to our own times. We still speak the language of the first ancestors -of our race; and this language with its wonderful structures, bears -witness against such gratuitous theories. The formation of language, -the composition of roots, the gradual discrimination of meanings, the -systematic elaboration of grammatic forms—all this working which we can -see under the surface of our own speech attests from the very first -the presence of a rational mind, of an artist as great at least as his -work.” (“Essays,” vol. I, p. 306.) History and philology are far more -solid and certain as a basis for inference than are “index fossils” and -prehistoric archæology; and the lesson taught by history and philology -is that primitive man was not a savage, but a cultured being endowed -with an intellect equal, if not superior, to our own. - -But, even if we grant the priority, which evolutionists claim for the -Old Stone Age, there are not absent even from that cultural level -evident tokens of artistic genius and high intellectual gifts. Speaking -of the pictures in the caves of Altamira, of Marsoulas in the Haute -Garonne, and of Fonte de Gaume in the Dordogne, the archæologist -Sir Arthur Evans says: “These primeval frescoes display not only -consummate mastery of natural design, but an extraordinary technical -resource. Apart from the charcoal used in certain outlines, the chief -coloring matter was red and yellow ochre, mortars and palettes for the -preparation of which have come to light. In single animals the tints -varied from black to dark and ruddy brown or brilliant orange, and so, -by fine gradations, to paler nuances, obtained by scraping and washing. -Outlines and details are brought out by white incised lines, and the -artists availed themselves with great skill of the reliefs afforded by -convexities of the rock surface. But the greatest marvel of all is -that such polychrome masterpieces as the bisons, standing and couchant, -or with limbs huddled together, of the Altamira Cave, were executed -on the ceilings of inner vaults and galleries where the light of day -has never penetrated. Nowhere is there any trace of smoke, and it is -clear that great progress in the art of artificial illumination had -already been made. We know that stone lamps, decorated in one case -with the engraved head of an ibex, were already in existence. Such was -the level of artistic attainment in southwestern Europe, at a modest -estimate, some 10,000 years earlier than the most ancient monuments -of Egypt or Chaldæa!” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1916, pp. 429, 430.) -While reaffirming our distrust of the undocumented chronology of -“prehistory,” we cite these examples of palæolithic art as a proof of -the fact that everywhere the manifestation of man’s physical presence -coincides with the manifestation of his intelligence, and that neither -in history nor in prehistory have we any evidence of the existence of -a bestial or irrational man preceding _Homo sapiens_, as we know him -today. It is interesting to note in this connection that a certain J. -Taylor claims to have found a prehistoric engraving of a mastodon on a -bone found in a rock shelter known as Jacobs’ Cavern in Missouri (cf. -_Science_, Oct. 14, 1921, p. 357). Incidents of this sort must needs -dampen the enthusiasm of those who are overeager to believe in the -enormous antiquity of the Old Stone Age in Europe. - -(11) _The Rhodesian Man_: In 1921 a human skull was found by miners -in the “Bone Cave” of the Broken Hill Mine in southern Rhodesia. It -was associated with human and animal bones, as well as very crude -instruments (knives and scrapers) in flint and quartz. It was found -at a depth of 60 feet below the surface. The lower jaw was missing, -and has not been recovered. It was sent to the British Museum, South -Kensington, where it is now preserved. Doctor Smith-Woodward has -examined and described it. “The skull is in some features the most -primitive one that has ever been found; at the same time it has many -points of resemblance to (or even identity with) that of modern man.” -(_Science_, Feb. 3, 1922, p. 129.) The face is intact. The forehead is -low, and the brow ridges are more pronounced than in any known fossil -human skull. The prognathism of the upper jaw is very accentuated. -The cranium is very flat on top and broad in the back. “Its total -capacity is surprisingly large. At least one prominent authority -thinks that this man had quite as much gray matter as the average -modern man.” (_Loc. cit._, pp. 129, 130.) Woodward, however, estimates -the cranial capacity of this skull as 1280 c.cm. The neck must have -had powerful muscles. The nasal bone is prominent and Neanderthaloid -in character. “The wisdom tooth is reduced in size—another point in -common with modern man and never found before in a fossil skull.” -(_Ibidem._) The palate and the teeth in general are like those of -existing men. The femur is not curved like that of the Neanderthal -man—“In contrast to the Neanderthal man who is supposed to have walked -in a crouching position (because of the rather curved femur and other -bits of evidence), this man is believed to have maintained the upright -position, because the femur is relatively straight and when fitted to -the tibia (which was also found) presents a perfectly good, straight -leg.” (_Ibidem._) According to the writer we have quoted, Dr. Elliot -Smith entertained hopes that the Rhodesian man might represent the -“missing link” in man’s ancestry, leaving the Neanderthal man as an -offshoot from the main ancestral trunk. No comment is necessary. The -skull may be a pathological specimen, but, in any case, it is evidently -human as regards its cranial capacity. The remains, moreover, serve -to emphasize the _fluctuational_ character of the so-called _Homo -primigenius_ type, being a mixture of modern and Neanderthaloid -features. They are not fossilized and present a recent appearance. -Hence, as B. Windle suggests, they may have fallen into the cave -through a crack, and may be modern rather than prehistoric. - -(12) _The Foxhall Man_: This is the earliest known prehistoric man. -He is known to us, however, only through “his flint instruments -partly burned with fire, found near the little hamlet of Foxhall, near -Norwich, on the east coast of England. These flints, discovered in -1921, constitute the first proofs that man of sufficient intelligence -to make a variety of flint implements and to use fire existed in -Britain at the close of the Age of Mammals; this is the first true -Tertiary man ever found.” (Osborn: _Guide-leaflet_ to “The Hall of the -Age of Man,” 2nd ed., 1923, p. 9.) Osborn assigns the twelve kinds -of flint instruments typical of the Foxhallian culture to the Upper -Pliocene epoch. R. A. Macalister, however, denies that the deposits are -Tertiary. Abbé Henri Breuil’s verdict was undecided. In any case, the -Foxhallian culture proves that the earliest of prehistoric men were -intelligent like ourselves. - -_Summa summarum_: So far as science knows, only one human species -has ever existed on the earth, and that is _Homo sapiens_. All the -alleged connecting links between men and apes are found, on careful -examination, to be illusory. When not wholly ambiguous in view of their -inadequate preservation and fragmentary character, they are (as regards -both mind and body) distinctly human, like the Neanderthal man, or they -are purely simian, like the Pithecanthropus, or they are heterogeneous -combinations of human and simian bones, like the Eoanthropus -Dawsoni.[18] “With absolute certainty,” says Hugues Obermaier, “we can -only say that man of the Quaternary period differed in no essential -respect from man of the present day. In no way did he go beyond the -limits of variation of the normal human body.” (“The Oldest Remains of -the Human Body, etc.,” Vienna, 1905.) The so-called _Homo primigenius_, -therefore, is not a distinct species of human being, but merely an -ancient race that is, at most, a distinct variety or subspecies of man. -In spite of tireless searching, no traces of a bestial, irrational -man have been discovered. Indeed, man whom nature has left naked, -defenseless, unarmed with natural weapons, and deficient in instinct, -has no other resource than his reason and could never have survived -without it. To imagine primitive man in a condition analogous to that -of the idiot is preposterous. “For other animals,” says St. Thomas of -Aquin, “nature has prepared food, garments of fur, means of defense, -such as teeth, horns, and hoofs, or at least swiftness in flight. But -man is so constituted that, none of these things having been prepared -for him by nature, reason is given him in their stead, reason by which -through his handiwork he is enabled to prepare all these things.... -Moreover, in other animals there is inborn a certain natural economy -respecting those things which are useful or hurtful, as the lamb by -nature knows the wolf to be its enemy. Some animals also by natural -instinct are aware of the medicinal properties of herbs and of other -things which are necessary for life. Man, however, has a natural -knowledge of these things which are necessary for life only in general, -as being able to arrive at the knowledge of the particular necessities -of human life by way of inference from general principles.” (“De regim. -princ.,” l. I, c. I.) As a matter of fact, man is never found apart -from evidences of his intelligence. The Neanderthaloid race, with their -solemn burials and implements of bone and stone, exemplify this truth -no less than the palæolithic artists of the Cave of Altamira. - - [18] See Addenda. - -§ 5. The Edict of the American Association - -In the Cincinnati meeting (1923-1924) of the American Association -for the Advancement of Science, a number of resolutions were passed -regarding the subject of evolution. True, the session in which these -resolutions were passed was but sparsely attended, and packed, for the -most part, with the ultra-partisans of transformism. Nevertheless, it -is to be regretted that the dignity of this eminent and distinguished -body was so unfittingly compromised by the fulmination of rhetorical -anathemas against W. J. Bryan and his Round Head adherents. Among -the resolutions, of which we have spoken, the following dictatorial -proclamation occurs: “_The evidences in favor of the evolution of man -are sufficient to convince every scientist in the world._” - -This authoritative decree is both rash and intolerant. The -resolution-committee of the American Association is by no means -infallible, and, in the absence of infallibility, no group of men -should be so unmindful of their own limitations as to strive to make -their subjective views binding upon others. Scientific questions are -not settled by authority, but exclusively by means of irresistible -evidence, which is certainly absent in the present case. Moreover, -the declaration in question is untrue; for many of the foremost -palæontologists and anthropologists of the day confess their complete -ignorance, as scientists, with respect to the origin of man. - -Dr. Clark Wissler, for example, who is the Curator-in-Chief of the -Anthropological section of the American Museum of Natural History -in New York City, made, in the course of an interview published in -the _New York American_ of April 2, 1918, the following statement: -“Man, like the horse or elephant, just happened anyhow, so far as has -been discovered yet. As far as science has discovered, there always -was a man—some not so developed, but still human beings in all their -functions, much as we are today.” Asked by the reporter, whether this -did not favor the idea of an abrupt, unheralded appearance of man on -earth, Doctor Wissler replied: “Man came out of a blue sky as far as -we have been able to delve back.” Fearing lest the reporter might have -sensationalized his words, the writer took occasion to question the -learned anthropologist on the subject during the Pan Pacific Conference -held at Honolulu, Hawaii (Aug. 2-20, 1920). His answer was that the -foregoing citations were substantially correct. - -The same verdict is given by the great palæontologist, Prof. W. -Branco, Director of the Institute of Geology and Palæontology at the -University of Berlin. In his discourse on “Fossil Man” delivered -August 16, 1901, before the Fifth International Zoölogical Congress -at Berlin, Branco said, with reference to the origin of man: -“Palæontology tells us nothing on the subject—it knows no ancestors -of man.” The well-known palæontologist Karl A. von Zittel reached -the same conclusion. He says somewhere (probably in his “Grundzüge -der Paläontologie”): “Such material as this (the discovered remains -of fossil men) throws no light upon the question of race and descent. -All the human bones of determinable age that have come down to us -from the European Diluvium, as well as all the skulls discovered in -caves, are identified by their size, shape, and capacity as belonging -to _Homo sapiens_, and are fine specimens of their kind. They do not -by any means fill up the gap between man and the ape.” Joseph Le -Conte repeats the identical refrain. In the revised Fairchild edition -(1903) of his “Elements of Geology” we read: “The earliest men yet -found are in no sense connecting links between man and ape. They are -distinctly human.” (Ch. VI, p. 638.) Replying to Haeckel, who in his -“Welträtsel” proclaims man’s descent from pithecoid primates to be -_an historical fact_, J. Reinke, the biologist of Kiel, declares: “We -are merely having dust thrown in our eyes when we read in a widely -circulated book by Ernst Haeckel the following words: ‘That man is -immediately descended from apes, and more remotely from a long line of -lower vertebrates, remains established as an indubitable historic fact, -fraught with important consequences.’ It is absurd to speak of anything -as a fact when experience lends it no support.” (“Haeckel’s Monism -and Its Supporters,” Leipzig, 1907, p. 6.) The sum-total, in fact, -of scientific knowledge concerning the origin of the human body is -contained in the saying of the geologist, Sir Wm. Dawson, President of -McGill University: “I know nothing about the origin of man, except what -I am told in the Scripture—that God created him. I do not know anything -more than that, and I do not know of anyone who does.” - -In view of this uncertainty and ignorance regarding the origin of the -human body, it is extremely unethical to strive to impose the theory -of man’s bestial origin by the sheer weight of scientific authority -and prestige. Conscientious scientists would never venture to abuse -in such a fashion the confidence which the people at large place in -their assurances. Hence those who respect their honor and dignity as -scientists should refrain from dogmatizing on the undemonstrated animal -origin of man, however much they may personally fancy this theory. “We -cannot teach,” says Virchow, “nor can we regard as one of the results -of scientific research, the doctrine that man is descended from the ape -or from any other animal.” (“The Liberty of Science,” p. 30, et seq.) -And Professor Reinke of Kiel concludes: “The only statement consistent -with her dignity, that Science can make, is to say that she knows -nothing about the origin of man.” (_Der Türmer_, V, Oct., 1902, Part I, -p. 13.) - -A slave, we are told (Tertul., _Apolog._ 33), rode in the triumphal -chariot of the Roman conqueror, to whisper ever and anon in his ear: -_Hominem memento te!_—“Remember that thou art a man!” It is unfortunate -that no similar warning is sounded when the tone of scientific -individuals or organizations threatens to become unduly imperious -and intolerant. This tendency, however, to forget limitations and to -usurp the prerogative of infallibility is sometimes rebuked by other -reminders. The writer recalls an instance, which happened in connection -with the Pan Pacific Conference at Honolulu during the August of 1920. - -The Conference was attended by illustrious scientists from every -land bordering upon the Pacific. After the preliminary sessions, -the delegates paid a visit to the famous volcano of Kilauea. Doctor -T. A. Jaggar, Jr., vulcanologist and Director of the United States -Observatory at Kilauea, acted as guide, the writer himself being one -of the party. In the course of our tour of inspection, we came to the -extinct volcano of Kenakakoe. There a number of volcanic bombs, some -shattered and some intact, were pointed out to us. For the benefit of -readers, who may not know, I may state that a volcanic bomb originates -as a fragment of foreign material, _e.g._ a stone, which, falling into -a volcano, becomes coated with an external shell of lava. In addition -to the bombs, certain holes in the soil were shown to us, which Doctor -Jaggar, evidently under the influence of military imagery suggested by -the then recent European War, described as “shell-craters” dug by the -aforesaid volcanic bombs. - -Doctor Jaggar accounted for the bombs and craters by a very ingenious -theory. In 1790, he said, the year in which Kamehameha I was contending -with Keoua for the mastery of the large island of Hawaii, the only -explosive eruption of Kilauea known to history occurred, and it was -during this eruption (which destroyed part of Keoua’s army) that the -bombs found at Kenakakoe were ejected from the above-mentioned volcano. -It was then, we were informed, that these bombs hurtling through the -air in giant trajectories from Kilauea struck the ground and scooped -out the “shell-craters” at Kenakakoe. Some of them, it appeared, did -not remain in the craters, but rebounded to strike again on the rocks -beyond. Of the latter, part were shattered, while others withstood the -force of the second impact. The whole party was much impressed by the -grandeur of this vivid description, and some of the scientists were at -great pains to photograph the craters as awe-inspiring vestiges of the -mighty bombardment wrought in times past by Nature’s volcanic artillery. - -When I returned to Hilo, I happened to mention to Brother Matthias -Newell some misgivings which I had felt concerning the size and -appearance of the so-called “shell-craters.” Brother Newell, a member -of the Marist Congregation and quite a scientist in his way, is famous -in the Islands as the discoverer of a fungus, by which the Japanese -Beetle, a local pest, has been largely exterminated. For several years, -prior to the advent of Doctor Jaggar and the United States Observatory, -he had studied extensively the famous volcano on the slopes of Mauna -Loa. On hearing my narrative of the foregoing incident, Brother Newell -was curious to know the exact locality, and burst into a hearty laugh -as soon as I mentioned Kenakakoe. He himself, he told me, in company -with Brother Henry, had frequently dug for bombs at Kenakakoe. When -successful in their quest, the two were wont to carry the volcanic -bomb to the rocks, and to break it open for the purpose of examining -the inner core. Some of the bombs, however, escaped this fate through -being too resistent to the hammer. The holes, needless to say, were not -“shell-craters” scooped by volcanic bombs, but ordinary excavations dug -by prosaic spades. Such was the simple basis of fact upon which the -elaborate superstructure of Jaggar’s theory had been reared! Though -Jaggar was, in a sense, entirely blameless, his theory was pure fiction -from start to finish. No scientist present, however, took exception to -it. On the contrary, all of them appeared perfectly satisfied with his -pseudoscientific explanation. - -If the foregoing incident conveys any lesson, it is this, that neither -singly nor collectively are scientists exempt from error, especially -when they deal with a remote past, which no one has observed. The -attempt to reconstruct the past by means of inference alone produces, -not history, but romance. Doctor Gregory’s genealogy of Man displayed -in the American Museum is quite as much the fruit of imagination as -Jaggar’s Kilauean fantasy. The sham pedigree bears like witness to the -ingenuity of the human mind, but, if anyone is tempted by its false -show of science to take it seriously, let him think of the bombs of -Kenakakoe. - - - - - AFTERWORD - - -With the close of the nineteenth century the hour hand of biological -science had completed another revolution. One after another, the -classic systems of evolution had passed into the discard, as its -remorseless progress registered their doom. The last of these systems, -De-Vriesianism, enjoyed a meteoric vogue in the first years of the -present century, but it, too, has gone into eclipse with the rise of -rediscovered Mendelism. Notwithstanding all these reverses, however, -the evolutionary theory still continues to number a host of steadfast -adherents. - -Some of its partisans uphold it upon antiquated grounds. Culturally -speaking, such men still live in the days of Darwin, and fail to -realize that much water has passed under the bridge since then. It -has other protagonists, however, who are thoroughly conversant with -modern data, and fully aware, in consequence, of the inadequacy of -all existent formulations of the evolutional hypothesis. Minds of the -latter type are proof, apparently, against any sort of disillusionment, -and it is manifest that their attitude is determined by some -consideration other than the actual results of research. - -This other consideration is monistic metaphysics. In defect of -factual confirmation, evolution is demonstrated aprioristically -from the principle of the minimum. The scope of this methodological -principle is to simplify or unify causation by dispensing with all -that is superfluous in the way of explanation. In olden days, it went -by the name of Occam’s Razor and was worded thus: _Entia non sunt -multiplicanda praeter necessitatem_—“Things are not to be multiplied -without necessity.” Evolution meets the requirements of this principle. -It simplifies the problem of organic origins by reducing the number of -ancestors to a minimum. Therefore, argues the evolutionist, evolution -must be true. - -As an empirical rule, the principle of the minimum is, no doubt, -essential to the scientific method. To erect it into a metaphysical -axiom, however, is preposterous; for _simple_ explanations are -not necessarily _true_ explanations. In the rôle of aprioristic -metaphysics, the principle of continuity is destructive, and tends -to plane down everything to the dead level of materialistic monism. -For those who transcendentalize it, it becomes the principle “that -everything is ‘nothing but’ something else, probably inferior to it.” -(Santayana.) To assert continuity, they are driven to deny, or, at -least, to leave unexplained and inexplicable, the obvious novelty -that emerges at each higher level of the cosmic scale. And thus it -comes to pass that intelligence is pronounced to be nothing but -sense, and sense to be nothing but physiology, and physiology to be -nothing but chemistry, and chemistry to be nothing but mechanics, -until this philosophical nihilism weeps at last for want of further -opportunities of devastation. Its exponents have an intense horror for -abrupt transitions, and resent the discovery of anything that defies -resolution into terms of mass and motion. - -Evolution smooths the path for monism of this type by transforming -nature’s staircase into an inclined plane of imperceptible ascent. -Hence Dewey refers to evolution as a “clinching proof” of the -continuity hypothecated by the monist. For the latter, there is no -hierarchy of values, and all essential distinctions are abolished; for -him nothing is unique and everything is equally important. He affirms -the democracy of facts and is blind to all perspective in nature. He -is, in short, the enemy of all beauty, all spirituality, all culture, -all morality, and all religion. He substitutes neurons for the soul, -and enthrones Natural Selection in the place of the Creator. He sets -up, in a word, the ideal of “an animalistic man and a mechanistic -universe,” and offers us evolution as a demonstration of this “ideal.” - -Vernon Kellogg objects to our indictment. “The evolutionist,” he says, -“does not like being called a bad man. He does not like being posted -as an enemy of poetry and faith and religion. He does not like being -defined as crassly materialist, a man exclusively of the earth earthy.” -(_Atlantic Monthly_, April 24, 1924, p. 490.) Apart from their object, -the likes or dislikes of an evolutionist are a matter of indifference. -What we want to know is whether his dislike is merely for the names, or -whether it extends to the reality denoted by these names. Human nature -has a weakness for euphemisms. Men may “want the game without the -name,” particularly when, deservedly or undeservedly, the name happens -to have an offensive connotation. - -There are, no doubt, evolutionists who mingle enough dualism with their -philosophy to mitigate the most objectionable aspects of its basic -monism. In so doing, however, they are governed by considerations that -are wholly extraneous to evolutionary thought. Indeed, if we take -Kellogg’s words at their face value (that is, in a sense which he -would probably disclaim), it is in spite of his philosophy that the -evolutionist is a spiritualist. “And just as religion and cheating,” -reasons Kellogg, “can apparently be compassed in one man, so can one -man be both evolutionist and idealist.” (_Loc. cit._, p. 490.) If this -comparison holds true, the evolutionist can be an idealist only to the -extent that he is inconsistent or hypocritical, since under no other -supposition could piety and crime coëxist in one and the same person. - -Be that as it may, the majority of evolutionists are avowed mechanists -and materialists, in all that concerns the explanation of natural -phenomena. “That there may be God who has put his Spirit into men” -(Kellogg, _ibid._, p. 491), they are condescendingly willing to -concede. And small credit to them for this; for who can _disprove_ the -existence of God, or the spirituality of the human soul? Nevertheless, -it is impossible, they maintain, to be _certain_ on these subjects. -Natural science is in their eyes the only form of human knowledge that -has any objective validity. Proofs of human spirituality they denounce -as _metaphysical_, and metaphysics is for them synonymous with “such -stuff as dreams are made of,” unworthy to be mentioned in the same -breath with physical science—“Es gibt für uns kein anderes Erkennen als -das mechanische, ... Nur mechanisch begreifen ist Wissenschaft.” (Du -Bois-Reymond.) - -In practice, therefore, if not in theory, the tendency of evolution -has been to unspiritualize and dereligionize the philosophy of its -adherents, a tendency which is strikingly exemplified in one of its -greatest exponents, Charles Darwin himself. The English naturalist -began his scientific career as a theist and a spiritualist. He ended -it as an agnostic and a materialist. His evolutionary philosophy was, -by his own confession, responsible for the transformation. “When thus -reflecting,” he says, “I feel compelled to look to a first cause -having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man, -and I deserve to be called a Theist. This conclusion was strong in my -mind about the time, as far as I remember, when I wrote the ‘Origin -of Species’; and it is since that time that it has very gradually, -with many fluctuations, become weaker. But then arises the doubt, can -the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a -mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when -it draws such grand conclusions? I can not pretend to throw the least -light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginning of all -things is insoluble by us; and I, for one, must be content to remain an -Agnostic.” (“The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin,” edited by Francis -Darwin, 1887, vol. I, p. 282.) - -Darwin likewise exemplifies in his own person the destructive -influence exercised upon the æsthetic sense by exclusive adherence to -the monistic viewpoint. Having alluded in his autobiography to his -former predilection for poetry, music, and the beauties of nature, -he continues as follows: “But now for many years I cannot endure to -read a line of poetry: I have tried lately to read Shakespeare, and -found that it nauseated me. I have also lost my taste for pictures and -music.... I retain some taste for fine scenery, but it does not cause -me the exquisite delight which it formerly did.... My mind seems to -have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large -collections of facts; ... if I had to live my life again, I would have -made it a rule to read some poetry and listen to some music at least -every week; for perhaps the parts of my brain now atrophied would have -been kept alive through use. The loss of these tastes is a loss of -happiness, and may possibly be injurious to the intellect, and more -probably to the moral character by enfeebling the emotional part of our -nature.” (_Op. cit._, vol. I, pp. 81, 82.) - -Evolution, we repeat, has brought us materialistic monism, in whose -barren soil nor faith, nor idealism, nor morality, nor poesy, nor art, -nor any of the finer things of life can thrive. To its dystelic and -atomistic view, Nature has ceased to be the vicar of God, and material -things are no longer sacramental symbols of eternal verities. It denies -all design in Nature, and dismembers all beauty into meaningless -fragments. It is so deeply engrossed in the contemplation of parts, -that it has forgotten that there is any such thing as a whole. The rose -and the bird-of-paradise are not ineffable messages from God to man; -they are but accidental aggregates of colloidal molecules fortuitously -assembled in the perpetual, yet aimless, flux of evolving matter. - -From the standpoint of the moral and sociological consequences, -however, the gravest count against evolution is the seeming support -which this theory has given to the monistic conception of an -animalistic man. Darwin’s doctrine on the bestial origin of man -brought no other gain to natural science than the addition of one more -unverified and unverifiable hypothesis to its already extensive stock -of unfounded speculations. It did, however, work irreparable harm to -millions of unlearned and credulous persons, whose childlike confidence -the unscrupulous expounders of this doctrine have not hesitated to -abuse. The exaggerations and misrepresentations of the latter met -with an all too ready credence on the part of those who were not -competent to discriminate between theory and fact. The sequel has been -a wholesale abandonment of religious and moral convictions, which has -ruined the lives and blighted the happiness of countless victims. - -Has it been worth while, we may well ask of the propounders of this -theory, to sacrifice so much in exchange for so little? The solid gain -to natural science has been negligible, but the consequences of the -blow unfairly dealt to morals and religion are incalculable and beyond -the possibility of repair. “Morals and Religion,” says Newman, “are not -represented to the intelligence of the world by intimations and notices -strong and obvious such as those which are the foundation of physical -science.... Instead of being obtruded on our notice, so that we cannot -possibly overlook them, they are the dictates either of Conscience or -of Faith. They are faint shadows and tracings, certain indeed, but -delicate, fragile, and almost evanescent, which the mind recognizes at -one time, not at another, discerns when it is calm, loses when it is -in agitation. The reflection of sky and mountains in the lake is proof -that sky and mountains are around it, but the twilight or the mist or -the sudden thunderstorm hurries away the beautiful image, which leaves -behind it no memorial of what it was.... How easily can we be talked -out of our clearest views of duty; how does this or that moral precept -crumble into nothing when we rudely handle it! How does the fear of sin -pass off from us, as quickly as the glow of modesty dies away from the -countenance! and then we say ‘It is all superstition.’ However, after a -time, we look around, and then to our surprise we see, as before, the -same law of duty, the same moral precepts, the same protest against -sin, appearing over against us, in their old places, as if they had -never been brushed away, like the Divine handwriting upon the wall at -the banquet.” (“Idea of a University,” pp. 513-515.) - -Had evolutionary enthusiasts adhered more strictly to the facts, had -they proceeded in the spirit of scientific caution, had they shown, -in fact, even so much as a common regard for the simple truth, the -“progress of science” would not have been achieved at the expense -of morals and religion. As it is, this so-called progress has left -behind a wake of destruction in the shape of undermined convictions, -blasted lives, crimes, misery, despair, and suicide. It has, in short, -contributed largely to the present sinister and undeserved triumph of -Materialism, Agnosticism, and Pessimism, which John Talbot Smith has so -fittingly characterized as the three D’s of dirt, doubt, and despair. A -little less sensationalism, a little more conscientiousness, a little -more of that admirable quality, scientific caution, and the concord of -faith and reason would have become a truism instead of a problem. But -such regrets are vain. The evil effects are here to stay, and nothing -can undo the past. - -If man is but a higher kind of brute, if he has no unique, immortal -principle within him, if his free will is an illusion, if his conduct -is the necessary resultant of chemical reactions occurring in his -protoplasm, if he is nothing more than an automaton of flesh, a mere -decaying organism which is the sport of all the blind physical forces -and stimuli playing upon it, if he has no prospect of a future life -of retribution, if he is unaccountable to any higher authority, -Divine or human, then morality ceases to have a meaning, right and -wrong lose their significance, virtue and vice are all the same. The -constancy of the martyr and the patriotism of the fallen soldier become -unintelligible folly, while a heartless and infamous sensualism preying -vulturelike upon the carrion of human misery and corruption is to be -reckoned the highest expression of wisdom and efficiency. The grandest -ideals that have inspired enthusiasm and devotion in human breasts are -but idle dreams and worthless delusions. From a world which accepts -this degraded view of human nature all heroism and chivalry must vanish -utterly; for it will recognize no loftier incentives to action than -pleasure and love of self. - -Such doctrines, too, are essentially antisocial. They destroy the very -foundation of altruism. To seek immortality in the effects of one’s -unselfish deeds becomes ridiculous. For what assurance can we have -that the fruits of our sacrifice will be acceptable to a progressive -posterity, or what difference will our self-denial make, when the whole -human species shall have become extinct on the desolate surface of a -dying world? Without an adequate motivation for altruism, however, the -existence of society becomes impossible, since self-interest is not -a feasible substitute. To urge the observance of social laws on the -ground that they protect person, life, and property, will hardly appeal -to men who have no possessions to be protected nor a comfortable life -to be prolonged. Yet the major portion of mankind are in this category. -For such the laws can mean nothing more than artificial corruptions, of -the natural and primitive order of things introduced for the special -benefit of the rich and powerful. - -Under circumstances of this sort, no plea avails to silence the heralds -of revolt. If there is no future life for the righting of present -injustices, then naught remains but to terminate the prosperity of the -wicked here and now. If there is no heaven for man beyond the grave, -then it behooves everyone to get all the enjoyment he can out of the -present life. It is high time, therefore, that this earthly heaven -of mankind should cease to be monopolized by a few coupon-holding -capitalists and become, instead, the property of the expropriated -proletariat. Anarchy and Socialism are the consequences which the logic -of the situation inexorably portends. The starving swine must hurl -their bloated brethren from the trough that the latter have heretofore -reserved for themselves. The sequel, of course, can be none other -than the complete disintegration of civilization and its ultimate -disappearance in a hideous vortex of carnage, rapine, and barbarity. - -Nor is this prognosis based on pure conjecture. In proportion as these -pernicious doctrines have gained ground, modern society has become -infected with the virus of animalism, egoism, and perfidy; expediency -has been substituted for honor; and purity has been replaced by -prophylaxis. One could not, of course, expect to see a universal and -thoroughgoing application of these principles in the concrete. The -materialistic view of human nature is horribly unnatural, and, in -practice, would be quite unbearable. Natural human goodness and even -the mere instinct of self-preservation militate against a reduction -to the concrete of this inhuman conception, and these tend, in real -life, to mitigate the evil effects of its acceptance. Nevertheless, -the actual consequences resulting from the spread of evolutionary -principles are so conspicuous and appalling as to leave no doubt -whatever of the deadly nature of this philosophy. - -Marxian Socialism has been called “scientific” for no other reason than -that it is based upon materialistic evolution, and this scientific -socialism has brought upon modern Russia a reign of terror, which -eclipses that of France in the bloodiest days of the Revolution. -Eleanor Marx, it will be remembered, after falling a victim to her -father’s teachings regarding “free love,” committed suicide. The same -confession of failure has been made by two recent editors of the -socialist _Appeal to Reason_ (J. W. Wayland and J. O. Welday), both -of whom committed suicide. These are but a few of the many instances -that might be cited to show that the life philosophy inculcated by -materialistic evolution is so intolerably unnatural and revolting that -neither society nor the individual can survive within the lethal shadow -of its baleful influence. - -But may not the extreme materialism and pessimism of this view be -peculiar to the sordid and joyless outlook of the social malcontent? -Does not evolutionary thought conduce to something finer and more -hopeful in the case of the progressive and optimistic liberal? Vain -hope! We cannot console ourselves with any delusions on this score. -Liberalism proclaims the emancipation of humanity from all authority, -and the rejection of a future life of retribution is the indispensable -premise of the doctrine that makes man a law unto himself. Hence, -wherever Liberalism controls the tongues of educators, the human -soul becomes a myth, religion a superstition, and immortality -an anodyne for mental weaklings. Strong-minded truth-seekers are -advised to abandon these irrational beliefs, and to adopt the “New -Religion,” which dispenses once for all with God and the hereafter. -“The new religion,” says Charles Eliot, ex-President of Harvard, -“will not attempt to reconcile people to present ills by the promise -of future compensation. I believe that the advent of just freedom -has been delayed for centuries by such promises. Prevention will be -the watchword of the new religion, and a skillful surgeon will be -one of its ministers. It cannot supply consolation as offered by old -religions, but it will reduce the need of consolation.” (“The New -Religion.”) - -Again, it may be objected that evolutionists, for all their -agnosticism and materialism, frequently put Christians to shame by -their irreproachably upright and moral lives. That they sometimes -succeed in doing this cannot be gainsaid. But they do so because they -borrow their moral standards from Christianity, and do not follow -the logical consequences of their own principles. Their morality, -therefore, is parasitic, as Balfour has wisely observed, and it will -soon die out when the social environment shall have been sufficiently -de-Christianized. “Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die,” -is their proper philosophy of life, only they have not the courage -of their convictions. For the rest, their philosophical convictions -have nothing in common with the moral standards which they actually -observe. In fact, not only does the monism of evolutionary science -fail to motivate the Christian code of morals, but it is radically and -irreconcilably opposed to all that Christianity stands for. Hartmann, a -modern philosopher, notes with grim satisfaction the clash of the two -viewpoints, and predicts (with what, perhaps, is premature assurance) -the ultimate triumph of “modern progress.” “Many there are,” he tells -us, “who speak and write of the struggle of civilization, but few there -are who realize that this struggle is the last desperate stand of the -Christian ideal before its final disappearance from the world, and -that modern civilization is prepared to resort to any means rather -than relinquish those things, which it has won at the cost of such -great toil. For modern civilization and Christianity are antagonistic -to each other, and it is therefore inevitable that one give place to -the other. Modern progress can acknowledge no God save one immanent to -the world and opposed to the transcendent God of Christian revelation, -nor other morality save only that true kind whose source is the human -will determining itself by itself and becoming a law unto itself.” -(“Religion de l’avernir.”) - -The World War has done much to dampen the ardor of those who looked -forward with enthusiasm to the millennium of a purely scientific -religion. In this spectacular lesson they have learned that science can -destroy as well as build. They have come to see that biology, physics, -and chemistry are morally colorless, and that we must go outside the -realm of natural science when we are in quest of that which can give -meaning to our lives and noble inspiration to our conduct. When science -supersedes religion, the result is always disillusionment following in -the wreck-strewn wake of moral and physical disaster. - - Grave little manikins digging in the slime - Intent upon the old game of ‘Once-upon-a-time.’ - Other little manikins engaged with things-to-come, - Building up the sand-heap called Millennium. - (_Theodore MacManus_) - -Recently, the chancellor of a great university has seen fit publicly -to disclaim, in the name of his institution, all responsibility for -a crime committed by two members of the student body. The young men -involved in this affair had performed an experimental murder. The -experimenters, it would seem, were unable to discriminate between man -and beast. They had been taught by their professors that scientific -psychology dispenses with the soul, and that the difference -between men and brutes is one of degree only, and not of kind. Even -that negligible distinction, they were told, had been bridged by -evolution. In the sequel, the young men failed, apparently, to see -why vivisection, which was right in the case of animals, should be -wrong in the case of human beings. Their astounding obtuseness on this -particular point was, of course, exceedingly regrettable and hard to -understand. Yet, somehow, one cannot help thinking but that their -education was largely responsible for it. - -In the startling crime of these students, modern educators will -find much food for serious thought. It should give pause to those, -especially, who have been overzealous in popularizing the Darwinian -conception of human nature. Let men of this type reflect upon what -slender grounds their dogmatism rests, and let them then weigh well the -gravity of the responsibility, which they incur. Tuccimei summarizes -for them, in the following terms, the nature and extent of their -accountability: - -“This perverse determination to place man and brutes in the same -category, interests me not so much from the scriptural standpoint -as for reasons moral and social. Science, as the more moderate of -our adversaries have told us often enough, does not assail religion, -but proceeds on its way regardless of the consequences. And the -consequences we see only too plainly, now that the evolutionary -philosophy has invaded every branch of knowledge and walk of life, -and has seeped down among the ignorant and turbulent masses. These -consequences are known as socialism and anarchy. The protagonists of -the new philosophy strove to repudiate them at first: but now many of -their number have laid aside even this pretense. Socialistic doctrines -are based exclusively upon our assumed kinship with the brutes, and the -leaders of militant socialism have inscribed on the frontispieces of -their books the chain fatally logical and terribly true of three names, -Darwin, Spencer, Marx. - -“In truth, our common origin with the brutes being taken for granted, -why should we not enjoy in common with them the right to gratify -every instinct? Social inequalities are the product of laws and -conventionalities willed by the rich and powerful. In the natural and -primitive state of things they did not exist; why not proceed then to a -general leveling of the existing social order? - -“Such an origin of the human race being assumed, the existence of the -soul and a future life becomes a myth invented by the priests of the -various religions. With this inconvenient restraint removed, there -remains no alternative save to aspire to the acquisition of all the -pleasures of life; and for him who lacks the wherewithal to procure -them for himself there remains no other recourse than to seek them by -means of violence or strategy. Hence anarchy. In this supposition, -morality no longer possesses that sole, true, and efficacious sanction -which religion alone can furnish; it amounts to nothing more than the -resultant of the evolution of the individual’s perfections and their -coördination to the well-being of his race and of society. But if, by -reason of retarded evolution, the social instincts have not progressed -to the point of repressing the individual or egoistic instincts, -what guilt will there be in the delinquent who lapses into the most -atrocious crimes? Hence free will is another myth that positive -psychology and the science of moral statistics have already been at -pains to explode. - -“And behold the suffering, the unfortunate, and the dying deprived of -their sole consolation, the last hope which faith held out to them, -and society reduced to an inferno of desperadoes and suicides! I could -go on showing in this way, to what a pass the evolutionistic theories -bring society and the individual.” (“La teoria dell’ evoluzione e le -sue applicazioni,” p. 46.) - - - - - GLOSSARY - - - _Abiogenesis_: The discredited hypothesis that life may - originate spontaneously in lifeless matter, _i.e._, apart from - the influence of living matter. - - _Adaptation_: (1) The reciprocal aptitude of organism and - environment for each other; (2) a structure, modification of - structure, or behavioristic response enabling the organism to - solve a special problem imposed by the environment; (3) the - process by which the organism’s adjustment to the environment - is brought about. - - _Allelomorphs_: Genes located opposite each other on homologous - chromosomes and representing contrasting characters; they - are separated during meiosis according to the Mendelian - law of segregation, _e.g._ the genes for red and white - in Four o’clocks which when united give rise to pink, and - when segregated, to red and white flowers respectively, are - allelomorphs of each other. - - _Alluvial_: Pertaining to the Alluvium, which consists of - fresh-water deposits of the Pleistocene and Recent series, to - be distinguished from the Diluvium which consists of older - Pleistocene formations. - - _Amino-acids_: The chemical building-stones of the - proteins—organic acids containing one or more amino-groups - (—NH₂) in place of hydrogen, _e.g._, amino-acetic acid, - CH₂·NH₂·COOH. - - _Amnion_: A membranous bag which encloses the embryo in - higher vertebrates. The lower vertebrates, namely, fishes - and amphibia, have no amnion and are termed “anamniotic.” - The reptiles, birds, and mammals which possess it are termed - amniotic vertebrates. - - _Amphioxus_: The most simply organized animal having a - dorsal notochord. It is classified among the Acrania in - contradistinction to the craniate Chordates which make up the - bulk of the vertebrates. - - _Angiosperms_: The higher plants, which have their seeds - enclosed in seed-vessels. - - _Anthropoid Apes_: Apes of the family SIMIIDÆ, which approach - man most closely in their organization, namely, the chimpanzee, - the gorilla, the gibbon, and orang-utan. - - _Antibody_: Chemical substances produced in the blood in - reaction to the injection of antigens or toxic substances and - capable of counteracting or neutralizing said substance. Such - antibodies are specific for determinate antigens. - - _Antigen_: Any substance that causes the production of special - antibodies in the blood of susceptible animals, after one or - several injections. - - _Arthropods_: The phylum of exoskeletal invertebrates - comprising crustaceans, arachnida, insects, etc. - - _Atavism_: The resemblance to an ancestor more distant than the - parents. - - _Automatism_: A spontaneous action, not in response to - recognizable stimuli. - - - _Basichromatin_: That portion of a cell’s nuclear network which - contains nuclein and is deeply stained by basic dyes. - - _Biparental_: Derived from two progenitors, _i.e._, a father - and mother. - - _Brachiopods_: Invertebrate animals bearing a superficial - resemblance to bivalve molluscs, but belonging to a totally - different group—lamp shells. - - - _Cambrian_: The “oldest” system of the Palæozoic group of - fossiliferous rocks. - - _Carbohydrates_: The sugars, starches, etc.,—polyhydric - alcohols with aldehydic or ketonic groups, and acetals of same, - etc. - - _Catalyst_: A substance which accelerates a chemical reaction - without permanently participating in it, being left over - unchanged at the end of the process. - - _Centriole_: The centrioles or central bodies are the foci of - mitotic division in animal cells, as well as the source of - the kinetic elements developed by such cells. They are minute - bodies usually located within a larger sphere known as the - centrosome or centrosphere. They do not occur in the cells of - the higher plants. - - _Cephalopods_: A class of molluscs in which the foot is - developed into a headlike structure with eyes and a circle of - arms, _e.g._, the octopus, the cuttlefish, the squid, and the - nautilus. - - _Ceratites_: A genus of extinct cephalopods having a coiled - shell and crooked sutures. - - _Character_: An external feature or sensible property of an - organism. It is the joint product of germinal factors (genes) - and environmental influences. - - _Chlorophyll_: The green pigment formed in the chloroplasts - (green plastids) of plant cells. It is a diester of phytyl - and methyl alcohols with the tribasic acid, chlorophyllin, - one of whose carboxyls is esterified with methyl alcohol, a - second with phytol, while the third is otherwise engaged. - Chlorophyllin is a tribasic acid consisting of the - chlorophyllic chromogen group (containing magnesium) joined to - three carboxyl groups. - - _Chondriosomes_: Cytoplasmic granules rodlike, threadlike, - or spherical in form, which often appear to divide on the - mitotic spindle, and are therefore credited with the power of - independent growth and division. The chondriosomes of embryonic - tissues are thought to be the original sources of the plastids, - the fibrillæ, and certain metaplastic granules. - - _Chordates_: The phylum of animals whose primary axial skeleton - consists temporarily or permanently of a notochord. - - _Chromatin_: Same as basichromatin. - - _Chromosomes_: The short threads or rodlike bodies into which - the basichromatin of the cell-nucleus is aggregated during - mitosis—each chromosome is segmented into granules called - chromomeres—in its submicroscopic structure it consists - of chain or linear series of genes (hereditary factors) - representing characters linked together in heredity, - each single chromosome being termed, on this account, a - “linkage-group” by geneticists. - - _Ciliate_: A protozoan whose motor-apparatus consists of cilia, - _i. e._, hairlike protoplasmic projections capable of rapid and - coördinated vibratile movement. - - _Cloaca_: A common passageway through which the intestine, - kidneys, and sex organs discharge their products,—it occurs in - certain fishes, in amphibia, reptiles, and birds, and in a few - mammals. - - _Coccyx_: Lower extremity of the vertebral column in man. - - _Colloids_: Insoluble gumlike substances, which will not - diffuse through organic membranes. - - _Commensalism_: The harmonious cohabitation of two organisms - belonging to different species, where the relation is not - necessarily beneficial nor necessarily harmful to either. - - _Crossover_: The exchange or reciprocal transfer of whole - blocks of genes from one homologous chromosome to the - other, which sometimes occurs in synapsis, probably at the - strepsinema-stage. - - _Crystalloids_: Soluble substances, which usually form crystals - and readily diffuse through organic membranes. - - _Cyst_: A protective envelope formed around an organism during - period of rest. - - _Cytode_: The non-nucleated cell hypothecated by Haeckel. - - _Cyptoplasm_: The cell-body or extranuclear protoplasm of a - cell. - - - _Endomixis_: A process of nuclear reorganization among the - protozoa, which does not require the coöperation of two cells - as in conjugation (amphimixis). - - _Endoskeleton_: An internal living skeleton providing - support and protection (as well as organs of movement, in - the bone-levers to which the muscles are attached)—it is - characteristic of the vertebrates. - - _Enzymes_: Organic catalysts, _i. e._, complex chemical - substances formed by organisms and serving to accelerate - chemical processes taking place in said organisms, _e. g._, - the digestive enzymes, which accelerate the hydrolysis of - starches, fats, and proteins. - - _Epigenesis_: Development of the embryo by differentiation of - previously undifferentiated protoplasm. - - - _Fats_: Esters of the higher fatty or organic acids (such as - stearic, palmitic, and oleic) esterified with the trihydric - alcohol glycerine (glycerol). - - - _Gamete_: A reproductive cell specialized for syngamy, _i.e._, - for union with a complementary germ cell, their union giving - rise to a synthetic cell known as a zygote. - - _Ganglion_: An aggregate of nerve-cells consisting mainly of - neural cell-bodies together with supporting cells. - - _Ganoids_: Fishes covered with enameled bony scales, and now, - for the most part, extinct. - - _Gene_: A factor or infinitesimal element in a nuclear thread - or chromosome, the latter being a linear aggregate of such - factors, each having definite specificity and manifesting - itself in the external character which develops from it. - - _Genotype_: The total assemblage of germinal factors - transmitted by a given species of organism, that is, the - complete complex of genes synthesized in the zygote and - perpetuated by equation-divisions in the somatic cells. Hence - the basic germinal or hereditary constitution of an organism or - group of organisms. - - _Germ Cells_: Cells specialized for reproduction as contrasted - with other vital functions, _e.g._, spores and gametes. - - _Germ-plasm_: The material basis of inheritance. - - _Glacial Epoch_: After the close of the Tertiary period, - Europe and North America are said to have been covered with - vast ice sheets known as continental glaciers (the result of - great climatic changes in the Northern hemisphere). As the - weather varied these ice sheets advanced and retreated, the - retreats corresponding to the so-called Interglacial intervals. - Four Glacial and three Interglacial stages are distinguished, - and it was during the Second and Third of these Interglacial - stages that Palæolithic Man is alleged to have entered Europe. - _Golgi Bodies_: A cytoplasmic apparatus consisting, in its - localized form, of a network, and, in its dispersed form, - of scattered granules. It appears to divide on the mitotic - spindle, and seems to have some important function connected - with secretion. - - - _Habitat_: The locality in which a given animal or plant - normally lives. - - _Hallux_: The great toe, opposable in the ape, but not in man. - - _Heredity_: “The appearance in offspring of characters whose - differential causes are in the germ cells” (Conklin). - - _Heterozygous_: Hybrid,—the condition in which the chromosomal - genes paired by syngamy in the zygote are unlike. - - _Homologous Chromosomes_: Corresponding chromosomes of the - same synaptic pair, being of paternal and maternal origin - respectively. - - _Homozygous_: Pure,—the condition in which the chromosomal - genes paired in the zygote by syngamy are alike. - - _Hormone_: An internal secretion elaborated in the endocrine - or ductless glands and diffused in the blood stream for the - purpose of influencing the activities or metabolism of parts of - the organism at a distance from the source of the hormone, _e. - g._, secretin, gastrin, adrenalin, etc. - - _Hydrotheca_: The cuplike extension of the perisarc (skeletal - sheath) surrounding the hypostome (oral cone) and tentacles of - certain polyps. - - _Hyloblatic_: Resembling the gibbon. - - - _Lemurs_: Four-handed animals allied to the Insectivora, with - curved nostrils and a claw instead of a nail on the first - finger of the rear hands. - - _Lethals_: A genetical term for hereditary factors (genes) - which cause the death of the gametes or the zygotes that - contain them. In the case of zygotes, death results from the - homozygous, but not from the heterzygous, condition. - - _Linin_: Same as oxychromatin. - - _Litopterna_: A suborder of extinct ungulate mammals from the - Miocene and Pliocene of South America resembling horses or - llamas. _Mammals_: Vertebrate animals which suckle their - young after birth. - - _Meiosis_: The process whereby the chromosomes of synaptic - pairs (in the primary oöcyte or spermatocyte) are separated - in such a way that the resulting gametes (eggs, or sperms) - receive a haploid (halved) number of unpaired chromosomes, - instead of the diploid (double) number of paired chromosomes - characteristic of the zygote and the somatic cells of the - species. - - _Metista_: Animals and plants normally multicellular and having - their cells differentiated into at least two distinct layers or - tissues—the Metazoans and Metaphytes. - - _Mitosis_: Typical cell-division, whose mechanism consists of - the spindle-fibers, and whose scope is to secure an exactly - equal partition of the single components of the nucleus of the - dividing cell between the two resultant daughter-cells. - - _Monism_: A system of thought which holds that there is but one - substance, either mind (idealistic subjectivism), or matter - (objectivistic materialism),—or else a substance that is - neither mind nor matter, but is the substantial ground of both. - Idealistic monism regards mind as the sole reality and matter - as its product. Materialistic monism regards matter as the sole - reality and mind as its product. - - - _Neolithic_: Pertaining to the Young-Stone Age, that is, to - prehistoric man of Post-glacial time. The implements of the - latter are of polished stone. The Young-Stone Age is said to - have begun about 7,000 years B.C., and to have ended with the - Copper Culture about 2,000 B.C. The Bronze Age, which followed - it, belongs to history. - - _Neurone_: The nerve-cell with all its processes, consisting, - therefore, of the nucleated cell-body, the axone or discharging - fiber, and the dentrites or receiving fibers. - - - _Oölites_: An English term for the Jurassic, or middle system - of the Mesozoic group of fossiliferous rocks. - - _Ontogeny_: The embryological development of the individual. - _Opposable_: A term applied to the thumb or great toe when they - are capable of being placed with their tips opposite to those - of the other digits. - - _Organelle_: Literally, a “miniature organ,” _i.e._, one of - the living components of a cell as distinguished from the - metaplastic or non-living inclusions. - - _Oxychromatin_: That portion of the nuclear network which - stains with acidic dyes, the finer nuclear reticulum in which - the coarser strands of basichromatin appear to be suspended. - - - _Palæolithic_: Belonging to the Old-Stone Age, which - corresponds to the latter half of the Glacial or Pleistocene - epoch. It is alleged to be the second period of prehistoric man - (following the Eolithic) and is characterized by implements - of unpolished stone shaped from flint by the chipping off of - flakes of the latter substance. - - _Palæontology_: The science of fossil organisms. - - _Palæozoic_: A term applied to the second group of - fossiliferous rocks, following the earliest, or Proterozoic, - group, and preceding the Mesozoic group. It comprises the - Cambrian, Ordovician, Devonian, Silurian, and Carboniferous - systems, and its sediments are the first that contain - well-preserved fossils. - - _Parasitism_: A condition in which one organism (the parasite) - residing in, or upon, another species of organism (the host) - lives at its expense, the relation being detrimental to the - latter. - - _Parthenogenesis_: The production of offspring from - unfertilized eggs. - - _Phenotype_: The sum-total of external characters by whose - enumeration an organism is described—the somatic or expressed - characters of an organism (or group of organisms) as - distinguished from those that are merely potential in the germ - cells. - - _Phylogeny_: Developmental history of the race, the - hypothetical evolutionary history of the race, in - contradistinction to the embryological development of - the individual (ontogeny). _Phylum_: A term used in - classification to denote any primary group of the plant or - animal kingdom. - - _Plantigrade_: Walking on the whole sole of the foot, like - bears. - - _Plastids_: Permanent organelles or living components of the - cellular cytoplasm, _e.g._, chloroplasts, leucoplasts, etc. - - _Pleistocene_: The lower series of the Quaternary system of - fossiliferous rocks. It corresponds to the so-called Glacial - epoch, and extends from the close of the Tertiary period - (system) to the dawn of the Recent or Historical epoch. - - _Polar Cell_: A synonym for polar body, or policyte. The - polar bodies are minute abortive cells given off by the egg - undergoing meiosis. Into them are shunted the chromosomes - which the egg discards in its process of nuclear reduction - (maturation). - - _Præformation_: Theory that the egg contains a complete - miniature of the organism into which it develops. - - _Prehension_: Grasping, catching hold. - - _Progression_: Advancing movement, locomotion. - - _Pro-simiæ_: The lemurs as distinguished from genuine apes - (Simiæ). - - _Protista_: Animals or plants which are normally unicellular - and which when multicellular show no differentiation into - tissues—the Protozoans and Protophytes. - - _Protoplasm_: Living matter. - - - _Receptor_: An organ specialized to receive stimuli, _e.g._, a - sense-organ. - - - _Sedimentary_: A term applied to rocks which originated as - sediments deposited under water. - - _Serum_: Watery portion of the blood, the plasma. - - _Somatic Cells_: Vegetative cells not especially set aside by - the organism for reproductive purposes, _e.g._, tissue-cells. - - _Somite_: One of the uniform segments of the longitudinal - series into which a metameric organism (such as an earthworm) - is partitioned. - - _Spermatist_: An old term applied to one who held that the - animal embryo was produced entirely by the male parent. - _Spore_: A single cell, incapable of syngamy, but capable of - giving rise to a new individual without the sexual process. - - _Symbiosis_: The obligatory association of two organisms of - different species for mutual benefit. - - _Synapsis_: Union in pairs of corresponding (homologous) - chromosomes of opposite parental origin as a preliminary to - their separation in meiosis. - - _Systematist_: An expert in classification (systematics), _i. - e._, a taxonomist. - - - _Taxonomy_: The science of classification. - - _Tertiary Period_: A geological time-division corresponding to - the rock-system that comprises the greater part of the Cenozoic - group. It is made up of four series, namely, the Eocene, - Oligocene, Miocene, and Pliocene. Its close marks the beginning - of the Glacial or Pleistocene epoch. - - _Tissue_: A layer of uniform cells specialized for the same - function. - - _Tissue Cell_: One of the somatic cells of which a tissue is - composed. - - _Troglodytic_: Resembling the chimpanzee and the gorilla. - - - _Woods Hole_: The seat of the Marine Biological Laboratory. It - is a watering-place on the New England coast opposite Martha’s - Vineyard. - - - _Zygote_: The synthetic cell formed by the union of two gametes - and giving rise by division either to a new multicellular - organism, or to a rejuvenated cycle of unicellular forms. - - - - - INDEX TO AUTHORS - - - Adami, J. G., 57. - - Aeby, Christoph Theod., 274. - - Æsop, 246. - - Alsberg, Moritz, 317. - - Altman, Richard, 141. - - Aquinas, St. Thomas, 32, 73, 268, 343. - - Aristotle, 133, 155, 172, 174, 192, 196, 197, 200, 202, 214, 215, - 227, 230. - - Armstrong, H. E., 190. - - Arrhénius, Svante, 166, 167, 182, 183, 184. - - Augustine, St., 32, 73, 74, 75. - - - Bach, Alexis, 145, 146. - - Bacon, Francis, 86, 87. - - Bagg, H. J., 266. - - Balfour, Arthur James, 358. - - Ballou, W. H., 318. - - Bardon, L., 330. - - Bastian, Charlton, 165. - - Bateson, Wm., 1, 5, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 28, 30, 43, 44, - 73, 84, 85, 88, 145, 146, 334. - - Bather, F. A., 3, 40, 76, 77, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93. - - Baudlisch, Oscar, 148. - - Baur, E., 88. - - Beddoe, 333. - - Bergson, Henri, 262. - - Bernouilli, Jacques, 248. - - Bey, Pruner-, 324. - - Binet, Alfred, 220. - - Biot, Jean Baptiste, 135. - - Blackwelder, Eliot, 117. - - Blake, C. Carter, 324. - - Blakeslee, Albert F., 17, 21, 22, 23. - - Blanford, Wm. Thomas, 95. - - Boule, Marcellin, 332. - - - Bouvier, E. L., 239, 260, 261, 265. - - Bouyssonie, A. J. & P., 330. - - Boveri, Th., 139. - - Branco, W., 344. - - Breuil, Abbé Henri, 290, 342. - - Brown, Barnum, 270, 310. - - Bryan, Wm. Jennings, 1, 343. - - Buffon, C. L., 305. - - Bühler, Karl, 218, 220. - - Bumüller, J., 273, 274. - - Burroughs, John, 244. - - Burton-Opitz, Russel, 299. - - - Calkins, Gary N., 39, 40, 161. - - Campbell, Marius Robinson, 107 note - - Carazzi, D., 304. - - Castle, W. E., 43. - - Caullery, Maurice, 12, 28, 29, 277. - - Chamberlain, T. C., 125. - - Chetverikov, S. S., 115, 116. - - Chiesa, Luigi, 210. - - Clausen, Roy Elwood, 26. - - Clemont, 324. - - Clifford, Wm. Kingdon, 237. - - Cohn, Ferd. Jul., 182. - - Coleman, Arthur P., 113, 114, 115. - - Comte, (Isidore) Auguste, 225, 226. - - Conklin, E. G., 270. - - Copernicus, Nicholas, XII, XIII. - - Coulter, John Merle, 24. - - Creighton, J. E., 238. - - Croll, James, 290. - - Crookes, Sir Wm., 183. - - Cuvier, Georges, 67, 72, 76, 90, 91, 102. - - - Dana, James Dwight, 111, 114, 117, 270. - - - Darwin, Charles, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 24, 30, 32, 65, 68, 75, 81, 152, - 191, 194, 236, 238, 245, 246, 269, 277, 286, 287, 288, 290, 295, - 296, 297, 298, 302, 305, 307, 338, 349, 352, 353, 360. - - Da Vinci, Leonardo, 257. - - Davis, Bradley Moore, 25, 26, 27, 28. - - Davis, J. Barnard, 324. - - Dawson, Sir John William, 345. - - Dawson, Charles, 320. - - Deaver, J. B., 295. - - De Chardin, Teilhard, 320. - - De Geer, Gerard, 289. - - Delage, Yves, 127, 150, 151. - - De Mattos, Alexander Teixeira, 247 note. - - De Puydt, Marcel, 326. - - Descartes, René, 172, 197, 198, 202, 231, 249. - - De Vires, Hugo, 16, 17, 20. - - Dewey, John, 350. - - Dorlodot, Canon Henri de, XII, 31, 34, 47, 70, 74. - - Dreisch, Hans, 12, 70, 172, 174, 190, 202, 244, 252. - - Dubois, Eugène, 313, 314, 316, 318. - - Du Bois-Reymond, Emil, 11, 268, 277, 352. - - Dumas, Jean Baptiste, 135. - - Duponceau, Pierre Étienne, 338. - - Dupont, André Hubert, 326. - - Dwight, Thomas, 36, 51, 59, 274, 275, 278, 285, 303, 304, 309, 319, - 320, 328, 336, 337. - - - Ecclesiastes, 192. - - Ehrlich, Paul, 57. - - Eimer, Th., 7. - - Eliot, Charles W., 358. - - Evans, Sir Arthur, 339. - - Ezekiel, 89. - - - Fabre, J. H., 240, 247 note, 249, 251, 252, 254, 258, 260, 263, 264, - 265, 266. - - Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 149. - - - Fenton, Henry John H., 146. - - Fischer, Emil, 145. - - Fleischmann, Albert, 12. - - Flemming, W., 137. - - Fontaine, T., 208. - - Fraipont, Julien, 327. - - Fuhlrott, C., 323. - - - Galiani, 11. - - Galilei, Galileo, XII, XIII. - - Garbowski, Thad., 284. - - Gaskell, Walter Holbrook, 293, 294. - - Gatenby, J. B., 140. - - Geikie, Sir Archibald, 96, 97, 107 note. - - Gerard, John, S.J., 82. - - Goodrich, Edwin S., 15, 62. - - Goodspeed, T. H., 26. - - Grabau, Amadeus, Wm., 335. - - Grassi, B., 66. - - Gray, Henry, 299. - - Gregory, W. K., 270, 309, 310, 311, 318, 348. - - Grignard, Victor, 209. - - Gruender, Hubert, 233 note. - - Gummersbach, Joseph, 247 note. - - Guyer, M. F., 15, 266. - - - Haacke, Joh. Wilh., 275, 317. - - Haeckel, Ernest, 33, 48, 89, 138, 186, 237, 275, 277, 278, 345. - - Hamann, Joh. Georg, 149. - - Handlirsch, Anton, 115. - - Hartmann, Karl Robert Eduard von, 358. - - Harvey, William, 155. - - Haswell, Wm. A., 316, 317. - - Hauser, O., 329. - - Hayes, Charles Willard, 107 note. - - Heilprin, Angelo, 120, 121. - - Heim, Albert, 107 note. - - Helmholtz, Herman von, 182, 298. - - Henderson, Lawrence J., 6, 153, 175, 176, 179. - - Hertwig, Oskar, 284. - - Hertwig, Richard, 315. - - Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 127. - - - Holworth, Sir Henry, 98. - - Horace, 54, 109. - - Howe, John Allen, 104, 105. - - Howell, Wm. H. 299. - - Hrdlička, A., 316, 318, 319, 322, 323, 325, 328, 329, 331, 332. - - Hubrecht, Ambrosius Arnold William, 309, 317. - - Hume, David, 198. - - Huxley, Thomas H., 20, 67, 76, 98, 111 note, 236, 237, 314, 325, 333. - - - Jaggar, T. A., Jr., 346, 347, 348. - - James, William, 205, 206, 212, 249. - - Jennings, H. S., 250. - - Johnson, Dr. George, XVI. - - Jordan, David Starr, 4, 18, 28. - - Jörgensen, J., 146, 147. - - Judd, J. W., 94. - - - Kammerer, Paul, 14, 266. - - Kant, Immanuel, 198. - - Keen, W. W., 48. - - Keith, Arthur, 319, 322, 328, 332, 336, 337. - - Kellogg, Vernon I., 46 note, 53 note, 350, 351. - - Kerr, J. Graham, 280, 282, 284. - - Keyser, C. J., 204. - - Kidd, F., 146. - - Klaatsch, A., 308, 309, 312, 317, 326, 328, 330. - - Koenen, C., 326. - - Kofoid, Charles A., 118, 162. - - Kohlbrugge, J. H. F., 274, 275, 277, 285, 308. - - Kölliker, Rudolph Albert, 7. - - Kollman, Julius, 285, 286, 317. - - Kramberger, K. Gorjanović, 320, 333. - - - Lamarck, Jean Baptiste, 8, 9, 16, 30, 32, 65, 286, 290. - - Lankester, E. Ray, 186. - - Laplace, Pierre Simon, 181. - - Lebedeff, 183. - - Le Conte, Joseph N., 345. - - Lee, 333. - - Leydig, Franz, 137. - - Linné, Carl von, 4. - - Loeb, Jacques, 159, 249, 250, 252, 264. - - Lohest, Maximin, 326. - - Lotsy, J. P., 25. - - Lucretius, 30. - - Lull, Richard S., 115. - - - Macalister, R. A. S., 342. - - MacCurdy, George Grant, 317, 326, 329, 331, 332. - - MacDowell, E. C., 266. - - MacManus, T., 359. - - Macnamara, N. C., 314, 325. - - Manouvrier, L., 316, 333. - - Marx, Karl, 360. - - Mathews, Albert, 293, 294, 302. - - Maxwell, J. Clerk, 183. - - McCann, Alfred W., 31, 32, 33, 34, 47, 50, 51. - - McConnell, R. G., 107, note, 109. - - McGregor, J. H., 315, 316, 317, 320, 322. - - Melanchthon, Phillip, 197. - - Mendel, Gregor Johann, 3, 24, 27, 28, 32. - - Mendeléef, Dimitri Ivanovitch, 56. - - Mercier, Désiré Cardinal, 204, 205, 208. - - Meyer, Ludwig, 302, 324. - - Michael Angelo, 257. - - Miller, Arthur M., 97, 98. - - Miller, Gerrit, 321. - - Minchin, E. A., 5. - - Moore, Benjamin F., 150, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170. - - Morgan, C. Lloyd, 233 note, 234 note, 237. - - Morgan, Thomas Hunt, 12, 16, 36, 44, 64, 85, 86, 88, 89, 276, 278, - 306, 334. - - Morton, Dudley J., 270. - - Muckermann, H., S.J., 325. - - Müller, Fritz, 48, 275, 278. - - Müller, Max, 338. - - - Nägeli, Karl Wilhelm, 7, 186. - - Newman, John Henry, 354. - - Newell, Bro. Matthias, 347. - - Newton, Sir Isaac, XIII. - - Nicholson, Henry Alleyne, 97, 272. - - Nicomachus, 196. - - - Obermaier, Hugues, 289, 290, 324, 327, 329, 342. - - Occam, William of, 67, 349. - - Osborn, Henry Fairfield, 2, 33, 65, 70, 76, 88, 89, 90, 170, 289, - 290, 309, 318, 342. - - - Paley, William, 11. - - Parker, G. H., 9, 233 note, 295. - - Parker, T. Jeffery, 316, 317. - - Pasteur, Louis, 135, 181. - - Paulsen, Friederich, 206. - - Pawlow, Ivan, 242, 249, 266. - - Pearson, Karl, 310. - - Peckham, Geo. W. and Eliz. G., 265. - - Perrier, Remy, 296. - - Pfizenmayer, E., 91, 92. - - Pictet, Amé, 143. - - Pirrson, L. V., 107 note, 109. - - Plato, 172, 197. - - Poulton, Edward B., 186. - - Price, George McCready, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110, 120. - - Price, T. S., 167. - - - Quatrefages De Breau, Jean Louis Armand de, 276. - - - Ranke, J., 271, 272, 273, 274, 324. - - Rautert, 326. - - Ray, John, 5, 20. - - Redi, Francesco, 134, 136, 137. - - Reinke, J., 345, 346. - - Renner, O., 16. - - Richter, Herm. Eberh., 182. - - Riddle, Oscar, 300. - - Robinson, James Harvey, 190, 194, 195, 236. - - Rösch, Joseph, 318. - - Rothpletz, Aug., 107 note. - - Russell, Bertrand, 204. - - - Santayana, George, 350. - - Sapir, Edward, 338. - - Schaaffhausen, D., 150, 325, 333. - - Schäfer, E. A., 58, 165, 179, 184, 185. - - Schleiden, Matthias J., 136. - - Schmidt, H. D., 260. - - Schoetensack, Otto, 318, 319. - - Schroeder, Ch. F., 251. - - Schuchert, Charles, 97, 98, 104 note, 106, 109, 110. - - Schultze, F. E., 218. - - Schultze, Max, 137, 138. - - Schwalbe, Gust. Alb., 286, 317, 324, 325, 333. - - Schwann, Theodor, 136. - - Scott, Wm. B., 78, 96, 103, 119, 120. - - Sedgwick, A., 95. - - Sellars, R. W., 233 note. - - Sewall, Anna, 236. - - Smith, G. Elliot, 289, 341. - - Smith, John Talbot, 355. - - Smith, William, 102. - - Snell, Karl, 308. - - Sollas, W. J., 289. - - Spallanzani, Lazzaro, 134, 136. - - Spencer, Herbert, 10, 12, 98, 102, 103, 148, 166, 179, 360. - - Starling, Ernest H., 57, 299, 301. - - Stockard, Charles R., 62. - - Stoll, A., 146. - - - Taylor, J., 340. - - Tertullian, 346. - - Thayer, Wm. Sydney, 135. - - Tholuck, Fried. Aug., 338. - - Thompson, Sir Wm., 182. - - Thorndyke, Edward L., 237. - - Tilden, Sir Wm., 151, 192. - - Titchener, Edward Bradford, 205, 209, 274. - - Tredgold, A. F., 15 note. - - Tuccimei, Giuseppe, XIII, 360, 361. - - Tyndall, John, 149. - - - Vallisnieri, Antonio, 134. - - Van Loon, Hendrick Willem, 190. - - Vegard, Lars, 183 note. - - Vicari, E. M., 266, 267. - - Virchow, Rudolph, 137, 273, 316, 317, 324, 346. - - Vogt, Carl, 276, 324. - - - Waagen, W., 16 note. - - Warner, H., 274. - - Walkhoff, O., 317. - - Walsh, James J., 336. - - Ward, James, 163. - - Wasmann, Erich, S.J., XII, 11, 33, 46, 47, 48, 49, 49 note, 67, 70, - 134, 247 note, 261, 262, 277, 312, 313, 325, 333. - - Waterston, David, 322. - - Watson, John B., 198, 204, 250. - - Wayland, John Walter, 357. - - Weismann, August, 10, 13, 16, 25, 65, 186, 267. - - Weber, Ernest Heinrich, 227. - - Weld, H. P., 253, 255. - - Welday, J. O., 357. - - Wells, H. G., 1, 33, 190. - - Wenstrup, Edward, O.S.B., XVI. - - Werner, Abraham Gottlob, 99, 102, 103. - - Wheeler, Geo. C. and Esther H., 261. - - Wiedersheim, Robert, 292. - - Wilder, Harris Hawthorne, 300, 301. - - Williams, H. S., 96. - - Willis, Bailey, 107 note. - - Willstätter, R., 146, 147. - - Wilson, Edmund B., 6, 12, 13, 140, 141, 143, 160, 164, 168, 170, - 200, 201, 211. - - Windle, Bertram C. A., 134, 341. - - Wirth, Edmund J., 205. - - Wissler, Clark, 344. - - Woodruff, Lorande Loss, 39, 115. - - Woods, Henry, 77, 78, 79, 80, 86, 118, 119. - - Woodward, A. Smith, 321, 322, 340, 341. - - Woodworth, Robert S., 198. - - Wright, C. F., 289. - - Wundt, Wilhelm, 197, 205, 206, 209, 212, 236, 237, 238. - - - Zahm, J. A., 268. - - Zeno, 226. - - Zittel, Karl A. von, 313, 345. - - - - - INDEX OF SUBJECTS - - - Abiogenesis, 131, 135, 136, 142, 160, 165, 167, 179, 183, 186; - “new theory” of, 165; - “old theory” of, 165; - “philosophical” proof of, 186 - - Absence of function, real, 291; - apparent, 291 - - Abstract concept, 219 - - Abstraction, 221, 224, 254, 261, 262; - of active intellect predispositive, 221; - of intellect, potential, cognitive, 221; - power of, 261, 262; - process of, 221, 224 - - Abstract thought, 215, 267; - has soul as its exclusive agent and subject, 215; - not same as imagery, 215; - unique prerogative of man, 267 - - Acids, butyric, 159; - carbonic, 145; - fatty, 145; - formic, 145 - - Acromegaly, 294 - - Acromikria, 294 - - Act, 199 - - Action, 174, 175, 176, 177, 215, 216; - agent of, 176; - an expression of entity, 125, 216; - chemical, 175; - effect of, 176, 177; - electrical, 176; - energy-content of, 174; - immanent, defined, 177; - mechanical, 175; - physical, 175; - reflexive, 177; - subject of, 176; - transitive, 174, 177; - defined, 177; - vital, 175 - - Active intellect, 220, 221 - - Activity, organic cannot escape physical determinism, 232 - - Adaptation, 7, 8, 9, 16, 45, 46, 47, 52, 53, 63, 124, 250, 290, 291, - 328; - acquired, 8, 9, 16, 45, 290, 328, 333 - —not inheritable, 9; - innate (inherited), 45, 46, 47, 52, 53, 63, 124; - of instinctive behavior to emergencies, 250; - structural, 291 - - Additive properties, 233 _note_ - - Adjustments, 204 - - Adolescence, 155 - - Adrenal bodies, 292, 295 - - Adults, 276 - - Aeschna grandis L., 115 - - Aftermath of evolutionary propaganda, 360 - - Agametes, 156 - - Agamic, 156 - - Agent, 171, 177 - - Age of Man, 289, 290 - - Agnosticism, 352, 355, 358; - parasitic, 358 - - Agulhas, Lost Land of, 114 - - Alberta, 108 - - Albumen, living and dead, 144 - - Alcohol, methyl, 147; - phytyl, 147 - - Aldehyde, 145, 148 - - Aldol condensation, 145 - - Allelomorphic, 42 - - Allocation, taxonomic, 320 - - Alluvial epoch, 313; - loam, 324 - - Alpha Centauri, 184 - - Alps, 109 - - Altamira, caves of, 339, 340, 343 - - Alternating personalities, 211; - psychopathic condition, 211 - - Altruism, 355, 356; - without adequate motivation, 356 - - Amboceptors, 57 - - American Association for Advancement of Science, 343, 344; - Edict of, 343 - - Ammonites, 84, 86, 249; - intergradence in, 84 - - Ammonium cyanate, 173 - - Ammophila, 264 - - Ammophila gryphus, 261 - - Ammophila urnaria, 261 - - Amnion, 276 - - Amœba albida, 159 - - Amphibia, 61, 281, 296 - - Amphioxus, 60, 161 - - Analogous organs, 35, 36, 61 - - Analogy, 35, 59, 60; - convergent, 61 - - Analysis, 144; - chemical, 144; - physical, 144 - - Anarchy, 355, 360 - - Anatomists, 296 - - Anatomy, 196, 208, 276, 277, 303, 308; - comparative, 276, 277, 308; - of consciousness, attempted by Associationists, 208 - - Ancestors, 55, 59, 76, 82, 83, 92, 95, 115, 270, 280, 296, 304, 308, - 309, 317, 349; - collateral, 76; - common, 55, 59, 83, 92, 269, 270, 278, 308; - direct, 76; - hypothetical, 308, 309, 317; - necessary priority of, 82, 83; - of man, 298 - —alleged to be fish-like, 280; - tertiary, 270 - - Ancestry, 92, 280; - entails antecedence in time, 92; - of man, 280 - - Ancitherium, 76 - - Angiosperms, 72, 73 - - Animal, 242, 249, 307; - appetite, gratification of, 242; - as “reflex machines,” 249; - cave, 307 - - Animalism, 365 - - Animalistic man, 350, 352 - - Animality of man, not a modern discovery, 191, 192 - - Animism, 197, 198 - - Anisogametes, 157, 158 - - Anisogamy, 157, 158 - - Annelida, 117, 278, 280 - - Anomalies, 112, 303, 305, 319, 320; - anatomical, fluctuational, 303; - mutational, 303; - of spatial distributions, 112 - - Antagonism, 358; - between modern progress and Christian ideal, 358 - - Anthropomorphism, 236, 246, 250, 262; - Darwinian, 236, 250 - - Anthropologists, 318, 344; - foremost ones confess their ignorance regarding origin of man, 344 - - Antibodies, 14, 15 - - Antigen, 15 - - Antirrhinum, majus and molle, 88 - - Anti-vivisectionists, 236 - - Ants, 261, 262; leaf-cutting, 261 - - Ape, 245, 270, 272, 275, 285, 308, 309, 311, 314, 315, 316, 317, 345; - anthropoid, 270, 271, 272, 275, 309, 315, 317; - cranial capacity, 314; - descended from man-like ancestor, 285; - descent from, not a doctrine of science, 345; - embryonic skull of, 285; - foot of, 50, 51 - —a hand functionally but not structurally, 50, 51; - fossil, 308, 313; - giant, geneological tree of, 315; - higher, 311; - its cranium, 271; - large, 315; - living, 308 - - Ape-like features, acquired adaptation, 330 - - Appalachians, 107 - - Appetite, 221, 235, 241; - rational, 221; - sensual, 235, 241 - - Appendicitis, 295 - - Appendix, vermiform, 295, 296; - useful, 296 - - Apple-tree, 6, 88, 161 - - Apterix, 305 - - Arbacia punctulata, 159 - - Arboreal life, 271, 308 - - Arca, 118 - - Archæan, 104, 117; - record, damaged condition of, 117 - - Archæology, prehistoric, 339 - - Archæopteryx, 86 - - Archæozoic, 104, 148; - times alleged to have been more favorable to origin of life, 148 - - Argument, 226; - no avail against fact, 226 - - Art, palæolithic, 340 - - Artefacts, 154 - - Artemia salina, 159 - - Artemisia absynthium, 248 - - Arthropoda, 61, 119, 261, 284 - - Artificial illumination, 340 - - Artistic attainment, high level of, 340 - - Artists, palæolithic, 335 - - Asia, 335 - - Ass, 5, 81, 304 - - Assimilation, 143 - - Association, 208, 235, 241, 242 - - Associationists, 208, 236 - - Astarte, 118 - - Asteroidea, 121, 122 - - Atavism, 303, 304 - - Atlantis, 114 - - Atmosphere, 148, 181, 183; - coronal of sun, 183; - formerly richer in carbon dioxide, 148; - of earth, 183 - - Atoms, 58, 144, 162, 165, 167, 170, 202; - structure of, 58 - - Atrophy, 285, 286, 288, 294, 299, 301, 302, 307; - due to misuse, 288; - somatic, 307 - - Attention, 208 - - Audist, 219 - - Aurignacian Man, 332 - - Aurora borealis, 183, 183 _note_, 184 _note_ - - Australian, 321, 325, 328, 330, 333; - blacks, 325, 333 - —modern, have brow ridges, 328; - modern, 325, 330; - skull of, 321 - - Author of Nature, 193 - - Autogamy, 158, 159, 161 - - Automatisms, 238, 240, 262; - teleological, 240 - - Automixis, 161 - - Autonomy, 174, 202; - dynamic, 174; - vital, 202 - - Axiom, 223, 224; - of reception, 223, 224 - - Axon, 213 - - Azoic bottom, 125 - - - Babylonia, 337 - - Bacteria, 135, 138, 183, 183 _note_ - - Barbarism, 337; - historically a state of degeneration and stagnation, 337; - not a primitive condition, 337; - no instance of spontaneous emergence from, 337 - - Bacteriologists, 183 - - Baltic Sea, 104, 105 - - Banana, 162 - - Basichromatin, 139 - - Bear Grass quarries, 106 - - Beaver, 247, 257 - - Bedding plane, 106 - - Bees, 257 - - Beetles, wingless, 306 - - Behavior, 249, 254, 255, 260, 261, 262, 263; - instinctive, 249, 254, 255, 260 - —objectively useful, 254, 255 - —subjectively agreeable, 254, 255; - concursively telic, 260-262; - consciously telic, _i. e._, intelligent 262; - unconcursively telic, 262; - must be perfect from outstart, 263 - - Behaviorism, degeneration of psychology into, 198 - - Behaviorists, 204, 250 - - Bestial man, 340, 342; - impossible, 340; - no traces of, 342 - - Bestial origin, 345, 352; - of man, 352; - of man, theory of, 345 - - Bestial soul, 114, 194, 213, 214, 234; - an emergent of matter, 194, 234 _note_ - —not a product of physicochemical action, 194; - exists in the interest of the organism, 214; - incomplete complement of matter, 213; - material but not corporeal, 194, 214; - operates only in conjunction with organism, 213; - perishes with dissolution of organism, 213 - - Bible, 127 - - Biochemists, 179 - - Biogenetic Law, 48, 275, 276, 277, 278, 283, 285 - - Biologists, 2, 3, 11, 19, 29, 53 _note_, 190, 200, 257 - - Biology, xiv, 24, 196, 197, 205 - - Bion, 170, 171 - - Biophysicists, 179 - - Bipinnaria, 283 - - “Biotic energy,” 170 - - Bird of Paradise, 154, 353 - - Birds, 282, 296, 297 - - Bison, 331, 332 - - “Black Beauty,” 236 - - Blackberries, 25 - - Blindness, germinal and somatic, 306 - - Blue-green Algæ, 138, 149, 181 - - Body, 198 - - Bone cave, 340 - - Bone fibres, 317 - - Bos primigenius, 329 - - Botany, 31, 55 - - Brachiopoda, 117, 118, 120 - - Bradypus, 52 - - Brain, 274, 315, 316; - human, 274 - —convolutions of, 274; - relative and absolute size of, 315; - relative size of, 316; - simian, 274 - - Brain case, 272 - - Brain cavities, below modern average, 329 - - Brain-fag, due to imaginative, not to intellectual activity, 228, - 229, 230; - follows mere memorizing, 229 - - Branchial arches and clefts, 278, 279 - - Branchial lamellæ, 279 - - Breasts, supernumerary, 304 - - Broken Hill Mine, 340 - - Bronze Age, historic, 337 - - Brow ridges, 328, 330, 333, 341; - most pronounced of any human specimen, 341 - - Brute, 213, 233, 235, 236, 360; - destitute of freedom, morality, responsibility, 233; - its psychic functions, all organic, 213; - lumination of, 236; - our common origin with, 360 - - Budding, 156 - - Burial, 330, 335; - deep, 335; - makes age of bones uncertain, 335; - solemn, indicates belief in immortality, 330 - - Butyric acid, 159 - - - Cæcum, 295 - - Cænogenesis, 277, 288 - - Cænozoic, 118, 119, 335 - - Calcium hydroxide, 145 - - Calicurgus, 263 - - Cambrian, 99, 100, 104, 105, 110, 116, 117, 118, 125; - Lower, 117; - terranes below, 125; - youthful appearance of, 104, 105 - - Canadian Shield, 104 _note_ - - Canadian survey, 108 - - Canal, alimentary, 293, 295, 301; - neural, 293 - - Canalization, 265 - - Carbohydrates, 145, 148; - production of, by plants, 145-148—not a synthesis, - 146-148—analogous to process in animals, 146, 147 - - Carbon dioxide, 145-147 - - Carboniferous, 73, 92, 115, 118; - Lower, 92; - Upper, 115 - - Carnivora, 271 - - Catarrhine monkeys, 287 - - Catastrophes, 72, 182; - cosmic, 182 - - Catastophism, 67, 68, 98, 312; - new, 98 - - Caterpillar, 260, 264 - - Cats, 284 - - Causation, active and efficient, 171, 172 - - Cave rat, 307 - - - Caves, 335, 336; - of France and Spain, 335, 336; - of Spain, 336 - - Cell-division, 59, 137, 138, 139, 155, 162, 163 - - Cell, 136, 137, 138, 141, 142, 155, 165, 168, 202, 301; - definition of, 137; - a multimolecule, 165; - cannot originate through exclusive agency of physicochemical - energies, 142; - fundamental unit of organization, 136; - germ, 156; - simplest of organic units capable of independent existence, 138; - simplest of organisms, 147; - somatic, 156; - submicroscopical components of, 141; - simplest form of organic life, 142; - vital, 142; - sperm, 137 - - Cell Theory, 136 - - Cellular continuity, 137, 141; - Fifth article of, 141; - Law of, 141 - - Centaur, constellation of, 184 - - Centers, sensory and motor, 251 - - Central neurones, 213, 222; - purpose of, 222 - - Centrioles, 140 - - Cephalic index, 329 - - Ceratites, 86 - - Ceratodus, 119 - - Cerebral cortex, 206, 213, 221, 222 - - Cerebral neurones, 222; - an extended receptor not proportioned to dematerialized abstract - objects, 222 - - Cerebrospinal system, 213 - - Certainty, 124, 125; - based on objective necessity, 124; - scientific, 125 - - Ceylon, 315 - - Chain-reflex, 250, 252 - - Chaldea, 337, 340 - - Chalk, 79, 86 - - Chance, 11, 151-154; - impotent to produce effect so complicatedly telic as an organism, - 151; - its efficacy and impotence, 151-154 - - Change, adaptive, 53 _note_; - germinal, 42, 43, 68, 307; - kinds of, 42; - somatic, 68; - specific, 7, 23, 68, 88, 89, 307; - varietal, 7, 68, 88 - - Characters (somatic or external), 5, 6, 17, 18, 41, 62, 63, 87, 88, - 121, 122, 278, 306, 334; - definition of, 41; - duplication and suppression of, 306; - embryonic not derived from adult, 278; - homologous and adaptational, 62, 63, 121 - —distinction has no experimental basis, 62; - “inherited” and “acquired,” 41 - - Chapelle-aux-Saintes, 288, 331; - Cave of, remains, 331; - remains, 228 - - Chela, 61, 261; - of lobster and African scorpion, 61 - - Chemical analysis, 143, 144, 216; - destroys life, 143, 144 - - Chemical synthesis of living matter possible, 142, 144 - - Chemist, 151; - guiding intelligence of need in synthesis of organic compounds, - 151; - necessity of regulation, 151 - - Chemistry, 142, 350; - physical, 142 - - Chemotaxis, 264 - - Chick, 255 - - Chimaeroids, 119 - - Chimpanzee, 33, 270, 314, 323 - - Chin, 319, 320, 328; - may be accentuated by a mutation, 320; - prominence in Spy No. 1, 328; - recessive, 320; - recessiveness of the, 319; - recessiveness and protuberance of, 320; - recessiveness, an acquired adaptation, 320; - receding, acquired, 328 - - China, 110, 337 - - Chinless mandible, not sloping backward, 332 - - Chlorophyll, 62, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 154; - chromogen group of, 148; - chromogen complex, 148; - colloidal solution of, 145; - not a “sensitizer” like Eosin, 147, 148; - regenerated from H₂O and CO₂, 147, 148; - “sensitizer,” 145 - - Chondriosomes, 140 - - Christianity, 359 - - Chromatin, 138, 139 - - Chromiole, 138 - - Chromosomes, 17, 21, 27, 44, 45, 139, 141, 157, 158, 159; - diploid number normal, 159; - diploid number of, 157, 158, 159; - duplication of, 17, 21, 44, 45; - haploid number of, 157, 158, 159; - homologous, - 17, 21; - random assortment of, 27 - - Chronology, 98; - lithic, 98; - principles of, 98 - - Chronometer, palæontological, 135 - - Chrysothrix, 274 - - Cidaris, 119 - - Ciliate, 163 - - Circumstances, environmental, 250-252 - - Civilization, old, destruction of, 336 - - Classes, 37 - - Classification, taxonomic, not historical, 112 - - Clays, Pleistocene, 289 - - Cleavage, 154, 159 - - Cloaca, 281 - - Coccyx, alleged rudiment of former tail, 297; - serves purpose, 298 - - Cockroaches, 115 - - Coelenterates, 78, 118 - - Coexistence of impressions, not a companion of them, 208 - - Cognitive intellect, 220, 221 - - Colloid systems, aggregates, not units, 168 - - Colloidal, 141, 170; - substances, 141; - systems not analogous to organisms, 170 - - Colloids, 166-169; - hydrophilic, 168, 169 - - Columns, continental and submarine, 114 - - Commanchian period, 72 - - Commensal, 46 - - Commensalism, 52 - - Common stock, 39 - - Comparative anatomy, 279, 304 - - Complexity, “Law” of, 166, 167 - - Components, 138, 139, 141, 142, 168; - cytoplasmic and nuclear, 138, 139; - of cell, 141 - —self-perpetuating, 168; - of protoplasmic system, 141 - - Compounds, organic, 142 - - Concepts, 219, 220, 221, 247; - abstract and general, 220, 247; - rational, 247 - - Conceptual thought, 219, 222, 223; - concerned with the reality of essence, 219; - excludes materiality - from its specific agent and receptive subject, 222; - not communicated to organism, 223; - subject in soul alone, 223 - - Conduction path, 265 - - Condyles, occipital, 272 - - Conformity, 105, 107, 110; - “deceptive,” 105, 110; - normal significance of, 105; - “upside-down,” 107 - - Conjugation, 157, 161 - - Consciousness, 198, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 211, 235, 238, 240, - 248, 262; - and unconsciousness, 198; - attests existence superficially variable but radically unchangeable - subject of mental life, 206; - attests persistence of our personal identity, 211; - dependence of all science upon, 204; - etymology of, 205, 206; - its testimony to the reality of the ego, 205; - organic and spiritual, 199; - phenomenal, 198; - sentient, 235, 238, 240, 248; - testimony of, 208 - - Constructions, complex and systematic, not producible by accident, - 53, 154 - - Consolation, 358, 361; - destroyed, 361; - eliminated, 358 - - Contamination of media, 135 - - Contiguity, 241, 242; - association of, 241; - law of, 241, 242 - - Continents, 113, 114; - permanence of, 114 - - Continuity, 350; - destructive as metaphysics, 350; - leads to materialistic monism, 350; - principles of, 350; - nuclear, 137 - - Control, 236, 251-253; - intelligent, 253; - psychic, 251; - rational and moral, 236; - sensory, 251-253 - - Consequences—socialism, anarchy, despair, 360 - - Convergence, 10, 36, 58, 59, 61, 63, 77, 78, 79, 80, 277, 283, 284, - 287; - kinds of 77 - - Corpuscular, 174 - - Correlation, 90, 91, 93, 99, 101, 111; - Cuvier’s Law of, 90, 91; - stratigraphic, 93, 96, 99, 101, 111 - - Cortical, 294, 315; - area, 274; - surface, 315 - - - Cosmic scale, 350; - Cosmogony, 181, 185 - - Cosmopolitan species, 73 - - Cosmozoa, 182 - - Cranial box, 272 - - Cranial capacity, 274, 315, 317, 322, 325, 332, 341; - absolute, 332; - human, 341; - large, 341; - of man and ape compared, 274; - relative, 317, 332 - - Cranial vault, more spacious in Spy No. 2, 327 - - Cranium, 118, 271, 321, 325, 328, 329, 331, 333, 337, 341; - dolichocephalic, 325, 331; - flat on top, broad in back, 341; - modern, 333; - human, 328; - of ape, 271; - of man, 271; - not subsequent to barbarism, 337; - Spy, 331 - - Creation, 67, 72, 186, 187; - defined, 187; - new, 67, 72; - simultaneous or recessive, 72 - - Creationism, 55 - - Creator, 72, 249, 298, 350 - - Credulous persons misled, 353 - - Cretaceous, 100, 104, 108, 109, 111, 118; - shales, 109 - - Crete, 337 - - Cretinism, 294 - - Cries, 246; - emotional, 246; - instinctive, 246 - - Crinoids, 119 - - Crossing, 4, 5, 19-21, 25-28, 88; - interspecific, 19-21, 26, 27; - intervarietal, 19, 20, 27, 28; - does not produce “new species,” 25-28 - - Crossover, 17, 26, 42 - - Crust, terrestrial, 113 - - Crustaceans, 117 - - Cryptorhetic system, 292-294 - - Crystalloids, 144 - - Crystals, 153 - - Crystal units, 144, 165 - - Ctenomys, 305 - - Cultures, 135, 309, 317; - sterilized and aërated, 135 - - Curved femur, acquired adaptation, 328 - - Cycads, 118 - - Cycas, 118 - - Cysts, 134 - - Cytodes, 138, 179, 207 - - Cytologist, 136, 141 - - - Cytology, 137 - - Cytoplasm, 137-139, 141; - of eggs differentiated, 141 - - Cytoplasmic components self-perpetuating, 139 - - Cytosome, 140 - - - Darwinism, 1, 5, 6, 16, 24, 29, 30, 32, 78, 79, 85, 263, 265, 285, - 291, 325; - contradicted by history, 337; - obsolete theory, 29, 30, 349 - - Datura stramonium, 21, 22, 23 - - Death, 156 - - Deceptive conformities, 98 - - Deep sea bottoms, 113 - - Degeneracy, 15, 15 _note_, 18, 336 - - Degradation of energy, 162, 163, 180; - implies beginning of life, 180; - law of, 162, 163 - - Delitzch, 118 - - Dependence, 217, 218, 221, 231; - direct, of psycho-organic functions on organism, 231; - incompatible with spirituality, 218; - intrinsic on matter, 218; - objective, not subjective, 221 - - Descent, 67, 80, 87, 88, 267, 269, 274, 277, 284, 305, 308, 310, - 312, 315, 317, 345; - collateral, 269, 308, 312, 317 - —of man, 308, 317 - —theory of, 269, 312; - common, 269, 315 - —reference of, 269; - direct, Darwin’s theory of, 274; - from ape, theory of, 274; - human, 317, 345 - —from pithecoid primates, not a historical fact, 345 - —theory of, 269; - lineal, 269, 305, 308, 309, 317 - —a chain of creatures, 305 - —from ape, theory of, 269 - —upheld by Darwin, 269; - of man, 308, 310; - theory of, 80, 277 - - Deterioration of organism does not always involve deterioration of - superorganic powers, 230 - - Devonian, 62, 99, 103, 106; - Middle, 106 - - De-Vriesianism, 23, 24, 29, 263, 265, 266, 349 - - Diester, phytyl-methyl, 147 - - Differences, 9, 12, 13, 16, 28, 37, 46, 81, 82, 84, 86, 89, 121, - 171, 236, 237, 271, 272, 273, 320, 331, 333, 334, 359; - anatomical, between - Homo primigenius and Homo sapiens, 331, 334 - —between man and ape, 271-273; - between living and lifeless, 171; - fluctuational, 121; - generic, 37, 46, 82, 84, 86; - individual, 16 - —alleged summation of, 9, 20, 29; - major, 9, 37, 46, 320 - —relative and absolute, 37; - minor, 9, 37, 46, 320; - mutational, 121, 334; - ordinal, 46; - psychological, between man and brute, 236, 237, 359, 360 - —amount to a distinction of kind, 236, 237, 359, 360; - specific, 12, 13, 28, 37, 46, 81, 84, 86, 333, 334; - varietal, 46 - - Differential threshold, law of, 227 - - Differentiation, 284 - - Diffusion of venom, 264, 265 - - Digestion, stimulates lymphatic glands, 301 - - Dileptus gigas, 138, 174 - - Diluvium, European, 345 - - Dinoflagellata, 118 - - Dinosaurs, 100, 271 - - Diphasic, 134 - - Diploid forms, 44, 45, 47 - - Dipnoan, 119 - - Diptera, 48, 49 - - Discernment, 240 - - Discina, 118 - - Disconformity, non-evident, 105 - - Discrimination, 208 - - Discursive analysis, 243, 244 - - Disease germs, 141, 169, 170, 216; - invisible, identified by the pathological effects, 216; - submicroscopic, 141, 169, 170 - - Disintegration, atomic, 163 - - Dispersing medium, 168 - - Dissociation, 235, 242 - - Distributed nucleus, 138 - - Distribution, 92, 99, 100, 112, 113, 115; - chronological, 92; - geographical, hard to distinguish from chronological, 99, 100; - of plants and animals, 115; - spatial, anomalies of, 112, 113 - - Disuse, 286, 288, 290, 305, 306; - effects, alleged of, 288 - - Divergence, 9, 36, 39, 57 - - Divine action, vivifying matter, not a miracle, 187, 188 - - - Dog, 248, 255, 287 - - Dogmatism, evolutionary, 360 - - Dolphins, 80 - - Domination of intellect and will over organic powers, 235 - - Doubt, “scientific,” 198 - - Dragonflies, 115 - - Drone, 158 - - Drosophila, 17, 18, 19, 27, 85, 86; - melanogaster, 85, 86 - —gradations in eye-color, wing-length and pigmentation of, 85, 86 - - Dryopithecus, 270, 310, 311, 323, 345; - dentition of, 311, rhenanus, teeth, human-like, 323 - - Dualism, 174, 198, 199, 231, 233, 234, 351; - conscious and unconscious, of Descartes, 198; - hylomorphic, 174, 198, 231; - of emergence and resistance, 233, 234 _note_; - of potency and act, 199; - psychic and physical, of Descartes, 198; - psychophysical, 198, 231 - - Duckbill, 287 - - Duplication, 44, 45, 305; - chromosomal, 44, 45; - of organs, 305 - - Dynamic, 206 - - - Ear, 302, 304; - helix of, 304 - - Earth columns, 113 - - Earthworm, 250, 280 - - East Indies, 118 - - Echinodermata, 119, 121, 122 - - Education, 245, 256, 360; - responsible, 360 - - Educator, modern, 360 - - Effect, 176, 177 - - Eggs, 134, 156, 158, 159, 160, 255, 259, 278, 283; - of sea urchin, 159, 160; - unfertilized, 158; - reduced, 158; - unreduced, 158 - - Ego, 209, 210, 224; - the, 209, 210; - the thinking, 224 - - Egoism, 256 - - Egypt, 115, 337, 340 - - Electrolytes, 168 - - Electronic theory, 56 - - Electrons, 163, 174 - - Elements, radioactive, 180 - - Elephants, 111, 115, 315; - brain of, 315; - Siberian, sudden extinction of, 111 - - - Elephas: - antiquus, 317; - primigenius, 326 - - Embryologists, 136 - - Embryology, 141, 275, 276, 308; - comparative, 276; - experimental, 141 - - Embryonic additions, 276 - - Embryos, 276, 278, 279, 280, 281; - alleged fish-like stage of, 279, 280; - human, 278, 280, 283; - mammalian, 281, 283; - vertebrate, 281 - - Emergents, 233 _note_, 234 _note_ - - Energy-content, 174 - - Emotion, 214, 231, 246, 247; - functions of sensual appetite, 247; - a psycho-organic function, 214; - organic function, 231 - - Emperor moth, 267 - - Emulsifier, 169 - - Emulsion, 139, 168 - - Encasement, 3, 4 - - Encystment, 162 - - End, 254, 259 - - Endocrine glands, 292-295, 298; - not functionless, 295 - - Endomixis, 161, 162, 163, 178 - - Endoskeletal, 36 - - Energy, 172, 174; - content, 174; - defined, 172; - kinetic and potential, 172 - - Energy-environment, 168 - - Enlightenment, 244, 245 - - Entelechy, 172-175, 199, 200, 202, 210; - definition of, 200; - Aristotelian sense perverted by Driesch, 172; - a constant in living units, a variant in inorganic units, 175, - 200, 202, 210; - common to inorganic units and living organisms, 173, 174; - consubstantial with matter, 202; - entitive, not dynamic, 172, 201; - equivalent to static affinity or structural valence, 173; - inorganic, 174; - not an agent but a specifying type, 201 - - Entitive, 206 - - Environment, 6-9, 12-15, 42, 46, 152, 153, 174, 180-182, 261, 307; - cosmic, of life, 180, 181; - internal, 14, 15; - not a mechanism for molding organisms, 152, 153 - - Environmental conditions, 15, 16, 68, 123, 284 - - Environmental stimulus, 255 - - Enzymes, 143 - - Eoanthropus, 320, 322, 323, 342; - a combination of simian and human remains, 342; - Dawsoni, 320-323, 342; - jaw older than cranium, 322 - - Eocene, 115, 309, 313, 317; - Lower, 313; - Middle, 115 - - Eoliths, 154, 321 - - Eosin, a sensitizer, 147 - - Epeira, 248, 249 - - Epicyclic subterfuges, 110 - - Epigenesis, 3, 4 - - Epiphysis, 292 - - Equus, 5, 95, 113; - American and European, 113; - asinus, 5; - caballus, 5 - - Erosion, 105, 109 - - Eskimo, 330, 338; - language more complex than English, 338 - - Euphemisms, 351 - - Europe, 112, 113, 335 - - Eurypterids, 117 - - Events, 208 - - Evolution (active and passive) of life from inorganic matter, 132, - 133 - - Evolution (alleged) of human soul, 194, 195, 268, 352 - - Evolution (alleged) of human body, 268, 309, 343 - - Evolution, xi-xiv, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 17, 19, 20, 21, 28, 29, 31, 32, - 34, 43, 44, 45, 63, 66, 70, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 86, 90, - 92, 97, 105, 116, 117, 123, 124, 125, 131, 193, 194, 267, 268, - 291, 297, 304, 309, 325, 335, 339, 349-361; - aspects, moral and social, of, 353-361; - causes of, 2, 6; - evidence for, experimental, 3, 7, 8, 17, 28 - —inferential or circumstantial, 3, 8, 125 - —genetical, 8, 18, 28, 29 - —zoological, 8, 34, 66, 76 - —palæontological, 3, 8, 66, 74-76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 92, 97, 105, - 126; - fact of, 2, 86, 124, 126; - heliocentric theory not on a par with, xii, xiii, law of, 1, 123; - monistic basis of, 349-353; - necessary as hypothesis, not as - dogma, xi; - senses of, 2, 74, 75, 131; - spirit not a product of, 193, 194, 268; - systems of, 1, 29, 31, 349; - Augustinian, 32, 74, 75; - Batesonian, 18-21, 43, 44, 79; - monophyletic, 69, 70, 116, 117; - polyphyletic, 70; - progressive, 44, 45, 116 - - Evolutionary thought, crisis in, 3, 29 - - Evolutionists, 279 - - Exoskeletal, 36 - - Expediency, 291 - - Experience, 238, 241, 253, 256; - learning by, 241; - sensory, 238, 253 - - Experimentation, 197 - - Eye, 60, 205, 217, 283, 298; - a corporal element intrinsic to the visual sense, 217; - an example of convergence, 60; - constituent part of agent and subject of vision, 217; - human, defective, 298; - not replaced by telescope, 205; - vertebrate type of, 283 - - - Factorial, complex, 45 - - Factors, germinal (genetic, hereditary), 5, 6, 15, 17, 18, 19, 41, - 42, 44, 45, 68, 122, 151, 152, 174, 207, 291 - —diagnosis of, 122 - —fractionation of, 19 - —positive and inhibitive, 19; - environmental, 6, 41, 42, 68, 151, 152, 174, 207, 291 - —blind, 151, 152 - —of disuse and selection, 207 - - Facts, 205; - former cannot be formulated except with reference to ego, 205; - in terms denoting or connoting ego, 205; - intramental and extramental, 205 - - “Falsifications” of ancestral records, 276 - - Families, 37, 58; - chemical, 58 - - Family-tree, evolutionary, 58 - - Fats, 145 - - Faulting, 107, 108; - horizontal and vertical, 108; - “Low angle,” 107, 108; - normal, 108 - - Fayûm, the, 115 - - Feldhofer Grotte, 323, 324, 326 - - Felis leo fossilis, 319 - - Femur, 313, 316, 317, 324, 327, 330, 341; - not curved as in Neanderthal type, 341; - shows curvature, 327, 330 - - Ferns, 118 - - Fertilization, 42, 157, 159, 160 - - Filiation, 75 - - Finality, immanent law of, 174 - - First causes, 52, 71, 249 - - Fishes, 61, 270, 276, 279, 283, 296; - adult, 279, 283; - embryo of, 279 - - Fish-kidney, 302 - - Fission, binary, 156, 161; - unequal, 156; - multiple, 156 - - Fixism, 4, 32, 52, 69, 70, 72, 75, 119, 124, 268; - unable to furnish “natural” explanation of homology, 52; - uniformitarian, 69 - - Flat worms, 278 - - Flies, 134 - - Fluctuants, 87 - - Fluctuations, 10, 16, 29, 302, 333; - cause of, 10, 16; - instance of, 16; - non-inheritable, 10, 16 - - Fœtal life, special conditions of, 299 - - Fœtus, 301 - - Fonte de Gaume, 339 - - Foot-and-mouth disease, germ of, 183 _note_ - - Foramnifera, 118 - - Force, 172, 176; - defined, 172; - no special vital, 176 - - Forehead, 328, 330, 341; - higher, 328; - low, 341; - retreating, 330 - - Formaldehyde, 145-148; - not first step in origin of life nor in photosynthesis, 145-147 - - Formaldehyde-hypothesis, 145-148 - - Formaldoxime, 148 - - Formations, fossiliferous, 105 - - Formations, geological, 75, 84, 93, 95, 99, 100, 103, 105, 108, 118, - 119, 126; - time-value of, 84 - - Formed bodies of cell, self-perpetuating, 168 - - Formose, 145 - - Forms, 246, 275, 276, 312; - fossil, sequence of, 276 - —intermediate, 312; - grammatical, 246; - intermediate, none between man and apes, 275 - - Fortuitous result, 249 - - Fossil bones, 319 - - Fossil facts, 311 - - Fossiliferous stratification, universality of, 102 - - Fossil remains, human, 213 - - Fossils, 3, 81, 87, 88, 94, 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 107, - 110, 111, 112, 118, 309, 317, 334, 335; - dated by theory of descent, 334; - evade experimental breeding tests, 87, 88, 334; - no invariable sequence of, 99, 102; - reconstructed, 88; - still “medals of Creation,” 94; - time-value problematic, 98, 100, 101, 107, 110, 111, 112, 335 - - Foxhall Man, 309, 341, 342; - alleged to be Tertiary, 309, 341, 342; - flint implements prove intelligence of, 342; - no fossils of, 342 - - Freedom, human, 232; - of will, 232 - - Free will, a myth, 360, 361 - - Frescoes, 339, 340; - polychrome, 340; - primeval, 339, 340 - - Frog, 64, 281; - tadpole, 281 - - Fruit-flies, eyeless, 306; - vestigial, 306; - wingless, 306 - - Functions, 215, 216, 241, 276; - extrinsically dependent on organism, 215, 216; - sensitivo-nervous, 241; - superorganic, 215 - - Fundulus, 62 - - Future life, 354, 361; - a myth, 361; - of retribution, 354 - - - Gametes, 13, 14, 25, 156, 157, 158, 159; - production of, 25; - specialization of, for kinetic and trophic functions, 157, 158 - - Ganoids, 119, 120 - - Gar pike, 119 - - Gastrula, 159 - - Gelation, 168 - - Gemmation, 156 - - Geneology, 95, 113, 348; - hypothetical, 113; - of horse, 95; - of man, 348 - - Geneological tree of man, 348 - - Genera, 3, 4, 37, 78, 80, 81, 86, 92, 119, 312, 313; - fossil, 3, 4, 78, 80, 81, 86, 312, 313 - - Generalization, power of, 261 - - Generation, univocal and equivocal, 68, 69 - - Genes, 17, 18, 19, 25, 27, 42, 43, 44, 45, 79, 141, 162; - inhibitive, 18, 19, 42, 79, 162 - - Genetic cellular continuity, law of, no exception to, 163, 164 - - Genetic continuity, 142, 160, 165, 311; - fivefold law of, 142; - law of, 136, 160 - —may not prevail in submicroscopic world, 165 - - Geneticists, 89, 334 - - Genetics, 2, 3, 24, 36, 46 _note_, 56, 82, 88, 89, 121, 126, 141, - 302, 305, 334 - - Genital distrophy, 294 - - Genotype, 5, 41, 43, 123 - - Geodesists, 114 - - Geological column, 106, 117, 125, 126 - - Geological record, 72, 80-84, 92, 106, 111, 120, 125, 126, 127, 297; - damaged, 92; - enigmatic, 126, 127; - incomplete, 72, 80, 106; - incompleteness assumed to explain absence of intermediates, 83; - time-value presupposes its completeness, 82, 83, 111 - - Geologists, 100, 102, 113, 114, 117, 125, 181 - - Geology, xiv, 98, 107, 111, 117; - can only prove local order of succession, 111 - - Germ, 13, 155, 156, 182; - multicellular and unicellular, 155, 156 - - Germ cells, 13, 14, 16, 156, 157, 163 - - Germ plasm, 14, 25, 26, 41, 42, 45, 265, 303 - - Germ tract, 14 - - Germinal constitution, 87, 123 - - Gerrymandering, geological, 116 - - Giantism, 44, 294 - - Gibbon, 271, 274, 310, 314, 316 - - Gibraltar skull, 322 - - Gill arches and clefts, 278, 279 - - Gills, 70, 279; - permanent, 279 - - Glacial, 104 _note_, 289, 320, 327, 329, 330, 331, 332, 334; - deposits, 104 _note_; - epoch, 320, 332, 334 - —middle of, 332 - —close of, 332; - period, 289, 327, 329, 330, 331 - —fourth or last, 327, 329 - —close of, 331 - - Glaciation, 290 - - Glacier, continental, 287, 289 - - Glacier National Park, 108 - - Glaciologists, 289 - - Glands, 296, 304; - muciparous, 296; - supernumerary mammary, 304 - - Glaurus overthrust, 107 - - Globigerina, 118 - - Glucose, 145 - - Gluteal region, 273 - - Glyceraldehyde, 145 - - God, 180, 351; - admitted as hypothetical, 351; - Author of Life, 180; - impossible to prove existence of, 351 - - Golgi bodies, 140 - - Gonads, interstitial cells of, 292 - - Gondwana Land, 114, 115 - - Gorilla, 51, 270, 271, 272, 273, 314; - face of, 271; - skull of, 271 - - Gradation, 82, 87, 315; - morphological, 82; - of forms, 87; - series, 315; - temporal succession, 82 - - Gradual approximation, dogma of, 110 - - Grammar, “scientific” revision of, 205 - - Graptolites, 78, 100 - - Great Peacock Moth, 260 - - Grey Worm, 246 - - Grignard reaction, 209 - - Groups, 335 - - Gryphaea, 79 - - Guest, 49, 53 - - - Habit, 8, 265, 266, 267, 291, 328, 333, 334; - automatisms of, alleged to be source of instinct, 267; - body-modifying, 333 - —of squatting, 328; - modern, 334 - - Habitat, 99, 112, 182 - - Hæmoglobin, 148 - - Hallucinations, 235 - - Hallux, human, 50; - simian, 50 - - Halogens, 58 - - Haptophores, 57 - - Heidelberg Man, 318, 319, 320; - jaw anomalous, 319, 320 - - Hen, 259, 260 - - - Heredity, 5, 39, 54, 88; - alleged cause of homology, 39; - biparental, 5 - - Heterogametes, 158 - - Hererogamy, 158 - - Hererozygous, 25, 26, 27 - - Histogenesis, 59 - - History, 337, 338, 339; - contradicts evolutionary assumption, 337, 338; - dawn of, 337; - proves primitive man to have been civilized, not barbaric, 339 - - Homœomorphy, heterogenetic, 79 - - Homology, 8, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 46, 47, 48, 51, 54, 59, 60, 61, 63, - 64, 65, 77, 268, 276, 277, 278, 279, 284, 287, 292, 298, 308; - definition of, 35; - anatomical, 276, 279, 284, 308; - application to man, 34, 51, 268; - disguised by external diversity, 48; - embryological, 48, 278, 279, 284, 308; - evolutionary argument from, 34, 47 _note_, 48, 54, 63, 64, 65, 268, - 292; - genetic explanation of, 39, 40, 47 - - Homologous organs, 35, 61 - - Homo neanderthalensis, 333 - - Homo primigenius, 323, 330, 333, 334, 341, 342; - a variety, not a distinct species, 342; - same as Homo Mousteriensis, 330; - type, fluctional nature of, 341 - - Homo sapiens, 325, 330, 332, 333, 340, 342, 345; - only human species, 342 - - Homozygous, 25, 27 - - Horizon, 93, 94, 125, 310, 335; - level, 335; - stratigraphical, 93, 94; - stratigraphic, 125, 310, 335 - - Hormones 14, 292, 294, 295 - - Horse, 5, 78, 81, 82, 304, 332 - - Host, 49, 53 - - Hottentots, 325 - - Human, 224, 227, 256, 335, 341, 342, 345, 352; - fossils all belong to the species, Homo sapiens, 345; - mind - —alleged to be of animal extraction, 352 - —reflects, 224 - —spiritual, 227; - reason, 256; - remains more ancient than formations in which they are found, 335 - - Human body, 267, 304, 345; - evolution of, 267; - ignorance and uncertainty regarding origin, 345; - not a mosaic of heterogenetic organs, 304; - origin of, 345 - - Humanization of brute, subjective, 238 - - Humanizers of brute, Darwinian, 263 - - Human language attests reality of ego, 205 - - Human nature, 360; - Darwinian conception of, 360 - —evils of popularizing it, 360 - - Human Soul, 193, 194, 202, 203, 210, 213, 214, 215, 216, 225, 231, - 232, 233, 267, 268; - could only originate by creation, 267; - creation of, 193, 267; - discarnate, 202, 214 - —not a complete person or nature, 202; - exists for its own sake, 215; - immortal, 193; - intrinsically independent of organism, 202, 215, 225; - not an emergent of matter, 194 - —alone active in superorganic functions, 202, 214, 216; - same as mind, 203; - simplicity of, 210 - —not to be confounded with spirituality of, 210; - spirituality of, 193, 203, 214, 215, 216, 231, 232, 233, 233 _note_, - 268 - —proofs of, 214, 215, 216, 231 - —from rational thought and volition, 231, 232, 233, 233 _note_; - substantiality of, 210; - underivable from matter, 268 - - Hunter, life of, 328, 330 - - Hyaloplasm, 139, 141 - - Hybridism, constant, 25 - - Hybridization, 16, 26, 88; - interspecific and intervarietal, 26 - - Hybrids, 4, 5, 17, 25, 26, 27, 28, 84, 85, 87; - interspecific, sterile, 4, 5, 26, 27; - invarietal, 19, 20, 27, 28; - as intermediates, 84, 85 - - Hydrang, 44 - - Hydrogen, 175; - liquid, 184 _note_ - - Hydroglissia, 248 - - Hydrosol, 169 - - Hydrosphere, 113, 181 - - Hydrotheca, 78 - - Hydroxylamine, 148 - - Hyrozoa erroneously classified, 122 - - Hylobatic, 314, 316, 317, 318; - type, 318 - - Hylomorphic dualism, 198 - - Hylomorphic vitalism, does not discourage experimental analysis of - life, 201 - - Hylomorphism, 174 - - Hypogamete, 158 - - Hypertrophy, 289, 290, 294; - due to use, 289 - - Hypophysis, 292, 293, 294, 295; - not functionless, 294 - - - Ice Age, 98 - - Ichthyosaurs, 80 - - Igneous masses, not basal, 125 - - Illusions, 235 - - Imageless thought, sense of term, 219 - - Imagery, 214, 215, 218, 219, 220, 221, 228, 229, 241, 243; - a function of the living cerebral cortex, 221; - association of, 241; - cerebral, 218; - concrete, 220, 221; - different in different persons, 219; - distributed by abnormal state of cortex, 221; - motor, 214; - neurographic, 243; - represents only superficial and exterior properties, 219; - rigid, correlated with metabolic process at work in cerebral - cortex, 228, 229; - rigidly proportioned underlying neurogram, 215; - sensible, presupposed by thought and volition, 221; - shows corresponding degrees of integrity and intensity, 229; - sporadic and fragmentary, 229; - tactile, 214 - - Imagination, 213, 221, 222, 228, 229, 231; - cerebral sense, 222, 228, 229; - its normal exercise depends on physiological normality of cerebral - cortex, 221; - organic function, 231 - - Imaginative activity, 229 - - Immortality, considered an anodyne, 358 - - Immunity, 57 - - Immutibility, 50, 52 - - Impenetrability, 225; - of matter, law of, 225; - reflection opposed to, 225 - - Improvised structures, 281 _note_, 283 - - Incubation, purposeless, 259 - - Independent Assortment, Law of, 27 - - Index fossils, 93, 94, 96, 97, 100, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, - 112, 335, 339; - basis of stratigraphic correlation, 93, 94; - an arbitrary and elastic criterion, 94, 95; - final court of appeal, 93, 96, 97, 335; - in conflict with physical and stratigraphic evidence, 100, 104-112 - - India, 114 - - Indian dialects, work of philosophers, 338 - - Indian Ocean, 114, 115 - - Individuation, 220, 224; - concrete, 224 - - Indo-Europeans, 334 - - Industry, Mousterian, 326, 327, 329, 330, 331; - Acheulean, 331; - Aurignacian, 331 - - Inertia, defined, 174 - - Infusion, 193; - not supernatural, 193; - of spirit into matter, not a miracle, 193 - - Infantilism, 294 - - Inference, 221, 240; - mediate, 221 - - Infundibulum, 293 - - Infusoria, supposed abiogenetic origin of, 134 - - Inheritance, 2, 8, 9, 24, 27, 38, 40, 41, 42, 45, 56, 57, 62, 63, - 64, 75, 160, 294, 320; - definition of, 41; - biparental, 160; - chemical theory of, 57; - laws of, 2, 24, 27, 42; - similifying process, 40, 45 - —not only one, 56 - —also said to diversify, 63, 64; - variable, 75 - - Inhibition, 242, 252 - - Initial vivification, 133; - act, 133; - of matter required a formative, 133; - rather than creative, 133 - - Inquilines, 46 - - Insectivora, 275 - - Insects, 225, 307; - evolutionary diminuendo of, 116; - wingless, 307 - - Instinct, 238, 240, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 256, 257, 259, - 263, 264, 265, 267, 291, 343, 361; - defined, 255, 256; - James’ definition of, - 249; - according to external circumstances, 250-252; - according to physiological state of organism, 250; - adjustment of, 250, 252; - constructive, 251; - effective only under normal circumstances 258; - evolutionary origin of, 267 - —improbable, 267; - fixity of, 258; - improbability of, 267; - its regulatory principal sense, 254; - not gradually acquired, 263, 264; - not intelligence, 254; - only slightly undefiable, 256; - origin of, 263; - psychic regulation of, 249; - requires no apprenticeship, 256; - teleology of, 249; - telic, 259; - variability of, 250 - - Instinctive acts, 256 - - Instruction, 244, 245 - - Instrumentation, 197 - - Intellect, 220, 221, 224, 226-230, 339; - active, 220, 221; - activity of, 221; - cognitive, 220, 221; - conscious of its own operations, 226, 227; - indirectly dependent on physiological condition of cortex, 221; - its immaterial nature, 224; - objectively dependent on organic activity of imagination, 221; - not bound to material organ, 226; - not debilitated by intense thinking, 227, 228; - not incapacitated but invigorated by intense thinking, 228; - not regulated by physiological vicissitude, 229; - not subject to metabolic laws, 230; - rooted in a spiritual principle, 227; - superorganic nature of, 227 - - Intellectual, 228, 229, 230; - activity may reach highest points of concentration and intensity - without involving commensurate fatigue on part of organism, 228 - - Intelligence, 239-241, 243, 245, 247, 248, 249, 254, 256, 257, 259, - 262, 263, 267, 329, 330, 340, 343, 350; - definition of, 239; - autonomous, 259; - a generalizing and abstracting power, 257; - “bestial,” 245, 247, 257; - conscious, 240; - deceptive semblance of, 240, 241; - Divine, 249; - etymology of, 239; - finite, 249; - genuine, 240, 241; - infinite, 248, 249; - incapable of being evolved from matter, 267; - inherent, 249, 256, 259, 267; - of worker bees, 267; - subjective or inherent, 248, 249; - used to denote power of profiting by experience, 239, 240 - - Intensity, 227, 230; - does not increase in same proportion as intensity of stimulus, 227; - may reach maximum with involving corresponding fatigue, 230; - of thought does not follow fluctuations of neural metabolism, 230 - - Interactionism, 206 - - Interaction, three types of, 175 - - Interglacial period, 329; - last, 329 - - Intergradation, 87 - - Intergradence, 84-87; - may indicate hybridism, 84, 85; - no argument for common ancestry, 84-86; - of mutants genetically independent, 85, 86 - - Intergradents, 85, 86; - hybrid, 85, 86; - mutational, 85, 86; - specific, 85, 86 - - Interjections, negligible part of human language, 247 - - Interpretation, ontogenetic, an alternative for phylogenetic, 302 - - Intervals, 105; - lost, unrepresented by deposition, erosion or disturbance, 105 - - Intravitous staining, 143 - - Introspection, 204, 205, 212, 225; - does not create personality, 212; - impossible to a material organ, 225 - - Intrusions, igneous, 125 - - Invertebrate, 293, 294; - stage, 293, 294 - - Involution, 160 - - Iron, 148 - - Irrational man unknown either to history or prehistory, 340 - - Islands, 153 - - Islets of Langerhans, 292 - - Isobares, 172 - - Isogametes, 157 - - Isogamy, 157 - - Isomers, 173 - - Isostacy, 113, 114 - - Isostatic equilibrium, 114 - - - Jacob’s Cavern, in Missouri, 340 - - Java, 313 - - Jaw, 331, 340; - lower, 331; - lower missing, 340 - - Jimson Weed, 21, 22 - - Judgment, 207, 220 - - Jupiter, 184 - - Jura, 103 - - Jura, European, 96, 106 - - Jurassic, 117 - - - Kena Kakoe, 346-348; - extinct volcano, 346 - - Kidney, 280-283; - adult, 282; - embryonic, 283; - fish, 280, 282; - mammalian, 280; - permanent, 281, 284 - - Kiluea, observatory at volcano of, 346 - - Kingdom, animal, 249 - - Kleistogamy, 159 - - Knowledge, 190, 191, 221, 256; - conceptional, 221; - experimental, 256; - technical, absence of, does not always disqualify, 190, 191 - - Krapina, 330, 332; - type of, 330 - - - Laboratory syntheses differ from those occurring in organism, 150 - - La Chapelle-aux-Saints remains, 232, 330-333 - - Lamarckism, 6, 7, 13, 15, 16, 24, 29, 46 _note_, 53, 67, 78, 79, - 263, 265, 266, 291; - recent revival of, 266 - - Lamps, 340 - - La Naulette remains, 326, 332; - alleged to be distinct species, 332; - absence of chin, 326; - allied to Neanderthal type, 326 - - Land bridges, 112 - - Language, 245, 246, 247, 330, 338, 339; - descriptive, conceptual and articulate, 246, 247; - first step in formation of, 245; - formation of, presupposes an artist as great as his works, 339; - human, 246, 247; - indicative, emotional and articulate, 247, 256; - of animals, 245, - 246, 247; - of savage races point to former civilization, 330 - - La Quina, industry of, 331 - - Law, definition of, 166, 167 - - Law of Weber, 227 - - “Learning” of animals, 243 - - Le Moustier, 329, 332; - remains, 322, 326, 329, 330 - - Lemuroids, 275 - - Lemurs, 312 - - Lepontine Alps, 109 - - Lethals, balanced, 25-28 - - Lias, 119 - - Liberalism, 257 - - Life, 133, 142, 144, 145, 154, 165, 176, 177, 181, 182, 186, 187, - 188, 203; - organic, definition of, 176, 177; - active cause of extramundane, 181, 182; - alleges submicroscopical units of, 165; - Author of, 186, 187; - conscious, 203; - initiation of, not a creation, 186, 187 - —not a miracle, 187, 188 - —not supernatural, 187, 188; - integrating and formative principle of, 144; - metabolic, sentient and rational, 203; - more than a chemical problem, 142; - origin of, 133 - chemical hypothesis, 145 - —not a problem of translation, 182; - spontaneous origin of, 154 - - Life-cycle, 69, 112, 138, 155, 156, 160 - - Lima, 118 - - Limit of microscopic vision, 140 - - Limulus polyphemus, 119 - - Lingula, 118 - - Linin, 139 - - Links, 84, 86, 312, 313, 315, 323, 341, 342; - connecting, 315, 323 - —between men and apes, 312; - connecting, so called are (a) human, (b) simian, (c) mixed - remains, 342; - generic and ordinal, insufficient, 86; - “missing,” 341; - specific, minimum, 86; - transitional, 84 - —none between man and apes, 313 - - Linkage groups, 17 - - Lithosphere, 113, 114, 181 - - Litopterna, 78 - - Living beings derive their matter from inorganic world, 123 - - - Living matter, 143, 171; - its uniqueness, a simple fact, 171; - maintains its specific type, 143 - - Lizards, 292 - - Loess, 326, 327 - - Logarithmic spiral, 248 - - Locomotion, mechanism of, 270 - - Logic, 198, 220, 245; - of scepticism, 198; - of thought, escapes our imagery, 220; - saltatory, 245 - - Loss, 352, 353; - of artistic taste by Darwin, 352, 353 - - Lucina, 118 - - Lumpers, 37 - - Lumping, 121 - - Lychnis diurna and vespertina, 84 - - Lycosa, 247, 263 - - Lycosids, 247, 263-265 - - Lymphatic glands, stimulated by digestive process, 301 - - Lymphatic system, adjuncts of, 300 - - Lymphatic vessels, 300 - - Lymph nodules, 300 - - Lymphocytes, 300, 301 - - Lymphoid cells, follicle, 299 - - - Macrogamete, 157, 158 - - Macrosomes, 139 - - Madeira, 306 - - Magalenians, 332 - - Maggots, 134 - - Magnesium, 146, 147, 148 - - Mammal, 46, 59, 60, 72, 73, 100, 115, 116, 275, 280, 282, 283, - 296, 304, 324, 342; - age of, 342; - early, 324; - evolutionary “crescendo” of, 116 - - Mammalian stock, 82 - - Mammoth, 91, 115, 326 - - Man, 192, 193, 212, 236, 271, 290, 340, 341, 343; - bestial, 340; - brutalization of, 236; - destitute of instincts, 343; - face of, 27; - indications of his physical presence always accomplished by signs - of intelligence, 340; - left defenceless by nature, 343; - modern, 341; - more than a decaying organism, 212; - never found apart from evidence of his intelligence, 343; - physically helpless, 343; - skull of, 271; - unique - in his soul, not in his body, 192, 193 - - Mantids, 247 - - Marattia, 118 - - Mars, 184 - - Marsoulas, caves of, 339 - - Marsupial, 114, 296 - - Mason bee, 251, 254, 260 - - Mastodons, 115, 340; - “prehistoric,” engraving of, 340 - - Material, 193, 194, 207, 214; - functions, 214; - organism coöperates intrinsically in organic substrate, 224; - sense of term, 193, 194; - substance, inaccessible to senses, 207 - - Materialism, 178, 199, 212, 214, 236, 352, 355, 357, 358, 361; - a purely academic philosophy, 211; - attempt to gloss over, 207; - Darwinian, 236; - evolutionary, 360, 361; - its destructive effect on religion, ideals and morality, 361; - parasitic, 358 - - Materialistic, 207, 351-356, 357; - philosophy ignores active rôle of mind, 207; - view of human nature unnatural and intolerable—complete and - consistent application impossible, 357; - view make morality unthinkable—antisocial, 351-356 - - Material organ cannot be effected by the supersensible, 222 - - Matterhorn, 109 - - Materialist, 230 - - Materialists, many evolutionists are avowed, 351 - - Matter, 71, 173, 174, 179, 181, 186, 194, 199, 200, 204, 210; - a constant in inorganic units, 175; - a source of indeterminism, 71; - a variant in living organisms, 175; - constant in chemical reactions, variant in metabolism, 199, 200, - 210; - does not coincide with sum total of reality, 186; - initial vivification of, due to supermaterial agency, 179; - inorganic, 181; - not more real than mind, 204; - notions of, 200; - ponderable and imponderable, 194 - - Maturity, 155 - - Mauer, 318 - - Mayflies, 115 - - Means, 254, 259 - - Measles, invisible germ of, 169 - - Mechanics, 350 - - Mechanism, 153, 154, 171, 179, 250; - environmental, 153; - teleological but simple, 153, 154 - - Mechanist, 58, 200, 204, 351; - many evolutionists are avowed, 351 - - Mechanistic universe, 350 - - Media, 136 - - Medium, vibrant, 213 - - Meganeura monyi Brogn, 115 - - Meiosis, 25, 42, 157 - - Melia, 261 - - Melocrinidae, 92 - - Membrana nictitans, 296, 297; - not functionless, 297 - - Memory, 213, 238, 242, 243; - associative, 238; - sensitive, 242, 243; - sentiment, 238, 242 - - Men, 318, 325, 328, 329; - and apes, link between, 318 - —intermediate between, 318; - fossil, 325; - of Krapina, 325, 328, 329 - - Mendelism, 3, 24, 25, 26, 28, 42, 46, _note_, 57, 349 - - Mental protuberance, 272 - - Mental states, 205 - - Merosthenic, 270 - - Mesonephric duct, 281, 282 - - Mesonephros, 280, 281, 282, 284 - - Mesozoic, 73, 104 _note_, 118, 119, 335; - lowest series of, 119; - middle system of, 119 - - Metabolism, 57, 139, 210, 211, 227, 228; - destructive and constructive, 137 - - Metagenesis, 122 - - Metamorphosis, 123, 283 - - Metamorphism, 89, 126; - of rocks, 126 - - Metanephros, 280, 282 - - Metaphysical, 351 - - Metaphysics, 152, 185, 231, 349, 350, 351, 352; - Epicurian, 152; - monistic, 349; - vs. physical science, 352 - - Metaphytes, 136 - - Metazoa, 118 - - Metazoans, 136, 170, 284 - - Meteorites, 182, 183 - - - Metista, 5, 59, 136, 156, 157, 159, 163 - - Microgamete, 158 - - Microns, 183 - - Microörganism, 169, 183 - - Microsomes, 139 - - Migrations, 72, 76, 112 - - Millennium, 358 - - Mimicry, 246 - - Mind, 195, 196, 198, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 211, 222, 223, 249; - active and passive, 207; - apprehends material objects under dematerialized form, 223; - a substance, 207; - connotation of, 203; - cannot utilize coöperation of material organ in abstract - conceptions, 223; - frame of, 211; - human, 249; - of man alleged to be of animal extraction, 195, 196; - phenomenalistic notion of, 209; - science of, 197; - states of, not less real than states of matter, 204; - noumenal, 198 - - Minimum, 238, 349, 350; - an empirical rule, not an axiom, 350; - principle of, 238, 349, 350 - - Miocene, 95, 310, 323; - Upper, 95 - - Miracle, definition of, 187 - - Miraculous, 69, 351-356, 357 - - Mitachondria, 140 - - Mitosis, 59, 138, 139, 155 - - Modification, 7, 41, 42, 45, 46, 51, 77, 80, 123, 307, 327, 334; - adaptive, 45, 46, 51, 80; - environmentally-induced, 123; - heritable, 42, 45, 307; - non-inheritable, 334; - parallel, 77, 80; - product of variation, 41; - of specific magnitude, 7; - of varietal magnitude, 7 - - Moeritherium, 115 - - Molars, 313, 322; - teeth, 322 - - Mole, 36, 80, 291, 305 - - Mole-cricket, 36, 80 - - Molecule, 57, 58, 143, 144, 162, 167, 170, 175, 202, 203; - biophoric, 57; - complex, 202; - complex endothermic, 162; - living and dead, 143; - structure of, 58 - - Molluscs, 117, 118, 119, 123, 278, 283 - - Mongolian, 324, 325, 334; - cossack, 324 - - - Monism, 350, 351, 352, 359; - destructive of culture, spirituality, morality, 350; - fail to motivate Christian morality, 358; - makes God immanent in world, 359; - makes will law unto itself, 359; - materialistic, 350, 352 - - Monist, 350 - - Monistic view vitiates artistic taste, 352 - - Monkey, 270, 275 - - Monomolecules, 165; - are not units, 165 - - Monotremeta, 296 - - Montana, 107 _note_ - - Moral consequences of failure to discriminate, 360 - - Morality, 354, 360; - evolutionary conception of, 360 - - Motor-verbalist, 219 - - Morphogenetic forces, 58, 284; - Laws, uniform, 284 - - Morphogeny, organic, 298 - - Morphology, embryonic and adult, 284 - - Mountain columns, 113 - - Mountains, 113, 153 - - Mouse, brain of, 315 - - Moustier Cave, 329 - - Movements, 241, 242; - reflex, 242; - spontaneous, 241, 242. - - Mule, 5 - - Müllerian duct, 281 - - Multimolecule, 58, 144, 162, 165, 166, 168, 170, 179; - are not units, 165; - colloidal, 166; - crystalloidal, 165, 166; - not a link between molecules and cells, 179; - structure of, 58 - - Murder, as an experiment, 359 - - Muscles, 298 - - Mutants, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 87; - chromosomal, 17, 21, 22, 23 - —balanced and unbalanced, 21, 22 - —balance, odd and even, 22 - —status as “new species” not established, 23; - factorial, 17, 18, 19, 20; - pseudo, 17, 27 - - Mutation, 16, 16 _note_, 26, 42, 86, 88, 122, 265, 303, 305, 307, - 334; - changes of loss, 18, 43; - chromosomal, 17, 42, 44, 45, 88; - factorial, - 19, 20, 42, 44, 45, 88, 305, 334 - —a varietal, not a specific change; fortuitous, 265; - heritable, 16, 303, 334; - pseudo, 17, 42, 88 - - Mutation, 16, 20, 46; - Theory, 16, 20 - - Myxœdema, 294 - - - Nahun beds, 95 - - Natural explanations, 69, 70 - - Naturalism borrows moral standards, 358 - - Natural process, 69, 74 - - Natural science, 186 - - Natural Selection, 9, 11, 12, 13, 29, 30, 152, 153, 305, 306, 350; - a theory of chance, 11, 350; - has no positive efficacy, 153; - theory has impeded progress of science, 13 - - Nature, 151, 185; - inorganic impotent to duplicate even laboratory synthesis, not - to speak of vital phenomena, 151 - —lacks means of self-vivification, 185; - not automatic, 151 - - Nautilus, 118, 283 - - Neanderthal, 314, 315, 317, 325, 326, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 335, - 337, 342; - bone, show some racial characteristics, 329; - cranium, 331, 332 - —capacity underestimated, 333, not ancestral to Cro-Magnon type, 335; - not more ancient than modern type, 337; - remains, 325, 332 - —human, 325; - skull, cranial capacity of, 314, 325; - type of, 330, 332 - - Neanderthal Man, 314, 315, 317, 323, 326, 341, 342; - distinctly human, 342; - a dwarf, 314; - No. 1, 323, 326; - divided opinion on, 324; - No. 2, skeleton, 326 - —skull missing, 326 - - Neanderthal type, 326, 330, 332, 333, 334, 336; - alleged to be distinct species, 332; - alleged to be more ancient, 334; - degenerate, 336; - differences, 334; - race, 334; - no longer considered oldest type, 336 - - Neanderthaloid, 328, 333, 341, 343; - characteristics occur in modern skulls, 333; - race, 343; - skulls, modern features occur in, 333 - - Nebular, hypothesis, 181 - - Negroes, 334 - - Neo-Darwinism, 10 - - Neo-Kantian, 203, 219; - phenomenalist, 203 - - Neo-Lamarkism, 10, 12, 15 - - Neolithic, 332 - - Neontologists, 76 - - Neotoma, 307 - - Neo-vitalism, 171, 201, 202; - postulates a unique force, an agent “sui generis,” 171 - - Neo-vitalists, 58, 200, 201; - regard vital principle as force “sui generis,” a unique agent, - 200, 201 - - Nephridia, 280 - - Neptune, 184 - - Nerve plasm, 265 - - Neurograms, 213, 214, 222; - extended, 222; - imprinted on neurons, 213, 214; - objects capable of stimulating an extended organ, 222; - objects of, endowed with concrete properties, 222; - proportioned to stimuli, 222; - physical basis of imagery, 214, 222 - - Neurons, 213, 222, 350; - sensory and central, 213; - utility of sensory, 222 - - New names for fossil duplicates of modern species, 119, 120 - - New Stone Age, prehistoric, 337 - - Nihilism, philosophical, 350 - - Nitrogen snow, 183 _note_; - reddish light of, 184 _note_ - - Non-cosmopolitan species, 283 - - Non-enents, 309 - - Non-opposability of human hallux, 50 - - Non-phenomenon or substance, 209 - - Non-specialist, when disqualified and when not, 189-191 - - Non-viable, 25 - - Novelty, emergent, 350 - - Nuclear components, self-perpetuating, 139 - - Nuclear reorganization, 155, 160, 161, 162; - a restorative process, - 155, 161; - means of rejuvenation, 161; - none in somatogenic reproduction, 160; - periodic, 162; - primitive, 162 - - Nuclear sap, 139 - - Nucleus, 137, 138, 161; - cellular, 138; - daughter, 161; - distributed, 138; - germinal, 161; - parent, 161 - - Nucula, 118 - - Nutrition, a reflexive activity, 175 - - - Object, 217, 223, 224; - concurrence of, extrinsic, 217; - indicated spiritual nature of mind, 224; - (material) abstract, made of representation, 224; - of abstract thought, incapable of making impressions or leaving - records on material receptors, 223 - - Occipital foramen, 272 - - Occiput, broad, 332 - - Ocean beds, elevation of, 114, 115 - - Ocean bottoms, 113-115 - - Ocean floor, 115 - - Octopus, 64 - - Œnothera, 16, 17, 27, 28; - gigas, 17; - Lamarkiana, 27, 28 - - Œsophagus, invertebrate, 293 - - Old Stone Age, 332, 337, 339, 340; - class of, 332; - prehistoric, 337 - - Oligocene, 309, 317 - - Onion-coat, 99, 102, 103, 109; - a convenient device, 109; - Alpine, 109; - hypothesis of, 102, 103 - —“transcendental form of,” 102; - lithological and biological, 102; - mineral envelopes, 102; - theory, 99 - - Ontogeny, 39, 79, 275, 285 - - Oölites, 79 - - Opisthonephros, 280, 282 - - Opposability of simian hallux, 50 - - Opposition, 218, 219, 234, 235; - between imagery and thought, 218, 219; - between psycho-organic and spiritual activity, 234, 235; - entails distinction, 235 - - Orang-utan, 33, 271 - - Orders, 37 - - Organ, 222, 226, 276, 286, 287, 288, 292, 298, 300, 303; - embryonic, 276; - functionless, 286, 287, 292; - incapable of reflection, 226; - material, cannot be effected by the supersensible, 222; - nascent and rudimentary, 287, 288; - distinction, arbitrary, 288; - reduced, 286, 287; - vestigial, 292, 300, 303; - useless, 286 - - Organelles, 139 - - Organic activity, rigidly regulated by metabolism, 228 - - Organic functions, 203, 213, 215; - agent and subject of, not soul alone, 203; - not only functions in man, 215 - - Organic substances, 149, 150; - laboratory synthesis of, 149, 150; - not to confounded with living or organized substances, 150 - - Organisms, 154, 155, 163, 201, 202, 203, 246; - a product of the law of Complexity, 167; - multicellular, 155; - none subcellular, 154; - of some species, syntonic, 246; - participates as coefficient factor in physiological and sensory - functions, 203; - soul-informed, 203; - unicellular, 154, 163 - - Organization, 143, 150; - elude art of chemist, 150 - - Order, 209; - ideal, phenomenalists confuse it with real order of things, 209; - real, of things, 209 - - Ordivician, 111 - - Orientation of forces, centrifugal and centripetal, 179 - - Origins, 71, 83, 161, 220, 221, 360; - biparental, 161; - common, 81 - —of man and brute, 360; - organic, need not be unified in space but should be in time, 71; - of concepts, 220, 221 - - Orneau, river, 326; - valley, 327 - - Ornithorhynchus, 59, 287 - - Ornithosaurs, 80 - - Orthogenesis, 6, 7, 46 _note_, 53; - cannot explain adaptation, 53 - - Osmia, 252 - - Outcrop, 93 - - Overthrust, 98, 107, 110; - a triumph of modern research, 107 - - Ovists, 160 - - Oximes, 148 - - Oxychromatin, 139 - - Oysters, 79 - - - Palæobotany, 117 - - Palæolithic, 327, 328, 330, 333, 343; - artists, 343; - human remains, 330; - man, 328, 333 - - Palæontological argument, 66-127; - defects in, 75, 124; - in abstract, 66-75; - in concrete, 75-127; - a theoretical construction, 126 - - Palæontological evidence, 3, 8, 66, 74-80, 83, 89, 97, 105, 107, - 124, 311, 312; - imperfection of, 89; - rated as outweighing physical evidence, 97, 107 - - Palæontological pedigrees, 3, 76, 78, 81, 82, 84, 126; - definition of, 81; - of horse, 76, 78, 81, 82, 126; - camel, 126, - and elephant, 126 - - Palæontologists, 76, 86, 87, 88, 91, 119, 190, 310, 313, 321, 334, - 344; - incompetent to decide questions of specific origin or - distinction, 87, 88, 89, 334 - - Palæontology, 3, 82, 83, 88, 92, 95, 96, 114, 119, 126, 195, 311, - 312, 313, 344; - facts of, 83, 195; - ignorant concerning origin of man, 344; - orthodox, 95, 96, 119 - - Palæotherium, 76 - - Palæozoic, 73, 108, 117, 118, 124 _note_, 125, 335 - - Palingenesis, 277, 288 - - Pan-Pacific Conferences, 344, 346 - - Panspermia, 182 - - Parallelism, 57, 58; - _vs._ divergence, 57 - - Paramœcium, 138, 161, 178; - aurelia, 138 - - Parasites, 46, 53 - - Parasitism, 52 - - Parathyroids, 292 - - Parent cell, 156 - - Parthenogenesis, 158, 159, 160, 162; - artificial, 159, 160 - —not violation of law of genetic continuity, 159, 160 - - Pathology, 141 - - Patient, 176, 177 - - Pear-tree, 6, 88 - - Pebrine, 44 - - Pecking instinct of chicks, 256 - - Pecten, 118 - - Pedigrees, of genera, 84 - - Pelopæus, 260 - - Penguin, wings of, 287 - - Pentacrinus, 119 - - Perception, 208, 212, 253; - an act of, 208; - of personality, not personality, 212; - sensory, 253 - - Percepts, objective, 235; - sensory, 219 - - Periodicity, 56; - of elements, 56; - families of elements, 56 - - Peri Psyches, Aristotle’s, 196, 197, 215 - - Perissodactyla, 78 - - Permian, 104, 118 - - Persistence, 116, 119, 123; - cannot be subsumed under same principles as transmutations, 123; - its significance intensified by current theories, 123; - of types, 119; - of unchanged types, 116 - - Persistent types, generic and specific, 123 - - Personal identity, sense of, 212 - - Personality, 205, 211, 212, 238; - a unitary and uniform reality, 212; - alternating, 211; - based on unchanging principle, 212; - perception of, 212 - - Pessimism, 355, 357 - - Petit-Puymoyen, industry of, 331 - - Phæophytin, 147 - - Pharyngeal arches and clefts, 278, 279 - - Phase, reversal of, 168, 169 - - Phenomena, 208, 209; - phenomenalists’ substantialization of, 209 - - Phenomenalism, 207, 208, 211, 212; - a purely academic philosophy, 211; - identifies mind with “thought stream,” 212 - - Phenomenalistic school, 206 - - Phenomenalists, 203, 205, 206, 207; - inconsistently admit of physical phenomena while denying subject - of psychic phenomena, 206, 207 - - Phenotype, 5, 19, 25, 27, 41, 43, 68, 123 - - Philology, 339; - proves primitive man to have been civilized, not barbaric, 339 - - Philosophers, 220 - - Philosophy, 189, 190, 195; - in rôle of critic, 189; - in rôle of sycophant, - 190; - materialistic, 195; - relation to science, 189 - - Phonetic elements, 246 - - Photosynthesis, 146 - - Phycocyanin, 149 - - Phylogeny, 39, 80, 122, 275, 276, 284, 285, 308; - human, 285, 308; - palæontological, 115 - - Phylum, 37, 38, 69, 116 - - Physical impressions, 213 - - Physical science, 352, 354 - - Physicochemical action, reducible to interaction between unequally - energized masses and particles, 175 - - Physicochemical forces, executive factors in vital operations, 201 - - Physiology, 350 - - Phytol, 147 - - Picotee sweet pea, 19 - - Piltdown skull, 320 - - Pineal eye, 292 - - Pineal gland, 292, 293, 295; - not functionless, 293 - - Pioneer colonies, 110 - - Pithecanthropus, distinctly simian, 342 - - Pithecanthropus erectus, 309, 313-318, 342; - cranial capacity of, 314; - a giant ape, 315; - existing casts inaccurate, 318 - - Pituitary body, 292, 293 - - Pituitrin, 294 - - Placenta, 276 - - Planarian, 278 - - Planetesimal, hypothesis, 181 - - Plantigrade, 272 - - Plastids, 139, 141 - - Platycrinidae, 92 - - Platyrhine monkeys, 287 - - Pleistocene, 78, 100, 104, 313, 319, 320, 325; - Lower, 313, 320; - Middle, 319 - - Pleurotomaria, 118 - - Plica, semilunaris, 297 - - Pliocene, 78, 95, 309, 313, 317, 323; - Upper, 309, 313, 317 - - Pluteus, 159 - - Polar body, second, 159 - - Polariscope, 144 - - Polymorphism, 122 - - Polynesians, 325 - - Polynuclear condition, 138 - - Polyphemus, the Cyclops, 293 - - Pompilids, 247, 248, 263, 264 - - Pompilius, 247, 261 - - Popular trust not to be abused, 345, 346 - - Postauricular muscles, 304, 305 - - Post-glacial time, 289 - - Preadaptations, 46, 47, 52, 53, 63, 124, 279; - adventitious appearance of, 46, 47; - divergent, 279; - entail modifications of specific magnitude, 47; - evolution as “natural explanation” of, 53; - inherited, 47 - - Pre-Cambrian, 100, 116, 118, 125; - terranes, 125 - —extension great, 125 - - Preformation, 3, 160 - - Prehension, 50, 271, 272 - - Prehistoric, 337 - - Prehuman, arboreal stage, 309, 217 - - Presupposition, latent in materialistic logic, 186 - - Pre-tertiary, 312 - - Primates, 308 - - Primitive man, 338, 342, 343; - not irrational, 342, 343; - not a savage, 338 - - Primula, 19 - - Principles, 171, 172; - entitive and dynamic, 171, 172 - - Priocnemis, flavicornis, 248 - - Priority, 76; - a “sine qua non” condition of ancestry, 76 - - Process, 206, 209, 225; - divorced from agents, 209; - of reflection entails identity of observer and observed, 225; - subjectless and sourceless, of phenomenalists, 206 - - Prognathic face, 332 - - Prognathism, 325, 330, 333, 341; - of upper jaw accentuated, 341 - - “Progress,” 355, 359; - modern, 359; - of science, 355 - - Progression, 50, 271, 272, 317; - bipedal, 272; - modes of, 271, 317 - - Prehistory, undocumented, unreliable, 340 - - Pronephric duct, 281 - - Pronephros, 280, 281 _note_ - - Prophylaxis, 356 - - - Propliopithecus, 309, 311 - - Prosthenic, 271 - - Protein, 140, 144, 145, 147, 151; - multimolecule of, 140 - - Proterotheres, 78 - - Proterotheriidæ, 78 - - Proterozoic, 104 _note_, 117 - - Protista, 5, 59, 136, 138, 156, 157, 163; - polynuclear condition not rare among, 138 - - Protoplasm, 141, 143, 144, 151, 160, 161, 175, 181; - dead, 143; - how reinvigorated, 160, 161; - invisible structure, 141; - not a chemical compound but a complex system, 142, 143; - persistent specificity of, 144; - ultramicroscopic structure of, 143; - visible, a picture of, 141 - - Protococcus, 151; - viridis, 151 - - Protons, 103, 174 - - Protophytes, 135, 136 - - Protoplasmic architecture, 174 - - Protozoa, 117, 118, 135, 136, 170 - - Psyche, 179, 200 - - Psychic, 198, 205, 230, 233; - and physical dualism of Descartes, 198; - functions, 205, 233 - —of organic type, 233; - states, correlated with organic states, 230 - - Psychology, 196, 197, 198, 204, 205, 208, 211, 235, 236, 361; - alone competent to pronounce origin of man, 196; - as science of behavior, 198; - human, 235; - positive, 361; - reveals psychic activities as modification of abiding ego, 205; - sole science that studies man on his distinctively human side, 196; - vulgar, 236; - without a soul, 208, 236 - - Psychophysical, 198, 206, 236; - dualism, 198; - parallelism, 206, 236 - - Psychosis, 213, 235, 255, organic, 213, 235 - —has for agent and recipient the psycho-organic composite, 213; - psycho-organic, 255 - - Physiological process not reducible to mere physicochemical - reaction, 199 - - Potency, 199 - - Purpose, 11, 249, 255, 258, 259, 298; - Divine, 249; - unconscious of, 255, 259 - - Purposiveness, 248, 249, 262; - no intelligence, 262; - objective, 248, 249; - unconscious, 248 - - - Quadrumana, 296 - - Qasr-el-Sagha, 115 - - Quaternary, 98, 319; - Early, 319 - - - Races, 334, 342 - - Radiation, pressure of, 183 - - Radioactive elements, 56 - - Radio-activity, 118 - - Radiolaria, 118 - - Radiometer, 183 - - Radius, shows curvature, 327 - - Ragweed, 16 - - Raft of Red River, 154 - - Random Assortment, 27, 42; - of chromosomes, 27 - - Ratio, body-brain, 317 - - Rays, 119 - - Reactants, 209 - - Reaction, 243, 252; - elementary, motor, 252; - historical basis of 243 - - Reaction-systems, 26, 204 - - Reason, 235, 240, 244, 245, 259, 267, 343; - not evolved, 267; - sole means of human preservation, 343; - superorganic power of, 244, 245 - - Reasoning, 207, 220 - - Recapitulation, 48, 275, 278, 279, 285; - embryonic, 48, 275, 278, 279 - - Receptors, 57, 213, 222; - extended, necessary to perceive material stimuli, 222 - - Recessive chin, 311 - - Recognition, 207 - - Recombination, 27, 42; - chromosomal, 27; - factorial, 27 - - Reconstructions, 89, 90, 92, 321; - of fossil skulls, 321; - psychological motivation of, 89, 90; - scientific, 89, 90, 92 - - Recuperation, autonomous, 163 - - “Recurrent faunas,” 110 - - Reduction, 42, 157 - - Reflection, 224, 225, 226, 240, 256; - a fact, 225, 226; - alleged impossibility of, 225; - only possible to spiritual agent, 224; - undeniable fact of, 225 - - Reflexes, innate and conditioned, 238 - - Reflexion, 225 - - Reflexive orientation, 174, 176; - of energies, no living being, 176; - of forces in living organism, 174; - in living being, 201 - - Regression of organ, 305 - - Regulation, 253; - intelligent, 253; - sensory, 253 - - Rejuvenation, 155, 161, 163; - three kinds of, 161 - - Rejuvenescence, 160, 161, 162 - - Reign of Terror, 357; - French, 357; - Russian, 357 - - Reindeer, 332 - - Re-integration of atoms, impossible, 163 - - Relationships, 254; - causal and telic, 254; - supersensible, 254 - - Religion, 354, 361; - only sanction of morality, 361 - - Remains, Javanese, 318 - - Repair-work, 251, 252 - - Reproduction, 5, 24, 25, 26, 56, 68, 69, 137, 141, 156, 157, 158, - 159, 161; - biparental (bisexual), 24, 158; - cytogenic, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161; - link between life-cycles, 156; - nonsexual, 156—three kinds of, 156, 157; - reducible to cell-division, 163; - sexual, 25, 156, 157 - —autosexual, 158, 159 - —bisexual, 158 - —unisexual, 158 - somatogenic, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161 - —limited, 161 - —no rejuvenation in, 161 - - Reptiles, 61, 80, 281, 282, 296, 301; - flying, 80; - palæozoic and modern, 296 - - Resemblance, 38, 54, 58, 63, 79, 80, 284, 340, 341; - compatible with separate ancestry, 63, 80 - —even specific, does not entail common origin, 79, 80; - family, 54, 56; - generic, 38, 56; - heterogenetic, 80; - ordinal, 56; - phyletic, 56; - specific, 38, 56, 79; - to modern man, 340, 341 - - Responsibility, 232, 360, 361; - harmful consequences, 360; - implies mastery of will over its own actions, 232; - of evolutionary propagandists, 360, 361 - - Resultants, 233 _note_, 234 _note_ - - Resurrection, natural basis of, 202 - - Reversion, 17, 303, 304, 305; - to type, 305 - - Rhinoceros etruscus, 319; - merckii, 329; - tichorhinus, 326, 329, 332 - - Rhodesian Man, 340, 341; - may be modern, 341 - - Rhynchonella, 118 - - Right-handedness, human, 288; - duration of, 290 - - River drift, 327 - - Rocks, 66, 93, 96, 103, 104, 107, 118, 120, 181, 297, 335; - composition and mineral contents disregarded in classification, 96; - crystalline, 104, 181; - fossiliferous, 104, 107, 118, 181, 279, 335; - European classification of, 107; - groups of, 120; - igneous, 181; - metamorphic, 104; - sedimentary, 66, 93, 96, 107, 181; - systems of, 103 - - Rubidium, isotopes of, 173 - - Rudiment, 293, 297, 301, 302; - ontogenetic, 301, 302; - phylogenetic, 301, 302 - - Rudimentary, 299 - - Rudimentary organs, 286, 291, 293, 298, 305; - criticism of, 286; - evolutionary argument from, 286; - ontogenetic explanation of, 298; - phylogenetic, 298 - —explanation of, 286 - - Running birds, 114, 305 - - - S-R bonds, 204 - - Salamander, 248 - - Saurians, 60 - - Savagery, not prior to civilization, 337 - - Savages, descended from civilized ancestry not vice versa, 338 - - Scandinavia, 110 - - Scepticism, 198 - logic of, 198 - - Scholastics, 191, 225 - - Scholastic, theory of origin of concepts, 220 - - Science, 188, 304, 359; - as religion, 359; - gives no heed to consequences, 360; - its attitude towards philosophy, 188; - sham, 304 - - Scientists, 344, 348; - many not satisfied with “evidence” for human evolution, 344; - fallibility of, 348 - - Scientific questions, decided by evidence, not by authority, 344 - - Scotland, 107 - - Sea-anemone, 261 - - Sea floor, 113 - - Sea-urchin, 119, 140; - egg of, 140 - - Second causes, 52, 71; - efficacy finite, 71 - - Sediment, 93, 103, 125; - primordial, 125; - universal layer of, 103 - - Seedlings, 161 - - Segregation, 25 - - Selection, 11, 12, 13, 65, 152, 153, 306; - artificial, 152 - —not on a par with natural selection, 152; - intelligent and fortuitous, 152, 153; - principle, 11, 12, 13, 65; - values, 306 - - Self, 205 - - Self-fertilization, 159 - - Self-observation, 224, 225; - impossible for an organ, 226; - power of, cannot reside in material organ, 224, 225; - requires a spiritual principle, 225 - - Self-regulation, 174, 176, 179 - - Self-sacrifice, rendered meaningless, 356 - - Semilunar fold, 296, 297 - - Senescence, 26, 157, 160, 162; - an inherent tendency of living matter, 160; - tendency practically if not actually universal, 162 - - Sensationists, 218 - - Sensations, 209, 227, 242; - intensity of, 227 - - Sense, 204, 227, 228, 235, 254, 350; - debilitated by powerful stimulus, 227; - external, 204; - organic nature of, 227; - their power of reaction temporarily inhibited by process of - repair, 227, 228 - - Sense organs, 213, 251 - - Sense-perception, 199, 203, 214, 219, 220, 227, 231, 235; - a brain function 199; - a psycho-organic function, 214; - concerned with factual reality of existence, 219; - involves a decomposition of neural tissue, 227; - not independent of body, 227; - organic function, 203 - - Sensibility, organic, 244, 245 - - Sensori-motor, 251 - - Sensory functions of the nervous system, 199 - - Sensual appetites, exhaustible, 232 - - Sensual emotion, organic function, 203 - - Sequence, 100, 107, 108; - inverted or “wrong,” 107, 108; - no invariable order of, 100; - of fossiliferous strata, 100; - “wrong,” 107, 107 _note_ - - Serum, 15 - - Sexual (gametic) incompatibility, 4, 5, 19, 20, 21 - - Sharks, 80, 119, 296 - - “Shell-craters,” 347 - - Shoots, 160 - - Sight, 217; - intrinsic dependence on eye, 217; - extrinsic dependence on object, 217 - - Silurian, 92, 106, 111, 118; - Middle, 92, 106 - - Simia satyrus, 32 - - Simple explanations not necessarily true, 350 - - Siwalik beds, 95, 310 - - Skeleton, 60, 61, 331; - human, 331 - - Skulls, 328, 329, 331, 333, 340, 341; - fossil, 33, 341; - human, 331 - - Skull cap, 271, 313, 314, 324, 328 - - Sleep, would interrupt process of relaying consciousness from - thought to thought, 212, 213 - - Sloth, 52 - - Snapdragon, 88 - - Social inequalities, artificial laws for benefit of rich, 361 - - Socialism, 357, 360; - Marxian, 357; - Scientific, 357 - - Sodium, 165, 166; - bromide, 165; - chloride, 165, 166; - iodide, 165 - - Solemn burial, 331, 332, 343; - most ancient instances, 332 - - Solutreans, 333 - - Soma, 13, 59, 303 - - Somatella, 59 - - Somatic cells, 13, 14, 17, 136, 156, 163 - - Somites, 280 - - Sophism, Comte’s like that of Zeno, 226 - - Soul, 172, 179, 193, 194, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, - 209, 210, 211, 216, 268, 311, 350, 361; - definition of, 200; - a “formative power” and “integrating” and unifying principle, 200, - 211; - a vital entelechy, 210; - as revealed in biology and psychology, 205; - consubstantial with matter, 202; - differs in kind, not merely in degree from bestial soul, 194; - discarded by Descartes, 197; - discarded by scientific psychology, 359; - formal principle of life, 203; - functional, 203, 206, 209 - —cannot be primary principle of life, 206; - name, not reality of, rejected, 200; - not a complete entity, 201; - primary ground of life, 206; - rejected in dynamic, not in entitive sense, 200, 201; - spiritual, not a product of evolution, 193, 216, 268 - —originates by a creative act, 193, 268; - subject of psychology, 197; - subsistent in man, 202; - substantial, 203, 209; - term alleged to be meaningless, 200 - - Specialism, advantages and disadvantages of, 189 - - Species, 3, 4, 5, 6, 17, 19, 26, 37, 38, 74, 75, 78, 80, 83, 84, - 86, 87, 110, 111, 112, 119, 120-123, 131, 157, 256, 257, 312, 313, - 320, 334, 342; - definition of, 4; - change of, 4, 6; - differentiation and multiplication of, 131; - difficulty of distinguishing, 120-123; - elementary, 17; - extinct and extant, 120-123, 334; - extinct, precarious basis for time-scale, 334; - formation as contrasted with transformation of, 74, 75, 131; - fossil, 3, 4, 83, 92, 120, 122, 312, 313; - intermediate, - absence of, 80, 83, 84, 334; - intersterility of, 4, 5, 26, 38; - only one human, 342; - persistent, 123; - syngamy, an essential requisite of, 5 - - Species-by-species method, 87 - - Spectral analysis of constitution of sun, 216 - - Spectroscope, 144 - - Speech, bestial, 245, 246 - - Sperm, 156, 158, 159, 160; - activation by means of, 159 - - Spermists, 160 - - Sphex gryphus (Sm), 261 - - Spiders, 257 - - Spiral cleavage, 278 - - Spirit, 194, 311; - definition of, 194 - - Spiritual, 206 - - Spiritualism, 202, 230, 231; - Aristotelian, 230, 231 - —admits direct dependence of lower psychic functions on organism, - 230 - —admits indirect dependence of higher psychic functions upon - organism, 231; - Cartesian, 230; - destroyed by facts of physiological psychology, 230; - hylomorphic, 202; - of Aristotle, 202; - psychophysical of Descartes, 202, 203 - - Spirituality, 203, 351; - excludes co-agency of organism, 203; - of human soul, 351 - - Spiritual representations, 221 - - Spleen, 301 - - Splitters, 37 - - Splitting, 121 - - Spontaneous generation, 131, 132, 133, 136, 142, 148, 149, 167, - 179, 182, 185, 186; - defined, 131-133; - antiquity of, 133; - old and new exception of, 167; - philosophical “proof” of, 185 - - Spontogenesis, an outlawed hypothesis, 164 - - Spores, 134, 136, 156, 181; - bacterial, 181 - - Sporulation, 156, 157 - - Springopora, 118 - - Spy, 329, 330, 333; - bones, 329; - crania, capacity underestimated, 330 - - Spy remains, 319, 325, 326, 327, 329, 330, 332; - skeletons of No. 1 and No. 2, 327 - - Squatting, a habit of savage races, 328 - - Squirrel, 260 - - Starfish, 140, 154, 382; - egg of, 140; - symmetry of, 154 - - States, 203, 208; - conscious or psychic, 203, 208; - mental, active and passive, 208; - of matter, not more real, 203 - - Statistics, moral, 361 - - Stems, 160 - - Stentor, 174 - - Sterility, interspecific, 5, 21, 38 - - Sterilization, 134, 135 - - Stimulators, 243 - - Stimulus, 227, 228 - - Stizus ruficornis, 247 - - Stock, 310, 311; - hylobatic and troglodyte, 310, 311; - pithecoid, 311 - - Stone implements, 329, 331, 334, 340, 342; - characteristic, unsafe basis for time-scale, 334 - - Stratification, 102; - scheme of, universal, 102; - synchronous deposition of, different in mineral content, 102 - - Stratigraphers, 106 - - Stratigraphic, 101, 102, 107; - continuity, 101; - facts, 107; - horizons, 101; - sequence, 101 - —invariable order of, 102 - - Stratigraphy, 93 - - Strata, 66, 83, 87, 92-96, 102, 103,108, 109, 116, 119, 120, 125; - classification of, 103; - concrete sequence of, 109; - dated by fossils and fossils by strata, 94; - fossiliferous, 92, 96, 102, 109, 116, 119 - —classification of, 119 - —European classification of, 102; - how characterized, 96; - intervening, skipped, 120; - mineral, 102; - substitution of fossiliferous for lithological, 103; - substitution of fossiliferous for mineral, 103; - wrong order of, 108; - “younger” and “older,” 108, 116 - - Strontium, isotopes of, 173 - - Structures, 122, 284; - constant and adaptive, 122; - distinction influenced by personal equation, 122; - embryonic, undifferentiated, 284; - homologous and adaptive, 122 - - Struggles for existence, 291 - - Sturgeons, 119 - - Sub-archæan beginnings of life impenetrable, 126 - - Subject, 205, 207, 208; - abiding, of our thoughts, feelings and desires, 205; - active, 208; - of thought, active, 207 - - Subjective abstractions, phenomenalist objectivation of, 209 - - Subjectless thought, an abstraction, 209 - - Submicron, 140, 183 _note_ - - Submicroscopic dimensions, no obstacle to manifestation of vital - phenomena, 170 - - Submicroscopic organisms show genetic continuity, reproductiveness - and typical vital power, 169, 170 - - Subspecies, 334, 342 - - Substages, 96, 103 - - Substance, 209 - - Substantial composite of body and soul, 203 - - Succession, 75, 76; - to be distinguished from filiation, 75; - not descent, 75, 76 - - Sunlight, once richer in actinic rays, 148 - - Superciliary ridges, 272 - - Superorganic, 240 - - Superorganic functions, 214, 227; - have soul as their exclusive agent and recipient, 214 - - Superorganic functions, soul alone active cause and receptive - subject, 203 - - Supernatural, 186, 187; - defined, 187 - - Supernumerary, 303, 304, 306; - mammary glands, 304; - organs, 303, 304 - - Superposition, 93, 101, 111; - as a criterion of comparative antiquity, 93; - criterion of, confined to local areas, 101 - —not available - for correlation of strata in different localities, 101; - only safe means of distinguishing between spatial and - chronological distribution, 101, 111; - restricted to local areas, 93 - - Suppression of organs, 305 - - Sweden, 289 - - Syllogisms, of no avail against facts, 226 - - Symbiosis, 52, 124 - - Symbiotes, 46, 53 - - Synapsis, 17, 25 - - Syngamy, 5, 25, 156, 157-161; - essential to biparental inheritance, 160; - means of rejuvenation, 161; - qualification of a true species, 5 - - Synthesis, chemical, spontaneous and artificial, 151, 152 - - Systems, 96, 101, 141, 142, 151; - colloidal, 142; - complete polyphasic, 142; - how determined, 96; - of rocks, 96; - of strata, 101; - polyphasic, 141; - protoplasmic, 141, 142; - simple, 151 - - Systematist, 46, 121 - - - Tactisms, 204 - - Tactualist, 219 - - Taenia, 248 - - Taiga, 91 - - Tarantula, 247, 263 - - Tasmanian blacks, 325 - - Tautomerism, 202 - - Taxonomic questions, 334 - - Taxonomist, 128 - - Taxonomy, 36, 37, 38, 77, 101, 121, 122, 123, 320; - fossil, 101, 122 - —basis of correlation, 101 - —arbitrary and unreliable, 122; - homology, basis of, 36; - influence of palæontology, 77; - need of revision in, 121, 123 - - Teleological, 225 - - Teleology, 154, 240, 248, 249, 259, 267; - a material expression of intelligence, 259; - does not entail vibrant intelligence, 259; - its combination with sentient consciousness, 240; - of organisms, 154; - of artefacts, 154; - psychic - implication of, 154; - unconscious, 240 - - Teleosts, 120 - - Telic, 150, 249; - phenomena of nature, 249 - - Terebratulina, striata, 118, 120; - caput serpentis, 118 - - Termitomyia, 46 - - Termitoxenia Heimi, 48 - - Tertiary, 72, 82, 99, 100, 104, 109, 111, 112, 113, 118, 154, 270, - 308, 311; - ancestor, 312; - Man, 154 - - Tertiary envelopes of eggs, 300 - - Tethelin, 294 - - Tethys, 109 - - Tetraploid race, 23, 45; - origin of, not yet observed, 23 - - Tetraploidy, 22, 23, 44 - - Thigh, bone, 316, 317 - - Third eyelid, 296, 297 - - Third Interglacial Period, latter half of, 331 - - Thoatherium, 78 - - Thought, 218-222, 227, 229, 230, 233; - and imagery, concomitant but incommensurable, 219; - digs below phenomenal surface, 219; - distinguished from imagery, 218, 219; - intellectual, steady, lucid and continuous, 229; - not function of material organism, 233; - power does not always degenerate with old age, 230; - presupposes imagery, 221; - proceeds with complete ease after initial exertion of - imagination, 229; - rational, 222, 224, 231, 233 - —has spiritual soul for source and subject, 233 - —reflective, 224 - —spiritual, 222 - —superorganic function of, 231; - reflective, a superorganic function, 227; - requires substrate of sensible images, 220 - —on which it is objectively dependent, 222; - some in all individuals, 219; - spiritual, 222; - untranslatable into adequate imagery, 219 - - Thrust faults, 107 - - Thrust planes like bedding planes, 108 - - Thymus, 299, 300, 301, 302; - an ontogenetic rudiment, 301, 302 - - Thyroid glands, 292, 294, 295, 301 - - Thyroxin, 294 - - Time-value, 75, 82, 83, 84, 95, 96, 101; - of geological formations, dubious, 75; - of index fossils, 95, 96 - —affords no basis for scientific certainty, 101 - - Tissue, lymphatic, 301 - - Tissue cells, 13, 14, 136, 156 - - Tonsils, 301 - - Tools, use of, by animals, 261 - - Trachelocerca, 138 - - Training, 244, 245, 256 - - Transformism, 3, 4, 6, 16, 24, 25, 32, 40, 43, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59, - 61, 67, 69-72, 75, 80, 84, 109, 117, 123, 124, 126, 127, 131, 263, - 268, 343; - definition of, 3; - impotent to explain origin of intelligence, 216, 233 _note_, 263; - interpretation, not corollary, of fossil facts, 126; - monophyletic, 69, 70; - “natural” explanation of homology, 52; - proofs for, empirical, aphoristic, and aposterioristic, 55, 56; - rests on personal belief rather than on facts, 127; - ultra-partisans of, 343; - unconcerned with origin of life, 131; - unifies origins in time, but not in space, 69 - - Transformist, 38 - - Transmutation, 6, 28, 35, 40, 50, 65, 69, 70, 71, 73, 123, 193 - - Trial and error, 241, 243 - - Triassic, 118, 119 - - Trilobites, 100, 117 - - Triploidy, 21, 22 - - Troglodyte, 34, 50, 314, - type, 314 - - Troglodytes niger, 33, 314 - - Tropisms, 204 - - Tubercule of Darwin, not homologous with apex of horse’s ear, 303 - - Tubers, 160 - - Tubules, nephridial or excretory, 280 - - Types, 54, 55, 66, 83, 84, 92, 116-120, 123, 124, 141, 328, 329, - 334, 335, 336; - Ancestral, 92, 117, 276; - annectant, 92; - approximation in, 66; - common ancestral, 83; - Crô-Magnon, 332, 334, 335; - no evidence of its descent from Neanderthal - type, 334; - generalized, 54, 55, 81, 84; - are abstractions, 54, 55; - generic, 116, 117; - persistence of, 118, 123; - Grimaldi, 332; - intergradent, 83; - invertebrate, 117; - modern, 116, 120, 334; - Neanderthaloid, 329, 335; - persistent, 116; - persistence of, 119; - phyletic, 116, 117; - permanence of, 118; - specific, 116, 141 - —persistence of, 118, 123; - fossil doctrine of their invariable sequence, 104, 312 - - - Ultramicron, 144, 168; - destitute of reproductive power, 168; - may not be natural unit, 168; - of colloidal solutions, 168 - - Ultramicroscope, 140, 144; - limit of, 140 - - Ultraspiritualism of Descartes, 199, 202 - - Ultra-violet rays, 148, 184 - - Unchange, not explained by theory of exchange, 123 - - Understanding, 235 - - Ungulates, 78, 82; - fossil, 82 - - Uniformitarianism, 67, 68 - - Uniformity of nature, 149, 186; - only justification for reconstruction of the past, 149; - principle of, 169 - - Union of soul and body, according to Descartes, 198, 199 - - Units, 144, 162, 163, 166, 167, 168, 170, 174-177, 199-201; - difference between, 170; - inorganic, 144, 163, 166, 170, 174, 175, 176, 177, 201 - —and living, 170, 175-177 - —incapable of other than transitive action, 174, 177; - living and non-living, 199, 200; - natural, 168; - new, of life to be discovered, 167; - of nature, non-living, 162, 163 - - Universe, Stone Book of, 127 - - Uranium, 146 - - Urea, 173 - - Ureter, 282 - - Uroleptus mobilis, 138, 161 - - Urosthenic, 270 - - Ursus spelaeus, 326, 329 - - Use, 291 - - Utility, 291 - - - Valence, 165; - atomic, 165; - molecular (residual), 165 - - Variation, 9, 18, 40, 41, 42, 45, 63, 64, 88, 303; - agencies of, 42; - cause of modification, 41; - converges and diverges, 63, 64; - fluctuational, 9, 303; - heritable, 42; - intra-specific, 43; - mutational, a change of loss, 18; - non-inheritable, 42; - process of diversifying, 40, 45; - trans-specific, 43, 88 - —no experimental evidence of, 45 - - Varieties, 334, 342 - - Vault, 329, 332 - - Vegetarians, 236 - - Versatility, 257, 258, 259; - distinctive mark of intelligence, 257, 258 - - Vertebræ, 279 - - Vertebrate, 60 - - Vertebrata, 119, 270, 271, 279-284, 292, 297, 300, 302; - amniotic, 280-282; - anamniotic, 280, 282 - - Vestigial remnants, 299 - - Viability, 4, 5, 25, 26, 43, 44 - - Vibration, 209; - pure, 209; - without vibrant medium, 209 - - Vinegar fly, 19, 85 - - Violet, 25, 159 - - Visceral arches and clefts, 278, 279 - - Visualist, 219 - - Vital activity, 201 - - Vital continuity, 134, 139, 155; - genetic, first article of, 134; - law of, 134, 155; - law of, 139; - its fourth article, 139 - - Vital force, no special, 201 - - Vitality, 150; - eludes art of chemist, 150 - - Vital principle, 172, 200, 203; - as defined by Neo-Vitalists, 172; - entitive, not dynamic, 172; - term alleged to be meaningless, 200; - term in disfavor, 200 - - Vivisection, 360 - - Volcanic bombs, 346-348 - - Volition, 221, 231, 233; - not function of the material organism, 233; - presupposes conception, 221; - rational, has spiritual soul for source and subject, 233; - rational, superorganic, 231 - - - Walrus, 296 - - Wasp, predatory, 247, 263 - - Weddas, cranial capacity of, 315 - - Weight, 315 - - Whale, 35, 46, 60, 279; - flipper of, 35, 60, 279 - - White Leghorns, 19 - - Wild Kirchli, industry of, 331 - - Will, 221, 232, 235; - insatiable, 232; - of man, free, 232; - self-determining or reflexive, 232; - superior to sensual appetite, 235 - - Wing venation, 49 _note_, 49 - - Wisconsin, Cambrian sediments of, 105 - - Wolffian duct, 281, 282 - - Woods Hole, 23, 42, 47 - - World War, 359 - - Worm, 249 - - Wormwood, 248, 255; - common, 255 - - Würtzburg, School of, 219 - - - X-rays, 144, 317 - - - Yoldia Sea, 289 - - Yolk-sac, 276 - - - Zamia, 118 - - Zebra, 81 - - Zones, stratigraphic, 96, 103, 106; - zoögeographical, 99 - - Zoölogists, 66, 77 - - Zoölogy, 35, 37, 55, 126, 304 - - Zoöpsychologists, 240 - - Zygote, 25, 136, 156-158 - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CASE AGAINST -EVOLUTION *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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