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diff --git a/old/68536-0.txt b/old/68536-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 98884ae..0000000 --- a/old/68536-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20625 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the war in the Peninsula -and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 4 -of 6, by William Francis Patrick Napier - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France - from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 4 of 6 - -Author: William Francis Patrick Napier - -Release Date: July 16, 2022 [eBook #68536] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 4 OF 6 *** - - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. - - Bold text is denoted by =equal signs=. - - A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example GEN^L or 1^{er}. - - Four periods .... indicate omitted text in a quotation. - Four mdashes ———— also indicate omitted text in a quotation. - - The two changes noted in the ERRATA have been applied to the etext. - - There are no Footnotes in the main text. The three Footnotes in the - Appendix have been placed at the end of the letter or table in - which they occur. The anchors are denoted by [number]. - - Unlike the prior three volumes, this book had a date (Year. Month) as - a margin header on most pages. This information about the chronology - of the narrative has been preserved as a Sidenote to the relevant - paragraph on that page whenever the header date changed. - - The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font. - - Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. - - With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings - of names have not been changed. - - Volume 1 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67318 - Volume 2 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67554 - Volume 3 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68187 - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - WAR IN THE PENINSULA - - AND IN THE - - SOUTH OF FRANCE, - - FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. - - BY - - W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. - - _COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH_ - _ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES._ - - VOL. IV. - - LONDON: - THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET. - - MDCCCXXXIV. - - - - - LONDON: - - MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET. - - - - -TABLE OF CONTENTS. - - - BOOK XIII. - - CHAP. I. - - Lord Wellington’s sieges vindicated—Operations in - Spain—State of Gallicia—Change of commanders—Bonet’s - operations in the Asturias—Activity of the Partidas—Their - system of operations—Mina captures a large convoy at - Arlaban—Bessieres contracts his position—Bonet abandons the - Asturias—Santocildes advances into Leon—French dismantle - Astorga—Skirmish on the Orvigo—General inefficiency of - the Gallicians and Asturians—Operations in the eastern - provinces—State of Aragon—State of Catalonia—State of - Valencia—Suchet marches against Tortoza—Fails to burn the - boat-bridge there—M‘Donald remains at Gerona—The Valencians - and Catalonians combine operations against Suchet—O’Donnel - enters Tortoza—Makes a sally and is repulsed—The - Valencians defeated near Uldecona—Operations of the seventh - corps—M‘Donald reforms the discipline of the troops—Marches - with a convoy to Barcelona—Returns to Gerona and dismantles - the outworks of that place—O’Donnel’s plans—M‘Donald - marches with a second convoy—Reaches Barcelona and returns - to Gerona—Marches with a third convoy—Forces the pass of - Ordal—Enters Reus and opens the communications with Suchet 1 - - - CHAP. II. - - O’Donnel withdraws his troops from Falcet and surrounds the - seventh corps—M‘Donald retires to Lerida—Arranges a new - plan with Suchet—Ravages the plains of Urgel and the higher - valleys—The people become desperate—O’Donnel cuts the - French communication with the Ampurdan—Makes a forced march - towards Gerona—Surprises Swartz at Abispal—Takes Filieu - and Palamos—Is wounded and returns to Taragona—Campo Verde - marches to the Cerdaña—M‘Donald enters Solsona—Campo Verde - returns—Combat of Cardona—The French retreat to Guisona, - and the seventh corps returns to Gerona—M‘Donald marches - with a fourth convoy to Barcelona—Makes new roads—Advances - to Reus—The Spaniards harass his flanks—He forages the - Garriga district and joins the third corps—Operations of - Suchet—General Laval dies—Operations of the Partidas—Plan - of the secret junta to starve Aragon—General Chlopiski - defeats Villa Campa—Suchet’s difficulties—He assembles - the notables of Aragon and reorganizes that province—He - defeats and takes general Navarro at Falcet—Bassecour’s - operations—He is defeated at Uldecona 19 - - - CHAP. III. - - Tortoza—Its governor feeble—The Spaniards outside - disputing and negligent—Captain Fane lands at Palamos—Is - taken—O’Donnel resigns and is succeeded by Campo - Verde—Description of Tortoza—It is invested—A division of - the seventh corps placed under Suchet’s command—Siege of - Tortoza—The place negotiates—Suchet’s daring conduct—The - governor surrenders—Suchet’s activity—Habert takes the - fort of Balaguer—M‘Donald moves to Reus—Sarsfield defeats - and kills Ugenio—M‘Donald marches to Lerida—Suchet goes to - Zaragoza—The confidence of the Catalans revives—The manner - in which the belligerents obtained provisions explained—The - Catalans attack Perillo, and Campo Verde endeavours to - surprise Monjuic, but is defeated with great loss—Napoleon - changes the organisation of the third and seventh Corps—The - former becomes the army of Aragon—The latter the army of - Catalonia 36 - - - CHAP. IV. - - Suchet prepares to besiege Taragona—The power of the - Partidas described—Their actions—They are dispersed on the - frontier of Aragon—The Valencians fortify Saguntum—Are - defeated a second time at Uldecona—Suchet comes to - Lerida—M‘Donald passes with an escort from them to - Barcelona—His troops burn Manresa—Sarsfield harasses his - march—Napoleon divides the invasion of Catalonia into two - parts—Sinking state of the province—Rovira surprises Fort - Fernando de Figueres—Operations which follow that event 52 - - - CHAP. V. - - Suchet’s skilful conduct—His error about English - finance—Outline of his arrangements for the siege of - Taragona—He makes French contracts for the supply of - his army—Forages the high valleys and the frontiers of - Castile and Valencia—Marches to Taragona—Description of - that place—Campo Verde enters the place—Suchet invests - it—Convention relative to the sick concluded between St. - Cyr and Reding faithfully observed—Sarsfield comes to - Momblanch—Skirmish with the Valencians at Amposta and - Rapita—Siege of Taragona—Rapita and Momblanch abandoned - by Suchet—Taragona reinforced from Valencia—The Olivo - stormed—Campo Verde quits Taragona, and Senens de Contreras - assumes the chief command—Sarsfield enters the place - and takes charge of the Port or lower town—French break - ground before the lower town—The Francoli stormed—Campo - Verde’s plans to succour the place—General Abbé is called - to the siege—Sarsfield quits the place—The lower town is - stormed—The upper town attacked—Suchet’s difficulties - increase—Campo Verde comes to the succour of the place, but - retires without effecting any thing—Colonel Skerrett arrives - in the harbour with a British force—Does not land—Gallant - conduct of the Italian soldier Bianchini—The upper town is - stormed with dreadful slaughter 70 - - - CHAP. VI. - - Suchet marches against Campo Verde—Seizes Villa Nueva de - Sitjes and makes fifteen hundred prisoners—Campo Verde - retires to Igualada—Suchet goes to Barcelona—A council - of war held at Cervera by Campo Verde—It is resolved - to abandon the province as a lost country—Confusion - ensues—Lacy arrives and assumes the command—Eroles - throws himself into Montserrat—Suchet sends detachments - to the valley of Congosta and that of Vich, and opens - the communication with M‘Donald at Figueras—Returns to - Reus—Created a marshal—Destroys the works of the lower - town of Taragona—Takes Montserrat—Negotiates with - Cuesta for an exchange of the French prisoners in the - island of Cabrera—Stopped by the interference of Mr. - Wellesley—Mischief occasioned by the privateers—Lacy - reorganizes the province—Suchet returns to Zaragoza, and - chases the Partidas from the frontier of Aragon—Habert - defeats the Valencians at Amposta—The Somatenes harass - the French forts near Montserrat—Figueras surrenders to - M‘Donald—Napoleon’s clemency—Observations—Operations in - Valencia and Murcia 100 - - - BOOK XIV. - - CHAP. I. - - State of political affairs—Situation of king Joseph—His - disputes with Napoleon—He resigns his crown and quits - Spain—The emperor grants him new terms and obliges him to - return—Political state of France as regards the war 120 - - - CHAP. II. - - Political state of England with reference to the - war—Retrospective view of affairs—Enormous subsidies - granted to Spain—The arrogance and rapacity of the juntas - encouraged by Mr. Canning—His strange proceedings—Mr. - Stuart’s abilities and true judgment of affairs shewn—He - proceeds to Vienna—State of politics in Germany—He is - recalled—The misfortunes of the Spaniards principally - owing to Mr. Canning’s incapacity—The evil genius of the - Peninsula—His conduct at Lisbon—Lord Wellesley’s policy - totally different from Mr. Canning’s—Parties in the - cabinet—Lord Wellesley and Mr. Perceval—Character of the - latter—His narrow policy—Letters describing the imbecility - of the cabinet in 1810 and 1811 131 - - - CHAP. III. - - Political state of Spain—Disputes amongst the leaders—Sir - J. Moore’s early and just perception of the state of affairs - confirmed by lord Wellington’s experience—Points of interest - affecting England—The reinforcement of the military - force—The claims of the princess Carlotta—The prevention of - a war with Portugal—The question of the colonies—Cisnero’s - conduct at Buenos Ayres—Duke of Infantada demanded by - Mexico—Proceedings of the English ministers—Governor of - Curaçoa—Lord Wellesley proposes a mediation—Mr. Bardaxi’s - strange assertion—Lord Wellington’s judgment on the - question—His discernment, sagacity, and wisdom shewn 146 - - - CHAP. IV. - - Political state of Portugal—Mr. Villiers’ mission expensive - and inefficient—Mr. Stuart succeeds him—Finds every thing - in confusion—His efforts to restore order successful at - first—Cortes proposed by lord Wellesley—Opposed by the - regency, by Mr. Stuart, and by lord Wellington—Observations - thereon—Changes in the regency—Its partial and weak - conduct—Lord Strangford’s proceedings at Rio Janeiro only - productive of mischief—Mr. Stuart’s efforts opposed, and - successfully by the Souza faction—Lord Wellington thinks - of abandoning the contest—Writes to the prince regent of - Portugal—The regency continues to embarrass the English - general—Effect of their conduct upon the army—Miserable - state of the country—The British cabinet grants a fresh - subsidy to Portugal—Lord Wellington complains that he is - supplied with only one-sixth of the money necessary to carry - on the contest—Minor follies of the regency—The cause of - Massena’s harshness to the people of Portugal explained—Case - of Mascarheñas—His execution a foul murder—Lord Wellington - reduced to the greatest difficulties—He and Mr. Stuart - devise a plan to supply the army by trading in grain—Lord - Wellington’s embarrassments increase—Reasons why he does not - abandon Portugal—His plan of campaign 161 - - - CHAP. V. - - Second English siege of Badajos—Means of the allies very - scanty—Place invested—San Christoval assaulted—The allies - repulsed—Second assault fails likewise—The siege turned - into a blockade—Observations 182 - - - CHAP. VI. - - General Spencer’s operations in Beira—Pack blows up - Almeida—Marmont marches by the passes to the Tagus, - and Spencer marches to the Alemtejo—Soult and Marmont - advance to succour Badajos—The siege is raised, and the - allies pass the Guadiana—Lord Wellington’s position on - the Caya described—Skirmish of cavalry in which the - British are defeated—Critical period of the war—French - marshals censured for not giving battle—Lord Wellington’s - firmness—Inactivity of the Spaniards—Blake moves to the - Condado de Niebla—He attacks the castle of Niebla—The - French armies retire from Badajos, and Soult marches to - Andalusia—Succours the castle of Niebla—Blake flies to - Ayamonte—Sails for Cadiz, leaving Ballesteros in the - Condado—French move against him—He embarks his infantry - and sends his cavalry through Portugal to Estremadura—Blake - lands at Almeria and joins the Murcian army—Goes to - Valencia, and during his absence Soult attacks his army—Rout - of Baza—Soult returns to Andalusia—His actions eulogised 195 - - - CHAP. VII. - - State of the war in Spain—Marmont ordered to take a central - position in the valley of the Tagus—Constructs forts at - Almaraz—French affairs assume a favourable aspect—Lord - Wellington’s difficulties augment—Remonstrances sent to the - Brazils—System of intelligence described—Lord Wellington - secretly prepares to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo—Marches into - Beira, leaving Hill in the Alemtejo—French cavalry take a - convoy of wine, get drunk and lose it again—General Dorsenne - invades Gallicia—Is stopped by the arrival of the allies - on the Agueda—Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo.—Carlos España - commences the formation of a new Spanish army—Preparations - for the siege—Hill sends a brigade to Castello Branco 215 - - - CHAP. VIII. - - The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo make some successful - excursions—Morillo operates against the French in - Estremadura, is defeated and driven to Albuquerque—Civil - affairs of Portugal—Bad conduct of the regency—They - imagine the war to be decided, and endeavour to drive lord - Wellington away from Portugal—Indications that Napoleon - would assume the command in the Peninsula observed by lord - Wellington—He expects a combined attack on Lisbon by sea - and land—Marmont and Dorsenne collect convoys and unite - at Tamames—Advance to succour Ciudad Rodrigo—Combat of - Elbodon—Allies retire to Guinaldo—To Aldea Ponte—Combat - of Aldea Ponte—The allies retire to Soita—The French - retire—Observations 229 - - - BOOK XV. - - CHAP. I. - - State of the war in Spain—Northern provinces—State of - Gallicia—Attempt to introduce English officers into - the Spanish service—Trafficked for by the Spanish - government—Repelled by the Spanish military—The English - government encourage the Partidas—Lord Wellington sends - the chiefs presents—His after opinion of them—Sir H. - Douglas succeeds general Walker—Miserable state of Gallicia - described—Disputes between the civil and military—Anomalous - proceedings of the English government—Gross abuses in - the Spanish army—Expedition against America fitted out - in Gallicia with the English supplies intended for the - defence of the province—Sir H. Douglas’s policy towards - the Partidas criticized—Events in the Asturias—Santander - surprised by Porlier—Reille and Caffarelli scour Biscay and - the Rioja—Bonet invades the Asturias—Defeats Moscoso, Paul - Lodosa, and Mendizabel, and occupies Oviedo—In Gallicia the - people prefer the French to their own armies—In Estremadura, - Drouet joins Girard and menaces Hill—These movements parts - of a great plan to be conducted by Napoleon in person 254 - - - CHAP. II. - - Conquest of Valencia—Suchet’s preparations - described—Napoleon’s system eminently methodical—State of - Valencia—Suchet invades that province—Blake concentrates - his force to fight—His advanced guard put to flight by the - French cavalry—He retires to the city of Valencia—Siege - of Saguntum—The French repulsed in an assault—Palombini - defeats Obispo near Segorbe—Harispe defeats C. O’Donnel - at Beneguazil—Oropesa taken—The French batteries open - against Saguntum—Second assault repulsed—Suchet’s - embarrassments—Operations in his rear in Catalonia—Medas - islands taken—Lacy proposes to form a general depôt at - Palamos—Discouraged by sir E. Pellew—The Spaniards - blow up the works of Berga, and fix their chief depôt - at Busa—Description of that place—Lacy surprises the - French in the town of Igualada—Eroles takes a convoy near - Jorbas—The French quit the castle of Igualada and join the - garrison of Montserrat—That place abandoned—Eroles takes - Cervera and Belpuig—Beats the French national guards in - Cerdaña—Invades and ravages the French frontier—Returns - by Ripol and takes post in the pass of Garriga—Milans - occupies Mataro—Sarsfield embarks and sails to the - coast of the Ampurdan—These measures prevent the march - of the French convoy to Barcelona—State of Aragon—The - Empecinado and Duran invade it on one side—Mina invades - it on the other—Calatayud taken—Severoli’s division - reinforces Musnier, and the Partidas are pursued to Daroca - and Molino—Mina enters the Cinco Villas—Defeats eleven - hundred Italians at Ayerbe—Carries his prisoners to - Motrico in Biscay—Mazzuchelli defeats the Empecinado at - Cubiliejos—Blake calls in all his troops and prepares - for a battle—Suchet’s position described—Blake’s - dispositions—Battle of Saguntum—Observations 266 - - - CHAP. III. - - Suchet resolves to invest the city of Valencia—Blake - reverts to his former system of acting on the French - rear—Napoleon orders General Reille to reinforce Suchet with - two divisions—Lacy disarms the Catalan Somatenes—Their - ardour diminishes—The French destroy several bands, - blockade the Medas islands, and occupy Mataro—Several - towns affected to the French interest—Bad conduct of the - privateers—Lacy encourages assassination—Suchet advances to - the Guadalaviar—Spanish defences described—The French force - the passage of the river—Battle of Valencia—Mahi flies - to Alcira—Suchet invests the Spanish camp—Blake attempts - to break out, is repulsed—The camp abandoned—The city is - bombarded—Commotion within the walls—Blake surrenders with - his whole army—Suchet created duke of Albufera—Shameful - conduct of the junta of the province—Montbrun arrives - with three divisions—Summons Alicant, and returns - to Toledo—Villa Campa marches from Carthagena to - Albaracin—Gandia and Denia taken by the French—They besiege - Peniscola—Lacy menaces Taragona—Defeats a French battalion - at Villa Seca—Battle of Altafulla—Siege of Peniscola—The - French army in Valencia weakened by draughts—Suchet’s - conquests cease—Observations 291 - - - CHAP. IV. - - Operations in Andalusia and Estremadura—Description of - Soult’s Position—Events in Estremadura—Ballesteros - arrives at Algesiras—Advances to Alcala de Gazules—Is - driven back—Soult designs to besiege Tarifa—Concludes a - convention with the emperor of Morocco—It is frustrated by - England—Ballesteros cooped up under the guns of Gibraltar by - Sémelé and Godinot—Colonel Skerrett sails for Tarifa—The - French march against Tarifa—Are stopped in the pass of La - Pena by the fire of the British ships—They retire from - San Roque—General Godinot shoots himself—General Hill - surprises general Girard at Aroyo Molino, and returns to the - Alemtejo—French reinforced in Estremadura—Their movements - checked by insubordination amongst the troops—Hill again - advances—Endeavours to surprise the French at Merida—Fine - conduct of captain Neveux—Hill marches to Almendralejos to - fight Drouet—The latter retires—Phillipon sends a party - from Badajos to forage the banks of the Guadiana—Colonel - Abercrombie defeats a squadron of cavalry at Fuente del - Maestro—Hill returns to the Alemtejo 313 - - - CHAP. V. - - Soult resolves to besiege Tarifa—Ballesteros is driven - a second time under the guns of Gibraltar—Laval invests - Tarifa—Siege of Tarifa—The assault repulsed—Siege is - raised—The true history of this siege exposed—Colonel - Skerrett not the author of the success 329 - - - BOOK XVI. - - CHAP. I. - - Political situation of king Joseph—Political state - of Spain—Political state of Portugal—Military - operations—Julian Sanchez captures the governor of Ciudad - Rodrigo—General Thiebault introduces a convoy and a - new governor into that fortress—Difficulty of military - operations on the Agueda—The allied army, being pressed for - provisions, takes wide cantonments, and preparations are - secretly made for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo 345 - - - CHAP. II. - - Review of the different changes of the war—Enormous efforts - of Napoleon—Lord Wellington’s situation described—His - great plans explained—His firmness and resolution under - difficulties—Distressed state of his army—The prudence and - ability of lord Fitzroy Somerset—Dissemination of the French - army—Lord Wellington seizes the opportunity to besiege - Ciudad Rodrigo 362 - - - CHAP. III. - - Means collected for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Major - Sturgeon throws a bridge over the Agueda—Siege of Ciudad - Rodrigo—Colonel Colborne storms fort Francesco—The scarcity - of transport baulks lord Wellington’s calculations—Marmont - collects troops—Plan of the attack changed—Two breaches are - made and the city is stormed—Observations 375 - - - CHAP. IV. - - Execution of the French partizans and English deserters - found in Ciudad Rodrigo—The works are repaired—Marmont - collects his army at Salamanca—Bonet abandons the - Asturias—Souham advances to Matilla—Hill arrives at - Castello Branco—The French army harassed by winter - marches and by the Partidas—Marmont again spreads his - divisions—Agueda overflows, and all communication with - Ciudad Rodrigo is cut off—Lord Wellington prepares to - besiege Badajos—Preliminary measures—Impeded by bad - weather—Difficulties and embarrassments arise—The - allied army marches in an unmilitary manner towards - the Alemtejo—Lord Wellington proposes some financial - measures—Gives up Ciudad to the Spaniards—The fifth - division is left in Beira—Carlos d’Espagna and general - Victor Alten are posted on the Yeltes—The Portuguese militia - march for the Coa—Lord Wellington reaches Elvas—He is beset - with difficulties—Falls sick, but recovers rapidly 390 - - - CHAP. V. - - The allies cross the Guadiana—Beresford invests - Badajos—Generals Graham and Hill command the covering - army—Drouet retires to Hornaches in the Llerena—Third - English siege of Badajos—Sally of the garrison - repulsed—Works impeded by the rain—The besieged rake the - trenches from the right bank of the Guadiana—The fifth - division is called up to the siege—The river rises and - carries away the bridge, and the siege is upon the point of - being raised—Two flying bridges are established—The fifth - division invest St. Christoval and the bridge-head—The - Picurina is stormed—The batteries open against the San - Roque and the body of the place—The covering army drive - general Drouet from the Serena into the Morena on the side - of Cordova—Marmont collects his forces in Leon—The Spanish - officers and the Portuguese government neglect the supplies - of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida—Soult advances from Cordova - towards Llerena—The fifth division is brought over the - Guadiana—The works of the siege are pressed—An attempt to - blow up the dam of the inundation fails—The two breaches - become practicable—Soult effects his junction with Drouet - and advances to the succour of the place—Graham and Hill - fall back—The bridge of Merida is destroyed—The assault is - ordered, but countermanded—A third breach is formed—The - fortress is stormed with a dreadful slaughter, and the city - is sacked by the allies 399 - - - CHAP. VI. - - The state of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida obliges lord - Wellington to relinquish his design of invading - Andalusia—Soult’s operations described—He reaches Villa - Franca—Hears of the fall of Badajos and retires—Penne - Villemur and Morillo move from the Niebla against - Seville—Ballesteros having defeated Maransin at Cartama, - comes from the Ronda against Seville—A French convoy is - stopped in the Morena, and the whole of Andalusia is in - commotion—Seville is saved by the subtlety of a Spaniard - in the French interest—Ballesteros retires—Assaults - Zahara and is repulsed—Sends a division against Ossuna, - which is also repulsed by the _Escopeteros_—Drives general - Rey from Allora to Malaga—Soult marches from Llerena - towards Seville, and general Conroux brings a brigade up - from the Guadalete to attack Ballesteros—Sir S. Cotton - defeats general Peyreymont’s cavalry near Usagre—Soult - concentrates his army near Seville to light the allies—Lord - Wellington marches to Beira—Marmont’s operations—He marches - against Ciudad Rodrigo—Carlos d’España retires towards - Almeida and Victor Alten towards Penamacor—The French - appear before Almeida—General Trant arrives on the Cabeça - Negro—The French retire and Trant unites with J. Wilson at - Guarda—Marmont advances to Sabugal—Victor Alten abandons - Penamacor and Castello Branco, and crosses the Tagus—The - Portuguese general Lecor opposes the enemy with skill and - courage—Marmont drives Trant from Guarda and defeats his - militia on the Mondego—Lord Wellington crosses the Tagus and - enters Castello Branco—Marmont’s position perilous—Lord - Wellington advances to attack him—He retreats over the - Agueda—The allied army is spread in wide cantonments, and - the fortresses are victualled 434 - - - CHAP. VII. - - General observations—The campaign considered—The - justice of Napoleon’s views vindicated, and Marmont’s - operations censured as the cause of the French - misfortunes—The operations of the army of the centre - and of the south examined—Lord Wellington’s operations - eulogized—Extraordinary adventures of captain Colquhon - Grant—The operations of the siege of Badajos examined—Lord - Wellington’s conduct vindicated 450 - - - APPENDIX. - - No. I. - - Justificatory papers relating to the state of Spain at - different periods 483 - - - No. II. - - Siege of Taragona 498 - - - No. III. - - Political state of king Joseph 512 - - - No. IV. - - Conduct of the English government, and extracts from Mr. - Canning’s and lord Wellesley’s instructions to Mr. Stuart 541 - - - No. V. - - Marmont and Dorsenne’s operations 549 - - - No. VI. - - Siege of Tarifa, with anonymous extracts from memoirs and - letters of different officers employed in the siege 563 - - - No. VII. - - Storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, with anonymous - extracts from memoirs and letters of officers engaged in, or - eye-witnesses of the action described 571 - - - No. VIII. - - English papers relating to Soult’s and Marmont’s operations, - and French papers relating to the same 578 - - - No. IX. - - Summary of the force of the Anglo-Portuguese army at - different periods, exclusive of drummers and fifers, with - summary of the French force at different periods, extracted - from the imperial muster-rolls 584 - - - - -LIST OF PLATES. - - - No. 1. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Tortoza - _to face page_ 41 - - 2. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Taragona - _to face page_ 75 - - 3. Explanatory Sketch of the Operations and Combat of Elbodon - _to face page_ 240 - - 4. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege and Battle of Saguntum - _to face page_ 283 - - 5. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege and Battle of Valencia - _to face page_ 297 - - 6. Explanatory Sketch of general Hill’s Operations - _to face page_ 324 - - 7. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Tarifa - _to face page_ 331 - - 8. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo - _to face page_ 386 - - 9. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Badajos, 1812 - _to face page_ 419 - - - - -ERRATA. - - - Page 3, line 23, _for_ “armies” _read_ “parties.” - 35, 9, _for_ “prisoners” _read_ “provisions.” - - - - -NOTICE. - - -In addition to the manuscript authorities used for the former -volumes, several memoirs, journals, and notes of officers employed in -the different operations have been consulted for this volume. Amongst -others, the Journal of general Harvey of the Portuguese service, and -some original papers supplied by sir Howard Douglas. - - - - -In a recent controversy, I have expressed my belief that the French -army at Albuera, instead of being more, was less numerous, than I had -represented it in my account, of that battle. The following letter, -since procured, decides the question:— - - _Extrait d’une lettre écrite de Seville le 4 Mai, 1811, par M. le - m^{al} duc de Dalmatie, général-en-chef de l’armée du midi, à S. A. - S. le prince de Wagram et de Neufchatel, major-général._ - -Le général Latour Maubourg a été obligé de se replier sur Constantina -et Alamis, Cordove est menacée par un corps Anglais, Portugais, et -Espagnol, beaucoup de troupes se concentrent en Estramadure; Badajoz -est investie. Le général Blake a réuni sur l’Odiel une armée de -quinze à seize mille hommes, et paroit se préparer à marcher sur -Seville. Le restant du quatrième corps est en opérations contre les -troupes qui out débauché de Murcie. Si j’enumere bien, je suis en cet -instant attaqué sur divers points par plus de soixante mille hommes -indépendamment de troupes qui sont restées à Cadiz et à l’isle de -Léon, et de celles qu’il y a à Tarrifa, à Algesiras, et à Gibraltar, -que je dois contenir, le danger est pressant, je dois faire face -de tous côtés assurer de nouveaux triomphes aux armées de S. M. -l’empereur, et éviter les facheux événemens, que l’on prépare contre -l’armée du midi. J’espère réussir, mais le succès sera complet si les -secours que j’attends arrivent apropos; voici mes dispositions. Je -pars dans quatre jours avec _vingt mille hommes, trois mille chevaux, -et trente pièces de canon_, pour rejetter au delà de la Guadiana les -corps ennemis qui se sont répandus en Estremadure, dégager Badajos -et faciliter l’arrivée du général comte d’Erlon. Si les troupes que -ce général amène peuvent se réunir avec celles que je conduirai et -si les troupes qui sont parties des armées du nord et du centre, -dont j’ai en partie disposé, arrivent à tems, j’aurai en Estremadure -trente-cinq mille hommes, cinq mille chevaux, et quarante pièces de -canon de campagne; alors je livre bataille aux ennemis quand bien -même toute l’armée Angloise qui est sur le continent y seroit réunie, -et ils seront vaincus. - -Si une partie des renforts que j’attends manquent je ferai avec ce -que j’aurai, tout ce que pourrai vers le but proposé. - - Le général-en-chef de l’armée impériale du midi, - (Signée) M^{al} Duc de DALMATIE. - Pour extraits conformes. - - - _To her grace the duchess of Abrantes._ - - _September 11, 1833._ -MADAM, - -In the eighth volume of your “_Mémoires_,” which I have only just -seen, I find the following passages:— - -“Toutefois, pourquoi donc m’étonner de la conduite des Portugais? -N’ai je pas vu _ici, en France_, un des frères d’armes de Junot -souffrir qu’on imprimât, dans un ouvrage traduit de l’Anglais, des -choses revoltantes de fausseté sur lui et sur le maréchal Ney?...... -Cet ouvrage, fait par un colonel Napier, et qui a trouvé grâce devant -le ministère de la guerre parce qu’il dit du bien du ministre, m’a -été donné _à moi, à moi la veuve de Junot_, comme renfermant des -documents _authentiques_. J’ai du y lire une indécente attaque contre -la vie privée d’un homme dont on ne pouvait dire aucun mal comme -militaire dans cette admirable affaire de la Convention de Cintra, -puisque les Anglais ont fait passer à une commission militaire ceux -qui l’avaient signée pour l’Angleterre; et les beaux vers de Childe -Harold suffisent seuls à la gloire de Junot, quand l’original de -cette convention ne serait pas là pour la prouver. Heureusement que -je le possède, moi, cet original, et même dans les deux langues. Il -n’est pas dans M. Napier;”———— - -It is not permitted to a man to discover ill-humour at the -expressions of a lady; yet when those expressions are dishonouring -to him, and that reputation and talents are joined to beauty to give -them a wide circulation, it would indicate insensibility to leave -them unnoticed. - -To judge of the talents of a general by his conduct in the field has -always been the undisputed right of every military writer. I will not -therefore enter upon that subject, because I am persuaded that your -grace could not mean to apply the words “_revolting falsehoods_” to -a simple judgement of the military genius of the duke of Abrantes. -Indeed you intimate that the offensive passages are those directed -against his private life, and touching the Convention of Cintra. -I think, however, your grace has not perused my work with much -attention, or you would scarcely have failed to perceive that I have -given the Convention of Cintra at length in the Appendix. - -But, in truth, I have only alluded to general Junot’s private -qualities when they bore directly upon his government of Portugal, -and, by a fresh reference to my work, you will find that I have -affirmed nothing of my own knowledge. The character of the late duke -of Abrantes, as drawn by me, is that ascribed to him by the emperor -Napoleon, (see _Las Cases_,) and the authority of that great man is -expressly quoted. It is against Napoleon therefore, and not against -me, who am but a repeater of his uncontradicted observations, that -your resentment should be directed. - -If your grace should deign to dispose of any further thought upon me -or my work, I would venture to suggest a perusal of the Portuguese, -and English, and Spanish, and German histories of the invasion of -Portugal; or even a slight examination of only a small part of the -innumerable, and some of them very celebrated periodicals which treat -of that event. You will be then convinced that, so far from having -wantonly assailed the character of general Junot, I have made no -slight effort to stem the torrent of abuse with which he has been -unjustly overwhelmed; and believe me, madam, that the estimation in -which an eminent man will be held by the world is more surely to -be found in the literature of different countries than in the fond -recollection of his own family. I admired general Junot’s daring -character, and having enough of the soldier in me to like a brave -enemy, I have, wherever the truth of history would permit, expressed -that feeling towards him and towards other French generals whose -characters and whose acts have been alike maligned by party writers -in this country: such indeed has been my regard for justice on this -point, that I have thereby incurred the charge of writing with a -French rather than a national bias, as your grace will discover by -referring to my lord Mahon’s History of the War of the Succession, -in which his lordship has done me the honour to observe that I have -written “_by far the best_ FRENCH _account_ yet published of the -Peninsular War.” - -For my own part I still think that to refrain from vulgar abuse -of a gallant enemy will not be deemed un-English, although lord -Mahon considers it wholly French; but his lordship’s observation -incontestibly proves that I have discovered no undue eagerness to -malign any of the French generals; and with respect to the duke -of Abrantes, I could shew that all the offensive passages in my -work rest upon the published authority of his own countrymen, and -especially of his great master the emperor Napoleon, and that -they are of a milder expression than those authorities would have -warranted. It is, however, so natural and so amiable in a lady to -defend the reputation of her deceased husband, that rather than -appear to detract in any manner from the grace of such a proceeding, -I choose to be silent under the unmitigated severity of your grace’s -observations. - -Not so, however, with respect to that part of your remarks which -relate to marshal Ney. After carefully re-examining every sentence -I have written, I am quite unable to discover the slightest grounds -for your grace’s accusations. In all parts of my work the name of Ney -is mentioned with praise. I have not, indeed, made myself a partizan -of marshal Ney in relating his disputes with marshals Soult and -Massena, because I honestly believed that he was mistaken; neither -have I attributed to him unbounded talents for the higher parts of -war, but this is only matter of opinion which the world is quite -capable of appreciating at its true value; and upon all other points -I have expressed admiration of marshal Ney’s extraordinary qualities, -his matchless valour, his heroic energy! - -In the hope that your grace will now think it reasonable to soften -the asperity of your feelings towards my work, I take my leave, with -more of admiration for your generous warmth in defence of a person so -dear to you, than of any sentiment of resentment for the harsh terms -which you have employed towards myself. And I remain, madam, - - Your very obedient servant, - WILLIAM NAPIER, COLONEL. - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - PENINSULAR WAR. - - - - -BOOK XIII. - - -CHAPTER I. - -[Sidenote: 1810.] - -While marshal Beresford followed Soult towards Llerena lord -Wellington recommenced the siege of Badajos, but the relation -of that operation must be delayed until the transactions which -occurred in Spain, during Massena’s invasion of Portugal, have been -noticed, for it is not by following one stream of action that a -just idea of this war can be obtained. Many of lord Wellington’s -proceedings might be called rash, and others timid, and slow, if -taken separately; yet, when viewed as parts of a great plan for -delivering the whole Peninsula, they will be found discreet or -daring, as the circumstances warranted: nor is there any portion of -his campaigns, that requires this wide-based consideration, more than -his early sieges; which, being instituted contrary to the rules of -art, and unsuccessful, or, when successful, attended with a mournful -slaughter, have given occasion for questioning his great military -qualities, which were however, then most signally displayed. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. III p. 404.] - -[Sidenote: Official abstract of general Walker’s despatches] - -[Sidenote: Official abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s despatches MSS.] - -In the northern provinces the events were of little interest. -Gallicia after the failure of Renovales’ expedition and the shipwreck -that followed, became torpid; the junta disregarded general Walker’s -exhortations, and, although he furnished vast supplies, the army, -nominally twenty thousand strong, mustered only six thousand in the -field: there was no cavalry, and the infantry kept close in the -mountains about Villa Franca, while a weak French division occupied -the rich plains of Leon. General Mahi having refused to combine his -operations with those of the Anglo-Portuguese army, was thought to -be disaffected, and at the desire of the British authorities had -been removed to make way for the duke of Albuquerque: he was however -immediately appointed to the command of Murcia, by Blake, in defiance -of the remonstrances of Mr. Wellesley, for Blake disregarded the -English influence. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. III pp. 312, 407, and 475.] - -When Albuquerque died, Gallicia fell to Castaños, and while that -officer was co-operating with Beresford in Estremadura, Santocildes -assumed the command. Meanwhile Caffarelli’s reserve having joined the -army of the north, Santona was fortified, and Bessieres, as I have -before observed, assembled seven thousand men at Zamora to invade -Gallicia. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.] - -In the Asturias, Bonet, although harassed, on the side of Potes, -by the Guerillas from the mountains of Liebana; and on the coast -by the English frigates, remained at Oviedo, and maintained his -communications by the left with the troops in Leon. In November -1810 he defeated a considerable body of insurgents, and in February -1811 the Spanish general St. Pol retired before him with the regular -forces, from the Xalon to the Navia; but this retreat caused such -discontent in Gallicia that St. Pol advanced again on the 19th March, -and was again driven back. Bonet then dispersed the Partidas, and -was ready to aid Bessieres’ invasion of Gallicia; and although the -arrival of the allied forces on the Coa in pursuit of Massena stopped -that enterprise, he made an incursion along the coast, seized the -Spanish stores of English arms and clothing, and then returned to -Oviedo. The war was, indeed, so little formidable to the French, -that in May Santander was evacuated, and all the cavalry in Castile -and Leon joined Massena for the battle of Fuentes Onoro, and yet the -Gallician and Asturian regular armies gained no advantage during -their absence. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted letter of general Barthelemy to general -Drouet, 1810. MSS.] - -The Partidas, who had re-assembled after their defeat by Bonet, were -more active. Porlier, Campillo, Longa, Amor, and Merino cut off small -French parties in the Montaña, in the Rioja, in Biscay, and in the -Baston de Laredo; they were not, indeed, dangerous in action, nor was -it very difficult to destroy them by combined movements, but these -combinations were hard to effect, from the little accord amongst -the French generals, and thus they easily maintained their posts at -Espinosa de Monteres, Medina, and Villarcayo. Campillo was the most -powerful after Porlier. His principal haunts were in the valleys of -Mena and Caranza; but he was in communication with Barbara, Honejas, -and Curillas, petty chiefs of Biscay, with whom he concerted attacks -upon couriers and weak detachments: and he sometimes divided his -band into small parties, with which he overran the valleys of -Gurieso, Soba, Carrado, and Jorrando, partly to raise contributions, -partly to gather recruits, whom he forced to join him. His chief -aim was, however, to intercept the despatches going from Bilbao to -Santander, and for this purpose he used to infest Liendo between -Ovira and Laredo, which he was enabled the more safely to do, because -general Barthelemy, the governor of the Montaña, was forced to watch -more earnestly towards the hilly district of Liebana, between Leon -and the Asturias. This district was Porlier’s strong-hold, and that -chief, under whom Campillo himself would at times act, used to cross -the Deba and penetrate into the valleys of Cabuerniego, Rio Nauza, -Cieza, and Buelna, and he obliged the people to fly to the mountains -with their effects whenever the French approached: nevertheless the -mass were tired of this guerilla system and tractable enough, except -in Liebana. - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -To beat Campillo once or twice would have been sufficient to ruin -him, but to ruin Porlier required great combinations. It was -necessary to seize Espinosa, not that of Monteres, but a village in -the mountains of Liebana, from whence the valleys all projected as -from a point, and whence the troops could consequently act towards -Potes with success. General Barthelemy proposed this plan to Drouet, -then with the 9th corps on the Upper Douro, whom he desired to -co-operate from the side of Leon, while Bonet did the same from the -side of the Asturias: but though partially adopted, the execution was -not effectually followed up, the districts of Liebana and Santander -continued to be disturbed, and the chain of Partidas was prolonged -through Biscay and the Rioja, to Navarre. - -[Sidenote: 1811. May.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.] - -In this last province Mina had on the 22d of May defeated at -the Puerto de Arlaban, near Vittoria, twelve hundred men who -were escorting a convoy of prisoners and treasure to France; his -success was complete, but alloyed by the death of two hundred of -the prisoners, unfortunately killed during the tumult; and it was -stained by the murder of six Spanish ladies, who, for being attached -to French officers, were in cold blood executed after the fight. -Massena, whose baggage was captured, was to have travelled with -this escort, but disliking the manner of the march, he remained in -Vittoria until a better opportunity, and so escaped. - -These partizan operations, combined with the descents on the coast, -the aspect of the war in Estremadura, and the unprotected state -of Castile, which was now menaced by Santocildes, were rendered -more important by another event to be noticed hereafter: Bessieres -therefore resolved to contract his position in the north; and first -causing Reille and Caffarelli to scour Biscay and the Rioja, he -ordered Bonet to abandon the Asturias. On the 14th of June that -general, having dismantled the coast-batteries, sent his sick and -baggage by sea to Santander and marched into Leon, where Santocildes, -who had now increased the Gallician field army to thirteen thousand -men, was menacing Astorga, which place the French evacuated after -blowing up some of the works. Serras and Bonet then united on the -Esla, and being supported by three thousand men from Rio Seco, -skirmished at the Ponte de Orvigo on the 23d, but had the worst, and -general Valletaux was killed on their side: and as lord Wellington’s -operations in Estremadura soon drew the French armies towards -that quarter Santocildes held his ground at Astorga until August. -Meanwhile two thousand French were thrown into Santona, and general -Rognet coming, from the side of Burgos, with a division of the young -guard, made a fruitless incursion against the Partidas of Liebana. - -[Sidenote: 1811. June.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.] - -This system of warfare was necessarily harassing to the French -divisions actually engaged, but it was evident that neither the -Asturias nor Gallicia could be reckoned as good auxiliaries to lord -Wellington. Gallicia with its lordly junta, regular army, fortified -towns, rugged fastnesses, numerous population, and constant supplies -from England, was of less weight in the contest than five thousand -Portuguese militia conducted by Trant and Wilson. The irregular -warfare was now also beginning to produce its usual effects; the tree -though grafted in patriotism bore strange fruit. In Biscay, which had -been longest accustomed to the presence of the invaders, the armed -peasantry were often found fighting in the ranks of the enemy, and -on one occasion did of themselves attack the boats of the Amelia -frigate to save French military stores! Turning now to the other line -of invasion, we shall find the contest fiercer, indeed, and more -honourable to the Spaniards, but the result still more unfavourable -to their cause. - - -OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES. - -It will be remembered that Suchet, after the fall of Mequinenza, was -ordered to besiege Tortoza while Macdonald marched against Taragona. -Massena was then concentrating his army for the invasion of Portugal, -and it was the emperor’s intention that Suchet should, after taking -Tortoza, march with half of the third corps to support the prince -of Esling. But the reduction of Tortoza proved a more tedious task -than Napoleon anticipated, and as the course of events had now given -the French armies of Catalonia and Aragon a common object, it will -be well to compare their situation and resources with those of their -adversary. - -Suchet was completely master of Aragon, and not more by the force of -his arms, than by the influence of his administration; the province -was fertile, and so tranquil in the interior, that his magazines -were all filled, and his convoys travelled under the care of Spanish -commissaries and conductors. Mina was however in Navarre on his -rear, and he communicated on the right bank of the Ebro with the -Partidas in the mountains of Moncayo and Albaracin; and these last -were occasionally backed by the Empecinado, Duran, and others whose -strong-holds were in the Guadalaxara, and who from thence infested -Cuença and the vicinity of Madrid. From Albaracin, Villa Campa -continued the chain of partizan warfare and connected it with the -Valencian army, which had also a line of operation towards Cuença. -Mina, who communicated with the English vessels in the bay of Biscay, -received his supplies from Coruña; and the others, in like manner, -corresponded with Valencia, from whence the English consul Tupper -succoured them with arms, money, and ammunition. Thus a line was -drawn quite across the Peninsula which it was in vain for the enemy -to break, as the retreat was secure at both ends, and the excitement -to renewed efforts constant. - -On the other flank of Suchet’s position the high valleys of the -Pyrenees were swarming with small bands, forming a link between -Mina and a division of the Catalonian army stationed about the Seu -d’Urgel, which was a fortified castle, closing the passage leading -from the plain of that name to the Cerdaña: this division in -conjunction with Rovira, and other partizans, extended the irregular -warfare on the side of Olot and Castelfollit to the Ampurdan; and -the whole depended upon Taragona, which itself was supported by -the English fleet in the Mediterranean. Aragon may therefore be -considered as an invested fortress, which the Spaniards thought to -reduce by famine, by assault, and by exciting the population against -the garrison; but Suchet baffled them; he had made such judicious -arrangements that his convoys were secure in the interior, and all -the important points on the frontier circle were fortified, and -connected, with Zaragoza, by chains of minor ports radiating from -that common centre. Lerida, Mequinenza, and the plain of Urgel -in Catalonia, the fort of Morella in Valencia, were his; and by -fortifying Teruel and Alcanitz he had secured the chief passages -leading through the mountains to the latter kingdom: he could thus, -at will, invade either Catalonia or Valencia, and from Mequinenza -he could, by water, transport the stores necessary to besiege -Tortoza. Nor were these advantages the result of aught but his -uncommon talents for war, a consideration which rendered them doubly -formidable. - -The situation of the French in Catalonia was different. Macdonald, -who had assumed the command at the moment when Napoleon wished -him to co-operate with Suchet, was inexperienced in the peculiar -warfare of the province, and unprepared to execute any extended plan -of operations. His troops were about Gerona and Hostalrich, which -were in fact the bounds of the French conquest at this period; for -Barcelona was a military point beyond their field system, and only -to be maintained by expeditions; and the country was so exhausted -of provisions in the interior, that the army itself could only be -fed by land-convoys from France, or by such coasters as, eluding the -vigilance of the English cruizers, could reach Rosas, St. Filieu, -and Palamos. Barcelona like the horse-leech continually cried for -more, and as the inhabitants as well as the garrison depended on the -convoys, the latter were enormous, reference being had to the limited -means of the French general, and the difficulty of moving; for, -although the distance between Hostalrich and Barcelona was only forty -miles, the road, as far as Granollers, was a succession of defiles, -and crossed by several rivers, of which the Congosta and the Tordera -were considerable obstacles; and the nature of the soil was clayey -and heavy, especially in the defiles of the Trenta Pasos. - -These things rendered it difficult for Macdonald to operate in -regular warfare from his base of Gerona, and as the stores for the -siege of Taragona were to come from France, until they arrived he -could only make sudden incursions with light baggage, trusting to the -resources still to be found in the open country, or to be gathered -in the mountains by detachments which would have to fight for every -morsel. This then was the condition of the French armies, that -starting from separate bases, they had to operate on lines meeting at -Tortoza. It remains to shew the situation of the Catalan general. - -[Sidenote: 1810. July.] - -After the battle of Margalef, Henry O’Donnel reunited his scattered -forces, and being of a stern unyielding disposition, not only -repressed the discontent occasioned by that defeat, but forced the -reluctant Miguelettes to swell his ranks and to submit to discipline. -Being assisted with money and arms by the British agents, and having -free communication by sea with Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Minorca, he -was soon enabled to reorganize his army, to collect vast magazines -at Taragona, and to strengthen that place by new works. In July his -force again amounted to twenty-two thousand men exclusive of the -Partidas, and of the Somatenes, who were useful to aid in a pursuit, -to break up roads, and to cut off straggling soldiers. Of this number -one division under Campo Verde, was, as I have before said, in the -higher valleys, having a detachment at Olot, and being supported by -the fortified castles of Seu D’Urgel, Cardona, Solsona, and Berga. -A second division was on the Llobregat, watching the garrison of -Barcelona, and having detachments in Montserrat, Igualada, and -Manresa to communicate with Campo Verde. The third division, the -reserve and the cavalry were on the hills about Taragona, and that -place and Tortoza had large garrisons. - -[Sidenote: General Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Colonel Green’s do MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Official Abstracts of Mr. Wellesley’s Despatches, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.] - -By this disposition, O’Donnel occupied Falcet, the Col de Balaguer, -and the Col del Alba, which were the passages leading to Tortoza; -the Col de Ribas and Momblanch, which commanded the roads to Lerida; -San Coloma de Queralt and Igualada, through which his connection -with Campo Verde was maintained; and thus the two French armies were -separated not only by the great spinal ridges descending from the -Pyrenees, but by the position of the Spaniards, who held all the -passes, and could at will concentrate and attack either Suchet or -Macdonald. But the Catalonian system was now also connected with -Valencia, where, exclusive of irregulars, there were about fifteen -thousand men under General Bassecour. That officer had in June -occupied Cuença, yet having many quarrels with his officers he could -do nothing, and was driven from thence by troops from Madrid: he -returned to Valencia, but the disputes continued and extended to the -junta or congress of Valencia, three members of which were by the -general imprisoned. Nevertheless, as all parties were now sensible -that Valencia should be defended at Tortoza, Bassecour prepared to -march to its succour by the coast-road where he had several fortified -posts. Thus, while Suchet and Macdonald were combining to crush -O’Donnel, the latter was combining with Bassecour, to press upon -Suchet; and there was always the English maritime force at hand to -aid the attacks or to facilitate the escape of the Spaniards. - -In the above exposition I have called the native armies by the names -of their provinces, but in December 1810 the whole military force -being reorganized by the regency the armies were designated by -numbers. Thus the Catalonian forces, formerly called _the army of -the right_, was now called the _first army_. The Valencians, together -with Villa Campa’s division, and the partidas of the Empecinado and -Duran, were called the _second army_. The Murcian force was called -the _third army_. The troops at Cadiz, at Algesiras, and in the Conde -Niebla were called the _fourth army_. The remnants of Romana’s old -Gallician division which had escaped the slaughter on the Gebora -formed the _fifth army_. The new-raised troops of Gallicia and those -of the Asturias were called the _sixth army_. And the partidas of the -north, that is to say, Mina’s, Longa’s, Campillo’s, Porlier’s, and -other smaller bands formed the _seventh army_. - -Such was the state of affairs when Napoleon’s order to besiege -Tortoza arrived. Suchet was ready to execute it. More than fifty -battering guns selected from those at Lerida were already equipped, -and his depôts were established at Mequinenza, Caspe, and Alcanitz. -All the fortified posts were provisioned; twelve thousand men under -general Musnier, intended for the security of Aragon, were disposed -at Huesca and other minor points on the left bank of the Ebro, and -at Daroca, Teruel, and Calatayud on the right bank; and while these -arrangements were being executed, the troops destined for the siege -had assembled at Lerida and Alcanitz, under generals Habert and -Laval, their provisions being drawn from the newly conquered district -of Urgel. - -[Sidenote: See plans, No. 1 & 3.] - -From Mequinenza, which was the principal depôt, there was -water-carriage, but as the Ebro was crossed at several points by -rocky bars, some of which were only passable in full water, the -communication was too uncertain to depend upon, and Suchet therefore -set workmen to reopen an old road thirty miles in length, which had -been made by the duke of Orleans during the war of the succession. -This road pierced the mountains on the right bank of the Ebro, passed -through Batea and other places to Mora, and from thence by Pinel to -Tortoza, running through a celebrated defile called indifferently -the _Trincheras_ and the _Passage of Arms_. When these preliminary -arrangements were made general Habert assembled his division at -Belpuig near Lerida, and after making a feint as if to go towards -Barcelona, suddenly turned to his right, and penetrating through the -district of Garriga, reached Garcia on the left bank of the Lower -Ebro the 5th of July. Laval at the same time quitted Alcanitz, made a -feint towards Valencia by Morella, and then turning to his left, came -so unexpectedly upon Tortoza by the right bank of the Ebro, that he -surprised some of the outposts on the 2d, and then encamped before -the bridge-head. The 4th he extended his line to Amposta, seized the -ferry-boat of the great road from Barcelona to Valencia, and posted -Boussard’s cuirassiers, with a battalion of infantry and six guns, at -Uldecona, on the Cenia river, to observe Bassecour’s Valencians. - -During these operations Suchet fixed his own quarters at Mora, and -as the new road was not finished, he occupied Miravet, Pinel, and -the Trincheras, on its intended line; and having placed flying -bridges, with covering works, on the Ebro, at Mora and Xerta, made -those places his depôt of siege. He likewise seized the craft on the -river, established posts at Rapita, near the mouth of the Ebro, and -at Amposta, and made a fruitless attempt to burn the boat-bridge of -Tortoza, with fire vessels. Following Napoleon’s order, Macdonald -should at this time have been before Taragona; but on the 9th, Suchet -learned, from a spy, that the seventh corps was still at Gerona, and -he thus found himself exposed alone to the combined efforts of the -Catalans and Valencians. This made him repent of having moved from -Aragon so soon, yet thinking it would be bad to retire, he resolved -to blockade Tortoza; hoping to resist both O’Donnel and Bassecour -until Macdonald could advance. - -The Spaniards who knew his situation, sallied on the right bank the -6th and 8th, and on the 10th his outposts on the left bank were -driven in at Tivisa by a division from Falcet, which, the next day, -fell on his works at Mora, but was repulsed; and the 12th, general -Paris pushed back the Spanish line, while Habert took post in -force at Tivisa, by which he covered the roads to Xerta and Mora. -O’Donoghue, who commanded Bassecour’s advanced guard, now menaced -Morella, but general Montmarie being detached to its succour, drove -him away. - -The 30th, O’Donnel having brought up fresh troops to Falcet, made a -feint with ten thousand men against Tivisa, and then suddenly entered -Tortoza, from whence at mid-day, on the 3d of August, he passed the -bridge and fell with the bayonet on Laval’s entrenchments. The French -gave way at first, but soon rallied, and the Spaniards fearing for -their communications regained the town in disorder, having lost two -hundred prisoners besides killed and wounded. - -[Sidenote: 1810. August.] - -This operation had been concerted with general Caro, who having -superseded O’Donoghue, was now marching with the Valencians by the -coast-road towards Uldecona: Suchet therefore, judging that the -intention of the Spaniards was to force him away from the Lower Ebro, -before Macdonald could pass the Llobregat, resolved first to strike -a sudden blow at the Valencians, and then turn upon the Catalans. -In this view he contracted his quarters on the Ebro, and united at -Uldecona, on the 13th, eleven battalions with eight hundred horsemen. -Caro was then in a strong position covering the two great routes to -Valencia, but when the French, after driving in his advanced guard -from Vinaros, came up, his Valencians would not stand a battle, -and being followed beyond Peniscola separated and retreated in -disorder by different roads. Whereupon Suchet returned to Mora, and -there found an officer of Macdonald’s army, who brought information -that the seventh corps was at last in the plains of Reus, and its -communications with the third corps open. - - -OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS. - -[Sidenote: 1810. June.] - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes des François.] - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -When Macdonald succeeded Augereau he found the troops in a state of -insubordination, accustomed to plunder, and excited to ferocity by -the cruelty of the Catalans, and by the conduct of his predecessor; -they were without magazines or regular subsistence, and lived by -exactions: hence the people, driven to desperation, were more like -wild beasts than men, and the war was repulsive to him in all its -features. It was one of shifts and devices, and he better understood -methodical movements; it was one of plunder, and he was a severe -disciplinarian; it was full of cruelty on all sides, and he was -of a humane and just disposition. Being resolved to introduce -regular habits, Macdonald severely rebuked the troops for their bad -discipline and cruelty, and endeavoured to soothe the Catalans, -but neither could be brought to soften in their enmity; the mutual -injuries sustained, were too horrible and too recent to be forgiven. -The soldiers, drawn from different countries, and therefore not bound -by any common national feeling, were irritated against a general, who -made them pay for wanton damages, and punished them for plundering; -and the Catalans attributing his conduct to fear, because he could -not entirely restrain the violence of his men, still fled from -the villages, and still massacred his stragglers with unrelenting -barbarity. - -While establishing his system it was impossible for Macdonald to -take the field, because, without magazines, no army can be kept in -due discipline; wherefore he remained about Gerona, drawing with -great labour and pains his provisions from France, and storing up the -overplus for his future operations. On the 10th of June however the -wants of Barcelona became so serious, that leaving his baggage under -a strong guard at Gerona, and his recruits and cavalry at Figueras, -he marched with ten thousand men and a convoy, to its relief, by the -way of the Trenta Pasos, Cardedieu, and Granollers. The road was -heavy, the defiles narrow, the rivers swelled, and the manner of -march rather too pompous for the nature of the war, for Macdonald -took post in order of battle on each side of the defiles, while the -engineers repaired the ways: in every thing adhered to his resolution -of restoring a sound system; but while imitating the Jugurthine -Metellus, he forgot that he had not Romans, but a mixed and -ferocious multitude under his command, and he lost more by wasting of -time, than he gained by enforcing an irksome discipline. Thus when he -had reached Barcelona, his own provisions were expended, his convoy -furnished only a slender supply for the city, and the next day he was -forced to return with the empty carts in all haste to Gerona, where -he resumed his former plan of action, and demolished the forts beyond -that city. - -[Sidenote: 1810. July.] - -In July he collected another convoy and prepared to march in the -same order as before, for his intent was to form magazines in -Barcelona sufficient for that city and his own supply, during the -siege of Taragona; but meanwhile Suchet was unable to commence the -siege of Tortoza, in default of the co-operation of the seventh -corps; and Henry O’Donnel having gained time to reorganize his army -and to re-establish his authority was now ready to interrupt the -French marshal’s march, proposing, if he failed, to raise a fresh -insurrection in the Ampurdan, and thus give further occupation on -that side. He had transferred a part of his forces to Caldas, Santa -Coloma, and Bruñolas, taking nearly the same positions that Blake had -occupied during the siege of Gerona; but the French detachments soon -obliged him to concentrate again behind the defiles of the Congosta, -where he hoped to stop the passage of the convoy; Macdonald, however, -entered Hostalrich on the 16th, forced the Trenta Pasos on the 17th, -and although his troops had only fifty rounds of ammunition he drove -three thousand men from the pass of Garriga on the 18th, reached -Barcelona that night, delivered his convoy, and returned immediately. - -[Sidenote: 1810. August.] - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -The French soldiers now became sickly from the hardships of a march -rendered oppressive by the severity of their discipline, and many -also deserted; yet others, who had before gone off, returned to their -colours, reinforcements arrived from France, and the emperor’s orders -to take the field were becoming so pressing, that Macdonald, giving -Baraguay d’Hilliers the command of the Ampurdan, marched on the 8th -of August with a third convoy for Barcelona, resolved at last to -co-operate with Suchet. Instructed by experience he however moved -this time with less formality, and having reached Barcelona the 11th, -deposited his convoy, appointed Maurice Mathieu governor of that -city, and on the 15th forced the pass of Ordal, and reached Villa -Franca with about sixteen thousand men under arms. O’Donnel, still -smarting from the affair at Tortoza, retired before him to Taragona -without fighting, but directed Campo Verde to leave a body of troops -under general Martinez in the mountains about Olot, and to move -himself through Montserrat to the district of Garriga, which lies -between Lerida and Tortoza; meanwhile the seventh corps passed by -Braffin and Valls into the plain of Reus, and as we have seen opened -the communication with Suchet, but to how little purpose shall be -shewn in the next chapter. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -[Sidenote: 1810. August.] - -As the Spanish general knew that the French could at Reus find -provisions for only a few days, he withdrew his division from Falcet, -and while Campo Verde, coming into the Garriga, occupied the passes -behind them, and other troops were placed in the defiles between -Valls and Villafranca, he held the main body of his army concentrated -at Taragona, ready to fall upon Macdonald whenever he should move. -This done, he became extremely elated, for like all Spaniards he -imagined that to surround an enemy was the perfection of military -operations. Macdonald cared little for the vicinity of the Catalan -troops, but he had not yet formed sufficient magazines at Barcelona -to commence the siege of Taragona, nor could he, as O’Donnel had -foreseen, procure more than a few days supply about Reus, he -therefore relinquished all idea of a siege and proposed to aid Suchet -in the operation against Tortoza, if the latter would feed the -seventh corps; and pending Suchet’s decision he resolved to remove to -Lerida. - -The 25th of August leaving seven hundred sick men in Reus, he made a -feint against the Col de Balaguer, but soon changing his direction -marched upon Momblanch and the Col de Ribas: his rear-guard, composed -of Italian troops, being overtaken near Alcover, offered battle at -the bridge of Goy, but this the Spaniards declined, and they also -neglected to secure the heights on each side, which the Italians -immediately turned to account and so made their way to Pixamoxons. -They were pursued immediately, and Sarsfield coming from the Lerida -side disputed the passage of Pixamoxons; but Macdonald, keeping the -troops from Taragona in check with a rear-guard, again sent his -Italians up the hills on the flanks while he pushed his French troops -against the front of the enemy, and so succeeded; for the Italians -quickly carried the heights, the rear-guard was very slightly -pressed, the front was unopposed, and in two hours, the army reached -Momblanch, whence after a short halt, it descended into the plains of -Urgel. - -[Sidenote: 1810. Sept.] - -Suchet being informed of this march came from Mora to confer with -Macdonald, and they agreed that the seventh corps should have for its -subsistence the magazines of Monzon and the plains of Urgel, which -had not yet delivered its contributions. In return Macdonald lent -the Neapolitan division to guard Suchet’s convoys down the Ebro, -and promised that the divisions of Severoli and Souham should cover -the operations of the third corps, during the siege of Tortoza, by -drawing the attention of the Catalan generals to the side of Cardona. - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -The seventh corps was now quartered about Tarega, Cervera, Guisona, -and Agramunt, and Severola was detached with four thousand men over -the Segre to enforce the requisitions about Talarn. He drove four -hundred Swiss from the bridge of Tremp, and executed his mission, but -with such violence that the people, becoming furious, assassinated -the stragglers, and laid so many successful schemes of murder, that -Macdonald was forced reluctantly to renew the executions and burnings -of his predecessors. Indeed, to feed an army forcibly when all -things are paid for, will, in a poor and mountainous country, create -soreness, because the things taken cannot easily be replaced; but -with requisitions severity is absolutely necessary. In rich plains -the inhabitants can afford to supply the troops and will do so, to -avoid being plundered; but mountaineers having scarcely any thing -besides food, and little of that, are immediately rendered desperate -and must be treated as enemies or left in quiet. - -While Severoli was ravaging Tremp and Talarn, general Eugenio marched -with another Italian detachment towards Castelfollit, which had a -French garrison, and Macdonald removed his own quarters to Cervera. -Meanwhile O’Donnel, having replaced his division at Falcet to observe -Suchet, distributed his other forces on the line of communication -through San Coloma de Querault, Igualada, Montserrat, and Cardona; he -thus cut off all connection between Macdonald and the Ampurdan, and -enabled Campo Verde closely to follow the operations of the seventh -corps, and that general seeing the French army separated, fell first -upon the head-quarters at Cervera, but being unsuccessful, marched -against Eugenio, and was by him also repulsed near Castelfollit. -Eugenio, distinguished alike by his valour and ferocity, then -returned with his booty to Agramunt, and afterwards invading Pons, -spoiled and ravaged all that district without hindrance. The -provisions obtained, were heaped up in Lerida and Balaguer; but while -Macdonald was thus acting in the plain of Urgel, O’Donnel formed and -executed the most skilful plan which had yet graced the Spanish arms. - -We have seen that Baraguay d’Hilliers was left with eighteen -or twenty thousand men in the Ampurdan, but these troops were -necessarily scattered: seven hundred were at Palamos, San Filieu, -and other small ports along the coast; twelve hundred, under general -Swartz, were quartered in Abispal, one short march from Gerona, -and two hundred were at Calonjé, connecting Abispal with Palamos; -the rest were in Figueras, Rosas, Olot, Castelfollit, Gerona, and -Hostalrich, and several thousand were in hospital. O’Donnel having -exact knowledge of all this, left a small garrison in Taragona, -placed the baron d’Errolles at Montserrat, colonel Georget at -Igualada, and Obispo at Martorel, while with six thousand infantry -and four hundred cavalry he marched himself through the mountains, -by San Culgat to Mattaro on the sea-coast: then crossing the Tordera -below Hostalrich, he moved rapidly by Vidreras to Llagostera which he -reached the 12th of September. His arrival was unknown to Macdonald, -or Maurice Mathieu, or Baraguay d’Hilliers, for though many reports -of his intentions were afloat, most of them spread by himself, no -person divined his real object: by some he was said to be gone -against a French corps, which, from the side of Navarre, had entered -the Cerdaña; by others that he was concentrating at Manresa, and many -concluded that he was still in Taragona. - -Having thus happily attained his first object, O’Donnel proceeded -in his plan with a vigour of execution equal to the conception. -Leaving Campo Verde with a reserve in the valley of Aro, he sent -detachments to fall on Calonjé and the posts along the coast, the -operations there being seconded by two English frigates; and while -this was in progress, O’Donnel himself on the 14th marched violently -down from Casa de Silva upon Abispal. Swartz, always unfortunate, -had his infantry and some cavalry under arms in an entrenched -camp, and accepted battle; but after losing two hundred men and -seeing no retreat, yielded, and all the French troops along the -coast were likewise forced to surrender. The prisoners and spoil -were immediately embarked on board the English vessels and sent to -Taragona. - -[Sidenote: 1810. October.] - -Until this moment Baraguay d’Hilliers was quite ignorant of -O’Donnel’s arrival, and the whole Ampurdan was thrown into confusion; -for the Somatenes, rising in all parts, cut off the communications -with Macdonald, whose posts on the side of Calaf and Cervera were at -the same time harassed by Errolles and Obispo: nevertheless, although -a rumour of Swartz’s disaster reached him, Macdonald would not credit -it, and continued in the plain of Urgel. Baraguay d’Hilliers was -therefore unable to do more than protect his own convoys from France, -and would have been in a dangerous position if O’Donnel’s activity -had continued; but that general having been severely wounded, the -Spanish efforts relaxed, and Napoleon, whose eyes were every where, -sent general Conroux, in the latter end of October, with a convoy -and reinforcement of troops from Perpignan to Gerona. O’Donnel, -troubled by his wound, then embarked; and Campo Verde, who succeeded -to the command, immediately sent a part of the army to Taragona, left -Rovira, and Claros, and Manso, to nourish the insurrection in the -Ampurdan, and took post himself at Manresa, from thence he at first -menaced Macdonald’s posts at Calaf; but his real object was to break -up that road, which he effected, and then passed suddenly through -Berga and Cardona to Puigcerda, and drove the French detachment, -which had come from Navarre to ravage the fertile district of -Cerdaña, under the guns of Fort Louis. - -This excursion attracted Macdonald’s attention, he was now -fully apprized of Swartz’s misfortune, and he hoped to repair -it by crushing Campo Verde, taking Cardona, and dispersing the -local junta of Upper Catalonia, which had assembled in Solsona; -wherefore, on the 18th, he put his troops in motion, and the 19th, -passing the mountains of Portellas, entered Solsona; but the junta -and the inhabitants escaped to Cardona and Berja, and up the -valleys of Oleana and Urgel. Macdonald immediately sent columns -in all directions to collect provisions and to chase the Spanish -detachments, and this obliged Campo Verde to abandon the Cerdaña, -which was immediately foraged by the troops from Fort Louis. It only -remained to sieze Cardona, and on the 21st the French marched against -that place; but Campo Verde, by a rapid movement, arrived before -them, and was in order of battle with a considerable force when -Macdonald came up. - - -COMBAT OF CARDONA. - -This town stands at the foot of a rugged hill, which is joined by -a hog’s-back ridge to the great mountain spine, dividing Eastern -from Western Catalonia. The Cardona river washed the walls, a castle -of strength crowned the height above, and though the works of the -place were weak, the Spanish army, covering all the side of the -hill between the town and the castle, presented such an imposing -spectacle, that the French general resolved to avoid a serious -action. But the French and Italians marched in separate columns, and -the latter under Eugenio, who arrived first, attacked contrary to -orders; yet he soon found his hands too full, and thus, against his -will, Macdonald was obliged also to engage to bring Eugenio off. Yet -neither was he able to resist Campo Verde, who drove all down the -mountain, and followed them briskly as they retreated to Solsona. - -Macdonald lost many men in this fight, and on the 26th returned -to Guisona. It was now more than two months since he had left the -Ampurdan, and during that time he had struck no useful blow against -the Spaniards, nor had he, in any serious manner, aided Suchet’s -operations; for the Catalans continually harassed that general’s -convoys, from the left of the Ebro, while the seventh corps, besides -suffering severely from assassinations, had been repulsed at Cardona, -had excited the people of the plain of Urgel to a state of rabid -insurrection, and had lost its own communications with the Ampurdan. -In that district the brigade of Swartz had been destroyed, the ports -of Filieu and Palamos taken, and the Catalans were every where become -more powerful and elated than before: Barcelona also was again in -distress, and a convoy from Perpignan destined for its relief dared -not pass Hostalrich. Macdonald therefore resolved to return to Gerona -by the road of Manreza, Moya, and Granollers, and having communicated -his intention to Suchet, and placed his baggage in Lerida, commenced -his march the 4th of November. - -[Sidenote: 1810. Nov.] - -Campo Verde getting intelligence of this design, took post to fight -near Calaf, yet when the French approached, his heart failed, and he -permitted them to pass. The French general therefore reached Manreza -the 7th, and immediately despatched parties towards Vich and other -places to mislead the Spaniards, while with his main body he marched -by Moya and the Gariga pass to Granollers, where he expected to -meet Baraguay d’Hilliers with the convoy from Barcelona; but being -disappointed in this, he returned by the Trenta Pasos to Gerona the -10th, and sent his convalescents to Figueras. - -[Sidenote: 1810. Dec.] - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -The vicinity of Gerona was now quite exhausted, and fresh convoys -from France were required to feed the troops, while the posts in -the Ampurdan were re-established and the district reorganized. -Macdonald’s muster-rolls presented a force of fifty-one thousand men, -of which ten thousand were in hospital, six thousand in Barcelona, -and several thousand distributed along the coast and on the lines of -communication, leaving somewhat more than thirty thousand disposable -for field-operations. Of this number, fourteen thousand were placed -under Baraguay d’Hilliers to maintain the Ampurdan, and when the -convoys arrived from France the French marshal marched, with the -remaining sixteen thousand, for the fourth time, to the succour of -Barcelona. His divisions were commanded by Souham and Pino, for -Severoli had been recalled to Italy to organize fresh reinforcements; -but following his former plan, this march also was made in one solid -body, and as the defiles had been cut up by the Spaniards, and the -bridge over the Tordera broken, Macdonald set his troops to labour, -and in six hours opened fresh ways over the hills on the right and -left of the Trenta Pasos, and so, without opposition, reached -the more open country about Granollers and Moncada. The Spaniards -then retired by their own left to Tarasa and Caldas, but Macdonald -continued to move on in a solid body upon Barcelona; for as he was -resolved not to expose himself to a dangerous attack, so he avoided -all enterprise. Thus, on the 23d, he would not permit Pino to improve -a favourable opportunity of crushing the Catalans in his front, and -on the 24th, after delivering his convoy and sending the carts back -to Belgarde, instead of pursuing Campo Verde to Tarasa, as all the -generals advised, he marched towards the Llobregat; and as Souham and -Pino remained discontented at Barcelona, their divisions were given -to Frere and Fontanes. - -Macdonald moved, on the 27th, towards Taragona, but without any -design to undertake the siege; for though the road by Ordal and -Villa Franca was broad and good, he carried no artillery or -wheel-carriages: the Spaniards, seeing this, judged he would again go -to Lerida, and posted their main body about Montserrat and Igualada; -but he disregarded them, and after beating Sarsfield from Arbos and -Vendril, turned towards the pass of Massarbones, which leads through -the range of hills separating Villa Franca from the district of -Valls. The Catalans had broken up both that and the pass of Christina -leading to the Gaya, yet the French general again made new ways, and -on the 30th spread his troops over the Paneda or plain of Taragona: -thus shewing of how little use it is to destroy roads as a defence, -unless men are also prepared to fight. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Jan.] - -Instead of occupying Reus as before, Macdonald now took a position -about Momblanch, having his rear towards Lerida, but leaving all the -passes leading from Taragona to the Ebro open for the Spaniards; -so that Suchet derived no benefit from the presence of the seventh -corps, nor could the latter feed itself, nor yet in any manner hinder -the Catalans from succouring Tortoza. For Campo Verde, coming from -Montserrat and Igualada, was encamped above the defiles between the -French position and Taragona, principally at Lilla, on the road -from Valls; and O’Donnel, who still directed the general movements, -although his wound would not suffer him to appear in the field, sent -parties into the Gariga behind Macdonald’s right flank to interrupt -his foraging parties, and to harass Suchet’s communications by the -Ebro. - -From the strong heights at Lilla, the Catalans defied the French -soldiers, calling upon them to come up and fight, and they would -have done so if Macdonald would have suffered them, but after ten -days of inactivity he divided his troops into many columns, and in -concert with Abbé’s brigade of the third corps, which marched from -Xerta, endeavoured to inclose and destroy the detachments in the -Gariga; the Spaniards however disappeared in the mountains and the -French army only gained some mules and four thousand sheep and oxen. -With this spoil they united again on the left bank of the Ebro, and -were immediately disposed on a line extending from Vinebre, which -is opposite to Flix, to Masos, which is opposite to Mora, and from -thence to Garcia and Gniestar. Suchet was thus enabled to concentrate -his troops about Tortoza and the siege of that place was immediately -commenced. - -The operations of the third corps during the five months it had been -dependent upon the slow movements of the seventh corps shall now be -related. - -[Sidenote: 1810. Sept.] - -Suchet, by resigning the plain of Urgel and the magazines at Monzon, -for Macdonald’s subsistence, in September, had deprived himself of -all the resources of the left bank of the Ebro from Mequinenza to -Tortoza, and the country about the latter place was barren; hence he -was obliged to send for his provisions to Zaragoza, Teruel, and other -places more than one hundred miles from his camp; and meanwhile the -difficulty of getting his battering train and ammunition down the -river from Mequinenza was increased because of the numerous bars and -weirs which impeded the navigation when the waters were low: moreover -Macdonald, by going to Cardona, exposed the convoys to attacks -from the left bank, by the Spanish troops which being stationed -between Taragona, Momblanch, and Falcet, were always on the watch. -Considering these things Suchet had, while the seventh corps was yet -at Lerida, and the waters accidentally high, employed the Neapolitan -brigade of the seventh corps to escort twenty-six pieces of artillery -down the river. This convoy reached Xerta the 5th of September, and -the Neapolitans were then sent to Guardia; general Habert was placed -at Tivisa; Mas de Mora was occupied by a reserve, and the Spaniards -again took post at Falcet. At this time general Laval died, and -his division was given to general Harispe, a person distinguished -throughout the war by his ability, courage, and humanity. - -Meanwhile the Valencian army had again concentrated to disturb -the blockade of Tortoza, wherefore Suchet strengthened Boussard’s -detachment at Uldecona, and gave the command to general Musnier, who -was replaced at Zaragoza by general Paris. At the same time colonel -Kliski was sent to command the detachments on the side of Montalvan, -Teruel, Daroca, and Calatayud, where a partizan warfare was continued -with undiminished activity by Villa Campa, who had contrived to -open secret communications, and to excite some commotions even in -Zaragoza. On the 7th of August he had beaten a French foraging -detachment near Cuevas, and recaptured six thousand sheep, and at -Andorra had taken both convoy and escort. On the side of Navarre -also, Mina coming down into the Cinco Villas destroyed some -detachments, and impeded the foraging parties. Thus the third corps -also began to suffer privations, and no progress was made towards the -conquest of Catalonia. - -In September, however, Villa Campa, having increased his forces, -advanced so near Suchet that general Habert attacked and drove him -over the frontier in dispersion, and recaptured all the sheep before -lost, and Suchet then brought down the remainder of the battering -train, and the stores for the siege; but as the waters of the Ebro -were low, the new road was used for the convoys, which thus came -slowly and with many interruptions and considerable loss; especially -on the 17th of September, when a whole Neapolitan battalion suffered -itself to be taken without firing a shot. - -[Sidenote: 1810. Oct.] - -In this manner affairs dragged on until the 28th of October; but then -Macdonald (O’Donnel having meantime captured Swartz and raised the -Ampurdan) returned to Gerona, whereby Suchet’s hopes of commencing -the siege were again baffled. And, as it was at this moment that -the assembling of the Cortez gave a new vigour to the resistance in -Spain and the regency’s plan of sending secret juntas, to organize -and regulate the proceedings of the partidas, was put in execution, -the activity of those bands became proportioned to the hopes excited, -and the supplies and promises thus conveyed to them. One of those -secret juntas composed of clergy and military men having property or -influence in Aragon, endeavoured to renew the insurrection formerly -excited by Blake in that province, and for this purpose sent their -emissaries into all quarters, and combined their operations with -Mina. They, also, diligently followed a plan of secretly drawing off -the provisions from Aragon, with a view to starve the French, and -general Carbajal, one of the junta, joining Villa Campa, assumed the -supreme command on that side; while captain Codrington, at the desire -of Bassecour, carried a Valencian detachment by sea to Peniscola to -fall on the left flank of Suchet, if he should attempt to penetrate -by the coast-road to Valencia. Thus, at the moment when Macdonald -returned to the Ampurdan, the Aragonese became unquiet, the partidas -from Navarre and the district of Montalvan and Calatayud, closed -in on Suchet’s communications, the Valencians came up on the one -side, towards Uldecona, and on the other Garcia Navarro moving from -Taragona with a division again assumed the position of Falcet. - -[Sidenote: 1810. Nov.] - -To check this tide of hostility the French general resolved first to -crush the insurrection project, and for this purpose detached seven -battalions and four hundred cavalry against Carbajal. Chlopiski, -who commanded them, defeated the Spaniards the 31st at Alventoza on -the route to Valencia, taking some guns and ammunition. Nevertheless -Villa Campa rallied his men in a few days on the mountain of Fuente -Santa, where he was joined by Carbajal, and having received fresh -succours renewed the project of raising the Aragonese. But Chlopiski -again defeated him the 12th of November, and the Spaniards fled in -confusion towards the river Libras, where the bridge breaking many -were drowned. The French lost more than a hundred men in this sharp -attack, and Chlopiski then returned to the blockade, leaving Kliski -with twelve hundred men to watch Villa Campa’s further movements. - -The Ebro having now risen sufficiently, the remainder of the -battering train and stores were embarked at Mequinenza, and on the -3d dropt down the stream; but the craft outstripped the escort, and -the convoy being assailed from the left bank, lost two boats; the -others grounded on the right bank, and were there defended by the -cannoneers, until the escort came up on the one side, and on the -other, general Abbé, who had been sent from Guardia to their succour. -The waters, however, suddenly subsided, and the convoy was still in -danger until Suchet reinforced Abbé, who was thus enabled to keep -the Spaniards at bay, while Habert, with fifteen hundred men, made -a diversion by attacking the camp at Falcet. On the 7th the waters -again rose and the boats with little loss reached Xerta on the 9th, -and thus all things were ready to commence the siege, but the seventh -corps still kept aloof. - -Suchet was now exceedingly perplexed; for the provisions he had with -so much pains collected, from the most distant parts of Aragon, -were rapidly wasting; forage was every day becoming scarcer, and the -plain of Urgel, was by agreement given over to the seventh corps, -which thus became a burthen instead of an aid to the third corps. -The latter had been, since the beginning of the year, ordered to -supply itself entirely from the resources of Aragon without any help -from France; and the difficulty of so doing may be judged of by the -fact, that in six months they had consumed above a hundred and twenty -thousand sheep and twelve hundred bullocks. - -To obviate the embarrassments thus accumulating, the French general -called the notables and heads of the clergy in Aragon to his -head-quarters, and with their assistance reorganized the whole -system of internal administration, in such a manner, that, giving -his confidence to the natives, removing many absurd restrictions of -their industry and trade, and leaving the municipal power and police -entirely in their hands, he drew forth the resources of the provinces -in greater abundance than before. And yet with less discontent, being -well served and obeyed, both in matters of administration and police, -by the Aragonese, whose feelings he was careful to soothe, shewing -himself in all things, an able governor, as well as a great commander. - -Macdonald was now in march from Barcelona towards Taragona, and -Suchet to aid this operation attacked the Spanish troops at Falcet. -General Habert fell on their camp in front the 19th, and to cut -off the retreat, two detachments were ordered to turn it by the -right and left; but Habert’s assault was so brisk, that before the -flanking corps could take their stations the Catalans fled, leaving -their general Garcia Navarro and three hundred men in the hands of -the victors. But while Suchet obtained this success on the side of -Falcet, the Valencian general Bassecour, thinking that the main body -of the French would be detained by Navarro on the left bank of the -Ebro, formed the design of surprising general Musnier at Uldecona. -To aid this operation, a flotilla from the harbour of Peniscola, -attacked Rapita, and other small posts occupied by the French, on -the coast between the Cenia and the Ebro; and at the same time the -governor of Tortoza menaced Amposta and the stations at the mouth of -the Ebro. - -Bassecour moved against Uldecona in three columns, one of which, -following the coast-road towards Alcanar, turned the French left, -while another passing behind the mountains took post at Las -Ventallas, in rear of Musnier’s position, to cut him off from -Tortoza. The main body went straight against his front, and in the -night of the 26th the Spanish cavalry fell upon the French camp -outside the town; but the guards, undismayed, opened a fire which -checked the attack, until the troops came out of the town and formed -in order of battle. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s Despatch. MSS.] - -At daylight the Spanish army was perceived covering the hills in -front; and those in rear also, for the detachment at Ventallas was -in sight; the French were thus surrounded and the action immediately -commenced; but the Valencians were defeated with the loss of sixteen -hundred men, and the detachment in the rear seeing the result made -off to the mountains again. Bassecour then withdrew in some order -behind the Cenia, where in the night Musnier surprised him, and at -the same time sent the cuirassiers by the route of Vinaros to cut -off his retreat, which was made with such haste and disorder that the -French cavalry falling in with the fugitives near Benicarlo, killed -or took nine hundred. Bassecour saved himself in Peniscola, and -thither also the flotilla, having failed at Rapita, returned. - -Suchet having thus cleared his rear, sent his prisoners to France -by Jaca, and directed a convoy of provisions, newly collected at -Mequinenza, to fall down the Ebro to the magazines at Mora: fearing -however that the current might again carry the boats faster than the -escort, he directed the latter to proceed first, and sent general -Abbé to Flix to meet the vessels. The Spaniards in the Garriga -observing this disposition, placed an ambuscade near Mequinenza, and -attacked the craft before they could come up with the escort; the -boats were then run ashore on the right side, and seventy men from -Mequinenza came down the left bank to their aid, which saved the -convoy, but the succouring detachment was cut to pieces. Soon after -this the seventh corps having scoured the Garriga took post on the -left bank of the Ebro, and enabled the third corps to commence the -long delayed siege. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: 1810. Dec.] - -Tortoza, with a population of ten thousand souls and a garrison of -from eight to nine thousand regular troops, was justly considered -the principal bulwark of both Catalonia and Valencia, but it was -under the command of general Lilli, Conde d’Alacha, a feeble man, -whose only claim was, that he had shewn less incapacity than others -before the battle of Tudela in 1808. However, so confident were the -Spaniards in the strength of the place that the French attack was -considerably advanced ere any interruption was contemplated, and had -any well considered project for its relief been framed, it could -not have been executed, because jealousy and discord raged amongst -the Spanish chiefs. Campo Verde was anxious to succeed O’Donnel in -command of the Catalonian army, Bassecourt held unceasing dispute -with his own officers, and with the members of the junta or congress -of Valencia; and Villa Campa repelled the interference both of -Carbajal and Bassecour. - -At this critical time therefore every thing was stagnant, except the -English vessels which blockaded Rosas, Barcelona, and the mouths of -the Ebro, or from certain head-lands observed and pounced upon the -enemy’s convoys creeping along from port to port: they had thrown -provisions, ammunition, and stores of all kinds into Taragona and -Tortoza, and were generally successful, yet at times met with -disasters. Thus captain Rogers of the Kent, having with him the Ajax, -Cambrian, Sparrow-hawk, and Minstrel, disembarked six hundred men and -two field-pieces under captain Fane at Palamos, where they destroyed -a convoy intended for Barcelona; but as the seamen were re-embarking -in a disorderly manner, the French fell upon them and took or killed -two hundred, captain Fane being amongst the prisoners. - -[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s despatches MSS.] - -The Catalan army was thirty thousand strong, including garrisons, and -in a better state than it had hitherto been; the Valencians, although -discouraged by the defeat at Uldecona, were still numerous, and all -things tended to confirm the Spaniards in the confident expectation -that whether succoured or unsuccoured the place would not fall. But -O’Donnel, who had been created Conde de’ Bispal was so disabled by -wounds, that he resigned the command soon after the siege commenced, -and Campo Verde was by the voice of the people raised in his stead; -for it was their nature always to believe that the man who made most -noise was the fittest person to head them, and in this instance, as -in most others, they were greatly mistaken. - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -[Sidenote: Suchet.] - -Tortoza, situated on the left of the Ebro, communicated with the -right bank by a bridge of boats, which was the only Spanish bridge on -that river, from Zaragoza to the sea; and below and above the place -there was a plain, but so narrowed by the juttings of the mountains -at the point where the town was built, that while part of the houses -stood close to the water on flat ground, the other part stood on the -bluff rocky points shot from the hills above; and thus appeared to -tie the mountains, the river, and the plains together. - -Five of these shoots were taken into the defence, either by the -ramparts or by outworks. That on the south of the town was crowned by -the fort of Orleans, and on the north another was occupied by a fort -called the Tenaxas. To the east a horn-work was raised on a third -shoot, which being prolonged, and rising suddenly again between the -suburbs and the city, furnished the site of a castle or citadel: the -other two, and the deep ravines between them were defended by the -ramparts of the place, which were extremely irregular, and strong -from their situation, rather than their construction. - -There were four fronts. - -1º. _The northern defending the suburb._ Although this front was -built on the plain, it was so imbedded between the Ebro, the -horn-work, the citadel, and the Tenaxas, that it could not even be -approached without first taking the latter fort. - -2º. _The eastern. Extending from the horn-work to the bastion -of San Pico._ Here the deep ravines and the rocky nature of the -ground, which was also overlooked by the citadel and flanked by the -horn-work, rendered any attack very difficult. - -3º. _The south eastern. From the bastion of San Pico to the bastion -of Santa Cruz._ This front, protected by a deep narrow ravine, was -again covered by the fort of Orleans, which was itself covered by a -second ravine. - -4º. _The southern. From the Santa Cruz to the Ebro._ The ground of -approach here was flat, the soil easy to work in, and the fort of -Orleans not sufficiently advanced to flank it with any dangerous -effect; wherefore against this front Suchet resolved to conduct his -attack. - -[Sidenote: Suchet.] - -[Sidenote: Official extract of Mr. Wellesley’s despatches MSS.] - -The Rocquetta, a rising ground opposite the bridge-head on the right -bank of the Ebro, was fortified and occupied by three regiments, -but the other troops were collected at Xerta; and the 15th, before -day-break, Suchet crossed the Ebro by his own bridge at that point, -with eight battalions, the sappers, and two squadrons of hussars. He -marched between the mountains and the river upon the fort of Tenaxas, -while general Habert, with two regiments and three hundred hussars, -moved from the side of Perillo, and attacked a detachment of the -garrison which was encamped on the Col d’Alba eastward of the city. -When Suchet’s column arrived in sight of the works, the head took -ground, but the rear, under general Harispe, filed off to the left, -across the rugged shoots from the hills, and swept round the place, -leaving in every ravine and on every ridge a detachment, until the -half circle ended on the Ebro, below Tortoza. The investment was then -perfected on the left bank by the troops from Rocquetta; and during -this movement Habert, having seized the Col d’Alba, entered the -line of investment, driving before him six hundred men, who hardly -escaped being cut off from the place by the march of Harispe. The -communication across the water was then established by three, and -afterwards by four flying bridges, placed above and below the town; a -matter of some difficulty and importance, because all the artillery -and stores had to come from Rocquetta, across the water, which was -there two hundred yards wide, and in certain winds very rough. - -The camps of investment were now secured, and meanwhile Macdonald, -sending the greatest part of his cavalry, for which he could find -no forage, back to Lerida by the road of Lardecans, marched, from -Mas de Mora, across the hills to Perillo, to cover the siege. His -patroles discovered a Spanish division in a position resting upon -the fort of Felipe de Balaguer, yet he would not attack them, and -thinking he could not remain for want of provisions, returned on -the 19th to Gniestar; but this retrograde movement was like to have -exposed the investing troops to a disaster, for as the seventh corps -retired, a second Spanish division coming from Reus reinforced the -first. However, Macdonald, seeing this, placed Frere’s division of -six thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry at Suchet’s disposal, -on condition that the latter should feed them, which he could well -do. These troops were immediately stationed behind the investing -force, on the road of Amposta, by which the Spaniards from Taragona -could most easily approach; and the remainder of the seventh corps -encamped at Gniestar, a strong position covering the siege on the -side of Falcet, only fifteen miles distant from Tortoza. In this -situation it could be more easily fed from Lerida, and could with -greater facility send detachments up the Ebro, to protect the convoy -of the third corps coming from Mequinenza. - -[Sidenote: Wimphen’s Memoir.] - -The Catalan army was now divided, part being kept on the Llobregat, -under general Caro, part under general Yranzo at Momblanch, and part, -under Campo Verde, on the hills watching Frere’s covering division. -O’Donnel had before directed two convoys upon Tortoza, but the -rapidity with which the investment had been effected prevented them -from entering the place; and while he was endeavouring to arrange -with Bassecour and Campo Verde a general plan of succour, his wounds -forced him to embark for Valencia, when the command, of right, -belonged to Yranzo, but the people, as I have before said, insisted -upon having Campo Verde. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 4 Plate 1._ - - _Explanatory Sketch_ - OF THE - SIEGE OF TORTOZA, - 1811. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._] - - -SIEGE OF TORTOZA. - -The half bastion of San Pedro, which was situated in the plain, and -close to the river, was the first object of the French attack, and -to prevent the fire of Fort Orleans from incommoding the trenches, -the line of approach was traced in a slanting direction, refusing the -right, and pushing forward the left; and to protect its flanks on the -one side, Fort Orleans was masked by a false attack, while, on the -other side of the Ebro, trenches were opened against the bridge-head, -and brought down close to the water. - -The 19th the posts of the besieged were all driven in, and an -unfinished Spanish work, commenced on the heights in advance of Fort -Orleans, was taken possession of. In the night, a flying sap was -commenced upon an extent of three hundred and sixty yards, and at -a distance of only one hundred and sixty from the fort; but in the -following night, the true attack was undertaken in the plain, during -a storm of wind which, together with the negligence of the Spaniards, -who had placed no guards in front of their covered way, enabled the -besiegers to begin this work at only one hundred and fifty yards from -the half bastion of San Pedro. This parallel was above five hundred -yards long, extending from the false attack against Fort Orleans, -down to the bank of the river; two communications were also begun, -and on the left bank ground was broken against the bridge-head. - -The 21st, at day-break, the Spaniards, perceiving the works, -commenced a heavy fire, and soon after made a sally; but they were -overwhelmed by musketry from the false attack of Fort Orleans, and -from the trenches on the right bank of the Ebro. - -In the night of the 21st, the communication in the plain was extended -to fourteen hundred yards, nine batteries were commenced, and bags of -earth were placed along the edge of the trenches, whence chosen men -shot down the Spanish artillery-men. - -On the 23rd, a night sally, made from the bridge-head, was repulsed; -and on the 24th, the second parallel of the true attack was commenced. - -In the night of the 25th, at eleven o’clock and at one o’clock, -separate sallies were again made, but both were repulsed, and the -works were advanced to within twenty-five yards of the pallisades; -a tenth battery was also commenced, and when day broke the Spanish -gunners quailed under the aim of the chosen marksmen. - -In the night of the 26th, the besieged fell upon the head of the -sap, which they overturned, and killed the sappers, but were finally -repulsed by the reserve, and the approach was immediately pushed -forward to the place of arms. Thus, on the seventh night of open -trenches, the besiegers were lodged in the covered way, before a -shot had been fired from either breaching or counter-batteries; a -remarkable instance of activity and boldness, and a signal proof that -the defence was ill-conducted. - -The night of the 27th, the works were enlarged as much as the fire of -the place which was untouched would permit; but the Spaniards seeing -the besiegers’ batteries ready to open, made a general sally through -the eastern gates, against the false attack at Fort Orleans; and -through the southern gates against the works in the plain. General -Habert drove them back with slaughter from the former point, but at -the latter they beat the French from the covered way, and arriving at -the second parallel, burnt the gabions and did much damage ere the -reserves could repulse them. - -The night of the 28th, the batteries were armed with forty-five -pieces, of which seventeen were placed on the right bank, to take the -Spanish works at the main attack in reverse and to break the bridge. -At day-break all these guns opened, and with success, against the -demi-bastion, on the left bank of the river; but the fire from the -castle, the bridge-head, the horn-work, and the quay, overpowered the -French guns on the right bank, and although the bridge was injured, -it was not rendered impassable. - -On the 30th, the Spanish fire was in turn overpowered by the -besiegers, the bridge was then broken, and in the following night an -attempt was made to pass the ditch at the true attack; but two guns -which were still untouched and flanked the point of attack, defeated -this effort. - -In the morning of the 31st, the Spaniards abandoned the bridge-head, -and the French batteries on the right bank dismounted the two guns -which had defended the half bastion of San Pedro. The besiegers then -effected the passage of the ditch without difficulty, and attached -the miner to the scarp. - -In the night of the 31st, the miner worked into the wall, and -the batteries opened a breach in the curtain, where a lodgement -was established in preparation for an assault. At ten o’clock in -the morning the besieged, alarmed at the progress of the attack, -displayed the white flag. The negotiations for a surrender were, -however, prolonged until evening by the governor, without any result, -and the miner resumed his work in the night. - -[Sidenote: 1811. January.] - -At seven o’clock on the 1st of January, two practicable breaches -besides that in the curtain were opened by the artillery, and the -mine was ready to explode, when three white flags were seen to wave -from different parts of the fortress; nevertheless the disposition of -the garrison was mistrusted, and Suchet demanded as a preliminary the -immediate possession of one of the forts,—a necessary precaution, -for disputes arose amongst the besieged, and general Lilli intimated -to Suchet, that his own authority was scarcely recognised. - -In this critical moment, the French general gave proof that his -talents were not those of a mere soldier, for suddenly riding up -to the gates with a considerable staff, and escorted only by a -company of grenadiers, he informed the Spanish officer on guard, -that hostilities had ceased, and then, leaving his grenadiers on the -spot, desired to be conducted to the governor who was in the citadel. -Lilli still wavering, was upon the point of renewing the defence, -in compliance with the desires of the officers about him, when the -French general thus came suddenly into his presence, and, although -the appearance of the Spanish guards was threatening, assumed an -imperious tone, spoke largely of the impatience of the French army, -and even menaced the garrison with military execution if any further -delay occurred; during this extraordinary scene general Habert -brought in the grenadiers from the gate, and the governor then -signing a short capitulation, gave over the citadel to the French. - -When this event was known in the city, the Spanish troops assembled, -and Alacha, in the presence of Suchet ordered them to lay down their -arms. Four hundred French and about fourteen hundred Spaniards had -fallen during the siege; and many thousand prisoners, nine standards, -one hundred pieces of artillery, ten thousand muskets, and immense -magazines, enhanced the value of the conquest, which by some was -attributed to general Lilli’s treachery, by others to his imbecility, -and it would seem that there was reason for both charges. - -The fall of Tortoza, besides opening the western passage into -Catalonia, and cutting off the communication between that province -and Valencia, reduced the Spanish army to twenty thousand men, -including the garrisons of the towns which still remained in their -possession. Campo Verde immediately retired from Falcet to Momblanch, -and Suchet, always prompt to make one success the prelude to another, -endeavoured in the first moment of consternation and surprise to get -possession of the forts of Peniscola and of Felipe de Balaguer: nor -was he deceived with respect to the last, for that place, in which -were five guns and a hundred men, was taken on the 9th by Habert; but -at Peniscola his summons was disregarded and his detachment returned. - -Meanwhile Macdonald leaving the Neapolitan brigade still on the -Ebro, passed by Falcet to Reus, where he encamped the 11th, as if to -invest Taragona; but without any real intention to do so, for his -cavalry and field artillery were left at Lerida and Tortoza, and his -actual force did not exceed twelve thousand men. Campo Verde, who had -retreated before him, then posted Sarsfield with six thousand men at -Valls, from whence he made incursions against Macdonald’s foragers, -and also surprised at Tarega, on the other side of the mountains, a -regiment of Italian dragoons, which would have been destroyed but for -the succour of a neighbouring post. - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes.] - -[Sidenote: General Doyle’s despatches MSS.] - -On the 14th Macdonald having marched towards Valls, Sarsfield -retired to Pla, and was pursued by general Eugenio with two thousand -Italian infantry. This officer being of a headstrong intractable -disposition, pushed into the plain of Pla, contrary to his orders, -and was nearing that town, when a strong body of cavalry poured out -of it; and on each side the Spanish infantry were seen descending the -hill in order of battle. Eugenio, instead of retiring, attacked the -first that entered the plain, but he fell mortally wounded, and his -men retreated fighting: meanwhile the firing being heard at Valls -Palombini marched to his assistance, but was himself beaten and -thrown into confusion, and Sarsfield at the head of the Spanish horse -was preparing to complete the victory, when the French colonel Delort -bringing up some squadrons charged with great fury, and so brought -off the Italians; yet Delort himself was desperately wounded, and the -whole loss was not less than six hundred men. - -Macdonald would not suffer his main body to stir, and Vacani asserts -that it was only by entreaty, that Palombini obtained permission to -succour Eugenio, which was certainly a great error, for so hot and -eager was Sarsfield in the pursuit, that he was come within two miles -of Valls, and being on open ground might have been crushed in turn. -He, however, returned unmolested to the pass of Cabra, leaving his -cavalry as before in Pla, whence through bye-roads they communicated -with Taragona. - -A few days after this fight Sarsfield came out again in order of -battle, and at the same time Campo Verde appeared with a division -on the hills in rear of Valls. Macdonald was thus surrounded, but -Palombini’s brigade sufficed to send Campo Verde back to Taragona, -and Sarsfield refused battle; then the French marshal, who had -resolved to go to Lerida, but wished to move without fighting, broke -up from Valls in the night, and, with great order and silence, passed -by the road of Fuencalde, between the defiles of Cabra and Ribas, and -though both were occupied by the Spaniards, they did not discover his -movements until the next day. From thence he marched by Momblanch, -upon Lerida, where he arrived the 19th, and three days afterwards -spread his troops over the plains of Urgel, to collect provisions, -money, and transport, and to watch the defiles of the mountains. - -[Sidenote: 1811. February.] - -On the other hand the Catalan general, who had received stores and -arms both from England and Cadiz, renewed the equipment of his -troops, and called out all the Miguelettes and Somatenes, of the -hills round the plain of Urgel, to replace the loss sustained by -the fall of Tortoza. These new levies were united at Santa Coloma -de Querault under Sarsfield, while the regular army assembled at -Igualada and Villafranca, by which the Spaniards holding a close and -concentrated position themselves, cut off Macdonald equally from -Barcelona and the Ampurdan; and this latter district was continually -harassed by Errolles, Rovira, and the brigade of Martinez, which -still kept the mountains behind Olot, Vich, and the Cerdaña. - -Meanwhile Suchet being called by the exigences of his government to -Zaragoza, carried one division there, and distributed another under -Musnier at Teruel, Molina, Alcanitz, and Morella: he also withdrew -his troops from Cambril, which Habert had surprised on the 7th of -February, but he left that general, with a division, in command of -Tortoza, having two thousand men at Perillo to connect the city with -San Felipe de Balaguer. Thus all things seemed to favour the Spanish -side, and give importance to their success, against Eugenio; for they -did not fail to attribute both Suchet’s and Macdonald’s retreats, to -fear occasioned by the skirmish with that general; and with some shew -of reason as regarded the latter, seeing that his night march had all -the appearance of a flight. - -Macdonald, while gathering provisions at Lerida, and stores and guns -at Tortoza, also repaired the works of Balaguer near Lerida, to serve -as a pivot for the troops employed to forage the country watered by -the Noguera, Cinça, and Segre rivers. However Sarsfield and Campo -Verde kept about Cervera and Calaf, watching for an opportunity to -fall on the French detachments, and meanwhile the organization of the -province went on. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 2.] - -It may appear extraordinary that the war could have been continued -by either side under such difficulties, but the resources were still -great. A patriotic junta had been formed in Catalonia to procure -provisions, and although the English orders in council interfered -with the trade of neutral vessels bringing grain, bread could -be bought at the rate of 12 lbs. to the dollar, while with lord -Wellington’s army in Castile it often cost half a dollar a pound. -When the French foraging parties came out from Barcelona, their march -could be always traced by the swarms of boats, loaded with people and -provisions, which shooting out from the coast-towns, would hover, for -a while, under the protection of the English vessels, and then return -when the danger was over: and the enemy did never meddle with these -boats lest they should remove the cover to their own supplies. Suchet -however armed Rapita, and other small places, at the mouth of the -Ebro, with a view to afford shelter to certain craft, which he kept -to watch for provision-vessels, sailing from Valencia for Taragona, -and to aid French vessels engaged in a like course coming from France. - -To feed Barcelona, Maurice Mathieu at times occupied the head-lands -from St. Filieu, to Blanes, with troops, and thus small convoys -crept along shore; a fleet loaded with provisions and powder, -escorted by three frigates, entered it in February, and a continual -stream of supply was also kept up by sailing-boats and other small -vessels, which could not be easily detected amidst the numerous -craft belonging to the people along the coast. And besides these -channels, as the claims of hunger are paramount to all others, it -was necessary, for the sake of the inhabitants, to permit provision -sometimes to reach Barcelona by land; the Spanish generals winked -at it, and Milans and Lacy, have even been charged with permitting -corn to pass into that city for private profit, as well as from -consideration for the citizens. By these, and like expedients, the -war was sustained. - -[Sidenote: 1811. March.] - -[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s Despatches. MSS.] - -No important event occurred after the skirmish in which Eugenio -fell, until the 3d of March, when the Spaniards having observed that -the garrison of Tortoza was weakened by the detachment at Perillo, -endeavoured to cut the latter off, intending if successful to assault -Tortoza itself. At the same time they also attacked the fort of San -Filippe, but failed, and the French at Perillo effected their retreat -although with considerable loss. This attempt was however followed -by a more important effort. On the 19th of March, Campo Verde having -assembled eight thousand men at Molinos del Rey, four thousand at -Guisols, and three thousand at Igualada, prepared to surprise the -city and forts of Barcelona, for he had, as he thought, corrupted the -town-major of Monjuic. Trusting to this treason, he first sent eight -hundred chosen grenadiers in the night by the hills of Hospitalette, -to enter that place, and they descended into the ditch in expectation -of having the gate opened; but Maurice Mathieu, apprized of the plan, -had prepared every thing to receive this unfortunate column, which -was in an instant overwhelmed with fire. - -Napoleon now changed the system of the war. All that part of -Catalonia west of the Upper Llobregat, and from Igualada by Ordal to -the sea, including the district of Tortoza, was placed under Suchet’s -government, and seventeen thousand of Macdonald’s troops were united -to the third corps, which was thus augmented to forty-two thousand -men, and took the title of the “_Army of Aragon_.” It was destined -to besiege Taragona, while Macdonald, whose force was thus reduced -to twenty-seven thousand under arms, including fifteen thousand in -garrison and in the Ampurdan, was restricted to the upper part of -Catalonia. His orders were to attack Cardona, Berga, Seu d’Urgel, -and Montserrat, and to wear down Martinez, Manso, Rovira, and other -chiefs, who kept in the mountains between Olot and the Cerdaña: and a -division of five thousand men, chiefly composed of national guards, -was also ordered to assemble at Mont Louis, for the purpose of acting -in the Cerdaña, and on the rear of the partizans in the high valleys. -By these means the line of operations for the invasion of Catalonia -was altered from France to Aragon, the difficulties were lessened, -the seventh corps reduced in numbers, became, instead of the -principal, the secondary army; and Macdonald’s formal method was thus -exchanged for the lively vigorous talent of Suchet. But the delay -already caused in the siege of Tortoza, could never be compensated; -Suchet had been kept on the Ebro, when he should have been on the -Guadalaviar, and this enabled the Murcians to keep the fourth corps -in Grenada, when it should have been on the Tagus aiding Massena. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -[Sidenote: 1811. March.] - -When the troops of the seventh corps were incorporated with the army -of Aragon, the preparations for the siege of Taragona, were pushed -forward with Suchet’s usual activity; but previous to touching upon -that subject it is necessary to notice the guerilla warfare, which -Villa Campa, and others, had carried on against Aragon during the -siege of Tortoza. This warfare was stimulated by the appointment -of the secret juntas, and by the supplies which England furnished, -especially along the northern coast, from Coruña to Bilbao, where -experience had also produced a better application of them than -heretofore. The movements of the English squadrons, in that sea, -being from the same cause better combined with the operations of the -Partidas, rendered the latter more formidable, and they became more -harassing to the enemy as they acquired something of the consistency -of regular troops in their organization, although irregular in their -mode of operations: for it must not be supposed, that because the -guerilla system was in itself unequal to the deliverance of the -country, and was necessarily accompanied with great evils, that as -an auxiliary it was altogether useless. The interruption of the -French correspondence was, as I have already said, tantamount to a -diminution on their side of thirty thousand regular troops, without -reckoning those who were necessarily employed to watch and pursue -the Partidas; this estimate may even be considered too low, and it is -certain that the moral effect produced over Europe by the struggle -thus maintained, was very considerable. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 2.] - -Nevertheless the same number of men under a good discipline would -have been more efficacious, less onerous to the country people, and -less subversive of social order. When the regular army is completed, -all that remains in a country may be turned to advantage as -irregulars, yet they are to be valued as their degree of organization -approaches that of the regular troops: thus militia are better than -armed bodies of peasantry, and these last, if directed by regular -officers, better than sudden insurrections of villagers. But the -Spanish armies were never completed, never well organized; and when -they were dispersed, which happened nearly as often as they took the -field, the war must have ceased in Spain, had it not been kept alive -by the Partidas, and it is there we find their moral value. Again, -when the British armies kept the field, the Partidas harassed the -enemy’s communications, and this constituted their military value; -yet it is certain that they never much exceeded thirty thousand in -number; and they could not have long existed in any numbers without -the supplies of England, unless a spirit of order and providence, -very different from any thing witnessed during the war, had arisen -in Spain. How absurd then to reverse the order of the resources -possessed by an invaded country, to confound the moral with the -military means, to place the irregular resistance of the peasants -first, and that of the soldiers last in the scale of physical -defence. - -That many of the Partida chiefs became less active, after they -received regular rank, is undeniable; but this was not so much a -consequence of the change of denomination, as of the inveterate -abuses which oppressed the vigour of the regular armies, and by which -the Partidas were necessarily affected when they became a constituent -part of those armies; many persons of weight have indeed ascribed -entirely to this cause, the acknowledged diminution of their general -activity at one period. It seems, however, more probable that a life -of toil and danger, repeated defeats, the scarcity of plunder, and -the discontent of the people at the exactions of the chiefs, had -in reality abated the desire to continue the struggle; inactivity -was rather the sign of subjection than the result of an injudicious -interference by the government. But it is time to support this -reasoning by facts. - -During the siege of Tortoza, the concentration of the third and -seventh corps exposed Aragon and Catalonia to desultory enterprises -at a moment when the Partidas, rendered more numerous and powerful -by the secret juntas, were also more ardent, from the assembly of -the Cortez, by which the people’s importance in the struggle seemed -at last to be acknowledged. Hence no better test of their real -influence on the general operations can be found than their exploits -during that period, when two French armies were fixed as it were -to one spot, the supplies from France nearly cut off by natural -difficulties, the district immediately around Tortoza completely -sterile, Catalonia generally exhausted, and a project to create -a fictitious scarcity in the fertile parts of Aragon diligently -and in some sort successfully pursued by the secret juntas. The -number of French foraging parties, and the distances to which they -were sent were then greatly increased, and the facility of cutting -them off proportionably augmented. Now the several operations of -Villa Campa during the blockade have been already related, but, -although sometimes successful, the results were mostly adverse to -the Spaniards; and when that chief, after the siege was actually -commenced, came down, on the 19th December 1810, towards the side of -Daroca, his cavalry was surprised by colonel Kliski, who captured or -killed one hundred and fifty in the village of Blancas. The Spanish -chief then retired, but being soon after joined by the Empecinado -from Cuença, he returned in January to the frontier of Aragon, and -took post between Molina and Albaracin. - -At this period Tortoza had surrendered, and Musnier’s division was -spread along the western part of Aragon, wherefore Suchet immediately -detached general Paris with one column from Zaragoza, and general -Abbé with another from Teruel, to chase these two Partidas. Paris -fell in with the Empecinado near Molina, and the latter then joined -Villa Campa, but the French general forced both from their mountain -position near Frias, where he was joined by Abbé; and they continued -the pursuit for several days, but finding that the fugitives took -different routes, again separated; Paris followed Villa Campa, and -Abbé pursued the Empecinado through Cuença, from whence Carbajal -and the secret junta immediately fled. Paris failing to overtake -Villa Campa, entered Beleta, Cobeta, and Paralejos, all three -containing manufactories for arms, which he destroyed, and then -returned; and the whole expedition lasted only twelve days, yet the -smaller Partidas, in Aragon, had taken advantage of it to cut off a -detachment of fifty men near Fuentes: and this was followed up on -the side of Navarre by Mina, who entered the Cinco Villas in April, -and cut to pieces one hundred and fifty _gens-d’armes_ near Sadava. -However Chlopiski pursued him also so closely, that he obliged his -band to disperse near Coseda in Navarre. - -[Sidenote: 1811. April.] - -During this time the Valencians had been plunged in disputes, -Bassecour was displaced, and Coupigny appointed in his stead. The -notables, indeed, raised a sum of money for recruits, but Coupigny -would not take the command, because the Murcian army was not also -given to him; and that army, although numerous, was in a very -neglected state, and unable to undertake any service. However, when -Tortoza fell, the Valencians were frightened, and set about their own -defence. They repaired and garrisoned the fort of Oropesa, and some -smaller posts on the coast, along which runs the only artillery-road -to their capital: they commenced fortifying Murviedro, or rather the -rock of Saguntum overhanging it, and they sent fifteen hundred men -into the hills about Cantavieja. These last were dispersed on the 5th -of April by a column from Teruel; and on the 11th another body having -attempted to surprise Uldecona, which was weakly guarded, were also -defeated and sabred by the French cavalry. - -These different events, especially the destruction of the -gun-manufactories, repressed the activity of the partizans, and -Suchet was enabled to go to Lerida, in the latter end of March, to -receive the soldiers to be drafted from the seventh corps: Macdonald -himself could not, however, regain Barcelona without an escort, -and hence seven thousand men marched with him on the 29th of the -month, not by Igualada, which was occupied in force by Sarsfield, -but by the circuitous way of Manresa; for neither Macdonald nor -Suchet wished to engage in desultory actions with the forces destined -for the siege. Nevertheless Sarsfield, getting intelligence of the -march, passed by Calaf with his own and Eroles’ troops, and waited -on Macdonald’s flanks and rear near the Cardenera river, while a -detachment, barricading the bridge of Manresa, opposed him in front. -This bridge was indeed carried, but the town being abandoned, the -Italian soldiers wantonly set fire to it in the night; an act which -was immediately revenged, for the flames being seen to a great -distance, so enraged the Catalans, that in the morning all the armed -men in the district, whether regulars, Miguelettes, or Somatenes, -were assembled on the neighbouring hills, and fell with infinite fury -upon Macdonald’s rear, as it passed out from the ruins of the burning -city. The head of the French column was then pushing for the bridge -of Villamara, over the Llobregat, which was two leagues distant; and -as the country between the rivers was one vast mountain, Sarsfield, -seeing that the French rear stood firm to receive the attack of the -Somatenes, while the front still advanced, thought to place his -division between, by moving along the heights which skirted the -road. Macdonald, however, concentrated his troops, gained the second -bridge, and passed the Llobregat, but with great difficulty and with -the loss of four hundred men, for his march was continually under -Sarsfield’s fire, and some of his troops were even cut off from the -bridge, and obliged to cross by a ford higher up. During the night, -however, he collected his scattered men, and moved upon Sabadel, -whence he pushed on alone for Barcelona, and on the 3d of April, -Harispe, who commanded the escort, recommenced the march, and passing -by Villa Franca, Christina, Cabra, and Momblanch, returned to Lerida -the 10th. - -The invasion of Catalonia was now divided into three parts, each -assigned to a distinct army. - -1º. Suchet, with that of Aragon, was to take Taragona and subdue the -lower part of the province. - -2º. Macdonald, with that part of the seventh corps called the active -army of Catalonia, was to break the long Spanish line extending from -Taragona, through Montserrat to the Cerdaña, and the high mountains -about Olot. - -3º. Baraguay d’Hilliers, having his head-quarters at Gerona, was to -hold the Ampurdan with the troops before assigned to his charge, -and to co-operate, as occasion might offer, with Macdonald, under -whose orders he still remained; and the division of five thousand -men before mentioned as having been collected near Mount Louis, at -the entrance of the French Cerdaña, was to act on the rear of the -Spaniards in the mountains, while the others attacked them in front. -Nor did the success appear doubtful, for the hopes and means of -the province were both sinking. The great losses of men sustained -at Tortoza and in the different combats; the reputation of Suchet; -the failure of the attempts to surprise Barcelona, Perillo, and San -Filippe de Balaguer; the incapacity of Campo Verde, which was now -generally felt, and the consequent desertion of the Miguelettes, -would probably have rendered certain the French plans, if at the -very moment of execution they had not been marred by Rovira, who -surprised the great fortress of Figueras, the key of the Pyrenees on -that side of Catalonia. This, the boldest and most important stroke -made by a Partida chief, during the whole war, merits a particular -detail. - - -SURPRISE OF FERNANDO DE FIGUERAS. - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s Despatches. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: General Campbell’s MSS.] - -[Sidenote: General Doyle’s MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Capt. Codrington’s MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -The governor of the place, general Guillot, enforced no military -discipline, his guards were weak, he permitted the soldiers to use -the pallisades for fuel, and often detached the greatest part of the -garrison to make incursions to a distance from the place; in all -things disregarding the rules of service. The town, which is situated -below the hill, upon which the great fortress of Fernando stands, was -momentarily occupied by the Italian general Peyri, with about six -hundred men, who were destined to join Macdonald, and who trusting to -the strength of the fortress above, were in no manner on their guard. -And the garrison above was still more negligent; for Guillot had on -the 9th of April sent out his best men to disperse some Somatenes -assembled in the neighbouring hills, and this detachment having -returned at night fatigued, and being to go out again the next day, -slept while the gates were confided to convalescents, or men unfit -for duty: thus the ramparts were entirely unguarded. Now there were -in the fort two Catalan brothers named Palopos, and a man called -Juan, employed as under-storekeepers, who being gained by Rovira -had, such was the negligence of discipline, obtained from the head -of their department the keys of the magazines, and also that of a -postern under one of the gates. - -Rovira, having arranged his plan, came down from the mountain of St. -Lorens de Muga in the night of the 9th, and secretly reached the -covered way with seven hundred chosen men of his own Partida. General -Martinez followed in support with about three thousand Miguelettes, -and the Catalan brothers, having previously arranged the signals, -opened the postern, and admitted Rovira, who immediately disarmed -the guard and set wide the gates for the reserve; and although some -shots were fired, which alarmed the garrison, Martinez came up -so quickly that no effectual resistance could be made. Thirty or -forty men were killed or wounded, the magazines were seized, the -governor and sixteen hundred soldiers and camp-followers were taken -in their quarters, and thus in an hour Rovira mastered one of the -strongest fortresses in Europe: three cannon-shot were then fired -as a signal to the Somatenes in the surrounding mountains, that -the place was taken, and that they were to bring in provisions as -rapidly as possible. Meanwhile general Peyri alarmed by the noise in -the fortress and guessing at the cause, had collected the troops, -baggage, sick men, and stores in the town below, and sent notice to -Gerona, but he made no attempt to retake the place, and at daylight -retired to Bascara. For having mounted the hills during the night, -to observe how matters went, he thought nothing could be done, an -opinion condemned by some as a great error; and indeed it appears -probable that during the confusion of the first surprise, a brisk -attempt by six hundred fresh men might have recovered the fortress. -At Bascara five hundred men detached from Gerona, on the spur of the -occasion, met him with orders to re-invest the place, and Baraguay -d’Hilliers promised to follow with all his forces without any delay. -Then Peyri, although troubled by the fears of his troops, many of -whom were only national guards, returned to Figueras, and driving -the Spaniards out of the town took post in front of the fort above; -but he could not prevent Martinez from receiving some assistance -in men and provisions from the Somatenes. The news of Rovira’s -exploit spread with inconceivable rapidity throughout the Peninsula, -extending its exhilarating influence, even to the Anglo-Portuguese -army, then not much given to credit or admire the exploits of the -Spaniards, but Baraguay d’Hilliers with great promptness assembled -his dispersed troops, and on the 13th invested the fort with six -thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry; and this so quickly that -the Spaniard had not time, or, more probably neglected, to remove, -sixteen thousand muskets which were in the place. - -Martinez remained governor, but Rovira was again in the mountains, -and all Catalonia, animated by the Promethean touch of this Partida -chief, seemed to be moving at once upon Figueras. Campo Verde came -up to Vich, intending first to relieve Figueras, and then in concert -with the English and Spanish vessels to blockade Rosas by land and -sea. Rovira himself collected a convoy of provisions near Olot. -Captain Bullen with the Cambrian and Volontaire frigates, taking -advantage of the French troops having been withdrawn from Gerona, -drove out the small garrison from San Filieu and Palamos, destroyed -the batteries, and made sail to join captain Codrington at Rosas. -A Spanish frigate, with a fleet of coasting-vessels loaded with -supplies, anchored at Palamos; and Francisco Milans, after beating -a small French detachment near Arens de Mar, invested Hostalrich; -Juan Claros hovered about Gerona, and Eroles and Manso coming from -Montserrat reduced Olot and Castelfollit. Sarsfield however remained -in the Seu d’Urgel, and directed the mountaineers to establish -themselves at Balaguer, but they were driven away again with great -loss by a detachment from the garrison of Lerida. - -On the 3d of May, Rovira having brought his convoy up to Besalu, -Campo Verde, who had arranged that captain Codrington should make a -diversion by an attack on Rosas, drew Milans from Hostalrich, and -having thus united eleven thousand men marched in several columns -from Avionet and Villa Fan against the town, hoping to draw Baraguay -d’Hilliers to that side; and to beat him, while Rovira, forcing a -small camp near Llers, at the opposite quarter, should introduce the -convoy and its escort into the fortress. The circuit of investment -was wide, and very difficult, and therefore slightly furnished of -men; but it was strengthened by some works, and when the Spanish -columns first advanced, the French general reinforced the camp near -Llers, and then hastened with four thousand men against Campo Verde, -who was already in the valley of Figueras, and only opposed by one -battalion. Baraguay d’Hilliers immediately fell on the right flank -of the Spaniards and defeated them; the French cavalry, which had -been before driven in from the front, rallied and completed the -victory, and the Spaniards retreated with a loss of fifteen hundred -including prisoners. This affair was exceedingly ill-managed by -Campo Verde, who was so sure of success that he kept the sheep of -the convoy too far behind, to enter, although the way was open for -some time, hence the succour was confined to a few artillery-men, -some tobacco, and medicines. Meanwhile the English ships landed some -men at Rosas, but neither did this produce any serious effect, and -the attempt to relieve Figueras having thus generally failed, that -place was left to its own resources which were few; for the French -with an unaccountable negligence had always kept a scanty supply -of provisions and stores there. Martinez, who had now above four -thousand men, was therefore obliged to practise the most rigorous -economy in the distribution of food, and in bearing such privations -the peninsular race are unrivalled. - -Macdonald was so concerned for the loss of Figueras, that, setting -aside all his own plans, he earnestly adjured Suchet to suspend -the siege of Taragona, and restore him the troops of the seventh -corps: Maurice Mathieu also wrote from Barcelona in a like strain, -thinking that the possession of Upper Catalonia depended upon one -powerful effort to recover the lost fortress. But Suchet, who had -no immediate interest in that part of the province, whose hopes of -obtaining a marshal’s staff rested on the taking of Taragona, and -whose preparations were all made for that siege, Suchet I say, whose -judgement was unclouded, and whose military talent was of a high -order, refused to move a step towards Figueras, or even to delay, for -one moment, his march against Taragona. - -He said that “his battalions being scattered, in search of supplies, -he could not reunite them, and reach Figueras under twenty-five days; -during that time the enemy, unless prevented by Baraguay d’Hilliers, -could gather in provisions, receive reinforcements, and secure the -fortress. A simple blockade might be established by the nearest -troops, and to accumulate great numbers on such a sterile spot would -not forward the recapture, but would create infinite difficulties -with respect to subsistence. It was probable Napoleon had already -received information of the disaster, and given orders for the -remedy; and it was by no means reasonable to renounce the attack on -Taragona, the only remaining bulwark of Catalonia, at the very moment -of execution, because of the loss of a fort; it was in Taragona, -the greatest part of the forces of Catalonia would be shut up, and -it was only in such a situation that they could be made prisoners; -at Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortoza, eighteen thousand men and eight -hundred officers had been captured, and if ten or twelve thousand -more could be taken in Taragona, the strength of Catalonia would be -entirely broken. If the Spaniards failed in revictualling Figueras, -that place, by occupying their attention, would become more hurtful -than useful to them; because Campo Verde might, and most probably -would, march to its succour, and thus weaken Taragona, which was a -reason for hastening rather than suspending the investment of the -latter; wherefore he resolved, notwithstanding the separation of his -battalions and the incomplete state of his preparations, to move down -immediately and commence the siege.” A wise determination and alone -sufficient to justify his reputation as a general. - -Macdonald was now fain to send all the troops he could safely -draw together, to reinforce Baraguay d’Hilliers. In June, when a -detachment from Toulon, and some frontier guards had arrived at -Figueras, the united forces amounting to fifteen thousand men, he -took the command in person and established a rigorous blockade, -working day and night, to construct works of circumvallation and -contravallation; his lines six miles in length, crowning the tops -of the mountains and sinking into the deepest valleys, proved what -prodigious labours even small armies are capable of. Thus with -incessant wakefulness Macdonald recovered the place; but this was at -a late period in the year, and when Suchet’s operations had quite -changed the aspect of affairs. - -When Tortoza fell, that general’s moveable columns traversing the -borders of Castile, the eastern districts of Valencia, a portion -of Navarre, and all the lower province of Catalonia, protected the -collection of supplies, and suppressed the smaller bands which -swarmed in those parts; hence, when the siege of Taragona was -confided to the third corps, the magazines, at Lerida and Mora, -were already full; and a battering train was formed at Tortoza, to -which place the tools, platforms, and other materials, fabricated at -Zaragosa were conveyed. Fifteen hundred draft horses, the greatest -part of the artillery-men and engineers, and ten battalions of -infantry were also collected in that town, and from thence shot and -shells were continually forwarded to San Felippe de Balaguer. This -was a fine application of Cæsar’s maxim, that war should maintain -itself, for all the money, the guns, provisions, and materials, -collected for this siege, were the fruits of former victories; -nothing was derived from France but the men. It is curious, however, -that Suchet so little understood the nature and effects of the -English system of finance, that he observes, in his memoirs, upon the -ability with which the ministers, made Spain pay the expense of this -war by never permitting English gold to go to the Peninsula; he was -ignorant, that the paper money system had left them no English gold -to send. - -The want of forage in the district of Tortoza, and the advantage -of the carriage-road by the Col de Balaguer, induced the French -general to direct his artillery that way; but his provisions, and -other stores, passed from Mora by Falcet and Momblanch to Reus, in -which latter town he proposed to establish his stores for the siege, -while Mora, the chief magazine, was supplied from Zaragoza, Caspe, -and Mequinenza. Divers other arrangements, of which I shall now give -the outline, contributed to the security of the communications, and -enabled the army of Aragon to undertake the great enterprize for -which it was destined. - -1º. Detachments of gens-d’armes and of the frontier guards of -France, descending the high valleys of Aragon, helped to maintain -tranquillity on the left bank of the Ebro, and occupied the castles -of Venasque and Jaca, which had been taken by Suchet in his previous -campaign. - -2º. The line of correspondence from France, instead of running as -before through Guipuscoa and Navarre, by Pampeluna, was now directed -by Pau, Oleron, and Jaca to Zaragoza; and in the latter city, and in -the towns around it, four or five battalions, and a proportion of -horsemen and artillery, were disposed, to watch the Partidas from -Navarre and the Moncayo mountains. - -3º. Four battalions with cavalry and guns, were posted at Daroca -under general Paris, whose command extended from thence to the fort -of Molina, which was armed and garrisoned. - -4º. General Abbé was placed at Teruel with five battalions, three -hundred cuirassiers, and two pieces of artillery, to watch Villa -Campa, and the Valencian army which was again in the field. - -5º. Alcanitz and Morella were occupied by fourteen hundred men, -whereby that short passage through the mountains from Aragon to -Valencia was secured; and from thence the line to Caspe, and down the -Ebro from Mequinenza to Tortoza, was protected by twelve hundred men; -Tortoza itself was garrisoned by two battalions, the forts at the -mouth of the Ebro were occupied, and four hundred men were placed in -Rapita. - -This line of defence from right to left was fourteen days march, but -the number of fortified posts enabled the troops to move from point -to point, without much danger; and thus the army of the great and -rich province of Valencia, the division of Villa Campa, the Partidas -of New Castile and Navarre, including Mina and the Empecinado, the -most powerful of those independent chiefs, were all set at nought -by twelve thousand French, although the latter had to defend a line -of one hundred and fifty miles. Under cover of this feeble chain -of defence, Suchet besieged a strong city which had a powerful -garrison, an open harbour, a commanding squadron of ships, and a -free communication, by sea, with Cadiz, Valencia, Gibraltar, and the -Balearic islands. It is true that detachments from the army of the -centre, acting on a large circuit round Madrid, sometimes dispersed, -and chased the Partidas that threatened Suchet’s line of defence, but -at this period, from circumstances to be hereafter mentioned, that -army was in a manner paralysed. - -While the French general’s posts were being established, he turned -his attention to the arrangements for a permanent supply of food. -The difficulty of procuring meat was become great, because he wisely -refrained from using up the sheep and cattle of Aragon, lest the -future supply of his army should be anticipated, and the minds of -the people of that province alienated by the destruction of their -breeding flocks; to avoid this, he engaged contractors to furnish him -from France, and so completely had he pacified the Aragonese, through -whose territories the flocks were brought, and with whose money -they were paid for, that none of his contracts failed. But as these -resources were not immediately available, the troops on the right -bank of the Ebro made incursions after cattle beyond the frontiers of -Aragon; and when Harispe returned from Barcelona, eight battalions -marched upon a like service up the higher valleys of the Pyrenees. - -It was in this state of affairs that Suchet received intelligence of -the surprise of Figueras, which induced him to hasten the investment -of Taragona. Meanwhile, fearing that Mina might penetrate to the -higher valleys of Aragon, and in conjunction with the partidas of -Upper Catalonia cut off all correspondence with France, he detached -Chlopiski with four battalions and two hundred hussars to watch the -movements of that chief only, and demanded of the emperor, that some -troops from Pampeluna should occupy Sanguessa, while others, from -the army of the north, should relieve the detachments of the army of -Aragon, at Soria and Calatayud. - -The battalions sent up the high valleys of Catalonia returned in -the latter end of April. Suchet then reviewed his troops, issued a -month’s pay, and six day’s provisions to each soldier, loaded many -carriages and mules with flour, and, having first spread a report, -that he was going to relieve Figueras, commenced his march to -Taragona by the way of Momblanch. Some Miguelettes entrenched in the -pass of Ribas, were dispersed by Harispe’s division on the 1st of -May, and the army descended the hills to Alcover; but four hundred -men were left in Momblanch, where a post was fortified, to protect -the line of communication with Lerida, and to prevent the Spanish -partizans on that flank, from troubling the communication between -Mora and Reus. The 2d the head-quarters were fixed at Reus, and the -3d the Spanish outposts were driven over the Francoli; meanwhile -Habert, sending the artillery from Tortoza by the Col de Balaguer, -moved himself with a large convoy from Mora by Falcet to Reus. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -[Sidenote: 1811. May.] - -In Taragona, although a siege had been so long expected, there was -a great scarcity of money and ammunition, and so many men had, -as Suchet foresaw, been drawn off to succour Figueras, that the -garrison, commanded by colonel Gonzalez, was not more than six -thousand, including twelve hundred armed inhabitants and the seamen -of the port. The town was encumbered with defensive works of all -kinds, but most of them were ill-constructed, irregular, and without -convenient places for making sallies. - -Taragona itself was built upon rocks, steep on the north-east and -south, but sinking gently on the south-west and west into low ground. -A mole formed a harbour capable of receiving ships of the line, and -beyond the mole there was a roadstead. The upper town was surrounded -by ancient walls, crowning the rocks, and these walls were inclosed -by a second rampart with irregular bastions which ran round the whole -city. On the east, across the road to Barcelona, there was a chain -of redoubts connected by curtains, with a ditch and covered way; and -behind this line there was a rocky space called the Milagro, opening -between the body of the place and the sea. The lower town, or suburb, -was separated from the upper, by the inner ramparts of the latter, -and was protected by three regular and some irregular bastions -with a ditch; a square work, called Fort Royal, formed a species -of citadel within, and the double town presented the figure of an -irregular oblong, whose length lying parallel to the sea, was about -twelve hundred yards. - -On the east beyond the walls, a newly constructed line of defence was -carried along the coast to the mouth of the Francoli, where it ended -in a large redoubt, built to secure access to that river when the -ancient aqueducts which furnished the city with water should be cut -by the French. This line was strengthened by a second redoubt, called -the Prince, half-way between that near the Francoli and the town; and -it was supported by the mole which being armed with batteries, and -nearly in a parallel direction, formed as it were a second sea-line. - -The approach on the side of the Francoli river was of a level -character, and exposed to the fire of the Olivo, a large outwork -on the north, crowning a rocky table-land of an equal height with -the upper town, but divided from it by a ravine nearly half-a-mile -wide, across which the aqueducts of the place were carried. This -Olivo was an irregular horn-work, four hundred yards long, with a -ditch twenty-four feet deep and forty wide, but the covered way -was not completed, and the gorge was only closed by a loop-holed -wall; neither was this defence quite finished, as the steepness of -the rock, and the fire of the city appeared to render it secure. -The bastion on the left of the Olivo, was cut off by a ditch and a -rampart from the body of the work, and on the right also within the -rampart there was a small redoubt of refuge, with a high cavalier -or bank, on which three guns were placed that overlooked all the -country round. The ordinary garrison of the Olivo was from twelve -to fifteen hundred men, and it contained fifty out of three hundred -pieces of artillery which served the defence of Taragona. - -The nature of the soil combined with the peculiarities of the works, -determined Suchet’s line of attack. On the north and east side -the ground was rocky, the fronts of defence wide, the approaches -unfavourable for breaching batteries; and as all the guns and stores -would have to be dragged over the hills on a great circuit, unless -the Olivo was first taken, no difficulty could be avoided in an -attack. Wherefore, on the side of the lower town the French resolved -to approach, although the artificial defences were there accumulated, -and the ground between the town and the Francoli river taken in -reverse by the Olivo, which rendered it necessary first to reduce -that outwork. But this part was chosen by the French, because the -soil was deep and easily moved, their depôts and parks close at hand, -the ground-plot of the works so salient that they could be easily -embraced with fire, and because the attack would, it was supposed, -cut off the garrison from fresh water, yet this last advantage was -not realized. - -On the 4th of May the French, passing the Francoli, drove in the -outposts, took possession of two small detached redoubts, situated -on the northern side, called the forts of Loretto, and invested the -place. However the Spanish troops supported by the fire of the Olivo -killed and wounded two hundred men, and the next day a fruitless -attempt was made to retake the lost ground; at the same time the -fleet under captain Codrington, consisting of three English ships of -the line and three frigates, besides sloops and Spanish vessels of -war, cannonaded the French right, and harassed their convoys, then -coming by the coast-road from the Col de Balaguer. The investing -troops whose posts were very close to the Olivo, were also greatly -incommoded by the heavy fire from that outwork, yet the line was -maintained and perfected. - -Habert’s division, forming the right wing, extended from the sea -to the bridge of the Francoli; general Frere’s division connected -Habert with Harispe’s, whose troops occupied the ground before -the Olivo; the Italian division prolonged Harispe’s left to the -road of Barcelona which runs close to the sea on the east side of -Taragona; three regiments were placed in reserve higher up on the -Francoli, where a trestle bridge was cast, and the park, which was -established on the right of that river, at the village of Canonja, -contained sixty-six battering guns and mortars, each furnished with -seven hundred rounds. There were also thirty-six field-pieces, two -thousand artillery-men to serve the guns, seven hundred sappers -and miners, fourteen hundred cavalry, and nearly fifteen thousand -infantry. The head-quarters were fixed at the village of Constanti, a -strong covering position, the depôt at Reus was secured by fortified -convents, and the works at Mora were defended by several battalions. -Other troops, placed at Falcet, guarded the communications, which -were farther secured by the escorts belonging to the convoys; and -the French had cut off the water of the aqueducts from the Olivo, -but this water, whose source was ten or twelve miles off, was also -necessary to the besiegers on that sterile land, and was again cut -off by the Somatenes, which obliged the French to guard its whole -course during the siege. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.] - -Meanwhile Campo Verde after his defeat at Figueras had sent Sarsfield -and Eroles to their former posts near Valls, Momblanch, and Igualada, -and embarking at Mattaro himself, with four thousand men, came on -the 10th to Taragona, where the sudden appearance of the French had -produced great consternation. Yet when Campo Verde arrived with -this reinforcement, and when colonel Green, the English military -agent, arrived on the 15th from Cadiz, in the Merope, bringing with -him fifty thousand dollars and two transports laden with arms and -stores, Spanish apathy again prevailed, and the necessary measures of -defence were neglected. Beyond the walls, however, the French post at -Momblanch was attacked by two thousand Miguelettes, and the Somatenes -assembled in the vicinity of Reus. - -Suchet detached general Frere with four battalions to relieve the -former place, where the attack had failed; the commandant of Reus -also dispersed the Somatenes, and meanwhile Harispe pushed his -patroles over the Gaya as far as Torre de Barra, where he found -some wounded Spaniards. These men were within the protection of a -convention, made by St. Cyr with Reding, by which the wounded men of -both armies were to be left in the civil hospitals of the different -towns, and mutually taken care of, without being made prisoners; and -it is remarkable that this compact was scrupulously executed on both -sides, while beyond those hospitals the utmost ferocity and a total -disregard of civilized usages prevailed. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 4 Plate 2._ - - _Explanatory Sketch_ - OF THE - SIEGE OF TARAGONA. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._] - -Sarsfield’s arrival near Momblanch threatened the communications -between Reus and Mora, and at the same time a Valencian column, -acting in concert with captain Adam of the Invincible, attacked -the posts of Rapita and Amposta: the former was abandoned by the -garrison, and the latter was surrounded by the Valencians, but a -regiment sent from Tortoza, after disengaging Amposta, defeated the -Valencians near Rapita; nevertheless Suchet, unwilling to lessen his -already too small force, did not restore the latter post. - - -SIEGE OF TARAGONA. - -The French general having resolved to attack the lower town, -commenced his operations by constructing a fort and batteries, on -the right of the Francoli, near the sea-shore, with a view to keep -the English ships of war and the gun-boats at a distance from his -projected trenches. These works commenced in the night of the 7th, -were successfully continued towards the mouth of the river under -the fire of the vessels; a trench, lined with musqueteers, was also -carried from the left along the bank of the river to the bridge, but -the Spaniards continually harassed the investing troops both from -within and from without, and made some attempts against the camp; -wherefore the brigade of general Salme, which was close to the Olivo, -was obliged to entrench, and yet lost fifty or sixty men daily by the -enemy’s skirmishers. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Sect. 1.] - -On the night of the 13th, during a tempest, the French stormed two -external entrenchments near the Olivo, and then turned them against -the besieged; the next morning a vigorous attempt to retake them -was repulsed with a loss of one hundred men, and on the Francoli -side, a sally supported by the shipping failed in consequence of the -cowardice of some Spanish officers. On the same day, besides this -attack on the side of the Francoli, the garrison came out from the -Barcelona gate, and six hundred Somatenes from the Upper Gaya fell on -the patroles of the Italian division, whereupon Palombini scoured the -country on the 15th as far as Arbos. - -The 18th a powerful sortie from the lower town was made by Gonzalez, -who passed the bridge, and, aided by a fire from the place, from the -Olivo, and from the fleet, pressed Habert’s division hard; Suchet -however came down with his reserve, pushed between the river and -the Olivo, and menaced the Spanish line of retreat, which obliged -Gonzalez to retire with loss. On the 20th three other sallies were -made from the Olivo, and from the upper town, on the Barcelona side, -but they were all in like manner repulsed; and that day Sarsfield -took post with twelve hundred men on a high and rugged place near -Alcover, thus menacing the depôt at Reus. The French general -therefore detached two battalions of infantry and some cavalry, under -general Broussard, to dislodge him, which was effected with the -loss of a hundred French; but three days later he appeared before -Momblanch, and was only driven away by the united brigades of Frere -and Palombini, who marched against him. Divers attempts were also -made upon the line of Falcet, especially at Grattallopes, where the -Spanish colonel, Villamil, having attacked Morozinski, a Pole, the -latter defended himself successfully, and with a bravery that has -always distinguished the people of that heroic nation; a nation whose -glory springs like an _ignis fatuus_ from the corruption of European -honour! - -These repeated attacks having warned Suchet how difficult it would be -to maintain, with his weak army, so great an extent of communication, -he abandoned his post at Momblanch, and contented himself with -preserving the lines of Falcet and of Felippe de Balaguer; a measure -the more necessary, that the garrison of Taragona was now greatly -augmented; for on the 16th, the Blake had sailed for Valencia to seek -reinforcements, and Carlos O’Donnel, who had succeeded Bassecour, -gave him above two thousand infantry and two hundred cannoneers, who -were safely landed at Taragona on the 22d, two thousand stand of -arms being, in return, delivered by captain Codrington to O’Donnel, -to equip fresh levies. Above twelve thousand men were thus collected -in the fortress, but all the richest citizens had removed with their -families and effects to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and the people were -dispirited. - -[Sidenote: Suchet.] - -Suchet broke ground before the Olivo in the night of the 21st, and -carried on his approaches from both ends of the Spanish entrenchments -which he had seized on the night of the 13th. His engineers wished -to reach a round hill, close to the works, on which they proposed to -plant their first breaching battery, and they crowned it on the 22d, -but with much loss, being obliged to carry the earth for the work, -up the hill in baskets, and they were continually interrupted by -sallies. Three counter-batteries were, however, completed and armed -on the 27th with thirteen pieces, of which six threw shells; but to -effect this, the soldiers dragged the artillery over the rocks, under -a heavy fire of grape, and the garrison making a vigorous sally, -killed general Salme, when he opposed them with the reserves. The -moment was dangerous to the French, but they were finally victorious, -and the fire of the batteries having opened the same morning, was -sustained until the evening of the 29th, when a breach being formed, -the assault was ordered. - - -STORMING OF THE OLIVO. - -Upon the success of this attack, Suchet thought, and with reason, -that his chance of taking the town would depend, seeing that his army -was too feeble to bear any serious check. Wherefore, having formed -his columns of assault, he personally encouraged them, and at the -same time directed the troops along the whole line of investment to -advance simultaneously, and menace every part of the town. The night -was dark, and the Spaniards were unexpectant of an attack, because -none of their guns had yet been silenced; but the French, full of -hope and resolution, were watching for the signal. When that was -given, the troops on the Francoli, and those on the Barcelona side, -made a sudden discharge of musketry, beat all their drums, and with -loud shouts approached the town at those opposite quarters; the -rampart of the place was instantly covered with fire from within and -from without; the ships in the offing threw up rockets, and amidst -the noise of four hundred guns the storming columns rushed upon the -Olivo. - -[Sidenote: Suchet.] - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -The principal force made for the breach; but a second column, -turning the fort, got between it and the town, at the moment when -fifteen hundred men, sent to relieve the old garrison, were entering -the gates. Some of the French instantly fell on their rear, which -hurrying forward, gave an opportunity to the assailants to penetrate -with them before the gates could be closed, and thirty sappers with -hatchets having followed closely, endeavoured to break the door, -while Papignay, their officer, attempted to climb over the wall; the -Spaniards killed him and most of the sappers, but the other troops, -planted their ladders to the right and left, and cutting through the -pointed stakes above, entered the place and opened the gate. - -At the main attack the French boldly assailed the narrow breach, but -the ditch was fifteen feet deep, the Spaniards firm, and the fire -heavy, and they were giving way, when the historian, Vacani, followed -by some of his countrymen, (it is a strange error to think the -Italians have not a brave spirit!) cut down the paling which blocked -the subterranean passage of the aqueduct, and thus got into the ditch -and afterwards into the fort. Then the Spaniards were driven from the -ramparts on all sides, back to the little works of refuge, before -noticed, as being at each end of the Olivo, from whence they fired -both musketry and guns; but the French and Italian reserves, followed -by Harispe with a third column now entered the place, and with a -terrible slaughter ended the contest. Twelve hundred men perished, -some escaped, a thousand were taken, and amongst them their commander -who had received ten wounds. - -In the morning three thousand Spaniards came out of Taragona, yet -retired without attacking, and Suchet demanded a suspension of arms -to dispose of the dead; this was however treated with scorn and the -heaps were burned, for the sterile rocks afforded no earth to bury -them. Campo Verde now gave general Senens de Contreras the command -of Taragona, and went himself to the field-army, which was about -ten thousand strong, including some new levies made by the junta of -Catalonia. - -[Sidenote: 1811. June.] - -Suchet’s investment having been precipitated by the fall of Figueras -his stores were not all collected until the 1st of June, when -trenches were opened to embrace the whole of the lower town including -the fort of Francoli and its chain of connecting works running along -the sea-shore, that is to say, 1º. The Nun’s bastion and a half-moon -called the King’s, which formed, on the Spanish right, a sort of -horn-work to the royal fort or citadel. 2º. The bastion of San Carlos -and a half-moon called the Prince’s, which stood on the left, in -the retiring angle where the sea-line joined the body of the place, -and served as a counter-guard to the bastion of San Carlos. 3º. The -sea-line itself and the Francoli fort. - -The 2d of June the besieged made a fruitless sally, and in the night -of the 3d some advanced Spanish entrenchments were destroyed by the -French. Sarsfield then entered Taragona with a detachment, and took -the command of what was called the Port, which included the Mole, -the works leading to the Francoli, and the suburb or lower town, -Contreras still remaining governor of all, although reluctantly, for -he expected no success. - -In the night of the 4th the approaches were carried forward by the -sap, the second parallel was commenced, and on the 6th the besiegers -were within twenty yards of the Francoli fort, which had a wet -ditch and was of regular construction. The breaching batteries which -had been armed as the trenches proceeded, opened their fire against -it on the 7th. The fresh masonry crumbled away rapidly, and at ten -o’clock that night, the fort being entirely destroyed, three hundred -chosen men in three columns, one of which forded the Francoli river, -attacked the ruins, and the defenders retired fighting, towards -the half-moon of the Prince. The assailants then made a disorderly -attempt to enter with them, but were quickly repulsed with a loss -of fifty men, yet the lodgement was under a heavy fire secured; and -the next night a battery of six pieces was constructed there, with a -view to silence the guns of the Mole, which together with that of the -place, endeavoured to overwhelm the small space thus occupied, with -shot. - -In the nights of the 8th and 9th under terrible discharges from both -the upper and lower town, the second parallel was prolonged to fort -Francoli on the right, and on the left, carried to within seventy -yards of the Nun’s bastion. - -The 11th Sarsfield making a sally, killed some men, and retarded -the works; but before the 15th, three approaches by the sap were -conducted against the Nun’s bastion, where the besiegers crowned -the glacis, and against the half-moon of the King and Prince. Fresh -batteries were also constructed, whose fire embraced the whole front -from the Prince to the Nun’s bastion. - -On the morning of the 16th fifty-four guns opened from the French -batteries, and the Spaniards placing sand-bags along the parapets -endeavoured by musketry to kill the gunners, who were much exposed, -while all the cannon of the place which could be directed upon the -trenches were employed to crush the batteries. Towards evening this -fire had in a great degree mastered that of the besiegers, destroyed -the centre of their second parallel, and silenced a battery on their -right; but the loss and damage was great on both sides, for two -consumption magazines exploded in the town and the Nun’s bastion was -breached. The engineers also observed that the ditch of the Prince -was not carried round to the sea, and hence Suchet who feared a -continuation of this murderous artillery battle, resolved to storm -that point at once, hoping to enter by the defect in the ditch. - -At nine o’clock two columns, supported by a reserve, issued from the -trenches, and after a short resistance entered the work both by the -gap of the ditch, and by escalade; the garrison fought well, and -were put to the sword, a few only escaping along the quay, these -were pursued by a party of the French, who passing a ditch, and -draw-bridge which cut off the road from the bastion of San Carlos, -endeavoured to maintain themselves there, but being unsupported were -mostly destroyed. The lodgement thus made was immediately secured and -included in the trenches. - -During the night of the 17th the old batteries were repaired and the -construction of a new one, to breach the bastion of San Carlos, was -begun upon the half-moon of the Prince; the saps and other approaches -were also pushed forward, a lodgement was effected in the covered way -of the Nun’s bastion, and the third parallel was commenced; but on -the right of the trenches, in advance of the Prince, the workmen came -upon water which obliged them to desist at that point. - -The 18th the third parallel was completed and the descent of the -ditch at the Nun’s bastion was commenced by an under-ground gallery; -yet the fire from the upper town plunged into the trenches, and -thirty-seven shells thrown very exactly into the lodgement on the -counterscarp, obliged the besiegers to relinquish their operations -there during the day. At this time also the gun-boats which hitherto -had been of little service in the defence, were put under the -direction of the British navy, and worked with more effect; yet it -does not appear that the enemy ever suffered much injury from the -vessels of war, beyond the interruption sometimes given to their -convoys on the Col de Balaguer road. - -During the nights of the 19th and 20th all the French works were -advanced, and the morning of the 21st the new battery, in the Prince, -being ready, opened its fire against San Carlos, and was followed -by all the other batteries. The explosion of an expense magazine -silenced the Prince’s battery after a few rounds, the damage was -however repaired, and at four o’clock in the evening nearly all -the Spanish guns being overcome and the breaches enlarged, Suchet -resolved to storm the lower town. But previous to describing this -terrible event, it is necessary to notice the proceedings within and -without the place, that a just idea of the actual state of affairs on -both sides may be formed. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 4.] - -Macdonald had continued the blockade of Figueras with unceasing -vigilance; and as the best of the Miguelettes were shut up there, -and as the defeat of Campo Verde, on the 3d of May, had spread -consternation throughout the province, the operations to relieve it -were confined to such exertions as Rovira, Manso, and other chiefs -could call forth. In like manner Francisco Milans was left in the -Hostalrich district, and by his local popularity amongst the people -of the coast between Palamos and Barcelona, was enabled to keep up -an irregular force; but his object was to be made captain-general of -the province, and his desire of popularity, or some other motive, -led him to favour the towns of his district at the expense of the -general cause. Mattaro and Villa Nueva de Sitjes trafficked in corn -with Barcelona, and one of their secret convoys was detected at a -later period passing the outposts with Milans’ written authority. He -put the men to death who permitted the convoy to pass, but he did -not succeed in removing the suspicion of corruption from himself. -This traffic was very advantageous for the French, and Maurice -Mathieu being either unwilling to disturb it, or that having recently -suffered in a skirmish at Mattaro, he feared to risk his troops, made -no movement to aid the siege of Taragona, which it would appear, he -might have done by taking possession of Villa Nueva de Sitjes. - -Such was the state of Eastern Catalonia, and in the western parts, -the infantry of Sarsfield, and of Eroles, who had come down to the -vicinity of Valls, and the cavalry under Caro, which was a thousand -strong, formed, with the new levies ordered by the junta, an army -of seven or eight thousand men. This force might have done much, -if Campo Verde, a man of weak character, and led by others, had -not continually changed his plans. At the opening of the siege, -Sarsfield had acted, as we have seen, with some success on the side -of Momblanch and Reus; but when he was sent into the lower town, the -active army being reduced to Eroles’ division, the cavalry could -do no more than supply small detachments, to watch the different -French convoys and posts. Campo Verde, however, fixed his quarters at -Igualada, sent detachments to the Gaya and Villa Franca, and holding -Villa Nueva de Sitjes as his post of communication with the fleet, -demanded assistance from Murcia and Valencia, and formed a general -plan for the succour of the place. But in Taragona his proceedings -were viewed with dislike, and discord and negligence were rendering -the courage of the garrison of no avail. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.] - -We have seen that captain Codrington landed two thousand five hundred -Valencians on the 22d of May; besides that reinforcement, vessels -loaded with powder and other stores, and additional mortars for the -batteries, came from Carthagena and from Cadiz in the beginning -of June. From Murcia also came reinforcements; but such was the -perversity of some authorities and the want of arrangement in all, -that the arms of these men were taken away from them before they -sailed; and yet in Taragona there were already two thousand men -without arms, a folly attributed by some to the Spanish authorities -of Murcia, by others to colonel Roche, the English military agent. -Nor did the confusion end here; for captain Codrington, when he -sailed from Taragona to Peniscola in the latter end of May, supplied -O’Donnel with arms for two thousand recruits, who were to replace -the Valencians then embarked; and a few days afterwards he delivered -so many more at the city of Valencia, that Villa Campa and the -Empecinado, whose troops, after their dispersion in April by Abbé -and Paris, had remained inactive, were enabled again to take the -field. Thus it appears that, while men were sent without arms from -Valencia to Taragona, arms were being conveyed from the latter place -to Valencia. - -[Sidenote: Report of Contreras.] - -The troops in Taragona had, by these different reinforcements, been -augmented to near seventeen thousand men; however that number was -never available at one time, for the Murcians were sent to Montserrat -to be armed, and the losses during the operations, including those -caused by sickness, had reduced the garrison at this period to less -than twelve thousand. Several colonels of regiments, and many other -officers, feigning sickness, or with open cowardice running away, -had quitted the town, leaving their battalions to be commanded by -captains; the general of artillery was incapable, and Contreras -himself, unknown to the inhabitants, unacquainted with the place -or its resources, was vacillating and deceitful to those serving -under him. He was very unwilling to undertake the defence, and he -was at variance with Campo Verde outside, and jealous of Sarsfield -inside. In the fleet also some disagreement occurred between captain -Codrington and captain Bullen, and the commanders of the Diana and -Prueba, Spanish ships of war, were accused of gross misconduct. - -Carlos O’Donnel and his brother the Conde de Abispal, at the desire -of captain Codrington, had permitted Miranda to embark with four -thousand of the best Valencian troops for Taragona, there to join in -a grand sally; but they exacted from Codrington a pledge to bring -those who survived back, for they would not suffer this their -second aid in men to be shut up in the place when the object was -effected. These troops landed the 12th at Taragona, yet the next day, -at Campo Verde’s order, Miranda, instead of making a sally as had -been projected, carried them off by sea to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, -and from thence marched to meet a detachment of horse coming from -Villa Franca; and on the 15th two squadrons of cavalry issuing from -Taragona by the Barcelona gate, passed the French line of investment, -without difficulty, and also joined Miranda who then marched to unite -with Campo Verde at Igualada. - -This movement was in pursuance of a grand plan to succour the place; -for the junta of Catalonia, having quitted Taragona after the fall -of the Olivo, repaired with the archives to Montserrat, and as usual -made their clamours for succour ring throughout the peninsula: -they had received promises of co-operation from O’Donnel, from -Villa Campa, and from the partizans, and Campo Verde proposed, that -the English ships of war should keep between the Col de Balaguer -and Taragona, to cannonade the French convoys on that route; that -a detachment should take post at Ordal to watch the garrison of -Barcelona, and that he with the remainder of his forces, which -including Miranda’s division amounted to ten thousand infantry and a -thousand cavalry, should take some commanding position near Reus. In -this situation he designed to send a detachment towards San Filippe -de Balaguer to communicate with the fleet, and, avoiding any serious -action, to operate by small corps against the French line of supply, -and thus oblige them to raise the siege, or if they came out of -their lines to fight them in strong positions. - -Contreras treated this plan with contempt. He said it would cause -the loss both of the place and the army; that the French would not -raise the siege except for a general battle, and that within their -lines the best mode of fighting them would be in concert with the -garrison; wherefore he desired the general-in-chief to attack them in -conjunction with himself, and the junta, who were at variance with -Campo Verde, backed this proposal. - -Neither of these plans, however, appear sound; for though it is -certain, if the generals could have depended upon their troops, -such was the reduced state of Suchet’s force, and so extensive -was his line of investment, that it would have been easy to break -through; yet, unless the French were put entirely to the route, -which was unlikely, no great advantage would have followed, because -the communication was already open by sea. On the other hand Campo -Verde’s plan was only proposed on the 13th, and would have been too -slow for the critical nature of the case. It would have been more in -accord with that great maxim of war, which prescribes the _attack of -an enemy’s weakest point with the greatest possible numbers_, to have -marched with his whole force upon Mora, or upon Reus, to beat the -troops there, and destroy the depôts; and then seizing some strong -posts on the hills close to the besieger’s lines to have entrenched -it and operated daily and hourly against their rear. If Campo Verde -had destroyed either of these depôts the siege must have been raised; -and if he was unable to beat two or three thousand infantry at those -places, he could not hope, even with the assistance of the garrison, -to destroy sixteen thousand of all arms in the entrenchments before -Taragona. Suchet did not fear a battle on the Francoli river; but so -tender was he of the depôts, that when Campo Verde sent an officer to -raise the Somatenes about Mora, he called Abbé with three thousand -infantry from Teruel, and that general who was active and experienced -in the guerilla warfare, soon dispersed the Spanish levies, and took -their chief with many others prisoners, after which he joined the -besieging army. - -Suchet required this reinforcement. He had lost a general, two -hundred inferior officers, and above two thousand five hundred men -during the siege, and had not more than twelve thousand infantry fit -for duty; but colonel Villamil, a partizan of Campo Verde’s, taking -advantage of Abbé’s absence, marched with a thousand men to attack -Mora, and being beaten on the 16th was succeeded by Eroles, who came -with his whole division to Falcet on the 20th, and captured a convoy -of loaded mules, driving back the escort with some loss to Mora. The -design was to tempt Suchet to send a strong detachment in pursuit -of Eroles, in which case the latter was by a rapid march to rejoin -Campo Verde near Alcover, when the whole army was to attack Suchet -thus weakened. However the French general would not turn from his -principal object, and his magazines at Reus were still so full that -the loss of the convoy did not seriously affect him. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.] - -Such was the situation of affairs on the 21st of June, when the order -to assault the lower town was given to an army, small in number, -but full of vigour, and confident of success; while, in the place -there was confusion, folly, and cowardice. Contreras indeed acted a -shameful part; for during captain Codrington’s absence, Sarsfield had -concerted with the navy, that in the case of the lower town being -stormed, the ships should come to the mole and the garrison would -retire there, rather than to the upper town; meanwhile Campo Verde -recalled him to the active army, intending that general Velasco -should replace him; but at three o’clock on the 21st, the breaches -being then open, and the assault momentarily expected, Contreras -commanded Sarsfield instantly to embark, falsely averring that such -was the peremptory order of Campo Verde. Sarsfield remonstrated -in vain, and a boat from the Cambrian frigate carried him and his -personal staff and his effects on board that vessel; thus the command -of the troops was left to an inefficient subordinate officer, the -assault took place at that moment, and when Velasco arrived, he found -only the dead bodies of those he was to have commanded. Contreras -then assured captain Codrington and the junta, that Sarsfield had -acted without his consent, and had in fact betrayed his post! - - -STORMING OF THE LOWER TOWN. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -[Sidenote: Suchet.] - -[Sidenote: Captain Codrington’s Papers, MSS.] - -This calamitous event happened in the evening of the 21st. Two -breaches had been made in the bastions, and one in the fort Royal; -they were not wide, and a few Spanish guns still answered the French -fire; nevertheless the assault was ordered, and as some suppose, -because Suchet had secret intelligence of Sarsfield’s removal, and -the consequent confusion in the garrison. - -Fifteen hundred grenadiers, destined for the attack, were assembled -under Palombini in the trenches; a second column was formed to -support the storming troops, and to repel any sally from the upper -town; and while the arrangements were in progress, the French guns -thundered incessantly, and the shouts of the infantry, impatient -for the signal, were heard between the salvos, redoubling as the -shattered walls gave way. At last Harispe’s division began to menace -the ramparts on the side of Barcelona, to distract the attention -of the Spaniards, and then Suchet exhorting the soldiers to act -vigorously, gave the signal and let them loose while it was still -day. In an instant the breaches were crowned, and the assailants -swarmed on the bastions, the ramparts, and the fort Royal; the -Spaniards, without a leader, were thrown into confusion, and falling -in heaps broke and fled towards the port, towards the mole, and -towards the upper town, and a reserve stationed under the walls of -the latter was overthrown with the same shock. Then some of the -fugitives, running towards the mole, were saved by the English -launches, others escaped into the upper town, a few were made -prisoners, and the rest were slaughtered. - -At eight o’clock the lower town was in the possession of the enemy. -Fifteen hundred bodies, many of whom were inhabitants, lay stretched -upon the place, and the mercantile magazines of the port being set on -fire, the flames finished what the sword had begun. When the carnage -ceased, the troops were rallied, working parties were set to labour; -and ere the confusion in the upper town had subsided, the besiegers -were again hidden in their trenches and burrowing forward to the -walls of the upper town. - -The front before them consisted of four bastions with curtains, but -without a ditch. The bastion of St. Paul was opposite their left, -that of St. John opposite their centre, that of Jesus opposite their -right; but the bastion of Cervantes, which covered the principal -landing place of the Milagro, although on the same front of defence, -was somewhat retired and not included within the attack. A hollow -piece of ground, serving as a trench, had enabled the French to -establish their left in a side bastion of the wall, connecting the -upper with the lower town; and their right was strongly protected by -some houses lining the road, for between the two parts of the city -there were four hundred yards of open garden-ground interspersed with -single houses. A battery was constructed to play upon the landing -places of the Milagro, two mortars which were on the hill of the fort -Loretto, concurred in this object, and the light troops were pushed -close up to the wall; but at daylight the ships of war passed the -port delivering their broadsides in succession, Contreras then showed -the heads of columns as if for a sally, and the French skirmishers -retired; whereupon the Spanish general, contented with having thus -cleared his front, re-entered the place. - -The men saved from the mole, by the ships, were now relanded in -the upper town, and the second reinforcement from Murcia arrived, -but being like the first detachment without arms only added to the -confusion and difficulties of the governor. Nevertheless as the loss -of the French in the storming was about six hundred, and that of the -Spaniards not more than two thousand, the besieged had still nine -thousand fighting men; a number nearly equal to the whole infantry -of Suchet’s army; and hence Contreras, far from quailing beneath the -blow, would not even receive a flag of truce by which the French -general offered honourable conditions. - -Suchet’s position was becoming more embarrassing every moment; he -had now delivered four assaults, his force was diminished nearly -one-fifth of its original number, and the men’s strength was spent -with labouring on his prodigious works: his line of communication -with Lerida was quite intercepted and that with Mora interrupted, -and he had lost a large convoy of provisions together with the mules -that carried it. The resolution of the besieged seemed in no manner -abated, and their communication with the sea, although partially -under the French fire, was still free; the sea itself was covered -with ships of war, overwhelming reinforcements might arrive at any -moment, and Campo Verde with ten thousand men was daily menacing his -rear. The Valencian army, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, Duran who -had defeated a French detachment near Mirando del Ebro, Mina who -had just then taken the convoy with Massena’s baggage at the Puerto -de Arlaban, in fine all the Partidas of the mountains of Albaracin, -Moncayo, and Navarre, were in motion, and menacing his position in -Aragon. This rendered it dangerous for him to call to his aid any -more troops from the right of the Ebro, and yet a single check might -introduce despondency amongst the soldiers of the siege, composed -as they were of different nations, and some but lately come under -his command; indeed their labours and dangers were so incessant and -wearing, that it is no small proof of the French general’s talent, -and the men’s spirit, that the confidence of both was still unshaken. - -On the 24th the crisis seemed at hand, intelligence arrived in the -French camp, that the Spanish army was coming down the Gaya river -to fight, at the same time the garrison got under arms, and an -active interchange of signals took place between the town and the -fleet. Suchet immediately placed a reserve to sustain the guards -of his trenches, and marched with a part of his army to meet Campo -Verde. That general, pressed by the remonstrances of Contreras and -the junta, had at last relinquished his own plan, recalled Eroles, -and united his army at Momblanch on the 22nd, and then moving -by Villardoña, had descended the hills between the Gaya and the -Francoli; he was now marching in two columns to deliver battle, -having directed Contreras to make a sally at the same moment. But -Miranda, who commanded his right wing, found, or pretended to -find, some obstacles and halted, whereupon Campo Verde instantly -relinquished the attack, and marched to Vendril before the French -general could reach him. - -The 25th he again promised Contreras to make a decisive attack, and -for that purpose desired that three thousand men of the garrison -should be sent to Vendril, and the remainder be held ready to cut -their way through the enemy’s lines during the action. He likewise -assured him that four thousand English were coming by sea to aid -in this project, and it is probable some great effort was really -intended, for the breaching batteries had not yet opened their fire, -and the wall of the place was consequently untouched; ten thousand -infantry and a thousand cavalry under Campo Verde were within a few -miles of the French camp on the Barcelona side; eight thousand men -accustomed to fire were still under arms within the walls; and on -the 26th colonel Skerrett appeared in the roadstead, not with four -thousand, but with twelve hundred British soldiers, sent from Cadiz -and from Gibraltar to succour Taragona. - -[Sidenote: Contreras’ Report] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.] - -The arrival of this force, the increase of shipping in the roadstead, -and the promises of Campo Verde, raised the spirits of the garrison -from the depression occasioned by the disappointment of the 27th; -and they were still more elated when in the evening colonel Skerrett -and his staff, accompanied by general Doyle, captain Codrington, and -other officers of the navy, disembarked, and proceeded to examine -the means of defence. But they were struck with consternation when -they heard that the British commander, because his engineers affirmed -that the wall would give way after a few salvos from the breaching -batteries, had resolved to keep his troops on board the transports, -idle spectators of the garrison’s efforts, to defend the important -place which he had been sent to succour. - -Contreras, thus disappointed on all sides, and without dependence -on Campo Verde, resolved, if the French delayed the storm until the -29th, to make way by a sally on the Barcelona road, and so join the -army in the field; meanwhile to stand the assault if fortune so -willed it. And he had good reason for his resolution, for the ground -in front of the walls was high and narrow; and although there was -neither ditch nor covered way, a thick hedge of aloe trees, no small -obstacle to troops, grew at the foot of the rampart, which was also -cut off from the town, and from the side works, by an internal ditch -and retrenchment. Behind the rampart the houses of the great street -called the Rambla, were prepared for defence, furnishing a second -line of resistance; and although the cuts on the flanks hindered the -making of sallies in force, which at such a period was a good mode of -defence, the reduced state of the French army gave reason to believe -that eight thousand brave men could resist it effectually. - -The 28th a general plan for breaking out on the Barcelona side, the -co-operation of the fleet, and a combined attack of the Spanish army, -was arranged; and Eroles embarked for the purpose of re-landing at -Taragona, to take the leading of the troops destined to sally forth -on the 29th. The French general had however completed his batteries -on the night of the 27th, and in the morning of the 28th they opened -with a crashing effect. One magazine blew up in the bastion of -Cervantes; all the guns in that of San Paulo were dismounted; the -wall fell away in huge fragments before the stroke of the batteries, -and from the Olivo, and from all the old French trenches, the guns -and mortars showered bullets and shells into the place. This fire -was returned from many Spanish pieces, still in good condition, and -the shoulders of the French batteries were beaten down; yet their -gunners, eager for the last act of the siege, stood to their work -uncovered, the musketry rattled round the ramparts, the men on both -sides crowded to the front, and while opprobrious words and mutual -defiance passed between them, the generals, almost within hearing of -each other, exhorted the soldiers to fight with the vigour that the -crisis demanded. - - -STORMING OF THE UPPER TOWN. - -[Sidenote: Suchet.] - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -[Sidenote: Codrington’s papers. MSS.] - -At five o’clock in the evening the French fire suddenly ceased, -and fifteen hundred men led by general Habert passing out from the -parallel, went at full speed up against the breach; twelve hundred -under general Ficatier followed in support, general Montmarie led a -brigade round the left, to the bastion of Rosario, with a view to -break the gates there during the assault, and thus penetrating, to -turn the interior defence of the Rambla. Harispe took post on the -Barcelona road, to cut off the retreat of the garrison. - -The columns of attack had to pass over an open space of more than a -hundred yards before they could reach the foot of the breach; and -when within twenty yards of it, the hedge of aloes obliged them to -turn to the right, and left, under a terrible fire of musketry and -of grape, which the Spaniards, who were crowding on the breach with -apparent desperation, poured unceasingly upon them. The destruction -was great, the head of the French column got into confusion, gave -back, and was beginning to fly, when the reserves rushed up, and a -great many officers coming forward in a body, renewed the attack. At -that moment one Bianchini, an Italian soldier, who had obtained leave -to join the column as a volunteer, and whose white clothes, amidst -the blue uniforms of the French, gave him a supernatural appearance, -went forth alone from the ranks, and gliding silently and sternly up -the breach, notwithstanding many wounds reached the top, and there -fell dead. Then the multitude bounded forward with a shout, the -first line of the Spaniards fled, and the ramparts were darkened by -the following masses of the French. - -Meanwhile Montmarie’s sappers cut away the palisades at Rosario, -and his light troops finding a rope hanging from the wall, mounted -by it, at the moment when the assailants at the breach broke the -Spanish reserves with one shock, and poured into the town like a -devastating torrent. At the Rambla a momentary stand was indeed made, -but the impulse of victory was too strong to be longer resisted, -and a dreadful scene of slaughter and violence ensued. Citizens and -soldiers, maddened with fear, rushed out in crowds by the Barcelona -gate, while others, throwing themselves over the ramparts, made for -the landing-places within the Milagro; but that way also had been -intercepted by general Rogniat with his sappers, and then numbers -throwing themselves down the steep rocks were dashed to pieces, -while they who gained the shore were still exposed to the sword of -the enemy. Those that went out by the Barcelona gate were met by -Harispe’s men, and some being killed, the rest, three thousand in -number, were made prisoners. But within the town all was horror; -fire had been set to many houses, Gonzales, fighting manfully, was -killed, Contreras, wounded with the stroke of a bayonet, was only -saved by a French officer; and though the hospitals were respected -by the soldiers, in every other part their fury was unbounded. When -the assault first commenced, the ship-launches had come close into -the Milagro, and now saved some of the fugitives, but their guns -swept the open space beyond, killing friends and enemies, as, mixed -together, they rushed to the shore; and the French dragoons, passing -through the flaming streets at a trot, rode upon the fugitives, -sabring those who had outstripped the infantry. In every quarter -there was great rage and cruelty, and although most of the women -and children had, during the siege, been removed from Taragona by -the English shipping, and that the richest citizens had all gone to -Sitjes, this assault was memorable as a day of blood. Only seven or -eight hundred miserable creatures, principally soldiers, escaped on -board the vessels; nine thousand, including the sick and wounded, -were made prisoners; more than five thousand persons were slain, and -a great part of the city was reduced to ashes. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -[Sidenote: 1811. June.] - -Suchet had lost in killed and wounded during the siege between four -and five thousand men, yet scarcely had the necessary orders to -efface the trenches, secure the prisoners, and establish order in the -ruined city been given, than the French general was again in movement -to disperse Campo Verde’s force. In the night of the 29th Frere’s -division marched upon Villa Franca, Harispe’s upon Villa Nueva, -being followed by Suchet himself with Abbé’s brigade and the heavy -cavalry. Campo Verde then abandoned Vendril, and Harispe’s column, -although cannonaded by the English squadron, reached Villa Nueva, -where a great multitude, military and others, were striving to embark -in the vessels off the port. The light cavalry sabred some and made -fifteen hundred prisoners, including the wounded men who had been -carried there from Taragona during the siege; and Frere’s column in -a like manner dispersed the Spanish rear-guard at Vendril and Villa -Franca. Campo Verde then fled with the main body to Igualada, and -Suchet pushed on with the reserve to Barcelona, where he arranged -with Maurice Mathieu a plan to prevent the Valencian division from -re-embarking, or marching to aid the blockade of Figueras. - -[Sidenote: 1811. July.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 5.] - -Distrust, confusion, and discord now prevailed amongst the Catalans. -The people were enraged against Campo Verde, and the junta sent to -Cadiz to demand the duke of Infantado as a chief. Milans, who had -assembled some Miguelettes and Somatenes about Arens de Mar, openly -proposed himself, and Sarsfield, whose division was the only one in -any order, was at variance with Eroles. The country people desired to -have the latter made captain-general, and a junta of general officers -actually appointed him; yet he would not accept it while Campo Verde -remained, and that general had already reached Agramunt, whence, -overwhelmed with his misfortunes, he meant to fly towards Aragon. He -was, however, persuaded to return to Cervera, and call a council of -war, and then it was proposed to abandon Catalonia as a lost country, -and embark the army; and this disgraceful resolution, although -opposed by Sarsfield, Santa Cruz, and even Campo Verde himself, was -adopted by the council, and spread universal consternation. The junta -remonstrated loudly, all the troops who were not Catalans deserted, -making principally for the Segre and Cinça rivers, in hope to pass -through Aragon into New Castile, and so regain their own provinces; -every place was filled with grief and despair. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 2.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 3.] - -In this conjuncture captain Codrington refused to embark any -Catalans, but he had promised to take back the Valencians, and -although the conditions of his agreement had been grossly violated -by Campo Verde and Miranda, he performed his contract: yet even -this was not arranged without a contest between him and Doyle, on -the one side, and Miranda and Caro on the other. Meanwhile colonel -Green, instead of remaining at the Spanish head-quarters, returned -to Peniscola with all the money and arms under his controul; and the -captain of the Prueba frigate, having under his command, several -Spanish vessels of war loaded with wounded men, the archives of -the municipality, ammunition, stores, and money, all belonging to -Catalonia, set sail for Majorca under such suspicious circumstances, -that captain Codrington thought it necessary to send a ship to fetch -him back by force. - -In the midst of these afflicting scenes Suchet brought up his troops -to Barcelona, and Maurice Mathieu with a part of his garrison -marching upon Mataro, dispersed a small body of men that Eroles had -collected there; but the Valencian infantry to the number of two -thousand four hundred escaped to Arens de Mar, and being received on -board the English vessels were sent back to their own country. The -cavalry, unwilling to part with their horses, would not embark, and -menaced their general Caro, who fled from their fury; nevertheless -Eroles rallied them, and having gathered some stores and money -from the smaller depôts, marched inland. Campo Verde then embarked -privately in the Diana to avoid the vengeance of the people, and -general Lacy, who had arrived from Cadiz, took the command; yet he -would have been disregarded, if Eroles had not set the example of -obedience. Suchet however moved against him, and first scouring the -valley of the Congosta and that of Vich, spread his columns in all -directions, and opened a communication with Macdonald at Figueras. -Lacy, thus pressed, collected the cavalry and a few scattered -Catalonian battalions remaining about Solsona, Cardona, and Seu -d’Urgel, and took refuge in the hills, while Eroles threw himself -into Montserrat, where large magazines had been previously formed. - -Suchet unable to find subsistence in the valleys, resolved to -attack this celebrated place, and for this purpose leaving Frere -and Harispe at Vich and Moya, with orders to move at a given time -upon Montserrat, returned himself with the reserve to Reus. Here he -received despatches from Napoleon, who had created him a marshal, -and had sent him orders to take Montserrat, to destroy the works -of Taragona, with the exception of a citadel, and finally to march -against Valencia. He therefore preserved the upper town of Taragona, -ruined the rest of the works, carried the artillery to Tortoza, and -marched against Montserrat on the 22d of July by the way of Momblanch -and San Coloma to Igualada. At the same time Harispe and Frere moved -by Manresa, and Maurice Mathieu entered Esparaguera with a part of -the garrison of Barcelona. - - -TAKING OF MONTSERRAT. - -This strong-hold was occupied by fourteen or fifteen hundred -Miguelettes and Somatenes, inadequate as it proved to defend it -against a great body of men such as Suchet was bringing up. But -Eroles was daily raising recruits and adding works to the natural -strength, and it would soon have been impregnable; for on all sides -the approaches were through the midst of steeps and precipices, and -high upon a natural platform, opening to the east, and overlooking -the Llobregat, stood the convent of “_Nuestra Señora de Montserrat_,” -a great edifice, and once full of riches, but the wary monks had -removed their valuables to Minorca early in the war. It was now well -stored and armed, and above it huge peaks of stone shot up into -the clouds so rude, so naked, so desolate, that, to use Suchet’s -expressive simile, “It was like the skeleton of a mountain.” - -There were three ways of ascending to this convent; one from -Igualada which winded up on the north, from Casa Mansana, between a -perpendicular rock and a precipice; this road which was the only one -supposed practicable for an attack, was defended by two successive -batteries, and by a retrenchment immediately in front of the convent -itself. The other two ways were, a foot-path on the south leading -to Colbato, and a narrow road crossing the Llobregat and running by -Monistrol on the east, but both so crossed and barred by precipices -as to be nearly inaccessible to troops. - -Suchet disposed one brigade at Colbato to menace that front, and to -intercept the retreat of the Spaniards; he then occupied the roads -of Igualada and Monistrol with Harispe’s and Frere’s divisions, and -directed Abbé’s brigade to attack from the convent by the northern -line. The 24th Abbé drove the Spaniards from Casa Mansana, and the -25th advanced up the mountain, flanked by some light troops, and -supported by Suchet in person with the Barcelona troops, but exposed -to the fire of the Somatenes, who had gathered round the peaks above. -In a short time the first Spanish battery opened upon the head of -the column as it turned an angle, but more light troops being sent -out, they climbed the rough rocks, and getting above the battery shot -down upon the gunners, while the leading companies of the column -rushed forward, in front, and before a second discharge could be -made, reached the foot of the battery beneath the line of fire. -The Spaniards then threw down large stones upon the French until -the fire of the light troops above, became so galling that the work -was abandoned, the French however followed close, and the men above -continued clambering along with that energy which the near prospect -of success inspires; thus the Spaniards, unable to rally in time, -were overtaken and bayoneted in the second battery, and the road was -opened. - -Abbé now re-formed his troops and marched on to assail the -entrenchments of the convent, but as he advanced a sharp musketry -was heard on the opposite quarter, and suddenly the Spanish garrison -came flying out of the building pursued by French soldiers, who were -supposed to be the brigade from Colbato; they however proved to be -the light troops first sent out, to keep off the Somatenes from the -right flank; for when the column advanced up the mountain, these -men, about three hundred in number, had wandered too far to the -right, and insensibly gaining ground up hill, had seized one or two -of the hermitages with which the peaks are furnished; then growing -more daring, they pressed on unopposed, until they gained the rock -immediately overhanging the convent itself, and perceiving their -advantage, with that intelligence which belongs only to veterans, -immediately attacked the Spanish reserves. Their commanding position, -the steep rocks, and narrow staircases, compensated for their -inferiority of numbers, and in a little time they gained one of the -doors, entered, and fought the defenders amongst the cloisters and -galleries, with various turns of fortune, until the fugitives from -the batteries, followed by Abbé, arrived, and then the whole garrison -gave way and fled down the eastern precipices to the Llobregat, -where from their knowledge of the country they easily avoided -Harispe’s men. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 4.] - -The loss of this place, which by Eroles and others was attributed -to colonel Green’s having carried off the money destined for -strengthening it, was deeply felt from its military importance, and -from the superstitious veneration in which it was held: several towns -then offered their submission, many villages gave up their arms, and -a general fear of Suchet’s prowess began to spread all over Spain; -but the Catalans, a fierce and constant race, were not yet conquered. -The anarchy attendant upon the fall of Taragona and the after -movements of Suchet had indeed been great; and as we have seen, most -of the persons who might have aided to restore order, acted so as to -increase the general confusion, and their bad example was followed -by the authorities in other provinces who were most immediately -connected with Catalonia: thus Cuesta, at this time governor of the -Balearic isles, Bassecour who was at Cuença, and Palacios, who had -just been made captain-general of Valencia, did in no manner comport -themselves as the occasion required. Cuesta who had neglected to -send from Minorca the guns wanted in Catalonia, now entered into -a negotiation to exchange the prisoners at Cabrera against those -of Taragona, a praiseworthy thing, if, as Suchet asserts, it arose -from humanity; and not an ill-judged measure in itself, because the -Catalonian soldiers to be exchanged were the best in Spain, and the -French prisoners were ruined in constitution by their hard captivity. -But at this period of distress it was impolitic, and viewed with -suspicion by the Catalonians, as tending to increase the French -force. At the desire of Mr. Wellesley this exchange was, however, -peremptorily forbidden by the regency, and Cuesta refused to receive -any more prisoners at Cabrera, which while those already there were -so tormented, was, from whatever motive arising, a meritorious act, -and the last important one of his life, for he soon after died. The -prisoners remained, therefore, a disgrace to Spain and to England; -for if her envoy interfered to prevent their release, she was bound -to insist, that thousands of men, whose prolonged captivity was the -result of her interference, should not be exposed upon a barren rock, -naked as they were born, and fighting for each other’s miserable -rations to prolong an existence inconceivably wretched. - -[Sidenote: 1811. August.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 4.] - -This untoward state of affairs in Catalonia was aggravated by the -English, Spanish, and French privateers, who taking advantage of -the times, plundered the people along the coast in concert; and -they were all engaged in the smuggling of tobacco, the monopoly of -which here as in other parts of Spain formed the principal resource -of the revenue. Yet there were many considerable resources left -to the Catalans. The chief towns had fallen, but the mountainous -districts were not subdued and scarcely crossed by the French lines -of invasion. The Somatenes were numerous, more experienced, and still -ready to come forward, under a good general, if arms were provided -for them, and the English squadron was always at hand to aid them: -Admiral Keats brought three thousand muskets from Gibraltar, Sir E. -Pellew, who had succeeded to the command of the Mediterranean fleet, -was anxious to succour the province to the full extent of his means, -and Minorca was a great depôt of guns, stores, and even men. Lacy, -Eroles, Rovira, and others, therefore, raised fresh levies; and while -the blockade of Figueras continued to keep all Macdonald’s army -employed, the Spaniards seized the opportunity to operate partially -on the side of Besalu and Bispal, and even in the French Cerdaña, -which being unprotected, was invaded by Lacy. - -Suchet, whose posts now extended from Lerida to Montserrat on one -side, and on the other from Taragona to Mequinenza, foresaw that -a new and troublesome Catalonian war was preparing; but he was -obliged to return to Saragoza, partly to prepare for the invasion of -Valencia, partly to restore tranquillity in Aragon, which had been -disturbed by the passage of the seceders from Campo Verde’s army. The -Valencian cavalry also, when Eroles threw himself into Montserrat, -had under the conduct of general Gasca endeavoured to push through -Aragon towards Navarre; and although they were intercepted by general -Reille, and followed closely by Chlopiski, they finally reached -Valencia without much loss, and the rest of the fugitives gained the -Moncayo mountains and afterwards joined Mina. That chief was then -in a very low state; he had been defeated on the 14th at Sanguessa, -by Chlopiski, and Reille, who using the reinforcements then pouring -into Spain, had pursued and defeated him again at Estella on the -23d of July, at Sorlada on the 24th, and at Val de Baygory on the -25th; yet he finally escaped to Motrico on the Biscay coast, where -he received fresh arms and stores from the English vessels; but he -was again defeated by Caffarelli, and finally driven for refuge to -the district of Leibana; here the soldiers flying from Taragona and -Figueras joined him, and he soon reappeared more fierce and powerful -than before. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s papers, MSS.] - -Meanwhile Villa Campa, whose division had been re-equipped from the -supplies given by captain Codrington, concerted his operations with -the partida chiefs Duran and Campillo; and their combined forces -being eight thousand strong, having advanced from different quarters -on the right bank of the Ebro, invested Calatayud, and sought to -carry off grain, which was now very scarce. This delayed the invasion -of Valencia, for Suchet would not undertake it until he had again -secured the frontier of Aragon, and many of his battalions were -then escorting the prisoners to France. But when they returned, he -directed numerous columns against the partidas, and at the same time -troops belonging to the army of the centre came down by the way of -Medina Celi; whereupon the Spaniards retired to their fastnesses in -the mountains of Soria on one side, and in those of Albaracin on the -other. - -Four thousand of the Valencian army had meanwhile marched against -Rapita and Amposta, for the former post was re-established after the -fall of Taragona, but although Habert, marching out of Tortoza with -seven or eight hundred men, defeated them with a considerable loss, -the embarrassments of the third corps were not removed; for while -these successes were obtained on the right of the Ebro the Catalans -began to harass the posts between Lerida and Montserrat. On the 9th -of August the Somatenes fell on some Italians placed in Monistrol, -and were with difficulty repulsed; and a few days after, a convoy -coming from Igualada to Montserrat, was attacked by fifteen hundred -insurgents, and was unable to proceed until Palombini arrived with a -battalion and dislodged the Catalans, but he lost more than a hundred -of his own men in the action. Suchet finding from these events that -he could not safely withdraw his main body from Catalonia until the -fall of Figueras should let loose the army of the upper province, -sent fresh troops to Montserrat, and ordered Palombini to move with -his garrison to aid Macdonald in the blockade; that place had, -however, surrendered before Palombini had passed Barcelona. - -General Martinez, after making many vain efforts to break the line of -blockade, and having used every edible substance, prepared, on the -16th of August, to make a final effort, in concert with Rovira who -came down to Llers. An officer deserting from the garrison betrayed -the project; and Rovira was beaten in the morning before the garrison -sallied, nevertheless, in the night Martinez endeavoured to cut his -way through the lines on the side of Rosas, but was driven back with -a loss of four hundred men. Three days after, the place was given up -and three thousand famished men were made prisoners. Thus ended the -fourth great effort of the Catalonians. The success of the French -was not without alloy, more than a fourth part of the blockading -troops had died of a pestilent distemper; Macdonald himself was too -ill to continue in the command, and the remainder of his army was -so weakened, that no further active operations could be undertaken; -Suchet was still occupied in Aragon, and Lacy thus obtained time and -means to reorganize troops for a fifth effort. - -The persons who had betrayed the place to Rovira were shot by -Macdonald, and the commandant whose negligence had occasioned this -misfortune was condemned to death; but Napoleon, who has been so -foully misrepresented as a sanguinary tyrant, Napoleon, who had -commuted the sentence of Dupont, now pardoned general Guillot; a -clemency in both cases remarkable, seeing that the loss of an army by -one, and of a great fortress by the other, not only tended directly -and powerfully to the destruction of the emperor’s projects, but were -in themselves great crimes; and it is to be doubted if any other -sovereign in Europe would have displayed such a merciful greatness of -mind. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. The emperor was discontented with Macdonald’s operations, and -that general seems to have mistaken both the nature of mountain -warfare in general, and that of Catalonia in particular. The first -requires a persevering activity in seizing such commanding posts on -the flanks or rear of an adversary as will oblige him to fight on -disadvantageous terms; and as the success greatly depends upon the -rapidity and vigour of the troops, their spirit should be excited -by continual enterprize, and nourished by commendation and rewards. -Now Macdonald, if we may believe Vacani, an eye-witness, did neither -gain the confidence of his soldiers, nor cherish their ardour; and -while he exacted a more rigid discipline, than the composition of -his troops and the nature of the war would bear, he let pass many -important opportunities of crushing his enemies in the field. His -intent was to reduce the ferocious and insubordinate disposition of -his men, but the peculiar state of feeling with respect to the war -on both sides, did not permit this, and hence his marches appeared -rather as processions and ceremonies than warlike operations. He -won no town, struck no important blow in the field, gave no turn to -the public feeling, and lost a most important fortress, which, with -infinite pains and trouble, he could scarcely regain. - -The plans of all the French generals had been different. St. Cyr used -to remain quiet, until the Spaniards gathered in such numbers that he -could crush them in general battles; but then he lost all the fruit -of his success by his inactivity afterwards. Augereau neither fought -battles nor made excursions with skill, nor fulfilled the political -hopes which he had excited. Macdonald was in constant movement, but -he avoided battles; although in every previous important attack the -Catalans had been beaten, whether in strong or in weak positions. -Suchet alone combined skill, activity, and resolution, and the -success which distinguished his operations is the best comment upon -the proceedings of the others. It is in vain to allege that this last -marshal was in a better condition for offensive operations, and that -the emperor required of the seventh corps exertions which the extreme -want of provisions prevented it from making. Napoleon might have been -deceived as to the resources at first, and have thus put it upon -enterprises beyond its means; but after two years’ experience, after -receiving the reports of all the generals employed there, and having -the most exact information of all occurrences, it is impossible to -imagine that so consummate a captain would have urged Macdonald to -undertake impracticable operations; and the latter gave no convincing -proof that his own views were sound. Notwithstanding the continual -complaints of St. Cyr, and other French writers, who have endeavoured -to show that Napoleon was the only man who did not understand -the nature of the war in Spain, and that the French armies were -continually overmatched, it is certain that, after Baylen, the latter -never lost a great battle except to the English; that they took every -town they besieged, and never suffered any reverse from the Spaniards -which cannot be distinctly traced to the executive officers. It would -be silly to doubt the general merit of a man who in so many wars, -and for many years, has maintained the noblest reputation, midst -innumerable dangers, and many great political changes in his own -country, but Macdonald’s military talents do not seem to have been -calculated for the irregular warfare of Catalonia. - -2º. The surprise of Figueras has been designated as a misfortune -to the Spaniards, because it shut up a large body of their best -Miguelettes, who fell with the place; and because it drew off Campo -Verde from Taragona at a critical period. Let us, however, contrast -the advantages, and, apart from the vigour and enterprise displayed -in the execution, no mean help to the cause at the time, it will -be seen that the taking of that fortress was a great gain to the -Catalans; for, first, it carried away Macdonald from Barcelona, -and thus the fall of Montserrat was deferred, and great danger of -failure incurred by Suchet at Taragona; a failure infallible, if his -adversaries had behaved with either skill or courage. Secondly, it -employed all the French army of Upper Catalonia, the national guards -of the frontier, and even troops from Toulon, in a blockade, during -which the sword and sickness destroyed more than four thousand -men, and the remainder were so weakened as to be incapable of field -service for a long time; meanwhile Lacy reorganized fresh forces, and -revived the war, which he could never have done if the seventh corps -had been disposable. Thirdly, seeing that Campo Verde was incapable -of handling large masses, it is doubtful if he could have resisted or -retarded for any time the investment of Taragona; but it is certain -that the blockade of Figueras gave an opportunity to Catalonia, to -recover the loss of Taragona; and it obliged Suchet, instead of -Macdonald, to take Montserrat, which disseminated the former force, -and retarded the invasion of Valencia. Wherefore Rovira’s daring, -in the surprise, and Martinez’ resolution in the maintaining of -Figueras, were as useful as they were glorious. - -3º. The usual negligence, and slowness of the Spaniards, was apparent -during this campaign; although resolution, perseverance, and talent -were evinced by Suchet in all his operations, the success was in a -great measure due to the faults of his opponents, and amongst those -faults colonel Skerrett’s conduct was prominent. It is true that -captain Codrington and others agreed in the resolution not to land; -that there was a heavy surf, and that the engineers predicted on the -27th that the wall would soon be beaten down; but the question should -have been viewed in another light by colonel Skerrett. Taragona -was the bulwark of the principality, the stay and hope of the war. -It was the city of Spain whose importance was next to Cadiz, and -before its walls the security or the ruin of Valencia as well as of -Catalonia was to be found. Of the French scarcely fourteen thousand -infantry were under arms, and those were exhausted with toil. The -upper town, which was the body of the place, was still unbreached, -it was only attacked upon one narrow front, and behind it the Rambla -offered a second and a more powerful defence. There were, to use the -governor’s expression, within the walls “_eight thousand of the most -warlike troops in Spain_,” and there was a succouring army without, -equal in number to the whole infantry of the besiegers. Under these -circumstances the stoutest assailants might have been repulsed, and a -severe repulse would have been fatal to the French operations. - -Captain Codrington asserts that in the skirmishes beyond the walls, -the valour of the garrison was eminent; and he saw a poor ragged -fellow endeavouring, such was his humanity and greatness of mind, to -stifle the burning fuze of a shell with sand, that some women and -children might have time to escape. Feeling and courage, the springs -of moral force, were therefore not wanting, but the virtue of the -people was diminished, and the spirit of the soldiery overlaid, by -the bad conduct of their leaders. The rich citizens fled early to -Villa Nueva, and they were followed by many superior officers of -regiments; Contreras jealous of Sarsfield had obliged him, as we have -seen, to quit his post at a critical moment, and then represented -it to the garrison as a desertion; the Valencians were carried off -after being one day in the place, and the Murcians came without arms; -and all this confusion and mischief were so palpable, that the poor -Spanish soldiers could anticipate nothing but failure if left to -themselves, and it was precisely for this reason that the British -should have been landed to restore confidence. And is there nothing -to be allowed for the impetuous fury of an English column breaking -out of the place at the moment of attack? Let it be remembered also, -that in consequence of the arrival of a seventy-four, convoying the -transports, such was the number of ships of war, that a thousand -seamen and marines might have been added to the troops; and who can -believe that three or four thousand French and Italians, the utmost -that could be brought to bear in mass on one point, and that not -an easy point, for the breach was narrow and scarcely practicable, -would have carried the place against eight thousand Spaniards and -two thousand British. But then the surf and the enemy’s shot at -the landing-place, and the opinion of general Doyle and of captain -Codrington and of the engineers! The enemy’s shot might have -inflicted loss, but could not, especially at night, have stopped -the disembarkation; and the opinion of the engineers, was a just -report of the state of the walls, but in no manner touched the moral -considerations. - -When the Roman Pompey was adjured by his friends not to put to sea -during a violent storm he replied, “_it is necessary to sail—it is -not necessary to live_.” It was also necessary to save Taragona! -Was no risk to be incurred for so great an object? Was an uncertain -danger to be weighed against such a loss to Spain? Was the British -intrepidity to be set at nought? Were British soldiers to be quiet -spectators, while Spaniards stood up in a fight too dangerous for -them to meddle with? Is that false but common doctrine, so degrading -to soldiers, that brick-and-mortar sentiment, that the courage of the -garrison is not to be taken into account, to be implicitly followed? -What if the Spaniards had been successful? The result was most -painful! Taragona strongly fortified, having at different periods -above fifteen thousand men thrown into it, with an open harbour and -free communication by sea, was taken by less than twenty thousand -French and Italian infantry, in the face of a succouring army, a -British brigade, and a British fleet! - -4º. The cruelty of the French general and the ferocity of his -soldiers, have been dwelt upon by several writers, but Suchet has -vindicated his own conduct, and it is therefore unnecessary here to -enter into a close investigation of facts which have been distorted, -or of reasoning which has been misapplied. That every barbarity, -commonly attendant upon the storming of towns, was practised may be -supposed; there is in the military institutions of Europe nothing -calculated to arrest such atrocities. Soldiers of every nation look -upon the devastation of a town taken by assault as their right, and -it would be unjust to hold Suchet responsible for the violence of an -army composed of men from different countries, exasperated by the -obstinacy of the defence, and by a cruel warfare; in Spanish towns -also the people generally formed a part of the garrison. - - -OPERATIONS IN VALENCIA AND MURCIA. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. III.] - -The transactions in the first of these provinces during the siege -of Taragona have been already sufficiently noticed; and those in -Murcia were of little interest, for the defeat of Blake at Cullar in -November 1810, and the fever which raged at Carthagena, together -with the frequent change of commanders, and the neglect of the -government had completely ruined the Murcian army. The number of -men was indeed considerable, and the fourth French corps, weakened -by drafts for the expedition to Estremadura, and menaced by the -Barossa expedition, could not oppose more than five or six thousand -men; yet the province had never been touched by an enemy, and the -circumstances were all favorable for the organization and frequent -trial of new troops. - -In February 1811 colonel Roche, the military agent, described the -whole army as “ready to disperse on the first appearance of an -enemy,” and in the following June he says that “after being left to -themselves for three years, the Murcian troops were absolutely in a -worse state than they were at the commencement of the revolution, -that general Freire, although at the head of sixteen thousand -infantry and three thousand cavalry, dared not attack the six -thousand French before him, lest his men should disperse, and they -thought as little of the general as he did of them; that indolence, -lassitude, and egotism prevailed in all parts; that the establishment -of the Cortes had proved but a slight stimulus to the enthusiasm, -which was fast dying away, and that the most agreeable thing in the -world at the moment to the Spaniards, would be to remain neuter, -while England and France fought the battle and paid all the expense.” -The Murcian force was increased after Mahi’s arrival to twenty-two -thousand men, but remained inactive until August, when Blake assumed -the command, and the events which followed will be treated of -hereafter. - -The petty warfare in the south of Grenada and Andalusia, deserves -little notice, for during Blake’s absence in Estremadura with the -fourth army, it was principally confined to the Ronda, where the -Serranos aided at times by the troops from Algesiras, and by succours -from Gibraltar, were always in arms; yet even there, the extreme -arrogance and folly of the Spanish generals, so vexed the Serranos, -that they were hardly prevented from capitulating in form with -the French, and while Soult continued at Llerena after the battle -of Albuera. The Escopeteros and civic guards sufficed to keep the -Partidas in check. Thus the blockade of the Isla remained undisturbed -from without, and Cadiz itself, the seat of all intrigues and -follies, was fed by English fleets and defended by English troops. - -The narrative of the circle of secondary operations being now -completed, and the fate of Spain proved to depend upon the British -general alone, it will be proper in the next book to take a view -of political affairs shewing how strongly they bore upon lord -Wellington’s decisions; and if such an interruption of the military -story should be distasteful to any reader I would have him reflect, -that war is not so much a series of battles, as a series of -difficulties in the preparations to fight them with success. - - - - -BOOK XIV. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -POLITICAL SITUATION OF JOSEPH. - -[Sidenote: 1810.] - -[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 1.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.] - -After the conquest of Andalusia, the intrusive monarch pursued -his own system of policy with more eagerness than before. He -published amnesties, granted honours and rewards to his followers, -took many of the opposite party into his service, and treated the -people generally with mildness. But he was guided principally -by his Spanish ministers, who being tainted with the national -weaknesses of character were, especially Orquijo, continually making -exaggerated reports, intriguing against the French generals, and -striving, sometimes with, sometimes without justice, to incense the -king against them. This course, which was almost the inevitable -consequence of his situation, excited angry feelings in the military, -which, joined to the natural haughtiness of soldiers in command, -produced constant disputes. In the conquered provinces, Joseph’s -civil agents endeavoured to obtain more of the spoil than comported -with the wants of the armies, and hence bickerings between the French -officers and the Spanish authorities were as unceasing as they were -violent. The prefects, royal commissaries, and intendants would not -act under military orders, with respect to the supplies, nor would -they furnish sums for the military chests. On the other hand the -generals often seized the king’s revenue, raised extraordinary and -forced contributions, disregarded legal forms, and even threatened -to arrest the royal agents when they refused compliance with their -wishes. Neither was Joseph’s own conduct always free from violence, -for in the latter part of 1811 he obliged the merchants of Madrid, to -draw bills, for two millions of dollars, on their correspondents in -London, to supply him with a forced loan. - -[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -He was always complaining to the emperor that the niggardly -allowances from France, the exactions of the generals, and the misery -of the country left him no means of existence as a monarch; and -during the greatest part of 1810 and the beginning of 1811, Santa -Fé, Almenara, and Orquijo, succeeding each other as ambassadors -at Paris, were in angry negotiations, with Napoleon’s ministers, -relating to this subject, and to a project for ceding the provinces -of the Ebro in exchange for Portugal. Against this project Joseph -protested, on the grounds that it was contrary to the constitution -of Bayonne, that it would alienate the Spaniards, was degrading to -himself, and unjust as a bargain; seeing that Portugal, was neither -so rich, so industrious, so pleasant, nor so well affected to him as -the provinces to be taken away, and the well-known hatred between the -Spaniards and Portuguese would never allow the latter to be quiet -subjects. - -[Sidenote: 1811. January.] - -[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -To these complaints, Napoleon answered with his usual force and -clearness of judgment. He insisted that the cost of the war had -drained the French exchequer; that he had employed nearly four -hundred thousand men for the king’s interest, and that rather than -increase the expenses he would withdraw some of the troops. He -reproached Joseph with the feebleness of his operations, the waste -and luxury of his court, his ill-judged schemes of conciliation, his -extravagant rewards, his too great generosity to the opposite party, -and his raising, contrary to the opinion of the marshals, a Spanish -army which would desert on the first reverse. The constitution of -Bayonne, he said, was rendered null by the war, nevertheless he had -not taken a single village from Spain, and he had no wish to seize -the provinces of the Ebro, unless the state of the contest obliged -him to do so. He required indeed a guarantee for the repayment of the -money France had expended for the Spanish crown, yet the real wishes -of the people were to be ascertained before any cession of territory -could take place, and to talk of Portugal before it was conquered -was folly. As this last observation was Joseph’s own argument, an -explanation ensued, when it appeared that Almenara, thinking the -seizure of the Ebro provinces a settled plan, had, of his own accord, -asked for Portugal as an indemnification; a fact that marks the -character of the Spanish cabinet. - -Napoleon also assured the king that there must be a great deal of -money in Spain, for, besides the sums sent from France, the plate of -the suppressed convents, and the silver received by the Spaniards -from America, there were the subsidies from England, and the enormous -expenditure of her troops. Then, the seizure and sale of national -domains, and of confiscated colonial produce, were to be taken into -calculation, and if the king wanted more, he must extract it from the -country, or go without. France would only continue her subsidy of two -millions of franks monthly. The emperor had always supported his wars -by the resources of the territory in which it was carried on, and the -king might do the same. - -[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.] - -Joseph replied that his court was neither luxurious nor magnificent; -that he recompensed services, by giving bills on the contingent sales -of national domains, which could not be applied to the wants of the -soldiers; that he could scarcely keep the public servants alive, -and that his own expenses were not greater than the splendour of -the crown required. That many of the best generals approved of his -raising a Spanish army, desertions from it were less frequent than -was imagined, and were daily diminishing; and these native troops -served to garrison towns while the French were in the field. He -wished, he said, to obtain large loans rather than small gifts from -the French treasury, and desired that the confiscated property of -the Spanish noblemen who had been declared traitors in 1808, should -be paid to him; but with regard to harsh measures, the people could -not pay the contributions, and the proceedings of a king with his -subjects should not be like those of a foreign general. Lenity was -necessary to tranquillize the provinces subdued, and as an example to -those which resisted. The first thing was to conciliate the people’s -affections. The plate of the suppressed convents was not so valuable -as it appeared at a distance, the greater part of it was already -plundered by the guerillas, or by the French troops. The French -marshals intercepted his revenues, disregarded his orders, insulted -his government, and oppressed the country. He was degraded as a -monarch and would endure it no longer. He had been appointed to the -throne of Spain without his own consent, and although he would never -oppose his brother’s will, he would not live a degraded king, and was -therefore ready to resign, unless the emperor would come in person -and remedy the present evils. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 3.] - -[Sidenote: February.] - -[Sidenote: April.] - -Napoleon, while he admitted the reasonableness of some of the king’s -statements, still insisted, and with propriety of argument, that it -was necessary to subdue the people before they could be conciliated. -Yet to prevent wanton abuses of power, he fixed the exact sum -which each person, from the general governors down to the lowest -subaltern was to receive, and he ordered every person violating -this regulation to be dismissed upon the spot, and a report of the -circumstance sent to Paris within twenty hours after. Before this, -Bessieres, acknowledged by all to be a just and mild man, had been -sent to remedy the mischief said to have been done by Kellerman, and -others in the northern provinces. And in respect of conciliation, -the emperor remarked that he had himself, at first, intended to open -secret negotiations with the Cortes, but on finding what an obscure -rabble they were, he had desisted. He therefore recommended Joseph -to assemble at Madrid a counter-cortes, composed of men of influence -and reputation, wherein (adverting to the insane insolence of the -Spaniards towards their colonies) he might by the discussion of -really liberal institutions, and by exposing the bad faith with which -the English encouraged the Americans, improve public opinion, and -conciliate the Spaniards with hopes of preserving the integrity of -the empire, so rudely shaken by the revolt of the colonies. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III.] - -[Sidenote: May.] - -An additional subsidy was peremptorily refused, but the emperor -finally consented to furnish Joseph with half a million of franks -monthly, for the particular support of his court; and it is worthy of -notice, as illustrating the character of Napoleon, that in the course -of these disputes, Joseph’s friends at Paris, repeatedly advised him, -that the diplomatic style of his letters incensed and hardened the -emperor, whereas his familiar style as a brother always softened and -disposed him to concede what was demanded. Joseph, however, could not -endure the decree for establishing the military governments, by which -the administration was placed entirely in the hands of the generals, -and their reports upon the civil and judicial administration referred -entirely to the emperor. It was a measure assailing at once his -pride, his power, and his purse. His mind, therefore, became daily -more embittered, and his prefects and commissaries, emboldened by -his opinions, absolutely refused to act under the French marshal’s -orders. Many of these complaints, founded on the reports of his -Spanish servants, were untrue and others distorted. We have seen how -the habitual exaggerations, and even downright falsehoods of the -juntas and the regency, thwarted the English general’s operations, -and the king, as well as the French generals, must have encountered a -like disposition in the Spanish ministers. Nevertheless, the nature -of the war rendered it impossible but that much ground of complaint -should exist. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 2.] - -Joseph’s personal sentiments, abstractedly viewed, were high-minded -and benevolent; but they sorted ill with his situation as an -usurper. He had neither patience nor profundity in his policy, and -at last such was his irritation, that having drawn up a private but -formal renunciation of the crown, he took an escort of five thousand -men, and about the period of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, passed -out of Spain and reached Paris: there Ney, Massena, Junot, St. Cyr, -Kellerman, Augereau, Loison, and Sebastiani, were also assembled, and -all discontented with the war, and with each other. - -[Sidenote: See Chap. I.] - -By this rash and ill-timed proceeding, the intrusive government was -left without a head, and the army of the centre was rendered nearly -useless at the critical moment, when Soult, engaged in the Albuera -operations, had a right to expect support from Madrid. The northern -army also was in a great measure paralysed, and the army of Portugal, -besides having just failed at Fuentes, was in all the disorganization -attendant upon the retreat from Santarem, and upon a change of -commanders. This was the principal cause why Bessieres abandoned -the Asturias and concentrated his forces in Leon and Castile on the -communications with France; for it behoved the French generals, -everywhere to hold their troops in hand, and to be on the defensive, -until the emperor’s resolution in this extraordinary conjuncture -should be known. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 3.] - -Napoleon astounded at this precipitate action of the king, -complained, with reason, that having promised not to quit the -country without due notice, Joseph had failed to him, both as a -monarch and as a general, and that he should at least have better -chosen his time; for if he had retired in January, when the armies -were all inactive, the evil would have been less, as the emperor -might then have abandoned Andalusia, and concentrated Soult’s and -Massena’s troops on the Tagus; which would have been in accord with -the policy fitting for the occasion. But now when the armies had -suffered reverses, when they were widely separated, and in pursuit of -different objects, the mischief was great, and the king’s conduct not -to be justified! - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 2.] - -Joseph replied that he had taken good measures to prevent confusion -during his absence, and then reiterating his complaints and declaring -his resolution to retire into obscurity, he finished by observing, -with equal truth and simplicity of mind, that it would be better for -the emperor that he should do so, inasmuch as in France he would be a -good subject, but in Spain a bad king. - -The emperor had however too powerful an intellect for his brother -to contend with. Partly by reason, partly by authority, partly by -concession, he obliged him to return again in July, furnished with -a species of private treaty, by which the army of the centre was -placed entirely at his disposal. He was also empowered to punish -delinquents, to change the organization, and to remove officers who -were offensive to him, even the chief of the staff, general Belliard, -who had been represented by Orquijo as inimical to his system. And if -any of the other armies should, by the chances of war, arrive within -the district of the centre army, they also, while there, were to be -under the king; and at all times, even in their own districts, when -he placed himself at their head. The army of the north was to remain -with its actual organization and under a marshal, but Joseph had -liberty to change Bessieres for Jourdan. - -[Sidenote: 1811. June.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 3.] - -To prevent the oppression of the people, especially in the -north, Napoleon required the French military authorities, to send -daily reports, to the king, of all requisitions and contributions -exacted. And he advised his brother to keep a Spanish commissary at -the head-quarters of each army, to watch over Spanish interests; -promising that whenever a province should have the means, and the -will, to resist the incursions of the guerillas, it should revert -entirely to the government of the king, and be subjected to no -charges, save those made by the Spanish civil authorities for general -purposes. The armies of the south and of Aragon were placed in a like -situation on the same terms, and meanwhile Joseph was to receive a -quarter of the contributions from each, for the support of his court -and of the central army. - -The entire command of the forces in Spain the emperor would not -grant, observing that the marshal directing from Madrid, as -major-general, would naturally claim the glory, as well as the -responsibility of arranging the operations; and hence the other -marshals, finding themselves, in reality, under his, instead of the -king’s command, would obey badly or not at all. All their reports -and the intelligence necessary to the understanding of affairs were -therefore to be addressed directly to Berthier, for the emperor’s -information. Finally the half million of francs hitherto given -monthly to the king was to be increased to a million for the year -1811; and it was expected that Joseph would immediately reorganize -the army of the centre, restore its discipline, and make it, what it -had not yet been, of weight in the contest. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -The king afterwards obtained some further concessions, the most -important of which related to the employment and assembling of -Spaniards according to his own directions and plans. This final -arrangement and the importance given to Joseph’s return, for by the -emperor’s orders, he was received as if he had only been to Paris -to concert a great plan, produced a good effect for a short time; -but after the fall of Figueras, Napoleon fearing to trust Spanish -civilians, extended the plan, hitherto confined to Catalonia, of -employing French intendants in all the provinces on the left of -the Ebro. Then the king’s jealousy was again excited, and the old -bickerings between him and the marshals were revived. - - -POLITICAL SITUATION OF FRANCE. - -In 1811 the emperor’s power over the continent, as far as the -frontier of Russia, was in fact, absolute; and in France internal -prosperity was enjoyed with external glory. But the emperor -of Russia, stimulated by English diplomacy, and by a personal -discontent; in dread also of his nobles, who were impatient under the -losses which the continental system inflicted upon them, was plainly -in opposition to the ascendancy of France, and Napoleon, although -wishing to avoid a rupture, was too long-sighted, not to perceive, -that it was time to prepare for a more gigantic contest than any -he had hitherto engaged in. He therefore husbanded his money and -soldiers, and would no longer lavish them upon the Spanish war. He -had poured men indeed continually into that country, but these were -generally conscripts, while in the north of France he was forming a -reserve of two hundred thousand old soldiers; but with that art that -it was doubtful whether they were intended for the Peninsula or for -ulterior objects, being ready for either, according to circumstances. - -Such an uncertain state of affairs, prevented him from taking more -decided steps, in person, with relation to Spain, which he would -undoubtedly have done if the war there, had been the only great -matter on his hands, and therefore the aspect of French politics, -both in Spain and other places, was favourable to lord Wellington’s -views. A Russian war, sooner or later, was one of the principal -chances upon which he rested his hopes of final success; yet his -anticipations were dashed with fear, for the situation of the Spanish -and Portuguese governments, and of their armies, and the condition of -the English government, were by no means so favourable to his plans, -as shall be shewn in the next chapter. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -POLITICAL STATE OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE WAR. - - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -It was very clear that merely to defend Portugal, with enormous -loss of treasure and of blood, would be a ruinous policy; and that -to redeem the Peninsula the Spaniards must be brought to act more -reasonably than they had hitherto done. But this the national -character and the extreme ignorance of public business, whether -military or civil, which distinguished the generals and statesmen, -rendered a very difficult task. - -Lord Wellington, finding the English power weak to control, and its -influence as weak to sway, the councils of Spain, could only hope -by industry, patience, and the glory of his successes in Portugal, -to acquire that personal ascendancy, which would enable him to -direct the resources of the whole Peninsula in a vigorous manner, -and towards a common object. And the difficulty of attaining that -ascendancy can only be made clear by a review of the intercourse -between the British government and the Spanish authorities, from the -first bursting out of the insurrection, to the period now treated of; -a review which will disclose the utter unfitness of Mr. Canning to -conduct great affairs. Heaping treasure, stores, arms, and flattery, -upon those who were unable to bear the latter, or use the former -beneficially, he neglected all those persons who were capable of -forwarding the cause; and neither in the choice of his agents, nor -in his instructions to them, nor in his estimation of the value of -events, did he discover wisdom or diligence, although he covered his -misconduct, at the moment, by his glittering oratory. - -[Sidenote: 1808.] - -Soon after the Spanish deputies had first applied for the assistance -of England, Mr. Charles Stuart, who was the only regular diplomatist -sent to Spain, carried, to Coruña, such a sum, as, with previous -subsidies made up one million of dollars for Gallicia alone. The -deputies from Asturias had at the same time demanded five millions of -dollars, and one was paid in part of their demand; but when this was -known, two millions more were demanded for Gallicia, which were not -refused; and yet the first point in Mr. Canning’s instructions to Mr. -Stuart, was, _to enter into “no political engagements.”_ - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -Mr. Duff, the consul for Cadiz, carried out a million of dollars -for Andalusia, the junta asked for three or four millions more, -and the demands of Portugal, although less extravagant, were very -great. Thus above sixteen millions of dollars were craved, and more -than four millions, including the gift to Portugal, had been sent; -the remainder was not denied; and the amount of arms, and other -stores given, may be estimated by the fact, that eighty-two pieces -of artillery, ninety-six thousand muskets, eight hundred thousand -flints, six millions and a half of ball-cartridges, seven thousand -five hundred barrels of powder, and thirty thousand swords and belts -had been sent to Coruña and Cadiz; and the supply to the Asturias was -in proportion. But Mr. Canning’s instructions to Mr. Duff and to the -other agents were still the same as to Mr. Stuart, “_His Majesty had -no desire to annex any conditions to the pecuniary assistance which -he furnished to Spain_.” - -Mr. Canning observed that he considered the amount of money as -nothing! but acknowledged that _specie_ was at this time so scarce -that it was only by a direct and secret understanding with the -former government of Spain, under the connivance of France, that -any considerable amount of dollars had been collected in England. -And “each province of Spain,” he said, “had made its own particular -application, and the whole occasioned a call for specie such as -had never before been made upon England at any period of its -existence. There was a rivalry between the provinces with reference -to the amount of sums demanded which rendered the greatest caution -necessary.” And the more so, that “the deputies were incompetent -to furnish either information or advice upon the state of affairs -in Spain;” yet Mr. Duff was commanded, while representing these -astounding things to the junta of Seville, “_to avoid any appearance -of a desire to overrate the merit and value of the exertions then -making by Great Britain in favour of the Spanish nation, or to lay -the grounds for restraining or limiting those exertions within any -other bounds than those which were prescribed by the limits of the -actual means of the country_.” In proof of Mr. Canning’s sincerity -upon this head, he afterwards sent two millions of dollars by Mr. -Frere, while the British army was left without any funds at all! -Moreover the supplies, so recklessly granted, being transmitted -through subordinates and irresponsible persons were absurdly and -unequally distributed. - -This obsequious extravagance, produced the utmost arrogance on the -part of the Spanish leaders, who treated the English minister’s -humble policy with the insolence it courted. When Mr. Stuart reached -Madrid, after the establishment of the supreme junta, that body, -raising its demands upon England, in proportion to its superior -importance, required, and in the most peremptory language, additional -succours so enormous as to startle even the prodigality of the -English government. - -Ten millions of dollars instantly, five hundred thousand yards of -cloth, four million yards of linen for shirts and for the hospitals, -three hundred thousand pair of shoes, thirty thousand pair of boots, -twelve million of cartridges, two hundred thousand muskets, twelve -thousand pair of pistols, fifty thousand swords, one hundred thousand -arobas of flour, besides salt meat and fish! These were their -demands! and when Mr. Stuart’s remonstrance obliged them to alter the -insulting language of their note, they insisted the more strenuously -upon having the succours; observing that England had as yet only -done enough to set their force afloat, and that she might _naturally -expect demands like the present to follow the first_. They desired -also that the money should be furnished at once, by bills on the -British treasury, and at the same time required the confiscation of -Godoy’s property in the English funds! - -Such was Mr. Canning’s opening policy, and the sequel was worthy -of the commencement. His proceedings with respect to the Erfurth -proposals for peace, his injudicious choice of Mr. Frere, his leaving -of Mr. Stuart without instructions for three months at the most -critical period of the insurrection, and his management of affairs -in Portugal and at Cadiz, during sir John Cradock’s command, have -been already noticed; and that he was not misled by any curious -accordance in the reports of his agents, is certain, for he was early -and constantly informed of the real state of affairs by Mr. Stuart. -That gentleman was the accredited diplomatist, and in all important -points, his reports were very exactly corroborated by the letters of -sir John Moore, and by the running course of events; yet Mr. Canning -neither acted upon them nor published them, but he received all -the idle, vaunting, accounts of the subordinate civil and military -agents, with complacency, and published them with ostentation; thus -encouraging the misrepresentations of ignorant men, increasing the -arrogance of the Spaniards, deceiving the English nation, and as far -as he was able misleading the English general. - -Mr. Stuart reached Coruña in July 1808, and on the 22d of that month -informed Mr. Canning that the reports of successes in the south -were not to be depended upon, seeing that they increased exactly -in proportion to the difficulty of communicating with the alleged -scenes of action, and with the dearth of events, or the recurrence -of disasters in the northern parts. He also assured him, that the -numbers of the Spanish armies, within his knowledge, were by no means -so great as they were represented. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.] - -On the 26th of July he gave a detailed history of the Gallician -insurrection, by which he plainly shewed that every species of -violence, disorder, intrigue, and deceit were to be expected from -the leading people; that the junta’s object was to separate Gallicia -from Spain; and that so inappropriate was the affected delicacy of -abstaining from conditions, while furnishing succours; that the -junta of Gallicia was only kept in power, by the countenance of -England, evinced in her lavish supplies, and the residence of her -envoy at Coruña. The interference of the British naval officers -to quell a political tumult had even been asked for, and had been -successful; and Mr. Stuart himself had been intreated to meddle in -the appointments of the governing members, and in other contests -for power, which were daily taking place. In fine, before the end -of August the system of folly, peculation, waste, and improvidence -which characterized Spanish proceedings, was completely detected by -Mr. Stuart, and laid before Mr. Canning, without in the slightest -degree altering the latter’s egregious system, or even attracting his -notice; nay, he even intimated to the ambitious junta of Seville, -that England would willingly acknowledge its supremacy, if the -consent of the other provinces could be obtained; thus holding out a -premium for the continuation of that anarchy, which it should have -been his first object to suppress. - -Mr. Stuart was kept in a corner of the peninsula, whence he could not -communicate freely with any other province, and where his presence -materially contributed to cherish the project of separating Gallicia; -and this without the shadow of a pretence, because there was also a -British admiral and consul, and a military mission at Coruña, all -capable of transmitting the necessary local intelligence. But so -little did Mr. Canning care to receive his envoy’s reports, that -the packet, conveying his despatches, was ordered to touch at Gihon -to receive the consul’s letters, which caused the delay of a week -when every moment was big with important events; a delay not to be -remedied by the admiral on the station, because he had not even been -officially informed that Mr. Stuart was an accredited person! - -[Sidenote: See Vol. I.] - -When the latter, thinking it time to look to the public affairs, -on his own responsibility, proceeded to Madrid, and finally -to Andalusia, he found the evils springing from Mr. Canning’s -inconsiderate conduct every where prominent. In the capital the -supreme junta had regarded England as a bonded debtor; and the -influence of her diplomatist at Seville may be estimated from the -following note, written by Mr. Stuart to Mr. Frere, upon the subject -of permitting British troops to enter Cadiz. - -“When the junta refused to admit general Mackenzie’s detachment, you -tell me it was merely from alarm respecting the disposition of the -inhabitants of Seville and Cadiz. I am not aware of the feelings -which prevail in Seville, but with respect to this town, whatever -the navy or the English travellers, may assert to the contrary, I am -perfectly convinced that there exists only a wish to receive them, -and general regret and surprise at their continuance on board.” - -Nor was the mischief confined to Spain. Mr. Frere, apparently tired -of the presence of a man whose energy and talent were a continued -reflection upon his own imbecile diplomacy, ordered Mr. Stuart, -either to join Cuesta’s army or to go by Trieste to Vienna; he chose -the latter, because there was not even a subordinate political agent -there, although this was the critical period, which preceded the -Austrian declaration of war against France in 1809. He was without -formal powers as an envoy, but his knowledge of the affairs of Spain, -and his intimate personal acquaintance with many of the leading -statesmen at Vienna, enabled him at once to send home the most exact -information of the proceedings, the wants, the wishes, and intentions -of the Austrian government, in respect to the impending war. - -That great diversion for Spain, which with infinite pains had been -brought to maturity by count Stadion, was on the point of being -abandoned because of Mr. Canning’s conduct. He had sent no minister -to Vienna, and while he was lavishing millions upon the Spaniards, -without conditions, refused in the most haughty and repulsive -terms, the prayers of Austria for a subsidy or even a loan, without -which, she could not pass her own frontier. And when Mr. Stuart -suggested the resource of borrowing some of the twenty-five millions -of dollars which were then accumulated at Cadiz, it was rejected -because Mr. Frere said it would alarm the Spaniards. Thus, the aid -of a great empire with four hundred thousand good troops, was in a -manner rejected in favour of a few miserable self-elected juntas in -the peninsula, while one-half the succours which they received and -misused, would have sent the whole Austrian nation headlong upon -France; for all their landwehr was in arms, and where the emperor had -only calculated upon one hundred and fifty battalions three hundred -had come forward, voluntarily, besides the Hungarian insurrection. -In this way Mr. Canning proved his narrow capacity for business, -and how little he knew either the strength of France, the value of -Austria, the weakness of Spain, or the true interests of England at -the moment; although he had not scrupled by his petulant answers to -the proposals of Erfurth to confirm a war which he was so incapable -of conducting. Instead of improving the great occasion thus offered, -he angrily recalled Mr. Stuart, for having proceeded to Vienna -without his permission. In his eyes the breach of form was of much -higher importance than the success of the object. Yet it is capable -of proof, that had Mr. Stuart remained, the Austrians would have been -slower to negotiate after the battle of Wagram; and the Walcheren -expedition would have been turned towards Germany, where a great -northern confederation was then ready to take arms against France. -The Prussian cabinet in defiance of the king, or rather of the queen, -whose fears influenced the king’s resolutions, only waited for these -troops, to declare war; and there was every reason to believe that -Russia would then also have adopted that side. The misfortunes of -Moore’s campaign, the folly and arrogance of the Spaniards, the loss -of the great British army which perished in Walcheren, the exhausting -of England both of troops and specie, when she most needed both; -finally the throwing of Austria entirely into the hands of France, -may thus be distinctly traced to Mr. Canning’s incapacity as a -statesman. - -But through the whole of the Napoleonic wars this man was the evil -genius of the Peninsula; for passing over the misplaced military -powers which he gave to Mr. Villiers’ legation in Portugal, while he -neglected the political affairs in that country, it was he who sent -lord Strangford to Rio Janeiro whence all manner of mischief flowed. -And when Mr. Stuart succeeded Mr. Villiers at Lisbon, Mr. Canning -insisted upon having the enormous mass of intelligence, received from -different parts of the Peninsula, translated before it was sent home; -an act of undisguised indolence, which retarded the real business of -the embassy, prevented important information from being transmitted -rapidly, and exposed the secrets of the hour to the activity of the -enemy’s emissaries at Lisbon. In after times when by a notorious -abuse of government he was himself sent ambassador to Lisbon, he -complained that there were no archives of the former embassies, and -he obliged Mr. Stuart, then minister at the Hague, to employ several -hundred soldiers, as clerks, to copy all his papers relating to the -previous war; these, at a great public expense, were sent to Lisbon; -and there they were to be seen unexamined and unpacked in the year -1826! And while this folly was passing, the interests of Europe -in general were neglected, and the particular welfare of Portugal -seriously injured by another display of official importance still -more culpable. - -It had been arranged that a Portuguese auxiliary force was to have -joined the duke of Wellington’s army, previous to the battle of -Waterloo; and to have this agreement executed, was the only business -of real importance which Mr. Canning had to transact during his -embassy. Marshal Beresford well acquainted with the characters, -of the members of the Portuguese regency, had assembled fifteen -thousand men, the flower of the old troops, perfectly equipped, -with artillery, baggage, and all things needful to take the field; -the ships were ready, the men willing to embark, and the marshal -informed the English ambassador, that he had only to give the order, -and in a few hours the whole would be on board, warning him at the -same time, that in no other way could the thing be effected. But as -this summary proceeding did not give Mr. Canning an opportunity to -record his own talents for negotiation, he replied that it must be -done by diplomacy; the Souza faction eagerly seized the opportunity -of displaying their talents in the same line, and being more expert, -beat Mr. Canning at his own weapons, and as Beresford had foreseen -no troops were embarked at all. Lord Wellington was thus deprived -of important reinforcements; the Portuguese were deprived of the -advantage of supporting their army, for several years, on the -resources of France, and of their share of the contributions from -that country; last and worst, those veterans of the Peninsular war, -the strength of the country, were sent to the Brazils, where they -all perished by disease or by the sword in the obscure wars of Don -Pedro! If such errors may be redeemed by an eloquence, always used in -defence of public corruption, and a wit, that made human sufferings -its sport, Mr. Canning was an English statesman, and wisdom has -little to do with the affairs of nations. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.] - -When the issue of the Walcheren expedition caused a change of -ministry, lord Wellesley obtained the foreign office. Mr. Henry -Wellesley then replaced Mr. Frere at Cadiz, and he and Mr. Stuart -received orders to make conditions and to demand guarantees for the -due application of the British succours; those succours were more -sparingly granted, and the envoys were directed to interfere with -advice and remonstrances, in all the proceedings of the respective -governments to which they were accredited: Mr. Stuart was even -desired to meddle with the internal administration of the Portuguese -nation,—the exertions and sacrifices of Great Britain, far from -being kept out of sight, were magnified, and the system adopted was -in every thing a contrast to that of Mr. Canning. - -But there was in England a powerful, and as recent events have -proved, a most unprincipled parliamentary opposition, and there were -two parties in the cabinet. The one headed by lord Wellesley, who -was anxious to push the war vigorously in the Peninsula, without -much regard to the ultimate pressure upon the people of his own -country; the other, headed by Mr. Perceval, who sought only to -maintain himself in power. Narrow, harsh, factious, and illiberal, -in every thing relating to public matters, this man’s career was -one of unmixed evil. His bigotry taught him to oppress Ireland, but -his religion did not deter him from passing a law to prevent the -introduction of medicines into France during a pestilence. He lived -by faction; he had neither the wisdom to support, nor the manliness -to put an end to, the war in the Peninsula, and his crooked, -contemptible policy was shown, by withholding what was necessary to -sustain the contest, and throwing on the general the responsibility -of failure. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV.] - -With all the fears of little minds, he and his coadjutors awaited -the result of lord Wellington’s operations in 1810. They affected to -dread his rashness, yet could give no reasonable ground for their -alarm; and their private letters were at variance with their public -instructions, that they might be prepared for either event. They -deprived him, without notice, of his command over the troops, at -Cadiz; they gave Graham power to furnish pecuniary succours to the -Spaniards at that place, which threw another difficulty in the way -of obtaining money for Portugal; and when Wellington complained of -the attention paid to the unfounded apprehension of some superior -officers more immediately about him, he was plainly told that those -officers were better generals than himself. At the same time he was, -from a pitiful economy, ordered to dismiss the transports on which -the safety of the army depended in the event of failure. - -Between these factions there was a constant struggle, and lord -Wellington’s successes in the field, only furthered the views of -Mr. Perceval, because they furnished ground for asserting that due -support had been given to him. Indeed such a result is to be always -apprehended by English commanders. The slightest movement in war -requires a great effort, and is attended with many vexations, which -the general feels acutely and unceasingly; but the politician, -believing in no difficulties because he feels none, neglects the -supplies, charges disaster on the general, and covers his misdeeds -with words. The inefficient state of the cabinet under both Mr. -Canning and Mr. Perceval may however be judged of by the following -extracts, the writers of which as it is easy to perceive were in -official situations. - -[Sidenote: A. April. 1810.] - -“I hope by next mail will be sent, something more satisfactory and -useful than we have yet done in the way of instructions. But I am -afraid the late O. P. riots have occupied all the thoughts of our -great men here, so as to make them, or at least some of them, forget -more distant but not less interesting concerns.” - -[Sidenote: A. April. 1811.] - -“With respect to the evils you allude to as arising from the -inefficiency of the Portuguese government, the people here are by no -means so satisfied of their existence (to a great degree) as you who -are on the spot. Here we judge only of the results, the details we -read over, but being unable to remedy forget them the next day; and -in the mean time be the tools you have to work with good or bad, so -it is that you have produced results so far beyond the most sanguine -expectations entertained here by all who have not been in Portugal -within the last eight months, that none inquire the causes which -prevented more being done in a shorter time; of which indeed there -seems to have been a great probability, if the government could have -stepped forward at an earlier period with one hand in their pockets, -and in the other strong energetic declarations of the indispensable -necessity of a change of measures, and principles, in the government.” - -[Sidenote: B. Sept. 1811.] - -“I have done every thing in my power to get people here to attend to -their real interests in Portugal, and I have clamoured for money! -money! money! in every office to which I have had access. To all -my clamour and all my arguments I have invariably received the -same answer, ‘_that the thing is impossible_.’ The prince himself -certainly appears to be _à la hauteur des circonstances_, and has -expressed his determination to make every exertion to promote -the good cause in the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley has a perfect -comprehension of the subject in its fullest extent, and is fully -aware of the several measures which Great Britain ought and could -adopt. But such is the state of parties and such the condition of the -present government, that I really despair of witnessing any decided -and adequate effect, on our part, to save the Peninsula. The present -feeling appears to be that we have done mighty things, and all -that is in our power, that the rest must be left to all-bounteous -Providence, and that if we do not succeed we must console ourselves -by the reflection that Providence has not been so propitious to us -as we deserved. This feeling you must allow is wonderfully moral and -christian-like, but still nothing will be done until we have a more -vigorous military system and a ministry capable of directing the -resources of the nation to something nobler than a war of descents -and embarkations.” - -A more perfect picture of an imbecile administration could scarcely -be exhibited, and it was not wonderful, that lord Wellington, -oppressed with the folly of the peninsular governments, should have -often resolved to relinquish a contest that was one of constant -risks, difficulties, and cares, when he had no better support from -England. In the next chapter shall be shewn the ultimate effects of -Canning’s policy in the Spanish and Portuguese affairs. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -POLITICAL STATE OF SPAIN. - - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 4.] - -As the military operations were, by the defeat of the regular armies, -broken into a multitude of petty and disconnected actions, so the -political affairs were, by the species of anarchy which prevailed, -rendered exceedingly diversified and incongruous. Notwithstanding the -restoration of the captain-generals, the provincial juntas remained -very powerful; and while nominally responsible, to the Cortes and the -regency, acted independently of either, except when interested views -urged them to a seeming obedience. The disputes that arose between -them and the generals, who were, for the most part, the creatures of -the regency, or of the Cortes, were constant. In Gallicia, in the -Asturias, in Catalonia, in Valencia, and in Murcia, disputes were -increasing. Mahi, Abadia, Moscoso, Campo Verde, Lacy, Sarsfield, -Eroles, Milans, Bassecour, Coupigny, Castaños, and Blake, were -always in controversy with each other or with the juntas. Palacios -dismissed from the regency for his high monarchical opinions, was -made captain-general of Valencia, where he immediately joined the -church party against the cortes. In the Condado de Niebla the junta -of Seville claimed superior authority, and Ballesteros of his own -motion placed the county under martial law. The junta, strangely -enough, then appealed to colonel Austin the British governor of the -Algarves, but he refused to interfere. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Letter to General Dumouriez 1811. MSS.] - -The cortes often annulled the decrees of the regency, and the latter, -of whomsoever composed, always hating and fearing the cortes, were -only intent upon increasing their own power, and entirely neglected -the general cause; their conduct was at once haughty and mean, -violent and intriguing, and it was impossible ever to satisfy them. -Thus confusion was every where perpetuated, and it is proved by the -intercepted papers of Joseph, as well as by the testimony of the -British officers, and diplomatists, that with the Spaniards, the only -moral resource left for keeping up the war, was their personal hatred -of the French, partially called into action by particular oppression. -Sir John Moore, with that keen and sure judgement which marked all -his views, had early described Spain as being “_without armies, -generals, or government_.” And in 1811, after three years of war, -lord Wellington complained that “_there was no head in Spain, neither -generals, nor officers, nor disciplined troops, and no cavalry; -that the government had commenced the war without a magazine or -military resource of any kind, without money or financial resource, -and that the people at the head of affairs were as feeble as their -resources were small_.” But the miserable state of the armies and the -unquenchable vanity of the officers, have been too frequently exposed -to need further illustration. They hated and ill-used the peasantry, -while their own want of discipline and subordination rendered them -odious to their country. The poorer people, much as they detested -the French, almost wished for the establishment of Joseph, and all -spirit and enthusiasm had long been extinct. - -The real points of interest affecting England in her prosecution -of the contest were, therefore, 1º. the improvement and the better -guidance of the military power; 2º. the preventing a war between -Portugal and Spain; 3º. the pretensions of the princess Carlotta of -Portugal; 4º. the dispute with the American colonies. - -With respect to the first, lord Wellington had made strenuous -efforts, and his advice, and remonstrances, had at times saved the -armies in the field from destruction; some partial attempts were also -made to form troops under British officers in the Spanish service, -but to a system like that which England exercised in Portugal, the -leading Spaniards would never listen. This was one result of Mr. -Canning’s impolitic fostering of the Spanish pride, for it was by -no means apparent that the people would have objected to such an -arrangement, if it had been prudently urged, before the republican -party in the cortes, and the popular press, had filled their minds -with alarm upon the subject. The Catalans openly and repeatedly -desired to have an English general, and in 1812 colonel Green did -organize a small corps there, while Whittingham and Roche formed in -the Balearic isles large divisions; colonel Cox had before proposed -a like scheme for the north, but it was rejected by lord Wellington, -and I have been unable to trace any important service rendered by -those officers with their divisions. Their reputation was however -quite eclipsed by one Downie, who had passed from the British -commissariat into the Spanish service, and the English ministers, -taken with his boasting manner, supplied him with uniforms and -equipments for a body of cavalry, called the Estremadura Legion, of -such an expensive and absurd nature, as to induce a general officer -to exclaim on seeing them that “he blushed for the folly of his -government.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 4.] - -When the British ministers found themselves unable to deal with the -Spanish regulars, they endeavoured to prop the war by the irregulars. -But the increase of this force, which however never exceeded thirty -thousand men in arms, gave offence to the regular officers, and -amidst these distractions, the soldiers, ill-organized, ill-fed, and -quite incapable of moving in the field in large bodies, lost all -confidence in their generals. The latter, as in the case of Freire -with the Murcian army, generally expected to be beaten in every -action, and cared very little about it, because the regency were sure -to affirm that they were victorious; and another of those wandering -starved naked bands, which they called armies, could be formed from -new levies in a month. - -The chances of a war with Portugal were by no means slight, the -early ravages of the Spanish insurgent forces when Junot was in -Lisbon, the violence of Romana’s soldiers, and the burning of the -village of San Fernando, together with the disputes between the -people of Algarves and the Andalusians had revived all the national -hatred on both sides. The two governments indeed entered into a -treaty for recruiting in their respective territories; but it was -with the utmost difficulty that the united exertions of Mr. Stuart -and lord Wellington could prevent the Portuguese regency first, -and afterwards the court of the Brazils, from provoking a war by -re-annexing Olivença to Portugal, when it was taken from the French -by marshal Beresford. And so little were the passions of these people -subordinate to their policy that this design was formed at the very -moment when the princess Carlotta, was, strenuously, and with good -prospect of success, pushing her claim to the regency of Spain. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.] - -The intrigues of this princess were constant sources of evil; she -laboured against the influence of the British at Cadiz, and her agent -Pedro Souza, proffering gold to vulgar baseness, diamonds to delicate -consciences, and promises to all, was adroit and persevering. In -August 1810 a paper signed by only one member, but with an intimation -that it contained the sentiments of the whole cortes, was secretly -given to Mr. Wellesley, as a guide for his conduct. It purported -that the impossibility of releasing Ferdinand and his brother from -their captivity being apparent, the princess Carlotta should be -called to the throne, and it was proposed to marry her eldest son, -Pedro, to the princess of Wales, or some other princess of the House -of Brunswick, that a “sudden and mortal blow might be given to the -French empire.” Mr. Wellesley was also told that a note, of the same -tendency, would in the first session of the cortes be transmitted -to the English legation. This, however, did not happen, chiefly -because Arguelles openly and eloquently expressed his reasons against -the appointment of a royal person as regent, and some months later -procured a decree, rendering such persons ineligible, to pass in -the cortes. This seemed to quash Carlotta’s intrigue, nevertheless -her pretensions, although continually overborne by the English -influence, were as continually renewed, and often on the point of -being publicly admitted. - -The assumption that it was hopeless to expect Ferdinand’s release was -founded partly on the great influence which it was known Napoleon had -acquired over his mind, and partly on his extreme personal timidity, -which rendered any attempt to release him hopeless. Otherwise there -were at Lisbon one Francisco Sagas, and his brother, daring men, who -were only deterred from undertaking the enterprize by a previous -experiment made at Bayonne, where they had for an hour implored -Ferdinand to escape, all things being ready, yet in vain, because -Escoiquez who ruled the prince, and was as timid as himself opposed -it. To prevent ill effects from this well-known weakness, the cortes -passed a decree to render null every act of Ferdinand while in -captivity. - -[Sidenote: See Vols. I. & III.] - -These intrigues of Carlotta were, however, of minor consequence -compared to the conduct of the American colonies, which was one of -the highest interest and importance. The causes and the nature of -their revolt have been already touched upon, and the violence and -injustice of the juntas, the regency, and the cortes, with relation -to them, having been also exposed in a general way, need not be -repeated here. When the Spanish insurrection first commenced, the -leading men of Mexico signed a paper which was sent to the peninsula -in November 1808, urging the immediate appointment of the duke of -Infantado to the vice-royalty. He was averse to quitting Spain, but -his wife persuaded him to consent, provided the central junta, just -then established, was not opposed to it. Mr. Stuart foreseeing -great advantage from this appointment laboured to persuade Mr. -Frere to support it; but the latter, always narrow in his views, -refused, because Infantado was personally disliked in England! and -this, joined to the duke’s own reluctance, seemed to end the matter. -Meanwhile the disturbances in the colonies went on, and Carlotta of -Portugal, urged her claim to be regent, and ultimately, queen of -that country, as well as of Spain; and her interests were strongly -supported there, until May 1809, when Cisneros, the Spanish viceroy, -arrived at Monte Video, and spoiled her schemes. - -[Sidenote: Sept.] - -The cry for a free trade with England, was then raised by the -colonists, and Cisneros assented, but under conditions, presenting -a curious contrast to the affected generosity of Mr. Canning, and -affording an additional proof how little the latter knew the temper -of the people he was dealing with. After detailing the dangers of -his situation from the disposition of the colonists to revolt, and -the impoverishment of the royal treasury in consequence of the -disturbances which had already taken place, Cisneros observed that -the only mode of relief was a temporary permission to trade with -England for the sake of the duties. Necessity, he said, drove him to -this measure; he regretted it, and directed that the ordinary laws -relative to the residence of foreigners, most rigorous in themselves, -should be most rigorously executed; and he added others of such a -nature, that at first sight, they appear to be directed against some -common enemy of mankind, rather than against the subjects and vessels -of a nation which was then supporting the mother-country with troops -and treasure in the most prodigal manner. Englishmen were not to be -suffered to possess property, to have a residence, to keep an hotel, -or even to remain on shore except for a fixed period. Any property -already acquired by them was to be confiscated, and when the goods by -which he hoped to raise his revenue were landed, the owners were not -to be permitted to have them carried to the warehouses by their own -sailors! - -In April 1810 the disposition to revolt spread; the Caraccas and -Porto Rico declared for independence, and the British governor of -Curaçoa expressed his approval of their proceedings. This naturally -gave great jealousy and alarm to the Spaniards, who looked upon -it as a secret continuation of Miranda’s affair. Lord Liverpool, -indeed, immediately disavowed the governor’s manifesto, but being -very desirous to retain the trade, to conciliate the Spaniards, and -to oblige the colonists to acknowledge Ferdinand and oppose France, -three things incompatible, his policy produced no good result. -Mexico indeed still remained obedient in outward appearance, but the -desire to have Infantado existed, and a strong party of the Mexicans -even purposed raising him to the throne, if Napoleon’s success -should separate the two countries; but the Spanish regency, with -characteristic folly, chose this moment to appoint Venegas, who was -the avowed enemy of Infantado, viceroy of Mexico, and thus the revolt -was forced on in that country also. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.] - -This state of affairs had a bad effect upon the war in Spain in many -ways. The Spaniards, thinking to retain the colonies by violence, -sent out a small squadron at first, and at a later period employed -the succours received from England, in fitting out large expeditions -of their best troops; and that, when the enemy were most closely, -pressing them in the Peninsula. The remonstrances of the British -on this head were considered as indications of a faithless policy; -and Carlotta also wrote to Elio, the governor of Buenos Ayres, and -to the cortes, warning both, to beware of the English as “a people -capable of any baseness where their own interests were concerned.” -Hence there was a prevalent suspicion, that England had a design of -connecting itself with the colonies independently of Spain, which -greatly diminished the English influence at Cadiz. - -[Sidenote: 1811. May.] - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellesley’s despatch to Mr. H. Wellesley, May, 1811. -MSS.] - -By this dispute with America the supply of specie for the Peninsula -was endangered, which involved the very existence of the war; all -things therefore conduced to make lord Wellesley desire his brother, -Mr. Wellesley, to offer the mediation of England, and to please the -Spaniards he also removed the governor of Curaçoa; but his plans, -like lord Liverpool’s, were based upon the desire to preserve the -trade with the colonies, and this feeling pervaded and vitiated -his instructions to Mr. Wellesley. That gentleman was directed to -enter into a full discussion of the subject, on principles founded -on cordial amity and good faith; and to endeavour to convince the -regency that the British course of proceeding had hitherto been the -best for all parties. For the primary object being to keep France -from forming a party in America, the revolted colonies had been by -England received into an amicable intercourse of trade, a measure not -inconsistent with good faith to Spain, inasmuch as the colonists -would otherwise have had recourse to France, whereas now England was -considered by them as a safe and honourable channel of reconciliation -with the mother-country. There had been, it was said, no formal -recognition of the self-constituted governments, or if any had taken -place by subordinate officers they would be disavowed. Protection -and mediation had indeed been offered, but the rights of Ferdinand -had been supported, and as war between Spain and America would only -injure the great cause, a mediatory policy was pressed upon the -latter.—The blockade of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas had already -diverted money and forces from Spain, and driven the Americans to -seek for French officers to assist them. The trade was essential to -enable England to continue her assistance to Spain, and although -this had been frequently represented to the regency, the latter had -sent ships (which had been fitted out in English ports and stored at -the expense of Great Britain for the war with France) to blockade -the colonies and to cut off the English trade; and it was done -also at a moment, when the regency was unable to transport Blake’s -army from Cadiz to the Condado di Niebla without the assistance of -British vessels. “It was difficult,” Lord Wellesley said, “to state -an instance in which the prejudices and jealousy of individuals had -occasioned so much confusion of every maxim of discretion and good -policy, and so much danger to the acknowledged mutual interests of -two great states engaged in a defensive alliance against the assaults -of a foreign foe”:—“Spain could not expect England to concur in a -continuance of a system by which, at her own expense, her trade was -injured, and by which Spain was making efforts not against the French -but against the main sources of her own strength.” - -[Sidenote: June.] - -After these instructions, which were given before the constitution -of Spain was arranged by the cortes, Mr. Wellesley pressed the -mediation upon Mr. Bardaxi the Spanish minister, who agreed to accept -it upon condition, that Mexico, which had not yet declared a form -of government, should be excepted,—that England should immediately -break off all intercourse with the colonies, and, if the mediation -failed, should assist Spain to reconquer them. When the injustice -and bad policy of this proposition was objected to, Mr. Bardaxi -maintained that it was just and politic, and pressed it as a secret -article; he however finally offered to accept the mediation, if Mr. -Wellesley would only pledge England to break off the intercourse -of trade. This was refused, and the negotiation continued, but as -Bardaxi asserted, that lord Wellington had before agreed to the -propriety of England going to war with the colonies, Mr. Wellesley -referred to the latter, and that extraordinary man, while actually -engaged with the enemy, under most critical circumstances, was thus -called upon to discuss so grave and extensive a subject. But it was -on such occasions that all his power of mind was displayed, and his -manner of treating this question proved, that in political, and even -in commercial affairs, his reach of thought and enlarged conceptions, -immeasurably surpassed the cabinet he served. And when we consider -that his opinions, stated in 1811, have been since verified in all -points to the very letter, it is impossible not to be filled with -admiration of his foresight and judgment. - -“He denied that he had ever given grounds for Bardaxi’s observation. -His opinion had always been that Great Britain should follow, as -he hoped she had, liberal counsels towards Spain, by laying aside, -at least during the existence of the war, all consideration of -merchants’ profits. He felt certain that such a policy would equally -suit her commercial interests and her warlike policy, as well as add -greatly to her character. The immediate advantages extorted from an -open trade with the colonies he had always considered ideal. Profit -was undoubtedly to be made there, and eventually the commerce would -be very great; but its value must arise from the increasing riches -of the colonies and the growth of luxury there, and the period at -which this would happen was more likely to be checked than forwarded -by the extravagant speculations of English traders. Whatever might -be the final particular relations established between Spain and her -colonies, the general result must be, the relaxation, if not the -annihilation, of their colonial commercial system, and Great Britain -was then sure to be the greatest gainer. - -“In expectation of this ultimate advantage, her policy ought to have -been liberal throughout, that is, the colonies themselves should have -been checked, and the endeavours of traders and captains of ships -to separate them from Spain ought to have been repressed. England -should, when the colonies first showed a disposition to revolt, have -considered not only what they could do but what Great Britain could -assist them to effect. His knowledge of the Spanish government and -its means enabled him to say she could not reduce even one of the -weakest of her colonies, and to make the attempt would be a gross -folly and misapplication of means. Nay England could not, in justice -to the great object in the Peninsula, give Spain any effectual -assistance; for it was but too true that distant colonies could -always separate from the mother country when they willed it, and -certainly it would be the highest madness, in Spain, to attempt at -that time to prevent such a separation by force, and in England, to -assist, or even encourage her in such an attempt. - -“The conduct of the latter should then have been by her influence -and advice to have prevented the disputes from coming to extremity, -and _now_ should be to divert Spain from such an absurdity as having -recourse to violence. But the reception of the deputies from America -which the Spaniards so much complained of, was useful to the latter. -It prevented those deputies from going to France, and if they had -gone, the fact, that colonies have the power to separate if they have -the will, would have been at once verified. - -“Great Britain, although late, had at last _offered_ that mediation -which he wished had been _asked_ for, and it remained to consider -on what terms it ought to be accepted. It would have been better -if Spain had come forward with an explicit declaration of what her -intentions towards the colonies in respect to constitution and -commerce were. England could then have had something intelligible -to mediate upon; but now Spain only desired her to procure the -submission of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas; and if she failed in -that impracticable object she was to aid Spain in forcing them to -submission! and he, lord Wellington, was said to have approved of -this! One would really, he exclaimed, believe that Mr. Bardaxi has -never adverted to the means and resources of his own country, to -the object they have acquired at home, nor to the efforts making by -England in the Peninsula; and that he imagines I have considered -these facts as little as he appears to have done! Great Britain -cannot agree to that condition! - -[Sidenote: See Vol. III. p. 419.] - -“In respect to constitution” (alluding to the acknowledgement of the -civil rights of the Americans by the cortes) “the Spaniards had gone -a great way, but not so far as some of her colonies would require, -they would probably ask her to have separate local representative -bodies for their interior concerns, such as the English colonial -assemblies, yet this important point had not been considered in -the treaty of mediation, and in respect of commerce the Spanish -government had said nothing; although it was quite certain her -prohibitory system could not continue, and the necessary consequence -of the actual state of affairs required that in the treaty of -mediation the colonies should be put, with respect to trade, exactly -on the same footing as the provinces of Old Spain. If that was not -done it would be useless to talk to the colonists of equal rights and -interests; they would feel that their interests were sacrificed to -those of the mother country. - -“It was true that the latter would lose immediately, though probably -not eventually, very largely in revenue and commercial profit by such -a concession. This was the unavoidable result of the circumstances -of the times, she had therefore a fair claim to participate in -the advantages the colonies would enjoy from it. To this object -the treaty of mediation should have adverted. Spain should have -confidentially declared to Great Britain her intended course, what -system she would follow, what duties impose, and what proportion -she would demand for general imperial purposes. Upon such materials -England might have worked with a prospect of permanently maintaining -the integrity of the Spanish empire on just and fair principles; or -at all events have allayed the present disputes and so removed the -difficulties they occasioned in the Peninsula, and in either case -have insured her own real interests. Spain had however taken a narrow -view both of her own and the relative situation of others, and _if -she did not enlarge it, matters would grow worse and worse. It would -be useless for England to interfere, and after a long contest which -would only tend to weaken the mother country and deprive her of the -resources which she would otherwise find in the colonies for her war -with France, the business would end in the separation of the colonies -from Spain._” - -The mediation was, however, after many discussions, finally accepted -by the cortes, Mexico only being excepted, and an English commission -of mediation, of which Mr. Stuart was the head, was even appointed -in September 1811, but from various causes it never proceeded -beyond Cadiz. The Spaniards continued to send out expeditions, Mr. -Wellesley’s remonstrances were unheeded, and although the regency -afterwards offered to open the trade under certain duties, in return -for a subsidy, nothing was concluded. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL. - - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -[Sidenote: Vol. III.] - -The power and crafty projects of the Souzas, their influence over -their weak-minded prince, their cabal to place the duke of Brunswick -at the head of the Portuguese army, the personal violence of the -patriarch, the resignation of Das Minas, and the disputes with lord -Wellington, have been already touched upon; but the extent of the -difficulties engendered by those things, cannot be understood without -a more detailed exposition. - -[Sidenote: Feb. 1810.] - -Mr. Villiers’s mission, like all those emanating from Mr. Canning, -had been expensive in style, tainted by intrigues, useless in -business, and productive of disorders. When Mr. Stuart arrived, he -found every thing, except the army under Beresford, in a state of -disorganization; and the influence of England was decreasing, because -of the vacillating system hitherto pursued by the British government. -As early as 1808 lord Wellington had advised the ministers not only -to adopt Portugal as the base of operations in the Peninsula, but to -assume in reality the whole administration of that country; to draw -forth all its resources, both of men and money, and to make up any -deficiency, by the power of England. This advice had been neglected, -and an entirely different policy pursued, which, in execution, was -also feeble and uncertain. - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -The Portuguese constitution, like most of those springing from -the feudal system, was excellent in theory, as far as regarded -the defence of the kingdom: but it was overwhelmed with abuses in -practice; and it was a favourite maxim with the authorities that -it did not become a paternal government to punish neglect in the -subordinates. When court intrigues were to be effected, or poor men -to be oppressed, there was no want of vigour or of severity; but in -all that regarded the administration of affairs, it was considered -sufficient to give orders without looking to their execution, and -no animadversion, much less punishment, followed disobedience. -The character of the government was extreme weakness; the taxes, -partially levied, produced only half their just amount; the payments -from the treasury were in arrears; the army was neglected in all -things dependent on the civil administration, and a bad navy was -kept up, at an expense of a quarter of a million, to meet a war with -Algiers. This last question was, however, a knife with a double edge, -for in peace, a tribute paid in coin, drained the treasury already -too empty, and in war the fleet did nothing; meanwhile the feeding -of Cadiz was rendered precarious by it; and of Lisbon also, for the -whole produce of Portugal was only equal to four months’ consumption. -In commercial affairs, the usual peninsular jealousy was displayed; -the imports of British goods were prohibited to the advantage of -smugglers only, while the government which thus neglected its own -resources to the injury of both countries, clamoured for subsidies. -Finally, the power of the Souzas was so great, and the regency was -so entirely subservient to them, that although Mr. Stuart had been -assured by Mr. Canning, that a note forbidding Domingo Souza to -meddle with affairs at Lisbon, had been procured from the Brazils, -all representations, to the regency, were met by references to that -nobleman, who was in London, and the business of the mission was thus -paralysed. - -In March 1809 the British government had taken ten thousand -Portuguese troops into pay. In May they were increased to twenty -thousand, and in June to thirty thousand. The cost of these forces, -and the increased pay to Portuguese officers, added to the subsidy, -amounted to two millions sterling; but this subsidy partly from -negligence, partly from the exhaustion of England in consequence of -Mr. Canning’s prodigal donations to Spain, was in arrears. However, -as this mode of proceeding was perfectly in unison with their own -method, the regency did not much regard it, but they were eager to -obtain a loan from England, in the disposal of which they would have -been quite uncontrolled, and for this very reason lord Wellington -strenuously opposed it. In revenge, the regency, by a wilful -misunderstanding of the debates of parliament, and by the distortion -of facts, endeavoured to throw a doubt upon the sincerity of England, -and this, with the encouragement given to all Portuguese malcontents -by the Whigs, whose clamour, just, as applied to the ministers, was -unjustly extended to the generals, greatly increased the disorder of -the times. - -In this state of affairs Mr. Canning being happily removed from -office, lord Wellesley, who succeeded him, changed the instructions -of the diplomatic agents in the Peninsula. They were now directed to -make conditions with respect to the succours, and in Portugal they -were vigorously to interfere in all civil changes, augmentations of -revenue, and military resources; and even to demand monthly reports -of the condition of the army, and the expenditure of the subsidy. -Lord Wellesley also, thinking that the example of a cortes in Spain, -might create a desire for a more temperate government in Portugal, -was prepared to forward such a change, provided old forms were -preserved, and that all appeared to flow from the prince regent, -whose consent he undertook to secure. Resistance to the enemy, he -said, would be in proportion to the attachment of the people, and -hence it was advisable to make timely concessions, giving however no -more than was absolutely necessary. - -The regency were strongly opposed to this notion of a cortes, and Mr. -Stuart and lord Wellington affirmed, and truly, that the docility of -the people, and their hatred of the French, were motives powerful -enough, without any other stimulus, to urge them to action. Thus the -project fell to the ground, and the time was perhaps inconvenient -to effect a revolution of this nature, which the people themselves -certainly did not contemplate, and which, as Spain had shewn, was not -a certain help to the war. Lord Wellington, who only considered what -would conduce to the success of the war, was therefore consistent -upon this occasion, but it is curious to observe the course of -the English cabinet. The enforcement in France of a military -conscription, authorized by the laws, was an unheard-of oppression -on the part of Napoleon; but in Portugal a conscription, enforced -by foreigners, was a wise and vigorous measure; and lord Wellesley -admitting that the Portuguese government had been harsh and -oppressive, as well as weak and capricious, was content to withhold -a better system from the people, expressly because they loved their -country and were obedient subjects; for he would have readily granted -it to them if they had been unruly and of doubtful patriotism. - -Mr. Stuart in concert with lord Wellington diligently endeavoured -to remedy the evils of the hour, but whenever he complained of any -particular disorder, he was, by the regency, offered arbitrary power -to punish, which being only an expedient to render the British odious -to the people, he refused. The intrigues of the Fidalgos then became -apparent, and the first regency was broken up in 1810. The marquis -of Das Minas retired from it under the pretext of ill health, but -really because he found himself too weak to support Mr. De Mello, a -Fidalgo officer, who was thrust forward to oppose the legal authority -of marshal Beresford. Mr. Cypriano Freire was then made minister of -finance, and of foreign affairs, and Mr. Forjas secretary-at-war, -with a vote in the regency on matters of war. But the former soon -after Mr. Stuart’s arrival resigned his situation in consequence of -some disgust, and the Conde Redondo, having undertaken the office, -commenced, with the advice of Mr. Stuart, a better arrangement of the -taxes, especially the “_decima_” or income tax, which was neither -impartially nor strictly enforced on the rich towns, nor on the -powerful people of the Fidalgo faction. The clergy also evaded the -imposts, and the British merchants, although profiting enormously -from the war, sought exemption under the factory privileges, not only -from the taxes, which in certain cases they could legally do, but -from the billets, and from those recruiting laws affecting their -servants, which they could not justly demand, and which all other -classes in the community were liable to. - -The working of the Souzas, in the Brazils, where the minister of -finance wished to have the regulation of the Portuguese treasury -under his control, soon changed this arrangement. Freire’s -resignation was not accepted, Redondo was excluded from the -government, and Forjas, who was the most efficient member of the -government, was deprived of his functions. The remaining members -then proposed to fill up Das Minas’ vacancy themselves, but this -was resisted by lord Wellington, on the ground, that, without the -prince’s order, the proceeding would be illegal, and involve the -regency in an indefensible quarrel at the Brazils. The order for -removing Redondo, and cramping the utility of Forjas, he, in concert -with Mr. Stuart, withstood; and this, for the moment, prevented a -change, which would have impeded the ameliorations begun. Such, -however, was the disorder in the finances, that Mr. Stuart proposed, -as the least difficult mode of arranging them, to take the whole -direction himself, England becoming answerable for the expenditure of -the country; lord Wellington thought this could not be done, without -assuming, at the same time, the whole government of the country, -which he had previously proposed to the British cabinet, but which -it was now too late to attempt, and Mr. Stuart’s project fell to the -ground. - -Another spring of mischief soon bubbled up, lord Strangford, whose -diplomatic dexterity evinced by his Bruton-street despatch, had been -rewarded by the situation of minister at the Brazils, was there -bestirring himself. It had been the policy of Mr. Stuart and the -English general, to keep the regency permanent, and to support the -secretariats as they were placed in the hands of Mr. de Forjas and -the Conde de Redondo; for these men had been found by experience, -to be better qualified to co-operate with the British authorities -than any other persons, and hence lord Wellington had resisted the -prince’s orders for Cypriano Freire’s resumption of office, and -had continued the functions of Forjas and Redondo, until his own -remonstrances could reach the Brazils. In this state of affairs lord -Strangford informed Mr. Stuart that he had persuaded the prince -to accede to the following propositions. 1º. That the British -plenipotentiary at Lisbon, the count Redondo, doctor Nogueras, and -the principal Souza, should be added to the old regency. 2º. That -admiral Berkeley should be naval commander-in-chief. 3º. That all -traitorous correspondence should be prevented, and that measures -should be taken to limit the exuberant power assumed by subordinates. -This last article was directed against Forjas, and the whole went to -establish the preponderance of the Souza faction. The only useful -part was the appointment of Mr. Stuart to the regency, but this was -arranged before it was known that Mr. Villiers had been recalled, and -consequently had the same object of favouring the Souzas in view. - -Mr. Stuart and lord Wellington strongly objected to this change, -although they submitted to it as not wishing to appear regardless -of the prince regent’s rights. Mr. Stuart, however, reflecting that -a government composed of men having different views and feelings, -and without any casting vote, the number being even, could not go on -usefully, was at first averse to join the regency, but was finally -persuaded to do so by lord Wellington, who justly considered that his -presence there would give the only chance of success. - -Doctor Nogueras’ appointment was described, by lord Strangford, as -a tribute to democracy, the object being to counteract the power of -those very secretariats which lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart were -labouring to preserve. But lord Strangford prided himself chiefly -upon the appointment of the principal Souza, who, he said, had been -recommended to him by Mr. Villiers, an avowal of great import, as -shewing at once the spirit of the new arrangement: for this Souza -had, in a subordinate situation, hitherto opposed every proceeding -of the British in Portugal; he was the avowed enemy of Beresford, -the contriver of all confusion, and the most mischievous person in -Portugal; and his absence from that country was so desirable, that -intimations to that effect had been formally given to him, by lord -Wellesley, through Mr. Stuart. This factious person was now, however, -armed with additional power, to thwart the English authorities in -Portugal, and thus lord Strangford’s diplomacy tended, in effect, to -ruin that cause which he had been sent to the Brazils to support. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. II. Appendix.] - -In relating these proceedings I have, following his own letter, -announcing the change, described lord Strangford as acting -voluntarily; but in a subsequent despatch he affirmed, that it -was under Mr. Canning’s instructions, he had pressed for this -incorporating of the British minister in the regency, and that -Nogueras’ appointment sprang entirely from the prince regent’s own -will, which he did not choose to oppose. In like manner, when lord -Wellesley was intent upon assembling a cortes, lord Strangford called -it “_a great and essential measure strongly and wisely urged by the -government_,” and yet afterwards acknowledged that he neglected to -press it, because he thought it “_useless and even hurtful_,” which -inconsistency renders it difficult to determine on whom these affairs -rested. As affecting Mr. Canning’s policy, however, it is to be -observed that if he originally arranged this change, his object was -to put Mr. Villiers in the regency, not with any view to the more -complete controul of Portugal for the purposes of war, but, as the -instructions to sir John Cradock prove, to ensure a preponderance to -the diplomatic department over the military in that country. - -The principal reforms, in the administration, which had been -sought for by lord Wellington, were a better arrangement of the -financial system—the execution of the laws without favour to the -fidalgos—the suppression of the “_junta di viveres_,” a negligent -and fraudulent board, for which he wished to establish a Portuguese -commissariat—the due supply of provisions and stores, for the -national troops and fortresses—the consolidation of the arsenal -department under one head—the formation of a military chest, -distinct from the treasury, which was always diverting the funds to -other purposes—the enforcing of the regulations about the means of -transport—the repairs of the roads and bridges—the reformation of -the hospitals—the succouring of the starving people, and the revival -of agriculture in the parts desolated by the war. - -These things he had hoped to accomplish; but from the moment the -change effected by lord Strangford took place, unceasing acrimonious -disputes ensued between the British commander and the Portuguese -government, and no species of falsehood or intrigue, not even -personal insult, and the writing of anonymous threatening letters, -were spared by the Souza faction. In the beginning of 1811 they -had organized an anti-English party, and a plot was laid to force -the British out of the country, which would have succeeded if less -vigilance had been used by Mr. Stuart, or less vigour of control -by lord Wellington. This plot however required that the patriarch -should go to the northern provinces, a journey which the envoy always -dexterously prevented. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -The first complaint of the British authorities, accompanied with a -demand for the removal of the principal Souza, reached the Brazils -in February 1811, and Das Minas died about the same time; but so -strongly was the faction supported at Rio de Janeiro, that in May, -the prince regent expressed his entire approval of the Souzas’ -proceedings and his high displeasure with Forjas and Mr. Stuart. His -minister, the Conde de Linhares, wrote, that the capture of Massena -with his whole army, which he expected to hear of each day, would not -make amends for the destruction of the country during the retreat of -the allies; and in an official note to lord Strangford, he declared, -that the prince regent could not permit Mr. Stuart to vote in matters -concerning the internal government of the kingdom, because he was -influenced by, and consulted persons suspected of disaffection, which -expression lord Strangford said referred solely to Forjas. - -[Sidenote: June.] - -The prince himself also wrote to lord Wellington, accusing Mr. Stuart -of acting separately from the commander-in-chief, and of being the -cause of all the factions which had sprung up, and he declared -that he would not remove Souza, unless Mr. Stuart was recalled. -He desired that Forjas, who he affirmed to be the real author of -the opposition complained of by the British, should be sent to the -Brazils, to answer for his conduct; and finally he announced his -intention to write in a like strain to the king of England. To this -lord Wellington answered that finding his conduct disapproved and -Souza’s applauded, he proposed to quit Portugal. Forjas immediately -sent in his resignation, admiral Berkeley proposed to do the same, -and Mr. Stuart withdrew from the council until the pleasure of his -own cabinet should be made known: the war was then on the point of -finishing, but the crisis was not perceived by the public, because -the resolution of the English general was kept secret, to avoid -disturbing the public mind, and in the hopes of submission on the -part of the prince. - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -Meanwhile other embarrassments were super-added, of a nature to -leave the English general little hope of being able to continue -the contest, should he even defeat the intrigues at Rio Janeiro; -for besides the quarrel with the Souza faction, in which he and -Mr. Stuart supported Forjas, Nogueira, and Redondo, against their -enemies in the Brazils, these very persons, although the best that -could be found, and men of undoubted ability, influenced partly -by national habits, partly by fears of ultimate consequences, -continually harassed him in the execution of the details belonging -to their offices. No delinquent was ever punished, no fortress ever -stored in due time and quantity, the suffering people were uncared -for, disorders were unrepressed, the troops were starved, and the -favouring of the fidalgos constant. The “_junta de viveres_” was -supported, the formation of a military chest, and commissariat, -delayed; many wild and foolish schemes daily broached; and the -natural weakness of the government was, by instability, increased, -because the prince regent had early in 1811 intimated an intention of -immediately returning to Europe. - -I have said that it was a favourite maxim with the regency that a -paternal government should not punish delinquents in the public -service, and they added to this another still more absurd, namely, -that the Portuguese troops could thrive under privations of food, -which would kill men of another nation; with these two follies they -excused neglect, whenever the repetition, that there had been no -neglect, became fatiguing to them. Besides this, collisions between -the British commissariat and the “_junta de viveres_” were frequent -and very hurtful, because the former able to outbid, and more in fear -of failure, overbought the latter; this contracted the already too -small sphere of their activity, and lord Wellington was prevented -feeding the whole Portuguese army himself by a curious obstacle. His -principal dependance for the support of his own troops was upon the -Spanish muleteers attached to the army, they were the very life and -sustenance of the war, and their patience, hardiness, and fidelity -to the British were remarkable; but they so abhorred the Portuguese -people that they would not carry provisions for their soldiers, and -lord Wellington only obtained their services, for those brigades -which were attached to the English divisions, by making them think -the food was entirely for the latter. Upon such nice management even -in apparently trifling matters did this war depend. And yet it is not -uncommon for politicians, versed only in the classic puerilities of -public schools, and the tricks of parliamentary faction, to hold the -rugged experience of Wellington’s camp as nothing in the formation of -a statesman. - -The effects of these complicated affairs were soon and severely felt. -Abrantes had like to have been abandoned, from want, at the time -Massena held Santarem, and the Portuguese troops were starved during -that general’s retreat; Beresford’s operations in the Alemtejo were -impeded, and his hospitals were left without succour; at Fuentes -Onoro ammunition failed, and the Portuguese artillery were forced to -supply themselves by picking up the enemy’s bullets; the cavalry of -that nation were quite ruined, and out of more than forty thousand -regular troops, formed by Beresford, only nineteen thousand were -to be found under arms after the battle of Albuera, the rest had -deserted or died from extreme want. - -When Massena retreated the provincial organization of the country was -restored, and to encourage the people to sow the devastated districts -before the season passed, Mr. Stuart had furnished seed corn on the -credit of the coming subsidy; an amnesty for deserters was also -published, the feudal imposts for the year were remitted, and fairs -were established to supply tools of husbandry; but notwithstanding -these efforts, such was the distress, that at Caldas eighty persons -died daily, and at Figueras where twelve thousand people, chiefly -from Portuguese Estremadura, had taken refuge, the daily deaths were -above a hundred, and the whole would have perished but for the active -benevolence of major Von Linstow, an officer of general Trant’s -staff. Meanwhile the country was so overrun with robbers that the -detached officers could not travel in safety upon the service of -the army, and Wellington was fearful of being obliged to employ his -troops against them. British officers were daily insulted at Lisbon, -and even assassinated while on duty with impunity; the whole army was -disgusted, the letters to England were engendering in that country -a general dislike to the war, and the British soldiers, when not -with their regiments, committed a thousand outrages on the line of -operations. - -As a climax to these scenes of misery and mischief, the harvest -which had failed in Portugal, failed also in England; and no corn -was to be got from the Baltic because there was no specie to pay for -it, and bills were refused. Hence the famine spread in a terrible -manner until Mr. Stuart obtained leave to license fifty American -vessels with corn, whose cargoes were paid for out of funds provided -partly by the charity of the people of England, and partly by a -parliamentary grant which passed when Massena retreated. - -In this crisis the British cabinet granted an additional subsidy -to Portugal, but from the scarcity of specie, the greatest part of -it was paid in kind, and the distress of the regency for money was -scarcely lessened; for these supplies merely stood in the place -of the plunder which had hitherto prevailed in the country. Thus -Mr. Canning’s prodigality, Mr. Vansittart’s paper system, and Mr. -Perceval’s economy, all combined to press upon the British general, -and to use his own words, he was supplied with only one-sixth part -of the money necessary to keep the great machine going which -had been set in motion. Mr. Perceval however, in answer to his -remonstrances, employed a secretary of the Treasury to prove in a -laboured paper, founded entirely upon false data, that the army had -been over-supplied, and must have money to spare. But that minister, -whose speeches breathed nothing but the final destruction of France, -designed to confine the efforts of England to the defence of Portugal -alone, without any regard to the rest of the Peninsula. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s papers, MSS.] - -Amongst the other follies of the Portuguese regency was a resolution -to issue proclamations, filled with bombastic adulation of -themselves, vulgar abuse of the French, and altogether unsuited to -the object of raising the public feeling, which flagged under their -system. To the English general’s remonstrances on this head, Forjas -replied, that praise of themselves and abuse of the French, was the -national custom, and could not be dispensed with! a circumstance -which certain English writers who have implicitly followed the -accounts of the Portuguese authors, such as Accursio de Neves, and -men of his stamp, relative to French enormities, would do well to -consider. And here it is right to observe, that so many complaints -were made of the cruelty committed by Massena’s army while at -Santarem, that lord Wellington had some thoughts of reprisals; but -having first caused strict inquiry to be made, it was discovered that -in most cases, the _ordenança_, after having submitted to the French, -and received their protection, took advantage of it to destroy the -stragglers and small detachments, and the cruelty complained of was -only the infliction of legitimate punishment for such conduct: the -projected retaliation was therefore changed for an injunction to the -_ordenanças_ to cease from such a warfare. - -The character of the regency was, however, most openly shewn in -their proceedings connected with the convention of Cintra. All the -advantages which that treaty ensured to Portugal, they complacently -reaped, but overlooked or annulled those points in which the -character of England was concerned. In violation of the convention, -and in despite of the remonstrances of lord Wellington and Mr. -Stuart, they cast the French residents at Lisbon into loathsome -dungeons, without any cause of complaint; and in the affair of -Mascarheñas their conduct was distinguished alike by wanton cruelty -and useless treachery. This youth, when only fifteen, had with -many others entered the French service in Junot’s time, under the -permission of his own prince; and he and the Conde de Sabugal, were -taken by the peasantry in 1810 endeavouring to pass from Massena’s -army into Spain, Sabugal in uniform, Mascarheñas in disguise. They -were both tried as traitors. The first, a general officer, and with -powerful friends amongst the Fidalgos, was acquitted, as indeed -was only just; but he was then appointed to a situation under the -regency, which was disgraceful, as arising from faction: Mascarheñas -was a boy, and had no powerful friends, and he was condemned to -death. Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart represented the injustice of -this sentence, and they desired that if humanity was unheeded the -government would put him to death as a spy, for being in disguise, -and so prevent the danger of reprisals, already threatened by -Massena. The young man’s mother and sisters, grovelling in the dust, -implored the regency to spare him, but to shew their hatred of lord -Wellington and Mr. Stuart, for the disputes with the regency were -then highest, the government told the miserable women, that it was -the British general and minister who demanded his death, and they -were sent, with this brutal falsehood, to weep and to ask grace -from persons who had no power to grant it. Mascarheñas was publicly -executed as a traitor, for entering the French service under the -authority of his native prince, while Sabugal was acquitted, and even -rewarded, although precisely in the same circumstances, when the -excuse of the disguise had been rejected. - -In 1810 one Corea, calling himself an aide-de-camp of Massena, was -likewise seized in disguise within the British lines, and, having -given useful information, was by lord Wellington confined in St. -Julians, to protect him from the Portuguese government. After a time -he became deranged, and was released, whereupon the regency, rather -than keep him, desired that he might be sent as a prisoner of war to -England; thus for convenience admitting the very principle which they -had rejected when only honour and humanity were concerned. A process -against the marquis d’Alorna had also been commenced, but his family -being powerful it was soon dropped, and yet the government refused -madame d’Alorna leave to join her husband, thus shewing themselves -spiteful and contemptible as well as cowardly and bloody. Even the -court of Brazil was shocked. The prince rebuked the regency severely -for the death of Mascarheñas, reversed the sentences on some others, -and banished Sabugal to Terceira. - -This was the political state of Portugal. - -[Sidenote: 1811. May.] - -Lord Liverpool’s intimation, that neither corn nor specie could be -had from England, threw lord Wellington on his own resources for -feeding his troops. He had before created a paper money by means of -commissariat bills, which, being paid regularly at certain periods, -passed current with the people when the national bonds called -“Apolocies” were at an enormous discount. He now in concert with Mr. -Stuart, entered into commerce to supply his necessities. For having -ascertained that grain in different parts of the world, especially -in South America, could be bought by bills, cheaper than it sold for -hard cash in Lisbon; and that in Egypt, although only to be bought -with specie, it was at a reduced price; they employed mercantile -agents to purchase it for the army account, and after filling the -magazines sold the overplus to the inhabitants. This transaction was, -however, greatly impeded by the disputes with North America, which -were now rapidly hastening to a rupture; the American ships which -frequented the Tagus being prevented by the non-importation act from -bringing back merchandize, were forced to demand coin, which helped -to drain the country of specie. - -As Mr. Stuart could obtain no assistance from the English -merchants of Lisbon, to aid him in a traffic which interfered with -their profits, he wrote circular letters to the consuls in the -Mediterranean, and in the Portuguese islands, and to the English -minister at Washington, desiring them to negotiate treasury bills; -to increase the shipments of corn to Lisbon, and pay with new -bills, to be invested in such articles of British manufacture as -the non-importation law still permitted to go to America. By this -complicated process he contrived to keep something in the military -chest; and this commerce, which lord Wellington truly observed, was -not what ought to have occupied his time and attention, saved the -army, and the people, when the proceedings of Mr. Perceval would have -destroyed both. Yet it was afterwards cavilled at and censured by the -ministers, on the representations of the merchants who found their -exorbitant gains interrupted by it. - -Pressed by such accumulated difficulties, and not supported in -England as he deserved, the general, who had more than once intimated -his resolution to withdraw from the Peninsula, now seriously thought -of executing it. Yet when he considered, that the cause was one -even of more interest to England than to the Peninsula; that the -embarrassments of the French might be even greater than his own, and -that Napoleon himself, gigantic as his exertions had been, and were -likely to be, was scarcely aware of the difficulty of conquering the -Peninsula while an English army held Portugal; when he considered -also, that light was breaking in the north of Europe, that the -chances of war are many, even in the worst of times, and above all, -when his mental eye caught the beams of his own coming glory, he -quelled his rising indignation, and re-tempered his mighty energies -to bear the buffet of the tempest. - -But he could not remove the obstacles that choked his path, nor could -he stand still, lest the ground should open beneath his feet. If he -moved in the north, Marmont’s army and the army under Bessieres were -ready to oppose him, and he must take Ciudad Rodrigo or blockade -it before he could even advance against them. To take that place -required a battering-train, to be brought up through a mountainous -country from Lamego, and there was no covering position for the -army during the siege. To blockade and pass it, would so weaken his -forces, already inferior to the enemy, that he could do nothing -effectual; meanwhile Soult would have again advanced from Llerena, -and perhaps have added Elvas to his former conquests. - -To act on the defensive in Beira, and follow up the blow against -Soult, by invading Andalusia, in concert with the Murcians and -the corps of Blake, Beguines, and Graham, while Joseph’s absence -paralysed the army of the centre; while the army of Portugal was -being reorganized in Castile; and while Suchet was still engaged with -Taragona, would have been an operation suitable to lord Wellington’s -fame and to the circumstances of the moment. But then Badajos must -have been blockaded with a corps powerful enough to have defied the -army of the centre, and the conduct of the Portuguese government -had so reduced the allied forces, that this would not have left -a sufficient army to encounter Soult. Hence, after the battle of -Albuera, the only thing to be done, was to renew the siege of -Badajos, which, besides its local interest, contained the enemy’s -bridge equipage and battering train; but which, on common military -calculations, could scarcely be expected to fall before Soult and -Marmont would succour it: yet it was only by the taking of that town -that Portugal itself could be secured beyond the precincts of Lisbon, -and a base for further operations obtained. - -According to the regular rules of art, Soult should have been driven -over the mountains before the siege was begun, but there was no time -to do this, and Marmont was equally to be dreaded on the other side; -wherefore lord Wellington could only try, as it were, to snatch -away the fortress from between them, and he who, knowing his real -situation, censures him for the attempt, is neither a general nor -a statesman. The question was, whether the attempt should be made -or the contest in the Peninsula be resigned. It failed, indeed, and -the Peninsula was not lost, but no argument can be thence derived, -because it was the attempt, rather than the success, which was -necessary to keep the war alive; moreover the French did not push -their advantages as far as they might have done, and the unforeseen -circumstance of a large sum of money being brought to Lisbon, by -private speculation, at the moment of failure, enabled the English -general to support the crisis. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -SECOND ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS. - -[Sidenote: 1811. May.] - -There is no operation in war so certain as a modern siege, provided -the rules of art are strictly followed, but, unlike the ancient -sieges in that particular, it is also different in this; that no -operation is less open to irregular daring, because the course of -the engineer can neither be hurried nor delayed without danger. -Lord Wellington knew that a siege of Badajos, in form, required -longer time, and better means, than were at his disposal, but he -was forced to incur danger and loss of reputation, which is loss of -strength, or to adopt some compendious mode of taking that place. The -time that he could command, and time is in all sieges the greatest -point, was precisely that which the French required to bring up a -force sufficient to disturb the operation; and this depended on the -movements of the army of Portugal, whose march from Salamanca to -Badajos, by the pass of Baños, or even through that of Gata, could -not be stopped by general Spencer, because the mouths of those -defiles were commanded by Marmont’s positions. It was possible -also at that season, for an army to pass the Tagus by fords near -Alcantara, and hence more than twenty days of free action against the -place were not to be calculated upon. - -Now the carriages of the battering guns used in Beresford’s siege -were so much damaged, that the artillery officers asked eleven days -to repair them; and the scanty means of transport for stores was much -diminished by carrying the wounded from Albuera to the different -hospitals. Thus more than fifteen days of open trenches, and nine -days of fire could not be expected. With good guns, plentiful stores, -and a corps of regular sappers and miners, this time would probably -have sufficed; but none of these things were in the camp, and it was -a keen jest of Picton to say, that “lord Wellington sued Badajos in -forma pauperis.” - -The guns, some of them cast in Philip the Second’s reign, were of -soft brass, and false in their bore; the shot were of different -sizes, and the largest too small; the Portuguese gunners were -inexperienced, there were but few British artillery-men, few -engineers, no sappers or miners, and no time to teach the troops -of the line how to make fascines and gabions. Regular and sure -approaches against the body of the place, by the Pardaleras and -the Picurina outworks, could not be attempted; but it was judged -that Beresford’s lines of attack on the castle and Fort Christoval, -might be successfully renewed, avoiding the errors of that general; -that is to say, by pushing the double attacks simultaneously, and -with more powerful means. San Christoval might thus be taken, and -batteries from thence could sweep the interior of the castle, which -was meanwhile to be breached. Something also was hoped from the -inhabitants, and something from the effect of Soult’s retreat after -Albuera. - -This determination once taken, every thing was put in motion with the -greatest energy. Major Dickson, an artillery officer whose talents -were very conspicuous during the whole war, had, with unexpected -rapidity, prepared a battering train of thirty twenty-four-pounders, -four sixteen-pounders, and twelve eight and ten-inch howitzers -made to serve as mortars by taking off the wheels and placing -them on trucks. Six iron Portuguese ship-guns were forwarded from -Salvatierra, making altogether fifty-two pieces, a considerable -convoy of engineer’s stores had already arrived from Alcacer do -Sal, and a company of British artillery marched from Lisbon to be -mixed with the Portuguese, making a total of six hundred gunners. -The regular engineer-officers present, were only twenty-one -in number; but eleven volunteers from the line were joined as -assistant-engineers, and a draft of three hundred intelligent men -from the line, including twenty-five artificers of the staff corps, -strengthened the force immediately under their command. - -Hamilton’s Portuguese division was already before the town, and on -the 24th of May, at the close of evening, general Houston’s division, -increased to five thousand men, by the addition of the seventeenth -Portuguese regiment, and the Tavira and Lagos militia, invested San -Christoval. The flying bridge was then laid down on the Guadiana, and -on the 27th Picton’s division, arriving from Campo Mayor, crossed -the river, by the ford above the town, and joined Hamilton, their -united force being about ten thousand men. General Hill commanded the -covering army which, including the Spaniards, was spread from Merida -to Albuera. The cavalry was pushed forward in observation of Soult, -and a few days after, intelligence having arrived that Drouet’s -division was on the point of effecting a junction with that marshal, -two regiments of cavalry and two brigades of infantry, which had -been quartered at Coria, as posts of communication with Spencer, were -called up to reinforce the covering army. - -While the allies were engaged at Albuera, Phillipon, the governor -of Badajos, had levelled their trenches, repaired his own damages, -and obtained a small supply of wine and vegetables from the people -of Estremadura, who were still awed by the presence of Soult’s army; -and within the place all was quiet, for the citizens did not now -exceed five thousand souls. He had also mounted more guns, and when -the place was invested, parties of the townsmen mixed with soldiers, -were observed working to improve the defences; wherefore, as any -retrenchments made in the castle, behind the intended points of -attack, would have frustrated the besiegers’ object by prolonging the -siege, lord Wellington had a large telescope placed in the tower of -La Lyppe, near Elvas, by which the interior of the castle could be -plainly looked into, and all preparations discovered. - -In the night of the 29th, ground was broken for a false attack -against the Pardaleras, and the following night sixteen hundred -workmen, with a covering party of twelve hundred, sank a parallel -against the castle, on an extent of eleven hundred yards, without -being discovered by the enemy, who did not fire until after daylight. -The same night twelve hundred workmen, covered by eight hundred men -under arms, opened a parallel four hundred and fifty yards from San -Christoval, and seven hundred yards from the bridge-head. On this -line one breaching, and two counter-batteries, were raised against -the fort and against the bridge-head, to prevent a sally from that -point; and a fourth battery was also commenced to search the defences -of the castle, but the workmen were discovered, and a heavy fire -struck down many of them. - -On the 31st the attack against the castle, the soil being very soft, -was pushed forward without much interruption, and rapidly; but the -Christoval attack, being carried on in a rocky soil, and the earth -brought up from the rear, proceeded slowly, and with considerable -loss. This day the British artillery company came up on mules from -Estremos, and the engineer hastened the works. The direction of -the parallel against the castle was such, that the right gradually -approached the point of attack by which the heaviest fire of the -place was avoided; yet, so great was the desire to save time, that -before the suitable point of distance was attained, a battery of -fourteen twenty-four-pounders with six large howitzers was marked out. - -[Sidenote: 1811. June.] - -[Sidenote: French Register of the Siege, MSS.] - -On the Christoval side, the batteries were not finished before the -night of the 1st of June, for the soil was so rocky, that the miner -was employed to level the ground for the platforms; and the garrison -having mortars of sixteen and eighteen inches’ diameter mounted -on the castle, sent every shell amongst the workmen. These huge -missiles would have ruined the batteries on that side altogether, -if the latter had not been on the edge of a ridge, from whence most -of the shells rolled off before bursting, yet so difficult is it to -judge rightly in war, that Phillipon stopped this fire, thinking it -was thrown away! The progress of the works was also delayed by the -bringing of earth from a distance, and woolpacks purchased at Elvas, -were found to be an excellent substitute. - -In the night of the 2d, the batteries on both sides were completed, -and armed with forty-three pieces of different sizes, of which -twenty were pointed against the castle; the next day the fire of the -besiegers opened, but the windage caused by the smallness of the -shot, rendered it very ineffectual at first, and five pieces became -unserviceable. However, before evening the practice was steadier, the -fire of the fort was nearly silenced, and the covering of masonry -fell from the castle-wall, discovering a perpendicular bank of clay. - -In the night of the 3d the parallel against the castle was prolonged, -and a fresh battery for seven guns traced out at six hundred and -fifty yards from the breach. On the 4th the garrison’s fire was -increased by several additional guns, and six more pieces of the -besiegers were disabled, principally by their own fire. Meanwhile the -batteries told but slightly against the bank of clay. - -At Christoval, the fort was much injured, and some damage was done -to the castle, from one of the batteries on that side; but the guns -were so soft and bad that the rate of firing was of necessity greatly -reduced in all the batteries. In the night the new battery was armed, -all the damaged works were repaired, and the next day the enemy -having brought a gun in Christoval to plunge into the trenches on -the castle side, the parallel there was deepened and traverses were -constructed to protect the troops. - -Fifteen pieces still played against the castle, but the bank of -clay, although falling away in flakes, always remained perpendicular. -One damaged gun was repaired on the Christoval side, but two more had -become unserviceable. - -In the night the parallel against the castle was again extended, -a fresh battery was traced out, at only five hundred and twenty -yards from the breach, to receive the Portuguese iron guns, which -had arrived at Elvas; and on the Christoval side some new batteries -were opened and some old ones were abandoned. During this night the -garrison began to entrench themselves behind the castle breach, -before morning their labourers were well covered, and two additional -pieces, from Christoval, were made to plunge into the trenches -with great effect. On the other hand the fire of the besiegers had -broken the clay bank, which took such a slope as to appear nearly -practicable, and the stray shells and shots set fire to the houses -nearest the castle, but three more guns were disabled. - -On the 6th there were two breaches in Christoval, and the principal -one being found practicable, a company of grenadiers with twelve -ladders were directed to assault it, while a second company turned -the fort by the east to divert the enemy’s attention. Three hundred -men from the trenches were at the same time pushed forward by -the west side to cut the communication between the fort and the -bridge-head; and a detachment, with a six-pounder, moved into the -valley of the Gebora, to prevent any passage of the Guadiana by -boats. - - -FIRST ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL. - -The storming party, commanded by major M‘Intosh, of the 85th -regiment, was preceded by a forlorn hope under Mr. Dyas, of the -51st, and this gallant gentleman, guided by the engineer Forster, a -young man of uncommon bravery, reached the glacis about midnight, -and descended the ditch without being discovered. The French had, -however, cleared all the rubbish away, the breach had still seven -feet of perpendicular wall, many obstacles, such as carts chained -together and pointed beams of wood, were placed above it, and -large shells were ranged along the ramparts to roll down upon the -assailants. The forlorn hope finding the opening impracticable, was -retiring with little loss, when the main body, which had been exposed -to a flank fire, from the town as well as a direct fire from the -fort, came leaping into the ditch with ladders, and another effort -was made to escalade at different points; the ladders were too short, -and the garrison, consisting of only seventy-five men, besides -the cannoneers, made so stout a resistance, and the confusion and -mischief occasioned by the bursting of the shells was so great, that -the assailants again retired with the loss of more than one hundred -men. - -[Sidenote: Lamarre’s Sieges.] - -Bad success always produces disputes, and the causes of this failure -were attributed by some to the breach being impracticable from the -first; by others to the confusion which arose after the main body -had entered. French writers affirm that the breach was certainly -practicable on the night of the 5th, but repaired on the 6th; that -as the besiegers did not attack until midnight, the workmen had -time to clear the ruins away and to raise fresh obstacles, and the -bravery of the soldiers, who were provided with three muskets each, -did the rest. But it is also evident, that whether from inexperience, -accident, or other causes, the combinations for the assault were not -very well calculated; the storming party was too weak, the ladders -few and short, and the breach not sufficiently scoured by the fire of -the batteries. The attack itself was also irregular and ill-combined, -for the leading troops were certainly repulsed before the main body -had descended the ditch. The intrepidity of the assailants was -admitted by all sides, yet it is a great point in such attacks that -the supports should form almost one body with the leaders, because -the sense of power derived from numbers is a strong incentive to -valour, and obstacles which would be insurmountable to a few, seem to -vanish before a multitude. It is also to be recollected that this was -a case where not loss of men, but time was to be considered. - -During this night the iron guns were placed in battery against the -castle, but two more of the brass pieces became unserviceable, and -the following day three others were disabled. However, the bank of -clay at the castle at last offered a practicable slope, and during -the night captain Patton of the engineers examined it closely; he -was mortally wounded in returning, yet lived to make his report that -it was practicable. Nevertheless the garrison continued, as they -had done every night at both breaches, to clear away the ruins, and -with bales of wool and other materials to form defences behind the -opening. They ranged also a number of huge shells and barrels of -powder, with matches fastened to them, along the ramparts, and placed -chosen men to defend the breach, each man being supplied with four -muskets. - -In this order they fearlessly awaited another attack, which was soon -made. For intelligence now arrived that Drouet’s corps was close -to Llerena, and that Marmont was on the move from Salamanca, and -hence lord Wellington, seeing that his prey was likely to escape, as -a last effort resolved to assault Christoval again. But this time -four hundred British, Portuguese, and French men of the Chasseurs -Britanniques, carrying sixteen long ladders, were destined for the -attack; the supports were better closed up; the appointed hour was -nine instead of twelve, and a greater number of detachments than -before were distributed to the right and left to distract the enemy’s -attention, to cut off his communication with the town, and to be -ready to improve any success which might be obtained. On the other -side Phillipon increased the garrison of the fort to two hundred men. - - -SECOND ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL. - -The storming party was commanded by major M‘Geechy; the forlorn -hope, again led by the gallant Dyas, was accompanied by Mr. Hunt, an -engineer officer, and a little after nine o’clock the leading troops -bounding forward, were immediately followed by the support, amidst a -shattering fire of musketry which killed major M‘Geechy, Mr. Hunt, -and many men upon the glacis. The troops with loud shouts jumped -into the ditch, but the French scoffingly called to them to come on, -and at the same time rolled the barrels of powder and shells down, -while the musketry made fearful and rapid havoc. In a little time -the two leading columns united at the main breach, the supports also -came up, confusion arose about the ladders, of which only a few could -be reared, and the enemy standing on the ramparts, bayonetted the -foremost of the assailants, overturned the ladders, and again poured -their destructive fire upon the crowd below. When a hundred and forty -men had fallen the order to retire was given. - -An assault on the castle breach might still have been tried, but the -troops could not have formed between the top, and the retrenchments -behind the breach, until Christoval was taken, and the guns from -thence used to clear the interior of the castle; hence the siege was -of necessity raised, because to take Christoval, required several -days more, and Soult was now ready to advance. The stores were -removed on the 10th, and the attack was turned into a blockade. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. The allies lost, during this unfortunate siege, nearly four -hundred men and officers, and the whole of their proceedings were -against rules. The working parties were too weak, the guns and stores -too few, and the points of attack, chosen, not the best; the defences -were untouched by counter-batteries, and the breaching batteries were -at too great a distance for the bad guns employed; howitzers mounted -on trucks were but a poor substitute for mortars, and the sap was not -practised; lastly, the assaults were made before the glacis had been -crowned, and a musketry fire established against the breach. - -2º. That a siege so conducted should fail against such a brave and -intelligent garrison is not strange; but it is most strange and -culpable that a government, which had been so long engaged in war as -the British, should have left the engineer department, with respect -to organization and equipment, in such a state as to make it, in -despite of the officers’ experience, bravery, and zeal, a very -inefficient arm of war. The skill displayed belonged to particular -persons, rather than to the corps at large; and the very tools with -which they worked, especially those sent from the storekeeper’s -department, were so shamefully bad that the work required could -scarcely be performed; the captured French cutting-tools were eagerly -sought for by the engineers as being infinitely better than the -British; when the soldiers’ lives and the honour of England’s arms, -were at stake, the English cutlery was found worse than the French. - -3º. The neglect of rules, above noticed, was for the most part -a matter of absolute necessity; yet censure might attach to the -general, inasmuch as he could have previously sent to England for a -battering train. But then the conduct of the Portuguese and British -governments when lord Wellington was in the lines, left him so little -hope of besieging any place on the frontier, that he was hourly -in fear of being obliged to embark: moreover, the badness of the -Portuguese guns was not known, and the space of time that elapsed -between the fall of Badajos and this siege, was insufficient to -procure artillery from England; neither would the Portuguese have -furnished the means of carriage. It may however at all times be taken -as a maxim, that the difficulties of war are so innumerable that no -head was ever yet strong enough to fore-calculate them all. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -[Sidenote: 1811. June.] - -It will be remembered, that Soult instead of retiring into Andalusia, -took a flank position at Llerena, and awaited the arrival of Drouet’s -division, which had been detached from Massena’s army. At Llerena, -although closely watched by general Hill, the French marshal, with an -army, oppressed by its losses and rendered unruly by want, maintained -an attitude of offence until assured of Drouet’s approach, when he -again advanced to Los Santos, near which place a slight cavalry -skirmish took place to the disadvantage of the French. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted despatch from Soult to Marmont.] - -On the 14th, Drouet, whose march had been very rapid, arrived, -and then Soult, who knew that lord Wellington expected large -reinforcements, and was desirous to forestal them, advanced to -Fuente del Maestro, whereupon Hill took measures to concentrate the -covering army on the position of Albuera. Meanwhile Marmont, who had -reorganized the army of Portugal, in six divisions of infantry and -five brigades of cavalry, received Napoleon’s orders to co-operate -with Soult; and in this view had sent Reynier with two divisions -by the pass of Baños, while himself with a considerable force of -infantry and cavalry and ten guns escorted a convoy to Ciudad -Rodrigo. General Spencer, with the first, fifth, sixth, and light -divisions, and one brigade of cavalry, was then behind the Agueda; -and Pack’s Portuguese brigade was above Almeida, which had been -again placed in a condition to resist an irregular assault. Spencer’s -orders were to make his marches correspond with those of the enemy, -if the latter should point towards the Tagus; but if the French -attacked, he was to take the line of the Coa, and to blow up Almeida -if the movements went to isolate that fortress. On the morning of the -6th, Marmont, having introduced his convoy, marched out of Rodrigo -in two columns, one moving upon Gallegos, the other upon Espeja. -The light division fell back before the latter, and Slade’s cavalry -before the former; but in this retrograde movement, the latter gave -its flank obliquely to the line of the enemy’s advance, which soon -closed upon, and cannonaded it, with eight pieces of artillery. -Unfortunately the British rear-guard got jammed in between the French -and a piece of marshy ground, and in this situation the whole must -have been destroyed, if captain Purvis, with a squadron of the fourth -dragoons, had not charged the enemy while the other troopers, with -strong horses and a knowledge of the firmest parts, got through the -marsh. Purvis then passed also, and the French horses could not -follow. Thus the retreat was effected with a loss of only twenty men. -After the action an officer calling himself Montbrun’s aide-de-camp -deserted to the allies. - -General Spencer, more distinguished for great personal intrepidity -than for quickness of military conception, was now undecided as to -his measures; and the army was by no means in a safe situation, for -the country was covered with baggage, the movements of the divisions -were wide, and without concert, and general Pack who had the -charge of Almeida too hastily blew it up. In this uncertainty the -adjutant-general Pakenham pointed out that the French did not advance -as if to give battle, that their numbers were evidently small, their -movements more ostentatious than vigorous, and probably intended -to cover a flank movement by the passes leading to the Tagus: he -therefore urged Spencer either to take up a position of battle which -would make the enemy discover his real numbers and intentions, -or retire at once behind the Coa, with a view to march to lord -Wellington’s assistance. These arguments were supported by colonel -Waters, who, having closely watched the infantry coming out of Ciudad -Rodrigo, observed that they were too clean and well dressed to have -come off a long march, and must therefore be a part of the garrison. -He had also ascertained that a large body was actually in movement -towards the passes. - -Spencer yielding to these representations marched in the evening by -Alfayates to Soito, and the next day behind the Coa. Here certain -intelligence, that Marmont was in the passes, reached him, and he -continued his march to the Alemtejo by Penamacor, but detached one -division and his cavalry to Coria, as flankers, while he passed with -the main body by Castello Branco, Vilha Velha, Niza, and Portalegre. -The season was burning and the marches long, yet so hardened by -constant service were the light division, and so well organized -by general Craufurd, that, although covering from eighteen to -eight-and-twenty miles daily, they did not leave a single straggler -behind. The flanking troops, who had been rather unnecessarily -exposed at Coria, then followed, and Marmont having imposed upon -Spencer and Pack by his demonstration in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, -filed off by the pass of Perales, while Reynier moved by the passes -of Bejar and Baños, and the whole were by forced marches soon united -at the bridge of Almaraz. Here a pontoon bridge expected from Madrid -had not arrived, and the passage of the Tagus was made with only one -ferry-boat which caused a delay of four days, which would have proved -fatal to Badajos, if the battering guns employed in that siege had -been really effective. - -When the river was crossed, the French army marched in two columns -with the greatest rapidity upon Merida and Medellin, where they -arrived the 18th, and opened their communications with Soult. - -On the other side, lord Wellington had been attentively watching -these movements; he had never intended to press Badajos beyond the -10th, because he knew that when reinforced with Drouet’s division, -Soult alone would be strong enough to raise the siege, and hence the -hurried assaults; but he was resolved to fight Soult, and although -he raised the siege on the 10th, yet, by a deciphered intercepted -letter, that Phillipon’s provisions would be exhausted on the 20th, -he continued the blockade of the place, in hopes that some such -accident of war as the delay at Almaraz might impede Marmont. It may -be here asked, why, as he knew a few days would suffice to reduce -Badajos, he did not retrench his whole army and persist in the siege? -The answer is that Elvas being out of repair, and exhausted both of -provisions and ammunition, by the siege of Badajos, the enemy would -immediately have taken that fortress. - -When Soult’s advanced guard had reached Los Santos, the covering -army, consisting of the second and fourth divisions and Blake’s -Spaniards was concentrated at Albuera, Hamilton’s Portuguese were -also directed there from Badajos; meanwhile the third and seventh -divisions maintained the blockade, and Wellington expecting a battle -repaired in person to Albuera, but, unlike Beresford, he had that -position entrenched, and did not forget to occupy the hill on the -right. - -On the 14th, it was known that Marmont was at Truxillo, and that -in four days he could unite with Soult, wherefore the blockade was -also raised with a view to repass the Guadiana, yet Wellington -still lingered at Albuera hoping to fall on Soult separately, but -the cautious manner in which the latter moved, continually refusing -his left and edging with his right, towards Almendralejos, soon -extinguished this chance; on the 17th, the blockade having been -raised the day before, the allies repassed the Guadiana in two -columns. The British and Portuguese moved by the pontoon bridge near -Badajos, the Spaniards crossed at Jerumenha;—this movement, not an -easy one, was executed without any loss of men or stores, and without -accident, save that general William Stewart by some error, took the -same line as Blake, and at night fell in with the Spaniards, who -thought his division French and were like to have fired. - -The 19th the united French armies entered Badajos, which was thus -succoured after two most honourable defences, and at a moment when -Phillipon, despairing of aid and without provisions, was preparing -his means of breaking out and escaping. - -The 21st Godinot’s division which had marched by Valverde took -possession of Olivenza; the 22d he pushed a detachment under the -guns of Jerumenha, and the same day the whole of the French cavalry -crossed the Guadiana in two columns, advancing towards Villa Viciosa -and Elvas on one side, and Campo Mayor on the other. - -Lord Wellington being now joined by the head of Spencer’s corps, -had placed his army on both sides of the Caya, with cavalry posts -towards the mouth of that river and on the Guadiana in front of -Elvas. His right wing was extended behind the Caya to the lower -bridge on that river, and his left wing had a field of battle on -some high ground resting on the Gebora, a little beyond Campo Mayor, -which fortress was occupied, and the open space between it and the -high ground strongly entrenched. On this side also cavalry were -posted in observation beyond the Gebora and about Albuquerque, the -whole position forming an irregular arch embracing the bridge of -Badajos. The wood and town of Aronches were behind the centre of -the position and the little fortified place of Ouguella was behind -the left; but the right wing was much more numerous than the left, -and the Monte Reguingo, a wooded ridge between Campo Mayor and the -Caya, was occupied by the light division, whose position could not be -recognized by the enemy. - -If the French attacked the left of the allies, a short movement would -have sufficed to bring the bulk of the troops into action on the -menaced point, because the whole extent of country occupied did not -exceed ten or twelve miles: the communications also were good, and -from Campo Mayor open plains, reaching to Badajos, exposed the French -movements which could be distinguished both from Elvas, from Campo -Mayor, and from the many atalayas or watch-towers on that frontier. - -The chief merit of this position was the difficulty of recognizing it -from the enemy’s side, and to protect the rear, the first division -was retained at Portalegre: from thence it could intercept the enemy -at Marvão or Castello de Vide if he should attempt to turn the allies -by Albuquerque; and was ready to oppose Soult if he should move -between Elvas and Estremos; but the march from Portalegre was too -long to hope for the assistance of this division in a battle near -Elvas or Campo Mayor. - -The French cavalry, as I have said, passed the Guadiana on the 21st, -both by the bridge of Badajos and by two fords, where the road of -Olivenza crosses that river, below the confluence of the Caya. The -right column after driving back the outposts of the allies, was -opposed by the heavy dragoons, and by Madden’s Portuguese, and -retired without seeing the position on the Campo Mayor side; but -the horsemen of the left column, while patrolling towards Villa -Viciosa and Elvas, cut off a squadron of the eleventh dragoons, -and the second German hussars which were on the Guadiana escaped -to Elvas with difficulty and loss. The cause of this misfortune in -which nearly a hundred and fifty men were killed or taken is not -very clear, for the French aver that colonel Lallemand, by a feigned -retreat drew the cavalry into an ambuscade, and the rumours in the -English camp were various and discordant. - -After this action the French troops were quartered along the Guadiana -above and below Badajos from Xeres de los Cavalheiros to Montijo, and -proceeded to collect provisions for themselves and for the fortress, -hence, with the exception of a vain attempt on the 26th to cut off -the cavalry detachments on the side of Albuquerque, no farther -operations took place. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 3.] - -All things had seemed to tend to a great and decisive battle, and, -although the crisis glided away without any event of importance, this -was one of the most critical periods of the war. For Marmont brought -down, including a detachment of the army of the centre, thirty-one -thousand infantry, four thousand five hundred cavalry, and fifty-four -guns; Soult about twenty-five thousand infantry, three thousand -cavalry, and thirty-six guns;—to effect this, Andalusia and Castile -had been nearly stripped of troops. Bessieres had abandoned the -Asturias, Bonnet united with general Mayer, who had succeeded Serras -in Leon, was scarcely able, as we have seen, to keep the Gallicians -in check on the Orbijo, the chief armies of the Peninsular were in -presence, a great battle seemed to be the interest of the French, and -it was in their option to fight or not. Their success at Badajos, -and the surprise of the cavalry on the Caya had made ample amends -for their losses at Los Santos and Usagre, and now, when Badajos was -succoured, and the allied army in a manner driven into Portugal, -Albuera seemed to be a victory. The general result of the Estremadura -campaign had been favourable to them, and the political state of -their affairs seemed to require some dazzling action to impose upon -the peninsulars. Their army was powerful, and as they were especially -strong in cavalry, and on favourable ground for that arm, there -could scarcely be a better opportunity for a blow, which would, -if successful, have revenged Massena’s disasters, and sent lord -Wellington back to Lisbon, perhaps from the Peninsula altogether; if -unsuccessful not involving any very serious consequences, because -from their strength of horse and artillery, and nearness to Badajos, -a fatal defeat was not to be expected. But the allied army was -thought to be stronger by the whole amount of the Spanish troops, -than it really was; the position very difficult to be examined was -confidently held by lord Wellington, and no battle took place. - -Napoleon’s estimation of the weight of moral over physical force -in war was here finely exemplified. Both the French armies were -conscious of recent defeats, Busaco, Sabugal, Fuentes, and the -horrid field of Albuera, were fresh in their memory; the fierce -blood there spilled, still reeked in their nostrils, and if Cæsar -after a partial check at Dyrracchiaum held it unsafe to fight a -pitched battle with recently defeated soldiers, however experienced -or brave, Soult may well be excused, seeing that he knew there were -divisions on the Caya, as good in all points, and more experienced, -than those he had fought with on the banks of the Albuera. The -stern nature of the British soldier had been often before proved -by him, and he could now draw no hope from the unskilfulness of -the general. Lord Wellington’s resolution to accept battle on the -banks of the Caya, was nevertheless, one of as unmixed greatness, -as the crisis was one of unmixed danger to the cause he supported. -For the Portuguese government, following up the system which I have -already described, had reduced their troops to the lowest degree of -misery, and the fortresses were, at times, only not abandoned to the -enemy. The British government had taken the native troops into pay, -but it had not undertaken to feed them; yet such was the suffering -of those brave men that Wellington, after repeatedly refusing to -assist them from the English stores, unable longer to endure the -sight of their misfortunes, and to prevent them from disbanding, at -last fed the six brigades, or three-fourths of the whole army, the -English commissariat charging the expense to the subsidy. He hoped -that the government would then supply the remnant, but they starved -it likewise, and during the siege of Badajos these troops were of -necessity thrown for subsistence upon the magazines of Elvas, which -were thus exhausted; and what with desertion, famine, and sickness, -that flourishing army which had mustered more than forty thousand -good soldiers in line, at the time of Massena’s invasion, could -now scarcely produce fourteen thousand for a battle on which the -fate of their country depended. The British troops, although large -reinforcements had come out, and more were arriving, had so many -sick and wounded, that scarcely twenty-eight thousand sabres and -bayonets were in the field. The enemy had therefore a superiority, of -one-fourth in artillery and infantry, and the strength of his cavalry -was double that of the British. - -To accept battle in such circumstances, military considerations -only being had in view, would have been rash in the extreme, but -the Portuguese government besides throwing the subsistence of the -troops upon Elvas, had utterly neglected that place, and Jerumenha, -Campo Mayor, and Ouguella, Aronches and Santa Olaya, which were the -fortresses covering this frontier; neither had they drawn forth any -means of transport from the country. The siege of Badajos had been -entirely furnished from Elvas; but all the carts and animals of -burthen that could be found in the vicinity, or as far as the British -detachments could go; and all the commissariat means to boot, were -scarcely sufficient to convey the ammunition, the stores, and the -subsistence of the native troops, day by day, from Elvas to the camp; -there was consequently no possibility of replacing these things from -the British magazines at Abrantes and Lisbon. - -When the allies crossed the Guadiana in retreat, Elvas had only ten -thousand rounds of shot left, and not a fortnight’s provisions in -store, even for her own garrison; her works were mouldering in many -places, from want of care, houses and enclosures encumbered her -glacis, most of her guns were rendered unserviceable by the fire at -Badajos, the remainder were very bad, and her garrison was composed -of untried soldiers and militia. Jerumenha was not better looked -to; Olaya, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella had nothing but their walls. -It would appear then, that if Soult had been aware of this state -of affairs, he might under cover of the Guadiana, have collected -his army below the confluence of the Caya, and then by means of the -pontoon train from Badajos, and by the fords at which his cavalry did -pass, have crossed the Guadiana, overpowered the right of the allies, -and suddenly investing Elvas, have covered his army with lines, -which would have ensured the fall of that place; unless the English -general, anticipating such an attempt, had, with very inferior -numbers, defeated him between the Caya and Elvas. But this, in a -perfectly open country, offering no advantages to the weaker army, -would not have been easy. Soult also, by marching on the side of -Estremos, could have turned the right, and menaced the communications -of the allies with Abrantes, which would have obliged him to retreat -and abandon Elvas or fight to disadvantage. The position on the -Caya was therefore taken up solely with reference to the state of -political affairs. It was intended to impose upon the enemy, and it -did so; Elvas and Jerumenha must otherwise have fallen. - -While a front of battle was thus presented, the rear was cleared -of all the hospitals and heavy baggage; workmen were day and night -employed to restore the fortifications of the strong places, and -guns, ammunition, and provisions were brought up from Abrantes, -by means of the animals and carts before employed in the siege of -Badajos. Until all this was effected Portugal was on the brink of -perdition, but the true peninsular character was now displayed, and -in a manner that proclaims most forcibly the difficulties overcome by -the English general, difficulties which have been little appreciated -in his own country. The danger of Elvas had aroused all the bustle of -the Portuguese government, and the regency were at first frightened -at the consequences of their own conduct; but when they found -their own tardy efforts were forestalled by the diligence of lord -Wellington, they with prodigious effrontery asserted, that he had -exhausted Elvas for the supply of the British troops, and that they -had replenished it! - -His imperturbable firmness at this crisis was wonderful, and the -more admirable, because Mr. Perceval’s policy, prevailing in the -cabinet, had left him without a halfpenny in the military chest, -and almost without a hope of support in his own country: yet his -daring was not a wild cast of the net for fortune; it was supported -by great circumspection, and a penetration and activity that let no -advantages escape. He had thrown a wide glance over the Peninsula, -knew his true situation, had pointed out to the Spaniards how to push -their war to advantage, while the French were thus concentrated in -Estremadura, and at this period had a right to expect assistance from -them; for Soult and Marmont were united at Badajos, the army of the -north and the army of the centre were paralysed by the flight of the -king, and this was the moment, when Figueras having been surprised -by Rovira, and Taragona besieged by Suchet, the French armies of -Catalonia and Aragon were entirely occupied with those places. Thus, -nearly the whole of the Peninsula was open to the enterprizes of the -Spaniards. They could have collected, of Murcians and Valencians -only, above forty thousand regulars, besides partizans, with which -they might have marched against Madrid, while the Gallicians operated -in Castile, and the Asturian army supported the enterprizes of the -northern partidas. - -[Sidenote: See Book XIII. Chap. I.] - -This favourable occasion was not seized. Julian Sanchez, indeed, -cut off a convoy, menaced Salamanca, and blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo; -Santocildes came down to Astorga, and as I have before observed, -Mina and the northern chiefs harassed the French communications; -some stir also was made by the guerillas near Madrid, and Suchet was -harassed, but the commotion soon subsided; and a detachment from -Madrid having surprised a congregation of partidas at Peneranda, -killed many and recovered a large convoy which they had taken; and -in this complicated war, which being spread like a spider’s web over -the whole Peninsula, any drag upon one part would have made the whole -quiver to the most distant extremities, the regular armies effected -nothing. Nor did any general insurrection of the people take place in -the rear of the French, who retained all their fortified posts, while -their civil administrations continued to rule in the great towns as -tranquilly as if there was no war! - -Lord Wellington’s principal measure for dissipating the storm in his -front had rested upon Blake. That general had wished him to fight -beyond the Guadiana, and was not well pleased at being refused; -wherefore the English general, instead of taking ten or twelve -thousand Spaniards, and an uneasy colleague, into the line of battle -at Campo Mayor, where he knew by experience that they would quarrel -with the Portuguese, and by their slowness, insubordination, and -folly, would rather weaken than strengthen himself, delivered to -Blake the pontoons used at Badajos, and concerted with him a movement -down the right bank of the Guadiana. He was to recross that river at -Mertola, and to fall upon Seville, which was but slightly guarded by -a mixed force of French and Spaniards in Joseph’s service; and this -blow, apparently easy of execution, would have destroyed all the -arsenals and magazines, which supported the blockade of Cadiz. Lord -Wellington had therefore good reason to expect the raising of that -siege, as well as the dispersion of the French army in its front. He -likewise urged the regency at Cadiz to push forward general Beguines -from San Roque, against Seville, while the insurgents in the Ronda -pressed the few troops, left in Grenada, on one side, and Freire, -with the Murcian army, pressed them on the other. - -Blake marched the 18th, recrossed the river at Mertola the 22d, -remained inactive at Castillegos until the 30th, and sent his heavy -artillery to Ayamonte by water; then, instead of moving direct with -his whole force upon Seville, he detached only a small body, and with -a kind of infatuation wasted two successive days in assaulting the -castle of Niebla; a contemptible work garrisoned by three hundred -Swiss, who had in the early part of the war abandoned the Spanish -service. Being without artillery he could not succeed, and meanwhile -Soult, hearing of his march, ordered Olivenza to be blown up, and -taking some cavalry, and Godinot’s division which formed the left of -his army, passed the Morena by Santa Ollalla and moved rapidly upon -Seville. From Monasterio he sent a detachment to relieve the castle -of Niebla; and at the same time, general Conroux, whose division was -at Xeres de los Cavalheiro, crossed the mountain by the Aracena road, -and endeavoured to cut off Blake from Ayamonte. - -Thus far, notwithstanding the failure at Niebla, the English -general’s project was crowned with success. The great army in his -front was broken up, Soult was gone, Marmont was preparing to retire, -and Portugal was safe. Blake’s cavalry under Penne Villemur, and some -infantry under Ballesteros, had also, during the attack on Niebla, -appeared in front of Seville on the right of the Guadalquivir, and -a slight insurrection took place at Carmona on the left bank. The -Serranos, always in arms, were assisted by Beguines with three -thousand men, and blockaded the town of Ronda; and Freire advancing -with his Murcians beyond Lorca, menaced general Laval, who had -succeeded Sebastiani in command of the fourth corps. In this crisis, -general Daricau, unable to keep the field, shut himself up in a great -convent, which Soult had, in anticipation of such a crisis, fortified -in the Triana suburb, before his first invasion of Estremadura. But -the Spanish troops of Joseph, shewed no disposition to quit him, the -people of Seville remained tranquil, and Blake’s incapacity ruined -the whole combination. - -[Sidenote: 1811. July.] - -Soult approached on the 6th of July, Ballesteros and Villemur -immediately retired, and the insurrection at Carmona ceased. Blake, -hearing of Conroux’s march, precipitately fled from Niebla, and only -escaped into Portugal by the assistance of a bridge laid for him at -San Lucar de Guadiana by colonel Austin. He then resolved to embark -some of his forces and sail to attack San Lucar de Barameda; but -scarcely had a few men got on board, when the French advanced guard -appeared, and he again fled in disorder to Ayamonte, and got into -the island of Canelas, where fortunately a Spanish frigate and three -hundred transports had unexpectedly arrived. While Ballesteros, with -the cavalry and three thousand infantry, protected the embarkation, -by taking a position on the Rio Piedra, Blake got on board with great -confusion, and sailed to Cadiz, for the French had reinforced San -Lucar de Barameda, and entered Ayamonte. The Portuguese militia, of -the Algarves, were then called out; and Ballesteros after losing some -men on the Piedra, took post in the mountains of Aroches on his -left, until the French retired, when he came back with his infantry -and entrenched himself in Canelas. On this island he remained until -August, and then embarked under the protection of the Portuguese -militia at Villa Real, while his cavalry marched up the Guadiana to -rejoin Castaños, who with a few troops still remained in Estremadura. -A small battalion left in the castle of Paymago was soon after -unsuccessfully attacked by the French, and this finished the long -partizan warfare of the Condado de Niebla. - -[Sidenote: 1811. August.] - -There was now nothing to prevent the French from again pressing -the allies on the Caya, except the timid operations of Freire on -the side of Grenada, and these Soult was in march to repress. With -indefatigable activity he had recalled the troops of the fourth -corps, from Estremadura, to supply the place of the detachments which -he had already sent, from Seville, Cadiz, Grenada, and Malaga, to -quell the insurrection in the Ronda; and while he thus prepared the -means of attacking Freire, Beguines was driven back to San Roque, -and the Serranos as I have before observed, disgusted with the -Spanish general’s ill conduct, were upon the point of capitulating -with the French. During these events in the Ronda, Godinot returned, -from the pursuit of Blake, to Jaen, whence on the 7th of August, he -was directed to march against Pozalçon and Baza, where the Murcian -army was posted. Meanwhile Blake, re-landing his troops at Almeria, -joined Freire; his intention was to have commenced active operations -against Grenada, but thinking it necessary to go first to Valencia -where Palacio was making mischief, he left the army, which was above -twenty-seven thousand strong, under Freire, and before he could -return it was utterly dispersed. - - -ROUT OF BAZA. - -General Quadra, who commanded the right wing of the Murcians, was at -Pozalçon, and it is said, had orders to rejoin Freire, but disobeyed. -The centre and left under Freire himself, were at Venta de Bahul in -front of Baza. The 8th, Soult, at the head of a mixed force of French -and Spanish troops in Joseph’s service, drove back the advanced -guards from Guadix. The 9th he appeared in front of Bahul, where -he discerned the Spanish army on strong ground, their front being -covered by a deep ravine. As his object was to cut off the retreat -upon Lorca, and the city of Murcia, he only shewed a few troops at -first, and skirmished slightly, to draw Freire’s attention, while -Godinot attacked his right at Pozalçon and got in his rear. Godinot -wasted time. His advanced guard, alone, had defeated Quadra with -great loss, but instead of entering Baza, he halted for the night -near it; and during the darkness, the Spaniards, who had no other -line of retreat, and were now falling back in confusion before Soult, -passed through that place, and made for Lorca and Caravalha. Soult’s -cavalry, however, soon cut this line, and the fugitives took to the -by-roads, followed and severely harassed by the French horse. - -At this time the whole province was in a defenceless state, but the -people generally took arms to protect the city of Murcia. That -place was entrenched, and the French marshal, whose troops were few, -and fatigued by constant marching, not thinking fit to persevere, -especially as the yellow fever was raging at Carthagena, returned -to Grenada, whence he sent detachments to disperse some insurgents -who had gathered under the Conde de Montijo in the Alpuxaras. Thus -Grenada was entirely quieted. - -Here it is impossible to refrain from admiring Soult’s vigour and -ability. We see him in the latter end of 1810, with a small force -and in the depth of winter, taking Olivenza, Badajos, Albuquerque, -Valencia d’Alcantara, and Campo Mayor; defeating a great army, -and capturing above twenty thousand men. Again when unexpectedly -assailed by Beresford in the north, by the Murcians in the east, by -Ballesteros in the west, and by Lapeña and Graham in the south, he -found means to repel three of them, to persevere in the blockade -of Cadiz, and to keep Seville tranquil, while he marched against -the fourth. At Albuera he lost one of the fiercest battles upon -human record, and that at a moment when the king by abandoning his -throne had doubled every embarrassment; nevertheless, holding fast -to Estremadura, he still maintained the struggle, and again taking -the offensive obliged the allies to repass the Guadiana. If he did -not then push his fortune to the utmost, it must be considered that -his command was divided, that his troops were still impressed with -the recollection of Albuera, and that the genius of his adversary -had worked out new troubles for him in Andalusia. With how much -resolution and activity he repressed those troubles I have just -shewn; but above all things he is to be commended for the prudent -vigour of his administration, which, in despite of the opposition -of Joseph’s Spanish counsellors, had impressed the Andalusians with -such a notion of his power and resources, that no revolt of any real -consequence took place, and none of his civic guards or “Escopeteros” -failed him in the hour of need. - -Let any man observe the wide extent of country he had to maintain; -the frontiers fringed as it were with hostile armies, the interior -suffering under war requisitions, the people secretly hating the -French, a constant insurrection in the Ronda, and a national -government and a powerful army in the Isla de Leon. Innumerable -English and Spanish agents prodigal of money, and of arms, -continually instigating the people of Andalusia to revolt; the coast -covered with hostile vessels, Gibraltar sheltering beaten armies -on one side, Cadiz on another, Portugal on a third, Murcia on a -fourth; the communication with France difficult, two battles lost, -few reinforcements, and all the material means to be created in the -country. Let any man, I say, consider this, and he will be convinced -that it was no common genius that could remain unshaken amidst such -difficulties; yet Soult not only sustained himself, but contemplated -the most gigantic offensive enterprises, and was at all times an -adversary to be dreaded. What though his skill in actual combat was -not so remarkable as in some of his contemporaries; who can deny -him firmness, activity, vigour, foresight, grand perception, and -admirable arrangement? It is this combination of high qualities that -forms a great captain. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -[Sidenote: 1811. July.] - -While Soult was clearing the eastern frontier of Andalusia, Marmont -retired gradually from Badajos and quartered his troops in the -valley of the Tagus, with exception of one division which he left, -at Truxillo. At the same time the fifth corps retired to Zafra, and -thus lord Wellington found himself relieved from the presence of the -French, at the very moment when he had most reason to fear their -efforts. He had by this time secured the fortresses on the frontier, -his troops were beginning to suffer from the terrible pestilence of -the Guadiana, this was sufficient to prevent him from renewing the -siege of Badajos, if Marmont’s position had not forbid that measure, -he therefore resolved to adopt a new system of operations. But to -judge of the motives which influenced his conduct we must again cast -a hasty glance over the general state of the Peninsula, which was -hourly changing. - -In Catalonia Suchet had stormed Taragona, seized Montserrat, and -dispersed the Catalan army. A division of the army of the centre had -chased the Partidas from Guadalaxara and Cuença, and re-established -the communications with Aragon. Valencia and Murcia were in fear and -confusion, both from internal intrigue and from the double disasters -on each side of their frontier, at Baza and Taragona - -The French emperor was pouring reinforcements into Spain by the -northern line; these troops as usual scoured the country to put down -the Guerillas on each side of their march, and nearly forty thousand -fresh men, mostly old soldiers from the army of the reserve, were -come, or coming into the north of Spain. The young guard which was at -Burgos, under general Dorsenne, was increased to seventeen thousand -men; and as no efforts, except those already noticed, were made by -the Spaniards, to shake the French hold of the country while Soult -and Marmont were on the Guadiana, the French generals were enabled to -plan extensive measures of further conquest: and the more readily, -because the king was now on his return from Paris, in apparent -harmony with his brother, and the powers and duties of all parties -were defined. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 3.] - -Suchet urged by Napoleon to hasten his preparations for the invasion -of Valencia, was resolved to be under the walls of that city in the -middle of September, and Soult was secretly planning a gigantic -enterprise, calculated to change the whole aspect of the war. In -the north when the king, who re-entered Madrid the 14th, had passed -Valladolid, the imperial guards entered Leon; thirteen thousand men -of the army of the north were concentrated at Benevente on the 17th, -and Santocildes retired into the mountains. Bessieres then sent a -large convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, but following the treaty between -Joseph and Napoleon, returned himself to France, and general Dorsenne -taking the command of the army of the north, prepared to invade -Gallicia. - -Meanwhile Marmont was directed to resign the whole of Castile and -Leon, to the protection of the army of the north, and to withdraw -all his posts and depôts with the exception of the garrison of Ciudad -Rodrigo, which was to be changed at a more convenient time. His line -of communication was to be with Madrid, and that city was to be his -chief depôt and base; he was to take positions in the valley of the -Tagus, and at Truxillo; to fortify either Alcantara or Almaraz, and -to secure the communication across the river. - -Thus posted, the emperor judged that Marmont could more effectually -arrest the progress of the allies than in any other. The invasion -of Andalusia, for the purpose of raising the siege of Cadiz, was, -he said, the only object the allies had at the moment, but it could -always be frustrated by Marmont’s moving against their flank; and -with respect to the north, the allies having no object on that side, -would be unlikely to make any serious attempt, because they must in -time be overmatched, as the French fell back upon their resources. -Marmont could also act against their right flank, as he could do -against their left flank, if they marched upon Andalusia; and while -stationary he protected Madrid, and gave power and activity to the -king’s administration. - -In pursuance of these instructions, Marmont, who had remained in -Estremadura, to cover Soult’s operations against Blake and the -Murcians, now proceeded to occupy Talavera, and other posts in the -valley of the Tagus; and he placed a division at Truxillo, the castle -of which place, as well as that of Medellin, was repaired. Another -division occupied Placentia, with posts in the passes of Bejar and -Baños; Girard’s division of the fifth corps, remained at Zafra, to -serve as a point of connexion between Marmont and Soult, and to -support Badajos, which, by a wise provision of Napoleon’s, was now -garrisoned with detachments from the three armies, of the centre, of -Portugal and of the south. This gave each general a direct interest -in moving to its succour, and in the same policy Ciudad Rodrigo was -to be wholly garrisoned by the army of the north, that Marmont might -have no temptation to neglect the army of the south, under pretence -of succouring Ciudad. - -To restore and maintain Alcantara was beyond the means of the duke of -Ragusa; he therefore repaired the bridge of Almaraz, and constructed -two strong forts, one at each side, to protect it, and to serve as an -intermediate field depôt; a third and more considerable fort was also -built on the high ridge of Mirabete, to insure a passage over the -hills from Almaraz to Truxillo. A free intercourse with the army of -the south was thus secured on one side, and on the other, the passes -of Baños and Bejar, and the Roman road of Puerto Pico, which had been -restored in 1810, served for communication with the army of the north. - -The French affairs had now assumed a very favourable aspect. There -was indeed a want of money, but the generals were obeyed with -scrupulous attention by the people of Spain, not only within the -districts occupied by them, but even in those villages where the -guerillas were posted. This obedience lord Wellington attributed -entirely to fear, and hoped as the exactions were heavy, that the -people would at last fight or fly from their habitations on the -approach of a French soldier; but this did not happen generally, -and to me it appears, that the obedience was rather a symptom of -the subjection of the nation, and that with a judicious mixture of -mildness and severity perfect submission would have followed if -England had not kept the war alive. - -On the other hand the weakness and anarchy of the Spaniards were -daily increasing, and the disputes, between the British general and -the Portuguese government, had arrived to such a height, that lord -Wellington, having drawn up powerful and clear statements of his -grievous situation, sent one to the Brazils and the other to his own -government, with a positive intimation that if an entirely new system -was not immediately adopted he would no longer attempt to carry on -the contest. Lord Wellesley, taking his stand upon this ground, -made strenuous exertions in both countries to prevent the ruin of -the cause; but lord Wellington, while expecting the benefit of his -brother’s interference, had to contend with the most surprising -difficulties, and to seek in his own personal resources for the means -of even defending Portugal. He had sent marshal Beresford to Lisbon, -immediately after Albuera, to superintend the reorganization and -restoration of the Portuguese forces, and Beresford had sent Mr. De -Lemos, an officer of his own staff, to the Brazils, to represent the -inconveniences arising from the interference of the regency in the -military affairs. On the other hand the Souzas sent one Vasconcellos, -who had been about the British head-quarters as their spy, to Rio -Janeiro, and thus the political intrigues became more complicated -than ever. - -But with respect to the war Wellington had penetrated Napoleon’s -object, when he saw Marmont’s position in the valley of the Tagus; -he felt the full force of the emperor’s military reasoning, yet he -did not despair, if he could overcome the political obstacles, to -gain some advantage. He had now a powerful and experienced British -force under his command, the different departments and the staff of -the army were every day becoming more skilful and ready, and he had -also seen enough of his adversaries to estimate their powers. The -king he knew to be no general, and discontented with the marshals; -Soult he had found able and vast in his plans, but too cautious in -their execution; Marmont, with considerable vigour, had already shown -some rashness in the manner he had pushed Reynier’s division forward, -after passing the Tagus, and it was, therefore, easy to conceive -that no very strict concert would be maintained in their combined -operations. - -Lord Wellington had also established some good channels of -information. He had a number of spies amongst the Spaniards who -were living within the French lines; a British officer in disguise, -constantly visited the French armies in the field; a Spanish -state-counsellor, living at the head-quarters of the first corps, -gave intelligence from that side, and a guitar-player of celebrity, -named Fuentes, repeatedly making his way to Madrid, brought advice -from thence. Mr. Stuart, under cover of vessels licensed to fetch -corn for France, kept _chasse marées_ constantly plying along the -Biscay coast, by which he not only acquired direct information, but -facilitated the transmission of intelligence from the land spies, -amongst whom the most remarkable was a cobbler, living in a little -hutch at the end of the bridge of Irun. This man while plying his -trade, continued for years, without being suspected, to count every -French soldier, that passed in or out of Spain by that passage, and -transmitted their numbers by the _chasse marées_ to Lisbon. - -With the exception of the state spy at Victor’s head-quarters, who -being a double traitor was infamous, all the persons thus employed -were very meritorious. The greater number, and the cleverest also, -were Spanish gentlemen, alcaldes, or poor men, who disdaining rewards -and disregarding danger, acted from a pure spirit of patriotism, and -are to be lauded alike for their boldness, their talent, and their -virtue. Many are dead. Fuentes was drowned in passing a river, on -one of his expeditions; and the alcalde of Caceres, a man, of the -clearest courage and patriotism, who expended his own property in the -cause, and spurned at remuneration, was on Ferdinand’s restoration -cast into a dungeon, where he perished; a victim to the unbounded -ingratitude and baseness of the monarch he had served so well! - -With such means lord Wellington did not despair of baffling the deep -policy of the emperor in the field. He thought that the saying of -Henry the Fourth of France, that “_large armies would starve and -small ones be beaten in Spain_,” was still applicable. He felt that -a solid possession of Portugal and her resources, which, through his -brother’s aid, he hoped to have, would enable him either to strike -partial blows against the French, or oblige them to concentrate in -large masses, which, confident in his own martial genius he felt he -could hold in check, while the Spaniards ruined the small posts, -and disorganized the civil administrations in their rear. Hitherto, -indeed, the Spaniards had not made any such efforts except by the -partidas, which were insufficient; but time, his own remonstrances, -and the palpable advantages of the system, he trusted would yet -teach them what to do. - -Having deeply meditated upon these matters and received his -reinforcements from England, he resolved to leave Hill with ten -thousand infantry, a division of cavalry, and four brigades of -artillery, about Portalegre, Villa Viciosa, and Estremos. From these -rich towns which were beyond the influence of the Guadiana fever, the -troops could rapidly concentrate either for an advance or retreat; -and the latter was secured upon Abrantes, or upon the communications -with Beira, by Niza, and Vilha Velha, where a permanent boat-bridge -had now been established. The front was protected by Elvas, -Jerumenha, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella; and Castaños also remained in -Estremadura with the fifth army, which by the return of the cavalry -from Ayamonte and the formation of Downie’s legion now amounted to -about a thousand infantry and nine hundred horse. This force placed -on the side of Montijo, had Albuquerque and Valencia de Alcantara -as posts of support, and a retreat either by the fords of the Tagus -near the bridge of Alcantara, or upon Portugal by Marvão and Castello -de Vide. Hill’s position was thus so well covered, that he could -not be surprised, nor even pressed except by a very strong army; -and he was always on the watch as we shall hereafter find, to make -incursions against the division of the fifth corps, which remained -in Estremadura. The rest of the army was then placed in quarters of -refreshment at Castello de Vide, Marvão and other places near the -Tagus, partly to avoid the Guadiana fever, partly to meet Marmont’s -movement to that river. - -When this disposition was made, the English general arranged his -other measures of offence. The conduct of the Portuguese government -and the new positions of the French armies had, as Napoleon had -foreseen, left him no means of undertaking any sustained operation; -but, as he was ignorant of the great strength of the army of the -north, he hoped to find an opportunity of taking Ciudad Rodrigo -before Marmont could come to its assistance. For this purpose he had -caused a fine train of iron battering guns, and mortars, together -with a reinforcement of British artillery-men, which had arrived at -Lisbon from England, to be shipped in large vessels, and then with -some ostentation made them sail as it were for Cadiz; at sea they -were however shifted on board small craft, and while the original -vessels actually arrived at Cadiz and Gibraltar, the guns were -secretly brought first to Oporto and then in boats to Lamego. During -this process, several engineer, artillery, and commissariat officers, -were sent to meet and transport these guns, and the necessary stores -for a siege, to Villaponte near Celerico; and as one of the principal -magazines of the army was at Lamego, and a constant intercourse was -kept up between it and Celerico, another great depôt, the arrival, -and passage of the guns and stores to their destination was not -likely to attract the attention of the French spies. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] - -Other combinations were also employed, both to deceive the enemy and -to prepare the means for a sudden attack, before the troops commenced -their march for Beira; but the hiding of such extensive preparations -from the French would have been scarcely possible, if the personal -hatred borne to the invaders by the peninsulars, combined with the -latter’s peculiar subtlety of character, had not prevented any -information spreading abroad, beyond the fact that artillery had -arrived at Oporto. The operation of bringing sixty-eight huge guns, -with proportionate stores, across nearly fifty miles of mountain, was -however one of no mean magnitude; five thousand draft bullocks were -required for the train alone, and above a thousand militia were for -several weeks employed merely to repair the road. - -[Sidenote: General Harvey’s Journal.] - -The allies broke up from the Caya the 21st of July, and they had -received considerable reinforcements, especially in cavalry, but -they were sickly and required a change of cantonments; hence when -an intercepted despatch gave reason to believe that Ciudad Rodrigo -was in want of provisions, Wellington suddenly crossed the Tagus -at Vilha Velha, and marched in the beginning of August by Castello -Branco and Penamacor towards Rodrigo, hoping to surprise it in a -starving state, but giving out that his movement was for the sake of -healthy quarters. His movement was unmolested save by some French -dragoons, from the side of Placentia, who captured a convoy of -seventy mules loaded with wine near Pedrogoa, and getting drunk with -their booty attacked some Portuguese infantry, who repulsed them -and recovered the mules; but there were other ostensible objects -besides the obvious one of removing from the well-known pestilence -of the Guadiana, which contributed to blind the French as to the -secret motives of the English general. We have seen that Dorsenne was -menacing Gallicia, and that Soult was in full operation against the -Murcians; it was supposed that he intended to invade Murcia itself, -and therefore the march of the allies had the double object, of -saving Gallicia, by menacing the rear of the invading army; and of -relieving Murcia by forcing Marmont to look after Ciudad Rodrigo, -and thus draw him away from the support of Soult, who would not, it -was supposed, then quit Andalusia. - -[Sidenote: General Walker’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Abadia’s ditto, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] - -Gallicia was meanwhile in great danger, for the Partidas of the north -had been vigorously repressed by Caffarelli and Reille, which enabled -Dorsenne to collect about twenty thousand men on the Esla. Abadia, -who had succeeded Santocildes, was posted with about seven thousand -disciplined men behind this river, and he had a reserve of fifteen -hundred at Foncebadon; but he could make no head, for to this number -the Gallician army had again dwindled, and these were starving. The -25th the French, having passed the river in four columns, made a -concentric march upon Astorga. Abadia, whose rear-guard sustained a -sharp conflict near La Baneza, retreated, precisely by the same line -as sir John Moore had done in 1809, and with about the same relative -proportion of force; but as he only took the Foncebadon road and -did not use the same diligence and skill as that general, the enemy -forestalling him by Manzanal and Bembibre, cut him off from Villa -Franca del Bierzo and from the road to Lugo, and on the 27th drove -him into the Val des Orres. During this operation the division of the -army of the north, which Bessieres had sent with the convoy to Ciudad -Rodrigo, entered that place and returned to Salamanca. - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The Spanish general having thus lost his line of communication with -Lugo, and the few stores he possessed at Villa Franca, took post -at Domingo Flores in the Val des Orres, where he entered a strong -country, and, under the worst circumstances, could retire upon -Portugal and save his troops if not his province. But his army which -was in the utmost distress before, for shoes and clothing, was now -ready to disband from misery, and the consternation in Gallicia was -excessive. That province torn by faction, stood helpless before the -invader, who could, and would, have taken both Coruña and Ferrol, but -for the sudden arrival of the allies on the Coa, which obliged him, -for his own safety, to return to the plains. Souham, also, who was -coming from Burgos, by forced marches, to support Dorsenne, halted at -Rio Seco, and Abadia did not fail to ascribe all this to the loss he -had inflicted, but his vanity was laughed at. - -To have thus saved Gallicia was a great thing. That kingdom was -the base of all the operations against the line of communication -with France; from thence went forth, those British squadrons which -nourished the guerilla warfare in Biscay, in the Montaña, in Navarre, -in the Rioja, and the Asturias; it was the chief resource for the -supply of cattle to the allied army, it was the outwork of Portugal, -and honestly and vigorously governed, would have been more important -than Catalonia. But like the rest of Spain it was always weak from -disorders, and, if the allies had remained in Alemtejo, there was -nothing to prevent Dorsenne from conquering it; for though he should -not have taken Ferrol and Coruña, the points of St. Jago, Lugo, Villa -Franca, and Orense would have given him an entire command of the -interior, and the Spaniards holding the ports only would not have -been able to dislodge him. - -[Sidenote: 1811. August.] - -Lord Wellington arrived upon the Coa about the 8th of August, -intending, as I have said, first a close blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, -and finally a siege; it was however soon known that the French had -on the 6th supplied the place for two months, and the first part -of the design was therefore relinquished. The troops were then -quartered near the sources of the Coa and Agueda, close to the line -of communication between Marmont and Dorsenne, and in a country where -there was still some corn. If the enemy advanced in superior numbers, -the army could retire through a strong country to a position of -battle near Sabugal, whence the communication with Hill was direct. -Nor was the rest of Beira left unprotected, because the French would -have exposed their left flank, by any advance in the direction of -Almeida, and the allies could, by Guarda, send detachments to the -valley of the Mondego in time to secure the magazines at Celerico. -The line of supply from Lamego along which the battering-train was -now moving, was however rather exposed. - -While the army was in this position, the preparations for the siege -went on briskly, until Wellington learned, contrary to his former -belief, that the disposable force of the army of the north, was above -twenty thousand good troops; and consequently, that Ciudad Rodrigo -could not be attacked in face of that corps, and of Marmont’s army. -Then changing his plan, he resolved to blockade the place, and wait -for some opportunity to strike a sudden blow, either against the -fortress, or against the enemy’s troops; for it was the foundation -of his hopes, that as the French could not long remain in masses, -for want of provisions, and that he could check those masses on the -frontier of Portugal, so he could always force them to concentrate, -or suffer the loss of some important post. But it is worthy of -observation, that his plans were based on calculations which did not -comprise the Gallician army. He had no expectation that it would -act at all, or if it did, that it would act effectually. It had no -cavalry, and the infantry being undisciplined dared not enter the -plains in face of the enemy’s horsemen; yet this was in August 1811, -and Gallicia had not seen the face of an enemy since June 1809! - -Early in September, Marmont, pushing a detachment from Placencia -through the passes, surprised a British cavalry piquet, at St. Martin -de Trebejo, and opened his communications with Dorsenne. Nevertheless -lord Wellington formed the blockade. His head-quarters were fixed at -Guinaldo, the fifth division was placed at Perales, in observation -of Marmont, and the first division, now commanded by general Graham, -occupied Penamacor. A battery of artillery, was withdrawn from -Hill, and three brigades of that general’s corps, reinforced by a -Portuguese regiment, passed the Tagus, and were placed on the Ponçul, -in advance of Castello Branco, to protect the magazines on that -line of communication. Meanwhile the battering-train was collected -at Villa de Ponte, the troops were employed to prepare gabions and -fascines, and the engineers instructed two hundred men of the line, -in the duties of sappers. The bridge over the Coa at Almeida which -had been broken by Massena, was permanently repaired, and the works -of Almeida itself, were ordered to be once more restored to form a -place of arms for the battering-train and stores; Carlos d’España -came also to Leon to form a new army under the protection of the -allies, but he was without officers, arms, money, or stores, and his -force was a mere name. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - -[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.] - -During the first arrangements, for the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, -the garrison made some excursions, to beat up the quarters of the -British cavalry, and to forage the villages; and some lancers -from Salamanca drove Julian Sanchez from Ledesma. Meanwhile in -Estremadura, Morillo chased the enemy from Caceres, and advancing -to Montanches, menaced Truxillo, but being beaten there by general -Foy, he returned to Montijo, where some French cavalry, arriving -from Zafra, again defeated him and drove him to Albuquerque. Other -military operations, worth relating, there were none, but the civil -transactions in Portugal were very important. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.] - -Mr. Stuart’s exertions had produced some improvement in the -Portuguese revenue; the ranks of the infantry were again filling -by the return of deserters, and by fresh recruits, which, with the -reinforcements from England had raised the actual number of the -allied army to upwards of eighty thousand men, fifty-six thousand -of which were British; the number under arms did not however exceed -twenty-four thousand Portuguese and thirty-three thousand British, -of whom five thousand were cavalry, with about ninety pieces of -artillery. The previous operations in Alemtejo had produced sickness, -which was increasing, and twenty-two thousand men were in hospital; -and hence, Hill’s corps being deducted, lord Wellington could not -bring to the blockade of Ciudad above forty-four thousand of all -arms, including Sanchez’s Partida. But Marmont, alone, could in -a few days bring as many to its succour, and Dorsenne always had -from twenty to twenty-five thousand men in hand; because the French -reinforcements had relieved the old garrisons in the north and the -latter had joined the army in the field. - -At this time the British military chest was quite bankrupt, even the -muleteers, upon whose fidelity and efficiency the war absolutely -depended, were six months in arrears for wages; and the disputes -with the Portuguese government were more acrimonious than ever. The -regency had proposed a new system of military regulations, calculated -to throw the burthen of feeding the native troops entirely upon -the British commissariat, without any reform of abuses, and lord -Wellington had rejected it, hence renewed violence; and as Beresford -had fallen sick at Cintra, Mr. Stuart deprived of his support on -military questions, and himself no longer a member of the regency, -was unable to restrain the triumphant faction of the Souzas. The -prince regent’s return to Portugal was prevented by troubles in -the Brazils, and the regency expecting a long hold of power, and -foolishly imagining that the war was no longer doubtful, were, after -the custom of all people who employ powerful auxiliaries, devising -how to get rid of the British army. With this view they objected to -or neglected every necessary measure, and made many absurd demands, -such as that the British general should pay the expenses of the -Portuguese post office; and at the same time they preferred various -vexatious, and unfounded charges against British officers, while -gross corruption, and oppression of the poorer people, marked the -conduct of their own magistrates. - -But the fate of Portugal, which to these people appeared fixed, -was in the eyes of the English general more doubtful than ever. -Intercepted letters gave reasons to believe that the emperor was -coming to Spain. And this notion was confirmed by the assembling -of an army of reserve in France, and by the formation of great -magazines at Burgos, and other places, to supply which, and to obtain -money, the French generals were exacting the fourth of the harvest, -and selling the overplus of corn again even by retail. Minute -reports of the state of these magazines were demanded by Napoleon; -reinforcements, especially of the imperial guards, were pouring into -Spain, and Wellington judging that the emperor must either drive the -British from the Peninsula, or lower his tone with the world, thought -that he would invade Portugal from the side of Rodrigo, the valley of -the Tagus, and Alemtejo at the same time; and that he would risk his -fleet in a combined attack upon Lisbon by sea and land. - -Whether Napoleon really meant this; or whether he only spread the -report, with a view to restrain the allies from any offensive -operations during the summer, and to mislead the English cabinet -as to the real state of his negotiations with Russia, intending if -the latter proved favourable to turn his whole force against the -Peninsula, does not very clearly appear; yet it is certain that every -thing in Spain at this time indicated his approach. Lord Wellington’s -opinion that the emperor was bound to drive the British army away or -lose his influence in the world does not however seem quite just; -because the mighty expedition to Moscow, proved, that Napoleon did -not want force to conquer Spain; and success in Russia would have -enabled him to prolong the war in the Peninsula as a drain on the -English resources for many years; which was so obvious a policy, -that the rest of Europe could not from thence draw conclusions -unfavourable to his influence. - -[Sidenote: Colonel Jones’s History of the Peninsular War.] - -Under the notion that Napoleon’s coming was probable, the English -general, with characteristic prudence, turned his own attention to -the security of his ancient refuge within the lines, and therefore -urgently desired the government to put the fortresses in order, -repair the roads, and restore the bridges broken during Massena’s -invasion. An increased number of workmen were also put to the lines, -for the engineers had never ceased to improve those on the northern -bank of the Tagus, and on the southern bank the double lines of -Almada had been continued on a gigantic scale. The defensive canal -there was planned to float ships of three hundred tons, and to serve -as a passage from the Tagus to Setuval by joining the navigation of -the Sadao and Marateca rivers; thus conducing to objects of general -utility as well as the military defence; as it will be found that -lord Wellington did at all times sustain, not only the political, -and financial, and military affairs, but also the agricultural, the -commercial, and charitable interests of Portugal. The batteries at -the mouth of the Tagus were likewise put into complete order, they -were provided with furnaces for heating shot, and captain Holloway -of the engineers, at a trifling expense, constructed four jetties at -St. Julian’s, in such an ingenious manner, that they withstood the -most tempestuous gales and secured the embarkation of the army in -any season. Finally the militia were again called out, a measure of -greater import, in the actual state of affairs, than would at first -appear; for the expense was a very heavy drain upon the finances, and -the number of hands thus taken away from agriculture was a serious -evil. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s correspondence with Lord Liverpool, MSS.] - -Had all these preparations been duly executed, lord Wellington -would not have feared even Napoleon; but all that depended upon -the Portuguese government, if that can be called government which -was but a faction, was, as usual, entirely neglected. The regency -refused to publish any proclamation to display the danger, or to -call upon the people to prepare for future efforts; and although the -ancient laws of Portugal provided the most ample means for meeting -such emergencies, the bridges over the Ceira, the Alva and other -rivers, on the line of retreat, were left unrepaired. The roads were -therefore impassable, and as the rainy season was coming on, the -safety of the army would have been seriously endangered if it had -been obliged to retire before the emperor. The regency pleaded want -of money, but this also could be traced to their own negligence in -the collection of the taxes, for which there was no solid reason; -because, with the exception of the devastated districts, the -people were actually richer than they had ever been, not indeed in -goods, but in hard cash, derived from the enormous sums expended -by the British army. To add to these embarrassments the secret -correspondents of the army on the side of Salamanca suddenly ceased -their communications, and it was at first feared they had paid -with their lives for the culpable indiscretion of the Portuguese -government; for the latter had published, in the Lisbon Gazette, all -the secret information sent to Silveira, which being copied into -the English newspapers, drew the enemy’s attention. Fortunately this -alarm proved false, but a sense of the other difficulties was greatly -aggravated to the English general, by comparison of his situation -with that of the enemy; neither necessity nor remuneration, could -procure for him due assistance from the Portuguese people, while the -French generals had merely to issue their orders to the Spaniards -through the prefects of the provinces, and all means of transport or -other succour, possible to be obtained, were sure to be provided on -the day and at the place indicated. - -In the midst of these cares lord Wellington was suddenly called -into military action by the approach of the enemy. Ciudad Rodrigo -having been blockaded for six weeks wanted food, and Marmont, who had -received a reinforcement of eleven thousand men from France, and had -now fifty thousand, present under arms, in the valley of the Tagus, -being in pain for the garrison, had concerted with Dorsenne a great -combined operation for its succour. In this view Truxillo had been -occupied by a part of the fifth corps, and Girard with the remainder -had advanced to Merida, while Foy, reinforced by a strong division of -the army of the centre, occupied Placentia. Marmont himself quitting -Talavera, had passed the mountains and collected a large convoy at -Bejar; at the same time Dorsenne reinforced by eight thousand men -under Souham, had collected another convoy at Salamanca, and leaving -Bonnet’s division, which now included Mayer’s troops, at Astorga, to -watch the Gallicians, came down to Tamames. They met on the 21st, -their united armies presenting a mass of sixty thousand men, of -which six thousand were cavalry; and they had above a hundred pieces -of artillery. - -The English general, who had expected this movement, immediately -concentrated his scattered troops. He could not fight beyond the -Agueda, but he did not think fit to retreat until he had seen their -whole army, lest a detachment should relieve the place to his -dishonour. Hence to make the enemy display his force, he established -himself in the following positions near the fortress. - -The third division, reinforced by three squadrons of German and -British cavalry, formed his centre. It was posted on the heights of -Elbodon and Pastores, on the left of the Agueda, and within three -miles of Ciudad, commanding a complete prospect of the plains round -that place. - -The right wing, composed of the light division, some squadrons of -cavalry, and six guns, was posted beyond the Agueda, and behind the -Vadillo, a river rising in the Peña de Francia, and flowing in a -rugged channel to the Agueda, which it joins about three miles above -Rodrigo; from this line an enemy coming from the eastern passes of -the hills could be discerned. - -The left wing, composed of the sixth division and Anson’s brigade of -cavalry, the whole under general Graham, was placed at Espeja, on -the lower Azava, with advanced posts at Carpio and Marialva. From -thence to Ciudad Rodrigo was about eight miles over a plain, and -on Graham’s left, Julian Sanchez’s Partida, nominally commanded by -Carlos d’España, was spread along the lower Agueda in observation. -The heads of the columns were therefore presented on three points to -the fortress; namely, at the ford of the Vadillo; and the heights of -Pastores and Espeja. The communication between the left and centre -was kept up by two brigades of heavy cavalry, posted on the Upper -Azava, and supported at Campillo by Pack’s Portuguese brigade. But -the left of the army was very distant from Guinaldo, which was the -pivot of operations, and to obviate the danger of making a flank -march in retreat, should the enemy advance, the seventh division -was placed in reserve at Alamedillo, and the first division at Nava -d’Aver. Thus the allied army was spread out on the different roads -which led, like the sticks of a fan, to one point on the Coa. - -The fifth division remained at St. Payo, watching the passes from -Estremadura, lest Foy should from that direction fall on the rear -of the right wing; and as Marmont’s movement affected the line of -communication along the eastern frontier, general Hill first sent -Hamilton’s Portuguese towards Alburquerque, to support the Spanish -cavalry, which was menaced by the fifth corps, and then brought the -remainder of his troops nearer to the Tagus, in readiness to take -the place of his third brigade, which now marched from the Ponçul to -Penamacor. - -Wellington’s position before Rodrigo was very extensive, and -therefore very weak. The Agueda, although fordable in many places -during fine weather, was liable to sudden freshes, and was on both -sides lined with high ridges. The heights, occupied by the troops, on -the left bank, were about three miles wide, ending rather abruptly -above Pastores and Elbodon, and they were flanked by the great -plains and woods, which extend from Ciudad to the bed of the Coa. -The position of Elbodon itself, which was held by the centre of -the army, was, therefore, not tenable against an enemy commanding -these plains; and as the wings were distant their lines of retreat -were liable to be cut, if the centre should be briskly pushed back -beyond Guinaldo. But, at the latter place, three field redoubts had -been constructed, on the high land, with a view to impose upon the -enemy, and so gain time to assemble and feel Marmont’s disposition -for a battle, because a retreat behind the Coa was to be avoided if -possible. - -On the 23d the French advanced from Tamames, and encamped behind the -hills to the north-east of Ciudad Rodrigo. Then a strong detachment -entered the plain, and having communicated with the garrison, and -examined the position of the light division on the Vadillo returned. - -The 24th, six thousand cavalry, with four divisions of infantry, -crossed the hills in two columns, and placing some troops in -observation on the Vadillo, introduced the convoy. On this day the -fourth division of the allies, was brought up to the position of -Guinaldo, and the redoubts were completed, yet no other change was -made, for it was thought the French would not advance further. But -the 25th, soon after daybreak, fourteen squadrons of the imperial -guards drove the outposts of the left wing from Carpio across the -Azava, and the lancers of Berg crossed that river in pursuit, they -were however flanked by some infantry in a wood, and then charged and -beaten by two squadrons of the fourteenth, and sixteenth, dragoons, -who reoccupied the post at Carpio. - -During this skirmish, fourteen battalions of infantry, thirty -squadrons of cavalry, and twelve guns, the whole under Montbrun, -passed the Agueda by the bridge of Rodrigo and the fords above it, -and marched towards Guinaldo. The road soon divided, one branch -turning the Elbodon heights on the right hand, the other leading -nearer to the Agueda, and passing through the villages of Pastores, -La Encina, and Elbodon; and as the point of divarication was covered -by a gentle ridge, it was for some time doubtful which branch -the French would follow. In a short time this doubt was decided. -Their cavalry poured along the right-hand road leading directly to -Guinaldo, the small advanced posts which the allied squadrons had on -the plain were rapidly driven in, and the enemy’s horsemen without -waiting for their infantry commenced the - - -COMBAT OF ELBODON. - -The position of the third division was completely turned by this -movement, and the action began very disadvantageously, for the -seventy-fourth and sixtieth regiments, being at Pastores, on the -right, were too distant to be called in, and Picton being with three -other regiments, at Elbodon, could not take any immediate part in -the fight. Hence, as the French force was considerable, Wellington -sent to Guinaldo for a brigade of the fourth division, and meanwhile -directed general Colville to draw up the seventy-seventh and fifth -British regiments, the twenty-first Portuguese, and two brigades -of artillery of the same nation, on the hill over which the road -to Guinaldo passed, supporting their flanks with Alten’s three -squadrons. The height, thus occupied by the allies, was convex -towards the enemy, and covered in front and on both flanks, by deep -ravines, but it was too extensive for their numbers; and before -Picton could bring in the troops from the village of Elbodon, the -crisis of the combat passed. The Portuguese guns had sent their shot -amongst the thickest of Montbrun’s horsemen in the plain, but the -latter passed the front ravine in half squadrons, and with amazing -vigour riding up the rough height, on three sides, fell vehemently -upon the allies. Neither the loose fire of the infantry, nor of -the artillery, could stop them, but they were checked by the fine -fighting of the cavalry, who charged the heads of the ascending -masses, not once but twenty times, and always with a good will, thus -maintaining the upper ground for above an hour. - -It was astonishing to see so few troopers bearing up against that -surging multitude, even favoured as the former were by the steep -rocky nature of the ground; but Montbrun obstinate to win soon -brought up his artillery, and his horsemen gaining ground in the -centre, cut down some of the gunners and captured the guns; and -one of the British squadrons by charging too far got entangled -in the intricacy of the ravines. The danger was then imminent, -when suddenly the fifth regiment, led by major Ridge, a daring -spirit, darted into the midst of the French cavalry, and retook -the artillery, which again opened its fire; and nearly at the same -time the seventy-seventh, supported by the twenty-first Portuguese, -repulsed the enemy on the left. However, this charging of a weak line -of infantry against a powerful cavalry, could only check the foe at -that particular point. Montbrun still pressed onwards with fresh -masses, against the left flank of the allies, while other squadrons -penetrated between the right flank and the village of Elbodon. From -the enclosures and vineyards of that village, Picton was at this time -with difficulty and some confusion extricating his regiments; the -expected brigade of the fourth division was not yet in sight, and the -French infantry was rapidly approaching: the position was no longer -tenable, and lord Wellington directed both Picton and Colville to -fall back and unite in the plain behind. - -Colville forming his battalions in two squares immediately descended -from the hill, but Picton had a considerable distance to move, and -at this moment, the allied squadrons, fearing to be surrounded by -the French, who had completely turned their right, galloped away, -and took refuge with the Portuguese regiment, which was farthest in -retreat. Then the fifth and seventy-seventh, two weak battalions -formed in one square, were quite exposed, and in an instant the -whole of the French cavalry came thundering down upon them. But how -vain, how fruitless to match the sword with the musket! To send the -charging horseman against the steadfast veteran! The multitudinous -squadrons, rending the skies with their shouts, and closing upon the -glowing squares, like the falling edges of a burning crater, were as -instantly rejected, scorched, and scattered abroad; and the rolling -peal of musketry had scarcely ceased to echo in the hills, when -bayonets glittered at the edge of the smoke, and with firm and even -step, the British regiments came forth like the holy men from the -Assyrian’s furnace. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 3._ - - EXPLANATORY SKETCH - of the - _OPERATIONS AND COMBAT_ - of - EL BODON. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._] - -Picton now effected his junction and the whole retired over -the plain to the position at Guinaldo, which was about six miles -distant. The French, although fearing to renew the close attack, -followed, and plied the troops with shot and shell, until about four -o’clock in the evening, when the entrenched camp was gained. Here -the fourth division presented a fresh front, Pack’s brigade came up -from Campillo, and the heavy cavalry from the Upper Azava, being also -brought into line, the action ceased. By this retrograde movement of -the left and centre of the third division, the seventy-fourth and the -sixtieth regiments, posted at Pastores, were cut off; they however -crossed the Agueda by a ford, and moving up the right bank happily -reached Guinaldo in the night, after a march of fifteen hours, in the -course of which they captured a French cavalry patrol. - -During the retreat from Elbodon, the left wing of the army was -ordered to fall back on the first division, at Nava d’Aver, but to -keep posts in observation on the Azava. Carlos d’España retired with -Sanchez’s infantry behind the Coa, and the guerilla chief himself -passed with his cavalry into the French rear. The seventh division -was withdrawn from Allemadilla to Albergaria, and the head-quarters -baggage moved to Casilla de Flores. The light division should have -marched to Guinaldo; general Craufurd received the order at two -o’clock, he plainly heard the cannonade, and might easily have -reached Guinaldo before midnight, but he only marched to Cespedosa, -one league from the Vadillo, which river was immediately passed -by fifteen hundred French. The position at Guinaldo was therefore -occupied by only fourteen thousand men, of which about two thousand -six hundred were cavalry. The left of the army, concentrated at Nava -d’Aver, under Graham, was ten miles distant; the light division being -at Cespedosa and debarred the direct route by the ford of Carros, was -sixteen miles distant, and the fifth division, posted at Payo in the -mountains, was twelve miles distant. Meanwhile Marmont brought up -a second division of infantry, and in the course of the night, and -the following day, united sixty thousand men in front of Guinaldo. -The situation of the English general was become most critical, yet -he would not abandon the light division, which did not arrive until -after three o’clock in the evening. Marmont’s fortune was fixed in -that hour! He knew nothing of the allies’ true situation, and having -detached a strong column by the valley of the Azava to menace their -left, contented himself with making an ostentatious display of the -imperial guards in the plain, instead of attacking an adversary who -was too weak to fight, and laughing to see him so employed, soon -changed the state of affairs. - -In the night, Wellington by a skilful concentric movement from -Guinaldo, Nava d’Aver, Perales, and Payo, united the whole army on -new ground, between the Coa and the sources of the Agueda, twelve -miles behind Guinaldo; and it is a curious fact that Marmont had so -little knowledge of his own advantages, that instead of harassing the -allies in this difficult movement, he also retired during the night, -and was actually in march to the rear, when the scouts of the column, -which had marched by the valley of Azava, brought word that the -allies were in retreat, and their divisions still widely separated. -Dorsenne then insisted that Marmont should wheel round and pursue, -but lord Wellington was already in a strong position behind the -stream of the Villa Maior. - -The fifth division, coming up from Payo, was now on the right at -Aldea Velha, the fourth and light divisions, with Victor Alten’s -cavalry, and the heavy dragoons, under sir Stapleton Cotton, were -in the centre in front of Alfayates; the convent of Sacaparte was -on their left, and the line was prolonged to Rebulon by Pack’s and -M‘Mahon’s Portuguese brigades; the sixth division with Anson’s -cavalry closed the line at Bismula. The cavalry picquets were pushed -beyond the Villa Maior in front of Aldea de Ponte, in the centre, and -towards Furcalhos on the right; and the third and seventh divisions -were in reserve behind Alfayates. This position was extensive, but -the days were short, serious dispositions were required for a general -attack, and the allies could not be turned, because they covered all -the practicable roads leading to the bridges and fords of the Coa. - - -COMBAT OF ALDEA DE PONTE. - -The French, moving by the roads of Furcalhos and of Aldea de Ponte, -were checked by the picquets of the light division on the former; but -on the latter their horsemen drove the cavalry posts from the hills, -and across the stream of the Villa Maior, and about ten o’clock took -possession of Aldea de Ponte. - -At twelve o’clock the head of the infantry came up and immediately -attacked general Pakenham, then commanding a brigade of the fourth -division, which was posted on the opposite heights. Lord Wellington -arrived at the same moment, and directed the seventh fuzileers to -charge in line, and he supported them on each flank with a Portuguese -regiment in column. The French, who had advanced well up the hill, -were driven back, and though they afterwards attempted to turn the -brigade by a wood, which was distant about musket-shot from the -right, while their cavalry advanced to the foot of the hills, the -artillery sufficed to baffle the effort. Then the English general -taking the offensive, directed the twenty-third fuzileers and -Portuguese caçadores to turn the French left, and seize the opposite -hills, which finished the action, and Aldea de Ponte was again -occupied by the allies. Wellington, who had been much exposed to -the fire, rode to another part of the position, but scarcely had he -departed when the French from the Forcalhos road joined those near -Aldea de Ponte, and at five o’clock renewing the attack retook the -village. Pakenham, with his fuzileers, immediately recovered it, but -the French were very numerous, the country rugged, and so wooded, -that he could not tell what was passing on the flanks, wherefore, -knowing that the chosen ground of battle was behind the Coa, he -abandoned Aldea de Ponte and regained his original post. - -In the night the allies retreated, and on the morning of the 28th -occupied a new and very strong position in front of the Coa, the -right resting on the Sierra de Mesas, the centre covered by the -village of Soita, the left at Rendo upon the Coa. The whole army thus -enclosed, as it were in a deep loop of the Coa river could only be -attacked on a narrow front, and Marmont, who had brought up but a -few days’ provisions and could gather none in that country, retired -the same day. This terminated the operations. The French placed a -fresh garrison in Ciudad Rodrigo; Dorsenne marched to Salamanca; a -strong division was posted at Alba de Tormes to communicate with -Marmont, and the latter resumed his old position in the valley of the -Tagus. At the same time Foy, who had advanced with his two divisions -as far as Zarza Mayor, in the direction of Castello Branco, returned -to Placentia; Girard also, being threatened by Hamilton’s Portuguese -division, which Hill had sent to check his advance, left two thousand -men of the fifth corps at Merida, and retired to Zafra; and when -these movements were known, the light division reinforced by some -cavalry resumed the nominal blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, in concert -with Julian Sanchez. The rest of the army was cantoned on both sides -of the Coa, and head-quarters were fixed at Frenada. - -[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes des François.] - -Nearly a month had been employed by the French in the preparation -and execution of this great operation, which terminated so feebly -and so abruptly, because the generals were as usual at variance. -They had victualled Ciudad Rodrigo, but they had lost the favourable -opportunity of invading Gallicia. Nothing had been gained in the -field, time was lost, and the English general’s plans were forwarded. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -[Sidenote: Londonderry’s Narrative.] - -[Sidenote: Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns] - -1º. Lord Wellington’s position behind Soita has been noticed by two -recent authors. The one condemns the imprudence of offering battle -on ground whence there was no retreat; the other intimates that it -was assumed in contempt of the adversary’s prowess. This last appears -a mere shift to evade what was not understood, for if lord Wellington -had despised Marmont, he would have fought him beyond the Agueda. But -sixty thousand French soldiers were never to be despised, neither -was Wellington a man to put an army in jeopardy from any overweening -confidence; and it is not difficult to show that his position was -chosen well, without imprudence, and without presumption. - -The space between the Sierra de Mesas and the Coa was less than six -miles, and the part open to attack was very much reduced by the -rugged bed of a torrent which covered the left. Forty thousand men -were quite able to defend this line, which was scarcely more than -one-third of their full front; and as the roads were bad, the country -hilly and much broken with woods and ravines, the superiority of the -enemy’s horse and guns would have availed him little. Lord Wellington -had a right to be bold against an adversary who had not molested him -at Guinaldo, and it is always of importance to show a menacing front. -It was also certain that great combinations must have been made by -Marmont, before he could fight a general battle on such ground; it -was equally certain that he could only have a few days’ provisions -with his army, and that the neighbourhood could not supply him. It -was, therefore, reasonable to expect that he would retire rather than -fight, and he did so. - -Let us however, take the other side, and suppose that Marmont was -prepared and resolute to bring on a great battle. The position behind -Soita would still have been good. The French were indeed too strong -to be fought with on a plain, yet not strong enough to warrant a -retreat indicating fear; hence the allies had retired slowly for -three days, each day engaged, and the enemy’s powerful horse and -artillery was always close upon their rear. Now the bed of the Coa, -which was extremely rugged, furnished only a few points for crossing, -of which the principal were, the ford of Serraleira behind the right -of the allies; the ford of Rapoulha de Coa behind their left; and the -bridge of Sabugal behind their centre. The ways to those points were -narrow, and the passage of the river, with all the baggage, could not -have been easily effected in face of an enemy without some loss and -perhaps dishonour: and had lord Wellington been unable to hold his -position in a battle, the difficulty of passing the river would not -have been very much increased, because his incumbrances would all -have been at the other side, and there was a second range of heights -half-a-mile in front of Sabugal favourable for a rear-guard. The -position of Soita appears therefore to have been chosen with good -judgment in regard to the immediate object of opposing the enemy; but -it is certain that the battering train, then between Pinhel and Villa -Ponte, was completely exposed to the enemy. Marmont, however, had not -sufficiently considered his enterprize, and knew not where or how to -strike. - -2º. The position of Aldea Ponte, was equally well chosen. Had the -allies retreated at once from Guinaldo, to Soita, baggage and -stores would have been lost, and the retrograde movement have had -the appearance of a flight; the road from Payo would have been -uncovered, and the junction of the fifth division endangered. But -in the position taken up, the points of junction of all the roads -were occupied, and as each point was strong in itself, it was not -difficult for a quick-sighted general, perfectly acquainted with -the country, and having excellent troops, to check the heads of the -enemy’s columns, until the baggage had gained a sufficient offing, -and the fifth division had taken its place in line. - -3º. The position at Guinaldo was very different from the others. The -previous entrenching of it proved lord Wellington’s foresight, and -he remained there thirty-six hours, that is, from mid-day of the -25th until midnight of the 26th, which proved his firmness. It is -said that sir George Murray advised him to abandon it in the night -of the 25th, and that arrangements were actually made in that view, -yet anxious for the safety of the light division he would not stir. -The object was certainly one of an importance sufficient to justify -the resolution, but the resolution itself was one of those daring -strokes of genius which the ordinary rules of art were never made to -controul. The position was contracted, of no great natural strength -in front, and easily to be turned; the entrenchments constructed were -only a few breast-works and two weak field redoubts, open in rear, -and without palisades; not more than fourteen thousand British and -Portuguese troops were in line, and sixty thousand French veterans -with a hundred pieces of artillery were before them! When Marmont -heard of the escape of the light division, and discovered the deceit, -he prophetically exclaimed, alluding to Napoleon’s fortune, “_And -Wellington’s star, it also is bright!_” - -4º. The positions of Aldea Ponte and Soita are to be commended, that -at Guinaldo to be admired rather than imitated, but the preceding -operations are censurable. The country immediately beyond Ciudad -Rodrigo offered no covering position for a siege or blockade; and -the sudden floods, to which the Agueda is subject, rendered the -communications with the left bank precarious. Nor though bridges had -been secured, could Wellington have ventured to encamp round the -place with lines of contravallation and circumvallation, on both -sides of the river; because Marmont’s army would then have advanced -from Placencia to Castello Branco, have seized the passage over the -Tagus at Vilha Velha, and in concert with the fifth corps endangered -the safety of Hill. This would have obliged the allies to quit their -entrenched camp, and Dorsenne could then have re-victualled the -place. It was therefore necessary to hold a strong central position -with respect to Marmont and Dorsenne, to keep both in check while -separate, and to oppose them when united. This position was on the -Coa, and as Salamanca or Bejar, the nearest points where convoys -could be collected for Ciudad Rodrigo, were from fifty to sixty miles -distant, lord Wellington’s object, namely the forcing the French to -assemble in large bodies without any adequate result, could be, and -was obtained by a distant as well as by a close investment. - -So far all was well calculated, but when Marmont and Dorsenne arrived -with sixty thousand men at Ciudad Rodrigo, the aspect of affairs -entirely changed, and as the English general could not dispute the -entrance of the convoy, he should have concentrated his army at -once behind Guinaldo. Instead of doing this he kept it extended on -a line of many miles and the right wing separated from the centre -by a difficult river. In his despatch, he says, that, from some -uncertainty in his estimate of the enemy’s numbers, it was necessary -to ascertain their exact strength by actual observation; but this is -rather an excuse than a valid reason, because, for this object, which -could be obtained by other means, he risked the loss of his whole -army, and violated two vital rules of war which forbid— - -1º. The parcelling of an army before a concentrated enemy. - -2º. The fixing of your own point of concentration within the enemy’s -reach. - -Now lord Wellington’s position on the 24th and 25th extended from -the ford of the Vadillo on the right of the Agueda, to Marialva -on the Azava; the distance either from the Vadillo, or Marialva, -to Guinaldo, was as great as that from Ciudad to Guinaldo, and by -worse roads; and the distance from Ciudad to Elbodon was as nothing, -compared to the distance of the wings from the same place. Wherefore -when Montbrun attacked, at Elbodon, the allies’ wings were cut off, -and the escape of the third and light divisions, and of the troops -at Pastores, was a matter of fortune and gallantry, rather than of -generalship; that is, in the enlarged sense of the last word, for -it cannot be denied that the actual movements of the troops were -conducted with consummate skill. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] - -But what if Marmont, instead of being drawn by circumstances into -a series of ill-combined, and partial attacks, had previously made -dispositions for a great battle? He certainly knew, through the -garrison, the real situation of the allies, and he also knew of -the camp at Guinaldo, which being on their line of retreat was the -important point. If he had issued from the fortress before daybreak -on the 25th with the whole or even half of his forces, he could -have reached Campillo in two hours with one column, while another -fell on the position at Pastores and Elbodon; the third division, -thus attacked, would have been enveloped and captured, or broken -and driven over the Agueda, by the ford of Zamara, and would have -been irretrievably separated from Guinaldo. And if this division -had even reached Guinaldo, the French army would have arrived with -it in such overwhelming numbers, that the fourth division could -not have restored the battle; meanwhile a few thousand men thrown -across the ford of Caros near Robleda would have sufficed to keep the -light division at bay, because the channel of the Robleda torrent, -over which their retreat lay, was a very deep and rugged ravine. -The centre being broken the French could, at choice, have either -surrounded the light division, or directed the mass of their forces -against the reserves, and then the left wing under Graham would have -had to retreat from the Azava over the plains towards Almeida. - -It may be said that all the French were not up on the 25th, but -they might have been so, and as lord Wellington was resolved to see -their number he would have been in the same position the 26th. It is -however sufficient to remark that the allies exclusive of the fifth -division, which was at Payo, did not exceed thirty-five thousand men -of all arms; that they were on an irregular line of at least twenty -miles, and mostly in an open country; that at no point were the -troops more than eight, and at the principal point, namely Pastores, -only three, miles, from a fortress from whence sixty thousand -infantry and six thousand cavalry, with one hundred and twenty guns -were ready to issue. Finally the point of concentration at Guinaldo -was only twelve miles from that fortress. The allies escaped because -their adversary was blind! Lord Wellington’s conduct at Guinaldo was -above rules, but at Elbodon it was against rules, which is just the -difference between genius and error. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] - -4º. In these operations Marmont gave proof that as a general he was -rather shining than great. He was in error throughout. Before he -commenced his march he had desired Girard to advance on the side of -the Alemtejo, assuring him that the whole of the allied army, and -even the Spanish troops under Castaños, had crossed the Tagus to -operate against Rodrigo; but in fact only one brigade of Hill’s corps -had moved, and Girard would have been destroyed, if, fortunately for -him, the allies had not intercepted the original and duplicate of the -letter containing this false information. - -5º. When Marmont brought his convoy into Ciudad, it would appear he -had no intention of fighting, but tempted by the false position of -the allies, and angry at the repulse of his cavalry on the Lower -Azava, he turned his scouting troops into columns of attack. And yet -he permitted his adversary to throw dust in his eyes for thirty-six -hours at Guinaldo; and at Aldea Ponte his attack was a useless waste -of men, because there was no local advantage offered, and he did not -intend a great battle. - -6º. The loss incurred in the different combats was not great. About -three hundred men and officers fell on the part of the allies, and on -that of the French rather more, because of the fire of the squares -and artillery at Elbodon. But the movements during the three days -were full of interest, and instruction, and diversified also by -brilliant examples of heroism. Ridge’s daring charge has been already -noticed, and it was in one of the cavalry encounters, that a French -officer in the act of striking at the gallant Felton Harvey of the -fourteenth dragoons, perceived that he had only one arm, and with a -rapid movement brought down his sword into a salute and passed on! -Such was the state of the war on the frontier of Portugal; in the -next book will be found the contemporary events in Spain. - - - - -BOOK XV. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -STATE OF THE WAR IN SPAIN. - - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] - -_Northern Provinces._ The invasion of Gallicia, which had been -arrested by the arrival of the allies on the Coa, would have been a -most serious calamity. Abadia, a weak man, with troops, distressed -for provisions and clothing, was on bad terms with the chief of his -staff Moscosa, whom he feared, and on worse terms with the junta. The -great road to Coruña was open, and although general Walker, seeing -the danger, advised that Ferrol, which was indefensible, should be -dismantled, and the guns, amounting to fifteen hundred, with the -timber and vessels of war in the harbour, transferred to Coruña, -neither that nor any other useful measure was executed. - -Before this, overtures had been made to the Spanish government, -to take Spanish troops into British pay after the manner of the -Portuguese; but the regency remembering the prodigality of Canning -demanded three millions yearly, besides arms and clothing, without -which they said the Spaniards could make no efficient exertions! To -introduce British officers into the service on any other terms was -not possible, because the Spanish military were indignant at what -they termed the degradation of such a proposal. The Perceval faction -finding it thus, and wanting greatness of mind to support Wellington, -on a scale commensurate with his talents, then turned their attention -to the encouragement of the Partidas, as being less expensive, and -affording an example to the continental nations of popular and -protracted resistance to France. - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Sir Howard Douglas, who succeeded general Walker as military agent, -(these officers must not be confounded with the military agents -originally sent out, and whose mischievous proceedings I have had -occasion to notice,) was directed to encourage those bodies by -increased supplies, and to combine their movements better with each -other and with the British squadron in the Bay of Biscay. Lord -Wellington at the desire of government, sent to the guerilla chiefs, -military presents, with a letter acknowledging the importance of -their services, and this was not mere compliment, for he had indeed -derived great advantages from their exertions, and thought he had -derived more, because he only knew of their exploits by hearsay. When -he afterwards advanced into Spain and saw them closely, he was forced -to acknowledge that the guerillas, although active and willing, and -although their operations in general occasioned the utmost annoyance -to the enemy, were so little disciplined that they could do nothing -against the French troops unless the latter were very inferior in -numbers. If the French took post in a house or church of which they -only barricadoed the entrance, both regular troops and guerillas were -so ill equipped as military bodies, that their enemy could remain in -security until relieved. In like manner Napoleon reprimanding his -generals for suffering the Partidas to gain any head, observed, that -when cut off from communication with the English ships they were a -nullity! - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Douglas arrived just as Dorsenne’s retreat enabled Abadia to resume -his position on the frontier, but the army was in a miserable -state; the wet season was setting in upon men, destitute of even -the necessaries of life, although the province abounded in cattle -and goods, which could be easily procured, because money, although -plentiful, was generally hoarded, and commodities were therefore -cheap, and could be obtained in lieu of taxes at the market-price. -An extraordinary increase of the customs, arising from the trade of -Santander and Bilbao being transferred to Coruña by the war, also -offered a valuable resource; the harbour was filled with colonial -goods, and as the appetites of men generally stifle patriotism, and -baffle power, a licensed commerce was carried on with the enemy’s -ports in Biscay; yet without judgment as related to the war, for the -return was iron, to re-export to the colonies, whereas by an internal -traffic of the same kind, clothes and grain for the troops might have -been had from Castile and Leon. But confusion and corruption every -where prevailed, the exigences of the war were always the last things -cared for, and the starving soldiers committed a thousand excesses -with impunity, for where there is no food or pay, there can be no -discipline. - -The people were oppressed with imposts, legal and illegal, and yet -the defalcation in the revenue was great, and the monopoly of tobacco -the principal financial resource, was injured by the smuggling -arising from the unsettled nature of the times. The annual charge -on the province was about £1,300,000, the actual receipts were less -than £500,000, and the junta endeavoured to supply the deficiency -by an extraordinary contribution from all property, save that of -day-labourers, which they expected would produce sixty millions of -reals (£750,000). But a corrupt and vexatious collection of this tax -tormented the people without filling the treasury; the clergy, and -the richer classes, were, as in Portugal, favoured, and it yielded, -in six months, less than a seventh part. - -From this state of affairs two inferences may be safely drawn:—1º. -That England and not Gallicia had hitherto supported the war here, as -in other parts of the Peninsula. 2º. That as England had in 1808-9 -paid to Gallicia three millions of hard dollars, and given other -succours sufficient for double the number of troops employed, the -deficiency of the revenue had been amply compensated, and the causes -of distress must be sought for in the proceedings of the authorities, -and in the anomalous nature of the war itself. The successive -juntas, apprehensive of offending the people, were always inert in -the civil administration, and either too corrupt, or too incapable, -to apply the succours from England, justly or wisely. The junta of -this period was, like its predecessors, factious and intriguing; it -was hostile to the junta of Leon, unfriendly to that of Asturias, -jealous and contemptuous of the military leaders; in return these -last abhorred the junta, and were tormented with factions of their -own. The regular officers hated the guerillas, and endeavoured to get -the controul of the succours granted, by England, to the latter; and -as they necessarily lived by plundering their own countrymen, they -strenuously opposed the arming of the peasants, partly from fear lest -the latter should resist this license, partly because the republican, -and anti-English spirit, which was growing up in the cortes had also -reached this quarter. - -The clergy clung to the peasantry, with whom they had great -influence, but the army, which had imbibed liberal words, rather than -principles, was inimical to them. A press had been established at -head-quarters, from whence issued political papers either original, -or repeated from the libels at Cadiz, in which, the Portuguese were -called slaves, for submitting to British influence; and it was openly -avowed that the French yoke was preferable to that of England; the -guerilla system, and the arming of the people were also attacked, -and these writings were met by other political papers from the civil -press at Coruña and St. Jago. The frequent changes of commanders -rendered all the evils more prominent; for the local government had -legal power to meddle with the military arrangements, and every -change of commander produced a new difficulty. Thus the junta refused -to acknowledge Abadia as their president during the absence of -Castaños, he in return complained alike of their neglect and of their -interference; and when they proposed to establish a general depôt at -Lugo he marched a part of his army there to prevent it. - -But the occult source of most of these difficulties is to be found in -the inconsistent attempts of the British cabinet, to uphold, national -independence with internal slavery, against foreign aggression, -with an ameliorated government. The clergy who led the mass of the -people, clung to the English, because they supported aristocracy and -church domination; and they were also strongly for the Partidas, -because these were commanded by men who sprung directly from the -church itself, or from people who were attached to the church, while -the regular armies being officered by the friends of the cortes, -disliked the Partidas, both as interlopers and as political enemies. -The English ministers, hating Napoleon, not because he was the enemy -of England, but because he was the champion of equality, cared not -for Spain, unless her people were enslaved. They were willing enough -to use a liberal cortes to defeat Napoleon, but they also desired to -put down that cortes, by the aid of the clergy, and of the bigoted -part of the people: nevertheless as liberty will always have more -charms than slavery, they would have missed of both objects, if the -exigences of the continental system had not induced the emperor to go -to Moscow, where the snow destroyed him; and if the very advocates -of liberty in Spain had not in their madness, resolved to oppress -the Americans. The cortes, by discovering a rabid love of power in -practice, rendered their democratic doctrines suspected, and lost -partizans; but lord Wellington, in support of aristocracy, used the -greatest prudence in policy, and in his actions was considerate and -just. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.] - -In the first conference held at Coruña, after sir Howard Douglas’s -arrival, the junta, as the usual preliminary, demanded more money -from England; but he advised, instead, a better management of their -own resources, and pointed out the military measures requisite to -render the army efficient. He recommended the adoption of the line -of retreat upon Orense, rather than upon Lugo and Coruña; and he -endeavoured to establish a permanent depôt in the island of Arosa, -on the Vigo coast, as a secure resource in the event of defeat; he -also furnished the soldiers with shoes and great-coats, the hospitals -with blankets, and completed the firelocks of the army to twenty-five -thousand. There were however abuses, which he could not remedy, and -which would seem rather to belong to the army of an Asiatic despot, -than to an European force fighting for independence. Innumerable -baggage animals devoured all the forage, and the personal servants -and cooks, who from custom never did duty, were above five thousand! -a sixth part of the whole force! When the sick men were deducted, -scarcely sixteen thousand infantry and three squadrons of cavalry -remained for service. Then there was so little organization or -arrangement that, although young, robust, patient, and docile to the -greatest degree, the troops could scarcely be moved, even from one -quarter to another, as a military body; and the generals, unable to -feed them on the frontier, more than once, menaced, and in December -did actually retire to Lugo, leaving the province open to invasion. - -Abadia at first exerted himself with activity, and appeared to enter -loyally into the ameliorations proposed. He gave the command of the -troops to Portasgo, repaired to Coruña himself, and organized the -province in seven military governments, under as many chiefs, one for -each division of the army. Every government was to raise a reserve, -and to supply and clothe the corresponding division on the frontier. -But in a little time this activity relaxed; he entered into various -intrigues, displayed jealousy, both of the peasantry and the English, -and no real improvement took place, save in that select part of the -army, which the Cadiz regency had destined for South America, and had -ordered him to equip from the English stores. This was done at the -very moment when a French army on the frontier was again preparing -to invade Gallicia, and sir Howard Douglas vehemently opposed the -disloyal proceeding; the junta also were really averse to it, and -Abadia pretended to be so; but he had a personal interest in the -colonies and secretly forwarded the preparations. The regency, to -evade Mr. Wellesley’s reproaches, promised to suspend the embarkation -of these troops, but the expedition sailed from Vigo, and the -organization of another, three times its strength, including all -the best artillery in the province, was immediately commenced, and -also sailed a few months later. This then was the state of Gallicia -in the latter end of 1811. She was without magazines, hospitals, or -system, whether civil or military, and torn by faction, her people -were oppressed, her governors foolish, her generals bad: she had no -cavalry, and the infantry were starving, although the province easily -supplied cattle for the allies in Portugal. As a natural consequence, -those famished soldiers were too undisciplined to descend into the -plains of Leon, and were consequently of little weight in the general -contest. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -Under these circumstances, sir Howard Douglas had nothing to work -upon, save the Guerilla leaders, whose activity he very considerably -increased. His policy was to augment the number of chiefs, but to -keep the force of each low, lest, growing proud of their command, -they should consider themselves generals, and become useless, as -indeed had already happened to Campillo, Longa, and Porlier, when -they were made a part of the seventh army. Nevertheless the advantage -of this policy may be doubted, for of all the numerous bands in the -north, seven only were not supported entirely by robbery. Mina, -Pastor, Salazar, Pinto, Amor, and the curate, whose united forces -did not exceed ten thousand men, were sustained by regular taxes, -customs, convent revenues, and donations; Longa supported his -from the produce of the salt-mines of Paza, but all the rest were -bandits, whose extinction was one of the advantages expected from the -formation of the seventh army. - -It is now convenient to resume the narrative of military events. - -In the Asturias, previous to Mendizabal’s arrival, and when Bonet had -marched to the Orbijo, Porlier surprised Santander, and plundered -some houses; but being followed by general Caucault, a very active -officer, he retired again to his strong-hold of Liebana. The British -cruizers, in concert with whom he acted, then destroyed several -coast-batteries, and the Iris frigate having arms on board, came to -the Bay of Biscay for the purpose of arranging an intercourse with -the Partidas of that province. But this was the period when Reille -and Caffarelli, were, as I have before noticed, chasing Mina and -Longa, whom they drove from the coast, into the mountains of Leon, -and thus marred the object of the Iris. Nevertheless, when Mina was -reinforced by the Valencians and other fugitives from Catalonia, he -returned to Navarre, and there performed very considerable exploits, -which, as belonging to other combinations of the war, will be -hereafter noticed. - -While Caffarelli and Reille thus scoured the line of communication, -Dorsenne having the invasion of Gallicia in view, relieved Bonet -on the Esla, and sent him early in November, with eight thousand -men to re-occupy the Asturias as a preliminary measure. The -Gallicians foreseeing this, had detached Moscoso with three thousand -five hundred men to reinforce San Pol, who was at Pagares, below -the passes leading from Leon; and on the other hand Mendizabal -uniting the bands of Porlier and other chiefs, concentrated five -thousand men to the eastward on the Xalon. Eleven thousand men were -therefore ready to oppose the entrance of Bonet, but with the usual -improvidence of the Spaniards, the passes of Cubillas and Ventana, to -the westward of Pagares, were left unguarded. By these roads, Bonet, -an excellent officer, turned Moscoso, and drove him down the Lena -with loss and disgrace; then turning upon Mendizabal, he chased him -also in disorder from Lanes into the Liebana. - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -All the civil authorities immediately fled to Castropol, the Spanish -magazines fell into the hands of the French, and Bonet having -resumed his old positions at Oviedo, Gihon, and Grado, fortified -several posts in the passes leading to Leon, raised contributions, -and effectually ruined all the military resources of the Asturias. -The organization of the seventh army was thus for the time crushed, -and in Gallicia great mischief ensued. For the return of Moscoso’s -division and the want of provisions in the Bierzo, which had obliged -Abadia to retire to Lugo, while Dorsenne was menacing the frontier, -had thrown that kingdom into a ferment, which was increased by the -imposition of the new contributions. The people became exceedingly -exasperated and so unfavourably disposed, that it was common to hear -them say, “the exactions of a French army were a relief in comparison -to the depredations of the Spanish troops.” - -During these transactions in the north, Drouet had joined Girard at -Merida, and menaced the allies in the Alemtejo, hoping thus to draw -Wellington from the Coa; but the demonstration was too feeble, and -the English general thought it sufficient to reinforce Hill with his -own brigade from Castello Branco. These movements were undoubtedly -part of a grand plan for invading Portugal, if the emperor could have -arranged his affairs peaceably with Russia. For to move once more -against Lisbon, by Massena’s route, was not promising, unless the -northern provinces of Portugal were likewise invaded, which required -the preliminary occupation of Gallicia, at least of the interior. In -the south also, it was advisable to invade Alemtejo, simultaneously -with Beira; and the occupation of Valencia and Murcia was necessary -to protect Andalusia during the operation. The plan was vast, -dangerous, and ready for execution; for though the wet season had set -in, an attack on the northern parts of Portugal, and the invasion -of Gallicia, were openly talked of in Dorsenne’s army, Caffarelli -was to join in the expedition, and Monthion’s reserve, which was to -replace Caffarelli’s on the line of communication, was already six -thousand strong. Ney or Oudinot were spoken of to command the whole, -and a strong division was already in march to reinforce the army of -the south, arrangements which could have reference only to Napoleon’s -arrival; but the Russian war soon baulked the project, and -Wellington’s operations, to be hereafter noticed, obliged Dorsenne to -relinquish the invasion of Gallicia, and caused Bonet once more to -abandon the Asturias. - -Thus, with various turns of fortune, the war was managed in the -northern provinces, and no great success attended the French arms, -because the English general was always at hand to remedy the faults -of the Spaniards. It was not so on the eastern line of invasion. -There Suchet, meeting with no opponent capable of resisting him, -had continued his career of victory, and the insufficiency of the -Spaniards to save their own country was made manifest; but these -things shall be clearly shewn in the next chapter, which will treat -of the conquest of Valencia. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -CONQUEST OF VALENCIA. - - -[Sidenote: 1811. August.] - -In August, and the beginning of September, Suchet, while preparing -for this great enterprise, had dispersed the bands of Villa Campa -and the other chiefs, who during the siege of Taragona vexed Aragon. -He had sent his feeble soldiers to France, receiving conscripts in -their places, and although the harvest was very bad, formed large -magazines in Morella and Tortoza. Eight thousand men had been left -in Catalonia under general Frere, another eight thousand were placed -under general Musnier, to protect Aragon, and twenty-four thousand -of all arms remained for the invasion of Valencia, but this force -Suchet thought inadequate, and demanded a reinforcement from the army -of reserve, then in Navarre. Napoleon, whose system of war, whatever -has been said to the contrary, was eminently methodical, refused. -He loved better to try a bold push, at a distant point, with a few -men, than to make an overwhelming attack, if he thereby weakened his -communications; he judged courage and enterprise fittest for the -attack, prudence and force for the support. And yet he designed to -aid Suchet’s operations vigorously when the decisive blow could be -struck. Then not only the divisions of the reserve were to march, -but combined movements, of detachments from nearly all the armies in -the Peninsula, were arranged; and we shall find, that if Wellington, -by menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, saved Gallicia, the French army of the -north, in return, by menacing Gallicia, fixed the allies on the -Agueda, and so protected Suchet’s invasion of Valencia. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.] - -Three roads led to the Guadalaviar, one from Tortoza by the -sea-coast, one by Teruel and Segorbe, and one by Morella and San -Mateo. That from Tortoza, and that by Teruel, were carriage-roads, -but the first only was fit for heavy artillery, and it was blocked, -partially by the fortress of Peniscola, and completed by the fort -of Oropesa. Wherefore, though the infantry and cavalry could move -on a bye-road to the right, the convoys and the guns, which were at -Tortoza, could not pass until Oropesa was reduced. Nevertheless the -French general, well knowing the value of boldness in war, resolved -to mask Peniscola, to avoid Oropesa, to send his field artillery by -Teruel, and uniting his troops near Saguntum, to offer battle to -Blake; and if the latter declined it, to reduce Oropesa and Saguntum, -trusting for subsistence to the “_huerta_” or garden of Valencia, -until the arrival of his convoys. - -He had, however, organized his system of supply with care. From -Morella and Tortoza, brigades of mules, after the manner adopted in -the British army, were to carry provisions to the troops, and sheep -and cattle were delivered to each regiment for its subsistence in -advance. This last plan, which sir John Moore had also projected in -his campaign, Suchet found advantageous; and I am persuaded that -the principle should be extended, so that all things requisite -for the subsistence, and fighting of troops should be organized -regimentally, and the persons employed wear the uniform of their -different corps. Jealousies between the functionaries, of different -branches of the service, would then be unknown; and the character -of all subordinate persons, being under the guardianship of the -battalions to which they belonged, would be equally praiseworthy, -which cannot now be said. - -[Sidenote: Capt. Codrington’s papers, MSS.] - -While Suchet was thus gathering his strength, Valencia was a prey -to disorder. About the period of the siege of Taragona, Palacios, -notwithstanding his high monarchical principles, which caused him to -be dismissed from the regency, had been appointed captain-general -of Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon; and he immediately raised a strong -party amongst the friars and other opponents of the cortes. When -after the dispersion of the Murcian army at Baza, Blake had rallied -the fugitives, and in virtue of his power as regent, assumed the -chief command at Valencia, Palacios’ faction opposed him, and -endeavoured to draw the soldiers and the populace to their side, -by proposing to inundate the plain of Murviedro, and to defend the -strong country in advance. Blake, however, resolved to act on the -flanks of the French army by detachments, and, in this view, sent C. -O’Donnel, with the divisions of Obispo and Villa Campa, to Albaracin, -supporting them with four thousand men at Segorbe and Liria. He -charged Mahy, who commanded five thousand infantry, and seven hundred -cavalry of the Murcian army, to surprise the French detachment of the -army of the centre, posted at Cuença. He detached Bassecour with two -thousand men to Requeña, and the same time, directed Duran and the -Empecinado, to unite, and invade Aragon; and it was to aid in this -expedition that Mina quitted the mountains of Leon. - -[Sidenote: Roche, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Tupper, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Wellesley, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Doyle, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 3.] - -Blake had, exclusive of Mahy’s and Bassecour’s divisions, about -twenty thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. Three thousand -five hundred men were placed in Saguntum, which was provisioned for -three months; two hundred were in Oropesa, and fifteen hundred in -Peniscola; and there were so many Partidas, that the whole country -seemed to be in arms, but the assembling of these people being very -uncertain, Blake could not depend upon having a permanent partizan -force, of more than eight thousand. The Valencian army contained the -Albuera divisions, St. Juan’s, Miranda’s, and Villa Campa’s veterans; -it was therefore, not only numerous, but the best Spain had yet -produced; and Valencia itself was exceedingly rich in all things -necessary for its supply: but there was no real power, the building, -though fair enough outside, had the dry rot within. The French had -many secret friends, faction was as usual at work, the populace were -not favourable to Blake, and that general had rather collected than -organized his forces, and was quite incapable of leading them. He was -unpopular, both at Cadiz and Valencia, and the regency of which he -formed a part was tottering. The Cortes had quashed Mahy’s command -of the Murcian army, and even recalled Blake himself; but the order, -which did not reach him until he was engaged with Suchet, was not -obeyed. Meanwhile that part of the Murcian army, which should have -formed a reserve, after Mahy’s division had marched for Cuença, fell -into the greatest disorder: above eight thousand men deserted in a -few weeks, and those who remained were exceedingly dispirited. Thus -all interest became concentrated in the city of Valencia; which was -in fact the key of all the eastern coast because Carthagena required -an army to defend it, and could only be fed from Valencia, and -Alicant was then quite defenceless. - -[Sidenote: Suchet.] - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -It was in this state of affairs, that Suchet commenced the invasion. -His army was divided into three columns, and, on the 15th of -September one moved by the coast-road, one by Morella and San Mateo, -and one by Teruel, where an intermediate magazine was established; -but this latter column instead of proceeding directly to Segorbe, -turned off to its left, and passed over the Sierra de Gudar to -Castellon de la Plana, where the whole three were united on the 20th. -The main column, commanded by Suchet in person, had masked Peniscola -on the 15th, and invested Oropesa by a detachment on the 19th; but as -the road run directly under the fire of the last place, the main body -moved by the rugged route of Cabanes to Villa Franca, leaving the -battering-train still at Tortoza. - -[Sidenote: Roche, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Tupper, MSS.] - -During these operations Blake appeared inclined to fight, for he -brought Zayas up in front of Murviedro, and called in Obispo; Mahy, -who had done nothing on the side of Cuença, was also in march to join -him; but all these divisions marched slowly, and with confusion; and -a slight skirmish at Almansora, on the Mingares, where a few French -dragoons put a great body of Spanish infantry to flight, made Blake -doubt the firmness of his troops. He therefore left O’Donnel with -four thousand men on the side of Segorbe, and then retired himself -with fifteen thousand behind the Guadalaviar. Valencia was thus -thrown into great confusion, but Bassecour’s division was at hand, -and Suchet fearing to attack so large an army in an entrenched camp -(which had cost two years to construct), while his own communication -with Tortoza was intercepted, merely dispersed the armed peasants -which had assembled on his flank, and then turned against Murviedro. - - -SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM. - -This celebrated place, situated about four leagues from Valencia, was -a rocky mountain, covered with the ruins of the ancient city, and -the remains of Moorish towers and walls, which being connected by -modern works, formed four distinct posts covering the whole summit -of the rock: but in consequence of the usual Spanish procrastination -the heavy guns prepared to arm it were not yet mounted, and only -seventeen pieces of inferior size were available for defence. The -modern town of Murviedro, situated at the foot of the rock, was -covered by the river Palancia, and by a canal, and occupied by some -Spanish picquets; but the 23d Habert, having passed the water, -invested the rock on the east, while Harispe invested it on the -west and south, and a third division drove the Spanish posts from -Murviedro and entrenched itself in the houses. The rest of the -army was disposed in villages, on the hills to the north-west, and -patroles were pushed towards Valencia. Thus the rock of Saguntum -was invested, but it was inaccessible to the engineer, save on the -west, where the ascent, although practicable, was very rough and -difficult. It would have been impregnable, if the Spaniards had -mounted their large guns; for the French were obliged to bring earth -from a distance, to form the batteries and parallels, and to set the -miner to level the approaches, and their parapets were too thin to -withstand heavy shot. - -The first point of resistance was an ancient tower called San Pedro, -and immediately above it was the fort of San Fernando, which could -not be attacked until San Pedro fell, and, from its height, then -only by the miner. But near the eastern extremity of the rock, there -were two ancient breaches which the Spaniards were still engaged -repairing, and had only stopped with timber; a large tank offered -cover for the assembling of troops close to these breaches, and -Suchet resolved to try an escalade. To effect this, three columns -were assembled before daybreak on the 28th in the tank, a strong -reserve was held in support, and a false attack was directed against -the San Pedro to distract the attention of the besieged: but in -the previous part of the night, the Spaniards having sallied were -repulsed, and the action having excited both sides, a French soldier -fired from the tank before the appointed time, whereupon the columns -rushing forward, in disorder, planted their ladders, and the garrison -would have carried the place by noise, but the garrison thrust the -ladders from the walls, and drove the stormers back, with the loss -of three hundred men. After this check, as the artillery was still -at Tortoza, Suchet ordered a part of his army to attack Oropesa, -employed another part in making a road, for the guns, to reach the -battery raised against the tower of San Pedro, and then turned his -own attention to the movements of Blake. - -That general following his first plan of action against the French -flanks, had during the investment of Saguntum, sent C. O’Donnel -with Villa Campa’s division and St. Juan’s cavalry, to Betera, and -Beneguazil, and Obispo’s division to Segorbe; thus forming a half -circle round the French army, and cutting its communication with -Teruel, near which place Mahy had by this time arrived. Suchet -however caused Palombini to attack Obispo, whose whole division -dispersed after a skirmish with the advanced guard, and the Italians -then returned to the siege. The next night Harispe marched against -O’Donnel, who was well posted at Beneguazil behind a canal, having -his centre protected by a chapel and some houses; nevertheless the -Spaniards were beaten with loss at the first shock, and fled in -disorder over the Guadalaviar. During these events Blake remained an -idle spectator of the defeat of his division, although he had a large -body of troops in hand, and was within a few miles of the field of -battle. - -[Sidenote: 1811. October.] - -The French train now advanced from Tortoza, and four pieces were -placed in battery against Oropesa. On the 10th Suchet took the -direction of the attack in person, and the fort situated upon an -isolated rock, was breached in a few hours; but the garrison of the -King’s Tower (a separate work placed on a small promontory, and -commanding the harbour) refused to surrender, and was carried off, -on the 11th, under the French fire, by the Magnificent. The French -general having thus with a loss of only thirty men opened the road -for his artillery, returned to Saguntum and pushed the siege of -that place; but the difficulties were very great, the formation of -the road to the batteries was itself a work of pain, and although -his indefatigable troops had formed a breaching battery on the -12th, while seven small mortars and howitzers, placed on the right -and left, had nearly silenced the Spanish fire, the muskets of the -besiegers alone brought down from fifteen to twenty men. - -On the 17th the breaching battery being armed, opened its fire -against the tower, and the new masonry crumbled away at once; yet -the ancient work resisted the guns like a rock. On the 18th the fire -recommenced, when the wall gave way to the stroke of the guns, and -the assault was ordered; but from the height of the tower, which -overlooked the works at a short distance, the preparations were -early discovered, the Spaniards collecting on the breach repaired -it with sand-bags, and regardless of the French fire, with loud -cries provoked the attack. At five o’clock, four hundred men rushed -forward as swiftly as the steepness of the ascent would permit. Soon, -however, the head of the column was checked, the rear began to fire, -the whole got into confusion, and when one-half had fallen without -making the slightest impression on the defenders, the attempt was -abandoned. After this signal failure the French erected a second -battery of six pieces, one hundred and forty yards from the tower, -and endeavoured to push the approach close to the foot of the breach, -yet the plunging fire of the besieged baffled them; meanwhile -Andriani the governor, having communication by signal with the ships -in the Grao, was encouraged to continue his gallant defence, and was -informed that he was already promoted for what he had done. But to -understand Suchet’s embarrassments, from the protracted resistance of -Saguntum, we must take a view of Lacy’s contemporary operations in -Catalonia, and the proceedings of the Partidas against the French -communications and posts in Aragon. - - -CATALONIA. - -[Sidenote: August.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 2.] - -It will be recollected that the blockade of Figueiras produced -sickness in M‘Donald’s army, and that the return of Suchet to -Aragon, and the parcelling of his troops on the lines, from Lerida -to Montserrat, Tortoza, and Taragona, had completely extinguished -the French power in the field; because the divisions of the army of -Aragon which still remained in Lower Catalonia, being destined for -the enterprize against Valencia, could not be employed in harassing -expeditions. Lacy was therefore enabled, notwithstanding the troubles -which followed the fall of Taragona, to reorganize about eight -thousand men in two divisions, the one under Eroles, the other under -Sarsfield; the junta also called out the tercios of reserve, and arms -and ammunition being supplied by the English navy, Lacy was soon in a -condition to act offensively. Thus the taking of Montserrat was very -injurious to the French, for it is generally supposed that Friere’s -division, if held together in the field, would have prevented this -reaction in the principality. Lacy at first suggested to the British -navy the recapture of the Medas Islands, and it was effected in the -latter end of August, by the Undaunted, Lavinia, and Blossom, aided -by a small party of Spaniards, the whole under the command of captain -Thomas. The enterprise itself was one of more labour than danger, -and the Spanish allies were of little use, but the naval officers -to whose exertions the success was entirely due, were indignant at -finding that colonel Green, who served as a volunteer, endeavoured to -raise his own reputation with the Catalans by injuring the character -of those under whom he served. - -[Sidenote: Memoir upon Busa, by Capt. Zeupfinning, MSS.] - -Immediately after the fall of Montserrat, Lacy and the junta had -proposed the fortifying of Palamos or Blanes, to be held as a marine -depôt and strong-hold, in common with the British navy, but with a -strange folly expected that sir E. Pellew, who had no troops, would -defend them from the enemy while establishing this post. Finding this -scheme received coldly by the admiral, they turned their attention -inland, and blowing up the works of Berga, fixed upon the position -of Busa, as a place of strength and refuge. This remarkable rock -which is situated between the Cardener and Bindasaes rivers and about -twenty miles from Cardona could be reached by one road only, and that -a very rugged one. The rock itself fourteen miles in circumference, -healthy and full of springs, is fertile, and produces abundance -of forage, and fuel. It is cut off from the rest of the world by -frightful precipices, and could neither be forced, nor starved into -a surrender. Busa, Cardona, Solsona, and Seu d’Urgel were therefore -guarded by the tercios of reserve and Lacy soon commenced offensive -excursions with the regular army, against the long lines of the -French communication. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.] - -In September while the Somatenes interrupted the passage of the -convoys to Montserrat, Eroles made an unsuccessful attack on the fort -of Moncada near Barcelona; Lacy who had returned from an incursion -in the French Cerdaña where he had gathered some booty, then united -Eroles and Sarsfield’s troops, and surprised the town of Igualada, -where he killed two hundred French, but not daring to attack the -castle retired to Calaf, and from thence again detached Eroles to -Jorbas, to attack a French convoy coming to Igualada. Eroles beat -the escort, and captured the convoy, and then the French quitted the -fortified convent of Igualada, and joined the garrison of Montserrat, -when the whole, fearful of being invested and so starved, abandoned -that important point, and marched through Barcelona to Taragona; the -Spaniards immediately occupied Montserrat, and recovered a large -store of clothing and cavalry equipments, which had been hidden -in a vault and were undiscovered by the enemy. Eroles, pursuing -his success, forced the garrisons of Belpuig, and Cervera, about -five hundred in all, to surrender, and thus the whole line of -communication, between Lerida and Barcelona, fell into the power of -the Catalonians. The confidence of the people then revived; Sarsfield -occupied Granollers, and the passes leading into the valley of Vich; -Manso and Rovira menaced the Ampurdan; and Eroles suddenly passing by -Seu d’Urgel into the Cerdaña, defeated, at Puigcerda, some national -guards commanded by general Gareau, who had been sent there after -Lacy’s invasion. He afterwards raised large contributions on the -frontier, burnt a French town, and returning with his spoil by the -way of Ribas, and Ripol, took post in the pass of Garriga, while -Milans occupied Mataro, and both watched to intercept a convoy which -M‘Donald was preparing for Barcelona. - -Sarsfield at the same time embarked his division and sailed to the -coast of the Ampurdan, but the weather would not permit him to land. -Nevertheless the attention of the French general was distracted, and -the convoy did not move. Lacy then recalled Sarsfield, and projected -the surprise of Barcelona itself, but after putting his troops in -march, feared the execution and relinquished the attempt. Meanwhile -one swarm of the smaller Partidas menaced the French communication -between Mequinenza and Tortoza, and another swarm settled on the -plains about Lerida. - -The state of Aragon was equally alarming. Duran and the Empecinado -had received Blake’s orders to unite near Cuença, for the purpose of -invading Aragon; but the secret junta of the district were averse to -the plan, and the troops of the latter chief refused to move, and -even came to blows with the junta’s people. In this confusion general -d’Armanac, who had retired from Cuença, returned, and dispersed -the whole. The Empecinado however collected them again, and having -joined Duran, their united powers being about six thousand infantry -and two thousand five hundred horse, moved against Calatayud; Mina -also acting in concert with them, quitted the mountains of Leon -and entered Navarre with about five thousand men, and some minor -partisans were already acting against different parts of Aragon. -The whole were in want of clothing and ammunition, but Mr. Tupper, -the consul at Valencia, having safe means of communication with the -interior supplied them. - -General Musnier’s force was so scattered that he could not fight -either of the large Partidas, without exposing some important -point to the other, and the 29th of September the Empecinado took -possession of the pass of Frasno, while Duran invested the fortified -convent of Calatayud. This place was garrisoned by some French and -Italian troops, who differed upon the defence, and when the explosion -of two mines had killed a number of them they surrendered. Musnier -collected some men to succour the place, but unable to force the -pass of Frasno, retired; yet being reinforced on the 5th, he again -advanced, and a column sent from Navarre by general Reille also came -up; whereupon the Spaniards disappeared until the French retired, and -then reoccupied Calatayud. They were now in full communication with -Mina and a general plan of invasion was discussed, but as Duran and -Mina could not accord each acted separately. - -[Sidenote: 1811. October.] - -Severoli’s division eight thousand strong and just arrived from -Italy, then reinforced Musnier, and on the 9th driving the Spaniards -from Calatayud pursued them on the roads to Molino, Daroca, and -Medinaceli. On the other side of the Ebro however Mina fell on the -post of Exca in the Cinco Villas; the garrison broke through his -investment in the night, but he pursued them almost to the gates of -Zaragosa, and then turning off towards Ayerbe, attacked that post and -menaced the communication by Jaca. The commandant of Zaragosa had -sent an Italian battalion to look after the flying garrison of Exca, -which was found at Zuera, and the united forces amounting to eleven -hundred infantry and sixty cavalry followed Mina and came up with -him at Ayerbe; the guerilla chief instantly turned with a part of -his troops, and the Italians retreated towards Huesca, but having to -cross a plain were all killed or taken. - -Reille and Musnier hearing of this misfortune spread their columns -in all directions to intercept Mina, but he evaded their toils, and -although sharply chased and several times engaged, reached Motrico -on the Biscay coast with his prisoners. The Iris frigate which was -then harassing the enemy’s coast line took some of them off his -hands, and the remainder, three hundred in number, were sent to -Corunna by the Asturian mountains, but only thirty-six arrived, the -rest were shot by the escort, under pretence that they made a noise -near a French post! - -While these events were passing on the left of the Ebro, -Mazzuchelli’s brigade followed the Empecinado, and having defeated -him in a sharp action, at Cubiliejos de la Sierra, brought off the -garrison of Molino and dismantled that fort; but the smaller Partidas -infested the road between Tortoza and Oropesa, and in this disturbed -state of affairs reports were rife that an English force was to -disembark at Peniscola. Blake also sent Obispo’s division against -Teruel, which was thus menaced on all sides, for Mahy was still in -those parts. Thus the partizan warfare seemed interminable, and -Suchet’s situation would really have been very dangerous, if he had -been opposed by a man of ability. He had an inferior force and was -cooped up between the enemy’s fortresses; his communications were all -interrupted; he had just met with two signal failures at Saguntum, -and he was menaced by a formidable army which was entirely master of -its operations. Blake however soon relieved him of his difficulties. - -Palacios with the junta had retired to Alcira, and in concert with -the friars of his faction had issued a manifesto, intended to raise -a popular commotion to favour his own restoration to the command, -but Blake was now become popular; the Valencians elated by the -successful resistance of Saguntum, called for a battle, and the -Spanish general urged partly by his courage, the only military -qualification he possessed, partly that he found his operations on -the French rear had not disturbed the siege, acceded to their desire. -Mahy and Bassecour’s divisions had arrived at Valencia, Obispo was -called in to Betera, eight thousand irregulars were thrown upon -the French communications, and the whole Spanish army amounting to -about twenty-two thousand infantry, two thousand good cavalry, and -thirty-six guns made ready for battle. - -Previous to this, Suchet, although expecting such an event, had -detached several parties to scour the road of Tortoza, and had -directed Palombini’s division to attack Obispo and relieve Teruel. -Obispo skirmished at Xerica on the 21st, and then rapidly marched -upon Liria with a view to assist in the approaching battle; but -Blake, who might have attacked while Palombini was absent, took -little heed of the opportunity, and Suchet, now aware of his -adversary’s object, instantly recalled the Italians who arrived the -very morning of the action. - -The ground between Murviedro and Valencia was a low flat, -interspersed here and there with rugged isolated hills; it was -also intersected by ravines, torrents, and water-cuts, and thickly -studded with olive-trees; but near Saguntum it became straitened by -the mountain and the sea, so as to leave an opening of not more than -three miles, behind which it again spread out. In this narrow part -Suchet resolved to receive the attack, without relinquishing the -siege of Saguntum; and he left a strong detachment in the trenches -with orders to open the fire of a new battery, the moment the -Spanish army appeared. - -His left, consisting of Habert’s division, and some squadrons of -dragoons, was refused, to avoid the fire of some vessels of war and -gun-boats which flanked Blake’s march. The centre under Harispe, was -extended to the foot of the mountains, so that he offered an oblique -front, crossing the main road from Valencia to Murviedro. Palombini’s -division and the dragoons, were placed in second line behind the -centre, and behind them the cuirassiers were held in reserve. - -This narrow front was favourable for an action in the plain, but the -right flank of the French, and the troops left to carry on the siege, -were liable to be turned by the pass of Espiritus, through which, the -roads from Betera led to Gilet, directly upon the line of retreat. -To prevent such an attempt Suchet posted Chlopiski with a strong -detachment of infantry and the Italian dragoons in the pass, and -placed the Neapolitan brigade of reserve at Gilet: in this situation, -although his fighting troops did not exceed seventeen thousand men, -and those cooped up between two fortresses, hemmed in by the mountain -on one side, the sea on the other, and with only one narrow line -of retreat, the French general did not hesitate to engage a very -numerous army. He trusted to his superiority in moral resources, and -what would have been madness in other circumstances, was here a proof -of skilful daring. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 4 Plate 4._ - - _Explanatory Sketch_ - OF THE SIEGE & BATTLE OF - _SAGUNTUM_, - 1811. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._] - -Blake having issued a fine address to his soldiers on the 25th of -October advanced to fight. His right wing under Zayas, composed -of the Albuera divisions, marched by a road leading upon the -village of Puzzol; and Blake followed in person, with a weak reserve, -commanded by general Velasco. - -The centre under Lardizabal supported by the cavalry of Loy and Caro, -moved by the main road. - -The left consisting of Miranda’s, and Villa Campa’s infantry, and of -St. Juan’s cavalry, and supported by Mahy’s division which came from -the side of Betera moved against the defile of Espiritus. Obispo, -also coming from Betera, acted as a flanking corps, and entering the -mountains by Naquera, menaced the right of Chlopiski, but he was met -by a brigade under general Robert. - -The Spaniards moved on rapidly and in good order, driving the French -outposts over a ravine called the Piccador, which covered Suchet’s -front. Zayas and Lardizabal immediately passed this obstacle as did -also Caro and Loy, and the first took possession of Puzzol while -the flotilla ranged along the coast and protected his right flank. -Blake with Velasco’s reserve halted at El Puig, an isolated hill on -the sea-coast behind the Piccador, but Lardizabal and the cavalry -forming an oblique line, in order to face the French front, occupied -the ground between Puzzol and the Piccador. Thus the Spanish order -of battle was cut in two by the ravine, for on the hither side of -it St. Juan, Miranda, and Villa Campa were drawn up, and Mahy took -possession of a height called the Germanels, which was opposite the -mouth of St. Espiritus. - -By this disposition the Spanish line, extending from Puzzol to the -Germanels, was not less than six miles, and the division of Obispo -was separated from the left by about the same distance. Blake’s order -of battle was therefore feeble, and he was without any efficient -reserve, for Velasco was distant and weak and Mahy’s was actually in -the line. The French order of battle covering less than three miles -was compressed and strong, the reserves were well placed and close -at hand; and Chlopiski’s division, although a league distant from -the main body, was firmly posted, and able to take a direct part in -the battle, while the interval between him and Suchet was closed by -impassable heights. - - -BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM. - -The fight was commenced by Villa Campa, who was advancing against the -pass of Espiritus, when the Italian dragoons galloping out overthrew -his advanced guard, and put his division into confusion. Chlopiski -seeing this, moved down with the infantry, drove Mahy from the -Germanels, and then detached a regiment to the succour of the centre, -where a brisk battle was going on, to the disadvantage of Suchet. - -That general had not judged his ground well at first, and when the -Spaniards had crossed the Piccador, he too late perceived that an -isolated height in advance of Harispe’s division, could command -all that part of the field. Prompt however to remedy his error, he -ordered the infantry to advance, and galloped forward himself with -an escort of hussars to seize the hill; the enemy was already in -possession, and their guns opened from the summit, but the head of -Harispe’s infantry then attacked, and after a sharp fight, in which -general Paris and several superior officers were wounded, gained the -height. - -At this time Obispo’s guns were heard on the hills far to the right, -and Zayas passing through Puzzol endeavoured to turn the French left, -and as the day was fine, and the field of battle distinctly seen by -the soldiers in Saguntum, they crowded on the ramparts, regardless of -the besiegers’ fire, and uttering loud cries of Victory! Victory! by -their gestures seemed to encourage their countrymen to press forward. -The critical moment of the battle was evidently approaching. Suchet -ordered Palombini’s Italians, and the dragoons, to support Harispe, -and although wounded himself galloped to the cuirassiers and brought -them into action. Meanwhile the French hussars had pursued the -Spaniards from the height to the Piccador, where however the latter -rallied upon their second line and again advanced; and it was in -vain that the French artillery poured grape-shot into their ranks, -their march was not checked. Loy and Caro’s horsemen overthrew the -French hussars in a moment, and in the same charge sabred the French -gunners and captured their battery. The crisis would have been fatal, -if Harispe’s infantry had not stood firm while Palombini’s division -marching on the left under cover of a small rise of ground, suddenly -opened a fire upon the flank of the Spanish cavalry, which was still -in pursuit of the hussars. These last immediately turned, and the -Spaniards thus placed between two fires, and thinking the flight -of the hussars had been feigned, to draw them into an ambuscade, -hesitated; the next moment a tremendous charge of the cuirassiers put -every thing into confusion. Caro was wounded and taken, Loy fled with -the remainder of the cavalry over the Piccador, the French guns were -recovered, the Spanish artillery was taken, and Lardizabal’s infantry -being quite broken, laid down their arms, or throwing them away, -saved themselves as they could. Harispe’s division immediately joined -Chlopiski’s, and both together pursued the beaten troops. - -This great, and nearly simultaneous success in the centre, and on the -right, having cut the Spanish line in two, Zaya’s position became -exceedingly dangerous. Suchet was on his flank, Habert advancing -against his front, and Blake had no reserve in hand to restore the -battle, for the few troops and guns under Velasco, remained inactive -at El Puig. However such had been the vigour of the action in the -centre, and so inferior were Suchet’s numbers, that it required two -hours to secure his prisoners and to rally Palombini’s division for -another effort. Meanwhile Zayas, whose left flank was covered in some -measure by the water-cuts, fought stoutly, maintained the village -of Puzzol for a long time, and when finally driven out, although he -was charged several times, by some squadrons attached to Habert’s -division, effected his retreat across the Piccador, and gained El -Puig. Suchet had however re-formed his troops, and Zayas now attacked -in front and flank, fled along the sea-coast to the Grao of Valencia, -leaving his artillery and eight hundred prisoners. - -During this time, Chlopiski and Harispe, had pursued Mahy, Miranda, -Villa Campa, and Lardizabal, as far as the torrent of Caraixet, -where many prisoners were made; but the rest being joined by Obispo, -rallied behind the torrent, and the French cavalry having outstripped -their infantry, were unable to prevent the Spaniards from reaching -the line of the Guadalaviar. The victors had about a thousand killed -and wounded, and the Spaniards had not more, but two generals, five -thousand prisoners, and twelve guns were taken; and Blake’s inability -to oppose Suchet in the field, being made manifest by this battle, -the troops engaged were totally dispirited, and the effect reached -even to Saguntum, for the garrison surrendered that night. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. In this campaign the main object on both sides was Valencia. -That city could not be invested until Saguntum was taken, and the -Spanish army defeated; hence to protect Saguntum without endangering -his army, was the problem for Blake to solve, and it was not very -difficult. He had at least twenty-five thousand troops, besides -the garrisons of Peniscola, Oropesa, and Segorbe, and he could -either command or influence the movements of nearly twenty thousand -irregulars; his line of operations was direct, and secure, and he -had a fleet to assist him, and several secure harbours. On the other -hand the French general could not bring twenty thousand men into -action, and his line of operation, which was long, and difficult, was -intercepted by the Spanish fortresses. It was for Blake therefore -to choose the nature of his defence: he could fight, or he could -protract the war. - -2º. If he had resolved to fight, he should have taken post at -Castellon de la Plana, keeping a corps of observation at Segorbe, and -strong detachments towards Villa Franca, and Cabanes, holding his -army in readiness to fall on the heads of Suchet’s columns, as they -came out of the mountains. But experience had, or should have, taught -Blake, that a battle in the open field between the French and Spanish -troops, whatever might be the apparent advantage, was uncertain; and -this last and best army of the country ought not to have been risked. -He should therefore have resolved upon protracting the war, and have -merely held that position to check the heads of the French columns, -without engaging in a pitched battle. - -3º. From Castellon de la Plana and Segorbe, the army might have -been withdrawn, and concentrated at Murviedro, in one march, and -Blake should have prepared an intrenched camp in the hills close to -Saguntum, placing a corps of observation in the plain behind that -fortress. These hills were rugged, very difficult of access, and -the numerous water-cuts and the power of forming inundations in the -place, were so favourable for defence, that it would have been nearly -impossible for the French to have dislodged him; nor could they have -invested Saguntum while he remained in this camp. - -4º. In such a strong position, with his retreat secure upon the -Guadalaviar, the Spanish general would have covered the fertile -plains from the French foragers, and would have held their army at -bay while the irregulars operated upon their communication. He might -then have safely detached a division to his left, to assist the -Partidas, or to his right, by sea, to land at Peniscola. His forces -would soon have been increased and the invasion would have been -frustrated. - -5º. Instead of following this simple principle of defensive warfare -consecrated since the days of Fabius, Blake abandoned Saguntum, and -from behind the Guadalaviar, sent unconnected detachments on a half -circle round the French army, which being concentrated, and nearer -to each detachment than the latter was to its own base at Valencia, -could and did, as we have seen, defeat them all in detail. - -6º. Blake, like all the Spanish generals, indulged vast military -conceptions far beyond his means, and, from want of knowledge, -generally in violation of strategic principles. Thus his project -of cutting the communication with Madrid, invading Aragon, and -connecting Mina’s operations between Zaragoza and the Pyrenees, with -Lacy’s in Catalonia, was gigantic in design, but without any chance -of success. The division of Severoli being added to Musnier’s, had -secured Aragon; and if it had not been so, the reinforcements then -marching through Navarre, to different parts of Spain, rendered the -time chosen for these attempts peculiarly unfavourable. But the -chief objection was, that Blake had lost the favourable occasion -of protracting the war about Saguntum; and the operations against -Valencia, were sure to be brought to a crisis, before the affair -of Aragon could have been sufficiently embarrassing, to recal the -French general. The true way of using the large guerilla forces, was -to bring them down close upon the rear of Suchet’s army, especially -on the side of Teruel, where he had magazines; which could have -been done safely, because these Partidas had an open retreat, and -if followed would have effected their object, of weakening and -distressing the army before Valencia. This would have been quite a -different operation from that which Blake adopted, when he posted -Obispo and O’Donnel at Benaguazil and Segorbe; because those -generals’ lines of operations, springing from the Guadalaviar, were -within the power of the French; and this error alone proves that -Blake was entirely ignorant of the principles of strategy. - -7º. Urged by the cries of the Valencian population, the Spanish -general delivered the battle of the 25th, which was another great -error, and an error exaggerated by the mode of execution. He who had -so much experience, who had now commanded in four or five pitched -battles, was still so ignorant of his art, that with twice as many -men as his adversary, and with the choice of time and place, he -made three simultaneous attacks, on an extended front, without any -connection or support; and he had no reserves to restore the fight or -to cover his retreat. A wide sweep of the net without regard to the -strength or fierceness of his prey, was Blake’s only notion, and the -result was his own destruction. - -8º. Suchet’s operations, especially his advance against Saguntum, -leaving Oropesa behind him, were able and rapid. He saw the errors -of his adversary, and made them fatal. To fight in front of Saguntum -was no fault; the French general acted with a just confidence in his -own genius, and the valour of his troops. He gained that fortress by -the battle, but he acknowledged that such were the difficulties of -the siege, the place could only have been taken by a blockade, which -would have required two months. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.] - -Saguntum having fallen, Suchet conceived the plan of enclosing and -capturing the whole of Blake’s force, together with the city of -Valencia, round which it was encamped; and he was not deterred from -this project by the desultory operations of the Partidas in Aragon, -nor by the state of Catalonia. Blake however, reverting to his -former system, called up to Valencia, all the garrisons and depôts -of Murcia, and directed the conde de Montijo, who had been expelled -by Soult from Grenada, to join Duran. He likewise ordered Freire to -move upon Cuença, with the Murcian army, to support Montijo, Duran, -and the Partida chiefs, who remained near Aragon after the defeat -of the Empecinado. But the innumerable small bands, or rather armed -peasants, immediately about Valencia, he made no use of, neither -harassing the French nor in any manner accustoming these people to -action. - -In Aragon his affairs turned out ill. Mazuchelli entirely defeated -Duran in a hard fight, near Almunia, on the 7th of November; on the -23d Campillo was defeated at Añadon, and a Partida having appeared at -Peñarova, near Morella, the people rose against it. Finally Napoleon, -seeing that the contest in Valencia was coming to a crisis, ordered -general Reille to reinforce Suchet not only with Severoli’s Italians, -but with his own French division, in all fifteen thousand good -troops. - -Meanwhile in Catalonia Lacy’s activity had greatly diminished. He -had, including the Tercios, above sixteen thousand troops, of which -about twelve thousand were armed, and in conjunction with the junta -he had classed the whole population in reserves; but he was jealous -of the people, who were generally of the church party, and, as he had -before done in the Ronda, deprived them of their arms, although they -had purchased them, in obedience to his own proclamation. He also -discountenanced as much as possible the popular insurrection, and he -was not without plausible reasons for this, although he could not -justify the faithless and oppressive mode of execution. - -He complained that the Somatenes always lost their arms and -ammunition, that they were turbulent, expensive, and bad soldiers, -and that his object was to incorporate them by just degrees with the -regular army, where they could be of service; but then he made no -good use of the latter himself, and hence he impeded the irregulars -without helping the regular warfare. His conduct disgusted the -Catalonians. That people had always possessed a certain freedom and -loved it; but they had been treated despotically and unjustly, by all -the different commanders who had been placed at their head, since the -commencement of the war; and now finding, that Lacy was even worse -than his predecessors, their ardour sensibly diminished; many went -over to the French, and this feeling of discouragement was increased -by some unfortunate events. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 3.] - -Henriod governor of Lerida had on the 25th of October surprised and -destroyed, in Balaguer, a swarm of Partidas which had settled on -the plain of Urgel, and the Partizans on the left bank of the Ebro -had been defeated by the escort of one of the convoys. The French -also entrenched a post before the Medas Islands, in November, which -prevented all communication by land, and in the same month Maurice -Mathieu surprised Mattaro. The war had also now fatigued so many -persons, that several towns were ready to receive the enemy as -friends. Villa Nueva de Sitjes and other places were in constant -communication with Barcelona; and the people of Cadaques openly -refused to pay their contributions to Lacy, declaring that they had -already paid the French and meant to side with the strongest. One -Guinart, a member of the junta, was detected corresponding with the -enemy; counter guerillas, or rather free-booting bands, made their -appearance near Berga; privateers of all nations infested the coast, -and these pirates of the ocean, the disgrace of civilized warfare, -generally agreed not to molest each other, but robbed all defenceless -flags without distinction. Then the continued bickerings between -Sarsfield, Eroles, and Milans, and of all three with Lacy, who was, -besides, on bad terms with captain Codrington, greatly affected the -patriotic ardour of the people, and relieved the French armies from -the alarm which the first operations had created. - -In Catalonia the generals in chief were never natives, nor identified -in feeling with the natives. Lacy was unfitted for open warfare, and -had recourse to the infamous methods of assassination. Campo Verde -had given some countenance to this horrible system, but Lacy and his -coadjutors have been accused of instigating the murder of French -officers in their quarters, the poisoning of wells, the drugging of -wines and flour, and the firing of powder-magazines, regardless of -the safety even of the Spaniards who might be within reach of the -explosion; and if any man shall doubt the truth of this allegation, -let him read “_The History of the Conspiracies against the French -Armies in Catalonia_.” That work, printed in 1813 at Barcelona, -contains the official reports of the military police, upon the -different attempts, many successful, to destroy the French troops; -and when due allowance for an enemy’s tale and for the habitual -falsifications of police agents is made, ample proof will remain that -Lacy’s warfare was one of assassination. - -The facility which the great size of Barcelona afforded for these -attempts, together with its continual cravings and large garrison, -induced Napoleon to think of dismantling the walls of the city, -preserving only the forts. This simple military precaution has been -noted by some writers as an indication that he even then secretly -despaired of final success in the Peninsula; but the weakness of -this remark will appear evident, if we consider, that he had just -augmented his immense army, that his generals were invading Valencia, -and menacing Gallicia, after having relieved Badajos and Ciudad -Rodrigo; and that he was himself preparing to lead four hundred -thousand men to the most distant extremity of Europe. However the -place was not dismantled, and Maurice Mathieu contrived both to -maintain the city in obedience and to take an important part in the -field operations. - -It was under these circumstances that Suchet advanced to the -Guadalaviar, although his losses and the escorts for his numerous -prisoners had diminished his force to eighteen thousand men while -Blake’s army including Freire’s division was above twenty-five -thousand, of which near three thousand were cavalry. He first -summoned the city, to ascertain the public spirit; he was answered -in lofty terms, yet he knew by his secret communications, that the -enthusiasm of the people was not very strong; and on the 3d of -November he seized the Grao, and the suburb of Serranos on the left -of the Guadalaviar. Blake had broken two, out of five, stone bridges -on the river, had occupied some houses and convents which covered -them on the left bank, and protected those bridges, which remained -whole, with regular works. Suchet immediately carried the convents -which covered the broken bridges in the Serranos, and fortified his -position there and at the Grao, and thus blocked the Spaniards on -that side with a small force, while he prepared to pass the river -higher up with the remainder of his army. - -The Spanish defences on the right bank consisted of three posts. - -1º. The city itself which was surrounded by a circular wall thirty -feet in height, and ten in thickness with a road along the summit, -the platforms of the bastions being supported from within by timber -scaffolding. There was also a wet ditch and a covered way with -earthen works in front of the gates. - -2º. An intrenched camp of an irregular form five miles in extent. It -enclosed the city and the three suburbs of Quarte, San Vincente, and -Ruzafa. The slope of this work was so steep as to require scaling -ladders, and there was a ditch in front twelve feet deep. - -3º. The lines, which extended along the banks of the river to the sea -at one side, and to the villages of Quarte and Manisses on the other. - -The whole line, including the city and camp, was about eight miles; -the ground was broken with deep and wide canals of irrigation, which -branched off from the river just above the village of Quarte, and the -Spanish cavalry was posted at Aldaya behind the left wing to observe -the open country. Suchet could not venture to force the passage -of the river until Reille had joined him, and therefore contented -himself with sending parties over to skirmish, while he increased his -secret communications in the city, and employed detachments to scour -the country in his rear. In this manner, nearly two months passed; -the French waited for reinforcements, and Blake hoped that while he -thus occupied his enemy a general insurrection would save Valencia. -But in December, Reille, having given over the charge of Navarre and -Aragon to general Caffarelli, marched to Teruel where Severoli with -his Italians had already arrived. - -The vicinity of Freire, and Montijo, who now appeared near Cuença, -obliged Reille to halt at Teruel until general D’Armanac with a -detachment of the army of the centre, had driven those Spanish -generals away, but then he advanced to Segorbe, and as Freire did not -rejoin Blake, and as the latter was ignorant of Reille’s arrival, -Suchet resolved to force the passage of the Guadalaviar instantly. - -[Illustration: _Vol 4. Plate 5._ - - _Explanatory Sketch_ - OF - The Siege & Battle of - VALENCIA, - 1812. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._] - -On the 25th, the Neapolitan division being placed in the camp at the -Serranos, to hold the Spaniards in check, Habert took post at the -Grao, and Palombini’s division was placed opposite the village of -Mislata, which was about half-way between Valencia and the village -of Quarte. Reille at the same time made a forced march by Liria -and Benaguazil, and three bridges being thrown in the night, above -the sources of the canals, opposite Ribaroya, the rest of the army -crossed the Guadalaviar with all diligence on the 26th and formed -in order of battle on the other side. It was then eight o’clock and -Reille had not arrived, but Suchet, whose plan was to drive all -Blake’s army within the entrenched camp, fearing that the Spanish -general, would evade the danger, if he saw the French divisions in -march, resolved to push at once with Harispe’s infantry and the -cavalry to the Albufera or salt-lake, beyond Valencia, and so cut off -Blake’s retreat to the Xucar river. Robert’s brigade therefore halted -to secure the bridges, until Reille should come up, and while the -troops, left on the other bank of the Guadalaviar, attacked all the -Spanish river line of entrenchments, Suchet marched towards the lake -as rapidly as the thick woods would permit. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.] - -The French hussars soon fell in with the Spanish cavalry at Aldaya -and were defeated, but this charge was stopped by the fire of -the infantry, and the remainder of the French horsemen coming up -overthrew the Spaniards. During this time Blake instead of falling on -Suchet with his reserve, was occupied with the defence of the river, -especially at the village of Mislata, where a false attack, to cover -the passage at Ribaroya, had first given him the alarm. Palombini, -who was at this point, had passed over some skirmishers and then -throwing two bridges, attacked the entrenchments; but his troops were -repulsed by Zayas, and driven back on the river in disorder; they -rallied and had effected the passage of the canals, when a Spanish -reserve coming up restored the fight, and the French were finally -driven quite over the river. At that moment Reille’s division, save -one brigade which could not arrive in time, crossed at Ribaroya, and -in concert with Robert, attacked Mahy in the villages of Manisses and -Quarte, which had been fortified carefully in front, but were quite -neglected on the rear, and on the side of Aldaya. Suchet who had -been somewhat delayed at Aldaya by the aspect of affairs at Mislata, -then continued his march to the lake, while Reille meeting with a -feeble resistance at Manisses and Quarte, carried both at one sweep, -and turned Mislata where he united with Palombini. Blake and Zayas -retired towards the city but Mahy driven from Quarte took the road to -Alcira, on the Xucar, and thus passing behind Suchet’s division, was -entirely cut off from Valencia. - -All the Spanish army, on the upper Guadalaviar, was now entirely -beaten with the loss of its artillery and baggage, and below the -city, Habert was likewise victorious. He had first opened a cannonade -against the Spanish gun-boats near the Grao, and this flotilla -although in sight of an English seventy-four and a frigate, and -closely supported by the Papillon sloop, fled without returning a -shot; the French then passed the water, and carried the entrenchment, -which consisted of a feeble breast-work, defended by the irregulars -who had only two guns. When the passage was effected Habert fixed -his right, as a pivot, on the river, and sweeping round with his -left, drove the Spaniards towards the camp; but before he could -connect his flank with Harispe’s troops, who were on the lake, -Obispo’s division, flying from Suchet’s cavalry, passed over the rice -grounds between the lake and the sea, and so escaped to Cullera. -The remainder of Blake’s army about eighteen thousand of all kinds -retired to the camp and were closely invested during the night. - -Three detachments of French dragoons, each man having an infantry -soldier behind him, were then sent by different roads of Alcira, -Cullera, and Cuença, the two first in pursuit of Mahy and Obispo, the -latter to observe Freire. Mahy was found in a position at Alcira, -and Blake had already sent him orders to maintain the line of the -Xucar; but he had lost his artillery, his troops were disheartened, -and at the first shot he fled although the ground was strong and he -had three thousand men while the French were not above a thousand. -Obispo likewise abandoned Cullera and endeavoured to rejoin Mahy, -when a very heavy and unusual fall of snow not only prevented their -junction, but offered a fine advantage to the French. For the British -consul thinking the Xucar would be defended, had landed large stores -of provisions and ammunition at Denia and was endeavouring to -re-embark them, when the storm drove the ships of war off the coast, -and for three days fifty cavalry could have captured Denia and all -the stores. - -In this battle which cost the French less than five hundred men, -Zayas alone displayed his usual vigour and spirit, and while retiring -upon the city, he repeatedly proposed to Blake to retreat by the road -Mahy had followed, which would have saved the army; yet the other -was silent, for he was in every way incapable as an officer. With -twenty-three thousand infantry, a powerful cavalry, and a wide river -in his front—with the command of several bridges by which he could -have operated on either side; with strong entrenchments, a secure -camp—with a fortified city in the centre, whence his reserves could -have reached the most distant point of the scene of operation, in -less than two hours—with all these advantages he had permitted -Suchet whose force, seeing that one of Reille’s brigades had not -arrived, scarcely exceeded his own, to force the passage of the -river, to beat him at all points, and to enclose him, by a march, -which spread the French troops on a circuit of more than fifteen -miles or five hours march; and he now rejected the only means of -saving his army. But Suchet’s operations which indeed were of the -nature of a surprise, proves that he must have had a supreme contempt -for his adversary’s talents, and the country people partook of the -sentiment; the French parties which spread over the country for -provisions, as far as Xativa, were every where well received, and -Blake complained that Valencia contained a bad people. - -The 2d of December, the Spanish general, finding his error, attempted -at the head of ten thousand men to break out by the left bank of -the Guadalaviar; but his arrangements were unskilful, and when his -advanced guard of five thousand men had made way, it was abandoned, -and the main column returned to the city. The next day many deserters -went over to the French, and Reille’s absent brigade, now arrived and -reinforced the posts on the left bank of the river. Suchet fortified -his camp on the right bank, and having in the night of the 30th -repulsed two thousand Spaniards who made a sally, commenced regular -approaches against the camp and city. - - -SIEGE OF VALENCIA. - -[Sidenote: 1812. January.] - -It was impossible for Blake to remain long in the camp; the city -contained one hundred and fifty thousand souls besides the troops, -and there was no means of provisioning them, because Suchet’s -investment was complete. Sixty heavy guns with their parcs of -ammunition which had reached Saguntum, were transported across -the river Guadalaviar to batter the works; and as the suburb of -San Vincente, and the Olivet offered two projecting points of the -entrenched camp, which possessed but feeble means of defence, the -trenches were opened against them in the night of the 1st of January. - -The fire killed colonel Henri, the chief engineer, but in the night -of the 5th the Spaniards abandoned the camp and took refuge in the -city; the French, perceiving the movement, escaladed the works, and -seized two of the suburbs so suddenly, that they captured eighty -pieces of artillery and established themselves within twenty yards -of the town wall, when their mortar-batteries opened upon the place. -In the evening, Suchet sent a summons to Blake, who replied, that -he would have accepted certain terms the day before, but that the -bombardment had convinced him, that he might now depend upon both the -citizens and the troops. - -This answer satisfied Suchet. He was convinced the place would -not make any defence, and he continued to throw shells until the -8th; after which he made an attack upon the suburb of Quarte, -but the Spaniards still held out and he was defeated. However, -the bombardment killed many persons, and set fire to the houses -in several quarters; and as there were no cellars or caves, as at -Zaragoza, the chief citizens begged Blake to capitulate. While he -was debating with them, a friar bearing a flag, which he called the -Standard of the Faith, came up with a mob, and insisted upon fighting -to the last, and when a picquet of soldiers was sent against him, -he routed it and shot the officer; nevertheless his party was soon -dispersed. Finally, when a convent of Dominicans close to the walls -was taken, and five batteries ready to open, Blake demanded leave to -retire to Alicant with arms, baggage, and four guns. - -These terms were refused, but a capitulation guaranteeing property -and oblivion of the past, and providing that the unfortunate -prisoners in the island of Cabrera should be exchanged against an -equal number of Blake’s army, was negotiated and ratified on the -9th. Then Blake complaining bitterly of the people, gave up the -city. Above eighteen thousand regular troops, with eighty stand of -colours, two thousand horses, three hundred and ninety guns, forty -thousand muskets, and enormous stores of powder were taken; and it is -not one of the least remarkable features of this extraordinary war, -that intelligence of the fall of so great a city took a week to reach -Madrid, and it was not known in Cadiz until one month after! - -On the 14th of January Suchet made his triumphal entry into Valencia, -having completed a series of campaigns in which the feebleness of -his adversaries somewhat diminished his glory, but in which his own -activity and skill were not the less conspicuous. Napoleon created -him duke of Albufera, and his civil administration was strictly in -unison with his conduct in the field, that is to say vigorous and -prudent. He arrested all dangerous persons, especially the friars, -and sent them to France, and he rigorously deprived the people of -their military resources; but he proportioned his demands to their -real ability, kept his troops in perfect discipline, was careful not -to offend the citizens by violating their customs, or shocking their -religious prejudices, and endeavoured, as much as possible, to govern -through the native authorities. The archbishop and many of the clergy -aided him, and the submission of the people was secured. - -The errors of the Spaniards contributed as much to this object, as -the prudent vigilance of Suchet; for although the city was lost, the -kingdom of Valencia might have recovered from the blow, under the -guidance of able men. The convents and churches were full of riches, -the towns and villages abounded in resources, the line of the Xucar -was very strong, and several fortified places and good harbours -remained unsubdued; the Partidas in the hills were still numerous, -the people were willing to fight, and the British agents and the -British fleets were ready to aid, and to supply arms and stores. -The junta however dissolved itself, the magistrates fled from their -posts, the populace were left without chiefs; and when the consul, -Tupper, proposed to establish a commission of government, having -at its head the padre Rico, the author of Valencia’s first defence -against Moncey, and the most able and energetic man in those parts, -Mahy evaded the proposition; he would not give Rico power, and -shewed every disposition to impede useful exertion. Then the leading -people either openly submitted or secretly entered into connection -with the French, who were thus enabled tranquilly to secure the -resources of the country; and as the regency at Cadiz refused the -stipulated exchange of prisoners, the Spanish army was sent to -France, and the horrors of the Cabrera were prolonged. - -During the siege of Valencia, Freire, with his Murcians, including a -body of cavalry, had abandoned the passes of the Contreras district -and retired across the Xucar to Almanza; Mahy occupied Alcoy, and -Villa Campa had marched to Carthagena. Suchet wished to leave them -undisturbed until he was ready to attack Alicant itself. But to -ensure the fall of Valencia, Napoleon had directed Soult to hold -ten thousand men in the Despeñas Peros, ready to march if necessary -to Suchet’s assistance; and at the same time Marmont was ordered to -detach Montbrun with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, -from the valley of the Tagus, to co-operate with the army of Aragon. -These last-named troops should have interposed between Valencia and -Alicant before the battle of the 26th, but they were delayed, and -only reached Almanza on the 9th, the very day Valencia surrendered. -Freire retreated before them, and Mahy, who was preparing to advance -again to Alcira, took shelter in Alicant. Montbrun knew that Valencia -had fallen, and was advised by Suchet to return immediately, but -ambitious to share in the glory of the hour he marched against -Alicant, and throwing a few shells summoned it to surrender. The -municipal authorities, the governor and many of the leading people, -were disposed to yield, yet Montbrun did not press them, and when -he retired the place was, as Suchet had foreseen, put into a state -of defence. The consul, Tupper, and Roche, the military agent, by -distributing clothes and food to the naked famishing soldiers, -restored their courage, drew many more to Alicant, and stopped the -desertion, which was so great that in one month Freire’s division -alone had lost two thousand men. Montbrun’s attempt therefore, hurt -the French interests, and his troops on their return to Toledo wasted -and pillaged the country through which they passed in a shameful -manner. - -Villa Campa now abandoned Carthagena and returned to the mountains -of Albarazin; and Suchet, embarrassed by the failure at Alicant, -and dreading the fever at Carthagena, posted Harispe’s division on -the Xucar, to guard against the pestilence rather than to watch the -enemy. Yet he seized Gandia and Denia, which last was strangely -neglected both by the Spaniards and by the British squadron after -the stores were removed; for the castle had sixty guns mounted, and -many vessels were in the port; and as a post it was important, and -might easily have been secured until a Spanish garrison could be -thrown in. When these points were secured Suchet detached a brigade -on the side of Cabrillas to preserve the communication with Cuença, -and then directed Musnier’s division to form the siege of Peniscola; -but at the moment of investing that place, intelligence arrived that -Taragona, the garrison of which, contrary to orders, had consumed -the reserve-provisions, was menaced by Lacy; wherefore Severoli’s -division moved from Valencia to replace Musnier, and the latter -marched to Tortoza in aid of Taragona. Previous to Musnier’s arrival, -Lafosse, governor of Tortoza, had advanced with some cavalry and -a battalion of infantry to the fort of Balaguer, to observe Lacy, -and being falsely told that the Spaniards were in retreat, entered -Cambril the 19th, and from thence pushed on with his cavalry to -Taragona. Lacy was nearer than he imagined. - -It will be remembered that the Catalan army was posted in the valley -of the Congosta and at Mattaro, to intercept the French convoy to -Barcelona. In December Maurice Mathieu seized Mattaro, while Dacaen, -who had received some reinforcements, brought down the long expected -convoy, and the Spaniards being thus placed between two fires, after -a slight action, opened the road. When Dacaen returned to Gerona -they resumed their position, but Lacy after proposing several new -projects, which he generally relinquished at the moment of execution, -at last decided to fall on Taragona, and afterwards to invade Aragon. -With this view, he drew off Eroles’ division and some cavalry, in -all about six thousand men, from the Congosta, and took post about -the 18th of January, at Reus. Stores from Cadiz were landed from the -English vessels at Cape Salou; captain Codrington repaired to the -Spanish quarters on the 19th to concert a combined operation with the -fleet, and it was at this moment the scouts brought word that Lafosse -had entered Taragona with the cavalry, and that the French infantry, -about eight hundred in number, were at Villa Seca, ignorant of the -vicinity of the Spanish army. - -Lacy immediately put his troops in motion, and captain Codrington -would have returned to his ship, but a patrol of French dragoons -chased him back, and another patrol pushing to Salou made two -captains and a lieutenant of the squadron prisoners, and brought them -to Villa Seca. By this time, however, Lacy had fallen upon the French -infantry in front, and Eroles turning both their flanks, and closing -upon their rear, killed or wounded two hundred when the remainder -surrendered. - -The naval officers, thus freed, immediately regained their ships, -and the squadron was that night before Taragona; but a gale of wind -off shore impeded its fire, the Spaniards did not appear on the -land-side, and the next day the increasing gale obliged the ships -to anchor to the eastward. Lacy had meanwhile abandoned the project -against Taragona, and after sending his prisoners to Busa, went off -himself towards Montserrat, leaving Eroles’ division, reinforced by -a considerable body of armed peasantry, in a position at Altafulla, -behind the Gaya. Here the bridge in front being broken, and the -position strong, Eroles, who had been also promised the aid of -Sarsfield’s division, awaited the attack of three thousand men who -were coming from Barcelona. He was however ignorant that Dacaen, -finding the ways from Gerona open, because Sarsfield had moved to the -side of Vich, had sent general Lamarque with five thousand men to -Barcelona, and that Maurice Mathieu was thus in march not with three -but eight thousand good troops. - - -BATTLE OF ALTAFULLA. - -The French generals, anxious to surprise Eroles, took pains to -conceal their numbers, and while Maurice Mathieu appeared in front, -Lamarque was turning the left flank. They marched all night, and at -day-break on the 24th, having forded the river, made a well combined -and vigorous attack, by which the Spaniards were defeated with a loss -of more than one thousand killed and wounded. The total dispersion -of the beaten troops baffled pursuit, and the French in returning to -Barcelona suffered from the fire of the British squadron, but Eroles -complained that Sarsfield had kept away with a settled design to -sacrifice him. - -While this was passing in Lower Catalonia, Dacaen scoured the higher -country about Olot, and then descending into the valley of Vich -defeated Sarsfield at Centellas, and that general himself was taken, -but rescued by one of his soldiers. From Centellas, Dacaen marched -by Caldas and Sabadel upon Barcelona, where he arrived the 27th -January, meanwhile Musnier re-victualled Taragona. Thus the Catalans -were again reduced to great straits, for the French knowing that they -were soon to be reinforced, occupied all the sea-coast, made new -roads out of reach of fire from the ships, established fresh posts -at Moncado, Mattaro, Palamos, and Cadaques, placed detachments in -the higher valleys, and obliged their enemies to resort once more -to an irregular warfare; which was however but a feeble resource, -because from Lacy’s policy the people were now generally disarmed and -discontented. - -Milans, Manso, Eroles, Sarsfield, and Rovira, indeed, although -continually quarrelling, kept the field; and being still supplied -with arms and stores which the British navy contrived to land, and -send into the interior, sustained the war as partizans until new -combinations were produced by the efforts of England; but Lacy’s -intrigues and unpopularity increased, a general gloom prevailed, and -the foundations of strength in the principality were shaken. The -patriots indeed still possessed the mountains, but the French held -all the towns, all the ports, and most of the lines of communication; -and their moveable columns without difficulty gathered the harvests -of the valleys, and chased the most daring of the partizans. -Meanwhile Suchet, seeing that Taragona was secure, renewed his -operations. - - -SIEGE OF PENISCOLA. - -This fortress, crowning the summit of a lofty rock in the sea, was -nearly impregnable; and the only communication with the shore, was by -a neck of land sixty yards wide and two hundred and fifty long. In -the middle of the town there was a strong castle, well furnished with -guns and provisions, and some British ships of war were at hand to -aid the defence; the rock yielded copious springs of water, and deep -marshes covered the approach to the neck of land, which being covered -by the waves in heavy gales, had also an artificial cut defended by -batteries and flanked by gun-boats. Garcia Navarro, who had been -taken during the siege of Tortoza, but had escaped from France, was -now governor of Peniscola, and his garrison was sufficiently numerous. - -On the 20th ground was broken, and mortar-batteries being established -twelve hundred yards from the fort, opened their fire on the 28th. - -In the night of the 31st a parallel five hundred yards long was -built of fascines and gabions, and batteries were commenced on either -flank. - -[Sidenote: 1812. February.] - -In the night of the 2d of February the approaches were pushed beyond -the first parallel, and the breaching batteries being finished and -armed were going to open when a privateer captured a despatch from -the governor, who complained in it that the English wished to take -the command of the place, and declared his resolution rather to -surrender than suffer them to do so. On this hint Suchet opened -negotiations which terminated in the capitulation of the fortress, -the troops being allowed to go where they pleased. The French found -sixty guns mounted, and the easy reduction of such a strong place, -which secured their line of communication, produced a general -disposition in the Valencians to submit to fortune. Such is Suchet’s -account of this affair, but the colour which he thought it necessary -to give to a transaction, full of shame and dishonour, to Navarro, -can only be considered as part of the price paid for Peniscola. The -true causes of its fall were treachery and cowardice. The garrison -were from the first desponding and divided in opinion, and the -British naval officers did but stimulate the troops and general to do -their duty to their country. - -After this capture, six thousand Poles quitted Suchet, for Napoleon -required all the troops of that nation for his Russian expedition. -These veterans marched by Jaca, taking with them the prisoners of -Blake’s army, at the same time Reille’s two French divisions were -ordered to form a separate corps of observation on the Lower Ebro, -and Palombini’s Italian division was sent towards Soria and Calatayud -to oppose Montijo, Villa Campa, and Bassecour, who were still -in joint operation on that side. But Reille soon marched towards -Aragon, and Severoli’s division took his place on the Lower Ebro; -for the Partidas of Duran, Empecinado, and those numerous bands from -the Asturias and La Montaña composing the seventh army, harassed -Navarre and Aragon and were too powerful for Caffarelli. Mina’s also -re-entered Aragon in January, surprised Huesca, and being attacked -during his retreat at Lumbiar repulsed the enemy and carried off his -prisoners. - -Suchet’s field force in Valencia was thus reduced by twenty thousand -men, he had only fifteen thousand left, and consequently could not -push the invasion on the side of Murcia. The approaching departure -of Napoleon from Paris also altered the situation of the French -armies in the Peninsula. The king was again appointed the emperor’s -lieutenant, and he extended the right wing of Suchet’s army to -Cuença, and concentrated the army of the centre at Madrid; thus -Valencia was made, as it were, a mere head of cantonments, in front -of which fresh Spanish armies soon assembled, and Alicant then -became an object of interest to the English government. Suchet, who -had neglected the wound he received at the battle of Saguntum, now -fell into a dangerous disorder, and that fierce flame of war which -seemed destined to lick up all the remains of the Spanish power, was -suddenly extinguished. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. The events which led to the capitulation of Valencia, were but -a continuation of those faults which had before ruined the Spanish -cause in every part of the Peninsula, namely, the neglect of all good -military usages, and the mania for fighting great battles with bad -troops. - -2º. Blake needed not to have fought a serious action during any part -of the campaign. He might have succoured Saguntum without a dangerous -battle, and might have retreated in safety behind the Guadalaviar; -he might have defended that river without risking his whole army, -and then have retreated behind the Xucar. He should never have shut -up his army in Valencia, but having done so he should never have -capitulated. Eighteen thousand men, well conducted, could always -have broken through the thin circle of investment, drawn by Suchet, -especially as the Spaniards had the power of operating on both banks -of the river. But the campaign was one huge error throughout, and was -pithily summed up in one sentence by the duke of Wellington. Being -accused by the regency at Cadiz of having caused the catastrophe, -by permitting the army of the north and that of Portugal to send -reinforcements to Suchet, he replied thus—“The misfortunes of -Valencia are to be attributed to Blake’s ignorance of his profession, -and to Mahi’s cowardice and treachery!” - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA. - - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -The affairs of these provinces were so intimately connected, that -they cannot be treated separately, wherefore, taking Soult’s position -at Seville as the centre of a vast system, I will show how, from -thence, he dealt his powerful blows around, and struggled, even as a -consuming fire, which none could smother though many tried. - -Seville the base of his movements, and the storehouse of his army, -was fortified with temporary citadels, which, the people being -generally submissive, were tenable against desultory attacks. From -this point he maintained his line of communication, with the army of -Portugal, through Estremadura, and with Madrid through La Mancha; -and from this point he sustained the most diversified operations on -all parts of a circle, which embraced the Condado de Niebla, Cadiz, -Grenada, Cordoba, and Estremadura. - -The Niebla, which furnished large supplies, was the most vulnerable -point, because from thence the allies might intercept the navigation -of the river Guadalquivir, and so raise the blockade of Cadiz; and -the frontier of Portugal would cover the assembly of the troops until -the moment of attack. Moreover, expeditions from Cadiz to the mouth -of the Guadiana were as we have seen frequent. Nevertheless, when -Blake and Ballesteros had been driven from Ayamonte, in July and -August, the French were masters of the Condado with the exception -of the castle of Paymago, wherefore Soult, dreading the autumnal -pestilence, did not keep more than twelve hundred men on that side. - -The blockade of the Isla was always maintained by Victor, whose -position formed an irregular crescent, extending from San Lucar de -Barameda on the right, to Conil on the left, and running through -Xeres, Arcos, Medina, Sidonia, and Chiclana. But that marshal -while thus posted was in a manner blockaded himself. In the Isla, -including the Anglo-Portuguese division, there were never less -than sixteen thousand troops, who, having the command of the sea, -could at any moment land on the flanks of the French. The Partidas, -although neither numerous nor powerful, often impeded the intercourse -with Seville; the Serranos of the Ronda and the regular forces at -Algeziras issuing, as it were, from the fortress of Gibraltar, -cut the communication with Grenada; and as Tarifa was still held -by the allies, for general Campbell would never relinquish that -important point, the fresh supplies of cattle, drawn from the great -plain called the Campiña de Tarifa, were straitened. Meanwhile the -expeditions to Estremadura and Murcia, the battles of Barosa and -Albuera, and the rout of Baza, had employed all the disposable part -of the army of the south; hence Victor’s corps, scarcely strong -enough to preserve its own fortified position, could make no progress -in the attack of the Isla. This weakness of the French army being -well known in Cadiz, the safety of that city was no longer doubtful, -a part of the British garrison therefore joined lord Wellington’s -army, and Blake as we have seen carried his Albuera soldiers to -Valencia. - -In Grenada the fourth corps, which, after the departure of -Sebastiani, was commanded by general Laval, had two distinct tasks to -fulfil. The one to defend the eastern frontier from the Murcian army; -the other to maintain the coast line, beyond the Alpuxaras, against -the efforts of the Partidas of those mountains, against the Serranos -of the Ronda, and against the expeditionary armies from Cadiz and -from Algeziras. However, the defeat at Baza, and the calling off of -Mahi, Freire, and Montijo to aid the Valencian operations, secured -the Grenadan frontier; and Martin Carera, who was left there with a -small force, having pushed his partizan excursions rashly, was killed -in a skirmish at Lorca about the period when Valencia surrendered. - -Cordoba was generally occupied by a division of five or six thousand -men, who were ready to operate on the side of Estremadura, or on that -of Murcia, and meanwhile chased the Partidas, who were more numerous -there than in other parts, and were also connected with those of La -Mancha. - -Estremadura was the most difficult field of operation. There Badajos, -an advanced point, was to be supplied and defended from the most -formidable army in the Peninsula; there the communications with -Madrid, and with the army of Portugal, were to be maintained by the -way of Truxillo; and there the fifth French corps, commanded by -Drouet, had to collect its subsistence from a ravaged country; to -preserve its communications over the Sierra Morena with Seville; to -protect the march of monthly convoys to Badajos; to observe the corps -of general Hill, and to oppose the enterprises of Morillo’s Spanish -army, which was becoming numerous and bold. - -Neither the Spanish nor British divisions could prevent Drouet from -sending convoys to Badajos, because of the want of bridges on the -Guadiana, below the fortress, but Morillo incommoded his foraging -parties; for being posted at Valencia de Alcantara, and having his -retreat upon Portugal always secure, he vexed the country about -Caceres, and even pushed his incursions to Truxillo. The French -general, therefore, kept a strong detachment beyond the Guadiana, -but this exposed his troops to Hill’s enterprises; and that bold and -vigilant commander having ten thousand excellent troops, and being -well instructed by Wellington, was a very dangerous neighbour. - -Marmont’s position in the valley of the Tagus; the construction of -the forts and bridge at Almaraz, which enabled him to keep a division -at Truxillo, and connected him with the army of the south, tended -indeed to hold Hill in check, and strengthened the French position -in Estremadura; nevertheless, Drouet generally remained near Zafra -with his main body, because from thence he could more easily make -his retreat good to the Morena, or advance to Merida and Badajos as -occasion required. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 3.] - -Such was the state of military affairs on the different parts of the -circle round Seville, at the period when Suchet invaded Valencia, and -Wellington blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo; and to support his extensive -operations, the duke of Dalmatia, if his share of the reinforcements -which entered Spain in July and August had joined him, would have -had about a hundred thousand troops, of which ninety thousand men -and fourteen thousand horses were French. But the reinforcements -were detained in the different governments, and the actual number of -French present with the eagles was not more than sixty-seven thousand. - -The first corps contained twenty thousand; the fourth and fifth about -eleven thousand each; the garrison of Badajos was five thousand; -twenty thousand formed a disposable reserve, and the rest of the -force consisted of “_Escopeteros_” and civic guards, who were chiefly -employed in the garrisons and police. Upon pressing occasions, Soult -could therefore take the field, at any point, with twenty-four or -twenty-five thousand men, and in Estremadura, on very pressing -occasions, with even a greater number of excellent troops well -and powerfully organized. The manner in which this great army was -paralysed in the latter part of 1811, shall now be shown. - -[Sidenote: 1811. October.] - -In October, Drouet was in the Morena, and Girard at Merida, watching -Morillo, who was in Caceres, when Soult, who had just returned to -Seville after his Murcian expedition, sent three thousand men to -Fregenal, seemingly to menace the Alemtejo. General Hill therefore -recalled his brigades from the right bank of the Tagus, and -concentrated his whole corps behind the Campo Maior on the 9th. - -The 11th Girard and Drouet advanced, the Spanish cavalry retired -from Caceres, the French drove Morillo to Caza de Cantellaña, and -every thing indicated a serious attack; but at this moment Soult’s -attention was attracted by the appearance of Ballesteros in the -Ronda, and he recalled the force from Fregenal. Drouet, who had -reached Merida, then retired to Zafra, leaving Girard with a -division and some cavalry near Caceres. - -Ballesteros had disembarked at Algeziras on the 11th of September, -and immediately marched with his own and Beguine’s troops, in all -four thousand men, to Ximena, raising fresh levies and collecting the -Serranos of the Ronda as he advanced. On the 18th he had endeavoured -to succour the castle of Alcala de Gazules, where Beguines had a -garrison, but a French detachment from Chiclana had already reduced -that post, and after some skirmishing both sides fell back, the one -to Chiclana, the other to Ximena. - -At this time six thousand French were collected at Ubrique, intending -to occupy the sea-coast, from Algeziras to Conil, in furtherance of -a great project which Soult was then meditating, and by which he -hoped to effect, not only the entire subjection of Andalusia, but the -destruction of the British power in the Peninsula. But this design, -which shall be hereafter explained more fully, required several -preliminary operations, amongst the most important of which was the -capture of Tarifa; for that place, situated in the narrowest part -of the straits, furnished either a protection, or a dangerous point -of offence, to the Mediterranean trade, following the relations -of its possessor with England. It affected, as we have seen, the -supplies of the French before the Isla; it was from its nearness, -and from the run of the current, the most convenient and customary -point for trading with Morocco; it menaced the security of Ceuta, -and it possessed, from ancient recollections, a species of feudal -superiority over the smaller towns, and ports along the coast, which -would have given the French, if they had taken it, a moral influence -of some consequence. - -Soult had in August despatched a confidential officer from Conil to -the African coast to negotiate with the Barbaric emperor, and the -latter had agreed to a convention, by which he engaged to exclude -British agents from his court; and to permit vessels of all nations -to use the Moorish flag to cover their cargoes, while carrying to -the French those supplies hitherto sent to the allies, provided -Soult would occupy Tarifa as a depôt. This important convention was -on the point of being ratified, when the opportune arrival of some -unusually magnificent presents from England, turned the scale against -the French: their agent was then dismissed, the English supplies were -increased, and Mr. Stuart entered into a treaty for the purchase of -horses to remount the allied cavalry. - -Although foiled in this attempt, Soult, calculating on the capricious -nature of barbarians, resolved to fulfil his part by the capture -of Tarifa; hence it was, that when Ballesteros appeared at Ximena, -he arrested the movement of Drouet against the Alemtejo, and sent -troops from Seville by Ubrique against the Spanish general, whose -position besides being extremely inconvenient to the first and fourth -corps, was likely to affect the taking of Tarifa. Ballesteros, if -reinforced, might also have become very dangerous to the blockade of -Cadiz, by intercepting the supplies from the Campiña de Tarifa, and -still more by menacing Victor’s communications with Seville, along -the Guadalquivir. A demonstration by the allies in the Isla de Leon -arrested the march of these French troops for a moment, but on the -14th eight thousand men under generals Godinot and Semélé advanced -upon St. Roque and Algeziras. The inhabitants of those places -immediately fled to the green island, and Ballesteros took refuge -under Gibraltar, where his flanks were covered by the gun-boats of -the place. The garrison was too weak to assist him with men, and -thus cooped up, he lived upon the resources of the place, while -efforts were therefore made to draw off the French by harassing their -flanks. The naval means were not sufficient to remove his whole army -to another quarter, but seven hundred were transported to Manilba, -where the Serranos and some Partidas had assembled on the left of -the French, and at the same time twelve hundred British troops with -four guns, under colonel Skerrett, and two thousand Spaniards, under -Copons, sailed from Cadiz to Tarifa to act upon the French right. - -Copons was driven back by a gale of wind, but Skerrett arrived the -17th. The next day Godinot sent a detachment against him, but the -sea-road by which it marched was so swept with the guns of the Tuscan -frigate, aided by the boats of the Stately, that the French after -losing some men returned. Then Godinot and Semélé being in dispute, -and without provisions, retreated; they were followed by Ballesteros’ -cavalry as far as Ximena, where the two generals separated in great -anger, and Godinot having reached Seville shot himself. This failure -in the south unsettled Soult’s plans, and was followed by a heavier -disaster in Estremadura. - - -SURPRISE OF AROYO MOLINO. - -When Drouet had retired to Zafra, Hill received orders from -Wellington to drive Girard away from Caceres, that Morillo might -forage that country. For this purpose he assembled his corps at -Albuquerque on the 23d, and Morillo brought the fifth Spanish army -to Aliseda on the Salor. Girard was then at Caceres with an advanced -guard at Aroyo de Puerco, but on the 24th Hill occupied Aliseda and -Casa de Cantillana, and the Spanish cavalry drove the French from -Aroyo de Puerco. The 26th at day-break Hill entered Malpartida de -Caceres, and his cavalry pushed back that of the enemy. Girard then -abandoned Caceres, but the weather was wet and stormy, and Hill, -having no certain knowledge of the enemy’s movements, halted for the -night at Malpartida. - -On the morning of the 27th the Spaniards entered Caceres; the enemy -was tracked to Torre Mocha on the road to Merida; and the British -general, hoping to intercept their line of march, pursued by a cross -road, through Aldea de Cano and Casa de Don Antonio. During this -movement intelligence was received that the French general had halted -at Aroyo Molino, leaving a rear-guard at Albala, on the main road -to Caceres, which proved that he was ignorant of the new direction -taken by the allies, and only looked to a pursuit from Caceres. Hill -immediately seized the advantage, and by a forced march reached -Alcuesca in the night, being then within a league of Aroyo de Molinos. - -This village was situated in a plain, and behind it a sierra or -ridge of rocks, rose in the form of a crescent, about two miles wide -on the chord. One road led directly from Alcuesca upon Aroyo, another -entered it from the left, and three led from it to the right. The -most distant of the last was the Truxillo road, which rounded the -extremity of the sierra; the nearest was the Merida road, and between -them was that of Medellin. - -During the night, though the weather was dreadful, no fires were -permitted in the allied camp; and at two o’clock in the morning of -the 28th, the troops moved to a low ridge, half-a-mile from Aroyo, -under cover of which they formed three bodies; the infantry on the -wings and the cavalry in the centre. The left column then marched -straight upon the village, the right marched towards the extreme -point of the sierra, where the road to Truxillo turned the horn of -the crescent; the cavalry kept its due place between both. - -One brigade of Girard’s division, having marched at four o’clock by -the road of Medellin, was already safe, but Dombrouski’s brigade -and the cavalry of Briche were still in the place; the horses of -the rear-guard, unbridled, were tied to the olive-trees, and the -infantry were only gathering to form on the Medellin road outside -the village. Girard himself was in his quarters, waiting for his -horse, when two British officers galloped down the street, and in an -instant all was confusion; the cavalry bridled their horses, and the -infantry run to their alarming posts. But a thick mist rolled down -the craggy mountain, a terrifying shout, drowning even the clatter of -the elements arose on the blast, and with the driving storm came the -seventy-first and ninety-second regiments, charging down the street. -Then the French rear-guard of cavalry, fighting and struggling hard, -were driven to the end of the village, and the infantry, hastily -forming their squares, covered the main body of the horsemen which -gathered on their left. - -The seventy-first immediately lined the garden walls, and opened a -galling fire on the nearest square, while the ninety-second filing -out of the streets formed upon the French right; the fiftieth -regiment closely following, secured the prisoners in the village, -and the rest of the column, headed by the Spanish cavalry, skirted -the outside of the houses, and endeavoured to intercept the line of -retreat. The guns soon opened on the French squares, the thirteenth -dragoons captured their artillery, the ninth dragoons and German -hussars, charged their cavalry and entirely dispersed it with -great loss; but Girard, an intrepid officer, although wounded, -still kept his infantry together, and continued his retreat by the -Truxillo road. The right column of the allies was however already -in possession of that line, the cavalry and artillery were close -upon the French flank, and the left column, having re-formed, -was again coming up fast; Girard’s men were falling by fifties, -and his situation was desperate, yet he would not surrender, but -giving the word to disperse, endeavoured to escape by scaling the -almost inaccessible rocks of the sierra. His pursuers, not less -obstinate, immediately divided. The Spaniards ascended the hills -at an easier part beyond his left, the thirty-ninth regiment and -Ashworth’s Portuguese turned the mountain by the Truxillo road; the -twenty-eighth and thirty-fourth, led by general Howard, followed him -step by step up the rocks, and prisoners were taken every moment, -until the pursuers, heavily loaded, were unable to continue the trial -of speed with men who had thrown away their arms and packs. Girard, -Dombrouski, and Briche, escaped at first to San Hernando, and Zorita, -in the Guadalupe mountains, after which, crossing the Guadiana at -Orellano on the 9th of November, they rejoined Drouet with about six -hundred men, the remains of three thousand. They were said to be -the finest troops then in Spain, and indeed their resolution not to -surrender in such an appalling situation was no mean proof of their -excellence. - -The trophies of this action were the capture of twelve or thirteen -hundred prisoners, including general Bron, and the prince of -Aremberg; all the French artillery, baggage, and commissariat, -together with a contribution just raised; and during the fight, a -Portuguese brigade, being united to Penne Villamur’s cavalry was sent -to Merida, where some stores were found. The loss of the allies was -not more than seventy killed and wounded, but one officer, lieutenant -Strenowitz, was taken. He was distinguished by his courage and -successful enterprises, but he was an Austrian, who having abandoned -the French army in Spain to join Julian Sanchez’ Partida, was liable -to death by the laws of war; having been however originally forced -into the French service he was, in reality, no deserter. General -Hill, anxious to save him, applied frankly to general Drouet, and -such was the latter’s good temper, that while smarting under this -disaster he released his prisoner. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 4 Plate 6._ - - _Explanatory Sketch of_ - GEN^L. HILL’S OPERATIONS, - 1811. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._] - -Girard was only deprived of his division, which was given to -general Barois, yet in a military point of view his offence was -unpardonable. He knew two or three days before, that general Hill -was near him; he knew that there was a good road from Malpartida -to Alcuesca, because he had himself passed it coming from Caceres; -and yet he halted at Aroyo de Molino without necessity, and without -sending out even a patrole upon his flank, thus sacrificing two -thousand brave men. Napoleon’s clemency was therefore great, and yet -not misplaced, for Girard, afterwards, repaid it by his devotion at -the battle of Lutzen when the emperor’s star was on the wane. On the -other hand general Hill neglected no precaution, let no advantage -escape; and to good arrangements added celerity of movement, with the -utmost firmness and vigour of execution. His troops seconded him as -he merited; and here was made manifest the advantage of possessing -the friendship of a people so strongly influenced by the instincts of -revenge as the Peninsulars; for, during the night of the 27th, every -Spaniard in Aroyo, as well as in Alcuesca, knew that the allies were -at hand, and not one was found so base or so indiscreet as to betray -the fact. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s papers, MSS.] - -This blow being struck, Hill returned to his old quarters, and the -Spanish troops fell back behind the Salor, but the report of Girard’s -disaster set all the French corps in motion. Drouet reoccupied -Caceres with a thousand men; Foy passed the Tagus at Almaraz on the -15th of November, and moved to Truxillo; a convoy entered Badajos -from Zafra on the 12th, a second on the 20th, and Soult, while -collecting troops in Seville, directed Phillipon to plant all the -ground under the guns at Badajos with potatoes and corn. Every thing -seemed to indicate a powerful attack upon Hill, when a serious -disturbance amongst the Polish troops, at Ronquillo, obliged Soult -to detach men from Seville to quell it. When that was effected, a -division of four thousand entered Estremadura, and Drouet, whose -corps was thus raised to fourteen thousand infantry and three -thousand cavalry, on the 5th of December advanced to Almendralejos, -and the 18th his advanced guard occupied Merida. At the same time -Marmont concentrated part of his army at Toledo, from whence -Montbrun, as we have seen, was directed to aid Suchet at Valencia, -and Soult with the same view sent ten thousand men to the Despeños -Peros. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.] - -Drouet’s movements were, however, again stopped by some -insubordination in the fifth corps. And as it was now known that -Soult’s principal object was to destroy Ballesteros, and take Tarifa, -Hill again advanced, partly to protect Morillo from Drouet, partly -to save the resources of Estremadura, partly to make a diversion in -favour of Ballesteros and Tarifa, and in some sort also for Valencia. -With this view he entered Estremadura by Albuquerque on the 27th of -December, and having received information that the French, untaught -by their former misfortunes were not vigilant, he made a forced march -in hopes to surprise them. On the 28th he passed Villar del Rey and -San Vincente and reached Nava de Membrillos, where he fell in with -three hundred French infantry, and a few hussars, part of a foraging -party, the remainder of which was at a village two leagues distant. -A patrole gave an alarm, the French retreated towards Merida, and -were closely followed by four hundred of the allied cavalry, who -had orders to make every effort to stop their march; but to use the -words of general Hill, “the intrepid and admirable manner in which -the enemy retreated, the infantry formed in square, and favoured as -he was by the nature of the country of which he knew how to take the -fullest advantage, prevented the cavalry alone from effecting any -thing against him.” Captain Neveux, the able officer who commanded -on this occasion, reached Merida with a loss of only forty men, all -killed or wounded by the fire of the artillery; but the French at -Merida immediately abandoned their unfinished works, and evacuated -that town in the night, leaving behind some bread and a quantity of -wheat. - -[Sidenote: 1812. January] - -From Merida, Hill, intending to fight Drouet, marched on the 1st of -January to Almendralejos, where he captured another field store; but -the French general, whose troops were scattered, fell back towards -Zafra; the weather was so bad, and the roads so deep, that general -Hill with the main body halted while colonel Abercrombie with a -detachment of Portuguese and German cavalry followed the enemy’s -rear-guard. Meanwhile Phillipon, who never lost an advantage, sent, -either the detachment which had escorted the convoy to Badajos, or -some Polish troops with whom he was discontented, down the Portuguese -frontier on the right of the Guadiana, by Moura, Mourao, and Serpe, -with orders to drive the herds of cattle from those places into the -sierra Morena. - -Abercrombie reached Fuente del Maestro, on the evening of the 3d, -where, meeting with a stout squadron of the enemy, a stiff charge -took place, and the French out-numbered and flanked on both sides -were overthrown with a loss of thirty men. But Drouet was now in full -retreat for Monasterio, and Morillo moving upon Medellin, took post -at San Benito. Thus the allies remained masters of Estremadura until -the 13th of January, when Marmont’s divisions moved by the valley -of the Tagus towards the eastern frontier of Portugal; Hill then -returned to Portalegre and sent a division over the Tagus to Castello -Branco. Drouet immediately returned to Llerena and his cavalry -supported by a detachment of infantry marched against Morillo, but -that general, instead of falling back when Hill did, had made a -sudden incursion to La Mancha, and was then attacking the castle of -Almagro. There, however, he was so completely defeated by general -Treillard that, flying to Horcajo in the Guadaloupe mountains, -although he reached it on the 18th, his fugitives were still coming -in on the 21st, and his army remained for a long time in the greatest -disorder. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.] - -While the events, recorded in the foregoing chapter, were passing in -Estremadura, the south of Andalusia was the scene of more important -operations. Soult, persisting in his design against Tarifa, had given -orders to assemble a battering train, and directed general Laval -with a strong division of the 4th corps to move from Antequera upon -San Roque. Skerrett was then menacing the communications of general -Semélé on the side of Vejer de Frontera, and Ballesteros had obtained -some success against that general at Bornos on the 5th of November; -but Skerrett finding that Copons instead of four thousand had only -brought seven hundred men, returned to Tarifa on the approach of some -French from Conil. - -Semélé, being thus reinforced, obliged Ballesteros, on the 27th, -again to take refuge under the walls of Gibraltar, which he reached -just in time, to avoid a collision with Laval’s column from -Antequera. Semélé’s troops did not follow very close, and a combined -attack upon Laval by the divisions of Ballesteros, Skerrett, and -Copons, was projected. The two latter with a part of the troops under -Ballesteros, were actually embarked on the 29th of November for the -purpose of landing at Manilba, in pursuance of this scheme, when -Semélé’s column came in sight, and Skerrett and Copons instantly -returned to Tarifa. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.] - -Ballesteros remained at Gibraltar, a heavy burthen upon that -fortress, and his own troops without shelter from the winter rain, -wherefore general Campbell proposed to send them, in British vessels, -to renew the attempt against Malaga, which had formerly failed -under Lord Blayney. On the 12th of January, at the very moment of -embarking, the French retired from before Gibraltar, by the Puerto de -Ojen, a grand pass connecting the plains of Gibraltar and the vallies -of the Guadaranque, with the great and rich plain called the Campiña -de Tarifa; and with the gorge of Los Pedragosos, which is the eastern -entrance to the pastures called the Vega de Tarifa. This movement -was preparatory to the siege of Tarifa; and as the battering train -was already within five leagues of that place, Skerrett proposed to -seize it by a combined operation from Cadiz, Tarifa, Gibraltar, and -Los Barios, where Ballesteros had now taken post. This combination -was however on too wide a scale to be adopted in all its parts; -Ballesteros indeed fell on the enemy by surprise at the pass of Ojen, -and Skerrett and Copons received orders from general Campbell to take -advantage of this diversion; but the former, seeing that his own plan -was not adopted to its full extent, would not stir, and the Spaniards -after a skirmish of six hours retired. Laval then left fifteen -hundred men to observe Ballesteros, and placing a detachment at -Vejes to cover his right flank, threaded Los Pedragosos and advanced -against Tarifa. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 7._ - - _Explanatory Sketch_ - OF THE - SIEGE OF TARIFA. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._] - -This town was scarcely expected by the French to make any resistance. -It was encircled with towers, which were connected by an ancient -archery wall, irregular in form without a ditch, and so thin as to -offer no resistance even to field artillery. To the north and east, -some high ridges flanked, and seemed entirely to command the weak -rampart; but the English engineer had observed that the nearest -ridges formed, at half pistol-shot, a natural glacis, the plane of -which, one point excepted, intersected the crest of the parapet with -great nicety; and to this advantage was added a greater number of -towers, better flanks, and more powerful resources for an interior -defence. He judged therefore that the seemingly favourable nature of -the ridges combined with other circumstances, would scarcely fail to -tempt the enemy to commence their trenches on that side. With a view -to render the delusion unavoidable, he strengthened the western front -of the place, rendered the access to it uneasy, by demolishing the -main walls and removing the flooring of an isolated suburb on the -north-west; and an outwork, of a convent which was situated about a -hundred yards from the place, and to the east of the suburb. This -done, he prepared an internal defence, which rendered the storming -of the breach the smallest difficulty to be encountered; but to -appreciate his design the local peculiarities must be described. - -Tarifa was cloven in two by the bed of a periodical torrent which -entering at the east, passed out at the opposite point. This stream -was barred, at its entrance, by a tower with a portcullis, in front -of which pallisades were planted across the bed of the water. The -houses within the walls were strongly built and occupied inclined -planes rising from each side of the torrent, and at the exit of the -latter there were two massive structures, forming part of the walls -called the tower and castle of the Gusmans, both of which looked -up the hollow formed by the meeting of the inclined planes at the -stream. From these structures, first a sandy neck of land, and then -a causeway, the whole being about six hundred yards long, joined the -town to an island, or rather promontory, about two thousand yards in -circumference, with perpendicular sides, which forbade any entrance -save by the causeway; and at the island end of the latter there was -an unfinished entrenchment and battery. - -On the connecting neck of land were some sand hills, the highest of -which, called the Catalina, was scarped and crowned with a slight -field work, containing a twelve-pounder. This hill covered the -causeway, and in conjunction with the tower of the Gusmans, which -was armed with a ship eighteen-pounder, flanked the western front, -and commanded all the ground between the walls and the island. The -gun in the tower of the Gusmans also shot clear over the town on to -the slope where the French batteries were expected to be raised; and -in addition to these posts, the stately ship of the line, the Druid -frigate, and several gun and mortar-boats were anchored in the most -favourable situation for flanking the enemy’s approaches. - -Reverting then to the head of the defence, it will be seen, that -while the ridges on the eastern fronts, and the hollow bed of the -torrent, which offered cover for troops moving to the assault, -deceitfully tempted the enemy to that side; the flanking fire of the -convent, the ruins of the suburb, the hill of the Catalina, and the -appearance of the shipping deterred them even from examining the -western side, and as it were, forcibly urged them towards the eastern -ridge where the English engineer wished to find them. There he had -even marked their ground, and indicated the situation of the breach; -that is to say, close to the entrance of the torrent, where the -hollow meeting of the inclined planes rendered the inner depth of the -walls far greater than the outer depth; where he had loop-holed the -houses, opened communications to the rear, barricaded the streets, -and accumulated obstacles. The enemy after forcing the breach would -thus have been confined between the houses on the inclined planes, -exposed on each side to the musketry from the loop-holes and windows, -and in front to the fire of the tower of the Gusmans, which looked -up the bed of the torrent. Thus disputing every inch of ground, the -garrison could at worst have reached the castle and tower of the -Gusmans, which being high and massive were fitted for rear-guards to -cover the evacuation of the place, and were provided with ladders for -the troops to descend and retreat to the island under cover of the -Catalina. - -The artillery available for the defence appeared very powerful, -for besides that of the shipping, and the guns in the Catalina, -there were in the island twelve pieces, comprising four -twenty-four-pounders, and two ten-inch mortars; and in the town -there were six field-pieces and four coehorns on the east front. An -eighteen-pounder was on the Gusmans, a howitzer on the portcullis -tower, and two field-pieces were kept behind the town in reserve for -sallies; but most of the artillery in the island was mounted after -the investment, so that two twenty-four-pounders and two mortars -only, could take part in the defence of the town; and as the walls -and towers of the latter were too weak and narrow to sustain heavy -guns, only three field-pieces and the coehorns did in fact reply to -the enemy’s fire. - - -SIEGE OF TARIFA. - -The garrison, including six hundred Spanish infantry and one hundred -horse of that nation, amounted to two thousand five hundred men, and -was posted in the following manner. Seven hundred were in the island, -one hundred in the Catalina, two hundred in the convent, and fifteen -hundred in the town. - -On the 19th of December the enemy having driven in the advanced -posts, were encountered with a sharp skirmish, and designedly led -towards the eastern front. - -The 20th the place was invested, but on the 21st a picquet of French -troops having incautiously advanced towards the western front, -captain Wren of the eleventh suddenly descended from the Catalina -and carried them off. In the night the enemy approached close to the -walls, but the next morning captain Wren again came down from the -Catalina, and, at the same time, the troops sallied from the convent, -with a view to discover the position of the French advanced posts. So -daring was this sally that Mr. Welstead of the eighty-second actually -pushed into one of their camps and captured a field-piece there; -and although he was unable to bring it off, in face of the French -reserves, the latter were drawn by the skirmish under the fire of the -ships, of the island, and of the town, whereby they suffered severely -and could with difficulty recover the captured piece of artillery -from under the guns of the north-east tower. - -In the night of the 22d the anticipations of the British engineer -were realized. The enemy broke ground in two places, five hundred -yards from the eastern front, and assiduously pushed forward their -approaches until the 26th; but always under a destructive fire, to -which they replied with musketry, and with their wall-pieces, which -killed several men, and would have been very dangerous, but for the -sand-bags which captain Nicholas, the chief engineer at Cadiz, had -copiously supplied. This advantage was however counterbalanced by the -absence of the ships which were all driven away in a gale on the 23rd. - -On the 27th the French battering-train arrived, and on the 29th -the sixteen-pounders opened against the town, and the howitzers -against the island. These last did little damage beyond dismounting -the gun in the tower of the Gusmans, which was however quickly -re-established; but the sixteen-pounders brought the old wall down in -such flakes, that in a few hours a wide breach was effected, a little -to the left of the portcullis tower, looking from the camp. - -The place was now exposed both to assault and escalade, but behind -the breach the depth to the street was above fourteen feet, the space -below was covered with iron window-gratings, having every second -bar turned up, the houses there, and behind all points liable to -escalade, were completely prepared and garrisoned, and the troops -were dispersed all round the ramparts, each regiment having its own -quarter assigned. The Spanish and forty-seventh British regiment -guarded the breach, and on their right some riflemen prolonged the -line. The eighty-seventh regiment occupied the portcullis tower and -extended along the rampart to the left. - -In the night of the 29th the enemy fired salvos of grape on the -breach, but the besieged cleared the foot of it between the -discharges. - -The 30th the breaching fire was renewed, the wall was broken for -sixty feet, and the whole breach offered an easy ascent, yet the -besieged again cleared away the rubbish, and in the night were fast -augmenting the defences behind, when a heavy rain filled the bed -of the river, and the torrent bringing down, from the French camp, -planks, fascines, gabions, and dead bodies, broke the palisades with -a shock, bent the portcullis backward, and with the surge of the -waters even injured the defences behind the breach: a new passage was -thus opened in the wall, yet such was the vigour of the besieged, -that the damage was repaired before the morning, and the troops -calmly and confidently awaited - - -THE ASSAULT. - -The waters subsided in the night as quickly as they had risen, but -at daylight a living stream of French grenadiers glided swiftly down -the bed of the river, and as if assured of victory, arrived, without -shout or tumult, within a few yards of the walls, when, instead of -quitting the hollow, to reach the breach, they, like the torrent -of the night, continued their rapid course and dashed against the -portcullis. The British soldiers, who had hitherto been silent and -observant, as if at a spectacle which they were expected to applaud, -now arose, and with a crashing volley smote the head of the French -column! The leading officer, covered with wounds, fell against the -portcullis and gave up his sword through the bars to colonel Gough; -the French drummer, a gallant boy, who was beating the charge, -dropped lifeless by his officer’s side, and the dead and wounded -filled the hollow. The remainder of the assailants then breaking -out to the right and left, spread along the slopes of ground under -the ramparts and opened a quick irregular musketry. At the same -time, a number of men coming out of the trenches, leaped into pits -digged in front, and shot fast at the garrison, but no escalade or -diversion at the other points was made, and the storming column was -dreadfully shattered. For the ramparts streamed forth fire, and from -the north-eastern tower a field-piece, held in reserve expressly -for the occasion, sent, at pistol-shot distance, a tempest of grape -whistling through the French masses, which were swept away in such a -dreadful manner, that they could no longer endure the destruction, -but plunging once more into the hollow returned to their camp, while -a shout of victory, mingled with the sound of musical instruments, -passed round the wall of the town. - -[Sidenote: 1812. January.] - -[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -In this combat the allies lost five officers and thirty-one men, -but the French dead covered all the slopes in front of the rampart, -and choked the bed of the river, and ten wounded officers, of -whom only one survived, were brought in by the breach. Skerrett, -compassionating their sufferings and admiring their bravery, -permitted Laval to fetch off the remainder; and the operations of -the siege were then suspended, for both sides suffered severely -from the weather. The rain partially ruined the French batteries, -interrupted their communications, and stopped their supplies; on -the other hand the torrent, again swelling, broke the stockades -of the allies and injured their retrenchments, and some vessels, -coming from Gibraltar with ammunition, were wrecked on the coast. -Nevertheless a fresh assault was hourly expected until the night of -the 4th, when, several cannon-shots being heard in the French camp, -without any bullets reaching the town, it was judged that the enemy -were destroying the guns previous to retreating. Soon afterwards -large fires were observed, and at daylight the troops issuing out -of the convent, drove the enemy from the batteries, and commenced a -skirmish with the rear-guard; but a heavy storm impeded the action; -the French conducted their retreat skilfully, and the British, after -making a few prisoners, relinquished the pursuit. Nevertheless -Laval’s misfortunes did not end here. The privations his troops had -endured in the trenches produced sickness; many men deserted, and it -was computed, at the time, that the expedition cost the French not -less than a thousand men, while the whole loss of the allies did not -exceed one hundred and fifty. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI. Section 3.] - -Such is the simple tale of Tarifa, but the true history of its -defence cannot there be found. To hide the errors of the dead is -not always a virtue, and when it involves injustice to the living -it becomes a crime; colonel Skerrett has obtained the credit, but -he was not the author of the success at Tarifa. He, and lord Proby, -the second in command, were from the first impressed with a notion, -that the place could not be defended and ought to be abandoned; -all their proceedings tended to that end, and they would even have -abandoned the island. At colonel Skerrett’s express desire general -Cooke had recalled him on the 18th, that is to say, the day before -the siege commenced; and during its progress he neither evinced -hopes of final success, nor made exertions to obtain it; in some -instances he even took measures tending directly towards failure. To -whom then was England indebted for this splendid achievement? The -merit of the conception is undoubtedly due to general Campbell, the -lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar. He first occupied Tarifa, and he -also engaged the Spaniards to admit an English garrison into Ceuta, -that the navigation of the straits and the coasting trade might be -secured; for he was the only authority in the south of the Peninsula -who appeared to understand the true value of those points. Finally, -it was his imperious and even menacing orders, which prevented -colonel Skerrett from abandoning Tarifa before the siege commenced. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI. Section 5.] - -General Campbell’s resolution is the more to be admired, because -Tarifa was, strictly speaking, not within his command, which did -not extend beyond the walls of his own fortress; and he had also -to contend against general Cooke, who claimed the controul of a -garrison which was chiefly composed of troops from Cadiz. He acted -also contrary to the opinion of lord Wellington, who, always averse -to any serious co-operation with the Spaniards, as well knowing -the latter would inevitably fail, and throw the burthen on the -British in the hour of need, was in this instance more strongly -influenced, because the reports of general Cooke, founded on colonel -Skerrett’s and lord Proby’s representations, reprobated the defence -of Tarifa. Thus misinformed of the real resources, and having no -local knowledge of the place, lord Wellington judged, that the -island only could be held—that Skerrett’s detachment was not wanting -for that purpose—and that without the island the enemy could not -keep possession of Tarifa. Were they even to take both, he thought -they could not retain them, while Ballesteros was in strength and -succoured from Gibraltar, unless they also kept a strong force in -those parts; finally, that the defence of the island was the least -costly and the most certain. However, with that prudence, which -always marked his proceedings, although he gave his opinion, he -would not interfere from a distance, in a matter which could only be -accurately judged of on the spot. - -But the island had not a single house, and was defenceless; the -rain alone, without reckoning the effects of the enemy’s shells, -would have gone near to force the troops away; and as the shipping -could not always remain in the roadstead, the building of casemates -and barracks, and storehouses for provisions and ammunition, would -have been more expensive than the defence of the town. Tarifa was -therefore an outwork to the island, and one so capable of a good -defence that a much more powerful attack had been expected, and a -more powerful resistance prepared by the English engineer; a defence -not resting on the valour of the troops alone, but upon a skilful -calculation of all the real resources, and all the chances. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted despatches, 17th April, 1812.] - -[Sidenote: General Campbell’s papers, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI.] - -That the value of the object was worth the risk may be gathered -from this, that Soult, three months after the siege, thus expressed -himself, “The taking of Tarifa will be more hurtful to the English -and to the defenders of Cadiz, than the taking of Alicant or even -Badajos, where I cannot go without first securing my left and taking -Tarifa.” And, besides the advantages already noticed as belonging -to the possession of this place, it was close to Ceuta where there -were a few British soldiers, but many French prisoners, and above -two thousand discontented Spanish troops and galley-slaves; Ceuta, -which was so neglected by the Spanish regency that a French general, -a prisoner, did not hesitate to propose to the governor to give it -up to Soult as his only means of avoiding starvation. Neither would -Soult have failed to strengthen himself at Tarifa in despite of -Ballesteros, were it only to command the supplies of the Campiña, -and those from Barbary which could but be brought to that port or to -Conil: the latter was however seldom frequented by the Moors, because -the run was long and precarious, whereas a favourable current always -brought their craft well to Tarifa. Swarms of French gun-boats would -therefore soon have given Soult the command of the coasting trade, if -not of the entire straits. - -Tarifa then was worth the efforts made for its defence; and setting -aside the courage and devotion of the troops, without which nothing -could have been effected, the merit chiefly appertains to sir Charles -Smith, the captain of engineers. That officer’s vigour and capacity -overmatched the enemy’s strength without, and the weakness and -cajolement of those who did not wish to defend it within. Skerrett -could not measure a talent above his own mark, and though he yielded -to Smith’s energy, he did so with avowed reluctance, and dashed it -with some wild actions, for which it is difficult to assign a motive; -because he was not a dull man, and he was a brave man, as his death -at Bergen-op-Zoom proved. But his military capacity was naught, and -his mind did not easily catch another’s enthusiasm. Tarifa was the -commentary upon Taragona. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI. Section 3.] - -During the siege, the engineer’s works in front were constantly -impeded by colonel Skerrett; he would call off the labourers to -prepare posts of retreat, and Smith’s desire to open the north-gate, -(which had been built up,) that the troops might have egress in -case of escalade, was opposed by him, although there was no other -point for the garrison to sally, save by the sea-gate which was -near the castle. On the 29th of December a shell, fired from the -eighteen-pounder in the tower of the Gusmans, having bursted too -soon, killed or wounded one of the inhabitants, and a deputation of -the citizens came to complain of the accident; Colonel Skerrett, -although the breach was then open, immediately ordered that gun, and -a thirty-two-pound caronade, which at four hundred yards looked into -the French batteries, to be dismounted and spiked! and it was done! -To crown this absurd conduct, he assigned the charge of the breach -entirely to the Spanish troops, and if Smith had not insisted upon -posting the forty-seventh British regiment alongside of them, this -alone would have ruined the defence; because hunger, nakedness, and -neglect, had broken the spirit of those poor men, and during the -combat general Copons alone displayed the qualities of a gallant -soldier. - -To the British engineer, therefore, the praise of this splendid -action is chiefly due; because he saw from the first all the -resources of the place, and with equal firmness and talent developed -them, notwithstanding the opposition of his superiors; because at the -same time he, by skilful impositions, induced the enemy (whose attack -should have embraced the suburbs and the north-west salient angle -of the place) to open his trenches on the east, where the besieged, -under the appearance of weakness, had concentrated all their -strength; finally, because he repressed despondency where he failed -to infuse confidence. The second in merit was captain Mitchell, of -the artillery; because in the management of that arm for the defence -of the town, his talent and enterprise were conspicuous, especially -during the assault; nor can the result of this last event be taken -as the just measure of either officer’s merits, seeing that a -prolonged siege and a more skilful and powerful attack was expected. -In the enemy’s camp was found the French engineer’s sketch for a -renewed operation by a cautious and extensive system of mines and -breaches; but nothing was there laid down that had not been already -anticipated, and provided against by his British opponents. If then -the defence of Tarifa was a great and splendid exploit, and none can -doubt that it was, those who conceived, planned, and executed it -should have all the glory. Amongst those persons colonel Skerrett has -no right to be placed; yet, such are the errors of power, that he was -highly applauded for what he did not do, and general Campbell was -severely rebuked by lord Liverpool for having risked his Majesty’s -troops! - -The French displayed courage but no skill. For two days, their heavy -howitzers had been directed vaguely against the interior of the -town, and the distant island, whither the unfortunate people fled -from their shattered and burning houses. A portion of the shells -thus thrown away in cruelty would have levelled the north-east tower -with the ground, and the French were aware of its importance; but -throughout the siege their operations were mastered by the superior -ability of the engineer and artillery officers opposed to them. - -In the expectation that a more powerful attack would be made in the -spring, general Campbell directed casemates and splinter proofs to -be made in the island, but Skerrett’s troops were recalled to Cadiz, -which now contained nearly eight thousand British, exclusive of -fifteen hundred of these destined for Carthagena and Alicant. This -arrangement was however soon changed, because the events of the -war put Carthagena out of the French line of operations, and the -pestilence there caused the removal of the British troops. Neither -was Tarifa again attacked; lord Wellington had predicted that it -would not, and on sure grounds, for he was then contemplating a -series of operations, which were calculated to change the state of -the war, and which shall be set forth in the next book. - - - - -BOOK XVI. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -Up to this period, the invasion, although diversified by occasional -disasters on the part of the invaders, had been progressive. The -tide, sometimes flowing, sometimes ebbing, had still gained upon the -land, and wherever the Spaniards had arrested its progress, it was -England that urged their labour and renovated their tired strength; -no firm barrier, no solid dike, had been opposed to its ravages, save -by the British general in Portugal, and even there the foundation of -his work, sapped by the trickling waters of folly and intrigue, was -sliding away. By what a surprising effort of courage and judgment -he secured it shall now be shown; and as the field operations, in -this war, were always influenced more by political considerations, -than by military principles, it will be necessary first to place the -general’s situation with respect to the former in its true light. - -_Political situation of king Joseph._ France, abounding in riches -and power, was absolute mistress of Europe from the Pyrenees to the -Vistula; but Napoleon, resolute to perfect his continental system for -the exclusion of British goods, now found himself, in the pursuit -of that object, hastening rapidly to a new war, and one so vast, -that even his force was strained to meet it. The Peninsula already -felt relief from this cause. The dread of his arrival ceased to -influence the operations of the allied army in Portugal, many able -French officers were recalled, and as it was known that the imperial -guards, and the Polish troops, were to withdraw from Spain, the scale -of offensive projects was necessarily contracted. Conscripts and -young soldiers instead of veterans, and in diminished numbers, were -now to be expected; and in the French army there was a general, and -oppressive sense, of the enormous exertion which would be required to -bring two such mighty wars to a happy conclusion. On the other hand, -the Peninsulars were cheered by seeing so powerful a monarch, as the -czar, rise in opposition to Napoleon, and the English general found -the principal basis of his calculations realized by this diversion. -He had never yet been strong enough to meet eighty thousand French -troops in battle, even under a common general; but his hopes rose -when he saw the great warrior of the age, not only turning himself -from the contest, but withdrawing from it a reserve of four hundred -thousand veterans, whose might the whole world seemed hardly able to -withstand. - -The most immediate effect, however, which the approaching contest -with Russia produced in the Peninsula, was the necessity of restoring -Joseph to his former power over the French armies. While the emperor -was absent from Paris, the supreme controul of the operations could -only be placed in the hands of the monarch of Spain; yet this was -only to reproduce there, and with greater virulence, the former -jealousies and disputes. Joseph’s Spanish policy remained unchanged; -the pride of the French generals was at least equal to his, pretexts -for disputes were never wanting on either side, and the mischievous -nature of those disputes may be gathered from one example. In -November the king being pressed for money, sold the magazines of corn -collected near Toledo, for the army of Portugal, and without which -the latter could not exist; Marmont, regardless of the political -scandal, immediately sent troops to recover the magazines by force, -and desired the purchasers to reclaim their money from the monarch. - -_Political state of Spain._ All the intrigues and corruptions and -conflicting interests before described had increased in violence. The -negotiations for the mediation of England with the colonies, were not -ended; Carlotta still pressed her claims; and the division between -the liberals and serviles, as they were called, became daily wider. -Cadiz was in 1811 the very focus of all disorder. The government -was alike weak and dishonest, and used many pitiful arts to extract -money from England. No subterfuge was too mean. When Blake was going -with the fourth army to Estremadura, previous to the battle of -Albuera, the minister Bardaxi entreated the British envoy to grant a -loan, or a gift, without which, he asserted, Blake could not move; -Mr. Wellesley refused, because a large debt was already due to the -legation, and the next morning a Spanish ship of war from America -landed a million and a half of dollars! - -In July, notwithstanding the victory of Albuera, the regency was -held in universal contempt, both it and the cortes were without -influence, and their conduct merited it. For although vast sums -were continually received, and every service was famished, the -treasury was declared empty, and there was no probability of any -further remittances from America. The temper of the public was soured -towards England, the press openly assailed the British character, and -all things so evidently tended towards anarchy, that Mr. Wellesley -declared “Spanish affairs to be then worse than they had been at any -previous period of the war.” - -The cortes, at first swayed by priests and lawyers, who cherished -the inquisition and were opposed to all free institutions, was now -chiefly led by a liberal or rather democratic party, averse to the -British influence; hence, in August a new constitution, quite opposed -to the aristocratic principle, was promulgated. With the excellencies -and defects of that instrument the present History has indeed little -concern, but the results were not in accord with the spirit of the -contrivance, and the evils affecting the war were rather increased -by it; the democratic basis of the new constitution excited many -and bitter enemies, and the time and attention, which should have -been bestowed upon the amelioration of the soldiers’ condition, was -occupied in factions, disputes, and corrupt intrigues. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I.] - -That many sound abstract principles of government were clearly and -vigorously laid down in the scheme of this constitution, cannot be -denied, the complicated oppressions of the feudal system were swept -away with a bold and just hand; but of what avail, as regarded the -war, was the enunciation of principles which were never attempted to -be reduced to practice? What encouragement was it to the soldier, to -be told he was a free man, fighting for a constitution as well as for -national independence, when he saw the authors of that constitution, -corruptly revelling in the wealth which should have clothed, and -armed, and fed him? What was nominal equality to him, when he saw -incapacity rewarded, crimes and treachery unpunished in the rich, the -poor and patriotic oppressed? He laughed to scorn those who could -find time to form the constitution of a great empire, but could not -find time or honesty to feed, or clothe, or arm the men who were to -defend it! - -The enemies of democracy soon spread many grievous reports of -misfortunes and treachery, some true, some false; and at the most -critical period of the war in Valencia, they endeavoured to raise a -popular commotion to sweep away the cortes. The monks and friars, -furious at the suppression of the inquisition, were the chief -plotters every where; and the proceedings of Palacios, in concert -with them, were only part of a church project, commenced all over -Spain to resist the cortes. In October, Lardizabal, the other deposed -regent, published at Alicant, a manifesto, in which he accused the -cortes and the Cadiz writers of jacobinism, maintained the doctrine -of passive obedience, and asserted, that the regents only took the -oath to the cortes, because they could not count on the army or the -people at Cadiz; otherwise they would cause the king’s authority to -be respected in their persons as his only legitimate representatives. -This manifesto was declared treasonable, and a vessel was despatched -to bring the offender to Cadiz; but the following day it was -discovered, that the old council of Castile had also drawn up a -manifesto similar in principle, and the persons sent by the cortes -to seize the paper were told that it was destroyed. The protest of -three members against it was however found, and five lawyers were -selected from the cortes to try the guilty councillors and Lardizabal. - -In November the public cry for a new regency became general, and it -was backed by the English plenipotentiary. Nevertheless the matter -was deferred upon divers pretexts, and meanwhile the democratic party -gained strength in the cortes, and the anti-British feeling appeared -more widely diffused than it really was; because some time elapsed -before the church and aristocratic party discovered that the secret -policy of England was the same as their own. It was so, however, -even to the upholding of the inquisition, which it was ridiculously -asserted had become objectionable only in name; as if, while the -frame-work of tyranny existed, there could ever be wanting the will -to fill it up. Necessity alone induced the British cabinet to put on -a smooth countenance towards the cortes. In this state of affairs, -the negotiation for the colonial mediation, was used by the Spaniards -merely as a ground for demanding loans, subsidies, and succours in -kind, which they used in fitting out new expeditions against the -revolted colonists; the complaints of the British legation on this -point were quite disregarded. At this time also Lapeña was acquitted -of misconduct at Barosa, and would have been immediately re-employed, -if the English minister had not threatened to quit Cadiz, and advised -general Cooke to do the same. - -Mr. Wellesley seeing that the most fatal consequences to the war must -ensue, if a stop was not put to the misconduct of the regency, had -sent Mr. Vaughan, the secretary of legation, to acquaint the British -cabinet with the facts, and to solicit a more firm and decided course -of policy. Above all things he desired to have the subsidies settled -by treaty, that the people of Spain might really know what England -had done and was still doing for them; for on every occasion, arms, -clothing, ammunition, loans, provisions, guns, stores, and even -workmen and funds, to form founderies, were demanded and obtained -by the Spanish government, and then wasted or embezzled, without -the people benefiting, or even knowing of the generosity, or rather -extravagance, with which they were supplied; while the receivers and -wasters were heaping calumnies on the donors. - -[Sidenote: 1811. June.] - -[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria.] - -The regency question was at last seriously discussed in the cortes, -and the deputy, Capmany, who if we may believe the partizans of -Joseph, was anti-English in his heart, argued the necessity of this -change on the ground of pleasing the British. This excited great -discontent, as he probably intended, and many deputies declared -at first that they would not be dictated to by any foreign power; -but the departure of Mr. Vaughan alarmed them, and a commission, -formed to improve the mode of governing, was hastening the decision -of the question, when Blake’s disaster at Valencia completed the -work. Carlotta’s agent was active in her behalf, but the eloquent -and honest Arguelles was opposed to him; and the cortes although -they recognized her claim to the succession, denied her the regency, -because of a previous decree which excluded all royal personages from -that office. - -[Sidenote: 1812.] - -On the 21st of January 1812, after a secret discussion of twenty-four -hours, a new regency, to consist of five members, of which two -were Americans, was proclaimed. The men chosen, were the duke of -Infantado, then in England, Henry O’Donnel, admiral Villarvicencio, -Joachim de Mosquera, and Ignacios de Ribas; and each was to have the -presidency by rotation for six months. - -They commenced beneficially. O’Donnel was friendly to the British -alliance, and proposed a military feast, to restore harmony between -the English and Spanish officers; he made many changes in the -department of war, and finances; consulted the British generals, and -disbanding several bad regiments, incorporated the men with other -battalions; he also reduced many inefficient and malignant colonels, -and striking off from the pay lists all unemployed and absent -officers, it was found, that they were five thousand in number! -Ballesteros was appointed captain-general of Andalusia and received -the command of the fourth army, whose head-quarters were prudently -removed to Algeziras; the troops there were encreased, by drafts -from Cadiz to ten or twelve thousand men, and a new army was set on -foot in Murcia. Finally, to check trading with the French a general -blockade of all the coast in their possession, from Rosas to St. -Sebastian, was declared. - -But it was soon discovered that the secret object was to obtain a -loan from England, and as this did not succeed, and nothing good was -ever permanent in Spanish affairs, the old disputes again broke out. -The democratic spirit gained strength in the cortes; the anti-English -party augmented; the press abounded in libels, impugning the good -faith of the British nation, especially with respect to Ceuta; for -which however there was some plausible ground of suspicion, because -the acquisition of that fortress had actually been proposed to lord -Liverpool. The new regency, also as violent as their predecessors -with respect to America, disregarded the mediation, and having -secretly organized in Gallicia an expedition against the colonies, -supplied it with artillery furnished from England for the French -war, and then, under another pretence, demanded money of the British -minister to forward this iniquitous folly. - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -_Political state of Portugal._—In October all the evils before -described still existed, and were aggravated. The old disputes -remained unsettled, the return of the royal family was put off, and -the reforms in the military system, which Beresford had repaired to -Lisbon to effect, were either thwarted or retarded by the regency. -Mr. Stuart indeed forced the government to repair the bridges and -roads in Beira, to throw some provisions into the fortresses; -and, in despite of Redondo, the minister of finance, who, for the -first time, now opposed the British influence, he made the regency -substitute a military chest and commissariat, instead of the “Junta -de Viveres.” But Forjas and Redondo then disputed for the custody of -the new chest; and when Mr. Stuart explained to the one, that, as -the intent was to separate the money of the army from that of the -civil departments, his claims were incompatible with such an object; -and to the other that the conduct of his own department was already -more than he could manage, both were offended; and this new source of -disorder was only partially closed by withholding the subsidy until -they yielded. - -Great malversations in the revenue were also discovered; and a plan, -to enforce an impartial exaction of the “decima,” which was drawn -up by Nogueira, at the desire of Wellington, was so ill received -by those whose illegal exemptions it attacked, that the Souzas -immediately placed themselves at the head of the objectors out of -doors. Nogueira then modified it, but the Souzas still opposed, and -as Wellington, judging the modification to be an evasion of the -principle, would not recede from the first plan, a permanent dispute -and a permanent evil, were thus established by that pernicious -faction. In fine, not the Souzas only, but the whole regency in -their folly now imagined that the war was virtually decided in their -favour, and were intent upon driving the British away by disgusting -the general. - -A new quarrel also arose in the Brazils. Lord Wellington had been -created conde de Vimiero, Beresford conde de Trancoso, Silveira -conde d’Amurante; and other minor rewards, of a like nature, had -been conferred on subordinate officers. These honours had however -been delayed in a marked manner, and lord Strangford, who appears -to have been ruled entirely by the Souza faction, and was therefore -opposed to Forjas, charged, or as he termed it, reported a charge, -made against the latter, at the Brazils, for having culpably delayed -the official return of the officers who were thus to be rewarded. -Against this accusation, which had no foundation in fact, seeing that -the report had been made, and that Forjas was not the person to whose -department it belonged, lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart protested, -because of the injustice; and because it was made in pursuance of a -design to remove Forjas from the government. The English general was -however thus placed in a strange position, for while his letters to -Forjas were menacing rebukes to him, and his coadjutors, for their -neglect of public affairs; and while his formal complaints of the -conduct of the regency were transmitted to the Brazils, he was also -obliged to send other letters in support of the very persons whom he -was justly rebuking for misconduct. - -In the midst of these embarrassments, an accidental event was like -to have brought the question of the British remaining in Portugal -to a very sudden decision. While Massena was before the lines, -one d’Amblemont had appeared in North America, and given to Onis, -the Spanish minister, a plan for burning the British fleet in the -Tagus, which he pretended to have received orders from the French -government to execute. This plan being transmitted to the Brazils, -many persons named by d’Amblemont as implicated were, in consequence -arrested at Lisbon and sent to Rio Janeiro, although Mr. Stuart had -ascertained the whole affair to be a forgery. The attention paid to -this man by Onis and by the court of Rio Janeiro, induced him to -make farther trial of their credulity, and he then brought forward -a correspondence between the principal authorities of Mexico and -the French government; he even produced letters from the French -ministers, directing intrigues to be commenced at Lisbon, and the -French interest there to be placed in the hands of the Portuguese -intendant of police. - -Mr. Stuart, lamenting the ruin of many innocent persons, whom -this forging villain was thus dooming, prayed lord Wellesley to -interfere; but meanwhile the court of Rio Janeiro, falling headlong -into the snare, sent orders to arrest more victims; and amongst -others, without assigning any cause, and without any communication -with the English general, the regency seized one Borel, a clerk in -the department of the British paymaster-general. This act being at -once contrary to treaty, hostile to the alliance, and insulting in -manner, raised lord Wellington’s indignation to such a pitch, that he -formally notified to the Portuguese government his resolution, unless -good reasons were assigned and satisfaction made for the outrage, -to order all persons attached to the British to place themselves -in security under the protection of the army, as if in a hostile -country, until the further pleasure of the British prince regent -should be made known. - -The political storm which had been so long gathering then seemed -ready to break, but suddenly the horizon cleared. Lord Wellington’s -letter to the prince, backed up by lord Wellesley’s vigorous -diplomacy, had at last alarmed the court of Rio Janeiro, and in -the very crisis of Borel’s case came letters, in which the prince -regent admitted, and approved of all the ameliorations and changes -proposed by the English general; and the contradiction given by -Mr. Stuart to the calumnies of the Souza faction, was taken as the -ground for a complete and formal retraction, by Linhares, of his -former insinuations, and insulting note relative to that gentleman’s -conduct. Principal Souza was however not dismissed, nor was Forjas’ -resignation noticed, but the prince declared that he would overlook -that minister’s disobedience, and retain him in office; thus proving -that fear, not conviction, or justice, for Forjas had not been -disobedient, was the true cause of this seeming return to friendly -relations with the British. - -Mr. Stuart considering the submission of the prince to be a mere -nominal concession of power which was yet to be ripened into real -authority, looked for further difficulties, and he was not mistaken: -meanwhile he made it a point of honour to defend Forjas, and -Nogueira, from the secret vengeance of the opposite faction. The -present submission of the court however gave the British an imposing -influence, which rendered the Souzas’ opposition nugatory for the -moment. Borel was released and excuses were made for his arrest; -the formation of a military chest was pushed with vigour; the paper -money was raised in value; the revenue was somewhat increased, and -Beresford was enabled to make progress in the restoration of the -army. The prince had however directed the regency to revive his -claim to Olivenza immediately; and it was with difficulty that -lord Wellington could stifle this absurd proceeding; neither did -the forced harmony last, for the old abuses affecting the civil -administration of the army rather increased, as will be shewn in the -narration of military operations which are now to be treated of. - -[Sidenote: 1811. October.] - -It will be remembered that after the action of El Bodon, the allied -army was extensively cantoned on both sides of the Coa. Ciudad -Rodrigo was distantly observed by the British, and so closely by -Julian Sanchez, that on the 15th he carried off more than two hundred -oxen from under the guns of the place, and at the same time captured -general Renaud the governor, who had imprudently ventured out with -a weak escort. At this time Marmont had one division in Placentia, -and the rest of his infantry between that place and Madrid; but his -cavalry was at Peneranda on the Salamanca side of the mountains, and -his line of communication was organized on the old Roman road of the -Puerto de Pico, which had been repaired after the battle of Talavera. -The army of the north stretched from the Tormes to Astorga, the walls -of which place, as well as those of Zamora, and other towns in Leon, -were being restored, that the flat country might be held with a few -troops against the Gallician army. It was this scattering of the -enemy which had enabled lord Wellington to send Hill against Girard -at Aroyo de Molino; but when the reinforcements from France reached -the army of Portugal, the army of the north was again concentrated, -and would have invaded Gallicia while Bonet attacked the Asturias, -if Julian Sanchez’s exploit had not rendered it necessary first to -revictual Ciudad Rodrigo. - -With this view a large convoy was collected at Salamanca, in -October, by general Thiebault, who spread a report that a force -was to assemble towards Tamames, and that the convoy was for its -support. This report did not deceive lord Wellington; but he believed -that the whole army of the north and one division of the army of -Portugal would be employed in the operation, and therefore made -arrangements to pass the Agueda and attack them on the march. The -heavy rains however rendered the fords of that river impracticable; -Thiebault seized the occasion, introduced the convoy, and leaving a -new governor returned on the 2nd of November before the waters had -subsided. One brigade of the light division was at this time on the -Vadillo, but it was too weak to meddle with the French, and it was -impossible to reinforce it while the Agueda was overflowed; for such -is the nature of that river that all military operations on its banks -are uncertain. It is very difficult for an army to pass it, at any -time in winter, because of the narrow roads, the depth of the fords -and the ruggedness of the banks; it will suddenly rise from rains -falling on the hills, without any previous indication in the plains, -and then the violence and depth of its stream will sweep away any -temporary bridge, and render it impossible to pass except by the -stone bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was at this time in the enemy’s -possession. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.] - -Early in November, Bonet, having reoccupied the Asturias, Dorsenne -marched a body of troops towards the hills above Ciudad, as if to -conduct another convoy; but the allied troops being immediately -concentrated, passed the Agueda at the ford of Zamara, whereupon the -French retired, and their rear was harassed by Carlos d’España and -Julian Sanchez, who captured some provisions and money contributions -they had raised. But now the provisions in the country between the -Coa and the Agueda were all consumed, and the continued negligence of -the Portuguese government, with respect to the means of transport, -rendered it impossible to bring up the field magazines from the -points of water carriage to the army. Lord Wellington was therefore, -contrary to all military rules, obliged to separate his divisions in -face of the enemy, and to spread the troops, especially the cavalry, -even to the Mondego and the valley of the Douro, or see them starved. - -To cover this dangerous proceeding he kept a considerable body of -men beyond the Coa, and the state of all the rivers and roads, at -that season, together with the distance of the enemy in some measure -protected him; general Hill’s second expedition into Estremadura was -then also drawing the attention of the French towards that quarter; -finally Marmont, being about to detach Montbrun towards Valencia, -had withdrawn Foy’s division from Placentia, and concentrated -the greatest part of his army at Toledo; all which rendered the -scattering of the allies less dangerous, and in fact no evil -consequences ensued. This war of positions had therefore turned -entirely to the advantage of the allies, lord Wellington by taking -post near Ciudad Rodrigo while Hill moved round Badajos, had in a -manner paralysed three powerful armies. For Soult harassed by Hill -in Estremadura, and by Ballesteros and Skerrett in Andalusia, failed -in both quarters; and although Marmont in conjunction with Dorsenne, -had succoured Ciudad Rodrigo, the latter general’s invasion of -Gallicia had been stopped short, and his enterprises confined to the -reoccupation of the Asturias. - -Meanwhile the works of Almeida were so far restored as to secure it -from a sudden attack, and in November when the army by crossing the -Agueda had occupied the attention of the French, the battering train -and siege stores were brought to that fortress, without exciting the -enemy’s attention, because they appeared to be only the armament -for the new works; a trestle bridge to throw over the Agueda was -also secretly prepared in the arsenal of Almeida by major Sturgeon -of the staff corps, an officer whose brilliant talents, scientific -resources, and unmitigated activity continually attracted the -attention of the whole army. Thus the preparation for the attack of -Ciudad advanced while the English general seemed to be only intent -upon defending his own positions. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -Having now brought the story of the war to that period, when, after -many changes of fortune, the chances had become more equal, and the -fate of the Peninsula, thrown as it were between the contending -powers, became a prize for the readiest and boldest warrior, I would, -ere it is shown how Wellington seized it, recal to the reader’s -recollection the previous vicissitudes of the contest. I would have -him remember how, when the first, or insurrectional epoch of the war, -had terminated successfully for the Spaniards, Napoleon vehemently -broke and dispersed their armies, and drove the British auxiliaries -to embark at Coruña. How the war with Austria, and the inactivity of -Joseph, rendered the emperor’s victories unavailing, and revived the -confidence of the Spaniards. How sir Arthur Wellesley, victorious on -the Douro, then marched into Spain, and, although the concentrated -force of the enemy, and the ill conduct of the Spanish government, -forced him to retreat again to Portugal as sir John Moore, from the -same causes, had been obliged to retreat to the ocean, he by his -advance relieved Gallicia, as Moore had by a like operation before -saved Andalusia, which concluded the third epoch. - -How the peninsulars, owing to the exertions of their allies, still -possessed a country, extending from the Asturias, through Gallicia, -Portugal, Andalusia, Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and including -every important harbour and fortress except Santander, Santona, -Barcelona, and St. Sebastian. How Wellington appreciating the -advantages which an invaded people possess in their numerous lines of -operation, then, counselled the Spaniards, and forced the Portuguese, -to adopt a defensive war; and with the more reason that England, -abounding beyond all nations in military resources, and invincible -as a naval power, could form with her ships a secure exterior -floating base or line of depôts round the Peninsula, and was ready to -employ her armies as well as her squadrons in the struggle. How the -Spaniards, unheeding these admonitions, sought great battles, and in -a few months lost the Asturias, Andalusia, Estremadura, Aragon, and -the best fortresses of Catalonia, and were again laid prostrate and -helpless before the enemy. - -How the victorious French armies then moved onwards, in swelling -pride, until dashed against the rocks of Lisbon they receded, broken -and refluent, and the English general once more stood a conqueror on -the frontier of Spain; and had he then retaken Badajos and Rodrigo -he would have gloriously finished the fourth or defensive epoch of -the war. But being baffled, partly by skill, partly by fortune; -factiously opposed by the Portuguese regency, thwarted by the Spanish -government, only half supported by his own cabinet, and pestered by -the follies of all three, he was reduced to a seeming inactivity; and -meanwhile the French added Taragona and the rich kingdom of Valencia -to their conquests. - -These things I would have the reader reflect upon, because they -are the proofs of what it is the main object of this history to -inculcate, namely that English steel, English gold, English genius, -English influence, fought and won the battle of Spanish independence; -and this not as a matter of boast, although it was very glorious! -but as a useful lesson of experience. On the other hand also we must -wonder at the prodigious strength of France under Napoleon, that -strength which could at once fight England and Austria, aim at the -conquest of the Peninsula, and the reduction of Russia at the same -moment of time, and all with good hope of success. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 2.] - -Let it not be said that the emperor’s efforts in the war of Spain -were feeble, for if the insurrectional epoch, which was unexpected -and accidental, be set aside, the grandeur of his efforts will be -found answerable to his gigantic reputation. In 1809 the French army -was indeed gradually decreased by losses and drafts for the Austrian -war, from three hundred and thirty-five thousand, which Napoleon -had led into the country, to two hundred and twenty-six thousand. -But in 1810 it was again raised to three hundred and sixty-nine -thousand, and fluctuated between that number and three hundred and -thirty thousand until August 1811, when it was again raised to three -hundred and seventy-two thousand men with fifty-two thousand horses! -And yet there are writers who assert that Napoleon neglected the war -in Spain! But so great is the natural strength of that country, that -had the firmness of the nation in battle and its wisdom in council, -been commensurate with its constancy in resistance, even this power, -backed by the four hundred thousand men who marched to Russia, would -scarcely have been sufficient to subdue it; whereas, weak in fight -and steeped in folly, the Spaniards must have been trampled in the -dust, but for the man whose great combinations I am now about to -relate. - -The nicety, the quickness, the prudence, and the audacity of -Wellington’s operations, cannot however be justly estimated without -an exact knowledge of his political, local, and moral position. His -political difficulties have been already described, and his moral -situation was simply, that of a man, who felt, that all depended upon -himself; that he must by some rapid and unexpected stroke effect in -the field what his brother could not effect in the cabinet, while -the power of the Perceval faction was prevalent in England. But to -understand his local or military position, the conformation of the -country and the lines of communication must be carefully considered. - -The principal French magazines were at Valladolid, and their advanced -troops were on the Tormes, from whence to the Agueda, where they held -the important point of Ciudad Rodrigo, was four long marches through -a wild forest country. - -The allies’ line of communication from the Agueda to Lisbon, was -supplied by water to Raiva on the Mondego, after which the land -carriage was at least a hundred miles, through wild mountains, or -devastated valleys; it required fifteen days to bring up a convoy -from Lisbon to the army. - -The line of communication with Oporto on the left flank, run through -eighty miles of very rugged country, before it reached the first -point of water carriage on the Douro. - -The line of communication with Hill’s army on the right flank, -running also through a country full of strong passes and natural -obstacles, offered no resources for an army, save what were furnished -by the allies’ field magazines, which were supplied from Abrantes, -the first navigable point on the Tagus. On this line the boat-bridge -of Villa Velha was a remarkable feature, as furnishing the only -military passage over the Tagus between Abrantes and Almaraz. - -The country between the Coa and the Agueda could not supply the -troops who occupied it; and the nature of the last river, and the -want of a covering position beyond, rendered it a matter of the -utmost danger and difficulty to besiege or even invest Ciudad -Rodrigo. The disadvantage which the French suffered in being so -distant from that fortress was thus balanced. - -These considerations had prevented the English general from attacking -Ciudad Rodrigo in May; he had then no battering train, and Almeida -and her guns, were rendered a heap of ruins by the exploit of -Brenier. Badajos was at that period his object, because Beresford was -actually besieging it, and the recent battle of Fuentes Onoro, the -disputes of the French generals, the disorganization of Massena’s -army, and as proved by that battle, the inefficiency of the army of -the north, rendered it improbable that a serious invasion of Portugal -would be resumed on that side. And as the lines of communication with -the Mondego and the Douro, were not then completely re-established, -and the intermediate magazines small, no incursion of the enemy could -have done much mischief; and Spencer’s corps was sufficiently strong -to cover the line to Vilha Velha. - -Affairs however soon changed. The skill of Phillipon, the diligence -of Marmont, and the generalship of Soult, in remaining at Llerena -after his repulse at Albuera, had rescued Badajos. Lord Wellington’s -boldness in remaining on the Caya prevented further mischief, but -the conduct of the Portuguese government, combined with the position -which Napoleon had caused Marmont to take in the valley of the -Tagus, effectually precluded a renewal of that siege; and then the -fallacious hope of finding Ciudad unprovided, brought lord Wellington -back to the Coa. This baffled the enemy’s projects, yet the position -of the army of the north, and that of Portugal, the one in front, the -other on the flank, prevented the English general from undertaking -any important operations in the field. For if he had advanced on -Salamanca, besides the natural difficulties of the country, his -communications with Hill, and even with Abrantes and Lisbon, would -have been cut by Marmont; and if he turned against Marmont on the -Tagus, Soult and Dorsenne would have closed upon his flanks. - -This state of affairs not being well considered, had induced some -able officers, at the time of the Elbodon operation, to censure -the line of retreat to Sabugal, because it uncovered the line of -Celerico, and exposed to capture the battering train then at Villa -Ponte; but war is always a choice of difficulties, and it was better -to risk guns, of whose vicinity the enemy was not aware, than to give -up the communication with Hill which was threatened by the advance of -Foy’s two divisions on Zarza Maior. - -As the French armies were reinforced after the allies came to -Beira, Dorsenne and Marmont became each equal to Wellington in the -field, and together infinitely too strong. Soult was then master of -Andalusia, and had a moveable reserve of twenty thousand men; the -army of Suchet daily gained ground in Valencia, the Asturias were -reoccupied by Bonet, and the army of the centre was reorganized. -Hence, to commence the siege of either Ciudad or Badajos, in form, -was hopeless, and when the rumour of Napoleon’s arrival became rife, -the English general, whose embarrassments were hourly increasing, -looked once more to the lines of Torres Vedras as a refuge. But -when the certainty of the Russian war removed this fear, the aspect -of affairs again changed, and the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo became -possible. For, first, there was a good battering train in Almeida, -and the works of that place were restored; secondly, the line of -communication with Oporto was completely organized, and shortened -by improving the navigation of the Douro; thirdly, Ciudad itself -was very weakly garrisoned and the ignorance of the French as to -the state of the allies’ preparations gave hope of a surprise. It -was, however, only by a surprise that success could be expected, -and it was not the least of lord Wellington’s merits that he so -well concealed his preparations, and for so long a period. No other -operation, promising any success, was open; and yet the general -could no longer remain inactive, because around him the whole fabric -of the war was falling to pieces from the folly of the governments -he was serving. If he could not effect a blow against the French -while Napoleon was engaged in the Russian war, it was clear that the -Peninsula would be lost. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.] - -Now the surprise of a fortress, with a garrison of only seventeen -hundred men, seems a small matter in such grave circumstances, but -in reality it was of the very greatest importance, because it was -the first step in a plan which saved the Peninsula when nothing else -could have saved it. Lord Wellington knew that the valley of the -Tagus, could not long support both the army of Portugal, and the -army of the centre; he knew by intercepted letters that Marmont and -the king were already at open war upon the subject, and he judged, -that if he could surprise Ciudad Rodrigo, the army of Portugal would -be obliged, for the sake of provisions, and to protect Leon, then -weakened by the departure of the imperial guards, to concentrate in -that province. This was the first step. - -The French kept magazines in reserve for sudden expeditions, feeding -meanwhile as they could upon the country, and therefore their -distress for provisions never obstructed their moving upon important -occasions. Nevertheless lord Wellington thought the tempestuous -season would render it very difficult for Marmont, when thus forced -into Leon, to move with great masses; wherefore he proposed when -Rodrigo fell, to march by Vilha Velha to Estremadura, and suddenly -besiege Badajos also, the preparations to be previously made in -Elvas, under the protection of Hill’s corps, and unknown to the -enemy. This was the second step, and in this surprise also he -hoped to be successful, because of the jealousies of the marshals, -the wet season, and his own combinations, which would impede -the concentration of the French armies, and prevent them from -keeping together if they did unite. He had hopes likewise that as -Ballesteros’ corps was now augmented, it would vex Soult’s posts on -the coast, while Hill and Morillo harassed him on the Guadiana; and -if Badajos fell, the English general was resolved to leave a force -to cover the captured place against the army of the centre, and then -fight Soult in Andalusia. For he judged that Marmont could not for -want of provisions, pass beyond the Guadiana, nor follow him before -the harvest was ripe; neither did he fear him in Beira, because the -torrents would be full, the country a desert, and the militia, aided -by a small regular corps, and covered by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, -would, he thought, be sufficient to prevent any serious impression -being made on Portugal during the invasion of Andalusia. - -This was lord Wellington’s plan, and his firmness and resolution -in conceiving it were the more signal because his own troops were -not in good plight. The army had indeed received reinforcements, -but the infantry had served at Walcheren, and exposure to night -air, or even slight hardship, threw them by hundreds into the -hospital, while the new regiments of cavalry, inexperienced, and -not acclimated, were found, men and horses, quite unfit for duty, -and were sent to the rear. The pay of the army was three months in -arrear, and the supplies, brought up with difficulty, were very -scanty; half and quarter rations were often served, and sometimes -the troops were without any bread for three days consecutively, and -their clothing was so patched, that scarcely a regiment could be -known by its uniform. Chopped straw, the only forage, was so scarce -that the regimental animals were dying of hunger; corn was rarely -distributed save to the generals and staff, and even the horses of -the artillery and of the old cavalry suffered; nay, the very mules -of the commissariat were pinched by the scarcity, and the muleteers -were eight months in arrears of pay. The cantonments on the Coa -and Agueda were unhealthy from the continued rains, above twenty -thousand men were in hospital; and deduction made for other drains, -only fifty-four thousand of both nations, including garrisons and -posts of communication, were under arms. To finish the picture, -the sulky apathy produced in the Portuguese regency by the prince -regents letter, was now becoming more hurtful than the former active -opposition. - -[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.] - -But even these distresses so threatening to the general cause, -Wellington turned to the advantage of his present designs; for the -enemy were aware of the misery in the army, and in their imagination -magnified it; and as the allied troops were scattered, for relief, -from the Gata mountains to the Douro, and from the Agueda to the -Mondego, at the very moment when the battering train entered Almeida, -both armies concluded, that these guns were only to arm that -fortress, as a cover to the extended country quarters which necessity -had forced the British general to adopt. No person, not even the -engineers employed in the preparations, knew more than that a siege -or the simulation of a siege was in contemplation; but when it was to -be attempted, or that it would be attempted at all, none knew; even -the quarter-master general Murray, was permitted to go home on leave, -with the full persuasion that no operation would take place before -spring. - -In the new cantonments, however, abundance of provisions, and dry -weather (for in Beira the first rains generally subside during -December,) stopped the sickness, and restored about three thousand -men to the ranks; and it would be a great error to suppose, that -the privations had in any manner weakened the moral courage of the -troops. The old regiments had become incredibly hardy and experienced -in all things necessary to sustain their strength and efficacy; the -staff of the army was well practised, and lord Fitzroy Somerset, the -military secretary, had established such an intercourse between the -head-quarters and the commanders of battalions, that the latter had, -so to speak, direct communication with the general-in-chief upon -all the business of their regiments; a privilege which increased -the enthusiasm and zeal of all in a very surprising manner. For the -battalions being generally under very young men, the distinctions of -rank were not very rigidly enforced, and the merits of each officer -were consequently better known, and more earnestly supported when -promotion and honours were to be obtained. By this method lord -Fitzroy acquired an exact knowledge of the true moral state of each -regiment, rendered his own office at once powerful and gracious to -the army, and yet, such was his discretion and judgment, did in -no manner weaken the military hierarchy; thus also all the daring -young men were excited, and being unacquainted with the political -difficulties of their general, anticipated noble triumphs which were -happily realized. - -The favourable moment for action so long watched for by Wellington -came at last. An imperial decree had remodelled the French armies. -That of Aragon was directed to give up four divisions to form a -new corps, under Reille, called the “_army of the Ebro_,” whose -head-quarters were at Lerida. The army of the south was recomposed in -six divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, besides the garrison -of Badajos, and marshal Victor returned to France, discontented, for -he was one of those whose reputation had been abated by this war. -His divisions were given to generals Conroux, Barrois, Villatte, -Laval, Drouet, Daricau, Peyremont, Digeon, and the younger Soult, -Phillipon continuing governor of Badajos. The reserve of Monthion -was broken up, and the army of the north, destined to maintain the -great communications with France and to reduce the Partidas, on that -line, was ordered to occupy the districts round Santander, Sebastian, -Burgos, and Pampeluna, and to communicate by the left with the new -army of the Ebro: it was also exceedingly reduced in numbers; for -the imperial guards, seventeen thousand strong, were required for -the Russian war, and marched in December to France. And besides -these troops, the Polish battalions, the skeletons of the cavalry -regiments, and several thousand choice men destined to fill the ranks -of the old guard were drafted; so that not less than forty thousand, -of the very best soldiers, were withdrawn, and the maimed and -worn-out men being sent back to France at the same time, the force in -the Peninsula was diminished by sixty thousand. - -[Sidenote: 1812. January.] - -The head-quarters of the army of the north arrived at Burgos in -January, and a division was immediately sent to drive Mendizabel from -the Montaña de Santander; but as this arrangement weakened the grand -line of communication with France, Marmont was ordered to abandon -the valley of the Tagus and fix his head-quarters at Valladolid or -Salamanca. Ciudad Rodrigo, the sixth and seventh governments, and -the Asturias, were also placed under his authority, by which Souham -and Bonet’s division, forming together about eighteen thousand men, -were added to his army; but the former general returned to France. -These divisions however, being pressed by want, were extended from -the Asturias to Toledo, while Montbrun was near Valencia, and -meanwhile Soult’s attention was distracted by Tarifa, and by Hill’s -pursuit of Drouet. Thus the French armies, every where occupied, were -spread over an immense tract of country; Marmont deceived by the -seemingly careless winter attitude of the allies, left Ciudad Rodrigo -unprotected within their reach, and Wellington jumped with both feet -upon the devoted fortress. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. - -[Sidenote: 1812. January.] - -The troops disposable for the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo were about -thirty-five thousand, including cavalry; the materials for the siege -were established at Gallegos, Villa del Ciervo, and Espeja, on the -left of the Agueda, and the ammunition was at Almeida. From those -places, the hired carts and mules, were to bring up the stores to -the parc, and seventy pieces of ordnance had been collected at Villa -de Ponte. But from the scarcity of transports only thirty-eight guns -could be brought to the trenches, and these would have wanted their -due supply of ammunition, if eight thousand shot had not been found -amidst the ruins of Almeida. - -On the 1st of January the bridge was commenced at Marialva, near -the confluence of the Azava with the Agueda, about six miles below -Ciudad, and piles were driven into the bed of the river, above and -below, to which the trestles were tied to render the whole firm. -The fortress was to have been invested on the 6th, but the native -carters were two days moving over ten miles of flat and excellent -road, with empty carts; the operation was thus delayed, and it was -dangerous to find fault with these people, because they deserted on -the slightest offence. Meanwhile the place being closely examined, -it was found that the French, in addition to the old works, had -fortified two convents, which flanked and strengthened the bad -Spanish entrenchments round the suburbs. They had also constructed -an enclosed and palisadoed redoubt upon the greater Teson; and this -redoubt, called Francisco, was supported by two guns and a howitzer -placed on the flat roof of the convent of that name. - -The soil around was exceedingly rocky, except on the Teson itself, -and though the body of the place was there better covered by the -outworks, and could bring most fire to bear on the trenches, it was -more assailable according to the English general’s views; because -elsewhere the slope of the ground was such, that batteries must -have been erected on the very edge of the counterscarp before they -could see low enough to breach. This would have been a tedious -process, whereas the smaller Teson furnished the means of striking -over the crest of the glacis at once, and a deep gully near the -latter offered cover for the miners. It was therefore resolved to -storm fort Francisco, form a lodgement there, and opening the first -parallel along the greater Teson, to place thirty-three pieces in -counter-batteries with which to ruin the defences, and drive the -besieged from the convent of Francisco; then working forward by the -sap to construct breaching batteries on the lesser Teson, and blow in -the counterscarp, while seven guns, by battering a weak turret on the -left, opened a second breach, with a view to turn any retrenchment -behind the principal breach. - -The first, third, fourth, and light divisions, and Pack’s Portuguese, -were destined for the siege, but as the country on the right bank of -the Agueda was destitute of fuel and cover, these troops were still -to keep their quarters on the left bank; and although there was a -very severe frost and fall of snow, yet one division carrying a day’s -provisions ready cooked, was to ford the river, every twenty-four -hours, either above or below the town, and thus alternately carry on -the works. Meanwhile to cover the siege, Julian Sanchez and Carlos -d’España were posted on the Tormes in observation of the enemy. - -To obviate the difficulty of obtaining country transport, the English -general had previously constructed eight hundred carts drawn by -horses, and these were now his surest dependence for bringing up -ammunition; yet so many delays were anticipated from the irregularity -of the native carters and muleteers, and the chances of weather, that -he calculated upon an operation of twenty-four days, and yet hoped -to steal it from his adversaries; sure, even if he failed, that the -clash of his arms would again draw their scattered troops to that -quarter, as tinkling bells draw swarming bees to an empty hive. - -The 8th of January the light division and Pack’s Portuguese forded -the Agueda near Caridad, three miles above the fortress, and making -a circuit, took post beyond the great Teson, where they remained -quiet during the day, and as there was no regular investment, the -enemy believed not that the siege was commenced. But in the evening -the troops stood to their arms, and colonel Colborne commanding; the -fifty-second, having assembled two companies from each of the British -regiments of the light division, stormed the redoubt of Francisco. -This he did with so much fury, that the assailants appeared to be at -one and the same time, in the ditch, mounting the parapets, fighting -on the top of the rampart, and forcing the gorge of the redoubt, -where the explosion of one of the French shells had burst the gate -open. - -Of the defenders a few were killed, not many, and the remainder, -about forty in number, were made prisoners. The post being thus taken -with the loss of only twenty-four men and officers, working parties -were set to labour on the right of it, because the fort itself was -instantly covered with shot and shells from the town. This tempest -continued through the night, but at day-break the parallel, six -hundred yards in length, was sunk three feet deep, and four wide, -the communication over the Teson to the rear was completed, and -the progress of the siege was thus hastened several days by this -well-managed assault. - -The 9th the first division took the trenches in hand. The place was -encircled by posts to prevent any external communication, and at -night twelve hundred workmen commenced three counter-batteries, for -eleven guns each, under a heavy fire of shells and grape. Before -day-light the labourers were under cover, and a ditch was also sunk -in the front to provide earth; for the batteries were made eighteen -feet thick at top, to resist the very powerful artillery of the place. - -On the 10th the fourth division relieved the trenches, and a -thousand men laboured, but in great peril, for the besieged had a -superabundance of ammunition, and did not spare it. In the night the -communication from the parallel to the batteries was opened, and on -the 11th the third division undertook the siege. - -This day the magazines in the batteries were excavated, and the -approaches widened, but the enemy’s fire was destructive, and the -shells came so fast into the ditch in front of the batteries, -that the troops were withdrawn, and the earth was raised from the -inside. Great damage was also sustained from salvos of shells, with -long fuzes, whose simultaneous explosion cut away the parapets in a -strange manner, and in the night the French brought a howitzer to the -garden of the convent of Francisco, with which they killed many men -and wounded others. - -On the 12th the light division resumed the work, and the riflemen -taking advantage of a thick fog, covered themselves in pits, which -they digged in front of the trenches, and from thence picked off the -enemy’s gunners; but in the night the weather was so cold, and the -besieged shot so briskly, that little progress was made. - -The 13th, the first division being on duty, the same causes impeded -the labourers, and now also the scarcity of transport baulked the -general’s operations. One third only, of the native carts, expected, -had arrived, and the drivers of those present were very indolent; -much of the twenty-four pound ammunition was still at Villa de Ponte, -and intelligence arrived that Marmont was collecting his forces to -succour the place. Wellington therefore changing his first plan, -resolved to open a breach with his counter-batteries, which were not -quite six hundred yards from the curtain, and then to storm the place -without blowing in the counterscarp; in other words, to overstep the -rules of science, and sacrifice life rather than time, for such was -the capricious nature of the Agueda that in one night a flood might -enable a small French force to relieve the place. - -[Sidenote: Vide page 328.] - -The whole army was immediately brought up from the distant quarters, -and posted in the villages on the Coa, ready to cross the Agueda and -give battle; and it was at this time, that Hill, who was then at -Merida, returned to Portalegre, and sent a division across the Tagus, -lest Marmont in despair of uniting his force in the north, in time to -save Ciudad, should act against the line of communication by Castello -Branco and Vilha Velha. - -In the night of the 13th the batteries were armed with twenty-eight -guns, the second parallel and the approaches were continued by the -flying sap, and the Santa Cruz convent was surprised by the Germans -of the first division, which secured the right flank of the trenches. - -The 14th the enemy, who had observed that the men in the trenches -always went off in a disorderly manner on the approach of the relief, -made a sally and overturned the gabions of the sap; they even -penetrated to the parallel, and were upon the point of entering the -batteries, when a few of the workmen getting together, checked them -until a support arrived, and thus the guns were saved. This affair, -together with the death of the engineer on duty, and the heavy fire -from the town, delayed the opening of the breaching batteries, but at -half-past four in the evening, twenty-five heavy guns battered the -“_fausse braye_” and rampart, and two pieces were directed against -the convent of Francisco. Then was beheld a spectacle at once fearful -and sublime. The enemy replied to the assailants’ fire with more than -fifty pieces, the bellowing of eighty large guns shook the ground -far and wide, the smoke rested in heavy volumes upon the battlements -of the place, or curled in light wreaths about the numerous spires, -the shells, hissing through the air, seemed fiery serpents leaping -from the darkness, the walls crashed to the stroke of the bullet, and -the distant mountains, faintly returning the sound, appeared to moan -over the falling city. And when night put an end to this turmoil, the -quick clatter of musketry was heard like the pattering of hail after -a peal of thunder, for the fortieth regiment assaulted and carried -the convent of Francisco, and established itself in the suburb on the -left of the attack. - -The next day the ramparts were again battered, and fell so fast that -it was judged expedient to commence the small breach at the turret, -and in the night of the 15th five more guns were mounted. The 16th -at day-light the besiegers’ batteries recommenced, but at eight -o’clock a thick fog obliged them to desist, nevertheless the small -breach had been opened, and the place was now summoned, but without -effect. At night the parallel on the lower Teson was extended, and a -sharp musketry was directed from thence against the great breach. The -breaching battery as originally projected was also commenced, and the -riflemen of the light division, hidden in the pits, continued to pick -off the enemy’s gunners. - -The 17th the fire on both sides was very heavy and the wall of the -place was beaten down in large cantles; but several of the besiegers’ -guns were dismounted, their batteries injured, and many of their men -killed; general Borthwick the commandant of artillery was wounded -and the sap was entirely ruined. Even the riflemen in the pits were -at first overpowered with grape, yet towards evening they recovered -the upper hand, and the French could only fire from the more distant -embrasures. In the night the battery, intended for the lesser -breach, was armed, and that on the lower Teson raised so as to afford -cover in the day-time. - -On the 18th the besiegers’ fire was resumed with great violence. -The turret was shaken at the small breach, the large breach became -practicable in the middle, and the enemy commenced retrenching it. -The sap however could make no progress, the superintending engineer -was badly wounded, and a twenty-four pounder having bursted in the -batteries, killed several men. In the night the battery on the lower -Teson was improved, and a field-piece and howitzer being placed -there, kept up a constant fire on the great breach to destroy the -French retrenchments. - -On the 19th both breaches became practicable, major Sturgeon closely -examined the place, and a plan of attack was formed on his report; -the assault was then ordered, and the battering-guns were turned -against the artillery of the ramparts. - - -ASSAULT OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. - -This operation which was confided to the third and light divisions, -and Pack’s Portuguese, was organized in four parts. - -1º. _The right attack._ The light company of the eighty-third and the -second caçadores which were posted in the houses beyond the bridge -on the Agueda, were directed to cross that river and escalade an -outwork in front of the castle, where there was no ditch, but where -two guns commanded the junction of the counterscarp with the body of -the place. The fifth and ninety-fourth regiments posted behind the -convent of Santa Cruz and having the seventy-seventh in reserve, were -to enter the ditch at the extremity of the counterscarp; then to -escalade the “_fausse braye_,” and scour it on their left as far as -the great breach. - -2º. _The centre attack or assault of the great breach._ One hundred -and eighty men protected by the fire of the eighty-third regiment, -and carrying hay-bags to throw into the ditch, were to move out of -the second parallel and to be followed by a storming party, which was -again to be supported by general Mackinnon’s brigade of the third -division. - -3º. _Left attack._ The light division, posted behind the convent of -Francisco, was to send three companies of the ninety-fifth to scour -the “_fausse braye_” to the right, and so connect the left and centre -attacks. At the same time a storming party preceded by the third -caçadores carrying hay-sacks, and followed by Vandeleur’s and Andrew -Barnard’s brigades, was to make for the small breach, and when the -“_fausse braye_” was carried to detach to their right, to assist the -main assault, and to the left to force a passage at the Salamanca -gate. - -4º. _The false attack._ This was an escalade to be made by Pack’s -Portuguese on the St. Jago gate at the opposite side of the town. - -The right attack was commanded by colonel O’Toole of the caçadores. - -Five hundred volunteers commanded by major Manners of the -seventy-fourth with a forlorn hope under Mr. Mackie of the -eighty-eighth, composed the storming party of the third division. - -Three hundred volunteers led by major George Napier of the -fifty-second with a forlorn hope of twenty-five men under Mr. -Gurwood, of the same regiment, composed the storming party of the -light division. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Sect. 1.] - -All the troops reached their different posts without seeming to -attract the attention of the enemy, but before the signal was given, -and while lord Wellington, who in person had been pointing out the -lesser breach to major Napier, was still at the convent of Francisco, -the attack on the right commenced, and was instantly taken up along -the whole line. Then the space between the army and the ditch was -covered with soldiers and ravaged by a tempest of grape from the -ramparts. The storming parties of the third division jumped out of -the parallel when the first shout arose, but so rapid had been the -movements on their right, that before they could reach the ditch, -Ridge, Dunkin, and Campbell with the fifth, seventy-seventh, and -ninety-fourth regiments, had already scoured the “_fausse braye_,” -and were pushing up the great breach, amidst the bursting of shells, -the whistling of grape and muskets, and the shrill cries of the -French who were driven fighting behind the retrenchments. There -however they rallied, and aided by the musketry from the houses, made -hard battle for their post; none would go back on either side, and -yet the British could not get forward, and men and officers, falling -in heaps, choked up the passage, which from minute to minute was -raked with grape, from two guns, flanking the top of the breach at -the distance of a few yards; thus striving and trampling alike upon -the dead and the wounded these brave men maintained the combat. - -Meanwhile the stormers of the light division, who had three hundred -yards of ground to clear, would not wait for the hay-bags, but with -extraordinary swiftness running to the crest of the glacis, jumped -down the scarp, a depth of eleven feet, and rushed up the “_fausse -braye_” under a smashing discharge of grape and musketry. The bottom -of the ditch was dark and intricate, and the forlorn hope took -too much to their left; but the storming party went straight to -the breach, which was so contracted that a gun placed lengthwise -across the top nearly blocked up the opening. Here the forlorn hope -rejoined the stormers, but when two-thirds of the ascent were gained, -the leading men, crushed together by the narrowness of the place, -staggered under the weight of the enemy’s fire; and such is the -instinct of self-defence, that although no man had been allowed to -load, every musket in the crowd was snapped. The commander, major -Napier, was at this moment stricken to the earth by a grape-shot -which shattered his arm, but he called on his men to trust to their -bayonets, and all the officers simultaneously sprang to the front, -when the charge was renewed with a furious shout, and the entrance -was gained. The supporting regiments coming up in sections, abreast, -then reached the rampart, the fifty-second wheeled to the left, the -forty-third to the right, and the place was won. During this contest -which lasted only a few minutes, after the “_fausse braye_” was -passed, the fighting had continued at the great breach with unabated -violence, but when the forty-third, and the stormers of the light -division, came pouring down upon the right flank of the French, the -latter bent before the storm; at the same moment, the explosion of -three wall magazines destroyed many persons, and the third division -with a mighty effort broke through the retrenchments. The garrison -indeed still fought for a moment in the streets, but finally fled to -the castle, where Mr. Gurwood who though wounded, had been amongst -the foremost at the lesser breach, received the governor’s sword. - -The allies now plunged into the streets from all quarters, for -O’Toole’s attack was also successful, and at the other side of -the town Pack’s Portuguese, meeting no resistance, had entered -the place, and the reserves also came in. Then throwing off the -restraints of discipline the troops committed frightful excesses. The -town was fired in three or four places, the soldiers menaced their -officers, and shot each other; many were killed in the market-place, -intoxication soon increased the tumult, disorder every where -prevailed, and at last, the fury rising to an absolute madness, a -fire was wilfully lighted in the middle of the great magazine, when -the town and all in it would have been blown to atoms, but for the -energetic courage of some officers and a few soldiers who still -preserved their senses. - -[Sidenote: Captain Cooke’s Memoirs, vol. i.] - -Three hundred French had fallen, fifteen hundred were made prisoners, -and besides the immense stores of ammunition, above one hundred and -fifty pieces of artillery including the battering-train of Marmont’s -army, were captured in the place. The whole loss of the allies was -about twelve hundred soldiers and ninety officers, and of these -above six hundred and fifty men and sixty officers had been slain or -hurt at the breaches. General Crawfurd and general Mackinnon, the -former a man of great ability, were killed, and with them died many -gallant men, amongst others, a captain of the forty-fifth, of whom it -has been felicitously said, that “three generals and seventy other -officers bad fallen, but the soldiers fresh from the strife only -talked of Hardyman.” General Vandaleur, colonel Colborne, and a crowd -of inferior rank were wounded, and unhappily the slaughter did -not end with the battle, for the next day as the prisoners and their -escort were marching out by the breach, an accidental explosion took -place and numbers of both were blown into the air. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 8._ - - _Explanatory Sketch_ - OF THE - SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO, - 1812. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._] - -To recompense an exploit so boldly undertaken and so gloriously -finished, lord Wellington was created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by the -Spaniards, earl of Wellington by the English, and marquis of Torres -Vedras by the Portuguese; but it is to be remarked, that the prince -regent of Portugal had previous to that period displayed great -ingratitude in the conferring of honours upon the British officers. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. The duration of this siege was twelve days, or half the time -originally calculated upon by the English general, and yet the -inexperience both of the engineer and soldier, and the very heavy -fire of the place, had caused the works to be more slowly executed -than might have been expected; the cold also had impeded the -labourers, and yet with a less severe frost the trenches would have -been overflowed, because in open weather the water rises every where -to within six inches of the surface. But the worst obstacle was -caused by the disgraceful badness of the cutting-tools furnished -from the storekeeper-general’s office in England, the profits of -the contractor seemed to be the only thing respected; the engineers -eagerly sought for French implements, because those provided by -England were useless. - -2º. The audacious manner in which Wellington stormed the redoubt of -Francisco, and broke ground on the first night of the investment; -the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the place before the -fire of the defence had been in any manner lessened, and before the -counterscarp had been blown in; were the true causes of the sudden -fall of the place. Both the military and political state of affairs -warranted this neglect of rules. The final success depended more upon -the courage of the troops than the skill of the engineer; and when -the general terminated his order for the assault, with this sentence, -“Ciudad Rodrigo _must_ be stormed this evening,” he knew well that -it would be nobly understood. Yet the French fought bravely on the -breach, and by their side many British deserters, desperate men, were -bayonetted. - -3º. The great breach was cut off from the town by a perpendicular -descent of sixteen feet, and the bottom was planted with sharp -spikes, and strewn with live shells; the houses behind were all -loop-holed, and garnished with musketeers, and on the flanks there -were cuts, not indeed very deep or wide and the French had left the -temporary bridges over them, but behind were parapets so powerfully -defended that it was said the third division could never have carried -them, had not the light division taken the enemy in flank: an -assertion perhaps easier made than proved. - -4º. The rapid progress of the allies on this occasion, has been -contrasted with the slow proceedings of Massena in 1810, and the -defence of Herrasti has been compared with that of Barrié. But -Massena was not pressed for time, and he would have been blameable -to have spared labour at the expense of blood; Herrasti also had -a garrison of six thousand men, whereas Barrié had less than two -thousand, of which only seventeen hundred were able to bear arms, -and he had additional works to guard. Nevertheless his neglect of -the lesser breach was a great error; it was so narrow and high, -that a very slight addition to its defences would have rendered it -quite impracticable; and as the deserters told him in the morning -of the 19th that the light division was come up, out of its turn, -he must have expected the assault and had time to prepare for it. -Moreover the small breach was flanked at a very short distance, by -a demi-bastion with a parapet, which, though little injured, was -abandoned when the head of the storming party had forced their way on -to the rampart. But the true way of defending Ciudad was by external -operations, and it was not until it fell, that the error of Marmont -at Elbodon could be judged in its full extent. Neither can that -marshal be in any manner justified for having left so few men in -Ciudad Rodrigo; it is certain that with a garrison of five thousand -the place would not have been taken, for when there are enough of men -the engineer’s art cannot be overcome by mere courage. - -[Sidenote: Captain Cooke’s Memoirs, vol. i. p. 122.] - -5º. The excesses committed by the allied troops were very -disgraceful. The Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed and -helpless, and all these claims were disregarded. “The soldiers were -not to be controuled.” That excuse will however scarcely suffice -here, because colonel Macleod of the forty-third, a young man of a -most energetic spirit, placed guards at the breach and did constrain -his regiment to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorders -commenced; but as no previous general measures had been taken, and no -organized efforts made by higher authorities, the men were finally -carried away in the increasing tumult. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. January.] - -In Ciudad Rodrigo, papers were found by which it appeared, that many -of the inhabitants were emissaries of the enemy: all these people -Carlos d’España slew without mercy, but of the English deserters, who -were taken, some were executed, some pardoned, and the rigour of the -Spanish generals was thought to be overstrained. - -When order had been restored workmen were set to repair the breaches -and to level the trenches, and arrangements were made to provision -the place quickly, for Marmont’s army was gathering at Valladolid; -that general was however still ignorant that Ciudad had fallen. In -the latter end of December, rumour, anticipating the fact had indeed -spoken of an English bridge on the Agueda, and the expedition to -Alicant was countermanded; yet the report died away, and Montbrun -recommenced his march. But though the bridge was cast on the 1st and -the siege commenced on the 8th, on the 12th nothing was known at -Salamanca. - -On the 11th Marmont arrived at Valladolid; on the 15th he for the -first time heard of the siege. His army was immediately ordered to -concentrate at Salamanca, Bonnet quitted the Asturias, Montbrun -hastened back from Valencia, Dorsenne sent a detachment to aid, and -on the 25th six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, being about -forty-five thousand in all, were assembled at Salamanca, from whence -to Ciudad, was four marches. - -On the 23d Souham had advanced to Matilla to ascertain the fate -of the fortress, but meanwhile five thousand of Hill’s troops had -reached Castello Branco, and the allies were therefore strong enough -to fight beyond the Agueda. Hence if the siege had even lasted -twenty-four days, the place might still have been taken. - -The 26th Marmont knew that the fortress was lost, and unable to -comprehend his adversary’s success, retired to Valladolid. His -divisions were thus harassed by ruinous marches in winter; for -Montbrun had already reached Arevalo on his return from Valencia, and -Bonnet in repassing the Asturian mountains, had suffered much from -cold and fatigue, and more from the attacks of Porlier who harassed -him without cessation. Sir Howard Douglas immediately sent money -and arms to the Asturians, on one flank, and on the other flank, -Morillo who had remained at Horcajo in great peril after his flight -from Almagro, took the opportunity to escape by Truxillo; meanwhile -Saornil’s band cut off a French detachment at Medina del Campo, -other losses were sustained from the Partidas on the Tietar, and -the operations of those in the Rioja, Navarre, and New Castile were -renewed. The regular Spanish troops were likewise put in movement. -Abadia and Cabrera, advancing from Gallicia, menaced Astorga and La -Baneza, but the arrival of Bonnet at Benevente, soon obliged them to -retire again to Puebla de Senabria and Villa Franca; and Silveira who -had marched across the frontier of Tras os Montes to aid them, also -fell back to Portugal. - -Marmont’s operations were here again ill judged. He should have taken -post at Tamames, or St. Martin de Rio, and placed strong advanced -guards at Tenebron and St. Espiritus, in the hills immediately above -Ciudad. His troops could have been concentrated at those places the -28th and on that day such a heavy rain set in, that the trestle -bridge at Marialva could not stand, and the river rose two feet over -the stone bridge at the town. The allies were then on the left bank, -the communication with the town was entirely cut off, the repair of -the breaches was scarcely complete, and Ciudad being entirely exposed -for several days might have been retaken. But the greatest warriors -are the very slaves of fortune! - -[Sidenote: 1812. February.] - -The English general’s eyes were now turned towards Badajos, which he -was desirous to invest in the second week of March; because then the -flooding of the rivers in Beira, would enable him to carry nearly all -his forces to the Alemtejo, without risk, and the same rains would -impede the junction of the enemy’s force in Estremadura. Green forage -was to be had in the last province considerably earlier than on the -Agueda, and the success of the contemplated campaign in Andalusia -depended upon the operations taking place before the harvest upon the -ground should ripen, which was the enemy’s resource, and would happen -much earlier there than in Leon. - -Preliminary measures were already in progress. In December a pontoon -bridge escorted by military artificers and some Portuguese seamen, -had been ordered from Lisbon to Abrantes, where draft bullocks were -collected to draw it to Elvas. After the fall of Ciudad stores and -tools were sent from Lisbon to Setuval, and thence in boats to -Alcacer do Sal; and a company of the military artificers, then at -Cadiz, were disembarked at Ayamonte to proceed to Elvas, where an -engineer officer secretly superintended the preparations for the -siege. Meanwhile the repairs of Ciudad went on, two new redoubts were -traced out upon the Tesons, the old one was enlarged, and the suburbs -were strengthened, but the heavy storms before mentioned, impeded -these works, and having entirely stopped all communication by sea -and land, delayed for many days the preparations for the ulterior -operations. When the weather cleared they were renewed, yet other -obstacles were not wanting. - -The draft bullocks, sinking from want, were unable to drag the -whole battering train by the way of Vilha Velha, and only sixteen -twenty-four pounders, and twenty spare carriages could be moved on -that line. To supply the deficiency sixteen twenty-four pounders, -then in vessels in the Tagus, were ordered up to Abrantes, and -admiral Berkeley was applied to for twenty ship-guns. He had none -of that calibre and offered eighteen pounders, which were accepted; -but when major Dickson, who superintended the arrangements for the -artillery service, arrived at Lisbon, he found that these were -Russian pieces whose bore was too large for English shot, and the -admiral refused to give guns from his own ship the Barfleur, in their -place. This apparently capricious proceeding produced both difficulty -and delay, because the artillery-men were in consequence obliged -to cull the Portuguese shot in the arsenal to obtain a sufficient -supply. However the energy of major Dickson overcame every obstacle, -and in the beginning of March the battering guns fifty-two in number, -the pontoons from Abrantes, and most of the stores from Alcarçer do -Sal, were parked at Elvas, where also gabions and fascines were piled -in great numbers. - -Marmont having lost his emissaries at Ciudad Rodrigo, and being -unable to measure his adversary’s talent and energy, had during -these transactions again spread his troops that he might the more -easily feed them. Three divisions of infantry and part of the cavalry -returned to Talavera and Toledo. Souham occupied the country from -Zamora and Toro, to the banks of the Tormes; and Bonnet after driving -the Gallicians back to Senabria and Villa Franca remained about -Benevente and Astorga. The army of Portugal appeared to dread no -further operations on the part of the allies, yet from some secret -misgiving, Marmont caused general Foy to march through the Guadalupe, -by the pass of St. Vincente to ascertain whether an army could march -by that line from the Tagus to the Guadiana. - -This scattering of the French relieved lord Wellington from a serious -embarrassment. The constant difficulty of land transport, had -prevented him from bringing up the clothing of the army, and he was -now obliged to send the regiments to those points on the Mondego, the -Douro, and the Tagus, where the clothing had arrived by boats; hence -the march to the Alemtejo was necessarily long and unmilitary, and -would have been too dangerous to attempt, if Marmont had kept his -troops together on the Tormes, with advanced posts pushed towards -Ciudad Rodrigo. The weather was now however extremely favourable -to the allies, and the new Portuguese commissariat supplied the -troops on this march well, and without any of those exactions and -oppressions which had always before marked the movements of the -native troops; nevertheless the scarcity was so great, that rations -of cassava root were served to the Portuguese instead of bread. - -The talents of lord Wellington always rose with his difficulties, -but the want of specie crippled every operation. A movement into -Spain, such as that now intended against Andalusia, could not be -effected without magazines when there was no harvest on the ground, -except by paying ready money; because it was certain that the -Spaniards, however favourably disposed, would never diminish their -own secret resources for mere promises of payment. The English -general and Mr. Stuart, therefore, endeavoured to get British bank -notes accepted as cash, by the great merchants of Lisbon and Oporto; -and lord Wellington reflecting that, from the enormous sums spent -in Portugal, many persons must needs have secret hoards which they -would be glad to invest if they could do it safely, asked for English -exchequer-bills to negotiate in the same manner; intending to pay -the interest punctually and faithfully however inconvenient it might -prove at the moment. This plan could not be adopted with Portuguese -paper, because the finances were faithlessly managed by the regency; -but some futile arguments against the proposition were advanced by -lord Liverpool, and money became so scarce, that we shall find, even -in the midst of victory, the war was more than once like to stop -altogether from absolute inability to proceed. - -[Sidenote: 1812. March.] - -On the 5th of March, the army being well on the way to the Alemtejo, -lord Wellington who had maintained his head-quarters on the Coa to -the last moment, that the enemy might not be awakened to his real -designs, gave up Ciudad Rodrigo to Castaños. He also in person, -and on the spot, explained to Vives, the governor, the plan and -intention of the new works; he supplied him with money to complete -them; furnished him with six weeks provision remaining from the field -stores of the British troops, and gave him the reserved stores at St. -Joa de Pesqueira on the Douro, from whence Carlos d’España undertook -to transport them to the fortress. - -As Marmont was at this time in Salamanca, and still ignorant of the -allies’ march, general Victor Alten’s brigade of cavalry was posted -on the Yeltes, to screen the allies’ movement as long as possible, -and he was instructed if Marmont advanced to retire on Beira, and -cover the magazines at Castello Branco, by disputing all the rivers -and defiles with the enemy’s advanced parties. At the same time -Silveira was directed to fall back upon the Douro to cover Oporto; -the militia, under Trant and J. Wilson, were ordered to concentrate -about Guarda; and those of Beira to unite about Castello Branco under -colonel Lecor; the orders of all being the same, namely, to dispute -the passage of the rivers and defiles. Trant was to defend those -of the Estrella, and Lecor those of Castello Branco, on which town -Victor Alten’s cavalry was finally to retire if pressed. With these -forces, and the Spaniards under Sanchez and España, and with the two -fortresses, for Almeida was now capable of defence, Marmont’s efforts -were not much to be dreaded in that season, after he had lost his -battering train in Ciudad. - -These things arranged, Wellington set off for Elvas which he reached -the 11th, and prepared to invest Badajos, although neither the troops -nor the stores were all arrived; but even this was ten days later -than he had designed, and threw his operations into the violent -equinoctial rains, by which the difficulties were augmented two-fold. -This was one of the evils produced by the incredibly vexatious -conduct of the Portuguese regency. There was no want of transport in -the country, but as the government would not oblige the magistrates -to do their duty, the latter either refused to procure carts for -the army, or obliged the poorer classes to supply them, from which -oppression the peasants naturally endeavoured to escape by flight. -Thus, all the arrangements for the investment of Badajos on the 6th -of March had been made, but the rich town of Evora, which had not -seen the face of an enemy for more than three years, refused to -supply any carriages at all, and the operation was necessarily put -off till the 17th. - -But it was in vain that Wellington threatened and remonstrated, -in vain that he employed his time and wasted his mental powers in -devising new laws, or remedies for bad ones; it was in vain that Mr. -Stuart exerted himself, with equal vigour, to give energy to this -extraordinary government; for whether in matters of small or vital -importance, insolent anger and falsehood, disgraceful subterfuges and -stolid indifference, upon the part of all civil functionaries, from -the highest to the lowest, met them at every turn. The responsibility -even in small matters became too great for subordinate officers; and -the English general was forced to arrange the most trifling details -of the service himself; thus the iron-strength of his body and mind -was strained, until all men wondered how they held, and in truth he -did fall sick, but recovered after a few days. The critical nature -of the war may be here judged of, for no man could have taken his -place at such a moment, no man, however daring or skilful, would -have voluntarily plunged into difficulties which were like to drive -Wellington from the contest. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. March.] - -The 15th the pontoons were laid over the Guadiana, about four miles -from Elvas, at a place where the current was dull, two large Spanish -boats were arranged as flying bridges; and the 16th, Beresford, who -had again joined the army, crossed the river, drove in the enemy’s -posts, and invested Badajos with the third, fourth, and light -divisions, and a brigade of Hamilton’s Portuguese; in all fifteen -thousand men. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.] - -Soult was then before the Isla, Drouet’s division, of five thousand -men, was at Villafranca, and Darricau with a like force was at -Zalamea de Serena near Medellin; wherefore general Graham passing the -Guadiana with the first, sixth, and seventh divisions of infantry, -and two brigades of cavalry, directed his march by Valverde, and -Santa Martha, upon Llerena, while Hill moved from Albuquerque by -Merida upon Almendralejos. These covering corps were together thirty -thousand strong, nearly five thousand including the heavy Germans -who were at Estremos being cavalry; and as the fifth division -was now on the march from Beira, the whole army presented about -fifty-one thousand sabres and bayonets, of which twenty thousand were -Portuguese. Castaños had repaired to Gallicia, but the fifth Spanish -army under Morillo and Penne Villemur, being about four thousand -strong, passed down the Portuguese frontier to the Lower Guadiana, -intending to fall on Seville when Soult should advance to the succour -of Badajos. - -As the allies advanced, Drouet marched by his right to Hornaches, -in the direction of La Serena and Medellin, with a view to keep -open the communication with Marmont by Truxillo. Hill then halted -at Almendralejos, and Graham took post at Zafra, placing Slade’s -cavalry at Villafranca; but Marmont had moved his sixth division from -Talavera towards Castile, through the Puerto de Pico, on the 9th, -and the four divisions and cavalry quartered at Toledo had recrossed -the Tagus and marched over the Guadarama, the whole pointing for -Valladolid. Thus it was already manifest that the army of Portugal -would not act in conjunction with that of the south. - - -THIRD ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS. - -[Sidenote: Vol. III. Appendix, No. IX.] - -This fortress has before been described. The garrison composed of -French, Hessian, and Spanish troops, was now near five thousand -strong including sick. Phillipon had since the last siege made -himself felt in all directions, for he had continually scoured the -vicinity of the place, destroyed many small bands, carried off -cattle, almost from under the guns of Elvas and Campo Mayor, and his -spies extended their researches from Ciudad Rodrigo to Lisbon, and -from Lisbon to Ayamonte. - -He had also greatly improved the defences of the place. An interior -retrenchment was made in the castle, and many more guns were there -mounted; the rear of fort Cristoval was also better secured, and -a covered communication from the fort itself, to the work at the -bridge-head, was nearly completed. Two ravelins had been constructed -on the south side of the town, and a third was commenced, together -with counterguards for the bastions; but the eastern front next -the castle, which was in other respects the weakest point, was -without any outward protection save the stream of the Rivillas. A -“_cunette_” or second ditch had been dug at the bottom of the great -ditch, which was also in some parts filled with water; the gorge of -the Pardaleras was enclosed, and that outwork was connected with the -body of the place, from whence powerful batteries looked into it. The -three western fronts were mined, and on the east, the arch of the -bridge behind the San Roque, was built up to form an inundation, two -hundred yards wide, which greatly contracted the space by which the -place could be approached with troops. All the inhabitants had been -obliged, on pain of being expelled, to lay up food for three months, -and two convoys with provisions and ammunition had entered the place -on the 10th and 16th of February, but Phillipon’s stores of powder -were still inadequate to his wants, and he was very scantily supplied -with shells. - -As the former system of attack against Cristoval and the castle, -was now impracticable, lord Wellington desired to assail one of the -western fronts which would have been a scientific operation; but -the engineer represented that he had neither mortars nor miners, -nor enough of guns, nor the means of bringing up sufficient stores -for such an attack. Indeed the want of transport had again obliged -the allies to draw the stores from Elvas, to the manifest hazard -of that fortress, and hence, here, as at Ciudad Rodrigo, time was -necessarily paid for, by the loss of life; or rather the crimes of -politicians were atoned for by the blood of the soldiers. - -The plan finally fixed upon, was to attack the bastion of Trinidad, -because, the counter-guard there being unfinished, that bastion could -be battered from the hill on which the Picurina stood. The first -parallel was therefore to embrace the Picurina, the San Roque, and -the eastern front, in such a manner that the counter-batteries there -erected, might rake and destroy all the defences of the southern -fronts which bore against the Picurina hill. The Picurina itself was -to be battered and stormed, and from thence the Trinidad and Santa -Maria bastions, were to be breached; after this all the guns were -to be turned against the connecting curtain, which was known to be -of weak masonry, that a third breach might be made, and a storming -party employed to turn any retrenchments behind the breaches in the -bastions. In this way the inundation could be avoided, and although -a French deserter declared, and truly, that the ditch was there -eighteen feet deep, such was the general’s confidence in his troops, -and in his own resources for aiding their efforts, that he resolved -to storm the place without blowing in the counterscarp. - -The battering train, directed by major Dickson, consisted of -fifty-two pieces. This included sixteen twenty-four-pound howitzers, -for throwing Shrapnel shells, but this species of missile, much -talked of in the army at the time, was little prized by lord -Wellington, who had early detected its insufficiency, save as a -common shell; and partly to avoid expense, partly from a dislike to -injure the inhabitants, neither in this, nor in any former siege, -did he use mortars. Here indeed he could not have brought them up, -for besides the neglect of the Portuguese government, the peasantry -and even the ordenança employed to move the battering train from -Alcacer do Sal, although well paid, deserted. - -Of nine hundred gunners present, three hundred were British, the rest -Portuguese, and there were one hundred and fifty sappers volunteers -from the third division, who were indeed rather unskilful, but of -signal bravery. The engineer’s parc was established behind the -heights of St. Michael, and the direction of the siege was given to -general Picton. General Kempt, general Colville, and general Bowes -alternately commanded in the trenches. - -In the night of the 17th, eighteen hundred men, protected by a guard -of two thousand, broke ground one hundred and sixty yards from the -Picurina. A tempest stifled the sound of their pickaxes, and though -the work was commenced late, a communication, four thousand feet in -length, was formed, and a parallel of six hundred yards three feet -deep, and three feet six inches wide, was opened. However, when -the day broke the Picurina was reinforced, and a sharp musketry -interspersed with discharges from some field-pieces, aided by heavy -guns from the body of the place, was directed on the trenches. - -In the night of the 18th two batteries were traced out, the parallel -was prolonged both on the right and left, and the previous works were -improved. On the other hand the garrison raised the parapets of the -Picurina, and having lined the top of the covered way with sand-bags, -planted musketeers there, to gall the men in the trenches, who -replied in a like manner. - -The 19th lord Wellington having secret intelligence that a sally was -intended, ordered the guards to be reinforced. Nevertheless, at one -o’clock some cavalry came out by the Talavera gate, and thirteen -hundred infantry under general Vielland, the second in command, filed -unobserved into the communication between the Picurina and the San -Roque; a hundred men were prepared to sally from the Picurina itself, -and all these troops jumping out at once, drove the workmen before -them, and began to demolish the parallel. Previous to this outbreak, -the French cavalry forming two parties had commenced a sham fight on -the right of the parallel, and the smaller party pretending to fly, -and answering Portuguese, to the challenge of the picquets, were -allowed to pass. Elated by the success of their stratagem, they then -galloped to the engineer’s parc, which was a thousand yards in rear -of the trenches, and there cut down some men, not many, for succour -soon came, and meanwhile the troops at the parallel having rallied -upon the relief which had just arrived, beat the enemy’s infantry -back even to the castle. - -In this hot fight the besieged lost above three hundred men and -officers, the besiegers only one hundred and fifty; but colonel -Fletcher, the chief engineer, was badly wounded, and several hundred -entrenching tools were carried off, for Phillipon had promised a -high price for each; yet this turned out ill, because the soldiers, -instead of pursuing briskly, dispersed to gather the tools. After the -action a squadron of dragoons and six field-pieces were placed as a -reserve-guard behind St. Michael, and a signal post was established -on the Sierra de Venta to give notice of the enemy’s motions. - -The weather continued wet and boisterous, and the labour of the works -was very harassing, but in the night of the 19th the parallel was -opened in its whole length, and the 20th it was enlarged; yet a local -obstacle and the flooding of the trenches, rendered the progress slow. - -In the night of the 20th the parallel was extended to the left, -across the Seville road, and three counter-batteries were commenced; -but they were traced, in rear of the parallel, partly because the -ground was too soft in front to admit of the guns moving; partly -for safety, because the batteries were within three hundred yards -of the San Roque, and as the parallel, eighteen hundred yards long, -was only guarded by fourteen hundred men, a few bold soldiers might -by a sudden rush have succeeded in spiking the guns if they had been -placed in front of the trench. A slight sally was this day repulsed, -and a shoulder was given to the right of the parallel to cover that -flank. - -The 21st the enemy placed two field-pieces on the right bank of the -Guadiana, designing to rake the trenches, but the shoulder, made -the night before, baffled the design, and the riflemen’s fire soon -sent the guns away. Indications of a similar design against the left -flank, from the Pardaleras hill, were also observed, and a guard of -three hundred men with two guns, was posted on that side in some -broken ground. - -[Sidenote: La Marre’s Siege of Badajos.] - -In the night another battery against the San Roque was commenced, and -the battery against the Picurina was finished; but heavy rain again -retarded the works, and the besiegers having failed in an attempt to -drain the lower parts of the parallel, by cuts, made an artificial -bottom of sand-bags. On the other hand the besieged thinking the -curtain adjoining the castle was the true object of attack, threw up -an earthen entrenchment in front, and commenced clearing away the -houses behind it. A covered communication from the Trinidad gate to -the San Roque, intended to take this supposed attack in reverse, was -also commenced; but the labour of digging being too great, it was -completed by hanging up brown cloth, which appeared to be earth, and -by this ingenious expedient, the garrison passed unseen between those -points. - -Vauban’s maxim, that a perfect investment is the first requisite in a -siege, had been neglected at Badajos to spare labour, but the great -master’s art was soon vindicated by his countrymen. Phillipon finding -the right bank of the Guadiana free, made a battery in the night for -three field-pieces, which at daylight raked the trenches, and the -shots pitching into the parallel, swept it in the most destructive -manner for the whole day; there was no remedy, and the loss would -have been still greater but for the soft nature of the ground, which -prevented the touch and bound of the bullets. Orders were immediately -sent to the fifth division, then at Campo Mayor, to invest the -place on that side, but these troops were distant and misfortunes -accumulated. In the evening heavy rain filled the trenches, the -flood of the Guadiana ran the fixed bridge under water sank twelve -of the pontoons, and broke the tackle of the flying bridges; the -provisions of the army could not then be brought over, and the guns -and ammunition being still on the right bank, the siege was upon the -point of being raised. In a few days, however, the river subsided, -some Portuguese craft were brought up to form another flying-bridge, -the pontoons saved were employed as row-boats, and in this manner the -communication was secured, for the rest of the siege, without any -accident. - -The 23d the besieged continued to work at the entrenchments covering -the front next the castle, and the besiegers were fixing their -platforms, when at three o’clock the rain again filled the trenches, -the earth, being completely saturated with water, fell away, the -works everywhere crumbled, and the attack was entirely suspended. - -The 24th the fifth division invested the place on the right bank of -the Guadiana, the weather was fine, and the batteries were armed with -ten twenty-fours, eleven eighteens, and seven five-and-a-half-inch -howitzers. The next day, at eleven o’clock, these pieces opened, but -they were so vigorously answered, that one howitzer was dismounted -and several artillery and engineer-officers were killed. Nevertheless -the San Roque was silenced, and the garrison of the Picurina was so -galled by the marksmen in the trenches, that no man dared look over -the parapet; hence, as the external appearance of that fort did not -indicate much strength, general Kempt was charged to assault it in -the night. - -The outward seeming of the Picurina was however fallacious, the -fort was very strong; the fronts were well covered by the glacis, -the flanks were deep, and the rampart, fourteen feet perpendicular -from the bottom of the ditch, was guarded with thick slanting pales -above; and from thence to the top there were sixteen feet of an -earthen slope. A few palings had, indeed, been knocked off at the -covered way, and the parapet was slightly damaged on that side, but -this injury was repaired with sand-bags, and the ditch was profound, -narrow at the bottom, and flanked by four splinter-proof casemates. -Seven guns were mounted on the works, the entrance to which by the -rear was protected with three rows of thick paling, the garrison -was above two hundred strong, and every man had two muskets. The -top of the rampart was garnished with loaded shells to push over, a -retrenched guard-house formed a second internal defence, and finally, -some small mines and a loop-holed gallery, under the counterscarp, -intended to take the assailants in rear, were begun but not finished. - -Five hundred men of the third division being assembled for the -attack, general Kempt ordered two hundred, under major Rudd of the -seventy-seventh, to turn the fort on the left; an equal force, under -major Shaw of the seventy-fourth, to turn the fort by the right; and -one hundred from each of these bodies were directed to enter the -communication with San Roque and intercept any succours coming from -the town. The flanking columns were to make a joint attack on the -fort, and the hundred men remaining, were placed under captain Powis -of the eighty-third, to form a reserve. The engineers, Holloway, -Stanway, and Gips, with twenty-four sappers bearing hatchets and -ladders, guided these columns, and fifty men of the light division, -likewise provided with axes, were to move out of the trenches at the -moment of attack. - - -ASSAULT OF PICURINA. - -The night was fine, the arrangements clearly and skilfully made, -and about nine o’clock the two flanking bodies moved forward. The -distance was short, and the troops quickly closed on the fort, which -black and silent before, now seemed one mass of fire; then the -assailants running up to the palisades in the rear, with undaunted -courage endeavoured to break through, and when the destructive -musketry of the French, and the thickness of the pales, rendered -their efforts nugatory, they turned against the faces of the work and -strove to break in there; but the depth of the ditch and the slanting -stakes at the top of the brick-work again baffled them. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2, Letter C.] - -At this time, the enemy shooting fast, and dangerously, the crisis -appeared imminent, and Kempt sent the reserve headlong against -the front; thus the fight was continued strongly, the carnage -became terrible, and a battalion coming out from the town to the -succour of the fort, was encountered and beaten by the party on the -communication. The guns of Badajos, and of the castle now opened, the -guard of the trenches replied with musketry, rockets were thrown up -by the besieged, and the shrill sound of alarm bells, mixing with the -shouts of the combatants, increased the tumult. Still the Picurina -sent out streams of fire, by the light of which, dark figures were -seen furiously struggling on the ramparts; for Powis first escaladed -the place in front where the artillery had beaten down the pales, -and the other assailants had thrown their ladders on the flanks in -the manner of bridges, from the brink of the ditch to the slanting -stakes, and all were fighting hand to hand with the enemy. Meanwhile -the axe-men of the light division, compassing the fort like prowling -wolves, discovered the gate, and hewing it down, broke in by the -rear. Nevertheless the struggle continued. Powis, Holloway, Gips, and -Oates, of the eighty-eighth, fell wounded on or beyond the rampart; -Nixon of the fifty-second was shot two yards within the gate; Shaw, -Rudd, and nearly all the other officers had fallen outside; and it -was not until half the garrison were killed, that Gaspar Thiery, the -commandant, and eighty-six men, surrendered, while some, not many, -rushing out of the gate, endeavoured to cross the inundation and were -drowned. - -The French governor hoped to have delayed the siege five or six -days by the resistance of Picurina, and had the assault been a day -later, this would have happened; for the loop-holed gallery in the -counterscarp, and the mines, would then have been completed, and the -body of the work was too well covered by the glacis to be quickly -ruined by fire. His calculations were baffled by this heroic assault, -which lasted an hour, and cost four officers and fifty men killed, -fifteen officers and two hundred and fifty men wounded; and so -vehement was the fight throughout, that the garrison either forgot, -or had not time to roll over the shells and combustibles arranged -on the ramparts. Phillipon did not conceal the danger accruing -to Badajos from the loss of the Picurina, but he stimulated his -soldiers’ courage, by calling to their recollection, how infinitely -worse than death it was, to be the inmate of an English hulk! an -appeal which must have been deeply felt, for the annals of civilized -nations, furnish nothing more inhuman towards captives of war, than -the prison-ships of England. - -When the Picurina was taken, three battalions of reserve advanced -to secure it, and though a great turmoil and firing from the -town, continued until midnight, a lodgment in the works, and a -communication with the first parallel, were established, and the -second parallel was commenced. However at day-light the redoubt -was so overwhelmed with fire, from the town, that no troops could -remain in it, and the lodgment was entirely destroyed. In the evening -the sappers effected another lodgment on the flanks, the second -parallel was then opened in its whole length, and the next day the -counter-batteries on the right of Picurina exchanged a vigorous fire -with the town; but one of the besiegers’ guns was dismounted, and the -Portuguese gunners, from inexperience, produced less effect on the -defences than was expected. - -In the night of the 27th a new communication from the first parallel -to the Picurina was made, and three breaching batteries were traced -out. The first to contain twelve twenty-four pounders, occupied the -space between the Picurina and the inundation, and was to breach the -right face of the Trinidad bastion. The second, to contain eight -eighteen pounders, was on the site of the Picurina, and was to breach -the left flank of the Santa Maria bastion. The third, constructed -on the prolonged line of the front to be attacked, contained three -Shrapnel howitzers, to scour the ditch and prevent the garrison -working in it; for Phillipon had now discovered the true line of -attack, and had set strong parties in the night, to raise the -counter-guard of the Trinidad and the imperfect ravelin covering the -menaced front. - -At day-break these works being well furnished with gabions and -sand-bags, were lined with musqueteers, who severely galled the -workmen employed on the breaching batteries and the artillery -practice also was brisk on both sides. Two of the besiegers’ guns -were dismounted; the gabions placed in front of the batteries to -protect the workmen were knocked over, and the musquetry then became -so destructive that the men were withdrawn and threw up earth from -the inside. - -In the night of the 27th the second parallel was extended to the -right, with the view of raising batteries, to ruin the San Roque, -to destroy the dam which held up the inundation, and to breach the -curtain behind; but the Talavera road proved so hard, and the moon -shone so brightly, that the labourers were quite exposed and the work -was relinquished. - -On the 28th the screen of gabions before the batteries was restored -and the workmen resumed their labours outside; the parallel was -then improved, and the besieged withdrew their guns from San Roque; -but their marksmen still shot from thence with great exactness, and -the plunging fire from the castle dismounted two howitzers in one -of the counter-batteries which was therefore dismantled. The enemy -had also during the night observed the tracing string, which marked -the direction of the sap in front of San Roque, and a daring fellow -creeping out just before the workmen arrived, brought it in the line -of the castle fire, whereby some loss was sustained ere the false -direction was discovered. - -In the night the dismantled howitzer battery was re-armed, with -twenty-four pounders, to play on the San Roque, and a new breaching -battery was traced out on the site of the Picurina, against the flank -of the Santa Maria bastion. The second parallel was also carried -by the sap across the Talavera road, and a trench was digged, for -riflemen, in front of the batteries. - -The 29th a slight sally, made on the right bank of the river, -was repulsed by the Portuguese, but the sap at the San Roque was -ruined by the enemy’s fire, and the besieged continued to raise the -counter-guard and ravelin of the Trinidad and to strengthen the front -attacked. On the other hand the besiegers during the night carried -the sap over the Talavera road, and armed two breaching batteries, -with eighteen pounders, which the next day opened against the flank -of Santa Maria; but they made little impression, and the explosion of -an expense magazine killed many men and hurt others. - -While the siege was thus proceeding Soult having little fear for -the town, but expecting a great battle, was carefully organizing -a powerful force to unite with Drouet and Daricau. Those generals -had endeavoured to hold the district of La Serena with the view of -keeping open the communication with Marmont by Medellin and Truxillo; -but Graham and Hill marched against their flanks and forced them into -the Morena by the Cordova roads; and on the other side of the country -Morillo and Penne Villemur, were lying close on the lower Guadiana -waiting their opportunity to fall on Seville when Soult should -advance. Nor were there wanting other combinations to embarrass and -delay the French marshal; for in February, general Montes being -detached, by Ballesteros, from San Roque, had defeated Maransin on -the Guadajore river, driving him from Cartama into Malaga. After this -the whole of the Spanish army was assembled in the Ronda hills, -with a view to fall on Seville by the left of the Guadiana while -Morillo assailed it on the right of that river. This had obliged -Soult to send troops towards Malaga, and fatally delayed his march to -Estremadura. - -Meanwhile Marmont was concentrating his army in the Salamanca -country, and it was rumoured that he meant to attack Ciudad Rodrigo. -Lord Wellington was somewhat disturbed by this information; he knew -indeed that the flooding of the rivers in the north, would prevent a -blockade, and he was also assured that Marmont had not yet obtained a -battering train. But the Spanish generals and engineers had neglected -the new works and repairs of Ciudad Rodrigo; even the provisions at -St. Joa de Pesquiera had not been brought up; the fortress had only -thirty days’ supply, Almeida was in as bad a state, and the grand -project of invading Andalusia was likely to be baulked by these -embarrassments. - -On the 30th Soult’s advance from Cordova being decided, the fifth -division was brought over the Guadiana as a reserve to the covering -army; but Power’s Portuguese brigade, with some cavalry, of the same -nation, still maintained the investment on the right bank, the siege -was urged forward very rapidly, forty-eight pieces of artillery were -in constant play, and the sap against St. Roque advanced. The enemy -was equally active, his fire was very destructive, and his progress -in raising the ravelin and counter-guard of the front attacked was -very visible. - -[Sidenote: 1812. April.] - -The 1st of April the sap was pushed close to the San Roque, the -Trinidad bastion crumbled under the stroke of the bullet, and the -flank of the Santa Maria, which was casemated and had hitherto -resisted the batteries, also began to yield. The 2d the face of the -Trinidad was very much broken, but at the Santa Maria the casemates -being laid open, the bullets were lost in their cavities, and the -garrison commenced a retrenchment to cut off the whole of the -attacked front, from the town. - -In the night a new battery against the San Roque was armed, and two -officers with some sappers gliding behind that outwork, gagged the -sentinel, placed powder-barrels and a match against the dam of the -inundation, and retired undiscovered, but the explosion did not -destroy the dam, and the inundation remained. Nor did the sap make -progress, because of the French musketeers; for though the marksmen -set against them slew many they were reinforced by means of a raft -with parapets, which crossed the inundation, and men also passed by -the cloth communication from the Trinidad gate. - -On the 3d some guns were turned against the curtain behind the San -Roque, but the masonry proved hard, ammunition was scarce, and as a -breach there would have been useless, while the inundation remained, -the fire was soon discontinued. The two breaches in the bastion -were now greatly enlarged and the besieged assiduously laboured at -the retrenchments behind them, and converted the nearest houses and -garden walls into a third line of defence. All the houses behind the -front next the castle were also thrown down, and a battery of five -guns, intended to flank the ditch and breach of the Trinidad, was -commenced on the castle hill, but outside the wall; the besiegers -therefore traced out a counter-battery, of fourteen Shrapnel -howitzers, to play upon that point during the assault. - -The crisis of the siege was now approaching rapidly. The breaches -were nearly practicable, Soult, having effected a junction with -Drouet and Daricau, was advancing; and as the allies were not in -sufficient force to assault the place and give battle at the same -time, it was resolved to leave two divisions in the trenches, and -to fight at Albuera with the remainder. Graham therefore fell back -towards that place, and Hill having destroyed the bridge at Merida, -marched from the Upper Guadiana to Talavera Real. - -Time being now, as in war it always is, a great object, the anxiety -on both sides redoubled; but Soult was still at Llerena, when on -the morning of the 5th the breaches were declared practicable, and -the assault ordered for that evening. Leith’s division was even -recalled to the camp to assist, when a careful personal examination -of the enemy’s retrenchments caused some doubt in lord Wellington’s -mind, and he delayed the storm, until a third breach, as originally -projected, should be formed in the curtain between the bastions -of Trinidad and Maria. This could not, however, be commenced -before morning, and during the night the enemy’s workmen laboured -assiduously at their retrenchments, regardless of the showers of -grape with which the besiegers’ batteries scoured the ditch and the -breach. But the 6th, the besiegers’ guns being all turned against -the curtain, the bad masonry crumbled rapidly away, in two hours a -yawning breach appeared, and Wellington, having again examined the -points of attack in person, renewed the order for the assault. Then -the soldiers eagerly made themselves ready for a combat, so fiercely -fought, so terribly won, so dreadful in all its circumstances, that -posterity can scarcely be expected to credit the tale; but many are -still alive who know that it is true. - -The British general was so sensible of Phillipon’s firmness and of -the courage of his garrison, that he spared them the affront of a -summons, yet seeing the breach strongly entrenched, and the enemy’s -flank fire, still powerful, he would not in this dread crisis, trust -his fortune to a single effort. Eighteen thousand daring soldiers -burned for the signal of attack, and as he was unwilling to lose the -service of any, to each division he gave a task such as few generals -would have the hardihood even to contemplate. - -On the right Picton’s division was to file out of the trenches, to -cross the Rivillas river, and to scale the castle walls, which were -from eighteen to twenty-four feet in height, furnished with all means -of destruction, and so narrow at top, that the defenders could easily -reach and as easily overturn the ladders. - -On the left, Leith’s division was to make a false attack on the -Pardaleras, and a real assault on the distant bastion of San -Vincente, where the glacis was mined, the ditch deep, the scarp -thirty feet high, and the parapet garnished with bold troops well -provided; for Phillipon, following his old plan, had three loaded -muskets placed beside each man, that the first fire might be quick -and deadly. - -In the centre, the fourth and light divisions under general Colville, -and colonel Andrew Barnard, were to march against the breaches. -They were furnished like the third and fifth divisions with ladders -and axes, and were preceded by storming parties of five hundred men -each with their respective forlorn hopes. The light division was to -assault the bastion of Santa Maria; the fourth division to assault -the Trinidad, and the curtain; and the columns were divided into -storming and firing parties, the former to enter the ditch, the -latter to keep the crest of the glacis. - -Besides these attacks, major Wilson of the forty-eighth was to storm -the San Roque with the guards of the trenches, and on the other side -of the Guadiana, general Power was to make a feint on the bridge-head. - -At first only one brigade, of the third division, was to have -attacked the castle, but just before the hour fixed upon, a sergeant -of sappers having deserted from the enemy, informed Wellington -that there was but one communication from the castle to the town, -whereupon he ordered the whole division to advance together. - -This was the outline of the plan, but many nice arrangements filled -it up, and some were followed, some disregarded, for it is seldom -that all things are strictly attended to in a desperate fight. Nor -were the enemy idle, for while it was yet twilight some French -cavalry issued from the Pardaleras, escorting an officer who -endeavoured to look into the trenches, with a view to ascertain if -an assault was intended; but the picquet on that side jumped up, and -firing as it run, drove him and his escort back into the works. Then -the darkness fell and the troops only awaited the signal. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 9._ - - EXPLANATORY SKETCH - _OF THE SIEGE OF_ - BADAJOS - 1812. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._] - - -ASSAULT OF BADAJOS. - -The night was dry but clouded, the air thick with watery exhalations -from the rivers, the ramparts, and the trenches unusually still; yet -a low murmur pervaded the latter, and in the former, lights were seen -to flit here and there, while the deep voices of the sentinels at -times proclaimed, that all was well in Badajos. The French, confiding -in Phillipon’s direful skill, watched, from their lofty station, the -approach of enemies, whom they had twice before baffled, and now -hoped to drive a third time blasted and ruined from the walls; the -British, standing in deep columns, were as eager to meet that fiery -destruction as the others were to pour it down; and both were alike -terrible for their strength, their discipline, and the passions -awakened in their resolute hearts. - -Former failures there were to avenge, and on either side, such -leaders as left no excuse for weakness in the hour of trial; and the -possession of Badajos was become a point of honour, personal with the -soldiers of each nation. But the strong desire for glory was, in the -British, dashed with a hatred of the citizens on an old grudge, and -recent toil and hardship, with much spilling of blood, had made many -incredibly savage: for these things render the noble-minded indeed, -averse to cruelty, but harden the vulgar spirit. Numbers also, like -Cæsar’s centurion who could not forget the plunder of Avaricum, were -heated with the recollection of Ciudad Rodrigo, and thirsted for -spoil. Thus every spirit found a cause of excitement, the wondrous -power of discipline bound the whole together as with a band of iron, -and, in the pride of arms, none doubted their might, to bear down -every obstacle that man could oppose to their fury. - -At ten o’clock, the castle, the San Roque, the breaches, the -Pardaleras, the distant bastion of San Vincente, and the bridge-head -on the other side of the Guadiana, were to have been simultaneously -assailed, and it was hoped that the strength of the enemy would -shrivel within that fiery girdle. But many are the disappointments of -war. An unforeseen accident delayed the attack of the fifth division; -and a lighted carcass, thrown from the castle, falling close to -where the men of the third division were drawn up, discovered their -array, and obliged them to anticipate the signal by half an hour. -Then, every thing being suddenly disturbed, the double columns of the -fourth and light divisions also moved silently and swiftly against -the breaches, and the guard of the trenches, rushing forward with a -shout, encompassed the San Roque with fire and broke in so violently -that scarcely any resistance was made. - -But a sudden blaze of light and the rattling of musketry indicated -the commencement of a most vehement combat at the castle. There -general Kempt, for Picton hurt by a fall, in the camp, and expecting -no change in the hour, was not present, there general Kempt, I say, -led the third division; he had passed the Rivillas, in single files -by a narrow bridge, under a terrible musketry, and then reforming, -and running up the rugged hill, had reached the foot of the castle -when he fell severely wounded, and being carried back to the trenches -met Picton who hastened forward to take the command. Meanwhile his -troops spreading along the front reared their heavy ladders, some -against the lofty castle, some against the adjoining front on the -left, and with incredible courage ascended amidst showers of heavy -stones, logs of wood, and bursting shells rolled off the parapet, -while from the flanks the enemy plied his musketry with a fearful -rapidity, and in front, with pikes and bayonets, stabbed the leading -assailants or pushed the ladders from the walls; and all this -attended with deafening shouts, and the crash of breaking ladders, -and the shrieks of crushed soldiers answering to the sullen stroke of -the falling weights. - -Still, swarming round the remaining ladders, these undaunted veterans -strove who should first climb, until all being overturned, the French -shouted victory, and the British, baffled, but untamed, fell back a -few paces, and took shelter under the rugged edge of the hill. Here -when the broken ranks were somewhat re-formed the heroic colonel -Ridge, springing forward, called, with a stentorian voice, on his men -to follow, and, seizing a ladder, once more raised it against the -castle, yet to the right of the former attack, where the wall was -lower, and an embrasure offered some facility. A second ladder was -soon placed alongside of the first, by the grenadier officer Canch, -and the next instant he and Ridge were on the rampart, the shouting -troops pressed after them, the garrison amazed, and in a manner -surprised, were driven fighting through the double gate into the -town, and the castle was won. A reinforcement, sent from the French -reserve, then came up, a sharp action followed, both sides fired -through the gate, and the enemy retired, but Ridge fell, and no man -died that night with more glory—yet many died, and there was much -glory. - -During these events, the tumult at the breaches was such as if the -very earth had been rent asunder and its central fires were bursting -upwards uncontrolled. The two divisions had reached the glacis, just -as the firing at the castle had commenced, and the flash of a single -musket discharged from the covered way as a signal shewed them that -the French were ready; yet no stir was heard, and darkness covered -the breaches. Some hay-packs were then thrown, some ladders were -placed, and the forlorn hopes and storming parties of the light -division, about five hundred in all, had descended into the ditch -without opposition, when a bright flame shooting upwards displayed -all the terrors of the scene. The ramparts crowded with dark figures -and glittering arms, were seen on the one side, and on the other, -the red columns of the British, deep and broad, were coming on like -streams of burning lava; it was the touch of the magician’s wand, -for a crash of thunder followed, and with incredible violence the -storming parties were dashed to pieces by the explosion of hundreds -of shells and powder-barrels. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2.] - -For an instant the light division stood on the brink of the ditch, -amazed at the terrific sight, then, with a shout that matched even -the sound of the explosion, flew down the ladders, or disdaining -their aid, leaped, reckless of the depth, into the gulf below; and -nearly at the same moment, amidst a blaze of musketry that dazzled -the eyes, the fourth division came running in and descended with a -like fury. There were however only five ladders for both columns, -which were close together, and a deep cut made in the bottom of -the ditch, as far as the counter-guard of the Trinidad, was filled -with water from the inundation; into this watery snare the head of -the fourth division fell, and it is said that above a hundred of -the fuzileers, the men of Albuera, were there smothered. Those who -followed, checked not, but as if such a disaster had been expected, -turned to the left, and thus came upon the face of the unfinished -ravelin, which, being rough and broken, was mistaken for the breach, -and instantly covered with men; yet a wide and deep chasm was still -between them and the ramparts from whence came a deadly fire wasting -their ranks. Thus baffled, they also commenced a rapid discharge of -musketry, and disorder ensued; for the men of the light division, -whose conducting engineer had been disabled early, and whose flank -was confined by an unfinished ditch intended to cut off the bastion -of Santa Maria, rushed towards the breaches of the curtain and -the Trinidad, which were indeed before them, but which the fourth -division were destined to storm. - -Great was the confusion, for now the ravelin was quite crowded with -men of both divisions, and while some continued to fire, others -jumped down and ran towards the breach, many also passed between the -ravelin and the counter-guard of the Trinidad, the two divisions got -mixed, and the reserves, which should have remained at the quarries, -also came pouring in, until the ditch was quite filled, the rear -still crowding forward, and all cheering vehemently. The enemy’s -shouts also, were loud and terrible, and the bursting of shells and -of grenades, the roaring of the guns from the flanks, answered by the -iron howitzers from the battery of the parallel, the heavy roll and -horrid explosion of the powder-barrels, the whizzing flight of the -blazing splinters, the loud exhortations of the officers, and the -continual clatter of the muskets, made a maddening din. - -Now a multitude bounded up the great breach as if driven by a -whirlwind, but across the top glittered a range of sword-blades, -sharp-pointed, keen-edged on both sides, and firmly fixed in -ponderous beams, which were chained together and set deep in the -ruins; and for ten feet in front, the ascent was covered with loose -planks, studded with sharp iron points, on which the feet of the -foremost being set the planks moved, and the unhappy soldiers, -falling forward on the spikes, rolled down upon the ranks behind. -Then the Frenchmen, shouting at the success of their stratagem, and -leaping forward, plied their shot with terrible rapidity, for every -man had several muskets; and each musket in addition to its ordinary -charge contained a small cylinder of wood stuck full of leaden slugs, -which scattered like hail when they were discharged. - -Again the assailants rushed up the breaches, and again the -sword-blades, immoveable and impassable, stopped their charge, -and the hissing shells and thundering powder-barrels exploded -unceasingly. Hundreds of men had fallen, and hundreds more were -dropping, but still the heroic officers called aloud for new trials, -and sometimes followed by many, sometimes by a few, ascended the -ruins; and so furious were the men themselves, that in one of these -charges, the rear strove to push the foremost on to the sword-blades, -willing even to make a bridge of their writhing bodies, but the -others frustrated the attempt by dropping down; and men fell so fast -from the shot, that it was hard to know who went down voluntarily, -who were stricken, and many stooped unhurt that never rose again. -Vain also would it have been to break through the sword-blades, -for the trench and parapet behind the breach were finished, and the -assailants, crowded into even a narrower space than the ditch was, -would still have been separated from their enemies, and the slaughter -would have continued. - -At the beginning of this dreadful conflict, colonel Andrew Barnard -had with prodigious efforts separated his division from the other, -and preserved some degree of military array; but now the tumult was -such, that no command could be heard distinctly, except by those -close at hand, and the mutilated carcasses heaped on each other, -and the wounded, struggling to avoid being trampled upon, broke the -formations; order was impossible! Yet officers of all stations, -followed more or less numerously by the men, were seen to start out, -as if struck by a sudden madness, and rush into the breach, which -yawning and glittering with steel, seemed like the mouth of some huge -dragon belching forth smoke and flame. In one of these attempts, -colonel Macleod of the forty-third, a young man, whose feeble body -would have been quite unfit for war, if it had not been sustained by -an unconquerable spirit, was killed. Wherever his voice was heard, -there his soldiers gathered, and with such a strong resolution did he -lead them up the fatal ruins, that when one behind him, in falling, -plunged a bayonet into his back, he complained not, and continuing -his course was shot dead within a yard of the sword-blades. But there -was no want of gallant leaders, or desperate followers. - -Two hours spent in these vain efforts convinced the soldiers that -the breach of the Trinidad was impregnable; and as the opening in -the curtain, although less strong, was retired, and the approach to -it impeded by deep holes, and cuts made in the ditch, the troops did -not much notice it after the partial failure of one attack which -had been made early. Gathering in dark groups and leaning on their -muskets, they looked up with sullen desperation at the Trinidad, -while the enemy stepping out on the ramparts, and aiming their shots -by the light of the fire-balls which they threw over, asked, as their -victims fell, “_Why they did not come into Badajos?_” - -[Sidenote: Now lieut.-col. Shaw Kennedy.] - -In this dreadful situation, while the dead were lying in heaps -and others continually falling, the wounded crawling about to get -some shelter from the merciless fire above, and withal a sickening -stench from the burnt flesh of the slain, captain Nicholas, of the -engineers, was observed by Mr. Shaw, of the forty-third, making -incredible efforts to force his way with a few men into the Santa -Maria bastion. Shaw having collected about fifty soldiers of all -regiments joined him, and although there was a deep cut along the -foot of this breach also, it was instantly passed, and these two -young officers at the head of their gallant band, rushed up the slope -of the ruins; but when they had gained two-thirds of the ascent, a -concentrated fire of musketry and grape, dashed nearly the whole -dead to the earth! Nicholas was mortally wounded, and the intrepid -Shaw stood alone! After this no further effort was made at any -point, and the troops remained passive, but unflinching, beneath -the enemy’s shot, which streamed without intermission; for, of the -riflemen on the glacis, many leaping early into the ditch had joined -in the assault, and the rest, raked by a cross-fire of grape from the -distant bastions, baffled in their aim by the smoke and flames from -the explosions, and too few in number, had entirely failed to quell -the French musketry. - -About midnight, when two thousand brave men had fallen, Wellington, -who was on a height close to the quarries, sent orders for the -remainder to retire and re-form for a second assault; for he had -just then heard that the castle was taken, and thinking the enemy -would still hold out in the town, was resolved to assail the breaches -again. This retreat from the ditch was, however, not effected without -further carnage and confusion, for the French fire never slackened, -and a cry arose that the enemy were making a sally from the distant -flanks, which caused a rush towards the ladders; then the groans -and lamentations of the wounded who could not move, and expected to -be slain, increased, many officers who had not heard of the order, -endeavoured to stop the soldiers from going back, and some would even -have removed the ladders but were unable to break the crowd. - -All this time the third division was lying close in the castle, and -either from a fear of risking the loss of a point which ensured the -capture of the place, or that the egress was too difficult, made no -attempt to drive away the enemy from the breaches. On the other side -however the fifth division had commenced the false attack on the -Pardaleras, and on the right of the Guadiana, the Portuguese were -sharply engaged at the bridge; thus the town was girdled with fire, -for general Walker’s brigade having passed on during the feint on -the Pardaleras, was escalading the distant bastion of San Vincente. -His troops had advanced along the banks of the river, and reached -the French guard-house, at the barrier-gate, undiscovered, for the -ripple of the waters smothered the sound of their footsteps; but just -then the explosion at the breaches took place, the moon shone out, -and the French sentinels, discovering the columns, fired. The British -troops immediately springing forward under a sharp musketry began to -hew down the wooden barrier at the covered way, while the Portuguese, -being panic-stricken, threw down the scaling-ladders. Nevertheless -the others snatched them up again, and forcing the barrier, jumped -into the ditch; but the guiding engineer officer was killed, and -there was a _cunette_, which embarrassed the column, and when the -foremost men succeeded in rearing the ladders, the latter were found -too short, for the walls were generally above thirty feet high. -Meanwhile the fire of the French was deadly, a small mine was sprung -beneath the soldiers’ feet, beams of wood and live shells were rolled -over on their heads, showers of grape from the flank swept the ditch, -and man after man dropped dead from the ladders. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2.] - -Fortunately some of the defenders having been called away to aid in -recovering the castle, the ramparts were not entirely manned, and -the assailants, having discovered a corner of the bastion where the -scarp was only twenty feet high, placed three ladders there under -an embrasure which had no gun and was only stopped with a gabion. -Some men got up, but with difficulty, for the ladders were still too -short, and the first man who gained the top was pushed up by his -comrades and then drew others after him, until many had gained the -summit; and though the French shot heavily against them, from both -flanks and from a house in front, they thickened and could not be -driven back; half the fourth regiment entered the town itself to -dislodge the enemy from the houses, while the others pushed along the -rampart towards the breach, and by dint of hard fighting successively -won three bastions. - -In the last of these combats general Walker leaping forward, sword -in hand, at the moment when one of the enemy’s cannoneers was -discharging a gun, fell covered with so many wounds that it was -wonderful how he could survive, and some of the soldiers immediately -after, perceiving a lighted match on the ground, cried out a mine! -At that word, such is the power of imagination, those troops whom -neither the strong barrier, nor the deep ditch, nor the high walls, -nor the deadly fire of the enemy could stop, staggered back appalled -by a chimera of their own raising, and in this disorder a French -reserve, under general Viellande, drove on them with a firm and rapid -charge, and pitching some men over the walls, and killing others -outright, again cleansed the ramparts even to the San Vincente. There -however Leith had placed colonel Nugent with a battalion of the -thirty-eighth as a reserve, and when the French came up, shouting and -slaying all before them, this battalion, about two hundred strong, -arose, and with one close volley destroyed them. - -Then the panic ceased, the soldiers rallied, and in compact order -once more charged along the walls towards the breaches, but the -French, although turned on both flanks and abandoned by fortune, did -not yet yield; and meanwhile the detachment of the fourth regiment -which had entered the town when the San Vincente was first carried, -was strangely situated, for the streets were empty and brilliantly -illuminated, and no person was seen; yet a low buzz and whisper were -heard around, lattices were now and then gently opened, and from time -to time shots were fired from underneath the doors of the houses by -the Spaniards. However, the troops with bugles sounding, advanced -towards the great square of the town, and in their progress captured -several mules going with ammunition to the breaches; but the square -itself was as empty and silent as the streets, and the houses as -bright with lamps; a terrible enchantment seemed to be in operation, -for they saw nothing but light, and heard only the low whispers close -around them, while the tumult at the breaches was like the crashing -thunder. - -There, indeed, the fight was still plainly raging, and hence, -quitting the square, they attempted to take the garrison in reverse, -by attacking the ramparts from the town-side, but they were received -with a rolling musketry, driven back with loss, and resumed their -movement through the streets. At last the breaches were abandoned -by the French, other parties entered the place, desultory combats -took place in various parts, and finally general Viellande, and -Phillipon who was wounded, seeing all ruined, passed the bridge -with a few hundred soldiers, and entered San Cristoval, where they -all surrendered early the next morning upon summons to lord Fitzroy -Somerset, who had with great readiness pushed through the town to the -draw-bridge ere they had time to organize further resistance. But -even in the moment of ruin the night before, the noble governor had -sent some horsemen out from the fort to carry the news to Soult’s -army, and they reached him in time to prevent a greater misfortune. - -Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness, which tarnished -the lustre of the soldier’s heroism. All indeed were not alike, for -hundreds risked and many lost their lives in striving to stop the -violence, but the madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men -were leaders here, all the dreadful passions of human nature were -displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, -cruelty, and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, -shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, -the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used -in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of -Badajos! on the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers -were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than -was quelled. The wounded men were then looked to, the dead disposed -of! - -Five thousand men and officers fell during this siege, and of these, -including seven hundred Portuguese, three thousand five hundred had -been stricken in the assault, sixty officers and more than seven -hundred men being slain on the spot. The five generals, Kempt, -Harvey, Bowes, Colville, and Picton were wounded, the first three -severely; about six hundred men and officers fell in the escalade -of San Vincente, as many at the castle, and more than two thousand -at the breaches, each division there losing twelve hundred! And how -deadly the strife was, at that point, may be gathered from this, the -forty-third and fifty-second regiments, of the light division, alone -lost more men than the seven regiments of the third division engaged -at the castle! - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2.] - -Let any man picture to himself this frightful carnage taking place in -a space of less than a hundred square yards. Let him consider that -the slain died not all suddenly, nor by one manner of death; that -some perished by steel, some by shot, some by water, that some were -crushed and mangled by heavy weights, some trampled upon, some dashed -to atoms by the fiery explosions; that for hours this destruction was -endured without shrinking, and that the town was won at last, let -any man consider this and he must admit that a British army bears -with it an awful power. And false would it be to say that the French -were feeble men, for the garrison stood and fought manfully and -with good discipline behaving worthily. Shame there was none on any -side. Yet who shall do justice to the bravery of the soldiers? the -noble emulation of the officers? Who shall measure out the glory of -Ridge, of Macleod, of Nicholas, or of O’Hare, of the ninety-fifth, -who perished on the breach, at the head of the stormers, and with -him nearly all the volunteers for that desperate service? Who shall -describe the springing valour of that Portuguese grenadier who was -killed the foremost man at the Santa Maria? or the martial fury of -that desperate soldier of the ninety-fifth, who, in his resolution -to win, thrust himself beneath the chained sword-blades, and there -suffered the enemy to dash his head to pieces with the ends of their -muskets? Who can sufficiently honour the intrepidity of Walker, of -Shaw, of Canch, or the resolution of Ferguson of the forty-third, -who having in former assaults received two deep wounds, was here, -with his hurts still open, leading the stormers of his regiment, the -third time a volunteer, and the third time wounded! Nor would I be -understood to select these as pre-eminent, many and signal were the -other examples of unbounded devotion, some known, some that will -never be known; for in such a tumult much passed unobserved, and -often the observers fell themselves ere they could bear testimony to -what they saw; but no age, no nation ever sent forth braver troops to -battle than those who stormed Badajos. - -When the extent of the night’s havoc was made known to lord -Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the -pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss -of his gallant soldiers. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. April.] - -The English general having now achieved the second part of his -project, was desirous to fight a great battle in Andalusia, which -would have been the crown of this extraordinary winter campaign; but -the misconduct of others would not suffer him to do this. At Ciudad -Rodrigo, the Spanish engineers had entirely ceased the repairs of the -works; Carlos d’España besides neglecting to provision that place, -had by his oppressive conduct alarmed all the people of the vicinity, -and created a dangerous spirit of discontent in the garrison; Almeida -was insecure, and Marmont’s army was already between the Agueda and -the Coa. - -It was essential to place those fortresses in safety, ere the march -into Andalusia could take place; but the English general knowing -that the danger in Beira was not very imminent, lingered a few days, -hoping that Soult, in his anger at the loss of Badajos, would risk a -blow on this side of the Morena; and he was certain, that the French -general could not stop more than a few days, because of the secondary -armies whose operations were then in progress. - -Soult was indeed deeply affected by the loss of Badajos, but he was -surrounded by enemies and the contest was too unequal. He had quitted -Seville the 1st of April with twelve regiments of infantry, two of -cavalry, and one battery of artillery. His march was by Lora del -Rio and Constantino upon Llerena; and, to impose upon the allies, -general Gazan moved by the road of Monasterio with the remainder -of the artillery and the baggage, escorted by Barois’ division of -infantry, and some cavalry. But this column turned into the cross -roads, at Santa de Guillena, and so reached Constantino, whence they -followed the main body, and thus the whole army was concentrated at -Llerena on the 6th. This circuitous march had been determined by the -situation of Drouet and Daricau, who having been before driven into -the mountains by the Cordova roads, could not rally upon the side of -Monasterio; now however they advanced to Fuentes de Ovejuña, and the -allies fell back to Albuera and Talavera Real. - -On the 7th the French reached Villafranca and their cavalry entered -Villalba and Fuente del Maestro. The 8th they were in march to fight, -when the horsemen sent by Phillipon from Badajos, during the assault, -brought the news of its fall; at the same moment their general was -apprized, by his spies, that Marmont by whom he expected to be joined -was in the north and could not assist him. He immediately fell back -to Llerena, for the allies could then bring forty-five thousand men -into action, and the French army though strongly constituted and the -best troops in Spain did not exceed twenty-four thousand. - -Soult had now little time to deliberate, for Penne Villemur and -Morillo, issuing out of Portugal with four thousand men, had crossed -the Lower Guadiana, and seized San Lucar de Mayor on the 4th. This -place was ten miles from Seville, which was only garrisoned by a -Spanish Swiss battalion in Joseph’s service, aided by “_Escopeteros_” -and by the sick and convalescent men; the commandant Rignoux had -therefore, after a skirmish, shut himself up in fortified convents. -The 6th the Spaniards had occupied the heights in front of the -Triana bridge, and the 7th attacked the French entrenchments, hoping -to raise a popular commotion. But a worse danger was gathering on -the other side, for Ballesteros, after the defeat of Maransin, at -Cartama, had advanced with eleven thousand men intending to fall on -Seville from the left of the Guadalquivir. - -To distract the attention of the French, and to keep Laval from -detaching troops to Seville, the Spanish general had sent Copons -with four thousand men by Itar to Junquera, which is on the Malaga -side of the Ronda; meanwhile he himself entered Los Barios with the -rest of his army and thus threatened at once Grenada and the lines -of Chiclana. At the same time all the smaller partidas of the Ronda -were let loose in different directions, to cut the communications, -to seize the small French magazines, and to collect the Spanish -soldiers, who, at different periods, had quitted their colours and -retired to their homes. - -Copons remained at Junquera, but Ballesteros with three divisions -commanded by Cruz Murgeon, the marquis de Las Cuevas, and the prince -of Anglona, marched to Utrera as soon as Soult had departed from -Seville; thus the communication of that city with Cadiz on one side, -and with Malaga and Grenada on the other, was cut off. The situation -of the French was very critical, and they wanted ammunition, because -a large convoy, coming from Madrid, with an escort of twelve hundred -men, was stopped in the Morena by the Partidas from the Ronda and -from Murcia. - -On the 6th the Spanish cavalry was within a few miles of Seville, -when false information adroitly given by a Spaniard in the French -interest, led Ballesteros to believe that Soult was close at hand, -whereupon he immediately returned to the Ronda; the next day Penne -Villemur having received notice from lord Wellington that the French -would soon return, also retired to Gibraleon. - -Ballesteros soon discovered the deceit, when, instead of returning -to Seville, he on the 9th assaulted the small castle of Zahara in -the hills, and being repulsed with considerable loss, made a circuit -north of Ronda, by Albodonales, Alcala de Pruna, to Casarbonela, -where he was rejoined by Copons. The division of Cuevas then marched -against Ossuna, which being only garrisoned by “_Escopeteros_,” was -expected to fall at once; but after two days combat and the loss of -two hundred killed and wounded, the three thousand patriots retired, -baffled by a hundred and fifty of their own countrymen fighting for -the invaders. - -When Cuevas returned, Ballesteros marched in three columns, by roads -leading from Casarbonela and Antequera, to attack general Rey, who -was posted with eighteen hundred men near Allora, on the Guadaljore -river. The centre column was first engaged without any advantage, -but when Rey saw the flank columns coming on, he retired behind the -Guadalmedina river, close to Malaga, having lost a colonel and two -hundred men in passing the Guadaljore. - -After this action Ballesteros returned to the Ronda, for Soult was -now truly at hand, and his horsemen were already in the plains. -He had sent Digeon’s cavalry on the 9th to Cordoba, to chase the -Partidas, and had ordered Drouet’s division to take post at Fuente -Obejuna; then directing Peyreymont’s cavalry upon Usagre, he had come -himself by forced marches to Seville, which he reached the 11th, -hoping to surprise the Spaniards; but the stratagem, which had saved -Seville on the 6th also saved Ballesteros, for general Conroux was -coming up on the other side from the Guadalete and the Spaniards -would have been enclosed but for their timely retreat. And scarcely -had Soult quitted Llerena when the French met with a disaster near -Usagre, which though a strong position had always proved a very -dangerous advanced post on both sides. - -Sir Stapleton Cotton, while following the trail of the enemy, on the -evening of the 10th, had received intelligence that Peyreymont’s -cavalry was between Villa Garcia and Usagre, and he immediately -conceived hopes of cutting it off. To effect this Anson’s brigade, -then commanded by colonel Frederic Ponsonby, moved during the night -from Villa Franca upon Usagre, and at the same time Le Marchant’s -brigade marched from Los Santos upon Benvenida to intercept the -retreat on Llerena. Ponsonby’s advanced guard having commenced the -action too soon, the French fell back, before Le Marchant could -intercept them, but as some heights, skirting the Llerena road, -prevented them from seeing that general, they again drew up in order -of battle behind the junction of the Benvenida road. - -The hostile bodies were nearly equal in numbers, about nineteen -hundred sabres on each side, but sir Stapleton soon decided the -action; for ably seizing the accidental advantage of ground he -kept the enemy’s attention engaged by skirmishing with Ponsonby’s -squadrons, while Le Marchant secretly passing at the back of the -heights, sent the fifth dragoon guards against their flank, and the -next moment Ponsonby charged their front. Thus assailed the French -gave way in disorder, and being pursued for four miles left several -officers and a hundred and twenty-eight men prisoners, and many were -killed in the field. The loss of the British was only fifty-six men -and officers, of which forty-five were of the fifth dragoon guards. - -The beaten troops found refuge with Drouet’s infantry which had not -yet left Llerena; but after this action, that general fell back with -all his troops behind the Guadalquivir, for Soult was then preparing -to fight the allies at Seville. - -The duke of Dalmatia was well aware of Wellington’s intention to -invade Andalusia. He knew exactly the amount and disposition of -his forces, and was resolved to meet him coming out of the Morena, -with all the French army united; neither did he doubt the final -issue, although the failure of the last harvest and the non-arrival -of convoys since February had lessened his resources. Wellington’s -plan was however deferred. He had levelled his trenches, and brought -two Portuguese regiments of infantry from Abrantes and Elvas to -form a temporary garrison of Badajos, until some Spaniards, who had -been landed at Ayamonte in March, could arrive; then giving over -the charge of the repairs to general Hill, who remained with two -divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry in Estremadura, -he marched himself upon Beira, which Marmont was now ravaging with -great cruelty. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VIII. Section 1.] - -That marshal had been anxious to unite with Soult in Estremadura, -but the emperor’s orders were imperative, that he should make a -diversion for Badajos by an irruption into Portugal. On the 14th of -March he ascertained that none of Wellington’s divisions were left on -the Agueda, and on the 27th he was ready to move. Bonet, reinforced -by Carier’s brigade, was then on the Orbijo, in observation of the -Gallicians; Ferrier’s division was at Valladolid, and Foy’s in the -valley of the Tagus; but the other five divisions of infantry, and -one of cavalry, had passed the mountains and concentrated on the -Tormes, carrying with them fifteen days provisions, scaling-ladders, -and the materials for a bridge. Both Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo were -therefore in manifest peril, and Almeida which contained the allies’ -battering train was still very incompletely fortified. Hence on the -first rumour of Marmont’s movement, lord Wellington had thrown in two -militia regiments, with a strong detachment of British artillery-men; -the garrison was therefore three thousand six hundred strong, and the -governor, colonel Le Mesurier, laboured hard to complete the defences. - -Of the northern militia, which had been called out before the allies -quitted the Coa, six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry were -under Silveira, three thousand infantry under Trant, the same number -under John Wilson, and two thousand five hundred under Lecor. But the -law was, that persons liable to serve should be enrolled by classes -in rotation, and therefore the present men, with the exception of -Silveira’s, were raw peasants totally unskilled in the use of arms. -All these officers save Lecor, whose post was at Castello Branco, had -been for some time in movement, and Trant and Wilson were on the 22d -at Lamego, where general Bacellar, who commanded the province, fixed -his head-quarters. Silveira had the same destination, but his march -was slow, and his object rather to draw the wonder of his countrymen; -for in his unquenchable vanity he always affected to act as an -independent general. - -When Trant was assured that Marmont’s direction would be on Ciudad, -and not Oporto, he advanced from Lamego followed by Wilson, -intending to take post on the Lower Coa. While in march he received -Le Mesurier’s despatches, which induced him to make a forced march -with one brigade to the Cabeça Negro mountain, behind the bridge -of Almeida. His design was to break down the restored part of that -structure, and so prevent the enemy from penetrating to Pinhel, where -there was a magazine; and his march was well-timed, for two French -divisions were then driving Carlos d’España over the plain beyond the -Coa. It appeared that Marmont having come close to Ciudad Rodrigo on -the 30th, the Spaniards and Victor Alter fell back from the Yeltes -before him; and the latter, who had six hundred excellent German -cavalry, immediately crossed the Agueda, and neither comprehending -the spirit of lord Wellington’s orders, nor the real situation of -affairs, retreated at once to Castello Branco, four long marches from -Ciudad, thus leaving all the country open to the enemy’s marauding -parties. Carlos d’España, who had eight hundred infantry, also -retreated across the plain of the Cima de Coa to Fort Conception, -but on the 3d the French, having laid their bridge at the ford of -Caridad, passed the Agueda and drove him from thence, and he reached -the Cabeça Negro in retreat with only two hundred men, at the very -moment Trant arrived. - -The latter seeing no French cavalry on the plain, and, being desirous -of concerting his operations with Le Mesurier, immediately threw -some skirmishers into the vineyards on the right of the road beyond -the bridge, then escorted by some guides whom he had dressed in red -uniform, he galloped to the glacis of the fortress, communicated with -the governor, received from him a troop of English cavalry which -happened to be in the place and returned at dusk. The Cabeça Negro -was immediately covered with bivouac fires, and in the evening Le -Mesurier sallied from the fortress, and drove back the enemy’s light -troops. Two divisions of infantry had come against Almeida, with -orders to storm it, but these vigorous actions disturbed them; the -attempt was not made, and the general commanding excused himself to -Marmont, on the ground that the sudden appearance of Trant, indicated -the vicinity of British troops. In this false notion he marched the -next morning up the Coa towards Alfayates, where Marmont met him with -two other divisions, and eight squadrons of cavalry, having left one -division to blockade Ciudad. - -Trant now sent back the horsemen to Le Mesurier and marched to -Guarda to cover the magazines and hospital at Celerico. Here he was -joined by Wilson, and here he ought also to have been joined by -Silveira; but that general instead of crossing the Douro on the 5th, -and marching up to Guarda, only crossed it on the 14th, and then -halted at Lamego. Thus, instead of twelve thousand infantry, and -four hundred cavalry, who had seen some service, there were scarcely -six thousand raw peasants, in a position, strong, if the occupying -force had been numerous enough to hold the ridge of Porcas and other -heights behind it, but a very dangerous post for a small force, -because it could be turned by the right and left, and the line of -retreat to the Mondego was not favourable. Neither had Trant any -horsemen to scout, for Bacellar, a weak old man, who had never seen -an enemy, was now at Celerico, and retained the only squadron of -dragoons in the vicinity for his own guard. - -This post Trant and Wilson held, with six thousand militia and six -guns, from the 9th to the 14th, keeping the enemy’s marauders in -check; and they were also prepared to move by the high ridge of the -Estrella to Abrantes, if the French should menace that fortress, -which was not unlikely. For Marmont had pushed forward on Sabugal, -and Victor Alten, abandoning Castello Branco, while the French were -still at Memoa, fifty miles distant from him, had crossed the Tagus -at Vilha Velha, and it is said had even some thoughts of burning the -bridge. The French parties then traversed the Lower Beira in every -direction, plundering and murdering in such a shameful manner, that -the whole population fled before them. However, general Lecor, a good -soldier, stood fast with the militia at Castello Branco; he checked -the French cavalry detachments, removed the hospitals and some of the -stores, and when menaced by a strong force of infantry on the 12th, -destroyed the rest of the magazines, and fell back to Sarnadas, only -one short march on the road to Vilha Velha; and the next day when the -French retired, he followed and harassed their rear. - -[Sidenote: Marmont’s Official Reports, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: General Trant’s papers, MSS.] - -Marmont’s divisions being now spread over the country in search -of supplies, Trant formed the very daring design of surprising -the French marshal himself in his quarters at Sabugal. Bacellar’s -procrastinations fortunately delayed the execution of this project, -which was undoubtedly too hazardous an enterprise to undertake -with such troops; for the distance was twenty miles, and it was a -keen observation of lord Wellington’s, when Trant adverted to the -magnitude of the object, to say that, “_In war nothing is so bad -as failure and defeat_.” This would undoubtedly have been the case -here; for in the night of the 13th, that on which Trant would have -made the attempt, Marmont having formed the design of surprising -Trant, had led two brigades of infantry and four hundred cavalry up -the mountain. He cut off the outposts, and was actually entering the -streets at day-break, with his horsemen, when the alarm was beaten -at Trant’s quarters by one drummer; this being taken up at hazard, -by all the other drummers in different parts of the town, caused the -French marshal to fall back at the moment, when a brisk charge would -have placed every thing at his mercy, for the beating of the first -drum was accidental, and no troops were under arms. - -The militia immediately took post outside Guarda, but they had only -one day’s provisions, and the French cavalry could turn their flank -and gain Celerico in their rear, while the infantry attacked their -front; the guns were therefore moved off under cover of the town, -and the regiments, withdrawing in succession, retreated over three -or four miles of open ground and in good order, although the enemy’s -cavalry hovered close on the flank, and the infantry followed at a -short distance. Further on, however, there was a wooded declivity, -leading to the Mondego, and here, while the head of the troops was -passing the river below, forty dragoons, sent up by Bacellar, the -evening before, were pressed by the French, and galloped through -the rear-guard of eight hundred infantry; these last seeing the -enemy dismount to fire their carabines, and finding that the wet had -damaged their own powder, fled also, and the French followed with hue -and cry. - -All the officers behaved firmly, and the Mondego was finally passed, -yet in confusion and with the loss of two hundred prisoners; and -Marmont might now have crossed the river, on the flank of the -militia, and galloped into Celerico where there was nothing to -defend the magazines; instead of which he halted and permitted -the disorderly rabble to gain that place. Such however was his -compassion, that when he found they were really nothing but poor -undisciplined peasants he would not suffer his cavalry to cut them -down and no man was killed during the whole action, although the -French horsemen were actually in the midst of the fugitives. Bacellar -having destroyed a quantity of powder at Celerico retreated with -Trant’s people the next day towards Lamego; Wilson remained at -Celerico, and when the enemy had driven in his outposts, he ordered -the magazines to be destroyed, but the order was only partly executed -when the French retired, and on the 17th the militia reoccupied -Guarda. - -This short campaign of the militia I have treated at length, because -it produced an undue effect at the time, and because it shews how -trifling accidents will mar the greatest combinations; for here the -English general’s extensive arrangements for the protection of Beira -were utterly disconcerted by the slow advance of Silveira on the one -side, and the rapid retreat of general Alten on the other. Again, the -French deceived by some red uniforms and by some bivouac fires, on -the Cabeça Negro, had relinquished the attack of Almeida to run after -a few thousand undisciplined militia men, who were yet saved by the -accidental beating of a drum; and it is curious to find a marshal of -France personally acting as a partizan, and yet effecting nothing -against these miserable troops. - -The disaster on the Mondego spread consternation as far as Coimbra, -and the most alarming reports reached lord Wellington, whose -operations it is now time to notice. When Soult’s retreat from -Llerena was ascertained, the allied army had marched towards the -Tagus, and on the 11th lord Wellington, hearing of Alten’s retreat, -sent him orders to recross that river without delay and return to -Castello Branco. The 16th the advanced guard of the army also reached -that town, and the same day a militia officer flying from Coimbra in -the general panic, came to head-quarters and reported that the enemy -was master of that town; but the next hour, brought general Wilson’s -report from Guarda, and the unfortunate wretch whose fears had led -him to give the false information, was tried and shot by order of -Beresford. - -At this time the French army, in number about twenty-eight thousand, -was concentrated, with the exception of Brennier’s division which -remained near Ciudad Rodrigo, between Sabugal and the ridge of hills -overlooking Penamacor. Marmont was inclined to fight, for he had -heard of a convoy of provisions which lord Wellington had some days -before sent by the way of Almeida to Ciudad, and intended to cut it -off; but the convoy having reached Almeida was safe, and the French -general’s own position was very critical. Almeida and the militia -at Guarda were on his right flank, Ciudad Rodrigo was on his rear, -and immediately behind him the Coa and the Agueda rivers were both -swelled by heavy rains which fell from the 13th to the 19th, and -the flood had broken the bridge near Caridad. There remained only -the Puente de Villar on the Upper Agueda for retreat, and the roads -leading to it were bad and narrow; the march from thence to Tamames -was also circuitous and exposed to the attack of the allies, who -could move on the chord through Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont’s retreat -must therefore have been effected through the pass of Perales upon -Coria, and the English general conceiving good hopes of falling on -him before he could cross the Coa, moved forward to Pedrogoa; but the -rear of the army was not yet across the Tagus, and a sufficient body -of troops for the attack could not be collected before the 21st. On -that day, however, the Agueda having subsided, the French restored -their bridge, the last of their divisions crossed it on the 24th, and -Marmont thus terminated his operations without loss. After this he -again spread his troops over the plains of Leon, where some of his -smaller posts had indeed been harassed by Julian Sanchez, but where -the Gallician army had done nothing. - -The Portuguese militia were immediately disbanded, and the English -general made the greatest exertions to revictual Almeida and Ciudad -Rodrigo, intending when that was effected to leave Picton with a -corps upon the Agueda, and march himself against Andalusia, following -his original design. The first division, which had only reached -Castello Branco, returned to Castello de Vide, and as Foy’s division -had meanwhile reoccupied Truxillo, Hill advanced to observe him, and -the fifth Spanish army returned to Estremadura. But the difficulty of -supplying the fortresses was very great. The incursion of Marmont had -destroyed all the intermediate magazines, and dispersed the means of -transport on the lines of communication; the Portuguese government -would not remedy the inconvenience either there, or on the other -frontier, and Elvas and Badajos were suffering from the same cause as -Ciudad and Almeida. - -In this dilemma lord Wellington adopted, from necessity, a very -unmilitary and dangerous remedy. For having declared to the members -of the Portuguese government, that on their heads he would throw -the responsibility of losing Badajos and Elvas, if they did not -immediately victual both, a threat which had its due effect, he -employed the whole of the carriages and mules attached to the army to -bring up stores to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; meanwhile he quartered -his troops near the points of water-carriage, that is to say, on the -Mondego, the Douro, and the Tagus. Thus the army was spread from the -Morena to the Tagus, from the Tagus to the Douro, from the Douro to -the Mondego, on a line little less than four hundred miles long, and -in the face of three hostile armies, the farthest of which was but -a few marches from the outposts. It was however scarcely possible -for the French to assemble again in masses, before the ripening of -the coming harvest; and on the other hand, even the above measure -was insufficient to gain time; the expedition against Andalusia was -therefore abandoned, and the fifth great epoch of the war terminated. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. - - -[Sidenote: 1812.] - -In this campaign the French forces were too much scattered, and they -occupied the countries bordering on Portugal rather as a conquered -territory than as a field of operations. The movements of the armies -of the north, of the centre, and of Portugal, might have been so -combined as to present a hundred thousand men on a field of battle; -yet Wellington captured two great fortresses within gun-shot as it -were of them all, and was never disturbed by the approach of even -thirty thousand men. This arose partly from want of union, partly -from the orders of the Emperor, whose plans the generals either did -not or would not understand in their true spirit, and therefore -executed without vigour; and yet the French writers have generally -endeavoured to fasten the failures on Napoleon, as if he only was -mistaken about the war in Spain! It is easy to spurn the dead lion! - -The expedition of Montbrun to Alicant has been fixed upon as the -chief cause of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. Napoleon however did not -desire that Montbrun’s march should be held in abeyance for a week, -upon the strength of some vague rumours relative to the allies’ -proceedings, and yet be finally sent at precisely the wrong period; -neither did he contemplate that general’s idle display at Alicant -after the city of Valencia had fallen. But ill-executed and hurtful -as this expedition doubtless was, in various ways, the loss of Ciudad -Rodrigo cannot be directly traced to it. Montbrun was at Almanza the -9th of January and the 19th Ciudad was stormed; now, if he had not -been at Almanza he would have been at Toledo or Talavera, that is, -eight marches from Salamanca; and as the commencement of the siege -was not known until the 15th, even at Valladolid, he could not have -been on the Tormes before the 25th, which would have been five days -too late. The emperor wished to strengthen Suchet at the crisis of -the Valencian operations, and his intent was that Montbrun should -have reached that city in December, but the latter did not arrive -before the middle of January; had he been only a week earlier, that -is, had he marched at once from Toledo, Mahy could not have escaped, -Alicant would then have fallen, and if Blake had made an obstinate -defence at Valencia the value of such a reinforcement would have been -acknowledged. - -At this period Valencia was the most important point in the -Peninsula, and there was no apparent reason why Ciudad should be -in any immediate danger; the emperor could not calculate upon the -errors of his own generals. It is futile therefore to affirm that -Montbrun’s detachment was made on a false principle; it was on the -contrary conceived in perfect accord with the maxim of concentrating -on the important point at the decisive moment; errors, extraneous -to the original design, alone brought it within the principle of -dissemination. - -The loss of Ciudad Rodrigo may be directly traced to the duke of -Ragusa’s want of vigilance, to the scanty garrison which he kept in -the place, to the Russian war which obliged the emperor to weaken the -army of the north; finally, to the extravagance of the army of the -centre. Marmont expressly asserts that at Madrid three thousand men -devoured and wasted daily the rations of twenty-two thousand, and the -stores thus consumed would have enabled the army of Portugal to keep -concentrated, in which case Wellington could not have taken Ciudad; -and if the army of the centre had been efficient, Hill would have -incurred great danger and Soult’s power been vastly augmented. - -It is not Napoleon’s skill only, that has been assailed by these -writers. Lord Wellington also is blamed for not crushing Souham’s -division at Tamames between the 23d and the 26th of January; although -Souham, a good general, never entered Tamames, except with cavalry -scouts, and kept his main body at Matilla, whence one forced march -would have placed him behind the Tormes in safety! In such a shallow -manner have the important operations of this period been treated. Nor -will the causes commonly assigned for the fall of Badajos better bear -examination. - -“_Marmont instead of joining Soult in Estremadura, followed a -phantom in Beira._” “_It was his vanity and jealousy of the duke -of Dalmatia that lost Badajos._” Such are the assertions of both -French and English writers; nevertheless the duke of Ragusa never -anticipated any success from his movement into Beira, and far from -avoiding Soult, earnestly desired to co-operate with him; moreover -this invasion of Beira, which has been regarded as a folly, was the -conception of Napoleon, the greatest of all captains! and it is not -difficult to shew that the emperor’s design was, notwithstanding the -ill result, capacious and solid. - -Let us suppose that Marmont had aided Soult, and that the army of -the centre had also sent men. If they had made any error in their -combinations the English general would have defeated them separately; -if they had effected their junction, he would have retreated, and -Badajos would have been succoured. But then eighty thousand French -would have been assembled by long marches in the winter rains, to -the great detriment of their affairs elsewhere, and unless they -came prepared to take Elvas, without any adequate object; for lord -Wellington could, after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, have repeated -this operation as often as he pleased, which, besides the opening -thus made for insurrection in Spain, would have stamped a character -of weakness on the French arms, extremely injurious, since character -is half the strength of an army. - -The emperor judged better; he disliked such timid operations, he -desired that his powerful armies should throw the allies on the -defensive and he indicated the means of doing so. Wellington, he -said, expecting an effort to retake Ciudad Rodrigo, had called Hill -across the Tagus, and to prevent that movement Soult was directed to -send twenty thousand men against the Alemtejo. The fall of Ciudad -had thus by obliging the allies to defend it, given the French their -choice of ground for a battle, and at a distance from the sea; it -was for Marmont to avail himself of the occasion, not by marching -to aid Soult, who had eighty thousand excellent troops, and at the -worst could be only driven from Andalusia upon Valencia or Madrid; -whereas if the army of Portugal or a part of it should be defeated -on the Guadiana the blow would be felt in every part of Spain. -Marmont’s business was, he said, first to strengthen his own position -at Salamanca, as a base of operations, and then to keep the allies -constantly engaged on the Agueda until he was prepared to fight a -general battle. Meanwhile Soult should either take the fortresses of -the Alemtejo, or draw off Hill’s corps from Wellington, who would -then be very inferior to Marmont and yet Hill himself would be -unequal to fight Soult. - -“Fix your quarters,” said the emperor, “at Salamanca, work day and -night to fortify that place—organize a new battering train—form -magazines—send strong advanced guards to menace Ciudad and -Almeida—harass the allies’ outposts, even daily—threaten the -frontier of Portugal in all directions, and send parties to ravage -the nearest villages—repair the ways to Almeida and Oporto, and -keep the bulk of your army at Toro Zamora, Benevente, and Avila, -which are fertile districts, and from whence, in four days, you can -concentrate the whole upon Salamanca. You will thus keep the allies -in check on the Agueda, and your troops will repose, while you -prepare for great operations. You have nothing to do with the south. -Announce the approach of your new battering train, and if Wellington -marches to invest Badajos with a few divisions, Soult will be able to -relieve it; but if Wellington goes with all his forces, unite your -army, march straight upon Almeida, push parties to Coimbra, overrun -the country in various directions, and be assured he will return. -Twenty-four hours after the receipt of this letter you should be on -your way to Salamanca, and your advanced guards should be in march -towards Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VIII. Section 2.] - -Now, if Marmont had thus conceived the war himself, he could have -commenced operations before the end of January; but this letter, -written the 15th of February, reached him in the latter end of -that month, and found him desponding and fearful even in defence. -Vacillating between his own wishes and the emperor’s orders, he did -nothing; but had he, as his despatch recommended, commenced his -operations in twenty-four hours, his advanced posts would have been -near Ciudad early in March, that is at the moment when the allies -were, as I have before shewn, disseminated all over Portugal, and -when only the fifth division was upon the Coa to oppose him. The -works of Almeida were then quite indefensible, and the movement upon -Badajos must have necessarily been suspended. Thus the winter season -would have passed away uselessly for the allies unless Wellington -turned to attack Marmont, which was a difficult operation in itself, -and would have been dangerous to the Alemtejo, while Soult held -Badajos, for that marshal, as we have seen, had received orders to -attack Hill with twenty thousand men. Here then the errors were -of execution, not of design, and the first part of the emperor’s -combinations was evidently just and solid. It remains to test the -second part which was to have been executed if lord Wellington -invested Badajos. - -It must be remembered, that Marmont was so to hold his army, that -he could concentrate in four days; that he was to make an incursion -into Beira the moment Wellington crossed the Tagus; that Oporto was -to be menaced, Almeida to be attacked, Coimbra to be occupied. These -operations would undoubtedly have brought the allies back again at -the commencement of the siege, because the fall of Badajos could -not be expected under three weeks, which would have been too long -to leave Beira and the fortresses at the mercy of the invader. Now -Marmont did not reach the Agueda before the 31st March, when the -siege of Badajos was approaching its conclusion; he did not storm -Almeida, nor attack Ciudad Rodrigo, nor enter Coimbra, nor menace -Oporto; and yet his operation, feebly as it was executed, obliged -lord Wellington to relinquish his meditated attack on Andalusia, -and return to the assistance of Beira. Again therefore the error -was in the execution. And here we may observe how inferior in -hardihood the French general was to his adversary. Wellington with -eighteen thousand men had escaladed Badajos, a powerful fortress and -defended by an excellent governor with five thousand French veterans; -Marmont with twenty-eight thousand men would not attempt to storm -Ciudad, although its breaches were scarcely healed, and its garrison -disaffected. Nor did he even assail Almeida, which hardly meriting -the name of a fortress, was only occupied by three thousand militia, -scarcely able to handle their arms; and yet if he had captured -Almeida, as he could scarcely have failed to do with due vigour, he -would have found a battering train with which to take Ciudad Rodrigo, -and thus have again balanced the campaign. - -The duke of Ragusa was averse to serving in the Peninsula, he wished -to be employed in the Russian expedition, and he had written to the -emperor to desire his recal, or that the whole of the northern -district, from Sebastian to Salamanca, including Madrid, should be -placed under his orders. Unless that were done, he said he could only -calculate the operations of his own troops. The other generals would -make difficulties, would move slowly, and the king’s court was in -open hostility to the French interest. The army of the north had in -retiring from Leon scrupulously carried away every thing that could -be useful to him, in the way of bridge, or battering equipages, or of -ammunition or provisions, although he was in want of all these things. - -Then he painted all the jealousies and disputes in the French -armies, and affirmed that his own force, care being had for the -posts of communication, and the watching of the army of Gallicia, -would not furnish more than thirty-four thousand men for the field; -a calculation contradicted by the imperial muster-rolls, which on -the 1st of March bore sixty thousand fighting men present with the -eagles. He also rated the allies at sixty thousand, well provided -with every thing and ready to attack him, whereas the returns of -that army gave only fifty-two thousand men including Hill’s corps; -about thirty-five thousand only could have passed the Agueda, and -their penury of means had, as we have seen, prevented them from even -holding together, on the northern frontier. In like manner he assumed -that two of the allied divisions were left upon the Agueda, when -the army marched against Badajos, whereas no more than six hundred -cavalry remained there. All these things prove that Marmont, either -from dislike to the war, or natural want of vigour, was not equal to -his task, and it is obvious that a diversion, begun so late, and -followed up with so little energy, could have had little effect upon -the siege of Badajos; it would have been far better to have followed -his own first design of detaching three divisions to aid Soult, and -retained the other two to menace Ciudad Rodrigo. - -It is fitting now to test the operations of the armies of the south, -and of the centre. The latter is easily disposed of. The secret of -its inactivity is to be found in Marmont’s letter. Every thing at -Madrid was confusion and intrigue, waste and want of discipline; in -fine, the union of a court and an army, had destroyed the latter. Not -so at Seville. There the hand of an able general, an indefatigable -administrator were visible, and the unravelling the intricate -combinations, which produced such an apparent want of vigour in the -operations of the duke of Dalmatia, will form at once the apology for -that general, and the just eulogium of lord Wellington. - -First it must be held in mind that the army of the south, so powerful -in appearance, did not furnish a proportionate number of men for -field-service, because the reinforcements, although borne on the -rolls, were for the most part retained in the northern governments. -Soult had sixty-seven thousand French and six thousand “Escopeteros” -present under arms in September; but then followed the surprise of -Girard at Aroyo de Molinos, the vigorous demonstrations of Hill in -December, the failure of Godinot at Gibraltar, the check sustained -by Semélé at Bornos, and the siege of Tarifa, which diminished the -number of men, and occasioned fresh arrangements on the different -points of the circle. The harvest of 1811 had failed in Andalusia, -as in all other parts, and the inhabitants were reduced to feed on -herbs; the soldiers had only half rations of bread, and neither -reinforcements of men, nor convoys of money, nor ammunition, nor -clothes, had come either from France or from Madrid for a long period. - -It was under these circumstances that Soult received the order to -send twenty thousand men against the Alemtejo. But the whole of -the Polish troops, and the skeletons of regiments, and the picked -men for the imperial guards, in all fifteen thousand, after being -collected at the Despeñas Peros, while Suchet was before Valencia, -had now marched to Talavera de la Reyna on the way to France; at -that moment also Ballesteros appeared, with the fourth Spanish army, -twelve thousand strong, in the Ronda, and his detachments defeated -Maransin at Cartaña, which of necessity occasioned another change -in the French dispositions. Moreover the very successes of Suchet -had at this time increased Soult’s difficulties, because all the -fugitives from Valencia gathered on the remains of the Murcian army; -and fifteen thousand men, including the garrisons of Carthagena and -Alicant, were again assembled on the frontier of Grenada, where, -during the expedition to Estremadura, the French had only three -battalions and some cavalry. - -Thus the army of the south was, if the garrison of Badajos be -excluded, reduced to forty-eight thousand French sabres and bayonets -present with the eagles, and this at the very moment when its enemies -were augmented by twenty-five thousand fresh men. Soult had indeed -besides this force five thousand artillery-men and other attendant -troops, and six thousand “_Escopeteros_” were capable of taking the -field, while thirty thousand civic guards held his fortified posts. -Nevertheless he was forced to reduce all the garrisons, and even -the camp before the Isla to the lowest numbers, consistent with -safety, ere he could bring twenty-four thousand French into the field -for the succour of Badajos, and even then as we have seen, he was -upon the point of losing Seville. These things prevented him from -coming against the Alemtejo in March, when his presence with an army -would have delayed the commencement of the siege until a battle had -been fought: but he was the less fearful for the fortress because -Marmont on the 22d of February and Foy on the 28th had announced, -that if Badajos should be menaced, three divisions of the army of -Portugal, then in the valley of the Tagus, would enter Estremadura; -and these divisions uniting with Daricau’s and Drouet’s troops would -have formed an army of thirty thousand men, and consequently would -have sufficed to delay the operations of the allies. But Marmont, -having subsequently received the emperor’s orders to move into -Beira, passed the Gredos mountains instead of the Tagus river, and -thus unintentionally deceived Soult; and whether his letters were -intercepted, or carelessly delayed, it was not until the 8th of -April, that the duke of Dalmatia was assured of his departure for -Salamanca. - -On the other hand Lord Wellington’s operations were so rapidly pushed -forward, that Soult cannot be censured for false calculations. No -general could suspect that such an outwork as the Picurina, would be -taken by storm without being first battered; still less that Badajos, -with its lofty walls, its brave garrison, and its celebrated -governor, would in like manner be carried before the counterscarp -was blown in, and the fire of the defences ruined. In fine, no man -accustomed to war could have divined the surpassing resolution and -surpassing fortune also, of the British general and his troops; -neither is it impertinent to observe here, that as the French never -use iron ordnance in a siege, their calculations were necessarily -formed upon the effect of brass artillery, which is comparatively -weak and slow: with brass guns the breaches would have been made -three days later. - -The fall of Badajos may therefore be traced partly to the Russian -war, which drew fifteen thousand men from the army of the south, -partly to the irresolution of Marmont, who did neither execute the -emperor’s plan nor his own; finally, to the too great extent of -country occupied, whereby time and numbers were swallowed. And here -the question arises, if Soult, acting upon the principles laid down -in his letter to Joseph, just before the battle of Talavera, should -not have operated against the allies in great masses, relinquishing -possession of Grenada, Malaga, in fine of every thing, save Seville -and the camp before the Isla. If beaten, he would have lost Andalusia -and fallen back on Suchet, but then the head of the French invasion, -might have been more formidable at Valencia than at Seville, and -Marmont could have renewed the battle. And such a chequered game, -lord Wellington’s political situation both in England and Portugal -being considered, would have gone near to decide the question of the -British troops remaining in the latter country. This however is a -grave and difficult matter to resolve. - -In whatever light this campaign is viewed the talent of the English -general is conspicuous. That fortune aided him is true, but it was -in the manner she favours the pilot, who watching every changing -wind, every shifting current, makes all subservient to his purpose. -Ascertaining with great pains the exact situation of each adversary, -he had sagaciously met their different modes of warfare, and with a -nice hand had adapted his measures to the successive exigences of -the moment. The army of the centre, where disorder was paramount, -he disregarded; Marmont whose temperament was hasty he deceived by -affected slowness; and Soult he forestalled by quickness. Twice -he induced the duke of Ragusa to send his divisions into distant -quarters, when they should have been concentrated, and each time he -gained a great advantage; once when he took Ciudad Rodrigo, and again -when, using a like opportunity, to obviate the difficulties presented -by the conduct of the Portuguese government, he spread his own troops -over the country, in an unmilitary manner, that he might feed and -clothe them on their march to the Alemtejo. This he could not have -done if the French had been concentrated; neither could he have so -well concealed that march from the enemy. - -In Estremadura, he kept his force compact and strong to meet Soult, -from whose warfare he expected a powerful opposition, hard indeed to -resist, yet not likely to abound in sudden strokes, and therefore -furnishing more certain ground for calculation as to time; and -then he used that time so wonderfully at the siege, that even his -enemies declared it incomprehensible, and he who had hitherto been -censured for over caution was now dreaded as over daring! This -daring was, however, in no manner allied to rashness, his precautions -multiplied as his enterprises augmented. The divisions of the army of -Portugal, quartered in the valley of the Tagus, could by moving into -Estremadura in March have delayed if not prevented the siege; lord -Wellington had therefore with forecast of such an event, designed -that Hill should, when the allies entered the Alemtejo, make a forced -march to surprise the bridge and forts at Almaraz, which would have -obliged the French divisions to make a long circuit by the bridges of -Arzobispo and Talavera to reach the scene of action in Estremadura. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted despatch of marshal Soult, 1812. MSS.] - -This bold and skilful stroke was baulked by the never-ceasing -misconduct of the Portuguese government, with respect to means of -transport; for the battering-guns intended for Hill’s enterprise were -thus prevented passing Evora. Nevertheless the siege was commenced, -because it was ascertained that Marmont was still ignorant of the -allies’ march, and had made no change in his extended quarters, -indicating a design to aid Soult; Hill also soon drove Drouet back -towards the Morena, and by occupying Merida, intercepted the line -of communication with Almaraz, which answered the same purpose. But -the best testimony to the skill of the operation is to be found in -the enemy’s papers. “So calculated,” said Soult, “was this affair -(the siege of Badajos) that it is to be supposed lord Wellington had -intercepted some despatches which explained to him the system of -operations and the irresolution of Marmont.” - -Nor when the duke of Ragusa was ravaging Beira, and both Almeida and -Ciudad appeared in the utmost danger, did lord Wellington’s delay -in Estremadura arise from any imprudence; he had good grounds for -believing, that the French would not attempt the latter place, and -that the loss of a few days would not prove injurious. For when the -first intelligence that the army of Portugal was concentrating on the -Tormes reached him, he sent captain Colquhoun Grant, a celebrated -scouting officer, to watch Marmont’s proceedings. That gentleman, -in whom the utmost daring was so mixed with subtlety of genius, and -both so tempered by discretion, that it is hard to say which quality -predominated, very rapidly executed his mission; and the interesting -nature of his adventures on this occasion will perhaps excuse a -digression concerning them. - -Attended by Leon, a Spanish peasant of great fidelity and quickness -of apprehension, who had been his companion on many former occasions -of the same nature, Grant arrived in the Salamancan district, and -passing the Tormes in the night, remained, in uniform, for he never -assumed any disguise, three days in the midst of the French camp. -He thus obtained exact information of Marmont’s object, and more -especially of his preparations of provisions and scaling-ladders, -notes of which he sent to lord Wellington from day to day by Spanish -agents. However, on the third night, some peasants brought him a -general order, addressed to the French regiments, and saying, that -the notorious Grant being within the circle of their cantonments, the -soldiers were to use their utmost exertions to secure him, for which -purpose also guards were placed as it were in a circle round the army. - -Nothing daunted by this news, Grant consulted with the peasants, -and the next morning, before daylight, entered the village of -Huerta, which is close to a ford on the Tormes, and about six miles -from Salamanca. Here there was a French battalion, and on the -opposite side of the river cavalry videttes were posted, two of -which constantly patrolled back and forward, for the space of three -hundred yards, meeting always at the ford. When day broke the French -battalion assembled on its alarm-post, and at that moment Grant -was secretly brought with his horse behind the gable of a house, -which hid him from the infantry, and was opposite to the ford. The -peasants standing on some loose stones and spreading their large -cloaks, covered him from the cavalry videttes, and thus he calmly -waited until the latter were separated the full extent of their beat; -then putting spurs to his horse he dashed through the ford between -them, and receiving their fire without damage, reached a wood, not -very distant, where the pursuit was baffled, and where he was soon -rejoined by Leon, who in his native dress met with no interruption. - -Grant had already ascertained that the means of storming Ciudad -Rodrigo were prepared, and that the French officers openly talked of -doing so, but he desired still further to test this project, and to -discover if the march of the enemy might not finally be directed by -the pass of Perales, towards the Tagus; he wished also to ascertain -more correctly their real numbers, and therefore placed himself on a -wooded hill, near Tamames, where the road branches off to the passes, -and to Ciudad Rodrigo. Here lying perdue, until the whole French -army had passed by in march, he noted every battalion and gun, and -finding that all were directed towards Ciudad, entered Tamames after -they had passed, and discovered that they had left the greatest -part of their scaling-ladders behind, which clearly proved that the -intention of storming Ciudad Rodrigo was not real. This it was which -allayed Wellington’s fears for that fortress. - -When Marmont afterwards passed the Coa, in this expedition, Grant -preceded him with intent to discover if his further march would be -by Guarda upon Coimbra, or by Sabugal upon Castello Branco; for to -reach the latter it was necessary to descend from a very high ridge, -or rather succession of ridges, by a pass, at the lower mouth of -which stands Penamacor. Upon one of the inferior ridges in the pass, -this persevering officer placed himself, thinking that the dwarf -oaks, with which the hills were covered, would effectually secure -him from discovery; but from the higher ridge above, the French -detected all his movements with their glasses, in a few moments -Leon, whose lynx-eyes were always on the watch, called out “_the -French! the French!_” and pointed to the rear, whence some dragoons -came galloping up. Grant and his follower, instantly darted into the -wood for a little space, and then suddenly wheeling, rode off in a -different direction; yet at every turn new enemies appeared, and at -last the hunted men dismounted and fled on foot through the thickest -of the low oaks; but again they were met by infantry, who had been -detached in small parties down the sides of the pass, and were -directed in their chase by the waving of the French officers’ hats on -the ridge above. At last Leon fell exhausted, and the barbarians who -first came up, killed him in despite of his companion’s entreaties. - -Grant himself they carried, without injury, to Marmont, who receiving -him with apparent kindness, invited him to dinner. The conversation -turned upon the prisoner’s exploits, and the French marshal affirmed -that he had been for a long time on the watch, that he knew all -his haunts, and his disguises, and had discovered that, only the -night before, he had slept in the French head-quarters, with other -adventures, which had not happened, for this Grant never used any -disguise; but there was another Grant, a man also very remarkable in -his way, who used to remain for months in the French quarters, using -all manner of disguises; hence the similarity of names caused the -actions of both to be attributed to one, which is the only palliative -for Marmont’s subsequent conduct. - -Treating his prisoner as I have said, with great apparent kindness, -the French general exacted from him an especial parole, that he would -not consent to be released by the Partidas, while on his journey -through Spain to France, which secured his captive, although lord -Wellington offered two thousand dollars to any guerilla chief who -should rescue him. The exaction of such a parole, however harsh, was -in itself a tacit compliment to the man; but Marmont, also, sent -a letter, with the escort, to the governor of Bayonne, in which, -still labouring under the error that there was only one Grant, he -designated his captive as a dangerous spy, who had done infinite -mischief to the French army, and whom he had only not executed on -the spot, out of respect to something resembling an uniform which -he wore at the time of his capture. He therefore desired, that at -Bayonne, he should be placed in irons and sent up to Paris. - -This proceeding was too little in accord with the honour of the -French army to be supported, and before the Spanish frontier was -passed, Grant, it matters not how, was made acquainted with the -contents of the letter. Now the custom at Bayonne, in ordinary -cases, was for the prisoner to wait on the authorities, and receive -a passport to travel to Verdun, and all this was duly accomplished; -meanwhile the delivering of the fatal letter being, by certain means, -delayed, Grant, with a wonderful readiness and boldness, resolved not -to escape towards the Pyrenees, thinking that he would naturally be -pursued in that direction. He judged that if the governor of Bayonne -could not recapture him at once, he would for his own security -suppress the letter in hopes the matter would be no further thought -of; judging, I say, in this acute manner, he on the instant inquired -at the hotels, if any French officer was going to Paris, and finding -that general Souham, then on his return from Spain, was so bent, he -boldly introduced himself, and asked permission to join his party. -The other readily assented; and while thus travelling, the general, -unacquainted with Marmont’s intentions, often rallied his companion -about his adventures, little thinking that he was then himself an -instrument in forwarding the most dangerous and skilful of them all. - -In passing through Orleans, Grant, by a species of intuition, -discovered an English agent, and from him received a recommendation -to another secret agent in Paris, whose assistance would be -necessary to his final escape; for he looked upon Marmont’s double -dealing, and the expressed design to take away his life, as -equivalent to a discharge of his parole, which was moreover only -given with respect to Spain. When he arrived at Paris he took leave -of Souham, opened an intercourse with the Parisian agent, from whom -he obtained money, and by his advice, avoided appearing before -the police, to have his passport examined. He took a lodging in a -very public street, frequented the coffee-houses, and even visited -the theatres without fear, because the secret agent, who had been -long established and was intimately connected with the police, had -ascertained that no inquiry about his escape had been set on foot. - -In this manner he passed several weeks, at the end of which, the -agent informed him that a passport was ready for one Jonathan Buck, -an American, who had died suddenly, on the very day it was to have -been claimed. Seizing this occasion, Grant boldly demanded the -passport, with which he instantly departed for the mouth of the -Loire, because certain reasons, not necessary to mention, led him to -expect more assistance there than at any other port. However, new -difficulties awaited him and were overcome by fresh exertions of his -surprising talents, which fortune seemed to delight in aiding. - -He first took a passage for America in a ship of that nation, but its -departure being unexpectedly delayed, he frankly explained his true -situation to the captain, who desired him to assume the character -of a discontented seaman, and giving him a sailor’s dress and forty -dollars, sent him to lodge the money in the American consul’s hands -as a pledge, that he would prosecute the captain for ill usage when -he reached the United States; this being the custom on such occasions -the consul gave him a certificate which enabled him to pass from port -to port as a discharged sailor seeking a ship. - -Thus provided, after waiting some days, Grant prevailed upon a -boatman, by a promise of ten Napoleons, to row him in the night -towards a small island, where, by usage, the English vessels watered -unmolested, and in return permitted the few inhabitants to fish and -traffic without interruption. In the night the boat sailed, the masts -of the British ships were dimly seen on the other side of the island, -and the termination of his toils appeared at hand, when the boatman, -either from fear or malice, suddenly put about and returned to port. -In such a situation, some men would have striven in desperation to -force fortune, and so have perished; the spirits of others would have -sunk in despair, for the money which he had promised was all that -remained of his stock, and the boatman, notwithstanding his breach -of contract, demanded the whole; but with inexpressible coolness and -resolution, Grant gave him one Napoleon instead of ten, and a rebuke -for his misconduct. The other having threatened a reference to the -police, soon found that he was no match in subtlety for his opponent, -who told him plainly that he would then denounce him as aiding the -escape of a prisoner of war, and would adduce the great price of his -boat as a proof of his guilt! - -This menace was too formidable to be resisted, and Grant in a few -days engaged an old fisherman, who faithfully performed his bargain; -but now there were no English vessels near the island; however the -fisherman cast his nets and caught some fish, with which he sailed -towards the southward, where he had heard there was an English ship -of war. In a few hours they obtained a glimpse of her, and were -steering that way, when a shot from a coast-battery brought them to, -and a boat with soldiers put off to board them; the fisherman was -steadfast and true; he called Grant his son, and the soldiers by whom -they expected to be arrested were only sent to warn them not to pass -the battery, because the English vessel they were in search of was on -the coast. The old man, who had expected this, bribed the soldiers -with his fish, assuring them he must go with his son or they would -starve, and that he was so well acquainted with the coast he could -always escape the enemy. His prayers and presents prevailed, he was -desired to wait under the battery till night, and then depart; but -under pretence of arranging his escape from the English vessel, he -made the soldiers point out her bearings so exactly, that when the -darkness came, he ran her straight on board, and the intrepid officer -stood in safety on the quarter-deck. - -After this Grant reached England and obtained permission to choose -a French officer of equal rank with himself, to send to France, -that no doubt might remain about the propriety of his escape; and -great was his astonishment to find, in the first prison he visited, -the old fisherman and his real son, who had meanwhile been captured -notwithstanding a protection given to them for their services. Grant, -whose generosity and benevolence were as remarkable as the qualities -of his understanding, soon obtained their release, and having -sent them with a sum of money to France returned himself to the -Peninsula, and within four months from the date of his first capture -was again on the Tormes, watching Marmont’s army! Other strange -incidents of his life I could mention, were it not more fitting to -quit a digression, already too wide; yet I was unwilling to pass an -occasion of noticing one adventure of this generous and spirited, and -yet gentle-minded man, who having served his country nobly and ably -in every climate, died, not long since, exhausted by the continual -hardships he had endured. - -Having now shewn the prudence of lord Wellington with respect -to the campaign generally, it remains to consider the siege of -Badajos, which has so often been adduced in evidence, that not skill -but fortune plumed his ambitious wing; a proceeding indeed most -consonant to the nature of man; for it is hard to avow inferiority, -by attributing an action so stupendous to superior genius alone. -A critical scientific examination would be misplaced in a general -history, but to notice some of the leading points which involve -the general conception will not be irrelevant. The choice of the -line of attack has been justified by the English engineers, as that -requiring least expenditure of means and time; but this has by the -French engineer been denied. Colonel Lamarre affirms that the front -next the castle was the one least susceptible of defence; because -it had neither ravelin nor ditch to protect it, had fewer flanks, -and offered no facility of retrenching behind it; a view which is -confirmed by Phillipon, who being the best judge of his own weak -points, did for many days imagine that this front was the true -object of the allies’ approaches. But Lamarre advances a far more -interesting question, when he affirms that the English general might -have carried Badajos by escalade and storm, on the first night of -the siege, with less difficulty than he experienced on the 7th of -April. On that night, he says, the defences were not so complete, -that the garrison was less prepared, and the surprise would have -availed somewhat; whereas at the second period the breaches were the -strongest part of the town, and as no other advantage had been gained -by the besiegers, the chances were in favour of the first period. - -This reasoning appears sound, yet the fact is one which belongs, not -to the rules but the secrets of the art, and they are only in the -keeping of great captains. That the breaches were impregnable has -indeed been denied by the English engineers. Colonel Jones affirms -that the centre breach had not the slightest interior retrenchment, -and that the sword-blades in the Trinidad, might have been overturned -by the rush of a dense mass of troops. This opinion is quite at -variance with that of the officers and men engaged; it is certain -also that all the breaches were protected by the sword-blades, -and if the centre breach was not retrenched, it was rendered very -difficult of approach by the deep holes digged in front, and it was -more powerfully swept by flank fire than the others were. It is -also a mistake to suppose that no dense rush was made at the great -breach. Engineers intent upon their own art sometimes calculate on -men as they do on blocks of stone or timber, nevertheless where the -bullet strikes the man will fall. The sword-blades were fitted into -ponderous beams, and these last, chained together, were let deep into -the ground; how then was it possible for men to drag, or push them -from their places, when behind them stood resolute men, whose fire -swept the foremost ranks away? This fire could not be returned by the -soldiers engaged in removing the obstacles, nor by those in rear, -because, from the slope of the breach, they could only see their -own comrades of the front ranks; and then the dead bodies, and the -struggling wounded men, and still more the spiked planks, rendered a -simultaneous exertion impossible. The breaches were impregnable! - -And why was all this striving in blood against insurmountable -difficulties? Why were men sent thus to slaughter, when the -application of a just science would have rendered the operation -comparatively easy? Because the English ministers, so ready to plunge -into war, were quite ignorant of its exigencies; because the English -people are warlike without being military, and under the pretence -of maintaining a liberty which they do not possess, oppose in peace -all useful martial establishments. Expatiating in their schools and -colleges, upon Roman discipline and Roman valour, they are heedless -of Roman institutions; they desire like that ancient republic, to be -free at home and conquerors abroad, but start at perfecting their -military system, as a thing incompatible with a constitution, which -they yet suffer to be violated by every minister who trembles at the -exposure of corruption. In the beginning of each war, England has to -seek in blood for the knowledge necessary to insure success, and like -the fiend’s progress toward Eden, her conquering course is through -chaos followed by death! - -But it is not in the details of this siege we must look for -Wellington’s merits. The apportioning of the number of guns, the -quantity of ammunition, the amount of transport, the tracing of the -works, and the choice of the points of attack, are matters within -the province of the engineer; the value and importance of the place -to be attacked in reference to other objects of the campaign, the -time that can be spared to effect its reduction, the arrangements -necessary to elude or to resist the succouring army, the calculation -of the resources, from whence the means of attack are to be drawn, -these are in the province of the general. With him also rests the -choice of shortening the scientific process, and the judging of -how much or how little ought to be risked, how much trusted to the -valour and discipline of his army, how much to his own genius for -seizing accidents, whether of ground, of time, or of conjunction to -accelerate the gain of his object. - -Now all armies come to the siege of a town with great advantages; for -first the besieged cannot but be less confident than the assailants; -they are a few against a many, and being on the defensive, are also -an excised portion of their own army, and without news, which damps -the fiery spirit. They are obliged to await their adversary’s time -and attack, their losses seem more numerous, in proportion to their -forces, because they are more concentrated, and then the wounded -are not safe even in the hospitals. No troops can hope to maintain -a fortress eventually, without the aid of a succouring army; their -ultimate prospect is death or captivity. The besiegers on the -contrary have a certain retreat, know the real state of affairs, feel -more assured of their object, have hope of profit, and a secure -retreat if they fail, while the besieged faintly look for succour, -and scarcely expect life. To this may be added that the inhabitants -are generally secret enemies of the garrison as the cause of their -own sufferings. - -The number of guns and quantity of ammunition, in a fortress, are -daily diminished; the besiegers’ means, originally calculated to -overpower the other, may be increased. Time and materials are -therefore against the besieged, and the scientific foundation of the -defence depends on the attack which may be varied, while the other -is fixed. Finally the firmness and skill of the defence generally -depends upon the governor, who may be killed, whereas many officers -amongst the besiegers are capable of conducting the attack; and the -general, besides being personally less exposed, is likely, as the -chief of an army, to be a man of more spirit and capacity than a -simple governor. It follows then that fortresses must fall if the -besiegers sit down before them according to the rules of art; and -when no succouring army is nigh, the time, necessary to reduce any -place, may be calculated with great exactness. When these rules -cannot be attended to, when every thing is irregular and doubtful, -when the general is hurried on to the attempt, be it easy or -difficult, by the force of circumstances, we must measure him by the -greatness of the exigency, and the energy with which he acts. - -This is the light in which to view the siege of Badajos. Wellington’s -object was great, his difficulties foreseen, his success complete. -A few hours’ delay, an accident, a turn of fortune, and he would -again have been foiled! aye! but this is war, always dangerous -and uncertain, an ever-rolling wheel and armed with scythes. Was -the object worth the risk—did its gain compensate the loss of -men—was it boldly, greatly acquired? These are the true questions -and they may be answered thus. Suchet had subjugated Aragon by his -mildness, Catalonia and Valencia by his vigour. In Andalusia, Soult -had tranquillized the mass of the people, and his genius, solid -and vast, was laying the deep foundation of a kingdom close to -Portugal. He was forming such great establishments, and contriving -such plans, as would, if permitted to become ripe, have enabled him -to hold the Peninsula, alone, should the French armies fail in all -other parts. In the centre of Spain the king, true to his plan of -raising a Spanish party, was likely to rally round him all those of -the patriots whom discontent, or weakness of mind, or corruption, -might induce to seek a plausible excuse, for joining the invaders; -and on the northern line the French armies, still powerful, were -strengthening their hold of the country by fortifying all the -important points of Leon and Old Castile. Meanwhile the great army, -which the emperor was carrying to Russia, might or might not be -successful, but in either case, it was the only moment when an -offensive war, against his army in Spain, could have been carried on -with success. - -But how could any extensive offensive operation have been attempted -while Badajos remained in the enemy’s possession? If Wellington had -advanced in the north, Soult making Badajos his base would have -threatened Lisbon; if Wellington marched against the French centre, -the same thing would have happened, and the army of the north would -also have acted on the left flank of the allies or have retaken -Ciudad Rodrigo. If an attempt had been made against Soult, it must -have been by the Lower Guadiana, when the French army of Portugal -coming down to Badajos, could have either operated against the rear -of the allies, or against Lisbon. - -Badajos was therefore the key to all offensive operations by the -allies, and to take it was an indispensable preliminary. Yet how take -it? By regular or by irreglar operations? For the first a certain -time was required, which from the experience of former sieges it -was not to be expected that the enemy would allow. What then would -have been the result, if thus, year after year, the allies showed -they were unable even to give battle to their enemies, much less to -chase them from the Peninsula? How was it to be expected that England -would bear the expense of a protracted warfare, affording no hope of -final success? How were the opposition clamours to be replied to in -Parliament? How were the secret hopes of the continental governments -to be upheld if the military power of England, Portugal, and Spain -united was unable to meet even a portion of the secondary armies of -Napoleon, while with four hundred thousand men he stalked, a gigantic -conqueror, over the wastes of Russia? To strike irregularly then -was Wellington’s only resource. To strike without regard to rules, -trusting to the courage of his men and to fortune to bear him through -the trial triumphant. Was such a crisis to be neglected by a general -who had undertaken on his own judgement to fight the battle of the -Peninsula? Was he to give force to the light declamation of the -hour, when general officers in England were heard to say that every -defeat of the French was a snare to decoy the British farther into -Spain! was he, at such a moment, to place the probable loss of a few -thousand men, more or less, in opposition to such a conjuncture, and -by declining the chance offered, shew that he despaired of success -himself? What if he failed? He would not have been, save the loss of -a few men, worse off than if he had not attacked. In either case, -he would have been a baffled general with a sinking cause. But what -if he succeeded? The horizon was bright with the coming glory of -England! - - - - - APPENDIX. - - - - - APPENDIX. - - JUSTIFICATORY PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE STATE - OF SPAIN AT DIFFERENT PERIODS. - - - - - No. I. - - - SECTION 1.—NORTHERN PROVINCES. - - - _Captain Irby to Mr. Croft._ - - “_H. M. S. Amelia,_ - “_Coruña, May 6, 1810._ - -“I have been cruizing for these two months past between Bayonne and -Santona.” - -“In addition to the troops I have observed under arms, there has been -a great proportion of armed peasantry at Baquio, a small place to the -westward of Rachidaes; as our boats were returning from destroying -some batteries, they were attacked by armed peasantry alone, who were -dispersed by shot from the ship, and also since they have assisted -the French troops, when we captured a vessel laden with military -stores from St. Andero.” - - - _Mr. Stuart to general Walker._ - - “_Lisbon, February 20, 1811._ - -“I own that from the various appointments which have lately taken -place in their armies, I forbode little advantage in the course of -the ensuing campaign; it is perhaps needful to tell you that my -fears are grounded on the nomination of the duke of Albuquerque -to Gallicia, Castaños to Estremadura, Mahi to Murcia, Coupigny to -Valencia, and the brother of O’Donnel to Catalonia.” - - - _Sir Howard Douglas to lord Wellington._ - - “_Villafranca, January 4, 1812._ - -“Each chief is allowed three servants, a captain two, a subaltern -one; the number of soldiers employed in this way is certainly not -_under_ the regulation, and all officers resident in the interior -likewise have this excessive indulgence. The officers’ servants never -do duty, or attend any drill or review. The cooks are in general -changed weekly, and are never present at drill or review; one cook is -allowed besides to every three serjeants. These two items certainly -take 5000 choice men from the ranks of this army.” - -“Some very violent recriminations have been brought on by the -imprudent reply of the military press, to some observations published -in a Coruña paper extolling the Guerillas, and at the same time -intended to convey a censure on the conduct of the army. I have had -frequent conversations with general Abadia on the spirit of disunion -which these two papers are sowing. He has at length prohibited -the military press from publishing any thing but professional -papers. I was present when he gave the order—he engaged me in the -conversation, and I could not avoid observing, that what was lost -could only be regained by the sword, not the pen. In this I alluded -to the Asturias, where certainly reputation and public confidence -were sacrificed.” - -“The truth is, the army is oppressive and expensive, as well as -inefficient, from its disorganised state, particularly in the -departments of supply; and it is a very unpleasant circumstance -to hear it generally admitted, that a Spanish corps is much more -destructive to the country than an equal French army. There are -also violent dissentions between the juntas of Leon and Gallicia: -inclosure No. 6 will shew this state of feeling.” - - - _Sir Howard Douglas to sir H. Wellesley._ - - “_Coruña, March 1, 1812._ - -“On the 20th ultimo I had the honour to despatch to your excellency -a copy of my letter of that date to lord Wellington, in which -I acquainted his lordship that three battalions of the army of -Gallicia are preparing for embarkation for America, and that I had -positively declined making, and would not permit the delivery of any -British arms or stores for that service. I have now discovered, that -in addition to these troops it is intended to send a division of -horse-artillery, to equip which, orders have been given to transfer -appointments from the cavalry of the army, and a demand is made for -funds to prepare the ordnance, and even to adapt to colonial service -more of the field artillery which I lately delivered for the use -of the sixth Gallician army. This measure has never been openly -avowed by the government of Cadiz, it has never been communicated to -the junta of this province by the regency. It has, I imagine, been -concealed from your excellency, and it has only come to my knowledge, -by the arrangements no longer to be hidden, which general Abadia is -making to carry it into effect.” - - - SECTION 2.—CATALONIA. - - - _Extract of a Letter from Don Antonio Rocca._ - - (Translated.) - - “_Reus, January 20, 1811._ - -“While we have venal men, ignorant men, and perfidious men in our -government, no good can befal us. He must be mad who can expect our -condition to ameliorate. The venal are those who, without being -called, seemingly abandon their own affairs, and introduce themselves -into the different branches of administration with no other view -than to enrich themselves at the public expense. The ignorant are -those who think themselves wise, and who either obtain by intrigue -or accept without reluctance employments the duties of which they -are not capable of discharging. The perfidious are all those who -are indifferent spectators of this bloody struggle, and who care -not for the issue, as they will equally submit to any master. Place -no confidence, my friend, in these sort of persons, nothing can be -expected from them, and yet by an inconceivable fatality which is -attached to us, to the ruin of all parties, it would appear that the -provinces employ none but these very people. Those who commend us are -either venal or ignorant, or indifferent; at least the more we search -for the remedy, the more our evil increases.” - - - _Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton._ - - “_April 24, 1811._ - -.... “With respect to the proposed plan of admitting supplies of -grain in neutral vessels from the ports of the enemy, &c., I have no -hesitation in saying I do not see sufficient reason to justify it in -the present circumstances of this part of the Peninsula, as I have -always found bread for sale at the different places on the coast, at -the rate of about _two pounds and three quarters for the quarter of -a dollar_, at which price I yesterday bought it at Escala. And as -there has been of late more corn at Taragona than money to purchase, -I presume the latter has been the greater desideratum of the two.” - -.... “The difficulty of allowing a free passage of provisions from -one part of the coast to the other would be lessened by being limited -to vessels above the size of common fishing-boats, in which I have -reason to believe considerable quantities have been carried to -Barcelona; and captain Bullen, I understand, found even a mortar in a -boat of this description.” - - - _General C. Doyle to captain Bullen._ - - “_Ripol, April, 1811._ - -“Can you believe that in this town, _the only fabric of arms, six -months_ have passed without a firelock being made!!! They begin -to-morrow, and give me two hundred and fifty every week, &c.” - -[Note. The italics and notes of admiration are in the original.] - - - _Admiral Freemantle to captain Codrington._ - - “_Mahon, May 19, 1811._ - -“The uncertainty of every thing connected with Spanish affairs is -such, that I am tired of writing and explaining all that arises from -their inconsistency and want of energy. - -“Until eight o’clock I had understood that the intendant had procured -one thousand quintals of biscuit for the army at Taragona, which -number I find on inquiry has dwindled to fifty-seven bags. I have -therefore been under the necessity of sending five hundred bags, -which we can very ill spare, from our own stores, with a proportion -of rice. I cannot tell you how much I have been worried and annoyed -the last three days, particularly as I feel the very great importance -Taragona is to the Spaniards, and how much this island is connected -with the event of the fall of that fortress. The intendant here has -wrote that he has sent two hundred and thirty-two bags of bread. You -will have the goodness to explain that only fifty-seven were procured -by him, which I have engaged to pay for, and that all the rest comes -immediately from our own stores, and are consequently at the disposal -of the British authorities at Taragona.” - - - _Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Pellew to captain - Codrington._ - - “_H.M. Ship Caledonia, July 22, 1811._ - -“The indecision, inactivity, and apparent disunion amongst the -Spanish leaders has been the great cause of failure throughout the -whole of this arduous contest, and is especially observable in the -late events in Catalonia; nor until the patriots are directed by pure -military councils and more energy and decision, can I permit myself -to think that any effectual stand can be made against the invaders.” - - - _Sir Edward Pellew to captain Codrington._ - - “_August 2, 1811._ - -“I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, &c. The -information therein conveyed affords me a very melancholy view of the -affairs of the patriots, and gives me little reason to hope better -things from their future exertions.”....“A despatch which reached me -by the same opportunity from the superior junta of Catalonia contains -a proposal for occupying a position on the coast as a naval depôt, -and the selection of Palamos is presented to my choice. It does -not appear to me that the junta possesses at present resources for -defending any such position, and from the measures being submitted to -my determination, it seems to be expected that I should provide means -of defending them while employed in securing themselves in their -new station.” “Yet whilst the noble spirit of this ill-fated people -remains unsubdued, it would not be just to expect a total failure, -although the loss of all confidence between them and the privileged -orders, and the want of leaders among themselves who possess either -skill or competency to guide them, afford but a very precarious -prospect of their doing anything effectual to stop the invaders.” - - - _Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._ - - “_November 1, 1811._ - -“By a letter from captain Strong it seems the people of Cadagues in -the early part of October openly refused assistance to the governor -of the Medas islands, declaring that they only acknowledged the -strongest party, and therefore paid their subscriptions to the -French; and that upon the Bustard’s going with a party of Spanish -troops to enforce obedience, they rang the alarm-bell as the signal -for the approach of an enemy, and sent to Rosas for assistance.” - - - _Extract of a Letter from captain Codrington to - E. H. Locker, esq._ - - “_February 7, 1812._ - -“Whilst the French pay the poor, who serve their purpose, at the -expense of the rich, the Spaniards deal out severity to the lower -classes, and oblige them to serve without pay and without clothes; -and the debauched and profligate of higher life are in many instances -rewarded, for imbecility, ignorance, and indifference to the fate of -their country never yet exceeded, without one single example being -made of the many traitors which have been discovered in the persons -of priests, officers of rank, or what are termed gentlemen.” - - - _Captain Codrington to general Lacy._ - - “_February 18, 1812._ - -“Being an eye-witness of the discontent of the people, which has -arisen from their being partially disarmed, and knowing how fatal -have been the consequences which have followed these practices -on former occasions, I must own I cannot offer to the admiral my -conviction of all that benefit arising from his good intentions in -which I should otherwise have confided. The officers and men of -the French army are walking about this part of the coast unarmed, -because _the juntas and justices have concealed the muskets they had_ -at their disposal, and refused the people permission to attack the -enemy. In the mean time the poor people, whose hearts are burning -with patriotism, are starving for want of bread, and the richer -citizens of this devoted country are supplying the enemy with corn -and other species of provisions.” - - - _Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._ - - “_Villa Nueva, February 22, 1812._ - -“I fear things are going on very ill in this principality from the -sudden change in the system of general Lacy, and the consequent -destruction of that confidence on the part of the people which was -certainly the cause of his former successes. Nor can there be any -doubt of the sound reason which guides the conduct of the Catalans -on this occasion; for the mode in which general Lacy effected the -dishonourable breach of faith of which they complain, bespeaks a mind -practised in deception. He ordered the patriotic companies to be -sent to particular points in subdivisions, at which points general -Sarsfield was to take forcible possession of them, and attach -them to different corps of the regular army. And the discovery of -this treachery was made by the letter to general Sarsfield falling -by mistake, into the hands of the officer who commanded the whole -division of patriotic companies. In the meantime the discontent of -the people gains ground with their sufferings, and instead of the -Spanish army being increased by the late arbitrary mandate according -to its avowed object, and not less probably in consequence of the -late extraordinary conduct of general Sarsfield, many of the Catalan -soldiers have actually passed over to the enemy.” - -“The letter of the baron de Eroles in the gazette No. 10, shews that -he was again deceived in the promised support of general Sarsfield -on the 24th, and I am told he says publicly it was part of a settled -plan to sacrifice him and his whole division.” - - - _Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._ - - “_Villa Nueva de Sitjes, February 22, 1812._ - -“Nothing but a total change can produce permanent good; for the -villanies of the intendant and commissary departments are so -thoroughly organized, that not one link of the chain can be left with -safety. I have good reason to think that even the money furnished by -England is so employed in the traffic of corn, by the individuals -through whose hands it passes, as to be the direct means of supplying -the enemy.” - - - _Captain Codrington to Mr. H. Wellesley._ - - “_March 1, 1812._ - -“The change of the regency will I trust produce a radical change of -that diabolical system by which plunder has been openly licensed, -and despotism and injustice towards the people, and even treachery -itself, in those of a higher class, have hitherto passed with -impunity.” - - - SECTION 3.—VALENCIA AND MURCIA. - - - _The councillor of state, Mariano Orquijo, to king Joseph._ - - “_Madrid, Decembre 4, 1810._ - -“Je viens de voir le proviseur et vicaire général qui fut arrêté à -Logrogne par les insurgés. Son opinion prononcée en faveur de V. M. -lui a attiré toutes sortes de mauvais traitemens et de disgraces, -mais enfin il est parvenu à se sauver de Valence. Il m’a rapporté -que l’esprit public de cette capitale a beaucoup changé depuis que -le général Caro (frère de Romana) s’est livré aux vexations et aux -dilapidations de toute espèce, et que son opinion est qu’on n’y -éprouvera aucune résistance. L’Archevêque de Valence, qui jouit à -présent d’une grande influence, lui a souvent parlé en secret d’une -manière favorable de V. M. et de ses ministres. C’est à l’Archevêque -qu’il est redevable de son evasion. Ce prélat m’ayant connu ainsi -que à M. de Montarco dans d’autres tems le chargea de nous voir. -Le général Bassecourt n’était nullement considéré. Le proviseur -ajoute, qu’à Alicant d’où il est parti le 14 Novembre, tout était -rempli, de réfugiés de Cadiz. D’après tout ce qu’il m’a dit, je conte -qu’aussitôt la prise de Tortoze, Valence se rendra sans coup férir. -J’ai renvoyé ce proviseur à Monsieur de Santa Fé qui l’a protégé en -sa qualité de ministre des affaires ecclesiastiques et qui fut très -sensible au malheur qui lui arriva à Logrogne.” - - - _General Doyle to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_March 8, 1811._ - -“There is a strong French party in Valencia. It is a sad thing -that we cannot _sacar Partido_ of that kingdom, in which are more -resources than in all the other provinces of Spain. With my head -I answer for it that in one month two thousand cavalry and twenty -thousand infantry, independent of the existing army, which is one -thousand five hundred effective cavalry and eleven thousand infantry, -could be raised, and there is money enough within the city to pay -them for six months, and without looking elsewhere for assistance -to clothe them. There is abundance of cloth, and provisions in -abundance, yet Valencia is doing nothing! and this time so precious, -while Massena draining all the rest of the Peninsula gives us time -to organize. We want a Robespierre in the government, and another in -every province!!” - - - _Colonel Roche to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_Carthagena, June 20, 1811_. - -“After three years leaving them to themselves, this army (the -Murcian) is everywhere in a worse state absolutely than it was in the -commencement of the revolution.” - -“The fact is that the Spaniards have no confidence in their general, -nor he in them, and thus Freire apprehends if he fights his people -will disperse. Valencia, with an immense population and great -resources, is doing little. Bassecour retired to Cuença. The same -indolence, lassitude, and egotism prevails through the country, and I -see little stimulus produced by the establishment of the cortes; that -feeling of enthusiasm which existed is fast dying away. The thing in -the world most agreeable to the Spaniards at this moment would be to -be allowed to be neuter, and that England and France should fight the -battle and pay all the expenses.” - - - _Captain Codrington to the honourable H. Wellesley._ - - “_September 8, 1811._ - -“After ascertaining that much art was employed to disgust the army -with general Blake, and at the same time to prejudice the people -against their officers, I relied upon the purity of my motives, and -opened the subject to the general with the candour and freedom it -required. I had great satisfaction in finding him well aware of all -that was passing, and upon his guard as to the consequences. Upon my -mentioning that certain hand-bills were posted up, he produced and -gave me the enclosed copies. He told me that upon obtaining them he -went to the marquis of Palacios, who, necessarily agreeing in their -evil tendency, consented to accompany the general to the palace of -the archbishop, where I trust measures were adopted to prevent a -repetition of the misconduct of the Padre Igual and his numerous -bigoted coadjutors. I submitted to the general’s attention the fatal -effects of his quitting this part of the Peninsula, while the minds -of the people were in such a state of fermentation, and allowing the -supreme authority to revert to the marquis of Palacios. He assured -me that he clearly saw the danger which would arise from it; he had -determined on no account to do so until the marquis was removed by -the government from his present situation.” - - - _Mr. Tupper’s report to sir H. Wellesley._ - - (Extract.) - - “_January 27, 1812._ - -“The scandalous behaviour of the members of the junta will have more -influence upon the public mind, will dishearten the people even more -than the fall of Valencia and the dispersion of the army. For seeing -their representatives return to their respective districts, it will -give an example to follow that all is lost, and having no authority -to protect them or to look to, the people have no other resource left -than to submit to the yoke of the enemy.” - - - _Extracts from Mr. Tupper’s report to sir Henry Wellesley - from 22 to 27 January, 1812._ - -“Blake with his immense resources remained altogether inactive, and -contented himself with observing the movements of the enemy, and his -progress in fortifying himself under the walls of the city.” - -“With Blake’s approbation I had raised a corps of about one hundred -and eighty men to act as guerillas, and by beginning a plan of -offensive operations I expected to see the example followed. I -also demanded the direction of the chief battery, that of Santa -Catalina, from whence the French camp might be much annoyed, and for -the space of thirty successive days caused the French considerable -damage in killed and wounded. Excepting this battery, that of St. -Joseph contiguous to it, and that of the Puente del Mar, every thing -else remained in a state of complete inactivity. Blake, lulled -into a state of confidence that the enemy would not attack without -reinforcements, had taken no measures whatever.” - -“The junta of Valencia was composed of members, as per list enclosed, -of which only the first remained, the others having before retired -and shamefully gone to their respective homes; but upon the fall of -the capital where they had their property, those remaining sent in -their resignation to Mahi, and without being competent to do so, gave -up the only representative authority of the province which had been -confided to them, and have thus thrown the whole country into a state -of anarchy, abandoning it altogether to the will of the enemy; yet I -am persuaded the spirit of the people is the same, great resources -are left in the province, immense riches still remain in the -churches, convents, diezmos, &c., &c.”————“I am however sorry to say -that since the fall of the capital, nay, since the battle of the 26th -ultimo, not a single step has been taken, and at this moment outside -the walls of Alicant the province does not exist.——Mahi has objected -to Padre Rico, the only man in my opinion, and in that of every body, -capable of giving activity and soul to the resources of the country.” - -.... “I am sorry to inform your excellency that after repeated -interviews with Mahi and the intendant Rivas, on the subject of the -commission I had proposed, I am now clearly of the opinion from the -repeated delays and studied objections that no authority will be -established.”————“ In short nothing has been done, and nothing will -be done.”———— - -“I am firmly of opinion that the people now in authority are -disposed, by leaving public affairs in their present abandoned -state, to submit to the French yoke.”————“On the 16th ultimo, when -Montbrun made his appearance, the Ayuntamiento desired the Syndico -Personeso to give a petition in the name of the people to enter -into a capitulation; he refused; but I am informed there was some -arrangement between the governor and the Ayuntamiento, the members -whereof remain in office notwithstanding their traitorous conduct on -the 16th.” - - - SECTION 4.—ANDALUSIA. - - - _General Graham to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_9th May, 1810._ - -“Nothing new here; the regency and the junta are as usual more -asleep than awake, and I can augur nothing good from the government -remaining in such hands—let their intentions be ever so good. -Nothing but the assembly of the cortes, and from thence springing up -a revolutionary system, overturning abuses and interesting the people -in their own cause by solid and permanent, instead of contingent -and prospective reforms, calling forth talents if to be found for -the chief situations, and inforcing vigour and rousing enthusiasm. -Nothing but some great change (such as we might in the beginning have -assisted in bringing about) can carry on this war to any good result. -The people are obstinate in their hatred of the French, and from that -alone spring the fits of patriotism and loyalty which keep alive the -flame in some place or another. That it is so one cannot doubt from -the effects, but it is never to be met with where one is, at least I -have never yet seen enthusiasm though I have heard of it. Hence the -bulk of the people seem to be completely indifferent to what is going -on, and all seem most unwilling to submit to the deprivation of any -comfort, and to the sacrifices which a state of siege requires. They -would be very well pleased to have any thing done for them, and to -see the enemy driven away, that they might go to eat strawberries -at Chiclana, and they are much disposed to blame our inactivity, -especially that of the navy, in permitting the enemy to have advanced -so near on the point of Trocadero. The destruction of these two -forts at first was certainly a great error in admiral Purvis; had -they been kept up and well garrisoned, as they support one another, -it would have been a very tedious operation to have reduced them. -Meanwhile you will hear that the improvidence of the junta, and their -denial of any such risk to Mr. Wellesley, placed the bread provision -of the town in much too precarious a situation; in short, they -completely deceived him by their assurances of the most ample means -of subsistence, and both flour and wheat have been sent away since he -came.” - - - _Mr. Wellesley to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_Isla de Leon, February 5, 1811._ - -“Blake is becoming very unpopular, and I think his reign will be -short. He is supposed to be by no means partial to the English. I -know not whether you will approve of the appointments to Estremadura -and Gallicia, but I am sure you will be surprised to hear that -general Mahi is appointed to command the army of the centre. I -communicated confidentially to general Blake the copy of the letter -which you forwarded to me from general Walker, taking care to conceal -general Walker’s name, so that Blake was fully apprised of our -opinion of general Mahi previously to his appointment of him to the -command in Murcia.” - - - _Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_Cadiz, February 27. 1811._ - -“It grieves me to see from day to day how little is done by the -Spaniards, and how little is likely to be done. The cortes have not -given a new impulse to the war as was expected. They look to their -regency for plans of reform for their armies, and their regency is -worse than any former government. Blake, of whom I know that you as -well as the world in general have a good opinion, does nothing. He -refuses to reform abuses that are pointed out to him, passes his days -in deliberation upon questions of no moment, and is in my opinion -decidedly adverse to the English. Whittingham’s plan, (disciplining -a separate corps,) which was approved of before his arrival, he has -endeavoured by every kind of trick to reject or render useless.” - -“The cortes is full of priests, who, united with the Catalans, -are for preserving the old routine of business, and adverse to -every thing that can give energy and vigour to the operations of -government. Fanaticism and personal interest direct their opinions; -Arguelles and his party are anxious that something should be done to -remedy the disgraceful state of their armies. I have no doubt but -that they would remove the present government, though the friends of -Blake, if there was any chance of the Catalan party permitting them -to elect a better.” - -“Be assured, my dear Stuart, that the cortes is, as at present -constituted, any thing but revolutionary or jacobinical. They love -their monarchy, and are anxious to maintain the inquisition in all -its forms, the only branch of government to which they seem disposed -to communicate any energy. If there is not soon some new spirit -infused into the cortes, it will become an overgrown junta, meddling -with every paltry detail of police, and neglecting the safety of -their country—and the regency will be content to reign (very badly) -over Cadiz and the Isla.” - - - _Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_Cadiz, August 5, 1811._ - -“The temper of the public mind at Cadiz is very bad, the press -has lately teemed with publications filled with reproaches of the -English.” - -“The regency and cortes have lost all influence every where, and -the distress for money added to the general depression here after -the campaign in Estremadura may possibly throw us into a state of -anarchy.” - -“I am somewhat alarmed by the state of the Serranos de Ronda; the -Spanish generals have been quarrelling, and the peasants declare they -are tired of the abuses committed there, and that it is reported they -mean to capitulate with the French.” - - - _General Graham to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_Isla de Leon, April 24, 1811._ - -“The Spanish government has published an official narrative of the -expedition (Barosa) full of misrepresentations and blinking the -question of the cause of failure entirely—this has obliged me to -add something to what I wrote before to Mr. Wellesley. There are -some instances of impudence supporting falsehood beyond example. The -_proud_ Spaniard is no less _vain_ I think.” - - - _General Graham to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_Isla, May 6, 1811._ - -“The government here supported by the cortes seemed to be determined -to adhere with blind obstinacy and pride to a system that has nearly -brought the cause to ruin, and notwithstanding Lord Wellington’s -great efforts they are playing Buonaparte’s game so positively that I -despair of any great good.” - - - _Colonel Austin to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_Faro, March 24, 1811._ - -“Whether Ballesteros is authorized by his government to pursue the -steps he has taken, I know not, but I certainly cannot but consider -them as just and necessary. The junta de Seville is a mere farce -supported at an immense expense without the least utility or benefit, -and preserving in its train a number of idle characters who ought to -be employed in the defence of the nation, but who now only add to its -burthens. I have had many negotiations with the junta, and though I -have always kept up appearances through policy, yet I have found, in -the room of the honour and candour which ought to characterize it, -nothing but chicanery and dissimulation.” - - - _General Carrol to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_Olivenza, April 29, 1811._ - -“Would to Heaven that the Spanish armies, or, more properly speaking, -the skeletons of the Spanish armies were under his lordship’s -(Wellington’s) command; we might in that case do great things, but -alas! our pride seems to increase with our misfortunes, and is only -equalled by our ignorance!” - - - _Mr. Stuart to Lord Wellesley._ - - “_July 13, 1811._ - -“I have endeavoured to throw together the numbers, &c. of the -different guerillas, &c., which clearly demonstrate the false -exaggerations circulated respecting that description of force; -though their appearance in different parts has most unreasonably -encreased the alarm of the enemy and proportionable confidence of -the Spaniards, they cannot be calculated to exceed in the aggregate -twenty-five or thirty thousand men at the utmost.” - -Note. Here follows a list of the Partidas with their numbers and -stations too long to insert. - - - _Mr. Wellesley to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_Cadiz, July 31, 1811._ - -“Nothing can be more wretched than the state of affairs here; the -regents are held in universal contempt, and such is the want of -talent, I can hardly hope that a change will make any improvement: -the treasury is empty, and no probability of the arrival of any -money from America, so that affairs are really in a worse state than -they have been at any time since the commencement of the war.” - - - _Extract from the manifesto of the Spanish regency._ - - “_January 23, 1812._ - -“There have reached the government the cries of the armies which -defend us, depicting their painful privations; the groans of the -inhabitants of districts, ready to fall under the yoke of the -barbarous invaders; the complaints of the provinces already occupied, -always loyal though oppressed and laid waste.” - -“Cease now, and henceforward, all personal pretensions; the -ill-understood feelings of interest dictated by provincial spirit; -exemptions unjustly demanded at this period of desolation, writings -which, while they ought to create the most ardent patriotism, to -unite and enlighten the nation, appear inspired by the enemy for the -purpose of enslaving it.” - - - SECTION 5. - - PRIVATEERS. - - - _Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._ - - “_Arens de Mar, August 23, 1811._ - -“I have numberless complaints of the Spanish privateers that come -upon the coast, and I am sure it would be a benefit to the country -if they were all deprived of their commission. They do nothing but -plunder the inhabitants of those places which are occasionally -overrun by the French armies, and who embrace the opportunity of -their absence to carry on a little trade with other parts of the -Peninsula.” - - - _Ditto to sir H. Wellesley._ - - “_Valencia, September 8, 1811._ - -“I trust some decisive measures will be taken to abolish altogether -a system of privateering nothing short of piracy; and in which the -vessels from Gibraltar seem to take the lead. I have great reason to -believe that they plunder the unfortunate vessels of all countries -by hoisting whatever colours may answer their purposes of assumed -national hostility; and as we never hear of their attacking each -other, I have no doubt that the British and French flags are often -united in furtherance of this predatory warfare. The numberless -complaints which I receive from all parts of the coast, and the -difficulty of trading betwixt Catalonia and Valencia, on account -of the privateers which swarm in these seas, drive many into an -intercourse with Barcelona and other places in the occupation of the -enemy, in order to get a livelihood.” - - - _Ditto to admiral Penrose, Valencia._ - -“The depredations of the Gibraltar privateers have been carried on -to such an extent, in all parts of the Mediterranean, as to bring -serious reflections upon the British flag.” - - - SECTION 6. - - FRENCH PRISONERS AT CABRERA. - - - _Captain Codrington to E. Locker, Esq._ - - “_September 18, 1811._ - -“I cannot at all events think it a wise measure to receive into -colonel Whittingham’s corps the prisoners at Cabrera, who have long -ago withstood the offers of general Roche, _when naked as they were -born, and fighting for each other’s miserable rations to prolong an -existence inconceivably wretched_, in hopes of rejoining the French.” - - - _Sir H. Wellesley to captain Codrington._ - - “_October 10, 1811._ - -“With regard to the French prisoners at Cabrera, I procured from -the Spanish government long since an order to the governor of the -Balearic Islands to suspend all negotiations with the French on that -subject, and not on any account to consent to exchange them.” - - * * * * * - - - No. II. - - - SECTION 1. - - SIEGE OF TARAGONA. - - - _Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton._ - - “_Taragona_, _May 15, 1811._ - -“During the panic which seems to have prevailed upon the unexpected -arrival of the French army, the greatest exertions and the most -extensive sacrifices appear to have been readily submitted to. But -from the present apathy and indifference in those who should set an -example of activity, and from the general deficiency of ordnance -stores, I by no means consider the place in that state of security -which the strength of its works and position would otherwise lead me -to expect.” - -“A well planned sortie was made yesterday, but failed through the -backwardness of some of the officers employed in it.”——“I had the -satisfaction of being assured by an officer, who conspicuously did -his duty on this occasion, and who was outflanked by the enemy, from -the backwardness of the column directed to support him, that he -attributes the salvation of his troops entirely to the fire from the -shipping.” - - - _Ditto to ditto._ - - “_Blake, off Villa Nueva, June 15, 1811._ - -“Leaving Taragona on the 16th (May), we reached Peniscola in the -forenoon of the 17th.”——“From thence general Doyle wrote to general -O’Donnel an account of the situation of Taragona and of my detaining -captain Adam at Peniscola, in readiness to receive any reinforcement -which he might be pleased to send to that garrison. Upon our arrival -off Murviedro, we found general O’Donnel had already ordered the -embarkation of two thousand three hundred infantry and two hundred -and eleven artillery-men.”——“Delivering to general O’Donnel two -thousand stand of arms, accoutrements, and clothing to enable him to -bring into the field as many recruits already trained as would supply -the place of the regular soldiers; thus detached from his army, we -proceeded to Valencia and landed the remainder of our cargo, by which -means the troops of general Villa Campa, then dispersed as peasantry -for want of arms, were enabled again to take the field, and the corps -of Mina and the Empecinado completed in all the requisites of active -warfare.” - -“At Alicant we proceeded to take in as many necessary materials for -Taragona as the ship would actually stow, besides eighty artillery -men and a considerable quantity of powder, ball-cartridge, &c. sent -in the Paloma Spanish corvette from Carthagena in company with a -Spanish transport from Cadiz deeply laden with similar supplies.” - -“After returning to Valencia, where we landed the additional arms, -&c. for the Aragonese army, we moved on to Murviedro, where the conde -of Bispal proceeded from Valencia to join us in a consultation with -his brother, although, on account of his wound, he was very unfit -for such a journey. The result of this conference was a determination -on the part of general O’Donnel to commit to my protection, for -the succour of Taragona, another division of his best troops under -general Miranda, consisting of four thousand men, whilst he himself -would move forward with the remainder of his army to the banks of the -Ebro.” - -“The frequent disappointments which the brave Catalonian army had -heretofore met with from Valencian promises, made the sight of so -extensive and disinterested a reinforcement the more truly welcome, -because the less expected, and the admiration which was thus created -in the besieged appeared to produce proportionate anxiety on the part -of the enemy.” - -“I shall direct the whole of my attention to the neighbourhood of -Taragona, in readiness for harassing the retreat of the French, if -general Suchet should unfortunately be obliged to raise the siege, -and for re-embarking and restoring to general O’Donnel whatever may -remain of the Valencian troops, according to the solemn pledge he -exacted from me before he would consent thus to part with the flower -and strength of his army. He even went so far as to declare, in the -presence of general Miranda, the principal officer of his staff, -general Doyle, captain Adam, captain White, and myself, that he -considered me as entirely answerable for the safety of the kingdom of -Valencia, and that if I failed in redeeming my pledge he would resign -his command for that particular account.” - -“It is but justice to myself, however, that I should tell you that I -did most distinctly warn general O’Donnel, that I would in no case -answer for his army if placed under the immediate command of Campo -Verde, for any distant inland operation, more particularly as I knew -that, in addition to his own deficiency in ability, he was surrounded -by people whose advice and whose conduct was in no case to be relied -on.” - - - _Ditto to ditto._ - - “_Blake, Taragona, June 22, 1811._ - -“I found upon my last return here an arrangement made, that in case -of the enemy gaining the Puerto, general Sarsfield should retire -to the Mole with part of his division, from whence I had only to -assist, but was much astonished to find, by a message, through -colonel Green, from general Contreras, that although he had heard -of such a disposition being made by general Sarsfield, and assented -to by the English squadron, it had not his official knowledge or -approbation.”——“I understand that an order had arrived in the morning -from the marquis of Campo Verde for general Velasco to take the -command of the Puerto, and for general Sarsfield to join his army, -that the latter had given up his command to some colonel at about -three o’clock, who was, by his own confession, totally unfit for it, -and that general Velasco only arrived in time to find the Spanish -troops flying in confusion from the want of being properly commanded -and the French assaulting the place.” - - - _Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._ - - “_Mattaro, November 1, 1811._ - -“Having stated in a letter to sir Charles Cotton, on the 22d June -last, that I understand general Sarsfield had quitted the Puerto -and embarked without the knowledge of general Contreras, (which -indeed was the substance of a message sent me by general Contreras -himself,) I owe it to an officer of general Sarsfield’s high military -character to declare my conviction that the statement there made by -general Contreras is absolutely false and unfounded, and I beg leave -to enclose in justification of my present opinion; 1st, a passport -sent by general Contreras to general Sarsfield in consequence as he -alleged of an order from the marquis of Campo Verde. 2d. An extract -from the manifesto of the marquis, in which he disavows having any -knowledge of the passports. 3d. A letter from general Contreras to -general Sarsfield in answer to one written by the latter requesting -to see the order by which he was directed to quit the Puerto at such -a critical moment, in which he says ‘that he cannot send him a copy -of that letter, because it is confidential, but that his presence -is necessary at the head-quarters to assist in the operations about -to take place for the relief of the garrison, and that he has not a -moment to lose.’ 4th. The copy of another letter written on the same -day by general Contreras to the superior junta, in which he says that -general Sarsfield quitted the Puerto without his knowledge!!!” - - - _General Doyle to colonel Roche._ - - “_June 23, 1811._ - -“Is it possible to conceive any thing so absurd, and I could almost -say _wicked_, as the conduct of the junta or captain-general of -Cartagena in taking away the firelocks from the regiments _they sent -with such a parade of their patriotism to relieve Taragona_. Two -thousand men are already in this city without firelocks, such is the -daily destruction of arms by the enemy’s fire and the getting out of -repair from constant use.” - - - _Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton._ - - “_Off Taragona, June 23, 1811._ - -“Another regiment arrived from Carthagena yesterday under convoy of -the Cossack, but, as on a former occasion, their arms were taken from -them by colonel Roche, upon their going to embark, and therefore, as -being of no use to the garrison, I have by desire of the general sent -them to Villa Nueva, and as there are already 2000 men in the place -without arms, I have sent the Termagant to Carthagena, to endeavour -to procure those which have been thus inconsiderately taken from the -troops belonging to that place.” - - - _Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton._ - - (Extract.) - - “_June 29, 1811._ - -“The Regulus with five transports including a victualler arrived -with colonel Skerrett and his detachments on the 26th. The surf -was so great on that day that we had no other communication in the -forenoon than by a man swimming on shore with a letter, and upon -colonel Skerrett putting questions to general Doyle and myself upon -the conduct he should pursue according to his orders, we agreed -in our opinion that although the arrival of the troops before the -Puerto (lower town) was taken would probably have saved the garrison, -it was now too late, and that their being landed, if practicable, -would only serve to prolong the fate of the place for a very short -time at the certain sacrifice of the whole eventually. This opinion -was grounded on a number of different circumstances, and was in -perfect coincidence with that of captains Adam and White. In the -evening the surf abated sufficiently for general Doyle, colonel -Skerrett, and some of his officers, as well as the captains of the -squadron and myself, to wait upon general Contreras, who repeated his -determination to cut his way out and join the marquis of Campo Verde -_the instant the enemy’s breaching battery should open_, and which -he expected would take place the following morning, and who agreed -the English ought not to land with any view of defending the town, -although he wished them to join in his meditated sortie.” - - - _Extracts from general Contreras’ report._ - - (Translated.) - -“I saw myself reduced to my own garrison.” “I considered if my force -was capable of this effort (defending the breach), one of the most -heroic that war furnishes, and to which few men can bring themselves. -I recollected however that I _had still eight thousand of the best -and most experienced troops in Spain_.” “All conspired against this -poor garrison. Campo Verde in quitting the place promised to come -back quickly to its succour, but he did not, although he daily -renewed his promises. The kingdom of Valencia sent Miranda with a -division which disembarked, and the day following re-embarked and -went to join Campo Verde. - -“An English division came on the 26th, colonel Skerrett, who -commanded them, came in the evening to confer with me and to demand -what I wished him to do. _I replied that if he would disembark and -enter the place, he should be received with joy and treated as he -merited; that he had only to choose the point that he wished to -defend and I would give it to him, but that all was at his choice, -since I would neither command nor counsel him._ The 27th the English -commandants of artillery and engineers came to examine the front -attacked, and being convinced that the place was not in a state to -resist, returned to their vessels, and then all went away from the -place they came to succour. - -“_This abandonment on the part of those who came to save was the -worst of all_; it made such an impression on the soldiers, that -they began to see that they were lost, became low-spirited and only -resisted from my continual exhortations, and because they saw my -coolness and the confidence I had, that if they executed my orders -the French would fail. But this only lasted a few hours, the notion -of being abandoned again seized them and overcame all other ideas.” - - - _Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton._ - - “_12th July, 1811._ - -“The vacillating conduct of general Contreras regarding the defence -of Taragona is a principal feature in the loss of that important -fortress.” - - - _Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._ - - “_12th July, 1811._ - -“The marquis blames generals Caro and Miranda, whilst the latter -retort the accusation; and I am inclined to think that in giving full -credit to what each says of the other, neither will suffer ignominy -beyond that to which his conduct has entitled him.” - - - _Ditto to Mr. Wellesley._ - - (Extract.) - - “_20th July, 1811._ - -“The disasters which have befallen the principality will produce -material accusations against the generals who lately commanded in it, -without, I fear, any of them meeting the punishment which is their -due. Some of the enclosed papers may help you to form a just opinion -of their conduct and that of the Spanish marine; and those respecting -the arms for which I sent to Carthagena will show how far colonel -Roche is entitled to the merit which he so largely assumes on that -occasion.” - -“To enable you to form a correct opinion of general Contreras I must -refer you to general Doyle, as from his ignorance of our service, -the various requests and proposals which arose from the vacillations -in what he called his determinations, were signified to me through -him. It does not appear to me that he ever visited the works himself, -or it would not have fallen to the lot of captain Adams and myself -to remove two boats, two large stages, sixteen gun-carriages, and -a mortar from the mole, long after the French were advanced beyond -the Francoli battery, and two nights previous to their gaining the -Puerto; an accidental visit to the mole one night, just after placing -the gun-boats and launches, discovered to me this mortar with no less -than twelve guns in readiness for forming a battery; and upon general -Doyle, by my request, representing this to the general of artillery, -he talked of _inquiring into it to-morrow_.” - -“It would be a waste of words to describe further the conduct of -the general of artillery, or I might find sufficient subject in -the events of every passing day from the first investment of the -place.”——“I shall be very ready to come forward personally in aid -of that justice which is due to the numberless brave men who fell a -sacrifice to the criminality of the persons alluded to who have so -grossly misconducted themselves.” - - - SECTION 2. - - - _Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._ - - “_29th July, 1811._ - -“Had colonel Green, the military agent appointed to succeed general -Doyle, adopted the plan of his predecessor of continuing at the -head-quarters of the army and in personal communication with the -captain-general instead of retiring to Peniscola with the money and -arms remaining, we should not be left as we are to the precarious -source of mere accidental communications for receiving intelligence.” - - - _Ditto to Don F. Savartes, vocal of the Junta._ - - “_28th July, 1811._ - -“————Colonel Green, the British military agent, being at Peniscola, -I have opened the letter from the junta to him.”——“Had I not in this -instance opened the letters to the admiral and the military agent, -the junta would have received no answer to them until it would have -been too late to execute their object.” - - - _Captain Thomas to captain Codrington._ - - (Extract.) - - “_H.M.S. Undaunted, off Arens, 7th Oct. 1811._ - -“Having observed, in the Catalonia Gazette of the 24th of September, -the copy of a letter said to be written by colonel Green to -his excellency general Lacy, relative to our operations on the -Medas Islands, from the surrender of the castle to the period of -our quitting them, I beg leave to state to you my surprise and -astonishment at seeing facts so grossly misrepresented, and request -you will be pleased to contradict in the most positive manner -the assertions there made use of. To prove how inconsistent this -letter is with real facts, it may be necessary for me only to say -that colonel Green, in the presence and hearing of all the English -officers, on my asking him a question relative to the practicability -of keeping the island, did declare that he had nothing to do with the -expedition; that my instructions pointed him out as a volunteer only. -But immediately after, in the hearing of all, did declare it to be -his opinion that the island was not tenable. - -“As I understood it was intended to form an establishment on the -larger island, I judged it proper to retire from it for a short time -and destroy the remains of the castle, which might induce the enemy -to withdraw from the works he had thrown up, and thereby afford -our ally an opportunity whenever he chose to occupy them again, to -fortify himself without molestation; and this supposition it has -appeared was well grounded. But while the ruins of the castle stood, -it was an object of jealousy to the French; nor would they in my -opinion have quitted the ground they occupied, nor the Spaniards have -been enabled to settle themselves, had this measure not been adopted. -I therefore gave orders for embarking the guns and stores. - -“If necessary, I could say much more on the subject of this most -extraordinary letter; the few remarks I have made will, I think, be -sufficient. As an act of courtesy to colonel Green, on landing the -marines I directed the marine officers to receive their orders from -him; but military aid was not necessary, for you may recollect before -the expedition sailed, on your informing me that general Lacy had -offered some Spanish troops, and asking how many I thought would be -necessary, my answer was ‘about forty;’ and I have no hesitation in -declaring that without the assistance of even a single soldier the -castle would have fallen into our hands as speedily as it did on this -occasion. - - - SECTION 3. - - - _Captain Codrington’s orders to captain Adam of the - Invincible._ - - “_July 1st, 1811._ - -“You are hereby directed, in consequence of a representation made -to me by general Doyle, to proceed towards Majorca in search of the -Spanish frigates Prueba, Diana, and Astrea, which the general reports -to be going to that island (contrary to orders) with the treasure, -archives of the province, and the vessels laden with stores and -ammunition destined for the inland fortresses of Catalonia, together -with the officers and soldiers which were saved from Taragona, and -which are required to join the army immediately. Upon meeting them -you are to deliver the accompanying order for them to return here, -and you are, if necessary, to enforce obedience.” - - - _Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton._ - - “_Villa Nueva, 3d July, 1811._ - -“I should feel the more hurt by being driven to adopt such a measure -had not the whole conduct both of the Prueba and Diana made their -captains a disgrace to the situation they hold. These two frigates -remained quiet spectators of the British squadron engaging the -batteries of the enemy on the 22d of last month, and never attempted -to give any assistance to the garrison, except by now and then -sending a gun-boat to join those manned by the English. They did -not assist in the embarkation of the numberless women, children, -and wounded soldiers, until goaded into it by the orders of general -Contreras, after I had already sent above two thousand to this place; -and even when I had no longer any transports for their reception, the -captain of the Prueba refused to receive some wounded officers.” - - - _Ditto to ditto._ - - “_18th July, 1811._ - -“I cannot describe to you the difficulties which I have been put to -by the misconduct of all the Spanish ships and vessels of war which -I have had to communicate with upon the coast, with exception of -the Astrea frigate and the Paloma corvette. In the others I have -seen neither courage to oppose the enemy nor humanity to alleviate -the distresses of their countrymen.”——“I have heard also that the -Algesiras, which lately arrived at Arens, has landed the stores and -ammunition, with which she was charged, at the risk of their falling -into the hands of the enemy, and has quitted the station!” - - - SECTION 4. - - - _Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._ - - “_12th July, 1811._ - -“General Milans is collecting a mixture of troops, consisting of -those who have escaped the enemy.” - -“He speaks loudly of his indifference to a command, while he boasts -that if he were captain-general he would raise forty thousand men and -clear the country of the enemy! But in the midst of this disgusting -rhodomontade it is not difficult to see that self-interest is the -main spring of all his actions, and that instead of raising an -army he is more likely, by the system he has adopted, to shake -the stability of that which is still left for the defence of the -principality.” - - - _Captain Codrington to sir H. Wellesley._ - - “_September 1, 1811._ - -“The affair of general Milans” (namely, the sending of corn to -Barcelona under his passport) “which I mentioned to you in my last -private letter, is still involved in mystery, which I hope however -to penetrate upon my return to Arens de Mar. The Mataro papers -reported that two soldiers were shot and a serjeant flogged at Arena -for suffering corn to pass their guard at Mongat on its way to -Barcelona. The _fact_ of the punishment is I believe truly stated, -but the _cause_ no less falsely, enterely as I suspect with the view -of terminating my investigation into this nefarious traffic. General -Lacy, instead of answering my letter, refers me by word of mouth to -the junta, and the deputation from the junta, who went to Mataro (as -they assured me) purposely to investigate the business, now tell me -that it is an affair purely military, and refer me to general Milans -himself.” - - - SECTION 5. - - - _Extract from a minute made by captain Codrington._ - - “_Mattaro, July 6, 1811._ - -“Colonel O’Ronan, aid-du-camp to the marquis of Campo Verde, arrived, -and informed me that he came from the marquis, who was on his march -to this town or Arens, for the purpose of embarking all the infantry -not Catalans, and the whole of the remaining cavalry, leaving the -horses on the beach. Colonel O’Ronan said this determination was the -result of a junta, composed of the marquis, general St. Juan, general -Caro, general Miranda, the general of artillery, brigadier Santa -Cruz, Velasco, and Sarsfield; that after the thing had been proposed -and discussed a long time, Sarsfield was the first to give his vote, -that he rose from his seat and said, ‘any officer who could give -such an opinion must be a traitor to his country, and that he and -his division would stand or fall with the principality.’ Every other -officer was of a contrary opinion, except the marquis (it afterwards -appeared that Santa Cruz also supported Sarsfield), who thought with -Sarsfield, and yet it seems he allowed himself to be led on by the -other generals. _In short, it appears he was resolved to abandon the -principality._ - -“I told him, without hesitation, that to embark the Valencians I -felt a duty to general O’Donnel, to the kingdom of Valencia, and to -the whole nation, but that I felt it equally my duty upon no account -to embark the army of Catalonia, and thus become a party concerned -in the abandonment of a province I had been sent to protect.”——“The -colonel, who could not venture on shore again lest he should be -murdered by the inhabitants of Mattaro, for having been the bearer of -a commission to arrest brigadier Milans about a month ago, sent to -the marquis my answer.” - - - _Extract from a minute of information given by the baron - d’Eroles._ - - “_July 9, 1811._ - -“The baron d’Eroles was appointed captain-general of Catalonia by -the junta of general officers, of which the marquis of Campo Verde -was president, and by the voice of the people. His reply was, that -so long as the army continued in the principality, and that there -was a senior general officer, he would not admit it, but that the -moment the army passed the frontier (it was then at Agramunt, in -full march to Aragon), he would accept the command, unmindful of the -dreadful situation in which he should place himself, but he would -do so in order to continue the struggle, and to prevent anarchy and -confusion. In this state things were when general Lacy arrived. -The baron instantly sought him, could not find, but met one of his -aid-du-camps, by whom he wrote to him to say what had occurred, but -that he was resolved to support general Lacy in his command, not only -with all his local influence, but by his personal exertions, and that -he would immediately join him to put this resolution in practice.” - - - _Extract from general Doyle’s Letter after seeing the above._ - -“The Valencian division, that is to say, two thousand four hundred -of the four thousand three hundred soldiers who disembarked in this -province, are now on board to return to Valencia. General Miranda -says the desertion took place in consequence of the marquis’s -determination to proceed to Aragon, which made them believe they -would not be embarked. In short, most disgraceful has been the -conduct of this division, and the marquis, as you will see by this -letter to me, attaches to it no small portion of blame.” - - - _Captain Codrington to the marquis of Campo Verde._ - - “_Blake, July 5, 1811._ - -“I have to remind you that by ordering the Valencian division out -of Taragona, in breach of the terms by which I bound myself when -I brought them, you yourself broke the pledge given by me, and -dissolved the contract.” - - - _Extracted from captain Codrington’s papers._ - - “Minute of a conference betwixt generals Caro and Miranda with - general Doyle and myself this day. - - “_July 9, 1811._ - -“About eight o’clock generals Caro and Miranda came on board the -Blake. After being seated in the cabin with general Doyle and myself, -general Caro begged general Doyle would explain to me, that they were -come in consequence of my promise, to request I would embark the -division of Valencian troops which I had brought from Peniscola. I -desired to know what promise general Caro understood me to have made? -He answered, that I would take the above troops back to Valencia. -I denied positively that I had made any promise to re-embark them -if they should ever join the marquis of Campo Verde, although I had -deeply pledged myself to restore them to general O’Donnel if they -joined in a sortie from the garrison, which I was very confident -would be decisive of its success. I then referred general Miranda to -a similar explanation, which I gave to him, through general Doyle, -on the day after our quitting Peniscola, when he had said he was -ordered, both by his written instructions and by verbal explanation -from general O’Donnel, not to land within the garrison. General -Miranda instantly repeated that so he was; upon which general Doyle, -to whom he had shewn those instructions jointly with myself, after -leaving Taragona for Villa Nueva, when under a difficulty as to how -he should proceed, referred him to them again, when it appearing -that he was therein positively ordered ‘desembarear en la plaza de -Tarragona,’ general Doyle stopped. - -“_General Miranda._ ‘Ah! but read on.’ - -“_General Doyle._ ‘No, sir, there is the positive proof of your -receiving such an order.’ - -“_General Miranda._ ‘Well, but read on.’ - -“_General Doyle_. ‘No, sir. This (_pointing to the paper_) is the -positive proof of your receiving such an order, which we wanted to -establish, because you positively denied it.’ - -“Upon this general Caro, shrugging up his shoulders, said, ‘he was -not aware of there being any such order.’ And general Miranda again -requested general Doyle would read on. - -“_General Doyle._ ‘For what purpose?’ - -“_General Miranda._ ‘To prove that I was not to shut myself up with -the division in the plaza de Taragona.’ - -“_General Doyle._ ‘There is no occasion, sir, for any proof of that, -for it was a part of the very stipulation made by captain Codrington -when he strongly pledged himself to general O’Donnel.’ - -“General Doyle continued,——‘And now, general Caro, that we have -proved to you that general Miranda _had_ orders to land in Taragona, -and that captain Codrington is bound by no such promise as you had -imagined, I must inform you that he has been eight days upon the -coast with all the ships of war and transports which are wanted for -other services, for the sole purpose of embarking these troops; and -he desires me to add that in consideration of what is due to the -liberal and exemplary assistance afforded by general O’Donnel and -Valencia in aid of Taragona, but not at all on account of any pledge -he has been said to have given, that he will use the same exertion in -re-embarking and restoring the troops which he would have done if so -bound by his word of honour.’” - - - _Mr. Wellesley to lord Wellesley._ - - “_July 28._ - -“The morning of 30th of June, a few hours after the arrival of the -British squadron and Spanish vessels in the roadstead of Villa Nueva, -five thousand French infantry and five hundred cavalry surprised the -place by a night-march, and seized all the property of Taragona, -which had been sent there before the siege. Twenty-five thousand -dollars for each of the next three months was demanded, but no -violence or plunder allowed. Eroles narrowly escaped. Lacy, appointed -to command in Catalonia, arrived 1st July at Villa Nueva, the 6th -went to Igualada to join Campo Verde.” - -“Desertion in the army at Mataro has been carried to a most -alarming extent since the fall of Taragona; the first night -fifteen hundred men disappeared, nearly three hundred cavalry had -likewise set off towards Aragon; and these desertions are to be -attributed to the gross neglect and want of activity on the part -of the officers.”————“The only division that keeps together in any -tolerable order is that of general Sarsfield, of about two thousand -men.”————“He had however disputes with Eroles, and the people called -for the latter to lead them.” - - * * * * * - - - No. III. - - - SECTION 1. - - POLITICAL STATE OF KING JOSEPH. - - SPANISH MINISTER’S COMPLAINTS OF THE FRENCH - GENERALS. - - - _From the councillor of state, Mariano Luis Orquijo, to - king Joseph._ - - “_Madrid, 22 Juillet, 1810._ - -“SIRE,—Le commissaire royal de Cordoue me mande, que le duc de -Dalmatie lui a fait écrire officiellement de ne remettre aucune -somme d’argent à la capitale lors même que le ministre des finances -le demanderait, jusqu’à ce que les dépenses de l’armée des régimens -qu’on lève et des employés de la province, &c., furent pleinement -couverts, et que le duc prendrait les mesures convenables, dans le -cas que cette détermination ne fut pas suivie.” - - - “_Madrid, 3 Agosto de 1810._ - -“Le général Sebastiani a fait voir au commissaire royale à Grenade, -un ordre du duc de Dalmatie, qui lui enjoint de la manière la plus -expresse, de le mettre en état d’arrestation si pour le 1er Août lui -et le préfet de Malaga ne mettent au pouvoir de Sebastiani quatre -millions de réaux. L’exorbitance de cette somme, pour une province -qui a déjà payé son contingent, et le court terme de huit jours -designé pour le payement, donnent à croire que cette somme une fois -livrée on en demandera une plus forte. Selon toutes les apparences, -et d’après les conversations particulières, il s’agit de profiter de -l’absence du roi pour mettre les Andalousies sur le même pied que -les provinces de Biscaye, Burgos, &c. Il se peut néanmoins qu’on ait -voulu inspirer ces craintes dans des idées tout-à-fait différentes. -Quoiqu’il en soit il serait scandaleux de voir un commissaire qui -représente la personne du roi arrêté dans une de ses provinces.” - - - _From Mariano Luis Orquijo to king Joseph._ - - “_Madrid, 7 Août, 1810._ - -“Monsieur d’Aranza m’écrit en dâte du 22 Août dans une lettre -particulière les paroles suivantes, en les soulignant pour mieux -fixer l’attention: ‘_Le maréchal Soult est très content, mais il ne -fera usage de son autorité que pour le bien: il aime le roi et la -nation: ce pays lui plait beaucoup_.’” - - - _Ditto to ditto._ - - “_Madrid, 13 Août, 1810._ - -“Parmi les lettres que m’a porté le courrier d’Andalousie arrivé -hier, j’en remarque une de monsieur Aranza écrite dans un stile -étudié et que je soupçonne redigée d’accord avec le duc de Dalmatie. -C’est un panégyrique à la louange de ce maréchal dans lequel monsieur -d’Aranza porte aux nues l’intelligence et la zêle du duc de Dalmatie -dans la partie administrative; la considération qu’il donne aux -autorités espagnoles; son extrême adresse à manier les esprits, et -l’habilité de ses dispositions militaires, dans un pays couvert -d’insurgés. M. d’Aranza termine en formant le vœu que le maréchal ne -soit aucunement troublé dans l’exécution de ses plans, et que le sort -de l’Andalousie soit mis entièrement a sa discretion.” - - - _Ditto to ditto._ - - “_Madrid, le 23 Août, 1810._ - -“Par ma correspondance avec l’Andalousie j’ai appris; de Cordone: -que M. Angulo à reçu les lettres qui l’appellent à Madrid, et -qu’il se dispose à suivre le grand convoi sorti de Seville le 11 -du courant. De Seville: qu’un corsaire Française s’étant emparé -d’un paquebot qui allait de Cadiz à Alicante, on y avait trouvé -entr’autres depêches une lettre de Campmany, grand partisan des -Anglais, et un des Coryphées de la revolution. Il avouait à son ami, -don Anselmo Rodriguez de Ribas, intendant de l’armée du centre, qui -s’était plaint à lui des excès que commettaient certaines juntes, -que Cadiz n’offrait pas un spectacle moins digne de pitié: que les -Anglais qu’il avait appris à connaître s’arrogaient peu à peu toute -l’autorité: que le commerce libre accordé aux ports d’Amerique -excitait à Cadiz un mécontentement général, et que Venegas allait au -Méxique en qualité de viceroi: il parle en outre de l’arrestation de -plusieurs personnes connues, et de la de considération dans laquelle -est tombée la régence.” - - - _Ditto to ditto._ - - “_Madrid, 27 Septembre, 1810._ - -“Le maréchal Victor permet le passage à beaucoup de femmes qui -veulent se réunir a leurs maris, les femmes en contant les choses -telles qu’elles sont, détruisent bien des erreurs dans lesquelles -on a généralement été entrainé par le gouvernement actuel. L’ennemi -permit ces jours derniers l’entrée dans l’île à plusieurs femmes qui -voulaient passer par Chiclanes pour se réunir à leurs parents, mais -dernièrement elles furent contenus à coups de canon, et un boulet -emporta la tête de celui qui les accompagnait. Le gouvernement -Anglais preside à toutes les opérations, et crainte cette espèce des -communications.” - - - “_Valladolid, le 11 Août, 1810._ - -“SIRE,—Je suis arrivé a Valladolid, où je n’ai pas trouvé le général -Kellermann. Il parait que les Espagnols out cerné un détachement de -Français qui se trouve à la Puebla de Sanabria, et que ce général y -eu allé pour le débloquer. Les guerrilles ont été hier aux portes -de Valladolid, et il y à cinq a six jours que soixante dix Français -ont été détruits à Villalon; la terreur s’est emparée de tous les -esprits, et l’on croit que trois cent hommes ne suffisent pas pour -faire paner un courrier: malgré cela, je parterai demain, escorté par -deux cent hommes avec un convoi de prisonniers de Ciudad Rodrigo, -donc le nombre n’est pas considérable, parcequ’ici on leur accorde la -liberté moyennant une somme qu’on règle avec le général Kellermann -pour les frais de la guerre. - -“Toutes les autorités du pays sont venues me visiter, et me consulter -sur la conduite qu’elles doivent tenir depuis les derniers ordres -du général Kellermann pour qu’elles n’obeinent ni ne correspondent -avec d’autre autorité que la sienne. C’est la chancellerie qui se -trouve plus embarrassée que toute autre, parce-qu’elle ne peut -concilier l’administrat de la justice au nom de votre majesté avec -l’impossibilité de correspondre avec son ministre. - -“Je n’ai pas reçu le moindre égard du général Dufrene qui est à la -place du général Kellermann. Il ne m’a pas visité, ni même accorde -un factionnaire; tout le monde s’en est apperçu, et cette conduite -a confirmé l’opinion que l’on a conçue que votre majesté ne règne -point dans ce pays. J’ai tâché de detruire une idée qui décourage les -véritables sujets de votre majesté, et soutient les espérances de ses -ennemis. Les généraux ne s’apperçoivent pas du mal qu’ils produisent -en ferant croire que le service de l’empereur, et ses intérêts -peuvent être en contradiction avec ceux de votre majesté. - -“Si le général Dufrene s’était borné à ne rien faire pour faciliter -mon voyage, j’aurai moins de motifs de plainte contre lui, mais il a -retenu l’escorte de cavalerie que le général Tilly m’avait donnée. De -toutes les manières, Sire, je ferai tout ce qui sera en mon pouvoir -pour accélérer mon voyage, et répondre à la confiance avec laquelle -votre majesté a daigné me distinguer. - - “LE MARQUIS ALMENARA.” - - - _Orquijo to Joseph, relating his conference with the French - ambassador._ - - (Extract.) - - “_Madrid, Août 22, 1810._ - -“Je lui dis de s’adresser sur ces deux points au ministre des -relations extérieures, il me répondit qu’un désagrément qu’on -éprouvait avec lui était l’obligation de lui donner à tout bout -de champ des notes écrites, qu’à Vittoria il l’avait compromis en -présentant à votre majesté ces notes comme officielles, que le -bon vieux duc (ce sont ses propres expressions) étourdissait dans -l’instant, qu’il n’entendait point, ou ne voulait point entendre -ce qu’on lui disait, et qu’il demandait qu’on lui donnat par écrit -ce qui n’était pas nécessaire d’écrire. Je lui répétais toujours -qu’il devait s’adresser au duc puisque c’était le seul canal par -lequel il devait diriger ses demandes, que je ne me mélais point de -ces affaires, et que je n’en entretiendrais votre majesté à moins -que votre majesté ne m’en parlat la première, mais comme simple -particulier je l’assurai de l’inviolabilité des promesses de votre -majesté et de ses idées liberales. L’ambassadeur ajouta que dans la -matinée du jour de St. Napoleon, et les jours suivants, le général -Belliard, Borelli, et leurs alentours avaient parlé fort mal des -expressions de votre majesté sur ses premiers devoirs, et qu’il ne -doutait pas qu’ils n’en eussent écrit à Paris; qu’il n’avait pas pu -se dispenser de transmettre à sa cour ces paroles; mais qu’il les -avait présentés comme une conséquence du premier discours tenu par -votre majesté et une nuance nécessaire pour adoucir le mauvais effêt -qu’avait produit ici l’article du Moniteur sur les mots de l’empereur -au duc de Berg. Je le lui avais présenté de cette manière en sortant -de l’appartement de votre majesté, et je lui montrai en même temps -un rapport venu de la Navarre dans lequel on dépeignait le facheux -étât de ce royaume en proie aux excès des bandes de brigands et -aux dilapidations des gouvernemens militaires. Si l’ambassadeur a -écrit dans ces termes comme il me l’a dit, autant par honneur que -par attachement à votre majesté, à son pays et au notre, il a bien -rempli ses devoirs. Quoiqu’il en soit, je me lui cru obligé de donner -connaissance à votre majesté de ces faits ainsi que de la surprise -que, selon l’ambassadeur, a causé à l’empereur et au ministère -Français le silence du duc de Santa Fé qui ne s’explique sur rien. -L’ambassadeur se plaint d’avoir été compromis par lui, car à sa -demande et en consequence des conversations fréquentes qu’il eut avec -lui pendant les trois jours qu’il passa à Madrid, il écrivit à sa -cour que le duc de Santa Fé était chargé de négocier sur la situation -de votre majesté et celle de notre pays, que l’ambassadeur lui-même -disait ne pouvoir pas durer. C’est à la lettre ce que c’est dit entre -l’ambassadeur et moi.” &c. &c. - - - _Ditto to ditto._ - - “_Madrid, le 13 Novembre, 1810._ - -“Monsieur Pereyra a reçu du maréchal Soult une réponse extrêmement -aigre. Ce commissaire royal persiste dans son opinion que les mesures -indiquées par le duc de Dalmatie pour l’approvisionnement de l’armée -ne rempliront pas le but qu’il se propose; mais le maréchal veut -être obéi. D’un autre côté le général Sebastiani l’a contraint à lui -donner onze cent mille réaux. Placé entre ces deux écueils, Monsieur -Pereyra a perdu courage et demande à votre majesté de le rappeller à -Madrid. Le général Dufour a pris le commandement de Grenade. - - “MARIANO LUIS DE ORQUIJO.” - - - _Ditto to ditto._ - - “_Madrid, 19 de Decembre, 1810._ - -“Monsieur le comte de Montarco était le 11 courant a Manzanares, -il m’écrit que les habitans de la Manche se plaignent de ce que -les troupes qui retrouvent dans la province ne les protégent pas -autant que leur nombre le leur permet, que les brigands viennent -leur enlever leurs grains pour les transporter dans les royaumes -de Valence et de Murcie, ou dans l’Estremadoure. Ils craignent une -disette et désirent ardemmement qu’il se forme de grands dépôts -de grains dans des places à l’abri des incursions des partis -d’insurgés. Les commandants des troupes Françaises sont d’une -exigence et d’une hauteur insupportables, et les rapports faits au -comte de Montarco par toutes les autorités légales du pays confirment -complettement ceux que l’intendant de la Manche ne cesse de faire aux -divers ministères depuis plusieurs mois.” - - - “_Madrid, le 15 Février, 1811._ - -“SIRE,—Le préfet de Santander me remêt, en dâte du 16 Janvier, -copie des offices qu’il a reçus pour la réunion de cette province au -gouvernement militaire de Biscaye. J’ai l’honneur de les mettre sous -les yeux de votre majesté en lui observant que cette mesure a été -prise sur la proposition du général Caffarelli. - -“On a demandé au préfet de Santander un état des employés civils -et militaires, des moines, du clergé, et des appointemens dont ils -jouissent. Il croit en conséquence que des attributions ainsi que -celles des employés seront nulles des que la province sera gouvernée -à l’instar de celle de Biscaye. Il ajoute que lui et les chefs -principaux de l’administration sont décidés à ne travailler que sous -les ordres de votre majesté et demandent avec instance que votre -majesté ne les abandonne pas. - -“Le sous-préfet de Logrogne me dit en dâte du 22 Janvier que -l’opinion publique s’est améliorée depuis qu’on y a appris les -nouvelles du Portugal, et qu’on y connait le peu de moyens de defense -qu’offre Valence dans le désordre extrême qui y règne. La Riofa ne -renferme plus de bandes complettes d’insurgés, mais on y trouve -encore quelques brigands épars et des voleurs de grands chemins. - - “MARIANO LUIS DE ORQUIJO.” - - - SECTION 2. - - (Relating to Joseph’s abdication.) - - _Vindication of the King._ - - - _Le ministre secrétaire d’état à monsieur le duc de Santa Fé, - et en son absence à monsieur le marquis d’Almenara._ - - _Palais de Madrid, le 12 Septembre, 1810, Pars._ - -EXCELLENCE,—Le courrier de cabinet, Don Martin Estenoz, qui partit -de Paris le 22 Juillet, a remis les lettres écrites par V. E. le -même jour et les copies de celles que vous envoyâtes le 19 Juin par -le courrier Alvarez, qui furent interceptées. Le roi les a lues -avec la plus grande attention, et après s’être bien pénétré des -communications faites à V. E. au nom de l’empereur, par monsieur le -due de Cadore, et les observations particulières de ce ministre, S. -M. desirant détruire d’un seul trait, les craintes et la défiance -que des personnes, tout au moins mal instruites, se sont efforcées -d’inspirer, m’a ordonné d’entrer en explication sur tous les points -dont elles traitent. Mais je dois avant tout faire connaître à V. E. -que le roi s’est montré satisfait de la juste interprétation donnée -à ses idées, et à ses sentimens dans la réponse que V. E. a faite -au duc de Cadore, relativement à la protection dont S. M. I. désire -que le commerce Français jouisse dans les réglemens des douanes, -en offrant d’assurer une faveur réciproque dans ses états aux -productions d’Espagne. L’empereur ne peut ignorer les vues liberales -de son auguste frère, et si S. M. I. a été exactement informée sur ce -point, elle saura que, dès son avénement au trône, le roi a écarté -bien des obstacles opposés à l’industrie française qu’il s’agit de -favoriser encore par de nouvelles dispositions. - -Il est bien douloureux pour le roi d’avoir à se justifier de -plusieurs imputations auxquelles on a dû croire puisqu’on les -a communiquées a V. E. L’une d’elles est que le roi a rendu à -leurs propriétaires, ou disposé à son gré, d’une partie des biens -confisqués par l’empereur. Cela supposerait de la part de S. M. un -oubli de la parole donnée a l’empereur de ne se mêler en aucune -manière de ces confiscations: mais c’est un infame imposture, et son -auteur mérite un chatiment exemplaire. Qu’on cite une propriété un -pouce de terrain confisqué par l’empereur, et dont on ait disposé: -on ne le pourra point si dans une pure question de fait on en -impose ainsi a l’empereur, que sera ce lorsqu’on ne parle que par -conjectures et présomption? Le roi porte à un si haut degré son -respect pour les décrets de confiscations de S. M. I. qu’ayant besoin -d’un des édifices qui y sont compris pour y placer des établissemens -publics, il n’a même pas voulu s’en servir provisoirement. S. M. -n’a-t-elle pas, en conséquence, le droit de réclamer, pour son -honneur, la punition de ses detracteurs? S. M. I. s’est expliquée sur -la direction donnée à la guerre et la manière dont elle a été faite. - -L’empereur écrivit au roi pour lui représenter la lenteur des -opérations, et l’inaction des armées. Aussitôt S. M. entreprit -la conquête de l’Andalousie. Le duc de Cadore a dit à V. E. que -la soumission de cette province était illusoire, puisqu’elle se -trouve inondée de partis d’insurgés et de bandes de brigands. -Qu’on considère la vaste étendue de l’Andalusie; le petit nombre -de troupes françaises que l’obstination de Cadiz permêt d’y -repandre; les pièges de toute espèce que tendent les Anglais et -leurs continuelles attaques: qu’on parcoure l’histoire de toutes -les guerres contre l’Angleterre et l’on verra qu’indépendamment des -vingt mille Espagnols constamment stationés à St. Rocq, il était -encore nécessaire d’entretenir sur cette côté un nombre considérable -de troupes pour les opposer aux entreprises partielles de l’ennemi. -Si ces précautions étaient indispensables dans un tems de calme -et de tranquillité, qu’elles doivent être les espérances et les -moyens de l’Angleterre dans l’agitation actuelle de l’Espagne et -la nature de la guerre dont elle est le théâtre? Le roi peut dire -avec verité que la conquête militaire et morale de l’Andalousie est -son ouvrage, et que ses paroles, sa conduite, et les sages mesures -qu’il a prises, out preparé la tranquillité dont elle jouit. S. M. -y a organisé des gardes civiques chargées de défendre leurs foyers, -et malgré le voisinage de cette province avec l’Estremadure et les -instigations continuelles de la junte de Cadiz et des Anglais, -l’Andalousie renferme beaucoups moins de partis ou de bandes -d’insurgés que la Castille, la Biscaye, et la Navarre, qui ont été -placés sous le régime militaire. Enfin l’on trouve en Andalousie une -organisation complette de compagnies de Miguelettes, qui veillent a -la tranquillité des villes et à la sûreté des chemins. Leurs services -sont tellement utiles que le maréchal duc de Dalmatie a donné le plus -de développement possible à cette institution. - -Si l’Andalousie n’est pas entièrement pacifiée, si la junte de Cadiz -existe encore, et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale influence, -on doit l’attribuer en grande partie aux machinations et aux traines -ourdies par la junte et l’Angleterre au moment où parvint à leur -connaissance le décret du 8 Février qui établit des gouvernemens -militaires dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l’Aragon, et la Catalogne. -Quelques gouverneurs français ayant traité ces provinces comme si -elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie, les membres de -la junte de Cadiz et les Anglais en profitèrent pour souffler de -nouveau le feu de la discorde et refuter les expressions du roi -qui répétait sans cesse, ‘Que la nation conserverait son intégrité -et son indépendance: que ses institutions s’amélioreraient sous -la protection d’un trône soutenu par les relations intimes du roi -avec l’empereur; qu’elle n’aurait à combattre que l’ennemi qui -voulait s’arroger l’empire exclusif des mers.’ Voila le sens qu’on -a toujours donné en Espagne aux mots indépendance et intégrité. -Ce langage est celui dont s’est servi S. M. I. non seulement avec -les Espagnols, mais à la face de l’univers: il ne peut donc être -odieux ni criminel dans la bouche du roi. Mais combien n’est-il -pas démenti par la conduite de certains gouverneurs qui paraissent -s’obstiner à prolonger l’insurrection d’Espagne à l’annihiler ou la -détruire plutôt qu’à la soumettre! car dans plusieurs endroits on ne -se contente pas d’exclure toute idée de l’autorité du roi en faisant -administrer la justice au nom de l’empereur, mais ce qui est pire, -on a exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Valencia -prêtassent serment de fidélité et d’obéissance à S. M. I. comme si la -nation Espagnole n’avait pas de roi. - -Monsieur le due de Cadore se plaint de l’indulgence dont on en a usé -en Andalousie; S. M. a montré contre ses ennemis, dans les champs de -Talavera et Ocana, toute la fermeté de son caractère; mais serait-il -juste, conviendrait-il à ses intérêts et aux vues de l’empereur, que -S. M. deployât de la rigueur contre des vaincus, des prisonniers qui -doivent être ses sujets? Si le maréchal Ney eut suivi ce généreux -exemple dans les villes de Galice où il fut reçu à bras ouverts, -et n’eut pas au contraire opprimé et saccagé cette province, elle -serait heureuse et soumise, et non livrée aux maux de l’insurrection -comme tant d’autres à qui l’on a fait éprouver le même sort. Cette -conduite de S. M. dans des pays soumis est vraisemblablement ce -que le duc de Cadore appelle des graces accordées aux insurgés de -préférence aux personnes attachées à la cause du roi. Les insurgés -n’ont obtenu d’autres graces que elles qui leur furent offertes dans -les proclamations pour dissiper l’erreur dans laquelle les Anglais -les avaient induits. Si le sequestre mis sur les biens invendus -de quelques habitans ou réfugiés, a été levé posterieurement, cet -exemple d’indulgence a eu d’heureux résultats, puisqu’il a attiré -un grand nombre de personnes á l’obéissance du roi: et qu’on ne -croye pas que ces individus n’aient point subi le chatiment qui leur -était dû pour le retard qu’ils ont mis à se soumettre, car s’ils -possedaient des billets royaux, il les ont perdues pour ne les avoir -pas présenté à tems au timbre sec; et s’ils sont porteurs d’autres -titres de créances sur l’état, ils doivent, pour les valider, -solliciter un décret particulier. - -Les avantages de la formation des corps Espagnols sont à la portée -de tout le monde: leur présence a influé plus qu’on ne pense -sur l’heureuse issue de la bataille d’Ocaña et de l’expédition -d’Andalousie. En y admettant un grand nombre d’officiers, on est -parvenu à éloigner de l’insurrection des hommes inquiets qui seraient -devenus chefs de brigands, et tout en avouant que la désertion a eu -lieu parmi les soldats, et qu’il en est resulté quelques maux, on -peut hardiment affirmer que la somme des biens est infiniment plus -grande, et qu’il n’y a pas de moyens qu’on ne doive employer pour -faire revenir de son égarement une nation de douze millions d’âmes -qu’il n’est pas facile d’assujettir par la force des bayonnettes, et -dont on veut d’ailleurs faire une amie et une alliée. - -On a parlé du mauvais emploi des ressources de l’Espagne, et du -dénuement dans lequel ont été laissées les troupes françaises. Les -soldats ont eu en Espagne des vivres en abondance: les hôpitaux -français ont été les mieux pourvus, il a fallu pour cela exiger des -contributions extraordinaires et des emprunts forcés, et vaincre le -grand obstacle de l’interceptation des communications de province à -province, et souvent de ville à ville. L’Espagne se trouve divisé -en gouvernemens militaires de sorte que S. M. est à peine maître -de la capitale et de sa banlieue: n’est ce donc point par une -espèce de miracle qu’elle y fait subsister des troupes, et qu’elle -y soutient des hôpitaux. Les gouverneurs français imposent, il est -vrai, des contributions extraordinaires sur leurs provinces, mais -ils les vexent et les ruinent, et certes ce n’est pas là le moyen de -les maintenir dans l’obéissance, ni un exemple bien attrayant pour -les provinces soulevées: cette ressource est d’ailleurs précaire -et insuffisante comme le prouvera bientôt l’expérience. S. M. se -flatte de ce que les intentions de l’empereur en faveur de la nation -seraient mieux remplies et ses troupes mieux dirigées, si toutes -celles qui sont en Espagne étaient sous ses ordres, et si les -propositions qu’il a faites à son auguste frère étaient acceptées. -Le duc de Cadore a évalue à plusieurs millions les confiscations -de marchandises anglaises, et l’enlévement de l’argenterie des -églises et des couvents qu’on aurait dû faire en Andalousie. Les -confiscations eurent lieu par ordre des généraux français à leur -entrée dans chaque ville, et si leur valeur fut exagerée, dans le -principe, pour donner plus d’éclat aux entreprises militaires, on -reconnut dès qu’on en vint à l’examen l’erreur dans laquelle on -était tombé; et dans le fait comment ne pas apperçevoir qu’après la -bataille d’Ocaña l’invasion d’Andalousie devant être prévue, chacun -avait grand soin de faire refluer les marchandises confiscables -sur les points les plus capables de resistance, afin de les mettre -hors de la portée du vainqueur. L’argenterie d’église a beaucoup -d’apparence et fort peu de valeur. On a pris dans les couvents, où il -en restait très peu, ainsi que dans les églises toute celle qui n’a -pas été jugée nécessaire pour la decence du culte, et comme le roi ne -voulait ni ravager ni détruire, mais bien pacifier et conserver, il a -dû régler sa conduite sur ce principe. - -Monsieur le duc de Cadore parle de dépenses, c’est vraiment une -fatalité qu’il soit si mal informé de faits généralement connus. Le -trésor public est ouvert à quiconque voudra s’assurer de la vérité. -On y verra que S. M. a reçu à peine chaque mois le cinquième de -l’assignation de la liste civile: qu’il a dû se reduire à la plus -stricte économie, et que non seulement il s’est vu faute de pouvoir -donner aux acteurs une légère avance, dans l’obligation de supprimer -le théâtre Italien qui était son unique délassement, mais encore de -vendre sa vaisselle platte, et de se défaire des choses les plus -nécessaires a l’ornement de sa cour. Aussi dans le repas que S. M. -donna, à l’occasion de la fête de l’empereur, à ses ministres, aux -grands officiers de la couronne, et à l’ambassadeur de France, la -table fut elle servie en fayence semblable à celle qu’ avait S. -M. au camp de Boulogne. Certainement l’embarras et la confusion -que cette excessive simplicité causait au roi n’aura pas échappé à -l’ambassadeur. Au milieu de tant de privations, et dans une situation -aussi contraire à sa dignité S. M. a la douleur de voir que ses -ministres, le conseil d’état, les tribunaux de la capitale, et les -employés civils, qui sont en petit nombre, ne perçoivent pas leur -traitement depuis plus de sept mois. Ce sont là les faveurs que S. M. -a dispensés avec tant de prodigalité. Le roi a donné, il est vrai, -quelques cédules aux officiers de sa maison, et à quelques individus -attachés à sa personne, pour les aider à acheter des biens nationaux: -on donne à ces bienfaits le nom de prodigalité, et d’un autre côté -l’on se plaint de l’abandon dans lequel S. M. laisse d’autres -individus, ce qui serait incompatible avec la façon de penser du roi -et la connaissances de ses devoirs comme homme et comme monarque. -C’est l’unique chose dont le roi puisse disposer dans la situation -où il se trouve et outre le but politique de ces donations, S. M. a -cru que c’était le seul moyen d’assurer à ces individus une médiocre -existence, et encore sa prévoyance à cet égard a-t-elle été trompée, -car les revenues des terres et des biens qui se trouvent dans les -personnes soumises au gouvernement militaire dont les limites -s’étendent jusqu’aux portes de Madrid, où ne se payent pas, tant -est grande la misère des fermiers, où les biens ne s’afferment pas -de crainte d’extorsions de la part des gouverneurs, où, enfin, les -revenus se trouvent absorbés par les contributions extraordinaires. -Les faits sont evidens, ils parlent d’eux-mêmes, et toute personne -impartiale peut en faire l’examen. - -Mais il faut qu’elle soit de meilleure foi que celle qui a voulu -imputer à S. M. l’aliénation des biens confisqués par l’empereur, -et les griefs auxquels on vient de répondre. S. M. pourrait, à -bien plus juste titre, se plaindre de la conduite des gouverneurs -Français: de celle du général Dufour, par exemple, qui a exigé des -dix membres dont il composa à sa manière ce conseil de Navarre -qu’on s’est vu bientôt obligé de dissoudre, qu’ils rédigeassent -une adresse à l’empereur dans laquelle ils demandaient à S. M. I. -un code des lois, et se mettaient à sa discrétion. Trois de ces -membres réfusèrent de signer, les autres cédèrent à la violence. -S. M. pourrait citer encore une foule d’actes qui out exaspéré les -esprits, fourni des armes à l’insurrection, et donné aux Anglais -des prétextes pour supposer des projets qui n’existent pas, et -rendre la guerre interminable. Qu’on compte le nombre des bandes -de brigands et d’insurgés en Espagne, et l’on verra combien il -s’est accru depuis l’institution des gouvernemens militaires. S. -M. ne peut elle se plaindre avec autant de justice de la situation -équivoque dans laquelle elle se trouve? qu’on en juge par le fait -suivant. Le nouveau ministre de finances venait d’entrer en fonction, -et il s’agissait déjà de réunir les plus forts capitalistes de la -place pour les engager à avancer une bonne somme d’argent, lorsque -le payeur de l’armée, monsieur Crouchart, et l’intendant-général, -monsieur Denniers, assurèrent au ministre que des employés venaient -de Paris avec des lettres cachetées qu’ils avaient l’ordre de -n’ouvrir qu’à Madrid. On prétendit aussitôt qu’ils devaient se -charger de l’administration civile, que les rentrées seraient -invariablement affectées à l’entretien et à la solde de l’armée, -et le surplus seulement, à la liste civile. C’était annoncer la -dissolution de l’état. Des bruits de cette nature répandus dans -toute la ville par les employés français parvenus à la connaissance -de l’ambassadeur de S. M. I. et appuyés par des malveillans qui -abondent toujours dans les capitales surtout à la suite des guerres -d’opinions, ne pouvait produire que de malheureux effets. La -confiance de ce petit nombre d’hommes qui aurait pu faire des avances -s’eteignit à l’instant, et toutes les portes furent fermées. S. M. -ignorait l’arrivée des nouveaux employés du trésor de France, et il -n’a connu comme le dernier de ses sujets, le contenu des lettres dont -ils étaient porteurs qu’à leurs ouvertures. - -Dans cet état de choses il est facile de se faire l’idée de la -confiance que peut inspirer le roi, et lorsque S. M. se trouve -hors d’état de faire le bonheur du pays qu’il doit gouverner et de -concourir à la réalisation des vues de son auguste frère: qu’il -voit enfin sa dignité avilée, doit on s’étonner qu’il ait manifesté -l’impossibilité de vivre plus long temps dans une situation aussi -précaire? Monsieur le duc de Cadore tout en reconnaissant les hautes -qualités du roi, a prétendu, que les personnes qui approchent S. -M. lui ont conseillé et lui conseillent sans cesse de se maintenir -dans l’indépendance de la France, et que ce principe se suivait -avec trop de rigueur. Monsieur le duc de Cadore sait que S. M. dans -aucune époque de sa longue et glorieuse carrière n’a eu besoin de -conseils et ne s’est soumis à aucune influence, surtout s’il s’est -agi de détruire son système inaltérable d’amitié sincère et éternelle -avec son auguste frère l’empereur; d’alliance et de bienveillance -affectueuse envers la nation Espagnole à la tête de laquelle il -est placé, et dont il s’efforcera de conserver la splendeur et le -bien-être, avec l’indépendance et l’intégrité de territoire. Les -vœux les plus constants de son cœur sont que les deux nations unies -entr’elles par les mêmes liens que leur monarques concourent d’une -manière uniforme à la félicité commune en forçant leur ennemie à -abandonner le sceptre des mers.’ - -Le prince don Fernando, ajoute le duc de Cadore, se prêterait à céder -les provinces qui conviennent à l’empereur et à toutes les conditions -qu’il voudrait lui imposer. Le roi ne veut entrer en comparaison avec -personne; mais il observera que ce ne fut pas dans ces sentimens -ni dans cette croyance qu’il accepta la couronne d’Espagne en -déposant celle de Naples: que l’empereur ni la France ne devraient -avoir confiances en des offres que la nation repousserait, et qui -ne pourrait avoir d’ailleurs qu’une exécution passagère; car comme -le sait très bien monsieur le duc de Cadore, les nations humiliées -dissimulent leur haine en attendant le moment favorable de venger -leurs outrages. Une semblable conduite serait incompatible avec le -façon de penser du roi, avec son noble caractère et celui de la -nation que S. M. gouverne. Elle est diamétralement en opposition -avec les assurances données par S. M. I. à la nation Espagnole -‘qu’il était nécessaire pour son bonheur qu’elle se régénérat sous -sa dynastie, et sous le prince qu’elle lui donnait égal en tout -à son auguste personne.’ A cette occasion le duc de Cadore parle -du peu d’avantages que rapporte à la France la guerre d’Espagne -en proportion des sacrifices immenses qu’elle a faits. Certes le -roi ne les ignore pas, et sa reconnaissance éclatera quand S. M. -se trouvera en état de les récompenser. Dans ce moment cela lui -est impossible; mais S. M. I. pourrait mettre le comble à ses bons -offices en s’offrant pour garant de l’emprunt ouvert en Hollande sous -les mêmes conditions que celui de Prusse, ou du moins en lui donnant -son assentiment, comme à celui d’Autriche. S. M. I. se convaincra -facilement que les liens du sang, les rélations les plus intimes -et les plus sûres d’une étroite amitié entre les deux nations, et -enfin la position même de ces armées seront les meilleurs garants de -l’exactitude des remboursements quelques sacrifices qu’ils exigent. - -Quant aux avantages futurs que promettent les sacrifices actuels -de la France, ce serait faire injure aux lumières du duc de Cadore -que de la fatiguer en les lui developpant. Lorsque S. M. I. crut -nécessaire l’établissement en Espagne de sa dynastie, l’expérience -lui avait démontré que survenant des troubles dans le nord, il ne -pouvait jamais compter sans ce changement, sur la sûreté d’une -des plus importantes frontières de son empire. Un siècle d’amitié -presque non interrompue depuis le regne en Espagne et en France de -la maison de Bourbon, le pacte de famille et la tournure différente -que prirent les relations entre les deux pays après l’exclusion de -la maison d’Autriche, sont les témoignages les plus authentiques de -l’utilité des efforts et des sacrifices de la France pendant six -ans, au commencement du siècle dernier. La résistance opiniâtre de -presque toute l’Europe et surtout celle de l’Angleterre, qu’elle -renouvelle dans cette guerre avec un plus grand developpement de -moyens démontrent l’importance de cet événement pour la France. -Ses meilleurs écrivains politiques ont indiqué avec la plus grande -clarté les avantages qui en ont resulté pour le commerce Français -et les richesses qu’il a procurées à la nation. Que ne doit elle -pas attendre aujourd’hui de la réunion des deux couronnes dans -la même famille, de l’analogie de leurs codes politiques et de -leurs institutions, des qualités d’un roi sage et éclairé qui aime -tendrement son auguste frère et la France, et qui est pénétré de -la nécessité d’abattre l’orgueil de l’Angleterre! n’est ce pas le -plus grand fruit qu’elle puisse retirer de cette resolution et de -tels résultats ne valent ils pas les sacrifices momentanées qu’elle -s’impose? - -Il a été bien sensible pour S. M. que les rapports mensongers de -personnes peu interessées à l’union et a l’amitié des deux frères -et des deux pays, ayant pu inspirer à S. M. I. un seul instant de -doutes. Quoique le roi a déjà écrit à l’empereur son auguste frère, -S. M. veut que V. E. ou en votre absence le marquis d’Almenara, -remette une copie de cette lettre à monsieur le duc de Cadore, -dans l’espérance que V. E. developpera à S. M. I. avec sa sagacité -ordinaire les causes qui ont influé sur la conduite du roi dans les -affaires d’Espagne, que S. E. lui dépeindra l’état véritable de la -nation, et qu’elle contribuera de cette manière à l’éxécution des -intentions des deux monarques qui n’ont été, et qui ne peuvent être -que les mêmes. - - Le ministre secrétaire d’état, - (Signé) MARIANO LUIS D’ORQUIJO. - - - _Letters from king Joseph to his ministers._ - - _10 Février, 1811._ - -Je suis peiné que l’empereur ait cru nécessaire d’employer des -formes diplomatiques avec moi et même avec la reine. Qu’il me fasse -clairement connoître sa volonté et je n’aurai rien de plus agréable -que de m’y conformer puisqu’elle ne peut être ni compatible avec mon -honneur qui me paroit inséparable du sien, comme mon intérêt. Le fait -est que je désire complaire, à la fois, à l’empereur et à mon frère; -il m’a fait reconnoître roi de Naples, roi d’Espagne, et a garanti -mon existence politique sans que je l’aie demandé. Je n’ai pas -sollicité le trône j’y suis monté parce-qu’il l’a voulu, aujourd’hui -l’empereur désire-t-il que je rentrois dans la retraite. Je suis -d’autant plus prêt à le faire que les événemens de trois années out -levé bien des scrupules et empêcher venir bien des regrets. - -J’ai dû croire que l’empereur vouloit que je quittâsse l’Espagne -dès que j’ai vu graduellement mon existence y devenir humiliant, -impossible, et qu’il doit savoir que je ne puis pas supporter -long-temps de me voir degradé: dans ce cas je désire partir pour -France. L’ordre publique sera assuré ici, je m’entendrai avec mon -frère, ou pour mieux dire je lui porterai moi-même mon blanc-seing. - -Je m’abandonne entièrement à sa justice et à ses sentimens paternels -pour ma famille, aussi point de négociations particulières; je -rétourne dès ce moment à l’empereur tous les droits qu’il m’a -transmis sur l’Espagne si son ambassadeur juge que je puisse partir -demain pour Morfontaine, et s’il eu autorisé à croire que l’empereur -verra ce parti sans déplaisir. - -L’empereur veut-il réellement que je reste au trône d’Espagne? Je -reste quelques qui soient les désagrémens indépendant de la volonté -qui m’y attendent. Mais il faut que je n’éprouve que ceux qu’il -ne peut m’éviter; je le répéte jamais les intérêts politiques ne -me diviseront avec lui, qu’il me fasse connoître sa volonté. Si -l’empereur venir ici, tout s’arrangera entre nous; s’il ne vient -pas en Espagne, qu’il me laisse aller le voir à Paris. S’il juge ce -voyage inopportun, qu’il rende mon existence tolerable pendant la -guerre: il sait mieux que personne ce qu’il doit faire pour cela. - -Il faut un changement marqué dans tout, avancer ou reculer, vous -connoissez l’état actuel; j’ignore comment je pourrai gagner le mois -nécessaire pour connoître la determination de l’empereur. - - - (The following abdication, by Joseph, was drawn up but never made - public.) - -L’expérience de trois années nous ayant convaincu que l’ordre social -ne peut être recomposé en Espagne qu’en cumulant dans les mêmes mains -les droits de souverainté dont nous sommes investés, et les moyens -de force et de puissance militaire dont dispose notre august frère -l’empereur des Français, de qui nous tenons les droits que nous -exerçons aujourd’hui sur la monarchie Espagnole, nous avons résolu de -notre pleine et libre volonté de rétrocéder à notre frère l’empereur -des Français les droits qu’il nous a remis et en vertu des quels nous -sommes entré dans ce royaume en 1808 à la suite de la constitution -que nous avons signée à Bayonne dans la même année. - -C’est pourquoi par les presents signées de notre main nous declarons -céder, transporter, et remettre à notre dit frère l’empereur des -Français, tous les droits qu’il nous transmis en 1808 sur la -monarchie d’Espagne et des Indes dans toute leur integrité et tels -qu’il les reçut lui même du roi Charles Quatre. - -Nous entendons que la présente rétrocession n’ait de force et valeur -que ce l’époque ou nous aurons pleine et entière connoissance de -l’acceptation de la présente rétrocession de la part de notre -frère l’empereur des Français: et comme nous ne sommes portés à -cet acte par aucune considération particulière, mais par l’unique -considération que nous avons exprimée plus haut et qu’en quittant -le trône d’Espagne nous n’avons en vue que le plus grand bien du -peuple Espagnol que nous ne pourrons pas rendre aussi heureux que -nous voudrions, et que nous n’avons d’autre ambition que celle de -rentrer dans la vie privée et dans la retraite la plus absolue. Nous -nous abandonnons entièrement à la justice de notre frère l’empereur -des Français pour le sort des personnes qui nous sont attachées au -sentimens de la gloire qui garantit ses efforts pour le bonheur de -l’Espagne et à ses sentimens paternels pour nos enfans, pour la -reine, notre épouse, et pour nous. - -Nous nous engagerons à faire revêtir de toutes les formes qui -pourroient paroître plus authentiques le présent acte écrit, rédigé, -et signé de notre propre main. Ayant jugé que le plus grand secret -était indispensable jusqu’à ce que nous ayons connoissance de -l’acceptation de S. M. l’empereur des Français, roi d’Italie. - - Fait à Madrid, etc. etc. - - - _Paris, 1811._ - -Depuis la conversation que j’ai eu avec vous sur ma position, elle -ne s’est pas améliorée; elle est telle aujourd’hui que je me voir -forcé d’embrasser le seul pratique qui me reste à prendre, celui de -la rétraite la plus absolue en France. Je serois déjà parti si je -ne venois d’être instruit que S. M. l’empereur qui a sû que j’avois -donné ordre d’acheter ou de louer une terre a cent lieues de Paris, -avoit disapprouvé cette demarche, et qu’il trouvait plus convenable, -si je persistois dans ma resolution, qui je me rendisse à ma terre de -Morfontaine après vous avoir prévenu de ma détermination, et avoir -assuré ici l’ordre publique après mon départ. Je dirai en partant que -je vais m’entendre avec l’empereur pour les affaires d’Espagne, et je -ferois les mêmes dispositions par rapport aux provinces qui entourent -Madrid que je fit lorsqu’il y a un an je partis pour l’expedition -d’Andalousie; cet état dura six mois sans nul désordre, et je ne -doute pas que les choses n’aillent de la même manière et ne donnent -le tems à l’empereur de prendre les dispositions définitives. - -Je suis prêt à rendre l’empereur les droits qu’il me rémit à Bayonne -sur la monarchie d’Espagne et des Indes si ma position ici ne change -pas; parceque je dois croire que c’est le désir de l’empereur -puisqu’il est impossible qu’il veuille que je reste roi d’Espagne, et -qu’il m’ôte tous les moyens d’existence. Il en peut être malheureux -que l’empereur ait voulu me reconnoître roi de Naples, il y a six ans -lorsqu’à la tête de ses troupes je fis la conquête de ce royaume; ce -fut malgré moi, et mes instances pour rester au commandement de son -armée avec la simple qualité de son lieutenant furent le sujet d’une -lettre dont je me rappelle très-bien. - -Lorsqu’en 1808 je fus proclamé roi d’Espagne, je l’ignorois encore; -cependant arrivé à Bayonne je fis tout ce que voulus l’empereur, je -signerais une constitution, je le signai appuyée par sa garantie. -Les événemens n’ayant pas répondu a nos espérances est ce ma faute? -Est celui qui en est le plus victim qui doit en porter la peine? -Cependant tant que la guerre dure je me suis soumis a tout ce que -l’on a voulu, mais je ne puis pas l’impossible; je ne puis pas rester -ici plus longtems si l’empereur ne vient à mon secours. En ordonnant -qu’il soit versé dans mon trésor à Madrid un million de francs par -mois, les autres provinces doivent contribuer aux besoins de la -capitale. Les troupes françoises qui sont dans les provinces du -centre (elles sont peu nombreuses) doivent être soldées par le trésor -de France. - -A la pacification générale l’empereur exigera des indemnités; -s’entendrer alors il posséde de fait presque toutes les provinces -aujourd’hui, il sera bien le maître de ne les évacuer qu’à mesure -qu’il croira que l’Espagne aura satisfait aux obligations qu’il -lui aura imposées. En résume je suis prêt à faire la volonté de -l’empereur pourvu que je la connoîsse. - -1º. Veut-il que je reste roi d’Espagne, je reste dès qu’il m’en donne -la possibilité, et je supporte tous les gouvernemens militaires qu’il -a établis puisqu’il les croit indispensables pendant la guerre. - -2º. Préféreroit-il que je rentrasse dans la sein de ma famille à -Morfontaine d’abord et l’hiver dans le midi. Je suis prêt à partir -dès que je connoîtrai sa volonté. J’ajoute de plus que le parti de la -retraite me conviendra beaucoup plus que l’autre dès que je saurai -qu’il lui convient. Je suis sur alors qu’il aura quelques bontés pour -les Français qui se sont attachés à mon soit, et que je ne serai pas -à même de rendre aussi heureux qu’ils le méritent. Quant à moi, à la -reine, et à mes enfans, l’empereur me faisant payer mon traitement -de prince Français, nous en aurons assez, mon intention étant de -vivre dans la retraite en m’occupant de l’education des mes enfans, -laissant a l’empereur le soin de leur établissemens, car je ne doute -pas si ce projet se verifie que je ne retrouve le cœur de mon frère, -et que dans les intervalles où il se rappellera qu’il est homme, il -ne trouve encore quelque consolation en retrouvant mon cœur pour lui -aussi jeune qu’il y a trente ans. - -Enfin j’aime mieux vivre sujet de l’empereur en France que de rester -en Espagne roi nominal, parceque je serai bon sujet en France, et -mauvais roi en Espagne, et que je veux rester digne de l’empereur, de -la France, et de moi-même. - - - _Marquis of Almenara to the minister secretary of state. - Translated from a deciphered Spanish letter._ - - _Fontainebleau, Novembre 4, 1810._ - -“This government is very uneasy about the military operations in -Portugal, from whence they receive no accounts except through -England, described therefore factitiously and with the strongest -hopes of resisting the French forces that oppose their army. This -problem will probably be already solved and its conclusion will -decide what is interesting to Spain. It is therefore very important -that our government should write all it knows, and what will prove -that it takes part in what belongs to both countries, because here -I am often asked what is said in Madrid on this subject, and people -are surprised that we limit ourselves entirely to the urgent points -of our negotiation. This explains the proofs of affection which the -prince royal of Sweden desired that the king should give to the -emperor, being convinced that the letters of his majesty, written in -his own familiar style when he explains his sentiments, produce a -great sensation with the emperor.” - - - SECTION 3. - - - _Letters from the prince de Neufchatel to king Joseph._ - - _Paris, 28 Janvier, 1811._ - -SIRE,—J’ai l’honneur de prévenir votre majesté que l’empereur par -sa décision du 21 Janvier a fixé les traitemens extraordinaires qui -pourront être payés en Espagne à date du 1^{er} de l’année 1811, dans -l’arrondissement des armées du midi, du nord, de l’Arragon, &c. Ces -traitemens sont détermines ainsi qu’il suit. - - _Savoir_: - - Fr. par mois. - - Les généraux gouverneurs dans les quatre gouvernemens - comprises dans l’arrondissement de l’armée du nord 4000 - - Le général chef de l’état major-général de l’armée 3000 - - Généraux de division 1800 - - Généraux de brigade, inspecteurs aux revues et - commissaires ordonnateurs 1200 - - Adjudans commandans, colonels, et sous-inspecteurs - aux revues 750 - - Officiers de santé principaux 500 - - Chefs de bataillons, d’escadrons, commissaires de guerre, - et chefs d’administration des différens services 400 - - Commandans de place occupant dans } capitaines 400 - l’armée un grade inférieur à ceux ci-dessus } lieutenans et } - désignées, savoir } sous-lieuts. } 300 - -Au moyen de ces indemnités il ne sera rien alloué au-dessus des -sommes fixées ni pour dépenses de bureaux ou de table, ni pour frais -extraordinaires de quelque nature qu’ils soient et sous quelque -prétexte que ce puisse être, et cette décision n’a aucun effet -rétroactif. J’écris à MM. les maréchaux et généraux commandant en -Espagne, pour leur faire connoître que, d’après les intentions de -l’empereur, tout militaire Français qui à l’avenir aurait exigé -ou reçu des traitemens extraordinaires plus forts que ceux fixés -par la décision du 21 Janvier, et qui s’en serait fait payer sans -une ordonnance régulière des intendans généraux ou commissaires -ordonnateurs, sera suspendu de ses fonctions et qu’il en sera rendu -compte dans les vingt-quatre heures pour prendre les ordres de -l’empereur. Votre majesté jugera sans doute convenable de donner ses -ordres au général Belliard pour que cette disposition soit suivie -dans l’arrondissement de l’armée du centre. Je prie votre majesté -d’agréer l’hommage de mon respect. - - - _Paris, 14 Février, 1811._ - -SIRE,—L’empereur ne m’a encore donné aucun ordre relatif à l’objet -de la lettre apportée par votre aide-de-camp le colonel Clermont -Tonnere. On pense que Valence ne se soumettra que par l’approche -d’une armée, et après la prise de Tarragone le corps du général -Suchet sera disponible.—Les affaires paroissent s’améliorer en -Portugal, le duc d’Istrie va établir l’ordre dans le nord de -l’Espagne. J’envoye mon aide-de-camp le colonel Le Jeune voir l’état -des choses à Grénade, Malaga, Cadiz et Badajos. Je prie votre -majesté d’avoir des bontés pour lui. L’empereur est en bonne santé, -l’imperatrice est bientôt à terme, et nous esperons un roi des -Romains. L’empereur affermit de plus en plus le grand empire. Votre -majesté le seconde mais nous apprécions ses peines et ses privations. -Une nouvelle armée de deux-cent-milles hommes se forme dans le nord -de la France, et l’empereur est en position d’en imposer à qui -tenteroit de contrarier ses grandes conceptions, tout est bien et va -bien en France. - - - _Paris, le 11 Avril, 1811._ - -SIRE,—J’ai eu l’honneur de mander votre majesté, que l’empereur -avoit donné des ordres pour qu’il lui fut envoyé chaque mois cent -mille francs, et je lui ai fait connoître combien il étoit important -que les troupes destinées pour l’Andalusie y arrivassent sans retard. - -L’empereur pense qu’il seroit utile de chercher à tirer parti de -bons Espagnole pour réunir de vrais cortez qui pourroient avoir de -l’influence sur les esprits: l’intégrité de l’Espagne peut encore -être maintenue si les cortez operoient une réaction dans l’opinion: -le Perou et le Méxique se sont déjà déclarés independant, et toutes -les autres colonies sont échapper à l’Espagne: les vrais Espagnols -doivent savoir combien les Anglais les maltraitent. On voit par les -gazettes Anglaises que les cortez rassemblés dans l’île de Leon ne -furent qu’une miserable canaille et des gens obscures qui n’ont -autre projet que d’aller végéter dans les tavernes de Londres il ne -peut y avoir rien à faire avec de pareils hommes. Sa majesté trouve -qu’il y auroit un grand avantage à former des cortez tirer de toutes -les provinces de l’Espagne occupées par les armées françaises. Une -discussion éclairée qui s’établiroit auroit beaucoup d’influence -sur les esprits. L’empereur est oblige d’abandonner le projet qu’il -avoit de s’entendre avec les cortez de l’île de Leon, puisque ce -n’est qu’un composé de gens sans aveu: ce ne seroit donc qu’avec des -cortez formé d’hommes tirés de toutes les parties de l’Espagne qu’on -pourroit éclairer l’opinion des Espagnols qui aiment leur pays. - -L’ambassadeur de l’empereur a transmis des plaintes sur votre -major-général. Votre majesté commande l’armée du centre. Par -conséquent la hiérarchie militaire ne peut pas permettre qu’il -s’écarte de ses devoirs. Si je correspond souvent avec le général -Belliard, c’est que votre majesté est un général roi, et que je dois -lui éviter des détails qu’un major-général lui soumet. - -Aucun village d’Espagne n’a été réuni à la France, et l’empereur -tient à ce que votre majesté ait en Espagne toute la considération -qui lui est due. Tout depend encore du parti qu’on peut tirer de la -nation. Ce qu’il y a de certain, c’est que les Anglais n’ont qu’un -but; celui de ruiner la péninsule, de la détruire, parcequ’ils -sentent bien qu’elle doit finir par appartenir à la France ou à -un prince de la maison de l’empereur, et qu’ils trouvent un grand -avantage à diviser un pays qu’il savent ne pouvoir gardes. - -Je présente à votre majesté l’hommage avec mon respect. - - Le Prince Neufchatel, Major-Général, - ALEXANDRE. - - - _Paris, ce 6 Mai, 1811._ - -SIRE,—J’ai montré à l’empereur la lettre de votre majesté, en date -du 21 Avril par laqu’elle elle fait connoître qu’elle se met en -route pour Paris: l’empereur ne s’attendoit pas à cette resolution; -votre majesté lui ayant promis de ne pas quitter l’Espagne sans être -convenu à l’avance des mesures à prendre et qu’exige une pareille -détermination. L’empereur trouve que dans ces circonstances le départ -de votre majesté devoit être précédé de l’évacuation de l’Andalousie -afin de concentrer les armées. Car dans la position des choses, le -départ de votre majesté va donner une secousse défavorable à la -situation des armées de l’empereur. Si votre majesté avoit quitté -l’Espagne au mois de Janvier, où les armées étoient en position -sans agir, cela auroit eu moins d’inconvenient. Dans ce moment -votre arrivée met l’empereur dans de grandes inquiétudes, en vous -considérant comme roi d’Espagne, et comme général-en-chef, l’empereur -voit que votre retour sera interprété selon l’esprit et la tournure -que les Anglais voudront y donner, et fera un mauvais effet; qu’il -est pénible que votre majesté se soit portée à cette démarche dont -il ne peut résulter aucun avantage, et qui peut avoir beaucoup -d’inconvenients, car dans ce moment d’agitation, l’Espagne va se -trouver sans chef. Votre majesté ne voulant pas rester à Madrid, -l’empereur trouve qu’il auroit été très utile qu’elle allât passer la -revue de l’armée de Portugal ou de l’armée d’Andalousie; l’influence -de votre majesté auroit surtout été bien utile pour procurer à -l’armée de Portugal tout ce qui lui est nécessaire. L’empereur, -sire, est dans une grande anxiété de savoir à qui vous avez donné -le commandement de l’armée du centre; si vous avez prévenu le duc -de Dalmatie de votre départ, et qui étant aux mains avec l’ennemi -trouvera ses embarras augmentés, n’ayant aucune direction sur ses -derrières. S’il étoit possible que votre majesté reçut cette lettre -encore en Espagne, l’empereur m’ordonne d’engager votre majesté à -sentir les inconvéniens de son retour si contraire aux circonstances. -L’empereur n’a aucune nouvelle ni de l’armée d’Andalousie ni de -l’armée du centre. J’expédie à votre majesté un de mes aides-de-camp. -Etc. etc. - - ALEXANDRE. - - - _Paris, le 1 Juin, 1811._ - -SIRE,—L’empereur a examiné attentivement les observations que votre -majesté lui a adressées, et me prescrit de me rendre auprès d’elle -pour avoir l’honneur de lui donner connoissance de ce qu’il juge le -plus convenable sur les divers points qui en sont l’objet. L’empereur -pense, sire, que votre majesté peut partir de Paris quand elle le -jugera à-propos, et même sans attendre son retour, si cela entrait -dans les intentions de votre majesté. L’armée du centre en Espagne -est pleinement entièrement sous les ordres de votre majesté, le -général Belliard ne doit point prendre le titre de major-général, -mais celui que lui ont toujours attribué les ordres émanées de -l’empereur, _de chef d’état-major de l’armée du centre_. Si votre -majesté n’est pas content de ce général, je vous engage, sire, à en -proposer un autre qui ait votre confiance. C’est à votre majesté, -sire, qu’il appartient de suspendre, de renvoyer, de traduire même -à des commissions militaires quand il y a lieu, les généraux et -officiers de l’armée du centre; d’administrer les provinces comprises -dans l’arrondissement de cette armée comme votre majesté le jugera le -plus convenable au bien du service. A l’armée du nord de l’Espagne, -l’empereur a besoin d’un maréchal qui soit chargé du commandement -des troupes stationées dans les provinces formant l’arrondissement -de cette armée. Le maréchal duc d’Istrie exerce maintenant ce -commandement; dans le cas, sire, où ce maréchal ne conviendroit -pas à V. M. l’empereur ne serait pas éloigné de le remplacer par -le maréchal Jourdan, si cette disposition étoit agréable à votre -majesté et à ce maréchal. Mais l’empereur ne juge pas qu’on puisse -rien changer à l’organisation de l’armée du nord; il est essentiel -que cette organisation reste telle qu’elle est, si ce n’est de mettre -cette armée sous les ordres d’un maréchal français qui posséde -d’avantage la confiance de votre majesté. Dans les gouvernemens -qui forment l’arrondissement de cette armée, c’est au nom de votre -majesté, sire, que la justice doit se rendre; le commandant doit -envoyer des rapports journaliers à V. M. l’intendant-général M. -Dudon doit envoyer à V. M. l’état de la perception des contributions -et de leur emploi. L’empereur pense que V. M. doit avoir auprès du -général-en-chef de l’armée du nord un commissaire Espagnol pour -veiller à ce que le quart du revenu des provinces de l’arrondissement -de cette armée, soit versé à Madrid pour le service de votre majesté -et pour sécourir l’armée du centre. L’empereur consent à ce que -toutes les fois que les provinces auraient les moyens nécessaires -pour se garder et se garantir des incursions des guerillas, elles -puissent rentrer entièrement sous l’administration Espagnole en ne -fournissant que ce qui sera convenu. Quant à l’armée du midi de -l’Espagne, l’empereur approuve qu’ ainsi qu’ à l’armée du nord, le -maréchal qui commande envoie des rapports à V. M. et l’instruire de -tout ce qui se passe; les budgets en recettes et en dépenses des -différentes provinces de l’armée du midi, doivent aussi être envoyés -à votre majesté, qui y tiendra un commissaire pour percevoir le quart -des revenues. - -La même méthode sera pareillement appliquée à l’armée d’Arragon. -L’empereur, sire, satisfait aussi aux désirs exprimés par V. M. Quant -à ce qui concerne le commandement général de ses armées en Espagne, -sa majesté ne croit pas pouvoir donner un tel commandement qui doit -être simple et un; votre M. sentira qu’il est dans la nature des -choses qu’un maréchal résident à Madrid et dirigeant les opérations -voudrait en avoir la gloire avec la responsibilité, et que dans ce -cas, les commandans des armées du midi et de Portugal se croyant -moins réellement sous les ordres de votre M. que sous de son chef -d’état-major, pourraient ne pas obéir, ou exécuter ce qui leur serait -prescrit. Mais indépendamment du commandement de l’armée du centre, -V. M. sire, aurait le commandement des troupes qui entreraient dans -l’arrondissement de cette armée. Si l’armée du Midi se repliait sur -l’armée du centre, elle serait dès-lors sous les ordres de V. M. et -il en serait de même pour l’armée de centre. - -Dans celles des armées ou V. M. se rendrait, elle aurait les honneurs -du commandement; mais, sire, l’empereur juge très important de ne -rien changer au commandement militaire ni à l’armée du nord, ni à -l’armée d’Arragon, ni aux armées du midi et de Portugal, excepté -ce qu’il est nécessaire d’établir pour que V. M. ait des rapports -de tout ce qui se passe, connaisse tout et puisse se servir de ces -relations, dans sa position centrale, pour instruire les autres -généraux: sa majesté pense que cette communication de renseignemens, -d’observations, de conseils, peut même avoir lieu par le canal du -ministre de la guerre de V. M. L’empereur désire, sire, que V. M. -veuille bien corresponds directement avec moi par des lettres signés -de sa main; j’aurai l’honneur d’adresser directement les miennes à -V. M. L’empereur désire également qu’elle s’en reserve l’ouverture -et fasse connaître ensuite à son chef d’état-major ce qu’elle jugera -convenable. Je prie votre M. de vouloir bien donner ses ordres pour -que tous les comptes rendus en états de situation me soient adressés, -que les rapports soient très exacts et que je sois instruit de tout -ce qui peut intéresser le service de l’empereur comme cela est -d’usage dans une armée. D’après les ordres de l’empereur une somme -de cinq cent mille francs par mois sera envoyée à V. M. jusqu’au 1er -Juillet, et à compter du 1er Juillet, cet envoi sera d’un million par -mois pendant le reste de l’année. - -L’empereur, sire, me prescrit d’avoir l’honneur de concerter avec -votre majesté les mesures qu’elle jugera convenables à l’organization -de l’armée du centre ainsi que pour en retirer les généraux qui -ne conviendraient pas à votre majesté, faire des examples de ceux -qui auroient commis des dilapidations, leur faire restituer les -sommes qu’ils auraient dilapidées; enfin, sire, l’empereur se repose -essentiellement sur votre majesté du soin de maintenir les officiers -de son armée dans la discipline convenable et de faire des examples, -et il désire que V. M. envoie journellement des rapports détaillés -sur tout ce qui est important. Votre majesté, sire, reconnaîtra dans -ces dispositions que le désir de l’empereur est de faire tout ce -qui peut donner un nouvel éclat à l’entrée de V. M. en Espagne, en -maintenant d’ailleurs dans leur intégrité, ainsi que sa majesté le -gage indispensable, l’organisation de l’armée d’Andalousie et des -autres armées de l’Espagne. &c. - - - _Observations faites par le roi d’Espagne sur la lettre du - major-général, de la 1ère Juin, 1811._ - -Le roi demande. - -1º. Que messrs. les maréchaux commandant-en-chef les armées de -l’empereur, à l’armée du nord, du Portugal, de midi, et de l’Arragon, -ne puissent augmenter les impôts existant à ce jour, =ni= lever -aucune contribution extraordinaire sans l’autorization du roi, ou de -l’empereur. - -2º. Le roi désire que le maréchal Jourdan remplace le maréchal due -d’Istrie dans le commandement de l’armée du nord. - -3º. Que les maréchaux commandant les armées de l’empereur et les -intendans général ne puissent vendre aucune bien national ou communal -sans l’autorization du roi; qu’il en soit de même pour les plombs et -vif argent appartenant à l’état. - -4º. Que les administrations Espagnoles dans l’arrondissement des -armées du nord, du midi, de l’Arragon, resteront telles qu’elles -sont, et que si des changemens paroissent utiles, ils seront demandés -au roi. - -5º. Qu’il soit specifié que le quart des revenues des provinces -occupées par les armées de l’empereur, en Espagne, sera versé net -dans le trésor du roi à Madrid, et que les trois autre quartes seront -employés aux besoin de l’armée dans les dites provinces, et en -payement des traitemens des administrations Espagnoles. - -6º. Le roi se trouvant avoir l’honneur du commandement près des -armées ou il se trouve, pense qu’il est dans les intentions de -votre majesté qu’il puisse voir et réunir les autorités Espagnoles -comme bon lui semblera pour leur parler dans l’intérêt des affaires -d’Espagne: ce que le roi trouve utile de faire dans les lieux où il -l’arrêtera pour se rendre à Madrid. - -7º. Il paroit entendu que le maréchal commandant l’armée de Portugal -rendra compte au roi des toutes les opérations, aussi que doivent le -faire les autres maréchaux. - -8º. Le roi trouve utile pour les intérêts des affaires d’Espagne -de pouvoir s’attacher des officiers Espagnols ou autres qui -se trouveroient parmi les prisonniers, et qui par des motifs -particuliers il jugeroit convenable d’employer. - -9º. Le roi de Westphalie qui ne peut pas recruter les régimens qu’il -a en Espagne est disposé à mettre le petit nombre d’hommes qui -restent aux drapeaux à la disposition du roi d’Espagne pour être à la -solde et à son service; le roi d’Espagne les placeroit utilement dans -la guarde. - -10º. Le roi désire que le général Maurice Mathieu remplace le général -Lorge. - -11º. Qu’il ne reste à Madrid que l’administration nécessaire pour -l’armée du centre, et que cette grande quantité d’administrateurs -appartenant à l’administration générale qui n’existe plus à Madrid -soit envoyée à Burgos ou en France. - -12º. Que la solde des troupes françaises faisant partie de l’armée du -centre continue n’être payée par le trésor de France. - -13º. Sa majesté conservera le général Belliard comme chef de son état -major. - -14º. Le roi désire pouvoir prendre toutes les mesures politiques -qu’il jugera convenable, et faire toutes autres dispositions à -l’égard de cortez en se conformant aux vues contenues dans la lettre -que j’ai écrite d’après l’ordre de V. M. pour cet objet. - -15º. Sur les 500,000 francs que V. M. met à la disposition du roi à -Madrid on en retient 100,000 francs pour l’arrière. Le roi demande -que cette somme soit pour le service courant. - - - _Paris, le 17 Juin, 1811._ - -SIRE,—L’empereur m’ordonne de vous envoyer la copie de la lettre que -j’adresse au duc d’Istrie: j’écris à-peu-près dans les mêmes termes -aux autres commandants. Je n’ai pas encore vu le maréchal Jourdan; je -le verrai demain et immédiatement après il partira pour Madrid, où -l’empereur apprendra avec plaisir qu’il est employé comme gouverneur. - -Le duc de Raguse mande qu’il est en marche sur le Tage. L’empereur -désire que V. M. donne ses ordres pour qu’on lui procure tous les -secours dont il peut avoir besoin: il a avec lui vingt-huit mille -bayonnettes, trois mille hommes de cavalerie, et trent-six pièces -de canon. L’empereur désire que V. M. puisse l’appuyer avec dixhuit -cent chevaux, quinze à dixhuit pièces de canon et deux à trois mille -hommes d’infanterie: ce corps pourroit être placé à proximité afin -de pouvoir rejoindre et aider le duc de Raguse, s’il devoit donner -bataille aux Anglais. L’empereur verroit avec plaisir, Sire, qu’après -votre arrivée à Madrid vous vous rendissiez à l’armée de Portugal, -pour la passer en revue, l’animer, et prendre dans vôtre revue l’état -des emplois vacans. - -J’écris au duc de Raguse que si l’on pouvoit retrancher Alcantara -et faire une tête de pont sur la rive droite, ce seroit une bonne -opération. Si l’armée de Portugal arrivoit à tems pour sécourir -l’armée du midi devant Badajoz, le petit corps de reserve dont je -viens de parler ci-dessus à votre majesté ne pourroit être que de la -plus grande utilité. - -Le siège de Tarragone a déjà attiré une partie des bandes qui étoient -dans l’arrondissement de l’armée du centre. Deux divisions de l’armée -de reserve que forme l’empereur arriveront l’une à Pampelune, l’autre -à Vittoria vers le 14 Juillet: cela mettra à même d’envoyer encore -aux armées du midi et de Portugal environ douze milles hommes qui -sont en Navarre, et qui passeront par Madrid. - -L’Empereur ne peut qu’engager votre majesté à envoyer à l’armée du -midi tout ce qui lui appartient, car c’est là que se portent les -grands coups et qu’ont lieu les opérations les plus importantes. - - &c. &c. - ALEXANDRE. - - - _To the duke of Istria._ - - _Paris, Juin 1811._ - -J’ai prevénu, monsieur le maréchal, le général Monthion, les généraux -Caffarelli et Dorsenne directement les dispositions dont je vais -vous entretenir, et qui ont rapport aux intentions de l’empereur -rélativement au rétour de roi d’Espagne dans ses états. - -Le roi commande en chef l’armée du centre, mais l’intention de -l’empereur est que vous correspondiez avec S. M. C. en lui faissant -le rapport de ce qui se passe afin de la mettre à même de connoître -l’ensemble des événemens en Espagne comme les autres généraux en -chef ont l’ordre d’en agir de même, le roi sera dans le cas de -pouvoir comme point central vous faire faire des communications qui -contribueront au succès des armes de l’empereur. - -S. M. I. m’ordonne aussi de vous faire connaître, M. le duc, que -son intention est que pendant le voyage du roi dans son rétour à -Madrid, tous les honneurs lui soient rendus dans les gouvernemens et -dans l’arrondissement de l’armée du nord comme si S. M. commandait -cette armée. Le roi donnera l’ordre et recevra les honneurs du -commandement. Les gouverneurs l’accompagneront dans leur gouvernement -et lui feront fournir toutes les escortes qui lui seront nécessaires. -Il est à présumer que le roi séjournera quelque tems à Vittoria et à -Burgos, et qu’il profitera de son séjour pour rassembler les notables -du pays les éclairer sur la situation des affaires, et améliorer -l’esprit public. Vous seconderez, mons. le maréchal, les mesures -que le roi pourra prendre pour rendre les villes et les villages -responsibles des abus qui se commettent sur leur territoire. Vous -agirez de même si le roi accorde le pardon à quelques bandes de -guerillas qui se rendraient. Vous devez aider de tous vos moyens les -mesures que S. M. prendra pour le rétablissement de l’ordre et de -la tranquillité publique. Du reste les troupes composant l’armée du -nord doivent rester sous le commandement respectif de leurs chefs -et vos ordres doivent continuer à être exécutés sans qu’aucun ordre -de qui que ce soit puisse les changer. Quant à l’administration du -pays, elle doit continuer à marcher dans la direction donnée par les -instructions et les ordres de l’empereur; les fonds doivent être -destinées aux besoins de l’armée, à l’entretien des hôpitaux, et vous -devez défendre et empêcher toute espèce d’abus. Le roi ayant plus -particulièrement encore que vous, les moyens de connaître les abus -qu’ont lieu, l’empereur ordonne que vous profiteriez des lumières -que le roi pourra vous donner à cet égard pour les réprimer. Il est -nécessaire, monsieur le duc, que vous me fassiez connaître le budjet -des ressources et des dépenses afin de savoir la partie des revenues -qui pourront être versés à Madrid, dans la caisse du gouvernement -pour le service du roi et pour l’armée du centre. - -Je n’ai pas besoin de vous répéter que la justice doit se rendre au -nom du roi; cela a toujours dû avoir lieu; le droit de faire grace ne -vous appartient pas pour les individus condamnés par les tribunaux; -vous n’êtes autorisé qu’à suspendre l’exécution dans les cas que vous -jugerez graciables. Le droit de faire grace n’appartient qu’au roi. -Vous n’avez pas non plus le droit de nommer à aucune place du clergé; -le roi y nomme dans toutes les parties de son royaume. - -Si le roi juge à-propos de tenir près de vous et des gouverneurs un -commissaire Espagnol pour connaître les recettes et les dépenses, -vous devez donner à ce commissaire les renseignemens dont il aura -besoin pour remplir sa mission. Vous aurez soin, monsieur le -maréchal, de me rendre compte journellement de ce qui se sera fait -pendant le séjour du roi afin que j’en informe l’empereur. - - &c. &c. - - - _Paris, le 24 Août, 1811._ - -SIRE,—J’ai l’honneur d’informer votre majesté que d’après les ordres -de l’empereur, je viens de faire connaître à M. le maréchal duc de -Raguse que l’armée de Portugal doit prendre désormais sa ligne de -communication sur Madrid; je lui mande que c’est là que doit être -son centre de dépôt, et que toute opération que l’ennemi ferait sur -la Coa ne peut déranger cette ligne; que si l’ennemi veut prendre -l’offensive il ne peut la prendre que dans l’Andalousie parceque de -ce côté il a un objet à remplir, qui est de faire lever le siège -de Cadiz, tandis que ses efforts dans le nord s’avença-t-il même -jusqu’à Valladolid, n’aboutiraient à rien puisque les troupes que -nous avons dans ces provinces en se repliant lui opposeraient une -armée considérable et qu’alors l’armée de Portugal devrait faire -pour l’armée du nord ce qu’elle ferait pour l’armée du midi. Je le -préviens que l’objet important est que sa ligne d’opérations soit sur -Talavera et Madrid parceque son armée est spécialement destinée à -protéger celle du midi. Je lui fais observer que l’armée de Portugal -étant attaquée de front, son mouvement de retraite est encore sur -Madrid parceque dans tous les cas possibles ce doit être sa ligne -d’opérations, qu’il faut donc que tous les dépôts quelconques -appartinant à l’armée de Portugal soient dirigés sur Talavera et -Madrid. Je donne l’ordre impératif au général Dorsenne de faire -partir dans les 24 heures tous les dépôts et détachemens qu’il a -appartenant à l’armée de Portugal; tout ce qui est en état de servir -sera dirigé en gros détachemens par Avila sur Placentia, et quant aux -hommes qui ne sont pas pour le moment en état de servir, le général -Dorsenne les fera diriger sur Madrid, et aura soin d’en informer à -l’avance votre majesté, de manière qu’il ne lui restera plus un seul -homme appartenant à l’armée de Portugal, sauf la garnison de Ciudad -Rodrigo qu’il fera relever et rejoindre aussitôt après l’arrivée des -renforts qui vont se rendre à l’armée du nord. - - &c. &c. - - - _Boulogne, le 20 Sept. 1811._ - -SIRE,—L’empereur m’a demandé si j’avois reponse à la lettre que -j’ai eu l’honneur d’adresser à V. M. en lui rendant compte de la -reddition de Figueras. L’empereur m’ordonne d’annoncer à V. M. que -son intention est d’étendre à toute la rive gauche de l’Ebre la -mesure qu’elle à jugé devoir adopter pour la Catalogne. L’empereur -pense que V. M. temoin de la resistance qui éprouvent les armées et -des sacrifices des toutes espèces que la France est obligé de faire, -est trop juste pour ne point apprécier les motifs de la conduite -de l’Empereur, et je suis autorisé à assurer V. M. des sentimens -d’intérêt et d’amitié qui continuent à animer l’empereur pour V. M. -mais il ne pouvent pas faire negliger à S. M. I. et R. ce qu’elle -doit à la sureté de son empire et à la gloire de son règne. - - &c. &c. - - * * * * * - - - No. IV. - - - SECTION 1. - - CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. - - EXTRACT FROM MR. CANNING’S INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. - STUART AND MR. DUFF, 1808. - - - _To Mr. Stuart._ - -“You are to enter into no political engagements.” - - - _To James Duff, Esq_. - - “_July 26, 1808._ - -“You will embark on board his majesty’s ship, Stately; on board -of that ship are embarked to the amount of one million of Spanish -dollars, three-fourths in dollars and one-fourth in bars, which sum -is consigned to your care and is destined by his majesty for the use -of the kingdom of Andalusia and the provinces of Spain connected with -them.” - -“His majesty has no desire to annex any conditions to the pecuniary -assistance which he furnishes to Spain.” - -“Military stores to a considerable amount are now actually shipping -for Cadiz, and the articles required for the clothing of the -Andalusian army will follow.” - -“It was only by a direct but secret understanding with the government -of Spain, under the connivance of France, that any considerable -amount of dollars has been collected in England.” - -“Each province of Spain made its own application with reference to -the full amount of its own immediate necessities, and to the full -measure of its own intended exertions, but without taking into -consideration that similar necessities and similar exertions lead -to similar demands from other parts, and that though each separate -demand might in itself be reasonably supposed to come within the -limits of the means of Great Britain, yet that the whole together -occasion a call for _specie_, such as never before was made upon this -country at any period of its existence.” - -“In the course of the present year it is publicly notorious that a -subsidy is paid by Great Britain to Sweden of one million two hundred -thousand pounds, the whole of which, or nearly the whole, must be -remitted in specie, amounting to at least seven million dollars. -One million of dollars has already been sent to Gihon, another to -Coruña _in part_ of the respective demands of the principality of -Asturias and the kingdom of Gallicia, and the remainder of these -demands as already brought forward would require not less than -eight million dollars more to satisfy them.”——“An application from -Portugal has also been received for an aid, which will amount to -about twelve or thirteen hundred thousand dollars, one million as has -been stated goes in the ship with you to Cadiz, and the remainder -of the Andalusian demand would require between three and four -millions of dollars more. Here, therefore, there are not less than -three-and-twenty millions of dollars, of which near sixteen millions -for Spain and Portugal required to be suddenly drawn from the British -treasury.” - -“In addition to this drain it is also to be considered that the -British armies are at the same moment sent forth in aid of the same -cause, and that every article of expence to be incurred by them on -foreign service in whatever country they may be employed, must be -defrayed by remittances in silver.”[1]——“You will be particularly -careful in entering upon the explanation with the junta of Seville, -to avoid any appearance of a desire to overrate the merit and value -of the exertions now making by Great Britain in favour of the Spanish -nation, or to lay the ground for restraining or limiting those -exertions within any other bounds than those which are prescribed by -the limits of the actual means of the country.” - - -FOOTNOTE: - - [1] Note by Editor.—Nevertheless sir John Moore had only £25,000 - in his military chest, and sir David Baird only £8,000 which were - given him by sir John Moore. - - _Admiral De Courcy to Mr. Stuart, October 21, 1808._ - - “Mr. Frere will have told you that the Semiramis has brought a - million of dollars in order to lie at his disposal, besides £50,000 - in dollars, which are to be presented to the army of the marquis - of Romana.”——“In the meantime the British troops remain in their - transports at Coruna, uncertain whether they shall be invited to - the war, and without a shilling to defray their expences.” - - - _Mr. Canning to Mr. Stuart._ - - _July 27, 1808._ - -“Already the deputy from Coruna has added to his original demand -for two millions of dollars, a further demand for three millions on -learning from the Asturian deputies that the demand from Asturias -had amounted to five millions in the first instance. Both profess in -conversation to include a provision for the interests of Leon and -of Old Castile in the demand. But this has not prevented a direct -application from Leon.” - -“It is besides of no small disadvantage that the deputies from the -Asturias and Gallicia having left Spain at so early a period are -really not competent to furnish information or advice upon the more -advanced state of things in that country.”——“I have already stated -to you that in applications for succours, there is an under-ground -appearance of rivalry, which with every disposition to do every -thing that can be done for Spain, imposes a necessity of perpetual -caution with respect to the particular demands of each province. The -Asturians having been rebuked by their constituents for not having -applied for pecuniary aid as quickly as the Gallicians are bent upon -repairing this fault, and the Gallician having been commended for -promptitude, is ambitious of acquiring new credit by increasing the -amount of his demand. Whatever the ulterior demands, these several -provinces have to make, will be made with infinitely more effect -through you and Mr. Hunter respectively, as they will then come -accompanied with some detailed and intelligible exposition of the -grounds and objects of each particular application.” - - - _Mr. Stuart’s despatches to Mr. Canning._ - - _Coruna, July 22, 1808._ - -“Accounts of advantages in the quarters, which from the present -state of things can have little or no communication with this place, -appear to be numerous in proportion as the north of Spain is barren -of events agreeable to the existing government; and I am disposed to -consider unauthenticated reports of success in Catalonia, Valencia, -Murcia, and Andalusia, to be a mode of concealing or palliating -disasters in Leon, Castile, and the Montaña.” - - - _July 24, 1808._ - -“One thousand men, under de Ponte, is the utmost force the Asturias -have yet organized or sent into the field, and the contingents of -Leon are very trifling. - -“Thirty thousand men, of which twenty thousand are regular troops -under Blake, were united to ten thousand Castilian recruits under -Cuesta. They went to Rio Seco to march against Burgos, and cut off -Bessieres’ retreat to France, but they lost seven thousand men at Rio -Seco. - -“The Estremadura army under Gallegos is at Almaraz, consisting of -twenty-four thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, but the -battle of Rio Seco has cut the communication which had been before -kept up to Andalusia.” - - - _Abstract of information sent to Mr. Canning by Mr. Stuart._ - - _July 26, 1808._ - -“The 29th of May the inhabitants of Coruna appointed a provisional -junta of forty members taken from the notables of the place, and -this junta despatched circulars to the seven provinces of St. Jago, -Betanços, Coruna, Mondonedo, Orense, Lugo, and Tuy, desiring that -deputies from each should come to Coruña to form a junta for Gallicia -entire. Seven persons came and immediately seized the government -and dissolved the local junta; the troops marched to the frontier, -deputies went to England, and all seemed to proceed well until -contributions were demanded. Then the provinces demurred saying, -their deputies were empowered only to signify their approbation of -what had past, but not to seize the government, and St. Jago insisted -upon sending more deputies, and having additional votes as being of -more consequence. It was then arranged that two deputies from each -province should be sent to Coruña with more power. The archbishop -and a Mr. Friere came from St. Jago, and others were arriving when -the first deputation resolved not to submit, and declared the second -to be an ordinary junta, chosen for the mere purpose of raising -money, and subordinate to themselves. The archbishop and the bishop -of Orense refused to act in such a capacity; but a letter from the -latter painting the true state of things being intercepted, he was -arrested and confined in the citadel. A body of troops was sent to -St. Jago, it was uncertain whether to seize the archbishop or to -awe the people; but Mr. Stuart was secretly assured it was for the -former purpose. The archbishop thought so also and came immediately -to Coruña. This transaction was studiously concealed from the English -envoy but he penetrated the secret. The people were discontented at -this usurpation of the junta of seven, but the lavish succours sent -to them by Mr. Canning and the presence of Mr. Stuart induced them to -submit, as thinking the junta were supported by England. - -“This junta of seven adopted no measures in common with any -neighbouring province, but willingly entered into close alliance with -the insurgents of Portugal as one independent state with another; and -they withheld any share of the English supplies for the armies of -Asturias and Leon. - -“The archbishop was an intriguing dangerous man, and secretly wrote -to Blake to march with the army against the junta, his letter being -intercepted six voted to arrest him, but the seventh with the -assistance of Mr. Stuart persuaded them to avoid so violent a measure -as tending towards a civil commotion. Tumults however did take place, -and the English naval officers were requested and consented to quell -a riot, and it proved that they had more influence over the people -than the junta. - -“In August the archbishop was commanded to leave Coruña, he obeyed, -and the bishop of Orense was after some resistance made a member of -the junta.” - - - _Mr. Stuart to Mr. Canning_. - - “_August 7._ - -“There is no common plan, and consequently no concert in their -proceedings. No province shares the succour granted by Great Britain -with its neighbour, although that advantage may not be useful to -themselves. No gun-boats have been sent from Ferrol to protect St. -Andero on the coast of Biscay, and the Asturians have in vain asked -for artillery from the depôts of Gallicia. - -“The stores landed at Gihon, and not used by the Asturians have -remained in that port and in Oviedo, although they would have -afforded a reasonable relief to the army of Blake. - -“The money brought by the Pluto for the province of Leon which has -not raised a man and was till this moment in the hands of the French, -remains unemployed in the port where it was landed. Estremadura is -said to have nine thousand cavalry, which are of little service since -the French quitted that province. Yet they have not sent a man to -Blake who cannot prudently stir from his present position without -cavalry. General Cuesta also has deprived him of six hundred horse -and his flying artillery with which he has actually quitted Salamanca -on his way to join the Estremadura army.” - - - _Ditto to Ditto_. - - (Abstract.) - - “_August 12._ - -“The duke of Infantado reached Blake’s quarters, after escaping from -France. Blake gave him his confidence and sent him to Madrid to form -a council of war, and to persuade Cuesta to send two thousand cavalry -to the army of Gallicia. The junta did not approve of this; they -suspected Infantado as a double dealer and in the French interest. - -“After Baylen, the juntas of Seville and Murcia wished to establish a -despotism, differing in nothing from that of Charles III. and Charles -IV. save that Florida Blanca was to be the head of a regency. But -in the north they were all for liberty, and put forward the British -constitution as a model. The army spoke of Infantado as regent, -but the civilians disliked him. All the English guns sent out for -Gallicia went by mistake to the Asturias, the succours were absurdly -distributed and every thing was in confusion.” - - - _Mr. Stuart to Mr. Canning_. - - “_Coruna, August 9._ - -“I am placed at the very extremity of the kingdom where I cannot -possibly obtain any sort of information respecting other provinces, -and my presence has very materially contributed to cherish the -project of separation from the rest of the peninsula in the minds of -the Gallicians. - -“Besides the constant communication of the navy with the junta, a -military mission is placed here consisting of several persons who -communicate regularly with the government and the admiralty, and -whose correspondence with England being a mere duplicate of my own -renders the one or the other perfectly useless. - -“The packet instead of coming weekly only arrived every fortnight, -being sent to Gihon to carry home Mr. Hunter’s letters, who I -understand has no order to report to me! - -“The admiral having no official notice of my situation here on the -part of government, cannot be expected to detach vessels for the -purpose of sending my despatches at a time when he is occupied in -sending his own accounts of the events taking place in Spain to the -admiralty.” - - - - - SECTION 2. - - LORD WELLESLEY’S INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. STUART. - - (Extracts.) - - - “_January 5, 1810._ - -“In return for these liberal supplies, his majesty is entitled to -claim from the Portuguese government every assistance which can -be afforded to the British commander and troops, a faithful and -judicious application of the funds granted for the support of so -large a portion of the Portuguese force, which must otherwise be -supplied from the exclusive resources of Portugal.” - -“I am commanded to signify to you the expectation that the -extraordinary efforts of his majesty’s government for the aid of -Portugal, and the consequent pressure upon the British resources, -will be met with corresponding exertions on the part of the regency, -and that all local and temporary prejudices will be submitted to the -urgent necessity of placing the finances of the kingdom in that state -which may render them available for its defence in the approaching -danger. You will direct your immediate and vigilant attention to -this most important object, nor will you refrain from offering, or -even from urging, your advice on any occasion which may open the -prospect of effecting any useful reduction in the civil charges, or -augmentation in the revenues or military resources of the country.” - -“In addition to these arrangements his majesty will expect to receive -regular monthly accounts of the expenditure of the sums applicable -to the military charges of Portugal, under the orders issued to lord -Wellington, as well as accurate returns of the state and condition of -the several corps receiving British pay.”————“It is also desirable -that his majesty should be acquainted with the state and condition -of that part of the Portuguese force which is to be maintained from -the revenues of Portugal.”————“The crisis demands the most unreserved -confidence and communication between his majesty’s ministers and -the local government of the prince regent. No jealousy or suspicion -should be harboured under such a pressure of common danger; the great -sacrifices which we have made for the interests of our ally must not -be frustrated by any consideration inferior to the main purpose of -our mutual security, nor must we now hesitate to take the lead in -any measures necessary to enable Portugal to contribute a just share -of their own efforts and resources for the accomplishment of their -own safety.” - -“The governing-power in Spain does not derive its authority from the -appointment of the sovereign, the disposition of some of its leading -members is at least equivocal, and its conduct has not satisfied any -expectations either of the Spanish nation or of the allies.”————“In -Spain, the assembly of the cortes is the only remedy to which that -country can resort for the purpose of investing the government with a -regular force or a national spirit, nor can any hope be entertained -of a sufficient exertion of the military resources of Spain, until a -governing power shall be so framed as to unite a due representation -of the crown with a just security for the interests and welfare of -all the estates of the realm.”———— - - - - - SECTION 3. - - CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. - - - _Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart_. - - “_Viseu, March 30, 1810._ - -“I don’t understand the arrangements which government have made -of the command of the troops there. I have hitherto considered -them as part of this army, and from the arrangements which I made -with the Spanish government they cost us nothing but their pay, -and all the money procured at Cadiz for bills was applicable to -the service in this country. Their instructions to general Graham -alter this entirely, and they have even gone so far as to desire -him to take measures to supply the Spaniards with provisions from -the Mediterranean, whereas I had insisted that they should feed our -troops. The first consequence of this arrangement will be, that we -shall have no more money from Cadiz. I had considered the troops -at Cadiz so much part of my army, that I had written to my brother -to desire to have his opinion whether, if the French withdrew from -Cadiz when they should attack Portugal, he thought I might bring into -Portugal at least the troops which I had sent there. But I consider -this now to be out of the question.” - - - _General Graham to Mr. Stuart_. - - “_Isla, May 22, 1810._ - -“I add this note merely as a postscript to my last, to tell you that -lord Liverpool has decided the doubt, by declaring this a part of -lord Wellington’s army, but saying it is the wish of government that -though I am second in command to him I should be left here for the -present. This is odd enough. I mean that it should not have been left -to his judgement to decide where I was to be employed; one would -think he could judge fully better according to circumstances than -people in England.” - - * * * * * - - - No. V. - - - SECTION 1. - - MARMONT AND DORSENNE’S OPERATIONS. - - - _Intercepted letter from Foy to Girard, translated from the - cypher_. - - “_Truxillo, 20 Août, 1811._ - -“MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,—Wellington bloque Rodrigo avec quarante mille -hommes; son avant-garde occupe la Sierra de Francia. On assure que -l’artillerie du train arrive de Porto pour faire le siège de cette -place. C’est approvisionnée pour trois mois. Marmont va se porter -vers le nord pour se réunir avec l’armée commandée par le général -Dorsenne et attaquer l’ennemi. Ma division partira le vingt six -pour passer le Tage et suivre le mouvement de Marmont. Huit mille -hommes de l’armée du centre nous remplaceront à Placentia et au Pont -d’Almaraz. - -“Monsieur le maréchal due de Raguse me charge de vous écrire que -c’est à vous à contenir quatre mille Espagnols qui sont en ce moment -réunis devant Truxillo.” &c. &c. - - “FOY.” - - - _Intercepted letter from general Wattier to the general commanding - at Ciudad Rodrigo_. - - (Extract.) - - “_Salamanca, Septembre 1, 1811._ - -“L’armée Espagnol de Galice, honteusement chassée de ses positions -de la Baneza et de Puente de Orvigo et poursuivie par l’avant-garde -au delà de Villa Franca, s’est retirée en grande hâte sur la Coruñe. -Le général-en-chef après avoir nettoyé ces parages, vient ici sous -six jours avec vingt-cinq mille hommes de la garde, et nous irons -tous ensemble voir s’il plait à ces illustres Anglais de nous -attendre, et de nous permettre de rompre quelques lances avec eux. -Le duc de Raguse à qui j’envoie de vos nouvelles est autour de vous -à Baños, Val de Fuentes, Placentia, &c., et nous agirons de concert -avec lui.” - - - _Intercepted letter from Marmont to Girard_. - - “_Placencia, 7embre, 1811._ - -“GÉNÉRAL,—Je vous ai écrit pour vous prier de faire passer une -lettre que j’addressai au maréchal duc de Dalmatie. Les Anglais out -réuni toutes leurs forces auprès de Rodrigo, les corps Espagnols -même qui étoient sur la rive gauche du Tage passent en ce moment -cette rivière; vous n’avez presque personne devant vous. Il serait -extrêmement important que pendant que la presque totalité de l’armée -va se porter sur Rodrigo vous puissiez faire un mouvement pour opérer -une diversion utile et rapeller un portion de la force ennemie de -votre côté. J’ignore quelles sont vos instructions, mais je ne doute -pas que ce mouvement n’entre dans les intentions du duc de Dalmatie.” - - - _Du maréchal Marmont au général de division Foy._ - - “_Talavera, Octobre 21, 1811._ - -“GÉNÉRAL,—Je reçois seulement dans ce moment votre lettre du 18^{me} -avec la copie de celle du général d’Aultanne. Pour instruction -générale vous ne devez obéir à aucun ordre qui vous serait donné -au nom du roi lorsqu’elles sont contraires à mes intentions -particulières. Ne vous départez jamais de ces dispositions. L’armée -de Portugal ne doit point servir aux escortes, ni à la communication -de l’armée du midi,—nos troupes auront bien assez de courses à -faire pour assurer la rentré de nos approvisionnemens. Le roi a paru -désirer que je n’occupe point Illescas, à cause de son voisinage -de Madrid; par ce motif et plus encore en raison de l’éloignement -et du service pénible des troupes, je ne veux point l’occuper. Mon -intention était de ne point occuper Aranjuez; mais puisque les -ministres du roi out pris la mesure inconsiderée d’ordonner la -vente des magazins, ne perdez pas un seul instant pour envoyer un -détachement occuper Aranjuez, où le préfet de Toledo fera faire -le plus de biscuit possible. Prenez la même mesure pour tous les -points où il y a des magazins.—Emparez vous en,—et que personne -n’y touche.—L’empereur a indiqué la province de Toledo et non la -préfecture; ainsi ce sont les réssources de toute la province qui -nous sont affectés.—Emparez vous en,—et que le préfet administre -tous le pays. Dites bien au préfet qu’à quelque titre que ce soit -aucun des réssources en blé, argent de quelque source qu’elles -préviennent ne doit être distraits pour Madrid, et qu’elles doivent -toutes être conservés pour l’armée de Portugal. À la fin du mois la -division de dragons arrivera dans les environs de Tolede.—J’espère -qu’elle éloignera les guerillas. Dans le cas ou ils resteroient dans -le voisinage on leur donnera la chasse. Voyez à obtenir du préfet de -Tolede qu’il fasse un effort extraordinaire pour envoyer à Talavera -le blé et l’orge qui lui out été demandés, attendu que comme ici on -est obligé de faire des expéditions en avant, nous sommes dans un -besoin très pressant. Je désirerois rentrer dans la possession de -tout le blé qui a été vendu. On renverroit les acheteurs par devant -le gouvernement Espagnol pour être indemnisées,—s’il y a possibilité -engagez le préfet à prendre des mesures conservatoires en attendant -que je prenne un arrête à cet égard sur le rapport que vous me ferez. -Je me rends à Madrid où je passerai deux jours dans l’espérance -d’éclairer le roi sur la conduite que ses véritables intérêts lui -commandent de tenir envers l’armée française. De là je me rends à -Tolede. Je n’ai pas besoin de vous recommander, général, d’envoyer à -Aranjuez un officier sage et ferme, qui exécute ponctuellement les -ordres qui lui seroient donnés, qui se fasse obéir et qui mette le -plus grand soin à faire respecter l’habitation du roi.” - - - _Intercepted letter in cypher from general Montbrun to the - governor of Ciudad Rodrigo._ - - _Val de Fuentes, Septembre, 1811._ - -Je reçu le—du courant, mon cher général votre réponse du—à la -lettre que je vous écrivis le—, et je m’empressai d’en communiquer -le continue à S. E. le maréchal duc de Ragusa, qui me charge de -me mettre en communication avec vous. Je m’en acquitterai avec -plaisir puisque c’en est toujours un nouveau pour moi de récevoir -de vos nouvelles. Je vous annonce qu’un approvisionnement très -considérable se prépare à Salamanque par les soins du général-en-chef -Dorsenne, le maréchal, sur lequel vous pouvez compter aussi fait -des preparatifs pour vous envoyer des vivres. Tous les convois -partiront sous bonne escorte, et se mettront en marche d’après ce -que je presume du—au—du courant au plus tard. Dans tous les cas ne -vous impatientez pas. Nous sommes prêts à venir à votre sécours de -toutes les manières. Vous ne sauriez trop de votre côté nous mettre -au courant de la force de la position et enfin vous ne pourriez nous -donner trop de détails sur l’armée Anglo-Portugaise. - -Je reçois à l’instant le billet que vouz avez écrit hier au général -Boyer, par lequel vous nous faites connoître que d’après tous les -renseignemens que vouz avez obtenus, vouz croyez que les sept -divisions Anglaises sont dans vos parages. Il importe de s’en assurer -positivement de connoître leur position, et, s’il est possible, leur -composition. II parait que vous n’avez pas beaucoup de monde dans -votre place sur qui vous puissiez compter. Proposez à l’homme que -je vous envoie d’aller reconnoître les Anglais à Gallegos et Fuente -Guinaldo, et de révenir par El Bodon, et vous me le renverriez -ensuite. Dites lui que je le paierai bien s’il veut faire cette -tournée, mais s’il s’y refuse je vous prie de ne pas l’y contraindre. -&c., &c. - - - _General Walker to lord Wellington._ - - “_Coruna, September 4, 1811._ - -“I saw the whole of the troops with him (general Abadia) in and -about a league in front of Astorga, having their advanced posts -on the Esla, the whole not amounting to above seven thousand men, -independent of a reserve of about fifteen hundred near Foncebadon -and Bembibre or on the road from Lugo. The force of the enemy in his -front when collected being estimated at about thirteen thousand men. -The wretched situation of the Gallician troops, in want almost of -every thing, one-third part at least without shoes, and dependent -on the precarious subsistence that can day by day be collected, -certainly does credit to their patience and good inclination.” - -————“In consequence of this movement, (Abadia’s retreat,) the -great road by Manzanal and Bembibre being left open or nearly so, -the French pushed forward on it so rapidly that shortly after my -arrival here (Coruña) intelligence was received of their having -got possession of the important pass of Villa Franca, and that the -Gallician troops thus cut off from it, had been obliged to make their -retreat by the Valdes Orres. Without any correct information of the -force of the enemy, and the entrance of Gallicia thus left entirely -in his hands, a very considerable alarm was for some time occasioned -here, of which I took every advantage to urge upon the junta the -necessity of a full compliance with the recommendation and wishes -of the general to enable him to put the troops in such a state of -equipment as might render them, either for defence or attack, in -every way disposable in his hands; and at the same time to put Coruña -into temporary security by withdrawing to it all the guns (amounting -to no less than fifteen hundred) of the indefensible arsenal of -Ferrol, which would otherwise become a sure depôt for the enemy in -any attack he might contemplate on this place, and who might not -otherwise venture to bring with him heavy artillery on so distant an -excursion.” - - - SECTION 2. - - _Official letters from the prince of Neufchatel to marshal - Marmont, extracted from the duke of Rovigo’s Memoirs._ - - “_Paris, le 21 Novembre, 1811._ - -“L’empereur me charge de vous faire connaître, monsieur le maréchal, -que l’objet le plus important en ce moment est la prise de Valence. -L’empereur ordonne que vous fassiez partir un corps de troupes qui, -réuni aux forces que le roi détachera de l’armée du centre, se dirige -sur Valence pour appuyer l’armée du maréchal Suchet jusqu’à ce qu’on -soit maître de cette place. - -“Faites exécuter sans délai cette disposition de concert avec S. -M. le roi d’Espagne, et instruisez-moi de ce que vous aurez fait a -cet égard. Nous sommes instruits que les Anglais ont vingt mille -malades, et qu’ils n’ont pas vingt mille hommes sous les armes, en -sorte qu’ils ne peuvent rien entreprendre; l’intention de l’empereur -est donc que douze mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie et sapeurs, -marchent de suite sur Valence, que vous détachiez même trois à quatre -mille hommes sur les derrières, et que vous, monsieur le maréchal, -soyez en mesure de soutenir la prise de Valence. Cette place prise, -le Portugal sera près de sa chute, parcequ’alors, dans la bonne -saison, l’armée de Portugal sera augmentée de vingt-cinq mille -hommes de l’armée du midi et de quinze mille du corps du général -Reille, de manière à réunir plus de quatre-vingt mille hommes. Dans -cette situation, vous recevriez l’ordre de vous porter sur Elvas, et -de vous emparer de tout l’Alemtejo dans le même temps que l’armée -du nord se porterait sur la Coa avec une armée de quarantre mille -hommes. L’équipage de pont qui existe à Badajoz servirait à jeter -des ponts sur le Tage; l’ennemi serait hors d’état de rien opposer -à une pareille force, qui offre toutes les chances de succès sans -presenter aucun danger. C’est donc Valence qu’il faut prendre. Le 6 -Novembre nous étions maîtres d’un faubourg; il y a lieu d’espérer que -la place prise en Décembre, ce qui vous mettrait, monsieur le duc, -à portée de vous trouver devant Elvas dans le courant de Janvier. -Envoyez moi votre avis sur ce plan d’opérations, afin qu’après avoir -reçu l’avis de la prise de Valence, l’empereur puisse vous donner des -ordres positifs. - -“Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général.” - - (Signé) “ALEXANDRE.” - - - “_Paris, le 15 Février, 1812._ - -“Sa majesté n’est pas satisfaite de la direction que vous donnez à la -guerre. Vouz avez la supériorité sur l’ennemi, et au lieu de prendre -l’initiative, vous ne cessez de la reçevoir. Quand le général Hill -marche sur l’armée du midi avec quinze mille hommes c’est ce qui peut -vous arriver de plus heureux; cette armée est assez forte et assez -bien organisée pour ne rien craindre d’armée Anglaise, aurait-elle -quatre ou cinq divisions réunies. - -“Aujourd’-hui l’ennemi suppose que vous allez faire le siège de -Rodrigo; il approche le général Hill de sa droite afin de pouvoir -le faire venir à lui à grandes marches, et vous livrer bataille -réunis, si vous voulez reprendre Rodrigo. C’est donc au duc de -Dalmatie à tenir vingt mille hommes pour le contenir et l’empêcher -de faire ce mouvement, et si général Hill passe le Tage, de se -porter à sa suite, ou dans l’Alemtejo. Vous avez le double de la -lettre que l’empereur m’a ordonné d’écrire au duc de Dalmatie le -10 de ce mois, en réponse à la demande qu’il vous avait faite de -porter des troupes dans le midi; c’est vous, monsieur le maréchal, -qui deviez lui écrire pour lui demander de porter un grand corps de -troupes vers la Guadiana, pour maintenir le général Hill dans le -midi et l’empêcher de se réunir à lord Wellington.... Les Anglais -connaîssent assez l’honneur français pour comprendre que ce succès -(la prise de Rodrigo) peut devenir un affront pour eux, et qu’au lieu -d’améliorer leur position, l’occupation de Ciudad Rodrigo les met -dans l’obligation de défendre cette place. Ils nous rendent maîtres -du choix du champ de bataille, puisque vous les forcez à venir au -sécours de cette place et à combattre dans une position si loin de -la mer.... Je ne puis que vous répéter les ordres de l’empereur. -Prenez votre quartier-général à Salamanque, travaillez avec activité -à fortifier cette ville, réunissez-y un nouvel équipage du siège -pour servir à armer la ville, formez-y des approvisionnemens, faites -faire tous les jours le coup de fusil avec les Anglais, placez deux -fortes avant gardes qui menacent, l’une Rodrigo, et l’autre Almeida; -menacez les autres directions sur la frontière de Portugal, envoyez -des partis qui ravagent quelques villages, enfin employez tout ce -qui peut tenir l’ennemie sur le qui-vive. Faites réparer les routes -de Porto et d’Almeida. Tenez votre armée vers Toro, Benavente. La -province d’Avila a même de bonnes parties où l’on trouverait des -ressources. Dans cette situation qui est aussi simple que formidable, -vous reposez vos troupes, vous formez des magasins, et avec de -simples démonstrations bien combinées, qui mettent vos avant-postes -à même de tirer journellement des coups de fusil avec l’ennemi, vous -aurez barre sur les Anglais, qui ne pourront vous observer.... Ce -n’est donc pas à vous, monsieur le duc, à vous disséminer en faveur -de l’armée du midi. Lorsque vous avez été prendre le commandement -de votre armée elle venait d’éprouver un échec par sa retraite de -Portugal; ce pays était ravagé, les hôpitaux et les magasins de -l’ennemi étaient à Lisbonne; vos troupes étaient fatiguées, dégoutées -par les marches forcées, sans artillerie, sans train d’équipages. -Badajoz était attaqué depuis long temps; une bataille dans le midi -n’avait pu faire lever le siège de cette place. Que deviez vous faire -alors? Vous portez sur Almeida pour menacer Lisbonne? Non, parceque -votre armée n’avait pas d’artillerie, pas de train d’équipages, et -qu’elle était fatiguée. L’ennemi à cette position, n’aurait pas cru -à cette menace; il aurait laissé approcher jusqu’à Coimbre, aurait -près Badajos, et ensuite serait venu sur vous. Vous avez donc fait -à cette époque ce qu’il fallait faire; vous avez marché rapidement -au secours de Badajoz; l’ennemi avait barre sur vous, et l’art de la -guerre était de vous y commettre. Le siège a été levé, et l’ennemi -est rentré en Portugal; c’est ce qu’il y avait à faire. .... Dans -ce moment, monsieur le duc, votre position est simple et claire, -et ne demande pas de combinaisons d’esprit. Placez vos troupes de -manière qu’en quatre marches elles puissent se réunir et se grouper -sur Salamanque; ayez-y votre quartier-général; que vos ordres, vos -dispositions annoncent à l’ennemi que la grosse artillerie arrive -à Salamanque, que vous y former des magasins.... Si Wellington se -dirige sur Badajoz, laissez le aller; réunissez aussitôt votre armée, -et marcher droit sur Almeida; poussez des partis sur Coïmbre, et -soyez persuadé que Wellington reviendra bien vîte sur vous. - -“Ecrivez au duc de Dalmatie et sollicitez le roi de lui écrire -également, pour qu’il exécute les ordres impératifs que je lui donne, -de porter un corps de vingt mille hommes pour forcer le général Hill -à rester sur la rive gauche du Tage. Ne pensez donc plus, monsieur -le maréchal, à aller dans le midi et marchez droit sur le Portugal, -si lord Wellington fait la faute de se porter sur la rive gauche -du Tage.... Profitez du moment où vos troupes se réunissent pour -bien organiser et mettre de l’ordre dans le nord. Qu’on travaille -jour et nuit à fortifier Salamanque qu’on y fasse venir de grosses -pièces, qu’on fasse l’équipage de siège; enfin qu’on forme des -magasins de subsistances. Vous sentirez, monsieur le maréchal, -qu’en suivant ces directions et en mettant pour les exécuter toute -l’activité convenable, vous tiendrez l’ennemi en échec.... En -recevant l’initiative au lieu de la donner, en ne songeant qu’ à -l’armée du midi qui n’a pas besoin de vous, puisqu’elle est forte -de quatre-vingt mille hommes des meilleures troupes de l’Europe, -en ayant des sollicitudes pour les pays qui ne sont pas sous votre -commandement et abandonnant les Asturies et les provinces qui vous -regardent, un combat que vous éprouveriez serait une calamité qui se -ferait sentir dans toute l’Espagne. Un échec de l’armée du midi la -conduirait sur Madrid ou sur Valence et ne serait pas de même nature. - -“Je vous le répète, vous êtes le maître de conserver barre sur -lord Wellington, en placant votre quartier-général à Salamanque, -en occupant en force cette position, et poussant de fortes -reconnaissances sur les débouches. Je ne pourrais que vous rédire -ce que je vous ai déjà expliqué ci-dessus. Si Badajoz était cerné -seulement par deux ou trois divisions Anglaises, le duc de Dalmatie -le débloquerait; mais alors lord Wellington, affaibli, vous mettrait -à même de vous porter dans l’intérieur du Portugal, ce qui secourrait -plus efficacement Badajoz que toute autre opération.... Je donne -l’ordre que tout ce qu’il sera possible de fournir vous soit -fourni pour completer votre artillerie et pour armer Salamanque. -Vingt-quatre heures après la réception de cette lettre l’empereur -pense que vous partirez pour Salamanque, à moins d’événemens -inattendus; que vous changerez une avant-garde d’occuper les -débouches sur Rodrigo, et une autre sur Almeida; que vous aurez dans -la main au moins la valeur d’une division; que vous ferez revenir la -cavalerie et artillerie qui sont à la division du Tage.... Réunissez -surtout votre cavalerie, dont vous n’avez pas de trop et donc vous -avez tant de besoin....” - - - “_Valladolid, le 23 Février, 1812._ - - “_Au Prince de Neuchâtel._ - -“MONSEIGNEUR,—J’ignore si sa majesté aura daigné accueillir d’une -manière favorable la demande que j’ai eu l’honneur d’adresser à -votre altesse pour supplier l’empereur de me permettre de faire -sous ses yeux la campagne qui va s’ouvrir; mais qu’elle que soit sa -décision, je regarde comme mon devoir de lui faire connaître, au -moment où il semble prêt à s’éloigner, la situation des choses dans -cette partie de l’Espagne. - -“D’après les derniers arrangemens arrêtés par sa majesté, l’armée de -Portugal n’a plus le moyen de remplir la tâche qui lui est imposée, -et je serais coupable, si, en ce moment, je cachais la verité. La -frontière se trouve très affaiblie par le départ des troupes qui -ont été rappelées par la prise de Rodrigo, qui met l’ennemi à même -d’entrer dans le cœur de la Castille en commençant un mouvement -offensif; ensuite par l’immense étendue de pays que l’armée est dans -le devoir d’occuper, ce qui rend toujours son rassemblement lent et -difficile, tandis qu’il y a peu de temps elle était toute réunie et -disponible. - -“Les sept divisions qui la composent s’éleveront, lorsqu’elles -auront reçu les régimens de marche annoncés, à quarante-quatre mille -hommes d’infanterie environ; il faut au moins cinq mille hommes pour -occuper les points fortifiés et les communications qui ne peuvent -être abandonnés; il faut à peu près pareille force pour observer -l’Esla et la couvrir contre l’armée de Galice, qui évidemment, dans -le cas d’un mouvement offensif des Anglais, se porterait à Bénavente -et à Astorga. Ainsi, à supposer que toute l’armée soit réunie entre -le Duero et la Tormes, sa force ne peut s’élever qu’à trente-trois -ou trente-quatre mille hommes, tandis que l’ennemi peut présenter -aujourd’hui une masse de plus de soixante mille hommes, dont plus de -moitié Anglais, bien outillés et bien pourvus de toutes choses: et -cependant que de chances pour que les divisions du Tage se trouvent -en arrière! Qu’elles n’aient pu être ralliées promptement, et soient -separées de l’armée pendant les momens les plus importans de la -campagne; alors la masse de nos forces réunies ne s’éleverait pas à -plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes. Sa majesté suppose, il est vrai, -que, dans ce pas l’armée du nord soutiendrait celle de Portugal par -deux divisions; mais l’empereur peut-il être persuadé que, dans -l’ordre de chose actuel, ces troupes arriveront promptement et à -temps? - -“L’ennemi parait en offensive: celui qui doit le combattre prépare -ses moyens; celui qui doit agir hypothétiquement attend sans -inquiétude, et laisse écouler en pure perte un temps précieux; -l’ennemi marche à moi, je réunis mes troupes d’une manière méthodique -et précise, je sais à un jour près le moment où le plus grand nombre -au moins sera en ligne, à qu’elle époque les autres seront en liaison -avec moi, et, d’après cet état de choses, je me détermine à agir ou -à temporiser; mais ces calculs, je ne puis les faire que pour des -troupes qui sont purement et simplement à mes ordes. Pour celles qui -n’y sont pas, que de lenteurs! que d’incertitudes et de temps perdu. -J’annonce la marche de l’ennemi et je demande des secours, on me -répond par des observations; ma lettre n’est parvenue que lentement -parceque les communications sont difficiles dans ce pays; la réponse -et ma réplique vient de même, et l’ennemi sera sur moi. Mais comment -pourrai-je même d’avance faire des calculs raisonnables sur les -mouvemens de troupes dont je ne connais ni la force ni l’emplacement? -Lorsque je ne sais rien de la situation du pays ni des besoins de -troupes qu’on y éprouve. Je ne puis raisonner que sur ce qui est à -mes ordres, et puisque les troupes qui n’y sont pas me sont cependant -nécessaires pour combattre, et sont comptées comme partie de la force -que je dois opposer à l’ennemi, je puis en fausse position, et je -n’ai les moyens de rien faire méthodiquement et avec connaissance de -cause. - -“Si l’on considère combien il faut de prévoyance pour exécuter -le plus petit mouvement en Espagne, on doit se convaincre de la -nécessité qu’il y a de donner d’avance mille ordres préparatoires -sans lesquels les mouvemens rapides sont impossibles. Ainsi les -troupes du nord m’étant étrangères habituellement, et m’étant -cependant indispensables pour combattre, le succès de toutes mes -opérations est dépendant du plus ou du moins de prévoyance et -d’activité d’un autre chef: je ne puis donc pas être responsable des -événemens. - -“Mais il ne faut pas seulement considérer l’état des choses pour la -défensive du nord, il faut la considérer pour celle du midi. Si lord -Wellington porte six divisions sur la rive gauche du Tage le duc de -Dalmatie a besoin d’un puissant secours; si dans ce cas, l’armée du -nord ne fournit pas de troupes pour réléver une partie d’armée de -Portugal dans quelques-uns des postes qu’elle doit évacuer alors -momentanement, mais qu’il est important de tenir, et pour la sûreté -du pays et pour maintenir la Galice et observer les deux divisions -ennemies qui seraient sur l’Agueda, et qui feraient sans doute -quelques demonstrations offensives; si dis-je l’armée du nord ne -vient pas à son aide, l’armée de Portugal, trop faible, ne pourra -pas faire un détachement d’une force convenable, et Badajoz tombera. -Certes, il faut des ordres pour obtenir de l’armée du nord un -mouvement dans cette hypothèse, et le temps utile pour agir; si on -s’en tenait à des propositions et à des négociations, ce temps, qu’on -ne pourrait remplacer, serait perdu en vaines discussions. Je suis -autorisé à croire ce résultat. - -“L’armée de Portugal est en ce moment la principale armée d’Espagne; -c’est à elle à couvrir l’Espagne contre les entreprises des Anglais; -pour pouvoir manœuvrer, il faut qu’elle ait des points d’appui, des -places, des forts, des têtes-de-pont, etc. - -“Il faut pour cela du matériel d’artillerie, et je n’ai ni canons ni -munitions à y appliquer, tandis que les établissemens de l’armée du -nord en sont tout remplis; j’en demanderai, on m’en promettra, mais -en résultat je n’obtiendrai rien. - -“Après avoir discuté la question militaire, je dirai un mot de -l’administration. Le pays donné à l’armée de Portugal a des products -présumés le tiers de ceux des cinq gouvernemens. - -“L’armée de Portugal est beaucoup plus nombreuse que l’armée du -nord; le pays qu’elle occupe est insoumis; on n’arrache rien qu’avec -la force, et les troupes de l’armée du nord ont semblé prendre à -tâche, en l’évacuant, d’en enléver toutes les ressources. Les autres -gouvernemens, malgré les guérillas, sont encore dans la soumission, -et acquittent les contributions sans qu’il soit besoin de contrainte. -D’après cela il y a une immense différence dans le sort de l’une et -de l’autre et comme tout doit tendre au même but, que partout ce -sont les soldats de l’empereur, que tous les efforts doivent avoir -pour objet le succès des opérations, ne serait-il pas juste que les -ressources de tous ces pays fussent partagées proportionnellement aux -besoins de chacun; et comment y parvenir sans une autorité unique? - -“Je crois avoir demontré que, pour une bonne défensive du nord, le -général de l’armée de Portugal doit avoir toujours à ses ordres les -troupes et le territoire de l’armée du nord, puisque ces troupes sont -appelées à combattre avec les siennes, et que les ressources de ce -territoire doivent être en partie consacrées à les entretenir. - -“Je passe maintenant à ce qui regarde le midi de l’Espagne. Une -des tâches de l’armée de Portugal est de soutenir l’armée du midi, -d’avoir l’œil sur Badajoz et de couvrir Madrid; et pour cela, il -faut qu’un corps assez nombreux occupe la vallée du Tage; mais ce -corps ne pourra subsister et ne pourra préparer des ressources pour -d’autres troupes qui s’y rendraient pour le soutenir, s’il n’a pas un -territoire productif, et ce territoire, quel autre peut-il être que -l’arrondissement de l’armée du centre? Quelle ville peut offrir des -ressources et des moyens dans la vallée du Tage si ce n’est Madrid? -Cependant aujourd’hui l’armée de Portugal ne possède sur le nord du -Tage, qu’un désert qui ne lui offre aucune espèce de moyens, ni pour -les hommes ni pour les chevaux, et elle ne rencontre de la part des -autorités de Madrid, que haine, qu’animosité. L’armée du centre, qui -n’est rien, possède à elle seule un territoire plus fertile, plus -étendu que celui qui est accordé pour toute l’armée de Portugal; -cette vallée ne peut s’exploiter faute de troupes, et tout le monde -s’oppose à ce que nous en tirions des ressources. Cependant si les -bords du Tage étaient évacués par suite de la disette, personne à -Madrid ne voudrait en apprécier la véritable raison, et tout le monde -accuserait l’armée de Portugal de découvrir cette ville. - -“Il existe, il faut le dire, une haine, une animosité envers les -Français, qu’il est impossible d’exprimer, dans le gouvernement -espagnol. Il existe un désordre à Madrid qui présente le spectacle -le plus révoltant. Si les subsistances employées en de fausses -consommations dans cette ville eussent été consacrées à former un -magasin de ressources pour l’armée de Portugal, les troupes qui sont -sur le Tage seraient dans l’abondance et pourvues pour long-temps; -on consomme 22 mille rations par jour à Madrid, et il n’y a pas -3,000 hommes: c’est qu’on donne et laisse prendre à tout le monde, -excepté à ceux qui servent. Mais bien plus, je le répete, c’est un -crime que d’aller prendre ce que l’armée du centre ne peut elle-même -ramasser. Il est vrai qu’il parait assez conséquent que ceux qui, -depuis deux ans, trompent le roi, habillent et arment chaque jour des -soldats qui, au bout de deux jours, vont se joindre à nos ennemis, et -semblent en vérité avoir ainsi consacré un mode régulier decrutement -des bandes que nous avons sur les bras, s’occupent de leur réserver -des moyens de subsistances à nos dépens. - -“La seule communication carrossable entre la gauche et le reste de -l’armée de Portugal est par la province de Ségovie, et le mouvement -des troupes et des convois ne peut avoir lieu avec facilité, -parceque, quoique ce pays soit excellent et plein de ressources, les -autorités de l’armée du centre refusent de prendre aucune disposition -pour assurer leurs subsistances. - -“Si l’armée de Portugal peut être affranchie du devoir de sécourir -le midi, de couvrir Madrid, elle peut se concentrer dans la -Vieille-Castille, et elle s’en trouvera bien; alors tout lui -devient facile; mais si elle doit au contraire remplir cette double -tâche, elle ne le peut qu’en occupant la vallée du Tage, et dans -cette vallée elle ne peut avoir les ressources nécessaires pour y -vivre, pour y manœuvrer, pour y préparer des moyens suffisans pour -toutes les troupes qu’il faudra y envoyer, qu’en possédant tout -l’arrondissement de l’armée du centre et Madrid. Ce territoire doit -conserver les troupes qui l’occupent à présent, afin qu’en marchant à -l’ennemi, l’armée ne soit obligée de laisser personne en arrière mais -qu’au contraire elle en tire quelque secours pour sa communication. -Elle a besoin surtout d’être délivrée des obstacles que fait naître -sans cesse un gouvernement veritablement ennemi des armes françaises; -quelles que soient les bonnes intentions du roi, il parait qu’il ne -peut rien contre l’intérêt et les passions de ceux qui l’environnent; -il semble également que jusqu’à présent il n’a rien pu contre les -désordres qui out lieu à Madrid, contre l’anarchie qui règne à -l’armée du centre. Il peut y avoir de grandes raisons en politique -pour que le roi réside à Madrid, mais il y a mille raisons positives -et de sûreté pour les armes françaises, qui sembleraient devoir lui -faire choisir un autre séjour. Et en effet, ou le roi est général -et commandant des armées, et dans ce cas il doit être au milieu des -troupes, voir leurs besoins, pourvoir à tout, et être responsable; -ou il est étranger à toutes les opérations, et alors, autant pour sa -tranquillité personnelle que pour laisser plus de liberté dans les -opérations, il doit s’éloigner du pays qui en est le théâtre et des -lieux qui servent de points d’appui aux mouvemens de l’armée. - -“La guerre d’Espagne est difficile dans son essence, mais cette -difficulté est augmentée de beaucoup par la division des commandemens -et par le grande dimunition des troupes que cette division rend -encore plus funeste. Si cette division a déjà fait tant de mal, -lorsque l’empereur, étant à Paris, s’occupant sans cesse de ses -armées de la péninsule, pouvait en partie remédier à tout, on doit -fremir du résultat infallible de ce système, suivi avec diminution de -moyens, lorsque l’empereur s’eloigne de trois cents lieues. - -“Monseigneur, je vous ai exposé toutes les raisons qui me semblent -démontrer jusqu’à l’évidence la nécessité de réunir sous la même -autorité toutes les troupes et tout le pays, depuis Bayonne jusques -et y compris Madrid et la Manche; en cela, je n’ai été guidé que par -mon amour ardent pour la gloire de nos armes et par ma conscience. -Si l’empereur ne trouvait pas convenable d’adopter ce système j’ose -le supplier de me donner un successeur dans le commandement qu’il -m’avait confié. J’ai la confiance et le sentiment de pouvoir faire -autant qu’un autre, mais tout restant dans la situation actuelle la -charge est au-dessus de mes forces. De quelques difficultés que soit -le commandement général, quelqu’imposante que soit la responsabilité -qui l’accompagne, elles me paraissent beaucoup moindres que celles -que ma position entraine en ce moment. - -“Quelque flatteur que soit un grand commandement, il n’a de prix -à mes yeux que lorsqu’il est accompagné des moyens de bien-faire: -lorsque ceux-ci me sont enlevés, alors tout me paraît préférable, et -mon ambition se réduit à servir en soldat. Je donnerai ma vie sans -regret, mais je ne puis rester dans la cruelle position de n’avoir -pour résultat de mes efforts et de mes soins de tous les momens, que -la triste perspective d’attacher mon nom à des événemens facheux et -peu dignes de la gloire de nos armes. - - “(Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE RAGUSE.” - - - _Joseph to Napoleon._ - - _Madrid, May 18, 1812._ - -SIRE,—Il y a aujourd’hui un mois et demi que j’ai reçu la lettre -du prince de Neufchatel en dâte du 16 Mars dernier, qui m’annonce -que votre majesté impériale et royale me confiait le commandement de -ses armées en Espagne, et me prévenait que les généraux-en-chef des -armées du Nord, de Portugal, du midi, et de l’Arragon recevaient les -ordres convenables. - -Depuis cette époque il m’a été impossible de remplir les intentions -de V. M. impériale et royale. Le général-en-chef de l’armée du nord -s’est refusé à m’envoyer aucune rapport disant, et écrivant qu’il -n’avait aucun ordre à cet égard. M. le maréchal commandant en chef -l’armée du midi n’a encore répondu à aucune des lettres que je -lui ai écrites ou fait écrire depuis cette époque. M. le maréchal -commandant-en-chef l’armée d’Arragon ne m’envoye aucune rapport, et -reste entièrement isolé de moi. M. le maréchal commandant-en-chef -l’armée de Portugal m’a fait beaucoup de demandes auxquelles il -savait parfaitement que je ne pouvais satisfaire, comme celles des -troupes de l’armée du nord, des vivres, &c. Sa conduite est tellement -indécente qu’elle n’est pas concevable. V. M. I. et R. pourra en -juger par mes dépêches au prince de Neufchatel.————Sire, en acceptant -le commandement des armées françaises à l’époque ou je l’ai reçu, -j’ai cru remplir un devoir que tous les liens qui m’attachent à V. -M. I. et R. et à la France m’imposaient parceque j’ai pensé pouvoir -être utile, mais j’étais persuadé que V. M. I. et R. me confiant un -dépôt si précieux les généraux-en-chef s’empresseraient d’obéir à -la volonté de V. M. Il n’en est pas ainsi, je m’adresse donc à elle -pour qu’elle veuille bien écrire ou faire écrire aux généraux-en-chef -qu’elle est sa volonté pour qu’elle leur fasse déclarer que leur -désobeissance à mes ordres les mettrait dans le cas d’être renvoyés -en France où ils trouveraient un juge juste mais sévère dans V. M. -I. et R. Si V. majesté ne trouve pas le moyen de persuader à ces -messieurs que sa volonté est que je sois obéi, je la supplie de -considérer que le role auquel je suis exposé est indigne de mon -caractère et du nom de V. M. Si la guerre du nord a lieu, je ne -puis être utile ici qu’autant que je suis obéi, et je ne puis être -obéi qu’autant que ces messieurs sauront que j’ai le droit de les -remplacer; je ne puis infliger, moi, d’autre punition que celle là -à un général-en-chef. Si je ne suis pas obéi, et que V. M. aille au -nord, l’Espagne sera évacué honteusement par les troupes impériales, -et le nom que je porte aura présidé inutilement à cette époque -désastreuse. - -Le mal est grand, mais il n’est au-dessus ni de mon devouement ni -de mon courage. C’est à votre majesté à les rendre efficaces par -la force dont il est indispensable qu’elle m’entoure; le salut des -armées impériales et de l’Espagne independent. - - * * * * * - - - No. VI. - - TARIFA. - -[The anonymous extracts are from the memoirs and letters of different - officers engaged in the siege. The Roman characters mark - different sources of information.] - - - SECTION 1. - - _Number and conduct of the French._ - - A. - -“As to the numbers of the French; the prisoners, the intercepted -letters, the secret information from Chiclana, all accounts, in fact, -concurred in stating that the troops employed _exceeded nine thousand -men_!” - - - _Extracts from colonel Skerrett’s despatch._ - -“The enemy’s force employed in the siege is stated at _ten thousand, -probably this is in some degree exaggerated_.” - - B. - -“The fact of the enemy, with _eleven thousand experienced soldiers_, -not having made another effort after his assault of the 31st, &c.” - - - _Lord Wellington’s despatch._ - - “_January 19, 1812._ - -“By accounts which I have from Cadiz to the 27th December, I learn -that the enemy invested Tarifa with a force of _about five thousand -men_ on the 20th December, covering their operation against that -place by another corps at Vejer.” - - - _Conduct of the French._ - - A. - -“There was not, on the part of the leading French officer (an old -lieutenant of the 94th) or of his followers, any appearance of panic -or perturbation. Their advance was serene, steady, and silent, worthy -of the 5th corps, of their Austrian laurels, of their ‘_vielles -moustaches_.’” - - - SECTION 2. - - _Conduct of the Spanish soldiers._ - - B. - -“At the assault general Copons himself was the only person who shewed -his head above the parapet. The precaution of outflanking him by -three companies of the 47th regiment remedied the chance of evil, -which so lamentable a want of chivalry might have occasioned, but the -knights of older times were probably better fed than were our poor -distressed friends.” - - - SECTION 3. - - _Conduct of colonel Skerrett._ - - A. - -“It is necessary to advert to the 18-pounder mounted on the Gusmans’ -tower, as Southey’s History contains some strange misrepresentation -on the subject.” “The French made the 18-pounder an early object -of attack, but they did not succeed in crushing it. Unfortunately -one of the spherical case shot, not precisely fitting its old and -worn calibre, burst in passing over the town, and killed or wounded -a person in the street. This produced some alarm and complaint -amongst the inhabitants for a moment, and in the first feeling of -that moment, Skerrett, with characteristic impetuosity, directed -the gun to be placed ‘_hors de service_.’ There was no ambiguity in -his command, ‘_Let it be spiked_.’” “Had he referred the case to -the commanding officer of artillery, the order would not have been -executed, means would have been found to remove the first impression -and tranquillize the people, without the sacrifice of the gun which -might have added materially to the offensive powers of the garrison, -particularly if the siege had been prolonged.” - - B. - -“On the 29th of December, colonel Skerrett with a rare activity, -dismounted a 32-pound carronade, that looked into the enemy’s -batteries at the distance of about four hundred yards, and he -succeeded in spiking and knocking off the trunnion of an 18-pounder, -borrowed from the Stately. This gun was mounted on the tower of the -Gusmans.” - - - _General Campbell to lord Liverpool._ - - “_January 3, 1812._ - -“Annexed is a letter received last night from colonel Skerrett; and, -notwithstanding the despondency therein expressed, which has been -equally so in other letters that I have received from him, my opinion -remains the same as formerly.” - - A. - -“At the crisis produced by Skerrett’s desire to retire from the town, -and desire to leave the island also, general Campbell sent express -instructions that the town should not be abandoned without the -concurrence of the commanding officers of artillery and engineers; -and accompanied these instructions with a positive command that every -officer and soldier belonging to Gibraltar should, in future, be -stationed in the island, to insure at all events the preservation of -that port.” - - - SECTION 4. - - _Sir C. Smith’s conduct._ - -“Smith never tolerated the idea of surrender—never admitted the -possibility of defeat.” - -“Comprehending from the first the resources and capabilities of -his post, and with a sort of intuition anticipating his assailant, -he covered the weak points while he concealed its strength; and so -conducted the skirmish which preceded the investment, that he, as it -were, dictated the whole plan of attack, and in reality pointed out -with his finger the position of the breaching battery.” - -“Had the dictates of his vigorous mind and enterprising spirit been -duly listened to within, the defence would have been more active and -more brilliant.” - - - SECTION 5. - - - (Extracts.) - - _Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool._ - - “_January 9, 1812._ - -“From the accounts which I have received of the place (Tarifa) it -appears to me quite impossible to defend it, when the enemy will be -equipped to attack it. The utmost that can be done is to hold the -island contiguous to Tarifa; for which object colonel Skerrett’s -detachment does not appear to be necessary. I don’t believe that -the enemy will be able to obtain possession of the island, without -which the town will be entirely useless to them, and, indeed, if -they had the island as well as the town, I doubt their being able to -retain these possessions, adverting to the means of attacking them -with which general Ballesteros might be supplied by the garrison of -Gibraltar, unless they should keep a force in the field in their -neighbourhood to protect them.” - - - _Lord Wellington to major-general Cooke._ - - “_February 1, 1812._ - -“SIR,—I have omitted to answer your letters of the 27th December and -of the 7th January, relating to the correspondence which you had had, -with the governor of Gibraltar, upon the conditional orders, which -you had given colonel Skerrett to withdraw from Tarifa, because I -conclude that you referred that correspondence to the secretary of -state with whom alone it rests to decide whether it was your duty -to recal colonel Skerrett, and whether you performed that duty at a -proper period, and under circumstances which rendered it expedient -that you should give colonel Skerrett the orders in question. From -the report of colonel Skerrett and Lord Proby, and other information -which I had received respecting Tarifa, I concurred in the orders -that you gave to colonel Skerrett, and my opinion on that subject -is not at all changed by what has occurred since. We have a right -to expect that his majesty’s officers and troops will perform -their duty upon every occasion; but we have no right to expect -that comparatively a small number would be able to hold the town -of Tarifa, commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed in -every direction, and unprovided with artillery and the walls scarcely -cannon proof. The enemy, however, retired with disgrace infinitely -to the honour of the brave troops who defended Tarifa, and it is -useless to renew the discussion. It is necessary, however, that you -should now come to an understanding with general Campbell regarding -the troops which have been detached from Cadiz and this army under -colonel Skerrett.” - - - _Ditto to Ditto._ - - “_February 25, 1812._ - -“I have already, in my letter of the 1st instant, stated to you my -opinion regarding Tarifa, I do not think that captain Smith’s letter -throws new light upon the subject. The island appears still to be -the principal point to defend, and the easiest to be defended at a -small expense and risk of loss. Whether the town and the hill of -Santa Catalina can be made subservient to the defence of the island -depends upon circumstances upon which it would be possible to decide -only by having a local knowledge of the place. It is very clear to -me, however, that the enemy will not attack Tarifa in this spring, -and that you will not be called upon to furnish troops to garrison -that place so soon as you expect. If you should be called upon -either by the Spanish government or by the governor of Gibraltar -you must decide the question according to the suggestions which I -made to you in my despatch of the 15th instant. If you should send -a detachment from Cadiz at the desire of the Spanish government for -purposes connected with the operations of general Ballesteros, I -conceive that the governor of Gibraltar has nothing to say to such -detachments, if you should send one to Tarifa at the desire of the -governor of Gibraltar, or of the Spanish government, it is better not -to discuss the question whether the detachment shall or shall not -obey the orders of the governor of Gibraltar. He has occupied Tarifa -permanently, and he is about to improve the defences of the place -which he conceives to be under his orders; but, according to all the -rules of his majesty’s service, the senior officer should command the -whole. I have nothing to say to the division of the command of the -island and town of Tarifa, which I conclude has been settled by the -governor of Gibraltar.” - - - _Extract from the notes of an officer engaged in the siege._ - -“Though the duke of Wellington yielded to the opinions and wishes -of general Cooke, colonel Skerrett, and lord Proby, yet his -characteristic and never failing sagacity seems to have suggested -to him a fear or a fancy, that part of the case was kept concealed. -A local knowledge was necessary, not only to judge of the relation -and reciprocal defences and capabilities of the town and island, -but to estimate the vast importance of the post, the necessity in -fact of its possession. It was my impression then, and it amounts -to conviction now, that the island, particularly during the winter, -half fortified as it was, and totally destitute of shelter from -bombardment or from weather, could not have been maintained against -an enemy in possession of the town, the suburb, and the neighbouring -heights. But even if it had, by means of British bravery, resolution, -and resource, been provisioned and defended, still the original -and principal objects of its occupation would have been altogether -frustrated, namely, the command and embarkation of supplies for Cadiz -and the fostering of the patriotic flame. It is demonstrable that, -had the duke of Dalmatia once become possessor of the old walls of -Tarifa, every city, village, fort, and watch-tower on the Andalusian -coast, would soon have displayed the banner of king Joseph, and the -struggle in the south of Spain was over.” - - - _General Campbell to lord Liverpool._ - - “_Gibraltar, April 2, 1812._ - -“MY LORD,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your -lordship’s letter of the 8th of February last, and I beg leave to -refer your lordship to the documents herewith, particularly to the -report of captain Smith, royal engineers, which I trust will prove -that the defence of the town of Tarifa was not taken up on slight -grounds, and that the detachment from Cadiz under the orders of -colonel Skerrett, together with the troops from hence which formed -the garrison of the town, were never in any danger of being cut -off, as their retreat would have been covered by the castle of the -Guzmans, the redoubt of Santa Catalina, and the island; the two first -of these points being connected by a field-work, and the whole -mounting twenty-nine pieces of cannon and mortars exclusively of -what remained in the town: the enemy’s batteries being completely -kept in check during such an operation by the island and the castle -of the Guzmans. My lord, colonel Skerrett stood alone in his opinion -respecting this post, and in direct opposition to my own and that -of captain Smith, royal engineers, who is considered by his corps -as an officer of first-rate professional abilities. Major-general -Cooke must therefore have acted on the reports of the colonel when -he authorised him to abandon his post, for the major-general was -unacquainted with its resources: besides, my lord, I had a right to -expect that troops sent to that point to assist in its defence should -not be withdrawn without my consent. Had the place been lost, my -lord, by such misrepresentation, it would have been attributed to any -other than the real cause, and the odium would have been fixed upon -me, as having taken up the position; I am happy, however, that its -capability has been proved whilst it remained under my orders, and -that by interposing my authority the valuable possession of Tarifa -has been saved from the grasp of the enemy. I was besides deeply -concerned in the fate of the place; a great quantity of military -stores and provision having been embarked on that service by my -authority, from a conviction that they were fully protected by this -additional force. - -“After the execution of a service, my lord, from which I concluded -I was entitled to some consideration, it is no small mortification -for me to find that my conduct should be deemed questionable; but -I flatter myself that if the government of his royal highness the -prince regent will do me the justice to read the annexed papers, -they will perceive that if I had done less his majesty’s arms must -have been dishonoured. In regard to the assumption of command on -that occasion, I have only to observe that, considering the post of -Tarifa as a dependency of Gibraltar, having occupied it exclusively -for these two years past, and that a commandant and staff were -appointed from my recommendation, with salaries annexed, and this -with the approbation of both governments, these circumstances, added -to what I have seen on similar occasions, put it past a doubt in -my mind, and colonel Skerrett having applied to me for ‘precise -orders,’ shows that he was aware that such was the case. If, my lord, -I ever had a right to exercise an authority over the post of Tarifa -from what I have stated, the entry of troops from another quarter, -unless actually commanded by an officer senior to myself, could not, -according to the custom of our service, deprive me of it; and I have -heard that the case has been referred to lord Wellington, who was of -the same opinion. This, however, I only take the liberty to advance -in justification of my conduct, and not in opposition to the opinion -formed by the government of his royal highness the prince regent. I -trust, therefore, I shall be excused in the eyes of government in -declaring, without reserve, that if I had not retained the command -the place would not now be in our possession, and the wants of our -enemies would have been completely supplied by its affording a free -communication with the states of Barbary. I have the honour to report -that I have made the necessary communication with major-general -Cooke, in consequence of its being the wish of government that Tarifa -shall be occupied by troops from Cadiz. The major-general informs me, -in answer thereto, that he has communicated with lord Wellington, -as he has not received orders to that effect, nor has he the means -at present to make the detachment required, and your lordship is -aware that I have it not in my power to reinforce that post in case -of need.” &c. &c.————P.S. “Should your lordship wish any further -information with respect to that post, it will be found on referring -to my report made after I had visited Tarifa, where commodore Penrose -and colonel sir Charles Holloway, royal engineers, accompanied me.” - - - _Extract from captain C. F. Smith’s report._ - - “_Tarifa, December 14, 1811._ - -“I do not hesitate to declare that I place the utmost reliance on the -resources of the place, and consider them as such as ought to make a -good and ultimately successful defence.” - - - _Ditto ditto._ - - “_December 24, 1811._ - -“My opinion respecting the defences of this post is unalterable, -and must ever remain so,—that till the island is more independent -in itself, there is a necessity of fairly defending the town as an -outwork.” - - * * * * * - - - No. VII. - - - STORMING OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOS. - - [The anonymous extracts are taken from the memoirs and journals of - officers engaged in, or eye-witnesses of the action described. The - Roman characters mark different sources of information.] - - - SECTION 1.—CIUDAD RODRIGO. - - A. - -“The duke of Wellington, standing on the top of some ruins of the -convent of Francisco, pointed out to colonel Colborne and to major -Napier,[2] commanding the storming-party of the light division, the -spot where the small breach was. Having done this, he said, _‘Now -do you understand exactly the way you are to take so as to arrive -at the breach without noise or confusion?_’ He was answered, ‘_Yes, -perfectly_.’ Some one of the staff then said to major Napier, ‘Why -don’t you load?’ He answered, ‘No, if we can’t do the business -without loading we shall not do it at all.’ The duke of Wellington -immediately said, ‘Leave him alone.’ - -————“The caçadores under colonel Elder were to carry hay-bags to -throw into the ditch, but the signal of attack having been given, and -the fire commencing at the great breach, the stormers would not wait -for the hay-bags, which, from some confusion in the orders delivered, -had not yet arrived; but from no fault of colonel Elder or his -gallant regiment; they were always ready for and equal to any thing -they were ordered to do. - -“The troops jumped into the ditch; the ‘_fausse braye_’ was faced -with stone, so as to form a perpendicular wall about the centre of -the ditch; it was scaled, and the foot of the breach was attained. -Lieutenant Gurwood had gone too far to his left with the forlorn -hope, and missed the entrance of the breach; he was struck down with -a wound on the head, but sprang up again, and joined major Napier, -captain Jones 52d regt., Mitchell 95th, Ferguson 43d, and some other -officers, who at the head of the stormers were all going up the -breach together.” - -————“Colonel Colborne, although very badly wounded in the shoulder, -formed the fifty-second on the top of the rampart, and led them -against the enemy.” - -“The great breach was so strongly barricaded, so fiercely defended, -that the third division had not carried it, and were still bravely -exerting every effort to force their way through the obstacles when -colonel M‘Leod of the forty-third poured a heavy flank fire upon the -enemy defending it.” - - -FOOTNOTE: - - [2] Brother to the author of this work. - - - B. - -“The third division having commenced firing, we were obliged to hurry -to the attack. The forlorn hope led, we advanced rapidly across the -glacis and descended into the ditch near the ravelin, under a heavy -fire. We found the forlorn hope placing ladders against the face -of the work, and our party turned towards them, when the engineer -officer called out, ‘_You are wrong, this is the way to the breach, -or the fausse braye which leads to the breach you are to attack_.’” - -————“We ascended the breach of the fausse braye, and then the breach -of the body of the place, without the aid of ladders.” - -————“We were for a short time on the breach before we forced the -entrance. A gun was stretched across the entrance, but did not impede -our march. Near it some of the enemy were bayonetted, amongst the -number some deserters, who were found in arms defending the breach.” - -————“Major Napier was wounded at the moment when the men were checked -by the heavy fire and determined resistance of the enemy about -two-thirds up the ascent. It was then that the soldiers, forgetting -they were not loaded, as the major had not permitted them, snapped -all their firelocks.” - -————“No individual could claim being the first that entered the -breach; it was a simultaneous rush of about twenty or thirty. The -forlorn hope was thrown in some degree behind, being engaged in -fixing ladders against the face of the work, which they mistook for -the point of attack. - -“Upon carrying the breach, the parties moved as before directed by -major Napier; that is, the fifty-second to the left, the forty-third -to the right. The forty-third cleared the ramparts to the right, and -drove the enemy from the places they attempted to defend, until it -arrived near the great breach at a spot where the enemy’s defences -were overlooked. At this time the great breach had not been carried, -and was powerfully defended by the enemy. The houses being on it were -loop-holed, and a deep trench lined with musketry bearing directly -upon it; the flanks of the breach were cut off, and the descent into -the town from the ramparts at the top of it appeared considerable, so -as to render it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to force -it without some other aid than a front attack.” - -————“The moment the light division storming-party arrived at the spot -described, they opened a heavy enfilading fire of musketry upon the -trench, which was the main defence of the great breach, and drove -the enemy from it with the aid of the storming-party of the third -division that now entered. I was wounded at this time, and retired -a short way back on the rampart, when I saw the first explosion on -the rampart near the great breach. It was in my opinion next to -impossible, as I have said before, to force the great breach by a -front attack as long as the enemy held their defences, but the moment -the light division turned their defences the breach was instantly -carried.” - - - _Abstract of the journal of general Harvey, Portuguese - service._ - -“I stood on rising ground and watched the progress of the attack. The -great breach was attacked first. At the top of it the third division -opened their fire heavily, and it was returned heavily, but there was -a distressing pause. The small breach was carried first, and there -was one considerable explosion and two or three smaller ones on the -ramparts.” - - - SECTION 2. - - BADAJOS.—ASSAULT OF PICURINA. - - C. - -“An engineer officer, who led the attack, told me, two days after, -‘that the place never would have been taken had it not been for the -intelligence of these men (a detachment from the light division) in -absolutely walking round the fort, and finding out the gate, which -was literally beaten down by them, and they entered at the point of -the bayonet. Lieutenant Nixon of the fifty-second was shot through -the body by a Frenchman a yard or two inside the gate.’” - - D. - - ASSAULT OF BADAJOS. - -“For the descent of the light and fourth division into the ditch -only _five ladders_ were placed, and those five ladders were close -to each other. The _advance_ (or storming-party) of the eighth -division preceded that of the fourth division, and I believe that no -part of the fourth division was up in time to suffer from the first -great explosion, and the storming-party only had entered when that -explosion took place; but observe that although the _advance_ of the -light division preceded the _advance_ of the fourth division, I only -mean by that, that the head of the light division entered the ditch -sooner than the _head_ of the fourth division, for the main bodies of -the two divisions joined at the ladders, and were descending into the -ditch at the same time. - -“I consider that the centre breach at Badajos was never seriously -attacked. I was not at the centre breach on the night of the assault, -therefore I cannot positively assert what took place there. But there -were not bodies of dead and wounded at the centre or curtain breach -in the morning to indicate such an attack having been made upon it, -and being in the curtain it was far retired from the troops, and the -approach to it was made extremely difficult by _deep cuts_, and I -think it passed unobserved except by a straggling few.” - -————“I consider that ‘_chevaux de frise_’ were placed upon the summit -of the centre breach during the assault. I was there at day-break. -The approach to it was extremely difficult, both from the difficulty -of finding it, and from the deep holes that were before it, which -to my recollection resembled the holes you see in a clay-field, -where they make bricks. Another great obstruction was the fire from -the faces and flanks of the two bastions, which crossed before the -curtain.” - - - _Extract from a memoir by captain Barney, Chasseurs Britanniques, - acting engineer at the siege._ - -“The explosion of the ‘_Bariques foudroyantes_’ resembled -‘_fougasses_,’ and I expected the bastion would have crumbled to -pieces. At this moment I perceived one person in the midst of fire, -who had gained the top of the breach in the face of the bastion, he -seemed impelling himself forward towards the enemy in an offensive -position when he sank down, apparently destroyed by the fire. On -examining this breach at day-light I found a Portuguese grenadier, -whom I suppose to be the person, as he lay dead the foremost on this -breach.” - -————“Twice the bugles sounded to retire from the breaches. The fire -diminished, and passing along the glacis of the ravelin I hastened to -the attack of general Picton, and found but _two ladders_, one only -just long enough to reach the embrasure, and the other with several -of the upper rounds destroyed. The castle was full of men, and had -the enemy thrown shells among them, I do not think it could have -been kept possession of. Major Burgh came to ascertain the result of -the attack, and the reserves were ordered up. On coming down from -the castle I met general Picton, and told him the castle was full of -men, but they had not advanced into the town. He immediately ordered -sorties to be made to clear the breach, and a good look-out to be -kept towards Christoval.”————“Passing in front of the battery where -lord Wellington was, I went on the right bank of the inundation till -I could cross, and going towards the breach, I was overtaken by the -prince of Orange, carrying an order for colonel Barnard to occupy the -breach. The enemy’s fire had ceased, yet none of the storming-party -knew whether we were successful or not. I told the prince I was just -come from the castle, which was occupied in force. As we approached -the breach the stench of burnt hair and scorched flesh was horrible, -and on the crest of the glacis the dead and wounded lay in such -numbers it was impossible to pass without treading on them.” - -“Here I also found but _three ladders_, one broken so as to render it -useless. On arriving at the _curtain-breach_, some men of the light -division assisted me in removing from the top _the chevaux de frise -of sword-blades and pikes_.” - - - _Extract from a memoir on the escalade of St. Vincent, by - captain Edward P. Hopkins, fourth regiment._ - -“The column halted a few yards from a breast-work surmounted with a -stockade and a ‘_chevaux de frise_’ concealing a guard-house on the -covered way, and at this moment a most awful explosion took place, -followed by the most tremendous peals of musketry. ‘That is at the -breaches,’ was the whisper amongst our soldiers, and their anxiety -to be led forward was intense, but their firmness and obedience were -equally conspicuous. The moon now appeared. We could hear the French -soldiers talking in the guard-house, and their officers were visiting -the sentries. The engineer officer who preceded the column, said, -‘_now is the time_;’ the column instantly moved to the face of the -gateway. It was only at this moment that the sentry observed us, -and fired his alarm-shot, which was followed by musketry. The two -companies of Portuguese carrying the scaling-ladders threw them down, -and deaf to the voices of their officers, made off. This occurrence -did not in the least shake the zeal and steadiness of our men, who -occupied immediately the space left, and shouldering the ladders -moved on. We could not force the gate open, but the breast-work was -instantly crowded, and the impediments cut away sufficiently to allow -of two men entering abreast.”————“The engineer officer was by this -time killed. We had no other assistance from that corps, and the loss -was most severely felt at this early period of the attack.” - -————“The troops were now fast filling the ditch; they had several -ladders, and I shall never forget the momentary disappointment -amongst the men when they found that the ladders were too -short.”————“The enemy took advantage of this to annoy us in every -way, rolling down beams of wood, fire-balls, &c. together with an -_enfilading_ fire. - -“We observed near us an embrasure unfurnished of artillery, its place -being occupied by a gabion filled with earth. A ladder was instantly -placed under its mouth, and also one at each side. This allowed three -persons to ascend at once, but only one at a time could enter in -at the embrasure. The first several attempts were met with instant -death. The ladders were even now too short, and it was necessary for -one person to assist the other by hoisting him up the embrasure.” -“Some shots were fired from a building in the town, and colonel Piper -was sent with a party to dislodge the enemy, while general Walker, -at the head of his brigade, attempted to clear the rampart to the -right,” &c. &c. - -“The enemy retired from the building on our approach, and colonel -Piper did not return to the ramparts, but moved into the body of the -town. Could we have divested our minds of the real situation of the -town it might have been imagined that the inhabitants were preparing -for some grand fête, as all the houses in the streets and squares -were brilliantly illuminated, from the top to the first floor, with -numerous lamps. This illumination scene was truly remarkable, not -a living creature to be seen, but a continual low buz and whisper -around us, and we now and then perceived a small lattice gently -open and re-shut, as if more closely to observe the singular scene -of a small English party perambulating the town in good order, the -bugleman at the head blowing his instrument. Some of our men and -officers now fell wounded; at first we did not know where the shots -came from, but soon observed they were from the sills of the doors. -We soon arrived at a large church facing some grand houses, in a sort -of square. The party here drew up, and it was at first proposed to -take possession of this church, but that idea was abandoned. We made -several prisoners leading some mules laden with loose ball-cartridges -in large wicker baskets, which they stated they were conveying -from the magazines to the breaches. After securing the prisoners, -ammunition, &c., we moved from the square with the intention of -forcing our way upon the ramparts. We went up a small street towards -them, but met with such opposition as obliged us to retire with loss. -We again found ourselves in the square. There an English soldier came -up to us who had been confined in the jail, probably a deserter. -He said our troops had attacked the castle, and had failed, but -that the French troops had afterwards evacuated it. At this period -rapid changes took place. Several French officers came into the -square; the town belonged to the English; the great Wellington was -victorious. A scene of sad confusion now took place; several French -officers of rank, their wives, and children, ran into the square in -a state of frenzy, holding little caskets containing their jewels -and valuables, and their children in their arms. The situation of -these females was dreadful; they implored our protection, and I -believe this party escaped the plunder and pillage which was now -unfortunately in progress. The scene that now commenced surpassed -all that can be imagined; drunkenness, cruelty, and debauchery, the -loss of many lives, and great destruction of property, was one boon -for our victory. The officers had lost all command of their men in -the town; those who had got drunk and had satisfied themselves with -plunder congregated in small parties and fired down the streets. I -saw an English soldier pass through the middle of the street with -a French knapsack on his back; he received a shot through his hand -from some of the drunkards at the top of the street; he merely turned -round and said, damn them, I suppose they took me for a Frenchman. An -officer of the Brunswickers, who was contending with a soldier for -the possession of a canary bird, was shot dead by one of these insane -drunkards. Groups of soldiers were seen in all places, and could we -have forgotten the distressing part of the scene, never was there a -more complete masquerade. Some dressed as monks, some as friars, some -in court-dresses, many carrying furniture, cloth, provisions, money, -plate from the churches; the military chest was even got at by the -soldiers.” - - * * * * * - - - No. VIII. - - - SECTION 1. - - ENGLISH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT’S AND - MARMONT’S OPERATIONS. - - - _Colonel Le Mesurier, commandant of Almeida, to brigadier-general - Trant._ - - “_Almeida, March 28, 1812._ - -“When I took possession of the fortress ten days since, I found -not a single gun in a state for working; either owing to the want -of side-arms or the ill assortment of shot and ammunition, not a -single platform was laid down, and scarcely a single embrasure opened -in any part of the newly repaired fronts. My powder was partly in -an outwork, partly in two buildings scarcely weather-proof, only -one front of my covered way pallisaded, and the face of one of my -ravelins without any revêtement whatever; the revêtement throughout -the whole of the nearly repaired fronts not being more than one-third -or one-fourth of its former height. Many of these defects have been -remedied; we have platforms and embrasures throughout the new fronts, -the guns posted with their proper side-arms and shot-piles, and with -a proper assortment of ammunition in the caissons; the bulk of our -powder and ordnance-cartridge being distributed in bomb proofs; we -have formed a respectable entrenchment on the top of the breach of -the mined ravelin, which it is proposed to arm with pallisades, but -the almost total want of transport has prevented our being able to -complete more than two fronts and a half of our covert way with those -essential defences. From this sketch you will collect that, though -the fortress is not to be walked into, it is yet far from being -secure from the consequences of a resolute assault, particularly if -the garrison be composed of raw and unsteady troops.” - - - _Extract from a memoir of general Trant._ - -“Now it so happened that on this same night Marmont had marched from -Sabugal in order to attack me in Guarda; he had at the least five -thousand infantry, some reports made his force seven thousand, and -he had five or six hundred cavalry. My distrust of the militia with -regard to the execution of precautions such as I had now adopted, -had induced me at all times to have a drummer at my bed-room-door, -in readiness to beat to arms; and this was most fortunately the case -on the night of the 13th April, 1812, for the very first intimation -I received of the enemy being near at hand was given me by my own -servant, on bringing me my coffee at daybreak of the 14th. He said -such was the report in the street, and that the soldiers were -assembling at the alarm rendezvous in the town. I instantly beat -to arms, and the beat being as instantly taken up by every drummer -who heard it, Marmont, who at that very moment was with his cavalry -at the very entrance of the town (quite open on the Sabugal side -more than elsewhere), retired. He had cut off the outposts without -their firing a shot, and, had he only dashed headlong into the town, -must have captured Wilson’s and my militia divisions without losing -probably a single man. I was myself the first out of the town, and -he was not then four hundred yards from it, retiring at a slow pace. -I lost no time in forming my troops in position, and sent my few -dragoons in observation. When at a couple of miles distant Marmont -drew up fronting Guarda, and it turned out, as I inferred, that he -expected infantry.” - - - _Lord Wellington to sir N. Trant._ - - “_Castello Branco, April 17, 1812._ - -“DEAR SIR,—I arrived here about two hours ago. Marshal Beresford -received your letter of the 13th upon the road, and I received that -of the 12th from general Bacellar this morning. We shall move on -as soon as the troops come up: it would appear that the French are -collecting more force upon the Agueda and Coa. You should take care -of yourselves on Guarda if they should collect two divisions at or -in the neighbourhood of Sabugal: Guarda is the most treacherous -position in the country, although very necessary to hold. I should -prefer to see an advanced guard upon it, and the main body on the -Mondego behind. Have you saved my magazines at Celerico? I enclose -a letter for the commissary there and one for don Carlos d’Espagna. -Pray forward both; the former is to order forward fresh supplies to -Celerico. Shew this letter to general Bacellar: I don’t write to him -as I have no Portuguese with me.” &c. &c. - - “WELLINGTON.” - - - _Ditto to ditto._ - - “_Pedrogao, April 1812._ - -“DEAR SIR,—I have received your letter of the 15th, and you will see -by mine of the 17th, written as soon as I knew that your division and -that of general Wilson were on Guarda, that I expected what happened, -and that I wished you to withdraw from that position. In fact, troops -ought not to be put in a strong position in which they can be turned -if they have not an easy retreat from it; and if you advert to that -principle in war, and look at the position of Guarda, you will agree -with me that it is the most treacherous position in Portugal. I can -only say that, as Marmont attacked you, I am delighted that you -have got off so well; which circumstance I attribute to your early -decision not to hold the position, and to the good dispositions which -you made for the retreat from it. - -“As to your plan to surprise Marmont at Sabugal, you did not attempt -to put it in execution, and it is useless to say any thing about it. -I would observe, however, upon one of your principles, viz. that -the magnitude of the object would justify the attempt, that in war, -particularly in our situation and with such troops as we, and you in -particular, command, nothing is so bad as failure and defeat. You -could not have succeeded in that attempt, and you would have lost -your division and that of general Wilson. I give you my opinion very -freely upon your plans and operations as you have written me upon -them, begging you at the same time to believe that I feel for the -difficulty of your situation, and that I am perfectly satisfied that -both you and general Wilson did every thing that officers should do -with such circumstances, and that I attribute to you the safety of -the two divisions. I shall be at Sabugal to-morrow or the next day; -and I hope to see you before we shall again be more distant from each -other.” &c. &c. - - “WELLINGTON.” - - - SECTION 2. - - FRENCH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT’S AND - MARMONT’S OPERATIONS. - - - _Translated. Extracts from Soult’s intercepted despatches._ - - “_Seville, April 14, 1812._ - -“I enclose copies of a letter from the duke of Ragusa, dated 22d -February, and another from general Foy, dated Velvis de Jara, 28th -February, which announced positively that three divisions of infantry -and one division of cavalry of the army of Portugal would join me if -Badajos was attacked; but those divisions, fifteen days afterwards, -marched into Old Castile at the moment when they knew that all the -English army was moving upon Badajos, and at the instant when I, -in virtue of your highness’s (Berthier’s) orders, had sent five -regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, and my skeleton regiments -to Talavera. It is certain that if those three divisions had remained -in the valley of the Tagus the enemy would not have attacked Badajos, -where they could have been fought to advantage. - -“The contrary has arrived. I have been left to my own forces, which -have been reduced by fifteen thousand men, as I have stated above, -and not even a military demonstration has been made, much less -succour, because the attack on Beira could not influence the siege, -and did not.”——“Badajos fell by a ‘_coup de fortune_,’ because it -was not in human foresight to think that five thousand men defending -the breach successfully, would suffer a surprise on a point where -no attack was directed, and when I was within a few marches with -twenty-four thousand men strongly organized. - -“If I had received your highness’s letter when I was before the -English, I might, although unaided by M. Marmont and numerically -inferior, have given battle to save Badajos; but I should probably -have been wrong, and I should have lost the force I left in -Andalusia, where not only Seville was invested and my communications -cut, but a general insurrection was commencing. Happily I heard -in time of the fall of Badajos; but I have not even yet opened -my communications with New Castile, Grenada, or Malaga. I have, -however, prepared in time to deliver a great battle on my own -ground—Andalusia. - -“The emperor, of course, cannot foresee all things, and in his orders -naturally meant that his generals should act with discretion on such -occasions; hence if Marmont had only made demonstrations on Beira -with a part of his army, and had crossed the Tagus to unite with -my troops, the siege would have been raised before the breach was -practicable. Marmont had nothing before him, and he knew Wellington -had passed the Guadiana and commenced the siege: I say that all the -English army had passed the Guadiana, and this was its disposition. - -“General Graham commanding the first corps of observation had the -sixth and seventh divisions of infantry and Cotton’s cavalry two -thousand five hundred strong, with thirty guns. This corps pushed -my right wing to Granja and Azagua at the ‘_debouche_’ of Fuente -Ovejuna, while Hill, with the second and third divisions, twelve -hundred cavalry under Erskine, and twelve guns, moved on my extreme -right in the direction of La Lerena from Belendenzer. - -“Wellington carried on the siege in person, having the fourth -division, part of the third division, a Portuguese corps; and I am -assured he has also two or three thousand Spaniards, which made round -the place eighteen thousand men. - -“The fifth division remained at first on the right bank of the Tagus -with a brigade of cavalry; but they were also called up and came to -Elvas on the 4th or 5th of April. The best accounts gave Wellington -thirty thousand men, and some make him as high as forty thousand, -at the moment when I was before him at Villalba; and if the army of -Portugal had joined me with twenty-five thousand men, Badajos would -have been saved or retaken: and a great victory would throw the -English back into their lines. I was not strong enough alone; and -besides the loss I should have suffered, I could not have got back in -time to save my troops in Andalusia. - -“The English did not hide their knowledge that Marmont was gathering -in Leon; but they knew he had no battering-train, and that the wasted -state of the country would not permit him to penetrate far into -Portugal. So measured, indeed, were their operations, that it is to -be supposed they had intercepted some despatch which explained the -system of operation and the irresolution of Marmont. - -“Your highness tells me I ‘should not have left Hill after his last -movement in December on Estremadura, nor have permitted him to take -my magazines:’ I say he has taken nothing from me. The advanced guard -at Merida lived from day to day on what was sent to them from La -Lerena. I know not if some of this has fallen into his hands; but it -can be but little. But at this period Wellington wished to besiege -Badajos, and only suspended it because of the rain, which would not -let him move his artillery, and because three divisions of the army -of Portugal were in the valley of the Tagus. If they had remained -the siege would not have been undertaken, and Marmont knew this; for -on the 22d February he wrote to me to say that, independent of those -three divisions under Foy, which he destined to send to the aid of -Badajos, he himself would act so as to surmount the difficulties -which the state of his munitions opposed to his resolution to defeat -the enemy’s projects. - -“If your highness looks at the states of the 14th April, you will -see that I had not, as you suppose by your letter of 19th February, -forty thousand men; I had only thirty-five thousand, including the -garrison of Badajos, out of which I had brought with me twenty-four -thousand, the rest being employed before Cadiz at Seville, in Grenada -and Murcia, and against Ballesteros. You must consider that fifteen -days before the English passed the Guadiana I had sent five regiments -of infantry, two of cavalry, and many skeletons upon Talavera, in -all fifteen thousand men; and since two years I have sent many other -skeleton regiments to France, being more than fifteen thousand men -changing their destination or worn out, without having yet received -the troops from the interior destined for my army, although these are -borne on the states: besides which, I have four thousand men unfit -for the field, who ought to go to France, but I am forced to employ -them in the posts. Ballesteros has, besides the army of Murcia, ten -thousand men; and in Murcia the Spaniards are strong, because the -fugitives from Valencia had joined two divisions which had not been -engaged there, and thus, including the garrisons of Alicant and -Carthagena, they had fifteen thousand men. Suchet’s operations have -certainly produced great results, but for _the moment_ have hurt -me, because all who fly from him come back upon my left flank at a -moment when I have only three battalions and four hundred cavalry to -oppose them at Grenada only. I have sent my brother there in haste -to support them. The English, Portuguese, and Spanish at Cadiz, -Gibraltar, and on the ocean could also at any time descend with ten -or twelve thousand men on any part of my line, and I want at least as -many to oppose them and guard my posts. I may therefore be accused of -having carried too many men to the relief of Badajos; and that army -was not strong enough, though excellent in quality. - -“I cannot hold twenty thousand men, as your highness desires, on -the Guadiana, unless I am reinforced, especially since the fall of -Badajos; but as soon as I know the English have repassed that river, -all my right under d’Erlon, _i.e._ nine regiments of infantry and -four of cavalry, and twelve guns, shall march into the interior of -Estremadura, and occupy Medellin, Villafranca, and even Merida, and, -if possible, hold in check the garrison of Badajos and the English -corps left in Alemtejo, and so prevent any grand movement up the -valley of the Tagus against Madrid. - -“Since my return here the demonstrations of the English appear -directed to invade Andalusia so far as to have obliged me to -unfurnish many points, and even in a manner raise the siege of Cadiz, -Graham has come to Llerena, and Cotton to Berlanga, where we had an -affair and lost sixty men.” “I have ordered d’Erlon to repass the -Guadalquivir and come to me to fight the English if they advance; if -not, he shall go on again, and I think the English general will not -commit the fault of entering the mountains, though he says he will!” - - * * * * * - - - No. IX. - - - SECTION 1. - - SUMMARY OF THE FORCE OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY AT DIFFERENT - PERIODS, EXCLUSIVE OF DRUMMERS AND ARTILLERY-MEN. - -October 1, 1811.—Cavalry. - - Present. Sick. Command. Prisoners. Total. - British 3571 1114 947 298 5930 - Portuguese 1373 256 1140 — 2769 - ------------------------------------------ - Total Cavalry 4944 1370 2087 298 8699 - ------------------------------------------ - -Infantry. - - British 29530 17974 2663 1684 51851 - Portuguese 23689 6009 1707 75 31480 - ------------------------------------------- - Total - Infantry 53219 23983 4370 1759 83331 - ------------------------------------------- - -General Total, including serjeants, 58263 sabres and bayonets in the -field. - - -January 8, 1812.—Cavalry. - - British 4949 841 741 — 6531 - Portuguese 613 43 275 — 391 - ------------------------------------------ - Total Cavalry 5562 884 1016 — 7462 - ------------------------------------------ - -Infantry. - - British 30222 11414 2827 — 14463 - Portuguese 20455 4849 2360 51 27715 - ------------------------------------------- - Total - Infantry 50677 16263 5187 51 72178 - ------------------------------------------- - -General Total, including sergeants, 56239 sabres and bayonets in the -field. - -Note. The abuses and desertions in the Portuguese cavalry had been so -great that one division was suppressed. - - -April 5, 1812.—Cavalry. - - Present. Sick. Command. Prisoners. Total. - British 4299 564 755 3 6048 - Portuguese 347 9 492 — 808 - ------------------------------------------ - Total Cavalry 4646 573 1247 3 6896 - ------------------------------------------ - -Infantry. - - British 26897 11452 2779 2 40703 - Portuguese 20224 5532 1507 18 27281 - ------------------------------------------- - Total - Infantry 47121 16984 4286 20 67984 - ------------------------------------------- - - Sabres and bayonets 51767 - Field artillery-men 1980 - Gunners in the batteries 900 - ----- - General Total 54647 - ----- - -Note. The heavy German cavalry were in the rear at Estremos, and two -Portuguese regiments were in Abrantes. - - - TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF BADAJOS, APRIL, 1812. - -British. - - Light division 2679 - Third division 2882 - Fourth division 2579 - Fifth division 2896 - ---- 11036 - -Portuguese. - - Hamilton’s division 4685 - Light division 858 - Third division 976 - Fourth division 2384 - Fifth division 1845 - ---- 10748 - ----- - Total 21,784 - ------ - - - ALLIED COVERING CORPS IN APRIL, 1812. - -Cavalry under general Hill.—Left Wing. - - British 783 - Portuguese 347 - ---- 1130 - -Infantry ditto. - - British 6156 - Portuguese 2385 - ---- 8541 - ----- - Total under general Hill 9671 - ----- - -Cavalry under general Graham.—Right Wing. - - British 3517 - Portuguese — - ---- 3517 - -Infantry ditto. - - British 10154 - Portuguese 5896 - ----- 16050 - ----- - Total under general Graham 19567 - ----- - -General Total of the covering army, exclusive of the artillery-men -and the heavy German cavalry, who remained in the rear at Estremos, -29238 sabres and bayonets. - - - SECTION 2. - - SUMMARY OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT - BADAJOS, 1812. - - - ASSAULT. - - _British Loss._ - - Killed. Wounded. - Generals — 5 - Staff 1 11 - Officers. Soldiers. - Artillery 2 20 - Engineers 5 5 - -- -- - Total 7 25 - -- -- - -Light division.--_Line._ - - Officers. Soldiers. Total. - 43d 18 329 347 } 670 - 52d 18 305 323 } - 95th, 1st bat. 14 179 193 - 95th, 3d bat. 8 56 64 - -- --- --- - Total 58 849 927 - -- --- --- - -Third division. - - 5th 4 41 45 } - 45th 14 83 97 } - 74th 7 47 54 } - 77th 3 10 13 } 490 - 83d 8 62 70 } - 88th 10 135 145 } - 94th 2 154 173 } - -- --- --- - 48 442 490 - -- --- --- - -Fourth division. - - Officers. Soldiers. Total. - 7th 17 163 180 - 23rd 17 134 151 - 27th 15 170 185 - 40th 16 124 140 - 48th 19 154 173 - -- --- --- - 84 745 829 - -- --- --- - -Fifth division. - - 1st 2 — 2 - 4th 17 213 230 - 9th — — — - 30th 6 126 132 - 38th 5 37 42 - 44th 9 95 104 - -- --- --- - 39 471 510 - -- --- --- - - 60th[3] 4 30 34 - Brunswick Oels[3] 2 33 35 - - -FOOTNOTE: - - [3] These regiments were attached by companies to the third, - fourth, and fifth divisions. - - -Total British loss at the assault. - - Officers. Sergeants. Soldiers. Total. - 51 40 560 killed } - 213 153 1983 wounded } 3022 - — 1 21 missing } - -Total Portuguese loss at the assault. - - 8 6 141 killed } - 45 32 468 wounded } 730 - — — 30 missing } - --- --- ---- ---- - Grand Total 317 232 3203 3752 - --- --- ---- ---- - - -British loss during the whole siege. - - Officers. Sergeants. Soldiers. Total. - 60 45 715 killed } - 251 178 2578 wounded } 3860 - — 1 32 missing } - - -Portuguese loss during the whole siege. - - 12 6 137 killed } - 55 38 687 wounded } 965 - — — 30 missing } - --- --- ---- ---- - General Total 378 268 4179 4825 - --- --- ---- ---- - - - - SECTION 3.--SUMMARY OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN SPAIN AT DIFFERENT - PERIODS, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS - - Under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Pris. Men. Horses. - - August 1811 262,276 37,669 50,502 10,869 41,452 00 354,418 35,348 - Reinforcements train 13,190 - in March 17,361 3,929 81 ” 981 00 18,423 3,929 - ------------------------------------------------------ - Total 279,637 41,598 50,583 10,869 42,433 00 372,841 52,467 - ------------------------------------------------------ - January 1812 258,156 41,049 22,805 5,434 42,056 00 324,933 42,348 - ------------------------------------------------------ - April 1812 240,654 36,590 12,224 3,314 33,504 ” 286,440 40,161 - Reserve 4,038 157 36 35 865 ” 4,939 192 - at Bayonne - ------------------------------------------------------ - Total 244,692 36,747 12,260 3,849 34,369 ” 291,379 40,653 - ------------------------------------------------------ - -_Observation._--In September 1811 an army of reserve, consisting of -two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, with artillery, in all -20,287 under arms, was formed for the armée du midi. - - -1st August, 1811. - - Under arms. Detached. Effective. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses. - 1,195 } - Armée du Midi 50,597 10,008 32,043 5,359 11,836 94,508 ----- } 4,608 - 3,413 } - - 3,236 } - du centre 16,540 3,729 391 64 1,781 18,712 ----- } 3,793 - 557 } - - 6,692 } - de Portugal 38,392 5,826 7,901 3,100 10,424 56,733 ----- } 8,926 - 2,334 } - - 3,667 } - d’Aragon 45,102 5,718 1,397 388 5,458 51,957 ----- } 6,106 - 2,439 } - - 3,531 } - du Nord 88,092 11,020 7,617 1,805 6,654 102,413 ----- } 12,825 - 4,294 } - - 1,268 } - de Catalogne 23,553 1,368 1,153 153 5,305 30,095 ----- } 1,521 - 253 } - ----------------------------------------------------------- - 35,348 } - Total 262,270 37,669 50,502 10,869 41,452 354,418 ----- } 48,538 - 13,190 } - - Reinforcements 17,361 3,929 81 ” 981 18,423 3,929 - ----------------------------------------------------------- - 39,277 } - General total 279,637 41,598 50,583 10,869 42,433 372,841 ----- } 52,467 - 13,190 } - ----------------------------------------------------------- - - -STATE OF THE IMPERIAL GUARDS. - -15th August, 1811. - - Under arms. Detached. Effective. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses. - 12,797 3,193 3,944 14 1,189 17,613 3,179 - ------------------------------------------------------- - - -STATE OF THE GARRISON OF BADAJOS. - -16th May, 1811.--Fifth battalion. - - 2,887 239 361 ” 380 3,725 239 - -1st March, 1812. - - 4,893 44 ” ” 478 5,034 44 - ------------------------------------------------------- - - -STATE OF THE GARRISON OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. - -15th December, 1811. - - 1,764 19 ” ” 130 1,956 19 - ------------------------------------------------------- - - -Return of numbers, by armies, 1st October, 1811. - - Under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp.Pris. Men. Horses. - 9,251 } - Armée du Midi 66,912 11,757 7,539 2,232 13,398 ” 88,033 ---- } 12,644 - train 3,393 } - - 5,196 } - du centre 19,125 6,262 511 84 1,685 ” 21,321 ---- } 5,749 - 553 } - - 6,909 } - de Portugal 50,167 11,662 1,283 858 10,012 ” 61,462 ---- } 11,615 - 4,706 } - - 3,322 } - d’Aragon 28,966 5,303 6,583 308 4,424 ” 39,953 ---- } 5,282 - 1,960 } - - 6,769 } - du Nord 87,913 10,821 6,201 1,069 9,414 ” 10,528 ---- } 10,955 - 4,186 } - - 1,150 } - de Catalogne 26,954 1,365 993 168 11,186 ” 39,241 ----- } 1,439 - 289 } - - Total 280,017 47,270 23,110 4,717 50,119 ” 353,538 37,684 - ----------------------------------------------------------- - Reinforcements 9,232 689 1,226 10,458 516 - ----------------------------------------------------------- - General Total 289,249 47,959 23,110 4,717 51,345 ” 363,996 38,200 - ----------------------------------------------------------- - - -15th April, 1812. - - Under arms. Detached. Effective. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses. - - Armée du Midi 55,797 11,014 2,498 70 6,065 64,360 11,714 - du centre 19,148 3,293 144 51 624 19,916 4,044 - de Portugal 56,937 8,108 4,394 2,278 7,706 69,037 10,386 - d’Aragon 14,786 3,269 2,695 658 1,467 18,948 8,927 - de l’Ebre 16,830 1,873 21 6 3,425 20,276 1,879 - de Catalogne 28,924 1,259 1,163 49 5,540 35,627 1,308 - du Nord 48,232 7,074 1,309 72 8,677 58,276 7,213 - -------------------------------------------------------- - Total 240,654 36,590 12,224 3,814 33,534 286,440 40,461 - Reserve a - Bayonne 4,038 157 36 35 865 4,939 192 - ------------------------------------------------------- - Grand total 244,692 36,747 12,260 3,849 34,369 291,379 40,653 - ------------------------------------------------------- - - - END OF VOL. IV. - - - MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET. - - * * * * * - - - PUBLISHED BY - - T. AND W. 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Each language is treated upon a _uniform - plan_, and analyzed on new and simple principles; short and - comprehensive rules are given, for attaining a just pronunciation, - for determining the gender, and inflecting the noun and verb; - together with a Syntax and Prosody, fully exemplified, and a - classed vocabulary of the most useful and necessary words. - - - THE EXPECTATIONS FORMED BY THE ASSYRIANS, THAT A GREAT DELIVERER - WOULD APPEAR, ABOUT THE TIME OF OUR LORD’S ADVENT, DEMONSTRATED. - 8vo. price 10_s._ boards. - - _And all the other Works of the same Author._ - - * * * * * - - - MOMENTS OF IDLENESS; - - OR, - - A PEEP INTO THE WORLD WE CALL “_OURS_.” - - “Il y en a qui ne font rien,—il y en a d’autres qui font des riens.” - - In 1 vol. foolscap 8vo. neatly bound in cloth, price 7_s._ - - “Will prove a pleasant source of mental employment at a leisure - hour.”——_Monthly Review._ - - “The author is clever and thinks, which is what very few people - actually achieve.”——_New Monthly Magazine._ - - “He is worth any man’s perusal (we have read him every bit); and, - besides many striking reflections, gives numerous evidences of a - benevolent and social disposition.”——_True Sun._ - - “This is a very remarkable volume, and it is one of great merit; - and he who devotes to it his ‘Moments of Idleness’ will be idle - no longer, or then it will be his own fault. We have seldom met, - indeed, with a volume containing so many and such substantial - materials for thinking, in so small a compass, and combining at the - same time so much intellectual employment with so much literary - amusement.”——_Liverpool Chronicle._ - - * * * * * - - - WALTER; - - OR, - - A WORD MORE TO THE WISE. - - “Still he comes, - Summer or winter, frost or rain. I’ve seen - The snow upon a level with the hedge, - Yet there was Master Walter.” - _Hunchback, Act_ 1. _Scene_ 2. - - BY THE AUTHOR OF “MOMENTS OF IDLENESS.” - - In 1 vol. foolscap 8vo. neatly bound in cloth, price 7_s._ - - * * * * * - - - A TREATISE - - ON THE - - GAME OF WHIST, - - BY THE LATE - - ADMIRAL CHARLES BURNEY, - - Author of Voyages and Discoveries in the Pacific, &c. - - _Second Edition._ 18mo. boards, price 2_s._ - - “The kind of play recommended in this Treatise is on the most - plain, and what the Author considers the most safe principles. I - have limited my endeavours to the most necessary instructions, - classing them as much as the subject enabled me, under separate - heads, to facilitate their being rightly comprehended and easily - remembered. For the greater encouragement of the learner, I - have studied brevity; but not in a degree to have prevented my - endeavouring more to make the principles of the game, and the - rationality of them intelligible, than to furnish a young player - with a set of rules to get by rote, that he might go blindly right.” - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Footnote [3] has two anchors on page 587. - - Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been - corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within - the text and consultation of external sources. - - Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, - when a predominant preference was found in the original book. - - To save space in the wide tables in Note IX of the Appendix, the - heading ‘Hospital.’ has been abbreviated to ‘Hosp.’. - - In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, some - corrections to accents have been made silently; primarily é for e, - and e for é. Incorrect grammar and spelling have been left unchanged. - - Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, - and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. - - Table of Contents: - Pg iii: ‘on the Orbigo’ replaced by ‘on the Orvigo’. - Pg iii: ‘General Leval’ replaced by ‘General Laval’. - Pg v: ‘the mili ary force’ replaced by ‘the military force’. - - Main text: - Pg 5: ‘by sea to St. Ander’ replaced by ‘by sea to Santander’. - Pg 13: ‘he surprized some’ replaced by ‘he surprised some’. - Pg 33: ‘embarrasments thus’ replaced by ‘embarrassments thus’. - Pg 48: ‘and Legre rivers’ replaced by ‘and Segre rivers’. - Pg 51: ‘to war down’ replaced by ‘to wear down’. - Pg 61: ‘Promothean touch’ replaced by ‘Promethean touch’. - Pg 135: ‘commucating with the alledged’ replaced by - ‘communicating with the alleged’. - Pg 141: ‘were they all’ replaced by ‘where they all’. - Pg 162: ‘the admistration’ replaced by ‘the administration’. - Pg 164: ‘Mr. Suart and’ replaced by ‘Mr. Stuart and’. - Pg 169: ‘acknowleged that’ replaced by ‘acknowledged that’. - Pg 169: ‘a proponderance to’ replaced by ‘a preponderance to’. - Pg 170: ‘Rio Janeiro’ replaced by ‘Rio de Janeiro’. - Pg 196: ‘aid-du-camp’ replaced by ‘aide-de-camp’. - Pg 231: ‘Miunte reports of’ replaced by ‘Minute reports of’. - Pg 243: ‘Aldea Ponte’ replaced by ‘Aldea de Ponte’. - Pg 245: ‘behind the Soita’ replaced by ‘behind Soita’. - Pg 268: ‘which caanot now’ replaced by ‘which cannot now’. - Pg 296, image caption: ‘The Seige’ replaced by ‘The Siege’. - Pg 309: ‘also an artifical’ replaced by ‘also an artificial’. - Pg 310: ‘and Catalayud to’ replaced by ‘and Calatayud to’. - Pg 314: ‘were straightened’ replaced by ‘were straitened’. - Pg 319: ‘a confidental’ replaced by ‘a confidential’. - Pg 319: ‘the Guadalquiver’ replaced by ‘the Guadalquivir’. - Pg 330, image caption: ‘SEIGE of’ replaced by ‘SIEGE of’. - Pg 342: ‘at Bergem-op-Zoon’ replaced by ‘at Bergen-op-Zoom’. - Pg 345: ‘from the Pyrennees’ replaced by ‘from the Pyrenees’. - Pg 373: ‘round St. Ander’ replaced by ‘round Santander’. - Pg 373: ‘de St. Ander’ replaced by ‘de Santander’. - Pg 383: missing ‘3º.’ inserted before ‘Left attack’. - Pg 388: ‘all loop-hooled’ replaced by ‘all loop-holed’. - Pg 403: ‘third divison’ replaced by ‘third division’. - Pg 419: ‘unususally still’ replaced by ‘unusually still’. - Pg 425: ‘semed like the’ replaced by ‘seemed like the’. - Pg 438: ‘Fuentes Overjuña’ replaced by ‘Fuente Obejuna’. - Pg 472: ‘not be irrelevent’ replaced by ‘not be irrelevant’. - Pg 502: ‘circnmstances, and’ replaced by ‘circumstances, and’. - Pg 549: ‘September 1’ replaced by ‘Septembre 1’. - Pg 572: ‘were loop-holded’ replaced by ‘were loop-holed’. - Pg 588: ‘13,190 train’ replaced by ‘train 13,190’. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 4 OF 6 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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