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diff --git a/old/68372-0.txt b/old/68372-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a47ee65..0000000 --- a/old/68372-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34602 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 15, by Various - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International - Military Tribunal, Volume 15 - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 - -Author: Various - -Release Date: June 21, 2022 [eBook #68372] - -Language: English - -Produced by: John Routh PM, Cindy Beyer, and the online Distributed - Proofreaders Canada team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR -CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOLUME 15 *** - - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - TRIAL - OF - THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - - BEFORE - - THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - _NUREMBERG_ - 14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946 - - - [Illustration] - - - _PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY_ - _1948_ - - - - - This volume is published in accordance with the - direction of the International Military Tribunal by - the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction - of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. - - - - - VOLUME XV - - _OFFICIAL TEXT_ - - _IN THE_ - - ENGLISH LANGUAGE - - - - _PROCEEDINGS_ - - - 29 May 1946-10 June 1946 - - - - - CONTENTS - - - One Hundred and Forty-first Day, Wednesday, 29 May 1946, - Morning Session 1 - Afternoon Session 36 - - One Hundred and Forty-second Day, Thursday, 30 May 1946, - Morning Session 63 - Afternoon Session 100 - - One Hundred and Forty-third Day, Friday, 31 May 1946, - Morning Session 132 - Afternoon Session 169 - - One Hundred and Forty-fourth Day, Saturday, 1 June 1946, - Morning Session 212 - - One Hundred and Forty-fifth Day, Monday, 3 June 1946, - Morning Session 253 - Afternoon Session 288 - - One Hundred and Forty-sixth Day, Tuesday, 4 June 1946, - Morning Session 311 - Afternoon Session 338 - - One Hundred and Forty-seventh Day, Wednesday, 5 June 1946, - Morning Session 370 - Afternoon Session 400 - - One Hundred and Forty-eighth Day, Thursday, 6 June 1946, - Morning Session 435 - Afternoon Session 474 - - One Hundred and Forty-ninth Day, Friday, 7 June 1946, - Morning Session 512 - Afternoon Session 546 - - One Hundred and Fiftieth Day, Saturday, 8 June 1946, - Morning Session 574 - - One Hundred and Fifty-first Day, Monday, 10 June 1946, - Morning Session 610 - Afternoon Session 640 - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST DAY - Wednesday, 29 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): The Tribunal will -adjourn this afternoon at 4 o’clock in order to sit in closed session. - -MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Mr. -President, the day before yesterday the Tribunal asked if we would -ascertain whether or not Document Number D-880 had been offered in -evidence. It consists of extracts from the testimony of Admiral Raeder, -and we have ascertained that it was offered, and it is Exhibit Number -GB-483. It was put to a witness by Mr. Elwyn Jones in the course of -cross-examination, and it has been offered in evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -MR. DODD: Also, with respect to the Court’s inquiry concerning the -status of other defendants and their documents, we are able to say this -morning that with respect to the Defendant Jodl the documents are now -being translated and mimeographed, and there is no need for any hearing -before the Tribunal. - -The Seyss-Inquart documents have been heard and are now being translated -and mimeographed. - -The Von Papen documents are settled; there is no disagreement between -the Prosecution and the Defendant Von Papen, and they are in the process -of being mimeographed and translated. - -With respect to the Defendant Speer, we think there will be no need for -any hearing, and I expect that by the end of today they will be sent to -the translating and mimeographing departments. - -The documents for the Defendant Von Neurath have not yet been submitted -by the defendant to the Prosecution. - -And with respect to the Defendant Fritzsche, our Russian colleagues will -be in a position to advise us more exactly in the course of the day. I -expect that I shall be able to advise the Tribunal as to the Defendant -Fritzsche before the session ends today. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude all questions of witnesses? - -MR. DODD: Yes, I believe—at least, we have no objection to any of the -witnesses. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then; there need not be any further hearing in -open court on the cases of the Defendants Jodl, Seyss-Inquart, Von -Papen, and Speer until their actual cases are presented. - -MR. DODD: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Defendant Sauckel): Mr. President, -I have a technical question to bring up. Yesterday the witness -Hildebrandt arrived, but again it was the wrong Hildebrandt. This is the -third witness who has appeared here in this comedy of errors. It was the -wrong one for Mende, the wrong one for Stothfang, and the wrong one for -Hildebrandt. But this witness knows where the right ones are. - -The witnesses had received information in their camp that they were to -appear here and they were then taken to the collecting center for -Ministerial Directors in Berlin-Lichterfelde. Perhaps it will still be -possible to bring these two witnesses here. Especially the witness -Hildebrandt, who can testify about the French matters, would be of -importance if we could still get him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was the name given accurately to the General Secretary? - -DR. SERVATIUS: The name was given accurately. The other man’s name was -also Hildebrandt, only not Hubert but Heinrich. He was also a -Ministerial Director... - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not mean only the surname but all his Christian -names. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, one name was Heinrich and the other Hubert, and -abbreviated it was “H” for both, Dr. H. Hildebrandt, which apparently -caused the confusion. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I say the names of all witnesses had better be -given in full; really in full, not merely with initials. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I had given the name in full. As to the physician, the -Witness Dr. Jäger, I received his private address this morning. He is -not under arrest. He was at first a witness for the Prosecution. His -private address is in Essen, in the Viehhof Platz, and he is there now. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better take up all these details with the -General Secretary, and he will give you every assistance. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the case of Sauckel, I should like to make one -more remark to the Tribunal. - -There are about 150 documents which have been submitted by the -Prosecution, and some of them are only remotely connected with Sauckel. -No trial brief and no special charges were presented here orally against -Sauckel, so that I cannot see in detail to what extent Sauckel is held -responsible. The case was dealt with only under the heading of “Slave -Labor,” and so the ground of the defense is somewhat unsteady. - -I do not intend to discuss every one of these 150 documents, but I -should like to reserve the right to deal with some of them later if that -should appear necessary. I want to point out only the most important -ones, and then return to them in the course of the proceedings. At any -rate, may I ask you not to construe it as an admission if I do not raise -objections against any of these documents now. - -THE PRESIDENT: No admission will be inferred from that. Dr. Servatius, I -have before me here a document presented by the French Prosecution -against the Defendant Sauckel. I suppose what you mean is that that -document, that trial brief entitled _Responsabilité Individuelle_, does -not refer to each of these 150 documents. - -DR. SERVATIUS: There was, first of all, a document book, “Slave Labor,” -submitted by the American Prosecution, which is not headed “Sauckel” but -“Slave Labor”; and I cannot say, therefore, which parts concern Sauckel -in particular. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, it does say, “...and the special responsibility of -the Defendants Sauckel and Speer therefore...” That is the American -document book. It does name Sauckel. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And there is this other trial brief presented by Mr. -Mounier on behalf of the French Delegation, which is definitely against -Sauckel. But no doubt that does not specify all these 150 documents that -you are referring to. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -[_The Defendant Sauckel resumed the stand._] - -Witness, yesterday near the end of the session we spoke about a -manifesto—that memorandum which was intended to impress upon the -various offices their duty to carry out your directives and to remove -the resistance that existed. Now, you yourself have made statements -which are hardly compatible with your directives, it seems. I submit to -you Document Number R-124. That concerns a meeting of the Central -Planning Board of 1 March 1944. There, with regard to recruitment, you -said that, in order to get the workers, one ought to resort to -“shanghai,” as was the custom in earlier days. You said: - - “I have even resorted to the method of training staffs of French - men and women agents ... who go out on man hunts and stupefy - victims with drink and persuasive arguments in order to get them - to Germany.” - -Have you found that? - -FRITZ SAUCKEL (Defendant): I have found it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Whereabouts in 124 is it? - -DR. SERVATIUS: That is Document R-124. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but it is a very long document. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It is in the document itself, Page 1770. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have got it. - -SAUCKEL: That is, as I can see, the report or record of a meeting of the -Central Planning Board of the spring of 1944. During that year it had -become extremely difficult for me to meet the demands of the various -employers of labor represented in the Central Planning Board. At no time -did I issue directives or even recommendations to “shanghai.” In this -conference I merely used that word as reminiscent of my days as a -seaman, in order to defend myself against those who demanded workers of -me, and in order to make it clear to the gentlemen how difficult my task -had become, particularly in 1944. Actually, a very simple situation is -at the root of this. According to German labor laws and according to my -own convictions, the “Arbeitsvermittlung” (procurement of labor)—the -old word for “Arbeitseinsatz” (allocation of labor)—was a right of the -State; and we, myself included, scorned private methods of recruitment. -In 1944 Premier Laval, the head of the French government, told me that -he was also having great difficulties in carrying out the labor laws -where his own workers were concerned. - -In view of that, and in agreement with one of my collaborators, Dr. -Didier, conferences were held in the German Embassy—the witness -Hildebrandt, I believe, is better able to give information about -that—with the head of the collaborationist associations, that is to -say, associations among the French population which advocated -collaboration with Germany. During these conferences at the German -Embassy these associations stated that in their opinion official -recruitment in France had become very difficult. They said that they -would like to take charge of that and would like to provide recruiting -agents from their own ranks and also provide people from among their -members who would go to Germany voluntarily. Recruitment was not to take -place through official agencies but in cafés. In these cafés, of course, -certain expenses would be necessary which would have to be met; and the -recruiting agents would have to be paid a bonus, or be compensated by a -glass of wine or some gin. That way of doing things, naturally, did not -appeal to me personally; but I was in such difficulties in view of the -demands put to me that I agreed, without intending, of course, that the -idea of “shanghai” with its overseas suggestions and so forth should be -seriously considered. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did this suggestion come from the Frenchmen, or was it -your suggestion? - -SAUCKEL: As I have said already, the suggestion was made by the French -leaders of these associations. - -DR. SERVATIUS: If you read on a few lines in the document, you will find -that mention is made of special executive powers which you wanted to -create for the allocation of labor; it says there: - - “Beyond that, I have charged a few capable men with the - establishment of a special executive force for the Allocation of - Labor. Under the leadership of the Higher SS and Police Leader a - number of indigenous units have been trained and armed, and I - now have to ask the Ministry of Munitions for weapons for these - people.” - -How do you explain that? - -SAUCKEL: That, also, can be explained clearly only in connection with -the events that I have just described. At that time there had been many -attacks on German offices and mixed German-French labor offices. The -Director of the Department for the Allocation of Labor in the office of -the military commander in France, President Dr. Ritter, had been -murdered. A number of recruiting offices had been raided and destroyed. -For that reason these associations who were in favor of collaboration -had suggested, for the protection of their own members, that a sort of -bodyguard for the recruiting organization should be set up. Of course I -could not do that myself because I had neither the authority nor the -machinery for it. In accordance with the orders of the military -commander, it had to be done by the Higher SS and Police Leader; that -is, under his supervision. This was carried out in conjunction with the -French Minister of the Interior at that time, Darnand; so as to be able -to stand my ground against the censure of the Central Planning Board, I -used an example in this drastic form. As far as I know, these -hypothetical suggestions were not put into practice. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who actually carried out the recruitment of the foreign -workers? - -SAUCKEL: The actual recruitment of foreign workers was the task of the -German offices established in the various regions, the offices of the -military commanders or similar civilian German institutions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You ordered recruitment to be voluntary. What was the -success of that voluntary recruitment? - -SAUCKEL: Several million foreign workers came to Germany voluntarily, as -voluntary recruitment was the underlying principle. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now, at the meeting of the Central Planning Board—the -same meeting which we have just discussed—you made a remark which -contradicts that. It is on Page 67 of the German photostat, Page 1827 of -the English text. I shall read the sentence to you. Kehrl is speaking. -He says, “During that entire period, you brought a large number of -Frenchmen to the Reich by voluntary recruitment.” - -Then an interruption by Sauckel: “Also by forced recruitment.” - -The speaker continues, “Forced recruitment started when voluntary -recruitment no longer yielded sufficient numbers.” - -Now comes the remark on which I want you to comment. You answered, “Of -the 5 million foreign workers who came to Germany, less than 200,000 -came voluntarily.” - -Please explain that contradiction. - -SAUCKEL: I see that this is another interruption which I made. All I -wanted to say by it was that Herr Kehrl’s opinion that all workers had -come voluntarily was not quite correct. This proportion, which is put -down here by the stenographer or the man writing the records, is quite -impossible. How that error occurred, I do not know. I never saw the -record; but the witness Timm, or others, can give information on that. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I refer now to Exhibit Sauckel-15. That is Directive -Number 4, which has been quoted already and which lays down specific -regulations with regard to recruiting measures. It has already been -submitted as Document Number 3044-PS. Why did you now abandon the -principle of voluntary recruitment? - -SAUCKEL: In the course of the war our opponents also carried out very -considerable and widespread countermeasures. The need for manpower in -Germany, on the other hand, had become tremendous. During that period a -request was also put to me by French, Belgian, and Dutch circles to -bring about a better balance in the economy of these territories and -even to introduce what we called a labor draft law, so that the pressure -of enemy propaganda would be reduced and the Dutch, Belgians, and French -themselves could say that they were not going to Germany voluntarily but -that they had to go because of a compulsory labor service and because of -laws. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did the proximity of the front have any influence on the -fact that people no longer wanted to come voluntarily? - -SAUCKEL: Of course I came to feel that; and it is understandable that -the chances of victory and defeat caused great agitation among the -workers; and the way things looked at the front certainly played an -important part. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did purely military considerations also cause the -introduction... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Dr. -Servatius, will you ask the witness what he means by a labor draft law. -Does he mean a law of Germany or a law of the occupied countries? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you heard the question, whether you mean a -German law or a law of the administration of the occupied countries? - -SAUCKEL: That varied. The Reich Government in some of the territories -introduced laws which corresponded to the laws that were valid for the -German people themselves. Those laws could not be issued by me, but they -were issued by the chiefs of the regional administrations or the -government of the country concerned on the order of the German -Government. - -In France these laws were issued by the Laval Government, in agreement -with Marshal Pétain; in Belgium, in agreement with the Belgian general -secretaries or general directors still in office or with the ministries. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean, in the other countries, by the German -Government or the German Government’s representatives? You have only -spoken of... - -SAUCKEL: The order to introduce German labor laws in the occupied -territories was given by the Führer. They were proclaimed and introduced -by the chiefs who had been appointed by the Führer for these -territories, for I myself was not in a position to issue any directives, -laws, or regulations there. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How were these laws carried out? - -SAUCKEL: The laws were published in the official publications and legal -gazettes, as well as being made known through the press and by posters -in those territories. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I mean the practical execution. How were the people -brought to Germany? - -SAUCKEL: They were summoned to the local labor office, which was mostly -administered by local authorities. Cases had to be examined -individually, according to my directives, which have been submitted here -as documents. Cases of hardship to the family, or other such cases, were -given special consideration. Then, in the normal manner—as was done in -Germany also—the individual workers or conscripted persons were brought -to Germany. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you present—did you ever witness this procedure? - -SAUCKEL: I observed this procedure personally in a number of cities in -Russia, France, and Belgium; and I made sure that it was carried out in -accordance with orders. - -DR. SERVATIUS: If compulsion was necessary, what coercive measures were -taken? - -SAUCKEL: At first, such compulsory measures were taken as are justified -and necessary in every normal civil administration. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And if they were not sufficient? - -SAUCKEL: Then proceedings were proposed. - -DR. SERVATIUS: These were legal measures, were they? - -SAUCKEL: According to my conviction, they were legal measures. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You have stated repeatedly in documents, which are -available here, that a certain amount of pressure was to be used. What -did you mean by that? - -SAUCKEL: I consider that every administrative measure taken on the basis -of laws or duties imposed by the state, on one’s own nation, or in any -other way, constitutes some form of stress, duty, pressure. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were not measures used which brought about some sort of -collective pressure? - -SAUCKEL: I rejected every kind of collective pressure. The refusal to -employ collective pressure is also evident from decrees issued by other -German offices in the Reich. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Is it not true that in the East the villages were called -upon to provide a certain number of people? - -SAUCKEL: In the East, of course, administrative procedure was rendered -difficult on account of the great distances. In the lower grades, as far -as I know, native mayors were in office in every case. It is possible -that a mayor was requested to select a number of workers from his -village or town for work in Germany. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Is that the same as that form of collective pressure, -where, if nobody came, the entire village was to be punished? - -SAUCKEL: Measures of that kind I rejected entirely in my field of -activity, because I could not and would not bring to the German economy -workers who had been taken to Germany in such a manner that they would -hate their life and their work in Germany from the very outset. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What police facilities were at your disposal? - -SAUCKEL: I had no police facilities at my disposal. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who exercised the police pressure? - -SAUCKEL: Police pressure in the occupied territories could be exerted on -order or application of the respective chief of the territory, or of the -Higher SS and Police Leader, if authorized. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then it was not within your competence to exert direct -pressure? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you exert indirect pressure by your directives, by -cutting off food supplies, or similar measures? - -SAUCKEL: After the fall of Stalingrad and the proclamation of the state -of total war, Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels in Berlin interfered -considerably in all these problems. He ordered that in cases of -persistent refusal or signs of resistance compulsion was to be used by -means of refusing additional food rations, or even by withdrawal of -ration cards. I personally rejected measures of that kind energetically, -because I knew very well that in the western territories the so-called -food ration card played a subordinate role and that supplies were -provided for the resistance movement and its members on such a large -scale that such measures would have been quite ineffective. I did not -order or suggest them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: At the meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 March -1944 you also stated that, if the French executive agencies were unable -to get results, then one might have to put a prefect up against a wall. -Do you still consider this to be legally justified pressure? - -SAUCKEL: That is a similarly drastic remark of mine in the Central -Planning Board which was never actually followed by an official order -and not even by any prompting on my part. It was simply that I had been -informed that in several departments in France the prefects or -responsible chiefs supported the resistance movement wholeheartedly. -Railroad tracks had been blown up; bridges had been blown up; and that -remark was a verbal reaction on my part. I believe, however, I was then -only thinking of a legal measure, because there did, in fact, exist a -French law which made sabotage an offense punishable by death. - -DR. SERVATIUS: May I refer to the document in this connection? - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it in Document Number R-124? - -DR. SERVATIUS: It is on Page 1776, where it says that on the basis of -the law it would then be necessary to put a mayor up against a wall. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you know what laws existed in France -compelling co-operation from the French authorities, or whether there -were such laws? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, such laws existed. - -DR. SERVATIUS: A number of reports, which were submitted here, -concerning the application of measures of compulsion, mentioned abuses -and outrageous conditions allegedly caused by recruitment measures. What -can you say about that in general? - -SAUCKEL: I did not quite understand your question. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the use of compulsion, a number of reports -were brought up here, and you have heard them; reports setting forth -measures which must surely be generally condemned. You heard of the -burning down of villages and the shooting of men. What can you say to -that in general? - -SAUCKEL: All these measures are clearly in contradiction to the -directives and instructions which I issued and which have been submitted -here in large numbers, and to these I must refer. These are methods -against which, when I heard as much as hints of them, I took very severe -measures. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And who bears the immediate responsibility for such -incidents? - -SAUCKEL: The responsibility for such incidents rests with the local -authorities which did these things. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were there any other offices besides the local -authorities which dealt with recruitment of labor? - -SAUCKEL: That is exactly what I was fighting for from the very -beginning—to eliminate and combat the intricate maze of offices which, -without restraint or control, recruited workers by compulsion. That was -part of my job. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of offices were they? Local offices? - -SAUCKEL: They were offices of all kinds. I myself heard about most of -them only here. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the situation with regard to the Todt -Organization? - -SAUCKEL: The Todt Organization for a long time recruited and used -manpower independently in all territories. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did the labor service have anything to do with that? - -SAUCKEL: Do you mean the labor service of Reichsarbeitsführer Hierl? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -SAUCKEL: That I cannot say; that was a German military organization for -training for manual work. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were workers taken for the Armed Forces? - -SAUCKEL: Workers were employed for local urgent work, of course, by army -groups, by construction and fortification battalions, and so on, which I -neither knew about nor was in a position to control. Road building... - -DR. SERVATIUS: How about the Reichsbahn? - -SAUCKEL: The Reichsbahn repaired its tracks itself and recruited or -hired the workers for its requirements whenever it needed them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: These offices were not under your supervision? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did they carry out your instructions or were they -required to carry them out? - -SAUCKEL: They were not obliged to carry them out; and for that very -reason I sent out, and in a very emphatic form, that manifesto which was -mentioned yesterday. As, however, I myself had no supervision over the -executive authorities, I had to leave it to the various offices to take -these instructions into consideration. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was the number of workers recruited in the various -territories in that manner very large? - -SAUCKEL: There were certainly very large numbers of them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: There were also Reich offices which dealt with the -question of manpower. What about the deportations carried out by -Himmler? Did you have any connection with those? - -SAUCKEL: With reference to the question of these deportations, I can -only say that I did not have the least thing to do with them. I never -agreed—I never could have agreed, in view of my own outlook, my -development, and my life—I could not have agreed to the use of -prisoners or convicts for work in that manner. That was absolutely -foreign to my nature. I also have the firm conviction that, on account -of my forcible statements and measures, I was intentionally kept -uninformed about the whole matter, because it was quite contrary to my -own views on work and on workers. I said very often—and it can be seen -in documents here—that I wanted to win the co-operation of the foreign -workers for Germany and for the German way of life, and I did not want -to alienate them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: These then were the various offices which, apart from -you, had to do with recruitment of workers? - -SAUCKEL: May I make a short statement in that respect? I heard the word -“deportation” a few times in Germany and I always rejected the idea very -emphatically because I knew nothing about such operations. According to -the use of the word in the German language I understand “deportation” to -mean the sending away of prisoners and of people who have committed some -punishable act against the State. I never carried out deportations -because of my own views on the ethics of work. On the contrary, I gave -the workers recruited through my office—and that was the point on which -I finally obtained Hitler’s consent at the beginning of my job, and it -was not an easy matter—I gave all foreign workers legal contracts, -whether they came voluntarily or through German labor conscription. They -should and must receive the same treatment, the same pay, and the same -food as the German workers. That is why I rejected the idea of -deportation in my methods and my program. I can testify here with a -clear conscience that I had nothing at all to do with those -deportations, the terrible extent of which I learned only here. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You have pointed out repeatedly that this labor had to be -brought to Germany under all circumstances, that one had to proceed -ruthlessly, that it was an absolute necessity to get the workers. Does -that not show that you agreed with such measures? - -SAUCKEL: I should like to point out the following distinction: - -My directives and instructions can be clearly seen in numerous -documents. I could issue only these because I had no executive power and -no machinery of my own. All these directives, from the very beginning, -prescribe legally correct and just treatment. It is true, however, that -I used the words “under all circumstances” when communicating with -German offices—the Führer himself had impressed these words on me—and -I used the word “ruthlessly,” not with respect to the treatment of -workers but with respect to the many arguments, disputes, arbitrary -acts, and individual desires which the German offices, with which I had -to contend fiercely, had among themselves and against me. For the most -part they did not understand the importance of the allocation of labor -as an economic measure in time of war. The military authorities, the -army commanders, very often told me, for instance, that it was nonsense -to bring these people to Germany. There was the Vlassov Army under the -Russian general of that name, and the military authorities wanted these -Russian workers to join the Vlassov Army. I opposed that. I did not -consider it right, nor did I consider it sufficiently reliable. These -were the things against which I had to proceed ruthlessly in my dealings -with the German administration in those territories. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were there other circumstances, too, which led to the -transportation of people to Germany? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, there were other circumstances which, however, were not -connected directly but indirectly with the allocation of labor, and they -often took me by surprise; for example, the evacuation of military -zones, which frequently had to be carried through at a moment’s notice -or after only a very short time of preparation. And when such an -evacuation had been carried out it was the task of the local labor -offices to put the evacuated population to work in areas in the rear or -to bring to Germany such workers as could be used there. - -This sort of labor allocation entailed, of course, considerable -difficulties for me. There were families and children among the -evacuated people; and they, naturally, had also to be provided with -shelter. It was often the very natural wish of the Russian fathers and -mothers to take their children with them. That happened, not because I -wanted it, but because it was unavoidable. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And did you always use this labor, or only occasionally? - -SAUCKEL: To a large extent those people were used by the local -authorities in those territories and put into agriculture, industry, -railroads, bridge building, and so on. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with resettlement? - -SAUCKEL: I never had anything to do with resettlement. By a decree of -the Führer that task was expressly delegated to the Reichsführer SS. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did Rosenberg not report to you about bad conditions -which existed in his sphere? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. I had about four conversations with Rosenberg, at his -request; and he told me about the bad conditions. There was no doubt on -my part that such conditions were to be utterly condemned. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did he speak about Koch? - -SAUCKEL: The Reichskommissariat Ukraine was mainly involved. There were -considerable differences between the Reich Minister for the Occupied -Eastern Territories, Rosenberg, and Reich Commissioner Koch. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you in a position to take measures against Koch? - -SAUCKEL: Koch was not subordinate to me either directly or indirectly. I -could not give him any instructions in such matters. I let him know from -the outset that I could not possibly agree with such methods as I had -heard about, to some extent through Rosenberg, although I could not -prove them. - -Koch was of the opinion—and he explained that in his letters to -Rosenberg—that in his territory he was the sole authority. He also -pointed that out to me. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did Rosenberg not think the cause for these conditions -was that your demands were too high? - -SAUCKEL: I also spoke to Herr Rosenberg about that. I personally was of -the opinion that, if the demands could be divided up and orderly -recruitment and conscription could take place, it was quite possible to -fill the quotas. After all I had orders and instructions from the Führer -and the Central Planning Board. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you ever talk about the methods which should be used? - -SAUCKEL: The methods that should be used were not only frequently -discussed between us, but I published them in many very clear -directives. I even went so far as to issue and distribute my manifesto -over the head of this higher authority to the subordinate offices so -that they could be guided by it. - -I have to point out emphatically, however, that these were incidents -which occurred for the most part before my directives came into effect -and before my appointment. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I want to refer you to Document Number 018-PS. That is in -the “Slave Labor Brief,” Page 10. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not Page 10. It is Number 10. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It is Exhibit Number USA-186. In the English “Slave -Labor” Book it is Document 10. It is a letter of 21 December 1942. - -[_The document was handed to the defendant._] - -If you go through that document, you will see that Rosenberg complains -about the methods used by your agents and collaborators. What are these -offices for which you are being made responsible here? - -SAUCKEL: There is an error in this letter on the part of Herr Rosenberg, -because it was not I who had offices there but the Reich Commissioner. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In other words you are saying that he addressed himself -to the wrong person? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then will you lay that document aside. - -SAUCKEL: Rosenberg writes on Page 2, “I empowered the Reich Commissioner -for the Ukraine...” - -DR. SERVATIUS: You assume, therefore, that the writer of this letter did -not himself know exactly who the authorities in his territory were? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that was quite possible, because I myself had only been in -office a short time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What did you do as a result of the complaint which -Rosenberg made? Did you do anything at all? - -SAUCKEL: After receiving Rosenberg’s letter I had a discussion with him -immediately. As it was shortly before Christmas, 21 December 1942, I -called by telegram an official meeting at Weimar for 6 January, to which -representatives of the respective offices in the East were invited. I -also invited Reich Minister Rosenberg to that meeting. And at that -conference these officials were again told clearly and unmistakably, -that it was their duty to use correct and legal methods. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In that connection I would like to refer to Document -Number Sauckel-82. It is in the Sauckel Document Book Number 3, Page -207. I submit the handbook itself, which contains a number of documents -for judicial notice. - -I quote one sentence from the speech on the principles of recruiting -which Sauckel made there before 800 people who were employed in the -Allocation of Labor program. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 800? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Page 206. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is 8,000 in my copy. Isn’t it 8,000? - -DR. SERVATIUS: The third book, Page 206, Document Number 82. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am looking at Document Number 82. I thought you said -800 men were employed. I am looking at the beginning of Document 82. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It begins on Page 204. He spoke before 800 people, not -8,000. It should be 800. That is a mistake in the translation of the -document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The following is stated here: - - “Principles of our recruiting: - - “1) Where the voluntary method fails (and experience shows that - it fails everywhere) compulsory service takes its place....”—I - skip a few sentences. - - “It is bitter to tear people from their homes, from their - children. But we did not want the war. The German child who - loses its father at the front, the German wife who mourns her - husband killed in battle, suffer far more. Let us disclaim every - false sentiment now.” - -THE PRESIDENT: You have left out some of the document, have you not? - -DR. SERVATIUS: I did not quite understand. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have left out some of the document. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I omitted some sentences and I said so. But I can -read all of it. - -THE PRESIDENT: I only mean on Page 206. I didn’t mean the whole -document. On Page 206 you have just skipped two sentences. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have four sentences there. I will read them again: - - “Where the voluntary method fails, compulsory service takes its - place.” - -Then I omitted two sentences, which I shall now read: - - “This is the iron law for the Allocation of Labor for 1943. In a - few weeks from now there must no longer be any occupied - territory in which compulsory service for Germany is not the - most natural thing in the world.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Didn’t you also leave out the words “experience shows -that it fails everywhere”? - -DR. SERVATIUS: I read that the first time; I wanted to save time. - - “We are going to discard the last remnants of our soft talk - about humanitarian ideals. Every additional gun which we procure - brings us a minute closer to victory. It is bitter to tear - people from their homes, from their children. But we did not - want the war. The German child who loses its father at the - front, the German wife who mourns her husband killed in battle, - suffer far more. Let us disclaim every false sentiment now. - - “Here we must be guided by the realization that in the long run - a high output can be demanded of foreign workers only if they - are satisfied with their lot. I will not tolerate men being - treated badly. - - “3) Under no circumstances are you, as the recruiting commission - abroad, permitted to promise things which according to the - directives and regulations issued are not possible and cannot be - carried out on account of the war. It is much better to - introduce labor conscription and say, ‘You must take this upon - yourselves and in return you will enjoy the rights of the - workers employed in Germany.’ Anyone who works in Germany has - rights in Germany, even if he is a Bolshevist. We shall watch - very carefully to insure that the German name be not sullied. - You can demand of me any protection in your field of work, but - none for any crimes. The name of our nation is holy. For the - first time in German history you must represent for the Reich - the principles of German labor. Be conscious of that at all - times.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Apart from the information which you -received from Rosenberg, did you receive any other reports concerning -recruiting methods? - -SAUCKEL: Apart from the information from Rosenberg and his letters of -that time, I did not receive any other direct complaints. But I had -issued emphatic orders that any complaints received by my office were to -be forwarded immediately to the competent Reich authorities for -investigation, punishment, and the remedying of the grievances. I should -like to state this: My office received a great many complaints which -concerned me; but they were complaints about insufficient numbers of -workers provided by me. It was my duty to correct this. For the -correction of inadequacies in administration, for eliminating unjust -measures in various fields or various agencies, I could not be -competent, as the Reich authorities themselves were competent in that -respect. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But it should have been of great interest to you what -happened there. Did you not hear anything of these incidents? Was -nothing reported to you? - -SAUCKEL: That I was interested from a humane and personal point of view -can be seen from the fact that I was concerned about these things, -although they did not come within my office. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But you spoke here about one case in which it was -reported to you that a cinema had been surrounded. Perhaps you remember -that case? - -SAUCKEL: When on a visit to Field Marshal Kluge, I heard from him that -he had been informed that in the area of his army, or army group, a -cinema had been surrounded and the people attending the cinema had been -brought to Germany to work. I immediately had that case most carefully -investigated, and the investigation took 3 months. Witnesses will be -able to testify to that when they appear here. The result of the -investigation was the following: It was not a case of labor recruitment -for Germany. A construction unit near Rovno was celebrating in that -cinema the end of one of its tasks; and in the middle of that -celebration the order was received that this unit had to be put on a new -job, a different place of work. The contractor thereupon interrupted the -celebration in a very drastic way by having the immediate transport of -these workers carried out by a force of police. That, of course, had -nothing to do with my work and my organization; but it took me 3 months -to discover the true facts of this complaint by Field Marshal Kluge. In -every case where such complaints came to my attention I investigated and -dealt with them and condemned them, because they did not help me. - -DR. SERVATIUS: We will leave this matter of recruitment now and turn to -the question of the transportation of these people to Germany. Who was -responsible for their transportation? - -SAUCKEL: For transportation the German Reichsbahn and the authorities -designated in my Directive Number 4—regional offices and regional labor -departments—were responsible. Immediately on assuming my office I had a -detailed discussion with Dr. Dorpmüller, Reich Minister of Transport; -his state secretary, Dr. Ganzenmüller; and before him Dr. Kleinmüller; -and it was agreed that the transportation of workers to Germany should -be carried out in an unobjectionable manner; that the transport trains -should be supplied with food for the duration of the journey; that, if -Russians were included in these transports, the cars should under no -circumstances be overcrowded; and that, if at all possible, passenger -coaches should be used for these transports. We agreed on this, though -the Reich Minister of Transport said that he could not be expected to -provide the people with better transport than the German soldiers had; -still, he could at least guarantee that the cars would not be -overcrowded. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You have seen the Molotov report, that is Exhibit Number -USSR-51. You know its contents, describing the conditions of these -transports, saying that the cars were overcrowded, that the dying were -thrown out and left lying on the tracks, and that newly born children -died immediately. Were such conditions reported to you, or did you hear -of them in your official position? - -SAUCKEL: Such incidents were not reported to me in my official position, -and they could not possibly have referred to worker transports of my -office. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of transports could they have been then? - -SAUCKEL: As far as I could determine from the proceedings here, they -must have been transports of inmates of concentration camps who were -being evacuated. I do not know for certain; but I cannot explain it -otherwise because I would not tolerate such conditions under any -circumstances, nor did I hear about them. Such things were of no -advantage to us. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is that document, USSR-51? - -DR. SERVATIUS: USSR-51 is the official report which I received in -printed form. I have a printed German copy. I assume that it has been -submitted to the Tribunal already. If not, I will obtain it and submit -it myself. - -THE PRESIDENT: If it has got the Number USSR-51, it must have been -submitted to the Tribunal. That is the exhibit number. I wonder whether -it has got some other number by which we can identify it? - -DR. SERVATIUS: The Prosecution handed me Document Number 054-PS: that is -Exhibit Number USA-198. That is Number 13 in the English “Slave Labor” -Book. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] There, on Page 4, mention is made of a -return transport, and in connection with it very bad conditions are -described and censured. Did you find it? The passage begins: - - “Very depressing effects on the morale of the skilled workers - and the population are caused above all by people returning from - Germany in a condition unfit for work, or who were already unfit - before they came to Germany.” - -SAUCKEL: These can only be incidents which occurred before... - -THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t had the question yet, have we? The question -didn’t come through, I think. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I will put the question again. - -In this document mention is made of return transports from Germany to -the East, and two transports are denounced on account of the abominable -conditions which are described. I quote from the document: - - “Very depressing effects on the morale of the skilled workers - and the population are caused above all by people returning from - Germany in a condition unfit for work, or who were already unfit - before they came to Germany. Several times already transports of - skilled workers on their way to Germany have passed returning - transports of such unfit persons, and they have stood on the - tracks alongside each other for some time. On account of the - insufficient care given these returning transports (sick, - injured, or weak people, mostly 50 or 60 to a car, often many - days without sufficient care and food, usually escorted by only - 3 or 4 men), and through the frequently very unfavorable—even - if exaggerated—statements of these repatriates about their - treatment in Germany and en route, added to what the people - could see with their own eyes, a psychosis of fear developed - among the skilled workers and others being transported to - Germany. Several transport leaders, especially those of the 62d - and the 63d Transports, reported details in this connection. In - one case the leader of the transport of skilled workers observed - with his own eyes how a person who had died of hunger was - unloaded on the side track from a returning transport. (1st Lt. - Hofmann of the 63d Transport, Darniza Station.) On another - occasion it was reported that en route three dead...” - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you need read all of this to the defendant. -He probably knows it and he can give his answer upon it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You see that reference is being made to a report; will -you please comment on it? - -SAUCKEL: Concerning this report, may I say the following: These terrible -conditions had to be investigated at once by the local authorities -concerned. A report on the result of the investigation did not reach me. -This report here was also not made to me. I may point out that the -transportation to Germany of sick people unfit for work was strictly -prohibited by me, because that would have been a crime and an -impossibility from the economic point of view. I could not possibly say -who sent these trains back. It was also not established what kind of -transports they really were. The report describes conditions which -already existed before I came into office. I, personally—and I should -like to emphasize this particularly—issued a decree according to which -sick people or pregnant women—I personally issued orders that, if a -return transport of sick people were necessary, the German Red Cross -were to furnish personnel to accompany these people all the way back to -their native place. These orders can be found among the codes. Such -terrible cases of negligence and crime are, therefore, in contradiction -to the clear regulations issued by the German labor authorities. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not equip Bad Frankenthal for sick people who -could not return? - -SAUCKEL: In my own Gau it was not Bad Frankenthal but Bad Frankenhausen, -Kyffhäuser, which I made available for sick Soviet workers. In addition, -I had a large school set aside in Edendorf near Weimar with 100 beds for -typhus patients and Russian prisoners of war. So, on my own initiative, -I myself did everything possible to help in dealing with cases of -sickness and similar matters. It was also prohibited to return people -while they were in a sick condition. - -THE PRESIDENT: We had better adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SERVATIUS: When the workers arrived in Germany... - -SAUCKEL: May I say something about Document Number 054-PS to supplement -my testimony? It is very important. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -SAUCKEL: On Page 5, near the center of the page, I should like to call -your attention to the following sentence of the reporter—this is a -report within a military authority: “These extreme incidents which took -place in transports in the first few months did not, to our knowledge, -repeat themselves in the summer.” In the first months of the year 1942 I -was not even in office, and my program did not commence until May. In -the summer of that year, as it is correctly stated here, an end was put -to this state of affairs. - -Furthermore, I should like to call attention in the same document, -054-PS, I believe on Page 10, to a copy of a letter of complaint which -says, “As I informed you in my letter of 20 April 1942...” It is -evident, therefore, that this letter deals with complaints about -conditions which must have been disclosed before I assumed office. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I was going to ask you about the arrival of workers in -Germany. What happened when a transport arrived in Germany? - -SAUCKEL: Upon their arrival in Germany the people of the transport had -not only to be properly received but they also had to be medically -examined again and checked at a transit camp. One examination had to be -made at the time and place of recruitment, and another took place at a -fixed point before the border. Thus, from the time of recruitment until -being put to work three medical examinations and checks had to be made, -according to my directives. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What were the transit camps? - -SAUCKEL: These transit camps were camps in which the people from the -various transports came together at the border, and where they were -examined and registered in the proper manner. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I submit Document Number UK-39 to you. I have no exhibit -number for it. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is a British exhibit? - -DR. SERVATIUS: I could not establish whether it already has an exhibit -number; I shall have to check on that. At any rate, it was given to me. - -THE PRESIDENT: You gave the Number UK-39? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, UK-39. - -THE PRESIDENT: It must be a British exhibit number, must it not? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): -The series is not a British exhibit; our exhibits are “GB.” It is an -earlier series of documents that we have prepared. But we will try to -find out. - -DR. SERVATIUS: If you will look at this document, it is a letter of the -Reich Security Main Office, dated 18 January 1943, concerning -“Concentration Camp Hertogenbosch.” Then it says, “This camp will be -equipped as a transit and reception camp.” - -Was that a place to which your workers were sent? - -SAUCKEL: The Allocation of Labor had nothing at all to do with these -camps and concentration camps. This was not a transit camp for workers -but was obviously the transit camp of a concentration camp. These were -not at all known to me. I never had to and never did concern myself with -such transports and transit camps; and I would not have done it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: A report of the French Government was submitted here; it -is Document Number UK-78 and French Exhibit Number RF-87. The heading is -“Third Study.” It is a very comprehensive report. I shall quote from my -notes. The report contains the following, roughly: “Immediately, upon -their arrival the workers were taken to these actual slave markets which -were called sorting houses. The living conditions there were miserable.” - -Is that one of your transit camps which is so described? - -SAUCKEL: That is absolutely impossible; such a camp never existed. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How was the distribution of the workers carried out in -practice? I refer once more to the Molotov report, Document Number -USSR-51. The Soviet Delegation says here that this document was -submitted under that exhibit number. The report says that the workers -were taken to the slave market and were sold for 10 to 15 marks. What do -you have to say to that? - -SAUCKEL: I believe every German employer who received these workers, -either in agriculture or in war industry, is a witness to the fact that -a procedure of this sort never took place in any form; that it was quite -inconceivable that such slave markets were instituted through the -authority of the Reich Ministry of Labor; but that these workers who -passed through National Socialist labor exchanges received exactly the -same contracts and conditions as the German workers themselves, with -some variations, and in no case were they put to work like slaves -without rights or pay, without a contract, without sickness insurance, -or without accident insurance. That may be seen from the numerous -directives and decrees which were issued by the Reich Ministry of Labor -and by me for every race involved. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What were the general living conditions of foreign -workers in Germany? - -SAUCKEL: The general living conditions of foreign workers in Germany as -far as they were recruited through the offices of the Allocation of -Labor, were exactly the same as those of German workers who were -accommodated in camps. Living conditions were dependent on the -circumstances of war and, in contrast with peacetime, were subject to -the same limitations as applied to the German population. The adjutant -of Herr Von Schirach, a man unknown to me, who appeared here as a -witness yesterday, described conditions in Vienna; those conditions -existed in other German cities too. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What were the security measures in these camps? - -SAUCKEL: In the camps themselves? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Well, I mean generally. - -SAUCKEL: The security measures were the responsibility of the Police, -not mine, because the camps came under the various industries and the -German Labor Front. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I submit Document Number EC-68. It contains -directives issued by the Regional Food Office of Baden regarding the -treatment of Poles in Germany. This is Exhibit Number USA-205, to be -found in the American Document Book “Slave Labor,” the fourth document. -I shall now read the beginning of this document, which you have already -seen. It says there: - - “The offices of the Reich Food Administration—(Regional Food - Office) of Baden—have received with great satisfaction the - result of the negotiations with the Higher SS and Police Leader - in Stuttgart on 14 February 1941. Appropriate memoranda have - already been sent to the district food offices. Below I - promulgate the individual regulations as they were laid down - during the conference and are now to be supplied accordingly: - - “1. In principle farm workers of Polish nationality no longer - have the right to complain; consequently, no complaints may be - accepted by any official agency. - - “2. Farm workers of Polish nationality may no longer leave the - localities in which they are employed.” - -Now, I shall omit some points and just confine myself to the essential -parts. I turn to Point 5: - - “5. Visits to theaters, cinemas, or other cultural - entertainments are strictly prohibited for farm workers of - Polish nationality.” - -Other regulations follow, prohibiting use of the railroad, and under -Number 12 there is a vital provision: - - “12. Every employer of Polish farm workers has the right to - administer chastisement...” - -Please comment on this document and tell us to what extent you approve -of it. - -SAUCKEL: First of all, I should like to point out that this document is -dated 6 March 1941—that is, more than a year before I assumed office. -Such an absurd and impossible decree never came to my attention during -my term of office. But since I am now being confronted with the document -and am learning about it, I should like to refer to my own decrees, -which I issued entirely independently of what had gone before and which -automatically revoked such decrees. In order to prevent these absurd -decrees of some agency in the Reich from being effective, I had my -decrees collected and published in a handbook in which it says—because -of the time factor and out of respect for the Tribunal, I cannot ask the -Tribunal to look at all of them; but they are in direct contradiction to -such views. I would like to ask that I be permitted to quote just one -sentence from the manifesto already referred to, which is directed -against such nonsense and against the misuse of manpower. I refer -particularly to my directives for fair treatment. The sentence reads as -follows: - - “...these orders and directives, as well as their supplements, - are to be brought very forcibly to the attention of works - managers and leaders of camps for foreign nationals, as well as - their personnel, at least four times a year by the regional - labor offices. Actual adherence to them is to be constantly - supervised.” - -DR. SERVATIUS: Does the manifesto end with that? - -SAUCKEL: That is a paragraph from the manifesto which refers -specifically to my orders prescribing just and humane treatment, -sufficient food, leisure time, and so forth. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You issued a great number of directives. Did you notice -any opposition to your basic regulations; and, if so, what did you do? - -SAUCKEL: As soon as I noticed opposition I made special reference to my -decrees, of course, because they had been approved by the Führer, upon -my recommendations, for my field of activity. - -DR. SERVATIUS: As far as care and welfare were concerned, did the -DAF—the German Labor Front—play a special role? What was the task of -the DAF? - -SAUCKEL: The task of the DAF was to care for German workers and look -after their interests. In this capacity it had to concern itself, as a -matter of course, with the welfare of foreign workers. That was its -ordinary task; and at the same time it had a corrective influence on -state labor administration, an influence similar to that exerted by the -trade unions on state control, as far as it exists, in other countries. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What tasks did the works managers have? - -SAUCKEL: They had the task of regulating the total production of their -works; and, of course, they were fully responsible for their workmen and -for the foreign workers who had been assigned to them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were they primarily responsible, or was the DAF -responsible? - -SAUCKEL: The employers were primarily responsible, according to the law -regulating German labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now the workers were mostly billeted in camps. Who -supervised the accommodations in these camps? - -SAUCKEL: The accommodations in these camps were under the final -supervision of the German trade inspection office, which was under the -Reich Ministry of Labor. The trade inspection office had the authority -and power to enforce observance from employers who failed to comply with -the orders of the Reich Minister of Labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you yourself issue any orders or decrees concerning -the camps? - -SAUCKEL: I personally issued orders concerning the camps, but they could -be put into effect and supervised only by the Reich Minister of Labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: So much about the accommodations of the camps. Now what -were the living conditions within the camps? Who was responsible for -them? - -SAUCKEL: In the camps themselves the camp leaders were responsible. The -camp leader was appointed by agreement between the DAF and the works -manager, and to my knowledge—this was not within the range of my -duties—his appointment had to be confirmed and accepted by the security -authorities. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You speak of the security authorities. To what extent did -the Police take part in the surveillance of these camps, the maintenance -of discipline, and such matters? - -SAUCKEL: Surveillance of the camp and maintenance of discipline was the -task of the camp leader, and had nothing to do with the Police. The -Police had, as I believe is the case in every country, surveillance and -control rights as regards espionage and the secrecy of the plant, _et -cetera_. Beyond that, the Police had nothing to do with the camp. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were these camps shut off from the outside world? What -was the situation in that respect when you assumed office? - -SAUCKEL: When I assumed office, the camps, particularly of the Eastern -Workers, were very much shut off from the world and were fenced in with -barbed wire. To me this was incompatible with the principle of employing -productive and willing workers; and with all the personal energy I could -muster, I succeeded in having the fences and barbed wire removed; and I -also reduced the limits of the curfew regulations for Eastern Workers, -so that the picture which was presented here yesterday could eventually -be realized. Anything else would have been incompatible, technically -speaking, with the workers’ willingness to work, which I wanted. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now the question of food. What was the food of these -foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: The feeding of the foreign workers came under the system that -was applied to the feeding of the German people, and accordingly -additional rations were allotted to people doing heavy, very heavy, or -overtime work. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did this situation exist when you assumed office? - -SAUCKEL: When I assumed office and received the order from the Führer -that in addition to the foreign workers who were already in the Reich I -was to bring further quotas into the Reich, the first step I took was to -visit the Reich Minister for Food, for it was obvious to me that -bringing in foreign workers was in the first place a question of -feeding; poorly fed workers, even if they want to, cannot turn out -satisfactory work. I had many detailed conversations with him; and by -referring to the Führer and the Reich Marshal, I succeeded in obtaining -suitable food for the workers, and food quotas were legally fixed. It -was not easy to do this because the food situation, even for Germans, -was always strained; but without these measures it would not have been -possible for me, also from a personal point of view, to carry through my -task. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Details with regard to the food situation were mentioned -here which would justify the assumption that extremely bad conditions -existed. Was nothing of this sort brought to your attention, or did you -yourself not hear anything? - -SAUCKEL: As far as bad feeding conditions in the work camps of civilian -laborers is concerned I never had any very unfavorable reports. I -personally made repeated efforts to have this matter in particular -constantly looked into. The works managers themselves took the problem -of food very seriously. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not, in a decree and letter to the Gau labor -offices and Gauleiter, deal with the subject of good treatment of -foreigners; and did you not on that occasion criticize existing -conditions? - -SAUCKEL: Immediately after I assumed office, when the Gauleiter were -appointed as plenipotentiaries for the Allocation of Labor in their -Gaue, I called their attention to the food situation and ordered them to -give their attention to that question and also to the question of -accommodation. I heard that in two Gaue my instructions were not being -taken seriously enough. In one case I myself went immediately to Essen -and remedied the situation there—it concerned the barbed wire—and in -another case, in eastern Bavaria, I also intervened personally. Besides -that, I made use of these two incidents to write to the Gauleiter and -the governments of the German Länder and provinces and again pointed out -the importance of observing these instructions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I refer to Document 19, that is in the English Book -Number 1, Page 54; Document Sauckel-19. - -THE PRESIDENT: 19? - -DR. SERVATIUS: This is Document Number 19, in the first document book, -Page 54. Only a portion of this is reproduced. In a circular to all the -Gau labor offices and Gauleiter is the following: - - “If in a Gau district the statement is still being made that ‘if - anyone in the Gau has to freeze this winter, the first ones - should be the Russians’ (that is, the Russian civilian laborers - employed for work in the Gau), such a statement shows plainly - that in that region of the Gau the contact between the - administrative labor office and the competent political offices - is as yet not close enough. It is one of the most important - tasks of the Allocation of Labor and the collaboration between - you and the Gauleiter as my deputies for the Allocation of Labor - to see to it that the foreign workers recruited for the German - armament industry and food economy are looked after in such a - manner as to enable them to give the maximum of efficiency. - There is, therefore, no question of protecting from want German - fellow countrymen only and being satisfied with inadequate - provisions for laborers of foreign origin. On the contrary, it - is imperative to bear constantly in mind the fact that, in order - to bring about victory, a maximum of efficiency must be demanded - not only of German fellow countrymen but also of the foreign - workers. It would be absurd to bring foreign workers into the - country, at considerable expense, for work for German economy - and then to allow their efficiency to be impaired or ruined - through lack of proper care.” - -In conclusion there follows a reminder that Sauckel’s decree must be -observed. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the situation with regard to the -clothing of foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: The clothing of foreign workers from the western regions gave -us relatively little trouble for these workers were well supplied and -they were also compensated for their clothing. But the clothing of the -Eastern Workers was a problem. On behalf of the Eastern Workers I -applied to the Reich Minister of Economy for a quota of clothing and -provided 1 million Eastern Workers with all necessary under and outer -clothing. To supply this quota of clothing 10,000 workers were required -as well as 30,000 tons of raw materials. Thus, every care was given to -the question of clothing, and this clothing was actually issued. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The French Delegation has submitted Document Number RF-5. -It is a propaganda brochure, _Work for Europe_. I had also submitted -this, and the Tribunal took judicial notice of it. I should like to -submit it again and refer to three pictures contained therein. The -essential thing about these pictures is that some of the workers coming -from the East arrived barefoot, and later there are pictures where these -workers are seen well dressed in Germany, and it is evident that the -situation as regards the clothing of these workers had made considerable -progress in Germany. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this Sauckel-5? - -DR. SERVATIUS: No, it is a document of the French Delegation, Document -RF-5. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the situation with regard to -working hours? Who regulated the working hours? - -SAUCKEL: The working hours were regulated on the basis of decrees by the -Führer, the Ministerial Council, and later on by Reich Minister -Goebbels. The carrying out of these decrees was my task. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the average working time? - -SAUCKEL: One can hardly talk of an average working time in Germany -during the war. There was the legal working time of 8 hours. For -anything beyond 8 hours, overtime had to be paid. - -In the year 1943 the average working time per week was at first set at -54 hours; later, as far as it was necessary, at 10 hours per day. When -Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels became Reich Delegate for Total War Effort, -against my objections and against the objection of other offices but on -the basis of the authority which he had, he demanded and proclaimed a -10-hour working day for all offices and industries. However this could -not be carried through at all, for in many industries and offices work -had to be regulated according to the difficulties which were already -then appearing—difficulties of raw materials, power supply, and the -amount of work. But in exceptional cases, which were not infrequent, 11 -and 12 hours of work were put in where production demanded it. German -workers as well worked longer hours. All workers were then compensated -accordingly. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In the French Document Number RF-22, on Page 101 of the -German text, is the following: - - “From the interrogations by the agencies of the _Ministère des - Prisonniers_ of deported workers who had returned home, it can - be seen that the average time of work per week was at least 72 - hours.” - -Then the source of this information is mentioned, but that does not -interest us here. - - “Sixty-four-hour weeks were not infrequent. Cases of 100-hour - weeks with 30 to 38 consecutive hours were mentioned.” - -What can you tell us about this? Did such cases come to your attention? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot comment on these reports, because I do not know -whether they concern people who were being used in concentration camps -or those who were used as civilian workers in the other sector for which -I was responsible. It is correct that in very exceptional cases there -were periods in which long hours of work were put in. That was decided -by the factory and applied also to the German workers. But in such cases -appropriate rest periods had to be interspersed. These long hours were -worked only for the completion of important contracts. Where these -people actually worked, I cannot determine from the interrogation and, -therefore, I cannot give you a precise answer. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What were the provisions for free time? - -SAUCKEL: Free time was at the disposal of the workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who was responsible for regulating free time? - -SAUCKEL: The regulation of free time was the responsibility of the DAF -as far as the arrangements of details for free time were concerned. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the situation regarding the employment of -children and young people? - -SAUCKEL: By German Reich law children under 12 years of age are not -permitted to work. Children under 14 are only permitted to work a few -hours on the land. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you issue decrees about working hours for children? - -SAUCKEL: I issued decrees or confirmed the laws which were already in -existence insofar as they applied to this work. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now I shall show you Document Number 345-PS, which is a -letter written by Reich Minister Rosenberg to Lammers, dated 20 July -1944. - -[_The document was handed to the defendant._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Has this been put in before? Has this been offered in -evidence before? - -DR. SERVATIUS: This document was submitted in cross-examination. I -myself have just received it. It deals with the recruitment of young -people of 15 to 20 years of age for employment in the Reich during the -war. Then the document refers to the transfer to the Reich of young -people aged 10 to 14 years; that is the “Hay Action.” And it goes on to -say: - - “The object of this action is the further care of young people - through the Reich Youth Leadership and the training of - apprentices for German economy in a manner similar to that which - has already been successfully carried out with the White - Ruthenia Youth Service in co-operation with the GBA”—which - means you. - -Please comment on whether you had use made of these young people. - -SAUCKEL: No, I had nothing whatever to do with this action; and in the -index of addresses my name is not mentioned. I do not know of this -matter. - -DR. SERVATIUS: So you did not violate your own rules by issuing special -directives? - -SAUCKEL: No. This was a transaction with which I did not concern myself. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then I should like to submit another letter to you, which -was also submitted by the Prosecution in connection with the Schirach -case. It is Document Number 1137-PS, a letter dated 19 October 1944. On -Page 3 of this document, the following appears: - - “In addition to this, other labor was supplied to the German - armament industry earlier—namely, first of all, 3,500 boys and - 500 girls to the Junkers Works; secondly, 2,000 boys and 700 - girls to the OT... - - “The agency under the Hitler Youth has procured from the - Occupied Eastern Territories for the armament industry”—I leave - out what does not interest us—“5,500 boys and 1,200 girls.” - -Did you authorize the use of this labor, or did this matter pass through -your hands? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS; How was this labor brought into the armament industry? - -SAUCKEL: Well, I personally am unable to explain that in detail. -Apparently this took place on the basis of an agreement between offices -of the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories or those of -Hauptbannführer Nickel. I have heard only during the proceedings here -that the young people involved were of an age at which work is -prohibited for them. I understood that it was more in the nature of -pre-employment care, but... - -DR. SERVATIUS: That is known. - -SAUCKEL: It did not go through me or through my office. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What about the use of foreign women? - -SAUCKEL: Women from foreign countries were used in exactly the same way -as German women. No other conditions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number 025-PS has been submitted here. That is -Exhibit Number USA-698, which was also submitted only now and is not -contained in the books. This is the record of a conference which took -place in your office and in which you spoke at length on the use of -female labor. In the third paragraph it says: - - “To this end, the Führer has ordered the use of 400,000 to - 500,000 female Eastern Workers from the Ukraine, between the - ages of 15 to 35, for domestic purposes; and the Plenipotentiary - General for the Allocation of Labor”—that is you—“has been - charged with the carrying through of this action, which is to be - concluded in approximately 3 months.” - -It goes on: - - “It is the specific wish of the Führer that as many girls as - possible shall be germanized if they prove satisfactory.” - -Will you please comment on this? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, this concerns a decree of the Führer to bring 400,000 to -500,000 female Eastern Workers into the Reich for German households, but -especially in order to lighten the work of the German farmers’ wives. I -should like to mention, in connection with this document, that I did not -compile it and that my office did not compile it either. Most likely -these minutes were written on the basis of notes which somebody had -taken. With reference to these proposed 400,000 to 500,000 domestic -servants, it must be said that they were to be brought into the Reich -only on a voluntary basis. Actually some 13,000 to 15,000 only, I -believe, came into the Reich. The idea of “Germanization,” as used here, -also refers only to their free will or wish to remain in Germany. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What medical attention did the foreign workers receive? -Various things have been mentioned here, for instance: “If the worker -can no longer work, he is no longer a concern of ours,” which is -supposed to have been a principle of yours. Then it is further said that -work, food, and pay must be brought into relationship with each other. -If the worker can no longer work, he is just a dead weight. What can you -say with regard to these accusations? - -SAUCKEL: Would you show me where I said that? I am not familiar with it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: This is in the transcript of a court session; I have the -page here, in the German transcript, 2789 (Volume V, Pages 394, 395). It -says there that if the worker can no longer work, no concern should be -given to his fate. Did you advocate this principle? - -SAUCKEL: On the contrary; there exist hundreds of precise decrees and -orders which I issued. They were published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, -in special issues sent to the factories and to the labor exchanges and -in special collections, in which it is set down most clearly that the -foreign workers who were brought into the Reich through the Allocation -of Labor had to be treated in accordance with German laws, regulations, -and directives as far as medical treatment and care, including -insurance, were concerned. There were also... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, were you putting to the defendant a -document where it was alleged he had said that after they were unfit to -work, that it is no more his concern? Was it the document you were -putting to him? - -DR. SERVATIUS: This document was submitted to him with regard to the -female workers of whom he is alleged to have said that they were to be -germanized. I am no longer dealing with that document, but have turned -to the question of medical care. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean that was in Document 025-PS, Exhibit USA-698? - -DR. SERVATIUS: That document, Number 025-PS, refers only to female -workers. This question has already been dealt with. I have turned to the -question of medical care in general and am no longer dealing with the -question of female workers. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you receive reports about abominable -conditions regarding the health and the medical care of foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: No. Not only German physicians were employed as official -physicians in the factories and camps to deal with the hygiene and -health of the workers, but also numerous physicians and medical -assistants from the home countries of the foreign workers were engaged -and assigned to these camps. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How did you supervise the execution of your decrees, and -what other controlling agencies existed? - -SAUCKEL: There were the following controlling agencies: first of all... - -DR. SERVATIUS: Just a moment. I should like to refer to Document -Sauckel-2. In it I have made a survey of the control and inspection -agencies concerned with supervision. I shall explain this diagram -briefly: - -In the center, there is the Reich Ministry of Labor, under Seldte; -underneath that, the trade inspection boards, including the police -department for trade and town planning. That was the only department -which had police powers—that is, it could take action against any -resistance on the part of those recruited for work. Besides this, -several other official agencies were created to handle the difficult -problem of welfare. There is, first of all, if you look at the -right-hand side, the German Labor Front, an agency encompassing the -interests of the employers, the industry, and the workers, and in some -respects taking the place occupied in the past by the trade unions. From -there matters of welfare were turned over to the factories. A special -inspection board was created, the Reich Inspection Office of the German -Labor Front, with a department for foreign workers which had its own -liaison men in the factories to hear complaints. In the factories -themselves there were also foreign workers who were able to report on -conditions there. - -Then, turning further to the right, is the Reich Ministry for Food and -Agriculture which, through the regional food offices, also had direct -insight into questions pertaining to food and welfare. The reports which -went to the Reich Foreign Minister through diplomatic channels were -eventually also passed on to Sauckel, as we shall see later. - -Then there is a special department for Eastern Workers under the -Rosenberg Ministry—that is the central agency for the peoples of the -East—and this last letter which we had here, apparently came from one -of the gentlemen in this agency. This central agency for the peoples of -the East in turn also had its agents in the factories and works, and -they made reports directly. All these reports were turned over to -Sauckel. - -Now, I turn to the left part of the diagram. Sauckel himself instituted -for inspectional purposes a personal staff which was sent around to -visit factories. We heard from several witnesses that these inspectors -appeared and saw to it that everything was in order. Then he established -a special office, the Reich Inspectorate. Complaints which came from the -German Labor Front and other sources were sent to this inspectorate. -When Sauckel says that he immediately passed on these complaints, they -were sent first to the Reich Inspectorate, which in turn advised the -necessary offices and, if need be, applied the compulsory measures of -the Reich Labor Ministry. Then also the Gauleiter were given the task of -supervision, and the witnesses who have appeared here—witnesses who -were Gauleiter in their time—have confirmed that they exercised control -as plenipotentiaries for the Allocation of Labor. Further to the left is -shown the care and control exercised by the Reich Ministry for -Propaganda which had taken over a supervisory function concerning the -direction of the camps and the workers. Then, finally on the far left, -comes the Wehrmacht which had its own supervisory machinery through its -inspectors, who were entrusted with the prisoners of war and who saw to -it that the conventions were observed. - -The reports of all these agencies were sent to Sauckel, and he testified -here that abominable conditions were not reported to him, that he could -make his influence felt only through directives, and that he gave his -instructions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, will you ask the defendant whether that -was a correct statement on the meaning of the chart? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, this explanation, which I have given, and this -diagram, which you have seen, are they correct? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: They are correct? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Would you comment now on the activity of the Gauleiter as -plenipotentiaries? How did you supervise the Gauleiter? - -SAUCKEL: I could not supervise the Gauleiter themselves, as I had no -disciplinary or official control over them. But I had the Gaue visited -by members of my staff at intervals of about 3 months. On the occasion -of these visits the complaints of the Gauleiter were heard and then -factories and camps were inspected jointly and a check was made to see -how far my directives were, or were not, carried out. I should like to -remark that these inspectors naturally were not allowed any control in -concentration camps and the work in the concentration camps; that was a -different field which was under the control of Obergruppenführer Pohl -and in which I had no authority and no insight. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): I ask permission -for the Defendant Von Papen to be absent from the court sessions -tomorrow morning and afternoon. I need a fairly long consultation with -him for the preparation of his defense which I would not be able to have -otherwise. Dr. Flexner will represent him during the session. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): If it please the Tribunal, a report -is made that the Defendant Göring is absent. - -THE PRESIDENT: As I said this morning, the Tribunal will rise at 4 this -afternoon. - -DR. SERVATIUS: This morning we got as far as the inspections, but I -should like to go back to one question. - -You said that the head of the factory was responsible for the workers. -Did that also apply to the prisoner-of-war and concentration camps? - -SAUCKEL: No. The Army, or that part of the Armed Forces under the -authority of which these prisoners of war were kept, was responsible for -the prisoner-of-war camps. In the same way, as far as I know, the -concentration camps alone were responsible for their inmates, even if -they worked. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You had formed a Department 9 as a Reich inspection -department in the Reich Ministry of Labor. What were the special tasks -of this inspection department? - -SAUCKEL: I had set up that inspection department, which had not existed -before in the Ministry of Labor, because I wanted to ascertain the -uniformity and execution of contracts throughout the entire area of the -Reich, as well as in the occupied territories where German undertakings -and German labor contracts were being carried out; also to examine and -control the unified administrative regulations; and, moreover, to see -whether my orders concerning food, lodging, treatment, and care were -being observed and to what extent they were in need of change. All this -was also contained in a directive which I gave to the inspection -department. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the Central Inspection -Department in the German Labor Front—the Central Inspection Department -for the care of foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: The Central Inspection Department of the DAF had the task of -supervising the welfare of foreign workers in the camps in Germany to -see whether they were being fed, and so on, in the prescribed way. - -DR. SERVATIUS: If there were any abuses, did the Inspection Department -report that to you; or who received the report? - -SAUCKEL: An agreement between the Führer, the German Labor Front, Dr. -Ley, and myself, was added as a supplement to the decree concerning the -formation of the Central Inspection Department, and it stated that where -it was a question of conditions in camps the Central Inspection -Department had to deal directly with the Reich offices concerned, or -with the industrial inspection office in the Reich Labor Ministry, in -order to remedy the conditions; whereas cases of shortage or surplus of -manpower, _et cetera_, were to be reported to me. - -DR. SERVATIUS: By this agreement, therefore, your rights were limited? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: That is Document 1913-PS, which has been submitted. It is -an agreement between Sauckel and Dr. Ley of 20 September 1943. It is -Exhibit USA-227. It is Document Number 41 in the English document book. -I shall only refer to it, without quoting from it. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] What other kinds of supervisory offices -existed? I am thinking about the French. - -SAUCKEL: Well, after I took office, men were appointed to act as liaison -agents with the foreign workers. These men, in agreement with the German -Labor Front, had the right to visit camps, talk to the workers -themselves, and hear their complaints. A special agreement had been -reached with the French Government in collaboration with the Reich -Foreign Minister. - -DR. SERVATIUS: That is Document Sauckel-31. It is on Page 79 of the -English text in the Sauckel Document Book Number 1, “French Agency for -the Care of the French Employed in the Reich.” That is a circular from -Sauckel dated 30 April 1942. I submit the document itself, which is in -this collection. I quote: - - “I communicate the following letter from the Foreign Office of - 10 April 1942: - - “The Government of the Reich has notified the French Government - that it agrees to the following regulations regarding the care - of French voluntary workers in Germany: - - “Besides the already existing office for prisoners of war, an - agency for French civilian workers will be established in Berlin - under the direction of Ambassador Scapini. The Reich Government - will furnish a building to house this agency. The agency may - establish branch offices in four other German cities. - - “The agency is charged with the care of the French workers in - Germany. It will supervise the fulfillment of the contracts made - by the workers engaged. It may accept proposals from the workers - and transmit them to the competent offices, and see that - unsatisfactory conditions are remedied. It is entitled to issue - certificates and references to the workers for submission to the - French authorities.” - -I omit one paragraph: - - “Moreover, the head of the French representatives is granted the - diplomatic privileges of personal immunity for the execution of - his tasks, as well as exemption from German jurisdiction and - from coercion by the police.” - -That is the citation. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] How did that office actually work with -you? - -SAUCKEL: That office actually worked with both the DAF and with me. The -representative of that office took part in the negotiations in France -with the French Government. The office changed later to the extent that -the care of the civilian workers was taken over by M. Brunedon in the -place of M. Scapini who looked after prisoners of war only. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then, it was only a change of personnel? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, it was only a change of personnel. I frequently talked -with these gentlemen and acted according to their wishes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What did the Central Inspection Department for the -peoples of the Eastern Territories do? - -SAUCKEL: The Central Inspection Department for the peoples of the -Eastern Territories was an office under the Reich Commissioner for the -Eastern Territories. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How did that office work? - -SAUCKEL: It worked in the same way as the French office, except that it -was a German organization and Germans were in charge. It had the -confidence of the Eastern Workers who worked with us as allies. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any complaints from that side? - -SAUCKEL: None, apart from the cases which Rosenberg reported to me and -which I discussed with him. Everything was attended to there. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now I come to the question of the maintenance of labor -discipline. What sort of regulations were there in order to maintain -labor discipline—punctuality and good work? What kind of regulations -existed? - -SAUCKEL: In Germany the regulations concerning labor discipline was a -matter for the factories themselves. Each factory had its regulations -which in normal times were agreed to between the management, the -foreman, and the workers’ council. This council could take disciplinary -action in the form of fines. During the war labor discipline had become -more strict, because owing to the scarcity of workers it was not -possible to maintain the right of the employer or the employee to give -notice. So the German worker, and German labor and industry were under -wartime decrees and laws. In order to enforce these, I later issued -Decree Number 13 at the suggestion of the Ministerial Council for the -Defense of the Reich. This decree, which has been submitted, provides, -first of all, for varying degrees of punishment within the industries -for infractions of labor regulations, tardiness and unexcused absence -from work. - -DR. SERVATIUS: That is Document Sauckel-23 in the Sauckel document book; -in the English text, Number 1, Page 62. The witness has given you the -essential contents. I merely refer to it now. - -SAUCKEL: These measures within the industries for the maintenance of -labor discipline started with a warning, and then went up to a fine, or -the loss of a day’s or week’s pay. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What happened in the case of gross offenses? - -SAUCKEL: If they could not be dealt with by the courts of honor of the -Labor Front, cases of constant and obstinate bad conduct had to be -reported to the police. - -DR. SERVATIUS: This law applied to foreigners as well as to Germans? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that applied to Germans and foreigners. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what was done in case of criminal offenses? - -SAUCKEL: They also had to be reported to the police. The labor -authorities had no competence in criminal and similar cases. - -DR. SERVATIUS: To whom were the complaints sent if the regulations were -not applied correctly; that is, if instead of fines corporal punishment -had been inflicted? - -SAUCKEL: Complaints of this kind were sent to the Labor Front, or to the -liaison men for the foreign workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were any such cases reported to you? - -SAUCKEL: None were reported to me, because that was not within my -competence. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What were the labor correction camps? - -SAUCKEL: They were institutions of the Reichsführer SS. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who was put into these camps? - -SAUCKEL: Those who were punished by the authorities for infractions of -labor discipline which could not be dealt with by the factory -regulations. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were they the same as concentration camps? - -SAUCKEL: No; in my opinion, no. These labor training camps were not -under the supervision of the Reich Labor Ministry, nor under mine. They -were a police institution. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You know from these proceedings that quite a number of -workers did, in fact, come into the concentration camps. How can you -explain that? - -I shall hand you Document 1063-PS, Exhibit USA-219. It is a letter of 17 -December 1942; in the English document book it is Number 28 of the Slave -Labor Book. It is a letter marked “Secret,” sent by the Chief of the -Security Police and the SD to all SS offices; at any rate, not to you. I -quote: - - “For reasons of war necessity which cannot be discussed further - here, the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police ordered - on 14 December 1942 that by the end of January 1943, at the - latest, at least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be sent to - the concentration camps. In order to obtain this number, the - following measures are required: 1. As from now (until 1 - February 1943) Eastern Workers, and those foreign workers who - are fugitives, or have broken their contracts ... are to be - brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration - camps....” - -THE PRESIDENT: Presumably the witness knows the document. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know that document? - -SAUCKEL: I saw that document here for the first time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You have not yet looked through it? - -SAUCKEL: I saw an excerpt here in Nuremberg for the first time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then I should like to draw your attention to the decisive -passage. Will you please read at the bottom of the first page. It says -the following: - - “In case of necessity, offices not directly involved must be - given to understand that each and every one of these measures is - an indispensable Security Police measure, and be told the - specific reasons in individual cases, so that complaints can be - prevented, or at any rate eliminated.” - -What did you know about that decree? - -SAUCKEL: Nothing was known to me about that decree. It explains many -things which puzzled us. It appears to be a letter from Gruppenführer -Müller and, to my surprise, it states quite clearly that other -offices—and they can only refer to my offices or Speer’s—should be -informed that these measures are necessary Security Police measures. -That was downright fraud with the intention of misleading us. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What do you understand... - -THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document—I understood the -defendant to say that workers were sent to labor camps for infraction of -labor rules. That was what you said, wasn’t it? - -SAUCKEL: If workers, in spite of repeated warnings and fines in the -factory, did not show improvement or continued the offenses, they were -reported by the factories, not by me, to a police office. As far as I -know, this police office had an agreement with the Reich Minister of -Justice according to which... - -THE PRESIDENT: I asked you where they were sent when you said that they -were sent to labor camps for infraction of labor rules, and for no other -reason. Did you say that? - -SAUCKEL: For no other reason; for infractions or for criminal offenses. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then how do you explain the first words of Paragraph 1 of -this document: - - “As from now, all Eastern Workers must be sent to the nearest - concentration camps...”? - -SAUCKEL: It says here, in the German text, Your Lordship: - - “As from now, until 1 February 1943, Eastern Workers, and those - foreign workers who are fugitives, or who have broken contracts, - or who do not belong to allied, friendly, or neutral states, are - to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration - camps, in observance of the necessary formalities as given under - Figure 3.” - -That is the arbitrary directive of that office which I did not know -about. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What do you understand by “extermination by labor”? - -SAUCKEL: I heard that expression “extermination by labor” for the first -time here in the courtroom. Such a concept was of necessity absolutely -contrary to the interests which I stood for in my position. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the employment of -concentration camp inmates? - -SAUCKEL: I had nothing to do with the employment of concentration camp -inmates, and I also told my colleagues that we would have nothing to do -with the employment of that kind of labor. I had nothing to do with -punitive measures of any kind. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who put the concentration camp inmates to work in the -armament industries? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you that from personal knowledge because I had -nothing to do with it, and I never participated in discussions dealing -with this subject. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It has been alleged here that you used the Nacht and -Nebel Order to get workers to Germany. - -SAUCKEL: I did not know the Nacht and Nebel Order. I only found out -about it here. It had nothing to do with the allocation of labor and my -duties. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What about the employment of Jewish workers? - -SAUCKEL: I had nothing to do with the employment of Jews. That was -exclusively the task of the Reichsführer of the SS. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I submit the Document R-91. That is Exhibit USA-241, and -Exhibit RF-347. It is not included in the document books. It is a letter -from the Chief of Security Police and SD Müller to the Reichsführer SS, -field headquarters, dated 16 December 1942. It says there, and I quote: - - “In connection with the increased assignment of manpower to the - KL”—that should probably read KZ—“which is ordered to take - place before 30 January 1943, the following procedure may be - applied in the Jewish sector: total number, 45,000 Jews.” - -Then there is a more detailed specification, and among other things, it -says at the end, “3,000 Jews from the occupied territories of the -Netherlands,” and further, “The number 45,000 includes those unfit for -work....” - -What had you to do with that letter? - -SAUCKEL: I have just learned of that letter for the first time. I did -not know of it before, and I can only emphasize that these transports -and this procedure had nothing to do with my work, and that I had -nothing to do with them at any time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then we have here Document L-61, which has been -submitted. That is Exhibit USA-177; in the English document book on -slave labor, it is Document Number 6. The document is in the first list -of documents which was made available to the Defense, and it was listed -as an original letter from Sauckel which admitted the deportation of -Jews. - -Will you please read this letter to yourself and state your position as -to how far you had anything to do with the deportation of Jews. I shall -briefly state what the contents are. It says there in that letter of 26 -November 1942: - - “By agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, - Jews who are still in employment are from now on also to be - evacuated from the territory of the Reich and are to be replaced - by Poles who are being deported from the Government General.” - -This letter ends by saying: - - “I transmit the foregoing copy for your information. Insofar as - this affects the removal of Jews employed in your area, I - request that you take the necessary measures in agreement with - the competent offices of the Chief of the Security Police and - the SD.” - -Then it says, “Signed, Fritz Sauckel.” - -Will you state your position with respect to that letter, please? - -SAUCKEL: May I say with respect to this document that it was shown to me -already in the preliminary interrogations. I had it only for a short -time then, and when it was presented to me again in the course of the -proceedings I found that it was not an original document which I had -signed. My name is typewritten at the bottom. - -Secondly, it appears very peculiar to me that this letter, which I am -supposed to have signed, was not dated by my office. My office, as can -be seen from numerous documents, was in Berlin, in Mohrenstrasse. This -letter was dated by the Saarlandstrasse office. - -As far as the contents are concerned, I have to state that I at no time -had a personal arrangement or agreement with the SD and Security Police -in the sense of that letter; neither had I any knowledge of that letter, -and I cannot remember it now either. The only thing in that letter which -is correct is that I was obliged to replace the loss of manpower in -German industry—whether Jews, soldiers, or others—within 2 weeks. It -is possible that this letter came from the Saarlandstrasse office, from -a subordinate office. I cannot say anything else about it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How is it, then, that the ending, “Signed, Fritz Sauckel” -is on the letter? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot understand that. If it were an authentic copy, it -would have had to be signed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the original? - -DR. SERVATIUS: No, I have not got the original. It has been submitted by -the Prosecution and is therefore in the files of the Tribunal as an -exhibit. - -SAUCKEL: The appendix deals with events which also occurred before my -time in office—that is, before I came into office these happenings had -practically all taken place. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any knowledge as to what would happen to the -Jews? - -SAUCKEL: Do you mean...? - -DR. SERVATIUS: The final solution. - -SAUCKEL: No, I had no knowledge of that. It would have made my task much -easier and I would have had much less difficulty if all these people, as -far as they were capable of working, had been brought into the labor -plan in a more reasonable manner. I knew absolutely nothing about this -final solution, and it was entirely contrary to my interest. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the question of wages, who was responsible for -the regulation of wages? - -SAUCKEL: I was responsible for the regulation of wages during my term of -office. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of wages were paid? Leave out the Eastern -people for the moment. - -SAUCKEL: In principle, all foreign workers were paid the wages which had -been agreed upon by contract with the liaison offices and the -governments, and which were in accordance with the wage scales -recognized as legal in the different regions in Germany. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What about the so-called Eastern Workers? - -SAUCKEL: As far as the Eastern Workers were concerned, when I took -office I found that under the existing regulations most of their wages -were deducted as taxes in favor of the Reich. This was in accordance -with a decree of the Ministerial Council for National Defense. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you satisfied with that, or did you take steps to -improve conditions? - -SAUCKEL: It can be seen from the documents—that is to say, from the -decrees which I issued during my term of office—that these regulations, -which I considered intolerable, were improved step by step, as far as I -was able to overcome opposition, until in 1944 the Eastern Worker stood -on the same level as the German worker. The first improvement was made -in June 1942 when wages were doubled, the second in 1943, and the last -in March 1944, by Decree 11. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I refer here to the following documents, which I shall -not read: Document Sauckel-50, in Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 134; -Document Sauckel-17, in Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 137; Document -Sauckel-52, Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 143; Document Sauckel-58, -Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 156; and finally, Document Sauckel-58(a), -Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 161. I submit the original in a -collection, “Regulations Governing Allocation of the Eastern Workers.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I understood the defendant to say just now -that that Document L-61 was drawn up before he took charge of the labor -commitment. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It refers to things which existed before his term of -office and were almost completed at the time when that letter was -drafted—that is, that state of things already existed. - -THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing in the document to show that, is there? - -DR. SERVATIUS: It can be seen from the date. - -THE PRESIDENT: The date is 26 November 1942. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The appendix refers to a decree of 27 March 1942. The -second appendix, if we go back further, is an appendix of 21 January -1942 which also deals with that question. What we have quoted here was -only the last letter, the final letter. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. We have not got the full document before us then. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I will submit it. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Regarding the wages of the Eastern -Workers, did the Eastern Workers receive any remuneration besides these -wages? - -SAUCKEL: The Eastern Workers, as a result of my efforts, received -remuneration in the form of premiums for good work, and Christmas -bonuses, in the same way as the German workers; and in addition there -was an agreement with the Eastern Ministry according to which the -families of Eastern Workers were to receive the amount of 130 rubles per -month upon request. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I refer here to some documents. They are Document -Sauckel-22, in the English book, Volume I, Page 9; a decree, Document -Sauckel-54, concerning premiums, which is in Volume II, Page 151; and -Document Sauckel-57, concerning Christmas bonuses, Volume II, Page 155. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] What remained for the Eastern Workers in -cash wages? - -SAUCKEL: When I started in office—that is before the regulations -introduced by me—the Eastern Worker, after his expenses for food and -lodging had been deducted, had about 4 marks 60 pfennigs per week left -over, if one takes as an average example the rate of 60 pfennigs an hour -for an average worker in German industry. - -The same worker’s net pay, or “Freibetrag” as it was called, was -increased in June 1942, after I had had an opportunity of looking into -these things, by about 100 percent to 9.10 marks. - -May I state that it would have been quite impossible for a German worker -at the same wage level to have had more left over for saving when one -considers his taxes and social contributions, his expenses for rent, -heating, and food. That was the principle laid down for me by the -Ministerial Council for Reich Defense for the payment of this labor. It -was not my wish. However, as early as March or April 1943 the wage of -the Russian worker, again due to my intervention, was increased to about -12 marks, and in the spring of 1944 it was increased to about 18 marks. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need to have all this in detail. There -is no particular charge against the defendant that he did not pay any of -the workers, is there? I mean, he says, he paid them and we do not want -the details of the number of marks. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the accusation of slave labor has been -made, and this as a rule is unpaid labor. The French report, Document -RF-22, has estimated a loss of 77 milliards which is supposed to have -been suffered by France through the use of her workers. It is -interesting to hear at least... - -THE PRESIDENT: You do not want exact details of it, do you? - -DR. SERVATIUS: [_Turning to the defendant._] What have you to say about -the facilities for transferring these wages? - -SAUCKEL: I first had to create facilities for transferring wages, -because the only real attraction for a foreign worker to work in Germany -was that he could support his family at home by sending part of his -earnings to his native country. That was done on the basis of agreements -reached with the President of the German Reichsbank. He himself has -testified to that. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the question of wages, I refer to Document -021-PS, which has been submitted as F-44. It is not in either of the -document books. It is dated 2 April 1943. It shows how rates of pay were -calculated and deals with the improvement of the wages of Eastern -Workers. I do not want to quote it in detail; but a study will reveal -that serious attempts were made here to bring about an improvement and -an equalization. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the duration of labor contracts? - -SAUCKEL: The duration of labor contracts depended on agreements which -had been concluded with the governments in question. For the western and -southern countries the contract was for 6 months, 9 months, or 1 year. -As for the eastern countries and the Soviet workers, when I came to -office, the existing regulations provided for an indefinite period. As I -considered a definite period to be necessary in spite of the greater -distances, here too I finally succeeded in obtaining a time limit of 2 -years. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was it intended to continue to use this manpower after -the war, and were these foreign workers to remain in Germany? I ask that -question because the French Prosecution quoted the following passage -from the book, _Work for Europe_, Exhibit RF-5, Page 23: - - “A large percentage of foreign workers will remain in our - country even after the victory, and then, having been trained - for construction work, they will continue and complete the - projects interrupted by the war.” - -From that was it concluded that forced labor was to continue even after -the war? - -SAUCKEL: That was partly or entirely the opinion of the author of that -article, but I believe that it was also mentioned that the workers would -return home and there use, for the benefit of their own homeland, the -knowledge and skill which they had gained from new work in Germany. I -had absolutely no intention of keeping foreign workers in Germany after -the war, and in any case I could not have done so. On the contrary, I -even ordered that a card index of foreign workers, a central register, -should be carefully kept on the basis of which, in case of a favorable -conclusion of the war, it would be possible for me faithfully to return -these workers to their native countries and have a record of them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: If I understood you correctly, it was not a question of -forcibly retaining the workers, but of keeping them here by recruitment? - -SAUCKEL: Yes; it was not reported to me that a large number of foreign -workers wanted to stay in Germany of their own accord. That is an -assumption. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What about the compulsory labor? What was the duration of -the contracts? - -SAUCKEL: There was no difference in pay or length of contract between -voluntary work and compulsory work, or what we called in the language of -the decree, “Dienstverpflichtungen.” This held true for all countries. -If a Frenchman doing compulsory labor had a contract for 6 or 9 months, -he had the same right as the voluntary worker to return after 9 months. -It was possible to extend the period. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In which cases was the contract extended? - -SAUCKEL: The contract was extended when the worker wanted of his own -free will to continue his services, or when there was an emergency or -shortage of manpower in a particular factory which justified an -extension. Then that had to be arranged with the liaison officers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Besides civilian workers, were prisoners of war also used -in Germany? What did you have to do with that use of manpower? - -SAUCKEL: The employment of prisoners of war was quite complicated, -because it had to take place in agreement with the general in charge of -the Prisoners of War Organization. The so-called technique of -transposition caused me difficulties. Allow me to explain this. - -There existed the Geneva Convention, or the Hague Convention, according -to which prisoners of war could not be used in armament or ammunition -industries. When, however, we spoke of prisoners of war being engaged in -the armament industry that meant that so-and-so many German women or -workers were transferred to industries in which the Geneva Convention -prohibited the use of prisoners of war, and that prisoners of war took -their place. That was done in agreement with the offices of the general -in charge of the Prisoners of War Organization. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And who saw to it that the Geneva Convention was -observed? - -SAUCKEL: The general in charge of the Prisoners of War Organization and -we ourselves, or the “Arbeitseinsatz” administration, adhered to the -rules of the Geneva Convention and several times compiled a catalog of -the types of work for which prisoners of war could be used. Also during -my time, in 1943 and 1944, a special edition of this catalog was -published, and it can be found in the so-called _Blue Book_. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Have you known cases where prisoners of war were used -contrary to the Geneva Convention? - -SAUCKEL: Certain agreements were made with the French Government, as far -as volunteers were concerned, and this applied to a certain extent to -Eastern Workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who was responsible for the housing, feeding, and care of -prisoners of war? - -SAUCKEL: The offices of the general in charge of the Prisoners of War -Organization were solely responsible. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Is it known to you that millions of prisoners of war had -perished by the time you had assumed office? - -SAUCKEL: It had become known to me before I assumed office that a great -number of prisoners of war perished in the so-called battles of -encirclement in the East. These battles lasted a long time, and owing to -our enormous transport difficulties we could not move the prisoners, and -they were left on the battlefield in a state of utmost exhaustion. That -is all I know about that. - -DR. SERVATIUS: At the beginning of your activities you had to deal with -prisoners of war, had you not? What did you find out at that time, or -what did you do? - -SAUCKEL: I found out that some of the Russian prisoners of war were -terribly undernourished. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What did you do? - -SAUCKEL: Together with the general in charge of the Prisoners of War -Organization I arranged for all these prisoners of war—as far as I know -and remember there were about 70,000 in the Reich at that time—to be -billeted with German farmers, in order to build up their strength. The -farmers were obliged to feed these prisoners of war for at least 3 -months, without putting them to work. As compensation the farmers were -given the assurance that these prisoners of war would stay with them and -work for them until the end of the war. - -DR. SERVATIUS: During the course of the war did prisoners of war obtain -the status of free laborers? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. As far as French workers were concerned, I was -instrumental in seeing that they were employed only by agreement with -the French Government. These agreements were concluded under the -sponsorship of the German Ambassador in Paris. The quotas were -negotiated in accordance with instructions given me by the Führer and by -the Reich Marshal. The first quota was 250,000 French laborers and -150,000 skilled workers. - -As a compensation for the use of these voluntary workers—and I -emphasize voluntary—50,000 French prisoners of war who were farmers -were to be, and actually were, returned to the French Government in -order to improve the cultivation of French farm land. - -That was the first agreement. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the _Relève_? - -SAUCKEL: The _Relève_ was an agreement between the French Government and -my office according to which for every three French workers who came to -Germany one French prisoner-of-war was released and sent home by the -Führer. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And who brought about this agreement? - -SAUCKEL: This agreement was concluded on the basis of a discussion -between the French Premier and myself. I was much in favor of this -agreement, because I myself spent 5 years behind barbed wire during the -first World War. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did it make it easier for the prisoners? Did they return -home? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, they returned home. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And how did the civilian population react to that? Above -all, how did the workers feel who had to go to Germany? - -SAUCKEL: This was an act of comradeship, and according to the reports I -received the feeling was favorable. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then in reality instead of one prisoner-of-war there were -three imprisoned workers? - -SAUCKEL: No. These workers could move about freely in Germany in the -same way as the other French workers and the German population. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did they have to come to Germany for an indefinite period -of time? - -SAUCKEL: No, they stayed according to the length of their contracts, -just like the other workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the average duration of a contract? - -SAUCKEL: 9 months. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then the result was that after 9 months the prisoners of -war, as well as the other workers, could return home? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. This continual exchange necessitated new quotas and new -agreements with the French Government, for there always had to be -replacements. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were these negotiations carried on under a certain -pressure? - -SAUCKEL: No. I beg you to hear witnesses on this. They were conducted on -a free diplomatic basis. - -DR. SERVATIUS: To what extent was this _Relève_ carried through? Was it -on a very large or only on a small scale? - -SAUCKEL: It was carried out on the basis of 250,000 workers who were to -go to Germany. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The French Prosecution in their government report said -that only weak and sick people were sent back who could not work anyway. -What have you to say to that? - -SAUCKEL: As far as I know, French soldiers who were prisoners of war -were sent back. The sending back and the selection of the soldiers was -not my task but that of the general in charge of the Prisoners of War -Organization. I consider it possible that sick soldiers were also sent -back to their homes in this way if they wished it. But certainly it was -not the intention to send back only sick or older soldiers, but soldiers -in general. That was the basis of the agreement. - -DR. SERVATIUS: There was a second course which was chosen—the improved -status which the French called “transformation.” What kind of -arrangement was that? - -SAUCKEL: The improved status was a third agreement which included the -provision that French prisoners of war in Germany were given the same -contracts and the same status as all other French civilian workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: When a new French worker came to Germany? The ratio -therefore was 1 to 1? - -SAUCKEL: 1 to 1. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did these French workers have to bind themselves -indefinitely, or was there a time limit here too? - -SAUCKEL: Exactly the same as applied to the _Relève_. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was this improvement in status welcomed by the French -soldiers, or did they disapprove of it? - -SAUCKEL: They did not disapprove of it but welcomed it, according to the -attitude of the individual soldier. A large number rejected it; others -accepted it gladly, for by this measure the workers received high wages -and all the liberties that were accorded outside the barbed wire, and -the like. I myself saw how an entire camp accepted this new status. They -had been told that the gates and barbed wire would be done away with, -the prisoner regulations discontinued, and the surveillance abolished. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Could these prisoners who had been turned into workers -also go home? - -SAUCKEL: My documents show that they were allowed to go home. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did they receive any furlough? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, they did. Many of them came back, and an equally large -number did not. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to refer to Document RF-22, German text, -Page 70 of the French Government report. This document shows and admits -that the prisoners received leave to go home at the beginning of this -transformation, and I quote, “The unfortunate men did not return, -however, and therefore this procedure was discontinued.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Have you heard of the idea, “indirect -forced labor”? - -SAUCKEL: No. Please explain it to me. - -DR. SERVATIUS: [_Turning to the Tribunal._] The French report contains -the argument that those workers who worked in France in armament -industries did so for the benefit of Germany. Sauckel was not connected -with this in any way. This French report, which deals at length with the -economic side of the Arbeitseinsatz, says that it worked according to a -well-conceived and flexible system, and at first negotiations were -friendly. The measures then became harsher in accordance with the -circumstances. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Was there a definite plan? Did you have to -carry out certain instructions, or what system was adopted? - -SAUCKEL: I should like to be allowed to explain this. A plan of the sort -you have just outlined never existed. The only thing towards which I -worked was the program which I drew up and which is in the possession of -the Tribunal; a program which I admit, and for which I take all the -consequences and the responsibility, even for my subordinates. This -program was carried out through my decrees, which are also available in -full. The development of the war did not permit me to give full -consideration to the circumstances which now, _post factum_, appear -obvious. We ourselves stood in the midst of the flow of events as the -war developed and did not have time to ponder over such matters. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What were the “Sperrbetriebe” and the “Ausnahmebetriebe” -in France? - -SAUCKEL: The Sperrbetriebe were industries which were the result of an -agreement between Reich Minister Speer and, I believe, the French -Minister of Economics, Bichelonne. They were industries which worked -partly for German armaments and partly for German civilian requirements, -and did not come under my offices. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the number of workers who were brought to -Germany from foreign countries? - -SAUCKEL: The number of workers brought from foreign countries to -Germany, according to careful estimates and the records of the -statistical department of the Reich Ministry of Labor, might be said to -be about 5 million. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you determine how far these laborers were to be used, -and how many were to be brought in? - -SAUCKEL: No, I could not determine that, for I did not represent the -German economy, and I myself could not decide the extent of the German -armament and agricultural programs. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Apart from the current quotas which you had to supply, -there were certain so-called program orders made by the Führer. Is that -true? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, because the Führer drew up the armament program, as far as -I know. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You have told me of your programs. I shall read the -figures, and perhaps you can confirm them. - -The first program in April 1942: the demand was for 1.6 million workers; -1.6 million were supplied, the entire figure being made up of -foreigners. - -The second program in September 1942: 2 million, and 2 million were -supplied, of which 1 million, that is only half, were foreigners. - -In 1943: the demand was for 1 million, and 1 million were supplied, the -entire figure being made up of foreign workers. - -Then the last program on 4 January 1944: the Führer demanded 4 million, -and the demand met with 0.9 million. - -SAUCKEL: Allow me to correct you. The figure should read, demand met -with 3 million. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Demand 4 million; demand met with 3 million. And how many -were foreigners? - -SAUCKEL: 0.9 million. - -DR. SERVATIUS: 0.9 million foreigners. How many workers came from the -East, how many from the West, and how many from other regions? - -SAUCKEL: I naturally cannot give you the exact figure here without data -or statistics, but on an average I would say that the figure for each -group might be about 30 percent; the percentage of workers from the East -was certainly somewhat higher. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And how were the requirements ascertained? - -SAUCKEL: Through the demands of the employers of labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what were the employers of labor? - -SAUCKEL: They were the Economic Ministry, the Armament Ministry, the -Agricultural Ministry, the various trades, the State Railways, the -mines, _et cetera_, all big undertakings. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And to whom did they present their demands? - -SAUCKEL: Usually the demand was made simultaneously to the Führer and to -me, or to the collecting agencies provided for by the Four Year Plan. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were they the reduced requirements, if their demands had -to be checked, or were they the original demands? - -SAUCKEL: I have just said that it varied. The demands were sent in to -me, and at the same time they were almost always sent to the Führer, -because the Führer had to approve these demands. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the position of the Central Planning Board? - -SAUCKEL: The Central Planning Board was an office where above all, as -far as I know, the quotas for raw materials were fixed, but where -questions of work and manpower were also discussed. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Could you receive orders from the Central Planning Board? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, the demands which were put to me I had to consider as -orders, for the Führer had laid on me the duty of meeting the demands of -the war economy. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you belong to the Central Planning Board yourself? - -SAUCKEL: No, I was only called in when there were to be debates on the -use of manpower. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the relationship between your office and -Speer’s? - -SAUCKEL: My office had to meet the demands made by Speer. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did Speer have his own machinery for directing labor? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, he had to have that in his ministry, and he did have it. -That was essential. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Could you meet all the demands made of you? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were your labor reserves exhausted? - -SAUCKEL: According to my conviction, yes; for already in 1943—and it -was one of the purposes of my manifesto—I pointed out that the economic -problems of the occupied countries were very serious and had to be -regulated and settled so as to avoid confusion. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What labor reserves were still left in Germany? - -SAUCKEL: In Germany after 1943 there were no more really usable reserves -of manpower left. Many discussions took place on this problem, but the -labor most in demand was skilled labor, miners, and workers for the -heavy industries. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what manpower reserves were there to be gotten out of -France? - -SAUCKEL: I must say that from our point of view, and according to our -judgment concerning economic and labor questions, there was a great deal -of manpower and very extensive reserves in the occupied territories. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you mean that in comparison the economic forces of -Germany were far more exhausted than those of the occupied countries? - -SAUCKEL: Perhaps I can show it by a comparison with the first World War. -In the first World War, 10 to 12 million Germans were mobilized for -labor. In this war about 25 million German men and women were used, and -more than half were women. I must add that all the women who did Red -Cross or other welfare work in Germany were not included in my -statistics. They were included in other countries. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have a concluding question: If you view your activity -as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor from today’s -standpoint, what would you say about the use of foreign labor in -general? - -SAUCKEL: It is very hard for me to answer this question. I myself and -the entire German people were of the opinion, and had to be, that this -war was neither willed nor brought about by the German people—and, to -be truthful, I must include the Party. Our standpoint was that we had to -do our duty to our people. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It is not intended that you should give an explanation in -the wider sense, but that you should limit yourself to the general -aspects of the question of labor allocation, and tell us whether today -you consider your activity justified or not. - -SAUCKEL: From the point of view of the war situation and of German -economy, and as I saw and tried to carry out my allocation of labor, I -considered it justified, and, above all, inevitable; for Germany and the -countries we occupied were an economic whole that could not be split up. -Without such an exchange of eastern and western manpower Germany could -not have existed for even 1 day. The German people themselves were -working to the extreme limit of their capacity. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have concluded my questioning of the defendant. - -DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Witness, did the -Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories often try to cut down the -labor quotas demanded by you? - -SAUCKEL: Not only the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories -tried to do that, but I myself tried very hard to do so by intervening -with the Führer and all the employers of labor. - -DR. THOMA: I should like to put several questions to you with regard to -Document Number 054-PS, which describes the abuses in the recruiting and -transporting of Eastern Workers. Did you personally take steps to put an -end to the abuses which are specified here? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, of course. Please interrogate the witnesses on this. - -DR. THOMA: Did you notice that this report deals with the city and the -region of Kharkov in the Ukraine, and do you know that this entire -district was never under the civilian administration of the Ministry for -the Occupied Eastern Territories? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I know that, and I testified that this report was not sent -to me but to an Army office. This Army office had its own labor -department which was directly subordinate to it. - -DR. THOMA: In this report did you especially notice the following -paragraph on the first page: - - “a) With few exceptions, the Ukrainians who are being employed - in the Reich as individual workers for example, in small trade - enterprises, on farms...” - -SAUCKEL: Will you please tell me where it says that? - -DR. THOMA: On Page 1, the last paragraph: “Judging from the discussions -with the gentlemen and the reading of the reports, it can be said in -general...” - -SAUCKEL: Which documents? There are several documents. - -DR. THOMA: I mean 054-PS, of course. - -SAUCKEL: Which? - -DR. THOMA: I think it is the first, second, third paragraph, “d”—the -second paragraph. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I have found it. - -DR. THOMA: It says there that the Ukrainians who were being employed as -individual workers in the Reich, were “very satisfied with the -conditions.” But: “b. On the other hand the Ukrainians living in -community camps complain a great deal...” - -Is that correct? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. In my testimony I quoted the passage in which the author -of the letter said that this was the case during the first few months -only, for I immediately had the camps inspected and improved. I even -went so far as to get the Reich Labor Minister to issue new camp -regulations, all as a result of this complaint. - -DR. THOMA: Did you personally visit the Occupied Eastern Territories on -several occasions and speak to the administrative authorities there; for -example, in Riga, Kovno, Zhitomir? - -SAUCKEL: Not only did I speak to the administrative authorities there, -but I compiled this manifesto in Russia and had it published there, and -everything that is contained in the manifesto was communicated to these -offices in the same way. - -DR. THOMA: Yes. But is it correct that you emphasized the special -urgency of the Führer decree? - -SAUCKEL: That was my duty; that was what I was there for. - -DR. THOMA: That is not right from the legal point of view; for your -actual authority came from Göring, as the Delegate for the Four Year -Plan. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct. The official channel was: Führer, Göring, -Four Year Plan—that was the order. - -DR. THOMA: Then, if you said it was the Führer’s order, you did so to -give a special emphasis? - -SAUCKEL: No, that was not my intention. The Führer commissioned me to -replace the loss of German soldiers, Doctor. These were instructions -which I had received directly from the Führer or Göring on the basis of -the requirements of the employers of labor. - -DR. THOMA: Was a written order sent to you? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, written orders were also sent. - -DR. THOMA: From Hitler personally? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, from Hitler and from Göring; from both of them. - -DR. THOMA: Do you recall that you made an agreement with Rosenberg to -the effect that Eastern Workers in Germany, after their return to their -own country, were to receive land so that they would not be at a -disadvantage as compared with the people who had remained? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that was agreed between Rosenberg and myself; that is -correct. - -DR. THOMA: Was this actually carried out? - -SAUCKEL: Just how far this was carried out, I am unable to state. That -was a task for the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories. I -assume that it was carried out as far as possible. - -DR. THOMA: Do you recall that Rosenberg constantly advocated the doing -away with the so-called Eastern Worker’s badge? - -SAUCKEL: Rosenberg, as well as I myself, advocated the abolition of the -Eastern Worker’s badge. There is a letter from the Reichsführer SS -refusing this; but I know for certain that at the end of 1943 or the -beginning of 1944 we succeeded in abolishing this Eastern Worker’s -badge, and it was replaced by a national emblem as worn by the other -foreigners. - -DR. THOMA: Why was this Eastern Worker’s badge to be abolished? - -SAUCKEL: This Eastern Worker’s badge was to be abolished for various -reasons, but above all to eliminate the demoralizing effect produced on -the Eastern Workers by the wearing of a discriminating badge. - -DR. THOMA: I have one last question. You said that you did not recall -having received any complaints except those that you discussed with -Rosenberg. Now, numerous complaints were constantly being investigated -by the Central Agency for Eastern People together with the DAF. Did the -DAF report to you on this? - -SAUCKEL: The DAF reported that, in accordance with my directives, it had -to put a stop to abuses and bad conditions wherever they were found. -That was its duty. In order to remedy these abuses the DAF had not to -apply to me but to the trade inspection department of the Reich Ministry -of Labor, whose task it was. - -DR. THOMA: Did you make sure whether this inspection department stopped -these abuses? - -SAUCKEL: I installed my own inspection agencies there, as mentioned by -Dr. Servatius. However, the trade inspection department was the only -authorized agency which had the legal authority to use compulsory -measures and it was supervised by the Reich Labor Minister who had full -authority. - -DR. THOMA: I have no further questions. Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the emblem that you have been speaking about? - -SAUCKEL: The Eastern Worker’s emblem or badge consisted of a -bluebordered square, which bore a blue inscription “Ost.” The -Reichsführer SS first ordered it to be worn on the right side of the -breast; later, on the sleeve. Still later I was instrumental in getting -this changed to a national emblem—blue, I think, or something -similar—like the Russian colors, as the people themselves wished. - -DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Herr Sauckel, the -Defendant Keitel and the OKW are accused by the Prosecution of the -deportation of civilian people for the purposes of the mobilization of -labor. You were also interrogated before the start of this Trial as to -whether the OKW, and Keitel as Chief of the OKW, participated in the -procurement, recruitment, and conscription of people in the occupied -territories. - -A number of things which were not clear and which are contained in the -record have been cleared up by your testimony. Especially in answering -the last question of my colleague, Dr. Thoma, you made it clear that the -organizational official channel was as follows: The Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor, the Four Year Plan—Göring, and the -Führer. Is that correct? - -SAUCKEL: Generally speaking, yes. - -DR. NELTE: I am interested in determining whether in this official -channel the OKW was included, or the Führer in some other function than -Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. - -SAUCKEL: I myself was not a soldier, and I am not familiar with the -detailed organization of the OKW and the OKH. It was often difficult for -a layman to make the distinction between these things. It is true that -the OKH was competent for the recruitment of workers in occupied -countries controlled by army groups. Therefore, labor regulations for -the occupied countries which were under the authority of the Army had to -be issued through laws or directives by the General Staff. - -DR. NELTE: You probably mean the Quartermaster General of the Army? - -SAUCKEL: The Quartermaster General was, as far as I know, next to the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army. - -DR. NELTE: And by this you mean to say that the OKW and the Defendant -Keitel had no competence concerning the procuring, recruiting, and -conscripting of manpower in the occupied territories? - -SAUCKEL: He had no competence in this respect. I came into contact with -Field Marshal Keitel, because the Führer repeatedly instructed me to ask -Field Marshal Keitel to transmit his orders to the army groups by -telephone or through directives. - -DR. NELTE: And what about the question of the allocation of workers? Did -the OKW, and specifically the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, have -any competence concerning the allocation of workers at home? - -SAUCKEL: No, for the workers were used in those economic branches for -which they had been demanded, and they had nothing at all to do with the -OKW. - -DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -M. JACQUES B. HERZOG (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): -Defendant Sauckel, you joined the National Socialist Party in 1925, -didn’t you? Is that correct? - -SAUCKEL: I joined the National Socialist Party for the first time, as an -ordinary member, as early as 1923. When the Party was reorganized in -1925 I again became a member. - -M. HERZOG: But you had supported the policy of National Socialism since -1921, had you not? - -SAUCKEL: From 1921 onwards, I supported a German policy. In 1921 I did -not as yet belong to the Party. I knew about the Party, and I was in -sympathy with its ideas; that is probably the right way to put it. - -M. HERZOG: Did you not make speeches in favor of National Socialism from -that time on? - -SAUCKEL: From about the middle of 1921 I made speeches in favor of -Germany, not expressly for the Party and only in a very small way, at -small gatherings, and as my conscience guided me. - -M. HERZOG: You were Gauleiter, member of the Landrat, Minister of the -Interior, and Governor of Thuringia. Is it correct that in this capacity -you brought about the Nazification of your Gau? - -SAUCKEL: I was Prime Minister of Thuringia from August 1932, and I was -Minister of the Interior as well. - -M. HERZOG: I am asking you the question again: Is it correct that, in -your capacity as Gauleiter and Governor of Thuringia, you brought about -the Nazification of your Gau? - -SAUCKEL: Nazification is a term with which I was neither familiar nor do -I consider it correct. I recruited for the National Socialist Party and -I supported it. - -M. HERZOG: You were Obergruppenführer of the organization of the SS, -were you not? - -SAUCKEL: I do not quite understand. Of the SS? - -M. HERZOG: You were an Obergruppenführer of the SS? - -SAUCKEL: I already stated in my preliminary interrogation that I was an -honorary Obergruppenführer of the SS. I myself never served in the SS, -nor did I exercise any functions in the SS. - -M. HERZOG: When did you become Obergruppenführer of the SS? - -SAUCKEL: As far as I remember I became an Obergruppenführer of the SS in -1934. - -M. HERZOG: And you were that until when? - -SAUCKEL: Until the end. - -M. HERZOG: Among the documents which you have presented in your document -book, there is Document Sauckel-95. I will read the following passage on -Page 252 of the French translation: - - “My dear fellow countrymen, our magnificent SA and SS, - persecuted and insulted during a whole decade as the scum of the - German people, have carried through, supported, and sustained - this revolution with an unshakable discipline....” - -Is it correct... - -THE PRESIDENT: From what are you reading? - -M. HERZOG: From Document Sauckel-95 of the defendant’s document book; -Document Sauckel-95, which was submitted yesterday by the learned -counsel for the defense, Page 252 of the French translation. It is in -the third document book of the defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on. - -M. HERZOG: I put the question again and read: - - “My dear fellow countrymen, our magnificent SA and SS, - persecuted and insulted during a whole decade as the scum of the - German people, have carried through, supported, and sustained - this revolution with an unshakable discipline....” - -Do you confirm this declaration? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but I request that I be shown the document in -cross-examination so that I can define my attitude in detail. - -M. HERZOG: This document is taken from your own document book, which you -yourself submitted. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I remember it well. - -M. HERZOG: Were the Nuremberg Laws concerning Jews in accordance with -your convictions? - -SAUCKEL: I had no influence on legislation such as culminated in the -Nuremberg Laws. My conviction is that every nation and every race has -the right to exist and to demand respect and protection through itself. -What I demand and have demanded for my own people is exactly the same. - -M. HERZOG: Did you see to it that the Nuremberg Laws were strictly -applied in the Gau of Thuringia? - -SAUCKEL: The Nuremberg Laws could apply to Thuringia only insofar as my -authority to appoint or dismiss employees was involved; and, of course, -according to German law, it was my duty to carry out the law. The -carrying out of this law by me entailed neither ill-usage nor any other -inhuman treatment. - -M. HERZOG: Did you approve of Hitler’s theory of living space? - -SAUCKEL: The Führer wrote about living space in his book. How far I -agreed or disagreed with him cannot, in my opinion, be dealt with in -this Trial, for I had no influence as to how the Führer himself should -interpret the word Lebensraum. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that you must answer the question, -whether or not you approve of the doctrine of Lebensraum. - -SAUCKEL: I am not fully acquainted with the statements made by the -Führer about the doctrine of Lebensraum. I should like to emphasize that -I never thought of Lebensraum in connection with the carrying out of -wars, or wars of aggression; neither did I promote the idea; but the -idea of Lebensraum is perhaps best brought home to us by the fact that -the population of Europe in the last 100 years has increased threefold, -from 150 million to 450 million. - -M. HERZOG: Did you, or did you not approve of the theory of Lebensraum? -Answer “yes” or “no.” - -SAUCKEL: I did not agree with the theory of Lebensraum if it had to do -with wars of aggression. - -M. HERZOG: Did you approve of Hitler’s theory of the master race? - -SAUCKEL: I could give abundant proof that I personally always refused to -emphasize the idea of a master race, and said so in my speeches. I am -personally much more interested in proficiency than in ideas about a -master race. - -M. HERZOG: Then you did not think that the foreign policy of Germany -should have been conducted according to these two theories; the theory -of Lebensraum on the one hand, and the theory of the master race on the -other hand? - -SAUCKEL: I have already stated to my counsel that I did not concern -myself with foreign policy and was not informed about it, as I am not -versed in matters of foreign policy. - -M. HERZOG: On the contrary, did you not approve of all the measures of -foreign policy, and did you not participate in them? - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better break off now, and you can repeat -the question tomorrow. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND DAY - Thursday, 30 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Sauckel resumed the stand._] - -PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Mr. President, I -should like to put a request to you. My client comes next in order and -he would like to be excused, if possible, this afternoon and all day -tomorrow, so that he can prepare his case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the -Defendant Von Papen is absent. - -M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, I was asking you yesterday whether you -considered that Germany’s foreign policy was based on the Hitlerian -theories concerning living space and the master race. - -SAUCKEL: May I ask you to repeat the question? I did not quite -understand it in German. - -M. HERZOG: I was asking you yesterday if you considered that the foreign -policy of Germany was based on the two Hitlerian theories, Lebensraum -and the master race. - -SAUCKEL: I have understood—whether German foreign policy was based on -the principles of Lebensraum and the master race. - -M. HERZOG: Yes, I am asking you to answer whether, in your opinion, it -was so. - -SAUCKEL: Not on the principle of a master race. I should like to be -permitted to give an explanation of this. - -I personally have never approved of the statements made by some of the -National Socialist speakers about a superior race and a master race. I -have never advocated that. As a young man I traveled about the world. I -traveled in Australia and in America, and I met families who belong to -the happiest memories of my life. But I loved my own people and sought, -I admit, equality of rights for them; and I have always stood for that. -I have never believed in the superiority of one particular race, but I -always held that equality of rights was necessary. - -M. HERZOG: That being so, you did not approve of the whole of the -foreign policy of Hitler; and you did not collaborate with him? - -SAUCKEL: In answer to the question by my counsel I stated that I never -considered myself to be a politician as regards foreign policy. I -entered the Party by quite a different way and for quite different -motives. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the declaration which you made on 4 September -1945 to two American officers? - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] This declaration is Document Number -3057-PS. It was submitted as Exhibit Number USA-223. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You said the following: - - “I have been a convinced National Socialist since 1921 and - agreed 100 percent with the program of Adolf Hitler. I worked - actively to that end; and during the period from 1921 until the - assumption of power I made about 500 speeches, the sense and - contents of which represented the National Socialist standpoint. - It was for me a particular satisfaction to have raised the Gau - of Thuringia to a predominant position with regard to its - National Socialist views and convictions. Until the collapse I - never doubted Adolf Hitler, but obeyed his orders blindly.” - -THE PRESIDENT: You are going a little bit too fast. This has been read, -M. Herzog. I do not think you need read all of it. - -M. HERZOG: I would ask you then, Defendant Sauckel, if you confirm the -statements which were made under oath, voluntarily and without any -duress, on 4 September 1945, and which contradict those that you made -yesterday and which you have just made to me. - -SAUCKEL: I confirm that my signature is appended to this document. I ask -the Tribunal’s permission to state how that signature came about. - -This document was presented to me in its finished form. I asked to be -allowed to read and study this document in my cell in Oberursel and -decide whether I could sign it. That was denied me. During the -conversation an officer was consulted who, I was told, belonged to the -Polish or Russian army; and it was made clear to me that if I hesitated -too long in signing this document I would be handed over to the Russian -authorities. Then this Polish or Russian officer entered and asked, -“Where is Sauckel’s family? We know Sauckel, of course we will take him -with us; but his family will have to be taken into Russian territory as -well.” I am the father of 10 children. I did not stop to consider; and -thinking of my family, I signed this document. - -When I returned to my cell, I sent a written message to the commandant -of the camp and asked permission to talk with him alone on this matter. -But that was not possible, because shortly afterwards I was brought to -Nuremberg. - -M. HERZOG: Is not your signature at the end of this document in which -you declared that you “made the above declarations voluntarily and -without any duress”? - -SAUCKEL: That is correct, but in this situation... - -M. HERZOG: I think your explanation is sufficient. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask him whether he has read it now and whether -it is true. - -M. HERZOG: I asked you a few moments ago, and I ask you now: Are you -ready to confirm that your statements are correct? - -SAUCKEL: These statements are not correct in individual points, and I -asked that I might correct these various points; but I was not given the -time to do that. - -On the last morning before I left I was told I could discuss this matter -in Nuremberg, and when I was interrogated here I told the American -officer about the matter. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, was this document read over in the Tribunal -during the prosecution? - -M. HERZOG: This document was submitted under Exhibit Number USA-223. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, as far as I recall this document was not -submitted. At the time I had a conversation with the American -representative of the Prosecution and told him about these objections. -He did not bring it up at a later session because of these objections; -and the President himself, at the conclusion, asked whether this -document would not be produced, and the prosecutor said, “No. Having -talked it over with the Defense, I will dispense with this document.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you tell us that it wasn’t read over in court. - -DR. SERVATIUS: No, it was not read in court. At any rate I would like to -object to the admissibility of this document, for it was given under -duress. - -THE PRESIDENT: Under these circumstances, M. Herzog, you may -cross-examine in what way you like upon the document. The Tribunal was -under the impression that it had already been read over. That is why -they stopped you reading it. - -M. HERZOG: [_Turning to the defendant._] In Paragraph 2 you declared: - - “After the putting into effect of the Nuremberg Laws, in keeping - with my convictions, I saw to it that all these laws were fully - carried out in the Gau of Thuringia.” - -Paragraph 4: - - “With regard to foreign policy I have been of the opinion that - the German people has a justified claim for living space in - Europe and by reason of their superior racial level have to - assume a leading position.... I agreed with all the decisions - taken by Hitler and the NSDAP concerning the means to be used - and the measures to be taken to obtain these ends, and I - collaborated actively in the execution of this plan.” - -SAUCKEL: I could not follow your concluding sentences. - -M. HERZOG: I will read it once more: - - “...I agreed with all the decisions taken by Hitler and the - NSDAP concerning the means to be used and the measures to be - taken to obtain these ends, and I collaborated actively in the - execution of this plan.” - -I ask you to confirm whether you made these statements. - -SAUCKEL: I certainly would not have made those statements in the way I -did, if I had been able to act freely and according to my own will. - -M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will consider it. Is it a fact that you were -appointed... - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, the Tribunal thinks that the document is -before the witness and he should be asked to point out in what way he -says the document is wrong. - -M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, you heard what the President has said. You -say that this document does not correspond to the truth. Will you kindly -tell the Tribunal in what way it does not. - -SAUCKEL: May I take this document point by point? I was 100 percent in -agreement with the social program, and I told my counsel that when he -examined me. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, what the Tribunal wishes is that you should -take the document and point out, sentence by sentence, what is wrong in -it. - -SAUCKEL: In Paragraph 1, the year 1921 is incorrect. - -I became a member, as my first membership card shows, only in 1923 or -1925. Before the year 1923 I was in sympathy with the Party. - -As to being 100 percent in agreement with Adolf Hitler’s program, I -meant 100 percent insofar as the program appeared to me to be justified -legally and constitutionally, and according to ethics and morality. - -Just how many meetings I conducted I cannot say. My speeches and -lectures were based mainly on my life and on my experiences. Those were -the only things that I could talk about, and I wanted to reconcile the -German social classes and the German professions to National Socialist -ideology. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I have pointed out to you that what the -Tribunal desires is for you to take the document and say what sentences -in it are wrong, and not to make speeches. - -SAUCKEL: In my eyes, all the sentences are wrong. I would not have put -them that way if I myself had been able to formulate them. The way they -stand, I dispute each and every sentence, for I did not write them and I -was not consulted. These sentences were put before me as they are now. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I be permitted to give an explanation -of this matter? This statement is practically a summary of all the -interrogations in which the various points appear as a confession in the -sense of the Indictment. The defendant could not say a word in his own -defense if this were correct. Since it is a résumé and since conclusions -can be drawn from it, he must have the opportunity of refuting these -conclusions; and that necessitates a statement. These are not definite -facts which can be answered with “yes” or “no.” - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has just said that the whole document is -wrong, and he has also said that the document was obtained from him -under duress. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And it is therefore not any use to go through it in -detail. But the Tribunal would like to hear from the American -Prosecution if they have anything to say about the matter. - -MR. DODD: I do not have a copy of the document before me in English, but -I... - -THE PRESIDENT: You see, Mr. Dodd, M. Herzog has said that it was offered -in evidence under the Exhibit Number USA-223. - -MR. DODD: My recollection is that—I will check the record, Mr. -President—my recollection is that in the presentation of the case on -Slave Labor, we included this in our document book but did not offer it -in evidence. I think I said to the Tribunal at the time that we had -decided not to offer it. It had been printed and put in the document -book. - -My memory may be faulty, but my recollection is, Mr. President, that the -President of the Tribunal asked me if I did not intend to offer it, and -I then stated that we had thought it over and decided not to use it. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not understand how it gets an exhibit number if it -isn’t offered in evidence. - -MR. DODD: I don’t either. I think it is an error. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. Mr. Dodd, do you know whether this is a résumé or -a summary of a number of interrogations which were taken? - -MR. DODD: My understanding is to the contrary. I think it was taken -before the Defendant Sauckel was in Nuremberg and before any -interrogations were conducted on the part of the interrogation division -of the American Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Were you aware Dr. Servatius was objecting to the -document on the ground that it was obtained under duress? - -MR. DODD: My recollection is that at the time of the presentation of the -Slave Labor case Dr. Servatius made some objection, and I think that is -what brought the matter up at that time; and that is why we did not use -it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you had better pass from it. - -M. HERZOG: [_Turning to the defendant._] You were appointed -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor by an ordinance of -21 March 1942? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct. - -M. HERZOG: Is it correct to say that this decree was countersigned by -the Codefendant Keitel? - -SAUCKEL: The decree, I believe, was countersigned three times. I believe -that is right. At the moment I cannot confirm it with certainty. - -M. HERZOG: Would you kindly explain to the Tribunal under what -circumstances you were appointed to that office? - -SAUCKEL: I answered that question when it was put to me by my counsel -yesterday. It was a surprise to me. - -M. HERZOG: Did Speer, the Reich Minister for Armaments, have anything to -do with your appointment? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you that from my own knowledge. Bormann’s -announcement said it was at the suggestion of Speer; but I cannot tell -you that from my own knowledge. - -M. HERZOG: Do you recollect having made any statement on that subject in -your interrogation on 12 September 1945? - -SAUCKEL: At this moment I cannot remember the statement. - -M. HERZOG: On 12 September 1945 you were interrogated by Major Monigan; -and you appear to have stated the following—the Tribunal will find this -on the first page of the extracts of the interrogatory which has been -handed them: - - “In March 1942 I was summoned rather suddenly by Minister Speer, - who had been appointed a short while previously. Speer told me - that it was urgent that I should assume...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Could you move those papers away from the light; you -cannot see the light which is constantly going on. - - M. HERZOG: “...Speer told me that it was urgent that I should - assume new functions in connection with the question of labor. A - few days later he asked me to go with him to general - headquarters, and I was introduced to the Führer who told me - that I must accept this new appointment without fail.” - -Do you confirm that statement? - -SAUCKEL: It is correct; only I cannot say whether that was before a -decision—whether my appointment was previously arranged before these -meetings through the initiative of some other gentlemen; but except for -that, the facts are correct. - -M. HERZOG: But you confirm that the Defendant Speer, Minister for -Armament and War Production, took you to Hitler’s headquarters on the -occasion of your appointment. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct. - -M. HERZOG: Yesterday your counsel submitted a chart showing the general -organization of your service and how it was connected with the other -organizations of the Reich. You declared that chart was correct. I would -ask you to confirm, by saying “yes” or “no,” whether you think that -chart is correct. - -SAUCKEL: According to my own personal recollection, yes. - -M. HERZOG: Have you that chart in front of you? - -SAUCKEL: No, I have not. - -M. HERZOG: It is the document which was handed up yesterday by your -counsel showing the different offices. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which chart is it? - -M. HERZOG: It is Chart Number 1, indicating how Sauckel’s department -dovetailed with the other ministerial services. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you look at Column 6 starting from -the left, the column above which there is the name of the Defendant -Funk? Have you found it? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -M. HERZOG: Would you go down that column, the third square, representing -the armament inspectors? Is it correct that the armament inspectors, as -shown here, were under the Defendant Funk? - -SAUCKEL: Under Funk? Which department do you mean, which division? That -is not quite correct here. It should be moved a bit to the side. Later -it was under Speer. It says Reichsautobahn and highway inspectors. That -did not come under Funk. That is a mistake. - -M. HERZOG: Do you see the square beside that one, which connects the -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor with the directorate -of the Reichsautobahn service. It is the square on the right-hand side, -a little above the others. Should it be connected with the -Reichsautobahn service? Should it not be with the square above, -inspectors of armaments? - -SAUCKEL: Yes; I cannot understand how this mistake could happen in this -chart. I have not seen this diagram before. This is the first time I -have seen it; that is a mistake. I did not know about that. - -M. HERZOG: And you stated it was accurate without having examined it -beforehand, is that so? - -SAUCKEL: I assumed it to be the same chart as the one which was put -before me as complete. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, when I presented this chart yesterday, I -mentioned that there might be a few discrepancies. These discrepancies -came in when it was being mimeographed. But I did not see the final... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you can ask any questions if you want to -in re-examination, but there is no ground for objection to questions -which have been put. The questions are perfectly proper. - -M. HERZOG: Defendant, you did take part in the conferences of the -Central Planning Board of the Four Year Plan? - -SAUCKEL: Only in some of them, when labor problems were being discussed. - -M. HERZOG: Will you please tell the Tribunal which of your colleagues -accompanied you or represented you at such conferences? - -SAUCKEL: That varied—Dr. Timm, Dr. Hildebrandt, Dr. Stothfang; but it -varied. - -M. HERZOG: Who among the other defendants also participated in those -conferences? Can you tell us? - -SAUCKEL: I can recall with certainty only Herr Speer as being one who -participated in these conferences. Whether Herr Funk actually -participated, I really cannot remember any particular meeting. Perhaps -he did, and perhaps not. I am sorry I cannot say for certain. - -M. HERZOG: And the Defendant Göring? - -SAUCKEL: At the meetings of the Central Planning Board I personally -never saw the Reich Marshal. I do not know whether certain conferences -which were held at his place had strictly to do with the Central -Planning Board. Some conferences in which he participated took place at -Karinhall, but whether they dealt with matters concerning the Central -Planning Board I cannot say. It was not always clear. - -M. HERZOG: But when the Defendants Göring and Funk did not take part in -these meetings were they not represented there? - -SAUCKEL: The Reich Marshal was represented by Field Marshal Milch, but -whether Reich Minister Funk was represented I cannot remember exactly. -He might have been represented by Herr Kehrl or someone else. There were -many gentlemen there; I did not know all of them personally. - -M. HERZOG: Is it not correct to say that, at these conferences of the -Central Planning Board of the Four Year Plan, the general decisions -concerning the allocation of labor were made by all the people who were -present or were represented? - -SAUCKEL: At the Central Planning Board no general decisions were made. -The demands were made known there and, as there was nearly always a -dispute, the higher authorities had to decide; generally it was the -Führer. That happened frequently. - -M. HERZOG: The Central Planning Board had established a collaboration -between you and the other defendants who were present or represented -there, is that not so? - -SAUCKEL: That collaboration did not originate there, as those questions -had already been discussed before the formation of this Central Planning -Board. The questions were also discussed there, and demands were -submitted and discussed. - -M. HERZOG: Will you please take Document Number R-124. It has already -been submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number USA-179. You will -see therein a declaration which you made at the meeting of 1 March 1944. -I read: - - “My duty towards the Führer...” - -SAUCKEL: Will you please tell me the page from which you are reading? - -M. HERZOG: Page 1780. The place is no doubt marked. - - “My duty towards the Führer, the Reich Marshal, Minister Speer, - and you, gentlemen, as well as towards agriculture, is clear; - and I will fulfill it. As a start we have already 262,000 new - workers; and I hope and am firmly convinced that I shall obtain - most of what has been asked. The labor will have to be - distributed, of course, according to the needs of German - armament first, and secondly, German industry as a whole; and I - shall always be prepared, gentlemen, to see to it that closest - contact is constantly maintained here and that closest - collaboration is given by the subordinated labor exchanges, as - well as by the Gau labor exchanges.” - -Therefore, you do not contest the fact that the Central Planning Board -did establish collaboration among the various services which recruited -manpower, because you yourself asked for this collaboration. - -SAUCKEL: I did not deny that there was collaboration. Collaboration is -necessary in every regime and in every system. Here we were not -concerned with foreign labor only, but chiefly with German labor, even -at that period. I did not dispute the fact that work was being carried -on; but final decisions were not always made there. That is what I -wanted to say. - -M. HERZOG: It is correct that you appointed delegates to represent you -in the various German administrative departments? - -SAUCKEL: I did not have representatives in the various administrative -departments. I had liaison men, or else the administrative departments -had liaison men in my office. - -M. HERZOG: Did you not have such a liaison officer with the Defendant -Speer, Minister for Armaments and War Production? - -SAUCKEL: The man who was constantly with Speer was not a liaison -officer, but the man who talked over with the Minister questions of -demand, _et cetera_, which were pending. As far as I remember it was a -Herr Berk. - -M. HERZOG: And did you have a liaison officer with the Reich Minister of -Labor? - -SAUCKEL: I had no liaison officer with the Reich Minister of Labor. -There were two departments in the Reich Ministry of Labor which -concerned themselves with these problems in an administrative capacity. - -M. HERZOG: In your interrogatory of 12 September 1945 you said as -follows—the Tribunal will find it on Pages 6 and 7 of the -interrogatory: - - “‘I had moreover two officials who acted as intermediaries - between Minister Speer and the Ministry of Labor.’ - - “Question: ‘Did this liaison officer establish a connection - between your Ministry, Minister Speer, and the Ministry of - Labor?’ - - “Answer: ‘Between me, Minister Speer, and the Ministry of - Labor...’” - -SAUCKEL: Will you please tell me the page? - -M. HERZOG: Pages 4 and 5. Have you found it? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -M. HERZOG: “Between me, Minister Speer, and the Ministry of Labor...” - -THE PRESIDENT: That is surely Page 6, is it not? You said Pages 4 and 5. -It is Page 6, is it not? - -M. HERZOG: Page 4 of the German extract, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see. - - M. HERZOG: “Between me, Minister Speer, and the Ministry of - Labor there were two counsellors, Dr. Stothfang ... and Landrat - Berk. They were jurists and experts in national economy. Dr. - Stothfang was commissioned to act principally as liaison officer - with the Ministry of Labor...” - -Why did you tell me a few minutes ago that you had no liaison officer -with the Ministry of Labor? - -SAUCKEL: I made it quite clear that there were two departments which -belonged to the Ministry of Labor, Departments 3 and 5; and this -Ministerialrat Dr. Stothfang was formerly the personal assistant to -State Secretary Syrup. In a few isolated cases he had discussions with -State Secretary Syrup at my request, that is true; but these were not -important. In general the departments themselves were in touch with the -Ministry of Labor. - -M. HERZOG: You confirm then, that you had a liaison officer at the -Ministry of Labor and another in Minister Speer’s office? - -SAUCKEL: I confirm that for occasional conferences. But these gentlemen -were attached to those departments, and they came to me as my personal -consultants and did not work in that Ministry. I cannot say either -whether in this case the translation is correct. I do not remember -exactly, but in principle it is correct. - -But these gentlemen worked with me. - -M. HERZOG: And will you please tell the Tribunal what the -Stabsbesprechung was? - -SAUCKEL: Stabsbesprechung was a conference on technical questions in -which the various ministries or industrial employers participated who -needed labor and the questions which had to be considered were -discussed. I could not act independently, of course, as you have heard. - -M. HERZOG: Who instituted these conferences, this new arrangement, these -staff conferences? Who took the initiative in instituting them? - -SAUCKEL: These staff conferences were instituted by me in order to -obtain a clear conception of all these important questions, because in -no regime or government in the world can anything be done in the dark. - -M. HERZOG: You confirm then that these various kinds of liaison imply a -common responsibility as to decisions taken by each one of you in the -matter of manpower? - -SAUCKEL: This question is not clear to me technically or -administratively, for I could not do anything with the workers. I had to -give them to other people, and I had to discuss the way this was to be -done. But these conferences did not take place with the idea of a -conspiracy or of a criminal act; they were the same kind of conferences -as formerly took place. I have been present at conferences under a -parliamentary system, and matters were dealt with in exactly the same -way. - -M. HERZOG: That is not what I was asking you. I was asking you whether -you confirmed that the existence of these liaison officers to Minister -Speer and the Minister of Labor, on the one hand, and the existence of -this new organization that you created, on the other hand, implied a -common responsibility in the decisions regarding manpower taken by -Minister Speer, the Minister of Labor, and by you? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot answer this question with a definite “no,” as orders -were given to me which, as a German official, I had to carry out in this -case; and in order to carry them out I had to hold conferences. It was -not possible to do otherwise, for it was not I personally, but German -economy, that demanded and used these workers. This matter had to be -settled in some way, regardless of whether German or other workers were -concerned; and the same situation applied in normal times. - -M. HERZOG: Is it a fact that, after you were appointed, you were -authorized to be represented by special representatives in the military -and civil departments of the occupied areas? - -SAUCKEL: After 30 October—I cannot state the exact date—at the -instigation of the Führer, I appointed representatives to the -governments in the occupied countries. I mentioned this yesterday -through my counsel. - -M. HERZOG: The 30th of October? I think you mean the decree of 30 -September 1942. It is a mistake on your part for the decree is dated 30 -September. - -SAUCKEL: I am sorry, I do not know the exact date. - -M. HERZOG: Is it right that these representatives, appointed by that -decree, were directly subordinate to you? - -SAUCKEL: Insofar as they were my delegates, that is, for the passing on -of orders, they were subordinate to me. - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that they were authorized to give directives to -the civilian and military authorities in the occupied territories? - -SAUCKEL: That is correct as far as orders were concerned, but it is not -true in general. It was a technical matter. - -M. HERZOG: Who was your delegate with the occupation authorities in -France? - -SAUCKEL: The delegate with the occupation authorities in France was, -first of all, President Ritter; he was murdered in Paris. And after him, -President Glatzel. - -M. HERZOG: Did you have a representative in Belgium? - -SAUCKEL: In Belgium I had a delegate by the name of Schulze; he was with -the military commander. - -M. HERZOG: And in Holland? - -SAUCKEL: In Holland there were various men. First of all, Herr Schmidt, -and there was another man; I believe his name was Ritterbusch, or -something like that, but I do not recall the exact name. - -M. HERZOG: This system of representatives with the occupation -authorities, was that approved of by Defendant Speer? - -SAUCKEL: This was at the instigation of the Führer, and I assume that -Speer agreed. He recommended it, as far as I know. - -M. HERZOG: To your knowledge, did he take any initiative in the decree -issued by the Führer concerning this matter? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. He was present and he recommended it. - -M. HERZOG: In your interrogatory you said, when speaking about these -representatives, that Speer instituted these agencies for manpower in -1941 or 1942. The Tribunal will find this statement on Page 9 of the -excerpts from the interrogatory. What do you understand by that -sentence? - -SAUCKEL: I did not quite understand you. - -M. HERZOG: I shall read an extract of your interrogation of 8 October -1945. - - “Question: ‘What was the mission entrusted to your - representatives in the labor offices of the military commander - and of the civil governor? Did they merely give technical advice - to the military authorities, which could be rejected at any time - by the latter, or did they have authority to give directives to - the military commanders on technical questions?’” - -THE PRESIDENT: On what page is that? - -M. HERZOG: Page 9, Mr. President. - - “Answer: ‘In 1941 or 1942 Speer instituted this delegation for - manpower.’” - -I would merely ask you what you understand by that phrase. What did you -mean when you said that Speer instituted this delegation for manpower in -1941 or 1942? - -SAUCKEL: I have to say, in this connection, that I never saw the minutes -again after I had been interrogated. I cannot confirm that sentence -about 1941-42, and I cannot imagine that I expressed myself in that way -during the interrogation. - -M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will judge your answer. Is it correct that, -besides your representatives with the civil and military commanders, you -installed administrative offices for labor in the occupied territories? - -SAUCKEL: That is not correct. They were already there. - -M. HERZOG: You confirm then that besides the delegates who represented -you, there were recruiting agencies for manpower in the occupied -territories? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. In the occupied territories, in all regional governments, -either civilian or military, there were departments dealing with -manpower which were a part of the administration; and they were -subordinate to the administration authorities. - -M. HERZOG: Can you give an indication of the size of the personnel of -those various services in the occupied areas? - -SAUCKEL: Do you mean the total number? I cannot tell you from memory the -separate figures for the personnel of these administrative offices. I -never have known these figures exactly. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the conference which took place, with you as -chairman, on 15 and 16 July 1944 at the Wartburg with the heads of the -regional labor offices and the labor delegations from the European -occupied territories? On 15 July 1944, in the afternoon, State -Counsellor Börger gave an account of the personnel employed. It is -Document Number F-810, which I submit under the Exhibit Number RF-1507. -I will read on Page 20: - - “State Counsellor Börger stated that outside the frontiers of - the Reich there are about 4,000 people engaged in the - administration of labor; Eastern area, 1,300; France, 1,016; - Belgium and Northern France, 429; Netherlands, 194...” - -Do you confirm this statement of State Counsellor Börger? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, speaking generally it may be true. - -M. HERZOG: Apart from your representatives, apart from those services -that we were talking about, did you not create in France commissions -composed of specialists who were entrusted with organizing the -employment of labor on the German pattern? Please answer. - -SAUCKEL: I did not quite understand the question. Please repeat it. - -M. HERZOG: I shall repeat it. Apart from your representatives—apart -from the services that we have been talking about—did you not create, -in France particularly, commissions composed of specialists who were -entrusted with organizing the employment of manpower on the German -pattern? - -SAUCKEL: I told my defense counsel yesterday about my collaboration with -French units for... - -M. HERZOG: That is not what I mean. I am talking about commissions -composed of specialists. Do you not remember that in order to insure the -recruiting of manpower in France you thought of the system of attaching -two French _départements_ to a German Gau? - -SAUCKEL: I remember now what you mean. This was the system of adoption -arranged in agreement with the French Government, according to which a -German Gau adopted a French _département_. The main object was to inform -the workers, who were to come to Germany, about conditions in Germany -and to have mutual talks with the economic offices of the French -_départements_ about statistics. - -M. HERZOG: I hand to the Tribunal Document Number 1293-PS, which becomes -French Exhibit Number RF-1508. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] This is a letter bearing your signature, -dated Berlin 14 August 1943, from which I shall read extracts. The -Tribunal will find it in the document book which I handed to them at the -beginning of this session. I shall first read the last paragraph on Page -1. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I have not got it—1293? - -M. HERZOG: Mr. President, the documents which figure in my document book -were handed to the Tribunal this morning—unless I am making a mistake, -for which I apologize in advance—in the order in which I intend to use -them. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have one. 1293. Is that right? - -M. HERZOG: I have attached a slip only to those documents which I think -I shall use several times, so that the Tribunal may find them more -easily. May I now begin to read? - -THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry but the documents had not been handed up to -me, that is all. None of them had been handed up. - -M. HERZOG: I am reading at the bottom of Page 1: - - “The solving of these two great manpower problems demands the - immediate setting up in France of a stronger and better German - labor organization possessing the necessary powers and means. - This will be done by a system of sponsorship by Gaue. France has - got about 80 _départements_. Greater Germany is divided into 42 - political Gaue, and for the purposes of manpower recruitment it - is divided into 42 Gau labor office districts. Each German Gau - labor office district will take over and sponsor, say, two - French _départements_. Each German Gau labor office will furnish - for the _départements_ it sponsors a commission of specialists, - made up of the ablest and most reliable experts. These - commissions will organize the allocations of labor in these - sponsored _départements_ according to the German pattern.” - -I skip one page and continue reading at the bottom of Page 2 of the -French text. That is Page 3 of the German translation: - - “There is no doubt that this projected system of sponsorship by - Gaue for the employment of French manpower in Germany, and - especially the transformation necessary in the interest of - Germany of French civilian workers for the German armament - industries, will bring about enormous advantages in France - herself compared with the present system.” - -I am passing to the bottom of Page 3 of the French text, and I read -under “d”: - - “The Central German Labor Office in Paris, that is, the - representative of the Plenipotentiary General and his office...” - -You told me a short while ago that the German offices for the -recruitment of labor in the occupied territories were not under you as -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, but under the local -authorities. How do you explain this sentence? - -SAUCKEL: It can be explained very simply. These men were subordinate to -the military commanders in the labor department. They were sent from -Germany, and they were taken from the labor offices and put into the -administration. - -M. HERZOG: You say, “The Central German Labor Office in Paris, that is, -the representative of the Plenipotentiary General and his office...” The -Central German Labor Office in Paris was therefore your representative? - -SAUCKEL: The Central German Labor Office in Paris was a part of the -civilian administration of the military commander in France. This is not -expressed in this sentence, for it was taken for granted in this letter -that the Gauleiter knew this. The position as I explained it is entirely -correct. - -M. HERZOG: I shall continue reading: - - “The Central German Labor Office in Paris, that is, the - representative of the Plenipotentiary General and his office, - will therefore have in the whole of France a reliable apparatus - which will make it a great deal easier for him to solve his - problems in France, in spite of any possible or even real - passive resistance on the part of the higher or lower French - bureaucracy.” - -I skip two lines. - - “I have, therefore, charged the presidents or the provisional - chiefs of the newly formed Gau labor offices to set up a - corresponding organization in the _départements_ which they are - sponsoring; and I request you, in your capacity as my - Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, in agreement with - Reichsleiter Bormann, to promote and give your fullest support - to the new task allotted to your Gau labor office. The president - or the provisional chief of your Gau labor office is instructed - to keep you informed of all details concerning the carrying out - of these measures.” - -Are not these measures an attempt to subordinate French territory to -German territory as far as the organization of labor is concerned? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. But I should like to ask you and the High Tribunal to -allow me to say the following in explanation: On the first page, -Paragraph 1—I quote from the third line—it says, “...with the full -consent of the Führer I am to take far-reaching and urgent measures in -France in negotiation with the head of the French Government and the -competent”—now comes the important part—“German authorities;”—that -is, the military commander’s department, in which these labor -authorities and this delegate were incorporated and to whom they were -subordinate. - -And on Page 4, I should like to read about the special purpose of this -system of sponsorship which should have nothing unfriendly about it. I -read from Page 4 in the German text, under the letter “a”: - - “Prejudice, suspicion, lack of care, failure to redress and look - into complaints”—that is, complaints by the workers—“which are - prejudicial to the employment of manpower in Germany, all these - things can be very largely eliminated by the relations between - the Gau and its sponsored _département_.” - -Now I read under letter “b”: - - “Every French worker in such a _département_ knows exactly where - and under what conditions he will have to work in Germany. - German propaganda and explanatory material will tell him about - the locality in which he will have to work and about all matters - which are of interest to him.” - -And that was the purpose of that arrangement. It was something I wanted -to do for the French workers, besides looking after German interests. - -M. HERZOG: Please answer me “yes” or “no.” Was this arrangement an -attempt to bring about a joint administration between the French -_départements_ and the German Gaue as far as the employment of labor was -concerned? Answer me “yes” or “no.” - -SAUCKEL: No. I should like to give an explanation to this negative -answer. The purpose of this arrangement was to clear up unsolved -problems between the French Government, between the French -_départements_, between French industrialists and factories, on the one -hand, and the administrative offices in Germany where the French workers -were to be employed. That was the real purpose—to settle complaints and -clear away mistrust. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. HERZOG: Defendant, is it true that your Codefendant Göring placed -under your control all the organizations of the Four Year Plan which -were concerned with the recruiting of labor? - -SAUCKEL: The various organizations of the Four Year Plan which had to do -with manpower were dissolved. Departments 3 and 5 of the Reich Ministry -of Labor continued to deal exclusively with these matters. - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that the powers of the Reich Minister of Labor -concerning the employment of labor were transferred to you and that as a -result of this transfer you had powers to issue regulations and laws? - -SAUCKEL: Only insofar as the work of Departments 3 and 5 were connected -with my own task. Otherwise the functions of the Reich Ministry of Labor -remained independent under the Reich Minister of Labor. - -M. HERZOG: But within these departments you exercised the powers of the -Reich Minister of Labor after your appointment as Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor? - -SAUCKEL: Within my office as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation -of Labor. But I must emphasize that these departments were not under me; -they were merely at my disposal. Great importance was attached to this -difference at the time. The departments continued to work independently -within the whole framework of the Ministry of Labor. - -M. HERZOG: But as a result of this situation you exerted administrative -autonomy in matters concerning labor? - -SAUCKEL: Not an autonomy; it was done by vote. I could not issue -decrees, but could only give instructions. In every case I had to get -the agreement of the other administrative authorities and Reich -ministries, and the agreement of the Führer or of my superior office. - -M. HERZOG: Did you not have carte blanche from the Führer for the -recruiting and the utilization of labor? - -SAUCKEL: Not for recruiting and utilization, but for guiding and -directing. If I may express it in this way, it was never a case of the -workers’ agent—that is, of course, what allocation of labor really -means—employing these workers himself. The firms employed the workers, -not the agent. - -M. HERZOG: For the recruiting of labor you had carte blanche from the -Führer. Is that not true? - -SAUCKEL: Not absolutely, and only after there had been a vote and after -the agreement of the regional authorities concerned had been obtained, -especially in the case of foreign countries. I never recruited workers -in France without the express agreement of the French Government and -with their collaboration. The French administration was used here. - -M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, you have on several occasions mentioned -the agreements and arrangements made in France with those whom you -yourself call “the leaders of collaboration.” You know better than any -other that these leaders of collaboration, imposed upon France by the -enemy, bound themselves only and that their acts were never ratified by -the French people as a whole. Besides, these leaders of collaboration, -whose testimony cannot be suspect to you, have themselves revealed that -pressure was exerted upon them, and we will discuss that now. Is it true -that on 16 April 1942, that is to say, less than a month after your -appointment, you stated in a letter to the Defendant Rosenberg—which -states your program and which was presented to you yesterday—that you -included the recruiting of foreign workers in your program for the -utilization^{*} of labor? - -SAUCKEL: I resent the term “exploitation.”^{*} By strictest orders from -the Führer, it is true that recruitment of foreign workers had to be -included in my program. - ------ - -^{*} The word _utilization_ used by the French prosecutor was wrongly -interpreted into German as “Ausbeutung” meaning “exploitation.” - ------ - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that you included the recruitment of foreign -workers in your program of 16 April 1942? You admitted this yesterday, -and I ask you to confirm it. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, it is true. I only emphasize that I did it on the -strictest orders from the Führer. - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that this program of 16 April 1942, that is to -say, 3 weeks after your appointment, already contained the principle of -forced recruiting? - -SAUCKEL: It was done by express order of the Führer, in case voluntary -recruitment proved to be inadequate. I said that yesterday to my -counsel. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the decree that you issued on 29 August 1942? -This decree dealt first and foremost with the employment of labor in -occupied territories—Decree Number 10 of 22 August by the -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. It was submitted to -the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-17 (Document Number RF-17). Do you -remember it? - -SAUCKEL: I do remember Decree Number 10. - -M. HERZOG: Was this decree applicable to the occupied territories which -were under German administration? - -SAUCKEL: As far as I can remember—I have not the exact wording and the -separate paragraphs before me—it dealt with the regulation of working -contracts drawn up by German firms. The purpose was to prevent a muddle. - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that you went on a mission to Paris in August -1942? - -SAUCKEL: That is possible; but I, of course, cannot remember the -individual dates. - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that you went on a mission to Paris in January -1943? - -SAUCKEL: That is also possible, even probable. - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that you went on a mission to Paris in January -1944? - -SAUCKEL: Also probable, yes; but I do not know the individual dates. - -M. HERZOG: You therefore went on missions to Paris before the French -authorities, the French de facto authorities, had published the -legislative decrees of 4 September 1942, 16 February 1943, and 1 -February 1944. Is that not true? - -SAUCKEL: I did not understand your question exactly. - -M. HERZOG: I asked you whether it is true, that before the French de -facto authorities published the three fundamental laws on forced labor -of 4 September 1942, 16 February 1943, and 1 February 1944, you went on -missions to France, to Paris? - -SAUCKEL: I only went on journeys to Paris for the purpose of negotiating -with the French Government, and I want to add that for me and in -accordance with my convictions... - -M. HERZOG: Do you admit that in the course of these missions you imposed -on the French authorities the laws on forced labor? - -SAUCKEL: It is not correct to put it in that way, rather... - -M. HERZOG: You therefore contest the fact that the laws on forced labor -were issued under pressure by you? - -SAUCKEL: I dispute the word “pressure.” I negotiated most correctly with -the French Government before such laws were published. I expressly -resent the word “pressure,” and there were plenty of witnesses during -these negotiations. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the telephone conversation that the Defendant -Speer had with you from the Führer’s headquarters on 4 January 1943? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I probably had several conversations with Speer. I do not -know which particular conversation you are referring to. - -M. HERZOG: Do you not remember a note that you sent to your various -offices as a result of this telephone conversation of 4 January 1943? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. Quite probably I did make several notes. I had to make -notes when I received a telephone conversation containing an -instruction. - -M. HERZOG: I now submit Document Number 556-PS, which has already been -submitted to the Tribunal under the Exhibit Numbers USA-194 and RF-67. I -will read that document, or at least its first paragraph: - - “On 4 January 1943, at 2000 hours, Minister Speer telephoned - from the Führer’s headquarters to inform me that according to - the decision of the Führer it is no longer necessary, when - engaging skilled and unskilled labor in France, to show any - special consideration for the French. Emphasis or more severe - measures may be used in order to recruit labor.” - -I ask you, Defendant, what you mean when you say that it is not -necessary to show any special consideration for the French? - -SAUCKEL: This note or rather this decision did not come from me. This -was a communication which came from the Führer’s headquarters, based on -a decision made by the Führer. In spite of that—and I want to emphasize -that particularly—my attitude towards the French Government did not -change, and it does not say so in this record either. I continued to -adopt the same polite attitude in my negotiations with the Government, -and I ask the Tribunal to be allowed to make a short statement on how -these negotiations with the French Government were conducted. - -M. HERZOG: You will give it later in your examination. Do you remember -the discussion that you had on 12 January 1943, at the German Embassy in -Paris, with the French authorities? - -SAUCKEL: As far as I know, I only talked to French ministers in the -German Embassy in Paris. - -M. HERZOG: That is exactly what I am asking you. Do you remember this -conversation that you had with the French authorities on 12 January -1943? - -SAUCKEL: Not in detail, no; but that I did negotiate is possible. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the persons who took part in this -conversation? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. Usually the French Premier, the French Minister for Labor, -Minister Bichelonne, took part in such discussions. On the German side, -the Ambassador; on behalf of the military commander, Dr. Fischer; and, -as my representative, probably Dr. Hildebrandt or some other gentleman. - -M. HERZOG: And you do not remember what Laval said to you at this -meeting of 12 January 1943? - -SAUCKEL: Very many matters were discussed in great detail during these -conferences, and I do not know what you mean. - -M. HERZOG: Well, I will submit to you the minutes of this meeting. It is -Document Number F-809, which I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit -Number RF-1509. - -In the course of this discussion Laval made a long statement to you; -more exactly, several statements. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where shall we find this? - -M. HERZOG: It is in my document book, Mr. President. It must be marked -with a slip 809. - -THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I have got it. - -M. HERZOG: First, I read Page 7 of the French text and of the German -text: - - “Gauleiter Sauckel demands a further 250,000 new workers. - Gauleiter Sauckel knows very well—and his offices have - certainly informed him about this—the difficulties which the - French Government had in carrying out the program last year. The - Gauleiter must realize that as a result of the number of - prisoners of war and workers who are already employed by - Germany, the sending of another 250,000 workers will increase - even further the difficulties of the French Government. I cannot - conceal these difficulties from the Gauleiter, because they are - evident; and the Germans who are in Paris know these - difficulties. When the Gauleiter replies that they have had to - overcome the same difficulties in Germany and when he even - states that French industry must be expanded, it seems to me - that I must remind him that Germany not only demands workers of - France, but is also beginning to take away the machines from - factories in order to transport them to Germany. France may have - nothing left, but until now she still had her means of - production. If these too are taken from her, France loses even - her possibilities for working. - - “I do everything to facilitate a German victory”—and you see - Laval could hardly be suspect to you, Defendant—“but I must - admit that German policy makes heavier demands on me nearly - every day and these demands do not conform to a definite policy. - Gauleiter Sauckel can tell the German workers that they are - working for Germany. I cannot say that Frenchmen are working for - France. - - “I see that in many fields the French Government is not able to - act. One would almost believe that on the German side they set - no value on the good will of the French and that they are bent - on instituting a German administration throughout France. My - task is being made more difficult every day. It is true that I - do not allow myself to be discouraged; but I consider, however, - that it is my duty to remind the Gauleiter of the gravity of - Franco-German relations and of the impossibility of continuing - along this path. It is no longer a matter of a policy of - collaboration; rather, it is on the French side a policy of - sacrifice, and on the German side a policy of coercion.” - -I pass to the next page, Page 11: - - “The present state of mind in France, the uncertainty concerning - the means which the French Government possesses, the - half-freedom in which it finds itself, all these do not give me - the necessary authority to furnish Gauleiter Sauckel with an - immediate reply. We can do nothing. We are not free to change - salaries; we are not free even to combat the black market; we - cannot take any political measure without everywhere coming up - against some German authority which has substituted itself in - our place. - - “I cannot guarantee measures which I do not take myself. I am - persuaded that the Führer is unaware that the French Government - cannot act. There cannot be in one country two governments on - questions which do not concern directly the security of the - occupation forces.” - -I skip two more pages, to Page 18; and I read only this sentence: - - “It is not possible for me to be a mere agent for German - measures of coercion.” - -That is the document which I submit to you, Defendant, and I ask you two -questions concerning it. - -The first question is: What did you answer to Laval when he made this -statement to you? - -The second one is: Do you not think that here there is proof of the -pressure which you dispute? - -SAUCKEL: To begin with, if the Tribunal would permit it, I should have -to read my reply to Premier Laval. The document proves, and this has -been confirmed to me by Premier Laval on various occasions, that I -conducted my negotiations with him in a proper manner; and in spite of -the fact that I had orders not to conduct political conversations but -only to deal with my actual task, I always reported to the Führer about -these matters. But I think that the tone of my reply was definitely -beyond reproach. These negotiations which I conducted... - -M. HERZOG: That is not the question that I asked you. I asked you what -you answered him when he made that statement to you, when he said to -you, for instance, that it was not possible for him to be a mere agent -for German measures of coercion. - -SAUCKEL: I would have to read my answer. I cannot remember it now. - -M. HERZOG: Do you therefore dispute the fact that this represents -pressure? - -SAUCKEL: Premier Laval did not complain about me in this connection. He -complained about general conditions in France, because this was the time -of occupation. The situation was that there was a German occupation. It -was war. - -M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to submit to you Document... - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, regarding this document, I should like to -draw your attention to an error of translation which will lead to -considerable misunderstanding. According to this document it says that -the recruitment could be approached with emphasis and more severe -measures, and the word “emphasis” has been translated by “pressure” in -the English. But that is not meant. It is not “Druck,” pressure; it is -“Nachdruck,” emphasis. That means that the next in authority can be -approached with energy. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am told that the translation we have got is “emphasis.” - -DR. SERVATIUS: “Pressure.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I am told the translation is “emphasis.” No, no, the -translation is “emphasis.” It is in this document, and the translation -in English is “emphasis.” - -DR. SERVATIUS: Oh, I had the French translation. - -M. HERZOG: I am going to submit to you Document... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this document in the PS series? - -M. HERZOG: No, Mr. President, it is a new document which I am submitting -now, a French document which will bear Exhibit Number RF-1509 (Document -Number F-809). - -THE PRESIDENT: Where did this document come from? - -M. HERZOG: That document comes, Mr. President, from the archives of the -Majestic Hotel in Paris, where the German offices in Paris were located. -Some months ago these archives were found again in Berlin, and we have -extracted the Sauckel documents. - -I submit to the Tribunal the certificate of authentication for the -Sauckel files, as well as for the documents which I intend to submit to -the Tribunal in the course of my cross-examination. Perhaps, as the -document is in French, the Tribunal would like me to read it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, read it, will you? You mean this procès-verbal? What -is this procès-verbal? Who is it identified by? - -M. HERZOG: This procès-verbal is identified by two persons, by -Commandant Henri, French liaison officer at the American Documentation -Center in Berlin, and by my colleague, M. Gerthoffer, who, with -Commandant Henri, took these archives. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better read this procès-verbal so that it -will go into the record. - - M. HERZOG: “I, Charles Gerthoffer, Deputy Prosecutor at the - Court of the Seine, on duty with the International Military - Tribunal for the Major War Criminals, having gone to Berlin to - the offices of the Ministerial Collecting Center, Commandant - Henri, Chief of the French Mission, gave to me, with the - authority of Colonel Helm of the American Army, Chief of the - 6889 Berlin Collecting Center, seven files from the archives of - the German military command in France concerning forced labor - and registered at the M.C.C. under the following numbers: 3 DS, - lumbers 1 to 213; 4 DS, Numbers 1 to 230; 5 DS, Numbers 1 to - 404; and two appendices; 6 DS, Numbers 1 to 218; 7 DS, Numbers 1 - to 118; and one appendix; 1 to 121; 50 DS, Numbers 1 to 55; 71 - DS, Numbers 1 to 40. - - “I declared to Commandant Henri that I took the said files in - order to submit them to the International Military Tribunal for - the Major War Criminals so that they might be used in the course - of the proceedings and that they will thereafter be delivered to - the French Ministry of Justice, whose property they remain. - - “There are five copies of this document, one of which is to - serve as an affidavit for the International Military Tribunal - for the Major War Criminals.” - -Signed, “Charles Gerthoffer,” and Signed, “Henri.” - -This represents the certificate of authentication of the files -themselves. - -I have a second certificate... - -SAUCKEL: May I make a remark regarding the first document, please? - -M. HERZOG: I would ask you not to interrupt me. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, the documents came from the Hotel Majestic, -did they? - -M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Hotel Majestic was the place where the... - -M. HERZOG: The place in Paris where the offices of the German military -command in France and the various occupation offices were located. These -documents, which had vanished at the time of the liberation, were found -again at the Ministerial Collecting Center in Berlin. The document which -I have just submitted to you is the certificate of authentication of -these files, and I also have the certificate of authentication of the -documents which I have extracted from these files and which I am now -ready to read to the Tribunal, if the Tribunal so desires. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Hotel Majestic was the place where the German -military government was established in Paris; isn’t that right? - -M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President, if I am not mistaken. Does the Tribunal -desire that I should read the other certificate of authentication, that -is to say at least in part—the one concerning the document itself? - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had already read it. - -M. HERZOG: No, Mr. President. I am submitting to the Tribunal two -certificates of authentication. The first, the one which I have just -read, is the certificate of authentication of seven files which contain -a very large number of documents. From these seven files we have -extracted only a certain number of documents which we are submitting to -the Tribunal; and that is why, after having presented the certificate... - -THE PRESIDENT: The second document only says that the documents which -you are submitting are documents which came from those files? - -M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: And the files themselves came from the Hotel Majestic, -which was the place where the German military administration was carried -on. Will you put the second document on the record? - -M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering in evidence the original German -documents? - -M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Since you still deny the pressure that you -exerted on the government, I will submit to you Document Number 1342-PS. - -SAUCKEL: I think that an error in translation has been made here. I -understood that you asked whether I denied that I was putting pressure -on the Tribunal. I respect this Tribunal too highly to try to exert -pressure upon it. I do not understand the question. I understood you to -ask me whether I denied that I exerted pressure on the Tribunal; and, of -course, that question I have to answer with “no.” - -M. HERZOG: I said this to you: Since you deny that you exerted pressure -on the French authorities, I will submit to you a new document. It is -Document Number 1342-PS which has already been submitted to the Tribunal -under Exhibit Number RF-63. This document represents the minutes of a -meeting which you held on 11 January 1943 in Paris with various German -occupation authorities. Do you remember that on that occasion you made a -declaration concerning your relations with the Vichy Government? I will -read this declaration to you. It is on Page 4 of the French and German -texts. - -SAUCKEL: Unfortunately, I am not able to find it. - -M. HERZOG: I will read the declaration: - - “The French Government...”—It is the last paragraph but one - before the end of Page 4.—“The French Government is composed of - nothing but adepts at temporization. If the first 250,000 - workers had arrived in Germany in time, before the autumn—the - negotiations with the French Government having already been - begun in the preceding spring—we might perhaps have been able - to recruit key men in the Reich earlier and form new divisions; - and it might then not have come to the cutting off of - Stalingrad. In any case, the Führer is now absolutely decided to - rule in France, if need be even without a French Government.” - -When you made this declaration, did it not reflect the pressure which -you were exerting on the French Government? - -SAUCKEL: This is not a conference with the French Government. This is a -statement of facts. - -M. HERZOG: I did not say that it was a conference with the French -Government. I asked you what you meant when you stated that the Führer -was determined to rule in France, even without the French Government. -Was that not pressure? - -SAUCKEL: That was a straightforward decision and a statement from the -Führer, for which I am not responsible. I merely repeated it, and in any -case it was never realized. - -M. HERZOG: Why did you transmit it to the occupation authorities in -France in the course of a conference that you were holding with them -concerning the recruitment of labor? - -SAUCKEL: Because it was my duty to give a description of the situation -as I saw it at the time. - -M. HERZOG: But do you not think that, in expressing to them this -declaration of the Führer, you were using it to exert pressure? - -SAUCKEL: I could not exert any pressure by that, because this was merely -transmitting a statement of the situation. I did not tell the French -Government that the Führer would remove them and that therefore they -would have to do such and such a thing. I merely negotiated. - -M. HERZOG: But you did state, and I ask you to confirm it, you did state -in the course of that conference that the Führer had decided to rule in -France, if need be, even without a French Government? - -Did you say that? I ask that you answer me “yes” or “no.” - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I repeated that, but not with the intention of doing that. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the discussion which you had on 14 January -1944 in Paris with various German personalities? - -SAUCKEL: Yes; it is possible that I had a discussion there at that time, -but I cannot remember at the moment what it was about. - -M. HERZOG: You do not remember a discussion which you had on 14 January, -and you do not remember the German personalities who were present, at -this meeting? - -SAUCKEL: Probably there were several conferences, but I cannot tell you -now which one you are talking about. Neither do I remember, of course, -what the actual subjects of the discussions were. - -M. HERZOG: On 14 January 1944 you had a conference in Paris with Abetz, -Von Stülpnagel, Oberg, and Blumentritt. Do you remember that in the -course of that discussion you submitted to your listeners the draft of a -law which you had drawn up and which you wanted to impose on the French -authorities? - -SAUCKEL: I was not trying to impose it. I was trying to discuss it. I -was negotiating. I was not trying to impose it upon them. The wording of -the minutes shows that quite clearly. - -M. HERZOG: Do you dispute the fact that you yourself drafted a law which -you transmitted to the French Government? - -SAUCKEL: No, that I do not deny. That I submitted such a draft law and -that I drafted it, I do not deny. - -M. HERZOG: You do admit then that you yourself drafted the text? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but I cannot tell you which one you mean. - -M. HERZOG: I submit to you Document Number F-813, which I put in under -Exhibit Number RF-1512. It is the minutes of this meeting of 14 January -1944, Document Number F-813. These minutes are signed by Abetz, Oberg, -Von Stülpnagel, Blumentritt, and you. I read from Paragraph III the -heading: “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of -Labor”—which was you—“has drawn up a draft law for the French -Government.” - -Do you still dispute the fact that you yourself drew up draft laws which -you submitted to the French Government? - -SAUCKEL: That I do not deny; I had to submit a proposal. However, it was -based on mutual negotiations. - -M. HERZOG: Do you deny the fact that you imposed this law by pressure? - -SAUCKEL: That I imposed this law by pressure, that I do deny. I -negotiated about it. - -M. HERZOG: Do you not remember that you gave an account to the Führer of -the mission which you carried out in Paris in January 1944? - -SAUCKEL: It was my duty to report when I made such journeys for I was -carrying out the Führer’s orders. - -M. HERZOG: I submit to you this report, Document Number 556-PS, which -was submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-67. Twice in the -course of this report you speak of German demands. Do you not think that -to give an account to the Führer of German demands having been accepted -is to give an account to him of the success of the pressure which you -exerted? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot conceive in what other way a basis for negotiations -could be found. The German Government made demands, and because of those -demands there were negotiations with the French Government which had to -be considered by me as _de jure_. - -M. HERZOG: Do you admit, therefore, that the German Government and you, -who were its agent, were making demands? Please answer “yes” or “no.” - -SAUCKEL: The German Government was making demands; yes, that is true. - -M. HERZOG: Thank you. And those demands, did they not, at times, take -the form of a veritable ultimatum? - -SAUCKEL: I am, not aware of that. I can only say that I was very polite -and accommodating when talking to the French Premier and that our -negotiations ran very smoothly. He often mentioned that, and it is in -the record. - -M. HERZOG: When you took action concerning the mobilization of the 1944 -class, do you not remember that you demanded this mobilization in a -veritable ultimatum? Answer “yes” or “no.” - -SAUCKEL: I cannot say so from memory. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, I think you might put to him the last sentence -in the letter of the 25th of January 1944, 556-PS. - - M. HERZOG: “I have, however, allowed no doubts to remain that - further and more severe measures will be taken if the demands - for the transfer of workers is not met.” - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I probably said that, though not in the form in which it -is put down in this letter. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember that on 6 June 1944, the day of the dawn of -our liberation, you addressed a letter to Ambassador Abetz? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you that from memory. - -M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to produce this letter. It is the French -document, Number F-822, which I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit -Number RF-1513: - - “6 June 1944. Paris. - - “Your Excellency and dear Party Comrade Abetz: - - “The long-expected invasion has finally begun. Thus ends also - for the Allocation of Labor a period of waiting which up to now - has served as an obvious, sometimes tacit, pretext for saying - that the sending of workers into the Reich was impossible owing - to the political atmosphere in the country.” - -I skip a few lines and I quote again. - - “Now that the German soldier must once more fight and bleed on - the Channel coast, now that the struggle may extend at any hour - to many other parts of France, any call or any words from Laval - can have no weight whatsoever. The only language which can now - be understood is that of the German soldier. I beg you, - therefore, in these decisive hours to ask Premier Laval at last - to do something which is obviously very difficult for him; that - is to say, that he should at last sign the order for the calling - up of the 1944 class. I do not wish to be kept waiting any - longer. Neither do I wish to leave with an opinion which might - be unjust but which at the same time is forced upon me, - concerning the temporizing tactics of the French Government. - - “I beg you, therefore, most urgently, to obtain by 10 o’clock - tomorrow morning the signature of the French Premier to the - decree for the calling up of the 1944 class, or else to inform - me quite clearly if Laval should answer with a categorical ‘no.’ - I will not accept any delaying excuses, as all technical - preparations regarding the quotas from the _départements_, as - well as the arrangements for transport, have either been made or - are now about to be made, thanks to the joint discussions which - have been going on.” - -Do you not call this a veritable ultimatum? - -SAUCKEL: It is only an ultimatum insofar as my departure was in question -and nothing else. I could not exert any pressure on Laval or use any -threats. - -M. HERZOG: What did you mean when you said: - - “I beg you, therefore, most urgently to obtain by 10 o’clock - tomorrow morning the signature of the French Premier to the - decree for the calling up of the 1944 class, or else to inform - me quite clearly if Laval should answer with a categorical ‘no.’ - I will not accept any delaying excuses...” - -Is that not an ultimatum? - -SAUCKEL: It is only an ultimatum insofar as I could not wait any longer. -I had to leave, because I had orders to leave. I was trying to get a -decision, a “yes” or “no,” nothing else. - -M. HERZOG: And to demand an answer “yes” or “no”—you do not consider -that an ultimatum, Defendant Sauckel? - -SAUCKEL: I had to leave, and I wanted a decision as to whether the -French Premier would sign it or not. - -M. HERZOG: Thank you. The Tribunal will, I am sure, note your answer. - -Do you know how many French workers were deported to Germany as the -result of your various actions? - -SAUCKEL: As far as I can remember—I cannot say exactly offhand—there -were 700,000 to 800,000 French workers employed in Germany. However, I -cannot tell you exactly without documents. - -M. HERZOG: Is it correct that in Belgium and in Northern France the -deportation of workers for forced labor was regulated through laws of -the army of occupation? - -SAUCKEL: I do not know about it being through the laws of the army of -occupation but through labor administration. - -M. HERZOG: Is it correct that it was the decree of 6 October 1942 which -instituted forced labor in Belgium and in Northern France? - -SAUCKEL: We called it “compulsory labor service” in German law. That is -correct. - -M. HERZOG: Is it correct that General Von Falkenhausen, the German -Military Commander in Belgium and in Northern France, who signed the -order of October 1942, did so under pressure from you? - -SAUCKEL: No, he did not sign it under pressure from me, because I talked -to him about it and there was not any argument. This was done at the -request of the Reich Government and the Führer. - -M. HERZOG: I submit to you the interrogatory of General Von -Falkenhausen, who testified before a French magistrate on 27 November -1945. I submitted this interrogatory under Exhibit Number RF-15 -(Document Number RF-15) in the course of my presentation in January. I -read from Page 1. Question 3: - - “Question: ‘Will you swear that you will tell the truth, the - whole truth, and nothing but the truth?’ - - “Answer: ‘I swear.’ - - “Question: ‘On 6 October 1942 there appeared an order which - instituted compulsory labor service in Belgium and in the - departments of Northern France...’” - -I skip two lines. - - “Answer: ‘I was Commander for Northern France and Belgium.’ - - “Question: ‘Does the witness remember having promulgated this - order?’ - - “Answer: ‘I do not remember exactly the text of this order, - because it was drawn up after a long struggle with Sauckel, the - Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.’ - - “Question: ‘Did you have any difficulties with Sauckel?’ - - “Answer: ‘I was fundamentally opposed to the institution of - compulsory labor service, and it was only after having received - orders that I consented to promulgate the decree.’” - -Do you still deny that General Von Falkenhausen issued this order under -pressure from you? - -SAUCKEL: I deny the version as it is put before me now, emphatically. - -M. HERZOG: You dispute the testimony of General Von Falkenhausen? - -SAUCKEL: In this version, yes, because the institution... - -M. HERZOG: This statement was given under oath, and your testimony today -is given under oath. The Tribunal will take note of it. - -SAUCKEL: I say with full consciousness that to the best of my -recollection this version is not completely correct. Laws regarding -labor in occupied territories were not made on my order but on the order -of the Führer, and I did not have any argument about it with General Von -Falkenhausen. We discussed it in a very friendly way, and he introduced -the law. I do not remember having had any difficulties in this -connection. And in another paragraph he states here that at that time he -gave all his instructions on Hitler’s orders. I myself had neither -arguments nor difficulties with him. - -M. HERZOG: Is it correct that in Holland the deportation of Dutch -workers for forced labor was under the jurisdiction of the -Reichskommissariat? - -SAUCKEL: Please, would you hear the Defendant Seyss-Inquart about that? -The expression jurisdiction is entirely new to me. In France, Belgium, -and Holland this matter was dealt with through the administration of the -labor departments, that is to say... - -M. HERZOG: Who signed the orders concerning forced labor in Holland? - -SAUCKEL: I assume that Herr Seyss-Inquart did. - -M. HERZOG: Is it correct that the orders signed by the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart constituted only a local application of the general -program which you were charged with carrying out? - -SAUCKEL: A local application in Holland? I do not quite understand it -the way it is put in German. - -M. HERZOG: Is it not correct that by signing the orders concerning -forced labor in Holland the Defendant Seyss-Inquart was but implementing -your program of forced labor? - -SAUCKEL: It was a realization of the Führer’s labor program as he, the -Führer, had ordered it. - -M. HERZOG: Did you go to Belgium or to Holland in order to control the -implementation of the laws on forced labor? - -SAUCKEL: Not to control. I was in Belgium and Holland only for a very -short time. I had conferences there with the leading men, and according -to my recollection I visited the labor authorities in Antwerp and saw -how they functioned—the German ones. - -M. HERZOG: And in the course of these journeys you were preparing -detailed measures for the implementation of the labor program, is that -not true? - -SAUCKEL: I did not draft them during those journeys; I discussed them -there. Of course, I did some work while traveling. - -M. HERZOG: I submit to you Document Number PS-556, Exhibit Number RF-67. -It is a letter which you wrote to the Führer on 13 August 1943. In this -you declare, Paragraph 1 of the letter: - - “My Führer, - - “I take the liberty of informing you of my return from France, - Belgium, and Holland, where I went on official business. After - difficult and lengthy negotiations I have imposed upon the - occupied territories of the West, for the 5 last months of the - year 1943, the program which is indicated below; and I have also - prepared detailed measures for its implementation—in France - through the military commander, the German Embassy, the French - Government; in Belgium through the military commander; and in - Holland through the offices of the Reich Commissioner.” - -Do you still dispute, Defendant, the fact that you went to Belgium and -Holland in order to prepare detailed measures there? - -SAUCKEL: I have never denied that, I would like to say that I do not -resent the expression, but only the way you present it now and then. It -says quite clearly that they were discussed there; that is what is meant -by preparation. - -M. HERZOG: One last question on this matter: What is your estimate of -the number of Dutch workers who were deported to Germany? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you exactly from memory how many Dutch workers -were employed on the basis of contracts with them and on the basis of -these laws. Maybe there were 200,000 or 300,000, maybe more. I cannot -tell you offhand what these Dutch figures were. - -M. HERZOG: Thank you. Is it correct that the forced recruitment of -foreign workers was carried out with brutality? - -SAUCKEL: Regarding the instructions which I issued, that was discussed -adequately and clearly yesterday. My instructions are available -practically in their entirety, and discountenance any brutal recruitment -which... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you were not asked about your instructions, -but you were asked whether brutality was shown. If you know, you can -answer. - -SAUCKEL: I cannot know. From time to time I heard about excesses, and I -stopped them at once, and I protested against them when I heard of them. - -M. HERZOG: Did you have knowledge of protests concerning the manner in -which the recruitment of workers was carried out in the occupied -territories? - -SAUCKEL: I received protests, and that was discussed yesterday with my -counsel. - -M. HERZOG: And when you received those protests, what did you do? - -SAUCKEL: I had those cases investigated and left any further measures to -the authorities concerned. I did everything on my side to prevent and -stop such occurrences, and that can and will be testified to here. - -M. HERZOG: Is it correct that you appealed for the help of the Wehrmacht -to insure the recruiting of foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: In those areas where the Wehrmacht exercised jurisdiction I -passed on to the military commanders or commanders-in-chief, through the -Quartermaster General of the Army, the instructions I received from the -Führer. - -M. HERZOG: Is it correct that you asked the military authorities to put -troops at the disposal of your offices and services? - -SAUCKEL: I have no recollection of troops, but there were labor -detachments there. It is true that in areas where there were uprisings -or partisan fighting I asked that order be restored, so that the -administration which had been disturbed or interrupted could be resumed. - -M. HERZOG: You therefore asked that troops should be put at your -disposal? - -SAUCKEL: Not at my disposal. It was not my task to bring order to those -areas. I explained that it was essential for the fulfillment of my own -tasks and that I could only carry them out if proper administration were -once more made possible by the establishment of order; it was not for -recruiting purposes. - -M. HERZOG: Did you not ask that those troops should participate in the -tasks assigned to the service for the recruitment of labor? I submit to -you Document Number F-815, which I put in under Exhibit Number RF-1514. -It is a letter of 18 April 1944 from General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt -and addressed to you. I read the first paragraph of it: - - “On the part of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation - of Labor...”—that is you, is it not? - -SAUCKEL: That is I, but there was another department in France, too... - - M. HERZOG: “....the request was made that the Commander, West - should be approached to the effect that in sectors where there - are units belonging to the Commander, West, the commanders of - these units should receive orders to support the execution of - the tasks assigned to the Allocation of Labor by making troops - available.” - -Do you still deny that you requested that troops should be put at your -disposal? - -SAUCKEL: I personally did not ask for them. This appears to be the -administrative office West. - -M. HERZOG: Are you not the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of -Labor? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but this order is not known to me personally. - -M. HERZOG: Do you know whether this request was seconded by the -Defendant Speer? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you. - -M. HERZOG: I submit to you Document Number 824-PS... - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you better put that off until after the -adjournment. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -M. HERZOG: Mr. President, I believe that Mr. Dodd has a statement to -make to the Tribunal. - -MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the -Defendant Jodl is absent. - -MR. DODD: Document Number 3057-PS, concerning which M. Herzog questioned -the defendant this morning, was in the document book offered by the -United States with reference to the slave-labor program, but it was not -offered in evidence, and I found the reference in the record at Page -1397 of the transcript for 13 December 1945 (Volume III, Page 494) and -the President of the Tribunal particularly asked why we had not read -Document 3057-PS. I answered that we had intended to offer it, but that -counsel for Sauckel had told me that his client maintained that he had -been coerced into the making of the statement, and for that reason we -preferred not to offer it, and were not offering it. - -THE PRESIDENT: I want to announce that the Tribunal will rise this -afternoon at half past 4 to sit in closed session. - -SAUCKEL: May I be permitted to give my explanation on that document? - -M. HERZOG: What document are you speaking of? - -SAUCKEL: I am referring to the letter of the Field Marshal Von -Rundstedt. This document represents a letter which is addressed to me... - -THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear you ask any question. Did you ask your -question? - -M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President. It is the document which I presented just -before the recess, and the document shows that the official in charge of -the recruitment and allocation of labor—that is he himself—asked that -troop units should be put at his disposal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean Document F-815? Yes, very well. - -M. HERZOG: That is correct, Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I ask you whether you recognize that this -document establishes the fact that you requested troop units? - -SAUCKEL: As far as this question is concerned I cannot answer precisely, -for I personally did not receive this letter. Instead it was sent to -Paris, to the office there. This letter is not initialed by me. But in -order to clarify my position, I should like to emphasize specifically -that I did not demand troops in order to recruit workers. I asked for -troops when in certain areas the administrative procedure could not be -carried through because of resistance activities, _et cetera_. In that -connection there is an error in this letter of Field Marshal Von -Rundstedt. But I did not receive this reply myself. It is initialed by -the office of the military commander in Paris. - -M. HERZOG: I submit Document F-824, which I hand to the Tribunal as -Exhibit RF-1515. This Document F-824 is a letter from the Commander of -the West, from his headquarters, dated 25 July 1944. I quote: - - “One can conclude from this that on the order of the Führer, and - after the abrogation of all contrary decrees, the desires of the - Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor...” - -This Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor is you -yourself; is that not so? - - “...and of Reich Minister Speer must in principle be carried - out. Following my telegraphic communication, on the basis of the - conference of ministers of 11 July in the Reich Chancellery, - concerning which the Commander of the West will be informed by - the military commander, the following directives are in force - from now on: - - “Without taking into account justified misgivings concerning - security and order within the country, recruiting must start - everywhere where the possibilities referred to in my telegram - present themselves. As an only exception the Führer has decided - that in the actual fighting zone no methods of coercion will be - used against the population as long as the latter are helpful to - the Wehrmacht. On the other hand, the recruiting of volunteers - among refugees from the combat zones is to be handled - energetically. Moreover, all means will be considered justified, - in order to recruit as much labor as possible from elsewhere by - means at the disposal of the Wehrmacht.” - -Do you again deny that at your request, and at that of Reich Minister -Speer, troop units carried out the recruiting of labor? - -SAUCKEL: I should like to remark in this connection that I do not -dispute what has just been described. At that time the -commander-in-chief was under the stress of battle and the evacuation of -the population. But I can testify that after the date of 25 July 1944 -these things did not apply any longer, for the withdrawal of German -troops was much too rapid; so that this decree, which had been issued by -the Führer, was no longer in effect. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the conference, the ministers’ conference of -11 July 1944, to which the document I have just read refers? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I recall it. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the persons who were present at this meeting? - -SAUCKEL: Not all of them. - -M. HERZOG: I submit to you the minutes of this meeting. It is Document -3819-PS, which has been handed to the Tribunal under number... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to read the last passage in -Document F-824—that is, not the last, but the last on that page -beginning with “Afin....” It is on Page 346 of the French translation. - - M. HERZOG: “In order to make the measures undertaken as - effective as possible, the troops must be informed of the - necessity of the Arbeitseinsatz organization so that they may - put down the many acts of subversive and open resistance. The - field commanders and military administration offices must give - as much aid as possible to the delegates of the Plenipotentiary - General for the Allocation of Labor and refrain from encroaching - on their activities which are in conformance with instructions. - I therefore ask you to give the necessary directions to this - effect...” - -Do you still deny that at your request the Army was used for the -recruitment of workers? - -THE PRESIDENT: There is a passage on the next page, too, in the -supplementary note, Paragraph 1. - - M. HERZOG: “Supplementary note by the Commander of the West. - - “The Commander of the West reported to the Chief of the OKW on - 23 July as follows: - - “1) In spite of anxieties concerning internal security, I have - authorized the application of the Sauckel-Laval agreement of 12 - May 1944. - - “2) I shall issue further instructions for the application of - these measures in the combat zone in agreement with OKW/WFSt/Qu. - (Verw. 1) 2 (West) Number 05201/44, Secret, of 8 July 1944. - - “The Commander of the West, signed Von Kluge, Field Marshal. - - “Further instructions follow. For the Commander of the West. The - Chief of the General Staff,” _et cetera_. - -I come back now to the conference of 11 July 1944. I submit to you -Document Number 3819-PS, submitted under Exhibit Number GB-306. The -Tribunal will find it under Document 3819-PS in the first part of my -document book. It represents the minutes of the ministers’ conference -which took place on 11 July 1944 in Berlin, a gathering of ministers, -chiefs of the Party, and of administration. - -You will find on Page 6 of the French translation the list of all the -persons who were there. Do you remember who, among the defendants, were -among those present? Do you recognize the signature of Defendant Funk? -That of Defendant Speer? - -SAUCKEL: I have not found it yet. - -M. HERZOG: Have you found them? - -SAUCKEL: I have not found Speer’s signature yet. - -M. HERZOG: Was Defendant Speer present at this conference? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you from memory. I cannot find his name. - -M. HERZOG: Were you yourself present at this conference? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I participated. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the proposals which, in the course of this -conference, General Warlimont made to you in the name of the General -Staff? Do you remember the reply that you made to these proposals? - -SAUCKEL: I recall a conversation between General Warlimont and myself on -that occasion, and I gave an answer; but I cannot give it to you -verbatim without having some data at my disposal. - -M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to read you the text. It is on Page 10. The -Tribunal will find it at the bottom of the page: - - “The representative of the Chief of the OKW, General Warlimont, - referred to a recent order of the Führer according to which all - German forces would have to be used in the task of recruiting - labor. Where troops of the Wehrmacht are stationed, whenever - they are not engaged exclusively in military tasks—such as the - construction of coastal fortifications—they will be available, - but they cannot be detached solely for the purpose of the - Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. General - Warlimont made the following practical proposals: - - “(a) Troops which are in action against partisans will, in - addition, have to be used for recruiting labor in the zones held - by partisan bands....” - -SAUCKEL: Would you please tell me where that is. I have not this passage -on this page. Will you please show me the page? - -M. HERZOG: I will have it shown to you. Point it out to the interpreter -also. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I find the place about General Warlimont, but in the -German translation it sounds entirely different from what you are -reading. - -M. HERZOG: It is on Page 3. Have you found it? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -M. HERZOG: Then I can resume the reading of it. - - “(a) Troops which are in action against partisans will, in - addition, be used for recruiting labor in the zones held by - partisan bands. Any person who cannot give a satisfactory reason - for his staying in that region will be compulsorily recruited. - - “(b) If large towns are totally or partially evacuated owing to - food difficulties, all the population capable of work will be - recruited for labor with the aid of the Wehrmacht. - - “(c) A special effort for recruiting labor among refugees from - areas close to the front must be made with the aid of the - Wehrmacht. - - “Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these proposals with gratitude and - expressed the hope that results would be obtained by these - means.” - -Do you still continue to claim that the Wehrmacht did not co-operate in -the recruiting of labor? - -SAUCKEL: I did not deny that in the combat area, and for the purpose of -maintaining order in the rear areas, these measures were proposed, but -they were not carried through. - -M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to produce a document which refers to 3 or 4 -days after this meeting of ministers. It is a telegram from Defendant -Keitel, Document Number F-814, which I submit to the Tribunal under -Exhibit Number RF-1516. It is a telegram addressed by Defendant Keitel -to all military commanders. I call your attention to the fact that it -bears the stamp of the labor department of the military commander in -France. This is dated 15 July and here is the text of it... - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, some of these documents are not tabbed and it -is quite impossible to find them unless you tell us where they are. - -M. HERZOG: I have tabbed only those documents which I intend to use -several times, so that the Tribunal will be able to find them easily. -Otherwise, the documents must be in the order in which I use them. -Document F-814 should, therefore, be immediately after Document 3819-PS, -unless I am mistaken. - -THE PRESIDENT: 3819, you mean? - -M. HERZOG: Actually it is after the document marked Document RF-15; it -is the fourth document after Document F-814. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have got 815 after that; after RF-15, we have Document -F-815. - -M. HERZOG: After 815 we have Document F-823, then F-824, and F-814, Mr. -President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes, now I see it. - -M. HERZOG: This document contains the instructions which Keitel gave in -connection with this meeting of leaders. I read the second paragraph: - - “The present situation demands the use of all conceivable means - for the procurement of additional labor, because it is the - fighting men who benefit first of all by all armament measures. - In view of this fact, all questions concerning internal unrest, - the increase of resistance and such matters must be put in the - background. We must concentrate on giving every help and support - to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. I - refer to my directives for the co-operation of the Wehrmacht in - the procurement of workers from France.” - -Do you still contend that the Wehrmacht was not used for the recruitment -of labor? - -SAUCKEL: I must emphasize here again that I did not dispute that these -things had been planned and ordered. I did not dispute that fact, and I -should like to emphasize that again. But these measures were not carried -through, and I would like to emphasize that also. And besides that, I -did not send this telegram. - -M. HERZOG: Is it correct to say that the German Police proceeded to take -steps to recruit foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: How far the Police carried through their measures in detail, I -do not know, but I do know that they carried through some measures on -their own accord. - -M. HERZOG: But is it not true that you recommended your offices to put -themselves in touch with the chiefs of the Police, the SD, and the SS? - -SAUCKEL: I considered both the SD and the Police to be regular and -justified institutions, and I had to ask for their help when it was -necessary. - -M. HERZOG: You, therefore, admit that you recommended your offices to -put themselves in contact with the chiefs of the Police, the SD, and the -SS for the accomplishment of their tasks? - -SAUCKEL: To support me in my tasks only where an orderly participation -or the use of the Police was necessary from an administrative point of -view—not for the recruitment of workers as such, but only to remove -difficulties or disturbances in administration. - -M. HERZOG: I ask you the question again, and I ask you to answer “yes” -or “no.” Did you recommend your offices to get in touch with the chiefs -of the Police, the SS, and the SD? - -SAUCKEL: I can only answer that question with a qualified “yes”—on -occasions when it was necessary to call in police aid; not in order to -carry through the task itself. - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that the chiefs of the German Police assisted in -the conferences which you held with the French authorities concerning -the recruitment of labor? - -SAUCKEL: Sometimes representatives of the Higher SS and Police Leader -were present just as in the case of the French, where the Minister of -the Interior or the Minister of the Police was present. I neither -demanded that nor proposed it. - -M. HERZOG: But you admit that the representatives of the German Police -were present at these discussions? Can you give the name of one of these -representatives? Do you know Standartenführer Knochen? - -SAUCKEL: Standartenführer Knochen was in Paris, and on occasions he was -present at these conferences. - -M. HERZOG: Is it correct that the chiefs of the German Police attended -the conferences which the German authorities held concerning labor -problems? - -SAUCKEL: To my recollection they attended various conferences, but that -occurred at the proposal of the military commander, under whose -direction these conferences took place. - -M. HERZOG: Was there a representative of the Police at the conference of -chiefs on 11 July 1944, which we mentioned just now in Document 3819-PS? - -SAUCKEL: Do you mean the meeting at Berlin? - -M. HERZOG: Yes, the Berlin meeting on 11 July 1944. - -SAUCKEL: I believe Kaltenbrunner attended that conference. The meeting -had been called by Reich Minister Lammers. - -M. HERZOG: Did you never ask Himmler, in the presence of the Führer, for -the help of the SS in the recruitment of labor? - -SAUCKEL: At a discussion with the Führer in January, Reichsführer SS -Himmler was present. On this occasion, as far as I recollect, I pointed -out that the program for the year 1944, which had been drawn up by the -Führer, could not be carried through by me if the partisan menace and -obstruction in certain areas were not removed. And that, of course, -could only be done by the authorities who had jurisdiction there. - -M. HERZOG: You admit, therefore, that you asked Reichsführer SS Himmler -to put his police forces at your disposal? - -SAUCKEL: No, it is not correct to put it in that way. I have to -contradict you there. Neither I nor my offices could have police forces -put at our disposal. I merely asked for help in those areas where I was -supposed to carry through administrative measures and where a -pacification and restoration of order was first necessary. Otherwise, I -could not carry out my task. - -M. HERZOG: I am going to show you Document Number 1292-PS. It has -already been submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number USA-225. It -is the minutes of a meeting held in the presence of the Führer on 4 -January 1944. In my document book it is a little way after the marked -document and is also marked with a tab. - -On Page 3 of the French text, Page 5 of the German text, you declared: - - “Success will depend mainly on what German executive forces are - made available. My action cannot be carried through with native - executive forces.” - -Do you recognize that declaration? - -SAUCKEL: Will you please indicate the place to me? I have not found it -yet. Which page in German? - -M. HERZOG: It must be on Page 5 of the text which was given to you. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct. That is a statement, a rather abbreviated -statement, probably made by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers. But I should -like to say emphatically that it can be interpreted only in this way: In -those areas, which were very numerous at the time, I could not put into -effect an administration to deal with manpower until order had been -restored through executive forces. This statement, therefore, is not -quite correct as presented here. - -M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, you said to us only yesterday that you -were formerly a worker. Did you ever consider that a worker could be -taken to his work handcuffed? - -SAUCKEL: No, I never thought of such a thing. I hear now for the first -time that I am supposed to have sent, or had workers sent to their -places of work handcuffed. I do not remember that. In any case, I never -decreed anything like that; that much I can say. - -M. HERZOG: On 30 August 1943, you made a speech in Paris to the -Allocation of Labor staffs which you were setting up in France. I give -you Document Number F-816, which I submitted to the Tribunal this -morning, and I ask you to look at it again. I ask you to read... - -Mr. President, I think I have made a mistake. I do not think I submitted -that document, and, therefore, I submit it now, under the Exhibit Number -RF-1517. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please look at Page 10 of the photostat -which has been given to you—Page 38 of the French translation, the last -line on the page: - - “The most severe measures for recruiting labor—police action or - the use of handcuffs—must be applied by us in the most - unobtrusive manner.” - -That is what you declared on 30 August 1943 to the Allocation of Labor -staffs when they met in Paris. - -SAUCKEL: I have not found the place. Will you please have it shown to -me? - -M. HERZOG: It is on Page 10, some 14 lines down. Have you found it now? - -SAUCKEL: Yes; I have found it. - -M. HERZOG: And you considered that handcuffs could be used in the -recruitment of labor? - -SAUCKEL: It can only be a statement regarding cases of flagrant -resistance to the authority of the state or to the execution of some -administrative action. Experience shows us that this has been found -necessary the whole world over. I merely said that everything should be -done in an orderly and correct way. I did not call that a rule to be -applied for the recruitment of labor. It cannot be understood in any -other way. - -M. HERZOG: But you said that to the Allocation of Labor officials in -France. The Tribunal will judge that. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but it must be interpreted as being applied only if there -were flagrant resistance to an executive authority; otherwise it was -never intended. - -M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will form its own opinion. - -Defendant Sauckel, have you ever created any special police for the -recruitment of labor? - -SAUCKEL: No, I established no special police; I explained that -yesterday. That was a suggestion put forward by the French units -themselves for protection. At a conference I exaggerated and called it -“police,” but it was not a police force. - -M. HERZOG: Have you heard of a “Committee for Social Peace”? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that was talked about. - -M. HERZOG: Have you heard a committee mentioned which was called the -“League for Social Order and Justice?” - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -M. HERZOG: Have you ever drafted any order or sent any instructions -which advised the institution of these committees? - -SAUCKEL: It was proposed, yes, and it was discussed. As far as I -remember that was in the spring of 1944. - -M. HERZOG: And you claim that you never set up these committees, or -drafted any instructions concerning the setting up of these committees? - -SAUCKEL: I have already said that I did that. - -M. HERZOG: You admit that you drafted instructions concerning the -formation of these special police forces? - -SAUCKEL: That was done on the basis of discussions which I had with -these French units. - -M. HERZOG: So you did do this? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, in agreement with these French units. - -M. HERZOG: Very well. - -I submit to the Tribunal Document Number F-827, under Exhibit Number -RF-1518. These are instructions of the Defendant Sauckel for the -formation of these special police forces. The document consists of -several sets of instructions. On Page 6, there is an order of 25 January -1944 by the Defendant Sauckel. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is it? - -M. HERZOG: On Page 6, immediately after Document 1292 in my document -book, you will find the instructions of the Defendant Sauckel. I read: - - “Berlin, 25 January 1944. Secret. - - “Subject: Formation of a protection corps for the execution of - the tasks of the Allocation Of Labor in France and in Belgium - during the year 1944. - - “1) To the Military Commander in France, Paris. - To the Military Commander for Belgium and Northern France, - Brussels. - - “In order to secure the carrying out of the necessary tasks of - the Allocation of Labor in Belgium and France, especially the - assignments for Germany, and to strengthen the executive, a - protective corps, the Committee for Social Peace, is to be - created in France and Belgium. This protective corps is to - consist of indigenous forces with a nucleus of German police who - will act as leaders. This protective corps will consist of - approximately 5,000 men in France, and approximately 1,000 men - in Belgium. I give the following provisional instructions for - the formation of this protective corps and the accomplishment of - its tasks: - - “I. Selection of members of the Protective Corps. - - “The selection shall be made in close agreement with the - competent Police and SD offices, which shall approve the - candidates, especially from the point of view of their loyalty. - The selection shall be made especially among the members of - political movements favorably disposed to collaboration with - Germany. - - “II. Organization of the Protective Corps. - - “The Protective Corps will be directed from central offices to - be set up in Paris and Brussels. The heads of these offices - shall be designated by me.”—That is to say, by you, Defendant - Sauckel.—“They shall take orders from my delegates in France. - In purely police questions, the Protective Corps shall be - directed by the Higher SS and Police Leader. The regional groups - of the Protective Corps shall take orders from the commanders of - German police forces, and the latter will receive technical - directions from the Feldkommandantur and from the recruiting - offices as to their participation in tasks concerning the - Allocation of Labor. The German Police and the services of the - SD will deal with instruction in police matters; technical - training, as far as the Allocation of Labor is concerned, will - be given insofar as is necessary by the experts of the - Feldkommandantur and the recruiting offices. - - “The members of the Protective Corps will not wear uniform; they - will however, carry firearms. - - “III. Execution of orders. - - “The members of the Protective Corps assigned to the recruiting - offices or to the Feldkommandantur shall be employed in such a - way as to insure maximum efficiency in the execution of measures - ordered. For example, they must be informed immediately if - Frenchmen who have been summoned by German offices do not - appear. They must find out the domiciles of these persons and - bring them to report in accordance with instructions from the - German police leader in collaboration with the French and German - police. Furthermore, they must track down immediately all those - who have refused to appear when summoned, and those who have - broken their contracts. In the interests of an effective - executive, it is expedient that they receive regularly lists of - persons summoned and persons liable for service, to enable them - to act immediately in cases where German directives have not - been complied with. - - “It is to be presumed that these quick methods, coupled with - fitting punishment and immediate publication of the punishments, - will have a more deterrent effect than that achieved by tracking - down the men afterwards, as has been done up to now. - Furthermore, members of the Protective Corps are to keep the - German offices informed of any particular difficulties in - recruitment....” - -And all that, Defendant, is signed “Sauckel.” Do you still claim that -you did not form a special police corps in France and Belgium? - -SAUCKEL: I already told my attorney yesterday that in agreement with -French organizations such a protective corps was set up, so that on the -one hand people who wanted to work could be protected, and on the other -hand administrative measures could be carried out. Since the Frenchmen -themselves declared that they were ready and willing to collaborate, I -did not see anything unfavorable in this or anything that was in any way -out of order. - -It was to alleviate the conditions of the indigenous people themselves. - -M. HERZOG: I ask you to answer my question “yes” or “no.” Do you admit -that you set up this special police service? - -SAUCKEL: I admit that I suggested this Protective Corps, and that it was -set up, but only on a small scale. - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that you issued instructions, or imposed measures -of constraint against those who evaded the compulsory labor service? - -SAUCKEL: I did not issue them myself, but rather the French Government -did. That is correct; for in every occupied territory—and that is true -the whole world over—the authority of the occupying power must be -respected. - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that you demanded that the death penalty should be -applied to officials who, for instance, hindered your action? - -SAUCKEL: It is true that at a conference with the French Premier Laval, -I demanded, by way of negotiations, the death penalty in cases of very -serious obstruction. - -M. HERZOG: Then you admit that you demanded the application of the death -penalty in the case of these officials? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, if a serious case of sabotage was in question—according -to martial law. - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that your task was to procure for the German war -industry the labor it required? - -SAUCKEL: That was one of my tasks. - -M. HERZOG: In this respect were you responsible to the Defendant Speer, -Minister for Armaments and Munitions, for the carrying out of your task? - -SAUCKEL: I was responsible to the Four Year Plan and to the Führer, and -I had instructions from the Führer to meet the requirements of Reich -Minister Speer as far as it was possible for me to do so. - -M. HERZOG: Did the Defendant Speer approve of all the steps which you -took in recruiting foreign labor? - -SAUCKEL: At all events he agreed, or he demanded, that workers should be -put at his disposal. Sometimes, however, we did not entirely agree as to -how it should be done; for instance, we did not agree about the -protected factories in France. - -M. HERZOG: We will come to that later. I ask you to tell me whether you -always succeeded in satisfying the demands for workers which were made -to you by the different sections of German industry? - -SAUCKEL: No, I was not always successful. - -M. HERZOG: And when you failed, did the orders that were sent to you by -Defendant Speer have to have priority over all others? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, they had to have priority. - -M. HERZOG: Were there not incidents in this respect? For instance, did -it not happen that some transports of workers were diverted from their -original destination on instructions from Defendant Speer? - -SAUCKEL: It did happen that, contrary to my instructions, labor -transports were stopped, or transferred to other regions or to other -factories. But whether the order always emanated from Herr Speer, or -from an armament commission, or from another office, I do not know. It -was not always from the same quarter. - -M. HERZOG: In your interrogatory you declared, however, that the -original destination of these transports was sometimes changed in order -to satisfy the demands of Speer’s offices. Do you confirm this? - -SAUCKEL: Yes; but I meant by that something rather different. In that -case I was informed about it. There were two kinds of changes, or -deviations: those which I did not know about, and those which were -agreed upon. - -M. HERZOG: Will you tell the Tribunal what was understood by the “red -ticket” system? - -SAUCKEL: The red ticket system was applied when there was a demand for -workers, mostly specialized or skilled workers, which had to take -priority over all other demands because the work was necessary. - -M. HERZOG: The system of the red ticket was applied to the armament -industry, was it not? - -SAUCKEL: The red ticket system was applied to the armament industry... - -M. HERZOG: And it was established by agreement between the Defendant -Speer and yourself? - -SAUCKEL: That was a system which, in my opinion, was always intended to -meet emergencies; there were variations, such as lists or red tickets. -Originally, there were only lists, and the red ticket was added by -decree. - -M. HERZOG: You therefore admit that by these various systems you share -with the Defendant Speer the responsibility of having compelled workers -to work in German factories for the needs of the war which Germany was -fighting against their own native lands? - -SAUCKEL: I should like to emphasize particularly that this red ticket -system did not apply only to foreign workers; it applied especially to -German workers too—German skilled workers. - -M. HERZOG: But it was applied also to foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: It applied to foreign workers as well, if they were specialists -and declared their willingness. - -M. HERZOG: Will you tell the Tribunal what is meant by the “blocking” of -factories? - -SAUCKEL: A factory was “blocked” if it was manufacturing articles which -were not essential for war, or if it was a question of so-called luxury -articles. - -M. HERZOG: I do not think you understood my question. What were, for -instance, the “S” factories in France—the factories protected by Speer? - -SAUCKEL: “Sperrbetriebe” known as “S” factories—is that what you mean? - -M. HERZOG: Yes. - -SAUCKEL: Sperrbetriebe were factories which worked for Speer in France, -which had been agreed to by the French Minister Bichelonne, and they -were blocked as far as labor recruitment was concerned. - -M. HERZOG: Did you not exert strong pressure on the Defendant Speer to -get him to abandon the practice of blocking industries? - -SAUCKEL: I asked him and I urged him, but I could not succeed in putting -an end to the blocking of these factories. - -M. HERZOG: Did you ever bring up the matter with Hitler and insist that -Speer should give up his position? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I was very insistent with Hitler about it, but I had no -success. - -M. HERZOG: In this connection did you not ask the Führer to increase -your powers at the expense of the Defendant Speer? - -SAUCKEL: I did not ask for a general extension of my powers, but I asked -that conditions should be allowed to remain as they had been previously, -for—I ask to be permitted to explain this to the Tribunal—my task was -to bring workers from France to Germany—may I make this statement: - -The departments under Speer demanded skilled workers from me. There were -skilled workers already in the factories which Speer had blocked. -Similar industries in Germany would, of course, be worse off if instead -of having skilled French workers they were supplied with unskilled -French workers, or men without experience in that particular trade. I -had to procure workers in any case, but I considered it wiser for German -economy to procure for it the right kind of workers and not workers who -were unskilled. - -M. HERZOG: I beg the Tribunal to turn back to Document Number 3819-PS, -the second part of 3819-PS. It consists of two letters, each addressed -to the Führer, by the Defendant Sauckel and by the Defendant Speer, on -this subject of the blocking of industries. - -First of all, I will read to the Tribunal some extracts from Sauckel’s -letter, which happens to be the second. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have these not both been read already? - -M. HERZOG: I think they have already been read, Mr. President; I cannot -affirm it, but believe so. Document Number 3819-PS has already been -submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number GB-306. If the Tribunal -wishes, I can limit myself to very short extracts. - -THE PRESIDENT: You need not read them for the purpose of your question -of the defendant. - -M. HERZOG: [_Turning to the defendant._] In this letter, on Page 27, you -asked whether you could obtain in a general manner a free hand for the -rational utilization of labor. - -Do you admit that you asked the Führer for this free hand? - -SAUCKEL: I have not found the place. I could never have asked for a free -hand, but I did ask to be permitted to recruit as before. I cannot find -the place that you are quoting. - -M. HERZOG: You will find it on Page 27. - -SAUCKEL: In this German text it says: “In this situation, it is -absolutely necessary that I should again have a free hand.” That means -that I should have a free hand once again, as I had had before the -blocked industries were instituted. That is correct, for I was -interested in a rational use of labor. - -M. HERZOG: That is what I asked you to confirm. Did you ask that your -powers should be increased at the expense of those of your Codefendant -Speer? Will you answer “yes” or “no,” if you can? - -SAUCKEL: I do not understand the question. Was it obtain them or ask for -them? - -M. HERZOG: Ask for them. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I asked for them, for it was to Speer’s advantage. - -M. HERZOG: You asked for that? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I asked for that in the interests of my tasks. - -M. HERZOG: And do you not remember that on other occasions, the -Defendant Speer likewise asked that his powers should be increased at -the expense of yours? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that might have happened also. - -M. HERZOG: You declared in your interrogatory that the very close -relations between Speer and Goebbels after the fall of Stalingrad made -Speer want particularly to have you under his authority. Can you confirm -this? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -M. HERZOG: Is it true that your general program for recruiting labor -included the employment of prisoners of war? - -SAUCKEL: The employment of prisoners of war as far as they should and -could be put to work under the care of the Wehrmacht. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the decree which we mentioned this morning, -your Decree Number 10, which stipulated the order of priority of work -and gave priority to armament? Was this order applicable to prisoners of -war as well? - -SAUCKEL: As I explained yesterday, this decree was applicable to -prisoners of war only by way of exchange, and to the extent as set forth -in the rules of work issued by the OKW and by me in a catalog of work. - -M. HERZOG: But Article 8 of this decree stipulates only that it was -applicable to prisoners of war. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, in accordance, of course, with the other decrees which -existed; that was a matter of course. - -M. HERZOG: You spoke to us yesterday about inspectorates. Is it true -that in September 1943 you came to an agreement with Dr. Ley concerning -the setting up of a central inspectorate for foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, for the purposes of their welfare. - -M. HERZOG: In consequence, you admit that you are responsible for the -measures concerning the treatment of foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: I am responsible for the directives which I issued; they are -all available. - -M. HERZOG: Do you consider yourself responsible for the feeding of -foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: I consider myself responsible for the directives which I issued -regarding the feeding of foreign workers. The actual feeding of these -people was not the task and responsibility of the labor authorities. -That was the responsibility of the factories, or the camp leaders who -had been charged by the factories to look after this. - -M. HERZOG: I am going to have submitted to you Document Number 025-PS. -This document was submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number -USA-698. You already had it yesterday. It consists of the report of a -meeting in the office of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation -of Labor—that is to say, you yourself—on 3 September 1942. The -document is dated 4 September. - -This document, Mr. President, is at the end of my document book, after -Document F-827, the last page of the French translation. I read:... - -THE PRESIDENT: The last page is Document F-857, is it not? The document -called 857—the last page I have got. It is just in front of Document -2200-PS. Did you come across that? It is just after Document 1913-PS. - -M. HERZOG: After Document 1913-PS, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -M. HERZOG: I read: - - “The Führer cannot understand that, in the struggle for the - future of Europe, the country which has to bear the brunt of - this struggle is the one to suffer most from hunger; whereas in - France...” - -THE PRESIDENT: It is on Page 1 or Page 4? - -M. HERZOG: No, Mr. President, on Page 4 of the French text—that is to -say, on the last page. - - “The Führer cannot understand that, in the struggle for the - future of Europe, the country which has to bear the brunt of - this struggle is the one to suffer most from hunger; whereas in - France, in Holland, in Hungary, in the Ukraine, or anywhere - else, there is no talk of hunger. He desires that it should be - the reverse in the future. As regards the foreign workers living - in the Reich—with the exclusion of the Eastern Workers—little - by little their rations must be reduced and made to correspond - to their output. It is not admissible that lazy Dutchmen or - Italians should receive better rations than good Eastern - Workers. In principle the guiding rule of utmost output must - apply equally to feeding.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I ask you what you meant when you stated -that, “In principle the guiding rule of utmost output must apply equally -to feeding?” - -SAUCKEL: There was a standard ration in the Reich which was increased by -additional rations based on output or performance. I fought for the -principle that these additional rations, which the workers from the West -were already largely receiving, should be granted to the workers from -the East as well; and that where western workers—that is, Dutch and -Belgian workers—did not keep up their output in the same way as the -Eastern Workers, these additional rations should be cut down -accordingly, but not the standard ration which applied to the German -people as well. - -M. HERZOG: You therefore consider that if the output of one worker is -smaller than that of another, his food rations must be smaller. Is that -what I am to understand? - -SAUCKEL: No, it is not right to interpret it that way. I should like to -explain the system again. In Germany each worker received his ration as -fixed by the Reich Minister for Food. In addition to that there were -special increases as a reward for increased output. At the beginning -these additional rations were not granted to Russian workers, and it is -these additional rations we are dealing with here; not with starving -people, or cutting down their standard food rations—additional rations -for increased output. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MARSHAL: If it pleases the Tribunal, the report is made that the -Defendant Raeder is absent. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, do you anticipate being able to conclude your -cross-examination before half past 4? - -M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President, I think that I might even finish before -that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, I offered in evidence this morning -Document Number F-810, which is an account of the conference which you -held on 15 and 16 July 1944 at Wartburg with the heads of the regional -labor offices. Do you remember? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I remember. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember whether during this conference the question -was raised as to the discipline to be imposed upon the workers? - -SAUCKEL: It is possible that during this conference—or -conferences—this question was discussed. I cannot remember exactly; I -did not participate in all the sessions. - -M. HERZOG: Do you know Ministerialrat Dr. Sturm? - -SAUCKEL: Ministerialrat Dr. Sturm is not personally known to me. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the statements made at the conference of 15 -and 16 July 1944 by Dr. Sturm? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot remember any particular statements by Dr. Sturm. - -M. HERZOG: I shall hand you once more the minutes of that meeting. It is -Document Number F-810 which was presented this morning under Exhibit -Number RF-1507. Will you please look at Page 25 of the German text. It -is also Page 25 of the French version. There you see—I read the first -line: “Sturm gave the following report from his sector on work -discipline.” - -I shall pass to the next page, where I read, “We are working with the -Gestapo...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is this? - -M. HERZOG: Document F-810, Mr. President; it is a document which is -marked... - -THE PRESIDENT: I know it is 806, but I thought you told us that they -followed on. - -M. HERZOG: 810, Sir, 810. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have got that. - -M. HERZOG: Page 25. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on. - -M. HERZOG: With your permission, I will begin again. - - “Sturm gave the following report from his sector on work - discipline...” - -And on the following page: “We are working with the Gestapo and the -concentration camps, and we are certainly on the right track.” - -Did you make any observations when that statement was made? - -SAUCKEL: I did not hear that statement myself. He gave a specialized -report on questions of labor legislation, as it says at the beginning. I -am seeing the record for the first time in my life. There were several -parallel meetings at the same time. I did not hear it myself, but it -stands to reason that some sort of ruling regarding penalties had to be -made, as is done in all labor legislation. - -Perhaps I may read to you from the same document, the beginning: - - “Measures regulating the employment of labor and wages are only - possible on the basis of a healthy working morale. Regulations - of a disciplinary and penal character for securing such morale - require unified handling, the details of which will be dealt - with at a subsequent meeting of experts on penal law.” - -That is, of course, not one of my offices. - -M. HERZOG: I asked you what you thought of Dr. Sturm’s statement. - -SAUCKEL: May I read in connection with Dr. Sturm’s statement, at the end -of the first page... - -M. HERZOG: Will you please answer my question first? What do you think -of this statement? - -SAUCKEL: I have already answered. - -M. HERZOG: Please answer my question. What do you think of this -statement? - -SAUCKEL: I did not know of this statement, as Sturm, I believe, came -from some other department. I do not know whether he belonged to the -Ministry of Labor itself, or to some other department; that I cannot -say. I did not hear these statements... - -THE PRESIDENT: Watch the light. Do you not see the light in front of -you? - -M. HERZOG: Do you not remember that an agreement was reached between you -and the Chief of the Police and SS to hand over to the Gestapo those -workers who were guilty of leaving their work? - -SAUCKEL: Well, there had to be an authority in Germany which dealt with -workers who left their places of work without being entitled to do so. -It could not have been done by any authority other than the Police; -there was no other way. In connection with this document I beg to be -allowed to read some more from Page 1: - - “Apart from that, the number of penalties imposed by the - authorities on German workers, such as reprimands, fines, - concentration camps, and legal penalties, was relatively - surprisingly small. In cases dealt with by the public prosecutor - the penalties inflicted amounted on an average to 0.1 to 0.2 for - every 1,000 workers.” - -M. HERZOG: What has that to do with the question which I asked you about -your relations with the Gestapo and the concentration camps? - -SAUCKEL: But there was no other authority except the police who could -make an arrest if it were necessary and legally justified by court -rulings. - -M. HERZOG: You admit, then, that it was with your agreement that the -Gestapo proceeded to arrest workmen who had broken what you call their -contract of work, and send them to concentration camps? - -SAUCKEL: Not to concentration camps, no, but into the custody which was -prescribed. The penalties were decreed in accordance with certain -regulations. I made no other agreement. - -M. HERZOG: I submit in evidence Document Number 2200-PS; which becomes -Exhibit Number RF-1519. It is a service memorandum of the Gestapo -addressed to the district police officials of the Cologne and Aachen -districts. It refers to the struggle against breaches of contract on the -part of foreign workers. Mr. President, it is the fourth document from -the end in my document book. I read from it: - - “The considerable number of refractory foreign workers ... is - dangerous to the security of the Reich.... There is always - danger of actual sabotage in such cases, ... the Reichsführer SS - and Chief of the German Police has reached an agreement with the - Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor that all - charges of absenteeism against foreign workers shall be dealt - with by the Gestapo. - - “...the district police authorities are expected to examine - anything bearing on this matter. They are authorized by me to - give warnings to absentees by order of the Gestapo State Police - office, Cologne, and to order corrective custody up to 3 days - for all cases of minor importance. The instructions concerning - the attitude to be taken toward the individual groups of foreign - workers are to be noted.... - - “In more serious cases of absenteeism the district police - authorities will submit the files concerning the cases to the - competent Gestapo office (Cologne, Aachen, or Bonn) for - decision. The Gestapo will examine the matter and order the - necessary measures—detention, sending to corrective labor - camps, or concentration camps.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you still deny that it was with your -agreement that refractory workers were first handed over to the Gestapo, -and then sent to concentration camps? - -SAUCKEL: I did not deny it, but as stated in the first paragraph, this -only happened if public order was disturbed by punishable offenses, that -is in serious cases, or when there were breaches of working contracts. -There was nobody except the police to undertake the search for such -people, and I consider the procedure to be perfectly correct. - -M. HERZOG: You think that it is a correct manner of procedure to hand -over foreign workers to the Gestapo and to concentration camps? I note -your answer. - -SAUCKEL: Only in the case of serious offenses. It says “in serious -cases” in the document. That was the demand imposed on me. - -M. HERZOG: At what period did you learn about the atrocities which were -committed in concentration camps? - -SAUCKEL: I can say with a good conscience that I gained knowledge here -of the cruelties which were committed in the concentration camps; after -the collapse of the Reich. - -M. HERZOG: Do you think that it was the same with all the Hitlerite -chiefs? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot speak for the others. I myself did not know of such -measures, which I abhor and which I only learned of here. - -M. HERZOG: Do you think that the Reichsführer SS Himmler, for example, -was aware of the atrocities which were committed in the concentration -camps? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot say whether the Reichsführer SS knew of them, whether -he himself instigated them. During the whole of my career I hardly ever -spoke to the Reichsführer SS because our personal relations were rather -strained. - -M. HERZOG: During the interrogation by your counsel yesterday you -declared that you once visited the concentration camp of Buchenwald; did -you not? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, in 1937 or 1938. I cannot tell you that from memory now. - -M. HERZOG: You declared you made this visit in the company of an Italian -commission, did you not? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct. - -M. HERZOG: Do you know that there is in existence an album of official -photographs of the concentration camp in Buchenwald? - -SAUCKEL: I do not know that. - -M. HERZOG: I offer that album in evidence to the Tribunal under Exhibit -Number RF-1520. It bears the Document Number D-565. It is a document of -the British Delegation. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you recognize yourself in these -photographs? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I recognize myself in this picture. - -M. HERZOG: With whom are you there? - -SAUCKEL: That is the Reichsführer SS. - -M. HERZOG: Himmler? - -SAUCKEL: Himmler, yes. - -M. HERZOG: Thank you. And you contend that you, a Gauleiter and -Reichsstatthalter of Thuringia, visited the Buchenwald Concentration -Camp in the company of the Reichsführer SS, and—I call your attention -to this—in the company of the commander of the camp, without knowledge -of what was happening inside the camp? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you when this picture was taken or whether it was -taken in the camp itself. I was once outside the camp together with the -Reichsführer SS—there was another large site there—but I was never -inside the camp together with the Reichsführer SS. I was there only once -with an Italian commission. - -This picture does not show that there was an inspection. Here you see -some troops lined up... - -M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will decide about that. - -I offer in evidence under Exhibit Number RF-1521 the certificate -establishing the origin of this album. - -In October of 1945 you were interrogated on the expulsion of Jews from -industry. You said this: - - “I never had anything to do with it. I had nothing to do with - the question of the eviction of Jews from industry. I had no - influence in this matter. It was an enigma to me.” - -Can you confirm this declaration? - -SAUCKEL: That is perfectly correct. I did not say the eviction of the -Jews from industry was a secret to me; I said that, to the best of my -recollection, I had nothing to do with it. - -M. HERZOG: Your counsel gave you a document yesterday, Document Number -L-61, which you thought you had to contest. - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -M. HERZOG: The point that you raised against this document was that it -was dated 1942, and that it dealt with questions prior to your -appointment. Did I understand you correctly yesterday? - -SAUCKEL: The enclosures to the document deal with questions that had -already been started before I was appointed. - -M. HERZOG: I offer in evidence Document Number L-156, which becomes -Exhibit Number RF-1522. It is a letter written under the authority of -the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary General for the -Allocation of Labor, which is you. It is dated 26 March 1943. It is -addressed to the chiefs of the regional labor offices, and it deals with -the question of the eviction of Jews. It begins thus: - - “In agreement with me and the Reich Minister for Armaments and - Munitions, the Reichsführer SS, for reasons of state security, - removed from their place of work at the end of February such - Jews as were not living in camps and who were working as free - workers. - - “They have been formed into working units or assembled for - deportation. In order not to endanger the efficacy of this - measure, I have avoided issuing any notification beforehand, and - I have notified only those regional labor offices in whose - districts free Jewish manpower was employed in large numbers. - - “So as to have a general view of the effect of those measures on - the manpower position, I ask you to let me have, as from 31 - March 1943, returns showing how many Jews were removed from - their work, and how many it has been found necessary to replace - by other workers. - - “When giving the numbers of the factories and of the Jews - employed by them, one should take into account the situation - which existed before the evacuation. The enclosed form should be - used for making reports, _et cetera_.” - -Do you still say that you had no part in the matter of the eviction of -Jews and their replacement by foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: Here again I must state emphatically that this letter was never -put before me. It has no signature, and here again it comes from a -subdivision in the Reich Ministry of Labor at 96 Saarlandstrasse. Some -official dealt with it there. I myself have absolutely no recollection -of having ever had knowledge of this letter. I did not write it, it does -not come from my office, it has been written “by order,” and the -signature is not mine. - -M. HERZOG: Will you please look on the left in the corner. It says: - -“The Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary General for -the Allocation of Labor.” Is not that you? You talk of a subordinate. -Are you trying to throw the responsibility on one of your subordinates? - -SAUCKEL: No, I do not want to do that. I merely want to say that the -letterhead belongs to some office, but I have never known anything about -the letter. This is the first time in my life that I have seen it, and I -myself did not have it written. I can say that under oath. - -M. HERZOG: With this letter is an application form for replacement for -the expelled Jews. Who else but you could have anything to do with this, -you who were the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, my department—I told my counsel yesterday that my -department, of course, had to furnish replacements if workers were taken -away from a concern, either by being called up for service or for some -other measure. I did not always know the details. - -M. HERZOG: You are not answering my question, the fact that this -letter... - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I have answered your question properly. - -M. HERZOG: The fact that this letter contains an application relating to -the replacement of workers, is that not proof that it comes from your -department, you being the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of -Labor? - -SAUCKEL: Such a request could not come from my department. The -evacuation of Jews was entirely the responsibility of the Reichsführer -SS. I had only troubles because of such measures, as it was very -difficult to replace workers. I had no interest in it. - -M. HERZOG: In short, you deny that you ever proposed special working -conditions for Jews? - -SAUCKEL: That is just what I am denying. I had nothing to do with it. It -was not my task. - -M. HERZOG: Would you please refer once more to Document Number F-810, -which I offered under Exhibit Number RF-1507? We will hand it to you if -you have not got it. Please look at Page 16, under the heading: -“Gauleiter Sauckel.” I quote... - -SAUCKEL: I have not the document at hand—oh yes, I think I have it. - -M. HERZOG: It was passed to you about 2 minutes ago. If you have not got -it, it will be handed to you again. - -SAUCKEL: Will you please give me the number again? - -M. HERZOG: Document F-810, but I do not think it is marked on the -photostat you have. Have you that document? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -M. HERZOG: Under the heading “Gauleiter Sauckel,” I read—it is on Page -16 of the document: - - “Sauckel objected very emphatically when it was said that the - inmates of concentration camps and the Hungarian Jews - constituted the best manpower on constructional work. This is - not true to fact, because they produce on an average 65 to 70 - percent of the work of a normal worker; never 100 percent. - Besides, it is unworthy to put the German worker and the German - moral conception of work in the same category as this pack of - traitors. To an inmate of a concentration camp and to a Jew, - work is not a mark of nobility. Things cannot be permitted to - reach the point where inmates of concentration camps and Jews - become articles in demand. It is absolutely essential that all - concentration camp inmates and Jews working on building sites be - kept apart from the remainder of the workers, including - foreigners. - - “Gauleiter Sauckel ended by pointing out that as a matter of - fact he did not object to the employment of Jews and - concentration camp inmates, but only to such exaggerations as - mentioned above.” - -I would ask you, Sauckel, you who yesterday described your own life as a -workman, what you meant when you said: “To an inmate of a concentration -camp and to a Jew work is not a mark of nobility.” - -SAUCKEL: I want to say most emphatically that this paragraph is a very -condensed and free rendering, and not a shorthand report. I raised an -objection because I assumed that inmates of concentration camps would be -traitors. My only object was that these people should not be taken to -the same places of work as the other workers, the Jews either. But I did -not employ them; that was the business of the Reichsführer SS. I was -speaking at a conference of leaders and in the interests of workers with -a clean record and the other foreign workers. I objected to their being -put to work together. - -M. HERZOG: I ask you this question again. What did you mean when you -said: “To an inmate of a concentration camp and to a Jew work is not a -mark of nobility?” - -SAUCKEL: By that I meant that the work of men who had been found guilty -of offenses should not be compared with the work of free workers with a -clean record. There is a difference if I employ prisoners in custody or -if I employ free workers, and I wanted to see the two categories -separated. - -M. HERZOG: So that Jews were prisoners in custody, were they not? - -SAUCKEL: In this case the Jews were prisoners of the Reichsführer SS. -Actually, I regret the expression. - -M. HERZOG: You dispute, therefore, that this phrase is an expression of -the hostility which you showed to Jews for instance? - -SAUCKEL: At that time I was, of course, against these Jews, but I was -not concerned with their employment. I was against these workers, whose -employment was the concern of the Reichsführer SS, being put with the -other workers. - -M. HERZOG: Did you ever conduct any propaganda against the Jews? - -SAUCKEL: I conducted propaganda against the Jews with regard to their -holding positions in the Reich which I considered should have been -occupied by Germans. - -M. HERZOG: I will submit to you an article which you wrote in June 1944, -a time when I think in your Germany there were not very many Jews still -occupying important posts. This article appeared in a newspaper, _Die -Pflicht_, which you published in the Gau of Thuringia. It is Document -Number 857 which I offer to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-1523. I -shall read extracts from this article. - -[_The document was handed to the defendant._] - -First extract from Page 1, Column 1, the last paragraph but one: - - “The old and finest virtues of the sailors, airmen, and soldiers - of Great Britain can no longer stop the Jewish plague of - corruption which is making such rapid ravages in the body of - their country.” - -Then, on Page 2, Column 2, the last paragraph but one: - - “There is no example in the history of the world to show that - anything of lasting value has been created in the course of - centuries by the Jews and their foolish followers who were bound - to them and corrupted by their customs and their women.” - -I ask you, Defendant Sauckel, what did you mean by the “Jewish plague of -corruption”? - -SAUCKEL: I meant that it was the outward sign of disintegration within -the nations. - -M. HERZOG: I ask you again my question. What do you mean by the “Jewish -plague of corruption”? - -SAUCKEL: It was my opinion that disintegration had set in among the -nations owing to certain Jewish circles. That was my view. - -M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will draw its own conclusions. Mr. President, I -have no further questions. - -MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): -I would like to make a general summary of your activities in your -function of Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. - -Tell me how many foreign workers were employed in German economy and -industry at the end of the war? - -SAUCKEL: As far as I can tell you without documents, not counting -prisoners of war, there were about 5 million foreign workers in Germany -at the end of the war. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You already quoted that number during your direct -interrogation by our counsel. I believe that number applies not to the -moment of the capitulation of Germany but to the date of 24 July 1942. I -shall quote somewhat different data on that subject and will use your -own documents. You were nominated Plenipotentiary General on 21 March -1942. On 27 July 1942,—that is to say, 3 months later—you submitted to -Hitler and Göring your first report. In this report you stated that from -1 April to 24 July 1942 the requested mobilization quota of 1,600,000 -persons was even surpassed by you. Do you confirm this figure? - -SAUCKEL: I quoted that figure, and as far as I can remember that did not -include only foreigners but also German workers. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In the final part of your report you state that the -total number of the population of the occupied territories evacuated to -Germany, up to 24 July 1942, numbered 5,124,000 persons. Is that number -exact? Do you confirm it? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but I believe that figure at the time included prisoners -of war who had been employed in industry. Then I must say in this -connection that in the case of all neutral, allied, and western -countries there was a continuous exchange, because these workers worked -either 6 months, 9 months, or 1 year in Germany, and at the end of the -period agreed on they returned to their own countries. That is why this -figure may have been correct. Toward the end of the year, however, they -could not have increased very much because this continuous exchange has -to be taken into consideration. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But the fact remains that, according to your figures, -the population evacuated to Germany numbered 5,124,000 persons up to 24 -July 1942; is that not so? - -SAUCKEL: If it says so in the document, then it may be true. It is -possible, or rather it is probable, that this takes into account the -prisoners of war employed. I cannot say that without any records. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will show you later another document referring to -this matter. On 1 December 1942, you compiled a summarized report on the -utilization of manpower up to 30 November 1942. In this summary you -quote a figure referring to the number of workers assigned to German war -industries from 1 April to 30 November 1942, and these workers number -2,749,652. On Page 8 of your report you state that by 30 November 1942, -in the territory of the Reich, 7 million workers were employed. Do you -confirm these figures? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot confirm the figures without records. Again, I assume -that French and other prisoners of war were once more included. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But the figure 7 million employed in German -industry—foreign workers employed, even if you include the prisoners of -war—is that figure exact? Will you now say how many workers were -brought to Germany from occupied territories during the year 1943? Tell -me that figure. - -SAUCKEL: The number of foreign workers brought to Germany during the -year of 1943 may have amounted to 1½ or 2 million. Various programs had -been made in that connection which were being continually changed. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am now interested to know approximately how many -workers were brought to Germany in 1943. You need not give an exact -figure. Approximately. - -SAUCKEL: I have already said from 1½ to 2 million. I cannot be more -exact. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I understand. Do you remember what task was assigned to -you for the year 1944? - -SAUCKEL: In 1944 a total of 4 million, including Germans, was demanded. -But of these 4 million only 3 million were supplied, and of these -approximately 2,100,000 were Germans and 900,000 foreigners. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now can you give us at least a general summary of your -activities? How many persons were brought to Germany from the occupied -territories during the war, and how many were employed in agriculture -and industry at the end of the war? - -SAUCKEL: As far as I know and remember there were 5 million foreign -workers in Germany at the end of the war. Several million workers -returned to neutral and allied and western countries during the war, and -they had to be replaced again and again, which was the cause of those -new programs which were constantly being made. That is the explanation. -Those workers who were already there before my time, and those who were -brought in, probably might have reached a figure of 7 million, but -during the war there were several millions who returned to their home -countries. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: And also, a large number perished as a result of hard -slave labor! That is not what I have in mind at the moment. In your -documents you probably meant actual manpower and not those who perished -or those who were absent. Could you tell us how many were brought to -Germany from occupied territories during the war? - -SAUCKEL: I have already given you the figure. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Five million? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You continue to assert that that is so? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I maintain that at the end of the war there were, -according to my statistical department and as far as I can remember, 5 -million workers in Germany, because millions of workers continuously -returned. The experts can give you a better answer than I. The contracts -with the others were only 6 and 9 months, you see. - -THE PRESIDENT: Your question is, is it not, how many were brought into -Germany, how many foreign workers, during the whole of the war? Is that -the question you are asking? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, it is, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your answer to that? - -SAUCKEL: I have already stated that, including the workers who were -there before my time, before I came into office, and including those who -were there at the end, there may have been about 7 million. In -accordance with my records, there were 5 million at the end, because the -others had gone back. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that is not what you are being asked. You are -being asked: How many persons were brought to Germany from foreign -countries during the whole of the war? You say there were 5 million at -the end of the war, and there were constant changes in the preceding -years. It follows that there must have been more than 5 million people -brought to Germany in the course of a year. - -SAUCKEL: I would estimate 7 million, but I cannot give you the exact -figures because I am not sure about the figures before my time. At any -rate, there must have been millions who returned home. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Up to 30 November 1942 you quoted the figure of -imported labor at 7 million... - -SAUCKEL: Workers employed in Germany, and that includes prisoners of -war, in 1942. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: All right, including prisoners of war, 7 million. Is -that right, 7 million by 30 November? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you for certain. It may be correct, but I cannot -tell you without documentary evidence. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will show you the document tomorrow. Today, please -answer my question. You said that during 1943 approximately 2 million -additional workers were imported. - -SAUCKEL: In 1943? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, in 1943. - -SAUCKEL: I said 1½ to 2 million. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is to say, 7 million plus 2 million make 9 million -in all. Is that correct? - -SAUCKEL: No. I said expressly that some were going back all the time, -and I did not add the prisoners of war to the new imported labor. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You do not seem to understand me. I am speaking of -those who were brought to Germany from the occupied territories, who -passed through your hands. To answer this it is of absolutely no -importance how many of them perished in Germany, or how many left. That -does not change the total number of workers brought to German territory -from abroad. - -If, therefore, by 30 November 1942 there were 7 million workers in -Germany, and, according to you, in 1943 a further 2 million were brought -in, and in 1944, as you just said, 900,000 were again brought in; then, -according to you, the total number of workers imported into Germany -during the war must have amounted to 10 million. Is that right? - -SAUCKEL: I can say that only with the reservation that I do not know how -many were actually there before my time. That may be correct as a guess, -and including all prisoners of war who were assigned for work. You have, -however, to deduct the prisoners of war from the civilian workers who -were brought into the country. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 31 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD DAY - Friday, 31 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Sauckel resumed the stand._] - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, I did not get a satisfactory answer -yesterday to my question as to how many foreign workers were imported -into Germany from the occupied territories. You will now be handed -Document Number 1296-PS. It is your report of 27 July 1942. In addition, -Document Number 1739-PS will also be handed to you. It is your survey of -conditions as of 30 November 1942. I wish to explain to you that in this -case we are dealing with the number of foreign workers imported into -Germany, including prisoners of war. The loss of this manpower in this -case is of no importance, since it will not change the number of persons -imported into Germany. They were brought to Germany, but later perished -either as a result of work beyond their strength, or else were returned -as incapable of work. Did you receive these documents? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. Please let us have a look at the documents, as we are -dealing with figures. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Pray do so. In Document Number... - -SAUCKEL: I have not yet finished. I cannot... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is not essential for you to acquaint yourself with -the contents of all the documents. In Document Number 1296-PS, on the -last page of the report, at the end, you will find Section V. It is -entitled, “General Summary...” Have you found it? - -SAUCKEL: No, I have not yet found the passage. Which document, please? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Document Number 1296-PS. Have you found it? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I have found this passage. - -GEN. ALEX ANDROV: It gives the total figure as 5,124,000. Is that -correct? - -THE PRESIDENT: 12 million, did you say? 12 million? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: 5,124,000 persons. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The translation said 12 million. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: That was an error. - -SAUCKEL: In connection with this document I must state emphatically that -the figure here is indicated as 5,124,000. It includes 1,576,000 -prisoners of war, but the latter do not rank with the civilian workers. -The prisoners were the responsibility of the Armed Forces and during -their employment, or during their employment by the generals in charge -of the prisoner-of-war camps, they were housed and cared for in the -individual military areas. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: They were employed in the German industries. Please -read after me Subparagraph V: “General Summary of Foreign Workers ... at -present employed in Germany.” - -SAUCKEL: Yes. That is correct. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is all I want. Now take... - -SAUCKEL: Please, have I your permission to explain that these prisoners -of war were not housed and cared for in the factories or by the DAF -(German Workers’ Front) but were billeted in the camps which were under -the jurisdiction of the generals in charge of prisoners of war in the -military areas, and they were consequently not included with the -civilian workers in my statistics. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: As far as the number of prisoners of war working in -your organization is concerned, a supplementary question will be asked -later on. Actually, I am interested to know how many civilians and how -many prisoners of war were employed in the German industries. Do you -confirm this figure of 5,124,000? Is this figure correct or not? - -SAUCKEL: That is a correct figure for this particular time. But in order -that the Tribunal may get an exact picture of the procedure I should -like to be allowed to refer to a very accurate document. That would be -Document Number 1764-PS. It deals with the exact enumeration of -individual workers from individual countries, and of prisoners of war -about 6 months later. I submitted it to the main Reich offices, and to -the Party offices in Posen. It was also submitted to the Führer and to -the Reich offices... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have to interrupt you... - -SAUCKEL: I beg you to allow me to complete my explanation. I must -completely clarify these matters here and now. My conscience demands -that I do so before the entire world. - -For February 1943, that is half a year later, there appears on Page 7 of -Document Number 1764-PS another exact enumeration with a figure of -4,014,000 civilian workers and 1,658,000 prisoners of war. The sum -total—this figure was very accurate—was 5,672,000. That in spite of -the inclusion of more foreign civilian workers this figure was not -materially increased has been proved by the fact—as I already stated -yesterday—that civilian workers from western, southern, and -southeastern territories for the most part had labor contracts binding -them for 6 months only. Whenever possible, when under my charge, these -contracts were observed; for otherwise, had I failed to keep to the -contracts, that is, if I had not insisted on doing so, I would never -have obtained any more workers. - -If I employed several hundred thousand workers in half a year and then -sent them back again, this figure would always disappear again because -they went home. Therefore, far more civilian workers entered Germany -than officially stated at any one time—than appeared in the total -amount—for the number of those returning would always have to be -deducted, and there were very many of them. - -A French document has been presented which is a report from the Envoy -Hemmen in Paris. My counsel will be good enough to tell me the PS number -later. It shows that French workers, about 800,000 of them came to -Germany; but these figures are not in accordance with those issued by my -department, but in accordance with a statement from the French Embassy. -In 1944 there were only 400,000 left in Germany as, owing to the time -limits of their contracts, these contracts were expiring every day and -thousands were returning home daily. Roughly 50 percent of the contracts -would expire while another 50 percent would still be working. That is an -exact explanation of this statement, made in all conscience. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: As to what these labor contracts actually were, those -so-called labor contracts, I shall mention at a later date. My French -colleague, during his examination, sufficiently proved the criminal -methods used in the mobilization of workers in the West. How this was -done in the East I will tell you a little later on. I should now like -you to confirm the figures of your report—5,124,000 persons. Is this an -exact figure, or is it not? I am not asking for any superfluous -explanations. You are asked to state only whether this figure is correct -or not. - -SAUCKEL: It is correct for the time this statement was made, but it -changed constantly for the reason I have mentioned. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: This figure is dated 24 July 1942; that is quite clear -to everybody. Now, take the second document, 1739-PS. The last page of -1739-PS, where you will find the following sentence: - - “Only then can we be sure that the immense number of foreign - workers, both men and women, in the territory of the - Reich—which has now reached 7 million, including all working - prisoners of war—will furnish the greatest possible assistance - to the German war industry.” - -Does this sentence occur there? Is the number of 7 million given there? - -SAUCKEL: The figure of 7 million is quoted here and includes all -prisoners of war employed as labor at that particular time... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I know what is written there. I am asking you: Is this -figure of 7 million contained in the document or not? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, it is written in this document. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is the correct figure? - -SAUCKEL: It is the correct figure, and I am asking the Tribunal that I -be allowed to read the two following sentences as well because you are -accusing me of resorting to criminal methods. I, on my part, did all I -could, and used all the influence I had, to prevent the use of criminal -methods. This is proved by the two following sentences which I shall now -read, and which state... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am obliged to interrupt you once more. - -SAUCKEL: Please, may I add to the explanation I have already given, in -accordance with the possibilities granted to me by the Tribunal, two -more sentences in support of my declaration: “...undernourished half...” - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel... - -THE PRESIDENT: Let him read the two sentences he wants to read. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: They have absolutely nothing to do with the question of -the number of workers imported into Germany... - -THE PRESIDENT: I have not got the translation of the document, so I -cannot tell. I want to hear him read the sentences... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then read them, please. - - SAUCKEL: “...half-desperate Eastern Workers would be more of a - hindrance than a help to the war economy. - - “It is essential that all the government offices, right down to - the factories concerned”—for these, I must add, I was not - responsible—“should be quite clear on the subject, and that is - my constant endeavor.” - -I merely wanted to show my conscientiousness by those two sentences, and -how sincerely I endeavored to carry out my task which was an extremely -difficult one for me. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, Defendant, will you kindly answer the questions and -only give explanations when it is necessary to explain the answer. All -you were asked was whether the figure of 5,124,000 in the first document -was correct and whether the figure of 7 million in the second document -is correct, and you said both of them were. - -Now go on, General. - -SAUCKEL: I have already answered that it is correct, that the figure of -7 million is given in this document... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not want any more explanations. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I can understand perfectly well that you are not -interested in increasing these appalling figures even by a single point, -let alone by several millions. - -Yesterday you stated that in 1943, 2 million more foreign workers came -to Germany, and in 1944 a further 900,000 persons. - -SAUCKEL: I must definitely correct that. I did not say that, but it is -true that from July 1942 until the end of 1943 about 2 million foreign -workers came to Germany, not in 1943 only. From February 1943, for -instance, until the end of 1943 only 1 million came to Germany because -we were experiencing considerable difficulties at the time. But from -July 1942 until the end of 1942 about 1½ million arrived, so that in 1½ -years 2 more million were added to the first number which I mentioned -yesterday. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is already known how many you received in 1942. -Yesterday you stated quite definitely that in 1943 about 2 million -workers came to Germany. Is that correct? I am talking of 1943. - -SAUCKEL: If I am supposed to have said that yesterday I do not remember -it, for it is not true; but the truth is that from about July 1942 until -the end of 1943 about 2 million foreign workers were sent to Germany. - -THE PRESIDENT: General, the Tribunal is not really interested in the -exact number of foreign workers who came to Germany. It does not seem to -us to make very much difference whether 5 million or 6 million or 7 -million came there. It is extremely difficult to follow the figures. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not intend to determine the numbers of workers -brought to Germany with mathematical precision. I do, however, consider -it quite indispensable to realize the scale on which these crimes were -committed. I would like the Defendant Sauckel to state definitely how -many workers were brought to Germany during the war. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I just told you we do not consider it important. -You say that you do not want to ascertain with mathematical accuracy, -but we have spent a considerable time in attempting to do so. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: This can be explained by the fact that the Defendant -Sauckel does not give a precise reply to the questions put to him. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Tell me, do you consider such methods of -warfare, the mass driving into slavery of millions of people from the -occupied territories, to be in accordance with the laws and customs of -war and human morality in general? - -SAUCKEL: I do not consider slavery and deportation admissible. Please -allow me to add the following explanation to this clear reply. -Personally, I was firmly convinced that it is no crime... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please do not evade the question. - -SAUCKEL: I am not evading the question, but I may and I have the right -to give an explanation of my reply; I have already given the answer. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Give a direct answer. - -SAUCKEL: It is necessary for my defense... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not think it is necessary. Answer directly: Do you -consider these methods criminal or do you not? - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment, General, you asked the defendant whether he -considered it honorable. Let him answer it in his own way. It is not a -question whether a thing is honorable. He is entitled to answer it -freely. - -SAUCKEL: Now that I have given a clear reply to the effect that I could -not be convinced in all conscience that I was committing a crime, I ask -permission to read out the relevant sentences from Document Sauckel-86 -in Document Book 3. They contain the instructions which I gave to my -department and to the industrial concerns: - - “We are not concerned”—I quote—“with material things but, and - I would emphasize this again very definitely, with human beings, - with many millions of human beings, every single one of - whom—whether we want it or not—makes his criticism from his - own point of view, be he a German or a foreign worker. - - “On the other hand, the output of the individual, be he a - Volksgenosse”—that means a German—“or not a - Volksgenosse”—that means an alien—“be he a friend or an enemy - of Germany, will always depend on whether he admits to himself - that he is being treated justly, or whether he comes to the - conclusion that he has been exposed to injustice. - - “Be just”—I may add that this was my order to my - departments—“Be just! There are many questions which you cannot - always answer by merely studying my instructions, or the - _Gesetzblatt_, or the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_....” - -THE PRESIDENT: We do not want to go into a very long speech, you know, -about a question like that. I mean, you do not want to read all your -instructions to your subordinates again. - -SAUCKEL: No, I only want to read two more sentences, Your Lordship: - - “The worker’s life is so rich that it cannot be comprised even - in many thick volumes. But every human breast harbors a feeling - which says to him, ‘Have you been treated with kindness and - justice...’” - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is enough. We have heard enough of that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, in July 1944 a conference was held -at Hitler’s headquarters to deal with the question of the treatment of -foreign workers in case of a further successful advance of the Allied -armies. Do you know anything of this conference or not? - -SAUCKEL: May I ask once more—what was the date? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am asking you about the conference which was held at -Hitler’s headquarters in July 1944. Do you know anything about this -conference or do you not? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot remember for certain. I must ask you to place some -document before me. I cannot remember any meeting in July because from -20 June 1944, or thereabout, I was no longer admitted to the Führer for -any discussions. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is enough for me. That means that you do not know -anything at all about this conference? - -Tell me, for what purpose, for what kind of work were the foreign -laborers employed who had been imported into Germany? Is it correct to -state that they were primarily employed in the armament and munitions -industries? - -SAUCKEL: Workers were brought to Germany for employment in the armament -industry. The armament industry is a very wide term, and is not -identical with the manufacture of arms and munitions. The armament -industry includes all products—from matches to cannons—that have -anything to do with supply for the army. It is, therefore, necessary, -within this broad, far-reaching term, to limit or isolate the -manufacture of arms and munitions. - -Moreover, workers were brought to Germany for all other branches of -civil economy essential to the war effort, such as agriculture, mining, -skilled trades, and so forth. We made three distinctions: War economy, -which meant the entire German economy in wartime; armament economy -meant... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Defendant, we do not want a lecture upon that, you -know. All you were asked was whether they were brought there for work in -the armament industry. - -SAUCKEL: A part of them. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I should like you to answer whether the workers brought -to Germany were primarily employed in Germany’s war industries and for -military purposes? Is that right or not? I mean in the broad sense of -the word. - -SAUCKEL: In the broad sense of the word, yes, including the entire -economy in wartime. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then the utilization of imported manpower was -subordinated entirely and fully to the conduct of the war of aggression -by Germany? Do you admit that? - -SAUCKEL: That is stretching the idea too far. My own views, according to -which I acted and could only act at the time, excluded the word -“aggressive.” - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please answer briefly if it appears to go too far. Tell -me do you admit it or do you not? - -SAUCKEL: I have already answered. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your part as organizer of the mass drive into slavery -of the peaceful population of the occupied territories is sufficiently -clear. I should now like to pass over to the elucidation of the part -played by the individual ministries in this matter. Please enumerate the -ministries and other government organizations which directly -participated in carrying out the requisite measures for the mobilization -and utilization of foreign manpower. Mention has already been made of -the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, of the War Ministry -and of the OKW, so that it is not necessary to speak about them again. -Kindly enumerate the others. - -SAUCKEL: On the plan, which has also been submitted to your delegation, -Mr. Prosecutor, there are some small inaccuracies, inaccuracies made by -the draftsman. I have not seen the completed drawing, but I took it for -granted that the original drawing, as submitted to me, was correctly -made by the draftsman. These small inaccuracies and deviations can be -rectified, and the plan will then be unmistakably clear and offer the -soundest explanation. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel has stated here that this plan is -not sufficiently accurate. It is precisely for that reason that I ask -you this question and request you to explain which ministries and other -government offices played an immediate part in the mobilization and -utilization of foreign manpower, over and above those which I have -already indicated. - -THE PRESIDENT: General, he says that it is substantially correct, and -that there was only one minor alteration suggested in it. Surely that is -sufficient for us. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, Sauckel’s defense counsel has himself -stated that there are a number of inaccuracies in the plan. I will, -however, endeavor to facilitate this task. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please tell me how the Foreign Office was -connected with this matter. - -SAUCKEL: The Foreign Office was connected with this matter in the -following way: - -It had to establish connections with countries where embassies, -legations, or German delegations were acting. Negotiations would then -take place under the chairmanship of the head of an embassy or -delegation. The Foreign Office always made every effort to conduct these -negotiations in a suitable way and in a proper manner. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 4 January 1944 a meeting was held with Hitler. This -is Document 1292-PS. It is written in Subparagraph 4 of the minutes of -this meeting, “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor -must, before taking measures, contact the Minister for Foreign Affairs.” -What did that mean in this particular case? - -SAUCKEL: In this case it meant that if I had to negotiate with the -French or the Italian Government, I would first have to get in touch -with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: After this meeting, which was held with Hitler on 4 -January 1944—on 5 January 1944 you sent a letter to Lammers in which -you related the question regarding the necessity for issuing a special -directive as a result of this meeting, in order that all aid should be -given you by the following authorities—I will enumerate them: The -Reichsführer SS, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister for Foreign -Affairs, Field Marshal Keitel, the Minister for the Occupied Eastern -Territories, Rosenberg, the Reich Commissioners, the Governor General, -and others. Do you remember this letter? - -SAUCKEL: I remember that letter; will you be kind enough to put it -before me. I cannot, of course, remember the contents in detail. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of that document, General? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is Number 1292-PS, Page 6 of the Russian text. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Have you found the passage? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. It is on the last page? May I ask if this is correct? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: This means you considered that all these organizations -were to participate fully, one way or the other, in the execution of -measures for the recruitment and utilization of manpower. Is that -correct? - -SAUCKEL: That is correct and I ask permission in this connection to give -the following explanation: It is obvious that I myself, in my office, -could not do certain things without informing the high-ranking -authorities of the Reich. It merely proves that I was attempting to work -correctly, and not to interfere wildly within the Reich, or in other -administrative departments. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like you to explain the following: When the -Hitlerite government resorted to these criminal measures for driving off -into slavery the population of the occupied territories, did practically -all the government organizations of Hitlerite Germany—besides -yourself—and the Party machinery of the NSDAP participate in these -activities? Would it be correct to say so? - -SAUCKEL: I protest against the words “driving off.” Please hear my -defense counsel on the subject in rebuttal. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is not a question of the words used. Answer me—is -it correct or not? - -SAUCKEL: The words are extremely important. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the entire machinery of the German State -participate in this matter or not? - -SAUCKEL: In this form I must answer your question in the negative. There -was... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No other reply is demanded of you. - -SAUCKEL: In the—I might explain this. For the recruiting of manpower, -that is in the registration according to German orders, it was the -chief, duly authorized and appointed for this purpose at the time, of a -territorial government, a Reich commissariat, or the like, who -participated—for I emphasize that I was unable to issue any laws in -that field and was not allowed to do so. I could not interfere in any -government department; that is impossible in any government system in -the world. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes. But you were obliged to co-ordinate the activities -of all these representative organizations in Germany. That was the task -assigned to you? - -SAUCKEL: Not to co-ordinate, but to instruct them: and to ask for their -co-operation where the case arose, if it came within their jurisdiction. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is not quite so. I did not wish to touch on this -question, but I must revert to it now as you have somewhat minimized -your part in this matter. - -SAUCKEL: I request permission to reply to the word “minimize.” The -distribution and direction of manpower in the Reich was my principal -task. It included, with the German workers, 30 million persons. I do not -wish to minimize this task, for I did my best to introduce order into -this mass of workers, as dictated by my sense of duty. I do not wish to -minimize anything. It was my task and my duty towards my people. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: We need not argue on this subject. It would be much -simpler to consult the document. An order by Göring will be handed to -you in a moment. - -SAUCKEL: I wish—I must apologize to you if you have misunderstood me. -I—I have no intention of arguing. I am only asking for permission to -clarify my conception of duty with regard to this task, for it was the -most personal task I had. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is quite apparent in this order by Göring of 27 -March 1942. It is Document Exhibit Number USSR-365. It will be handed to -you in a minute. I will read a brief excerpt from it, showing the powers -you were endowed with. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of it? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is Exhibit Number USSR-365. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. This is a Soviet exhibit. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please read Subparagraph 4 which clearly -states: - - “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor for the - execution of his tasks is given authority through power assigned - to me by the Führer to issue instructions to the highest - authorities of the Reich and to their subordinate offices, as - well as to the offices of the Party and to its organizations and - affiliated organizations, to the Reich Protector, the Governor - General, the military commanders, and the heads of civil - administration.” - -That is what we read in Subparagraph 4 of this order. I believe, -therefore, that on the strength of this order you were appointed -Plenipotentiary General, with extraordinary powers, for the Allocation -of Labor. Is that correct or not? - -SAUCKEL: That is correct. I should like to add that this authority was -limited to my own special sphere, and I take the liberty of reading the -following sentence: “Orders and directives of fundamental importance are -to be submitted to me in advance.” - -Also I might point out that a restriction was imposed on my deputies -later in the autumn. There is a witness who can make a statement to that -effect. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am not talking about your deputies. Your powers are -only too clearly defined in Subparagraph 4 of Göring’s order. - -Now, will you enumerate which of the defendants, at the same time as -yourself, directly and in his own sphere of action participated in the -execution of measures for the mass deportation into slavery of the -population of the occupied territories and their employment in Germany. -Name them in succession. Did Defendant Göring participate in all these -crimes, as your immediate chief and leader? - -SAUCKEL: I want to point out most emphatically that I could not possibly -have been aware that entire populations had been carried off by means of -lawful recruitment and service engagements based on legal decrees. I -deny this. I had nothing to do with measures concerning prisoners, _et -cetera_, but... - -THE PRESIDENT: The question was, did the Defendant Göring participate -with you in the bringing of foreign workers into Germany? You do not -seem to me really to be answering it at all. - -SAUCKEL: I was directly subordinate to the Reich Marshal of the Greater -German Reich in the question of the introduction of foreign manpower. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then why do you not say so? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: So the Defendant Göring participated in the execution -of these criminal measures? - -THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, when you want to ask a question of -that sort I think it would be much better that you should not allege the -fact that it is a crime. If you want to know whether the Defendant -Göring took part with this defendant in the work that he was doing you -can refer to that without calling it a crime; and then he perhaps will -answer you more easily. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, My Lord. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Did the Defendant Von Ribbentrop -participate in carrying out these measures on diplomatic lines, and did -he sanction the violation of international treaties and conventions -where the utilization of foreign workers and prisoners of war in the -German industries was concerned? - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, there again, these defendants are saying that there -was no violation of international law; so the question you should put to -him is: Did Von Ribbentrop participate with him in these measures as far -as diplomacy was concerned? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am now asking what was the connection between the -Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the allocation of labor, and I would like -to receive an answer to this question from the Defendant Sauckel. - -SAUCKEL: The part played by Defendant Ribbentrop consisted in holding -conferences with foreign statesmen or foreign government offices in the -occupied territories as well as in neutral and friendly foreign -countries; and he considered it highly important that these conferences -should be conducted in a correct manner and that the aim should be to -obtain the best possible conditions for foreign workers. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will question you about that a little later, when the -question arises concerning the employment of prisoners of war in the -German industries. - -Please tell me now, what was the attitude of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner -regarding these measures? - -SAUCKEL: In this connection I met the Defendant Kaltenbrunner on one -single occasion during a conference—the date of which I cannot at -present remember—at the Reich Chancellery with Minister Lammers. I -believe it was in 1944. Apart from that, I had no interview of any kind -with Kaltenbrunner, nor did I reach any agreements with him on questions -concerning the employment of labor. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yet the Defendant Kaltenbrunner placed police forces at -your disposal for carrying out the recruitment of labor, did he not? - -SAUCKEL: I have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the recruitment of -workers was no concern of the Police. I must ask my defense counsel to -submit the relevant regulations, of which there are numerous specimens -available. They prove quite clearly and unequivocally and irrefutably -the division of tasks between the Police and my department. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the Police participate in the execution of these -measures or did it not? I am not reproaching you now. - -SAUCKEL: In my opinion the Police participated only in cases where the -execution of administrative duties was rendered impossible in partisan -areas. In White Ruthenia alone 1,500 local mayors were murdered by the -partisans. This is seen from the document. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But was recruitment, even in normal circumstances, not -carried out by police methods? Did you know nothing at all about that? - -SAUCKEL: I will tell you exactly what I know about it. There were in the -occupied territories of Europe about 1,500 districts—here I mean areas -or departments, the Feldkommandanturen, which we in German -administration would describe as being the size of a Kreis -(district)—and these 1,500 districts contained 1,500 administrative -centers staffed partly by local and partly by German personnel. In -addition to this personnel, in the territories of the Soviet Union -alone, 1,000 Russian workers who were previously employed in Germany -were acting as recruiting officers. Now if each of these administrative -centers, which would correspond to a German Landkreis and have a -population of 40,000 to 70,000 inhabitants, selected in a proper way, -examined, and tested five persons daily, that alone would amount to 2 -million people a year; a perfectly clear method of administration, such -as I ordered, organized, and carried out to the best of my -administrative possibilities. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You are giving needlessly detailed explanations in -reply to these questions, and under such conditions the interrogation is -being greatly prolonged. I consider it necessary that you answer -briefly. You are perfectly able to do this, for I am putting the -questions to you clearly. - -SAUCKEL: I am trying to answer as briefly as possible. I regret that a -specialized field is always difficult to understand and calls for -explanations; I found it very difficult myself. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please answer: What part did the Defendant -Kaltenbrunner play in the execution of measures on the allocation of -labor? Did he participate in this or did he not? - -SAUCKEL: I have already given you that answer. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I did not understand you. Did he participate or did he -not? - -THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. He said that he only met Kaltenbrunner -on one occasion and that the task of the recruitment of labor was not -one for Police. That is what he said. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is not necessary to multiply the number of meetings -in order for Kaltenbrunner to have participated in the execution of -these measures. He did not have to meet Defendant Sauckel frequently. - -THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, I do not want you to argue with me. I -have told you what his answer was. It seemed to be an answer to your -question. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am not arguing. I am merely explaining the reason for -this question. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] As far as the participation of Defendant -Rosenberg is concerned, I shall not ask you any questions, as Defendant -Rosenberg gave sufficiently clear answers when questioned by my American -colleague, Prosecutor Dodd. Now tell me, what part did Defendant Frick -play in the execution of these measures? - -SAUCKEL: Defendant Frick, as Reich Minister of the Interior—I do not -know how long he remained in office—scarcely participated at all. As -far as I can remember I had discussions with his Reich Ministry of the -Interior concerning the most necessary laws to be promulgated within -Germany for German workers and the validity of those laws. Apart from -that, he had no further part in this task; his work was quite different. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: We are discussing the question of foreign manpower. It -was not merely by accident that you mentioned, in a letter to Lammers -written after a meeting at Hitler’s headquarters on the 4 January 1944, -that the Ministry of the Interior was among the government offices -detailed to operate with you. That is why I ask you, what part did -Defendant Frick play in the execution of these measures for the -recruitment of labor? You yourself asked for the co-operation of the -Ministry of the Interior. Then how was this co-operation to be -expressed? - -SAUCKEL: To my very great personal sorrow Frick was at that time no -longer Reich Minister of the Interior, but Himmler—if I remember -correctly. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What co-operation did you expect from the Ministry of -the Interior? - -SAUCKEL: It is, I believe only natural that in every form of government -the internal and the general administration should be kept informed of -events occurring and should participate as well, and so important a -sphere as the employment of human beings calls for many ordinances. I -could not possibly issue legal decrees, nor had I authority to do so. I -had to submit them to the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the -Reich. I could only issue technical directions, and that is quite a -different thing altogether. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were Defendant Funk, as Minister of Economics, and -Defendant Speer, as Minister for Armaments, the principal intermediaries -between the industrialists and yourself as suppliers of manpower? Is -that correct? - -SAUCKEL: The end of your sentence contains a very erroneous conclusion. -They were not middlemen between myself and the industries, but the -industries were responsible to the Ministry for Armaments. Of course -there were personal instructions issued about this in the course of -years. I did not negotiate with the industries. The industries asked for -workers and they got them, as did the agricultural industries. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please tell me, what part did the Defendants Funk and -Speer play in the execution of these measures? I do not want any long -drawn-out explanations. Answer me briefly. - -SAUCKEL: Those two ministers were heads of the various business -enterprises inside German economy which came within the jurisdiction of -their ministries. They received their workers, and that was the end of -my task. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the Defendants Frank, Seyss-Inquart, and Neurath -participate in the execution of these measures for the allocation of -labor in such territories as were under their jurisdiction? I mean the -territories of Poland, Bohemia and Moravia, and Holland. Is that -correct? - -SAUCKEL: These gentlemen, within the framework of their duties inside -their own territories, supported me in issuing decrees and laws, and -they themselves attached great importance to the proper and humane -drafting of these laws and decrees. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the part played by Defendant Fritzsche? - -SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you. I only met Dr. Fritzsche in Germany on -one occasion—and that a very brief one—in, I believe, 1945, the -beginning of 1945. I never spoke to him at all about my work, nor do I -know whether he had anything to do with it. I can only state that I made -repeated applications to the Reich Ministry for Propaganda to have my -instructions and directives—as contained in the document books -submitted by my defense counsel—widely circulated, particularly to the -industries and other circles which received these workers. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But one defendant is left—Bormann—and he is missing. -What part did he play? He placed at your disposal the entire Party -machinery of the NSDAP, did he not? - -SAUCKEL: No, he did not. He placed the Gauleiter at my disposal. The -instructions which I issued to the Gauleiter and the letters which I -addressed to them—three of which are available here, and there never -were many more of them—were to the effect that I was entitled to call -on the Party for assistance in insuring the welfare, feeding, and -clothing of the workers, and to see that they received everything that -was humanly necessary and all we could possibly supply in view of -existing wartime conditions. That was the role played by the Party, to -the extent that it was asked to do so for me. Thus it was a form of -control for the benefit of the foreign and German workers employed in -Germany. Otherwise the Party had nothing to do with it. Incidentally, I -did not much like interference on the part of outside offices. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is incorrect. I would remind you of your program -for the allocation of labor which was issued in 1942. This is Document -Number USSR-365 which states that the Gauleiter are appointed as your -plenipotentiaries where the question of manpower is concerned, and that -they will utilize this manpower. - -SAUCKEL: Where does it say that? I could not appoint my -plenipotentiaries myself. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will be shown the document in one moment. I do not -quote the paragraph, I merely mention the contents, the gist of the -paragraph, where it states that the Gauleiter will use the Party -organizations in the districts subordinate to them. I therefore assume -that the Party machinery as a whole participated in the execution of -these measures. - -SAUCKEL: It does not say so at all, Mr. Prosecutor. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you found it: “The plenipotentiaries ... make use -of their...”? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, and I did this only for the purpose I have described. Will -you be good enough to read on? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Read it yourself. - -SAUCKEL: Thank you. - - “The leaders of the highest departments of the state and of - economy which are competent in their respective Gaue shall - advise and instruct the Gauleiter on all important questions - dealing with the allocation of labor.” - -That means within the scope of their spheres of duty; and then the -latter are specified: - - “The president of the Regional Labor Office”—that is not a - Party but a government department—“the Trustee for Labor”—not - a Party but a government department—“the Regional Peasant - Leader”—not a Party but a government department—“the Gau - Economic Adviser”—now, that is a Party department... - -THE PRESIDENT: Please observe the light, to be sure the interpreters are -getting it. - -SAUCKEL: I apologize, Your Lordship. - - “...the Gau representative of the Labor Front”—a department of - the Labor Front—“the Regional Leaders of the Women’s League...” - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Everything is perfectly clear, you need not enumerate. -I should like to draw your attention to Subparagraph VI. It clearly -states that the Gauleiter, functioning as plenipotentiaries for the -allocation of labor, will, in their own Gaue, make use of the Party -organizations under them. Is it written there? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It next enumerates the methods by which this task was -executed, also through what institutions and what authorities. I -conclude from this subparagraph, which states that they will utilize the -Party institutions under their control, that the entire organization of -the NSDAP participated in the execution of these measures, and I wish -you to answer “yes” or “no.” - -SAUCKEL: No. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: There is no more to say. - -SAUCKEL: No. May I supplement this reply of “no.” You, in your first -reply, told me that my description was not quite correct. My description -is absolutely correct, that the Party was employed to deal with the -welfare of German and foreign workers and to see to it that they were -properly cared for and supplied. The Party organizations here mentioned -were only entrusted with this kind of task, and could have had no other; -and I, a former workman myself, was eager that these workers, both -German and foreign, should be cared for as well as wartime conditions -allowed. Hence this employment of Party organizations and no others. -Therefore, my reply was absolutely correct. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the district leaders of the Hitler Youth also -participate in the execution of these measures? - -SAUCKEL: The district leaders of the Hitler Youth participated in order -to protect and care for the young people as expressly required by -Reichsleiter Schirach and later by Reich Youth Leader Axmann. Protection -had to be provided for the young people against any danger. The Hitler -Youth did this, including young people employed from foreign countries. -I must expressly emphasize this. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you personally approve of the policy of the -Hitlerite Government with regard to the deportation into slavery of the -population of the occupied territories in order to insure the waging of -a war of aggression? Did you approve of that policy? - -SAUCKEL: I am forced to consider your question in the light of an -accusation. - -I personally have said over and over again that I had nothing to do with -either foreign or domestic politics; nor was I a soldier, I meant to -say. I received a task and I received orders. As a German, I tried to -carry out that task correctly for the sake of my people and its -government and to carry it out to the best of my ability, for it was -made perfectly clear to me that the fate of my people depended on the -accomplishment of this task. I worked with this in mind, and I admit -that I did my utmost to accomplish that task in the manner which I have -pointed out here. I conceived this to be my duty and must acknowledge -this fact here. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In order to define your personal attitude to these -crimes, I would like to remind you of a few of your own statements. -These are taken from Document Number USSR-365. This document is a -program for the utilization of labor in 1942, Page 9. You will now be -shown the passage which I am about to quote: “I beg you to believe me, -as an old and fanatical National Socialist Gauleiter...” Is it written -there? - -SAUCKEL: That is written there. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now we will go on to Document Number 566-PS. It is your -telegram to Hitler dated 20 April 1943 which you sent during your flight -to Riga. This telegram will now be handed to you and you will be shown -the excerpt which I am about to read: - - “I shall devote my entire strength with fanatical determination - to the accomplishment of my task, and to justify your - confidence.” - -Is that correct? - -SAUCKEL: It is correct. I saw in Hitler, whom at that time I revered, a -man who was the leader of the German people, who had been chosen by the -German people; and I, as a German citizen and a member of a German -government department, considered it my duty to justify by my work in my -own sphere the confidence placed in me by the head of the State. I might -say regarding this telegram... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No explanations are needed about this telegram. I am -not interested in your attitude towards Hitler. I am only interested in -your personal attitude to those measures for compulsory labor which were -carried out by you. It is essential to keep all questions within these -limits. Now follows Document Number 1292-PS. This is a record of the -meeting at Hitler’s headquarters on 4 January 1944... - -SAUCKEL: I request the permission of the Tribunal to add a few words to -your last statement, Mr. Prosecutor. I was unable to see a criminal in -Hitler at that time, and I never felt he was one; but I did feel obliged -to do my duty, nothing else. As a human being and as the result of my -upbringing I would never have supported crime. - -THE PRESIDENT: What was your question, General? Simply whether this was -a telegram sent to Hitler? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I asked about the telegram, from which I have read one -sentence into the record, in order to obtain a confirmation from the -Defendant Sauckel that this telegram had been sent. I was not interested -in anything else. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] The next document is 1292-PS. Have you got -this document? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have already been shown the passage I am about to -read. Your statement reads as follows: “GBA Sauckel declared that with -fanatical determination he would attempt to secure this manpower.” - -You were, at that time, speaking of the mobilization of 4 million -workers. It says further: “He would do everything in his power to obtain -the manpower desired for 1944.” - -Did you say that? Is the statement correctly rendered in the minutes of -the report? - -SAUCKEL: I did say that, and I ask to be allowed to add the following to -my affirmative reply. I knew that the German people, and they were my -people, were in dire—may I add an explanation to my clear reply, -stating why I answered as I did? I am entitled to do so. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, you accompany every answer you give -with lengthy supplementary explanations. You are merely delaying the -interrogation. I am quite satisfied with your reply; what you have told -me is perfectly sufficient. - -THE PRESIDENT: General, he has given a perfectly clear answer that he -did say it, and I think he is entitled to give some word of explanation. -It is perfectly true that his explanations are intolerably long, but he -is entitled to give some explanation. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, if every answer is to be accompanied by -such extensive explanations... - -THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, I have said that he is entitled to -give some explanation. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now then; please make it short. - -SAUCKEL: I knew that the German people were engaged in their most bitter -struggle. It was my duty to carry on with my task with all my -strength—that is what I meant by “fanatical.” I further explained, in -another sentence, that I could not accomplish my task that year. As far -as I was able to accomplish it in 1944 two-thirds were German workers, -not mainly aliens but more than two-thirds Germans; and I was trying my -utmost to put all German women to work, as far as they were capable of -working, and in 1944 there were over 2 million of them. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In April 1943 in order to accelerate the deportation of -manpower to Germany from the occupied territories you visited Rovno, -Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Simferopol, Minsk, and Riga. In June -of the same year you visited Prague, Kiev, Kraków, Zaporozhe, and -Melitopol. Is that correct? - -SAUCKEL: That is true, and during those journeys I personally satisfied -myself that my departments were working properly. That was the object of -my journey. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus you personally organized the deportation into -slavery of the peaceful population of the occupied territories. Is that -correct too? - -SAUCKEL: I must protest against that statement in the most vehement and -passionate way. I did not do that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then why did you go to all these towns and inhabited -places? Did you not do so in order to enforce the deportation of the -people in the occupied territories? - -SAUCKEL: I visited these areas to satisfy myself personally as to how my -offices in these cities—I should not say “my,” but the labor offices of -the local administrations—were working; whether they were -conscientiously carrying out their obligations towards the workers; -whether they were attending to medical examinations, card indexing, _et -cetera_, according to my instructions. That is why I went to those -towns. I negotiated with the chiefs in the matter of quotas, that is -quite true, since it was my task to recruit workers and to check the -quotas, but during my visits to these cities I inspected the offices -personally to satisfy myself that they were functioning properly. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: And also to insure the speedy deportation of compulsory -labor to Germany? Is that correct? - -SAUCKEL: To employ the best possible methods for the purpose in view. -That is indisputably stated in my orders, and the manifesto which has -been submitted to the Tribunal was written on this very journey which -you have just mentioned. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You specially visited these cities in order to improve -the methods of compulsory recruitment? Have I understood you correctly? - -SAUCKEL: I went to these towns to see for myself whether the methods -were correct or not, and to discuss them with the departments. That is -true, for it was not necessary for me to visit Kharkov, Kiev, or any -other town to discuss my task in terms of figures. For that I would only -have to talk to the reporter for the East, whose office was in Berlin, -or with the Reich Commissioner—whom I did not contact as he was -sometimes in Rovno. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In your statements to your defense counsel you declared -that no cases of criminal or illegal methods of compulsory recruitment -had ever come to your knowledge. Then what was the reason for such -extensive trips to the occupied territories? Does it mean that some -indication had already reached you that large-scale, illegal practices -were taking place in the process of labor recruitment? Was that the -reason for your journeys? You visited over 10 cities. - -SAUCKEL: May I inform you, Mr. Prosecutor, while we are on this subject, -that my defense counsel has already asked me that question and that I -answered it with “yes,” and that, generally speaking, whenever -complaints reached me I discussed them with Rosenberg, and that wherever -a wrong could be righted it was righted. Please hear my defense counsel -and my witnesses in this connection... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: The witnesses will be called on the decision of the -Tribunal. I should now like to ascertain that you took those trips in -order to improve methods of recruitment. I have come to the logical -conclusion that in all these towns, prior to your arrival, a certain -lawlessness had prevailed and crimes had been committed during the -recruiting of manpower. That is what I am speaking about. And now will -you give me a definite answer as to why you visited these places? - -SAUCKEL: I have already answered that question in every respect. -However, I would add that I assume that you, Mr. Prosecutor, have -yourself had sufficient administrative experience to realize that in -every department, anywhere in every country of the world, it is a matter -of course that administrative orders should be checked. One does not -need to know that mistakes are made in human life and in every human -organization; a control must be exercised all the same. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: If you deny that you went there in order to improve -conditions and to suppress the crimes perpetrated in the course of labor -recruitment, then you must have gone there to accelerate the deportation -of manpower into Germany. It is one thing or the other. Choose for -yourself. - -SAUCKEL: No, I must emphatically deny that. I undertook these journeys -in order to satisfy myself, within the scope of my duties, how this task -was being carried out, and to stop defects which were reported to me, as -for instance—as I once told my defense counsel during my -interrogation—I had also been asked to do so by Field Marshal Kluge. -But I also wanted to look into matters carefully and myself give -appropriate admonitions and instructions to the departments. My best -evidence of this is the manifesto produced during this journey. - -THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, can you tell the Tribunal how much -longer you will be? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am afraid to make an exact statement, but I should -imagine about 2 more hours. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are not losing sight of the fact, are you, that we -have already had a thorough cross-examination by the French Prosecutor? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hopes that you will try to make your -cross-examination as short as possible, and the Tribunal will adjourn -now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, tell us what attitude you, as -Plenipotentiary General, adopted toward the employment of Soviet -prisoners of war in the German industries? - -SAUCKEL: I must reply to your question by saying that I had no -collaborators in the employment of prisoners of war, for I did not -employ prisoners of war. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: And you never saw to their mobilization; you never -registered them? - -SAUCKEL: As the authorized mediating agency I had to have the -administrative measures carried out through the labor offices, or the -Gau labor offices, which served as intermediaries between the factories -and the Stalags or the generals in charge of prisoner-of-war affairs, -who in their turn supplied prisoners of war for the industries. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: And what were these organizations? What kind of -organizations were they? - -SAUCKEL: They were either the generals in charge of prisoner-of-war -establishments in the military administrative districts, or the -organizations of the industries, or the factories themselves. These -worked through the respective ministries, such as the Reich Ministry of -Food and Agriculture, in which case the majority of the prisoners were -billeted with farmers for work on the land or in war industries. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In other words, you had nothing to do with it? I would -remind you... - -SAUCKEL: I had to include the labor offices and the Gau labor offices to -the extent that they had undertaken to act officially as intermediaries, -but only if they did not act directly between the factories and the -Stalags. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote an excerpt from your report to Hitler -on 27 July 1942. It is Document Number 1296-PS. In this report, Part -III, there is a particular section. It is entitled... - -SAUCKEL: II or III, please? - -GEN. ALEX ANDROV: III. It is entitled: “Employment of Soviet Russian -Prisoners of War.” You write there: - - “In addition to the employment of civilian manpower, I have - increased the employment of Soviet prisoners of war, according - to plan, in co-operation with the Prisoners of War Organization - of the OKW.” - -And further on. - - “I particularly stress the importance of a further increased and - expedited deportation of the maximum number of prisoners of war - possible from the front to work within the Reich.” - -Is this correct? - -SAUCKEL: That is correct, and it corresponds exactly to what I have -stated before. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It does not altogether correspond. - -SAUCKEL: But it does. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You mentioned that you did not have anything to do with -the employment of prisoners of war in the German industries and now, in -your report, you give perfectly different data. So I am asking you, in -connection with what I have read into the record: Did you not plan in -advance the employment of Soviet prisoners of war as workers in the -industries? That was provided for in your plans and your report covers -that. Was that so, or was it not? - -SAUCKEL: I must point out one fundamental error on your part. Labor -procurement, the whole world over, whether operated by the state or by -private individuals, is not an organization or institution which -exploits workers, but rather which procures workers. I must establish -this fundamental error. It was my duty to provide the necessary -connection, so that prisoners of war in Stalags in the occupied -territories—let us say in the Government General—could be registered -by local generals in charge of prisoner-of-war establishments, for work -contemplated in Germany in certain agricultural or other sectors, and -then allotted accordingly. Employment of labor in factories was not -under my supervision and had nothing to do with me. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In other words, you participated in supplying Soviet -prisoners of war for utilization in German industry. Is that correct? - -SAUCKEL: That is not correct, according to my use of the German -language, as I understand you. Rather, to act as agent is quite a -different thing from utilization; concerning this, other gentlemen would -have to comment. I can only speak as far as agency is concerned. In -Germany this was managed by the State. In other countries it is managed -privately. That is the difference, but I have never exploited anybody. -As Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor I did not employ -a single worker. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know that the Soviet prisoners of war were -being employed in the armament industries in Germany? - -SAUCKEL: It was known to me that Soviet prisoners of war were being -employed in the German war industry for this industry was vast and -widespread, and covered the most varied branches. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were you acquainted, in particular, with the directive -of Defendant Keitel regarding the employment of Soviet prisoners of war -in the mining industry? This directive is dated 8 January 1943. Do you -know anything at all about this directive? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot recollect it in detail. I have not got it. Will you be -good enough to put it before me? - -[_The document was handed to the defendant._] - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you read it? - -SAUCKEL: I have read it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It clearly mentions the employment of Soviet prisoners -of war in the mining industry for military purposes. Is that correct? - -SAUCKEL: It refers to the employment of prisoners of war in the mining -industry in Germany. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: For what purpose? It is clearly stated in this -document. - -SAUCKEL: For employment in the mining industry. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But for what purpose? What purpose was it to serve? It -is clearly stated here. - -SAUCKEL: For work, I presume. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In the interest of the war? - -SAUCKEL: Well, as a matter of fact, the German mining industry did not -only work in the interest of the war; Germany also supplied quite a lot -of coal to neutral countries. It varied according to circumstances. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Follow this document; read it with me: - - “For the execution of the expanded iron and steel program the - Führer ordered on 7 July the absolute guarantee...” - -SAUCKEL: I have not been given the part you are reading. - - GEN. ALEXANDROV: “For the execution of the expanded iron and - steel program the Führer ordered on 7 July the absolute - guarantee of the coal and means of production needed. For this - purpose he has also ordered that the necessary manpower be - supplied by prisoners of war.” - -Now, have you found the place? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I have read it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus the Soviet prisoners of war were to be employed in -the mining industry for the purposes of the war. Is that right? The fact -is definitely established by this document. - -SAUCKEL: Yes; it says so—I might remark that this document is not -addressed to me. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I asked you whether you knew of this document. You said -“yes,” did you not? - -SAUCKEL: I am not acquainted with it—no; I do not know it now. I did -not know it previously as it was not addressed to me. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You said that, broadly speaking, you did know about -this directive and you asked me to allow you to acquaint yourself with -it in detail. This is how it was translated to me. - -SAUCKEL: No; I told you—and I should like to emphasize this—that I did -not remember; I only asked that this document might perhaps be placed -before me. The document is not addressed to me. The office to which it -is addressed is clearly indicated and according to that it never came -into my hands nor reached my office. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In order that you may fully understand this question, I -shall give you Exhibit USA-206. That is your directive of the 22 August -1942 with regard to supplying manpower by means of importation from the -occupied territories. Do you know about this directive? - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: One minute, please. Unfortunately I have no information -about the PS number. All I have is the USA Exhibit Number, which is 206. -Defendant Sauckel... - -THE PRESIDENT: Have the United States prosecutors got the corresponding -number to USA-206? - -MR. DODD: I could have it in a few minutes, Mr. President. I do not have -it right at my fingertips, but I will obtain it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Right; thank you. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, Subparagraph. 8 of this order -states: “This order applies also to prisoners of war.” Does it contain a -reference of this description? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Therefore, you yourself did not differentiate between -prisoners of war and the civilian population as far as their utilization -in the German war industries was concerned. Do you admit that? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, and I have already replied to my defense counsel, I think -it was yesterday, that a catalog was given to me and the Ministry of -Labor in general showing how prisoners of war might be employed. But -this Paragraph 8 has nothing to do with this document, for that was an -agreement or an order which did not come to me and was also not -addressed to me. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, Exhibit USA-206 bears the following -number: 3044-PS. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] In addition to those statements to your -defense counsel which you have just mentioned, you also declared that, -although employing prisoners of war in the German war industries, the -requirements of the Geneva and Hague Conventions were nevertheless -observed. Do you remember saying that? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, and it is also proved by documentary evidence that in the -Reich Ministry of Labor, and in my offices, the directive was issued and -circulated that the Geneva Convention was also to be observed with -regard to Soviet prisoners of war. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You did not differentiate at all between Soviet -prisoners of war and civilian workers? Does that result from the -foregoing? - -SAUCKEL: No, that is not so at all. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In other words, a violation of these conventions -occurred in the utilization of manpower, inasmuch as they, the prisoners -of war, were treated by you in the same way as the civilians, and were -utilized in industries for the purpose of waging war. - -SAUCKEL: In that case, I must have misunderstood you, or you may have -misunderstood me. I particularly declared that I did attach importance -to it, and that it was printed and that during the time I was in office -a special copy was published for the factories and the interested -parties in which it was stipulated that the Geneva Convention was to be -observed. I could do no more than that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel questioned you in connection with -the operation known under the code name of “Hay.” You answered his -question as follows and I quote from the transcript: “Sauckel: No, I had -nothing to do with these particular measures.” - -I shall now hand you a letter from Alfred Meyer dated 11 July 1944. This -is Document Number 199-PS. It is a letter addressed to you. Will you -please study Subparagraph 1; it reads: - - “Army recruiting staff ‘Mitte,’ hitherto stationed in Minsk, - must continue its activities with regard to the recruitment of - young White Ruthenian and Russian workers for military - employment within the Reich. The staff has the additional task - of bringing into the Reich young folk from 10 to 14 years of - age.” - -Have you found this passage? - -SAUCKEL: I have read the passage and my reply is that the letter, to be -sure, is addressed to me, but only for my information, and I had nothing -to do with those proceedings either in my office or personally. I -have—that was—it has been mentioned already in the case of the -Defendant Schirach—that was carried out within those offices, and the -Allocation of Labor, as an office was not involved in it. I personally -do not remember it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What were your relations with the army recruiting staff -Mitte? Was that your staff? - -SAUCKEL: I do not understand your question. What staff do you mean? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: The staff referred to in Alfred Meyer’s letter, staff -Mitte, dealing with the employment of labor. - -SAUCKEL: I cannot find the word “staff.” - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Right in the beginning of the sentence: “It is -imperative that the army recruiting staff...” - -SAUCKEL: The army recruiting staff Mitte is a term completely unknown to -me. I do not know what it was, or whether it was a military or a civil -office. It had nothing to do with me. I do not know it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have testified here that the Reich Security Office -had introduced special identification badges for people brought in from -the occupied territories. For the Soviet citizens the badge was—can you -not hear me? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot understand the translation. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have testified before the Tribunal that for people -brought in from the occupied territories special identification badges -were introduced. For the Soviet citizens the marking was “Ost,” for -Polish citizens it was the letter “P.” You testified that you were not -in agreement with the marking. What did you do to stop this insult? - -SAUCKEL: I persistently tried to avoid the identification markings -altogether. But the Reichsführer SS categorically demanded—to the best -of my knowledge there is a letter from him to that effect—that these -foreign workers who, at my request, were free to move about Germany, -should bear a distinguishing mark when they went out of their camps. It -was no insult. I should like to emphasize expressly that I did not look -on this as an insult. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is your point of view. Did you discuss the matter -at all with your immediate superior, the Defendant Göring? - -SAUCKEL: I can no longer remember today whether I spoke directly to -Göring or not. I can only declare that I made repeated efforts to stop -the practice, and that in the spring of 1944, in March I believe, my -efforts were actually crowned with success and the small badge “Ost” was -changed to a national badge on the sleeve, as had been suggested by -liaison officers for the various peoples in the East. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I asked you whether you discussed the matter with -Göring? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot remember. Perhaps I did; perhaps not. It was -frequently discussed. - -THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, I think you might pass on from this. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In reply to questions by your defense counsel and by my -French colleague in regard to Speer’s attitude to your appointment as -Plenipotentiary General, you mentioned that you did not know anything at -all about it. You will now be handed an article from the newspaper, -_Völkischer Beobachter_. This is Exhibit Number USSR-467 and I am -submitting it to the Tribunal. This article was published on 28 March -1942 in connection with your appointment as Plenipotentiary General. It -has even got your photograph, as you can see for yourself. Have you -found the passage with the following statement: - - “The appointment, at the wish of Reich Minister Speer, of - Gauleiter Sauckel was also due to the extraordinary importance - of labor allocation in the armament industry.” - -We assume that you must have read the article. Did you read the article? - -SAUCKEL: I really cannot say so positively at this moment. It is however -possible or probable. I did not have much time to read the papers then. -But I should like to tell you very definitely, Mr. Prosecutor, that -during my term of office I transferred over 5 million German workers -from the most widely different branches of German industry to the -armament industry. Therefore, it was a task which dealt principally with -German workers and their transfer. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I was interested in something else: Why was Defendant -Speer interested in your personal appointment as Plenipotentiary General -for the Allocation of Labor? That is what I wanted to ascertain. Can you -tell me anything in this respect? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you why Reich Minister Speer was interested in my -appointment. I have already told my defense counsel that I myself was -surprised at the time. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel acquainted you with Document EC-68 -during the session of May 29. This document deals with the treatment of -foreign workers of Polish nationality. I shall not dwell upon the -subject, since your defense counsel has already quoted the document in -detail, and I will limit myself to your reply intended for your defense -counsel, as it appears in the transcript of that session. - -I read from the transcript: - - “Sauckel: First of all, I should like to point out that this - document is dated 6 March 1941—that is more than one year - before I assumed office.... Since this document, Number 4, has - been submitted to the Tribunal, I must add supplementary - documents to my case which confirm that I automatically - destroyed all such unnecessary directives.... In such a case I - could not have issued orders of this description to any - government office in the Reich.” - -Do you remember these depositions given at the session of the 29th of -May the current year? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: General, I am told that this is an incorrect translation. -It was “revoked” and not “destroyed.” You said “destroyed,” did you not? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am reading from the Russian transcript and perhaps -there are certain inaccuracies in it, but I do not object to replacing -“destroy” by “revoke.” The meaning remains the same. - -SAUCKEL: May I ask for the context to be repeated? It is not quite -clear. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, I do not want to revert to Document EC-68. All I -want is to establish what you said in reply to your defense counsel in -connection with this document. You do not contradict your testimony -which I have just read into the record? Does it correspond to the -statement you made here on the 29th of May? - -SAUCKEL: No. But I do not understand what the term “destroyed” has to do -with it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: We should not read “destroy,” but should use the word -“revoke.” - -SAUCKEL: That is possible. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: So you confirm the testimony which I have just read -into the record from the transcript. - -Now, tell us, do you remember the living conditions you imposed on the -Ukrainian women and girls from the occupied territories, on those who -had been mobilized for work in German agriculture? - -I shall now hand you Document Number USSR-383. - -[_The document was handed to the defendant._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the PS number? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, Sir; that is a USSR document. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] There is an addendum, Number 2, to your -directive dated 8 September 1942. This addendum is entitled, “Memorandum -for housewives concerning the employment of domestic workers from the -East in urban and rural households.” Do you know this document? This -memorandum? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote a few excerpts in order to describe -the conditions which you imposed on those Ukrainian women and girls who -had been sent to work on agricultural tasks in Germany. Please find -Section B, “Registration with the Police, Identification, Supervision.” -Have you found that section? - -SAUCKEL: No, not quite. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Section B. Have you found it? - -SAUCKEL: Page 4? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Section B, “Registration with the Police, -Identification, Supervision,” contains the following instructions: - - “The Eastern female worker is obliged to wear the identification - badge ‘Ost’ on the right breast of each of her outer garments.” - -SAUCKEL: I cannot find it. I have not found it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will find it later. That order is included there. - -SAUCKEL: Yes; but, please, I must be able to follow you. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you found it? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now Paragraph 4. It is entitled “Labor Conditions.” It -is written there: - - “Women domestic workers from the East employed in the Reich are - under special working conditions.” - -We shall see later on what these special conditions were. Please find -Paragraph 9, Sentence 1, “Free Time.” The opening sentence states: - - “No claim to free time exists.” - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but I must ask you to read on. It says exactly the same as -in the case of the German household staff, who also... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now read the whole of Paragraph 9 into the -record. - -THE PRESIDENT: General, I do not think you should interrupt him when he -is making a legitimate explanation. You should wait until he has made -his explanation, and then draw attention to anything in the rest of the -document that you wish to. Now, what did you wish to say, Defendant? - -SAUCKEL: I asked for a further part to be read. There is a sentence in -which it is stated a weekly outing can nevertheless be granted. May I -read the sentence once more: - - “Women domestic workers from the East may, as a matter of - principle, only go outside the confines of the household when - attending to household matters. However, on a probationary - basis, as a reward, the opportunity may be given them once a - week to remain outside the household for 3 hours without having - work to do.” - -The same also held good for German domestic workers at that time. Free -time amounts to the same thing. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is written differently here. No free time was -allowed them. It says: - - “...as a reward, the opportunity may be given them to remain - outside the household once a week 3 hours without having work to - do. This outing must end before darkness falls, but by 2000 - hours at the latest.” - -So there is no mention here of a day off, but of 3 hours off. Now find -Paragraph 10. - -SAUCKEL: But I did not say that. Because of the blackout, this curfew -applied also to German employees during the war. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now find Paragraph 10: “Leave and return home.” That is -the heading of this particular passage. Have you found it? It is -written: - - “For the time being no leave shall be granted. Women domestic - workers from the East are recruited for an indefinite time.” - -SAUCKEL: I should like to add, in this connection... - -THE PRESIDENT: General, I think you can pass on from this. You -know—this is not a matter of very great importance. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I should like Defendant Sauckel to -explain the discrepancies which have arisen in his testimony with regard -to Document EC-68, and with regard to what was written in his directive -concerning the employment of Ukrainian women for domestic service in -Germany. I wish to receive this reply in order to eliminate the -discrepancies which have arisen. - -SAUCKEL: I am in a position to answer that question very precisely. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes? - -SAUCKEL: This directive was not composed by me alone. Quite a large -number of paragraphs were introduced at that time by the Reichsführer -SS. Already as far back as the spring of 1943 I succeeded in having -these paragraphs altered and the indefinite time of employment for the -Eastern Workers was limited to 2 years. Furthermore, in a document which -I believe my defense counsel will also submit to the Tribunal, it is -proved that the removal of the restrictions applied to the Eastern -Workers was the result of my endeavors. I tried to remove these -restrictions in the very beginning, as I correctly stated in my first -answer, so that the Eastern Workers stood on equal footing to other -foreign workers and to the German workers. - -That was my aim and my conception of my duty as I performed it. I was -particularly glad to do this for the Eastern Workers as they were the -best workers we had in Germany. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I now go on to the next question. On 18 August 1942 you -had a meeting with Defendant Frank in Kraków. I shall read out what has -been written about this meeting in Frank’s diary. That is Document -Number USSR-223. In the diary for 1942, Volume III, Page 918, is -written: - - “I am happy to be able to inform you officially that we have so - far transported more than 800,000 workers into the Reich. - - “A short time ago you applied for 140,000 more workers. - - “Over and above this figure of 140,000, however, you can next - year count on a further number of workers from the Government - General, for we shall employ the Police for recruiting - purposes.” - -Does that tally with the actual facts? Did such a conversation between -you and Frank take place? Has it been correctly entered in his diary? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot possibly confirm an entry which I have never seen -before, and details of which I cannot possibly recollect. I therefore -cannot say that all of it is correct. Those were future possibilities -visualized by Herr Frank. I can, however, on the strength of the -documents before me, say that the employment of Polish civilian -workers... - -THE PRESIDENT: If you do not remember, why can you not say so and stop? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But did he speak to you about resorting to police -methods in the recruitment of manpower, or did he not mention it? Do you -remember this, or do you not? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot possibly remember this communication which took place -in 1942. Conditions at that time were so utterly different. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In his activities, where the recruiting of manpower was -concerned, did Defendant Funk resort to police measures or not? Do you -know about it? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot, from my own knowledge, tell you whether the Governor -General solved this problem by the employment of police forces or not. -Please ask him himself. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am submitting a document to the Tribunal, Document -Number USSR-469, which describes the methods of labor recruitment as -applied in the territory of Poland. This document is an official -directive, printed by the Kreishauptmann of the Minsk and Warsaw -district. It is dated 2 February 1943. This directive was handed to -Kazimir Navak, who was born on the 6 May 1926, and resided in Dyzin in -the Kolbey community. It reads: - - “Pursuant to the compulsory service decree dated 13 May 1942 - _Verordnungsblatt_, GG, Page 255, I direct you to labor service - in the Reich.” - -The following stands at the bottom of this page: - - “In case of insubordination...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this a document you are putting in evidence now for -the first time? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: This document is being presented for the first time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have not got the document. Have you any copies -of it? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, it should have been handed to you. The document, -Mr. President, is not included in the document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering it now for the first time, or is it -already in evidence? - -Did you not hear that? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, I hear you, Mr. President. This document is being -presented for the first time. - -THE PRESIDENT: We do not seem to have it anyhow. I mean, I have not a -copy of it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: The original document has just been handed to the -defendant, and he has got it. The copies in German were handed to the -Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have it now in German. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is stated at the bottom of this decree: - - “Should you disobey this compulsory service decree, the members - of your family (parents, wife, brothers, sisters, and children) - will be placed in a punitive camp and will be liberated only - after you have presented yourself. Moreover, I reserve for - myself the right to confiscate your personal and real property - as well as the personal and real property of the members of your - family. Moreover you, in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the - above-mentioned decree, will be punished with confinement in - prison, or with penal servitude, or with internment in a - concentration camp. - - “Kreishauptmann Dr. Bittrich.” - -Did you know anything about the application of such methods for the -recruitment of manpower in the territory of Poland and of the existence -of Defendant Frank’s decrees? - -SAUCKEL: I can openly and clearly answer that the threat of such -penalties in this form was completely unknown to me and that I would -never have mentioned it. If I had learned of it, I would have stopped it -immediately. I must, however, beg permission to tell the Tribunal that -this appendix at the end of the document, regarded as coming from my -office, is incorrect, and was not sanctioned by me. The first paragraph -of this document reads correctly and I request permission to quote it. -It is in keeping with German labor legislation and runs: - - “Pursuant to the compulsory service decree, _Verordnungsblatt_, - GG, Page 255, dated 13 May 1942, I direct you to labor service - in the Reich. - - “Your employment in the Reich will be under properly regulated - working conditions and your wages will be paid according to a - regular scale. Wage savings can be transmitted regularly by you - to your home. Close relatives, to whose support you have - hitherto been substantially contributing, may apply to the labor - office for special allowances.” - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Was that written at the bottom of the decree? - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we need the details. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I want to remind you now of certain directives which -were issued with regard to the so-called recruitment of labor, -directives which were issued by your government organizations in -Germany, and personally by yourself in your own famous program. The -document is Document Number USSR-365, and you wrote the following... - -SAUCKEL: I have not got it here. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will be helped to find it. - -Have you been shown the passage which I am now going to read into the -record? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is written there: - - “It is therefore unavoidably necessary to exhaust completely the - manpower reserves now available in the conquered Soviet - territories. If it is not possible to obtain required workers on - a voluntary basis then steps must be taken immediately to - conscript them or bring in compulsion.” - -Did you issue these instructions? - -SAUCKEL: I have not found these passages so far. They have not been -pointed out to me properly. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will at once be shown the passage again. - -Did you ever issue these instructions? - -SAUCKEL: I myself was not able to issue orders for compulsory service in -the occupied territories; that had to be done by the district -authorities. But by compulsion I did not understand that penalties would -be threatened to the extent as stated in that one document signed by -Bittrich, but that they would be in keeping with German regulations. -That is a very substantial difference. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Was that which I have just read out to you included in -your program or not? - -SAUCKEL: It is in my program—but I have expressly stated that I was -directed to do that by the Führer. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Let us proceed. In the letter of 3 October 1942 -addressed to Gauleiter Meyer you wrote—this document, Number 017-PS -will be handed to you in a moment. Please follow me when I read: - - “I do not underestimate the difficulties connected with the - execution of the new task, but I am convinced that with the - ruthless employment of all means”—I should like to underline - that ‘all means’—“and with the absolute devotion of all - concerned, the new quota can be filled by the date fixed.” - -Did you write that? - -SAUCKEL: I wrote that, yes. But I want you to let me give you an -explicit explanation: In all my directives I invariably demanded the -most considerate treatment for the workers; that has already been proved -in the Trial. When I refer here to the ruthless use of all means, I only -mean the ruthless use of all technical means and propaganda, because I -had been told from different sources that such means were not available -there to a sufficient degree. This is an explanation of what led up to -this letter. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 31 March 1942 you addressed a letter to the Reich -commissioners. This letter will be presented to you in a few minutes. It -is Document Number USSR-137. Here you wrote as follows: - - “I request that the recruitment, for which you together with the - commissioners are responsible to me, be speeded up on your part - by adequate measures, if necessary by the application of - compulsory labor in the severest form, so that the recruitment - figures may be trebled in the shortest possible time.” - -Did you issue this directive? - -SAUCKEL: That is my directive and I issued it. By the severest use of -compulsory labor I meant no wicked or criminal measures, but rather, if -it was necessary that it should be used, it was with reference to the -number, the number to be made up. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote a few excerpts from the documents of -other people. I shall begin by reading an excerpt from a speech by -Defendant Rosenberg, Document Number USSR-170, which was delivered at -the conference of the German Labor Front in November 1942. I shall quote -a brief excerpt from this speech: - - “...millions of Russians, trembling with fright, react in the - same way...” - -SAUCKEL: I have not found it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will be helped in one moment. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. NELTE: I should like to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the -following fact: General Alexandrov this morning referred to Document -Number 744-PS. First of all a document was given me which was described -as a German translation. That translation contains things which are -obviously impossible. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, you said 744? - -DR. NELTE: 744-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: I haven’t got any note that he referred to that document. -I don’t know whether he—did you refer to 744-PS this morning, General -Alexandrov? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I referred this morning to the document in question. It -was a directive of the Defendant Keitel, dated 8 July 1943, referring to -the employment of prisoners of war in the mining industry. - -DR. NELTE: Then the Russian Prosecution presented me with the original, -that is the photostatic copy of a letter dated 8 July 1943, signed by -Keitel. I now have two German versions before me. Not only do they -differ greatly as far as the contents are concerned, but also the -translation contains something additional which is not in the original, -namely that to the heading of the letter, “Chief of the High Command of -the Wehrmacht,” is added “Army General Staff.” - -I do not want to delay you by reading the other incorrect translations, -but I must assume that you have before you the texts in the foreign -languages, which, as I see from the translation back into German, are -incorrect. As this document, the original, is the evidence and is not -being objected to, I should like to ask you to order that the -translations in the foreign languages, which you have before you, be -checked in order to find out to what extent they differ from the -original document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Had the document been put in evidence before? Had it been -offered in evidence? Was it an exhibit? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: 744-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, that does not mean that it has been put in -evidence. That only means that it is identified in that way. Had it been -offered in evidence before? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not know the U.S.A. number of this document, but -according to the data at my disposal I am able to state that it was -submitted in evidence to the Tribunal. In the German copy, presented in -the German language, it is written that the German translation was made -on 26 November 1945 by Second Lieutenant of the U. S. Infantry, Fred -Niebergall. As Dr. Nelte has discovered certain inaccuracies in the -translation, I consider that the Translation Division should be asked to -check these divergencies. - -DR. NELTE: I am convinced, Mr. President... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think that is the best thing to do, to have it checked -by the Translation Division. We will order that that shall be done at -once. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: [_Turning to the defendant._] The transcript of -Defendant Rosenberg’s speech will be handed over to you immediately. I -shall limit myself to a very short excerpt from this transcript. Please -read after me: - - “Part of them imagine that the road to Germany is somewhat - similar to the road to Siberia.” - -And further: - - “I know that if 1½ million people are brought here, they cannot - be given the best accommodations. The fact that thousands of - people are badly housed or badly treated is obvious. It is not - worth while worrying about that. However, this is a very - reasonable question, and I believe that Gauleiter Sauckel has - already discussed it, or will do so. These people from the East - are being brought to Germany in order to work and to endeavor to - reach as high a level of production as possible. This is quite a - reasonable transaction. In order to reach this production - capacity one should naturally not bring them over three-quarters - frozen or let them stand for 10 hours. One must rather give them - enough to eat that they will have reserve strength.” - -Does Defendant Rosenberg correctly describe the conditions in which the -workers you brought from the occupied territories found themselves, or -do you consider that Defendant Rosenberg has not described them -correctly? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot say and do not know when Rosenberg made this speech. I -myself did not hear it or receive a copy of it. I can, however, -definitely state that as soon as I came into office I made most -extensive arrangements, so that the conditions which Rosenberg discusses -here—and which can have nothing to do with my term of office—might be -avoided under all circumstances. It was for that purpose that I issued -those most comprehensive orders. To prevent such conditions I planned -hundreds of valid and binding instructions of a legal nature, affecting -every nationality working in Germany, which would make such conditions -impossible. That is what I have to say to that. It cannot refer to -conditions during my term of office. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I shall limit myself to this one single -excerpt from the speech of the Defendant Rosenberg, and I shall not -avail myself of the numerous documents already presented to the -Tribunal, documents which confirm beyond all manner of doubt the -criminal methods applied—with the full cognizance of the Defendant -Sauckel—for the mobilization of manpower in the occupied territories -and for the exploitation of the workers as slaves in Germany. - -I shall only submit to the Tribunal one single new document, listed as -Document Number USSR-468. This document is a worker’s identity card -issued by the German authorities in Breslau to a Polish citizen, Maria -Atler. This card is characterized by the fact that it is stamped on the -reverse side with the image of a pig. Maria Atler has stated on oath -that such worker’s identity cards were issued to all foreign workers in -1944 by the German authorities in Breslau. Together with this original -document I am submitting a certificate of the Polish State Commission -which quotes the testimony of the witness Maria Atler. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Sauckel, have you looked at that -worker’s identity card? Have you found the image of a pig on that card? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -GEN. ALEX ANDROV: Did you know of the existence of such workers’ cards, -stamped with the image of a pig as an insult to human dignity? - -SAUCKEL: I did not have cards like that, and I knew nothing about it. I -cannot quite make out what this image is meant to be. I have nothing at -all to do with this. I am not familiar with such an identification mark -on a card and do not know what I am to say about it. I do not know -whether it was possible for some labor administration office to use such -identification marks or not. I should like permission to see the -original. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know of the existence of such cards and of -their utilization? - -SAUCKEL: No, I had no idea of the existence of such cards with images -like that. It was not to my advantage, and I had no reason at all to -offend such people who were working in Germany. I had no idea of that, -and I do not know what this was meant to be. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote a brief excerpt from Document Number -USSR-170. This is a transcript of the minutes of a conference held with -Reich Marshal Göring on 6 August 1942. I shall quote that part of the -statement in which the Defendant Göring expresses his appreciation of -your activities. I quote: - - “To that I must say that I do not wish to praise Gauleiter - Sauckel; he does not need it. But what he has done in this brief - time to collect workers from all over Europe and bring them to - our factories with such rapidity is a unique feat. I will say - this to you all: If everybody in his own sphere would apply a - tenth of the energy which Gauleiter Sauckel has applied, then - indeed the tasks which have been assigned to you would be easily - fulfilled. That is my inner conviction and not mere words.” - -Did you hear such an appreciation of your activities from the lips of -Reich Marshal Göring? - -SAUCKEL: It is possible that the Reich Marshal said that. I cannot -remember the details of a meeting that took place so long ago. What is -correct is that I, as a human being and as a member of my nation, was -obliged to do my duty. My documents prove that I tried to do my duty -decently and humanely. I did my utmost to do that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I now submit to the Tribunal a document listed as -Document Number USSR-462. It is an article by Dr. Friedrich Didier, -published in the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_ of 1944. This is an official -publication of the Reich Ministry of Labor and of the Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor. The article is entitled “Fritz -Sauckel on his Fiftieth Birthday.” - -I do not intend to quote this article as it is written entirely in -praise of Sauckel’s activities, and there is no reason to dwell on it. I -only wish to ask you, Defendant Sauckel, are you acquainted with this -article? - -SAUCKEL: I do not know this article. I cannot say what is in it. I was -not always able to read through the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_—it wasn’t -published by me. It is an old institution of the Labor Ministry which -contains all the decrees published by that Ministry and also my decrees. -The decrees in the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_ all testify to my concern for -foreign and for German workers. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then you will have to acquaint yourself very rapidly -with the contents of this article. It will be handed to you immediately. - -THE PRESIDENT: What document is this he is reading? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is an article in the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_ entitled -“Fritz Sauckel on his Fiftieth Birthday.” We are submitting this -document for the first time as Document Number USSR-462. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Are you now conversant with it? Tell us, -does this article correctly characterize your political and governmental -activity? - -SAUCKEL: The author of this article is not an expert. I cannot make any -further comments on the contents of a birthday article. It contains a -very cursory description of my career and my sphere of work. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: And now, one last question. In your speech at the first -meeting of the staffs for the Allocation of Labor, held in Weimar on 6 -January 1943, you stated—and I quote from the third document book of -your defense counsel, Document Number Sauckel-82: - - “Now, where the foundations of our work are concerned...”—I - skip the first paragraph and pass directly to the second—“We - are true to our Führer and to our people. This loyalty justifies - us in the execution of the harshest measures.”—And then, at the - end—“In this respect I will assume ever-increasing - responsibility.” - -Tell us now, are you assuming responsibility for the enforced mass -deportation into slavery of the population of the occupied territories, -for the suffering and misery of the millions you drove into slavery, for -the grim period of slaveholding which you revived in the twentieth -century? - -SAUCKEL: I am most grateful to you that you quoted this document at this -very moment. Would you show me this document so that I can give the -correct explanation of my views as contained therein? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: If necessary, your defense counsel will acquaint you -with this document. - -Mr. President, I have finished my cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, do you want to re-examine? - -DR. THOMA: Witness, what was Rosenberg’s role, as Minister for the -Occupied Eastern Territories, in the execution of the Allocation of -Labor? - -SAUCKEL: The Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, in carrying -out the Allocation of Labor, had to pass on my wishes and demands to the -offices under him in that Ministry insofar as they related to my tasks. -I cannot, of course, comment on the other departments in the Ministry -for the Occupied Eastern Territories, which I do not know. - -DR. THOMA: Did not Rosenberg tell you repeatedly that he would give -Reich Commissioner Koch directions to make use of his authority? - -SAUCKEL: That is correct. It was one of Rosenberg’s tasks to give orders -to Reich Commissioner Koch, who was under him, in every field of -administration there. - -DR. THOMA: So that the way you understood it was that he was to give him -instructions. In what way? - -SAUCKEL: Rosenberg did and should—as we had expressly agreed—give -instructions to Koch to put a stop to any wild and objectionable methods -which were contrary to my instructions; and that Rosenberg did, as far -as I know. - -DR. THOMA: Rosenberg, by referring to the authority of the Reich -Commissioner, meant that he was to prohibit your recruiting methods and -no longer permit your recruiting units to bring away Eastern Workers? - -SAUCKEL: Rosenberg never said that to me, rather he denied it; for these -commissions, while they were in the Ukraine, were subordinate to and -part of the labor allocation department of Reich Commissioner Koch. Koch -was the supervising authority and the administrative authority for such -matters. Those are the undeniable facts. - -DR. THOMA: May I point out to the Tribunal that a Document, -Rosenberg-10, shows that Sauckel did not understand this statement of -Rosenberg’s. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you refer to some document there, Dr. Thoma? - -DR. THOMA: Rosenberg-10. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the re-examination of the witness by the -defense counsel for the Defendant Rosenberg must limit itself to new -matters which have been brought up and are the subject of argument. -There was every opportunity, when his client was in the witness stand, -to clarify these questions. At the time I wanted to clear up this -question on my own initiative, but I was informed that I ought to ask -Sauckel. He made a clear statement here, and in my opinion there is no -cause once more to come back in this connection to documents which -belong to a previous period of the defense. I object to such -questioning. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, I think you had better go on and ask -your next question. I have not got the document before me yet that you -are putting to the witness, or referring to. What is your next question? - -DR. THOMA: Witness, did you not in your program assume full -responsibility for the Allocation of Labor? - -SAUCKEL: I assumed responsibility, and I acknowledge it, for what came -within the limits of my power—I cannot do more than that—and for what -I ordered and for what I caused to be done. This collection of decrees, -Dr. Thoma, has been submitted and was shown to Herr Rosenberg... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the defendant has been over this all before. -He has been all through this before—about his responsibility. - -DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I point out that regarding the question of -responsibility, there is a certain paragraph—the decisive -paragraph—which has not yet been read. It is Document 016-PS concerning -the labor allocation program, and it says on Page 21, Figure 1... - -THE PRESIDENT: Just say what the document is again, will you Dr. Thoma? - -DR. THOMA: 016-PS, Page 20 of the German document. It says: - - “All technical and administrative procedure of labor allocation - is subject exclusively to the jurisdiction and responsibility of - the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, the - regional labor offices and the labor offices...” - -SAUCKEL: Inside Germany, Doctor. Outside Germany I was, of course, -subject to the competent chiefs of the areas in question. That is quite -obvious. - -DR. THOMA: In reply to that answer I draw the attention of the Tribunal -to Page 15 of this labor program. This Figure 1, which I have just read, -comes under the paragraph, “Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers.” - -SAUCKEL: To the extent that they were employed in Germany. - -DR. THOMA: May I point out that it states clearly under Figure 1: - -“All technical and administrative procedure of labor allocation...” - -SAUCKEL: And may I point out that it was not possible for me to -interfere with Reich Commissioner Koch’s authority. He had said -expressly that he would not permit that. - -DR. THOMA: Witness, the Delegate for the Four Year Plan gave you special -powers concerning conscription in dealings with all authorities and, in -my opinion, it is not right that you should now deny these methods of -recruitment and pass responsibility for them on to the Minister for the -Occupied Eastern Territories. - -I have no further questions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the defense counsel for Defendant -Rosenberg may engage in cross-questioning, but it does not appear to me -to be the right moment for him to make a speech of accusation against my -client. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am well aware of the facts that there have -been two cross-examinations, and I have no desire to go on with another -one. However, we do have one document that we think is of some -importance and which was turned over to General Alexandrov, but I think -there must have been some language difficulty. The translation of it was -not presented. I would like the permission of the Tribunal to ask one or -two questions of this defendant about it and to present it. I think it -is rather important that it be presented. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal does not think that this ought to -create a precedent, but in view of your statement that the document was -supplied to General Alexandrov and that, for some reason, he did not -deal with it, we will allow you to cross-examine upon it. - -MR. DODD: Very well, Sir. - -Witness, do you remember an occasion in 1942, just after your -appointment, when you met with some officials of the Ministry of Labor -and you discussed with them the program which you were about to -institute and for which you were about to take responsibility? Do you -recall it? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot, of course, remember details of that discussion. -Various points of the program were discussed, and I might also say in -connection with the comments made by the defense counsel for the -Defendant Rosenberg since what he has been quoting is... - -MR. DODD: Just a minute, just a minute. I simply asked you if you -remembered this meeting, and you said you did not, and now there is the -document. - -SAUCKEL: Details of that conference I do not remember. - -MR. DODD: And now take a look at the minutes of the meeting. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the document? - -MR. DODD: This is EC-318. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the exhibit number? Has it been offered or not? - -MR. DODD: I am now offering it. I was waiting to get the number from the -secretary. - -I will have to get the number a little later, Mr. President. I had not -made preparations to submit this document, so I did not have the number -in advance. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I want to call your attention -particularly to a few passages. You start out by telling the officials -who were gathered there that you want to co-operate closely with them; -and then, moving along, you give some idea of the number of workers whom -you intend to recruit. You say there is an estimated requirement of 1 -million; and you also made perfectly clear that day that you were to get -most of your people, most of these workers, from the East and -particularly from Soviet Russia. - -You told these officials that you had talked for several hours with the -Führer and for 8 hours with the Reich Marshal, and that you all agreed -that the most important problem was the exploitation of the manpower in -the East. - -You further stated—do you see that in there? - -SAUCKEL: Where does it say exploitation? I cannot find that word. - -MR. DODD: Well, do you find where you say you had discussed your task -with the Führer in a conversation that had lasted for several hours? Do -you find that? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot find it. - -MR. DODD: You have the German there before you, have you not? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but will you please be kind enough to tell me the page? - -MR. DODD: In the middle of Page 2. Have you found it? - -SAUCKEL: Mr. Prosecutor, I want particularly to point out to you the -difference in German between the words “Ausnutzung” and “Ausbeutung.” -“Ausbeutung” (exploitation) is a word which, in the language of the -workers, has a rather bad implication, but “Ausnutzung” (use of) is -quite an ordinary concept; to use something means making it useful. That -is a great difference in meaning in the German language. - -MR. DODD: Well, we will stand by ours and you may stand by yours, and -the Tribunal will ascertain between the two of us who has the correct -translation. - -In any event, whether you said “use of” or “exploit,” you did say that -the most important solution was either the use of or the exploitation... - -SAUCKEL: But that is not the same thing, Mr. Prosecutor. In German there -is a fundamental difference in meaning. I must point out that the word -exploitation is a word which I did not use and did not want to use. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, would you speak a little bit lower. You quite -drown the interpreter’s voice. - -SAUCKEL: I beg your pardon, My Lord. - -MR. DODD: I am not concerned with whether or not you agree with the word -“exploit.” That is a very unimportant part of this document, as I think -you probably already recognize. - -SAUCKEL: I beg to contradict you. That word is most important from the -humane point of view. - -MR. DODD: I don’t care to have any argument with you at all. We... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal is perfectly well able to -understand the difference between the use of the words, and you have -told us the translation you say is right. - -MR. DODD: Now, if you move down a little bit, do you recall having said -that 1 million Russians would have to be brought into Germany as rapidly -as possible, to become available even prior to the offensive? - -It is the next sentence or two there in your text. You won’t see it by -looking at me. Do you read the next sentence? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I should like permission to read the next sentence: - - “The necessary condition for taking on the task would be the - assurance that Russians would be given approximately the same - rations as have been in force for the German civilian - population.” - -MR. DODD: You have skipped the sentence that I want you to read. I know -that one comes along, but I want you to read the one where you say you -would have to bring 1 million Russians into the Reich as rapidly as -possible, and that is the very next or almost the next sentence after -the one you have been discussing, about the word “exploit” or “use of.” - -SAUCKEL: “...must be brought to the Reich as quickly as possible.” - -MR. DODD: That is all I want to know. Do you remember saying that? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I said that. I must say in connection with this that this -is a record which I have never seen before or checked. Someone made it, -but the record itself I was not familiar with, and it was never -submitted to me. - -MR. DODD: Well, I suppose it could be truthful even though you didn’t -make it. - -Let us move on here to the next to the last paragraph, and you will find -a sentence which says or suggests: - - “They”—referring to the Russians—“will have to be handled so - roughly by the German administration in the East that they will - prefer to go to Germany rather than stay in Russia.” - -Do you find that? - -SAUCKEL: Will you tell me where that sentence is? - -MR. DODD: Well, it is right after the sentence where you talk about your -negotiations with Himmler. Maybe that will help you. - -Do you find where you say you had negotiations with the Reichsführer SS? -You succeeded in getting him to remove the barbed wire. Surely you have -read that. - -Now you find the sentence, do you? - - “They would have to be handled so roughly by the German - administration in the East that they would prefer to go to - Germany rather than stay in Russia.” - -Do you remember saying that? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot say that I used these specific words in speaking to -him, for, as I have already stated, it is a record of statements of a -problematical nature which I myself did not check, and I cannot be sure -how a third person came to write this record from memory. These are not -shorthand minutes; it is merely a record which is not signed by anyone -and in which... - -MR. DODD: I don’t think you need to give us any long dissertation on the -fact that it is somebody else’s minutes. It is not offered to you as -being your own. - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but I have the right and am obliged to say that. - -MR. DODD: I wish you would wait a minute and let me put a question to -you once in a while. I have not suggested that these are your minutes. I -have merely put it to you for the purpose of determining whether or not -on seeing it you remember it. And do you, or do you not remember it? - -SAUCKEL: I certainly do not remember that passage. I can merely read -here something written by a third person, and I do not know who it was. -This person may quite well have misunderstood me; that is possible... - -MR. DODD: Well, you also find you did have some conversations with the -Reichsführer SS. Do you remember having said that, in the course of this -conversation or speech or whatever it was that you were making? - -SAUCKEL: The Reichsführer SS put me off on several occasions, and I had -to insist to get the Reichsführer SS to remove the barbed wire fences. I -did that. From the very beginning of my term of office I moderated the -orders of the Reichsführer SS; and that, of course, caused vigorous -arguments between us. - -MR. DODD: Then that part of the minutes of this meeting is correct, -isn’t it? The reporter, or whoever it was that took this down, correctly -reported what you said about your negotiations with the Reichsführer SS, -did he? You find no fault with that? - -SAUCKEL: What he wrote down in detail about what I am supposed to have -said I have not yet read. - -MR. DODD: Now, listen. You read back and look at that paper at which you -have just been looking. You find fault with the sentence that reports -that you said they were to be handled roughly in the East, but you do -not find any fault with the sentence ahead of it which says you had the -barbed wire taken down, isn’t that so? - -You seem to be complaining about the fact that this was somebody else’s -report and not yours. Have you read it? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -MR. DODD: Well, it is the sentence just before the one we have just been -talking about. - -Do you really mean you cannot find it? Do you want help? - -SAUCKEL: Two pages appear in duplicate here. - -MR. DODD: All I have asked you, Witness, is whether or not the sentence -about your meeting with Himmler is a fairly accurate report of what you -said. Is it? - -SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you from memory. I very seldom spoke to -Himmler and then only cursorily. It may have been negotiations carried -out by my office on my order. That I cannot tell you. - -MR. DODD: Well, your answer to all of this is, then, that you don’t -remember what you said there; this doesn’t help you any to remember. - -SAUCKEL: You cannot possibly expect me to remember exactly events which -lasted very briefly and took place so long ago. - -MR. DODD: I am perfectly willing to let it rest there. There is the -written record against your failure of memory, and I will leave that -with the Tribunal... - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think you should put to him... - -SAUCKEL: With which, however, I was not familiar before this. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you should put to him the next paragraph, -“Thirdly...” which follows after the sentence about handling them so -roughly. - -MR. DODD: Yes, Sir. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, if you will keep your finger on that -place that you have there, you won’t lose it, and you will find the next -sentence is—begins: - - “Thirdly, he termed intolerable the wage rates previously - decreed by the Reich Marshal, and has persuaded the Reich - Marshal that Russians should have the possibility of earning up - to one half of the wages of German workers.” - -With reference to that statement, what had the Reich Marshal suggested, -by the way? - -SAUCKEL: Before I took up my office—and I have talked about that at -length with my defense counsel—there existed decrees of the Ministerial -Council regarding wage regulations, and I continually improved those -wages—four times, in fact, as far as I could manage it, during my term -in office. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question you -were asked was: What had the Reich Marshal suggested as wages for these -workers? You can answer that. - -SAUCKEL: The Reich Marshal did not make any suggestions to me. When I -entered office I found regulations in existence which I considered -insufficient. - -MR. DODD: Well, tell us a little more about it. What do you mean -insufficient? You used here the word intolerable. What was the situation -when you came into the office with respect to wages? - -SAUCKEL: I already explained that yesterday, during the examination by -my defense counsel, and I gave as an example the fact that an Eastern -Worker, when I came into office, drew wages of about 60 pfennigs per -hour, which, after deductions for food and lodging, would leave him -about 4½ marks in cash. I altered that after I came into office and -doubled the cash payments. The purpose of the instructions which existed -before my service was probably to prevent too great a circulation of -money for reasons concerning currency. I do not know the details. - -MR. DODD: This exhibit, Mr. President, becomes USA-881. - -I have no further questions. - -DR. WALTER BALLAS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): I am replacing Dr. -Horn for Defendant Von Ribbentrop. - -I have a few questions to put to the witness. - -Yesterday in cross-examination you spoke about a French diplomatic -organization, formed under the French Ambassador Scapini, for Frenchmen -in Germany. Is it true that it was at Defendant Ribbentrop’s wish that -this organization was formed? - -SAUCKEL: At our mutual wish and agreement. We both had the same -interests. That is correct. - -DR. BALLAS: Can you tell me the reasons which caused Von Ribbentrop to -create this organization? - -SAUCKEL: The reason for this was, in my opinion, to bring about an -understanding between the French and German populations by giving -assurance that particular care would be taken of Frenchmen working in -Germany. - -DR. BALLAS: This diplomatic organization was also responsible for the -treatment of French prisoners of war? Can you tell me for what reasons -the German Foreign Office decided on so unusual an arrangement at a time -when a state of war still existed between France and Germany? - -SAUCKEL: There were conferences between the French Government of Marshal -Pétain and the German Government, and both nations tried conscientiously -to bring about an understanding. - -DR. BALLAS: And because of that came these unusual measures concerning -prisoners of war? - -SAUCKEL: Not only because of that; I considered it a particular -necessity, and I might mention in this connection that this organization -was later divided or supplemented. In addition to M. Scapini, who took -care of French prisoners of war in particular, a M. Broehne took special -charge of French civilian workers. - -DR. BALLAS: Is it true that Defendant Von Ribbentrop in the Foreign -Office created an organization to bring into Germany from occupied -countries artists, lecturers, newspapers, books, _et cetera_, for -foreign workers so that these workers would return home well inclined -toward an understanding with Germany? - -SAUCKEL: It was the purpose of an agreement established by the Reich -Foreign Minister in collaboration with the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, -the German Labor Front, and my office, to improve the leisure time of -the foreign workers by means of foreign artists and lecturers. Many -Russian artists were in Germany for this purpose. It also had the -purpose of bringing libraries and periodicals to these people from their -home countries. - -DR. BALLAS: Thank you. I have no further questions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, in order to rectify an error in a chart in -Document Sauckel-1, I just want to have the witness’ confirmation. - -[_The document was handed to the defendant._] - -Witness, among the employers of labor you mentioned the departments of -Minister Funk, did you not? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And going down you find written in the third square -“armament inspectorate,” and under that, “Reichsautobahn.” These two -squares have been incorrectly put in. They do not belong there. Is it -true that these two squares should be crossed out? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I therefore ask that the chart be rectified by having -these two squares crossed out. They belong to Speer’s Ministry, but I -have not given any close attention to that side, and I do not wish to -discuss it here. - -Then, from the Buchenwald photograph album there were a number of -pictures submitted which show the defendant together with Himmler. - -Witness, can you tell from the picture the approximate time of that -meeting? There are certain indications which you discussed with me -yesterday. Will you briefly describe these? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. The left-hand top picture shows that construction is still -going on; I can see unfinished roadbeds and the like. This may therefore -be during the construction period. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what can you say about the time from the dress of the -various people? - -SAUCKEL: The dress shows quite clearly that this is at a time before the -war, for Himmler is wearing a black uniform which he never wore during -the war. Apart from that he is wearing a sword, which was forbidden -during the war. It is quite clear that this meeting took place before -the war. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Are these people wearing decorations? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot see whether they are wearing decorations; no. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And so I can conclude that this picture was taken -sometime before the war? - -SAUCKEL: Quite definitely sometime before the war, because I myself did -not wear an SS uniform during the war. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number F-810 was submitted yesterday. That is a -report about the meeting at the Wartburg. Beginning on Page 25 of the -German text there is a report by Dr. Sturm, which was shown you and in -which it is said among other things that there was collaboration between -the Gestapo and the concentration camps and that that was the right road -to take. You were asked whether that was your view too, and whether such -collaboration was correct. - -What did you understand by that? Do you mean that you agreed to the -methods used in concentration camps, as practiced by Himmler? - -SAUCKEL: Under no circumstances, I wanted to indicate that it was -correct, as the document shows, that workers’ discipline should be -enforced step by step, as provided for in cases of disobedience: First a -reprimand, then small fines imposed by the factory, as laid down, in -fact, in my Decree Number 13, which I want to submit as documentary -evidence. Only then, after reprimands and small disciplinary penalties -at the factory had proved inadequate, should there be further treatment -of these cases, as is mentioned in the document, by having them brought -to court by the public prosecutor. I called a proper penal procedure -correct. By no means did I want thereby to characterize methods in -concentration camps as correct. I was not at all familiar with these -methods at that time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I have a document, Number 1764-PS, before -me. I have not been able to ascertain when and if it has already been -submitted. I have just received it in the form of a photostatic copy. It -is the so-called Hemmen report, a report which Envoy Hemmen made about a -sector of the labor allocation in France. I want to read a short passage -to the defendant which deals with the number of Frenchmen employed in -Germany, and I want him to confirm it. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, I shall read you a passage and -ask you to... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, it is not usual to allow documents to be -put in re-examination. Why was this not used in examination-in-chief? - -DR. SERVATIUS: The figures were questioned during the cross-examination, -not before. I attach no great importance to finding out in detail how -many hundred thousands came or went. I can omit this question and come -back to it in the final pleadings. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal was not saying you could not use it now. As -it arose out of the cross-examination, I think you may be able to use -it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I should like briefly to read to you the -relevant passage; and I want you to tell me whether the views presented -there are correct. - -Envoy Hemmen reports here, in a letter received at the Foreign Office on -6 February 1944, under Paragraph III as follows: - - “Allocation of Labor in Germany: - - “It started with the voluntary recruitment of workers which, up - to the end of 1942, produced 400,000 men. During the first half - of 1943 two further voluntary recruitments of 250,000 men each - were effected. The first, by granting the privileges of the - _relève_—which allowed leave for prisoners of war at a ratio of - 1 prisoner to 3 recruits—or the granting of worker status, - produced some 200,000; whereas the second could be carried out - only by using the new compulsory service law, that is to say, - coercion, and produced only 122,000 men.” - -I skip the end of the page and read from Page 8: - - “As the total result of the Sauckel Action 818,000 persons all - told, mostly men, went to Germany; 168,000 of them owing to the - compulsory service law. Of all these there were only 420,000 - still there at the end of January 1944.” - -As far as you can recollect, are these statements generally correct? - -SAUCKEL: May I remark in this connection that the Envoy Hemmen at the -Embassy in Paris dealt with these questions there, and they are given -correctly. Finally, you meant to say 420,000 and not 420, did you not? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Thousand. - -SAUCKEL: The decisive point is that because of the short term of the -contracts, the French workers were changed every 6 months, thus only one -half could be here at a time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, you have already said that. - -SAUCKEL: As an explanation I should like permission to tell the Tribunal -that while there was a ratio of 1 to 3—meaning that Germany gave back 1 -prisoner-of-war in return for 3 workers—both the prisoner-of-war and -the French civilian workers who had replaced him for the most part had -returned to their own country after 1½ years, as each stayed for only 6 -months. - -It was very hard to win the Führer over to this regulation. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear some supplementary applications -for witnesses and documents at 2 o’clock on Monday. - -M. HERZOG: Mr. President, I should like to come back briefly to Document -D-565, that is to say, to the photographs showing, the Defendant Sauckel -at the Concentration Camp of Buchenwald. - -The Prosecution has never claimed, and does not claim now, that these -photographs date from a period during the war. Quite the contrary, the -original, which has been shown to you, has the date of these photographs -and the year is 1938. - -The defendant, when he was examined by his counsel, told us that he -visited Buchenwald in the company of Italian officers. I do not see a -single Italian officer in these photographs; I simply see the -Reichsführer SS Himmler. - -However, I do not dispute, and I never claimed that these photographs -dated from a year other than 1938. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I have one last question in connection -with Exhibit Sauckel-82 from Document Book Sauckel 3, Page 206 and -following. On Page 207 we find a statement under Number 3 which I should -like to put to the defendant again, because the prosecutor for the -Soviet Union has stated that Sauckel declared here that he gave no -protection against crime. I should like to read the sentence to the -defendant again and ask him for an explanation. I myself have already -quoted it once before; apparently there is a misunderstanding. It is a -very short sentence; it reads: “You can demand of me every protection in -your labor area, but no protection for crimes.” - -Does that mean, Witness, that you did not grant protection against -crimes? - -SAUCKEL: On the contrary, it can be seen very clearly from that document -that I did not tolerate any crime. I would not protect these people, who -were not subordinate to me, if they committed crimes there. They were -not to do that; that was what I prohibited... - -DR. SERVATIUS: I believe that the German shows very clearly that this -explanation, as the defendant has just given it, is correct. - -I have no further questions to put to the witness. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant Sauckel, I want to ask you a number -of questions. And will you try to speak a little more quietly, and will -you listen carefully to the questions and try to make your answers -responsive to the questions? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, first, I am going to ask you a little -bit about your personnel. You had one large central office, I take it, -did you not—one large central office? - -SAUCKEL: I had a small central office, Your Honor. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): A small central office. And how many -people... - -SAUCKEL: An office of my own. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many employees were in that office? - -SAUCKEL: In this personnel office, Your Honor, there were two personnel -experts; a Ministerialrat, Dr. Stothfang; a Landrat Dr.... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Just a moment; how many, just how many? - -SAUCKEL: Two higher officials and about eight middle and lower officials -as assistants and registrars. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did your inspectors work out of that office? - -SAUCKEL: The inspectors belonged to Department 9 of the Reich Ministry -of Labor which had been installed there. That was a special department -which was established in the Reich Ministry of Labor at my request, with -higher officials who... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now the inspectors worked, I suppose, under -your instructions and reported to you, did they? - -SAUCKEL: The inspectors reported first to Department 5 in the Reich -Ministry of Labor. I was informed in important cases. The inspectors had -the right and the duty to correct bad conditions on the spot when they -were confirmed in the labor administration. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many inspectors were there? - -SAUCKEL: There were in Department 9, I believe... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No, no—in all, how many in all? - -SAUCKEL: There were various inspection offices, Your Honor. This -inspection... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): One moment, Defendant. Just listen to the -question. I said how many inspectors in all the inspection offices were -there? - -SAUCKEL: From my own knowledge I cannot say how many there were in the -Labor Front. The extent of inspection offices in the Labor Front would -have been a matter for Dr. Ley to explain. That I do not know in detail. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, do you know about how many inspectors -were working to inspect the labor work. You must know about how many -were there, don’t you? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot give you accurate figures, but it may have been -approximately 60 or 70, if you take all of them together including those -of the German Labor Front. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, did they go outside of Germany, or did -they work only in Germany? - -SAUCKEL: These inspectors worked for the most part only in Germany. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And they would inspect such matters as food -and travel and conditions of the camps, and so on, would they not? - -SAUCKEL: That was their task. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes. And the important reports would come to -you? - -SAUCKEL: No. According to an agreement the reports had to be sent to the -highest competent Reich authorities for bad conditions to be corrected. -For bad conditions in industry and in camps the competent authority was -the Industrial Inspectorate under Reich Minister of Labor Seldte. That -was the highest... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, did not any of them come to you? - -SAUCKEL: Complaints were also brought to me, but I could do nothing but -send them back to the competent offices and ask that everything be done -to remedy the conditions; and that is what I did. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did the inspectors’ reports come to you, any -of the inspectors’ reports? - -SAUCKEL: The reports did not come to me directly; they went through -channels to those offices which were concerned with correcting such -abuses. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant, I am asking you not whether they -came directly; but did they come to you eventually? Did you get them? -Did you see them? - -SAUCKEL: Such reports came very seldom to me. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So you do not know what the conditions were -then, since you did not get the inspectors’ reports, is that right? - -SAUCKEL: Four times or twice a year I also sent my assistants and these -inspectors in person to the Gauleiter in the German Gaue, and I received -reports on what they discussed during these private conferences with the -regional offices and on what they inspected and observed. There was -nothing of a catastrophic nature, merely shortcomings in the execution -of the directives which I had issued. I was informed about things of -that sort... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So you are telling us that you never got any -reports or complaints of a catastrophic nature; is that right? - -SAUCKEL: I did not quite understand that question. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You never got any reports or complaints of -what you call a catastrophic nature; is that right? - -SAUCKEL: Within Germany—I received reports and complaints such as I -described to my counsel from Field Marshal Kluge, or else they were made -known to me in discussions with Rosenberg. Immediately I took the -necessary measures. But that was not frequently the case... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant, if you would listen to the -question and try to answer it, I think we would get along much faster. -You used the expression “catastrophic nature”; those were your words. -Did you get any reports of a catastrophic nature? - -SAUCKEL: I learned through Field Marshal Kluge, and through reports, -which have been mentioned here, from Rosenberg, about a few cases which -I considered catastrophic and tried to correct. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): These were what you call catastrophic cases? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What were they? - -SAUCKEL: There was the case in the East which Field Marshal Kluge -reported to me, where motion picture houses were surrounded by -recruiting agents. I considered that catastrophic. The second case was -the case of the returning transport, where according to the report—it -is called the later report, but I do not remember the number of the -document—children are said to have died on the way and been placed -outside the train. I considered that catastrophic. But there could... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You have answered. - -SAUCKEL: But... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You have answered that now. - -Did you get any complaints about Koch? - -SAUCKEL: I received complaints about Koch at times from the Minister for -the Occupied Eastern Territories, Rosenberg, and also from another -source. Koch, of course, always defended himself very vehemently. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then you had complaints from several people -about Koch? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. I could... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the complaints said what Koch was doing, -did they? - -SAUCKEL: I did not receive complaints from many sides about Koch, but -rather from one side... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, wait... - -SAUCKEL: But from several people... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait. Won’t you answer the question? I did -not ask you if you have received many complaints. I said, “The -complaints said what Koch was doing.” Is that right? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, in some cases. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And what did you do with those complaints? - -SAUCKEL: As far as my field of work was concerned, when I received -complaints such as have been discussed here, I called a conference in my -office. That was the case immediately after the complaints from -Rosenberg, and on that occasion I adopted the attitude which my defense -counsel cited and pointed out with respect to the conference of 6 -January 1943. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the Koch matter ended after the -conference, I take it? That was all you did? - -[_There was no response._] - -That was the end of it as far as you were concerned? - -SAUCKEL: As far as I was concerned, I personally pointed out to the -Führer on several occasions that I considered it quite out of the -question to treat the Eastern Workers and the people in the East badly; -and by means of the decrees which I issued continually, and which are -contained in my documents, I did whatever I could to protect them. I -ask... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I have asked you about your central office. -Did you have any branch offices? - -SAUCKEL: No, I had no branch offices. Two departments of the Ministry of -Labor, 5 and 6, were put at my disposal for the carrying out of my tasks -of an administrative and technical nature. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. That is enough. - -SAUCKEL: There business matters of an administrative nature were carried -on. I ask... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. Now, were the recruitment -offices in the Ministry of Labor? - -SAUCKEL: No. In the Ministry of Labor there were... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Never mind. That is all you have to say. - -Where were they, where were the recruitment offices? - -SAUCKEL: The recruitment offices were in the occupied territories. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. But under what office? -What administration? What department? - -SAUCKEL: The departments for labor were themselves incorporated in the -administration of these territories. That can be seen very clearly from -my Decree 4, for that had been done in the same manner before I came -into office. They were integral parts of the local administration. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of the local administration? When you -mentioned the 1,500 district offices, were those the recruitment -offices? - -SAUCKEL: Those were the offices in all the various territories which -represented these various administrations on the lowest level, as I have -just mentioned. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You do not answer the question. I asked you -whether they were recruiting offices. Were they recruiting offices? - -SAUCKEL: They were not only recruiting offices, they were the offices of -the territorial labor administration on the lowest level. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So they did administration and recruiting? - -[_There was no response._] - -They did recruiting, did they not? - -SAUCKEL: I understand that that was one and the same thing. The -recruitment was carried on according to German principles as part of the -administration. Outside the administration recruitment could not be -carried on. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): They were recruiting offices, then? The -answer is “yes,” is it not? They were recruiting offices? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. You should have said that in the -beginning. That is what I wanted to know. Now, I want to know the -relation of your offices to the Party offices. The Gaue and the -Gauleiter worked in co-operation with you as plenipotentiaries, working -with you, did they not? - -SAUCKEL: No, Your Honor, that is a mistake. The Gauleiter had nothing to -do with recruiting, that was... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, wait. I said nothing about recruiting. I -asked you the relation of your offices to the Gauleiter. The Gauleiter -co-operated with you in the general program, did they not? - -SAUCKEL: Not in the general program, Your Honor; only in the program of -caring for German and foreign workers. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see. The Gauleiter, then, had nothing to do -with recruiting; is that right? - -SAUCKEL: No; that is right. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right? They looked after the care and -comfort of the men who were recruited, is that right? - -SAUCKEL: If they were working in the Reich, yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In the Reich? - -SAUCKEL: In the Reich. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did the Gaue outside the Reich in the -occupied territories also work for you, or do you consider that they -were part of the Reich? - -[_There was no response._] - -Let me ask the question again. I do not think it is very clear. Certain -of the occupied territories had been incorporated into the Reich, had -they not? - -SAUCKEL: In the East only the territories Wartheland and West Prussia -were incorporated into the Reich... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now again I am not asking you the number that -was incorporated; I just said certain of the occupied territories, -certain parts of them, were incorporated into the Reich. Is that right? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, and when you say the Gauleiter in the -Reich, that includes, does it not, the Gauleiter in those territories -which had been incorporated into the Reich; is that right? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but in this case they could not function in their capacity -as Gauleiter, but only if they were Reichsstatthalter, that is, only if -they had a state administration under them. These were two entirely -separate institutions with different personnel. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did each Gauleiter have a labor office -connected with his Gau, in his Gau? - -SAUCKEL: May I ask if you mean all German Gaue, or only those Gaue of -which we have just spoken, Your Honor? - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I mean only the Gaue of which we have spoken. -They each had a labor office, had they not? - -SAUCKEL: They had a labor administration at the head of which there was -a Gau labor president. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That’s right. That is enough. Now, do you -know the organization of the Gau in the labor administration? Did they -also have a Kreisleiter who attended to the labor work? - -SAUCKEL: No, they did not have that. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I take it there were no Ortsgruppenleiter -that worked on the labor program, then? - -SAUCKEL: No, that was not the case; rather that was a strictly separate -administrative concept... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all right. - -SAUCKEL: But that was... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No, that is all right. - -Now I would like to know a little bit about what you call this private -recruitment. Who appointed the agents who were to do private recruiting? -Who appointed them? Did the employers hire agents to get workmen for -them? - -[_There was no response._] - -Do you know what I mean by private recruiting? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That was done by agents, was it not? - -SAUCKEL: Only in one case: In the year 1944 in France and in part in -Belgium, by way of exception, I permitted agents to act on the basis of -agreements with these French organizations. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Again, Witness, I did not ask you that at -all. You do not listen. I said: Who appointed these agents that worked -as private recruiting agents? Who appointed them? - -SAUCKEL: In those countries, the commissioner for labor allocation -appointed them—I myself could not appoint them—together with the -French organizations. That was an understanding, not a set -appointment... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see. And they would be paid on, I think you -said, a commission basis; is that right? They would be paid, in other -words, so much per workman? Every workman they brought in, they would -get a fee for that; is that right? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. I do not know the details myself any more, but for the -most part that is correct. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, I take it when you used the word -shanghai, which you referred to and explained, that simply means private -recruiting with force. That is all it means, is it not? - -[_There was no response._] - -That is all it means, is it not? Private recruiting with force? - -SAUCKEL: No... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, wait a minute. Can you shanghai a man -without using force? You do not mean that you shanghaied them by -persuasion? Did you? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, for I wanted to recruit these French associations in just -this voluntary, friendly way, over a glass of beer or wine in a café, -and not in the official offices. I don’t mean shanghai in the bad sense -as I recall its being used from my sailor days. This was a rather -drastic expression, but not a concrete representation of the actual -procedure. Never, Your Honor, in France or anywhere else, did I order -men to be shanghaied, but rather... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I know you did not order it. That was not -my question. You mean that “shanghai” just meant that you had a friendly -glass of wine with a workman and then he joined up? Was that what you -meant? - -SAUCKEL: I understood it in that way. I described it to the Central -Planning Board in a somewhat drastic form in order to answer the demands -made of me with some plausible counterarguments as to the efforts I was -making. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why did you object to this private -recruitment? What was the objection to it? - -SAUCKEL: In this case I did not object, but it was contrary to German -ideas concerning the procurement of labor. According to German -principles and... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was it contrary to German law? - -SAUCKEL: It was against my convictions and contrary to German laws. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you that. I am not interested -for the moment in your convictions. I said: Was it contrary to German -law? It was, wasn’t it, against law? - -SAUCKEL: It was in general contrary to the German labor laws. As far as -possible no private recruitment was to take place. But may I say as an -explanation, Your Honor, that after the workman had been won over, he -nevertheless entered into an obligation on the basis of a state -contract. Thus it must not be understood to mean that the worker in -question came into the Reich without a contract approved by the state; a -contract was granted to him just as it was to all others. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean, a laborer that was shanghaied by -private agents had the same rights, once he was in the employment, as -anyone else; is that what you mean? - -SAUCKEL: The same rights and assurances that everyone else had. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right. Now I am going to come to -another subject for a moment. I simply want to understand your defense -and what your point of view is. Now see if this is correct. You did no -recruiting yourself. The Police did no recruiting. Your main job was, in -the first place, to see that everything was done lawfully and legally. -Was not that right, that was your important function? - -SAUCKEL: That was my endeavor. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In order to do that you had to arrange to -have the proper laws passed so as to have the recruiting done under the -law; that is right, isn’t it? That was your job? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes. And very often those laws—by the way, -those laws were simply decrees, of course. They were just orders that -were signed by the Führer, or by you, or by some of the ministers. When -you say laws, you mean, of course, decrees? - -SAUCKEL: The laws in the occupied territories for the recruitment of -manpower had to be decreed by the Führer and issued by the chiefs in the -territories. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What I mean is, in order to make this use of -foreign labor lawful, you simply had to get certain decrees signed; that -was part of your duty, to get them signed? Now... - -SAUCKEL: I did not sign these decrees... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. I did not say you signed -them. I understand that. You have explained that in great detail. Now -let us see where the Police came in. They had nothing to do with the -recruiting. Once a decree was signed, it became law, did it not? When a -decree was signed, it was law? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And if any man resisted being brought in as a -workman, or did not register, or did not live up to his contract, he -became a criminal. That is right, isn’t it? - -SAUCKEL: In this case he violated the law. We did not call it a crime, -but rather an offense. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But he broke the law? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean he did not commit a crime? Did he or -did he not commit a crime? Supposing a man failed to register when he -was told to register for work, was that a crime? - -SAUCKEL: No, that was not a crime. We called that an offense in Germany. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And then when he committed this, he was then -turned over to the Police. Is that right? - -SAUCKEL: Not immediately; in the preliminary proceedings he was told by -the local labor office to appear and to report and... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you explained all that. He got 3 or 4 -days, and then if he did not finally register, for the offense he was -turned over to the Police? Is that right? - -SAUCKEL: How that was actually handled in the various territories I -cannot say. It differed greatly, and was in part very lax. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You told us already in your cross-examination -that if a man broke the law that was when the Police came in. The Police -were there simply to see that the law was not broken. That is right, -isn’t it? That was their function? - -SAUCKEL: No, that was not my task; that was the task of the service -authorities. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, why do you always say, “it was not my -task”? I did not ask you if it was your task. I am just talking about -the Police; I am not talking about you. Now when those labor decrees -were violated, then it was, at a certain time, that the Police began to -function. Isn’t that right? - -SAUCKEL: That would have been the normal way, the correct way. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Good. Or after the men—let us say in -Paris—were rounded up, if they offered physical resistance, then the -Police had to be called in, had they not? If there was physical -resistance you had to call in the Police, had you not? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but I can say that that was hardly ever reported to me. In -most cases the men were then released. It can be clearly seen from the -lists of the workers’ transports—for instance, in the year 1944—that -of a large program not even 10 percent came to Germany. Then there was -nothing else for us to do but to shanghai. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Please don’t go on. You have given all that -evidence before. I just want to get a picture of the whole system. Now -the Army. I think you said the role the Army played was where there had -been sabotage or resistance in the occupied territories the Army would -have to clean that out, so that the labor administration could work. -That would be right, wouldn’t it? - -SAUCKEL: In so-called resistance areas in which the administration was -handicapped by resistance movements, not only in the field of labor -allocation but also in other directions, and the public safety of German -troops could no longer be guaranteed. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not interested in other functions. I am -interested particularly in the field of manpower at this time. So that, -for instance, in Poland or Russia, where it was impossible to recruit -people on account of the resistance to the recruiting or the resistance -to the Army, the Army would go in and help with the recruiting. It would -not be unfair to say that, would it? - -SAUCKEL: One can say that. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right. Now, by the way, did any of -these workmen who resisted or who broke the law or who did not register -after 3 days, were they ever tried by a court, or were they simply -handled by the Police if necessary? They were never tried by court, were -they? - -SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you in detail or in general. Probably there -were various ways of handling that. I do not know the details. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, let us get that in particular. Did any -of your decrees provide for trial by a court of such persons? - -SAUCKEL: No, my decrees did not do that. I was not authorized to issue -such decrees within the territories with regard to court proceedings, -because I was not the competent regional authority. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. I am not very clear on this -picture of camps. Let us look at that for a moment. There were what you -called, I think, distribution or transition camps, were there not? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many? - -SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you from memory. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No, of course not; but do you think there -were more than a hundred? - -SAUCKEL: No, I do not think so. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Hardly. But perhaps nearly a hundred? - -SAUCKEL: No, I do not think that is quite correct either. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You could give no figure on that? - -SAUCKEL: I assume that perhaps in the Reich there were 30 or 40 -transition camps. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In the Reich? - -SAUCKEL: In the Reich. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And were those transition camps also in the -occupied territories, or in France? - -SAUCKEL: In the occupied territories? Whether there were any transition -camps in France and, if so, how many, that I cannot say. In the West, -along the border, there were reception stations; and in the East, along -the border, there were transition camps which had as their purpose an -additional physical examination, delousing of clothing, and... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think that is enough. I think you have -answered that enough. Now there were also what you called the labor -training camps. Do you remember, you said there were also labor training -camps? - -SAUCKEL: These training camps... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Can’t you say “yes” or “no”? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many? - -SAUCKEL: Of that I have no idea... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So you have no idea of that? Maybe 50 or 100? - -SAUCKEL: No. I cannot tell you even approximately how many because I -have never received a list. They were not under me. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): To whom were they subordinate? - -SAUCKEL: They were subordinate exclusively to the Police, that is, as -far as I know, to Gruppenführer Müller. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I presume that they were staffed and -officered by the SS, as were the other concentration camps? - -SAUCKEL: I have to assume that also, but I cannot say definitely because -I have never seen any such camps. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But that would not be improbable, would it? - -SAUCKEL: No. These camps were subordinate exclusively to the Police. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): To the Police. Now who went to the labor -training camps? Who was sent to them? - -SAUCKEL: As far as I know—I heard very little about that—people were -sent there who in a number of cases had committed violations of the -labor regulations, or of discipline in the factories, and so on. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right. That is fine. Thank you very -much. That is all I want to know about that point. In other words, -people who did not turn up for registration, or who broke their -contracts, were sent for training. Now what was the training? What does -that mean, “training”? How are you trained? - -SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you. I assume that they had to work. A -period of time was provided of from about 8 days to 56 days, I believe; -I cannot say exactly. I also heard about that in this courtroom for the -first time. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, let us get a little more light on that -subject. You see, you were after all, were you not, Plenipotentiary, so -you must have known something about these matters. There were labor -camps as well as labor training camps, were there not? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, and I want to distinguish between them... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I will distinguish. Let me ask you the -question. The labor camps were camps where workmen were sent and housed -who were working in industry; isn’t that right? They were simply camps -where workmen were housed and lived. Is that right? - -SAUCKEL: They were camps where workers were billeted; where they lived. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right; and labor training camps were -different from the labor camps, weren’t they? - -SAUCKEL: They were basically different. The labor training camps were an -institution of the Reichsführer SS; the labor camps, in which they -lived, were set up by the factory or group of factories where the -workers were employed. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So when a man was sent to a labor training -camp, he was not sent simply to labor; he was being punished, wasn’t he, -for having broken the law? That must be right, is it not? - -SAUCKEL: To my knowledge, he came to a labor training camp in order to -be trained to be punctual at work, and at the same time it was a -punishment for his offenses at the factory. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were there any decrees with respect to the -labor training camps, any regulations? - -SAUCKEL: I know of no regulations. They had to be issued by the -Reichsführer SS, by the Chief of Police. I issued no regulations. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So, although part of your duty was to look -after the foreign laborers who were brought over here, that stopped -after they were turned over to the Police, and you had no more -jurisdiction; is that right? - -SAUCKEL: That is right; but in one respect I have to correct that. I did -not have the task of looking after the workers; I merely had the task of -getting workers for the industries. The supervision of the camps and the -care of the workers was in no way my task. I have... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Stop, Defendant, we clearly understand that. -You had practically no executive functions, but you repeatedly said that -you passed decrees—by the hundreds, you said—for improving the -condition of the men. Now, we know that you didn’t have the job to feed -them or to house them; but you did have one of your main jobs—one of -your main jobs was to try to keep them in as good condition as possible, -and that was the reason you were interested in any complaints. We all -understand that, don’t we? That is correct? One of your functions was to -do that, wasn’t it? - -SAUCKEL: I had taken over this task; it was not one of the duties with -which I had been entrusted. The complaints with which I was confronted -every day were to the effect that there were not enough workers -available. My task was the direction and the acquisition of workers, but -in my own interest I pointed out the necessity of caring for the workers -and keeping them in good condition. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see, that was a voluntary job on your part. -It was not part of your duty, but nevertheless you did it. But, now, let -me come a little bit to the workers themselves. I think we are very -clear, or comparatively so, as to the numbers that were brought in. I -want to know how many were voluntary and how many were involuntary. Now, -before you answer that, I mean those workers who were brought in, not -under law, but simply who volunteered for work of their own accord. -There were not very many of those, I suppose, were there? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, there were a great many workers who volunteered without -legal compulsion, as the result of propaganda and recruitment and -because of the fact that in Germany wages and such things were -comparatively high and regulated. There were a great many workers... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, let us take a look at that. There came a -time when the laws applying to German workers were applied to workers -for foreign countries; is that not true? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I mean, every German had to work, had he not, -under the law? Right? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, that is right. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And that law was finally applied to foreign -workers as well, as you just said. Right? - -SAUCKEL: That law was also introduced into the occupied territories. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. For everyone alike. So that after that -law was introduced, there was no such thing as voluntary work because -after that law was introduced everyone had to work, had they not? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, as far as demands were made for them in the occupied -territories and elsewhere, according to need. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So when you were talking about involuntary -work, that must have applied to the time before that law was passed? -Right? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, however... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was the law passed? - -SAUCKEL: That law was introduced at various dates in the late autumn of -1942. I cannot tell the exact dates in the various territories, but I -should like to say that under this law, as well, voluntary workers still -came voluntarily, to Germany. They... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You are right. If they had not, they would -have gone involuntarily, wouldn’t they? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why not? - -SAUCKEL: Only certain quotas were raised but not all the workers were -demanded for Germany. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, then those certain quotas that were -requested would have to have gone involuntarily; right? - -SAUCKEL: No. There was also voluntary recruitment carried out, and that -means that among the workers... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait, wait, Defendant. Don’t let us fool over -this. It is quite simple. If there was a law which made it necessary for -men to work when their quotas had been called up, they had to work, had -they not? Right? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, they had to work, in their own countries first of all, but -they also could volunteer to work in Germany instead of working in their -own country. And we attached great importance to this. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In other words, a man had a choice of forced -labor in an industry in France or in Germany, so in that sense it was -voluntary; is that right? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, just two or three more questions. You -have answered clearly, I think. I just want to ask you about three -documents. I think that is all. I am not going into detail. Do you -remember the document known as R-124, which was the conference on March -1st of 1944? You remember that conference? - -Would someone show him the German notes of that, please, if you have -them? - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you remember the conference? Have you -looked at the notes? - -SAUCKEL: That was the conference about the Central Planning Board. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, that is right. Did you look over those -notes? - -SAUCKEL: Now? - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes. - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do they tell about what took place in -substance? In substance, there was an account of the conference, wasn’t -there? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, at this moment—I beg to be excused—I cannot remember the -concrete topic of discussion at that conference. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, did you find anything in the notes, as -you read them, over, which you thought in substance was a great mistake? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot tell now what subject is meant. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Have you read the notes? Have you read them? - -SAUCKEL: I did not read all the notes about the Central Planning Board. -At that time the notes about the Central Planning Board were not -available to me. Therefore I did not know that notes were taken about -the Central Planning Board. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Don’t go on with all this talk. I simply -asked whether you read them and you said you had not read them all. That -is all we need. - -SAUCKEL: No, I have not read them all. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of the portion that you read, did you find -any mistakes? - -SAUCKEL: I found inexact passages, yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Inexact passages? - -SAUCKEL: Inaccuracies. For instance, the report of my interpolation -“200,000 to 5,000,000”; that is an utterly impossible proportion. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Quite. Now, you used one expression in those -notes which I did not understand; and I am going to ask you what you -meant by it. You spoke of your special labor supply executives. Was that -the committee for social peace that you spoke about yesterday—about a -thousand people in it? Do you remember? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is the same thing? That was the -committee that you said had to be specially trained by the SS, I think, -and by the police in France, or wherever they were used? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): By the way, you spoke of them being armed. -Why were they armed? Why did they carry arms? - -SAUCKEL: For their own protection and for the protection of those whom -they recruited; they had to have some means of defense against attacks. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You did not usually have anything to do with -the Police, did you? Why did you organize this police corps? Why did you -help organize this police corps, an armed police corps? Why did you do -it? - -SAUCKEL: That was not an armed police corps in the usual sense, rather -it was... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Never mind describing it. We know what it -was. Why did you organize it? I thought you kept away from police -measures. - -SAUCKEL: In order to have protection for these people and for these -places which frequently were raided, demolished, or harassed by the -resistance movement. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see what you mean. This was an organization -to protect the recruiting that was going on; is that right? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see. Now, I just want to ask one question -about another manuscript, 016-PS, dated 20 April 1944, which was the -labor mobilization program. That is the program which you issued and -signed, is it not? You look at it. That is the program you signed? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): It is not? I do not know what you mean. - -SAUCKEL: I have not understood you correctly, I believe. I understood -1944. It was... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No, no, on 20 April 1942. You issued the -labor mobilization program. Is that the program signed by you, shown in -the Document 016-PS? That is the program, is it not? - -SAUCKEL: The program—may I say the following in this connection: It was -a program which did not become effective immediately... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant, please answer the question. All I -want to know is, first, you did issue a mobilization program, did you -not? - -SAUCKEL: That I did, but... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. And that is the one shown in that -exhibit, is it not? I am simply identifying it. - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. I wanted to ask you a little bit about -bringing the youths of the occupied territories into the Reich. Certain -of the youths were brought in, were they not? - -SAUCKEL: Youths were brought in, but against my... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Against your desire, you said. How many were -brought in? - -SAUCKEL: That I cannot possibly say from my own knowledge. I do not -know. There were youths... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, what were the ages? How young were -they? - -SAUCKEL: That I cannot say either—what age the youths were—because -they were with their families who came into the Reich as a result of -refugee measures or the evacuation of other localities. Then another -time, in connection with the so-called “Hay Action” in 1944, youths came -to the Reich, but without my having anything to do with it. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You know there were young adolescents, of -course, young adolescent children, do you not? You know that, do you -not? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What was the purpose of bringing them in? -Were they recruited for labor, or were they to be trained in the Reich -and educated? - -SAUCKEL: There are various explanations for the fact that youths were -brought into the Reich. Some of these youths were not recruited or -brought in by agents; rather they came with their families, at the -latter’s wish, when refugee and evacuation measures were carried out. -Others came... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. We will leave out the ones -that came with the families. Some were recruited for labor, were they -not? Some for work, were they not? - -SAUCKEL: Youths under the legal age of 14 years could not be brought in -for work. By agreements, such as can be found in the documents, other -offices brought youths in to train and care for them. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You just do not answer the questions. I asked -you whether some were brought in for work. Children over 14, who were -still under 20, were brought in for work, were they not—recruited for -work? - -SAUCKEL: But only volunteers were brought in. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Only volunteers were brought in? - -SAUCKEL: Youths were supposed to be brought in only as volunteers. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You did not recruit any youth involuntarily; -you mean that? - -SAUCKEL: I did not. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I do not mean you personally; I mean the -administration. - -SAUCKEL: No, the labor administration was not supposed to bring in any -youths, especially girls, by compulsion; only voluntarily. Domestic -servants were only volunteers. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Some were brought in to be educated in -Germany and to become German citizens, were they not? - -SAUCKEL: That I found out from the documents; but I was not responsible -for that. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You did not know about that before? Did -anyone advise you that it was in accordance with international law to -force people in occupied countries to come to Germany to work? - -SAUCKEL: I was expressly urged by the Führer to take that measure, and -it was described to me as admissible. No office raised any objections to -or had any misgivings about this measure; rather it met with the -requirements of all offices. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you that. I asked you whether -anybody advised you that it was in accordance with international law. - -SAUCKEL: No. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You knew, did you not, that the Foreign -Office had to consider such matters? - -SAUCKEL: I spoke with the Foreign Office on various occasions and this -was found to be in order, because we were convinced that in these -territories, on the basis of the terms of surrender, the introduction of -German regulations was permissible and possible under the conditions -prevailing and in view of existing agreements. That was my belief. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you say that you were advised by the -Foreign Office that you were entitled under international law to force -people to come from Russia to work in Germany? - -SAUCKEL: The Foreign Office never told me anything to the contrary; but -the Foreign Office, I believe, was not competent for questions -concerning the East: I do not know. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Whom did you ask for advice on the subject? - -SAUCKEL: I found these regulations in existence before I took office. -These regulations had already been issued. The Führer expressly charged -me to carry them out. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then, the answer is that you asked nobody? Is -that right? - -SAUCKEL: I did not ask anybody. I could not ask anybody, because all -offices wanted these measures and accepted them. There was never any -discussion to the contrary. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And did you say that it was not the task of -the Police to enforce recruiting for labor? - -SAUCKEL: It was not the task of the Police to carry out recruitment. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, why did you say at the conference on 4 -January 1944, which is reported in the Document 1292-PS, that you would -do everything in your power to furnish the requested manpower in 1944; -but whether it would succeed depended primarily on what German -enforcement agents would be made available, and that your project could -not be carried out with domestic enforcement agents? Does that not mean -that the Police would have to enforce your recruitment programs? - -SAUCKEL: No, it means—the reproduction of these minutes is not very -exact—I explained to the Führer that I probably would not be able to -carry out his program because there were very large partisan areas; and -as long as these partisan areas were not cleared up, so that a regular -administration could be established there, no recruitment could take -place there either. First of all, therefore, normal administrative -conditions would have to be established again. That could be done only -by those organs whose task it was. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What did you mean by German enforcement -agents? - -SAUCKEL: By German enforcement agencies I meant the normal -administration as such, but in some territories that was too weak. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, then, why was it that the Reichsführer -SS explained that the enforcement agents put at his disposal were -extremely few, if those enforcement agents were not police agents? - -SAUCKEL: I did not understand the question correctly in the first place. -The Reichsführer, I believe, said—according to my recollection—that -for the pacification of these areas he did not have troops enough -because they were all at the front. That did not refer to the -recruitment and management of compulsory labor, but to the -re-establishment of normal conditions in these areas. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well then, are you saying that it was not the -task of the Police to help you in recruitment, but that it was the task -of the military? - -SAUCKEL: That differed greatly depending on the various regulations in -the territories. There were areas in which the military commanders had -the sole executive power, and there were areas in which civilian -authorities had the executive power on the German side. There was a -third kind of area, military operational zones with rear areas, in which -the commanders of the armies had the executive power. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, then, either it was the Police, or it -was the military, or it was some other force which was going to carry -out your forcible recruiting; is that right? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, but in these areas as well, the machinery of the civilian -administration was available, which was not identical with the military -or with the Police, but represented within these Wehrmacht organizations -separate branches of the administration under a special administrative -chief. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, I don’t understand then what you meant -by saying that your project could not be carried out with domestic -enforcement agents. - -That is all I have to ask. Then the defendant can return to the dock. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I am asking the Tribunal to look at -Document Sauckel-3, which is a list of Sauckel’s offices, to see the -position of the witness whom I am about to call. - -Under Sauckel in the Reich Ministry of Labor there were various -departments, one of which, the department of the witness Timm, was the -so-called Europe Office, which had three subdepartments—one for the -West, one for the East, and the third for the South and Southwest. - -With the permission of the Court, I call the witness Timm. - -[_The witness Timm took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name. - -MAX TIMM (Witness): Max Timm. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you worked in the Reich Labor Ministry in the -Allocation of Labor department? - -TIMM: Yes, that is correct. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you already there when Sauckel took office? - -TIMM: Yes, and I had been in the labor administration for some years -before that. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the impression you had of your new superior when -Sauckel took over the office? - -TIMM: When Sauckel assumed office, I had the impression of a very -energetic, hard-working man, who was inclined to get excited at times, -even angry no doubt, and who demanded much of his co-workers, but also -made great demands on himself. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How was he in carrying out his measures? - -TIMM: When he assumed office there was a good deal of confusion in the -field of labor allocation. Everybody had something to do with labor -allocation. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was that the reason why that office was created? - -TIMM: The previous chiefs had not had enough force to push their program -through against the opposition of various offices; and Sauckel was the -strong man, and particularly the strong political figure, who was to put -things in order. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How did Sauckel approach this new task? Did he adhere to -the administrative regulations, or did he do it in his own way, in—as -one says—an unrestrained new manner? - -TIMM: He considered his task very much a political task, but he always -did his best to handle administrative matters in an orderly way. He was -known generally as a Gauleiter who was friendly to the civil servants. -Also, in order to instruct all the offices under his administration, he -held so-called staff meetings at regular intervals in which the most -important things were discussed. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was your position in that office? - -TIMM: In the Allocation of Labor department I had first a subdepartment -and later a department. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What did that department deal with? - -TIMM: That department had to deal with all questions concerning the -assignment of labor, particularly the classification of skilled workers, -training of workers, vocational advice, and employment agencies for -apprentices. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was your office called the Europe Office? - -TIMM: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have an over-all view of what went on in the -office? - -TIMM: Not completely, owing to the fact that Gauleiter Sauckel at the -same time remained Gauleiter in Thuringia and he worked in Berlin in -Thuringia House, whereas the special departments put at his disposal -remained in the Ministry of Labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: No, you did not understand my question. The question was -whether you, from your office, had an over-all view of what went on in -the field of labor allocation without regard to Sauckel’s activity. - -TIMM: Yes, but not entirely, because we were not informed about all -events, due to the separation of the offices. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What were the staff meetings? Who took part in them and -of what kind of people were they composed? - -TIMM: For the most part the liaison men of the various branches were -called to staff conferences. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of people were they? - -TIMM: There were various kinds of people, civil servants but also -economists, and the like. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But you should tell us from what offices these people -came, or were they people who were in Sauckel’s office? - -TIMM: They were mostly people from other branches, as, for instance, a -representative of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the -representatives of the Ministry for Armament and War Production, of the -Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and of other departments. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was that the so-called specialist labor staff? - -TIMM: That was the specialist labor staff. - -DR. SERVATIUS: About how many people were in it? - -TIMM: In my estimation there were probably about 15 to 20 people. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Besides that, Sauckel had a personal labor staff. What -kind of people were in that? - -TIMM: The personal labor staff consisted mostly of men whom Sauckel had -brought with him from Weimar, men of his own immediate circle. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did he also have consultants? Who were these? - -TIMM: He had two personal consultants, Landrat Berch and Ministerialrat -Dr. Stothfang. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what position did Dr. Didier hold? - -TIMM: Dr. Didier, as far as I remember, was the press expert. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How were these staff meetings carried on? What was -discussed? - -TIMM: At those staff meetings all matters of labor allocation, that is -the entire German labor allocation program, were discussed; and the -sessions were generally opened with a complete report by Herr Sauckel, -in which he explained his plans for the future. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were questions of recruitment in occupied territories -also discussed; and what is of importance here, the difficulties which -existed then, and the methods of which we have heard? What was said -about that? - -TIMM: Questions of recruitment were generally not discussed there so -much but rather questions concerning the Reich. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I asked you first about the occupied territories. Was, -for instance, that case discussed which has been brought up here, the -surrounding of a motion picture house and the seizing of people there, -and similar cases? - -TIMM: Yes, the case of the motion picture house is known to me. - -DR. SERVATIUS: That was discussed? - -TIMM: Yes, that was discussed. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what was done about it? - -TIMM: Sauckel at once instructed several gentlemen—I don’t remember -whom—to make all possible investigations in order to clarify the case. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were other cases reported? - -TIMM: There were no other cases which could be compared in seriousness -with that case which has just been described. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was there also discussion about the question of labor -conditions in Germany for foreign workers? - -TIMM: There were discussions at the staff conferences about labor -conditions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And was it not reported there that conditions existed in -individual camps or industries which were objectionable? - -TIMM: Cases of that kind were discussed. In general they concerned -clothing, nutrition, and similar things. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How did these reports come to the staff conferences? Who -reported them? From what source did one find out about them? - -TIMM: Herr Sauckel always attached importance to having these things -examined on the spot, and he maintained an extensive system of -inspection in order to get an accurate picture of these questions; and -these inspection reports were then discussed in detail at the staff -conferences. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have an announcement to make. - -Upon consideration of the motion of the Prosecution, dated the 21st of -May, and the memorandum of the Defense Counsel in reply thereto, dated -the 29th of May, the Tribunal makes the following order: - -The motion of the Prosecution that arguments as to the guilt or -innocence of the individual defendants be heard at the conclusion of the -evidence relating to the individual defendants and before the -introduction of evidence relating to the accused organizations is -granted. The Tribunal, however, will not decide the question of the -guilt or innocence of any defendant until after all the evidence has -been heard; and, if any of the evidence relating to the accused -organizations is thought by counsel for any defendant to support his -defense, he may ask to be heard further with regard thereto. The -Tribunal, at the conclusion of the evidence relating to the individual -defendants, will accordingly hear first the argument in their behalf, -and then the summing up of the Prosecution. The statements of each of -the defendants in his own behalf will be heard at the conclusion of the -Trial before judgment. - -The Tribunal is of opinion that the argument relating to the guilt or -innocence of the individual defendants will be more helpful if heard -immediately at the conclusion of the evidence bearing thereon, and -before the Tribunal has departed from this and goes into the branch of -the case relating to the organizations. This arrangement, furthermore, -will give the commissioners, who are taking the evidence as to the -organizations, further time in which to complete their work. The -defendants will not be prejudiced in any way by this arrangement; for, -apart from the fact that their cases are essentially different from the -cases of the organizations, they will be allowed to call to the -attention of the Tribunal any circumstance developed on the hearing of -the organizations which is thought to be helpful to their defense. The -Tribunal finds nothing in the Charter which forbids this procedure, and -Article 9 leaves to the discretion of the Tribunal the manner of hearing -evidence on behalf of the accused organizations. - -Counsel for the individual defendants will not be permitted to -cross-examine the witnesses called by counsel on behalf of the -organizations, or to take part in such proceedings save when specially -authorized to do so by the Tribunal. - -That is all. - -The Tribunal will sit tomorrow at 10 o’clock in open session until 1 -o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH DAY - Saturday, 1 June 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I ask permission for the Defendant Von Papen to be -absent on Monday and Tuesday to prepare his case. - -He will be represented by my colleague Dr. Nelte. - -[_The witness Timm resumed the stand._] - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, yesterday we were speaking, at the end, of the -staff conferences. I should like to leave this question now, but we will -come back to it later when we talk about controls. First, I should like -you to explain the relationship of Sauckel’s office to the higher -authorities. Whom did Sauckel come under? - -TIMM: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was under -the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what did he have to do with Hitler? - -TIMM: The Plenipotentiary General kept in the closest touch with Hitler, -and as far as possible he presented his plans to Hitler at personal -discussions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was there a constant connection with the Four Year Plan -through a liaison man, or how was that done? - -TIMM: There were various ways of keeping the contact active. There were -liaison men on both sides. The Plenipotentiary General sent men from his -select staff to the office of the Four Year Plan for a preliminary -co-ordination of his plans, and on the other hand, as far as I can -recall, there were almost constantly delegates from the office of the -Four Year Plan who took part in the staff conferences. - -In addition, the Plenipotentiary General frequently had personal talks -with the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How was the co-operation with the other ministries -conducted? With Goebbels, to begin with? - -TIMM: The Plenipotentiary General felt in principle that it was -important to keep as close a contact as possible with the other -departments and to have his plans and intentions co-ordinated -beforehand. Co-operation with the Ministry of Propaganda was no longer -so good, especially at the time when the Minister, Dr. Goebbels, was -Delegate for Total War Effort. - -DR. SERVATIUS: After the proclamation of total war was Sauckel -subordinate to Goebbels? - -TIMM: The relationship was never quite clear. In my opinion it had to be -looked at this way: The Delegate for Total War Effort received -comprehensive powers for all tasks, and was therefore in fact superior -to the GBA (Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor). - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the relation with the other authorities, for -instance with the Reich Ministry for Food? - -TIMM: The co-operation with the Reich Ministry for Food was very good. -The relations with State Secretary Backe especially were always very -good as far as I could judge. There were also continual conferences -between the experts of both offices on questions of feeding in general. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, what was the date of the proclamation of -total war? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Does the witness know when total war was declared? - -TIMM: I do not remember the date. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It was after the fall of Stalingrad. I cannot give you -the exact date. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, please. - -DR. SERVATIUS: As to relations with Himmler, what co-operation was there -with that office? - -TIMM: I know nothing of any close personal relations between the GBA and -Himmler. On Sauckel’s labor staff there was a liaison man from the -Reichsführer SS, especially for any general police questions that might -arise concerning the allocation of labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of questions were there? - -TIMM: All kinds of questions; especially the question of badges in -connection with the employment of foreigners. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And probably also questions concerning barbed wire? - -TIMM: Yes; questions concerning barbed wire, and all the questions which -arose in police spheres. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And also the question of labor training camps? - -TIMM: As I was not an expert on those questions I cannot remember very -well, and I do not know whether there were any detailed conferences -about them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I should like to pass on to the connection of the -authorities with the occupied territories. - -With whom were negotiations carried on and to whom did one apply when -making demands on the occupied territories? - -TIMM: One had to apply to the respective district governments at the -time—military commanders, Reich commissioners or something similar. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of position did Sauckel’s deputies have? - -TIMM: The deputies were organized and intended to be men who were to -exert a direct and vigorous influence on the execution of Sauckel’s -plans, instructions and orders. - -This goal, however, was not reached as they were not able to succeed. I -remember that the Plenipotentiary General therefore intended to ask -Hitler for more comprehensive instructions and more comprehensive -powers. - -I seem to recall that the Plenipotentiary General once announced that he -had learned from Hitler himself, or from his entourage, that Hitler was -not inclined to extend these powers as he could not release the local -governments, especially the military commanders, from their -comprehensive responsibility and powers; so the Plenipotentiary General -had only one recourse, that of putting forward his wishes through the -channel of direct negotiations. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Why were the deputies not able to succeed? - -TIMM: The deputies could only try to consult with the existing regional -governments, but the opposition was so strong that they could not carry -any weight. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did these deputies not hold another position at the same -time? - -TIMM: As they could not attain an independent position, the deputies -were generally incorporated into the existing local administration by -way of negotiations. With few exceptions they were entrusted with the -management of the labor section, or were incorporated into the section -for economy and labor. - -Generally they were placed within the staffs of the military commanders -as administrative officials and that was the position which they held -ostensibly. - -DR. SERVATIUS: So it was a combination of two or more positions held by -one person? - -TIMM: It was, to a certain extent, a combination of different positions -held by one person, of which, without doubt, the most important was the -position of section chief in the existing regional government. - -DR. SERVATIUS: With whom did this arrangement of a dual position -originate? - -Was it Sauckel who insisted on it, or the responsible regional -authorities? - -TIMM: As far as I know, it resulted from talks with the regional -governments on the question of the position of the deputies. The -regional governments wanted on no account to have any men in their -districts who were independent of their administration and had special -powers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: So that curbed the initiative of the deputies? - -TIMM: Their initiative as originally planned was no doubt checked. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How did Sauckel exercise his authority to issue -instructions? - -TIMM: The authority to issue instructions to the offices abroad was -generally exercised by means of sending instructions, directives, and -decrees through normal administrative channels via the central offices. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Could he issue instructions to cover everything that -happened there, or were there other offices which dealt with the -recruitment of labor? - -TIMM: At that time, unfortunately, the situation was such that even -after the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation -of Labor other agencies there repeatedly interfered in labor matters or -carried on recruiting too—that is, agencies which had neither the power -nor the authority to do so. - -THE PRESIDENT: What time is he talking about; he says “at that time”? - -DR. SERVATIUS: I did not quite understand. - -THE PRESIDENT: I say what time. He said “at that time.” At what time? -What time is he speaking about? - -DR. SERVATIUS: [_Turning to the witness._] What time are you speaking -about? - -TIMM: It was at the time when the Plenipotentiary General for the -Allocation of Labor was appointed. - -DR. SERVATIUS: When was he appointed? - -TIMM: He was appointed in March 1942. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How was the recruiting carried out? Was it voluntary? How -would you differentiate between the types? - -TIMM: In principle, recruiting was carried out on a voluntary basis -because from the technical point of view—that is, from the point of -view of the utilization of the labor recruited—only voluntary -recruiting could lead to success. That is to say only voluntary -recruiting could bring people who were happy and willing to work, and -who could achieve the output necessary for production. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was that the point of view which Sauckel emphasized? - -TIMM: During the whole time that I worked with Sauckel in the Ministry -of Labor I never heard of any events which indicated any other point of -view. He repeatedly emphasized that the basis of recruiting must be -voluntary. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. He issued many directives and held many speeches. -But did he not within the select circle... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, and Witness, will you try and pause -between the sentences, and between the questions and the answers? The -witness’ sentences seem to me to be running on, whereas if he would -pause it would give the interpreter some chance. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Sauckel issued a number of directives and -made speeches to that effect. Did he not give you more precise -instructions for the guidance of the department? - -TIMM: The instructions which we received always agreed in principle with -the instructions which he issued to larger circles at presidential or -similar conferences. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the result of voluntary recruiting? Did the -workers come solely on the basis of that recruiting, that is on the -basis of the conditions as described to them? - -TIMM: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: About how many were there? - -TIMM: It is, of course, not possible for me to give exact figures. -Thinking it over I believe I can say that about 2 to 3 million workers -might be considered voluntary workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Other workers came by virtue of the compulsory service -laws which were introduced in those countries? - -TIMM: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What do you estimate the number of those people to be? - -TIMM: I can hardly give an estimate. As about 2 to 3 million may be -considered volunteers, the rest must reach this figure too. - -DR. SERVATIUS: People were deported too. Do you understand what is meant -by deportation? - -TIMM: If I may ask, does that mean the people who were transported for -military or similar reasons? I am not quite clear as to what you mean by -that. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You do not know what deportations are? - -TIMM; You mean forcible deportations, do you not? I cannot remember and -do not know anything about such measures in connection with the activity -of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In connection with the obtaining, recruiting, and -conscription of labor, there are quite a number of serious charges -concerning abuses which occurred. To what extent did you learn of them? - -TIMM: I understand your question to mean abuses in the recruiting -itself? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -TIMM: I have no practical knowledge of the recruiting itself. As far as -I had a general view of the situation, serious abuses, such as you -mention in your question, were not reported to the GBA. Yesterday in an -answer I pointed out that I knew of the case of the surrounded cinema, -and that I could recall no events surpassing that case in gravity. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now I come to conditions in Germany. Did you hear -anything about conditions of the worst kind there? You probably read the -papers and know what these charges mean. You were one of the people most -closely involved there, so what did you learn? - -TIMM: Complaints about the treatment of foreigners came through various -channels to the GBA too. They referred in general to questions of -clothing and food, and that of barbed wire which came up repeatedly, and -the question of badges, the marking of foreign workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the Prosecution is speaking here of Crimes -against Humanity. - -TIMM: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Are those only things which happened daily in a normal -administration, or are they, so to say, things which were reported? - -TIMM: Such things as you call catastrophic, Doctor, did not come to my -knowledge, because if they had, I should still remember them now. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who supervised the execution of the orders, and how did -that come to your knowledge, or how should that have come to your -knowledge? - -TIMM: Various authorities were concerned with supervising the work of -foreign workers. These were five or six different offices. There was in -particular the German Labor Front, which, on the basis of a so-called -Führer decision, claimed for itself the question of the treatment and -care of foreign workers. And I may mention in this connection that it -repeatedly said this assignment went beyond the order given by the -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor to the German Labor -Front, and that to a certain extent it was bound by a higher authority -to carry out this task of welfare and control of treatment, _et cetera_. -On this fundamental question there were repeated conferences between the -office of the GBA and the German Labor Front, and these later led to an -agreement according to which the GBA also transferred this question to -the German Labor Front. To settle these matters, the German Labor Front -established a central inspectorate whose mission it was to look after -foreign workers throughout the whole Reich. In addition to this central -inspectorate, the Office for the Allocation of Labor within the German -Labor Front was still functioning. - -DR. SERVATIUS: We will come to that in a minute. - -TIMM: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What connection was there between Sauckel’s office and -this inspectorate of the Labor Front? How were contacts maintained? - -TIMM: In the first place, a man from the German Labor Front worked as -liaison man on Sauckel’s technical staff... - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who was that? - -TIMM: That was Herr Hoffmann. And secondly, the central inspectorate of -the German Labor Front constantly had conferences on their inspection -activities to which an official of the GBA was invited. - -DR. SERVATIUS: This liaison man, Hoffmann, presumably reported on what -he heard from the Labor Front? - -TIMM: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What did he report? - -TIMM: The things which he reported covered the same ground as I have -already told you about. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The German Labor Front already had this task before -Sauckel’s office was set up? - -TIMM: The German Labor Front was of the opinion, as I, for several... - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you must answer me. The German Labor Front had -this task before Sauckel came? - -TIMM: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did it consider that its authority was restricted by the -fact that Sauckel was appointed? - -TIMM: I was just about to explain that it considered its task a general, -comprehensive one; and when the newly appointed Plenipotentiary General -for the Allocation of Labor occupied himself so intensively with these -matters, it did see in this a certain encroachment on its task. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And was this agreed upon between Ley and Sauckel? - -TIMM: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: At whose instigation was this agreement reached? - -TIMM: As far as I can recall the suggestion was the outcome of a wish of -the German Labor Front. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the aim? - -TIMM: Of course, I can give only my personal opinion. I believe that the -aim was in any case to express the fact that the German Labor Front was -generally competent for these questions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who presented the agreement, Sauckel...? - -THE PRESIDENT: Have we not got the agreement between Sauckel and Ley? - -DR. SERVATIUS: It was submitted by the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: If we have it, we do not want to have his personal -recollection of it, do we? - -DR. SERVATIUS: The witness goes back too far. I would like to know who -suggested it and drew it up, and when it was signed. There are two dates -at the foot of this document as far as I remember today. - -M. HERZOG: Mr. President, the document which is being mentioned now was -submitted to the Tribunal. It is Document Number 1913-PS. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It is in my document book, in the first document book, -Page 79. In the English book it is Page 74. Here in the first text may -be found... - -THE PRESIDENT: What are you after? There is no use in getting the -evidence of a witness, who said he does not remember in detail about it, -about a document which we have got before us. It does not seem to me to -be in the least bit useful to know who suggested that the agreement -should be entered into. - -DR. SERVATIUS: [_Turning to the witness._] There were still other -inspectorates. For example, the Gauleiter was an authorized agent for -the Allocation of Labor Department. To what extent did the Gauleiter -report things which occurred in their Gaue during the allocation of -labor? - -TIMM: The Gauleiter were appointed by the Plenipotentiary General for -the Allocation of Labor by virtue of his Decree Number 1, to be his -authorized agents, with the task of applying themselves precisely to -this question. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What did they report? - -TIMM: I do not know of any written reports from the Gauleiter on this -question; at least, not to any extent worth mentioning. Hardly any -written reports from the Gauleiter came in on this question; at least, -not to our office. - -DR. SERVATIUS: At this opportunity I should like to clear up the -question of the position held by the Gauleiter as authorized agents for -the Allocation of Labor in relation to the Gau labor offices. Was the -Gauleiter president of the Gau labor offices, or in what relation did -they stand to each other? - -TIMM: In administration and matters of personnel, the president of the -Gau labor offices was undoubtedly subordinate to the Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor, or to the Reich Minister for Labor. -But the Plenipotentiary General had made it the duty of these presidents -to keep in closest contact with the Gauleiter and to make constant -reports on the things which occurred in their sphere of work. In -particular, if there were any tension or difficulties in the Gau, they -were to apply to the Gauleiter for aid. - -DR. SERVATIUS: If I understand you correctly, the Party as such had -nothing to do with the actual utilization of labor itself? - -TIMM: I believe that is so. If the question is to be considered in that -way, I would say that the institution of a Plenipotentiary General -emphasized the political aspect of the Allocation of Labor, and that the -Gauleiter, according to their varying personal opinions, concerned -themselves to a greater or lesser extent with the Allocation of Labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: As an organ for care and control? - -TIMM: Yes; for all questions concerning labor allocation. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you will understand that your testimony -concerning your knowledge of the events submitted by the Prosecution is -received with great skepticism. Did you not unofficially hear and see -things which, if they did not come to your attention officially, -certainly should have given you cause to investigate them more -thoroughly? - -TIMM: Of course, one heard here and there of cases where foreign workers -were allegedly ill-treated in some way. As far as such things came to my -attention I always considered them official matters, and made out a -report accordingly or had them attended to. In such cases, the necessary -investigations were made immediately and everything necessary was done -to clear up the matter. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were these individual cases not symptoms of conditions as -a whole? - -TIMM: I do not believe so. At any rate, events which one might call -catastrophic never came to my attention. As I have already said, they -were nearly always only things which were connected with the question of -treatment—that is to say, questions of accommodations in camps, -clothing, and so forth. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the output and the morale of the workers? - -TIMM: The output achieved by foreign workers varied. The output of the -Eastern Workers was especially good. In general, because of this output, -the demand for Eastern Workers was great. The output was also very good -in particular of the skilled French workers... - -DR. SERVATIUS: That is enough. Now, I must come back again to your -connections with the occupied territories. Did you take part in -negotiations with authorities in the occupied territories? - -TIMM: Not in the East. A few times I went on journeys in the West with -the Plenipotentiary General and took part in negotiations. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you with him once when he visited General -Falkenhausen? - -TIMM: Yes, I was present at the negotiations. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Of what nature were these negotiations, as far as the -atmosphere was concerned? Were they tense, were they friendly, or what -were they like? - -TIMM: The conferences with General Falkenhausen at which I was present -were generally comparatively short. I had the feeling that the two -gentlemen did not care for each other... - -THE PRESIDENT: What does it matter whether they were tense or friendly -or short? - -DR. SERVATIUS: General Falkenhausen made an affidavit, which was -submitted here, in which he said that Sauckel gave him orders and -negotiated with him in a manner which caused him to offer the strongest -opposition. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you want to contradict Falkenhausen’s affidavit you -can put it to the witness, if that’s what you are trying to do. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I do not have it here at the moment. I will forego that -question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You were in France? - -TIMM: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you present at negotiations with the French -authorities? - -TIMM: I was present at negotiations with Laval, who was Premier at that -time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Of what nature were these negotiations? - -TIMM: One can certainly say that the negotiations were carried on in a -very friendly manner. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did the French not bring any complaints? - -TIMM: Individual complaints were made. I remember that the complaints -were especially about the question of the transfer of wages. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to ask you whether complaints about -treatment, the methods of recruitment, coercive measures, and so -on—whether complaints were made about those things? - -TIMM: No, I do not remember any complaints of that sort. I should -certainly remember them if there had been any. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have a few more questions concerning Sauckel’s -relations with the Central Planning Board and with Speer. You yourself -repeatedly represented Sauckel at the Central Planning Board. Is that -correct? - -TIMM: Yes, a few times. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the Central Planning Board as -far as Sauckel was concerned? - -TIMM: The Central Planning Board was a branch of the Four Year Plan. Its -task, as far as the GBA was concerned, was to collect the demands for -workers made by the big employers, and to adjust these demands at -regular sessions. As the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of -Labor could not judge himself the importance of the use made of workers -by the various industries, this question was decided in the Central -Planning Board. An attempt was made, for certain periods of time, for as -long a time as possible, to work out a balance of workers, I might say, -and in connection... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant Sauckel told us all about this already, didn’t -he? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then there is no need to go into it with another witness. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know Speer’s position? - -TIMM: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was Speer’s position in relation to Sauckel and vice -versa? Could Speer give orders to Sauckel in particular? - -TIMM: Speer was Plenipotentiary General for Armament while Sauckel was -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, and Speer held the -point of view that he, as Armament Minister, should have decisive -authority in all matters pertaining to the production of armaments, that -is raw materials, coal and consequently also the allocation of labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Could Speer give Sauckel orders and instructions, or did -he actually give them? - -TIMM: Yes, as a matter of form. As I have just said, the question was -not quite clear, and the two conceptions were opposed. In reality there -was always a certain tension between the two men because the Armament -Ministry wanted more or less to claim the power to issue instructions. -This tension was generally cleared up through talks, or the exchange of -letters between the two men. Sometimes it led to what one might call -“agreement conferences,” headed by Reichsminister Lammers, as he was at -that time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the result of these conferences, these agreement -conferences? - -TIMM: These conferences led to agreements which, as far as I remember, -were several times taken down in writing, and in my opinion they led to -an increasingly strong influence by the Armament Ministry on questions -concerning the allocation of labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions to put to this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other counsel want to ask any more questions? - -DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Witness, in connection -with your last statement, I should like to ask one question. You have -testified to tension between the Defendants Sauckel and Speer because -Speer claimed the right to give instructions. Do I understand you -correctly if I assume that the tension arose from the fact that Sauckel -energetically disputed this right to issue instructions? - -TIMM: As I wanted to express in my last answer, the difficulties -consisted in the fact that Speer, as Plenipotentiary General for -Armaments said: “I must have control of all the things which belong to -actual manufacture. So it is essential for me as regards the direction -of labor allocation...” - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: I understood that, Witness; my question is only, did this -tension arise from the fact that Sauckel emphatically refused to -recognize this right to issue instructions which you say was assumed by -Speer? - -TIMM: As Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor Sauckel -felt himself competent and responsible for all questions concerning it. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: With regard to the demands of the Armament Ministry which -he did not feel he could consider justified, did Sauckel not hold the -point of view that he was responsible only to the Führer? - -TIMM: I do not remember anything so definite. He was Plenipotentiary -General for... - -THE PRESIDENT: Surely this is very far removed from anything we have got -to deal with. He says that the tension was cleared up by conferences. -What more is there to discuss? - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: That was the last question I wanted to ask the witness. - -Witness, you spoke of conferences which are supposed to have taken place -with Minister Lammers. In the minutes of the session of 11 July 1944 and -of 4 January 1944, which have been previously submitted here, there is -no mention at all of such differences. I would be grateful to you, if -you could tell me what session with Lammers you have in mind? - -TIMM: Unfortunately, I cannot give the dates of the sessions exactly. I -know only that the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor -several times wished to report these circumstances to the Führer, and -that the two men, as far as I can remember, agreed that these questions -should be discussed with the Führer. Then, however, in order to avoid -always taking things to the Führer they agreed to have matters talked -over with Reichsminister Lammers. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: You cannot give any details about that? - -TIMM: Only if—I remember, for example, that the question of the blocked -industries in France was discussed. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Very well. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine the witness? - -M. HERZOG: Witness, were you a member of the National Socialist Party? - -TIMM: Yes. - -M. HERZOG: From what date? - -TIMM: In 1933 I applied for admission. My application was at first -refused, and as far as I remember it was approved in 1934 or 1935. - -M. HERZOG: Were you a member of the SA? - -TIMM: I was a member of the SA for a short time. I left the SA when -proceedings for my expulsion were instituted against me in the SA, and I -resigned. - -M. HERZOG: Were you a member of the SS? - -TIMM: No. - -M. HERZOG: What were your functions up to the time you entered Sauckel’s -office? - -TIMM: I was employed in that branch of the Reich Ministry of Labor which -had the employment agency, the office for vocational guidance, and the -training agency. - -M. HERZOG: When did you first meet Sauckel? - -TIMM: As far as I can remember, I saw Sauckel for the first time when he -visited State Secretary Syrup in the Reich Ministry of Labor, and the -individual officials were invited to meet him. - -M. HERZOG: At what time did this take place? - -TIMM: I cannot give the date exactly. I believe it was about a few weeks -after the appointment of Sauckel as Plenipotentiary General for the -Allocation of Labor. - -M. HERZOG: What was your position at the time when Sauckel was appointed -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor? - -TIMM: I was in the department for employment and unemployment -relief—the employment department... - -M. HERZOG: And at the end, what was your position? - -TIMM: At that time I was a Ministerialrat in the Reich Ministry of -Labor. - -M. HERZOG: Will you tell me where Sauckel’s offices were in Berlin? - -TIMM: I did not understand the question. - -M. HERZOG: Will you tell me where Sauckel’s offices were in Berlin? - -TIMM: In Berlin, Sauckel himself worked in Thuringia House, while the -special sections made available by the Reich Ministry of Labor were in -the building of the Reich Ministry of Labor at Saarlandstrasse 96, and -some, after a part of the building had been destroyed, were in -alternative quarters near Berlin. - -M. HERZOG: Thank you. The offices at Saarlandstrasse 96 therefore came -under Sauckel’s administration? Is that right? - -TIMM: The office at Saarlandstrasse 96 was not a new office; it was the -Reich Ministry of Labor. The two sections had been made available by a -Führer decree to carry out the tasks of the GBA. - -M. HERZOG: A document headed “Delegate for the Four Year Plan, -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, Berlin SW 11, -Saarlandstrasse 96” therefore comes from Sauckel’s office? - -TIMM: I did not quite understand. - -M. HERZOG: A document which has the following heading: “Delegate for the -Four Year Plan, Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Why not show him the document? - -M. HERZOG: I show you Document Number L-61, which was submitted to the -Tribunal in the course of the last few sessions. This document bears, as -you see, the following heading at the top on the left: “The Delegate for -the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of -Labor.” On the top in the right-hand corner, “Berlin SW 11, -Saarlandstrasse 96.” It is dated 26 November 1942, and comes, therefore, -from Sauckel’s offices. Is that right? - -TIMM: This document comes from the GBA, therefore from Sauckel’s office. - -M. HERZOG: Thank you. Did you represent Sauckel at the conferences of -the Central Planning Board for the Four Year Plan? - -TIMM: I either represented him, or I went with the GBA to take part in -the sessions. Not always, but frequently. - -M. HERZOG: When you represented him there, you received instructions -before going there, did you not? - -TIMM: When we had to go to larger and more important conferences, we -were informed by Thuringia House that there were to be sessions, and we -received our instructions as to how we were to represent the GBA at -these sessions. - -M. HERZOG: And when you came back from these meetings, you gave Sauckel -a report on them, did you not? - -TIMM: After the sessions we either reported the results of the -conference to him personally, or through his personal advisers. - -M. HERZOG: Sauckel then had to take the responsibility for the -declarations you made at the various meetings? Is that right? - -TIMM: As an official, it was always my duty to make sure when I made -reports in a session and to ascertain... - -M. HERZOG: That is not what I asked. Will you answer my question? You -received instructions before the conferences began. You reported to -Sauckel afterwards what was discussed at these conferences. Consequently -Sauckel was responsible for what was discussed there, was he not? - -TIMM: If I might be allowed to explain about this... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is not that really a matter of law, not a matter of -evidence? - -M. HERZOG: Yes, of course, Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You declared a short while ago that the -conversations at which you had been present in Paris were of a friendly -nature. Do you remember taking part in the conference of 12 January -1943? - -TIMM: At the moment I cannot remember just from the date whether I took -part, but I could tell from the subject of the discussion whether I was -present or not. - -M. HERZOG: I have already submitted Document Number F-809 to the -Tribunal. It contains the minutes of this conference. In the course of -the conference, Laval, among other things, said to Sauckel: - - “It is no longer a matter of a policy of collaboration; it is - rather, on the French side, a policy of sacrifice, and on the - German side a policy of coercion... - - “We cannot take any political measure without everywhere coming - up against some German authority which has substituted itself in - our place. - - “I cannot guarantee measures which I do not take myself... - - “It is not possible for me to be a mere agent for German - measures of coercion.” - -Do you think that those are friendly remarks? - -TIMM: I did not understand one word. “Do you believe that those...”? - -M. HERZOG: “...friendly remarks.” You said that these conversations were -friendly. I have given you an extract from the contents of these -conversations. Do you still say that they were friendly? - -TIMM: I can only confirm the spirit of the negotiations in which I took -part. I do not recognize these statements in the form you give them to -me. - -M. HERZOG: If you had known them, would you still have said that they -were friendly conversations? - -THE PRESIDENT: He was not there. He just said that he did not know about -it. We can judge for ourselves whether the tone of it is friendly. - -M. HERZOG: Witness, you stated earlier that you had no knowledge of -forced deportations. - -TIMM: I said that I knew of no forced deportations under the authority -of the GBA; and I do not know of any deportations. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember a conference held on 15 and 16 July 1944 at -Wartburg, which you attended, and at which Sauckel, a number of chiefs -of Gau labor offices, and people who worked with Sauckel were also -gathered? - -TIMM: At Wartburg there was a conference of the presidents of the Gau -labor offices. I was there for that conference. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember having spoken there? - -TIMM: Yes. - -M. HERZOG: Do you remember the statements you made about recruiting -methods? - -TIMM: I do not recall that so well; no. - -M. HERZOG: I will now show you Document Number F-810, which I submitted -to the Tribunal under the Exhibit Number RF-1507. The Tribunal will find -the extract I want to submit to the witness on Page 10. - -You were speaking of the conferences which the Plenipotentiary General -for Allocation of Labor was having with the Wehrmacht about its -co-operation in compulsory recruiting, and you said: “The Führer has -approved the use of measures of coercion to the fullest extent.” - -Do you deny that you knew that workers were being recruited for forced -deportations? - -TIMM: I ask for a moment’s time. I have not yet found the place. It was -not shown me before. - -These are notes made by some one present, presumably the Military -Commander in Paris. I have not my statements on this question at hand, -but I should imagine that the GBA, in view of the difficult... - -M. HERZOG: Will you please look at Page 8, Paragraph IV? - -TIMM: Page 8, yes. - -M. HERZOG: Under Paragraph IV, on Page 8: - - “As regards the employment of European labor and the problems, - methods, and means for the same, Timm made the following - remarks: 1) Northern Europe; 2) Southeast; 3) Italy; 4) France.” - -Then we come to the passage about which I am asking you for an -explanation, because you made this statement. Will you answer that? Do -you still deny your knowledge of the fact that these deportations were -forced? - -TIMM: I have no intention of denying anything. I can only say that -Sauckel probably had powers from the Führer to use all reasonable means -to speed up the procurement of workers. - -Measures were introduced and carried out in France which, even if they -were approved by Laval, the Premier at the time, might nevertheless be -termed compulsory. - -M. HERZOG: Thank you. I have one last question to ask you. In this -quotation you say, “The Führer has approved....” If the Führer approved -something, it means, that something was suggested to him. Is that not a -fact? - -TIMM: As far as I can remember, Gauleiter Sauckel always reported the -results of his talks in Paris to the Führer. It is possible that he -reported to the Führer the question of recruiting methods which he had -discussed with Laval; and it was customary for him, as I have already -said in my testimony, always to make sure of the Führer’s approval, so -that he did not work against the Führer’s ideas. - -M. HERZOG: Thank you. I have no more questions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the document which was last submitted to you, -L-61, from Saarlandstrasse, is not in the original, but it contains the -words: “Signed, Sauckel.” The Defendant Sauckel has informed me that it -is possible he did not sign it himself, but that he may have been -informed, in a general way only, that there were letters about one thing -and another—routine office correspondence—and he might have given -authority for them to be signed. Is that possible? - -TIMM: It was like this; the departments in Saarlandstrasse... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, did Sauckel state that in evidence, or are -you telling us simply what he said to you? Do you remember? - -DR. SERVATIUS: I cannot say exactly whether he stated that here. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on then. - -DR. SERVATIUS: [_Turning to the witness._] Answer the question. - -TIMM: Yes. As Sauckel continued to exercise his functions as Gauleiter -in Weimar, it sometimes happened that things did not reach him. The -sections in Saarlandstrasse submitted their drafts to the personal -adviser in Thuringia House, and it is quite possible—as I know from my -own knowledge of conditions—that the contents of the drafts were -transmitted by telephone, and that the personal advisers were authorized -to sign the name of the Plenipotentiary General. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was the mail so extensive that he did not take exact -cognizance of individual letters? - -TIMM: That is hard for me to judge. - -DR. SERVATIUS: That is enough. One more question: -Führer—Sauckel—Speer. Is it true that the Defendant Sauckel told you -that the Führer had ordered him to fulfill all Speer’s demands? - -TIMM: I do not know whether exactly such a statement was made. - -DR. SERVATIUS: We have shown you the document in which Laval complains -about the conduct of the German authorities. Did this complaint refer to -Sauckel’s activities, or was it not that he had told Sauckel of these -complaints and was thanking him personally for his attitude? - -TIMM: I recall from the talks with Laval, that Laval repeatedly -expressed his gratitude to Sauckel for having put into effect measures -and means for facilitating matters which he had suggested. Laval -attached special importance—to use his own expression—to putting the -climate and the atmosphere in order, and to having talks with Hitler -himself as soon as possible; and he asked Sauckel to pave the way for -him. As far as I know, Sauckel did actually arrange for talks of this -kind and Laval thanked him for doing so. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions for this witness. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The job of the GBA was to get workmen to -replace the men who had been taken into the Army out of industry. That -was largely your work, was it not? - -TIMM: The task of the GBA was much more comprehensive, as previously all -the tasks... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, I understand, but that was part of your -work, was it not? - -TIMM: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. Now, you were therefore told -beforehand the number of people that the Army was taking out of -industry, weren’t you, so you could make up your estimates? - -TIMM: The numbers were adjusted in the Central Planning Board. It was -precisely the task of the Central Planning Board, that the plans made in -the OKW... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. I don’t care who examined the -figures, but your organization certainly had knowledge of the needs of -the Army, of the number of people the Army was taking out of industry. -You had to have that information, had you not? - -TIMM: The number of men to be drafted was reported to the Central -Planning Board. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right, reported to the Central Planning -Board. Now then, they were taking people out of industry also who were -not needed for the Army, weren’t they? I mean Jews. They were taking -Jewish people out of industry, were they not? Sauckel said yesterday -that Jewish people were being taken out of industry. You admit that, -don’t you? - -TIMM: Yes. Jews were eliminated from industry. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right; and I suppose the Central Planning -Board was given the number of Jewish people that were taken out of -industry, were they not? - -TIMM: I do not know that. In the conferences at which I was present... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not assume that that must have been -the case, if they had to find the number of replacements. It must have -been so, mustn’t it? - -TIMM: I cannot judge as to that because I learned only the total number -of men to be drafted, independently of the Jewish question. I will not -venture an opinion; I do not know. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not know that Himmler and the SS told -the Central Planning Board the number of Jews that were being taken out -of industry for whom replacements were needed? You know that as a fact, -don’t you? - -TIMM: No. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You do not? - -TIMM: No. I know only that we received certain statements from the -Reichsführer SS that people were being taken out of industry, and owing -to the objections of the Plenipotentiary General, who had to supply the -replacements—I remember that this measure was partly withdrawn. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And you do know that one of the duties of the -Reichsführer SS was to withdraw Jews from industry? You know that? - -TIMM: I know from statements in reports that Jews were to be withdrawn -from industry. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire and the Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -[_The witness Hildebrandt took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name. - -HUBERT HILDEBRANDT (Witness): Hubert Hildebrandt. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you were working in the office of Sauckel, is -that correct? - -HILDEBRANDT: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You were subordinate to Timm. What was your special -field? - -HILDEBRANDT: In the Reich Ministry of Labor from 1930 I dealt with -questions concerning labor for the iron and metal industry, the chemical -industry, and the textile industry. After 1940 I also dealt with -questions concerning workers in the West. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Regional questions in the West? - -HILDEBRANDT: Yes; in France, Belgium, and Holland; some of those -questions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You must remember to pause before you answer. Did you -have any general idea about what happened in Sauckel’s office? - -HILDEBRANDT: No; I did not. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But you participated in the staff conferences? - -HILDEBRANDT: Yes; I was present at most of those. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And in that way you found out, to a certain extent, about -what happened in other offices? - -HILDEBRANDT: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I want to ask you especially about conditions in France. -What was the position of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation -of Labor in France? - -HILDEBRANDT: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in -France, just as in other occupied countries, had appointed special -deputies who transmitted his wishes, and helped to carry out these -wishes and these tasks. The organization of the entire labor strength -from the occupied western territories remained in the hands of the -German military or civil administrative offices there. - -DR. SERVATIUS? So he did not have an organization of his own? - -HILDEBRANDT: The first deputy in France tried to establish an -organization of his own, but after a short time he met with the -opposition of the German administrative offices, and the offices which -he had established in the meantime were taken over by the military -commander. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the military commander? - -HILDEBRANDT: The military commander was and remained responsible for the -entire allocation of the labor in his district, and also for the labor -sent from his district to Germany. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the German Embassy? - -HILDEBRANDT: The German Embassy took the leading part in all -negotiations which were to be carried out by the Plenipotentiary General -or his deputies, with French Government offices. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the French Government as regards -the allocation of labor? - -HILDEBRANDT: The French Government made agreements with the -Plenipotentiary General concerning the carrying out of his programs, and -ordered its own offices to carry out certain tasks, especially when -compulsory labor was introduced in France. It published the necessary -decrees and gave the necessary directives to the subordinate offices. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And who had the executive power to recruit labor? Was -that done by the French or the Germans? - -HILDEBRANDT: One must distinguish between two periods. When it was still -a question of recruiting volunteers, until the fall of 1942 these -volunteers could report to German offices as well as to French offices; -and also to recruiting offices which had been established by German -firms, and some by branches of the Wehrmacht. After the introduction of -compulsory labor, the administrative executive for the carrying out of -the decrees rested solely with the French authorities. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what happened when somebody did not report? - -HILDEBRANDT: Then a first summons to appear was received from the French -authorities, and then repeated summonses, and if these proved to be -unsuccessful the French authorities called in the French police. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were those who did not come brought before the courts? - -HILDEBRANDT: I assume that that may have happened sometimes. I do not -know for certain. - -DR. SERVATIUS: German or French courts? - -HILDEBRANDT: French courts, according to French regulations. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What would be your estimate of the number of voluntary -workers who came from France to Germany? - -HILDEBRANDT: The number of voluntary workers from France, until the -middle of 1942—but I can only give approximate figures from memory... - -DR. SERVATIUS: Please, just the approximate figure. - -HILDEBRANDT: Something over 200,000. After the compulsory labor decree -had been introduced in the course of 1942, there were still voluntary -recruitments as well on a fairly large scale. The number of volunteers -was, at times, considerably larger than the number of conscripts, so -that altogether more than half of all the labor recruited in France -consisted of volunteers. It is noticeable that women were only recruited -if they volunteered. There was no compulsory service for them. With -regard to the compulsory labor assignments moreover, it must be pointed -out that a number of them were only formal. In reality these people had -come voluntarily, but for economic reasons, or out of consideration for -their relatives and friends in their home towns, they attached -importance to being conscripted. We had compulsory labor assignments -which were only put on an official basis afterwards. Such requests -reached the German labor offices especially during the last months -before the end of the war; and the Foreign Office requested the -Plenipotentiary General to approve such demands, and that was done. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you hear anything in your department about recruiting -measures such as the surrounding of churches, cinemas, and similar -places in France? - -HILDEBRANDT: No; I do not know of any such recruiting measure. I know -that in France, as well as in Belgium, identity papers were controlled -among members of the age groups which had been called up to register. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You were also probably in Paris, and you spoke to the -German authorities there; is that right? - -HILDEBRANDT: Yes. Every time I was in Paris I took the opportunity to -talk to members of the offices about current events. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did they not tell you about things which must have -surprised you? - -HILDEBRANDT: With each major task we carried out we had some -difficulties, of course, and certain excesses. Once it was reported to -me, among other things, that there were impossible conditions in the -“Pépinière”—a camp, a kind of transit camp for people who had to leave. -These conditions were reported immediately to the Town Major of Paris -who remedied matters. Then there were irregularities in the recruiting -in Marseille, where recruiting agents used blackmail. This was also -stopped immediately. - -Beyond that, a fairly large number of individual cases were brought to -me. These were minor difficulties about vacations, salaries, and so -forth, which I transmitted each time to the competent offices for -further action. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was it part of your official duties to follow these -things up? - -HILDEBRANDT: As far as they came within my sphere, I took the necessary -steps immediately. As far as it was the business of other departments I -immediately transferred them to those departments for further attention. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I did not ask what you did, but whether it was -your official duty to look after these things. - -HILDEBRANDT: The general problems of recruiting and statistical checking -of programs came within my field of duty. Questions of housing, pay, and -transport were dealt with by other departments. Of course, when I found -out about bad conditions it was my duty to investigate them at once, if -only in the interests of further recruiting. - -We considered it of the greatest importance that every abuse should be -stopped immediately, because it was only in this way that further -recruiting of volunteers could be guaranteed. Labor conscription was -therefore looked on as a last resort. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I would like to know whether it was your -official duty, or your moral duty to look after these things? - -HILDEBRANDT: In this case it was my moral duty as well as my official -duty. - -DR. SERVATIUS: As regards the way transports were effected, I have one -question. Mention has been made of irregularities on transports. That is -why I would like you to tell us what steps you took to have the -transports that came from France supervised and directed. Can you -describe that briefly? - -HILDEBRANDT: A special department was created in the office of the -military commander in France for the carrying out of transports. For -each man who went to Germany, it was already settled to what firm he was -to be sent. The recruiting was effected on the basis of planned -contracts and definite working conditions, so that it was known what -route could be chosen for the journey. Transports were assembled to -include as many as possible, so that a definite number of workers would -go in the same direction and to the same firm. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, these details are of less interest to me than -the question of how you conducted these transports and kept a check on -them when something irregular happened on the way. - -HILDEBRANDT: In giving a few details, I only wanted to indicate that -there was a detailed check made of every person intended for Germany. -For each transport there was an exact list of the persons and of the -firms to which they were sent. The transports were given guides who -brought them to their destination, and there they were turned over to -the presidents of the regional labor offices whose duty it was to take -further care of them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to put a concrete case to you. A case has -been reported here of a transport train which was left in the Saar -district, and when it was opened, after a few days, most of the people -had been frozen to death. Did you have control of such trains? Should -that have been reported to you? Could that train have been sent upon -your orders? How do you explain that? - -HILDEBRANDT: Such an incident would have become known to us immediately. -As the coming of transports was reported beforehand to the presidents of -the regional labor offices, we were informed immediately when they did -not arrive. That happened frequently, namely, when difficulties arose -because of some emergency on the way, and a transport was held up—for -instance, in the last days of the war, when traffic obstructions caused -by bomb damage had to be cleared away, and so on. We could then -immediately have inquiries made concerning the transports, which was -always done. I know nothing of the case which you have just mentioned. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you must speak more slowly. The interpreters -cannot possibly follow. - -Will you state your opinion as to the incident, which I have described, -of the train with the people who froze to death in the Saar district. - -HILDEBRANDT: The incident could not possibly have occurred on transports -of labor recruits. The transports were well prepared. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You have said that before. - -HILDEBRANDT: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How do you explain then, the case of that transport? - -HILDEBRANDT: I learned for the first time through the press during the -last few months that the SS also conducted transports to Germany, and -that conditions such as you have just described are said to have been -present. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, were you present during the negotiations between -Sauckel and Laval? - -HILDEBRANDT: Yes, I was frequently present. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In what kind of atmosphere were these negotiations -conducted? - -HILDEBRANDT: These negotiations were conducted in a friendly manner; but -occasionally, especially when promises on the part of the French -Government had not been kept, quite violent disputes occurred. Any real -difficulties, however, did not as a rule arise during these -negotiations. Arrangements were made concerning the number of people who -were to be sent to Germany. As a matter of principle, Laval was always -willing to put manpower at the disposal of Germany. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what, in particular, were the relations between Laval -and Sauckel? Did Laval speak well of Sauckel or not? - -HILDEBRANDT: M. Laval expressed his gratitude from time to time for the -way in which things had been made easier for France, too. For instance, -as regards the status of French prisoners of war, the permission given -to the wives of French workmen to visit their husbands, and the taking -over of welfare work for the relatives of the French workmen in Germany. -All these things, as I have said, took the form of agreements whereby -one party put labor at the disposal of the other party, and that party -in return gave back manpower or granted other advantages. Laval -certainly expressed repeatedly his urgent wish to do more for Germany if -he could only be given political advantages for it. Therefore, he asked -the Plenipotentiary General repeatedly to make it possible for him to -have discussions with the Führer in order to create a favorable -atmosphere in France for further efforts. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did these friendly relations prevail until the end? - -HILDEBRANDT: Until the last negotiation, which I think took place at the -end of 1944. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I believe the question of relève and -“transformation” has been clarified sufficiently, so that I need not -question the witness about it again. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, in what manner did the negotiations -with the German military commander take place? Did Sauckel give orders -there? Was he the highest authority, or was it the military commander? - -HILDEBRANDT: The negotiations were never carried out in the form of a -transmission of orders. The Plenipotentiary General described the -situation in Germany and what needs... - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you can be very brief. - -HILDEBRANDT: I only want to say the following: Of course, the military -commander, as was the case with the civil administration in Holland, was -more interested in receiving orders to be filled than in sending -manpower to Germany, and that led to conflict. The authorities, however, -had to be convinced in each instance that manpower must be sent to -Germany—for agricultural work, for example, which could not be done in -Holland, and also for a number of branches of the German armaments -industry. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, a few questions now concerning Belgium and -Northern France: Was the position of Sauckel as regards the chief -authorities there the same as in France on the whole; and was everything -conducted similarly, or were there any differences? - -HILDEBRANDT: No, the conditions were the same as in France, only that -the deputies of the Plenipotentiary General were, from the very -beginning, incorporated into the military administration. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any reports or discover anything yourself -about irregularities in that territory? - -HILDEBRANDT: Yes. There were isolated cases of irregularities. For -instance, I was informed one day that reprisals were to be taken against -relatives of members of age groups who had not appeared when they were -called up. We stopped that immediately by discussing the matter with the -representatives of the military commander. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And how did Sauckel negotiate with the military commander -there? - -HILDEBRANDT: He also told him what he wanted. Von Falkenhausen was, of -course, also interested in the first place in having orders for the -German armaments industry carried out in Belgium; but it was also agreed -that manpower should be sent to Germany. He certainly made frequent -efforts to protect students, school children, and members of younger age -groups. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I will show you the minutes of an interrogation -of General Von Falkenhausen on 27 November 1945. I want you to look at a -few sentences. If you take Page 2, you will find there in the middle of -the page, in answer to the question: “Is the witness in a position...” - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document? - -DR. SERVATIUS: It is Document Number RF-15. - -[_Turning to the witness._] It is the following question: - - “Is the witness in a position to define to us the limitations of - his powers and the competence of the administration for the - Allocation of Labor?” - -Answer by General Von Falkenhausen: - - “Up to a certain time there was a labor office in my territory - which was concerned with the recruiting of voluntary workers. I - cannot remember the exact date any longer—it may have been in - the fall of 1942—when the labor office was put under Sauckel; - and from then on I had only to carry out the orders I received - from him.” - -Is this position of the military commander in relation to Sauckel -correct? - -HILDEBRANDT: It is not quite correct in several points. In Belgium there -was not just one labor office, but a number of labor offices which dealt -with the recruiting of volunteers, and also a number of recruiting -offices which worked with them. But from the very beginning these labor -organizations worked under the supervision of the Feldkommandanturen in -Belgium. These Feldkommandanturen were offices of the military -commander. There was no question of the Plenipotentiary General taking -over the work. Before he appointed his deputies he could only send his -requests directly to the military administration, to General Von -Falkenhausen, but not directly to a labor office. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What were the conditions in Holland? Who was the -competent district head there? - -HILDEBRANDT: It was the Reich Commissioner. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And was there a deputy of Sauckel’s with him? - -HILDEBRANDT: Yes, a deputy was appointed there too, who was a member of -the administration of the Reich Commissioner. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who issued the labor service decrees there? - -HILDEBRANDT: The Reich Commissioner. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And who carried out the recruiting? German or Dutch -offices? - -HILDEBRANDT: As far as I remember there were Dutch labor offices. The -heads of these labor offices were Germans; the rest of the personnel was -mainly Dutch. These offices took the necessary steps for the allocation -of labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I have one more question concerning Germany. The -metal industries came into your field, did they not? - -HILDEBRANDT: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Krupp, for instance. - -HILDEBRANDT: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of reports did you receive about conditions in -the Krupp works as far as the welfare of the workmen was concerned? - -HILDEBRANDT: I had no unfavorable reports about Krupp. The personal -adviser of the Plenipotentiary General, Landrat Berk, visited the Krupp -works frequently and informed me of the requests made by the firm and of -the impressions he had received, but he never said that proper care was -not taken of foreign workmen. I myself never visited the Krupp firm -during the war. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions for the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the German counsel want to ask questions? -Prosecution? - -M. HERZOG: Mr. President, we have the same problems here. The Tribunal -has already heard explanations on these points. The Tribunal is in -possession of the documents which I have submitted, and I have, -therefore, no questions to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the -witness Stothfang. - -[_The witness Stothfang took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you state your full name? - -WALTER STOTHFANG (Witness): Walter Stothfang. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat these words after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, what was your position with Sauckel? - -STOTHFANG: I was personal adviser to the Plenipotentiary General for the -Allocation of Labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: When did you assume that position? - -STOTHFANG: One year after the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation -of Labor had assumed office; that was on 19 April 1943. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was the witness Timm there when you came? - -STOTHFANG: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And the witness Hildebrandt? - -STOTHFANG: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What orders did you receive when you came? - -STOTHFANG: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor did -not give any special personal directives because his general principles -could be clearly seen in his decrees and in his program, and I only -started work 1 year later. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Before that, had you already been in the Ministry of -Labor? - -STOTHFANG: Yes, I had been connected with that type of work since 1926; -and for the last 8 years I was the personal assistant of State Secretary -Dr. Syrup in the Ministry of Labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was it a considerable change when you came to Sauckel? - -STOTHFANG: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What did your colleagues in the office tell you about the -whole work, and Sauckel’s attitude to the work? - -STOTHFANG: The work, as such, was carried out according to principles -and decrees which were not essentially different to previous ones. In -practice of course, they were much more far reaching than anything -hitherto. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you work very closely with Sauckel in your sphere? -You were his personal assistant. - -STOTHFANG: As far as that was necessary for carrying out the task of the -Plenipotentiary General for the war effort. Sauckel was not only -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, but at the same -time he had remained Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter in Thuringia. -Besides that, during the last 1½ years of his activities, he was very -much occupied with the construction of an underground factory in Kahle, -in Thuringia; so that he... - -DR. SERVATIUS: We will come back to that later. - -STOTHFANG: ...could only be in Berlin from time to time; at the most 1 -day a week, and often only half a day. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what was your task as his personal adviser? - -STOTHFANG: We had to receive incoming mail, sort out what had to be -reported, and pass on the rest to the competent departments. We also had -to submit newly arrived drafts to the Plenipotentiary General. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who called staff conferences? Do you know that? - -STOTHFANG: That was generally done by the office. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You always attended these conferences? - -STOTHFANG: Yes, from the time I first came into the office. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you participate in conferences to which individual -members returned from so-called inspection trips and made their reports? - -STOTHFANG: Later that no longer happened or only very seldom. It was -only in the beginning. - -DR. SERVATIUS: That you were present, or that inspection trips took -place? - -STOTHFANG: No; that reports were made. - -DR. SERVATIUS: There were fewer reports later? - -STOTHFANG: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the reason for that? - -STOTHFANG: I do not know the reason. - -DR. SERVATIUS: During the period when you were present, did you learn of -anything particularly shocking as regards irregularities in Germany? We -will include transports to Germany, transit camps, the work shops -themselves, the camps, and the factories. - -STOTHFANG: I myself found out about some irregularities on the occasion -of inspection trips which I made on orders, but these were at once -discussed with the competent offices and steps were taken to put a stop -to them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Sauckel had to work with a number of offices. Was there -any special opposition to overcome here? - -STOTHFANG: With the exception of two cases, no. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What cases were these? - -STOTHFANG: One was the Party Chancellery; and the other was the -Reichsführer SS and Chief of the Secret State Police. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know of specific instances in the case of the -Reichsführer SS? - -STOTHFANG: The general treatment of foreign workers—particularly of -those coming from the East—as far as it was determined by the -Reichsführer SS or the principles laid down by the Reichsführer SS, was -contrary to the ideas of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation -of Labor. The Reichsführer SS was not inclined to meet the far-reaching, -definite demands of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of -Labor. The same thing happened, in other directions, in the case of the -head of the Party Chancellery. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In what directions? - -STOTHFANG: For example, where social insurance was concerned. In this -case the Party Chancellery was of the opinion that equality with German -workers was not justified on either practical or political grounds; nor -was as high a rate of pay. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what did Sauckel say to that? - -STOTHFANG: He tried, again and again, to regulate all these matters -according to his principles. In some things he was definitely -unsuccessful, and in others he was successful only after great efforts. -I would remind you of the equal status given to the Eastern Workers -which was actually only put into effect in March 1945 through a decree. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any special reports from the Gauleiter -who were appointed deputies for the Allocation of Labor, or did you -speak to the Gauleiter? - -STOTHFANG: There were instructions that on inspection trips the -competent Gauleiter of the district visited had to be seen, so that any -relevant questions could be discussed with him. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you take part in meetings of the Central Planning -Board? - -STOTHFANG: I went to one single meeting of the Central Planning Board -with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have just mentioned March 1945 as the date -when the Eastern Workers were given equality with the rest of the -workers. Are you not mistaken in the year—1944? I will show you the -decree. - -STOTHFANG: As far as I remember, it was March 1945. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I will have it shown to the witness in a -moment; we are looking for it. - -[_Turning to the witness._] What was the relationship between Speer and -Sauckel? - -STOTHFANG: Apparently the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for -the Allocation of Labor was due to a suggestion which Minister Speer had -made to the Führer. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I refer to Document 58, in Document Book Number 2, Page -167 of the German text, and Page 156 of the English text. That is the -decree concerning the conditions of employment of Eastern Workers, of 25 -March 1944, and I read Paragraph 2: - - “Wages. - - “For Eastern Workers the same conditions apply for wages and - salary as for other foreign workers. Eastern Workers are paid - wages only for work they actually do.” - -THE PRESIDENT: How did the wages compare with the wages of the German -workers? - -STOTHFANG: It was a fundamental rule that they must be based on the -German wages for the same type of work, in order to avoid additional -profits for the industries which employed Eastern Workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you remember a conference at which Goebbels stated his -opinion to Sauckel as regards the latter’s policy concerning social -questions and questions of wages? - -STOTHFANG: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Can you describe it to us? - -STOTHFANG: I myself did not take part in that conference. I only knew -about it from the description given by my colleague Dr. Hildebrandt, who -was present at the meeting with Gauleiter Sauckel. - -It was the first discussion between the two gentlemen after Reich -Minister Goebbels had become Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War Effort. -At this conference Minister Speer was also present, and in the course of -the conference Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels reproached the -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor with the fact his -previous measures... - -THE PRESIDENT: He is now telling us, is he not, what Hildebrandt told -him? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Hildebrandt has been in the witness box and he has -not been asked about it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: There has been confusion of the two witnesses. They -arrived only a short time ago. I ask permission for this witness to say -what Hildebrandt told him. It can be explained by the fact that the -witness was here for only a very short time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, the Tribunal does not think that you ought -to be allowed to ask him that question. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were there any difficulties with Speer? - -STOTHFANG: Not at the beginning. In the course of years difficulties -arose because of the fundamentally different ideas of the two men. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have had the relationships between Sauckel and Speer -gone into elaborately. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. I will withdraw that question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] What did the offices have to do with the -employment of concentration camp prisoners? Did they deal with that? - -STOTHFANG: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not receive reports that manpower was -disappearing from other industries, and in this way became concentration -camp workers? - -STOTHFANG: No reports were received about that. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Are you aware that concentration camp workers were -employed in large numbers for work? - -STOTHFANG: It was the general practice of the Police to put prisoners to -work. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You did not receive any reports about that, did you? - -STOTHFANG: No. An effort was made to gain influence to the extent of -having reports sent to the offices of the labor administration -concerning the employment of concentration camp prisoners, so that they -could be considered in the general planning of labor allocation. But -these reports were not received by the labor offices. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now I have only a few more questions concerning the -control offices, and other control agencies, which had been established -in order to investigate conditions among the workers in Germany. Do you -know how far foreign workers themselves were included in that control -system? I am thinking first of all of the office of Ambassador Scapini. -How did this office work? Did you hear anything about it? - -STOTHFANG: I do not know many details about the office of Scapini. I -know of its existence, but to the best of my knowledge Scapini’s office -was chiefly occupied with the welfare of French prisoners of war rather -than with the welfare of French civilian workers, because for the latter -a special office existed under M. Brunedon. But generally the foreign -workers were represented by the German Labor Front. So-called Reich -liaison offices were set up everywhere, from the central office via the -Gaue to the small districts, and each employed several people who -visited the camps, listened to complaints and negotiated with the -offices of the German Labor Front, or with other offices of the labor -administration. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Those were German employees that you mentioned? - -STOTHFANG: No; they were foreign employees from countries abroad, in -fact from almost every country. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In the factories themselves, did the workmen have any -representatives who had contact, as liaison men, with the supervisory -offices of the German Labor Front? - -STOTHFANG: Not to my knowledge. - -DR. SERVATIUS: For the Eastern Workers there was also a control office. -Do you know that office? - -STOTHFANG: In Rosenberg’s department there was a special one for that -purpose. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How did that office work? Did you hear anything about it? - -STOTHFANG: Yes. It had regular contact with the technically competent -offices of the labor administration. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And whom had this office to contact if it received -complaints? The Labor Front, Sauckel’s office, or the Minister of Labor? -To whom did they have to go? - -STOTHFANG: That depended on the nature of the irregularities, or the -complaints which were made. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I will give you an example—complaints about labor -conditions. - -STOTHFANG: In that case one had to go first to the competent local labor -office in order to have detailed inquiries made into the case, and to -see about the general conditions, or the actual conditions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And if it was a matter of housing and nutrition, to whom -did one go? - -STOTHFANG: First to the offices of the German Labor Front, which, by a -decree of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor—I -believe it was Decree Number 4—was given the general task of looking -after the foreign workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And did the Labor Front report to you further? - -STOTHFANG: Within the scope of their capacity they tried to put matters -right. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then the Labor Front itself, in fact, was the highest -authority for questions of complaints about the welfare of workers? - -STOTHFANG: If you put it like that, yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who supervised the treatment of prisoners of war? Did the -complaints come to Sauckel? - -STOTHFANG: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who had charge of that? - -STOTHFANG: The High Command of the Armed Forces. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The Reich Inspection Board was also a control office. -What did Sauckel have to do with the Reich Inspection Board? - -STOTHFANG: That must be an incorrect designation. I do not know what you -mean by the Reich Inspection Board. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I mean the Trade Inspection Board, the Reich Trade -Inspection Board. - -STOTHFANG: In Germany the trade inspection boards in principle were -competent for labor protection in factories. As far as labor protection -in factories was concerned, they had to see that the decrees which had -been issued, and were in force, were carried out and obeyed. Therefore -in case of complaints they were the competent authorities. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was Sauckel accused by other offices of looking after the -workmen too well? And was there not, in some cases, even envy of the -situation of certain foreign workers? - -STOTHFANG: Yes. Such accusations came from three places. First, from the -two offices I mentioned before, which offered general objections and -resistance to the far-reaching demands of the Plenipotentiary General -for the Allocation of Labor. Then Bormann’s office, and Himmler’s -office. It went so far that the Plenipotentiary General for the -Allocation of Labor was even suspected of being pro-Bolshevik. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defense counsel wish to ask any questions? - -[_There was no response._] - -Does the Prosecution wish to? - -[_There was no response._] - -The witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I do not know whether the witness Jäger -has arrived yet. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am told not. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I assume that he will be here by Monday, and I would -suggest that I be permitted to submit some documents now, or perhaps an -interrogation of the witness Goetz, which is in the document book. -Perhaps I may refer to several passages. It is a very long affidavit, -and it throws some light on the matter in this connection and will make -it easier to understand. - -THE PRESIDENT: You probably have some remarks to make about your -documents, have you not, which will take you up until 1 o’clock? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the document books contain primarily the -decrees which Sauckel issued, and they cover what has been said here by -the witnesses and by the defendant himself as a witness. As far as -possible, the book is divided up into sections dealing with special -subjects, but as the decrees which were issued frequently applied to -several subjects at the same time, the separate divisions overlap in -this book. - -I refer principally to Volume I, to all the decrees included there, -which I do not want to read individually. I should like only to call -special attention to the decrees about police matters. That is Document -6, which is on Page 16; Document 10, on Page 20; and Document 15, on -Page 25. These documents... - -THE PRESIDENT: You understand that you must offer in evidence each -document or number of documents that you want to put in evidence? It is -not sufficient to put it in your document book. So please state the -document which you wish to put in evidence. - -DR. SERVATIUS: These documents are included in a collection of laws -which has already been submitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: The whole thing you mean? The whole thing has been -submitted? - -DR. SERVATIUS: It has, as far as I know. That is Document Number -3044-PS: “Enactments, Decrees, Announcements.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, probably only a small part of 3044-PS has been read -and, therefore, unless it is translated into the four languages, it does -not form part of the record. Dr. Servatius, if you will go into the -matter and offer what you want to offer in evidence on Monday morning, -that will be quite satisfactory. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But may I refer to them now, and then submit the -documents on Monday? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: These three decrees and enactments of the Reichsführer SS -I have submitted in order to show how efforts were made at improvement -even in this difficult field. Decree Number 6 was issued shortly before -Sauckel came into office, and one must assume that this was done in -order to produce a _fait accompli_. - -The next decree, Document Number 10, already shows an improvement. It -deals with the barbed wire and the workers’ outings, and this is even -more relaxed in the next document. Document Number 15, that is Decree -Number 4, which has already been submitted, is probably the most -important first decree, which describes the fundamental authority and -directives, as well as recruiting methods, transportation, and treatment -in Germany. - -Decree Number 16 deals with the employment of Eastern Workers and gives -the first basic regulations, because until then there was no definite -legal regulation of a uniform type. - -Then I come to Document Number 19, which is on Page 54 in the English -text. This is a decree and a letter from Sauckel to the Gau labor -offices and the Gauleiter, of 14 October 1942, concerning good treatment -for foreign workers. This letter is an intervention on the part of -Sauckel to remove poor conditions and to correct certain abuses of which -he had been informed. I quote here in the German text on Page 59 the -following... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, that document has been quoted already I think, -hasn’t it? - -DR. SERVATIUS: A part of the document has already been mentioned. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which part has not been quoted? - -DR. SERVATIUS: It is Page 59 in my book; in the English text, Page 54. - -THE PRESIDENT: Page 54 is only the heading. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Heading: “Decree and letter of Sauckel dated 14 October -1942,” and on the next page the text begins. The first page contains -only the title of the decree. - -THE PRESIDENT: But Page 55 in the English text, the beginning of the -document has already been read. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The beginning has already been read. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then what did you want to read? - -DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to read the whole thing in order to show -how far Sauckel... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you see, beginning with the words, “If in a Gau -district the statement was recently still made,” that has been read -already, down to the bottom of that paragraph. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have here only a short note. If it has already been -read, then I need not read it again. I will dispense with the reading. - -Document Number 20 on Page 56 in the English document book deals with -compulsory labor service for foreign female domestic help and shows the -regulations in force at that time... - -THE PRESIDENT: Which document? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number 20. - -THE PRESIDENT: Continue. - -DR. SERVATIUS: ...whereby it is pointed out particularly that a forced -transfer of foreign women for domestic help would not be carried out; -and the statement made by Sauckel emphasizes that only voluntary workers -should be taken for domestic employment. - -Decree Number 21 introduces the labor book. That is in the English text -on Page 57. The purpose of the labor book was, as Sauckel has stated -here, to facilitate a registration of manpower, so that one could review -it and not lose control. Above all, in connection with this, there was -to be an allocation of land to the Eastern Workers, as the Defendant -Sauckel has explained. A central file was to be compiled, and with the -help of this the regular transportation of the workers home again was to -be arranged at a later date. That was the preparatory measure of the -labor book. - -Then we come to Document Number 22, of 23 July 1943, which deals with -the limitation of the duration of employment of Eastern Workers. It is -said in this connection that the duration of employment should be for 2 -years, with certain modifications, and that there should be facilities -for leave, and premiums should be given for the work done. There was to -be leave in Germany, and, under certain conditions, home leave. For -vacations in Germany, as can be seen here, special leave camps were set -up for Eastern Workers. The reason was that, on account of transport -conditions and other circumstances, these workers could not go home, -especially if they came from territories which in the meantime were no -longer occupied by Germans. - -Then there follows Decree Number 13. That is Document Number 23, Page 62 -in the English document book. This decree deals with the keeping of -order in factories and works. It is the decree on the basis of which -measures could be taken for the maintenance of discipline. I have -submitted it in order to show that it was valid both for German and for -foreign workers, and is not a decree which discriminates against Eastern -Workers. - -Now I will refer to Document Number 26. That is Page 66 in the English -document book. This is a decree of 25 July 1944 according to which the -position of female domestic workers from the East was in principle to be -equal to that of the German domestic help. Working hours are regulated -and also time off. It reads: “Every week the female Eastern Worker is to -have an adequate amount of free time.” - -The question of vacations is regulated in Paragraph 7, to the effect -that they will be granted leave after 12 months’ work in Reich -territory. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are those figures right in Document 26, Page 67 in the -English document book? Working hours to fall between 6 o’clock in the -morning and 9 o’clock at night? - -DR. SERVATIUS: It says there: “The regular working hours, including rest -periods and preparation for work, are to fall between 0600 and 2100 -hours, unless special conditions call for other arrangements.” That does -not mean that the work is to be done from 6 o’clock in the morning until -9 o’clock at night. It means that between these two time limits these -people have to work. They cannot work before 6 o’clock in the morning, -and these girls cannot work after 9 o’clock at night. It cannot... - -THE PRESIDENT: I am only asking if the figures are correct. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The figures are correct. - -Document 27 deals with the position of foreign workers in factories. It -is a decree of the German Labor Front and there are one or two basic -statements made in it. Here for example: - - “The pleasure they take in their work and the willingness of - German workers must in no circumstances be endangered by - preferential treatment for foreign workers. - - “As regards the treatment of foreign workers, it must be taken - into consideration that they came to Germany voluntarily and are - giving us their services for the carrying out of tasks of - military importance. In order to maintain their pleasure in - their work, the conditions of their contracts must be respected, - and absolutely fair treatment and comprehensive care and - attention must be given them.” - -Document 28 is the agreement between Ley and Sauckel instituting the -supervision by the Central Inspectorate. It has already been submitted -by the Prosecution. - -Document 30 deals with the tasks in detail and it states: - - “The Reich Inspectorate, with regard to allocation of labor, - affairs of the Reich Trustee, and administration, is entrusted - with the following tasks: - - “The supervision of the execution of my regulations and decrees. - On the basis of the practical knowledge gained, the Reich - Inspectorate is to make suggestions, propose improvements and - foster mutual exchange of experiences.” - -The last document in this book deals with the establishment of French -offices. It is in the English document book on Page 79, and is entitled, -“French agencies for the care of the French workers employed in the -Reich.” - -I believe I have already read the document here. With that, I have -finished Document Book 1. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well; we will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH DAY - Monday, 3 June 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the witness Jäger is to appear in about -half an hour. I shall read some other documents from my document book, -if it please the Tribunal. - -In the last session I had read all the documents from the first document -book with the exception of Document Sauckel-16, which I left out by -mistake. It is a leaflet for Eastern Workers. I need not read it, but I -shall refer to it. - -I have submitted as Exhibit Sauckel-1 the _Handbuch für die -Dienststellen_ ... (_Manual for Labor Employment_), and in this exhibit -we find the following documents which I have read in part, and shall -read some now: Documents Sauckel-12, 13, 15, 22, 28, 58(a), 67(a), 82, -83, 85, 86, and 88. - -Then, I have submitted Exhibit Sauckel-2, _Sonderveröffentlichung des -Reichsarbeitsblattes_ (_Special Publication of the -Reichsarbeitsblatt_)—namely, _Einsatzbedingungen der Ostarbeiter, sowie -der sowjetrussischen Kriegsgefangenen_ (_Conditions for the Employment -of Eastern Workers and Soviet Russian Prisoners of War_), which contains -the following documents: Documents Sauckel-6, 32, 36, 39, 47, and 52. - -Then, as Exhibit Sauckel-3, I have submitted the _Manifest des -Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz_ (_Manifesto of the -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor_), Document -Sauckel-84. - -Then, as Exhibit Sauckel-4, _Arbeitsgesetze: Textsammlung des Deutschen -Arbeitsrechtes_ (_Labor Laws: Collection of German Laws_), which -contains Documents Sauckel-16, 31, and 49. - -As Exhibit Sauckel-5, I have submitted a book, _Fritz Sauckels -Kampfreden_ (_Fritz Sauckel’s Battle Speeches_). That is Document -Sauckel-95. - -As Exhibit Sauckel-6, _Nationalsozialistische Regierungstätigkeit in -Thüringen, 1932-33_ (_National Socialist Governmental Activity in -Thuringia, 1932-33_), has been submitted. It is contained in Document -Sauckel-96. - -Exhibit Sauckel-7, _Nationalsozialistische Regierungstätigkeit in -Thüringen, 1933-34_ (_National Socialist Governmental Activity in -Thuringia, 1933-34_), is contained in Document Sauckel-97. - -I have once more submitted as Exhibit Sauckel-8 the publication entitled -_Europa arbeitet in Deutschland_ (_Europe Works in Germany_), which has -already been submitted as Document RF-5. - -Then I shall submit an affidavit of Sauckel’s son, Dieter Sauckel, which -is very short. It refers to the evacuation of the Buchenwald Camp which -Sauckel is said to have ordered. I shall read the eight lines of the -affidavit: - - “Between 4 and 7 April 1945, approximately, I was present when - my father, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel, had a conference in his - study. On this occasion the question of the Buchenwald Camp was - discussed, and the following was decided: A certain number of - guards should remain in the camp until the arrival of the enemy - in order to hand the camp prisoners over to them.”—This is - Sauckel Document Book 3, Document Sauckel-94, Page 247. - - “I swear to the truth of the preceding statement for the purpose - of having it submitted to the International Military Tribunal in - Nuremberg. - - “I am ready to swear upon oath to the truth of my statement. - Schönau, 22 March 1946. Dieter Sauckel.” - -I submit this as Exhibit Sauckel-9. - -In Exhibit USA-206, Document 3044-PS, which has been submitted already, -the following documents of Volume II are contained, which I shall read -later: Sauckel-7, 10, 14, 18, 19, 27, and 41. - -The documents which have not been read yet are in the official -collections of laws. I have had the individual laws laid aside in the -library. I do not know whether it is necessary to submit them -individually, or whether it is sufficient for me to state here in what -volume of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ they can be found. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are they in your document book? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. They are short excerpts from the official legal -gazettes. In each case the relevant passages have been extracted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I think it would be convenient if you gave -their exhibit numbers, if they are in your book; but I do not quite -understand how you are arranging these. You told us that Number 1 -contained a great number of other numbers. Now is Number 1 the exhibit -number? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Number 1 is the exhibit number, and this exhibit contains -these documents with the numbers they have in the document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: In the books? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I understand. So that you are only submitting—up -to the present you have only got as far as nine exhibits. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And then you are going to give these various laws which -you have in your books additional exhibit numbers. They will be 10 to... - -DR. SERVATIUS: I did not know whether it was necessary to submit these -Reich legal gazettes as exhibits. As far as I know they have already -been submitted because they are an official collection of laws from the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ of 1942 and 1940. Of course, I can take out these -individual issues and submit them here. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would it not be best if you submitted them as, say, -Exhibit 10, and then told us the numbers in your books which are -contained in Number 10? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then it would be necessary to submit the original text of -the collection of laws. I wanted to avoid that. - -THE PRESIDENT: We can take judicial notice of them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them. -I shall point out in what volumes these documents can be found. That -will be _Reichsgesetzblatt 1942_ in which Documents Sauckel-8, 11, and -17 are contained; _Reichsgesetzblatt 1940_ which contains Document -Sauckel-45; _Reichsgesetzblatt 1943_, which contains Document -Sauckel-21... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Which was the first _Reichsgesetzblatt_? -The one which contained 8, 11, and 17? - -DR. SERVATIUS: 1942. - -THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The second was _Reichsgesetzblatt 1940_, with Document -Sauckel-45. The third was _Reichsgesetzblatt 1943_, with Document -Sauckel-21. The fourth is _Reichsarbeitsblatt 1940_, Document -Sauckel-33... - -THE PRESIDENT: What year, though? - -DR. SERVATIUS: 1940. _Reichsarbeitsblatt_, Document Sauckel-33. The -fifth is _Reichsarbeitsblatt 1942_, which contains Documents Sauckel-9, -35, 40, 46, 50, 51, 64(a). The sixth, _Reichsarbeitsblatt 1943_, -contains Documents Sauckel-20, 23, 37, 42, 43, 44, 48, 54, 55, 57, 60, -60(a), 61, 62, 64, and 68. - -And the last, _Reichsarbeitsblatt 1944_, has Documents Sauckel-26, 30, -38, 58, 59, 65, 67, and 89. - -I shall now go briefly through the document book. I begin with Sauckel -Document Book 2, Document Sauckel-32, “Orders and Decrees Concerning the -Employment of Prisoners of War.” That is the agreement of 27 July 1939. -This is an excerpt concerning the work of prisoners of war, and in -Article 31 prohibited labor is listed. - -In the next document, Sauckel-33, there is a decree of the Reich -Minister of Labor, “Use of Prisoners of War in Places of Work.” There -the types of work for which these prisoners of war are being used are -listed in detail. Among the types of work not included is the -manufacture of arms; but included is work in factories, agriculture, -forestry, work on roads, canals, and dams of importance to the war, work -in brickyards, and so forth, as can be read in detail. - -In Document Sauckel-35 we can see how the employment of prisoners of war -took place, namely by co-operation between the prisoner-of-war camp and -the contractors, and how a contract regulated in detail the conditions -under which the employment of prisoners of war took place. It can be -seen from this that Sauckel’s labor recruitment had nothing to do with -that. - -In Document Sauckel-36 we find a circular decree concerning the -treatment of prisoners of war—a memorandum concerning the treatment of -prisoners of war—which was drawn up jointly by the OKW and the Ministry -for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda: - - “Treatment of prisoners of war: Prisoners of war must be treated - in such a way that their full production capacity may benefit - industry and food economy. To insure this, sufficient - nourishment is necessary.” - -This I wanted to underline. - -Document Sauckel-37 deals with the question of an improved status, -namely the conversion of prisoners of war into civilian workers for work -of importance to the war in Germany. It shows that in this case they get -special allowances, such as an allowance of money for maintaining a -separate household—a so-called compassionate pay. It shows that these -workers were treated like civilian workers. - -The next document, Sauckel-38, is along the same lines and deals with -the visits of relatives to French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners of war -and to Italian military internees in the Reich. It says there: - - “Visits to French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners of war as well - as to Italian military internees are permitted only for wives, - parents, children, and brothers and sisters, who work in Germany - or have their homes in Alsace or Lorraine, and then only on - Sundays and holidays.” - -This shows that actually the prisoner-of-war status had ceased. - -Document Sauckel-39 is a memorandum with respect to general conditions -valid for the employment of prisoners of war. It deals with the working -hours: “The daily working hours, including the time of marching to and -from work, should not be excessive.” And in another passage it says, -“The prisoners of war have a right to a continuous rest period of 24 -hours, to be granted on Sundays when possible...” - -Under Paragraph 7 it is stated that neither the employer, nor his -relatives, nor his employees are entitled to carry out any punitive -measures against prisoners of war. - -Then there follows an excerpt about housing and other accommodation in -camps. It is Document Sauckel-40, which decrees—on the basis of -Sauckel’s Order Number 9—the inspection of housing, food, heating, and -upkeep of the camps by workmen employed at the camps. It is dated 14 -July 1942. It says: - - “By 10 August 1942 an inspection of all industrial - establishments employing foreign labor must be made by all labor - offices in their respective districts to determine whether they - have duly carried out regulations and decrees governing housing, - feeding, and treatment of all foreign male and female workers - and prisoners of war. It is my desire that the offices of the - NSDAP and the DAF should participate in this inspection to a - proportionate extent. Where shortcomings are discovered, the - manager of the works is to be given a time limit within which - such shortcomings are to be remedied.” - -Further on, under 2(a) it is stated that provision should be made for -feeding in winter. And finally: “All factories are to make provision for -camps and billets to be heated when cold weather sets in and to see that -the necessary fuel is ordered in time.” The decree states at the end -that workmen, paid by the factories, are to be employed in the camps to -see to the upkeep of the camps. - -Then there is Document Sauckel-18, a memorandum for works managers and -Eastern Workers, which contains camp rules. The introduction says: - - “In response to a wish of the Plenipotentiary General for - Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, I recommend that the - officials satisfy themselves from time to time that the - regulations issued with respect to the employment of Eastern - Workers are being adhered to within the establishments.” - -That shows that control was emphasized here once again. - -The camp rules then go on to say: - - “Eastern Workers, you are finding in Germany wages and bread, - and by your work you are safeguarding the maintenance of your - families....” - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Could you not summarize these documents more -shortly? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Document Sauckel-41 shows that caring for the Eastern -Workers was especially the task of the German Labor Front, which is -explained here in detail. - -Document Sauckel-42 deals with the same subject. It stresses above all -the importance of trade inspection and says that all necessary measures -for the welfare of foreign workers must be taken immediately and all -shortcomings remedied at once. The inspection officials and the local -authorities have to arrange matters together with the Labor Front. It is -issued by Reich Minister of Labor Seldte, not by Sauckel, which makes it -evident that Sauckel had not become the Reich Minister of Labor. - -In Document Sauckel-43 there are explanations of the camp regulations to -which I shall refer in detail later. But in Document Sauckel-43 I should -like to stress again the position of the Trade Inspection Board. Here -the question of responsibility for hygienic conditions and for the -extermination of vermin is regulated; and it says at the end: “The -supervisory authority in accordance with the new regulations is the -Trade Inspection Board....” - -Document Sauckel-44 contains specifications about sleeping quarters: -Their size, the number of beds, and the administration of medical care. -This again is signed by the Reich Minister of Labor, Franz Seldte, and -not by Sauckel. - -The next group of documents deals with food. Document Sauckel-45 is the -meat inspection law which deals with the question of how far meat of -inferior quality is fit for consumption. That law too has a certain -importance with regard to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, about the inspection of meat, we do not -require any further information about it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Document Sauckel-46 shows merely that the foreign workers -received their food ration cards when away from the camp. - -Document Sauckel-47 is a decree by the Reich Minister for Food and -Agriculture, and shows that he was responsible for determining the food -quotas. The document also gives the rations. I mention only a few: For -the ordinary workers, 2,600 grams of bread per week. That increases, and -it may be read here, if questions of importance... - -THE PRESIDENT: Page 128 shows that prisoners of war are employed in the -armament industry, does it not? Page 128. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It says there: “Food rations of Soviet prisoners of war -working in the armament industry or in trade industries, if they are -accommodated in camps...” and then follows a list of rations. I cannot -see how far that shows... - -THE PRESIDENT: 128 in English, Page 128, Lines 4 to 12: “Treatment of -the sick. All prisoners of war and Eastern Workers, male and female, who -are employed in the armament industry...” - -DR. SERVATIUS: It says there, “All prisoners of war or Eastern Workers -... who are employed in the armament industry...” Armament industry is -not the manufacture of weapons. - -Document Sauckel-48 only refers to a law—I see the translation -department has left out a short paragraph, but I can do without that. -The heading indicates the subject. It refers to taking food for the -journey home. It thus concerns supplies for the return journey. - -Document Sauckel-49 shows a regulation whereby additional food could -also be given; and special diets in the hospitals were also provided. - -In the next group, questions of wages are dealt with. The first decree -is Document Sauckel-50. - -THE PRESIDENT: How far you go—it seems to me sufficient if you give us -a group, and then tell us what it deals with. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. That is from Documents Sauckel-50 to 59, omitting -Document Sauckel-56. The questions of wages and scales of wages are -included here. One will have to look at these more carefully if these -questions become crucial. Therefore, I shall not make any further -specific statements about that now. - -Sauckel Document Book Number 3 is a group of documents containing legal -orders. Documents Sauckel-60 to 68 refer to medical care. I believe here -also I need not go through the individual documents, because they become -of interest only when the subject is dealt with. - -THE PRESIDENT: Give us a group and tell us what it is about, and then we -can look at it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. It deals with medical care; and as I said, the -details become of interest only when the question becomes important. -There is no point in speaking of them now. - -The next group is speeches made by Sauckel on the subject of labor -allocation, and they are contained in the manual. I should like to refer -to one in particular—a speech of 6 January 1943 which was made after -the conference between Sauckel and Rosenberg. It says there at the -beginning: “The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor on 5 and -6 January...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Which page? - -DR. SERVATIUS: It is 204 in my book, and in the English text it should -also be Page 204. - -THE PRESIDENT: Probably that 8,000 should be 800. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, it should be 800. I have also mentioned that -document already, and read the main parts. - -Documents Sauckel-82 and 83 have also been mentioned already in their -essential parts. - -Document Sauckel-84 is a manifesto which has already been presented in -detail. - -Document Sauckel-85 shows the generally valid and binding principles -followed by Sauckel, all of them well-known principles. The main fact is -that after 1943 they showed the same tendency as they had before. - -Document Sauckel-86 is a later speech—a speech of 24 August 1943—to -the presidents of the Gau labor offices. Here again in his speech to the -responsible Gau labor presidents Sauckel stresses his basic attitude, as -he has often stated it here. He adheres to the same attitude on 17 -January 1944—that is, Document Sauckel-88—when he again emphasizes to -these presidents, that: - - “The foreign workers must be treated better. The reception camps - are not to be primitive; rather they must be a recommendation - for us.” - -And at the end: - - “The more I do for the foreign laborers working in Germany, the - better I treat them, the more I influence them—the greater the - extent of their available production capacity.” - -And that was shortly—2 months—before he succeeded in putting the other -foreign workers on an equal footing with the German workers. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have heard the Defendant Sauckel explain... - -DR. SERVATIUS: I beg your pardon? - -THE PRESIDENT: ...that the work was carried on. And will you tell us -where the group of speeches—how far does the group go? - -DR. SERVATIUS: It is Document Sauckel-89. - -Document Sauckel-94 I have read already. Documents Sauckel-95, 96, 97 I -have already read to the extent necessary. And that brings me to the end -of the presentation of documents. - -Now, comes an affidavit of the witness Karl Goetz, which is included in -the document book. I submit it as Exhibit Number 10, the affidavit by -Karl Goetz. This is an interrogatory which was submitted very early and -was therefore considered in a very abridged form, as the details had not -become apparent at that time. Consequently, the witness answered very -shortly and could say nothing specific to a number of questions. Where -he did answer the questions, he refers to an introduction which he -wrote, and in answering the questions raised by the Prosecution he also -refers to that introduction. Therefore, I believe that I might also read -this introduction as far as is necessary. - -The affidavit is of 20 March 1946. In this introduction, on the second -page, I should like to call attention to a conference in Paris. This -witness Goetz was a bank expert in Weimar. He had known Sauckel before -and had worked on his staff of experts. He had been with him in Paris -and had taken part in the negotiations with Laval. He says here: - - “The negotiations led to an extensive talk, which was conducted - in a proper and polite manner as far as I could judge. Laval - took note of Sauckel’s proposals and agreed to accede to his - request. But he made counterproposals...” - -I do not think I need go into detail, because what was then negotiated -is of minor significance. He says on the third page: - - “During a later conference in Paris the proceedings were - similar. Laval assumed a stiffer attitude, and he pointed out - the great difficulties which would impede the recruitment of - additional workers. He emphasized in particular the necessity of - not stripping the French labor market of its best forces.” - -I think I can go on to Page 4. The witness says there under 5: - - “My last mission, at Sauckel’s request, was to ascertain whether - it was possible by means of using our banking connections to - purchase an additional amount of grain in Romania and - Hungary—about 50,000 to 100,000 tons was the figure given. This - grain was to be used as additional food for foreign laborers in - the form of a light afternoon meal.” - -Then he says that that project failed due to circumstances. He gives a -general impression of Sauckel, and says briefly: - - “Sauckel approached that task with the energy and vigor peculiar - to him. He pointed out repeatedly what conditions were necessary - for the success of the task and repeatedly emphasized that it - was the major duty of all authorities to see that correct - treatment was given to workers at their places of employment.” - -Then he describes the details: - - “Above all, he demanded that foreign workers should not be given - the feeling of being imprisoned in their camps. He demanded the - removal of all barbed wire fences.” - -He continues by saying: - - “...Sauckel said that the workers must return to their native - countries as propaganda agents.” - -Then the witness gives an important statement concerning information as -to atrocities and bad conditions. I should like to read something from -Page 6 to show what kind of person this witness Goetz is. He says... - -THE PRESIDENT: What page is your excerpt from? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Page 6, or Page 266 of the document book, at the top of -the page. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on. - -DR. SERVATIUS: He says: - - “I feel also that I should mention that following my arrest by - the Gestapo, after the affair of 20 July 1944, Sauckel spoke on - my behalf to the RSHA (Kaltenbrunner). I cannot say to what - extent my release from the Ravensbrück Concentration Camp was - brought about by this. - - “I wish to state further that I did not receive from Sauckel any - material remuneration, awards, or decorations. - - “I found it expedient to conceal from him my own inner political - convictions and my connections with Goerdeler and Popitz. In his - blind obedience to Hitler—and in spite of our old - friendship—he would otherwise no doubt have handed me over to - that Gestapo from which he endeavored to free me in November - 1944.” - -I have read this in advance and I return now to Page 265, because the -witness, who was then working on Sauckel’s staff, states his attitude to -that question which is of great interest to all of us. He says: - - “Now that the extent of atrocities in concentration camps has - become known to me from publications, I ponder and rack my - brains as to how the picture drawn above can be made to tally - with the events now brought to light. Although I have thought it - over for weeks, I can find no explanation for this.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What page is this? Page 265? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Page 265. It is near the top of the page. Where it is in -the English text, I cannot say; but it should be Page 265. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - - DR. SERVATIUS: “On one side I see the foreign workers, men and - women who move freely about in great numbers and associate with - the German population. Frenchmen and Belgians, with whom I spoke - out of personal interest, were usually happy to hear their - native tongue, conversed freely, hoped the war would soon end, - and criticized their work, but rarely sharply. On the other side - appears the totally unbearable sight of the recently revealed - mass atrocities. One had heard that foreign workers were tried - and sentenced—they were certainly subject to the same - arbitrariness and the same methods of punishment as were the - natives—but not that mass sentences were passed. But that - really had nothing to do with the Allocation of Labor. I find it - impossible to reconcile what I heard and what I saw in those - days with the present revelations. Either this was a development - which took place in the last year and a half, when I was not - able to observe the situation because of my arrest and my - retirement to the country, or else there existed, besides the - regular Allocation of Labor, an employment of concentration camp - inmates on a vast scale. It is also possible that Sauckel was - not able to supervise things and was not informed or that he - deceived himself with his general orders and oral statements, - which I could not comprehend.” - -I considered these statements of particular importance, because the -witness stood on the side of the men of 20 July 1944 and certainly -observed carefully, and great importance has to be attached to his -judgment. - -As to the questions themselves, Question Number 1 and its answer I -consider irrelevant; also, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. All of these are answers -which are of minor importance. - -To Question Number 10, Page 276: - - “Who was responsible for the billeting, treatment, and feeding - of foreign workers after they had arrived at the place of work?” - -The answer is: - - “The only thing I heard was that from the moment work was - started responsibility for that rested with the factory - managers, and in most cases with special employees under them.” - -Question 11 is: - - “What kind of orders did Sauckel issue for the treatment of - workers in the factories?” - -The witness in his answer refers to the introduction which I have read. - -The next questions—13, 14, 15, 16, and 17—are irrelevant. - -Question 18 is: - - “Did Sauckel receive reports about irregular conditions? What - measures did he take? Do you know of any individual cases?” - -The answer is: - - “I remember only one case. Sauckel was informed that the workers - of a certain factory were still housed in a camp surrounded by - barbed wire. I cannot recollect the name of the place or the - factory concerned. I heard that he ordered the immediate removal - of the fence.” - -Then we come to the questions which are put by the Prosecution. I -consider that Question Number 1 is not relevant because it deals with -personal, unofficial relations with Sauckel, and how he became -acquainted with him. He made his acquaintance when a prisoner of war. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, Mr. Biddle thinks that the Prosecution -ought to be asked to read anything they wish to out of those -interrogatories. - -M. HERZOG: The Prosecution, Mr. President, does not wish to read any -excerpts from this interrogatory. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you know that the witness Jäger is -present, do you not? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, he is present. - -THE PRESIDENT: You know he is present. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call -the witness Jäger. - -[_The witness Jäger took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? - -DR. WILHELM JÄGER (Witness): Dr. Wilhelm Jäger. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, during the war you worked as a doctor with the -firm of Krupp, in Essen, and were entrusted with the medical care of the -camps of foreign workers? Is that true? - -JÄGER: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who put you in charge there? - -JÄGER: I was appointed by the firm of Krupp which employed me when a -change in the care of foreign workers was brought about through the -public health administration having to take it over. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you not also appointed to this post by the German -Labor Front? - -JÄGER: No. The contract which the firm of Krupp made with me was made -through the German Labor Front. - -DR. SERVATIUS: If I understand you correctly, you did not conclude the -contract directly with the Labor Front; but you were under obligations -to the German Labor Front, were you not? - -JÄGER: I have never felt that I had anything to do with the Labor Front -in that respect. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you not continuously send reports to the -German Labor Front about the conditions in the camps? - -JÄGER: That happened only in a few cases, as far as I can remember. I -generally sent these reports to the public health authorities and to the -firm of Krupp. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not also report to the Trade Inspection Board? - -JÄGER: Not always. I reported just a few cases to the health office of -the city of Essen, but only in individual cases when it appeared -important to me that the health office should be informed. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the office for public health and medical -care? - -JÄGER: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: With what office was that connected? - -JÄGER: That was in Essen. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I do not mean the locality, but with what office was it -connected? Was it not with the German Labor Front? - -JÄGER: I cannot say that precisely. I know only that it was a -subdepartment of the public health administration in Essen. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Is it known to you that the foreign workers were under -the care and control of the German Labor Front? - -JÄGER: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Also with respect to their health? - -JÄGER: On only one occasion did I meet a commission from the Labor Front -in my camp. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the institution of Gau camp doctors? - -JÄGER: An institution of that kind was to have been created in Essen, -but it did not happen. At that time, when we had just had a typhus -epidemic, I suggested to the health officer—who was then Dr. Heinz -Bühler of Mühlheim—that something of the sort should be instituted. -Then also at a meeting I spoke about my idea, but I did not hear -anything more about this Gau office for camp doctors. - -DR. SERVATIUS: That will do. How many camps did you supervise? - -JÄGER: That varied. First, there may have been 5 or 6, then later maybe -17 or 18, and later again it fell to a lower figure. But I am not able -at this moment to give you the exact figure. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the nature of your task? - -JÄGER: Above all, I was supposed to assure the medical care of foreign -workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the treatment of the -sick? - -JÄGER: Only when they were brought to me and when I was in the camps. I -always concerned myself personally with individual cases in the camps -whenever I inspected them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You had not only a supervisory capacity, but you also -gave treatment yourself? - -JÄGER: Whenever I was in a camp I would be consulted by the camp doctors -and I would advise them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the job of the camp doctors? - -JÄGER: The camp doctors had their daily duty in the infirmary and the -care of the patients in general. - -DR. SERVATIUS: So your work was supervisory? - -JÄGER: Yes; supervisory. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the Prosecution has repeatedly interrogated you -outside this courtroom? - -JÄGER: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You have been in Nuremberg before—in this building here? - -JÄGER: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you make an affidavit about the conditions in the -Krupp camps? - -JÄGER: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I will put this affidavit to you. This is an affidavit of -15 October 1945. Did you give that affidavit as a witness for the -Prosecution? - -JÄGER: As far as I can remember, yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now I ask you to state whether you still stand by the -statements which you made at that time? - -JÄGER: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I shall read the statements to you: “My name is Dr. -Wilhelm Jäger. I am a physician in Essen...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, we cannot have the whole document read to -him. You can put to him anything you want to challenge him upon. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Very well. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You say, at about the middle of the first -page: - - “I began my work with a thorough inspection of the camps. At - that time, in October 1942, I found the following - conditions...”—and you go on to say—“The Eastern Workers were - housed in the following camps: Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, - Spendlerstrasse, Hoegstrasse, Germaniastrasse, Dechenschule...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you challenging that? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where were these camps? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, that is what I want to ask him. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Did these camps exist at the time, and were -they occupied? - -JÄGER: As far as I can remember. One has to take into consideration that -until I started my work I did not know at all what camps existed. At a -meeting which had been called, where there were doctors of the various -nationalities, I asked first of all what camps there were. They did not -know; and then a list was procured in which the camps were given. -Then... - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have mentioned the camps here by name, and -yet you are not certain that these camps existed at that time, in -October 1942? - -JÄGER: I have given the camps which existed at the beginning of my -activities, as far as I could remember. I had to go to each one of these -camps personally, and I had to depend entirely upon myself. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Further, concerning the food of the Eastern Workers—if -you will look at the second page of the document—you state the -following: - - “The food for the Eastern Workers was completely inadequate. - They received 1,000 calories less per day than the minimum for - Germans....” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, below the names of the camps he says: -“...all surrounded by barbed wire and were closely guarded.” I -understand you are challenging that? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were the camps surrounded by barbed wire and closely -guarded, as it says here? - -JÄGER: In the beginning, yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But you do not know whether that was the same case in all -camps, do you? - -JÄGER: The camps which I visited, where I was as yet unknown, for -instance, Krämerplatz and Dechenschule, were closely guarded, and I had -to show my credentials in order to get in. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I repeat the question concerning the food. You said the -Eastern Workers received 1,000 calories less per day than the minimum -for Germans. Whereas German workers who did hard work received 5,000 -calories per day, the Eastern Workers who performed the same kind of -work received only 2,000 calories per day. Is that true? - -JÄGER: That was true at the beginning of my activities. The food for -Eastern Workers—as could be seen from the posted lists—had been -determined as to quantity, and there was a difference between that for -Eastern Workers and that for German workers. The 5,000 calories -mentioned here were given to specific categories of German workers who -did the hardest type of work. That was not given to everybody. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I shall put to you a chart of the calories. - -I submit to the Tribunal a copy of this chart. That is an exact table of -the calories to which the individual categories of workers were -entitled. It begins with 9 February 1942 and shows the individual quotas -for the various types of workers; and on the last page there is a -summary of the average quotas of calories which were allotted. - -It is shown there in the summary, Group 1. Eastern Workers and Soviet -prisoners of war: Average workers, 2,156 calories; heavy workers, 2,615; -very heavy workers, 2,909; for long hours and night workers, 2,244. Are -you familiar with these figures? - -JÄGER: Approximately. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Will you compare that with what the German workers -received: The normal consumer, 2,846 calories; heavy workers, 3,159; -very heavy workers, 3,839; for long hours and night workers, 2,846 -calories. Is that in accordance with your statement, according to which -you said that German workers doing the heaviest work received 5,000 -calories, whereas the Eastern Workers received only 2,000 calories? - -THE PRESIDENT: It is very hard to follow these figures unless you give -us the exact page. Are you on the last page? - -DR. SERVATIUS: This is a summary. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, on which page are you? - -DR. SERVATIUS: On the last page, the last sheet on the right side. -First, there are the food groups 1, 2, 3 on different pages; and then on -the last page, on the right side next to Group 3, which concerns the -Poles, there is a summary of calories for Eastern Workers, for Germans, -and for Poles. If you compare the amounts of calories here in the -columns, that should tally with what the witness has stated. He singled -out the very heavy workers and said that the Germans received 5,000 -calories; the table shows that they received only 3,839. He also says -the Eastern Workers received 2,000 calories; whereas, according to the -table, they received 2,900—that is, instead of a proportion of 5,000 to -2,000, it is from 2,900 to 3,800—in round figures about 1,000 calories -and not, as the witness has said here, 3,000 calories. Is that correct? -Do you stand on your statement? A distinction has to be made... - -THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear the witness’ answer. - -MR. DODD: I think it would be more helpful to the Tribunal, and -certainly to the Prosecution, if it were established who made up this -chart, and whether or not the figures given here cover the camps where -this witness had jurisdiction. From looking it over I cannot tell where -it was made up, except on the front page it says: - - “According to the food table by Dr. Hermann Schall, Medical - Superintendent of the ‘Westend’ Sanatorium. Calculations of - controlled foodstuffs for the camps of the firm of Krupp...” - - And so on. - -But these things can be made up by the bale and presented to witnesses. -Unless there is some foundation laid, I think it is an improper way to -cross-examine. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have an affidavit which can prove where that chart -comes from. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you ever seen this chart before? - -DR. SERVATIUS: It is the affidavit of the witness Hahn. - -JÄGER: Was a question put to me, please? - -DR. SERVATIUS: The witness has the original. It is attached. May I ask -the witness to return the document to me? - -JÄGER: I wanted to make a statement on this subject. - -At the beginning of my activity the Eastern Workers’ food definitely -differed from that of the German people, and also from that of the -so-called western workers—the French, the Belgians, and so on. It can -be seen from the figures that, even though it may not be stated exactly, -at least there is a difference of 700 to 800 calories. In the beginning -until, I believe, February or March 1943, the Eastern Workers received -no additional rations for long hours, heavy work, or very heavy work. -These additional quotas were given only after Sauckel had ordered it; -and that was, if I remember correctly, at the beginning of 1943. At that -time, as far as I remember, the Eastern Workers were put on an equal -footing with the German workers as far as food was concerned; and they -received additional rations for long hours, heavy work, and very heavy -work, which they had not received at all before. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, if I understand you correctly, you want to say -that this chart may be right but that in reality the workers did not -receive what is listed on the chart. Did I understand you correctly? - -JÄGER: Even from this chart you can see the difference. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It was a difference of 3,000 calories which you -mentioned, whereas the table shows a difference of about 1,000 calories. - -JÄGER: I said before that there were individual categories of workers -doing the heaviest type of work—such as stokers and miners—and that -they received up to 5,200 calories. That, however, was not the rule. -Only very special workers received up to 5,200 calories. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then what you say here is not correct, because you did -not mention that. You say generally that, whereas the German worker who -did the heaviest type of work received 5,000 calories, the Eastern -Workers who did the same type of work received only 2,000 calories per -day. That is, however, a general statement; and it does not show that -you are referring to exceptional cases of individual groups of workers. -Is that correct? - -JÄGER: That is the way I saw it, and I believe that you understand it as -it appears here. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, where does this chart come from, and are you putting -it in? Will you put it in? - -DR. SERVATIUS: In the affidavit this assertion is made, and the witness -said clearly at that time that the workers doing the heaviest type of -work received 5,000 calories if they were German, and if they were -Eastern Workers, they received only 2,000. That is a very clear -statement in the affidavit, which is not in accordance with the chart. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering it in evidence? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: What will it be? What number will it be? - -DR. SERVATIUS: That will be Exhibit Sauckel-11. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the affidavit refer to the chart? - -DR. SERVATIUS: I asked because I questioned the correctness of the -affidavit. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, I asked whether the affidavit refers to and -identifies the chart, the chart which the witness has just had in his -hand. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you have put in an affidavit by Walter -Hahn. Does that affidavit mention the chart and say where the chart -comes from and by whom it was made up and to what it refers? - -DR. SERVATIUS: The affidavit which is here as Document Number D-288 does -not mention the chart, but only the affidavit which I have submitted. -Now I understand it is the affidavit by the witness Hahn, and the chart -is attached; and it is covered by the affidavit made by the witness. -That document I submit in evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: I said the affidavit by Walter Hahn—does it identify and -is it attached to the chart? What page? There are seven pages, you know. -We cannot find it unless you tell us. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In the German text on Page 4. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you mean where it says, “The amount of calories -contained in this food can be seen from the calorie table made by me -which covers the whole period of the war”? Is that what you mean? That -is on Page 4 of our copy. It is under the heading “C”: “Food Supply of -French Prisoners of War and Italian Military Internees.” - -DR. SERVATIUS: It is there, as I have said before, on Page 4 of the -German text, where it says that the rations were based on calories; and -that the caloric content of the food can be seen from the calculations -made which cover the entire duration of the war. That is the document -attached. - -THE PRESIDENT: But it is all right to say that the document is attached, -but it does not refer to it by any name. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But the document is attached, so that it is obvious that -it must belong to it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I do not want to be contentious about this, -but—maybe I do not understand—I think we ought to know when this -schedule was made; by whom. This affidavit says it is an appendix. Maybe -it was made by the man Hahn, but we do not know it yet; and this witness -has not testified to it, and counsel has not told us. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the position is this, is it not: The man named -Walter Hahn made an affidavit annexed to this chart. That affidavit is -dated, I imagine... - -MR. DODD: Yes, 1946. - -THE PRESIDENT: ...after the affidavit had been made by this witness, and -replies in detail to the evidence given by this witness. - -MR. DODD: Yes. What I wanted to understand fully was that this schedule, -concerning which this witness is being cross-examined, was apparently -not made up at the time when he had responsibility for these camps; and -so far it does not appear from the examination that that is so, and I -think it would have great bearing on the weight of the evidence adduced -through the cross-examination. - -I would like to point out that it was the defense of Sauckel that he had -nothing to do with the feeding and care of these workers after they came -into Germany, but that it was the responsibility of the DAF. I think it -might be more helpful if counsel cleared that up, so that we would know -whether he does admit responsibility after they came in and whether that -is the purpose of this cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The Tribunal does not think that you need -interrupt your cross-examination. You can go on. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The Prosecution has just made that assertion as an -accusation against Sauckel. If the Prosecution today is of the opinion -that Sauckel was not responsible for the happenings in the factories but -rather the works manager was responsible and that he was not responsible -for prisoners of war but that the Armed Forces were responsible for -them, then I do not need this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on with your cross-examination, please. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have made some statements concerning the -clothing of Eastern Workers. You said that they slept in the same -clothes in which they had come from the East and that almost all of them -had no overcoats and were therefore forced to use their blankets—even -in cold and rainy weather—to carry their blankets in the place of -coats. - -Was it always like that, or only for a time? Was that a general -occurrence or only an individual case? - -JÄGER: In order to avoid another misunderstanding I have to state again: -At the beginning of my activity I depended entirely on myself. There was -no camp command. There was nobody else to work with me. The calorie -tables as were as the clothing charts were not made until later. - -The camp management which existed, according to Hahn—if I remember -correctly—was only until February or April 1943. The phase which I -intended to describe, and have described here, refers strictly to the -time when I started my work. At that time the conditions were actually -as I have described them, and I had to go by that. That also included -clothing, as I have confirmed. These people remained in the same -condition as on arrival, as far as clothing was concerned, for quite a -while; and as far as I know they did not receive anything at that time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was done about that? - -JÄGER: I reported these conditions as soon as possible. I do not -remember when. As far as I could see, the intention was to establish -tailor shops, shoe repair shops, and other work shops in the camps; and -some of them were actually established. - -DR. SERVATIUS: One question. Did things generally get much better in the -course of your activities, or did they become worse? - -JÄGER: They did not become worse after 1943. After, the first heavy air -raids, of course, the confusion was always very great. A great deal was -destroyed by fire. I recall that during one night 19,000 persons became -homeless; and, of course, clothes and underwear were destroyed also. It -naturally took quite some time to make up these losses. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were these conditions caused by the firm of Krupp, or by -lack of supervision on the part of the Labor Front? - -JÄGER: As I have said, I saw members of the Labor Front only once in a -camp. Then that commission did actually criticize conditions. It was in -the camp at Krämerplatz, and the firm of Krupp was fined at that time, -because of the conditions. But that was the only time that I got in -touch at all with the Labor Front. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did the firm of Krupp object in any way to the -improvements, so that the Labor Front had to intervene? - -JÄGER: That I cannot say. I had no influence in that respect and did not -know anything about it, because I had to deal only with medical affairs, -and did not participate in meetings of the firm of Krupp or the Labor -Front. I could only make reports. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you also made statements concerning the -conditions of health; and you said that the supply of medical -instruments, bandages, medicines, and other medical equipment was -completely inadequate in these camps. Is that true, or were those -exceptional cases; or was it a condition which existed all the time? - -JÄGER: That was how I found the camps in October 1942, and slowly I had -to clear up these conditions. Later, of course, there was an -improvement. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You say here that the number of Eastern Workers who fell -sick was twice as high as the number of German workers; that -tuberculosis was especially prevalent; and that the percentage was four -times as high among the Eastern Workers as among the Germans. Is that -correct? - -JÄGER: That was the case at the beginning when we received workers who -had not had any medical examination at all. When I went through the -camps, I heard from the camp doctors—and saw for myself on the occasion -of inspections—that very many people were sick. The figure was -considerably higher than among the Germans, as far as I could see at -that time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what was done about that by the Krupp firm? - -JÄGER: After we had found out that it was tuberculosis we had to deal -with, we made examinations in large numbers, even X-ray examinations. -Then those affected with tuberculosis were separated from the others and -put into the Krupp hospital for medical treatment. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then you mentioned typhus, and said that that was also -widespread among the workers. - -JÄGER: I busied myself with that in particular, as we had about 150 -cases. - -DR. SERVATIUS: At what time? - -JÄGER: During the entire period from 1942 to 1945. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How many workers did you have during that time? - -JÄGER: Oh, that varied. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Give us some approximate figure. - -JÄGER: Well, if I remember correctly, there may have been 23,000 or -24,000; there may have been more. Later, there were about 9,000. But -these figures varied. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you consider it correct, if 150 people out of such a -large number are affected by typhus over such a long period of time, to -say that it was very widespread among the workers? - -JÄGER: Yes, for we had no typhus at all among the German population. So -that statement may be justified. If among a population of 400,000 or -500,000—such as there was in Essen at that time—there was no typhus at -all, and if one then takes an average of 20,000, with 150 cases among -the 20,000, then that statement can quite well be made. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In other words, you maintain your statement, that it is a -correct statement that typhus was widespread. You say, furthermore, that -carriers of these diseases were fleas, lice, bedbugs, and other vermin -which tortured the inhabitants of those camps. Was that true of all the -camps? - -JÄGER: It was the case in almost all the camps when I began my work. -Then a disinfection station was set up by the firm of Krupp, which was -hit in an air attack immediately. It was then rebuilt, and then -destroyed a second time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You say that in cases of illness the workers had to go to -work until a camp doctor certified that they were unfit for work. In the -camps at Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germaniastrasse, and -Kapitän-Lehmannstrasse there were no daily consultation hours, and that -at these camps the camp doctors appeared only every second or third day. -Consequently workers were forced to go to work despite illness, until a -doctor appeared. Is that correct? - -JÄGER: Naturally a worker had to work unless a camp doctor certified he -was unfit. It was the same with the German population. I am a panel -doctor myself and I know that in many cases a man had to go to work if -he did not report himself sick; there was no difference in that respect. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And you say that that was the case in the camps -mentioned; that there was no real consultation hour, which meant that a -man could not possibly report sick? - -JÄGER: But he could go to a doctor. Because there were no doctors there, -I purposely arranged that whenever possible people should come to me -during my consultation—to me personally. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But you have said here... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you just said that the workers could report ill -even when there was no doctor present, that there was some other -provision for them. Here you say that these camps were visited only -every second or third day by the competent camp doctors; that as a -consequence the workers, despite illness, had to report for work until a -doctor was actually there. Is that correct? - -JÄGER: That is wrongly expressed. If anyone reported ill he had to be -taken to a doctor, or the doctor was notified. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I should like to return once more to the subject -of the spreading of typhus. How many deaths resulted? - -JÄGER: Only about three or four cases of death resulted, and they -occurred only because the case was diagnosed too late. I always took -personal charge of the typhus cases and had them brought to the hospital -immediately, for I was responsible for this. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then you say in another place, on Page 2: - - “The plan of supplies prescribed a little meat each week. Only - Freibankfleisch could be used for this purpose, which was horse - meat, meat infected with tuberculosis, or meat condemned by the - veterinary.” - -Does that mean that the foreign workers received bad meat? - -JÄGER: One must define the expression “Freibankfleisch.” That was meat -which was not released for general consumption by the veterinary but -which, after being treated in a certain way, was quite fit for human -food. Even in times of peace and afterwards, the German population -bought this meat. During the war the German population received in -return for their coupons a double quantity of Freibankfleisch. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then the veterinary allowed it for consumption? - -JÄGER: Meat which had been condemned at first was released for human -consumption after it had been treated in a certain manner and was then -not harmful. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then the expression “condemned by the veterinary” means -that it was first condemned and then allowed? - -JÄGER: Yes, then allowed. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, regarding the French prisoner-of-war camp in -Nöggerathstrasse you said the following: - - “This camp was destroyed in a bombing attack; and the inmates - for almost half a year were housed in dog kennels, latrines, and - old baking ovens.” - -Is that correct? - -JÄGER: That is how I found this camp. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And you saw that yourself for a half year? - -JÄGER: I was there only on three occasions. It was described to me in -that way, and I found the camp in that condition. As far as I could -determine at the time, it had been in that condition for about 4 months; -then it was rebuilt. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I am interested in the dog kennels. How many dog -kennels were there? Were they really dog kennels, or was that only a -derogatory remark about some other kind of billets? - -JÄGER: It was an expression of mine, because the inmates built and -hammered these huts together themselves. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Is the same true of the latrines, or what does that mean? - -JÄGER: That was the place where the doctor had his consultations. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a former latrine, or was it a latrine that was -being used as such? - -JÄGER: A former latrine. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then it was a former latrine which had been rebuilt? - -JÄGER: It had not been rebuilt; it was just as it had been. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was this latrine then still being used? - -JÄGER: It was not being used. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then you say that there were no tables, chairs, or -cupboards in this camp. - -JÄGER: That was also not the case. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you swear to this testimony which you have -seen? - -JÄGER: Yes, to the one I saw before. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Are you sure it is that testimony which you have just had -in your hands? - -JÄGER: In my home in Chemnitz I crossed out various things in the record -of the interrogatory which was submitted to me, and initialed these -corrections... - -DR. SERVATIUS: This very sentence, did you not... - -THE PRESIDENT: Please do not interrupt him. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Please continue. - -JÄGER: I must assume that this is that corrected record. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But you have it before you? - -JÄGER: Yes, I have a record before me. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Can you not determine which passages you crossed out? -Were there many passages like that, or was it just single words? - -JÄGER: No, sometimes entire sentences. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And you swore to that? - -JÄGER: Yes. After I had made these changes, I swore to this record. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I should like to call the attention of the -Tribunal to the fact that this statement was in the Krupp files at the -beginning of the proceedings, and that it was considerably shorter, and -that a number of sentences which the witness has sworn to here were -lacking in that statement. I would suggest, therefore, that the -Prosecution should submit the original, which the witness states he has -altered, so that it can be seen just what he did write. As far as I -know, he struck out at the time a few of those very statements which he -has just repeated here. - -As an example, I mention that he stated that in this camp there were no -chairs, tables, or cupboards. That is a sentence which was struck out. -The witness thus had doubts at the time, and did not swear to these -facts. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you are talking about. We have before -us what is called a sworn statement, which was put in evidence and which -is signed by the witness. The witness is now saying that that statement -is correct, subject to any alterations which you have extracted from him -in cross-examination. - -DR. SERVATIUS: He said it might be entire sentences. I should like to -ask the Prosecution to produce the original document with the passages -crossed out, because I have seen two statements: a brief one in which -these passages are apparently left out, and a complete one, such as we -have before us, and which the witness says had been cut short. - -THE PRESIDENT: All that the witness is saying, is it not, is that it was -originally submitted to him in a certain form? He made certain -alterations in it. Then, when those alterations had been made—I do not -know whether it was fair-copied or not—he then signed it and swore to -it, and that is the document that we have. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, my contention is this: The document which -we have before us does not show these crossings out. The words which -were struck out are still contained in the document. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the witness any question you like about it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How did you mark your alterations? - -JÄGER: I crossed the passages out with ink and put my name next to the -alterations. It is difficult, of course, and today I am not able to say -what I did strike out at that time, as I did not retain a copy. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, if this document which we have before us -were reproduced correctly these crossed-out passages would have to be -shown, especially as the witness says that he put his initials in the -margin. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you sign the document after it had been fair-copied? -Witness, did you sign the document after it had been fair-copied? You -know what a fair copy is, do you not? - -JÄGER: Yes. I must try to remember exactly. - -The document was submitted to me. I made the alterations, and then I -signed three or four of these statements. Then these records were taken -away; and on the same day or the following day, I was in Essen and swore -to this record. Then I received a record which I read before the court. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a fair copy without any alterations? - -JÄGER: That was a fair copy. I do not remember exactly; I really cannot. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And why did you make these alterations? - -JÄGER: The record came about in this way. Captain Harris came to me and -interrogated me on these matters. Notes were taken; and then Captain -Harris, I think, compiled this record and asked me to sign it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And why did you make these alterations? - -JÄGER: Because I could not swear to those things—the things that I -struck out I could not swear to. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was it incorrect, or did it go too far? - -JÄGER: In part it went too far, I think I can put it that way; and in -part it was incorrect—unintentionally, of course. But I had to make -those changes, and I did make them. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, if I show you a document in which I mark in red -the passages that you struck out, would you recognize those passages? - -JÄGER: That is very difficult, for I cannot remember that. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have no further questions. - -MR. DODD: I am not clear on this. I do not know whether counsel is -claiming that we have another document, one which we have not submitted. -I do not know of any such. We submitted the only one that came into our -possession... - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got that original, or is it with... - -MR. DODD: There were a number of these made up, and they were all signed -as originals. The first was the copy made with the typewriter, the -others carbon copies. It was a joint British-American team that -interrogated the witness, and this one copy was turned over to us, and -we submitted it. That is the only one we have ever seen. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see in the certificate of translation it refers to a -certificate dated 14 October 1945, signed by Captain N. Webb... - -MR. DODD: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You will find that at the end of the document, I think. - -DR. BALLAS: As former counsel for Herr Krupp Von Bohlen, I wish to make -a statement about this. - -In the Krupp file which the counsel for Krupp... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What have you got to do with it? We are -now considering the suggestion made by Dr. Servatius that this document, -which we are now considering... - -DR. BALLAS: I am sorry. I did not quite follow you, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: We are now considering the Document Number D-288. You -haven’t anything to do with that document. - -DR. BALLAS: Yes, this document does concern me. The Krupp portfolio... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What right have you to speak about it? You -are only a former counsel to Krupp. - -DR. BALLAS: I want to help explain the matter. At present I am appearing -for Dr. Siemers, counsel for Admiral Raeder. - -THE PRESIDENT: But how can you help us about the framing of the -affidavit of this witness by the Prosecution? You cannot do anything -about that. - -DR. BALLAS: I just wanted to refer to the different versions of the -document. - -In the Krupp file there is a Document D-288 which is considerably -shorter than this Document D-288 which has been submitted by the -Prosecution in the case of Sauckel. At the time I called Dr. Servatius’ -attention to this difference, and we checked point by point just how far -the deviations went. There are thus two documents—the one original -Document D-288 and the one in the Krupp file which differs from the -document presented in the case of Sauckel. - -THE PRESIDENT: But this document was signed by this witness. There may -have been some other document signed which was put in the Krupp file, -but this witness has said that he signed this document. Therefore, it -does not seem to me that it is material. - -DR. BALLAS: I just wanted to call your attention to the fact that there -are two different documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes; thank you. Is there any other member of the Defense -that wants to ask questions of this witness? - -[_There was no response._] - -Then, Mr. Dodd, do you want to re-examine him? - -MR. DODD: No, Sir—except that I would like to say, with respect to the -Tribunal’s question concerning this certificate of translation where the -name Captain N. Webb appears, that I am informed that refers to a -certificate which is attached to all British documents and that is a -certificate which goes along for the purpose of the translators. -Undoubtedly, that is what it is. However, I will have a search made in -the document room and clear it up. It is better that way. But my British -friends say that is so—they do send a certificate; and the only -possible explanation is that it is the certificate with a mistake in the -date. But in any event, I will look into it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness had the original of that affidavit put to -him? - -MR. DODD: I believe he has. I understood he had the one which is before -the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has he acknowledged the signature? - -MR. DODD: Well, I understood so. I can inquire. - -[_Turning to the witness._] - -Witness, you saw the signature? Is it your signature? - -JÄGER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: As a matter of fact, I talked to you personally on this -matter; and you told me that this was a statement you gave. Do you -remember that? Do you recall when you and I talked, and you told me this -was your statement? You looked it over and read it. - -JÄGER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You read English as well as German, do you not? You have some -knowledge of English. - -JÄGER: Some knowledge, yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, the document is being handed to you. It is in -German, is it not? - -JÄGER: It is in German. - -THE PRESIDENT: And it is signed by you, is it? - -JÄGER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any passage in it which you want to strike out -of it? - -JÄGER: May I read the document first? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes; you may read it as quickly as you can. - -MR. DODD: While the witness is reading the document, I should like to -inform the Tribunal that we made a call to the document room and have -been told by the officer there that there is only one Document D-288, -and this is it; there is no duplicate signed, as counsel for Krupp -stated. - -JÄGER: Yes, here there is an alteration which is written in pencil, on -Page 2. I crossed that out, but that was not written by me. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I submit the document which I received -from the counsel for Krupp at the beginning? I also have here an English -document, Document Number 288 and the passages which allegedly were -crossed out at the time have been marked by me in red. I should like to -submit this document for the information of the Court; I believe it will -help in clarifying this matter. There are many passages struck out. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Servatius, that is a different document, as I -understand it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: We do not need that. We have this document before us, -signed by the witness; and we have asked him whether he has anything in -it which he thinks did not form part of the original document which he -signed. - -JÄGER: On Page 1 it says, “Conditions in all these camps were extremely -bad.” I would have probably limited this statement, because I... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Witness, we do not want to know whether -you think you expressed yourself too strongly. We only want to know -whether the document represents the document which you -signed—accurately represents the document which you signed. If there is -anything which you want to change now, you can say what it is. - -JÄGER: The record, as it is before me, I would not change in any way. - -THE PRESIDENT: Just one or two questions I want to ask you. Were -prisoners of war employed at Krupp’s during the time you were -supervising these camps? - -JÄGER: I did not supervise the prisoner-of-war camps. That is a wrong -expression. I received the permission to visit the prisoner-of-war camps -which were under the sole jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht, and I was told -that these prisoners of war were all working for Krupp. - -THE PRESIDENT: Were any of the people who were working at the camps, -which you mentioned in this, prisoners of war? - -JÄGER: In Hoegstrasse. - -THE PRESIDENT: Prisoners of war were working there, were they? - -JÄGER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Krupp’s? - -JÄGER: For the Krupp Works, yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: What sort of work was it? - -JÄGER: These things were not under my jurisdiction. It depended on their -trade—locksmiths probably worked in the locksmith shop. But there were -also many unskilled laborers. But I am naturally not able to give you -all the details; these matters were not under my jurisdiction. I was -concerned with these people only in my capacity as a physician. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have found that certificate; and it is as I -described it for the Tribunal. It is a certificate by Captain Weber of -the British Army service that he received a copy of this document from -the American team; and it is signed by him, Captain H. Weber, IMT Corps, -British Army, European Sector. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that your case then, Dr. Servatius? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. There are two more witnesses, Biedermann and -Mitschke. I can dispense with both of these witnesses. - -Then we still do not have the sworn affidavits, the interrogatories from -Dr. Voss, Dr. Scharmann, a witness by the name of Marenbach, and the -witness Letsch, who was an expert in Sauckel’s office. We have received -interrogatories from the witnesses Darré and Seldte, but these have not -been translated as yet. I shall submit them as soon as they have been -translated. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have concluded my case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, counsel for the Defendant Jodl. - -DR. EXNER: Your Honors, with your kind permission I shall present my -case in the following manner. First of all, I shall call the Defendant -Jodl to the stand and use all documents, with a single exception, during -his examination, and submit them to the Court. - -I do not need to bore the Tribunal with lengthy readings. I have three -document books which are numerically arranged, Jodl 1, Jodl 2, and so -forth—and I shall in each case quote the page which is found in the -upper left-hand corner on every page of the translation. The numbering -is the same as in the original; they correspond. I am sorry to say that -the documents are not exactly in the order in which I shall read them, -and this is due partly to the fact that they were received too late and -partly to other factors. I still do not have several interrogatories, -particularly one which is very important to me. I hope that I shall be -able to submit them later. I was granted five witnesses, but I can -dispense with one of them. The four remaining witnesses will take up -little time. - -Now, with the kind permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call the -Defendant Jodl to the witness box. - -[_The Defendant Jodl took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -ALFRED JODL (Defendant): Alfred Jodl. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The defendant repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. EXNER: Generaloberst Jodl, in the English-American trial brief it -says that you are 60 years old. That is a mistake. You became 56 -recently. You were born when? - -JODL: I was born in 1890 on 10 May. - -DR. EXNER: You were born in Bavaria, and both of your parents are -descended from old Bavarian families. You chose the military profession; -what was the chief reason for your choice? - -JODL: A great-grandfather of mine was an officer; my father was an -officer; an uncle was an officer; my brother became an officer; my -father-in-law was an officer—I can well say that the military -profession was in my blood. - -DR. EXNER: And now I should like to hear something about your political -attitude. To which of the political parties which existed in Germany -before 1933 were you closest in spirit? - -JODL: As an officer all party politics were entirely remote to me; and -especially the offshoots of the post-war period. If I look at the -background from which I come, the attitude of my parents, I must say -that I would have been closest to the National Liberal Party and its -ideas. In any event, my parents never voted anything but National -Liberal. - -DR. EXNER: Tell us in a few words what your attitude was to the Weimar -Republic. - -JODL: True to my oath I served the Weimar Republic honestly and without -reserve. If I could not have done that, I would have resigned. Moreover, -a democratic system and a democratic constitution was not at all a -foreign idea to us southern Germans, for our monarchy was also -democratic. - -DR. EXNER: And what were your relations to Von Hindenburg? - -JODL: I knew Hindenburg. I was assigned to him after his first election -to the Reich Presidency when he spent his first vacation in -Dietramszell. Then I spent a day with the Hindenburg family at their -Neudeck estate together with Field Marshal Von Manstein. I can only say -that I admired him; and when he was elected Reich President for the -first time, I considered that the first symptom of the German people’s -return to self-respect. - -DR. EXNER: What was your attitude toward the National Socialist Party? - -JODL: The National Socialist Party I hardly knew and hardly noticed -before the Munich Putsch. It was this Putsch which dragged the -Reichswehr into this internal political development. At that time, with -few exceptions, it met this test of obedience. But after this Putsch -there was a certain cleavage in the views of the officers’ corps. -Opinions varied as to Hitler’s worth or worthlessness. I was still -extremely skeptical and unconvinced. I was not impressed until Hitler, -during the Leipzig trial, gave the assurance that he was opposed to any -undermining of the Reichswehr. - -DR. EXNER: Did you attend meetings at which Hitler spoke? - -JODL: No, never. - -DR. EXNER: Tell us which leaders of the Party you knew before 1933. - -JODL: I knew only those who had previously been officers: for example, -Epp, Hühnlein, and Röhm. But I no longer had any connection or contact -with them after they had left the Reichswehr. - -DR. EXNER: Before the seizure of power had you read the book _Mein -Kampf_? - -JODL: No. - -DR. EXNER: Did you read it later? - -JODL: I read parts of it later. - -DR. EXNER: What was your opinion on the Jewish question? - -JODL: I was not anti-Semitic. I am of the opinion that no party, no -state, no people, and no race—not even cannibals—are good or bad in -themselves, but only the single individual. Of course I knew that Jewry, -after the war and in the moral disintegration that appeared after the -first World War, came to the fore in Germany in a most provocative -fashion. That was not anti-Semitic propaganda; those were facts, which -were regretted very much by Jews themselves. Nevertheless, I was most -sharply opposed to any outlawing by the state, any generalization, and -any excesses. - -DR. EXNER: The Prosecution asserts that all the defendants cried, -“Germany awake; death to the Jew.” - -JODL: As far as I am concerned, that assertion is wrong. At every period -of my life I associated with individual Jews. I have been a guest of -Jews, and certain Jews have visited my home. But those were Jews who -recognized their fatherland. They were Jews whose human worth was -undisputed. - -DR. EXNER: Did you on occasion use your influence on behalf of Jews? - -JODL: Yes, that too. - -DR. EXNER: Did you know that the Reich Government in the year 1932 -counted on the possibility of attempts to overthrow it and sought to -save itself in this direction? - -JODL: I certainly knew that, for when I came to Berlin at that time I -did not find in the later operational division any preparations for war; -but I found preparations for the use of the Reichswehr in the interior -of the country, against the extreme leftists as well as the extreme -rightists. There were plans for maneuvers of some sort in that -connection in which I myself participated. - -DR. EXNER: What was your attitude to the appointment of Hitler as Reich -Chancellor in the year 1933? - -JODL: The appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor was a complete -surprise to me. That evening when I was returning home with a comrade, -through the excited crowds, I said to him, “This is more than a change -of government; it is a revolution. Just how far it will lead us we do -not know.” But the name of Hindenburg, who had legalized this -revolution, and the names of such men as Von Papen, Von Neurath, -Schwerin-Krosigk exerted a reassuring influence on me and gave me a -certain guarantee that there would be no revolutionary excesses. - -DR. EXNER: At this point I should like to read a part of General -Vormann’s interrogatory. This is Page 208 of the third volume of my -document book. I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to -the fact that Page 208 in the upper left hand corner—I submit the -original—refers to the period from 1933 on. Jodl was then at the group -headquarters (Gruppenamt), and Vormann was in his group. I read under -Figure 2: - - “Jodl, who at that time was a major on the General Staff, was my - group (Gruppe) leader in 1933. He shared completely the view of - the Chief of the Army Command at that time, General Von - Hammerstein, and was thoroughly opposed to Hitler and the - Party.” - -I shall now skip a few lines; they are not so important. Then in the -center of the page, I continue: - - “When on 30 January 1933 Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor, - Jodl was dismayed and astonished. I clearly recall that on 30 or - 31 of January, at his request, I had to call together the - officers of his group for a conference. At this conference he - explained that Hitler had been called to be the head of the - Reich according to the existing constitution and the laws in - force. It was not for us to criticize this, particularly the - behavior of Reich President and Field Marshal Von Hindenburg. We - must obey and do our duty as soldiers. The kind of criticisms - made hitherto, of the new measures initiated by the new - chancellor, were not to be made in future for they were - inconsistent with his and our own position. - - “His entire speech showed great worry and apprehension with - regard to the coming development of the situation...” and so - forth. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, this would be a convenient time to break off. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, Sir David, you were going to show these -applications. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. - -I wonder if I might leave, for the moment, Number 1, which my friend -General Rudenko will deal with, because he will deal with another one; -and if I might deal with the ones which I have? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The second one is on behalf of Defendant -Kaltenbrunner and is an application to cross-examine three witnesses -whose affidavits were used by the Prosecution. The first is -Tiefenbacher, and he dealt with conditions at Mauthausen; the second, -Kandruth, who dealt with the same subject; the third, Stroop, dealt with -the reception of orders from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner by Stroop as SS -and Polizeiführer in Warsaw. The Prosecution submits that in these cases -cross-examination by way of interrogatories would be sufficient. Next, I -do not know if... - -THE PRESIDENT: Interrogatories are all they asked for, certainly in the -case of—in all three. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will have no objection to -cross-interrogatories as long as they are not brought here as witnesses. - -My Lord, the next application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath -to use M. François-Poncet as witness. The Prosecution will be grateful -if the Tribunal would allow that to stand over for a day or two, as my -French colleagues are awaiting instructions from Paris at the moment and -they have not got a reply yet. I do not think it will prejudice the -Defendant Von Neurath’s case. It will be time for a reply before there -is any difficulty as to time. - -Then, My Lord, the next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Von -Schirach. I think that all that is now wanted is to use an affidavit -from Dr. Otto Wilhelm von Vacano. The affidavit is 12 pages long and is -a highly academic statement on the educational philosophy underlying the -Adolf Hitler Schools. The Prosecution feel that the matter has been -thoroughly covered by the Defendant Von Schirach himself and also by his -witnesses Hoepken and Lauterbacher, and they feel that the affidavit -would be cumulative and repetitive. But, of course, it is an affidavit; -it is not a question of an oral witness, and if the Tribunal feel that -they ought to have it, the Prosecution do not wish to press their -objection unreasonably. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been translated yet? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I have certainly got an English—I have -read the English translation of it, My Lord, so I assume that it has -been translated into the other languages. - -The next, applications from the Defendants Hess and Frank to put an -interrogatory to General Donovan. If I may put the objection quite -shortly, that raises the same point as the application on 2 May 1946 for -Mr. Patterson of the United States War Department. The objection of the -Prosecution is the same as I made on that occasion, that when you are -cross-examining a witness as to credibility you are bound by his answer, -and should not, in the opinion of the Prosecution, be allowed to call -evidence to contradict him. So it is on exactly the same point, the -relationship between the witness Gisevius and the United States Office -of Strategic Services. - -The next application is on behalf of the Defendant Speer for the -approval of certain documents which are in his possession. The -Prosecution have no objection to the application. They reserve the right -to make any individual objection when the documents are produced at the -Trial. - -My Lord, the next is a purely formal application on behalf of the -Defendant Jodl, whose case is now before the Tribunal, to use an -affidavit of Dr. Lehmann. There is no objection to that. - -Next is the application on behalf of the Defendant Hess... - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, that application we have already heard. We -have heard the arguments for that in full and the Tribunal will consider -that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. - -Then I think that only leaves an application of the Defendant Keitel for -the use of a decree of Hitler of 20 July 1944, and the Prosecution has -no objection to that. - -My Lord, I think I have dealt with every one except the first one, which -my friend General Rudenko will deal with—the application of the -Defendant Göring. - -GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Members of -the Tribunal, the Soviet Prosecution have several times expressed their -view respecting the application of Defense Counsel to call witnesses -with regard to the mass shooting of Polish officers by the Fascist -criminals in Katyn Forest. Our position is that this episode of criminal -activity on the part of the Hitlerites has been fully established by the -evidence presented by the Soviet Prosecution, which was a communication -of the special Extraordinary State Commission investigating the -circumstances of the mass shooting of Polish officer prisoners of war by -the German Fascist aggressors in Katyn Forest. This document was -presented by the Soviet Prosecution under the Document Number USSR-54 on -14 February 1946, and was admitted by the Tribunal; and, as provided by -Article 21 of the Charter, it is not subject to argument. - -Now the Defense once again are putting in an application for the calling -of three supplementary witnesses—a psychiatrist, Stockert; a former -adjutant of the Engineer Corps, Böhmert; and a special expert of the -staff of the Army Group Center, Eichborn. - -We object to the calling of these three witnesses for the following -reasons: - -The calling of the psychiatrist Stockert as a witness must be considered -completely pointless as the Tribunal cannot be interested in the -question of how the commission drew its conclusion—a conclusion which -was published in a Hitlerite _White Book_. No matter how this conclusion -was drawn, the fact of the mass shooting of Poles by Germans in Katyn -Forest has been unequivocally established by the Soviet Extraordinary -State Commission. - -Stockert himself is not a doctor of forensic medicine but a -psychiatrist—at that time a member of the Hitlerite commission, not on -the basis of his competence in the field of forensic medicine, but as a -representative of the German Fascist military command. - -The former adjutant, Captain Böhmert, is himself a participant in the -crimes of Katyn Forest, having been a member of the Engineer Corps which -carried out the executions. As he is an interested party, he cannot give -any useful testimony for clarifying the circumstances of this matter. - -Third, the expert of the staff of the Army Group Center also cannot be -admitted as a witness because he, in general, knew nothing at all about -the camp of the Polish prisoners of war, and could not have known all -that pertained to the matter. The same reasons apply to his potential -testimony to the fact that the Germans never perpetrated any mass -shooting of Poles in the district of Katyn. Moreover, Eichborn cannot be -considered an unprejudiced witness. - -Regardless of these objections which express the opinion of all the -prosecutors, the Soviet Prosecution especially emphasize the fact that -these bestial crimes of the Germans in Katyn were investigated by the -special authoritative State Investigating Committee, which went with -great precision into all the details. The result of this investigation -has established the fact that the crimes in Katyn were perpetrated by -Germans, and are but a link in the chain of many bestial crimes -perpetrated by the Hitlerites, a great many proofs of which have -previously been submitted to the Tribunal. - -For these reasons the Soviet Prosecution categorically insists on the -rejection of the application of the Defense Counsel. - -I have finished my statement. - -THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for Kaltenbrunner, Sir David was right, was he -not, in saying that you were only asking for cross-interrogatories, -which the Prosecution do not object to? - -DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, -I have no objection to questionnaires, but I would then ask that these -witnesses be heard in my presence outside this courtroom; and then, on -the basis of this interrogation, questionnaires can later be submitted -to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: But are the witnesses here? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I do not know. - -THE PRESIDENT: We granted interrogatories, and you now ask for -cross-interrogatories; that is all you ask for, and that does not -involve bringing the witnesses here at all. The cross-interrogatories -will be sent to them; they will answer them. If, for any reason, on the -cross-interrogatories being answered, you want to make further -application, you can always do so. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: The rule of the Court so far was, as I understood it, -that I have the right to cross-examine in this courtroom if the -Prosecution submits affidavits of these witnesses here. That has, so -far, been the ruling of the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think it depends on what the substance of the affidavit -is. If it is a matter of importance, no doubt we—we have never made any -general rule, but we have generally allowed the witness to be brought -here for cross-examination if the matter is of importance; but if the -matter is of less importance, then we have very frequently directed that -there should be cross-interrogatories. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add to this last sentence? I consider this -testimony extremely important. The Court will probably know the -contents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Again in your application you say that three -interrogatories were used by the Prosecution on the understanding that -the deponents would be subject to cross-interrogation. That means, I -suppose, cross-interrogatories. It does not say cross-examination; it -says cross-interrogation. Do you want to have them brought here for -cross-examination? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: That is what I had intended, unless my first suggestion -is accepted. My first suggestion is simpler, in my opinion, and it would -save time. It proposes that I be allowed to be present at the -questioning of the witnesses outside this courtroom. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we understand your point of view, Dr. Kauffmann, -and we will consider it. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you. - -DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): May I make a brief -statement with reference to General Rudenko’s motion? - -General Rudenko wishes to reject my application for evidence, referring -to Article 21, I believe, of the Charter. I do not believe that this -regulation opposes my application. It is true of course, that government -reports are evidence... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think the Tribunal has already ruled that -that article does not prevent the calling of witnesses; but General -Rudenko, in addition to an argument based upon Article 21, also gave -particular reasons why he said that these particular witnesses were not -witnesses who ought to be called. He said that one of them was a -psychiatrist, and the other one could not give any evidence of any -value. We should like to hear you upon that. - -DR. STAHMER: In the report submitted by the Soviet Union, the charge is -made that members of the engineer staff which was stationed near Katyn -carried out the execution of these Polish officers. They are mentioned -by name, and I am bringing counterevidence—namely members of the same -staff—to prove that during the whole time that this staff was stationed -there no killings of Polish officers occurred. I consider this is a -pertinent assertion and a presentation of relevant evidence. One cannot -eliminate a witness by saying that he was involved in the act. With -reference to these people, that is not yet settled, and it is not -mentioned at all in the record. Neither are these people, whom I have -now named, listed in the Russian record as having taken part in the -deed. Apart from that, I consider it out of the question to eliminate a -witness by saying that he committed the deed. That is what has to be -proved by hearing him. - -THE PRESIDENT: About the psychiatrist, was he a member of the German -commission? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: He was a member of it? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. He was present at the unloading, and he ascertained -from the condition of the corpses that the executions must have been -carried out at some time before the occupation by the German Army. - -THE PRESIDENT: But he does not actually say in the application that he -was a member. He said he was present during the visit of the military -commission; he knows how the resolution of the commission was produced. - -DR. STAHMER: I do not think he was an appointed member, but he took part -in this inspection and in the duties connected with it. As far as I -know, he was a regimental doctor in some regiment near—he was a -regimental doctor of a regimental staff in the vicinity. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will consider your argument. - -Then, is the counsel for Von Neurath agreeable that that matter should -stand over? Is counsel for Von Neurath here? He is not here? Very well -then, we will consider that. - -Then, Counsel for the Defendant Schirach, do you wish to say anything in -answer to what Sir David said? - -DR. NELTE: My colleague Dr. Sauter asked me, if necessary, to represent -the interests of the Defendant Von Schirach. - -As to the statement of Sir David, I have only to say that, according to -the opinion of the Defendant Von Schirach, the witness Von Vacano, who -made and signed this affidavit, makes statements on a number of points -on which Herr Von Schirach did not speak when he was examined as a -witness. I therefore ask the Court to examine this affidavit to -determine whether it does not contain individual points which would be -important in connection with the charges against Von Schirach, and then -to decide whether to admit it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then does counsel for the Defendants Hess and Frank want -to say anything about the application for an interrogatory to General -Donovan? Dr. Seidl, we have already heard the argument about it. - -DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): I have nothing -to add to the arguments which I have already offered on the application -to obtain official information from the War Department. I have also -withdrawn my request for a decision on my first application, which was -to obtain information from the War Department. It has not yet been -decided, however, whether a questionnaire is to be submitted to -Secretary of War Patterson. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the matter will be considered. There was no -objection to the other three applications, so it is unnecessary to hear -argument. Then the Tribunal will consider all these matters. - -Now, Dr. Exner. Dr. Exner, if it is convenient to you personally, the -Tribunal thinks that you might go a little bit faster in your speech -through the earphones. - -DR. EXNER: Before the recess, we heard what you told your officers when -Adolf Hitler entered the government. Now I should like to hear what you -felt about the appointment of Hitler as head of the State in 1934. - -JODL: The union of the two offices in one person gave me much concern. -When we lost Hindenburg, we lost the Field Marshal loved by the -Wehrmacht and by the whole German people. What we should get with -Hitler, we did not know. It is true, the result of the plebiscite was so -overwhelming that one could say that a higher law than this popular will -could not possibly exist. Thus we soldiers were quite justified in -taking the oath to Adolf Hitler. - -DR. EXNER: The Prosecution speak of your close relationship with Hitler. -When did you learn to know Adolf Hitler personally? - -JODL: I was presented to the Führer by Field Marshal Keitel in the -command train on 3 September 1939 when we were going to the Polish -Eastern Front. At any rate that was the day I first exchanged words with -him. - -DR. EXNER: Two days after the outbreak of war? - -JODL: Two days after the beginning of the war. - -DR. EXNER: Did the Führer have confidence in you? - -JODL: That came about very gradually. The Führer had a certain distrust -of all General Staff officers, especially of the Army, as at that time -he was still very skeptical toward the Wehrmacht as a whole. - -I may, perhaps, quote a statement of his which was often heard: “I have -a reactionary Army, a Christian”—sometimes he said too—“an imperial -Navy, and a National Socialist Air Force.” - -The relations between us varied a great deal. At first, until about the -end of the campaign in the West, there was considerable reserve. Then -his confidence in me increased more and more until August 1942. Then the -great crisis arose, and his attitude to me was severely caustic and -unfriendly. That lasted until 30 January 1943. Then relations improved -and were particularly good, sincere, after the Italian betrayal in 1943 -had been warded off. The last year was characterized by numerous sharp -altercations. - -DR. EXNER: To what extent did the Führer confide in you regarding his -political intentions? - -JODL: Only as far as we needed to know them for our military work. Of -course, for the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff political -plans are somewhat more necessary than for a battalion commander, for -politics is part of strategy. - -DR. EXNER: Did he permit discussions of political questions between -himself and you? - -JODL: Discussion of political questions was generally not admissible for -us soldiers. One example is especially characteristic. When I reported -to the Führer in September 1943 that Fascism was dead in Italy, for -party emblems were scattered all over, this is what he said: “Such -nonsense could only be reported by an officer. Once again it is obvious -that generals do not understand politics.” - -It can be easily understood that after such remarks the desire for any -political discussions was slight. - -DR. EXNER: Were political and military questions therefore kept strictly -separate? - -JODL: Yes, they were strictly separated. - -DR. EXNER: Was it possible for you to consult him on military matters or -not? - -JODL: Consultation on military questions depended entirely on the -circumstances of the moment. At a time when he himself was filled with -doubts, he often discussed military problems for weeks or months, but if -things were clear in his own mind, or if he had formed a spontaneous -decision, all discussion came to an end. - -DR. EXNER: The system of maintaining secrecy has often been discussed -here. Were you also subject to this secrecy? - -JODL: Yes, and to an extent which I really first realized during this -Trial. The Führer informed us of events and occurrences at the beginning -of the war—that is, the efforts of other countries to prevent this war, -and even to put an end to it after it had already begun—only to the -extent that these events were published in the press. He spoke to the -politicians and to the Party quite otherwise than to the Wehrmacht; and -to the SS differently again. - -The secrecy concerning the annihilation of the Jews, and the events in -the concentration camps, was a masterpiece of secrecy. It was also a -masterpiece of deception by Himmler, who showed us soldiers faked -photographs about these things in particular, and told us stories about -the gardens and plantations in Dachau, about the ghettos in Warsaw and -Theresienstadt, which gave us the impression that they were highly -humane establishments. - -DR. EXNER: Did not news reach the Führer’s headquarters from the -outside? - -JODL: The Führer’s headquarters was a cross between a cloister and a -concentration camp. There were numerous wire fences and much barbed wire -surrounding it. There were outposts on the roads leading to it to -safeguard it. In the middle was the so-called Security Ring Number 1. - -Permanent passes to enter this security ring were not given even to my -staff, only to General Warlimont. Every guard had to check on each -officer whom he did not know. Apart from reports on the situation, only -very little news from the outer world penetrated into this holy of -holies. - -DR. EXNER: But what about foreign papers and radio reports? - -JODL: Among foreign papers we studied very carefully the illustrated -American and English papers, for they gave us very good information on -new weapons. The foreign news itself was received and censored by the -headquarters civilian press section. I was given only what was of -military interest. Reports concerning internal politics, police, or the -present situation were forbidden. - -DR. EXNER: How did your collaboration with the Führer take place? - -JODL: It took place as follows: Every day I made at least two reports on -the situation. Some time ago it was asserted, rather indignantly, that I -took part in 119 conferences. I took part in far more than 5,000 -conferences. This discussion of the situation and reporting on the -military position was at the same time an issuing of orders. On the -basis of the reports on events, the Führer decided immediately what -orders were to be given for the next few days. - -I worked in this way: When my report was finished, I went into an -adjoining room. There I immediately drew up the teletype messages and -orders for the next few days, and while the reports on the situation -were still going on, I read these drafts to the Führer for his approval. -Warlimont then took them along to my staff where they were sent off. - -DR. EXNER: Were you also present at political talks? - -JODL: May I add—to complete the picture it should be said that I did -not hear many things which were discussed during these reports on the -situation. The same is true of Field Marshal Keitel, who worked in a -similar manner. - -DR. EXNER: Were political matters also brought up at the discussions of -the situation, and to what extent were you present at discussions of a -political nature? - -JODL: As I have already said at the beginning, political problems were -discussed only to the extent that was necessary for our military -measures. Also on occasions when political and military leaders came -together, when the Reich Foreign Minister was present, problems were -discussed which lay on the borderline between politics and the conduct -of the war. I did not take part in the exclusively political talks with -foreign politicians, neutral or allied, or with the Reich Foreign -Minister. I did not even take part in the discussions on the -organization, armament, and administration of the occupied territories, -for the purely military discussions of the situation in which I had to -take part often lasted or required as much as 6 or 8 hours a day. I -really needed the time I then had left for my own work. - -DR. EXNER: It has often been stated here that it was impossible to -contradict the Führer. Did you have any success with remonstrances? - -JODL: One cannot say it was really impossible to contradict the Führer. -Very many times I contradicted him most emphatically, but there were -moments when one actually could not answer a word. Also by my objections -I induced the Führer to desist from many things. - -DR. EXNER: Can you give an example? - -JODL: There were a great number of operational questions which do not -interest the Court; but in the sphere of interest to the Court, there -was, for example, Hitler’s intention to renounce the Geneva Convention. -I prevented that because I objected. - -DR. EXNER: Were there other possibilities of influencing Hitler? - -JODL: If it was not possible by open contradiction to prevent something -which according to my innermost convictions I should prevent, there was -still the means I often employed of using delaying tactics, a kind of -passive resistance. I delayed work on the matter and waited for a -psychologically favorable moment to bring the question up again. - -This procedure, too, was occasionally successful, for example, in the -case of the intention to turn certain low-level fliers over to lynch -justice. It had no success in the case of the Commando Order. - -DR. EXNER: We will speak about that later. The Führer therefore ordered -that himself. - -The witness Gisevius in answer to questions by the Prosecution, said -that “Jodl had a key position with Hitler.” - -Did you know this witness by sight, or by hearing about him, or in any -other way? - -JODL: I did not have that honor. I heard the name of this witness for -the first time here, and I saw him for the first time here in Court. - -DR. EXNER: What, if anything, could you influence Hitler not to do? - -JODL: Obviously, I could give the Führer only an extract of events. In -view of his inclination to make emotional decisions I naturally was -particularly cautious in presenting unverified reports made by agents. -If the witness meant this by his general term of “key position,” he was -not wrong. But if he intended it to mean that I kept from the Führer -atrocities committed by our own Wehrmacht, or atrocities committed by -the SS, then that is absolutely untrue. Besides, how was that witness to -know about it? - -On the contrary, I immediately reported any news of that kind to the -Führer, and no one could have stopped me from doing so. I will give -examples: An affidavit by Rittmeister Scheidt was read here. He -testified that Obergruppenführer Fegelein told the Chief of the General -Staff, Colonel Guderian, and Generaloberst Jodl of atrocities committed -by the SS Brigade Keminski in Warsaw. That is absolutely true. Ten -minutes later I reported this fact to the Führer and he immediately -ordered the dissolution of this brigade. When I heard through the -American radio, through my press chief, of the shooting of 120 American -prisoners near Malmédy, I immediately, on my own initiative, had an -investigation started through the Commander, West so as to report the -result to the Führer. When unimaginable horrors committed by an Ustashi -company in Croatia came to my knowledge, I reported this to the Führer -immediately. - -DR. EXNER: I should like to interrupt you a moment. In your diary -Document Number 1807-PS, you write, on 12 June 1942—Page 119, second -document book: - - “The German field police disarmed and arrested a Ustashi company - because of atrocities committed against the civilian population - in Eastern Bosnia.” - -I should like to add here that this is noteworthy because this Ustashi -company was something like an SS troop in Croatia and was fighting on -the German side. Because of the atrocities, the German field police -arrested this Ustashi company. - - “The Führer did not approve of this measure, which was carried - out by order of the commander of the 708th Division, as it - undermined the authority of the Ustashi on which the whole - Croatian State rests. This is bound to have a more harmful - effect on peace and order in Croatia than the unrest of the - population caused by the atrocities.” - -Was this the incident of which you were thinking just now? - -JODL: Yes. - -DR. EXNER: Have you another example? - -JODL: After the issuing of the Commando Order, I reported enemy -violations of international law to the Führer only when he would be -certain to have heard of them through other channels. I reported cases -of Commando undertakings and capture of Commandos only when I could be -quite sure that he would hear of them through other channels. In this -respect I did try to hold back any new spontaneous emotional decisions. - -DR. EXNER: Was it possible to hold Hitler back? - -JODL: Unfortunately not. - -DR. EXNER: I do not understand. - -JODL: I can only say, unfortunately not. There were endless ways through -which the Führer was informed about military matters. Every individual -and every office could hand in reports direct to the adjutant’s -department. The photographer sent out by the Führer to take pictures at -the front, found it expedient to use this opportunity to report to the -Führer on military matters also. When I objected to this, the Führer -answered, “I do not care from whom I hear the truth; the main thing is -that I hear it.” These reports, however, were not reports of atrocities, -but just the opposite. Unfortunately, through many channels hostile to -the Wehrmacht, inciting reports against the correct and chivalrous -attitude of the Wehrmacht reached the Führer. It was these reports which -brought about these decisions which led to brutal proceedings. A -tremendous amount of damage would have been avoided if we soldiers had -been in a position to hold the Führer back. - -DR. EXNER: What role did Canaris play in this connection? - -JODL: Canaris saw the Führer dozens of times. Canaris could report to -him what he wanted and whatever he knew. It seems to me that he knew far -more than I, for I was concerned exclusively with the operational -conduct of the war. But he never said a word. He never said one word to -me, and it is quite clear why; this witness was on the best of -terms—this man, who is now dead, was on the very best of terms with -Himmler and with Heydrich. It was necessary that he should be so that -they would not become suspicious of this nest of conspirators. - -DR. EXNER: The witness Gisevius said a great deal about revolts and -intentions to carry out a Putsch. Did you personally ever learn anything -about such plans? - -JODL: I never heard a single word or intimation about any revolt or -about any intentions to carry out a Putsch. - -DR. EXNER: At any time, before or during the war, would you have -considered a revolt possible or promising? - -JODL: The witness spoke of revolts as casually as of washing his hands. -That alone proves to me that he never thought about it seriously. The -results of the Kapp Putsch in 1921, of the Hitler Putsch of 1923, are -well known. If more proof is necessary, there is the result of 20 July -1944. At that time no one any longer hoped for victory in the true sense -of the word. Nevertheless, in this revolt, in this attempt, not one -soldier, not a single arm of the Wehrmacht, not one worker, rose up. All -the perpetrators and all the members of the Putsch were alone. To -overthrow this system a revolution would have been necessary, a -mightier, a more powerful revolution than the National Socialist one had -been. And behind such a revolution there would have had to be the mass -of the workers and the majority of the Wehrmacht as a whole, and not -simply the commander of the Potsdam garrison of whom the witness spoke. - -But how one could wage a war for life or death with other countries and -at the same time carry on a revolution and expect to gain anything -positive for the German people, I do not know. Only geniuses who lived -in Switzerland can judge that. The German Wehrmacht and the German -officers were not trained for revolution. Once the Prussian officers -struck the ground with their swords—that was the only revolutionary -deed of the German Armed Forces that I know of. That was in the year -1848. If today people who co-operated actively to bring Hitler to power, -who had a part in the laws which we soldiers with our oath of allegiance -to Adolf Hitler were bound to support, if these people demanded -revolution and mutiny of the Wehrmacht when they no longer liked the -man, or when reverses occurred, then I can only call that wicked. - -DR. EXNER: Did tension and crises arise in your relations with Hitler? -You have already intimated something in that connection. - -JODL: I could write a book about that more easily than give a brief -answer. I should like to say only that, apart from many exalting -moments, our life in the Führer’s headquarters was in the long run a -martyrdom for us soldiers; for it was not a military headquarters, it -was a civilian one, and we soldiers were guests there. It is not easy to -be a guest anywhere for 5½ years. I should like to add just one thing. -Among the few officers who dared to look the Führer squarely in the -face, and to speak in a tone and manner that made listeners hold their -breath because they feared a catastrophe—among these few officers, I -myself belonged. - -DR. EXNER: Give us an example of such a crisis in your relations with -Hitler. - -JODL: The worst crisis was in August 1942, in Vinnitza, when I defended -Generaloberst Halder against unjustified criticism. It was my -operational problem, the details of which will not interest the Court. -Never in my life did I experience such an outbreak of rage from any -human being. From that day on he never came to dinner. - -DR. EXNER: To your mess? - -JODL: No, he never came to the mess during the remainder of the war. The -report on the situation was no longer given in my map room but in the -Führer’s quarters. At every report on the situation from that day on an -SS officer took part. Eight stenographers were ordered to be there, and -from then on they took down every word. The Führer refused to shake -hands with me any more. He did not greet me any more, or rarely. This -situation lasted until 30 January 1943. He told me, through Field -Marshal Keitel, that he could no longer work with me and that I would be -replaced by General Paulus as soon as Paulus had taken Stalingrad. - -DR. EXNER: Did you yourself not try during this time to be released from -the OKW? - -JODL: During all this time, every other day I asked General Schmundt to -see to it that I should be sent at last to a position at the front with -the mountain troops in Finland. I wanted to go there. But nothing -happened. - -DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has asserted that you enjoyed the good graces -of the Führer and that the Führer lavished his favor on you. How much of -that is true? - -JODL: I need not waste many words on that. What I said is the actual -truth. I am afraid that what the Prosecution said is imagination. - -DR. EXNER: It was also said that you were ambitious in your military -career. How about that? - -JODL: If the Prosecution mean that as a so-called political soldier I -was promoted especially quickly, they are mistaken. I became a general -in my fiftieth year. That is quite normal. In July 1940, when I was -appointed general of Artillery it is true I skipped the grade of -lieutenant general, but that was only an accident. A much younger -general in the Air Force, Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the -Luftwaffe, was to be promoted to Air Chief Marshal. Then Schmundt said -to the Führer: “Jodl could perhaps do that too.” Thereupon, shortly -before the Reichstag session, the Führer decided to promote me also—to -general of Artillery. This Jeschonnek, who is much younger than I am, -became Generaloberst much sooner than I. Zeitzler, who was formerly my -subordinate, became Generaloberst at the same time as I did. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we will break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30. - -DR. EXNER: We were discussing to what extent you enjoyed the favor of -the Führer, that is with regard to— - -Did you not receive exceptional decorations from Hitler? - -JODL: To my surprise, when the Vinnitza crisis was over, on 30 January -1943, I received from the Führer the Golden Party Badge. That was the -only decoration I received from the Führer. - -DR. EXNER: In the entire 5½ years of war? - -JODL: Yes. - -DR. EXNER: Did you receive a gift or donation from Hitler, or from the -Party? - -JODL: Not a single cent. If I am to conceal nothing I must mention the -fact that at headquarters we received a package of coffee from the -Führer each Christmas. - -DR. EXNER: Did you acquire any property in the territories occupied by -us, or receive any as a gift or as a token of remembrance? - -JODL: Nothing at all. When in the Indictment the sentence is found to -the effect that the defendants enriched themselves from the occupied -territories, as far as I am concerned I have only one word for that, and -I must be frank—it is a libel against a decent German officer. - -DR. EXNER: During the war you saved some of your pay as a Generaloberst. -How did you invest this money? - -JODL: My entire savings of this war are at the moment in Reich bonds... - -THE PRESIDENT: He said that he could not save a penny. He has not yet -been cross-examined about it. - -DR. EXNER: During the entire period of the war you were with Hitler and -therefore you must really know him best. So I should like to ask you in -detail about the personality of the Führer, but the Court is not very -fond of repetition. Therefore tell us quite briefly what particularly -influenced you in Hitler’s behavior, what impressed you particularly? -What were the things you disliked? - -JODL: Hitler was a leader to an exceptional degree. His knowledge and -his intellect, his rhetoric, and his will power triumphed in the end in -every spiritual conflict over everyone. He combined to an unusual extent -logic and clarity of thought, skepticism and excess of imagination, -which very frequently foresaw what would happen, but also very often -went astray. I really marveled at him when in the winter of 1941-42, by -his faith and his energy, he established the wavering Eastern Front; for -at that time, as in 1812, a catastrophe was imminent. His life in the -Führer headquarters was nothing but duty and work. The modesty in his -mode of life was impressive. There was not one day during this war... - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment. As you said, Dr. Exner, the Tribunal has had -to listen to this sort of thing over and over again already. We are not -interested in that. - -DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can tell the Tribunal something which they have -heard less frequently, namely what you disliked in the personality of -Hitler. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that, put in that general way, it is of -any interest to the Tribunal, what he disliked in Hitler. I mean, can he -not get on with his own case? - -DR. EXNER: Did you feel that you were close to the Führer personally? - -JODL: No; in no way at all. - -DR. EXNER: All your relations were essentially official? - -JODL: Yes, purely official. I did not belong to his private circle, and -he did not know any more about me than that my name was Jodl, and that -therefore, presumably, I came from Bavaria. - -DR. EXNER: Who belonged to the private circle? - -JODL: Chiefly all the old guard from the time when the Party was in its -developing stage: Bormann first of all, the original women secretaries, -his personal physician, and the political or SS adjutants. - -DR. EXNER: Your Gauleiter speech was used by the Prosecution to prove -that you were an unconditional follower of the Führer and his -enthusiastic adherent. Tell us, how did you come to make that speech? - -JODL: Bormann proposed this speech to the Führer, and the Führer ordered -it, though I undertook this speech very reluctantly, chiefly because of -lack of time. But it was generally the wish in this period of crisis... - -DR. EXNER: When was this speech? - -JODL: In November 1943. The Italian defection had preceded it. It was -the time of the heavy air attacks. At that moment it was naturally -necessary to give the political leaders at home a completely -unembroidered picture of the whole military situation, but at the same -time to fill them with a certain amount of confidence in the supreme -leadership. This speech, which had the title, “The strategic situation -of Germany at the beginning of the fifth year of the war,” could -obviously not be made by a Blockleiter, it could only be made by an -officer of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and so I came to deliver -this speech. - -DR. EXNER: What were the contents of this speech? - -JODL: The contents, as I have already said, were an over-all picture of -the strategic situation. Here, before the Tribunal naturally only the -introduction was read. This introduction painted a picture of what lay -behind us, but not from the political point of view, rather from the -strategic angle. I described the operational necessity for all the -operations of the so-called wars of aggression. In no way did I identify -myself with the National Socialist Party, but, as is only natural for a -General Staff officer, with my Supreme Commander; for at that time it -was no longer a question of National Socialism or democracy. The -question was the “to be or not to be” of the German people. And there -were patriots in Germany too, not only in the neighboring states; and I -shall count myself among these patriots while I have breath. Moreover, -it is not important to whom one speaks, but it is important what one -says and what one speaks about. Besides, I may also state that I -delivered that same speech to the military district commanders and to -the senior officers of the reserve army. - -DR. EXNER: The beginning and the end of the speech contain a eulogy of -the Party and the Führer that is incontestable. Why did you include that -in a purely objective military speech? - -JODL: It was impossible for me to begin a speech of that kind with a -critical controversy about the Party or about my Supreme Commander. It -was necessary to create confidence between the officer and the Party -leader; for this confidence was not only necessary in order that the -speech would serve its purpose; this confidence was the prerequisite for -victory. Moreover, I should like to make an important point; that which -the Prosecution submitted as Document Number L-172... - -DR. EXNER: Is that the Gauleiter speech? - -JODL: That is not the Gauleiter speech at all; it is not the speech -which I delivered. That is nothing else but the “wastepaper basket” -version of this speech. It is the first rough draft which was completely -revised and altered because it contained many things which were not -important. The entire nucleus of the speech, namely the section about -the situation at the time, the part dealing with the enemy and the means -at his disposal and his intentions, all that is missing. The things -contained in this document are many hundreds of notes for the speech -which were sent to me by my staff. I compiled my speech from these -notes, and then I returned all this material to my staff. - -DR. EXNER: Then it is not the manuscript of your speech? - -JODL: It is in no way the manuscript; that looks entirely different. - -DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different point. Which leaders of the -Party did you get to know from the time of the seizure of power until -the outbreak of the war? - -JODL: Not mentioning the soldiers, Reich Minister Frick alone. I was -with him twice when the questions of Reich reform were to be discussed. - -DR. EXNER: And which of the defendants here present did you know before -1939, or before the beginning of the war? - -JODL: Of the defendants here, I knew only the Reich Marshal, -Grossadmiral Raeder, Field Marshal Keitel, and Minister Frick; no one -else. - -DR. EXNER: In the meantime, had you concerned yourself at all with the -literature of National Socialism? - -JODL: No. - -DR. EXNER: Did you participate in Reich Party rallies? - -JODL: In the year 1937, in my official capacity, I participated the last -3 days in Nuremberg, when the Labor Service, the SA, and the Wehrmacht -were reviewed. - -DR. EXNER: Did you participate in the commemorations at Munich, that is, -every year on 9 November? - -JODL: No. I really did not belong there. - -DR. EXNER: Can you tell us what your position was with respect to the -semimilitary units of the Party? - -JODL: These semimilitary organizations sprang up like mushrooms after -the seizure of power; but only the SA under Röhm tried to seize complete -power. The witness Gisevius said here that there was no Röhm Putsch. -That is correct, but it was just about to happen. At that time in the -Reich War Ministry we were armed to the teeth, and Röhm was a real -revolutionary, not a frock coat insurgent. When the Führer intervened in -June 1934, from that moment there were no more conflicts between the -Wehrmacht and the SA. The Wehrmacht became all the more suspicious of -the units of the SS, which from that moment multiplied in an -extraordinary fashion. The Army, one can very well say, was never -reconciled to this dualism of two armed organizations within the -country. - -DR. EXNER: Now I should like to quote various excerpts from your -diary—Document Number 1780-PS, Page 2 of the first volume of the -document book—in order to show that Jodl again and again concerned -himself with this infiltration of the SS into the Army. On 19 -April—that is the second paragraph—or before that, on 22 March, there -is an entry to this effect. Then on the 19th of April: “H. visits chief -of the Armed Forces Department; tells him his misgivings concerning -development of the SS.” - -In the French translation this “H” is replaced by “Heydrich.” That, of -course, has no sense, for Heydrich certainly had no misgivings -concerning the development of the SS; but the “H” quite obviously stands -for “Halder,” who was Quartermaster General. I do not know whether this -correction was made in the French document book. I am sorry to say that -I noted quite a few mistakes in translation in the English and French -document books and have applied to the General Secretary in this -connection to have corrections made. I must certainly say that this -large number of errors in translation makes a doubtful impression, -especially if for an “H” the word “Heydrich” is substituted, and the -chief of the Armed Forces is connected with one of the most unpleasant -figures in the SS. I must say that I am filled with misgivings—I must -emphasize this—because in the course of the last few months hundreds of -documents have been submitted to the Tribunal, the translation of which -we could not check. When we did make a check on one occasion we found -quite a few defects, as did Dr. Siemers recently. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you are supposed to be asking the questions. -You are making some long statements now. - -DR. EXNER: I should like to refer to the next to the last point of 3 -February, on the same page... - -THE PRESIDENT: Professor Exner, we cannot have counsel making long -statements which are not in evidence. You cannot make statements of that -sort. If there is any mistranslation you can draw our attention to it; -but that is not the way to do it, making general statements about the -translation of the documents. - -DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to give any more explanations -now, but I should like to quote passages from my document book referring -to 3 February... - -THE PRESIDENT: You have corrected one apparent mistranslation or -misinterpretation of the letter “H.” Well, you can do so again, if -necessary, in other places. You cannot make general statements about it. - -DR. EXNER: I will only read what is permissible. I will read extracts -from the document book without making any criticism. I have nothing -further to say about that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. EXNER: It says, on 3 February: - - “General Thomas reports that the liaison officer to the Ministry - of Economy ... Lieutenant Colonel Drews, visited him by order of - Schacht. He was of the opinion that the SS would employ all - means to cast suspicion on the Wehrmacht and to force it to the - wall in its present weak state.” - -Then it says under the date of 10 February: - - “Himmler is said to be distressed that senior officers of the - Wehrmacht had made unheard of accusations against him.” - -Then perhaps one other passage; from the next document, on Page 4 of the -document book, again the same diary, Document Number 1809-PS, the entry -of 25 May 1940: - - “The plan for the unlimited expansion of the SS sounds generally - suspicious.” - -Did you, even at that time, have misgivings about the dangers of this -dualism that you just mentioned? - -JODL: As a man very well versed in history, I had many misgivings about -this. Not only did I have misgivings, but even during the war I quite -openly expressed these misgivings to Himmler and Bormann. - -DR. EXNER: How did it come about that Himmler acquired more and more -influence in military spheres? - -JODL: That can be explained by the fact that the Führer had the -feeling—which perhaps on the whole was right—that a large section of -the officer corps opposed his ideas. He saw in this attitude not only an -inner political danger but also saw in it a danger to victory, which he -believed was to be attained only through ruthless methods. - -DR. EXNER: And what practical results came about through this? - -JODL: The practical results were these: The SS units were multiplied -tremendously; the Police received authority which extended even into the -operational sphere of the Army, and later, the Higher SS and Police -Leaders were created; the intelligence service was transferred to the -SS—where, by the way, it was organized by Kaltenbrunner far better than -before—the reserve army was put under the jurisdiction of Himmler, and, -in the end, also the entire Prisoners of War Organization. - -DR. EXNER: In your diary you express satisfaction at the appointment by -the Führer of General Von Brauchitsch as the Commander-in-Chief of the -Army. At that time there was a choice between him and General Reichenau. -Why were you glad that Brauchitsch was chosen? - -JODL: General Von Reichenau was known as a truly political general, and -I was afraid that he might perhaps have no scruples in sacrificing all -the good old tradition of the Army to the new regime. - -DR. EXNER: I should like to refer in this connection to Jodl’s diary, -Document Number 1780-PS, Page 6, first volume, with the entry of 2 -February 1938, second paragraph, and again to the entry of 3 February -1938 to be found on Page 7, where he appears particularly happy: - - “The chief of the Armed Forces Department informs me that the - battle has been won. The Führer has decided that General Von - Brauchitsch should be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need read this. It simply says that he -is in favor of Von Brauchitsch. - -DR. EXNER: You thought about the particular consequences for the -generals concerned in case Von Reichenau were appointed? - -JODL: Yes. There was no doubt that the senior generals, such as -Rundstedt, Bock, Adam, List, Halder, and so on, would never have -subordinated themselves to Von Reichenau. - -DR. EXNER: After this introduction, let us turn to the crimes against -the laws of war and humanity which have been charged against you. There -is very little time left. Therefore, I should like to clarify your -participation in the Commissar Decree. A draft by the High Command of -the Army on the treatment of Soviet commissars was submitted to you, and -you put a notation in the margin of this draft on the grounds of which -the Prosecution has accused you... - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document? - -DR. EXNER: The number of the document is 884-PS, Exhibit Number -USSR-351, Page 152, second volume of my document book. The whole is a -set of notes on a report. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Perhaps you can tell us this first of all: -What connection did you have with this matter, that is, with the -treatment of commissars? - -JODL: I did not participate in preparing this draft. I was not concerned -with prisoners of war nor with questions of martial law at that time. -But the draft was submitted to me before it was transmitted to Field -Marshal Keitel. - -DR. EXNER: All right. Now you added: “We must count on retaliation -against German fliers. It is best, therefore, to brand the entire action -as retaliation.” - -What do you mean by this statement? - -JODL: The intention of the Führer which was set forth in this draft was -rejected unanimously by all soldiers. Very heated discussions took place -about this also with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. This resistance -ended with the characteristic sentence by the Führer: “I cannot demand -that my generals should understand my orders, but I do demand that they -follow them.” Now, in this case, by my notation I wanted to indicate to -Field Marshal Keitel a new way by which one might possibly still -circumvent this order which had been demanded. - -DR. EXNER: The Prosecution, as you probably remember, have made this -order the subject of such a serious charge against the German military -authorities because it was drafted before the beginning of the war. -These notes are dated 12 May 1941, and there you say: “It is best to -brand the entire action as retaliation.” What did you mean by that? - -JODL: It is correct that, because of his ideological opposition to -Bolshevism, the Führer counted on the possible authorization of the -commissars (decree) as a certainty. He was confirmed in this belief, and -gave his reasons by saying: “I have carried on the war against Communism -for 20 years. I know Communism, but you do not know it.” I must add that -we as well were, of course, to a certain extent under the influence of -what had been written in the literature of the entire world about -Bolshevism since 1917. We also had had some experiences, for example, -the Räte Republic in Munich. Despite that, I was of the opinion that -first of all we should wait and see whether the commissars would -actually act as the Führer expected them to act; and if his suspicions -were confirmed, we could then make use of reprisals. That was what I -meant by my notation in the margin. - -DR. EXNER: That is to say, you wanted to wait until the beginning of the -war; then you wanted to wait until you had had experiences in this war; -and then you wanted to propose measures which, if necessary, could be -considered as reprisals against the methods of fighting used by the -enemy. Was that what you meant when you said: “It is best, therefore, to -brand the entire action as retaliation”? What do you mean by “Man zieht -auf”? These words were translated by the Prosecution as... - -MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, in -the examination of my learned friend, Dr. Exner, he has for several -minutes now been asking the defendant very long leading questions as to -what was the meaning of the passage in that letter. In my submission, -that is not evidence at all by the witness; it is a speech by Dr. Exner, -and I would ask him not to make another one now. - -DR. EXNER: I still think that it is necessary in the presentation of -evidence to determine what the defendant thought when he wrote those -words. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have heard me say on several occasions that when -counsel ask leading questions, which put the answer into the mouth of -the witness, it carries very little weight with the Tribunal. It is -perfectly obvious that if you wanted to ask what the witness meant by -his note he could have answered; and that is the proper way to put the -question, and not to suggest the answer to him. - -DR. EXNER: First of all I put the question, and then I believe I was -summarizing the main points of what the witness said. - -There is also a difficulty here with translation which I should like to -overcome; that is, I am not sure about it. “Es wird aufgezogen” or “man -zieht es am besten auf als Repressalie” is translated as, “It is best -therefore to brand” in English, and in French as _stigmatiser_. It seems -to me as though this were not quite correct, and as though one should -say, “It is best to handle it as a reprisal,” and in French to say -_traiter_. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Then what happened? - -JODL: I believe one should further explain the expression “aufziehen.” -The German word “aufziehen” also has something doubtful about it. It has -been said that that was a typical military expression used by the -Defendant Jodl at that time. That does not mean, as is assumed by the -Prosecution, “to camouflage.” Rather, I would say literally: “I believe -we must handle this operation quite differently,” that is, tackle it in -a different way. We would say that we would handle the demonstration to -the Führer of new weapons in a different way; that means, for instance, -“in a different sequence; in a different manner.” Among us soldiers -“aufziehen,” to handle, meant exactly the same as “to tackle” or “to -arrange” something. But it did not mean “to deceive.” - -DR. EXNER: You mean that the word “aufziehen” has no secondary meaning -indicating deception? - -JODL: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH DAY - Tuesday, 4 June 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._] - -DR. EXNER: General, yesterday afternoon we started dealing with war -crimes, but today I should like first of all to put a few preliminary -questions to you. What position and what tasks were yours during the -period of the war? - -JODL: I had to deal with the entire general staff work concerning the -strategic operational conduct of the war. Then, subordinate to me was -the military propaganda department, whose duty it was to co-operate with -the press; and thirdly, I was head of an office which, speaking broadly, -had to distribute means of communication to the various branches of the -Wehrmacht. The whole of this sphere of work took up my time to such an -extent that as a rule I worked night after night, until 3 o’clock in the -morning. I had no time at all to concern myself with other things. I -already had to delegate to my personal adjutant almost all my work with -the press, which had to receive daily information. - -DR. EXNER: These tasks, which you have just named, were all tasks -connected with your office, and that was the Armed Forces Operations -Staff, of which you were chief, is that not so? - -JODL: Yes, of which I was chief. - -DR. EXNER: And one department of the Operations Staff, the main and most -important one, was the operations department? - -JODL: Yes, operations. - -DR. EXNER: And most of your tasks were concerned with this department. -The Prosecution say you were Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Keitel. Do -you agree? - -JODL: That is not correct as has already been shown by the organization -which was explained here during Field Marshal Keitel’s case. There is a -great difference. As Chief of Staff, I would have been Field Marshal -Keitel’s assistant, concerned with all of his duties. I was, however, -only the chief of one of the many departments subordinate to Field -Marshal Keitel. - -Beginning with the year 1941 it became the practice for me and my -operational branch to report to the Führer direct on all matters -concerned with strategics, while Field Marshal Keitel, using my -quartermaster department as a sort of personal working staff, took over -all other tasks. - -DR. EXNER: Did you, as Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, have -authority to issue orders? - -JODL: No—or rather only through my working staff. I was subordinate to -Field Marshal Keitel, and even Keitel himself was not a commander but -only the chief of a staff. But in the course of this war I naturally -decided many operational details myself and signed them myself. There -was no disagreement of any sort in these matters with the -commanders-in-chief for I had their confidence, and I worked on the best -possible terms with them. - -DR. EXNER: For someone on the outside it is not quite easy to understand -that even though you had no authority to issue orders, so many orders -have been submitted here which were, in fact, signed by you, and signed -in different ways—sometimes with your full name, sometimes with a “J,” -the first letter of your name. Please explain these differences. - -JODL: One must differentiate as follows: The decrees which the Führer -himself signed, if they were of an operational nature, bear my initial -at the end, on the lower right; and that means that I at least assisted -in the formulation of that order. Then there were orders which also came -from the Führer, though they were not signed by him personally, but were -signed “by order, Jodl”; but they always had at the beginning the -sentence, “The Führer has decreed,” or that sentence was found somewhere -in the course of the order. There would be a preamble, usually giving -reasons for the order, and then, it would read: “The Führer has -therefore decreed.” - -DR. EXNER: And what was the difference between these two groups of -orders? Why was one group of orders signed by the Führer, and the other -only by you? - -JODL: The difference was merely that the orders signed by me were of -less importance. - -DR. EXNER: Now, there were other orders which did not begin with “The -Führer has decreed,” but were signed by you nevertheless. What about -these? - -JODL: These orders were as a rule signed: “The Chief of the High Command -of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl.” These were orders which emanated -from me, that is, I or my staff formulated them. The Führer himself and -Field Marshal Keitel had perhaps been informed of these orders, but not -in every case. - -Then there were other orders, which bear my initial on the first page, -in the upper right-hand corner. Those were orders issued by other -departments. My initial “J” on the first page was merely an office -notation to show that the order had been submitted to me. But it did not -mean that I had read it for if, on perusing the first page, I saw that -the decree dealt with a matter not connected with my sphere of work, -then I initialed it and put it aside, because I had to save time. - -DR. EXNER: Now, there is another large volume of documents, of which -some are being used as very incriminating evidence against you; they are -not orders but summarized notes. Can you comment on these? - -JODL: These summarized notes were an arrangement used on higher staff -levels for the convenience of people who had not time to study enormous -files. The summarized notes contained, in a short condensed form, a -description of some matter or other, frequently the views taken by other -departments and sometimes even a proposal. The important point, however, -is that it was not an order; it was not a draft of an order, but it -formed the basis for an order. - -DR. EXNER: Perhaps the situation will best be clarified if you can -explain this to the Tribunal in connection with the draft notes -concerning the commissars, which were touched on yesterday. It is -884-PS, Exhibit USSR-351; Volume II of my document book, Page 152. - -Before you start I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to -an error in the translation. On Page 152, under Figure I, it says: - - “The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding - political officials _et cetera_ ... regarding commissars...” - -The English translation says: “The Army High Command presents a -statement...”; but it is a draft. And I cannot quite follow the French; -it says: _Confirmation des instructions_. It should obviously be -_projet_. - -In any case the German original says: - - “The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding - treatment of political officials _et cetera_, for the uniform - application of the order issued on 31 March 1941.” - -And these are the commissars. The whole of this is a condensed draft. -Will you please explain what it means? - -JODL: This document is a typical example. First of all it contains the -draft by another department of the Army High Command, not verbatim, but -in a brief, condensed form. Then, secondly, under Figure II, on Page -153, the views of another department—that of Reichsleiter -Rosenberg’s—are set forth. Then, under Figure III, it contains a -proposal of my own staff. - -The whole matter, therefore, is far from being an order; it is to become -one. And on a summarized draft like that, I naturally made very many, I -might say, cursory marginal notes to serve as a guide for the further -treatment and discussion or disposal of the whole question. Therefore -one cannot apply to this the same criteria as would be applied to the -well-considered words contained in an actual order. - -DR. EXNER: All right. So much for the summarized draft and your notes. - -Now we turn to the very delicate topic of the Commando Order. This -matter has been dealt with here on various occasions; and indeed, it -goes beyond this Court in its importance and its repercussions, as we -know from the newspapers. - -I should like to hear from you something about the factors that led to -this order. This order is Document 498-PS, Exhibit Number USA-501. I do -not have it in my document book, but I asked the General Secretary to -have it put at the disposal of the Tribunal in the various languages. I -hope this has been done. - -Then there is an explanatory decree in addition to the main order; both -are signed by the Führer. That is Document 503-PS, Exhibit Number -USA-542. - -MR. ROBERTS: It is 498-PS. It is in the Keitel and Jodl Document Book, -Number 7, Page 64. - -DR. EXNER: The first order is addressed to the troops; the second is an -explanatory order addressed to the commanders-in-chief. The first order -threatens enemy soldiers with death if they engage in bandit-like -warfare; and it refers to the Wehrmacht communiqué in this connection. - -Can you first explain the connection between the Commando Order and the -Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October ’42? - -JODL: May I ask the Tribunal to permit me, as an exception, to go into -greater detail. Very much depends on this order; not my person, my own -person does not matter in this Trial, but the honor of German soldiers -and German officers whom I represent here is in question. - -The Commando Order is inseparably linked with the announcement in the -Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942, for this announcement in the -Wehrmacht communiqué heralded the actual Commando Order. - -DR. EXNER: And who was responsible for this announcement in the -Wehrmacht communiqué? Who wrote it? - -JODL: This Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942—it was really a -supplement to the communiqué—emanated in the main from me. It deals -with the denial of a report by the British Ministry of War, a matter -which I will not discuss further, for it is a very delicate point. The -Prosecution especially does not wish it to be brought up. - -DR. EXNER: But this supplement... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, we do not know—at least I have not seen the -document of 7 October 1942, and the Prosecution has made no objection to -any answer to any English documents as far as we know. - -DR. EXNER: I wished to submit this document but objections were raised. - -THE PRESIDENT: What does the defendant mean by saying that the -Prosecution does not wish him to present it or to answer it? - -DR. EXNER: He probably refers to the fact that we were not allowed to -present this Wehrmacht communiqué; but he can give us the contents of it -briefly. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, it may be a question of translation, but if he -means simply that no evidence has been given by the Prosecution on the -subject, of course, there is no objection to his saying that; but when -he says that the Prosecution does not want him to put forward or does -not want him to answer the document, that is a most improper statement -to make. - -DR. EXNER: Yes, I understand. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Perhaps you can tell us briefly the -contents of this Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942. I believe you -have it in your own document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, but, Dr. Exner, that is not quite what I mean. What -the defendant has said was that the Prosecution does not want him to -deal with this subject. - -DR. EXNER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, if that is the remark that is made, that is an -improper remark to make. The Prosecution have no communication with the -Defense upon this subject, presumably, except that they have put it -forward in the evidence in this case. - -DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] Did you understand? You must -not say that you are not allowed to touch upon this subject. Perhaps you -will give us an explanation of what you meant? - -JODL: This communiqué is in direct connection with the Commando Order. -Only the last paragraph of this Wehrmacht communiqué is important. It -was written by the Führer himself, as Field Marshal Keitel has already -stated, and Professor Jahrreiss read it here before the Tribunal. It is -the sentence which reads: - - “...in future all terror and sabotage troops of the British and - their accomplices who do not act like soldiers but like bandits - will be treated as such by the German troops and will be - ruthlessly eliminated in battle wherever they appear.” - -This sentence was written, word for word, by the Führer himself. - -DR. EXNER: And then you were instructed to issue a detailed order to -that effect... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. - -Defendant, what the Tribunal wants to know is this: You said that the -Commando Order appeared originally in a Wehrmacht report of the 7th of -October 1942 which, in the main, emanated from you, and that that report -refuted an English statement by the Ministry of War which the -Prosecution did not want you to deal with. What do you mean by that? - -JODL: By that I meant that my defense counsel intended to submit the -entire Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942 as a document in evidence. -But he refrained from doing so when the Prosecution objected to the -document. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have certainly never objected to this -document. I have asked Mr. Roberts and he tells me that he has never -objected to it; and, as far as we know, no one on behalf of the -Prosecution has ever objected to it. I certainly have no objection to it -at all myself; as a member of the English Government at the time when -this matter was issued, I have never heard anything about it before; but -I have no objection to it at all. - -DR. EXNER: May I say something? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. EXNER: If there has been a misunderstanding here, we shall be all -the more pleased, and we shall submit this Wehrmacht communiqué either -this afternoon or tomorrow. - -I should like to clarify one point regarding the question which Mr. -President put to the defendant. The defendant said that the Wehrmacht -communiqué, in the main, emanated from him, but that the Führer wrote -the supplementary sentence... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, if you want to correct anything that I have -said you must do it through the witness and not through yourself. You -are not entitled to give evidence. You only give evidence through the -witness. - -DR. EXNER: Yes. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please, state once more which part of the -Wehrmacht communiqué you wrote and which part was added by the Führer. - -JODL: The entire first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué has nothing -whatever to do with Commando troops, but is concerned with the -well-known affair of the shackling of German prisoners of war on the -beach of Dieppe. I shall refer to that again later. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean that I was correct in saying that in the main it -emanated from you? - -JODL: Yes, absolutely. The first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué was -formulated by me and contains an authentic refutation of a statement of -the British Ministry of War broadcast by the British radio. - -This statement of the British Ministry of War was false, and I -established the reasons why it was false on the basis of records, -photographs, and affidavits which we possessed. Initially this affair -had nothing to do with Commandos and reprisals. That was only introduced -into the Wehrmacht communiqué through the supplement by the Führer, -which begins with the sentence: “The High Command of the Wehrmacht is -therefore compelled to decree the following.” - -DR. EXNER: And it was considered necessary to make this announcement -known in the Wehrmacht communiqué in an executive order. Did the Führer -demand from you drafts for an executive order? - -JODL: When the Führer had written this last supplementary sentence, he -turned to Field Marshal Keitel and to me and demanded an executive order -to follow this general announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué. And he -added: “But I do not want any military courts.” - -DR. EXNER: Did you make a draft? - -JODL: I had very many doubts which a careful study of the Hague rules of -warfare could not dispel. Neither Field Marshal Keitel nor I prepared -such a draft; but members of my staff, on their own initiative, asked -for drafts and for the views of various departments. Thus Document -1263-PS came into being, to which I shall return later. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is Document 1263-PS? - -DR. EXNER: 1263. It is Page 104, Volume II of my document book, 1263-PS, -RF-365; but we shall deal with that later. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you say Page 204? - -DR. EXNER: No, Page 104, Volume II. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please continue. - -JODL: My wish was an entirely different one. It was my intention to -avoid an order altogether, and I rather expected that as a result of the -announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué—an announcement which was -certainly not kept secret but which was broadcast over the air to the -entire world—the British Ministry of War would approach us again, -either directly or via Geneva, as it had done on several previous -occasions. And I hoped that in this way the whole matter would be -shifted to the sphere of the Foreign Office. However, that did not -happen. The British War Ministry remained silent. - -In the meantime 10 days had passed and nothing had been done. Then on 17 -October General Schmundt, the Chief Adjutant of the Führer, came to me -and said that the Führer was demanding an executive order. I gave him -the following answer, word for word: - - “Please give him my best regards, but I will not issue an order - like that.” Schmundt laughed and said, “Well, I cannot tell him - that,” and my reply was, “Very well, then, tell the Führer that - I do not see how a decree like that could be justified under - international law.” - -And with that he left. I hoped now that I would be asked to come to the -Führer, so that at last, after many months, I should again be able to -speak to him personally. - -DR. EXNER: And this coincided with the Vinnitza crisis? - -JODL: Yes. I wanted an opportunity either of telling him my misgivings -or else being thrown out altogether. Either eventuality would have -helped me but neither occurred. A few minutes later Schmundt called me -on the telephone and informed me that the Führer was going to draw up -the orders himself. On 18 October Schmundt again came in person and -brought with him these two orders of the Führer—the order to the -troops, and an explanation for the commanders. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you referring to two documents which are before us? - -JODL: These are the two documents, 498-PS and 503-PS. The papers -submitted to the Tribunal as documents are not the originals of the -Führer; I personally handed over the originals at Flensburg. The -documents which are in the hands of the Tribunal are copies of the -originals, or mimeographed copies of my staff. - -DR. EXNER: Now, I should like to interpolate a question. You mentioned -that your staff worked out something in detail, and you referred to -1263-PS, which has been submitted to the Tribunal—Page 104 of Volume -II. In this document you wrote two remarks on Page 106. The first remark -on that page is “No.” In the French translation this non is missing, and -should be added. On the same page a little further down, it says in your -own handwriting, “That will not do either,” and your initial “J” for -Jodl. - -Can you explain in general what this means? - -JODL: As I have already said, the members of my staff—as may be seen -under the first figure on Page 104—on their own initiative asked for -proposals, firstly, from the foreign intelligence department, Canaris, -because he had a group of experts on international law and, secondly, -from the Wehrmacht legal department, since, after all, we were concerned -with a legal problem. - -On Page 106, under paragraph “a,” there is the proposal which the -foreign division of the intelligence department made: - - “Members of terrorist and sabotage troops who are found ... - without uniform, or in German uniform, will be treated as - bandits ... or if they fall into German hands outside battle - operations, they are to be taken at once to an officer for - interrogation. Thereafter they are to be dealt with by summary - court martial.” - -That was quite impossible, for if one came across a soldier in civilian -clothing, without uniform, no one could know just who he was. He might -be a spy or an escaped prisoner-of-war or an enemy airman who had saved -his life by jumping from his plane and now hoped to escape in civilian -clothing. That had to be determined by an experienced interrogating -officer and not by a summary court martial consisting of a lieutenant, -two noncommissioned officers, and two soldiers. In paragraph “b”... - -DR. EXNER: And for that reason you wrote “No”? - -JODL: For that reason I wrote “No.” - -In paragraph “b” it was suggested that if such sabotage groups were -captured wearing uniforms, a report should be made to the Armed Forces -Operations Staff, which should then decide what should be done. But in -that case the Armed Forces Operations Staff would have assumed the -function of a military court, and that it could never be. - -I really must claim for myself that, thanks to my wider experience, I -saw these problems a little more clearly than some of my subordinates. - -DR. EXNER: And so you rejected this proposal. You said that you also had -grave misgivings about the Führer Order. Will you tell the Court now -what misgivings you had? - -JODL: First of all I had a number of doubts as to its legality. -Secondly, the order was ambiguous, and also it was not sufficiently -clear for practical application. Particularly in this case I considered -military courts absolutely necessary. I know well that even judges may -on occasion, consciously or not, be under coercion and may pass judgment -not strictly in accordance with the law; but at least they provide some -safeguard against a miscarriage of justice. - -DR. EXNER: Therefore, if I understand you rightly, you wanted to install -some legal procedure. What did you mean by unclear and ambiguous? - -JODL: The theory was that soldiers, who by their actions put themselves -outside the laws of war, cannot claim to be treated in accordance with -the laws of war. This is a basic principle definitely recognized in -international law, for instance in the case of a spy or a -_franc-tireur_. - -The aim of this order was to intimidate British Commando troops who were -using such methods of warfare. But the order of the Führer went further -and said that all Commando troops were to be massacred. This was the -point on which I had grave misgivings. - -DR. EXNER: What legal doubts did you have? - -JODL: Just this doubt—that on the basis of this order, soldiers also -would be massacred... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, it is not necessary to speak so slowly, if you -can speak a little bit more fast. - -JODL: I was afraid that not only enemy soldiers who, to use the Führer’s -expression, really behaved like bandits, but also decent enemy soldiers, -would be wiped out. In addition—and this was especially repugnant to -me—at the very end of Document 503-PS it was ordered that soldiers were -to be shot after they had been captured and had been interrogated. What -was totally unclear to me was the general legal position, namely, -whether a soldier who had acted like a bandit would upon capture enjoy -the legal status of a prisoner-of-war, or whether on account of his -earlier behavior he had already placed himself outside this legal -status. - -DR. EXNER: By that you mean the Geneva Convention? - -JODL: Yes, I mean the Geneva Convention. - -DR. EXNER: Could you understand the idea that enemy soldiers who had -acted in an unsoldierly manner should not be treated as soldiers? - -JODL: Yes, I could quite understand that, and so could others, for the -Führer had received very bitter reports. We had captured all the orders -of the Canadian brigade which had landed at Dieppe, and these orders -were put before me in the original. These orders said that, wherever -possible, German prisoners were to have their hands shackled. But after -some time, through the Commander, West, I received authentic reports and -testimony of witnesses, with photographs, which definitely convinced me -that numerous men of the Todt Organization, fathers of families, -unarmed, old people, who were wearing an arm band with a swastika—that -was their badge—had been shackled with a loop around their necks and -the end of the rope fastened around their bent-back legs in such a way -that they had strangled themselves. - -I may add that I kept these photographs from the Führer, and I did not -tell him of these aggravating incidents which to me had been proved. I -concealed them from the German people and from the Propaganda Ministry. -Then came the English radio report denying emphatically that any German -soldier had been shackled at Dieppe. - -Some time later, a Commando troop made an attack on the island of -Saercq. Again we received official reports that German prisoners had -been shackled. - -Finally we captured the so-called British order for close combat. That -was the last straw for the Führer; I also studied it very carefully. -These close-combat instructions showed by pictures how men could be -shackled in such a way that they would strangle themselves through the -shackling, and it was stated exactly within what time death would occur. - -DR. EXNER: Therefore, the reasons which Hitler gave for his Order 498 -were actually based on reliably reported facts. I remark that Hitler -referred to prisoners who had been shackled, prisoners who had been -killed, and that criminals, as Commandos... - -THE PRESIDENT: You are paraphrasing the evidence in a way that is -inaccurate, because the defendant has just said that he kept these -things from Hitler. You are now saying that Hitler knew about them. That -is not what the witness said. - -DR. EXNER: Then, I must ask you whether the facts upon which this order -is based were reported to you. - -JODL: I believe the Tribunal has Document 498-PS. In it the Führer first -makes the general statement that for some time our opponents in their -conduct of the war have been using methods which violate the -international Geneva Convention. I must support this statement as true -on the basis of reports which, regrettably, we had been receiving since -the summer of 1941. I do not wish to go into individual cases. There was -an outrageous incident with a British U-boat in the Aegean Sea. There -was the order in North Africa that German prisoners of war should not be -given water before they were interrogated. There were a large number of -such reports. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal thinks that it is very difficult -to go into individual incidents which occurred long before this order -was drafted, and you have told us what you said the order was drafted in -respect of, namely the shackling; and you are now referring to other -things which you allege happened long before that. It does not seem that -it is possible for the Tribunal to investigate all those matters which -happened long before. - -JODL: And I do not want to speak about these matters any longer. I only -want to point out, as I think I must, that generally speaking the -reasons given by the Führer for this order did not spring from a -diseased imagination but were based on actual proof in his and in our -possession. For it is certainly very different whether I, in my own -mind, had to admit there was some justification for this order or -whether I considered the whole order an open scandal. That is a vital -point for my own conduct. But I shall try to be very brief. The fact -that many previously convicted persons and criminals were included in -the Commandos, who were of course reckless people, was proved by the -testimony of prisoners; and the fact that prisoners were shackled was -obvious from captured orders and the testimony of witnesses. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have told us that already. We have heard that more -than once—that you had evidence before you that prisoners were shackled -and that you had the Canadian orders before you. - -DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can just say a few words on the subject of -killing prisoners. - -JODL: In conclusion, I want to say that I did not see any order, any -captured order, which decreed death for German prisoners of war, though -this was also contained as a reason in the Führer Order. But I must -explain that the British Ministry of War advised us—I cannot recall -exactly whether it was via Geneva or through the radio—that situations -might very well arise in which prisoners of war would have to be -killed—no, rather, in which prisoners of war would have to be shackled -because otherwise one would be forced to kill them. And so, if at the -end here the Führer says orders have been found according to which the -Commandos were on principle to kill prisoners, then I think he is -referring to the British close-combat instructions which described a -method of shackling which would cause death. - -DR. EXNER: And that was your own part in this Commando Order? - -JODL: My part consisted only in distributing this order, or having it -distributed, in accordance with express instructions. - -DR. EXNER: The Prosecution said once that you also signed this -order—one of these two orders, I do not know which one. That is not -correct? - -JODL: No, I signed only a general decree to have one of the orders kept -secret. - -DR. EXNER: Yes, we will deal with that in a moment. Could you have -refused to transmit this order? - -JODL: No, if I had refused to transmit an order of the Führer, I would -have been arrested immediately; and I must say, with justification. But -as I said, I was not at all sure whether this decree, either in its -entirety or in part, actually violated the law; and I still do not know -that today. I am convinced that if one were to convene here a conference -of experts on international law, each one of them would probably have a -different opinion on the subject. - -DR. EXNER: General, you can speak a little faster. - -Could you have made counterproposals? - -JODL: At any other time, probably yes. At that time, however—a time of -conflict with the Führer—it was not possible for me to speak to him -personally at all. To broach the subject during the general conference -on the situation was quite out of the question. Therefore I intended in -the execution of this order to adopt a very magnanimous attitude, and I -was certain that the commanders-in-chief would do the same. - -DR. EXNER: And what do you mean by magnanimous? Could this order have -been interpreted in different ways? - -JODL: Yes. The order offered two ways of avoiding the treatment of -really decent soldiers like criminals. If a Commando troop, mostly -encountered in fights at night, was not wiped out but captured, as was -the rule in almost all cases, that was already certain proof that our -troops did not consider these men as bandits. It was then the task of -the commanders-in-chief to make an investigation. If it was purely a -reconnaissance operation, the entire action did not fall within the -sphere of the Commando Order at all and would not be reported as a -Commando raid. However, if the operation was really carried out by a -sabotage and demolition unit, its equipment had to be examined. It had -to be investigated whether the men were wearing civilian clothing under -their uniforms; whether they were carrying the famous armpit guns, which -go off automatically when the arms are lifted in the act of surrender; -or whether they used other despicable methods during the fighting. The -commanders-in-chief could then act in accordance with the outcome of -such an investigation. I believe that in that way it was quite -possible—and in fact it happened many times, I might almost say in the -bulk of cases—that the shooting of brave, decent soldiers was avoided. - -DR. EXNER: Could you yourself exert any influence on the practices -followed by the troops? - -JODL: I tried to exert my influence on various occasions. When it was -reported to me that a Commando unit had been captured—which according -to the Führer decree was not allowed—then I raised no questions or -objections. I made no report at all to the Führer on Commando operations -which met with only minor success. And finally, I often dissuaded him -from taking too drastic views, as in the Pescara case, which Field -Marshal Kesselring has already described here, when I succeeded in -convincing the Führer that only a reconnaissance unit was involved. - -DR. EXNER: Were many units actually wiped out? - -JODL: Commando operations decreased considerably as a result of the -public announcements in the Wehrmacht communiqué. I believe that not -more than 8 or 10 cases occurred in all. - -For a time, during the months of July and August 1944, increasingly -large numbers of terrorists were reported killed in the Wehrmacht -communiqué; these, however, were not Commando troops, but insurgents who -were killed in the fighting in France. That may be proved if the -Tribunal will read Document 551-PS, Figure 4. There the order is -given—it is USA-551, on Page 117. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is Page 70 of Book 7. - -JODL: Or Page 117 of our Volume II. There it is ordered... - -DR. EXNER: What is ordered? I should like to deal now with another -document, Document 532-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. EXNER: With reference to the Commando Order, I want to mention -Document 532-PS, Exhibit Number RF-368, which is in our Document Book 2, -Page 113. - -This document was offered on a previous occasion, and I objected to it -because it was not signed, or rather because it was crossed out. - -Will you explain why you crossed out the draft order which is contained -in this document? - -JODL: Immediately before this draft order was written, the Commander, -West requested that now, after the invasion, the Commando Order should -be rescinded altogether. I approved that proposal. A draft was submitted -to me here which rescinded the order only partially, namely in regard to -the immediate area of the beachhead and that part of Brittany, a little -further from the beachhead, where landings by parachutists were taking -place daily at that time. - -THE PRESIDENT: At the time of your objection was this document not -rejected? You told us that you objected to the document. What I am -asking you is, what did the Tribunal do upon your objection? Did they -maintain it, or did they deny it? - -DR. EXNER: The objection was allowed, and I think the document was -struck off. I do not think that I am mistaken. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, why are you putting it in now? - -DR. EXNER: I did not ask at the time to have the document struck off. I -merely raised the objection that no mention was made of the facts that -the draft order in the document was crossed out, and that it clearly -bore a handwritten marginal note by Jodl rejecting it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Either the document was offered in -evidence or it was not; and either it has got an exhibit number or it -has not; and, as I understand, your objection was rejected. - -MR. ROBERTS: It was in fact objected to by Dr. Exner, after having been -given the French Exhibit Number RF-368; and after discussing it, it was -then stricken from the record, the English shorthand note reference -being Page 3631 (Volume VI, Page 360). My Lord, I think in fact both the -Prosecution and the Defense agreed it has Jodl’s writing upon it; and, -therefore, I feel certain that there can be no question as to its -admissibility, either on behalf of the Prosecution or the Defense. My -Lord, I certainly intend, with the permission of the Tribunal, to -cross-examine him about it; and I have not the slightest objection to my -friend Dr. Exner putting it in. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. It may, therefore, be left in as RF-368. - -DR. EXNER: Will you continue? - -JODL: At that time it was my intention to get rid of the Commando Order -entirely. For that reason I wrote, next to the sentence under Figure 4: -“That is just what they should not”—the entire first page. That was of -no use, however, because on that very day the Führer made a different -decision with regard to the request of the Commander, West, and his -decision is contained in Document 551-PS. - -DR. EXNER: 551-PS, Exhibit Number USA-551. That is contained in the -second volume on Page 115; it is an order on the treatment of men -belonging to Commandos. This order contains the following handwritten -remark of yours: “Similar action should be taken in the Italian theater -of war.” This is on Page 117. - -Will you briefly explain the contents of that order and the reason for -your remark. - -JODL: That can be quickly explained. In that order territorial limits -were set restricting the use of the Commando Order, which henceforth was -to apply only to enemy operations behind the corps command posts but not -to the battle area of the beachhead. These were territorial limitations -which had not so far been fixed or ordered; and I immediately accepted -this order for the Italian theater of war, because in Italy also there -existed a fighting front on land. If this order were put into practice -in Italy, it would mean that no Commando operation which began with a -landing on the coast need be regarded as a Commando operation, because -all these landings took place in front of the lines of the corps command -posts. Therefore I was very anxious to have the same lighter conditions -applied to the whole Italian theater of war. - -DR. EXNER: I just want to read one paragraph on Page 116. It is the -second paragraph under Number 1. In the first paragraph it says: “...the -order remains in force....” But the second paragraph reads: - - “Excepted are enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate battle - area of the beachhead—that is in the area of the divisions - fighting in the front line—as well as reserve troops up to and - including corps commands, in accordance with Figure 5 of the - basic order....” - -The word “Generalkommando” means “corps command,” and it has not been -quite correctly translated into English and French. This limitation of -the order to certain areas was, on the basis of Jodi’s comment, also to -apply to the Italian theater. - -Now finally—but before that I have another important question... - -THE PRESIDENT: What is it you are saying about this translation? - -DR. EXNER: Yes; the word “Generalkommando” has been translated into the -French, _Région Militaire_. _Région Militaire_ is not quite clear. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the English? - -DR. EXNER: And in the English it says, “corps command.” That is correct. -The English is correct: “corps command.” That is the same as -“Generalkommando.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal would prefer that you should draw -the attention of the Tribunal to anything which you say is a -mistranslation, rather than stating that it is a mistranslation. I call -it a question of opinion whether it is a mistranslation or not. It is -not for you to tell us that it is a mistranslation. You may draw our -attention to it and say that you submit it as a mistranslation. But now, -will you tell us this also: In one copy of this Document 551-PS, it -appears to be signed by, or initialed by Warlimont. In the other, in -your version of the translation, it appears to be signed by the -Defendant Keitel. What is the explanation of that? - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, might I make a suggestion? I think the Court -should get the original from the Exhibit Room. 551-PS in fact consists -of three documents. The first is a draft altered in pencil; and the -second is a draft initialed “W”—that is Warlimont, with Jodi’s penciled -note at the end extending it to Italy; and the third is the final order -in which the penciled note of Jodl and the alteration of distribution to -Italy is incorporated. So, there are really three documents, and the -last is a mimeographed document with the mimeographed signature of -Keitel. That appears from the original draft. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Exner. - -DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution has been -emphasizing that you gave strict instructions to have this order kept -secret, and that you ordered its distribution only down to the level of -commanding officers to avoid its falling into enemy hands at all costs. -You gave these instructions for the second order, the explanatory order, -503-PS. Will you explain why you ordered such strict secrecy? - -JODL: These instructions for secrecy refer actually only to Document -503-PS. - -DR. EXNER: That, I may add, is in the second volume of my document book, -on Page 102. That is the order for secrecy, signed by Jodl. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you continue? - -JODL: Particular secrecy for this order was quite inevitable. First of -all, it was directed only to the commanders. Secondly, the order -contained in great detail information on the considerable damage which -the German Wehrmacht had already suffered through these Commando -operations, and the damage which might still be caused under certain -circumstances. If the order were to fall into enemy hands, it would -certainly be an incentive for the enemy to continue that particular type -of warfare in increased measure. Thirdly, the order, 498-PS, could be -considered as a reprisal. But the last sentence in Document 503-PS, a -sentence which can easily be recognized as a later addition—as the -order seems to end before it—that sentence, I must say, made me -indignant and was one of the reasons why I insisted on such particularly -strict secrecy for this order. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which sentence are you referring to? - -JODL: I refer to the last sentence of document 503-PS, which says: - - “If it should serve some useful purpose to save one or two men - temporarily to interrogate them, they are to be shot immediately - after interrogation.” - -I cannot prove it... - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not in 503, is it? - -DR. EXNER: 503-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have not printed the whole of 503 in your document -book. Is that it? - -DR. EXNER: Unfortunately, 503-PS is not in it, but only the secrecy -order, Page 102. I expressly requested, however, that it should be -submitted to the Tribunal. - -JODL: May I add that this sentence became the source of all trouble. The -troops made use of that sentence and on principle, or as a rule, did not -kill Commandos but took them prisoner. - -DR. EXNER: You said this last sentence made you indignant. Were you also -convinced that it was against international law? - -JODL: One might have doubts in that respect too. But I found it -distasteful from a human point of view, for if one does shoot a man, I -think it is base to extort all information out of him first. - -DR. EXNER: I want to ask one more question concerning what you mentioned -before the recess. You said that you did not report everything to the -Führer; you did not report all Commando raids to him. That is quite -clear. But you said you also did not report information which you -obtained from the enemy—killings, and so on. What did you mean by that? - -JODL: I reported the results of Dieppe and, should we say, the -violations of international law which we considered had been committed -there—the shackling of German prisoners, and so on. There was only one -thing which I did not report, namely, the shackling of some men -belonging to the Todt Organization in such a manner that they strangled -themselves. I did not report that, and it did not appear in any order or -Wehrmacht communiqué. - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already told us about this, so why you -should ask him again I don’t know. - -DR. EXNER: I thought it was not quite clear. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] We now pass to another subject, the order -regarding Leningrad and Moscow. How did Hitler’s order about the fate of -Leningrad and Moscow come into being? It is C-123, second volume, Page -145 of my document book; it was submitted under the number USSR-114. -This is the order stating that surrender was not to be accepted. How did -this order come into being? - -JODL: At the beginning of the second paragraph appears the sentence: -“The moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world.” -I shall now explain that. The first reason was a report from Field -Marshal Von Leeb, the Commander of Army Group North at Leningrad. He -reported that the population of Leningrad had already begun to flock out -toward his lines in the south and west. He pointed out that it would be -absolutely impossible for him to keep these millions of Leningrad people -fed and supplied if they were to fall into his hands, because the supply -situation of the army group was deplorable at that time. That was the -first reason. But shortly beforehand Kiev had been abandoned by the -Russian armies, and hardly had we occupied the city when tremendous -explosions occurred one after another. The major part of the inner city -was destroyed by fire; 50,000 people were made homeless; German soldiers -were used to fight the flames and suffered considerable losses, because -further large masses of explosives went off during the fire. At first -the local commander at Kiev thought that it was sabotage on the part of -the population, until we found a demolition chart, listing 50 or 60 -objectives in Kiev which had already been prepared for destruction some -time before; and this chart was in fact correct, as investigation by -engineers proved at once. At least 40 more objectives were ready to be -blown up, and for most of them a remote-control was to set off the -explosion by means of wireless waves. I myself had the original of this -demolition chart in my hands. That proved... - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need go into the details of Kiev. This -deals with Leningrad. The defendant might briefly state in substance -what he says happened at Kiev; but we cannot investigate details of it. - -DR. EXNER: Mr. President, the defendant wanted to show that it was -feared these happenings in Kiev might repeat themselves in Leningrad. - -THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that; but if he said that he had plans -of the blowing up of Leningrad, it would be a different matter, and he -could give that in more detail. But what I am saying is we cannot go -into the details about Kiev. - -DR. EXNER: No. I only want to refer without quoting to my Exhibit AJ-15 -(Document Jodl-50), on Page 149 of my second volume. That is a report on -these explosions in Kiev. We will not delay over this matter any more -now. I just wanted to bring it to the notice of the Tribunal. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please continue. - -JODL: Then I only need to say in conclusion that the Führer always -expected that what had happened in Kiev, in Kharkov, and in Odessa would -happen also in Leningrad, and possibly in Moscow. That was the decisive -reason why this order, which already had been put into writing, was -given by him orally to the High Command of the Army. And the order was -given added weight because the Russian radio reported that Leningrad had -been undermined and would be defended to the last man. - -The purpose of the order was exclusively that of protecting German -troops against such catastrophes as had already occurred; for entire -staffs had been blown into the air in Kharkov and Kiev. For this reason -the Führer issued this order, which I in turn, at his express request, -put into writing. Therefore the order began with the words, “The Führer -has again decided”—that means “once more,” “for the second time.” - -DR. EXNER: What was the reason for the order to leave openings to the -east in the encirclement of Leningrad and Moscow? - -JODL: We did not want these masses of the population. We had had our -experiences in Paris. There it had even been necessary to use the -transport space of four divisions and the whole relief train “Bavaria,” -which could supply tens of thousands of people, to save the population -from starvation. In Leningrad that would have been quite impossible, -because in the first place the railways had been destroyed; the rails -had not yet been adjusted to our gauge, and the supply situation was -very difficult. It would have been impossible to help these millions of -people in any way; there would have been a real catastrophe. Hence the -idea of pressing them back to the east, into the Russian areas; an idea, -incidentally, not in conformity with the assertion which has been made -here that we wanted to exterminate the Slavs. - -DR. EXNER: I now come to another subject. The French prosecutor has -accused you of ordering in Document UK-56—which is Exhibit RF-335 in my -document book, the second volume, Page 153—of ordering the deportation -of Jews, thereby giving, as chief of a military staff, a political -order. - -Will you explain how this order came into being? - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the translation must have come through wrong. You -said—at least, I took it down—Page 153. - -DR. EXNER: Page 155. I beg your pardon, it is on Page 155 of the second -volume of my document book. The actual order is on Page 156. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please reply. - -JODL: I must explain in connection with this document that the -deportation of Jews from Denmark was discussed during a conference at -which I did not participate. Himmler suggested it to the Führer; and the -Führer approved or ordered it. I was informed of it either through -General Schmundt or Ambassador Hewel. - -Then on instructions conveyed to me by Schmundt, I transmitted to the -military commander in Denmark the details of this order. The heading, or -rather, the address of this teleprint message shows that it was directed -to two offices, namely to the Foreign Office and to the commander of the -German troops in Denmark. These are the two principal offices for which -it was destined. The Reichsführer SS received the letter only for -information purposes, as is noted on it in accordance with our office -practice. He did not have to act upon it; it was not an order for him, -but it was merely for information. He already knew the Führer’s -decision. - -I did not in any way order the deportation of the Jews, but I wrote, -“The deportation of Jews will be carried out by the Reichsführer SS...” - -DR. EXNER: That is under Figure 2? - -JODL: Figure 2. Had this been an order, it would have had to be -addressed to the Reichsführer SS; and it would have had to be worded -like this: “Reichsführer SS is to deport Jews from Denmark.” But it is -exactly the other way about. This Figure 2 informs General Von Hannecken -in Denmark that he has nothing to do with this affair, but that it is -being handled by the Reichsführer SS. But General Von Hannecken had to -be told of this, because at that time a state of military emergency -existed. He had executive power in Denmark, and if anything like that -had been done without his knowledge he might immediately have objected -to it and forbidden it. - -The matter appeared to me so urgent that, in order to avoid incidents, I -informed the military commander in Denmark about it over the telephone, -quite openly and without regard to its secrecy. The French Prosecution -mentioned an indiscretion which enabled most Jews to escape from Denmark -into Sweden; presumably it was this telephone call which made that -possible. - -Finally, therefore, I repeat that I was far from ordering the -deportation of Jews; I merely informed the military commander in -question that he was to have nothing to do with the matter. Besides, as -I heard afterwards on making inquiries, these Jews were taken to -Theresienstadt, where they were cared for and visited by the Red Cross; -and even the Danish minister declared himself satisfied with their -treatment. - -DR. EXNER: May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to what I consider -is an inadequate translation into English and French. Under Figure 1 on -Page 156 of the second volume the word “volunteers” does not appear in -the translation. It says here, “The Reichsführer SS has permission to -recruit volunteers from the former members of the Danish forces who are -to be released...” The word “volunteers” is missing in the English -translation; the French, merely says _hommes_—“men.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You actually had no dealings with matters -in occupied territories; they were outside your jurisdiction. How then -did you come to sign this order? - -JODL: Actually this affair did not concern me at all. I signed the order -because Field Marshal Keitel was away on that day. - -DR. EXNER: As we are just talking of the Jews, will you tell the Court -what you knew about the extermination of Jews? I remind you that you are -under oath. - -JODL: I know just how improbable these explanations sound, but very -often the improbable is true and the probable untrue. I can only say, -fully conscious of my responsibility, that I never heard, either by hint -or by written or spoken word, of an extermination of Jews. On one single -occasion I had doubts, and that was when Himmler spoke about the revolt -in the Jewish Ghetto. I did not quite believe in this heroic fight; but -Himmler immediately supplied photographs showing the concrete dugouts -which had been built there, and he said, “Not only the Jews but also -Polish Nationalists have taken refuge there and they are offering bitter -resistance.” And with that he removed my suspicions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Warsaw? - -JODL: I am speaking of the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto of which I -heard through a personal report from Himmler given in our presence, in -the presence of soldiers at the Führer’s headquarters. Himmler spoke -only of an uprising and of bitter fighting. As far as the activities of -the Police are concerned, of the so-called action groups, Einsatzgruppen -and Einsatzkommandos—a conception, incidentally, of which I first heard -here in detail—there was never any explanation through the Führer -himself other than that these police units were necessary to quell -uprisings, rebellions, and partisan actions before they grew into a -menace. This was not a task for the Armed Forces, but for the Police, -and for that reason the Police had to enter the operational areas of the -Army. I have never had any private information on the extermination of -the Jews; and on my word, as sure as I am sitting here, I heard all -these things for the first time after the end of the war. - -DR. EXNER: What did you know about concentration camps... - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it is necessary to point out to you that -you cannot speak about there having been no explanation to the Führer; -you can only speak about there having been no explanation to yourself. -The translation I heard was, as to these Einsatzgruppen, that there had -been no explanation to the Führer. - -THE INTERPRETER: From the Führer. - -THE PRESIDENT: From the Führer? - -THE INTERPRETER: Yes, My Lord. - -JODL: I said that the Führer had never given us any other reason for the -presence of police forces than his statement that police measures were -necessary. - -THE PRESIDENT: I misheard the translation. - -DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about concentration camps, or what did -you know about them? Please be brief. - -JODL: I can briefly say that I knew there were concentration camps at -Dachau and Oranienburg. Some divisional officers visited Oranienburg -once in 1937 and gave me very enthusiastic accounts of it. I heard the -name of Buchenwald for the first time in the spring of 1945. When the -name was mentioned, I thought it was a new troop training camp; and I -made inquiries. The inmates were always described as German habitual -criminals and certain inveterate political opponents, who however, like -Schuschnigg or Niemöller, were held there in a kind of honorable -detention. I never heard a single word about tortures, deported persons, -or prisoners of war, crematoriums or gas vans, torments reminiscent of -the Inquisition, and medical experiments. I can only say that, even if I -had heard of these things, I would not have believed them until I had -seen them with my own eyes. - -DR. EXNER: The French prosecutor read a statement by the German Police -General Panke, according to which you were present at a conference with -Hitler on 30 December 1942, when terror and counterterror and so on, and -reprisal murders in Denmark were said to have been discussed. What do -you say to that? - -JODL: I think it was on 30 December 1943. - -DR. EXNER: Was it? - -JODL: In some points that statement is correct; in others it is -incorrect. During that conference, at least as long as I was present, -the word “murder” was never mentioned. The Führer said: - - “I want to fight the terror of sabotage and attacks, now - beginning in Norway, with exactly the same weapons. That is to - say, if a Danish factory working for Germany is blown up, which - has happened, then a factory working solely for the Danes will - be blown up also. If some of our strong points are attacked by - terrorists, which has also happened, these terrorists will be - hunted, surrounded, and wiped out in fighting; and I do not want - courts martial, which only create martyrs.” - -He did not say or suggest, however, that innocent Danes should now be -murdered as a reprisal. I can only say that, in my presence and in the -presence of Field Marshal Keitel, that and nothing else was said. Again, -it is a very debatable question from the point of view of international -law whether an army is not entitled to adopt the fighting methods of its -opponents in its countermeasures, particularly in such _franc-tireur_ -warfare and in rebellions like these. It seems to me a very moot point. - -DR. EXNER: You just said, “as long as I was present.” Were you not -present during the entire conference? Can you remember? - -JODL: I do not think that even in my absence any other statements were -made. Once during the conference I went out to telephone and was away -for a short time, perhaps 15 minutes. - -DR. EXNER: We now come to the partisan fighting. Partisan fighting and -partisans have been mentioned frequently here. Can you say briefly what -these partisans were? - -JODL: It is not easy to define that clearly, considering all the types -of fighting adopted in this world war; but there are five -characteristics: - -1) A partisan group is a fighting unit formed behind one’s own front; 2) -it is not or is only partly in uniform; 3) it is not an organic part of -the Armed Forces even though it receives its orders from them; 4) it -must be in a position, or it generally is in a position to... - -THE PRESIDENT: We don’t require a lecture about this matter. - -DR. EXNER: Well, then we know approximately what partisans are. I now -want to ask you about the fighting against partisan groups. First of all -I must read what we have heard here about partisans, Document L-180, -USA-276, which is contained in the second volume of my document book, -Page 121. That is a complete report of an Einsatzgruppe in action -against partisans; it is Appendix Number 9. What is found on Page 122 -is, I think, of importance. First of all under Roman Numeral I, Figure -5, I quote: - - “In the larger cities, especially those with industrial works, - so-called _istrebitelni_ battalions (i. e. destruction - battalions) were formed by the Soviets before the entry of the - German troops....” - -Then, under Roman Numeral III: - - “...the tasks and fighting methods of the various partisan - groups have become known ... partly from the captured combat - directives of the partisans themselves. This statement of a - captured partisan ... is significant: ‘A partisan must destroy - everything that he can reach...’” - -And then, in one of the “Combat Directives for Partisan Groups” received -by us from the commander of the army, rear area North, we find stated: - - “Unbearable conditions are to be created for the enemy and his - allies in territories occupied by him. All the measures of the - enemy are to be opposed.” - -And then instructions are given to blow up bridges, to destroy roads, -_et cetera_. I shall not read it all. In the last paragraph, which I -have on Page 123, it expressly states that partisans are to disguise -themselves cleverly; that they will sometimes appear as farmers or will -work in the fields as soon as German forces appear in the vicinity. The -witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski stated here that the fight against -partisans was carried out in a chaotic manner. He meant by that that it -was not directed from higher quarters. You must be informed about that. -Is that correct? - -JODL: No, that is not correct. This expert on partisan fighting -obviously has a bad memory. I draw attention to Document F-665, in -Document Book 2, Page 126. Here the first page is given of a directive -for partisan warfare. It is called “Instructions for Partisan Warfare,” -and was signed by me personally on 6 May 1944. The Tribunal will see -that in the second sentence it says that... - -DR. EXNER: Page 126. - -JODL: ...the instructional pamphlet number so-and-so, “Instructions for -Partisan Warfare in the East,” issued by the OKW, Armed Forces -Operations Staff, dated 11 November 1942, is canceled. That proves that -at least since 11 November 1942, the troops had in their possession -instructions issued by the Armed Forces Operations Staff as to how the -battle against partisans should be conducted. - -DR. EXNER: May I now draw attention to my Document AJ-1, Page 133. It is -an affidavit of a Pastor Wettberg; I do not want to read it. Pastor -Wettberg contacted me because he himself had been engaged in the warfare -against partisans, and he confirmed that the fighting was perfectly well -directed even before the new instructions were issued, that is, from -1942 onwards. In 1944 you issued this new directive without Hitler’s -permission; is that correct? - -JODL: Yes. - -DR. EXNER: What made you do that? Was it not an unusual step? - -JODL: I want to state that I did not submit this directive either to -Field Marshal Keitel or to the Führer, because it was a contradiction of -all existing orders. I shall prove in detail later that it gives -instructions for all so-called partisans in France and -Yugoslavia—partisan areas in Russia were now in front of our lines—to -be treated immediately as regular fighting troops, and thus as prisoners -of war. - -I took this unusual step because I became convinced, after the shooting -of the English Air Force officers at Sagan, that the Führer no longer -concerned himself with the idea of human rights; and also because after -1 May 1944 I myself felt responsible for questions of international law, -as the “Canaris” department had been dissolved on that day and the -foreign section, together with the international law department, had -come under my command. I was resolved not to tolerate and not to -participate in any such violations of international law on our part, and -I acted accordingly from that day up to the end of the war. - -In this order I declared all partisans and those supporting them, and -even those wearing civilian clothes, to be regular troops and prisoners -of war, long before Eisenhower—on 7 July 1944 only—demanded that -terrorists in France should be given that status. - -DR. EXNER: The Prosecution asserts that the fight against partisans was -only a code name under which Jews and Slavs were killed; is that true? - -JODL: The fight against partisans was a horrible reality. In July 1943, -to quote some figures, 1,560 instances of railway sabotage occurred in -Russia. There were 2,600 in September; that is 90 per day. A book by -Ponomarenko was published from which an American paper quoted 500,000 -Germans as having been killed by the partisans. If a nought is crossed -off from that figure, it is still quite a considerable achievement for a -peaceful Soviet population. But the book is also said to have stated -that the population became increasingly hostile; that murder and terror -became more frequent; and that the peaceful Quisling mayors were being -killed. At any rate it was a tremendous fight which was taking place in -the East. - -DR. EXNER: In this connection, I would like to draw the Tribunal’s -attention to an entry in Jodl’s Diary, Document 1807-PS. It is on Page -119 of the second volume of my document book. Under 25 May it says, -“Colonel General Halder draws the attention of the Führer to increasing -partisan activity...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The defendant stated, I think, that in -this directive of his on the 6th of May 1944 there was an order that -guerrillas should be treated as prisoners of war. Will you refer us to -the passage? - -DR. EXNER: Will you name the passage, Defendant? - -JODL: It is under Figure 163, on Page 131. - -DR. EXNER: Page 131 of the second volume. - -JODL: May I read it? - -DR. EXNER: Yes. - - JODL: “All partisans captured in enemy uniform or civilian - clothing or surrendering during combat are to be treated in - principle as prisoners of war. The same applies to all persons - encountered in the immediate fighting area who may be considered - as supporting the partisans, even when no combat action can be - proved against them. Partisans in German uniform, or in the - uniform of an allied army, are to be shot after careful - interrogation if captured in combat. Deserters, no matter how - they are dressed”—and, may I add, even if dressed in German - uniform—“are, on principle, to be well treated. The partisans - must hear of this.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Well, perhaps—it is 1 o’clock—we might -break off now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. EXNER: I have one further question concerning the partisan -regulations. The Prosecution brings the charge that you, through Number -161 of the partisan regulations—that, Your Honors, is in the document -we used last, F-665, Page 130 of Volume II—were responsible for the -destruction of whole villages, and even of the total population of -villages in France. Will you please comment on this? - -JODL: I believe the opposite is true. Through Number 161, I reduced the -collective measures and collective punishments that the Führer had -decreed without restraint, to what was permitted by Article 50 of the -Hague Rules of Land Warfare. In this article collective punishment is -prohibited unless the entire population is equally guilty in terror -activities of any kind. Therefore, with this Number 161 I did not order -the burning down of villages, not even in exceptional cases, but on the -contrary I said that such collective measures might be used only in very -exceptional cases, and then only with the approval of a divisional -commander, for he would have a tribunal and could make a judicial -investigation. - -I do not wish to trouble the Tribunal with any other merits of mine, -which may be read in this document. I discussed the good treatment of -the population; the necessity of leaving them the necessaries of life, -_et cetera_. I believe, at any rate, that this document actually serves -as a model of how this sort of war may be brought within the scope of -international law. I did this as I was convinced that at that time the -French Maquis movement, and also the Tito revolt had gradually begun to -develop into a regular war. - -Now the case of the 2d SS Panzer Division is cited as an example of -things that I caused through this Number 161. I can say only that the -behavior of the SS Panzer Division is the responsibility of its -commander. I learned about it only months afterwards. I am grateful to -the French Prosecution for having submitted this document, and I am -grateful also for the statement that the Maquis movement in the -beginning was nothing else than _franc-tireur_ warfare, the heroism of -which I do not dispute. - -DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different problem, the low-level -fliers. From Document 731-PS, Page 139 of the second document book, and -Page 144 of Volume II of my document book—from these documents it can -be seen that from various sources proposals had been made as to the -treatment of enemy airmen who had made emergency landings. Can you tell -us, first of all, the reason for this, and what your attitude was toward -these proposals? - -JODL: I shall try to be as brief as possible. The reason was that -numerous reports had been received of people being attacked by -individual enemy aircraft contrary to international law. The Führer -demanded countermeasures, and that is the origin of the memorandum -731-PS, Exhibit RF-1407. It is not a draft for an order, still less an -order. It is a note containing proposals made by the Luftwaffe in that -connection. There was no talk as yet about lynching. The fact that I -concerned myself with this problem at all may find its explanation in -the responsibility which, as I have previously mentioned, I believed had -rested with me since 1 May with regard to questions of international -law. The note which I wrote on the document has already been read. I -objected to one paragraph—a case which I nevertheless considered -entirely admissible according to international law. This was later -crossed out and replaced by a statement that it was to be considered -murder if one of our soldiers landing by parachute was shot. I wrote -this objection on Document 735-PS. The concept of lynching... - -DR. EXNER: I should like to state, for the assistance of the Tribunal, -where this passage is. The remark made by Jodl in his handwriting is -found on Page 144 of the document book. Various proposals are made in -this memorandum, and then Jodl adds “To Number 3...”; and then there is -a notation. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please comment on this. - -JODL: My notation was: “Is the Foreign Office in agreement with Number -3b?”—namely, that the shooting of our own airmen who have been shot -down and are parachuting to earth is to be considered a mean terrorist -act. - -DR. EXNER: This Number 3b is on the same page, at the top. - -JODL: I just wanted to add that lynching was suggested in an article by -Goebbels, published in the _Völkischer Beobachter_. The more I concerned -myself with this problem, the more it was obvious that nothing at all -could be achieved with measures of this kind, for one could never -capture a guilty low-flying airman, for he would either escape or he -would be dashed to pieces on the ground. This would only lead to a -general murder of airmen. Therefore, I decided—and I was in complete -agreement with Field Marshal Keitel on this point—to cause this entire -action to fail. The Court can see that between Document 731-PS, which -was compiled on 21 May, and Document 735-PS, 16 days had elapsed wherein -nothing had been done. When on 6 June I received a rather lengthy -report, I noted on it, “This is not sufficient; we have to start all -over again; how can we be certain that other enemy airmen will not be -treated in the same way? Should some legal procedure be arranged or -not?” If I wrote that, then, Your Honors, it is absolute proof, if you -consider my general method of work, that I had no other intention than -to delay and drag things out until the matter had solved itself. And I -succeeded in this case. No military authority issued an order. We did -not even go so far as to make a draft of an order. The only thing we had -were these scraps of paper. It has been proved, and it will be proved -further, that many months afterwards the Führer brought the gravest -charges against us, and against the Luftwaffe in particular, of having -torpedoed his order. - -DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to something entirely different. The Chief -of the OKW, in a letter written in 1941, called you and Warlimont his -representatives for collaborating with Rosenberg’s Ministry for the -Occupied Eastern Territories. That is Document 865-PS, Exhibit USA-143. -How did that work out in practice? - -JODL: Not at all. Apart from one conference in 1943 dealing with an -appeal to the peoples of the East, I had no connection with Rosenberg’s -Ministry whatsoever. The only collaboration which took place constantly -was carried on by my propaganda division, for all pamphlets which it -compiled and which were dropped over Russia were discussed first with -the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories. - -DR. EXNER: Then why were you appointed at all? Why was that necessary? - -JODL: That was purely a matter of form, because Minister Dr. Lammers -wrote to each of the higher Reich authorities in general asking that a -deputy be designated; and so Field Marshal Keitel also designated a -deputy. - -DR. EXNER: We shall now turn to something new. You have been shown the -rather strange Document C-2, Exhibit USA-90. It is not contained in my -document book, but the Court will remember it at once. It is a -compilation in tabular form in which certain incidents of significance -in international law are cited in the first column. In the second column -there are examples; in the third and fourth... - -MR. ROBERTS: It is Page 163 in the big document book. - -DR. EXNER: This is a diagramatic compilation which sets down on one side -a certain incident, and on the other enumerates the consequences of this -incident: its appraisal in the light of international law, its use for -propaganda, and so forth. - -Will you explain how this came about? It is really a very strange -document. Twelve infringements of international law by our side are set -down, and, I believe, 13 infringements by the enemy. - -JODL: I do not think this document is so remarkable after all. It was -compiled at the end of September 1938, shortly before the Munich -Conference. As I, in my department, did not know for certain whether we -would have an armed conflict or not, and as at that time the -stipulations of international law were not clear to us, I wanted, by -taking various examples, to find out from the experts on international -law what the present attitude was towards such infractions. Every -officer in my division then racked his brain to find an example, and we -tried to cover every branch of international law through some specific -instance. I consider it worthy of note that even then we concerned -ourselves with the conception of international law. There can be no -doubt whatsoever that I alone carry responsibility for having thought -out these examples. But if one were to take exception to the reply to -these examples, that is to the judgment on the lines of international -law or to justification according to the rules of warfare, I can only -say that this did not come from me; it emanated from the office of -Canaris. Apart from that, it shows a very careful and noteworthy -attitude toward international law, especially concerning air warfare. At -any rate, it was on a much higher level than what took place in actual -practice. - -DR. EXNER: Therefore, was it the intention to commit these infractions -of international law? - -JODL: Not at all, but as one conversant with the history of warfare, I -knew that there has never yet been in this world a war in which -infractions of international law did not occur. - -If, perhaps, objection should be raised that quite at the end of the -paragraph there appears: “Explanation by the Propaganda Ministry,” I -should like to say that that comes at the end, after the justification -according to the laws of war and the judgment from the standpoint of -international law, and that Admiral Bürckner, who gave the reply, -himself referred to it—that propaganda could be put into practice only -after the aspects of international law had been clarified. Moreover the -whole answer was only a preliminary one, as first the Foreign Office and -the various branch chiefs of the Wehrmacht would have had to be heard on -the subject. - -DR. EXNER: I asked for Admiral Bürckner as a witness on this question, -but it really seems to be too unimportant a matter, and I shall -therefore forego the calling of this witness. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I want to ask you the following question -in this connection: What was your attitude in general as to the -limitations placed on the conduct of war by international law? - -JODL: I recognized and valued international law with which I was well -acquainted, as a prerequisite for the decent and humane conduct of war. -Copies of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention were -always lying on my desk. I believe that by my attitude toward the -Commissar Order, toward lynching, and toward the intention to repudiate -the Geneva Convention—bluntly rejected by all Commanders-in-Chief and -all branches of the Wehrmacht, and by the Foreign Office—I have proved -that I tried, as far as it was possible for me, to observe international -law. - -Of course, there is a wealth of positive proof available. The pertinent -documents will probably be submitted by my defense counsel. I will refer -only to the behavior of the German Wehrmacht in Norway, a matter in -which I collaborated. I refer to the partisan regulations... - -DR. EXNER: I submit Document AJ-14, Pages 99 and 100 in my document -book, Volume I. These are special directives for conduct during the -occupation of Norway and Denmark, directives which, therefore, were -issued when those countries were occupied. There are some very -characteristic sentences contained in this document, sentences which I -should like to read. You will find on Page 98, Figure I: - - “The military occupation of Denmark and Norway is taking place - for the purpose of ensuring the neutrality of these countries. - The aim must be to carry this out in a peaceful way.” - -Then on Page 99, at the top it says: - - “Directives for conduct in personal intercourse with the - Norwegian population. - - “Every member of the Armed Forces must remember that he is not - entering enemy country, but that the troops are moving into - Norway for the protection of the country and for the safety of - its inhabitants. - - “Therefore, the following is to be observed: - - “I. The Norwegian has a strongly developed national - consciousness. Moreover the Norwegian people feel themselves - closely related to other Nordic peoples. - - “Therefore avoid anything that might wound national honor.” - -Figure 2 is also very characteristic. Then I shall turn to Figure 4: - - “The home of the Norwegian is sacred according to the old - Germanic conception. Hospitality is offered generously. Property - is inviolable. The house remains...” - -THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to read all of this. One paragraph is -enough to show the nature of the document, isn’t it? - -DR. EXNER: Then I will make mention of the remainder of the document -which I shall not read, and ask that the Tribunal take official notice -of this document. - -Then there is a directive here, Document AJ-16... - -THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, that last document does not appear to -have been signed by the defendant, does it? - -DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] What had you to do with this -document? Did you... - -JODL: It is signed by Von Falkenhorst, but it is well known that we—the -Armed Forces Operations Staff and the staff of Von -Falkenhorst—comprised one unit for the Norwegian enterprise. I -participated in the drawing up of this document, and I submitted it to -the Führer and the Führer approved of it. There is even an entry to that -effect in my diary. - -DR. EXNER: Then comes Document AJ-16, which I submit herewith. - -“Special directives for the administration and pacification of the -occupied areas of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.” This is Page 161, -Volume II of my document book. I will quote only from Page 162 in order -to save time. I will read perhaps the last sentence: “International law -must be strictly observed in every case.” But I request the Tribunal to -take judicial notice of the other regulations. - -In this connection I should like to mention Document 440-PS, Exhibit -GB-107, in my Document Book 2, Page 164—Directive Number 8 regarding -the conduct of war, dated 20 November 1939. It says in respect to the -tasks of the Air Force—I will read the last paragraph: - - “Localities, especially large open cities, and industries are - not to be attacked without a compelling military reason, neither - in the Dutch nor in the Belgian-Luxembourg areas.—Signed - Keitel.” - -Did you also draft that? - -JODL: I drafted that order. - -DR. EXNER: Then we might refer to the regulations for fighting -partisans, a matter which has been discussed here also. - -JODL: And I should like to refer to something I believe I have stated -already, that I ordered an immediate investigation of the Malmédy -incident. - -DR. EXNER: Did you constantly bear in mind the aspects of international -law where your orders were concerned? - -JODL: I believe I have already stated that. I studied international law -very carefully in its bearing on my orders. I do not wish to detain the -Court with the knowledge I gathered from these regulations, for it is -only incomplete, but I should like to conclude by saying that owing to -the fact that there were no regulations governing air warfare, -deplorable confusion in definition arose—for instance between rebellion -and legal war force; between _franc-tireur_, bandit, and scout; between -spy and scout; demolition crews and saboteurs. Any time with the help of -aircraft a rebellion might be converted into a legal war; and a legal -war, on the other hand, might become a state of rebellion. That is the -effect that parachute troops and the furnishing of supplies by air have -had on international law. - -DR. EXNER: In this connection, I should like to submit the affidavit of -Lehmann, Exhibit AJ-10 (Document Number Jodl-63). This document has not -been submitted to the Court because it was only yesterday that the -Prosecution declared itself in agreement with the use of this affidavit. -I believe it is the affidavit of the Judge Advocate General, Dr. -Lehmann. If the Tribunal will declare this affidavit admissible, I can -perhaps merely refer to it... - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is it? - -DR. EXNER: I submit it herewith but it has not been translated yet, as -we received permission for it only yesterday in Court. - -MR. ROBERTS: As Sir David said yesterday there is no objection to the -affidavit, although there was no actual order granting the affidavit of -Lehmann. My Lord, it is very short, especially the copy I had, and I -think there is no reason to object to it. - -DR. EXNER: Then, in order to save time, I shall just refer to it; and I -beg the Tribunal to read these statements of Dr. Lehmann. They seem to -me to be significant, as after all it is the highest jurist in the -German Wehrmacht, Judge Advocate General Lehmann, who is giving -information here. - -THE PRESIDENT: You had better give it an exhibit number. - -DR. EXNER: Yes, AJ-10 was the exhibit number I gave it, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. EXNER: This gentleman mentions legal discussions, which he had -occasion to carry on with Jodl, and he gives us Jodl’s attitude toward -legal questions. - -And now, General, in connection with crimes against the laws of war -there is one last question which comes to our attention. Numerous -entries in the war diary, orders, _et cetera_, are the subject of -serious charges against you. Did you have the possibility, before you -were captured, of destroying all this material? - -JODL: Yes, between 3 May and 23 May I had time and leisure to burn every -piece of paper, but I gave instructions to my staff not to destroy a -single file, for I felt I had nothing to conceal. I handed the complete -files, and above all the especially important ones, all the original -Führer directives since 1940, to the American officer when I was -captured. - -DR. EXNER: And now I shall turn to the alleged Crimes against Peace. -First of all we have to make it clear what posts you held during this -critical period. Tell us, please, what posts you held from 1933. - -JODL: From 1932 to 1935 I was in the division which was later called the -Operations Division of the Army. From the middle of 1935 until October -1938 I was Chief of the Department for National Defense in the -Wehrmachtsamt, which was later called the OKW. - -DR. EXNER: That means the Wehrmachtsamt was actually the OKW? - -JODL: Yes, later on. From October 1938 until shortly before the Polish -campaign I was artillery commander at Vienna and at Brünn, in Moravia; -and from 27 October 1939... - -DR. EXNER: Just a moment please. 27 September? - -JODL: No—August, rather. On 27 August 1939 I took over the office and -the tasks of Chief of the General Staff. - -DR. EXNER: Now, let us take that period. Did you concern yourself with -war plans in the years 1932-35 when you were in the so-called -Truppenamt? - -JODL: At that time there were no preparations in the Operations -Division, except for combat directives for the improvised Grenzschutz -Ost (frontier guard East). This was a militia-like organization, and -preparations were made to evacuate the whole German border in case of -enemy occupation. That was all. - -DR. EXNER: Had you anything to do with the proclamation of general -conscription? - -JODL: No, I had nothing to do with that. I believe I heard about it the -day before. - -DR. EXNER: What were your duties as chief of the Department for National -Defense from June 1935 to October 1938? - -JODL: In this position I had to work out the operational strategic -directives according to the instructions of my chiefs, Keitel and -Blomberg. I had to study and to clarify the problem of the leadership of -the Wehrmacht; to prepare studies and exercises for the big Wehrmacht -maneuvers in 1937. I had to supervise the Wehrmacht Academy; I had to -work out drafts for laws in connection with the general conscription -order and with the unified preparation for mobilization in the civilian -sector, that is, of state and people. The so-called Secretariat of the -Reich Defense Committee came under me. - -DR. EXNER: Tell us, please, what were you at that time? What was your -military rank? - -JODL: I acquired that position while I was lieutenant colonel; and in -1936—I believe—I became a colonel. - -DR. EXNER: Did you take any part in the Reich Defense Law? - -JODL: No, that law originated before I entered my office in the -Wehrmachtsamt. - -DR. EXNER: But the Prosecution is accusing you of participation in it on -the grounds of a supplement which you made to the Document 2261-PS, -Exhibit USA-24, which is to be found in Volume I, Page 9. In this -document it says, “Attached a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 21 May -1935...” The signature is Blomberg’s and it is dated 24 June. Then comes -a supplementary paragraph: “Berlin, 3 September 1935. To the Defense -Economic Group la, copy transmitted, Signed Jodl.” What can you tell us -about that? - -JODL: Indisputably that is a valid Reich law of which I had to transmit -a copy to one of the other offices. I need not say more than that. - -DR. EXNER: You yourself did not participate in the drawing up of the law -itself? - -JODL: No. - -DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Council? - -JODL: No. - -DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Committee? - -JODL: I was that automatically from the moment I took over the direction -of the National Defense Department. At the tenth session of this meeting -of experts, on 26 June 1935, General Von Reichenau designated me as his -deputy. - -DR. EXNER: What was the purpose of this committee? This has already been -discussed, I believe, so please be as brief as possible. - -JODL: In a few words: With this committee a unified mobilization, not of -the Army, but the mobilization of the State and people, corresponding to -military mobilization, was prepared. These plans were laid down in the -mobilization books giving final figures and various stages of tension. - -DR. EXNER: What were these various stages of tension? - -JODL: We had learned about this from France and had adopted it. The -French had a system by which mobilization was carried out in five stages -according to the degree of tension existing. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do we need the detail about this? Is it not sufficient to -say it was copied from France? - -DR. EXNER: Very well. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Perhaps you can tell us what this meant; -why we adopted this system of stages of tension? What was the reason? - -JODL: The purpose was to have some means at our disposal—as was -customary all over Europe at that time—that would achieve an -intensified readiness for war before the public order for mobilization -was issued. - -DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with armament? - -JODL: No. It did not concern itself with armament at all. - -DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with political -plans or intentions? - -JODL: It had nothing to do in any way with political problems. - -DR. EXNER: But how about war? - -JODL: It was concerned only with mobilization. - -DR. EXNER: That means, a certain particular war... - -JODL: Mobilization is a necessity for every possible war. - -DR. EXNER: In this committee you concerned yourself with mobilization -books. Is that correct? - -JODL: Yes. I believe I have already explained that. In these books the -details of all the chief Reich authorities were set down and indexed -according to degrees of tension. - -DR. EXNER: What do you mean by chief Reich authorities? - -JODL: I mean all the ministries. - -DR. EXNER: You mean the civil authorities? - -JODL: Yes, the civil authorities. And the preparations made by them had -to be brought into line with the preparations by the military. - -DR. EXNER: What were the preparations in the demilitarized zone? - -JODL: The preparations in the demilitarized zones were connected solely -with evacuation, that is the surrendering of the areas west of the Rhine -in case of a French occupation. - -DR. EXNER: I believe we have discussed that at length already, and in -this connection I should like to refer to Document EC-405, Exhibit -GB-160, Page 11 of my document book, the first volume, where the tenth -session is mentioned. You are accused of having decreed the utmost -secrecy concerning all these preparations, which, according to your -description, were of a purely defensive nature. Why all this secrecy? - -JODL: Keeping measures of this kind secret is taken for granted all over -the world. For us in Germany it was especially important, as for years -the civil authorities had no longer been accustomed to concern -themselves with military matters, and it seemed to me of particular -importance that in foreign countries no misunderstanding should arise -by, let us say, the capture of an order of this nature—a very -characteristic misunderstanding such as occurred in these proceedings in -connection with the “Freimachung” of the Rhine. - -DR. EXNER: And why did you decree secrecy? So that foreign countries -would not be disquieted? - -JODL: At that time we were even weaker than during the period when we -had an army of only 100,000 men. This army of 100,000 men had been -broken up into hundreds of small groups. It was the time of our very -greatest impotence, and at that period we had to be extremely careful to -avoid any and all tension with foreign countries. - -DR. EXNER: What were the military plans of those days? - -JODL: I have already said that there were the combat directives for the -Grenzschutz Ost. I had also worked out instructions for the commander in -East Prussia in case he were cut off from the Reich through a sudden -attack by Poland. - -DR. EXNER: Did you know of any German intentions of attack at that time? - -JODL: There was no thought or talk of that whatsoever. - -DR. EXNER: Well, I should like to quote one sentence from the twelfth -session of the Reich Defense Council. It is on Page 14 of Volume I of my -document book, Document EC-407, Exhibit GB-247. At that meeting -Lieutenant Colonel Wagner of the OKH said—who was he, by the way? - -JODL: He later became Quartermaster General. - -DR. EXNER: Lieutenant Colonel Wagner said: - - “The outcome of the war”—that is, the last war—“has resulted - in a completely changed military and political situation in the - case of a future war, namely the necessity for waging it in - one’s own country.” - -He said that on 14 May 1936. What would you gather from this sentence? - -JODL: Of course, one can perhaps say... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, surely it is a statement by somebody else, and -this statement speaks for itself. It is not a matter that this witness -can interpret to us. - -DR. EXNER: Very well. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, were you concerned with armament in -the Truppenamt, and later in the Department for National Defense? - -JODL: I personally had nothing at all to do with armament in the real -sense. That was a matter for the various branches of the Wehrmacht—the -Army, the Navy, the Air Force—and it was dealt with and handled by -their organizational staffs. The Commanders-in-Chief discussed these -matters with the Führer direct. But I hope, and I will not deny, that my -work in the General Staff contributed to the reconstruction of the -German Wehrmacht. - -DR. EXNER: Your diary, 1780-PS, does not contain a word about armament, -and it seems obvious that at that time you did not concern yourself with -this problem. What were your thoughts and ideas on the question of -armament? Were you in favor of it? - -JODL: At that time I was of the same opinion as my superiors; and it was -characteristic that on the day before the statement was made that 36 -divisions were to be formed, Blomberg as well as Fritsch suggested to -the Führer that only 24 divisions should be formed. They feared a -thinning down of the entire army. Perhaps they also feared too stormy a -foreign policy, based on forces existing only on paper. - -DR. EXNER: Please answer a question which appears to be important to me: -What were the deadlines in connection with the armament in 1935? - -JODL: Various stages were provided for. The first deadline set was -1942-43. Most of the West Wall was to be completed by 1945. The Navy’s -plan of construction ran on to 1944-45. - -DR. EXNER: At that time what did you consider the objective of the -armament? - -JODL: Since it was not possible to achieve general disarmament, the -objective was to establish military parity between Germany and the -neighboring countries. - -DR. EXNER: In this connection I should like to refer to a document which -has already been submitted—the 2-year report of General George -Marshall. This has already been submitted as Raeder-19. I have a part of -it here before me, a part which I submitted under Exhibit AJ-3, -(Document Jodl-56) Page 168. Regarding the problem of rearmament, some -sentences seem to hit the nail right on the head. - -In the second paragraph on Page 6, or rather the last sentence there, we -see: - - “The world does not seriously consider the wishes of the weak. - Weakness is too great a temptation to the strong, particularly - to the brutal who scheme for wealth and power.” - -Then on the next page there is another sentence: - - “Above all we must, I think, correct the tragic misunderstanding - that a security policy is a war policy...” - -Can you tell us, please, what the ratio of our military strength to that -of foreign countries was at that time? - -JODL: In 1935, when we set up 36 divisions, France, Poland, and -Czechoslovakia possessed 90 divisions for times of peace, and 190 -divisions for war. We had hardly any heavy artillery, and tank -construction was in its earliest stages. The conception of defensive and -offensive armament has been discussed here on various occasions. It -would lead us too far afield to go into that in detail. But I should -like to say only that as far as Germany was concerned, with her -geographical position this conception did not apply. The disarmament -conference too, after months of discussion, failed because a proper -definition for this conception could not be formed. - -DR. EXNER: I should like to quote from an expert, George Marshall again, -on Page 168 of my document book, from which I have just quoted; and -again just one sentence. It is in the first paragraph: “The only -effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack...” - -Now, however, the Prosecution asserts that you should have known that -such a tremendous rearmament as the German rearmament could serve only -for an aggressive war. Will you comment on this, please? - -JODL: I believe this can only be explained as an expression of military -ignorance. Up to the year 1939 we were, of course, in a position to -destroy Poland alone. But we were never, either in 1938 or 1939, -actually in a position to withstand a concentrated attack by these -states together. And if we did not collapse already in the year 1939 -that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the -approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held -completely inactive against the 23 German divisions. - -DR. EXNER: But tell us, when did intensive rearmament actually begin? - -JODL: Real rearmament was only begun after the war had already started. -We entered into this world war with some 75 divisions. Sixty percent of -our total able-bodied population had not been trained. The peacetime -army amounted to perhaps 400,000 men, as against 800,000 men in 1914. -Our supplies of ammunition and bombs, as the witness Milch has already -testified, were ridiculously low. - -DR. EXNER: In that connection I should like to read a diary entry of -yours, Page 16 of Volume I of my document book, which is 1780-PS, -USA-72. On 13 December you said: - - “After completion of project for L”—that is the - Landesverteidigung, National Defense—“Field Marshal reports on - state of war potential of Wehrmacht, indicating chief bottleneck - is inadequate stocks of ammunition for Army—10 to 15 days of - combat equals 6 weeks’ supply.” - -JODL: That is right, we had ammunition for 10 to 15 days of combat. - -DR. EXNER: Now I shall turn to the question of the occupation of the -Rhineland. - -THE PRESIDENT: Let us break off now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. EXNER: General, when did you first hear of the plans to occupy the -Rhineland? - -JODL: On 1 or 2 March 1936; that is to say about 6 days before the -actual occupation. I could not have heard of them any earlier because -before that the Führer had not yet made the decision himself. - -DR. EXNER: Did you and the generals have military objections to that -occupation? - -JODL: I must confess that we had the uneasy feeling of a gambler whose -entire fortune is at stake. - -DR. EXNER: Did you have legal objections? - -JODL: No; I was neither an expert on international law nor a politician. -Politically speaking it had been stated that the agreement between -Czechoslovakia, Russia, and France had made the Locarno Pact void, which -I accepted as a fact at the time. - -DR. EXNER: How strong were our forces in the Rhineland after the -occupation? - -JODL: We occupied the Rhineland with approximately one division, but -only three battalions of that went into the territory west of the Rhine; -one battalion went to Aachen, one to Trier, and one to Saarbrücken. - -DR. EXNER: Three battalions. That is really only a symbolic occupation, -is it not? - -JODL: Yes, and they acted only symbolically. - -DR. EXNER: Did you do anything to avoid a military conflict because of -that occupation? - -JODL: There were serious reports which came from our military attachés -in Paris and London at the time. I could not fail to be impressed by -them. We suggested to Field Marshal Von Blomberg then that perhaps he -ought to discuss withdrawing these three battalions west of the Rhine on -condition that the French would withdraw four to five times as many men -from their borders. - -DR. EXNER: Was that suggestion ever made? - -JODL: Yes, it was made to the Führer, but he turned it down. He rejected -very bluntly General Beck’s suggestion that we should declare that we -would not fortify the area west of the Rhine. That was a suggestion of -General Beck’s, which the Führer turned down very bluntly. - -DR. EXNER: Did you think at the time that that action was connected with -any aggressive intention? - -JODL: No, there could not be any question of aggressive intentions. - -DR. EXNER: Why not? - -JODL: I can only say that, considering the situation we were in, the -French covering army alone could have blown us to pieces. - -DR. EXNER: Do you think that the leading men had aggressive intentions -then? - -JODL: No, nobody had aggressive intentions; but it is of course possible -that in the brain of the Führer there was already an idea that the -occupation was a prerequisite for actions to be taken later in the East. -That is possible; but I do not know, because I could not see into the -Führer’s brain. - -DR. EXNER: But you did not see any outward signs of it? - -JODL: No, none whatsoever. - -DR. EXNER: Did you know of the so-called testament of Hitler dated 5 -November 1937 which has been presented here? - -JODL: The first time I heard it read was here in Court. - -DR. EXNER: What did you learn about it at the time? - -JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg informed Keitel and Keitel informed me -that there had been a discussion with the Führer. When I asked for the -minutes I was told that no minutes had been taken. I refer to my diary, -Document 1780-PS, as proof of this. What I was told was not at all -sensational and hardly different in any way from anything contained in -general directives for the preparation of a war. I can only assume that -Field Marshal Von Blomberg at that time kept these things to himself -because he may not have believed that they would ever be carried out. - -DR. EXNER: Was there an operational plan against Austria? - -JODL: There was no operational plan against Austria. I state that most -emphatically. - -DR. EXNER: Now we come to Document C-175, a directive which has the -Exhibit Number USA-69. It is in Volume I; Page 18 and the following -pages. It is a directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces -for war of the year 1937. The Prosecution quoted Case Otto only from -this directive, so that the impression was bound to be created that the -whole was a plan for a campaign against Austria. Please explain what -this directive means. - -JODL: It was one of those typical standard preparations for war, for -every conceivable eventuality. Such directives had come out every year -in Germany ever since there was a General Staff and general -conscription. These theoretical military studies made a distinction -between two cases, namely cases of war which because of their nature -were politically probable or might be probable, and cases which were -improbable. As far as the former were concerned, a plan of operations -was to be drafted by the Army and the Air Force. For the latter -appropriate suggestions only were to be brought forward. If the Tribunal -would turn to Page 21 of the document, there appears at the end of the -page, Part 3, a sentence as follows: “The following ‘special cases’ are -to be considered by the High Command in general without participation by -regional authorities...” and among such cases, on Page 22, is the -special “Case Otto.” - -DR. EXNER: On Page 18 of this document is a directive valid from 1 July -1937 until, probably, 30 September 1938, that is a little more than a -year. That, in turn, replaces another similar directive which is -referred to in the first paragraph, which had been drawn up for the same -problems previously. Did you participate in discussions on the Austrian -case? - -JODL: No, I did not participate in any discussions. - -DR. EXNER: It is said in the trial brief that on 12 February 1938 you -had been at Obersalzberg. Keitel has already rectified that. Your entry -in the diary under 12 March 1938 is, therefore, based only on an account -which you received through Keitel; is that right? - -JODL: Yes. It is merely a note on a brief account given to me by General -Keitel about that day, probably related a bit colorfully. - -DR. EXNER: But then it says, evening of 11 February: “General Keitel -with Generals Von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and -G. Schmidt are being subjected to very great political and military -pressure.” In the English and French translations it says that -Schuschnigg and Schmidt are “again subjected to very great political and -military pressure.” This word “again” does not appear in my German -original. - -Now, did you suggest deceptive maneuvers against Austria? That is being -held against you. - -JODL: I did not suggest any deceptive maneuvers. The Führer ordered -them; and I do not think that they are illegal, because I believe that -in the gambling of world history, in politics and in war, false cards -have always been played. But the Führer ordered it and that is stated in -the entry in my diary. I supplied military information and documents to -Canaris as to where our garrisons were situated, what maneuvers were -taking place. Canaris elaborated them and then released them in Munich. - -DR. EXNER: What did you think was the purpose of... - -JODL: I had been told that the purpose was to exert a certain amount of -pressure so that Schuschnigg, when he had returned home, would adhere to -the agreement made at Obersalzberg. - -DR. EXNER: How long before the actual entry into Austria did you know of -such intentions? - -JODL: On 10 March in the morning just before 11 o’clock I heard of it -for the first time. - -DR. EXNER: And the entry took place when? - -JODL: On the 12th. It was when General Keitel and General Viehbahn, who -was then temporarily Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, were -suddenly ordered to the Reich Chancellery that I heard of the intention -for the first time. - -DR. EXNER: Then did you have a plan made, or what? - -JODL: The Führer surprised them by stating that the question involved -was the Austrian problem; and then they remembered, that there was a -General Staff plan called “Otto.” They sent for me and for the -directive, and learned from me that such a directive actually did exist, -but that in practice nothing at all had been prepared. As it had only -been a theoretical plan and drafted solely in the event of an Austrian -restoration, and as such a restoration was not expected for the moment, -the High Command of the Army had virtually done nothing about it. - -DR. EXNER: How did you yourself understand the entire Austrian action? - -JODL: It appeared to me to be a family squabble which Austria herself -would solve through her domestic politics in a very short time. - -DR. EXNER: And what made you think that? - -JODL: My own extensive knowledge of Austria. Through relatives and -acquaintances, through the German-Austrian Alpine Club to which I -belonged, as one who knew the Austrian mountains, I had been in closer -contact with Austria than with northern Germany, and I knew that in that -country there had been a government against the will of the people for a -long time. The peasant uprising in Styria was a characteristic example. - -DR. EXNER: Was the march into Austria the carrying out of the -suggestion, C-175? - -JODL: No, it was completely improvised within a few hours with the -corresponding result. Seventy percent of all the armored vehicles and -lorries were stranded on the road from Salzburg and Passau to Vienna, -because the drivers had been taken from their recruitment training to be -given this task. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you said just now, didn’t you, that the Führer -told them it was the problem of Austria? You said that, didn’t you? - -JODL: I said that the Führer had informed General Keitel and General -Viehbahn about that on 10 March, in the morning. He did not talk to me, -and until that day I had not talked to the Führer either. - -THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to know the date. You said it was 10 March? - -JODL: Yes, on 10 March, in the morning. - -DR. EXNER: Is it correct that only peacetime formations marched into the -frontier districts, into Austrian territory? - -JODL: Yes; it is a fact that only peacetime units which were intended -for the parade in Vienna actually marched in. All units which might have -been necessary for a military conflict, say, with Czechoslovakia or -Italy, were stopped at the last moment and did not cross the border. - -DR. EXNER: Ammunition columns, for instance? - -JODL: No, everything remained behind. - -DR. EXNER: Was there any hesitation among the political leaders at the -last moment? - -JODL: On 11 March, in the afternoon, I had news from the Reich -Chancellery that the Wehrmacht was not to move in, but that the Police -would pass through the Wehrmacht and move in alone. In the evening, -however, on 11 March, at 2030 hours, the final decision reached me, -which was that the Wehrmacht was to move in after all. I was unable to -find out the reason for that hesitation. - -DR. EXNER: So that altogether there was not really an invasion by force? - -JODL: No, it was a purely peaceful occupation. It was characterized by -my suggestion to the chief of the operations department of the Army that -he should have bands marching at the head of the columns and that all -drivers should be sure to wear goggles, otherwise they might be blinded -by the flowers thrown at them. - -DR. EXNER: What was the significance of the order you signed regarding -the march into Austria? It has been put before you under Document Number -C-182, Exhibit USA-77. You remember it, do you not? - -JODL: Yes, I remember. That is nothing other than the written record of -something which had previously been ordered orally and which was already -being carried out. That written order, you see, would have come much too -late. - -DR. EXNER: And what is the significance of Document C-103, Exhibit -USA-75, referring to a possible clash with Czech troops or Italian -troops on Austrian territory? How did you come to that? - -JODL: That was based on an inquiry from the General Staff of the Army. -They wanted to know, even in the case of the remotest eventuality, how -the troops were to comport themselves. I clarified the matter over the -telephone, through General Schmundt, with the Führer, and I then put his -decision down in writing, by his order. - -DR. EXNER: And how did the operation come off? - -JODL: It came off exactly as expected. There was jubilation and a -triumphal march, such as the world probably has seldom seen—even though -no one likes to acknowledge it today. The population came to meet us -during the night already; the custom barriers were removed, and all the -German troops called that march just a battle of flowers. - -DR. EXNER: We now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. Did you -participate in the conferences on 21 April 1938, and 28 May 1938, which -the Prosecution have described as conspirators’ conferences? - -JODL: I did not participate in any of these conferences. - -DR. EXNER: What type of General Staff work were you carrying out for -“Case Green”—which is, of course, the Czechoslovakia operation? - -JODL: I must refer again to Document C-175, which is on Page 17 of the -first volume of my document book. In that general directive for the -unified preparation for war two important cases were dealt with, or were -to be dealt with: A defensive deployment against France if she opened -hostilities—“Case Red” and an offensive deployment—Case Green—against -Czechoslovakia. That would have been worked out in just the same way, -even if we had not had an acute conflict with Czechoslovakia, because a -war on two fronts—which was the problem we always faced—could never be -conducted or won in any other way than by means of an attack against the -weaker. This directive, as far as the Case Green is concerned, had to be -drawn up afresh the very moment that Austria automatically became a new -assembly zone. Thus, on 20 May 1938, a new draft was made by me for Case -Green which began with the customary words: “I do not intend to attack -Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without -provocation...” - -DR. EXNER: Just wait a minute. That quotation is Document 388-PS, -Exhibit USA-26. It is the document dated 20 May 1938. “I do not intend -to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without -provocation...” Now, please continue. - -JODL: That was 20 May. On the 21st, the day after, a monstrous incident -occurred. Czechoslovakia not only mobilized but even marched up to our -borders. The Czechoslovakian Chief of General Staff explained this to -Toussaint by saying that 12 German divisions had been assembled in -Saxony. I can only state—and my diary entries prove it—that not a -single German soldier had been moved. Nothing, absolutely nothing had -happened. - -DR. EXNER: In this connection I think I ought to draw the attention of -the Tribunal to a questionnaire—Exhibit AJ-9 (Document Jodl-62). It is -a questionnaire submitted to General Toussaint who at that time was the -German military attaché in Prague. He confirms the mobilization of that -time. Third volume, 199—Page 201 of the document, at the bottom, there -is the following question: “What was the reason for the Czechoslovakian -mobilization in May 1938?” - -And he answered: - - “It is my personal opinion that the Czechoslovakian Government - wished to force her political allies to take up a definite - position. Krejci, the Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff, - informed me, as the reason for the mobilization, that he had - exact information that 10 to 12 German divisions had assembled - in the Dresden area, and that he could no longer bear the - responsibility of not taking countermeasures.” - -On the other hand a diary note from Jodl, Volume I, Page 26 should be -mentioned: - - “The Führer’s intention not to touch on the Czech problem yet is - altered by the Czech deployment on 21 May, which took place - without any German threat and without even any apparent cause. - Germany’s silence thereto would lead to a loss of prestige for - the Führer, to which he is not willing to submit again. Hence - the issuing on 30 May of the new directive for Case Green.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] That is from Jodl’s diary, Page 26, first -volume. Now continue, please. - -JODL: That was the information which I received, partly through General -Keitel and partly through the then Major Schmundt, regarding the -impression made on the Führer. The result was that he personally changed -my draft of 20 May and put at the beginning the following words: - - “It is my unalterable decision that Czechoslovakia must be - destroyed within a reasonable period of time by military action. - To decide upon the militarily and politically opportune moment - is a matter for the political leadership.” - -DR. EXNER: These words appear in the Document 388-PS, which I have -already referred to, which is Exhibit USA-26. It is the order of 30 May -1939. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please tell us briefly what the contents -of these directives were. - -JODL: In that order of 30 May three possibilities were mentioned by the -Führer as to how a conflict with Czechoslovakia might arise: 1) Without -particular cause—politically impossible and out of the question; 2) -after a prolonged period of tension—most undesirable, because of the -lack of the element of surprise; 3) the best solution, after an -incident, such as were happening nearly daily at that time, and which -would justify us morally before the world if we decided to intervene. - -Furthermore, there was the command that on the first day the Army should -break through the fortifications in order to clear the way for the free -operation of the mobile forces, the armored divisions, so that after 4 -days such a situation would be created that the military position of -Czechoslovakia would become untenable. - -DR. EXNER: Why was the entire directive redrafted in June? - -JODL: The entire directive C-175 was thoroughly revised in June. This -was done because on 1 October a new mobilization year began, and because -this directive C-175 was in any case planned to be valid only until 30 -September 1938. The old directive was, of course, still in force until 1 -October, but became invalid on 1 October through that directive which -had been drafted by me on 24 June, or 18 June. In that directive the -Case Green was mentioned in the sense of the Führer’s intention—namely, -that it was the immediate aim of his policy that from 1 October -1938—not on, but from 1 October 1938—every favorable opportunity was -to be utilized to solve the problem of Czechoslovakia, but only if -France did not interfere or march, or Great Britain either. - -I confirm that no date existed in any of the orders for the starting of -a war against Czechoslovakia. In the directive of 30 May the date was -left open altogether; and the new instructions, C-175, of 18 June stated -only from 1 October, on the first favorable occasion. - -DR. EXNER: That is on Page 29 of our document book, second paragraph: “I -have decided, from 1 October...” - -JODL: May I perhaps conclude this whole question by saying, in order to -be explicit, that actually before 14 September, as far as the military -forces were concerned, nothing happened. - -DR. EXNER: I once again refer to an entry in Jodl’s Diary Volume I, Page -32. It is an extract from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72, and is the -entry under 14 September 1938: - - “At noon it was announced that the general order for - mobilization had been posted in Czechoslovakia.... This, - however, did not take place, although approximately eight age - groups were called up at short notice. As the Sudeten Germans - are crossing the border en masse, we request at about 1730 - hours, at the suggestion of the OKH, Department 2, the calling - up of the strengthened frontier guard (GAD) along the Czech - border in military districts VIII, IV, XIII, and XVII. The - Führer gives his authorization from Munich.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What was it that you were reading from then? - -DR. EXNER: I have read from Page 32 of my document book; Volume I, Page -32, and it is an excerpt from Jodl’s diary of 14 September, therefore an -entry made in the midst of that critical period. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Just what were these military measures -which were being introduced? - -JODL: On 13 or 14 September the eight age groups were called up in -Czechoslovakia. We used the strengthened frontier guard so that the many -escaping Sudeten Germans could be taken over. - -On 17 September the Führer formed the Freikorps Henlein, contrary to the -previous agreement and without telling us beforehand. Previously it had -been agreed that these Sudeten Germans of military age were to join the -Reserve Army. - -Around that time the political discussions started. The first one at the -Berghof had already taken place. Beneš ordered mobilization in -Czechoslovakia on 23 September and only now, and in accordance with the -political discussions, did the military deployment against -Czechoslovakia commence. - -I had no doubt that it was going to be used in the event of -Czechoslovakia not submitting to any agreement we had made with the -Western Powers; for the Führer had clearly stated that he would -negotiate only if France and England did not intervene politically or -militarily. - -DR. EXNER: You made two more entries in your diary, on 22 and 26 -September, which prove that you were worried at the time. Statement made -by Captain Bürckner, in the first volume of my document book, on Page -34; again an excerpt from 1780-PS, dated 22 September: - - “Captain Bürckner, chief of the foreign section, reports that - according to an intercepted long-distance telephone conversation - between Prague and the local Czech Legation Counsellor, the - German Embassy in Prague has just been stormed. I am immediately - having connection made by telephone and wireless with Prague - through Colonel Juppe. - - “1050 hours: Bürckner reports that the incident has not been - confirmed. The Foreign Office has spoken with our Embassy. - - “1055 hours: I establish liaison with Prague and with Toussaint. - To my question as to how he is getting along, he replies, - ‘Thanks, excellently.’ The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces, - who had been informed of the first report with the suggestion - that he should think over what measures would have to be taken - if the Führer should wish for an immediate bombardment of - Prague, is informed through Ic about the false report which may - have had the purpose of provoking us to a military action.” - -Then, on 26 September, it says: - - “It is important that false reports do not induce us to military - actions before Prague replies.” - -The Prosecution have stated that 1 October had long before been decided -on as the date for aggression. Will you tell me what significance that -date, 1 October 1938, had for Case Green? - -JODL: I have already said that, I believe. I explained that the new -mobilization year had started, and that no order contained a fixed date -for the beginning of the campaign against Czechoslovakia. - -DR. EXNER: Did you believe that the conflict might be localized? - -JODL: I was certainly convinced of that, because I could not imagine -that the Führer, in the position we were in, would start a conflict with -France and Britain which had to lead to our immediate collapse. - -DR. EXNER: And the entries in your diary probably show your concern -about incidents? - -JODL: Yes. In my diary on 8 September there is reference to a -conversation with General Stülpnagel. According to that, Stülpnagel was -at the moment very worried lest the Führer should depart from his -oft-defined attitude and allow himself to be dragged into military -action, in spite of the danger of France’s intervention. - -According to the entry in my diary I replied that actually at the moment -I shared his worries to some extent. - -DR. EXNER: This is an entry which the Tribunal will find on Page 26 of -the first volume of my document book. Once again it is an extract from -Document 1780-PS, and it is the entry of 8 September 1938. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You have already said, have you not, what -your worries were? Our weakness? - -JODL: It was out of the question with five fighting divisions and seven -reserve divisions in the western fortifications, which were nothing but -a large construction site, to hold out against 100 French divisions. -That was militarily impossible. - -DR. EXNER: On 24 August, in a letter addressed to Schmundt, you referred -to the importance of an incident for the tasks of the Wehrmacht in this -case. You have been gravely accused of that, and I want you to tell me -what the significance of that statement is. - -Your Honor, it is 388-PS, and it is on Page 35 of the first volume. It -is an extract from the often quoted Document 388-PS: It is a report made -at the time of the “X” Order and the preliminary measures. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please, will you state what you intended -in this work of the General Staff? - -JODL: The Führer’s order of 30 May which I have already explained, -assuming that it ever came to this action, left no other choice than to -attack on a previously decided date. This could only follow as the -result of an incident, because without provocation the operation was out -of the question; and it was not to be attempted if too long a time had -passed. - -The Army, in order to be ready for such a surprise break-through of the -Czech fortifications, required 4 days of preparation. If nothing -happened after those 4 days, the military preparations could no longer -be kept secret and the surprise element would disappear. Therefore, -nothing else remained but either a spontaneous incident in -Czechoslovakia, which would then 4 days later have resulted in military -action, or a date which had to be decided on previously. In that case an -incident had to happen during those 4 days which the Army required for -deployment. - -The Führer’s demands could, in fact, not be solved in any other way from -the point of view of the General Staff. My letter to Major Schmundt was -meant to explain that difficult situation to the Führer. - -At that time incidents occurred every day. May I remind you that since -the first partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans -liable to be called for military service had mostly evaded the order. -They escaped over the border into Germany, and the Czechoslovakian -border police shot at them. Bullets were shot over daily into Germany. -All together, more than 200,000 Sudeten Germans crossed the border in -that manner. - -From that point of view the conception of an incident was not so mean -and criminal as it might have been, for instance, if peaceful -Switzerland had been involved. If I said, therefore, how keenly -interested we would be in such an incident, that was meant to express -that if one resorted to military action at all—all this is, of course, -purely theoretical—one might use just such an incident as a _casus -belli_. - -DR. EXNER: And how do you explain this remark of yours: “...unless the -intelligence department is ordered to organize this incident in any -case”? - -That is at the end of Page 38 in the second paragraph. It is an extract -from 388-PS. - -JODL: Yes, I had too much knowledge of European military history not to -know that the question of the first shot—the apparent cause of war, not -the inner cause of war—has played an important part in each war and on -each side. - -The responsibility for the outbreak of war is always attributed to the -enemy; it is not characteristic of Germany alone, but of all European -nations who have ever been at war with one another. In the case of -Czechoslovakia the deeper cause of the war was quite apparent. I need -not describe the condition in which 3½ million Germans found themselves -who were supposed to fight against their own people. I myself was able -to watch that tragedy in my own house. In this case, the deeper cause of -the war, was firmly established, and Lord Runciman, who came on that -mission from London, left no doubt about it whatsoever. In such a -situation I certainly had no moral scruples about exaggerating one of -these incidents, and, by means of a counteraction in vigorous reply to -the Czech doings and activities, extending and enlarging such an -incident in order that if the political situation allowed it, and -England and France did not interfere—as the Führer believed—we might -find a really obvious reason for taking action. - -DR. EXNER: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, there is one point to which I wish -to draw your attention. In my opinion it is once more a mistake in -translation. I refer to the second paragraph from the bottom on Page 36. -It is the report about the incident. The second but last paragraph on -Page 36 states: “...that Case Green may be set in motion as a result of -an incident in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation -(Anlass) for military intervention.” The translation in English of these -last words is a “provocation”; “Anlass” is translated as “provocation.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What are you saying? What is the alteration? - -DR. EXNER: I believe that the translation is not correct. I am not -absolutely certain but I would like to call the Tribunal’s attention to -it. “Anlass” means “_prétexte_” in French—which as far as we know is -“pretext.” - -THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, there is no difference in the meaning of -the words, whether it is “provocation,” or whether it is “cause.” - -DR. EXNER: “Provocation” sounds a bit more aggressive, does it not? I -just want to call your attention to it. In the German it is “cause” and -not “provocation.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now the Prosecution calls these -considerations, which we have just talked about, criminal ideas and -connects them with the supposedly planned murder of the German -Ambassador in Prague. We are said to have planned that murder so as to -have a cause for marching into Czechoslovakia. What do you have to say -to that? - -JODL: This, of course, is grotesque. The example that the Führer -allegedly mentioned in his talks with Field Marshal Keitel, that the -German Ambassador had been murdered by the people of Prague, was not -even known to me. General Keitel did not tell me; I only heard of it -here. Apart from that, I think it is useless to go on discussing it as -we did exactly the opposite. We gave the order to General Toussaint to -protect the German Embassy in Prague and to protect the lives of the -people in it, because, in fact, at one stage it had been seriously -threatened. - -DR. EXNER: This is proved by Exhibit AJ-9, Document Jodl-62, third -volume of the document book, Page 200. That again is the interrogatory -of General Toussaint, who was a military attaché in Prague at that time. -The third question is as follows: - - “Is it true or not that in the summer of 1938 you received the - order to defend the German Embassy at Prague and to protect the - lives of all the Germans in the Embassy?” - -And his answer is: - - “Yes, it is true. I remember this order was given to me by - telephone probably in September 1938...”—and so on and so - forth. - -Then in Question 4... - - “It is true that the German Embassy...” - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness has already said once it was so. - -DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] Then I shall only refer to the -testimony of Toussaint. In addition it has been said that the incident -had been staged by us. We need not go into that in detail. Did the -incident really happen? - -JODL: No, there was neither a preparation for the incident, nor was it -necessary. Incidents kept multiplying day after day, and the solution -was a political one and entirely different. - -DR. EXNER: So that this note, which we have often read, remained purely -theoretical, did it? - -JODL: It was merely work on paper, an idea, which was not really -necessary at all. - -But it has already been made clear that as soon as the political -discussions started I made continuous efforts to prevent the -provocations, apparently desired on the part of the Czechs, from leading -to any military measures on our part. - -DR. EXNER: Did the signatory powers in Munich at the end of September -know of Germany’s military preparations? Did the statesmen there know -that we were militarily prepared? - -JODL: The Prosecution gave me the distinct impression that that had -become known only today, and that it was unknown in the autumn of 1938 -at Munich. But that is quite impossible. All the world knew of the -calling up of the eight age groups in Czechoslovakia in September. The -whole world knew of the total mobilization on 23 September. A political -correspondent of _The Times_ wrote an article on 28 September against -this Czechoslovakian mobilization. Nobody was surprised that immediately -after the signing of the Munich Pact, on 1 October, we marched into... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner... - -DR. EXNER: Well, that ends this subject. - -Is it true that in August 1938 you prepared a new operational plan of -which you had already spoken on 7 July? A new plan based on the previous -one? - -JODL: Yes. Already before the solution brought about by the Munich Pact, -I, on my own initiative, drew up a secret operational plan for the -protection of all the German borders. It was so arranged that the -borders only were to be protected while the bulk of the Army was to be -kept in reserve in the center of Germany. That complete plan was -available here during my interrogation. It is now no longer contained in -Document 388-PS, but there is a reference made to it. - -DR. EXNER: On Page 40, Volume I of our document book, I again read an -extract from 388-PS. At the very end the following is stated: - - “...after the conclusion of Green, it must be made possible to - put a provisional deployment into action soon.” - -And then: - - “...first the Wehrmacht will guarantee the protection of the - German frontiers, including those of the newly acquired lands, - while the bulk of the Army and of the Air Force will remain at - our disposal. Such a future ‘frontier protection’ deployment - should be executed separately on the various fronts.” - -Why did you prepare this “frontier protection” deployment? What was the -cause of it? - -JODL: The reason was that once the necessity for an operation against -Czechoslovakia had become superfluous, through the problem being solved -in some way, we would no longer have had any deployment plan at all. And -as no other intention of the Führer was known to me, I on my own -initiative drew up a plan for this operation which would be suitable for -any eventuality. - -DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about the intentions of the Führer, -after the Munich Agreement, to go even further and occupy Bohemia and -Moravia? - -JODL: No, I had no idea of that. I knew of his speech of 26 September -where he said: “Now we are facing the last problem to be solved.” - -I believed in that assurance, and this is proved by the fact that during -those days—it was about 10 or 11 September—I suggested to Field -Marshal Keitel, than General Keitel, that he should ask the British -Delegation, whose arrival had been announced, to come to Iglau in -Moravia, because many Germans who were living there had been threatened -by armed Czechoslovakian Communists. This of course was a suggestion -which I would never have made if I had had any idea that the Führer -nourished any further intentions concerning Bohemia and Moravia. - -DR. EXNER: These further intentions of the Führer were recorded on 21 -October 1938 in a directive. Did you know about that in the OKW, or what -was the position? - -JODL: No, I did not know about it. I did not see it. I only saw it here -in this courtroom during my preliminary interrogation. - -DR. EXNER: Then were you transferred to... - -JODL: I was transferred to Vienna as Artillery Commander of the 44th -Division stationed there. - -DR. EXNER: That was the end of October, was it not? - -JODL: The end of October. - -DR. EXNER: How did you imagine further military developments would be? -But, of course, you have already answered that. - -JODL: Actually, I expected an easing of the political tension and a -period of peace. I can certainly say that. - -DR. EXNER: And what happened to you then? - -JODL: As I knew of no other plans, I transferred my home to Vienna -taking all my furniture with me. Naturally I would never have done that -if I had had the faintest idea that war was pending, because I knew that -in the event of war I was to become the Chief of the Armed Forces -Operations Staff and so would have to return to Berlin. I asked General -Keitel to help me to become the Commander of the 4th Mountain Division -in Reichenhall, from 1 October 1939, a request which again it would -never have entered my mind to make if I had any idea of what was going -to come. - -DR. EXNER: Did you as Artillery Commander in Vienna remain in contact -with the OKW? - -JODL: No, hardly at all. I had no connections with the OKW. I received -no military documents from the OKW during all that period. - -DR. EXNER: And who informed you then about the situation during that -time? - -JODL: Nobody. During that time I knew no more about what was going on or -what was intended than any lieutenant in my artillery. - -DR. EXNER: Did you have private correspondence with Keitel? - -JODL: I received one letter from General Keitel. It was, I think, at the -end of July 1939. He personally gave me the good news that quite -probably I would become Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in -Reichenhall on 1 October, and that General Von Sodenstern would become -Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, now on peacetime footing, on -1 October. - -DR. EXNER: Did you help to draw up the plan for the occupation of the -remaining parts of Czechoslovakia? - -JODL: No, I did not. During this occupation I remained in Vienna for the -time being and temporarily became Chief of Staff of the 18th Army Corps -at Vienna. Then, later on, I was transferred to Brünn in Czechoslovakia -together with the entire 44th Division. - -DR. EXNER: When did you hear about the whole thing? - -JODL: It was through the orders of my divisional staff that I heard of -that operation in March of 1939, some 2 or 3 days beforehand. - -DR. EXNER: Was this move into Czechoslovakia the carrying out of Case -Green which you had originally drafted? - -JODL; No; it had no longer anything to do with that. There were -completely different troop units, and not even half of the troops -provided for in 1938 were actually used for the march into -Czechoslovakia in 1939. - -DR. EXNER: Now, during that period when you were in Vienna there was a -conference with the Führer on 23 May 1939, which has often been -mentioned here, concerning the disregarding of neutrality, _et cetera_. -It has often been stated that Warlimont was present there as your -representative. What was the position? Was he your representative? - -JODL: With great persistence it has been said again and again that -General Warlimont took part in the conference as the representative of -Jodl, or even, it was once said, as his assistant. There is no question -of that. He was my successor but not my representative. And even if it -is repeated again and again, it still does not make it true. He was my -successor. - -DR. EXNER: You had left the OKW, had you not? - -JODL: Yes, I had completely left the OKW. The fact that quite -accidentally Warlimont became my deputy later on has nothing whatsoever -to do with the events of May 1939. - -DR. EXNER: When did you hear for the first time of this meeting in May -1939? - -JODL: Here in Nuremberg in 1946. - -DR. EXNER: Did you have any contact with Party leaders meanwhile, or -with Austrian National Socialists? - -JODL: No, not at all; with nobody. - -DR. EXNER: Or with these defendants here? - -JODL: No, not with them either. - -DR. EXNER: Once during that time the Führer went to Vienna with Keitel. -I think they were there 2 days or so. Did you have to report to him on -that occasion? - -JODL: Yes, coming from Prague he visited Vienna quite unobtrusively, and -on that occasion I spoke a few words to General Keitel, but I did not -talk to the Führer. - -DR. EXNER: You were not presented to him? - -JODL: No. - -DR. EXNER: What was your war appointment to be? - -JODL: As I have already said, in the event of a war I was to become -Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. - -DR. EXNER: What about your private personal plans for that summer? - -JODL: For that summer I already had tickets for a cruise in the eastern -Mediterranean on 23 September 1939. - -DR. EXNER: On 23 September 1939 the voyage... - -JODL: The voyage was to start at Hamburg; I had already paid for the -tickets. - -DR. EXNER: When did you buy the tickets? Do you remember? - -JODL: I bought them about the second half of July. - -DR. EXNER: When did you return to Berlin? - -JODL: I am not absolutely certain about the exact date, but I imagine -that it was on 23 or 24 August—according to a telegram which reached me -unexpectedly in Brünn. - -DR. EXNER: If you had not received that telegram, when would you have -had to go to Berlin? - -JODL: In case of a general mobilization I would have had to go to Berlin -anyway. - -DR. EXNER: And did you now have to report to the Führer in Berlin? - -JODL: No, I did not report to him, either. I only reported, of course, -to General Keitel and to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and -the Air Force and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. - -DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have now completed that subject, and I -thought that this would be a convenient time to adjourn. - -THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us how long you are likely to be? - -DR. EXNER: I very much hope—certainly it will be in the course of -tomorrow morning; but shall we say until noon? - -DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Mr. -President, as Counsel for Dr. Seyss-Inquart, I have to ask on behalf of -my client that he may be permitted to be absent from the session for 2 -days, to prepare his defense. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 5 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH DAY - Wednesday, 5 June 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._] - -THE MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that -Defendant Seyss-Inquart is absent. - -PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr. -President, in agreement with the Prosecution I ask permission to submit -a memorandum by Hitler, concerning the Four Year Plan of 1936. It is a -certified copy, certified by a British officer in Dustbin Camp. I have -numbered it Exhibit Schacht-48. In the afternoon session of 1 May my -friend Dr. Dix referred to this memorandum, which could not at that time -be incorporated into the record. Dr. Schacht then quoted a few passages -from this memorandum. The President stated that we could submit the -memorandum at a later date on condition, of course, that the Prosecution -agreed. The Prosecution has acquiesced and I therefore trust that I may -now be permitted to submit it. - -Furthermore I am handing in a number of English translations. I regret I -have not yet been able to have translations made in the other languages, -and I ask permission to supply those translations later on. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kraus, until the other translations are actually -made, the documents will not become part of the record. - -DR. KRAUS: No. The English translations are available, and the others -are not yet ready. May I submit them later? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. And they will then become part of the -record. - -DR. KRAUS: Yes, as a supplement to the document book. - -DR. EXNER: Generaloberst, you told us yesterday that you were the Chief -of the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war and that your main -task consisted in the preparation of military operational plans. That is -correct, is it not? - -JODL: That is correct. - -DR. EXNER: Then, where did you get the plans? Who decided what plans you -had to make? - -JODL: It was the same as in any other military staff. The -Commander-in-Chief—in this case the Führer personally—received data -for the decisions to be made: maps, strength returns of both our own and -enemy forces, and information about the enemy. He then made his own -decisions, and thereupon I would set my general staff to work, giving -these decisions the military form necessary for the entire machinery of -the Wehrmacht. - -DR. EXNER: Now, in the course of these tasks and studies you also had to -work on operations which were never actually carried out? - -JODL: I have prepared a great number of such operations. Of the total -number of operations for which I prepared orders and instructions there -was only one which I definitely knew would be carried out; that was the -operation against Yugoslavia. In the case of all the other operational -plans, the decision as to whether it would be carried out or not -remained undecided for a long time. - -As an example of operational plans which had been drafted in every -detail but which were never carried out, I mention the invasion of -England, the march into Spain, the seizure of Gibraltar, the seizure of -Malta, the capture of the Fischer Peninsula near Petsamo, and a winter -attack on Kandalakscha on the Murmansk Railway. - -DR. EXNER: Then, did these tasks of yours cover all the theaters of the -war? - -JODL: At the beginning of the war the work of my general staff did not -apply to theaters of war at all, but the Führer’s instructions went only -to the branches of the Wehrmacht—that is to the Army, the Navy and the -Air Force; and it was only in the Norwegian campaign that circumstances -developed for the first time so that the Armed Forces Operations Staff -was made responsible for a theater of war. And this condition changed -completely when in the beginning of 1942 the Führer himself assumed -supreme command in the Army. Kesselring has already been asked about -this, but did not answer. However, it stands to reason that the Führer, -as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, could not issue orders through -Jodl to himself in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and -then have them carried out through Generaloberst Zeitzler. Consequently -a separation came about. From that moment on he, with the General Staff -of the Army, directed the entire Eastern Front, while the Armed Forces -Operations Staff became responsible for the general staff work of all -the other theaters of war. - -DR. EXNER: Now, the witness Field Marshal Paulus stated before the -Tribunal that the OKW was responsible for the order to hold Stalingrad; -and, as a matter of fact, both Keitel and Jodl have been repeatedly -accused by the foreign press of having given that disastrous order. Is -that true? - -JODL: No, that is not true. The witness, for whom I feel the deepest -sympathy and with whom I have worked in the most comradely fashion -possible, could not have known anything at all about it. The facts are -as follows: The moment danger threatened, the decision that Stalingrad -must be held was made by the Führer during a private conversation with -Generaloberst Zeitzler and contrary to the latter’s advice. Zeitzler -told me so himself on his return from this interview. At a later stage, -when blizzards were already raging across the steppes of the Don, the -question of a break-through by the Stalingrad garrison was discussed -again. Field Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Zeitzler, and I were present -on this occasion. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, I do not quite see how that is relevant, -although Field Marshal Paulus may have said something about it. I mean, -he may have given some evidence on the fighting at Stalingrad, and he -undoubtedly did; but I do not see how it bears upon the case before us, -or how it bears upon the case for Jodl. - -DR. EXNER: Mr. President, this has already settled the matter. It was -necessary to clear up Field Marshal Paulus’ error. But this has already -settled the matter. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] We now come to the time when you were -recalled from Vienna to Berlin in 1939. What state of affairs did you -find in Berlin on your arrival? - -JODL: I found a completely incomprehensible state of affairs in -Berlin—at least it was incomprehensible to me. Nobody knew what was -really true or what was bluff. The pact with Russia sustained all our -hopes for the preservation of peace, hopes which were immensely -increased and strengthened by the surprise cancellation of the attack -ordered for 26 August. None of the soldiers to whom I spoke expected a -war with the Western Powers at that time. Nothing had been prepared -except the operations for the attack on Poland. - -There was only a defensive deployment of troops on the West Wall. The -forces stationed there were so weak that we could not even man all the -pillboxes. The actual efforts for the preservation of peace, however, -efforts I have heard about here from the Reich Marshal, the name of -Dahlerus—all these negotiations remained unknown to me insofar as they -were not published in the press. But there is one thing I can say in -conclusion. When the declaration of war was received from England and -France it was like a blow from a cudgel for us soldiers who had fought -in the first World War. And I heard in confidence from General -Stapf—today the matter is no longer confidential—that the Reich -Marshal reacted in exactly the same way. - -DR. EXNER: Do you know when Poland mobilized? - -JODL: That I cannot say. I only know that at the moment when I arrived -in Berlin and was being informed by General Von Stülpnagel for the very -first time about the situation and our own strength, a Polish deployment -was already in progress along the frontier, as well as the German one. - -DR. EXNER: That in itself already answers the accusation brought against -you in the trial brief, namely “planning against Poland.” - -Had you prepared a plan against Poland? - -JODL: No. Not by a single stroke of the pen did I participate in the -preparations for the Polish war. - -DR. EXNER: Then I am right in saying, to sum up, that when you left -Berlin there was not yet a plan of operations against Poland? - -JODL: No. - -DR. EXNER: And when you returned to Berlin the plan was ready? - -JODL: Yes. The plan of attack was completely worked out. - -DR. EXNER: Did you hear the Führer’s speech of 22 August 1939 which has -been so often quoted here? - -JODL: No; on that day I was still in Vienna. - -DR. EXNER: When did you hear of that speech? - -JODL: For the first time here in Nuremberg. - -DR. EXNER: Do you remember the meeting in the Führer’s special train on -9 September 1939, described here by General Lahousen? Can you remember -that? - -JODL: Yes, I remember that meeting perfectly. - -DR. EXNER: What was the subject of conversation during that meeting -while you were on the Führer’s train? - -JODL: I met the Führer in the so-called command car, in the chartroom, -where Field Marshal Keitel, Canaris, and Lahousen were; and then Canaris -made a brief report on the information he had received from the West and -expressed the opinion that a French attack in the Saarbrücken sector was -imminent. The Führer contradicted this, and so did I. Apart from that -nothing else was discussed. - -DR. EXNER: Then Lahousen’s statement is correct that you were only -present during that particular part of the discussion? - -JODL: As far as I am concerned I have not a word of objection to raise -against Lahousen’s statement. Absolutely correct. - -DR. EXNER: Frequent mention has been made during this Trial of the -artillery and air bombardment of Warsaw. Did you participate in the -giving of the orders for this? - -JODL: Yes, I participated insofar as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army -had applied to the Führer for permission for the artillery to bombard -Warsaw as soon as the deployment of artillery units had been completed. -The Führer refused this. He said, “What is happening here because of the -Poles is madness.” He ordered me to draft new leaflets—which I did -personally and immediately—and have them dropped again over the city of -Warsaw. It was only when this renewed demand to cease the hopeless -resistance had proved absolutely unsuccessful that he sanctioned -artillery bombardment and air attacks on the fortress of Warsaw—and I -emphasize the word “fortress.” - -DR. EXNER: When issuing orders, did you have anything to do with the -co-ordination of German and Soviet Russian operations? - -JODL: Yes. When we were still 3 days’ march away from the Vistula, I was -informed to my great surprise—by, I believe, the representative of the -Foreign Office—while I was entering the Führer’s headquarters, that -Soviet Russia would occupy the Polish territories... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, if it is convenient to you, I think you might -speak a little faster. - -JODL: ...that the Polish territories east of an agreed demarcation line -would be occupied by Soviet Russian troops at the appointed time. When -we were approaching this agreed demarcation line, which was shown to me -on a map—the line was the East Prussian Lithuanian border, Narew, -Vistula, San—I telephoned to our military attaché in Moscow and -informed him that we could probably reach individual points of this -demarcation line in the course of the following day. Shortly afterwards -I was informed over the telephone that the Russian divisions were not -yet ready. - -When, the day after the next, we reached the demarcation line and had to -cross it in pursuit of the Poles, I once again received news from -Moscow, at 0200 hours, that the Soviet Russian divisions would take up -their position along the entire front at 0400 hours. This maneuver was -punctually carried out, and I then drafted an order to our German troops -that wherever they had contacted the troops of the Soviet Union, and in -agreement with them, they were to withdraw behind the demarcation line. - -DR. EXNER: Do you know on what day all this happened? - -JODL: I cannot tell you exactly when the troops reached the line, but I -would say it was about 14 or 15 September. - -DR. EXNER: We shall now deal with aggressive wars against the neutral -countries... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, now all that the defendant has just been -telling us seems to be to me a simple waste of our time, with absolutely -no relevance to this case at all; and why you let him do it, I do not -know. - -DR. EXNER: You have been accused of having used your personal influence -and your close relations with the Führer to attack a whole series of -neutral countries. Tell me, is that true? - -JODL: No, it is untrue. I remember that a witness here spoke of a -sinister influence, of a key position of a sinister kind—at any rate, -something sinister. But my influence on the Führer was unfortunately not -in the least as great as it might, or perhaps even ought to have been in -view of the position I held. The reason lay in the powerful personality -of this despot who never suffered advisers gladly. - -DR. EXNER: When did you first hear of a plan for a possible occupation -of Norway? - -JODL: The Führer first spoke to me—I think it was in mid-November -1939—at any rate, a fairly long time after Grossadmiral Raeder had -first spoken to him. At that first conference, which I believe took -place on 10 October, I had not yet heard of anything nor did the Führer -give me any information. But in the middle of November he spoke to me -about it. I first learned the details during the oral report made by the -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, which took place on 12 November and at -which I was present. - -DR. EXNER: In this connection I would draw your attention to Document -C-64, Exhibit GB-86, Page 46 of the document book. But I do not need to -read it aloud. Volume I, Page 46. - -What was the Führer’s point of view? - -JODL: The general attitude of the Führer at that time was—it is also -established in writing: “I am not at all interested in extending the -theaters of war, but if the danger of an occupation of Norway by England -really exists and if that is true, then the situation would be quite -different.” - -DR. EXNER: Was anything ordered at that time? - -JODL: Nothing was ordered at that time, but he merely instructed me to -think this problem over generally. The preliminary work, as has been -proved by documents, began on 27 January 1940. - -DR. EXNER: That may be seen from Document C-63, Exhibit GB-87. - -Were you at that time of the opinion that the assurance given by Hitler -in December and October 1939 that Norwegian neutrality would be -respected—were you of the opinion that this assurance was given for the -purpose of lulling Norway into a state of security, as has been alleged -by the Prosecution? - -JODL: That allegation can be definitely refuted, and by means of a few -dates which I shall now enumerate. These assurances, these political -assurances, were given by the Führer—or by the Reich Government, I do -not know which—on 2 September and 6 October. On 9 October the Führer -read and signed the famous memorandum known as Document L-52. I do not -know whether the Tribunal is aware of the fact that it is a personal -memorandum by the Führer. - -DR. EXNER: That is Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. It is printed on Page -48, Volume I, of my document book. - -In this memorandum—for whom was the memorandum prepared? - -JODL: This memorandum, as I think is obvious from the document, went out -to the three Commanders-in-Chief and to the Chief of the High Command of -the Armed Forces. It was dictated word for word by the Führer himself -and was completed in 2 nights. - -DR. EXNER: I shall read Paragraph 2, printed on Page 48 of my document -book: - - “The Nordic States. - - “Their neutrality, provided no completely unforeseen - circumstances arise, may be assumed also for the future. The - continuation of German trade with these countries appears - possible, even if the war is of long duration.” - -JODL: It is quite out of the question that the Führer, in this extremely -secret memorandum, could have mentioned anything but his true purpose at -that particular time. That, however, is all the more comprehensible -since it was not until 1 day later, namely 10 October, that Grossadmiral -Raeder first mentioned these fears to the Führer. - -DR. EXNER: Was the occupation of Norway a very weighty decision for the -leadership? - -JODL: It was a terribly weighty decision. To put it shortly—it meant -gambling with the entire German fleet. The result of it was that we had -to defend a coastline of over 3,000 kilometers, and that meant that -nearly 300,000 men were lying idle there. The decision, therefore, -depended on really reliable information that Norway was threatened by -actual danger. That is the reason why no definite date was fixed for -this operation “Weserübung,” and the reason why I at a later date -suggested that the forces for the Norway operation, in case it became -necessary, and for an attack in the West, should be completely separate -from each other. - -DR. EXNER: What were the reasons why the occupation had to be prepared -in every detail? - -JODL: The reasons are quite openly and definitely stated in the order of -1 March 1940 which is Document C-174... - -DR. EXNER: That is Exhibit GB-89. - -JODL: Yes; we had to be prepared in any case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that Document 174-PS, or what? - -DR. EXNER: It is not printed in my document book. It refers to a -document which the British Prosecution has submitted under Exhibit -GB-89. - -THE PRESIDENT: But 174 must mean something, must it not? The document -said Document 174. - -DR. EXNER: Document C-174. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is C-174. - -THE PRESIDENT: C-174. Very well. - -MR. ROBERTS: And it was put in by Mr. Elwyn Jones, in Document Book 3. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. EXNER: Now, you say in your diary that the Führer was searching for -a justification. The meaning has already been explained here; but you -yourself should know best what the meaning is, since you wrote it -yourself. What does it mean? - -JODL: The Führer said in those days, when I wrote it—not in a diary, -but in my notebook, my memorandum book—he said: “To carry out a -decision of this kind I need absolutely reliable information with which -I can really justify this decision before the world and prove that it -was necessary. I cannot tell, I only heard the following from Herr -Quisling...” And for this reason he kept the Intelligence Service in -particular very busy at this time, in order to get even more precise -information for the Führer about these many reports which we received... - -DR. EXNER: Now, Grossadmiral Raeder has explained the facts from which -England’s plans could be deduced. Have you anything to add to that, or -is the question settled? - -JODL: On the whole, Grossadmiral Raeder has already submitted all the -information. There is one thing which remains in my memory and which is -also written in my notebook. That is the special insistence, quite -openly advocated in the French press, that under all circumstances -Germany must be cut off from the Swedish ore supplies. Then came the -mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters; and then came the _Altmark_ -case which, according to my study of international law, was a flagrant -breach of the agreement ruling the rights and duties of neutral states -in naval warfare, and Articles 1 and 2... - -DR. EXNER: Regarding the first two points which the witness has -mentioned, I should like to draw attention to Document 1809-PS—that is, -his diary, Exhibit GB-88, Page 53 of Volume I of my collection. There is -an entry on 10 March: - - “The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations is very - gratifying from a political point of view. The French press is - furious about it, because it considers it necessary to cut - Germany off from Swedish ore.” - -And then the entry of 25 March: - - “The English have begun to molest or to fire on our merchantmen - in Danish and Norwegian territorial waters.” - -Now, please tell us what gave rise to the decision to attack? - -JODL: The Führer’s final decision was made on 2 April and was made on -the basis of two pieces of information. First, the reports from the Navy -regarding repeated firing on German merchant ships both in Norwegian and -Danish territorial waters. Second, a report from Canaris that British -troops and transports were lying in a state of readiness in the northern -part of the English east coast. - -DR. EXNER: What would have been the consequences for us if England had -got there first? - -JODL: As to that I can refer to Grossadmiral Raeder’s testimony, and can -only say that once Norway was in British hands the war would have been -half lost for us. We would have been strategically encircled on the -northern flank and because of the weakness of our fleet we would have -been incapable of ever rectifying this again. - -DR. EXNER: Was indisputable proof found later that the British plan -really existed? - -JODL: We captured the entire records of the British brigade which landed -in Namsos and in other places. We surprised and captured the British war -correspondent Romilly in Narvik, where he expected anything rather than -the arrival of German ships, otherwise he could have escaped capture. To -the question what he wanted to report about the war in peaceful Narvik -he could not give us any information at all. - -Later on we captured all the records of the French General Staff, a part -of which have already been presented by Admiral Raeder’s counsel. -Particularly instructive, and of great interest to me, were the diaries -carried by the English officers and some of the noncommissioned officers -whom we captured in Norway. At least they proved one thing, namely, that -all these troops had already been embarked and had been put ashore again -the moment our German fleet advanced towards Norway. - -DR. EXNER: I should like to refer again to two entries in the diary, -Page 54, Volume I of my document book, the entry of 24 April and the -entry of 26 April. There it says: - - “Major Soltmann reports on the interrogation of the Englishmen - and submits additional important documents, among them the - secret Army list. At noon the first prisoners arrived in Berlin. - They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and - confirm the authenticity of the orders. All the material is - being handed over to the Foreign Office.” - -In conclusion, I also draw your attention again to Soltmann’s -interrogatory. It is Document AJ, Number 4, Exhibit Jodl-57, which I now -present; Page 173 of Volume II. I need not read it aloud; I merely draw -your attention to Soltmann’s answers to questions 4 and 5. - -Now, one last question about this Norwegian affair. The English -representative of the Prosecution has said that this shows how honorable -the soldiers were who attacked Norway and then made use of lies and -excuses. What do you say about this? - -JODL: The Prosecution has thereby placed a purely operational problem on -the level of soldierly or human honor. Until now that has never been the -custom in this world. I can only say that I neither attacked Norwegians, -nor did I resort to lies or excuses. But I did use all my strength to -contribute to the success of an operation which I considered absolutely -necessary in order to forestall a similar action on the part of the -English. If the seals of the archives are ever broken, the rightness of -my attitude will then be clearly shown. But even if it were wrong, the -honesty of my own subjective opinion at that time cannot for that reason -be changed in any way. - -DR. EXNER: We will now talk about the war in the West. After the end of -the Polish campaign, was there already an operational plan for attacks -in the West? - -JODL: No. To begin with, there was no plan of attack in the West; but, -on the contrary, there was, particularly in the Army, a widespread -opinion that the war would die a natural death if only we kept quiet in -the West. That went so far that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army -transformed even mobile infantry divisions into fortress divisions, and -took away all their mobile equipment from them. - -DR. EXNER: Did you already know during the Polish campaign what the -Führer’s intentions were concerning the West? - -JODL: The Führer himself had his doubts during the Polish campaign. He -too could find no plausible explanation for the complete inactivity of -the French and English forces in France, who only staged a kind of a -sham war with the help of their war communiqués. In reality not a single -shot was fired at the front. But by the end of September, if I remember -rightly, the Führer did realize that once England enters a war she -fights it out to the bitter end. - -DR. EXNER: As an officer of the General Staff you should be able to -answer the following questions better than anybody else. Could we, from -a purely strategical viewpoint, have remained purely on the defensive as -far as the West was concerned? - -JODL: I shall be very brief since such problems are not directly -connected with the Trial. I will only say that it would have been the -greatest possible error of strategy, because the superiority we -possessed at that time would necessarily have diminished in proportion -to our delay in making aggressive use of it; for England was continually -bringing further divisions over to France, just as the French were from -their colonial empire. - -I believe I need say no more about that. - -DR. EXNER: I draw your attention to Document C-62, Exhibit GB-106, -Volume I of my document book, Page 56. I need not, however, read it -aloud. It is a directive for the conduct of the war, and contains the -basic ideas which we have already heard expressed. - -JODL: One thing more is perhaps important. The Führer took such a -serious view of this danger, that we might not maintain our superiority -in the long run, that he actually wanted to attack in the winter, -although all soldiers without exception advised him against it. - -DR. EXNER: Here attention might be drawn to our document, Volume I, -Pages 48 and 49. It is a memorandum of the Führer on the conduct of the -war in the West, from which Jodl has already quoted Document L-52, -Exhibit USA-540. A detailed justification of this is on Page 49 of my -document book. - -Why then was France not attacked without violating the neutrality of -Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium? - -JODL: It was no trifle for the Führer to create new enemies possessing a -strength of 500,000 men, which the Dutch and Belgian forces represented. -It resulted in our having to make the attack in the West with actually -inferior forces, namely, with 110 divisions against approximately 135 of -the enemy. No military commander would do that except in an emergency. - -DR. EXNER: Now, what were the reasons? - -JODL: We were not in a position to break through the Maginot Line at its -strongest points, which would then have remained uncaptured—namely, -between the Rhine and the Luxembourg border, or the Upper Rhine where -the Vosges mountains were an additional obstacle in breaking through -this West Wall at these points, this Maginot Line. For this purpose -heavy artillery was lacking. But that was not a moral reason; it was, in -fact, rather an unmoral one. - -The great danger lay in the fact that so protracted an attack on the -fortifications exposed us to an attack in the rear by the combined -English and French mobile forces thrusting through Belgium and Holland; -and they were north of Lille with their engines already running, one -might say, for this very task. And the decisive factor was that owing to -the many reports which reached us, the Führer and we ourselves, the -soldiers, were definitely under the impression that the neutrality of -Belgium and Holland was really only pretended and deceptive. - -DR. EXNER: How did you arrive at that conclusion? - -JODL: Individually the reports are not of great interest. There was, -however, an endless number of reports from Canaris. They were -supplemented and confirmed by letters from the Duce, Mussolini. But what -was absolutely proved and completely certain, which I could see for -myself on the maps every day, were the nightly flights to and fro of the -Royal Air Force, completely unconcerned about neutral Dutch and Belgian -territory. This necessarily strengthened the conviction in us that even -if the two countries wished to—and perhaps in the beginning they did so -wish—they could not possibly remain neutral in the long run. - -DR. EXNER: What danger would the occupation of Belgium and Holland by -the English and French have meant to us? - -JODL: Those dangers were quite clearly indicated by the Führer, first, -in his memorandum, Document L-52, which has been repeatedly quoted. -There, on Page 48 of the document book, in the last paragraph of the -page, is a reference to the enormous importance of the Ruhr—of which, -incidentally, there seems to be quite sufficient evidence even today. - -In his address of 23 November 1939 to the Commanders-in-Chief—Document -789-PS, or Exhibit USA-23—he describes once more, on Page 59, Volume I -of the document book, precisely how that danger would be for the Ruhr -district if one day British and French forces were to appear by surprise -in that region. He referred to it there as the “Achilles’ heel,” and -that is just what it was for German war strategy. - -DR. EXNER: And he said there, on Page 59 of our document book: - - “We have an Achilles’ heel: the Ruhr district. The strategy of - the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr district. If - England and France thrust through Belgium and Holland into the - Ruhr, we shall be in the very greatest danger.” - -JODL: I cannot, of course, or could not at the time, swear to the -absolute accuracy of the numerous reports from Canaris, but the material -we captured afterwards—and in this connection I would draw your -attention to the conference of the Supreme War Council in London of 17 -November 1939—confirmed on the whole the accuracy of the intelligence -reports. - -DR. EXNER: Presumably you had no reason at that time to doubt Canaris’ -honesty, had you? - -JODL: No. At that time there was not the slightest reason for doubt. - -DR. EXNER: Yes. But now some doubt has arisen as to his honesty. - -Now, the German attack was originally planned for November 1939. Why did -the Führer postpone it over and over again? We have before us no less -than 17 orders postponing the attack time and again. - -JODL: It is not quite correct to say that the Führer had ordered the -attack for mid-November, but rather he wanted to order the attack for a -time when the meteorologists could predict about 6 or 7 days of clear, -frosty weather. But the meteorologists failed completely in this. At -times they thought they could predict such a state of the weather, and -then all preparations would be made for the attack. Then they would -cancel their weather forecasts again, and the final preparations for -attack would be discontinued once more. That is why we so often prepared -for the attack and then refrained from carrying it out. - -On such an occasion I received a report from Canaris to the effect that -one unit of the French Army had already crossed one part of the Belgian -frontier. I do not know if that is true. - -DR. EXNER: You have been accused by the Prosecution of first deceiving -these countries and then invading them. Please tell us what you have to -say on that subject. - -JODL: The same applies here as I said before. I was neither a -politician, nor was I the military Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. -I was under the impression—and, indeed, an impression which could be -proved—that in actual fact the neutrality of these two countries was no -longer being respected. And as for the ethical code of my action, I must -say that it was obedience—for obedience is really the ethical basis of -the military profession. That I was far from extending this code of -obedience to the blind code of obedience imposed on the slave has, I -consider, been proved beyond all manner of doubt by my previous -testimony. Nevertheless, you cannot get around the fact that, especially -in operational matters of this particular kind, there can be no other -course for the soldier but obedience. - -And if the Prosecution today is in a position to indict German officers -here at all, it owes this only to the ethical concept of obedience of -its own brave soldiers. - -DR. EXNER: We now come to the Balkans. In your diary, Document 1809-PS, -on 19 March you made the following entry: “The Balkans should and must -remain quiet.” That is on Page 61 of Volume I of my book, Exhibit GB-88, -Document 1809-PS, the entry of 19 March. It says first: - - “The Führer has returned beaming with joy and highly satisfied - from the conference with the Duce. Complete agreement. ... The - Balkans should and must remain quiet.” - -What does that mean? - -JODL: Herr Professor, I must correct you. This is not my diary. - -DR. EXNER: Yes. Well then I must put in another question here. Your -diary and your diaries are always being talked about. Explain just what -this is—what we are dealing with here. Is one a real diary and the -other not? - -JODL: There is only one diary, and that is Document 1780-PS, which is -from the year 1937 to 1938, and I used to make entries in it every -evening. - -DR. EXNER: And now this diary, Document 1809-PS, what was that? - -JODL: I kept no diary at all during the war, but, of course, I filled up -dozens of small notebooks. When one of these notebooks was full I marked -important passages in red on the margin, and my secretary copied them -out later, as they might be important for writing the history of the war -and for the official diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. An -example would be Document 1809-PS. - -DR. EXNER: Did you check what your secretary had compiled? - -JODL: No, I did not check it, and never saw it again. It fell then into -the hands of the Prosecution. - -DR. EXNER: Now, there is still a third one which is always quoted here -as a diary. That is the Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. - -THE PRESIDENT: You said it fell into the hands of the Prosecution. Do -you mean it was not one of the documents that you handed over to the -Prosecution? - -JODL: No. I did not know at all where those extracts from my notebook -had gone. The Prosecution captured it somewhere or other. The remainder -are extracts, and partial extracts, from the official Diary of the Armed -Forces Operations Staff. - -DR. EXNER: And who kept this, the official Diary of the Armed Forces -Operations Staff? Not you? - -JODL: No. It was always kept by a highly qualified expert of my own -selection. - -DR. EXNER: Did you check it? - -JODL: The final check was made by Dr. Schramm, a professor at the -Göttingen University. - -DR. EXNER: We shall hear him as a witness. - -Did you check the entries made in that official diary, or did you not? - -JODL: I usually did not have the time; but if General Scherff read -through it and discovered anything in particular he would draw my -attention to it. - -DR. EXNER: Well, so much for clearing that up. - -We now come back to the Balkan question again. It says in your so-called -diary, “The Balkans should and must remain quiet.” What was meant by -that? - -JODL: That was a brief note on the statement by the Führer—namely, that -he was in perfect agreement with Mussolini that the Balkans must be kept -quiet. - -DR. EXNER: And did we not actually try to keep the Balkan states as -quiet as possible? - -JODL: Yes. We made unremitting endeavors for that. Our attitude toward -Yugoslavia was as considerate as if we were dealing with a prima donna. -Matters went so far that when we had to prepare the Greek campaign the -Führer even refused a proposal from the Quartermaster General of the -Army that sealed trains—the supply trains—should be sent through -Yugoslavia, which would have been permissible according to international -law. Moreover, we brought pressure to bear on Bulgaria so that she -should not participate in the impending campaign against Greece, above -all so as not to alarm Turkey. And even after the Greco-Italian -campaign, the Führer still hoped that a conflict, an actual war, between -Germany and Greece could be avoided. - -DR. EXNER: I refer here to Directive Number 18, printed on Page 66 of -Volume I of our document book, which contains an extract from Document -444-PS, Exhibit GB-116, and here we find the following statement in the -paragraph before the last: - - “The preparatory measures of the High Command for the conduct of - the war in the near future are to be made in accordance with the - following guiding principles...” - -And it is then stated in the last but one paragraph of that page: - - “The utilization of the railway through Yugoslavia may not be - counted on for the deployment of these forces...” - -Well, what forced us to give up this program? - -JODL: That program was completely wrecked by Italy’s arbitrary act, -about which the Reich Marshal and the Grossadmiral have already made -statements. I have only a brief addition to make. Italy was beaten, as -usual, and sent the Chief of the Operational Staff of the Supreme -Command to me crying for help. But in spite of this calamity the Führer -did not intervene in the war in Albania. He did not send a single German -soldier there, although the matter had been under consideration. He -ordered only an operation against Greece, starting from Bulgaria, to be -prepared for the following spring. Even that was for the primary purpose -of occupying the Salonika Basin, thereby giving direct relief to the -Italians and only in the event, which to be sure was feared, of English -divisions now landing in the Balkans as the result of Italy’s madness. -In that case it was decided to consider the whole of Greece as an -operational area, since we could not possibly tolerate a Royal Air Force -base in the immediate vicinity of the Romanian oil fields. And this -contingency is shown very clearly in the order which has been submitted -to the Tribunal as Document 1541-PS, Exhibit GB-117, Pages 63 and 64 of -the document book. I should like to quote two passages, two very brief -passages from it. In Paragraph 2, Subparagraph b of Page 63, it says: - - “‘Operation Marita.’ My plan therefore is”—I am quoting—“... - to send these forces straight through Bulgaria, for the - occupation of the north Aegean coast and, if necessary, the - entire mainland of Greece.” - -I then quote from Page 64, Paragraph 4, Subparagraph a: - - “The primary objective of the operation is the occupation of the - Aegean coast and the Salonika Basin. The continuation of the - attack by way of Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth may prove - necessary.” - -It is quite obvious from these conditional orders that the occupation of -the whole of Greece was intended only if we should be forced to take -this measure by the landing of English troops, which at that time was -not yet the case. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. EXNER: You said we had planned to leave Yugoslavia neutral. Now this -plan was apparently changed by the Simovic Putsch. Why did this event -alter our policy toward Yugoslavia? - -JODL: This Putsch against a legal government, by officers meddling in -politics, immediately after Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact -had necessarily an anti-German tendency. We stood directly on the verge -of the campaign against Greece, against the whole of Greece, for in the -meantime English divisions had landed there, and this campaign could -only be waged with a safely neutral Yugoslavia behind us. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, various other members of the -defendants—Defendants Göring and Keitel—have dealt with the political -aspects of the entry of Germany into Yugoslavia. Unless there is -anything new for this defendant to give evidence about it seems to be -entirely cumulative. - -DR. EXNER: Then kindly just tell us, if you have anything new to -add—some documents, _et cetera_. - -JODL: I have something to add which concerns myself personally. - -THE PRESIDENT: Nothing is coming through—the English was not coming -through. Please, try it again. Repeat what you said. - -JODL: I have something else to add which concerns me personally with -regard to the Yugoslav problem... - -THE PRESIDENT: No. There is nothing coming through to us. Go on then, -Defendant. You were asked if there is anything new to say. - -JODL: Yes, I have something personal to add. - -DR. EXNER: Yes, do so. - -JODL: On this morning when the Führer spontaneously ordered the -immediate preparation of an attack on Yugoslavia, I proposed to him, or -at least I mentioned to him, that after concentrating our troops we -ought first to clarify the real situation, the political situation, by -an ultimatum. He refused to do so. He said, “That will not be of any -use.” Field Marshal Keitel has already confirmed this. - -DR. EXNER: Tell me, was that on 27 March? - -JODL: Yes, that was on the 27th. May I give proof of this. On the -evening of the 27th the order was issued... - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary if the Defendant Keitel -said it, and you say it, and there is no cross-examination about it. - -DR. EXNER: But I feel that there is something important. - -JODL: A document was submitted, Document 1746-PS, Exhibit GB-120, on -Page 70 of the document book. - -DR. EXNER: Page 71. - -JODL: Yes, the text is on Page 71. If the Court will compare this -sentence on Page 71, Paragraph 1, with the sentence on Page 69 of the -document book a difference will be noticed. Page 69 contains the order -signed by the Führer, and it begins with this sentence which I shall -quote: - - “The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political - situation in the Balkans. Even if she makes a declaration of - loyalty, Yugoslavia must be considered as an enemy and therefore - beaten as quickly as possible.” - -This, as appears from the date, was issued on 27 March. I worked that -whole night at the Reich Chancellery, which is another proof of the -sudden nature of the whole case. At 4 o’clock on the morning of the -28th, as stated on Page 71, I put the following _aide-mémoire_, this -operational _aide-mémoire_, into the hand of General Von Rintelen, our -liaison officer with the Italian High Command. In it I had written—I -quote: - - “Should political developments call for armed intervention - against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention...” _et cetera_. - -I must admit that, in this instance, I ventured a little into the -political field, but in so doing I thought that if Germany did not -clarify the political situation beyond any doubt, Italy perhaps might do -it. - -DR. EXNER: The next document is also evidence of the suddenness of this -decision, and I have had it printed on Page 73, Volume 1. That is the -order issued by the High Command of the Army on the basis of these -directives—the order for deployment of troops for the operation. That -is Document R-95, Exhibit GB-127, Page 73, of Volume I, as I have -already stated, and it says there: - - “As a result of the change in the political situation...” _et - cetera_—and then—“there will be concentrated...”—and then the - last paragraph states—“The operation will be given the code - name ‘Project 25.’” - -I ask you, Generaloberst, can anything be gathered from this? - -JODL: The order issued was not until 3 April... - -DR. EXNER: No, 30 March. - -JODL: ...30 March. - -DR. EXNER: Did the operation receive the code name “Project 25”? - -JODL: A code name for this operation was ordered for the first time 3 -days after the Putsch, which proves that it had not been planned in 1937 -as was once stated here. - -DR. EXNER: And now, just one last question on this Balkan matter. Was -Greek neutrality still being maintained on 24 March 1941 when we gave -permission for the Luftwaffe attack on her territory of Crete? In this -connection I refer to Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13. It is an order of 24 -March 1941 which, as I have just stated, sanctioned air attacks on Crete -and also on Greek shipping. Now, what about Greek neutrality on 24 March -1941? - -JODL: From the point of view of international law it no longer existed -at that date. The English had in the meantime landed on Crete and at -Piraeus, and we had already learned about this on 5 or 6 March. The -order, therefore, was in accordance with all the principles of -international law. But to conclude the Yugoslav problem I may add that -the allegation made by the Prosecution, that the plan to attack -Yugoslavia emanated from Jodl’s office, is a statement which has not -been and cannot be substantiated by anything. - -THE PRESIDENT: What was that document that you were referring to? -24-March 1941? You said 360, which did not indicate anything to us. - -DR. EXNER: 24 March, which is Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. What page? - -DR. EXNER: Page 76, Volume I. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] We now come to the question of the Soviet -Union. How many troops did we have in the East during the Western -campaign? - -JODL: At first it was 10 divisions, which in the course of the Western -campaign were reduced to 6 or 5 divisions. - -DR. EXNER: What prompted us to send troops to the East after the Western -campaign? - -JODL: The notification from the commander in the East that with such -weak forces he could neither keep Poland quiet nor guard the demarcation -line. - -DR. EXNER: In your diary—the so-called diary—Document 1809-PS, Volume -I of my document book, Page 83, you write on 24 May: “Situation in the -East becomes precarious due to the Russian menace against Bessarabia.” -That is on 24 May 1940. That is what you wrote in your diary. How did -you come to this conclusion? - -JODL: The reason was a dispatch from Canaris reporting the concentration -of 30 Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the note expressing -anxiety originated with me, or whether it was an idea of the Führer’s -which I jotted down, I can no longer say today. - -DR. EXNER: Well, on 6 September 1940 you signed an order stating that -the regrouping should not give the impression of an offensive -preparation. How should that be understood? - -JODL: This order signed by me was interpreted as the first attempt to -conceal the impending attack on Russia. - -DR. EXNER: One moment. I want to point out the order in question to the -Tribunal. It is Page 78, Volume I, Document 1229-PS, Exhibit USA-130. It -is an order by Jodl, addressed to the Foreign Intelligence Service, and -it says there: - - “The Eastern area will be manned by stronger forces in the - coming weeks. By the end of October, the status indicated on the - enclosed map ought to have been reached.” - -And now, Your Honors, I am sorry to have to point out an omission in the -English and French translations. The next paragraph is missing, and this -is very important for the understanding of the entire document. It says, -namely, “For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as well as for -answering questions asked by the Russian Intelligence Service...” - -THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear to be in our document. What paragraph -are you reading? - -DR. EXNER: It is Paragraph 2 in my document book, Page 78. - -THE PRESIDENT: It has not been translated. - -DR. EXNER: That is just what I said. That is the error. Therefore I will -dictate it now, or read it slowly. - -THE PRESIDENT: You want it to be translated? - -DR. EXNER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You see, Paragraph 2 is not translated at all. There is -nothing here. - -DR. EXNER: These three lines were not translated at all, but they are -very important. - -THE PRESIDENT: Just read it through the earphones, then. Read the -passage. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the full document is in the British Document Book -7, Page 102. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Go on. - - DR. EXNER: “For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as - well as for answering questions asked by the Russian - Intelligence Service, the following guiding principles apply...” - -And now explain the subject further. - -JODL: Instructions such as these to Canaris’ office were issued by me -every 6 weeks. They formed the basis for the so-called counterespionage -work, which I do not wish to discuss in detail here. In this case what -matters to me was that the weak forces which we kept in the East at this -time should be made to appear actually stronger. That, for instance, can -be clearly seen from Paragraph 3 which says, and I quote: - - “In statements on the equipment situation of the forces, - especially of the armored divisions, it is advisable to - exaggerate if necessary.” - -I also pointed out in the next paragraph that antiaircraft defenses -should be exaggerated. All this was done because at that time anxiety -had already arisen that possibly a Russian operation against Romania -might develop. The purpose of this order was to deter them from that, -and it was intended for the intelligence only. If on 6 September, I had -already known of any aggressive intention against Russia I would have -said exactly the contrary; for with this order, as I had issued it, I -would have been working in the interests of Gisevius and his -friends—namely, I would have been informing the Russians that we were -beginning to deploy our troops. - -DR. EXNER: Now, when did you first hear of the Führer’s fears that -Russia might prove hostile to us? - -JODL: For the first time, on 29 July 1940, at the Berghof near -Berchtesgaden. - -DR. EXNER: In what connection? - -JODL: The Führer kept me back alone after a discussion on the situation -and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might -occupy still more territory in Romania before the winter and that the -Romanian oil region, which was the _conditio sine qua non_ for our war -strategy, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not -deploy our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to -oppose with strong forces any such Russian intention. These are almost -the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false. - -DR. EXNER: You have just mentioned Hitler’s concern about the seizure of -the Romanian oil fields. Did the Führer do anything on account of this -apprehension? - -JODL: It was precisely on the basis of this conversation—when I -protested that it was quite impossible to carry out a troop deployment -at that time for it would take 4 months—that the Führer ordered that -these deployment arrangements were to be improved. Two orders were then -issued immediately. One, I believe, is of 9 August. It was called -“Reconstruction East” and included all measures to improve the -deployment arrangements in the eastern area. The second order was issued -on 27 August. We do not have it here, but it has been recorded in the -War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. - -DR. EXNER: Yes, that is Page 85, Volume I of my document book. There is -an entry, right at the end of the page, in the Diary of the Naval -Operations Staff: - - “Transfer of 10 divisions and 2 armored divisions to the - Government General, in case prompt intervention should prove - necessary for the protection of the Romanian oil fields.” - -That is an excerpt from Document C-170, Exhibit USA-136. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you seem to be reading from Page 85. Were you? - -DR. EXNER: Yes, from Page 85. It is Page 85 of the German version. -Perhaps the numbering of the pages does not quite tally with the -numbering of the English version. It is the entry: “Transfer of 10 -divisions and 2 armored divisions to the Government General.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. - -JODL: This entry is a proof of the Führer’s intentions at that time with -regard to this reinforcement in the East. - -DR. EXNER: Well, when was the Führer’s order issued to prepare for -attack? - -JODL: The first order for deliberation concerning an attack, or for the -discussion of any aggressive operation at all, was issued in writing by -the Armed Forces Operations Staff and submitted to the Führer on 12 -November. It is Document 444-PS... - -DR. EXNER: It is on Page 66, Volume I of my document book. - -JODL: ...and it is already known to the Tribunal. But this first order, -which is known to me, had to be preceded by oral instructions from the -Führer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. - -DR. EXNER: That can be gathered from the document itself, namely from -Page 67 which reads: - - “Irrespective of the result of these discussions, all - preparations for the East which have already been verbally - ordered are to be carried out.” - -This is proof, therefore, that oral orders and preparation had preceded. - -JODL: I am not in a position to say, however, when these oral -instructions had been given to the Army. - -DR. EXNER: Tell me, in these statements, which Hitler made to you, was -there ever any mention made of such things as the extension of the -“Lebensraum,” and of the food basis as a reason for a war of conquest, -and so on? - -JODL: In my presence the Führer never even hinted at any other reason -than a purely strategic and operational one. For months on end, one -might say, he incessantly repeated: - - “No further doubt is possible. England is hoping for this final - sword-thrust against us on the continent, else she would have - stopped the war after Dunkirk. Private or secret agreements have - certainly already been made. The Russian deployment is - unmistakable. One day we shall suddenly become the victim of - cold-blooded political extortion, or we shall be attacked.” - -But otherwise, though one might talk about it for weeks on end, no word -was mentioned to me of any other than purely strategical reasons of this -kind. - -DR. EXNER: According to the reports received, how did the military -situation develop in the East after the Polish campaign? - -JODL: When we first contacted the Russians in the Polish campaign, -relations were rather cool. We were carefully prevented from gaining any -information about their troops or equipment. There were constantly -unpleasant incidents on the San. The Russians shot at everything, at -fleeing Poles or at German soldiers, and there were wounded and dead; -and the demarcation line was flown over in numerous cases. The unusually -strong forces employed, by Russia for the occupation of the Baltic -states, of Poland and Bessarabia struck us from the very beginning. - -DR. EXNER: Did the reports which you received contain indications of -military reinforcements for the Red Army? - -JODL: From maps which were submitted every few days, which were based on -intelligence reports and information from the radio interception -section, the following picture was formed: In the summer of 1940 there -were about 100 Russian divisions along the border. In January 1941, -there were already 150 divisions; and these were indicated by number, -consequently the reports were reliable. In comparison with this -strength, I may add that the English-American-French forces operating -from France against Germany never, to my knowledge, amounted to 100 -divisions. - -DR. EXNER: Did Hitler attempt to clear up the political situation by -diplomatic means? - -JODL: He attempted to do so by the well-known conference with Molotov; -and I must say that I placed great hopes on this conference, for the -military situation for us soldiers was as follows: With a definitely -neutral Russia in our rear—a Russia which in addition sent us -supplies—we could not lose the war. An invasion, such as took place on -6 June 1944, would have been entirely out of the question if we had had -at our disposal all the forces we had used and lost in this immense -struggle in Russia. And it never for a single moment entered my mind -that a statesman, who after all was also a strategist, would needlessly -let such an opportunity go. And it is a fact that he struggled for -months with himself about this decision, being certainly influenced by -the many contrary ideas suggested to him by the Reich Marshal, the -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as well as the Minister for Foreign -Affairs. - -DR. EXNER: On the basis of the reports which you received, what did the -further military situation on both sides look like? - -JODL: The Intelligence Service was put to work as from January 1941. The -divisions on our borders and also along the Romanian frontier grew -rapidly. On 3 February 1941 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army -informed the Führer of the operations which he himself intended to carry -out. At the same time he presented a map showing the Russian troop -deployment. This map indicated—and this has been proved by -documents—that there were 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry -divisions... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, do we need all these strategic details of -plans which were drawn up by the German General Staff? - -DR. EXNER: It is of very great importance to establish the picture -facing the General Staff at that time. If an overwhelming concentration -of Russian troops had not... - -THE PRESIDENT: But that is not what he tells about. He is telling us -about February 1941. The OKW had produced plans to show the deployment -of German troops. - -DR. EXNER: That is a plan which was developed by... - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary to go into such details as -to tell us how many cavalry regiments they had there. - -DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] Please tell us on general lines -how Halder pictured the situation to you after the February 1941 -reports. One figure only: how many divisions were deployed? - -JODL: I have already said that 150 Russian divisions were deployed -against us in February. - -THE PRESIDENT: He said that already. - -DR. EXNER: And how many were there on our side? - -JODL: I should like to say in reply that at this same time our -deployment, as reported by General Halder, had only just begun. And -furthermore, I should like to point out that according to Document C-39, -Exhibit USA-138, Page 92 of the first document book, it is clear from a -study of this document book—it is the timetable for the -deployment—that it was not until 1 June that the actual attack -formations, consisting of 14 armored divisions and 12 motorized infantry -divisions, were brought up. In fact they were not actually moved until -10 June. I mention this so that it cannot be said that the German -intention to attack was already obvious in February 1941. Such was not -the case. - -DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has especially emphasized that this plan for -the attack on Soviet Russia had been drawn up long before then. Can you -perhaps say anything more about that? - -JODL: I will explain the matter in a few words. We had to use 10,000 -trains for this deployment. If one could have run 100 a day it would -have taken 100 days; but we never reached that figure. So for purely -technical reasons this deployment had already taken 4 months. - -DR. EXNER: Did events in Yugoslavia have any influence on the Führer’s -decision? - -JODL: They gave it the final impetus. Until that time the Führer still -had doubts. On 1 April, not earlier, he decided to attack; and on 1 -April he ordered the attack to be made ready for about 22 June. The -order for the attack itself—that is, the real opening of the -campaign—was issued only on 17 June, which is likewise proved by -documents. - -DR. EXNER: Then, in your opinion, the Führer waged a preventive war. Did -later experiences prove that this was a military necessity? - -JODL: It was undeniably a purely preventive war. What we found out later -on was the certainty of enormous Russian military preparations opposite -our frontiers. I will dispense with details, but I can only say that -although we succeeded in a tactical surprise as to the day and the hour, -it was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war. - -DR. EXNER: As an example, could you perhaps tell the Tribunal the number -of new airfields which were discovered in the Russian-Polish area? - -JODL: I recall approximately that there had been about 20 airfields in -eastern Poland, and that in the meantime these had been increased to -more than a hundred. - -DR. EXNER: Quite briefly, under these conditions what would have been -the result of Russia’s having forestalled us? - -JODL: I do not want to go into the strategic principles, into the -operations behind the front; but I can state briefly that we were never -strong enough to defend ourselves in the East, as has been proved by the -events since 1942. That may sound grotesque, but in order to occupy this -front of over 2,000 kilometers we needed 300 divisions at least; and we -never had them. If we had waited until the invasion, and a Russian -attack had caught us in a pincer movement, simultaneously, we certainly -would have been lost. If, therefore, the political premise was correct, -namely that we were threatened by this attack, then from a military -point of view also the preventive attack was justified. The political -situation was presented to us soldiers in this light, consequently we -based our military work accordingly. - -DR. EXNER: Now, a few questions concerning Japan. What significance did -Directive 24 of 5 March 1941 have for co-operation with Japan? It has -already been mentioned, but the matter is not quite clear. That is Page -94, Volume I of our document book, which is Document C-75, Exhibit -USA-151. Grossadmiral Raeder, in the witness stand, has already said -something about this directive. Can you tell me anything new? - -JODL: The document is very important. First, I must make a confession. -So far I have been accused of merely having received this document. But -it emanated from me; I authorized it. It was worked out by my staff in -the Navy group. Consequently, I knew this document better than anybody -else. It is not an operational order, it is a guide for German officers. - -DR. EXNER: What does that mean? - -JODL: All German officers who officially or unofficially came into -contact with Japanese officers were to be told exactly what the aims of -German policy were, namely, to attack England even in the Far East and -precisely thereby to keep America out of the war. - -DR. EXNER: In Paragraph 3, Subparagraph a, of this directive we read: - - “It must be emphasized that the common aim in this war is to - crush England as soon as possible and thereby keep the United - States out of the war.” - -JODL: Such a directive was necessary in order that careless statements -on the part of German officers should not be used by officers of the -Japanese Army and Navy for their own political purposes. For this reason -the Foreign Office also received a copy, as is shown in the distribution -list on the bottom of Page 96. This would never have happened in the -case of an operational order. Also that is why the Führer did not sign -it. - -DR. EXNER: The objectives of the German Navy are also stated on the top -of Page 96. They read as follows: - - “Moreover, attacks on other British bases—on American naval - forces only if the entry of the United States into the war - cannot be prevented—are capable of shattering enemy forces in - those places.” - -And so we again find the endeavor to prevent the entry of the United -States into the war and to attack them only if nothing else should prove -possible. - -JODL: I should like to add that the purpose of this document was not to -exert influence on Japan, as that would have been a political action; it -was merely a directive for all officers telling them what to say in such -a case. - -DR. EXNER: Grossadmiral Raeder has already told us by what naval orders -he had endeavored to keep the United States out of the war. Have you -anything to add to that? - -JODL: Only one point, which the Grossadmiral did not mention. It comes -from Document C-119 and Exhibit Jodl-37. It can be read on Page 98 of -Document Book Number 1. - -DR. EXNER: Page 98 of Volume I, Exhibit Jodl-37, which we submit. There -we find: “Special regulations on deportment during the occupation of -Denmark and Norway.” And then... - -JODL: Only the last sentence need be read. - -DR. EXNER: Please read it. - - JODL: “All warships and merchant vessels under the U.S.A. flag, - as well as aircraft, are excepted from the prohibition to sail - or take off.” - -DR. EXNER: And that is the last sentence at the bottom of Page 98. The -paragraph speaks of prohibiting warships, merchant vessels, aircraft, -_et cetera_, from leaving port, with the exception of the Americans. - -JODL: And so, in all the war measures of the Naval Operations Staff, -America was granted an exceptional position for a long time. - -DR. EXNER: Before Japan’s attack on America, did you have any official -dealings with Japanese officers? - -JODL: No, not before. - -DR. EXNER: None at all? - -JODL: No. - -DR. EXNER: Did you expect the attack on Pearl Harbor? - -JODL: The attack came as a complete surprise. It was a complete surprise -to me, and I had the feeling it was also a surprise for the Führer; for -he came, in the middle of the night, to my map room in order to give the -news to Field Marshal Keitel and myself. He was completely surprised. - -DR. EXNER: Now, I should like you to clear up an erroneous -interpretation of this letter of Falkenstein’s. It is Page 81, Volume I, -of our document book. A letter, Document 376-PS, Exhibit USA-161, can be -found there. There is a letter from Falkenstein to yourself, I believe? - -JODL: No, no. - -DR. EXNER: No? - -JODL: No, to General Von Waldau, of the Air Force Operations Staff. - -DR. EXNER: It states: - - “With a view to a future war against America, the Führer is - considering the question of the occupation of the Atlantic - islands.” - -That can be interpreted to mean that he intended to attack America: -“With a view to a future war against America, the Führer is -considering...” What is meant by that, and how did you interpret it? - -JODL: That is perfectly obvious. At that time consideration was actually -being given to the occupation of the Atlantic islands, a thing the -Führer had always wanted to do. - -DR. EXNER: For what purpose? - -JODL: As a certain security base, thus an outpost in case of American -intervention; and so we had to take this idea into consideration. -Although the Navy as well as the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the -Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces definitely rejected it, we -had to consider these matters in theory at least; and this is what he -tells General Von Waldau in this letter. - -Furthermore, the same thing was then written in a document, later in an -order, Document 444-PS, exactly as written here. - -DR. EXNER: Did we have any interest at all in extending the war? - -JODL: I, personally, none. I can only say that the expanse from the -North Cape to Tobruk, and from Brest to Rostov-on-the-Don was too great -for my liking. - -DR. EXNER: And were we interested in having Japan at war with America? - -JODL: No, we would have much preferred a new and powerful ally without a -new and powerful enemy. - -DR. EXNER: Did we drag Italy into the war? - -JODL: I do not know what was done politically; but after the collapse of -France, when Italy also wished to take an active part in the war, we -tried to prevent this, we soldiers in the OKW. But we only succeeded in -delaying her intervention by 4 to 6 days; the Führer could not refuse -altogether. But during the whole of the war Italy was of no help to us, -rather only a burden; and this will be confirmed by subsequent histories -of the war. - -DR. EXNER: As to all the accusations concerning Crimes Against Peace, I -should like to refer to the relevant documents which have been submitted -by Göring, Ribbentrop, Raeder, and Dönitz. I do not know whether such a -reference is at all necessary according to the rules of procedure. - -Now one final question. The Prosecution has represented this whole -series of campaigns as a long premeditated and concerted plan of -conquest which you, as a conspirator, both instigated and carried out. -What have you to say to this? - -JODL: I believe I have already corrected this completely distorted -picture by my testimony. The war against Poland broke out without my -having taken any part in its preparation. It developed into a World War -contrary to the hopes of all soldiers. Everything had to be improvised -for this war. There was nothing ready except the plan of attack against -Poland. There were neither enough bombs nor enough ammunition. At that -time not a single soldier thought about Norway, Belgium, Holland, -Yugoslavia, Greece, or even Russia. No military agreements had been -reached with Italy or with Japan. - -I acknowledge the statement of the American Chief of General Staff, -General Marshall, to be absolutely correct in almost every point. - -DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any -questions? - -DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of -the German Armed Forces): General, as Chief of the Armed Forces -Operations Staff, you were for many years the leading General Staff -officer of the German Armed Forces? - -JODL: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: In the course of your military activity you were also for -a fairly long time a teacher at the War Academy? - -JODL: Not exactly at the War Academy but at the General Staff courses -which preceded the War Academy and which at that time were held at the -individual district headquarters. - -DR. LATERNSER: As all our higher military leaders came from the -professional class of General Staff officers, I ask you to tell us -briefly how these officers were trained at the War Academy. Please -confine yourself exclusively to the following points: - -How was, or rather how much time was allotted to instruction on attack; -then for propaganda for wars of aggression; and the attitude toward -international law and politics? - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this question is completely -irrelevant. - -DR. LATERNSER: If the Court considers these questions to be irrelevant, -I will dispense with the answers to these questions. - -Generaloberst, you know the standpoint of the Prosecution, that the -military leaders are supposed to have formed a group with the aim of -unleashing wars of aggression and, in the course of these wars, -committing crimes against military law and the laws of humanity. Please -explain to the Tribunal your attitude toward this point, particularly as -to whether the higher military leaders ever actually formed such a -group. - -JODL: I never understood the idea of such a group, and I never shall -understand it. It is just as if the passengers of a passenger ship were -to meet on an ocean liner and there form a unit—or be obliged to form a -unit—under the authority of the captain. This so-called group of -high-ranking officers might possibly have existed in imperial times as -an absolute entity, but not entirely even then. But here, after the -National Socialist revolution, these groups broke up completely in all -spheres of life, politically, philosophically, and ideologically. The -goal that united them was the military profession and the necessary -obedience. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn at this time. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]_ - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, before the occupation of Czechoslovakia -there was a meeting on 10 August 1938 at the Berghof between Hitler and -the military leaders, at which you were also present. Up to now that -conference has not yet been discussed here, and I want to ask you what -was the subject of that conference. - -JODL: During that conference, the Führer spoke to General Staff officers -only, and gave them a talk that lasted for about two and a half hours on -the whole military and political situation. In particular, he dealt with -the Sudeten-German problem, and said that it would have to be solved no -matter what happened. He described the various possibilities and, in -particular, made it clear that he intended to solve the question without -interference from France and England and was confident he would succeed. - -DR. LATERNSER: That was the subject of that conference? - -JODL: Yes, that in the main was the subject. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know for what reason the Commanders-in-Chief of -the three branches of the Armed Forces and their chiefs were not there? - -JODL: I know the reason because the Chief Adjutant, Major Schmundt, -informed me of it before the conference. He told me that it was the -Führer’s intention to speak directly to the senior General Staff -officers at a time when they would not be under the influence of their -too-critical Commanders-in-Chief and thus not inclined to balk or -criticize. - -DR. LATERNSER: But then, during that conference there was, nevertheless, -considerable criticism on the part of those officers, was there not? - -JODL: I could not say that there was criticism; but one of the generals -believed that he could or should draw the Führer’s attention to the -possibility that France and England might interfere after all, if he did -something against Czechoslovakia. That was General Von Wietersheim. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did Hitler later on again follow the principle of -excluding the highest military leaders from such conferences? - -JODL: The Führer did that quite often. I would say that he did it on -principle. For instance, after our unsuccessful attack on the bridgehead -at Nettuno, southwest of Rome, he ordered the junior officers, who were -taking part in these battles, from the regimental commanders down to the -company commanders, to come to the Führer’s headquarters. For days he -personally interrogated each one of them alone without their superiors -being present. He did the same thing very, very often with Air Force -officers, whom he interrogated without the Commander-in-Chief of the Air -Force present. - -DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you were present during most of the Hitler -conferences on the situation. Could the commanding generals present at -the Führer’s headquarters at the time take part in such conferences -without difficulties? - -JODL: As long as during these orientation conferences on the situation -only things which had already happened were discussed, the Führer was -very generous about who took part in them; but as soon as something was -discussed which dealt with future operations—for instance, the attack -on Russia in 1942—commanding generals of an army group from the Western -Front could not take part; nor was it possible the other way round, so -that so far as his intentions were concerned, he would only initiate -such officers as had to be informed for official reasons. - -DR. LATERNSER: In such cases then, the so-called “smallest circle” was -summoned to a situation conference? - -JODL: That is right. And so it was that the chief adjutant would -announce, on behalf of the Führer, that a discussion among the smallest -circle would now take place in which only such and such officers could -take part. - -DR. LATERNSER: During such situation discussions, did you often hear -energetic remonstrances on the part of the commanding generals of an -army group? Who made these remonstrances, and on what occasion? Please -limit yourself to the most important instances. - -JODL: I can only give you a very short answer to that question; -otherwise, I would have to speak about it for an hour. I can say that -not a single conference took place without the old traditional -conceptions, if I may call them so, regarding operations coming into -conflict with the revolutionary conceptions of the Führer. Therefore, -apart perhaps from single operations during the first part of the war, I -can state that whenever such a report was made by a commanding general -of an army group, there was a clash of opinions. I could mention the -names of all the commanding generals of army groups who ever held a -post. I know of none to whom this would not apply. - -DR. LATERNSER: Of course, you knew all the commanding generals of army -groups, did you not? - -JODL: During the first half of the war I knew all the commanding -generals down to, and including, commanding generals of army groups. -During the second half of the war, there were commanding generals of -army groups in the East whom I did not know. For the most part they did -not come from the General Staff, but were line officers, so that I did -not know some of them. - -DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, could, for instance, a commanding general -of an army group report for a discussion with Hitler without -difficulties? - -JODL: The commanding general of an army group could not do that. The -commanding general of an army group would, first of all, have to ask the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army as long as there was one. When the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army no longer existed, the commanding -generals of army groups then applied to the military adjutant’s office, -or they applied to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army for -permission to make a report, which the commanding generals could not do -themselves. - -DR. LATERNSER: So that, if a commanding general of an army group -intended to protest against some measure which he did not consider -right, then he had to go to the commander-in-chief of his army group, -who in turn would have to go to the commander-in-chief of the particular -branch of the Armed Forces; so that this was practically the only -channel through which objections could be made to Hitler in the normal -official way? - -JODL: That is perfectly correct. All military departments did that, and -it had been done for a number of years. - -DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about Himmler’s attempt to set Hitler -against the generals? When I say “generals” I mean the ones who are of -the “group.” - -JODL: I have perhaps already answered that in part when I complained -that we were not in a position to prevent military reports and news of -irresponsible sources from reaching the Führer. It was a standing rule -that police circles particularly continually used the opportunity -through Himmler to criticize the traditional, or—as they called it—the -reactionary, humanitarian, chivalrous attitude of the higher military -leaders, so that the severe orders of the Führer for brutal action—as -he called it—might be stayed. This was a constant state of affairs. All -of them were by no means involved and it was not directed against all -the commanding generals, but it was against quite a few. - -DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you still have not quite answered my -question. I asked you whether you knew anything about Himmler’s attempt -to make Hitler hostile, for reasons which I hope you will tell me. - -JODL: Well, the outcome of what I have just described was that Himmler -went to the Führer and reported to him, privately of course. He -complained about certain commanding generals, all of them of the Army; -and we knew about it, because the following day the Führer suddenly -began to raise some objections to some commanding general without our -knowing why, and would cause bad feeling. - -DR. LATERNSER: How were the relations between the OKW and the OKH? - -JODL: Before the war and during the first part of the war the -relationship between the High Command of the Armed Forces and the High -Command of the Army was made difficult by considerable tension. The -reason, however, was exclusively an internal military one. Because in -the creation of the High Command of the Armed Forces a general staff -group had come into being which was outside the jurisdiction of the -Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and which was, I should say, -even above the General Staff of the Army and gave orders to them. This -constellation was, of course, regarded with a great deal of distrust by -the General Staff of the Army. I might add, however, that Field Marshal -Keitel and I, and many reasonable officers, succeeded in completely -overcoming this tension as the war went on. - -DR. LATERNSER: I think, Generaloberst, that that is enough on that -point. - -The military leaders are accused of having delayed the end of a hopeless -war unnecessarily. What do you know about the efforts of Field Marshal -Von Rundstedt and Rommel after the invasion had succeeded? - -JODL: I remember a conference with these two commanding generals when -the Führer and I flew to the headquarters which had been prepared north -of Reims. That was about July 1944. During that conference, both Field -Marshal Von Rundstedt and particularly Rommel described in an -unmistakable manner the seriousness of the entire situation in France, -characterized by the tremendous superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air -Force, against which ground operations were powerless. I remember quite -clearly that Field Marshal Rommel asked the Führer at the end, “My -Führer, what do you really think about the further development of the -war?” The Führer was rather angry at this remark, and he answered -curtly, “That is a question which is no part of your duty. You will have -to leave that to me.” - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you read the letter which Field Marshal Von Kluge -wrote to Hitler shortly before he died? - -JODL: I stood next to the Führer when he received this letter. He opened -the envelope, read the letter, and then gave it to me to read. It said -exactly the opposite of what I had expected. Field Marshal Von Kluge -began his letter with fulsome praise for the Führer’s personality and -steadfastness in the conduct of the war. He said that he was much more -in sympathy with his ideals than the Führer assumed. He had begun his -task in the West full of confidence. But as the promised support of our -own Air Force had not been given he was now convinced that the situation -was hopeless, and his dying counsel was to make peace now. That briefly, -was what the letter contained. - -DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, can you give further examples regarding -the efforts of the commanding generals to end the hopeless war? - -JODL: No commanding general could touch upon the political question, -because the ending of a war is not a military but a political decision. -But indirectly I must say that there was not one officer in a -responsible position who did not tell the Führer soberly, honestly, and -openly what the military situation was and describe it as hopeless—as -indeed it turned out to be at the end. I, myself, too, expressed this -view in writing in a memorandum to the Führer. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have a few questions regarding the various campaigns. - -What was the attitude of the High Command of the Army, particularly -Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, regarding the Austrian campaign? - -JODL: The evening before the march into Austria, at about 2 o’clock in -the morning, I was with Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. I found him in a -dejected mood. I saw no reason for it; but apparently he was convinced -that this march into Austria might possibly lead to a military conflict -either with Italy or with Czechoslovakia. Or perhaps from a political -point of view he was not quite pleased about this impending increase of -the south German element in the Reich. I do not know. But at any rate he -was most dejected. - -DR. LATERNSER: What were the reasons for the tension which existed -between Hitler on the one hand and the military leaders on the other -after the Polish campaign? - -JODL: The conflict was particularly serious at that time because the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army and many of the higher generals held the -view I described this morning—namely, that we should remain quiet in -the West to end the war. As this again was a political argument, which -they could not use, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army presented a -military argument to the Führer at that time. This argument was that -considering the conditions in which our Army was at the time, it would -not be in a position to defeat the French Army, strengthened by the -British Army, in an offensive. That made the Führer extremely bitter, -and this bitterness expressed itself repeatedly in every speech to the -commanding generals. The entire speech of 23 November, the entire -memorandum which he wrote on 10 October can only be explained in the -light of that conflict. - -DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution, as a basis for the Indictment of the -group, have presented a number of affidavits. I should like to ask you -to state your views in connection with Affidavit Number 12, Document -3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, which was made by Walter Schellenberg. There -on Page 1 Schellenberg testifies that in the front zone the SD special -task groups were entirely under the command of the armies—that is to -say, tactically, technically, and from the point of view of troop -service, as he says in his affidavit. Is that true, Generaloberst? - -JODL: It is only true to a very limited extent. I must start my answer -by saying I was not familiar with the idea of the Einsatzgruppe and -Einsatzkommando until I came here to Nuremberg. I must say that quite -openly, even at the risk of being called a “Parsifal,” but it is a fact. -I only knew about the Police. The operational territory of the Army was -divided into three sectors. The front line was called the fighting zone, -and that went back approximately as far as the enemy artillery could -fire. In that sector everything, that was anything at all, was in all -respects subordinate to the Army. But in that sector there was no -Police—except the Secret Field Police, who were in any case completely -under the jurisdiction of the Army. - -DR. LATERNSER: The Secret Field Police were actually a part of the -division, were they not? - -JODL: Yes, they were divisional troops which carried out police work -among the troops. Then came the rear area of the armies which was under -the commanding generals of the armies, and behind that were the lines of -communication of the Army which comprised all the supply units and -services of the Quartermaster General of the Army. In this main -sector—which was by far the largest sector as it comprised 97 percent -of the entire operational area—the entire Police and everything which -did not belong to the Army organically was not under the command of the -Army, as far as tasks were concerned, but under the Police, under the -Reichsführer SS Himmler. Only from the standpoint of servicing the -troops—that is, with regard to their supplies or movements during -advance or retreat—did the Army, of course, have the right to give -orders to the troops regarding their movements and their accommodation. - -DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg states that in the rear operational areas -and in the rear areas of the Army these special task groups came under -the Army only as far as supplies were concerned; and as far as orders -and tasks were concerned, under the Reich Security Main Office. Is that -correct? - -JODL: That is correct. The entire Police received orders about what they -were to do from Himmler only. - -DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg also states further in his Affidavit Number -12, Document 3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, that this subordination as -regards troop servicing also included the question of discipline. Is -that true? - -JODL: That is wrong. An officer of the Army could never punish a member -of the Police or the SS. - -DR. LATERNSER: As has been established, the chief task of these special -task groups was to carry out mass extermination of Jews and Communists. -Schellenberg states in his Affidavit Number 12 that he was convinced -that the commanding generals of the army groups and armies had been -clearly informed of these tasks through official channels. Since -Schellenberg has stated his conviction in this affidavit I ask you to -give us yours, because I think I am right in assuming that you were with -the best informed officers of the Armed Forces. - -JODL: I cannot, of course, judge exactly what the commanding generals -actually experienced while they were together at the front; but I can -say with absolute certainty that I have never seen an order which -revealed that these police units had been sent into the operational zone -for any other purpose than that of maintaining quiet and order, from the -police point of view, and uncovering revolts and partisan activities. I -have never seen a report or an order which contained anything other than -that. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you believe, Generaloberst, that the commanding -generals of the armies or army groups would have tolerated those -conditions without protest? - -JODL: I consider that out of the question, because even in the case of -much smaller incidents they raised the most violent protests. Hundreds -of documents which have been offered by the Prosecution here show how -the troops at the front had objected to measures which they considered -inadmissible from a humane point of view or dangerous to peace and order -in the occupied territories. I have only to remind you of Blaskowitz’ -memorandum, which was one of the first. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you read that memorandum? - -JODL: No, I did not read it. I only heard about it. - -DR. LATERNSER: Furthermore, the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit -Number 13 from Rittmeister Wilhelm Scheidt. It is Document 3711-PS, -Exhibit USA-558. Scheidt says in this affidavit, and I quote from Page -2: “It was a generally known fact that the partisan fights were -conducted with cruelty on both sides.” - -I skip a sentence. He goes on to say: - - “There is no question but that these facts must have been known - to the leading officers in the Armed Forces Operations Staff and - in the General Staff of the Army. It was also known that it was - Hitler’s view that in the fight against partisans only the use - of cruel, intimidating punishment could be successful.” - -Is Rittmeister Scheidt’s statement correct, namely, that the leading -officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the General Staff of -the Army knew of the cruelty employed by both sides in the partisan -fighting? - -JODL: What we knew about the conduct of partisan warfare has already -been submitted to this Tribunal. I refer to the instructions which I -signed regarding the combating of partisans in Document F-665, Exhibit -RF-411. It begins with a lengthy discourse on how the partisans -conducted this war. Of course, we did not invent this. This was -extracted from hundreds of reports. That troops in such a fight, seeing -the methods employed by the enemy, would on their part not be exactly -mild can readily be imagined. In spite of that the directives which we -issued never contained a word to the effect that no prisoners were to be -taken in these partisan fights. On the contrary, all reports showed that -the number taken prisoner was larger by far than the number killed. That -it was the Führer’s view that in their fight against the partisans the -troops should in no way be restricted is authentically proved by the -many arguments which I, as well as the General Staff of the Army, had -with the Führer on this subject. - -DR. LATERNSER: What if the commanding generals received reports about -cruelties committed by their own soldiers? - -JODL: Then they would be court-martialed. That again is established in -the documents. I remind you of an order, issued by the Führer, which -begins with the sentence, “It has been reported to me that individual -soldiers of the Armed Forces have been dealt with by court martial -because of their behavior when fighting partisans.” - -DR. LATERNSER: And that was the only thing the commanding general could -do in a case like that? - -JODL: There was no other way open. And even on these orders, he always -acted in accordance with his own legal judgment. Who could stop him from -doing that? - -DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have also submitted Affidavit Number 15, -by General Röttiger, Document 5713-PS which is numbered Exhibit USA-559. -In this affidavit General Röttiger states, in the middle of Page 1: - - “Only now, on the strength of documents put before me, do I - realize that in issuing the order to employ the severest - measures to combat partisans, the highest levels might possibly - have had in mind the final aim of using this combating of - partisans by the Army to achieve the relentless extermination of - Jewry and other undesirable elements.” - -Did the military leadership at the highest level hold any such point of -view, and was that their final aim? - -JODL: No. Of course, one is wise after the event. I too have learned -many things today which I did not know before. However, this knowledge -does not apply at all here, because there were next to no Jews among the -partisans. In the main, these partisans were fanatical Russian -fighters—mostly White Russians—and were as hard as steel. And, to a -question put by my counsel, even the witness Bach-Zelewski had to admit -that there were just about no Jews among these partisans. - -As regards the extermination of Slavs, I can only say that the Slavs who -were killed in the partisan fighting amounted to no more than -one-twentieth or one-thirtieth of the numbers which in the normal, -large-scale battles with the Soviet Russian armies the Russians lost in -dead or wounded. As far as figures are concerned, that carries no weight -at all. Therefore that is a completely erroneous view. - -DR. LATERNSER: A further Affidavit, Number 16, by the same General -Röttiger, was submitted by the Prosecution under Document 5714-PS, -Exhibit Number USA-560. In the last sentence General Röttiger states the -following, and I quote: - - “Although generally speaking one knew what the special tasks of - the SD units were, and although this apparently happened with - the knowledge of the highest leaders of the Armed Forces, we - opposed these methods as far as possible since it meant - endangering our own troops.” - -In other words, General Röttiger, in his affidavit, maintains that the -special tasks of the SD units were apparently carried out with the -knowledge of the highest military leaders. If that is correct, then, -you, Generaloberst, must have known about the tasks and these questions -you have already... - -JODL: Yes, I have already answered. I have never spoken to a single -officer who had knowledge of these matters and told me about them. - -DR. LATERNSER: Also, in the case against the General Staff and the OKW, -the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit 17, Document 3715-PS, Exhibit -Number USA-562. This affidavit comes from SS Leader Rode. Rode states, -at the top of Page 2: - - “As proof, one can quote the OKW and OKH order which stated that - all members of partisan groups who had been captured, such as - Jews, agents, and political commissars, were to be handed over - by the troops to the SD for ‘special treatment’ without delay. - Apart from that, this order contained instructions that in - guerrilla fighting no prisoners, apart from the above-mentioned, - were to be taken.” - -Generaloberst, was there such an order that in guerrilla fighting no -prisoners were to be taken? - -JODL: Such an order never existed. I have never seen such an order. It -was not contained in the instructions regarding guerrilla fighting. -Apart from that, practically every word in that statement is untrue. -There never was an order from the OKW-OKH—that is, an order which came -from both departments. Jews among the guerrillas. I have already dealt -with that. Agents among the guerrillas. Agents—that is a chapter by -itself. Political commissars. That is quite another point. They were -never handed over to the SD for special treatment—if they were handed -over at all—because the task of the SD was an entirely different one. -They may have been handed over to the Security Police. In other words, -every word is untrue. - -DR. LATERNSER: There is an Affidavit Number IS, by the same SS Leader -Rode, which the Prosecution have submitted under Document 3716-PS, -Exhibit Number USA-563. Rode states as follows in this affidavit: - - “As far as is known to me, the SD special task groups, attached - to the various army groups, were under the jurisdiction of the - latter in every way—that is to say, tactically, as well as in - every other way. For that reason, the tasks and methods of these - units were fully known to the commanding generals. They approved - of the tasks and methods, since apparently, they never raised - any decisive objections to them.” - -Do you know SS Leader Rode? - -JODL: No, I do not know him. I do not think it is necessary to say much -about this, because the General of the Police Schellenberg, who led such -a special task group himself, and who really must know, has stated quite -clearly on this witness stand what jurisdiction he was under and from -whom he received his orders. - -DR. LATERNSER: That was not the witness Schellenberg; that was -Ohlendorf. - -JODL: Ohlendorf? Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have a few questions about the Commissar Order. -Were you present at the conference when Hitler gave the Commissar Order -orally to the commanding generals? - -JODL: As far as I remember, right at the beginning he spoke only to the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army, or the Chief of the General Staff and a -few officers of the OKW, about this Commissar Order. As far as I -recollect he referred to that order of his at a later date when -addressing the commanding generals. I believe that it was during that -second conference that he used the words, “I cannot expect that my -generals understand my orders, but I must demand that they obey them.” - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know any commanding generals who resisted that -order? - -JODL: Later on someone told me—I do not know whether it is true—that -Field Marshal Rommel had burned this order. But... - -DR. LATERNSER: Does not that recollection of yours refer to the Commando -Order? General Field Marshal Rommel was... - -JODL: Oh, yes, that was the Commando Order. You are talking about the -Commissar Order, are you not? - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that is right. - -JODL: I remember that there were constant objections from the High -Command of the Army which, unfortunately, had to carry out this order, -and these went on for a long time. Officers of the General Staff told me -confidentially that for the most part it was not being carried out. I -know of one official application made to the Führer to have this order -officially withdrawn. That was done, although I cannot remember when. - -DR. LATERNSER: Who made that application? - -JODL: The High Command of the Army. Whether it was the Chief of the -General Staff or the Commander-in-Chief, I cannot say. - -DR. LATERNSER: When was this application made? - -JODL: I believe it was in the spring of 1942. - -DR. LATERNSER: The spring of 1942? And to that application... - -JODL: I know for certain, the order was withdrawn. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you talk to any commanding general who approved of -that order? - -JODL: No. All the officers to whom I spoke considered, first, that the -order should be turned down from the humane point of view and, secondly, -that it was wrong from the practical point of view. - -DR. LATERNSER: When Hitler gave his reasons for this order orally—and -you have already told us some of them—he is supposed to have mentioned -additional reasons for making it. I should like you to tell us what they -were so that we may get this matter quite clear. - -JODL: He gave a lengthy explanation—as he always did when he felt it -necessary to convince somebody. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did he state... - -THE PRESIDENT: Have not these reasons already been given? - -DR. LATERNSER: As far as I am informed, Mr. President, they have not yet -all been given. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] During that conference did Hitler state... - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Haven’t you already given the reasons which, -you say, Hitler gave for this order? - -JODL: I have not given some very important reasons, which the Führer -also pointed out. They were... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. - -Dr. Laternser, I have already had to ask you to be more brief on many -occasions in which you have examined witnesses, and really you have -spent over an hour already on this High Command Staff. Every witness who -comes to the box you take a very long time over, and the Tribunal think -that a great deal of their time has been wasted by you. Now, this -witness can give any further reasons, but I do not want any argument -about it. He can give his explanation now. - -JODL: I have only to add that the Führer said on that occasion: “If you -do not believe what I am telling you, then read the reports from -Counterintelligence which we have received regarding the behavior of the -Russian commissars in the occupied Baltic states. Then you will get a -picture of what can be expected from these commissars.” - -He also stated that. - -DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put a question to you about the report -in Document 884-PS, submitted under Exhibit USSR-351. - -THE PRESIDENT: Repeat the number please. - -DR. LATERNSER: Number 884-PS, it is a document submitted by the Russian -Prosecution on 13 February, and it is on Page 151 of the second document -book for General Jodl. Under Number II of this report, Page 153, there -is the following statement. I quote, “To this, Reichsleiter Rosenberg in -Memorandum 3 suggests...” I do not want to read further. The next is a -suggestion. - -I would like to ask you for what reason this Number II was brought out -in this report. - -JODL: I can only guess because I did not write it. But I have no -doubt... - -THE PRESIDENT: We do not want his guesses, you know. If he can only -guess, then he had better not guess. We want evidence, not guesses. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I will dispense with this question. I assumed that -the witness would have personal knowledge about that. - -Witness, you said yesterday that the Commando Order of 18 October 1942 -had been changed—that is, partially revoked by application of the -Commander, West. Who was that Commander, West who had applied for that -change? - -JODL: General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and he applied to have the -entire order withdrawn. - -DR. LATERNSER: You know the order by General Von Reichenau which the -Russian Prosecution submitted on 13 February as Document USSR-12? It is -dated 10 October 1941. Do you know the reasons this order was issued? - -JODL: Yes. Reichenau, at that time, was commanding general of the 6th -Army, and in his army sector was the town of Kiev. This morning I -already started to describe events that took place in Kiev at the end of -September, and that was the reason for this order. - -DR. LATERNSER: How did the commanding generals exercise their -jurisdiction—strictly, or not so strictly? - -JODL: I know this because Dr. Lehmann... - -THE PRESIDENT: That has nothing to do with the charge against the High -Command. There is no charge against the High Command for having arranged -courts martial or administering their courts martial improperly. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I believe I am of a different opinion on -this point. If the commanding generals heard of any breaches of -discipline or atrocities... - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you know of anything in the Indictment, or anything in -the evidence, which charges the High Command, or any member of the High -Command, with improper behavior at a court martial, or in connection -with a court martial? - -DR. LATERNSER: No. I merely want to discover the typical attitude of the -High Command. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] What do you know about the reasons for the -mass deaths which occurred among Russian prisoners of war during the -winter of 1941? - -JODL: I am informed on this subject because several adjutants of the -Führer were sent there personally, and they reported to the Führer in my -presence. We were mostly concerned with the mass deaths after the last -great battle for the Vyazma pocket. The reason for the mass deaths was -described by the Führer’s adjutants as follows: The half-famished -encircled Russian armies had put up fanatical resistance during the last -8 or 10 days. They literally lived on the bark of trees and roots -because they had retreated to impenetrable wooded country, and when they -fell into our hands they were in such a condition that they could hardly -move. It was impossible to transport them. The situation as regards -supplies was critical, because the railway system had been destroyed, so -that it was impossible to take them all away. There were no -accommodations nearby. Only immediate careful hospital treatment could -have saved the majority of them. Soon afterwards the rain started, and -then the cold set in, and that is the reason why such a large number of -those prisoners—particularly these prisoners of Vyazma—died. - -That is the report of the Führer’s adjutants who had been sent there to -investigate. Similar reports came from the Quartermaster General of the -Army. - -DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the shelling of Leningrad by -German artillery? You remember that a witness has been examined here on -that point? - -JODL: I was present during two conferences which the Führer himself had -with the German artillery commander who was in charge of the artillery -before Leningrad. He brought along the exact target chart, and it showed -a very carefully worked-out system, according to which only key plants -in Leningrad were marked as necessary targets, so as to cripple the -power of resistance of the fortress. They were mostly factories which -were still producing munitions. The ammunition for this heavy artillery, -only a small portion of which could reach the center of Leningrad, was -so scarce that one had to be extremely economical in its use. They were -mostly captured guns from France, and we only had as much ammunition as -we had captured. - -DR. LATERNSER: You know that the witness has asserted that in his -opinion the artillery deliberately destroyed the castles in Leningrad. -You have seen the target chart for this artillery? - -JODL: Yes; I myself had the artillery target chart in my brief case for -many weeks. Only the armament industry was marked on it. It would have -been insane to shoot at anything else. Of course, every artilleryman -knows that through dispersion the shots can fall elsewhere. - -DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the order from Hitler and the OKH -to destroy dwellings and fireplaces during the retreat in the winter of -1941? What was the reason for that order? - -JODL: The reasons are that... - -DR. LATERNSER: I refer to the Order USSR-130. Unfortunately, I have not -been able to ascertain on what day the Prosecution presented this order. -I shall ascertain it later and have the Tribunal informed. - -JODL: During that frightful winter battle, with a temperature of 48 -degrees of frost, the commanders at the front reported to the Führer in -his headquarters that this battle was exclusively a battle for warm -shelter. Those who did not have some sort of heating arrangement—that -is to say, a village with serviceable stoves—could not hold out and -would not be able to fight the following day. One could say it was -really a fight for stoves. And when, because of this, we were forced to -retreat, the Führer then ordered that those fireplaces must be -destroyed—not only the houses but also the fireplaces were to be blown -up—because in such a critical situation that alone would prevent the -Russians from pursuing. Since, in accordance with the Hague Regulations -for Land Warfare, every type of destruction is permissible which is -absolutely necessary from the military point of view, I believe that for -this type of winter warfare—and it happened only during the -winter—that order can be justified. - -DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the case of Katyn? - -JODL: Regarding the finding of these mass graves, I received the first -report through my propaganda department, which was informed through its -propaganda company attached to the army group. I heard that the Reich -Police Criminal Department had been given the task of investigating the -whole affair, and I then sent an officer from my propaganda department -to the exhumation to check the findings of the foreign experts. I -received a report which, in general, tallies with the report which is -contained in the _White Book_ issued, I think, by the Foreign Office. I -have never heard anyone raise any doubts as to the facts as they were -presented. - -DR. LATERNSER: You have also seen the film which the Russian Prosecution -have shown in this courtroom, and which showed atrocities committed in -the Yugoslav theater of war. Can you explain any of the pictures which -you perhaps still recollect? - -JODL: I believe that every picture shown in this courtroom is, and was, -perfectly truthful as a picture. These were captured photographs. But it -has never been said what the photographs represented. It was not clear -from the film whether the dog that was mauling a human being was not -photographed in an army dog training center. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is mere argument. - -DR. LATERNSER: I was about to stop him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: I was thinking of certain photographs which you might be -able to clarify with a statement as: “I remember one photograph of a -police dog jumping at a human being or a dummy.” Can you say... - -THE PRESIDENT: You asked him about these photographs, and he says that -they were all true—in his opinion—true pictures; and he didn’t take -them. He doesn’t know anything about them, and anything that he can say -upon them appears to us to be argument. - -DR. LATERNSER: I will withdraw that question. - -Generaloberst, was Louvain captured in the manner as testified by the -witness Van der Essen? The witness Van der Essen said that Louvain was -taken without fighting. - -JODL: I have ascertained that the Armed Forces communiqué of, I think, -18 May contains the sentence, “Louvain taken after heavy fighting.” But -I do not believe... - -THE PRESIDENT: What was the place that you are asking about? - -DR. LATERNSER: I asked the witness in what way Louvain was captured: -whether it was only evacuated by the enemy, and then occupied, or -whether the town had to be fought for. The witness has stated that there -was no fighting for Louvain, and that therefore it was a particularly -despicable act. - -THE PRESIDENT: How did it affect the General Staff? - -DR. LATERNSER: Well, in that case, Mr. President, I do not know who -should be blamed for this event. I cannot see any connection with any -one of the defendants; and if nobody can be blamed for it, we must -strike out the whole event. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it one of the events which is charged in the -Indictment? - -DR. LATERNSER: No, the Indictment does not refer to it. - -THE PRESIDENT: And the evidence, did the evidence deal with it? - -DR. LATERNSER: There is no reference to it in the Indictment; but in the -evidence, a witness was produced who stated that the University of -Louvain was willfully destroyed by the German artillery although there -was no reason to fire on the town. - -THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t catch the place—but go on. - -JODL: I know that the Armed Forces communiqué of 18 May 1940 contained -the sentence, “Louvain captured after heavy fighting.” Even though the -German Armed Forces communiqué was silent on some things, it certainly -never stated deliberate untruths. I can say that because I edited it. - -DR. LATERNSER: You already spoke yesterday about the case of Oradour. I -merely wanted to ask you what Field Marshal Von Rundstedt did about this -event when it was reported to him. - -JODL: Many weeks afterwards I learned that an investigation had been -started by Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and that there was -correspondence about the case of Oradour between Field Marshal Keitel, -the Armistice Commission, and Field Marshal Von Rundstedt. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did the Commander, West begin court-martial proceedings? - -JODL: He must have done so, because I read a statement of an SS court in -connection with this event. - -DR. LATERNSER: What was the outcome of those proceedings? - -JODL: I cannot say. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then I come to the last points. How many conferences were -there before the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944? - -JODL: There were four conferences about the Ardennes Offensive. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you attend all of them? - -JODL: I took part in all of them. - -DR. LATERNSER: Was there ever any request for an order, or was an order -ever issued at one of these conferences to shoot prisoners during this -offensive? - -JODL: No. And I can also add that not once during any one of those -conferences was a single word mentioned which did not deal with purely -operational considerations. There was no talk at all about the conduct -of the troops. - -DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, would you have known if such an order had -been issued by—let us assume—Field Marshal Von Rundstedt? - -JODL: There can be no question of such an order. It never could have -been issued through the military channels. It could have been issued -only through the Police—that is to say, Himmler or the SS. - -PR. LATERNSER: But then it would not have been binding on the units of -the Armed Forces—that is, of the Army? - -JODL: It is quite out of the question that any commanding general of the -Army would even have accepted such an order; and I know of no order of -the Führer which was directed against ordinary prisoners in this way. - -DR. LATERNSER: I merely put that question because the witness Van der -Essen also stated in this courtroom that, judging by the way the -prisoners were treated, he had to draw the conclusion that it was the -result of an order from a higher level. That is why I asked that -question. - -Do you know the case—the Commando case? - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had put your last question. You said that -was your last question. - -DR. LATERNSER: The last questions. Mr. President, I shall be through in -about 5 minutes. I ask you to take into consideration the fact that -Generaloberst Jodl is a member of the indicted group, and that he is the -officer who is best informed, and that an hour and a half for such an -examination is not an excessive amount of time. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you know the Commando case in which the -son of the British Field Marshal Alexander was a participant? - -JODL: Yes, I know the case. - -DR. LATERNSER: Please tell us about it. - -JODL: I heard about this affair through a report—I cannot quite -remember whom it came from. I discussed it with Field Marshal Keitel, -and I expressed the view that it was not necessary to take court -proceedings against a lieutenant just because he was wearing a German -cap during an action of this kind. Court proceedings were in progress -against him, and Field Marshal Keitel gave the order that these -proceedings be discontinued. - -DR. LATERNSER: And the proceedings were discontinued? - -JODL: Yes, they were. - -DR. LATERNSER: Well now, regarding the extent of the group, two more -questions: What was the jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of the Armed -Forces Operations Staff? - -JODL: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff—I would -say—directed, in practice, the general staff work of my entire staff, -from which, of course, I was separated to a certain extent because I was -in the so-called Security Circle Number 1, and my staff was in Security -Circle Number 2—that is to say, outside; and the whole of this general -staff work within the inner staff was directed by him, and if necessary, -he acted, of course, as my deputy. - -DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have stated that the Deputy Chief of the -Armed Forces Operations Staff was responsible for strategic planning. Is -that correct? - -JODL: No. I was primarily responsible. - -DR. LATERNSER: Is the significance of the position of this Deputy Chief -of the Armed Forces Operations Staff equal to the significance of the -other positions which are comprised in the indicted group? - -JODL: No, it is far below that. He did not have the position of a -commanding general of an army, nor the position of a General Staff -chief. - -DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much; I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to ask any -questions. - -DR. STAHMER: Were you present, Generaloberst, when toward the end of -March 1944 Himmler reported to Hitler, during the situation conference, -that about 80 Royal Air Force officers had escaped from the camp, Stalag -III, at Sagan? - -JODL: At the moment when Himmler reported this fact, I was not in the -big hall of the Berghof. I was in the next room telephoning. Hearing a -very loud discussion, I went over to the curtain to hear what was going -on. I heard that they were talking about the escape of the English -airmen from the Sagan Camp. - -DR. STAHMER: Was Reich Marshal Göring present at this situation -conference? - -JODL: The Reich Marshal was not present at this situation conference. I -am absolutely certain about that. - -DR. STAHMER: In later talks with the Reich Marshal, did you find out -what he thought of the shooting of some of the escaped officers? - -JODL: From talks with the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, I -learned that the Reich Marshal was indignant at this shooting, and I -knew that particularly in situations such as these the former officer in -him who did not approve of such incredible acts came to the surface. One -must give him his due. There were repeated arguments over this between -him and the Führer, which I witnessed personally. - -DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions. - -HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): With the permission of the Court, I -will ask the witness a few questions. - -Witness, you were Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the -units at your disposal were known to you. The Prosecution assert that -you expected to find in the SA a fighting unit in the first days of -aggressive war on the basis of the so-called Commando unit -(Kommandotruppe). Now I should like to ask you if the term Commando unit -is known to you in connection with the use of the SA by the Wehrmacht. - -JODL: No, that is not known to me. I heard the word Commando unit for -the first time in connection with the undertakings of the English Ranger -battalions. We never used this term. - -HERR BÖHM: There can be no question then that the SA was used as a -Commando unit behind the regular troops in the entry into Austria or in -the occupation of the Sudetenland? - -JODL: I know of no case where formations of the SA co-operated in the -occupation of another country—with the exception of the Henlein Free -Corps; but that, however, consisted primarily of Sudeten-German -refugees. In the Henlein Free Corps there were, I believe, a few SA -leaders who had formerly been officers. - -HERR BÖHM: Was the Feldherrnhalle Regiment used as an SA unit or as a -Wehrmacht regiment in the war? - -JODL: The Feldherrnhalle Regiment was definitely a Wehrmacht regiment. I -should like to say that it embodied the traditions of the SA, and it was -recruited primarily from the SA, but it had nothing whatever to do with -the Supreme SA Command. It was a Wehrmacht regiment in every sense of -the word. - -HERR BÖHM: Do you know anything about the fact that in 25 group schools, -and in 3 Reich leader schools of the SA, 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and -assistant leaders were trained annually for the front, and that these -22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were used as such in the -Wehrmacht? - -JODL: I know nothing about this, and I consider it impossible that the -Wehrmacht had its leaders and assistant leaders trained by anyone else -than by its own personnel. - -HERR BÖHM: Would not the position be that all the SA members were -drafted into the Wehrmacht as ordinary soldiers, and had to rise from -the ranks in the same way as any Wehrmacht soldier? - -JODL: The SA were drafted into the Wehrmacht the same as any other -German. I know of many cases where high SA leaders started their service -in the Wehrmacht in the very lowest positions as soldiers or as -noncommissioned officers. - -HERR BÖHM: Then, the Prosecution also assert that after 1934 the SA -trained not only 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders, but -that 25,000 officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, were trained by -the SA for the Wehrmacht. Do you know anything about this? - -JODL: What I said before about assistant leaders is true to an even much -greater extent among the officers. The officers were trained only in the -military schools of the Army and nowhere else. - -HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution assert further—and I ask whether you know -anything about this—that in the course of extending the war effort, 86 -percent of the professional leadership corps were made available. - -JODL: I cannot give a binding answer to that. I do not know about that. - -HERR BÖHM: And the Prosecution assert further that the SA sent 70 -percent of its millions of members straight to the Wehrmacht. It may be -that 70 percent of the SA members did their military service. I want to -ask you whether these 70 percent were taken straight from the SA or -whether they were called up in the ordinary groups which applied to the -able-bodied male population? - -JODL: No importance whatsoever was attached to the SA when men were -drafted into the Army. The SA man was drafted like any other German who -was called up for military service. Whether or not a man had been in the -SA previously, did not matter in the slightest. - -HERR BÖHM: Did the Wehrmacht ever take SA signal units (Stürme), -engineer units, or cavalry units, or medical units, and use them in -action inside or outside a division of the Wehrmacht? - -JODL: I personally knew of no case where any SA unit appeared in action -outside Germany during the war. - -HERR BÖHM: Did the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff have a -liaison man with the SA? - -JODL: No. From time to time an officer came to me from the Supreme SA -Command, and he generally inquired as to the fate and well-being of the -Feldherrnhalle Regiment, which had come primarily from the SA, or was -composed mainly of members of the SA, and later, about a Panzer -formation which also continued the tradition of the Feldherrnhalle of -the SA. - -HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution have submitted a newspaper which shows that -on the occasion of the mustering of SA members, Field Marshal -Brauchitsch was present. They want to show from this the close -connection between the training of the SA and the Wehrmacht. Can you -explain this photograph? - -JODL: I believe it can be explained by the fact that Field Marshal Von -Brauchitsch accompanied the Chief of Staff Lutze once when the latter -inspected an ordinary SA unit, and he was accompanied by Field Marshal -Von Brauchitsch because, as I have already said, after the Röhm Putsch -we no longer had any cause for conflict with the SA. At the outbreak of -war the SA placed all their equipment, including all tent squares, at -the disposal of the Wehrmacht. I remember very clearly. - -HERR BÖHM: Could this visit of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, when he -inspected the SA members, be part of the official activity of the Field -Marshal? - -JODL: No, in my opinion that was an act of courtesy. - -HERR BÖHM: From the point of view of conspiracy with which the SA is -charged here, do you know that it was said to have always been the task -of the SA, especially in the years 1933 to 1939, to prepare Germany, and -especially the youth, for a difficult war of conquest by instilling, -increasing, and maintaining a warlike spirit in Germany, especially -among the youth? Do you know anything in this connection from personal -observations? - -JODL: I do not know anything about that. That the SA, as a branch of the -Party, also endeavored to foster the patriotic spirit within its ranks, -to carry on physical training, is a matter of course. As to preparing -for wars of aggression, no one ever did that. - -HERR BÖHM: But that was asserted here in regard to the SA. You are of -the opinion that it is not true? - -JODL: I have no reason to think that it is true. - -HERR BÖHM: I have no more questions. - -DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Generaloberst, -the 26th of August 1939 was fixed as X-Day for the attack on Poland. Is -it true that on 25 August the order to attack was withdrawn upon the -urgent request of Ribbentrop because, according to the communication -which reached the Foreign Office, Great Britain had ratified the Treaty -of Alliance concluded with Poland on 6 April 1939, and Ribbentrop told -the Führer that the advance of German troops would therefore mean war -with Great Britain? - -JODL: I cannot answer the whole of your question, but I do know -something about it. When, on the 25th, to our great surprise we received -the order, “The attack fixed for the 26th will not take place,” I -telephoned to the then Major Schmundt—Field Marshal Keitel was not -there—and asked him what was the matter. He told me that shortly before -the Reich Foreign Minister had reported to the Führer that Britain had -concluded a pact—a mutual assistance pact—with Poland, and for that -reason he could expect British intervention in the war with Poland. For -this reason the Führer had withdrawn the order for attack. That is what -I learned at that time. - -DR. HORN: In the spring of 1941, after the Simovic Putsch, the Führer -held a conference with the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the -Wehrmacht and the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was called in to this -conference later. Is it true that at this conference Von Ribbentrop -represented the point of view that before military action was taken, an -attempt should be made to settle the differences with Yugoslavia by -diplomatic means? How did Hitler react to this suggestion? - -JODL: I recall this incident especially well because about 1 hour before -I had said the same thing to the Führer, that we should clear up the -situation with an ultimatum. An hour later, without knowing about this, -the Reich Foreign Minister made the same remark, and he fared -considerably worse than I did. The Führer said: - - “Is that how you size up the situation? The Yugoslavs would - swear black is white. Of course, they say they have no warlike - intentions, and when we march into Greece they will stab us in - the back.” - -I recall that statement very exactly. - -DR. HORN: Generaloberst, is it true that the Foreign Office from the -very outbreak of the Russian war was completely eliminated from Eastern -questions, that Ribbentrop complained personally and through his liaison -man, Ambassador Ritter, and that he had no success with his suggestions -to the Führer? - -JODL: I know that Ambassador Ritter, who came to see me very often, -repeatedly complained in private talks about having such a large part of -its field of activity taken away from the Foreign Office, and I must -assume that that was not only the opinion of Ambassador Ritter but also -the opinion of the whole Foreign Office as well as of the Foreign -Minister. - -DR. HORN: In your testimony you have already mentioned the fact that the -Wehrmacht was against Hitler’s intention to renounce the Geneva -Convention. Do you know that Ribbentrop also energetically opposed -Hitler’s intention, and that after the objections of the Wehrmacht had -been rejected at the beginning, Ribbentrop then succeeded in inducing -Hitler to give up his intention? - -JODL: Put that way, I cannot confirm it fully. One thing I know for -certain: the Foreign Office informed me in writing of its unfavorable -attitude toward this suggestion or idea of the Führer. For me that was -conclusive proof that the Reich Foreign Minister held this point of -view. I recorded this unfavorable attitude of the Foreign -Office—together with the unfavorable attitude of the Army, Navy, and -Luftwaffe—in a short memorandum, and submitted it to the Führer. To -what extent the Reich Foreign Minister personally remonstrated with the -Führer about the matter, I cannot say with certainty. - -DR. HORN: Is it true that Von Ribbentrop spoke against the chaining of -English prisoners of war as reprisal for the chaining of German -prisoners of war, and in agreement with the OKW induced Hitler to -discontinue this measure? - -JODL: That is true. The Reich Foreign Minister, the Foreign Office, -repeatedly remonstrated with the Führer to withdraw the order concerning -the chaining of Canadian prisoners, and it must be assumed that these -many objections, which were also supported by the OKW, finally succeeded -in having the order withdrawn. - -HERR BÖHM: In the Tuesday afternoon session you discussed the question -of terror-fliers. In this connection you stated that by making inquiries -and observations you wanted to prevent the ‘cause’ for the decision -regarding the intended treatment of this question. The Prosecution -submitted two documents on this question. One was the record of an -alleged talk between Ribbentrop, Göring, and Himmler at Klessheim, the -other an opinion by Ambassador Ritter, who has already been mentioned. I -would like to hear from you as to whether you know anything about -Ribbentrop’s attitude toward the handling of the question of -terror-fliers, especially whether Ribbentrop advocated that this -question be dealt with according to the Geneva Convention, and whether -he thought that it was possible to deviate from this Convention only if -decisive military necessities demanded it, and even in that case only by -expressly indicating beforehand to the protective powers that it -intended to depart from the Geneva Convention? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, can’t you put that question more shortly; what -does he know about it? - -DR. HORN: Is it true, Generaloberst, with regard to the question of -terror-fliers, that Von Ribbentrop, in the same way as the Wehrmacht, -was against departing from the Geneva Convention, and he put this view -to Hitler? - -JODL: To this I can say—again from talks with Ambassador Ritter—that I -knew that the Reich Foreign Minister advocated official procedure, that -is, official notice that we could no longer consider certain acts of -terror as belonging to regular warfare. That was the original point of -view of the Foreign Office. To this I said at the time that the Führer -would probably not be interested as I had concluded from his oral -instructions. As it turned out, the suggestion, such as the Reich -Foreign Minister intended to make, was never put forward, or at least I -never saw it. - -DR. HORN: Do you know anything of a peace feeler by English officers on -behalf of General Alexander, backed up by the English Government, in -1943? - -JODL: I know very well that at that time, in Athens, an Englishman—I -believe it was an English captain—established contact with us. This -captain said that he came from English headquarters in the southeastern -area. I was present when the Reich Foreign Minister reported to the -Führer about this matter, and I know he suggested that this contact be -tried to see what results it might bring. That was done; the Führer -agreed; but I heard nothing more about the matter, and apparently -nothing came of it. - -DR. HORN: Do you know anything about any further peace attempts of -Ribbentrop, especially after the Polish campaign, after Dunkirk and -1943? - -JODL: I only knew of the attempts and intentions after the Western -campaign. At that time the Führer spoke quite openly and frankly with -everyone. I myself, as well as the Reich Foreign Minister, heard the -Führer agree that peace would be concluded with England at any time only -if part of our former colonies were given back to us. - -DR. HORN: Is it true that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop suggested to -Hitler that Hungarian Jews, insofar as they wished to do so, be -permitted to emigrate? - -JODL: I recall that too. Shortly after the occupation of Hungary by our -troops, at about the beginning of May 1944, there was a conference at -the Berghof, at which a decision was to be reached. The Führer wanted to -hear our views as to whether the Hungarian Army should be dissolved, or -whether it should be left as it was. At the end of this discussion, -which was of a purely military nature, the Reich Foreign Minister said -to the Führer, “Can we not send all the Hungarian Jews by ship to some -neutral country?” The Führer answered, “That is easier said than done. -Do you think that is possible? No one would take them. Besides, it is -technically impossible.” That is my recollection of this talk. - -DR. HORN: You spoke yesterday of the expulsion of the Danish Jews, and -you said that this expulsion took place on Himmler’s orders. An -affidavit by a Colonel Mildner has been submitted to me, in which it is -asserted that this expulsion took place on the orders of the Reich -Foreign Minister. Is that statement true? - -JODL: Before this Himmler-Führer conference, which caused me to send my -teletype message to the Wehrmacht Commander in Denmark, I never heard a -word about the Jews being deported from Denmark, and I never heard that -the Foreign Office had any part in it. - -DR. HORN: Did you ever get to know anything about the basic attitude of -the Defendant Von Ribbentrop toward the Jewish question? - -JODL: Apart from this suggestion about the Hungarian Jews, I do not -recall any talk by the Reich Foreign Minister, at which I was present, -in which there was any mention of Jews. - -DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions. - -DR. KRAUS: Did I understand you correctly, Generaloberst, when you -testified yesterday that in 1935 it was decided to set up 36 divisions? - -JODL: That is true, yes. - -DR. KRAUS: I am interested to know how many divisions were ready by 1 -April 1938? I am interested in this key date because on that day the -financial aid of the Reichsbank stopped. Can you tell me how many -divisions were ready on 1 April 1938? - -JODL: At that time there were about 27 or 28 divisions actually -ready—that is, as regards personnel and materiel. - -DR. KRAUS: Can you tell me, Generaloberst, how they were made up? - -JODL: I cannot say with certainty. - -DR. KRAUS: Approximately? - -JODL: I do know that only one Panzer division was ready at that time, -one cavalry division, one mountain division, and the rest were probably -infantry divisions. The other Panzer divisions were not yet equipped, -and they existed only as skeleton formations. - -DR. KRAUS: I would like to know to what extent this armament was -increased between that date and the outbreak of the war on 1 September -1939—that is, increased from 27 divisions? - -JODL: From the autumn of 1938 on, the picture became much more favorable -because the preparations in the armament industry were now producing -results, and plenty of equipment was being delivered for the divisions; -also, because from this time on, the trained age groups were beginning -to come in. Therefore, in the late autumn of 1938, we were in a position -to set up approximately 55 divisions—including reserve divisions—even -though some of them may have been only poorly equipped. In 1939—as I -said before, according to my recollection—there were between 73 and 75 -divisions. - -DR. KRAUS: Therefore, the number of divisions set up after March or -April of 1938, after President Schacht left the Reichsbank, increased by -200 percent in 15 or 16 months, whereas it took more than 3 years to set -up 27 divisions? - -JODL: That is true, except that these 55 divisions, or rather these 75, -were still very short of equipment in the same way as the small number -in the spring of 1938, or in April 1938, which I mentioned. But the fact -that from that time on armament went much faster was due—as I have -said—to the very nature of things. - -DR. KRAUS: Thank you, I have no further questions. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you testified yesterday that the Intelligence -Service during Kaltenbrunner’s time was better organized than before. -Please tell me, what position did Kaltenbrunner hold during your time in -the OKW? - -JODL: I met Kaltenbrunner when... - -THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Dr. Kauffmann, you have asked a general -question. We have had all of Kaltenbrunner’s positions given to us more -than once. What is it you want to know? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, Kaltenbrunner only testified quite -generally to the fact that his intelligence service was connected with -the military Intelligence Service. This witness can tell us what this -connection of the military Intelligence Service with the other -intelligence service amounted to, especially as regards its scope and -its influence on policy as a whole. - -THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t understand you to ask him anything about the -Intelligence Service. You asked him a quite general question about what -relations he had had with the OKW during the time that the defendant was -connected with the OKW, in perfectly general terms. It might have -involved an answer which would take about an hour. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: May I restate the question which apparently did not come -through properly? - -Witness, you testified yesterday that in Kaltenbrunner’s time the whole -Intelligence Service was better organized than before that time—that -is, under Canaris. Now, I ask you what position did Kaltenbrunner have -within the Intelligence Service? - -JODL: Kaltenbrunner... - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the particular question that you want to ask? The -Tribunal do not think that you ought to ask general questions of this -nature. If you have got anything particular that you want to know about, -you can ask it. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: What did Kaltenbrunner do during the situation -discussions which took place daily? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is scarcely possible to imagine any -more general question than that with reference to Kaltenbrunner: What -was his activity over a number of years? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I said, during the situation report, that -is, the daily military conferences—how did Kaltenbrunner conduct -himself? What did he do? What did he say? Did he report? What did his -reports consist of? That, in my opinion, is a concrete question. - -THE PRESIDENT: What time are you asking about? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking about the time after his appointment as Chief -of the Reich Security Main Office, the time from 1943 on. That is the -only time which is in question. - -THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him with reference to particular conferences, -certainly. Why not ask him with reference to particular conferences, if -you know any? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: That was my intention. - -Witness, do you understand what the question is? Will you please tell -me? - -JODL: As far as I recall, until the spring of 1945 when the headquarters -were finally moved to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, Kaltenbrunner did -not take part in any situation discussions. I cannot recall ever seeing -him at a discussion in the Führer’s headquarters. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Excuse me, do you mean 1944 or 1945? - -JODL: 1945. From the spring of 1945—that is, from the end of January, I -frequently met Kaltenbrunner in the Reich Chancellery. Before that time -he came to the Führer’s headquarters, from time to time, and talked to -me there—especially about taking over the Canaris Intelligence -Service—but he was not present at the situation conferences of the -Führer. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did he submit written military situation reports? - -JODL: Before he took over the Intelligence Service from Canaris—he took -it over on 1 May 1944—before he took over the Intelligence Service, he -sent me from time to time very good reports from the southeastern area, -and these reports first called my attention to his experience in the -Intelligence Service. He then took over the Intelligence Service, and -although I was against it at first, after I had expressed my views to -him I even supported him, for I had the impression that the man knew his -business. After that, of course, I constantly received reports from -Kaltenbrunner as I previously had received them from Canaris. Not only -did I receive the daily reports from agents, but from time to time he -sent what I should call a political survey on the basis of the -individual agent’s reports. These comprehensive situation reports about -the political situation everywhere abroad attracted my special attention -because they summed up our whole military situation with a frankness, -soberness, and seriousness which had not been at all noticeable in -Canaris’ reports. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you also testified yesterday that after the -daily military situation conference was ended, Hitler gathered around -him his trusted confidants and his political men. I ask you now: Was -Kaltenbrunner in this circle of confidants? - -JODL: I never heard of Kaltenbrunner being in this private circle of the -Führer, and I never saw him there. What I saw was a purely official -attitude. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you, I have no more questions. - -FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): -Generaloberst, Grossadmiral Dönitz is accused of calling on the Navy to -continue to fight in the spring of 1945. Did you yourself, as a -responsible military adviser, advise the Führer at that time to -capitulate? - -JODL: I did not advise him to capitulate at that time. That was -completely out of the question. No soldier would have done that. It -would have been of no use. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes -Offensive in February 1945? - -JODL: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive. The Führer -realized the situation, as a whole, as well as we did, and probably much -sooner than we did. Therefore, we did not need to say anything to him in -this connection. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the reasons for not doing this? - -JODL: In the winter of 1944 there were many reasons for not doing this, -apart from the fact that the question of capitulation or discontinuing -resistance concerns only the Supreme Commander. The reasons against it -were, primarily, that we had no doubt there could be only unconditional -surrender, for the other countries left us in no doubt on that score; -and even if we had had any doubt as to what faced us, it was completely -removed by the fact that we captured the English “Eclipse”—the -gentlemen of the British Delegation will know what that is. It was exact -instructions about what the occupying power was to do in Germany after -the capitulation. Now, unconditional surrender meant that the troops -would cease to fight where they stood on all the fronts, and be captured -by the enemy facing them. The same thing would happen as happened in the -winter of 1941 at Vyazma. Millions of prisoners would suddenly have to -camp in the middle of winter in the open. Death would have taken an -enormous toll. - -Above all, the men still on the Eastern Front, who numbered about 3½ -million, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy in the East. It -was our endeavor to save as many people as possible by sending them into -the western area. That could only be done by drawing the two fronts -closer together. Those were the purely military opinions which we held -in the last stages of the war. I believe that in years to come there -will be more to say about this than I can say or wish to say today. - -DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, how long have you known Field Marshal Keitel? - -JODL: I believe I met him in 1932 when he was chief of the -organizational department of the Army. - -DR. NELTE: And from that time, except for the time you were in Vienna, -you always worked with him? - -JODL: There was a time when Field Marshal Keitel was not in the War -Ministry but in the field. I believe that was in 1934-35. I then lost -sight of him. Otherwise I was with him all the time. - -DR. NELTE: Was your work with him only official, or did you have -personal relations with him? - -JODL: In the course of the years, as a result of all we went through -together, these relations became very personal. - -DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have characterized Field Marshal Keitel as -one of the most powerful officers of the Wehrmacht. They charge him with -using this position to influence Hitler. Other circles represented here -called Keitel, weak, and accused him of not being able to achieve his -purpose in his position. - -I do not want to ask any questions which have previously been asked and -answered; but there are questions which have been previously answered in -various ways—as you have heard—and only a person like you can answer -them, a person who worked with the Field Marshal for more than a decade. -Therefore, please tell me briefly—making your sentences short—what the -official relations were between Keitel and Hitler. - -JODL: The official relations between the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel -were exactly the same as between the Führer and me, but on a somewhat -different level. They were purely official, especially in the beginning. -They were interspersed, just as in the case of all other higher -officers, by constant clashes between a revolutionary and a Prussian -officer bound by tradition. - -DR. NELTE: Then, these clashes, the result of differing opinions, were a -daily occurrence? - -JODL: They were a daily occurrence and in effect led to extremely -unpleasant scenes, such scenes as made one ashamed, as a senior officer, -to have to listen to such things in the presence of young adjutants. The -entry in my diary proves that on 19 April 1940, for instance, Field -Marshal Keitel threw his portfolio on the table and left the room. That -is a fact. - -DR. NELTE: May I ask what the reason was? - -THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Nelte. If you want him to confirm the evidence -which the Defendant Keitel has given, why don’t you ask him whether he -confirms it? - -DR. NELTE: These are questions, Mr. President, which I have not -submitted to Field Marshal Keitel. My line of questioning became -necessary because between the questioning of the defendant... - -THE PRESIDENT: The question you put to him was: What were his relations -with the Führer? You could not have put it any wider than that, and you -certainly covered that with the Defendant Keitel. - -DR. NELTE: I discussed it with Keitel. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have put the question to Keitel, and Keitel answered -it at great length. - -DR. NELTE: Mr. President, after Keitel was questioned, a witness -appeared here who would discredit the statement of Field Marshal Keitel, -if what he says is true. Therefore, in order to clarify, I must... - -THE PRESIDENT: That is the very reason why I asked you whether you -wanted this witness to confirm what the Defendant Keitel said, and—if -you did—why you didn’t ask him whether he did confirm the evidence of -Keitel. - -DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, you have heard that we can simplify the -question on this matter. I submit to you that which the witness Gisevius -said here, in this room, about Field Marshal Keitel. It was, for the -main part, in contradiction to what Field Marshal Keitel, and the other -witnesses questioned about Keitel, had said. I point out that Gisevius -did not speak from his own knowledge, but that he was given information -from the OKW. If you want to consider that, please answer the question -now: According to your knowledge of these things, is it true what Field -Marshal Keitel said under oath—and which was confirmed by others, with -the exception of Gisevius—or is it true what Gisevius said? - -JODL: Only that is true which Field Marshal Keitel said. I experienced -it on thousands of days. What the witness Gisevius said in this -connection are general figures of speech. Apart from Hitler, there was -no powerful man; there was and could be no influential man next to him. - -DR. NELTE: The witness Gisevius mentioned an example to prove that -Keitel prevented certain reports from being presented to Hitler. Since -you had a part in this document, I should like to have this one document -presented to you, and ask you to comment on it. It is Document 790-PS. -This document is not an actual set of minutes, but a note for the files, -as you see. It is about the _White Book_ which was prepared on the -alleged Belgian and Dutch violations of neutrality. And in this -connection, the witness Gisevius said: - - “I believe that I should cite two more examples which I consider - especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to - incite Keitel to warn Hitler before the invasion of Belgium and - Holland, and to tell him—that is, Hitler—that the information - which had been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged - violation of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. - Counterintelligence”—that is Canaris—“was to produce these - reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral - Canaris, at that time, refused to sign these reports.... He told - Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which were supposedly - produced by the OKW, were wrong. - - “That is one instance when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler - that which he should have.” - -Generaloberst, I ask you to confirm, after you have looked over this -document, that these notes show that Field Marshal Keitel and you were -expected to cover false reports, and that on the basis of the Canaris -report—contained in Part A—the OKW refused to cover this _White Book_. -Is that true? - -[_There was no response._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you understand the question, will you answer it? - -JODL: I understand the question, and I should like to establish the -facts here briefly, and tell how it really was as far as I can without -being choked with disgust. - -I was present when Canaris came to the Reich Chancellery with this -report to Field Marshal Keitel, and submitted to him the draft of the -_White Book_ of the Foreign Office. Field Marshal Keitel then looked -through this book and listened carefully to the essential remarks which -Canaris made, at the wish of the Foreign Office, to the effect that the -intelligence needed perhaps some improvement, that he was to confirm -that military action against Holland and Belgium was absolutely -necessary, and that, as it says here, a final really flagrant violation -of neutrality was still lacking. Before Canaris had said another word, -Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on the table, and said, “I will not -stand for that. How could I assume responsibility for a political -decision? In this _White Book_ are, word for word, the reports which you -yourself—Canaris—gave me.” - -Whereupon Canaris said, “I am of exactly the same opinion. In my -opinion, it is completely superfluous to have this document signed by -the Wehrmacht, and the reports which we have here, as a whole, are quite -sufficient to substantiate the breaches of neutrality which have taken -place in Holland and in Belgium.” And he advised Field Marshal Keitel -against signing it. - -That is what took place. The Field Marshal took the book with him, and I -do not know what happened after that. But one thing is certain, that the -imaginary reports of this Herr Gisevius turn everything upside down. All -these reports about the violations of neutrality came from these people -who now assert that we had signed them falsely. This is one of the most -despicable incidents of world history. - -DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, Admiral Canaris played a part in this case. -Gisevius said, “It was not possible for Admiral Canaris to submit an -urgent report to Hitler on his own initiative.” He asserts that Canaris -gave reports to Field Marshal Keitel who did not submit them. I ask you, -is that true? - -JODL: Of course, I did not follow up every document that came to Field -Marshal Keitel; but Field Marshal Keitel submitted everything which was -considered necessary for the Führer to know about. I have already said -that if Canaris had not been satisfied in this connection, he could have -gone to the Führer directly. He had only to go into the next office and -inform the Führer’s chief adjutant, or he had only to tell me. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you don’t know, why don’t you say so? If you don’t -know whether he gave it to the Führer or not, say so. - -DR. NELTE: I only asked whether the testimony is true, that Admiral -Canaris could not go to Hitler. I wanted you to answer that question. - -JODL: In fact, he went to the Führer dozens of times. - -DR. NELTE: If he wanted it, he had access at any time? - -JODL: Absolutely, at any time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, will you tell me what page in the shorthand notes -this evidence is of Gisevius? - -DR. NELTE: The evidence about Keitel is in the transcript of the session -of 26 April 1946 (Volume XII, Pages 265 to 271). - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. NELTE: I now want to show you two affidavits which you signed -together with Field Marshal Keitel, which have also been submitted to -the Tribunal. These are the Affidavit Number Keitel-9, High Command of -the Wehrmacht and General Staff, and the Affidavit Number Keitel-13, -Development of the Conditions in France, 1940 to 1945, and the military -competencies. - -You remember that you signed these affidavits? - -JODL: I did so, yes. - -DR. NELTE: And if you are sure of that, do you remember the contents? - -JODL: Yes. - -DR. NELTE: You confirm the accuracy of your affidavit? - -JODL: I confirm this statement. - -DR. NELTE: I will not read these affidavits or parts of them. On the -subject of rearmament—that is, regarding General Thomas, who was also -given here as a source of information—I should like to ask you a few -questions. - -You know that the Prosecution submitted a voluminous book here, Document -2353-PS, which is a description of the rearmament, written by General -Thomas. As General Thomas was also given by the witness Gisevius here as -a source of information, I must question you about Thomas. In his -affidavit, which is attached to Document 2353-PS, he said that on 1 -February 1943 he was released from the OKW. Do you know whether that is -true or not? - -JODL: As far as I can recall, he was assigned to the group of officers -for special employment by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. He was -therefore at the disposal of Field Marshal Keitel. - -DR. NELTE: Did he not have a special assignment when he was made -available for special employment? - -JODL: He took over several assignments after that, I believe. - -DR. NELTE: I only wanted to ascertain that also after 1 February 1943, -General Thomas was still given assignments by the OKW, especially that -of writing this book which has been submitted here, is that true? - -JODL: That is true, that he was engaged in writing what might be called -the “History of Rearmament.” - -DR. NELTE: What was his relation to Field Marshal Keitel? - -JODL: I know of that from the time when the two men worked -together—that was only before the war and at the very beginning of the -war, and the relations were good. - -DR. NELTE: Do you know the reports of General Thomas concerning -rearmament? - -JODL: I have no exact recollection of any reports about our own -rearmament. I can only recall reports about the war potential of our -enemies. I remember those. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you going to be much longer, because it is -10 minutes past 5, and if you are not going to conclude tonight we had -better adjourn. - -DR. NELTE: I will need a quarter of an hour yet. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn at this time. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH DAY - Thursday, 6 June 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._] - -DR. NELTE: General, yesterday in answer to my last question about -General Thomas you said that he regularly made reports on the war -potential of enemy powers to you and Field Marshal Keitel. Were these -important reports always submitted to Hitler? - -JODL: These reports, with detailed graphic descriptions, sketches, and -drawings, were regularly submitted to the Führer and often occasioned -violent disputes, because the Führer considered this representation of -the enemy potential as greatly exaggerated. - -DR. NELTE: Did you and Field Marshal Keitel hold the point of view that -the representations of General Thomas were well-founded? - -JODL: Field Marshal Keitel and I were both of the opinion that, after a -very careful study of enemy achievements in armament production, these -statements of Thomas were doubtless on the whole completely accurate. - -DR. NELTE: You heard the witness Gisevius say that Thomas was supposed -to have been an opponent of Hitler’s war leadership. In the course of -years and in the reports made, did you ever realize this fact? - -JODL: I did not observe this. The only thing that I observed was that he -objected to this exaggerated optimism in which the Führer habitually -indulged, and that perhaps in his basic attitude he was of a pessimistic -rather than an optimistic nature. - -DR. NELTE: Was General Thomas dismissed from his position as head of the -Economic Armament Office of the OKW through Keitel’s efforts? - -JODL: No, at the time he retired from active service General Thomas was -under Minister Speer, but Minister Speer no longer cared to work with -him and requested the Führer that he be dismissed from the armament -office which Minister Speer had taken over. And that was done by the -Field Marshal on the order of the Führer. - -DR. NELTE: I can therefore establish... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, how is the evidence about General Thomas -relevant to the case of Keitel—how is the question of whether General -Thomas was acting against the supposed interests of Germany or not -relevant to the cases of either Keitel or Jodl? The evidence of Gisevius -was relevant to the case of the Defendant Schacht. It seems to me—and I -think, to the Tribunal—to be entirely irrelevant to the case of either -the defendant whom you represent or the case of the Defendant Jodl. What -does it matter to us whether General Thomas was acting in order to try -and overthrow Hitler or not? - -DR. NELTE: The question which concerns the Defendant Keitel is whether -Field Marshal Keitel submitted and supported the reports handed in by -Thomas. The witness Gisevius said here, referring to Thomas as a source -of information, that these reports of Thomas were kept from Hitler. -Therefore this evidence... - -THE PRESIDENT: We went into that yesterday and now the Defendant Jodl -has said that the reports of Thomas were submitted to the Führer. But -what I was pointing out to you was that the question whether Thomas was -making his reports honestly or not is a matter which is entirely -irrelevant. - -DR. NELTE: Not as to the credibility of Gisevius’ sources of -information, in my opinion; but I will withdraw this question. However, -in this connection I must ask one more question with regard to the other -source of information, Canaris. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Canaris was a regular and frequent guest -in the Führer’s headquarters and a guest of yours. What were the -relations of Field Marshal Keitel to his oldest office chief? - -JODL: The relations between Field Marshal Keitel and Canaris from the -first day to the last were remarkably friendly, and unfortunately one of -too much blind confidence. - -DR. NELTE: May I ask what the relations were after the 20th of July? - -JODL: I know that even after the 20th of July Field Marshal Keitel did -not believe the charges against Canaris and that after the arrest of -Canaris he supported his family with money. - -DR. NELTE: How were the relations between Canaris and Heydrich? - -JODL: I mentioned that once before. Canaris always tried to maintain -especially good relations with Himmler and Heydrich so that they would -not distrust him. - -DR. NELTE: What can you say about the attitude of Field Marshal Keitel -to Hitler’s plan in October 1939, the plan to attack in the West? - -JODL: I know that Field Marshal Keitel was apparently strongly impressed -by the attitude of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the General -Staff of the Army and also raised a warning voice against this attack in -the West. I know it, although I did not experience it personally; but -Schmundt told me about it later—I know that during this time he also -had a controversy with the Führer which led to the first request to -resign. This is what I can report according to what Schmundt told me; I -did not witness it myself, nor did Field Marshal Keitel tell me about it -personally then. - -DR. NELTE: In Document 447-PS, which the Prosecution submitted—these -are the guiding principles for special tasks issued with Directive -Number 21—under I, 2b, is the now famous paragraph according to which, -in the operational area of the Army, the Reichsführer SS is given -special tasks on behalf of the Führer in connection with the preparation -of a political administration, resulting from the inevitable conflict -between two opposing political systems. So much for the brief citation. -I will not hand the document to you since you are certainly well -acquainted with it, and to make the matter brief I will only ask you to -tell the Court how Field Marshal Keitel reacted to the issuing of this -order. - -JODL: The claim of the Führer to infringe upon the sovereignty of the -Army in its operational area with Himmler and the Police led to days of -bitter disputes with the Führer. The same disputes had already taken -place when Terboven was appointed in Norway. One need only read my -entries in my diary, 1780-PS. Of course I know today why the Führer -insisted on this point of view under all circumstances and why he forced -the Police, under Himmler, into the operational area. It was against all -our rules. It was against all previous agreements with the Police and -with Himmler, but in the end the Führer put this measure through in -spite of resistance all along the line. - -DR. NELTE: The Prosecution asserted here that in 1940 Field Marshal -Keitel gave the order to kill General Weygand, at that time Chief of the -General Staff of the French Army. This statement is based essentially on -testimony of the witness General Lahousen. I have a few brief questions -to put to you on this matter. Was Field Marshal Keitel competent to -order the killing of a general? - -JODL: No. Any death sentence at all had to be confirmed by the Führer. - -DR. NELTE: Well, I naturally do not mean a death sentence—in this -connection. - -JODL: Well. No one at all has the authority to order murder to be -committed. - -DR. NELTE: I ask this because Lahousen’s testimony made it appear as if -this order had been given by Field Marshal Keitel to Admiral Canaris. If -we assume that such an order was issued by Hitler, this would have been -a politically highly important act considering the importance of -Weygand. - -JODL: Undoubtedly. - -DR. NELTE: Would it not also have been a foolish act in terms of policy? - -JODL: It would first of all have been a crime... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, this is all argument, and you are putting your -questions in an entirely leading form. The real objection to it is that -it is argumentative. Go on. - -DR. NELTE: If such an order had been given, could it have remained -unknown to you? - -JODL: I cannot imagine that Field Marshal Keitel, charged with the -ordering of the murder, would not have spoken about it to me. - -DR. NELTE: What exactly did you hear about the Weygand case? - -JODL: I never heard a single word about the Weygand case. I heard only -one thing when Himmler reported to the Führer in my presence: “I have -given Weygand a very nice villa in Baden. He is completely provided for -there in such a way that he can be satisfied.” That is the only thing I -ever heard in which the name of Weygand figured. - -DR. NELTE: The witness Lahousen was also heard in the case of General -Giraud. Did you also know anything of this case of Giraud which -attracted much attention? - -JODL: I heard a little more about the Giraud case. Shortly after the -successful flight of Giraud, Field Marshal Keitel told me once in a -conversation that he was having Giraud watched by Canaris so that he -would not, as the Führer always feared, go to North Africa and there -direct the formation of the Colonial Army against us or, so that he -could be arrested in the event that he should rejoin his family in the -territory actually occupied. That is what he told me. Several months -later he said to me again, “I have now withdrawn this assignment to -Canaris because the Führer has given it to Himmler. If two agencies are -concerned with it there will only be difficulties and differences.” The -third time I heard about the Giraud case was when Field Marshal Keitel -told me that a deputy of Giraud—I believe it was about the end of 1943 -or in the spring of 1944—approached the counterintelligence service and -said that Giraud, who could not agree with De Gaulle in North Africa, -asked whether he might not return to France. I told Field Marshal Keitel -then that we absolutely must agree to that immediately because that was -extremely favorable for us politically. That is the only thing I ever -heard about the Giraud case. Nothing else. - -DR. NELTE: The day before yesterday you spoke about the talks in the -Führer’s train in September 1939, at which General Lahousen was also -present. In this connection you said, “I have no objections to -Lahousen’s statement.” But to avoid misunderstandings, I should like you -to say whether you mean by that that all the testimony of Lahousen, -which also referred to Giraud and Weygand, is credible and correct, or -only the part regarding your presence in the Führer’s train? - -JODL: Of course, I meant only those statements of Lahousen which he made -about me. As for the other statements which were made here, I have my -own opinion, but perhaps that is not appropriate here. - -DR. NELTE: Yesterday, in answer to a question by Dr. Stahmer, you spoke -about the dispute on the occasion of the 80 RAF officers who escaped. In -order to clarify this question, which weighs heavily against Field -Marshal Keitel, I should like to know the following: Did you hear that -Keitel objected violently because the recaptured RAF officers were -turned over to Himmler, that is, to the Gestapo? - -JODL: When I stood at the curtain for those 1 or 2 minutes, I heard the -Führer say first of all: - - “That is unheard of. That is the tenth time that dozens of - officer prisoners have escaped. These officers are an enormous - danger. You don’t realize”—meaning Keitel—“that in view of the - 6 million foreign people who are prisoners and workers in - Germany, they are the leaders who could organize an uprising. - That is the result of this careless attitude of the commandants. - These escaped Air Force officers are to be turned over to - Himmler immediately.” - -And then I heard Field Marshal Keitel answer: - - “My Führer, some of them have already been put back into the - camp. They are prisoners of war again. I cannot turn them over.” - -And the Führer said, “Very well, then they can stay there.” That is what -I heard with my own ears at that moment, until a telephone conversation -called me away again. - -DR. NELTE: Afterwards did you speak again with Field Marshal Keitel -about this incident? - -JODL: We drove back to Berchtesgaden together from the Berghof. Field -Marshal Keitel was beside himself, for on the way up he had told me that -he would not report the escape of these fliers to the Führer. He hoped -that on the next day he would have them all back. He was furious with -Himmler, who had immediately reported it to the Führer. I told him that -if the Führer, in view of the total situation in Germany, saw such a -great danger in the escape of foreign officers, then England should be -notified so that the order might be rescinded—all officers who were -prisoners had to make an attempt to escape. - -I must say openly that at this moment neither of us had any thought that -these recaptured fliers might be shot. For they had done nothing except -escape from a camp, which German officers had also done dozens of times. -I imagined that he wanted to remove them from the disciplinary action of -the Army, which certainly, in his opinion, would be far too lenient, and -wanted to have them work as punishment for some time in a concentration -camp under Himmler. That is what I imagined. - -DR. NELTE: In any case, in your presence and in your hearing, Hitler’s -orders to Himmler to shoot these officers were not issued? - -JODL: I know that with absolute certainty for I know how I felt when I -suddenly received the news that they had been shot. - -DR. NELTE: Now I should like to ask you a few brief concluding -questions. - -The Tribunal asked the Defendant Keitel on the witness stand whether he -had submitted written applications asking for his resignation. You were -present. What can you tell the Court about Keitel’s efforts to resign -from his position? - -JODL: The first case that I mentioned a while ago must have been in the -spring of 1940, because of the Western campaign. Schmundt told me about -it, but I did not see it myself. The second case about which I know -exactly, was in 1941, November, when there was an enormous controversy -between the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel, and the Führer chose to use -the expression, “I am only dealing with blockheads.” - -THE PRESIDENT: We do not want the details. I mean, if he can tell us -when Keitel attempted to resign... - -JODL: This second case was in the fall of 1941. After the controversy, -Field Marshal Keitel wrote his request for his resignation. When I -entered the room his pistol lay before him on his desk, and I personally -took it away from him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I have told you that the Tribunal does not -want the details, and now we are being told about details about the -resignation, about the way in which it was made. - -DR. NELTE: Can it be of no importance to the Court to know how serious -the matter was to the Defendant Keitel that he even wanted to use his -pistol? - -THE PRESIDENT: He is going into details about the particular desk on -which the document was put, or something of that sort. He made his -efforts to resign in writing. That is of importance. - -DR. NELTE: You can testify about this case when Field Marshal Keitel -handed in his resignation in writing? - -JODL: I myself saw him writing it, and I read the introduction. - -DR. NELTE: If things like this occurred frequently, as you have stated -in the course of your testimony, and went as far as the pistol incident -indicates, how did it happen that Keitel always remained? - -JODL: Because the Führer would not separate from him under any -circumstances. He absolutely refused to let him go. I believe that -various attempts were made in this direction from other sources, too; -but the Führer did not let him go. In the second place, of course our -mutual attitude was that we were, after all, engaged in a war for -existence in which an officer, in the long run, could not stay at home -and knit stockings. Over and over again it was the sense of duty that -won the upper hand and caused us to bear all the difficulties. - -DR. NELTE: You will understand that one must hold up to the generals -“loyalty unto loyalty” and that duty can only go to the point where it -does not injure human dignity. Have you ever thought of that? - -JODL: I have thought a lot about it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is not a question for counsel to put. It is -an argument, is it not? It is argument, not evidence. It is not a proper -question to put. - -DR. NELTE: I have finished. - -DR. THOMA: Witness, is it true that Rosenberg, in the middle of January -1943, gave you and General Zeitzler the draft of a proclamation to the -peoples of eastern Europe? - -JODL: That is true. It was after the discussion on the situation. -Rosenberg was present in headquarters. He asked me and Zeitzler to step -into the next room for a moment and said that he wanted to report to the -Führer a proclamation to the Eastern peoples and that he would like to -submit it to us first. I recall that. - -DR. THOMA: Do you still recall the contents? - -JODL: It was a very extensive concession in regard to the sovereignty of -these individual eastern states. It was an outspoken attempt, through a -policy of reconciliation, to combat unrest and antagonism to the German -system. - -DR. THOMA: Did you express to Rosenberg your pleasure at this -proclamation? - -JODL: We said then that this had always been our idea, but that we had -doubts whether it was not already too late. - -DR. THOMA: What was the success of this memorandum? - -JODL: As Rosenberg told me after the conference, the Führer, as he often -did, pigeonholed the matter; that is, he did not reject it, but he said, -“Put it aside.” - -DR. THOMA: Did you have the impression that Rosenberg’s suggestions -arose from concern about the dangers caused by Koch’s methods? - -JODL: Undoubtedly it was an attempt to counteract these methods which -were gradually used by Himmler and particularly by Koch. - -DR. THOMA: Thank you, I have no more questions. - -DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for SS): Was the strategic assignment of the -divisions of the Waffen-SS under you? - -JODL: The divisions of the Waffen-SS, in regard to assignment, were -generally treated like the divisions of the Army. - -DR. HAENSEL: How many Waffen-SS divisions were there, according to your -recollection? Please mention the number of Wehrmacht divisions also so -that we have a means of comparison. - -JODL: At the beginning of the war, I believe, we began with three SS -divisions. The number increased until the end of the war to an estimated -35 to 37 divisions, as against a number of Army divisions which varied, -but which one can give approximately as about 280, 290, 300. - -DR. HAENSEL: What was the procedure in setting up new divisions? Who -decided whether such a new division would be a Waffen-SS division or a -Wehrmacht division? - -JODL: As soon as the Führer had ordered the establishment of a new -series of divisions he said, after consulting Himmler, that so-and-so -many divisions were to be set up and so-and-so many Waffen-SS divisions. -He determined the number. - -DR. HAENSEL: Was there a certain standard, or was that done arbitrarily? - -JODL: I had the impression that in setting up the SS divisions, the -Führer wanted to go as far as he absolutely could. - -DR. HAENSEL: And what do you consider—when you say “could,” what do you -consider the limit? - -JODL: The limit was in the fact that the soldiers of these Waffen-SS -divisions were to be volunteers; and the time came very soon when -Himmler had to report, “I do not get any more replacements for the -divisions;” and from that time on the situation arose that, when the men -came for military duty, the cream of the crop was taken by the SS, and -these people, even if they were strict Catholic peasants’ sons, were -drafted into the SS divisions. I myself received bitter letters from -peasants’ wives about this. - -DR. HAENSEL: In connection with this drafting into the Waffen-SS that -you have just described, were political viewpoints taken into account? -Was a recruit first questioned politically in some way before he was -turned over to the Waffen-SS, or was no consideration taken of this? - -JODL: No, the decisive thing was that the fellow was big, looked -healthy, and promised to become a good soldier. That was the decisive -thing. - -DR. HAENSEL: You said yesterday that in the drafting of recruits no -consideration was given to whether a man belonged to the SA or not. Is -the same thing true of membership in the General SS? I mean in this -sense, was no consideration given to whether the recruit belonged to the -General SS, either in drafting, in training, or in promotion? - -JODL: Not to such a pronounced extent as in the case of the SA. I -believe that the majority of the men in the General SS came to the -Waffen-SS and volunteered. But I also know that very many did not do -that and were drafted in the normal way by the Army, so that they were -treated in the Army just like any other German. - -DR. HAENSEL: If I understand you correctly then, there were many members -of the General SS on the one hand who served in the Army; and on the -other hand, there were many who belonged neither to the Party nor to the -SS but served in the Waffen-SS? - -JODL: That is true; it does not apply to the very beginning of the war, -but it is absolutely true for the second half of the war. - -DR. HAENSEL: And this second half of the war contained the greater -number? - -JODL: Undoubtedly, that—the second half—I always call that part after -the big losses in the first Russian campaign of 1941. - -DR. HAENSEL: How strong was the total Waffen-SS at the end of the war, -approximately? - -JODL: About 480,000 men. - -DR. HAENSEL: And the losses, that is the dead and captured, would be -added to this number? - -JODL: Yes, they would be added. - -DR. HAENSEL: And do you have any figures in mind about that? - -JODL: It is hard to give an estimate in regard to the SS. - -MR. ROBERTS: Witness, you told the Tribunal 2 days ago that you had -soldiering in the blood, is that right? - -JODL: Yes, this is true. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. And you said yesterday that you were here to -represent the honor of the German soldier, is that right? - -JODL: Yes, I do that to a high degree. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good, yes. And you put yourself forward as an -honorable soldier. - -JODL: With full consciousness, yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: And you put yourself forward as a truthful man. - -JODL: I represented myself as such a man, and I am. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Because of the things you say you have been made -to do in the last 6 or 7 years, do you think your honor has become at -all soiled? - -JODL: My honor was certainly not soiled, for I guarded it personally. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good, you say your honor is not soiled. - -Have you—during the last 6 or 7 years, when causing to be said the -things which you say you had to circulate—has your truthfulness -remained at the same high standard? - -[_There was no response._] - -Can’t you answer that question? - -JODL: I believe I am too dull for that question. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good, then if you are too dull, I won’t persist in it; -I will go on. I will leave the question and I will go on. - -In 1935 you were lieutenant colonel at the head of the Home Defense -Department of the Wehrmacht, is that right? - -JODL: Absolutely right. - -MR. ROBERTS: That is Department L, Landesverteidigung, is that right? - -JODL: Yes, that is correct. - -MR. ROBERTS: And was Field Marshal Von Blomberg your superior? - -JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg was not my direct superior, but one of -my superiors. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you work a good deal with Field Marshal Von Blomberg? - -JODL: On various occasions I reported to him personally, of course not -nearly so much as the Chief of the Armed Forces Department. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you attend staff talks with him? - -JODL: I did not attend large conferences with Blomberg. I believe that -there were seldom more persons than General Keitel and I and perhaps one -other chief of a department. - -MR. ROBERTS: And would they be called staff talks? - -JODL: No, those conferences took place in the Office of the Chief of the -Armed Forces Department. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you go to staff talks? - -JODL: Of course, since I belonged to the staff. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I thought that. - -Now, will you please look at the Document C-139, Exhibit USA-53. First -look at the signature, will you. That is signed by Blomberg, is it not? - -JODL: That is signed by Blomberg, yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, that is dealing with “Operation Schulung.” Do you -remember what Operation Schulung was? - -[_There was no response._] - -That is the reoccupation of the Rhineland, isn’t it? - -[_There was no response._] - -Can’t you answer me? - -JODL: I can answer you as soon as I have read that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the question was whether you remember what -Operation Schulung was. It isn’t necessary to read the document in order -to answer that question. - -JODL: According to my recollection—I do not know whether it comes from -studying the documents here in Nuremberg—the term Schulung meant -preparations for the occupation of the Rhineland after evacuation of the -West Rhine territories in the case of French sanctions... - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good, I agree. - -JODL: But—there is more to be said in that connection. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, wait a moment. That is then dealing with the -reoccupation of the Rhineland; do you agree with that? - -JODL: No, that does not deal with the reoccupation of the Rhineland. -That is absolutely false, but it... - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, just let us look at this document together and see -what it says. Now, first of all, it is dated the 2d of May 1935. - -“For the operation...” I am reading it to you if you will follow it, and -might I make this point first: It is apparently so secret that it -couldn’t be entrusted to a stenographer, isn’t it? The whole document is -written in manuscript, handwriting, isn’t it? - -[_There was no response._] - -MR. ROBERTS: You can answer that question surely. Can’t you see whether -it is in handwriting or not? - -JODL: It is in handwriting, yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, why not say so? - -Now then, let’s just look at the document. It is from the Reich Minister -of Defense; that is Von Blomberg, isn’t it? It is the second copy, “By -hand only.” It is, to the Chief of the High Command, Chief of the Naval -High Command, and the Reich Minister for Air. - - “For the operation suggested in the last staff talks”—that is - why I asked you whether you went to staff talks, you see—“of - the Armed Forces, I lay down the code name, ‘Schulung.’” - -Then, may I just refer briefly to the contents: - - “This is a joint undertaking of the three branches of the - Wehrmacht... The operation must be executed”—and this is a - phrase we have become familiar with later—“by a surprise blow - at lightning speed. - - “Strictest secrecy is necessary ... only peacetime strength....” - -And Number 3: - - “Every improvement of our armaments will make possible a greater - measure of preparedness....” - -And then: - - “The High Command of the Army is asked: How many divisions ready - for action?” - -Not one token battalion as you said yesterday. - - “Reinforcement of the necessarily inadequate forces there”—that - is in the West—“by the East Prussian divisions which will be - brought here at once by rail or sea transport... High Command of - the Navy to look after the safe transport of the East Prussian - troops by sea, in case the overland route is closed.” - -What could that refer to, that secret instruction—so secret it had to -be in manuscript—if it wasn’t the reoccupation of the Rhineland? - -JODL: If you will permit me to make quite a brief explanation, then the -Tribunal will be saved a tremendous lot of time. - -MR. ROBERTS: Please, Witness, answer my question first and then make an -explanation after, if it is brief. The question is, what could it refer -to except the reoccupation of the Rhineland? - -JODL: I am not here as a clairvoyant; I do not know the document; I have -never read it; at this time I was not in the Armed Forces -Department—that has entirely different signatures—I was in the -operations section of the Army. I neither saw nor ever heard of this -paper. If you look at the date, 2 May 1935, it is proven there in -writing, for I entered the Armed Forces Department only in the middle of -June 1935. Thus, only on the basis of my general staff training can I -give you some assumptions; but the Court do not want assumptions. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good, if that is your answer. And are you saying that -you, who heard General Field Marshal Von Blomberg’s staff talk, cannot -help the Court at all as to what that secret operation order is about? - -JODL: It was before my time. I was not with Von Blomberg then. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, will you look, please at EC-405. Now—let -him see the German book, Page 277. - -My Lord, that is Page 26. Hasn’t he a German book? - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you did say, did you not, that you remember -that the Operation Schulung was the preparation for the occupation of -the Rhineland? - -JODL: No, I said the contrary. I said that I heard the word, Schulung, -for the first time here in the Court; and then I wondered what that -could have been. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Court will be able to judge as to what you said -by the shorthand notes. You say, do you, that you did not say Schulung -meant the preparation for the occupation of the Rhineland? Is that -right? - -JODL: I mean, that as General Staff officer of the operations section at -that time I had to know what military preparations were made. - -THE PRESIDENT: But, that is not what I asked you. What I want to know is -what you said just now when you were asked if you remembered what -Operation Schulung meant. What did you say? It is suggested that it may -have come through wrongly to us in the translation. What did you say? - - JODL: I said, “I believe I recall, but I am not certain whether - this recollection did not result from studying the documents - here or earlier, that the word, Schulung, meant the preparations - for the evacuation of the western Rhine territory and occupation - of the Rhine boundary in case of French sanctions, for that was - the only thing with which we were concerned at that time.” - -All the evacuation measures which I later mentioned anyway in Document -EC-405 were part of that. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, you remember the date of that first document, 2d of -May 1935. Now I refer to EC-405 which is in the big Document Book 7, -Page 261, and it is on Page 277 of the German book, 277. Now this, -Witness, is a meeting—I want you to look, please, at Pages 43 and 44 of -the original which you have. Have you got 43 and 44? - -JODL: 43 and 44, yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, now, you see there—it is a meeting of the -working committee of the Reich Defense Council. It is dated the 26th of -June 1935 and at letter “F:” “Lieutenant Colonel Jodl ... about -‘participation in Mobilization Preparations,’” and the first three -paragraphs deal with general mobilization; and I do not want to read -them, but the fourth paragraph reads: - - “Demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his speech of - 21 May 1935 and other utterances the Führer has stated that the - stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact - regarding the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the - _aide-mémoire_ of the French Chargé d’Affaires of 17 June 1935 - on ‘Recruiting Offices in the Demilitarized Zone,’ the German - Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting - authorities nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have - been entrusted with mobilization tasks such as the raising, - equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of - war or in preparation thereof.” - -Now, if Von Blomberg’s handwritten letter of the 2d of May 1935 did -refer to preparations for reoccupying the Rhineland by surprise, it was -highly dishonest of the Führer, 19 days later on the 21st of May, to say -that the Locarno and Versailles treaties were being observed, wasn’t it? - -JODL: No, it wasn’t dishonest, for if it is true at all that the term, -Schulung... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think that is a matter of comment, if you please. - -MR. ROBERTS: I shall, of course, My Lord, have to make certain comments -on the witness as I proceed. No doubt Your Lordship will realize that I -am not endeavoring to depart from this particular ruling which is only -for this particular question, presumably. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think—the Tribunal think that you ought not to make -comments but you ought to confine yourself as far as possible to -cross-examination about the facts. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, My Lord I—about your Lordship’s ruling—I have had, -of course, a very extensive experience in cross-examination in many -courts, and I bow entirely to Your Lordship’s ruling; but it is very -difficult for a cross-examiner to confine himself entirely to the facts. -But I shall do the very best I can. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Then I shall read on: - - “Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present - under all circumstances, only those preparatory measures that - are urgently necessary may be carried out in the demilitarized - zone. The existence of such preparations or the intention of - making them must be kept strictly secret in the zone itself as - well as in the rest of the Reich.... - - “Weapons, equipment, insignia, field-gray uniforms, and other - items stored for mobilization purposes must be kept from sight.” - -And now I want to refer to the last paragraph: - - “Commitment to writing of directives for mobilization purposes - is permissible only insofar as it is absolutely necessary to the - smooth execution of the measures provided for the demilitarized - zone. Without exception such material must be kept in safes.” - -You were collecting weapons and uniforms in the demilitarized zone, were -you? - -JODL: They were weapons and items of equipment of the Landespolizei, the -Order Police, and the Gendarmerie. There were no troops there. -Consequently, there were no weapons there for them. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did the Police wear field-gray uniforms? - -JODL: To my knowledge the Police wore a gray-green uniform or a green -uniform. - -MR. ROBERTS: Then what was the need of this great secrecy if this was -only police equipment? - -JODL: It was the equipment in addition for the reinforced border -guards—the customs inspectors—about which I have already said that it -was intended... - -MR. ROBERTS: My question, Witness, was what was the need for secrecy? -What was the need for secrecy if you were not breaking the Treaty of -Versailles? Can’t you answer that? - -JODL: I have already testified to the reasons for keeping all these -measures secret in detail during my direct examination, and I confirm -that in all these preparations it was a question—in case of an -occupation of the western Rhenish territory by France—of setting up a -blockade along the line with the aid of the Police, the Gendarmerie, and -the reinforced border guards. That was the intention at that time, only -for this eventuality. I have already testified under oath that I learned -about the occupation of the Rhineland only 6 or 8 days beforehand. - -MR. ROBERTS: I know you have, you see, and I am suggesting to you that -your evidence was quite untrue on that point; and I am going to suggest -it is quite untrue on many points. Now then, will you please go back to -the first paragraph that I read. You say: - - “To the _aide-mémoire_ of the French Chargé d’Affaires ... the - German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian - recruiting authorities nor other offices ... have been entrusted - with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping, and - arming of any kind of formations for the event of war....” - -Doesn’t that subsequent paragraph about the weapons, equipment, -insignia, and field-gray uniforms show that the truth was not told to -the French Chargé d’Affaires? - -JODL: I only repeat the answer that was given to the French Chargé -d’Affaires. I believe that that was essentially true: No mobilization -tasks, such as disposition, equipment, and arming of formations for the -event of war. There was no thought of war, no one mentioned it with even -one word. - -MR. ROBERTS: I will not repeat the point, I submitted—may I just remind -you—and I think there are copies for the Tribunal too—of Article 43 of -the Versailles Treaty. - -Article 42 defines the area, the left bank of the Rhine and the right -bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east. Article 43: - - “In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of - armed forces, either permanently of temporarily, and military - maneuvers of any kind; as well as the upkeep of all permanent - works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.” - -I suggest to you the step you were taking—mentioning at that -meeting—was a clear breach of Versailles. Do you agree, or don’t you? - -JODL: No, I do not agree to that. They were taken in the event that the -enemy should not abide by the treaty and should attack us again, as that -time in the Ruhr district. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now I propose to refer to you a document which -has been described as your speech, L-172, from time to time—and I want -to make it quite clear first as to what you say the document is, because -you wouldn’t say one thing one day and the opposite the next, would you, -Witness? That document has your writing in places, has it not? I can -refer you to the pages if you like. If you look at page... - -JODL: That is unnecessary. It contains many handwritten corrections and -notations by me. But I have... - -MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Witness, for saving me that trouble then. And is -that a speech—the notes of a speech—which you delivered at Munich to -the Gauleiter in 1943? - -JODL: I have already clearly said that this was the rough draft, not the -speech that I made but parts of the first draft and most of the contents -consist of notes by my staff, which they sent me for the preparation of -this speech. I crossed out whole pages and sent the whole rough draft -back again and only then did I make my speech. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well now, I want to examine that, because you said quite -differently, did you not, when you were interrogated by one American -officer on two separate occasions? You said quite differently, did you -not? - -[_There was no response._] - -Were you interrogated on this matter on the 8th of October last year by -Colonel Thomas Hinkel? Do you remember that? Perhaps you would not -remember the date. - -JODL: No. Oh, we spoke about this matter a few times. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, and you were sworn when you gave your answers to the -interrogators? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well now, may I read, to refresh your memory, a copy from -the shorthand notes of the interrogation? - - “I show you a photostatic reproduction of a number of pages of a - lecture, which was purported to have been given by you on the - 7th of November 1943, and ask you if those pages represent the - lecture that was delivered. For the record, that is identified - as L-172.” - -Then you answer: - - “Yes. A number of things are not contained therein, which I - explained with the map. - - “Question: ‘You interpolated the remarks that do not appear in - the written part; is that correct?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes, many particulars I set forth just with the map at - hand.’ - - “Question: ‘Is that your handwriting appearing on the cover - page?’ - - “Answer: ‘No, it is not mine.’ - - “But the remaining sheets you identify as the written version of - a lecture at Munich? - - “Answer: ‘I cannot say whether it was actually my lecture as it - was, because I see the signature of Buttlar. It isn’t the - lecture itself. That is the materials of the brochures which had - been furnished to me.’” - -Then: - - “Do you identify...” - -Just follow this, will you, Witness? - - “Do you identify the first 29 pages as constituting the lecture - that you delivered? - - “Answer (after examining the document): ‘Yes, that is my - lecture.’” - -Do you want to alter that sworn answer now? Do you? - -JODL: I have not read the transcript of the notes which were taken here. -I do not know the translation. I made several other statements in that -regard. I observed in the second interrogation that that was not -actually my speech, and that... - -MR. ROBERTS: I will read the second one, Witness. I have that for you. -This was on the 16th... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, had you finished what you wanted to say? - -JODL: No, I had not finished. I was interrupted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then finish what you want to say. - -JODL: I wanted to say that before I had looked over the whole document, -at the first moment, of course, I had the impression that that was the -copy from which I delivered my speech. However, when I looked at it more -carefully in the course of the interrogations, I noticed that it was -only the material collected for this speech, and I said clearly and -distinctly: - - “It contains the first draft, the outline and the conclusion by - me. The whole middle part is only material furnished by my - staff, and the whole thing is not at all the speech which I - gave.” - -That is word for word what I told Colonel Hinkel. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Let me read now what I was going to read, the second -interrogation. This is the 16th of November 1945, 4 days before the -Trial: - - “This document is identified for the record as L-172. I show you - the photostatic reproduction in order to refresh your - recollection concerning it. - - “As I remember your previous testimony, it was to the effect - that the first part of the document is the speech that you wrote - for delivery to that meeting. The second part consists of - various thoughts on the basis of which this speech was prepared; - is that right? - - “Answer: ‘One moment, please. This is not my real lecture. This - is a conglomeration of the pieces of writings which are partly - drafts of my own, that is, the introduction; but all the - appendices are the basis of my lecture furnished me by my staff. - - “‘The photostats appended to the original lecture—it was a - photographed copy—and also a number of maps which were drawn up - were included. - - “‘This is not my lecture as such; and the annotations made here, - in this calligraphic manner, were not mine. I made them in my - own handwriting. - - “‘I do not know the origin of this copy. Most likely it was - furnished me by the OKW for the purpose of my giving this - lecture. It is altogether a conglomeration of various pieces of - writing, and it is usable only with limitations. However...’” - -And just listen to this, will you? - - “‘...as to the broad lines of it, this is what I have used as a - lecture.’” - -Then the next question was: - - “I believe you stated before that the written speech that you - had was not given as set forth in the text because you - interpolated various remarks in the course of the speech, - particularly whenever you referred to one of the maps that you - placed before the audience, in order to follow the campaigns - which you discussed. Isn’t that correct?” - -Now listen to this: - - “What I have written down I have actually spoken and I followed - this text written down by myself. But in regard to the momentary - situation on the various fronts”—and that is Part 3 and 4, - where you will find a note “delivered extemporaneously”—“I had - that so clearly in mind that I did not need to base my speech on - any written statements. Also, I referred to the maps freely.” - -Then the last question on this point: - - “Is it not true, however, that the document before you - represents, in general, the speech that you gave at Munich in - November 1943 to this meeting?” - -The answer is: - - “Yes; much, without doubt, is the same. All the appendices with - regard to these various theaters of war and other appendices I - had not used during my speech. I had returned them.” - -Do you agree with your answer to that interrogation? - -JODL: On the whole, you have confirmed just what I said. However, I do -not know why we have to talk so long about it. The case is completely -clear. It is... - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, please do not worry yourself. I know I am stopping -you; but I apprehend that I am stopping you from saying something quite -irrelevant, and in the interest of time I regard it as my duty to stop -you. Please do not worry about why I should do something. - -I want to know whether that document roughly represents what you said in -the speech. It is quite a different thing to being in a wastepaper -basket. - -JODL: The introduction and the conclusion, as contained here in the -first draft were, of course, basically retained in the speech in this -form. However, the whole speech was only finally worked out on the basis -of this first draft; it was shortened, changed, parts were crossed out, -and mistakes were eliminated. And only then came the main part of the -speech for which only the material is here. There is no proof, and I am -not in a position to say whether I actually spoke even one sentence of -those which are here in the form in which it is found in the first -draft. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I will accept that. - -JODL: If you give me a copy of my actual speech I will recognize it. - -MR. ROBERTS: That is all we can give you, Witness, because that is all -we found. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we might as well adjourn now. - -MR. ROBERTS: If Your Lordship please. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I should like to call attention to the -following: When my client was interrogated here, he was heard through an -interpreter, since he does not understand the English language. On the -basis of this testimony the minutes were, as I have just heard, set down -in the English language. These minutes he never saw and he did not sign -them. And now these minutes, which were compiled in English, are -submitted to him in a German translation. In my opinion it is quite -impossible under such circumstances to tie the defendant down to -specific words which are contained in the minutes. He abides by what he -said, but he cannot recognize everything that is in those minutes -when... - -THE PRESIDENT: That is true. We will keep these facts in mind. The -Tribunal will keep these facts in mind, if you will draw them to their -attention. - -MR. ROBERTS: If it please the Tribunal, I am passing from that point. -The witness, I think, said the document was the basis of his speech; and -I accept that answer and I pass to another point. - -Would you please give the witness his diary, 1780-PS, German C-113. And -it is Page 133 in the large document book, Page 133. - -Witness, I think you have seen this entry. My Lord, it is the 5th of -November 1937 I am dealing with: - - “Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course - and conduct of policy....” - -Page 133 of the large book. - -THE PRESIDENT: When you say, large book, you mean Number 7? - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, Number 7; I am sorry. I should have given it a number. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] 5th of November 1937: - - “Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course - and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed - Forces...”—_et cetera_. - -There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the chief -of Armed Forces and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. - -“...the intention of L...”—does that mean your department, -Landesverteidigung—its intention to have these thoughts put on paper? - -[_There was no response._] - -MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, Witness. - -JODL: “Intention of L,” that means the intention of the Department of -National Defense (Landesverteidigung) to have these thoughts put down on -paper and transmitted to the branches of the Wehrmacht. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, the meeting that you were talking about was -what we have called the Hossbach Conference, was it not, which is -386-PS? The Tribunal is very familiar with it. You remember the -conference, do you not? You have read it many times here? - -JODL: Yes, but I was not present at this conference. I do recall the -things that were read here. - -MR. ROBERTS: I know you were not present. But presumably you, as head of -the Home Defense Department, were told of what was said at the -conference? - -JODL: I have already stated with regard to that that the report which I -received was in no way sensational. The directives for the preparations -after this time are available to the Court in writing; what we prepared -and worked out at the time is proved thereby. We have the orders of 20 -May and of 14 June; they are available. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you were only asked whether you were told what -happened at the conference. It was not necessary to make a long -statement about that. - -MR. ROBERTS: You see, I try to put simple questions, and I am asking for -simple answers. The last thing I want is to interrupt you. - -Were you told that at that conference Hitler said that Germany’s problem -was a question of space? - -JODL: No, not one word. - -MR. ROBERTS: Were you told that Hitler said that the German question -could only be solved by force? - -JODL: No. - -MR. ROBERTS: And were you told that Hitler said that German rearmament -was practically complete? - -JODL: No. - -MR. ROBERTS: And the last question I will ask you: Were you told that -Hitler said that the first aim in the event of war would be Austria and -Czechoslovakia? - -JODL: The report about the more active preparations for the march -against Czechoslovakia was, I believe, contained in these statements. -But I can only say that the details which I received from Field Marshal -Keitel are not in my recollection at present. I recall only one thing, -that it was no surprise or sensation for me, and only small corrections -of the directives which had been given out up to that point were -necessary. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Thank you. Now then, you were not present at -Obersalzberg when Keitel was there with Schuschnigg the following -February, were you? - -JODL: No, I was not present. - -MR. ROBERTS: But Keitel later told you what had happened? - -JODL: He made a few brief remarks about that in narrative form, for -after all, I had no further concern in this matter. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you make that entry in your diary; that is, the next -entry to the one I was referring to, Page 133, Book 7, the same page, -under 11th of February 1938: - - “Evening 12 February General Keitel, with General Reichenau, and - Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and Schmidt were again put - under severest political and military pressure.” - -Did Keitel tell you that? - -JODL: Yes. You have only inserted the word “again.” That is not in my -diary. This entry I made personally, because Keitel told me that during -lunch Reichenau and Sperrle had carried on warlike conversations, that -they had talked about the new rearmament of Germany. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, in March—I think this is common -ground—you signed or initialed one or two orders for the “Operation -Otto.” - -JODL: Yes; but at that time it was not called Otto but “For the March -into Austria.” - -MR. ROBERTS: Hitler, when he heard that Schuschnigg was going to obtain -the opinion of the people by plebiscite, decided to invade at once, did -he not? - -JODL: Yes, I was told, when he heard that there was to be a grotesque -violation of public opinion through the trick of a plebiscite, he said -that he would certainly not tolerate this under any circumstances. This -is what I was told. - -MR. ROBERTS: He would not tolerate public opinion being ascertained? - -JODL: No; he would not tolerate public opinion being abused through this -trick. That is how it was told to me. - -MR. ROBERTS: So the Armed Forces of Germany then marched into Austria? -That is right? - -JODL: That is right; the Wehrmacht marched in. - -MR. ROBERTS: And Austria, from that day, received all the benefits of -National Socialism, is that right? - -JODL: That is a political question. At any rate it could perhaps have -become the happiest country on earth. - -MR. ROBERTS: I wasn’t asking what it could have become, but what it -received. It received the SS, the Gestapo, the concentration camps, the -suppression of opponents, and the persecution of Jews, didn’t it? - -JODL: Those are questions with which I did not concern myself. Those -questions you have to put to the competent authorities. In addition it -received me as artillery commander; and they loved me; I only want to -confirm that. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You say the people appeared pleased to see you? - -JODL: The people who were under my jurisdiction were very happy about -this officer; I can say that. - -MR. ROBERTS: They had to appear to be, whether they were or not, didn’t -they? - -JODL: No, they did not have to be. At any rate, after I had been away -for a long time, they certainly did not have to write enthusiastic -letters to me, letters which I received throughout the war from these -Austrians to whom my heart belonged. - -MR. ROBERTS: There was one man who was not pleased to see you, wasn’t -there? - -JODL: I know no such person. - -MR. ROBERTS: Don’t you? - -JODL: No. - -MR. ROBERTS: What about Schuschnigg? - -JODL: I never saw Schuschnigg. He doesn’t know me and I do not know him. -I don’t know... - -MR. ROBERTS: He wasn’t pleased to see you come in, was he? - -JODL: I cannot say that. - -MR. ROBERTS: What happened to him? - -THE PRESIDENT: We know that, Mr. Roberts. - -MR. ROBERTS: I quite realize that. I can’t imagine my question is not -admissible, but if you don’t want me to put it—it is one of a series of -questions—I won’t. - -Schuschnigg was put in a concentration camp, wasn’t he? - -JODL: I was told that the Führer had decided: “I do not want a martyr, -under any circumstances, but I cannot liberate him; I must put him in -honorary custody.” That was the impression I had during the entire war. - -MR. ROBERTS: Honorary custody? - -JODL: It was called honorary custody. - -MR. ROBERTS: What? Was he an honorary member of Dachau? - -JODL: That I do not know. Those are not questions that you can put to -me, for I was a soldier and not the commandant of a concentration camp. - -MR. ROBERTS: That is an honor that one would be glad to dispense with, -isn’t it? - -JODL: I would gladly dispense with much that took place during these -years. - -DR. EXNER: Please, I must protest against questions like that, purely -political and based purely on legal questions and on matters which the -defendant cannot at all answer through his own knowledge. It is not a -fact whether Schuschnigg was happy. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, in my respectful submission, these questions are -perfectly proper; they are questions the like of which have been put by -every counsel who has cross-examined both for the Prosecution and the -Defense. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, the Tribunal thinks that the -cross-examination is proper. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I am passing from that point. I am grateful to -you. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] The only question I ask in conclusion is -that Schuschnigg was kept in prison or kept in confinement for several -years without any charge and any trial. That is right, isn’t it? - -JODL: It may be, I do not know. - -MR. ROBERTS: You knew, did you not, when you signed those orders for the -march into Austria, that Germany had given an assurance in May 1935 to -respect the territorial integrity of the state of Austria and that on -the 11th of July 1936 there had been entered into by your Government and -the Austrian Government an agreement by Germany to recognize the full -sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria? Did you know of these -things? - -JODL: At that moment I did not know that; in my position as a colonel in -the General Staff that did not concern me in the least. What would that -have led to? - -MR. ROBERTS: I am passing from Austria with this one last question: Is -there an entry in your diary—it is a passage in L-172, the basis for -the draft of your speech—that after the Anschluss Czechoslovakia was -enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim? My Lord, that is -Page 290 of Book 7. Do you remember that passage? - -JODL: In the first draft which I made for my Gauleiter speech it was put -down exactly what strategic improvements had taken place through the -various actions of the Führer, in retrospect, but only these strategic -results.... - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, but—again I do not want to stop you, but did you say -that—something to this effect—and I will give you the document if you -like—that Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall -a victim? - -JODL: In the first draft I set down that through the taking -over—through the Anschluss of Austria—the strategic situation of -Czechoslovakia had become so hopeless that at any time it must fall a -victim to a pincers attack; a strategic retrospect about facts, -indisputable facts. - -MR. ROBERTS: I accept that, Witness. Now I go very shortly to the case -of Czechoslovakia. I only want to deal really with a couple of -documents. I want to deal with item 17, which the Tribunal will find on -Page 29 of Book 7. And it is marked—if you’ll hand it up—and I have -flagged that for you, Witness, item 17. - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: You are familiar with that? - -JODL: Yes, I know that. - -MR. ROBERTS: And I do not propose to read it again, because it was read -very recently; but you agree, do you not, you said yesterday, the -problem was this: First of all, you must have a surprise attack; if you -were going to attack at all, you must have a surprise attack. - -JODL: On the basis of the stipulations made by the Führer; yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: You must have a surprise attack first, and your troops -would take 4 days to get into their battle position. - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: And therefore you must know the time, the incident which is -going to be the cause of the attack; you must know the time when the -incident is going to take place. - -JODL: Yes, I said that one would either have to predetermine the time or -one must know it in advance; otherwise the demands could not be carried -out. - -MR. ROBERTS: And, therefore, you must create the incident yourself. - -JODL: I testified to that at length yesterday. Either one of the many -had to be exploited or perhaps one would have to help the situation -along a bit; but, as I said, those are General Staff considerations -which, when we capture them from the French, you consider entirely -irrelevant. - -MR. ROBERTS: It is set down at the end of the document on Page 30 that -either the Wehrmacht or the counterintelligence section would be charged -with the manufacture of the incident in the last paragraph. - -JODL: Yes, I therefore wrote: “In case the counterintelligence service -is not charged with the organization of an incident _aside from -that_”—“in case.” These are all theoretical deliberations of the -General Staff in a situation, which I depicted quite accurately -yesterday, where such incidents already occurred every day. - -MR. ROBERTS: I know. Then, if this had taken place, the world would have -been told that because of that incident Germany had been compelled to go -to war? - -JODL: I do not believe that this would have been reported to the world. -Rather, I believe the true reason would have been told the world, which, -furthermore, was made known constantly through the press, that 3½ -million Germans cannot be used as slaves by another people permanently. -That was the issue. - -MR. ROBERTS: If the world is going to be told the truth, what is the -earthly good of manufacturing an incident? - -JODL: I testified as to that yesterday—I can only repeat what I said -yesterday at length: I knew the history of war too well not to know that -in every war things like that happen—the question as to who fired the -first shot. And Czechoslovakia at that time had already fired thousands -of shots which had fallen on this territory. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, I say, Witness, subject to correction, that you are -not answering the question at all. The question was a very short one and -you make a long speech about something quite different. The question is, -if the truth was sufficient to justify your going to war, why should you -want to manufacture an incident? If you can’t answer it, say so. - -JODL: Well, it isn’t at all confirmed that I wanted to bring about an -incident. I wrote, “in case ... not.” We never prepared one and that is -surely the essential thing. - -MR. ROBERTS: I won’t argue any further with you. I have put my point and -will leave it. But now I want, on quite another point, to refer to the -last paragraph on Page 29, the same document: - - “Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is - impossible before the first air attack, although the consequence - could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of - such an attack.” - -Perhaps you would read this paragraph, known already to the Tribunal. - - “...death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral - powers.” - -That means an air raid before there has been any declaration of war or -any warning to the civilian population, doesn’t it? - -JODL: That meant that I called the attention of the Führer, through this -document, to the fact that on the basis of his decree that result could -or would come about. - -MR. ROBERTS: Would you call that a terror attack? A terror attack? - -JODL: It cannot be said under what conditions such an action would be -launched. These are all theoretical tasks for our General Staff. How and -if that was translated into practice, that no one can say, whether with -justice or injustice; that depended on the political decision. - -MR. ROBERTS: I will show you later how those thoughts were carried into -practice in the case of other countries. So we will leave that document -altogether now and I will leave the case of Czechoslovakia. Now you were -recalled to the OKW on the 23d of August 1939, from your artillery -employment. We know that, don’t we? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: That was a great compliment to the opinion that the Führer -had of you, wasn’t it? - -JODL: The Führer was not responsible for my being called back. I do not -know whether he knew about it at all. I do not believe so. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. On a very small point, Witness, you told the -Court yesterday or the day before that you never had a conference with -the Führer, I think, until September 1939; but your diary, on the 10th -of August 1938—it is Page 136 of Book 7—your diary said you attended a -conference at the Berghof with the Army chiefs and the Air Force groups. -Didn’t you meet the Führer then? - -JODL: That which you asserted in your first sentence, I did not say. -What I said was, word for word: - - “On 3 September I was introduced to the Führer by Field Marshal - Keitel, and on this occasion, at any rate, I spoke with him for - the first time.” - -That is what I testified to, word for word, yesterday. I had seen the -Führer a dozen times before then and I had heard him when he delivered -his big speeches, after he was Reich Chancellor and Supreme Commander. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I accept that. It is quite likely that I was wrong. -Now, with regard to the Polish campaign, did I hear you right when you -said that Warsaw was only bombed after leaflets had been dropped? - -JODL: That applies to the period of the siege of Warsaw. The terror -attack, I might say, which was to hit the entire city through artillery -bombardment, that took place after two previous warnings. - -MR. ROBERTS: It is a matter of history, is it not, that Warsaw was -bombed, with many other Polish towns, in the early hours of the 1st of -September 1939 before any declaration of war? Isn’t that a matter of -history? - -JODL: As far as this historical fact is concerned, Field Marshal -Kesselring, who is very well informed about this, testified to that here -in detail. He said—and also Reich Marshal Göring—that on this date the -militarily important objectives throughout Poland were attacked but not -the population of Warsaw. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You are quite right, now Kesselring—If the -Tribunal wants the reference, he gave evidence as to the bombing of -Warsaw, the English transcript, Page 5731 (Volume IX, Page 175). - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I suppose the result of the Polish -campaign was naturally a source of satisfaction to all of you? - -JODL: The military development of the Polish campaign, from the military -point of view, was extremely satisfactory to us. Of course things happen -in life that would give more satisfaction than a military action. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want you to look at a letter. This is—My -Lord, this is a new exhibit, D-885, and it is GB-484. - -That letter is in your writing, is it not? Is it in your writing? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, it is written to Police President Dr. Karl -Schwabe, Brünn, Moravia, Police Presidency, dated October 28, 1939: - - “My dear Police President: For your enthusiastic letter of 22 - September, I thank you heartily. I was quite particularly - pleased about it. This wonderful campaign in Poland was a grand - opening for this hard and decisive struggle and has brought - about for us an unusually favorable point of departure - politically as well as militarily. The difficult part for the - people as well as the Armed Forces is still ahead.”—I propose - to read it without comments and comment afterward. - - “But the Führer and his associates are full of the greatest - confidence; for the sanctimonious British will not succeed in - throttling our economy, and militarily we are without worry. - Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the - many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of - the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of. - This time we will show that we have better nerves and greater - unity. That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty - share to keeping the Czechs at it and not let them perk up, of - this I am convinced.” - -Then he is very pleased about the high recognition granted to the -troops: - - “Thanking you heartily once more for your words of appreciation - which exceed my modest contribution in the shadow of the - powerful personality of our Führer. I am with a Heil Hitler.” - -Why did you call the British sanctimonious? Because they keep treaties -and don’t have concentration camps and don’t persecute Jews? Is that why -you thought we were sanctimonious, because we don’t break treaties? - -JODL: No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the political -situation generally was represented that way, and that I was actually of -that opinion at the time. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now you deal with: - - “Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this - the many strong-willed and devoted men who are at the head of - the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of.” - -Who were these strong-willed and devoted men? Is that the SS and the -Gestapo? - -JODL: No, these are the Gauleiter. - -MR. ROBERTS: The Gauleiter? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, but I mean we have one or two Gauleiter here, -Gauleiter Sauckel, for instance; in a large area like Thuringia, he -couldn’t do much by himself, could he? He would have to have some SS or -Gestapo, wouldn’t he? - -JODL: We are not at all concerned with that here. The fact is that these -Gauleiter actually directed the organization of the State and the -administration in this war in a noteworthy way. Despite the catastrophe -the people were much better taken care of than in the years 1914-18. -That is uncontested and it is to the credit of these people. - -MR. ROBERTS: They were better taken care of? - -JODL: Even in the most terrible conditions at the end every man in -Berlin received his normal rations. It was a model of organization, I -can only say that. - -MR. ROBERTS: And a model of organization because no opposition to the -government or the Party was allowed, was it? - -JODL: Certainly, it made it easier on one hand, and on the other hand, -led to terrible catastrophes about which, of course, I only heard here -for the first time. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, the letter speaks for itself, and I will -go along. May I just ask you about this last sentence: - - “That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share - to keeping the Czechs at it and to not let them perk up...” - -What did you mean by that? - -JODL: Since he was Police President in Brünn, it was his task to see -that quiet and order were maintained in Brünn and not to tolerate a -Czech uprising at our backs while we were at war. That is a matter of -course. I did not say that he was to murder or germanize the Czechs at -all, but he had to keep them in order. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I pass from that now and I want to go to the -various campaigns in the West. Now, with regard to Norway, of course you -knew that your country had given its solemn word repeatedly to respect -the integrity of Norway and Denmark, did you not? - -JODL: I said yesterday, with reference to the two declarations of... - -MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, it is such a simple one. - -JODL: Yes, I believe, I recalled that at the time. I am quite sure. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good; and we know there was an assurance at the -beginning of the war to reassure all these western neutrals, and there -was another assurance on the 6th of October; and you say that in -November Hitler decided to invade Denmark and Norway? - -JODL: Yes. I testified as to that at length yesterday. - -MR. ROBERTS: I know you did. Please don’t always say that. I have got to -ask you to go over the same ground from the other angle, you see. -“Norway,” as your speech said—and I am quoting from Page 291 of Book -7—perhaps you had better give it to him—Page 11 of your notes... - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] It is in the middle, My Lord, under -Paragraph 8: - - “In the meantime we were confronted by a new and urgent problem: - The occupation of Norway and Denmark.... - - “In the first place there was danger that England would seize - Scandinavia and thereby, besides effecting a strategic - encirclement from the north, would stop the import of iron and - nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes. - Secondly, it was with the realization of our own maritime - necessities”—“Notwendigkeiten”—that is the word, isn’t - it—“Notwendigkeiten”... - -My Lord, that ought to be “necessary” and not -“imperative”—“erforderten.” - - “...which made it necessary for us to secure free access to the - Atlantic by a number of air and naval bases.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You wanted air bases and U-boat bases, -didn’t you? - -JODL: Militarily they were tremendously important to us, there is no -doubt about that; but the prerequisites to taking them, those were the -reports which we had, the threat to Norway. - -MR. ROBERTS: What I suggest to you, you see, is this: In this, like the -case of the other three Low Countries—in this case, you simply made an -excuse. You thought England might do something, although she had not -done it for months, and you breached Norway’s neutrality at your own -chosen time. Is that right? - -JODL: In order to answer that question “yes” or “no,” one would have to -undertake a very thorough study of all the historical documents on both -our own and the other side. Then one can say if it is correct or not. -Before that has been decided, only a subjective opinion exists. I have -mine, and you have another. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And I point out to you that it was Germany on every -occasion who violated the neutrality. The other countries, the Allies, -did not. - -JODL: In the case of Norway, the English did that first in the case of -the _Altmark_ by laying mines and by firing upon German ships in -Norwegian territorial waters. That has been proved indisputably. There -is no doubt about that. - -MR. ROBERTS: The _Altmark_, as you very well know, Witness, was not an -occupation at all; it was merely the act of the British Navy in taking -British prisoners from a German prison ship, and I imagine your Navy -would have done the same if they had had the chance. What is the good of -talking about the _Altmark_? It was not an occupation at all. - -JODL: But it was a violation of international law as far as Norwegian -sovereignty was concerned. You could only request that Norway do that, -but you yourselves could not carry out a combative action in Norwegian -waters. I know the regulations in this connection exactly. - -MR. ROBERTS: Why should you break your word to Norway and cause untold -suffering and misery to the inhabitants of that country because the -British went into the territorial waters and took out a few hundred -prisoners? What is the logic of it? Why should the Norwegians suffer for -it? - -JODL: You are just quoting one small example from the tremendously real -picture of England’s occupation, but there are hundreds of them. - -MR. ROBERTS: It is the example you quoted, Witness, not I. I did not -quote it. - -JODL: I can only say that we were under the definite subjective -impression that we carried through an enterprise, in the last second, -for which British troops were already embarked. If you can prove to me -that is not true, I shall be extremely grateful to you. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, now I am going to call your attention to the only -outside evidence that you have produced about that, because it was read -rather hurriedly—quite rightly, yesterday. - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] My Lord, it is in Jodl’s Document Book 2, -and it is Page 174. Well, My Lord, it begins at Page 174. My Lord, that -is on the left-hand top corner. Page 174 says that Albrecht Soltmann was -an expert specialist, that he evaluated files from the British landing -brigade, and that he examined diaries. That is on the second page, and -the bottom of Page 175: - - “The documents and statements by prisoners showed that a short - time before our landing in Norway the British invasion troops - had been embarked on destroyers. On the following day they were - again disembarked and remained in the vicinity of the port of - embarkation. They were then reembarked after the German invasion - of Norway for the second time and transported to Norway. What - intention the English pursued in the embarkation of their troops - before our landings could not be determined from the documents - and from the statements of prisoners. Whether they intended to - occupy Norway before our invasion could at that time only be - conjectured, because the prisoners did not make any exact - statements in this respect. The conjectures are based on the - special equipment of these British troops. Insofar as I could - evaluate the documents and statements furnished by prisoners - they did not contain proof of the English plans with regard to - Norway.” - -And this is the next question: - - “Have not the results of all documents and statements furnished - by prisoners been to the effect that in the invasion of Norway - we arrived only just ahead of the English? - - “Answer: ‘Yes, the information in the documents and the - statements furnished by prisoners could be interpreted to mean - that in our invasion we were just ahead of the English. However, - whether this was considered unmistakable evidence I cannot - judge.’” - -And then they deal with French documents captured in a railway train. -The witness does not know anything about them. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] That is pretty poor evidence, isn’t it, on -which Norway was to be invaded, contrary to all the treaties and all the -assurances? - -JODL: I quite agree with you on that; you are quite correct. But that is -only because Soltmann was unfortunately not the expert in this field. He -was not even an officer of the General Staff. I had forgotten that. We -had further and quite different evidence which lay before me on my desk; -namely, all the commands carried by the English landing brigade. They -confirmed our assumptions absolutely and definitely. - -MR. ROBERTS: An invasion without any warning or any declaration of war? - -JODL: That is a political question. - -MR. ROBERTS: You have told the Court yesterday what a stickler you were -about international law, how keen you were to see that international law -was observed. You knew that was against international law, didn’t you? - -JODL: These matters were not in our regulations, but only the provisions -which applied to the Wehrmacht. The concept of an aggressive war was not -found in any regulation. We went only by the Geneva Convention and the -Hague Land Warfare Regulations. - -MR. ROBERTS: I mean if an honorable German gives his word he keeps it, -does he not? He does not break his word without saying that he is going -to depart from it, does he, an honorable German? - -JODL: That seems to be a practice which is generally observed all over -the world when human beings work together, but not in the sphere of -politics. - -MR. ROBERTS: If that is your code of honor, why is it not grossly -dishonorable for Germany to break her word over and over and ever again? -Or would you rather not answer that question? - -JODL: No, you would do better to put that question to the people who -were responsible for German politics. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very well, I will leave that. Now I want to come to the -invasion of Holland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. I beg your pardon, -the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. - -You have no doubt at all, have you, on the documents that in the event -of war in the West, it was always Hitler’s intention to violate the -neutrality of those three small countries? - -JODL: From the beginning, in his orders for the attacks in the West, he -had the intention to go through Belgium; but he had reservations with -regard to Holland for a long time, which were only rescinded later—I -believe in the middle of November. Regarding Holland his intentions were -not specific. Regarding Belgium his intentions in that direction were -known comparatively early, that is, about the middle or the early part -of October. - -MR. ROBERTS: You could not, of course—I mean Germany naturally wanted -to wage an offensive war and an offensive war in somebody else’s -country. That is the ambition, naturally, isn’t it? - -JODL: The German objective in this war was to win, at that time. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. You couldn’t attack in the West unless you attacked -through Belgium, could you? - -JODL: In any event, any other attack was tremendously difficult and was -highly doubtful. I have already said that. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is why, of course, France built the Maginot Line, -so that you couldn’t attack her frontally. - -Well, now, if you secured the coast of Belgium and Holland, you secured -air bases from which you could annihilate England or Great Britain. That -is what you hoped, wasn’t it? - -JODL: No doubt the strategic position of Germany in the battle against -England improved through our having the coast; that is true. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. May I just remind you of a few documents which the -Tribunal know already. I do not intend to read them, but the first -document in order of date is 375-PS, USA-84, dated 25 August 1938. It is -during the Fall Grün time. That was the Air Force appreciation which, in -the last paragraph of the document, Page 11, I think, it says: - - “Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands would represent an - extraordinary advantage in the air war against Great - Britain....” - -And the Army is asked to say how long it would take. - -That was at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis, wasn’t it? - -JODL: Yes, but this document, I believe, has already been characterized -as a ridiculous piece of paper, being the work of an insignificant -captain. - -MR. ROBERTS: He seems to have been a very good judge, at any rate, -judging what happened afterwards. - -Well now, the next document—I know you were in Austria, but no doubt -you heard about it from Keitel—was the Chancellery meeting the 23d of -May 1939. That is L-79, it is Book Number 7, Page 275. Do you remember -there that the Führer said: - - “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be militarily occupied. - Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.... - - “In this matter, considerations of right and wrong or treaties - have no significance.... - - “The Army will have to take positions essential to the Navy and - the Air Force. If Belgium and the Netherlands are successfully - occupied and held, if France is also defeated, then fundamental - conditions for a successful war against England will have been - secured.... - - “Daily attacks by the German Air Force and Navy will cut her - life lines.” - -There wasn’t any doubt as to the policy of the Führer in May 1939, was -there? - -JODL: It was in Court here that I first heard about this conference and -about the things which were purportedly discussed at that time; and I am -not able to judge whether it is correct, for I did not hear it, not even -from Keitel, not even later. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Did you hear about the speech made by the Führer -on the 22d of August 1939? - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] I do not know if the Court has got this. It -is not in the Document Book; 798-PS, in Document Book Number 4. There -are some loose copies, My Lord. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] - - “Those countries”—Holland, Belgium—“and Scandinavia will - defend their neutrality by all available means. England and - France will not violate their neutrality.” - -You always thought Hitler was a good prophet, didn’t you? You thought -Hitler was a good judge. - -JODL: Very often, yes, very often. - -MR. ROBERTS: And he was a good judge that England and France would keep -their word, whereas Germany would break hers. - -Now, then, that is August. Now then I want to... - -JODL: But that I don’t know. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, I want to come to the document which you -put in yesterday. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, wait a minute. Defendant, what do you mean by -saying you don’t know that? Do you mean that you did not know the -document? You said, “I don’t know that.” - -JODL: I do not know what the Führer actually said in his conference on -the 22d of August. I did not even know that a discussion had taken -place, for I was in Vienna. I only know what is ostensibly in documents -which have been submitted here. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now I want to put the whole Document L-52. Dr. Exner, quite -properly of course, read some extracts; but I want to read some more. -Have you got copies for the Tribunal? - -Now, L-52 was Hitler’s memorandum on the 9th of October 1939. May I -point out that the 9th of October 1939 was 3 days after his renewed -assurances to the western neutrals. - -I want to refer—certain passages you have read; I want to refer to -others. - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] My Lord, what I am now reading from, -starting with the outside page, is the 5th page. It is Page 27 of the -original, which appears in the bottom right-hand corner. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I read the paragraph on Page 25 of your -original, Witness. - - “Germany’s military means of waging a lengthy war are, as far as - our main enemy is concerned, the Air Force and the U-boat arm. - - “The U-boat can even today, if ruthlessly employed, become an - extraordinary threat to England. The weaknesses of German U-boat - warfare lie in the great distance of approach to the scene of - their activity, in the extraordinary danger attached to these - approaches, and in the continual threat to their home bases. - That England has not, for the moment, laid the great mine fields - as in World War I, between Norway and the Shetland Islands, is - possibly connected—provided the will to wage war exists at - all—with a shortage of necessary blockade materials. But if the - War lasts long an increasing difficulty to our U-boats must be - reckoned with in the use of these only remaining inward and - outward routes. Every creation of U-boat bases outside these - constricted home bases would lead to an enormous increase in the - striking power of this arm.” - -Is that a covert reference to the Norwegian bases, do you think, giving -access to the Atlantic? - -JODL: I do not believe so. I believe it is a general correct naval -strategic consideration and can apply just as well to a base at Murmansk -which, for instance, we already had at that time, or in Spain, or in -some other state that was neutral at the time; but it is not a reference -to Norway, for I have declared under oath that at the time, the Führer -never gave a thought to Norway, not the slightest thought, before he -received the report from Quisling. - -MR. ROBERTS: I have your answer. Now, may I go on reading? - - “The German Air Force: It can only succeed in effective - operations against the industrial center of England and her - south and southwest ports, which are gaining in importance - during the war, when it is no longer compelled to operate - offensively from our present small North Sea coast by - tremendously devious routes involving long flights. If the - Dutch-Belgian area were to fall into the hands of the English - and French, then the enemy air forces, in order to strike at the - industrial heart of Germany, would need to cover barely a sixth - of the distance required by the German bomber to reach really - important targets. If we were in possession of Holland, Belgium, - or even the Straits of Dover as jumping-off bases for German air - attacks, then, without a doubt, Great Britain could be struck a - mortal blow, even if the strongest reprisals were attempted. - - “Such a shortening of the air approaches would be all the more - important to Germany because of our greater difficulties in fuel - supply. Every 1000 kilograms of fuel saved is not only an asset - to our national economy, but means that 1000 kilograms more of - explosive can be carried in the aircraft; that is, 1000 - kilograms of fuel would become 1000 kilograms of bombs. This - also leads to economy in aircraft, in mechanical wear and tear, - and above all, in the precious blood of soldiers.” - -Then I ask you to turn to your Page 41. - -My Lord, it is two pages on, and Your Lordship will see “41” nearly at -the top of the page, with an asterisk, and the heading, “The German -Attack.” Has Your Lordship got it? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - - MR. ROBERTS: “The German Attack. The German attack is to be - launched with the fundamental object of destroying the French - Army, but in any case it must create a favorable initial - situation which is a prerequisite for a successful continuation - of the war. Under these circumstances the only possible area of - attack is the sector between Luxembourg in the south and - Nijmegen in the north, excluding the fortress of Liège. The - object ... is to attempt to penetrate the area - Luxembourg-Belgium, and Holland in the shortest possible time - and to engage and defeat the opposing Belgian-French-English - forces.” - -I suppose I can’t ask you to say what is your opinion of the honesty of -giving those western neutrals a guarantee on the 6th of October and -saying that is the only possible means of attack in that memorandum of -the 9th. I suppose that is a question of politics, is it? - -JODL: That is a political question, but the declarations were always -made only on the condition of the strictest neutrality of these -countries. But this neutrality was not kept, for British fliers flew -over this area by day and by night. - -MR. ROBERTS: Why should the wretched people of the Netherlands and -Belgium be destroyed and mutilated because British airmen fly over their -territory—destroyed and mutilated by the German Army? What is the logic -of your remark at all? - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] My Lord, there was one more passage from -that document I should like to read. If Your Lordship is thinking of -adjourning, perhaps I might read it, and then I will have finished with -the document. My Lord, it is the next page, and it is toward the end of -the page. It is against the lettering—the number L-52. It is just -above, “Time of Attack.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] It is on your Page 52, Witness, at the -very beginning, or just at the end of Page 51: - - “All the leaders must keep firmly fixed in their minds the fact - that the destruction of the Anglo-French Army is the main - objective, the attainment of which will make possible the - prerequisite conditions for later and successful employment of - the German Air Force against other objectives. The brutal - employment of the German Air Force against the heart of the - British will to resist can and will follow at the given moment.” - -Did that mean terror attacks against the civilian population? - -JODL: You are asking me continually about a document which from the -first to the last word was written by the Führer, as I have already told -you. You are producing a rather interesting picture of the Führer as a -strategist and as a military leader, and it is of interest to the world; -but I cannot see how this concerns me. These are the thoughts which the -Führer put down as military commander and are of great interest for all -soldiers in the world. But what does it have to do with me? That I do -not understand. - -MR. ROBERTS: But may I point out, Witness, that your own counsel -produced it and you relied on certain parts of it. That is how it -concerns you; you relied on it. - -JODL: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. ROBERTS: Witness, I only have two other questions on the alleged -aggression against the Low Countries. Will you look at your diary, -1809-PS, for the 8th of May 1940. It is Page 141 in Document Book 7, and -it is Page 115 in the German book. The actual quotation is Page 143 in -the Document Book 7; at the top of the page: “8 May. Alarming news from -Holland, canceling of furloughs, evacuations, road blocks, other -mobilization measures.” - -Were you afraid that the Dutch might actually take some steps to defend -themselves against your invasion? - -JODL: I was sure that the Dutch would defend themselves against Germany. - -MR. ROBERTS: Was it alarming you because you thought the Dutch might -have suspected you were going to break your treaties and assurances? - -JODL: I did not understand the question. - -MR. ROBERTS: I will go on: - - “According to the intelligence reports the British are said to - have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch refused. - According to reports, measures of the Dutch partly directed - against the coast and partly against us. Not possible to obtain - a clear picture whether the Dutch do not work hand in hand with - the English or whether they really want to defend their - neutrality against the first attacker.” - -It is clear from that, is it not, that you had no information at all -that Dutch neutrality was going to be broken? - -JODL: That is not clear from the entry; it is only a brief argument on -the basis of masses of reports which we received from Canaris on that -day or on the previous day. If they were to be followed up accurately, -the reports immediately preceding this entry would have to be at hand; -the entry refers to the latest reports, and not to the many thousands -which had come in before. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, on the 10th of May without any declaration of war -these three countries, small countries, were invaded with all of the -armed might of Germany, were they not? - -JODL: The attack began on the 10th of May along the whole front. - -MR. ROBERTS: What had those countries done at all to deserve the horrors -of invasion and the misery of German occupation? - -JODL: That, again, is a historical question. I have already said that -according to my personal point of view England and France in fact forced -them to give up their strictly neutral attitude. That was my impression. - -MR. ROBERTS: Their only fault, was it not, was that they stood in the -way of your air bases and U-boat bases? - -JODL: They were not only in the way, but by tolerating actions -incompatible with neutrality, they helped England in the war against us. -That was my subjective impression. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, I have only got—with the permission of the Tribunal, -there was one question I should have asked on Norway; only one; and if I -might go back to that, I want to ask you about your diary entry, -1809-PS, Page 143 in Document Book 7. I have not got a reference to the -German but it is about at that place. I will read it slowly: “13 March: -Führer does not give order yet for ‘W’”—Weser—“He is still looking for -an excuse”—or “justification”—to use your word. And the next day: “14 -March: Führer has not yet decided what reason to give for Weser -Exercise.” - -If you had a good reason for breaking Norwegian neutrality, why should -the Führer be unable to find one? - -JODL: Because for this operation the Führer considered it absolutely -necessary to have some documentary proof. So far, there had only been -very strong indications which came near to a proof, but we had as yet no -documentary evidence. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I leave that part of the case, and I now go to -Yugoslavia, and I have only two or three questions on Yugoslavia. - -I want you to look at Document 1746-PS, Page 127 in Document Book 7; -German book, 112. - -Before we deal with the document, Witness, Yugoslavia had also received -assurances from Hitler. That is so, is it not, or do you not know? - -JODL: Yes. Not only did Yugoslavia receive assurances from Hitler, but -we also received them from the Yugoslav Government, which had concluded -a treaty with us on the previous day. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, you will find the document I am going to refer to—it -has got a piece of paper headed with the German word for “discussion,” -“Besprechung.” Have you found it? It should be a piece of paper with the -word “Besprechung.” - -JODL: “Discussion on the Situation in Yugoslavia”; yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, that is right. - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Dated 27 March 1941? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now if you turn to—I think it is Page 2: - - “The Führer is determined, without waiting for declarations of - good faith from the new government, to make all preparations to - destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No - diplomatic inquiries will be made; no ultimatum presented. - Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted - for the future, will be taken note of. The attack will start as - soon as the means and the troops suitable are ready. It is - important that action be taken as fast as possible.” - -Now I go to Page 3, Witness: - - “Politically it is especially important that the blow against - Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and military - destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking.” - -Now I go to Page 5, Witness: - - “The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible - with the destruction of the Yugoslav Air Force ground - installation, and to destroy its capital, Belgrade, in waves of - attacks.” - -The Führer was not going to give the civilian population even half an -hour’s warning, was he? - -JODL: I do not know what preparations for warning the Yugoslav -Government had been made, but at the moment of the Putsch it immediately -made military preparations and deployed its forces along our border. - -MR. ROBERTS: May I ask you this? Do you approve, as an honorable -soldier, of attacking a city crowded with civilians without a -declaration of war or even half an hour’s warning? - -JODL: I do not hold that view. I have already said that I, personally, -and half an hour or an hour later the Reich Foreign Minister, suggested -an ultimatum. - -MR. ROBERTS: When you lost air superiority and people were able to hit -back, you Germans made a great deal of fuss then about terror attacks, -did you not? - -JODL: This city was at the same time the center of a Putsch government -which had annulled a treaty concluded with Germany, and which from that -moment on had made preparations along the whole front for war with -Germany. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, I am going to leave the incident. Do you remember how -you referred to it in the notes for your lecture? It appears on Page -127—no, My Lord, it does—I beg your pardon, it appears on 292 of Book -7 and at 304 of the German. You refer to it as “an interlude.” Do you -remember? The German word is “Zwischenspiel,” “interlude.” Is that your -idea of an interlude? - -JODL: To be juridically exact, you mean the first draft of my lecture -and not my lecture which you do not know. However, even in this first -draft I cannot recall mentioning an interlude. - -MR. ROBERTS: How many civilians, how many thousands, do you think were -killed in the first movement of that “interlude”—in the bombing of -Belgrade without warning? - -JODL: I cannot say, but surely only a tenth of the number killed in -Dresden, for example, when you had already won the war. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now I come to the alleged aggression against the Union of -Soviet Socialist Republics. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Republic -in July of 1940, did he not? - -JODL: In July of 1940 he had not yet reached that decision. - -MR. ROBERTS: But at any rate—I do not want to waste time—we know that -on the 22d of June 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union contrary to her -nonaggression pact. That is history, is it not? - -JODL: Yes. The surprise attack on 22 June 1941 is a historical fact -which took place because the politicians were of the opinion that the -Soviet Union had not kept the pact. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, Witness, I am going to pass from this part of the case -altogether. I want to put one last question: Do you not think that this -record of broken pledges will dishonor the name of Germany for centuries -to come? - -JODL: It might, if historical research after exact investigation of -Russian documents delivers clear proof that Russia had no intention of -strangling us politically or of attacking us. In that case, yes; -otherwise, no. - -MR. ROBERTS: I now want to ask—to come to quite a different part of the -case under Count Three and Count Four. The documents have been put to -you so often. I do not want to put them again. - -But, you remember the “Barbarossa” order. That is C-50, in Document Book -7, Page 187; and German book, 146. That was circulated by your office, -was it not, Wehrmachtführungsstab, L? - -JODL: It was dealt with in the Quartermaster Section of the -Wehrmachtführungsstab. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well now, would you agree that that was a shameful order to -have to issue? - -JODL: I agree. I have already said that there was no soldier who was not -opposed to this order; they all did so. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now we know that on the 17th of July—and this -is Document C-51, which is in Document Book 7, at Page 190, German Page -150—we know that from the same office, the WFSt, L, there was issued an -order that the previous order was to be destroyed, but its validity was -not to be affected, destroyed below corps level. What was the object of -the destruction of that order? - -JODL: Unfortunately I cannot tell you; I do not recall this order. I do -not believe I ever saw it, at least not before this Trial. - -MR. ROBERTS: Perhaps you would look at it, Witness, C-51, Page 190, Book -7; 150, German book. Now, that comes from WFSt—that is, -Wehrmachtführungsstab—Department “L”; and then “Q” for “Quartermaster,” -in brackets. That is your office, is it not? - -JODL: That is a part of the Wehrmachtführungsstab. - -MR. ROBERTS: It is signed Keitel. - -JODL: Yes. But I do not know this order; it was shown to me for the -first time here in Nuremberg; I had never seen it before. I do not know -what it is about or what order is being rescinded. I have already said -that these questions of military legal jurisdiction were dealt with by -Field Marshal Keitel, and that he used my Quartermaster Section as a -working staff without my having any part in these matters. I do not know -this order. - -MR. ROBERTS: And you cannot suggest any reason why it had to be -destroyed? - -JODL: No; I cannot give you any information about it. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now then, I want C-52, which has not yet been put in. Your -Lordships will find it on Page 191 of Book 7. I offer it as GB-485, and -it is in the German book on Page 153. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, this is another Keitel order. It -comes from Wehrmachtführungsstab, L; then, in brackets, “I Op.” Is that -your department? - -JODL: That is the section which worked with me on all operational -questions. - -MR. ROBERTS: Do you remember that order? - -JODL: Yes, I remember the order. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now—I think you took part in drafting it; did you not? - -JODL: Certainly, because it is an operational order which supplements a -directive. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, well, will you look at Paragraphs 6 and 7? Paragraph -6: - - “In view of the vast size of the occupied areas in the East, - forces available for establishing security will be sufficient - only if all resistance is punished not by legal prosecution of - the guilty, but by the occupation forces spreading such terror - as is alone appropriate to eradicate every inclination to - resist. - - “The respective commanders, together with the troops at their - disposal, are to be held responsible for maintaining peace in - their respective areas. The commanders must find the means of - keeping order within the regions where security is their - responsibility, not by demanding more forces, but by applying - suitable Draconian measures.” - -That is a terrible order, is it not? - -JODL: No, it is not at all terrible for it is established by -international law that the inhabitants of an occupied territory must -follow the orders and instructions of the occupying power, and any -uprising, any resistance against the army occupying the country is -forbidden; it is, in fact, partisan warfare, and international law does -not lay down means of combating partisans. The principle of such warfare -is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and this is not even a -German principle. - -MR. ROBERTS: Is it not the tooth and the eye of the innocent? - -JODL: It is not a question of the innocent. It expressly states, “to -eradicate every inclination to resist.” It is a question of those who -resist, that is, by partisan warfare. - -MR. ROBERTS: I will not argue about it, Witness. I gather you approve of -the order. - -JODL: I approve it as a justified measure conforming to international -law and directed against a widespread resistance movement which employed -unscrupulous methods. Of that we had evidence. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now I want to come to something quite different. -I want to come to the Commando Order, and I desire to put in two -documents which have not yet been put in, to trace the history of the -making of this order, because I suggest it was drawn up in your office -under your jurisdiction. - -Will you give the witness, please, 1266-PS, which I offer, My Lord, as -GB-486. - -Now, this is the first document, dated the 8th of October. That is a -memorandum from the “Q” branch of the Wehrmachtführungsstab; that is -right, is it not? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: And it was—that is the wireless order that you mentioned? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: First it deals with the “tying up,” My Lord, which is not -important. Secondly, the wireless announcement of the 7th of October -1942, which reads as follows: - - “All terror and sabotage detachments of the British and their - accomplices who do not behave like soldiers but like bandits - will in future be treated as such by German troops and will be - ruthlessly slain in battle wherever they make their appearance.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, of course, that order does not mean -very much, does it? It assumes that the enemy are not behaving like -soldiers, but like bandits, and says they may be slain in battle. - -But then the second paragraph: - - “The Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff...” - -That was Warlimont, was it not, Witness? - -JODL: Yes, that was Warlimont. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. - - “...has given the following urgent task to ‘Q’: - - “1) Drafting of the order.” - -Look at Number 2: - - “Like the Barbarossa order issued at the time this order must - also be drawn up—in conjunction with the Armed Forces Legal - Department and Counterintelligence—with great thought and care. - Distribution down to armies only, from there forward only - orally. To be destroyed after having been taken cognizance of.” - -What was the nature of that order that was drawn up with so much care by -your staff and the Legal Department and Counterintelligence? - -JODL: I believe that was Document C-50, which you mentioned earlier. The -Barbarossa order is not a clear term. - - MR. ROBERTS: “The following must be borne in mind regarding the - contents of the order: - - “In cases where captives are temporarily taken into custody for - our own purposes, the persons concerned are to be handed over to - the SD by Counterintelligence after a thorough examination in - which the SD is also to take part. - - “Not to be lodged in prisoner-of-war camps under any - circumstances. - - “This order is to take effect subsequently with regard to the - people from Norway.” - -The people from Norway were some English Commandos who had blown up a -power station in Norway; is not that so? - -JODL: That is possible, but I do not know. I have never seen this. - -MR. ROBERTS: I think I will be able to remind you later about it. - -The next document I do not read. It is from somebody called “Dr. Hülle,” -whom I do not know, and I do not think it adds anything to it. - -Then the next document—the third in Your Lordship’s bundle—is dated 9 -October and is signed “Warlimont.” Is it dated 9 October, Witness? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Signed Warlimont? - -JODL: Signed by Warlimont. - -MR. ROBERTS: It sets out the first facts in the first two paragraphs -that we know: - - “The Führer wishes an order to be issued laying down the proper - behavior of the Armed Forces. - - “At the instance of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Armed - Forces Legal Department has drawn up the draft attached hereto. - - “You are requested to co-operate in a thorough examination, if - necessary, calling in the Reichsführer SS. - - “We refer to the discussion between Chief of Counterintelligence - and the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.” - -Then the next document is the draft order prepared by the Legal -Department: - - “Members of terror and sabotage detachments of the British Armed - Forces who demonstrably break the rules of an honorable way of - fighting will be treated as bandits: To be exterminated - mercilessly in battle or in flight. If in case of military - necessity they should be temporarily arrested, or if they fall - into German hands outside combat actions, they are to be brought - before an officer immediately for interrogation and are then to - be handed over to the SD. - - “Holding them in a prisoner-of-war camp is forbidden. - - “This order may be distributed only down to armies. From there - to the front it must be transmitted only verbally.” - -And did you—do you remember having a conversation on the telephone with -the head of the Legal Department about this order? - -JODL: No, I do not remember. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, will you look at the next document; it is dated 14 -October. It is in the same bundle, the next page of it—I beg your -pardon, it is a memorandum. Now you notice the heading, the original -heading was: “Reprisal Actions—Prisoners of War.” Somebody struck that -out and put instead: “Combating of Enemy Sabotage Detachments.” - - “Memorandum. (Telephone discussion with the Chief of the Armed - Forces Legal Department). - - “The Chief of the Armed Forces Legal Department has spoken with - the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff by telephone.” - -That is you, is it not? - -JODL: Yes. - - MR. ROBERTS: “The latter”—that is you—“said that the Führer’s - aim in this action was to prevent this manner of waging war - (dropping small detachments who do great damage by demolitions - and then surrender).” - -That was the object of the order, was it not? - -JODL: Yes, but by using methods contrary to international law. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, that is a matter perhaps neither for you nor me to -discuss. But if I might be allowed to ask you this question: Do you draw -any distinction between a British airman who bombs a power station from -the air and a British parachutist in uniform who is landed and blows it -up with an explosive? Do you draw any distinction in international law? - -JODL: No. As such, the destruction of an objective by a demolition troop -I consider completely admissible under international law; but I do not -consider it admissible during such an operation for civilian clothes to -be worn under the uniform and armpit pistols to be carried which start -firing as soon as the arms are raised in the act of surrender. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, there are two things there, you see, and one answer -and I am not going to argue at all with you; but when you consider the -case you will find many, many cases where these persons were executed -and there is no suggestion they had anything but a uniform at all. - -JODL: I believe that these cases were quite rare, that at least these -people were mixed with those who wore civilian clothes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, I am not going to argue with you because there are -other documents and they will have to be, perhaps, summarized sometime. -But would you agree that a parachutist in uniform, with no civilian -clothes, acting like that, if he is killed, shot by the SD, would you -agree that that would be murder? Or would you rather not answer that? - -JODL: I have already said that if a soldier in full uniform only blows -up or destroys an objective, I do not consider it an action contrary to -international law; and for that reason I opposed the Commando Order in -this form almost to the last moment... - -MR. ROBERTS: I hear your answer and I will not pursue that matter. Then -the document goes on—I do not want to read it all: - - “The Chief of the Armed Forces Legal Department spoke to the - effect that under these circumstances one should consider - issuing an order fit for publication. Article 23c of the Hague - Land Warfare Regulations, which forbids the killing or wounding - of an enemy who lays down his arms or is unarmed, if he - surrenders unconditionally, had to be explained; when the Land - Warfare Regulations were concluded this manner of waging war was - not yet known and the regulation therefore could not apply to - this.” - -Well now, that was the first bundle. Now I want to put you a... - -JODL: I should like to make a brief comment on this document. I have not -seen any of these papers before; I am now seeing them for the first -time; but they prove, word for word, what I said here the day before -yesterday under oath, that on their own initiative, the members of my -staff, as they heard that the Führer had demanded an executive order, -began preparatory work for the draft of such an order with the Legal -Department and with the Foreign Department, but that I did not accept -and did not submit any order to the Führer. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well now, I want to put to you another document, 1265-PS. - -My Lord, I offer it as GB-487. - -Now the first document in the bundle is a teletype dated 13 October and -it is signed by Canaris. Is that right, Witness? - -JODL: Yes, a teletype message from Canaris. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, and it is a teletype to the OPS Staff. The subject is -“Treatment of Prisoners of War.” - - “Regarding discussions and measures in pursuance of OKW’s - announcement of 17 October 1942 the following general attitude - is taken:” - -Number 1 does not matter; it is about chaining. Number 2 is the -important one: - - “Treatment of Sabotage Units: Sabotage units in uniform are - soldiers and have the right to be treated as prisoners of war. - Sabotage units in civilian clothes or German uniform have no - claim to treatment as prisoners of war (_francs-tireurs_).” - -You agree, of course, with the correctness of that, do you not? The rest -of that document does not matter. You agree, do you not, with that -opinion in Paragraph 2, as a man who knows international law? - -JODL: Yes, I agree with Paragraph 2; it corresponds entirely with my -opinion; it agrees completely with my point of view. - -MR. ROBERTS: And now the next document. - -If you go to the—if the Tribunal would kindly go to the last document -of the three; and would you go to the document which is headed, -“Telephone call; Reference: Letter Ausland Abwehr of 13. 10. 42.” My -Lord, that is the one I have just read. - - “Opinion of the Armed Forces Legal Department”—Paragraph 2, - that is referring to Canaris’ opinion—“Fundamentally in - agreement. - - “It may, however, be possible to support the following train of - thought with regard to special cases: - - “Fighting methods such as exist now and such as it is intended - to prevent came about long after the creation of the Hague - Regulations for Land Warfare, in particular as a result of war - in the air. Special attention is drawn to the mass use of - parachutists for purposes of sabotage. Anyone who commits acts - of sabotage as a soldier with the intention of surrendering - after the act of sabotage without fighting does not act like an - honest fighter. He misuses Article 23c of the Hague Regulations - for Land Warfare during the formulation of which no such methods - were contemplated. The misuse lies in the speculation on - surrender without fighting after successful completion of the - act of sabotage. - - “This view regarding the inadmissibility of sabotage Commandos - can be backed up without reservation provided we also apply it - to ourselves.” - -That document has your initial on the top, Witness? Is that right? - -JODL: I have read this document. It contains a statement on -international law by the Armed Forces Legal Department, which on this -point agrees with the Führer’s opinion. It actually confirms the -possibility that a misuse of international law may be committed by -surrendering immediately after an action and thus securing for oneself -complete absence of danger in the conduct of a war operation. That -interpretation is disputable; I do not fully approve of it, but it was -the view of the highest legal authority at that time. - -MR. ROBERTS: Many, many brave soldiers, when they are outnumbered, -surrender, do they not? Many Germans surrendered at Bizerte and Tunis, -thousands of them. How did that put them outside the pale of -international law or the protection of it? - -JODL: But they were soldiers captured in the normal manner of war, which -the Führer always recognized. This is a disputable case and very -doubtful under international law, but, as I said, it is not an idea of -mine and has nothing to do with me; I only took note of it. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. My Lord, the intermediate document is a letter -signed “Lehmann,” who was head of the Legal Department. It merely -confirms the telephone conversation which I have read, and I do not -think it is necessary to read it again. It is before the defendant. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Well now, the last of these documents -before the order was finally drawn up and issued, the Court has already -seen, because it was put in. - -It is 1263-PS, RF-365, My Lord, it was in Jodl’s Document Book Number 2, -Page 104. - -Will you look at the original, please. - -There is an unfortunate omission from Page 110 in Dr. Exner’s book, -which I am perfectly certain is quite inadvertent. Will you look at the -document dated 15 October 1942? - -My Lord, I think that is the first in your bundle. It is Page 110. It is -first in the single documents. It is Page 110 of Dr. Exner’s book, and I -apologize to him because I have just seen the marginal writing. It was -covered over before, and I had not seen it. I apologize. - -My Lord, the... - -It is a note, is it not, Witness, signed Warlimont, your deputy, 15 -October. I think you will find it the second document in your file. I do -not want to read it all again because it has been read, but you see: -“The Proposal of the Amt Ausland Abwehr will be submitted as Appendix -1.” - -The Tribunal will find Appendix 1, in which he says—in which it is -suggested, under letter “A,” that sabotage troops who do not wear -uniforms should be court-martialed. You have said “no.” You have given -your reasons. I will not worry you about that any more. And then “B”; -members of sabotage units, who are in uniform but are guilty of -dishonorable activities are after capture to be put into special -confinement. Do you say that that does not go either? - -And then, if you will go back to 15 October, just the second paragraph -down: - - “The Chief of WR”—that is the Legal Department—“has made a - statement to the effect that the order was to be drawn up in - such a way that it will take into account our own interests...” - -Is it “our own interests,” Witness? “Take into account our own -interests”? - -JODL: Yes, “our own interests.” - - MR. ROBERTS: “...our own interests while considering the future - conduct of the war. In this way he wanted to avoid repercussions - which would run counter to our further intentions. Sabotage is - an essential part of conducting war in time of total warfare; we - ourselves have strongly developed this method of fighting.” - -And you write against that, do you, “But the English make much more use -of it”? - -JODL: Yes, it is an undeniable fact that at that time of the war the -English made much more use of it than we. - -MR. ROBERTS: Is that a reason for making a law, an order of this kind, -to try and discourage the English from using sabotage detachments? - -JODL: No, that is certainly not a reason. It is only a denial of the -statement that we had strongly developed this method of fighting; hence -my remark, “Yes, but the English to a much greater extent than we.” -That, of course, has nothing at all to do with the reason for the order. - -MR. ROBERTS: Then I am not going to take more time on that particular -document, except—have you got a document dated 14 October with 1, 2, 3, -4 at the end? I think it is on a separate page, the 1, 2, 3, 4. - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: It says: - - “With the view in mind—to prevent the enemy’s fighting the war - by using sabotage troops—following questions have to be - clarified before formulating an order: - - “1) Have we ourselves the intention of dropping sabotage Units - in the zone of rear echelons of the enemy, or also far back in - the interior? - - “2) Who will drop more sabotage troops, the enemy or we? - - “3) Can we establish the principle: Sabotage troops do not - conduct legal war; they are to be exterminated in the fighting - without mercy? - - “4) Do we attach importance to first arresting the single - members of this group for interrogation by Counterintelligence - and not killing them immediately?” - -These were the considerations which were discussed in your office before -the orders were drawn up. - -JODL: These were questions—not points of view—questions which were -raised in the Armed Forces Operations Staff as a result of the Armed -Forces communiqué. Fortunately, the submission of all these documents -proves the complete correctness of everything I said here 2 days ago. -The staff, the Legal Department, and the Ausland department racked their -brains and pondered how they could draw up the executive order -implementing the Führer’s additions to the Wehrmacht communiqué. Neither -they nor I came to any conclusion, and no proposal was made to the -Führer; nothing was done. That is what I stated here the day before -yesterday, and that is what, fortunately, you yourself have proved by -submitting these documents. - -MR. ROBERTS: You have said, I think, that part of the Führer’s order -disgusted you? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: And you have said in your interrogation that circulating -this order was one of the things which went against your inner -conscience—one of the few things. “Your inner convictions”—to use your -actual words. - -JODL: In the preliminary interrogation I said that it was one of the -few—or the only—order I received from the Führer which I, in my own -mind, completely rejected. - -MR. ROBERTS: You rejected it, but these young men went on being shot, -did they not? - -JODL: I have already described exactly how the commanding generals at -the front, vigorously supported by me, interpreted this order in the -mildest imaginable way in practice; actually, only very few such -incidents occurred, and I believe that most—at any rate, nearly all -that came to my knowledge—were highly justified, because the fighting -methods of those people were not methods of honest soldiers. - -MR. ROBERTS: You see, you talk about your “inner convictions.” I think -Keitel spoke about his “inner conscience.” But should we have heard -anything about these convictions and this conscience if Germany had not -lost the war? - -JODL: No, but then we might have heard of the strangled at Dieppe in a -similar trial. - -MR. ROBERTS: It is very late and—now, I just want to deal with a few -examples, very very quickly, of the order being carried out, as you said -it was only carried out a few times. I just, first of all, want to refer -to UK-57, which is Page 309 of Document Book 7, the German copy Page -33—German copy Page 344. I am sorry, I had given you the wrong number. -I can read this out. It is a report which is initialed by Keitel. - - “On 16 September 1942”—mark the date, that is more than a month - before the Commando Order came into force—“10 Englishmen and 2 - Norwegians landed on the Norwegian coast, dressed in the uniform - of the British Mountain Rifle Regiment, heavily armed and - equipped with explosives of every description. After negotiating - difficult mountain country, they blew up important installations - in the power station Glomfjord on 21 September. A German sentry - was shot during the incident. Norwegian workmen were threatened - that they would be chloroformed if they resisted. For this - purpose the Englishmen were equipped with morphium syringes. - Seven of the participants have been arrested. The others escaped - into Sweden.” - -Then follow seven names, which I read out to this Court, I think, in -January. They were shot on 30 October 1942. That would be, shot as a -result of the order which you circulated, although it was not in -existence when those men blew up that power station. You told me some -little time ago that that power station was a proper military target. -These men were in uniform. Can you begin to justify that? - -JODL: No, I cannot justify that, and I will not justify it. I consider -it completely illegal, because this order could certainly not have been -retroactive; but I did not learn of this affair at the time. Of UK-57 I -read the first and second parts here for the first time; the third part -I read in April 1944. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, there are other exhibits dealing with this -matter which I am not going to put to you. They have been referred to -before, and I do not want to be cumulative. I would like you—or perhaps -I will ask you one question first. - -I think it was laid down, was it not, that every action taken under this -Führer Order was to be reported in the Wehrmacht report? - -JODL: Yes, that was ordered. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I just want to give you an example of the Wehrmacht -report. - -526-PS, USA-502, My Lord, it is 7a, Page 15. It is dated 10 May 1943, -German Page 21 of the small book. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] It is a notice from the “Q” branch of your -staff. - - “On 30 March 1943 in Toftefjord an enemy cutter was sighted. - Cutter was blown up by enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners. - - “Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetlands) by the Norwegian - Navy. - - “Arms: Two Colt machine guns, two mounted machine guns, a small - transmitter ... 1,000 kilograms of explosives.... - - “Purpose: Forming an organization for sabotaging strong-points, - battery positions, staff and troop billets, and bridges.... - - “Führer order executed by the SD. - - “Wehrmacht report of 6 April announces the following: - - “In northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and - destroyed on approaching the coast.” - -That was false, was it not? - -JODL: I confirmed this communiqué of 6 April which included the -contribution from the commander in Norway as I received it on 6 April; -this brief formulation always originated with the commander at the -front. But what actually happened is set down in this note of 10 May -which, most unfortunately, I never saw, because on 10 May 1943 I -traveled by train to Bad Gastein to begin a cure for a severe case of -lumbago; and so, unfortunately, I saw this document for the first time -here in Nuremberg. I am sorry, because this would have been one of the -few cases in which I might have been able to intervene. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, but, Witness—keep it in front of you—because you see -the action was not taken on 10 May; it was taken before, or on 6 April. -Look at the last paragraph: - - “Wehrmacht report of 6 April announces the following: - - “...enemy sabotage unit engaged and destroyed on approaching the - coast.” - -Whereas, in fact, they had been taken prisoner and then shot like dogs -by the SD. - -JODL: Yes, I have just said that. Before this contribution of 6 April, I -heard nothing about the whole matter, but only on the 10th of May did it -come to our knowledge, and then the Armed Forces Operations Staff drew -up this note. The whole investigation into these events was made by the -Intelligence Service, the office of Canaris, together with its Security -Police; it was not the SD; that is wrong; it was the Security Police. - -Unfortunately I did not know of these details; the Intelligence Service -knew them. I was concerned with the whole question only because I had to -edit the Armed Forces communiqué; otherwise I would never have dealt -with the Commando Order; I was quite innocent of it. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now I just want to show you one more instance. It is -2610-PS. - -It is, My Lord, in small Document Book 7a, Page 23, the German small -book Page 41. - -Now, I want you to notice, Witness, this is the only document which I -rely on, which is not one of your own captured contemporaneous German -documents. This is a report from the Judge Advocate General’s -Department, United States Army. It concerns 15 United States personnel -who were shot under this order. If you look at the second page: - - “On the night of 22 March 1944, 2 officers and 13 enlisted men - of the Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the - United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and - landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All 15 men - were members of the United States Army and were in the military - service of the United States. When they landed they were all - properly dressed in the field uniform of the United States Army - and they had no civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish - a railroad tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. - That rail line was being used by the German Forces to supply - their fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead - fronts.” - -That was a good military target, that tunnel, was it not? - -JODL: Yes, a military target, absolutely. - -MR. ROBERTS: And all 15 men were shot because of the order that you -circulated... - -JODL: I did not understand. The order which—which I circulated; yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Which you circulated on the 19th of October. You circulated -a supplementary order to the Führer Order, the last paragraph of which, -I think, disgusted you. That is 503-PS. - -JODL: It would be more correct to say “which you had to circulate.” - -MR. ROBERTS: I will take that question up in a moment. I do not agree. I -must not argue with you, but I must put some questions. - -General Dostler, who ordered the shooting of those men, he himself, you -see, was also shot by sentence of this court martial. - -I am going to turn now from the Commando Order and... - -JODL: May I say something else about this document? - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, anything you like. - -JODL: This incident never came to my knowledge; at least, I have no -recollection of it. As far as I know, it never appeared in the Armed -Forces communiqué, because General Dostler did not report the incident -to his commanding officer, Kesselring, who might have been able to take, -and might have taken, a different course in this affair. - -MR. ROBERTS: Why do you say that you had to circulate this order? No man -can compel another to circulate an order for murder, unless he does it. - -JODL: I have explained at length that this order could not simply be -interpreted as an order to murder, but that very serious and justified -doubts and considerations could arise with regard to international law -and with regard to the justness of this order. In any case, you should -have complete appreciation of such a delicate situation, because even -now, in my position here, I cannot say or do as I like, and that exactly -is what I experienced during these last 5½ years. - -MR. ROBERTS: You could have refused. You could have said, and the other -generals could have said, could you not: “We are all honorable soldiers. -We will not publish and issue those orders”? - -JODL: Certainly under other circumstances it might have been possible, -first, if at the time I had not had that conflict with the Führer, and -secondly, if the British Ministry of War had made my task a little -easier. However, these events and the statement made by the British on -the 2d of September put the Führer into a rage against which I was -powerless. How much I tried to resist, for that the document itself is -the best proof, because the threat of punishment and detailed -justification for it were directed against me personally. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, would that be a convenient time to break -off? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ROBERTS: I want to ask you a few questions about the deportation of -the Jews from Denmark. Will you look, please, at a new exhibit, D-547, -which I offer as GB-488. Now, that is the OKW Operational Staff from the -commander, Denmark, dated 20 September 1943. That is before the teletype -which has been put in, 2 days before: - - “The Führer has agreed in principle with Dr. Best’s telegram - that the Jewish question in Denmark be solved very soon by - deportation. - - “Execution of this measure should take place while the state of - military emergency still exists. It is not certain if sufficient - police forces can be provided for the arrest of the Jews and - their families, about 6,000 persons, most of whom live in - Copenhagen. The Army would be heavily burdened.... - - “I believe that the results of the deportation will be - serious.... - - “The armament industry deliveries will be prejudiced. - Considerable disturbances will have to be reckoned with.” - -And you made a note on the back of it: - - “I know nothing of this. If a political measure is to be carried - out by the commander of Denmark the OKW must be notified by the - Foreign Office.” - -Is that right? - -JODL: Yes. I would not have recalled this document, but I certainly -wrote the note. It proves that I did not remember until now that -obviously this question had been discussed in Denmark some days before -and that the commander in Denmark had been making objections. -Consequently I wrote, I know nothing of this. This is a political -measure, and if a political measure is to be carried out in Denmark, -then the Foreign Office should kindly notify us. - -MR. ROBERTS: I omit one or two unimportant documents. Will you go to -document dated 1 October 1943—the fifth or sixth document of Your -Lordship’s file, Number D-547, dated 1 October 1943. It is to the OKW -from Denmark, and quotes as follows: - - “The Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark has given the following - report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs: - - “1) The arrest of the Jews will take place on the night of 1-2 - October. Transportation from Zealand will be carried out by - ship.... - - “2) Should I receive no contrary instruction, I do not intend - allowing the Jewish action to be mentioned, either on the radio - or in the press”—and then - - “3) ...I intend leaving the possessions of the evacuated Jews - undisturbed in order that the seizure of these possessions - cannot be imputed to be the reason or one of the reasons for the - action.” - -Then you deal with the disadvantages—the writer does—and there is a -question: “Does the Reichsführer SS know?” The answer: - -“The Reichsführer SS knows, is in agreement,” and then a pencil note in -Jodl’s handwriting, “The Führer agrees.” Is that in your writing? - -JODL: Yes, that is my handwriting, but that refers only to the -announcement of the release of the interned Danish soldiers. - -MR. ROBERTS: I see. - -JODL: Then it is important to note in this document that the commander -in Denmark said that he did not intend having the property of the -evacuated Jews disturbed. He said: - - “...I intend leaving the possessions of the evacuated Jews - undisturbed....” - -He had the executive power at that time. - -MR. ROBERTS: Have you got the next document in the same bundle, 2d of -October 1943, to OKW Operations Staff, from Denmark? I quote: - - “Jewish action carried out in the night of the 1-2 October by - the German Police without incidents.” - -And then the last document, dated 3 October 1943, to the OKW Operations -Staff: - - “According to the statement of the Reich Plenipotentiary, the - Reichsführer SS has ordered that the Reichsführer SS alone as - the person ordering the Jewish action is to receive the exact - figures on arrests. - - “The Plenipotentiary has, therefore, given no figures to the - commander of the German troops in Denmark. 232 Jews have been - handed in by the Police via the collecting points set up by the - Watch Battalion, Copenhagen.” - -What was the Watch Battalion? - -JODL: I cannot say that at the moment; I do not know how it was -composed. It might have been a unit of the Police; it might have been -part of the Army; I cannot say with certainty. At any rate it was a unit -which was used only for guard duties. But it is interesting that I wrote -the remark: “Is a matter of complete indifference to us,” which proves -that I was not interested in the affair, and refused to have any part in -it. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I wonder. First of all, you said that the Watch -Battalion might have been a part of the Wehrmacht. Were you... - -JODL: That is not certain. I do not wish to dispute it definitely. There -were also watch battalions of the Army, but it might equally well have -been a watch unit of the Police. I cannot say it with certainty, but -General Von Hannecken should have information about it. - -MR. ROBERTS: But were your “decent German soldiers,” whom you mentioned -yesterday, were they called upon to round up Jews who managed to get -through the SS net? - -JODL: No, it says here, “...it was carried through by the Police,” and I -do not believe that any unit of the Wehrmacht concerned itself with -deportation of Jews. I do not believe it; the Wehrmacht rejected that. - -MR. ROBERTS: Dirty work, was it not? - -JODL: I do not believe that it happened; I do not believe it. - -MR. ROBERTS: Then your note: “...is a matter of complete indifference to -us”—it was a matter of complete indifference to you how many Jews were -deported, you did not care? - -JODL: The note does not imply that, but it does prove that the matter -was a political one, and with political matters I was not concerned. My -attitude to the Jewish question has, I believe, been made clear already. - -MR. ROBERTS: Where did the Jews go to, Auschwitz? - -JODL: No. The French Prosecution read it here; these Jews of whom we are -speaking now were taken to Theresienstadt; a few of the older people -died there, but all of them were treated well, and received clothing and -food. I had the same information, and this document of the Danish -Government confirms it. - -MR. ROBERTS: You believe that, do you? - -JODL: Yes, I believe that, because the Danish Government confirms it -here; it was confirmed in this court by the Prosecution itself. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now I want to deal with one other topic, the topic of -forced labor. Did you say in your speech—will you look at your notes of -your speech, Pages 38 and 39, and it is Page 298 of Document Book 7, the -big one, the paragraph, which begins on Page 38 in the witness’ copy. It -has got a frame; I think it is a piece of paper headed “38.” I wonder if -you can find it for him. - - “This dilemma of manpower shortage has led to the idea of making - more thorough use of the manpower reserves in the territories - dominated by us. Right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up - together. I believe that insofar as concerns labor, everything - has been done that could be done. Where this has not yet been - achieved, it appeared to be more favorable politically to - refrain from measures of compulsion, and secure in turn order - and economic aid. In my opinion, however, the time has now come - to take steps with remorseless vigor and resolution in Denmark, - Holland, France, and Belgium to compel thousands of idlers to - carry out the fortification work which is more important than - any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been - given.” (Document Number L-172, Exhibit Number USA-34.) - -Do you remember them? - -JODL: There is no doubt that I drafted this once. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes? - -JODL: But that does not prove that I said it. - -MR. ROBERTS: But had the necessary orders been given for the civilians -in the occupied territories to work on the German fortification? - -JODL: A compulsory labor order was issued in most countries, but I—you -may not know it—I state under my oath that in Denmark and Holland, and -also in Belgium, local firms, which recruited their own labor under the -labor order, worked on these fortifications and that the populations of -these areas were particularly glad about this, because the stronger -their coast was fortified, the more certain were they that the invasion -would not take place in their neighborhood. And, of course, they were -greatly interested in preventing an invasion, which they knew would -destroy everything. Though it sounds incredible, the local inhabitants -did work on these fortifications, some of them with the greatest -enthusiasm. That is a fact. - -MR. ROBERTS: No, I did not stop you. But had the necessary orders been -given—that is in the last sentence—to compel these people who did not -want to, to compel them to work on fortification? I am not talking about -the people who did want it, but the people who did not. - -JODL: I understand. I did not know details of the procedure, as I did -not concern myself with it, but I did know that compulsory labor orders -had been issued in the occupied countries. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I will leave that, if you have said all you want -to say. Will you look now, please, at a new document, Number 1383-PS, -which I offer as GB-489. This is a report of a discussion of the current -military situation, 12 December 1942, Pages 65 and 66, Jodl speaking: - - “The military commander of France reports: The number of French - workers deported into the Reich since 1 June has now passed - 220,000. There are in round figures 100,000 skilled laborers in - Berlin.” - -How many of these 220,000 were volunteers, did you find out? - -JODL: I cannot say that; I only quoted from a report which was appended -to the situation report from France. That a large-scale exchange between -prisoners of war and workers had been in progress has already been -stated in detail by Sauckel. - -MR. ROBERTS: I will leave that. I ask only two questions now on Sagan, -Stalag Luft III. - -You said yesterday that after the incident of the Sagan shooting, you -thought Hitler was no longer “humane.” Did you say that? - -JODL: I said yesterday, I had the impression then that he was disavowing -all humane conceptions of right. - -MR. ROBERTS: Had you thought that he was humane up to March of 1944? - -JODL: Before this time, I personally knew of no action of his which -could not be justified legally, at least under international law. All -his previous orders, so far as I knew, could still be justified in some -way. They were reprisals. But this act was not a reprisal. - -MR. ROBERTS: This was—would you agree with me—the word is not too -strong—that this was sheer murder of these 50 airmen? - -JODL: I completely agree with you: I consider it sheer murder. - -MR. ROBERTS: How could you honorable generals go on serving a murderer -with unabated loyalty? - -JODL: I did not serve with unabated loyalty after this event, but I did -everything in my power to avoid further injustice. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now I come to something else, the question of destruction -in Norway. The document is 754-PS. It has not yet been exhibited. I -offer it as GB-490. This document is signed by you, is it not? - -JODL: I have known this document for a long time; it is signed by me. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Perhaps I might just read parts of it to the Tribunal. -Dated 28 October 1944. It is from your staff, and the distribution is to -the Army supreme command; commander-in-chief, Norway; to the Reich -Commissioner, Norway; and the Navy. - - “Because of the unwillingness of the northern Norwegian - population to evacuate voluntarily the Führer has agreed to the - proposals of the Reich Commissioner and has ordered that the - entire Norwegian population east of the Fjord of Lyngen be - evacuated by force in the interest of their own security, and - that all homes are to be burned to the ground or destroyed. - - “The commander, Northern Finland, is responsible that the - Führer’s orders be carried out without consideration. Only by - this method can the Russians with strong forces, aided by these - homesteads and the population familiar with the terrain, be - prevented from following our withdrawal operations during the - winter and shortly appearing in front of our position in Lyngen. - This is not the place for sympathy for the civilian population.” - -Lyngen is in the very north of Norway, is it not, on the west coast? - -JODL: No, on the northern coast, where Finland is closest to the coast -of the polar region and very near Norway. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, that order was carried out, according to the Norwegian -report, UK-79, which the Tribunal will find as the last document in the -small book, 7A, Page 26 of the Norwegian report, at the bottom of the -page, Page 26: - - “As a result of the advance of the Russian troops and the - retreat of the German Army in Finnmark, October-November 1944, - the Germans practiced the ‘scorched earth’ policy for the first - time in Norway. Orders were issued that the civilian population - was to evacuate, and that all houses, transport, and stores were - to be destroyed. As a result of this, about 30,000 houses were - damaged apart from 12,000 items of damage to chattels amounting - to 176 million kroner.” - -And then, for photographs will the Tribunal turn to Pages 62 and 63; 62 -is a copy of the German order, and 63 is a photograph of the ruins of a -fishing village. - -That was a cruel order, was it not, Witness? - -JODL: No, not exactly. I should like to make a few explanatory remarks -about it. Typically, as I have always said, this order was urged upon -the Führer by the Reich Commissioner Terboven; not by the soldiers but -much against their will. - -Secondly, this order was not carried out, because otherwise the cities -of Kirkenes, Hammerfest, and Alta would today no longer exist. All these -cities are east of the Lyngen Fjord. In practice this order was -moderated by our forces in agreement with me, and in conversations I had -with my brother, who was the commanding general in that region—and whom -I wanted to call as a witness since I expected this document to be -produced—it was moderated to such an extent that, in fact, only what -was necessary from a military point of view and could be justified under -Article 23 of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare was destroyed. -Otherwise no city or house would be left today in northern Norway; and -if you were to travel there, you would see that these cities are still -standing, not destroyed. - -The Armed Forces commander in Norway strongly protested against this -attitude of Terboven, and I repeated these objections to the Führer in -similarly strong terms, but nevertheless he demanded that this order be -issued. We who retained our humanitarian sentiments carried out the -order only insofar as it was absolutely necessary for military reasons. -These are the facts. - -MR. ROBERTS: I think you said, when you were interrogated, that your -brother complained of this order, did he not? - -JODL: Yes, quite, he was enraged by this decree. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very well. I am now going to turn to two documents with -regard to the treatment of the Norwegian civilian population. - -They are in your Document Book 1, Pages 99 and 100—well, it begins at -Page 98. These are regulations on the conduct during the occupation of -Denmark and Norway. And there are instructions to the troops to treat -the inhabitants politely and well and to behave themselves with due -decorum. That is right, is it not? - -JODL: Yes, that is correct. - -MR. ROBERTS: And they must be told that they are entering Norway for the -protection of the country and the safety of its inhabitants. That -appears on Page 99. That is rather a euphemistic description of a sudden -invasion with no declaration of war, is it not? - -JODL: Yes, but at first it was carried out in a fairly peaceful manner -on the whole. - -MR. ROBERTS: From your point of view? - -JODL: No, from the point of view of the Norwegians as well. The most -extraordinary things... - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, you know, we have seen—we can see in the Norwegian -Government’s report photograph after photograph of these towns and -villages bombed to ruins. Is that your idea of an orderly occupation? - -JODL: What was bombed on the day of the landing is hardly worth -mentioning; just a few coastal batteries and a few fortifications, but -no cities. Villages were destroyed only later in the battle with the -English brigade at Dombass and at Lillehammer, but nothing was destroyed -when the country was first occupied. Then the Norwegians only stood at -the quays, hands in their pockets, and looked on with great interest. - -MR. ROBERTS: And naturally, Witness, if you could have landed without -opposition and occupied the country without opposition, so much the -better for you? That is obvious, is it not? - -JODL: Yes, undoubtedly; that would have been even better; and the -Norwegians would certainly have fared very well during the occupation if -Terboven had not come. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want you to look at a part of that document which, -quite properly, of course, was not read. - -It is Appendix 5 which will be part, My Lord, I assume, of Exhibit -AJ-14, the number which this document was given when it was put in in -the examination-in-chief. But I am handing the Tribunal copies of -Appendix 5, because it does not appear in the Jodl document book. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, now, Appendix 5, I can describe as -the sting in the tail of this document: - - “Guiding Principles for the Attitude of Troops in Occupied - Areas. - - “Only”—I do not read the first few paragraphs—“Only in the - event of the civil population’s putting up a resistance or - behaving rebelliously can the following decisions be carried - out: - - “1) If the civilian population offers resistance or if attacks - are to be feared, the arrest of hostages should, on principle, - be resorted to. Hostages should only be arrested on orders of - the commander of a regiment or a commander of equivalent rank. - - “When accommodating and feeding hostages it should be borne in - mind that they are not imprisoned because of crimes. Hostages - and population are to be informed that the hostages will be shot - at any sign of hostile action. Previous sanction of the shooting - by the divisional commander must be obtained....” - -Then: - - “Armed resistance by the civilian population is to be crushed by - force of arms.” - -The last sentence on that page: - - “The death penalty will be imposed for violence of any kind - against the German Armed Forces. Immediate trials will be held - by a field court martial. The regimental commander can appoint - the summary court, composed of one captain, one sergeant, one - corporal, hear witnesses, draw up the sentence in writing. The - verdict will be the death penalty if guilty, otherwise - acquittal. The sentence will be executed immediately after - confirmation by the regimental commander. - - “The following are to be considered as acts of violence: - Sabotage, destruction of our lines of communications, cutting of - telephone wires, demolitions, _et cetera_.” (Document Number - Jodl-37, Exhibit Number AJ-14.) - -A little drastic, that, was it not? Only the death penalty? - -JODL: These instructions are, word for word, in complete accord with our -directives which, in times of peace, were laid down by the group of -experts on international law in co-operation with the Foreign Office and -with German professors of international law. It would have been well, if -only these, our military precepts, our military court procedure laid -down before we went to war, had been followed consistently everywhere. -Our official directives laid down the question of hostages from the -point of view of international law, and there is no doubt that under -international law as applicable in the year 1939, the taking of hostages -was admissible. - -MR. ROBERTS: I suggest to you, as you raise that point, that nowhere in -international law will you find the shooting of hostages legalized at -all. - -JODL: Then it is not with certainty prohibited anywhere in international -law. I believe it is an open question. In our directives, even in the -_Handbook on Tactics_, the concept of taking hostages had been laid down -for years. - -MR. ROBERTS: That may be so, and I do not want to argue with you about -it. I suggest to you that the Hague Regulations protect the lives of -civilians in occupied countries, unless they commit crimes, of course, -and also prohibit collective punishment of the innocent. - -If you do not want to say any more on that—I do not want to stop you if -you do. - -JODL: I can only summarize and say that every word here is in accord -with the directives applicable in the German Army, and these directives -were not illegal. But one would have to argue this problem with experts -on international law. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, will you look at one other document dealing -with Norway? It is D-582. - -My Lord, it is a new document, and I offer it as GB-491. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Is that a document which comes from your -office? - -JODL: Yes. It originated with the Armed Forces Operations Staff, -Quartermaster Section. - -MR. ROBERTS: Do you know of it or not? - -JODL: I cannot recall it, but there are some notes of mine on it, and so -I undoubtedly saw the document. - -MR. ROBERTS: Oh, yes. Where are the notes, Witness? - -JODL: They are on the back page of the last teleprint message. - -MR. ROBERTS: Oh, I see what you mean, yes. Well, will you take first of -all—I had forgotten that you were getting more than one document. Will -you take first of all the document dated the 2d of February 1945? I -think it is the top one. - -JODL: There are no remarks of mine on that document, so I cannot say -with certainty whether I have seen it. - -MR. ROBERTS: Just have a look at it and tell me whether you have seen -it. - -JODL: I do not think I have seen this. I do not—I have no recollection -of having ever read it. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, then, I do not think it would be right to -cross-examine you on that document. - -My Lord, in that case, I would ask to withdraw it, and I will not put it -in as an exhibit. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the defendant said that it was from his office. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very well, then. I will—he did that. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You see what the document says, Defendant. -It is dated 2 April 1945; it deals with... - -JODL: The 2d of February. - -MR. ROBERTS: It is the 2d of February. It deals with Reich Commissioner -Terboven’s report to the Führer. It says: - - “Those responsible for attempts to murder and to carry out - sabotage are the illegal elements within Norway with a - bourgeois-national majority and a communist minority, as well as - individual groups which came direct from England or Sweden.... - - “The bourgeois-national majority was opposed to the communist - minority in conception of sabotage and murder, and in particular - with regard to their extent and nature. This resistance has ... - become progressively weaker during the course of the past year. - - “Official departments of the exile government, as for instance - the Crown Prince Olaf, as so-called Commander-in-Chief of the - Norwegian Armed Forces, and various others, have called upon the - population in speeches and orders to carry out sabotage. As a - result, there is a particularly good possibility here of - stamping every supporter of the exile government as an - intellectual instigator or accomplice. - - “The aim of the coming measures must therefore be: a) to - strengthen the power and will to turn once more against sabotage - by threatening the very influential class of leaders in the - bourgeois camp; b) thereby to exacerbate more and more - antagonism between the bourgeois and Communists....” - -And then, “Suggestions.” These are suggestions from your office, -apparently: - - “1. Particularly influential representatives of the explicitly - anti-German and anti-National Socialist class of industrialists - to be shot without trial on the accusation that they are - intellectual instigators or accomplices and stating that they - were convicted within the framework of police investigations. - - “2. Similar men from the same circle to be sent to Germany to - work on fortifications. - - “3. In cases where the circumstances are particularly suitable, - proceedings to be taken before the SS and Police Court, with the - execution of the sentence of death and suitable publicity.” - -There are other suggestions which I need not read. And then the last -paragraph but one: - - “The Führer has agreed to these proposals only in part. - Especially in connection with efforts at protection against acts - of sabotage he has rejected taking hostages. He has rejected the - shooting of influential Norwegian representatives without - trial”—which is underlined in blue pencil. - -Is that your blue pencil? - -JODL: No, it is not mine. - -MR. ROBERTS: You see, it is a remarkable document, Witness, because that -is one instance where your department is suggesting a course of what I -submit is brutal action, which for once the Führer rejects. - -JODL: I believe, Mr. Roberts, you are somewhat mistaken. No proposal at -all is being made here, but the Armed Forces Operations Staff is -advising the military commander in Norway of what Reich Commissioner -Terboven has told the Führer. He reported to the Führer first about the -general situation and then be made the proposals mentioned here; and the -Armed Forces Operations Staff which obviously had a representative at -this meeting—I was not there—immediately advised the military -commander of the handsome proposals of his friend Terboven. - -That is what happened and these proposals went beyond—they were too -much even for the Führer. But they were not our proposals. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good, Witness, I hear your answer, and the Court will -consider it. It may be accepted. The document speaks for itself. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you read the first—the subject description -“Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven’s Report to the Führer”? - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is the first—that is the subject, is it not, -beginning, Witness, “Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven’s -Report”? Whose orientation? Your department’s? - -JODL: Orientation of the Mountain Army, that is, of General Böhm. -General Böhm as commanding general of the Mountain Army, High Command -20, is advised of the report made to the Führer by Reich Commissioner -Terboven, so that he would know what his friend Terboven was proposing. -It is no more than information on what Terboven said to the Führer. I -cannot tell you who was present; I was not there. The entire thing did -not originate with me; I have never seen it. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well now, the second document, this is from Terboven to -Bormann on the 28th of October 1944. That is with regard to the -evacuation east of Lyngen. I do not think I need read that. Then, the -next document, maybe the second document, it is a teleprint of the 6th -of April 1945, from Oberführer Fehlis, SS Oberführer to the Operations -Staff, and it says: - - “In accordance with the instructions of the OKW (WFSt) ... dated - 29 March 1945, members of the Norwegian resistance movement who - appear in organized units and who are easily recognizable as - combatants by arm bands or other insignia are to be treated as - prisoners of war.” - -And then the SS Oberführer says: - - “I consider this order completely intolerable. I explained this - clearly to Lieutenant Colonel Hass and Major Benze from the - Armed Forces Operations Staff, who stayed here. There have been - isolated appearances of uniformed groups in Norway, but there - has been no fighting as yet. Inquiries were made at the defense - headquarters in London as to whether armed resistance should be - offered in case of German or Norwegian police action. As yet no - partisan or other fighting in Norway. On one occasion, captured - members of the military organization in uniform claimed the - right to be treated as prisoners of war. If this demand were met - at the present moment, the result would be that active fighting - on the part of the military organization would be set going. - Please obtain cancellation of the order of the Armed Forces - Operations Staff.” - -And you, you voted for the exemption being removed, did you not? - - “The objection is justified. Norway has a government in its own - country. Whoever fights against it in the country is a rebel. It - is another question in the case of Norwegian troops who were - taken to England and from there brought into the struggle under - England’s order.” - -That is your note? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: And you stick to that, do you? I mean you—that is your -opinion today? - -JODL: Yes, indeed. I am of the opinion, from the point of view of -international law, that members of a resistance movement against their -own Norwegian government are certainly not to be considered as normal -troops but as constituting an uprising, a rebellion. But if Norwegian -troops come to Norway from England, then they are regular soldiers. And -that, today, is still my opinion on the basis of international law. - -MR. ROBERTS: What do you call their own Norwegian government, the puppet -government which was set up by the Germans? - -JODL: In any event, there was the government of Quisling at the time; -and in any event, speaking now from the point of view of international -law, we were occupying the country, and therefore, according to -international law, were justified in issuing laws and enforcing them. -That is accepted under international law, and resistance against it has -been considered all over the world as rebellion. The same applies to us -in Germany today. - -MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want to deal quite shortly with three other matters, -and then I have finished. I want to deal first of all with what you have -said with regard to Hitler’s suggestion to revoke the Geneva Convention. -You say you were instrumental in preventing him from renouncing that -Convention? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: Would you look at a document which has already been put in, -C-158, which is GB-209. I think you have loose copies for it; it is not -in a document book. This was put in with regard to the case against -Dönitz. It is headed, “Extracts from Minutes of the Hitler Conference on -the 19th of February 1945...”: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was present on 19 February - 1945. - - “The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should - renounce the Geneva Convention. As not only the Russians but - also the Western Powers are violating international law by their - actions against the defenseless population and the residential - districts, it appears expedient to adopt the same course in - order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with - every means for our existence, and also to urge our people to - resist to the utmost. The Führer orders the Commander-in-Chief - of the Navy to consider the pros and cons and to state his own - opinion.” - -Then, further down, My Lord—Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on the -Hitler conference of the 20th of February: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy informed Generaloberst Jodl, - Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the - representative of the Foreign Office at the Führer’s - headquarters, Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to - Germany’s possible renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a - military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as - the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the - disadvantages outweigh the advantages; even from a general - standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that - this measure would bring no advantages. It would be better to - carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and - at all costs to save face with the world. The Chief of the Armed - Forces Operations Staff and Ambassador Hewel are in full - agreement.” - -You were saying there, were you not, that you agreed with Raeder when he -said, “Break the Geneva Convention, but do not tell the world that we -are doing so.” - -JODL: Grossadmiral Dönitz. - -MR. ROBERTS: Dönitz, right. I beg your pardon. That is what you were -saying, is it not? - -JODL: No. The whole thing, as I have said, is a notice of Admiral Wagner -on a conference from which one can gather only that Grossadmiral Dönitz -disapproved, and that he is supposed to have made this remark at the -end. I can hardly account for that remark today, because the only reason -given to us by the Führer at that time was that the tremendous number of -German soldiers in the West must be prevented from deserting as a -consequence of enemy propaganda about good treatment. I cannot explain -this remark, and in my written draft which I submitted to the Führer and -which contains the attitude of the Navy that sentence was not included, -but only advantages and disadvantages were compared. The disadvantages -were overwhelming; the whole thing was completely impracticable and -impossible, and so it was not carried out. More I cannot say. Witnesses -will confirm my statement. - -MR. ROBERTS: I am now going to put to you your own Document D-606. - -My Lord, that has not yet been exhibited. I offer it as 492-GB. GB-492. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now that is signed by you, is it not? It -deals with the subject of the breach of the Geneva Convention. If you -would say first if it is signed by you? Is it signed by you? Please -answer my question: Is it signed by you? - -JODL: Yes; my signature is at the end. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, that is where one usually finds the signature. Now, -it is dated 21 February 1945, and it is written on your letterhead -notepaper. And then, “Notes on report submitted to the Führer on 23 -February through the Chief of the Operations Staff. The following -questions were to be examined.” - -My Lord, I do not propose to read it all, or anything like that. If the -witness would follow me, I will read anything he wants. But it is a -discussion as to the various advantages and disadvantages of repudiating -the various international agreements, and I think I am not doing the -witness an injustice if I say from a utilitarian rather than a moral -point of view. - -JODL: Yes, quite correct. For my only aim was to succeed with the -Führer, and this document was worded accordingly. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want to read the last paragraph. - -My Lord, it is the last page but one of Your Lordship’s document, right -at the bottom: - - “C. Proposal of the OKW: - - “At the present moment the disadvantages of repudiating the - agreements which have been kept up to now in any case outweigh - the advantages by far. - - “Just as it was a mistake in 1914 that we ourselves solemnly - declared war on all the states which had for a long time wanted - to wage war on us, and through this took the whole guilt of the - war on our shoulders before the outside world, and just as it - was a mistake to admit that the necessary”—note the word - “necessary”—“passage through Belgium in 1914 was our own fault, - so it would be a mistake now to repudiate openly the obligations - of international law which we accepted and thereby to stand - again as the guilty party before the outside world. - - “Adherence to the accepted obligations does not demand in any - way that we should have to impose on ourselves any limitations - which will interfere with the conduct of the war. For instance, - if the British sink a hospital ship, this must be used for - propaganda purposes, as has been done to date. That, of course, - in no way prevents our sinking an English hospital ship at once - as a reprisal and then expressing our regret that it was a - mistake in the same manner as the British do.” - -That is not very honorable, is it? - -JODL: I can only say in reply that this was the sole method which -achieved success with the Führer, and by its use success was, in fact, -achieved. If I had come to him with moral or purely legal arguments, he -would have said, “Leave me alone with this foolish talk,” and he would -have proceeded with the renunciation of the Convention; but these things -compelled him to reconsider the step and, in consequence, he did not -carry it through. - -You must after all grant me that at the end of 5½ years I knew best how -to achieve good results with him and avoid bad ones. My aim was to -achieve success, and I achieved it. - -MR. ROBERTS: But, you see, you were deploring it there, the fact that -you told the world the truth in 1914. In 1914 you said that you regarded -treaties only as a scrap of paper. You are saying now, “What a pity we -told the world the truth in 1914. We ought to have told them something -untrue, and then we should have, possibly, had a better world -reputation.” - -JODL: That was an argument which the Führer used frequently. If one -repeated his arguments in that form again and again he was more inclined -to read and accept one’s suggestions. One had to prevent his flinging -our proposals to the ground in a fit of rage and immediately decreeing -renunciation. That was the approach one had to follow. If one cannot do -good openly, it is better to do it in a roundabout way than not at all. - -MR. ROBERTS: I am now coming to quite another point: Were you an admirer -of the principles of the Nazi Party? - -JODL: No. - -MR. ROBERTS: Were you of the opinion that there was a successful fusion -between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht, which brought about the -rejuvenation, the resurrection of Germany after 1933? - -JODL: It would have happened, and I hoped for a long time that it would -happen; indeed, on the whole the relationship improved somewhat in the -course of the years and especially during the war. At first, it was -poor, very poor. - -MR. ROBERTS: You wrote—please, I am reading now from your speech, -L-172. It is Page 290 of Document Book 7, and it is Page 6 of your -lecture notes, Page 290 of Document Book 7 and 203 of the German: - - “The fact that the National Socialist movement in its struggle - for internal power was the preparatory stage to the outer - liberation from the shackles of the dictate of Versailles I need - not enlarge upon in this circle. I should like, however, to - mention how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what - an important part has been played by the National Socialist - movement in reawakening the will to fight, in nurturing fighting - strength, and in rearming the German people. Despite all its - inherent virtues this small Reichswehr could never have been - able to cope with this task, if only because of its restricted - radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at and has - luckily been successful in bringing about was a fusion of these - two forces.” - -Did that represent your honest opinion or not? - -JODL: Yes, that is historical truth, indisputable historical truth. The -Movement did bring that about; that is certain. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Then, I now want to put to you the last document -but one that I put in. - -My Lord, it has not been exhibited. It is 1808-PS. I offer it as GB-493. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You made a speech, did you not, after the -attempt on Hitler’s life, to your staff? And are these the notes of your -speech on 24 July? - -JODL: I have never seen this document before; I am seeing it for the -first time now. I did not know that any notes were made about the -speech. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, let us go by stages. Did you make a speech to your -staff shortly after the attempt on Hitler’s life—on 24 July 1944? - -JODL: Yes, even while my head was still bandaged. - -MR. ROBERTS: Secondly, is that document which you have in front of you, -is that a document which comes from your files? Look at the cover, if -necessary. - -JODL: I assume so. It is headed: “Armed Forces Operations Staff War -Diary.” Most likely these are notes of Major Schramm. - -MR. ROBERTS: Let me begin at the beginning of those notes. Just see if -you can remember what you said. Did you begin by saying: “The 20th of -July was the blackest day which German history has seen as yet, and will -probably remain so for all times”? - -JODL: Yes, that is quite possible. - -MR. ROBERTS: Why was it such a black day for Germany? Because somebody -tried to assassinate a man whom you now admit was a murderer? - -JODL: Should I—at a moment when I am to be blown up in a cowardly, -insidious manner by one of my own comrades, together with many opponents -of the regime—should I perhaps approve of it all? That was to me the -worst thing that happened. If the man with a pistol in his hand had shot -the Führer and had then given himself up, it would have been entirely -different. But these tactics I considered most repulsive to any officer. -I spoke under the impression of those events, which are actually among -the worst I know, and I maintain today what I said then. - -MR. ROBERTS: I do not want to argue with you, but do you think it is any -more dastardly than shooting those 50 American soldiers who landed in -the north of Italy to destroy a military target, shooting them like -dogs? - -JODL: That also was murder, undoubtedly. But it is not the task of a -soldier to be the judge of his commander-in-chief. May history or the -Almighty do that. - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I have only about three more questions to ask -you. - -My Lord, I am going to read from Page 2 of that document, about 10 lines -from the top. It begins, “The Führer...” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] If I read this slowly, perhaps see if you -can recognize it. - - “The Führer ignored this and other things, and now the would-be - assassins wished to do away with him, as a ‘despot’.” - -Do you remember saying that or something like that? Can you find the -place? - - “The Führer ignored this and other things, and now the would-be - assassins wished to eliminate him as a ‘despot’.” - -Do you remember that? - - “And yet, they themselves experienced how the Führer did not - come to power by force, but borne up by the love of the German - people.” - -Do you remember saying that? - -JODL: Yes, and that is true. He came to power, borne up by the love of -the German people. I had tremendous experiences in that respect. He was -almost overwhelmed by this love of the people and of the soldiers. - -MR. ROBERTS: Borne up by—I beg your pardon, have you finished? I did -not mean to interrupt you. - -JODL: Yes, I have dealt with that point. - -MR. ROBERTS: Borne up by the love of the German people. You have -forgotten the SS, the Gestapo, and the concentration camps for political -opponents, have you not? - -JODL: I have told you how unfortunately little I knew of all these -things, almost nothing. Of course, with a knowledge of these things, all -this takes a different aspect. - -MR. ROBERTS: I take your answer, and I put my last document to you. - -My Lord, this is a new document, 1776-PS; I offer it as GB-494. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Just have a look; see if it is signed by -you, will you? - -JODL: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: So it is signed by you. Now, you have told this Court that -you were opposed to terror attacks. Just see what this document says. -Now, note the date first, the 30th of June 1940. That is just after the -temporary fall of France? - - “Chief WFA. - - “The Continuation of the War against England. - - “If political means are without results, England’s will to - resist must be broken by force: - - “a) by making war against the English mother country. - - “b) by extending the war on the periphery. - - “Regarding Point a) there are three possibilities: - - “1) Siege.... - - “2) Terror attacks against English centers of population. - - “3) Landing of troops....” - -And now I read this as an example of historical prophesy: - - “Germany’s final victory also over England is only a question of - time.” - -Then I go down several paragraphs: - - “Together with propaganda and temporary terror attacks—declared - to be reprisal actions—this increasing weakening of English - food supply will paralyze the will of her people to resist and - finally break and thus force its government to - capitulate....”—Signed—“Jodl.” - -“Terror attacks against English centers of population”—would you like -to say anything to justify that sentence? - -JODL: Yes, a few remarks. This proposal, which actually is only a -compilation of notes, proves three things: - -First of all, that on 30 June 1940 I did not know of any intention or of -the possibility of entering into a war with Russia, otherwise I would -not have written: “Germany’s final victory over England is only a -question of time.” - -Secondly, I admit having voiced a thought which was later carried into -practice with such perfection by the Anglo-American Air Force. - -Thirdly, this thought came to me only after the attack on the civilian -population had been started and continued by the English Air Force, -despite months of efforts and repeated warnings on the part of the -Führer. - -It is a historical fact, confirmed by many documents, that the Führer -tried to the utmost to avoid this form of aerial war against the -population. But it was already clear at that time, that he would not be -able to succeed. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I have finished, Witness. You will notice that -of all the documents I have put, except for that one American report, -they were all German documents, originating at the time of these events -about which I have been cross-examining. - -In the face of those documents, do you still say that you are an -honorable soldier and a truthful man? - -JODL: Not only do I still affirm that, but I also think that the -submission of these documents has actually and quite specifically proved -it. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 7 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH DAY - Friday, 7 June 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4 o’clock to -sit in closed session. The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in open session -from 1000 to 1300. - -COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): You -have testified that you were the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations -Staff. That was the chief department of the OKW, was it not? - -JODL: I did not quite understand the last part of your question. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Was the Armed Forces Operations Staff the chief -department of the OKW? - -JODL: Because of the significance of the activity, one can certainly say -that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was one of the most important -departments of the OKW. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Is that the reason why you deputized for Keitel in his -absence? - -JODL: In the majority of cases I was the deputy only in operational -matters. As for war ministerial questions, it was the senior chief, as a -rule, Admiral Canaris, who deputized. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Do you deny that you were Keitel’s deputy? - -JODL: When Keitel was not at headquarters, then, as a matter of course, -whenever the Führer had anything to say to the OKW, he talked first with -me, as I was the next officer by seniority. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Do you remember the testimony of the witness Wagner to -the effect that either you or Keitel usually represented the OKW at all -important staff meetings at which this witness, Admiral Wagner, was also -present? Do you remember that testimony? - -JODL: I did not quite understand that question on account of translation -difficulties. - -COL. POKROVSKY: That is possible. I shall repeat it. On the 13th of May, -appeared the witness Wagner here before the Tribunal. Do you remember, -or not? - -JODL: I remember the witness Wagner. He testified that Field Marshal -Keitel and I were present at every situation report, and I do not -dispute it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: He said either Field Marshal Keitel or Generaloberst -Jodl was present. Is that correct? Do you catch the difference in the -way this question is phrased? - -JODL: In 99 percent of all cases, both of us were present at the -situation conferences. - -COL. POKROVSKY: So that if we forget for one minute such formal -considerations, such formal circumstances, would it be right to conclude -that it was precisely you, Jodl, who actually was Keitel’s acting deputy -in the eyes of Hitler, of the whole cadre of officers, and of the entire -military machinery of the German Reich? Would that be correct, or not? - -JODL: In individual cases, when the Field Marshal was not there, and in -unimportant things, yes; but when it came to important things I could -reach him by telephone, at any time, and so it hardly ever happened that -I deputized. He was never ill, and was never away on leave. When he was -away he was in Berlin at headquarters. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In that case I would like to remind you of one such -fact, which you yourself confirmed here on the 6th of June, while -testifying to the Tribunal about the motives which caused you to sign -Document UK-56, Exhibit RF-1438. You said that the document had had no -connection with your sphere of activity. It concerned the deportation of -Jews from Denmark and, you signed the document even though it actually -had no connection with the operations staff work. You signed it because -Keitel was away at the time. Was it not so? Is it true? - -JODL: That is absolutely correct. It was an urgent matter and had to be -signed immediately. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Good. We can find a great many documents of that type; -but I do not consider it necessary to waste any more time on the further -elucidation of this point. Tell me, would it be correct to say that you -were well aware of the entire work carried out by the OKW—that you well -knew what important problems were occupying the OKW at that time? - -JODL: Only to a limited extent—in individual matters. I was not at all -aware of everything that took place in the numerous offices in Berlin. -That was quite impossible. It did not concern me. I have testified -already that my time was so fully taken up that I had much more to do -than I had time for. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, you force me to revert to a question which I -really wanted to have done with. Will you please now look at our new -Document USSR-476. This document consists of excerpts from Keitel’s -testimony of 9 November 1945. It is stated there: - - “Question: ‘Would it have been possible for General Jodl, - without your knowledge to call such a meeting?’” - -We are talking, My Lord, of the conference in Reichenhall. - -Reply of Field Marshal Keitel: - - “Yes, it was quite possible, as I was frequently on official - journeys; and General Jodl had authority to call a meeting - because he represented me in my absence.” - -Have you found the passage? Have you read it? - -JODL: Colonel Pokrovsky, of course, it is very difficult for you to -follow these military matters. It is ridiculous. Surely I may question -my staff officers. I do not need to call a meeting for that. These were -my General Staff officers with whom I worked in Reichenhall. Surely I -could go to them. That was my office and my duty. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary for you to raise your -voice in that way. - -COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me that you have still not answered two of -my questions. First, have you read this document? - -Please tell me: Have you, or have you not, read the passage which I have -just read into the record on Page 1? - -JODL: Yes. Here, Field Marshal Keitel says, “...since I was very often -away on official journeys...” - -COL. POKROVSKY: You do not have to read it a second time. I have read it -already. I merely want you to tell me whether you have read that -passage? - -JODL: Yes, I read that, and it says here, “...to ask Generaloberst -Jodl.” - -COL. POKROVSKY: No, you are reading beyond the passage which interests -me at this moment. As for the words “...to ask Generaloberst -Jodl.”—rest assured, we shall get to that passage. But is it true that -Keitel was often away, and that you deputized for him? I do not hear any -answer. - -[_There was no response._] - -I still hear no answer. - -JODL: I have already said that, now and then, he went to the front for a -day or so and that he was several times in Berlin for a few days; but he -was at those offices which were subordinate to him. I was alone with my -operations staff, and I could do whatever I pleased with my staff. -During the entire war I never called a conference of other offices as a -deputy of Field Marshal Keitel. I did not understand anything about -those matters. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You have uttered a great many words, but have not given -me a clear answer to my very short and simple question—namely, do you -confirm, or do you not confirm, the truth of Keitel’s statement? “Yes” -or “no.” That is very easy to answer, is it not? - -JODL: That is what it amounts to, but the thing as written down is -ridiculous. - -COL. POKROVSKY: We shall gauge the truth of your statement later. It is -important to me to establish the fact. - -I am submitting our Document USSR-263 to the Tribunal. You will now have -the pleasure of reading it yourself. It is an excerpt from the evidence -of another officer who worked with you, General Warlimont. Please -acquaint yourself with that passage which is marked on your copy while I -read it aloud. That will be quicker. - -The question put to Warlimont: - - “When did the OKW first receive the order for preparing for the - attack on the Soviet Union?” - -Have you found this passage? - -JODL: That which I have before me—the passage which is marked in -red—contains a statement by Warlimont as to the organization of the -offices of the OKW. On the next page something follows about the -preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union. - - COL. POKROVSKY: “When did the OKW first receive the order for - preparing for the attack on the Soviet Union?” - -Warlimont replies: - - “I personally first heard about the plan on 29 July 1940... On - that day Generaloberst Jodl arrived by special train in Bad - Reichenhall, where also Section ‘L’ of the Armed Forces - Operations Staff was quartered.” - -Have you found the passage? - -JODL: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, I do not consider it necessary to read a -greater part of Warlimont’s testimony, because we are dealing with a -well-known fact, that is, the convocation of the conference during which -Jodl gave his colleagues the order to prepare the plan for the attack on -the Soviet Union. This document has already been accepted in evidence by -the Tribunal. - -Warlimont then states, “Jodl stunned us by his announcement of the -coming attack, for which we were not at all prepared.” Have you found -the passage? Please look at the document. - -[_There was no response._] - -Jodl, will you please take the document in your hand and see whether it -has been read into the record correctly. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it not coming through properly? Wait a minute. - -DR. EXNER: I just wanted to call the attention of the Tribunal to the -fact that the translation and the transmission is coming through to us -so very badly that I have scarcely understood anything. I hear only half -a question at a time, and I am surprised that the defendant could answer -at all. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it coming through better now? Is the translation -coming through better now? - -DR. EXNER: I am of the opinion that the translation itself is poor, not -only the technical transmission. It is often very difficult to -understand the question—it makes no sense at all. And my colleague, Dr. -Stahmer, confirms this. Therefore it is difficult for us. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we had better go on and see, perhaps, if it will -improve. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to read one other sentence to yourself. -It is the passage in which Warlimont states to whom the responsibility -for elaborating the plans was entrusted and how the officers present had -reacted. He testifies, “Jodl stunned us by this announcement...” It is -on the first page at about the middle of the page. Have you found it? - -JODL: I could not find the sentence which you have just read, “Jodl -stunned us.” I cannot find that sentence. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In that case, I shall begin with the preceding sentence. -Perhaps it will be easier for you. - - “Besides myself, he also ordered three other senior officers ... - Colonel Von Lossberg, Lieutenant Colonel Freiherr von - Falkenstein of the Luftwaffe, and Captain Junge of the Navy to - attend.” - -Have you found it? - -JODL: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you. - - “Jodl stunned us by this announcement ... for which we were not - at all prepared.” - -And then a little further down: - - “Jodl announced that the Führer had decided to prepare for war - against Russia. The Führer based his decision on the fact that - war with Russia must come sooner or later and that it would be - better to carry this campaign through in the course of this - war...” - -Have you found the passage? - -JODL: Yes, I have it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Now, I would like you to read one more -paragraph from Document USSR-476, which has just been handed to you, on -Page 1. It is, Jodl, the one which you began to read the first time, and -I told you then that we should get back to it eventually. Keitel is -asked whether he knows anything about that conference, and he answers: - - “I know nothing whatever about a conference with regard to an - attack on the Soviet Union. I heard about it for the first time - after I was imprisoned here.” - -Have you found the place? - -JODL: No. I have not found it, but I do recall it. I read it just a -short while ago. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I should like you to have it. We do not want any -misunderstandings. A little lower down Keitel states that you did not -inform him of this conference even later. Is that so? Do you confirm -this statement, or do you not? Would you say that Keitel had testified -correctly? - -JODL: Actually there is no such thing as a conference in these military -matters. You have conferences in civil and parliamentary life, but we do -not have conferences. I talked to my General Staff officers as often as -I pleased. Therefore, it is... - -COL. POKROVSKY: Excuse me, I am going to interrupt you here. Later on -you may add all you wish to say, but I merely want a direct answer to -the question: Is Keitel’s testimony correct, that you never reported -this conference to him? Is that true or not? - -JODL: I certainly did not report to him on this very discussion; but -that is not in the least important. I am certain that I reported to him -what the Führer told me, because that was an important matter; and -later, because of this, he wrote a memorandum. Therefore, he must have -heard about it—but that is only a supposition, a very likely -supposition, which I am voicing here. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, I am perfectly satisfied with your reply. And -to conclude my first group of questions, I want to ask just one more on -this particular matter: Do you not agree with me that only the Deputy -Chief of the OKW, and not just any other responsible official, could -quite independently—without Keitel’s knowledge, without any -instructions, and without even a _post factum_ report to him—decide -questions, such as the preparation of a plan for attacking another -country? Have you understood my question? - -JODL: I understood your words, but not their meaning. First of all, you -put a wrong assertion in your question. You asserted that I did not -report the preparation for an attack on a neutral country to Field -Marshal Keitel. That is an assertion on your part which I refuted -yesterday under oath. We were not concerned with an attack on the Soviet -Union at this meeting. We were concerned with the defense against a -Soviet attack on the Romanian oil fields. That is established in -Document C-170, the War Diary of the Navy. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Is that all you wanted to say on that question? - -JODL: I believe that suffices. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I do not intend to argue with you. I merely wish to say -that we have two proofs of this conference. First, your testimony, in -which you deny the fact of the preparation of a plan for attacking the -Soviet Union; and second, the testimony of another participant at this -conference, Warlimont, who says straight out that the meeting was -specifically concerned with elaborating the plan of attack on the Soviet -Union and that this directive greatly astonished all of them. I do not -intend to deal with this question any further, but I should like to -ask... - -JODL: If you are interested, I could explain that divergence to you. - -COL. POKROVSKY: No, at the present moment it does not interest me. - -Would it be correct to state that you were either the leading, or one of -the leading, staff officers in Hitlerite Germany who were engaged in -preparing measures for attacking the Soviet Union, as far back as the -summer of 1940? It is precisely on this matter that I want to hear your -reply. Is the question clear to you? - -JODL: The question is clear, and my answer to it is that I was probably -the first who learned of the Führer’s concern about Russia’s political -attitude. However, I was not the first who made preparations for an -attack on the Soviet Union. To my surprise I discovered here, through -the witness Paulus, that long before we concerned ourselves with any -orders of this kind, plans of attack were already worked out in the -General Staff of the Army. I cannot tell you with absolute certainty why -it was done. Perhaps Generaloberst Halder can tell us about that. I can -only express that as a supposition on my part. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Suppositions are of no interest to us; we are only -concerned with facts here. On the day before yesterday, the 5th of June, -you stated that the attack on the Soviet Union, whereby Germany broke -her nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, was in the nature of a -preventive war. That is what you then stated, is it not? - -JODL: Yes, that is what I said, it was a preventive war. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. That is your opinion. Do you remember that -from the testimonies of Milch and Raeder, from the testimony of Göring, -from the testimonies of Paulus and Keitel, it seems that they were all -opposed to the attack on the Soviet Union? I shall read into the record -one sentence from Keitel’s testimony here in court just to help you to -remember. - -While General Rudenko, Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. was -cross-examining Keitel, he put this question: - - “You stated that you especially went to Hitler with the request - that he, Hitler, change his intentions with regard to the Soviet - Union?” - - Answer (Keitel): “Yes, I asked him not only to change this plan, - but to do away with these plans altogether, that is, not to wage - war against the Soviet Union.” - -Do you remember that testimony of Keitel? - -JODL: Yes, I remember, and I know the memorandum as well. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Do you not find it rather strange that a -man—in this case yourself—who has in every way endeavored to disclaim -the fact that he was Keitel’s deputy, should emphasize before Hitler and -here before the Tribunal, that he was better informed on current events -than Keitel and could, therefore, find the courage to make a statement -in direct opposition to the attitude of Keitel, Paulus, Raeder, Göring, -and Milch? - -JODL: I did not understand that. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I shall be very pleased to make my meaning more -explicit. Keitel did not appear to see any necessity for what you call a -“preventive” war, and all the persons whose testimony I have just -mentioned also saw no reason for waging a so-called “preventive” war. -They did not believe that the Soviet Union intended to attack Germany, -whereas you declared that the war was of a “preventive” nature. Now, do -you understand my question? - -JODL: Yes, now I understand you. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, would you like to answer the question? - -JODL: Yes, I can give an explanation. First of all, it is not certain -what stand Field Marshal Keitel took in the spring of 1941 with regard -to this question. Secondly, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the -Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force—with due respect to both of these -gentlemen—saw the problem as a whole only from the point of view of -naval or air strategy, and they saw no danger whatsoever in the Russian -Navy or the Russian Air Force. What was taking place on land, of course, -was of less interest to them. That explains why the strongest opposition -came from the Luftwaffe and the Navy; and only the Army, in this case, -was much more inclined to see the tremendous danger with which it was -confronted. But in spite of this, every one of us, I myself included, -warned the Führer most urgently against this experiment, which should -have been undertaken only if there really was no other way out. I will -not take it upon myself to judge whether there might perhaps have been a -political possibility which was not exhausted; I cannot judge that. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I am satisfied with your reply, and -particularly with the fact that you have condescended to define the -breaking of this treaty and the attack on the Soviet Union by the word -“experiment.” I want you to look at the document... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you should not make comments of that sort. You -must ask questions and not make comments. - -COL. POKROVSKY: My remark, My Lord, is connected with my next question. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, please look at Document 865-PS. -Have you got this document? - -JODL: Yes, I have the document before me. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In reply to the questions of your counsel, -you stated that Lammers had, quite by accident, designated you as a -collaborator of Rosenberg. There in your hands is a very brief document, -which I shall now read aloud—a document signed by Keitel. It is a -top-secret letter of 25 April 1941, addressed to Rosenberg personally. -This letter states: - - “The Chief of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the - Führer’s directive appointing you his plenipotentiary for - dealing with questions relating to eastern European territories. - I, on the part of the High Command of the Armed Forces, entrust - the handling of these questions to the Chief of the Armed Forces - Operations Staff, General of Artillery Jodl, with Major General - Warlimont as his deputy. I request that your department contact - these two persons only. - - “Heil Hitler! Yours truly”—signed—“Keitel.” - -With this document in mind what do you say now in reply to the question -as to whether or not you remember, that you, with Warlimont as your -deputy, were charged by the High Command of the Armed Forces, as far -back as April 1941, to deal with the practical problems of the Hitlerite -expansion to the east in accordance with the directives of the Staff -Rosenberg. - -Do you understand my question? - -JODL: I already told the Court yesterday everything that can be said in -connection with this formality. Minister Lammers sent the very same -letter to all Reich Ministries. He asked every Ministry to designate a -plenipotentiary and a deputy; and accordingly, Field Marshal Keitel -naturally designated the two officers who were at headquarters. I never -worked with Rosenberg, and it was not necessary to do so—except for one -single talk with him, which I mentioned yesterday. Only my propaganda -section conferred with the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories -about leaflets—quite simple matters which every soldier can understand. - -COL. POKROVSKY: By the way, concerning the question of soldiers. You -stubbornly affirm that you were only concerned with military questions -of an operational nature and had nothing to do at all with political -questions. Have I understood you correctly? - -JODL: I gave that explanation yesterday as well, insofar as politics -were not an integral part of the strategy. To a certain extent politics -did come into it, for without politics there could be no strategy. It is -an essential part of strategy. But since I was not a strategist, but -only dealt with this matter as a General Staff officer, I was not -concerned with this subject directly. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You were not concerned with these matters? You will now -look at Document C-26, Exhibit USSR-477, and I must ask you if you have -found your own signature on the last page. - -JODL: Yes, I see my signature. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You have found it? It is a directive on the organization -of propaganda in connection with “Case Barbarossa.” Is that correct? - -JODL: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Are you going to deny that in that directive, issued by -you, the question is clearly put that the U.S.S.R., as a sovereign -state, should be destroyed and that you consider that a purely military -problem—you, an officer of the General Staff, did not deal with -politics? - -JODL: I cannot find the place where it says that Russia is to be -destroyed. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You are quite right if you want to draw attention to the -wording. It is not stated there in just these words. I am thinking of -the general sense of the directive, particularly of Subparagraph “d.” - -JODL: Yes, but—I know the document. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I want to read out one sentence: - - “Propaganda aiming at the dismemberment of the Soviet Union into - separate states shall not be used for the time being.” - -Further on there are a couple of technical remarks, and then it says in -the same paragraph: - - “Nevertheless, we should avoid such terms as ‘Russia,’ - ‘Russians,’ ‘Russian Armed Forces,’ _et cetera_, and substitute - ‘Soviet Union,’ ‘Peoples of the Soviet Union,’ ‘Red Army,’ _et - cetera_.” - -Have you found the place, Jodl? - -JODL: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. What would you like to say if you want to say -anything at all on the subject? - -JODL: Why, certainly. I wish to answer the question. - -COL. POKROVSKY: If you please. - -JODL: As may be seen from the heading of this directive, it deals with -the handling of propaganda. Compared with the British and the Soviet -Union, we were mere schoolboys in propaganda. You are perhaps aware that -propaganda is something quite justifiable and is not limited by any -regulations of international law. At one time, in Geneva, there was a -long debate about this; and the idea that propaganda should be -restricted by international law was rejected. I have already stated that -in my preliminary interrogation. In the field of propaganda, I can do -whatever I wish. There is no law, either criminal or international, in -regard to that. But perhaps you do not know that this propaganda had to -be in line with the political directives of the Führer, and this was -being done here. I am very well acquainted with propaganda, for I -studied it for 5 years—yours, too. That is still quite another type of -propaganda. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You preferred not to give a direct answer to the -question you were asked. I am perfectly satisfied with that, too, since -I have understood your attitude toward this subject. - -Now, I should be interested in receiving a reply to the following -question: What connection did the Ministry of Propaganda have with the -issue of this directive? Did this Ministry participate in the drafting -of the directive, or were you and the OKW solely responsible? Did you -understand me? - -JODL: Yes, I understood you. My propaganda division worked in Berlin. I -cannot tell you in detail how it worked with Minister Rosenberg or with -the Ministry of Propaganda on such a document. But General Von Wedel, -the chief of this division, could tell you. I only knew it was drawn up -in agreement with the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, for -I was always eager that we should not take separate lines but rather -work in line with the competent civilian authorities. But it is only -propaganda; it is not a directive to destroy Russia. Propaganda is a -spiritual weapon. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I do not propose to enter into a discussion with you on -what constitutes propaganda and whether you were only responsible for -propaganda. We shall have quite a number of other questions to ask. - -Do you suggest that this directive was issued after a certain pattern -decided upon with other departments? That is how I understood you. Is -this correct? Partly by agreement with “Stab Rosenberg”? - -JODL: Yes, I believe that. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Now let us pass on to a second complex of -questions. Do you dispute the fact that the document regarding the -conference at Hitler’s headquarters on 27 March 1941 dealt with the -subject of Yugoslavia? You, of course, remember that conference? - -JODL: Yes, I remember that. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Would you argue the fact that the documents describing -this conference and the directive for operations against -Yugoslavia—both documents are dated 28 March 1941, in other words, they -were issued on the following day—would you still argue that these -documents did not emanate from the Armed Forces Operations Staff, that -is, from you personally? You can, if you like, take a look at Document -1746-PS. It might help you to remember events. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, you are not losing sight of the fact -that this subject was fully gone into by Mr. Roberts in -cross-examination of the defendant? - -COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, if you consider that the question has already -been completely clarified, I shall refrain from asking it. But it seems -to me that insofar as I understood him, he analyzed this question in -another sense. But if you think the matter is clear, I shall withdraw -it. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know yet. But I was only pointing out to you -that it had been fully gone into by Mr. Roberts. I do not know what this -document you are suggesting is. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I offered for the attention of the defendant two -documents, My Lord: the directive for operations against Yugoslavia, -dated 28 March, and the minutes of the conference. Both documents were -submitted to the Tribunal. If you think that the matter has been fully -covered already, I will not ask the questions. However, it appears to me -that there is some reason for asking the question. - -THE PRESIDENT: All the Tribunal want to know is whether there is some -really fresh point which is being brought out. You must have heard Mr. -Roberts’ cross-examination of the defendant upon the Yugoslavian attack. -And I do not know what these documents of the 22d of March and the 28th -of March are, or what you are asking to get out of them. If there is -anything that is really fresh or new, of course, you may put it; but if -it is not, then it is covered by what the Tribunal have already said, -that cross-examination ought not to go over the same ground again. - -COL. POKROVSKY: If you will permit me to say so, My Lord, I understood -Jodl to mean that for him... - -THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you, too. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I understood in Jodl’s testimony, in reply to Mr. -Roberts’ question, that it is still not quite clear as to who was in -charge of the operations against Yugoslavia; and I only want to have -this point elucidated. Now, if the Tribunal consider that this question -has already been replied to, I shall, of course, withdraw it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal are not able to see -what there is fresh in this method of questioning that you are now -raising; and unless you insist upon it yourself because you think it is -of great importance, I think you should pass on to the next matter in -your cross-examination. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I shall continue, My Lord. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Your counsel has submitted Document L-172, -containing the following sentence made by you in your speech to the -Gauleiter of 7 November 1943. I shall read out this sentence: “This -dilemma of the shortage of men has brought us to the idea of utilizing -more fully the reserves of manpower in the occupied territories.” - -Do you remember this document? - -JODL: I did not understand the question. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I can repeat it. Your counsel submitted to the Tribunal -Document L-172, which is a speech made by you before the Gauleiter. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the matter now? You cannot hear without your -earphones on. - -[_Turning to Dr. Exner._] Do you wish to say something? - -DR. EXNER: If you please, Mr. President, the translation is such that we -simply cannot understand anything. We receive half a sentence which -makes no sense at all—at least, that is our opinion—and I believe the -other gentlemen, including the defendant, have the same difficulty... - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has not shown any sign that he was unable -to understand the translation; he has never protested, and he has -answered the questions. - -DR. EXNER: Do you understand, Defendant? - -JODL: I would say that I can guess what most of the questions mean. -Since I am fully acquainted with the problem, it is easy for me; but I -am not sure... - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, will you go a little slower. You -heard, did you not, what Dr. Exner said? - -COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, I heard him. I fear, however, My Lord, that the -tempo of my speech may impede the interrogation, but I shall try to -speak more slowly. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] In the speech with which you addressed the -Gauleiter on the 7th of November 1943, you expressed, _inter alia_, the -following idea: “The dilemma of the shortage of men has brought us to -the idea of utilizing more fully...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, can you possibly indicate to us what -page this is on. In our book we have not any single document in English, -as yet. This document we have not had in English. - -COL. POKROVSKY: It is Document L-172, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, this very passage that you have just -read, or part of which you just read, was put by Mr. Roberts yesterday -to the defendant. Surely that is contrary to our rules; we cannot have -the same subject gone over twice. We already have it marked. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I am quoting this sentence, My Lord, not as a question -to the witness, but only as an introductory remark to the question which -is to follow this sentence. I am reminding him of this sentence in order -to receive an answer. The sentence as such is not to be considered as a -question. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat what you said? - -COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, he will now receive the document in order to -save time, and I shall then ask him the question. I want... - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we want to know what the question is, -so we may see if it is not a question which has been gone into by Mr. -Roberts. Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal have indicated to you that they -do not want you to go over the same ground which was gone over -yesterday. If you have some new question, by all means put it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I do not intend, Mr. President, to repeat in my -questions any question previously asked by Mr. Roberts. Therefore, with -your permission, I shall now continue, and I should like you, Witness, -to look at Document J-6, Exhibit Number USSR-130. It is stated in these -documents that they were issued with the consent of the OKW. They deal -with the introduction of general conscription in the occupied -territories of Carinthia and Krain. Have you found it? Have you found -the passage that I have just read, that is, the decree dealing with the -introduction of conscription in the occupied territories of Carinthia -and Krain? - -JODL: Yes, that document begins with the following sentence... - -COL. POKROVSKY: It begins with the following sentence, “In agreement -with the OKW...” Is that correct? - -JODL: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: As Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, you could -not but know of such facts as the conscription for service in the German -Army of the population of the occupied Yugoslav territories. What do you -have to say about this decree, which is a gross violation of -international law? Do you understand my question? - -JODL: Yes. I can only say that I see it here for the first time. This is -the first I have heard of it. After all, I am not the OKW. I am Chief of -the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I never read this document during the -war. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Will you read it, then, immediately. Do you not consider -it a gross violation of international law? - -JODL: In order to give my opinion, I would have to go into it more fully -from a legal point of view, and I am not in a position to do that, and I -believe it is not of interest to the Tribunal. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Well, on 4 June you testified before the Tribunal that -the decisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions were your reference -book. You will now be shown Document 638-PS, submitted to the Tribunal -on 20 March as Exhibit USA-788. The authenticity of this document... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, 638 is the document which has been handed up. - -COL. POKROVSKY: It is Document 638-PS, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, is the document that you just handed -up to us J-6? Are you offering that in evidence? Are you offering that? - -COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not submitting a new document. It was already -submitted as evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Are you referring to the Document 638-PS, -or are you referring to Document J-6? - -COL. POKROVSKY: I am referring to Document 638-PS, accepted by the -Tribunal as U.S.A. evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: I was not. I was referring to the Document J-6. The -document which is here before me, which is 638, is the Yugoslav -document. - -COL. POKROVSKY: The document to which you refer, My Lord, bears a double -number, USSR-130 and J-6; and the second document also bears a double -number, USSR-447. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not want to know about the second document. I only -want to know whether you are offering the first document in evidence, or -has it already been offered in evidence? - -COL. POKROVSKY: It has already been submitted, My Lord, by the -Delegation of the Soviet Union. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You, Jodl, have probably had sufficient -time to read the document. Is that right? Have you read it? - -JODL: I know about this document from these proceedings. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Quite correct. I only wish to remind you that Göring has -twice confirmed the authenticity of this document and merely questioned -the accuracy of certain entries in individual sentences. I should now -like to ask you how you reconcile your concepts of international law -with the formation of bands under German command, attired in German -military uniforms, bands recruited from the dregs of the criminal -classes, who were officially authorized to plunder, murder, burn, and -violate—they could also do all this during military operations. Have -you understood my question? - -You, of course, well remember that these bands were actually created and -entered the ranks of the Armed Forces of the German Reich. You remember -the testimony of the witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski, of 7 January 1946, -concerning the special commands acting on these principles? - -JODL: I do not know just how you come to know that the High Command gave -its approval and that this actually took place; I do not know. These are -merely the notes of alleged statements by the Reich Marshal, but I do -not know how they concern me. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I shall try to help you to understand this fact. Do you -remember that at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 a special -command was formed to operate against the partisans? The first -commanding officer of that unit was Dirlewanger, and Von dem -Bach-Zelewski testified about him here on 7 January 1946. Do you -remember that? - -JODL: No, I do not remember that. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You cannot remember? Very well. Then we shall prove it -without your testimony. Do you remember the fact that units of the -Yugoslav Army wore regulation uniforms, complete with insignia, numbers -of regiments and divisions? Do you remember that? Do you understand my -question, or do you not? - -JODL: I understood. Do you mean the Brandenburg Regiment? I have some -idea of that. - -COL. POKROVSKY: No, I have something else in mind. I wish to remind you -that despite the fact that parts of the Yugoslav Army did not come under -these descriptions which you have enumerated here before the Tribunal in -speaking of bands—that these parts of the Yugoslav Army were referred -to in every official document of the German High Command as bands, in -order to justify any atrocity perpetrated against them, and only in the -top-secret correspondence between German officers and staffs was the -correct, factual nomenclature of these divisions, regiments, and -brigades indicated. Perhaps this fact, in your opinion, also testifies -to the adherence of the German High Command to the standards of -international law? Have you understood me? - -JODL: I understand you very well, yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Do you wish to say anything on the matter? - -JODL: Yes. I can only say this assertion of yours is untrue. We... - -COL. POKROVSKY: I would ask you to reply as briefly as possible. - -JODL: Yes, I was going to answer very briefly. We always called these -Yugoslav bandits “bands” for propaganda reasons, but in practice -uniformed fighters always were treated as prisoners of war; and there is -no order which would have prevented them from receiving such treatment -as prisoners of war. Otherwise, we would not have had so many prisoners. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I am very much obliged to you for having raised the -question of the prisoners of war. You have testified on oath before the -Tribunal that there was no decree which forbade taking prisoners of war. -You have not yet forgotten that testimony of yours? - -JODL: No, there are no international law regulations which apply to a -rebellion. There is no such thing. - -COL. POKROVSKY: No, I asked you to confirm only if I have rendered your -testimony correctly to the Tribunal. You stated, before the Tribunal, -that there was no decree against taking prisoners of war. Did you give -such testimony before the Tribunal, or did you not? - -JODL: What you have stated here is not my verbatim testimony. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Just a minute, just a minute. We shall discuss in detail -the matter I have mentioned. First, I want you to tell me the following: -You stated, before the Tribunal, on oath, that there was no decree in -the German Armed Forces to the effect that prisoners of war were not to -be taken. Did you give this testimony or not? Have you understood me? - -JODL: I think I remember. I do not know of any such order that no -prisoners of war were to be taken. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Good. One moment more. I now want you to help me to -elucidate another matter. A sentence of yours appears in this typed -script to the effect that you considered it improper to question a -prisoner-of-war if a decision had already been made that the -prisoner-of-war was to be shot. Is that so? Is it correct? - -JODL: Yes, I testified to the effect that I rejected that sentence from -the moral and from the humane point of view. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Excellent. Now I want you to tell me the following: Do -you remember that there was a 4th Mountain Division in the German Army? -It seems that you, at one time, were directly connected with it? Was -there such a division or not? - -JODL: That there were four mountain divisions, that I do not remember, -there were many more. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I am not talking about four divisions. You have been -given an inaccurate translation. I am asking you whether you remember -that there was a 4th Mountain Division? - -JODL: I certainly knew about that. I wanted to be the commander of that -division. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In that case, you may also remember another -responsible officer of the German Army, whose name was Kübler? He -operated in Yugoslavia. - -JODL: There were two men of the name of Kübler, an older man and a -younger man. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Major General Kübler is the one who interests me. I am -not asking you who Keitel was. You know that better than I do. - -THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for a few minutes? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -COL. POKROVSKY: Now, you and I, Defendant Jodl, will attend to these two -documents. Please take Document J-67, Exhibit Number USSR-132. It is a -directive to the 118th Infantry Division. - -JODL: 118th Infantry Division. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I will read to you the “Instructions for Conduct of -Troops during Operations,” Paragraph 2. “Prisoners: Any man who has -obviously fought against the German Armed Forces, and has been captured, -is to be shot after interrogation.” Is that correct? It says so -precisely in those words? Do you hear me? - -JODL: That is approximately what it says in that one sentence, but I -should like to have the whole document. Nothing can be gathered from one -sentence. What is decisive is what comes before it, and that is not -stated in the document. - -COL. POKROVSKY: It is written above: “Instructions for the Conduct of -Troops during Operations.” - -Now for the second document. It bears the stamp of the IV Mountain -Regiment. It was issued on 6 October 1943 and contains Keitel’s personal -instructions, written in his own hand, on how to deal with prisoners of -war. I will ask you to revert to Subparagraph 3. It says, in the second -part of this subparagraph, “...commanders having at least the rank of -divisional commanders are authorized to issue orders to take no -prisoners, and the civilian population in the combat area may be shot.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Apparently the translation was not coming -through correctly. Perhaps you are going too fast. It was coming through -correctly to me, but it apparently was not coming through correctly to -the defendants. Would you put your question again? - -COL. POKROVSKY: In Subparagraph 3 of the document issued by the IV -Mountain Regiment it says... - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you give us the number of it? - -COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, My Lord. It is Exhibit USSR-470; and it bears a -double number, Document J-127. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Have you found Subparagraph 3, Defendant -Jodl? - -JODL: Yes, but this cannot possibly be described as a document. That is -not a document. - -COL. POKROVSKY: This document says how prisoners of war are to be -treated. - -I do not know how you feel about it, but it is quite clear to me. - -JODL: But it is not an original. It is a fantastic translation. Any -soldier would have thrown it straight into the wastepaper basket. It is -a falsification. But I admit that it may be due to the foolish -translation. In my opinion, all it contains is nonsense. The heading -says “IV Mountain Regiment,” and it is a Roman four. It should be an -Arabic number. It is never called Mountain Regiment. It then goes on to -say, the commander of the IV Mountain Division, Section Ic, delivers -under number such and such the following—all that is nonsense, pure, -unadulterated nonsense! This is not a document. It is a scrap of paper. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I am not responsible for the translation. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to see the original of these -documents. They were put in, apparently, as USSR-132 and USSR-470. Is -USSR-470 a new document? - -COL. POKROVSKY: No, My Lord, this document has already been submitted, -and the original is in the records of the Tribunal. Now I am only -submitting a copy of this document which is at our disposal. Both -documents were previously submitted in the original. If it is necessary, -we can obtain these original documents and submit them a second time. - -THE PRESIDENT: One of the secretaries of the Tribunal says that it was -not submitted before—not offered in evidence before—USSR-470. Are you -sure? - -COL. POKROVSKY: There may have been some technical error. I was informed -that it had already been submitted. We shall now go into this matter -thoroughly. I believe, My Lord, that the original of the second document -is in your possession. - -JODL: I can say something to clarify this. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal are uncertain about the -admission of this Document 470. Could you tell us exactly what the -document is, and in what circumstances it is now being offered in -evidence? What the document is, and where it came from? - -COL. POKROVSKY: I can give quite a definite answer to the last question, -My Lord, but perhaps I shall have to answer the first part of your -question a few minutes later. The matter is being investigated. - -On the second page of Exhibit USSR-470, at the bottom of the page, there -is an affidavit: - - “This is to certify that this is a correct and certified copy of - the original document which was captured during military - operations in June 1944, at Pakracu, by the Yugoslav National - Army of Liberation. The original document is kept in the - archives of the State Commission for the Investigation of - Atrocities perpetrated by the occupants and their collaborators - in Belgrade, dated 4 January 1946, Belgrade,” - -signed by the President of the State Commission, University Professor -Dr. D. Nedelkovitsch. - -I am just having investigations made as to whether this document has -already been submitted, by what member of the Soviet Delegation it was -submitted, and on what date. If the document has not yet been submitted, -then we can demand the original from the Belgrade archives—the German, -the captured copy—or else a certified photostat, whichever is most -acceptable to the Tribunal and have it presented in evidence. - -My Lord, I have just been informed that this document was not presented. -Therefore, it will be submitted for the first time, and we shall -immediately ask for the original as additional evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, with reference, for the moment, to -Document USSR-132, which I understand has already been put in -evidence—offered in evidence—the Tribunal would like to see the -original of that document because there are only two paragraphs put out -in the copy that we have before us, and that was the point that was -taken by the Defendant Jodl, that he wanted to see the whole document. - -Colonel Pokrovsky, first of all, with reference to Document 132, which -the Tribunal understand has already been offered in evidence, the -Tribunal think that that document in full should be put before the -defendant for him to make any comments. With reference to Document 470, -which you are now offering in evidence, the Tribunal are of the opinion -that you should go on cross-examining with reference to that document, -subject to the production, as soon as possible, of the original or a -photostatic copy of the original, and subject to the right of the -defendant’s counsel to apply to have that cross-examination struck out -if there is any substantial difference between the translation in the -Yugoslav language—which is now being put to the defendant, or used for -the purpose of cross-examination of the defendant—and the original -document. - -Is that clear to you and to Dr. Exner? - -COL. POKROVSKY: It shall be done, My Lord. - -DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I think that a discussion of this document -ought not to be permitted at the moment. There are too many -discrepancies in it. As it stands, it cannot be correct. Roman numeral -IV, for instance, “the IV Mountain Regiment,” is referred to. That Roman -numeral IV is quite wrong. Then it says “the commander delivers...” -which is not German. Then, on Line 4 there is mention... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal want to know what you are talking -about. Are you talking about 470? - -DR. EXNER: Yes. I am merely trying to show that this cannot be a genuine -document because it is not proper German at all. - -For instance, in Line 4 it says, “Armed Forces Operations Staff, Ob.H.” -The Armed Forces Operations Staff is attached to the OKW, not to the -Ob.H. - -Then, there is no signature. It is signed “Keitel” on the first page; -but he signs as a Generaloberst, whereas I am told he was already a -Field Marshal at that time. - -Furthermore, this signature is part of the quotation and it says, “The -OKW supplies the following...” Then there is the quotation—and Keitel’s -signature is a part of that—whereas the document itself is supposed to -originate from the 4th Mountain Regiment, and there is no signature of -the 4th Mountain Regiment. I really do not think there would be any -sense in talking about the document until the original has been -supplied. For instance, on Page 2 of the document there is the statement -that this goes to the commanders of 6, 7, _et cetera_. They are not -commanders, these company commanders. No German military person could -have written this document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal adhere to the decision that this -document may be used now. All the points which you are now raising and -any other points which you may wish to raise upon the document will be -open to you if you wish to move to have the cross-examination struck out -at a later stage when the original had been produced. - -DR. EXNER: I understand. - -THE PRESIDENT: For the purposes of not wasting time, it is, the Tribunal -think, more convenient to have the cross-examination now upon this -document. We will leave it to you to move hereafter to strike the whole -cross-examination out. - -DR. EXNER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, Colonel Pokrovsky, here is the original Document -USSR-132 which the defendant ought to have for the purpose of making any -comments that he wishes to make. - -COL. POKROVSKY: The instructions of the Tribunal will be carried out, My -Lord. We shall submit the original document. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Have you acquainted yourself with the -contents of the document? - -JODL: It is an order of the 118th Infantry Division. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You have no doubts at all about the authenticity of the -document? - -JODL: No, there is no doubt that it is an order of the 118th Infantry -Division, but the connection between the 118th Infantry Division and -myself is puzzling. But the order is genuine. - -COL POKROVSKY: Perhaps you would like to admit now that this is not a -question of stupidity but of villainy. Perhaps you would like to amplify -your testimony in this sense? - -JODL: I did not understand you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, when you were asked about Paragraph 2 of -Document USSR-132, you said that the whole document was not before you. -Now you have the whole document. - -JODL: I have it, yes. I have the entire document. The entire order from -Kübler is perfectly in order in my opinion. Apparently the doubts which -the Prosecutor has refer to Point 2, where it says, “Any man who has -obviously fought against the German Armed Forces and has been captured -is to be shot after interrogation.” - -That, of course, does not refer to normal troops. That refers to the -population. At least, that is how I see it. Paragraph 8 says, “Attitude -towards the Population.” - -That is also in order from the point of view of international law. It -draws a distinction between the attitude towards a hostile population -and the attitude towards a peaceful population. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Is that all you wish to say? - -JODL: Yes, but as I said, I do not understand the connection between -Major General Kübler’s order and myself. I do not understand it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You confirm that the question of the treatment of the -civilian population has been isolated to form an independent paragraph, -Number 8? Is that correct? You have just referred to that. - -JODL: Yes, Paragraph 8 mentions the treatment to be meted out to the -civilian population. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I am satisfied with your answer. Let us pass on to -another group of questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. - -JODL: But I wished, with the permission of the Tribunal, to object... - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Defendant, are you suggesting that there is -anything in the order itself which indicated that the prisoners dealt -with in Paragraph 2 are not, as you have put it, normal troops? - -JODL: In that respect, the paragraph is not very clear; but the next -document which the Prosecutor has submitted might give the proof -regarding what other orders have been issued. However, I consider that -it is out of the question that Kübler gave an order saying that Yugoslav -troops captured in battle should be shot. That is quite impossible. And -had he done so, then he would have done so against the orders of the -High Command of the German Armed Forces. But how can I give my views on -an order from Major General Kübler? It would be best to ask him, he is -alive. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, your answer to my question, then, is in the -negative, that there is nothing in the order itself which shows or -indicates that the prisoners referred to in Paragraph 2 are not normal -troops. - -JODL: That cannot be concluded from the wording of that order. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps I ought to draw your attention to the words under -“General Directives for the Conduct of Troops in Action.” - -At any rate, that is your answer upon the whole document. - -JODL: May I please have permission to look at the original again? I have -only a copy here before me. - -[_The document was submitted to the defendant._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You now have the original document before you. Do you -want to add anything to what you have said? - -JODL: I just wanted to add—if you are dealing with this order of Major -General Kübler—that it is not certain whether this order refers to any -particular action, for example, the mopping up of guerrillas in a given -territory who were not regarded as regular troops at that particular -moment, but were regarded as a revolt of the population. That is -feasible. - -At any rate, I cannot answer these questions because I am not Major -General Kübler. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now you can pass on to 470. - -JODL: May I ask the Tribunal for permission to make a correction in my -objection to this document? - -THE PRESIDENT: Which document are you speaking of? - -JODL: Document USSR-470. - -THE PRESIDENT: What do you want to say about it? - -JODL: I previously described that document as nonsensical because, at -the first moment, I regarded it as a German order. In the meantime I -have ascertained that it is obviously a Croatian order, because it is -addressed to three Ustashi battalions. In this Croatian order the -Croatian commander of this mountain regiment tells his troops something -which he had apparently received in the way of orders from the 4th -German Mountain Division, regarding the treatment of prisoners. He, in -turn, traces it back to an order from Keitel which, however, is -misrepresented and which, if it were correct, would best be handed in to -the counsel for Field Marshal Keitel, because it is the best example of -the attitude toward the guerrillas in Yugoslavia in keeping with -international law—that is, if it is correct. Therefore, it is not a -German order; it is apparently a draft or a translation of a Croatian -order of the 4th Mountain Regiment. But what the 4th Croatian Regiment -has to do with the General or the Defendant Jodl is a puzzle to me. I do -not understand it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Colonel Pokrovsky. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I ask you, Defendant Jodl, whether you knew of such a -directive by Keitel to the effect that division commanders or officers -of higher rank were entitled to issue orders that no prisoners should be -taken. Do you know of such a directive? - -JODL: No, it is not known to me; and it is not certain that the order -was issued in that way. However, in certain cases it is permissible -under international law. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I have no further questions to ask in connection with -this document. The defense counsel will obviously ask some questions -when the original document is submitted to the Tribunal. - -I shall now proceed to another group of questions. If I am not mistaken, -you confirmed the authenticity of your so-called notes for “Plan Grün” -where it dealt with the creation of an incident on the borders of -Czechoslovakia. It is stated quite clearly there that the organization -of this incident was to be entrusted to the counterintelligence. Have I -interpreted the idea of your notes correctly? - -JODL: No. The translation as it came over to me is completely distorted. -But there has been a full discussion about that, too. - -COL. POKROVSKY: To facilitate the task of the interpreters, I shall -simplify the question. You, I believe, confirmed the authenticity of -this document dealing with the incident and the organization of the -incident. This is Defense Document Jodl-14. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it has come through properly. - -JODL: No. It did not make any sense to me at all. - -COL. POKROVSKY: All right. I shall repeat it. Do I clearly understand -that you do not contest the authenticity of Document Jodl-14? - -JODL: If that is the letter from me to Major Schmundt, then that is an -absolutely genuine document, which I wrote myself. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In this connection I should like to ask you one precise -question: Do you confirm that the provocation which you call the -“organization of an incident” had two objectives: First, to give a -pretext for an attack against Czechoslovakia; and secondly—to use your -own terminology, which we heard here on 4 June—to shift the blame for -the war on to somebody else’s shoulders? Had you these two objectives -when you proposed to organize an incident? Do you understand my -question? - -JODL: I understood roughly what you said. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Can you give an answer? - -JODL: Yes, I can repeat the answer I gave yesterday. I have... - -COL. POKROVSKY: You confirm this? - -JODL: My testimony of yesterday? Yes, of course. I still maintain today -something which I said yesterday. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I would like you to tell the Tribunal -everything you know about the supplying of weapons to the Sudeten -Germans organized into the Henlein Corps, which you mentioned to the -Tribunal in passing. You stated that this corps contained a certain -number of officers. Do you remember? - -JODL: Yes, I remember. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In order to help you, I will show you a document. - -[_The document was submitted to the defendant._] - -It is the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank. He declares in this testimony -that the Henlein Corps received a certain quantity of weapons. Do you -know anything about this? - -JODL: I only know of weapons supplied to the Henlein Free Corps at the -time when it was being formed on German territory. Whether arms had been -previously smuggled into Czechoslovakia for that Sudeten-German group, -or how they were brought in, is something which I know nothing about. -The Armed Forces were never in any way concerned with that, just as -later on they were not concerned with the Henlein Free Corps. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know what kind of weapons were sent there? Were -they of German origin or not? - -JODL: The fact that arms were taken into Czechoslovakia is something I -know absolutely nothing about. I was not a smuggler of arms; I was a -General Staff officer. - -COL. POKROVSKY: That is why I am asking you, since you have said that -you received reports on the arming of the Henlein Free Corps when it -arrived on German territory. That is why I asked you, an officer of the -General Staff, were these weapons of German origin or not? You must know -that. - -JODL: Henlein’s Free Corps—which was formed near Hof, and in the -district to the North, on 17 September—received, in my opinion, former -Austrian, or even German, arms. I think they were Austrian weapons, but -I do not know that for certain. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Then it is not necessary. We only need definite -information and definite facts. You will now be handed a photostatic -copy of the Case Green folder. - -[_The folder was submitted to the defendant._] - -You will look at the passage which has been marked. The marked passage -says, “For the success of the operation, the penetration into Sudeten -Germany with parachute troops will be of great value.” The Defendant -Keitel, on 6 April 1946, when questioned regarding this part of the -document, said that it is precisely you who could give the requisite -explanations with regard to this document. - -JODL: With reference to this paragraph I have to say that, in the -preparation for a possible war, the Army had a notation inserted to the -effect that fortifications would have to be penetrated quickly or would -have to be opened up from the rear and that for the success of this -joint action the co-operation of airborne troops, together with the -border population and the Sudeten Germans who deserted to us, might be -of value. For, of course, it was a fact that among the Germans who had -been drawn into the ranks and who numbered about 100,000, not one would -have turned his weapon upon us but would have deserted on the spot. They -wrote that to me personally while in Czech uniform. These Germans would -have deserted on the spot. That, of course, we expected and had taken -into account in our military calculations. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I fear that you have not understood me quite correctly -or that you did not wish to understand the question which I put to you. - -Defendant Jodl, I am interested in something else. Do you confirm the -fact that prior to the attack on Czechoslovakia you had planned -diversionary activity on the territory of Czechoslovakia proper. That is -what I am interested in. Yes or no? - -JODL: First, there was no attack upon Czechoslovakia at all; that is a -historical untruth. Second, this was General Staff work, which was -prepared for a possible war; and there is nothing else to be said about -that. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question was -whether you planned before the war—or the possible war—diversionary -activity in Czechoslovakia. Did you plan that? Can you answer that? - -JODL: No, I did not. You will have to ask Admiral Canaris about that. -Such matters were not in my jurisdiction. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Keitel advised us to ask you, and you advise us to -question Canaris. Very well; I have another question to ask you. Was the -unification of all pro-Fascist forces and armed Fascist bands in -Yugoslavia, which fought against the Allies, carried out with your -knowledge? Or do you know nothing about that? - -JODL: You mean the military organization under Marshal Tito. That is -known to me, yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am referring to the organization under the -direction of the German High Command, of a united front of all -pro-Fascist bands—of Nedish, Michailovič, and others—financed by -Germany, helped by Germany, and under the leadership of the German High -Command. Do you know anything about that, or do you not? - -JODL: I do not know whether you have in mind the Chetniks. They were -under Italian command. Because of this there was always a big row -between us and the Italians. Then there was the Ustashi, they were -Croatians. But the other pro-Fascist organizations are not known to me. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will look at Document J-95, Exhibit -USSR-288. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal. It is the -testimony of Nedish. Two or three sentences from this document have a -direct bearing on the questions that I have asked you. Nedish testified -under oath, naming those who had helped him to form and to finance his -bands. He named the representatives of the German High Command and the -Gestapo who helped him to create his armed forces. - -Have you found that? - -JODL: That is right. Nedish formed a Serbian unit. I forgot that before. -Nedish had a—what shall I say—a Serbian... - -COL. POKROVSKY: Do you remember it? - -JODL: Yes. Nedish had a small unit. That is right. There were perhaps -5,000 to 6,000 men. They were Serbs. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Did you give financial support to this organization? - -JODL: No. I had no money. I did not back these things. - -COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not speaking of your personal means, but the -means of the German Reich. - -JODL: I cannot tell you that. I did not concern myself with money in -this war. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Was the German High Command at the head of the work of -controlling the organization of these bands, or was it not? - -JODL: No. I did not organize it. The Commander, Southeast, probably -discussed that with Nedish. But it was Nedish’s own private affair if he -wished to call on the Serbs to fight. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I do not know whether it was his private business or -not. But it is most important to me that you confirm the fact that these -bands actually existed. How Nedish organized them does not interest me. - -JODL: I can confirm that. There were about 5,000 to 6,000 men of the -Serbian auxiliary police. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will be shown another report from this -group of questions. It is an official report of the Polish Government -sent to the Military Tribunal. You will find that it contains some very -valuable information about the activities of the Fifth Column. Please -turn to the sentence which is marked “B.” It is said there: - - “In addition to the agents selected from among the young people - and appointed to co-operate with the German civilian population, - there also existed a group of leaders and instructors made up of - officers who had come to Poland, supplied with valid passports, - weeks before the outbreak of hostilities.” - -Do you, as the direct leader of the counterintelligence—this section -was subordinate to you—know anything about this Fifth Column -organization in Poland? - -JODL: There are two small errors you have made, Colonel Pokrovsky: first -of all, counterintelligence was not under me but under the Chief of the -High Command of the Armed Forces; and secondly, I stated at length -yesterday that I know nothing about any of the preparations for the -Polish campaign, either from the point of view of operations or -otherwise, because I was Artillery Commander in Vienna and Brünn. What -Canaris did at that time with respect to Poland is something I know -absolutely nothing about. I am afraid, therefore, that I cannot be of -any help. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Well, let us proceed to the next group of questions. You -were examined on 8 November by the Soviet Prosecution, and you were -asked whether Germany was pursuing a predatory policy when attacking the -Soviet Union? Do you remember being asked this question? - -JODL: I remember very well, yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You will now be handed a copy of your answer. You -replied: - - “I admit that the question of the expansion of Germany’s - ‘Lebensraum’ and the utilization of Russian economy for - Germany’s needs did play a certain part, but it was not the - basic reason for the attack on the Soviet Union.” - -Do you remember answering in this sense? - -JODL: It is possible. I did not sign it. At any rate, I said it was not -the chief cause. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You also said in the same answer: - - “It was never our intention to keep enlarging our ‘Lebensraum’ - and thereby create new enemies.” - -It appears that you do remember that? - -JODL: Yes, I do. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you will now recall that the witness -Ohlendorf testified before the Tribunal that prior to the outbreak of -hostilities against the Soviet Union, Himmler, in his speech, had -outlined a program for the annihilation, in the East, of 10,000,000 -Slavs and Jews? Do you remember this statement? - -JODL: I recollect having heard that testimony in this courtroom, yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In the light of this—in the light of Ohlendorf’s -testimony—would you not like to answer more precisely the question as -to whether the war against the Soviet Union was waged with a predatory -purpose, with the purpose of seizing territory, annihilating the -population, and then of transforming the occupied territories, to quote -Hitler’s own words, “into a paradise for the Germans”? Do you not think -that is exactly what did happen? - -JODL: What the Führer might have wanted to create later on I do not -know; but the military and strategic reasons, which he gave us and which -were definitely confirmed by the many reports received, I explained -yesterday in great detail. The main reason was the feeling that we were -under a dire threat of being attacked by Russia. That was the decisive -point. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will now be handed Document C-57. It has -already been submitted to the Tribunal, My Lord. On the evening of 5 -April 1946 this document was put to Defendant Keitel as Exhibit -USSR-336. I must ask you to turn to Subparagraph 4 of this document and -to Subparagraph 7, for Defendant Keitel stated that you could give far -more detailed explanations about these documents. Point 4 referred to -the active participation of Spain in the seizure of Gibraltar as far -back as 1941. Tell us, how was this active participation of Spain to be -expressed? Have you found this passage in the document? - -JODL: Yes, I already know the document. But nobody signed it. First of -all, I have to give an explanation of what this document is, so that it -is not mistaken for an order. - -COL. POKROVSKY: But I do not believe I ever said that it was an order. - -JODL: That is all right, because it is not an order. I cannot say what -the people who drew up this document had in mind at the time. It was -obviously a draft which the General Staff officers, presumably from my -department, together with the operations expert of the Navy, prepared in -my office and which they submitted to the Naval Operations Staff for -their perusal, according to the principle that General Staff officers -must think and plan a long time ahead. They had these personal ideas and -put them down on paper without my ever having seen them. - -THE PRESIDENT: What was your question, Colonel Pokrovsky? It was whether -the draft did not... - -COL. POKROVSKY: I asked a question to which I received no answer. My -Lord, I asked him what he could say about the actual part which Spain -was to play in the seizure of Gibraltar in 1941. - -JODL: I cannot make a statement on what other people thought. I can only -talk about serious intentions in connection with Spain in 1940. That I -can talk about. But as far as this paper is concerned, I can say nothing -about it. For at the time I had long ago dismissed the thing as -impossible. I know of it only since I have been in Nuremberg; I never -saw it before. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Whether that plan could not be fulfilled is quite -another question. Defendant Keitel said that you could give an -explanation. You declare that you cannot say anything. - -JODL: As I have just said, it is some preliminary work carried out by -the younger General Staff officers, which I saw here in the document -room for the first time with great interest and some amusement. It was -not shown to me at the time, because it could already be seen that in a -week’s time the situation would change. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You know nothing about the proposed dispatch of an -expeditionary corps to Egypt, Iran, and Iraq, through Trans-Caucasia in -the direction of the Persian Gulf, if the Soviet Union had fallen, as is -stated here; you did not know anything about that either? - -JODL: It was never a really serious proposition. On the contrary, I had -the biggest row of my life with the Führer because I refused to attack -beyond the Caucasus in the direction of Baku. But the General Staff -officers did entertain such ideas in the first flush of optimism because -of the big victories in the summer. That is what they are there for—to -have ideas. But the decisions are made by the older and more -level-headed men. - -COL. POKROVSKY: So you confirm that the success of the Red Army upset -what you call “the bold and far-reaching plans” of Hitler to send an -expeditionary corps to Syria and Egypt? Is that right? - -JODL: If the Soviet Union had collapsed, then one might have entertained -such ideas for continuing the war. But never the idea, for instance, of -attacking Turkey. She would have come over to our side anyway -voluntarily. That was the opinion of the Führer. - -COL. POKROVSKY: How do you know that? - -JODL: How do I know it? Even the document says so. And there are the -entries in the Diaries of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, which are -here in Court. It says: - - “After big German victories, Turkey will come over to our side, - anyway. I order that she be given preferential treatment in the - supply of munitions and arms and tanks.” - -In fact, Turkey had expressed such a wish, and she was very grateful to -receive from us tanks equipped with arms. The Führer would never have -done that if he had expected Turkey to join our opponents. - -COL. POKROVSKY: We shall proceed to another group of questions. On the -eve of the campaign against Russia, a conference was held between the -representatives of the OKW, the OKH, and the so-called RSHA. The -participation of the subdepartment SIPO was being considered. Do you -know anything about this conference, at which the witness Ohlendorf was -present? - -JODL: I know nothing about that. I was working on quite different -matters, and I have never had any conferences or connections with the -Reich Security Main Office at all. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Are you acquainted with Wilhelm Scheidt, a colleague in -the Prisoners of War Organization of the OKW? - -JODL: Yes, I know him. He was an assistant to General Scherff. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Are you acquainted with his testimony which was given -before the Tribunal? It is, My Lord, on Page 2207 of the English -transcript (Volume IV, Page 467). He testifies that the criminal -practice of inflicting punitive measures on the peaceful civilian -population was known to the leading officers of the Armed Forces -Operations Staff and of the General Staff of the Army. Do you remember -that? - -JODL: I do not know the words that he used. Criminal actions were -neither known to the Armed Forces Operations Staff nor to me. I rejected -criminal actions and fought against them, and I made that abundantly -clear here. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Am I to understand that you deny all knowledge of the -criminal punitive measures taken against the civilian population? Do you -mean to say you knew nothing about them? - -JODL: Of course, I know of the fight against your partisans. That is -quite clear. I have shown two instructions which were issued by the -Armed Forces Operations Staff in this connection. - -COL. POKROVSKY: On 7 January 1946, the witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski -testified that the real aim of this struggle against the partisans was -the extermination of the Slavs and the Jews, and that the methods used -in this struggle were known to the High Command. Do you wish to deny -this, too? - -JODL: It might have been the intention of Bach-Zelewski; it was not -mine. My instructions were different. I already described the intention -yesterday as completely senseless. The numbers of guerrillas made no -difference at all in the gigantic struggle between the German and the -Soviet Armies. It was a minute percentage. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Could you perhaps recollect, Defendant Jodl, when and in -what circumstances you yourself said, at one of Hitler’s conferences, -that the German troops were entitled to treat the partisans as they -wished and to subject them to any kind of death by torture, by -quartering, hanging them head downward, _et cetera_. Do you remember -having said something of the kind at that time? - -JODL: About this matter—which is more comical than serious—we talked -for quite some time during the preliminary interrogation. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps you can tell us about this matter at less length -but with greater precision. Will you answer my question whether you -spoke these words or anything like these words, and in what -circumstances did you say them? - -JODL: I want to explain it briefly. It was on 1 December 1942. As the -Tribunal will remember, a directive in regard to combating the -guerrillas was issued on 11 November by the Armed Forces Operations -Staff, which we declared to be outdated by the new issue on 6 May 1944. -In that directive, which was issued on 11 November, I had written the -sentence: “The burning down of villages as a reprisal is forbidden, -because it necessarily only creates new partisans.” - -The draft of that instruction remained in the Führer’s hands for weeks. -He always objected that this instruction would hamper the troops in -ruthlessly combating the guerrillas. As at that time I had already -issued that instruction and he still had not given his approval, I -became rather rude; and when he once more came with lengthy explanations -of his fighting experience, his experience of fighting the Communists in -Chemnitz, I said, in order to break the ice at last, “My Führer, what -people do in battle does not come into this instruction at all. As far -as I am concerned, they can quarter them or they can hang them upside -down.” - -If I had known that the Russian gentlemen have so little sense of irony, -I would have added, “and roast them on the spit.” That is what I said -and I added, “But in this instruction we are concerned with reprisals -after the battle, and they must be prohibited.” - -Then there were roars of laughter from all the officers present, and -also from the Führer; and he gave me permission to issue that directive; -and the testimony of a witness, General Buhle, who was present, will -confirm that to you. That quartering people has not been the custom in -Germany since the sixteenth century, any more than hanging people upside -down, everybody in the world certainly knows. Therefore that remark -could only be an ironical one. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I ask the Tribunal to grant me one minute for one last -question, literally one minute only. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you know that the German troops, -evidently understanding irony better than we do—and in the literal -sense of the word—quartered, hanged upside down, and roasted Soviet -captives over the fire? Did you know of that? - -JODL: Not only I did not know it, but I do not even believe it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: With the permission of the Tribunal I shall proceed to -the last group of questions left to me after the recess. - -THE PRESIDENT: How much longer will that take, Colonel Pokrovsky? - -COL. POKROVSKY: I have only a very few questions to put, and I believe -it will not take very long. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -COL. POKROVSKY: You have given very important testimony before the -Tribunal. You have admitted that in 1941 the warriors of the Red Army at -Vyazma were fanatically resisting the Fascist invaders. Many of them -were taken prisoner only because they were too exhausted to move. You -thereby explained the abnormally high mortality among the Soviet -prisoners of war. Is that correct? - -JODL: That is true with regard to the prisoners, particularly in the -Vyazma pocket. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Can you think of any other reasons you know which would -account for this high mortality among the Soviet prisoners of war? - -JODL: I did not hear of any other reasons. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Then I will refresh your memory a little and draw your -attention to a short excerpt from our Exhibit Number USSR-353. It is a -letter from Rosenberg to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, -that is, it was sent directly to the OKW. The letter is dated 28 -February 1942. I would draw your attention to a few short extracts from -this document. On Page 1, I believe, the following sentences are -underlined: - - “The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is a - large-scale tragedy.... A great part of them have died of hunger - or from the inclement weather. Thousands have also died of - typhus.” - -I will leave out a few sentences and proceed to the next page: - - “Several intelligent camp commanders have taken this line with - some success.” - -Before it had been a question of the population being willing to supply -the prisoners of war with food of their own accord. - - “In the majority of cases, however, the camp commanders have - forbidden the civilian population to give any food to the - prisoners of war and have preferred to let them die of - starvation.... Moreover, in many cases, when prisoners of war on - the march could no longer keep up from sheer hunger and - exhaustion, they were shot in full view of the horrified - civilian population; and the corpses were left by the roadside.” - -And further on: - - “Remarks have been heard like these: ‘The more of these - prisoners that die, the better it will be for us.’” - -And again on Page 3: - - “It would be too naive to imagine that what went on in the - prisoner-of-war camps could be concealed from the Soviet - Government. It is obvious from Molotov’s circular note that the - Soviets are perfectly well aware of the conditions described - above....” - -Have you found the passages in question? - -JODL: Yes, I have found them. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Now, did you really know nothing of the reasons for this -high mortality? - -JODL: No. I heard of the letter here in court for the first time. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Defendant Jodl, I am not asking you about the letter. I -am asking you about the reasons for these mass deaths among the Soviet -prisoners. So you did not know of the reasons which led to these mass -deaths? - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the document signed? - -COL. POKROVSKY: The document bears no signature. It is a captured -document, Number 081-PS. It belongs to the documents captured by the -United States and was handed to us so that we could submit it to the -Tribunal. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I did not hear your reply, Defendant. - -JODL: I knew nothing about these reasons for the mass deaths. In any -case they are completely wrong; that I do know, because I can give rough -figures from memory as regards the number of Soviet prisoners of war and -their whereabouts. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Good. We will now deal with this question from a -different angle. Are you familiar with the name of Von Graevenitz? - -JODL: Von Graevenitz? Yes, the name is familiar to me. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Did he not work in the OKW? - -JODL: He was, if I am not mistaken, in the Armed Forces Department as a -subordinate of General Reinecke. - -COL. POKROVSKY: This time you are quite accurate; you are right. Do you -know General Österreich? - -JODL: No, I do not know that general. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You have never even heard the name? - -JODL: I do not recall it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: This general was chief of the department in charge of -prisoners of war in one of your military districts. Do you perhaps -remember this general’s testimony about the directive he had received -from Von Graevenitz in the OKW with respect to the Soviet prisoners of -war? You will now be shown Document Number USSR-151, Page 5 of the -German text. You will find there the passage to which I should like to -draw your attention. - - “At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942 I was repeatedly - called to Berlin to attend conferences held by the commanders in - charge of prisoners of war in the military districts. - - “The newly appointed commander of the Prisoners of War - Organization in the headquarters of the OKW, Major General Von - Graevenitz, presided over the conference. - - “During the conference there was a discussion about the - treatment of prisoners of war who, because of their wounds or - from exhaustion and disease, were unfit to live and unfit to - work. At the suggestion of General Von Graevenitz several of the - officers present, among them several doctors, gave their - opinions on it and declared that such prisoners of war should be - concentrated in a camp or in a hospital and be poisoned. - Following this discussion, Major General Von Graevenitz issued - an order to the effect that all prisoners of war who were unfit - to live and to work should be killed and that medical personnel - should be employed for this purpose.” - -Did you know anything at all about that? - -JODL: I knew nothing about that at all, and I cannot comment on this -document. It has nothing to do with me and I do not know whether what -has been said here is true, but General Von Graevenitz must certainly -know about it. I had no connection whatsoever with prisoners of war. -That was another office, General Reinecke. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Von Graevenitz himself defends his statement. He was an -executive; he put the directives of the OKW into effect and also issued -the relevant instructions and yet you tell me you knew nothing about -them? - -JODL: I did not say that. General Von Graevenitz is no subordinate of -mine. I had no interviews of any kind with him. I have seen him perhaps -twice in all my life. I was not responsible for prisoners of war, and I -was not competent to deal with them. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. We will now pass on to my last group of -questions. There are very few of them. - -When Defendant Keitel was cross-examined here before the Tribunal, as -well as in the preliminary interrogations preceding the Trial—I believe -these particular subjects arose during the preliminary interrogation—he -said that you would give us more detailed information about directives -for the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad. You stated here before the -Tribunal that the directives were issued for two reasons: First, because -General Von Leeb had reported on the gradual seeping through of the -Leningrad populations to the west and south to the front lines; and -secondly, they were issued as a reprisal for Kiev. Is that correct? - -JODL: Not reprisals, but the justifiable fear that whatever could happen -to us in Kiev could also happen to us in Leningrad; and the third reason -was the announcement by the Soviet Russian radio that this would -actually take place. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Good. The only important thing for me is to establish -the fact that you connected the issuing of this directive with the -report from the Leningrad front and with the affair in Kiev; is that -correct? - -JODL: I did not connect them; but events, as they actually happened, -necessarily influenced the decision of the Führer in this direction. -These were the reasons which he gave himself. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you will remember when the High -Command received this information from Leeb—in what month? - -JODL: It was in the first days—as far as I remember in the first days -of September. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you can also remember the date on -which the Germans captured Kiev. Was it not towards the end of September -1941? - -JODL: As far as I remember, Kiev was occupied at the end of August. I -believe it was on 25 August or about that date. But I cannot... - -COL. POKROVSKY: Was that not on 22 September? - -JODL: That is entirely out of the question. We have a document here, a -report about the incidents in Kiev; I do not know the date of it from -memory, but it is Document 053-PS. We must be able to see the date from -that document. - -COL. POKROVSKY: It is precisely in that document that 23 and 24 -September are mentioned. Well, let us, however, suppose that it really -did happen in August. Would you not remember the date when Hitler first -declared that Leningrad should be razed to the ground? - -JODL: I beg your pardon. I have made a mistake all the time about the -date. This document is—Document C-323, the Führer decree, is dated 7 -October. So, your statement may be correct. I was a month off in my -calculations, and the taking of Kiev was actually at the end of -September. The reports which we received from Leeb came in the first -days of October. I made a mistake. I am sorry. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Please, do not mention it; it is of no importance. I -only want you to remember when Hitler first stated categorically that he -would raze Leningrad to the ground. That is important for me. - -JODL: You are referring to the naval document, I assume, the document of -the SKL, the Naval Operations Staff. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You will now be handed Document L-221 and will be shown -the passage where it is written that, on 16 July 1941, during a -conference in the Führer’s headquarters, the following statement was -made: - - “The Finns are claiming the district of Leningrad. The Führer - wants to raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand it over to - the Finns.” - -Have you found the passage? - -JODL: Yes, I have found the place. - -COL. POKROVSKY: This took place on 16 July 1941, did it not? - -JODL: The document was written on 16 July 1941, yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: That was considerably earlier than the date you received -the report from the Leningrad front? - -JODL: Yes, it was 3 months before then. - -COL. POKROVSKY: It was also long before the day when explosions and -fires first occurred in Kiev. Is that correct? - -JODL: Quite correct. - -COL. POKROVSKY: It was clearly not by accident that in the directive you -drew up yourself and in the statements you made before the Tribunal, you -declared that the Führer had again decided to raze Leningrad to the -ground. It was not the first time he had made this decision. - -JODL: No, this decision, if it actually was a decision—and the -statements made at this conference—I learned for the first time here in -Court. I personally did not take part in the discussion, nor do I know -whether the words were said in that way. My remark that the Führer had -again taken a decision refers to the verbal order he had given to the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army shortly before, perhaps 1 or 2 days -earlier. It is quite clear that there was already talk of this and that -in the order I am referring to—a letter of the High Command of the Army -of 18 September—and in that way the word “again” is to be explained. I -was quite unaware of the fact, and I heard of it for the first time here -in Court. It was only here in Court that I heard of the conference -taking place at all. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. The Tribunal will probably be able to judge -precisely when Hitler made this statement for the first time. - -You have declared that you knew nothing about reprisals against the -Jews? - -JODL: No. - -COL. POKROVSKY: And yet you have just referred to Document Number -053-PS. - -[_The document was submitted to the defendant._] - -It is a report from Koch, personally signed by him. Maybe you will -confirm that it states quite clearly that Koch held the civilian -population of the city responsible for the Kiev fires and exterminated -the entire Jewish population of Kiev, numbering some 35,000 souls, over -half of whom were women. That is what the report says. Is it correct? - -JODL: I know that very well indeed, but I only found this document here -in the document room; and I used it as a good piece of evidence for the -incidents in Kiev. The existence of the document was unknown to me until -I came to Nuremberg and it never went to the OKW either. At all events, -it never came into my hands. I do not know whether it was ever sent. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You also did not know whether the Jews were exterminated -or not? Is that true? - -JODL: I certainly believe it today. There can be no more doubt about -that; it has been proved. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In the document submitted by your defense -counsel as Exhibit Number Jodl-3, Document Number 1780-PS, Page 6 of -your document book, in the last entry made on that page, you will read -the following: “A large proportion of senior generals will leave the -Army.” - -This refers to the entry in your diary of 3 February 1938. Do you -remember? - -JODL: Yes, that is from my diary. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Are we to understand that resignations from the Army -could take place at any time, in other words, that any general could -retire or resign from the Army whenever he wanted to? That is what you -say here. - -JODL: At that time, I believe it was quite possible. In the year 1938 I -knew of no decree which prohibited it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In Document Number Jodl-64, Exhibit Number -AJ-11, which was submitted by your defense counsel, we find a passage -which, for some reason or other, was not read into the record; and I -would like to quote it now. It is the testimony of General Von Vormann, -who states under oath that you, together with General Von Hammerstein, -often used such expressions as “criminal” and “charlatan,” when -referring to Hitler? - -Do you confirm the accuracy of that testimony, or has Vormann expressed -himself incorrectly? - -JODL: To the best of my knowledge, and in all good conscience, I believe -that he is confusing two things. In talking about the Führer, I very -often said that I looked on him as a charlatan; but I had no cause or -reason to consider him a criminal. I often used the expression -“criminal”; but not in connection with Hitler, whom I did not even know -at the time. I applied it to Röhm. I repeatedly spoke of him as a -criminal, in my opinion; and I believe that Vormann is confusing these -statements just a little. I often used the expression “charlatan”; that -was my opinion at the time. - -COL. POKROVSKY: That is to say, you considered Röhm a criminal and the -Führer a charlatan? Is that correct? - -JODL: Yes, that is right, because at that time it was my opinion. I knew -Röhm, but I did not know Adolf Hitler. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Then how are we to explain that you accepted leading -posts in the military machine of the German Reich, after the man whom -you yourself described as a charlatan had come to power? - -JODL: Because in the course of the years I became convinced—at least -during the years from 1933 to 1938—that he was not a charlatan but a -man of gigantic personality who, however, in the end assumed infernal -power. But at that time he definitely was an outstanding personality. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Did you receive the Golden Party Badge of the Hitler -Party? - -JODL: Yes, I have already testified to that and confirmed it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In what year did you receive the badge? - -JODL: On 30 January 1943. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Was it after that when you came to the conclusion that -Hitler was not a “charlatan”? Did you hear my question? - -JODL: Yes. It became clear to me then that he was, as I said before, a -gigantic personality, even if with certain reservations. - -COL. POKROVSKY: And after you had reached that conclusion you promptly -received the Golden Party Badge? I thank you. - -I have no more questions, Your Honor. - -DR. NELTE: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the -Document Number USSR-151, which was submitted by Colonel Pokrovsky. I -should like to ask for this document to be admitted only if General -Österreich can be produced as a witness for cross-examination. My -reasons for this are the following: - -1. The document as submitted contains the heading “Aussagen” or -“statements,” but we cannot make out before whom these statements were -made. - -2. The document contains no mention of the place where it was drawn up. - -3. The document is not an affidavit, although according to the last -paragraph General Österreich set it down in his own handwriting; and, -therefore, it could have been certified as a statement under oath. - -Because of the severity of the accusation which this document brings -forward against the administration of the prisoner-of-war system, it is -necessary in my opinion to order this general to appear here in person. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes; go on. - -DR. NELTE: Those are the reasons for my request. In conclusion I should -just like to point out that General Von Graevenitz is no longer alive. -At all events, he cannot be located. I tried to find him as a witness on -behalf of Defendant Keitel. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it a fact that this document was offered in evidence -as long ago as February or March? - -DR. NELTE: I do not remember that, nor—and I know this for certain—was -it issued to us through the Document Division. I am seeing this document -for the first time now. But perhaps Colonel Pokrovsky can give some -information about it. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider your request. - -DR. NELTE: May I also call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact -that the document is dated 28 December 1945, and it is to be assumed -that General Österreich can also be produced by the people who took his -testimony at that time. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Mr. President, I believe that I can give some -information about this document. It was submitted by the Soviet -Delegation on 12 February 1946, when it was accepted as evidence by the -Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, just a moment. Was it translated into -German then or was it read in Court? - -COL. POKROVSKY: I have just received a memorandum from our document -room. The document was submitted on 13 February, at the time when I was -presenting documentary evidence with regard to the subject of prisoners -of war. It is all I have on the matter. - -I personally assume that the document was translated into German as a -matter of course at that time. I have almost no doubt about it. However, -we can easily make sure. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to re-examine the -defendant? - -DR. EXNER: First of all, I should like to put one question which came up -again during the interrogation by the Defense Counsel. It was a point -which seems to me in need of clarification. - -One of the Defense Counsel reminded you of the photographs which were -shown us here depicting atrocities in the occupied countries, and you -said that the pictures were genuine. - -What do you mean by that? - -JODL: I meant to say that it was not trick photography, at which the -Russian propagandists were past masters, according to my experience. I -meant that they were pictures of actual events. But I also meant to say -that the pictures offered no proof of whether it was a matter of -atrocities at all, nor did they show who committed them. The fact that -they were found in the possession of Germans would even lead us to -assume that they were pictures of things which had been perpetrated by -the enemy, by the forces of Tito or perhaps the Ustashi. Generally one -does not take a picture of one’s own acts of cruelty if any were ever -committed. - -DR. EXNER: Very well. The English Prosecutor has submitted a new -document, 754-PS, dealing with the destructions during the retreat in -Norway. Why in this purely military Führer Decree did you write: “The -Führer had agreed to the proposals of the Reich Commissioner for the -occupied Norwegian territories, and has given his orders -accordingly....” and so on? Why did you deliberately put in “to the -proposals,” and so forth? - -JODL: In issuing orders I had a kind of secret code for the -commanders-in-chief. If an order was the result of an agreement between -the OKW and the Führer, then I started with the words “The Führer has -decreed....” - -If a decree originated from the Führer himself, I started the decree -with a preamble which gave the Führer’s reasons and the arguments in -favor. Then, after the preamble, I wrote “The Führer, therefore, has -decreed....” - -If the Führer was prompted by the proposal of a nonmilitary agency to -issue a decree, then, as a matter of basic principle, I added, “The -Führer, on the proposal of this or that civil authority, has -decided....” In this way the commanders-in-chief knew what it was all -about. - -DR. EXNER: Did you draft this decree—Document Number 754-PS—without -objection or resistance? - -JODL: This decree originated in much the same manner as the Commando -Order. One of the Führer’s civilian adjutants advised me that Terboven -wished to speak to the Führer. He had had trouble with the Wehrmacht in -Norway because of the evacuation of the civilian population from -northern Norway. The civilian adjutant said he wanted to advise me first -before he established connections with Terboven by telephone. Thereupon -I at once had inquiries made through my staff of the commander in -Norway-Finland. I was told that the Wehrmacht—the commander of the -Wehrmacht in Norway had rejected Terboven’s proposals and did not -consider them possible on such a large scale. In the meantime Terboven -had spoken with the Führer. I then remonstrated with the Führer and told -him that, in the first place, the decree and Terboven’s intention were -not practicable on such a scale, and secondly, that there was no -necessity for it on such a large scale. I said that it would be better -to leave it to the discretion of Generaloberst Rendulic to decide what -he wanted or had to destroy for military reasons. The Führer however, -incited by Terboven, insisted on the decree’s being issued on the -grounds of these arguments which I had to set down. But it was certainly -not carried out to this extent. This is also shown by the report of the -Norwegian Government, and it can also be seen from personal discussions -between me and my brother. - -DR. EXNER: Now let us turn to something else. When there were drafts and -proposals to be submitted to the Führer, you often voiced objections and -presented arguments. It seems remarkable that when matters contrary to -international law were contemplated you raised no objections on the -grounds of international law or on moral grounds, but you mostly voiced -objections of a practical nature or from considerations of opportunity. -Can you tell us briefly why you acted in this manner? - -JODL: I already told you that when I gave my reasons for the formulation -of the proposal not to renounce the Geneva Convention. - -DR. EXNER: Namely? - -JODL: This form had to be chosen to meet with any success with the -Führer. - -DR. EXNER: Yes, that is sufficient. Now, you said yesterday... - -MR. ROBERTS: Your Lordship, I object to this merely in the interest of -time, because it is exactly the same evidence which was given yesterday; -and, in my submission, it is pure repetition. - -DR. EXNER: This discussion at Reichenhall was mentioned today. Please -tell us briefly how it came about that you made such statements in -Reichenhall or how such directives as you described today were decided -upon in Reichenhall? - -JODL: I have already testified about the conversation with the Führer. - -DR. EXNER: Yes, it was only a question of provisions... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the defendant has just told us that he has -given evidence about this already. - -DR. EXNER: Yes, about the conversation which preceded it, but you did -not testify about the actual conversation at Reichenhall. - -JODL: No, I have not yet spoken of the actual conversation at -Reichenhall. - -DR. EXNER: Please be brief. - -JODL: In regard to this conversation at Reichenhall—that is, the -orientation of the three officers of my staff—Warlimont’s description -is somewhat different from mine. He is confusing here the earlier events -with the later ones, which is not surprising, because from 20 July until -the time he was arrested, he was ill at home with severe concussion of -the brain and complete loss of memory. Up to the time he was captured he -was no longer fit for service. That my description is the right one may -be readily seen from the notes in the War Diary of the Naval Operations -Staff. It is stated there that these divisions would be transferred to -the East only to prevent Russia from taking the Romanian oil fields. - -DR. EXNER: I should like to correct one point which, it seems to me, was -presented erroneously by the Russian prosecutor. He said that Göring and -Keitel did not consider the war against Russia to be a preventive war. -On Page 5956 of the record (Volume IX, Page 344) it states that Göring, -too, considered the war to be a preventive one and that he only differed -in opinion from the Führer insofar as he would have chosen a different -period of time for this preventive war. Keitel was, in general, of the -same opinion. - -Furthermore, the Russian prosecutor submitted a document, Number 683-PS. -I do not know what exhibit number he gave. I cannot quite see how this -document is to be connected with Jodl; and I have the idea that may be a -matter of signature, for the document is signed “Joel,” who is not at -all identical with the Defendant Jodl. I just wanted to draw attention -to this point. Perhaps there is simply a mistake in the names. - -Further, the Prosecution said that the defendant made a remark about -partisans being hanged upside down, and so on. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you have simply made a statement, which you -are not entitled to do, about this document. If you want to prove it by -evidence you should ask the witness about it. You have told us that this -document has nothing to do with Jodl, and that the signature on it is -somebody else’s. Why didn’t you ask the witness? - -I am told just now that it has already been proved that it isn’t Jodl’s -document. - -DR. EXNER: The translations this morning were bad; I do not remember -having heard that. I do not know whether it is permissible for me now in -this connection to read something from a questionnaire? It is only one -question and an answer in connection with this remark about the hanging -of prisoners, and so on. Is that permissible? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if it arises out of the cross-examination. - -DR. EXNER: Yes; the Russian prosecutor brought up the question of -whether the defendant made this remark during the discussions about the -prisoners, in connection with the guerrilla directive—that members of -guerrilla bands could also be quartered during combat. - -There it says: - - “Question: Is it true or not...?” - -Oh yes, I must say that is my Document Number Jodl-60, Exhibit Number -AJ-7. Page 189 of Volume III of my document book. It is an interrogatory -of General Buhle, which was made in America. - -Then it says: - - “Question: ‘According to a stenographic transcript, you also - took part in a report on the military situation on the evening - of 1 December 1942, which resulted in a lengthy discussion - between the Führer and Jodl as to combating partisans in the - East. Is that correct?’ - - “Answer: ‘I took part in this discussion, but I no longer - remember the exact date.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: What page did you say, Dr. Exner? - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is the third page of the third book—or the -third document in the third book. - -DR. EXNER: It is Page 189. I have just read Question 4. Now I come to -Question 5: - - “Question: ‘Is it or is it not correct that on this occasion - Jodl asked the Führer to return the directive which had been - drawn up in his office relative to the combating of partisans?’ - - “Answer: ‘That is correct.’ - - “Question 6: ‘Is it or is it not correct that in this draft the - burning of villages was expressly prohibited?’ - - “Question 7: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer wanted - to have this prohibition rescinded?’ - - “Answer: ‘Since I never had the draft of the directive in my - hands, I do not know for certain if the burning of villages was - expressly prohibited. However this is to be assumed, because I - remember that the Führer protested against individual provisions - of the directive and demanded the burning down of villages.’ - - “Question 8: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer also - had misgivings about the draft because he did not want any - restrictions to be placed on soldiers who were directly engaged - in combating the partisans?’” - -According to the minutes Jodl stated in reply: - - “This is out of the question here. During the fighting they can - do whatever they like, they can hang them, hang them upside down - or quarter them; it says nothing about that. The only limitation - applies to reprisals after the fighting in those areas in which - the partisans were active.... - - “Answer: ‘It is correct that the Führer had fundamental - misgivings about these restrictions. Jodl’s remark is correct as - far as its contents are concerned. I can no longer recall his - exact words.’ - - “Question 9: ‘Is it or is it not correct that following this - remark all those present’—Führer, Keitel, Kranke, and you - yourself—‘including the Führer, laughed and the Führer - abandoned his standpoint?’ - - “Answer: ‘It is probable that all of us laughed on account of - Jodl’s remark. Whether after this the Führer really abandoned - his standpoint I do not know for certain. However, it seems - probable to me.’ - - “Question 10: ‘Then how were the expressions “hang, hang upside - down, quartered,” interpreted?’ - - “Answer: ‘The expressions, “hang,” “hang upside down,” - “quartered,” could in this connection only be interpreted as an - ironical remark and be understood to mean that in accordance - with the directive no further restrictions were to be placed on - the soldiers in combat.’ - - “Question 11: ‘Could you perhaps say something about Jodl’s - fundamental attitude towards the obligation of the Wehrmacht to - observe the provisions of international law in wartime?’ - - “Answer: ‘I do not know Jodl’s fundamental attitude. I only know - that Keitel, who was Jodl’s and my own immediate superior, - always endeavored to observe the provisions of international - law...’ - - “Question 12: ‘Did you ever have the experience yourself that - Jodl influenced the Führer to issue an order which violated - international law?’ - - “Answer: ‘No.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: None of that last part arises out of the -cross-examination. - -DR. EXNER: Did you have anything to do with prisoners of war? - -JODL: I had nothing at all to do with prisoners of war. It was the -general Armed Forces Department which dealt with them. - -DR. EXNER: Now, one last question. - -It is alleged by the Prosecution, and during yesterday’s examination it -was reaffirmed, that there was or had been a conspiracy between -political and military leaders for the waging of aggressive wars and -that you were a member of that conspiracy. Can you say anything else -about that before we finish? - -JODL: There was no conspiracy... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal does not think that that really -arises out of the cross-examination. Anyhow, he said it already; he said -that he was not a member of a conspiracy. There is no use repeating his -evidence. - -DR. EXNER: It was again said yesterday that there was a very close -connection with the Party and the members of the Party and, of course, -that is connected with the conspiracy. That is why I should have thought -the question permissible. - -THE PRESIDENT: He said already that he was not a member of the -conspiracy. - -DR. EXNER: In that case, I have no further questions. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I merely wish to join in the objection -which Dr. Nelte has raised to the written statement of Lieutenant -General Von Österreich. I refer to the reasons which he has given. That -is all. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant Jodl, you spoke—I think it was the -day before yesterday—about the number of SS divisions at the end of the -war. Do you remember that? - -JODL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you said there were 35 at the end of -the war. Is that right, 35 about? - -JODL: If I remember rightly, I said between 35 and 38. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. Now, what I want to be clear about is -this. You were referring only to Waffen-SS divisions, were you not? Only -the Waffen-SS? - -JODL: Yes, only the Waffen-SS. It is true they were... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they completely co-ordinated into the -Army and under the command of the Army? - -JODL: For tactical operations they came under the Wehrmacht commanders, -but not for disciplinary matters. As regards the latter their superior -was, and remained, Himmler, even when they were fighting. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was discipline the only thing that brought -them under Himmler’s jurisdiction? - -JODL: He was also looked upon as their commander for all practical -purposes. That is seen from the fact that the condition of the -divisions, their equipment, and their losses were frequently or almost -exclusively reported to the Führer by Himmler himself. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When had they been co-ordinated into the -Army? When? What year? - -JODL: They were co-ordinated into the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the -war, at the moment when the Polish campaign began. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, only one other question, about Russia; I -want to see if I understood your point of view clearly. You feared an -invasion of Germany by Russia; is that right? - -JODL: I expected, at a certain moment, either political blackmail on the -strength of the large troop concentration or an attack. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, please, Defendant, I asked you if you -did not fear an attack by Russia. You did at one time, did you not? - -JODL: Yes, I was afraid of that. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. When was that? When? - -JODL: It began through... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When did you fear it? When did you first fear -that attack? - -JODL: I had that fear for the first time during the summer of 1940; it -arose from the first talks with the Führer at the Berghof on 29 July. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then from the military point of view, from -that moment on, it was necessary for you to attack first, was it not? - -JODL: After the political clarification, only then; up to then it had -only been a conjecture. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How could you afford to wait for the -political clarifying work if you were afraid of an immediate attack? - -JODL: For that reason we increased our defensive measures to begin with, -until the spring of 1941. Up to then we only took measures for defense. -It was not until February 1941 we began concentrating troops for an -attack. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, then, just one other question. I am not -at all clear on this. During that attack did you then advise that -Germany attack first, or did you advise that Germany should not attack? -What was your advice? You saw this danger; what did you do about it? - -JODL: That problem, too, like most of the others, was the subject of a -written statement I made to the Führer in which I drew his attention to -the tremendous military effects of such a decision. One knew of course -how the campaign would begin, but no human being could imagine how it -would end... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): We have heard all that. I did not want to go -into that. What I wanted to get at is this: You were afraid that Russia -was going to attack. If that was true, why didn’t you advise Germany to -attack at once? You were afraid Russia would attack, and yet you say you -advised against moving into Russia. I do not understand. - -JODL: That is not the case. I did not advise against marching into -Russia; I merely said that if there were no other possibility and if -there was really no political way of avoiding the danger, then I, too, -could only see the possibility of a preventive attack. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all. Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock. - -[_The defendant left the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner? - -DR. EXNER: I have four witnesses to bring before the Tribunal, but I -should like to begin by making a request. In consideration of my lame -leg may I leave it to my colleague Jahrreis to question these four -witnesses? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Exner. - -Dr. Exner, the Tribunal wishes me to say that we allow another counsel -to examine the witnesses as an exception to our general rule that only -one counsel may appear in court and in the presentation of the case on -behalf of the defendant. We will make this exception in your favor. - -PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): In that -case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the first -witness, General Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels. - -[_The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please? - -GENERAL HORST FREIHERR VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS (Witness): Horst Freiherr -von Buttlar-Brandenfels. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff -during the war? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: During what period? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was a member of the Wehrmacht Operations -Staff from 1 January 1942 until 15 November 1944. - -DR. JAHRREISS: What was your position on the staff? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was first General Staff officer of the Army, -and in my capacity as department chief I was in charge of the Operations -Department of the Army. - -DR. JAHRREISS: I am going to have a document shown you, Document Number -823-PS, Exhibit Number RF-359. It is in document book Jodl, second -volume, Page 158. Will you please be good enough to have a look at it. - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Do you want me to read the whole document? - -DR. JAHRREISS: I want you to glance through it. Who is the author of the -document? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is written by the Wehrmacht Operations -Staff, Department QU, Administration Group. - -DR. JAHRREISS: By whom is it signed? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is signed by me. - -DR. JAHRREISS: By you. To what extent is that document connected with -the Defendant Jodl? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The document has nothing at all to do with the -Defendant Jodl. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Then please will you look at the signatures at the upper -right-hand corner on the first page; there is an initial which can be -read as a “J.” - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: That must be a mistake. The initial is exactly -the same as the one which appears below in the signature to the written -note, and this initial is that of the Chief of the Quartermaster -Department, Colonel Polleck. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Colonel Polleck? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: If you will look at Page 2, you will see two -signatures at the bottom. The first must be that of the expert. I cannot -recognize it for certain. I take it for the signature of the Senior -Administrative Counsellor Niehments. - -DR. JAHRREISS: You mean the initial behind which there are the Numbers 4 -or 9 for the date? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean the top one. - -DR. JAHRREISS: The top one? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The top one. The bottom initial is the -signature, the initials of Colonel Polleck. When the document had been -submitted to the Chief of the OKW it was returned to me. Then I -initialed it again at the top, and marked it for the Quartermaster -Department, that is the “QU” underlined at the top. Then it was again -initialed by the “QU” chief, and after that it is marked “Administrative -Group” and initialed again by the man who dealt with it. In addition I -should like to point out that all this relates to prisoners of war, and -that was a field of work with which Jodl actually had nothing to do. In -the quartermaster and organizational branches of the Armed Forces -Operations Staff we had several fields of work which, although they came -from his staff... - -DR. JAHRREISS: Just a minute, Witness. I do not mind your giving us a -lecture, but I should like to get to the point. There are remarks in the -margin of this document, do you see them? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Is any one of them written by Jodl? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No, they are initialed with a “K” for Field -Marshal Keitel. - -DR. JAHRREISS: But the French Prosecution assert that these are comments -made by Jodl on the prisoner-of-war question; and if I understood you -correctly, you mean to say that this was not possible at all for reasons -of competency? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Apart from the fact that there is not a mark on -the document made by Jodl, it is unlikely that Jodl had any knowledge of -the affair at all, because of the way in which it had to be dealt with. - -DR. JAHRREISS: But is it not correct, Witness, that Department “QU” came -under Jodl? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Actually, it is correct, but in “QU” -Department, just as in “Org.” Department there were several fields of -work which the Generaloberst had given up and which were dealt with -either directly by the head of the department, or through the deputy -chief, with the Chief of the OKW. - -DR. JAHRREISS: You say prisoner-of-war questions were among those, is -that true? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Among other things also the question of -prisoners of war. - -DR. JAHRREISS: What other work did this Department “QU” have? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As its main task or in its first department, -“QU-1,” Department “QU” looked after nothing but supplies and also -supervised the provisioning of the various theaters of war, which came -directly under the OKW. The second department was occupied mainly with -military administration, and the third department dealt with general -questions, such as the prisoner-of-war system—for example, questions -concerning international law and so on. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have just one more question about these -organizational matters. Were all the departments of the Armed Forces -Operations Staff in the Führer’s headquarters? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No; for example we had the “Org.” Department, -an organizational department, which was not located at headquarters but -in the neighborhood of Berlin. - -DR. JAHRREISS: If I have understood you correctly, the affairs of -Department “QU” by-passed Jodl, so to speak, and were handled with the -Chief of OKW? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Not in every case, but in a certain number of -cases. - -DR. JAHRREISS: At all events the question of prisoners of war? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Certainly, the question of prisoners of war. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Witness, what position did you have at the -beginning of the war? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: At the beginning of the war I was the second -General Staff officer in the Central Department of the General Staff of -the Army. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Would you speak a little more slowly. And what were your -duties there? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: My department dealt with the filling of -positions in the higher command offices for mobilization. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Those of the General Staff officers of the OKW too? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, those, too. - -DR. JAHRREISS: General, do you know who was meant to be Chief of the -Armed Forces Operations Staff in the event of mobilization from 1 -October 1939 on? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, General Von Sodenstern was meant to hold -this position for the next mobilization year. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Am I to understand that if the war had broken out after 1 -October—let us say on 5 or 6—then Jodl would not have been Chief of -the Armed Forces Operations Staff at all? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I am not sure of the date on which the new -mobilization year of 1939 to 1940 began. From that time on... - -MR. ROBERTS: I submit this testimony is not relevant to any issue in -this case at all, and it may be somewhat interesting to know the answers -that are submitted have no relevancy at all. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t quite understand what the relevancy of the -evidence at the moment is. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if the Prosecution are right that the -Defendant Jodl belonged to a group of conspirators aiming at world -conquest and if, as the Prosecution say, that group of conspirators -obtained use of the German state machine to achieve their aims, then it -must be a somewhat peculiar state system when conspirators are changed -periodically. To that extent I believe the case must be presented to the -Tribunal for consideration. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has he been given the dates of his exchanges, without any -cross-examination? He went to Vienna at a certain date, he came back at -another date, and we have no challenge of that. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that is a different question. The -Defendant Jodl has said that if mobilization was decreed before 1 -October he was Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and had to -leave Vienna for Berlin. Now the witness says that this was only up to -the new mobilization year and that then the other would have come along -if the war had broken out 14 days later. I think... - -THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is extraordinarily remote, Dr. Jahrreiss. You -show us a matter of surmise about what would have happened if something -else would have happened. That does not help us very much. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, the testimony of the witness is not a mere -conjecture. He only said that the person who held this important -position was disposed of in a routine manner according to date. That was -the only thing to be shown. - -May I continue, Mr. President? - -THE PRESIDENT: No, in the interest of time and an expeditious trial, the -Tribunal rules you may not go into that. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, if I now ask you about a certain field of -activity which you just mentioned, it is because I assume that you have -particularly expert knowledge of it. Is it true that you were officially -connected with the suppression of partisans? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. The chief authority for combating -guerrillas was turned over to my department toward the end of the summer -of 1942, and the tactical basis for combating guerrillas was dealt with -by my department from that date on. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Are you familiar with the pamphlet on the suppression of -partisans, issued in May 1944? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, the leaflet was drawn up in my department. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Was that the first one, or had there been a previous -regulation concerning guerrilla warfare? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. In the autumn of 1942 a short and -incomplete directive had been issued on the subject of combating -guerrillas. At that time we were still comparatively inexperienced; and -since guerrilla fighting had not been anticipated in peacetime, we first -had to get further experience. - -DR. JAHRREISS: In this connection I am interested particularly in the -guerrilla fighting in the East and Southeast, on the subject of which -the Prosecution have shown that they have a very definite idea. Is it -correct to speak of a “guerrilla war,” as has been done here several -times? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is correct according to the extent and -danger which guerrilla fighting assumed, given its limitations in regard -to time and space. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Does that mean that the characteristics of this fighting -went beyond the general conception of the _franc-tireur_ system? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In extent, yes. In the methods, no. - -DR. JAHRREISS: What do you mean by “extent”? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean by “extent” the dimensions of the area -affected by guerrilla fighting. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Was it therefore unusual with regard to territory or with -regard to people involved? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The guerrilla fighting was certainly unusual -both in regard to its territorial extent and the people who took part in -it. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether there were many Jews in -these guerrilla groups in the East and Southeast? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I do not remember that among the hundreds of -reports I received on guerrilla fighting, there was never any mention of -Jews. If there were Jews in these groups it can only have been to a very -limited extent. - -DR. JAHRREISS: But it has been asserted here that this anti-guerrilla -warfare was carried on for the purpose of exterminating the Jews; is -that true? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I never heard anything about that. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Or the extermination of the Slavs? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: There again, I never heard so much as a hint of -such a thing. Such an interpretation would have been quite contrary to -the intentions of the military leaders. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Why? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The military command had a very definite -interest in seeing a peaceful country and a productive population behind -every front; and every measure which aimed at this was always welcomed -by the military authorities. Every soldier we had to use in guerrilla -fighting was urgently needed at the front. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Was the policy in the East carried out as the Wehrmacht -command wished for their purposes? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Without any doubt that was not the case, -because the Wehrmacht would have been glad to see a different policy in -the East for the very sake of its volunteer units. We ourselves, with -our own methods, made attempts to reach a bloodless pacification of the -country even among the guerrillas. Big propaganda campaigns were -undertaken there to induce the guerrillas to stop fighting. In certain -cases there were special negotiations with individual groups; and, -although they were limited to certain occasions and periods, these were -most successful. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know General Von Pannewitz? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz was the Commander of -the 1st Cossack Division. - -DR. JAHRREISS: When, please? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must have been during 1943. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Is it correct that this General, as Commander of the 1st -Cossack Division, this volunteer division, once complained to the OKW -about the difficulties he was having in his division? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz is a friend of mine -from my old regiment. He came to see me at headquarters and on that -occasion—in the summer of 1943 or maybe during the autumn—talked to me -in detail about the state of affairs in recruiting his troops and the -difficulties he was experiencing with the morale of his unit, -particularly because of the Government’s policy in the East. At that -time he complained particularly about the fact that the Government’s -policy held up no national aim for his division; and he made other -complaints about the difficulties incurred by the members of his -division at that time who were partly on the road and had to be settled. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did Jodl take care of the affair? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. After the visit I reported the subject of -our conversation to the Generaloberst and asked him to use his influence -in the interests of our volunteer units. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Influence on whom do you mean? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Influence on the Führer. - -DR. JAHRREISS: But you told me that Jodl was not competent for this? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Generaloberst Jodl... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, what is the relevancy of this, about some -general who commanded a Cossack Division and that he had difficulties -with morale? What has that got to do with this case? - -DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that was a preparatory question. I am now -coming to the real question. It is the question of the dividing up of -competency and responsibility. I was just about to ask the witness the -decisive question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] General... - -THE PRESIDENT: What relevancy have the preparatory questions got to do -with the decisive question? How can a visit of this general have -anything to do with it? What is the decisive question? - -DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if I am to give the reason for that, then -I will have to tell the witness what I want him to tell me. Then my -question will become a leading one. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is not an unusual thing in this Court. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but I did not want to make that mistake. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. The Tribunal hopes that you -won’t take up too much time over these preliminary questions which are -leading to decisive ones. - -DR. JAHRREISS: I am sorry, but I did not understand. - -THE PRESIDENT: I said, the Tribunal hopes that you will not take up too -much time with these preparatory questions before the decisive one. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can abbreviate the examination of the -witness a great deal because I am in possession of an affidavit by this -witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, why are you at the microphone? - -DR. LATERNSER: I thought, My Lord, that Dr. Jahrreiss had finished with -his interrogation, that he had no more questions to put to the witness. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, there is a misunderstanding. The witness -has, in fact, already answered my question. - -THE PRESIDENT: He has answered it, has he? - -DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, he has answered it. I merely wanted to enlarge on it -a little further but... - -THE PRESIDENT: Then you have finished, have you, Dr. Jahrreiss? - -DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. I now have no further questions to put to the -witness. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can shorten the examination considerably -because I have an affidavit from the witness which he made on 20 May -1946. If it is my turn, I propose to submit this affidavit to the -Tribunal. But so that I may not be reproached for not having ascertained -the facts when the witness was available in the courtroom, I will now -ask the witness whether the contents of the affidavit of 20 May 1946, -are correct. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, are the contents of the affidavit -which was given me, dated 20 May 1946, correct? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: They are correct. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know General Heusinger? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, I know General Heusinger. - -DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution in their case against the General Staff -submitted Affidavit Number 20, Document Number 3717-PS, Exhibit Number -USA-564; and on Page 2, Figure 4, this general makes the following -statement. I quote: - - “It has always been my personal view that the treatment of the - civilian population in operational areas and the methods of - guerrilla fighting in the operational zone offered a welcome - opportunity for the supreme political and military leadership to - carry out their aims, that is to say, to bring about the - systematic reduction of Slavs and Jews.” - -I want to ask you now, can you explain how General Heusinger could have -arrived at that view? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I worked closely with General Heusinger and -very often I talked to him about questions concerning anti-guerrilla -warfare. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: He never said anything to me which might -express this view and I cannot explain this statement of his, because it -is entirely contrary to the basic views of the military leaders in -regard to the conduct of anti-guerrilla warfare. - -DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. Why was the general command over -anti-guerrilla fighting in the East in 1943, as well as in Italy at the -end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, transferred to Himmler by the -Führer’s order? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The Führer always held the view that -anti-guerrilla warfare was predominantly a task for the Police and that -police forces were more suited to carrying it out than the partly -over-aged security forces of the Army which we could detail for these -tasks. Just how far Himmler wanted to obtain a new increase of power in -this connection I do not know, nor how far he might have suggested it to -the Führer. - -DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the OKW and especially of the -Armed Forces Operations Staff to this decree of Hitler’s? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must be emphasized first of all in this -connection that, so far as operational areas were concerned, there was -no change. The operational area remained until the end, in the case of -guerrilla warfare too, under the orders of the commanding generals. In -the remaining areas the Armed Forces Operations Staff did not altogether -disagree with this arrangement, because we hoped that in these zones the -Reichsführer SS would be in a position to use some of his reserves, -which were, mostly unknown to us; and we should then have some forces -released for the front. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you remember, Witness, that the Commander, Southwest -made an urgent request to be excepted from this measure, that is, from -transferring his authority in anti-guerrilla warfare to Himmler? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These cases were discussed with General -Westphal several times over the telephone, and I consider it possible -that he might have made such a suggestion at that time. - -DR. LATERNSER: You yourself did not discuss it with the Commander, -Southwest? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: With the chief? - -DR. LATERNSER: With the chief, yes. As you have just said, before the -war you were in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army; -and, as I know, the filling of the higher command positions was handled -there, too. Now I want to ask you on what principles they based their -selection of commanding generals of army groups and armies? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These appointments were made according to -ability and length of service, and the peacetime appointments formed the -framework for filling positions at the time of mobilization. - -DR. LATERNSER: Were these appointments of the higher commanders carried -out strictly from a military standpoint? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These nominations took place entirely on the -strength of military considerations; and retired officers, some of whom -I am convinced left because of political pressure, were again placed in -responsible positions in the event of mobilization. I should like to -cite as examples General Von Leeb, General Von Kressenstein, General Von -Kleist, Generaloberst Von Hammerstein. - -DR. LATERNSER: And these officers you have just mentioned had already -retired before the outbreak of the war but were meant to take over -higher positions of command in the event of a mobilization? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did the Central Department, which had to fill these -positions, ever learn that the military leaders had formed a group with -the aim of carrying out aggressive wars and of disregarding -international law in these wars of aggression? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In the Central Department we knew nothing of -the formation of such a group. Perhaps I may state in this connection -that during the years 1937 to 1939 quite a number of General Staff -officers came to see Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and me, as -personnel administrators of the General Staff officers, and talked to -us. The majority of these officers were chiefs of army corps, army, and -army group general staffs; and they were, therefore, the confidential -and responsible advisers of the commanding generals and commanders. -These officers, just like their commanding generals, had fought in the -first World War; and the opinion they always expressed to us was only -that the German nation should be spared a second war. In spite of every -positive attitude to the Führer’s successes, there was a certain anxiety -about his policy and particularly about the rapid rearmament of the -forces, which made careful work difficult. - -After the Munich negotiations confidence increased a great deal and it -was the general opinion of the officers that the Führer would continue -to be successful in maintaining peace. - -DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the higher commanders towards -Hitler after the Munich Agreement? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: After the Munich Agreement I concluded from my -talks with General Staff officers that there was a general conviction -among them that, thanks to his policy, the Führer would continue to -preserve peace. I remember that as late as 25 or 26 August I saw the -Führer, at headquarters in Zossen, having a conversation with Lieutenant -Colonel Von Zielberg and several other officers. At that time these -officers were still of the opinion that a war would not occur and that -to render the Führer’s political aims feasible it was only necessary to -keep the troops firmly under control so that no political catastrophe -should be produced by the laying down of arms. - -DR. LATERNSER: I think that is enough as far as this question is -concerned. Now, regarding the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, at -what time were the preparations for that offensive begun? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: So far as I can remember... - -THE PRESIDENT: How can that have any relevance after about 5 years of -war? - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for my next question I should like to ask -the witness who of the commanding generals were informed of this -offensive and when. It is important to ascertain what co-operation there -was among the group. I beg you to allow me to put this question. It is -the last but one. The one I just mentioned is the last. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on. - -DR. LATERNSER: When were the preparations for the Ardennes Offensive -begun? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As far as I can remember, the first -preparations were begun in about September 1944. - -DR. LATERNSER: When were the commanding generals informed of these -intentions and were commanding generals who did not take part in the -offensive informed before it began? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: To the last question I can answer, “no.” The -first question I cannot answer as far as the date is concerned: but I do -know that in the zone which was proposed for the offensive there had -already been troop movements ordered by the supreme command before the -Commander, West, who was responsible, was informed and that he therefore -made frequent inquiries of us asking for an explanation of these -movements. - -DR. LATERNSER: The Commander, West, who later on had to direct the -offensive, was not previously informed about the movements and transfer -of divisions for the offensive, all of which took place in his very -territory? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. Later on, of course, he was informed. - -DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 8 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH DAY - Saturday, 8 June 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels resumed the stand._] - -MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the -Defendants Hess and Raeder are absent. - -THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the applications for witnesses and -documents that were made the other day in Court, I will take them in the -order in which they were dealt with in Court. - -The first application is the application of Kaltenbrunner, and the three -witnesses which he asks for are allowed: Tiefenbacher, Kandruth, and -Strupp. - -The application of the Defendant Schirach is rejected. - -The applications of the Defendants Hess and Frank for General Donovan -are rejected. - -The applications of the Defendants Speer and Keitel are granted, and the -application of the Defendant Jodl for an affidavit I think was granted -yesterday. - -The application for the Defendant Göring for two witnesses, Stuckart and -Burmath is granted, but on the condition that three witnesses only may -be called upon the subject concerned. - -With reference to the application of the Defendant Hess, the Tribunal -order as follows: - -The affidavit of the former Ambassador Gaus of the 17th of May 1946 is -rejected on the ground that it is not in accordance with the permission -given on May 14, 1946, but purports to incorporate not merely the -substance but also the form of the secret treaties, and the form -embraced in the affidavit is not identified as being correct either by a -person who made the copies or by one who compared them with the -originals. Such copies cannot be received in evidence, and the Tribunal -have twice ruled to this effect. The matter of importance to the issues -before the Tribunal is not the form of the treaties, but their contents, -and evidence of their contents is already before the Tribunal by the -testimony of three witnesses. The admission of this affidavit would add -nothing to the proof before the Tribunal. The same is true of the -proposal to call Gaus as a witness, who would only support evidence as -to the contents of the treaties which has not been contradicted. The -motion of the 23d of May 1946 to reconsider the Tribunal’s former -decision and the motion of the 24th of May 1946 to call Gaus as a -witness are accordingly denied. - -There is one other matter with which the Tribunal propose to deal, and -it is this: In the future, counsel for the organizations which the -Prosecution have asked the Tribunal to declare to be criminal will not -be permitted to examine or to cross-examine any witnesses other than the -defendants in this Court. If they wish to examine or to cross-examine -those witnesses, they must call them before the commissions which are -now sitting for the taking of evidence oh the questions with which the -organizations are concerned. - -That is all. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to voice a further request for the case of -Von Papen. I already submitted a written request on 6 June. This was -discussed with the Prosecution, and the General Secretary has instructed -me to bring this matter to the attention of the Court. - -Prince Erbach-Schönberg has filled out an interrogatory. His answers, -however, are partially incomplete and sometimes misleading, and it is -therefore necessary to supplement them. I suggest that Prince Erbach, -who is in Gmunden in the American-occupied zone of Austria, be brought -here and interrogated—outside of this Court but in the presence of the -Prosecution—to supplement this interrogatory. - -My associate received a letter some days ago from Count Pfeil, who is -living in Bad Ischl, which is also in the American-occupied zone of -Austria, not far from Gmunden, the residence of Prince Erbach. In this -letter he has made detailed statements about the contacts which the -Defendant Von Papen had with the circle of conspirators involved in the -attempted assassination of 20 July. Since this question was raised by -the witness Gisevius, the Defense feel themselves bound to discuss it in -the presentation of evidence, although they attach no great importance -to it. This evidence can probably be produced by means of an affidavit. - -I ask that Count Pfeil be brought here with Prince Erbach at the same -time so that he can depose an affidavit in the presence of the -Prosecution. It is absolutely essential to bring both of these witnesses -here, because the case of Von Papen is imminent, and we could not take -care of these matters by correspondence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, will you draw our attention to the -particular points in which you say that the interrogatory of Prince -Erbach-Schönberg is incomplete or misleading? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with one of the preceding questions of this -interrogatory, Prince Erbach answered that the Defendant Von Papen had -desired to achieve his assignment by peaceful means rather than by the -use of force. The witness answered a later question as to whether the -Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these political principles -as follows: - - “As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant - Von Papen acted in accordance with these principles—that is, - the establishment of relations by peaceful means rather than by - the use of force.” - -This last statement contradicts the first half of the answer. Moreover, -this latter phrasing scarcely corresponds to the facts. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that that answer is incomplete or -contradictory? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is a contradiction. “Rather than by force” -contradicts the first half of his reply, that he acted according to -these principles. These questions... - -THE PRESIDENT: The answer that I have got is: - - “As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant - Von Papen acted according to this policy of establishing - relations through peaceful means rather than force.” - -There is nothing contradictory in that, in English. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German text it says, “rather than with force.” The -word “rather” disturbs me, and is a contradiction. It does not mean the -same thing—namely, that he wanted to bring about connections in a -peaceful manner only and not by force. - -THE PRESIDENT: It means the same thing. It means that he wanted to -establish the relations by peaceful means rather than with forceful -means. “Not by force” he means. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: This version might lead to the assumption that the -Defendant Von Papen may even have considered non-peaceful means. We want -to prove, in accordance with the foregoing answer, that he rejected all -means other than peaceful means from the beginning, and never introduced -them into his discussions. However, if the High Tribunal interpret the -interrogatory in the manner which has just been stated, then I have no -further reason to supplement it. - -THE PRESIDENT: It couldn’t mean anything else in English. I don’t know -what it could mean in German. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German version it is translated, “I would prefer -peaceful means to force; as a last resort, other than peaceful means -might have to be considered.” That would be the interpretation placed on -the German translation. - -We want to establish clearly the fact that none other than peaceful -methods were ever considered. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To save any trouble, I should like to assure the -Tribunal that the Prosecution accepted the answer in the sense which -Your Lordship has just put. We shouldn’t suggest for a moment that -Prince Erbach would make any other answer than in the sense the Tribunal -have accepted it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps a way of meeting the difficulty would be if you -would agree to read the words in the sense “and not by force.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, of course, I quite agree. And I should like to have -the Tribunal’s decision as to whether Count Pfeil is to be brought here -to depose an affidavit. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean the other witness? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: The second witness, Count Pfeil, who wrote the letter -which we wish to submit to the High Tribunal in the form of an -affidavit. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that when we have heard Sir David. - -Are there any other inconsistencies or contradictions which you wish to -draw our attention to in the Prince’s interrogatory? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the letter of Count Pfeil been translated? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, it has not as yet been translated. But it is simply a -letter, the identity of which we cannot prove, and that is why we wanted -the affidavit in the proper form. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would the letter itself be sufficient if the Prosecution -were prepared to admit the letter? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, it would suffice, for we could certainly prove -nothing more with the affidavit than what is contained in the letter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no objection to admitting the letter, My -Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Sir David. - -Then the interrogatories of Prince Erbach-Schönberg will be amended in -the way that we have indicated, and the letter of Count Friedrich Karl -von Pfeil will be admitted. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if Your Lordship will allow me to -mention one point that arose on Tuesday. - -Your Lordship may remember that the Defendant Jodl said that he had not -been permitted by the Prosecution to mention a document. My Lord, a -misunderstanding arose in this way. Your Lordship may remember that at -an early stage in dealing with witnesses and applications, I objected to -general evidence of shackling because I said that the Prosecution had -not made the evidence as to shackling by the Germans a part of their -case, and therefore it did not seem to me an issue that need be pursued. -I put that forward, and Mr. Roberts, who was dealing with the later -stages, adopted the same line. - -Apparently that was understood as including an objection to the -Wehrmacht order which the Defendant Jodl mentioned, and which he wanted -to use as an answer to a broadcast of the British War Office. This, I -think, is a further remark which could be made. I certainly didn’t wish -to object to the Defendant Jodl clarifying a Wehrmacht order that was -part of the preparations for the Commando Order, and I said so at the -time. - -I should not like the Tribunal to think that I was making any reflection -on the learned professors who are conducting the Defendant Jodl’s case, -or putting forward that they had made a basic accusation against me. I -thought, therefore, the Tribunal would allow me just a moment to explain -that it was a misunderstanding, and that neither of us feels that we -have been injured in any way by the other by what has been said. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything further that needs to be done with -reference to the admission or introduction of this? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, because I waived any objection to -it, and the Defendant Jodl was permitted, in giving his evidence, to -make a full explanation concerning it. I only wanted it understood how -the misunderstanding had arisen, and that I did not feel that Professor -Exner or Professor Jahrreiss had made any baseless charges against me in -so doing. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you very much. - -DR. NELTE: I should like to put one question to the witness. - -Witness, the charge has been made against the Defendant Field Marshal -Keitel that—and I quote—“rather than back up his subordinate officers -and protect them, he threatened them; yes, he threatened to turn them -over to the Gestapo.” - -Can you give us facts about this charge which prove that this was not -the case? - -VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I can testify that Field Marshal Keitel, as -superior, was always very well-disposed toward the officers of the Armed -Forces Operations Staff. For instance, the relations between himself and -Colonel Moench, who was closely connected with him in his military -capacity of Chief of the Organization Division, were almost that of -father and son; and he deeply lamented his death in action on the -Eastern Front. - -I can also say that I myself, along with Lieutenant Colonel Ziehrvogel, -the A-1 man on my staff, on the basis of factual disagreement with the -staff of the Reichsführer SS, was in 1944 accused in a letter to Field -Marshal Keitel of sabotaging the co-operation between OKW and -Reichsführer SS and the conduct of the war. In his reply, which I saw -myself, Field Marshal Keitel defended us in every way, and said that he -would take entire responsibility for everything done by his subordinate -officers. - -DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross-examination? - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not propose to cross-examine. That, of -course, will not be taken that the Prosecution is accepting the truth of -this evidence at all. But the whole question of atrocities in the East -has been so thoroughly covered by evidence and by document, My Lord, I -think it would be wrong and repetitious if I cross-examined. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Roberts. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there was one other point. Dr. Laternser, in the -interests of saving time, produced an affidavit of this witness dated -the 20th of May 1946. - -My Lord, of course, we are most anxious to assist Dr. Laternser in any -effort on his part to save time, and we do not put any objection to this -affidavit. But I am not quite certain as to what the affidavit is, and -as to whether it has been put in as an exhibit—in which case it should -be given a number—or whether it should go to the commission. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it necessary for it to be given an exhibit -number. It was put to the witness, and he says the evidence was correct. -That enables Dr. Laternser to refer to it hereafter. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. Then I propose the Prosecution should get -copies. Could that be conveniently arranged? - -THE PRESIDENT: Of course. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Mr. Dodd is pointing out that we have not seen -this affidavit; we do not know what it contains. But we will get a copy, -and if we have any further application to make, we can make it. - -THE PRESIDENT: When an affidavit is used in this way and put to a -witness who is in the witness box, of course the affidavit ought to be -supplied to the Prosecution in order that they may see what is in it, -and so be able to cross-examine if they wish to do so. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: That has not been done in this case. The best course -would be for the affidavit to be supplied to the Prosecution, and they -may, if they wish, apply to examine on it before the commission. - -Do you think it is necessary? Perhaps you could see the affidavit soon -and decide whether it is necessary to keep the witness here. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I respectfully agree. - -THE PRESIDENT: And we shall hold the witness in Nuremberg? - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, we accept the invitation to examine the affidavit -over the week end, and then, if necessary, we could make an application -on Monday. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes; that is quite all right. Then, the witness can -retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -Yes, Dr. Jahrreiss, will you call the next witness? - -DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, if it is the Tribunal’s wish. With the permission of -the Tribunal, I wish to call Major Büchs as my next witness. Major -Büchs. - -[_The witness Büchs took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? - -HERBERT BÜCHS (Witness): Herbert Büchs. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold nothing and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, what position did you have in the last years of -the war? - -BÜCHS: From November 1943 I was a General Staff officer of the Air Force -serving with the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff; and in that -capacity I was second adjutant to General Jodl. - -DR. JAHRREISS: And were you in this position until the end of the war? - -BÜCHS: I remained in this position until the end, until our arrest on 23 -May 1945. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, during this time in which you were in the -Führer’s headquarters, were you in the various compounds of these -headquarters? - -BÜCHS: Yes. I was in the headquarters in East Prussia, and in addition -to that I was in the headquarters in Berlin, and in 1944 also in -Berchtesgaden. - -DR. JAHRREISS: It has been said that there was a Party clique at the -Führer’s headquarters. Do you know anything about that? - -BÜCHS: If I am to understand by that a circle of people, I would name -Fegelein, Bormann, and Burgdorf. - -DR. JAHRREISS: You would say that that was a clique? - -BÜCHS: These were three gentlemen who were in very close personal and -official contact, and who made that impression on outsiders. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Was this very close official and personal relationship -between themselves or with others? - -BÜCHS: They not only had very close relations among themselves, but I -also observed that these three gentlemen had very strong influence on -Adolf Hitler himself. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, would you ascertain the names of the three -again? They did not come to us quite clearly. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Major, will you please pronounce slowly the -names of these three gentlemen you just mentioned? - -BÜCHS: There is Fegelein, Himmler’s liaison officer to Adolf Hitler; -then Bormann, the head of the Party Chancellery and the representative -of the Party; and General Burgdorf, who had a dual position as Chief of -the Army Personnel Office and at the same time Chief Adjutant of the -Armed Forces with the Führer. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did General Jodl have official relations with each of -these three gentlemen? - -BÜCHS: If I may start with Fegelein: Fegelein as liaison officer to -Himmler was, as far as the Führer was concerned, the man to whom he -turned in all questions of material and personal equipment of the -Waffen-SS divisions whenever these questions arose during the situation -discussions in connection with putting these divisions into operation. -In this connection, points which fell within Fegelein’s sphere were -frequently raised during situation reports. But the official connection -between Jodl and Fegelein was otherwise very distant. - -DR. JAHRREISS: And how about Bormann? - -BÜCHS: In dealing with Bormann as Deputy of the Party, General Jodl -always strictly defined his own sphere of military tasks. He always -rejected complaints or unjustifiable accusations or possible attacks -against the Armed Forces. I witnessed this especially while the war was -fought on German soil and there was often friction with the Gauleiter -who had been appointed Reich Defense Commissars. For instance, I saw -that General Jodl on receiving complaints or letters from Bormann simply -returned the originals with rather abrupt marginal notes of his views. -If that had no effect, he did not hesitate to express his views to the -Führer in every possible way in order to obtain his decision as to the -dispute in question. - -DR. JAHRREISS: And the third of these gentlemen, Burgdorf? - -BÜCHS: To my recollection Generaloberst Jodl had very little official -contact with General Burgdorf, although it was Burgdorf who discussed -the important questions of the appointment of the commanders and higher -officers with the Führer. It was in just such a case that I saw General -Burgdorf first of all discuss these matters with the Führer alone, so -that General Jodl had comparatively little influence in that direction. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Now I should like to hear from you, Witness, what -personal relations existed between Generaloberst Jodl and each of these -three gentlemen. - -BÜCHS: Jodl disliked Fegelein, because—I believe—he discerned the -defects of his character at a very early stage. I have known him on -several occasions to call Fegelein to account and reprimand him. - -As for Bormann, I should say General Jodl had no connection with him at -all. I also have never noticed any personal or informal relations -between them. What I have said about Fegelein also applies to his -relations with General Burgdorf, whom General Jodl probably also -disliked personally. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Now I turn to a different point. Witness, do you know -anything about the fact that in the last phase of the war the -possibility of exposing a certain category of captured enemy airmen to -the popular rage was under consideration? Did you hear about that? - -BÜCHS: Yes. I recall that in the spring of 1944, at Berchtesgaden, the -Führer vehemently demanded that Allied fliers who made emergency -landings in Germany no longer be protected by the Armed Forces against -the enraged populace. This demand was based on reports alleging that a -Kreisleiter of the Party and an officer of the Air Force had protected -an Allied airman. At that time the Führer made this demand in a very -sharp and pointed manner. He demanded that the Armed Forces issue the -appropriate orders to put a stop to this once and for all. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did Hitler also make this demand of General Jodl? - -BÜCHS: This demand was made at a situation conference attended by these -gentlemen and Jodl himself; but I do not think that General Jodl had any -direct connection with the handling of the whole question, as it was not -directly connected with military matters. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did the General make no comment at all on the matter? - -BÜCHS: General Jodl, like all the other gentlemen, rejected this demand -and, on his part, did everything he could to try to dissuade the Führer -from this demand. He began immediately by adopting a critical attitude, -which expressed itself later in details he gave of four cases of -violation of international law on the part of Allied airmen. - -DR. JAHRREISS: I really do not need to ask you about this, for we have -documentary proof of it. If Hitler was so enraged and demanded a decree -with the urgency you have described, was it possible to pursue a -delaying action? - -BÜCHS: In a case of this kind, in which the Führer in the heat of his -rage made such demands, it was impossible for the gentlemen to whom the -demand was put to oppose him at the moment, let alone flatly refuse to -carry out the order. There was nothing else for them to do—General Jodl -used these tactics frequently—but to try by obtaining data, arguments -pro and con, and asking for comments and opinions from all the offices -concerned—to collect the material and at a quiet opportune moment -approach the Führer on the matter again and try to dissuade him from his -extravagant demand. Outwardly, this resulted in a lengthy -correspondence, in which the files of the various departments involved -were sent back and forth, all with the intent of delaying the matter to -the utmost and, if possible, shelving it completely. My impression, as -far as the treatment of the terror-fliers was concerned, was that in -this case we really succeeded even though the Führer’s attention was -repeatedly called to this question through new reports and statements -and he demanded that a decree be put into execution. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Then was no such order issued? - -BÜCHS: I know of no such order. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Can you cite an incident which shows clearly that no such -decree was issued? - -BÜCHS: On one occasion in August 1944 I personally was called to account -by the Führer rather sharply. After an air raid on Munich, Fegelein had -described low-level attacks to Hitler rather crudely and reported the -incident where a plane was shot down by antiaircraft artillery, and two -Allied airmen had made an emergency parachute landing. When they were -captured and brought off by a Wachtmeister of the antiaircraft -artillery, he himself said that he had called this man to account, and -had asked him why he had not shot the two fliers. The man replied, -“because I had no orders to do so.” At that moment I interpolated on my -own account that no such order existed. And then the Führer reproached -me in the most violent manner because the leading men of the Armed -Forces had not issued a decree like that. Then, of course, he again -demanded that the order be carried out. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Was it carried out then? - -BÜCHS: No, for that was the period after 20 July, and the time of the -campaign in the West when there were more urgent questions in the -foreground. And because of all of these questions that of the treatment -of terror-fliers was again put aside. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know about an incident in Berlin—I -believe in March 1945—which is supposed to have taken place in the -Reich Chancellery, where the Führer again complained that in spite of -his demand this decree had not been issued? - -BÜCHS: I recall that in March 1945 the Führer again expressed himself -very heatedly on this problem to General Koller, who was then Chief of -the General Staff of the Air Force. I myself was not present at the -beginning of this conversation. I was called in, however, and heard the -Führer say something to the effect that on the basis of the attitude -taken by the Armed Forces, and especially by the Air Force, it had been -impossible for him to counteract the terror of the Allied fliers over -Germany by means of a corresponding counterterror... - -DR. JAHRREISS: Just a moment, Witness. You said that you had not been -present at the entire discussion. - -Mr. President, we have an interrogatory which we want to submit to the -Tribunal. It is in our document book, Volume II, Page 178, and is the -testimony of General of the Air Force, Koller. This testimony under -Number 5, which is on Page 180 of the document book, contains all the -details worth preserving of this extremely important conference in -Berlin. Only part of this conversation took place in the Führer’s room. -Another part took place in the anterooms—as, for instance, that with -Kaltenbrunner—while the conversation with Göring was carried on by -telephone. In order to save time and to avoid splitting up the matter, I -should like to have the Tribunal’s permission to present it as a whole, -even though the witness heard only a part. - -With regard to Jodl, the last sentence says, as a whole—I believe, Mr. -President, we can save time if I may present it now. - -First of all, I must read the first question put to General Koller, -which is to be found on Page 179. Here the witness was asked: - - “How long have you been Chief of the General Staff of the Air - Force?” The answer is on the next page and is: - - “From 1 September 1943 to 3 September 1944 I was Chief of the - Air Force Operations Staff; from 23 November 1944, Chief of the - General Staff of the Air Force.” - -Question 5—and that is the question which concerns us—is on Page 179: - - “Do you recall that about March 1945, in the bunker of the Reich - Chancellery, the Führer censured you and the Air Force because - such an order was not given?” - -Answer, Page 180: - - “Yes, I remember exactly. A notice taken from the Allied press - reporter survey between the beginning and the middle of March - 1945 was laid before the Führer by Bormann during the situation - discussion. In brief it read somewhat to this effect: - - “‘An American combat air crew, shot down over Germany a short - time previously, was overtaken by advancing American troops. - They had declared that they were ill-treated by enraged members - of the population, threatened with death, and probably would - have been killed if German soldiers had not released them and - taken them under their protection.’ - - “Bormann further pointed out to the Führer in a few words that - this confirmed that soldiers in such cases intervene against the - population. - - “b) Hitler turned angrily to me and said excitedly: - - “‘I have already issued one order that bomber crews which bail - out are not to be protected against the population. These people - only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that - German soldiers should take measures to protect them against our - own population, which is acting on motives of justifiable hate. - Why are my orders not carried out?’ - - “Surprised by this attack I replied something like this: - - “‘I know nothing about any such order; and it would in any case - be a practical impossibility.’ - - “Hitler turned to me and said very loudly and sharply: - - “‘The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the - cowardice of the Air Force, because the gentlemen of the Air - Force are cowards, and are afraid that something might happen to - them too. The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly pact - between the Air Force and the British and American airmen.’ - - “Hitler then turned also to Kaltenbrunner, who happened to be - present in the background, and went on, addressing him but - sometimes not looking at him: - - “‘I hereby order that all bomber crews who bailed out in the - last few months, as well as all bomber crews bailing out in - future, are to be turned over immediately by the Air Force to - the SD, and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone failing to - carry out my orders, or taking action against the population, is - liable to the death penalty and is to be shot.’ - - “Hitler then further expressed in general terms his indignation - and his views on the matter. The assembled officers gave the - impression of general surprise and disapproval. - - “c) After the situation discussion with the Führer I requested - an interview with Kaltenbrunner in the side passageway. - Essential points: - - “Koller: ‘It is impossible to carry out those orders. The Air - Force will have nothing more to do with them, nor I myself in - any way whatsoever—and I can say as much for the Reich Marshal. - It is entirely out of the question that the Air Force will agree - to this in any way, shape, or form.’ - - “Kaltenbrunner: ‘The Führer has completely mistaken ideas. The - duties of the SD are also constantly misunderstood. Those things - are no concern of the SD. Moreover, no German soldier does what - the Führer demands. That is not in the German soldier’s line. He - does not kill prisoners. If individual fanatical Party followers - of Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier intervenes. The - Führer has a completely false idea of the views held by our - soldiers. Moreover, I myself will do nothing in the matter - either. I have no intention of doing anything. We must just take - care that we get out of it again, otherwise we will be the first - to get shot. We must gain time. I am again leaving Berlin at - once for a fairly long time anyway.’ - - “Koller: ‘Then we are agreed on the main point. Your leaving - Berlin is favorable. But we must have another way out as far as - the Führer is concerned, for it is possible that he may again - refer to his order tomorrow. Later on if it becomes extreme, we - will have to see how we can put a stop to the business, or what - is going to happen to us?’ - - “The following was decided at my suggestion: - - “No order along the lines decreed by the Führer will be issued - by the Air Force or the SD. - - “Surrenders to the SD—none. - - “In case the Führer should refer to his order again, then, first - of all, prevent further action through explanations of the - following kind: All members of air crews previously captured, - not in the hands of the Air Force but dispersed under the - control of the Replacement Army Commander (BdE). Time of capture - not known to a central office. Therefore a lengthy and difficult - process to determine the number of air personnel captured during - the last few months. - - “Also, preparations must be made in detail for getting them out - without attracting attention. The newly captured crews go - automatically to interrogation centers. These are in process of - transfer owing to operations. Communications are bad. - - “Detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. In - order to preserve the appearance of discussion, the I-c officer - of the High Command of the Air Force (I-c of OKL) should go to a - delegate of Kaltenbrunner who, however, would first have to be - appointed. - - “d) After the situation discussion with the Führer, I spoke to - Field Marshal Keitel at the entrance of the air-raid shelter, - and said: - - “‘The Führer’s order is insane.’—Keitel affirmed, ‘It certainly - is’—‘The Air Force must keep its escutcheon clean. The order - cannot be carried out. I am convinced that the Reich Marshal is - entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order—and - verbally—and moreover with such threats of punishment. He must - sign an order of this kind with his own name. It may or may not - be carried out—but not by the Air Force. Nor by the SD, either; - I have spoken to Kaltenbrunner.’ - - “Field Marshal Keitel: ‘He will not sign such orders then, and - everything is always placed on the shoulders of the OKW. But - I’ll be damned if I issue such an order.’ - - “Koller: ‘The Air Force cannot join in this in any - circumstances. We will not assume such a responsibility.’ - - “Field Marshal Keitel: ‘You are right; neither can I. I must - think over what I can do about it, and how I can do it.’ - - “The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was called to - the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and annoyed about the - Führer’s order. - - “e) After refreshments in a side room of the air-raid shelter, I - had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again to - reach the cloakroom and exit. Hitler happened to come out of the - room to give an order to an orderly, and he called me as I was - passing. The door leading to the conference room was open, and - Ley was sitting at the table. Hitler said to me: - - “‘I must come back to my order once more. You must all help me, - for matters cannot go on like this any longer. The Air Force—or - at least defense of the Reich—has failed. What am I to do - against the frightful bombing terror which is murdering German - women and children?’ - - “Koller: ‘The Air Defense and our crews do what they can and - what is humanly possible. Our neglect of air armament and the - enemy’s present technical and numerical superiority cannot be - eliminated or remedied overnight. When the searchlight units get - stronger, the air situation over Germany will be more in our - favor.’ - - “Hitler: ‘I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible - to the German people for the continuation of this situation in - the air. If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as - terrorists, they will think twice about flying here.’ - - “Koller: ‘That will certainly not improve the situation in the - air. On the contrary, it will make it worse.’ - - “Hitler: ‘No; the Japanese method is the best.’ - - “Hitler’s manner was now calm again, in comparison with what it - had been at the situation discussion. He appeared more - approachable. Experience had shown that it was better to talk to - him alone than in the presence of others. I thought it was a - good opportunity to attack the whole problem and stated: - - “‘If I may state my point of view, I think that this will not - do. Measures of this kind are in such crass opposition to the - education, feelings, and way of thinking of all soldiers, that - they cannot be carried out. One cannot train soldiers on the - regulations governing warfare and decent conduct, and then order - actions which are repulsive to everyone. You must not forget, my - Führer, that enemy airmen also carry out orders, and do their - duty just as ours do. If they are shot down or make forced - landings, they are defenseless and unarmed prisoners. What would - the world think of us? And the first thing the enemy would do - would be to treat our air crews in the same way. That is - something for which we cannot answer to our men and their - relatives. All their willingness to serve and their discipline - would collapse at one blow.’ - - “Up to that point the Führer had not interrupted me. After his - first glance at me he looked away again and seemed to be lost in - thought. He had been listening, however, and at that point he - interrupted me and said quietly and earnestly: - - “‘So the Air Force is afraid after all. That is all very well. - But I am responsible for the protection of the German people and - have no other means except this.’ - - “Hitler turned away, and went back into the conference room. - - “f) After my arrival at the Air Force headquarters (Kurfürst) I - told Colonel Von Brauchitsch what had happened, and ordered him - to report it to the Reich Marshal as soon as possible. I myself - could not contact the Reich Marshal at the moment. During our - conversation Brauchitsch also expressed disapproval of the - Führer’s order. - - “g) An hour or two later the Reich Marshal called me, and began - with the following words, ‘Tell me, has he gone quite mad now?’ - - “It was quite clear who was meant. I myself reported the - principal happenings and the conversation with Kaltenbrunner to - the Reich Marshal again, and added: - - “‘I will not carry out this order or anything connected with it. - I will endeavor to handle the situation so as to gain time now, - in any case, and will do everything in my power to protect any - of us from disastrous consequences. Perhaps after the last - conference the Führer will not refer to his order again. If he - does, however, a very difficult situation will arise, and you - will have to go to the Führer yourself. What the Führer has - ordered must in no case be allowed to happen.’ - - “The Reich Marshal expressed strong disapproval of Hitler’s - attitude and agreed with me in every point. He ordered me to act - as I had suggested, to inform him immediately when necessary, - and ended the interview with these words, ‘This is all insane - and cannot be done.’ - - “h) Measures against Allied airmen on the basis of the - above-mentioned Führer’s order were taken neither by the Air - Force nor by the SD. This order did not become known, in my - opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (BdE), or its offices, - as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Führer’s - meeting, and the order was not transmitted by the Armed Forces - High Command (OKW). - - “Hitler made no further reference to his order, either to the - Reich Marshal or to myself or my representative or, I think, to - Kaltenbrunner. To be sure, I never spoke to the latter again - about this matter. - - “I cannot judge whether Hitler deliberately let the matter drop - or whether he forgot about it under the pressure of events. - - “i) I know that about two or three weeks later an OKW directive - was issued—I think a teletype—in which, as I recall, mention - was made of the correspondent’s report that occasioned it. It - disclosed the fact that the Führer had expressed his displeasure - that German soldiers had taken action against their own people. - - “No mention was made of the main point of Hitler’s order. If I - remember correctly, the directive was signed by Keitel, and must - be regarded as an attempt to cover himself as far as the Führer - was concerned. - - “In my opinion, General Jodl had nothing to do with the affair - at all.” - -Witness, as far as you were present at this meeting, is the picture -presented by General Koller correct? - -BÜCHS: I remember personally something like the following formulation by -the Führer, “This results from the fact that in the Air Force war is -based on a mutual life insurance policy of, ‘Don’t hurt me; I won’t hurt -you.’” That was the sentence which impressed me most strongly, which -emphasizes what was said... - -DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Then I need not ask you any further questions -on this point. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, we will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, I assume that you can still recollect how the -offices of the Führer’s headquarters were furnished. - -BÜCHS: Yes, I can still remember. - -DR. JAHRREISS: In the offices occupied by the Führer, the Field Marshal, -the General, and yourself, were there maps on the wall? - -BÜCHS: Yes, and also in East Prussia—particularly the headquarters—the -Führer had a topographic map of Germany, as well as a political map of -Europe, and there were similar maps in the various other rooms. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Were maps of Germany hanging there, too? - -BÜCHS: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: And the neighboring territories on which concentration -camps and penal institutions were indicated with a red or blue ring? - -BÜCHS: No. Neither in the headquarters in East Prussia nor in the Reich -Chancellery in Berlin, nor at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden, have I ever -seen such a map. - -DR. JAHRREISS: At 1230 hours on 11 May 1946, the Munich radio station -broadcast a letter from a painter asserting that he had seen maps in the -Führer’s headquarters which could only be intended to show the location -of concentration camps. Is that possible? - -BÜCHS: That is quite out of the question. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Was there any more detailed statement about...? - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need go into the broadcast from Munich. -We have no evidence of a broadcast from Munich. - -DR. JAHRREISS: I am afraid I was misunderstood. I did not ask him -whether he heard it, but I wanted to illustrate how the public had come -to believe that there were such maps. Thank you, I have no further -questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that it ought not be referred -to, as it is not in evidence. The fact which you alleged, that there was -a broadcast, ought not to be referred to. - -DR. STAHMER: Major Büchs, during the time you spent as commanding -officer attached to Führer headquarters, were you regularly present at -the daily discussions of the situation? - -BÜCHS: Yes, I participated in the daily military situation discussions. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you still remember whether you attended the situation -discussion of 27 January 1945, at which the fate of the 10,000 air force -officers imprisoned in the Sagan Camp was discussed? - -BÜCHS: I can remember something like this: Fegelein must have raised the -question of evacuating that camp on the approach of the Russian troops. -These captured officers were asked whether they wished to remain in the -camp and be handed over to the Russian Army, or whether they wanted to -be taken away in the course of the evacuation of Silesia. As far as I -remember, they definitely decided on the latter alternative—that is to -say, to be taken away; and I believe that the only question still to be -decided was how their transport was to be arranged. - -DR. STAHMER: Can you still remember the suggestions that were made -regarding that transport, and who made them? - -BÜCHS: No. I believe, at that time, the Führer only said in general -terms that these imprisoned officers could not receive better treatment -than our own people. It was just at the time of the evacuation of -Silesia, and our traffic situation did not permit the transport of even -our own people by means of railway trains or in large columns, and the -population had to tramp along the roads even in winter. And I think I -remember that, at the time, the Führer said, “If these officers wish to -be taken along on a transport, they will have to march just like the -German civilian population.” - -DR. STAHMER: May I, Mr. President, in connection with this statement, -refer to an error, in the record. During the cross-examination of the -Defendant Göring on 20 March 1946, Document 3786-PS, Exhibit USA-787 was -presented. In the German record, Page 6249, after a discussion of how -they should be transported, there is a statement that the Führer said, -“They will have to go even if they march in ‘Dreck’ (mud).” The actual -text is, “They will have to go even if they trek (Treck) on foot.” That -is quite a different thing. I do not know how the word is translated in -the English text; but that, of course, would give it a very different -and entirely wrong meaning. As the witness has just said, the Führer -said, “They have got to go even if they have to trek”—that is to march -in a column, on foot. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Now, the Tribunal think that the best way to deal -with these questions of translation is to take it up with the General -Secretary, and get it submitted to the Translation Division. - -DR. STAHMER: I merely wanted to establish the fact. - -[_Turning to the witness._] A remark is supposed to have been made in -the course of that conference, during the discussion on transport, “Take -off their boots and trousers so that they cannot walk in the snow.” Do -you remember who made that remark? - -BÜCHS: No, I cannot remember; and I think it is quite impossible. - -DR. STAHMER: You do not remember any such remark, or by whom it was -made? - -BÜCHS: It is perfectly possible that Fegelein made such a suggestion in -some connection or other; I do not know. - -DR. STAHMER: According to the record, Reich Marshal Göring is supposed -to have made such a remark. - -BÜCHS: I think that is quite out of the question. - -In this connection may I just mention that it was extremely difficult to -take notes of the proceedings. Four to six people frequently spoke at -once during these conferences—and much more rapidly than usual. The -stenographers could only take down what they heard. They could neither -look up nor make certain who actually made such and such a remark at -such and such a moment. There was a table around which there were often -some 30 people standing; and that interfered with the work of the -stenographers. - -DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, at this point of the Trial I feel obliged -to make a statement. I wanted to ask this witness some important -questions, but I am not in a position to do so because of the decision -announced by the Tribunal today. I state that through that decision I... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you will have full opportunity to put the -questions to the witness before the Commission. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I please complete my statement. - -I have explained that as a result of the decision announced today, I am -not in a position to put my questions, and that I must submit to that -decision. I wish to state, however, that I consider this decision... - -THE PRESIDENT: But it is inaccurate to say you are not in a position to -put your questions. You are not able to put your questions now to the -witness, but it is not true to say that you are not in a position to put -your questions without further qualification. You are in a position to -put your questions to the witness before the Commission. - -DR. LATERNSER: Nevertheless, Mr. President, I feel there is an -impediment for the defense, constituted by the fact that the defense of -the organizations is thus not in a position to present its evidence -directly. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has announced its decision. - -DR. LATERNSER: I only regret, Mr. President, that that decision was -announced without the Defense having first been notified. - -DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): I should like to add in -connection with the statements of my colleague Laternser that I must -emphasize them because... - -THE PRESIDENT: On what point, Dr. Löffler? - -DR. LÖFFLER: On the point that the witnesses called today cannot be -questioned by defense counsel for the organizations, as has been the -custom until now, and that is, therefore, a disadvantage to the defense -because for all practical purposes we lose these witnesses altogether. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, you and Dr. Laternser seem not to have read -Article 9 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal may direct in -what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard. That is with -reference to the organizations. The Tribunal, after very great trouble, -have brought to Nuremberg a very large number of witnesses and have set -up commissions for the purpose of examining those witnesses, and they -are going to hear some witnesses from among those witnesses at a future -date in this Court. - -The Tribunal have given the matter full consideration, and it doesn’t -desire to hear any further arguments from you or from any other of the -counsel for the organizations. - -DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, we appreciate the Tribunal’s grounds, but we -feel obliged to point out from the point of view of the defense that -these reasons are justified in theory, but entail in practice the loss -of that witness. - -I ask permission, therefore, to give you a very brief explanation so -that the Tribunal will understand why we lose those witnesses. You, Mr. -President, have said that the witnesses can be heard before this -Commission. These witnesses cannot be heard before the Commission -because the number... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, the Tribunal, as I have told you, have -already considered this matter, and it may be that they will consider it -further, but they don’t desire to hear any further argument about it. It -is a matter entirely within their discretion, and they have been at very -great pains to provide that the applicants who wish to be heard in -respect to these organizations shall be fully and thoroughly heard. - -The Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage. - -DR. LÖFFLER: May I give one explanation... - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear what I said? I said the Tribunal will not -hear you further at this stage. - -DR. LÖFFLER: Very well. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have only a few questions. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Your memory of that conference doesn’t seem -to be entirely clear. - -BÜCHS: May I ask which conference? - -MR. ROBERTS: The conference that you last mentioned, with regard to the -evacuation of the prisoners of Sagan. - -BÜCHS: I am not aware that it was incorrect in any point. - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, but you say that you don’t remember any mention being -made of the prisoners having to walk through the snow without their -boots on. - -BÜCHS: Yes, that is what I said. - -MR. ROBERTS: And you know that it is—I can’t find the actual place; I -had no idea this exhibit was going to be referred to—but you know that -that is in the actual stenographer’s notes, do you not? - -BÜCHS: So it was said. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And you would agree with me that the stenographer -could hardly put that remark down unless it was said? - -BÜCHS: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: But you didn’t hear the remark; therefore, you don’t know -who said it? - -BÜCHS: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: That is all I ask on that. - -I just ask on one other matter: In April of 1945 did Fegelein attain the -status of Hitler’s brother-in-law, when Hitler got married? - -BÜCHS: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: And two days afterwards, was Fegelein shot on the orders of -his new-found brother-in-law? - -BÜCHS: Yes. - -MR. ROBERTS: That is all. - -DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further question to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. JAHRREISS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the -witness Professor Dr. Schramm. - -[_The witness Schramm took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? - -PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM (Witness): Percy Ernst Schramm. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you working in the Armed Forces Operations -Staff during the war? - -SCHRAMM: Yes. From March 1943 onwards, I was working in the Armed Forces -Operations Staff. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Until the end? - -SCHRAMM: Until the end—that is to say, the beginning of May 1945. - -DR. JAHRREISS: What functions did you have in the Armed Forces -Operations Staff? - -SCHRAMM: During my entire time in the Armed Forces Operations Staff I -kept the War Diary of that staff. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Was there a special reason why you received that task? - -SCHRAMM: My appointment to the Armed Forces Operations Staff was due to -the fact that my civilian profession is professor of history at the -University of Göttingen. At that time an expert was sought whose name -would constitute a guarantee for expert work. General Jodl appointed me -to the position at the suggestion of the deputy chief. - -DR. JAHRREISS: If you were to write a war diary in the way a historian -would wish to do, you would require an insight into all the events -connected with that staff, would you not? - -SCHRAMM: Yes. I did not attend the Führer’s situation discussions or the -internal conferences; but I did participate every day in the situation -discussions of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and every important -document passed through my office during those two years. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, considering that you had perhaps more insight -into the activities of the Armed Forces Operations Staff than anyone -else, I should like you to tell us here what you know of the range of -General Jodl’s activities. - -SCHRAMM: It is impossible to overestimate the range of the General’s -activities. As proof of this, I may say that in 1944 alone, according to -information which I received from a competent officer, 60,000 teleprint -messages went through the teleprint department of the Armed Forces -Operations Staff. There was also a large courier correspondence which, -of course, was even larger. Then there was internal correspondence -between individual departments. The bulk of that correspondence appeared -on the General’s desk at some time or other. To look at it from another -angle, the General was responsible for four theaters of war: North -Finland and Norway; West Holland, Belgium, France; then the Southwest, -in the first place Africa and Italy; and then the Southeast. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Please speak more slowly. - -SCHRAMM: It was the General’s task not only to have up-to-date -information based on incoming reports, but also to act as operational -adviser to the Führer. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as saying that the four -theaters you have just mentioned were the so-called OKW main theaters of -war? - -SCHRAMM: Precisely. The East was under the General Staff of the Army, -and the General was concerned only insofar as the main difficulty always -lay in co-ordinating the interests of the other theaters of war with -those of the Eastern Front. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as mentioning 60,000 -teleprint messages in a year? - -SCHRAMM: Yes, 60,000. I remember the exact figure. And I remember it -exactly, because my clerk calculated that 120 volumes of files passed -through the War Diary office, and that they were so [_demonstrating_] -thick. Therefore, about 12 yards of material passed constantly through -my office. That represents 10,000 sheets of paper, if not 100,000. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Perhaps you may be able to help us with a question which -has been repeatedly touched upon here, but to which no precise answer -has ever been given. Do you know anything about an order from Hitler -saying that generals must not resign? - -SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember that very exactly from an order which appeared -in the middle of 1944, repeating with great strictness an order already -issued before my time—that must have been during 1940 or 1941. That -order was about 1½ typewritten pages in length and most forcefully -worded. Its contents are still clear in my mind, because I discussed it -afterwards with several of my comrades. The order stated that every -commanding officer—and the departments under him correspondingly—was -entitled to mention any objections he might have to the measures of the -Supreme Command, but that he would then have to obey unconditionally the -order once it was given him by higher quarters—that is to say, he would -have to do something which meant acting contrary to his intentions. It -added that it was impossible for a commander to resign in consequence of -this. The reason stated was that the sergeants in the trench could not -tell their company commander that they wanted to resign when they were -not in agreement with his orders. - -I repeat, it was so emphatically worded that we talked about it a great -deal. From that time on, the commanders had even less chance of evading -an order from the Supreme Command. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Professor Schramm, might I ask you to speak just a little -more slowly? - -This order—the contents of which you have just described to us, and by -means of which you have established the date of the final and most -stringent formulation—did this order also apply to a man like General -Jodl? - -SCHRAMM: If it applied to the commanders, it naturally applied all the -more to General Jodl. - -DR. JAHRREISS: I now turn to another question. - -General Jodl has been described as a political general. You are a -civilian and a professor; and I assume, therefore, that you possess the -detachment required to enable you to make up your mind on the matter and -to supply the Tribunal with facts which will permit it to form its -decision. Can you give us facts which would of necessity form a basis -for judgment for or against? - -SCHRAMM: If the question aims at establishing whether or not the General -was a Party general, then I deny it most emphatically. It was utterly -immaterial to the General whether the members of his staff were Party -members or not. Although I was on that staff for 2 years, I personally -could not tell you which of the officers were Party members. That was -completely unimportant. As to whether the General tried to exercise -political influence, I must again draw your attention to the tremendous -amount of work for which he was responsible. He would not have had time -for it; and with regard to my documents I can only tell you that I do -not remember any papers from which such a conclusion might be drawn. -What the General committed to paper—and these papers, as I have seen -myself, run into thousands—was always strictly confined to military -matters, and in no way encroached upon the sphere of politics. To be -more exact, I do not remember in the course of those 2 years ever having -seen in my files any document of a political nature inspired by the -Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff or written by himself. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; but perhaps he was fond of the limelight and had -great ambitions; and perhaps, and outside of the files... - -SCHRAMM: I can answer that question with a definite “no,” because I know -from his associates, and from conversations with him, that all -diplomatic procedure was repugnant to him and that he disliked it -because it had nothing to do with soldiers. I did not notice any -ambition, because if the General was ambitious he certainly had chosen -the least suitable position for such a purpose, since he thus exposed -himself to criticism from those below him—from people who did not know -the underlying reasons. From that time on he was criticized a good deal, -and he did not receive from higher quarters the recognition he deserved. -I always thought it peculiar, and even grotesque, that the General, at -the time of Adolf Hitler’s, death, had scarcely more German war -decorations than I had myself, as a mere major in the reserve. I did not -see whether he had foreign decorations. I never saw him wearing a -foreign order. At any rate, there were no indications of ambition or of -political aspirations. - -DR. JAHRREISS: During this Trial there has been frequent mention of a -speech made by the General during the winter of 1943-44 addressed to the -Gauleiter. I do not know whether you know anything about that speech. - -SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember it exactly. - -DR. JAHRREISS: What do you remember exactly? - -SCHRAMM: First of all, let me tell you that the reason why I remember it -exactly is because I received the material on which the speech was -based. After it was no longer needed, it was given to me for my War -Diary. It was like this: - -That was a speech for which material was collected in the various -departments. For this purpose an enormous map was needed, which was -difficult to prepare because it was larger than the offices in which we -were working. The speech was made at this annual meeting in Munich on 8 -or 9 November. The particular reason for the General making a speech -outside the usual military circle was the following: Italy’s dropping -out of the war in September 1943 had led to a break in the Southern -Front extending from Marseilles to Athens, a distance of 4,000 km. We -had succeeded in filling the gap again, but a good deal of uneasiness -was felt by all those who understood the situation. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I object to long reasons being given for the -speech being made. The speech is in evidence and, in my submission, the -reasons for the speech are entirely immaterial. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, please go on telling us about the attack. - -SCHRAMM: This was the one reason... - -THE PRESIDENT: No, no, I said that the Tribunal upheld Mr. Roberts’ -objection as to what the witness must say. That’s a mistranslation. - -DR. JAHRREISS: It was a misunderstanding. I am sorry. It was wrongly -translated. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, I want to show you a document which -was submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution 2 days ago, Document -1808-PS. Perhaps you will just look through the whole of the document -first. - -[_The document was submitted to the witness._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it among the Jodl documents? - -DR. JAHRREISS: No, it is a document which the Prosecution submitted in -the course of the cross-examination 2 days ago. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that document was handed up separately by me -during the cross-examination, and I am afraid it is not in the book. It -is one of those documents which received a new GB number, and was handed -up loose towards the end of the cross-examination, Document 1808-PS. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. May I go on? - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, does your signature appear at the foot of the -second last page, on the right? - -SCHRAMM: Yes. This is a file which I started after the attempt of 20 -July 1944, in order to have a permanent record of what was being done in -the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I want to add in this connection that -the Armed Forces Operations Staff was in no way involved in that -conspiracy. This copy presumably comes from the war archives. The -signature and the corrections are partly mine, and partly those of my -clerk. - -DR. JAHRREISS: I want to draw your attention to Number 5 in this file of -documents. - -SCHRAMM: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: It is dated 25 July. Do you have it? - -SCHRAMM: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did you draw it up? - -SCHRAMM: Yes, I drew it up myself. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Please, will you tell us what the basis for this work of -yours was? - -SCHRAMM: The officers of the staff were called to our mess hall at short -notice. We were told that the General wanted to address his staff. As -not all the officers were able to attend, I was ordered to take notes, -so that the other officers could be informed of what the General had -said. I remember clearly that I jotted down a few key words, still -standing, so this is not a shorthand record. I cannot write shorthand. -There was no time to find a stenographer. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did you base this on your notes? - -SCHRAMM: Yes. Afterwards, probably on the following day, I reconstructed -the General’s speech as far as possible from my notes. I am not certain, -of course, if all the details are quite accurate, because the notes -which I had taken standing up were much too sketchy for that. And, of -course, I am particularly doubtful about the accuracy of the actual -words spoken. I now see that there are 4½ pages. The speech was, of -course, very much longer than that. It is therefore a compressed -account. - -DR. JAHRREISS: A compressed account only... - -SCHRAMM: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Now, I should like to know more about the circumstances -in which the General made that speech, the actual words of which we do -not possess. That was... - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is my respectful submission—again in the -interests of saving time—to mention that these matters are all very -irrelevant. We know that an attempt was made on Hitler’s life, and that -Jodl addressed his staff. It is my submission that the circumstances are -not relevant at all. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope you’ll do it briefly. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; thank you. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, will you please be very brief and -quote the personal circumstances? - -SCHRAMM: The General appeared on the scene with white bandages around -his head. We were all most surprised that he should have recovered so -quickly from the attempt considering that he had been standing right -next to the explosion. I must say that, at that time, we were deeply -impressed by the concentrated energy with which he reappeared before his -staff and by his moral attitude to such an attempt. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions? - -[_There was no response._] - -Does the Prosecution want to? - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have no questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further questions. May I now call the next -witness, General Winter? - -[_The witness Winter took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please. - -AUGUST WINTER (Witness): August Winter. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you take part in the beginning of the -Russian campaign? - -WINTER: Yes, I took part as the first general staff officer of Field -Marshal Von Rundstedt’s army group. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, may I point out to you that I want you to allow -a small pause after my question and to speak in general more slowly than -you have just been doing. - -WINTER: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Can you tell me—since you had a very responsible -position—what was officially said to be Hitler’s reason, at that time, -for the German attack on the Soviet Union? - -WINTER: The official reason, given to me at the time by my commander and -my chief, was that an attack from Soviet Russia was to be expected -shortly, and that this was therefore a preventive measure. - -DR. JAHRREISS: And then you experienced the first battles on the -frontier, did you not? - -WINTER: Yes, in this staff. - -DR. JAHRREISS: That was toward the south? - -WINTER: It was in the Ukraine, Army Group South. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Even after those first battles, you had a certain amount -of experiences and certain impressions of the opponent, did you not? - -WINTER: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Were they, General, such impressions as to confirm the -official reason given, that of a preventive war? - -WINTER: It was the uniform impression of the command of the army -group—including the commander, the chief, and the operations department -under my command—that the reason given for the campaign was the true -one. Our own impression at the time was that we had hit on active -preparations for an offensive campaign. - -DR. JAHRREISS: But did you have the facts on which to base this -impression? - -WINTER: We had a number of facts which confirmed that impression, -according to our ideas. I may state them briefly. First of all, there -was the strength of the troops we encountered which, although I cannot -give you figures now, was greater than the figures mentioned in our -marching orders. Then there was the extraordinary deployment of troops, -so near and like a front, which struck us, with unusual large -proportions of armored troops far exceeding anything we had expected, -and the deployment of a comparatively strong group opposite the -Hungarian border which we could not explain to ourselves as a defensive -force. One point is particularly significant; the fact that during the -first week we found that captured enemy staffs were equipped with maps -which covered a large area of German or ex-Austrian territory which, -again, did not seem in keeping with purely defensive considerations. In -addition we observed a number of smaller things, not very important in -themselves. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, just now you spoke of evidence which, in your -opinion, was particularly significant—namely, the finding of these maps -which you described a few minutes ago. Why is that particularly -significant—more significant than the other things you have mentioned? - -WINTER: It is particularly noticeable that the units on the Russian -Front were equipped with maps covering much more than the area which -would normally be included in a defensive reconnaissance area—even -allowing for the fact that at the beginning of a campaign such -reconnaissance might go beyond the enemy’s frontier. - -DR. JAHRREISS: There has been mentioned in this courtroom the fact that -after marching into the Ukraine, our troops found themselves faced with -exceptional circumstances and difficulties in certain Ukrainian cities. -Have you any idea of what I mean? - -WINTER: Yes, that is obvious. We encountered an enormous number of these -difficulties when we approached the Dnieper. I imagine that you are -referring to the matter of remote-controlled explosions, or -delayed-action explosions, which were carried out, as it seemed, on a -very large scale in our fighting zone in the Kiev-Kharkov-Poltava area. -They caused us a great deal of trouble, and they forced us to adopt -extensive countermeasures at the time. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know whether that applies to Odessa? - -WINTER: I heard that things were blown up in Odessa, but I cannot give -you details. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know the details about Kharkov? - -WINTER: I know about Kharkov indeed, because something happened there -which caused us to adopt certain security measures. In the battles along -the west border of Kharkov which were rather long and serious, a -divisional staff with all its main material—I cannot remember its -number—was destroyed by a delayed-action explosion of this kind. This -caused orders to be issued for the carrying out of special security -searches in all buildings which had to be used for accommodation of -staffs and other authorities from that time on. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did you, Witness, actually handle a Russian map, or see -one, which indicated plans for such blowing-up operations? - -WINTER: No, I cannot remember seeing such a map. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another point. You said a few moments ago that Field -Marshal Von Rundstedt was your commanding officer. Who was your chief? - -WINTER: Infantry General Von Sodenstern. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another subject. If I remember correctly, Field -Marshal Von Rundstedt retired at that time or was dismissed; is that -right? - -WINTER: When the attack on Rostock failed in November 1941 and -permission to withdraw his leading units had been refused by the OKH, -Field Marshal Von Rundstedt sent a report to the OKH, to the army to -which we were subordinated, in which he said that if the necessary -confidence was not felt in his leadership, he must ask the Führer to -nominate a new commander for that army group. I have a painfully -accurate recollection of this incident, because I myself drafted the -telegram and the Field Marshal made that addition with his own hand. - -The telegram was dispatched in the evening, and Hitler’s answer, -relieving him of his post, arrived in the course of the same night. - -DR. JAHRREISS: So that his application was granted? - -WINTER: The application was granted. But perhaps I may tell you that -there were repercussions later with Hitler. A few days afterwards Hitler -himself flew to Mariupol in order to obtain information about the actual -situation on the spot. On his homeward flight, he visited Field Marshal -Von Rundstedt’s Poltava headquarters and had a discussion with him. In -the course of this discussion, Hitler—I cannot tell you for certain -whether I witnessed this scene myself, or whether the Chief Adjutant -Oberst Schmundt told me about it immediately afterwards—I repeat, there -was a personal discussion in the course of which Hitler again reproached -the Field Marshal for having put that alternative question, and said to -him: - - “In the future I do not intend to tolerate any such applications - to resign. When I have once made a decision the responsibility - is transferred to me. I myself am not in a position to go to my - superior, for instance, God Almighty, and to say to him, ‘I am - not going on with it, because I don’t want to take the - responsibility.’” - -We considered, at the time, that that scene was of basic importance, and -I may add that, to judge from the orders later given on that point, our -impression was correct. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether Hitler, at some later date, -altered his decision not to allow that in the future? - -WINTER: No, he certainly did not alter his decision. Because, as I know, -there were two occasions, I believe, on which orders to that effect were -issued, forbidding resignations on the part of a commander, or an -officer in a leading position, on grounds of unwillingness to assume -responsibility. - -DR. JAHRREISS: I now come to another point. If I am properly informed, -you were in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the later stages of -the war, were you not? - -WINTER: On 15 November 1944 I was called there to succeed General -Warlimont who had fallen ill; and I took over his functions on 15 -November 1944. My appointment was dated from 1 December 1944. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you regularly attend the situation -discussions with the Führer? - -WINTER: Yes, I was there on an average of 5 days out of 7 during the -week. - -DR. JAHRREISS: There has been a great deal of discussion about these -situation conferences in this courtroom, and a great many events took -place at them which are of importance for this Trial; but up to now, no -real picture has yet been presented to us of what those situation -discussions really were. Can you explain the procedure of such a -situation discussion with reference to its length and the number of -people present? - -WINTER: The situation discussion was a permanent part of the afternoon’s -program, and was attended by a fairly large number of people, while -there was a second situation discussion at 2 o’clock in the morning, of -no importance to us here. In it, reports were made only by the junior -General Staff officers of the OKH for the Eastern Front and of the -Operations Staff of the OKW for the Western Front. - -MR. ROBERTS: Mr. President, I have a submission again in the interest of -time. The Defendant Jodl gave evidence as to these conferences, and no -one put one word of cross-examination to suggest that his evidence was -not accepted. Therefore, I would like to submit that this is pure -repetition on a point which is not disputed. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear anything of a general or -detailed nature about these conferences unless there is something in -particular that you want to prove about them. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, so as to clarify matters, may I ask at -this time whether the objection raised by Mr. Roberts means that in this -case the rule applies that something which has not been touched upon in -cross-examination can be considered proved? I am not sure whether I have -made myself understood. The objection from the prosecutor apparently is -based on the supposition that something has been heard... - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you need lay down any hard and fast rules, -but General Jodl gave general evidence about the nature of these -“situation conferences,” and he was not cross-examined on it. It doesn’t -seem at all necessary to go into the general nature of these conferences -with any other witness. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, it is possible in military life for -an officer to receive an order with which he does not agree, is it not? - -WINTER: Yes. - -DR. JAHRREISS: In that case, is it possible for him to put his divergent -opinion on record? - -WINTER: In the German Army, if I remember rightly, such a possibility -existed from the time of Moltke. An order from Hitler which came out in -1938—I think, in winter 1938-39—removed such a possibility once and -for all. An order was issued at the time prohibiting even chiefs of -general staffs and command authorities from putting their divergent -opinions on record. - -DR. JAHRREISS: In order to avoid creating difficulties for the -interpretation, will you please explain the word “Aktenkundig”? - -WINTER: According to that it was not possible to include in the official -files or in the war diaries of events kept by command staffs any -comments to the effect that the chief was not in agreement with the -decision or order of his superior. - -DR. JAHRREISS: It was canceled? - -WINTER: These possibilities existed previously, but since 1938 they no -longer existed as they were done away with. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, General, I am now going to have a document -shown to you, Document D-606, a document which the Prosecution also -submitted during cross-examination 3 days ago. I am afraid I do not know -the exhibit number. Perhaps it is... - -MR. ROBERTS: Well, that’s the Number 3606. It’s Exhibit GB-292, My Lord. -I put it in separately in cross-examination, in their book... - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know this document? - -WINTER: I am acquainted with the document. It has my file reference -number on it. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Did you write it yourself? - -WINTER: No, General Jodl wrote it personally. But I can see a blank -space under Figure 11. I do not know whether it is complete. The -document consists of a preliminary draft, which is not contained here; -but now that I have looked at it, I can see that it is dealt with in the -file copy from my quartermaster’s department. The third copy must have -been sealed and attached to the same records. - -Immediately after the attacks on Dresden, when Hitler had raised the -question of leaving the Geneva Convention, this preliminary draft was -drawn up at my headquarters under the responsibility of General Jodl, -and the order stated that all angles should be worked on which would -prevent the Führer from coming to such a decision—that is, of leaving -the Geneva Convention. This document was carefully worked out from the -point of view of international law and from the point of view of the -psychological effect on the enemy troops, as well as on our own at home. -I myself did it. The following day, my chief, General Jodl, received me. -He had this document, the contents of which I have not checked now, and -he told me that he was completely in agreement with this negative -treatment, but that he had felt obliged to work on the draft in more -detail, and bring it into line with the information he had from the Navy -and so formulate it tactically in such a way that would guarantee its -success with Hitler under all circumstances—for his idea must not be -allowed to be put into practice. - -DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendant’s counsel want to ask questions? - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I ask whether the prohibition -regarding interrogation applies to this witness? And I want to point out -that this witness is a member of the indicted group of the General Staff -and of the OKW. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether he is or not, but it does not -matter whether he is or not. You can question him before the Commission. -I mean, you can call him yourself before the Commission. - -DR. LATERNSER: I merely wanted to clarify the matter by means of this -question. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thanks. Dr. Laternser, if there is any witness who -is not residing in Nuremberg, you can have him kept for the purpose of -having him examined before the Commission if you want to do so. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I only want to ask one question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You have told us that Germany attacked the -Soviet Union in breach of their Nonaggression Pact, because Germany -feared an attack from the Soviet Union. - -WINTER: May I be more precise by saying that we, as General Staff -officers in the high command of an army group that was deployed in the -Ukraine, were given that reason by our commanding officer. Whether -politically... - -MR. ROBERTS: Very good. We know now from the evidence in this Court that -Hitler decided, in July 1940, to attack the Soviet Union; that on 18 -December 1940—446-PS, it is Page 53 of Book 7—that on 18 December -Hitler stated that the Armed Forces must be prepared to overthrow Soviet -Russia in a single attack of lightning-like speed. We know that the -attack was not until 22 June. It does not look as though the leaders of -Germany were very much frightened, does it, of Russia, or should we say -the Soviet Union, breaking the Nonaggression Pact. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Witness, you had to take retaliation measures -in the Ukraine, did you not? - -WINTER: We did not undertake any reprisals—as far as the troops were -concerned—in the operational zone of the Ukraine; at least, I have no -recollection now of any such instances. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What measures did you take against the -resistance of the population? - -WINTER: During the entire campaign in which Army Group South was -involved, there was no resistance by the population in the operational -zone in the Ukraine. Only in rear areas were there fights, at that time, -with struggling Russian troop units. A resistance on the part of the -population did not occur—as far as I know—until later when the -operational zone had already been limited in the rear, and then there -was resistance against political Reich commissioners. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Very well. You were not there at that time? - -WINTER: The command to which I belonged was withdrawn from the front at -the end of January, or in the early days of February 1943. The rear area -lines were at the Dnieper at that time. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -DR. EXNER: Mr. President, in conclusion I have only two interrogatories -to submit to the Tribunal; and I want to read a few lines from one of -them—something which was forgotten. - -To begin with, the interrogatory, Exhibit AJ-8, Document Jodl-61, an -interrogatory of Waizenegger, which I herewith submit and beg the -Tribunal to take judicial notice of its contents. And then there is -Exhibit AJ-6, Document Jodl-59, an interrogatory of Brudermüller, with -reference to which I wish to make a similar request. Then, from the last -to be submitted, Exhibit AJ-12, Document Jodl-65, General Greiffenberg’s -statement, I should like to quote the important parts. It is a question -of the attack against Yugoslavia and the question of whether or not, -after the Simovic Putsch, Yugoslavia had already taken up a position -against us. This is in the third volume of my document book on Page 211. -The Simovic Putsch was over, and the question was whether there was an -immediate threat from Yugoslavia at the time. - - “Question: Is it a fact that Yugoslavia, immediately after the - _coup d’état_ of the army, started to deploy her armies on all - her borders? - - “Answer: I know only the front which was opposite the German - Twelfth Army, located at the Bulgarian border. Here the - Yugoslavs had deployed their armies at the border. - - “Question: Is it a fact that the Army ‘List,’ of which you were - the commander at the time, had the order, before the _coup - d’état_ in Yugoslavia, to respect strictly the neutrality of - Yugoslavia during the pending attacks on Greece, and that not - even supply trains should be dispatched through Yugoslavian - territory? - - “Answer: I can testify that the strictest order had been given - to respect Yugoslavia’s neutrality. - - “Question: Did you hear of any violations of this order? - - “Answer: No.” - -Gentlemen of the Tribunal, a number of interrogatories have not yet come -in. Whether we are going to get them or not, I do not know. At any rate, -I shall have to reserve to myself the right to submit them later. Apart -from that, I have completed my case. - -THE PRESIDENT: On Monday the Tribunal will hear the case of the -Defendant Seyss-Inquart, will it not? - -Very well, the Tribunal may adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST DAY - Monday, 10 June 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, High Tribunal, I open the defense case -with the last words spoken by Dr. Schuschnigg as he resigned from the -Austrian Chancellorship on 11 March 1938: “God protect Austria.” - -It is a coincidence in history that at a time when the question of the -Anschluss is being discussed here with reference to the person of -Seyss-Inquart, the four Foreign Ministers are preparing the peace -treaties on the basis of the same events. May I, therefore, draw the -Tribunal’s attention to my documents on this matter and ask that I be -permitted to quote from them at somewhat greater length than I had -originally intended? - -Now, with the permission of the Tribunal, may I begin with the -examination of the defendant as witness in his own defense. - -[_The defendant took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? - -ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART (Defendant): Arthur Seyss-Inquart. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, when and where were you born? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I was born in 1892 in Iglau, situated in what was up to -now a German-speaking enclave in Moravia. Moravia, at that time, was a -crown province of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There and in the -German-speaking enclave Olmütz, also in Moravia, I lived until the age -of 15, when with my parents I moved into the vicinity of Vienna where I -completed my studies at the Gymnasium and the legal faculty of the -University of Vienna. In August 1914 I enlisted in the Army. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Were you in the Army during the whole of the war? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I served with the Tyrolean Kaiserjäger and saw -fighting in Russia, Romania, and in Italy. On a furlough during the war -I passed my final examinations, and in 1917 I received my doctor’s -degree. I was wounded once, decorated several times, three times for -bravery in the face of the enemy. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What impressions of importance for your later life did -you retain from the time of your youth? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Relevant to my case is, I think, only the experience of -the struggle between the nationalities in Moravia, between the Germans -and the Czechs. The Germans in those days were in favor of a unified -Austrian state, while the Czechs pursued a predominantly nationalistic -policy. It is, however, not without significance that a language -compromise was agreed upon in Moravia. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What lasting impressions did you retain from your -service in the war? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Apart from the experience of comradeship at the front, I -remember especially the discussion toward the end of the war on the -Fourteen Points of President Wilson. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Their essential content being the people’s right of -self-determination? - -SEYSS-INQUART: It was clear to us that the realization of those Fourteen -Points would mean the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. We -Germans regarded it as at least a compensation that in pursuance of this -right of self-determination the German Erblande (the domain of the Holy -Roman Emperors) would be able to return to the Reich from which they had -been separated just 50 years before, in 1866. Yes, these territories had -been created by the German Reich and had been part of it for 950 out of -the 1,000 years of their existence. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What did you do after your return from the war? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I devoted myself to my legal profession. In 1921 I set up -my own practice, which in time grew into a very successful one. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What of your political attitude? Were you a member of -any political party? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I was not a member of any political party, because I did -not want to tie myself to partisan politics. I had good friends in all -parties, including the Christian Social and Social Democratic Parties; -but the party programs seemed to me rather one-sided, too much designed -for individual groups of the community. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Were you a member of any political clubs, for instance, -the Austro-German Volksbund? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I was a member of the executive of the Austro-German -Volksbund, because the only political idea to which I adhered after 1918 -was Austria’s Anschluss with the German Reich. I witnessed 12 November -1918, when the Provisional National Assembly, in fulfillment of the -right of self-determination, decided that “Austria is a part of the -German Republic.” Furthermore, the Constitutional National Assembly -repeated the decision 6 months later. But the Treaty of St. Germain -forbade the Anschluss. Thereupon the various districts tried to hold -plebiscites; in Salzburg and the Tyrol 98 percent of those entitled to -the vote were in favor of the Anschluss. Dr. Schuschnigg describes these -events in his book, _Three Times Austria_. - -The answer was a serious attempt to divide Austria among its non-German -neighbors; but they could not agree on the booty. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I at this point submit to the -Tribunal and refer briefly to several documents of my document book? The -first document, to which I have given the Document Number -Seyss-Inquart-1, is on Page 2 of the document book and contains the -proclamation of the German-Austrian deputies after the collapse of the -Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on 21 October 1918. There the second sentence -reads: - - “The German-Austrian State claims the territorial jurisdiction - over the entire territory of German settlement areas, especially - in the Sudetenland. The German-Austrian State will fight any - annexation by other nations of territories which are inhabited - by German farmers, workers, and citizens.” - -Then, as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-2, I should like to submit—it is -on Page 4 of the document book—the resolution which the witness has -already mentioned, passed by the Provisional Austrian National Assembly -on 12 November 1918, which says: - - “German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public authorities - are installed by the people. German-Austria is a part of the - German Republic.” - -The leader of the biggest national party of the time, Dr. Karl Renner, -explained the reasons for this law on 12 November and said the -following, which appears on Page 6 as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-3: - - “Our great people is in distress and misery, the people whose - pride it has always been to be called the people of poets and - thinkers, our German people of humanism, our German people which - loves all mankind is deeply bowed in misery. But it is just in - this hour in which it would be so easy and convenient and - perhaps also tempting to settle one’s account separately and - perhaps to snatch advantages from the enemy’s ruse, in this hour - our people in all provinces wish to proclaim: We are one family - and one people living under a common fate.” - -Then I come to Document Number Seyss-Inquart-4, which is on Page 18... - -THE PRESIDENT: Page 8, is it not? - -DR. STEINBAUER: Page 18. I beg your pardon, yes, Page 8. - -That refers to the plebiscite on 24 April 1921 in the Tyrol, when -145,302 voted for the Anschluss and 1,805 against it. On 18 May 1921, -there were 98,546 votes for the Anschluss in the district of Salzburg, -and 877 votes against it. - -Your Honors, while submitting the document, I said that I maintain there -were three component factors leading to the Anschluss: First, the -economic emergency which runs as a recurring theme through the entire -history of the period. Second, the disunity among the democratic -parties, resulting therefrom. Third, the attitude of the rest of the -world, particularly the big powers, toward our small country. - -Those thoughts are laid down in my document book, and I should like now -with reference to the economic emergency of that time to submit as my -next exhibit the speech of Prelate Hauser, President of the Austrian -Parliament. The speech, made on 6 September 1919, appears on Page 14 of -my document book. As President of the Parliament he suggested the -acceptance of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, giving the following -reason: - - “The National Assembly has no choice. Country and people need - lasting peace which will open the world to them again morally - and economically and which can once again procure work for the - masses of our people at home and abroad....” - -Then in the second paragraph he says: - - “It also has no other choice because our country depends on the - big powers for its supply of food, coal, and industrial raw - materials as well as in the re-establishment of its credit and - its currency.” - -The same point of view was expressed by the two statesmen Seipel and -Schober. In Document Number Seyss-Inquart-17, Seipel, regarded as the -greatest Austrian statesman, said at that time: - - “But we will never believe that the Central European question is - solved as long as the great state which virtually makes up - Central Europe, the German Reich, is not a party to the - solution.” - -I shall now continue with the examination of the witness. - -I want to ask you, Witness, do you still remember the time and the -conditions after 1927? - -SEYSS-INQUART: On account of the economic situation which you have just -described, the League powers again and again forced Austria to make -so-called voluntary declarations renouncing the Anschluss. This had -repercussions in Austrian domestic politics. The Austrians, who in 1918 -had been resolved to have a democratic parliamentary form of government, -turned to radical ideas of an authoritarian character. - -DR. STEINBAUER: At that time a new party was formed. Which one was that? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Then there occurred the so-called Palace of Justice fire, -an uprising of the Marxists, which brought in its wake the creation of -the anti-Marxists Home Guard, a militant organization. Thus uniforms -were introduced into the political life of Austria. The controversy -between the Marxists and the anti-Marxists became ever more marked. The -only nonpartisan organization at that time was the German-Austrian -Volksbund, and the Anschluss idea was the only political objective which -still held all parties together. Around the year 1930—at least then it -was first noticeable—the National Socialist German Workers Party made -its appearance. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What impression did that Party make on you, particularly -with reference to the seizure of power in the Reich? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I want to say quite openly that amidst Austrian -conditions the Party appeared somewhat strange. Uniforms had, of course, -already been introduced into politics by the Republican Guard of the -Marxists and the Home Guard, but in the NSDAP even the actual political -leaders wore uniforms and marched in close formation. And also the kind -of political intransigence which they displayed was not in keeping with -our customary political thinking. - -DR. STEINBAUER: But what then were the reasons for that? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Well, let me say that the NSDAP did not recognize any -value in any other party and was never prepared to co-operate with any -other. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Then, what positive successes did you think the Party -had gained in the Reich? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I think that the influence of the Party in -Austria—undoubtedly very great as time went on—was due to its -unqualified determination to attain the Anschluss. I am of the opinion -that the radicalism is to be attributed, for instance, to the negation -of the customs union by the Hague decision, to please the democratic -party leaders. - -DR. STEINBAUER: In addition, were there not economic reasons which -brought success to the NSDAP? - -SEYSS-INQUART: What was discussed in the Reich, and what we heard from -the Reich... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I suppose you are hearing the words spoken by -Dr. Steinbauer direct, and you are answering them without any pause, -which gives the interpreter no chance. - -SEYSS-INQUART: We in Austria observed after 1933 the removal of the -discriminations imposed by the Versailles Treaty and above all, the -elimination of unemployment in the Reich. In Austria, too, about 10 -percent of the population were unemployed at that time. Especially the -Austrian workers, therefore, were hoping that the Anschluss would put an -end to their unemployment; and Austrian farmers were greatly interested -in the Reich Food Estate and in the German market control. - -DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, then, it was the -Anschluss idea which brought you, too, in contact with the Party? I do -not want to speak of the Party program, which has been discussed here -again and again; but I just want to ask you briefly: When did you join -the Party? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Officially, I became a member of the Party on 13 May -1938, and my membership number is above 7 million. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have any contact with Dr. Dollfuss? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I met Dr. Dollfuss in the period after the war. I knew -that he wanted to take me into his Ministry in 1933; and a week before -25 July 1934, at his invitation, I had a discussion with him. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did you participate in any way in the murder of Federal -Chancellor Dr. Dollfuss on 25 July 1934? - -SEYSS-INQUART: No, in no way. Dr. Dollfuss planned to have another -discussion with me. He was interested in my view regarding the calming -of the very radical situation of that time. I told Dr. Dollfuss already -at that time that there were no more nationalists in Austria but only -National Socialists, and that the National Socialists were acting only -on Hitler’s orders. - -DR. STEINBAUER: But, I must remind you, Doctor, that the Prosecution -have submitted a photograph which shows the murder of Dollfuss being -extolled. - -SEYSS-INQUART: That is the so-called Annual Commemoration in the year -1938. During that celebration nobody thought of Dollfuss; it was a -Commemoration by the Party in honor of the seven SS men who had been -hanged in connection with the Putsch attempt at that time. None of us -referred to that death as murder. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Well, Dr. Schuschnigg succeeded Dollfuss as Federal -Chancellor, and I want to ask you: What conclusions were drawn by the -NSDAP from this event, as far as you could gather? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The NSDAP itself was completely broken up and -disorganized, and a small circle of men was formed at that time; I also -found my way to those men, and we drew the following conclusions from -the events of 25 July: - -First, that they represented a considerable danger. I recall the meeting -of statesmen in Stresa and their resolutions against Germany. And even -though we were never worried about Italy, one had nevertheless to -realize that in this very troubled atmosphere anything could easily lead -to war. We all agreed that the main task of German policy must be to -avoid war. - -DR. STEINBAUER: We are now in the year... - -SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that, with regard to domestic -policy, the events on 25 July were the worst that could possibly have -happened to the prospect of the Anschluss. We reflected on what might be -done and came to the conclusion that the Party in the Reich should cease -its interference in the Austrian National Socialist Party, the existence -of which anticipated the Anschluss; but in return, the National -Socialists in Austria should once more receive permission to be active, -and especially, there should be elections to ascertain the proportional -strength of the parties. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What I am interested in is the question whether you had -any connections with authorities in the Reich at that time, that is, in -1936? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I had no connections with authorities in the Reich. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Did you... - -SEYSS-INQUART: Only, as Reich Marshal Göring has already testified, when -I became a State Councillor, did I, for the first time, meet a leading -German politician. - -DR. STEINBAUER: When was that? - -SEYSS-INQUART: That was in June or July 1937. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What was your attitude toward the NSDAP in Austria at -that time, when you were State Councillor? - -SEYSS-INQUART: When the agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached—without -my having taken any part in it—Dr. Schuschnigg, through Minister Klees -asked me for my political co-operation. At that time I had particularly -close connections with Zernatto, the General Secretary of the Fatherland -Front. At the suggestion of Zernatto and his friends I became an -Austrian State Councillor and Dr. Schuschnigg gave me the task, in -writing, of examining the conditions under which the national opposition -could be enlisted to collaborate politically. In order to fulfill that -task I did, of course, have to contact the National Socialists, because -the national opposition consisted only of National Socialists. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the head of the NSDAP in Austria? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The Party in Austria had reorganized illegally; Captain -Leopold was the head. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Were you on friendly terms with him? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I could not come to an agreement with Captain Leopold; he -did not understand my policy, but thought that on the basis of the -agreement of 11 July Dr. Schuschnigg had to allow the NSDAP again in its -earlier form. I think I talked to Leopold only twice, or at most three -times, throughout that time. He demanded that I be subordinate to him; -that I refused. - -DR. STEINBAUER: May I in this connection draw attention to the following -documents without reading from them? - -Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-44, on Page 103 of the document book, an -excerpt from the Document Number 3471-PS, Exhibit Number USA-583, -already submitted to the Court. - -Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-45, on Page 105, Document Number 3473-PS, Exhibit -Number USA-581. - -And Document Number Seyss-Inquart-97, on Page 109, in which Zernatto -expressly states that Seyss-Inquart did not fall in with Leopold’s aims -and efforts. - -My client has been accused by the Prosecution of having played a double -game. As counterevidence, I applied for permission to hear the former -Gauleiter Siegfried Uiberreither. He was interrogated here, and I want -to quote from the interrogatory, which is Document Number -Seyss-Inquart-59, from the counterquestions put by the Prosecution on -Page 140: - - “Question: ‘Was not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, before the time - when the Nazi Party was legalized, that is, before it was - declared legal in February 1938, was he not in constant contact - with the illegal Nazi Party of Austria?’ - - “Answer: ‘No. I personally did not know Seyss-Inquart until his - visit to Graz. In Nazi circles he was considered a non-Party - member. I think—I do not know with certainty—that he joined - the NSDAP only when it was legalized. For this reason, he - personally encountered a strong opposition in illegal Nazi - circles.’” - -On Page 6 of the same document it says: - - “Question: ‘Did not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart play a double - game: On one side his legal position in Schuschnigg’s Cabinet - and on the other side his co-operation with the formerly illegal - Nazi Party, whose activity was then legalized to a certain - extent through the efforts of the defendant at Berchtesgaden in - February 1938?’ - - “Answer: ‘I do not know to what extent he was in touch with the - illegal Nazi circles before 12 February. I do not know about it, - because I was not in Vienna. But from 18 February his contact - with the Nazi Party was not duplicity but his duty. Schuschnigg - himself had discussions with Leopold, the leader of the Nazis at - that time—before Klausner it was Leopold.’” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] This brings us to 1938. At the beginning -of that year you were State Councillor in the Austrian Government. What -did you think of the political situation at that time? - -SEYSS-INQUART: In many conversations with Dr. Schuschnigg but most of -all in continual discussions with Zernatto, I suggested, in line with -the conclusions I had drawn from the events of 25 July 1934, that the -Reich, and particularly Hitler, be asked to refrain from any -interference in Austrian politics through the medium of the Austrian -National Socialist Party. I proposed that instead the Austrian National -Socialists should receive permission to resume activities. That did not -mean at all that I would give up the Anschluss, but I was completely -convinced that a lawful and responsible policy of the Austrian National -Socialists in Austria would in the course of time win for them the -support of a clear majority of the Austrian nation—I mean of the -Germans in Austria; and that the demonstration of such a clear majority -would no longer be challenged by the powers of the League of Nations. -One had to attempt to make Adolf Hitler agree to such a policy by -enlisting the support of the autonomous and independent state of Austria -for the Führer’s policy and the demand for equal rights of the German -people. It was in the interests of these ideas that I talked to Field -Marshal Göring and Herr Hess. I reported the outcome of these -conversations to Dr. Schuschnigg and to Zernatto and I recommended the -formation of a coalition government by taking National Socialist -ministers into the cabinet, on condition that Adolf Hitler offer -adequate guarantees. My suggestions made no headway with either of the -two parties, but were not directly turned down. Meanwhile, the Austrian -National Socialists continued to be active illegally; the police -intervened and made arrests; three Austrian concentration camps were set -up; in short, the events of that time foreshadowed today’s -denazification system. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Were you at the Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938? - -SEYSS-INQUART: No. But I want to describe how that meeting came about. -First of all, a renewed Party radicalism set in. At the beginning of -1938, legitimist tendencies were being promoted in Austria, the laws -regarding the return of the Hapsburg property were discussed in the -State Council. For the moment my own position, therefore, became -untenable; I retired and informed Zernatto and State Secretary Keppler -who had been officially nominated by the Reich Government to conduct the -political affairs relating to Austria. I felt that in view of my task it -was my duty to inform Keppler also. I myself accepted an invitation from -the Reich Sports Leader Tschammer-Osten and went to -Garmisch-Partenkirchen. There, without previous appointment, I met Herr -Von Papen. Each of us poured out his troubles to the other, and came to -the conclusion that both parties, that is to say, Hitler as well as the -Austrian Government—that is, Dr. Schuschnigg—should be made aware of -the fact that a clear decision on the lines of my proposal was -necessary. At that time, participation of the National Socialists in the -government was certainly discussed. Perhaps the Ministry of the Interior -was also a subject of discussion, but my name was definitely not -mentioned though it was the obvious one. I received no report on the -discussions which Herr Von Papen had with Hitler, but I informed -Zernatto of my conversation with Herr Von Papen. Zernatto at that time -met me half-way on some questions, in particular with regard to the -expansion of those sections dealing with national policy which were -concerned with the National Socialists; and for this purpose he also -placed means at my disposal. It was on 10 February, I think, when I -heard through the group of my colleagues that Hitler had invited Dr. -Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden. Among the members of my circle were Dr. -Reiner, Dr. Jury, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, Langot, and several others. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Were you informed of the outcome of the discussions at -the Obersalzberg? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I was informed of the outcome of this conference only by -Zernatto. On the evening of the 11th, before Dr. Schuschnigg left for -Berchtesgaden, I had a detailed discussion with him and Zernatto. We -agreed to a large extent regarding the appointment of National -Socialists—for instance, Jury, Reinthaller, and Fischböck—to certain -public functions but not to ministerial positions. I did not broach the -subject of a ministerial post, because I did not know how Adolf Hitler -reacted to the suggestion which I made to Herr Von Papen. On 13 February -Zernatto asked me to see him, and he then told me of the results and -contents of the Berchtesgaden conference, which were known to him. - -DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection, I want to refer to Document Number -Seyss-Inquart-48, Page 111, in which Zernatto states, “I had the -definite impression that he”—Seyss-Inquart—“did not until then know -anything about the result of the discussion and the contents of the -agreement”—of 12 February. - -Witness, on the basis of that agreement, you became Minister of the -Interior and Police, did you not? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, on 17 February. - -DR. STEINBAUER: On 17 February 1938, with the assignment of establishing -connections between Austria and the Reich, or rather of improving them. -Did you also have a discussion with Hitler himself? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. The agreement at Berchtesgaden on 12 February -contained a definite stipulation to the effect that I was to be liaison -man between the Austrian Government and the Austrian National Socialists -on one side, and the German Reich on the other. The contents of the -protocol appeared to me unsatisfactory and even dangerous. There was no -doubt at all that my appointment to the Ministry of the Interior and -Security served as a notification, if not a signal, for the Austrian -National Socialists that they might expect an early realization of their -political objectives. In addition they received permission to profess -their beliefs; they could wear the swastika and salute with the raised -hand. What was not permitted, however, was their organization; that -means, my National Socialist friends in Austria had no possibility of -getting in touch with the National Socialists in a legal way. This -agreement opened the gates without providing for a regular procedure -thereafter. Hence, I myself resolved to see Adolf Hitler in order to -make sure whether my plan had his approval. I went with Dr. -Schuschnigg’s assent and with an Austrian diplomatic passport. - -DR. STEINBAUER: And when did you talk then to Hitler? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I mentioned an incorrect date just now; it was on 16 -February that I became Minister and I went to Berlin on the 17th. I -talked with Adolf Hitler alone for more than 2 hours. - -It was pointed out here by the Prosecution that I saluted Adolf Hitler -with the raised-hand greeting. That was permissible under the agreement. -But I would ask the Prosecution to admit that during every one of my -interrogations I stated that I had emphasized to Adolf Hitler at once -that I was an Austrian Minister and as such responsible to Austria. I -made some shorthand notes on this discussion on the back of a letter, -and a few weeks later I dictated those notes to my secretary. I now want -to relate the contents of my talk with Hitler on the basis of those -notes. My statements... - -DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, will you kindly be as brief as possible; can -you do it in headings, perhaps? - -SEYSS-INQUART: But this is the most important point with regard to my -whole responsibility. - - “A condition of Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg is that I - adhere to an autonomous and independent Austria, that I support - the Constitution, that is, further development, including the - Anschluss, must be based on this. The formation of public - opinion in Austria must proceed independently and in accordance - with present constitutional possibilities; I must be an active - guarantor for Dr. Schuschnigg of the revolutionary way, in the - meaning of these statements (Yes), no Trojan horse. The Party - and Movement must not adopt a militant attitude against - prevailing cultural conceptions. (Yes). No totalitarianism of - the Party and Movement; that is, National Socialist ideology to - be realized with due appreciation and regard for conditions in - Austria; not to be imposed on others by force. The Party as such - is not simply to disappear, but to exist as an organization of - individuals; no illegal activity, no efforts inimical to the - State, everything to be done in a legal fashion, anyone failing - to do this, to be locked up.” - -In the main, Adolf Hitler agreed, and he told me: - - “It is not a question of the 25 points. One cannot proclaim a - dogma; one must arrive from the pan-German and the national - German conception to a National Socialist one.” - -That was the gist of my conference with Adolf Hitler on 17 February, -from 12 to 2:10 o’clock. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did you... - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I understood the witness to say that he made -his notes on the meeting with Hitler and later dictated them to his -secretary. It is not clear to me whether he was reading from those -notes. Furthermore, we have never seen such notes and I think it should -be made clear on the record. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, has the defendant got the notes? - -DR. STEINBAUER: The original was taken from him when he was arrested. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you heard the question I asked; have you got -the notes? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The original of these notes was among my files in Vienna. -I made an application to have these files of mine, which were found, -searched for the notes. I handed a copy of the notes to the Prosecution -during one of my first interrogations; it is in the files of the -Prosecution. I have only copies here; I do not have the original. - -THE PRESIDENT: The copy would be just as good for the purposes. - -SEYSS-INQUART: I have placed a copy at the disposal of the Defense. - -DR. STEINBAUER: But I gave it back to you. - -SEYSS-INQUART: Then you can submit this one. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, would you hand it over? - -[_The document was submitted to the Tribunal._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you give it an exhibit number, Dr. Steinbauer? - -DR. STEINBAUER: Number Seyss-Inquart-61, otherwise it would be confused -with the others. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am confused about this; I still do not -understand, and I am sure that my colleagues do not. We have never -received any copy of any notes that this defendant has claimed he made -soon after, or at the time of, his conference with Hitler. We have no -such copy in our files. And I would like to have understood myself -whether or not he is now claiming that this copy which is offered to the -Tribunal is a copy of this original that he claims he gave to us. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that what you say, Defendant, that the document which -you have just handed to your counsel is a copy of the document which you -say you produced during your interrogations, which was from the -shorthand notes you made at that time? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. President, the original notes I made on the afternoon -of 17 February. A few weeks later I dictated these notes, which I made -in shorthand, to my secretary, who took them down on a typewriter. I had -several copies, one of which I presented to the Prosecution during one -of my interrogations last summer. I have now given a second copy to my -defense counsel. These are copies made from the original notes a few -weeks after the conference. The original was in my secret flies in -Vienna. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: I wonder if we could learn just who it was to whom this -defendant gave these notes? Mr. President, I would like to have some -search made for them, and some effort made to find them. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you know who was the interrogating counsel? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Dodd himself. - -MR. DODD: We do not have it. - -SEYSS-INQUART: I think I am right in saying that it was handed over. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the main points of the contents coincide -with the voluntary statement, which the defendant... - -MR. DODD: I think this is important enough at this point, Mr. President, -to clear up. I have the interrogation that I first conducted on this -defendant, and it clearly shows that he referred to the notes; but he -clearly said at the time that he did not have them, that he left them in -a black leather case with other documents in Mondorf, and he asked me if -I would make an effort to get them; and I said that I would, and we -never have been able to find them, and that is the transcript of the -interrogation. - -SEYSS-INQUART: May I say that I received them. The black leather case -was brought to me here in Court and the notes were in it. I submitted -the copy at one of the subsequent interrogations. - -[_There was a short pause._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Steinbauer. - -DR. STEINBAUER: May I say that Document Number Seyss-Inquart-49, Page -113, is substantially of the same content. The defendant, the present -witness, informed Schuschnigg of the substance of that talk; that is -evident from Document Number 3271-PS, Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-65, -on Page 158. - -Witness, I want to ask you now whether Hitler approved of your -proposals? - -SEYSS-INQUART: He clearly said “yes” to a number of things, but on other -points he expressed doubts as to whether the Austrian Government would -agree; the principal impression was, however, that this policy seemed -feasible. - -DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection it has also been alleged that as -Minister of the Interior and Police you brought executive power under -the control of the Nazis. - -SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to leave the main explanation of this -matter to my witness, Dr. Skubl. After Dollfuss’ death Dr. Skubl was a -special confidant of the Austrian Government and was placed at my side -as State Secretary and Inspector General for Security Matters—clearly -also to act as a kind of check. I had no objection at all to that and -was very pleased to have such an expert at my disposal. - -I should just like to mention briefly that all orders of the entire -executive came from Skubl. I myself never gave a direct order to the -Austrian police. Skubl was given instructions by Dr. Schuschnigg, -particularly on 10 and 11 March. I myself did not bring a single -National Socialist into the Austrian police. - -DR. STEINBAUER: All right, that is sufficient. - -SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps I might refer briefly to the public appeal... - -DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I want to refer to two documents, -Numbers Seyss-Inquart-51 and 52, on Pages 117 and 119 respectively. We -have now reached Document Book Number 2. The first is a speech by the -defendant as Minister, addressed to his police officials, and the second -speech is a radio talk which he gave at Linz. - -We now come to the critical days in March. Were you informed of the -plebiscite plan of Schuschnigg, and by whom? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The day before Dr. Schuschnigg announced in Innsbruck the -plan for the plebiscite he called me in and informed me of his plan. I -asked him at that time whether the decision was unalterable, and he -affirmed that. I expressed my concern that this might lead to -difficulties; but I promised him that I would help him wherever I could, -either to make the best of this plebiscite or to bring about a suitable -outcome—suitable, that is to say, even for the National Socialists. Of -course, I had continual contact with the Austrian National Socialists, -since I was the liaison man. I spoke at several meetings—Zernatto and -Dr. Schuschnigg were informed of that—and recounted what I had -discussed with Adolf Hitler or what I had proposed to him. I avoided all -possibilities of demonstrations, and as Minister of the Interior also -banned such demonstrations. In that connection may I refer to the -general ban on public meetings, imposed by me among others, and to the -specific prohibition of a demonstration at Graz, evident from the -interrogatory of the witness Uiberreither. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did Schuschnigg give you any promises? - -SEYSS-INQUART: No. I want to say that on the same evening I was also -approached by Dr. Jury who in some way had already heard of the plan for -the plebiscite. I did not tell him that I had given my assent to Dr. -Schuschnigg, though on account of my function as liaison man as laid -down in the agreement of 12 February, I should not have allowed silence -to be imposed on me; yet, I did keep silent. - -DR. STEINBAUER: I think, Mr. President, this might be a suitable moment -for the recess. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will break off now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. STEINBAUER: We got as far as the plebiscite which Schuschnigg had -planned and which then became known. We come now to 11 March. What did -you do in the forenoon on that day? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I must say first that a day or two before, after -consultation with Austrian National Socialists, I wrote a letter to Dr. -Schuschnigg in which I commented on the plebiscite in an unfavorable -way. The reasons were primarily that a real plebiscite result was not -guaranteed, because it was not a proper plebiscite within the meaning of -the national laws. For example, the plebiscite was not decided on by the -Council of Ministers but by the Fatherland Front, that is, by the party; -and it was to have been carried out by that party. - -It was suggested that the plebiscite be postponed and a proper election -with all its legal requisites be held. On the evening of 10 March, in -the presence of Foreign Minister Schmidt, I had another detailed -conversation with Dr. Schuschnigg; and we agreed that the Government—as -well as the provincial governments, and so forth—should include -National Socialists, that, in effect, a coalition government should be -formed; and in that case the National Socialists would also vote “yes.” -Only with reference to the license of the Party, the activities of the -Party, were there still differences of opinion. I reported this to the -Austrian National Socialists but they were not much interested, because -news had come from Berlin that Hitler had rejected the plebiscite. I was -told that on the next day I would receive a letter from Hitler. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive a letter? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I received a letter from Hitler by courier. I am -almost certain that the letter also contained the draft of a telegram -for a march into Austria, but I cannot recall whether the draft of a -radio speech was also included in it. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What did you do in the morning, after receiving this -letter? - -SEYSS-INQUART: After receiving this letter I went with Minister Glaise -to Dr. Schuschnigg. We were at the Federal Chancellor’s office at 10 -o’clock, and I informed Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg of the entire -contents of this letter without reservation. In particular, I pointed -out that in case of a refusal Adolf Hitler expected unrest among the -Austrian National Socialists and that he was ready, if disturbances -occurred, to answer an appeal for help by marching in. In other words, I -expressly called Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg’s attention to the -possibility of this development. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did you ask for an answer from him? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The letter set a deadline, 12 o’clock. As our talk lasted -until about 11:30, I asked Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg to give me an -answer by 2 o’clock. I know that in the meantime, and also on the -previous day, he had taken security measures through Dr. Skubl, of which -I had approved. A number of age groups of the Austrian Federal Army were -called up, the police everywhere received instructions, and a curfew was -imposed in the evening. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What happened in the afternoon of 11 March? - -SEYSS-INQUART: At 2 o’clock I went to the Federal Chancellor’s office -with Minister Glaise. We had a talk with Dr. Schuschnigg; he rejected a -postponement. At that moment I was called to the telephone; Field -Marshal Göring was on the phone, and the conversation between us is -reproduced here under the Exhibit Number USA-76, Document Number -2949-PS. - -And then followed demands and concessions. When I told Field Marshal -Göring that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg rejected the postponement, he -declared, in the name of the Reich, that he had to ask for Schuschnigg’s -resignation, because he had broken the agreement of 12 February and the -Reich had no confidence in him. Dr. Schuschnigg was then ready to -adjourn, but not to resign. Thereupon Field Marshal Göring demanded not -only Schuschnigg’s resignation, but my appointment as Federal -Chancellor. During a conference with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg at -3:30 in the afternoon, the Chancellor said that he would hand to the -Federal President the resignation of the whole Cabinet. When I was -informed of this, I left the Federal Chancellor’s office, because I -considered my function as a middleman concluded in the meaning of the -agreement of 12 February; and I did not want in any way to advocate or -promote my own appointment as Federal Chancellor. - -DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection may I refer to my Exhibit Number -Seyss-Inquart-58, Page 134 (Document Number 2949-PS). This is an excerpt -from the telephone conversations of Göring; Göring is listening to -reports, and Seyss-Inquart is speaking of the relationship between -Germany and Austria. It says here: “Yes, he means that Austrian -independence will be preserved....” - -Now, that was on 11 March, in the late afternoon? - -SEYSS-INQUART: In these telephone conversations it was also suggested -that the Party formation, the emigrant Legion, should come to Austria. -From the same telephone conversation it is obvious that I opposed this -and wanted rather an election or a plebiscite held before the entry of -any formation into Austria. - -In the course of that afternoon State Secretary Keppler came to Vienna -and requested information from me. And so I again went to the Federal -Chancellor’s office. Berlin repeatedly asked me to intervene with the -Federal President in order to effect my own appointment as Federal -Chancellor. I always refused to do that. - -DR. STEINBAUER: And what did the Austrian NSDAP do at that time? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The Party in Austria began demonstrations. Party members -left their houses, filled the streets, and as Party members or -sympathizers took part in a demonstration against the system and for the -National Socialists, a demonstration which assumed enormous proportions. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What was the feeling in the Federal provinces? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I had no contact with the Federal provinces but learned -quite late during that night or on the next day that there, even on a -larger scale than in Vienna, big demonstrations of very large crowds had -taken place against the Fatherland Front and for the National -Socialists. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What attempts did Federal President Miklas make to solve -this situation? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot say anything about that from my own observation, -for until 8 o’clock in the evening no one at all approached me on these -matters. No one spoke to me about the Federal Chancellorship; no other -possibility of a solution was discussed with me. I heard that the -Federal President wanted to make Dr. Ender, of Vorarlberg, Chancellor -and me Vice Chancellor. I believe that suggestion would have been -completely practicable. But I could not discuss it—least of all with -Berlin—because no one had said anything to me about it. - -DR. STEINBAUER: And when events reached a climax and Schuschnigg offered -his resignation, did you compile a Cabinet list? - -SEYSS-INQUART: In the course of the evening it became clear that Federal -Chancellor Schuschnigg would resign and that the Reich would not -tolerate any other than a National Socialist Government. Therefore, in -order to avoid being taken by surprise, I considered it my task to study -whom I should take into a Cabinet. The suggestions mentioned in the -telephone conversations were not transmitted by me at all. I chose my -colleagues quite independently—naturally after consultations with -Austrian National Socialists—and they included also people with strong -Catholic ties, such as Professor Mengin, Dr. Wolf, and others. - -I asked Foreign Minister Schmidt to enter the Cabinet. He asked me for a -reason, and I told him: I want to keep Austria autonomous and -independent, and I need a foreign minister who has connections with the -Western Powers. Schmidt refused, remarking that Federal Chancellor -Schuschnigg had introduced him into polities and that he would remain -loyal to him. - -DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit some documents now: Document -Number Seyss-Inquart-50, Page 115, from Zernatto’s book on -Seyss-Inquart’s position; then, on Page 125, Document Number -Seyss-Inquart-54, also from Zernatto’s book, where it says: -“...he”—Seyss-Inquart—“no longer has developments in his hands.” - -Then Document Number Seyss-Inquart-62, Page 149, in which Zernatto -quotes from a conversation with Dr. Seyss-Inquart: - - “He says that there are two main points on which he will not - compromise. The first is Austria’s independence and the second, - the possibility for the conservative Catholic element to develop - its own life.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now we come to a very important question. -You then made a radio speech in which you called yourself a Minister, -although Schuschnigg had already resigned. - -SEYSS-INQUART: The situation was as follows: The resignation of the -whole Cabinet was not accepted by the Federal President; and we, -including myself, remained Ministers. When Dr. Schuschnigg made his -farewell speech, he did not speak of the resignation of the whole -Cabinet. He only said, “We yield to force.” Dr. Schuschnigg and Federal -President Miklas had agreed at that time that I would not actually be -appointed Federal Chancellor, but that with the entry of German troops -executive power should be passed to me. Therefore, in my opinion, I was -_de facto_ Minister of the Interior and Foreign Minister. - -DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution assert that you yourself exerted -pressure on Federal President Miklas to appoint you Chancellor. - -SEYSS-INQUART: I did not see Federal President Miklas at all until 9 or -10 o’clock in the evening, after Schuschnigg’s speech “We yield to -force.” - -DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit to the Court this speech of -Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg of 11 March under Document Number -Seyss-Inquart-53, Page 122; in it he says: - - “The Federal President has commissioned me to inform the - Austrian people that we are yielding to force. Since we are at - all costs determined not to spill German blood, even in this - grave hour, we have given orders to our Armed Forces to withdraw - without resistance, if the invasion of Austria is carried out, - and to await the decision within the next hours.” - -The Prosecution, Witness, sees evidence of this pressure also in the -fact that SS units were called to the Federal Chancellor’s office at -that time. What can you say to that? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I believe it was after Schuschnigg’s farewell speech, -when I saw in the anterooms 10 or 15 young men in black trousers and -white shirts, that was the SS. I had the impression that they were doing -messenger and orderly duty for State Secretary Keppler and the others. -As they approached the rooms in which Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg and -President Miklas were, I ordered guards of the Austrian Guard Battalion -to be placed at their doors. I may mention that these were selected men -of the Austrian Army who according to Austrian standards were very well -armed, while these SS men—40 at most—possibly carried pistols. -Moreover, 50 steps from the Federal Chancellor’s office were the -barracks of the Guard Battalion, with a few hundred picked and -well-armed men. If Federal President Miklas and Federal Chancellor -Schuschnigg had not been concerned with things other than those which -happened in the Federal Chancellor’s office and on the street outside -it, they could easily have put an end to this situation by calling out -the Guard Battalion. - -DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution has submitted an affidavit of the -Gauleiter of Upper Austria, Eigruber, which states that even before you -became a Federal Chancellor, you ordered the seizure of power in the -various Austrian Federal provinces. - -SEYSS-INQUART: That is completely incorrect, and the Gauleiter of Upper -Austria also does not claim to have talked to me. I believe he says that -he had received a telegram signed by me. I did not send a telegram, and -I did not give oral instructions to any Gauleiter or to anyone else for -the seizure of power. - -Later I heard from Globocznik that he had carried out the seizure of -power. He told me of that in these words: “You know, I seized power for -you and acted as the government; but I did not tell you anything about -it, because you would have been against it.” - -DR. STEINBAUER: You say you would have been against it. Was the -population against it, too, against the marching in, which had meanwhile -taken place, that is, the invasion as described by the Defendant Göring? - -SEYSS-INQUART: One cannot call it an invasion; it was a stormy, loudly -cheered entry of German troops. There were no villages—even those with -an orthodox Catholic population—and no workers’ districts which did not -burst out in stormy jubilation. Moreover, both Dr. Schuschnigg and I -were completely clear about this; once in 1937 he had agreed with me -when I said that the entry of German troops into Austria could not be -impeded by anything but the ovations of the population. - -DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to a Document -Number Seyss-Inquart-37, Page 86. This is a quotation from the book by -Sumner Welles, _The Time for Decision_, describing a conversation -between him and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, and it says: - - “Before the occupation of Austria, Dr. Schuschnigg came to Rome. - He admitted to me frankly that, if Germany occupied Austria, the - majority of Austrians would support the occupation and, if Italy - sent troops into Austria to prevent the occupation, the - Austrians as one man would join with the Germans to fight - Italy.” - -Now, Witness, we come to the next day, to 12 March. Did you not at that -time have a telephone conversation with Hitler? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; I called the Führer in connection with the entry of -troops. I should like to repeat and explain that on the day before, at -about 7 o’clock, the negotiations suddenly came to a stop. Everybody -waited. At half past 7 State Secretary Skubl came with the news that the -entry of German troops had actually begun, according to a report from -one of the frontier posts; indeed Field Marshal Göring had repeatedly -said that it would take place. Thinking that the entry was actually in -progress, Schuschnigg then made his farewell speech. And with that the -government of the Fatherland Front had resigned from office. And I state -expressly, up to this moment I did nothing which in any way furthered -the taking over of control in Austria or to express it more correctly, -which intentionally furthered the establishment of the National -Socialists and the seizure of power. I only acted as an intermediary -within the meaning of the Treaty of 12 February. But from the moment -when the system of the Fatherland Front came to an end, I considered it -my responsibility to take action. First I made a radio speech, but not -the one which had been prescribed for me in the morning. For I did not -speak of a provisional government, but referred to myself as Minister of -the Interior. Only then did I call on the SA and the SS to act as -auxiliary police; and like Schuschnigg, I gave the order to offer no -resistance to the entry of German troops. Subsequently I was appointed -Federal Chancellor, and my Cabinet was approved. On the same night I -drove Dr. Schuschnigg home in my car, because I was afraid something -might happen to him at the hands of provocateurs; and I asked Dr. -Keppler to call up the Führer and ask him not to give the order for the -entry of troops. Reich Marshal Göring spoke about that here. In the -morning I called up again; then I met the Führer at the airport in Linz, -and, as the entry of the troops was in full progress, I asked him -whether it would not be possible to have Austrian troops march into the -German Reich, so that, symbolically at least, equal rights would be -maintained. The Führer agreed; and Austrian troops actually marched into -Munich, Berlin, and other cities, in Austrian uniform. - -DR. STEINBAUER: How, in your capacity as newly appointed Federal -Chancellor, did you envisage the further development of the situation? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Since the system of the Fatherland Front had broken down, -I could no longer entertain my idea of a coalition government. It was -clear to me that a National Socialist government with a very strong -Catholic tendency would control developments not in the form of an -immediate Anschluss but rather—by carrying out appropriate elections -and a plebiscite—in the form of an economic and possibly a military -union with the German Reich. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this connection, I should like to -submit an extremely important document, which shows in an entirely new -way how the Anschluss Law came about. It is a sworn statement of the -former State Secretary of the Interior, Dr. Stuckart, who is imprisoned -here. I submit it to the Court and should like to establish the -following from this testimony... - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is the document? - -DR. STEINBAUER: It is not in the document book because I received it -later. The translation of it has not yet been completed. I will read -from the witness’ testimony only briefly to establish the connection—I -have submitted the original to the Court... - -THE PRESIDENT: You are giving it a number, are you? - -DR. STEINBAUER: Document Number Seyss-Inquart-92. The witness says in it -that Hitler would probably have incorporated the presidency of Austria -in his own person, that he, the witness, was told by Frick to draft a -law to that effect, but that he was then suddenly ordered to Linz... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute, Dr. Steinbauer. - -DR. STEINBAUER: In the Dutch matter also, there are a few affidavits -which have not yet arrived or which have just come in. Perhaps it would -be more expedient to submit these documents when they have been -translated. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will have the affidavit, I suppose? - -DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, the Prosecution already have the affidavits. - -If I may continue, he says that to his surprise he was told by Hitler in -Linz to draft a law providing for the direct, total Anschluss, that is, -providing for Austria’s status as a province, a Land, of the German -Reich, like Bavaria and the other German Länder. He worked out this law, -as he had been instructed to do, flew to Vienna, and submitted it for -approval to the ministers who were assembled there. - -I should like to establish in three documents the impression which the -Anschluss made on the population. First, Document Number -Seyss-Inquart-30. This is the celebration at which the Viennese welcomed -the Führer in the biggest square in Vienna, the Heldenplatz. On that -occasion, on 15 March, the witness welcomed the Führer and said: - - “The goal for which centuries of German history have battled, - for which untold millions of the best Germans have bled and - died, which has been the final aim of fierce struggle, the last - consolation in the bitterest hours—has today been reached. - Austria has come home.” - -Hitler now ordered that this Anschluss Law subsequently be sanctioned by -a plebiscite of the Austrian population. Documents showing the results -of this plebiscite have already been submitted to the Court. I should -just like to point out, in addition, the attitude of the Catholic -bishops toward the plebiscite—that is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-32, -Page 73—and the attitude at that time of the present Federal President, -Dr. Karl Renner—that is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-33, Page 76. On -the attitude of the other powers to the Anschluss question I shall quote -from testimony of the witness Schmidt, who as the then Foreign Minister -was the qualified man; but I should like to submit one document on it, -namely Document Number Seyss-Inquart-38, Page 89. That is the House of -Commons speech of Chamberlain, who was Prime Minister at the time. In -reply to a question regarding the Anschluss he said: “...nothing could -have stopped this action by Germany unless we and others had been ready -to use force to prevent it.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now Austria has been incorporated, it is a -part of the Greater German Reich, with Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. Did -you remain Federal Chancellor or did you receive another state function -after the seizure of power? - -SEYSS-INQUART: On the 13th during the night, I reported on the Anschluss -Law to the Führer; and I took the opportunity of discussing three -questions with him immediately. That was, however, not at all easy, for -the Führer was deeply moved and wept. - -First, I asked that the Austrian Party might retain relative -independence and be headed by an Austrian as the provincial leader; -second, that Austria as a state might also enjoy a certain degree of -independence. To the first request the Führer said, “Possibly”; to the -second he said, “Yes”; Austria would receive her own governor, a -Reichsstatthalter. I then rose and asked the Führer that I be allowed to -return to my private practice as a lawyer. As a third request, I asked -that the unjust exchange rate of 2 schillings to 1 mark be altered to -1.50. The Führer agreed to that also. - -On 15 March, on the occasion of the celebration which has already been -mentioned here, the Führer told the radio announcer, “Announce that -Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart will now speak.” That to me was actually -the first news of my appointment as Reichsstatthalter. I held that post -until the end of April 1939. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Who really directed policy in Austria after the -Anschluss? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Bürckel was sent to Austria immediately with the task of -reorganizing the Party and preparing the plebiscite. The interference of -Bürckel and his collaborators, and various plans somewhat strange and -adverse to Austrian conceptions, caused me, on 8 April, in Bürckel’s -presence, to call the Führer’s attention to this sort of co-ordination -and in my hearing the Führer said to Bürckel: “Bürckel, you must not do -that, otherwise the enthusiasm of the Austrians for the Anschluss will -change to dissatisfaction with the Reich.” - -Nevertheless, a few weeks later he made Bürckel Reich Commissioner for -the Reunion. He controlled the Party and politics and propaganda, -including church policy, and he had the right to give me instructions in -state matters. - -DR. STEINBAUER: You know that the Prosecution make charges against you -in connection with the policy in Austria shortly after the Anschluss. -The first charge is with regard to the Jewish question, namely, that you -participated in this grievous treatment of the Jewish population, or -that you were responsible for it. - -What can you say to that? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot at all deny it; for certainly, as chief of the -civil administration, I issued orders along that line in my field of -authority, though Bürckel claimed that the Jewish question, as such was -part of his field; and in a document which has been submitted here, he -called the Jewish question a matter arising as a consequence of the -Anschluss. - -DR. STEINBAUER: May I, in this connection, refer to two documents. One -is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-64, a decree on Page 154. It is the -decree of the Führer on the appointment of Bürckel as Reich Commissioner -for the Reunion of Austria with the Reich. I emphasize here especially -Article 4, which gives Bürckel the detailed authority to issue orders to -the witness. The second document is Exhibit Number Seyss-lnquart-67, -Page 163; the Court already has it; it is Document Number 2237-PS. With -this long document, I only want to demonstrate that the entire solution -of the Jewish problem, particularly in November 1938, was a matter with -which the defendant had nothing to do. - -The defendant’s own attitude I should like to show by submitting an -affidavit which came to me unsolicited from Australia. This is Document -Number Seyss-Inquart-70, Page 175. I am fully aware of the Tribunal’s -view that it is not very weighty evidence that some defendants have -submitted letters from Jews; “One swallow does not make a summer,” as -the proverb says. The reason for my submitting this document is -Paragraph 12 on Page 4, in which the witness, Dr. Walter Stricker, who -comes from a highly respected Jewish family in Linz, says the following: - - “After my departure from Austria, I heard of other cases in - which Dr. Seyss gave similar help to Jews and that in May 1938, - when persecutions of Jews became particularly severe, he - protested to the Gauleiter Bürckel.” - -It is therefore quite clear that the defendant did not participate but -rejected this radical policy. - -Witness, you know from the trial brief that you are charged with having -played a double game. What was the attitude of the Party toward you -after the Anschluss? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I know that this charge is made against me and has been -made against me before. Radical circles of the Party made the same -accusation against me, and I will admit openly that I can understand why -it was made. I attempted to bring together two groups which, as history -has shown, simply could not be brought together; and since this could -not be anticipated at the time, the radical elements of both groups must -have come to the conclusion that the man who attempted it was not honest -in his attempt. But more important is something else. The final solution -of the Austrian question was not my solution at all, but the solution of -the radical elements in the Party. I myself, however, from 11 March at 8 -o’clock in the evening, participated in that solution. As a result, it -is easy for people to say that I participated in it beforehand and -prepared for it; but that is not true. Only at 8 o’clock in the evening, -after Schuschnigg and the Fatherland Government had resigned, did I too -adopt this point of view, because under the given political conditions -there was no other possibility. For there was no political power in -Austria other than that of the National Socialists; the alternative was -civil war. - -I myself welcomed the Anschluss Law, and my decision also determined -that of my colleagues. On 13 March, of course, I welcomed the opportune -moment. At most, there might have been some sort of hesitation as to -whether the Anschluss should actually then be carried through. I -considered that, but as I saw it, there was no need for misgivings from -the foreign political point of view, because, according to all reports, -everything would pass quietly. Domestically, there had never been so -much enthusiasm in Austria. I felt that no Austrian statesman, no man in -a position of responsibility, ever had the whole population behind him -as much as I. But the Anschluss Law was valuable and useful, insofar as -in any case the Reich would in reality have had the authority, and thus -it was certainly better it had full responsibility outwardly too. - -DR. STEINBAUER: The Defendant Kaltenbrunner told me that he and you were -at this time very closely shadowed by Heydrich. Is that correct? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Heydrich in particular was among those who distrusted us, -and “us” includes Kaltenbrunner. At the end of 1937 Heydrich wrote a -secret report, which I later received. In this report he said that the -solution of the Austrian question in favor of the Party was inescapable, -that the policy of State Councillor Seyss-Inquart might, however, prove -to be the only obstacle, for he would be in a position to produce -something like Austrian National Socialism. After the Anschluss a -so-called “escort” detail was attached to me with the sole task of -sending to Heydrich constant reports on what I was doing. I had as -little objection to this as to the fact that, as Austrian Minister of -Security, my telephone conversations were intercepted. - -DR. STEINBAUER: After you had allegedly played the main role in this -affair, what reward did you receive for your activity? Were you given an -estate or a gratuity of several hundred thousand marks? Did you ever -receive anything like that? - -SEYSS-INQUART: No, and there was no question of anything like that. My -reward was the knowledge of having worked for the formation of Greater -Germany. - -DR. STEINBAUER: I would still like to ask you: Did you ever receive -anything? - -SEYSS-INQUART: No. On my fiftieth birthday... - -DR. STEINBAUER: But you received a title, did you not? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean the title of Gruppenführer of the SS? On 15 -March I was named Gruppenführer of the SS, as an honorary rank. I must -add that I did not try to obtain it and that I went through no -examinations or other such things. As a rule an honorary rank in the SS -does not entail membership in the general SS; it does not bestow on the -holder either command or disciplinary powers. I myself learned that when -I complained to Himmler about Bürckel and demanded proceedings—that -letter has been submitted here. Himmler told me then that he had no -disciplinary powers over Bürckel, who held only an honorary rank. I -myself, as regards the SS... - -DR. STEINBAUER: I think that is sufficient. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, as I understood it, the defendant said -that he received a secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich. What -was that secondary post? Is that what you said? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Heydrich wrote a secret report against me. No, I am -sorry, Heydrich sent an “escort” detail... - -THE PRESIDENT: You said in 1937 Heydrich issued a secret report about -Austria, and then said that the solution was unavoidable except for the -policy of Seyss-Inquart. That was the substance of it, was it not? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite understand that. - -THE PRESIDENT: And after that, I understood you to say you received a -secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich. - -SEYSS-INQUART: No, Heydrich sent four or five of his men to accompany me -as a kind of guard escort, and these men had orders to report my -movements to him. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see; I must have misunderstood the translation. - -DR. STEINBAUER: To sum up, I can say that apart from your appointment as -SS Gruppenführer you received no awards, with the exception of a promise -that you would become Reich Minister within a year? Is that correct? - -SEYSS-INQUART: This promise was given at the end of April 1938. I refer -to a question in the cross-examination of the Reich Marshal. Before 13 -March 1938 I did not receive the slightest promise from the Reich on -anything and was not in any way under obligation to anyone or bound to -obey anyone in the Reich. - -DR. STEINBAUER: And with that I can close the chapter on Austria and -briefly discuss the Czechoslovakian question. - -You are accused, on the basis of a congratulatory letter sent to the -Führer by Henlein, of having taken an active part in the annexation of -Czechoslovakia. - -SEYSS-INQUART: In the affairs of September 1938 I had no other part at -all than that of receiving, as Reichsstatthalter in Austria, the -refugees from the border areas, lodging, and caring for them in Austria. -Henlein, and a few other leaders, I knew personally but did not -interfere in their politics and was not well acquainted with their -relations to the Reich. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What can you say about Slovakia? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The relations between Vienna and Bratislava were very -good even at the time of the old Austrian Monarchy. I myself had -relatives in Bratislava. Hence the Slovaks and the Germans knew each -other well. We knew in particular the complaint of the Slovaks that the -promise of Pittsburgh had not been kept, that they had not received full -autonomy of Slovakia. Father Hlinka was in favor of complete autonomy; -he was venerated in Slovakia as a saint, and at least three-quarters of -the Slovakian people were behind him; he advocated independence from the -Parliament in Prague and the adoption of Slovakian as the official -language. After March 1938—to be exact, after September 1938—I met a -few Slovakian politicians, Sidor, Dr. Tiso, Dr. Churchansky, and perhaps -one or two others. The Führer himself once asked me to inform him and to -send him a report on Slovakian conditions; and I commissioned two of my -colleagues, who had very good personal connections in Slovakia, to -obtain the desired information. In March 1939 I talked to Sidor and Dr. -Tiso, because they wanted to confer with me on possible Berlin-Prague -developments and their consequences for Slovakia; at least, so I was -told by my colleagues who had invited me. Mention was made in these -discussions of the possibility of a Berlin-Prague clash and of the -concern for the integrity of Slovakia, because there was the danger that -the Hungarians, and the Poles too, might take advantage of the occasion -by occupying Slovakian territory. The Slovakian gentlemen wanted -assurances on what Berlin intended to do and what they could do to -preserve the integrity of their country. I spoke very openly with these -gentlemen; but I did not ask them to declare their independence, for -they themselves had to make that decision. We discussed rather the -question of whether differences between Slovakian and German interests -existed, and we established that they did not exist. - -DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to two -documents. One is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-71, Page 181. This is -the reference to the Pittsburgh Treaty. The second document is Exhibit -Number Seyss-Inquart-72 (Document Number D-751), Page 183, submitted by -the Prosecution as Exhibit Number USA-112, as proof that the defendant -was in unlawful contact with the Slovakians. - -You are, of course, acquainted with this document, Witness. It is a -report of Viscount Halifax, of 21 March 1939. Who was in Bratislava with -you at that time? Or were you there at all? - -SEYSS-INQUART: State Secretary Keppler was at that time sent from Berlin -to Vienna with the task of putting certain questions to the Slovakian -Government. Both Bürckel and I had refused to take over such an -assignment; that was one of the few instances in which I agreed with -Bürckel. As chief of territorial administration it fell to me to make -preparations for the visit to Bratislava, and it was agreed that State -Secretary Keppler would go to Bratislava in my car. Bürckel and I -accompanied Keppler. No generals or other representatives of the -Wehrmacht were present. The record of the conversations may be -considered accurate. - -DR. STEINBAUER: It says in the document “and five German generals.” - -SEYSS-INQUART: That is wrong. - -I should like to call the Court’s attention to the fact that both the -Slovakian Minister Sidor and Monsignor Tiso, who later became President, -declare in this document that they negotiated only with Bürckel; the -name Seyss-Inquart does not appear at all. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Then, to sum up, can I say that you did not engage in -the activity with which the Prosecution charge you in connection with -Czechoslovakia or Slovakia? Is that correct? - -SEYSS-INQUART: At any rate, I do not think that, in pursuing the -interests of the Reich, I overstepped those limits which in such -negotiations must be conceded to someone charged with representing -legitimate interests. I did not participate when on 12 March Dr. Tiso -through Bürckel—I did not overstep the limits justified in representing -legitimate interests of the German Reich. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is sufficient. - -Then in 1939, on 1 May 1939, you became Minister without Portfolio. Is -that correct? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did you ever take part in a Cabinet session, or a -session of the Secret Defense Council? - -SEYSS-INQUART: It no longer existed. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have influence in any way on the decision to -make war on Poland? - -SEYSS-INQUART: In no way whatever. - -DR. STEINBAUER: When the war with Poland had actually begun, did you -express your opinion on it to Hitler? - -SEYSS-INQUART: In the second week of September I wrote a letter to -Hitler. I hope that this letter too is among my Vienna files. I read a -copy of it about a year and a half ago, and I remember the contents -well. I called Hitler’s attention to the fact that among the German -people there was no enthusiasm at all; but, on the contrary, the gravest -concern that it would be a life-and-death struggle. I expressed my -opinion that the war would not end by a military solution but would have -to be solved politically and that the basis for such a political -solution would be the alliance with the Soviets, which should perhaps be -extended to a military alliance. Consideration should be given to the -fact that the Soviets, like Czarist Russia, would never abandon their -interests in the Balkans and that Pan-Slavism would also play a role; -consequently, Russia would have to be reckoned with in the -Czechoslovakian and Polish questions. I said that it was necessary at -all costs to maintain the belt of neutral states. Then the war on the -narrow Western Front would run its course. The Italian policy, however, -should not become a burden for Germany; but an agreement should be -reached with Greece and Turkey. England could not be defeated through -the air or by U-boats; one had to attack her position in the -Mediterranean to force her to make peace. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive an answer to this letter from the -Führer? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I received no direct answer, but once in a conversation -he made a remark which showed clearly that he had read the letter. He -said to me, “I do not want to destroy the British Empire at all,” -whereby, however, he implied that he had misunderstood my letter. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, if the Tribunal agree, I think this would -be a suitable time to adjourn. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. STEINBAUER: We last spoke about your attitude with regard to the -question of Czechoslovakia. You talked about your position as Reich -Governor in Vienna, and described your intolerable relations with -Bürckel, which was the reason why you changed your work and went to -Poland. What were your functions in Poland? - -SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I was appointed administrative chief for -Southern Poland, which position actually came within the organization of -the Armed Forces. This administrative post, however, was never set up, -since the Government General was created forthwith and I became the -Deputy of the Governor General. My sphere of influence was legally -defined but depended, of course, upon the different cases in which the -Governor General needed me as his deputy. On 19 January 1940, he -determined this at a conference. - -DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document -Seyss-Inquart-73, on Page 185, which is an extract from Dr. Frank’s -diary. On Page 14 of this diary he describes the functions of -Seyss-Inquart, and then on Page 30 he says something which he repeated -to me in person, namely, that he bore the responsibility for what -happened there. - -Now, you became the deputy of the Governor General—although by rank as -a Reich Minister you were actually placed higher—and you exercised -certain functions there which, as we have heard, consisted primarily of -making out reports. Under Document Number 2278-PS is a report which you -yourself wrote, in which there are certain things for which you are -accused. Will you please tell us what you have to say about this report -on your official travels. - -SEYSS-INQUART: My secretary wrote that report. I have read it, of -course. - -DR. STEINBAUER: It is Exhibit USA-706. - -SEYSS-INQUART: It is brought against me, among other things, that the -Governor of Lublin had suggested that the Jews be transferred from -Lublin to the district of Cycow and then decimated. The Prosecution -itself has stated that this is an insertion made by the writer. In any -case this was not an official report at a meeting. - -Cycow itself was a settlement occupied by a group of Germans, and by -employing Jews in that area I could hardly be suspected of wanting to -exterminate the Jews in that district because of the climatic -conditions. I knew, however, that it was the Governor’s wish to have the -very large Jewish population of Lublin removed from the town. I remember -nothing of any specific intention expressed by the word “decimating”—in -the sense of annihilating. The Governor of Radom reported to me that -desperate criminals there had been shot. It is true, he did tell me -that. I was under the impression that this had been done by the summary -courts martial, which still functioned at the time. But there are -several passages in this same report where I always point out that -German courts must be introduced, and that no sentence must be carried -out without proper court procedure. I think that quite probably I said -the same thing at the time I was at Radom—only this is not mentioned in -the report. - -I have been accused of wanting to monopolize certain vital products, -such as salt, _et cetera_. That was quite natural, considering the -economic chaos in which we found Poland. We had to arrive at a “natural” -economic system, and supply the agricultural population with certain -products so that they in turn could supply food to the Polish town -populations. In this connection I wish to point out that I urged the -re-establishment of the Polish National Relief Organization under the -former Polish management, and that I asked for 9 million zloty to be -placed at its disposal also for motor vehicles, _et cetera_. In addition -to this I said that compulsory work must be replaced by normal -employment as soon as possible. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, the so-called “AB Action” plays a considerable -part in the Polish question. It is an abbreviation for “extraordinary -pacification action.” Since that might still have happened in your time, -I should like to ask if you know anything about it. - -SEYSS-INQUART: This affair took place during the very last period of my -stay in Poland. With the beginning of the Norwegian campaign the -resistance movement in Poland became extremely active, and grew as a -result of the campaign in the West. The Security Police demanded the -severest countermeasures. Bühler really made the objection which he -stated here on this witness stand. I always understood the Governor -General’s words just as Bühler wanted them to be understood. But Bühler -was quite right in making the objection, because the Police might have -interpreted these words as giving them much greater powers than the -Governor General intended to give them. - -Dr. Frank always opposed the sentences passed by these summary courts -martial, and he set up his own investigation commission. I was the -chairman of this commission as long as I was in Poland, and sometimes we -canceled as many as 50 percent of the sentences imposed. - -DR. STEINBAUER: How long were you actually Deputy during your period of -office, when Dr. Frank was prevented from carrying out his duties? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Ten days, I believe. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Ten days. Well, then, I think I can rapidly wind up the -Polish question by asking: Did you introduce any measures which could -really be said to be in the interests of the Polish population? - -SEYSS-INQUART: During the winter of 1939-40 there was a famine in Polish -towns. I myself intervened with State Secretary Backe, and on one -occasion, for instance, I obtained 6,000 tons of grain for the large -cities. I approached Reich Marshal Göring and the Führer too, and asked -for the town of Lodz to be left under the administration of the -Government General. I did the same for the coal district west of Kraków. - -DR. STEINBAUER: I now come to the main part of the accusation held -against you, and that is the question of your activities in the -Netherlands. - -My first question is this: How did you become Reich Commissioner for the -Netherlands? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The Führer appointed me. - -DR. STEINBAUER: And where were you at the time? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I was on a service mission in the Government General, and -Dr. Lammers called me to headquarters. - -DR. STEINBAUER: So you did not apply for this job? - -SEYSS-INQUART: No, that did not even enter my mind. At that time I had -just asked the Führer for permission to join the Armed Forces. - -DR. STEINBAUER: But did not your war injury prevent your joining the -Armed Forces? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I had hoped that I might be useful somehow or other. - -DR. STEINBAUER: And what were the instructions the Führer gave you with -regard to your new position? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The instructions are described in Document 997-PS, which -was submitted by the Prosecution. That gives a fair picture of them. - -DR. STEINBAUER: That is Exhibit RF-122. - -SEYSS-INQUART: I was responsible for the civil administration, and, -within this administrative task, I had to look after the interests of -the Reich. Apart from this I had a political task. I was to see to it -that while Dutch independence was maintained, the Netherlands should be -persuaded to change their pro-British attitude for a pro-German one and -enter into a close economic collaboration. - -I wish to draw your attention to Paragraph 3 of this document, in which -I pointed out the difficulties connected with these two tasks, and the -difficulties in co-ordinating them. I showed that one cannot co-ordinate -the two so easily. An occupational power, I said, demands the -suppression of all official activities and an awakening of a common -political will, but grants such freedom which in the end may lead the -Dutch to feel dependent on their own decisions. It was not my intention, -therefore, to force upon the Dutch people any definite political will. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Was this order of the Führer ever altered later on? - -SEYSS-INQUART: No, this order was never altered. - -DR. STEINBAUER: How did you carry out this task from the political point -of view? Did you ask the existing parties in Holland to co-operate? - -SEYSS-INQUART: With the exception of the Marxists I allowed all parties -to remain, and I gave them as much freedom to continue their activities -as was compatible with the interests of the occupying forces. I -particularly helped the National Socialist parties. - -DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution make the accusation against you that in -your speeches you often describe things quite differently from the way -in which you carry them out. In this regard I refer to Document 3430-PS, -Exhibit USA-708. - -It is asserted there that you tried to force National Socialism upon the -Dutch. That is Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-76, on Page 197 of my document -book. - -SEYSS-INQUART: It is certainly correct that the goal which I had set for -myself, and which I proclaimed in my speeches, was not reached in -practice, nor could it have been. However, it may be possible that it -gave the Dutch the impression that I was trying to force National -Socialism upon them because, after all, later on I could admit only -National Socialist parties, whereas I had to dissolve the others. I -never used state methods of coercion to force any Dutchman to become a -National Socialist, nor did I make membership in the National Socialist -Party a condition for exercising the general rights and privileges to -which every Dutchman was entitled. - -Incidentally, I referred to this quite clearly in my speech. I said: - - “I shall always act as a National Socialist.... But that does - not mean that I shall force National Socialism on one single - person. National Socialism is a matter of inner conviction. - - “There are two groups of organizations. There is the political, - in the case of which I attach importance to the demand that each - and every member be led to National Socialism—but these are - absolutely voluntary organizations.... Then there is the - vocational.... in which it is immaterial what political views - the individual has, as long as he fulfills his duties in his - particular profession.” - -DR. STEINBAUER: Why and when did you dissolve the political parties in -Holland? - -SEYSS-INQUART: That happened during the second half of 1941. With the -beginning of the Eastern campaign all the political parties, with the -exception of the National Socialists, adopted an actively hostile -attitude toward the occupational forces. In the interests of the -occupational forces that could no longer be tolerated. - -I think it remarkable, to say the least, that for 1½ years I allowed -those parties to continue their work since, after all, they were no less -hostile to National Socialism than National Socialism is today with -regard to the democratic parties. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Tell me, is it true or not that you showed partiality, -and gave preference to the NSB Party? - -SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite true as far as the field of political -propaganda was concerned; it is untrue as far as state matters were -concerned. - -The creation of a so-called National Political Secretariat has been held -up as an accusation against me. That was a National Socialist advisory -body for my administration, and it was not allowed to exercise any -influence on the Dutch administration. Any such attempts were strictly -prohibited by me. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did you not, nevertheless, put individual members of the -NSB into state positions? - -SEYSS-INQUART: That is true, and it seemed a matter of course to me, -because I had to find colleagues on whom I could rely. They were not -under Party orders, however; on the contrary, in most cases certain -differences developed between these people and the heads of the Party. - -In the face of urgent remonstrances I did not create a National -Socialist government in the Netherlands—as was the case in Norway—and -chiefly because Certain Dutch gentlemen like General Secretary Van Damm, -President Van Lohn of the Supreme Court, and Professor Schneider who was -President of the Cultural Committee, urged me to realize how wrong it -would be to do so. - -DR. STEINBAUER: President Vorrink, a witness who has been examined here, -talked about a policy of exploitation which you carried on. Is that -true? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The use of the National Socialist parties for the benefit -of German policy did actually occur. I observed it, and I stated the -fact publicly. I regretted this occurrence, but I could not stop it. The -German occupational forces had to introduce a number of measures which -were oppressive for the Dutch people, and which discredited our Dutch -friends. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What do you have to say to the accusation brought -against you that you had co-ordinated all the cultural institutions? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly this accusation is, so to speak, correct in -part. With the prohibition of the political parties, most of the -organizations of the free professions became impossible, since right -down to the chessplayers’ club everything in the Netherlands was -organized on a political basis. In the interests of the occupational -forces I had to create new supervisory bodies. Maybe it was due to lack -of imagination that these organizations were, in part at least, very -similar to their prototypes in the Reich. But I used these organizations -only for purposes of supervision, and never asked them to co-operate -politically. Not only did I refrain from making the exercise of a -profession dependent on co-operation, but I did not even insist upon -compulsory collection of membership fees. - -I admit that we made two mistakes from two errors of judgment: First of -all, we had the mistaken impression that the order we imposed as -occupational authorities was necessarily the right one—at least the -better one; and secondly, that in an occupied country, an independent -political will can develop. It was there that our policy failed. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What institution did you then set up? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I created a cultural association (Kulturkammer), a -medical association (Ärztekammer), a chemists’ association -(Apothekerkammer), and a board of agriculture (Landstand). Then there -was a workers’ front, but that was a voluntary organization. Members -could leave it without any disadvantage to themselves whenever they -wished. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Then another charge is brought against you, that of -“Germanization.” What do you say to that? - -SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I must get something quite clear. In -English, you say Germany, and in Russian you say Germanski. Both mean -German (Deutsch). And when we spoke of Germanization then, we did not -mean “making them into Germans”; We meant a political and cultural union -of the so-called Germanic peoples, with reciprocal equal rights. That we -did intervene in this way, I stated in a speech, Exhibit -Seyss-Inquart-103: - -“Why do the Germans interfere with everything in the Netherlands?” - -Then I went on to say that in this total warfare there would be moments -of tension... - -THE PRESIDENT: What page is that on? - -DR. STEINBAUER: It is still Exhibit USA-708, which has not been -translated. But the entire book has been presented. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number? - -DR. STEINBAUER: Its document number is 3430-PS. It has been made Exhibit -USA-708. It is a book entitled _Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden_, and it -contains a collection of speeches made by the witness, several of which -have been submitted by the Prosecution. The witness is now replying to -them. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -SEYSS-INQUART: There are moments of tension when there is no longer any -dividing line between what is important to the military war effort and -something which is private and a matter for civilians. - -I was quite aware of the fact that all public activities might be used -for or against the occupational forces and that I had, therefore, to -exercise control over them. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Were there any attempts on the part of the NSDAP in the -Reich to influence your administration for the interests of the Party? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The Auslands-Organisation in the Netherlands made an -alteration in its set-up which permitted it to support the policy of the -Dutch National Socialist Party in every respect. It had, however, no -particular influence of its own. - -DR. STEINBAUER: That is the important thing. Now, let us turn to the -administration proper. Who were the competent authorities in the -Netherlands? - -SEYSS-INQUART: In the civilian sector there was the Reich Commissioner; -on a similar footing was the military commander and the Armed Forces, -and the Police had a sector of its own. The military commander had -special rights to intervene, and from July 1944 a part of the executive -powers was transferred to him. - -The Police were merely placed at my disposal, but came under the Higher -SS and Police Leader, who was suggested by Himmler and appointed by the -Führer. I was never asked about this beforehand. The Police reserved the -right to investigate. That is to say, if I gave them an order they would -investigate to see whether the order was in line with the instructions -which Himmler had given directly to the Higher SS and Police Leader. - -Then there were the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor and -the Armament Minister, who carried out the orders for the Four Year -Plan. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Yes; and as another Reich organization, there was -Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab too—and Speer, to complete the picture? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, Speer was the Minister for Armaments. Then there -were other smaller and separate assignments of a special nature. - -DR. STEINBAUER: So that you were really nothing but a kind of executive -organ for the superior Reich offices? - -SEYSS-INQUART: No, I was not an ordinary official. I bore the -responsibility for the Reich in the civilian sector. Perhaps during the -first few months departments in Berlin went straight ahead and ignored -me, but I then concentrated the administration in such a way in my own -hands that nothing occurred in the civilian sector to which I had not -previously given my consent. The Führer acknowledged this quite plainly -on one occasion, and I should like to remark that you must not draw any -conclusions from this with regard to other occupied territories. I am -completely convinced that in the Eastern Territories and in the -Government General the same centralization did not exist. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities did you have, then, of setting up an -administration? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The initiative for, and the extent of, the demands made -by the Reich came, of course, from the competent central offices in the -Reich. I investigated the demands with my colleagues in consultation -with the Dutch offices. We would then make counterproposals which seemed -to us reasonable for the Dutch. And if the Reich still demanded more, -then we made efforts not to exceed what could be expected. Until 1943 -all demands were fulfilled by the Dutch authorities themselves. I gave -my officials no authority to make such demands until after this period. -Then the demands became so large, that I no longer expected the Dutch -authorities to supply them. - -DR. STEINBAUER: I come back to the question of the Police for a moment, -which, as you said, stood directly under Himmler... - -SEYSS-INQUART: You asked what possibilities I had? - -DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. - -SEYSS-INQUART: I had two possibilities: with the Queen of the -Netherlands and the Government gone to England, I could have nominated a -new Dutch Government, as in Norway, or conducted the administration of -the country myself. I decided on the second solution. - -DR. STEINBAUER: How did you organize the existing Dutch police force? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Whereas the German Police were not in any way dependent -on me, the Dutch police were under my orders; but it was a matter of -course that I should transfer the supervision of the Dutch police to the -Higher SS and Police Leader as well—that is, in the capacity as my -Commissioner General for Security. The Dutch police were divided into -three or four different branches. I think that we can safely say we were -acting in the interests of the occupational power when we co-ordinated -them as regards organization. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What was the Home Guard (Landwacht)? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The Home Guard was a protection squad organized by the -Dutch National Socialists. In 1943 there were serious cases of terror -attacks on National Socialists—some very cruel murders. There was the -danger of the counterterror of which we had heard in Denmark and, in -fact, several unfortunate incidents did happen. Consequently I had this -Home Guard organized with orders to act as a regular disciplined -auxiliary police force, and to control street traffic at night, and -guard railways, _et cetera_. The result was that these acts of terror -ceased almost entirely, and until the middle of 1944 no further -difficulties arose. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, we now come to an exceptionally important -chapter. - -SEYSS-INQUART: May I just for a moment refer to Exhibit -Seyss-Inquart-101? This document has been held against me by the -Prosecution... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is 101 the right designation? - -DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the speeches which the defendant is -quoting have been sent down by me to be mimeographed. Although they are -actually already before the Tribunal, the translation department did not -quite catch up, as they wanted to translate all the affidavits too. So -they are not here yet in the translation, but I hope to have them by -tomorrow morning. - -THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t it got a PS number, or any other designation? - -DR. STEINBAUER: It is a book, Exhibit USA-708. The Prosecution have only -quoted individual passages from it. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. - -SEYSS-INQUART: The Prosecution have quoted Page 167. - -On 1 August 1943 I made a speech announcing special measures which would -bring difficulties and restrictions upon the Dutch, and the Prosecution -believe that the shootings which took place later are connected with it. -That is an error. The restrictions I spoke of in that speech concerned -only an order forbidding Dutch people to stay in places outside their -own provinces, so that bands of terrorists from the northwest could not -get to the east. As this happened just during the vacation time, it -really was a restriction for the Dutch. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next question. Did you change and -possibly misuse the existing organization of the lower courts? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I took over the organization of the Dutch courts -entirely. The administration of justice in the Netherlands was of a -commendably high standard. Only on two occasions did I supplement it. -The Dutch judges showed little understanding of the economic situation. -For instance, on one occasion a group of black market butchers, who had -killed large numbers of cattle and brought them to the black market, -were fined 200 guilders; so I installed special economic judges, -Dutchmen, who had more understanding of these economic necessities. But -the legal situation remained as it was. Of course, we also introduced -our German courts, as every occupational power does. - -DR. STEINBAUER: So that we had Dutch courts, German courts for Germans -staying in the Netherlands, and the police courts? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but also for the Dutch who violated the interests of -the German occupational forces. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it is alleged in the proceedings that through these -courts there were 4,000 executions, which have to be accounted for. - -SEYSS-INQUART: That is completely false. If I take into account all the -death sentences which were pronounced and actually carried out by the -German courts, the police courts, and the military courts; and if I add -to them the cases where Dutchmen lost their lives in clashes with the -executive powers; then, according to a statement of the Higher SS and -Police Leader, up to the middle of 1944 there were less than 800 cases -in 4 years—that is to say, less than were caused by a bombing attack on -the town of Nijmegen. The shootings came afterwards. - -DR. STEINBAUER: You also exercised the rights to reprieve, for which you -had a special reprieve department? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. - -DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I wish to refer to Document -Seyss-Inquart-75, Page 190 in the document book. This is the affidavit -of Rudolf Fritsch, who was a judge at the Prussian Supreme Court and -reprieve expert for the Reich Commissioner. I should like to quote two -paragraphs from this document, and I refer to the second paragraph on -Page 3: - - “In exercising his right to reprieve, the Reich Commissioner - proceeded from the standpoint that this was one of the most - sacred rights of the head of a state, and that it was especially - calculated to create a friendly, confidential atmosphere between - the Germans and the Dutch. Therefore, in the beginning it was he - himself who made the decision in every case, on the basis of - case reports which were submitted to him together with a - suggestion for a reprieve from the reprieve department. After - about 2 to 3 months he delegated the exercise of the right to - reprieve within his own organization to the chief of the - Department for Reprieves. The latter was competent except in the - following cases: 1) the cancellation of proceedings; 2) decision - in case of death sentences; 3) decision in fundamental - questions; 4) decision in isolated cases without precedent... - - “No sentence of death was carried out without there being an - official examination of the question of a reprieve, even when a - formal appeal for a reprieve was not submitted.” - -Then I come to Page 5, the last paragraph: - - “Since co-operation with authorities in the Dutch courts proved - that they could be trusted, the Reich Commissioner gradually - delegated in the main the right of reprieve to the Dutch - Minister of Justice. From the huge amount of mail which came in - ... I repeatedly learned of police actions staged by the Gestapo - whereby regular jurisdiction was eliminated.... In such cases I - would collect material and use it to take action in order to - bring the persons involved before regular courts for judgment. - And I was actually successful with such action. This was proof - to me that the Reich Commissioner opposed the wild police - methods of the Gestapo and was an adherent of regular legal - procedure.” - -I think that with this we can close this subject of justice and now come -to the question of finance. - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but the Führer’s order excluding courts is also very -important. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Well, if you wish to add something else. - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it is decisive. - -After the strike at Amsterdam, I proposed summary court-martial -procedure. That is not an invention of recent times; it is summary court -procedure for special emergencies, such as you can find in the -legislation of every country. The summary courts martial were subject to -special precautionary provisions. First of all, a proper judge had to be -there; secondly, the defense was allowed a counsel, who could be Dutch; -thirdly, evidence had to be given in the proper manner, and if the -question of guilt was not clearly determined, then the case had to be -transferred to the ordinary courts. This summary court-martial procedure -was only in force for 2 weeks at the time of the general strike in May -1943. The number of people shot later on cannot be traced back to these -summary courts martial. Also they had been provided for the special -emergency of the Netherlands again becoming a theatre of war. - -In the meantime, however, a decree came from the Führer which had -already been made public in an order from the High Command of the Armed -Forces. I refer to 1155-PS—no, I beg your pardon, that is wrong—it is -Document 835-PS. - -On 30 July 1944 the Führer ordered that all non-German civilians in -occupied territories who were guilty of sabotage or terror actions were -to be handed over to the Security Police. The Higher SS Leader and I -both objected to this order, as we clearly realized what damaging -effects it would have, especially in the Netherlands. Through such an -order the Dutch would only be driven into illegal organizations. - -During a period of 4 to 6 weeks the Higher SS and Police Leader never -carried out the order. But he then received a severe reprimand from -Himmler, and from that time on he was obliged to deal with the Dutch who -had been arrested for sabotage or illegal activities, and had to judge -them according to his own jurisdiction, shooting them when necessary. -One can account in this way for the shootings on a larger scale, but I -do not believe that there were as many as 4,000. As often as I could, I -urged the Security Police to be most careful in carrying out this order, -but I never received any reports on the individual cases. I had the -impression that there were perhaps 600 to 700. - -DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, then this was a police -affair, which was directly... - -SEYSS-INQUART: At all events it no longer came under my authority or -influence. But if, at that time, I gave the Security Police orders to -check up on an illegal movement somewhere, I nevertheless had to realize -that some Dutchman or other, who was discovered to be the leader of such -a movement, would be shot by the Police without the courts or myself -being able to investigate the case. But then I could not desist from -safeguarding the security of the occupational authorities, because the -Führer decree had been issued. - -DR. STEINBAUER: I now come to the chapter of finance. A document has -been presented here where a certain Mr. Trip announces his resignation. -Who was this gentleman? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Trip was the President of the Bank of the -Netherlands—that is to say, the bank of issue—and he was also the -General Secretary for Finance. I think he can readily be considered one -of the world’s leading banking experts. He is an outstanding personality -and one of the men described today as a Dutch patriot. - -DR. STEINBAUER: He was also General Secretary for Finance, was he not? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Until March 1941 he was the General Secretary for -Finance. In my first speech to the general secretaries I said that I -would not ask any general secretary to do anything that was contrary to -his conscience. If he thought that there was something he felt he could -not do, then he could resign without any harm to himself. I said that -all I asked was that he carry out my orders loyally as long as he -remained in office. Mr. Trip was in office until March 1941, and then he -resigned because there was something he refused to carry out. He did -this without the slightest disadvantage to himself. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Who was his successor? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to say that what Mr. Trip carried out until -March 1941 is, in my opinion, justifiable in every respect. Otherwise he -most certainly would not have done it. - -His successor was Mr. Rost van Tonningen. Rost van Tonningen was a -League of Nations Commissioner in Austria who there had had tasks -similar to those I gave him in the Netherlands. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What about the costs of occupation? - -SEYSS-INQUART: As far as the civilian administration was concerned, Mr. -Trip and I agreed that I receive 3 million guilders a month. Then there -was another 20 million in fines in addition to that. During the first 3 -years I saved 60 million guilders, which remained in the Netherlands as -a special bequest. - -As far as the cost of the military occupation was concerned, I had no -authority to check that. The Armed Forces put in their demands to the -Minister of Finance, and I then received orders to place the money at -their disposal. During 1941, the Reich exacted indirect occupation -costs. It took the point of view that not only the expenses which were -incurred directly in the Netherlands should be paid for, but that the -cost of preparations in the Reich should be borne too. Fifty million -marks per month were demanded—partly in gold. Later this contribution -was designated as voluntary assistance for the East... - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean marks, or do you mean guilders? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Marks, 50 million marks. Later on this contribution was -called voluntary assistance for the East, for political reasons, but of -course it was not so. Later on, the Reich demanded that this sum be -increased to 100 millions, but I refused. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. Trip retired as General Secretary for Finance -because the foreign currency embargo, which still existed at the time -between Germany and the Netherlands, was lifted? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct. I received a request by my -administration for the purpose of intensifying economic exchanges -between the Reich and the Netherlands—to lift the foreign currency -embargo so that, without having recourse to banks of issue, guilders -could be exchanged for marks, and vice versa. The fundamental -possibility of such exchanges had already been determined under Mr. -Trip, but it was subject to the control of the bank of issue, that is to -say, of the Netherlands Bank as well. Mr. Trip raised objections and I -passed the matter on to Berlin. Berlin decided that it was to be carried -out and Mr. Trip resigned. I appointed Mr. Rost van Tonningen, President -of the Bank of the Netherlands, and I published the decree. - -I wish to say that the President of the Reichsbank, Herr Funk, was -against this procedure, and I can quote in explanation that at that time -the effects could not be foreseen as turning out as catastrophic as they -did later on. At that time the Netherlands were completely cut off, and -the Reich had reached the height of its power. It was to be expected -that the mark would become the leading currency in Europe, and that -thereby the guilder would have been given the same importance. In -February 1941, for instance, imports from the Reich into the Netherlands -were greater than the exports from the Netherlands into the Reich. Reich -Minister Funk always held the view that these were real debts, so that -in the event of a different outcome of the war such debts which amounted -to some 4½ billion would have had to be paid back to the Netherlands. - -DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, it was your General -Secretary for Finance, Dr. Fischböck, who suggested this matter contrary -to the wishes of Trip. - -SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know whether the suggestion came from Fischböck -alone. I presume that he must have talked it over with other people; but -it was he who put the matter to me. - -DR. STEINBAUER: You have also been accused of imposing collective -penalties in the form of fines, which is contrary to international law. - -SEYSS-INQUART: Collective fines are prohibited under international law -only in case of individual offenses. The large collective fine of 18 -million guilders was imposed in connection with the general strike in -Amsterdam, Arnhem, and Hilversum, in which the entire population took -part. Later, I had collective fines paid back whenever it was discovered -that definite individuals were responsible for the offense. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Can you give us any example? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I think witness Schwebel will be able to tell you that. -It was in towns in the south of Holland where it happened. - -DR. STEINBAUER: You are also accused by the Prosecution of -responsibility for what happened in the hostage camp in Michelsgestel. -What have you to say to that? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I can take full and absolute responsibility for what -happened in the hostage camp in St. Michelsgestel. It was not a hostage -camp in the actual sense of the word: I took Dutchmen into custody only -when they had shown themselves to be active in resistance movements. The -camp at St. Michelsgestel was not a prison. I visited it. The inmates of -the camp played golf. They were given leave, in the case of urgent -family affairs or business matters. Not a single one of them was ever -shot. I think the majority of the present Dutch Ministers were at St. -Michelsgestel. It was a sort of protective custody to temporarily hinder -them from continuing their anti-German activities. - -DR. STEINBAUER: In addition to this you are said to have prohibited the -reading of pastoral letters, and to have put Catholic priests and -Lutheran ministers in concentration camps? - -SEYSS-INQUART: It is true that I prohibited one pastoral letter, which -may happen in times of occupation—because it publicly opposed the -measures of the occupational power and incited people to disobedience. -That was an isolated case, and it never happened again—for the good -reason, too, that there were no more provocations of such a kind in the -pastoral letters. In fact, I even intervened and canceled the -prohibition issued by the Police, whenever it was a matter only of a -criticism toward the measures taken by the occupational powers, and -there was no incitement to resistance. - -I myself never sent priests to concentration camps. On the contrary, at -the beginning of 1943 after having made repeated urgent requests, I -finally received a list from the Security Police with the names of the -priests who were shut up in concentration camps. There were 45 or 50 of -them altogether. Three or four were mentioned as having died in the -concentration camp. On the grounds of the facts of their case, I sought -out about a third of them and demanded their release; for the second -third I demanded investigation within the coming 6 months; and it was -only as far as the last third was concerned that it was impossible for -me to intervene without violating my own responsibility towards the -Reich. - -Dutch hostages were also taken for purposes of reprisal. When the -Netherlands came into the war, the Germans in the Dutch East Indies were -put into prison and allegedly mistreated. The Reich demanded the arrest -of 3,000 Dutchmen. The Security Police arrested 800 and took them to -Buchenwald. When I heard that the mortality was high, I made such urgent -appeals that the hostages were finally returned. They were then -accommodated in such a way that one could no longer talk of a prison. -They were given leave, and when necessary I released them. In the end, I -had less than 100. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, you are said to have prohibited prayers in -church, and especially prayers for the Queen. - -SEYSS-INQUART: That is incorrect. The prayers in Dutch churches were -obvious demonstrations. Prayers were made—as was quite natural—for the -Queen of the Netherlands, and for her happiness and prosperity, and the -fulfillment of her wishes. At the same time there were prayers for the -Reich Commissioner, for his enlightenment. I was severely reproached for -tolerating these demonstrations. But I found nothing wrong with these -prayers, and did not prohibit them. Perhaps, in some isolated cases a -subordinate authority would put in his say, but this was always -suppressed. - -DR. STEINBAUER: That would not have been so bad; but it is said that you -were particularly cruel and had a large number of people shot without -legal proceedings. What have you to say to that? - -SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I can remember, there was only one real case of -hostages being shot—that is, people were shot without there being any -causal connection with a crime. This occurred in August 1942, and the -case has already been brought up here. It was handled strictly according -to the so-called Hostage Law, which has been quoted here. It was in -connection with an attack on an army transport, and 50 or 25 hostages -were to be shot. It was, I think, the Higher SS and Police Leader who -made the demand through the Military Commander upon request of the High -Command of the Army. - -My intervention consisted in reducing this figure to 5 and in looking -over the list which had been submitted to me by other departments, and -which has been read out here in court. I, too, noticed something -peculiar about it. The Higher SS and Police Leader had expressly -emphasized that the list had been drawn up strictly in keeping with the -directives, saying that the attack could be traced back to rightist -circles of resistance, not to those on the Left, so that no workers -could be shot. I only exercised my influence insofar as I caused the -Higher SS and Police Leader to cross off the list the names of fathers -with several children. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what do you know, in detail, about the people -who were shot when the camp at Vught was evacuated? - -SEYSS-INQUART: When the British and Canadians were advancing through -Belgium toward the south of Holland, I had so much to do to keep order -in my province that I could not pay any special attention to the camp at -Vught, which was under police direction. The Higher SS and Police Leader -informed me generally that the most seriously charged political -prisoners, numbering about 200, would be transferred to the Reich, that -the less seriously charged political prisoners would be set free, and -that ordinary criminals would be placed under the command of a Dutch -police officer and handed over to the Canadians. It was only here that I -heard some people had been shot, and the only way I can explain it is -that at the last minute the Reich forbade these people to be transported -into the Reich and gave orders for them to be shot. I do not believe -there were 600 of them, because from what the witness Kollpuss said -there seem to have been some 130 to 150. But even that is enough. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the shooting of hostages after -the attack on the SS and Police Leader Rauter? - -SEYSS-INQUART: The attack on the Higher SS and Police Leader came from -the resistance movement, and was carried out with British weapons. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the Putten case? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Excuse me, I have not finished my previous statement. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Oh, you want to give a more exact... - -SEYSS-INQUART: Himmler, at that time, gave orders for 500 hostages to be -shot. Rauter’s deputy Dr. Schöngarth refused, and informed me that there -were a number of Dutchmen in the prisons who were to be shot, in -accordance with the Führer’s order, because they had been convicted of -other acts of sabotage. He had hesitated, he said, since the number was -somewhat larger, but now he could not hesitate any longer. He did not -give me the actual figure. In this situation I could not, in my opinion, -prevent him from carrying out the order, because we had to suppress the -resistance movement by all means. The movement had been organized and -supplied with arms by the Dutch Government in London, and it presented a -serious danger to the German occupational forces. - -Two hundred and thirty Dutchmen were supposed to be shot—amongst them -80 in Apeldoorn alone—and this seemed to me a lot. But Dr. Schöngarth -told me that in the north of Apeldoorn there was a center of the illegal -resistance movement. - -DR. STEINBAUER: I want to ask you, last of all, what do you know about -the Putten case? - -SEYSS-INQUART: In Putten there was an attack on German officers. Three -were murdered. The whole thing took place within the Armed Forces, the -SS, and the Police; and I knew that measures of reprisal were planned. I -myself, at that time, was concerned with the construction of defenses. -The Higher SS and Police Leader informed me that he had received the -order to burn the village of Putten, and to transfer the male population -to a concentration camp in the Reich. However, he had reduced the figure -to 40 percent, and later on he reported to me that there was a high -mortality rate in German concentration camps. Both he and I applied to -the military commander to have these men returned. The military -commander agreed. Whether this order could still be carried out I do not -know. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, perhaps at this point we could have a -short recess? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, I should like to come back to the -question of the embargo on foreign currencies. - -The Defendant Reich Marshal Göring has just informed me, during the -recess, that in this conflict, Fischböck, Trip, and Wohlthat on the one -hand, and on the other Funk, who was against it, and he himself, Göring, -as head of the Four Year Plan, made a decision to lift the embargo on -foreign currencies. And he writes me here, “I bear the responsibility.” -So it was a decision which was taken by Göring. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, it is not, of course, a regular way in -which to inform the Tribunal about anything, to tell them what one of -the defendants may have said to you during an adjournment. - -DR. STEINBAUER: He wrote it. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that doesn’t make it any better. You may ask -the witness any question about it. - -DR. STEINBAUER: As regards the question of shooting without a court -sentence, I should like to refer to a very important document. Exhibit -Seyss-Inquart-77, Page 199. This is Document F-224 D, a report made by -Kriminalkommissar Mund. He says the following on Page 3: - - “In my opinion it is very likely that General Christiansen - demanded the maximum number of victims to be executed. - Christiansen spoke of numerous measures of reprisal to Rauter, - who was an impulsive and tactless man, and he on his part - applied pressure to the Commander of the Security Police (Dr. - Schöngarth)...” - -He reports further on Page 5: - - “It was often a question of prisoners who had already been - sentenced to death by the Higher SS and Police Leader. - - “Reprisals for punishable acts were a matter for the Police. - After August 1944, and in accordance with an order of the - Führer’s, these measures of reprisal were interpreted in such a - way that a number of Dutchmen were shot for acts of sabotage and - attempts at murder although they had been arrested for entirely - different reasons.” - -SEYSS-INQUART: May I explain that briefly? - -DR. STEINBAUER: Please do. - -SEYSS-INQUART: For example, leading members of the resistance movement -were arrested, and on examination by the Higher SS and Police Leader it -was decided that they should be shot according to the Führer’s orders. -The Higher SS and Police Leader had called upon his court officer for -this examination. When later on an attempt to blow up a bridge was made, -instead of shooting hostages these men were taken and shot. That was the -exact opposite of the shooting of hostages—or at least, it was supposed -to be. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I come to Chapter IV-B, “Concentration Camps and -Prisons.” My first question: Who was competent in these matters? - -SEYSS-INQUART: For concentration camps and for police detention prisons, -the Police were competent. For court detention prisons, and court -authorities, I myself was competent—that is, the court prisons were -under my charge. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Were there concentration camps in the Netherlands, too? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, especially the big concentration camp of Putten near -Hertogenbosch. Then also a police transit camp near Amersfoort, and a -Jewish assembly camp in Westerborg. I have already spoken of St. -Michelsgestel; that was a protective custody camp. And then there might -be mentioned the camp at Ommen, which was neither a police nor a -concentration camp, but abuses occurred there. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What can you tell me about the Hertogenbosch Camp? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Hertogenbosch was originally meant as a Jewish assembly -camp, at the time when we intended to keep the Jews in the Netherlands. -But Reichsführer Himmler gave orders for it to be turned into a -concentration camp. After some reflection I was satisfied with this -idea. In consideration of the fact that I could not prevent Dutchmen -from being put into concentration camps, I preferred them to be in -concentration camps in the Netherlands, where I might still be able to -exert a certain influence. - -DR. STEINBAUER: But there are supposed to have been excesses in these -concentration camps, too—for example, especially in the Vught Camp, -which you mentioned. - -SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite true. There were excesses in prisons, as -well as in concentration camps. In wartime I consider this almost -unavoidable, because subordinates get unlimited power over others and it -cannot adequately be controlled. Whenever I heard of any excesses, I -took steps—the first time toward the end of 1940, or 1941, when the -president of my German court reported to me that a prisoner had been -brought up with injuries from blows on the head. I had the case -investigated, and the prison warden received disciplinary punishment and -was sent back to the Reich. - -In the Vught Concentration Camp, soon after its opening, there was a -high mortality rate. Immediately I had an investigation started, using -the services of Dutch medical personnel. Every day—and later on every -week—I had the mortality figures reported to me, until they sank to -what was approximately a normal level. Of course, I do not know whether -the director of the camp reported the normal death cases only, or -whether he included the cases of shooting—I could not say. - -In this camp there were excesses due to drinking parties and reveling; -brawls and fights were also heard now and then. The head of the camp was -removed and sent to the Reich. I noted that the Higher SS and Police -Leader had apparently himself tried to maintain order, although he was -not in charge of the camps; they were under Gruppenführer Pohl. - -There was one very serious case which, in Document Number F-224 D, is -described under the title, “Women in Cell.” The head of the camp, -allegedly for disciplinary reasons, had a large number of women crowded -into a cell overnight, whereby three or four women were smothered to -death. When we heard of that, we demanded court action. The Central -Administration in Berlin refused, and we turned to Reichsführer SS -Himmler and did not give in. The head of the camp was put on trial and -received at least 4 years—I believe even a sentence of 8 years. That is -indicated, moreover, in the French report. - -DR. STEINBAUER: What about the Amersfoort Camp? - -SEYSS-INQUART: That was a police transit camp—that is, for police -prisoners who were to be turned over to the courts, or who were to be -sent to the Reich; or persons who refused labor service who were being -sent to the Reich. In general, they were not to be there more than 6 or -8 weeks. There were Dutch guards in this camp—not Dutch Police, but a -voluntary SS guard company, I believe. - -Excesses did occur here. General Secretary Van Damm called my attention -to the fact that a Dutchman was supposed to have been beaten to death -there. I urged the Higher SS and Police Leader to bring this case to -light. He did this through his court officer, and sent the documents to -me. According to the documents, severe mistreatment occurred, but no one -was killed, and the persons responsible were punished. - -I repeatedly called the attention of the Higher SS and Police Leader to -the fact that concentration camps and prisons in wartime actually -favored the perpetration of brutal excesses. If, here or there, not a -severe case but certain mistreatment was reported to me, I always called -his attention to it. He then reported to me either that the case had not -occurred, or that he had taken steps, and so forth. - -In particular, I always had the food ration statistics of the -concentration camps and prisons reported to me. The food rations were -satisfactory. I believe that the Dutch in the concentration camps and -prisons, at the end of 1944 and in 1945, received more than the Dutch in -the western Netherlands. Of course, I do not want to give too much -importance to this fact, because the Dutch did suffer from hunger. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Then there was the Westerborg Camp. - -SEYSS-INQUART: The Dutch Government had already set up Westerborg as a -completely free camp for Jews who had fled from Germany. This was -enlarged into an assembly camp for Jews. In the camp itself there were -Jewish guards to maintain order. Dutch Police guarded the camp on the -outside. There was only a detail of the Security Police for supervision -in the camp. In all the files I found no report about excesses in the -camp itself. Every Sunday clergymen went to the camp, at least one -clergyman for the catholic Jews, and one for the so-called Christians. -They, too, never reported anything. - -DR. STEINBAUER: We will speak about their removal later on. - -Now I would like to speak about Ommen. There is a long report on that. - -SEYSS-INQUART: Ommen was intended as a training camp for those Dutch who -voluntarily wanted to be employed in the economy in the Eastern -Territories. They were given instruction on the country, the people, and -their language. The head of the camp borrowed prisoners from a -neighboring Dutch prison for the work. Then I received reports that -these prisoners were being mistreated. The judges of Amsterdam turned to -me. I gave the Dutch judges of Amsterdam permission to personally -inspect the camp and speak to the prisoners. That was done, according to -Document F-224(d), on 5 March 1943. Thereupon the Amsterdam judges wrote -a long letter to the General Secretary for Justice. They complained -about the mistreatment of the prisoners, which they had noted, and about -the fact that Dutch prisoners were transferred to prisons in the Reich -for labor assignment. The complaints were justified, and I ordered that -the prisoners be sent back from the Ommen Camp to the Dutch penal -institution, and that Dutch prisoners be returned from German prisons to -Dutch prisons. This procedure was correct, and therefore I necessarily -took due steps to settle the matter. - -DR. STEINBAUER: But now I have to ask you a certain question and -confront you with a charge. Document RF-931 shows that you removed -judges who made such complaints, namely, in Leeuwarden. - -SEYSS-INQUART: In my eyes the procedure of the court of Leeuwarden was -incorrect. These judges did not consult me, but publicly asserted in a -verdict that the Dutch prisoners were being sent to German concentration -camps and shot. According to the facts, which lay before me, that was -false. I then informed them of the results obtained by the Amsterdam -judges. The Leeuwarden judges refused to pass further judgments. I asked -them to continue to officiate, but they refused. I then dismissed them -as persons who refused to work. Of course, I could have had them tried -by a German court with charges of making atrocity propaganda. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive complaints from the Red Cross about -conditions in the camps? - -SEYSS-INQUART: In the Netherlands we had the arrangement that a -representative of the Dutch Red Cross, Mrs. Van Overeem, could visit all -concentration camps and prisons, especially for the purpose of verifying -whether the food packages were being delivered. Neither Mrs. Van Overeem -nor the heads of the Dutch Red Cross ever directed any complaint to me. -I should like to say that this circumstance was especially gratifying -for me, because the Dutch complained about everything, and if for a -change I received no complaints, then that was a certain relief for me. - -I should like to remark that about the beginning of 1944, according to -the reports submitted to me, about 12,000 Dutch persons were in -concentration camps or prisons. That is the same as if today, in all of -Germany, 120,000 Germans were in prisons or camps. That occasioned my -setting up legal commissions which had to visit the camps and the -prisons in order to make investigations and determine what prisoners -could be released or placed on trial. Naturally, in cases where there -were orders for arrest from Berlin, I could do nothing. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, so you say that you waged a constant struggle -with the Police on this question? - -SEYSS-INQUART: I would not like to call it a struggle. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Do you believe that you were successful? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I believe so, on the basis of certain definite -facts. I have followed the proceedings here very carefully, and—we have -heard most terrible things. The reports from the Netherlands, it seems -to me, are not that bad. I do not want to say that I disclaim every -excess. However, such reports as those about Breedonck in Belgium, do -not exist. The reports show beatings as the most serious charge. There -is only a single report here—that is Document F-677, the report of the -tax collector Bruder—which attains the level of the usual atrocity -reports. But I do not believe that this report should be accepted at its -face value, since Bruder does not even say who told him this. And the -information itself is not credible. He asserts, for example, that the -prisoners who were at work had to prostrate themselves before every SS -guard. I do not believe that the camp authorities would have permitted -that, because then the prisoners would not have been able to work. - -It is hard for me to say, but I do not think that conditions in the -Netherlands were quite as bad as all that. - -DR. STEINBAUER: I think that I can now conclude this chapter and turn to -Point V of the Indictment, which deals with the question of labor -commitment. What problems did you have in the Netherlands in the field -of labor commitment? - -SEYSS-INQUART: In the field of labor commitment we must distinguish -between three or perhaps four different phases. When I came to the -Netherlands, there were about 500,000 unemployed: registered unemployed, -those who might become so due to demobilization of the Dutch land and -naval forces, part-time workers, and so forth. It was an urgent -problem—not only a social one—for me to reduce the number of -unemployed. For, in the first place, such an army of unemployed is -without doubt a good source of recruits for illegal activities. In the -second place, as the war continued, it was to be expected that the -material condition of the unemployed would steadily become worse. - -At that time we instituted measures which I must, despite all charges, -call voluntary labor recruitment. That lasted until the middle of -1942—that is, about 2 years. During that period, I gave neither the -German nor the Dutch labor authorities full power to press any worker to -work abroad. Without doubt there was a certain economic pressure, but I -believe that always exists in this connection. The recruitment was -carried out by the Dutch labor offices, which were subordinate to the -Dutch General Secretary for Social Administration. There were German -inspectors in the labor offices. There were also private hiring -agencies; companies from the Reich sent their own agents over. On the -whole, about 530,000 Dutchmen were engaged to work in the Reich. In the -period which I call “voluntary,” 240,000 to 250,000 volunteers went to -the Reich and about 40,000 to France. - -By the first half of 1942, this reservoir had been used up. The Reich -demanded more workers. We then considered introducing compulsory labor -service. I recall I did not receive instructions to this effect from -Sauckel, but from Bormann as a direct Führer order. Now, labor -commitment occurred predominantly, but not exclusively, in the following -way. Young and, as far as possible, unmarried Dutchmen were called to -the labor office, where they received certificates of conscription for -work in the Reich. The Dutch report itself says that only a few refused. -Of course, some of those who refused were arrested by the Police and -taken to the Reich. The Higher SS and Police Leader reported to me that -this totaled 2,600 people of about 250,000 to 260,000 labor conscripts, -and of the total engaged 530,000 persons. So this meant only 1 percent, -or even 0.5 percent. I believe that the figure resulting from compulsory -measures in the Reich was no lower—or higher. - -At the beginning of 1943 the Reich demanded a large commitment of -workers, and I was advised to draft whole age groups to send to the -Reich. I call attention to the fact that all of these workers received -free labor contracts in the Reich and were not put into labor camps. I -decided to draft three young age groups—I believe 21 to 23 years of -age—in order to spare married men. The success was satisfactory in the -first group; in the second group it was moderate; and in the third it -was quite bad. I realized that I could draft further groups only by -sheer force. I refused to do so. But at that time I managed, due to -Minister Speer’s understanding, to arrange not to have the workers taken -to their work, but that the work be brought to the workers. Big orders -arrived in the Netherlands, and the industries charged with filling -these orders were declared “blocked” industries. Among them was the -Organization Todt. - -Dutchmen who were needed in the Netherlands were exempted. Over a -million certificates of exemption were issued by the Dutch authorities. -It was clear that that was Dutch sabotage, but I did not want to take -steps against it. No woman was ever forced to work outside the -Netherlands, nor were young people under 18. Reich Minister Lammers has -confirmed here that at the beginning of 1944 he transmitted the Führer -order to me demanding that 250,000 workers be brought to the Reich. He -also confirmed that I refused it. At that time Gauleiter Sauckel came to -me and discussed this matter with me. I must state that he understood my -arguments surprisingly quickly, and did not insist on carrying out the -forced recruitment. By “forced recruitment,” I mean blocking off whole -districts and seizing the men. - -In the course of 1944 labor recruitment ceased almost completely. -Instead of 250,000 I believe 12,000 were sent to the Reich. But -something entirely different took place in the fall of 1944. From -experience gathered in France and Belgium, the High Command of the Army -decided that able-bodied Dutchmen were to be drawn from Holland—that -is, the western Netherlands. That was because the Netherlands Government -in England had set up an illegal army. I had the organizational charter -in my hands. There was a complete General Staff and a complete War -Ministry. We estimated that there were about 50,000 illegal troops. If -an appeal was made and one more able-bodied Dutchman joined, the illegal -forces would have been more numerous than the German troops in Holland. -Moreover, they had received very good equipment from England. Full -shiploads of the most modern tommy guns were confiscated by us, but I am -convinced that the larger part of the weapons was not confiscated. - -The High Command of the Army, through the military commanders, ordered -the removal of the able-bodied Dutchmen. The measure was entirely -carried out by the Armed Forces. A general who was sent for that very -purpose was entrusted with the task, with an operational staff of his -own. This measure was carried out by the local commandants. My local -authorities were informed of the action to be taken, sometimes at the -last moment and sometimes not at all. Of course I knew about the -measure. In view of these reasons I could not take the responsibility of -protesting against it. I only intervened when it was necessary to -protect civilian interests, and prevent the workers in the vital -industries from being removed also. I entrusted this to the -Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort, whom Dr. Goebbels had -sent to the Netherlands in the meantime. His task was to issue exemption -certificates. He issued 50,000 of them. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean Himmler? - -SEYSS-INQUART: Goebbels, the Delegate for Total War Effort. - -I admit that this measure led to conditions which were unbearable for -the Dutch. I am certain that, as for feeding, temporary lodging, and -transportation, the population in the bombed German territories did not -live under any better conditions. But one could not demand this from the -Dutch. Many Dutch people told me, at that time, that they would be -willing to agree to this labor commitment—by no means in order to aid -the German cause, but only in order to avoid these severe conditions—if -they would be drafted in orderly proceedings. I then did that. The -Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort issued the proclamation -which has been submitted to the Court. The people were called to the -labor offices, recorded on lists, sent home again to get clothes, and -ordered to report to the railroad stations. Not the Police but labor -officials took them to the Reich to be put to work under normal -conditions. The Dutch report, in its objectivity, recognizes this fact. -It speaks of the better transportation facilities for those mobilized -for labor. I am responsible for this labor mobilization for the reasons -which I have given. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I remark in this connection that my -Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-78, Document 1726-PS, Exhibit USA-195, Page 200, -excerpt from the Netherlands Government report, confirms the statement -of my client fully. I should like to read it briefly because it is -important. Page 2: - - “...workers who refused—relatively few—were prosecuted by the - Security Service.” - -Then, Page 3: - - “...apart from that, the measure was not very successful. - Certain German authorities seem to have opposed its execution, - because many former members of the armed forces received - exemption; others went underground.... - - “The result was that in the last month of 1943, and in the - greater part of 1944, relatively few persons were deported....” - -And then, Page 6: - - “...until the end of 1944, the method of transportation for - deportees was bearable.... - - “Anyone who reported for the manpower mobilization in January - 1945, enjoyed improved transportation facilities—that is, - almost the whole journey by rail, although only in freight - cars....” - -SEYSS-INQUART: Even for our own use we had no other cars at that time. - -I should like to refer to the fact that I also drafted Dutch workers in -order to carry out the construction work entrusted to me by the Führer -on the resistance lines east of the Ijssel. I used part of the -transports which came from Rotterdam, _et cetera_, for this purpose, and -thus I prevented these people from being sent to the Reich. I had no -influence on the treatment in the Reich; I only forbade further -transports into the Gau Essen, because it was reported to me that in the -Rees Camp the treatment was very poor, and that some Dutch people had -died. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next count of the Indictment—that is, -to the Jewish question. The Netherlands Government report, Exhibit -USA-195, sums up all ordinances submitted by the Prosecution. I should -like to submit this Document 1726-PS to my client, so that it may remind -him of the laws. The Court already has it. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] What did you, as Reich Commissioner, do -about the Jewish question? - -SEYSS-INQUART: When I took over the functions of the Reich Commissioner, -I of course realized that I had to take a definite attitude, and would -have to take some steps with regard to the Jews in the Netherlands. -Amsterdam, in western Europe, is perhaps one of the best known and one -of the oldest seats of Jewish communities in western Europe. Moreover, -in the Netherlands there were a great many German Jewish emigrants. - -I will say quite openly that since the first World War and the postwar -period, I was an anti-Semite and went to Holland as such. I need not go -into detail about that here. I have said all that in my speeches, and -would refer you to them. I had the impression, which will be confirmed -everywhere, that the Jews, of course, had to be against National -Socialist Germany. There was no discussion of the question of guilt as -far as I was concerned. As head of an occupied territory I had only to -deal with the facts. I had to realize that, particularly from the Jewish -circles, I had to reckon with resistance, defeatism, and so on. - -I told Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, -that in the Netherlands I would remove Jews from leading posts in the -economy, the press, and the administration. The measures taken by me -from May 1940 to March 1941 were limited to that. The Jewish officials -were dismissed, but were given pensions. The Jewish firms were -registered, and the heads of the firms were dismissed. In the spring of -1941 Heydrich came to me in the Netherlands. He told me that we would -have to expect that the greatest resistance would come from Jewish -circles. He told me that the Jews would at least have to be treated like -other enemy aliens. The English, for instance, in the Netherlands, were -interned and their property confiscated. In view of the large number of -Jews—about 140,000—this was not so simple. I admit frankly that I did -not object to this argument of Heydrich’s. I also felt that this was -necessary in a war which I absolutely considered a life and death -struggle for the German people. For that reason, in March 1941 I ordered -that the Jews in the Netherlands be registered. And then things went on -step by step. - -I will not say that the final results—as far as the Netherlands are -concerned—were intended thus from the beginning; but we decided on this -method. The regulations cited here, if they appeared in the Dutch Legal -Gazette, were mostly signed by me personally. At least, they were -published with my express assent. Individual measures mentioned here, -however, were not by me. For example, in February 1,000 Jews were -supposed to have been arrested and sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen. -That much I know. In the Amsterdam ghetto... - -THE PRESIDENT: February of what year? - -SEYSS-INQUART: February 1941. In the Amsterdam ghetto, a National -Socialist was killed by Jews. Reichsführer Himmler thereupon ordered 400 -young Jews sent to Mauthausen. I was not in the Netherlands at that -time. That was, by the way, the reason for the general strike in -Amsterdam in March 1941. After my return to the Netherlands, I protested -against this measure, and to my knowledge such a mass transfer to -Mauthausen did not occur again. Synagogues were also burned. Apparently -someone ambitiously tried to imitate the 8 November 1938. I immediately -intervened. Further incidents did not occur. On the other hand, the -Police wanted to tear down the old temple in Amsterdam. General -Secretary Van Damm called this to my attention, and I prevented it. - -I indicated earlier that the motive for the measures is to be found in -the consideration to treat Jews like enemy aliens. Later, with other -measures, the original intention was certainly abandoned; they became -the same as those taken against the Jews in the Reich. Perhaps, in one -case or another, this was even exceeded, for I know that, for example, -in the Netherlands there was a drive to get the Jews sterilized. - -Our goal was to keep the Jews in the Netherlands—namely, in two -districts of Amsterdam and then in the Westerborg Camp and in the Vught -Camp. We had also prepared to create the necessary opportunities for -work. I instructed the General Secretary for Education to withdraw as -much money from the Dutch budget for the education of the Jews as they -should have according to their proportion of the population. It is -certain that with this measure of concentrating the Jews in two -districts and two camps, harshness occurred which was perhaps -unavoidable, and which might even in some cases be considered as -excessive. - -Finally, the Security Police demanded the introduction of the so-called -Jewish Star. A not inconsiderable number of Jews were not in the -confined areas, and the Security Police demanded that they be marked in -order that it might be ascertained whether the Jews adhered to the other -restrictions. In the eyes of Germans, this star was certainly considered -a stigma. The Dutch did not consider it as such. There was many a -Dutchman who, out of protest, wore such a star himself. - -About 1942, I believe, Heydrich came along with further demands—this -time that the Jews be evacuated. He explained this by saying that -Holland would sooner or later be a theater of war, in which one could -not allow such a hostile population to remain. He pointed out that he -was responsible for the police security of the Reich, and that he could -not bear this responsibility if the Jews remained in Holland. I believe -that we in the Netherlands opposed this evacuation project for 3 or 4 -months while attempting to find other ways out. - -Finally, Heydrich had a Führer decree sent to me, according to which he -had unlimited powers to carry out all measures in the occupied -territories as well. I inquired of Bormann what this meant, and this -order was confirmed, whereupon the evacuation of the Jews was begun. At -that time I tried to ascertain the fate of the Jews, and it is rather -difficult for me to speak about it now because it sounds like mockery. I -was told that the Jews were to be sent to Auschwitz. I had people sent -from the Netherlands to Auschwitz. They came back with the report that -that was a camp for 80,000 people with sufficient space. The people were -comparatively well off there. For example, they had an orchestra of 100 -men. A witness here, confirming that this orchestra played when victims -arrived at Auschwitz, made me think of that report. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, you probably won’t finish today. - -DR. STEINBAUER: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you are likely to be? - -DR. STEINBAUER: I hope to be finished, at the latest, by noon tomorrow, -but perhaps it will take only an hour. I still have questions on -plundering, economic measures, and destruction. Then I will be finished. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 June 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; -however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus -“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes -French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: -hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout. - -Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in -the trial. - -An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as -possible to the original document presentation and layout. - -[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International -Military Tribunal Vol. 15_, by Various.] - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR -CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOLUME 15 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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