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diff --git a/old/68187-0.txt b/old/68187-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ab66337..0000000 --- a/old/68187-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20602 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the War in the Peninsula -and in the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, vol. 3 -of 6, by William Francis Patrick Napier - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France - from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, vol. 3 of 6 - -Author: William Francis Patrick Napier - -Release Date: May 27, 2022 [eBook #68187] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 3 OF 6 *** - - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. - - A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example Nov^r or 5^{th}. - - Omitted text is indicated by four asterisks, * * * *. - - All changes noted in the ERRATA have been applied to the etext. - - Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been - placed at the end of the book. - - Several Sidenotes have the abbreviation S. As in other volumes, this - stands for Soult. - - With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings - of names have not been changed. - - The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font. - - Minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. - - Volume 1 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67318 - Volume 2 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67554 - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - WAR IN THE PENINSULA - - AND IN THE - - SOUTH OF FRANCE, - - FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. - - BY - - W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. - - COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, AND MEMBER OF - THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES. - - VOL. III. - - LONDON: - THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET. - - MDCCCXXXI. - - - - -TABLE OF CONTENTS. - - - BOOK IX. - - - CHAPTER I. - - Inactivity of the Asturians and Gallicians--Guerilla system - in Navarre and Aragon--The Partidas surround the third - corps--Blake abandons Aragon--Suchet’s operations against the - Partidas--Combat of Tremendal--The advantages of Suchet’s - position--Troubles at Pampeluna--Suchet ordered by Napoleon to - repair there--Observations on the Guerilla system _Page_ 1 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Continuation of the operations in Catalonia--St. Cyr sends Lecchi - to the Ampurdan; he returns with the intelligence of the Austrian - war--Of Verdier’s arrival in the Ampurdan, and of Augereau’s - appointment to the command of the seventh corps--Augereau’s - inflated proclamation--It is torn down by the Catalonians--He - remains sick at Perpignan--St. Cyr continues to command--Refuses - to obey Joseph’s orders to remove into Aragon--Presses Verdier - to commence the siege of Gerona--Reinforces Verdier--Remains - himself at Vich--Constancy of the Spaniards--St. Cyr marches - from Vich, defeats three Spanish battalions, and captures a - convoy--Storms St. Felieu de Quixols--Takes a position to cover - Verdier’s operations--Siege of Gerona--State of the contending - parties--Assault of Monjouic fails--General Fontanes storms - Palamos--Wimphen and the Milans make a vain attempt to throw - succours into Gerona--Monjouic abandoned 17 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Claros and Rovira attack Bascara and spread dismay along the - French frontier--Two Spanish officers pass the Ter and enter - Gerona with succours--Alvarez remonstrates with the junta of - Catalonia--Bad conduct of the latter--Blake advances to the aid - of the city--Pestilence there affects the French army--St. Cyr’s - firmness--Blake’s timid operations--O’Donnel fights Souham, but - without success--St. Cyr takes a position of battle--Garcia - Conde forces the French lines and introduces a convoy into - Gerona--Blake retires--Siege resumed--Garcia Conde comes out of - the city--Ridiculous error of the French--Conde forces the French - lines and escapes--Assault on Gerona fails--Blake advances a - second time--Sends another convoy under the command of O’Donnel - to the city--O’Donnel with the head of the convoy succeeds, - the remainder is cut off--Blake’s incapacity--He retires--St. - Cyr goes to Perpignan--Augereau takes the command of the - siege--O’Donnel breaks through the French lines--Blake advances a - third time--Is beaten by Souham--Pino takes Hostalrich--Admiral - Martin intercepts a French squadron--Captain Hallowell destroys a - convoy in Rosas-bay--Distress in Gerona--Alvarez is seized with - delirium, and the city surrenders--Observations 31 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Plot at Seville against the Supreme Junta defeated by lord - Wellesley--Junta propose a new form of government--Opposed by - Romana--Junta announce the convocation of the national Cortez, - but endeavour to deceive the people--A Spanish army assembled in - the Morena under Eguia--Bassecour sends cavalry to reinforce Del - Parque, who concentrates the Spanish army of the left at Ciudad - Rodrigo--He is joined by the Gallician divisions--Santocildes - occupies Astorga--French endeavour to surprise him, but are - repulsed--Ballasteros quits the Asturias and marching by Astorga - attempts to storm Zamora--Enters Portugal--Del Parque demands the - aid of the Portuguese army--Sir A. Wellesley refuses, giving his - reason in detail--Del Parque’s operations--Battle of Tamames--Del - Parque occupies Salamanca, but hearing that French troops were - assembling at Valladolid retires to Bejar 55 - - - CHAPTER V. - - Areizaga takes the command of Equia’s army and is ordered to - advance against Madrid--Folly of the Supreme Junta--Operations in - La Mancha--Combat of Dos Barrios--Cavalry combat of Ocaña--Battle - of Ocaña--Destruction of the Spanish army 67 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - King Joseph’s return to Madrid--Del Parque’s operations--Battle - of Alba de Tormes--Dispersion of the Spanish troops--Their - great sufferings and patience--The Supreme Junta treat sir - A. Wellesley’s counsels with contempt--He breaks up from the - Guadiana and moves to the Mondego--Vindication of his conduct for - having remained so long on the Guadiana--French remain torpid - about Madrid--Observations 86 - - - BOOK X. - - CHAPTER I. - - Joseph prepares to invade Andalusia--Distracted state of - affairs in that province--Military position and resources - described--Invasion of Andalusia--Passes of the Morena forced - by the French--Foolish deceit of the Supreme Junta--Tumult in - Seville--Supreme Junta dissolved--Junta of Seville re-assembles, - but disperses immediately after--The French take Jaen--Sebastiani - enters Grenada--King Joseph enters Cordoba and afterwards - marches against Seville--Albuquerque’s march to Cadiz--Seville - surrenders--Insurrection at Malaga put down by Sebastiani--Victor - invests Cadiz--Faction in that city--Mortier marches against - Badajos--The visconde de Gand flies to Ayamonte--Inhospitable - conduct of the bishop of Algarve 101 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Operations in Navarre, Aragon, and Valencia--Pursuit of - the student Mina--Suchet’s preparations--His incursion - against Valencia--Returns to Aragon--Difficulty of the - war in Catalonia--Operations of the seventh corps--French - detachments surprised at Mollet and San Perpetua--Augereau - enters Barcelona--Sends Duhesme to France--Returns to - Gerona--O’Donnel rallies the Spanish army near Centellas--Combat - of Vich--Spaniards make vain efforts to raise the blockade of - Hostalrich--Augereau again advances to Barcelona--Sends two - divisions to Reus--Occupies Manreza and Villa Franca--French - troops defeated at Villa Franca and Esparaguera--Swartz abandons - Manreza--Is defeated at Savadel--Colonel Villatte communicates - with the third corps by Falcet--Severolli retreats from Reus to - Villa Franca--Is harassed on the march--Augereau’s unskilful - conduct--Hostalrich falls--Gallant exploit of the governor, - Julian Estrada--Cruelty of Augereau 124 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Suchet marches against Lerida--Description of that - fortress--Suchet marches to Tarega--O’Donnel advances from - Taragona--Suchet returns to Balaguer--Combat of Margalef--Siege - of Lerida--The city stormed--Suchet drives the inhabitants into - the citadel and thus forces it to surrender 144 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Reflections on that act--Lazan enters Alcanitz, but is driven out - by the French--Colonel Petit taken with a convoy by Villa Campa, - and assassinated after the action--Siege of Mequinenza--Fall - of that place--Morella taken--Suchet prepares to enter - Catalonia--Strength and resources of that province 158 - - - CHAPTER V. - - Operations in Andalusia--Blockade of Cadiz--Dissentions in - that city--Regency formed--Albuquerque sent to England--Dies - there--Regency consent to admit British troops--General Colin - Campbell obtains leave to put a garrison in Ceuta, and to destroy - the Spanish lines at San Roque--General William Stewart arrives - at Cadiz--Seizes Matagorda--Tempest destroys many vessels--Mr. - Henry Wellesley and general Graham arrive at Cadiz--Apathy of - the Spaniards--Gallant defence of Matagorda--Heroic conduct of a - sergeant’s wife--General Campbell sends a detachment to occupy - Tarifa--French prisoners cut the cables of the prison-hulks, - and drift during a tempest--General Lacey’s expedition to the - Ronda--His bad conduct--Returns to Cadiz--Reflections on the - state of affairs 169 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - Continuation of the operations in Andalusia--Description of - the Spanish and Portuguese lines of position south of the - Tagus--Situation of the armies in Estremadura--Complex operations - in that province--Soult’s policy 188 - - - CHAPTER VII. - - Situation of the armies north of the Tagus--Operations in Old - Castile and the Asturias--Ney menaces Ciudad Rodrigo--Loison - repulsed from Astorga--Kellerman chases Carrera from the - Gata mountains--Obscurity of the French projects--Siege of - Astorga--Mahi driven into Gallicia--Spaniards defeated at - Mombouey--Ney concentrates the sixth corps at Salamanca--The - ninth corps and the imperial guards enter Spain--Massena - assumes the command of the army of Portugal and of the - northern provinces--Ney commences the first siege of Ciudad - Rodrigo--Julian Sanchez breaks out of the town--Massena - arrives and alters the plan of attack--Daring action of three - French soldiers--Place surrenders--Andreas Herrasti--His fine - conduct--Reflections upon the Spanish character 201 - - - BOOK XI. - - CHAPTER I. - - Lord Wellington’s policy--Change of administration in - England--Duel between lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning--Lord - Wellesley joins the new ministry--Debates in Parliament--Factious - violence on both sides--Lord Wellington’s sagacity and firmness - vindicated--His views for the defence of Portugal--Ministers - accede to his demands--Grandeur of Napoleon’s designs against the - Peninsula--Lord Wellington enters into fresh explanation with the - English ministers--Discusses the state of the war--Similarity - of his views with those of sir John Moore--His reasons for not - advancing into Spain explained and vindicated 215 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Greatness of lord Wellington’s plans--Situation of the - belligerents described--State of the French--Character of - Joseph--Of his Ministers--Disputes with the Marshals--Napoleon’s - policy--Military governments--Almenara sent to Paris--Curious - deception executed by the marquis of Romana, Mr. Stuart, - and the historian Cabanes--Prodigious force of the French - army--State of Spain--Inertness of Gallicia--Secret plan of - the Regency for encouraging the Guerillas--Operations of those - bands--Injustice and absurdity of the Regency, with respect to - South America--England--State of parties--Factious injustice on - both sides--Difficulty of raising money--Bullion committee--Wm. - Cobbett--Lord King--Mr. Vansittart--Extravagance of the - Ministers--State of Portugal--Parties in that country--Intrigues - of the Patriarch and the Souza’s--Mr. Stuart is appointed - Plenipotentiary--His firmness--Princess Carlotta claims the - regency of the whole Peninsula, and the succession to the throne - of Spain 234 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Lord Wellington’s scheme for the defence of Portugal--Vastness - of his designs--Number of his troops--Description of the - country--Plan of defence analysed--Difficulty of supplying the - army--Resources of the belligerents compared--Character of the - British soldier 254 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Character of Miguel Alava--Portuguese government demand more - English troops--Lord Wellington refuses, and reproaches the - Regency--The factious conduct of the latter--Character of the - light division--General Crawfurd passed the Coa--His activity - and skilful arrangements--Is joined by Carrera--Skirmish - at Barba del Puerco--Carrera invites Ney to desert--Romana - arrives at head-quarters--Lord Wellington refuses to succour - Ciudad Rodrigo--His decision vindicated--Crawfurd’s ability - and obstinacy--He maintains his position--Skirmish at - Alameda--Captain Kraükenberg’s gallantry--Skirmish at Villa de - Puerco--Colonel Talbot killed--Gallantry of the French captain - Guache--Combat of the Coa--Comparison between general Picton and - general Crawfurd 273 - - - CHAPTER V. - - Slight operations in Gallicia, Castile, the Asturias, - Estremadura, and Andalusia--Reynier passes the Tagus--Hill - makes a parallel movement--Romana spreads his troops - over Estremadura--Lord Wellington assembles a reserve at - Thomar--Critical situation of Silveira--Captures a Swiss - battalion at Puebla de Senabria--Romana’s troops defeated at - Benvenida--Lascy and captain Cockburne land troops at Moguer - but are forced to reimbark--Lord Wellington’s plan--How - thwarted--Siege of Almeida--Allies advance to Frexadas--The - magazine of Almeida explodes--Treachery of Bareiros--Town - surrenders--The allies withdraw behind the Mondego--Fort of - Albuquerque ruined by an explosion--Reynier marches on Sabugal, - but returns to Zarza Mayor--Napoleon directs Massena to - advance--Description of the country--Erroneous notions of lord - Wellington’s views entertained by both armies 296 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - Third Invasion of Portugal--Napoleon’s prudence in military - affairs vindicated--Massena concentrated his corps--Occupies - Guarda--Passes the Mondego--Marches on Viseu--Lord Wellington - falls back--Secures Coimbra, passes to the right bank of the - Mondego, and is joined by the reserve from Thomar--General - Hill anticipates his orders, and by a forced march reaches the - Alva--The allied army is thus interposed between the French - and Coimbra--Daring action of colonel Trant--Contemporaneous - events in Estremadura, and the Condado de Niebla--Romana - defeated--Gallantry of the Portuguese cavalry under general - Madden--Dangerous crisis of affairs--Violence of the Souza - faction--An indiscreet letter from an English officer, creates - great confusion at Oporto--Lord Wellington rebukes the Portuguese - Regency--He is forced to alter his plans, and resolves to offer - battle--Chooses the position of Busaco 312 - - - CHAPTER VII. - - General Pack destroys the bridges on the Criz and Dao--Remarkable - panic in the light division--The second and sixth corps arrive in - front of Busaco--Ney and Regnier desire to attack, but Massena - delays--The eighth corps and the cavalry arrive--Battle of - Busaco--Massena turns the right of the allies--Lord Wellington - falls back, and orders the northern militia to close on the - French rear--Cavalry skirmish on the Mondego--Coimbra evacuated, - dreadful scene there--Disorders in the army--Lord Wellington’s - firmness contrasted with Massena’s indolence--Observations 325 - - - CHAPTER VIII. - - Massena resumes his march--The militia close upon his - rear--Cavalry skirmish near Leiria--Allies retreat upon the - lines--Colonel Trant surprises Coimbra--The French army continues - its march--Cavalry skirmish at Rio Mayor--General Crawfurd is - surprised at Alemquer and retreats by the wrong road--Dangerous - results of this error--Description of the lines of Torres - Vedras--Massena arrives in front of them--Romana reinforces - Lord Wellington with two Spanish divisions--Remarkable works - executed by the light division at Aruda--The French skirmish at - Sobral--General Harvey wounded--General St. Croix killed--Massena - takes a permanent position in front of the Lines--He is harassed - on the rear and flanks by the British cavalry and the Portuguese - militia 340 - - - CHAPTER IX. - - State of Lisbon--Embargo on the vessels in the river--Factious - conduct of the Patriarch--The desponding letters from the - army--Alarm--Lord Liverpool--Lord Wellington displays the - greatest firmness, vigour, and dignity, of mind--He rebukes - the Portuguese Regency, and exposes the duplicity and - presumption of the Patriarch’s faction--Violence of this - faction--Curious revelation made by Baron Eben and the editor - of the Brazilienza--Lord Wellesley awes the Court of Rio - Janeiro--Strengthens the authority of Lord Wellington and Mr. - Stuart--The French seize the Islands in the river--Foolish - conduct of the governor of Setuval--General Fane sent to the left - bank of the Tagus--Lord Wellington’s embarrassments become more - serious--The heights of Almada fortified--Violent altercation of - the Regency upon this subject--The Patriarch insults Mr. Stuart - and nearly ruins the common cause 364 - - - CHAPTER X. - - Massena’s pertinacity--He collects boats on the Tagus, - and establishes a depôt at Santarem--Sends general Foy to - Paris--Casts a bridge over the Zezere--Abandons his position in - front of the Lines--Is followed by lord Wellington--Exploit of - serjeant Baxter--Massena assumes the position of Santarem--Lord - Wellington sends general Hill across the Tagus--Prepares to - attack the French--Abandons this design and assumes a permanent - position--Policy of the hostile generals exposed--General - Gardanne arrives at Cardigos with a convoy, but retreats - again--The French marauders spread to the Mondego--Lord - Wellington demands reinforcements--Beresford takes the command - on the left of the Tagus--Operations of the militia in - Beira--General Drouet enters Portugal with the ninth corps--Joins - Massena at Espinhal--Occupies Leiria--Claparede defeats Silveira - and takes Lamego--Returns to the Mondego--Seizes Guarda and - Covilhao--Foy returns from France--The duke of Abrantes wounded - in a skirmish at Rio Mayor--General Pamplona organizes a secret - communication with Lisbon--Observations 377 - - - BOOK XII. - - CHAPTER I. - - General sketch of the state of the war--Lord Wellington objects - to maritime operations--Expedition to Fuengirola--Minor - operations in Andalusia--National Cortez assemble in the - Isla de Leon--Its proceedings--New regency chosen--Factions - described--Violence of all parties--Unjust treatment of the - colonies 402 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Soult assumes the direction of the blockade of Cadiz--His - flotilla--Enters the Troccadero canal--Villantroys, or - cannon-mortars, employed by the French--Inactivity of the - Spaniards--Napoleon directs Soult to aid Massena--Has some - notion of evacuating Andalusia--Soult’s first expedition - to Estremadura--Carries the bridge of Merida--Besieges - Olivenza--Ballasteros defeated at Castellejos--Flies into - Portugal--Romana’s divisions march from Cartaxo to the succour of - Olivenza--That place surrenders--Romana dies--His character--Lord - Wellington’s counsels neglected by the Spanish generals--First - siege of Badajos--Mendizabel arrives--Files the Spanish army into - Badajos--Makes a grand sally--Is driven back with loss--Pitches - his camp round San Christoval--Battle of the Gebora--Continuation - of the blockade of Cadiz--Expedition of the allies under general - Lapeña--Battle of Barosa--Factions in Cadiz 421 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Siege of Badajos continued--Imas surrenders--His cowardice - and treachery--Albuquerque and Valencia de Alcantara taken - by the French--Soult returns to Andalusia--Relative state of - the armies at Santarem--Retreat of the French--Massena’s able - movement--Skirmish at Pombal--Combat of Redinha--Massena halts - at Condeixa--Montbrun endeavours to seize Coimbra--Baffled by - colonel Trant--Condeixa burnt by the French--Combat of Casal - Nova--General Cole turns the French at Panella--Combat of Foz - d’Aronce--Massena retires behind the Alva 450 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Allies halt for provisions--State of the campaign--Passage of the - Ceira--Passage of the Alva--Massena retires to Celerico--Resolves - to march upon Coria--Is prevented by Ney, who is deprived of - his command and sent to France--Massena abandons Celerico and - takes post at Guarda--The allies oblige the French to quit that - position, and Massena takes a new one behind the Coa--Combat of - Sabugal--Trant crosses the Coa and cuts the communication between - Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo--His danger--He is released by the - British cavalry and artillery--Massena abandons Portugal 473 - - - CHAPTER V. - - Estimate of the French loss--Anecdote of Colonel Waters--Lord - Wellington’s great conceptions explained--How impeded--Affairs - in the south of Spain--Formation of the fourth and fifth - Spanish armies--Siege of Campo Mayor--Place falls--Excellent - conduct of major Tallaia--Beresford surprises Montbrun--Combat - of cavalry--Campo Mayor recovered--Beresford takes - cantonments round Elvas--His difficulties--Reflections upon - his proceedings--He throws a bridge near Jerumenha and - passes the Guadiana--Outposts of cavalry cut off by the - French--Castaños arrives at Elvas--Arrangements relative to - the chief command--Beresford advances against Latour Maubourg, - who returns to Llerena--General Cole takes Olivenza--Cavalry - skirmish near Usagre--Lord Wellington arrives at Elvas, examines - Badajos--Skirmish there--Arranges the operations--Political - difficulties--Lord Wellington returns to the Agueda--Operations - in the north--Skirmishes on the Agueda--Massena advances to - Ciudad Rodrigo--Lord Wellington reaches the army--Retires behind - the Dos Casas--Combat of Fuentes Onoro--Battle of Fuentes - Onoro--Evacuation of Almeida 489 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - Lord Wellington quits the army of Beira--Marshal Beresford’s - operations--Colonel Colborne’s beats up the French quarters - in Estremadura, and intercepts their convoys--First English - siege of Badajos--Captain Squires breaks ground before San - Cristoval--His works overwhelmed by the French fire--Soult - advances to relieve the place--Beresford raises the siege--Holds - a conference with the Spanish generals, and resolves to - fight--Colonel Colborne rejoins the army, which takes a position - at Albuera--Allied cavalry driven in by the French--General Blake - joins Beresford--General Cole arrives on the frontier--Battle of - Albuera 523 - - - CHAPTER VII. - - Continuation of the battle of Albuera--Dreadful state of both - armies--Soult retreats to Solano--General Hamilton resumes the - investment of Badajos--Lord Wellington reaches the field of - battle--Third and seventh divisions arrive--Beresford follows - Soult--The latter abandons the castle of Villalba and retreats - to Llerena--Cavalry action at Usagre--Beresford quits the - army--General Hill reassumes the command of the second division, - and lord Wellington renews the siege of Badajos.--Observations 542 - - - _Papers relating to the former volumes._ - - I. Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby 559 - - II. Note upon the situation of Spain in 1808, dictated by - Napoleon 560 - - - APPENDIX. - - No. I. - - Returns of the French army in the Peninsula, extracted from the - French muster-rolls 567 - - No. II. - - Extracts of letters from lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, and - one from sir John Moore to major-general M’Kenzie, commanding in - Portugal 573 - - No. III. - - Extracts from the correspondence of a field-officer of engineers, - employed at Cadiz, and extracts from the official abstract of - military reports from the British commanders at Cadiz 580 - - No. IV. - - Extracts from king Joseph’s correspondence 583 - - No. V. - - Extracts of letters from lord Wellington 586 - - No. VI. - - Extracts from a report made by the duke of Dalmatia to the prince - of Wagram and Neufchatel 603 - - Intercepted letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor 607 - - No. VII. - - Miscellaneous correspondence of the French marshals and others, - and extracts from general Pelet’s journal 607 - - No. VIII. - - The French officers, prisoners of war at Oporto, to general Trant 623 - - No. IX. - - A letter from lieutenant-general Graham to the right hon. H. - Wellesley, and state of the troops at Tarifa, under his command 624 - - Extract of a letter from general Frederick Ponsonby, and various - other documents 629 - - No. X. - - Extracts from the correspondence of captain Squires, of the - engineers 638 - - No. XI. - - Extract of a letter from general Campbell to lord Melville 639 - - - - -ERRATA. - - - Page 10, line 6, _for_ “Caspe secured the communication between the - wings of the third corps and Fraga, and its - wooden bridge, &c.” _read_ “Caspe secured the - communication between the wings of the third - corps, while Fraga and its wooden bridge, &c.” - - .. 14, .. last, _for_ “absolutely” _read_ “absolute.” - - .. 71, .. 16, _for_ “Bulluno” _read_ “Belluno.” - - .. 91, .. 20, _for_ “thousend” _read_ “thousand.” - - .. 139, margin, _for_ “Istoria militaire degl’Italiano” _read_ - “Istoria militáre degl’Italiani.” - - .. 143, .. 10, _for_ “Augereau’s” _read_ “Augereau.” - - .. 194, .. 3 from bottom, _for_ “marched” _read_ “march.” - - .. 216, .. 15, _for_ “fitting, out &c.” _read_ “fitting out, &c.” - - .. 219, .. 6 from bottom, _for_ “even that in case” _read_ “even - in that case.” - - .. 249, .. 3, _for_ “denied” _read_ “desired.” - - .. 278, .. 14 from bottom, _for_ “him” _read_ “he.” - - .. 304, .. 10 from bottom, _for_ “amounted” _read_ “mounted.” - - .. 306, .. 11 from bottom, _for_ “only” _read_ “principal.” - - .. 319, .. 23, _for_ “severally” _read_ “several.” - - .. 382, .. 6, _for_ “where” _read_ “there.” - - .. 392, .. 5, _for_ “right bank” _read_ “left bank.” - - .. 417, .. 4, _for_ “latter” _read_ “Cortes.” - - .. 431, .. 17, _for_ “besieged” _read_ “besiegers.” - - .. 443, .. 2 from bottom, _for_ “Dikies” _read_ “Dilke.” - - .. 465, margin, _for_ “Campagne de Français” _read_ “Campagne - des Français.” - - .. 470, .. 9, _for_ “Fons” _read_ “Foz.” - - .. 470, .. 17, _for_ “Fons” _read_ “Foz.” - - .. 512, .. 2, _for_ “eight” _read_ “eighth.” - - - - -LIST OF PLATES. - - - No. 1. Suchet’s Operations, 1809-10 _to face page_ 10 - - 2. Siege of Gerona _to face page_ 48 - - 3. Areizaga’s Operations, 1809 _to face page_ 84 - - 4. Invasion of Andalusia, 1810 _to face page_ 108 - - 5. Defence of Portugal, 1810 _to face page_ 266 - - 6. Crawfurd’s Operations, 1810 _to face page_ 292 - - 7. Operations on the Mondego, 1810 _to face page_ 334 - - 8. Lines of Torres Vedras, 1810 _to face page_ 358 - - 9. Battle of Barosa, March 5th, 1811 _to face page_ 446 - - 10. Massena’s Retreat, Combat of Sabugal, 1811 _to face page_ 486 - - 11. Battle of Fuentes Onoro _to face page_ 516 - - 12. Battle of Albuera _to face page_ 540 - - - - -NOTICE. - - -The manuscript authorities consulted for this volume consist of -original papers and correspondence of the duke of Wellington, marshal -Soult, king Joseph, Mr. Stuart,[1] general Graham,[2] general -Pelet,[3] general Campbell,[4] captain Codrington,[5] and colonel -Cox,[6] together with many private journals and letters of officers -employed during the war. - -Before the Appendix two papers are inserted, the one a letter from -major-general Frederick Ponsonby relative to a passage in the -description of the battle of Talavera; the other is an original note -by the emperor Napoleon, which I had not seen when I published my -first volume. The reader is referred to it as confirmatory of the -arguments used by me when objecting to Joseph’s retreat from Madrid. - - - The reader is informed that, in the second volume, Book VI. & - VII. should be Book VI., and Book IX. should be Book VIII. - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - PENINSULAR WAR. - - - - -BOOK IX. - - -CHAPTER I. - -[Sidenote: 1809.] - -When Gallicia was delivered by the campaign of Talavera, the Asturias -became the head of a new line of operation threatening the enemy’s -principal communication with France. But this advantage was feebly -used. Kellerman’s division at Valladolid, and Bonet’s at San Andero, -sufficed to hold both Asturians and Gallicians in check; and the -sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus, were colaterally, -as well as directly, unprofitable to the allies. In other parts the -war was steadily progressive in favour of the French; yet their -career was one of pains and difficulties. - -Hitherto Biscay had been tranquil, and Navarre so submissive, that -the artillery employed against Zaragoza, was conveyed by the country -people, without an escort, from Pampeluna to Tudela. But when the -battle of Belchite terminated the regular warfare in Aragon, the -Guerilla system commenced in those parts; and as the chiefs acquired -reputation at the moment when Blake was losing credit by defeats, -the dispersed soldiers flocked to their standards; hoping thus to -cover past disgrace, and to live with a greater license, because the -regular armies suffered under the restraints without enjoying the -benefits of discipline, while the irregulars purveyed for themselves. - -Zaragoza is surrounded by rugged mountains, and every range became -the mother of a Guerilla brood; nor were the regular Partizan corps -less numerous than the Partidas. On the left of the Ebro, the -Catalonian colonels, Baget, Perena, Pedroza, and the chief Theobaldo, -brought their Migueletes to the Sierra de Guara, overhanging Huesca -and Barbastro. In this position, commanding the sources of the -Cinca and operating on both sides of that river, they harassed -the communication between Zaragoza and the French outposts; and -maintained an intercourse with the governor of Lerida, who directed -the movements and supplied the wants of all the bands in Aragon. - -On the right of the Ebro, troops raised in the district of Molina, -were united to the corps of Gayan, and that officer, taking -possession of the mountains of Montalvan, the valley of the Xiloca, -and the town of Daroca, pushed his advanced guards even to the plain -of Zaragoza, and occupied Nuestra Senora del Aguilar. This convent, -situated on the top of a high rock, near Cariñena, he made a depôt -of provisions and ammunition, and surrounded the building with an -entrenched camp for three thousand men. - -On Gayan’s left, general Villa Campa, a man of talent and energy, -established himself at Calatayud, with the regular regiments of Soria -and La Princessa, and making fresh levies, rapidly formed a large -force, with which he cut the direct line of communication between -Zaragoza and Madrid. - -Beyond Villa Campa’s positions the circle of war was continued -by other bands; which, descending from the Moncayo mountains, -infested the districts of Taranzona and Borja, and intercepted the -communications between Tudela and Zaragoza. - -The younger Mina, called the student, vexed all the country between -Tudela and Pampeluna; and the inhabitants of the high Pyrennean -valleys of Roncal, Salazar, Anso, and Echo, were also in arms, and -commanded by Renovalles. This general officer, taken at Zaragoza, -was, by the French, said to have broken his parole; but he, pleading -a previous breach of the capitulation, fled to Lerida, and from -thence passing with some regular officers into the valleys, took the -command of the insurrection, and succeeded in surprising several -French detachments. His principal post was at the convent of San Juan -de la Pena, which is built on a rock, remarkable in Spanish history -as a place of refuge maintained with success against the Moorish -conquerors. The bodies of twenty-two kings of Aragon rested in the -church, and the whole rock was held in veneration by the Aragonese, -and supposed to be invulnerable. From this post Saraza, acting under -Renovalles, continually menaced Jaca, and communicating with Baget, -Pedroza, and Father Theobaldo, completed, as it were, the investment -of the third corps. - -All these bands, amounting to, at least, twenty thousand armed -men, commenced their operations at once, cutting off isolated men, -intercepting convoys and couriers, and attacking the weakest parts -of the French army. Meanwhile Blake having rallied his fugitives at -Tortoza, abandoned Aragon to its fate, and proceeding to Taragona, -endeavoured to keep the war alive in Catalonia. - -Suchet, in following up his victory at Belchite, had sent detachments -as far as Morella, on the borders of Valencia, and pushed his -scouting parties close up to Tortoza; but finding the dispersion of -Blake’s troops complete, he posted Meusnier’s division on the line -of the Guadalupe, with orders to repair the castle of Alcanitz, so -as to form a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro. Then -crossing that river at Caspe with the rest of the army, he made -demonstrations against Mequinenza, and even menaced Lerida, obliging -the governor to draw in his detachments, and close the gates. Suchet, -however, continued his march by Fraga, recrossed the Cinca, and -leaving Habert’s division to guard that line, returned himself in the -latter end of June to Zaragoza by the road of Monzon. - -Having thus dispersed the regular Spanish forces and given full -effect to his victory; the French General sought to fix himself -firmly in the positions he had gained. Sensible that arms may win -battles, but cannot render conquest permanent, he projected a system -of civil administration which enabled him to support his troops, -and yet to offer some security of property to those inhabitants -who remained tranquil. But, as it was impossible for the people to -trust to any system, or to avoid danger, while the mountains swarmed -with the Partidas, Suchet resolved to pursue the latter without -relaxation, and to put down all resistance in Aragon before he -attempted to enlarge the circle of his conquests. Foreseeing that -while he thus laid a solid base for further operations, he should -also form an army capable of executing any enterprize. - -He commenced on the side of Jaca, and having dislodged the Spaniards -from their positions near that castle, in June, supplied it with ten -months’ provisions. After this operation, Almunia and Cariñena, on -the right of the Ebro, were occupied by his detachments; and having -suddenly drawn together four battalions and a hundred cuirassiers at -the latter point, he surrounded Nuestra Senora del Aguilar, during -the night of the 19th, destroyed the entrenched camp, and sent a -detachment in pursuit of Gayan. On the same day, Pedrosa was repulsed -on the other side of the Ebro, near Barbastro, and general Habert -defeated Perena. - -The troops sent in pursuit of Gayan dispersed his corps at Uzed, -and Daroca was occupied by the French. The vicinity of Calatayud -and the mountains of Moncayo were then scoured by detachments from -Zaragoza, one of which took possession of the district of Cinco -Villas. Meanwhile Jaca was continually menaced by the Spaniards at -St. Juan de la Pena, and Saraza, descending from thence by the valley -of the Gallego, on the 23d of August, surprised and slew a detachment -of seventy men close to Zaragoza. On the 26th, however, five French -battalions stormed the sacred rock, and penetrated up the valleys of -Anso and Echo in pursuit of Renovalles. Nevertheless, that chief, -retiring to Roncal, obtained a capitulation for the valley without -surrendering himself. - -These operations having, in a certain degree, cleared Aragon of -the bands on the side of Navarre and Castile, the French general -proceeded against those on the side of Catalonia. Baget, Perena, and -Pedrosa, chased from the Sierra de Guarra, rallied between the Cinca -and the Noguerra, and were joined by Renovalles, who assumed the -chief command; but on the 23d of September, the whole being routed -by general Habert, the men dispersed, and the chiefs took refuge in -Lerida and Mequinenza. - -Suchet, then occupied Fraga, Candasnos, and Monzon, established -a flying bridge on the Cinca, near the latter town, raised some -field-works to protect it, and that done, resolved to penetrate the -districts of Venasques and Benevarres, the subjection of which would -have secured his left flank, and opened a new line of communication -with France. The inhabitants, having notice of his project, assembled -in arms, and being joined by the dispersed soldiers of the defeated -Partizans, menaced a French regiment posted at Graus. Colonel La -Peyrolerie, the commandant, marched the 17th of October, by Roda, -to meet them; and having reached a certain distance up the valley, -was surrounded, yet he broke through in the night, and regained his -post. During his absence the peasantry of the vicinity came down to -kill his sick men, but the townsmen of Graus would not suffer this -barbarity; and marshal Suchet affirms that such humane conduct was -not rare in Aragonese towns. - -While this was passing in the valley of Venasque, the governor of -Lerida caused Caspe, Fraga, and Candasnos to be attacked, and some -sharp fighting took place. The French maintained their posts, but -the whole circle of their cantonments being still infested by the -smaller bands, petty actions were fought at Belchite, and on the side -of Molino, at Arnedo, and at Soria. Mina also still intercepted the -communications with Pampeluna; and Villa Campa, quitting Calatayud, -rallied Gayan’s troops, and gathered others on the rocky mountain of -Tremendal, where a large convent and church once more furnished as a -citadel for an entrenched camp. Against this place colonel Henriod -marched in November, from Daroca, with from fifteen hundred to two -thousand men and three pieces of artillery, and driving back some -advanced posts from Ojos Negros to Origuela; came in front of the -main position at eleven o’clock in the morning of the 25th. - - -COMBAT OF TREMENDAL. - -The Spaniards were on a mountain, from the centre of which a tongue -of land shooting out, overhung Origuela, and on the upper part of -this tongue stood the fortified convent of Tremendal. To the right -and left the rocks were nearly perpendicular, and Henriod, seeing -that Villa Campa was too strongly posted to be beaten by an open -attack, imposed upon his adversary by skirmishing and making as if -he would turn the right of the position by the road of Albaracin. -Villa Campa was thus induced to mass his forces on that side. In the -night, the fire of the bivouacs enabled the Spaniards to see that the -main body of the French troops and the baggage were retiring, and, -at the same time, Henriod, with six chosen companies and two pieces -of artillery, coming against the centre, suddenly drove the Spanish -outposts into the fortified convent, and opened a fire with his -guns, as if to cover the retreat. The skirmish soon ceased, and Villa -Campa, satisfied that the French had retired, was thrown completely -off his guard, when Henriod’s six companies, secretly scaling the -rocks of the position, rushed amongst the sleeping Spaniards, -killed and wounded five hundred, and put the whole army to flight. -Meanwhile, on the other side of the Ebro, a second attempt was made -against the valley of Venasque, which being successful, that district -was disarmed. - -Petty combats still continued to be fought in other parts of Aragon, -but the obstinacy of the Spaniards gradually gave way. In the month -of December, Suchet (assisted by general Milhaud, with a moveable -column from Madrid,) took the towns of Albaracin and Teruel, the -insurgent junta fled to Valencia, and the subjection of Aragon was, -in a manner effected. The interior was disarmed and quieted, and -the Partidas, which still hung upon the frontiers, were recruited, -as well as supplied, from other provinces, and acted chiefly on the -defensive. The Aragonese also were so vexed by the smaller bands, now -dwindling into mere banditti, that a smuggler of Barbastro raised a -Spanish corps, with which he chased and suppressed many of them. - -Reinforcements were now pouring into Spain, and enabled the French -general to prepare for extended operations. The original Spanish army -of Aragon was reduced to about eight thousand men; of which, a part -were wandering with Villa Campa, a part were in Tortoza, and the rest -about Lerida and Mequinenza. Those fortresses were, indeed, the only -obstacles to a junction of the third with the seventh corps; and in -them the Spanish troops who still kept the field took refuge, when -closely pressed by the invaders. - -The policy of the Supreme Junta was however, always to form fresh -corps upon the remnants of their beaten armies. Hence Villa Campa, -keeping in the mountains of Albaracin, recruited his ranks, and -still infested the western frontier of Aragon: Garcia Novarro, -making Tortoza his base of operations lined the banks of the Algas, -and menaced Alcanitz: and Perena, trusting to the neighbourhood -of Lerida for support, posted himself between the Noguera and the -Segre. But the activity of the French gave little time to effect any -considerable organization. - -Suchet’s positions formed a circle round Zaragoza; and Tudela, Jaca, -and the castle of Aljaferia were garrisoned; but his principal forces -were on the Guadalupe and the Cinca, occupying Alcanitz, Caspe, -Fraga, Monzon, Barbastro, Benevarres, and Venasque; of which the -first, third, and fourth were places of strength: and certainly, -whether his situation be regarded in a political, or a military -light, it was become most important. One year had sufficed, not only -to reduce the towns and break the armies, but in part to conciliate -the feelings of the Aragonese--confessedly the most energetic portion -of the nation--and to place the third corps, with reference to the -general operations of the war, in a most formidable position. - -1º. The fortified castle of Alcanitz formed a head of cantonments on -the right bank of the Ebro; and being situated at the entrance of the -passes leading into Valencia, it also furnished a base, from which -Suchet could invade that rich province; and by which also, he could -place the Catalonian army between two fires, whenever the seventh -corps should again advance beyond the Llobregat. - -2º. Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third -corps, while Fraga and its wooden bridge over the Cinca, offered the -means of passing that uncertain river at all seasons. - -3º. Monzon, a regular fortification, in some measure balanced Lerida; -and its flying bridge over the Cinca enabled the French to forage all -the country between Lerida and Venasques; moreover a co-operation -of the garrison of Monzon, the troops at Barbastro, and those at -Benevarres, could always curb Perena. - -4º. The possession of Venasques permitted Suchet to communicate with -the moveable columns, (appointed to guard the French frontier,) while -the castle of Jaca rendered the third corps in a manner independent -of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In fine, the position on the Cinca -and the Guadalupe, menacing alike Catalonia and Valencia, connected -the operations of the third with the seventh corps; and henceforward -we shall find these two armies gradually approximating until they -form but one force, acting upon a distinct system of invasion against -the south. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 1._ - - SUCHET’S OPERATIONS - 1809-10. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -Suchet’s projects were, however, retarded by insurrections in -Navarre, which, at this period, assumed a serious aspect. The student -Mina, far from being quelled by the troops sent at different periods -in chase of him, daily increased his forces, and, by hardy and sudden -enterprizes, kept the Navarrese in commotion. The duke of Mahon, -one of Joseph’s Spanish adherents, appointed viceroy of Navarre, was -at variance with the military authorities; and all the disorders -attendant on a divided administration, and a rapacious system, -ensued. General D’Agoult, the governor of Pampeluna, was accused of -being in Mina’s pay. His suicide during an investigation seems to -confirm the suspicion, but it is also abundantly evident, that the -whole administration of Navarre was oppressive, venal, and weak. - -To avert the serious danger of an insurrection so close to France, -the emperor directed Suchet to repair there with a part of the third -corps. That general soon restored order in Pampeluna, and eventually -captured Mina himself; but he was unable to suppress the system of -the Partidas. “_Espoz y Mina_” took his nephew’s place; and from that -time to the end of the war, the communications of the French were -troubled, and considerable losses inflicted upon their armies by this -celebrated man--undoubtedly the most conspicuous person among the -Partida chiefs. And here it may be observed how weak and inefficient -this guerilla system was to deliver the country, and that, even as an -auxiliary, its advantages were nearly balanced by the evils. - -It was in the provinces lying between France and the Ebro that -it commenced. It was in those provinces that it could effect the -greatest injury to the French cause; and it was precisely in those -provinces that it was conducted with the greatest energy, although -less assisted by the English than any other part of Spain: a fact -leading to the conclusion, that ready and copious succours may be -hurtful to a people situated as the Spaniards were. When so assisted, -men are apt to rely more upon their allies than upon their own -exertions. But however this may be, it is certain that the Partidas -of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, although they amounted at -one time to above thirty thousand men, accustomed to arms, and often -commanded by men of undoubted enterprize and courage, never occupied -half their own number of French at one time; never absolutely -defeated a single division; never prevented any considerable -enterprize; never, with the exception of the surprise of Figueras, to -be hereafter spoken of, performed any exploit seriously affecting the -operations of a single “corps d’armée.” - -It is true, that if a whole nation will but persevere in such a -system, it must in time destroy the most numerous armies. But no -people will thus persevere, the aged, the sick, the timid, the -helpless, are all hinderers of the bold and robust. There will, also, -be a difficulty to procure arms, for it is not on every occasion -that so rich and powerful a people as the English, will be found in -alliance with insurrection; and when the invaders follow up their -victories by a prudent conduct, as was the case with Suchet and some -others of the French generals, the result is certain. The desire of -ease natural to mankind, prevails against the suggestions of honour; -and although the opportunity of covering personal ambition with the -garb of patriotism may cause many attempts to throw off the yoke, -the bulk of the invaded people will gradually become submissive and -tranquil. It is a fact that, notwithstanding the violent measures -resorted to by the Partida chiefs to fill their ranks, deserters -from the French and even from the British formed one-third of their -bands. - -To raise a whole people against an invader may be easy, but to direct -the energy thus aroused, is a gigantic task, and, if misdirected, -the result will be more injurious than advantageous. That it was -misdirected in Spain was the opinion of many able men of all sides, -and to represent it otherwise, is to make history give false lessons -to posterity. Portugal was thrown completely into the hands of lord -Wellington; but that great man, instead of following the example of -the Supreme Junta, and encouraging independent bands, enforced a -military organization upon totally different principles. The people -were, indeed, called upon and obliged to resist the enemy, but it -was under a regular system, by which all classes were kept in just -bounds, and the whole physical and moral power of the nation rendered -subservient to the plan of the general-in-chief. To act differently -is to confess weakness: it is to say that the government being -unequal to the direction of affairs permits anarchy. - -The Partida system in Spain, was the offspring of disorder, and -disorder in war is weakness accompanied by ills the least of which is -sufficient to produce ruin. It is in such a warfare, that habits of -unbridled license, of unprincipled violence, and disrespect for the -rights of property are quickly contracted, and render men unfit for -the duties of citizens; and yet it has with singular inconsistency -been cited, as the best and surest mode of resisting an enemy, by -politicians, who hold regular armies in abhorrence, although a high -sense of honour, devotion to the cause of the country, temperance, -regularity, and decent manners are of the very essence of the -latter’s discipline. - -[Sidenote: Extract from the Life of Mina.] - -Regular armies have seldom failed to produce great men, and one -great man is sufficient to save a nation: but when every person is -permitted to make war in the manner most agreeable to himself;--for -one that comes forward with patriotic intentions, there will be two -to act from personal interest; in short, there will be more robbers -than generals. One of the first exploits of Espoz y Mina was to -slay the commander of a neighbouring band, because, under the mask -of patriotism, he was plundering his own countrymen: nay, this the -most fortunate of all the chiefs, would never suffer any other -Partida than his own to be in his district; he also, as I have before -related, made a species of commercial treaty with the French, and -strove earnestly and successfully to raise his band to the dignity -of a regular force. Nor was this manner of considering the guerilla -system confined to the one side. The following observations of St. -Cyr, a man of acknowledged talents, show that, after considerable -experience of this mode of warfare, he also felt that the evil was -greater than the benefit. - -“Far from casting general blame on the efforts made by the Catalans, -I admired them; but, as they often exceeded the bounds of reason, -their heroism was detrimental to their cause. Many times it caused -the destruction of whole populations without necessity and without -advantage.” - -“When a country is invaded by an army stronger than that which -defends it, it is beyond question that the population should come -to the assistance of the troops, and lend them every support; but, -without an absolute necessity, the former should not be brought on -to the field of battle.”--“It is inhuman to place their inexperience -in opposition to hardened veterans.” - -“Instead of _exasperating_ the people of Catalonia, the leaders -should have endeavoured to _calm_ them, and have directed their -ardour so as to second the army on great occasions. But they excited -them without cessation, led them day after day into fire, fatigued -them, harassed them, forced them to abandon their habitations, to -embark if they were on the coast, if inland to take to the mountains -and perish of misery within sight of their own homes, thus abandoned -to the mercy of a hungry and exasperated soldiery. The people’s -ardour was exhausted daily in partial operations, and hence, on great -occasions, when they could have been eminently useful, they were not -to be had.” - -“Their good will had been so often abused by the folly of their -leaders, that many times their assistance was called for in vain. -The peasantry, of whom so much had been demanded, began to demand in -their turn. They insisted that the soldiers should fight always to -the last gasp, were angry when the latter retreated, and robbed and -ill-used them when broken by defeat.” - -“They had been so excited, so exasperated against the French, that -they became habitually ferocious, and their ferocity was often -as dangerous to their own party, as to the enemy. The atrocities -committed against their own chiefs disgusted the most patriotic, -abated their zeal, caused the middle classes to desire peace as -the only remedy of a system so replete with disorder. Numbers of -distinguished men, even those who had vehemently opposed Joseph at -first, began to abandon Ferdinand; and it is certain that, but for -the expedition to Russia, that branch of the Bourbons which reigns in -Spain, would never have remounted the throne.” - -“The cruelties exercised upon the French military were as little -conformable to the interest of the Spaniards. Those men were but the -slaves of their duty, and of the state; certain of death a little -sooner or a little later, they, like the Spaniards, were victims of -the same ambition. The soldier naturally becomes cruel in protracted -warfare; but the treatment experienced from the Catalans brought out -this disposition prematurely; and that unhappy people were themselves -the victims of a cruelty, which either of their own will or excited -by others, they had exercised upon those troops that fell into -their power; and this without any advantage to their cause, while a -contrary system would, in a little time, have broken up the seventh -corps,--seeing that the latter was composed of foreigners, naturally -inclined to desert. But the murders of all wounded, and sick, and -helpless men, created such horror, that the desertion, which at first -menaced total destruction, ceased entirely.” - -Such were St. Cyr’s opinions; and, assuredly, the struggle in -Catalonia, of which it is now the time to resume the relation, was -not the least successful in Spain. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. - - -[Sidenote: See Vol II. p. 102.] - -The narrative of the Catalonian affairs was broken off at the -moment, when St. Cyr having established his quarters at Vich, -received intelligence of the Austrian war, and that Barcelona had -been relieved by the squadron of admiral Comaso. His whole attention -was then directed towards Gerona; and with a view to hastening -general Reille’s preparation for the siege of that place, a second -detachment, under Lecchi, proceeded to the Ampurdan. - -During this time Conpigny continued at Taragona, and Blake made -his fatal march into Aragon; but those troops which, under Milans -and Wimphen, had composed Reding’s left wing, were continually -skirmishing with the French posts in the valley of Vich, and the -Partizans, especially Claros and the doctor Rovira, molested the -communications in a more systematic manner than before. - -Lecchi returned about the 18th of May, with intelligence that -Napoleon had quitted Paris for Germany, that general Verdier had -replaced Reille in the Ampurdan, and that marshal Augereau had -reached Perpignan in his way to supersede St. Cyr himself in the -command of the seventh corps. The latter part of this information -gave St. Cyr infinite discontent. In his “Journal of Operations,” he -asserts that his successor earnestly sought for the appointment, and -his own observations on the occasion are sarcastic and contemptuous -of his rival. - -Augereau, who having served in Catalonia during the war of the -revolution, imagined, that he had then acquired an influence which -might be revived on the present occasion, framed a proclamation that -vied with the most inflated of Spanish manifestoes. But the latter, -although turgid, were in unison with the feelings of the people, -whereas, Augereau’s address, being at utter variance with those -feelings, was a pure folly. This proclamation he sent into Catalonia, -escorted by a battalion; but even on the frontier, the Miguelette -colonel, Porta, defeated the escort, and tore down the few copies -that had been posted. - -The French marshal, afflicted with the gout, remained at Perpignan, -and St. Cyr continued to command; but reluctantly, because (as he -affirms) the officers and soldiers were neglected, and himself -exposed to various indignities, the effects of Napoleon’s ill-will. -The most serious of these affronts was permitting Verdier to -correspond directly with the minister of war in France, and the -publishing of his reports in preference to St. Cyr’s. For these -reasons, the latter contented himself with a simple discharge of his -duty. Yet, after the conspiracy in the second corps, Napoleon cannot -be justly blamed for coldness towards an officer, who, however free -himself from encouraging the malcontents in the French army, was -certainly designed for their leader. It is rather to be admired that -the emperor discovered so little jealousy; when a man has once raised -himself to the highest power, he must inevitably give offence to his -former comrades, for, as all honours and rewards, flowing from him, -are taken as personal favours, so all checks and slights, or even -the cessation of benefits, are regarded as personal injuries. Where -the sanction of time is wanting, to identify the sovereign with the -country, the discontented easily convince themselves that revenge is -patriotism. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. II p. 363.] - -While St. Cyr was preparing for the siege of Gerona, Joseph, as -we have seen, directed him to march into Aragon, to repel Blake’s -movement against Suchet. This order he refused to obey, and with -reason; for it would have been a great error to permit Blake’s false -movement to occupy two “Corps d’Armée,” and so retard the siege of -Gerona, to the infinite detriment of the French affairs in Catalonia. -Barcelona was never safe while Hostalrich and Gerona were in the -Spaniard’s possession. St. Cyr was well aware of this, but the evils -of a divided command are soon felt. He who had been successful in all -his operations, was urgent, for many reasons, to commence the siege -without delay, but Verdier, who had failed at Zaragoza, was cautious -in attacking a town which had twice baffled Duhesme, and when pressed -to begin, complained that he could not, after placing garrisons in -Rosas and Figueras, bring ten thousand men before Gerona; which, -seeing the great extent of the works, were insufficient. - -St. Cyr, disregarding the works, observed that the garrison did not -exceed three thousand men, that it could not well be increased, and -that expedition was of more consequence than numbers. Nevertheless, -considering that a depôt of provisions, established for the service -of the siege at Figueras, and which it was unlikely Napoleon would -replenish, must, by delay, be exhausted, as well as the supplies -which he had himself collected at Vich: he sent all his own -cannoniers, sappers, and artillery horses, two squadrons of cavalry, -and six battalions of infantry to the Ampurdan, and having thus -increased the number of troops there to eighteen thousand men, again -urged Verdier to be expedite. - -These reinforcements marched the 22d of May, and the covering army -diminished to about twelve thousand men under arms, continued to hold -the valley of Vich until the middle of June. During this time, the -Miguelettes often skirmished with the advanced posts, but without -skill or profit; and the inhabitants of the town, always remained -in the high mountains unsheltered and starving, yet still firm of -resolution not to dwell with the invaders. This may be attributed -partly to fear, but more to that susceptibility to grand sentiments, -which distinguishes the Spanish peasants. Although little remarkable -for hardihood in the field, their Moorish blood is attested by -their fortitude; and, men and women alike, they endure calamity -with a singular and unostentatious courage. In this they are truly -admirable. But their virtues are passive, their faults active, and, -continually instigated by a peculiar arrogance, they are perpetually -projecting enterprises which they have not sufficient vigour to -execute, although at all times they are confident and boasting more -than becomes either wise or brave men. - -Early in June, St. Cyr, having consumed nearly all his corn, resolved -to approach Gerona, and secure the harvest which was almost ripe in -that district; but, previous to quitting Vich, he sent his sick and -wounded men, under a strong escort, to Barcelona, and disposed his -reserves in such a manner that the operation was effected without -loss. The army, loaded with as much grain as the men could carry, -then commenced crossing the mountains which separate Vich from the -districts of Gerona and Hostalrich. This march, conducted by the way -of Folgarolas, San Saturnino, Santa Hillario, and Santa Coloma de -Farnes, lasted two days; and, the 21st of June, the head-quarters -being fixed at Caldas de Malavella, the Fort of St. Felieu de Quixols -was stormed, and the Spanish privateers driven to seek another -harbour. The French army was then distributed in a half circle, -extending from St. Felieu to the Oña river. Intermediate posts were -established at St. Grace, Vidreras, Mallorquinas, Rieu de Arenas, -Santa Coloma de Farnes, Castaña, and Bruñola; thus cutting off the -communications between Gerona and the districts occupied by Conpigny, -Wimphen, the Milans, and Claros. - -During the march from Vich, the French defeated three Spanish -battalions, and captured a convoy, coming from the side of Martorel, -and destined for Gerona. St. Cyr calls them the forerunners of -Blake’s army; a curious error, for Blake was, on that very day, -being defeated at Belchite, two hundred miles from Santa Coloma. -Strictly speaking, there was, at this period, no Catalonian army, -the few troops that kept the field were acting independently, and -Conpigny, the nominal commander-in-chief, remained at Taragona. He -and the other authorities, more occupied with personal quarrels and -political intrigues than with military affairs, were complaining and -thwarting each other. Thus the Spanish and French operations were -alike weakened by internal divisions. - -Verdier was slow, cautious, and more attentive to the facilities -afforded for resistance than to the number of regular soldiers within -the works; he, or rather Reille, had appeared before Gerona on the -6th of May, but it was not till the 4th of June that, reinforced with -Lecchi’s division, he completed the investment of the place on both -sides of the Ter. On the 8th, however, ground was broken; and thus, -at the very moment when Blake, with the main body of his army, was -advancing against Zaragoza, in other words, seeking to wrest Aragon -from the French, Catalonia was slipping from his own hands. - - -THIRD SIEGE OF GERONA. - -When this memorable siege commenced, the relative situations of -the contending parties were as follows:--Eighteen thousand French -held the Ampurdan, and invested the place. Of this number about -four thousand were in Figueras, Rosas, and the smaller posts of -communication; and it is remarkable that Verdier asserted that -the first-named place, notwithstanding its great importance, was -_destitute of a garrison_, when he arrived there from France. A -fact consistent with Lord Collingwood’s description of the Catalan -warfare, but irreconcilable with the enterprise and vigour attributed -to them by others. - -[Sidenote: Imperial Muster Roll. MSS.] - -St. Cyr, the distribution of whose forces has been already noticed, -covered the siege with twelve thousand men; and Duhesme, having -about ten thousand, including sick, continued to hold Barcelona. -Forty thousand French were, therefore, disposed between that city -and Figueras; while, on the Spanish side, there was no preparation. -Blake was still in Aragon; Conpigny, with six thousand of the worst -troops, was at Taragona; the Milans watched Duhesme; Wimphen, with a -few thousand, held the country about the Upper Llobregat. Juan Claros -and Rovira kept the mountains on the side of Olot and Ripol; and, -in the higher Catalonia, small bands of Miguelettes were dispersed -under different chiefs. The Somatenes, however, continuing their own -system of warfare, not only disregarded the generals, as in the time -of Reding, but fell upon and robbed the regular troops, whenever a -favourable opportunity occurred. - -The Spanish privateers, dislodged from St. Filieu, now resorted to -Palamos-bay, and the English fleet, under Lord Collingwood, watched -incessantly to prevent any French squadron, or even single vessels, -from carrying provisions by the coast. But from Gerona, the governor -did not fail to call loudly on the generals, and even on the _Supreme -Central Junta_, for succours; yet his cry was disregarded; and when -the siege commenced, his garrison did not exceed three thousand -regular troops: his magazines and hospitals were but scantily -provided, and he had no money. Alvarez Mariano was however, of a -lofty spirit, great fortitude, and in no manner daunted. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. I. p. 78.] - -The works of Gerona, already described, were little changed since the -first siege; but there, as in Zaragoza, by a mixture of superstition, -patriotism, and military regulations, the moral as well as physical -force of the city had been called forth. There, likewise, a sickness, -common at a particular season of the year, was looked for to thin the -ranks of the besiegers, and there also women were enrolled, under the -title of the Company of Sta. Barbara, to carry off the wounded, and -to wait upon the hospitals, and at every breath of air, says St. Cyr, -their ribbons were seen to float amidst the bayonets of the soldiers! -To evince his own resolution, the governor forbad the mention of a -capitulation under pain of death; but severe punishments were only -denounced, not inflicted upon faint-hearted men. Alvarez, master of -his actions, and capable of commanding without phrenzy, had recourse -to no barbarous methods of enforcing authority; obstinate his defence -was, and full of suffering to the besieged, yet free from the stain -of cruelty, and rich in honour. - -On the 4th of June the siege was begun, and, on the 12th, a -mortar-battery, from the heights of Casen Rocca, on the left of the -Ter, and two breaching-batteries, established against the outworks of -Fort Monjouic, being ready to play, the town was summoned in form. -The answer was an intimation that henceforth all flags of truce would -be fired upon; the only proceeding indicative of the barbarian in the -conduct of Alvarez. - -The 13th the small suburb of Pedreto was taken possession of by the -French, and early on the morning of the 14th, the batteries opened -against Monjouic, while the town was bombarded from the Casen Rocca. - -The 17th the besieged drove the enemy from Pedreto, but were finally -repulsed with the loss of above a hundred men. - -The 19th the stone towers of St. Narcis and St. Louis, forming the -outworks of Monjouic, being assaulted, the besieged, panic-stricken, -abandoned them and the tower of St. Daniel also. The French -immediately erected breaching-batteries, four hundred yards from the -northern bastion of Monjouic. Tempestuous weather retarded their -works, but they made a practicable opening by the 4th of July, and -with a strange temerity resolved to give the assault, although the -flank fire of the works was not silenced, nor the glacis crowned, -nor the covered way or counterscarp injured, and that a half moon, -in a perfect state, covered the approaches to the breach. The latter -was proved by the engineers, in a false attack, on the night of -the 4th, and the resolution to assault was then adopted; yet the -storming-force drawn from the several quarters of investment was only -assembled in the trenches on the night of the 7th; and during these -four days, the batteries ceasing to play, the Spaniards retrenched, -and barricadoed the opening. - -At four o’clock in the morning of the 8th, the French column, jumping -out of the trenches, rapidly cleared the space between them and the -fort, descended the ditch, and mounted to the assault with great -resolution; but the Spaniards had so strengthened the defences that -no impression could be made, and the assailants taken in flank and -rear by the fire from the half moon, the covered way, and the eastern -bastion, were driven back. Twice they renewed the attempt, but the -obstacles were insurmountable, and the assault failed, with a loss of -a thousand men killed and wounded. The success of the besieged was -however mitigated by an accidental explosion, which destroyed the -garrison of the small fort of St. Juan, situated between Monjouic -and the city. - -About the period of this assault which was given without St. Cyr’s -knowledge, the latter finding that Claros and Rovira interrupted -the convoys coming from Figueras to Gerona, withdrew a brigade of -Souham’s division from Santa Coloma de Farnés, and posted it on the -left of the Ter, at Bañolas. The troops on the side of Hostalrich -were thus reduced to about eight thousand men under arms, although -an effort to raise the siege was to be expected. For letters from -Alvarez, urgently demanding succours of Blake, had been intercepted, -and the latter, after his defeat in Aragon, was, as I have said, -collecting men at Taragona. - -Meanwhile, to secure the coast-line from Rosas to Quixols before -Blake could reach the scene of action, St. Cyr resolved to take -Palamos. To effect this, general Fontanes marched from St. Filieu, -on the 5th of July, with an Italian brigade, six guns, and some -squadrons of dragoons. Twice he summoned the place, and the bearer -being each time treated with scorn, the troops moved on to the -attack; but in passing a flat part of the coast near Torre Valenti, -they were cannonaded by six gun-boats so sharply, that they could not -keep the road until the artillery had obliged the boats to sheer off. - - -STORMING OF PALAMOS. - -This town having a good roadstead, and being only one march from -Gerona, was necessarily a place of importance; and the works, -although partly ruined, were so far repaired by the Catalans as to -be capable of some defence. Twenty guns were mounted; and the town, -built on a narrow rocky peninsula had but one front, the approach to -which was over an open plain, completely commanded from the left by -some very rugged hills, where a considerable number of Somatenes were -assembled, with their line touching upon the walls of the town. - -Fontanes drove the Somatenes from this position, and a third time, -summoned the place to surrender. The bearer was killed, and the -Italians immediately stormed the works. When the Spaniards flying -towards the shore endeavoured to get on board their vessels, the -latter put off to sea, and some of Fontanes’ troops having turned the -town during the action, intercepted the fugitives, and put all to the -sword. - -Scarcely had Palamos fallen when Wimphen and the Milans, arriving -near Hostalrich, began to harass Souham’s outposts at Santa -Coloma, hoping to draw St. Cyr’s attention to that side, while a -reinforcement for the garrison of Gerona should pass through the left -of his line into the city. The French general was not deceived; but -the Spaniards nevertheless sent fifteen hundred chosen men, under -the command of one Marshal, an Englishman, to penetrate secretly -through the enemy’s posts at Llagostera. They were accompanied by -an aide-de-camp of Alvarez, called Rich, apparently an Englishmen -also, and they succeeded on the 9th in passing general Pino’s posts -unobserved. A straggler, however, was taken, and St. Cyr being thus -informed of the march, and judging that the attempt to break the line -of investment would be made in the night and by the road of Casa de -Selva, immediately placed one body of men in ambush near that point, -and sent another in pursuit of the succouring column. - -As the French general had foreseen, the Spaniards continued their -march through the hills at dusk, but being suddenly fired upon by -the ambuscade, hastily retired, and the next day fell in with the -other troops, when a thousand men were made prisoners: the rest -dispersing, escaped the enemy, yet were ill used and robbed of their -arms by the Somatenes. St. Cyr says that Mr. Marshal, having offered -to capitulate, fled during the negotiation, and thus abandoned his -men; but the Spanish general Conpigny affirmed that the men abandoned -Marshal, and refused to fight, that Rich ran away before he had seen -the enemy, and that both he and the troops merited severe punishment. -It is also certain that Marshal’s flight was to Gerona, where he -afterwards fell fighting gallantly. - -This disappointment was sensibly felt by Alvarez. Sickness and battle -had already reduced his garrison to fifteen hundred men, and he was -thus debarred of the best of all defences, namely, frequent sallies -as the enemy neared the walls. His resolution was unshaken, but he -did not fail to remonstrate warmly with Conpigny, and even denounced -his inactivity to the Supreme Junta. That general excused himself on -the ground of Blake’s absence, the want of provisions, and the danger -of carrying the contagious sickness of Taragona into Gerona; and -finally adduced colonel Marshal’s unfortunate attempt, as proof that -due exertion had been made. Yet he could not deny that Gerona had -been invested two months, had sustained forty days of open trenches, -a bombardment and an assault without any succour, and that during -that time, he himself remained at Taragona, instead of being at -Hostalrich with all the troops he could collect. - -From the prisoners taken the French ascertained that neither Conpigny -nor Blake had any intention of coming to the relief of Gerona, until -sickness and famine, which pressed as heavily on the besiegers as -on the besieged, should have weakened the ranks of the former; and -this plan receives unqualified praise from St. Cyr, who seems to have -forgotten, that with an open breach, a town, requiring six thousand -men to man the works, and having but fifteen hundred, might fall at -any moment. - -After the failure of the assault at Monjouic, Verdier recommenced his -approaches in due form, opened galleries for a mine, and interrupted -the communication with the city by posting men in the ruins of the -little fort of St. Juan. But his operations were retarded by Claros -and Rovira, who captured a convoy of powder close to the French -frontier. To prevent a recurrence of such events, the brigade of -Souham’s division was pushed from Bañolas to St. Lorenzo de la Muja; -and, on the 2d of August, the fortified convent of St. Daniel, -situated in the valley of the Galligan, between the Constable fort -and Monjouic, was taken by the French, who thus entirely intercepted -the communication between the latter place and the city. - -On the 4th of August, the glacis of Monjouic being crowned, the -counterscarp blown in, and the flank defences ruined, the ditch -was passed, and the half moon in front of the curtain carried by -storm, but no lodgement was effected. During the day, Alvarez made -an unsuccessful effort to retake the ruins of St. Juan; and at the -same time, two hundred Spaniards who had come from the sea-coast with -provisions, and penetrated to the convent of St. Daniel, thinking -that their countrymen still held it, were made prisoners. - -On the 5th the engineers having ascertained that the northern bastion -being hollow, the troops would, after storming it, be obliged to -descend a scarp of twelve or fourteen feet, changed the line of -attack, and commenced new approaches against the eastern bastion. A -second practical breach was soon opened, and preparations made for -storming on the 12th, but in the night of the 11th, the garrison -blew up the magazines, spiked the guns, and, without loss, regained -Gerona. Thus the fort fell, after thirty-seven days of open trenches -and one assault. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -Verdier, elated by the capture of Monjouic, boasted, in his -despatches, of the difficulties that he had overcome, and they were -unquestionably great, for the rocky nature of the soil had obliged -him to raise his trenches instead of sinking them, and his approaches -had been chiefly carried on by the flying sap. But he likewise -expressed his scorn of the garrison, held their future resistance -cheap, and asserted that fifteen days would suffice to take the -town; in which he was justified neither by past nor succeeding -facts; for the Spaniards indignant at his undeserved contempt, -redoubled their exertions and falsified all his predictions; and -while these events were passing close to Gerona, Claros and Rovira, -at the head of two thousand five hundred Miguelettes, attacked -Bascara a post between Figuera and Gerona at the moment when a -convoy, escorted by a battalion had arrived there from Belgarde. -The commandant of Figueras indeed, uniting some “_gens d’armes_” -and convalescents to a detachment of his garrison, succoured the -post on the 6th; but, meanwhile, the escort of the convoy had fallen -back on France and spread such terror, that Augereau applied to St. -Cyr for three thousand men to protect the frontier. That general -refused this ill-timed demand, and, in his Memoirs, takes occasion -to censure the system of moveable columns, as more likely to create -than to suppress insurrections, as being harassing to the troops, -weakening to the main force, and yet ineffectual, seeing that the -peasantry must always be more moveable than the columns, and better -informed of their marches and strength. There is great force in -these observations, and if an army is in such bad moral discipline -that the officers commanding the columns cannot be trusted, it is -unanswerable. It must also be conceded that this system, at all times -requiring a nice judgement, great talents, and excellent arrangement, -was totally inapplicable to the situation and composition of the -seventh corps. Yet, with good officers and well combined plans, it is -difficult to conceive any more simple or efficient mode of protecting -the flanks and rear of an invading army, than that of moveable -columns supported by small fortified posts; and it is sufficient -that Napoleon was the creator of this system, to make a military man -doubtful of the soundness of St. Cyr’s objections. The emperor’s -views, opinions, and actions, will in defiance of all attempts to -lessen them, go down, with a wonderful authority to posterity. - -A few days after the affair of Bascara, eight hundred volunteers, -commanded by two officers, named Foxa and Cantera, quitted Olot, and -making a secret march through the mountains, arrived in the evening -of the 10th, upon the Ter, in front of Angeles; but being baffled in -an attempt to pass the river there, descended the left bank in the -night, pierced the line of investment, and, crossing at a ford near -St. Pons, entered Gerona at day-break. This hardy exploit gave fresh -courage to the garrison; yet the enemy’s approaches hourly advanced, -pestilence wasted the besieged, and the Spanish generals outside the -town still remained inactive. - -In this conjuncture, Alvarez and his council were not wanting to -themselves; while defending the half ruined walls of Gerona with -inflexible constancy, they failed not to remonstrate against the -cold-blooded neglect of those who should have succoured them; and -the Supreme Junta of Catalonia, forwarded their complaints to the -Central Junta at Seville, with a remarkable warmth and manliness of -expression. - -“The generals of our army,” they said, “have formed no efficient plan -for the relief of Gerona; not one of the three lieutenant-generals -here has been charged to conduct an expedition to its help; they -say that they act in conformity to a plan approved by your Majesty. -Can it be true that your Majesty approves of abandoning Gerona to -her own feeble resources! If so, her destruction is inevitable; and -should this calamity befall, will the other places of Catalonia and -the Peninsula have the courage to imitate her fidelity, when they -see her temples and houses ruined, her heroic defenders dead, or -in slavery? And if such calamities should threaten towns in other -provinces, ought they to reckon upon Catalonian assistance when -this most interesting place can obtain no help from them?”--“Do you -not see the consequences of this melancholy reflection, which is -sufficient to freeze the ardour, to desolate the hearts of the most -zealous defenders of our just cause? Let this bulwark of our frontier -be taken, and the province is laid open, our harvests, treasures, -children, ourselves, all fall to the enemy, and the country has no -longer any real existence.” - -In answer to this address, money was promised, a decree was passed to -lend Catalonia every succour, and Blake received orders to make an -immediate effort to raise the siege. How little did the language of -the Spaniards agree with their actions! Blake, indeed, as we shall -find, made a feeble effort to save the heroic and suffering city; -but the Supreme Central Junta were only intent upon thwarting and -insulting the English general, after the battle of Talavera, and this -was the moment that the Junta of Catalonia, so eloquent, so patriotic -with the pen, were selling, to foreign merchants, the arms supplied -by England for the defence of their country! - -Towards the end of August, when the French fire had opened three -breaches in Gerona, and the bombardment had reduced a great part of -the city to ashes, Blake commenced his march from Taragona with a -force of eight or ten thousand regulars. Proceeding by Martorel, El -Valles, and Granollers, he reached Vich, and from thence crossed the -mountains to St. Hillario, where he was joined by Wimphen and the -Milans; and as he had free communication with Rovira and Claros, he -could direct a body of not less than twenty thousand men against the -circle of investment. His arrival created considerable alarm among -the French. The pestilence which wasted the besieged, was also among -the besiegers, and the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan contained -many thousand patients. The battalions in the field could scarcely -muster a third of their nominal strength. Even the generals were -obliged to rise from sick-beds to take the command of the brigades; -and the covering army, inferior in number to the Spanish force, -was extended along more than thirty miles of mountainous wooded -country, intersected by rivers, and every way favourable for Blake’s -operations. - -Verdier was filled with apprehension, lest a disastrous action should -oblige him to raise the long-protracted siege, notwithstanding his -fore-boasts to the contrary. But it was on such occasions that St. -Cyr’s best qualities were developed. A most learned and practised -soldier, and of a clear methodical head, he was firm in execution, -decided and prompt in council; and, although, apparently wanting -in those original and daring views, which mark the man of superior -genius, seems to have been perfectly fitted for struggling against -difficulties. So far from fearing an immediate battle, he observed, -“that it was to be desired, because his men were now of confirmed -courage. Blake’s inaction was the thing to be dreaded, for, -notwithstanding every effort, not more than two days provisions could -be procured, to supply the troops when together, and it would be -necessary after that period to scatter them again in such a manner, -that scarcely two thousand would be disposable at any given point. -The Spaniards had already commenced skirmishing in force on the -side of Bruñola, and as Blake expected no reinforcements, he would -probably act immediately. Hence it was necessary to concentrate as -many men as possible, in the course of the night and next day, and -deliver battle, and there were still ten thousand good troops under -arms, without reckoning those that might be spared from the investing -corps.” - -On the other hand, Blake, with an army, numerous indeed but by no -means spirited, was from frequent defeat, become cautious without -being more skilful. He resolved to confine his efforts to the -throwing supplies of men and provisions into the town; forgetting -that the business of a relieving army is not to protract, but to -raise a siege, and that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia. - -He had collected and loaded with flour, about two thousand beasts of -burthen, and placed them in the mountains, on the side of Olot, under -an escort of four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. Garcia -Conde, an ambitious and fiery young man of considerable promise, -undertook to conduct them to Gerona, by the flat ground between the -Ter and the Oña, precisely opposite to that of the French attack. -To facilitate this attempt, Blake caused colonel Henry O’Donnel to -fall upon Souham’s posts, near Bruñola, on the evening of the 31st of -August, supporting this attack with another detachment under general -Logoyri. At the same time he directed colonel Landen to collect the -Miguelettes and Somatenes on the side of Palamos, and take possession -of “_N. S. de los Angelos_,” a convent, situated on a high mountain -behind Monjouic. Claros and Rovira also received directions to attack -the French on the side of Casen Rocca. Thus the enemy were to be -assailed in every quarter, except that on which the convoy was to -pass. - -O’Donnel, commencing the operations, attacked and carried a part of -the position occupied by one of Souham’s battalions at Bruñola, but -the latter, with an impetuous charge, again recovered the ground. -The Spanish general, being joined by Loygori, renewed the skirmish, -but could make no further impression on the enemy. Meanwhile, St. -Cyr, having transferred his head-quarters to Fornels, was earnestly -advised to concentrate his troops on the left of the Ter, partly, -that it was thought Blake would attempt to penetrate on that side; -partly that, being so close to the Spanish army, the French divisions -might, if ordered to assemble on their actual centre, be cut off in -detail during their march. But he argued that his opponent must be -exceedingly timid, or he would have attacked Souham with all his -forces, and broken the covering line at once; and, seeing that such -an opportunity was neglected, he did not fear to concentrate his own -troops, on the Oña, by a flank march close under the beard of his -unskilful adversary. - -Souham’s division, falling back in the night, took post the 1st of -September, on the heights of San Dalmaz, reaching to Hostalnou, and -at eight o’clock, the head of Pino’s division entered this line, -prolonging it, by the left, in rear of the village of Rieudellot. At -twelve o’clock, these two divisions were established in position, -and at the distance of four miles in their rear, Verdier with a -strong detachment of the besieging corps, was placed in reserve on -the main road to Gerona. Lecchi was sick, and his troops, commanded -by Millosewitz, took post at Salt, guarding the bridge and the flat -ground about St. Eugenio; having also instructions to cross the -Ter and march against Rovira and Claros, if they should press the -Westphalian division which remained at San Pons. The trenches under -Monjouic were guarded. The mortar battery of Casa Rocca was disarmed, -and the Westphalians had orders, if attacked, to retire to Sarria, -and look to the security of the parc and the trenches. A thick -fog and heavy rain interrupted the view, and both armies remained -apparently quiet until the middle of the day, when the weather -clearing, St. Cyr rode to examine the Spanish positions; for the -heads of Blake’s columns were disposed as if he would have penetrated -at once, by Bruñola, Coloma de Farnés, Vidreras, and Mallorquinas. -Scarcely had the French general quitted Fornels, when Garcia Conde, -who, under cover of the mist had been moving down the mountains, -crossed the Ter at Amer, and decended the heights of Bañolas with his -convoy. He was now on the flat ground, where there was no other guard -than the two thousand men under Millosewitz, placed, as I have said, -at Salt to watch the garrison and the movements of Rovira and Claros; -and consequently, with their rear to the advancing convoy. - -Verdier’s reserve, the nearest support, was six miles distant, and -separated from Millosewitz by considerable heights, and the Spanish -columns, coming into the plain without meeting a single French post, -advanced unperceived close to the main body, and, with one charge, -put the whole to flight. The fugitives, in their panic, at first -took the direction of the town; but being fired upon, turned towards -the heights of Palau, made for Fornels; and would have gone straight -into Blake’s camp, if they had not met St. Cyr on his return from -viewing that general’s positions. Rallying and reinforcing them with -a battalion from Pino’s division, he instantly directed them back -again upon Salt, and at the same time sent Verdier orders to follow -Garcia Conde with the reserve; but the latter had already conducted -his convoy safely into the town. Alvarez, also, sallying forth, had -destroyed the French works near St. Ugenio, and thinking the siege -raised, had immediately sent five hundred sick men out of the town, -into the convent of St. Daniel, which place had been abandoned by the -French two days before. - -Verdier after causing some trifling loss to Conde, passed the bridge -of Salt, and marched down the left of the Ter to Sarria, to save his -parcs, which were threatened by Rovira and Claros; for when those two -Partizans skirmished with the Westphalian troops, the latter retired -across the Ter, abandoning their camp and two dismounted mortars. -Thus the place was succoured for a moment; but, as Blake made no -further movement, Alvarez was little benefitted by the success. The -provisions received, did not amount to more than seven or eight days’ -consumption; and the reinforcement, more than enough to devour the -food, was yet insufficient to raise the siege by sallies. - -While Millosewitz’s troops were flying on the one side of the Ter, -the reports of Claros and Rovira, exaggerating their success on the -other side of that river, had caused Alvarez to believe that Blake’s -army was victorious, and the French in flight. Hence, he refrained -from destroying the bridge of Salt, and Verdier, as we have seen, -crossed it to recover his camp at Sarria. But for this error, the -garrison, reinforced by Conde’s men, might have filled the trenches, -razed the batteries, and even retaken Monjouic before Verdier could -have come to their support. - -St. Cyr having but one day’s provisions left, now resolved to seek -Blake, and deliver battle; but the Spanish general retired up the -mountains, when he saw the French advancing, and his retreat enabled -St. Cyr again to disseminate the French troops. Thus ended the first -effort to relieve Gerona. It was creditable to Garcia Conde, but so -contemptible, with reference to the means at Blake’s disposal, that -Alvarez believed himself betrayed; and, trusting thenceforth only to -his own heroism, permitted Conde’s troops to go back, or to remain as -they pleased; exacting, however, from those who stopped, an oath not -to surrender. Renewing the edict against speaking of a capitulation, -he reduced the rations of the garrison first to one half, and -afterwards to a fourth of the full allowance, a measure which caused -some desertions to the enemy; but the great body of the soldiers and -citizens were as firm as their chief, and the townsmen freely sharing -their own scanty food with the garrison, made common cause in every -thing. - -Garcia Conde’s success must be attributed partly to the negligence -of St. Cyr’s subordinates; but the extended cantonments, occupied in -the evening of the 31st, gave Blake, as the French general himself -acknowledges, an opportunity of raising the siege without much -danger or difficulty: nor were St. Cyr’s dispositions for the next -day perfectly combined. It is evident that giving Blake credit for -sound views, he was himself so expectant of a great battle that he -forgot to guard against minor operations. The flat country between -the left of the Oña and the Ter was the natural line for a convoy to -penetrate to the town; hence it was a fault to leave two thousand men -in that place, with their front to the garrison, and their rear to -the relieving army, when the latter could steal through the mountains -until close upon them. Cavalry posts at least should have been -established at the different inlets to the hills, and beacons raised -on convenient eminences. The main body of the army appears also to -have been at too great a distance from the town; the firing that took -place in the plain of Salt was disregarded by Verdier’s reserve; and -the first information of the attack was brought to Fornels by the -fugitives themselves. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations.] - -St. Cyr says that his generals of division were negligent, and so -weakened by sickness as to be unable to look to their outposts; that -he had recommended to Verdier the raising of field-works at the -bridge of Salt and in the passes of the hills, and, when his advice -was disregarded, forbore, from the peculiar situation in which he -himself was placed by the French government, to enforce his undoubted -authority. But St. Cyr avows that his soldiers answered honestly to -every call he made; and he was bound, while he retained the command, -to enforce every measure necessary for maintaining their honour. In -other respects, his prudence and vigilance were such as beseemed -his great reputation. It was not so with Blake. The whole of his -operations proved that he had lost confidence, and was incapable of -any great enterprize. He should have come up with a resolution to -raise the siege or to perish. He contented himself with a few slight -skirmishes, and the introduction of a small convoy of provisions; and -then notwithstanding the deep suffering of this noble city, turned -away, with a cold look, and a donation that mocked its wants. - -When the siege was resumed, St. Cyr withdrew the French posts from -Palau and Monte Livio, leaving the way apparently open on that side, -for the return of Garcia Conde, who, deceived by this wile came out -at daybreak on the 3d of September, with fifteen hundred men and the -beasts of burthen. Halting, for a little time, just beyond the gate, -he examined the country in front with his glass; every thing appeared -favourable and his troops were beginning to move forward, when the -noise of drums beating to arms gave notice that an ambuscade was -placed behind Palau. St. Cyr had, indeed, posted a brigade there in -the hope of surprising the Spaniards, but the French forgetting the -ambush, were performing the regular service of the camp at day-light, -and a cry of astonishment burst from the Spanish column as it hastily -retreated again into the town. - -Baffled by this ridiculous mistake, and concluding that the next -attempt would be by Castellar and La Bispal, St. Cyr placed -Mazzuchelli’s brigade (the same that had been behind Palau) in the -valley of the Oña in such a manner that it could fall upon Conde’s -rear when the latter should again come forth. He also put a battalion -on the hills in a position to head the Spanish column, and drive it -back either upon Mazzuchelli’s brigade or upon La Bispal, where he -also posted three battalions and a squadron of Pino’s division. - -The 4th of September one thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, -and eleven hundred mules again came out of Gerona, and ascending -the heights in which the fort of the Capuchin was situated, pushed -in single files along a by-path, leading to Castellar da Selva. -Mazzuchelli saw them plainly, but did not attack, waiting for the -fire of the battalion ahead, and that battalion did not fire because -Mazzuchelli did not attack, and it was supposed the Spaniards were -part of his brigade. Garcia Conde quickly perceived their double -error, and with great readiness filing off to his left, turned the -right of the battalion in his front, and gained Castellar without -hurt, although the French in Monjouic observing all that passed, -played their guns upon the rear of his column. Being informed by the -peasants at Castellar, that troops were also waiting for him at La -Bispal, he made for Caza de Selva, and General Pino having notice of -his approach, directed two battalions to seize the summit of a ridge -which crossed the Spanish line of march, but the battalions took a -wrong direction; the Spaniards moved steadily on, and although their -rear was attacked by Pino’s personal escort, and that fifty men and -some mules were captured, the main body escaped with honour. - -There were now four open breaches in Gerona; Mazzuchelli’s brigade -and the troops at La Bispal were added to the investing corps, and -the immediate fall of the city seemed inevitable, when the French -store of powder failed, and ten days elapsed before a fresh supply -could be obtained. Alvarez profitted of this cessation, to retrench -and barricade the breaches in the most formidable manner. Verdier -had retaken the convent of St. Daniel in the valley of Galligan, -and obliged the five hundred sick men to return to the town on the -4th; but Landen, the officer sent by Blake, on the 31st of August, -to seize the convent of _Madona de los Angeles_, had fortified that -building, and introduced small supplies of provisions; thus reviving, -in the mind of Alvarez, a plan for taking possession of the heights -beyond those on which the Capuchin and Constable forts were situated, -by which, in conjunction with the post at Madona de los Angeles, and -with the assistance of Blake’s army, he hoped to maintain an open -communication with the country. A bold and skilful conception, but -he was unable to effect it; for making a sally from the Capuchins on -the 6th with eighteen hundred men, he was beaten by a single French -regiment; and the same day Mazzuchelli’s Italians stormed Madona de -los Angeles, and put the garrison to the sword. - -During these events, Verdier marched against Claros and Rovira who -were posted at St. Gregorio, near Amer. He was repulsed with loss, -and the French general Joba was killed. Meanwhile the batteries -having recommenced their fire on the 13th, Alvarez made a general -sally, by the gates of San Pedro, beat the guards from the trenches, -and spiked the guns in one of the breaching batteries. The 18th, -however, Verdier thinking the breaches practicable, proposed to give -the assault, and required assistance from St. Cyr, but disputes -between the generals of the covering and the investing forces were -rife. The engineers of the latter declared the breaches practicable, -those of the former asserted that they were not, and that while -the fort of Calvary, outside the walls, although in ruins was in -possession of the Spaniards, no assault should be attempted. - -Either from negligence, or the disputes between St. Cyr and Augereau, -above five thousand convalescents capable of duty were retained in -a body at Perpignan, and Verdier could not produce so many under -arms for the assault, nor even for this number were there officers -to lead, so wasting was the sickness. The covering army was scarcely -better off, and Blake had again taken the position of St. Hilario. -Howbeit, St. Cyr, seeing no better remedy, consented to try the storm -provided Calvary were first taken. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations] - -Souham’s division was appointed to watch Blake, Pino was directed to -make a false attack on the opposite quarter to where the breaches -were established, and, on the 19th, Verdier’s troops, in three -columns, advanced rapidly down the valley of Galligan to the assault. -But the fort of Calvary had not been taken, and its fire swept the -columns of attack along the whole line of march. Two hundred men fell -before they reached the walls, and just as the summit of the largest -breach was gained, the French batteries, which continued to play on -the Spanish retrenchments, brought down a large mass of wall upon the -head of the attacking column. The besieged resisted manfully, and -the besiegers were completely repulsed from all the breaches with a -loss of six hundred men. Verdier accused his soldiers of cowardice, -and blamed St. Cyr for refusing to bring the covering troops to -the assault; but that general, asserting that the men behaved -perfectly well, called a council of war, and proposed to continue -the operations with as much vigour as the nature of the case would -permit. His persevering spirit was not partaken by the council, and -the siege was turned into a blockade. - -Blake now advanced with his army, and from the 20th to the 25th, -made as if he would raise the blockade; but his object was merely -to introduce another convoy. St. Cyr, divining his intention and -judging that he would make the attempt on the 26th, resolved to let -him penetrate the covering line, and then fall on him before he could -reach the town. In this view, Souham’s division was placed behind -Palau and Pino’s division at Casa de Selva, and Lecchi’s division of -the investing troops, was directed to meet the Spaniards in front, -while the two former came down upon their rear. - -Blake assembled his troops on the side of Hostalrich, then made a -circuitous route to La Bispal, and, taking post on the heights of -St. Sadurni, detached ten thousand men, under Wimphen, to protect -the passage of the convoy, of which Henry O’Donnel led the advanced -guard. At day-break, on the 26th, O’Donnel fell upon the rear of -the French troops at Castellar, broke through them, and reached -the fort of the Constable with the head of the convoy; but the two -French battalions which he had driven before him, rallying on the -heights of San Miguel to the right of the Spanish column, returned -to the combat, and at the same time St. Cyr in person, with a part -of Souham’s division came upon the left flank of the convoy, and, -pressing it strongly, obliged the greater part to retrograde. -When Pino’s division, running up from Casa de Selva, attacked the -rear-guard under Wimphen, the route was complete, and Blake made -no effort to save the distressed troops. O’Donnel with a thousand -men and about two hundred mules got safely into the town, but the -remainder of the convoy was taken. The Italians gave no quarter and -three thousand of the Spaniards were slain. - -After this action, some troops being sent towards Vidreras, to menace -Blake’s communications with Hostalrich, he retired by the side of St. -Filieu de Quixols, and Gerona was again abandoned to her sufferings -which were become almost insupportable. Without money, without -medicines, without food; pestilence within the walls, the breaches -open. “If,” said Alvarez, “the captain-general be unable to make a -vigorous effort, the whole of Catalonia must rise to our aid, or -Gerona will soon be but a heap of carcases and ruins, the memory of -which will afflict posterity!” - -St. Cyr now repaired to Perpignan to make arrangements for future -supply, but finding Augereau in a good state of health, obliged that -marshal to assume the command. Then, he says, every thing needful -was bestowed with a free hand upon the seventh corps, because he -himself was no longer in the way; but a better reason is to be found -in the state of Napoleon’s affairs. Peace had been concluded with -Austria, the English expeditions to the Scheldt and against Naples -had failed, and all the resources of the French government becoming -disposable, not only the seventh, but every “corps d’armée” in Spain -was reinforced. - -Augereau, escorted by the five thousand convalescents from Perpignan, -reached the camp before Gerona, the 12th of October. In the course -of the following night, O’Donnel, issuing from the town, on the side -of the plain, broke through the guards, fell upon Souham’s quarters, -obliged that general to fly in his shirt, and finally effected a -junction with Milans, at Santa Coloma; having successfully executed -as daring an enterprise as any performed during this memorable -siege. Augereau, however, pressed the blockade, and thinking the -spirit of the Spaniards reduced, offered an armistice for a month, -with the free entry of provisions, if Alvarez would promise to -surrender unless relieved before the expiration of that period. Such, -however, was the steady virtue of this man and his followers, that, -notwithstanding the grievous famine, the offer was refused. - -Blake, on the 29th of October took possession once more of the -heights of Bruñola. Souham, with an inferior force put him to -flight, and this enabled Augereau to detach Pino against the town of -Hostalrich, which was fortified with an old wall and towers, defended -by two thousand men, and supported by the fire of the castle. It -was carried by storm, and the provisions and stores laid up there -captured, although Blake, with his army, was only a few miles off. -This disaster was however, more than balanced by an action off the -coast. Rear-admiral Baudin, with a French squadron, consisting of -three ships of the line, two frigates, and sixteen large store-ships, -having sailed from Toulon for Barcelona, about the 20th of October, -was intercepted by admiral Martin on the 23d. During the chase -several of the smaller vessels were burnt by the enemy, the rest -were driven on shore at different places, and two of the line of -battle ships were set on fire by their own crews. The store-ships and -some of the armed vessels, taking refuge at Rosas, put up boarding -nettings, and protecting their flanks by Rosas and the Trinity-fort, -presented a formidable front, having above twenty guns on board -disposed for defence, besides the shore batteries. On the 31st of -November however, captain Hallowell appeared in the bay with a -squadron; and the same evening, sending his boats in, destroyed the -whole fleet, in despite of a very vigorous resistance which cost the -British seventy men killed and wounded. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 2._ - - SIEGE of GERONA - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -Meanwhile the distress of Gerona increased, desertions became -frequent, and ten officers having failed in a plot to oblige the -governor to capitulate, went over in a body to the enemy. During -November, famine and sickness increased within the city, and the -French stores of powder were again exhausted; but on the 6th of -December, ammunition having arrived, the suburb of Marina, that of -Girondella, the fort of Calvary, and all the other towers beyond the -walls, were carried by the besiegers; and the besieged, confined -to the circuit of the walls, were cut off from the Capuchin and -Constable forts. Alvarez, who had been ill for some days, roused -himself for a last effort; and, making a general sally, on the 7th, -retook the suburb of Girondella and the redoubts; and opening a way -to the outworks of the Constable, carried off the garrison. The next -day, overcome by suffering, he became delirious. A council of war -assembled, and after six months of open trenches, Gerona yielded -on the 10th. The garrison marched out with the honours of war, the -troops were to be exchanged in due course, the inhabitants were to -be respected, and none but soldiers were to be considered prisoners. -Such was the termination of a defence which eclipsed the glory of -Zaragoza. - -French and Spanish writers alike, affirm that Augereau treated -Alvarez with a rigour and contumely that excited every person’s -indignation; and that, in violation of the capitulation, the monks -were, by an especial order of Napoleon, sent to France. This last -accusation admits, however, of dispute; the monks had during the -siege, formed themselves into a regular corps, named the Crusaders; -they were disciplined and clothed in a sort of uniform; and being -to all intents soldiers, it can hardly be said, that to constitute -them prisoners, was a violation, although it was undoubtedly a harsh -interpretation of the terms. - -Alvarez died at Figueras in his way to France; but so long as virtue -and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in -veneration; and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant -Spaniard’s merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. In this siege, the constancy with which the Geronans bore the -most terrible sufferings accounts for the protracted resistance; -but constancy alone could not have enabled them to defy the regular -progress of the engineer; as I have before observed, the combinations -of science are not to be defied with impunity. But the French -combinations were not scientific; and this, saving the right of -Gerona to the glory she earned so hardly, was the secret of the -defence. - -2º. General St. Cyr, after observing that the attack on Montjouic was -ill judged and worse executed, says, “The principal approaches should -have been conducted against the Marcadel, because the soil there, was -easy to work in, full of natural hollows and clifts, and the defences -open in flank and rear to batteries on the Monte Livio and the -Casen Rocca. Whereas on the side of Montjouic, the approaches, from -the rocky nature of the soil, could only be carried forward by the -flying sap, with great loss and difficulty.” If however, the Marcadel -had fallen, the greatest part of the city would still have been -covered by the Oña, and Montjouic, and the forts of the Constable -and Capuchin, (regular places complete in themselves,) would have -remained to be taken, unless it can be supposed, that a governor who -defended the feeble walls of the town after those outworks fell, -would have surrendered all, because a lodgement was made in an -isolated quarter. These things are, however, ordinarily doubtful; -and certainly, it must always be a great matter with a general, to -raise the moral confidence of his own army, or to sink that of his -adversary, even though it should be by a momentary and illusive -success. - -3º. The faulty execution of the attack on Montjouic is less doubtful -than the choice of direction. The cessation of the breaching fire for -four days previous to the assault, and the disregard of the rules -of art already noticed, amply account for failure; and it is to be -observed, that this failure caused the delay of a whole month in the -progress of the siege; that during that month disease invaded the -army, and the soldiers, as they will be found to do in all protracted -operations, became careless and disinclined to the labours of the -trenches. - -4º. The assault on the body of the place was not better conducted -than that against Montjouic; and considering these facts, together -with the jealousy and disputes between the generals, the mixture of -Germans, Italians, and French in the army, and the mal-administration -of the hospitals, by which so many men were lost, and so many more -kept from their duty, it is rather surprising that Gerona was taken -at all. - -5º. The foregoing conclusions in no wise affect the merits of the -besieged, because the difficulties and errors of their adversaries -only prolonged their misery. They fought bravely; they endured -unheard of sufferings with constancy; and their refusal to accept -the armistice offered by Augereau, is as noble and affecting an -instance of virtue as any that history has recorded. Yet how mixed -are good and evil principles in man; how dependent upon accidental -circumstances is the development of his noble or base qualities! -Alvarez, so magnanimous, so firm, so brave, so patriotic at Gerona, -was the same Alvarez who, one year before, surrendered the Barcelona -Montjouic, on the insolent summons of Duhesme! At that period, the -influence of a base court, degraded public feeling, and what was weak -in his character came to the surface; but in times more congenial to -virtuous sentiments, all the nobility of the man’s nature broke forth. - -6º. When the siege of Gerona is contrasted with that of Zaragoza, -it may shake the opinion of those who regard the wild hostility of -the multitude as superior to the regulated warfare of soldiers. -The number of enemies that came against the latter was rather less -than those who came against the former city. The regular garrison -of Zaragoza was above thirty thousand; that of Gerona about three -thousand. The armed multitude, in the one, amounted to at least -twenty-five thousand; in the other, they were less than six thousand. -Cruelty and murder marked every step in the defence of Zaragoza; -the most horrible crimes were necessary to prolong the resistance, -above forty thousand persons perished miserably, and the town was -taken within three months. In Gerona there was nothing to blush -for; the fighting was more successful; the actual loss inflicted -upon the enemy greater; the suffering within the walls neither -wantonly produced nor useless; the period of its resistance doubled -that of Zaragoza; and every proceeding tended to raise instead of -sinking the dignity of human nature. There was less of brutal rule, -more of reason, and consequently more real heroism, more success at -the moment, and a better example given to excite the emulation of -generous men. - -7º. With reference to the general posture of affairs, the fall of -Gerona was a reproach to the Spanish and English cabinets. The latter -having agents in Catalonia, and such a man as lord Collingwood in -the Mediterranean, to refer to, were yet so ignorant, or so careless -of what was essential to the success of the war, as to let Gerona -struggle for six months, when half the troops employed by sir John -Stuart to alarm Naples, if carried to the coast of Catalonia, and -landed at Palamos, would have raised the siege. It was not necessary -that this army should have been equipped for a campaign, a single -march would have effected the object. An engineer and a few thousand -pounds would have rendered Palamos a formidable post; and that place -being occupied by English troops, and supported by a fleet, greater -means than the French could have collected in 1809, would not have -reduced Gerona. The Catalans, indeed, were not more tractable nor -more disposed than others to act cordially with their allies; but -the natural sterility of the country, the condensed manufacturing -population, the number of strong posts and large fortified towns in -their possession, and, above all, the long and difficult lines of -communication which the French must have guarded for the passage of -their convoys, would have rendered the invaders’ task most difficult. - -8º. From the commencement of the Spanish insurrection, the policy -of the Valencians had been characterised by a singular indifference -to the calamities that overwhelmed the other parts of Spain. The -local Junta in that province, not content with asserting their own -exclusive authority, imagined that it was possible to maintain -Valencia independent, even though the rest of the Peninsula should -be conquered. Hence the siege of Zaragoza passed unheeded, and the -suffering of Gerona made no impression on them. With a regular -army of above ten thousand men, more than thirty thousand armed -irregulars, and a large fleet at Carthagena, the governors of this -rich province, so admirably situated for offensive operations, never -even placed the fortified towns of their own frontier in a state of -defence, and carelessly beheld the seventh and third corps gradually -establishing, at the distance of a few days’ march from Valencia -itself, two solid bases for further invasion! But it is now time to -revert to the operations of the “_Central Supreme Junta_,” that it -may be fully understood how the patriotism, the constancy, the lives, -and the fortunes of the Spanish people were sported with by those who -had so unhappily acquired a momentary power in the Peninsula. - - - - -CHAP. IV. - - -When sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier of Portugal, the -calumnies propagated in Andalusia, relative to the cause of that -movement, were so far successful that no open revolt took place; but -the public hatred being little diminished, a design was formed to -establish a better government, as a preliminary to which, measures -were secretly taken to seize the members of the Junta, and transport -them to Manilla. The old Junta of Seville being the chief movers of -this sedition, no good could be expected from the change, otherwise, -such an explosion, although sure to be attended with slaughter and -temporary confusion, was not unlikely to prove advantageous to the -nation at large, it being quite obvious that some violent remedy was -wanting to purge off the complicated disorders of the state. - -“_Spain_,” said lord Wellesley, “_has proved untrue to our alliance, -because she is untrue to herself._”--“_Until some great change shall -be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and -in the state of her armies, no British army can attempt safely to -co-operate with Spanish troops in the territories of Spain.”--“No -alliance can protect her from the results of internal disorders and -national infirmity._” - -This evident discontent of the British ambassador led the -conspirators to impart their designs to him, in the hopes of -assistance; but he being accredited to the existing government, -apprised it of the danger, concealing, however, with due regard -to humanity, the names of those engaged in the plot. The Junta, in -great alarm, immediately sought to mitigate the general hatred; -but still averse to sacrificing any power, projected a counter -scheme. They had, for the public good according to some, for private -emolument according to others, hitherto permitted trading, under -licenses, with the towns occupied by the enemy. This regulation -and some peculiarly-heavy exactions they now rescinded, and, as a -final measure of conciliation, appointed, with many protestations of -patriotism, commissioners to prepare a scheme of government which -should serve until the fit period for convoking the Cortes arrived. - -But the commissioners, principally chosen from amongst the members -of the Junta, soon made manifest the real designs of that body. They -proposed that five persons should form a supreme executive council, -every member of the existing Junta, in rotation, to have a place; -the colonies to be represented as an integral part of the empire; -and the council so composed, to rule until the Cortes should meet, -and then to preside in that assembly. Thus under the pretence of -resigning their power, by a simple change of form, the present and -the future authority of the Junta were to be confirmed, and even the -proposal, in favour of the colonies, was, following the opinion of -lord Wellesley, a mere expedient to obtain a momentary popularity, -and entirely unconnected with enlarged or liberal views of policy and -government. - -[Sidenote: Vol. II. p. 348.] - -This project was foiled by Romana, who, being of the commission, -dissented from his colleagues; and it was on this occasion that -he drew up that accusatory paper, quoted in another part of this -history, and the bad acts therein specified, although sufficiently -heinous, were not the only charges made at this period. It was -objected to some amongst the Junta, that having as merchants, -contracted for supplying the army, they in their public capacity, -raised the price to be paid by the treasury for the articles; and -that the members generally were venal in their patronage, difficult -of access, and insolent of demeanour. - -Romana proposed a council of regency, to be composed of five persons, -not members of the Junta. This council to be assisted by a fresh -chosen Junta, also composed of five members and a procurator-general, -and to be stiled “_The Permanent Deputation of the Realm_.” One of -this body to be a South American, and the whole to represent the -Cortes, until the meeting of that assembly, which, he thought, could -not be too soon. His plan, introduced by misplaced declarations in -favour of arbitrary power, and terminated by others equally strong -in favour of civil liberty, was not well considered. The “_Permanent -Deputation_,” being to represent the Cortes, it was obvious that it -must possess the right of controlling the Regency; but the numbers -and dignity of both being equal, and their interests opposed, it -was as obvious that a struggle would commence, in which the latter, -having the sole distribution of honours and emoluments, could not -fail to conquer, and no Cortes would be assembled. - -Some time before this, when the terror caused by sir Arthur -Wellesley’s retreat from Spain, was fresh, Don Martin de Garay -had applied to lord Wellesley for advice, as to the best form of -government, and that nobleman also recommended a “_Council of -Regency_,” and, like Romana, proposed a second council; but with -this essential difference, that the latter were only to arrange the -details for electing the members of Cortes, a proclamation for the -convocation of which was to be immediately published, together with -a list of grievances, “_a Bill of Rights_” founded on an enlarged -conciliatory policy and having equal regard for the interests of -the colonies as for those of the mother country. Garay approved of -this advice while danger menaced the Junta; but when the arrangement -for the command of the armies had been completed, and the first -excitement had subsided, his solicitude for the improvement of the -government ceased. It must, however, be acknowledged, that lord -Wellesley, condemned the existing system, as much for its democratic -form as for its inefficiency; because the English cabinet never -forgot, that they were the champions of privilege, nor, that the war -was essentially, less for the defence of Spain, than the upholding of -the aristocratic system of Europe. - -To evade Romana’s proposition, the Junta, on the 28th of October, -announced that the National Cortes should be convoked on the 1st -of January, 1810, and assembled for business on the 1st of March -following. Having thus, in some measure, met the public wishes, they -joined to this announcement a virulent attack on the project of a -Regency, affirming, and not without some foundation as regarded -Romana’s plan, that such a government would disgust the colonies, -trample on the king’s rights, and would never assemble the Cortes; -moreover that it would soon be corrupted by the French. Then -enlarging on their own merits in a turgid declamatory style, they -defended their past conduct by a tissue of misrepresentations, which -deceived nobody; for, to use the words of lord Wellesley, “_no plan -had been adopted for any effectual redress of grievances, correction -of abuses or relief from exactions, and the administration of -justice, the regulation of revenue, finance, commerce, the security -of persons and property, and every other great branch of government, -were as defective as the military establishments_.” - -However, the promise of assembling the Cortes sufficed to lull -the public wrath; and the Junta resolved to recommence offensive -military operations, which they fondly imagined would, at once, crush -the enemy, and firmly establish their own popularity and power. -They were encouraged by a false, but general impression throughout -Andalusia, that Austria had broken off negotiations with France; and -in September and October, fresh levies, raised in Estremadura and -Andalusia, were incorporated with the remains of Cuesta’s old army; -the whole forming a body of more than sixty thousand soldiers, of -which nearly ten thousand were cavalry. Nor was the assembling and -equipment of this force a matter of great difficulty; for owing to -the feeble resistance made against the invaders, the war had hitherto -drawn so little on the population, that the poorer sort never evaded -a call for personal service; and the enormous accumulation of English -stores and money at Cadiz and Seville, were sufficient for every -exigency. - -In October Eguia advanced with this army a short way into La Mancha; -but when the French, unwilling to lose the resources of that fertile -province made a movement towards him, he regained the Sierra Morena -on the 16th, taking post, first at St. Elena, and finally at La -Carolina. The first and fourth corps then occupied the whole of La -Mancha, with advanced posts at the foot of the mountains; the second -and fifth corps were established in the valley of the Tagus and at -Toledo; and the reserve at Madrid. During these movements, Bassecour, -who commanded in Estremadura, detached eight hundred horsemen to -reinforce the duke Del Parque, and quartered the rest of his forces -behind the Guadiana. Thus in the latter end of October, there were -sixty thousand men, under Eguia, covering Seville by the line of La -Mancha; ten thousand under Bassecour on the line of Estremadura, and -about six thousand employed as guards to the Junta and in the service -of the depôts behind the Morena. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. II. p. 427.] - -In the north, the Spanish army of the left was concentrated near -Ciudad Rodrigo. For when Beresford marched down the Portuguese -frontier to the Tagus, the duke Del Parque, reinforced with the eight -hundred cavalry from Estremadura, and with the Gallician divisions -of Mendizabel and Carrera, (amounting to thirteen thousand men, -completely equipped from English stores, brought out to Coruña in -July,) made a movement into the rugged country, about the Sierra de -Francia, and sent his scouting parties as far as Baños. At the same -time general Santocildes, marching from Lugo with two thousand men, -took possession of Astorga, and menaced the rear of the sixth corps, -which after forcing the pass of Baños, had been quartered between the -Tormes and the Esla. In this situation, a French detachment attempted -to surprise one of the gates of Astorga, on the 9th of October, -and, being repulsed, returned to their cantonments. Soon afterwards -Ballasteros, having again collected about eight thousand men in the -Asturias, armed and equipped them from English stores, and, coming -down to Astorga, crossed the Esla, and attempted to storm Zamora. -Failing in this, he entered Portugal by the road of Miranda, and from -thence proceeded to join the duke Del Parque. Thus the old armies -of Gallicia and the Asturias being broken up, those provinces were -ordered to raise fresh forces; but there was in Gallicia a general -disposition to resist the authority of the Central Junta. - -Del Parque, eager to act against the sixth corps, demanded, through -Perez Castro the Spanish envoy at Lisbon, that the Portuguese army -should join him; but this being referred to sir Arthur Wellesley, he -gave it a decided negative, grounding his refusal upon reasons which -I shall insert at large, as giving a clear and interesting view of -the military state of affairs at this period. - -[Sidenote: Letter from Sir A. Wellesley, Sept. 23, 1809. MS.] - -“The enemy, he said, were superior to the allies, including those -which Beresford might bring into the field, not only in numbers, but -(adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies, the want of -cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, ammunition, and -arms, and the deficiency of discipline in all) superior in efficiency -even to a greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, and -the absolute deficiency in means, were the causes why, after a great -victory at Talavera, the armies had been obliged to recur to the -defensive, and nothing had altered for the better since. - -“But, besides these considerations, the enemy enjoyed peculiar -advantages from his central position, which enabled him to frustrate -the duke Del Parque’s intended operations. He could march a part, or -the whole of his forces to any quarter, whereas the operation of the -different corps of the allies must necessarily be isolated, and each -for a time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to prevent the -enemy from throwing himself upon the duke Del Parque and Beresford, -with the whole corps of Ney, which was at Salamanca, of Soult, -which was at Plasencia, and with the force under Kellerman, which -was near Valladolid, in which case, even if he, sir Arthur, had the -inclination, he had not the means of marching in time to save them -from destruction. - -“In the same manner the British army, if it took an advanced -position, would be liable to a fatal disaster; so likewise would -the Spanish army of La Mancha. It followed, then, that if any one -of these armies made a forward movement, the whole must co-operate, -or the single force in activity would be ruined; but the relative -efficiency and strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the -commencement of the argument, forbad a general co-operation with -any hopes of solid success; and the only consequence that could -follow would be, that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions -performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by others, and after -the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be -forced again to resume those defensive positions, which they ought -never to have quitted. - -“Satisfied that this was the only just view of affairs, he, although -prepared to make an effort to prevent Ciudad Rodrigo from falling -into the enemy’s hands, was resolved not to give the duke Del Parque -any assistance to maintain his former position, and he advised the -Portuguese government, not to risk Bereford’s army in a situation -which could only lead to mischief. The proposed operation of the -duke Del Parque was not the mode to save Ciudad Rodrigo. The only -effectual one was to post himself in such a situation as that the -enemy could not attack and defeat him without a long previous -preparation, which would give time for aid to arrive, and a march, -in which the enemy himself might be exposed to defeat. To expose -those troops to defeat which were ultimately to co-operate in defence -of Ciudad Rodrigo, was not the way of preventing the success of an -attempt of that fortress. The best way was to place the Spanish -force in such a post that it could not be attacked without risk -to the enemy, and from whence it could easily co-operate with the -other corps, which must be put in motion, if Ciudad was to be saved; -and although he would not take upon himself to point out the exact -position which the duke Del Parque ought to occupy, he was certain -that, in his present forward one, although joined by Beresford, he -could not avoid defeat. Ciudad Rodrigo would be lost, and other -misfortunes would follow, none of which could occur under any other -probable, or even possible concurrence of circumstances. In fine, -that he had long been of opinion that the war must necessarily be -defensive on the part of the allies, and that Portugal at least, if -not Spain, ought to avail herself of the short period, which the -enemy seemed disposed to leave her in tranquillity, to organize, -and equip, and discipline her armies. Those objects could not be -accomplished, unless the troops were kept quiet, and yet they were -much more important to all parties, than any desultory successful -operations against the French troops about Salamanca; but any success -was doubtful, and certain to be temporary, because the enemy would -immediately collect in numbers sufficient to crush the allies, who -must then return, having failed in their object, lost a number of -men, and, what was worse, time, which would have been more usefully -employed in preparing for a great and well combined effort.” - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence with Don M. Forjas, -October 19, 1809. MSS.] - -This reasoning, solid, clear, convincing, made no impression upon the -Spanish Junta or their general. Castro replied to it, by demanding a -positive and definitive answer, as to when the Portuguese army would -be in a condition to co-operate with the Spaniards in the Spanish -territories. “_When there is a Spanish army with which the Portuguese -can co-operate on some defined plan, which all parties will have -the means, and will engage to carry into execution, as far as any -person can engage to carry into execution a military operation._” -“_When means shall be pointed out, and fixed, for the subsistence of -the Portuguese troops while they remain in Spain, so that they may -not starve, and be obliged to retire for want of food, as was the -case when lately in that country._” “_When decided answers shall be -given upon those points, I shall be enabled to tell the governors -of Portugal that their excellencies have an army in a state to be -sent into Spain._” This was sir Arthur’s reply, which ended the -negotiation, and the duke Del Parque commenced operations by himself. - -To favour the junction of Ballasteros, his first movement was towards -Ledesma. General Marchand immediately drew together, at Salamanca, -eleven thousand men and fourteen guns, and marched to meet him. -Thereupon, the duke, without having effected his junction, fell -back to Tamames; taking post half-way up a mountain of remarkable -strength, where he awaited the enemy, with a thousand cavalry and -twenty thousand infantry, of which the Gallicians only could be -accounted experienced soldiers. - - -BATTLE OF TAMAMES. - -General Losada commanded the Spanish right, count Belvidere the -reserve, Martin Carrera the left, which being on the most accessible -part of the mountain was covered and flanked by the cavalry. -Marchand, desirous of fighting before Ballasteros could arrive, -moved rapidly, reached the foot of the mountain early on the 18th of -October, and immediately fell upon Del Parque’s left. The Spanish -cavalry fled rather hastily; the French horsemen followed closely, -the infantry surprised in the midst of an evolution, were thrown -into disorder, and the artillery was taken. Carrera, Mendizabel, and -the duke, rallied the troops on the higher ground, reinforced them -from the reserve, and coming down with a fresh impetus, recovered -the guns, and discomfitted the French with the loss of an eagle, one -cannon, and several hundred men. During this brilliant combat on -the left, the right and centre were felt by the French skirmishers; -but the ground was too strong to make any impression. Marchand, -seeing his men repulsed in all quarters with loss, and fearing to -be enclosed by Ballasteros in that disordered state, retreated to -Salamanca. - -Del Parque did not venture to follow up his victory until the 21st, -when, being joined by Ballasteros, he pushed with nearly thirty -thousand men for Ledesma; crossed the Tormes there on the 23d, turned -Salamanca by a night march, and early in the morning of the 24th -crowned the heights of San Cristoval in rear of that city, hoping to -cut off Marchand’s retreat. But that general had timely information, -and was already at Toro, behind the Douro. Meanwhile, the news of the -defeat at Tamames reached Madrid, Dessolle’s division was detached -through the Puerto Pico to reinforce the sixth corps; and Kellerman -was directed to advance from Valladolid, and take the command of the -whole. - -When the duke Del Parque heard of this reinforcement, he fell back, -not to Ciudad Rodrigo, but by the way of Alba de Tormes to Bejar, -which latter place he reached on the 8th of November. And while -these events were taking place in Castile, the Central Junta having -finally concocted their schemes, were commencing an enterprise of -unparalleled rashness on the side of La Mancha. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -In the arrangement of warlike affairs, difficulties being always -overlooked by the Spaniards, they are carried on from one phantasy -to another so swiftly, that the first conception of an enterprise is -immediately followed by a confident anticipation of complete success, -which continues until the hour of battle; and then when it might be -of use, generally abandons them. Now the Central Junta having, to -deceive the people, affirmed that sir Arthur Wellesley retreated to -the frontiers of Portugal at the very moment when the French might -have been driven to the Pyrenees, came very soon to believe this -their own absurd calumny, and resolved to send the army at Carolina -headlong against Madrid: nay, such was their pitch of confidence, -that forenaming the civil and military authorities, they arranged a -provisionary system for the future administration of the capital, -with a care, that they denied to the army which was to put them in -possession. - -Eguia was considered unfit to conduct this enterprise, and -Albuquerque was distasteful to the Junta; wherefore, casting their -eyes upon general Areizaga, they chose him, whose only recommendation -was, that, at the petty battle of Alcanitz, Blake had noticed his -courage. He was then at Lerida, but reached La Carolina in the latter -end of October; and being of a quick lively turn, and as confident as -the Junta could desire, readily undertook to drive the French from -Madrid. - -This movement was to commence early in November, and at first, only -Villa Campa, with the bands from Aragon, were to assist. But when -Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose confidence, the -duke of Albuquerque, successor to Bassecour in Estremadura, received -instructions to cause a diversion, by marching on Arzobispo and -Talavera de la Reyna. The duke Del Parque, coming by the pass of -Baños, was to join him there; and thus nearly ninety thousand men -were to be put in motion against Madrid, but precisely on that plan -which sir Arthur Wellesley had just denounced as certain to prove -disastrous. Indeed, every chance was so much in favour of the French, -that taking into consideration the solid reasons for remaining on -the defensive, Areizaga’s irruption may be regarded as an extreme -example of military rashness; and the project of uniting Del Parque’s -forces with Albuquerque’s, at Talavera, was also certain to fail; -because, the enemy’s masses were already in possession of the point -of junction, and the sixth corps could fall on Del Parque’s rear. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.] - -Partly to deceive the enemy, partly because they would never admit -of any opposition to a favourite scheme, the Junta spread a report -that the British army was to co-operate; and permitted Areizaga to -march, under the impression that it was so. Yet nothing could be more -untrue. Sir Arthur Wellesley being at this period at Seville, held -repeated conversations with the Spanish ministers and the members of -the Junta, and reiterating all his former objections to offensive -operations, warned his auditors that the project in question was -peculiarly ill-judged, and would end in the destruction of their -army. The Spanish ministers, far from attending to his advice, did -not even _officially inform him of Areizaga’s march until the 18th of -November_, the very day before the fatal termination of the campaign. -Yet, on _the 16th they had repeated their demand for assistance_, and -with a vehemence, deaf to reason, required that the British should -instantly co-operate with Albuquerque and Del Parque’s forces. Sir -Arthur, firm to his first views, never gave the slightest hopes that -his army would so act; and he assured the Junta, that the diversion -proposed would have no effect whatever. - - -OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA. - -Areizaga, after publishing an address to the troops on the 3d of -November, commenced his march from La Carolina, with sixty pieces -of artillery, and from fifty to sixty thousand men, of which about -eight thousand were cavalry. Several British officers and private -gentlemen, and the baron Crossard, an Austrian military agent, -attended the head-quarters which was a scene of gaiety and boasting; -for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, gave a free scope to his -social vivacity. The army marched by the roads of Manzanares and -Damiel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation, and without any -military equipment save arms; but the men were young, robust, full -of life and confidence; and being without impediments of any kind, -made nearly thirty miles each day. They moved however in a straggling -manner, quartering and feeding as they could in the villages on their -route, and with so little propriety, that the peasantry of La Mancha -universally abandoned their dwellings, and carried off their effects. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.] - -Although the French could not at first give credit to the rumours -of this strange incursion, they were aware that some great movement -was in agitation, and only uncertain from what point and for what -specific object the effort would be made. Jourdan had returned to -France; Soult was major-general of the French armies, and under his -advice, the king, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, prepared to -meet the coming blow. But the army was principally posted towards -Talavera; for the false reports had, in some measure, succeeded in -deceiving the French as to the approach of the English; and it was -impossible at once to conceive the full insanity of the Junta. - -The second corps, commanded by general Heudelet, being withdrawn -from Placentia, was, on the 5th of November, posted at Oropesa and -Arzobispo, with an advanced guard at Calzada, and scouting parties -watching Naval Moral, and the course of the Tietar. - -The fifth corps, under Mortier, was concentrated at Talavera. - -Of the fourth corps, half a division garrisoned Madrid in the absence -of Dessolle’s troops; and the other half, under general Liger Belair, -was behind the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the -capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by Sebastiani, were, the -one at Toledo, the other with Milhaud’s cavalry at Ocaña. - -[Sidenote: Imperial Muster Roll. MSS.] - -The first corps, about twenty-one thousand strong, and commanded by -marshal Victor, was at Mora and Yebenes, a day’s march in advance of -Toledo, but the cavalry of this corps under the command of Latour -Maubourg occupied Consuegra and Madrilejos, on the road to the Sierra -Morena. The whole army including the French and Spanish guards, was -above eighty thousand fighting men, without reckoning Dessolle’s -division, which was on the other side of the Guadarama mountains. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.] - -In the night of the 6th, information reached the king, that six -thousand Spanish horsemen, supported by two thousand foot, had come -down upon Consuegra from the side of Herencia, and that a second -column likewise composed of cavalry and infantry, had passed the -Puerto de Piche, and fallen upon the outposts at Madrilejos. All the -prisoners taken in the skirmishes agreed that the Spanish army was -above fifty thousand strong, and the duke of Belluno immediately -concentrated the first corps at Yebenes, but kept his cavalry at -Mora, by which he covered the roads leading from Consuegra and -Madrilejos upon Toledo. On the 8th, there were no Spaniards in front -of the first corps, yet officers sent towards Ocaña, were chased back -by cavalry; and Soult judged what was indeed the truth, that Areizaga -continuing his reckless march, had pushed by Tembleque towards -Aranjuez, leaving the first corps on his left flank. The division of -the fourth corps was immediately moved from Toledo by the right bank -of the Tagus to Aranjuez, from whence Sebastiani carried it to Ocaña, -thus concentrating about eight thousand infantry, and fifteen hundred -cavalry at that point on the 9th; and the same day Victor retired -with the first corps to Ajofrin. - -On the 10th, Gazan’s division of the fifth corps was ordered to march -from Talavera to Toledo; and the first corps which had reached the -latter town, was directed to move up the right bank of the Tagus -to Aranjuez to support Sebastiani, who holding fast at Ocaña, sent -six squadrons to feel for the enemy towards Guardia. The Spaniards -continuing their movement, met those squadrons and pursued them -towards Ocaña. - - -COMBAT OF DOS BARRIOS. - -Areizaga, ignorant of what was passing around him, and seeing only -Sebastiani’s cavalry on the table-land between the town of Dos -Barrios and Ocaña, concluded that they were unsupported, and directed -the Spanish horse to charge them without delay. The French thus -pressed, drew back behind their infantry which was close at hand -and unexpectedly opened a brisk fire on the Spanish squadrons which -were thrown into confusion, and being charged in that state by the -whole mass of the enemy’s cavalry, were beaten, with the loss of two -hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. Areizaga’s main body -was, however, coming up, and Sebastiani fell back upon Ocaña. The -next morning he took up a position on some heights lining the left -bank of the Tagus and covering Aranjuez, the Spaniards entered Dos -Barrios, and their impetuous movement ceased. They had come down from -the Morena like a stream of lava; and burst into La Mancha with a -rapidity that scarcely gave time for rumour to precede them. But this -swiftness of execution, generally so valuable in war, was here but -an outbreak of folly. Without any knowledge of the French numbers or -position, without any plan of action, Areizaga rushed like a maniac -into the midst of his foes, and then suddenly stood still, trembling -and bewildered. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.] - -From the 10th to the 13th he halted at Dos Barrios, and informed his -government of Sebastiani’s stubborn resistance, and of the doubts -which now for the first time assailed his own mind. It was then the -Junta changing their plans, eagerly demanded the assistance of the -British army, and commanded the dukes of Albuquerque and Del Parque -to unite at Talavera. Albuquerque commenced his movement immediately, -and the Junta did not hesitate to assure both their generals and the -public, that sir Arthur was also coming on. - -Thus encouraged, and having had time to recover from his first -incertitude, Areizaga on the 14th, made a flank march by his right to -Santa Cruz la Zarza, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, -turn the French left, and penetrate to the capital by the eastern -side; but during his delay at Dos Barrios the French forces had been -concentrated from every quarter. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.] - -South of Ocaña, the ground is open and undulating, but on the north, -the ramifications of the Cuença mountains, leading down the left -bank of the Tagus, presented, at Santa Cruz, ridges which stretching -strong and rough towards Aranjuez, afforded good positions for -Sebastiani to cover that place. Soult was awake to his adversary’s -projects, yet could not believe that he would dare such a movement -unless certain of support from the British army; and therefore kept -the different corps quiet on the eleventh, waiting for Heudelet’s -report from Oropesa. In the night it arrived, stating that rumours of -a combined Spanish and English army being on the march, were rife, -but that the scouts could not discover that the allied force was -actually within several marches. - -Soult, now judging that although the rumours should be true, his -central position would enable him to defeat Areizaga and return -by the way of Toledo in time to meet the allies in the valley of -the Tagus, put all his masses again into activity. The first corps -was directed to hasten its march to Aranjuez; the fifth corps to -concentrate at Toledo; the second corps to abandon Oropesa, Calzada -and Arzobispo, and replacing the fifth corps at Talavera, to be -in readiness to close upon the main body of the army. Finally, -information being received of the duke Del Parque’s retreat from -Salamanca to Bejar and of the re-occupation of Salamanca by the sixth -corps, Dessolle’s division was recalled to Madrid. - -During the 12th, while the first, second, and fifth corps were in -march, general Liger Belair’s brigade continued to watch the banks of -the Tajuna, and the fourth corps preserved its offensive positions -on the height in the front of Aranjuez, having fifteen hundred men -in reserve at the bridge of Bayona. The 14th the general movement -was completed. Two corps were concentrated at Aranjuez to assail the -Spaniards in front; one at Toledo to cross the Tagus and fall upon -their left flank, and the king’s guards at Madrid, formed a reserve -for the fourth and first corps. The second corps was at Talavera, -and Dessolle’s division was in the Guadarama on its return to the -capital. In fine, all was prepared for the attack of Dos Barrios, -when Areizaga’s flank march to Santa Cruz la Zarza occasioned new -combinations. - -In the evening of the 15th, it was known that the Spaniards had made -a bridge at Villa Maurique, and passed two divisions and some cavalry -over the Tagus. The duke of Belluno was immediately ordered to carry -the first and fourth corps (with the exception of a brigade left in -Aranjuez) up the left bank of the Tagus, operating, to fix Areizaga, -and force him to deliver battle; and, with a view of tempting the -Spaniard, by an appearance of timidity, the bridges of La Reyna and -Aranjuez were broken down. - -While these dispositions were making on the French side, the Spanish -general commenced a second bridge over the Tagus; and part of his -cavalry, spreading in small detachments, scoured the country, and -skirmished on a line extending from Arganda to Aranjuez. The Partidas -also, being aided by detachments from the army, obliged the French -garrison to retire from Guardalaxara upon Arganda, and occupied -the former town on the 12th. But, in the night of the 13th, eight -French companies and some troops of light cavalry, by a sudden march, -surprised them, killed and wounded two or three hundred men, and took -eighty horses and a piece of artillery. - -The 16th the infantry of the first and fourth corps was at Morata -and Bayona, the cavalry at Perales and Chinchon, and, during this -time, the fifth corps, leaving a brigade of foot and one of horse at -Toledo, marched by Illescas towards Madrid, to act as a reserve to -the duke of Belluno. - -The 17th Areizaga continued his demonstrations on the side of the -Tajuna, and hastened the construction of his second bridge; but on -the approach of the duke of Belluno with the first corps, he stayed -the work, withdrew his divisions from the right bank of the Tagus, -and on the 18th, (the cavalry of the first corps having reached -Villarejo de Salvanes,) he destroyed his bridges, called in his -parties, and drew up for battle on the heights of Santa Cruz de la -Zarza. - -Hitherto the continual movements of the Spanish army, and the -unsettled plans of the Spanish general, rendered it difficult for the -French to fix a field of battle; but now Areizaga’s march to St. Cruz -had laid his line of operations bare. The French masses were close -together, the duke of Belluno could press on the Spanish front with -the first corps, and the king, calling the fourth corps from Bayona, -could throw twenty-five or thirty thousand men on Areizaga’s rear, -by the road of Aranjuez and Ocaña. It was calculated that no danger -could arise from this double line of operations, because a single -march would bring both the king and Victor upon Areizaga; and if the -latter should suddenly assail either, each would be strong enough to -sustain the shock. Hence, when Soult knew that the Spaniards were -certainly encamped at Santa Cruz, he caused the fifth corps, then in -march for Madrid, to move during the night of the 17th upon Aranjuez. -The fourth corps received a like order. The king, himself, quitting -Madrid, arrived there on the evening of the 18th, with the Royal -French Guards, two Spanish battalions of the line, and a brigade of -Dessolle’s division which had just arrived; in all about ten thousand -men. The same day, the duke of Belluno concentrated the first corps -at Villarejo de Salvanés, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa -Maurique, and attack the Spanish position on the 19th. - -A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled the French to -repair the broken bridges, near Aranjuez, in two hours; and about one -o’clock on the 18th, a division of cavalry, two divisions of infantry -of the fourth corps, and the advanced guard of the fifth corps, -passed the Tagus, part at the bridge of La Reyna, and part at a ford. -General Milhaud with the leading squadrons, immediately pursued a -small body of Spanish horsemen; and was thus led to the table-land, -between Antiguela and Ocaña, where he suddenly came upon a front of -fifteen hundred cavalry supported by three thousand more in reserve. -Having only twelve hundred dragoons, he prepared to retire; but at -that moment general Paris arrived with another brigade, and was -immediately followed by the light cavalry of the fifth corps; the -whole making a reinforcement of about two thousand men. With these -troops Sebastiani came in person, and took the command at the instant -when the Spaniards, seeing the inferiority of the French, were -advancing to the charge. - - -CAVALRY COMBAT AT OCAÑA. - -The Spaniards came on at a trot, but Sebastiani directed Paris, -with a regiment of light cavalry and the Polish lancers, to turn -and fall upon the right flank of the approaching squadrons, which -being executed with great vigour, especially by the Poles, caused -considerable confusion in the Spanish ranks, and their general -endeavoured to remedy it by closing to the assailed flank. But to -effect this he formed his left and centre in one vast column. -Sebastiani charged headlong into the midst of it with his reserves, -and the enormous mass yielding to the shock, got into confusion, -and finally gave way. Many were slain, several hundred wounded, and -eighty troopers and above five hundred horses were taken. The loss of -the French bore no proportion in men, but general Paris was killed, -and several superior officers were wounded. - -This unexpected encounter with such a force of cavalry, led Soult -to believe that the Spanish general, aware of his error, was -endeavouring to recover his line of operations. The examination of -the prisoners confirmed this opinion; and in the night, information -from the duke of Belluno, and the reports of officers sent towards -Villa Maurique arrived, all agreeing that only a rear-guard was to -be seen at Santa Cruz de la Zarza. It then became clear that the -Spaniards were on the march, and that a battle could be fought the -next day. In fact Areizaga had retraced his steps by a flank movement -through Villa Rubia and Noblejas, with the intention of falling upon -the king’s forces as they opened out from Aranjuez. He arrived on the -morning of the 19th at Ocaña; but judging from the cavalry fight, -that the enemy could attack first, drew up his whole army on the same -plain, in two lines, a quarter of a mile asunder. - -Ocaña is covered on the north by a ravine, which commencing gently -half a mile eastward of the town, runs deepening and with a curve, -to the west, and finally connects itself with gullies and hollows, -whose waters run off to the Tagus. Behind the deepest part of this -ravine was the Spanish left, crossing the main road from Aranjuez -to Dos Barrios. One flank rested on the gullies, the other on Ocaña. -The centre was in front of the town, which was occupied by some -infantry as a post of reserve, but the right wing stretched in the -direction of Noblejas along the edge of a gentle ridge _in front_ -of the shallow part of the ravine. The cavalry was on the flank and -rear of the right wing. Behind the army there was an immense plain, -but closed in and fringed towards Noblejas with rich olive woods, -which were occupied by infantry to protect the passage of the Spanish -baggage, still filing by the road from Zarza. Such were Areizaga’s -dispositions. - -Joseph passed the night of the 18th in reorganizing his forces. The -whole of the cavalry, consisting of nine regiments, was given to -Sebastiani. Four divisions of infantry, with the exception of one -regiment, left at Aranjuez to guard the bridge, were placed under the -command of marshal Mortier, who was also empowered, if necessary, -to direct the movements of the cavalry. The artillery was commanded -by general Senarmont. The Royal Guards remained with the King, and -marshal Soult directed the whole of the movements. - -Before day-break, on the 19th, the monarch marched with the intention -of falling upon the Spaniards wherever he could meet with them. At -Antiguela his troops quitting the high road, turned to their left, -gained the table-land of Ocaña somewhat beyond the centre of the -Spanish position, and discovered Areizaga’s army in order of battle. -The French cavalry instantly forming to the front, covered the -advance of the infantry, which drew up in successive lines as the -divisions arrived on the plain. The Spanish outposts fell back, and -were followed by the French skirmishers, who spread along the hostile -front and opened a sharp fire. - -About forty-five thousand Spanish infantry, seven thousand cavalry, -and sixty pieces of artillery were in line. The French force was only -twenty-four thousand infantry, five thousand sabres and lances, and -fifty guns, including the battery of the Royal Guard. But Areizaga’s -position was miserably defective. The whole of his left wing, fifteen -thousand strong, was paralized by the ravine; it could neither attack -nor be attacked: the centre was scarcely better situated, and the -extremity of his right wing was uncovered, save by the horse, who -were, although superior in number, quite dispirited by the action of -the preceding evening. These circumstances dictated the order of the -attack. - - -BATTLE OF OCAÑA. - -At ten o’clock, Sebastiani’s cavalry gaining ground to his left, -turned the Spanish right. General Leval, with two divisions of -infantry in columns of regiments, each having a battalion displayed -in front, followed the cavalry, and drove general Zayas from the -olive-woods. General Girard, with his division arranged in the same -manner, followed Leval in second line; and at the same moment, -general Dessolles menaced the centre with one portion of his troops, -while another portion lined the edge of the ravine to support the -skirmishers and awe the Spanish left wing. The king remained in -reserve with his guards. Thus the French order of battle was in two -columns: the principal one, flanked by the cavalry, directed against -and turning the Spanish right, the second keeping the Spanish centre -in check; and each being supported by reserves. - -These dispositions were completed at eleven o’clock; at which hour, -Senarmont, massing thirty pieces of artillery, opened a shattering -fire on Areizaga’s centre. Six guns, detached to the right, played -at the same time across the ravine against the left; and six others -swept down the deep hollow, to clear it of the light troops. The -Spaniards were undisciplined and badly commanded, but discovered -no appearance of fear; their cries were loud and strong, their -skirmishing fire brisk; and, from the centre of their line, sixteen -guns opened with a murderous effect upon Leval’s and Girard’s -columns, as the latter were pressing on towards the right. To -mitigate the fire of this battery, a French battalion, rushing out -at full speed, seized a small eminence close to the Spanish guns, -and a counter battery was immediately planted there. Then the -Spaniards gave back: their skirmishers were swept out of the ravine -by a flanking fire of grape; and Senarmont immediately drawing the -artillery from the French right, took Ocaña as his pivot, and, -prolonging his fire to the left, raked Areizaga’s right wing in its -whole length. - -During this cannonade, Leval, constantly pressing forward, obliged -the Spaniards to change their front, by withdrawing the right wing -_behind_ the shallow part of the ravine, which, as I have before -said, was in its rear when the action commenced. By this change, the -whole army, still drawn up in two lines, at the distance of a quarter -of a mile asunder, was pressed into somewhat of a convex form with -the town of Ocaña in the centre, and hence Senarmont’s artillery tore -their ranks with a greater destruction than before. Nevertheless, -encouraged by observing the comparatively feeble body of infantry -approaching them, the Spaniards suddenly retook the offensive, their -fire, redoubling, dismounted two French guns; Mortier himself was -wounded slightly, Leval severely; the line advanced, and the leading -French divisions wavered and gave back. - -The moment was critical, and the duke of Treviso lost no time -in exhortations to Leval’s troops, but, like a great commander, -instantly brought up Girard’s division through the intervals of -the first line, and displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping one -regiment in square on the left flank: for he expected that Areizaga’s -powerful cavalry, which still remained in the plain, would charge -for the victory. Girard’s fire soon threw the Spanish first line -into disorder; and meanwhile, Dessolles, who had gained ground by -an oblique movement, left in front, seeing the enemy’s right thus -shaken, seized Ocaña itself, and issued forth on the other side. - -The light cavalry of the king’s guard, followed by the infantry, -then poured through the town; and, on the extreme left, Sebastiani, -with a rapid charge, cut off six thousand infantry, and obliged them -to surrender. The Spanish cavalry, which had only suffered a little -from the cannonade, and had never made an effort to turn the tide -of battle, now drew off entirely: the second line of infantry gave -ground as the front fell back upon it in confusion; and Areizaga, -confounded and bewildered, ordered the left wing, which had scarcely -fired a shot, to retreat, and then quitted the field himself. - -For half an hour after this, the superior officers who remained, -endeavoured to keep the troops together in the plain, and strove to -reach the main road leading to Dos Barrios; but Girard and Dessolle’s -divisions being connected after passing Ocaña, pressed on with steady -rapidity, while the Polish lancers and a regiment of chasseurs, -outflanking the Spanish right, continually increased the confusion: -finally, Sebastiani, after securing his prisoners, came up again -like a whirlwind, and charged full in the front with five regiments -of cavalry. Then the whole mass broke, and fled each man for himself -across the plain; but, on the right of the routed multitude, a deep -ravine leading from Yepes to Dos Barrios, in an oblique direction, -continually contracted the space; and the pursuing cavalry arriving -first at Barrios, headed nearly ten thousand bewildered men, and -forced them to surrender. The remainder turned their faces to all -quarters; and such was the rout, that the French were also obliged -to disperse to take prisoners, for, to their credit, no rigorous -execution was inflicted; and hundreds, merely deprived of their arms, -were desired, in raillery, “to return to their homes, and abandon -war as a trade they were unfit for.” This fatal battle commenced at -eleven o’clock; thirty pieces of artillery, a hundred and twenty -carriages, twenty-five stand of colours, three generals, six hundred -inferior officers, and eighteen thousand privates were taken before -two o’clock, and the pursuit was still hot. Seven or eight thousand -of the Spaniards, however, contrived to make away towards the -mountain of Tarancon; others followed the various routes through La -Mancha to the Sierra Morena; and many saved themselves in Valencia -and Murcia. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, -1809. MSS.] - -Meanwhile, the first corps, passing the Tagus by a ford, had -re-established the bridge at Villa Maurique before ten o’clock in -the morning, and finding Santa Cruz de la Zarza abandoned, followed -Areizaga’s traces; at Villatobas, the light cavalry captured -twelve hundred carriages, and a little farther on, took a thousand -prisoners, from the column which was making for Tarancon. Thus -informed of the result of the battle, the duke of Belluno halted at -Villatobas, but sent his cavalry forward. At La Guardia they joined -Sebastiani’s horsemen; and the whole continuing the pursuit to -Lillo, made five hundred more prisoners, together with three hundred -horses. This finished the operations of the day: only eighteen -hundred cannon-shot had been fired, and an army of more than fifty -thousand men had been ruined. The French lost seventeen hundred -men, killed and wounded; the Spaniards five thousand: and, before -nightfall, all the baggage and military carriages, three thousand -animals, forty-five pieces of artillery, thirty thousand muskets, and -twenty-six thousand captives were in the hands of the conquerors! - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 3._ - - AREIZAGA’S - Operations, - 1809. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -[Sidenote: Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, -1809. MSS.] - -Areizaga reached Tembleque during the night, and La Carolina the -third day after. On the road, he met general Benaz with a thousand -dragoons that had been detached to the rear before the battle -commenced; this body he directed on Madrilegos to cover the retreat -of the fugitives; but so strongly did the panic spread that when -Sebastiani approached that post on the 20th, Benaz’s men fled, -without seeing an enemy, as fearfully as any who came from the fight. -Even so late as the 24th, only four hundred cavalry, belonging to all -regiments, could be assembled at Manzanares; and still fewer at La -Carolina. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -Joseph halted at Dos Barrios, the night of the battle, and the next -day directed Sebastiani, with all the light cavalry and a division -of infantry, upon Madrilegos and Consuegra; the first corps, by St. -Juan de Vilharta, upon the Sierra Morena, and the fifth corps, by -Tembleque and Mora, upon Toledo. One division of the fourth corps -guarded the spoil and the prisoners at Ocaña. A second division, -reinforced with a brigade of cavalry, was posted, by detachments, -from Aranjuez to Consuegra. - -The monarch himself, with his guards and Dessolle’s first brigade, -returned, on the 20th, to Madrid. - -Three days had sufficed to dissipate the storm on the side of La -Mancha, but the duke Del Parque still menaced the sixth corps in -Castile, and the reports from Talavera again spoke of Albuquerque -and the English being in motion. The second brigade of Dessolle’s -division had returned from Old Castile on the 19th, and the -uncertainty with respect to the British movements, obliged the king -to keep all his troops in hand. Nevertheless, fearing that, if Del -Parque gained upon the sixth corps, he might raise an insurrection -in Leon, Gazan’s division of the fifth corps was sent, from Toledo, -through the Puerto Pico, to Marchand’s assistance, and Kellerman was -again directed to take the command of the whole. - -During these events, the British army remained tranquil about -Badajos; but Albuquerque, following his orders, had reached Peralada -de Garbin, and seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation of -being joined by the duke Del Parque. That general, however, who -had above thirty thousand men, thought, when Dessolle’s division -was recalled to Madrid, that he could crush the sixth corps, and, -therefore, advanced from Bejar towards Alba de Tormes on the 17th, -two days before the battle of Ocaña. Thus, when Albuquerque expected -him on the Tagus, he was engaged in serious operations beyond the -Tormes, and, having reached Alba, the 21st, sent a division to take -possession of Salamanca, which Marchand had again abandoned. The 22d -he marched towards Valladolid, and his advanced guard and cavalry -entered Fresno and Carpio. Meanwhile Kellerman, collecting all the -troops of his government, and being joined by Marchand, moved upon -Medina del Campo, and the 23d, fell with a body of horse upon the -Spaniards at Fresno. The Spanish cavalry fled at once; but the -infantry stood firm, and repulsed the assailants. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. MSS.] - -The 24th the duke carried his whole army to Fresno, intending to give -battle; but on the 26th imperative orders to join Albuquerque having -reached him, he commenced a retrograde movement. Kellerman, without -waiting for the arrival of Gazan’s division, instantly pursued, and -his advanced guard of cavalry overtook and charged the Spanish army -at the moment when a part of their infantry and all their horse had -passed the bridge of Alba de Tormes; being repulsed, it retired upon -the supports, and the duke, seeing that an action was inevitable, -brought the remainder of his troops, with the exception of one -division, back to the right bank. - - -BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES. - -Scarcely was the line formed, when Kellerman came up with two -divisions of dragoons and some artillery, and, without hesitating, -sent one division to outflank the Spanish right, and, with the other, -charged fiercely in upon the front. The Spanish horsemen, flying -without a blow, rode straight over the bridge, and the infantry of -the right being thus exposed, were broken and sabred; but those on -the left stood fast and repulsed the enemy. The duke rallied his -cavalry on the other side of the river, and brought them back to the -fight, but the French were also reinforced, and once more the Spanish -horse fled without a blow. By this time it was dark, and the infantry -of the left wing, under Mendizabel and Carrera, being unbroken, made -good their retreat across the river, yet not without difficulty, and -under the fire of some French infantry, which arrived just in the -dusk. During the night the duke retreated upon Tamames unmolested, -but at day-break a French patrol coming up with this rear, his whole -army threw away their arms and fled outright. Kellerman having, -meanwhile entered Salamanca, did not pursue, yet the dispersion was -complete. - -After this defeat, Del Parque rallied his army in the mountains -behind Tamames, and, in ten or twelve days, again collected about -twenty thousand men; they were however without artillery, scarcely -any had preserved their arms, and such was their distress for -provisions, that two months afterwards, when the British arrived -on the northern frontier, the peasantry still spoke with horror of -the sufferings of these famished soldiers. Many actually died of -want, and every village was filled with sick. Yet the mass neither -dispersed nor murmured! For Spaniards, though hasty in revenge and -feeble in battle, are patient, to the last degree, in suffering. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 7, 1809. MSS.] - -This result of the duke Del Parque’s operation amply justified sir -Arthur Wellesley’s advice to the Portuguese regency. In like manner -the battle of Ocaña, and the little effect produced by the duke of -Albuquerque’s advance to Arzobispo, justified that which he gave to -the Central Junta. It might be imagined that the latter would have -received his after-counsels with deference; but the course of that -body was never affected by either reason or experience. Just before -the rout of Alba de Tormes, sir Arthur Wellesley proposed that ten -thousand men, to be taken from the duke Del Parque, should _reinforce -Albuquerque, that the latter might maintain the strong position of -Meza d’Ibor, and cover Estremadura for the winter_. Meanwhile Del -Parque’s force, thus reduced one-third, could be more easily fed, and -might keep aloof from the enemy until the British army should arrive -on the northern frontier of Portugal, a movement long projected, -and, as he informed them, only delayed _to protect Estremadura until -the duke of Albuquerque had received the reinforcement_. The only -reply of the Junta was an order, directing Albuquerque _immediately -to quit the line of the Tagus, and take post at Llerena, behind the -Guadiana_. Thus abandoning Estremadura to the enemy, and exposing -his own front in a bad position to an army coming from Almaraz, and -his right flank and rear to an army coming from La Mancha. - -This foolish and contemptuous proceeding, being followed by Del -Parque’s defeat, which endangered Ciudad Rodrigo, sir Arthur -at once commenced his march for the north. He knew that twenty -thousand Spanish infantry and six thousand mounted cavalry were -again collected in La Carolina; that the troops (eight thousand), -who escaped from Ocaña, on the side of Tarancon, were at Cuença, -under general Echevarria; and as the numbers re-assembled in the -Morena were (the inactivity of the French after the battle of Ocaña -considered) sufficient to defend the passes and cover Seville for -the moment, there was no reason why the British army should remain -in unhealthy positions to aid people who would not aid themselves. -Albuquerque’s retrograde movement was probably a device of the Junta -to oblige sir Arthur to undertake the defence of Estremadura; but it -only hastened his departure. It did not comport with his plans to -engage in serious operations on that side; yet to have retired when -that province was actually attacked, would have been disreputable -for his arms, wherefore, seizing this unhappily favourable moment to -quit Badajos, he crossed the Tagus, and marched into the valley of -the Mondego, leaving general Hill, with a mixed force of ten thousand -men, at Abrantes. - -The Guadiana pestilence had been so fatal that many officers blamed -him for stopping so long; but it was his last hold on Spain, and the -safety of the southern provinces was involved in his proceedings. It -was not his battle of Talavera, but the position maintained by him -on the frontier of Estremadura, which, in the latter part of 1809, -saved Andalusia from subjection; and this is easy of demonstration, -for, Joseph having rejected Soult’s project against Portugal, dared -not invade Andalusia, by Estremadura, with the English army on his -right flank; neither could he hope to invade it by the way of La -Mancha, without drawing sir Arthur into the contest. But Andalusia -was, at this period, the last place where the intrusive king desired -to meet a British army. He had many partisans in that province, who -would necessarily be overawed if the course of the war carried sir -Arthur beyond the Morena; nor could the Junta, in that case, have -refused Cadiz, as a place of arms, to their ally. Then the whole -force of Andalusia and Murcia would have rallied round the English -forces behind the Morena; and, as Areizaga had sixty thousand men, -and Albuquerque ten thousand, it is no exaggeration to assume that a -hundred thousand could have been organized for defence, and the whole -of the troops, in the south of Portugal, would have been available to -aid in the protection of Estremadura. Thus, including thirty thousand -English, there would have been a mass of at least one hundred -thousand soldiers, disposable for active operations, assembled in the -Morena. - -From La Carolina to Madrid is only ten marches, and while posted at -the former, the army could protect Lisbon as well as Seville, because -a forward movement would oblige the French to concentrate round the -Spanish capital. Andalusia would thus have become the principal -object of the invaders; but the allied armies, holding the passes of -the Morena, their left flank protected by Estremadura and Portugal, -their right by Murcia and Valencia, and having rich provinces and -large cities behind them, and a free communication with the sea, and -abundance of ports, could have fought a fair field for Spain. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Moore’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -It was a perception of these advantages that caused sir John Moore -to regret the ministers had not chosen the southern instead of the -northern line for his operations. Lord Wellesley, also, impressed -with the importance of Andalusia, urged his brother to adopt some -plan of this nature, and the latter, sensible of its advantages, -would have done so, but for the impossibility of dealing with the -Central Junta. Military possession of Cadiz and the uncontrolled -command of a Spanish force were the only conditions upon which he -would undertake the defence of Andalusia; conditions they would -not accede to, but, without which, he could not be secured against -the caprices of men whose proceedings were one continued struggle -against reason. This may seem inconsistent with a former assertion, -that Portugal was the true base of operations for the English; but -political as well as physical resources and moral considerations -weighed in that argument. - -For the protection, then, of Andalusia and Estremadura, during -a dangerous crisis of affairs, sir Arthur persisted, at such an -enormous sacrifice of men, to hold his position on the Guadiana. Yet -it was reluctantly, and more in deference to his brother’s wishes -than his own judgement, that he remained after Areizaga’s army was -assembled. Having proved the Junta by experience, he was more clear -sighted, as to their perverseness, than lord Wellesley; who, being -in daily intercourse with the members, obliged to listen to their -ready eloquence in excuse for past errors, and more ready promises of -future exertion, clung longer to the notion, that Spain could be put -in the right path, and that England might war largely in conjunction -with the united nations of the Peninsula, instead of restricting -herself to the comparatively obscure operation of defending Lisbon. -He was finally undeceived, and the march from Badajos for ever -released the British general from a vexatious dependence on the -Spanish government. - -Meanwhile the French, in doubt of his intentions, appeared torpid. -Kellerman remained at Salamanca, watching the movements of the duke -Del Parque; and Gazan returned to Madrid. Milhaud, with a division of -the fourth corps, and some cavalry, was detached against Echavaria; -but, on his arrival at Cuença, finding that the latter had retreated, -by Toboado, to Hellin, in Murcia, combined his operations with -general Suchet, and, as I have before related, assisted to reduce -the towns of Albaracin and Teruel. Other movements there were none, -and, as the Spanish regiments of the guard fought freely against -their countrymen, and many of the prisoners, taken at Ocaña, offered -to join the invaders’ colours, the king conceived hopes of raising a -national army. French writers assert that the captives at Ocaña made -a marked distinction between Napoleon and Joseph. They were willing -to serve the French emperor, but not the intrusive king of Spain. -Spanish authors, indeed, assume that none entered the enemy’s ranks -save by coercion and to escape; and that many did so with that view, -and were successful, must be supposed, or the numbers said to have -reassembled in the Morena, and at Cuença, cannot be reconciled with -the loss sustained in the action. - -The battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes terminated the series of -offensive operations, which the Austrian war, and the reappearance of -a British army in the Peninsula had enabled the allies to adopt, in -1809. Those operations had been unsuccessful; the enemy again took -the lead, and the fourth epoch of the war commenced. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. Although certain that the British army would not co-operate -in this short campaign, the Junta openly asserted, that it would -join Albuquerque in the valley of the Tagus. The improbability of -Areizaga’s acting, without such assistance, gave currency to the -fiction, and an accredited fiction is, in war, often more useful than -the truth; in this, therefore, they are to be commended; but, when -deceiving their own general, they permitted Areizaga to act under -the impression that he would be so assisted, they committed not an -error but an enormous crime. Nor was the general much less criminal -for acting upon the mere assertion that other movements were combined -with his, when no communication, no concerting of the marches, -no understanding with the allied commander, as to their mutual -resources, and intentions, had taken place. - -2º. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, tempestuous, -momentary, such was Areizaga’s movement on Dos Barrios, and assuredly -it would be difficult to find its parallel. There is no post so -strong, no town so guarded, that, by a fortunate stroke, may not be -carried; but who, even on the smallest scale, acts on this principle, -unless aided by some accidental circumstance applicable to the -moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government; but no general -is bound to obey orders (at least without remonstrance) which involve -the safety of his army; to that he should sacrifice everything but -victory: and many great commanders have sacrificed even victory, -rather than appear to undervalue this vital principle. - -3º. At Dos Barrios the Spanish general, having first met with -opposition, halted for three days, evidently without a plan, and -ignorant both of the situation of the first corps on his left flank, -and of the real force in his front: yet this was the only moment -in which he could hope for the slightest success. If, instead of a -feeble skirmish of cavalry, he had borne forward, with his whole -army, on the 11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and driven -across the Tagus, and Areizaga, with fifty thousand infantry and a -powerful cavalry, would, on the 12th, have been in the midst of the -separated French corps, for their movement of concentration was not -completely effected until the night of the 14th. But such a stroke -was not for an undisciplined army, and this was another reason -against moving from the Morena at all, seeing that the calculated -chances were all against Areizaga, and his troops not such as could -improve accidental advantages. - -4º. The flank march, from Dos Barrios to Santa Cruz, although -intended to turn the French left, and gain Madrid, was a circuitous -route of at least a hundred miles, and, as there were three rivers -to cross, namely, the Tagus, the Tajuna, and Henares, only great -rapidity could give a chance of success; but Areizaga was slow. So -late as the 15th, he had passed the Tagus with only two divisions -of infantry. Meanwhile the French moving on the inner circle, got -between him and Madrid, and the moment one corps out of the three -opposed to him approached, he recrossed the Tagus and concentrated -again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. The king by -the way of Aranjuez had, however, already cut his line of retreat, -and then Areizaga who, on the 10th, had shrunk from an action with -Sebastiani, when the latter had only eight thousand men, now sought -a battle, on the same ground with the king, who was at the head of -thirty thousand; the first corps being also in full march upon the -Spanish traces and distant only a few miles. Here it may be remarked -that Victor, who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, had been -on the 9th to the westward at Yebenes and Mora, having moved in ten -days, on a circle of a hundred and fifty miles, completely round this -Spanish general, who pretended, to treat his adversaries, as if they -were blind men. - -5º. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga to entrench himself -in the mountains, to raise the peasantry, and to wait the effect of -Albuquerque’s and Del Parque’s operations. If so, his military ideas -do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga’s, and the proposal was -but a repetition of Mr. Frere’s former plan for Albuquerque; a plan -founded on the supposition, that the rich plains of La Mancha were -rugged mountains. In taking a permanent position at Santa Cruz or -Tarancon, Areizaga must have resigned all direct communication with -Andalusia, and opened a fresh line of communication with Valencia, -which would have been exposed to the third corps from Aragon. Yet -without examining whether either the Spanish general or army were -capable of such a difficult operation, as adopting an accidental -line of operations, the advice, if given at all, was only given on -the 18th, and on the 19th, the first corps, the fourth, the greatest -part of the fifth, the reserve and the royal guards, forming a mass -of more than fifty thousand fighting men, would have taught Areizaga -that men and not mountains decide the fate of a battle. But in fact, -there were no mountains to hold; between Zarza and the borders of -Valencia, the whole country is one vast plain; and on the 18th, there -was only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the two French -armies, or of retreating by forced marches through La Mancha. The -former was chosen, Areizaga’s army was destroyed, and in the battle -he discovered no redeeming quality. His position was ill chosen, -he made no use of his cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot, -and when the men undismayed by the defeat of the right, demanded to -be led into action, he commanded a retreat, and quitted the field -himself at the moment when his presence was most wanted. - -6º. The combinations of the French were methodical, well arranged, -effectual, and it may seem misplaced, to do ought but commend -movements so eminently successful. Yet the chances of war are -manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to some points -of this short campaign. Areizaga’s burst from the mountains was -so unexpected and rapid, that it might well make his adversaries -hesitate; and hence perhaps the reason why the first corps circled -round the Spanish army, and was singly to have attacked the latter in -front at Zarza, on the 19th; whereas, reinforced with the division -of the fourth corps from Toledo, it might have fallen on the rear -and flank from Mora a week before. That is, during the three days -Areizaga remained at Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours -march. - -7º. The 11th, the king knew the English army had not approached the -valley of the Tagus; Areizaga only quitted Dos Barrios the 13th, and -he remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight days therefore, -the Spanish general was permitted to lead, and had he been a man -of real enterprise he would have crushed the troops between Dos -Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed, the boldness with -which Sebastiani maintained his offensive position beyond Aranjuez, -from the 9th to the 14th, was a master-piece. It must, however, be -acknowledged that Soult could not at once fix a general, who marched -fifty thousand men about like a patrole of cavalry, without the -slightest regard to his adversary’s positions or his own line of -operations. - -8º. In the battle, nothing could be more scientific than the mode in -which the French closed upon and defeated the right and centre, while -they paralized the left of the Spaniards. The disparity of numbers -engaged, and the enormous amount of prisoners, artillery, and other -trophies of victory prove it to have been a fine display of talent. -But Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction of her -troops; why then was the fruit of victory neglected? Did the king, -unable to perceive his advantages, control the higher military -genius of his advising general, or was he distracted by disputes -amongst the different commanders? or, did the British army at Badajos -alarm him? An accurate knowledge of these points is essential in -estimating the real share Spain had in her own deliverance. - -[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool. MS.] - -9º. Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co-operate in this -short and violent campaign. He remained a quiet spectator of events -at the most critical period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish -projects promised well. Areizaga’s army exceeded fifty thousand -men, Albuquerque’s ten thousand, and thirty thousand were under Del -Parque, who, at Tamames had just overthrown the best corps in the -French army. Villa Campa also, and the Partida bands on the side of -Cuença were estimated at ten thousand; in fine, there were a hundred -thousand Spanish soldiers ready. The British army at this period, -although much reduced by sickness, had still twenty thousand men fit -to bear arms, and the Portuguese under Beresford were near thirty -thousand, making a total of a hundred and fifty thousand allies. -Thirty thousand to guard the passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch -the sixth corps, a hundred and twenty thousand to attack the seventy -thousand French covering Madrid! Why then, was sir Arthur Wellesley, -who only four months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise -with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals of the Junta? -“_Because moral force is to physical force, as three to one in war._” -He had proved the military qualities of Spaniards and French, had -foresaw, to use his own expressions, “_after one or two battles, -and one or two brilliant actions by some, and defeats sustained by -others, that all would have to retreat again_:” yet this man, so -cautious, so sensible of the enemy’s superiority, was laying the -foundation of measures that finally carried him triumphant through -the Peninsula. False then are the opinions of those, who, asserting -Napoleon might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, blame sir -John Moore’s conduct. Such reasoners would as certainly have charged -the ruin of Spain on sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this period the -chances of war had sent him to his grave. But in all times the wise -and brave man’s toil has been the sport of fools! - -[Sidenote: 1810.] - -Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions of 1809. In -the beginning, Napoleon broke to atoms and dispersed the feeble -structure of the Spanish insurrection, but after his departure the -invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his lieutenants. Sir -Arthur Wellesley turned the war back upon the invaders for a moment, -but the jealousy and folly of his ally soon obliged him to retire to -Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their single strength, and were -trampled under foot at Ocaña, and notwithstanding the assistance of -England, the offensive passed entirely from their hands. In the next -book we shall find them every where acting on the defensive, and -every where weak. - - - - -BOOK X. - - -CHAPTER I. - - -Napoleon, victorious in Germany, and ready to turn his undivided -strength once more against the Peninsula, complained of the past -inactivity of the king, and Joseph prepared to commence the campaign -of 1810 with vigour. His first operations, however, indicated great -infirmity of purpose. When Del Parque’s defeat on one side and -Echevaria’s on the other had freed his flanks, and while the British -army was still at Badajos, he sent the fourth corps towards Valencia, -but immediately afterwards recalled it, and also the first corps, -which, since the battle of Ocaña, had been at Santa Cruz de Mudela. -The march of this last corps through La Mancha had been marked by -this peculiarity, that, for the first time since the commencement -of the war, the peasantry, indignant at the flight of the soldiers, -guided the pursuers to the retreats of the fugitives. - -[Sidenote: Appendix No. IV. Sec. 1.] - -Joseph’s vacillation was partly occasioned by the insurrection in -Navarre, under Renovalles and Mina. But lord Wellington, previous -to quitting the Guadiana, had informed the Junta of Badajos, as a -matter of courtesy, that he was about to evacuate their district; -and his confidential letter being published in the town Gazette, -and ostentatiously copied into the Seville papers, Joseph naturally -suspected it to be a cloak to some offensive project. However, -the false movements of the first and fourth corps distracted the -Spaniards, and emboldened the French partizans, who were very -numerous both in Valencia and Andalusia. The troubles in Navarre were -soon quieted by Suchet; the distribution of the British army in the -valley of the Mondego became known, and Joseph seriously prepared -for the conquest of Andalusia. This enterprise, less difficult than -an invasion of Portugal, promised immediate pecuniary advantages, -which was no slight consideration to a sovereign whose ministers were -reduced to want from the non-payment of their salaries, and whose -troops were thirteen months in arrears of pay. Napoleon, a rigid -stickler for the Roman maxim, that “War should support war,” paid -only the corps near the frontiers of France, and rarely recruited the -military chest. - -Both the military and political affairs of Andalusia were now at the -lowest ebb. The calm produced by the promise to convoke the National -Cortes had been short lived. The disaster of Ocaña revived all the -passions of the people, and afforded the old Junta of Seville, the -council of Castile, and other enemies of the Central Junta, an -opportunity to pull down a government universally obnoxious; and the -general discontent was increased by the measures adopted to meet the -approaching crisis. The marquis of Astorga had been succeeded by the -archbishop of Laodicea, under whose presidency the Junta published -a manifesto, assuring the people that there was no danger,--that -Areizaga could defend the Morena against the whole power of -France,--that Albuquerque would, from the side of Estremadura, fall -upon the enemy’s rear,--and that a second Baylen might be expected. -But, while thus attempting to delude the public, they openly sent -property to Cadiz, and announced that they would transfer their -sittings to that town on the 1st of February. - -Meanwhile, not to seem inactive, a decree was issued for a levy of -a hundred thousand men, and for a forced loan of half the jewels, -plate, and money belonging to individuals; sums left for pious -purposes were also appropriated to the service of the state. - -To weaken their adversaries, the Junta offered Romana the command of -the army in the Morena,--sent Padre Gil on a mission to Sicily, and -imprisoned the Conde de Montijo and Francisco Palafox. The marquis of -Lazan, accused of being in league with his brother, was also confined -in Pensicola, and the Conde de Tilly, detected in a conspiracy to -seize the public treasure and make for America, was thrown into a -dungeon, where his infamous existence terminated. Romana refused to -serve, and Blake, recalled from Catalonia, was appointed to command -the troops re-assembled at La Carolina; but most of the other -generals kept aloof, and in Gallicia the Conde de Noronha, resigning -his command, issued a manifesto against the Junta. Hence the -public hatred increased, and the partizans of Palafox and Montijo, -certain that the people would be against the government under any -circumstances, only waited for a favourable moment to commence -violence. Andalusia generally, and Seville in particular, were but -one remove from anarchy, when the intrusive monarch reached the foot -of the Morena with a great and well organized army. - -The military preparation of the Junta was in harmony with their -political conduct. The decree for levying a hundred thousand men, -issued when the enemy was but a few marches from the seat of -government, was followed by an order to distribute a hundred thousand -poniards, as if assassination were the mode in which a great nation -could or ought to defend itself, especially when the regular forces -at the disposal of the Junta, were still numerous enough, if well -directed, to have made a stout resistance. Areizaga had twenty-five -thousand men in the Morena; Echevaria, with eight thousand, was close -by, at Hellin; five or six thousand were spread over Andalusia, and -Albuquerque had fifteen thousand behind the Guadiana. The troops -at Carolina were, however, dispirited and disorganized. Blake had -not arrived, and Albuquerque, distracted with contradictory orders -transmitted almost daily by the Junta, could contrive no reasonable -plan of action, until the movements of the enemy enabled him to -disregard all instructions. Thus, amidst a whirlpool of passions, -intrigues, and absurdities, Andalusia, although a mighty vessel, and -containing all the means of safety, was destined to sink. - -This great province, composed of four kingdoms, namely, Jaen and -Cordoba in the north, Grenada and Seville in the south, was protected -on the right by Murcia and on the left by Portugal. The northern -frontier only was accessible to the French, who could attack it -either by La Mancha or Estremadura; but, between those provinces, -the Toledo and Guadalupe mountains forbad all military communication -until near the Morena, when, abating somewhat of their surly -grandeur, they left a space through which troops could move from one -province to the other in a direction parallel to the frontier of -Andalusia. - -Towards La Mancha, the Morena was so savage that only the royal -road to Seville was practicable for artillery. Entering the hills, -a little in advance of Santa Cruz de Mudela, at a pass of wonderful -strength, called the Despenas Perros, it led by La Carolina and -Baylen to Andujar. On the right, indeed, another route passed through -the Puerto del Rey, but fell into the first at Navas Toloza, a little -beyond the Despenas Perros; and there were other passes also, but all -falling again into the main road, before reaching La Carolina. Santa -Cruz de Mudela was therefore a position menacing the principal passes -of the Morena from La Mancha. - -To the eastward of Santa Cruz the town of Villa Nueva de los Infantes -presented a second point of concentration for the invaders. From -thence roads, practicable for cavalry and infantry, penetrated the -hills by La Venta Quemada and the Puerto de San Esteban, conducting -to Baeza, Ubeda, and Jaen. - -In like manner, on the westward of Santa Cruz, roads, or, rather, -paths, penetrated into the kingdom of Cordoba. One, entering the -mountains, by Fuen Caliente, led upon Montoro; a second, called the -La Plata, passed by La Conquista to Adamuz, and it is just beyond -these roads that the ridges, separating La Mancha from Estremadura, -begin to soften down, permitting military ingress to the latter, -by the passes of Mochuello, Almaden de Azogues, and Agudo. But the -barrier of the Morena still shut in Andalusia from Estremadura, -the military communication between those provinces being confined -to three great roads, namely, one from Medellin, by Llerena, to -Guadalcanal; another from Badajos to Seville, by the defiles of -Monasterio and Ronquillo; and a third by Xeres de los Caballeros, -Fregenal, and Araceña. From Almaden, there was also a way, through -Belalcazar, to Guadalcanal; and all these routes, except that of -Araceña, whether from La Mancha or Estremadura, after crossing the -mountains, led into the valley of the Guadalquivir, a river whose -waters, drawn from a multitude of sources, at first roll westward, -washing the foot of the Morena as far as the city of Cordoba, but -then, bending gradually towards the south, flow by Seville, and are -finally lost in the Atlantic. - -To defend the passage of the Morena, Areizaga posted his right in -the defiles of San Esteban and Montizon, covering the city of Jaen, -the old walls of which were armed. His left occupied the passes -of Fuen Caliente and Mochuello, covering Cordoba. His centre was -established at La Carolina and in the defiles of the Despenas Perros -and Puerto del Rey, which were entrenched, but with so little skill -and labour as to excite the ridicule rather than the circumspection -of the enemy. And here it may be well to notice an error relative -to the strength of mountain-defiles, common enough even amongst men -who, with some experience, have taken a contracted view of their -profession. - -From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow passes, in which -the greatest multitudes may be resisted. But, without stopping to -prove that local strength is nothing, if the flanks can be turned -by other roads, we may be certain that there are few positions so -difficult as to render superior numbers of no avail. Where one man -can climb another can, and a good and numerous infantry, crowning -the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed pass, will soon -oblige the defenders to retreat, or to fight upon equal terms. If -this takes place at any point of an extended front of defiles, such -as those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences to the -whole of the beaten army are obvious. - -Hence such passes should only be considered as fixed points, around -which an army should operate freely in defence of more exposed -positions, for defiles are doors, the keys of which are on the -summits of the hills around them. A bridge is a defile, yet troops -are posted, not in the middle, but behind a bridge, to defend the -passage. By extending this principle, we shall draw the greatest -advantages from the strength of mountain-passes. The practice of -some great generals may, indeed, be quoted against this opinion; -nevertheless, it seems more consonant to the true principles of war -to place detachments in defiles, and keep the main body in some -central point behind, ready to fall on the heads of the enemy’s -columns as they issue from the gorges of the hills. - -Pierced by many roads, and defended by feeble dispirited troops, -the Morena presented no great obstacle to the French; but, as they -came up against it by the way of La Mancha only, there were means -to render their passage difficult. If Albuquerque, placing his -army either at Almaden de Azogues, or Agudo, had operated against -their right flank, he must have been beaten, or masked by a strong -detachment, before Areizaga could have been attacked. Nor was -Andalusia itself deficient of interior local resources for an -obstinate defence. - -Parallel to the Morena, and at the distance of about a hundred -miles, the Sierra Nevada, the Apulxaras, and the Sierra Ronda, -extend from the borders of Murcia to Gibraltar, cutting off a narrow -tract of country along the coast of the Mediterranean: and the -intermediate space between these sierras and the Morena is broken by -less extensive ridges, forming valleys which, gradually descending -and widening, are finally lost in the open country about Seville. -Andalusia may therefore be considered as presenting three grand -divisions of country:--1º. The upper, or rugged, between the Sierra -Morena and the Sierra Nevada. 2º. The lower, or open country, about -Seville. 3º. The coast-tract between the Nevada and Ronda, and the -Mediterranean. This last is studded, in its whole length, with -sea-port towns and castles, such as Malaga, Velez-Malaga, Motril, -Ardra, Marbella, Estipona, and an infinity of smaller places. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 4._ - - INVASION - of - ANDALUSIA - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone, 1830._] - -No important line of defence is offered by the Guadalquivir. An -army, after passing the Morena, would follow the course of its -waters to gain the lower parts of Andalusia, and, thus descending, -the advantage of position would be with the invaders. But, to reach -the Mediterranean coast, not only the ridges of the Nevada or Ronda -must be crossed, but most of the minor parallel ridges enclosing the -valleys, whose waters run towards the Atlantic. Now all those valleys -contain great towns, such as Jaen and Cordoba, Ubeda, Grenada, and -Alcala Real, most of which, formerly fortified, and still retaining -their ancient walls, were capable of defence; wherefore the enemy -could not have approached the Mediterranean, nor Grenada, nor the -lower country about Seville, without first taking Jaen, or Cordoba, -or both. The difficulty of besieging those places, while a Spanish -army was stationed at Alcala Real, or Ecija, while the mountains, on -both flanks and in the rear, were filled with insurgents, and while -Albuquerque hung upon the rear at Almada, is apparent. Pompey’s sons, -acting upon this system, nearly baffled Cæsar, although that mighty -man had friends in the province, and, with his accustomed celerity, -fell upon his youthful adversaries before their arrangements were -matured. - -But in this, the third year of the war, the Junta were unprovided -with any plan of defence beyond the mere occupation of the passes -in the Morena. Those, once forced, Seville was open, and, from that -great city, the French could penetrate into all parts, and their -communication with Madrid became of secondary importance, because -Andalusia abounded in the materials of war, and Seville, the capital -of the province, and, from its political position, the most important -town in Spain, was furnished with arsenals, cannon-founderies, and -all establishments necessary to a great military power. - - -INVASION OF ANDALUSIA. - -The number of fighting-men destined for this enterprise was about -sixty-five thousand. Marshal Soult directed the movements; but the -king was disposed to take a more prominent part, in the military -arrangements than a due regard for his own interest would justify. -To cover Madrid, and to watch the British army, the second corps -was posted between Talavera and Toledo, with strong detachments -pushed into the valley of the Tagus. Two thousand men, drawn from -the reserve, garrisoned the capital; as many were in Toledo, and two -battalions occupied minor posts, such as Arganda and Guadalaxara. -Gazan’s division was recalled from Castile, Milhaud’s from Aragon; -and the first, fourth, and fifth corps, the king’s guards, and the -reserve, increased by some reinforcements from France, were directed -upon Andalusia. - -During the early part of January, 1810, the troops, by easy marches, -gained the foot of the Morena, and there Milhaud’s division, coming -by the way of Benillo, rejoined the fourth corps. A variety of -menacing demonstrations, made along the front of the Spanish line of -defence, between the 14th and 17th, caused Areizaga to abandon his -advanced positions and confine himself to the passes of the Morena; -but, on the 18th, the king arrived in person at Santa Cruz de Mudela, -and the whole army was collected in three distinct masses. - -In the centre, the artillery, the king’s guards, the reserve, and the -fifth corps, under marshal Mortier, were established at Santa Cruz -and Elviso, close to the mouths of the Despenas Perros and the Puerto -del Rey. - -On the left, Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, occupied Villa Nueva -de los Infantes, and prepared to penetrate, by Venta Quemada and -Puerto San Esteban, into the kingdom of Jaen. - -On the right, the duke of Belluno, placing a detachment in Agudo, -to watch Albuquerque, occupied Almaden de Azogues, with the first -corps, pushed an advanced guard into the pass of Mochuelo, and sent -patrols through Benalcazar and Hinojosa towards Guadalcanal. By -these dispositions, Areizaga’s line of defence in the Morena, and -Albuquerque’s line of retreat from Estremadura, were alike threatened. - -On the 20th, Sebastiani, after a slight skirmish, forced the defiles -of Esteban, making a number of prisoners; and when the Spaniards -rallied behind the Guadalen, one of the tributary torrents of the -Guadalquiver, he again defeated them, and advancing into the plains -of Ubeda, secured the bridges over the Guadalquiver. - -In the centre Dessolles carried the Puerto del Rey without firing a -shot, and Gazan’s division crowning the heights right and left of the -Despenas Perros, turned all the Spanish works in that pass, which was -abandoned. Mortier, with the main body and the artillery, then poured -through, reached La Carolina in the night, and the next day took -possession of Andujar, having passed in triumph over the fatal field -of Baylen; more fatal to the Spaniards than to the French, for the -foolish pride, engendered by that victory, was one of the principal -causes of their subsequent losses. - -Meanwhile the duke of Belluno pushed detachments to Montoro, Adamuz, -and Pozzoblanco, and his patrols appeared close to Cordoba. His and -Sebastini’s flanking parties communicated also with the fifth corps -at Andujar; and thus, in two days, by skilful combinations upon an -extent of fifty miles, the lofty barrier of the Morena was forced, -and Andalusia beheld the French masses portentously gathered on the -interior slopes of the mountains. - -In Seville all was anarchy: Palafox and Montijo’s partisans were -secretly preparing to strike, and the Ancient Junta openly discovered -a resolution to resume their former power. The timid, and those -who had portable property, endeavoured to remove to Cadiz; but the -populace opposed this, and the peasantry came into the city so fast -that above a hundred thousand persons were within the walls, and the -streets were crowded with multitudes that, scarcely knowing what to -expect or wish, only wanted a signal to break out into violence. -The Central Junta, fearing alike, the enemy, and their own people, -prepared to fly, yet faithful to their system of delusion, while -their packages were actually embarking for Cadiz, assured the people -that the enemy had indeed forced the pass of Almaden, leading from -La Mancha into Estremadura, but that no danger could thence arise. -Because the duke Del Parque was in full march to join Albuquerque; -and those generals when united being stronger than the enemy would -fall upon his flank, while Areizaga would co-operate from the Morena -and gain a great victory. - -It was on the 20th of January, and at the very moment when the Morena -was being forced at all points, that this deluding address was -published, it was not until the day after that the Junta despatched -orders for the duke Del Parque (who was then in the mountains beyond -Ciudad Rodrigo) to effect that junction with Albuquerque from which -such great things were expected! Del Parque received the despatch on -the 24th, and prepared to obey. Albuquerque, alive to all the danger -of the crisis, had left general Contreras at Medellin, with four -thousand five hundred men, destined to form a garrison for Badajos, -and marched himself on the 22d, with about nine thousand, towards -Agudo, intending to fall upon the flank of the first corps; but he -had scarcely commenced his movement, when he learned that Agudo and -Almaden were occupied, and that the French patrols were already at -Benalcazar and Hinojosa, within one march of his own line of retreat -upon Seville. - -In this conjuncture, sending Contreras to Badajos, and his own -artillery through the defile of Monasterio, he marched with his -infantry to Guadalcanal. During the movement, he continued to -receive contradictory and absurd orders from the Junta, some of -which, he disregarded, and others he could not obey; but conforming -to circumstances, when the Morena was forced, he descended into the -basin of Seville, crossed the Guadalquivir a few leagues from that -city, at the ferry of Cantillana, reached Carmona on the 24th, and -immediately pushed with his cavalry for Ecija to observe the enemy’s -progress. Meanwhile the storm, so long impending over the Central -Junta, burst at Seville. - -Early on the 24th a great tumult arose. Mobs traversing all the -quarters of the city, called out, some for the deposition of the -Junta, others for the heads of the members. Francisco Palafox and -Montijo were released, and the Junta of Seville being re-established -by acclamation, the Central Junta, committed to their hands the -defence of Andalusia, and endeavoured themselves to reach Cadiz, each -as he could; but with the full intention of reuniting and resuming -their authority. On the road however, some of them were cast into -prison by the people, some were like to be slain at Xerez, and the -Junta of Seville had no intention that the Central Junta should ever -revive. Saavedra, the President of the former, by judicious measures -calmed the tumult in the city, restored Romana to the command of his -old army, which was now under the duke Del Parque, made some other -popular appointments, and in conjunction with his colleagues sent a -formal proposition to the Junta at Badajos, inviting them to take -into consideration the necessity of constituting a Regency, which -was readily acceded to. But the events of war crowding on, overlaid -their schemes; and three days after the flight of the Central Junta, -treason and faction being busy amongst the members of the Seville -Junta, they also disbanded, some remaining in the town; others, and -amongst them Saavedra, repairing to Cadiz. The tumults were then -renewed with greater violence, and Romana was called upon to assume -the command and defend the city; but he evaded this dangerous honour, -and proceeded to Badajos. - -Thus abandoned to themselves, the people of Seville, discovered the -same disposition, as the people of other towns in the Peninsula, -had done upon like occasions. If men like the Tios of Zaragoza, had -assumed command, they might have left a memorable tale and a ruined -city, but there were none so firm, or so ferocious; and finally, a -feeling of helplessness produced fear in all, and Seville was ready -to submit to the invaders. - -When the passage of the mountains was completely effected, the French -corps again received their artillery, but the centre and right wing -of the army remained stationary, and a detachment of the first corps, -which had approached Cordoba, returned to Montoro. Areizaga rallied -his troops at Jaen, but Sebastiani marching from Ubeda, drove him -upon Alcala Real, and Jaen surrendered with forty-six guns mounted -on the walls. The Spanish general made one more stand; but being -again beaten, and all his artillery captured, his army dispersed. -Five thousand infantry and some squadrons of cavalry throwing away -their arms escaped to Gibraltar; and Areizaga himself, with a remnant -of horse, flying into the kingdom of Murcia, was there superceded -by Blake. Meanwhile, Sebastiani marched upon Grenada, and entering -it the 28th of January, was received with apparent joy, so entirely -had the government of the Central Junta extinguished the former -enthusiasm of the people. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -As the capture of Jaen secured the left flank of the French, the -king with the centre and right, moved on Cordoba the 27th, and there -also, as at Jaen and Grenada, the invaders were received without any -mark of aversion,[7] and thus the upper country was conquered. But -the projects of Joseph were not confined to Andalusia; he had opened -a secret communication with Valencia, where his partisans undertook -to raise a commotion whenever a French force should appear before -the city. Hence, judging that no serious opposition would be made in -Andalusia, he directed Sebastiani to cross the Sierra Nevada, and -seize the Grenadan coast, an operation that would enable him with -greater facility to act against Valencia. To ensure the success of -the latter enterprise, he wrote from Cordoba to Suchet, urging him -to make a combined movement from Aragon, and promising a powerful -detachment from Andalusia, to meet him under the walls of Valencia. - -Dessolles, with the reserve, occupied Cordoba and Jaen; but the first -and fifth corps, followed by the king’s guards, proceeded without -delay towards Ecija, where it will be remembered, Albuquerque’s -cavalry had been posted since the night of the 24th. As the French -approached, the duke fell back upon Carmona, from whence he could -retreat either to Seville, or Cadiz, the way to the latter being -through Utrera. But from Ecija there was a road through Moron to -Utrera, shorter than that leading through Carmona, and along this -road the cavalry of the first corps was pushed on the 27th. - -Albuquerque now despairing for Seville, resolved to make for Cadiz, -and lest the enemy should reach Utrera before him, gained that town -with great expedition, and thence moving through Lebrija and Xeres, -by long marches, journeying day and night, reached Cadiz on the 3d of -February. Some French cavalry overtook and skirmished with his rear -at Utrera; but he was not pursued further, save by scouting parties; -for the king had altered the original plan of operations, and ordered -the first corps which was then pushing for Cadiz, to change its -direction and march by Carmona against Seville, and the 30th, the -advanced guards came on that city. - -Some entrenchments and batteries had been raised for defence, and -the mob still governing, fired upon the bearer of the first French -summons, and announced in lofty terms a resolution to fight. Besides -the populace, there were about seven thousand troops, composed partly -of fugitives from the Morena, partly of the original garrison of the -town; nevertheless, the city, after some negotiation, surrendered on -the 31st, with all its stores, founderies, and arsenals complete, and -on the 1st of February the king entered in triumph. The lower country -was thus conquered, and there remained only Cadiz, and the coast -tract lying between the Mediterranean and the Sierra de Nevada to -subdue. - -The first corps was immediately sent against Cadiz, and the fifth -against Estremadura; and Sebastiani having placed fifteen hundred -men in the Alhambra, and incorporated among his troops, a Swiss -battalion, composed of those who had abandoned the French service in -the battle of Baylen, seized Antequera. He was desirous to establish -himself firmly in those parts before he crossed the Nevada, but his -measures were precipitated by unexpected events. At Malaga, the -people had imprisoned the members of the local Junta, and headed by -a Capuchin friar, resolved to fight the French, and a vast multitude -armed in all manners took post above Antequera and Alhama, where the -road from Grenada enters the hills. - -[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence from Gibraltar. MSS.] - -As this insurrection was spreading, not only in the mountains, but -through the plains of Grenada, Sebastiani resolved to fall on at -once, lest the Grenadans having Gibraltar on the one flank, Murcia -on the other, and in their own country, many sea-ports and fortified -towns, should organize a regular system of resistance. The 5th of -February, after a slight skirmish at Alhama, he penetrated the hills, -driving the insurgents upon Malaga; but near that place they rallied, -and an engagement, with the advanced guard of the French, under -general Milhaud, taking place, about five hundred Spaniards fell, and -the conquerors entered the town fighting. A few of the vanquished -took refuge on board some English ships of war; the rest submitted, -and more than a hundred pieces of heavy, and about twenty pieces of -field artillery with ammunition, stores, and a quantity of British -merchandize, became the spoil of the conquerors. Velez-Malaga opened -its gates the next day, Motril was occupied, and the insurrection was -quelled; for in every other part, both troops and peasantry, were -terrified and submissive to the last degree. - -Meanwhile, Victor followed the traces of Albuquerque with such -diligence, as to reach Chiclana on the 5th of February, and it is -generally supposed, that he might have rendered himself master -of Leon, for the defensive works at Cadiz, and the Isla were in -no way improved, but rather deteriorated since the period of Sir -George Smith’s negotiation. The bridge of Zuazo was indeed broken, -and the canal of Santa Petri a great obstacle; but Albuquerque’s -troops were harassed, dispirited, ill clothed, badly armed, and in -every way inefficient; the people of Cadiz were apathetic, and the -authorities, as usual, occupied with intrigues and private interests. -In this state, eight thousand Spanish soldiers could scarcely have -defended a line of ten miles against twenty-five thousand French, if -a sufficient number of boats could have been collected to cross the -canal. - -Venegas was governor of Cadiz; but when it was known that the Central -Junta had been deposed at Seville, a Municipal Junta, chiefly -composed of merchants, was elected by general ballot. This body, as -inflated and ambitious of power as any that had preceded it, would -not suffer the fugitive members of the Central Junta to assume any -authority; and the latter, maugre their extreme reluctance, were -obliged to submit, but, by the advice of Jovellanos, appointed a -Regency, composed of men not taken from amongst themselves. The -Municipal Junta vehemently opposed this proceeding, but finally, -the judicious intervention of Mr. Bartholomew Frere induced them to -acquiesce; and the 29th of January, the bishop of Orense, general -Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, Saavedra, and Fernandez de Leon, were -appointed Regents, until the Cortes could be assembled. Leon was -afterwards replaced by one Lardizabal, a native of New Spain. - -The council of Castile, which had been reinstated before the -fall of Seville, now charged the deposed Junta, and truly, with -usurpation--the public voice added peculation and other crimes; -and the Regency, which they had themselves appointed, seized their -papers, sequestered their effects, threw some of the members into -prison, and banished others to the provinces: thus completely -extinguishing this at once odious, ridiculous, and unfortunate -oligarchy. Amongst the persons composing it, there were undoubtedly, -some of unsullied honour and fine talents, ready and eloquent of -speech, and dexterous in argument; but it is not in Spain only, that -men possessing all the “grace and ornament” of words have proved to -be mean and contemptible statesmen. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Albuquerque, elected president of the Municipal Junta, and commander -of the forces, endeavoured to place the Isla de Leon in a state to -resist a sudden attack; and the French, deceived as to its strength, -after an ineffectual summons, proceeded to gird the whole bay with -works. Meanwhile, Marshal Mortier, leaving a brigade of the fifth -corps at Seville, pursued a body of four thousand men, that, under -the command of the Visconde de Gand, had retired from that town -towards the Morena; they evaded him, and fled to Ayamonte, yet -were like to be destroyed, because the bishop of Algarve, from -national jealousy, would not suffer them to pass the Portuguese -frontier. Mortier disregarding these fugitives, passed the Morena, -by Ronquillos and Monasterio, and marching against Badajos, summoned -it, the 12th of February. Contreras’ detachment had however, arrived -there on the 26th of January, and Mortier, finding, contrary to his -expectation, that the place was in a state of defence, retired to -Merida. - -This terminated the first series of operations in the fourth epoch -of the war; operations which, in three weeks, had put the French in -possession of Andalusia and Southern Estremadura, with the exception -of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the one, and of Badajos, Olivenza, and -Albuquerque in the other province. Yet, great as were the results -of this memorable irruption, more might have been obtained; and the -capture of Cadiz would have been a fatal blow to the Peninsula. - -From Andujar to Seville is only a hundred miles, yet the French took -ten days to traverse that space; a tardiness for which there appears -no adequate cause. The king, apparently elated at the acclamations -and seeming cordiality with which the towns, and even villages, -greeted him, moved slowly. He imagined that Seville would open her -gates at once; and thinking that the possession of that town, would -produce the greatest moral effect, in Andalusia, and all over Spain, -changed the first judicious plan of campaign, and marched thither -in preference to Cadiz. The moral influence of Seville, was however -transferred, along with the government, to Cadiz; and Joseph was -deceived in his expectations of entering the former city as he had -entered Cordoba. When he discovered his error there was still time to -repair it by a rapid pursuit of Albuquerque, but he feared to leave -a city with a hundred thousand people in a state of excitement upon -his flank; and resolving first to reduce Seville, he met indeed with -no formidable resistance, yet so much of opposition, as left him only -the alternative of storming the town or entering by negotiation. The -first his humanity forbad; the latter cost him time, which was worth -his crown, for Albuquerque’s proceedings were only secondary: the -ephemeral resistance of Seville was the primary cause of the safety -of Cadiz. - -The march by which the Spanish duke secured the Isla de Leon, is -only to be reckoned from Carmona. Previous to his arrival there, his -movements, although judicious, were more the result of necessity -than of skill. After the battle of Ocaña, he expected that Andalusia -would be invaded; yet, either fettered by his orders or ill-informed -of the enemy’s movements, his march upon Agudo was too late, and his -after-march upon Guadalcanal, was the forced result of his position; -he could only do that, or abandon Andalusia and retire to Badajos. - -From Guadalcanal, he advanced towards Cordoba on the 23d, and he -might have thrown himself into that town; yet the prudence of -taking such a decided part, was dependent upon the state of public -sentiment, of which he must have been a good judge. Albuquerque -indeed, imagined, that the French were already in possession of the -place, whereas they did not reach it until four days later; but -they could easily have entered it on the 24th: and as he believed -that they had done so, it is apparent that he had no confidence in -the people’s disposition. In this view, his determination to cross -the Guadalquivir, and take post at Carmona, was the fittest for the -occasion. It was at Carmona he first appears to have considered -Seville a lost city; and when the French approached, we find him -marching, with a surprising energy, towards Cadiz, yet he was again -late in deciding; for the enemy’s cavalry, moving by the shorter -road to Utrera, overtook his rear-guard: and the infantry would -assuredly have entered the Island of Leon with him, if the king had -not directed them upon Seville. The ephemeral resistance of that city -therefore saved Albuquerque; and he, in return, saved Cadiz. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -Lord Wellington’s plans were deeply affected by the invasion of -Andalusia: but before treating of the stupendous campaign he was now -meditating, it is necessary, once more to revert to the operations in -the other parts of the Peninsula, tracing them up to a fixed point; -because, although bearing strongly on the main action of the war, to -recur to them chronologically, would totally destroy, the unity of -narrative indispensable to a just handling of the subject. - - -OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND VALENCIA. - -Suchet, being ordered to quell the disorders in Navarre, repaired to -Pampeluna, but previously directed an active pursuit of the student -Mina, who, availing himself of the quarrel between the military -governor and the viceroy, was actually master of the country between -that fortress and Tudela, and was then at Sanguessa. General Harispe, -with some battalions, marched straight against him from Zaragoza, -while detachments from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavoured to surround -him by the flanks, and a fourth body moving into the valleys of Ainsa -and Medianoz, cut him off from the Cinca river. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -Harispe quickly reached Sanguessa, but the column from Pampeluna -being retarded, Mina, with surprising boldness, crossed its line -of march, and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French line -of communication; the garrison, however, made a strong resistance, -and Mina disappeared the next day. At this period, however, -reinforcements from France were pouring into Navarre, and a division, -under Loison, was at Logroño, wherefore Harispe having, in concert -with this general and with the garrison of Pampeluna, occupied -Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, Puenta de Reyna, and all the passages of -the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers, launched a number of moveable -columns, that continually pursued Mina, until chased into the high -parts of the Pyrenees, cold and hunger obliged his band to disperse. -The enterprising chief himself escaped with seven followers, and when -the French were tracking him from house to house, he, with a romantic -simplicity, truly Spanish, repaired to Olite, that he might see -Suchet pass on his way from Zaragoza to Pampeluna. - -But that general, while seemingly occupied with the affairs of -Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials, for a -methodical war of invasion, beyond the frontiers of Aragon, and when -general Reynier, coming soon afterwards from France, with troops -intended to form an eighth corps, was appointed governor of Navarre, -Suchet returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, some petty actions -had taken place, but his general arrangements were not disturbed, and -the emperor having promised to increase the third corps to thirty -thousand men, with the intention of directing it at once against -Valencia, all the stores befitting such an enterprise were collected -at Terruel in the course of January. The resistance of Gerona, -and other events in Catalonia having, however, baffled Napoleon’s -calculations, this first destination of the third corps was changed. -Suchet was ordered to besiege Tortoza or Lerida; the eighth corps, -then forming at Logroño, was directed to cover his rear, and the -seventh corps to advance to the Lower Ebro and support the siege. -Nor was this arrangement definitive; fresh orders sent the eighth -corps towards Castile, and just at this moment Joseph’s letter from -Cordoba, calling upon Suchet to march against Valencia, arrived, and -gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in Spain. - -A decree of the emperor, dated the 8th of January, and constituting -Aragon a particular government, rendered Suchet independent of the -king’s orders, civil or military. But this decree, together with a -renewed order to commence the siege of Lerida, had been intercepted, -and the French general, doubtful of Napoleon’s real views, undertook -the enterprise against Valencia. Desirous, however, of first -intimidating the partisans hanging on the borders of Aragon, he -detached Laval against Villa Campa, and the latter being defeated on -the side of Cuença, his troops dispersed for the moment. - -Suchet then fortified a post at Terruel, to serve as a temporary base -of operations, and drew together at that place twelve battalions -of infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons of light -cavalry, and some field artillery, and, at the same time, caused -six battalions and three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled at -Alcanitz, under general Habert. The remainder of the third corps was -distributed on the line of the Cinca, and on the right bank of the -Ebro. The castles of Zaragoza, Alcanitz, Monzon, Venasque, Jaca, -Tudela, and other towns, were placed in a state of defence, and four -thousand men, newly arrived from France, were pushed to Daroca, to -link the active columns to those left in Aragon. These arrangements -occupied the whole of February, and, on the 1st of March, a duplicate -of the order, directing Suchet to commence the siege of Lerida, -reached Terruel. But as Habert’s column having marched on the 27th, -by the road of Morella, was already committed in the province of -Valencia, the operation went on. - - -INCURSION TO VALENCIA. - -The first day, brought Suchet’s column, in presence of the Valencian -army, for Ventura Caro, captain-general of that province, was in -march to attack the French at Terruel, and his advanced guard of five -or six thousand regulars, accompanied by armed peasants, was drawn up -on some high ground behind the river Mingares, the bed of which is a -deep ravine so suddenly sunk, as not to be perceived until close upon -it. The village and castle of Alventoza, situated somewhat in advance -of the Spaniard’s centre, were occupied, and commanded a bridge over -the river. Their right rested on the village and bridge of Puenseca, -and their left on the village of Manzanera, where the ground was -rather more practicable. - -Suchet, judging that Caro would not fight so far from Valencia, -while Habert’s column was turning his right, sent a division before -daylight, on the 2d, to turn the left of the position, and cut off -the retreat; but, although the French, after a skirmish, crossed the -ravine, the Spaniards retired with little loss upon Segorbe, and Caro -fell back to the city of Valencia. Suchet entered Segorbe the 3d, and -on the 4th was at Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, four leagues from -Valencia. At the same time, Habert, who had defeated a small corps at -Morella, arrived at Villa Real on the sea coast. The country between -their lines of march was mountainous and impracticable, but after -passing Saguntum, the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, the richest -and most delightful part of Spain, opened, the two columns, united, -and arriving before the city on the 5th of March, seized the suburb -Seranos, and the harbour called the Grao. - -Suchet’s spies at first confirmed the hopes of an insurrection -within the walls, but the treason was detected, the leader, a -baron Pozzo Blanco, publicly executed, and the archbishop and many -others imprisoned; in fine, the plan had failed, the populace were -in arms, and there was no movement of French troops on the side -of Murcia. Five days the French general remained before the city, -vainly negotiating, and then, intrigue failing, and his army being -inadequate to force the defences, he resolved to retire. In the -night of the 10th he commenced his retreat in one column by Segorbe -and Terruel. Meanwhile the Spanish partisans were gathering on his -rear. Combats had already taken place at Liria and Castellon de la -Plana, and general Villa Campa, who had reassembled his dispersed -troops, captured four guns, with their ammunition and escort, between -Terruel and Daroca; cut off another detachment of a hundred men left -at Alventoza, and, having invested the post at Terruel, on the 7th, -by a bold and ready witted attempt, nearly carried the castle. The -12th, however, the head of Suchet’s column came in sight, Villa Campa -retired, and the 17th the French general reached Zaragoza. - -During his absence, Perena had invested Monzon, and when the garrison -of Fraga marched to its relief, the Spaniards from Lerida, entered -the latter town, and destroyed the bridge and French entrenchments. -Mina, also, was again become formidable, and, although several -columns were sent in chase of him, it is probable, that they would -have done no more than disperse his band for the moment, but for an -accident, which threw him into their hands a prisoner. - -Suchet’s failure at Valencia was more hurtful to the French than -would at first sight appear. It happened at the moment when the -National Cortes, so long desired, was at last directed to assemble; -and as it seemed to balance the misfortunes of Andalusia, it was -hailed by the Spaniards as the commencement of a better era. But the -principal military advantage was the delaying of the sieges of Lerida -and Mequinenza, whereby the subjection of Catalonia was retarded: -and although Suchet labours, and successfully, to show that he was -drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, Napoleon’s -avowed discontent was well founded. The operations in Catalonia -were so hampered by the nature of the country, that it was only at -certain conjunctures, any progress could be made, and one of the -most favourable of those conjunctures, was lost, for want of the -co-operation of the third corps; but to understand this, the military -topography of Catalonia must be well considered. - -[Sidenote: Vol. I. Book I. Chap. VI.] - -That province is divided in its whole length by shoots from the -Pyrenees, which, with some interruptions, run to the Atlantic shores; -for the sierras separating Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia from -the central parts of Spain, are but continuations of those shoots. -The Ebro, forcing its way transversely through the ridges, parts -Catalonia from Valencia, but the hills, thus broken by the river, -push their rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off Taragona -from Tortoza, and enclosing what may be called the eastern region of -Catalonia, which contains Rosas, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona, -Manreza, Taragona, Reus, and many more towns. The torrents, the -defiles, and other military features of this region have been -before described. The western portion of Catalonia lying beyond the -principal spine, is bounded partly by Aragon, partly by Valencia; -and, like the eastern region, it is an assemblage of small plains and -rugged valleys, each, the bed of a river, descending towards the Ebro -from the Pyrenees. It contains the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida, -Mequinenza, Cervera, and, near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortoza, which, -however, belongs in a military view rather to Valencia than Catalonia. - -Now the mountain ridge, parting the eastern from the western region -of Catalonia, could only be passed by certain routes, for the most -part impracticable for artillery, and those practicable, leading upon -walled towns at both sides of the defiles. Thus Cervera is situated -on the principal and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer, -Cardona, and Montserrat, on another and more circuitous road to -the same city. Between Lerida and Taragona, stands Momblanch, and -between Taragona, and Tortoza, the Fort St. Felippe blocks the Col de -Balaguer. All these places were in the hands of the Spaniards, and a -number of smaller fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, Berga, and -Solsona, served as rallying points, where the warlike Somatenes, of -the higher valleys, took refuge from the moveable columns, and from -whence, supplied with arms and ammunition, they sallied, to harass, -the flanks and rear, of both the French corps. - -In the eastern region, the line of operations for the seventh corps, -was between the mountains and the sea-coast, and parallel with both; -hence, the Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications, -and the high valleys on both sides of the great dividing spine, could -at all times descend upon the rear and flanks of the French, while -the regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front, and supported -by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich, and Taragona, could advance -or retire as circumstances dictated. And upon this principle, the -defence of Catalonia was conducted. - -Detachments and sometimes the main body of the Spanish army, passing -by the mountains, or by sea from Taragona, harassed the French -flanks, and when defeated, retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat, -or Cervera, and finally to Taragona. From this last, the generals -communicated with Tortoza, Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles, -and even Sicily, and drew succours of all kinds from those places, -and meanwhile the bands in the mountains continued to vex the -French communications; and it was only during the brief period of -lassitude in the Spanish army, following any great defeat, that the -seventh corps could chase those mountaineers. Nor, until Gerona -and Hostalrich fell, was it easy to make any but sudden and short -incursions towards Taragona, because the Miguelettes from the higher -valleys, and detachments from the army at Taragona, again passing -by the hills or by sea, joined the garrisons, and interrupted the -communications; and thus obliged the French to retire, because the -country beyond the Llobregat could never feed them long. - -But when Barcelona could not be succoured by sea, it was -indispensable to conduct convoys by land, and to insure their -arrival, the whole army was obliged to make frequent movements in -advance, retiring again when the object was effected; and this being -often renewed, offered many opportunities for cutting off minor -convoys, detachments, and even considerable bodies isolated by the -momentary absence of the army. Thus, during the siege of Gerona, -Blake passed through the mountains and harassed the besiegers. -When the place fell, he retired again to Taragona, and Augereau -took the occasion to attack the Miguelettes, and Somatenes, in the -high valleys; but in the midst of this operation admiral Baudin’s -squadron, was intercepted by admiral Martin; and the insatiable -craving of Barcelona, obliged Augereau to reassemble his army, and -conduct a convoy there by land. Yet he was soon obliged to return -again, lest he should himself consume the provisions he brought for -the city. This retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniards, who were -again defeated; and Augereau once more advanced, in the intention -of co-operating with the third corps, which, he supposed, would, -following the Emperor’s design, be before Lerida or Tortoza. However, -when Augereau thus advanced, Suchet was on the march to Valencia; and -Henry O’Donnel who had succeeded Blake in the command, recommenced -the warfare on the French communications, and forced Augereau again -to retire to Gerona, at the moment when Suchet, having returned to -Aragon, was ready to besiege Lerida; thus, like unruly horses in a -chariot dragging different ways, the French impeded each other’s -movements. I shall now briefly narrate the events touched upon above. - - -OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS. - -Gerona having fallen, general Souham with a division, scoured the -high valleys, beating the Miguelettes of Claros and Rovira, at -Besalu, Olot, Ribas, and Campredon; and at Ripoll, he destroyed -a manufactory for arms. Being afterwards reinforced with Pino’s -division, he marched from Olot, by the road of Esteban and Manlieu; -the Somatenes disputed the defiles near the last point, but the -French forcing the passage, again took possession of Vich. Meanwhile -Blake having been called to Andalusia, the Provincial Junta of -Catalonia rejecting the duke Del Parque, took upon themselves to give -the command to Henry O’Donnel, whose courage during the siege of -Gerona had gained him a high reputation. He was now with the remains -of Blake’s army at Vich, and as the French approached that town he -retired to the pass of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free -retreat upon Moya and Manresa. Souham’s advanced guard, pursued, -and at Tona, captured some baggage, but the Spaniard turned on -finding his rear pressed, and when the pursuers mounted the heights -of Sespino, charged with a shock, that sent them headlong down the -hills again. Souham rallied the beaten troops in the plain, and the -next day offered battle; but O’Donnel continued his retreat, and the -French general returned to Vich. - -During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment in Hostalrich to -blockade the castle, marched to Barcelona, by the road of Cardedieu, -having previously ordered Duhesme, to post three battalions and five -squadrons of cuirassiers, with some guns, near the junction, of the -roads of Cardedieu and Manresa, to watch O’Donnel. Colonel Guery, -commanding this detachment, placed one battalion at Granollers, a -second at Santa Perpetua, and with the remainder occupied Mollet, -taking however no military precautions; and O’Donnel who had been -joined by Campo Verde, from the side of Cervera, sent him to fall -upon the French posts. Campo Verde, passing by Tarrassa and Sabadel, -surprised and put to the sword or captured all the troops at Santa -Perpetua and Mollet; but those at Granollers, threw themselves into a -large building, and defended it for three days, when by the approach -of Augereau they were relieved. The marshal finding the streets of -Mollet strewed with French carcasses, ordered up the division of -Souham from Vich, but passed on himself to Barcelona. When there, he -became convinced how oppressive Duhesme’s conduct had been, and sent -him to France in disgrace; after which, unable to procure provisions -without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, he resumed his former -position at Gerona, and Souham, passing the defiles of Garriga, -returned to Vich. - -All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued; but the retreat -of Augereau, and the success of Campo Verde’s enterprise, produced -extraordinary joy over all Catalonia. The prisoners taken, were -marched from town to town, and the action everywhere exaggerated; -the decree for enrolling a fifth of the male population was enforced -with vigour, and the execution entrusted to the Baron d’Erolles, a -native of Talarn, who afterwards obtained considerable celebrity. -The army, in which there was still a large body of Swiss troops, -was thus reinforced; the confidence of the people increased hourly, -and a Local Junta was established at Arenys de Mar, to organise the -Somatenes on the coast, and to direct the application of succours -from the sea. The Partisans, also reassembling their dispersed bands -in the higher valleys, again vexed the Ampurdan, and incommoded the -troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich. - -O’Donnel himself, moving to Manresa, called the Miguelettes from -the Lerida side, to his assistance; and soon formed a body of more -than twelve thousand fighting-men, with which he took post at Moya, -in the beginning of February, and harassed the French in front of -Vich, while, in the rear of that town, Rovira occupied the heights -above Roda. Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming with -enemies, and, having but five thousand men of all arms to oppose to -them, demanded reinforcements; but Augereau paid little attention -to him: and, on the 20th, O’Donnel, descending the mountain of -Centellas, entered the plains in three columns, and the French -general had scarcely time to draw up his troops a little in front of -the town, ere he was attacked with a vigour hitherto unusual with the -Spaniards. - - -COMBAT OF VICH. - -Rovira commenced the action, by driving the enemy’s posts, on the -side of Roda, back upon the town, and soon afterwards O’Donnel, -coming close up on the front of the French position, opened all his -guns, and, throwing out skirmishers along the whole of the adverse -line, filed his cavalry, under cover of their fire, to the right, -intending to outflank Souham’s left; but the latter general, leaving -a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his own infantry, -and sent his dragoons against the Spanish horsemen, who, at the -first charge, were driven back in confusion. The foot then fell in -on the French centre, but, failing to make any serious impression, -the Spanish general, whose great superiority of numbers enabled him -to keep heavy masses in reserve, endeavoured to turn both flanks of -the enemy at the same time. Souham was now hard pressed, his infantry -were few, his reserves all engaged, and himself severely wounded in -the head. O’Donnel, who had rallied his cavalry, and brought up his -Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, and in person fiercely led -the whole mass once more against the left; but, at this critical -period, the French infantry, far from wavering, firmly closed their -ranks, and sent their volleys more rapidly into the hostile ranks, -while the cavalry, sensible that the fate of all (for there was no -retreat) hung upon the issue of their charge, met their adversaries -with such a full career that horse and man went down before them, and -the Swiss, being separated from the rest, surrendered. Rovira was -afterwards driven away, and the Spanish army returned to the hills, -having lost a full fourth of its own numbers, and killed or wounded -twelve hundred of the enemy. - -O’Donnel’s advance, had been the signal, for all the irregular -bands to act against the various quarters of the French; they -were, however, with the exception of a slight succour, thrown into -Hostalrich, unsuccessful, and, being closely pursued by the moveable -columns, dispersed. Thus the higher valleys were again subdued, the -Junta fled from Arenys de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the country -about Cervera, and O’Donnel, quitting the Upper Llobregat, retired by -Taraza, Martorel, and Villa Franca to the camp of Taragona, leaving -only an advanced guard at Ordal. - -It was at this moment, when Upper Catalonia was in a manner abandoned -by the Spanish general, that the emperor, directed the seventh -corps upon the Lower Ebro, to support Suchet’s operations against -Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving a detachment -under Verdier, in the Ampurdan, and two thousand men to blockade -Hostalrich, ordered his brother and general Mazzucchelli (the one -commanding Souham’s, and the other Pino’s division) to march upon -Manreza, while he himself, with the Westphalian division, repaired -once more to Barcelona, and from thence directed all the subsequent -movements. - -General Augereau, passing by Col de Sespina, entered Manreza, the -16th of March, and there joined Mazzucchelli; but the inhabitants -abandoned the place, and general Swartz was sent with a brigade, from -Moncada, to take possession, while the two divisions continued their -movement, by Montserrat, upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced -to Villa Franca, and the Spaniards retired from Ordal towards -Taragona. But the French, acting under orders from Barcelona, left a -thousand men in Villa Franca, and, after scouring the country on the -right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina, and established their -quarters about Reus, by which the Spanish army at Taragona was placed -between them and the troops at Villa Franca. - -O’Donnel, whose energy and military talents, were superior to his -predecessors, saw, and instantly profited from this false position. -By his orders, general Juan Caro marched, with six thousand men, -against the French in Villa Franca, and, on the 28th, killed many -and captured the rest, together with some artillery and stores; but, -being wounded himself, resigned the command to general Gasca, after -the action. Augereau, alarmed for Manreza, detached troops, both by -Olesa and Montserrat, to reinforce Swartz. The first reached their -destinations, but the others, twelve hundred strong, were intercepted -by Gasca, and totally defeated at Esparaguera on the 3d of April. -Campo Verde then, coming down from the side of Cervera, took the -chief command, and proceeded against Manreza, by Montserrat, while -Milans de Boch, and Rovira, hemmed in the French on the opposite -side, and the Somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the operations. -Swartz evacuated the town in the night, and thinking to baffle the -Spaniards, by taking the road of Taraza and Sabadel, was followed -closely and beaten, by Rovira and Milans, on the 5th of April, and, -with great difficulty and the loss of all his baggage, reached -Barcelona. - -These operations having insulated the French divisions at Reus, -an officer was despatched, by sea, with orders to recall them to -Barcelona. Meanwhile count Severoli, who had taken the command of -them, and whose first instructions were to co-operate with Suchet, -feared to pass the mountains between Reus and the Ebro, lest he -should expose his rear to an attack from Taragona, and perhaps -fail of meeting the third corps at last. Keeping, therefore, on -the defensive at Reus, he detached colonel Villatte, at the head -of two battalions and some cavalry, across the hills, by Dos Aguas -and Falcet, to open a communication with the third corps, a part of -which had just seized Mora and Flix, on the Lower Ebro. Villatte -accomplished his object, and returned with great celerity, fighting -his way through the Somatenes, who were gathering round the defiles -in his rear. He regained Reus, just as Severoli, having received the -order of recall, was commencing his march for Barcelona. - -[Sidenote: Vacani Istoria Militáre degl’Italiani in Ispagna.] - -In the night of the 6th, this movement took place, but in such -confusion, that, from Taragona, O’Donnel perceived the disorder; -and sending a detachment, under colonel Orry, to harass the French, -followed himself with the rest of his army. Nevertheless, Severoli’s -rear guard, covered the retreat successfully, until a position was -attained near Villa Franca; and there Orry, pressing on too closely, -was wounded and taken, and his troops rejoined their main body. As -these divisions arrived, Campo Verde fell back to Cervera, Severoli -reached Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having lost more -than three thousand men, by a series of most unskilful movements. The -situation in which he voluntarily placed himself, was precisely such -as a great general would rejoice to see his adversary choose. - -Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was encircled by mountains, -to be passed only at certain defiles; now Reus and Manresa, were -beyond those defiles, and several days march from each other. Rovira -and Milans being about San Culgat, cut the communication between -Manresa and Barcelona; and O’Donnel, at Taragona, was nearer to -the defiles of Cristina, than the French divisions at Reus. His -communication with Campo Verde, was open by Valls, Pla, and Santa -Coloma de Querault; and with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca, San -Sadurni, and Igualada. - -Augereau indeed, placed a battalion in Villa Franca, but this only -rendered his situation worse; for what could six hundred men effect -in a mountainous country against three considerable bodies of the -enemy? The result was inevitable. The battalion, at Villa Franca, was -put to the sword; Swartz only saved a remnant of his brigade by a -timely flight; the divisions at Reus with difficulty made good their -retreat; and O’Donnel, who, one month before, had retired from the -battle of Vich, broken and discomfited by only five thousand French, -now, with that very beaten army, baffled Augereau, and obliged him, -although at the head of more than twenty thousand men, to abandon -Lower Catalonia, and retire to Gerona with disgrace: a surprising -change, yet one in which fortune had no share. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoirs.] - -Augereau’s talents for handling small corps in a battle, have been -recorded by a master hand. There is a vast difference between that -and conducting a campaign; but the truth is, that Catalonia had, -like Aragon, been declared a particular government, and Augereau, -afflicted with gout, remained in the palace of Barcelona, affecting -the state of a viceroy, when he should have been at the head -of his troops in the field. On the other hand, his opponent, a -hardy resolute man, excited by a sudden celebrity, was vigilant, -indefatigable, and eager. He merited the success he obtained; and, -with better and more experienced troops, that success would have been -infinitely greater. Yet if the expedition to Valencia had not taken -place, O’Donnel, distracted by a double attack, would have remained -at Taragona; and neither the action of Vich, nor the disasters at -Mollet, Villa Franca, and Esparaguera, would have taken place. - -Napoleon, discontented, as he well might be, with these operations, -appointed M’Donald, duke of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau; but, in -the meantime, the latter, having reached Gerona, disposed his troops -in the most commodious manner to cover the blockade of Hostalrich, -giving Severoli the command. - - -FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoirs.] - -This citadel was invested early in January. Situated on a high rock, -armed with forty guns, well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man, -it was nearly impregnable; and the French at first endeavoured to -reduce it by a simple blockade: but, towards the middle of February, -commenced the erection of mortar-batteries. Severoli also pressed the -place more vigorously than before, and although O’Donnel, collecting -convoys on the side of Vich and Mattaro, caused the blockading troops -to be attacked at several points by the Miguelettes, every attempt -to introduce supplies failed. The garrison was reduced to extremity, -and honourable terms were offered, but the governor, Julian Estrada, -rejected them, and prepared to break through the enemy’s line, an -exploit always expected from a good garrison in Turenne’s days, and, -as Napoleon has shewn by numerous examples, generally successful. - -O’Donnel, who could always communicate with the garrison, being -aware of their intention, sent some vessels to Arenys de Mar, and -made demonstrations from thence, and from the side of St. Celoni, to -favour the enterprise; and in the night of the 12th, Estrada, leaving -his sick behind, came forth with about fourteen hundred men. He first -made as if for St. Celoni, but afterwards turning to his right, broke -through on the side of St. Felieu de Buxalieu and pushed for Vich; -but the French closing rapidly from the right and left, pursued so -closely, that Estrada himself was wounded, and taken, together with -about three hundred men; many also were killed, the rest dispersed -in the mountains, and eight hundred reached Vich in safety. This -courageous action was therefore successful. Thus, on the 14th of -May, after four months of blockade and ten weeks of bombardment, the -castle fell, the line of communication with Barcelona was completed, -and the errors committed by Duhesme were partly remedied, but at -an expense of two years of field operations, many battles, and four -sieges. - -[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.] - -Two small islands, called Las Medas, situated at the mouth of the -Ter, and affording a safe anchorage, were next seized, and this event -which facilitated the passage of the French vessels, stealing from -port to port with provisions, or despatches, finished Augereau’s -career. It had been the very reverse of St. Cyr’s. The latter, -victorious in the field, was humane afterwards; but Augereau -endeavouring, to frighten those people into submission, who he had -failed to beat, erected gibbets along the high-roads, upon which -every man taken in arms was hung up without remorse, producing -precisely the effect that might be expected. The Catalans more -animated by their successes, than daunted by this barbarous severity, -became incredibly savage in their revenge, and thus all human feeling -lost, both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded with -crimes. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -While Augereau lost, in Barcelona, the fruits of his success at -Gerona, Suchet, sensible how injurious the expedition to Valencia -had proved, was diligently repairing that error. Reinforcements from -France, had raised his fighting men to about twenty-three thousand, -and of these, he drew out thirteen thousand to form the siege of -Lerida; the remainder, were required to maintain the forts in Aragon, -and to hold in check the Partisans, principally in the higher -valleys of the Pyrenees. Villa Campa however, with from three to -four thousand men, still kept about the lordship of Molina, and the -mountains of Albaracin. - -Two lines of operation were open to Suchet, the one, short and -direct, by the high road leading from Zaragoza through Fraga to -Lerida; the other circuitous, over the Sierra de Alcubierre, to -Monzon, and from thence to Lerida. The first was inconvenient, -because the Spaniards, when they took Fraga, destroyed the bridge -over the Cinca. Moreover, the fortress of Mequinenza, the Octogesa -of Cæsar, situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, -was close on the right flank, and might seriously incommode the -communications with Zaragoza, whereas the second route, although -longer, was safer, and less exhausted of forage and provisions. - -Monzon was already a considerable military establishment, the -battering train consisting of forty pieces, with seven hundred rounds -of ammunition attached to each, was directed there, and placed under -the guard of Habert’s division, which occupied the line of the Cinca. -Leval leaving general Chlopiski with a brigade at Daroca, to observe -Villa Campa, drew nearer to Zaragoza with the rest of his division. -Musnier marched with one brigade to Alcanitz, and was there joined -by his second brigade, which had been conducted to that point, from -Terruel, across the Sierra de Gudar. And while these movements were -executing, the castles of Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina, -Bujarola, and other points on the left of the Ebro, were occupied by -detachments. - -The right bank of that river, being guarded by Leval’s division, and -the country on the left bank, secured by a number of fortified posts, -there remained two divisions of infantry, and about nine hundred -cavalry, disposable for the operations against Lerida. On the Spanish -side, Campo Verde was with O’Donnel at Manreza, and Garcia Novaro at -Taragona, having small detachments on the right bank of the Ebro to -cover Tortoza; Perenna with five battalions occupied Balaguer on the -Upper Segre. - -Such were the relative situations of both parties, when general -Musnier quitting Alcanitz towards the end of March, crossed the -Guadalupe, drove Novarro’s detachments within the walls of Tortoza, -and then remounting the Ebro, seized some boats, and passing that -river at Mora and at Flix, communicated as I have before related, -with colonel Villatte of the seventh corps. And while this was -passing on the Ebro, general Habert crossed the Cinca in two columns, -one of which moved straight upon Balaguer, while the other passed -the Segre at Camarasa. Perenna, fearing to be attacked on both sides -of that river, and not wishing to defend Balaguer, retired down the -left bank, and using the Lerida bridge, remounted the right bank to -Corbins, where he took post behind the Noguerra, at its confluence -with the Segre. - -Suchet himself repaired to Monzon the 10th of April, and placed a -detachment at Candasnos to cover his establishments from the garrison -of Mequinenza, and the 13th he advanced with a brigade of infantry, -and all his cavalry, by Almacellas, against Lerida; meanwhile Habert, -descending the right bank of the Segre, forced the passage of the -Noguerra, and obliged Perenna to retire within the place. The same -day Musnier came up from Flix, and the town being thus encompassed, -the operations of the seventh and third corps were connected. -Suchet’s line of operations from Aragon, was short, direct, and easy -to supply, because the produce of that province was greater than -the consumption; but Augereau’s line, was long and unsafe, and the -produce of Catalonia was at no time equal to the consumption. - -Lerida, celebrated in ancient and modern times, contained about -eighteen thousand inhabitants. Situated upon the high road from -Zaragoza to Barcelona, and about sixty-five miles from each; it -possessed a stone bridge over the Segre, and was only a short -distance from the Ebro, and the Cinca rivers; its strategic -importance was therefore great, and the more so, that it in a manner -commanded the plains of Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia. -The regular governor was named Gonsalez, but Garcia Conde had been -appointed chief commandant, to appease his discontent at O’Donnel’s -elevation; and the troops he brought with him had encreased the -garrison to nine thousand regulars, besides the armed inhabitants. - -The river Segre covered the town on the south-east, and the head of -the bridge was protected on the left bank, by a rampart and ditch -enclosing a square stone building. The body of the place on the north -side, was defended by a wall, without either ditch or covered way, -but strengthened and flanked by bastions, and by towers. This wall on -the east, was joined to a rocky hill more than two hundred and fifty -feet high, the top of which sustained the citadel, an assemblage -of huge solid edifices, clustered about a castle of great height, -and surrounded by an irregular work flanked by good bastions with -ramparts from forty to fifty feet high. - -The descent from this rock into the town, was gentle, and the works -were there strengthened by ditches; on the other parts, the walls -could be seen to their base; yet the great height of the rock -rendered it impossible to breach them, and the approaches were nearly -inaccessible. Between the citadel-rock and the river, the town was -squeezed out, about two or three hundred yards, and the salient part -was secured by an entrenchment, and by two bastions called the Carmen -and the Magdalen. - -To the westward of the town, at the distance of seven or eight -hundred yards, the hill, on which Afranius and Petrieus encamped -to oppose Cæsar, was crowned, on the end next to Lerida, by Fort -Garden, which was again covered by a large horn-work, with ditches -above twenty feet deep; and at the farthest extremity of the Afranian -hill, two large redoubts called the Pilar and San Fernando, secured -the whole of the flat summit. All the works of Lerida were in good -condition, and armed with more than one hundred pieces of artillery; -the magazines were full, and the people enthusiastic. A local Junta -also had been formed to excite public feeling; and two officers of -artillery had already been murdered and their heads nailed to the -gates of the town. - -The siege was to be a joint operation by the third and seventh corps, -but the information derived from colonel Villatte, and the appearance -of Spanish Partisans on the lower Ebro, led Suchet to suspect that -the seventh corps had already retired, and that the burthen would -rest on him alone, wherefore he still kept his battering train at -Monzon, intending to wait until O’Donnel’s plans should be clearly -indicated, before he commenced the siege. Meanwhile, he established a -communication across the Segre, by means of a rope ferry, one league -above Lerida, and after closely examining the defences, prepared -materials for the construction of batteries. - -Two battalions of the investing troops had been left at Monzon and -Balaguer, but the remainder were thus distributed. On the left bank -of the Segre, at Alcoteletge, four thousand men, including the -cavalry, which was composed of a regiment of cuirassiers and one -of hussars, were stationed as a corps of observation; and Harispe, -with three battalions, invested the bridge-head of Lerida. By this -disposition, the ferry-boat was protected, and all danger from the -sudden rising of the Segre obviated, because the stone bridge of -Balaguer furnished a certain communication. The rest of the troops -occupied different positions, on the roads to Monzon, Fraga, and -Corbins, but as the number was insufficient to complete the circle -of investment round Fort Garden, that part was continually scoured by -patrols. - -Scarcely were these arrangements completed when a Spanish officer, -pretending to bear propositions for an exchange of prisoners, was -stopped on the left bank of the Segre, and the French general -detained him, suspecting his real object was to gain information; for -rumours obtained, that O’Donnel was collecting troops at Momblanch, -that Campo Verde was at Cervera, and that the Somatenes of the high -valleys were in arms on the upper Segre. Suchet anxious to ascertain -the truth of these reports, reinforced Harispe with three hundred -hussars on the 19th of April, and carried the corps of observation -to Balaguer. The governor of Lerida took that opportunity to make -a sally, but was repulsed, and the 21st, the French general, to -strengthen his position at Balaguer, caused the bridge of Camarasa, -above that town, to be broken, and then advanced as far as Tarrega, -forty miles on the road to Barcelona, to obtain intelligence; for he -was still uncertain of Augereau’s movements, and like every other -general, French or English, found it extremely difficult to procure -authentic information. On this occasion, however, by a happy fortune, -he ascertained that O’Donnel, with two divisions, was at Momblanch, -ready to descend the mountains and succour Lerida; wherefore -returning by one forced march to Balaguer, he directed Musnier -to resume his former position at Alcoleletge. This rapidity was -well-timed, for O’Donnel had passed the defiles of Momblanch, with -eight thousand chosen infantry, and six hundred cavalry, and encamped -at Vinaxa, about twenty-five miles from Lerida, on the 22d. There a -note from Garcia Conde, saying that, the French reserve being drawn -off, the investing force was weak, reached him, and he being willing -to seize the favourable moment, immediately pushed forward, reached -Juneda, fourteen miles from Lerida, by ten o’clock in the morning of -the 23d, and, after a halt of two hours, resumed his march with the -cavalry and one division of infantry, leaving the other to follow -more leisurely. - - -COMBAT OF MARGALEF. - -Four miles from Juneda, stood the ruined village of Margalef, and -from thence to Lerida was an open country, on which O’Donnel could -perceive no covering force. Hence, trusting implicitly to Conde’s -information (already falsified by Suchet’s activity), the Spanish -general descended the hills, and crossed the plain in three columns, -one following the high road and the other two marching on the right -and left. The centre outstripping the flankers, soon beat back -the advanced posts of Harispe; but that general, charged with his -three hundred hussars, upon the Spanish column, so suddenly, that -it was thrown into confusion, and fled towards Margalef, to which -place, the flank columns also retreated, yet in good order. During -this skirmish, the garrison sallied over the bridge, but the French -infantry stood firm, and the besieged, seeing the rout of O’Donnel’s -column, returned to the town. - -Meanwhile, Musnier, hearing the firing, guessed the real state of -affairs, and marched at once with his infantry and four hundred -cuirassiers from Alcoteletge across the plain towards Margalef, -hoping to cut off the Spaniards’ retreat. O’Donnel had, however, -rallied his troops, and was already in line of battle, the artillery -on the right and the cavalry on the left, his second division being, -however, still in the rear. The French cuirassiers and a battery of -light artillery, came up at a quick pace, a cannonade commenced, and -the Spanish cavalry rode forward, but the cuirassiers, commanded by -general Boussard, charged hotly, and forced them back on the line -of battle in such a manner that the latter wavered, when Boussard, -observing the confusion, came with a rude shock upon the flank of -the infantry. The Walloon guards made an effort to form square, -but the confusion was extreme, and nearly all the Spanish infantry -threw down their arms or were sabred. The cuirassiers, elated with -their success, then met and overthrew a Swiss regiment, forming the -advanced guard of the second Spanish division; but the main body of -the latter checked their fury, and O’Donnel retreated in good order, -and without further loss to the defile of Momblanch. - -This action, although not discreditable to O’Donnel, was very -unfortunate. The plain was strewed with carcases; three Spanish -guns, one general, eight colonels, and above five thousand men were -captured; and the next day the prisoners, being first ostentatiously -marched under the walls of the town, were shown to the Spanish -officer who had been detained on the 19th, after which he was -dismissed by the road of Cervera, that he might spread the news of -the defeat. - -Suchet wishing to profit from the effect of this victory upon the -besieged, attempted the night after the battle, to storm the -redoubts of San Fernando and Pilar. He was successful with the -latter, and the assailants descended into the ditch of San Fernando, -from whence the Spaniards, only fifty in number and unprovided with -hand grenades, could not drive them, and a parley ensuing it was -agreed that the French should retire without being molested. Thus the -Pilar was also saved, for being commanded by San Fernando, it was -necessarily evacuated. Previous to this attempt, Suchet had summoned -the city to surrender, offering safe conduct for commissioners to -count the dead on the field of Margalef, and to review the prisoners; -but Garcia Conde replied, “_that Lerida never looked for external -succour in her defences_.” - - -SIEGE OF LERIDA. - -The absolute retreat of Augereau, was now fully ascertained, yet the -victory of Margalef, and the apathy of the Valencians, encouraged -Suchet to commence the siege in form. The prisoners were sent to -France by the way of Jaca; the battering train was brought up from -Monzon, and all the other necessary preparations being completed, -the Spanish outposts were driven within the walls between the 26th -and 27th. The following night, under the direction of general Haxo, -ground was broken three hundred yards from the bastions of the Carmen -and Magdalen; the Spaniards threw some fire-balls, and opened a few -guns, but without interrupting the workmen, and when day broke, the -besiegers were well covered in the trenches. - -In the night of the 30th the first parallel was completed. -Breaching and counter-batteries were commenced, six sixteen-pounders -were destined to batter the left face of the Carmen, four long -twelve-pounders, to ruin the defences of the Magdalen, and four -mortars of eight inches to throw shells into the citadel. The weather -was rainy and the labour heavy, yet the works advanced rapidly, -and on the 2d of May, a fourth battery, armed with two mortars and -two sixteen-pounders, was raised against the Carmen. Meanwhile the -Spanish musqueteers, incommoded the trenches from the left bank -of the Segre, which obliged the French to contract the circle of -investment on that side. - -In the evening of the 4th of May, six hundred Spaniards, sallying -from the Carmen, carried the fourth battery and all the left of the -trenches, while another body, coming from the Magdalen, menaced the -right of the French works. The French guards held the latter in -check, and the reserves finally drove the former back into the town, -but after this attack, a ditch and rampart, to serve as a place of -arms, was carried from the battery which had been taken, down to the -river, and as the light troops still continued to ply the trenches -from the other side of the Segre, ground was broken there, close to -the water, and a battery of two guns was constructed to answer six -Spanish field-pieces, posted on the bridge itself. The parallel of -the main attack was also extended on the right, embracing a part of -the northern front of the citadel, and two mortars were placed at -this extremity. - -All the French batteries opened at day-break on the 7th, the mortars -played into the town and citadel, and four Spanish guns were -dismounted in the Carmen. Nevertheless, the counter fire silenced -three French batteries, the dismounted guns were replaced, and three -hundred men stealing out at dusk by the Puerta Nueva, fell upon the -right of the parallels, took the two mortars, and penetrated as far -as the approaches against the Magdalen. This sally was repulsed by -the French reserves, but the latter pursuing too far, suffered from -grape, and in the night a violent storm, with rain, damaged the -batteries and overflowed the trenches. From the 8th to the 11th the -French only laboured at the works, and opened a second parallel one -hundred and fifty yards in advance of the first, with the intention -of forming fresh batteries; that being closer under the citadel-rock, -would be less exposed to its plunging fire. More guns, and of a -larger size, were also mounted; three new batteries were constructed; -and marksmen were planted to harass the Spanish cannoneers. - -On the 12th the besiegers recommenced their fire from eight -batteries, containing fifteen guns and nineteen mortars. The besieged -replied at first sharply, but in a little time stammered in their -answers, and the French artillery taking the ascendent, the walls of -the Carmen and Magdalen crumbled under their salvos, and a portable -magazine blew up in the citadel. Towards evening two breaches in -the Carmen, and one in the Magdalen appeared practicable, and after -dark, some Swiss deserters coming out through the openings, brought -intelligence, that the streets of the town behind the breaches, were -retrenched and defended by batteries. - -Suchet’s hopes of an early termination to the siege now rose high. -He had from the first supposed, that the vehemence of the citizens, -and of the armed peasantry who had entered the place, would oblige -the governor to fight the town to the last, instead of reserving -his efforts for the defence of the citadel. He knew that armed -mobs easily excited, are as easily discouraged, and he projected -to carry the breaches briskly, and, with one sweep, to force all -the inhabitants into the citadel, being well assured that they -would hamper, if not entirely mar, the defence of that formidable -fortress: but he resolved first, to carry the forts of San Fernando -and the Pilar and the horn-work of Fort Garden, lest the citizens, -flying from the assault of the breaches, should take refuge on that -side. To effect this, three columns, provided with ladders and other -necessary implements, simultaneously mounted the hill of Afranius -that night; one marched against the redoubts, and the others were -ordered to storm the horn-work on two sides. The Pilar was carried -without difficulty, and the garrison flying towards Fort Garden, fell -in with the second French column, which arrived with the fugitives -at the ditch of the horn-work, and being there joined by the third -column, which had taken a wrong direction, the whole mass entered -the place fighting. The Spaniards saved themselves in Fort Garden, -and meanwhile the people in Fernando resisted desperately, and that -redoubt was not taken until two-thirds of the defendants were put to -the sword. Thus the French effected their object with the loss of a -hundred men. - -During this operation the great batteries only played into the -citadel, but, at daybreak, renewed their fire on the breaches; steps -were also cut in the parallel, to facilitate the advance of the -troops to the assault; and all the materials, necessary to effect -a solid lodgement on the walls, were conveyed into the trenches. On -the other hand, the Spaniards were preparing a grand sally, to retake -the horn-work of Fort Garden, but the French arrangements being -first completed, at seven o’clock, in the evening of the 13th, four -shells were thrown as a signal, and the storming-parties, jumping -out of the trenches, rushed towards the breaches, two advancing -against the Carmen, a third attacking the Magdalen, and a fourth, -moving close by the river, endeavouring to break in on that side. The -Spaniards, unexpectant of the attack, at first permitted the French -to mount the breaches unmolested; but, soon recovering, poured such -a fire of musquetry and artillery upon the head of the principal -columns that they staggered, yet, being encouraged by general Habert, -finally forced their way into the town; and, at the same moment, the -troops on the right and left, being also successful, turned all the -retrenchments in the streets. On the other side of the river, general -Harispe carried the bridge, and Suchet himself, with the reserve, -followed close upon the steps of the storming-parties; the Spaniards -were thus overpowered, and the regular troops commenced a retreat -into the citadel. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -It was now that the French general put his design in execution. -Harispe’s brigade passing the bridge, made for the gate of St. -Anthony, looking towards Fort Garden, and cut off all egress from the -town; and this done, the French columns advanced from every side, -in a concentric direction, upon the citadel, and, with shouts, and -stabs, and musquetry, drove men, women, and children before them, -while the guns of the castle smote friends and foes alike. Then, -flying up the ascent, the shrieking and terrified crowds rushed into -the fortress with the retiring garrison, and crowded the summit of -the rock; but, all that night, the French shells fell amongst the -hapless multitude, and, at daylight, the fire was redoubled, and the -carnage swelled, until Garcia Conde, overpowered by the cries and -sufferings of the miserable people, hoisted the white flag. - -At twelve o’clock, the horrible scene terminated, and the -capitulation that followed was honourable in terms to the besieged; -but Fort Garden being included, Suchet became master of Lerida, with -its immense stores and near eight thousand prisoners, for the whole -loss of the garrison had been only twelve hundred men. - -Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced, by a proceeding, -politic indeed, but scarcely to be admitted within the pale of -civilized warfare. For, though a town, taken by assault, be -considered the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant -of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, does not warrant -the driving of unarmed helpless people, into a situation, where they -must perish from the fire of the enemy, unless a governor fail in his -duty. Suchet justifies it, on the ground, that he thus spared a great -effusion of blood which must necessarily have attended a protracted -siege, and the fact is true. But this is to spare soldiers’ blood at -the expense of women’s and children’s, and, had Garcia Conde’s nature -been stern, he, too, might have pleaded expediency, and the victory -would have fallen to him who could longest have sustained the sight -of mangled infants and despairing mothers. - - - - -CHAP. IV. - - -When Lerida fell, Conde was accused of treachery, but there seems no -foundation for the charge; the cause stated by Suchet is sufficient -for the effect; yet the defence was very unskilful. The walls, on -the side of the attack, could not be expected, and scarcely did, -offer an impediment to the French general; hence the citadel should -have been the better prepared, and, as the besiegers’ force, the -corps of observation being deducted, did not exceed the garrison in -number, it might have baffled Suchet’s utmost efforts. Engineers -require that the relative strength of besiegers and besieged, should -not be less than four to one; yet here the French invested a force -equal to themselves, and in a short time reduced a great fortress in -the midst of succouring armies, for Lerida had communications, 1º. -With the armed population of the high valleys; 2º. With O’Donnel’s -corps of fourteen thousand; 3º. With Cervera, where Campo Verde was -posted with four thousand men; 4º. With Tortoza, where the marquis of -Lazan, now released from his imprisonment, commanded from five to six -thousand; 5º. With Valencia, in which province there was a disposable -army of fifteen thousand regular and more than thirty thousand -irregular soldiers. - -It is evident that, if all these forces had been directed with skill -and concert upon Lerida, not only the siege would have been raised, -but the very safety of the third corps endangered; and it was to -obviate this danger that Napoleon directed the seventh corps to take -such a position on the Lower Ebro as would keep both O’Donnel and -the Valencians in check; but Augereau, as we have seen, failed to do -this; and St. Cyr asserts that the seventh corps could never safely -venture to pass the mountains, and enter the valley of the Ebro. On -the other hand, Suchet affirms that Napoleon’s instructions could -have been obeyed without difficulty. St. Cyr himself, under somewhat -similar circumstances, blockaded Taragona for a month; Augereau, who -had more troops and fewer enemies, might have done the same, and yet -spared six thousand men to pass the mountains; Suchet would then have -been tranquil with respect to O’Donnel, and would have had a covering -army to protect the siege, and these troops, fed from the resources -of Aragon, would have relieved Catalonia. - -Augereau has been justified, on the ground, that the blockade of -Hostalrich would have been raised while he was on the Ebro. The -danger of this could not have escaped the emperor, yet his military -judgement, unerring in principle, was often false in application, -because men measure difficulties by the standard of their own -capacity, and Napoleon’s standard only suited the heroic proportions. -One thing is, however, certain, that Catalonia presented the most -extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. The powerful military -organization of the Miguelettes and Somatenes,--the well-arranged -system of fortresses,--the ruggedness and sterility of the -country,--the ingenuity and readiness of a manufacturing population -thrown out of work,--and, finally, the aid of an English fleet, -combined to render the conquest of this province a gigantic task. -Nevertheless, the French made progress, each step planted slowly -indeed and with pain, but firmly, and insuring the power of making -another. - -Hostalrich and Lerida fell on the same day. The acquisition of the -first consolidated the French line of communication with Barcelona; -and, by the capture of the second, Suchet obtained large magazines, -stores of powder, ten thousand muskets, the command of several -dangerous rivers, easy access to the higher valleys, and a firm -footing in the midst of the Catalonian strong holds; and he had taken -or killed fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers. Yet this was but the -prelude to greater struggles. The Miguelettes supplied O’Donnel with -abundance of men, and neither his courage nor his abilities were at -fault. Urgel, Cardona, Berga, Cervera, Mequinenza, Taragona, San -Felippe Balaguer, and Tortoza the link of connexion between Valencia -and Catalonia, were still to be subdued, and, during every great -operation, the Partisans, being unmolested, recovered strength. - -Thus while the siege of Lerida was going on, the marquis of Lazan -entered the town of Alcanitz with five thousand men, and would have -carried the castle, but that general Laval despatched two thousand -men, from Zaragoza, to its succour, when the Spaniards, after a -skirmish in the streets, retired; and, while this was passing at -Alcanitz, Villa Campa, intercepted four hundred men conducting a -convoy of provisions from Calatayud to Zaragoza. Colonel Petit, the -commander, being attacked in the defile of Frasno, was forced to -abandon his convoy, and, under a continued fire, to fight his way for -ten miles, until his detachment, reduced to one hundred and eighty -wounded men, passed the Xalon river, and, at the village of Arandiza, -finally repulsed the assailants. The remainder of this desperate band -were taken or killed, and Petit himself, wounded, a prisoner, and -sitting in the midst of several Spanish officers, was basely murdered -the evening after the action. Villa Campa put the assassin to death, -but, at the same time, suffered the troops to burn alive the Alcalde -of Frasno, an old man taken among the French. - -This action happened the day Lerida fell; and, the next day, -Chlopiski, following Villa Campa’s march from Daroca, reached Frasno. -The Spaniards were no longer there, and Chlopiski, dividing his -forces, pursued them, by the routes of Calatayud and Xarava, to -Molina, where he destroyed a manufactory for arms, and so pressed -the Spanish general, that his troops disbanded, and several hundred -retired to their homes. At the same time, an attack, made from the -side of Navarre, on the garrison of Ayerbe, was repulsed. - -But these petty events, while they evinced the perseverance of the -Spaniards, proved also the stability of Suchet’s power in Aragon. -His system was gradually sapping the spirit of resistance in that -province. In Lerida his conduct was as gentle and moderate as the -nature of this unjust war would permit; and, however questionable, -the morality of the proceeding by which he reduced the citadel, -it must be acknowledged that his situation required most decided -measures, for the retreat of the seventh corps set free not only -O’Donnel’s army, but Campo Verde’s and all the irregular bands. The -Somatenes of the high valleys appeared in force, on the Upper Segre -the very day of the assault; eight hundred Miguelettes attacked -Venasque three days after; and Campo Verde, marching from Cervera, by -Agramunt, took post in the mountains of Lliniana, above Talarn and -Tremp, where great bodies of the Somatenes also assembled. - -Their plans were disconcerted by the sudden fall of Lerida; the -Miguelettes were repulsed from Venasque; the Somatenes defeated at -Tremp; and general Habert, marching from Balaguer, cut off Campo -Verde from Cervera, and forced him to retreat upon Cardona. But, if -the citadel of Lerida had held out, and O’Donnel, less hasty, had -combined his march, at a later period, with these Somatenes and with -Campo Verde, the third corps could scarcely have escaped a disaster; -whereas, now the plain of Urgel and all the fertile valleys opening -upon Lerida fell to the French, and Suchet, after taking measures -to secure them, turned his arms against Mequinenza, which, by its -situation at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, just where the -latter begins to be navigable, was the key to further operations. The -French general could not advance in force against Tortoza, nor avail -himself of the water-carriage, until Mequinenza should fall. - -Suchet’s activity was extreme; one detachment, sent the day after the -assault of Lerida, by the left bank of the Segre, was already before -the place, and general Musnier’s division, descending the right -bank of that river, drove in some of the outposts and commenced the -investment on the 20th of May. - -Mequinenza, built on an elbow of land formed by the meeting of -the Segre and Ebro, was fortified by an old Moorish wall, and -strengthened by modern batteries, especially on the Fraga road, the -only route by which artillery could approach. A shoot from the Sierra -de Alcubierre filled the space between the two rivers, and narrowing -as they closed, ended in a craggy rock, seven hundred feet high and -overhanging the town, which was built between its base and the water. - -This rock was crowned by a castle, with a rampart, which being -inaccessible on two sides from the steepness, and covered, on a -third, by the town, could only be assailed, on the fourth, along a -high neck of land, three hundred yards wide, that joined the rock to -the parent hills; and the rampart on that side, was bastioned, lined -with masonry, and protected by a ditch, counterscarp, and covered way -with palisades. - -No guns could be brought against this fort, until the country people, -employed by Suchet, had opened a way from Torriente, over the hills, -and this occupied the engineers until the 1st of June. Meanwhile -the brigade, which had defeated Lazan, at Alcanitz, arrived on the -right bank of the Ebro, and completed the investment. The 30th of -May, general Rogniat, coming from France, with a reinforcement of -engineer-officers, and several companies of sappers and miners, also -reached the camp, and, taking the direction of the works, contracted -the circle of investment, and commenced active operations. - - -SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA. - -The Spaniards made an ineffectual sally the 31st; and, the 2d of -June, the French artillery, consisting of eighteen pieces, of which -six were twenty-four-pounders, being brought over the hills, the -advanced posts of the Spaniards were driven into the castle, and, -during the night, ground was broken two hundred yards from the place, -under a destructive fire of grape. The workmen suffered severely; -and, while this was passing on the height, approaches were made -against the town, in the narrow space between the Ebro and the foot -of the rock. Strong infantry posts were also entrenched, close to the -water, on the right bank of that river, to prevent the navigation; -yet eleven boats, freighted with inhabitants and their property, -quitted the town, and nine effected their escape. - -In the night of the 3d the parallels on the rock were perfected, the -breaching-batteries commenced, and parapets of sand-bags were raised, -from behind which the French infantry plied the embrasures of the -castle with musketry. The works against the town were also advanced; -but, in both places, the nature of the ground greatly impeded the -operations. The trenches above, being in a rocky soil, were opened -chiefly by blasting; those below were in a space too narrow for -batteries, and, moreover, searched by a plunging fire, both from the -castle, and from a gun mounted on a high tower in the town wall. The -troops on the right bank of the Ebro, however, opened their musketry -with such effect on the wall, that a part of the garrison quitted it; -both it and the tower were then escaladed without difficulty; and the -Spaniards all retired to the castle. The French placed a battalion in -the houses, and put those next the rock in a state of defence; and -although the garrison of the castle rolled down large stones from -above; they killed more of the inhabitants than of the enemy. - -The 6th the French batteries on the rock, three in number, were -completed; and, in the night, forty grenadiers carried by storm a -small outwork called the horse-shoe. The 7th Suchet, who had been -at Zaragoza, arrived in the camp; and, on the 8th, sixteen pieces -of artillery, of which four were mortars, opened on the castle. The -Spaniards answered with such vigour, that three French guns were -dismounted; yet the besiegers acquired the superiority, and, at -nine o’clock in the morning, the place was nearly silenced, and the -rampart broken in two places. The Spaniards endeavoured to keep up -the defence with musketry, while they mounted fresh guns, but the -interior of the castle was so severely searched by the bombardment, -that, at ten o’clock, the governor capitulated. Fourteen hundred men -became prisoners of war; forty-five guns, large stores of powder and -of cast iron were captured, and provisions for three months were -found in the magazines. - -Two hours after the fall of Mequinenza, general Mont-Marie, -commanding the troops on the right bank of the Ebro, marched, with -his brigade, against Morella, in the kingdom of Valencia, and took it -on the 13th of June; for the Spaniards, with a wonderful negligence, -had left that important fortress, commanding one of the principal -entrances into the kingdom of Valencia, without arms or a garrison. -When it was lost, general O’Donoju, with a division of the Valencian -army, advanced to retake it, but Mont-Marie defeated him. The works -were then repaired, and Morella became a strong and important place -of arms. - -By these rapid and successful operations Suchet secured, 1º. A -fortified frontier against the regular armies of Catalonia and -Valencia; 2º. Solid bases for offensive operations, and free entrance -to those provinces; 3º. The command of several fertile tracts of -country and of the navigation of the Ebro; 4º. The co-operation of -the seventh corps, which, by the fall of Lerida, could safely engage -beyond the Llobregat. But, to effect the complete subjugation of -Catalonia, it was necessary to cut off its communications by land -with Valencia, and to destroy O’Donnel’s base. The first could only -be attained, by taking Tortoza, the second by capturing Taragona. -Hence the immediate sieges of those two great places, the one by -the third, and the other by the seventh corps, were ordered by the -emperor. - -Suchet was ready to commence his part, but many and great obstacles -arose: the difficulty of obtaining provisions, in the eastern region -of Catalonia, was increased by O’Donnel’s measures, and that general, -still commanding above twenty thousand men, was neither daunted by -past defeats, nor insensible to the advantages of his position. His -harsh manners and stern sway, rendered him hateful to the people, but -he was watchful to confirm the courage, and to excite the enthusiasm -of his troop’s by conferring rewards and honours on the field of -battle; and, being of singular intrepidity himself, his exhortations -had more effect. - -Two years of incessant warfare had also formed several good -officers, and the full strength and importance of every position -and town were, by dint of experience, becoming known. With these -helps O’Donnel long prevented the siege of Tortoza, and found -full employment for the enemy during the remainder of the year. -Nevertheless, the conquest of Catalonia advanced, and the fortified -places fell one after another, each serving, by its fall, to -strengthen the hold of the French, in the same proportion that it had -before impeded their progress. - -The foundations of military strength were however, deeply cast in -Catalonia. There the greatest efforts were made by the Spaniards, -and ten thousand British soldiers, hovering on the coast, ready to -land on the rear of the French, or to join the Catalans in an action, -would at any period of 1809 and 1810, have paralized the operations -of the seventh corps, and saved Gerona, Hostalrich, Tortoza, -Taragona, and even Lerida. While those places were in the hands of -the Spaniards and their hopes were high, English troops from Sicily -were reducing the Ionian islands or loitering on the coast of Italy, -but when all the fortresses of Catalonia had fallen, when the regular -armies were nearly destroyed, and when the people were worn out with -suffering, a British army which could have been beneficially employed -elsewhere, appeared, as if in scorn of common sense, on the eastern -coast of Spain. - -Notwithstanding the many years of hostility with France, the English -ministers were still ignorant of every military principle; and yet -too arrogant to ask advice of professional men; for it was not until -after the death of Mr. Perceval, and when the decisive victory -of Salamanca shewed the giant in his full proportions, that even -Wellington himself was permitted the free exercise of his judgement, -although he was more than once reminded by Mr. Perceval, whose -narrow views continually clogged the operations, that the whole -responsibility of failure would rest on his head. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -Suchet’s preparations equally menaced Valencia, and Catalonia, and -the authorities in the former province, perceiving, although too -late, that an exclusive and selfish policy would finally bring -the enemy to their own doors, resolved to co-operate with the -Catalonians, while the Murcians, now under the direction of Blake, -waged war on the side of Grenada, and made excursions against the -fourth corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated of when the -course of the history leads me back to Catalonia, but those of the -Murcian army belong to the - - -OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA. - -[Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence, captured at Victoria. MSS.] - -During the month of February, the first corps was before Cadiz, the -fourth in Grenada, Dessolles’ division at Cordoba, Jaen, and Ubeda, -and the fifth corps (with the exception of six battalions and some -horse left at Seville) in Estremadura. The king, accompanied by -marshal Soult, moved with his guards and a brigade of cavalry, to -different points, and received from all the great towns assurances -of their adhesion to his cause. But as the necessities of the -army demanded immediate and heavy contributions, both of money -and provisions, moveable columns were employed to collect them, -especially for the fourth corps, and with so little attention to -discipline as soon to verify the observations of St. Cyr, that they -were better calculated to create than to suppress insurrections. -The people exasperated by disorders, and violence, and at the same -time excited by the agents of their own and the British government, -suddenly rose in arms and Andalusia, like other parts of Spain, -became the theatre of a petty and harassing warfare. - -The Grenadans of the Alpujarras, were the first to resist, and this -insurrection spreading on the one hand through the Sierra de Ronda, -and on the other, towards Murcia, received succours from Gibraltar, -and was aided by the troops and armed peasantry under the command -of Blake. The communication between the first and fourth corps -across the Sierra de Ronda, was maintained by a division of the -former, posted at Medina Sidonia, and by some infantry and hussars -of the latter quartered in the town of Ronda. From this place, the -insurgents, principally smugglers, drove the French, while at the -other extremity Blake marching from Almeria, took Ardra and Motril. -The mountaineers of Jaen and Cordoba at the same time interrupted -Dessolles’ communications with La Mancha. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -These movements took place in the beginning of March, and the king -and Soult being then in the city of Grenada, sent one column across -the mountain by Orgiva to fall upon the flank of Blake at Motril, -while a second moving by Guadix and Ohanes upon Almeria, cut off -his retreat. This obliged the Murcians to disperse, and at the same -time, Dessolles defeated the insurgents on the side of Ubeda; and -the garrison of Malaga, consisting of three battalions, marched to -restore the communications with the first corps. Being joined by the -detachment beaten at Ronda, they retook that post on the 21st of -March; but during their absence the people from the Alpuxaras entered -Malaga, killed some of the inhabitants as favourers of the enemy, -and would have done more, but that another column from Grenada came -down on them, and the insurrection was thus strangled in its birth. -It had however, sufficed to prevent the march of the troops designed -to co-operate with Suchet at Valencia, and it was of so threatening -a character, that the fifth corps was recalled from Estremadura, and -all the French troops at Madrid, consisting of the garrison, and a -part of the second corps, were directed upon Almagro in La Mancha, -the capital itself being left in charge of some Spanish battalions in -the invader’s service. The king then repaired to La Mancha, fearing -an offensive movement, by the Valencian and Murcian armies, but -after a time returned to Madrid. The duke of Dalmatia then remained -chief commander of Andalusia, and proceeded to organize a system -of administration so efficacious, that neither the efforts of the -Spanish government, nor of the army in Cadiz, nor the perpetual -incursions of Spanish troops issuing from Portugal, and supported -by British corps on that frontier, could seriously shake his hold, -but this will be better shewn hereafter; at present, it is more -convenient to notice. - - -THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ. - -Marshal Victor declining, as we have seen, an assault on the Isla, -spread his army round the margin of the bay, and commenced works of -contravallation on an extent of not less than twenty-five miles. The -towns, the islands, castles, harbours, and rivers, he thus enclosed -are too numerous, and in their relative bearings, too intricate for -minute description; yet, looking as it were from the French camps, I -shall endeavour to point out the leading features. - -The blockade was maintained in three grand divisions or entrenched -positions, namely, Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria. The first, -having its left on the sea coast near the Torre Bermeja, was from -thence carried across the Almanza, and the Chiclana rivers, to the -Zuraque, on a line of eight miles, traced along a range of thickly -wooded hills, and bordering a marsh from one to three miles broad. -This marsh, traversed in its breadth by the above-mentioned rivers, -and by a number of navigable water courses or creeks, was also cut in -its whole length by the Santi Petri, a natural channel connecting the -upper harbour of Cadiz with the open sea. The Santi Petri, nine miles -long, from two to three hundred yards wide, and of depth to float -a seventy-four, received the waters of all the creeks crossing the -marsh and was the first Spanish line of defence. In the centre, the -bridge of Zuazo, by which the only road to Cadiz passes, was broken -and defended by batteries on both sides. On the right hand, the -Caraccas, or Royal Arsenal, situated on an island just in the harbour -mouth of the channel, and on account of the marsh inattackable, save -by water or by bombardment, was covered with strong batteries and -served as an advanced post. On the left hand the castle of Santi -Petri, also built on an island, defended the sea mouth of the channel. - -Beyond the Santi Petri was the Isla de Leon, in form a triangular -island, the base of which rests on that channel, the right side on -the harbour, the left on the open sea, and the apex points towards -Cadiz. All this island was a salt-marsh, except one high and strong -ridge in the centre, about four miles long, upon which the large town -of La Isla stands, and which being within cannon shot of the Santi -Petri, offered the second line of defence. - -From the apex, called the Torre Gardo, a low and narrow isthmus about -five miles long, connected the island with the rocks upon which Cadiz -stood, and across the centre of this narrow isthmus, a cut called the -Cortadura, defended by the large unfinished fort of Fernando, offered -a third line of defence. The fourth and final line, was the land -front of the city itself, regularly and completely fortified. - -On the Chiclana side therefore, the hostile forces were only -separated by the marsh; and although the Spaniards commanded the -Santi Petri, the French having their chief depôts in the town of -Chiclana, could always acquire the mastery in the marsh and might -force the passage of the channel, because the Chiclana, Zuraque, and -Almanza creeks, were navigable above the lines of contravallation. -The thick woods behind, also afforded the means of constructing an -armed flotilla, and such was the nature of the ground bordering the -Santi Petri itself, on both sides, that off the high road, it could -only be approached by water, or by narrow footpaths, leading between -the salt-pans of the marsh. - -The central French or Puerto Real division extending from the Zuraque -on the left, to the San Pedro, a navigable branch of the Guadalete -on the right; measured about seven miles. From the Zuraque to the -town of Puerto Real, the line was traced along a ridge skirting the -marsh, so as to form with the position of Chiclana a half circle. -Puerto Real itself was entrenched, but a tongue of land four miles -long projected from thence perpendicularly on to the narrow isthmus -of Cadiz. This tongue, cloven in its whole length by the creek or -canal of Troccadero, separated the inner from the outward harbour, -and at its extreme points stood the village of Troccadero, and the -fort of Matagorda; opposed to which there was on the isthmus of Cadiz -a powerful battery called the Puntales. From Matagorda to the city -was above four thousand yards, but across the channel to Puntales was -only twelve hundred, it was the nearest point to Cadiz and to the -isthmus, and was infinitely the most important post of offence. From -thence the French could search the upper harbour with their fire and -throw shells into the Caraccas and the fort of Fernando, while their -flotilla safely moored in the Troccadero creek, could make a descent -upon the isthmus, and thus turn the Isla, and all the works between -it and the city. Nevertheless, the Spaniards dismantled and abandoned -Matagorda. - -The third or Santa Maria division of blockade, followed the sweep of -the bay, and reckoning from the San Pedro, on the left, to the castle -of Santa Catalina the extreme point of the outer harbour, on the -right, was about five miles. The town of Santa Maria, built at the -mouth of the Guadalete in the centre of this line, was entrenched and -the ground about Santa Catalina was extremely rugged. - -Besides these lines of blockade which were connected by a covered -way, concealed by thick woods, and when finished armed with three -hundred guns, the towns of Rota and San Lucar de Barameda were -occupied. The first, situated on a cape of land opposite to Cadiz, -was the northern point of the great bay or roadstead. The second -commanded the mouth of Guadalquivir. Behind the line of blockade, -Latour Maubourg, with a covering division, took post at Medina -Sidonia, his left being upon the upper Guadalete, and his advanced -posts watching the passes of the Sierra de Ronda. Such was the -position of the first corps. I shall now relate the progress of -events within the blockaded city. - -[Sidenote: Albuquerque’s Manifesto.] - -The fall of the Central Junta, the appointment of the regency and -the proclamation for convoking the national Cortes have been already -touched upon. Albuquerque, hailed as a deliverer, elected governor, -commander in chief, and president of the Junta, appeared to have -unlimited power; but in reality, possessed no authority except over -his own soldiers, and he did not meddle with the administration. The -regency appointed provisionally and composed of men without personal -energy or local influence, was obliged to bend and truckle to the -Junta of Cadiz; and that imperious body without honour, talents, or -patriotism, sought only to obtain the command of the public revenue -for dishonest purposes, and meanwhile, privately trafficked with the -public stores. - -[Sidenote: Private Correspondence of Officers from Cadiz. 1810. MSS.] - -Albuquerque’s troops were in a deplorable state; the whole had -been long without pay, and the greater part were without arms, -accoutrements, ammunition, or clothes. When he demanded supplies, -the Junta declared that they could not furnish them; but the duke -affirming this to be untrue, addressed a memorial to the Regency, and -the latter, anxious to render the Junta odious, yet fearing openly to -attack them, persuaded Albuquerque to publish his memorial. The Junta -replied by an exposition, false as to facts, base and ridiculous in -reasoning; for although they had elected the duke president of their -own body, they accused him amongst other things, with retreating from -Carmona too quickly; and they finished with an intimation, that, -supported by the populace of Cadiz, they were able and ready to -wreak their vengeance on all enemies. Matters being thus brought to -a crisis, both Albuquerque and the Regency gave way, and the former -being sent ambassador to England, died in that country some months -after of a phrenzy brought on, as it is said, by grief and passion at -the unworthy treatment he received. - -But the misery of the troops, the great extent of the positions, -the discontent of the seamen, the venal spirit of the Junta, the -apathy of the people, the feebleness of the Regency, the scarcity -of provisions, and the machinations of the French, who had many -favourers and those amongst the men in power, all combined to place -Cadiz in the greatest jeopardy; and this state of affairs would have -led to a surrender, if England had not again filled the Spanish -store-houses, and if the Regency had not consented to receive British -troops into the city. - -[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -At the same time, general Colin Campbell (who had succeeded Sir John -Cradock as governor of Gibraltar) performed a great service to his -country, for, by persevering negotiation, he obtained that an English -garrison should likewise enter Ceuta, and that the Spanish lines of -San Roque, and the forts round the harbour of Algesiras should be -demolished. Both measures were very essential to the present and -permanent interests of England; but the first especially, because -it cleared the neighbourhood of the fortress, and gave it a secure -harbour. Gibraltar, at this time, contained a mixed and disaffected -population of more than twelve thousand persons, and merchandize to -the value of two millions sterling, which could have been easily -destroyed by bombardment; and Ceuta which was chiefly garrisoned -by condemned troops, and filled with galley-slaves, and its works -miserably neglected, had only six days’ provisions, and was at the -mercy of the first thousand French that could cross the streights. -The possession of it would have availed the enemy in many ways, -especially in obtaining provisions from Barbary, where his emissaries -were exceedingly active. - -[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Operations at Cadiz. 1810. MSS.] - -General William Stewart arrived in Cadiz, on the 11th of February, -with two thousand men, a thousand more joined him from Gibraltar, -and the whole were received with an enthusiasm, that proved sir -George Smith’s perception to have been just, and that Mr. Frere’s -unskilful management of the Central Junta, had alone prevented a -similar measure the year before. The 17th of February, a Portuguese -regiment, thirteen hundred strong, was also admitted into the -city, and Spanish troops came in daily in small bodies. Two ships -of war, the Euthalion and Undaunted, arrived from Mexico with six -millions of dollars; and another British battalion, a detachment -of artillery, and more native troops, having joined the garrison, -the whole force assembled behind the Santi Petri, was not less than -four thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and fourteen thousand Spaniards. Yet -there was little of enthusiasm amongst the latter; and in all this -time, not a man among the citizens had been enrolled or armed, or -had volunteered, either to labour or to fight. The ships recovered -at Ferrol, had been transferred to Cadiz, so there were in the bay, -twenty-three men of war, of which four of the line and three frigates -were British; and thus, money, troops, and a fleet, in fine, all -things necessary to render Cadiz formidable, were collected, yet to -little purpose, because procrastination, jealousy, ostentation, and -a thousand absurdities, were the invariable attendants of Spanish -armies and governments. - -General Stewart’s first measure, was to recover Matagorda. In -the night of the 22d, a detachment consisting of fifty seamen -and marines, twenty-five artillery-men, and sixty-seven of the -ninety-fourth regiment, the whole under the command of captain -M’Lean, pushed across the channel during a storm, and taking -possession of the dismantled fort, before morning effected a -solid lodgement, and although the French cannonaded the work with -field-artillery all the next day, the garrison, supported by the fire -of Puntales, was immoveable. - -The remainder of February passed without any event of importance, yet -the people suffered from the want of provisions, especially fresh -meat; and from the 7th to the 10th of March, a continued tempest, -beating upon the coast, drove three Spanish and one Portuguese sail -of the line, and a frigate and from thirty to forty merchantmen, on -shore, between San Lucar and St. Mary’s. One ship of the line was -taken, the others burnt and part of the crews brought off by boats -from the fleet; but many men, and amongst others a part of the fourth -English regiment fell into the hands of the enemy, together with an -immense booty. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, Sect. 1.] - -Early in March, Mr. Henry Wellesley, minister plenipotentiary -arrived, and on the 24th of that month, general Graham coming from -England assumed the chief command of the British, and immediately -caused an exact military survey of the Isla to be made. It then -appeared, that the force hitherto assigned for its defence, was -quite inadequate, and that to secure it against the utmost efforts -of the enemy, twenty thousand soldiers, and a system of redoubts, -and batteries, requiring the labour of four thousand men for three -months, were absolutely necessary. Now, the Spaniards had only -worked beyond the Santi Petri, and that without judgement; their -batteries in the marsh were ill placed, their entrenchments on the -tongue of land at the sea mouth of that channel, were of contemptible -strength, and the Caraccas which they had armed with one hundred -and fifty guns, being full of dry timber could be easily burned by -carcasses. The interior defences of the Isla were quite neglected, -and while they had abandoned the important posts of Matagorda, and -the Troccadero, they had pushed their advanced batteries, to the -junction of the Chiclana road with the Royal Causeway, in the marsh, -that is to say, one mile and a half beyond the bridge of Zuazo, and -consequently exposed, without support, to flank attacks both by water -and land. - -It was in vain that the English engineers presented plans, and -offered to construct the works; the Spaniards would never consent -to pull down a house, or destroy a garden; their procrastination, -paralized their allies, and would have lost the place, had the enemy -been prepared to press it vigorously. Nor were the English works -(when the Spaniards would permit any to be constructed) well and -rapidly completed, for the Junta furnished bad materials, there was a -paucity of engineer-officers, and, from the habitual negligence of -the ministerial departments at home, neither the proper stores, nor -implements had been sent out. Indeed, an exact history, drawn from -the private journals of commanders of British expeditions, during the -war with France, would show an incredible carelessness of preparation -on the part of the different cabinets. The generals were always -expected to “make bricks without straw,” and thus the laurels of the -British army were for many years blighted. Even in Egypt, the success -of the venerable hero, Abercrombie, was due, more to his perseverance -and unconquerable energy before the descent, than to his daring -operations afterwards. - -Additional reinforcements reached Cadiz the 31st of March, and both -sides continued to labour, but the allies slowly and without harmony, -and, the supplies being interrupted, scarcity increased, many persons -were forced to quit Cadiz, and two thousand men were sent to Ayamonte -to collect provisions on the Guadiana. But now Matagorda, which, -though frequently cannonaded, had been held fifty-five days, impeded -the completion of the enemy’s works at the Troccadero point. This -small fort, of a square form, without a ditch, with bomb-proofs -insufficient for the garrison, and with one angle projecting towards -the land, was little calculated for resistance, and, as it could -only bring seven guns to bear, a Spanish seventy-four and an armed -flotilla were moored on the flanks, to co-operate in the defence. The -French had however raised great batteries behind some houses on the -Troccadero, and, as daylight broke, on the 21st of April, a hissing -shower of heated shot, falling on the seventy-four, and in the midst -of the flotilla, obliged them to cut their cables and take shelter -under the works of Cadiz. Then the fire of forty-eight guns and -mortars, of the largest size, was concentrated upon the little fort -of Matagorda, and the feeble parapet disappeared in a moment before -this crashing flight of metal. The naked rampart and the undaunted -hearts of the garrison remained, but the troops fell fast, the enemy -shot quick and close, a staff, bearing the Spanish flag, was broken -six times in an hour, and the colours were at last fastened to the -angle of the work itself, while the men, especially the sailors, -besought the officers to hoist the British ensign, attributing the -slaughter to their fighting under a foreign flag. Thirty hours the -tempest lasted, and sixty-four men out of one hundred and forty were -down, when general Graham, finding a diversion he had projected -impracticable, sent boats to carry off the survivors. The bastion -was then blown up, under the direction of major Lefebre, an engineer -of great promise, and he also fell, the last man whose blood wetted -the ruins thus abandoned. Here I must record an action of which -it is difficult to say whether it were most feminine or heroic. A -sergeant’s wife, named Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded -men, when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the -well of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel -from his hand, braved the terrible cannonade herself, and, although a -shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, she recovered the vessel, and -fulfilled her mission.[8] - -[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -After the evacuation of Matagorda, the war languished at Cadiz; but -Sebastiani’s cavalry infested the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, and -he himself entered the capital of Murcia, on the 23d of April, when -Blake retired upon Alicant and Carthagena. Meanwhile the French -covered Matagorda point with batteries; but they were pressed for -provisions, and general Campbell, throwing a detachment into Tarifa, -drove their foragers from that vicinity, which abounds with cattle. -The Spaniards at San Roque promised to reinforce this detachment, -but their tardiness enabled the enemy to return with four hundred -foot and some cavalry, and although the former were repulsed, the -horse foraged the country, and drove off several herds of cattle -during the action. General Campbell then increased the detachment to -five hundred men, joining some guns, and placing the whole under the -command of major Brown of the 28th. - -In May the French prisoners, cutting the cables of two hulks, drifted -in a heavy gale to the French side of the bay; and the boats sent -against them being beat off, by throwing cold shot from the decks, -above fifteen hundred men saved themselves, in despite of the fire -from the allied fleet, and from Puntales, which was continued -after the vessels had grounded, although the miserable creatures, -thus struggling for life, had been treated with horrible cruelty, -and, being all of Dupont’s or Vedel’s corps, were prisoners only -by a dishonourable breach of faith. Meanwhile, in Cadiz, disorder -was daily increasing. The Regency having recalled Cuesta to their -military councils, he published an attack on the deposed Central -Junta, and was answered so as to convince the world, that the -course of all parties had been equally detrimental to the state. -Thus fresh troubles were excited. The English general was hampered -by the perverse spirit of the authorities, and the Spanish troops -were daily getting more inefficient from neglect, when the departure -of Albuquerque enabled Blake to take the chief command in the Isla, -and his presence produced some amelioration in the condition and -discipline of the troops. At his instance, also, the Municipal Junta -consented, although reluctantly, that the British engineers should -commence a regular system of redoubts for the defence of the Isla. - -[Sidenote: General Graham’s Despatches. MSS.] - -English reinforcements continued to arrive, and four thousand -Spaniards, from Murcia, joined the garrison, or, rather, army now -within the lines; but such was the state of the native troops, and -the difficulty of arranging plans, that hitherto the taking of -Matagorda had been the only check given to the enemy’s works. It -was, however, necessary to do something; and, after some ill-judged -plans of the Regency had been rejected by Graham, general Lacy was -embarked, with three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, to -aid the armed peasants, or Serranos, of the Ronda. These people had -been excited to arms, and their operations successfully directed -by captain Cowley and Mr. Mitchel, two British artillery-officers, -sent from Gibraltar, and general Campbell offered to reinforce Lacy, -from Gibraltar, if he would attack Malaga, where there were twenty -thousand males fit to carry arms. The French were only two thousand, -and cooped in the citadel, a Moorish castle, containing but twelve -guns, and dependent for water on the town, which was itself only -supplied by aqueducts from without. Lacy rejected this enterprise, -but demanded that eight hundred men, from Gibraltar, should make a -diversion to the eastward, while he, landing at Algesiras, moved -on Ronda; and, this being assented to, the English armament sailed -under the command of general Bowes. Lacy made good his movement -upon Ronda the 18th of June; but the French, having fortified -it, were too strong at that point, or, rather, Lacy, a man of no -enterprise, durst not act, and, when he was joined by many thousand -mountaineers, he arrested their leaders for some offence, which so -disgusted the men that they disbanded. The enemy, alarmed by these -operations, which were seconded from the side of Murcia, and by an -insurrection at Baeza, put all their disposable troops in motion; -but the insurrection at Baeza was quickly crushed, and general Rey, -marching from Seville, against Lacy, entirely defeated and cut him -off from Gibraltar, so that he was forced to re-embark with a few men -at Estipona, and returned to Cadiz in July. - -Here it is impossible not to reflect on the little use made of the -naval power, and the misapplication of the military strength in -the southern parts of Spain. The British, Portuguese, and Spanish -soldiers, at Cadiz, were, in round numbers, 30,000, the British in -Gibraltar 5000, in Sicily 16,000, forming a total of more than fifty -thousand effective troops, aided by a great navy, and favourably -placed for harassing that immense, and, with the exception of -the Valencian and Murcian coasts, uninterrupted French line of -operations, which extended from the south of Italy to Cadiz, for, -even from the bottom of Calabria, troops and stores were brought to -Spain. Yet a Neapolitan rabble, under Murat, in Calabria, and from -fifteen to twenty thousand French around Cadiz, were allowed to -paralize this mighty power. - -It is true that vigilance, temper, and arrangement, and favourable -localities, are all required, in the combined operations of a fleet -and army, and troops disembarking, also require time to equip for -service. But Minorca offered a central station, and a place of arms -for the army, and a spacious port for the fleet; the operations would -always have been short, and independent of the Spanish authorities, -and lord Collingwood was fitted, by his talents, discretion, zeal, -experience, and accurate knowledge of those coasts, successfully to -direct such a floating armament. What coast-siege, undertaken by the -seventh or third corps, could have been successfully prosecuted, -if the garrison had been suddenly augmented with fifteen or twenty -thousand men from the ocean? After one or two successful descents, -the very appearance of a ship of war would have checked the -operations of a siege, and obliged the enemy to concentrate: whereas, -the slight expeditions of this period, were generally disconcerted by -the presence of a few French companies. - -In July the British force, in Cadiz, was increased to eight thousand -five hundred men, and Sir Richard Keats arrived to take the command -of the fleet. The enemy, intent upon completing his lines, and -constructing flotillas at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and San Lucar de -Barameda, made no attacks, and his works, have been much censured, -as ostentatiously extended, and leading to nothing. This is however -a rash criticism; for the Chiclana camp was necessary to blockade -the Isla, and, as the true point for offensive operations, was at -the Troccadero, the lines of Puerto Real and Santa Maria, were -necessary to protect that position, to harass the fleet, to deprive -the citizens of good water, which, in ordinary times, was fetched -from Puerto Maria, and finally to enable the flotilla, constructing -at San Lucar, to creep round the coast. The chances from storms, -as experience proved, almost repaid the labour, and it is to be -considered that Soult contemplated a serious attack upon Cadiz, not -with a single corps, generally weaker than the blockaded troops, -but, when time should ripen, with a powerful army. Events in other -parts of the Peninsula first impeded, and finally frustrated this -intention, yet the lines were, in this view, not unnecessary or -ostentatious. - -Neither was it a slight political advantage, that the duke of -Dalmatia should hold sway in Seville for the usurper’s government, -while the National Cortes, and the Regency, were cooped up in a -narrow corner of the province. Moreover the preparations at Matagorda -constantly and seriously menaced Cadiz, and a British division was -necessarily kept there, for the English generals were well assured, -that otherwise, some fatal disaster would befall the Spaniards. Now -if a single camp of observation at Chiclana had constituted all the -French works, no mischief could have been apprehended, and Graham’s -division, consisting of excellent soldiers would have been set free, -instead of being cooped up, without any counterbalance in the number -of French troops at the blockade; for the latter aided indirectly, -and at times directly, in securing the submission of Andalusia, and -if not at Cadiz, they must have been covering Seville as long as -there was an army in the Isla. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -While the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville scarcely required -a garrison, and in March, six hundred infantry, under colonel -Remond, and two hundred cavalry, commanded by the duke D’Aremberg, -were despatched from thence, against the viscount De Gand, who was -still at Ayamonte, vainly demanding refuge in Portugal. He had four -thousand troops, but declining an engagement, passed by his left -through Gibraleon into the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Condado -de Niebla. The French then occupied Moguer and Huelva, towns situated -at the mouths of the Odiel and Tinto rivers, from whence Cadiz had -hitherto drawn supplies, and the viscount returning to Ayamonte, -sailed with his troops to Cadiz, being replaced by general Copons, -who came with two thousand men to gather provisions on the lower -Guadiana, and in the Tinto and Odiel districts. - -On the other side of Seville, Sebastiani had an uneasy task. The -vicinity of Gibraltar and of the Murcian army, the continued descents -on the coast, and the fierceness of the Moorish blood, rendered -Grenada the most disturbed portion of Andalusia, and a great part of -that fine province, visited by the horrors of insurrectional war, was -ravaged and laid waste. - -In the northern parts of Andalusia, about Jaen and Cordoba, Dessolles -reduced the struggle to a trifling Guerilla warfare; but it was not -so in La Mancha, where the Partidas became so numerous and the war -so onerous, that one of Joseph’s ministers, writing to a friend, -described that province as peopled with beggars and brigands. -Meanwhile Estremadura was the scene of various complicated movements -and combats, producing no great results, indeed, but important as -being connected with and bearing on the defence of Portugal. - -The Spanish and Portuguese line of frontier, south of the Tagus, may -be divided into three parts. - -1º. From the Tagus to Badajos, on the Guadiana. 2º. From Badajos to -the Morena. 3º. From the Morena to the sea. Each of these divisions -is about sixty miles. Along the first, two-thirds of which is -mountainous and one-third undulating plains and thick woods, a double -chain of fortresses guard the respective frontiers. Alcantara, -Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Badajos are the Spanish; -Montalvao, Castello de Vide, Marvao, Aronches, Campo Mayor, and -Elvas, the Portuguese places. The three first on either side are in -the mountains, the others in the open country, which spreads from the -Guadiana to Portalegre, a central point, from whence roads lead to -all the above-named fortresses. - -From Badajos to the Morena, forms the second division of the country, -it is rugged and the chain of fortresses continued. On the Portuguese -side, Juramenha, Mourao and Moura; on the Spanish, Olivenza (formerly -Portuguese), Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Aroche. - -From the Morena to the sea, the lower Guadiana separates the -two kingdoms. The Spanish side, extremely rugged, contained the -fortresses of San Lucar de Guadiana, Lepe, and Ayamonte. The -Portuguese frontier, Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, and Castro Marin, -and, although the greater number of these places were dismantled, -the walls of all were standing, some in good repair, and those of -Portugal for the most part garrisoned by militia and ordenanza. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -When Mortier attempted Badajos, on the 12th of February, Romana was -near Truxillo, and the place was so ill provided, that a fortnight’s -blockade would have reduced it; but the French general, who had only -brought up eight thousand infantry and a brigade of cavalry, could -not invest it in face of the troops assembling in the vicinity, and -therefore retired to Zafra, leaving his horsemen near Olivenza. -In this position he remained until the 19th of February, when his -cavalry was surprised at Valverde, and the commander Beauregard -slain. Romana returned to Badajos the 20th and the 27th, and Mortier -then leaving some troops in Zafra, marched to Merida, to connect -himself with the second corps, which had arrived at Montijo, on the -Guadiana. - -It will be remembered that this corps, commanded by general Mermet, -occupied the valley of the Tagus in its whole length during the -invasion of Andalusia, and communicating with the sixth corps through -the pass of Baños, formed an intermediate reserve between Mortier and -Kellerman. The latter was at Bejar, and Miranda de Castanar, watching -the duke Del Parque, in the early part of January; but withdrew -to Salamanca, when the British army arrived in the valley of the -Mondego, and the duke Del Parque, leaving Martin Carrera with a weak -division in the Sierra de Gata, marched, with thirteen thousand men, -through the pass of Perales, crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete -on the 10th of February, and on the 12th, the day Mortier summoned -Badajos, was in position with his right at Albuquerque and his left -on the Guadiana. - -When Mermet, whose advanced guard was at Placentia, knew of this -movement, he first detached three thousand men across the Tagus, -by Seradillo, to observe Del Parque, and soon afterwards Soult’s -brother, with four thousand men from Talavera, crossed the bridge -of Arzobispo, and advancing by Caceres, surprised some Spanish -troops at Villa del Rey and reaching Montijo, pushed patrols close -to Badajos. The remainder of the second corps arrived at Caceres by -degrees; general Reynier then took the command, and, as I have said, -was joined by Mortier, who immediately commenced defensive works at -Merida, and prepared gabions and facines as if to besiege Badajos. - -These demonstrations attracted the notice of general Hill, who -advanced with ten thousand men from Abrantes to Portalegre, and -Romana, finding himself, by the junction of the duke Del Parque’s -army, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, resolved to act -against the communications of the French. - -His first division, commanded by Charles O’Donnel, brother to the -Catalan general, occupied Albuquerque. The second, under Mendizabel, -was posted near Castello de Vide. The third, consisting of five -thousand Asturians, was sent, under Ballasteros, to Olivenza, and the -fourth remained at Badajos. The fifth, under Contreras, was detached -to Monasterio, with orders to interrupt Mortier’s communication with -Seville. - -Contreras reached Xeres de los Cavalleros the 1st of March, but a -detachment from Zafra soon drove him thence, and Romana retired to -Campo Mayor with three divisions, leaving Ballasteros with the fourth -at Olivenza. On the other hand, Mortier, uneasy about Contreras’ -movements, repaired to Zafra, leaving the second corps at Merida, -and the 10th, Romana, advanced again towards Albuquerque; but having -pushed a detachment beyond the Salor river, it was surprised by -general Foy. The 14th O’Donnel endeavoured to surprise Foy, but the -latter, with very inferior numbers, fought his way through the Puerto -de Trasquillon, and the Spaniards took possession of Caceres. - -At this period the insurrections in Grenada, the movements of the -Murcian army, and the general excitement of Valencia, in consequence -of Suchet’s retreat, caused Joseph to recall Mortier for the defence -of Andalusia, and the latter, after holding a council of war with -Reynier, destroyed the works at Merida, the 19th of March, and -retired to Seville, leaving Gazan’s division at Monasterio. Reynier -having sent his stores to Truxillo drove the Spaniards out of Caceres -the 20th, and followed them to the Salor, but afterwards took post at -Torremacho, and O’Donnel returned to Caceres. - -There are two routes leading from Merida and Badajos to Seville: 1º. -The Royal Causeway, which passes the Morena by Zafra, Los Santos, -Monasterio, and Ronquillo. 2º. A shorter, but more difficult, road, -which, running westward of the causeway, passes the mountains by -Xeres de los Cavalleros, Fregenal, and Araceña. These parallel -routes, have no cross communications in the Morena, but on the -Estremaduran side, a road runs from Xeres de los Cavalleros to -Zafra, and on the Andalusian side, from Araceña to Ronquillo. When, -therefore, Mortier retired, Ballasteros marched from Olivenza to -Xeres de los Cavalleros, and being joined by Contreras, their united -corps, amounting to ten thousand men, gained the Royal Causeway by -Zafra, and, on the evening of the 29th of March, came up with Gazan, -and fought an undecided action; but the next day, the Spaniards -being repulsed, Ballasteros retired to Araceña and Contreras to the -high mountains above Ronquillo. From Araceña, Ballasteros marched to -Huerva, within a few leagues of Seville, but Gerard’s division drove -him back to Araceña, and defeated him there; yet again entering the -Condado de Neibla, he established himself at Zalamea de Real on the -Tinto river. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -Meanwhile, Romana detached a force to seize Merida, and cut the -communication of the fifth corps with Reynier, but that general, -marching with eight thousand men from Torremocha, passed through to -Medellin before the Spaniards arrived, and pushed troops, the 2d of -April, into the Morena, intending to take Contreras in rear, while -Gazan attacked him in front; and this would have happened, but that -O’Donnel, immediately threatened Merida, and so drew Reynier back. -Nevertheless, Contreras was attacked by Gazan, at Pedroche, and so -completely defeated, that he regained Zafra in the night of the -14th, with only two thousand men, and Ballasteros also, assailed by -a detachment from Seville, retired to Araceña. The 20th, Reynier -marched to Montijo, and O’Donnel retired from Caceres, but his rear -guard was defeated at La Rocca the 21st, and his division would -have been lost, if Mendizabel and Hill also had not come to his -aid, when Reynier declining a general action, retired to Merida. -The insurrection in the Alpuxaras was now quelled, the Valencians -remained inactive, Joseph re-entered Madrid, Soult assumed the -government of Andalusia, and Mortier returned to Estremadura. -While on the Spanish side, Contreras was displaced, and Imas, his -successor, advanced to Ronquillo, in Mortier’s rear; Ballasteros -remained at Aroche; Hill returned to Portalegre; and Romana encamped, -with fourteen thousand men, near Bajados, where a Spanish plot was -formed to assassinate him. It was discovered, but the villain who was -to have executed the atrocious deed escaped. - -Notwithstanding Romana’s presence, Reynier and the younger Soult, -passed the Guadiana below Badajos, with only four hundred cavalry, -and closely examined the works of that fortress, in despite of the -whole Spanish army; and at the same time, Mortier’s advanced guards -arrived on the Guadiana, and a reinforcement of four thousand men -joined the second corps from Toledo. But as the want of provisions -would not permit the French to remain concentrated, Mortier returned -to the Morena, to watch Imas. The 14th of May, a French detachment -again came close up to Badajos, then took the road to Olivenza, and -would have cut off Ballasteros, if Hill had not by a sudden march to -Elvas, arrested their movements. Meanwhile, Ballasteros again menaced -Seville, and was again driven back upon Aroche, with a loss of three -hundred men. - -To check these frequent incursions, the French threatened the -frontier of Portugal, by the Lower Guadiana; sometimes appearing -at Gibraleon, and Villa Blanca, sometimes towards Serpa, the -possession of which would have lamed Ballasteros’ movements, yet the -advantages were still chequered. A Portuguese flotilla intercepted, -at the mouth of the Guadiana, a convoy of provisions going to the -first corps; and O’Donnel having made an attempt during Reynier’s -absence, to surprise Truxillo, was repulsed, and regained Albuquerque -with great difficulty. It would be perplexing, to trace in detail -all the movements, on the line from Badajos to Ayamonte, yet two -circumstances there were, of historical importance. In the beginning -of July, when Lacy was in the Sierra de Ronda, Ballasteros near -Aroche, and Copons in the Condado Neibla, the French marched against -Lacy, leaving Seville garrisoned solely by Spaniards in Joseph’s -service; and while this example was furnished by the enemy, the -Portuguese and Spanish troops on the frontier, complaining, the one -of inhospitality, the other of robbery and violence, would, but for -the mediation of the British authorities, have come to blows, for the -mutual spirit of hatred extended to the governments on both sides. - -Hitherto, Hill had not meddled in the Spanish operations, save, -when Romana was hardly pressed, but the latter’s demands for aid -were continual, and most of his projects were ill judged, and -contrary to lord Wellington’s advice. On the 26th of June however, -Reynier passing the Guadiana, foraged all the country about Campo -Mayor, and then turned by Montijo to Merida; it was known that his -corps belonged to the army assembling in Castile for the invasion -of Portugal, and that he had collected mules and other means of -transport in Estremadura; and the spies asserted, that he was going -to cross the Tagus. Hill, therefore, gathered his divisions well -in hand, ready to move as Reynier moved, to cross the Tagus if he -crossed it, and by parallel operations to guard the frontier of -Beira. The march of the second corps was, however, postponed, and the -after operations belonging to greater combinations, will be treated -of in another place. - -Although, apparently complicated, the movements in Estremadura were -simple in principle. The valley of the Guadiana as far as Badajos, -is separated from the valley of the Tagus, by a range of heights, -connecting the Guadalupe mountains with those of Albuquerque, and the -country between those hills and the Tagus, contained fertile valleys, -and considerable towns; such as Valencia de Alcantara and Caceres. To -profit from their resources was an object to both parties. Reynier, -whose base was at Truxillo, could easily make incursions as far as -Caceres, but beyond that town, the Salor, presented a barrier, from -behind which, the Spaniards supported by the fort of Albuquerque, -could observe whether the incursion was made in force, and act -accordingly; hence O’Donnel’s frequent advances and retreats. - -Reynier could not operate seriously, unless in unison with the fifth -corps, and by the valley of the Guadiana; and, therefore, Merida, -on account of its stone bridge, was the key of his movements; but -Mortier’s base of operations, being in Andalusia, his front, was -spread, from Zafra to Merida, to cover his line of retreat, and to -draw provisions from about Llerena; but the road of Xeres de los -Cavalleros was open to the Spaniards, and the frequent advances -of Ballasteros and Contreras, were to harass Mortier’s line of -communication. The clue of affairs was this; Romana, holding Badajos, -and being supported by Hill, acted on both flanks of the French, -and the Portuguese frontier furnished a retreat from every part of -his lines of operation; but, as his projects were generally vague -and injudicious, lord Wellington forbad Hill to assist, except for -definite and approved objects. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] - -To put an end to the Spanish system, Mortier had only to unite the -two corps and give battle, or, if that was refused, to besiege -Badajos, which, from its influence, situation, and the advantage -of its stone bridge, was the key to the Alemtejo; and this he -ardently desired. Soult, however, would not permit him to undertake -any decisive operation while Andalusia was exposed to sudden -insurrections and descents from Cadiz, and to say that either marshal -was wrong would be rash, because two great interests clashed. Mortier -and Reynier united, could have furnished twenty thousand infantry, -fifty guns, and more than three thousand cavalry, all excellent -troops. Romana having garrisoned Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque, -could not bring more than fifteen thousand men into line, and must -have joined Hill. But with a mixed force and divided command, the -latter could not have ventured a battle in the plain country beyond -Portalegre. A defeat would have opened Lisbon to the victor, and -lord Wellington must then have detached largely from the north, the -king and Soult could have reinforced Mortier, and the ultimate -consequences are not to be assumed. - -On the other hand, Soult, judging, that ere further conquests were -attempted, the great province of Andalusia, should be rendered a -strong hold and independent of extraneous events, bent all his -attention to that object. An exact and economical arrangement, -provided for the current consumption of his troops; vast reserve -magazines were filled without overwhelming the people; and the -native municipal authorities, recognized and supported in matters of -police and supply, acted zealously, yet without any imputation upon -their patriotism; for those who see and feel the miseries, flowing -from disorderly and wasting armies, may honestly assist a general -labouring to preserve regularity. Yet all this could not be the work -of a day, and meanwhile the marshals under Soult’s orders, being -employed only in a military capacity, desired the entire control -of their own corps, and to be engaged in great field operations, -because, thus only could they be distinguished; whereas the duke -of Dalmatia while contributing to the final subjugation of Spain, -by concentrating the elements of permanent strength in Andalusia, -was also well assured, that, in fixing a solid foundation for -future military operations, he should obtain reputation as an able -administrator and pacificator of a conquered country. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -His views, however, clashed, not more with those of the generals, -than with the wishes of the king, whose poverty, forced him to grasp -at all the revenues of Andalusia, and who having led the army, in -person across the Morena, claimed both as monarch and conqueror. -But he who wields the sword will always be first served. Soult, -guided by the secret orders of Napoleon, resisted the king’s -demands, and thus excited the monarch’s hatred to an incredible -degree; nevertheless, the duke of Dalmatia, never lost the emperor’s -confidence, and his province, reference being had to the nature of -the war, was admirably well governed. The people were gradually -tranquillized; the military resources of the country drawn forth, and -considerable bodies of native troops raised, and even successfully -employed, to repress the efforts of the Partisan chiefs. The arsenal -of construction at Seville was put into full activity; the mines of -lead at Linares were worked; the copper of the river Tinto gathered -for the supply of the founderies, and every provision for the use of -a large army collected; privateers also were fitted out, a commerce -was commenced with neutral nations in the ports of Grenada, and -finally, a secret, but considerable, traffic carried on with Lisbon -itself, demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult. Andalusia -soon became the most powerful establishment of the French in Spain. - -Both marshals appear to have entertained sound views, and the -advantages of either plan being considered, leads to the reflection -that they might have been reconciled. A reinforcement of twenty-five -thousand men in Estremadura, during the months of June and July, -would have left scarcely a shadow of defence for Portugal; and -it would seem that Napoleon had an eye to this, as we find him -directing Suchet, in July, to co-operate with fifteen thousand men -in the invasion, whenever Tortoza should fall. The application of -this reasoning will, however, be better understood as the narrative -advances; and whether Napoleon’s recent marriage with the Austrian -princess drew him away from business, or that, absorbed by the -other many and great interests of his empire, he neglected Spanish -affairs, or whether deceived by exaggerated accounts of successes, -he thought the necessity for more troops less than it really was, I -have not been able to ascertain. Neither can I find any good reason, -why the king, whose army was increased to twenty thousand men before -the end of June, made no movement to favour the attack on Portugal. -It is, however, scarcely necessary to seek any other cause, than -the inevitable errors, that mar all great military combinations not -directed by a single hand. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -The operations, south of the Tagus, having been described, those -which occurred, north of that river, shall now be traced; for -previous to the invasion of Portugal, the French, stretching in -one great line across the Peninsula, from Cadiz to Gihon, eagerly -discussed the remnants of the Spanish armies. - -It will be remembered, that the duke Del Parque left Martin Carrera -in the Gata mountains, to interrupt the communication, between the -Salamanca country and the valley of the Tagus. Julian Sanchez also, -issuing from time to time out of Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the French -foragers in the open country between the Agueda and the Douro; and -beyond the Douro, the Gallician army, under Garcia (in number about -ten thousand), occupied Puebla de Senabria, Puente Ferrada, Villa -Franca, and Astorga, and menaced the right flank, and rear, of the -sixth corps. Mahy was organising a second army at Lugo, and in the -Asturias, the captain-general D’Arco, commanded seven thousand men, -three thousand of which were posted at Cornellana, under general -Ponte. Thus an irregular line of defence, six hundred miles long, -was offered to the invaders, but without depth or substance, save at -Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, behind which the British and Portuguese -troops were lying. - -On the other hand, the French, holding the interior line, kept -their masses only on the principal routes, communicating by moveable -columns, and thus menacing all the important points without -scattering their forces. The influx of fresh troops from France, -continually added to their solidity, especially in Old Castile, where -Ney had resumed the command, and was supported by Kellerman with the -force of his government, and by an eighth corps under the duke of -Abrantes. - -The invasion of Andalusia was the signal for a general movement -of all the French in Spain; and while Victor and Mortier, menaced -Cadiz and Badajos, Ney summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and Bonet, entering -the Asturias, threatened Gallicia by the Concija d’Ibas. At the -same time, Loison, with eight thousand fresh men, occupied Leon and -Medina del Campo, and the advanced guard of the eighth corps passed -Valladolid. Loison gave out that he would invade Gallicia by Puebla -de Senabria, and on the 15th of February, his cavalry cut to pieces -five hundred Spanish troops at Alcanizas, but he finally marched -against Astorga, and, at the same time, Bonet destroyed Ponte’s force -at Potes de Sierra, and advanced to Nava de Suarna. These movements -alarmed the Spaniards. Garcia, menaced at once by Bonet and by -Loison, and fearing equally for Astorga and Lugo, threw two-thirds of -his army into the former, and carried the remainder to Villa Franca, -to support Mahi. - -Ney, however, made only a feint of escalading Ciudad Rodrigo, and -Loison, although supported by the men from Leon, who advanced to -Puente Orbijo, was repulsed from Astorga. Junot then concentrated the -eighth corps at Benevente, intending to besiege Astorga in form; but -he was suddenly called towards Madrid, lest disorders should arise -in the capital during the king’s absence, and Mahi and Garcia being -apprised of this, immediately brought up the new levies to the edge -of the mountains, thinking that they might relieve the Asturians -by threatening an irruption into the plains of Leon. But as Loison -still remained at Benevente, they were unable to effect their object, -and, after drawing off five thousand men from Astorga, retired to -Villa Franca. Bonet, however, did not pass Nava de Suarna, and when -general Arco had rallied the Asturian fugitives at Louarca, Garcia, -leaving Mahi to command in Gallicia, marched himself with the remnant -of the old army of the left, to join Romana at Badajos. Meanwhile -Kellerman advanced to Alba de Tormes, and detachments from his and -Ney’s force chased Carrera from the Gata and Bejar mountains, driving -him sometimes over the Alagon, sometimes into Portugal. But it is -unnecessary to trace all these movements, for the French, while -preparing for greater operations, were continually spreading false -reports, and making demonstrations in various directions to mislead -the allies, and to cover their own projects. - -Those projects were at first obscure. It is certain that the invasion -of Portugal by the northern line, was not finally arranged, until -a later period, yet it seems probable that, while Bonet drew the -attention of the Gallician army towards Lugo, the duke of Abrantes -designed to penetrate by Puebla Senabria, not as Loison announced, -for the invasion of Gallicia, but to turn the Tras os Montes and -descend by the route of Chaves upon Oporto, while Ney, calling the -second corps to the aid of the sixth, should invest Ciudad Rodrigo. -But whatever designs might have been contemplated, they were -frustrated partly by the insurrection in Grenada and the failure of -Suchet against Valencia, partly by disunion amongst the generals, for -here also Ney and Junot complained reciprocally, and every where it -was plainly seen that the French corps d’armée, however formidable in -themselves, would not, in the absence of Napoleon, act cordially in a -general system. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -When the commotions in the south subsided, Junot returned to Old -Castile, Loison joined the sixth corps on the Tormes, Kellerman -retired to Valladolid, detachments, placed on the Douro, maintained -the communications between Ney and Junot, and the latter, having -drawn a reinforcement from Bonet, invested Astorga with ten thousand -infantry, two thousand cavalry, eighteen field-guns, six twenty-four -pounders, and two mortars. His covering-divisions were placed, one at -Benevente, to watch the road of Mombuey, one near Puebla de Senabria, -and one at Puente Ferrada. Mahi immediately concentrated the -Gallician army at Villa Franca and Fonceabadon, and detached fifteen -hundred men, under Echevarria, to Mombuey and Puebla, to harass the -flank and rear of the investing army; yet his force was weak. The -Gallician authorities had frequently assured lord Wellington that -it amounted to twenty thousand well-organized troops; but it now -appeared that only eight thousand were in the field, and those ill -provided, and prone to desertion. - - -SIEGE OF ASTORGA. - -Santocildes, governor of this place, was an officer of courage; his -garrison consisted of two thousand five hundred infantry, besides -cannoneers and armed peasantry, and the Moorish ramparts had been -strengthened by fresh works; but there was little ammunition, -scarcely twenty days’ rations, and nothing outside the walls, capable -of seriously disturbing the enemy. The town stood in an open plain, -and had three suburbs: Puerto de Hierro, to the north; St. Andreas, -to the east; and Retebia, to the west. On the two last Junot made -false attacks, but conducted his real approaches, against the front, -between Puerto de Hierro and Retebia. The place was invested the 22d -of March; and Puerto de Hierro was carried by storm, two sallies -repulsed, and the trenches opened, before the end of the month. -A breach was then commenced, but the battering-guns soon became -unserviceable, and the line of approach was flanked by the houses -of Retebia, which were filled with Spanish infantry. Nevertheless, -the town suffered from shells, and the wall was so much broken, on -the 20th of April, that an assault was ordered. A previous attack on -Retebia had failed; but Santocildes was distressed for ammunition, -and, during the preparations for storming, offered to capitulate. - -Junot refused the terms demanded, and, at five o’clock in the evening -of the 21st, some picked troops ran up to the breach; but it was -well retrenched and stockaded, and defended with great obstinacy, -and the flank fire from Retebia stopped the supporting columns. The -storming-party, thus abandoned to its own exertions, was held at bay -on the summit of the breach; and being plied on both flanks, and in -front, with shot from the houses of the town, and in rear by the -musketry from Retebia, would have been totally destroyed, but for -the scarcity of ammunition, which paralized the Spanish defence. -Three hundred French fell on the breach itself, but the remainder -finally effected a lodgement in the ruins, and, during the night, -a second attack on Retebia proving successful, a communication -was opened from the parallels to the lodgement, and strong -working-parties were sent forward, who cut through the stockade into -the town, when the governor surrendered. - -Mahi, who had advanced to the edge of the mountains, as if he would -have succoured the place, hearing of this event, retired to Bembibre, -where his rear was overtaken and defeated by general Clausel on the -24th. He then fell back to Lugo, and recalled his detachment from -Mombuey; but the French from Benevente were already in that quarter, -and, on the 25th, totally defeated Echevaria at Castro Contrijo. -Meanwhile, Junot placed garrisons in Astorga and Leon, and restored -Bonet his division. That general, who had retired to Santander during -the siege, then re-occupied Oviedo and Gihon, defeated the Asturians, -and once more menaced Gallicia by the road of Concija, and by that -of Sales; several slight actions ensued; but the French did not -penetrate farther, and the Junta of Gallicia reinforced the Asturians -with three thousand men. - -During the siege of Astorga, the sixth corps was concentrated at -Salamanca, a strong detachment of Kellerman’s troops siezed the pass -of Baños, and Martin Carrera, quitting the hills, joined the English -light division near Almeida. In fine, the great operations were -commencing, and the line of communication with France, was encumbered -with the advancing reinforcements. A large battering-train, -collected from Segovia, Burgos, and Pampeluna, arrived at Salamanca; -general Martineau, with ten thousand men for the eighth corps, -reached Valladolid; general Drouet passed the Pyrennees with a ninth -corps, composed of the fourth battalions of regiments already in -Spain; and these were followed by seventeen thousand of the imperial -guards, whose presence gave force to the rumour, that the emperor -himself was coming to take the chief command. - -Fortunately for the allies, this report, although rife amongst all -parties, and credited both by Joseph’s ministers, and the French -ambassador at Madrid, proved groundless; and a leader for the -projected operations was still to be named. I have been informed -that marshal Ney resumed the command of the sixth corps, under the -impression that he was to conduct the enterprise against Portugal, -that the intrigues of marshal Berthier, to whom he was obnoxious, -frustrated his hopes, and that Napoleon, fatigued with the disputes -of his lieutenants, had resolved to repair in person to the -Peninsula: that his marriage, and some important political affairs, -diverted him from that object, and that Massena, prince of Esling, -was finally chosen, partly for his great name in arms, and partly -that he was of higher rank than the other marshals, and a stranger -to all the jealousies and disputes in the Peninsula. His arrival was -known in May amongst the allies, and lord Wellington had no longer to -dread the formidable presence of the French emperor. - -That Massena’s base of operations might not be exposed to the -interference of any other authority in Spain, the four military -governments, of Salamanca, Valladolid, Asturias, and St. Andero were -placed under his temporary authority, which thus became absolute in -the northern provinces. But previous to taking the command of the -troops, he repaired to Madrid, to confer with the king; and it would -seem that some hesitation as to the line of invasion still prevailed -in the French councils, because, in the imperial muster-rolls, the -head-quarters of the army of Portugal are marked as being at Caceres -in Estremadura, and the imperial guards are returned as part of that -army, yet during the month of April only; a circumstance strongly -indicating Napoleon’s intention to assume the command himself. The -northern line was, however, definitively adopted; and, while the -prince of Esling was still in the capital, the eighth corps passed -the Tormes, and Ney commenced the - - -FIRST SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -This fortress had been commanded, in the beginning of the year, by -a person whose conduct had been so suspicious, that lord Wellington -demanded his removal. But don Andreas Herrasti, the actual governor, -was a veteran of fifty years’ service, whose silver hairs, dignified -countenance, and courteous manners excited respect; and whose -courage, talents, and honour were worthy of his venerable appearance. -His garrison amounted to six thousand fighting men, besides the -citizens; and the place, built on a height overhanging the northern -bank of the Agueda river, was amply supplied with artillery and -stores of all kinds. The works were, however, weak, consisting of -an old rampart, nearly circular, about thirty feet in height, and -without other flanks than a few projections containing some light -guns: a second wall, about twelve feet high, called a “_fausse -braie_,” with a ditch and covered way, surrounded the first; but was -placed so low on the hill, as scarcely to offer any cover to the -upper rampart. There were no bomb-proofs, even for the magazine, -and Herrasti was forced to place his powder in the church, which he -secured as he might. - -Beyond the walls, and totally severed from the town, the suburb of -Francisco, defended by an earthern entrenchment, and strengthened by -two large convents, formed an outwork to the north-east of the place. -The convent of Santa Cruz served a like purpose on the north-west; -and between these posts there was a ridge called the Little Teson, -which, somewhat inferior in height to the town, was only a hundred -and fifty yards from the body of the place. There was also a Greater -Teson, which, rising behind the lesser at the distance of six hundred -yards from the walls, overlooked the ramparts, and saw into the -bottom of the ditch. - -The country immediately about Ciudad Rodrigo, although wooded, was -easy for troops; especially on the left bank of the Agueda, to which -the garrison had access by a stone bridge within pistol-shot of the -castle-gate. But the Agueda itself, rising in the Sierra de Francia, -and running into the Douro, is subject to great and sudden floods; -and six or seven miles below the town, near San Felices, the channel -deepens into one continued and frightful chasm, many hundred feet -deep, and overhung with huge desolate rocks. - -During February and March, the French departed as lightly as they -had advanced against Ciudad Rodrigo; but, on the 25th of April, a -camp was pitched upon a lofty ridge five miles eastward of the city; -and, in a few days, a second, and then a third, arose: and these -portentous clouds continued to gather on the hills until June, when -fifty thousand fighting men came down into the plain, and throwing -two bridges over the Agueda, begirt the fortress. - -This multitude, composed of the sixth and eighth corps, and a reserve -of cavalry, was led by Ney, Junot, and Montbrun. The sixth corps -invested the place; the eighth occupied San Felices Grande, and -other points, and the cavalry swarmed on both sides of the river; -but the battering train and a great escort was still two days’ march -in the rear; for the rains inundating the flat country between the -Agueda and the Tormes, rendered the roads impassable. The bridges -were established on the 2d and 7th of June; the one above, the other -below the town; and on the 13th, ground was broken on the Greater -Teson. The 22d, the artillery arrived, and preparations were made to -contract the circle of investment on the left bank of the Agueda, -which had hitherto been but slightly watched. But that night, Julian -Sanchez, with two hundred horsemen, passed silently out of the -castle-gate, and, crossing the river, fell upon the nearest French -posts, pierced their line in a moment, and reached the English light -division, then behind the Azava, six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. This -event, induced Ney, to reinforce his troops on the left bank, and -a movement, to be hereafter noticed, was directed against general -Crawfurd the 25th, on which day, also, the French batteries opened. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted French Correspondence. MSS.] - -Ney’s plan, was to breach the body of the place without attending to -the Spanish fire. Salvos, from forty-six guns, constantly directed -on one point, soon broke the old masonry of the ramparts; but the -besieged, who could bring twenty-four guns to bear on the Teson, -shot so well that three magazines blew up at once in the trenches, -and killed above a hundred of the assailants. On the 27th, the -prince of Esling arrived in the camp, and summoned the governor to -surrender. Herrasti answered in the manner to be expected from so -good a soldier; and the fire was resumed until the 1st of July, when -Massena, sensible that the mode of attack was faulty, directed the -engineers to raise counter-batteries, to push their parallels to the -Lesser Teson, work regularly forward, blow in the counterscarp, and -pass the ditch in form. Meanwhile, to facilitate the progress of the -new works, the convent of Santa Cruz, on the right flank, was carried -after a fierce resistance; and, on the left, the suburb was attacked, -taken, and retaken by a sally, in which great loss was inflicted -on the French. Howbeit, the latter remained masters of every thing -beyond the walls. - -During the cessation of fire, consequent upon the change in the -French dispositions, Herrasti removed the ruins from the foot of the -breach, and strengthened his flank defences: but, on the 9th of July, -the besieger’s batteries, being established on the Lesser Teson, -re-opened with a terrible effect. In twenty-four hours, the fire of -the Spanish guns was nearly silenced, part of the town was in flames, -a reserve magazine exploded on the walls, the counterscarp was blown -in by a mine, on an extent of thirty-six feet, the ditch filled by -the ruins, and a broad way made into the place. At this moment, -three French soldiers, of heroic courage, suddenly running out of -the ranks, mounted the breach, looked into the town, and having -thus, in broad daylight, proved the state of affairs, discharged -their muskets, and, with matchless fortune, retired unhurt to their -comrades. - -The columns of assault immediately assembled. The troops, animated -by the presence of Ney, and excited by the example of the three -men who had so gallantly proved the breach, were impatient for the -signal. A few moments would have sent them raging into the midst of -the city, when the white flag waved on the rampart, and the venerable -governor was seen standing alone on the ruins, and signifying, by his -gestures, that he desired to capitulate. He had stricken manfully, -while reason warranted hope, and it was no dishonour to his silver -hairs, that he surrendered when resistance could only lead to -massacre and devastation. - -Six months had now elapsed, since the French resuming the plan of -conquest interrupted by the Austrian war and by the operations of -sir Arthur Wellesley, had retaken the offensive. Battle after battle -they had gained, fortress after fortress they had taken, and sent the -Spanish forces, broken and scattered, to seek for refuge in the most -obscure parts: solid resistance there was none; and the only hope of -deliverance for the Peninsula rested upon the British general. How -he realized that hope shall be related in the next book. Meanwhile, -the reader should bear in mind that the multifarious actions related -in the foregoing chapters, were contemporaneous; and that he has been -led, as it were, round the margin of a lake, whose turbulent waters -spread on every side. Tedious to read, and trifling many of the -circumstances must appear, yet, as a whole, they form what has been -called the Spanish military policy: and, without accurate notions on -that head, it would be impossible to appreciate the capacity of the -man who, like Milton’s phantom, paved a broad way through the chaotic -warfare. - -I have been charged with incompetence to understand, and, most -unjustly, with a desire to underrate the Spanish resistance; but it -is the province of history to record, foolish as well as glorious -deeds, that posterity may profit from all: and neither will I -mislead those who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputation of -my country’s arms to shallow declamation upon the unconquerable -spirit of independence. To expose the errors is not to undervalue -the fortitude of a noble people; for in their constancy, in the -unexampled patience, with which they bore the ills inflicted alike by -a ruthless enemy, and by their own sordid governments, the Spaniards -were truly noble: but shall I say that they were victorious in their -battles, or faithful in their compacts; that they treated their -prisoners with humanity; that their Juntas were honest or wise; their -generals skilful; their soldiers firm? I speak but the bare truth, -when I assert, that they were incapable of defending their own cause! -Every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years -that the war lasted, rise up in support of this fact; and to assume -that an insurrection so conducted did, or could possibly baffle -the prodigious power of Napoleon is an illusion. Spain baffle him! -Her efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his failure. -Portugal has far greater claims to that glory. Spain furnished the -opportunity; but it was England, Austria, Russia, or rather fortune, -that struck down that wonderful man. The English, more powerful, more -rich, more profuse, perhaps more brave than the ancient Romans; the -English, with a fleet, for grandeur and real force, never matched, -with a general equal to any emergency, fought as if for their own -existence. The Austrians brought four hundred thousand good troops to -arrest the conqueror’s progress, the snows of Russia destroyed three -hundred thousand of his best soldiers; and finally, when he had lost -half a million of veterans, not one of whom died on Spanish ground, -Europe, in one vast combination, could only tear the Peninsula from -him, by tearing France along with it. What weakness, then, what -incredible delusion to point to Spain, with all her follies, and -her never-ending defeats, as a proof that a people fighting for -independence must be victorious. She was invaded, because she adhered -to the great European aristocracy; she was delivered, because England -enabled that aristocracy to triumph for a moment, over the principles -of the French revolution. - - - - -BOOK XI. - - -CHAPTER I. - - -The defence of Portugal, was not the result of any fortuitous -combination of circumstances, nor was lord Wellington moved thereto, -by any hasty ambition to magnify his own reputation, but calmly and -deliberately, formed his resolution, after a laborious and cautious -estimate of the difficulties and chances of success. Reverting then -to the period, when, by retreating upon Badajos, he divorced his -operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly trace his -military and political proceedings up to the moment, when, confident -in the soundness of his calculations, he commenced his project, -unmoved by the power of his enemy, the timidity of his friends, the -imprudence of his subordinates, or the intrigues of discontented men, -who secretly, and with malignant perseverance, laboured to thwart his -measures and to ruin his designs. - -[Sidenote: Lord Castlereagh’s Statement] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Canning’s Statement] - -After the retreat from Spain in 1809, he repaired to Seville, partly -to negotiate with the Central Junta, upon matters touching the war, -but principally to confer with his brother, ere the latter quitted -the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley’s departure was caused by the state of -politics in England, where a change in the administration was about -to take place,--a change, sudden indeed, but not unexpected; because -the ineptitude of the government, was, in private, acknowledged by -many of its members, and the failure of the Walcheren expedition, -was only the signal, for a public avowal of jealousies and wretched -personal intrigues, which had rendered the Cabinet of St. James’s -the most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any in Europe. Mr. Canning, -the principal mover of those intrigues, had secretly, denounced lord -Castlereagh to his colleagues, as a man incapable of conducting the -public affairs, and exacted from them a promise to dismiss him. -Nevertheless, he permitted that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation -on his abilities, to plan, and conduct the fitting out, of the most -powerful armament that ever quitted England. But when it became -evident that only loss and ruin waited on this unhappy expedition, -Mr. Canning claimed the fulfilment of the promise, and the intrigue -thus becoming known to lord Castlereagh, was by him characterised -as “_a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and -private_.” This was followed by a duel; and by the dissolution of the -administration. Mr. Perceval and lord Liverpool were then empowered -to form another Cabinet; and after a fruitless negotiation with lord -Grey, and lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves, and offered -the department of foreign affairs to lord Wellesley. - -Contrary to the general expectation, he accepted it. His brother had -opened to him those great views for the defence of Portugal, which -were afterwards so gloriously realized, but which could never have -been undertaken with confidence by the general, unless secure of -some powerful friend in the administration, embued with the same -sentiments, bound by a common interest, and resolute, to support -him when the crisis of danger arrived. It was therefore wise, and -commendable, in lord Wellesley, to sacrifice something of his own -personal pretensions, to be enabled to forward projects, promising -so much glory to the country and his own family, and the first -proceedings in parliament justified his policy. - -[Sidenote: See Parliamentary Debates.] - -Previous to the change in the Cabinet, sir Arthur Wellesley had been -created baron Douro, and viscount Wellington; but those honours, -although well deserved, were undoubtedly conferred as much from party -as from patriotic feeling, and greatly excited the anger of the -opposition members, who with few exceptions, assailed the general, -personally, and with an acrimony not to be justified. His merits, -they said, were nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, rash; -his campaign one deserving not reward, but punishment. Yet he had -delivered Portugal, cleared Gallicia and Estremadura, and obliged -one hundred thousand French veterans to abandon the offensive and -concentrate about Madrid! - -Lord Grey opposing his own crude military notions, to the practised -skill of sir Arthur, petulantly censured the latter’s dispositions at -Talavera; others denied that he was successful in that action; and -some, forgetting that they were amenable to history, even proposed to -leave his name out of the vote of thanks to the army! That battle, so -sternly fought, so hardly won, they would have set aside with respect -to the commander, as not warranting admission to a peerage always -open to venal orators; and the passage of the Douro, so promptly, -so daringly, so skilfully, so successfully executed, that it seemed -rather the result of inspiration than of natural judgement, they -would have cast away as a thing of no worth! - -This spirit of faction was, however, not confined to one side: -there was a ministerial person, at this time, who in his dread -of the opposition, wrote to lord Wellington complaining of his -inaction, and calling upon him to do something that would excite a -public sensation: _any thing provided blood was spilt_. A calm but -severe rebuke, and the cessation of all friendly intercourse with -the writer, discovered the general’s abhorrence of this detestable -policy; but when such passions were abroad, it is evident that lord -Wellesley’s accession to the government, was essential to the success -of lord Wellington’s projects. - -Those projects delivered the Peninsula and changed the fate of -Europe; and every step made towards their accomplishment merits -attention, as much from the intrinsic interest of the subject, as -that it has been common to attribute his success to good fortune and -to the strenuous support he received from the Cabinet at home. Now -it is far from my intention to deny the great influence of fortune -in war, or that the duke of Wellington has always been one of her -peculiar favourites; but I will make it clearly appear, that if he -met with great success, he had previously anticipated it, and upon -solid grounds, that the Cabinet did not so much support him as it -was supported by him; and finally, that his prudence, foresight, and -firmness were at least as efficient causes as any others that can be -adduced. - -Immediately after the retreat from Jaraceijo, and while the -ministers were yet unchanged, lord Castlereagh, brought, by continual -reverses, to a more sober method of planning military affairs, had -demanded lord Wellington’s opinion upon the expediency, the chance of -success, and the expense of defending Portugal. This letter reached -the general on the 14th of September, 1809; but the subject required -many previous inquiries and a careful examination of the country; -and, at that period, any plan for the defence of Portugal, was -necessarily to be modified, according to the energy or feebleness of -the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not until after his return -from Seville, a few days previous to the defeat at Ocaña, that lord -Wellington replied to lord Liverpool, who, during the interval, had -succeeded lord Castlereagh in the war department. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. Badajos, 14th Nov. -1809. MSS.] - -Adverting to the actual state of the French troops in the Peninsula, -he observed, that, unless the Spanish armies met with some great -disaster, the former _could not then make an attack upon Portugal_; -yet, if events should enable them to do so, that the forces at that -moment in the latter might defend it. “But the peace in Germany,” he -said, “might enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain largely, -when the means of invading Portugal would be increased, not only -in proportion to the additional troops then poured in, but also in -proportion to the effect which such a display of additional strength -would necessarily have upon the spirit of the Spaniards. Even in -that case, _until Spain should have been conquered and rendered -submissive_, the French would find it difficult, if not impossible, -to obtain possession of Portugal, _provided England employed her -armies in defence of that country, and that the Portuguese military -service was organised to the full extent of which it was capable._ -But the number of British forces employed should not be less than -thirty thousand effective men. Although the Portuguese regular force, -actually enrolled, consisted of thirty-nine thousand infantry, three -thousand artillery, and three thousand cavalry; and the militia -amounted to forty-five thousand, exclusive of the ordenanças.” - -The next point of consideration was the probable expense. “The actual -yearly cost of the British army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of -transport-vessels, was about £1,800,000, being only half a million -sterling more than they would cost if employed in England. Hence -the most important consideration was the expense of renovating, and -supporting the Portuguese military, and civil services. The British -government, had already subsidised the Portuguese Regency, at the -rate of six hundred thousand pounds yearly, being the expense of -twenty thousand men, which the latter were bound by treaty to place -at the service of the English commander-in-chief. - -“But this was far from sufficient to render the Portuguese army -efficient for the impending contest. The revenue of Portugal was -between eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses between -fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a deficiency of more than six -millions of dollars. Hence, for that year, the most pressing only of -the civil and military demands had been paid, and the public debt -and the salaries of the public servants were in arrear. The advances -already made by Great Britain amounted to two millions of dollars; -there remained a deficiency of four millions of dollars, which, after -a careful inquiry, it appeared could not be made good by Portugal; -and it was obvious that the administration would, when distressed, -gradually appropriate the subsidy to support the civil authorities to -the detriment of the military service. Nay, already money from the -English military chest had been advanced to prevent the Portuguese -army from disbanding from want of food. - -“It was impossible to diminish the expenses of the Regency, and -yet the French invasion and the emigration to the Brazils had so -impoverished the country that it was impossible to raise the revenue -or to obtain money by loans. The people were unable to pay the taxes -already imposed, and the customs, which formed the principal branch -of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to nothing by the transfer of -the Brazilian trade from the mother-country to Great Britain. This -transfer, so profitable to the latter, was ruinous to Portugal, and, -therefore, justice as well as policy required that England should -afford pecuniary assistance to the Regency. - -“Without it, nothing could be expected from the Portuguese army. The -officers of that army had, for many years, done no duty, partly that -their country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace -nearly half a century, they had continued in the same garrisons, and -lived with their families; and, to these advantages, added others -arising from abuses in the service. Now the severe but necessary -discipline introduced by marshal Beresford, had placed the Portuguese -officers in a miserable situation. All abuses had been extirpated, -additional expenses had been inflicted, and the regular pay was -not only insufficient to support them in a country where all the -necessaries of life were enormously dear, but it was far below the -pay of the English, Spanish, and French officers, with whom, or -against whom, they were to fight. - -“If, therefore, the war was to be carried on, it was advisable to -grant a subsidy of one hundred and thirty thousand pounds yearly, to -enable the Regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese officers; -and to this sum, for the reasons before-mentioned, should be added -a further subsidy of about three hundred thousand pounds, to supply -the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. Or, if the English -cabinet preferred it, they might take ten thousand more Portuguese -troops into pay, which could be done at an expense of two hundred -and fifty thousand pounds. With such assistance, the difficulties of -the moment might be overcome; but, without it, he lord Wellington, -felt assured, that the whole financial and military system of the -Portuguese would break down at once; all the expense, hitherto -incurred, would be cast away, and all hopes of defending the country -extinguished. It was for the ministers to decide. - -“There remained two other points to consider--the re-embarkation of -the British army, in the event of failure, and the chances of the -Portuguese nation continuing the contest alone. As to the first, he -could carry off everything safely, except the horses of the cavalry -and artillery, those could not be carried off, if the embarkation -took place after a lost battle; and, if under other circumstances, -the expense of horse-transports would be more than the worth of the -animals. As to the second point, if the British army evacuated -Portugal, under any circumstances, he could not give hopes that the -contest could be prolonged effectually by the natives. Although -I,” he said, “_consider the Portuguese government and army as the -principals in the contest for their own independence, and that -their success or failure must depend principally upon their own -exertions and the bravery of their army, and that I am sanguine in -my expectations of both, when excited by the example of British -officers and troops, I have no hope of either, if his Majesty should -now withdraw the army from the Peninsula, or if it should be obliged -to evacuate it by defeat. There is no doubt that the immediate -consequences will be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably -without a contest; and other consequences will follow, affecting the -state of the war, not only in Portugal but Spain._ If, therefore, it -should be thought advisable now to withdraw, or if, eventually the -British army should be obliged to withdraw from Portugal, I would -recommend a consideration of the means of carrying away such of the -Portuguese military as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than -continue, by their means, the contest in this country.” - -Peniché and Setuval offered secure points of embarkation in the event -of failure, but neither were likely to come within the scope of the -operations, and lord Wellington’s opinion as to the facility of -carrying off the army from Lisbon was founded chiefly upon admiral -Berkeley’s assurances that the embarkation would not take longer -than four hours, during which time, even though the left bank of -that river should be occupied by the enemy, the ships of war could -sustain the fire and at the same time sweep with their own guns all -the ground above Passo d’Arcos, which, from the circumstance of -its having no surf, was thought preferable to St. Julian’s for an -embarkation. But the admiral’s views, as I shall have occasion to -observe hereafter, were erroneous; the fleet could not remain in the -Tagus, if the enemy were in possession of the left bank. - -Although alarmed at the number of men demanded, a number which, -from the recent loss sustained on the Walcheren expedition, they -truly observed, would, in case of disaster, endanger the safety of -England, the ministers assented to lord Wellington’s proposals, -undertook to pay ten thousand additional Portuguese troops, and to -advance money for the increased stipends to the officers; but thus -pledging themselves to an annual subsidy of nearly one million, they -with justice required that the Portuguese Regency, under pain of the -subsidy being stopped, should keep all that part of the military -establishment which remained under their own direction in a state of -complete efficiency. - -Thus supported, lord Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelligence -to meet the impending contest. His troops removed from the Guadiana, -took healthy cantonments on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal, -and he expected a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and a -regiment of cavalry from England. Smaller detachments had already -reached him, and the army when it commenced its march from the -Guadiana was numerically thirty thousand strong; but those actually -under arms scarcely amounted to twenty thousand; nine thousand were -in hospital, and many in the ranks were still tottering from the -effects of past illness. - -The 20th of January, the head-quarters, and the artillery parcs, were -established at Viseu, in Upper Beira. The cavalry, was quartered, -by single regiments, at Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, Celerico, -and Santarem. General Hill, was left with five thousand British, and -a like number of Portuguese at Abrantes, and the remainder of the -infantry (one regiment, forming the garrison of Lisbon, excepted) was -distributed along the valley of the Mondego. - -The plans of the English general, were--at first, grounded, upon -the supposition, that the French would follow the right or northern -line, in preference to the centre or southern line of operations, -against the Peninsula, that is, _attack Portugal from the side of -Old Castile_, rather than _Andalusia from the side of La Mancha_. In -this he was mistaken. The movements were again directed by Napoleon, -his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia alone, but every -part of the Peninsula, was destined to feel the weight of his arms. -Fresh troops, flushed with their recent German victories, were -crowding into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and left, -scouring the main communications, and following the footsteps of -the old bands, as the latter were impelled forward in the career of -invasion. Hence, the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected -the defence of Portugal, that, on the 31st of January, at the moment -Seville was opening her gates, lord Wellington demanded fresh -instructions, reiterating the question, whether _Portugal should be -defended at all_, but at the same time transmitting, one of those -clear and powerful statements, which he invariably drew up for the -ministers’ information previous to undertaking any great enterprise; -statements, in which, showing the bearings of past and present -events, and drawing conclusions as to the future with a wonderful -accuracy, he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly has -attributed to fortune, and the favour of the cabinet, successes, -which were the result of his own sagacity and unalterable firmness. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, 31st Jan. 1810. MSS.] - -“The enemy,” he said, “aimed at conquering the south; he would no -doubt obtain Seville with all its resources, and the defeat and -dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any -action, in which either their imprudence or necessity, or even -expediency, might engage them. The armies might, however be lost and -the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partisans would continue; -Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the Central Junta even exist -within its walls; but it would be without authority, because the -French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs, left -Portugal untouched; but it was chiefly to that country he wished to -draw the ministers’ attention. - -“They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms -could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of ninety thousand -men, regularly organized, could be calculated upon, exclusive of the -armed population and of the British army. Much had been done within -the last nine months, for the enrollment, organization, and equipment -of this great force; but much remained to be done, and with very -insufficient means, before the fifty thousand men, composing the -militia, could possibly contend with the enemy; and although this -should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence -in themselves and in their officers, which is only to be acquired by -military experience. - -“When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to -that pass, _that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility -existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale -as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each -part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French -force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burthen rather -than an advantage to the French government_. Thence arose this -question, ‘Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal, afford -any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of -benefit to the allies?’ - -“It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree -of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the -regulars every thing that discipline could effect had been done, and -they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country -would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which -the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese -had confidence in the British nation and army; they were loyal to -their Prince; detested the French government, and were individually -determined to do every thing for the cause. Still they were not to be -certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority -of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced -in military affairs.” - -Under these circumstances, and _adverting to the approaching -subjection of Spain_, he demanded to know whether “_the enemy, -bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country -should be defended, or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off -all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could -be found_. But, under any circumstances, (he said) the British army -could always be embarked in despite of the enemy.” - -[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative]. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 12.] - -Such being the view taken of this important subject by lord -Wellington, it may seem proper here to notice an argument which, -with equal ignorance and malice, has often been thrust forward in -disparagement of sir John Moore, namely, that he declared Portugal -could not be defended, whereas lord Wellington did defend that -country. The former general premising that he was not prepared to -answer a question of such magnitude, observed, that the frontier, -being, although rugged, open, could not be defended against a -superior force; yet that Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, -Celerico, Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check -the advance of an enemy, and cover the embarkation of stores, &c. -which could only be made at Lisbon, that the Portuguese in their own -mountains would be of much use, and that he hoped that they could -alone defend the Tras os Montes. That, if the French succeeded in -Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal “_because the -latter was without a military force_,” and if it were otherwise, from -the experience of Roriça and Vimiero, no reliance was to be placed on -their troops. But this opinion, hastily given, had reference only -to the _state of affairs existing at that moment_, being expressly -founded on the _miserable condition and unpromising character of the -Portuguese military_, Spain also being supposed conquered. - -[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 14. 1809. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid. Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.] - -Lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country; after the -termination of the anarchy, which prevailed during sir John -Cradock’s time; after immense subsidies had been granted to -Portugal, her whole military force re-organized, and her regular -troops disciplined, paid, and officered by England; after the war -in Germany had cost Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in -the Peninsula at least fifty thousand more; in fine, after mature -consideration, and when Spain was still fighting, when Andalusia, -Catalonia, Murcia, Valencia, Gallicia, and the Asturias, were still -uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, most important posts -with reference to this question, were still in possession of the -Spaniards, and prepared for defence, lord Wellington, I say, came to -the conclusion, that Portugal might be defended against the enemy -then in the Peninsula, provided _an enormous additional subsidy and -a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one -earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation_. -And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government, that, _although -success could only be expected from the devotion and ardour of the -Portuguese, their army could not even then be implicitly trusted_. -Lisbon also, he considered as the only secure point of resistance, -and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celerico, as -temporary posts. But, in all things concerning this war, there was -between those generals, a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan -of action. - -[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative.] - -“_The French_,” said sir John Moore, “_will find the Spaniards -troublesome subjects, but in the first instance they will have little -more than a march to subdue the country_.” - -[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool, Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.] - -“_The defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies will be_,” said -lord Wellington, “_the probable consequence of any action in which -either imprudence, necessity, or even expediency, may lead them to -engage. The armies may be lost, the authorities dispersed, but the -war of Partisans will probably continue._” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 3.] - -And when the edge of the sword was, in 1810, as in 1808, descending -on the unguarded front of Andalusia, lord Wellington, on the first -indication of Joseph’s march, designed to make a movement similar in -principle to that executed by sir John Moore on Sahagun, that is, -by an irruption into Castile, to threaten the enemy’s rear, in such -sort that he should be obliged to return from Andalusia or suffer -his forces in Castile to be beaten. Nor was he at first deterred -from this project, by the knowledge, that fresh troops were entering -Spain. The Junta, indeed, assured him that only eight thousand men -had reinforced the French; but, although circumstances led him to -doubt this assertion, he was not without hopes to effect his purpose -before the reinforcements, whatever they might be, could come into -line. He had even matured his plan, as far as regarded the direction -of the march, when other considerations obliged him to relinquish it, -and these shall be here examined, because French and Spanish writers -then, and since, have accused him of looking on with indifference, if -not with satisfaction, at the ruin of the Central Junta’s operation, -as if it only depended upon him to render them successful. - -Why he refused to join in the Spanish projects has been already -explained. He abandoned his own,-- - -1º. Because the five thousand men promised from England had not -arrived, and his hospitals being full, he could not, including Hill’s -division, bring more than twenty thousand British soldiers into the -field. Hill’s division, however, could not be moved without leaving -the rear of the army exposed to the French in the south,--a danger, -which success in Castile, by recalling the latter from Andalusia, -would only increase. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -2º. The Portuguese had suffered cruelly during the winter from hunger -and nakedness, the result of the scarcity of money before-mentioned. -To bring them into line, was to risk a total disorganization, -destructive alike of present and future advantages. On the other -hand, the French in Castile, consisting of the sixth corps and the -troops of Kellerman’s government, lord Wellington knew to be at least -thirty thousand strong, of which twenty thousand were in one mass; -and, although the rest were dispersed from Burgos to Avila, and from -Zamora to Valladolid, they could easily have concentrated in time to -give battle, and would have proved too powerful. That this reasoning -was sound shall now be shewn. - -[Sidenote: Rolls of the French army.] - -Mortier’s march from Seville would not have terminated at Badajos, if -the British force at Abrantes, instead of advancing to Portalegre, -had been employed in Castile. The invasion of Andalusia, was only -part of a general movement throughout Spain; and when the king placed -himself at the head of the army, to force the Morena, Kellerman -marched from Salamanca to Miranda del Castanar and Bejar, with the -sixth corps, and thus secured the defiles leading into the valley -of the Tagus, and at the same time, the second corps coming down -that valley, communicated with the sixth by the pass of Baños, and -with the fifth by Seradillo and Caceres. Hence, without losing hold -of Andalusia, three _corps d’armée_, namely, the sixth, second, and -fifth, amounting to fifty thousand men, could, on an emergency, -be brought together to oppose any offensive movement of lord -Wellington’s. Nor was this the whole of the French combinations; for, -in rear of all these forces, Napoleon was crowding the Peninsula with -fresh armies, and not eight thousand, as the Central Junta asserted, -but one hundred thousand men, rendered disposable by the peace with -Austria and the evacuation of Walcheren, were crossing, or to cross, -the western Pyrennees. - -Of these, the first detachments reinforced the divisions in the -field, but the succeeding troops formed an eighth and ninth -corps, and the former, under the command of the duke of Abrantes, -advancing gradually through Old Castile, was actually in the -plains of Valladolid, and would, in conjunction with Kellerman, -have overwhelmed the British army; but for that sagacity, which -the French, with derisive but natural anger, and the Spaniards, -with ingratitude, have termed “_The selfish caution of the English -system_.” - -Truly, it would be a strange thing, to use so noble and costly a -machine, as a British army, with all its national reputation to -support, as lightly as those Spanish multitudes, collected in a day, -dispersed in an hour, reassembled again without difficulty, incapable -of attaining, and consequently, incapable of losing, any military -reputation. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -The greatness of the French reinforcements having dispelled the -idea of offensive operations, lord Wellington turned his whole -attention to Portugal, and notwithstanding the unfavourable change of -circumstances, the ministers consented that he should undertake its -defence; yet, the majority yielding to the influence of his brother, -rather than to their own conviction of its practicability, and -throwing the responsibility entirely on the shoulders of the general. -The deep designs, the vast combinations, and the mighty efforts, by -which he worked out the deliverance of that country, were beyond the -compass of their policy; and even now, it is easier to admire than to -comprehend, the moral intrepidity which sustained him under so many -difficulties, and the sagacity which enabled him to overcome them; -for he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies and -fears of several weak cabinets to correct, the snares of unprincipled -politicians to guard against, and finally to oppose public opinion. -Failure was every where anticipated, and there were but few who even -thought him serious in his undertaking. But having now brought the -story of the war down to the period, when not Spain nor Portugal, but -England was to contend with France; before I enter upon the narrative -of this memorable contest, it will be well to take a survey of the -respective conditions and plans of the belligerents, and to shew how -great the preparations, how prodigious the forces on both sides, and -with what a power each was impelled forward to the shock. - -_State of the French._--France victorious, and in a state of the -highest prosperity, could with ease, furnish double the number of -men, required to maintain the struggle in the Peninsula for many -years. But the utmost strength of the Spaniards having been proved, -it was evident that if the French could crush the British armies, -disorder and confusion might indeed be prolonged for a few years, -yet no effectual resistance made, and as in the war of succession, -the people would gradually accommodate themselves to the change of -dynasty, especially as the little worth of Ferdinand was now fully -demonstrated, by an effort to effect his release. The agent, a baron -Kolli being detected, and his place supplied by one of the French -police to ascertain the intentions of the captive king, the latter, -influenced by personal fears alone, not only refused to make the -attempt, but dishonourably denounced Kolli to the French government. -The only real obstacles then to the entire conquest of the Peninsula -were Cadiz and Portugal. The strength of the former was precarious, -and the enormous forces assembled to subdue the latter appeared to be -equal to the task. Yet in war, there are always circumstances, which, -though extraneous to the military movements, influence them as much -as the wind influences the sailing of a ship, and amongst the most -important of these, must be reckoned the conduct of the intrusive -king. - -Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that even the Spaniards -never accused him of any thing worse than being too convivial; but -it is evident that he was unequal to his task and mistook his -true situation, when, resisting Napoleon’s policy, he claimed the -treatment of an independent king. He should have known that he was a -tool, and in Spain, could only be a tool of the emperor’s. To have -refused a crown, like his brother Lucien, would have been heroic -firmness, but like his brother Louis, first to accept, and then -to resist the hand that conferred it, was a folly that, without -ameliorating the condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in -Napoleon’s path. Joseph’s object was to create a Spanish party for -himself by gentle and just means, but the scales fell from the hands -of justice when the French first entered the Peninsula, and while -the English supported Spain, it was absurd to expect even a sullen -submission, much less attachment from a nation so abused, neither was -it possible to recast public feeling, until the people had passed -through the furnace of war. The French soldiers were in Spain for -conquest, and without them the intrusive monarch could not keep his -throne. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.] - -Now Joseph’s Spanish ministers, were men who joined him upon -principle, and who, far from shewing a renegado zeal in favour of the -French, were as ardently attached to their own country, as any of -those who shouted for Ferdinand VII.; and whenever Spanish interests -clashed (and that was constantly) with those of the French armies, -they as well as the king invariably supported the former; and so -strenuously, that in Paris it was even supposed that they intended -to fall on the emperor’s troops. Thus civil contention weakened the -military operations, and obliged Napoleon either to take the command -in person, or to adopt a policy which however defective, will upon -inspection prove perhaps, to have been the best adapted to the -actual state of affairs. - -He suffered, or as some eager to lower a great man’s genius to their -own level, have asserted, he fomented disputes between the marshals -and the king, but the true question is, could he prevent those -disputes? A wise policy, does not consist in pushing any one point -to the utmost perfection of which it may be susceptible, but in -regulating and balancing opposing interests, in such a manner, that -the greatest benefit shall arise from the working of the whole. - -To arrive at a sound judgement of Napoleon’s measures, it would -be necessary to weigh all the various interests of his political -position, but there are not sufficient materials yet before the -world, to do this correctly, and we may be certain, that his -situation with respect both to foreign and domestic policy, required -extraordinary management. It must always be remembered, that, he was -not merely a conqueror, but the founder, of a political structure -too much exposed to storms from without, to bear any tampering with -its internal support. If money be the sinew of war, it is the vital -stream of peace, and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon’s -policy, than the care with which he handled financial matters; -avoiding as he would the plague, that fictitious system of public -credit, so fatuitously cherished in England. He could not without -hurting France, transmit large quantities of gold to Spain, and the -only resource left was to make “_the war maintain the war_.” - -[Sidenote: See Vol. I. p. 420.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Sections 2 and 3.] - -But Joseph’s desire of popularity, and the feelings of his ministers, -were much opposed to this system; nor were the proceeds always -applied for the benefit of the troops. This demanded a remedy; -yet openly to declare the king of no consideration would have been -impolitic in the highest degree. The emperor adopted an intermediate -course, and formed what were called “_particular military -governments_,” such as Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia; -in which the marshal, or general, named governor possessed both the -civil and military power: in short, he created viceroys as he had -threatened to do when at Madrid; and, though many disadvantages -attended this arrangement, it appears to have been wise and -consistent with the long reach which distinguishes all Napoleon’s -measures. The principal disadvantages were, that it mortally offended -the king, by thwarting his plans for establishing a national party; -that many of the governors were wantonly oppressive, and attentive -only to their own situation, without regarding the general objects of -the war; that both the Spanish ministers and the people regarded it -as a step towards dismembering Spain, and especially with respect to -the provinces beyond the Ebro; and, indeed, the annexing those parts -to France, if not resolved upon, was at one time contemplated by the -emperor. - -[Sidenote: Memoires de St. Helene.] - -On the other hand, experience proved, that Joseph was not a general -equal to the times. Napoleon himself admits, that, at this period, -the marauding system necessary to obtain supplies, joined to the -Guerilla warfare, had relaxed the discipline of the French armies, -and introduced a horrible license, while the military movements were -feebly pushed. Hence, perhaps, the only effectual means to obtain the -resources of Spain for the troops, with least devastation, was to -make the success of each “_corps d’armée_,” and the reputation of -its commander, dependent upon the welfare of the province in which it -was fighting. And, although some of the governors, had neither the -sense nor the justice to fulfil this expectation; others, such as -Soult and Suchet, did tranquillize the people, and yet provided all -necessary things for their own troops; results which would certainly -not have been attained under the supreme government of the king, -because he knew nothing of war, loved pleasure, was of an easy, -obliging disposition, and had a court to form and maintain. - -I am aware that the first-named generals, especially Soult, were -included by Joseph amongst those who, by oppressing the people, -extended the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was the result -of personal enmity; and facts, derived from less interested quarters, -as well as the final results, prove that those officers had a longer -reach in their policy than the king could understand. - -There is yet another view in which the matter may be considered. -Napoleon says he left many provinces of Italy under the harsh -government of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy, common to the -small states of that country, might be broken, and the whole rendered -amenable and ready to assimilate, when he judged the time ripe to -re-form one great kingdom. Now the same policy may be traced in the -military governments of Spain. The marshal’s sway, however, wisely -adapted to circumstances, being still the offspring of war and -violence, must, of necessity, be onerous and harsh; but the Peninsula -once subdued, this system would have been replaced by the peaceful -government of the king, who would then have been regarded as a -deliverer. Something of this nature was also necessary to sweep away -the peculiar privileges which many provinces possessed, and of which -they were extremely tenacious; and the iron hand of war, only, could -introduce that equality which was the principal aim and scope of the -constitution of Bayonne. - -[Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -Nevertheless, the first effects of the decree establishing this -system, were injurious to the French cause. Fresh contributions were -exacted to supply the deficiency occasioned by the cessation of -succours from France; and, to avoid these, men, who would otherwise -have submitted tranquilly, fled from the military governments. The -Partidas also suddenly and greatly increased, and a fresh difficulty -arose about their treatment when prisoners. These bodies, although -regardless of the laws of war themselves, claimed all the rights of -soldiers from their adversaries, and their claim was supported by -the Spanish government. Thus, when Soult, as major-general for the -king, proclaimed that military execution would be done on the bands -in Andalusia, as assassins, and beyond the pale of military law, the -Regency answered, by a retaliatory declaration; and both parties had -strong grounds for what they did: the Junta, because the defence of -the country now rested chiefly on the Partidas; Joseph, because the -latter, while claiming the usages of war, did not act upon them, and -were, by the Junta, encouraged in assassination. Mina, and, indeed, -all the chiefs, put their prisoners to death whenever it became -inconvenient to keep them; and Saraza publicly announced his hope of -being able to capture Madame Suchet when she was pregnant, that he -might destroy the mother and the infant together! And such things -were common during this terrible war. The difficulties occurring -in argument were, however, overcome in practice; the question of -the treatment of the prisoners was generally decided by granting no -quarter on either side. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 5.] - -Joseph, incensed at the edict establishing the governments, sent the -marquis of Almenara to Paris, to remonstrate with his brother, and to -complain of the violence and the injustice of the French generals, -especially Ney and Kellerman; and he denounced one act of the latter, -which betrayed the most wanton contempt of justice and propriety; -namely, the seizure of the national archives at Simancas; by which, -infinite confusion was produced, and the utmost indignation excited, -without obtaining the slightest benefit, political or military. -Another object of Almenara’s mission was to ascertain if there was -really any intention of seizing the provinces beyond the Ebro; and -this gave rise to a curious intrigue; for his correspondence, being -intercepted, was brought to Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, and he, -in concert with Romana, and Cabanes the Spanish historian, simulated -the style and manner of Napoleon’s state-papers, and composed a -counterfeit “_senatus consultum_” and decree for annexing the -provinces beyond the Ebro to France, and transmitted them to Joseph, -whose discontent and fears were thereby greatly increased. Meanwhile, -his distress for money was extreme; and his ministers were at times -actually destitute of food. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.] - -These political affairs impeded the action of the armies, but the -intrinsic strength of the latter was truly formidable; for, reckoning -the king’s French guards, the force in the Peninsula was not less -than _three hundred and seventy thousand men, and eighty thousand -horses_. Of these, forty-eight thousand men were in hospital, four -thousand prisoners, and twenty-nine thousand detached; leaving nearly -two hundred and eighty thousand fighting men actually under arms, -ready either for battle or siege: and moreover, a fresh reserve, -eighteen thousand strong, was in march to enter Spain. In May, -this prodigious force had been re-organized; and in July was thus -distributed:-- - - -_Governments or Armies in the 2d Line._ - - Total Strength. - 1. Catalonia Seventh corps Duke of Tarento 55,647 - 2. Aragon Third corps Gen. Suchet 33,007 - { Detachments and } - 3. Navarre { a division of the } Gen. Reille 21,887 - { Imperial Guards } - 4. Biscay Detachments Gen. Caffarelli 6,570 - 5. Old Castile, { Divisions of the } - comprising Burgos, { Imperial Guards } Gen. Dorsenne 10,303 - Aranda, and Soria { and Cavalry } - 6. Valladolid, &c. Detachments Gen. Kellerman 6,474 - 7. Asturias One division Gen. Bonet 9,898 - ------- - Total for the governments 143,786 - ------- - - -_Armies in the 1st Line._ - - _Army of the South_, composed of the first, fourth, and - fifth corps, under the command of Soult 72,769 - - _Army of the Centre_, composed of the Royal Guards, two - divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under the - personal command of the king 24,187 - - _Army of Portugal_, composed of a reserve of cavalry and - the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of - Massena 86,896 - - The ninth corps, commanded by general Drouet, distributed, - by divisions, along the great line of communication from - Vittoria to Valladolid 23,815 - - A division under general Serras, employed as a moveable - column to protect the rear of the army of Portugal 10,605 - ------- - 218,272 - ------- - -Thus the plan of invasion was determined in three distinct lines, -namely, the third and seventh corps on the left; the army of the -south in the centre; the army of Portugal on the right. But the -interior circle was still held by the French; and their lines of -communication were crowded with troops. - - -[Sidenote: Memoirs of Contreras, published by himself.] - -_State of Spain._--On the right, the armies of Valencia and -Catalonia, were opposed to the third and seventh corps; but the -utmost efforts of the last could only retard, not prevent the sieges -of Taragona and Tortoza. In the centre, the Murcian troops and -those assembled at Cadiz, were only formidable by the assistance -of the British force under general Graham. On the left, Romana, -supported by the frontier fortresses, maintained a partizan warfare -from Albuquerque to Ayamonte, but looked to Hill for safety, and to -Portugal for refuge. In the north, the united forces of Gallicia and -Asturias, did not exceed fifteen thousand men; and Mahi declared -his intention of retiring to Coruña if Bonet advanced beyond the -frontiers. Indeed, the Gallicians were so backward to join the -armies, that, at a later period, Contreras was used to send through -the country moveable columns, attended by an executioner, to oblige -the villages to furnish their quota of men. Yet, with all this -severity, and with money and arms continually furnished by England, -Gallicia never was of any signal service to the British operations. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.] - -But, as in the human body livid spots and blotches appear as the -vital strength decays, so, in Spain, the Partidas suddenly and -surprisingly increased as the regular armies disappeared. Many -persons joined these bands, as a refuge from starvation; others from -a desire to revenge the licentious conduct of the marauding French -columns; and, finally, the Regency, desirous of pushing the system -to its utmost extent, established secret Guerilla Juntas, in each -province, enjoining them, diligently to collect stores and provisions -in secure places. District inspectors and paymasters, selected by -the nearest general officer in command of regular troops, were also -appointed, as superintendents of details relative to the discipline -and payment of the Partidas, and particular tracts were charged with -the supplies, each according to its means. Lastly, every province was -divided into three parts, each part, following its population, being -to furnish seven, eight, or nine squadrons of this irregular force; -and the whole, whenever circumstances required it, to unite and act -in mass. - -The first burst of these bands, occasioned the French considerable -loss, impeded their communications, and created great alarm. It was -a second insurrection of the whole country. The Murcians, in concert -with the peasants of Grenada and Jaen, waged war in the mountains of -Andalusia; Franquisette and Palarea beset the neighbourhood of Ciudad -Real, and Toledo in La Mancha. El Principe, Saornil, and Juan Abril, -descending from the Carpentino mountains, sometimes on the side of -Segovia, sometimes on the side of Madrid, carried off small French -posts, close to the capital, and slew the governor of Segovia, at the -very gates of that town. - -On the other side of Madrid, the Empecinado, with twelve hundred -cavalry and infantry, kept the hills above Guadalaxara, and ventured -sometimes to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was formidable -in Navarre. Longa and Campillo, at the head of two thousand men, -harassed Biscay and the neighbourhood of Vittoria, and the chain -of communication, between these great bands and the Empecinado, -was maintained by Amor, Merino, and the Friar Sapia, the two first -acting about Burgos, and the third holding the mountains above Soria. -In the Asturias, Escaidron, continually hanging upon the flanks and -rear of Bonet, between St. Andero and Oviedo, acted in concert with -Campillo on one side, and with Porlier on the other, and this last -chief, sometimes throwing himself into the mountains on the borders -of Gallicia, and sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly troubled -the Asturias by his enterprises. To curb these bands, the French -fortified all their own posts of communication and correspondence, -slew numbers of the Guerillas, and suppressed others. Many were -robbers who, under pretence of acting against the enemy, merely -harassed their own countrymen; and few were really formidable, though -all were vexatious. Enough, however, has been said upon this point! - -But, while reduced to this irregular warfare, for preventing the -entire submission of Old Spain, the Regency, with inconceivable folly -and injustice, were alienating the affections of their colonies, and -provoking civil war; as if the terrible struggle in the Peninsula -were not sufficient for the ruin of their country. The independence -of Spain was, with them, of subordinate interest to the continuance -of oppression in South America. Money, arms, and troops, were -withdrawn from the Peninsula, to subdue the so-called rebellious -colonists; nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency, of -expecting Napoleon’s innumerable hosts to be beaten close to their -own doors, by Guerilla operations, and yet attempting, with a few -divisions, to crush whole nations, acting in the same manner, at -three thousand miles distance. Such being the state of French and -Spanish affairs, it remains to examine the condition of England and -Portugal, as affecting the war in the Peninsula. - - -_England._--The contentions of party were vehement, and the -ministers’ policy resolved itself into three principal points: 1º. -The fostering the public inclination for the war; 2º. The furnishing -money for the expenses; and, 3º. The recruiting of the armies. The -last was provided for by an act passed in the early part of 1809, -which offered eleven guineas bounty to men passing from the militia -to the line, and ten guineas bounty to recruits for the militia; this -was found to furnish about twenty-four thousand men in the year; but -the other points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition, in -parliament, was powerful, eloquent, and not very scrupulous. The -desperate shifts which formed the system of the ministers, were, -indeed, justly attacked, but when particulars, touching the contest -in Portugal, were discussed, faction was apparent. The accuracy -of Beresford’s report of the numbers and efficiency of the native -forces, was most unjustly questioned, and the notion of successful -resistance, assailed by arguments and by ridicule, until gloom and -doubt were widely spread in England, and disaffection wonderfully -encouraged in Portugal; nor was the mischief thus caused, one of the -smallest difficulties encountered by the English general. - -On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their majorities in -parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, yet wilfully, and like -men expecting that fortune would befriend them, they knew not why or -wherefore, and they dealt also more largely than their adversaries -in misrepresentations to mislead the public mind. Every treasury -newspaper teemed with accounts of battles which were never fought, -plans which were never arranged, places taken which were never -attacked, and victories gained where no armies were. The plains -of the Peninsula could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of -the Spaniards and Portuguese; cowardice, weakness, treachery, and -violence were the only attributes of the enemy; if a battle was -expected, his numbers were contemptible; if a victory was gained, -his host was countless. Members of parliament related stories of the -enemy which had no foundation in truth, and nothing, that consummate -art of intrigue could bring to aid party spirit, and to stifle -reason, was neglected. - -[Sidenote: Paper against Gold.] - -But the great and permanent difficulty was to raise money. The -country, inundated with bank-notes, was destitute of gold; Napoleon’s -continental system burthened commerce, the exchanges were continually -rising against England, and all the evils which sooner or later are -the inevitable result of a fictitious currency, were too perceptible -to be longer disregarded in parliament. A committee appointed to -investigate the matter, made early in the following session, a report -in which the evils of the existing system, and the causes of the -depreciation were elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning -to cash payments enforced: but the authors did not perceive, or at -least did not touch upon the injustice, and the ruin, attending -a full payment in coin of sterling value, of debts contracted -in a depreciated paper currency. The celebrated writer, William -Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this very clearly, -and subsequent experience has confirmed his views. The government -endeavoured to stave off the discussion of the bullion question, -but lord King, by demanding gold from those of his tenants whose -leases were drawn before the depreciation of bank-notes, proved the -hollowness of the system, and drove the ministers to the alternative, -of abandoning the prosecution of the war, or of denying the facts -adduced in the bullion report. They adopted the latter; and at the -instance of Vansittart, the chancellor of the exchequer, the house -voted in substance, that a pound-note and a shilling, were equal in -value to a golden guinea of full weight, at the moment when light -guineas were openly selling at twenty-eight shillings. This vote, -although well calculated to convince the minister’s opponents, that -no proposition could be too base, or absurd, to meet with support in -the existing parliament, did not, however, remove the difficulties of -raising money, and no resource remained, but that of the desperate -spendthrift, who never intending to pay, cares not on what terms he -supplies his present necessities. The peculiar circumstances of the -war, had, however, given England a monopoly of the world’s commerce -by sea, and the ministers affirming, that, the country, was in a -state of unexampled prosperity, began a career of expense, the like -of which no age or nation had ever seen; yet without one sound or -reasonable ground for expecting ultimate success, save the genius of -their general, which they but half appreciated, and which the first -bullet might have extinguished for ever. - - -_State of Portugal._--In this country, three parties were apparent. -That of the _people_ ready to peril body and goods for independence. -That of the _fidalgos_, who thought to profit from the nation’s -energy without any diminution of ancient abuses. That of the -_disaffected_, who desired the success of the French; some as -thinking that an ameliorated government must follow, some from mere -baseness of nature. This party, looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and -Gomez Freire, as chiefs if the enemy triumphed; for those noblemen, -in common with many others, had entered the French service in Junot’s -time, under the authority of the prince regent’s edict to that -effect. Freire more honourable than his companions, refused to bear -arms against his country, but the two others had no scruples, and -Pamplona even sketched a plan of invasion, which is at this day in -the military archives at Paris. - -The great body of the people, despising both their civil governors -and military chiefs, relied on the British general and army; but -the fidalgos, or cast of nobles, working in unison with, and -supported by the regency, were a powerful body, and their political -proceedings after the departure of sir John Cradock, demand notice. -The patriarch, formerly bishop of Oporto, the Monteiro Mor, and the -marquess of Das Minas, composed the regency, and they and every other -member of the government were jealous of each other, exceedingly -afraid of their superiors in the Brazils, and, with the exception -of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in support of abuses; -and as the military organization carried on by Beresford, was only -a restoration of the ancient institutions of the country, it was -necessarily hateful to the regency, and to the fidalgos, who profited -by its degeneracy. This, together with the unavoidable difficulties -in finance, and other matters, retarded the progress of the regular -army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered the efforts to -organize the militia, and ordenança, nearly nugatory. Nevertheless, -the energy of lord Wellington and of Beresford, and the comparatively -zealous proceedings of Forjas, proved so disagreeable to Das Minas, -who was in bad health, that he resigned, and immediately became a -centre, round which all discontented persons, and they were neither -few, nor inactive, gathered. The times, obliged the government, to -permit an unusual freedom of discussion in Lisbon; it naturally -followed that the opinions of designing persons were most obtruded, -and those opinions being repeated in the British parliament, were -printed in the English newspapers, and re-echoed in Lisbon. Thus -a picture of affairs was painted in the most glaring colours of -misrepresentation, at the moment when the safety of the country -depended upon the devoted submission of the people. - -After Das Minas’ resignation, four new members were added to the -regency, namely, Antonio, commonly called, Principal Souza, the -Conde de Redondo, the marquis de Olhao, and doctor Noguiera. The two -last were men of some discretion, but the first, daring, restless, -irritable, indefatigable, and a consummate intriguer, created the -utmost disorder, seeking constantly to thwart the proceedings of the -British generals. He was strenuously assisted by the patriarch, whose -violence and ambition were no way diminished, and whose influence -amongst the people was still very considerable. - -An exceedingly powerful cabal, was thus formed, whose object was to -obtain the supreme direction, not only of the civil, but military -affairs, and to control both Wellington and Beresford. The Conde -Linhares, head of the Souza family, was prime minister in the -Brazils; the Principal was in the regency at Lisbon; the chevalier -Souza was envoy at the British court, and a fourth of the family, don -Pedro de Souza, was in a like situation near the Spanish regency; -so that playing into each others hands, and guided by the subtle -Principal, they were enabled to concoct very dangerous intrigues; and -their proceedings, as might be expected, were at first supported with -a high hand by the cabinet of Rio Janeiro. Lord Wellesley’s energetic -interference reduced the latter, indeed, to a reasonable disposition, -yet the cabal secretly continued their machinations, and what they -durst not attempt by force, they sought to attain by artifice. - -In the latter end of the year 1809, Mr. Villiers was replaced as -envoy, by Mr. Charles Stuart, and this gentleman, well experienced -in the affairs of the Peninsula, and disdaining the petty jealousies -which had hitherto marked the intercourse of the principal political -agents with the generals, immediately applied his masculine -understanding, and resolute temper, to forward the views of lord -Wellington. It is undoubted, that the dangerous political crisis -which followed his arrival, could not have been sustained, if a -diplomatist less firm, less able, or less willing to support the -plans of the commander had been employed. - -To resist the French was the desire of two of the three parties in -Portugal, but with the fidalgos, it was a question of interest more -than of patriotism. Yet less sagacious than the clergy, the great -body of which perceiving at once that they must stand or fall with -the English army heartily aided the cause, the fidalgos clung rather -to the regency. Now the caballers in that body, who were the same -people that had opposed sir Hew Dalrymple, hoped not only to beat -the enemy, but to establish the supremacy of the northern provinces -(of which they themselves were the lords) in the administration of -the country, and would therefore consent to no operations militating -against this design. - -Another spring of political action, was the hatred and jealousy of -Spain common to the whole Portuguese nation. It created difficulties -during the military operations, but it had a visibly advantageous -effect upon the people, in their intercourse with the British. For -when the Spaniards shewed a distrust of their allies, the Portuguese -were more minded to rely implicitly on the latter, to prove that they -had no feeling in common with their neighbours. - -Yet, notwithstanding this mutual dislike, the princess Carlotta, wife -to the Prince Regent, and sister to Ferdinand, claimed, not only -the succession to the throne of Spain in the event of her brother’s -death or perpetual captivity, but the immediate government of the -whole Peninsula as hereditary Regent; and to persuade the tribunals -to acknowledge her claims, was the object of Pedro Souza’s mission to -Cadiz. The council of Castile, always ready to overthrow the Spanish -Regency, readily recognized Carlotta’s pretensions in virtue of the -decision of the secret Cortes of 1789 which abolished the Salique -law of Philip the Fifth: but the regents would pay no attention to -them, yet Souza renewing his intrigues when the Cortes assembled, -by corruption obtained an acknowledgement of the princess’s claim. -His further progress was, however, promptly arrested by lord -Wellington, who foresaw that his success would not only affect the -military operations in Portugal, by placing them under the control -of the Spanish government, but the policy of England afterwards, if -power over the whole Peninsula was suffered thus to centre in one -family. Moreover, he judged it a scheme, concocted at Rio Janeiro, to -embarrass himself and Beresford; for it was at first kept secret from -the British Cabinet, and it was proposed that the princess should -reside at Madeira, where, surrounded by the contrivers of this plan, -she could only have acted under their directions. Thus it is plain -that arrogance, deceit, and personal intrigues, were common to the -Portuguese and Spanish governments; and why they did not produce the -same fatal effects in the one as in the other country, will be shewn -in the succeeding chapters. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 9.] - -When lord Wellington required thirty thousand British troops to -defend Portugal, he considered the number that could be fed, rather -than what was necessary to fight the enemy; and hence it was, that -he declared success would depend upon the exertions and devotion of -the native forces. Yet knowing, from his experience in Spain, how -passions, prejudices, and abuses would meet him at every turn, he -would trust neither the simple enthusiasm of the people, nor the free -promises of their governors, but insisted that his own authority as -_marshal-general of Portugal_ should be independent of the local -government, and absolute over all arrangements concerning the English -and Portuguese forces, whether regulars, militia, or “ordenanças;” -for his designs were vast, and such as could only be effected by -extraordinary means. - -Armed with this power, and with the influence derived from the money -supplied by England, he first called upon the Regency, to revive and -enforce the ancient military laws of the realm, by which all men -were to be enrolled, and bear arms. That effected, he demanded that -the people should be warned and commanded to destroy their mills, -to remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their -fields, abandon their dwellings, and carry off their property, on -whatever line the invaders should penetrate: and that this might be -deliberately and effectually performed, he designed at the head of -all the allied regular forces, to front the enemy, in such sort, -that, without bringing on a decisive battle, the latter should yet -be obliged to keep constantly in a mass, while the whole population, -converted into soldiers, and closing on the rear and flanks, should -cut off all resources, save those carried in the midst of the troops. - -But it was evident, that if the French could find, or carry, -supplies, sufficient to maintain themselves until the British -commander, forced back upon the sea, should embark or giving battle -be defeated, the whole of this system must necessarily fall to -pieces, and the miserable ruined people submit without further -struggle. To avoid such a calamitous termination, it was necessary -to find a position, covering Lisbon, where the allied forces could -neither be turned by the flanks, nor forced in front by numbers, -nor reduced by famine, and from which a free communication could -be kept up with the irregular troops closing round the enemy. The -mountains filling the tongue of land upon which Lisbon is situated, -furnished this key-stone to the arch of defence. Accurate plans of -all the positions, had been made under the directions of sir Charles -Stuart in 1799, and, together with the French colonel Vincent’s -minutes, shewing how they covered Lisbon, were in lord Wellington’s -possession; and from those documents the original notion of the -celebrated lines of Torres Vedras are said to have been derived; but -the above-named officers only contemplated such a defence as might be -made by an army in movement, before an equal or a greater force. It -was lord Wellington, who first conceived the design, of turning those -vast mountains into one stupendous and impregnable citadel, wherein -to deposit the independence of the whole Peninsula. - -Hereafter the lines shall be described more minutely; at present -it must suffice to observe, that intrenchments, inundations, and -redoubts secured more than five hundred square miles of mountainous -country lying between the Tagus and the ocean. Nor was this the -most gigantic part of the English general’s undertaking. He was a -foreigner, ill supported by his own government, and holding power -under that of Portugal by a precarious tenure; he was vehemently -opposed by the local authorities, by the ministers, and by the -nobility of that country; and yet, in this apparently weak position, -he undertook at one and the same time, to overcome the abuses -engendered by centuries of misgovernment, and to oblige a whole -people, sunk in sloth, to arise in arms, to devastate their own -lands, and to follow him to battle against the most formidable power -of modern times. - -Notwithstanding the secret opposition of the Regency, and of -the _fidalgos_, the ancient military laws were revived, and so -effectually, that the returns for the month of May gave a gross -number of more than four hundred and thirty thousand men in arms, of -which about fifty thousand were regular troops, fifty-five thousand -militia, and the remainder “ordenanças;” but this multitude was -necessarily subject to many deductions. The “_capitans mor_,” or -chiefs of districts, were at first exceedingly remiss in their duty, -the total number of “ordenanças” really assembled, fell far short of -the returns, and all were ill-armed. This also was the case with the -militia, only thirty-two thousand of which had muskets and bayonets: -and deserters were so numerous, and the native authorities connived -at absence under false pretences, to such an extent, that scarcely -twenty-six thousand men ever remained with their colours. Of the -regular troops the whole were in good condition, and thirty thousand -being in the pay of England, were completely equipped, clothed, -disciplined, and for the most part commanded by British officers; -but, deduction being made for sick men and recruits, the actual -number under arms did not exceed twenty-four thousand infantry, three -thousand five hundred cavalry, and three thousand artillery. Thus the -disposable native force was about fifty-six thousand men, one-half of -which were militia. - -At this period, the British troops employed in the Peninsula, -exclusive of the garrison of Gibraltar, somewhat exceeded -thirty-eight thousand men of all arms, but six thousand were in -hospital or detached, and above seven thousand were in Cadiz. The -latter city was protected by an allied force of nearly thirty -thousand men, while the army, on whose exertions the fate of the -Peninsula rested, was reduced to twenty-five thousand British; such -was the policy of the English Cabinet; for this was the ministers’ -and not the general’s arrangement. The ordenanças being set aside, -the actual force at the disposition of lord Wellington, cannot be -estimated higher than eighty thousand men, and the frontier to -defend, reckoning from Braganza to Ayamonte, four hundred miles -long. The great military features, and the arrangements made to take -advantage of them in conformity with the general plan of defence, -shall now be described. - -The Portuguese land frontier presents four great divisions open to -invasion:-- - -1º. The northern line of the Entre Minho and the Tras os Montes, -extending from the mouth of the Minho, to Miranda on the Douro. - -2º. The eastern line of the Tras os Montes following the course of -the Douro from Miranda to Castel Rodrigo. - -3º. The frontier of Beira from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal on the -Tagus. - -4º. The Alemtejo and the Algarve frontiers, stretching, in one line -from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana. - -But these divisions may be simplified with respect to the military -aspect of the country; for Lisbon taken as the centre, and the -distance from thence to Oporto as the radius, a sweep of the compass -to Rosaminhal will trace the frontier of Beira; and the space lying -between this arc, the Tagus, and the sea-coast, furnished the main -body of the defence. The southern and northern provinces being -considered as the wings, were rendered subservient to the defence of -the whole, but had each a separate system for itself, based on the -one general principle, that the country should be wasted, and the -best troops opposed to the enemy without risking a decisive action, -while the irregular forces closed round the flanks and rear of the -invaders. - -The northern and southern provinces have been already described, -Beira remains to be noticed. Separated by the Douro from the Entre -Minho and Tras os Montes, it cannot well be invaded on that line, -except one or both of those provinces be first subdued; but from -Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal, that is from the Douro to the Tagus, -the frontier touches upon Spain, and perhaps the clearest method to -describe the conformation of the country will be to enter the camp of -the enemy. - -An invading army then, would assemble at Ciudad Rodrigo, or at Coria, -or at both those places. In the latter case, the communications -could be maintained, directly over the Gata mountains by the pass of -Perales, or circuitously, by Placentia and the pass of Baños, and -the distance being by Perales not more than two marches, the corps -could either advance simultaneously, or unite and force their way -at one point only. In this situation, the frontier of Beira between -the Douro and the Tagus, would offer them an opening of ninety miles -against which to operate. But in the centre, the Sierra de Estrella, -lifting its snowy peaks to the clouds and stretching out its gigantic -arms, would seem to grasp and claim the whole space; the summit -is impassable, and streaming down on either hand, numerous rivers -cleaving deeply, amidst ravines and bristled ridges, continually -oppose the progress of an army. Nevertheless, the invaders could -penetrate to the right and left of this mountain in the following -directions:-- - -_From Ciudad Rodrigo._--1º. By the valley of the Douro.--2º. By the -valley of the Mondego.--3º. By the valley of the Zezere. - -_From Coria._--1º. By Castello Branco and the valley of the Tagus; -and, 2º. By the mountains of Sobreira Formosa. - -To advance by the valley of the Douro, would be a flank movement -through an extremely difficult country, and would belong rather to -an invasion of the northern provinces than of Beira, because a fresh -base must be established at Lamego or Oporto, before the movement -could be prosecuted against Lisbon. - -To gain the valley of the Mondego there are three routes. The -first passing by Almeida and Celerico, the second by Trancoso and -Viseu, the third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high ridges of -the Estrella. To gain the valley of the Zezere, the march is by -Alfayates, Sabugal, and Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or -the Mondego, these routes, although rugged, are practicable for -artillery; but between Guarda and Belmonte some high table-land -offers a position where an army could seal the passage on either side -of the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. In fact, the position -of Guarda may be called the breast-plate of the Estrella. - -On the side of Coria, an invading army must first force or turn the -passages of the Elga and Ponçul rivers, to reach Castello Branco, and -that done, proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus or over the -savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. But the latter is impracticable -for heavy artillery, even in summer, the ways broken and tormented by -the deep channels of the winter torrents, the country desert, and the -positions if defended, nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the -Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the villages are few, -the ridges not less steep than those of Sobreira, and the road quite -impracticable for artillery of any calibre. - -Such, and so difficult, being the lines of invasion through Beira, it -would seem that a superior enemy might be met with advantage on the -threshold of the kingdom; but it is not so. For, first, the defending -army must occupy all the positions on this line of ninety miles, -while the enemy, posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could, in two -marches, unite and attack on the centre, or at either extremity, with -an overwhelming force. Secondly, the weakness of the Beira frontier -consists in this, _the Tagus along its whole course is, from June -to December, fordable as low down as Salvatierra, close under the -lines_. A march through the Alemtejo and the passage of the river at -any place below Abrantes would, therefore, render all the frontier -positions useless; and although there were no enemy on the borders of -the Alemtejo itself, the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria, -and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank to the lowest ford in -the river, would be little longer than the route by the valley of the -Mondego or that of the Zezere. For these reasons _the frontier of -Portugal must be always yielded to superior numbers_. - -Both the conformation of the country, and the actual situation of -the French corps, led lord Wellington to expect, that the principal -attacks would be by the north of Beira and by the Alemtejo, while -an intermediate connecting corps would move by Castello Branco -upon Abrantes, and, under this impression, he made the following -dispositions. Elvas, Almeida, and Valença, in the first, and Peniché, -Abrantes, and Setuval, in the second line of fortresses, were -garrisoned with native troops, part regulars, part militia. - -General Baccellar, having Silveira and the British colonels, Trant, -Miller, and J. Wilson, under his orders, occupied the provinces -beyond the Douro, with twenty-one regiments of militia, including the -garrison of Valença, on the Minho. - -The country between Penamacor and the Tagus, that is to say, the -lines of the Elga and the Ponçul, was guarded by ten regiments of -militia, a regiment of native cavalry, and the Lusitanian legion. In -the Alemtejo, including the garrisons, four regiments of militia were -stationed, and three regiments held the fortresses of the Algarves. -There remained in reserve, twelve regiments of the fifty composing -the whole militia force, and these were distributed in Estremadura on -both sides of the Tagus, but principally about Setuval. The regular -Portuguese troops, deducting those in garrison at Almeida Elvas and -Cadiz, were at Thomar and Abrantes. - -But the British, organized in five divisions of infantry and one of -cavalry, were distributed as follows:-- - - Men. - 1st Division General Spencer, about 6000 Viseu. - 2d Division, including } General Hill, ” 5000 Abrantes. - the 13th Dragoons } - 3d Division General Picton, ” 3000 Celerico. - 4th Division General Cole, ” 4000 Guarda. - Light Division Robert Crawfurd, ” 2400 Pinhel. - The Cavalry General Cotton, ” 3000 { Valley of - { Mondego. - ------ - Total 23,400 under arms. - ------ - -Thus the wings of the defence were composed solely of militia and -ordenança, and the whole of the regular force was in the centre. The -Portuguese at Thomar, and the four British divisions of infantry -posted at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celerico, formed a body of -thirty-eight thousand men, the greater part of which could, in -two marches, be united either at Guarda or between that position -and the Douro. On the other side Beresford and Hill could, in as -short a period, unite by the boat-bridge of Abrantes, and thus -thirty-two thousand men would be concentrated on that line. If the -enemy should attempt the passage of the Elga either direct from -Coria, or by a flank movement of the second corps from Estremadura, -across the Tagus, Beresford could succour the militia by moving over -the Sobreira Formosa to Castello Branco, while Hill could reach -that place much quicker than general Reynier, in consequence of an -arrangement which merits particular attention. - -It has been already said that the march from Abrantes to Castello -Branco is over difficult mountains; to have repaired the roads -between these places would have been more useful to the enemy than -to the allies, as facilitating a passage for superior numbers to -penetrate by the shortest line to Lisbon. But lord Wellington, after -throwing boat-bridges over the Tagus and the Zezere, and fortifying -Abrantes, established between the latter and Castello Branco a line -of communication by the left bank of the Tagus, through Niza, to -the pass of Vilha Velha, where, by a flying bridge, the river was -recrossed, and from thence a good road led to Castello Branco. Now -the pass of Vilha Velha is prodigiously strong for defence, and the -distance from Abrantes to Castello Branco being nearly the same by -Niza as by the other bank of the river, the march of troops was yet -much accelerated, for the road near Vilha Velha being reconstructed -by the engineers, was excellent. - -Thus all the obstacles to an enemy’s march by the north bank were -preserved, and the line by Vilha Velha, enabled not only Hill to -pass from Portalegre, or Abrantes, to Castello Branco by a flank -movement in less time than Reynier, but it also provided a lateral -communication for the whole army, which we shall hereafter find -of vital importance in the combinations of the English general, -supplying the loss of the road by Alcantara and the pass of Perales, -which otherwise would have been adopted. - -The French, also, in default of a direct line of communication -between Estremadura and the Ciudad Rodrigo country, were finally -forced to adopt the circuitous road of Almaraz and the pass of Baños, -and it was in allusion to this inconvenience that I said both parties -sighed over the ruins of Alcantara. - -But, notwithstanding this facility of movement and of concentration, -the allies could not deliver a decisive battle near the frontier, -because the enemy could unite an overwhelming force in the Alemtejo, -before the troops from the north could reach that province, and a -battle lost there, would, in the dry season, decide the fate of -Lisbon. To have concentrated the whole army in the south, would have -been to resign half the kingdom and all its resources to the enemy; -but to save those resources for himself, or to destroy them, was the -very basis of lord Wellington’s defence, and all his dispositions -were made to oblige _the French to move in masses_, and to _gain time -himself_, time to secure the harvests, time to complete his lines, -time to perfect the discipline of the native troops, and to give -full effect to the arming and organization of the ordenança, and, -above all things, time to consolidate that moral ascendancy over the -public mind which he was daily acquiring. A closer examination of his -combinations will shew, that they were well adapted to effect these -objects. - -1º. The enemy durst not advance, except with _concentrated masses_, -because, on the weakest line of resistance, he was sure to encounter -above twenty thousand men. - -2º. If, choosing the Alemtejo, he suddenly dispersed Romana’s -troops and even forced back Hill’s, the latter passing the Tagus -at Abrantes, and uniting with Beresford, could dispute the passage -of the Tagus until the arrival of the army from the north; and no -regular and sustained attempt could be made on that side without -first besieging Badajos or Elvas to form a place of arms. - -3º. A principal attack on the central line could not be made without -sufficient notice being given by the collection of magazines at -Coria, and by the passage of the Elga and Ponçul, Beresford and Hill -could then occupy the Sobreira Formosa. But an invasion on this -line, save by a light corps in connexion with other attacks, was not -to be expected; for, although the enemy should force the Sobreira -and reach Abrantes, he could not besiege the latter, in default of -heavy artillery. The Zezere, a large and exceedingly rapid river, -with rugged banks, would be in his front, the Tagus on his left, the -mountains of Sobreira in his rear, and the troops from Guarda and the -valley of the Mondego would have time to fall back. - -4º. An attack on Guarda could always be resisted long enough to -gain time for the orderly retreat of the troops near Almeida, to -the valley of the Mondego, and moreover the road from Belmonte -towards Thomar by the valley of the Zezere was purposely broken and -obstructed. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 5._ - - Defence - of - _Portugal_ - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -The space between Guarda and the Douro, an opening of about thirty -miles leading into the valley of the Mondego, remains to be examined. -Across this line of invasion, the Agueda, the Coa, and the Pinel, -run, in almost parallel directions from the Sierra de Francia and -Sierra de Estrella, into the Douro, all having this peculiarity, -that as they approach the Douro their channels invariably deepen -into profound and gloomy chasms, and there are few bridges. But -the principal obstacles were the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and -Almeida, both of which it was necessary to take before an invading -army could establish a solid base of invasion. After this the -lines of the Douro and of the Mondego would be open; if the French -adopted the second, they could reach it by Guarda, by Alverca, and -by Trancoso, concentrating at Celerico, when they would have to -choose between the right and the left bank. If the latter, they must -march between the Mondego and the Estrella mountains, until they -reached the Alva, a river falling at right angles into the Mondego, -and behind which they would find the allied army in a position of -surprising strength. If, to avoid that, they marched by the right of -the Mondego upon Coimbra, there were other obstacles to be hereafter -noticed; but, in either case, the allied forces, having _interior -lines of communication_, could, as long as the Belmonte road was -sealed, concentrate in time behind the Alva, or in front of Coimbra. -Hence it was on the side of the Alemtejo that danger was most to -be apprehended; and it behoved general Hill to watch vigilantly -and act decisively in opposition to general Reynier; for the latter -having necessarily the lead in the movements, might, by skilful -evolutions and rapid marches, either join the sixth and eighth -corps before Hill was aware of his design, and thus overwhelm the -allied divisions on the Mondego, or drawing Hill across the Tagus, -furnish an opportunity for a corps from Andalusia to penetrate by the -southern bank of that river. - -In these dispositions the English general had regard only to the -enemy’s actual situation, and expecting the invasion in summer; -but in the winter season the rivers and torrents being full, and -the roads deteriorated, the defence would be different; fewer -troops would then suffice to guard the Tagus, and the Zezere, the -Sobreira Formosa would be nearly impassable, a greater number of the -allied troops, could be collected about Guarda, and a more stubborn -resistance made on the northern line. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -Every probable movement being thus previously well considered, lord -Wellington trusted that his own military quickness, and the valour -of the British soldiers, could baffle any unforeseen strokes during -the retreat, and once within the Lines, (the Portuguese people -and the government doing their part) he looked confidently to the -final result. He judged that, in a wasted country, and with thirty -regiments of militia, in the mountains on the flank and rear of the -enemy, the latter could not long remain before the Lines, and his -retreat would be equivalent to a victory for the allies. There were -however many hazards. The English commander, sanguine and confident -as he was, knew well how many counter-combinations were to be -expected; in fine, how much fortune was to be dreaded in a contest -with eighty thousand French veterans having a competent general at -their head. Hence, to secure embarkation in the event of disaster, a -third line of entrenchments was prepared, and twenty-four thousand -tons of shipping were constantly kept in the river to receive the -British forces; measures were also taken to procure a like quantity -for the reception of the Portuguese troops, and such of the citizens -as might wish to emigrate. It only remained to feed the army. - -In the Peninsula generally, the supplies were at all times a source -of infinite trouble on both sides, and this, not as some have -supposed, because Spain is incapable of supplying large armies; -there was throughout the war an abundance of food in that country -but it was unevenly distributed; some places were exhausted, others -overflowing, the difficulty was to transport provisions, and in -this the allies enjoyed a great advantage; their convoys could pass -unmolested, whereas the French always required strong guards first -to collect food and then to bring it up to their armies. In Portugal -there was however a real deficiency, even for the consumption of the -people, and after a time scarcely any food for man or beast, (some -cattle and straw from the northern provinces excepted,) was to be -obtained in that country: nay, the whole nation was at last in a -manner fed by England. Every part of the world accessible to ships -and money was rendered subservient to the cravings of this insatiable -war, and even thus, it was often a doubtful and a painful struggle -against famine, while near the sea, but at a distance from that -nurse of British armies, the means of transport necessarily regulated -the extent of the supply. Now wheel-carriage was scarce and bad in -Portugal, and for the most part the roads forbade its use; hence the -only resource, for the conveyance of stores, was water-carriage, to a -certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burthen. - -Lisbon, Abrantes, and Belem Castle, on the Tagus; Figueras and Raiva -de Pena Cova, on the Mondego; and, finally, Oporto and Lamego, on -the Douro, were the principal depôts formed by lord Wellington, and -his magazines of consumption were established at Viseu, Celerico, -Condeixa, Leiria, Thomar, and Almeida. From those points four hundred -miserable bullock-cars and about twelve thousand hired mules, -organized in brigades of sixty each, conveyed the necessary warlike -stores and provisions to the armies; when additional succours could -be obtained, it was eagerly seized, but this was the ordinary amount -of transport. - -With such means and with such preparations was the defence of -Portugal undertaken, and it must be evident to the most superficial -observer, that, amidst so many difficulties, and with such a number -of intricate combinations, lord Wellington’s situation was not one -in which a general could sleep, and that, due allowance being made -for fortune, it is puerile to attribute the success to aught but his -talents and steel-hardened resolution. - -In the foregoing exposition of the political and military force -of the powers brought into hostile contact, I have only touched, -and lightly, upon the points of most importance, designing no more -than to indicate the sound and the diseased parts of each. The -unfavourable circumstances for France would appear to be the absence -of the emperor,--the erroneous views of the king,--the rivalry of -the marshals,--the impediments to correspondence,--the necessity of -frequently dispersing from the want of magazines,--the iniquity of -the cause, and the disgust of the French officers, who, for the most -part, spoiled by a rapid course of victories on the continent, could -not patiently endure a service replete with personal dangers, over -and above the ordinary mishaps of war, yet promising little ultimate -reward. - -For the English, the quicksands were--the memory of former failures -on the continent,--the financial drain,--a powerful and eloquent -opposition pressing a cabinet so timid and selfish that the general -dared not risk a single brigade, lest an accident should lead to a -panic amongst the ministers which all lord Wellesley’s vigour would -be unable to stem,--the intrigues of the Souza party,--and the -necessity of persuading the Portuguese to devastate their country for -the sake of defending a _European cause_. Finally, the babbling of -the English newspapers, from whose columns the enemy constantly drew -the most certain information of the strength and situation of the -army. - -On the other side, France had possession of nearly all the fortified -towns of the Peninsula, and, while her enormous army threatened to -crush every opponent, she offered a constitution, and recalled to the -recollection of the people that it was but a change of one French -dynasty for another. The church started from her touch, but the -educated classes did not shrink less from the British government’s -known hostility to all free institutions. What, then, remained -for England to calculate upon? The extreme hatred of the people -to the invaders, arising from the excesses and oppressions of the -armies,--the chances of another continental war,--the complete -dominion of the ocean with all its attendant advantages,--the -recruiting through the militia, which was, in fact, a conscription -with two links in the chain instead of one; and, not least, the -ardour of the troops to measure themselves with the conquerors of -Europe, and to raise a rival to the French emperor. And here, as -general Foy has been at some pains to misrepresent the character of -the British soldiers, I will set down what many years’ experience -gives me the right to say is nearer the truth than his dreams. - -That the British infantry soldier is more robust than the soldier -of any other nation, can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, -observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies -of Europe, and, notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he -sustains fatigue, and wet, and the extremes of cold and heat with -incredible vigour. When completely disciplined, and three years are -required to accomplish this, his port is lofty, and his movements -free; the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military -bearing, nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not, -indeed, possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to -dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although -he may perceive them; but he is observant, and quick to comprehend -his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute -in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers -in moments of imminent peril. - -It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle, is the -result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling. -Never was a more stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon’s troops fought in -bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory, but -the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy; -no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the -applauses of his countrymen, his life of danger and hardship was -uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore! -Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, -sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, and, with -incredible energy overthrow every opponent, at all times proving -that, while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount -of honour was also full and fresh within him! - -The result of a hundred battles and the united testimony of impartial -writers of different nations have given the first place, amongst the -European infantry, to the British; but, in a comparison between the -troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that -the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the -world. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -In resuming the thread of military events, it is necessary to refer -back to the commencement of the year, because the British operations -on the frontier of Beira were connected, although not conducted, -in actual concert with those of the Spaniards; and here I deem it -right to notice the conduct of Miguel Alava, that brave, generous, -and disinterested Spaniard, through whom this connexion was kept up. -Attached to the British head-quarters, as the military correspondent -of the Junta, he was too sagacious not to perceive the necessity -of zealously seconding the English general; yet, in the manner of -doing it, he never forgot the dignity of his own country, and, as he -was too frank and honest for intrigues, his intercourse was always -honourable to himself and advantageous to both nations. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] - -It will be remembered that, in February, Ney threatened Ciudad -Rodrigo at the same time that Mortier menaced Badajos and that Hill -advanced from Abrantes to Portalegre; lord Wellington immediately -reinforced the line between Pinhel and Guarda, and sent the light -division across the Coa, to observe the enemy’s proceedings. The -Portuguese Regency were alarmed, and demanded more British troops; -but lord Wellington replying that the numbers already fixed would -be as great as he could feed, took occasion to point out, that the -measures agreed upon, with respect to the native forces, were -neither executed with vigour nor impartiality, and that the carriages -and other assistance, required for the support of the British -soldiers then in the country were not supplied. These matters he -urgently advised them to amend before they asked for more troops; -and, at the same time, as the Regency in the hope of rendering him -unpopular with the natives, intimated a wish that he should take the -punishment of offenders into his own hands; he informed them that, -although he advised the adoption of severe measures, he would not be -made the despotic punisher of the people, while the actual laws were -sufficient for the purpose. - -When the siege of Astorga was commenced by the French, the Portuguese -army was brought up to Cea and Viseu, and the militia in the northern -provinces, were ordered to concentrate at Braganza to guard the Tras -os Montes. Ciudad Rodrigo, being soon afterwards seriously menaced, -lord Wellington sent a brigade of heavy cavalry to Belmonte, and -transferred his own quarters to Celerico, intending to succour -Ciudad if occasion offered; but the conduct of the Portuguese -Regency cramped his operations. The resources of the country were -not brought forward, and the English general could scarcely maintain -his actual position, much less advance; yet the Regency treated his -remonstrances lightly, exactly following the system of the Spanish -Central Junta during the campaign of Talavera: lord Wellington was, -however, in a different situation. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] - -Writing sharply, he told them that “their conduct was evasive and -frivolous; that the army could neither move forward nor remain -without food; that the time was one which would not admit of idle -or hollow proceedings, or partiality, or neglect of public for -private interests; that the resources were in the country, could -be drawn forth, and must be so if the assistance of England was -desired; finally, that punishment should follow disobedience, and, -to be effectual, must begin with the higher classes.” Then, issuing -a proclamation, he pointed out the duties and the omission of both -magistrates and people, and by this vigourous conduct procured some -immediate relief for his troops. - -Meanwhile, Crawfurd commenced a series of remarkable operations. His -three regiments of infantry were singularly fitted for any difficult -service; they had been for several years under sir John Moore, and, -being carefully disciplined in the peculiar school of that great -man, came to the field with such a knowledge of arms that, in six -years of real warfare, no weakness could be detected in their system. -But the enemy’s posts on the Agueda rendered it impossible for the -light division to remain, without cavalry, beyond the Coa, unless -some support was at hand nearer than Guarda or Celerico. Crawfurd -proposed that, while he advanced to the Agueda, Cole, with the fourth -division, should take up the line of the Coa. But that general would -not quit his own position at Guarda; and lord Wellington approving, -and yet desirous to secure the line of the Coa with a view to -succour Ciudad Rodrigo, brought up the third division to Pinhel, and -reinforcing Crawfurd with the first German hussars, (consisting of -four hundred excellent and experienced soldiers,) and with a superb -troop of horse-artillery, commanded by captain Ross, gave him the -command of all the outposts, ordering Picton and Cole to support -him, if called upon. - -In the middle of March, Crawfurd lined the bank of the Agueda with -his hussars, from Escalhon on the left, to Navas Frias on the right, -a distance of twenty-five miles, following the course of the river. -The infantry were disposed in small parties in the villages between -Almeida and the Lower Agueda; the artillery was at Fort Conception, -and two battalions of Portuguese caçadores soon afterwards arrived, -making a total of four thousand men, and six guns. The French at this -period were extended in divisions from San Felices to Ledesma and -Salamanca, but they did not occupy the pass of Perales; and Carrera’s -Spanish division being at Coria, was in communication with Crawfurd, -whose line, although extended, was very advantageous. From Navas -Frias to the Douro, the Agueda was rendered unfordable by heavy rain, -and only four bridges crossed it on that whole extent, namely, one at -Navas Frias; one at Villar, about a league below the first; one at -Ciudad Rodrigo; and one at San Felices, called the bridge of Barba -del Puerco. While therefore, the hussars kept a good watch at the two -first bridges which were distant, the troops could always concentrate -under Almeida before the enemy could reach them from that side; and -on the side of Barba del Puerco, the ravine was so profound that a -few companies of the ninety-fifth were considered capable of opposing -any numbers. - -This arrangement sufficed while the Agueda was swollen; but that -river was capricious, often falling many feet in a night without -apparent reason: when it was fordable, Crawfurd always withdrew his -outposts, and concentrated his division; and his situation demanded a -quickness and intelligence in the troops, the like of which has never -been surpassed. Seven minutes sufficed for the division to get under -arms in the middle of the night; and a quarter of an hour, night or -day, to bring it in order of battle to the alarm-posts, with the -baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear. -And this not upon a concerted signal, or as a trial, but at all times -and certain. - -The 19th of March, general Ferey, a bold officer, either to create -a fear of French enterprise at the commencement of the campaign, or -to surprise the division, collected six hundred grenadiers close -to the bridge of San Felices, and, just as the moon, rising behind -him, cast long shadows from the rocks, and rendered the bottom of -the chasm dark, he silently passed the bridge, and, with incredible -speed, ascending the opposite side, bayonetted the sentries, and fell -upon the piquet so fiercely that friends and enemies went fighting -into the village of Barba del Puerco while the first shout was still -echoing in the gulf below. So sudden was the attack, and so great -the confusion, that the British companies could not form, but each -soldier encountering the nearest enemy, fought hand to hand; and -their colonel, Sydney Beckwith, conspicuous by his lofty stature and -daring actions, a man capable of rallying a whole army in flight, -urged the contest with such vigour that, in a quarter of an hour, the -French column was borne back, and pushed over the edge of the descent. - -This skirmish proved that, while the Agueda was swollen, the enemy -could gain nothing by slight operations; but it was difficult -to keep in advance of the Coa: the want of money had reduced the -whole army to straits, and Crawfurd, notwithstanding his prodigious -activity, being unable to feed his division, gave the reins to -his fiery temper, and seized some church-plate, with a view to -the purchasing of corn. For this impolitic act he was immediately -rebuked, and such redress granted that no mischief followed; and -the proceeding itself had some effect in procuring supplies, as it -convinced the priests that the distress was not feigned. - -When the sixth corps again approached Ciudad Rodrigo in the latter -end of April, lord Wellington, as I have before said, moved his -head-quarters to Celerico, and Carrera took post at St. Martin -Trebeja, occupying the pass of Perales; being, however, menaced there -by Kellerman’s troops, he came down, in May, from the hills to Ituero -on the Azava river, and connected his left with the light division, -which was then posted at Gallegos Espeja and Barba del Puerco. -Crawfurd and he then agreed that, if attacked, the British should -concentrate in the wood behind Espeja, and, if unable to maintain -themselves there, unite with the Spaniards at Nava d’Aver, and -finally retire to Villa Mayor, a village covering the passage of the -Coa by the bridge of Seceira, from whence there was a sure retreat to -Guarda. - -It was at this period that Massena’s arrival in Spain became known -to the allies; the deserters, for the first time, ceased to speak -of the emperor’s commanding in person; yet all agreed that serious -operations would soon commence. Howbeit, as the river continued -unfordable, Crawfurd maintained his position; but, towards the end -of May, certain advice of the march of the French battering-train -was received through Andreas Herrasti: and, the 1st of June, Ney, -descending upon Ciudad Rodrigo, threw a bridge, on trestles, over the -Agueda at the convent of Caridad, two miles above; and, a few days -afterwards, a second at Carboneras, four miles below the fortress. As -this concentration of the French relieved the northern provinces of -Portugal from danger, sixteen regiments of militia were brought down -from Braganza to the Lower Douro; provisions came by water to Lamego, -and the army was enabled to subsist. - -The 8th of June four thousand French cavalry crossed the Agueda, -Crawfurd concentrated his forces at Gallegos and Espeja, and the -Spaniards occupied the wood behind the last-named village. It was -at this moment, when Spain was overwhelmed, and when the eye could -scarcely command the interminable lines of French in his immediate -front, that Martin Carrera thought fit to invite marshal Ney to -desert! - -Nothing could be more critical than Crawfurd’s position. From the -Agueda to the Coa the whole country, although studded with woods and -scooped into hollows, was free for cavalry and artillery, and there -were at least six thousand horsemen and fifty guns within an hour’s -march of his position. His right was at Espeja, where thick woods -in front rendered it impossible to discover an enemy until close -upon the village; while wide plains behind, almost precluded hope, -in a retreat before the multitude of French cavalry and artillery. -The confluence of the Azava with the Agueda offered more security -on his left, because the channel of the former river there became a -chasm, and the ground rose high and rugged at each side of the bridge -of Marialva, two miles in front of Gallegos. Nevertheless, the bank -on the enemy’s side was highest, and, to obtain a good prospect, it -was necessary to keep posts beyond the Azava; moreover the bridge -of Marialva could be turned by a ford, below the confluence of the -streams. The 10th, the Agueda became fordable in all parts, but, as -the enemy occupied himself raising redoubts, to secure his bridge -at Carboneras, and making preparations for the siege of Rodrigo, -Crawfurd, trusting to his own admirable arrangements, and to the -surprising discipline of his troops, still maintained his dangerous -position: thus encouraging the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and -protecting the villages in the plain between the Azava and the Coa -from the enemy’s foraging parties. - -On the 18th, the eighth corps was seen to take post at San Felices, -and other points; and all the villages, from the Sierra de Francia to -the Douro, were occupied by the French army. The 23d, Julian Sanchez, -breaking out of Ciudad, came into Gallegos. On the 25th, the French -batteries opened against the fortress, their cavalry closed upon the -Azava, and Crawfurd withdrew his outposts to the left bank. The 26th, -it was known that Herrasti had lost one hundred and fifty killed, and -five hundred wounded; and, the 29th, a Spaniard, passing the French -posts, brought Carrera a note, containing these words: “_O venir -luego! luego! luego! a socorrer esta plaza_.” (“Oh! come, now! now! -now! to the succour of this place.”) And, on the 1st of July, the -gallant old man repeated his _“Luego, luego, luego, por ultimo vez_.” - -Meanwhile, lord Wellington (hoping that the enemy, by detaching -troops, would furnish an opportunity of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo) -transferred his quarters to Alverca, a village half-way between -Almeida and Celerico. The Spaniards supposed he would attack; and -Romana, quitting Badajos, came to propose a combined movement for -carrying off the garrison. This was a trying moment! The English -general had come from the Guadiana with the avowed purpose of -securing Rodrigo; he had, in a manner, pledged himself to make it a -point in his operations; his army was close at hand; the garrison -brave and distressed; the governor honourably fulfilling his part. -To permit such a place to fall without a stroke struck, would be a -grievous disaster, and a more grievous dishonour to the British arms; -the troops desired the enterprise; the Spaniards demanded it, as a -proof of good faith; the Portuguese to keep the war away from their -own country: finally, policy seemed to call for an effort, lest the -world might deem the promised defence of Portugal a heartless and a -hollow boast. Nevertheless, Romana returned without his object. Lord -Wellington absolutely refused to venture even a brigade; and thus -proved himself a truly great commander, and of a steadfast mind. - -It was not a single campaign but a terrible war that he had -undertaken. If he lost but five thousand men, his own government -would abandon the contest; if he lost fifteen, he must abandon it -himself. His whole disposable force did not exceed fifty-six thousand -men: of these, twelve thousand were with Hill, and one-half of the -remainder were untried and raw. But this included all, even to the -Portuguese cavalry and garrisons. All could not, however, be brought -into line, because Reynier, acting in concert with Massena, had, -at this period, collected boats, and made demonstrations to pass -the Tagus and move upon Coria; French troops were also crossing the -Morena, in march towards Estremadura, which obliged lord Wellington -to detach eight thousand Portuguese to Thomar, as a reserve, and -these and Hill’s corps being deducted, not quite twenty-five thousand -men were available to carry off the garrison in the face of sixty -thousand French veterans. This enterprise would also take the army -two marches from Guarda, and Coria was scarcely more distant from -that place, hence, a division must have been left at Guarda, lest -Reynier, deceiving Hill, should reach it first. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section I.] - -Twenty thousand men of all arms remained, and there were two modes -of using them. 1º. In an open advance and battle. 2º. In a secret -movement and surprise. To effect the last, the army might have -assembled in the night upon the Azava, and filed over the single -bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view of capturing the battering -train, by a sally, or of bringing off the garrison. But, without -dwelling on the fact that Massena’s information was so good that he -knew, in two days after it occurred, the object of Romana’s visit, -such a movement could scarcely have been made unobserved, even in the -early part of the siege, and, certainly, not towards the end, when -the enemy were on the Azava. - -An open battle a madman only would have ventured. The army, passing -over a plain, in the face of nearly three times its own numbers, -must have exposed its flanks to the enemy’s bridges on the Agueda, -because the fortress was situated in the bottom of a deep bend of -the river, and the French were on the convex side. What hope then -for twenty thousand mixed soldiers cooped up between two rivers, -when eight thousand cavalry and eighty guns should come pouring over -the bridges on their flanks, and fifty thousand infantry followed -to the attack? What would even a momentary success avail? Five -thousand undisciplined men brought off from Ciudad Rodrigo, would -have ill supplied the ten or twelve thousand good troops lost in the -battle, and the temporary relief of the fortress would have been a -poor compensation for the loss of Portugal. For what was the actual -state of affairs in that country?--The militia deserting in crowds -to the harvest, the Regency in full opposition to the general, the -measures for laying waste the country not perfected, and the public -mind desponding! The enemy would soon have united his whole force and -advanced to retrieve his honour, and who was to have withstood him? - -Massena, sagacious and well understanding his business, only desired -that the attempt should be made. He held back his troops, appeared -careless, and in his proclamations taunted the English general, that -he was afraid!--that the sails were flapping on the ships prepared -to carry him away--that he was a man, who, insensible to military -honour, permitted his ally’s towns to fall without risking a shot -to save them, or to redeem his plighted word! But all this subtlety -failed; lord Wellington was unmoved, and abided his own time. “If -thou art a great general, Marius, come down and fight! If thou art a -great general, Silo, make me come down and fight!” - -Ciudad Rodrigo left to its fate, held out yet a little longer, and -meanwhile the enemy pushing infantry on to the Azava; Carrera retired -to the Dos Casas river, and Crawfurd, reinforced with the sixteenth -and fourteenth light dragoons, placed his cavalry at Gallegos, and -concentrated his infantry in the wood of Alameda, two miles in rear. -From thence he could fall back, either to the bridge of Almeida -by San Pedro or to the bridge of Castello Bom by Villa Formosa. -Obstinate however not to relinquish a foot of ground that he could -keep either by art or force, he disposed his troops in single ranks -on the rising grounds, in the evening of the 2d of July, and then -sending some horsemen to the rear to raise the dust, marched the -ranks of infantry in succession, and slowly, within sight of the -enemy, hoping that the latter would imagine the whole army was come -up to succour Ciudad Rodrigo. He thus gained two days; but, on the -4th of July, a strong body of the enemy assembled at Marialva, and -a squadron of horse, crossing the ford below that bridge, pushed at -full speed towards Gallegos driving back the picquets. The enemy -then passed the river, and the British retired skirmishing upon -Alameda, leaving two guns, a troop of British and a troop of German -hussars to cover the movement. This rear-guard drew up on a hill -half-cannon shot from a streamlet with marshy banks, which crossed -the road to Alameda; in a few moments a column of French horsemen -was observed coming on at a charging pace, diminishing its front as -it approached the bridge, but resolute to pass, and preserving the -most perfect order, notwithstanding some well-directed shots from -the guns. Captain Kraüchenberg, of the hussars, proposed to charge. -The English officer did not conceive his orders warranted it; and -the gallant German rode full speed against the head of the advancing -columns with his single troop, and with such a shock, that he killed -the leading officers, overthrew the front ranks, and drove the whole -back. Meanwhile the enemy crossed the stream at other points, and a -squadron coming close up to Alameda was driven off by a volley from -the third caçadores. - -This skirmish not being followed up by the enemy, Crawfurd took a -fresh post with his infantry and guns in a wood near Fort Conception. -His cavalry, reinforced by Julian Sanchez and Carrera’s divisions, -were disposed higher up on the Duas Casas, and the French withdrew -behind the Azava, leaving only a piquet at Gallegos. Their marauding -parties however entered the villages of Barquillo and Villa de Puerco -for three nights successively; and Crawfurd, thinking to cut them -off, formed an ambuscade in a wood near Villa de Puerco with six -squadrons, another of three squadrons near Barquillo, and disposed -his artillery, five companies of the ninety-fifth and the third -caçadores in reserve, for the enemy were again in force at Gallegos -and even in advance of it. - -A little after day-break, on the 11th, two French parties were -observed, the one of infantry near Villa de Puerco, the other of -cavalry at Barquillo. An open country on the right would have enabled -the six squadrons to get between the infantry in Villa de Puerco and -their point of retreat. This was circuitous, and Crawfurd preferred -pushing straight through a stone enclosure as the shortest road: the -enclosure proved difficult, the squadrons were separated, and the -French, two hundred strong, had time to draw up in square on a rather -steep rise of land; yet so far from the edge, as not to be seen -until the ascent was gained. The two squadrons which first arrived, -galloped in upon them, and the charge was rough and pushed home, but -failed. The troopers received the fire of the square in front and on -both sides, and in passing saw and heard the French captain Guache -and his serjeant-major exhorting the men to shoot carefully. - -Scarcely was this charge over when the enemy’s cavalry came out of -Barquillos, and the two squadrons riding against it, made twenty-nine -men and two officers prisoners, a few being also wounded. Meanwhile -colonel Talbot mounting the hill with four squadrons of the -fourteenth dragoons, bore gallantly in upon captain Guache; but the -latter again opened such a fire, that Talbot himself and fourteen -men went down close to the bayonets, and the stout Frenchman made -good his retreat; after which Crawfurd returned to the camp, having -had thirty-two troopers, besides the colonel, killed or wounded in -this unfortunate affair. That day Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, and -the Spanish troops, grieved and irritated, separated from the light -division, and marching by the pass of Perales, rejoined Romana; but -Crawfurd assumed a fresh position, a mile and a half from Almeida, -and demanded a reinforcement of two battalions. Lord Wellington -replied that he would give him two divisions, if he could hold his -ground; but that he could not do so; yet, knowing the temper of the -man, he repeated his former orders _not to fight beyond the Coa_. - -On the 21st, the enemy’s cavalry again advanced, Fort Conception was -blown up, and Crawfurd fell back to Almeida, apparently disposed to -cross the Coa. Yet nothing was further from his thoughts. Braving -the whole French army, he had kept with a weak division, for three -months, within two hours march, of sixty thousand men, appropriating -the resources of the plains entirely to himself; but this exploit, -only to be appreciated by military men, did not satisfy his feverish -thirst of distinction. Hitherto he had safely affronted a superior -power, and forgetting that his stay beyond the Coa was a matter of -sufferance, not real strength, with headstrong ambition, he resolved, -in defiance of reason and of the reiterated orders of his general, to -fight on the right bank. - - -COMBAT OF THE COA. - -Crawfurd’s whole force under arms consisted of four thousand -infantry, eleven hundred cavalry, and six guns, and his position, -one mile and a half in length, extended in an oblique line towards -the Coa. The cavalry piquets were upon the plain in his front, his -right on some broken ground, and his left resting on an unfinished -tower, eight hundred yards from Almeida, was defended by the guns of -that fortress; but his back was on the edge of the ravine forming the -channel of the Coa, and the bridge was more than a mile distant, in -the bottom of the chasm. - -A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July. The troops, drenched -with rain, were under arms before day-light, expecting to retire, -when a few pistol shots in front, followed by an order for the -cavalry reserves and the guns to advance, gave notice of the enemy’s -approach; and as the morning cleared, twenty-four thousand French -infantry, five thousand cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery -were observed marching beyond the Turones. The British line was -immediately contracted and brought under the edge of the ravine; -but meanwhile Ney, who had observed Crawfurd’s false disposition, -came down with the stoop of an eagle. Four thousand horsemen and a -powerful artillery swept the plain. The allied cavalry gave back, -and Loison’s division coming up at a charging pace, made towards the -centre and left of the position. - -While the French were thus pouring onward, several ill-judged changes -were made on the English side, part of the troops were advanced, -others drawn back, and the forty-third most unaccountably placed -within an enclosure of solid masonry, at least ten feet high, -situated on the left of the road with but one narrow outlet about -half-musket shot down the ravine. While thus imprisoned, the firing -in front redoubled, the cavalry, the artillery, and the caçadores -successively passed by in retreat, and the sharp clang of the -ninety-fifth rifle was heard along the edge of the plain above. A -few moments later, and the forty-third would have been surrounded; -but that here, as in every other part of this field, the quickness -and knowledge of the battalion officers remedied the faults of the -general. One minute sufficed to loosen some large stones, a powerful -effort burst the enclosure, and the regiment, re-formed in column -of companies, was the next instant up with the riflemen; there -was no room to array the line, no time for any thing but battle, -every captain carried off his company as an independent body, and -joining as he could with the ninety-fifth or fifty-second, the whole -presented a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties and under no -regular command; yet each confident in the courage and discipline of -those on his right and left, and all regulating their movements by a -common discretion and keeping together with surprising vigour. - -It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of French soldiers. -It is well known with what gallantry the officers lead, with what -vehemence the troops follow, and with what a storm of fire they waste -a field of battle. At this moment, with the advantage of ground and -numbers, they were breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns -ranged along the summit, played hotly with grape, and their hussars, -galloping over the glacis of Almeida, poured down the road, sabring -every thing in their way. Ney, desirous that Montbrun should follow -this movement with the whole of the French cavalry, and so cut off -the troops from the bridge, sent five officers in succession to urge -him on, and so mixed were friends and enemies at the moment, that -only a few guns of the fortress durst open, and no courage could have -availed against such overwhelming numbers. But Montbrun enjoyed an -independent command, and, as the attack was made without Massena’s -knowledge, he would not stir. Then the British regiments, with -singular intelligence and discipline, extricated themselves from -their perilous situation. For falling back slowly, and yet stopping -and fighting whenever opportunity offered, they made their way -through a rugged country tangled with vineyards, in despite of their -enemies, who were so fierce and eager, that even the horsemen rode in -amongst the enclosures, striking at the soldiers as they mounted the -walls or scrambled over the rocks. - -As the retreating troops approached the river, they came upon a more -open space; but the left wing being harder pressed, and having the -shortest distance, arrived while the bridge was still crowded and -some of the right wing distant. Major M’Leod, of the forty-third, -seeing this, rallied four companies on a hill just in front of the -passage, and was immediately joined by a party of the ninety-fifth, -and at the same time, two other companies were posted by -brigade-major Rowan, on another hill flanking the road, these posts -were thus maintained until the enemy, gathering in great numbers, -made a second burst, when the companies fell back. At this moment the -right wing of the fifty-second was seen marching towards the bridge, -which was still crowded with the passing troops, M’Leod, a very young -man, but with a natural genius for war, immediately turned his horse -round, called to the troops to follow, and, taking off his cap, rode -with a shout towards the enemy. The suddenness of the thing, and the -distinguished action of the man, produced the effect he designed; a -mob of soldiers rushed after him, cheering and charging as if a whole -army had been at their backs, and the enemy’s skirmishers, astonished -at this unexpected movement, stopped short. Before they could recover -from their surprise, the fifty-second crossed the river, and M’Leod, -following at full speed, gained the other side also without a -disaster. - -As the regiments passed the bridge, they planted themselves in loose -order on the side of the mountain. The artillery drew up on the -summit and the cavalry were disposed in parties on the roads to the -right, because two miles higher up the stream there were fords, and -beyond them the bridge of Castello Bom, and it was to be apprehended -that, while the sixth corps was in front, the reserves, and a -division of the eighth corps, then on the Agueda, might pass at those -places and get between the division and Celerico. The river was, -however, rising fast from the rains, and it was impossible to retreat -farther. - -The French skirmishers, swarming on the right bank, opened a biting -fire, which was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both sides -played across the ravine, the sounds were repeated by numberless -echoes, and the smoke, rising slowly, resolved itself into an immense -arch, spanning the whole chasm, and sparkling with the whirling -fuzes of the flying shells. The enemy gathered fast and thickly; his -columns were discovered forming behind the high rocks, and a dragoon -was seen to try the depth of the stream above, but two shots from -the fifty-second killed horse and man, and the carcasses, floating -between the hostile bands, showed that the river was impassable. The -monotonous tones of a French drum were then heard, and in another -instant, the head of a noble column was at the long narrow bridge. -A drummer and an officer in a splendid uniform, leaped forward -together, and the whole rushed on with loud cries. The depth of the -ravine at first deceived the soldiers’ aim, and two-thirds of the -passage was won ere an English shot had brought down an enemy; yet -a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of -the leading French section fell as one man! Still the gallant column -pressed forward, but no foot could pass that terrible line; the -killed and wounded railed together, until the heap rose nearly even -with the parapet, and the living mass behind melted away rather than -gave back. - -The shouts of the British now rose loudly, but they were confidently -answered, and, in half an hour, a second column, more numerous than -the first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, the range -was better judged, and ere half the distance was won, the multitude -was again torn, shattered, dispersed, and slain; ten or twelve men -only succeeded in crossing, and took shelter under the rocks at the -brink of the river. The skirmishing was renewed, and a French surgeon -coming down to the very foot of the bridge, waved his handkerchief -and commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was -his appeal unheeded: every musket turned from him, although his -still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt. -The impossibility of forcing the passage was, however, become too -apparent, and this last effort, made with feebler numbers and less -energy, failed almost as soon as it commenced. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 6._ - - CRAWFURD’S - _OPERATIONS_ - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -Nevertheless, the combat was unnecessarily continued. By the French, -as a point of honour, to cover the escape of those who had passed -the bridge. By the English, from ignorance of their object. One -of the enemy’s guns was dismantled, a powder-magazine blew up, and -many continued to fall on both sides until about four o’clock; when -a heavy rain causing a momentary cessation of fire the men amongst -the rocks returned, unmolested, to their own party, the fight ceased, -and Crawfurd retired behind the Pinhel river. Forty-four Portuguese, -two hundred and seventy-two British, including twenty-eight officers, -were killed, wounded, or taken, and it was at first supposed that -lieutenant Dawson and half a company of the fifty-second, which -had been posted in the unfinished tower, were also captured: but -that officer kept close until the evening, and then, with great -intelligence, passed all the enemy’s posts, and, crossing the Coa at -a ford, rejoined his regiment. - -In this action the French lost above a thousand men, the slaughter at -the bridge was fearful to behold; but Massena claimed to have taken -two pieces of artillery, and it was true; for the guns intended to -arm the unfinished tower, near Almeida, were lying dismounted at -the foot of the building. They, however, belonged to the garrison -of Almeida, not to the light division, and that they were not -mounted and the tower garrisoned was a great negligence; the enemy’s -cavalry could not otherwise have fallen so dangerously on the left -of the position, and the after-investment of Almeida would have -been retarded. In other respects, the governor, severely censured -by Crawfurd, at the time, for not opening his fire sooner and more -vigorously, was unblameable; the whole affair had been so mismanaged -by the general himself, that friends and enemies were mingled -together from the first, and the shots from the fortress would have -killed both. - -During the fight, general Picton came up alone from Pinhel, Crawfurd -desired the support of the third division; it was refused; and, -excited by some previous disputes, the generals separated after a -sharp altercation. Picton was decidedly wrong, because Crawfurd’s -situation was one of extreme danger; he durst not retire, and Massena -might undoubtedly have thrown his reserves, by the bridge of Castello -Bom, upon the right flank of the division, and destroyed it, between -the Coa and the Pinhel rivers. Picton and Crawfurd were, however, not -formed by nature to act cordially together. The stern countenance, -robust frame, saturnine complexion, caustic speech, and austere -demeanour of the first promised little sympathy with the short thick -figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements, and fiery temper of -the second; nor, indeed, did they often meet without a quarrel. -Nevertheless, they had many points of resemblance in their characters -and fortunes. Both were inclined to harshness, and rigid in command, -both prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission from -inferiors, and they were alike ambitious and craving of glory. -They both possessed decided military talents, were enterprising -and intrepid, yet neither were remarkable for skill in handling -troops under fire. This, also, they had in common, that both, after -distinguished services, perished in arms, fighting gallantly, and -being celebrated as generals of division while living, have, since -their death, been injudiciously spoken of, as rivalling their great -leader in war. - -That they were officers of mark and pretension is unquestionable, and -Crawfurd more so than Picton, because the latter never had a separate -command, and his opportunities were necessarily more circumscribed; -but to compare either to the duke of Wellington displays ignorance of -the men and of the art they professed. If they had even comprehended -the profound military and political combinations he was conducting; -the one would have carefully avoided fighting on the Coa; and the -other, far from refusing, would have eagerly proffered his support. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -During the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, Mahi, coming down from the -Gallician mountains, menaced Astorga, and a detachment of his army, -under Toboado Gil, occupied Puebla de Senabria; acting in concert -with Silveira; and an expedition sailing from Coruña, under Porlier, -seized Santona, and dismantled that and other points on the coast, -near Santander. Mahi’s movements could not be well opposed by either -Kellerman or Serras, during the siege, because the former had a -strong detachment in Baños, and the troops of the latter were spread -over too great an extent of ground; but, when the place fell, the -eighth corps, being detached beyond the Tormes, to gather provisions, -enabled Serras to act against the Gallicians. The latter were driven -into the mountains, and Toboado Gil, removing his stores from Puebla -Senabria, drew closer to Silveira, in expectation of an attack; but -Serras, only placing a Swiss battalion and sixty dragoons at Puebla, -fell back to Zamora, and the eighth corps re-occupied the country -between the Tormes and the Agueda. - -Bonet defeated the Spaniards at Sales, and entered Castropol, on -the frontier of Gallicia, but returned to Oviedo, on hearing of the -expedition to Santona. The Spaniards then re-embarked for Coruña, -the project of a larger armament, to be directed against Santander -itself, was adopted, and Mahi affirmed that, if more arms and -ammunition were sent to him from England, he would clear the plains -of Leon, as far as the Esla river. His demands were complied with; -sir Home Popham was appointed to superintend the naval expeditions -against the coast of the Asturias and Biscay, and a serious -interruption of the French communications was planned, but never -realised. - -Meanwhile, general Reynier passed the Tagus with the second corps, -but it appears that this movement should have been executed in June; -for boats were collected at Barca de Alconete, in the middle of that -month, and the French only waited for a detachment from Andalusia, -when Mendizabel, taking the road of Zafra, attacked that detachment, -at Los Santos, on the 23d, and Reynier immediately moved to its -succour with one division of infantry and all his cavalry. - -But, at this period, the insurrection caused by Lascy’s expedition to -the Ronda, had drawn all the troops of the fifth corps from Seville -to that side, the duke of Aremberg and general Remond had fallen back -behind the river Tinto, and Copons had advanced to collect provisions -on the Odiel. In this threatening state of affairs, instead of -returning to Merida, Reynier endeavoured to surprise Imas, at Xeres -de los Cavalleros, and failing in that, pushed across the Morena -against Ballasteros, the latter being at Campo Frio, beyond Araceña, -and, ignorant that Imas had retreated, could only save himself by a -hasty flight across the frontier of Portugal. Meanwhile, Lascy was -beaten in the Ronda, the fifth corps retired to Seville, D’Aremberg -and Remond re-occupied Huelva and Moguer; and Reynier, going back to -Merida, resumed his design of passing the Tagus. - -His boats were still at Alconete, for the Spaniards had neglected -this opportunity of destroying them; but, as it was necessary to -cover the operations both from Hill’s division which was concentrated -at Campo Mayor, and from the Portuguese troops behind the Elga river, -a strong rear guard was placed on the Salor to watch the former, and -the French division at Baños advanced to Coria to awe the latter. -Reynier then quitting Merida the 10th of July, marched, by Truxillo -and Caceres, upon Alconete and Almaraz, and effected the passage; his -rear guard following on the 16th. - -This cautious operation saved him from an attack meditated by Hill, -who had received orders to unite with Romana, and drive the second -corps back, with a view to gather the harvest for the victualling of -Badajos and the other frontier fortresses. But the passage of the -Tagus being thus effected by the French, general Hill made a parallel -movement, which, on his part, only required thirty-six hours; and -meanwhile, lord Wellington assembled a reserve at Thomar, under the -command of general Leith, consisting of eight thousand Portuguese and -two thousand British infantry, just arrived from England. - -Soon after Reynier had reached Coria, he detached a force, by -Perales, upon Sabugal, but recalled it when he found that Hill, -having crossed the Tagus by Vilha Velha, was at Castello Branco on -the 21st. The two generals then faced each other. Hill, joined by -a strong body of Portuguese cavalry, under general Fane, encamped, -with sixteen thousand men and eighteen guns, at Sarzedas, just in -front of the Sobreira Formosa; his advanced guard in Castello Branco; -his horsemen on the line of the Ponçul; and a brigade of Portuguese -infantry at Fundao, to keep up the communication with Guarda, and to -cover the Estrada Nova. Behind him, Leith occupied the line of the -Zezere: and thus twenty-six thousand men, besides the militia, were -in observation between the Estrella and the Tagus. - -Reynier first made demonstrations on the side of Salvatierra; but -being repulsed by some Portuguese cavalry, divided his forces between -Penamacor and Zarza Mayor, established a post of one hundred and -fifty men on the left bank of the Tagus, near the mouth of the Rio -Del Monte, and, by continual movements, rendered it doubtful whether -he meant to repass the Tagus or to advance upon Sarzedas, or to join -Massena. Meanwhile, Ballasteros returned to Araceña, Imas to Xeres -de los Cavalleros, O’Donnel entered Truxillo, and Carlos d’España -cut off the French post on the Rio del Monte. Romana was, however, -soon obliged to concentrate his troops again; for Mortier was on -the Guadalquivir, with a view to re-enter Estremadura. Such was the -situation of the armies in the beginning of August; and when Massena -was assured that Reynier had crossed the Tagus, he directed the sixth -corps and the cavalry upon Almeida, which led, as we have seen, to -the combat on the Coa; during which, Loison, imagining the governor -to be a native, pressed him to desert the cause of the English: -“_that vile people, whose object was to enslave the Portuguese_.” - -Lord Wellington’s situation was critical. Ciudad Rodrigo furnished -the French with a place of arms; they might disregard Almeida: and -their tardy investment of it, viewed in conjunction with the great -magazines collecting at Ciudad Rodrigo, indicated an intention of -so doing. But Massena’s dispositions were such as rendered his true -designs difficult to be discovered. The sixth corps and the reserve -cavalry were, indeed, around Almeida; but, by telegraphic intercourse -with the garrison, it was known that the investment was not real, and -the heads of the columns pointed towards Celerico. Loison’s advanced -guard was in Pinhel the day after Crawfurd’s action; the second -corps, divided between Zarza Mayor and Penamacor, and with boats, -near Alcantara, on the Tagus, menaced equally the line of that river -and the line of the Zezere; and it was as likely that Massena would -join Reynier as that Reynier would join Massena. The eighth corps and -the divisions of Serras and Kellerman were between the Tormes and the -Esla, and might break into the northern provinces of Portugal, while -the sixth and second corps should hold the allies in check: and this -was undoubtedly the surest course; because the taking of Oporto would -have furnished many resources, stricken the natives with terror, -opened the great coast-road to Lisbon, and enabled Massena to avoid -all the difficult country about the Mondego. The English general -must then have retired before the second and sixth corps, unless he -attacked Ney; an unpromising measure, because of the enemy’s strength -in horse: in fine, Massena had one hundred and sixteen thousand men -and the initial operations in his power, and lord Wellington was -obliged to wait upon his movements. - -The actual position of the allies was too extended and too forward; -yet to retire at once would have seemed timid: hence lord Wellington -remained quiet during the 25th, 26th, and 27th of July, although -the enemy’s posts were thickening on the Pinhel river. But the -28th, the British cavalry advanced to Frexadas, and the infantry -withdrew behind the Mondego, except the fourth division, which -remained at Guarda. The light division occupied Celerico; the other -divisions were posted at Penhancos, Carapichina, and Fornos; the -Portuguese troops being a day’s march behind. The sick and wounded -men transferred daily to the rear, and the line of retreat kept free -from encumbrance. The enemy then made a demonstration towards St. Joa -de Pesquera, and defeated some militia at Fosboa, on the Douro, but -finally retired across the Coa, and, after a few skirmishes with the -garrison on the 3d of August, left the communication with Almeida -again free. At the same time, a detachment of Reynier’s horse was -encountered at Atalaya, near Fundao, and beaten by the Portuguese -cavalry and ordenança, with a loss of fifty killed or taken. - -On the side of Gallicia, Kellerman advanced from Benevente to Castro -Contrijo, and detachments from Serras’s division penetrated towards -Monterey, ordering provisions for ten thousand men on the road to -Braganza. But Silveira, marching on Senabria, defeated the enemy’s -cavalry there on the 6th; invested the Swiss on the 7th; and, on -the 10th, obliged them to capitulate at the moment when Serras was -coming to their relief. Five hundred men and an eagle were taken, -and Silveira, who did not lose a man, would have given battle to -Serras also, if Beresford, alarmed at such rashness, had not sent -him imperative orders to retreat; an operation he effected with some -difficulty. - -This advantage in the north was balanced by a disaster in -Estremadura. The Spanish generals, never much disposed to respect -lord Wellington’s counsels, were now less so than before, from the -discontent engendered by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. He had pressed -upon Romana the policy of avoiding battles; had procured permission -that Campo Mayor should be given to him as a place of arms, with -leave to retire into Portugal when overmatched by the enemy; and he -had shewn him that Hill’s departure greatly augmented the necessity -of caution. Nevertheless, Romana joined Ballasteros; and, as their -united force amounted to fourteen thousand infantry and fifteen -hundred horse, the English general immediately foresaw that they -would offer battle, be defeated, and lay open the whole frontier of -the Alemtejo; he, therefore, directed Hill to send Madden’s brigade -of Portuguese cavalry to their assistance. - -Madden reached Campo Mayor the 14th of August, but Romana’s advanced -guard had been already intercepted at Benvenida, and having lost six -hundred men, was going to lay down its arms, when fortunately Carrera -arrived with the Spanish cavalry and disengaged them. The whole then -retreated across the Morena to Monte Molin and Fregenal, but the -French pursued and slew or took four hundred more. The following -day Mortier entered Zafra, and Romana retired to Almendralejos. The -enemy did not, however, press this advantage, because Lascy with -three thousand men from Cadiz convoyed by Capt. Cockburn of the -British navy, had landed near Moguer and driven the duke of Aremberg -towards Seville, while Copons drove Remond upon Zalamea; and although -the French soon rallied and obliged Lascy to re-embark, Mortier was -withdrawn towards the Morena, and Romana again advanced to Zafra. -This affair at Moguer was very trifling, but a tumid description in -Cockburn’s despatches obtained for it a momentary celebrity. - -It would appear that Massena had been waiting for Mortier’s movements -to develope his own plans, for on the day that the latter entered -Zafra, the sixth corps formally invested Almeida; and lord Wellington -immediately bringing up the Portuguese, recrossed the Mondego; the -British being at Pinhel, Frexadas, and Guarda, and the Portuguese at -Celerico, Govea, Melho, and Trancoso. In this situation, expecting -a vigorous defence from Almeida, he had good hopes to delay the -enemy for six weeks or two months, when the rains setting in would -give him additional advantages in the defence of the country. He had -intended to keep the light division on the Cabeça Negro overhanging -the bridge of the Coa, and thus secure a communication with the -garrison, or force the French to invest the place with their whole -army: Crawfurd’s rashness marred this plan, and he himself was so -dispirited by the action on the 24th, that the commander-in-chief did -not think it prudent to renew the project. Yet Massena’s tardiness -and the small force with which he finally invested the place, led -lord Wellington to think of assembling secretly a large and chosen -body of men behind the Cabeça Negro, with the view of suddenly -forcing the bridge and the fords and taking the French battering -train, or at least bringing off the garrison; but while revolving -this great stroke in his mind, an unexpected and terrible disaster -broke his measures. - - -SIEGE OF ALMEIDA. - -[Sidenote: Colonel Cox’s Narrative.] - -This fortress, although regularly constructed with six bastions, -ravelins, an excellent ditch, and covered way, was extremely -defective. The ramparts were too high for the glacis, and from some -near ground, on the side of the attack, the bottom of the ditch might -be seen. An old square castle, built on a mound in the centre of -the town, contained three bomb proofs, the doors of which were not -secure; but with the exception of some damp casements in one bastion, -there was no other magazine for the powder. Colonel Cox was governor, -and his garrison composed of one regular and two militia regiments, a -body of artillery and a squadron of cavalry, amounted to about four -thousand men. - -On the 18th, the trenches were begun under cover of a false attack, -and in the morning of the 26th (the second parallel being commenced) -sixty-five pieces of artillery mounted in ten batteries opened at -once. Many houses were soon in flames and the garrison was unable to -extinguish them; the counter fire was, however, briskly maintained, -little military damage was sustained, and towards evening the -cannonade slackened on both sides; but just after dark the ground -suddenly trembled, the castle bursting into a thousand pieces, gave -vent to a column of smoke and fire, and with a prodigious noise the -whole town sunk into a shapeless ruin! Treason or accident had -caused the magazines to explode, and the devastation was incredible. -The ramparts were breached, the greatest part of the guns thrown into -the ditch, five hundred people were struck dead on the instant, and -only six houses left standing; the stones thrown out hurt forty of -the besiegers in the trenches, and the surviving garrison, aghast at -the horrid commotion, disregarded all exhortations to rally. Fearing -that the enemy would take the opportunity to storm the ramparts, the -governor beat to arms, and, running to the walls with the help of -an artillery officer, fired off the few guns that remained; but the -French shells fell thickly all the night, and in the morning of the -27th, two officers appeared at the gates, with a letter from Massena, -offering terms. - -Cox, sensible that further resistance was impossible, still hoped -that the army would make a movement to relieve him, if he could -impose upon the enemy for two or three days; and he was in act of -refusing the prince of Esling’s offer, when a mutiny, headed openly -by the lieutenant-governor, one Bernardo Costa, and secretly by -José Bareiros, the chief of artillery, who had been for some time -in secret correspondence with the French, obliged him to yield. The -remainder of the native officers disturbed by fear, or swayed by the -influence of those two, were more willing to follow than to oppose -their dishonourable proceedings, and Costa expressed his resolution -to hoist the white flag. The governor seeing no remedy by force, -endeavoured to procrastinate, and, being ignorant of Bareiros’ -treason, sent him to the enemy with counter propositions. Bareiros -immediately informed Massena of the true state of garrison, and never -returned; and the final result was a surrender upon agreement that -the militia should retire to their homes, and the regulars remain -prisoners of war. - -[Sidenote: Justification of Colonel W. Cox.] - -[Sidenote: Note by Gen. Pelet. Appendix to Vol. XII. Victoires et -Conquestes des Français.] - -While the treaty was pending and even after the signature of the -articles, in the night of the 27th, the French bombarded the place. -This act, unjustifiable and strange, because Massena’s aide-de-camp, -colonel Pelet, was actually within the walls when the firing -commenced, was excused, on the ground of an error in the transmission -of orders; it, however, lasted during the whole night, and Cox also -asserts that the terms of the capitulation with respect to the -militia were violated. Pelet indignantly denies this, affirming that -when the garrison still amounting to three thousand men perceived -the marquis d’Alorna amongst the French generals, the greatest -part immediately demanded service, and formed a brigade under -general Pamplona. Yet, so easily are men’s minds moved by present -circumstances, that the greater number deserted again, when they -afterwards saw the allied armies. - -Bareiros, having joined the enemy, escaped punishment, but De -Costa, being tried, was afterwards shot as a traitor, by the -orders of marshal Beresford. His cowardice and mutiny merited -this chastisement, yet the principal evidence against him was an -explanatory letter, written to lord Liverpool, by Cox, while a -prisoner at Verdun. - -The explosion, the disappearance of the steeple, and cessation of -fire, proclaimed the misfortune of Almeida in the allied camp; but -the surrender was first ascertained by lord Wellington on the 29th, -when, with a telescope, he observed many French officers on the -glacis of the place. The army then withdrew to its former position -behind the Mondego; and while these things were passing on the Coa, -the powder-magazine in Albuquerque, being struck with lightning, also -exploded and killed four hundred men; and, on the 1st of September, -general Reynier, after several demonstrations towards Castello -Branco, in one of which he lost a squadron of horse, suddenly -reached Sabugal. The British piquets on the Pinhel were attacked the -following day by the horsemen of the sixth corps, the enemy’s plans -seemed to be ripe for execution; and lord Wellington transferring his -quarters to Govea, withdrew his infantry behind Celerico, and fixed -his cavalry at that place with posts of observation at Guarda and at -Trancoso. Reynier, however, suddenly returned to Zarza Mayor, and, -throwing a bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara, again involved the -French projects in obscurity. - -Massena experienced considerable difficulty in feeding his forces, -and he seemed at first, either disinclined to commence the invasion -or undecided as to the mode. Two months had elapsed since the -surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida had only resisted for ten days, -the French army was still behind the Coa, and it would seem, by an -intercepted letter, dictated by Napoleon, in September, that he -expected further inaction: “Lord Wellington,” he observed to Massena, -“has only eighteen thousand men, Hill has only six thousand; and it -would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty-five thousand English can -balance sixty thousand French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall -boldly on after having _well observed where the blow may be given_. -You have twelve thousand cavalry, and four times as much artillery -as is necessary for Portugal. Leave six thousand cavalry and a -proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca, -and with the rest commence operations. The emperor is too distant, -and the positions of the enemy change too often, to direct how you -should attack; but it is certain that the utmost force the English -can muster, including the troops at Cadiz, will be twenty-eight -thousand men.” - -This letter was accurate as to the numbers of the English army, but -Napoleon was ignorant how strongly lord Wellington was thrusting -Portugal forward in the press. - -Massena had commenced the invasion before these instructions reached -him; but to understand his operations it is essential to have a -clear idea of the country in which they were conducted. The advanced -positions of the allies extended from Almeida over the Sierra de -Estrella, by Guarda to Fundao, Sarzedas, and Castello Branco: no -enemy could penetrate that line unless by force, and a serious -attack on any one point was to be the signal for a gradual retreat -of the whole, in concentric directions towards the Lines. But, if -Guarda were evacuated, the enemy while menacing Celerico, could move -either by Belmonte or Covilhao and separate general Hill from lord -Wellington, the distance between those generals being twice as great -as the enemy’s perpendicular line of march would be. - -To balance this disadvantage, the road from Covilhao was broken up, -a Portuguese brigade placed in Fundao, and general Leith’s corps -was stationed at Thomar, between two entrenched positions, which -formed the second temporary line of resistance. The first of those -positions was behind the Zezere, extending from the Barca de Codies -to the confluence of that river with the Tagus. The second behind -the Alva, a strong and swift stream descending from the Estrella and -falling into the Mondego some miles above Coimbra. Both were strong, -the rivers deep and difficult of access, and the Sierra de Murcella -closely hugs the left bank of the Alva. - -Hill’s line of retreat from Sarzedas to the Zezere, has been already -noticed, and from that river to the Alva, there was a military road -constructed through the mountains to Espinhal. But the country from -Celerico to the Murcella, a distance of about sixty miles, is one -long defile, lying between the Sierra Estrella and the Mondego. The -ridge upon which Celerico stands, being a shoot from the Estrella, -and encircled by a sweep of the Mondego, closes this defile in front. -In like manner the Sierra Murcella, covered by the Alva river, closes -it in the rear, and the intermediate parts are but a succession of -smaller streams and lower ridges. The principal road was repaired -and joined to the road of Espinhal, and a branch was also carried -across the Mondego to Coimbra. Thus an internal communication was -established for the junction of all the corps. Nevertheless, between -Celerico and the Alva, the country was not permanently tenable, -because, from Guarda and Covilhao, there were roads over the Estrella -to Gouvea, Cea, and Gallices, towns in rear of Celerico; and the -enemy could also turn the whole tract by moving through Trancoso and -Viseu, and so down the right bank of the Mondego to Coimbra. - -But lord Wellington keeping the head of his army one march behind -Celerico, in observation of the routes over the Estrella, and his -rear close to the Alva, was master of his retreat; and as the Mondego -was fordable in summer and bridged at several points, he could pass -it by a flank movement in a few hours. Now the right bank was also -one great defile, lying between the river and the Sierra de Alcoba or -Caramula. This mountain stretching with some breaks from the Douro to -Coimbra, separates the valley of the Mondego from the coast line, and -in approaching Coimbra sends out a lofty transverse shoot, called the -Sierra de Busaco, exactly in a line with the Sierra de Murcella, and -barring the way on the right bank of the Mondego in the same manner -that the latter Sierra bars it on the left bank. Moreover this route -to Coimbra was the worst in Portugal, and crossed by several deep -tributaries of the Mondego, the most considerable of which were the -Criz and Dao. The Vouga, however, opened a passage through the Alcoba -near Viseu, and that way the French could gain the great road from -Oporto, and so continue their movement upon Coimbra. - -Such being the ground on both sides of the Mondego, the weakest point -was obviously towards the Estrella, and lord Wellington kept the mass -of his forces there. But Massena was ill-acquainted with the military -features, and absolutely ignorant of the lines of Torres Vedras. -Indeed, so circumspectly had those works been carried on, that only -vague rumours of their existence reached the bulk of the English -army; and many British officers imagined that the campaign was -only to cloak the general’s intention of embarking when he reached -Lisbon. In England the opposition asserted that he would do so: -the Portuguese dreaded it; the French army universally believed it; -and the British minsters seem to have entertained the same opinion; -for at this time an officer of engineers arrived at Lisbon, whose -instructions, received personally from lord Liverpool, were unknown -to lord Wellington, and commenced thus:--“_As it is probable that the -army will embark in September._” - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL. - - -Massena’s command, extended from the banks of the Tagus to the Bay -of Biscay, from Almeida to Burgos, and the number of his troops -present under arms exceeded one hundred and ten thousand men. -From these must be deducted thirteen thousand in the Asturias and -province of Santander, four thousand in the government of Valladolid, -eight thousand under Serras at Zamora and Benevente, and lastly, -the reserve of Bayonne under general Drouet, nineteen thousand -strong, which, organized as a ninth corps had only entered Spain in -August, being replaced at Bayonne by a fresh reserve under general -Caffarelli. Thus, the active army of invasion did not much exceed -seventy thousand; and as every man, combatant or non-combatant, is -borne on the strength of a French army, not more than fifty-five -thousand infantry and about eight thousand horsemen were with the -eagles. The ninth corps had however orders to follow the traces of -the prince of Esling, and the void thus left at Burgos and Valladolid -was supplied by sixteen thousand of the young guard. - -This arrangement shows how absurdly Napoleon has been called a -rash warrior, and one never thinking of retreat. No man ever made -bolder marches, but no man ever secured his base with more care. -Here he would not suffer any advance to fresh conquests until his -line of communication had been strengthened with three additional -fortresses,--namely, Astorga, Ciudad, and Almeida; and while he -employed sixty-five thousand men in the invasion of Portugal, he kept -more than eighty thousand in reserve. Thus, even the total loss of -the army destined to make what is technically termed “a point” upon -Lisbon, would, as a mere military disaster, have scarcely shaken his -hold of Spain. - -Massena’s instructions were to convert, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, -into places of arms for the conquest of Portugal, and to move on both -sides of the Tagus against Lisbon in the beginning of September. -Either thinking his force too weak to act upon two lines at the same -time, or trusting to the co-operation of Soult’s army from Andalusia, -he relinquished the Alemtejo, looking only to the northern bank of -the Tagus; and hence, as the experience of Junot’s march in 1807, -warned him off the Sobreira mountains, his views were confined to the -three roads of Belmonte, Celerico, and Viseu. - -[Sidenote: Note by General Pelet.] - -The strength of the positions about the Alva was known to him, as -were also the measures taken to impede a descent from Covilhao to -Espinhal; but Alorna, Pamplona, and the other Portuguese in the -French camp, with a singular ignorance, asserted that the road by -Viseu and Coimbra was easy, and that no important position covered -the latter town. Wherefore the French general resolved suddenly to -assemble all his forces, distribute thirteen days’ bread to the -soldiers, and pour in one solid mass down the right bank of the -Mondego, not doubting to reach Coimbra before general Hill could join -lord Wellington. - -In pursuance of this project the three corps were directed to -concentrate on the 16th of September; Reynier’s at Guarda; Ney’s, -and the heavy cavalry, at Maçal da Chao, and Junot’s at Pinhel. By -this disposition all three roads were alike menaced; and the allies -being kept in suspense as to the ultimate object, Massena hoped to -gain one march, a great thing, seeing that from Coimbra he was not -more than a hundred miles, whereas Hill’s distance from that town -was longer. But, to cover the real object with more care, and to -keep Hill as long as possible at Sarzedas, the French general caused -Guarda to be siezed on the 12th, by a detachment, which withdrew -again immediately, as if it were only a continuation of the former -feints; and meanwhile Reynier, having first ascertained that Mortier -was at Monasterio, threatening Estremadura, suddenly destroyed the -boat-bridge at Alcantara, and marched towards Sabugal. - -On the 13th the allies re-established their post at Guarda; but on -the 15th, it was again driven away by a considerable mass of the -enemy, and retired up the side of the Estrella. At the same time -the cavalry in front of Celerico was forced back in the centre, and -the post at Trancoso chased towards Mongualde on the left. Lord -Wellington then felt assured that the invasion was at last in serious -progress; and having ascertained, beyond a doubt, that the troops in -Guarda were of Reynier’s corps, despatched his final orders for Hill -and Leith to concentrate on the Alva. - -On the 16th, Reynier descended from Guarda to the plains bordering -the Mondego; and being there joined by the sixth corps and Montbrun’s -horsemen, the whole passed the river, and, pushing through Celerico, -drove back the cavalry posts of the allies to the village of Cortiço; -but there the first German hussars turning, overthrew the leading -squadrons, and made some prisoners. Near Cortiço, the road branching -off to the bridge of Fornos and to Gouvea; a French brigade took the -latter to cover the march of the main body which made for Fornos. But -this feint was closely watched; for there is a custom, peculiar to -the British army, of sending mounted officers, singly to observe the -enemy’s motions; and, such is their habit, that they will penetrate -through the midst of his cantonments, cross the line of his movement, -and hover, just out of musket-shot, for whole days, on the skirts of -his columns, until they obtain a clear notion of the numbers and the -true direction of the march. Colonel Waters, one of these exploring -officers, being close on the left of Reynier’s troops during this -day, reported their movements, and in the evening, leading some of -the German cavalry behind the enemy, took several prisoners and the -baggage of a general. - -The French operations were decisive. Lord Wellington directed the -first, third, and fourth divisions upon the Alva, withdrew his heavy -cavalry from the front, and placed the light division at St. Romao, -in the Estrella, to cover the head-quarters, which were transferred, -that night, to Cea. - -The 17th, the whole of the second and sixth corps were observed to -pass the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard entered Mongualde; -but the eighth corps still kept the road leading towards Oporto, for -ten thousand militia of the northern provinces, forming the brigades -of Trant, Wilson, and Miller, were collected upon the Douro to -harass the enemy’s right flank and rear, and Trant, with about three -thousand, was already at Moimenta de Beira, in the defiles leading -through the hills to Lamego. The country between the Coa and Coimbra, -on both sides of the Mondego, had been before laid waste, the -mills were destroyed, the ordenança were in arms, and the helpless -population hidden amongst the highest mountains. - -On the 18th, the French advanced guard reached the deserted city of -Viseu. Pack’s Portuguese brigade immediately passed the Mondego at -Fosdao, and took post beyond the Criz; and general Pakenham, with a -brigade of the first division, entered Coimbra, to protect it from -the enemy’s scouting parties. On the 19th, captain Somers Cocks, -a very gallant and zealous officer, commanding the cavalry post -which had been driven from Guarda, came down from the Estrella, and -following the enemy through Celerico, ascertained that neither sick -men nor stores were left behind: hence it was evident that Massena, -relinquishing his communications, had thrown his cavalry, infantry, -artillery, parcs, baggage and hospital waggons, in one mass, upon -the worst road in Portugal. The allies were now in motion also to -cross the Mondego, when a false report, that the enemy was again on -the left bank, arrested the general movement. The next day, however, -the third, fourth, and light divisions, and the British cavalry -passed the river at Pena Cova, Olivarez, and other places, and were -distributed; the light division at Mortagao supporting Pack; the -third and fourth in the villages between the Sierra de Busaco and -Mortagao; and the horse on a plain in front of the latter place, -connecting the light division with Pack’s brigade. - -But the eighth corps still pointed towards the valley of the Vouga; -and it was doubtful whether Massena would not that way gain the main -road from Oporto to Coimbra; wherefore general Spencer, with the -first division, marched upon Milheada, and Trant was directed to join -him by a march through San Pedro de Sul to Sardao. Meanwhile Leith -arrived on the Alva, and general Hill was only one march behind; for -having discovered Reynier’s movements on the 12th, and, at the same -time, getting intelligence that all the French boats on the Tagus -had been destroyed, he, with a ready decision, anticipating lord -Wellington’s orders, directed his artillery by Thomar, and putting -his troops in motion that evening, reached Espisnal on the 20th, -and was there joined by general Lecor, who, with equal vigour and -judgement, had brought the Portuguese brigade, by long marches, from -Fundao. On the 21st, Hill arrived on the Alva, and pushed his cavalry -in observation beyond that river. Thus the two corps of the allied -army were united on the same day that the main body of the enemy -entered Viseu; and, although the French horsemen were on the Criz, -the bridges had been destroyed by Pack; and the project of surprising -Coimbra was baffled. - -Neither had Massena failed to experience other evil consequences -from his false movement. He had been obliged to repair the road from -day to day for his artillery; and it was still twenty miles from -Viseu on the 19th. Trant, aware of this, formed the hardy project of -destroying it; and quitting Moimenta de Beira in the night, with -a squadron of cavalry, two thousand militia, and five guns, on the -20th, surprised a patrole of ten men, from whom he learnt that the -convoy was at hand, and that Montbrun’s cavalry was close in the -rear. The defiles were, however, narrow, and, Trant charging the head -of the escort, took a hundred prisoners and some baggage. The convoy -then fell back, and the militia followed; the ways being so narrow -that Montbrun could never come up to the front. At this time, a -resolute attack would have thrown all into confusion, but the militia -were unmanageable; and the enemy, having at last rallied a few men, -and repulsed the Portuguese cavalry, with a loss of twelve troopers, -the whole got into disorder, and Trant, seeing nothing more was to -be effected, returned to Moimenta de Beira, and from thence marched -to Lamego with his prisoners. The French, ignorant of the number and -quality of their assailants, still fell back, and did not finally -reach Viseu until the 23d; by which, Massena lost two most important -days. - -While these events were passing in the valley of Mondego, a small -expedition from Cadiz again landed at Moguer, to aid Copons in -collecting provisions on the Tinto. It was, however, quickly obliged -to re-embark; and Copons was defeated by general Remond, with the -loss of three hundred men on the 15th. Meanwhile, Romana attacked the -French posts near Monasterio, pushing his cavalry towards Seville. -Soult sent the fifth corps against him, and he retired; but was -beaten at Los Santos on the same day that Copons had been defeated on -the Tinto. The pursuit was continued to Fuente del Maestre; and the -whole army was like to disperse in flight, when Madden’s Portuguese -cavalry came up, and, charging the pursuers with signal gallantry, -overthrew the leading squadrons, recovered some prisoners, and gained -time for the Spaniards to rally. Nevertheless, the French entered -Zafra, and Romana retreated, by Almendralejo and Merida to Montijo, -on the 18th, throwing a garrison into Olivenza, and three battalions -into Badajos. Being, however, sensible that the latter place was in -no condition to resist a serious attack, he directed the Junta to -repair to Valencia d’Alcantara, and took refuge himself at Elvas. - -Lord Wellington’s anticipations were thus realized and the Alemtejo -laid open. Fortunately for the allies, Sebastiani was at this -moment near Carthagena in pursuit of the Murcian army, and a fresh -insurrection breaking out in the mountains of Grenada the castles -of Motril and Almunecar were taken; Copons also advanced to the -Tinto, and all these calls upon Soult taking place at one time, he -was unable to bring quite twelve thousand men to Zafra; a number -inadequate to the invasion of the Alemtejo, the more especially -that several regiments withdrawn from Cadiz, and others coming from -England had reached Lisbon about this period, and formed a reserve -for the allies, of more than five thousand British troops. Wherefore -the French returned to Ronquillo, the Spaniards again advanced to -Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Araceña, and this dangerous crisis -glided gently away. But, to understand this, it is necessary to shew -how encreasing political embarrassments had thwarted the original -plan of the English general. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -The first vexatious interference of the Souza faction had been -checked, but the loss of Almeida furnished a favourable opportunity -to renew their clamorous hostility to the military proceedings. -Falsely asserting, that the provisions of that fortress had been -carried away by the English commissaries; and as falsely pretending -that lord Wellington had promised to raise the siege, this party -hypocritically assumed, that his expressions of sorrow for its fall -were indications of an intention to remove by a splendid victory the -public despondency. They vehemently insisted, also, on a defence -of the frontier, inveighed against the destruction of the mills, -and endeavoured to force their own friends of the fidalgo faction -even on to the staff of marshal Beresford, that they might the more -readily embarrass the operations. Meanwhile, neglecting or delaying -the measures agreed upon for laying waste the country, they protected -the minor authorities when disobedient, refrained from punishing -delinquents, and took every occasion to mislead the public mind at -the very moment when the enemy commenced the invasion. Nor was there -wanting either accident or indiscretion to encrease the growing -confusion. - -When Almeida fell, an officer of the guards writing to a friend -at Oporto, indiscreetly asserted, that Massena was advancing in -front with a hundred thousand French, and that eighty thousand more -were moving in rear of the allies upon Lisbon. This letter being -immediately made public, created such a panic amongst the English -merchants, that one and all applied for ships to carry their families -and property away, and there arose such a tumult that Trant was -obliged to quit his command for the purpose of suppressing the -commotion. To dry this source of mischief lord Wellington issued -proclamations; and, in the orders of the day, declared that he would -not seek to ascertain the author of this and similar letters, being -assured that the feelings and sense of the officers would prevent any -repetition. - -To the regency he addressed himself in a more peremptory and -severe manner, reproving them for the false colouring given to his -communications, and informing them that he would never “_permit -public clamour and panic to induce him to change, in the smallest -degree, a system and plan of operation which he had adopted after -mature consideration, and which daily experience proved to be the -only one likely to produce a good end_.” But this remonstrance only -increased the virulence of his opponents; and such was their conduct, -that, before lord Wellington reached Busaco, he was obliged to tell -them, “_their miserable intrigues must cease or he would advise his -own government to withdraw the British army_.” - -Meanwhile their proceedings had been so mischievously successful, -that the country between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the Lines, still -contained provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing -winter, and the people were alike unprepared to expect an enemy or to -attempt a removal of their property. - -Lord Wellington could but choose then, between stopping the invaders -on the Mondego, or wasting the country by force as he retreated. -But what an act the last! His hopes depended upon the degree of -moral strength he was enabled to call forth, and he would have had -to retire with a mixed force before a powerful army and an eminent -commander, his rear guard engaged, and his advance driving miserable -multitudes before it to the capital, where nothing was prepared to -save them from famine, but where the violent and powerful faction in -the regency was ready to misrepresent every proceeding, and inflame -the people’s minds; and this, when the court of Rio Janeiro was -discontented, and the English ministers, as I shall have occasion -to shew, panic-stricken by the desponding letters of some general -officers about the commander-in-chief! It was evidently necessary to -fight, although Massena had above sixty thousand veterans, and lord -Wellington could only bring about fifty thousand men into line, more -than half of which were untried soldiers. - -The consequences of such a battle were not, however, to be estimated -by the result on the field. The French general might indeed gain -every thing by a victory; but, if defeated, his powerful cavalry and -the superior composition and experience of his army would prevent -it from being very injurious; or a serious check might induce him -to turn his attention from Coimbra towards Oporto, contenting -himself with the capture of that city, and the reduction of the -northern provinces, until more formidable preparations should enable -him to renew his first design. Nor could the time thus gained by -the allies be as profitably employed in the defence. The French -could be reinforced to any amount, whereas the English general’s -resources could not be much improved, and it was very doubtful if -either England or Portugal would longer endure the war, without some -palpable advantage to balance the misery and the expense. - -Such was the state of affairs, when the allies passed to the right -bank of the Mondego with a view to fight the battle thus forced upon -their general. While the French remained concentrated at Viseu, the -first division, under Spencer, was held at Milheada in observation of -the great road from Oporto; the light division at Mortagao watching -the road from Viseu, and the remainder of the army in reserve ready -to move to either side. But when the French advanced guard had -repaired the bridges over the Criz, and passed that river, lord -Wellington recalled the first division, and fixed upon the Sierra de -Busaco for his position of battle. - -This mountain, about eight miles in length, abuts to the right on the -Mondego, and on the left is connected with the Sierra de Caramula by -a hilly rugged country, impervious to the march of an army. A road -along the crest of Busaco afforded an easy communication, and at Pena -Cova, just behind the right hand extremity, a ford in the Mondego -permitted the troops to pass in a few hours to the Murcella ridge, -behind the Alva. The face of Busaco was steep, rough, and fit for -defence. The artillery of the allies fixed on certain points, could -play along the front freely, and there was some ground on the summit -suitable for a small body of cavalry; but neither guns nor horsemen -of the enemy had a fair field, their infantry were to contend -with every difficulty, and the approach to the position was also -unfavourable to an attacking army. - -After passing the Criz, a table-land permitted Massena to march, in a -wide order of battle, to Mortagao; but then a succession of ascending -ridges led to the Sierra Busaco, which was separated from the last -by a chasm, so profound, that the naked eye could hardly distinguish -the movement of troops in the bottom, yet in parts so narrow that -twelve-pounders could range to the salient points on the opposite -side. From Mortagao four roads conducted to Coimbra. The first, -unfrequented and narrow, crossed the Caramula to Boyalva, a village -situated on the western slope of that sierra, and from thence led to -Sardao and Milheada. The other roads, penetrating through the rough -ground in front, passed over the Sierra de Busaco; one by a large -convent on the right hand of the highest point of the ridge; a second -on the left hand of this culminating point, by a village called St. -Antonio de Cantara; and a third, which was a branch from the second, -followed the Mondego to Pena Cova. - -When this formidable position was chosen, some officers expressed -their fears that Massena would not assail it. “_But, if he does, -I shall beat him_,” was the reply of the English general, who was -well assured that the prince would attack; for his advanced guard -was already over the Criz, the second and sixth corps were in mass -on the other side of that river, and it was improbable that so -celebrated a commander would, at the mere sight of a strong position, -make a retrograde movement, change all his dispositions, and adopt -a new line of operations by the Vouga, which would be exposed also -to the militia under Baccellar. Massena was, indeed, only anxious -for a battle, and, being still under the influence of Alorna’s and -Pamplona’s false reports, as to the nature of the country in his -front, never doubted that the allies would retire before him. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -General Pack, on the 22d, destroyed the bridges over the Criz, -and fell back upon the light division; but, the 23d, the enemy -re-established the communications, passed the river, and obliged -the British horse to quit the plain, and take to the hills behind -Mortagao. Three squadrons of light and one regiment of heavy cavalry -were retained there by lord Wellington; but the rest he sent over -the Sierra de Busaco to the low country about Milheada, whence he -recalled Spencer, and at the same time caused the third and fourth -divisions to take their ground on the position, the former at St. -Antonio de Cantara, the latter at the convent. But the light division -falling back only a league, encamped in a pine-wood, where happened -one of those extraordinary panics that, in ancient times, were -attributed to the influence of a hostile god. No enemy was near, -no alarm was given, yet suddenly the troops, as if seized with a -phrenzy, started from sleep, and dispersed in every direction; nor -was there any possibility of allaying this strange terror, until some -persons called out that the enemy’s cavalry were amongst them, when -the soldiers mechanically run together in masses, and the illusion -was instantly dissipated. - -The 24th, the enemy appeared in force, and skirmished with the -picquets in front of Montagao, when the light division, again -retiring four miles, occupied strong ground, and, in the evening, -some of the enemy’s cavalry approaching too close, were charged by a -squadron of the fourteenth dragoons, and overthrown, with the loss of -twenty or thirty men. - -Early on the 25th, Crawfurd moved down from his post, and appeared -somewhat disposed to renew the scene at the Coa; for the enemy’s -cavalry were gathering in front, and the heads of three infantry -columns were plainly descried on the table-land above Mortagao, -coming on abreast, and with a most impetuous pace, while heavy clouds -of dust, rising and loading the atmosphere for miles behind, showed -that the whole French army had passed the Criz, and was in full -march to attack. The cavalry skirmishers were already exchanging -pistol-shots, when lord Wellington, suddenly arriving, ordered the -division to retire, and, taking the personal direction, covered the -retreat with the fifty-second and ninety-fifth, the cavalry, and -Ross’s troop of horse-artillery. Nor was there a moment to lose: -the enemy, with incredible rapidity, brought up both infantry and -guns, and fell on so briskly, that all the skill of the general -and the readiness of the excellent troops composing the rear -guard, could scarcely prevent the division from being dangerously -engaged. Howbeit, a series of rapid and beautiful movements, a -sharp cannonade, and an hour’s march, brought everything back, in -good order, to the great position; but, almost at the same moment, -the opposite ridge was crowned by the masses of the sixth corps, -and the French batteries opened as the English troops mounted the -steep ascent on which the convent was situated. Meanwhile, Reynier, -taking the left hand route, along which a Portuguese battalion had -retired, arrived at St. Antonio de Cantara, in front of the third -division, and before three o’clock, forty thousand French infantry -were embattled on the two points, and the sharp musketry of the -skirmishers arose from the dark-wooded chasms beneath. - -Ney, whose military glance was magical, perceived in an instant that -the position, a crested not a table mountain, could not hide any -strong reserve, that it was scarcely half occupied, and that great -part of the allied troops were moving from one place to another, with -that sort of confusion which generally attends the first taking up -of unknown ground. He desired to make an early and powerful attack; -but the prince of Esling was at Montagao, ten miles in the rear, and -an aide-de-camp, despatched to inform him of the state of affairs, -after attending two hours for an audience, was (as I have been -informed) told that everything must await Massena’s arrival. Thus -a most favourable opportunity was lost; for the first division of -the allies, although close at hand, was not upon the ridge; Leith’s -troops, now called the fifth division, were in the act of passing -the Mondego; Hill was still behind the Alva; scarcely twenty-five -thousand men were actually in line, and there were great intervals -between the divisions. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.] - -Reynier coincided with Ney; and they wrote in concert to Massena, -on the 26th, intimating their joint desire to attack. The prince -of Esling, however, did not reach the field until twelve o’clock, -bringing with him the eighth corps, with which, and the cavalry, -he formed a reserve, connecting the sixth and second corps, and -then sending out his skirmishers along the whole front, proceeded -carefully to examine the position from left to right. - -The situation of the allies was now greatly changed. Hill’s corps, -having crossed the Mondego, was posted athwart the road leading over -the Sierra to Pena Cova; on his left Leith prolonged the line of -defence, having the Lusitanian legion in reserve. Picton, with the -third division, supported by Champlemond’s Portuguese brigade, was -next to Leith, and Spencer, with the first division, occupied the -highest part of the ridge, being between Picton and the convent. The -fourth division closed the extreme left, covering a path leading to -Milheada, where the cavalry held the flat country, one heavy regiment -only being kept in reserve on the summit of the sierra. Pack’s -brigade, forming an advanced guard to the first division, was posted -half way down the descent, and the light division, supported by a -German brigade, occupied a piece of ground jutting out nearly half a -mile in front of and about two hundred feet lower than the convent, -the space between being naturally scooped like the hollow of a wave -before it breaks. Along the whole of the front skirmishers were -thrown out on the mountain side, and about fifty pieces of artillery -were disposed upon the salient points. - -Ney was averse to attack after the delay which had taken place, but -Massena resolved to attempt carrying the position. Reynier thought -that he had only to deal with a rear-guard of the allies, and the -prince, whether partaking of this error, or confident in the valour -of his army, directed the second and sixth corps to fall on the next -day, each to its own front, while the eighth corps, the cavalry, and -the artillery remained in reserve. To facilitate the attack the light -French troops, dropping by twos and threes into the lowest parts of -the valley, endeavoured, in the evening, to steal up the wooded -dells and hollows, and to establish themselves unseen close to the -picquets of the light division. Some companies of rifle corps and -caçadores checked this, but similar attempts made with more or less -success at different points of the position, seeming to indicate a -night attack, excited all the vigilance of the troops. Yet, were it -otherwise, none but veterans, tired of war, could have slept, for the -weather was calm and fine, and the dark mountain masses, rising on -either side, were crowned with innumerable fires, around which more -than a hundred thousand brave men were gathered. - - -BATTLE OF BUSACO. - -Before day-break on the 27th, the French formed five columns of -attack; three under Ney, opposite to the convent, and two under -Reynier, at St. Antonio de Cantara, these points being about three -miles asunder. Reynier’s troops had comparatively easier ground -before them, and were in the midst of the picquets and skirmishers -of the third division almost as soon as they could be perceived to -be in movement. The allies resisted vigorously, and six guns played -along the ascent with grape, but in less than half an hour the French -were close upon the summit, so swiftly and with such astonishing -power and resolution did they scale the mountain, overthrowing every -thing that opposed their progress. The right of the third division -was forced back; the eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces, -and the hostile masses gained the highest part of the crest, just -between the third and the fifth divisions. The leading battalions -immediately established themselves amongst the crowning rocks, and -a confused mass wheeled to the right, intending to sweep the summit -of the sierra, but at that moment lord Wellington caused two guns to -open with grape upon their flank, while a heavy musketry was still -poured into their front, and, in a little time, the forty-fifth and -the eighty-eighth regiments charged so furiously that even fresh -men could not have withstood them. The French, quite spent with -their previous efforts, opened a straggling fire, and both parties, -mingling together, went down the mountain side with a mighty clamour -and confusion; the dead and dying strewing the way even to the bottom -of the valley. - -Meanwhile the French who first gained the summit had re-formed their -ranks with the right resting upon a precipice overhanging the reverse -side of the Sierra, and thus the position was in fact gained, if -any reserve had been at hand, for the greatest part of the third -division, British and Portuguese, were fully engaged, and a misty -cloud capped the summit, so that the enemy, thus ensconced amongst -the rocks, could not be seen, except by general Leith. That officer -had put his first brigade in motion to his own left as soon as he -perceived the vigorous impression made on the third division, and he -was now coming on rapidly; yet he had two miles of rugged ground to -pass in a narrow column before he could mingle in the fight. Keeping -the royals in reserve, he directed the thirty-eighth to turn the -right of the French; but the precipice prevented this; and meanwhile -colonel Cameron, informed by a staff-officer of the critical state -of affairs, formed the ninth regiment in line under a violent fire, -and, without returning a single shot, ran in upon and drove the -grenadiers from the rocks with irresistible bravery, plying them with -a destructive musketry as long as they could be reached, and yet with -excellent discipline refraining from pursuit, lest the crest of the -position should be again lost, for the mountain was so rugged that it -was impossible to judge clearly of the general state of the action. -The victory was, however, secure. Hill’s corps edged in towards the -scene of action; the second brigade of Leith joined the first, and a -great mass of fresh troops was thus concentrated, while Reynier had -neither reserves nor guns to restore the fight. - -Ney’s attack had as little success. From the abutment of the mountain -upon which the light division was stationed, the lowest parts of the -valley could be discerned. The ascent was steeper and more difficult -than where Reynier had attacked, and Crawfurd, in a happy mood of -command, had made masterly dispositions. The table-land between him -and the convent was sufficiently scooped to conceal the forty-third -and fifty-second regiments, drawn up in line; and a quarter of a mile -behind them, but on higher ground and close to the convent, a brigade -of German infantry appeared to be the only solid line of resistance -on this part of the position. In front of the two British regiments, -some rocks, overhanging the descent, furnished natural embrasures, in -which the guns of the division were placed, and the whole face of the -hill was planted with the skirmishers of the rifle corps and of the -two Portuguese caçadores battalions. - -While it was yet dark, a straggling musketry was heard in the deep -hollows separating the armies; and when the light broke, the three -divisions of the sixth corps were observed entering the woods below -and throwing forward a profusion of skirmishers; soon afterwards -Marchand’s division emerging from the hollow, took the main road, as -if to turn the right of the light division, Loison’s made straight up -the face of the mountain in front, and the third remained in reserve. - -General Simon’s brigade, which led Loison’s attack, ascended with a -wonderful alacrity, and though the light troops plied it unceasingly -with musketry, and the artillery bullets swept through it from the -first to the last section, its order was never disturbed, nor its -speed in the least abated. Ross’s guns were worked with incredible -quickness, yet their range was palpably contracted every round, -and the enemy’s shot came singing up in a sharper key, until the -skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the -edge of the ascent, when the artillery suddenly drew back, and the -victorious cries of the French were heard within a few yards of the -summit. Crawfurd, who standing alone on one of the rocks, had been -intently watching the progress of the attack, then turned, and in a -quick shrill tone desired the two regiments in reserve to charge. The -next moment a horrid shout startled the French column, and eighteen -hundred British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill. -Yet so truly brave and hardy were the leaders of the enemy, that each -man of the first section raised his musket, and two officers and ten -soldiers fell before them. Not a Frenchman had missed his mark! They -could do no more! The head of their column was violently overturned -and driven upon the rear, both flanks were lapped over by the -English wings, and three terrible discharges at five yards’ distance -completed the route. In a few minutes a long trail of carcasses and -broken arms indicated the line of retreat. The main body of the -British stood fast; but several companies followed the pursuit down -the mountain, until Ney moving forward his reserve, and opening his -guns from the opposite height killed some men, and thus warned the -rest to recover their own ground. The German brigade then spread over -the hill, and the light division resumed its original position. - -Loison shewed no disposition to renew the attack, but Marchand’s -people, who had followed the main road, broke into several masses, -gained a pine wood half-way up the mountain, and sent a cloud of -their skirmishers against the highest part, at the very moment that -Simon was defeated. Such however was the difficulty of ascending, -that Pack alone held the enemy in check, and half a mile higher up, -Spencer shewed a line of the royal guards which forbade any hope of -success; and from the salient point of land occupied by the light -division, Crawfurd’s artillery took the main body of the French in -the wood, in flank. Ney, who was there in person, after sustaining -this murderous fire for an hour, relinquished the attack. The -desultory fighting of the light troops then ceased, and before two -o’clock Crawfurd having assented to a momentary truce, parties of -both armies were mixed amicably together searching for the wounded -men. - -Towards evening, however, a French company having, with signal -audacity, seized a village within half-musket shot of the light -division, refused to retire; which so incensed Crawfurd that, turning -twelve guns on the village, he overwhelmed it with bullets for -half an hour. After paying the French captain this distinguished -honour, the English general recovering his temper, sent a company of -the forty-third down, which cleared the village in a few minutes. -Meanwhile an affecting incident, contrasting strongly with the savage -character of the preceding events, added to the interest of the day. -A poor orphan Portuguese girl, about seventeen years of age, and -very handsome, was seen coming down the mountain and driving an ass, -loaded with all her property, through the midst of the French army. -She had abandoned her dwelling in obedience to the proclamation, -and now passed over the field of battle with a childish simplicity, -totally unconscious of her perilous situation, and scarcely -understanding which were the hostile and which the friendly troops, -for no man on either side was so brutal as to molest her. - -In this battle of Busaco, the French after astonishing efforts of -valour, were repulsed, in the manner to be expected from the strength -of the ground, and the goodness of the soldiers opposed to them; and -their loss, although prodigiously exaggerated at the time, was great. -General Graind’orge and about eight hundred men were slain, generals -Foy and Merle wounded, Simon made prisoner, and the sum total may be -estimated at four thousand five hundred men, while that of the allies -did not exceed thirteen hundred. For on the one side musketry and -artillery were brought into full activity, but the French sought to -gain the day by resolution and audacity rather than by fire. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 7._ - - OPERATIONS - on the - MONDEGO, - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -After this Massena judged the position of Busaco impregnable, and -to turn it by the Mondego impossible, as the allies could pass -that river quicker than himself. But a peasant informed him of the -road leading from Mortagao over the Caramula to Boyalva, and he -resolved to turn lord Wellington’s left. To cover this movement -the skirmishing was renewed with such vigour on the 28th, that a -general battle was for some time expected. Yet an ostentatious -display of men, the disappearance of baggage, and the throwing up -of entrenchments on the hill covering the roads to Mortagao plainly -indicated some other design. Howbeit, it was not until evening when -the enemy’s masses in front being sensibly diminished, and his -cavalry descried winding over the distant mountains, that the project -became quite apparent. Hill then crossed the Mondego, and retired by -Espinal upon Thomar, while the centre and left of the army defiled in -the night by the other roads upon Milheada. In this manner Busaco was -evacuated before the 29th, the guns followed the convent road, and -the light division furnished the rear-guard until they passed Fornos, -when the open country enabled the cavalry to relieve them. - -Massena’s scouts reached Boyalva in the evening of the 28th, and it -has been erroneously asserted, that Trant’s absence from Sardao alone -enabled the French general to execute his design. Trant was however -at Sardao, four miles from Boyalva before one o’clock on the 28th; -but having, through a mistake of Baccellar’s, marched from Lamego, by -the circuitous route of Oporto, instead of the direct road through -San Pedro do Sul, he lost men from fatigue and desertion, and could -bring only fifteen hundred militia into line; hence his absence or -presence could have produced no effect whatever, even though he had, -as lord Wellington intended, been at Boyalva itself. - -Accordingly, the French cavalry, pushing between him and the British -horse, on the 29th cut off one of his patroles, and the next morning -drove him, with the loss of twenty men, behind the Vouga. When -Massena’s main body had cleared the defiles of Boyalva, it marched -upon Coimbra, and the allies, crossing the Mondego at that city, -commenced the passage of the defiles leading upon Condexa and Pombal. -The commissariat stores, which had been previously removed from -Raiva de Pena Cova to Figueras, were embarked at Peniché; the light -division and the cavalry remained on the right bank of the river; and -Baccellar was directed to bring down all the militia of the northern -provinces upon the Vouga. - -But, notwithstanding the proclamations and the urgent, and even -menacing remonstrances of the English general, the Portuguese Regency -had not wasted the country behind the Mondego. During the few days -that the enemy was stopped at Busaco, only the richest inhabitants -had quitted Coimbra; when the allied army retreated, that city was -still populous; and when the approach of the enemy left no choice -but to fly or to risk the punishment of death and infamy announced -in the proclamation, so direful a scene of distress ensued that the -most hardened of men could not behold it without emotion. Mothers, -with children of all ages; the sick, the old, the bedridden, and even -lunatics, went or were carried forth; the most part, with little -hope and less help, to journey for days in company with contending -armies. Fortunately for this unhappy multitude, the weather was fine, -and the roads firm, or the greatest number must have perished in the -most deplorable manner. And, notwithstanding all this misery, the -object was not gained: the people fled, but the provisions were left, -and the mills were but partially and imperfectly ruined. - -On the 1st of October, the outposts were attacked, and driven from -the hills bounding the plain of Coimbra to the north. The French, on -entering this plain, suffered some loss from a cannonade, and the -British cavalry were drawn up in line, but with no serious intention -of fighting, and were soon after withdrawn across the Mondego, yet -somewhat unskilfully; for the French following briskly, cut down some -men even in the middle of the river, and were only prevented from -forcing the passage by a strong skirmish, in which fifty or sixty men -fell. - -This scrambling affair obliged the light division to march hastily -through the city, to gain the defiles of Condeixa, which commence at -the end of the bridge; and all the inhabitants who had not before -quitted the place rushed out, each with what could be caught up in -the hand, and driving before them a number of animals loaded with -sick people or children. At the entrance to the bridge, the press was -so great that the troops halted for a few moments, just under the -prison; the jailor had fled with the keys, the prisoners, crowding -to the windows, were endeavouring to tear down the bars with their -hands, and even with their teeth, and bellowing in the most frantic -manner, while the bitter lamentations of the multitude increased, -and the pistol-shots of the cavalry, engaged at the ford below, were -distinctly heard. - -Captain William Campbell, an officer of Crawfurd’s staff, burst the -prison-doors, and released the wretched inmates, while the troops -forced their way over the bridge; yet, at the other end, the up-hill -road, passing between high rocks, was so crowded that no effort, even -of the artillery, could make way. A troop of French dragoons crossed -a ford, and hovering close upon the flank, increased the confusion; -and a single regiment of foot would have sufficed to destroy the -division, wedged in, as it was, in a hollow way, and totally -incapable of advancing, retreating, or breaking out on either side. -At last, some of the infantry opened a passage on the right flank, -and, by great exertions, the road was cleared for the guns; but it -was not until after dusk that the division reached Condeixa, although -the distance was less than eight miles. Head-quarters were that night -at Redinha, and the next day at Leiria. - -Hitherto the marches had been easy, the weather fine, and provisions -abundant; nevertheless, the usual disorders of a retreat had already -commenced. In Coimbra, a quantity of harness and intrenching tools -were scattered in the streets; at Leiria, the magazines were -plundered by the troops and camp-followers; and, at Condeixa, a -magazine of tents, shoes, spirits, and salt meat was destroyed, or -abandoned to the enemy: and, while the streets were flowing, ancle -deep, with rum, the light division and Pack’s Portuguese brigade, at -the distance of a quarter of a mile, were obliged to slaughter their -own bullocks, and received only half rations of liquor. - -Lord Wellington arrested this growing disorder with a strong hand. -Three men, taken in the fact at Leiria, were hanged on the spot; and -some regiments, whose discipline was more tainted than others, were -forbidden to enter a village. This vigorous exercise of command, -aided by the fine weather and the enemy’s inactivity, restored -order amongst the allies; while Massena’s conduct, the reverse of -the English general’s, introduced the confusion of a retreat in -the pursuing army. In Coimbra, the French general permitted waste; -and, in a few days, resources were dissipated that, under good -arrangements, would have supplied his troops for two months: and, -during this licentious delay, the advantage gained by his dangerous -flank march to Boyalva was lost. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. “_Attack vigorously, after having observed well where to -strike._” This simple, but profound expression in Napoleon’s letter -of service, forms the test by which the prince of Esling’s operations -should be judged. - -2º. The design of turning the strong ground behind Celerico, by the -route of Viseu, required close and rapid movements; yet the French -general did not quit Viseu, to march against Coimbra, until the tenth -day after passing the Pinhel. This was not a “_a vigorous attack_.” - -3º. Massena should have brought the allies to action in a forward -position; and he might have done so either when Almeida fell, or -before that event, because the complement of mules for the service -of the army not being then full, the commissariat was dependent -upon the country carts; and when the first retrograde movement took -place from Alverca, the drivers fled with their animals, producing -infinite confusion in the rear. The commissary-general Kennedy -contrived, indeed, to procure fifteen hundred additional mules; but, -intermediately, a brisk advance of the enemy would have forced the -English general to fight, or retire more hastily than would have -beseemed his reputation, or suited his political position. - -4º. If the prince of Esling had not been misled by Alorna and -Pamplona, and the more readily that the estates of the latter were -situated about Coimbra, he would have judged that the line his -adversary had studied for eight months, and now so carefully and -jealously guarded, was more likely to afford advantages, than the -circuitous route by Viseu, which was comparatively neglected. The -French general, ill acquainted with the scene of action, but having -the stronger and more moveable army, should have followed closely. - -A rapid pursuit, through Celerico, would have brought the French -army on to the Alva before Hill or even Leith could have joined -lord Wellington. The latter must then have fought with half his own -army, or he must have retreated to the Lines. If he offered battle, -his position could be turned either by the right or left; on the -left by the slopes of the Estrella, on the right by crossing the -Mondego, for Busaco was too extensive to be occupied before Hill -and Leith arrived. Now, the road by Viseu being the longest and -least practicable, demanded great diligence to compensate for the -difficulties of the way, and to gain Coimbra and force the allies -to a battle before Hill arrived, were objects more readily to be -attained by the left bank of the Mondego. The point where to strike -was therefore not “_well considered_,” and it is clear that Massena -did not rightly estimate the greatness of his enterprise. - -5º. When the rocks of Busaco glittering with bayonets first rose on -the prince of Esling’s view, two fresh questions were to be solved. -Was he to attack or to turn that formidable post? Or, availing -himself of his numerical strength and central situation, was he to -keep the allies in check, seize Oporto, and neglect Lisbon until -better combinations could be made? The last question has been already -discussed; but, contrary to the general opinion, the attack upon -Busaco appears to me faulty in the execution rather than in the -conception; and the march by which that position was finally turned, -a violation of the soundest principles of war. In a purely military -view, the English general may be censured for not punishing his -adversary’s rashness. - -With respect to the attack, sixty-five thousand French veterans had -no reason to believe that fifty thousand mixed and inexperienced -troops, distributed on a mountain more than eight miles long, were -impregnably posted. It would have been no overweening presumption -in the French general to expect, that three corps well disposed, -supported by a numerous artillery, and led on the first day, (as -Ney desired,) might carry some part of the position, and it is an -error, also, to suppose that guns could not have been used: the -light division were constantly within range, and thirty pieces of -artillery employed on that point would have wonderfully aided the -attack by the sixth corps. But when a general in chief remains ten -miles from a field of battle, gives his adversary two days to settle -in a position, makes his attacks without connection, and without -artillery, and brings forward no reserves, success is impossible even -with the valiant soldiers Massena commanded. - -6º. “_An army should always be in condition to fight._” - -“_A general should never abandon one line of communication without -establishing another._” - -“_Flank marches within reach of an enemy are rash and injudicious._” - -These maxims of the greatest of all generals have been illustrated -by many examples; Senef, Kollin, Rosbach, the valley of the Brenta, -Salamanca, attest their value. Now, Massena violated all three, by -his march to Boyalva, and some peculiar circumstances, or desperate -crisis of affairs should be shewn, to warrant such a departure -from general principles. Sir Joshua Reynolds, treating of another -art says, “_genius begins where rules end_.” But here genius was -dormant, and rules disregarded. Massena was not driven to a desperate -game. The conquest of Oporto was open to him, or a march by Viseu -upon the Vouga, which, though demanding time, was safe; while in -that by Boyalva, he threw his whole army into a single and narrow -defile, within ten miles of an enemy in position; and that also (as -I have been informed by an officer of marshal Ney’s staff) with much -disorder: the baggage and commissariat, the wounded and sick, the -artillery, cavalry, and infantry, mixed together; discord raging -amongst the generals, confusion amongst the soldiers, and in the -night season when every difficulty is doubled. His “_army was not, -then, in a condition to fight_.” He was making “_a flank march within -reach of an enemy in position_,” and he was “_abandoning his line of -communication without having established another_.” - -7º. Lord Wellington was within four hours march of either end of the -defile, through which the French army was moving. He might have sent -the first division and the cavalry (forming with Portuguese regular -troops, and Trant’s militia, a mass of twelve or fourteen thousand -men) to Sardao, to head the French in the defile; while the second, -third, fourth, fifth, and light divisions, advancing by Martagao, -assailed their rear. That he did not do so, is to be attributed to -his political position. War is full of mischances, and the loss of a -single brigade might have caused the English government to abandon -the contest altogether. Nevertheless, his retreat was more critically -dangerous than such an attack would have been, and in a military view -the battle of Busaco should not have been fought: it was extraneous -to his original plan, it was forced upon him by events, and was in -fine a political battle. - -8º. Massena’s march, being unopposed, was successful. The allied -army could not cope with him in the open country between Busaco and -the sea, where his cavalry would have had a fair field; hence lord -Wellington, reverting to his original plan, retreated by the Coimbra -and Espinhal roads. But the prince of Esling was at Avelans de Cima -and Milheada on the 30th, the allied cavalry and the light division -being still on the right bank of the Mondego, which was fordable in -many places below Coimbra. Had the French general, directing his -march through Tentugal, crossed at those fords, and pushed rapidly -on to Leiria, by the route sir Arthur Wellesley followed, in 1808, -against Junot, the communication with Lisbon would have been cut: -terror and confusion would then have raged in the capital, the -patriarch’s faction would have triumphed, and a dangerous battle must -have been risked before the Lines could be reached. - -9º. When the allies had gained Leiria, and secured their line of -retreat, the fate of Portugal was still in the French general’s -hands. If he had established a fresh base at Coimbra, employed the -ninth corps to seize Oporto, secured his line of communication with -that city and with Almeida by fortified posts, and afterwards, -extending his position by the left, attacked Abrantes, and given his -hand to a corps sent by Soult from the south; not only would the -campaign have been so far a successful one, but in no other manner -could he have so effectually frustrated his adversary’s political and -military projects. Lord Wellington dreaded such a proceeding, and -hailed the renewed advance of the French army, as the rising of a -heavy cloud discovering a clear sky in the horizon beneath. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Sect. 2.] - -Even at Coimbra, the prince was unacquainted with the existence -of the lines, and believed that, beyond Santarem, the country was -open for the usage of all arms. It is strange that, when Junot, -Loison, Foy, and many other officers, who had served in Portugal, -were present, better information was not obtained; but every part -of this campaign illustrated Massena’s character, as drawn by -Napoleon:--“Brave, decided, and intrepid; dull in conversation, but -in danger acquiring clearness and force of thought; ambitious, -filled with self-love, neglectful of discipline, regardless of good -administration, and, consequently, disliked by the troops; his -dispositions for battle were bad, but his temper was pertinacious to -the last degree, and he was never discouraged!” - -10º. It appears that the French reached Coimbra at the moment when -the fourteen days’ bread, carried by the soldiers, was exhausted, and -it is worthy of consideration that French soldiers are accustomed to -carry so much bread. Other nations, especially the English, would -not husband it; yet it was a practice of the ancient Romans, and it -ought to be the practice of all armies. It requires a long previous -discipline and well-confirmed military habits; but, without it, men -are only half efficient, especially for offensive warfare. The secret -of making perfect soldiers is only to be found in national customs -and institutions; men should come to the ranks fitted, by previous -habits, for military service, instead of being stretched as it were -upon the bed of Procrustes, by a discipline which has no resource but -fear. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - -From the 1st of October until the 3d, the French army was in -disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria, -leaving his sick and wounded, with a slender guard, (in all about -four thousand seven hundred men,) at Coimbra. His hospital was -established at the convent of Santa Clara, on the left bank of the -river, and all the inhabitants, who were averse or unable to reach -the Lines, came down from their hiding-places in the mountains. -But scarcely had the prince left the city, when Trant, Miller, and -Wilson, with nearly ten thousand militia, closed upon his rear, -occupying the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, and cutting off -all communication with Almeida. - -On the evening of the 4th, the French drove the English picquets from -Pombal, and, the next morning, pushed so suddenly upon Leiria, as to -create some confusion; but the road being crossed at right angles, -by a succession of parallel ravines, captain Somers Cocks took -advantage of one, to charge the head of the enemy, and checked him -until general Anson’s brigade of cavalry, and captain Bull’s troop -of artillery, arrived to his support. The French then, forming three -columns, endeavoured to bear down the British with the centre, while -the others turned the flanks. The ravines were, however, difficult -to pass; Bull’s artillery played well into the principal body, and -Anson, charging as it emerged from every defile, slew a great -number. The British lost three officers and about fifty men, the -enemy considerably more, and, in five hours, he did not gain as many -miles of ground, although he had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten. -During this delay, Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated; the -right by Thomar and Santarem, the centre by Batalha and Rio Mayor, -the left by Alcobaça and Obidos, and at the same time a native force, -under colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniché. Massena followed, in -one column, by the way of Rio Mayor; but, meanwhile, an exploit, as -daring and hardy as any performed by a Partizan officer during the -war, convicted him of bad generalship, and shook his plan of invasion -to its base. - - -SURPRISE OF COIMBRA. - -Colonel Trant reached Milheada, intending to form a junction with -Wilson and Miller; but these last were still distant, and, believing -that his own arrival was unknown at Coimbra, he resolved, alone to -attack the French in that city. Having surprised a small post at -Fornos early in the morning of the 7th, he sent his cavalry, at -full gallop, through the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass -the bridge, and cut off all communication with the French army, of -whose progress he was ignorant. Meanwhile, his infantry penetrated -at different points into the principal parts of the town, and the -enemy, astounded, made little or no resistance. The convent of Santa -Clara surrendered at discretion, and thus, on the third day after the -prince of Esling had quitted the Mondego, his depôts and hospitals, -and nearly five thousand prisoners wounded and unwounded, amongst -which there was a company of the marines of the imperial guards, fell -into the hands of a small militia force! The next day, Miller and -Wilson, arriving, spread their men on all the lines of communication, -and picked up above three hundred more prisoners, while Trant -conducted his to Oporto. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VIII.] - -During the first confusion, the Portuguese committed some violence -on the prisoners; and the Abbé du Pradt and other French writers -have not hesitated to accuse Trant of disgracing his country and his -uniform by encouraging this conduct; whereas, his exertions repressed -it; and if the fact, that not more than ten men lost their lives -under such critical circumstances, was not sufficient refutation, the -falsehood is placed beyond dispute in a letter of thanks, written to -colonel Trant, by the French officers who fell into his hands. - -This disaster made no change in Massena’s dispositions. He continued -his march, and, on the 8th, his advanced guard drove the cavalry -picquets out of Rio Mayor. General Slade, who commanded, took no -heed of this; and the enemy, pushing rapidly on, was like to have -taken the brigade of artillery in Alcoentre; a good deal of confusion -ensued, but the royals and the sixteenth drove the French out of -the town, sabred many, and made twelve prisoners. The next day the -skirmish was renewed with various turns of fortune, but, finally, the -British retreated. - -Meanwhile the allied army was entering the Lines. The first, fourth, -and fifth divisions in the centre by Sobral, the third division -on the left by Torres Vedras, and Hill’s corps on the right by -Alhandra. The light division and Pack’s brigade should also have -entered by Aruda. But Crawfurd, who had reached Alemquer on the 9th, -was still there, at three o’clock, p. m. on the 10th. The weather -being stormy, the men were placed under cover, and no indication of -marching was given by the general. The cavalry had already filed into -the Lines; yet no guards were posted, no patroles sent forward, nor -any precaution taken against surprise, although the town, situated in -a deep ravine, was peculiarly favourable for such an attempt. - -Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, anxiously watched -the height in front, and, about four o’clock, observed some French -dragoons on the summit, which was within cannon shot. The alarm was -given, and the regiments got under arms, but the posts of assembly -had been marked on an open space, very much exposed, and from -whence the road led through an ancient gateway to the top of the -mountain behind. The enemy’s numbers increased every moment, and they -endeavoured to create a belief that their artillery was come up. This -feint was easily seen through, but the general desired the regiments -to break and re-form on the other side of the archway, out of gun -range, and in a moment all was disorder. The baggage animals were -still loading, the streets were crowded with the followers of the -division, and the whole in one confused mass rushed or were driven -headlong to the archway. Several were crushed, and with worse troops, -a general panic must have ensued; but the greatest number of the -soldiers, ashamed of the order, stood firm in their ranks until the -first confusion had abated. - -Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great, and the enemy’s -infantry descending the heights, endeavoured some to turn the town -on the left, while others pushed directly through the streets -in pursuit, and thus with his front in disorder, and his rear -skirmishing, Crawfurd commenced a retreat. The weather was, however, -so boisterous that the fire soon ceased, and a few men wounded and -the loss of some baggage was all the hurt sustained; yet so uncertain -is every thing in war, that this affair had like to have produced the -most terrible results in another quarter. - -The division, instead of marching by Caregada and Cadafaes, followed -the route of Sobral, and was obliged in the night to make a flank -march of several miles along the foot of the Lines to gain Aruda, -which was meanwhile left open to the enemy. Hence, the cavalry -patroles from Villa Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers of -the camp near Caregada, were by them told that the light division was -cut off, a report confirmed in some measure by the unguarded state of -Aruda, and by the presence of the enemy’s scouts on that side. This -information alarmed general Hill for the safety of the second line, -and the more so that the weakest part was in the vicinity of Aruda; -he made a retrograde movement towards Alverca with a view to watch -the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass of Bucellas according to -circumstances. Hence, when the enemy was in full march against the -Lines, the front from Alhandra to the forts above Sobral, a distance -of eight or nine miles, was quite disgarnished of troops. The true -state of affairs was, however, quickly ascertained, and Hill regained -Alhandra before day-light on the 11th. - -During this time the second and the eighth corps passed Alemquer, the -former marching upon Villa Franca, the latter upon Sobral. Reynier’s -movements were languid, he did not discover the unguarded state of -Alhandra, and his picquets did not enter Villa Franca until the next -day; but general Clausel, one of the most distinguished officers in -the French army, coming upon Sobral in the dusk with the head of the -eighth corps dislodged the troops of the first division, occupied -the ridge on which the town is built, and in the night threw up some -entrenchments close under the centre of the allies position. - -It is however time to give a more detailed description of those -celebrated works, improperly called - - -THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. - -[Sidenote: Memoranda of the lines, &c. by Col. J. T. Jones, Royal -Engineers, printed for private circulation.] - -It has been already said, that they consisted of three distinct -ranges of defence. - -The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the -Zizandre on the sea-coast, was, following the inflections of the -hills, twenty-nine miles long. - -The second, traced at a distance varying from six to ten miles in -rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth -of the St. Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length. - -The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended from -Passo d’Arcos on the Tagus to the tower of Junquera on the coast. -Here an outer line, constructed on an opening of three thousand -yards, enclosed an entrenched camp designed to cover the embarkation -with fewer troops, should the operation be delayed by bad weather; -and within this second camp, Fort St. Julian’s (whose high ramparts -and deep ditches defied an escalade) was armed and strengthened to -enable a rear-guard to protect both itself and the army. - -The nearest part of the second line was twenty-four miles from these -works at Passo d’Arcos, and some parts of the first line were two -long marches distant; but the principal routes led through Lisbon, -where measures were taken to retard the enemy and give time for the -embarkation. - -Of these stupendous Lines, the second, whether regarded for its -strength or importance, was undoubtedly the principal, and the others -only appendages, the one as a final place of refuge, the other as an -advanced work to stem the first violence of the enemy, and to enable -the army to take up its ground on the second line without hurry or -pressure. Massena having, however, wasted the summer season on the -frontiers, the first line acquired such strength, both from labour -and from the fall of rain, that lord Wellington resolved to abide his -opponent’s charge there. - -The ground presented to the French being, as it were, divided into -five parts or positions, shall be described in succession from right -to left. - -1º. From Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandrix. This -distance, of about five miles, was a continuous and lofty ridge, -defended by thirteen redoubts, and for two miles rendered -inaccessible by a scarp fifteen to twenty feet high, executed along -the brow. It was guarded by the British and Portuguese divisions -under general Hill, and flanked from the Tagus by a strong flotilla -of gun-boats, manned by British seamen. - -2º. From the head of the vale of Calandrix to the Pé de Monte. -This position, also five miles in length, consisted of two salient -mountains forming the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in -the mouth of the pass. Only three feeble redoubts, totally incapable -of stopping an enemy for an instant, were constructed here; the -defence of the ground was entrusted to general Crawfurd and the light -division. - -3º. The Monte Agraça. This lofty mountain overtopped the adjacent -country in such a manner, that from its summit the whole of the -first line could be distinctly observed. The right was separated -from the Aruda position, by a deep ravine which led to nothing, the -left overlooked the village and valley of Zibreira, and the centre -overhung the town of Sobral. The summit of this mountain was crowned -by an immense redoubt, mounting twenty-five guns, and having three -smaller works, containing nineteen guns, clustered around. The -garrisons, amounting to two thousand men, were supplied by Pack’s -brigade, and on the reverse of the position, which might be about -four miles in length, the fifth division, under general Leith, was -posted in reserve. - -4º. From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras. This position, -seven miles long, was at first without works, because it was only -when the rains had set in, that the resolution to defend the first -line permanently, was adopted. But the ground being rough and well -defined, and the valley in front watered by the Zizandre, now -become a considerable river, it presented a fine field of battle for -a small army. The first and fourth, and a sixth division formed of -troops just arrived from England and from Cadiz, were there posted, -under the immediate command of lord Wellington himself; and his -head-quarters were fixed at Pero Negro, near the Secorra, a rock, on -which a telegraph was erected, communicating with every part of the -Lines. - -5º. From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth of the Zizandre. -The right flank of this position and the pass in front of the town -of Torres Vedras were secured, first, by one great redoubt, mounting -forty guns, and, secondly, by several smaller forts, judiciously -planted so as to command all the approaches. From these works to the -sea a range of moderate heights were crowned with small forts; but -the chief defence there, after the rains had set in, was to be found -in the Zizandre, which was not only unfordable, but overflowed its -banks, and formed an impassable marsh. A paved road, parallel to the -foot of the hills, run along the whole front, that is, from Torres -Vedras, by Runa Sobral and Aruda, to Alhandra. This was the nature of -the _first_ line of defence; the _second_ was still more formidable. - -1º. From the mouth of the St. Lourença to Mafra, a distance of seven -miles, there was a range of hills naturally steep, artificially -scarped, and covered by a deep, and in many parts impracticable -ravine. The salient points were secured by forts, which flanked and -commanded the few accessible points; but as this line was extensive, -a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the rear, to secure a -road leading from Ereceira to Cintra. - -2º. On the right of the above line the Tapada, or royal park of -Mafra, offered some open ground for an attack. Yet it was strong, -and, together with the pass of Mafra, was defended by a system of -fourteen redoubts, constructed with great labour and care, well -considered with respect to the natural disposition of the ground, -and, in some degree, connected with the secondary post spoken of -above: in front, the Sierra de Chypre, covered with redoubts, -obstructed all approaches to Mafra itself. - -3º. From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas, a space of ten or twelve -miles, which formed the middle of the second line, the country is -choked by the Monte Chique, the Cabeça, or head of which is in the -centre of, and overtopping all the other, mountain masses. A road, -conducted along a chain of hills, high and salient, but less bold -than any other parts of the line, connected Mafra with the Cabeça, -and was secured by a number of forts. The country in front was -extremely difficult, and a second and stronger range of heights, -parallel to and behind the first, offered a good fighting position, -which could only be approached with artillery by the connecting -road in front, and to reach that, either the Sierra de Chypre, on -the left, or the pass of the Cabeça de Monte Chique, on the right, -must have been carried. Now the works covering the latter consisted -of a cluster of redoubts constructed on the inferior rocky heads in -advance of the Cabeça, and completely commanding all the approaches, -and both from their artificial and natural strength, nearly -impregnable to open force. The Cabeça and its immediate flanks were -considered secure in their natural precipitous strength; and, in like -manner, the ridges connecting the Cabeça with the pass of Bucellas, -being impregnable, were left untouched, save the blocking of one bad -mule road that led over them. - -4º. From Bucellas (the pass of which was difficult and strongly -defended by redoubts on each side) a ridge, or rather a collection -of impassable rocks, called the Sierra de Serves, stretches to the -right for two miles without a break, and then dies away by gradual -slopes in the low ground about the Tagus. These declivities and the -flat banks of the river offered an opening two miles and a half -wide, which was laboriously and carefully strengthened by redoubts, -water-cuts, and retrenchments, and connected by a system of forts -with the heights of Alhandra, but it was the weakest part of the -whole line in itself, and the most dangerous from its proximity to -the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda. - -There were five roads practicable for artillery piercing the _first -line_ of defence, namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and -one at Alhandra; but as two of these united again at the Cabeça, -there were, in fact, only four points of passage through the _second -line_, that is to say, at Mafra, Monte Chique, Bucellas, and -Quintella in the flat ground. The aim and scope of all the works -was to bar those passes and to strengthen the favourable fighting -positions between them, without impeding the movements of the army. -These objects were attained, and it is certain that the loss of the -_first line_ would not have been injurious, save in reputation, -because the retreat was secure upon the _second and stronger line_, -and the guns of the first were all of inferior calibre, mounted on -common truck carriages, and consequently immoveable and useless to -the enemy. - -The movements of the allies were free and unfettered by the works. -But the movements of the French army were impeded and cramped by the -great Monte Junta, which, rising opposite the centre of the first -line, sent forth a spur called the Sierra de Baragueda in a slanting -direction, so close up to the heights of Torres Vedras that the -narrow pass of Ruña alone separated them. As this pass was commanded -by heavy redoubts, Massena was of necessity obliged to dispose his -forces on one or other side of the Baragueda, and he could not -transfer his army to either without danger; because the sierra, -although not impassable, was difficult, and the movement, which would -require time and arrangement, could always be overlooked from the -Monte Agraça, whence, in a few hours, the allied forces could pour -down upon the head, flank, or rear of the French while in march. And -this with the utmost rapidity, because communications had been cut by -the engineers to all important points of the Lines, and a system of -signals were established, by which orders were transmitted from the -centre to the extremities in a few minutes. - -Thus much I have thought fit to say respecting _the Lines_, too -little for the professional reader, too much, perhaps, for a general -history. But I was desirous to notice, somewhat in detail, works, -more in keeping with ancient than modern military labours, partly -that a just idea might be formed of the talents of the British -engineers who constructed them, and partly to show that lord -Wellington’s measures of defence were not, as some French military -writers have supposed, dependent upon the first line. Had that been -stormed, the standard of Portuguese independence could still have -been securely planted amidst the rocks of the second position. - -To occupy fifty miles of fortification, to man one hundred and fifty -forts, and to work six hundred pieces of artillery, required a number -of men; but a great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body of marines -sent out from England, the civic guards of Lisbon, the Portuguese -heavy artillery corps, the militia and the ordenança of Estremadura -furnished, altogether, a powerful reserve. The native artillery and -the militia supplied all the garrisons of the forts on the second, -and most of those on the first line. The British marines occupied -the third line: the navy manned the gun-boats on the river, and -aided, in various ways, the operation in the field. The recruits from -the depôts, and all the men on furlough, being called in, rendered -the Portuguese army stronger than it had yet been; and the British -army, reinforced, as I have said, both from Cadiz and England, and -remarkably healthy, presented such a front as a general would desire -to see in a dangerous crisis. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 8._ - - LINES - of - _Torres Vedras_ - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -It was, however, necessary not only to have strength, but the -appearance of strength; and lord Wellington had so dealt with Romana -that, without much attention to the wishes of his own government, the -latter agreed to join the allies with two divisions. The first, under -his own command, crossed the Tagus at Aldea Gallega on the 19th of -October, reached head-quarters the 24th, and was posted at Enxara -de los Cavalleros, just behind the Monte Agraça; the other followed -in a few days: and thus, before the end of October, not less than one -hundred and thirty thousand fighting men received rations within the -Lines; more than seventy thousand being regular troops, completely -disposable and unfettered by the works. - -Meanwhile, Mendizabel, with the remainder of the Spanish army, -reinforced by Madden’s Portuguese dragoons, advanced towards Zafra. -Ballasteros, at the same time, moved upon Araceña; and Mortier, -ignorant of Romana’s absence, retired across the Morena on the 8th, -for Soult was then seriously menacing Cadiz. Thus fortune combined, -with the dispositions of the English general, to widen the distance, -and to diversify the objects of the French armies, at the moment -when the allies were concentrating the greatest force on the most -important point. - -Massena, surprised at the extent and strength of works, the existence -of which had only become known to him five days before he came upon -them, employed several days to examine their nature. The heights -of Alhandra he judged inattackable; but the valleys of Calandrix -and Aruda attracted his attention. Through the former he could turn -Hill’s position, and come at once upon the weakest part of the -second line; yet the abattis and the redoubts erected, and hourly -strengthening, gave him little encouragement to attack there; while -the nature of the ground about Aruda was such that he could not -ascertain what number of troops guarded it, although he made several -demonstrations, and frequently skirmished with the light division, to -oblige Crawfurd to shew his force. That general, by making the town -of Aruda an advanced post, rendered it impossible to discover his -true situation without a serious affair; and, in a short time, his -division, with prodigious labour, secured the position in a manner -really worthy of admiration. - -Across the ravine on the left, a loose stone wall, sixteen feet -thick and forty feet high, was raised; and across the great valley -of Aruda, a double line of abattis was drawn; not composed, as is -usual, of the limbs of trees, but of full-grown oaks and chestnuts, -dug up with all their roots and branches, dragged, by main force, for -several hundred yards, and then reset and crossed, so that no human -strength could break through. Breast-works, at convenient distances, -to defend this line of trees, were then cast up; and along the -summits of the mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including -the salient points, other stone walls, six feet high and four in -thickness, with banquettes, were built; so that a good defence could -have been made against the attacks of twenty thousand men. - -The next points that drew Massena’s attention were the Monte Agraça -and the vale of the Upper Zizandre, where, from the recent period -at which lord Wellington had resolved to offer battle on the first -line, no outworks had been constructed; and the valley of Zibreira, -and even the hills above Runa, had not been fortified. Here it -was possible to join battle on more equal terms, but the position -of the allies was still very formidable; the flanks and rear were -protected by great forts, and not only was a powerful mass of troops -permanently posted there, but six battalions, drawn from Hill’s -corps, and placed at Bucellas, could, in a very short time, have come -into action. - -Beyond Runa, the Baragueda ridge and the forts of Torres Vedras -forbad any flank movement by the French general; and it only remained -for him to dispose his troops in such a manner between Villa Franca -and Sobral that, while the heads of the columns menaced the weakest -points of the Lines, a few hours would suffice to concentrate the -whole army at any part between the Tagus and the Baragueda ridge. The -second corps, still holding the hills opposite Alhandra, extended -its right along some open ground as far as Aruda, and being covered, -at that point, by a force of cavalry, was connected with the eighth -corps; the head of which was pushed forward on Sobral, occupying the -lower ridges of the Baragueda, and lining the banks of the Zizandre -as far as Duas Portas on the road to Runa: the outposts of the two -armies being nearly in contact. - -Massena did not bring the sixth corps beyond Otta, and his -dispositions were not made without several skirmishes, especially -near Sobral, on the morning of the 14th, when, attempting to dislodge -the seventy-first regiment from a field-work, his troops were -repulsed, pursued, and driven from their own retrenchments, which -were held until evening; and only evacuated because the whole of the -eight corps was advancing for the purpose of permanently establishing -its position. The loss of the allies in these petty affairs amounted -to one hundred and fifty; of which, the greatest part fell at Sobral; -that of the enemy was estimated higher. The English general Harvey -was wounded, and at Villa Franca the fire of the gun-boats killed -the French general St. Croix, a young man of signal ability and -promise. - -The war was now reduced to a species of blockade: Massena’s object -being to feed his army until reinforcements reached it; lord -Wellington’s to starve the French before succour could arrive. -The former spread his moveable columns in the rear to seek for -provisions, and commenced forming magazines at Santarem, where his -principal depôt was established; but the latter drew down all the -militia and ordenança of the north on the French rear, putting their -right in communication with the garrison of Peniché, and their -left with the militia of Lower Beira. To strengthen the latter he -prevailed on Carlos d’España to cross the Tagus, and act between -Castello Branco and Abrantes; and thus the French were completely -enclosed, without any weakening of the regular army. - -To aid the communication between Peniché and the militia, a Spanish -light battalion and a strong body of English cavalry advanced to -Ramalhal. Obidos, surrounded by old walls, was placed in a temporary -state of defence, and garrisoned by three hundred Portuguese, -under major Fenwick; and a moveable column, under colonel Waters, -issuing from Torres Vedras, made incursions against the enemy’s -marauding detachments, capturing many prisoners, and part of a -considerable convoy which was passing the Baragueda. The French were -thus continually harassed, yet their detachments scoured the whole -country, even beyond Leiria, and obtained provisions in considerable -quantities. - -[Sidenote: See Annals of the Peninsular War, Vol. II. p. 331.] - -Meanwhile, the main bodies of the hostile forces remained quiet, -although the French right was greatly exposed. Lord Wellington -had four British divisions and Romana’s corps, forming a mass of -twenty-five thousand men, close round Sobral, and, by directing the -greatest part of his cavalry and the six battalions, at Bucellas, -upon Aruda, he could have assembled from eight to ten thousand men -there also, who, advancing a short distance into the plain, could, in -conjunction with Hill, have kept the second corps in check; while the -twenty-five thousand, pouring down at daylight from the Monte Agraça, -from the valley of Zibreira, and from the side of Ruña, could have -enveloped and crushed the head of the eighth corps long before the -sixth could have reached the scene of action. But war is a curious -and complicated web! and while the purely military part was thus -happily situated and strong, the political part was one of weakness -and alarm. Scarcely could the English general maintain a defensive -attitude, struggling as he was against the intrigues and follies of -men who have, nevertheless, been praised for their “earnest and manly -co-operation.” - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -The presence of the enemy, in the heart of the country, embarrassed -the finances, and the Regency applied to England for an additional -subsidy. Mr. Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, took upon himself -to direct the house of Sampayo to furnish provisions to the troops -on the credit of the first subsidy; he also made the greatest -exertions to feed the fugitive inhabitants, forty thousand of whom -arrived before the 13th of October, and others were hourly coming in, -destitute and starving. Corn, purchased at any price, was sought for -in all countries; from Ireland, America, and Egypt; and one thousand -tons of government shipping were lent to merchants to fetch grain -from Algiers. One commission of citizens was formed to facilitate the -obtaining cattle and corn from the northern provinces; another to -regulate the transport of provisions to the army, and to push a trade -with Spain through the Alemtejo. Small craft were sent up the Tagus -to carry off both the inhabitants and their stock, from the islands -and from the left bank, and post-vessels were established along the -coast to Oporto. Bullion and jewels were put on board the men of war, -a proclamation was issued, calling upon the people to be tranquil, -and a strong police was established to enforce this object. Finally, -to supply the deficiency of tonnage created by the sending off the -transports in search of corn, an embargo was laid upon the port of -Lisbon; it was strongly protested against by the Americans, but an -imperious necessity ruled. - -All these measures were vehemently opposed by the Patriarch and his -faction; and that nothing might be wanting to shew how entirely the -fate of the Peninsula depended, in that hour, upon lord Wellington’s -firmness, the fears of the British cabinet, which had been encreasing -as the crisis approached, were now plainly disclosed. During the -retreat from the north, affairs seemed so gloomy to the eyes of some -officers of rank, that their correspondence bore evidence of their -feelings; and the letters of general Spencer and general Charles -Stewart appeared so desponding to lord Liverpool, that he transmitted -them to lord Wellington, and, by earnestly demanding an opinion upon -their contents, shewed how deeply they had disturbed his own mind. - -Thus beset on every side, the English general rose like a giant. -Without noticing either the arguments or the forebodings in these -letters, he took a calm historical review of the grounds upon which -he had undertaken the defence of Portugal, and which he had before -pointed out to the minister he was addressing; then shewing that, -up to that period, his views had been in every instance borne out -by the results, he demonstrated that it was reasonable to confide -in his judgement of what was to come. Having thus vindicated his -own prudence and foresight by irresistible facts, he proceeded to -trace the probable course of future events, entered largely into -both his own and the enemy’s designs, and with such a judgement and -sagacity that the subsequent course of the war never belied his -anticipations. This remarkable letter exists, and, were all other -records of lord Wellington’s genius to be lost, it would alone -suffice to vindicate his great reputation to posterity. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 3.] - -Having with conscious superiority replied to his own government, he, -with a fierceness rendered necessary by the crisis, turned upon the -patriarch and his coadjutors. Reproaching them for their unpatriotic, -foolish, and deceitful conduct, he told them plainly, that they were -unfaithful servants of their country and their prince, and threatened -_to withdraw the British army altogether_, if the practices of which -he complained were not amended. - -“The king of England and the prince regent of Portugal had,” he said, -“entrusted him with the conduct of the military operations, and he -would not suffer any person to interfere. He knew what to do, and he -would not alter his plans to meet the _senseless suggestions of the -Regency_. Let the latter look to their own duties! Let them provide -food for the army and the people, and keep the capital tranquil.” -“With principal Souza,” he said, “it was not possible to act, and, -if that person continued in power, the country would be lost. Either -the principal or himself must quit their employments; if himself, he -would take care that the world should know the reasons; meanwhile he -would address the prince upon the conduct of the Regency.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix No. V. Section 4.] - -“He had hoped,” he resumed in another letter, “that the Portuguese -government was satisfied with his acts, and that instead of -endeavouring to render all defence useless by disturbing the minds of -the populace at Lisbon, they would have adopted measures to secure -the tranquillity of that capital. But, like other weak individuals, -they added duplicity to weakness, and their past expressions of -approbation and gratitude he supposed were intended to convey -censure. All he asked from them was to preserve tranquillity, to -provide food for their own troops while employed in the Lines, and -to be prepared, in case of disaster, to save those persons and -their families who were obnoxious to the enemy.” “I have,” he said -“little doubt of final success, but _I have fought a sufficient -number of battles to know, that the result of any is not certain, -even with the best arrangements_.” These reproaches were neither too -severe nor ill-timed, for the war had been hanging in even balance, -and the weight of interested folly thus thrown in by the Regency, -was beginning to sink the scale. Yet to shew the justice of lord -Wellington’s complaints, it is necessary to resume the thread of -those intrigues which have been before touched upon. - -[Sidenote: Appendix No. V. Section 8.] - -Instead of performing their own duties, the government assumed, that -the struggle could be maintained on the frontier, and when they -should have been removing the people and the provisions from the -line of retreat, they were discussing the expediency of military -operations which were quite impracticable. When convinced of their -error by facts, they threw the burthen of driving the country upon -the general, although they knew that he was ignorant even of the -names and places of abode of those officers and magistrates who -were to execute it, and that there was but one Portuguese agent at -head-quarters to give assistance in translating the necessary orders. - -When this was remarked to them, they issued the orders themselves, -but made the execution referable to the general, without his -knowledge, and well knowing that he had no means of communicating -with the country people, and this at the very moment of the enemy’s -advance. The battle of Busaco, by delaying the French army, alone -enabled the orders even to reach the persons to whom they were -addressed. But it was the object of the Regency, by nourishing and -soothing the national indolence, to throw the odium of harsh and -rigorous measures upon the British authorities. Lord Wellington, -however, while he reproached them for this conduct, never shrunk from -the odium; he avowed himself, in his proclamations, the author of the -plan for wasting the country, and he was willing the Regency should -shelter themselves under his name, but he was not willing to lose the -fruit of his responsibility, or, that those whose courage did shrink -from the trial, “should seek popularity with the populace at the -expense of the best interests of the country.” - -After the disputes which followed the fall of Almeida, the English -government convinced that a more secure and powerful grasp must be -taken of Portugal, insisted, at the instance of lord Wellington, that -their envoy, Mr. Stuart, should have a seat in the Regency, and that -the subsidy should be placed under the control of the British instead -of the native authorities. The 2d of October, Mr. Stuart took his -seat, and together with doctor Noguera, the Conde de Redondo, and the -marquis Olhao (the former of whom was decidedly averse to the Souzas’ -faction, and the two latter moderate in their conduct) proceeded to -control the intrigues and violence of the Patriarch and principal -Souza. It was full time, for both were formally protesting against -the destruction of the mills in Beira, and vigorously opposing every -measure proposed by lord Wellington. They were deeply offended by -the suppression of the Lusitanian legion, which about this time was -incorporated with the regular forces; and they had openly declared, -that the Portuguese troops should not retreat from the frontiers, and -that if the enemy obliged the British army to embark, not a native, -whether soldier or citizen, should go with it. When the allies, -notwithstanding this, fell back to the Lines, Souza proposed that the -Regency should fly to the Algarves, which being indignantly protested -against by Mr. Stuart, Souza threatened to quit the government. The -dispute was then referred to lord Wellington, and, on the 6th of -October, drew from him those severe expressions of which an abstract -has been given above. - -Meanwhile, the restless Principal pursued his designs with activity, -and, in conjunction with his brothers and the Patriarch, established -a regular and systematic opposition to lord Wellington’s plans -of defence. Factious in council, they were also clamorous out of -doors, where many echoed their sentiments, from anger at some wanton -ravages, that, in despite of the general’s utmost efforts, had marked -the retreat. They courted the mob of Lisbon servilely and grossly; -and Antonio Souza getting the superintendence of the succours for -the fugitive population, became the avowed patron of all persons -preferring complaints. He took pains to stimulate and exasperate -the public griefs, and to exaggerate the causes of them, frequently -hinting that the Portuguese people and not the British army had -formerly driven out the French. All these calumnies being echoed by -the numerous friends and partisans of the caballers, and by the -fidalgos, who endeavoured to spread discontent as widely as possible; -there wanted but slight encouragement from the Brazils, to form a -national party, and openly attack the conduct of the war. - -To obtain this encouragement, Raymundo, the old tool of the party in -the Oporto violences, was sent to the court of Rio Janeiro, to excite -the prince regent against lord Wellington; and the Patriarch himself -wrote to the prince of Wales and to the duke of Sussex, thinking to -incense them also against the English general. The extent and nature -of the intrigues may be estimated from a revelation made at the time -by baron Eben, and by the editor of a Lisbon newspaper, called the -_Brazilienza_. - -Those persons abandoning the faction, asserted that the -Patriarch, the Souzas, and (while he remained in Portugal) the -ex-plenipotentiary, Mr. Villiers, were personally opposed to -lord Wellington, marshal Beresford, and Mr. de Forjas, and had -sought to remove them from their situations, and to get the duke -of Brunswick appointed generallissimo in Portugal; that they had -also endeavoured to engage the duke of Sussex to take a leading -part, but that his royal highness had repulsed them at the outset; -that their plan was to engage a newspaper to be their organ in -London, as the _Brazilienza_ was to have been in Lisbon; that in -their correspondence lord Wellington was designated under the name -of _Alberoni_; lord Wellesley, _Lama_; Beresford, _Ferugem_; Mr. -Stuart, _Labre_; the Patriarch, _Saxe_; Antonio Souza, _Lamberti_; -colonel Bunbury and Mr. Peel, then under secretaries of state, -as _Thin_ and _By-Thin_. That after Mr. Villier’s departure, the -intrigue was continued by the Patriarch and the Souzas, but upon a -different plan; for, overborne by the vigour of Mr. Stuart in the -council, they agreed to refrain from openly opposing either him or -Forjas, but resolved to write down what either might utter, and -transmit, that which suited their purpose, to the Conde de Linhares -and the chevalier Souza; these persons undertaking to represent the -information so received, after their own fashion, to the cabinets of -St. James’ and Rio Janeiro. - -The violent temper of the Patriarch unfitted him to execute this -plan; he made open display of his hostility to the English general; -and it is worthy of observation that, while thus thwarting every -measure necessary to resist the enemy, his faction did not hesitate -to exercise the most odious injustice and cruelty against those whom -they denominated well-wishers to the French. By a decree of the -prince regent’s, dated the 20th of March, 1809, private denunciations -in cases of disaffection, were permitted, the informer’s name to be -kept secret; and in September, 1810, this infamous system, although -strenuously opposed by Mr. Stuart, was acted upon, and many persons -suddenly sent to the islands, and others thrown into dungeons. -Some might have been guilty; and the government pretended that a -traitorous correspondence with the enemy was carried on through a -London house, which they indicated; but it does not appear that a -direct crime was brought home to any, and it is certain that many -innocent persons were oppressed. - -All these things shewing that vigorous measures were necessary to -prevent the ruin of the general cause, lord Wellesley dealt so with -the Brazilian court, that every intrigue there was soon crushed, -lord Wellington’s power in Portugal confirmed, and his proceedings -approved of. Authority was also given him to dismiss or to retain -Antonio Souza and even to remove lord Strangford, the British envoy -at Rio Janeiro, if it suited him so to do. The subsidies were placed -under his and Mr. Stuart’s control; admiral Berkeley was appointed -to a seat in the Regency; and, in fine, Portugal was reduced to the -condition of a vassal state. A policy which could never have been -attempted, however necessary, if the people at large had not been -willing to acquiesce; but firm in their attachment to independence -and abhorring the invaders, they submitted cheerfully to this -temporary assumption of command, and fully justified the sagacity of -the man, who thus dared to grasp at the whole power of Portugal with -one hand, while he kept the power of France at bay with the other. - -Although so strongly armed, lord Wellington removed no person, but -with equal prudence and moderation reserved the exercise of this -great authority until further provocation should render it absolutely -necessary. But this remedy for the disorders above related was not -perfected for a long time, nor until after a most alarming crisis of -affairs had been brought on by the conduct of the Lisbon cabal. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 5.] - -From the strength of the Lines, it is plain that offensive operations -were far more to be dreaded on the left, than on the right bank of -the Tagus. In the Alemtejo, the enemy could more easily subsist, -more effectually operate to the injury of Lisbon, and more securely -retreat upon his own resources. Now lord Wellington had repeatedly -urged the Regency to oblige the inhabitants to abandon their -dwellings, and carry off their herds and grain, especially those near -the banks, and on the numerous islands in the river, and above all -things to destroy or remove every boat. To carry this into effect -a commission had been appointed, but so many delays and obstacles -were interposed by the Patriarch and his coadjutors, that the -commissioners did not leave Lisbon until the enemy were close upon -that river; both banks being still stocked with cattle and corn, and -what was worse forty large boats on the right side, by which the -French immediately made themselves masters of the islands, especially -of Lizirias, where they obtained abundance of provisions. But while -the Regency thus provided for the enemy, they left the fortresses of -Palmella, St. Felippe de Setuval, and Abrantes with empty magazines. - -Lord Wellington thinking that the ordenança on the left bank, of whom -four hundred were armed with English muskets and furnished with three -pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to repel plundering parties -attempting to cross the Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the -Lines. He wanted numbers there and he also judged that the ordenança -would, if once assisted by a regular force, leave the war to their -allies. But Antonio Souza was continually urging the planting of -ambuscades, and other like frivolities, upon the left bank of the -Tagus; and as his opinions were spread abroad by his party, the -governor of Setuval adopted the idea, and suddenly advanced with his -garrison to Salvatierra on the river side. - -This ridiculous movement attracted the enemy’s attention, and lord -Wellington fearing they would pass over a detachment, disperse the -Portuguese troops, and seize Setuval before it could be succoured, -peremptorily ordered the governor to return to that fortress. This -retrograde movement caused the dispersion of the ordenança, and -consternation reigned in the Alemtejo. The supply of grain coming -from Spain was stopped, the chain of communications broken, and, the -alarm spreading to Lisbon, there was no remedy but to send general -Fane, with some guns and Portuguese cavalry, that could be ill -spared from the Lines, to that side. Fane immediately destroyed all -the boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions, and -patrolling the banks of the river as high as the mouth of the Zezere, -kept a strict watch upon the enemy’s movements. - -Other embarrassments were however continually arising. The number -of prisoners in Lisbon had accumulated so as to become a serious -inconvenience; because, for some reason which does not appear, the -English Admiralty would not permit them to be transported to England -in ships of war, and other vessels could not be spared. About this -time also admiral Berkeley, whose elaborate report the year before, -stated that, although the enemy should seize the heights of Almada, -he could not injure the fleet in the river, now admitted that he was -in error; and the engineers were directed to construct secondary -lines on that side. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 7.] - -Another formidable evil, arising from the conduct of the Regency, was -the state of the Portuguese army. The troops were so ill supplied -that more than once they would have disbanded, had they not been -relieved from the British magazines. Ten thousand soldiers of the -line deserted between April and December, and the militia and -ordenança abandoned their colours in far greater numbers; for, as -no remonstrance could induce the Regency to put the laws in force -against the delinquents, that which was at first the effect of want -became a habit; so that even when regularly fed from the British -stores within the Lines, the desertion was alarmingly great. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 10.] - -Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing up, neither the -Patriarch nor the Principal ceased their opposition. The order to -fortify the heights of Almada caused a violent altercation in the -Regency, and lord Wellington, greatly incensed, denounced them to the -Prince Regent; and his letter produced such a paroxysm of anger in -the Patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. Stuart, and vented his -passion in the most indecent language against the general. Soon after -this, the deplorable state of the finances obliged the government to -resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions in kind for the -feeding of the troops: and in that critical moment the Patriarch, -whose influence was, from various causes, very great, took occasion -to declare that “he would not suffer burthens to be laid upon the -people which were evidently for no other purpose than _to nourish the -war in the heart of the kingdom_.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 7.] - -But it was his and his coadjutors’ criminal conduct that really -nourished the war, for there were ample means to have carried off in -time ten-fold the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena -could not then have remained a week before the Lines, and his retreat -would have been attended with famine and disaster, if the measures -previously agreed to by the Regency had been duly executed. Whereas -now, the country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Gollegao, and Santarem -was absolutely untouched; the inhabitants remained; the mills, but -little injured, were quickly repaired, and lord Wellington had the -deep mortification to find that his well considered design was -frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a right to expect -the most zealous support. There was, indeed, every reason to believe -that the prince of Esling would be enabled to maintain his positions -until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain to aid him. -“_It is heart-breaking_,” was the bitter reflection of the British -general, “_to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy -and folly_.” - - - - -CHAPTER X. - - -The increasing strength of the works, and the report of British -deserters (unhappily very numerous at this period), soon convinced -Massena that it was impracticable to force the Lines without great -reinforcements. His army suffered from sickness, from the irregular -forces in the rear, and from the vengeance of individuals, driven to -despair by the excesses which many French soldiers, taking advantage -of the times, committed in their foraging courses. Nevertheless, with -an obstinate pertinacity, only to be appreciated by those who have -long made war, the French general maintained his forward position, -until the country for many leagues behind him was a desert, and then, -reluctantly yielding to necessity, he sought for a fresh camp in -which to make head against the allies, while his foragers searched -more distant countries for food. - -Early in October artillery officers had been directed to collect -boats for crossing both the Tagus and the Zezere. Montbrun’s cavalry, -stretching along the right bank of the former, gathered provisions, -and stored them at Santarem, and both there and at Barquiña (a creek -in the Tagus, below the mouth of the Zezere), rafts were formed and -boats constructed with wheels, to move from one place to another; -but, from the extreme paucity of materials and tools, the progress -was necessarily slow. Meanwhile Fane, reinforced by some infantry, -watched them closely from the left bank; Carlos d’España came down -from Castello Branco to Abrantes; Trant acted sharply on the side of -Ourem, and Wilson’s Portuguese militia so infested the country from -Espinhal to the Zezere, that Loison’s division was detached upon -Thomar to hold him in check. - -Towards the end of October, however, all the hospitals, stores, and -other incumbrances of the French army were removed to Santarem, -and, on the 31st, two thousand men forded the Zezere above Punhete -to cover the construction of a bridge. From this body, four hundred -infantry and two hundred dragoons, under general Foy, moved against -Abrantes, and, after skirmishing with the garrison, made towards -Sobreira Formosa. The allies’ bridge of Villa Velha was foolishly -burnt, but Foy, with a smaller escort, pushed for Pena Macor, and -the 8th had gained Ciudad Rodrigo, on his way to France, having -undertaken to carry information of the state of affairs to Napoleon; -a task which he performed with singular rapidity, courage, and -address. The remainder of his escort retiring down the Zezere, were -attacked by Wilson, and suffered some loss. - -The bridge on the Zezere was destroyed by floods, the 6th; but the -enemy having entrenched the height over Punhete, not only restored -it, but cast a second at Martinchel, higher up the river. Massena -then commenced his retrograde march, but with great caution, because -his position was overlooked from the Monte Agraça, and the defile of -Alemquer being in the rear of the eighth corps, it was an operation -of some danger to withdraw from before the Lines. To cover the -movement from the knowledge of the Partizans in the rear, Montbrun’s -cavalry marched upon Leiria and his detachments scoured the roads -to Pombal, on the one side, and towards the Zezere, on the other. -Meanwhile the sixth corps marched from Otta and Alemquer to Thomar, -and Loison removed to Golegao with his division, reinforced by a -brigade of dragoons. - -These dispositions being made, general Clausel withdrew from Sobral -during the night of the 14th, and the whole of the eighth corps -passed the defile in the morning of the 15th, under the protection of -some cavalry left in front of Aruda, and of a strong rear-guard on -the height covering Alemquer. The second corps then retreated from -Alhandra by the royal causeway upon Santarem, while the eighth corps -marched by Alcoentre upon Alcanhede and Torres Novas. - -This movement was not interrupted by lord Wellington. The morning of -the 15th proved foggy, and it was some hours after day-break ere he -perceived the void space in his front which disclosed the ability -of the French general’s operations. Fane had reported on the 14th -that boats were collecting at Santarem, and information arrived at -the same time that reinforcements for Massena were on the march from -Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy’s intention was not clearly developed. It -might be a retreat to Spain; it might be to pass round the Monte -Junta, and so push the head of his army on Torres Vedras, while the -allies were following the rear. Lord Wellington, therefore, kept the -principal part of the army stationary, but directed the second and -light divisions to follow the enemy, the former along the causeway to -Villa Franca, the latter to Alemquer, at the same time calling up -his cavalry, and requesting admiral Berkeley to send all the boats of -the fleet up the Tagus, to enable the allies to pass rapidly to the -other bank, if necessary. - -[Sidenote: Private Journal of the Hon. Captain Somers Cocks, 16th -Dragoons.] - -Early on the 16th the enemy was tracked, marching in two columns, the -one upon Rio Mayor, the other upon Santarem. Having passed Alcoentre, -it was clear that he had no views on Torres Vedras; but whether -he was in retreat to cross the Zezere by the bridges at Punhete -and Martinchel, or making for the Mondego, was still uncertain. In -either case, it was important to strike a blow at the rear, before -the reinforcements and convoy, said to be on the road from Ciudad -Rodrigo, could be met with. The first division was immediately -brought up to Alemquer, the fifth entered Sobral, the light division -and cavalry marched in pursuit, four hundred prisoners were made, -principally marauders; and a remarkable exploit was performed by -one Baxter, a serjeant of the sixteenth dragoons. This man, having -only five troopers, came suddenly upon a piquet of fifty men, who -were cooking. The Frenchmen ran to their arms, and killed one of -the dragoons; but the rest broke in amongst them so strongly, that -Baxter, with the assistance of some countrymen, made forty-two -captives. - -The 17th, the eighth corps marched upon Alcanhede and Pernes, the -head of the second corps reached Santarem, and Fane, deceived by some -false movements, reported that they were in full retreat, and the -troops at Santarem only a rear guard. This information seeming to -be confirmed by the state of the immense plains skirting the Tagus, -which were left covered with straw-ricks, it was concluded that -Massena intended to pass the Zezere, over which it was known that -he had cast a second bridge. Hill was immediately ordered to cross -the Tagus with the second division and thirteenth dragoons, and move -upon Abrantes, either to succour that fortress or to head the march -of the French. Meanwhile, the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions were -directed upon Alemquer, the first division and Pack’s brigades upon -Cartaxo, and the light division reached El Valle, a village on the -Rio Mayor, where a considerable rear guard was formed, and an unequal -engagement would have ensued, but for the opportune arrival of the -commander-in-chief. In the evening the enemy joined their main body -on the heights of Santarem. - -Hitherto, lord Wellington, regarding the security of the Lines with a -jealous eye, acted very cautiously. On the 15th and 16th, while the -French were still hampered by the defiles, his pursuit was slack, -although it would in no degree have risked the safety of the Lines, -or of the pursuing troops, to have pushed the first, second, and -light divisions and Pack’s brigade vigorously against the enemy’s -rear. On the 18th, however, when Hill had passed the Tagus at -Villada, and Fane was opposite to Abrantes, lord Wellington, whether -deceived by false reports, or elated at this retrograde movement, -this proof of his own superior sagacity, prepared, with a small -force, to assail what he conceived the rear guard of an army in full -retreat. But the French general had no intention of falling back any -farther; his great qualities were roused by the difficulty of his -situation, he had carried off his army with admirable arrangement, -and his new position was chosen with equal sagacity and resolution. - -Santarem is situated on a mountain, which, rising almost -precipitously from the Tagus, extends about three miles inland. In -front, a secondary range of hills formed an outwork, covered by the -Rio Mayor, which is composed of two streams, running side by side -to within a mile of the Tagus, but there they unite and flow in a -direction parallel with that river for many miles; the ground between -being an immense flat, called the plain of Santarem. - -In advancing by the royal road from Lisbon, the allies ascended the -Rio Mayor, until they reached the Ponte Seca, a raised causeway, -eight hundred yards long, leading to the foot of the French -position. On the right hand, as far as the Tagus, a flat sedgy -marsh, not impassable, but difficult from deep water-cuts, covered -the French left. On the other hand, the two streams of the Rio Mayor -overflowing, presented a vast impassable sheet of water and marsh, -covering the French right, and, in the centre, the causeway offered -only a narrow line of approach, barred at the enemy’s end, by an -abattis, and by a gentle eminence, with a battery looking down the -whole length. To force this dangerous passage was only a preliminary -step; the secondary range of hills was then to be carried before the -great height of Santarem could be reached; finally, the town, with -its old walls, offered a fourth point of resistance. - -In this formidable position, the second corps covered the rich plain -of Golegao, which was occupied by Loison’s division of the sixth -corps, placed there to watch the Tagus, and keep up the chain of -communication with Punhete. On Reynier’s right, in a rugged country, -which separated Santarem from the Monte Junta and the Sierra de -Alcoberte, the eighth corps was posted; not in a continuous line -with the second, but having the right pushed forward to Alcanhete, -the centre at Pernes, and the left thrown back to Torres Novas, where -Massena’s head-quarters were fixed. On the right of Alcanhete, the -cavalry were disposed as far as Leiria, and the sixth corps was at -Thomar, in reserve, having previously obliged Wilson’s militia to -retire from the Zezere upon Espinhal. - -Massena thus enclosed an immense tract of fertile country; the plain -of Golegao supplied him with maize and vegetables, and the Sierra de -Alcoberte with cattle. He presented a formidable head to the allies -at Santarem, commanded the road, by Leiria, to Coimbra, with the -eighth corps and the cavalry; that from Thomar, by Ourem, to Coimbra, -with the sixth corps; and, by his bridges over the Zezere, opened -a line of operations towards the Spanish frontier, either through -Castello Branco, or by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte. Preserving the -power of offensive operations, by crossing the Tagus on his left, or -of turning the Monte Junta by his right, he necessarily paralized a -great part of the allied force, and appeared, even in retreating, to -take the offensive. - -His first dispositions were, however, faulty in detail. Between -Santarem and the nearest division of the eighth corps there was a -distance of ten or twelve miles, where the British general might -penetrate, turn the right of the second corps, and cut it off from -the rest of the army. Reynier, fearing such an attempt, hurried off -his baggage and hospitals to Golegao, despatched a regiment up the -Rio Mayor to watch two bridges on his right, by which he expected -the allies to penetrate between him and the eighth corps, and -then calling upon Junot for succour, and upon Massena for orders, -proceeded to strengthen his own position. It was this march of -Reynier’s baggage, that led Fane to think the enemy was retreating to -the Zezere, which, corresponding with lord Wellington’s high-raised -expectations, induced him to make dispositions; not for a general -attack, by separating the second corps from the rest of the army, -but, as I have before said, for assaulting Santarem in front with a -small force, thinking he had only to deal with a rear guard. - -On the 19th, the light division entering the plain between the -Rio Mayor and the Tagus advanced against the heights by the sedgy -marsh. The first division under Spencer, was destined to attack the -causeway, and Pack’s Portuguese brigade and the cavalry were ordered -to cross the Rio Mayor at the bridges of Saliero and Subajeira and -turn the right of the French. The columns were formed for the attack, -and the skirmishers of the light division were exchanging shots -with the enemy in the sedgy marsh, when it was found that the guns -belonging to Pack’s brigade had not arrived; and lord Wellington, -not quite satisfied with the appearance of his adversary’s force, -after three hours’ demonstrations, ordered the troops to retire to -their former ground. It was, indeed, become evident, that the French -were determined to maintain this position. Every advantageous spot -of ground was fully occupied, the most advanced centinels boldly -returned the fire of the skirmishers, large bodies of reserve were -descried, some in arms, others cooking, the strokes of the hatchet, -and the fall of trees, resounded from the woods clothing the hills, -and the commencement of a triple line of abattis, and the fresh earth -of entrenchments were discernible in many places. - -On the 20th the demonstrations were renewed; but, as the enemy’s -intention to fight was no longer doubtful, they soon ceased, and -orders were sent to general Hill to halt at Chamusca, on the left -bank of the Tagus. General Crawfurd, however, still thought it was -but a rear-guard at Santarem; his eager spirit was chafed, he seized -a musket, and, followed only by a serjeant, advanced in the night -along the causeway, commencing a personal skirmish with the French -piquets, from whose fire he escaped by miracle, convinced at last -that the enemy were not yet in flight. - -Meanwhile Clausel brought his division from Alcanhete close up to -Santarem, and Massena carefully examining the dispositions of the -allies, satisfied himself, that no great movement was in agitation; -wherefore, recalling the baggage of the second corps, he directed -Clausel to advance towards Rio Mayor; a feint which instantly obliged -lord Wellington to withdraw the first division and Pack’s brigade -to Cartaxo; and the light division was also held in readiness to -retreat. In truth, Massena was only to be assailed by holding the -second corps in check at the Ponte Seca, while a powerful mass of -troops penetrated in the direction of Tremes and Pernes; but heavy -rains rendered all the roads impracticable, and as the position of -Santarem was maintained for several months, and many writers have -rashly censured the conduct of both generals, it may be well to shew -here that they acted wisely and like great captains. - -It has been already seen how, without any extreme dissemination -of his force, the French general contrived to menace a variety of -points and to command two distinct lines of retreat; but there were -other circumstances that equally weighed with him. He expected -momentarily to be joined by the ninth corps, which had been added to -his command, and by a variety of detachments; his position, touching -upon Leiria and upon the Zezere, enabled him to give his hand to his -reinforcements and convoys, either by the line of the Mondego or that -of Belmonte and the Estrada Nova; at the same time he was ready to -communicate with any troops coming from Andalusia to his assistance. -He was undoubtedly open to a dangerous attack, between Santarem -and Alcanhete; but he judged that his adversary would not venture -such a decisive operation, requiring rapid well-timed movements, -with an army composed of three different nations and unpractised in -great evolutions. In this, guided by his long experience of war, he -calculated upon moral considerations with confidence, and he that -does not understand this part of war is but half a general. - -Like a great commander, he calculated likewise upon the military and -political effect, that his menacing attitude would have. While he -maintained Santarem, he appeared, as it were, to besiege Lisbon; he -also prolonged the sufferings of that city, and it has been estimated -that forty thousand persons died from privations within the Lines -during the winter of 1810: moreover he encouraged the disaffected, -and shook the power which the English had assumed in Portugal, -thus rendering their final success so doubtful in appearance, that -few men had sagacity enough to judge rightly upon the subject. At -this period also, as the illness of George the Third, by reviving -the question of a Regency in England, had greatly strengthened the -opposition in parliament, it was most important that the arguments of -the latter against the war should seem to be enforced by the position -of the French army. It is plain therefore that, while any food was -to be obtained, there were abundant reasons to justify Massena in -holding his ground; and it must be admitted that, if he committed -great errors in the early part of his campaign, in the latter part he -proved himself a daring, able, and most pertinacious commander. - -On the side of the British general, such were the political -difficulties, that a battle was equally to be desired and dreaded. -Desirable, because a victory would have silenced his opponents both -in England and Portugal, and placed him in a situation to dictate -the measures of war to the ministers instead of having to struggle -incessantly against their fears. Desirable to relieve the misery of -the Portuguese people, who were in a state of horrible suffering; -but, above all things desirable, lest a second and a third army, now -gathering in Castile and in Andalusia, should reach Massena, and -again shut up the allies in their works. - -Dreaded, because a defeat or even a repulse would have been -tantamount to the ruin of the cause; for it was at this period that -the disputes in the Regency, relative to the Lines, at Almada, were -most violent, and the slightest disaster would have placed the -Patriarch at the head of a national party. Dreaded, because of the -discussions relative to the appointment of a Regency in England, -as any serious military check would have caused the opposition -to triumph, and the troops to be withdrawn from Portugal. In this -balanced state it was essential that a battle, upon which so many -great interests hung, should not be fought, except on terms of -advantage. Now those terms were not to be had. Lord Wellington, who -had received some reinforcements from Hallifax and England, had -indeed more than seventy thousand fighting men under arms, and the -enemy at this time was not more than fifty thousand: nevertheless, if -we analyze the composition and situation of both, it will be found -that the latter, from the advantage of position, could actually bring -more soldiers into the fight. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.] - -In the Portuguese army, since the month of April, the deaths had -been four thousand, the disbanded four thousand, the deserters ten -thousand, the recruits thirty thousand; the numbers were therefore -increased, but the efficiency for grand evolutions rather decreased. -The Spanish auxilliaries also, ill-governed and turbulent, were at -open discord with the Portuguese, and their general was neither able -in war himself nor amenable to those who were. - -While the heights of Almada were naked, the left bank of the Tagus -could not be watched with less than twelve thousand men; and as from -Alcanhete the march to Torres Vedras was shorter than from Cartaxo, -two British divisions were employed to protect the Lines; during -the attack upon Pernes, Reynier also might break out from Santarem, -and ten thousand men were required to hold him in check: thus, the -disposable troops would have fallen short of forty-five thousand, -comprehending soldiers of three nations and many recruits. Lord -Wellington’s experience in the movement of great armies was not -at this period equal to his adversary’s, and the attack was to be -made in a difficult country, with deep roads, where the Alviella, -the Almonda, and other rivers, greatly swelled by incessant rain, -furnished a succession of defensive lines to the enemy, and the means -of carrying off two-thirds of his army. Victory might crown the -attempt, but the stakes were unequal. If Massena lost even a third of -his force, the ninth corps could have replaced it. If lord Wellington -failed, the Lines were gone, and with them the whole Peninsula. - -He judged it best to remain on the defensive; to strengthen the -Lines; and to get the works at Almada sufficiently forward; -meanwhile, quieting the troubles occasioned by the Patriarch, to -perfect the discipline of the Portuguese troops, and improve the -organization of the militia in rear of the enemy. In this view, the -light division, supported by a brigade of cavalry, occupied Valle and -the heights overlooking the marsh and inundation; the bridge at the -English end of the causeway was mined; a sugar-loaf hill, looking -straight down the approach, was crowned with embrasures for artillery -and laced in front with a zigzag covered way, capable of containing -five hundred infantry: thus the causeway being blocked, the French -could not, while the inundation kept up, make any sudden irruption -from Santarem. - -On the left of the light division, posts were extended along the -inundation to Malhorquija; thence, by a range of heights to Rio -Mayor; and behind the latter place, Anson’s cavalry was stationed -in observation of the roads leading from Pernes and Alcanhede. In -rear of Anson, a position was entrenched at Alcoentre, and occupied -by a division of infantry. Thus all the routes leading upon the -Lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junta, were secured by what -are technically called heads of cantonments, under cover of which, -the other divisions were disposed in succession; the first and the -head-quarters being at Cartaxo, a few miles in the rear of Valle; the -remainder at Alemquer and Sobral. Torres Vedras was, however, always -occupied in force, lest the enemy should make a sudden march round -the Monte Junta. - -Massena, satisfied that his front was safe, continued to build -boats, fortified a post at Tancos, on the Tagus, and expected, with -impatience, the arrival of a convoy escorted by five thousand men, -with which general Gardanne was coming from Ciudad Rodrigo. This -reinforcement, consisting of detachments and convalescents left in -Castile when the army entered Portugal, marched by Belmonte and the -Estrada Nova, and the 27th, was at Cardijos, within a few leagues of -the French bridges on the Zezere. The advance of a cavalry patrol on -either side would have opened the communications, and secured the -junction; but, at that moment, Gardanne, harassed by the ordenança, -and deceived by a false rumour that general Hill was in Abrantes, -ready to move against him, suddenly retreated upon Sabugal, with such -haste and blindness that he sacrificed a part of his convoy, and lost -many men. - -Notwithstanding this event, Massena, expecting to be joined by -the ninth corps, greatly strengthened his position at Santarem, -which enabled him to draw the bulk of his forces to his right, and -to continue his marauding excursions in the most daring manner. -General Ferey, with a strong detachment of the sixth corps, crossing -the Zezere, foraged the country as far as Castello Branco without -difficulty, and returned without loss: Junot occupied Leiria and -Ourem with detachments of the eighth corps, and on the 9th of -December a battalion endeavoured to surprise Coimbra: Trant, however, -baffled that project. Meanwhile, Drouet avowed a design to invade -the Tras os Montes, but the 22d of December occupied the line of the -Coa with the ninth corps, and Massena’s patroles appeared again on -the Mondego above Coimbra, making inquiries about the fords: all the -spies likewise reported that a great reunion of forces from the south -was to have place near Madrid. - -These things gave reason to fear, either that Massena intended to -file behind the Mondego and seize Oporto, or that the reinforcements -coming to him were so large that he meant to establish bridges over -the Mondego, and occupy the northern country also. It was known that -a tenth corps was forming at Burgos; the head of the fifth corps was -again in Estremadura; the French boats at Punhete and Barquiña were -numerous and large; and in all parts there was evidence of great -forces assembling for a mighty effort on both sides of the Tagus. - -It was calculated that, before the end of January, more than forty -thousand fresh troops would co-operate with Massena; and preparations -were made accordingly. An outward line of defence, from Aldea -Gallega to Setuval, was already in a forward state; Abrantes, -Palmella, and St. Felippe de Setuval had been at last provisioned; -and a chain of forts parallel to the Tagus were constructing on -the hills lining the left bank from Almada to Traffaria. Labourers -had also been continually employed in strengthening the works of -Alhandra, Aruda, and Monte Agraça, which were now nearly impregnable, -soldiers only being wanting to defy the utmost force that could -be brought against them. To procure these, lord Wellington wrote -earnestly to lord Liverpool on the 29th of December, demonstrating -the absolute necessity of reinforcing the army; and, on the receipt -of his letter, five thousand British were ordered to embark for -Lisbon, and three regiments were drafted from Sicily. - -Sickness obliged general Hill to go home in December; and, as Soult -was known to be collecting a disposable force behind the Morena, -the troops on the left bank of the Tagus were augmented, and -marshal Beresford assumed the command: for the Portuguese army was -now generally incorporated with the British divisions. His force, -composed of eighteen guns, two divisions of infantry, and five -regiments of cavalry, Portuguese and British, was about fourteen -thousand men, exclusive of Carlos d’Espana’s brigade, which, being at -Abrantes, was under the marshal’s orders. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 1.] - -To prevent the passage of the Tagus; to intercept all communication -between Massena and Soult; to join the main body of the army, by -Vellada if in retreat; and by Abrantes if in advance; were the -instructions given to Beresford; hence, fixing his quarters at -Chamusca, he disposed his troops along the Tagus, from Almeyrim by -Chamusca, as high as the mouth of the Zezere, establishing signals -between his different quarters. He also beat the roads leading -towards Spanish Estremadura; established a sure and rapid intercourse -with Elvas and the other frontier fortresses; organized good sources -of intelligence at Golegao, at Santarem, and especially at Thomar, -and, in addition to these general precautions, erected batteries -opposite the mouth of the Zezere. But, against the advice of the -engineers, he placed them at too great distance from the river, and -in other respects unsuitable, and offering nothing threatening to the -enemy: for the French craft dropped down frequently towards Santarem, -without hindrance, until colonel Colborne, of the sixty-sixth -regiment, moored a guard-boat close to the mouth of the Zezere, -disposing fires in such a manner on the banks of the Tagus that -nothing could pass without being observed. - -On the side of Santarem, as all the country between Alcanhete and the -Ponte Seca continued impracticable from the rain, the main bodies of -both armies were, of necessity, tranquil. Anson’s cavalry, however, -acting in concert with major Fenwick, who came down from Obidos -towards Rio Mayor, harassed the enemy’s foraging parties; and in the -Upper Beira several actions of importance had taken place with the -militia, which it is time to notice as forming an essential part of -lord Wellington’s combinations. - -It will be remembered that the ninth corps, being ordered to scour -Biscay and Upper Castile in its progress towards the frontier -of Portugal, was so long delayed that, instead of keeping the -communications of Massena free, and securing his base, Drouet lost -all connexion with the army of Portugal. Meanwhile the Partidas of -Leon and Salamanca gave such employment to Serras’ division that -the Tras os Montes were unmolested, and Silveira, falling down to -the Lower Douro, appeared, on the 29th, before Almeida. Its former -garrison had entered the French service, yet immediately deserted to -their countrymen, and Silveira then blockaded the place closely, and -made an attempt to surprise a French post at San Felices, but failed. - -In November, however, the head of the ninth corps reached Ciudad -Rodrigo, bringing a large convoy of provisions, collected in Castile, -for Massena. Lord Wellington, anxious to prevent this from reaching -its destination, directed Silveira to intercept it if possible, -and ordered Miller on the 16th to Viseu, in support. On the 13th, -general Gardanne, with four thousand infantry and three squadrons of -cavalry, raised the blockade of Almeida, took possession of Pinhel, -and, supported by the ninth corps, conducted the convoy towards -Sabugal and Penamacor. The 16th, he was between Valverde and Pereiro -Gavillos, but Silveira falling upon him killed some of his men, took -many prisoners, and then retiring to Trancoso on the 17th, united -with Miller, the latter taking post at Guarda. Nevertheless, Gardanne -pursued his march, but finally, as we have seen, retreated from -Cardigos in a panic. - -Drouet had not yet received the orders to put himself under Massena’s -command, but, at the representation of Foy, moved forward into -Portugal, and to hide his object, spread the report, already noticed, -of his intention to penetrate the Tras os Montes; the 17th December, -however he passed the Coa with fourteen thousand infantry and two -thousand cavalry, and crossing the Mondego the 18th, encamped near -Gouvea, the 22d. Thence the cavalry and one division under general -Claparede, marched against Silveira, and after a skirmish occupied -Trancoso; meanwhile, Drouet with eleven battalions, and the troops -under Gardanne, made for the Alva and reached Ponte Murcella the 24th. - -Hitherto lord Wellington’s communications with Baccellar, had been -carried on, through Trant on the side of Coimbra, and through Wilson -on that of Espinhal and Abrantes. But this sudden advance of the -ninth corps obliged Wilson to cross the Mondego to avoid being -enclosed, and Drouet effecting his junction with Massena by Espinhal, -established his division at Leiria; and then spreading towards the -sea cut off all communication between the allies and the northern -provinces. On the 2d of January, however, Trant intercepted a letter -from Drouet to Claparede, giving an account of his own arrival, -and of the state of Massena’s army; intimating also, that a great -operation was in contemplation, and that the fifth corps was daily -expected in the Alemtejo: Claparede was desired to seize Guarda, to -forage the neighbouring villages, and to watch the road of Belmonte; -and if Silveira should be troublesome, to defeat him. - -Silveira, an insufficient man, naturally vain, and inflated with -his former successes, had indeed, already attacked Claparede, and -was defeated with the loss of two hundred men at Ponte Abad, on the -side of Trancoso. Baccellar, alarmed for the safety of Oporto, then -recalled Miller and Wilson. The first moved upon Viseu; the last who -had already repassed the Mondego and taken a hundred stragglers of -Drouet’s division, marched hastily towards the same point. Meanwhile, -Silveira again provoked Claparede, who pressed him so closely, from -the 10th to the 13th of January, that he drove him with loss over -the Douro at Pezo de Ragoa, seized Lamego, and menaced Oporto before -any troops could concentrate to oppose him. Yet when Baccellar -brought up his reserve to the Pavia, and Miller’s and Wilson’s corps -reached Castro d’Airo, Claparede returned to Moimenta de Beira, being -followed by Wilson. Meanwhile, the arrival of the ninth corps having -relieved the French troops in Leon, the latter again menaced Tras os -Montes, and Silveira marched to Braganza. Miller died at Viseu, but -Wilson and Trant continued to harass the enemy’s parties. - -Claparede taking post at Guarda, according to his instructions, -seized Covilhao; while Foy, who in returning from France had -collected about three thousand infantry and cavalry convalescents, -was marching by the road of Belmonte. Foy had escaped innumerable -perils. At Pancorbo he was fain to fly from the Partidas, with the -loss of his despatches and half his escort, and now at Enxabarda -entering the Estrada Nova, he was harassed by colonel Grant with a -corps of ordenança from the Lower Beira; and although he suffered -nothing here by the sword, three hundred of his men died on the -mountain from cold. On the 2d of February he reached Santarem, where -affairs were working to a crisis. - -During December and January, the country being always more or -less flooded, the armies continued in observation; but Massena’s -positions were much strengthened, his out posts were reinforced, and -his marauding excursions extended in proportion to his increasing -necessities. The weak point on either side was towards Rio Mayor, -any movement there created great jealousy, especially as the season -advanced and the roads became firmer. Hence, on the 19th of January -(some reinforcements having landed at Lisbon a few days before) a -fear lest the allies should be concentrating at Alcoentre, induced -Junot to drive the out posts from Rio Mayor to probe the state of -affairs, and a general attack was expected; but after a skirmish he -returned with a wound which disabled him for the rest of the campaign. - -Early in February, a column of six thousand French again scouring -all the country beyond the Zezere, got much concealed food near -Pedragoa; while other detachments arriving on the Mondego below -Coimbra, even passed that river, and carried off four hundred oxen -and two thousand sheep intended for the allies. These excursions -gave rise to horrible excesses, which broke down the discipline of -the French army, and were not always executed with impunity; the -British cavalry at various times redeemed many cattle and brought in -a considerable number of prisoners, amongst them an aide-de-camp of -general Clausel’s. - -Meanwhile, Massena, organized a secret communication with Lisbon, -through the Portuguese general Pamplona, who effected it by the help -of the fidalgos in that capital: their agents, under the pretence of -selling sugar to the inhabitants of Thomar and Torres Novas, passed -by the road of Caldas and thence through the mountains of Pedragoa. -Lord Wellington, on the other hand, was understood to have gained -a French officer of rank, and it is certain that both generals had -excellent information. - -In this manner hostilities were carried on, each commander -impatiently waiting for reinforcements which should enable him to -act offensively. How both were disappointed, and how other events -hitherto unnoticed, bore upon the plans of each, must be the subject -of another book. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. “_War is not a conjectural art._” Massena forgetting this, -assumed that the allies would not make a stand in front of Lisbon, -and that the militia would not venture to attack Coimbra, but the -battle of Busaco and the capture of his hospitals evinced the -soundness of the maxim. Again, he conjectured that the English would -re-embark if pressed; the Lines put an end to his dream; yet once -awake, he made war like a great man, proving more formidable with -reduced means and in difficulties, than he had been when opportunity -was rife and his numbers untouched. His stay at Santarem shews what -thirty thousand additional men acting on the left bank of the Tagus -could have done, had they arrived on the heights of Almada before -admiral Berkeley’s error was discovered: the supply of provisions -from Alemtejo and from Spain would then have been transferred from -Lisbon to the French armies, and the fleet would have been driven -from the Tagus; when, the misery of the inhabitants, the fears of the -British cabinet, the machinations of the Patriarch, and the little -chance of final success would probably have induced the British -general to embark. - -2º. It has been observed, that Massena, in the first week might have -easily passed the Tagus, secured the resources of the Alemtejo, and -sent the British fleet out of the port. This was not so practicable -as it might at first sight appear. The rains were heavy; the fords -impassable; the French had not boats sufficient for a bridge; a -weak detachment would have been useless, a strong detachment would -have been dangerous: to collect boats, cast a bridge, and raise the -entrenchments necessary to defend it, in the face of the allied -forces, would have been neither a safe nor certain operation; -moreover, Massena would then have relinquished the certain aid of the -ninth for the uncertain assistance of the fifth corps. - -3º. Lord Wellington conjecturing the French to be in full retreat, -had like to have received a severe check at Santarem; he recovered -himself in time, and with this exception, it would be difficult to -support essential objections to his operations: yet, many have been -urged, as that, he might have straightened the enemy’s quarters more -effectually at Santarem; and that Hill’s corps, passing through -Abrantes, could have destroyed the bridges at Punhete, and lining the -Zezere cut off Massena’s reinforcements, and obliged him to abandon -his positions or even to capitulate. This last idea, advanced at -the time by colonel Squires, an engineer of great zeal and ability, -perfectly acquainted with the localities, merits examination. - -As a simple operation it was feasible, but the results were not -so certain; the Lines of Almada being unfinished, the rashness of -leaving the Tagus unguarded, before an enemy who possessed eighty -large boats, exclusive of those forming the bridges on the Zezere, -is apparent; Hill’s corps must then have been replaced, and the army -before Santarem would have been so weak as to invite a concentrated -attack, to the great danger of the Torres Vedras Lines. Nor was -the forcing of the French works at Punhete a matter of certainty; -the ground was strong, there were two bridges over the Zezere, and -the sixth corps, being within a short march, might, by passing at -Martinchel, have taken Hill in flank. - -4º. The same officer, at a later period, miscalculating the enemy’s -numbers at thirty thousand men, and the allies at more than seventy -thousand regulars, proposed that Beresford should cross the Tagus -at Azingha, behind the Almonda, and march upon Golegao, while lord -Wellington, concentrating at Rio Mayor, pushed upon Torres Novas. -It was no common head that conceived this project, by which seventy -thousand men would, in a single march, have been placed in the midst -of the enemy’s extended quarters; but the hand of Napoleon could -scarcely have launched such a thunder-bolt. Massena had still fifty -thousand fighting-men; the boats from Abrantes must have been brought -down, to pass the Tagus; the concentration of troops at Rio Mayor -could scarcely have escaped the enemy’s notice; exact concert, in -point of time, was essential, yet the eighth corps could have held -the allies in check on the Alviella, while Reynier, from Santarem, -and Ney, from Thomar, crushed Beresford between the Almonda and -the Tagus: moreover the roads about Tremes were nearly impassable -from rain during December; in January, Soult, of whose operations -I shall speak in the next book, was menacing the Alemtejo, and a -disaster happening to the allies would have relieved the enemy’s -difficulties, when nothing else could. A campaign is like other works -of art; accessaries, however splendid, must be rejected when not -conducive to the main object. That judgement, which duly classes the -value of every feasible operation, is the best quality of a general, -and lord Wellington possessed it in a remarkable degree; to it, his -genius and his courage were both subservient; without it he might -have performed many brilliant exploits in the Peninsula, but could -never have conducted the war to a successful end. - - - - -BOOK XII. - - -CHAPTER I. - - -In the preceding book, Spanish affairs have been little noticed, -although lord Wellington’s combinations were deeply affected by them. -The general position of the allies, extending from Coruña to Cadiz, -presented a great crescent, in the convex of which the French armies -were operating, and it was clear that, when checked at Lisbon, the -most important point, their wings, could reinforce the centre, unless -the allied forces, at the horns of the crescent, acted vigorously -on a system which the harbours and fortresses, at either extremity, -pointed out as suitable to those who possessed the absolute command -of the sea. A British army and fleet were therefore established at -Cadiz, and a squadron of frigates at Coruña; and how far this warfare -relieved the pressure on lord Wellington I shall now show. - -The Gallician troops, under Mahi, usually hanging on the borders of -Leon, were always reported to be above twenty thousand men when arms -or stores were demanded from England; but there were never more than -ten or twelve thousand in line, and, although Serras’ division, of -only eight thousand, was spread over the plains, from Benevente to -the Agueda, during Massena’s advance, no stroke of importance was -effected against it; the arrival of the ninth corps, in October, put -an end to all hopes from the Gallicians in that quarter, although -the Partidas often surprised both posts and convoys. Behind Mahi -there was, however, a second army, from four to six thousand strong, -embodied to defend the coast line towards the Asturias; and, in the -latter province, about eight thousand men, including the irregular -bands of Porlier and other chiefs, constantly watched Bonet’s -movements. - -That general frequently mastered the Asturias, but could never -maintain himself there; because the country is a long defile, lying -between the great mountains and the sea, and being crossed by a -succession of parallel ridges and rivers, is admirably calculated for -partizan warfare in connexion with a fleet. Thus, if he penetrated -towards Gallicia, British and Spanish frigates, from Coruña, landing -troops at the ports of Gihon, Santander, or Santona, could always -form a junction with the great bands of Longa, Mina, and Amor, and -excite insurrections on his rear. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -In this manner Porlier, as before related, forced him to withdraw -from Castropol, after he had defeated general Ponte at Sales, about -the period of Almeida being invested; and the advantages of such -operations being evident, the British government sent sir Home Popham -to direct the naval, and general Walker the military affairs at -Coruña. Preparations were then made to embark a considerable force, -under Renovales, to renew the attack at Santona and Santander; the -Partidas of the interior were to move at the same time; a battalion -of marines was assembled, in England, to garrison Santona, when -taken; and Mahi promised to co-operate by an incursion. Serras, -however, threatened the frontier of Gallicia, and Mahi remained in -suspense, and this, together with the usual procrastination of the -Spaniards, and the late arrival of sir Home Popham, delayed the -expedition until October. Meanwhile, Porlier, Escadron, and other -chiefs commenced an isolated attack in the beginning of September. -Serras returned to Zamora, Mahi sent a division into Leon, and Bonet, -aware of the preparations at Coruña, first concentrated at Oviedo, -and then fell back towards Santander, leaving a post at Gihon. - -On the 16th of October Renovales sailed but with only thirteen -hundred men; accompanied, however, by general Walker, who carried -ten thousand stand of arms and ammunition. The 19th, entering the -harbour of Gihon, they captured some French vessels; and Porlier, -coming up on the land side, took some treasure and eighty prisoners. -The next day, Renovales proceeded to Santona, but tempests impeded -his landing, and he returned to Coruña the 2d of November, with only -eight hundred and fifty men: a frigate and a brig had foundered, with -the remainder of his troops, in a dreadful gale, which destroyed all -the Spanish naval force along the coast, twelve vessels being wrecked -even in the harbour of Coruña. Meanwhile, Mahi, leaving Toboado Gil’s -division to watch Serras, entered the Asturias with the rest of the -Gallicians, and being joined first by the troops of that province, -and soon after by Renovales, was very superior to the French; yet he -effected nothing, and Bonet maintained his line from Gihon, through -Oviedo, to the borders of Leon. - -[Sidenote: Abstract of General Walker’s Military Reports from -Gallicia. MSS.] - -In this manner hostilities wore feebly on; the Junta of the Asturias -continued, as from the first, distinguished by their venality and -indifference to the public good; their province was in a miserable -and exhausted state; and the powers of the British naval officers on -the coast not being defined, occasioned some dispute between them -and general Walker; and gave opportunity to the Junta to interfere -improperly with the distribution of the English stores. Gallicia was -comparatively rich, but its Junta culpably inactive in the discharge -of duties and oppressive in government, disgusted the whole province, -and a general desire to end their power was prevalent. In the course -of the winter a combination of the clergy was formed to oppose both -the Local Junta and the General Cortes, and assumed so threatening an -aspect that Mahi, who was then on the coast, applied to be taken in -an English vessel to Coruña, to ensure his personal safety; one Acuña -was soon after arrested at Ponferrada, the discontent spread, and -the army was more employed to overawe these factions than to oppose -the enemy. Little advantage, therefore, was derived from the Spanish -operations in the north, and general Walker, despairing to effect any -thing useful, desired either that a British force should be placed at -his disposal or that he might join the army in Portugal. - -These expeditions from Coruña naturally encreased the audacity of the -inland partidas, who could only become really dangerous, by having -a sea-port where they could receive supplies and reinforcements, -or embarking save themselves in extremity, and change the theatre -of operations. To prevent this, the emperor employed considerable -numbers of men in the military governments touching on the Bay of -Biscay, and directed, as we have seen, the corps d’armée, in their -progress towards Portugal, to scour all the disturbed countries -to the right and left. The ninth corps was thus employed during -the months of August and September, but when it passed onward, -the partidas resumed their activity. Mina, Longa, Campillo, and -Amor, frequently united about Villar Caya and Espinosa in numbers -sufficient to attack large French detachments with success; and to -aid them, general Walker repeatedly recommended the taking possession -of Santona with a corps of British troops. That town, having the -best winter harbour along the coast, and being built on a mountain -promontory joined to the main by a narrow sandy neck, could have been -made very strong; it would have cut off Bonet’s communication with -France by sea, have given the British squadron a secure post from -whence to vex the French coasts; and it offered a point of connexion -with the partidas of the Rioja, Biscay, and Navarre. - -[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool. 7th May, 1811. MSS.] - -Lord Liverpool, swayed by these considerations, desired to employ a -corps of four thousand men to secure it; but, having first demanded -lord Wellington’s opinion, the latter “earnestly recommended that -no such maritime operations should be undertaken. For,” said he, -“unless a very large force was sent, it would scarcely be able to -effect a landing, and maintain the situation of which it might take -possession. Then that large force would be unable to move or effect -any object at all adequate to the expense, or to the expectations -which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those -equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships -must be deficient. It was vain to hope for any assistance, even in -this way, much less military assistance from the Spaniards; the -first thing they would require uniformly would be money; then arms, -ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses, -means of transport, and every thing which the expedition would have a -right to require from them; and, after all, _this extraordinary and -perverse people would scarcely allow the commander of the expedition -to have a voice in the plan of operations, to be followed when the -whole should be ready to undertake any, if indeed they ever should be -ready_.” - -Meanwhile Napoleon caused Caffarelli’s reserve to enter Spain, -ordered Santona to be fortified, directed other reinforcements -from France upon the northern provinces, and finally sent marshal -Bessieres to command the young guard, the third and fourth -governments, and that of the Asturias, including Bonet’s division, -the whole forming a distinct force, called the army of the north. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 6.] - -The 1st of January, 1811, this army exceeded seventy thousand, of -which fifty-nine thousand men and eight thousand horses, were present -under arms; and Bessieres, who had received unusual powers, was -especially ordered to support and furnish all necessary assistance -to the army of Portugal. This was the state of the northern parts of -Spain. - -In the middle parts, the army of the centre, or that immediately -under the king, at first about twenty thousand, was, before the end -of the year, carried up to twenty-seven thousand, exclusive of -French and Spanish guards and juramentados, or native troops, who had -taken the oath of allegiance: with this power he protected his court, -watched the movements of the Valencians, and chased the Guerillas of -the interior. - -The summer and autumn of 1810 were, however, for reasons -before-mentioned, the period of greatest activity with these -irregulars; numerous petty actions were constantly fought around -the capital, many small French posts, and numbers of isolated -men and officers, were cut off, and few despatches reached their -destinations without a considerable escort. To remedy this, the lines -of correspondence were maintained by small fortified posts which -run from Madrid; through Guadarama and Segovia to the provinces of -Valladolid and Salamanca; through Buitrago and Somosierra to the -army of the north; through Guadalaxara and Calatayud to the army of -Aragon; through La Mancha to the army of the south; and by the valley -of the Tagus, Arzobispo, and Truxillo, to the fifth corps during its -incursions into Estremadura; a brigade of cavalry, was also generally -stationed at Truxillo. - -As the warfare of the Partidas was merely a succession of surprises -and massacres, little instruction, and no pleasure, can be derived -from the details; but in the course of the summer and autumn, not -less than twelve considerable, and an infinite number of trifling -affairs, took place between the moveable columns and these bands: and -the latter being almost always beaten; at the close of the year, only -the Empecinado, Sanchez, Longa, Campillo, Porlier, and Mina retained -any reputation, and the country people were so harassed, that -counter Partidas, in many places assisted the French. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 4.] - -The situation of the army of the centre enabled the king to aid -Massena, either by an advance upon the Elga, or by reinforcing, or, -at least, supporting the fifth corps in Estremadura. But Joseph, -troubled by the Partidas, and having many convoys to protect, was -also averse to join any of the marshals, with all of whom, except -Massena, he was on ill terms; neither were his relations with -Napoleon such as to induce him to take an interest in any military -operations, save those which affected the immediate security of his -court. His poverty was extreme; he was surrounded by French and -Spanish intriguers; his plan of organizing a national party was -thwarted by his brother’s regulations; plots were formed, or supposed -to be formed, against his person, and, in this uneasy posture, the -secondary part he was forced to sustain, combined with his natural -gentleness which shrunk from the terrible scenes of bloodshed and -devastation continually before his eyes, rendered his situation so -irksome, that he resolved to vacate the throne and retire to France, -a resolution which he soon afterwards partially executed. Such -being the course of affairs in the northern and central provinces, -it remains to trace the more important military operations at the -southern horn of the crescent, where the allies were most favourably -situated to press the left flank of the invaders. - -Sebastiani was peculiarly exposed to a harassing warfare, because of -the city of Grenada and other towns in the interior, which he was -obliged to hold at the same time with those on the coast, although -the two districts were completely separated by the mountains. Hence -a large body of troops were necessarily kept in the strip of country -bordering the Mediterranean, although menaced, on the one flank by -Gibraltar and the Spanish troops at San Roque, on the other by the -Murcian army, and, in front by continual descents from the sea; -yet, from the shallowness and length of their position, unable to -concentrate in time to avoid being cut off in detail. Now the Murcian -army, nominally twenty thousand, was based upon the cities of Murcia -and Carthagena, and menaced alike the coast-line and that of Grenada -by the route of Baza and Guadix; and any movement towards the latter -was sure to attract the French, while troops landing from Cadiz or -Gibraltar fell upon their disseminated posts along the coast. - -To meet this system, Sebastiani, keeping his reserves about Grenada, -where he had entrenched a permanent camp, made sudden incursions, -sometimes against the Murcians, sometimes against the Spanish forces -on the side of Gibraltar; but that fortress afforded a refuge to -the patriots on one side, and Carthagena, surrounded by arid lands, -where, for two marches, no water is to be found, always offered a -sure retreat on the other. Meanwhile the French general endeavoured -to gain the important castles on the coast, and to put them into a -state of defence; yet Estipona and Marbella were defended by the -Spaniards, and the latter sustained many attacks, nor was it finally -reduced until the 9th of December, when the garrison, of one hundred -men, took refuge on board the Topaze frigate. But Sebastiani’s hold -of these towns, and even the security of the French troops along the -coast, depended upon the communications across the mountains with -Grenada, Chiclana, and Seville, and to impede these, general Campbell -sent British officers into the Ronda, who successfully directed the -wild mountaineers of that district, until their operations were -marred by Lascy’s misconduct. - -The various movements and insurrections in Grenada during the summer -of 1810 have been already noted, but, in October, general Campbell -and admiral Penrose, conjointly with the governor of Ceuta, renewed -the design of surprising Malaga, where were many privateers and a -flotilla of gun-boats, supposed to be destined against the islands -near Ceuta. The French depôt for the siege of Marbella was at -Fuengirola, which is only thirty miles from Malaga, and it was judged -that an attack there would draw the troops from the latter place; and -the more surely, as general Valdemoro, commanding the Spanish force -at San Roque, engaged to co-operate on the side of Ronda. - - -EXPEDITION OF FUENGIROLA. - -[Sidenote: General C. Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. XI.] - -On the 13th of October, captain Hope, in the Topaze, sailed from -Ceuta, with a division of gun-boats and a convoy, containing a -brigade of twelve-pounders, sixty-five gunners, a battalion of -the eighty-ninth regiment, a detachment of foreign deserters, and -the Spanish imperial regiment of Toledo, in all fifteen hundred -men, including serjeants. Lord Blayney, commanding this force, was -directed to make a false attack on Fuengirola, and should the enemy -come out from Malaga, he was to sail against that place. A landing -was effected the same day, and Sebastiani instantly marched, leaving -only three hundred men in Malaga: lord Blayney was as instantly -apprised of the success of the demonstration, yet he remained two -days cannonading the castle with twelve-pounders, although the -heavier metal of the gun-boats and of the frigate, had failed to make -any impression on the walls; and during this time his dispositions -betrayed the utmost contempt of military rules. On the second day, -while he was on board a gun-boat himself, the garrison, which did not -exceed two hundred men, having first descried Sebastiani’s column, -made a sally, took the battery, and drove the British part of the -investing force headlong towards the boats. Lord Blayney landed, -rallied his men, and retook the artillery; but at this moment two -squadrons of French cavalry came up, and his lordship, mistaking -them for Spaniards, ordered the firing to cease. He was immediately -made prisoner; his troops again fled to the beach, and would have -been sabred but for the opportune arrival of the Rodney with the -eighty-second regiment, the flank companies of which were immediately -disembarked and first checked the enemy. The Spanish regiment, -untouched by the panic, regained the ships regularly and without -loss; but, of the British, two officers and thirty men were killed -or wounded, and one general, seven inferior officers, and nearly -two hundred serjeants and privates taken. Thus an expedition, well -contrived and adequate to its object, was ruined by misconduct, and -terminated in disaster and disgrace. - -[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -Scarcely was this affair finished, when Valdemoro and the marquis of -Portasgo appeared in the Ronda, an insurrection commenced at Velez -Malaga and in the neighbouring villages; and Blake, who had returned -from Cadiz to the army in Murcia, advanced, with eight thousand men, -towards Cullar on the side of Baza. General Campbell immediately -furnished money to Portasgo, and embarked a thousand stand of arms -for the people of Velez Malaga. An English frigate was also sent to -cruize along the coast, yet Sebastiani, relieved from the fear of a -descent, soon quelled this insurrection; and then sending Milhaud on -before with some cavalry, followed himself with reinforcements for -general Rey, who was opposed to Blake. The latter, retiring behind -the Almanzora river, was overtaken by Milhaud, and, being defeated -on the 4th of November, his army dispersed: at the same time, a -contagious fever, breaking out at Carthagena, spread along the coast -to Gibraltar and Cadiz, and the Spanish operations on the side of -Murcia ceased. - -In the kingdom of Seville, the war turned chiefly upon the blockade -of the Isla, and the movements of the Spanish armies in Estremadura. -Provisions for Cadiz were principally drawn from the Condado de -Neibla, and it has been seen that Copons, aided by descents from the -ocean, endeavoured to secure this important resource; but neither his -efforts, nor the descents, would have availed, if Ballasteros had -not co-operated by constantly menacing Seville from Araceña and the -Aroche mountains. Neither could Ballasteros have maintained the war -there, were it not for the support of Badajos and Olivenza; under -cover of which, Romana’s army protected his line of operation, and -sent military supplies and reinforcements. On the possession of -Badajos, therefore, the supply of Cadiz chiefly depended. - -Seville was the French point of defence; Cadiz Estremadura and the -Condado de Neibla their points of offence. The want of provisions, or -the desire to cut off the Spanish convoys, or the sudden irruption -of troops from Cadiz, threatening their posts at Moguer and Huelva, -always drew them towards the coast; the enterprises of Ballasteros -brought them towards Araceña; and, in like manner, the advance of -Romana towards the mountains brought them to Estremadura; but Romana -had wasted the greater part of the latter province, and as the fifth -corps alone was disposable either for offensive movements, or for the -defence of the country around Seville, Soult contented himself with -such advantages as could be gained by sudden strokes; frequently, -however, crossing the mountains to prevent the Spaniards from -permanently establishing themselves on the frontier of Andalusia. - -In October, Romana entered the Lines of Torres Vedras, and -Mendizabal, who remained with two divisions, finding that Mortier, -unconscious of Romana’s absence, had retired across the mountains, -occupied Merida. He would also have established himself in the yet -unwasted country about Llerena; but the appearance of a moveable -column on the frontier of La Mancha, sent him back to Badajos, and, -on the 20th of November, he united with Ballasteros. The French -then fortified Gibraleon and other posts in the Condado de Neibla; -Girard’s division re-appeared at Guadalcanal, and being joined by -the column from La Mancha, foraged the country towards Llerena: -whereupon Mendizabel took post at Zafra with nine thousand infantry -and two thousand cavalry, including Madden’s Portuguese brigade. -Meanwhile, Copons, who had four thousand men, was totally defeated at -Castillejos by D’Aremberg, and retired to Puebla de Gusman. - -At Cadiz, no change or military event had occurred after the affair -of Matagorda, save the expeditions against Moguer already noticed, -and a slight attempt of the Spaniards against the Chiclana works in -September; but all men’s hopes and expectations had been wonderfully -raised by political events which it was fondly hoped would secure -both independence and a good constitution to Spain. After two years -of intrigues and delay, the National Cortes was assembled, and -the long suppressed voice of the people was at last to be heard. -Nevertheless the members of the Cortes could not be duly and legally -chosen in the provinces possessed by the enemy; and as some members -were captured by the French on their journey to Cadiz, many persons -unknown, even by name, to their supposed constituents, were chosen: -a new principle of election, unknown to former Cortes, was also -adopted; for all persons twenty-five years old, not holding office -or pension under the government, nor incapacitated by crime, nor by -debts to the state, nor by bodily infirmity, were eligible to sit if -chosen. A supplement of sixty-eight members was likewise provided -to supply accidental vacancies; and it was agreed that twenty-six -persons then in Spain, natives of the colonies, should represent -those dependencies. - -Towards the latter end of September this great assembly met, and -immediately took the title of Majesty: it afterwards declared -the press free in respect of political, but not of religious -matters, abolished some of the provincial juntas, re-appointed -captains-general, and proceeded to form a constitution worded in -the spirit of republican freedom. These things, aided by a vehement -eloquence, drew much attention to the proceedings of the Cortes, -and a fresh impulse seemed given to the war: but men brought up -under despotism do not readily attain the fashions of freedom. The -Provincial Junta, the Central Junta, the Junta of Cadiz, the Regency, -had all been, in succession, violent and tyrannical in act, while -claiming only to be popular leaders, and this spirit did not desert -the Cortes. Abstract principles of liberty were freely promulgated, -yet tyrannical and partial proceedings were of common occurrence; and -the reformations, by outstripping the feelings and understandings -of the nation, weakened the main springs of its resistance to -the French. It was not for liberty, but for national pride and -from religious influence, that the people struck. Freedom had no -attractions for the nobles, nor for the monastics, nor even for the -merchants; and the Cortes, in suppressing old establishments and -violating old forms and customs, wounded powerful interests, created -active enemies, and shocked those very prejudices which had produced -resistance to Napoleon. - -In the administration of the armies, in the conduct of the war, -in the execution of the laws, and the treatment of the colonies, -there was as much of vanity, of intrigue, of procrastination, -negligence, folly, and violence as before. Hence the people were -soon discontented; and when the power of the religious orders was -openly attacked by a proposition to abolish the inquisition, the -clergy became active enemies of the Cortes. The great cause of feudal -privileges being once given up, the natural tendency of the Cortes -was towards the enemy. A broad line of distinction was thus drawn -between the objects of the Spanish and English governments in the -prosecution of the war; and, ere the contest was finished, there was -a schism between the British cabinet and the Spanish government, -which would inevitably have thrown the latter into Napoleon’s hands, -if fortune had not, at the moment, betrayed him in Russia. - -The Regency, jealous of the Cortes, and little pleased with the -inferior title of highness accorded them, were far from partaking of -the republican spirit, and so anxious to check any tendency towards -innovation, that early in the year they had invited the duke of -Orleans to command the provinces bordering on France, permitted him -to issue proclamations, and received him at Cadiz with the honours -of a royal prince; intending to oppose his authority to that of the -Local Juntas at the moment, and finally to that of the Cortes. The -latter, however, refused their sanction to this appointment, obliged -the duke to quit Spain, and soon afterwards displaced the Regency -of Five; appointing Joachim Blake, Gabriel Cisgar, and Pedro Agar -in their stead. During the absence of the two first, substitutes -were provided, but one of them (Palacios) making some difficulty -about taking the oath to the Cortes, was immediately declared to -have forfeited the confidence of the nation; so peremptorily did the -Cortes proceed. - -Nevertheless, the new regents, not more pleased with the democratic -spirit than their predecessors, and yet wishing to retain the power -in their own hands, refused to listen to the princess of Brazils’ -claim, and thus factions sprung up on every side; for the republicans -were not paramount in the Cortes at first, and the majority were -so subtilely dealt with by Pedro Souza, as actually to acknowledge -Carlotta’s hereditary claim to the succession and to the immediate -control of the whole Peninsula; and, as I have before noticed, would -have proclaimed her sole Regent, but for the interference of lord -Wellington. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -Don Manuel Lapeña being declared captain-general of Andalusia, and -commander of the forces in the Isla, was subservient to the views of -the Cortes; but the new Regency, anxious to have a counterbalancing -force, and being instigated also by persons from Badajos, enemies to -Romana, removed that officer in December, and ordered his divisions -to separate from the British army and come to Cadiz. The conduct of -those divisions had, indeed, given little satisfaction either to the -British or Portuguese, but numbers were so absolutely necessary to -lord Wellington, that colonel O’Neal was sent to remonstrate with -the Regency; and, by shewing that the fall of Estremadura, and the -total loss of communication with the interior of Spain would ensue, -obtained a momentary respite. - -In matters relating to the war against the French, or to the -administration of the country, the Spanish leaders were incapable -of acting cordially on any mature plan; but with respect to the -colonies, all parties agreed to push violence, injustice, cruelty, -and impolicy to their utmost bounds. To please the British -government, the first Regency had published, in May, a decree, -permitting the South Americans to export their own products, under -certain conditions. This legalizing of a trade, which could not be -suppressed, and which was but a decent return to England for her -assistance, gave offence to the Municipal Junta of Cadiz, and its -resentment was so much dreaded that the Regency, in June, disowned -their own decree of the previous month, and even punished the -printers, as having given birth to a forged instrument. Exasperated -at this treatment, the colonies, who had resisted all the intrigues -of the French, with a firmness and singleness of purpose very -displeasing to the government in Old Spain, openly discovered their -discontent, and then the authorities in the Mother Country, throwing -off the mask of liberality and patriotism, exposed their own secret -views. “It is not enough that Americans should be Spanish subjects -now, but that in all cases they should belong to Spain,” was the -proclamation of the Regency, in answer to a declaration from the -Caraccas, avowing attachment to the cause of Ferdinand: meaning that, -if Spain should pass under the power of the usurper America must -follow, as having no right to decide in any case for herself. - -When the Cortes met, America expected more justice; she had -contributed ninety millions of dollars for the support of the war, -and many of her sons had served zealously in person; she had also -been declared an integral part of the empire by the Central Junta, -and her deputies were now permitted to sit in the Great National -Assembly. She was however soon made to understand, that the first -of these privileges meant eternal slavery, and that the second was -a mere form. “The Americans complain of having been tyrannized over -for three hundred years! they shall now suffer for three thousand -years,” and “I know not to what class of beast the Americans belong:” -such were the expressions heard and applauded in the Cortes, when -the rights of the colonists were agitated in that assembly. Better -to lose Spain to Joseph, if America be retained, than to save Spain -if America be separated from her, was a feeling deeply rooted in -every Spanish heart, a sentiment covertly expressed in many public -documents, and openly acted upon; for, when repeated insults, -treachery, and continued violence, had driven the colonists to defend -their rights in arms, the money and stores, supplied by England -for the support of the war against the French, were applied to the -fitting out of expeditions against America. Thus the convocation of -the National Cortes, far from improving the posture of affairs, dried -up the chief sources of revenue, weakened the army in the field, -offended many powerful bodies in the state, involved the nation in a -colonial war, and struck at the root of the alliance with England. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -While the Spaniards were occupied with the debates of the Cortes, -the French works were laboured with care. The chain of forts was -perfected, each being complete in itself with ditch and palisades and -a week’s provisions; the batteries at the Trocadero were powerful, -and the flotillas at San Lucar de Barameda, Santa Maria, Puerto -Real, and Chiclana, were ready for action. Soult repaired in person -to San Lucar, and in the last night of October, thirty pinnaces and -gun-boats slipping out of the Guadalquivir eluded the allied fleet, -passed along the coast to Rota, and from thence, aided by shore -batteries, fought their way to Santa Maria and the San Pedro. But, -to avoid the fire of the fleet and forts in doubling Matagorda, the -duke of Dalmatia, remembering what he had formerly effected at Campo -Saucos on the Minho, transported his flotilla on rollers, overland; -and in November, one hundred and thirty armed vessels and transports -were assembled in the Trocadero canal. This success was, however, -alloyed by the death of general Senarmont, an artillery officer of -the highest reputation. - -At the Trocadero point there were immense batteries, and some -notable pieces of ordnance called cannon-mortars, or Villantroys, -after the inventor. These huge engines were cast in Seville, and, -being placed in slings, threw shells with such prodigious force as -to range over Cadiz, a distance of more than five thousand yards. -But to obtain this flight the shells were partly filled with -lead, and their charge of powder was too small for an effective -explosion. Nevertheless, they produced some alarm in the city, and -were troublesome to the shipping. But Soult’s real design was first -to ruin, by a superior fire, the opposite fort of the Puntales, then -pass the straits with his flotilla, and establish his army between -the Isla and the city; nor was this plan chimerical, for on the side -of besieged there was neither concert nor industry. - -Two drafts, made, in August and September, by lord Wellington, had -reduced Graham’s force to five thousand men, and in October the fever -broke out in Cadiz; but as Soult’s preparations became formidable, -reinforcements were drawn from Gibraltar and Sicily, and, at the end -of the year, seven thousand British, Germans, and Portuguese, were -still behind the Santi Petri. Graham felt confident, 1º. that, with -due preparation, he could maintain the Puntales even though its fire -should be silenced. 2º. That Soult must establish a stronger flotilla -than the allies, or his communication with Matagorda could not be -maintained. 3º. That the intercourse between the army in Isla and the -garrison of Cadiz could not be interrupted, unless the great redoubt -of the Cortadura was lost. - -[Sidenote: Graham’s Despatches MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4.] - -To ensure a superiority of naval means, admiral Keats drew all the -armed craft from Gibraltar. To secure the land defence, general -Graham perseveringly urged the Regency to adopt certain plans, and -he was warmly seconded by sir Henry Wellesley; but neither their -entreaties, nor the imminence of the danger, could overcome the -apathy of the Spaniards. Their army, reinforced by a small body from -Ceuta, was wanting in discipline, clothing, and equipments, and only -sixteen thousand men of all arms were effective on a muster-roll of -twenty-three thousand. The labour of the British troops, far from -being assisted, were vexatiously impeded; it was the end of December, -and after many sharp altercations, ere Graham could even obtain leave -to put the interior line of the Cortadura in a state of defence, -although, by a sudden disembarkation, the enemy might enter it from -the rear, and cut off the army of the Isla from the city. But while -the duke of Dalmatia was thus collecting means of attack, the events -in Portugal prevented the execution of his design. - -[Sidenote: The King’s Correspondence, captured at Vittoria] - -When Massena passed the frontier, his communications with France -became so uncertain, that the emperor’s principal source of -information was through the English newspapers. Foy brought the -first exact intelligence of the posture of affairs. It was then -that the army of the north was directed to support the army of -Portugal; that the ninth corps was made a component part of the -latter; that the prince of Esling was enjoined to hold fast between -Santarem and the Zezere; to besiege Abrantes; and to expect the duke -of Dalmatia, who had been already several times commanded to move -through the Alemtejo, to his assistance. The emperor seems even to -have contemplated the evacuation of Andalusia and the concentration -of the whole army of the south on the Tagus, a project that would -have strengthened rather than weakened the French in the Peninsula, -because it was more important to crush the regular warfare in -Portugal, than to hold any particular province. - -Massena’s instructions reached him in due time, Soult’s were -intercepted by the Guerillas, and the duplicates did not arrive -before the end of December; a delay affording proof that thirty -thousand men would scarcely have compensated for the uncertainty -of the French communications. Postponing his design against Cadiz, -the duke of Dalmatia repaired to Seville, carrying with him Latour -Maubourg’s cavalry and five thousand infantry from the first corps. -His instructions neither prescribed a line of movement nor enjoined -any specific operation; the prince of Esling was to communicate -his plan to which Soult’s was to be subordinate. But no certain -intelligence even of Massena’s early proceedings had reached Seville, -and such were the precautions of lord Wellington, such the activity -of the Partidas, that from the time Soult quitted Cadiz, until his -operation terminated, no communication could be effected between the -two marshals, and each acted in perfect ignorance of the plans and -situation of the other. - -[Sidenote: Marshal Soult’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -The duke of Dalmatia considering that Sebastiani had his hands full, -and that the blockade of Cadiz, the protection of Seville on the -side of Neibla and of Araceña, would not permit the drawing off more -than twenty thousand men, represented to the emperor that with such -a force, he durst not penetrate the Alemtejo, leaving Olivenza and -Badajos, and Ballasteros, (who would certainly join Mendizabel) on -his rear; while Romana alone, without reckoning British troops, could -bring ten thousand men against his front; hence he demanded leave to -besiege those places, and Napoleon consented. Meanwhile, order was -taken to secure Andalusia during the operations. Dessolles’ division -had been recalled to form the army of the centre, and general Godinot -took his place at Cordoba; a column of observation was posted under -general Digeon at Ecija; Seville entrenched on the side of Neibla, -was given over to general Daricau, and a detachment under Remond -was posted at Gibraleon. The expeditionary army, consisting of -sixteen thousand infantry, artillery, sappers and miners, and about -four thousand cavalry and fifty-four guns, was assembled on the 2d -January. An equipage of siege, a light pontoon train, and seventeen -hundred carts, for stores and provisions were also prepared, and -Soult’s administration was now so efficient, that he ordered a levy -of five thousand young Spaniards, called “_escopeteros_” (fuzileers) -to maintain the police of the province. - - -SOULT’S FIRST EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA. - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Sect. 5, 6.] - -Mortier moving from Guadalcanal, entered Zafra on the 5th January, -Mendizabel retired to Merida, and Ballasteros, in consequence of -orders from the Regency, passed over the mountains to Frejenal. -Winter tempests raged, and the French convoy which moved on -Araceña, being overwhelmed by storms, was detained at the foot of -the mountains, and to cover it, Gazan marching from Zafra, drove -Ballasteros out of Frejenal. Meanwhile, the Spanish leaders, as well -those in Estremadura, as in Cadiz, were quite ignorant of Soult’s -intentions, some asserting that he was going to pass the Tagus at -Almaraz, others, that his object was only to crush Ballasteros. Lord -Wellington alone divined the truth, and it was he who first gave -Mendizabel notice, that the French were not assembling at Seville -at all, so destitute of intelligence and of military knowledge were -the Spaniards. Now when the French were breaking into Estremadura, -terror and confusion spread far and wide; Badajos was ill -provisioned, Albuquerque in ruins, Olivenza nearly dismantled; and, -in the midst of this disorder, Ballasteros was drawn off towards the -Condada de Neibla by the Regency, who thus deprived Estremadura of -half its defenders at the moment of invasion. - -Lord Wellington had advised that the troops should be concentrated, -the bridges over the Guadiana mined for destruction, and the -passage of that river disputed to gain time; but these things being -neglected, an advanced guard of cavalry alone carried the bridge of -Merida on the 6th. Soult then turned upon Olivenza with the infantry, -and while Latour Maubourg’s dragoons held Mendizabel in check on the -side of Badajos, Briche’s light horsemen collected cattle on the -side of Estremadura; Gazan’s division, still posted near Frejenal, -protected the march of the artillery and convoy, and La Houssaye’s -brigade, belonging to the army of the centre, quitting Truxillo, -marched against the Partidas and scoured the banks of the Tagus from -Arzobispo to Alcantara. - - -FIRST SIEGE OF OLIVENZA. - -This place, although regularly fortified with nine bastions, a -covered way, and some unfinished ravelins, was incapable of a -good defence. With an old breach slightly repaired, very few guns -mounted, and commanding no passage of the Guadiana, it was of little -importance to the French, yet, as containing four thousand troops, it -was of some consequence to reduce it. Lord Wellington had pressed -Romana to destroy the defences entirely, or to supply it with the -means of resistance, and the marquis decided on the former; but -Mendizabel slighting his orders, had thrown his best division into -the place. - -It was invested the 11th of January; an abandoned outwork, three -hundred and forty yards south of the town, was taken possession -of the first night; and breaching batteries of eight guns, and -counter-batteries of six guns were then marked out. The trenches -were opened on the west, and approaches carried on by the flying sap -against the old breach; but the rains were heavy and continual, the -scarcity of entrenching-tools great, and it was not until the 18th, -when the head of the convoy had passed the mountains, that the works -could be properly advanced. - -On the 19th the covered way was crowned, and the 20th the breaching -batteries opened their fire; two mortars also threw shells into -the town, and a globe of compression was prepared to blow in the -counterscarp. In the evening, the governor of Badajos skirmished -unsuccessfully with Latour Maubourg’s horsemen, and, on the 21st, the -mine was completed and preparations made for the passage of the ditch. - -Mendizabel, unable from the absence of Ballasteros’ division to -relieve Olivenza, demanded succour, and Romana sent Carlos D’España’s -brigade from Abrantes the 18th, and general Virues, with his own -Spanish division, from Cartaxo on the 20th. The 21st, the governor -of Olivenza was informed of this, and replied that he would maintain -the place to the last moment; but the next day he capitulated, having -still provisions, ammunition, eighteen guns, and four thousand one -hundred effective soldiers. The 26th Soult marched against Badajos. - -Meanwhile Ballasteros advanced upon Neibla, but being followed by -Gazan, was overtaken at Castillejos on the 28th, and, after a sharp -battle, driven with the loss of a thousand men over the Guadiana. The -Spanish artillery was saved in the castle of Paymigo, the infantry -took refuge at Alcontin and Mertola; and, that nothing might be left -to alarm the French in that quarter, the Regency recalled Copon’s -force to Cadiz. In this manner a fortress was taken, and twelve -thousand men, who, well employed, might have frustrated the French -designs against Badajos, were all dispersed, withdrawn, or made -prisoners in twenty days after the commencement of Soult’s expedition. - -For many months previous to these events lord Wellington had striven -to teach the Spanish commander that there was but one safe mode -of proceeding in Estremadura, and Romana had just yielded to his -counsels, when the sudden arrival of the French threw every thing -into confusion. The defence of the Guadiana, the dismantling of -Olivenza, the concentration of the forces were all neglected. Romana, -however, had sent his divisions towards the frontier, and they -reached Montemor the 22d; the 23d they received Mendizabel’s orders -to halt as Olivenza had surrendered; and the 24th Romana died of -an aneurism in the heart. He was a worthy man and of quick parts, -although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss, -yet his influence was on the wane; he had many enemies, and his -authority was chiefly sustained by the attachment of his troops, -and by his riches, for his estates being in the Balearic Isles, his -revenues did not suffer by the war. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 6.] - -Mendizabel now commanded in Estremadura. He had received Romana’s -orders to adopt lord Wellington’s plan, which was still to -concentrate all the Spanish troops, amounting to at least ten -thousand men, on the frontier, and, before the enemy appeared on the -right bank of the Guadiana, to occupy a certain position of great -natural strength close to Badajos; the right touching the fort of -St. Christoval, the front covered by the Gebora river and by the -Guadiana, the fortress of Campo Mayor immediately in rear of the -left, and Elvas behind the centre. When Mendizabel was entrenched -on this position, and a strong garrison in Badajos, the English -general thought Soult could not invest or even straighten the -communications of the town, yet, knowing well the people he dealt -with, prophetically observed, “_with soldiers of any other nation -success is certain, but no calculation can be made of any operation -in which Spanish troops are engaged_.” - -When Olivenza fell, a small garrison was in Albuquerque, and another -in Valencia d’Alcantara; Carlos d’España was in Campo Mayor, and -Virues, with Romana’s divisions, at Montemor. When Soult drove back -the outposts of Badajos on the 26th, Mendizabel shut himself up with -six thousand men in that fortress; but, although a siege had been -expected for a year, the place was still unprovisioned. It was, -however, still possible to execute the English general’s plan, yet -no Spaniard moved, and, on the 27th, Latour Maubourg, crossing the -Guadiana at Merida, forded the Gebora, and cut off the communications -with Campo Mayor and Elvas! - - -FRENCH SIEGE OF BADAJOS. - -This city stands on a tongue of land at the confluence of the -Guadiana with the Rivillas; the first is a noble river five hundred -yards broad, the second a trifling stream. A rock, one hundred feet -high, and crowned by an old castle, overhangs the meeting of the -waters, and the town, spreading out like a fan as the land opens -between the rivers, is protected by eight regular curtains and -bastions, from twenty-three to thirty feet in height, with good -counterscarps, covered way, and glacis. On the left bank of the -Guadiana the outworks were, 1º. the Lunette of San Roque, covering -a dam and sluice on the Rivillas, by which an inundation could be -commanded; 2º. an isolated redoubt, called the Picurina, situated -beyond the Rivillas, and four hundred yards from the town; 3º. -the Pardaleras, a defective crown-work, central between the Lower -Guadiana and the Rivillas, and two hundred yards from the ramparts. - -On the right bank of the Guadiana a hill, crowned by a regular fort -three hundred feet square, called San Christoval, overlooked the -interior of the castle, and a quarter of a mile farther down the -stream, the bridge, six hundred yards in length, was protected by a -bridge-head, slightly connected with San Christoval, but commanded on -every side. - -[Sidenote: Conquête de l’Andalusie, par Edouard Lapéne.] - -Soult constructed a ferry on the Guadiana, above the confluence of -the Gebora, and three attacks were opened against the town the 28th, -two on the side of Picurina and one on that of the Pardaleras. The -29th and 30th slight sallies were repulsed, but tempestuous weather -spoiled the works. Gazan’s division was distant; the infantry before -the place were few, and, on the 30th, the garrison making a vigorous -sally from the Pardaleras, killed or wounded sixty men and cleared -the trenches. Meanwhile some Spanish cavalry, gliding round the left -of the French, sabred several engineers and sappers, and then retired. - -[Sidenote: Siege de Badajos, par le Col. Lamare.] - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -In the night of the 2d of February a violent tempest flooded the -Rivillas, carried away the French bridges, drowned men and horses, -damaged the depôts, and reduced the besiegers to the greatest -distress. The cavalry employed in the investment could no longer -forage; scarcity was felt in the camp; the convoys could only arrive -by detachments; the rigour of winter bivouacs caused sickness, and, -on the 3d, the Spaniards, making a second sally from Pardaleras, -killed or wounded eighty men and ruined a part of the parallel. -The same day Gazan arrived in camp, but the French cavalry being -withdrawn from the right bank of the Guadiana, in consequence of -rigorous weather, the communication was re-established with Elvas, -and Mendizabel called the divisions in Portugal to his assistance. -Virues immediately marched upon Elvas, Carlo d’España, and Madden -united at Campo Mayor, and Julian Sanchez brought down his Partida -from Upper Estremadura. - -In the night of the 5th, Mendizabel repaired to Elvas in person; -passed the Caya the next day, and being joined on the road by the -troops from Campo Mayor, pushed the few French horsemen still on the -right of the Guadiana over the Gebora. The Portuguese brigade crossed -that river in pursuit, and captured some baggage; but the infantry -entered Badajos, for Mendizabel again neglecting lord Wellington’s -counsel, designed not to take up a position behind the Gebora, but -to raise the siege by a sally; yet he delayed this until the next -day, thus risking to have his whole army shut up in an ill-provided -fortress; for Latour Maubourg, seeing that Madden was unsupported, -turned and drove him back over the Gebora with loss. Badajos now -contained sixteen thousand men, and, early on the 7th, Carrera and -Carlos d’España, at the head of five thousand infantry and three -hundred cavalry, breaking out at the Picurina side, with one burst -carried the trenches and the batteries; the soldiers fought with -surprising ardour, but the entire want of arrangement on the part of -the generals (unworthy to command the brave men under them) ruined -all. They had not even provided the means to spike the guns, and -when Mortier brought his reserves against the front and flank of -the attack, the whole driven back in disorder, re-entered the city, -having eighty-five officers and near six hundred soldiers killed and -wounded; the enemy also lost several engineers and four hundred men. - -While this action took place on the left bank, Latour Maubourg -occupied the ground between the Gebora and the Caya, and again cut -off the communication with Elvas and Campo Mayor; but his forces -were too weak to maintain themselves there, and Mendizabel, leaving -the defence of the town entirely to the governor, Rafael Menacho, -pitched his own camp round San Christoval. Some days previous to -this, the French had bombarded Badajos, a proceeding only mischievous -to themselves; for the inhabitants, terrified by the shells, fled -in great numbers while the communication was open, but left behind -their provisions; which enabled Menacho to feed his garrison without -difficulty. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 2.] - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. MSS.] - -Soult observing the numbers, and awake to all the real resources -of the Spanish succouring army, feared lest delay should produce a -change of commanders, or of system, and resolved to bring matters -to a crisis. On the 11th he stormed the Pardaleras; on the 12th, he -sent fifteen hundred cavalry across the Guadiana to Montijo; and, -on the 14th, threw shells into the camp about Christoval, which -obliged Mendizabel to remove from the heights in front of that fort. -Meanwhile, intelligence that Castaños was appointed captain-general -of Estremadura created the greatest anger amongst Romana’s soldiers: -they had long considered themselves independent of the central -government, and in this mood, although the position behind the -Gebora, recommended by lord Wellington, was at last occupied, little -attention was paid to military discipline. The English general had -expressly advised Mendizabel to increase the great natural strength -of this position with entrenchments; for his design was that the -Spaniards, whom he thought quite unequal to open field-operations, -should have an impregnable post, whence they could safely aid in the -defence of the town, and yet preserve a free communication with the -Alemtejo, until the arrival of his own reinforcements (which he -expected in the latter end of January) should enable him to raise -the siege. Mendizabel, with that arrogance which is peculiar to his -nation, rejected this counsel, and hung twelve days on the heights of -Christoval in a torpid state; and, when driven thence by the French -shells, merely destroyed a small bridge over the Gebora, but neither -cast up entrenchments, nor kept a guard in his front, nor disposed -his men with care. Soult observing these things, suddenly leaped upon -him. - - -BATTLE OF THE GEBORA. - -The Guadiana and the Gebora rivers covered the Spanish position; this -did not deter the duke of Dalmatia from attempting to pass both and -surprise the camp. But first to deprive Mendizabel of the aid of San -Christoval, and to create a diversion, the French mortar-batteries -again threw shells on the 17th: yet the swell of the rivers would not -permit the main operation to be commenced before the evening of the -18th, when the cavalry drew down the right bank of the Guadiana from -Montijo, and the artillery and infantry crossed at the French ferry, -four miles above the confluence of the Gebora. These combinations -were so exactly executed, that, at daybreak, on the 19th, six -thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry were in order of battle -on the right bank of the Guadiana; the Gebora was however still to -be forded, and, behind it, the Spaniards had ten thousand infantry, -a considerable artillery, and fifteen hundred cavalry, besides many -armed followers of the camp; the whole number not being less than -fifteen thousand. - -A thick mist covered the country, no Spanish posts were in advance, -and Soult, riding through the French ranks, and exhorting the -soldiers to fight manfully, commenced the passage of the Gebora. His -cavalry forded five miles up the stream, but his infantry passed -in two columns, on the right and left of the ruined bridge: a few -shots, near the latter, first alarmed the Spaniards, and, as the -instant clamour amongst the multitude indicated that the surprise was -complete, Mortier, who directed the movements, rapidly formed the -line of battle. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 8.] - -At eight o’clock the fog cleared away, and the first beams of the -sun and the certainty of victory, flashed together on the French -soldiers; for the horsemen were already surrounding the Spanish left; -and in the centre, infantry, cavalry, and guns, heaped together, -were waving to and fro in disorder; while the right having fallen -away from San Christoval was unsupported. In one moment, Girard, -with three battalions, stood between the Spaniards and the fort; the -artillery roared on both sides; and the French bore forward as one -man to the attack: six battalions pressed the centre; Girard moved -perpendicularly on the right, and Latour Maubourg charged the left. -Thus surrounded, Mendizabel’s people instinctively crowding together -on the centre, resisted, for some time, by their inert weight; -but the French infantry closed with a destroying musketry, the -horsemen rode in with loose bridles, and the Spaniards were shaken, -divided, and slaughtered. Their cavalry fled outright, even Madden’s -Portuguese, either from panic, or from hatred of their allies, -disregarded alike his exhortations and example, and shamefully turned -their backs. At ten o’clock the fight was over; Virues was taken, -Mendizabel and Carrera escaped with difficulty, España alone made -good his retreat to Campo Mayor with two thousand men; a few more -reached Elvas, three thousand got into Badajos, by the bridge, and -nine hundred bodies strewed the field: eight thousand, including -armed followers, were made prisoners; and guns, colours, muskets, -ammunition, baggage, all, fell into the enemy’s hands. - -It was a disastrous and a shameful defeat. In the depth of winter, -Soult, with a small force, had passed two difficult rivers, carried a -strong position, and annihilated an army which had been two years in -constant service. Mendizabel, instead of destroying the bridge over -the Gebora, should have cast others, that he might freely issue to -attack the French while crossing the Guadiana; he should have opposed -them again in passing the Gebora; or he might have passed through -Badajos, and fallen on the troops in the trenches, with his whole -army, while Soult was still entangled between the rivers. - -In the evening after the action the French cast up entrenchments, -posting three battalions and the heavy cavalry on the important -position they had gained; and the next day the works of the siege -were renewed with greater activity; yet the difficulty of Soult’s -undertaking was rendered apparent by his victories. The continual -rains, interrupting the arrival of his convoys, obliged him to employ -a number of men at a great distance to gather provisions; nearly two -thousand French had been killed or wounded in the two sieges and in -this battle, many also were sick, and Badajos was still powerful. The -body of the place was entire, the garrison nine thousand strong, -and, by the flight of the inhabitants, well provided with food; and -there was no want of other stores: the governor was resolute and -confident; the season rigorous for the besiegers; no communication -had been yet opened with Massena; and lord Wellington, in momentary -expectation that his reinforcements would arrive, was impatient -to bring on a crisis; meanwhile, the duke of Dalmatia’s power, in -Andalusia, was menaced in the most serious manner. - - -CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ. - -[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Military Reports. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 5.] - -When general Graham was aware of Soult’s departure, and knew, also, -that the fifth corps had quitted Seville, he undertook, in concert -with the Spaniards, to drive Victor out of his lines. A force, -sailing from Cadiz the 29th of January, was to have been joined, -in rear of the enemy, by the troops from Tarifa under major Brown, -and by three thousand Spaniards, from Algesiras and San Roque under -general Beguines; but contrary winds detained even the vessels -carrying counter orders to Beguines and Brown, and they advanced, -the first to Medina, the other to Casa Vieja. Victor, having notice -of this project, at first kept close, but afterwards sent troops to -retake Medina and Casa Vieja; and, in the course of February, twelve -thousand men, drawn from the northern governments, were directed upon -Andalusia, to reinforce the different corps. The first corps was thus -increased to twenty thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were -before Cadiz, and the remainder at San Lucar, Medina, Sidonia, and -other quarters. Nevertheless, on the 21st of February, ten thousand -infantry and near six hundred cavalry, of the allies, were again -embarked at Cadiz; being to land at Tarifa, and march upon the rear -of the enemy’s camp at Chiclana. Meanwhile, general Zayas, commanding -the Spanish forces left in the Isla, was to cast a bridge over the -San Petri, near the sea mouth; Ballasteros, also, with the remains of -his army, was directed to menace Seville, the irregular bands were -to act against Sebastiani, and insurrections were expected in all -quarters. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 2.] - -The British troops passed their port in a gale, the 22d, but, landing -at Algesiras, marched to Tarifa the next day. Being there joined -by the twenty-eighth, and the flank companies of the ninth and -eighty-second regiments, somewhat more than four thousand effective -troops (including two companies of the twentieth Portuguese and one -hundred and eighty German hussars) were assembled under general -Graham; all good and hardy troops, and himself a daring old man and -of a ready temper for battle. - -General La Peña arrived on the 27th, with seven thousand Spaniards, -and Graham, for the sake of unanimity, ceded the chief command, -although it was contrary to his instructions. The next day, the -whole, moving forward about twelve miles, passed the mountain ridges -that, descending from Ronda to the sea, separate the plains of -San Roque from those of Medina and Chiclana: but being now within -four leagues of the enemy’s posts, the troops were re-organized. -The vanguard was given to Lardizabal; the centre to the prince of -Anglona; the reserve, composed of two Spanish regiments and the -British were confided to Graham; but the cavalry of both nations, -formed in one body, was commanded by colonel Whittingham, then in the -Spanish service. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted Letter of General Werlé to Sebastiani, Alhama, -March 12.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 6.] - -The French covering division, under general Cassagne, consisted of -three battalions and a regiment of horse at Medina, with outposts at -Vejer de la Frontera and Casa Viejas. Before La Peña’s arrival, the -irregulars had attacked Casa Viejas, and general Beguines had even -taken Medina; but Cassagne, reinforced by a battalion of infantry -from Arcos, retook and entrenched it the 29th; and the signal of -action being thus given, the French generals in the higher provinces, -perceiving that the people were ready for commotion, gathered in -their respective forces at Seville, Ecija, and Cordoba; following -the orders left by Soult. In Grenada the insurgents were especially -active; Sebastiani, doubtful if the storm would not break on his -head, concentrated a column at Estipona as a good covering point to -the coast line, and one whence he could easily gain Ronda. Victor -manned his works at Rota, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and the Trocadero -with a mixed force, of refugee French, juramentados, and regular -troops; but he assembled eleven thousand good soldiers near Chiclana, -taking post between the roads of Conil and Medina, to await the -development of the allies’ project. - -At first, La Peña’s march pointed to Medina Sidonia, his vanguard -stormed Casa Viejas on the 2d of March, and the troops from -Algesiras, amounting to sixteen hundred infantry, besides several -hundreds of irregular cavalry, came in to him; encreasing his force -to twelve thousand infantry, eight hundred horsemen, and twenty-four -guns. The 3d he resumed his march, but hearing that Medina Sidonia -was entrenched, turned towards the coast, and drove the French -from Vejer de la Frontera. The following evening he continued his -movement, and at nine o’clock on the morning of the 5th, after a -skirmish, in which his advanced guard of cavalry was routed by a -French squadron, he reached the Cerro de Puerco, called by the -English, the heights of Barosa; being then only four miles from the -sea mouth of the Santi Petri. - -Barosa is a low ridge, creeping in from the coast, about one mile -and a half, and overlooking a high and broken plain of small extent. -This plain was bounded on the left by the coast clifts, on the right -by the forest of Chiclana, and in front by a pine-wood, beyond which -rose the narrow height of Bermeja, filling the space between the -Almanza creek and the sea. The Bermeja hill, could be reached either -by moving through the wood in front, or along the beach under the -clifts. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.] - -At Tarifa, Graham, judging that Victor would surely come out of his -lines to fight, had obtained from La Peña a promise to make short -marches; to keep the troops fresh for battle; and not to approach the -enemy except in a concentrated mass. Nevertheless, the day’s march -from Casa Vieja, being made through bad roads, with ignorant guides, -had occupied fifteen hours, and the night march to Barosa had been -still more fatiguing. The troops came up in a straggling manner, -and ere they had all arrived, La Peña, as if in contempt of his -colleague, without either disclosing his own plans, or communicating -by signal or otherwise with Zayas, sent the vanguard, reinforced -by a squadron and three guns, straight against the mouth of the -Santi Petri. Zayas had, indeed, cast his bridge there on the 2d, -and commenced an entrenchment; but, in the following night, being -surprised by the French, was driven again into the Isla: hence the -movement of the vanguard was exceedingly dangerous. Lardizabal, -however, after a sharp skirmish, in which he lost nearly three -hundred men, forced the enemy’s posts between the Almanza creek and -the sea, and effected a junction with Zayas. - -Graham was extremely desirous of holding the Barosa height, as the -key both to offensive and defensive movements, and he argued that no -general in his senses would lend his flank to an enemy, by attacking -the Bermeja while Barosa was occupied in force. Lascy, the chief of -the Spanish staff, having however opposed this reasoning, La Peña -commanded Graham to march the British troops through the wood to -Bermeja. With great temper, he obeyed this uncourteous order; and -leaving the flank companies of the ninth and eighty-second, under -major Brown, as a guard for the baggage, commenced his march, in the -full persuasion that La Peña would remain with Anglona’s division and -the cavalry at Barosa; and the more so, as a Spanish detachment was -still on the side of Medina. But scarcely had the British entered -the wood, when La Peña, without any notice, carried off the corps of -battle, directed the cavalry to follow by the sea-road, and repaired -himself to Santi Petri, leaving Barosa crowded with baggage, and -protected only by a rear guard of four guns and five battalions. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 7.] - -During these movements, Victor remained close in the forest of -Chiclana, and the patrols of the allied cavalry reported that -they could see no enemy; Graham’s march therefore, being only of -two miles, seemed secure. The French marshal was, however, keenly -watching the allies’ progress; having recalled his infantry from -Medina Sidonia as soon as La Peña had reached Barosa, he momentarily -expected their arrival; but he felt so sure of success, that the -cavalry at Medina and Arcos were directed upon Vejer and other -places, to cut off the fugitives after the approaching battle. The -duke of Belluno had in hand fourteen pieces of artillery and nine -thousand excellent troops, of the divisions of Laval, Ruffin, and -Villatte; from these he drew three grenadier battalions as reserves, -attaching two of them and three squadrons of cavalry to the division -of Ruffin, which formed his left wing, the other to the division of -Laval, which formed his centre. Villatte’s troops, about two thousand -five hundred in number, after being withdrawn from Bermeja, were -posted close to a bridge on the Almanza creek, to cover the works of -the camp, and to watch the Spanish forces at Santi Petri and Bermeja. - - -BATTLE OF BAROSA. - -When Victor observed that Graham’s corps was in the wood, that a -strong body of Spaniards was on the Bermeja, that a third body, with -all the baggage, was at Barosa, and a fourth still in march from -Vejer; he took Villatte’s division as his pivot, and coming forth -with a rapid pace into the plain, directed Laval against the English, -while himself, with Ruffin’s brigade, ascending the reverse side of -Barosa, cut off the Spanish detachment on the road to Medina, and -drove the whole of the rear guard off the height towards the sea; -dispersing the baggage and followers of the army in all directions, -and taking three Spanish guns. - -Major Brown, seeing the general confusion, and being unable to stem -the torrent, slowly retired into the plain, sending notice of what -was passing to Graham, and demanding orders. That general, being -then near Bermeja, answered, that he was to fight; and instantly -facing about himself, regained the plain with the greatest celerity, -expecting to find La Peña, with the corps of battle and the cavalry, -on the height: but when the view opened, he beheld Ruffin, flanked -by the chosen battalions, near the top of Barosa at the one side, -the Spanish rear guard and baggage flying in confusion on the other, -the French cavalry between the summit and the sea, and Laval close -on his own left flank; but La Peña he could see no where. In this -desperate situation, he felt that to retreat upon Bermeja, and thus -bring the enemy, pell mell with the allies on to that narrow ridge, -must be disastrous, hence, without a moment’s hesitation, he resolved -to attack, although the key of the field of battle was already in the -enemy’s possession. - -Ten guns, under major Duncan, instantly opened a terrific fire -against Laval’s column, while colonel Andrew Barnard, with the -riflemen and the Portuguese companies, running out to the left, -commenced the fight: the remainder of the British troops, without any -attention to regiments or brigades, so sudden was the affair, formed -two masses, one of which under general Dilke marched hastily against -Ruffin, and the other under colonel Wheately against Laval. Duncan’s -guns ravaged the French ranks; Laval’s artillery replied vigorously; -Ruffin’s batteries took Wheately’s column in flank; and the infantry -on both sides pressed forward eagerly, and with a pealing musketry; -but, when near together, a fierce, rapid, prolonged charge of the -British overthrew the first line of the French, and, notwithstanding -its extreme valour, drove it in confusion, over a narrow dip of -ground upon the second, which was almost immediately broken in the -same manner, and only the chosen battalion, hitherto posted on the -right, remained to cover the retreat. - -Meanwhile Brown, on receiving his orders, had marched headlong -against Ruffin. Nearly half of his detachment went down under the -enemy’s first fire; yet he maintained the fight, until Dilke’s -column, which had crossed a deep hollow and never stopt even to -re-form the regiments, came up, with little order indeed, but in a -fierce mood, when the whole run up towards the summit; there was -no slackness on any side, and at the very edge of the ascent their -gallant opponents met them. A dreadful, and for some time a doubtful, -fight ensued, but Ruffin and Chaudron Rousseau, commanding the chosen -grenadiers, both fell mortally wounded; the English bore strongly -onward, and their incessant slaughtering fire forced the French from -the hill with the loss of three guns and many brave soldiers. - -The discomfitted divisions, retiring concentrically, soon met, and -with infinite spirit endeavoured to re-form and renew the action; -but the play of Duncan’s guns, close, rapid, and murderous, rendered -the attempt vain. Victor was soon in full retreat, and the British -having been twenty-four hours under arms, without food, were too -exhausted to pursue. - -While these terrible combats of infantry were fighting, La Peña -looked idly on, neither sending his cavalry, nor his horse-artillery, -nor any part of his army, to the assistance of his ally, nor yet -menacing the right of the enemy, which was close to him and weak. -The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some -Guerilla cavalry, indeed turned without orders, coming up just as -the action ceased; and it was expected that colonel Whittingham, an -Englishman commanding a powerful body of horse, would have done as -much; but no stroke in aid of the British was struck by a Spanish -sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed two -hundred and fifty men, and it is evident that the eight hundred under -Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin’s division, -have rendered the defeat ruinous. So certain, indeed, was this, that -colonel Frederick Ponsonby, drawing off the hundred and eighty German -hussars belonging to the English army, reached the field of battle, -charged the French squadrons just as their retreating divisions met, -overthrew them, took two guns, and even attempted, though vainly, to -sabre Rousseau’s chosen battalions. - -Such was the fight of Barosa. Short, for it lasted only one hour -and a half, but most violent and bloody; for fifty officers, sixty -serjeants, and above eleven hundred British soldiers, and more than -two thousand Frenchmen were killed and wounded; and from the latter, -six guns, an eagle, and two generals (both mortally wounded) were -taken, together with four hundred other prisoners. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.] - -After the action, Graham remained some hours on the height, still -hoping that La Peña would awake to the prospect of success and glory, -which the extreme valour of the British had opened. Four thousand -men and a powerful artillery had come over the Santi Petri; hence -the Spanish general was at the head of twelve thousand infantry and -eight hundred cavalry, all fresh troops; while before him were only -the remains of the French line of battle retreating in the greatest -disorder upon Chiclana. But all military feeling being extinct in La -Peña, Graham would no longer endure such command. The morning of the -6th saw the British filing over Zaya’s bridge into the Isla. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 9._ - - BATTLE of BAROSA - _5^{th} March, 1811_. - - _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] - -[Sidenote: Official Abstracts of Military Reports, MSS.] - -On the French side, Cassagne’s reserve came in from Medina, a council -of war was held in the night of the 5th, and Victor, although of a -disponding nature, proposed another attack; but the suggestion being -ill received, nothing was done; and the 6th, Admiral Keats, landing -his seamen and marines, dismantled, with exception of Catalina, every -fort from Rota to Santa Maria, and even obtained momentary possession -of the latter place. Confusion and alarm then prevailed in the French -camp; the duke of Belluno, leaving garrisons at the great points of -his lines, and a rear guard at Chiclana, retreated behind the San -Pedro, where he expected to be immediately attacked. If La Peña had -even then pushed to Chiclana, Graham and Keats were willing to make a -simultaneous attack upon the Trocadero; but the 6th and 7th passed, -without even a Spanish patrole following the French. On the 8th -Victor returned to Chiclana, and La Peña instantly recrossing the -Santi Petri, destroyed the bridge, and his detachment on the side of -Medina being thus cut off from the Isla, was soon afterwards obliged -to retire to Algesiras. - -All the passages in this extraordinary battle were so broadly marked, -that observations would be useless. The contemptible feebleness of La -Peña furnished a surprising contrast to the heroic vigour of Graham, -whose attack was an inspiration rather than a resolution, so wise, so -sudden was the decision, so swift, so conclusive was the execution. -The original plan of the enterprise having however been rather rashly -censured, some remarks on that head may be useful. “Sebastiani, it -is said, might, by moving on the rear of the allies, have crushed -them, and they had no right to calculate upon his inactivity.” This -is weak. Graham, weighing the natural dislike of one general to serve -under another, judged, that Sebastiani, harassed by insurrections -in Grenada, would not hastily abandon his own district to succour -Victor, before it was clear where the blow was to be struck. The -distance from Tarifa to Chiclana was about fifty miles, whereas, from -Sebastiani’s nearest post to Chiclana was above a hundred, and the -real object of the allies could not be known until they had passed -the mountains separating Tarifa from Medina. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 5.] - -Combining these moral and physical considerations, Graham had reason -to expect several days of free action; and thus indeed it happened, -and with a worthy colleague he would have raised the blockade: more -than that could scarcely have been hoped, as the French forces would -have concentrated either before Cadiz or about Seville or Ecija; and -they had still fifty thousand men in Andalusia. - -Victor’s attack on the 5th, was well-judged, well-timed, vigorous; -with a few thousand more troops he alone would have crushed the -allies. The unconquerable spirit of the English prevented this -disaster; but if Graham or his troops had given way, or even -hesitated, the whole army must have been driven like sheep into an -enclosure; the Almanza creek on one side, the sea on the other, the -San Petri to bar their flight, and the enemy hanging on their rear in -all the fierceness of victory. Indeed, such was La Peña’s misconduct, -that the French, although defeated, gained their main point; the -blockade was renewed, and it is remarkable that, during the action, a -French detachment passed near the bridge of Zuazo without difficulty, -and brought back prisoners; thus proving that with a few more troops -Victor might have seized the Isla. Meanwhile Ballasteros, who had -gone against Seville, was chased, in a miserable condition, to the -Aroche hills, by Daricau. - -In Cadiz violent disputes arose. La Peña, in an address to the -Cortes, claimed the victory for himself. He affirmed that all the -previous arrangements were made with the knowledge and approbation -of the English general, and the latter’s retreat into the Isla -he indicated as the real cause of failure: Lascy and general -Cruz-Murgeon also published inaccurate accounts of the action, and -even had deceptive plans engraved to uphold their statements. Graham, -stung by these unworthy proceedings, exposed the conduct of La Peña -in a letter to the British envoy; and when Lascy let fall some -expressions personally offensive, he enforced an apology with his -sword; but having thus shewn himself superior to his opponents at all -points, the gallant old man soon afterwards relinquished his command -to general Cooke, and joined lord Wellington’s army. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -While discord prevailed at Cadiz, the siege of Badajos continued. -Early in March, the second parallel being completed and the -Pardaleras taken into the works, the approaches were carried by -sap to the covered way, and mines were prepared to blow in the -counterscarp. Nevertheless, Rafael Menacho, the governor, was in no -manner dismayed; his sallies were frequent and vigorous, his activity -and courage inspired his troops with confidence, he had begun to -retrench in the streets behind the part attacked, and as the fire of -the besiegers was also inferior to that of the besieged, every thing -seemed to promise favourably for the latter: but, on the evening of -the 2d, during a sally, in which the nearest French batteries were -carried, the guns spiked, and trenches partly ruined, Menacho was -killed, and the command fell to Imas, a man so unworthy that a worse -could not be found. At once the spirit of the garrison died away, the -besiegers’ works advanced rapidly, the ditch was passed, a lodgement -was made on one of the ravelins, the rampart was breached, and the -fire of the besieged being nearly extinguished, on the 10th of March -the place was summoned in a peremptory manner. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Despatch.] - -At this time the great crisis of the campaign had passed, and a -strong body of British and Portuguese troops were ready to raise the -siege of Badajos. In three different ways, by telegraph, by a letter, -and by a confidential messenger, the governor was informed, that -Massena was in full retreat and that the relieving army was actually -in march. The breach was still impracticable, provisions were -plentiful, the garrison above eight thousand strong, the French army -reduced, by sickness, by detachments and the previous operations, to -less than fourteen thousand men. Imas read the letter, and instantly -surrendered, handing over at the same moment the intelligence thus -obtained to the enemy. But he also demanded that his grenadiers -should march out of the breach, it was granted, and he was obliged -to enlarge the opening himself ere they could do so! Yet this man so -covered with opprobrium, and who had secured his own liberty while -consigning his fellow soldiers to a prison, and his character to -infamy, was never punished by the Spanish rulers: lord Wellington’s -indignant remonstrances forced them, indeed, to bring him to trial, -but they made the process last during the whole war. - -When the place fell, Mortier marched against Campo Mayor, and Latour -Maubourg seizing Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, made six -hundred prisoners; but Soult, alarmed by the effects of the battle -of Barosa, returned to Andalusia, having, in fifty days, mastered -four fortresses and invested a fifth; having killed or dispersed ten -thousand men, and having taken twenty thousand with a force which, at -no time, exceeded the number of his prisoners: yet great and daring -and successful as his operations had been, the principal object of -his expedition was frustrated, for Massena was in retreat. Lord -Wellington’s combinations had palsied the hand of the conqueror. - -While the siege of Badajos was proceeding, no change took place in -the main positions of either army at Santarem. The English general, -certain that the French, who were greatly reduced by sickness, must -soon quit their ground if he could relieve Badajos, was only waiting -for his reinforcements to send Beresford with fourteen thousand men -against Soult; when the battle of the Gebora ruined this plan and -changed his situation. The arrival of the reinforcements could not -then enable him to detach a sufficient number of men to relieve -Badajos, and it was no longer a question of starving Massena out, -but of beating him, before Soult could take Badajos and the two -armies be joined. In this difficulty, abandoning the design of -raising the siege by a detachment, lord Wellington prepared to attack -Massena’s army in front on the side of Tremes, while Beresford, -crossing at Abrantes, fell upon the rear; he hoped thus to force -back the French right and centre, and to cut off the left and to -drive it into the Tagus. However, nothing could be attempted until -the troops from England arrived, and day after day passed in vain -expectation of their coming. Being embarked in January, they would -have reached Lisbon before the end of that month, had sir Joseph -Yorke, the admiral, charged to conduct the fleet, taken advantage -of a favourable wind, which blew when the troops were first put on -board; but he neglected this opportunity, contrary gales followed, -and a voyage of ten days was thus prolonged for six weeks. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. II] - -On the other hand, the French general’s situation was becoming very -perilous. To besiege Abrantes was above his means, and although that -fortress was an important strategic point for the allies who had a -moveable bridge, it would not have been so for the French. Massena -could only choose then, to force the passage of the Tagus alone, or -to wait until Soult appeared on the left bank, or to retreat. For -sometime he seemed inclined to the first, shewing great jealousy of -the works opposite the mouth of the Zezere, and carrying his boats -on wheel-carriages along the banks of the Tagus, as if to alarm -Beresford and oblige him to concentrate to his left: yet that general -relaxed nothing of his vigilance, neither spy nor officer passed his -lines of observation, and Massena knew, generally, that Soult was -before Badajos, but nothing more. However, time wore away, sickness -wasted the army, food became daily scarcer, the organization of the -troops was seriously loosened, the leading generals were at variance, -and the conspiracy to put St. Cyr at the head of the army in Spain -was by no means relinquished. - -Under these accumulating difficulties even Massena’s obstinacy gave -way; he promised to retreat when he had no more provisions left than -would serve his army for the march. A tardy resolution; yet adopted -at the moment, when to maintain his position was more important -than ever, as ten days longer at Santarem would have insured the -co-operation of Soult. General Pelet says, that the latter marshal, -by engaging in the siege of Badajos and Olivenza, instead of coming -directly down upon the Tagus, was the cause of Massena’s failure; -this can hardly be sustained. Before those sieges and the battle of -the Gebora, Mendizabel could have assembled twenty thousand men on -Soult’s rear, and there was a large body of militia on the Ponçul -and the Elga; Beresford had fourteen thousand British and Portuguese -regulars, besides ordenança; while the infinite number of boats at -lord Wellington’s command would have enabled him to throw troops -upon the left bank of the Tagus, with a celerity that would have -baffled any effort of Massena to assist the duke of Dalmatia. Now, -if the latter had been defeated; with what argument could he have -defended his reputation as a general, after having left three or four -garrisoned fortresses and thirty-five thousand men upon his flank -and rear; to say nothing of the results threatened by the battle of -Barosa. - -The true cause of Massena’s failure was the insufficiency of his -means to oppose the English general’s combinations. The French army -reduced by sickness to forty thousand fighting men, exclusive of -Drouet’s troops at Leiria, would have been unable to maintain its -extended position against the attack meditated by lord Wellington; -and when Massena, through the means of the fidalgos, knew that the -English reinforcements were come, he prepared to retreat. Those -troops landed the 2d of March, and, the 6th, the French had evacuated -the position of Santarem. - -[Sidenote: Muster-Rolls of the French Army.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII.] - -At this time Napoleon directed the armies of Spain to be remodelled. -The king’s force was diminished; the army of the south increased; -general Drouet was ordered to march with eleven thousand men to the -fifth corps, which he was appointed to command, in place of Mortier; -the remainder of the ninth corps was to compose two divisions, under -the command of Clausel and Foy, and to be incorporated with the army -of Portugal. Marmont was appointed to relieve Ney in the command -of the sixth corps; Loison was removed to the second corps; and -Bessieres was ordered to post six thousand men at Ciudad Rodrigo, -to watch the frontiers of Portugal and support Claparede. Of the -imperial guards; seven thousand were to assemble at Zamora, to -hold the Gallicians in check, and the remainder at Valladolid, with -strong parties of cavalry in the space between those places, that -intelligence of what was passing in Portugal might be daily received. -Thus Massena was enabled to adopt any operation that might seem good -to him, without reference to his original base; but the order for the -execution of these measures did not reach the armies until a later -period. - - -RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM SANTAREM. - -Several lines of operation were open to the prince of Esling. 1º. He -could pass the Tagus, between Punhete and Abrantes, by boats or by -fords, which were always practicable after a week of dry weather. 2º. -He could retire, by the Sobreira Formosa, upon Castello Branco, and -open a communication with the king by Placentia, and with the duke of -Dalmatia by Alcantara. 3º. He could march, by the Estrada Nova and -Belmonte, to Sabugal, and afterwards act according to circumstances. -4º. He could gain the Mondego, and ascend the left bank of that -river towards Guarda and Almeida; or, crossing it, march upon Oporto -through an untouched country. Of these four plans, the first was -perilous, and the weather too unsettled to be sure of the fords. The -second and third were difficult, from the ruggedness of the Sobreira, -and exposed, because the allies could break out by Abrantes upon the -flank of the army while in retreat. Massena decided on the last, but -his actual position being to the left of the line of retreat, he -was necessarily forced to make a flank movement, with more than ten -thousand sick men and all his stores, under the beard of an adversary -before he could begin his retreat. Yet this he executed, and in a -manner bespeaking the great commander. - -Commencing his preparations by destroying munition, and all guns that -could not be horsed, he passed his sick and baggage, by degrees, -upon Thomar, keeping only his fighting-men in the front, and at the -same time indicating an intention of passing the Zezere. But when -the impediments of the army had gained two marches, Ney suddenly -assembled the sixth corps and the cavalry on the Lys, near Leiria, as -if with the intention of advancing against Torres Vedras, a movement -that necessarily kept lord Wellington in suspense. Meanwhile, the -second and eighth corps, quitting Santarem, Tremes, and Alcanhete, -in the night of the 5th, fell back, by Pernes, upon Torres Novas and -Thomar, destroying the bridges on the Alviella behind them. The next -morning the boats were burnt at Punhete, and Loison retreated by -the road of Espinal to cover the flank of the main line of retreat; -the remainder of the army, by rapid concentric marches, made for a -position in front of Pombal: the line of movement to the Mondego was -thus secured, and four days gained; for lord Wellington, although -aware that a retreat was in execution, was quite unable to take -any decided step, lest he should open the Lines to his adversary. -Nevertheless he had caused Beresford to close to his right on the -5th, and at daylight, on the 6th, discovering the empty camps of -Santarem, followed the enemy closely with his own army. - -Thomar seemed to be the French point of concentration; but as their -boats were still maintained at Punhete, general William Stewart -crossed the Tagus, at Abrantes, with the greatest part of Beresford’s -corps, while the first, fourth, and sixth divisions, and two brigades -of cavalry, marched to Golegao; the light division also reached -Pernes, where the bridge was rapidly repaired by captain Tod, of -the royal staff-corps. The 7th, the enemy having burnt his boats on -the Zezere, the Abrantes bridge was brought down to that river, and -Stewart, crossing, moved to Thomar; on which place the divisions at -Golegao were likewise directed. But the retreat being soon decidedly -pronounced for the Mondego, the troops at Thomar were ordered to -halt; and the light division, German hussars, and royal dragoons -followed the eighth corps, taking two hundred prisoners. - -This day’s march disclosed a horrible calamity. A large house, -situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered, filled -with starving persons. Above thirty women and children had sunk, -and, sitting by the bodies, were fifteen or sixteen survivors, of -whom one only was a man, but all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat -the little food we had to offer them. The youngest had fallen first; -all the children were dead; none were emaciated in the bodies, but -the muscles of the face were invariably drawn transversely, giving -the appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight -imaginable. The man seemed most eager for life; the women appeared -patient and resigned, and, even in this distress, had arranged the -bodies of those who first died, with decency and care. - -While one part of the army was thus in pursuit, the third and -fifth divisions moved, from the Lines, upon Leiria; the Abrantes’ -boats fell down the river to Tancos, where a bridge was fixed; and -the second and fourth divisions, and some cavalry, were directed -to return from Thomar to the left bank of the Tagus, to relieve -Badajos: Beresford also, who remained with a part of his corps near -Barca, had already sent a brigade of cavalry to Portalegre for that -purpose. This was on the morning of the 9th; but the enemy, instead -of continuing his retreat, concentrated the sixth and eighth corps -and Montbrun’s cavalry on a table-land, in front of Pombal, where the -light division skirmished with his advanced posts, and the German -horse charged his cavalry with success, taking some prisoners. - -Lord Wellington, finding the French disposed to accept battle, was -now compelled to alter his plans. To fight with advantage, it was -necessary to bring up, from Thomar, the troops destined to relieve -Badajos; not to fight, was giving up to the enemy Coimbra, and the -untouched country behind, as far as Oporto: Massena would thus retire -with the advantages of a conqueror. However, intelligence received -that morning, from Badajos, described it as being in a sufficient -state, and capable of holding out yet a month. This decided the -question. - -The fourth division and the heavy cavalry, already on the march for -the Alemtejo, were countermanded; general Nightingale, with a brigade -of the first division and some horse, was directed by the road of -Espinal, to observe the second corps; and the rest of the army was -concentrically directed upon Pombal. How dangerous a captain Massena -could be, was here proved. His first movement began the 4th, it was -the 11th before a sufficient number of troops could be assembled to -fight him at Pombal, and, during these seven days, he had executed -one of the most difficult operations in war, gained three or four -marches, and completely organized his system of retreat. - - -SKIRMISH AT POMBAL. - -Pack’s brigade and the cavalry, the first, third, fourth, fifth, -sixth, and light divisions, and the Portuguese troops, which were -attached, like the ancient Latin auxiliaries of the Roman legion, -to each British division, were assembling in front of the enemy on -the 10th; when Massena, who had sent his baggage over the Soure -river in the night by the bridge of Pombal, suddenly retired through -that town. He was so closely followed by the light division, that -the streets being still encumbered, Ney drew up a rear-guard on a -height behind the town, and threw a detachment into the old castle -of Pombal. He had, however, waited too long. The French army was -moving in some confusion and in a very extended column of march, by -a narrow defile, between the mountains and the Soure river, which -was fordable; and the British divisions were in rapid motion along -the left bank, with the design of crossing lower down, and cutting -Massena’s line of retreat. But darkness came on too fast, and the -operation terminated with a sharp skirmish at Pombal, whence the -ninety-fifth and the third caçadores of the light division, after -some changes of fortune, drove the French from the castle and town -with such vigour, that the latter could not destroy the bridge, -although it was mined. About forty of the allies were hurt, and the -loss of the enemy was somewhat greater. - -In the night Massena continued his retreat, which now assumed a -regular and concentrated form. The baggage and sick, protected by the -reserve cavalry, marched first; these were followed by the eighth -corps; and the sixth, with some light cavalry, and the best horsed -of the artillery, were destined to stem the pursuit. Ney had been -ordered to detach Marcognet’s brigade on the 10th, from the Lys, to -seize Coimbra; but some delay having taken place, Montbrun was now -appointed for that service. - -Lord Wellington’s immediate object was to save Coimbra, and he -designed, by skilful, rather than daring, operations, to oblige -Massena to quit the Portuguese territory: the moral effect of such an -event, he judged, would be sufficient; but as his reinforcements were -still distant, he was obliged to retain the fourth division and the -heavy cavalry from the relief of Badajos, and was therefore willing -to strike a sudden stroke, if a fair occasion offered. Howbeit the -country was full of strong positions, the roads hollow and confined -by mountains on either hand, every village formed a defile; the -weather also, being moderate, was favourable to the enemy, and Ney, -with a wonderfully happy mixture of courage, readiness, and skill, -illustrated every league of ground by some signal combination of war. - -Day-break, on the 12th, saw both armies in movement, and eight miles -of march, and some slight skirmishing, brought the head of the -British into a hollow way, leading to a high table-land on which Ney -had disposed five thousand infantry, a few squadrons of cavalry, and -some light guns. His centre was opposite the hollow road, his wings -were covered by wooded heights, which he occupied with light troops; -his right rested on the ravine of the Soure, his left on the Redinha, -which circling round his rear fell into the Soure. Behind him the -village of Redinha, situated in a hollow, covered a narrow bridge and -a long and dangerous defile; and, beyond the stream, some very rugged -heights, commanding a view of the position in front of the village, -were occupied by a division of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and -a battery of heavy guns; all so skilfully disposed as to give the -appearance of a very considerable force. - - -COMBAT OF REDINHA. - -After examining the enemy’s position for a short time, lord -Wellington first directed the light division, now commanded by sir -William Erskine, to attack the wooded slopes covering Ney’s right: -in less than an hour these orders were executed. The fifty-second, -the ninety-fifth, and the caçadores, assisted by a company of the -forty-third, carried the ascent and cleared the woods, and their -skirmishers even advanced on to the open plain; but the French -battalions, supported by four guns, immediately opened a heavy -rolling fire, and at the same moment, colonel Ferriere, of the third -French hussars, charged and took fourteen prisoners. This officer, -during the whole campaign, had never failed to break in upon the -skirmishers in the most critical moments; sometimes with a squadron, -sometimes with only a few men; he was, however, sure to be found in -the right place, and was continually proving how much may be done, -even in the most rugged mountains, by a small body of good cavalry. - -Erskine’s line, consisting of five battalions of infantry and six -guns, being now formed in such a manner that it outflanked the French -right, tending towards the ford of the Redinha, was reinforced with -two regiments of dragoons; meanwhile Picton seized the wooded heights -protecting the French left, and thus Ney’s position was laid bare. -Nevertheless, that marshal observing that lord Wellington, deceived -as to his real numbers, was bringing the mass of the allied troops -into line; far from retreating, even charged Picton’s skirmishers, -and continued to hold his ground with an astonishing confidence if -we consider his position; for the third division was nearer to the -village and bridge than his right, and there were already cavalry -and guns enough on the plain to overwhelm him. In this posture both -sides remained for about an hour, when, three shots were fired from -the British centre as a signal for a forward movement, and a most -splendid spectacle of war was exhibited. The woods seemed alive with -troops; and in a few moments thirty thousand men, forming three -gorgeous lines of battle, were stretched across the plain; but -bending on a gentle curve, and moving majestically onwards, while -horsemen and guns, springing forward simultaneously from the centre -and from the left wing, charged under a general volley from the -French battalions: the latter were instantly hidden by the smoke, and -when that cleared away no enemy was to be seen. - -Ney keenly watching the progress of this grand formation, had opposed -Picton’s foremost skirmishers with his left, and, at the same moment, -withdrew the rest of his people with such rapidity, that he gained -the village ere the cavalry could touch him: the utmost efforts of -Picton’s skirmishers and of the horse-artillery scarcely enabled -them to gall the hindmost of the French left with their fire. One -howitzer was, indeed, dismounted close to the bridge, but the village -of Redinha was in flames; and the marshal wishing to confirm the -courage of his soldiers at the commencement of the retreat, in person -superintended the carrying it off: this he effected, yet with the -loss of fifteen or twenty men, and with great danger to himself, for -the British guns were thundering on his rear, and the light troops -of the third division, chasing like heated blood hounds, passed the -river almost at the same time with the French. The reserves of the -latter cannonaded the bridge from the heights beyond, but a fresh -disposition of attack being made by lord Wellington, while the third -division continued to press the left, Ney fell back upon the main -body, then at Condeixa, ten miles in the rear. - -The British had twelve officers and two hundred men killed and -wounded in this combat, and the enemy lost as many; but he might -have been utterly destroyed; for there is no doubt, that the duke -of Elchingen remained a quarter of an hour too long upon his -first position, and that, deceived by the skilful arrangement of -his reserve, lord Wellington paid him too much respect. Yet the -extraordinary facility and precision with which the English general -handled so large a force, was a warning to the French commander, and -produced a palpable effect upon the after operations. - -On the 13th, the allies renewed the pursuit, and before ten o’clock -discovered the French army, the second corps which was at Espinhal -excepted, in order of battle. The crisis of Massena’s retreat had -arrived, the defiles of Condeixa, leading upon Coimbra, were behind -him; those of Miranda de Corvo, leading to the Puente de Murcella, -were on his left; and in the fork of these two roads Ney was seated -on a strong range of heights covered by a marsh, his position being -only to be approached by the highway leading through a deep hollow -against his right. Trees were felled to obstruct the passage; a -palisado was constructed across the hollow; breast-works were thrown -up on each side, and Massena expected to stop the pursuit, while -Montbrun seized Coimbra: for he designed to pass the Mondego, and -either capture Oporto or maintain a position between the Douro and -the Mondego, until the operations of Soult should draw the British -away; or until the advance of Bessieres with the army of the north, -should enable himself again to act offensively. Hitherto the French -general had appeared the abler tactician, but now his adversary -assumed the superiority. - -When at Thomar lord Wellington had sent Baccellar orders to look to -the security of Oporto, and had directed Wilson and Trant also to -abandon the Mondego and the Vouga the moment the fords were passable, -retiring across the Douro; breaking up the roads as they retreated, -and taking care to remove or to destroy all boats and means of -transport. Now, Wilson was in march for the Vouga, but Trant having -destroyed an arch of the Coimbra bridge on the city side, and placed -guards at the fords as far as Figueras, resolved to oppose the -enemy’s passage; for the sound of guns had reached his outposts, the -river was rising, and he felt assured that the allied army was close -upon the heels of the enemy. - -[Sidenote: Campagne des Français en Portugal.] - -As early as the evening of the 11th, the French appeared at the -suburb of Santa Clara, and a small party of their dragoons actually -forded the Mondego at Pereiras that day: on the 12th, some French -officers examined the bridge of Coimbra, but a cannon-shot from the -other side wounded one of them, and a general skirmish took place -along the banks of the river, during which a party attempting to -feel their way along the bridge, were scattered by a round of grape. -The fords were, however, actually practicable for cavalry, and there -were not more than two or three hundred militia and a few guns at the -bridge; for Baccellar had obliged Trant to withdraw the greatest part -of his force on the 11th; nevertheless the latter opposed the enemy -with the remainder, and it would appear that the French imagined the -reinforcement, which reached Lisbon the 2d of March, had been sent -by sea to the Mondego and was in Coimbra. This was an error. Coimbra -was saved by the same man and the same militia that had captured it -during the advance. - -Montbrun sent his report to Massena early on the 13th, and the latter -too readily crediting his opinion of Trant’s strength, relinquished -the idea of passing the Mondego, and determined to retire by the -Puente de Murcella: but to ensure the power of changing his front, -and to secure his communication with Reynier and Loison, he had -carried Clausel’s division to Fonte Coberta, a village about five -miles on his left; situated at the point where the Anciao road -falls into that leading to Murcella. There Loison rejoined him, and -being thus pivotted on the Anciao Sierra, and covering the line of -communication with the second corps while Ney held Condeixa, he -considered his position secure. His baggage was, however, observed -filing off by the Murcella road when the allies first came upon Ney, -and lord Wellington instantly comprehending the state of affairs, as -instantly detached the third division by a very difficult path over -the Sierra de Anciao to turn the enemy’s left. - -For some time all appeared quiet in the French lines. Massena, in -repairing to Fonte Coberta, had left Ney orders, it is said, to fire -Condeixa at a certain hour when all the divisions were simultaneously -to concentrate at Casal Nova, in a second position, perpendicular -to the first, and covering the road to Puente Murcella. But towards -three o’clock Picton was descried winding round the bluff end of a -mountain, about eight miles distant, and as he was already beyond the -French left, instant confusion pervaded their camp: a thick smoke -arose from Condeixa, the columns were seen hurrying towards Casal -Nova; and the British immediately pushed forward. The felled trees -and other obstacles impeded their advance at first, and a number of -fires, simultaneously kindled, covered the retreating troops with -smoke, while the flames of Condeixa stopped the artillery, hence the -skirmishers and some cavalry only could close with the rear of the -enemy, but so rapidly, as to penetrate between the division at Fonte -Coberta and the rest of the French; and it is affirmed that the -prince of Esling, who was on the road, only escaped capture by taking -the feathers out of his hat and riding through some of the light -troops. - -Condeixa being thus evacuated, the British cavalry pushed towards -Coimbra, opened the communication with Trant, and cutting off -Montbrun, captured a part of his horsemen. The rest of the army -kindled their fires, and the light division planted piquets close up -to the enemy; but, about ten at night, the French divisions, whose -presence at Fonte Coberta was unknown to lord Wellington, stole out, -and passing close along the front of the British posts, made for -Miranda de Corvo. The noise of their march was heard, but the night -was dark, it was imagined to be the moving of the French baggage to -the rear, and being so reported to sir William Erskine, that officer, -without any further inquiry, put the light division in march at -day-light on the 14th. - - -COMBAT OF CASAL NOVA. - -The morning was so obscured that nothing could be descried at the -distance of a hundred feet, but the sound of a great multitude was -heard on the hills in front; and it being evident that the French -were there in force, many officers represented the rashness of thus -advancing without orders and in such a fog; but Erskine, with an -astounding negligence, sent the fifty-second forward in a simple -column of sections, without a vanguard or other precaution, and even -before the piquets had come in from their posts. The road dipped -suddenly, descending into a valley, and the regiment was immediately -lost in the mist, which was so thick, that the troops unconsciously -passing the enemy’s outposts had like to have captured Ney himself, -whose bivouac was close to the piquets. The riflemen followed in a -few moments, and the rest of the division was about to plunge into -the same gulf; when the rattling of musketry and the booming of -round shot were heard, and the vapour slowly rising, discovered the -fifty-second on the slopes of the opposite mountain, engaged, without -support, in the midst of the enemy’s army. - -At this moment lord Wellington arrived. His design had been to turn -the left of the French, for their front position was very strong, -and behind it they occupied the ridges, in succession, to the Deuca -river and the defiles of Miranda de Corvo. There was, however, a -road leading from Condeixa to Espinhal, and the fourth division was -already in march by it for Panella, having orders, to communicate -with Nightingale; to attack Reynier; and to gain the sources of the -Deuca and Ceira rivers: between the fourth division and Casal Nova -the third division was more directly turning the enemy’s left flank; -and meanwhile the main body was coming up to the front, but as it -marched in one column, required time to reach the field. Howbeit -Erskine’s error forced on this action, and the whole of the light -division were pushed forward to succour the fifty-second. - -The enemy’s ground was so extensive, and his skirmishers so thick -and so easily supported, that, in a little time, the division was -necessarily stretched out in one thin thread, and closely engaged in -every part, without any reserve; nor could it even thus present an -equal front, until Picton sent the riflemen, of the sixtieth, to -prolong the line. Nevertheless, the fight was vigorously maintained -amidst the numerous stone enclosures on the mountain side; some -advantages were even gained, and the right of the enemy was partially -turned; yet the main position could not be shaken, until Picton near -and Cole further off, had turned it by the left. Then, the first, -fifth, and sixth divisions, the heavy cavalry, and the artillery, -came up on the centre, and Ney commenced his retreat, covering his -rear with guns and light troops, and retiring from ridge to ridge -with admirable precision, and, for a long time, without confusion and -with very little loss. Towards the middle of the day, however, the -British guns and the skirmishers got within range of his masses, and -the retreat became more rapid and less orderly; yet he finally gained -the strong pass of Miranda de Corvo, which had been secured by the -main body of the French. - -Montbrun also rejoined the army at Miranda. He had summoned Coimbra -on the 13th at noon, and, without waiting for an answer, passed -over the mountain and gained the right bank of the Deuca by a very -difficult march. The loss of the light division this day was eleven -officers and a hundred and fifty men; that of the enemy was greater, -and about a hundred prisoners were taken. - -During the action of the 14th, Reynier, seeing the approach of the -fourth division, hastily abandoned Panella; and Cole having effected -a junction with Nightingale, passed the Deuca; when Massena fearing -lest they should gain his rear, set fire to the town of Miranda, -and passed the Ceira that night. His whole army was now compressed -and crowded in one narrow line, between the higher sierras and the -Mondego; and to lighten the march, he destroyed a great quantity of -ammunition and baggage; yet his encumbrances were still so heavy, and -the confusion in his army so great, that he directed Ney to cover the -passage with a few battalions; yet charged him not to risk an action. -Ney, however, disregarding this order, kept on the left bank, ten or -twelve battalions, a brigade of cavalry, and some guns. - - -COMBAT OF FOZ D’ARONCE. - -The 15th, the weather was so obscure that the allies could not reach -the Ceira, before four o’clock in the evening, and the troops, as -they came up, proceeded to kindle fires for the night; thinking that -Ney’s position being strong, nothing would be done. The French right -rested on some thickly wooded and rugged ground, and their left upon -the village of Foz d’Aronce, but lord Wellington, having cast a rapid -glance over it, directed the light division, and Pack’s brigade, to -hold the right in play, ordered the third division against the left, -and at the same moment the horse-artillery, galloping forward to a -rising ground, opened with a great and sudden effect. Ney’s left -wing being surprised and overthrown by the first charge of the third -division, dispersed in a panic, and fled in such confusion towards -the river, that some, missing the fords, rushed into the deeps and -were drowned, and others crowding on the bridge were crushed to -death. On the right the ground was so rugged and close that the -action resolved itself into a skirmish, and thus Ney was enabled to -use some battalions to check the pursuit of his left, but meanwhile -darkness came on and the French troops in their disorder fired on -each other. Only four officers and sixty men fell on the side of the -British. The enemy’s loss was not less than five hundred, of which -one-half were drowned; and an eagle was afterwards found in the bed -of the river when the waters subsided. - -In the night Massena retired behind the Alva; yet Ney, -notwithstanding this disastrous combat, maintained the left bank of -the Ceira, until every encumbrance had passed; and then blowing up -seventy feet of the bridge, sent his corps on, but remained himself, -with a weak rear guard, on the opposite bank. Thus terminated the -first part of the retreat from Santarem, during which the French -commander, if we except his errors with regard to Coimbra, displayed -infinite ability, but withal a harsh and ruthless spirit. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Despatches] - -I pass over the destruction of Redinha, Condeixa, Miranda de -Corvo, and many villages on the route; the burning of those towns -covered the retrograde movements of the army, and something must be -attributed to the disorder, which usually attends a forced retreat: -but the town of Leiria, and the convent of Alcobaça, were given to -the flames by express orders from the French head-quarters; and, -although the laws of war rigorously interpreted, authorize such -examples when the inhabitants take arms, it can only be justly -done, for the purpose of overawing the people, and not from a -spirit of vengeance when abandoning the country. But every horror -that could make war hideous attended this dreadful march! Distress, -conflagrations, death, in all modes! from wounds, from fatigue, from -water, from the flames, from starvation! On every side unlimited -violence, unlimited vengeance! I myself saw a peasant hounding on -his dog, to devour the dead and dying; and the spirit of cruelty -once unchained smote even the brute creation. On the 15th the French -general, to diminish the encumbrances of his march, ordered a number -of beasts of burthen to be destroyed; the inhuman fellow, charged -with the execution, hamstringed five hundred asses and left them to -starve, and thus they were found by the British army on that day. -The mute but deep expression of pain and grief, visible in these -poor creatures’ looks, wonderfully roused the fury of the soldiers; -and so little weight has reason with the multitude, when opposed by -a momentary sensation, that no quarter would have been given to any -prisoner at that moment. Excess of feeling would have led to direct -cruelty. This shews how dangerous it is in war to listen to the -passions at all, since the most praiseworthy could be thus perverted -by an accidental combination of circumstances. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -On the 16th the allies halted, partly because the Ceira was -swollen and unfordable, partly from the extreme exhaustion of the -troops who had suffered far greater privations than the enemy. The -latter, following his custom, carried fifteen days’ bread; the -allies depended upon a commissariat, which broke down under the -difficulties; not from any deficiency in the chief (Mr. Kennedy), who -was distinguished alike for zeal, probity, and talent; but from the -ill conduct of the Portuguese government; who, deaf to the repeated -representations of lord Wellington and Beresford, would neither feed -the Portuguese troops regularly while at Santarem, nor fill their -magazines, nor collect the means of transport for the march. Hence, -after passing Pombal, the greater part of the native force had been -unable to continue the pursuit; and the brigades under general Pack -and colonel Ashworth, which did keep up and engaged daily with the -enemy, were actually four days without food of any sort. Numbers died -of inanition on the roads, and to save the whole from destruction, -the British supplies were shared with them. The commissary-general’s -means were thus overlaid, the whole army suffered, and an imperative -necessity obliged lord Wellington to halt. Nevertheless he had saved -Coimbra, forced the enemy into a narrow, intricate, and ravaged -country, and, with an inferior force, turned him out of every strong -position; and this, by a series of movements, based on the soundest -principles of war. For, noting the skill and tenacity with which -Massena and Ney clung to every league of ground and every ridge -defensible, against superior numbers, he seized the higher slopes -of the mountains by Picton’s flank march on the 13th; and again by -Cole’s on the 14th; and thus, continually menacing the passes in -rear of the French, obliged them to abandon positions which could -scarcely have been forced: and this method of turning the strength -of the country to profit is the true key to mountain warfare. He who -receives battle in the hills has always the advantage; and he who -first seizes the important points chooses his own field of battle. - -In saying an inferior force, I advert to the state of the Portuguese -army and to Badajos; for lord Wellington, having saved Coimbra, and -seen that the French would not accept a general battle, except on -very advantageous terms, had detached a brigade of cavalry, some -guns, and a division of native infantry, from Condeixa, to the -Alemtejo. He had, therefore, actually less than twenty-five thousand -men in hand, during the subsequent operations. In the night of the -13th, also, he received intelligence that Badajos had surrendered, -and, feeling all the importance of this event, detached the fourth -division likewise to the Alemtejo, for he designed that Beresford -should immediately retake the lost fortress: but, as the road of -Espinhal was the shortest line to the Tagus, general Cole, as we have -seen, moved into it by Panella, thus threatening Massena’s flank and -rear at the same moment that he gained a march towards his ultimate -destination. Meanwhile, Trant and Wilson, with the militia, moving -up the right bank of the Mondego, parallel to the enemy’s line of -retreat, forbad his foragers to pass that river, and were at hand -either to interfere between him and Oporto, or to act against his -flank and rear. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 9.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -Such were the dispositions of the English general; but the military -horizon was still clouded. Intelligence came from the north that -Bessieres, after providing for his government, had been able to -draw together, at Zamora, above seven thousand men, and menaced an -invasion of Gallicia; and, although Mahi had an army of sixteen -thousand men, lord Wellington anticipated no resistance. In the -south, affairs were even more gloomy. The battle of Barosa, the -disputes which followed, and the conduct of Imas and Mendizabel, -proved that, from Spain, no useful co-operation was ever to be -expected. Mortier, also, had invested Campo Mayor, and it was hardly -expected to hold out until Beresford arrived. The Spaniards, to whom -it had been delivered, under an engagement of honour, entered into -by Romana, to keep it against the enemy, had disloyally neglected -and abandoned it at the very moment when Badajos fell, and two -hundred Portuguese militia, thrown in at the moment, had to defend -this fortress, which required a garrison of five thousand regulars. -Nor was the enemy, immediately in the British front, the last to be -considered. - -Ney withdrew from the Ceira in the evening of the 16th, and on the -17th the light division forded that river with great difficulty, -while the rest of the army passed over a trestle bridge, thrown in -the night by the staff-corps. The French were, however, again in -position immediately behind the Alva and on the Sierra de Moita, -and they destroyed the Ponte Murcella and the bridge near Pombeira; -while the second corps moved towards the upper part of the river, -and Massena spread his foraging parties to a considerable distance, -designing to halt for several days. Nevertheless the first, third, -and fifth divisions were directed on the 18th, by the Sierra de St. -Quiteria, to menace the French left, and they made way over the -mountains with a wonderful perseverance and strength, while the sixth -and light divisions cannonaded the enemy on the Lower Alva. - -As the upper course of the river, now threatened by lord Wellington’s -right, was parallel to the line of Massena’s retreat, that marshal -recalled the second corps, and, quitting the Lower Alva also, -concentrated on the Sierra de Moita, lest the divisions, moving up -the river, should cross, and fall on his troops while separated and -in march. It then behoved the allies to concentrate also, lest the -heads of their columns should be crushed by the enemy’s masses. -The Alva was deep, wide, and rapid, yet the staff-corps succeeded -in forming a most ingenious raft-bridge, and the light division -immediately passed between Ponte Murcella and Pombeira; and at the -same time the right wing of the army entered Arganil, while Trant and -Wilson closed on the other side of the Mondego. - -Massena now recommenced his retreat with great rapidity, and being -desirous to gain Celerico and the defiles leading upon Guarda -betimes, he again destroyed baggage and ammunition, and abandoned -even his more distant foraging parties, who were intercepted and -taken, to the number of eight hundred, in returning to the Alva: -for lord Wellington, seeing the success of his combinations, had -immediately directed all his columns upon Moita, and the whole army -was assembled there the 19th. The pursuit was renewed the 20th, -through Penhancos, but only with the light division and the cavalry; -the communication was, however, again opened with Wilson and Trant -who had reached the bridge of Fornos, and with Silveira, who was -about Trancoso. The third and sixth divisions followed in reserve, -but the remainder of the army halted at Moita, until provisions, -sent by sea from Lisbon to the Mondego, could come up to them. The -French reached Celerico the 21st, with two corps and the cavalry, -and immediately opened the communication with Almeida, by posting -detachments of horse on the Pinhel, and at the same time Reynier, who -had retired through Govea, occupied Guarda with the second corps. - -Massena had now regained his original base of operations, and his -retreat may be said to have terminated; but he was far from wishing -to re-enter Spain, where he could only appear as a baffled general, -and shorn of half his authority; because Bessieres commanded the -northern provinces, which, at the commencement of the invasion, -had been under himself. Hence, anxious to hold on to Portugal, -and that his previous retreat might appear as a mere change of -position, he formed the design of throwing all his sick men and other -incumbrances into Almeida, and then, passing the Estrella at Guarda, -make a countermarch, through Sabugal and Pena Macor, to the Elga; -establishing a communication across the Tagus with Soult, and by the -valley of the Tagus with the king. - -[Sidenote: General Pelet’s Notes. See Vol. xxi. Victoires et -Conquêtes des Français.] - -But now the factions in his army had risen to such a height that he -could no longer command the obedience of his lieutenants; Montbrun, -Junot, Drouet, Reynier, and Ney were all at variance with each other -and with him. The first had, in the beginning of the retreat, been -requested to secure Coimbra; instead of which he quitted Portugal, -carrying with him Claparede’s division; Marcognet’s brigade was then -ordered for that operation, but it did not move; finally, Montbrun -undertook it, and failed in default of vigour. Junot was disabled by -his wound, but his faction did not the less shew their discontent. -Reynier’s dislike to the prince was so strong, that the officers -carrying flags of truce, from his corps, never failed to speak of it -to the British; and Ney, more fierce than all of them, defied his -authority. To him the dangerous delay at Pombal, the tardiness of -Marcognet’s brigade, and, finally, the too-sudden evacuation of the -position at Condeixa, have been attributed: and it is alleged that, -far from being ordered to set fire to that town on the 13th, as the -signal for a preconcerted retreat, that he had promised Massena to -maintain the position for twenty-four hours longer. The personal -risk of the latter, in consequence of the hasty change of position, -would seem to confirm this; but it is certain that, when Picton was -observed passing the Sierra de Anciao by a road before unknown to the -French, and by which the second corps could have been separated from -the army, and the passes of Miranda de Corvo seized, Ney would have -been frantic to have delayed his movement. - -At Miranda, the long gathering anger broke out in a violent -altercation between the prince and the marshal; and at Celerico, -Ney, wishing to fall back on Almeida, to shorten the term of the -retreat, absolutely refused to concur in the projected march to -Coria; and even marched his troops in a contrary direction. Massena, -a man not to be opposed with impunity, then deprived him of his -command, giving the sixth corps to Loison; and each marshal sent -confidential officers to Paris to justify their conduct to the -emperor. From both of those officers I have derived information, -but as each thinks that the conduct of his general was approved by -Napoleon, their opinions are irreconcilable upon many points; I have, -therefore, set down in the narrative the leading sentiments of each, -without drawing any other conclusions than those deducible from the -acknowledged principles of art and from unquestioned facts. Thus -judging, it appears that Massena’s general views were as superior to -Ney’s as the latter’s readiness and genius in the handling of troops -in action were superior to the prince’s. Yet the duke of Elchingen -often played too near the flame, whereas nothing could be grander -than the conceptions of Massena: nor was the project now meditated by -him the least important. - -From Guarda to Zarza Mayor and Coria was not two days longer march -than to Ciudad Rodrigo, but the army of Portugal must have gone to -the latter place a beaten army, seeking for refuge and succour in its -fortresses and reserves, and being separated from the central line of -invasion: whereas, by gaining Coria, a great movement of war, wiping -out the notion of a forced retreat, would have been accomplished. -A close and concentric direction would also have been given to the -three armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal; and -a powerful demonstration effected against Lisbon, which would -inevitably bring lord Wellington back to the Tagus. Thus the -conquests of the campaign, namely, Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida, Badajos, -and Olivenza, would have been preserved, and meanwhile the army of -the north could have protected Castile and menaced the frontier of -Portugal. Massena, having maturely considered this plan, gave orders, -on the 23d, for the execution; but Ney, as we have seen, thwarted him. - -Meanwhile the English horse and the militia, hovering round Celerico, -made, in different skirmishes, a hundred prisoners, and killed as -many more; and the French cavalry posts withdrew from the Pinhel. -The sixth corps then took a position at Guarda; the second corps at -Belmonte; the eighth corps and the cavalry in the eastern valleys of -the Estrella. - -Ney’s insubordination had rendered null the plan of marching upon the -Elga; but Massena expected still to maintain himself at Guarda with -the aid of the army of the south, and to hold open the communications -with the king and with Soult. His foragers had gathered provisions -in the western valleys of the Estrella, and he calculated upon being -able to keep his position for eight days with his own force alone; -and, independent of the general advantage, it was essential to hold -Guarda for some time, because Drouet had permitted Julian Sanchez -to cut off a large convoy destined for Ciudad Rodrigo, and had left -Almeida with only ten days’ provisions. Lord Wellington’s ready -boldness, however, disarranged all the prince’s calculations. - -The troops had come up from Moita on the 28th, and with them the -reinforcements, which were organized as a seventh division. - -The light division and the cavalry then passed the Mondego at -Celerico, and, driving the French out of Frexadas, occupied the -villages beyond that place: at the same time, the militia took post -on the Pinhel river, cutting the communication with Almeida, while -the third division was established at Porca de Misarella, half way up -the mountain, to secure the bridges over the higher Mondego. Early on -the 29th the third, sixth, and light divisions, and two regiments of -light cavalry, disposed in five columns of attack on a half circle -round the foot of the Guarda mountain, ascended by as many paths, all -leading upon the town of Guarda, and outflanking both the right and -left of the enemy; they were supported on one wing by the militia, -on the other by the fifth division, and in the centre by the first -and seventh divisions. A battle was expected, but the absence of Ney -was at once felt by both armies; the appearance of the allied columns -threw the French into the greatest confusion, and, without firing a -shot, this great and nearly impregnable position was abandoned. Had -the pursuit been as vigorous as the attack, it is not easy to see how -the second corps could have rejoined Massena; but Reynier quitting -Belmonte in the night, recovered his communication with a loss of -only three hundred prisoners, although the horse-artillery and -cavalry had been launched against him at daylight on the 30th. Much -more could however have been done, if general Slade had pushed his -cavalry forward with the celerity and vigour the occasion required. - -On the 1st of April, the allied army descended the mountains, and -reached the Coa; but the French general, anxious to maintain at -once his hold of Portugal and the power of operating either on the -side of Coria or of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, was in position on -the right bank of that river. The sixth corps was at Rovina, with -detachments guarding the bridge of Seceiras and the ford of Atalayon, -and the communication with Almeida was maintained by a brigade of -the ninth corps, which was posted near the ford of Junça. The second -corps was on the hills behind Sabugal, stretching towards Alfayates, -but having strong detachments at the bridge of Sabugal and the ford -of Rapoulha de Coa. The eighth corps was at Alfayates, and a post was -established at Rendo to maintain the communication between the second -and the sixth corps. In this situation, the French army was disposed -on two sides of a triangle, the apex of which was at Sabugal, and -both fronts were covered by the Coa, because Sabugal was situated -in a sharp bend of the stream: by holding Alfayates, Massena also -commanded the passes leading through St. Martin Trebeja to Coria. - -Along the whole course of the Coa, which is a considerable river, the -banks are rugged, but the ravine continually deepens as the stream -flows; and, during the first two days of April, the allies occupied -a line parallel to the enemy’s right, which could not be attacked. -Meanwhile Trant and Wilson, passing the Coa below Almeida, penetrated -between that fortress and Ciudad Rodrigo, as if the passage of -the river was to be made on that side. Lord Wellington’s aim was, -however, against the other flank, and, to protect the left and rear -of the army, he placed the sixth division opposite the sixth corps, -and a battalion of the seventh division at the bridge of Seceiras. - -At daylight, on the 3d of April the cavalry under general Slade, -being on the extreme right, was directed to cross the Upper Coa; the -light division was ordered to ford a little below; the third division -still lower; and the fifth division, with the artillery, to force -the bridge of Sabugal; the first and seventh, with the exception of -the battalion at Seceiras, were held in reserve. The English general -having thus, ten thousand men pivotted on the fifth division at -Sabugal, designed to turn Reynier’s left, to separate him from the -eighth corps, and to surround him before he could be succoured by the -sixth corps. One of those accidents which are frequent in war marred -this well-concerted plan, and brought on the - - -COMBAT OF SABUGAL. - -The morning was so foggy, that the troops could not gain their -respective posts of attack with that simultaneous regularity which is -so essential to success; and in the light division no measures were -taken by sir William Erskine to put the columns in a right direction: -the brigades were not even held together, and he carried off the -cavalry and the third caçadores without communicating with colonel -Beckwith. This officer, who commanded the first brigade, being -without any instructions, halted at a ford to await further orders, -and at that moment a staff officer rode up, and somewhat hastily -asked, why he did not attack? The thing appeared rash, but with an -enemy in his front he could make no reply, and instantly passing -the river, which was deep and rapid, mounted a very steep wooded -hill on the other side. Four companies of the ninety-fifth led in -skirmishing order, and were followed by the forty-third regiment; -but the caçadores and the other brigade, being in movement to the -true point, were already distant, and a dark heavy rain setting in -rendered it impossible for some time to distinguish friends or foes. -The attack was thus made too soon, for, owing to the obscurity, none -of the divisions of the army had reached their respective posts. It -was made also in a partial, disseminated, and dangerous manner, and -on the wrong point; for Reynier’s whole corps was directly in front, -and Beckwith, having only one bayonet regiment and four companies of -riflemen, was advancing against more than twelve thousand infantry, -supported by cavalry and artillery. - -Scarcely had the riflemen reached the top of the hill, when a compact -and strong body of French drove them back upon the forty-third; the -weather cleared at that instant, and Beckwith at once saw and felt -all his danger; but he met it with a heart that nothing could shake. -Leading a fierce charge he beat back the enemy, and the summit of the -hill was attained, but at the same moment two French guns opened with -grape at the distance of a hundred yards, a fresh body appeared in -front, and considerable forces came on either flank of the regiment. -Fortunately, Reynier, little expecting to be attacked, had for the -convenience of water, placed his principal masses in the low ground -behind the height on which the action commenced; his renewed attack -was therefore up hill; yet the musketry, heavy from the beginning, -now encreased to a storm; the French sprung up the acclivity with -great clamour, and it was evident that nothing but the most desperate -fighting could save the regiment from destruction. - -Captain Hopkins, commanding a flank company of the forty-third, -immediately ran out to the right, and with admirable presence of mind -seized a small eminence, close to the French guns and commanding -the ascent up which the French troops turning the right flank were -approaching. His first fire was so sharp, that the assailants were -thrown into confusion; they rallied and were again disordered by the -volleys of this company; a third time they endeavoured to form a head -of attack; when Hopkins with a sudden charge increased the disorder, -and at the same moment the two battalions of the fifty-second -regiment, which had been attracted by the fire, entered the line. -Meanwhile, the centre and left of the forty-third were furiously -engaged and wonderfully excited; for Beckwith wounded in the head, -and with the blood streaming down his face, rode amongst the foremost -of the skirmishers, directing all with ability, and praising the men, -in a loud cheerful tone. - -The musket-bullets flew thicker and closer every instant, but the -French fell fast, a second charge cleared the hill, a howitzer was -taken, and the British skirmishers were even advanced a short way -down the descent, when small bodies of French cavalry came galloping -in from all parts, and obliged them to take refuge with the main body -of the regiment. The English line was instantly formed behind a stone -wall above; yet one squadron of dragoons surmounted the ascent, and, -with incredible desperation, riding up to this wall, were in the act -of firing over it with their pistols, when a rolling volley laid -nearly the whole of them lifeless on the ground. By this time however -a second and stronger column of infantry had rushed up the face of -the hill, endeavouring to break in and retake the howitzer which was -on the edge of the descent and only fifty yards from the wall; but no -man could reach it and live, so deadly was the forty-third’s fire. -Meanwhile two English guns came into action, and the two battalions -of the fifty-second charging upon the flank of the assailants, -vindicated the right of the division to the height. A squadron of -French cavalry, which had followed the columns in their last attack, -then fell in amongst the fifty-second men, extended as they were from -the circumstances of the action, and at first created considerable -confusion, but it was finally repulsed. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 10._ - - MASSENA’S RETREAT - Combat of Sabugal - 1811. - - _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] - -[Sidenote: Official Despatch.] - -Reynier, convinced at last that he had acted unskilfully in sending -up his troops piece-meal, put all his reserves, amounting to nearly -six thousand infantry with artillery and cavalry, in motion, and -outflanking the division on its left, appeared resolute to storm the -contested height. But, at this critical period, the fifth division -passed the bridge of Sabugal, the British cavalry appeared on the -hills beyond the enemy’s left, and general Colville with the leading -brigade of the third division issuing out of the woods on Reynier’s -right, opened a fire on that flank, which instantly decided the fate -of the day. The French general hastily retreated upon Rendo, where -the sixth corps, which had been put in march when the first shots -were heard, met him, and together they fell back upon Alfayates, -pursued by the English cavalry. The loss of the allies in this bloody -encounter, which did not last quite an hour, was nearly two hundred -killed and wounded, that of the enemy was enormous; three hundred -dead bodies were heaped together on the hill, the greatest part round -the captured howitzer, and more than twelve hundred were wounded; -so unwisely had Reynier handled his masses and so true and constant -was the English fire. Although, the principal causes of this -disproportion undoubtedly was, first, the heavy rain which gave the -French only a partial view of the British, and secondly, the thick -wood which ended near the top of hill, leaving an open and exposed -space upon which the enemy mounted after the first attack; yet it was -no exaggeration in lord Wellington to say, “that this was one of the -most glorious actions that British troops were ever engaged in.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.] - -The next day, the light division took the route of Valdespina, to -feel for the enemy on the side of the passes leading upon Coria; -but Massena was in full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the 5th -crossed the frontier of Portugal. Here the vigour of the French -discipline on sudden occasions was surprisingly manifested. Those men -who had for months been living by rapine, whose retreat had been one -continued course of violence and devastation, passed an imaginary -line of frontier, and became the most orderly of soldiers; not the -slightest rudeness was offered to any Spaniard, and every thing -demanded was scrupulously paid for, although bread was sold at two -shillings a pound! Massena himself also, fierce and terrible as he -was in Portugal, always treated the Spaniards with gentleness and -moderation. - -While these events were passing at Sabugal, Trant crossing the -Lower Coa with four thousand militia, had taken post two miles from -Almeida, when the river suddenly flooded behind him. Near fort -Conception, there was a brigade of the ninth corps, which had been -employed to cover the march of the battering train from Almeida to -Ciudad Rodrigo; but ere those troops discovered Trant’s dangerous -situation, he constructed a temporary bridge and was going to retire -on the 6th, when he received a letter from the British head-quarters, -desiring him to be vigilant in cutting the communication with -Almeida, and fearless, because the next day a British force would be -up to his assistance. Marching then to Val de Mula, he interposed -between the fortress and the brigade of the ninth corps. The latter -were already within half a mile of his position, and his destruction -appeared inevitable; but suddenly two cannon shots were heard to -the southward, the enemy immediately formed squares and commenced a -retreat, and six squadrons of British cavalry and Bull’s troop of -horse-artillery came sweeping over the plain in their rear. Military -order and coolness, marked the French retreat across the Turones, -yet the cannon shots ploughed with a fearful effect through their -dense masses, and the horsemen continually flanked their line of -march: they however gained the rough ground, and finally escaped -over the Agueda by Barba del Puerco; but with the loss of three -hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners. The prince of Esling -had reached Ciudad Rodrigo two days before, and lord Wellington now -stood victorious on the confines of Portugal, having executed what to -others appeared incredibly rash and vain even to attempt. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -Massena entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand men; his -reinforcements while at Santarem were about ten thousand; he repassed -the frontier with forty-five thousand; hence the invasion of Portugal -cost him about thirty thousand men, of which fourteen thousand might -have fallen by the sword or been taken. Not more than six thousand -were lost during the retreat; but had lord Wellington, unrestrained -by political considerations, attacked him vigorously at Redinha, -Condeixa, Casal Nova, and Miranda de Corvo, half the French army -would have been lost. It is unquestionable that a retreating army -should fight as little as possible. - -When Massena reached the Agueda, his cavalry detachments, heavy -artillery, and convalescents, again augmented his army to more than -fifty thousand men, but the fatigues of the retreat and the want -of provisions, would not suffer him to shew a front to the allies; -wherefore, drawing two hundred thousand rations from Ciudad, he fell -back to Salamanca, and lord Wellington invested Almeida. The light -division occupied Gallegos and Espeja, the rest of the army were -disposed in villages on both sides of the Coa, and the head-quarters -were transferred to Villa Formosa. - -Here colonel Waters, who had been taken near Belmonte during the -retreat, rejoined the army. Confident in his own resources, he had -refused his parole, and, when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo, rashly -mentioned his intention of escaping to the Spaniard in whose house -he was lodged. This man betrayed him; but a servant, detesting his -master’s treachery, secretly offered his aid, and Waters coolly -desired him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened. When the French -army was near Salamanca, Waters, being in the custody of _gens -d’armes_, waited until their chief, who rode the only good horse in -the party, had alighted, then giving the spur to his own beast, he -galloped off! an act of incredible resolution and hardihood, for he -was on a large plain, and before him, and for miles behind him, the -road was covered with the French columns. His hat fell off, and, -thus distinguished, he rode along the flank of the troops, some -encouraging him, others firing at him, and the _gens d’armes_, sword -in hand, close at his heels; but suddenly breaking at full speed, -between two columns, he gained a wooded hollow, and, having baffled -his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy’s army. The third day he -reached head-quarters, where lord Wellington had caused his baggage -to be brought, observing that he would not be long absent. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII.] - -Massena, having occupied Salamanca, and communicated with Bessieres, -sent a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, and lord Wellington was unable -to prevent its entrance. He had sent the militia to their homes, -disposed his army between the Coa and the Agueda, and blockaded -Almeida; but the Portuguese regulars were in a dreadful state, and -daily decreasing in numbers; while the continued misconduct of -the Regency, and the absolute want of money gave no hope of any -amelioration; it was therefore impossible to take a position beyond -the Agueda. - -The depôts were re-established at Lamego on the Douro, and at Raiva -on the Mondego; and magazines of consumption were formed at Celerico, -from whence the mule-brigades brought up the provisions by the way -of Castello Bom: measures were also taken at Guarda, Pena Macor, and -Castello Branco, to form commissariat establishments which were to be -supplied from Abrantes. But the transport of stores was difficult, -and this consideration, combined with the capricious nature of -the Agueda and Coa, rendered it dangerous to blockade both Ciudad -Rodrigo and Almeida; seeing that the troops would have those rivers -behind them, while the position itself would be weak and extended. -The blockade of Almeida was undertaken because, from intercepted -letters and other sources, it was known to have provisions only for -a fortnight; but the operation formed no part of the plan which lord -Wellington was now revolving in his mind, and he was even prepared to -relinquish it altogether if hardly pressed. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, May 7th, 1810. MSS.] - -The success in Portugal had given stability to the English ministers; -and it would appear that they at first meant to limit their future -efforts to the defence of that country, for lord Liverpool required -the return of many battalions. But offensive warfare in Spain, -occupied the general’s thoughts, and two lines of operation had -presented themselves to his mind.--1º. Under the supposition that it -would be long ere Massena could again make any serious attempt on -Portugal; to remain on the defensive in Beira, and march against the -army of the South to raise the siege of Cadiz. 2º. If Almeida fell -to the blockade, to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo; or if Almeida did not so -fall, to besiege both together, and, when they were taken, march at -once into the heart of Spain, and open a communication with Valencia -and with the army of Sicily. This great and lofty conception would -have delivered Andalusia as certainly as any direct operation; for -thus Madrid, the great depôt of the French, would have been taken, -the northern and southern armies cut asunder, and the English base -momentarily fixed on the Mediterranean coast: then the whole of the -Spanish and British force could have been concentrated, and one or -two great battles must have decided the fate of Spain. - -Filled with this grand project lord Wellington demanded -reinforcements from England, and leave to carry his design -into execution, if occasion offered: yet he checked his secret -aspirations, when reflecting upon the national pride and perverseness -of the Spaniards, and on their uncertain proceedings, and the great -difficulty, if not impossibility, of ensuring any reasonable concert -and assistance. When to this he also added the bad disposition of the -Portuguese Regency, and the timid temper of the English ministers, -so many jarring elements were presented that he could make no fixed -combinations. Nevertheless, maturing the leading points of action -in his own mind, he resolved to keep them in view; adapting his -proceedings to circumstances as they should arise. - -His projects were however necessarily conditional upon whether -Napoleon reinforced his armies again, which would create new -combinations; and before any other measure, it was essential to -recapture Badajos; not only as its possession by the enemy affected -the safety of Cadiz, but, as it bore upon the execution of both the -above-mentioned plans, and upon the safety of Portugal, by enabling -the enemy to besiege Elvas: yet so deeply and sagaciously had he -probed the nature of the contest, that we shall find his after -operations strictly conformable to these his first conceptions, -and always successful. Judging now that Massena would be unable to -interrupt the blockade of Almeida, lord Wellington left the command -of the northern army to general Spencer, and departed for the -Alemtejo, where Beresford was operating: but, as this was one of the -most critical periods of the war, it is essential to have a clear -notion of the true state of affairs in the South, at the moment when -Beresford commenced his memorable campaign. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted Letter from Chief of Engineers, Garbé, Mar. -25th.] - -[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Military Reports, from Cadiz, 1811. -MSS.] - -Soult returned to Andalusia immediately after the fall of Badajos, -leaving Mortier to besiege Campo Mayor, and his arrival at Seville -and the fame of his successes restored tranquillity in that province, -and confidence amongst the troops. Both had been grievously shaken -by the battle of Barosa, and the works of Arcos, Lucar, Medina, and -Alcalade Gazules, intended to defend the rear of the first corps, had -been stopped, and the utmost despondency prevailed. Discontent and -gloom were, however, also strong in Cadiz, the government had for -some days pretended to make a fresh effort against Victor; but the -fall of Badajos menaced the city with famine, and hence Zayas was -finally detached with six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry -to Huelva. His object was to gather provisions in the Conda de -Neibla, where Ballasteros had, on the 10th, surprised and dispersed -Remond’s detachment. The French, were however soon reinforced, Zayas -was checked by D’Aremberg, and as many of his men deserted to -Ballasteros, he withdrew the rest. Blake then assumed the command, -Ballasteros and Copons were placed under his orders, and the united -corps, amounting to eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred -cavalry, were called the _fourth army_. Meanwhile Mendizabal rallying -his fugitives from the battle of the Gebora, at Villa Viciosa, -re-formed a weak corps, called the _fifth army_; during these -proceedings, Mortier occupied Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, -and carried on the - - -SIEGE OF CAMPO MAYOR. - -This fortress being commanded, at four hundred yards distance, by a -hill, on which there was an abandoned horn-work, would have fallen at -once, but for the courage and talents of major Tallaia, a Portuguese -engineer. With only two hundred men and five mounted guns, he made -such skilful dispositions, that the French opened regular trenches, -battered the wall in breach with six guns, bombarded the palace with -eleven mortars, and pushed a sap to the crest of the glacis. At -the end of five days a breach was made, but Tallaia, although ill -seconded by the garrison, repulsed one partial assault, and, being -summoned for the second time, demanded and obtained twenty-four hours -to wait for succour. None arrived, and this brave man surrendered the -21st of March. Mortier then returned to the Guadiana, leaving Latour -Maubourg to dismantle the works and remove the artillery and stores -to Badajos. - -Such was the posture of affairs when Beresford who had quitted the -northern army after the combat of Foz d’Aronce, arrived at Portalegre -with twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and eighteen -guns. - -His instructions were to relieve Campo Mayor, and to besiege Olivenza -and Badajos. The first had already surrendered, but the marshal, -being within two marches of it, judged that he might surprise the -besieging corps, and, with this view, put his troops in motion the -23d. In the morning of the 25th his advanced guard of cavalry, -supported by a detachment of infantry, under colonel Colborne, came -suddenly upon Campo Mayor, just as Latour Maubourg was marching -out in confusion, with twelve hundred cavalry, three battalions of -infantry, some horse-artillery and the battering train of thirteen -guns. The allies pursued him, and passing over a wooded rise of -ground, issued forth at the other side by some gentle slopes on -either flank of the French, who were in a fine plain. Colonel -Colborne was on the right and at a considerable distance from the -enemy, but colonel Head, with the thirteenth light dragoons, was -on the left, close to them, and supported by colonel Otway with -two squadrons of the seventh Portuguese. The heavy cavalry was -in reserve; and while in this state the French hussars, suddenly -charging with a loose rein from behind their infantry, fell some on -the Portuguese and some on the thirteenth dragoons. So fiercely did -these last on both sides come together, that many men were dismounted -by the shock, and both parties pierced clear through to the opposite -side, then re-formed, and passed again in the same fearful manner -to their own ground: but Head’s troopers rallied quicker than the -French, and riding a third time closely in upon them, overthrew horse -and man, receiving at the same time the fire of the infantry squares. -Nevertheless, without flinching, they galloped upon the battering -train, hewed down the gunners, and, drawing up beyond the French -line of march, barred the way, in expectation that the heavy cavalry -would also fall on; but Beresford would not suffer the latter to -charge, and the French infantry returned for their guns and resumed -their march. The thirteenth and the Portuguese, however, continued -the pursuit, in a rash and disorderly manner, even to the bridge -of Badajos, and being repulsed by the guns of that fortress, were -followed by Mortier in person, and lost some prisoners. Of the allies -one hundred men were killed or hurt, and above seventy taken. Of the -enemy about three hundred suffered, one howitzer was captured, and -the French colonel Chamorin was slain in single combat by a trooper -of the thirteenth. - -_To profit from sudden opportunities, a general must be constantly -with his advanced guard in an offensive movement._ When this combat -commenced, Beresford was with the main body, and baron Trip, a -staff-officer, deceived by appearances, informed him, that the -thirteenth had been cut off. Hence the marshal, anxious to save his -cavalry, which he knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up -the first blow, truly observing that the loss of one regiment was -enough. But the regiment was not lost, and, the country being open -and plain, the enemy’s force and the exact posture of affairs were -easy to be discerned. The thirteenth were reprimanded, perhaps -justly, for having pursued so eagerly without orders, yet the -unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them. - -Campo Mayor was thus recovered so suddenly, that the French left -eight hundred rations of bread in the magazines; and they also -evacuated Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, being infinitely -dismayed by the appearance of so powerful an army in the south: -indeed, so secretly and promptly had lord Wellington assembled it, -that its existence was only known to the French general by the blow -at Campo Mayor. But, to profit from such able dispositions, it was -necessary to be as rapid in execution, giving the enemy no time to -recover from his first surprise; and this was the more essential, -because the breach in Badajos was not closed, nor the trenches -obliterated, nor the exhausted magazines and stores replenished. -Soult had carried away six battalions and a regiment of cavalry, four -hundred men were thrown into Olivenza, three thousand into Badajos; -thus, with the losses sustained during the operations, Mortier’s -numbers were reduced to less than ten thousand men: he could not -therefore have maintained the line of the Guadiana and collected -provisions also, and Beresford should have instantly marched upon -Merida, driven back the fifth corps, and opened a fresh communication -by Jerumenha with Elvas; the fall of Badajos would then have been -inevitable. The confusion occasioned by the sudden appearance of -the army at Campo Mayor and the charge of the thirteenth dragoons -guaranteed the success of this march; the English general might even -have passed the river at Merida before Mortier could have ascertained -his object. - -Beresford, neglecting this happy opportunity, put his troops into -quarters round Elvas, induced thereto by the fatigue and wants of -the soldiers; especially those of the fourth division, who had been -marching incessantly since the 6th of the month, and were bare-footed -and exhausted. - -He had been instructed, by lord Wellington, to throw a bridge over -the Guadiana at Jerumenha; to push back the fifth corps; and to -invest Olivenza and Badajos. The Portuguese government had undertaken -not only to provide the means for these operations, but had actually -reported that they were collected at Elvas and Jerumenha; that is -to say, that provisions, shoes, battering guns, ammunition, and -transport were there; that the Guadiana abounded in serviceable -craft; that twenty large boats, formerly belonging to Cuesta, which -had been brought away from Badajos before the siege, were at Elvas; -and that all other necessaries would be sent from Lisbon. It now -appeared that no magazines of provisions or stores had been formed; -that very little transport was provided; that only five of Cuesta’s -boats had been brought from Badajos; that there was no serviceable -craft on the river, and that some small pontoons, sent from Lisbon, -were unfit to bear the force of the current, or to sustain the -passage of guns. The country, also, was so deficient in provisions, -that the garrison-stores of Elvas were taken to feed the army. - -All these circumstances combined to point out Merida as the true line -of operations; moreover, plenty of food was to be had on the left -bank of the Guadiana, and the measures necessary to remedy the evil -state of affairs on the right bank, did not require the presence of -an army to protect them. The great distress of the fourth division -for shoes, alone offered any serious obstacle; but, under the -circumstances, it would not have been too much to expect a momentary -effort from such an excellent division, or, it might without danger -even have been left behind. - -Marshal Beresford preferred halting until he could procure the means -of passing at Jerumenha; an error which may be considered as the -first and principal cause of those long and bloody operations which -afterwards detained lord Wellington nearly two years on the frontiers -of Portugal. For, during Beresford’s delay, general Phillipon, one -of the ablest governors that ever defended a fortress, levelled the -trenches, restored the glacis, and stopped the breach; meanwhile -Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in command of the troops, -covered the country with foraging parties and filled the magazines. - -Captain Squires, of the engineers, now undertook to bridge the -Guadiana under Jerumenha, by fixing trestle-piers on each side in -the shallows, and connecting them with the five Spanish boats; -wherefore, a squadron of cavalry was secretly passed over, by a ford, -to protect the workmen from surprise. The 3d of April, the bridge -being finished, the troops assembled during the night in the woods -near Jerumenha, being to cross at daylight; but the river suddenly -swelling, swept away the trestles, rendered the ford impassable, -and stopped the operations. No more materials could be immediately -procured, and the Spanish boats were converted into flying bridges -for the cavalry and artillery, while Squires constructed a slight -narrow bridge for infantry with the pontoons and with casks taken -from the neighbouring villages. To cover this operation a battalion -was added to the squadron already on the left bank, and the army -commenced passing the 5th of April; but it was late in the night of -the 6th, ere the whole had crossed and taken up their position, which -was on a strong range of hills, covered by a swampy rivulet. - -During this time, Latour Maubourg was so entirely occupied in -securing and provisioning Badajos, that his foragers were extended -fifty miles to the rear, and he took no notice whatever of -Beresford’s proceedings; an error savouring rather of the Spanish -than of the French method of making war: for it is evident that a -moveable column of five thousand infantry, with guns and cavalry, -could have easily cut off the small detachment of the British on -the left bank, and thus have completely frustrated the operations. -The allied troops, being most numerous, should have been carried -over in the boats, and entrenched on the other side in sufficient -force to resist any attack before the construction of the bridge -was attempted: it is not easy to say which general acted with -most imprudence; Latour Maubourg in neglecting, or Beresford in -unnecessarily tempting fortune. - -When the British were in possession of the left bank, the French -general awaking, collected three thousand infantry, five hundred -cavalry, and four guns at Olivenza, whence he marched, at daylight on -the 7th, to oppose a passage which had been completed the day before. -He, however, surprised a squadron of the thirteenth, which was in -front, and then came so close up to the main body as to exchange -shots; yet he was permitted to retire unmolested, in the face of -more than twenty thousand men! - -During these proceedings, the fifth Spanish army re-occupied Valencia -d’Alcantara and Albuquerque; having cavalry posts at La Rocca and -Montijo. Ballasteros also entered Fregenal, and Castaños, who was -appointed to command in Gallicia as well as Estremadura, arrived -at Elvas. This general was in friendly intercourse with Beresford, -but had a grudge against Blake. At first, he pretended to the chief -command, as the elder captain-general; but Blake demanded a like -authority over Beresford, who was not disposed to admit the claim. -Now Castaños, having little liking for a command under such difficult -circumstances, and being desirous to thwart Blake, and fearful lest -Beresford should, under these circumstances, refuse to pass the -Guadiana, arranged, that he who brought the greatest force in the -field should be generalissimo. Thus the youngest officer commanded in -chief. - -Beresford, being joined by Madden’s cavalry, and having traced out -entrenchments capable of covering several thousand men, ordered -his bridges to be reconstructed in a more substantial manner; -brought up a Portuguese regiment of militia to labour at the works; -left a strong detachment of British infantry and some Portuguese -horse for their protection, and advanced with the remainder of the -army. Hereupon Latour Maubourg retired upon Albuera, and Beresford -summoned Olivenza on the 9th, apparently expecting no defence; but -the governor having rejected the summons, the army encamped round -the place, and major A. Dickson was despatched to Elvas to prepare -battering-guns for the siege. The communication was now opened with -Ballasteros at Fregenal, and Castaños having carried Morillo’s -division of infantry and Penne Villamur’s cavalry from Montijo to -Merida, pushed a part on to Almendralejos. Latour Maubourg then -retired to Llerena; and, on the 11th, Beresford, leaving general -Cole with the fourth division, Madden’s cavalry, and a brigade of -nine pounders to besiege Olivenza, took post himself at Albuera; -communicating, by his left, with Almendralejos, and spreading his -cavalry in front, so as to cut off all communication with Badajos. -The army now lived on the resources of the country; and a brigade was -sent to Talavera Real to collect supplies. - -The 14th, six twenty-four pounders reached Olivenza, and, being -placed in a battery constructed on the abandoned horn-work formerly -noticed, played with such success that the breach became practicable -before the morning of the 15th. Some riflemen posted in the vineyards -kept down the fire of the place, and the garrison, consisting of -three hundred and eighty men, with fifteen guns, surrendered at -discretion. Cole was immediately directed upon Zafra by the road of -Almendral; and Beresford, who had recalled the brigade from Talavera, -was already in movement for the same place by the royal causeway. -This movement was to drive Latour Maubourg over the Morena, and cut -off general Maransin. The latter general had been in pursuit of -Ballasteros ever since the retreat of Zayas, and having defeated -him at Fregenal on the 12th, was following up his victory towards -Salvatierra: an alcalde, however, gave him notice of the allies -approach, and he retreated in safety. Meanwhile two French regiments -of cavalry, advancing from Llerena to collect contributions, had -reached Usagre, where meeting with the British cavalry, they were -suddenly charged by the thirteenth dragoons, and followed for six -miles so vigorously that three hundred were killed or taken, without -the loss of a man on the part of the pursuers. - -On the 16th general Cole arrived from Olivenza, and the whole army -being thus concentrated about Zafra, Latour Maubourg retired on the -18th to Guadalcanal; the Spanish cavalry then occupied Llerena, -and the resources of Estremadura were wholly at the service of the -allies. During these operations, general Charles Alten, coming from -Lisbon with a brigade of German light infantry, reached Olivenza, -and lord Wellington also arrived at Elvas, where Beresford, after -drawing his infantry nearer to Badajos, went to meet him. The -presence of the general-in-chief was very agreeable to the troops; -they had seen, with surprise, great masses put in motion without any -adequate results, and thought the operations had been slow, without -being prudent. The whole army was over the Guadiana on the 7th, and, -including the Spaniards from Montijo, Beresford commanded at least -twenty-five thousand men, whereas Latour Maubourg never had more than -ten thousand, many of whom were dispersed foraging, far and wide: -yet the French general had maintained himself in Estremadura for ten -days; and during this time, no corps being employed to constrain the -garrison of Badajos, the governor continued to bring in timber and -other materials for the defence, at his pleasure. - -Lord Wellington arrived the 21st. The 22d, he forded the Guadiana -just below the mouth of the Caya with Madden’s cavalry and Alten’s -Germans, pushing close up to Badajos. A convoy, escorted by some -infantry and cavalry, was coming in from the country, and an effort -was made to cut it off; but the governor sallied, the allies lost a -hundred men, and the convoy reached the town. - -Lord Wellington, now considering that Soult would certainly endeavour -to disturb the siege with a considerable force, demanded the assent -of the Spanish generals to the following plan of combined operations, -before he would commence the investment of the place. 1º. That -Blake, marching up from Ayamonte, should take post at Xeres de los -Cavalleros. 2º. That Ballasteros should occupy Burquillo on his left. -3º. That the cavalry of the fifth army, stationed at Llerena, should -observe the road of Guadalcanal, and communicate through Zafra, -by the right, with Ballasteros. These dispositions were to watch -the passes of the Morena. 4º. That Castaños should furnish three -battalions for the siege, and keep the rest of his corps at Merida, -to support the Spanish cavalry. 5º. That the British army should be -in second line, and, in the event of a battle, Albuera, centrically -situated with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajos, -should be the point of concentration for all the allied forces. - -In consequence of the neglect of the Portuguese government, the whole -of the battering-train and stores for the siege were necessarily -taken from the ramparts and magazines of Elvas; the utmost prudence -was therefore required to secure the safety of these guns, lest that -fortress, half dismantled, should be exposed to a siege. Hence, as -the Guadiana, by rising ten feet, had again carried away the bridge -at Jerumenha on the 24th, lord Wellington directed the line of -communication with Portugal to be re-established by Merida, until -settled weather would admit of fresh arrangements. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 10.] - -Howbeit, political difficulties intervening obliged him to delay -the siege. The troops under Mendizabel had committed many excesses -in Portugal; the disputes between them and the inhabitants were -pushed so far, that the Spanish general pillaged the town of -Fernando; while the Portuguese government, in reprisal, meant to -seize Olivenza, which had formerly belonged to them. The Spanish -Regency publicly disavowed Mendizabel’s conduct, and Mr. Stuart’s -strenuous representations deterred the Portuguese from plunging the -two countries into a war; but this affair, joined to the natural -slowness and arrogance of the Spaniards, prevented both Castaños and -Blake from giving an immediate assent to the English general’s plans: -meanwhile, intelligence reached the latter that Massena was again -in force on the Agueda; wherefore, reluctantly directing Beresford -to postpone the siege until the Spanish generals should give in -their assent, or until the fall of Almeida should enable a British -reinforcement to arrive, he repaired with the utmost speed to the -Agueda. - - -OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH. - -During his absence, the blockade of Almeida had been closely pressed, -while the army was so disposed as to cut off all communication. The -allied forces were, however, distressed for provisions, and great -part of their corn came from the side of Ledesma; being smuggled by -the peasants through the French posts, and passed over the Agueda -by ropes, which were easily hidden amongst the deep chasms of that -river, near its confluence with the Douro. - -Massena was, however, intent upon relieving the place. His retreat -upon Salamanca had been to restore the organization and equipments -of his army, which he could not do at Ciudad Rodrigo, without -consuming the stores of that fortress. His cantonments extended from -San Felices by Ledesma to Toro, his cavalry was in bad condition, -his artillery nearly unhorsed: but from Bessieres he expected, with -reason, aid, both of men and provisions, and in that expectation -was prepared to renew the campaign immediately. Discord, that bane -of military operations, interfered. Bessieres had neglected and -continued to neglect the army of Portugal; symptoms of hostilities -with Russia were so apparent, even at this period, that he looked -rather to that quarter than to what was passing before him; his -opinion that a war in the north was inevitable was so openly -expressed as to reach the English army; and meanwhile, Massena vainly -demanded the aid, which was necessary to save the only acquisition of -his campaign. - -A convoy of provisions had entered Ciudad Rodrigo on the 13th of -April; on the 16th a reinforcement and a second convoy also succeeded -in gaining that fortress, although general Spencer crossed the -Agueda, with eight thousand men, to intercept them; a rear-guard of -two hundred men was indeed, overtaken; but, although surrounded by -the cavalry in an open plain, they made their way into the place. - -Towards the end of the month, the new organization, decreed by -Napoleon, was put in execution. Two divisions of the ninth corps -joined Massena; and Drouet was preparing to march with the remaining -eleven thousand infantry and cavalry, to reinforce and take the -command of the fifth corps; when Massena, having collected all his -own detachments, and received a promise of assistance from Bessieres, -prevailed upon him to defer his march until an effort had been made -to relieve Almeida. With this view the French army was put in motion -towards the frontier of Portugal. The light division immediately -resumed its former positions, the left at Gallegos and Marialva, -the right at Espeja; the cavalry were dispersed, partly towards the -sources of the Azava, and partly behind Gallegos, and, while in -this situation, colonel O’Meara and eighty men of the Irish brigade -were taken by Julian Sanchez; the affair having been, it was said, -preconcerted, to enable the former to quit the French service. - -On the 23d, two thousand French infantry and a squadron of cavalry -marching out of Ciudad Rodrigo, made a sudden effort to seize the -bridge of Marialva; but the passage was bravely maintained by captain -Dobbs, with only a company of the fifty-second and some riflemen. - -On the 25th, Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo; and the 27th, his -advanced guards felt all the line of the light division from Espeja -to Marialva. Lord Wellington arrived on the 28th, and immediately -concentrated the main body of the allies behind the Dos Casas river. -The Azava being swollen and difficult to ford, the enemy continued -to feel the line of the outposts; but, on the 2d of May, the waters -having subsided, the whole French army was observed coming out -of Ciudad Rodrigo, wherefore, the light division, after a slight -skirmish of horse at Gallegos, commenced a retrograde movement, -from that place and from Espeja, upon Fuentes Onoro. The country -immediately in rear of those villages was wooded as far as the Dos -Casas, but an open plain between the two lines of march offered the -enemy’s powerful cavalry an opportunity of cutting off the retreat. -As the French appeared regardless of this advantage, the division -remained in the woods bordering the right and left of the plain -until the middle of the night, when the march was renewed, and the -Dos Casas was crossed at Fuentes Onoro. This beautiful village had -escaped all injury during the previous warfare, although occupied -alternately, for above a year, by both sides. Every family in it was -well known to the light division, it was therefore a subject of deep -regret to find that the preceding troops had pillaged it, leaving -only the shells of houses where, three days before, a friendly -population had been living in comfort. This wanton act, was so warmly -felt by the whole army, that eight thousand dollars were afterwards -collected by general subscription for the poor inhabitants; yet the -injury sunk deeper than the atonement. - -Lord Wellington had determined not to risk much to maintain his -blockade, and he was well aware that Massena, reinforced by the -army of the north and by the ninth corps, could bring down superior -numbers. Nevertheless, when the moment arrived, trusting to the -valour of his troops and the ascendancy which they had acquired over -the enemy during the pursuit from Santarem, he resolved to abide a -battle; but not to seek one, because his force, reduced to thirty-two -thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry in bad condition, and -forty-two guns, was unable, seeing the superiority of the French -horse, to oppose the enemy’s march. - -The allies occupied a fine table-land, lying between the Turones -and the Dos Casas, the left at Fort Conception; the centre opposite -to the village of Alameda; the right at Fuentes Onoro; the whole -distance being five miles. The Dos Casas, flowing in a deep ravine, -protected the front of this line, and the French general could not, -with any prudence, venture to march, by his own right, against -Almeida, lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the villages of -Alameda and Fuentes Onoro, should fall on his flank, and drive him -into the Agueda. Hence, to cover the blockade, which was maintained -by Pack’s brigade and an English regiment, it was sufficient to leave -the fifth division near Fort Conception, and the sixth division -opposite Alameda. The first and third were then concentrated on a -gentle rise, about a cannon-shot behind Fuentes Onoro, where the -steppe of land which the army occupied turned back, and ended on the -Turones, becoming rocky and difficult as it approached that river. - - -FIRST COMBAT OF FUENTES ONORO. - -The French came up in three columns abreast, the cavalry, the sixth -corps, and Drouet’s division against Fuentes Onoro; but the eighth -and second corps against Alameda and Fort Conception, seeming to -menace the left of the position; wherefore, the light division, after -passing the Dos Casas, reinforced the sixth division. General Loison -however, without waiting for Massena’s orders, fell upon Fuentes -Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions of chosen troops, -detached from the first and third divisions. - -Most of the houses of this village were quite in the bottom of the -ravine, but an old chapel and some buildings on a craggy eminence, -overhung one end. The low parts were vigorously defended; yet -the violence of the attack was so great, and the cannonade so -heavy, that the British abandoned the streets, and could scarcely -maintain the upper ground about the chapel. Colonel Williams, the -commanding officer, fell badly wounded, and the fight was becoming -very dangerous, when the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and the -seventy-ninth regiments, coming down from the main position, charged -so roughly, that the French were forced back, and, after a severe -contest, finally driven over the stream of the Dos Casas. During the -night the detachments were withdrawn; but the twenty-fourth, the -seventy-first, and seventy-ninth regiments were left in the village, -where two hundred and sixty of the allies and somewhat more of the -French had fallen. - -On the 4th Massena arrived, and, being joined by Bessieres with -twelve hundred cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard, examined -all the line, and made dispositions for the next day. His design was -to hold the left of the allies in check with the second corps, but to -turn the right with the remainder of the army. - -Forty thousand infantry, and five thousand horse, with thirty pieces -of artillery, were under arms, and they had shewn in the action of -the 3d that their courage was not abated; it was, therefore, a very -audacious resolution in the English general to receive battle on -such dangerous ground. His position, as far as Fuentes Onoro, was -indeed strong and free for the use of all arms, and it covered his -communication by the bridge of Castello Bom; but, on his right flank, -the plain was continued in a second steppe to Nava d’Aver, where a -considerable hill overlooking all the country, commanded the roads -leading to the bridges of Seceiras and Sabugal. The enemy could, -therefore, by a direct march from Ciudad Rodrigo, place his army at -once in line of battle upon the right flank of the allies, and attack -them while entangled between the Dos Casas, the Turones, the Coa, and -the fortress of Almeida; and the bridge of Castello Bom only would -have been open for retreat. To prevent this stroke, and to cover his -communications with Sabugal and Seceiras, lord Wellington, yielding -to general Spencer’s earnest suggestions, stretched his right wing -out to Nava d’Aver, the hill of which he caused Julian Sanchez -to occupy, supporting him by the seventh division, under general -Houston. Thus the line of battle was above seven miles in length, -besides the circuit of blockade. The Dos Casas, indeed, still covered -the front; but above Fuentes Onoro, the ravine became gradually -obliterated, resolving itself into a swampy wood, which extended to -Poço Velho, a village half way between Fuentes and Nava d’Aver. The -left wing of the seventh division occupied this wood and the village -of Poço Velho, but the right wing was refused. - - -BATTLE OF FUENTES ONORO. - -It was Massena’s intention to have made his dispositions in the -night, in such a manner as to commence the attack at day-break on the -5th; but a delay of two hours occurring, the whole of his movements -were plainly descried. The eighth corps withdrawn from Alameda, and -supported by all the French cavalry, was seen marching above the -village of Poço Velho, and at the same time the sixth corps and -Drouet’s division took ground to their own left, but still keeping a -division in front of Fuentes. At this sight the light division and -the English horse hastened to the support of general Houston; while -the first and third divisions made a movement parallel to that of the -sixth corps. The latter, however, drove the left wing of the seventh -division, consisting of Portuguese and British, from the village of -Poço Velho with loss, and was gaining ground in the wood also, when -the riflemen of the light division arriving at that point, restored -the fight. The French cavalry, then passing Poço Velho, commenced -forming in order of battle on the plain, between the wood and the -hill of Nava d’Aver. Julian Sanchez immediately retired across the -Turones, partly in fear, but more in anger, at the death of his -lieutenant, who, having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy, -making many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer, and -shot by a soldier of the guards, before the action commenced. - -Montbrun occupied himself with this weak partida for an hour; but -when the Guerilla chief had fallen back, the French general turned -the right of the seventh division, and charged the British cavalry, -which had moved up to its support. The combat was unequal; for, by -an abuse too common, so many men had been drawn from the ranks as -orderlies to general officers, and for other purposes, that not -more than a thousand troopers were in the field. After one shock, -in which the enemy were partially checked and the French colonel -Lamotte taken fighting hand to hand, by general Charles Stewart, the -cavalry withdrew behind the light division. Houston’s people, being -thus entirely exposed, were charged strongly, and captain Ramsay’s -horse-artillery was cut off and surrounded. The light division -instantly threw itself into squares, but the main body of the French -horsemen were upon the seventh division, ere a like formation could -be effected: nevertheless the troops stood firm, and, although some -were cut down, the chasseurs Brittaniques, taking advantage of a -loose wall, received the attack with such a fire that the enemy -recoiled. Immediately after this, a great commotion was observed -amongst the French squadrons; men and officers closed in confusion -towards one point where a thick dust was rising, and where loud -cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols, indicated -some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude was violently -agitated, an English shout arose, the mass was rent asunder, and -Norman Ramsay burst forth at the head of his battery, his horses -breathing fire and stretching like greyhounds along the plain, his -guns bounding like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners in -close and compact order protecting the rear. But while this brilliant -action was passing in one part, the enemy were making progress in the -wood, and the English divisions being separated and the right wing -turned, it was abundantly evident that the battle would soon be lost, -if the original position was not immediately regained. - -In this posture of affairs lord Wellington directed the seventh -division to cross the Turones and move down the left bank to -Frenada, the light division to retire over the plain, the cavalry -to cover the rear. He also withdrew the first and third divisions, -placing them and the Portuguese in line on the steppe, before -described as running perpendicular to the ravine of Fuentes Onoro. - -General Crawfurd, who had resumed the command of the light division, -first covered the passage of the seventh division over the Turones, -and then retired slowly over the plain in squares, having the British -cavalry principally on his right flank. He was followed by the -enemy’s horse, which continually outflanked him, and near the wood -surprised and sabred an advanced post of the guards, making colonel -Hill and fourteen men prisoners, but then continuing their charge -against the forty-second regiment, the French were repulsed. Many -times Montbrun made as if he would storm the light division squares, -but the latter were too formidable to be meddled with; yet, in all -this war, there was not a more dangerous hour for England. The whole -of that vast plain as far as the Turones was covered with a confused -multitude, amidst which the squares appeared but as specks, for -there was a great concourse, composed of commissariat followers of -the camp, servants, baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by -curiosity, and finally, the broken piquets and parties coming out -of the woods. The seventh division was separated from the army by -the Turones, five thousand French cavalry, with fifteen pieces of -artillery, were close at hand impatient to charge; the infantry of -the eighth corps was in order of battle behind the horsemen; the -wood was filled with the skirmishers of the sixth corps, and if the -latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had issued forth, while Drouet’s -divisions fell on that village, while the eighth corps attacked the -light division, and while the whole of the cavalry made a general -charge; the loose multitude encumbering the plain would have been -driven violently in upon the first division, in such a manner as to -have intercepted the latter’s fire and broken their ranks. - -No such effort was made; Montbrun’s horsemen merely hovered about -Crawfurd’s squares, the plain was soon cleared, the cavalry took post -behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve to the -right of the first division, sending the riflemen amongst the rocks -to connect it with the seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada -and was there joined by Julian Sanchez. - -At sight of this new front, so deeply lined with troops, the French -stopped short, and commenced a heavy cannonade, which did great -execution from the closeness of the allied masses; but twelve British -guns replied with vigour and the violence of the enemy’s fire abated; -their cavalry then drew out of range, and a body of French infantry -attempting to glide down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed -by the riflemen and the light companies of the guards. But all -this time a fierce battle was going on at Fuentes Onoro. Massena -had directed Drouet to carry this village at the very moment when -Montbrun’s cavalry should turn the right wing; it was, however, two -hours later ere the attack commenced. The three British regiments -made a desperate resistance, but overmatched in number, and little -accustomed to the desultory fighting of light troops, they were -pierced and divided; two companies of the seventy-ninth were taken, -colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, and the lower part of the town -was carried; the upper part was, however, stiffly held, and the -rolling of the musketry was incessant. - -Had the attack been made earlier, and the whole of Drouet’s division -thrown frankly into the fight, while the sixth corps moving through -the wood closely turned the village, the passage must have been -forced and the left of the new position outflanked; but now lord -Wellington having all his reserves in hand, detached considerable -masses to the support of the regiments in Fuentes. The French -continued also to reinforce their troops until the whole of the -sixth corps and a part of Drouet’s division were engaged, when -several turns of fortune occurred. At one time the fighting was on -the banks of the stream and amongst the lower houses; at another -upon the rugged heights and round the chapel, and some of the -enemy’s skirmishers even penetrated completely through towards the -main position; but the village was never entirely abandoned by the -defenders, and, in a charge of the seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and -eighty-eighth regiments, led by colonel M’Kinnon against a heavy -mass which had gained the chapel eminence, a great number of the -French fell. In this manner the fight lasted until evening, when the -lower part of the town was abandoned by both parties, the British -maintaining the chapel and crags, and the French retiring a cannon -shot from the stream. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3. Plate 11._ - - Battle of - FUENTES ONORO - _5^{TH} MAY, 1811._ - - _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] - -When the action ceased, a brigade of the light division relieved the -regiments in the village; and a slight demonstration by the second -corps near Fort Conception, having been repulsed by a battalion -of the Lusitanian legion, both armies remained in observation. -Fifteen hundred men and officers, of which three hundred were -prisoners, constituted the loss of the allies; that of the enemy was -estimated at the time to be near five thousand, but this exaggerated -calculation was founded upon the erroneous supposition that four -hundred dead were lying about Fuentes Onoro. All armies make rash -estimates on such occasions. Having had charge to bury the carcasses -at that point, I can affirm that, immediately about the village, not -more than one hundred and thirty bodies were to be found, one-third -of which were British. - -During the battle, the French convoy for the supply of Almeida, -being held at Gallegos, in readiness to move, lord Wellington -sent Julian Sanchez from Frenada, to menace it, and to disturb -the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This produced no effect, -and a more decisive battle being expected on the 6th, the light -division made breast-works amongst the crags of Fuentes Onoro, while -lord Wellington entrenched that part of the position, which was -immediately behind this village, so that the carrying of it would -have scarcely benefitted the enemy. Fuentes Onoro, strictly speaking, -was not tenable; there was a wooded tongue of land on the British -right, that overlooked, at half-cannon shot, all the upper as well -as the lower part of the village both in flank and rear, yet was too -distant from the position to be occupied by the allies: had Ney been -at the head of the sixth corps, he would have quickly crowned this -ridge, and then Fuentes could only have been maintained by submitting -to a butchery. - -On the 6th the enemy sent his wounded to the rear, making no -demonstration of attack, and as the 7th passed in a like inaction, -the British entrenchments were perfected. The 8th Massena withdrew -his main body to the woods leading upon Espeja and Gallegos, but -still maintained posts at Alameda and Fuentes. On the 10th, without -being in any manner molested, he retired across the Agueda; the sixth -and eight corps, and the cavalry, at Ciudad Rodrigo, the second corps -by the bridge of Barba del Puerco. Bessieres also carried off the -imperial guards, for Massena had been recalled to France, and Marmont -assumed the command of the army of Portugal. - -Both sides claimed the victory; the French, because they won the -passage at Poço Velho, cleared the wood, turned our right flank, -obliged the cavalry to retire, and forced lord Wellington to -relinquish three miles of ground, and to change his front. The -English, because the village of Fuentes so often attacked, was -successfully defended, and because the principal object (the covering -the blockade of Almeida) was attained. - -Certain it is, that Massena at first gained great advantages. -Napoleon would have made them fatal! but it is also certain that, -with an overwhelming cavalry, on ground particularly suitable to -that arm, the prince of Esling having, as it were, indicated all the -errors of the English general’s position, stopped short at the very -moment when he should have sprung forward. By some this has been -attributed to negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded -by Marmont; but the true reason seems to be, that discord in his -army had arisen to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would -not charge at his order; Junot did not second him cordially; Loison -neglected his instructions; Drouet sought to spare his own divisions -in the fight; and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the -machinery of battle being shaken, would not work. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 8.] - -General Pelet censures lord Wellington for not sending his cavalry -against Reynier after the second position was taken up; asserting -that any danger, on that side, would have forced the French to -retreat; but the criticism is unsustainable, being based on the -notion that the allies had fifty thousand men in the field, whereas, -including Sanchez’ Partida, they had not thirty-five thousand. It -may be with more justice objected to Massena that he did not launch -some of his numerous horsemen, by the bridge of Seceiras, or Sabugal, -against Guarda and Celerico, to destroy the magazines, cut the -communication, and capture the mules and other means of transport -belonging to the allied army. The vice of the English general’s -position would then have been clearly exposed, for, although the -second regiment of German hussars was on the march from Lisbon, it -had not passed Coimbra at this period, and could not have protected -the depôts. But it can never be too often repeated that war, however -adorned by splendid strokes of skill, is commonly a series of errors -and accidents. All the operations, on both sides, for six weeks, -furnished illustration of this truth. - -Ney’s opposition had prevented Massena’s march upon Coria, which -would have secured Badajos and Campo Mayor, and, probably, added -Elvas to them. Latour Maubourg’s tardiness had like to have cost -Mortier a rear guard and a battering-train. By refusing the line -of Merida, Beresford enabled the French to secure Badajos. At -Sabugal, the petulance of a staff-officer marred an admirable -combination, and produced a dangerous combat. Drouet’s negligence -placed Almeida at the mercy of the allies, and a mistaken notion of -Massena’s sufferings during the retreat, induced lord Wellington to -undertake two great operations at the same time, which were above -his strength. In the battle of Fuentes Onoro, more errors than skill -were observable on both sides, and the train of accidents did not -stop there. The prize contended for presented another example of the -uncertainty of war. - - -EVACUATION OF ALMEIDA. - -General Brennier, a prisoner at Vimiero, and afterwards exchanged, -was governor of this fortress. During the battle of Fuentes Onoro, -his garrison, consisting of fifteen hundred men, skirmished boldly -with the blockading force, and loud explosions, supposed to be -signals of communication with the relieving army, were frequent in -the place. When all hopes of succour vanished, a soldier, named -Tillet, contrived, with extraordinary courage and presence of mind, -to penetrate, although in uniform, through the posts of blockade, -carrying Brennier orders to evacuate the fortress. The French general -had, however, by crossing the Agueda, left Almeida to its fate; the -British general placed the light division in its old position on the -Azava with cavalry posts on the Lower Agueda, and desired sir William -Erskine to send the fourth regiment to Barba del Puerco, while -general Alexander Campbell continued the blockade with the sixth -division and with general Pack’s brigade. - -Campbell’s dispositions were either negligently made, or negligently -executed. Erskine never transmitted the orders to the fourth -regiment, and, in the mean time, Brennier, undismayed by the -retreat of the French army, was preparing, like Julian Estrada, at -Hostalrich, to force his way through the blockading troops. An open -country and a double line of posts greatly enhanced the difficulty, -yet Brennier was resolute not only to cut his own passage but to -render the fortress useless to the allies. To effect this, he ruined -all the principal bastions, and kept up a constant fire of his -artillery in a singular manner, for always he fired several guns at -one moment with very heavy charges, placing one across the muzzle of -another, so that, while some shots flew towards the besiegers and a -loud explosion was heard, others destroyed pieces without attracting -notice. - -At midnight of the 10th, all being ready, he sprung his mines, -sallied forth in a compact column, broke through the piquets, and -passed between the quarters of the reserves, with a nicety that -proved at once his talent of observation and his coolness. General -Pack following, with a few men collected on the instant, plied him -with a constant fire, yet nothing could shake or retard his column, -which in silence, and without returning a shot, gained the rough -country leading upon Barba del Puerco. Here it halted for a moment, -just as daylight broke, and Pack, who was at hand, hearing that -some English dragoons were in a village, a short distance to the -right, sent an officer to bring them out upon the French flank, thus -occasioning a slight skirmish and consequent delay. The troops of -blockade had paid little attention at first to the explosion of the -mines, thinking them a repetition of Brennier’s previous practice; -but Pack’s fire having roused them, the thirty-sixth regiment was -close at hand, and the fourth, also, having heard the firing at Valde -Mula, was rapidly gaining the right flank of the enemy. Brennier, -having driven off the cavalry, was again in march; yet the British -regiments, throwing off their knapsacks, followed at such a pace, -that they overtook the rear of his column in the act of descending -the deep chasm of Barba del Puerco, killed and wounded many, captured -about three hundred, and even passed the bridge in pursuit; there -however the second corps, which was in order of battle, awaiting -Brennier’s approach, repulsed them with a loss of thirty or forty -men. Had sir William Erskine given the fourth regiment its orders, -the French column would have been lost. - -Lord Wellington, stung by this event, and irritated by several -previous examples of undisciplined valour, issued a remonstrance -to the army. It was justly strong, and the following remarks are -as applicable to some writers as to soldiers:--“_The officers of -the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed -is not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what has been -printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, -unsupported, successfully opposed to large; nor has the experience of -any officer realized the stories which all have read of whole armies -being driven by a handful of light infantry and dragoons._” - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 11.] - -When Marmont had thus recovered the garrison of Almeida, he withdrew -the greatest part of his army towards Salamanca. Lord Wellington then -leaving the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, under general -Spencer, on the Azava, directed the third and seventh divisions and -the second German hussars upon Badajos: and on the 15th, hearing that -Soult, although hitherto reported, by Beresford, to be entirely on -the defensive, was actually marching into Estremadura, he set out -himself for that province; but, ere he could arrive, a great and -bloody battle had terminated the operations. - -While awaiting the Spanish generals accession to lord Wellington’s -plan, Beresford fixed his head-quarters at Almendralejos; but Latour -Maubourg remained at Guadalcanal, and his parties were foraging -the most fertile tracts between the armies. Penne Villamur was, -therefore, reinforced with five squadrons; and colonel John Colborne -was detached with a brigade of the second division, two Spanish -guns, and two squadrons of cavalry, to curb the French inroads, and -to raise the confidence of the people. Colborne, a man of singular -talent for war, by rapid marches and sudden changes of direction, in -concert with Villamur, created great confusion amongst the enemy’s -parties. He intercepted several convoys, and obliged the French -troops to quit Fuente Ovejuna, La Granja, Azuaga, and most of the -other frontier towns, and he imposed upon Latour Maubourg with so -much address, that the latter, imagining a great force was at hand, -abandoned Guadalcanal also and fell back to Constantino. - -Having cleared the country on that side, Colborne attempted to -surprise the fortified post of Benelcazar, and, by a hardy attempt, -was like to have carried it; for, riding on to the drawbridge with a -few officers in the grey of the morning, he summoned the commandant -to surrender, as the only means of saving himself from the Spanish -army which was close at hand and would give no quarter. The French -officer, amazed at the appearance of the party, was yet too resolute -to yield, and Colborne, quick to perceive the attempt had failed, -galloped off under a few straggling shot. After this, taking to the -mountains, he rejoined the army without any loss. - -During his absence, the Spanish generals acceded to lord Wellington’s -proposition; Blake was in march for Xeres Caballeros, and Ballasteros -was at Burgillos. The waters of the Guadiana had also subsided, the -bridge under Jerumenha was restored, and the preparations completed -for the - - -FIRST ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS. - -The 5th of May, general William Stewart invested this place, on -the left bank of the Guadiana, with two squadrons of horse, six -field-pieces, and three brigades of infantry, while the formation of -the depôt of the siege was commenced by the engineers and artillery. - -On the 7th the remainder of the infantry, reinforced by two thousand -Spaniards under Carlos d’España, encamped in the woods near the -fortress; but Madden’s Portuguese remained in observation near -Merida, and a troop of horse-artillery arriving from Lisbon was -attached to the English cavalry, which was still near Los Santos and -Zafra. The flying bridge was at first brought up from Jerumenha, and -re-established near the mouth of the Caya; it was however again drawn -over, because the right bank of the Guadiana being still open, some -French horse had come down the river. - -The 8th general Lumley invested Christoval on the right bank, with -a brigade of the fourth division, four light Spanish guns, the -seventeenth Portuguese infantry, and two squadrons of horse drafted -from the garrison of Elvas; nevertheless the troops did not arrive -simultaneously, and sixty French dragoons, moving under the fire of -the place, disputed the ground, and were only repulsed, after a sharp -skirmish, by the Portuguese infantry. - -Thus the first serious siege undertaken by the British army in -the Peninsula was commenced, and, to the discredit of the English -government, no army was ever so ill provided with the means of -prosecuting such enterprises. The engineer officers were exceedingly -zealous, and, notwithstanding some defects in the constitution -and customs of their corps tending rather to make regimental than -practical scientific officers, many of them were very well versed in -the theory of their business. But the ablest trembled when reflecting -on their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service. -Without a corps of sappers and miners, without a single private who -knew how to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled -to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, practised, and -scientific troops of the age: the best officers and the finest -soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, -to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government, -always ready to plunge the nation into war, without the slightest -care of what was necessary to obtain success. The sieges carried on -by the British in Spain were a succession of butcheries, because the -commonest resources of their art were denied to the engineers. - -Colonel Fletcher’s plan was to breach the castle of Badajos, while -batteries established on the right bank of the Guadiana should take -the defences in reverse; false attacks against the Pardaleras and -Picurina were also to be commenced by re-opening the French trenches; -but it was necessary to reduce the fort of Christoval ere the -batteries for ruining the defences of the castle could be erected. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 3.] - -In double operations, whether of the field or of siege, it is -essential to move with an exact concert, lest the enemy should crush -each in detail, yet neither in the investment nor in the attack was -this maxim regarded. Captain Squires, although ill provided with -tools, was directed to commence a battery against Christoval on the -night of the 8th, under a bright moon, and at the distance of only -four hundred yards from the rampart. Exposed to a destructive fire -of musketry from the fort, and of shot and shells from the town, he -continued to work, with great loss, until the 10th, when the enemy, -making a furious sally, carried his battery. The French were, indeed, -immediately driven back, but the allies pursuing too hotly, were -taken in front and flank with grape, and lost four hundred men. -Thus five engineer and seven hundred officers and soldiers of the -line were already on the long and bloody list of victims offered to -this Moloch; and only one small battery against a small outwork was -completed! On the 11th it opened, but before sunset the fire of the -enemy had disabled four of its five guns, and killed many more of the -besiegers; nor could any other result be expected, seeing that this -single work was exposed to the undivided fire of the fortress, for -the approaches against the castle were not yet commenced, and two -distant batteries on the false attacks scarcely attracted the notice -of the enemy. - -To check future sallies, a second battery was erected against -the bridge-head, but this was also overmatched, and meanwhile -Beresford, having received intelligence that the French army was -again in movement, arrested the progress of all the works. On -the 12th, believing this information premature, he resumed the -labour, directing the trenches to be opened against the castle: -the intelligence was, however, true, and being confirmed at twelve -o’clock in the night, the working-parties were again drawn off, and -measures taken to raise the siege. - - -SOULT’S SECOND EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 11.] - -The duke of Dalmatia resolved to succour Badajos the moment he heard -of Beresford’s being in Estremadura; the tardiness of the latter not -only gave the garrison time to organize a defence, but permitted the -French general to tranquillise his province and arrange a system -of resistance to the allied army in the Isla. With that view, he -commenced additional fortifications at Seville, renewing also the -construction of those which had been suspended in other places by -the battle of Barosa, and thus deceived Beresford, who believed -that, far from thinking to relieve Badajos, he was trembling for his -own province. Nothing could be more fallacious. There were seventy -thousand fighting men in Andalusia, and Drouet, who had quitted -Massena immediately after the battle of Fuentes Onoro, was likewise -in march for that province by the way of Avila and Toledo, bringing -with him eleven thousand men. - -All things being ready, Soult quitted Seville the 10th, with thirty -guns, three thousand heavy dragoons, and a division of infantry, -reinforced by a battalion of grenadiers belonging to the first corps, -and by two regiments of light cavalry belonging to the fourth corps. -The 11th he entered Olalla, where general Marasin joined him, and at -the same time a brigade of Godinot’s division marched from Cordoba -upon Constantino, to reinforce the fifth corps, which was falling -back from Guadalcanal in consequence of Colborne’s operations. The -13th a junction was effected with Latour Maubourg, who assumed the -command of the heavy cavalry, while Girard taking that of the fifth -corps, advanced to Los Santos. The 14th the French head-quarters -reached Villa Franca. Being then within thirty miles of Badajos, -Soult caused his heaviest guns to fire salvos during the night, to -give notice of his approach to the garrison; but the expedient failed -of success, and the 15th, in the evening, the army was concentrated -at Santa Marta. - -Beresford, as I have before said, remained in a state of uncertainty -until the night of the 12th, when he commenced raising the siege, -contrary to the earnest representations of the engineers, who -promised to put him in possession of the place in three days, if -he would persevere. This promise was ill-founded, and, if it had -been otherwise, Soult would have surprised him in the trenches: -his firmness, therefore, saved the army, and his arrangements for -carrying off the stores were admirably executed. The artillery and -the platforms were removed in the night of the 13th, and, at twelve -o’clock, on the 15th, all the guns and stores on the left bank, -having been passed over the Guadiana, the gabions and fascines -were burnt, and the flying bridge removed. These transactions were -completely masked by the fourth division, which, with the Spaniards, -continued to maintain the investment; it was not until the rear guard -was ready to draw off, that the French, in a sally, after severely -handling the piquets of Harvey’s Portuguese brigade, learned that the -siege was raised. But of the cause they were still ignorant. - -Beresford held a conference with the Spanish generals at Valverde, -on the 13th, when it was agreed to receive battle at the village -of Albuera. Ballasteros’ and Blake’s corps having already formed a -junction at Baracotta, were then falling back upon Almendral, and -Blake engaged to bring them into line at Albuera, before twelve -o’clock, on the 15th. Meanwhile, as Badajos was the centre of an -arc, sweeping through Valverde, Albuera, and Talavera Real, it was -arranged that Blake’s army should watch the roads on the right; the -British and the fifth Spanish army guard those leading upon the -centre; and that Madden’s Portuguese cavalry should observe those -on the left, conducting through Talavera Real. The main body of the -British being in the woods near Valverde, could reach Albuera by a -half march, and no part of the arc was more than four leagues from -Badajos; but the enemy being, on the 14th, at Los Santos, was eight -leagues distant from Albuera: hence, Beresford, thinking that he -could not be forestalled on any point of importance to the allies, -continued to keep the fourth division round the fortress. Colborne’s -moveable column joined the army on the 14th, Madden then retired -to Talavera Real, Blake’s army reached Almendral, and the allied -cavalry, under general Long, fell back before the enemy from Zafra -and Los Santos, to Santa Marta, where it was joined by the dragoons -of the fourth army. - -In the morning of the 15th, the British occupied the left of the -position of Albuera, which was a ridge about four miles long, having -the Aroya Val de Sevilla in rear and the Albuera river in front. The -right of the army was prolonged towards Almendral, the left towards -Badajos, and the ascent from the river was easy, the ground being in -all parts practicable for cavalry and artillery. Somewhat in advance -of the centre were the bridge and village of Albuera, the former -commanded by a battery, the latter occupied by Alten’s brigade. The -second division, under general William Stewart, was drawn up in one -line, the right on a commanding hill over which the Valverde road -passed; the left on the road of Badajos, beyond which the order of -battle was continued in two lines, by the Portuguese troops under -general Hamilton and colonel Collins. - -The right of the position, which was stronger, and higher, and -broader than any other part, was left open for Blake’s army, because -Beresford, thinking the hill on the Valverde road to be the key of -the position, as protecting his only line of retreat, was desirous to -secure it with the best troops. The fourth division and the infantry -of the fifth army were still before Badajos, but general Cole had -orders to send the seventeenth Portuguese regiment to Elvas; to throw -a battalion of Spaniards into Olivenza; to bring his second brigade, -which was before Christoval, over the Guadiana, by a ford above -Badajos, if practicable, and to be in readiness to march at the first -notice. - -In this posture of affairs, about three o’clock in the evening of the -15th, while Beresford was at some distance on the left, the whole -mass of the allied cavalry, closely followed by the French light -horsemen, came in from Santa Marta in a hurried manner, and passing -the Albuera abandoned all the wooded heights in front to the enemy, -whose dispositions being thus effectually concealed at the distance -of cannon-shot, the strength of the position was already sapped. -Beresford immediately formed a temporary right wing with the cavalry -and artillery, stretching his piquets along the road to Almendral, -and sending officers to hasten Blake’s movements; but that general, -who had only a few miles of good road to march, and who had promised -to be in line at noon, did not reach the ground before eleven at -night; and his rear was not there before three o’clock in the -morning of the 16th; meanwhile, as the enemy was evidently in force -on the Albuera road, Cole and Madden were ordered up. The orders -failed to reach the latter, but, at six o’clock in the morning, the -former reached the position with the infantry of the fifth army, -two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, and two brigades of the fourth -division; the third brigade, under colonel Kemmis, being unable to -cross the Guadiana, above Badajos, was in march by Jerumenha. The -Spanish troops immediately joined Blake on the right, and the two -brigades of the fourth division, were drawn up in columns behind -the second division. The Portuguese squadrons reinforced colonel -Otway, whose horsemen, of the same nation, were pushed forward in -front of the left wing; and, as general Long seemed oppressed by the -responsibility of directing the troops of so many different nations, -general Lumley assumed the chief command of the allied squadrons, -which were concentrated in rear of the centre. - -The position was now occupied by thirty thousand infantry, above two -thousand cavalry, and thirty-eight pieces of artillery, of which -eighteen were nine-pounders; but, the brigade of the fourth division -being still absent, the British infantry, the pith and strength -of battle, did not amount to seven thousand, and already Blake’s -arrogance was shaking Beresford’s authority. The French had fifty -guns, and above four thousand veteran cavalry, but only nineteen -thousand chosen infantry; yet being of one nation, obedient to one -discipline, and animated by one spirit, their excellent composition -amply compensated for the inferiority of numbers, and their general’s -talent was immeasurably greater than his adversary’s. - -Soult examined Beresford’s position, without hindrance, on the -evening of the 15th, and having heard that the fourth division was -left before Badajos, and that Blake would not arrive before the -17th, he resolved to attack the next morning, for he had detected all -the weakness of the English general’s dispositions for battle. - -The hill in the centre, commanding the Valverde road, was undoubtedly -the key of the position if an attack was made parallel to the front; -but the heights on the right presented a sort of table-land, trending -backwards towards the Valverde road, and looking into the rear of the -line of battle. Hence it was evident that, if a mass of troops could -be placed there, they must be beaten, or the right wing of the allied -army would be rolled up on the centre and pushed into the narrow -ravine of the Aroya: the Valverde road could then be seized, the -retreat cut, and the powerful cavalry of the French would complete -the victory. Now the right of the allies and the left of the French -approximated to each other, being only divided by a wooded hill, -about cannon-shot distance from either but separated from the allies -by the Albuera, and from the French by a rivulet called the Feria. -This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult. -During the night he placed behind it the artillery under general -Ruty; the fifth corps under Girard; and the heavy dragoons under -Latour Maubourg; thus concentrating fifteen thousand men and forty -guns within ten minutes’ march of Beresford’s right wing, and yet -that general could neither see a man nor draw a sound conclusion as -to the real plan of attack. - -The light cavalry; the division of the first corps under general -Werlé; Godinot’s brigade, and ten guns, still remained at the French -marshal’s disposal. These he formed in the woods, extending along -the banks of the Feria towards its confluence with the Albuera, and -Godinot was ordered to attack the village and bridge, and to bear -strongly against the centre of the position, with a view to attract -Beresford’s attention, to separate his wings, and to double up his -right at the moment when the principal attack should be developed. - - -BATTLE OF ALBUERA. - -During the night, Blake and Cole, as we have seen, arrived with -above sixteen thousand men; but so defective was the occupation of -the ground, that Soult had no change to make in his plans from this -circumstance, and, a little before nine o’clock in the morning, -Godinot’s division issued from the woods in one heavy column of -attack, preceded by ten guns. He was flanked by the light cavalry, -and followed by Werlé’s division of reserve, and, making straight -towards the bridge, commenced a sharp cannonade, attempting to force -the passage; at the same time Briché, with two regiments of hussars, -drew further down the river to observe colonel Otway’s horse. - -The allies’ guns on the rising ground above the village answered -the fire of the French, and ploughed through their columns, which -were crowding without judgement towards the bridge, although the -stream was passable above and below. But Beresford observing that -Werlé’s division did not follow closely, was soon convinced that -the principal effort would be on the right, and, therefore, sent -Blake orders to form a part of the first and all the second line of -the Spanish army, on the broad part of the hills, at right angles -to their actual front. Then drawing the Portuguese infantry of the -left wing to the centre, he sent one brigade down to support Alten, -and directed general Hamilton to hold the remainder in columns of -battalions, ready to move to any part of the field. The thirteenth -dragoons were posted near the edge of the river, above the bridge, -and, meanwhile, the second division marched to support Blake. The -horse-artillery, the heavy dragoons, and the fourth division also -took ground to the right, and were posted; the cavalry and guns -on a small plain behind the Aroya, and the fourth division in an -oblique line about half-musket shot behind them. This done, Beresford -galloped to Blake, for that general had refused to change his front -and, with great heat, told colonel Hardinge, the bearer of the order, -that the real attack was at the village and bridge. Beresford had -sent again to entreat that he would obey, but this message was as -fruitless as the former, and, when the marshal arrived, nothing had -been done. The enemy’s columns were, however, now beginning to appear -on the right, and Blake, yielding to this evidence, proceeded to -make the evolution, yet with such pedantic slowness, that Beresford, -impatient of his folly, took the direction in person. - -Great was the confusion and the delay thus occasioned, and ere the -troops could be put in order the French were amongst them. For -scarcely had Godinot engaged Alten’s brigade, when Werlé, leaving -only a battalion of grenadiers and some squadrons to watch the -thirteenth dragoons and to connect the attacks, countermarched -with the remainder of his division, and rapidly gained the rear of -the fifth corps as it was mounting the hills on the right of the -allies. At the same time the mass of light cavalry suddenly quitted -Godinot’s column, and crossing the river Albuera above the bridge, -ascended the left bank at a gallop, and, sweeping round the rear of -the fifth corps, joined Latour Maubourg, who was already in face -of Lumley’s squadrons. Thus half an hour had sufficed to render -Beresford’s position nearly desperate. Two-thirds of the French were -in a compact order of battle on a line perpendicular to his right, -and his army, disordered and composed of different nations, was -still in the difficult act of changing its front. It was in vain -that he endeavoured to form the Spanish line sufficiently in advance -to give room for the second division to support it; the French guns -opened, their infantry threw out a heavy musketry, and their cavalry, -outflanking the front and charging here and there, put the Spaniards -in disorder at all points; in a short time the latter gave way, and -Soult, thinking the whole army was yielding, pushed forward his -columns, while his reserves also mounted the hill, and general Ruty -placed all the batteries in position. - -At this critical moment general William Stewart arrived at the foot -of the height with colonel Colborne’s brigade, which formed the head -of the second division. The colonel, seeing the confusion above, -desired to form in order of battle previous to mounting the ascent, -but Stewart, whose boiling courage overlaid his judgement, led up -without any delay in column of companies, and attempted to open out -his line in succession as the battalions arrived at the summit. Being -under a destructive fire the foremost charged to gain room, but a -heavy rain prevented any object from being distinctly seen, and -four regiments of hussars and lancers, which had passed the right -flank in the obscurity, came galloping in upon the rear of the line -at the instant of its developement, and slew or took two-thirds of -the brigade. One battalion only (the thirty-first) being still in -column, escaped the storm and maintained its ground, while the French -horsemen, riding violently over every thing else, penetrated to all -parts. In the tumult, a lancer fell upon Beresford, but the marshal, -a man of great strength, putting his spear aside cast him from his -saddle, and a shift of wind blowing aside the mist and smoke, the -mischief was perceived from the plains by general Lumley, who sent -four squadrons out upon the lancers and cut many of them off. - -During this first unhappy effort of the second division, so great -was the confusion, that the Spanish line continued to fire without -cessation, although the British were before them; whereupon -Beresford, finding his exhortations to advance fruitless, seized an -ensign and bore him and his colours, by main force, to the front, yet -the troops would not follow, and the man went back again on being -released. In this crisis, the weather, which had ruined Colborne’s -brigade, also prevented Soult from seeing the whole extent of the -field of battle, and he still kept his heavy columns together. His -cavalry, indeed, began to hem in that of the allies, but the fire -of the horse-artillery enabled Lumley, covered as he was by the bed -of the Aroya and supported by the fourth division, to check them -on the plain, while Colborne still maintained the heights with the -thirty-first regiment; the British artillery, under major Dickson, -was likewise coming fast into action, and William Stewart, who had -escaped the charge of the lancers, was again mounting the hill -with general Houghton’s brigade, which he brought on with the same -vehemence, but, instructed by his previous misfortune, in a juster -order of battle. The weather now cleared, and a dreadful fire poured -into the thickest of the French columns convinced Soult that the day -was yet to be won. - -Houghton’s regiments soon got footing on the summit, Dickson placed -the artillery in line, the remaining brigade of the second division -came up on the left, and two Spanish corps at last moved forward. -The enemy’s infantry then recoiled, yet soon recovering, renewed the -fight with greater violence than before; the cannon on both sides -discharged showers of grape at half range, and the peals of musketry -were incessant and often within pistol shot; but the close formation -of the French embarrassed their battle, and the British line would -not yield them one inch of ground nor a moment of time to open their -ranks. Their fighting was, however, fierce and dangerous. Stewart was -twice hurt, colonel Duckworth, of the forty-eighth, was slain, and -the gallant Houghton, who had received many wounds without shrinking, -fell and died in the act of cheering his men. Still the struggle -continued with unabated fury. Colonel Inglis, twenty-two other -officers, and more than four hundred men out of five hundred and -seventy that had mounted the hill, fell in the fifty-seventh alone, -and the other regiments were scarcely better off, not one-third -were standing in any. Ammunition failed, and, as the English fire -slackened, the enemy established a column in advance upon the right -flank; the play of Dickson’s artillery checked them a moment, but -again the Polish lancers charging, captured six guns. And in this -desperate crisis, Beresford, who had already withdrawn the thirteenth -dragoons from the banks of the river and brought Hamilton’s -Portuguese into a situation to cover a retrograde movement, wavered! -destruction stared him in the face, his personal resources were -exhausted, and the unhappy thought of a retreat rose in his agitated -mind. Yet no order to that effect was given, and it was urged by -some about him that the day might still be redeemed with the fourth -division. While he hesitated, colonel Hardinge boldly ordered -general Cole to advance, and then riding to colonel Abercrombie, who -commanded the remaining brigade of the second division, directed -him also to push forward into the fight. The die being thus cast, -Beresford acquiesced, and this terrible battle was continued. - -The fourth division had only two brigades in the field; the one -Portuguese under general Harvey, the other commanded by sir W. Myers -and composed of the seventh and twenty-third British regiments, was -called the fuzileer brigade. General Cole directed the Portuguese -to move between Lumley’s dragoons and the hill, where they were -immediately charged by some of the French horsemen, but beat them -off with great loss: meanwhile he led the fuzileers in person up the -height. - -At this time six guns were in the enemy’s possession, the whole of -Werlé’s reserves were coming forward to reinforce the front column -of the French, and the remnant of Houghton’s brigade could no longer -maintain its ground; the field was heaped with carcasses, the -lancers were riding furiously about the captured artillery on the -upper part of the hill, and on the lower slopes, a Spanish and an -English regiment in mutual error were exchanging volleys: behind all, -general Hamilton’s Portuguese, in withdrawing from the heights above -the bridge, appeared to be in retreat. The conduct of a few brave -men soon changed this state of affairs. Colonel Robert Arbuthnot, -pushing between the double fire of the mistaken troops, arrested that -mischief, while Cole, with the fuzileers, flanked by a battalion of -the Lusitanian legion under colonel Hawkshawe, mounted the hill, -dispersed the lancers, recovered the captured guns, and appeared on -the right of Houghton’s brigade exactly as Abercrombie passed it on -the left. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 12._ - - BATTLE of ALBUERA - _16^{TH} MAY, 1811._ - - _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] - -Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke and rapidly -separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled -the enemy’s heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing -onwards as to an assured victory: they wavered, hesitated, and then -vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their -front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery -whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed; Cole and the -three colonels, Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkshawe, fell wounded, and -the fuzileer battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled, and -staggered like sinking ships. Suddenly and sternly recovering, they -closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a -strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult, -by voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen; in vain did the hardiest -veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded columns, sacrifice -their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair -field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving, -fire indiscriminately upon friends and foes, while the horsemen -hovering on the flank threatened to charge the advancing line. -Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of -undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability -of their order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in -their front; their measured tread shook the ground; their dreadful -volleys swept away the head of every formation; their deafening -shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of -the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot and with a horrid carnage it -was driven by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest -edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining with the -struggling multitude, endeavour to sustain the fight; their efforts -only increased the irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass giving -way like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the ascent. The rain -flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and fifteen hundred -unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British -soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill! - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -While the fuzileers were thus striving on the upper part of the -hill, the cavalry and Harvey’s brigade continually advanced, and -Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, battered by Lefebre’s guns, retired -before them, yet still threatening the British with their right, -and covering the flank of their own infantry from a charge of -Lumley’s horse. Beresford, seeing that colonel Hardinge’s decision -had brought on the critical moment of the battle, then endeavoured -to secure a favourable result. Blake’s first line had not been at -all engaged, and were ordered to move upon the village; Alten’s -Germans and Hamilton’s and Collins’s Portuguese were thus rendered -disposable, forming a mass of ten thousand fresh men with which -the English general followed up the attack of the fuzileers and -Abercrombie’s brigade, and at the same time the Spanish divisions of -Zayas, Ballasteros, and España advanced. Nevertheless, so rapid was -the execution of the fuzileers, that the enemy’s infantry were never -attained by these reserves, which yet suffered severely; for general -Ruty got the French guns altogether, and worked them with prodigious -activity, while the fifth corps still made head, and, when the day -was irrevocably lost, he regained the other side of the Albuera, and -protected the passage of the broken infantry. - -Beresford, being too hardly handled to pursue, formed a fresh line -with his Portuguese, parallel to the hill from whence Soult had -advanced to the attack in the morning, and where the French troops -were now rallying with their usual celerity. Meanwhile the fight -continued at the village, but Godinot’s division and the connecting -battalion of grenadiers on that side were soon afterwards withdrawn, -and the action terminated before three o’clock. - -The serious fighting had endured only four hours, and in that space -of time, nearly seven thousand of the allies and above eight thousand -of their adversaries were struck down. Three French generals were -wounded, two slain, and eight hundred soldiers so badly hurt as to be -left on the field. On Beresford’s side only two thousand Spaniards, -and six hundred Germans and Portuguese, were killed or wounded; hence -it is plain with what a resolution the pure British fought, for they -had only fifteen hundred men left standing out of six thousand! The -laurel is nobly won when the exhausted victor reels as he places it -on his bleeding front. - -The trophies of the French were five hundred unwounded prisoners, a -howitzer, and several stand of colours; the British had nothing of -that kind to boast of; but the horrid piles of carcasses within their -lines told, with dreadful eloquence, who were the conquerors, and all -the night the rain poured down, and the river and the hills and the -woods on each side, resounded with the dismal clamour and groans of -dying men. Beresford, obliged to place his Portuguese in the front -line, was oppressed with the number of his wounded; they far exceeded -that of the sound amongst the British soldiers, and when the latter’s -piquets were established, few men remained to help the sufferers. In -this cruel situation he sent colonel Hardinge to demand assistance -from Blake; but wrath and mortified pride were predominant in that -general’s breast, and he refused; saying it was customary with allied -armies for each to take care of its own men. - -Morning came, and both sides remained in their respective situations, -the wounded still covering the field of battle, the hostile lines -still menacing and dangerous. The greater multitude had fallen on -the French part, but the best soldiers on that of the allies; and -the dark masses of Soult’s powerful cavalry and artillery, as they -covered all his front, seemed alone able to contend again for the -victory: the right of the French also appeared to threaten the -Badajos road, and Beresford, in gloom and doubt, awaited another -attack. On the 17th, however, the third brigade of the fourth -division came up by a forced march from Jerumenha, and enabled the -second division to retake their former ground between the Valverde -and the Badajos roads. On the 18th, Soult retreated. - -He left to the generosity of the English general several hundred men -too deeply wounded to be removed; but all that could travel he had, -in the night of the 17th, sent towards Seville, by the royal road, -through Santa Marta, Los Santos, and Monasterio: then, protecting his -movements with all his horsemen and six battalions of infantry, he -filed the army, in the morning, to its right, and gained the road of -Solano. When this flank march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered -the rear with the heavy dragoons, and Briché protected the march of -the wounded men by the royal road. - -The duke of Dalmatia remained the 19th at Solano. His intention -was to hold a position in Estremadura until he could receive -reinforcements from Andalusia; for he judged truly that, although -Beresford was in no condition to hurt Badajos, lord Wellington -would come down, and that fresh combats would be required to save -that fortress. On the 14th he had commenced repairing the castle -of Villalba, a large structure between Almendralejos and Santa -Marta, and he now continued this work; designing to form a head of -cantonments, that the allies would be unable to besiege before the -French army could be reinforced. - -When Beresford discovered the enemy’s retreat, he despatched general -Hamilton to make a show of re-investing Badajos, which was effected -at day-break the 19th, but on the left bank only. Meanwhile the -allied cavalry, supported by Alten’s Germans, followed the French -line of retreat. Soult then transferred his head-quarters to Fuente -del Maestre, and the Spanish cavalry cutting off some of his men -menaced Villalba. Lord Wellington reached the field of battle the -same day, and, after examining the state of affairs, desired the -marshal to follow the enemy cautiously; then returning to Elvas -himself, he directed the third and seventh divisions, which were -already at Campo Mayor, to complete the re-investment of Badajos on -the right bank. - -Meanwhile Beresford, advanced by the Solano road to Almendralejos, -where he found some more wounded men. His further progress was not -opposed. The number of officers who had fallen in the French army, -together with the privations endured, had produced despondence and -discontent; the garrison at Villalba was not even disposed to -maintain the castle, and under these circumstances, the duke of -Dalmatia evacuated it, and continued his own retreat in the direction -of Llerena, where he assumed a position on the 23d, his cavalry -being near Usagre. This abandonment of the royal road to Seville was -a well-considered movement. The country through which Soult passed -being more fruitful and open, he could draw greater advantage from -his superior cavalry; the mountains behind him were so strong he -had nothing to fear from an attack; and by Belalcazar and Almaden, -he could maintain a communication with La Mancha, from whence he -expected Drouet’s division. The road of Guadalcanal was in his rear, -by which he could draw reinforcements from Cordoba and from the -fourth corps, and meanwhile the allies durst not venture to expose -their left flank by marching on Monasterio. - -From Llerena, a detachment was sent to drive away a Spanish Partizan -corps which had cut his communications with Guadalcanal, and at -the same time Latour Maubourg was directed to scour the country -beyond Usagre; this led to an action; for that town, built upon -a hill, and covered towards Los Santos by a river with steep and -rugged banks, had only the one outlet by the bridge on that side, -and when Latour Maubourg approached, Lumley retired across the -river. The French light cavalry then marched along the right bank, -with the intention of crossing lower down and thus covering the -passage of the heavy horsemen; but before they could effect this -object, general Bron rashly passed the river with two regiments of -dragoons, and drew up in line just beyond the bridge. Lumley was -lying close behind a rising ground, and when the French regiments -had advanced a sufficient distance, Lefebre’s guns opened on them, -and the third, and fourth dragoon guards, charged them in front -while Madden’s Portuguese fell on their flank. They were overthrown -at the first shock, and fled towards the bridge, but that being -choked by the remainder of the cavalry advancing to their support, -the fugitives, turned to the right and left, endeavouring to save -themselves amongst some gardens situated on the banks of the river; -there they were pursued and sabred until the French on the opposite -side, seeing their distress, opened a fire of carbines and artillery -that obliged the British to discontinue the attack. Forty killed, -above a hundred wounded, and eighty prisoners were the fruits of this -brilliant action of general Lumley’s, which terminated Beresford’s -operations, for the miserable state to which the Regency had reduced -the Portuguese army imperatively called for the marshal’s presence. -General Hill, who had returned to Portugal, then re-assumed the -command of the second division, amidst the eager rejoicings of the -troops, and lord Wellington directed the renewed siege of Badajos in -person. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -No general ever gained a great battle with so little increase of -military reputation as marshal Beresford. His personal intrepidity -and strength, qualities so attractive for the multitude, were -conspicuously displayed, yet the breath of his own army withered -his laurels, and his triumph was disputed by the very soldiers who -followed his car. Their censures have been reiterated, without change -and without abatement, even to this hour; and a close examination -of his operations, while it detects many ill-founded objections, and -others tainted with malice, leaves little doubt that the general -feeling was right. - -When he had passed the Guadiana and driven the fifth corps upon -Guadalcanal, the delay that intervened, before he invested Badajos, -was unjustly attributed to him: it was lord Wellington’s order, -resulting from the tardiness of the Spanish generals, that paralyzed -his operations. But when the time for action arrived, the want -of concert in the investment, and the ill-matured attack on San -Christoval belonged to Beresford’s arrangements; and he is especially -responsible in reputation for the latter, because captain Squires -personally represented the inevitable result, and his words were -unheeded. - -During the progress of the siege, either the want of correct -intelligence, or a blunted judgement, misled the marshal. It was -remarked that, at all times, he too readily believed the idle tales -of distress and difficulties in the French armies, with which -the spies generally, and the deserters always, interlarded their -information. Thus he was incredulous of Soult’s enterprise, and that -marshal was actually over the Morena before the orders were given -for the commencing of the main attack of the castle of Badajos. -However, the firmness with which Beresford resisted the importunities -of the engineers to continue the siege, and the quick and orderly -removal of the stores and battering-train, were alike remarkable -and praiseworthy. It would have been happy if he had shewn as much -magnanimity in what followed. - -When he met Blake and Castaños at Valverde, the alternative of -fighting or retiring behind the Guadiana was the subject of -consideration. The Spanish generals were both in favour of giving -battle. Blake, who could not retire the way he had arrived, without -danger of having his march intercepted, was particularly earnest to -fight; affirming that his troops, who were already in a miserable -state, would disperse entirely if they were obliged to enter -Portugal. Castaños was of the same opinion. Beresford also argued -that it was unwise to relinquish the hope of taking Badajos, and -ungenerous to desert the people of Estremadura; that a retreat would -endanger Elvas, lay open the Alemtejo, and encourage the enemy to -push his incursions further, which he could safely do, having such a -fortress as Badajos with its bridge over the Guadiana, in his rear; -a battle must then be fought in the Alemtejo with fewer troops and -after a dispiriting retreat; there was also a greater scarcity of -food in the Portuguese than in the Spanish province, and, finally, as -the weather was menacing, the Guadiana might again rise before the -stores were carried over, when the latter must be abandoned, or the -army endangered to protect their passage. - -But these plausible reasons were but a mask; the true cause why the -English general adopted Blake’s proposals was the impatient temper -of the British troops. None of them had been engaged in the battles -under lord Wellington. At Busaco the regiments of the fourth division -were idle spectators on the left, as those of the second division -were on the right, while the action was in the centre. During -Massena’s retreat they had not been employed under fire, and the -combats of Sabugal and Fuentes Onoro had been fought without them. -Thus a burning thirst for battle was general, and Beresford had not -the art either of conciliating or of exacting the confidence of his -troops. It is certain that if he had retreated, a very violent and -unjust clamour would have been raised against him, and this was so -strongly and unceremoniously represented to him, by an officer on his -own staff, that he gave way. These are what may be termed the moral -obstacles of war. Such men as lord Wellington or sir John Moore can -stride over them, but to second-rate minds they are insuperable. -Practice and study may make a good general as far as the handling of -troops and the designing of a campaign, but that ascendancy of spirit -which leads the wise, and controls the insolence of folly, is a rare -gift of nature. - -Beresford yielded with an unhappy flexibility to the clamour of the -army and the representations of Blake, for it is unquestionable that -the resolution to fight was unwarrantable on any sound military -principle. We may pass over the argument founded upon the taking of -Badajos, because neither the measures nor the means of the English -general promised the slightest chance of success; the siege would -have died away of itself in default of resources to carry it on. -The true question to consider was, not whether Estremadura should -be deserted or Badajos abandoned, but whether lord Wellington’s -combinations and his great and well considered design for the -deliverance of the Peninsula, should be ruined and defaced at a blow. -To say that the Alemtejo could not have been defended until the -commander-in-chief arrived from the north with reinforcements was -mere trifling. Soult, with twenty or even thirty thousand men, durst -not have attempted the siege of Elvas in the face of twenty-four -thousand men such as Beresford commanded. The result of the battle -of Fuentes Onoro was known in the English and in the French camps, -before Beresford broke up from Badajos, hence he was certain that -additional troops would soon be brought down to the Guadiana; indeed, -the third and seventh divisions were actually at Campo Mayor the -23d of May. The danger to the Alemtejo was, therefore, slight, and -the necessity of a battle being by no means apparent, it remains to -analyze the chances of success. - -Soult’s numbers were not accurately known, but it was ascertained -that he had not less than twenty thousand veteran troops. He had also -a great superiority of cavalry and artillery, and the country was -peculiarly suitable for these arms; the martial character of the man -was also understood. Now the allies could bring into the field more -of infantry by ten thousand than the French, but they were of various -tongues, and the Spanish part ill armed, starving, and worn out -with fatigue, had been repeatedly and recently defeated by the very -troops they were going to engage. The French were compact, swift of -movement, inured to war, used to act together, and under the command -of one able and experienced general. The allied army was unwieldy, -each nation mistrusting the other, and the whole without unity of -spirit, or of discipline, or of command. On what, then, could marshal -Beresford found his hopes of success? The British troops. The latter -were therefore to be freely used. But was it a time to risk the total -destruction of two superb divisions and to encounter a certain and -heavy loss of men, whose value he knew so well when he calculated -upon them alone for victory in such circumstances? - -To resolve on battle was, however, easier than to prepare for it with -skill. Albuera, we have seen, was the point of concentration. Colonel -Colborne’s brigade did not arrive until the 14th, and these was no -certainty that it could arrive before the enemy did. Blake did not -arrive until three in the morning of the 16th. The fourth division -not until six o’clock. Kemmis with three fine British regiments, and -Maddens cavalry, did not come at all. These facts prove that the -whole plan was faulty, it was mere accident that a sufficient force -to give battle was concentrated. Beresford was too late, and the -keeping up the investment of Badajos, although laudable in one sense, -was a great error; it was only an accessary, and yet the success of -the principal object was made subservient to it. If Soult, instead -of passing by Villa Franca, in his advance, had pushed straight on -from Los Santos to Albuera, he would have arrived the 15th, when -Beresford had not much more than half his force in position; the -point of concentration would then have been lost, and the allies -scattered in all directions. If the French had even continued their -march by Solano instead of turning upon Albuera, they must inevitably -have communicated with Badajos, unless Beresford had fought without -waiting for Blake, and without Kemmis’s brigade. Why, then, did the -French marshal turn out of the way to seek a battle, in preference to -attaining his object without one? and why did he neglect to operate -by his right or left until the unwieldy allied army should separate -or get into confusion, as it inevitably would have done? Because the -English general’s dispositions were so faulty that no worse error -could well be expected from him, and Soult had every reason to hope -for a great and decided victory; a victory which would have more than -counterbalanced Massena’s failure. He knew that only one half of the -allied force was at Albuera on the 15th, and when he examined the -ground, every thing promised the most complete success. - -Marshal Beresford had fixed upon and studied his own field of battle -above a month before the action took place, and yet occupied it -in such a manner as to render defeat almost certain; his infantry -were not held in hand, and his inferiority in guns and cavalry was -not compensated for by entrenchments. But were any other proofs of -error wanting, this fact would suffice, he had a greater strength of -infantry on a field of battle scarcely four miles long, and three -times the day was lost and won, the allies being always fewest in -number at the decisive point. It is true that Blake’s conduct was -very perplexing; it is true that general William Stewart’s error cost -one brigade, and thus annihilated the command of colonel Colborne, a -man capable of turning the fate of a battle even with fewer troops -than those swept away from him by the French cavalry: but the neglect -of the hill beyond the Albuera, fronting the right of the position, -was Beresford’s own error and a most serious one; so also were the -successive attacks of the brigades, and the hesitation about the -fourth division. And where are we to look for that promptness in -critical moments which marks the great commander? It was colonel -Hardinge that gave the fourth division and Abercrombie’s brigade -orders to advance, and it was their astounding valour in attack, and -the astonishing firmness of Houghton’s brigade in defence that saved -the day; the person of the general-in-chief was indeed seen every -where, a gallant soldier! but the mind of the great commander was -seen no where. - -Beresford remained master of the field of battle, but he could not -take Badajos, that prize was the result of many great efforts, -and many deep combinations by a far greater man: neither did he -clear Estremadura, for Soult maintained positions from Llerena to -Usagre. What then did he gain? The power of simulating a renewal -of the siege, and holding his own cantonments on the left bank -of the Guadiana; I say simulating, for, if the third and seventh -divisions had not arrived from Beira, even the investment could not -have been completed. These illusive advantages he purchased at the -price of seven thousand men. Now lord Wellington fought two general -and several minor actions, with a smaller loss, and moreover turned -Massena and seventy thousand men out of Portugal! - -Such being the fruit of victory, what would have been the result -of defeat? There was no retreat, save by the temporary bridge of -Jerumenha, but, had the hill on the right been carried in the battle, -the Valverde road would have been in Soult’s possession, and the -line of retreat cut; and, had it been otherwise, Beresford, with -four thousand victorious French cavalry at his heels, could never -have passed the river. Back, then, must have come the army from the -north, the Lines of Lisbon would have been once more occupied--a -French force fixed on the south of the Tagus--Spain ruined--Portugal -laid prostrate--England in dismay. Could even the genius of lord -Wellington have recovered such a state of affairs? And yet, with -these results, the terrible balance hung for two hours, and -twice trembling to the sinister side, only yielded at last to the -superlative vigour of the fuzileers. The battle should never have -been fought. The siege of Badajos could not have been renewed without -reinforcements, and, with them, it could have been renewed without an -action, or at least without risking an unequal one. - -But would even the bravery of British soldiers have saved the day, at -Albuera, if the French general had not also committed great errors. -His plan of attack and his execution of it, up to the moment when the -Spanish line fell back in disorder, cannot be too much admired; after -that, the great error of fighting in dense columns being persisted -in beyond reason, lost the fairest field ever offered to the arms of -France. Had the fifth corps opened out while there was time to do so, -that is, between the falling back of the Spaniards and the advance -of Houghton’s brigade, what on earth could have saved Beresford from -a total defeat? The fire of the enemy’s columns alone destroyed -two-thirds of his British troops; the fire of their lines would have -swept away all! - -It has been said that Latour Maubourg and Godinot did not second -Soult with sufficient vigour; the latter certainly did not display -any great energy, but the village was maintained by Alten’s Germans, -who were good and hardy troops, and well backed up by a great body of -Portuguese. Latour Maubourg’s movements seem to have been objected -to without reason. He took six guns, sabred many Spaniards, and -overthrew a whole brigade of the British, without ceasing to keep -in check their cavalry. He was, undoubtedly, greatly superior in -numbers, but general Lumley handled the allied squadrons with skill -and courage, and drew all the advantage possible from his situation, -and, in the choice of that situation, none can deny ability to -marshal Beresford. The rising ground behind the horsemen, the bed of -the Aroya in their front, the aid of the horse-artillery, and the -support of the fourth division, were all circumstances of strength so -well combined that nothing could be better, and they dictated Latour -Maubourg’s proceedings, which seem consonant to true principles. If -he had charged in mass, under the fire of Lefebre’s guns, he must -have been thrown into confusion in passing the Aroya at the moment -when the fourth division, advancing along the slopes, would have -opened a musketry on his right flank; Lumley could then have charged, -or retired up the hill, according to circumstances. In this case, -great loss might have been sustained, and nothing very decisive could -have accrued to the advantage of the French, because no number of -cavalry, if unsustained by infantry and artillery, can make a serious -impression against the three arms united. - -On the other hand, a repulse might have been fatal not only to -himself but to the French infantry on the hill, as their left would -have been open to the enterprises of the allied cavalry. If Latour -Maubourg had stretched away to his own left, he would, in like -manner, have exposed the flank of Soult’s infantry, and his movements -would have been eccentric, and contrary to sound principles; and, -(in the event of a disaster to the corps on the hill, as really -happened,) destructive to the safety of the retreating army. By -keeping in mass on the plain, and detaching squadrons from time to -time, as favourable opportunities offered for partial charges, he -gained, as we have seen, great advantages during the action, and -kept his troopers well in hand for the decisive moment; finally, he -covered the retreat of the beaten infantry. Still it may be admitted -that, with such superior numbers, he might have more closely pressed -Lumley. - -When Soult had regained the hills at the other side of the Albuera, -the battle ceased, each side being, as we have seen, so hardly -handled that neither offered to renew the fight. Here was the -greatest failure of the French commander; he had lost eight thousand -men, but he had still fifteen thousand under arms, and his artillery -and his cavalry were comparatively untouched. On the side of the -allies, only fifteen hundred British infantry were standing; the -troops were suffering greatly from famine; the Spaniards had been -feeding on horseflesh, and were so extenuated by continual fatigue -and misery, that, for several days previous to the battle, they -had gone over in considerable numbers even to the French, hoping -thus to get food: these circumstances should be borne in mind, when -reflecting on their conduct in the battle; under such a commander -as Blake, and, while enduring such heavy privations, it was a great -effort of resolution, and honourable to them that they fought at all. -Their resistance feeble, when compared to the desperate valour of the -British, was by no means weak in itself or infirm; nor is it to be -wondered at that men so exhausted and so ill-managed should have been -deaf to the call of Beresford, a strange general, whose exhortations -they probably did not understand. When the fortune of the day changed -they followed the fuzileers with alacrity, and at no period did they -give way with dishonour. - -Nevertheless, all circumstances considered, they were not and could -not be equal to a second desperate struggle, a renewed attack on -the 17th, would have certainly ended in favour of the French; and -so conscious was Beresford of this, that, on the evening of the -16th, he wrote to lord Wellington, avowing that he anticipated a -certain and ruinous defeat the next day. The resolution with which he -maintained the position notwithstanding, was the strongest indication -of military talent he gave during the whole of his operations; had -Soult only persisted in holding his position with equal pertinacity, -Beresford must have retired. It was a great and decided mistake -of the French marshal not to have done so. There is nothing more -essential in war than a confident front; a general should never -acknowledge himself vanquished, for the front line of an army always -looks formidable, and the adversary can seldom see the real state of -what is behind. The importance of this maxim is finely indicated in -Livy, where he relates that, after a drawn battle, a god called out -in the night, the Etruscans had lost one man more than the Romans! -Hereupon the former retired, and the latter, remaining on the field, -gathered all the fruits of a real victory. - - - - -PAPERS RELATING TO THE FORMER VOLUMES. - - -_Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby to colonel Napier._ - -After the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned my -name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may appear -extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; but my -silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise to myself -which I do not deserve. - -The whole of your account of the charge made by general Anson’s -brigade is substantially correct; you have given the reason for -it, and the result; but there are two points, in the detail, which -are inaccurate. The first affecting the German hussars; the other -respecting myself. - -The Germans, on the left of the twenty-third, could not reach the -French columns, from the impracticability of the ravine where they -charged; this I ascertained, by personal observation, the following -day; the obstacle was much less serious where the twenty-third -attacked, headed by general Anson and colonel Seymour. The mountain -torrent, which gradually decreased as it descended into the plain, -was about thirty yards in front of the enemy, and the twenty-third, -though much broken in passing this obstacle, charged up to the -columns, and was repulsed, no rally could be attempted; but the -right squadron, under captain Drake, having an easier passage of the -ravine, and no French column immediately in front, passed through the -intervals, and caused much confusion, which, together with the delay -occasioned by the charge, prevented the masses of infantry which were -in readiness on the French right flank, from joining in the general -attack on our line. - -You will perceive that this account, which I believe to be the exact -truth, does not, in the slightest degree, affect the accuracy of your -description of the movement; but, if I am correct, it proves that -the Germans were obliged to halt by an insuperable difficulty, and -that I had no particular merit in the execution of the charge of the -twenty-third. - - Believe me - Very sincerely yours, - F. PONSONBY. - - _Malta, Dec. 30, 1829._ - - -_Note sur la Situation actuelle de l’Espagne._ - - _Rochefort, le Août, 1808._ - -1º. Les événemens inattendus du général Dupont sont une preuve de -plus que le succès de la guerre dépend de la prudence, de la bonne -conduite, et de l’expérience du général. - -2º. A la seule lecture du rapport du colonel d’Affry, on avoit -diviné tous les événemens; après une perte aussi considérable, on ne -peut être surpris que le roi et les généraux jugent convenable de -concentrer l’armée et d’évacuer Madrid. - -En examinant avec attention, non les rapports mensongers des -individus qui parlent dans leur sens, mais les faits tels qu’ils se -sont passés, on est convaincu: premièrement, que le général Castaños -n’avoit pas plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes de troupe de ligne et de -quinze mille paysans; un jour on sera à même de vérifier ce qui sera -avancé ici. Secondement, que si le général Dupont les eut attaqués -ou se fût battû; avec tout son corps réuni, il les eut complettement -défaits. - -3º. On pense qu’on aura tout le tems d’évacuer les blessés de Madrid -qui arrivent à Aranda; il faudra occuper aussi longtems qu’il sera -possible les hauteurs de Buitrago, afin de donner le temps au -maréchal Bessières de revenir de son mouvement de Gallice; qu’il faut -réorganiser la province de Burgos, les trois Biscayes, et la province -de Navarre; elle comprendront facilement que, dans ce moment plus que -jamais, elles doivent rester fidèles et se bien conduire sous peine -d’être traitées avec toute la rigueur de la guerre. - -4º. On pense que l’armée doit être divisée en trois corps, _le -corps principal_, ou de centre, où commande le roi, qu’on porteroit -à 30,000 hommes campé à Aranda; le corps de droite, du maréchal -Bessières d’environ 15 mille hommes faisant face à ce qui pourroit -arriver de Gallice ou d’Estramadura, occupant Valladolid par une -division, ayant une autre division intermédiaire avec le corps du -centre, et une troisième division de plus sur sa droite, selon les -circonstances; enfin le _corps de gauche_, ou d’Arragon destiné à -maintenir la Navarre et le pays environnant, occupant Logrono et -Tudela et liant sa droite au corps du centre, par une division qui au -besoin renforceroit ce corps et devra maintenir Soria par un corps -volant. - -Le corps du centre, et le corps de droite doivent s’appuyer sur -Burgos et le corps d’Arragon doit avoir son appui sur Pampelune. - -5º. Pour organiser le corps du centre dans ce bût, on croit qu’on -doit le renforcer de la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, -200 chevaux et 8 pièces de canon, qu’on tireroit du corps devant -Saragosse; de la brigade du général Mouton composée du 4^{me} legère, -15^{me} legère, du bataillon de Paris, et de huit pièces de canon; -de la brigade commandée par le maréchal Ney, et qui est déjà à une -marche en avant de Bayonne, composée du 43^{me}, et du 51^{me} de -ligne, du 26^{me} de chasseurs, et de 6 pièces de canon; enfin de -4 escadrons de marche de dragons et d’une régiment Polonais de la -garde; on réuniroit le 3^{me} bataillon aux deux premiers de tous les -régimens d’infanterie, et on méleroit les jeunes soldats aux anciens. - -On évalue à environ dix mille hommes de renfort que recevroit le -corps du centre, qui seroit alors composé: savoir des - - 18,000 qui le forment à présent 18,000 - Du renfort évalué à 10,000 - -Le détachement du depôt du 4^{me} legère, 15^{me} legère. - -14^{me}, 44^{me}, 43^{me}, et 51^{me} de ligne, le 2^{me} et 12^{me} -legère rejoindront insensiblement et porteront ce corps à 30,000 -hommes. - -Ces trente mille hommes ne sauroient être en meilleure mains, que -sous les ordres du maréchal Ney, hormis une réserve de 4 à 5 mille -hommes destinés à la garde du roi, et que le roi conserveroit auprès -de sa personne et feroit marcher avec le général Saligny, ou avec le -général Savary quand il le jugeroit nécessaire. - -Le corps du centre ce tiendrait à la hauteur d’Aranda, ses -communications bien assurées avec le maréchal Bessières à Valladolid, -des têtes de pont bien établies à Aranda et à Valladolid. Ce corps se -nourrira par Burgos et devra non seulement maintenir la tranquillité -dans cette province, mais encore assurer ses communications avec le -corps de Saragosse qui occupera Tudela et Logrono. - -Le corps du maréchal Bessières, fort de quinze mille hommes, devra -occuper Valladolid en faisant face à ce qui arrivera d’Estramadure et -de Castille, ayant ses trois divisions en échélons et se nourrissant -de la province de Valladolid, Placentia, et Leon. - -On enverra le maréchal Moncey pour commander le corps du général -Verdier, et on chargera le maréchal du commandement de la Biscaye et -de tous les derrières. - -On estime qu’on peut retirer du camp sous Saragosse le 14^{me} et -44^{me} de ligne, 200 chevaux, et 8 pièces de canon, le reste doit -être formé en trois divisions, et destiné, à maintenir la Navarre. La -position de Logrono est trop près, il faut occuper au moins jusqu’à -Tudela pour soumettre la Navarre, et tout ce qui bougeroit. Dans -l’ordre offensif, deux divisions peuvent se porter en marche forcée -sur l’armée. - -6º. Il ne faut point faire une guerre timide, ni souffrir aucun -rassemblement armé à deux marches d’aucun corps d’armée. Si l’ennemi -s’approche, il ne faut point se laisser décourager par ce qui s’est -passé, se confier dans sa supériorité, marcher à lui et le battre. -L’ennemi prendra lui même probablement une marche très circonspecte: -il y sera réduit du moment qu’il aura eu quelque exemple. - -Dans cette situation de choses, toutes les fois qu’on seroit -sérieusement attaqué par l’ennemi, on pourra lui opposer le corps du -roi, qui doit toujours être ensemble, et les deux tiers du corps du -maréchal Bessières. Se maréchal doit toujours tenir un tiers de son -corps, à une demi journée, un tiers à une journée du corps du centre, -et un tiers sur la droite, suivant les circonstances, également, un -tiers du corps du général Verdier doit se tenir à la gauche du roi, -pour le joindre si cela étoit nécessaire, de sorte que dans un jour -le roi puisse réunir 40 mille hommes. - -7º. Il faut débuter par des coups d’éclât, qui rélévent le moral -du soldat et qui fassent comprendre à l’habitant qu’il doit rester -tranquille, un des premiers coups le plus important à porter, et qui -seroit utile pour réléver l’opinion et compenser l’évacuation de -Madrid, seroit que la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} qu’on rappelle -de Saragosse, aidée d’une détachement du corps du centre, soumette -Soria, le désarme et le fasse rester tranquille. Attaquer et culbuter -tout ce qui se présentera doit être l’instruction générale, donnée -au maréchal Bessières, au maréchal Ney, et au général Verdier, de -sorte qu’à une marche, ou à une marche et demie du corps François, -il n’y ait aucun rassemblement d’insurgés; on est d’opinion que si -l’avant garde du général Castaños s’avance sur l’Aranda et dépasse -les montagnes de Buitrago il faut, avec tout ce qu’on réunira dans -un jour, marcher à lui sans lui donner le tems de s’y établir -sérieusement, le culbuter, le jetter au delà des montagnes, et si -l’affaire est décisive, se reporter sur Madrid. L’ennemi doit essayer -de déloger l’armée Françoise de cette position, par trois points, -par la Gallice et l’Estramadure, par la droite d’Aranda, et enfin -par les rassemblemens des provinces d’Arragon, de Valence et autres -de Castille. Toutes ces combinaisons sont difficiles à l’ennemi, -et si on dissipe ces rassemblemens à mesure qu’ils se formeront -sur tous les points et qu’on les tienne à distance d’une ou deux -marches du cantonnement François, si alternativement les François -prennent l’offensive, tantôt à leur droite, en renforçant le maréchal -Bessières, pendant que le centre se tiendra dans une bonne position -derrière la rivière, et à l’abri de toute attaque, tantôt au centre -avec le corps du roi, les deux tiers du corps de droite, et un tiers -du corps de gauche, l’ennemi sera bientôt obligé à la plus grande -circonspection. - -8º. On auroit pu aussi conserver Madrid en renforçant le corps qui -s’y trouve, du 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, de la brigade du général -Mouton, de celle du général Le Fevbre, qui en dernier lieu a été -renvoyée au marshal Bessières, et enfin du renfort qu’amène le -maréchal Ney. On auroit ainsi renforcé le corps de Madrid de plus de -14 mille hommes, et il est douteux que l’ennemi eut voulu se mesurer -avec des forces aussi considérables et s’exposer à une perte certaine. - -9º. Si de fortes raisons obligoient d’évacuer Aranda, on perdroit -l’espoir de rétablir ses communications avec le Portugal. Dans le -cas où un évènement quelconque porteroit à évacuer le Duero et à se -concentrer sur Burgos pour se réunir là avec le maréchal Bessières, -le corps du général Verdier peut communiquer par l’Ebre, et avoir -toujours son mouvement isolé pour maintenir la Navarre, contenir -l’Arragon, tous les rassemblemens de ce côté, et protéger la route -principale.[9] Pendant cet intervalle des renforts journaliers -arriveront à l’armée, jusqu’à ce qu’enfin les divisions de la grande -armée qui sont en marche, soient sur les Pyrénées. - -On a recommandé de tous tems le petit fort de Pancorvo. Il est -nécessaire de l’occuper, même quand on ne garderoit pas la ligne -de l’Ebre, c’est une vedette d’autant plus utile qu’elle domine la -plaine, et seroit un obstacle si jamais l’ennemi s’en emparoit.[9] - -10º. La troisième position qui se présente à l’armée, c’est la -gauche à Pampelune, et la droite sur Vittoria, maintenant ainsi -ses communications avec les places importantes de St. Sebastien -et de Pampelune. Au reste toutes ces notes peuvent difficilement -être de quelque utilité, les évènemens modifient nécessairement les -dispositions, tout dépend d’ailleurs de saisir un moment. - -11º. Résumé. Le premier but est de se maintenir à Madrid si cela est -possible. - -Le second, de maintenir ses communications avec le Portugal en -occupant la ligne du Duero. - -Le troisième, de conserver l’Ebre. - -Le quatrième de conserver ses communications avec Pampelune et St. -Sebastien afin que la grande armée arrivant, on puisse en peu de tems -culbuter et anéantir tous les révoltés. - - LIEUT.-GEN. BERTRAND. - - _Rochefort, 6 Août, 1808._ - - - - -APPENDIX. - - - - -APPENDIX. - - -No. I. - -SECTION 1.--GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN THE PENINSULA, -EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER ROLLS. - -King Joseph commanding, 1st Oct. 1809. - - Present under - arms Detached. Absent. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Prison. Men. Cav. Draught. - 180,814 28,091 10,407 3,165 46,109 4,124 237,330 23,196 8,060 - Deduct for the governments 10,407 3,165 - ------- ------ - Real total 226,927 28,091 - ------- ------ - -15th July, 1810. - - 273,403 52,336 29,462 7,846 47,107 4,915 349,972 41,848 18,334 - In march to join - 6,121 736 ” ” 636 ” 6,757 736 - ------- ------ ------ ----- ------ ----- ------- ------ - 279,524 53,072 29,462 7,846 47,743 4,915 356,729 60,918 - ------- ------ ------ ----- ------ ----- ------- ------ - -15th August, 1810. - - 279,639 52,063 25,340 6,017 46,982 5,995 351,961 41,446 16,634 - In march to join 1,957 681 511 - ------- ------ ------ - Total effective in Spain 353,918 42,127 17,145 - Troops destined for Spain, quartered on the - frontier 16,006 1,447 ” - ------- ------ ------ - Grand total 369,924 43,574 17,145 - ------- ------ ------ - -_Note._--By this state it appears that allowance being made for -casualties, the reinforcements for Spain, in consequence of the peace -with Austria, were not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men. - -15th Jan. 1811. - - Present under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Cav. Draught. - 295,227 52,462 17,780 4,714 48,831 361,838 41,189 15,987 - -15th April, 1811. - - 276,575 46,990 15,121 2,166 40,079 331,776 37,855 11,301 - -These states shew a decrease of nearly thirty thousand men in three -months. During this period the siege of Badajos, the retreat of -Massena, the battles of the Gebora, Barrosa, and Fuentes Onoro took -place. Hence, if the deaths in hospital be added to the losses -sustained in those operations we shall find that, at the period of -its greatest activity, the Guerilla system was more harassing than -destructive to the French army. - - -SECTION 2.--STATE OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL. - -April, 1810.--Head-quarter Caceres. Massena, Prince of Esling, -commanding. - - Pris- - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. oners. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. - - 2d corps d’armée - 18,372 4,449 1,119 132 1,628 7 21,126 3,520 1,061 - - 6th Ditto - 33,759 10,159 496 110 5,086 349 39,690 3,140 3,129 - - 8th Ditto - 28,045 7,070 25 ” 5,976 99 34,145 5,312 1,758 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - Total active army - 80,176 21,678 1,640 242 12,690 455 94,961 15,972 5,948 - - Imperial guards - 17,380 3,800 174 15 733 ” 18,287 2,831 954 - - Province of St. Ander - 13,464 752 276 ” 1,774 377 15,891 15,752 ” - - Province of Valladolid - 4,509 124 123 ” 859 145 6,136 ” 126 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - Total under Massena’s command - 116,029 26,254 2,213 257 16,056 977 135,275 19,555 7,056 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -15th May, 1810. - - Etat major et gend’armes - 229 241 ” ” ” ” 229 241 ” - - 2d corps Reynier - 16,903 2,921 992 231 1,337 42 19,232 2,186 966 - - 6th do. Ney - 28,883 5,421 1,224 964 4,940 357 35,067 2,152 4,233 - - 8th do. Junot - 30,782 4,228 7 30 5,642 75 2,643 2,142 2,116 - - Reserve of cavalry. Montbrun - 4,776 4,851 246 189 95 ” 5,117 5,040 11 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - Total active army - 71,573 17,662 2,489 1,414 12,014 474 86,076 11,761 7,315 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -15th August, 1810. - - Etat major, &c - 199 222 ” ” 3 ” 202 222 ” - - 2d corps - 16,418 2,894 2,494 397 3,006 ” 21,913 1,969 1,304 - - 6th corps - 23,456 2,496 1,865 577 5,541 193 30,862 1,701 1,372 - - 8th corps - 18,803 1,959 436 169 4,996 98 24,235 2,016 1,112 - - Reserve of cavalry - 4,146 4,322 1,138 831 157 31 5,441 4,907 246 - - Artillerie et genie et du siege - 2,724 2,969 205 159 409 ” 3,339 108 3,128 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - Total active army - 65,746 15,862 6,139 2,119 14,112 302 85,997 10,815 7,162 - - 6th Government Valladolid. Division Serras - 12,693 3,045 639 20 1,775 641 15,107 2,931 134 - - Asturias et St. Ander. Bonet - 12,913 ” 1,394 15 1,578 107 14,885 434 ” - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - Total under Massena - 91,352 18,907 8,172 2,154 17,465 1,050 115,989 13,746 7,296 - - 9th corps, Drouet Comte D’Erlon - 19,144 2,436 24 ” 3,147 ” 22,315 2,436 ” - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - General Total - 110,496 21,343 8,196 2,154 20,612 1,050 138,304 16,616 7,296 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -Army of Portugal, 27th September, 1810. The 9th corps to the 15th -October. - -The reserve of cavalry, and the artillery of siege to the 1st -September only. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. - - Etat major - 192 219 ” ” 4 196 219 ” - - 2d corps - 16,575 2,921 2,397 287 2,214 21,186 1,872 1,336 - - 6th do. - 23,224 2,478 1,708 600 5,418 30,350 1,730 1,348 - - 8th do. - 18,807 2,958 663 140 4,656 24,126 2,027 1,071 - - Reserve of cavalry - 4,146 4,322 1,138 831 157 5,441 4,907 246 - - Artilleries of siege - 3,022 3,115 206 159 409 3,637 146 3,128 - - Battalion of march which quitted Bayonne the 2d of October - ” ” 474 16 ” 474 16 ” - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Total - 65,966 16,013 6,586 2,033 12,858 85,410 10,917 7,129 - - 9th corps - 19,062 2,072 413 ” 3,516 22,991 1,755 317 - - Division Serras - 8,586 1,015 269 35 1,750 10,605 1,050 ” - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Grand Total - 93,614 19,100 7,268 2,068 18,124 119,006 13,722 7,446 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - - -Army of Portugal--1st January, 1811. - -Head-quarters, Torres Novas. - -2d Corps, Head-quarters Santarem. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. - - Merle’s division, 9 battalions - 4,368 ” 150 ” 1,549 6,067 ” ” - - Heudelet’s do. 12 do. - 5,718 ” 451 ” 2,646 8,815 ” ” - - Lt. cavalry, Soult, 15 squadrons - 1,146 993 523 537 231 1,900 1,530 ” - - Artillery and engineers - 1,284 1,121 52 9 189 1,425 112 1,018 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Total - 12,516 2,114 1,176 546 4,515 18,207 1,642 1,018 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - -6th Corps, Thomar. - - Marchand, 11 battalions - 4,987 28 529 ” 1,121 6,637 28 ” - - Mermet’s, 11 do. - 6,252 ” 743 ” 1,077 8,104 ” ” - - Loison, 12 do. - 4,589 ” 1,037 ” 3,291 8,917 ” ” - - Light cavalry, Lamotte, 7 squadrons - 652 651 663 663 117 1,432 1,314 ” - - Artillery and engineers, 28 companies - 1,769 1,372 47 78 165 1,981 52 1,398 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Total - 18,272 2,051 3,019 741 5,771 27,094 1,394 1,398 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - -8th Corps, Pernes. - - Clausel, 11 battalions - 4,007 18 484 ” 3,989 8,627 18 ” - - Solignac, 14 do - 4,997 ” 1,953 ” 3,337 10,346 ” ” - - St. Croix’s dragoons, 12 squadrons - 981 1,024 698 698 238 1,917 1,722 ” - - Artillery and engineers - 1,106 859 24 4 359 1,522 151 712 - - On leave - ” ” ” ” ” 206 ” ” - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Total - 11,108 1,901 3,159 702 7,956 22,605 1,191 712 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - -Montbrun, Ourem. - - Reserve of cavalry 24 squadrons with artillery - 2,729 2,871 1,486 1,466 178 4,533 4,337 - ------------------------------------------------------------- - Artillery, engineers, and equipage of the army - 1,546 614 ” ” 283 2,090 614 - ------------------------------------------------------------- - -9th Corps, Leiria. - - Claparede, 15 battalions, Almeida - 7,863 11 369 ” 432 8,714 ” - - Couroux, 12 battalions, Leiria - 7,592 27 447 ” 1,299 9,338 27 - - Fournier’s cavalry, 7 squadrons at Toro - 1,698 1,591 60 67 114 1,872 1,658 - - Artillery and engineers, Ciudad Rodrigo - 670 464 ” 72 742 ” 464 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Total - 17,823 2,093 876 139 2,637 19,924 2,149 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - -_Note._--Salamanca constituted a government containing the towns of -Alba de Tormes, Penaranda, and Salamanca, in which were deposited the -sick men, stragglers, equipages, and depôts, of the army of Portugal. -The total amounting to 2,354 men and 1,102 horses. - - Present under arms. - Men. Horses. - General Total of the army of Portugal in the - position of Santarem 46,171 9,551 - 9th Corps 17,823 2,093 - ------ ------ - 63,994 11,644 - Deduct troops of the 9th corps not in Portugal 10,231 2,066 - ------ ------ - Real numbers under Massena 53,763 9,578 - ------ ------ - - -Army of Portugal--1st April, 1811. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. - - 8th corps, Junot 13,448 ” 992 ” 5,719 20,159 ” - 6th do. Marmont 13,984 ” 1,374 ” 1,576 16,934 ” - 2d corps, Reynier 10,837 ” 1,350 ” 4,318 16,505 ” - Montbrun - { Dragoon, 23 squadrons - { 4,173 4,404 ” ” ” 4,173 4,404 - { Light cavalry, 14 squadrons - { 3,636 3,906 ” ” 38 3,636 3,906 - { 1 squadron of gens-d’armes - { 190 72 ” ” 5 102 72 - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. - Artillery and Engineers - { Foot artillery. Almeida and Rodrigo - { 936 ” ” ” 88 1,055 ” - { Horse artillery - { 410 425 ” ” 23 453 425 - { Artillery of the train - { 2,181 2,378 ” ” 237 2,448 2,378 - { Workmen - { 259 ” ” ” 25 295 ” - { Engineers - { 1,448 60 ” ” 140 1,623 ” - { Military equipage - { 596 897 ” ” 60 668 897 - -------------------------------------------------- - Total artilleries, engineers, &c. - 5,969 3,335 ” ” 573 6,542 2,760 - Total of infantry - 37,269 ” 3,716 ” 11,613 53,598 ” - Total of cavalry - 7,999 8,382 ” ” 43 7,911 8,382 - --------------------------------------------------- - General Total 51,237 11,717 3,716 ” 12,229 68,051 11,142 - --------------------------------------------------- - -_Note._--In the imperial rolls there was no state of the army of -Portugal for May. Two divisions of the 9th corps, directed to be -added to the army of Portugal, are included in the state for April, -and the prince of Esling was empowered to distribute the cavalry -as he pleased, provided the brigade of general Fournier, from the -9th corps, was kept in the reserve. The detached men were in the -government of Salamanca. On the 1st of June, however, the army of -Portugal is returned as present under arms 44,548 men, 7,253 horses, -and 4,620 men detached. Hence, I have estimated the number of -fighting men and officers, including the imperial guards, at Fuentes -Onoro at 45,000, a number, perhaps, too great, when the artificers, -engineers, &c. are deducted. - - -SECTION 3.--ARMY OF THE SOUTH, SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA, COMMANDING. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. - - 1st of January 55,602 12,092 5,744 1,999 6,412 67,758 10,868 3,223 - ------------------------------------------------------- - 15th May 75,133 13,124 3,915 1,336 11,420 90,468 12,156 2,304 - - Deduct the troops of the 9th corps in march from the north - 11,917 1,619 ” ” ” 13,310 1,220 399 - ------------------------------------------------------ - Real total of the army of the South - 63,216 11,505 3,915 1,336 11,420 77,158 10,936 1,905 - ------------------------------------------------------ - - -SECTION 4. - -5th Corps, 15th January. - - Under arms. Detached. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. - - 18,766 6,158 3,035 640 - -16th December, 1810, le Duc de Dalmatie, va faire le siège de -Badajos, avec tout le 5^{em} corps d’armée, 8 régimens de cavalerie -formant 2,600 chevaux pris dans les l^{ere} et 5^{em} corps d’armée -sous les orders de general Latour Maubourg, 900 hommes du 63^{em} -regiment de ligne, 2 compagnies d’artillerie légère, 4 compagnies de -sappeurs, 1 compagnie de mineurs, et trois escadrons de cavalerie -Espagnols. - - -SECTION 5. - -1st Corps before Cadiz. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Train. - - 15th February, 1811 - 20,572 1,886 1,331 681 1,254 23,457 1,495 1,072 - - Reinforcement on the march from the Governments - 5,209 775 ” ” 743 5,952 712 62 - ------------------------------------------------------------ - Total 25,781 2,661 1,331 681 1,997 29,409 2,407 1,035 - ------------------------------------------------------------ - - 4th corps, 15th Feb. - 16,706 4,007 741 397 1,699 19,143 3,618 793 - - Reinforcement on the march from the Governments - 6,620 1,457 ” ” 878 6,854 1,451 ” - ------------------------------------------------------------ - Total 22,726 5,464 741 397 2,577 25,998 5,069 793 - ------------------------------------------------------------ - -_Note._--A reinforcement of more than one thousand men likewise -joined the 5th corps while in front of Badajos. - - -SECTION 6.--ARMY OF THE NORTH--BESSIERES, DUKE OF ISTRIA, COMMANDING. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Cav. Train. - - 1st February, 1811 - 58,515 8,874 1,992 6,860 67,767 7,979 1,079 - ----------------------------------------------------------- - 15th April, 1811 - 53,148 6,930 2,221 5,350 60,719 6,065 879 - - -SECTION 7.--ARMÉE IMPÉRIALE DU MIDI DE L’ESPAGNE 1^{me} CORPS. - -Situation des présens sous les armes à l’époque du 22d Mars 1811. - - (Part 1 of 2) - - Etat des Dans les Emplacement des Troupes - Designation des presens Forts et dans les Forts - Division 1. Regimens sous les Redoutes. et Redoutes. - armes. - 9^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,000 - 24^{me} do. do. 800 400 Depuis et compris le Fort - St. Catherine jusqu’au - Rio St. Petro - 96^{me} do. do. 1,100 - - Division 2. Regimens - 16^{me} do. do. 350 350 Xeres et la Cartuxa - 8^{me} do. do. 713 - 45^{me} do. do. 1,072 744 Depuis et compris le Fort - Napoleon jusqu’à Chiese fe - 54^{me} do. do. 820 - Bataillon d’Elite 236 - - Division 3. Regimens - 27^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,400 - 63^{me} do. do. 845 - 94^{me} do. do. 1,500 650 Depuis et compris la Redoute - jusqu’à cette de Vellati - 95^{me} do. do. 1,414 472 Arcos, Medina, Vejer, et - Conil - Régiment de Marine. - 43^{me} Battalions de 900 900 Au Trocadero - marine - 2^e do. d’Ouvriers do. 615 615 Do. - 5^e Chasseurs 320 - - Cavalrie. - 1^e de Dragoons 230 50 De Montesà, Alcazar de Xeres - 2^e do. do. 218 72 Do. et à la Cartuxa - - Artillerie - à pied à Cheval 678 500 Sur la ligne du Blocas - Sapeurs 323 323 Au Trocadero - Mineurs 77 77 Do. - ------ ----- - 14,611 5,153 - ------ ----- - - - (Part 2 of 2; columns 1, 2 and 3 repeated) - - Etat des Dans les - Designation des presens Forts et Disposeables. - Division 1. Regimens sous les Redoutes. - armes. - 9^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,000 1,000 Sta Maria. - 24^{me} do. do. 800 400 400 Do. - 96^{me} do. do. 1,100 1,100 Do. San Lucar, Esta, - Chipiona, la Viala - Atta. - Division 2. Regimens - 16^{me} do. do. 350 350 - 8^{me} do. do. 713 713 Port Reale au - Trocadero. - 45^{me} do. do. 1,072 744 328 Port Reale. - 54^{me} do. do. 820 820 Chiclana. - Bataillon d’Elite 236 236 Do. - - Division 3. Regimens - 27^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,400 1,400 Do. - 63^{me} do. do. 845 845 Port Reale. - 94^{me} do. do. 1,500 650 850 Chiclana. - 95^{me} do. do. 1,414 472 942 Do. - - Régiment de Marine. - 43^{me} Battalions de 900 900 - marine - 2^e do. d’Ouvriers do. 615 615 - 5^e Chasseurs 320 320 Vejer et Conil. - - Cavalrie. - 1^e de Dragoons 230 50 180 Xeres. - 2^e do. do. 218 72 146 Arcos. - - Artillerie - à pied à Cheval 678 500 178 Santa Maria, Puerto - Reale, et Chiclana. - Sapeurs 323 323 - Mineurs 77 77 - ------ ----- ----- - 14,611 5,153 9,458 - ------ ----- ----- - - By this return, which is not extracted from the imperial rolls, but - was found amongst Colonel Lejeune’s intercepted papers, it appears - that Victor had above nine thousand disposable troops seventeen days - after the battle of Barosa. He must, therefore, have had about eleven - thousand disposable before that action, and Cassagne’s detachment - being deducted leaves about nine thousand for the battle of Barosa. - - -SECTION 8.--STATE OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN TROOPS ON THE COA, 25TH -APRIL, 1811, EXTRACTED FROM THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S RETURNS. - - Under arms. Sick. Detached. - Men. Men. Men. - Cavalry 4 regiments 1,525 274 542 - Infantry 41 battalions 20,700 8,880 3,214 - Artillery 1,378 144 1,156 - ------ ----- ----- - Total of all arms 23,613 9,298 4,912 - ------ ----- ----- - - Guns 24 British, 18 Portuguese Total 42 - - _Note._--There are no separate returns of the army engaged in the - battle of Fuentes Onoro. Hence, the above is only an approximation - to the numbers of British and German troops; but if the Portuguese - and the Partida of Julian Sanchez be added, the whole number in - line will be about thirty-five thousand men of all arms. - - * * * * * - - -No. II. - -EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL. - - -SECTION 1. - - “_November 30, 1809._ - -“I enclose copies and extracts of a correspondence which I have had -with Mr. Frere on the subject of the co-operation of the British army -with the corps of the duke of Albuquerque and the duke Del Parque in -this plan of diversion. - -“Adverting to the opinion which I have given to his majesty’s -ministers and the ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed that -I could have encouraged the advance of general Areizaga, or could -have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British army. - -“The first official information which I had from the government of -the movement of general Areizaga was on the 18th, the day before his -defeat, and I gave the answer on the 19th regarding the plan of which -I now enclose a copy. - -“I was at Seville, however, when the general commenced his march -from the Sierra Morena, and in more than one conversation with the -Spanish ministers and members of the Junta, I communicated to them my -conviction that general Areizaga would be defeated. The expectation, -however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of fifty -thousand men, was so general and so sanguine that the possibility -of disappointment was not even contemplated, and, accordingly, your -lordship will find that, on the 10th only, the government began to -think it necessary to endeavour to make a diversion in favour of -general Areizaga, and it is probable that it was thought expedient to -make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the general’s -own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the -10th instant.”--“I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British -army and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castile, from thinking -that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy -from effecting any important object, and which best answers for my -future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view, I have -requested Mr. Frere to urge the government to reinforce the duke -D’Albuquerque’s corps, in order to secure the passage of the lower -part of the Tagus. And, although the state of the season would render -it desirable that I should make the movement at an early period, I do -not propose to make it till I shall see most clearly the consequences -of that defeat, and some prospect that the city of Seville will be -secure after I shall move.” - - -SECTION 2. - - “_December 7, 1809._ - -“----I had urged the Spanish government to augment the army of the -duke D’Albuquerque to twenty thousand men, in order that it might -occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz -and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo to -Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually -the province of Estremadura, during the winter at least, and -would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for farther -opposition to the enemy, and I delayed the movement, which I have -long been desirous of making, to the northward of the Tagus, till -the reinforcements could be sent to the duke D’Albuquerque which I -had lately recommended should be drawn from the army of the duke -Del Parque. During the discussions upon the subject, the government -have given orders to the duke D’Albuquerque to retire with his corps -behind the Guadiana, to a position which he cannot maintain, thus -leaving open the road into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the -loss of that province whenever the enemy choose to take possession of -it.” - - -SECTION 3. - - “_January 31, 1810._ - -“----There is no doubt that, if the enemy’s reinforcements have not -yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced within the -Spanish frontiers, the operation which they have undertaken is one -of some risk, and I have maturely considered of the means of making -a diversion in favour of the allies, which might oblige the enemy to -reduce his force in Andalusia, and would expose him to risk and loss -in this quarter. But the circumstances, which are detailed in the -enclosed copy of a letter to M. Frere, have obliged me to refrain -from attempting this operation at present. I have not, however, given -up all thoughts of it, and I propose to carry it into execution -hereafter, if circumstances will permit.” - - -SECTION 4. - - “_January 12, 1811._ - -“My former despatch will have informed your lordship that I was -apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make -any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the -enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been -directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and -Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to -defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was -in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed at least for some -days before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been -disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida -appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry.” - - -SECTION 5. - - “_January 19, 1811._ - -“At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from Seville -general Ballasteros received an order from the Regency, dated the -21st December last, directing him to proceed with the troops under -his command into the Condada de Niebla. The force in Estremadura -was thus diminished by one-half, and the remainder are considered -insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivenza.” - -“The circumstances which I have above related will show your lordship -that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, -and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with -corps so ill organised, in possession of so little intelligence, and -upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely -be credited that the first intelligence which general Mendizabel -received of the assembly of the enemy’s troops at Seville was from -hence; and if any combination was then made, either for retreat or -defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed by the orders from the -Regency, to detach general Ballasteros into the Condado de Niebla, -which were dated the 21st of December, the very day on which Soult -broke up from Cadiz, with a detachment of infantry, and marched to -Seville.” - - -SECTION 6. - - “_February 2, 1811._ - -“The various events of the war will have shown your lordship that no -calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the -Spanish troops are engaged. But if the same number of troops of any -other nation (ten thousand) were to be employed on this operation, -(the opening the communication with Badajos,) I should have no doubt -of their success, or of their ability to prevent the French from -attacking Badajos with the forces which they have now employed on -this service.” - - -SECTION 7. - - “_February 9, 1811._ - -“General Mendizabel has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by -the late marquess De la Romana, which provided for the security of -the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to -the left of the Guadiana. I don’t believe that the strength of the -enemy, on either side of the Guadiana, is accurately known, but if -they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be -apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajos, -and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided -with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been -expected for the last year.” - - -SECTION 8. - - “_February 23, 1811._ - -“Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the -effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the -frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this recent -disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army -and its probable consequences, the fall of Badajos, have materially -altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula, -and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in -which they were, much less in that in which they would have been, -if that misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned to add to this -melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not -behave much better than the other troops. Brigadier-general Madden -did every thing in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain.” -“The operations of the Guerillas continue throughout the interior; -and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain -towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing. But I have -not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular -funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one.” - - -SECTION 9. - - “_March 21, 1811._ - -“It (Campo Mayor) had been given over to the charge of the marquis of -Romana, at his request, last year. But, lately, the Spanish garrison -had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very -satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honourable engagements -to defend the place into which the marquis entered when it was -delivered over to his charge. I am informed, however, that marshal -Bessieres has collected at Zamora about seven thousand men, composed -principally of the imperial guard, and of troops taken from all the -garrisons in Castile. He thus threatens an attack upon Gallicia, in -which province there are, I understand, sixteen thousand men under -general Mahi; but, from all I hear, I am apprehensive that that -general will make no defence, and that Gallicia will fall into the -hands of the enemy.” - - -SECTION 10. - - “_May 7, 1811._ - -“Your lordship will have observed, in my recent reports of the state -of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I -don’t know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of -restoring them. All measures recommended to the existing government -in Portugal are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed -as to be of no use whatever; and the countenance which the prince -regent of Portugal has given to the governors of the kingdom, who -have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to every thing -proposed for the increase of the resources of the government and the -amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these -evils. The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal, is want of -money to carry on the ordinary operations of the government, much -more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are -engaged.” - -“I have not received the consent of Castaños and Blake to the plan of -co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajos; and I have -been obliged to write to marshal Beresford to desire him to delay the -siege till they will positively promise to act as therein specified, -or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence.” - -“Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your -operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be, upon -which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be -offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commander -must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish -authorities; by which means alone he will be enabled to draw some -resources from the country and some assistance from the Spanish -armies.” - - -SECTION 11. - - “_May 22, 1811._ - -“On the night of the 15th instant I received, from marshal sir -William Beresford, letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which -reported that marshal Soult had broken up from Seville about the -10th, and had advanced towards Estremadura, notwithstanding the -reports which had been previously received, that he was busily -occupied in strengthening Seville, and the approaches to that city, -by works, and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain -on the defensive in Andalusia.” - - -SECTION 12. - -_Letter from sir J. Moore to major-general M’Kenzie, commanding in -Portugal._ - - _Salamanca, 29th November, 1808._ - -SIR, - -The armies of Spain, commanded by generals Castaños and Blake, -the one in Biscay and the other in Arragon, have been beaten and -dispersed. This renders my junction with sir David Baird’s corps -impracticable, but if it were, I cannot hope, with the British alone, -to withstand the formidable force which France has brought against -this country; and there is nothing else now in Spain to make head -against it. - -I have ordered sir David Baird to fall back on Coruña, re-embark, -and proceed to the Tagus; I myself, with the corps which marched -from Lisbon, mean to retire by Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, and, by -taking up such positions as offer, endeavour to defend, for a time, -the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon. But, looking forward -that this cannot be done for any considerable time against superior -numbers, it becomes necessary for me to give you this notice, that -you may embark the stores of the army, keeping on shore as little as -possible that may impede a re-embarkation of the whole army both now -with you and that which I am bringing. - -We shall have great difficulties on the frontier for subsistence; -colonel Murray wrote on this subject to colonel Donkin yesterday, -that supplies might be sent for us to Abrantes and Coimbra. Some -are already at Oporto, and more may be sent. I have desired sir D. -Baird, if he has with him a victualler, of small draft of water, to -send her there. On the subject of provisions the commissary-general -will write more in detail, and I hope you will use your influence -with the government of Portugal to secure its aid and assistance. It -will be right to consider with the Portuguese officers and engineers -what points may be immediately strengthened and are most defensible, -and what use you can make of the troops with you to support me in my -defence of the frontiers, and I shall be glad to hear from you upon -this subject. I cannot yet determine the line I shall take up, but -generally it will be Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, -Viseu. The Portuguese, on their own mountains, can be of much use, -and I should hope, at any rate, that they will defend the Tras os -Montes. Mr. Kennedy will probably write to Mr. Erskine, who now had -better remain at Lisbon; but, if he does not write to him, this, -together with colonel Murray’s letter to colonel Donkin, will be -sufficient for you and Mr. Erskine to take means for securing to us -not only a supply of biscuit and salt provisions, but the supplies -of the country for ourselves and horses, &c. In order to alarm as -little as possible, it may be said that more troops are expected from -England, to join us through Portugal: this will do at first, but -gradually the truth will, of course, be known. I am in great want of -money, and nothing else will secure the aid of the country. - - I have the honour to be, &c. - J. MOORE. - - P.S. Elvas should be provisioned. - - * * * * * - - -No. III. - -EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF A FIELD-OFFICER OF ENGINEERS, -EMPLOYED AT CADIZ. - - -SECTION 1. - - “_May 7, 1810._ - -“We have at last broke ground for some works, but I am almost at a -loss to explain to you the cause of our delay. The truth is, we left -England so ill provided with tools and other requisites for beginning -works that till lately it has been positively impossible to commence, -even on a small scale, from our own resources and number of men. -These facts, with the backwardness of the Spaniards to contribute -either stores or workmen to the general cause, has kept us so long -inactive. We have now one thousand three hundred men at work, and the -Board of Ordnance has supplied us with more tools.” - - -SECTION 2. - - “_Isla, June 1, 1810._ - -“We might defy the power of France to expel us by force from hence if -all were done that might be done, or even what is projected, but we -have only British troops at work on this important position, and our -numbers will not permit the progress which the exigency of affairs -requires.”--“We have in our respected general (Graham) a confidence -which is daily on the increase. He has a mind and temper well adapted -to encounter difficulties which less favoured dispositions could -not bear. We may possibly maintain our ground. If we do, although -our success may have none of the brilliancy of victory, yet his -merits, who, by patience, prudence, and self-possession, shall have -kept all quiet within our lines, preserved tolerable harmony, and -kept an enterprizing enemy off with very inadequate means, should -be rewarded by his country’s good opinion, although none but those -who have witnessed can fully estimate the value of his exertions. -On the whole, our situation may be said to inspire hope, though not -security: to animate resistance, though not to promise victory.” - - -SECTION 3. - - “_June 29, 1810._ - -“I have been attending a committee of Spanish engineers and artillery -officers, to settle some determinate plan for taking up the ground -near the town of La Isla; but they will enter into no views which -include the destruction of a house or garden. They continue to -propose nothing but advanced batteries upon the marsh in front of -the town, the evident object of which is to keep the shells of the -enemy rather farther from the houses. At a general attack, all this -would be lost and carried, by small parties coming in on the flanks -and gorges. Instead of deepening the ditches and constructing good -redoubts at every seven hundred yards, this is what they propose, -although we offer to perform the labour for them. On a barren spot -they will agree to our working; but of what service is one redoubt, -if unsupported by a collateral defence, and if a general system is -not attended to. We have now been here three months, and although -they have been constantly urged to construct something at that weak -tongue of low land, St. Petri, still nothing of importance is begun -upon, nor do I imagine they will agree to any work of strength at -that point. I am almost in despair of seeing this place strongly -fortified, so as to resist an army of from fifty to one hundred -thousand men, which I am convinced it is capable of.”--“We have -now one thousand three hundred labourers of the line and eighty -carpenters, but, for the latter, the timber we are supplied with -from our ally, is so bad that these artificers produce not more than -one-fifth or one-sixth what they would be capable of if the materials -were good. To judge from their conduct it is impossible to suppose -them determined to oppose a vigorous resistance even in La Isla, and -I have no idea of there ever being a siege of Cadiz itself.”--“Of our -seven subalterns of engineers two are generally ill; we are obliged, -therefore, to get assistance from the line. The consequence is that -the work is neither so well nor so speedily executed. We ought to -have many more (engineers). It is not economy in the governments; and -with Lord Wellington they have hardly any with the army.” - - -EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF MILITARY REPORTS FROM THE -BRITISH COMMANDERS AT CADIZ. - - -SECTION 4. - - _General William Stewart, March 13, 1810._ - -“The enemy’s force was supposed to be diminished, but no advantage -could be taken of it, on account of the inefficient state of the -Spanish troops.” - - - _General Graham, March 26, 1810._ - -“The isle of Leon required for its defence a larger force than had -been assigned. Its tenure was, in the then state of the defences, -very precarious.” - - - _May, 1810._ - -“General Blake, appointed to command the Spanish forces, introduced -some degree of activity and co-operation, in which the Spaniards had -been very deficient.” - - - _October, 1810._ - -“The progress made by the enemy at the Trocadero assumed a very -formidable character; while the Spaniards persisted in their apathy, -and neglected to fortify the most vulnerable points of their line.” - - - _General Graham to lord Liverpool, Cadiz, January 2, 1811._ - -“----As far as the exertions of the British engineers and soldiers -under my command have been concerned, I have every reason to be -satisfied. I can by no means say the same of the Spaniards, for, -besides the reluctance with which some of the most essential measures -of the defence were agreed to, our people were not permitted to carry -into execution the plan for the intrenchment of the left part of the -Cortadura de St. Fernando until after much delay and very unpleasant -contests.” - - * * * * * - - -No. IV. - - -EXTRACTS FROM KING JOSEPH’S CORRESPONDENCE. - - -SECTION 1. - -_The duke of Santa Fé to the King, Paris, June 20, 1810._ - -(Translation from the Spanish.) - -“Will your majesty believe that some politicians of Paris have -arrived at saying that in Spain there is preparing a new revolution, -very dangerous for the French; and they assert that the Spaniards -attached to your majesty will rise against them. Let your majesty -consider if ever was heard a more absurd chimera, and how prejudicial -it might be to us if it succeeded in gaining any credit. I hope that -such an idea will not be believed by any person of judgement, and -that it will soon subside, being void of probability.” - - -SECTION 2. - -_Ministerial letter from the King to the marquis of Almenara._ - -(Translation from the Spanish.) - - “_September 21, 1810._ - -“The impolitic violence of the military governors has attacked not -only men, and fields, and animals, but even the most sacred things in -the nation, as the memorials and the actions of families, in whose -preservation those only are interested to whom they belong, and from -which strangers cannot reap the least fruit. In this class are the -general archives of the kingdom, called the archives of Simancas, -which are found in the province of Valladolid, the governor, -Kellerman, has taken possession of them.” “Those archives, from the -time of their institution, for centuries past, have contained the -treaties of the kings since they were known in Castile; also, ancient -manuscripts of the kindred of the princes, the descents and titles -of families, pleadings in the tribunals, decisions of the Cortes; in -short, all that is publicly interesting to the history of the nation, -and privately to individuals.” - - -SECTION 3. - -_The Spanish secretary of state to the duke of Santa Fé._ - - “_Madrid, September 12, 1812._ - -“----Si l’Andalusie n’est pas entièrement pacifiée; si la junte -de Cadiz exista encore et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale -influence, on doit l’attribuer en grande partie aux machinations, -et aux-trames ourdies par la junta et l’Angleterre au moment où -parvint à leur connaissance le décret du 8 Febrier, qui établit des -governmens militaire dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l’Arragon, et la -Catalogne. Quelques governeur Françaises ayant traité ces provinces -comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie.” - -“----Mais combiens n’est il pas dementi par la conduite de certains -governeurs qui paraissent s’obstiner a prolonger l’insurrection -d’Espagne plutôt qu’a la soumettre! Car dans plusieurs endroits on ne -se contente pas d’exclure toute idée de l’autorité du roi, en faisant -administrer la justice au nom de l’empereur mais ce qui est pire, -on à exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Palencia, -pretassent serment de fidelité et d’obeisance à sa majesté impériale -comme si la nation Espagnole n’avoit pas de roi.” - - -SECTION 4. - -_Memorial from the duke of Santa Fé and marquis of Almenara to the -prince of Wagram._ - -(Translated from the Spanish.) - - “_Paris, September 16, 1810._ - -“----The decrees of his majesty the emperor are the same for all the -generals. The prince of Esling, who has traversed all the provinces -to the borders of Portugal, who appears to be forming immense -magazines, and has much greater necessities than the governors of -provinces, has applied to the Spanish prefects, who have made the -arrangements, and supplied him with even more than he required; -and this speaks in favour of the Spanish people, for the prince of -Esling receives the blessings of the inhabitants of the provinces -through which his troops pass. Such is the effect of good order and -humanity amongst a people who know the rules of justice, and that war -demands sacrifices, but who will not suffer dilapidations and useless -vexations.” - - -SECTION 5. - -_Intercepted letter of comte de Casa Valencia, counsellor of state, -written to his wife, June 18, 1810._ - -“Il y a six mois que l’on ne nous paie point, et nous perissons. - -“----Avant hier j’écrivis à Almenara lui peignant ma situation et le -pryant de m’accorder quelque argent pour vivre; de me secourir, si -non comme ministre, du moins comme ami. Hier je restai trois heures -dans son antichambre esperant un reponse, je le vis enfin et elle fut -qu’il n’avait rien.” - -“----Rien que la faim m’attend aujourd’hui.” - - * * * * * - - -No. V. - -EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON. - - -SECTION 1. - - “_Celerico, May 11, 1810._ - -“----I observe that the minister Don Miguel Forjas considers the -inconvenience, on which I had the honour of addressing you, as of -ordinary occurrence, and he entertains no doubt that inconveniences -of this description will not induce me to desist from making the -movements which I might think the defence of the country would -require. It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot -procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from -the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the -deficiency of the number of carriages in the country. But it has -rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has -been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there -is literally no food, and in which, if there was food, there is no -money to purchase it; and, whenever that has been the case, the army -has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had -refused or been unable to remove to the army. This is precisely -the case of the allied armies in this part of the country; and, -however trifling the difficulty may be deemed by the regency and -the ministers, I consider a starving army to be so useless in any -situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position or -to make any movement in which the food of the troops is not secured. -I have no doubt of the ability or of the willingness of the country -to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the -government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to -their public duties rather than to their private interests in this -time of trial. I have written this same sentiment to the government -so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am -of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower -orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests -and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any -omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher -classes of society. These must be forced to perform their duty, and -no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful, -should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of -their duty to the public in these times. Unless these measures are -strictly and invariably followed, it is vain to expect any serious -or continued exertion in the country, and the regency ought to be -aware, from the sentiments of his majesty’s government, which I have -communicated to them that the continuance of his majesty’s assistance -depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual -effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause. I -have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this -subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties -which I had stated to exist were noticed by Monsieur de Forjas. -I have to mention, however, that, since I wrote to you, although -there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that -some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has -enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to -be able to continue as long as may be necessary. I concur entirely -in the measure of appointing a special commission to attend the head -quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted -without delay. I enclose a proclamation which I have issued, which -I hope will have some effect. It describes nearly the crimes, or -rather the omissions, of which the people may be guilty in respect -to the transport of the army; these may be as follow:--1st, refusing -to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen, when required; 2dly, -refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the -enemy; 3dly, disobedience of the orders of the magistrates to proceed -to and remain at any station with carriages, boats, &c.; 4th, -desertion from the service, either with or without carriages, &c.; -5th, embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed -to transport. The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates -may be classed as follows:--1st, disobedience of the orders of their -superiors; 2d, inactivity in the execution of them; 3d, receiving -bribes, to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions -upon them.” - - -SECTION 2. - -_Lord Wellington to M. Forjas._ - - _Gouvea, September 6, 1810._ - - MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR, - -I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me -that you had placed before the government of this kingdom my despatch -of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected -news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government had learned -with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to -succour the place, hoping, at the same time, that the depression -of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the -quick and great successes which they expect with certainty from the -efforts of the army. I have already made known to the government of -the kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that -I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to -depress and afflict the people of this kingdom. It was by no means my -intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had -not been my intention to have succoured the place, and I now request -the permission of the government of the kingdom to say that, much -as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly -made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan -of operations which have been determined, after the most serious -deliberation, as best adequate to further the general cause of the -allies, and, consequently, Portugal. I request the government to -believe that I am not insensible to the value of their confidence as -well as that of the public; as, also, that I am highly interested in -removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I -should forget my duty to my sovereign, to the prince regent, and to -the cause in general, if I should permit public clamour or panic -to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan -of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and -which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a -good end. - - (Signed) WELLINGTON. - - -SECTION 3. - - _Gouvea, September 7, 1810._ - -----In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I -beg that you will inform the government that _I will not stay_ in the -country, and that I will advise the king’s government to withdraw -the assistance which his majesty affords them, if they interfere -in any manner with the appointment of marshal Beresford’s staff, -for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the army, or -with any of the points which, with the original arrangements with -marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I -propose, also, to report to his majesty’s government, and refer to -their consideration, what steps ought to be taken, if the Portuguese -government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political -arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military -operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the -destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested -by me long ago, and marshal Beresford did not write to government -upon them till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes on the -subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures -may be adopted not only in the country between the Tagus and the -Mondego, laying north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed, -but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal, -and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render -useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military -officers. I have already adopted this measure with success in this -part of the country, and it must be adopted in others in which it -is probable that the enemy may endeavour to penetrate; and it must -be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it -is only consistent with all the other measures which, for the last -twelve months, I have recommended to government to impede and make -difficult, and if possible prevent, the advance and establishment of -the enemy’s force in the country. But it appears that the government -have lately discovered that we are all wrong; they have become -impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the -Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had -the power I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending -to this call; and if I had, the cause would now have been safe; -and, having the power now in my hands, I will not lose the only -chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest -attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government. -I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the -government; and, as I must attribute it to the persons recently -introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with -me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the -subject to the prince regent, if I should hear any more of this -conduct. I leave you to communicate the whole or any part of this -letter that you may think proper to the regency. - - (Signed) WELLINGTON. - - -SECTION 4. - - _Rio Mayor, October 6, 1810._ - -----You will do me the favour to inform the regency, and above all -the principal Souza, that his majesty and the prince regent having -entrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with -the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or -any body else, to interfere with them. That I know best where to -station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and -I shall not alter a system formed upon mature consideration, upon -any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they -are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which -they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz. to -provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army -and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. -As for principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have -had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since -he has been a member of the government; that, being embarked in a -course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful -termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that -no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one -moment after I shall have obtained his majesty’s leave to resign -my charge, if principal Souza is to remain either a member of the -government or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country -or I will: and, if I should be obliged to go, I shall take care that -the world, or Portugal at least, and the prince regent shall be -made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3d, which I -have received from Monsieur Forjas, I had hoped that the government -was satisfied with what I had done, and intended to do, and that, -instead of endeavouring to render all farther defence fruitless, -by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have -done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of -the town; but I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they -add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of -approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure. - - WELLINGTON. - -P.S.--All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is tranquillity in the -town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops while they will -be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt -of success; but, as I have fought a sufficient number of battles -to know that the result of any one is not certain, even with the -best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt -preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy’s way those -persons and their families who would suffer if they were to fall into -their hands. - - -SECTION 5. - - _Pero Negro, October 28, 1810._ - -The cattle, and other articles of supply, which the government have -been informed have been removed from the island of Lizirias, are -still on the island, and most probably the secretary of state, Don M. -Forjas, who was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall -be glad to hear whether the government propose to take any and what -steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders and -have deceived them by false reports. The officers and soldiers of -the militia, absent from their corps, are liable to penalties and -punishments, some of a civil, others of a military nature: first, -they are liable to a forfeiture of all their personal property, upon -information that they are absent from their corps without leave; -secondly, they are liable to be transferred to serve as soldiers -in the regiments of the line, upon the same information; and, -lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion inflicted by -the military tribunals. The two first are penalties which depend -upon the civil magistrate, and I should be very glad to have heard -of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which -the government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry -into execution the law in either of these respects. I entreat them -to call for the names of the officers and soldiers absent without -leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments of militia, to disgrace -any one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for -their shameful desertion of their posts in the hour of danger, and -to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers -absent without leave, and to send these men to serve with any of -the regiments of the line. I entreat them to adopt these measures -without favour or distinction of any individuals in respect to any -one regiment, and to execute the laws _bonâ fide_ upon the subject; -and I shall be satisfied of their good intentions, and shall believe -that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country; but, if we -are to go on as we have hitherto, if Great Britain is to give large -subsidies and to expend large sums in support of a cause in which -those most interested sit by and take no part, and those at the -head of the government, with laws and powers to force the people -to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is -placed, are aware of the evil but neglect their duty and omit to -put the laws in execution, I must believe their professions to be -false, that they look to little dirty popularity instead of to save -their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and -persons in whom his allies can place no confidence. In respect to the -military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into -execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military -persons who have deserted their duty in these critical times will be -punished as they deserve. The governors of the kingdom forget the -innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the -defects in the proceedings of courts martial, which, in times of -active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an -additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the -Olivera regiment of militia, who behaved ill in the action with the -enemy at Villa Nova de Fosboa, in the beginning of August last, and -a court martial was immediately assembled for this trial, are still, -in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will, probably, -not be concluded till Christmas. In like manner, the military trial -of those deserters of the militia, after assembling officers and -soldiers at great inconvenience, for the purpose cannot possibly be -concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit -might be secured from the example of the punishment of any one or -number of them. The defect in the administration of the military -law has been repeatedly pointed out to the government, and a remedy -for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by -the Prince Regent. But they will not adopt it; and it would be much -better if there was no law for the government of the army than that -the existing laws should continue without being executed. - - WELLINGTON. - - -SECTION 6. - - “_October 29, 1810._ - -“----In answer to lord Wellesley’s queries respecting the Portuguese -Regency, my opinion is that the Regency ought to be appointed by the -Prince Regent, but during his pleasure; they ought to have full power -to act in every possible case, to make appointments to offices, to -dismiss from office, to make and alter laws, in short, every power -which the prince himself could possess if he were on the spot. They -ought to report, in detail, their proceedings on every subject, and -their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The prince ought -to decline to receive any application from any of his officers or -subjects in Portugal not transmitted through the regular channels -of the government here, and ought to adopt no measure respecting -Portugal not recommended by the Regency. The smaller the number of -persons composing the Regency the better; but my opinion is that -it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it -excepting principal Souza, with whom I neither can nor will have any -official intercourse. The patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary -evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity and confidence through -the country which would increase if he was removed from office, and -he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he was not employed. -If we should succeed in removing the principal (which _must_ be -done), I think the patriarch will take warning, and will behave -better in future. In respect to military operations, there can be no -interference on the part of the Regency or any body else. If there -is I can no longer be responsible. If our own government choose to -interfere themselves, or that the Prince Recent should interfere, -they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I will carry -them strictly into execution, to the best of my abilities; and I will -be responsible for nothing but the execution; but, if I am to be -responsible, I must have full discretion and no interference on the -part of the Regency or any body else. I should like to see principal -Souza’s detailed instructions for his “_embuscados_” on the left -bank of the Tagus. If principal Souza does not go to England, or -somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose -in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and in -the wrong direction given to the deliberations of the government, -is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for the Alemtejo ought to -have been in the province on the evening of the 24th, but, instead of -that, three valuable days of fine weather will have been lost because -the government do not choose to take part in our arrangements, which, -however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom -it will affect; although it is certain that, sooner or later, these -persons must and will be ruined, by leaving behind them all their -valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country, -every thing which can enable the enemy to remain in the country. -In answer to Mr. de Forjas’ note of the 22d, enclosed in yours, -(without date,) I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by -the British army excepting by the commissary-general, and none are -detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese governors, or its -officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages, -contrary to my repeated orders; or the regiment, or where they are -stationed; but this they will never do. All that we do with the -carriages is to send back sick in them, when there are any. It will -not answer to make an engagement that the wheel-carriages from Lisbon -shall not come farther than Bucellas, Montachique, &c. many articles -required by the army cannot be carried by mules, and the carriages -must come on with them here. In many cases the Portuguese troops in -particular are ill provided with mules, therefore this must be left -to the commissary-general of the army, under a recommendation to him, -if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel-carriages beyond the places -above mentioned. I wish, in every case, that a regulation made should -be observed, and the makers of regulations should take care always to -frame them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my -entering so particularly into this point.” - - “WELLINGTON.” - - -SECTION 7. - - “_Pero Negro, October 31, 1810._ - -“----I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that -they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps -as well regarding the provisions in the Alemtejo as the desertion of -the militia. The _ordenanza_ artillery now begin to desert from the -works although they are fed by us with English rations and taken care -of in the same manner as our own troops. Your note, No.--, of 29th, -is strictly true in all its parts, the French could not have staid -here a week if all the provisions had been removed, and the length of -time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what -they have found in places from which there existed means of removing -every thing, if the quantity had been ten times greater. They are -stopped effectually; in front all the roads are occupied, and they -can get nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements -which have been made are useless if they can find subsistence on the -ground which they occupy. For what I know to the contrary, they may -be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is -brought to their assistance. It is heart-breaking to contemplate the -chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly!” - - “WELLINGTON.” - - -SECTION 8. - - “_Pero Negro, November 1, 1810._ - -“I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of papers -to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to which -the enclosures relate, but it would be very desirable if they would -state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for -not obeying those orders. The fact is that the government, after -the appointment of principal Souza to be a member of the Regency, -conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier, -contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in -the country, and, instead of giving positive orders preparatory to -the event which was most likely to occur, viz. that the allied army -would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing, with -me, the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and -omitted to give the orders which were necessary for the evacuation of -the country between the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants. -Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed -that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant -of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of -the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of -the measure, and, moreover, I have but one gentleman in my family -to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language, and -they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them -referable to me, without my knowledge or consent, and still knowing -that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and -they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing -from Almeida. If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco -he must have been in his present situation long before the order -could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct -was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid to adopt -a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the -country, was likely to disturb the habits of indolence and ease of -the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and -upon the British government. I avowed, in my proclamation, that -I was the author of that measure, and the government might have -sheltered themselves under that authority, but the principle of the -government has lately been to seek for popularity, and they will not -aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the -country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon. I cannot -agree in the justice of the expression of the astonishment by the -secretary of state that the measure should have been executed in -this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into -complete execution in Upper Beira, notwithstanding that the army -was in that province, and the means of transport were required for -its service, not a soul remained, and, excepting at Coimbra, to -which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not -an article of any description was left behind; and all the mills -upon the Coa and Mondego, and their dependent streams, were rendered -useless. But there were no discussions there upon the propriety of -maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and -they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly. In -this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having -a place of security to retire to, notwithstanding the advantage of -water-carriage, notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many -places at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their -property to the left of the river, and fortunately filled at the -moment the enemy approached its banks; the inhabitants have fled from -their habitations as they would have done under any circumstances, -without waiting orders from me or from the government; but they have -left behind them every thing which could be useful to the enemy, and -could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched; accordingly, -the enemy still remain in our front, notwithstanding that their -communication is cut off with Spain and with every other military -body; and if the provisions which they have found will last, of -which I can have no knowledge, they may remain till they will be -joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem -and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having -the advantage of water-carriage, the enemy found subsistence for -their army for a considerable length of time. Thus will appear the -difference of a measure adopted in time, and the delay of it till -the last moment; and I only wish that the country and the allies may -not experience the evil consequences of the ill-fated propensity -of the existing Portuguese Regency to seek popularity. In the same -manner the other measure since recommended, viz. the removal of the -property of the inhabitants of Alemtejo to places of security has -been delayed by every means in the power of the government, and -has been adopted at last against their inclination: as usual, they -commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the -enemy from crossing the Tagus, they then sent their civil officer to -me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an -instruction of the ----, to which I propose to draw the attention of -his royal highness the Prince Regent and of his majesty’s government. -His royal highness and his majesty’s government will then see in what -manner the existing Regency are disposed to co-operate with me. The -additional order of the 30th of October, marked 5 in the enclosures -from Mr. Forjas, shew the sense, which the Regency themselves -entertained of the insufficiency of their original instructions to -the Disembargador Jacinto Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken the -system of defence to be adopted for this country, and principal -Souza and other members of the Regency may be better judges of the -capacity of the troops and of the operations to be carried on than -I am. In this case they should desire his majesty and the Prince -Regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot -doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and they know -that not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is -not devoted to promote it; and the records of this government will -shew what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore, -they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence -in the measures which I adopt by desiring that I should be removed, -they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their prince, -to co-operate with me by all means in their power, and thus should -neither thwart them by opposition, or render them nugatory by useless -delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the satisfaction -of receiving the support and co-operation of the government; and -I regret that, his royal highness the Prince Regent should have -been induced to make a change which has operated so materially to -the detriment of his people and of the allies. In respect to the -operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that -the ordenança would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over -any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any -measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that, as soon as -circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw -the troops, which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the -ordenança would disperse. The truth is, that, notwithstanding the -opinion of some of the government, every Portuguese, into whose hands -a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting -the enemy. Experience, which the members of the government have not -had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of -the different description of troops in this country; and it would -be very desirable, if the government would leave, exclusively, to -marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements. -The conduct of the governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause -of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought -forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not -reflect, and possibly was not aware as I am, that if they had been -attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they -would have dispersed; and thus Setuval, as well as the regiment, -which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was -necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune, -and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the ordenança as -usual dispersed, and the government will lose their five hundred -stand of new arms, and, if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time, -their 3-pounders. These are the consequences of persons interfering -in military operations, who have no knowledge of them, or of the -nature of the troops which are to carry them on. I am now under -the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a -detachment to the left of the Tagus.” - - -SECTION 9. - - “_December 5, 1810._ - -“All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles: -First, That, by my appointment of marshal-general of the Portuguese -army with the same powers as those vested in the late duc de la -Foéns, I hold the command of that army independent of the local -government of Portugal. Secondly, That, by the arrangements made -by the governors of the kingdom with the king’s government, when -sir William Beresford was asked for by the former to command -the Portuguese army, it was settled that the commander-in-chief -of the British army should direct the general operations of the -combined force. Thirdly, That, supposing that my appointment of -marshal-general did not give me the independent control over the -operations of the Portuguese army, or that, as commander-in-chief -of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the -operation of the whole under the arrangement above referred to; it -follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been -separated, or the Portuguese government must have had the power of -directing the operations of the British army. Fourthly, It never was -intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss, -which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation; and, -undoubtedly, his majesty’s government never intended to give over -the British army to the government of the kingdom, to make ducks and -drakes of. The government of the kingdom must, in their reply to -my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must -prove that my charge against them is without foundation, and that -they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures, recommended by -me and marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with -the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the -influence of principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing with -me the propriety of my military arrangements.” - - “WELLINGTON.” - - -SECTION 10. - - “_Cartaxo, January 18, 1811._ - -“It is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the -Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments -which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent discussions at the -meeting of the Regency. It appears that his eminence has expatiated -on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, ‘which -were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the -heart of the kingdom.’ It must be recollected that these discussions -are not those of a popular assembly, they can scarcely be deemed -those of a ministerial council, but they are those of persons whom -his royal highness the Prince Regent has called to govern his -kingdom in the existing crisis of affairs. I have always been in -the habit of considering his eminence the Patriarch as one of those -in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices are to be made, -provided the kingdom could preserve its independence; and, I think -it most important that the British government, and the government -of the Prince Regent, and the world, should be undeceived, if we -have been mistaken hitherto. His eminence objects to the adoption -of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds -for the maintenance of his royal highness’s armies, because a war -may exist in the heart of the kingdom, but I am apprehensive the -Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered -this kingdom, in the year 1807, that in which they were expelled -from it, having had complete possession of it in 1808, and that -they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two -most valuable provinces of the kingdom in 1809, and the mode in -which they were expelled from those provinces. He forgets that it -was stated to him in the month of February, 1810, in the presence -of the Marquis of Olhao, of Don M. Forjas, and of Don Joa Antonio -Saltar de Mendoza, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, that it was -probable the enemy would invade this kingdom with such an army as -that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose -him with any chance of success, and that this concentration could -be made with safety in the neighbourhood of the capital only, and -that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him which -went to bring the enemy into the heart of the kingdom; and that he -expressed before all these persons his high approbation of it. If he -recollected these circumstances he would observe that nothing had -occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided -for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, of whose -consequences he now disapproves. The Portuguese nation are involved -in a war not of aggression, or even defence on their parts, not of -alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political -system, for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems -in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants of Portugal made -war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant whose -government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and -properties; they chose this lot for themselves, principally at the -instigation of his eminence the Patriarch, and they called upon -his majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal, whose alliance had been -relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy, to aid them in -the glorious effort which they wished to make, and to restore the -independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties -of its inhabitants. I will not state the manner in which his majesty -has answered the call, or enumerate the services rendered to this -nation by his army; whatever may be the result of the contest, -nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever -forget them; but when a nation has adopted the line of resistance to -the tyrant under the circumstances under which it was unanimously -adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered -in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the -miseries of war, or that their government act inconsistently with -their sentiments when they expatiate on ‘the inutility of laying -fresh burthens on the people, which were evidently for no other -purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.’ The -patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions -which have principally involved his country in the contest when he -talks of discontinuing it, because, it has again, for the third -time, been brought into ‘the heart of the kingdom.’ Although the -Patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing government -approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810, -according to which it was probable that this kingdom would be made -the seat of war which has since occurred, I admit that his eminence, -or any of those members may fairly disapprove of the campaign and of -the continuance of the enemy in Portugal. I have pointed out to the -Portuguese government, in more than one despatch, the difficulties -and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy’s position in -this country, and the probable success not only to ourselves but to -our allies of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and -had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have -literally sustained no loss of any description, and this army is, at -this moment, more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign -in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have -suffered and are continuing to suffer. But without entering into -discussions which I wish to avoid on this occasion, I repeat, that if -my counsels had been followed these sufferings would at least have -been alleviated, and I observe that is the first time I have heard -that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part of any nation -have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which had -for its object the deliverance of the whole. The Patriarch may, -however, disapprove of the system I have followed, and I conceive -that he is fully justified in desiring his majesty and the Prince -Regent to remove me from the command of these armies. This would be -a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under -the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion, -but this measure is entirely distinct from the refusal to concur in -laying those burthens upon the people which are necessary to carry -on and to secure the object of the war. It must be obvious to his -eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of -the affairs of Portugal, unless a great effort is made to render the -resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure all plans and -systems of operation will be alike, for the Portuguese army will be -able to carry on none. At this moment although all the corps are -concentrated in the neighbourhood of their magazines, with means of -transport, easy, by the Tagus, the Portuguese troops are frequently -in want of provisions because there is no money to pay the expense -of transport, and all the departments of the Portuguese army, -including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable -them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty. -The deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have -known the Portuguese army, and it is well known that it must have -been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the -provisions, stores, and funds, of the British army. It may likewise -occur to his eminence that in proportion as the operations of the -armies would be more extended, the expense would increase, and the -necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become -more urgent, unless, indeed, the course of their operations should -annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objection then -to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government, go to -decide the question whether the war should be carried on or not in -any manner. By desiring his majesty and the Prince Regent to remove -me from the command of their armies, his eminence would endeavour -to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the -duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of -the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the -contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up -the independence of the country, and the security of the lives and -properties of the Portuguese nation. In my opinion the Patriarch is -in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, -on the part of his majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by -refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the -funds, to enable this country to carry on the war; at all events, I -request that this letter may be communicated to him in the Regency, -and that a copy of it may be forwarded to his royal highness the -Prince Regent, in order that his royal highness may see that I -have given his eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives -either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration -of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes, in respect to the -independence of his country.” - - “WELLINGTON.” - - * * * * * - - -No. VI. - -EXTRACT FROM A REPORT MADE BY THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE PRINCE OF -WAGRAM AND OF NEUFCHATEL. - - -SECTION 1. - - “_Seville, August 4th, 1810._ - -“Par une décision de l’Empereur du mois de Fevrier dernier S. -M. détermine qu’à compter du 1^{er} Janvier toutes les dépenses -d’administration générale du Genie et de l’artillerie seraient au -compte du gouvenement Espagnol; aussitôt que j’en fus instruit -je sollicitai S. M. C. d’assigner à cet effet une somme; mais je -ne pus obtenir que 2,000,000, de réaux (533,000 f.) et encore le -Roi entendait il que les payements ne remontassent qu’au mois -de Fevrier; cette somme était de beaucoup insuffisante. Je n’ai -cessé d’en faire la représentation, ainsi que Monsr. l’Intendant -Général; nos demandes n’ont pas été accueillies, et pour couvrir -autant que possible la différence j’ai du avoir recours aux recettes -extraordinaires faites sans la participation des ministres Espagnols. -J’espère que ce moyen réussira, déjà même il a produit quelques -sommes. L’état que je mets ci joint fait connaître les recouvremens -qui out été opérés sur les fonds de 533,000 f. du crédit mensuel -à l’époque du 1^{er} Août lesquels forment la somme de 3,731,000 -f. mais indépendamment il y a eu des recettes extraordinaires pour -au moins 500,000 f. qui ont reçu la même destination (les dépenses -d’administration générale) antérieurement à cette époque. J’avais -fait mettre à la disposition de Monsr. l’Intendant Général des -Valeurs pour plus d’un million qui devait servir à payer une partie -de l’armée. Mr. l’Intendant Général justifie de l’emploi de toutes -ces sommes dans ses comptes généraux. Les ministres de S. M. C. -n’admettent pas les comptes que je présente; d’abord ils ne veulent -pas allouer la somme de 500,000 f. qui a été reportée a l’article -des dépenses d’administration générale, s’appuyant sur ce sujet sur -la décision du roi qui ne fait remonter ces dépenses que jusqu’au -mois de Fevrier, quoique l’empereur ait expressement entendu que le -mois de Janvier devait aussi y être compris, ils ne veulent pas non -plus reconnaître les recettes extraordinaires, où ils prétendent -en précompter le produit sur le crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. Il -n’est pas dans mon pouvoir d’admettre leurs motifs, la décision -de l’empereur est expresse et tant que je serai dans la situation -délicate où je me trouve, mon devoir m’obligera de pourvoir aux -besoins du service par tous les moyens praticables. Les recettes -qui ont eu lieu en Andalusie ont servi à toutes les dépenses de -l’artillerie, du genie, des état majors et de l’administration -générale qui sont vraiment immenses, et quoiqu’on ait absolument -rien reçu de France ni de Madrid, j’ai en même temps pu faire payer -trois mois de solde à l’armée, c’est sans doute bien peu quand il -est du 8 à 10 mois d’arrière à la troupe et que l’insuffisance des -moyens oblige à augmenter encore cet arrière, mais ne recevant rien -je crois qu’il m’était impossible de mieux faire. V. A. en sera elle -même convaincue si elle veut s’arrêter un moment sur l’apperçu que -je vais lui donner des charges que l’Andalusie supporte. On consomme -tous les jours près de 100,000 rations de vivres et 20,000 rations -de fourrage; il y a 2000 malades aux hôpitaux. La forteresse de -Jaen, le fort de Malaga, l’Alhambra de Grenade, au dessus duquel -on a construit un grand camp retranché; tous les châteaux sur les -bords de la mer depuis le cap de Gata jusqu’à Fuengirola, le château -d’Alcala la Réal, la place de Ronda, les anciens châteaux d’Olbera -et de Moron, le château de Belalcazar, le château de Castillo de -Los Guardias et plusieurs autres portes sur les frontières de -l’Estremadura qu’on a dû aussi occuper. On a pourvu aux dépenses -que les travaux devant Cadiz et la construction d’une flottille -occasionment. On a établi à Grenade une poudrière et une fabrique -d’armes, laquelle jusqu’à présent a peu donné, mais qui par la suite -sera très utile. On a rétabli et mis dans une grande activité la -fonderie et l’arsenal de Seville où journellement 1500 ouvriers -sont employés. Nous manquions de poudre et de projectiles de feu et -d’affûts. J’ai fait rétablir deux moulins à poudre à Seville et fait -exploiter toutes les nitrières de l’Andalusie, à présent on compte -aussi à Seville des projectiles de tous les calibres, jusqu’aux -bombes de 12 pouces, tout le vieux fer a été ramassé, on a construit -les affûts nécessaires pour l’armement des batteries devant Cadiz. -On a fait des réquisitions en souliers et effets d’habillement -dont la troupe a profité. J’ai fait lever dans le pays 2000 mules -qui out été données à l’artillerie, aux équipages militaires et au -Génie. J’ai fait construire et organiser un équipage de 36 pièces de -montagnes, dont 12 obusiers, de 12 qui sont portés à dos de mulets -et vont être repartis dans tous les corps d’armée. La totalité de -ces dépenses ainsi qu’une infinité d’autres dont je ne fais pas -l’énumération sont au compte du gouvernement Espagnol, et le pays -les supporte indépendamment du crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. et des -recettes extraordinaires que je fais opérer lorsqu’il y a possibilité -dont l’application a lieu en faveur de l’administration générale -de l’armée, du Genie, de l’artillerie, des états majors, des frais -de courses et des dépenses secrettes. Ces charges sont immenses et -jamais le pays n’aurait pu les supporter si nous n’étions parvenus à -mettre de l’ordre et la plus grande régularité dans les dépenses et -consommations; mais il serait difficile de les augmenter, peut-être -même y aurait il du danger de chercher à le faire; c’est au point -que malgré que nous soyons à la récolte il faut déjà penser à faire -venir du bled des autres provinces, le produit de l’Andalusie -étant insuffisant pour la consommation de ses habitans et celle de -l’armée. Cependant S.M.C. et ses ministres qui sont parfaitement -instruits de cette situation ont voulu attirer à Madrid les revenues -de l’Andalusie: je dis les revenues car leurs demandes dépassaient -les recettes; des ordres ont même été expédiés en conséquence -aux commissaires Royaux des Préfectures et je me suis trouvé dans -l’obligation de m’opposer ouvertement à l’effet de cette mesure dont -l’exécution eut non seulement compromis tous les services de l’armée, -mais occasionné peut être, des mouvemens séditieux; d’ailleurs il -y avait impossibilité de la remplir, à ce sujet j’ai l’honneur -de mettre sous les yeux de V.A. extrait d’une lettre que j’eus -l’honneur d’écrire au roi le 13 Juillet dernier et copie de celle que -j’adressai à Monsieur le marquis d’Almenara, ministre des finances, -le 30 du même mois pour répondre à une des siennes, où il me peignait -l’état désespérant des finances de S.M.C. Je supplie avec instance -V.A. de vouloir bien rendre compte du contenu de ces lettres et du -présent rapport à S.M. l’empereur. - -“J’aurai voulu pour que S.M. fut mieux instruite de tout ce que s’est -fait en Andalousie pouvoir entrer dans des détails plus étendus; -mais j’ai dû me borner à traiter des points principaux, les détails -se trouvent dans ma correspondance, et dans les rapports de Monsieur -l’intendant général sur l’administration. Cependant d’après ce que -j’ai dit S.M. aura une idée exacte des opérations administratives -et autres qui ont eu lieu, ainsi que de l’état de ses troupes et -des embarras de ma situation: elle est telle aujourd’hui que je -dois supplier avec la plus vive instance S.M. au nom même de son -service de daigner la prendre en considération: j’ai des devoirs -à remplir dont je sais toute l’étendue, je m’y livre sans réserve -mais la responsabilité est trop forte pour que dans la position où -je me trouve je puisse la soutenir; en effet j’ai à combattre des -prétentions et des intérêts qui sont évidemment en opposition avec -ceux de l’armée et par conséquent avec ceux de l’empereur; je suis -forcé par mes propres devoirs de m’opposer à l’exécution des divers -ordres que le roi donne et faire souvent le contraire. J’ai aussi -constamment à lutter contre l’amour propre des chefs militaires, -que souvent peuvent différer d’opinion avec moi et naturellement -prétendent faire prévaloir leurs idées. Toutes ces considérations -me font regarder la tâche qui m’est imposée comme au dessus de -mes forces et me portent à désirer que S.M. l’empereur daigne me -faire connaître ses intentions ou pourvoir à mon remplacement et -mettre à la tête de son armée dans le midi de l’Espagne, un chef -plus capable que moi d’en diriger les opérations. Je me permettrai -seulement de faire observer à ce sujet que le bien du service de -l’empereur commande impérieusement que toutes les troupes qui sont -dans le midi de l’Espagne depuis le Tage jusqu’aux deux mers suivent -le même système d’opérations, et soyent par conséquent commandés -par un seul chef lequel doit être dans la pensée de l’empereur, -et avoir ses instructions afin que le cas se présentant où il lui -serait fait opposition d’une manière quelconque, il puisse se -conduire en conséquence et parvenir au but qui lui sera indiqué; -tout autre système retardera la marche des affaires et occasionera -inévitablement des désagréments qu’on peut autrement éviter.” - - “J’ai l’honneur, &c. - “(Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.” - - -SECTION 2. - -_Intercepted Letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor, 13th July, -1810._ - - SIRE, - -L’état de nullité où je suis depuis que Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, -major général, a pris l’initiative de tous les movemens même le -plus minutieux de 5^{eme} corps rend ici ma presence tout à fait -inutile, il ne me reste que le chagrin de voir d’excellentes troupes -animées du meilleur esprit, disseminées dans toute l’Andalusie et -perdant tous les jours de braves gens sans but ni résultat. Dans -cet état des choses je prie V.M. de vouloir bien me permettra des -me retirer à Burgos pour y attendre des ordres s’il ne juge pas à -propos de m’accorder un congé pour retourner en France, congé que -reclame ma santé à la suite d’une maladie grave dont je suis à peine -convalescent. - - J’ai l’honneur, &c. &c. - LE MARESCHAL DUC DE TRÉVISE. - - * * * * * - - -No. VII. - - -SECTION 1. - -_Extract from an intercepted despatch of Massena, dated July 10, -1810._ - -“Generals Romana and Carrera have gone to lord Wellington’s -head-quarters, but the latter has not abandoned his Lines.” - - -_General P. Boyer to S. Swartz, July 8._ - -“We are covering the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, a place strong by its -position and works, and which has been attacked with but little -method. The English army is opposite ours, but, for good reasons, -does not move: we compose the corps of observation; we are on the -look out for them.” - - -SECTION 2. - -_Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet, premier aide-de-camp du -maréchal prince d’Essling._ - -“1810. 5 Août, à Ciudad Rodrigo.--Le capitaine du génie Boucherat -arrive du 2^e corps; il a fait la campagne du Portugal, 1807. -Beaucoup causé avec lui sur ce pays. Il a fait la route de Lisbonne à -Almeyda avec M. Mairet, et me remet un itinéraire qu’il en a dressé. -Il prétend ces routes très difficiles; les rivières très encaissées, -et inabordable sur les deux rives du Mondego. Celui-ci a peu d’eau, -doit être guéable presque partout; et une partie de ses rives bien -difficiles, et en certains endroits il n’y a pas plus de 20 toises -de largeur; un seul pont sans chemin (je crois à Fornos;) mais la -rivière n’est pas un obstacle aux communications des deux rives. La -route d’Idanha, Castelbranco, &c. mauvaise, cependant non absolument -impraticable à des pièces légères. Tage, très escarpé, rocailleux, -profond jusqu’à Abrantés * * * * Au dessous de cette ville, ou -plutôt au confluent du Zézère, le pays devient plat; le lit du Tage -s’élargit; il n’y a plus que des collines même éloignées, et tout -est très praticable. Les montagnes de Santarem sont des collines -peu élevées, praticables, accessibles sur leur sommet, peu propres -à être défendues ce qui est commune jusqu’à la mer pour celles de -Montachique, qui sont des plateaux arrondis, accessibles à toute -les armes; et on pourrait marcher ou manœuvrer dans toutes les -directions. J’ai fait copier cet itinéraire.” - -“1810. 7 Octobre, à Leyria.--Causé avec le général Loison des -position de Montachique, ensuite avec le prince.” - -“1810. 9 Octobre, à Riomajor. On dit que l’ennemi se retranche à -Alhandra et Bucella. Les généraux Reynier et Foy ont une carte de -Riomajor à Lisbonne; espèce de croquis fait à la hâte, d’après de -bons matériaux, mais où la figure est très mauvaise. Je le fais -copier.” - - -SECTION 3. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling. Sur la hauteur en arrière -de Moira, le 26 Septembre, 1810, à 10 heure ½._ - -J’ai l’honneur de vous adresser une lettre que je viens de recevoir -du général Reynier et copie d’une réponse. - -Vous trouverez également ci-joint une lettre du général Reynier -adressée à votre excellence. - -Je vous renouvelle, prince, l’assurance de ma haute considération. - - (Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC D’ELCHINGEN. - - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Elchingen. St. Antonio, le 26 -Septembre, à 8 heure du matin._ - -Depuis que le brouillard est dissipé, on apperçoit sur le Serra au -delà de St. Antonio, cinq bataillons Portugais qui étoient à mi-côte -et qui sont montés sur la crête à mesure que le brouillard s’est -éclairci. Il y a de plus au col où passe le chemin, 6 pièces de canon -et un détachement d’infantrie Anglaise, et à mi-côte une ligne de -tirailleurs partie Anglais qui s’étend depuis le chemin qui monte du -village de Carvailha à ma gauche, jusques vis-à-vis des postes du -6^e corps, on voit des troupes sur les sommités qui font face au 6^e -corps; mais comme on ne les apperçoit que de revers, ou ne peut juger -de leur nombre. - -On ne peut deviner s’il y a des troupes en arrière, mais d’après -l’organisation de la montagne dont les crêtes, sont étroites, et qui -a des pentes rapides de chaque côte il ne doit pas avoir de terrain -pour y placer de fortes réserves et manœuvres. Cela me parait une -arrière garde mais la position est forte, et il faut faire des -dispositions pour l’attaquer avec succès. J’attends des nouvelles -de ce que l’ennemi fait devant vous pour faire aucun mouvement; si -vous jugez que c’est une arrière garde et que vous l’attaquiez, -j’attaquerai aussi. Si vous jugez convenable d’attendre les ordres -de Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, j’attendrai aussi, comme -je pense qu’il viendra vers votre corps, je vous prie de lui faire -parvenir le rapport ci-joint avec les vôtres. - -J’ai l’honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le maréchal, d’agréer -l’hommage de mon respect. - - (Signé) REYNIER. - - -_A Monsieur le Général Reynier. Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, -le 26 Septembre 1810, à 10 heures ½ du matin._ - -Je reçois à l’instant, mon cher général, votre lettre de ce jour. -Je pense qu’une grande partie de l’armée Anglo-Portugaise a passé -la nuit sur la crête des montagnes qui domine toute la vallée de -Moira. Un paysan dit qu’il existe de l’autre côté de ces montagnes -une plaine assez belle d’une demi-lieue d’étendue, et très garnie -d’Oliviers. Depuis ce matin, l’ennemi marche par sa gauche, et semble -diriger ses colonnes principales sur la route d’Oporto; cependant -il tient encore assez de monde à la droite du parc qui couvre le -couvent des minimes nommé Sako; et il montre une 12^{ne} de pièces -d’artillerie. Le chemin de Coïmbre passe très près de ce courent. - -J’ai envoyé ce matin un de mes aides-de-camp au prince d’Essling pour -lui dire que nous sommes en présence, et qu’il serait nécessaire -qu’il arrivât pour prendre un parti. Si j’avais le commandement, -j’attaquerais sans hésiter un seul instant; mais je crois, mon cher -général, que vous ne pouvez rien compromettre en vous échelonnant -sur la droite de l’ennemi; et en poussant ses avant-postes, car -c’est véritablement par ce point qu’il faudrait le forcer à faire sa -retraite. - - Je vous renouvelle, &c. - (Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC D’ELCHINGEN. - - -SECTION 4. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée -de Portugal, Paris, le 4 Décembre, 1810._ - -Monsieur le prince d’Essling, le général Foy que vous avez expédié -est arrivé à Paris le 22 Novembre; il a fait connaître à sa majesté -et dans le plus grand détail ce qui s’est passé et votre situation. - -Dès le 4 Novembre le général Gardanne était en avant d’Almeida avec -un corps de 6,000 hommes. Le compte d’Erlon avec les divisions -Claparede, Conroux, et la division Fournier a dû se trouver à Guarda -vers le 20 Novembre. - -L’Empereur, prince, a vu par les journaux Anglais, que vous aviez -établi des ponts sur le Tage et que sous en avez un sur le Zézère, -défendu sur les deux rives pas de fortes têtes de pont. Sa majesté -pense que vous devez vous retrancher dans la position, que vous -occupez devant l’ennemi; qu’Abrantés se trouvant à 800 toises du -Tage, vous l’aurez isolé de son pont et bloqué pour en faire le -siège. L’Empereur vous recommande d’établir deux ponts sur le Zézère, -de défendre ces ponts par des ouvrages considérables, comme ceux du -Spitz devant Vienne. Votre ligne d’opérations et de communications -devant être établie par la route de Garda, partant du Zézère, -passant par Cardigos, suivant la crête des montagnes par Campinha et -Belmonte, vous aurez toujours la route de Castelbranco et Salvatera -pour faire des vivres. - -Je viens de donner de nouveau l’ordre déjà réitéré plusieurs -fois au duc de Dalmatie, d’envoyer le 5^{me} corps sur le Tage -entre Montalveo et Villaflor, pour faire sa jonction avec vous. -L’Empereur croit qu’il serait nécessaire de s’emparer d’Alcantara, -de fortifier et de consolider tous les ponts sur le Zézère et sur le -Tage, d’assurer toutes vos communications en saississant les points -favorables que peuvent offrir les localités pour fortifier de petites -positions; des châteaux ou maisons qui, occupées par peu de troupes, -soient à l’abri des incursions des milices. - -Vous sentirez, Monsieur le Prince d’Essling, l’avantage de -régulariser ainsi la guerre, ce qui vous mettra à même de profiter de -la réunion de tous les corps qui vont vous renforcer, pour marcher -sur lord Wellington et attaquer la gauche de sa position, soit pour -l’obliger à se rembarquer en marchant sur la rive gauche du Tage, ou -enfin, si tous ces moyens ne réussissaient pas, vous serez en mesure -de rester en position pendant les mois de Décembre et de Janvier, -en vous occupant d’organiser vos vivres et de bien établir vos -communications avec Madrid et Almeyda. - -L’armée du centre qui est à Madrid, ayant des détachements sur -Placentia, vos communications avec cette capitale ne sont pas -difficiles. - -Deux millions 500 mille francs destinés à la solde de votre armée -sont déjà à Valladolid; deux autre millions partent en ce moment de -Bayonne. Ainsi votre armée sera dans une bonne situation. - -Votre position deviendra très embarrassante pour les Anglais, qui, -indépendamment d’une consommation énorme d’hommes et d’argent, se -trouveront engagés dans une guerre de système, et ayant toujours -une immensité de bâtimens à la mer pour leur rembarquement. Il faut -donc, Prince, travailler sans cesse à vous fortifier vis-à-vis de la -position des ennemis, et pouvoir garder la vôtre avec moins de monde; -ce qui rendra une partie de votre armée mobile et vous mettra à même -de faire des incursions dans le pays. - -Vous trouverez ci-joint des moniteurs qui donnent des nouvelles -de Portugal, parvenues par la voie de l’Angleterre, datées du 12 -Novembre. - - Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, - Major-Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 5. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée -de Portugal, Paris, le 22 Décembre, 1810._ - -Je vous expédie, Prince, le général Foy que l’Empereur a nommé -général de division; je vous envoie les moniteurs; vous y verrez que -nous apprenons par les nouvelles d’Angleterre qu’au 1 Décembre, vous -vous fortifiez dans votre position de Santarem. - -L’Empereur met la plus grande importance à ce que vous teniez -constamment en échec les Anglais, à ce que vous ayez des ponts sur le -Zézère et sur le Tage; la saison va devenir bonne pour les opérations -militaires, et vous aurez le moyen de harceler les Anglais et de -leur faire éprouver journellement des pertes. Par les nouvelles -des journaux Anglais, il parait qu’il y a beaucoup de malades dans -leur armée, ils ne comptent que -------- 27 à 28 mille hommes sous -les armes et un effectif de 31 milles, y compris la cavalerie et -l’artillerie. La situation de l’armée Anglaise en Portugal tient -Londres dans une angoise continuelle, et l’Empereur regarde comme un -grand avantage de tenir les Anglais en échec, de les attirer et de -leur faire perdre du monde dans des affaires d’avant-gardes, jusqu’à -ce que vous soyez à même de les engager dans une affaire générale. Je -réitère encore au maréchal duc de Trévise l’ordre de marcher sur le -Tage avec le 5^{me} corps. - -Le comte d’Erlon, qui réunit son corps à Ciudad-Rodrigo, va profiter -de ce moment où les pluies cessent pour reprendre l’offensive et -battre tous ces corps de mauvaises troupes que se trouvent sur vos -communications et sur vos flancs. - -Vos ponts étant bien assurés sur le Zézère, la ligne de vos -opérations la plus naturelle parait devoir être par la rive gauche de -cette rivière. - -Le général Foy, à qui l’Empereur a parlé longtems vous donnera plus -de détails. - - Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, - Major-Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 6. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée de -Portugal, Paris, le 16 Janvier, 1811._ - -Je vous préviens, Prince, que par décret impérial, en date du 15 de -ce mois, l’Empereur a formé une armée du Nord de l’Espagne, dont le -commandement est confié à Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie qui va -établir son quartier général à Burgos. - -L’arrondissement de l’armée du Nord de l’Espagne est composé:-- - -1º. De la Navarre formant le 3^e governement de l’Espagne. - -2º. Des trois provinces de la Biscaye et de la province de Santander, -formant le 4^e gouvernement. - -3º. De la province des Asturies. - -4º. Des provinces de Burgos, Aranda, et Soria, formant le 5^e -gouvernement. - -5º. Des provinces de Palencia, Valladolid, Leon, Benevente, Toro, et -Zamore, formant le 6^e gouvernement. - -6º. De la province de Salamanque. - -Ainsi cet arrondissement comprend tout le pays occupé par les troupes -Françaises entre la mer, la France, le Portugal, et les limites de -l’arrondissement des armées du centre et de l’Arragon. - -Cette disposition en centralisant le pourvoir, va donner de -l’ensemble et une nouvelle impulsion d’activité aux opérations -dans toutes les provinces du Nord de l’Espagne; et Monsieur le -maréchal duc d’Istrie mettra un soin particulier à maintenir les -communications entre Valladolid, Salamanque, et Almeida. - -Je vous engage, Prince, à correspondre avec Monsieur le maréchal duc -d’Istrie toutes les fois que vous le jugerez utile au service. - -D’après les ordres de l’Empereur je préviens Monsieur le duc -d’Istrie que dans des circonstances imprévues, il doit appuyer -l’armée de Portugal et lui porter du secours; je le préviens aussi -que le 9^{me} corps d’armée serait sous ses ordres dans le cas où ce -corps rentrerait en Espagne. - - Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, - Major-Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 7. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, Paris, le 24 Janvier, 1811._ - -Vous verrez par le moniteur d’hier, Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, que -les armées de Portugal étaient à la fin de l’année dernière dans -la même position. L’Empereur me charge de vous renouveller l’ordre -de vous porter au secours du prince d’Essling, qui est toujours -à Santarem; il a plusieurs ponts sur le Zézère, et il attend que -les eaux soient diminuées pour en jetter un sur le Tage. Il parait -certain que le 9^{me} corps a opéré sa jonction avec lui par le Nord, -c’est-à-dire, par Almeyda. - -L’Empereur _espère que le prince d’Essling aura jetté un pont sur le -Tage_; ce que lui donnera des vivres. - -Les corps insurgés de Valence et de Murcie vont se trouver occupé -par le corps du général Suchet, aussitôt que Tarragone sera tombé -entre nos mains, comme l’a fait la place de Tortose; alors Sa Majesté -_pense que le_ 5^{me} corps et une partie _du_ 4^{me} pourront-se -porter au _secours_ du prince d’Essling. - - Le Major Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 8. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Paris, le 25 Janvier, 1811._ - -Je vous préviens, prince, que Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie -s’est mis en marche dans les premiers jours de Janvier avec le 9^{me} -corps d’armée, un corps de cavalerie, et un équipage de siège pour -se porter sur Badajoz et faire le siège de cette place. Ces troupes -ont dû arriver le 10 de ce mois devant Badajoz; je mande au duc de -Dalmatie qu’après la prise de cette place il doit se porter sans -perdre de tems sur le Tage avec son équipage de siège pour vous -donner les moyens d’assiéger et de prendre Abrantés. - - Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, - Major Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 9. - -_Au Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général, Paris, le 6 -Fevrier, 1811._ - -Mon cousin, je pense que vous devez envoyer le moniteur d’aujourd’hui -au duc de Dalmatie, au duc de Trévise, au général Belliard, au duc -d’Istrie, aux commandans de Cuidad Rodrigo et d’Almeida, aux général -Thiébaut, et aux généraux Dorsenne, Cafarelli, et Reille. Ecrivez au -duc d’Istrie en lui envoyant le moniteur, pour lui annoncer qu’il y -trouvera les dernières nouvelles du Portugal, qui paraissent être du -13; que tout parait prendre une couleur avantageuse; que si Badajoz -a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, le duc de _Dalmatie a pû se -porter sur le Tage, et faciliter l’établissement du pont au prince -d’Essling_; qu’il devient donc très important de faire toutes les -dispositions que j’ai ordonnées afin que le général Drouet avec ses -deux divisions puisse être tout entier à la disposition du prince -d’Essling. Ecrivez en même tems au duc de Dalmatie pour lui faire -connaître la situation du duc d’Istrie, et lui réitérer l’ordre _de -favoriser le prince d’Essling_ pour son possage du Tage; que j’espère -que Badajoz aura été prix dans le courant de Janvier; et que vers le -20 _Janvier sa jonction aura eu lieu sur le Tage_, avec le prince -d’Essling; qu’il peut, si cela est nécessaire, retirer des troupes du -4^{me} corps; _qu’enfin tout est sur le Tage._ Sur ce je prie Dieu, -mon cousin, qu’il vous ait dans sa sainte et digne garde. - - (Signé) NAPOLEON. - -P.S. Je vous renvoie votre lettre au duc d’Istrie, faites le partir. - - -SECTION 10. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, commandant-en-chef l’armée -de Portugal, Paris, le 7 Février_, 1811. - -Je vous envoie, prince, le moniteur du 6, vous y trouverez les -dernières nouvelles que nous avons du Portugal; elles vont jusqu’au -13 Janvier, et annoncent _que tout prend une tournure avantageuse. -Si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, comme cela est -probable, le duc de Dalmatie aura pu faire marcher des troupes sur -le Tage, et vous faciliter l’établissement d’un pont._ Je lui en -ai donné et je lui en réitère l’ordre; l’Empereur espère que la -_jonction des troupes de ce maréchal a eu lieu maintenant avec vous -sur le Tage_. - -Les deux divisions d’infanterie du corps du général Drouet, vout -rester entièrement à votre disposition d’après les ordres que je -donne à Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, commandant en chef l’armée -du nord de l’Espagne; je lui mande de porter son quartier général -à Valladolid, d’établir des corps nombreux de cavalerie dans la -province de Salamanque afin d’assurer d’une manière journalière -sure et rapide la correspondance entre Almeyda, Cuidad Rodrigo et -Valladolid, et nous envoyer promptement toutes les nouvelles qui -pourront parvenir à l’armée de Portugal. - -Je lui prescris de tenir à Ciudad Rodrigo, un corps de 6,000 hommes -qui puisse éloigner toute espèce de troupe ennemie de Ciudad Rodrigo -et d’Almeida, faire même des incursions sur Pinhel et Guarda, -empêcher qu’il se forme aucun rassemblement sur les derrières du -9^{me} corps et présenter des dispositions offensives sur cette -frontière du Portugal. - -De réunir une forte brigade de la garde impériale vers Zamora d’où -elle sera à portée de soutenir le corps de Ciudad Rodrigo, et où elle -se trouvera d’ailleurs dans une position avancée pour agir suivant -les circonstances. - -De réunir une autre forte brigade de la garde à Valladolid où elle -sera en mesure d’appuyer la première et de réunir le reste de la -garde dans le gouvernement de Burgos. - -Par ces dispositions, prince, les deux divisions d’infanterie du -9^{me} corps, seront entièrement à votre disposition et avec ce -secours vous serez en mesure de tenir longtems la position que vous -occupez; de vous porter sur la rive gauche du Tage; ou enfin d’agir -comme vous le jugerez convenable sans avoir aucune inquiétude sur -le nord de l’Espagne, puisque le duc d’Istrie sera à portée de -marcher sur Almeyda et Ciudad Rodrigo et même sur Madrid, si des -circonstances inattendues le rendaient nécessaire. - -Dès que le duc d’Istrie aura fait ses dispositions il enverra -un officier au général Drouet, pour l’en instruire et lui faire -connoître qu’il peut rester en entier pour vous renforcer. - -Le général Foy a dû partir vers le 29 Janvier de Ciudad Rodrigo, avec -4 bataillons et 300 hommes de cavalerie pour vous rejoindre. - - Le Prince de Wagram et d’Neuchâtel, - Major Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 11. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Guarda, le 29 Mars, 1811._ - -Mon cher Maréchal, vous aurez appris notre arrivée aux frontières du -Portugal, l’armée se trouve dans un pays absolument ruiné; et avec -toute ma volonté et la patience de l’armée, je crains de n’y pouvoir -tenir 8 jours, et je me verrai forcé de rentrer en Espagne. - -J’écris à Mr. le Cte. d’Erlon pour qu’il fasse approvisionner Almeyda -et Rodrigo; ces deux places n’auraient jamais dû cesser d’avoir pour -3 mois de vivres aux quels ou n’aurait pas dû toucher sous aucun -prétexte; et ma surprise est extrême d’apprendre qu’il n’y a que -pour 10 jours de vivres à Almeyda. Je lui écris aussi de prendre une -position entre Rodrigo et Almeyda, avec ses deux divisions; vous -sentez combien il est nécessaire, qu’il se place à portée de marcher -au secours d’Almeyda. - -Si je trouvais des vivres, je ne quitterais pas les frontières -d’Espagne et du Portugal, mais comme je vous l’ai dit, je ne vois -guère la possibilité d’y rester.... - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 12. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Alfayates, le 2 Avril, 1811._ - -Mon cher Maréchal, le pays que l’armée occupe ne pouvant en aucune -manière le faire vivre, je me vois forcé de la faire rentrer -en Espagne. Voici les cantonnements que je lui ai assignés et -l’itinéraire de marche de chaque corps d’armée.... - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 13. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Rodrigo, le 5 Avril, 1811._ - -Mon cher Maréchal, je suis arrivé avec toute l’armée sur Ciudad -Rodrigo, mes troupes depuis plusieurs jours sont sans pain; et je -suis obligé de faire prendre sur les approvisionnments de Rodrigo -200 mille rations de biscuit, que je vous prie d’ordonner de -remplacer avec les ressources qui peuvent se trouver à Salamanque et -Valladolid. Nous partirons ensuite pour les cantonnements que j’ai -eu soin de vous faire connaître. J’espère que vous aurez bien voulu -faire donner des ordres aux intendans de province, d’y faire préparer -des vivres, seul moyen d’y faire maintenir l’ordre. - -Je compte séjourner 3 à 4 jours ici pour voir si l’ennemi ne -s’approcherait pas des places. - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 14. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 15 Avril, 1811._ - -Mon cher Maréchal, ma position devient toujours plus allarmante; -les places appellent des secours; je ne reçois pas de réponses de -vous à aucune de mes demandes; et si cet état de chose se prolonge, -je serai forcé de faire prendre à l’armée des cantonnements où elle -puisse vivre, et d’abandonner les places que je ne suis pas chargé de -défendre et encore bien moins d’approvisionner, mes troupes manquant -absolument de vivres. - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 15. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal due d’Istrie, Paris, le 3 Avril, 1811._ - -Le general Foy est arrivé, Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, ainsi -que les deux aides-de-camp du maréchal prince d’Essling, le capitaine -Porcher, et le chef d’escadron Pelet. Il parait que le prince -d’Essling avec son corps d’armée prend position à Guarda, Belmonte, -et Alfuyates. Ainsi il protège Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeyda, Madrid et -l’Andalousie. Ses communications doivent s’établir facilement avec -l’armée du midi par Alcantara et Badajoz. Si ce qu’on ne prévoit pas, -le prince d’Essling étoit vivement attaqué par l’armée Anglaise, -l’empereur pense que _vous pourriez le soutenir avec une 15ne. de -milles hommes_. L’armée du centre doit avoir poussé un corps sur -Alcantara. L’armée du midi sera renforcée par ce que vous aurez déjà -fait partir, et d’après le prince d’Essling, elle va se trouver assez -forte pour ne rien craindre de l’ennemi.... - - (Le reste est sans intérêt.) - - Le Major Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 16. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 17 Avril, 1811._ - - MON CHER MARECHAL, - -Le général Reynaud, commandant supérieur à Rodrigo, ainsi que le -général Marchand, qui est avec sa division autour de cette place, me -rendent compte que 2 divisions Portugaises avec une division Anglaise -ont pris position aux environs d’Almeyda. Quoique cette place ait -encore des vivres pour une 20^{ne} de jours, et que les Anglais et -les Portugais meurent de faim dans leurs positions, il faut faire des -dispositions pour les chasser au delà de la Coa, et pour ravitailler -cette place. Je vous propose en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, -de mettre à ma disposition 12 à 1500 chevaux, ceux de l’armée de -Portugal n’étant en état de rendre aucun service; je vous demande de -plus une division d’infanterie pour placer en réserve. Vers le 24 ou -le 29, ces forces se joindront aux 6 divisions que je compte réunir -de l’armée de Portugal pour attaquer l’ennemi, s’il nous attend dans -ses positions et le chasser au delà de la Coa. Il est impossible de -faire faire le moindre mouvement à toutes ces troupes, du moins à -celles de l’armée de Portugal pour attaquer l’ennemi; si on ne peut -leur faire distribuer pour 10 jours de biscuit et avoir de l’eau de -vie à la suite de l’armée. Je vous demande encore 15 à 18 pièces -d’artillerie bien attelées, celles à mes ordres étant hors d’état -de marcher. Avec ces moyens, nul doute que l’ennemi ne soit déposté -et chassé hors des frontières de l’Espagne et au delà de la Coa. -Mon cher maréchal, je vis ici au jour le jour; je suis sans le sol, -vous pouvez tout; il faut donc nous envoyer du biscuit, de l’eau de -vie, du pain et de l’orge. Ce sera avec ces moyens que nous pourrons -manœuvrer. Il ne faut pas perdre un instant. Il est très urgent de -marcher au secours d’Almeyda. C’est à vous à donner vos ordres; et -vous me trouverez porté de la meilleure volonté à faire tout ce qui -sera convenable aux intérêts de S. M. - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 17. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 22 Avril, 1811._ - - MON CHER MARECHAL, - -J’ai reçu votre dépêche. Toutes vos promesses de vous réunir à moi -s’évanouissent donc dans le moment où j’en ai besoin, ravitailler -Almeida et Rodrigo est la 1^{re} opération et la seule qui peut -nous donner la faculté de rendre l’armée de Portugal disponible, -lorsqu’on n’aura plus rien à craindre sur le sort des places. En y -jettant pour 3 à 4 mois de vivres, on peut ensuite établir plusieurs -colonnes mobiles; on peut envoyer des troupes à Avila et Ségovie; on -peut au besoin appuyer le mouvement de l’armée d’Andalousie. Mais ne -serait il pas honteux de laisser rendre une place faute de vivres, -en présence de deux maréchaux de l’Empire? Je vous ai déjà prévenu -de la nullité de ma cavalerie, de l’impossibilité où se trouvent les -chevaux d’artillerie de rendre aucun service. Vous savez aussi que -je dois envoyer le 9^{me} corps en Andalousie; je voulais aussi le -faire concourir avant son départ au ravitaillement des places. Pouvez -vous, mon cher maréchal, balancer un seul instant à m’envoyer de la -cavalerie et des attelages d’artillerie? Si vous voulez garder votre -matériel? Ne vous ai-je pas prévenu que je commencerais mon mouvement -le 26? et vous paraissez attendre le (22) une seconde demande de ma -part. Vous le savez aussi bien que moi, perdre un ou deux jours à -la guerre est beaucoup; et ce délai peut avoir des suites fâcheuses -qu’on ne répare plus. - -Quand je vous ai dit que je ne réunerais que 6 divisions; c’était -pour ne pas tout dégarnir des points importans occupés par les corps -d’armée; mais de la cavalerie et de l’artillerie sont un secours -dont je ne puis me passer. Je vous prie en conséquence, mon cher -maréchal, de me faire arriver de la cavalerie et des attelages -d’artillerie à marches forcées. Réflechissez qu’une fois les places -réapprovisionnées, je pourrai disposer des ⅔ de l’armée, et que cette -opération passe avant tout. - -En m’offrant de nous envoyer les attelages pour 16 pièces, vous -aurez bien entendu, sans doute, mon cher maréchal y comprendre ceux -nécessaires pour les caissons des pièces. - - (Signé.) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 18. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 24 Avril, 1811._ - - MON CHER MARECHAL, - -Je me rends demain à Ciudad Rodrigo, où toute l’armée sera réunie -le 26. Le ravitaillement de la place d’Almeida est du plus haut -intérêt pour les armes de S. M; et il eut été bien à désirer que -les secours que j’ai en l’honneur de vous demander nous eussent été -envoyés. L’ennemi parait avoir de 20 à 29 mille hommes autour de -cette place. Vous dire que je n’aurai en cavalerie que 15 à 1800 -hommes, et seulement 20 pièces de canon pour toute l’armée, c’est -vous faire sentir, mon cher maréchal, combien votre secours m’eut -été nécessaire au moins sous deux rapports, pour votre armée même et -pour la tranquillité du nord de l’Espagne. Je n’ai pas ménagé mes -instances auprès de vous. Si mes efforts n’étaient pas heureux; votre -dévouement pour le service de l’Empereur, vous ferait certainement -regretter de ne pas les avoir secondés avec les moyens que vous -m’aviez fait espérer, avant que j’en eusse besoin. - - (Signé.) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 19. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Rodrigo, le 29 Avril, 1811._ - - MON CHER MARECHAL, - -Vos lettres sont inconcevables. Dans celle du 20, vous me dites que -vous ne pouvez me donner aucun secours. Par celle du 22, vous me -dites que le 25 ou le 26 vous me joindrez partout où je serai, et -que la tête de votre colonne arrivera à Salamanque le 26. Par celle -que je reçois à l’instant, vous me dites, que votre cavalerie et -votre artillerie se trouvent encore le 27 à une journée en arrière -de Salamanque; et vous concluez que mon mouvement doit être fini; et -vous me témoignez vos regrèts de n’avoir pû y coopérer. Convenez, -mon cher maréchal, que si l’armée de Portugal recevait un échec, -vous auriez bien des reproches à vous faire. Je vous ai demandé de -l’artillerie et des attelages et encore plus positivement de la -cavalerie; vous avez sous différens prétextes éludé ma demande. -Toutes les troupes qui sont en Espagne, sont de la même famille. -Vous êtes, jusques à ce qu’il y ait de nouveaux ordres, chargé de la -défense et de l’approvisionnement des places d’Almeida et de Rodrigo. -Je n’aurais pas mieux demandé que d’employer l’armée de Portugal sous -me ordres à défendre ces places, à marcher au secours de l’armée du -midi; mais comment puis-je le faire sans vivres? - -Je compte faire mon mouvement demain matin. J’ignore quelle pourra -être l’issue de ce mouvement; si ma lettre vous arrive dans la -journée de demain, votre cavalerie et votre artillerie pourraient -toujours se mettre en mouvement dans la nuit pour arriver après -demain 1er Mai à Cabrillas. Je vous prie de faire filer sans -s’arrêter le biscuit, la farine, le grain que vous n’aurez pas -manqué de réunir à la suite de vos troupes. Il est instant que ces -ressources comme beaucoup d’autres, arrivent à Rodrigo; cette place -n’aura pas pour 15 jours de vivres. A mon départ d’ici, il faudra que -des convois considerables y soient envoyés. - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 20. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Raguse, Paris, le 20 Avril, 1811._ - - MONSIEUR LE DUC DE RAGUSE, - -Vous trouverez ci-joint l’ordre de l’Empereur qui vous donne le -commandement de l’armée de Portugal. Je donne l’ordre au maréchal -prince d’Essling de vous remettre le commandement de cette armée. -Saisissez les rènes d’une main ferme; faites dans l’armée les -changemens qui deviendraient nécessaires. L’intention de l’Empereur -est que le duc d’Abrantes et le général Reynier restent sous vos -ordres. S. M. compte assez sur le dévouement que lui portent ses -généraux, pour être persuadé qu’ils vous seconderont de tous leurs -moyens. - -L’Empereur ordonne, Monsieur le duc de Raguse, que le prince -d’Essling en quittant l’armée n’emmène avec lui que son fils et un de -ses aides-de-camp. Mais son chef d’état-major, le général Fririon, -le colonel Pelet, ses autre aides-de-camp, tous le officiers de son -état-major doivent rester avec vous. - -Toutefois, Monsieur le duc, je vous le répète S. M. met en vous une -confiance entière. - - Le Major Général, &c. - (Signé.) ALEXANDRE. - - * * * * * - - -No. VIII. - -_Les Officiers Français Prisonniers de Guerre, détenus à la Maison, -Rue S. Jean, à Monsieur le Général Trant, Gouverneur de le Ville et -Province d’Oporto._ - - MONSIEUR LE GENERAL, - -Chacun des officiers Français prisonniers de guerre, détenus à la -maison rue S. Jean, pénétré des obligations qu’il vous a désirerait -vous offrir individuellement l’expression de sa reconnoissance. C’est -nous que ces messieurs ont choisi pour être auprès de vous leur -organes et nous sommes d’autant plus flattés de cette commission -agréable qu’il n’y en a pas un parmi nous qui dans son particulier -n’ait reçu de vous des services importants. Nous osons nous flatter -que vous agréerez favorablement ce foible témoignage de notre -gratitude et les sincères remerciments que nous venons vous présenter -pour toutes les bontés que vous avez eues pour nous. Ce n’est pas -sans un vif regret que nous envisageons le moment de votre départ, -mais ce que déjà vous avez fait pour nous, nous fait espérer que -votre solicitude s’étendra au delà de votre séjour et que pendant -votre absence nous continuerons à en éprouver les effets. - -Ce n’est pas, monsieur le général, d’après l’étendue de notre lettre -qu’il faudra mesurer celle de notre reconnoissance; nous sommes mieux -en état de sentir que d’éxprimer ce que nous vous devons et lorsque -des circonstances plus heureuses nous rameneront vers notre patrie, -nous nous ferons un devoir et une satisfaction de faire connaître -la manière dont nous avons été traités et les peines que vous vous -êtes donnés pour adoucir notre sort. Nous nous recommandons à la -continuation de votre bienveillance, et nous vous prions d’agréer -l’assurance de gratitude et de haute considération avec lesquelles -nous avons l’honneur d’être, monsieur le général, vos très humbles et -très obeissants serviteurs, - -Au nom des officiers Français, prisonniers de guerre. - - FALLOT, - Docteur médecin des armées Françaises attaché au - grand quartier général de l’armée de Portugal. - -Le colonel sous inspecteur au revues des troupes Françaises, - - CATELOT. - H. DELAHAYE, - C^{om.} de la marine. - - * * * * * - - -No. IX. - - -SECTION 1. - -_Letter from lieut.-general Graham to the right honourable Henry -Wellesley, Isla de Leon, 24th March, 1811._ - - SIR, - -You will do justice to my reluctance to enter into any controversy -for the purpose of counteracting the effects of that obloquy which -you yourself and many others assured me my conduct was exposed to by -the reports circulated, at Cadiz, relative to the issue of the late -expedition. - -But a copy of a printed statement of general La Peña having been -shewn to me, which, by implication at least, leaves the blame of -the failure of the most brilliant prospects on me, it becomes -indispensably necessary that I should take up my pen in self-defence. - -Having already sent you a copy of my despatch to the earl of -Liverpool, with a report of the action, I will not trouble you with -a detail of the first movements of the army, nor with any other -observation relative to them, than that the troops suffered much -unnecessary fatigue by marching in the night, and without good guides. - -Considering the nature of the service we were engaged in, I was most -anxious that the army should not come into contest with the enemy in -an exhausted state, nor be exposed to the attack of the enemy but -when it was well collected; and, in consequence of representations -to this effect, I understood that the march of the afternoon of the -4th was to be a short one, to take up for the night a position near -Conil; to prepare which, staff-officers, of both nations, were sent -forward with a proper escort. - -The march was, nevertheless, continued through the night, with those -frequent and harassing halts which the necessity of groping for the -way occasioned. - -When the British division began its march from the position of -Barrosa to that of Bermeja, _I left the general on the Barrosa -height, nor did I know of his intentions of quitting it_; and, when -I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did so to -support the troops left for its defence, and believing the general to -be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of the attack, -which was made so near the spot where the general was supposed to be, -and, though confident in the bravery of the British troops, I was -not less so in the support I should receive from the Spanish army. -The distance, however, to Bermeja is trifling, and no orders were -given from head-quarters for the movement of any corps of the Spanish -army to support the British division, to prevent its defeat in this -unequal contest, or to profit of the success earned at so heavy -expense. The voluntary zeal of the two small battalions, (Walloon -guards and Ciudad Real,) which had been detached from my division, -brought them alone back from the wood; but, notwithstanding their -utmost efforts, they could only come at the close of the action. - -Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse-artillery, -been rapidly sent by the sea-beach to form in the plain, and to -envelop the enemy’s left; had the greatest part of the infantry been -marched through the pine-wood, in our rear, to turn his right, what -success might have been expected from such decisive movements? The -enemy must either have retired instantly, and without occasioning -any serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed -himself to absolute destruction, his cavalry greatly outnumbered, -his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion; a general -dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close -pursuit; our wearied men would have found spirits to go on and would -have done so trusting to finding refreshments and repose at Chiclana. -This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour’s ride of the -scene of action, the general remained ignorant of what was passing, -_and nothing was done!_ Let not, then, this action of Barrosa form -any part of the general result of the transactions of the day; it -was an accidental feature; it was the result of no combination, it -was equally unseen and unheeded by the Spanish staff; the British -division, left alone, suffered the loss of more than one-fourth of -its number, and became unfit for future exertion. Need I say more to -justify my determination of declining any further co-operation in -the field towards the prosecution of the object of the expedition? -I am, however, free to confess that, having thus placed myself -and the British division under the direction of the Spanish -commander-in-chief in the field, (contrary to my instructions,) I -should not have thought myself justified to my king and country to -risk the absolute destruction of this division in a second trial. But -I have right to claim credit for what would have been my conduct from -what it was; and I will ask if it can be doubted, after my zealous -co-operation throughout, and the ready assistance afforded to the -troops left on Barrosa height, that the same anxiety for the success -of the cause would not have secured to the Spanish army the utmost -efforts of the British division during the whole of the enterprise, -_had we been supported as we had a right to expect_? - -There is not a man in the division who would not gladly have -relinquished his claim to glory, acquired by the action of Barrosa, -to have shared, with the Spaniards, the ultimate success that was -within our grasp as it were. - -The people of Spain, the brave and persevering people, are -universally esteemed, respected, and admired by all who value liberty -and independence; the hearts and hands of British soldiers will ever -be with them; the cause of Spain is felt by all to be a common one. - -I conclude with mentioning that the only request expressed to me, at -head-quarters, on the morning of the 6th, on knowing of my intention -to send the British troops across the river St. Petri, was _that the -opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish troops, during the night, was -lost_; and on my observing that, after such a defeat, there was no -risk of attack from an enemy, a very contrary opinion was maintained. - -In point of fact, no enemy ever appeared during several days employed -in bringing off the wounded and burying the dead. It may be proper -to remark on the report published relative to the enemy’s number at -St. Petri, (4500 men of Villat’s division,) that, by the concurrent -testimony of all the French officers here, general Villat’s division -had charge of the whole line,--what, then, must be the strength of -that division to have afforded 4500 men to St. Petri alone? In order -to establish, by authentic documents, facts which may have been -disputed, and to elucidate others, I enclose, by way of appendix, the -reports of various officers of this division. - - I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c. - (Signed) THO^S. GRAHAM, - Lt.-General. - -P.S. I must add this postscript distinctly to deny my having -spoken, at head-quarters, in the evening of the 5th, of sending -for more troops, or for provisions from the Isla. My visit was a -very short one, of mere ceremony. I may have asked if the Spanish -troops expected were arrived. This error must have arisen from the -difficulty of conversing in a foreign language. - -With this I send you a sketch of the ground, &c. of the action of -Barrosa; by which it will be seen how impossible, according to my -judgement, it would be for an enemy to expose his left flank, by -making a direct attack through the wood on the Barmeja position, -while that of Barrosa was occupied in force by the allied army. - - -SECTION 2. - -_Adjutant-general’s state of the troops assembled at Tarifa, under -the command of the lieut.-general Graham, 25th Feb. 1810._ - - Number of - Designations. bayonets. Commanders. - - Two squadrons of 2d } ” Major Busche. - German Hussars. } - - Detachment of artillery. Major Duncan. 10 guns - - Detachment of engineers 47 Captain Birch. - - Brigade of guards, reinforced } - by a detachment } 1221 Brigadier-gen. Dilke. - of the 2d battalion 95th } - rifles } - - 1st battalion 28th foot; } - 2d battalion 67th; 2d } - battalion 87th; reinforced } 1764 Colonel Wheatley. - with 2 companies } - of the 20th Portuguese } - - Flank battalion composed } - of detachments of the } - 3d battalion 95th rifles } 594 Lt.-col. A. Barnard, - and two companies of } 95th regt. - the 47th foot } - - Two companies of 2d battalion } - 9th regt.; two } - companies of 1st battalion } 475 Lt.-col. Brown, 28th regt. - 28th regt.; two } - companies of 2d battalion } - 82 regt. } - - One Company of the royal } 33 Lieutenant Reid. - staff corps } - ---- - Total number of bayonets 4114 - The hussars were about 180 - ---- - Total of sabres and bayonets 4294, with 10 guns. - - -SECTION 3. - -_Extract from a letter of general Frederick Ponsonby._ - -“I proceeded rapidly towards the entrance of the wood, found the -Germans, and conducted them along the right flank of our little army. -We came in contact with the French dragoons, whom we found nearly -abreast of our front line and about three hundred yards apart from -it on our right flank, our line had just halted and the firing was -gradually decreasing at the time we charged. I do not imagine the -French dragoons much exceeded us in number, they behaved well, but if -we had had half a dozen stout squadrons the mass of beaten infantry -would not have returned to their camp.” - - -SECTION 4.--STATE OF THE FIRST CORPS. - - (Part 1 of 3) - - [A] Genereaux de Brigade. - [B] Colonels. - [C] Chefs de Bt. ou Escadron. - [D] Capitaines. - [E] Lieutenants. - [F] Sous Lieutenants. - [G] Sous Officiers et Soldats. - [H] Total. - - (Part 1 of 3) - - ----------------------------+-----------------------------------++ - | || - | Tués. || - | || - +---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ - | | | | | | | | || - |[A]|[B]|[C]|[D]|[E]|[F]| [G] | [H] || - | | | | | | | | || - ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ - St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | | | | | | 3 | 3 || - {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || - { {Etat Major | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 2 || - { {9 Infr. Ligne| | | | | 1 | | 14 | 15 || - { 1 {24 Ligne | | | | 1 | 1 | | 33 | 35 || - { {96 Ligne | | 1 | | 1 | | | 39 | 41 || - { {1 Br. Elite | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 || - { {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || - { {45 Ligne | | | | 1 | | | 7 | 8 || - 5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 63 | 74 || - { {54 Ligne | | | 1 | 2 | | | 26 | 29 || - { {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || - { {27 Infr. Ligne| | | | | 1 | | 20 | 21 || - { 3 {94 Ligne | | | | | 1 | | 9 | 10 || - { {95 Ligne | | | | | | | 1 | 1 || - { {1 Regt. | | | | | | | 2 | 2 || - {Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | | | 3 | 3 || - { {Artillerie | | | | | | | 16 | 16 || - Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 10 | 10 || - {Artillerie| | | | 1 | | | | 1 || - Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | | 4 | 4 || - 8 Dr. {95 | | | | | | | 4 | 4 || - +---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ - | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 255 | 281 || - ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ - - - (Part 2 of 3) - - ----------------------------+----------------------------------------++ - | || - | Blessés. || - | || - +---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ - | | | | | | | | || - |[A]|[B]|[C]| [D]| [E]| [F]| [G] | [H] || - | | | | | | | | || - ----------------------------+---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ - St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 32 | 37 || - {Etat Major | | 2 | | 1 | | | | 3 || - { {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || - { {9 Infr. Ligne| | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | 70 | 74 || - { 1 {24 Ligne | | 1 | | 4 | 2 | | 214 | 221 || - { {96 Ligne | | | 1 | 3 | 2 | | 199 | 205 || - { {1 Br. Elite | | | | 2 | | 3 | 136 | 141 || - { {Etat Major | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 2 || - { {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 44 | 44 || - 5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | | | 2 | 6 | 3 | 622 | 633 || - { {54 Ligne | | | | 4 | 5 | 1 | 284 | 294 || - { {Etat Major | 1 | | | | | | | 1 || - { {27 Infr. Ligne| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 150 | 157 || - { 3 {94 Ligne | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 49 | 52 || - { {95 Ligne | | | | | | | 32 | 32 || - { {1 Regt. | | | | 3 | 1 | 2 | 30 | 36 || - {Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | | | 12 | 12 || - { {Artillerie | | | | | 3 | | 31 | 34 || - Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 43 | 43 || - {Artillerie| | | | | | | 2 | 2 || - Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | | 29 | 29 || - 8 Dr. {95 | | | 1 | | | | 18 | 19 || - +---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ - | 1 | 3 | 5 | 23 | 27 | 12 | 1997 | 2008 || - ----------------------------+---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ - - - (Part 3 of 3) - - ----------------------------+---------------------------++------- - | || - | Restes sus les Champ || - | grièvement Blessés || - +---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- - | | | | | | || - |[A]|[B]|[D]|[F]| [G] | [H] || Total - | | | | | | ||General - ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- - St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | | | | 5 | 5 || 42 - {Etat Major | | | | | | || 3 - { {Etat Major | 1 | | | | | 1 || 3 - { {9 Infr. Ligne| | | | 1 | 18 | 19 || 108 - { 1 {24 Ligne | | | 2 | 1 | 21 | 24 || 280 - { {96 Ligne | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 || 249 - { {1 Br. Elite | | | 1 | | 59 | 60 || 203 - { {Etat Major | | | | | | || 2 - { {45 Ligne | | | | | 3 | 3 || 55 - 5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | | | | 19 | 19 || 726 - { {54 Ligne | | | | | | || 323 - { {Etat Major | | | | | | || 1 - { {27 Infr. Ligne| | | | 2 | 21 | 23 || 201 - { 3 {94 Ligne | | | | | | || 62 - { {95 Ligne | | | | | 1 | 1 || 34 - { {1 Regt. | | | 1 | | 3 | 4 || 42 - {Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | 4 | 4 || 19 - { {Artillerie | | 1 | | | | 1 || 51 - Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | 1 | 27 | 28 || 81 - {Artillerie| | | | | 6 | 6 || 9 - Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | || 33 - 8 Dr. {95 | | | | | 1 | 1 || 24 - +---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- - | 1 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 180 | 202 || 2551 - ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- - - Certified copy by Count GAZAN. - - Total 2551 - - _Note by the Editor._-- - Deduct affair of the 4th about Santa Petri 45 - ” ” at Puerta Santa Maria. 81 - ” ” at Medina 64 - ---- - 190 - ---- - Remains loss at Barrosa 2361 - - -SECTION 5. - -_Intercepted papers of colonel Lejeune._ - -ORDRE. - -Il est ordonné à Monsieur le colonel baron le Jeune, mon A. D. C. -de partir sur le champ en poste pour porter les ordres ci-joints et -parcourir l’Andalousie et l’Estramadure. - -Monsieur le colonel le Jeune se rendra d’abord à Grenade auprès de -Monsieur le général Sebastiani, commandant du 4^{me} corps d’armée, -et il lui remettra les ordres qui le concernent. - -De Grenade, Monsieur le Jeune se rendra par Séville devant Cadiz, et -verra par lui-même la situation des choses, afin de pouvoir à son -retour en rendre un compte détaillé à l’Empereur. Monsieur le Jeune -remettra à Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, les dépêches qui -lui sont destinées, soit à Séville, soit à Cadiz, soit partout où -il sera. Il se rendra ensuite au 5^{me} corps d’armée commandé par -Monsieur le maréchal duc de Trévise en Estremadure: le corps doit -être à Badajos, ou même sur le Tage. - -Monsieur le Jeune prendra une connaissance exacte de sa position, et -de celle des troupes de l’armée du centre commandée par le général ----- qui sont réunies sur le Tage. Il verra si ces corps sont en -communication avec l’armée de Portugal, et recueillera les nouvelles -que l’on pourrait avoir de cette armée de ce côté. - -Monsieur le Jeune prendra tous les renseignemens nécessaires pour -pouvoir réprondre à toutes les questions de l’Empereur, sur la -situation des choses en Andalousie, devant Cadiz, et en Estremadure, -d’où il viendra me rendre compte de sa mission. - - LE PRINCE DE WAGRAM ET DE NEUFCHATEL, - Major-général. - -_Paris, le 14 Février, 1811._ - - -SECTION 6. - -_Extracts from Lejeune’s reports._ - -CADIZ. - -“Montagnes de Ronda foyer d’insurrection entre le 4^{me} corps et le -premier.” - -“Les obusiers à la villantrois portent à 2560 toises: l’obus doit -peser 75 livres, et contient 11 à 12 onces de poudre: on charge -l’obusier à poudre d’un ⅓ du poids de l’obus pour obtenir cette -distance. Il n’y en a que le 4 en batterie: à la redoute Napoleon on -en a 12 en fondus: mais il manque de projectilles et de la poudre en -suffisante quantité. Toutes les obus n’éclatent pas en ville.” - -“Le pont de St. Pestri a été traversé le jour de l’affaire par un -sergent du 24^{me} qui est revenu avec les Espagnols que l’on a pris. -Le moment eut été favorable pour s’emparer de l’Isle.” - -“Le duc de Bellune bien ennuyé, désire beaucoup retourner: bon -général mais voyant les choses trop en noir.” - - -SECTION 7. - - _Puerto Real, 20 Mars, 1811._ - - MON CHER GENERAL, - -Enfin après 15 jours des plus cruelles souffrances je me trouve en -état de reprendre la plume et de continuer le réçit que j’ai eu -l’honneur de vous adresser dans ma lettre du 6 au 7 de ce mois. - -L’une des choses qui mérite d’abord de fixer votre attention, est la -composition de cette armée combinée dont nous avons été tout-à-coup -assaillis. J’ai déjà dit que le 26 Février une flotte de 180 voiles -était sortie de Cadiz portant 1500 hommes de débarquement, et que -de ce nombre étaient environ 4000 Anglais et 1000 Portugais. Cette -flotte se dirigea vers Tarifa où le débarquement se fit le lendemain -sans aucun accident. Il parait que les Anglais en réunissant les -garnisons d’Algéciras et de Gibraltar à quelques restes de troupes -venues récemment de Sicile, avaient déjà formé à Tarifa un petit -corps de 1000 Anglais et de 2000 Portugais commandé par le général -Stuart, et qui forma avec 2 ou 300 hommes de cavalerie, l’avant garde -de l’expédition dirigée contre nous. Cette armée ainsi composée de -10 à 12,000 Espagnols bien ou mal équipés, de 4 à 5000 Anglais et -de 3000 Portugais se mit enfin en campagne, et vint nous attaquer -le 5. Il parait que Monsieur le maréchal Victor ne fut instruit que -tard de la vraie direction prise par l’armée ennemie. Il arriva à -Chiclana le 5 entre 8 et 9 heures du matin, suivi des bataillons de -la 1^e et 2^{de} division: le plan d’opérations auquel il s’arrêta -fut d’envoyer sur le champ la division Villate avec un régiment de -cavalerie aux lignes de St. Petri, avec ordre de laisser arriver -l’ennemi, de lui résister foiblement pour l’engager à suivre notre -mouvement de retraite et de l’attirer ainsi sous la position St. -Anne, où il ne pouvait manquer de se trouver dans une situation -extrêmement desavantageuse. Pendant cette manœuvre Monsieur le -maréchal Victor s’était lui-même porté avec la 1^{re} et 2^{de} -division entre Conil et St. Petri, à peu près à la hauteur de la -Torre Barrosa avec l’intention de couper à l’ennemi la retraite des -montagnes. Là, rencontrant la queue de l’armée, qui finissait de -se filer, il la fit attaquer vigoureusement, culbuta tout ce qui -se rencontra devant lui et accula les Espagnols à la mer, mais les -Anglais que cette manœuvre hardie mettaient entre deux feux, et -dans l’impossibilité de regagner Conil, revinrent sur leurs pas, et -attaquant avec la rage du désespoir, ils forcèrent à la retraite nos -deux divisions, qui ne formaient pas ensemble 5000 hommes. - -Cependant Monsieur le maréchal Victor se croyait si sur de la -victoire qu’avant d’attaquer il envoya ordre aux troupes qui étaient -à Médina, de se porter entre Veger et Conil, pour ramasser le reste -des trainards; les bagages, et les trains de munitions qu’ils -pouvaient rencontrer. - -Le projet d’attirer l’ennemi sur le feu de St. Anne n’avait pas mieux -réussi du côté de la division Villatte; car si cette division fut -d’abord assaillie par presque toute l’armée combinée, les généraux -Anglais et Espagnols, avertis de bonne heure que Monsieur le maréchal -les tournaient avec un corps de troupes, arrêterent leurs colonnes -sur la rive gauche du ruisseau qui touche au Moulin d’Almanza, et -là, naturellement retranchés derrière ce marais, ils n’eurent à -garder que le pont et le Moulin, les seuls endroits par lesquels on -pouvait les attaquer. Quelque chose de plus malheureux, fut, que des -le commencement de l’action, nos lignes de St. Petri, n’étant pas -défendues, il sortit par le pont de Radeaux 5000 hommes de troupes -fraiches de la Isla, lesquels se plaçant en bataille devant la -division Villatte, et couverts par le ruisseau du Moulin d’Almanza -laissèrent au reste de l’armée combinée la liberté de se retourner -tout entière contre l’attaque de Monsieur le maréchal Victor. Ainsi -se termina la battaille du 5, l’ennemi coucha sur son champ de -battaille, sans poursuivre les divisions Laval et Rufin dans leur -retraite. Je vous ai déjà fait part de notre perte. Le général Rufin -que nous croyons tué par une balle, qui lui a traversé la tête, a été -porté par les Anglais à la Isla, où après deux jours de léthargie, il -a donné signes de vie; on dit qu’il va mieux. - -La perte de l’ennemi a été à peu près de 3000 Anglais ou Portugais, -et de 5 à 600 Espagnols, tués ou blessés; les Anglais ont eu beaucoup -des officiers mis hors de combat, on croit les généraux _Grâm_ et -Stuart ainsi que le général Peña blessés. Le 6 à la pointe du jour -nous nous attendions bien à une attaque générale qui pouvait nous -être très funeste; mais l’ennemi se contenta d’occuper avec 2000 -hommes, le fort de Médina, que nous avions un peu imprudemment -abandonnés; la flotille ennemie fit aussi des démonstrations -d’attaque sur le Trocadero, mais sans effet. Elle débarqua 6 à 700 -hommes entre le Port de St. Marie, et le fort St. Cataline, qui -fût sommé de se rendre; on répondit à coups de canons. Un officier -Anglais vint chez le gouverneur de St. Marie le prévenir qu’il allait -prendre possession de la ville, mais il avait laissé ses troupes à la -porte. Elles courent faire une action d’éclat en brulant et réduisant -la petite redoute St. Antoine, qui n’était point gardée; enchantés -de ce succès ils se rembarquèrent. M. le maréchal s’attendait bien -à être attaqués le 6 à Chiclana, il avait donné des ordres en -conséquence, ces ordres furent mal interprétés, et on endommagea -mal-à-propos dans la nuit quelques uns de nos ouvrages, mais ils -furent sur le champ réparés. Lui-même était venu à Puerto Réal avec -la division Laval, et avait envoyé la 1^{re} division à St. Marie -pour reprendre la ligne de Blocus comme avant la bataille du 5. Le -5^{me} regiment de chasseurs fut envoyé entre Puerto Real et Médina -à la ferme de Guerra en reconnaissance; il y rencontra une poste de -cavalerie ennemie, et la tailla en pièces. Le 6 au soir, on essaya -de reprendre le fort de Médina, mais sans succès. Le 7 il fallut y -envoyer plus de monde, et les Espagnols l’évacuèrent sans opposer de -résistance. - -Dans la nuit du 5 les Espagnols avaient rasés nos lignes de St. -Petri, ils employèrent pendant plusieurs jours et plusieurs nuits -6000 hommes, à transporter à la Isla, du bois, dont ils manquaient, -quelques jours après, nous avons fait cesser ces approvisionnements, -en reprenant la position de St. Petri, où on ne trouva personne; -les Espagnols craignant une répétition de l’affaire du 2 Mars, ont -détruits eux-même de fort bonne grace leur tête de pont, et replié -leur pont de Radeaux, des ce moment chacun resta chez soi, comme -avant les hostilités. - - - _Du 21 Mars, 1811._ - -Il est surprenant que l’armée combinée ne nous ait pas poursuivis le -5, bien plus surprenant encore qu’elle ne nous ait point attaqués le -6 au matin; on en conçoit plusieurs raisons. On conjecture d’abord -que la principale perte de la bataille étant tombée sur les Anglais, -qui ont eu un grand nombre d’officiers et même leurs généraux -mis hors de combat, les Espagnols n’ont pas osé venir seuls nous -attaquer. Le général _Grâm_ voulait cependant les y contraindre le -lendemain, mais sur leur refus formel, il les a traité de lâches, -de gens indignes d’être secourus. Ils ont répondu qu’ils feraient -une sortie de la Isla si l’on voulait mettre le tiers d’Anglais -ou Portugais avec les deux tiers d’Espagnols, le général Anglais -a répondu qu’il n’exposerait plus un seul de ses soldats avec des -troupes de cette espèce, et sur le champ il a donné ordre aux Anglais -et Portugais de se retirer. - -A Cadiz ou dans la ville de la Isla. Il parait même que le lendemain -les Anglais se sont embarqués pour se rendre à Gibraltar ou peut-être -à Lisbonne. Les gens du pays donnent pour certain que le général -_Grâm_, en envoyant ces jours derniers à Londres trente-trois -officiers des moins blessés, n’a pas dissimulé qu’il les chargeaint -d’exposer à son gouvernement quelle folie il y avait de sacrifier -de braves gens pour soutenir en Espagne un parti sans moyens, sans -bravoure et sans moralité. Si ce qui précède n’est pas vrai, au moins -sommes nous certains qu’une grande mésintelligence règne entre les -Espagnols et leurs alliés. Le 20, les Espagnols ont encore essayé -une sortie de la Carraca mais sans succès; ils s’y prennent un peu -tard. Nous sommes à présent très à mesure pour les recevoir. Ils font -semblant d’embarquer continuellement des troupes qui n’agissent pas -et qui ne peuvent plus nous nuire. Il est arrivé à Médina quelques -bataillons du 4^{me} corps, deux bataillons du soixante-trois sont -aussi venus de Séville. Nous apprenons avec la prise de Badajos, que -M. le maréchal Soult est à Séville. La blessure de M. le commandant -Bompar et les miennes vont un peu mieux. - - LEGENTIL. - -Excusez les imperfections de cette longue lettre, j’écris de mon lit, -dans une posture gênante. - -_Monsieur le général de division Lery, à Séville._ - - -SECTION 8. - -_Extracts from the intercepted report of general Garbé, commanding -the French engineers, at the Blockade of Cadiz._ - - _25 Mars, 1811._ - -“On avait apperçu le 26 de Février au matin un grand convoi partant -de la baye de Cadiz, pour se diriger sur Tarifa. Ce convoi portait -à peu près 6 ou 7000 hommes des troupes de débarquement, qui allait -joindre celles qui étaient déjà réunies sur la Barbate et dans les -environs de l’Alcala de los Gazules. Le 2 Mars à la pointe du jour, -l’ennemi commença son opération sur Caza Vieja, qui fut évacué, et en -même temps, il effectua vers l’embouchure de St. Petri, un passage -pour faciliter l’établissement d’un pont de radeaux et d’une tête de -pont. Il fit aussi débarquer des troupes dans l’Isletta del Coto, et -s’occupa d’y établir deux batteries. Le 3, on fit marcher la division -du général Rufin, qui prit position à moitié chemin de Puerto Real à -Médina Sidonia. Celle du général Laval, s’établit en avant de Puerto -Real, et le général Vilatte garda ses positions auprès de Chiclana. -Ce jour on n’apperçut aucun mouvement de l’ennemi. Tous les ouvrages -de la ligne étaient gardes par les garnisons qu’on avait désignées -auparavant. Santa Marie fut évacué et le pont replié sur la rive -gauche. - -“Puerto Real était défendu par une compagnie de sapeurs, deux du -45^{me} régiment, et par tous les réfugiés Français qu’on avoit armés. - -“Le 4 Monsieur le maréchal fit attaquer à la pointe du jour l’ennemi -dans sa tête de pont de Santi Petri. Cette attaque se fit par 4 -compagnies du 95^{me} régiment qui s’emparèrent de l’ouvrage, firent -prisonniers 500 hommes, et enlevèrent un drapeau. Il est certain que -si on eut employé dans cette opération 2 ou 3000 hommes on enlevait -le pont et l’Isle de Léon. L’ennemi fut si disconcerté qu’il avait -abandonné ses batteries et ses ouvrages fermés. Un pareil résultat -paraissait être d’un très bon augure pour les grandes opérations. On -fit partir le même jour de Médina une reconnaissance sur Casa Vieja. -On reçut avis dans la nuit que cette reconnaissance n’avait rencontré -personne, et que les colonnes ennemies se dirigeant sur Conil, le -mouvement ne pouvait avoir pour but que d’opérer la jonction de ce -corps d’armée, avec celui qui était resté dans l’île. Le 5, avant -le jour, on se mit en marche de la position qu’on occupait à moitié -chemin de Médina pour se porter sur Chiclana. Arrivé dans cet -endroit, Monsieur le maréchal donna l’ordre au général Villatte de -rassembler toute sa division vers les flèches de St. Petri, pour y -maintenir l’ennemi qui y paraissait en force, pendant qu’il dirigeait -sur la route de Conil, les divisions de Laval et Rufin, et le peu -de cavalerie qu’il avait avec lui. Il se porta de ce côté, et ne -tarda pas à rencontrer une forte colonne, qui marchait le long de -la mer entre St. Petri et Conil, et se dirigeait sur le premier de -ses endroits. Les troupes arrivées à portée de canon se formèrent. -Le général Rufin prit la gauche pour aller occuper un mamelon où -l’ennemi paraissait s’établir. Quand les deux divisions furent -formées, elle se trouvèrent en présence d’une armée, beaucoup plus -nombreuse qu’on ne l’avait cru d’abord. L’artillerie n’était pas -encore arrivée, et celle de l’ennemi commençait à jour de toute -parts. Le général Vilatte n’avait pu garder les flèches de St. Petri, -qui étaient au moment d’être prises, n’étant alors défendues que par -un seul bataillon du 27^{me} d’infantrie légère. - -“Cette division fut obligée de se replier et de repasser le ravin -dans lequel roulent les eaux du Moulin d’Almanza. Ce mouvement -empêcha le général Vilatte de se réunir aux deux autres divisions, -qui n’ayant en tout que dix bataillons, essuyaient un feu terrible de -la part de l’ennemi. Nos pertes devenaient d’autant plus sensible que -le nombre des combattans n’était que le tiers de celui de l’ennemi. -Des corps entiers se trouvaient accablés avant qu’on eut pu entamer -la ligne des Anglais. Il n’y avait point de réserve. Le deux mille -hommes de Médina Sidonia étaient en marche pour Conil. Il fallut -penser à la retraite qui se fit en bon ordre, jusque sur les hauteurs -en avant de Chiclana, où l’on fit camper une division pendant la -nuit. Les Anglais firent leur jonction avec les troupes de l’île -de Léon, et les Espagnols continuèrent d’occuper notre position du -Moulin d’Almanza et de St Petri. Si l’ennemi voulant continuer ses -opérations offensives dans la journée du 6, se fut présenté de bonne -heure, il est probable que dans la situation où nous nous trouvions -après la journée du 5 nous étions obligés d’évacuer le terrain -jusqu’à Puerto Réal, où on aurait pris la position dont j’ai parlé -plus haut, pour y livrer une seconde bataille, mais les opérations -ont manqué d’ensemble. Il s’est contenté de rentrer dans l’île et -pendant ce temps un très petit corps de troupes Anglaises opéraient -un débarquement entre St. Marie, et la pointe de St. Catherine, -qui n’eut d’autre résultat que d’enlever une batterie défendue par -quinze hommes et de se promener une ou deux heures dans les rues de -St. Marie. Monsieur le maréchal ne voyait aucun mouvement offensif, -ordonna de rétablir les grandes communications par St. Marie, chacun -rentra dans ses portes et cette mesure produisit beaucoup plus -d’effet, sur l’armée et les habitans du Pays, que les dispositions -qu’on auraient pu prendre.” - - * * * * * - - -No. X. - -EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CAPTAIN SQUIRES, OF THE ENGINEERS. - - -SECTION 1. - - “_March 1, 1811._ - -“I have been employed in constructing batteries, opposite the mouth -of the Zezere, for twenty-five guns! though we have only one brigade -of nine pounders to arm them. - -“Thank God, for my own credit, I protested against these batteries -from the first, in my reports which were sent to lord Wellington, -and now I verily believe the marshal himself is ashamed of their -construction. Punhete, you know, is situated precisely at the -confluence of the Zezere with the Tagus, the enemy’s bridge is -about half a mile from the mouth of the river, and one mile, by -measurement, from the nearest of our heights, which we have crowned -with an eight-gun battery.” - - -SECTION 2. - -“I was truly sorry to hear that the Spaniards were so thoroughly -routed near Badajos, but Mendizabel was an idiot. On the 18th -February, the enemy threw a bridge over the Guadiana, above Badajos. -Don Carlos España, an active officer, whom I know very well, -reconnoitred the bridge, and made his report to Mendizabel, who was -playing at cards. Very well, said the chief, we’ll go and look at it -to-morrow! At day-break the Spanish army was surprised.” - - -SECTION 3. - -“May 17, 1811. I reconnoitred the ground in front of Cristoval, and -was pressed, by Colonel Fletcher, who was on the other side of the -Guadiana, to commence our operations that evening. The soil was hard -and rocky, and our tools infamous. I made, however, no difficulties, -and we began our battery on the night of the 8th, the moon being at -the full: our work was barely four hundred yards from Cristoval. In -spite, however, of a most destructive fire of musketry, and shot, and -shells, from various parts of the body of the place, we succeeded in -completing our battery on the night of the 10th; and, on the morning -of the 11th, at four, a. m. its fire was opened. The enemy’s fire -was, however, very superior to our own; and, before sunset, the -three guns and one howitzer were disabled, for against our little -attack was the whole attention of the enemy directed. On the other -side of the river the intended attack had not yet been begun, and we -sustained the almost undivided fire of Badajos! I told the marshal, -when I saw him on the 11th, that to continue to fight our battery was -a positive sacrifice; he did not, however, order us to desist until -our guns were silenced. If doubt and indecision had not governed all -our operations, and had we begun even on the night of the 9th, I am -satisfied that our plan of attack was excellent, and that we should -have entered the place on the 15th. It is true that two distant -batteries were erected, on the left bank of the river, against the -place, but they scarcely excited the enemy’s attention; our little -corps bore the brunt of the enemy’s exertions, which were great and -spirited. Including those who fell in the sortie, our loss has been -from six to seven hundred men. Both officers and men were exhausted, -mind and body; they felt and saw that they were absurdly sacrificed.” - - * * * * * - - -No. XI. - -EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL CAMPBELL TO LORD LIVERPOOL. - - “_Gibraltar, October 23, 1810._ - -“The troops at Malaga, with the exception of three hundred men, moved -upon Fuengirola, of which lord Blayney was apprised; but, in place -of his lordship taking advantage of this fortunate event, he wasted -two days in a fruitless attack on the fort of Fuengirola, cannonading -it from twelve-pounders, although he perceived that no impression -had been made on it by the fire of the shipping and gun-boats, the -artillery of which were double the calibre. In this situation he was -surprised by an inferior force, and, whilst he was on board of a -gun-boat, his guns taken and the whole thrown into confusion; at this -moment he was informed of the disaster, and, so far to his credit, he -retook his guns, but, immediately after, conceiving a body of French -cavalry to be Spaniards, he ordered the firing to cease, when he was -surrounded and made prisoner; his men, losing confidence, gave way, -and, hurrying to the beach, relinquished their honour and the field.” - - -END OF VOL. III. - - -LONDON: - -PRINTED BY W. MARCHANT, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Lord Stuart de Rothesay. - -[2] First aide-de-camp to marshal Massena. - -[3] Admiral sir Edward Codrington. - -[4] Lord Lynedoch. - -[5] Lieut.-gov. of Gibraltar. - -[6] Governor of Almeida. - -[7] Dupont’s proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume, -have been commented upon in a recent publication, entitled “_Annals -of the Peninsular Campaigns_.” - -Upon the authority of general Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba -was sacked, calls it “_a gratuitous atrocity_,” and “_an inhuman -butchery_” and no doubt, taking for fiction the stories of -Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand others, gravely affirms, -that, _capacity and cruelty are rarely united_; that _Dupont was a -fool_, and that _Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon_, but that -he must have “_dragged on a miserable existence exposed to universal -scorn and hatred_.” - -Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont, -although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became -minister of war at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed -by the author of “_the Annals_,” _as the era of good government in -France_. But I rejected Foy’s authority, 1st, because his work, -unfinished and posthumous, discovered more of the orator than the -impartial historian, and he was politically opposed to Dupont. -Secondly, because he was not an eye witness, and his relation at -variance with the “_official journal of Dupont’s operations_” was -also contradicted by the testimony of a _British general of known -talents and accuracy, who obtained his information on the spot a few -months subsequent to the event_. - -“Some time after the victory, _order was restored, pillage was -forbidden under pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained -the police_.”--Journal of Operations. - -_Cordoba was not pillaged_, being one of the few places where the -_French were well received_.--Letters from a British general to -colonel Napier. - -On this point, therefore, I am clear; but the author of the -“_Annals_,” after contrasting my account with Foy’s, thus proceeds, -“It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given -by colonel Napier _without any quotation of authority_.” - -A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, _six -months_ previous to the publication of the _Annals_, colonel Napier, -hearing that some of his statements appeared inconclusive to the -author of that work, _because there was no quotation of authority_, -transmitted through a mutual friend, an assurance that he had -authority for every _statement_, and that he would willingly _furnish -the author with any or all of them_: no notice was taken of this -offer! - -[8] An interesting account of this noble-minded woman, is to be found -in a small volume, entitled, “_Sketches of a Soldier’s Life, in -Ireland_,” by the author of “_The Eventful Life of a Soldier_.” This -last work was erroneously designated, in my first volume, as “_The -Life of a Sergeant_.” - -[9] [Note in Napoleon’s own hand.] On ne doit pas oublier qu’en -approchant de France tout favourise la desertion. - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Footnote [9] is referenced twice from page 563. - - Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been - corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within - the text and consultation of external sources. - - Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, - when a predominant preference was found in the original book. - - To save space in the wide tables in Note I of the Appendix, the - headings ‘Hospital.’ and ‘Cavalry.’ have been abbreviated to - ‘Hosp.’ and ‘Cav.’. - - The original table in Note I, section 7, was quite wide and has been - split into two parts. The original table in Note IX, section 4, was - very wide and has been split into three parts. - - In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, some - corrections to accents have been made silently; primarily é for e, - and e for é. Incorrect grammar and spelling has been left unchanged. - - Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, - and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. - - Table of Contents: - Pg v: ‘Captain Hollowell’ replaced by ‘Captain Hallowell’. - Pg x: ‘maratime operations’ replaced by ‘maritime operations’. - Pg xii: ‘retreats to Lerena’ replaced by ‘retreats to Llerena’. - - Main text: - Pg 3: ‘Pyrennean vallies’ replaced by ‘Pyrennean valleys’. - Pg 3: ‘into the vallies’ replaced by ‘into the valleys’. - Pg 5: ‘Nuesta Senora’ replaced by ‘Nuestra Senora’. - Pg 11: ‘the commucations of’ replaced by ‘the communications of’. - Pg 13: ‘being unqual to’ replaced by ‘being unequal to’. - Pg 14: ‘very essense of’ replaced by ‘very essence of’. - Pg 18: ‘on the ocsion’ replaced by ‘on the occasion’. - Pg 21: ‘occupied by Coupigny’ replaced by ‘occupied by Conpigny’. - Pg 33: ‘calamity befal’ replaced by ‘calamity befall’. - Pg 47: ‘was betowed with’ replaced by ‘was bestowed with’. - Pg 54: ‘and carelesssly’ replaced by ‘and carelessly’. - Pg 61 (Sidenote): ‘Wellesly’ replaced by ‘Wellesley’. - Pg 63: ‘the Portugese’ replaced by ‘the Portuguese’. - Pg 64 (Sidenote): ‘Wellesly’ replaced by ‘Wellesley’. - Pg 73: ‘subborn resistance’ replaced by ‘stubborn resistance’. - Pg 86: ‘from Aranjues to’ replaced by ‘from Aranjuez to’. - Pg 92: ‘whose procedings’ replaced by ‘whose proceedings’. - Pg 96: ‘at Yevenes and’ replaced by ‘at Yebenes and’. - Pg 125: ‘war of invavasion’ replaced by ‘war of invasion’. - Pg 138: ‘evacuted the town’ replaced by ‘evacuated the town’. - Pg 139: ‘to recal them’ replaced by ‘to recall them’. - Pg 143 (Sidenote): ‘des Française’ replaced by ‘des Français’. - Pg 174: ‘Toccadero creek’ replaced by ‘Troccadero creek’. - Pg 179: ‘soldiers, and and a’ replaced by ‘soldiers, and a’. - Pg 197: ‘from about Lerena’ replaced by ‘from about Llerena’. - Pg 237: ‘required extrordinary’ replaced by ‘required extraordinary’. - Pg 237: ‘merely a a conqueror’ replaced by ‘merely a conqueror’. - Pg 242: ‘dictinct lines’ replaced by ‘distinct lines’. - Pg 243: ‘Gallicia and Asturia’ replaced by ‘Gallicia and Asturias’. - Pg 247: ‘in misrepresentions’ replaced by ‘in misrepresentations’. - Pg 261: ‘having Silviera and’ replaced by ‘having Silveira and’. - Pg 280: ‘secorrer esta plaza’ replaced by ‘socorrer esta plaza’. - Pg 304 (Sidenote): ‘Cox’s Narative’ replaced by ‘Cox’s Narrative’. - Pg 307: ‘lost a quadron’ replaced by ‘lost a squadron’. - Pg 331: ‘Portuguese caçadore’ replaced by ‘Portuguese caçadores’. - Pg 356: ‘3º. From Bucellas’ replaced by ‘4º. From Bucellas’. - Pg 359: ‘Massena, suprised’ replaced by ‘Massena, surprised’. - Pg 366: ‘own governmennt’ replaced by ‘own government’. - Pg 380: ‘Frenchmen run to’ replaced by ‘Frenchmen ran to’. - Pg 380: ‘with the assistace’ replaced by ‘with the assistance’. - Pg 396: ‘when Bacellar brought’ replaced by ‘when Baccellar brought’. - Pg 414: ‘Moguer and Heulva’ replaced by ‘Moguer and Huelva’. - Pg 454: ‘the posisition of’ replaced by ‘the position of’. - Pg 464: ‘the abler tactitian’ replaced by ‘the abler tactician’. - Pg 473: ‘from distruction’ replaced by ‘from destruction’. - Pg 485: ‘immediately run out’ replaced by ‘immediately ran out’. - Pg 514: ‘seventh divison’ replaced by ‘seventh division’. - Pg 583: ‘de St. Fernado’ replaced by ‘de St. Fernando’. - Pg 588: ‘wish to emove’ replaced by ‘wish to remove’. - - Appendix: - Pg 608 Note VII: missing heading ‘SECTION 2.’ inserted before - ‘Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet’. - Pg 615 Note VII: ‘SECTION IX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 9’. - Pg 621 Note VII: ‘SECTION XVIII’ replaced by ‘SECTION 18’. - Pg 621 Note VII: ‘SECTION XIX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 19’. - Pg 622 Note VII: ‘SECTION XX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 20’. - Pg 628 Note IX: ‘SECTION II’ replaced by ‘SECTION 2’. - Pg 628 Note IX: ‘Brigadier-gen. Dilkes’ replaced by - ‘Brigadier-gen. Dilke’. - Pg 629 Note IX: ‘SECTION III’ replaced by ‘SECTION 3’. - Pg 635 Note IX: ‘SECTION 7’ replaced by ‘SECTION 8’. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 3 OF 6 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. 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