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diff --git a/6762.txt b/6762.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..239294f --- /dev/null +++ b/6762.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10104 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Politics, by Aristotle + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Politics + A Treatise on Government + +Author: Aristotle + +Release Date: October, 2004 [EBook #6762] +Posting Date: June 5, 2009 +Last updated: December 8, 2012 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK POLITICS *** + + + + +Produced by Eric Eldred + + + + + +A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT + +By Aristotle + + +Translated From The Greek Of Aristotle By William Ellis, A.M. + +London & Toronto Published By J M Dent & Sons Ltd. & In New York By E. +P. Dutton &. Co + +First Issue Of This Edition 1912 Reprinted 1919, 1923, 1928 + + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +The Politics of Aristotle is the second part of a treatise of which +the Ethics is the first part. It looks back to the Ethics as the Ethics +looks forward to the Politics. For Aristotle did not separate, as we are +inclined to do, the spheres of the statesman and the moralist. In the +Ethics he has described the character necessary for the good life, but +that life is for him essentially to be lived in society, and when in the +last chapters of the Ethics he comes to the practical application of his +inquiries, that finds expression not in moral exhortations addressed to +the individual but in a description of the legislative opportunities +of the statesman. It is the legislator's task to frame a society which +shall make the good life possible. Politics for Aristotle is not a +struggle between individuals or classes for power, nor a device for +getting done such elementary tasks as the maintenance of order and +security without too great encroachments on individual liberty. The +state is "a community of well-being in families and aggregations +of families for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life." The +legislator is a craftsman whose material is society and whose aim is the +good life. + +In an early dialogue of Plato's, the Protagoras, Socrates asks +Protagoras why it is not as easy to find teachers of virtue as it is to +find teachers of swordsmanship, riding, or any other art. Protagoras' +answer is that there are no special teachers of virtue, because virtue +is taught by the whole community. Plato and Aristotle both accept the +view of moral education implied in this answer. In a passage of the +Republic (492 b) Plato repudiates the notion that the sophists have a +corrupting moral influence upon young men. The public themselves, +he says, are the real sophists and the most complete and thorough +educators. No private education can hold out against the irresistible +force of public opinion and the ordinary moral standards of society. +But that makes it all the more essential that public opinion and +social environment should not be left to grow up at haphazard as they +ordinarily do, but should be made by the wise legislator the expression +of the good and be informed in all their details by his knowledge. The +legislator is the only possible teacher of virtue. + +Such a programme for a treatise on government might lead us to expect in +the Politics mainly a description of a Utopia or ideal state which +might inspire poets or philosophers but have little direct effect upon +political institutions. Plato's Republic is obviously impracticable, for +its author had turned away in despair from existing politics. He has no +proposals, in that dialogue at least, for making the best of things as +they are. The first lesson his philosopher has to learn is to turn away +from this world of becoming and decay, and to look upon the unchanging +eternal world of ideas. Thus his ideal city is, as he says, a pattern +laid up in heaven by which the just man may rule his life, a pattern +therefore in the meantime for the individual and not for the statesman. +It is a city, he admits in the Laws, for gods or the children of gods, +not for men as they are. + +Aristotle has none of the high enthusiasm or poetic imagination of +Plato. He is even unduly impatient of Plato's idealism, as is shown +by the criticisms in the second book. But he has a power to see the +possibilities of good in things that are imperfect, and the patience of +the true politician who has learned that if he would make men what +they ought to be, he must take them as he finds them. His ideal +is constructed not of pure reason or poetry, but from careful and +sympathetic study of a wide range of facts. His criticism of Plato in +the light of history, in Book II. chap, v., though as a criticism it is +curiously inept, reveals his own attitude admirably: "Let us remember +that we should not disregard the experience of ages; in the multitude +of years, these things, if they were good, would certainly not have been +unknown; for almost everything has been found out, although sometimes +they are not put together; in other cases men do not use the knowledge +which they have." Aristotle in his Constitutions had made a study of one +hundred and fifty-eight constitutions of the states of his day, and the +fruits of that study are seen in the continual reference to concrete +political experience, which makes the Politics in some respects a +critical history of the workings of the institutions of the Greek city +state. In Books IV., V., and VI. the ideal state seems far away, and +we find a dispassionate survey of imperfect states, the best ways of +preserving them, and an analysis of the causes of their instability. +It is as though Aristotle were saying: "I have shown you the proper and +normal type of constitution, but if you will not have it and insist on +living under a perverted form, you may as well know how to make the best +of it." In this way the Politics, though it defines the state in the +light of its ideal, discusses states and institutions as they are. +Ostensibly it is merely a continuation of the Ethics, but it comes to +treat political questions from a purely political standpoint. + +This combination of idealism and respect for the teachings of experience +constitutes in some ways the strength and value of the Politics, but it +also makes it harder to follow. The large nation states to which we are +accustomed make it difficult for us to think that the state could be +constructed and modelled to express the good life. We can appreciate +Aristotle's critical analysis of constitutions, but find it hard to take +seriously his advice to the legislator. Moreover, the idealism and the +empiricism of the Politics are never really reconciled by Aristotle +himself. + +It may help to an understanding of the Politics if something is said on +those two points. + +We are accustomed since the growth of the historical method to the +belief that states are "not made but grow," and are apt to be impatient +with the belief which Aristotle and Plato show in the powers of the +lawgiver. But however true the maxim may be of the modern nation state, +it was not true of the much smaller and more self-conscious Greek city. +When Aristotle talks of the legislator, he is not talking in the +air. Students of the Academy had been actually called on to give new +constitutions to Greek states. For the Greeks the constitution was not +merely as it is so often with us, a matter of political machinery. It +was regarded as a way of life. Further, the constitution within the +framework of which the ordinary process of administration and passing +of decrees went on, was always regarded as the work of a special man or +body of men, the lawgivers. If we study Greek history, we find that the +position of the legislator corresponds to that assigned to him by +Plato and Aristotle. All Greek states, except those perversions +which Aristotle criticises as being "above law," worked under rigid +constitutions, and the constitution was only changed when the whole +people gave a commission to a lawgiver to draw up a new one. Such was +the position of the AEsumnetes, whom Aristotle describes in Book III. +chap, xiv., in earlier times, and of the pupils of the Academy in the +fourth century. The lawgiver was not an ordinary politician. He was +a state doctor, called in to prescribe for an ailing constitution. So +Herodotus recounts that when the people of Cyrene asked the oracle of +Delphi to help them in their dissensions, the oracle told them to go to +Mantinea, and the Mantineans lent them Demonax, who acted as a "setter +straight" and drew up a new constitution for Cyrene. So again the +Milesians, Herodotus tells us, were long troubled by civil discord, till +they asked help from Paros, and the Parians sent ten commissioners +who gave Miletus a new constitution. So the Athenians, when they were +founding their model new colony at Thurii, employed Hippodamus of +Miletus, whom Aristotle mentions in Book II, as the best expert in +town-planning, to plan the streets of the city, and Protagoras as the +best expert in law-making, to give the city its laws. In the Laws Plato +represents one of the persons of the dialogue as having been asked +by the people of Gortyna to draw up laws for a colony which they were +founding. The situation described must have occurred frequently in +actual life. The Greeks thought administration should be democratic and +law-making the work of experts. We think more naturally of law-making +as the special right of the people and administration as necessarily +confined to experts. + +Aristotle's Politics, then, is a handbook for the legislator, the expert +who is to be called in when a state wants help. We have called him a +state doctor. It is one of the most marked characteristics of Greek +political theory that Plato and Aristotle think of the statesman as one +who has knowledge of what ought to be done, and can help those who call +him in to prescribe for them, rather than one who has power to control +the forces of society. The desire of society for the statesman's +advice is taken for granted, Plato in the Republic says that a good +constitution is only possible when the ruler does not want to rule; +where men contend for power, where they have not learnt to distinguish +between the art of getting hold of the helm of state and the art of +steering, which alone is statesmanship, true politics is impossible. + +With this position much that Aristotle has to say about government is in +agreement. He assumes the characteristic Platonic view that all men seek +the good, and go wrong through ignorance, not through evil will, and so +he naturally regards the state as a community which exists for the sake +of the good life. It is in the state that that common seeking after +the good which is the profoundest truth about men and nature becomes +explicit and knows itself. The state is for Aristotle prior to the +family and the village, although it succeeds them in time, for only when +the state with its conscious organisation is reached can man understand +the secret of his past struggles after something he knew not what. If +primitive society is understood in the light of the state, the state is +understood in the light of its most perfect form, when the good after +which all societies are seeking is realised in its perfection. Hence for +Aristotle as for Plato, the natural state or the state as such is the +ideal state, and the ideal state is the starting-point of political +inquiry. + +In accordance with the same line of thought, imperfect states, although +called perversions, are regarded by Aristotle as the result rather of +misconception and ignorance than of perverse will. They all represent, +he says, some kind of justice. Oligarchs and democrats go wrong in +their conception of the good. They have come short of the perfect state +through misunderstanding of the end or through ignorance of the proper +means to the end. But if they are states at all, they embody some common +conception of the good, some common aspirations of all their members. + +The Greek doctrine that the essence of the state consists in community +of purpose is the counterpart of the notion often held in modern times +that the essence of the state is force. The existence of force is for +Plato and Aristotle a sign not of the state but of the state's failure. +It comes from the struggle between conflicting misconceptions of the +good. In so far as men conceive the good rightly they are united. The +state represents their common agreement, force their failure to make +that agreement complete. The cure, therefore, of political ills is +knowledge of the good life, and the statesman is he who has such +knowledge, for that alone can give men what they are always seeking. + +If the state is the organisation of men seeking a common good, power and +political position must be given to those who can forward this end. This +is the principle expressed in Aristotle's account of political justice, +the principle of "tools to those who can use them." As the aim of the +state is differently conceived, the qualifications for government +will vary. In the ideal state power will be given to the man with most +knowledge of the good; in other states to the men who are most truly +capable of achieving that end which the citizens have set themselves +to pursue. The justest distribution of political power is that in which +there is least waste of political ability. + +Further, the belief that the constitution of a state is only the +outward expression of the common aspirations and beliefs of its members, +explains the paramount political importance which Aristotle assigns to +education. It is the great instrument by which the legislator can ensure +that the future citizens of his state will share those common beliefs +which make the state possible. The Greeks with their small states had +a far clearer apprehension than we can have of the dependence of a +constitution upon the people who have to work it. + +Such is in brief the attitude in which Aristotle approaches political +problems, but in working out its application to men and institutions +as they are, Aristotle admits certain compromises which are not really +consistent with it. + +1. Aristotle thinks of membership of a state as community in pursuit of +the good. He wishes to confine membership in it to those who are capable +of that pursuit in the highest and most explicit manner. His citizens, +therefore, must be men of leisure, capable of rational thought upon +the end of life. He does not recognise the significance of that less +conscious but deep-seated membership of the state which finds its +expression in loyalty and patriotism. His definition of citizen includes +only a small part of the population of any Greek city. He is forced to +admit that the state is not possible without the co-operation of men +whom he will not admit to membership in it, either because they are not +capable of sufficient rational appreciation of political ends, like the +barbarians whom he thought were natural slaves, or because the leisure +necessary for citizenship can only be gained by the work of the artisans +who by that very work make themselves incapable of the life which +they make possible for others. "The artisan only attains excellence +in proportion as he becomes a slave," and the slave is only a living +instrument of the good life. He exists for the state, but the state does +not exist for him. + +2. Aristotle in his account of the ideal state seems to waver between +two ideals. There is the ideal of an aristocracy and the ideal of what +he calls constitutional government, a mixed constitution. The principle +of "tools to those who can use them" ought to lead him, as it does +Plato, to an aristocracy. Those who have complete knowledge of the good +must be few, and therefore Plato gave entire power in his state into +the hands of the small minority of philosopher guardians. It is in +accordance with this principle that Aristotle holds that kingship is +the proper form of government when there is in the state one man of +transcendent virtue. At the same time, Aristotle always holds that +absolute government is not properly political, that government is not +like the rule of a shepherd over his sheep, but the rule of equals +over equals. He admits that the democrats are right in insisting that +equality is a necessary element in the state, though he thinks they do +not admit the importance of other equally necessary elements. Hence he +comes to say that ruling and being ruled over by turns is an essential +feature of constitutional government, which he admits as an alternative +to aristocracy. The end of the state, which is to be the standard of the +distribution of political power, is conceived sometimes as a good for +the apprehension and attainment of which "virtue" is necessary and +sufficient (this is the principle of aristocracy), and sometimes as a +more complex good, which needs for its attainment not only "virtue" but +wealth and equality. This latter conception is the principle on which +the mixed constitution is based. This in its distribution of political +power gives some weight to "virtue," some to wealth, and some to mere +number. But the principle of "ruling and being ruled by turns" is not +really compatible with an unmodified principle of "tools to those who +can use them." Aristotle is right in seeing that political government +demands equality, not in the sense that all members of the state should +be equal in ability or should have equal power, but in the sense that +none of them can properly be regarded simply as tools with which the +legislator works, that each has a right to say what will be made of his +own life. The analogy between the legislator and the craftsman on which +Plato insists, breaks down because the legislator is dealing with men +like himself, men who can to some extent conceive their own end in life +and cannot be treated merely as means to the end of the legislator. The +sense of the value of "ruling and being ruled in turn" is derived from +the experience that the ruler may use his power to subordinate the +lives of the citizens of the state not to the common good but to his +own private purposes. In modern terms, it is a simple, rough-and-ready +attempt to solve that constant problem of politics, how efficient +government is to be combined with popular control. This problem arises +from the imperfection of human nature, apparent in rulers as well as in +ruled, and if the principle which attempts to solve it be admitted as a +principle of importance in the formation of the best constitution, then +the starting-point of politics will be man's actual imperfection, not +his ideal nature. Instead, then, of beginning with a state which would +express man's ideal nature, and adapting it as well as may be to man's +actual shortcomings from that ideal, we must recognise that the state +and all political machinery are as much the expression of man's weakness +as of his ideal possibilities. The state is possible only because +men have common aspirations, but government, and political power, the +existence of officials who are given authority to act in the name of the +whole state, are necessary because men's community is imperfect, because +man's social nature expresses itself in conflicting ways, in the clash +of interests, the rivalry of parties, and the struggle of classes, +instead of in the united seeking after a common good. Plato and +Aristotle were familiar with the legislator who was called in by the +whole people, and they tended therefore to take the general will or +common consent of the people for granted. Most political questions are +concerned with the construction and expression of the general will, and +with attempts to ensure that the political machinery made to express the +general will shall not be exploited for private or sectional ends. + +Aristotle's mixed constitution springs from a recognition of sectional +interests in the state. For the proper relation between the claims of +"virtue," wealth, and numbers is to be based not upon their relative +importance in the good life, but upon the strength of the parties which +they represent. The mixed constitution is practicable in a state where +the middle class is strong, as only the middle class can mediate between +the rich and the poor. The mixed constitution will be stable if it +represents the actual balance of power between different classes in the +state. When we come to Aristotle's analysis of existing constitutions, +we find that while he regards them as imperfect approximations to the +ideal, he also thinks of them as the result of the struggle between +classes. Democracy, he explains, is the government not of the many but +of the poor; oligarchy a government not of the few but of the rich. +And each class is thought of, not as trying to express an ideal, but as +struggling to acquire power or maintain its position. If ever the class +existed in unredeemed nakedness, it was in the Greek cities of the +fourth century, and its existence is abundantly recognised by Aristotle. +His account of the causes of revolutions in Book V. shows how far were +the existing states of Greece from the ideal with which he starts. +His analysis of the facts forces him to look upon them as the scene +of struggling factions. The causes of revolutions are not described as +primarily changes in the conception of the common good, but changes in +the military or economic power of the several classes in the state. The +aim which he sets before oligarchs or democracies is not the good life, +but simple stability or permanence of the existing constitution. + +With this spirit of realism which pervades Books IV., V., and VI. +the idealism of Books I., II., VII., and VIII. is never reconciled. +Aristotle is content to call existing constitutions perversions of +the true form. But we cannot read the Politics without recognising +and profiting from the insight into the nature of the state which is +revealed throughout. Aristotle's failure does not lie in this, that he +is both idealist and realist, but that he keeps these two tendencies +too far apart. He thinks too much of his ideal state, as something to +be reached once for all by knowledge, as a fixed type to which actual +states approximate or from which they are perversions. But if we are to +think of actual politics as intelligible in the light of the ideal, we +must think of that ideal as progressively revealed in history, not as +something to be discovered by turning our back on experience and having +recourse to abstract reasoning. If we stretch forward from what exists +to an ideal, it is to a better which may be in its turn transcended, not +to a single immutable best. Aristotle found in the society of his +time men who were not capable of political reflection, and who, as he +thought, did their best work under superintendence. He therefore called +them natural slaves. For, according to Aristotle, that is a man's +natural condition in which he does his best work. But Aristotle also +thinks of nature as something fixed and immutable; and therefore +sanctions the institution of slavery, which assumes that what men are +that they will always be, and sets up an artificial barrier to their +ever becoming anything else. We see in Aristotle's defence of slavery +how the conception of nature as the ideal can have a debasing influence +upon views of practical politics. His high ideal of citizenship offers +to those who can satisfy its claims the prospect of a fair life; +those who fall short are deemed to be different in nature and shut out +entirely from approach to the ideal. + + +A. D. LINDSAY. + + + + +BIBLIOGRAPHY + +First edition of works (with omission of Rhetorica, Poetica, and +second book of OEconomica), 5 vols. by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1495-8; +re-impression supervised by Erasmus and with certain corrections by +Grynaeus (including Rhetorica and Poetica), 1531, 1539, revised 1550; +later editions were followed by that of Immanuel Bekker and Brandis +(Greek and Latin), 5 vols. The 5th vol. contains the Index by Bonitz, +1831-70; Didot edition (Greek and Latin), 5 vols. 1848-74. + +ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS: Edited by T. Taylor, with Porphyry's Introduction, +9 vols., 1812; under editorship of J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross, 1908. + +Later editions of separate works: + +De Anima: Torstrik, 1862; Trendelenburg, 2nd edition, 1877, with English +translation, E. Wallace, 1882; Biehl, 1884, 1896; with English, R. D. +Hicks, 1907. + +Ethica: J. S. Brewer (Nicomachean), 1836; W. E. Jelf, 1856; J. E. T. +Rogers, 1865; A. Grant, 1857-8, 1866, 1874, 1885; E. Moore, 1871, 1878, +4th edition, 1890; Ramsauer (Nicomachean), 1878, Susemihl, 1878, 1880, +revised by O. Apelt, 1903; A. Grant, 1885; I. Bywater (Nicomachean), +1890; J. Burnet, 1900. + +Historia Animalium: Schneider, 1812; Aubert and Wimmer, 1860, Dittmeyer, +1907. + +Metaphysica: Schwegler, 1848; W. Christ, 1899. + +Organon: Waitz, 1844-6. + +Poetica: Vahlen, 1867, 1874, with Notes by E. Moore, 1875; with English +translation by E. R. Wharton, 1883, 1885; Uberweg, 1870, 1875; with +German translation, Susemihl, 1874; Schmidt, 1875; Christ, 1878; I. +Bywater, 1898; T. G. Tucker, 1899. + +De Republics, Atheniensium: Text and facsimile of Papyrus, F. G. Kenyon, +1891, 3rd edition, 1892; Kaibel and Wilamowitz--Moel-lendorf, 1891, 3rd +edition, 1898; Van Herwerden and Leeuwen (from Kenyon's text), 1891; +Blass, 1892, 1895, 1898, 1903; J. E. Sandys, 1893. + +Politica: Susemihl, 1872; with German, 1878, 3rd edition, 1882; Susemihl +and Hicks, 1894, etc.; O. Immisch, 1909. + +Physica: C. Prantl, 1879. + +Rhetorica: Stahr, 1862; Sprengel (with Latin text), 1867; Cope and +Sandys, 1877; Roemer, 1885, 1898. + +ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF ONE OR MORE WORKS: De Anima (with Parva +Naturalia), by W. A. Hammond, 1902. Ethica: Of Morals to Nicomachus, by +E. Pargiter, 1745; with Politica, by J. Gillies, 1797, 1804, 1813; +with Rhetorica and Poetica, by T. Taylor, 1818, and later editions. +Nicomachean Ethics, 1819; mainly from text of Bekker, by D. P. Chase, +1847; revised 1861, and later editions with an introductory essay by +G. H. Lewes (Camelot Classics), 1890; re-edited by J. M. Mitchell (New +Universal Library), 1906, 1910; with an introductory essay by Prof. +J.H. Smith (Everyman's Library), 1911; by R.W.Browne (Bohn's Classical +Library), 1848, etc.; by R. Williams, 1869, 1876; by W. M. Hatch and +others (with translation of paraphrase attributed to Andronicus of +Rhodes), edited by E. Hatch, 1879; by F, H. Peters, 1881; J. E. C. +Welldon, 1892; J. Gillies (Lubbock's Hundred Books), 1893. Historia +Animalium, by R. Creswell (Bohn's Classical Library), 1848; with +Treatise on Physiognomy, by T. Taylor, 1809. Metaphysica, by T. Taylor, +1801; by J. H. M'Mahon (Bohn's Classical Library), 1848. Organon, with +Porphyry's Introduction, by O. F. Owen (Bohn's Classical Library), +1848. Posterior Analytics, E. Poste, 1850; E. S. Bourchier, 1901; On +Fallacies, E. Poste, 1866. Parva Naturalia (Greek and English), by G. R. +T. Ross, 1906; with De Anima, by W. A. Hammond, 1902. Youth and Old Age, +Life and Death and Respiration, W. Ogle, 1897. Poetica, with Notes +from the French of D'Acier, 1705; by H. J. Pye, 1788, 1792; T. Twining, +1789,1812, with Preface and Notes by H. Hamilton, 1851; Treatise on +Rhetorica and Poetica, by T. Hobbes (Bohn's Classical Library), 1850; +by Wharton, 1883 (see Greek version), S. H. Butcher, 1895, 1898, 3rd +edition, 1902; E. S. Bourchier, 1907; by Ingram Bywater, 1909. De +Partibus Animalium, W. Ogle, 1882. De Republica Athenientium, by E. +Poste, 1891; F. G. Kenyon, 1891; T. J. Dymes, 1891. De Virtutibus et +Vitiis, by W. Bridgman, 1804. Politica, from the French of Regius, +1598; by W. Ellis, 1776, 1778, 1888 (Morley's Universal Library), 1893 +(Lubbock's Hundred Books); by E. Walford (with AEconomics, and Life by +Dr. Gillies) (Bohn's Classical Library), 1848; J. E. C. Welldon, 1883; +B. Jowett, 1885; with Introduction and Index by H. W. C. Davis, 1905; +Books i. iii. iv. (vii.) from Bekker's text by W. E. Bolland, with +Introduction by A. Lang, 1877. Problemata (with writings of other +philosophers), 1597, 1607, 1680, 1684, etc. Rhetorica: A summary by T. +Hobbes, 1655 (?), new edition, 1759; by the translators of the Art of +Thinking, 1686, 1816; by D. M. Crimmin, 1812; J. Gillies, 1823; +Anon. 1847; J. E. C. Welldon, 1886; R. C. Jebb, with Introduction +and Supplementary Notes by J. E. Sandys, 1909 (see under Poetica and +Ethica). Secreta Secretorum (supposititious work), Anon. 1702; from the +Hebrew version by M. Gaster, 1907, 1908. Version by Lydgate and Burgh, +edited by R. Steele (E.E.T.S.), 1894, 1898. + +LIFE, ETC.: J. W. Blakesley, 1839; A Crichton (Jardine's Naturalist's +Library), 1843; J. S. Blackie, Four Phases of Morals, Socrates, +Aristotle, etc., 1871; G. Grote, Aristotle, edited by A. Bain and G. +C. Robertson, 1872, 1880; E. Wallace, Outlines of the Philosophy of +Aristotle, 1875, 1880; A. Grant (Ancient Classics for English readers), +1877; T. Davidson, Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals (Great +Educators), 1892. + + + + + +A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT + + + + +BOOK I + + + + +CHAPTER I + + +As we see that every city is a society, and every society Ed. is +established for some good purpose; for an apparent [Bekker 1252a] good +is the spring of all human actions; it is evident that this is the +principle upon which they are every one founded, and this is more +especially true of that which has for its object the best possible, and +is itself the most excellent, and comprehends all the rest. Now this is +called a city, and the society thereof a political society; for those +who think that the principles of a political, a regal, a family, and +a herile government are the same are mistaken, while they suppose that +each of these differ in the numbers to whom their power extends, but +not in their constitution: so that with them a herile government is one +composed of a very few, a domestic of more, a civil and a regal of still +more, as if there was no difference between a large family and a small +city, or that a regal government and a political one are the same, only +that in the one a single person is continually at the head of public +affairs; in the other, that each member of the state has in his turn a +share in the government, and is at one time a magistrate, at another +a private person, according to the rules of political science. But now +this is not true, as will be evident to any one who will consider this +question in the most approved method. As, in an inquiry into every other +subject, it is necessary to separate the different parts of which it is +compounded, till we arrive at their first elements, which are the most +minute parts thereof; so by the same proceeding we shall acquire a +knowledge of the primary parts of a city and see wherein they differ +from each other, and whether the rules of art will give us any +assistance in examining into each of these things which are mentioned. + + + + + +CHAPTER II + + +Now if in this particular science any one would attend to its original +seeds, and their first shoot, he would then as in others have the +subject perfectly before him; and perceive, in the first place, that it +is requisite that those should be joined together whose species cannot +exist without each other, as the male and the female, for the business +of propagation; and this not through choice, but by that natural impulse +which acts both upon plants and animals also, for the purpose of their +leaving behind them others like themselves. It is also from natural +causes that some beings command and others obey, that each may obtain +their mutual safety; for a being who is endowed with a mind capable +of reflection and forethought is by nature the superior and governor, +whereas he whose excellence is merely corporeal is formect to be a +slave; whence it follows that the different state of master [1252b] and +slave is equally advantageous to both. But there is a natural difference +between a female and a slave: for nature is not like the artists +who make the Delphic swords for the use of the poor, but for every +particular purpose she has her separate instruments, and thus her ends +are most complete, for whatsoever is employed on one subject only, +brings that one to much greater perfection than when employed on many; +and yet among the barbarians, a female and a slave are upon a level in +the community, the reason for which is, that amongst them there are none +qualified by nature to govern, therefore their society can be nothing +but between slaves of different sexes. For which reason the poets say, +it is proper for the Greeks to govern the barbarians, as if a barbarian +and a slave were by nature one. Now of these two societies the domestic +is the first, and Hesiod is right when he says, "First a house, then +a wife, then an ox for the plough," for the poor man has always an ox +before a household slave. That society then which nature has established +for daily support is the domestic, and those who compose it are called +by Charondas _homosipuoi_, and by Epimenides the Cretan _homokapnoi_; +but the society of many families, which was first instituted for their +lasting, mutual advantage, is called a village, and a village is most +naturally composed of the descendants of one family, whom some persons +call homogalaktes, the children and the children's children thereof: for +which reason cities were originally governed by kings, as the barbarian +states now are, which are composed of those who had before submitted to +kingly government; for every family is governed by the elder, as are the +branches thereof, on account of their relationship thereunto, which +is what Homer says, "Each one ruled his wife and child;" and in this +scattered manner they formerly lived. And the opinion which universally +prevails, that the gods themselves are subject to kingly government, +arises from hence, that all men formerly were, and many are so now; and +as they imagined themselves to be made in the likeness of the gods, so +they supposed their manner of life must needs be the same. And when many +villages so entirely join themselves together as in every respect to +form but one society, that society is a city, and contains in itself, if +I may so speak, the end and perfection of government: first founded that +we might live, but continued that we may live happily. For which reason +every city must be allowed to be the work of nature, if we admit that +the original society between male and female is; for to this as their +end all subordinate societies tend, and the end of everything is the +nature of it. For what every being is in its most perfect state, that +certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or +a house: besides, whatsoever produces the final cause and the end which +we [1253a] desire, must be best; but a government complete in itself is +that final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident that a city is +a natural production, and that man is naturally a political animal, and +that whosoever is naturally and not accidentally unfit for society, must +be either inferior or superior to man: thus the man in Homer, who is +reviled for being "without society, without law, without family." Such +a one must naturally be of a quarrelsome disposition, and as solitary as +the birds. The gift of speech also evidently proves that man is a more +social animal than the bees, or any of the herding cattle: for nature, +as we say, does nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who enjoys +it. Voice indeed, as being the token of pleasure and pain, is imparted +to others also, and thus much their nature is capable of, to perceive +pleasure and pain, and to impart these sensations to others; but it is +by speech that we are enabled to express what is useful for us, and what +is hurtful, and of course what is just and what is unjust: for in +this particular man differs from other animals, that he alone has +a perception of good and evil, of just and unjust, and it is a +participation of these common sentiments which forms a family and a +city. Besides, the notion of a city naturally precedes that of a family +or an individual, for the whole must necessarily be prior to the parts, +for if you take away the whole man, you cannot say a foot or a hand +remains, unless by equivocation, as supposing a hand of stone to be +made, but that would only be a dead one; but everything is understood to +be this or that by its energic qualities and powers, so that when these +no longer remain, neither can that be said to be the same, but something +of the same name. That a city then precedes an individual is plain, +for if an individual is not in himself sufficient to compose a perfect +government, he is to a city as other parts are to a whole; but he that +is incapable of society, or so complete in himself as not to want it, +makes no part of a city, as a beast or a god. There is then in all +persons a natural impetus to associate with each other in this manner, +and he who first founded civil society was the cause of the greatest +good; for as by the completion of it man is the most excellent of all +living beings, so without law and justice he would be the worst of all, +for nothing is so difficult to subdue as injustice in arms: but these +arms man is born with, namely, prudence and valour, which he may apply +to the most opposite purposes, for he who abuses them will be the most +wicked, the most cruel, the most lustful, and most gluttonous being +imaginable; for justice is a political virtue, by the rules of it the +state is regulated, and these rules are the criterion of what is right. + + + + + +CHAPTER III + + +SINCE it is now evident of what parts a city is composed, it will be +necessary to treat first of family government, for every city is made +up of families, and every family [1253b] has again its separate parts of +which it is composed. When a family is complete, it consists of freemen +and slaves; but as in every subject we should begin with examining into +the smallest parts of which it consists, and as the first and smallest +parts of a family are the master and slave, the husband and wife, the +father and child, let us first inquire into these three, what each of +them may be, and what they ought to be; that is to say, the herile, the +nuptial, and the paternal. Let these then be considered as the three +distinct parts of a family: some think that the providing what is +necessary for the family is something different from the government of +it, others that this is the greatest part of it; it shall be considered +separately; but we will first speak of a master and a slave, that we +may both understand the nature of those things which are absolutely +necessary, and also try if we can learn anything better on this subject +than what is already known. Some persons have thought that the power of +the master over his slave originates from his superior knowledge, and +that this knowledge is the same in the master, the magistrate, and the +king, as we have already said; but others think that herile government +is contrary to nature, and that it is the law which makes one man a +slave and another free, but that in nature there is no difference; for +which reason that power cannot be founded in justice, but in force. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + +Since then a subsistence is necessary in every family, the means of +procuring it certainly makes up part of the management of a family, for +without necessaries it is impossible to live, and to live well. As +in all arts which are brought to perfection it is necessary that they +should have their proper instruments if they would complete their works, +so is it in the art of managing a family: now of instruments some of +them are alive, others inanimate; thus with respect to the pilot of the +ship, the tiller is without life, the sailor is alive; for a servant +is as an instrument in many arts. Thus property is as an instrument +to living; an estate is a multitude of instruments; so a slave is an +animated instrument, but every one that can minister of himself is more +valuable than any other instrument; for if every instrument, at command, +or from a preconception of its master's will, could accomplish its work +(as the story goes of the statues of Daedalus; or what the poet tells us +of the tripods of Vulcan, "that they moved of their own accord into the +assembly of the gods "), the shuttle would then weave, and the lyre play +of itself; nor would the architect want servants, or the [1254a] master +slaves. Now what are generally called instruments are the efficients +of something else, but possessions are what we simply use: thus with a +shuttle we make something else for our use; but we only use a coat, or a +bed: since then making and using differ from each other in species, and +they both require their instruments, it is necessary that these should +be different from each other. Now life is itself what we use, and not +what we employ as the efficient of something else; for which reason the +services of a slave are for use. A possession may be considered in the +same nature as a part of anything; now a part is not only a part of +something, but also is nothing else; so is a possession; therefore a +master is only the master of the slave, but no part of him; but the +slave is not only the slave of the master, but nothing else but that. +This fully explains what is the nature of a slave, and what are his +capacities; for that being who by nature is nothing of himself, but +totally another's, and is a man, is a slave by nature; and that man who +is the property of another, is his mere chattel, though he continues a +man; but a chattel is an instrument for use, separate from the body. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + +But whether any person is such by nature, and whether it is advantageous +and just for any one to be a slave or no, or whether all slavery is +contrary to nature, shall be considered hereafter; not that it is +difficult to determine it upon general principles, or to understand +it from matters of fact; for that some should govern, and others be +governed, is not only necessary but useful, and from the hour of their +birth some are marked out for those purposes, and others for the other, +and there are many species of both sorts. And the better those are who +are governed the better also is the government, as for instance of man, +rather than the brute creation: for the more excellent the materials +are with which the work is finished, the more excellent certainly is the +work; and wherever there is a governor and a governed, there certainly +is some work produced; for whatsoever is composed of many parts, which +jointly become one, whether conjunct or separate, evidently show the +marks of governing and governed; and this is true of every living thing +in all nature; nay, even in some things which partake not of life, as +in music; but this probably would be a disquisition too foreign to our +present purpose. Every living thing in the first place is composed of +soul and body, of these the one is by nature the governor, the other the +governed; now if we would know what is natural, we ought to search for +it in those subjects in which nature appears most perfect, and not in +those which are corrupted; we should therefore examine into a man who +is most perfectly formed both in soul and body, in whom this is evident, +for in the depraved and vicious the body seems [1254b] to rule rather +than the soul, on account of their being corrupt and contrary to nature. +We may then, as we affirm, perceive in an animal the first principles +of herile and political government; for the soul governs the body as the +master governs his slave; the mind governs the appetite with a political +or a kingly power, which shows that it is both natural and advantageous +that the body should be governed by the soul, and the pathetic part by +the mind, and that part which is possessed of reason; but to have no +ruling power, or an improper one, is hurtful to all; and this holds +true not only of man, but of other animals also, for tame animals are +naturally better than wild ones, and it is advantageous that both should +be under subjection to man; for this is productive of their common +safety: so is it naturally with the male and the female; the one is +superior, the other inferior; the one governs, the other is governed; +and the same rule must necessarily hold good with respect to all +mankind. Those men therefore who are as much inferior to others as the +body is to the soul, are to be thus disposed of, as the proper use of +them is their bodies, in which their excellence consists; and if what I +have said be true, they are slaves by nature, and it is advantageous to +them to be always under government. He then is by nature formed a slave +who is qualified to become the chattel of another person, and on that +account is so, and who has just reason enough to know that there is such +a faculty, without being indued with the use of it; for other animals +have no perception of reason, but are entirely guided by appetite, +and indeed they vary very little in their use from each other; for the +advantage which we receive, both from slaves and tame animals, arises +from their bodily strength administering to our necessities; for it +is the intention of nature to make the bodies of slaves and freemen +different from each other, that the one should be robust for their +necessary purposes, the others erect, useless indeed for what slaves are +employed in, but fit for civil life, which is divided into the duties of +war and peace; though these rules do not always take place, for slaves +have sometimes the bodies of freemen, sometimes the souls; if then it +is evident that if some bodies are as much more excellent than others as +the statues of the gods excel the human form, every one will allow that +the inferior ought to be slaves to the superior; and if this is true +with respect to the body, it is still juster to determine in the same +manner, when we consider the soul; though it is not so easy to perceive +the beauty of [1255a] the soul as it is of the body. Since then some +men are slaves by nature, and others are freemen, it is clear that where +slavery is advantageous to any one, then it is just to make him a slave. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + +But it is not difficult to perceive that those who maintain the contrary +opinion have some reason on their side; for a man may become a slave two +different ways; for he may be so by law also, and this law is a certain +compact, by which whatsoever is taken in battle is adjudged to be the +property of the conquerors: but many persons who are conversant in law +call in question this pretended right, and say that it would be hard +that a man should be compelled by violence to be the slave and subject +of another who had the power to compel him, and was his superior in +strength; and upon this subject, even of those who are wise, some think +one way and some another; but the cause of this doubt and variety of +opinions arises from hence, that great abilities, when accompanied with +proper means, are generally able to succeed by force: for victory is +always owing to a superiority in some advantageous circumstances; so +that it seems that force never prevails but in consequence of great +abilities. But still the dispute concerning the justice of it remains; +for some persons think, that justice consists in benevolence, others +think it just that the powerful should govern: in the midst of these +contrary opinions, there are no reasons sufficient to convince us, that +the right of being master and governor ought not to be placed with those +who have the greatest abilities. Some persons, entirely resting upon the +right which the law gives (for that which is legal is in some respects +just), insist upon it that slavery occasioned by war is just, not that +they say it is wholly so, for it may happen that the principle upon +which the wars were commenced is unjust; moreover no one will say that a +man who is unworthily in slavery is therefore a slave; for if so, men of +the noblest families might happen to be slaves, and the descendants of +slaves, if they should chance to be taken prisoners in war and sold: to +avoid this difficulty they say that such persons should not be called +slaves, but barbarians only should; but when they say this, they do +nothing more than inquire who is a slave by nature, which was what we +at first said; for we must acknowledge that there are some persons +who, wherever they are, must necessarily be slaves, but others in no +situation; thus also it is with those of noble descent: it is not only +in their own country that they are Esteemed as such, but everywhere, +but the barbarians are respected on this account at home only; as if +nobility and freedom were of two sorts, the one universal, the other not +so. Thus says the Helen of Theodectes: + + "Who dares reproach me with the name of slave? When from the +immortal gods, on either side, I draw my lineage." + +Those who express sentiments like these, shew only that they distinguish +the slave and the freeman, the noble and the ignoble from each other +by their virtues and their [1255b] vices; for they think it reasonable, +that as a man begets a man, and a beast a beast, so from a good man, a +good man should be descended; and this is what nature desires to do, but +frequently cannot accomplish it. It is evident then that this doubt +has some reason in it, and that these persons are not slaves, and those +freemen, by the appointment of nature; and also that in some instances +it is sufficiently clear, that it is advantageous to both parties for +this man to be a slave, and that to be a master, and that it is right +and just, that some should be governed, and others govern, in the manner +that nature intended; of which sort of government is that which a master +exercises over a slave. But to govern ill is disadvantageous to both; +for the same thing is useful to the part and to the whole, to the body +and to the soul; but the slave is as it were a part of the master, as if +he were an animated part of his body, though separate. For which reason +a mutual utility and friendship may subsist between the master and the +slave, I mean when they are placed by nature in that relation to each +other, for the contrary takes place amongst those who are reduced to +slavery by the law, or by conquest. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + +It is evident from what has been said, that a herile and a political +government are not the same, or that all governments are alike to each +other, as some affirm; for one is adapted to the nature of freemen, the +other to that of slaves. Domestic government is a monarchy, for that is +what prevails in every house; but a political state is the government of +free men and equals. The master is not so called from his knowing how to +manage his slave, but because he is so; for the same reason a slave and +a freeman have their respective appellations. There is also one sort of +knowledge proper for a master, another for a slave; the slave's is of +the nature of that which was taught by a slave at Syracuse; for he for +a stipulated sum instructed the boys in all the business of a household +slave, of which there are various sorts to be learnt, as the art of +cookery, and other such-like services, of which some are allotted to +some, and others to others; some employments being more honourable, +others more necessary; according to the proverb, "One slave excels +another, one master excels another:" in such-like things the knowledge +of a slave consists. The knowledge of the master is to be able properly +to employ his slaves, for the mastership of slaves is the employment, +not the mere possession of them; not that this knowledge contains +anything great or respectable; for what a slave ought to know how to do, +that a master ought to know how to order; for which reason, those who +have it in their power to be free from these low attentions, employ a +steward for this business, and apply themselves either to public affairs +or philosophy: the knowledge of procuring what is necessary for a family +is different from that which belongs either to the master or the slave: +and to do this justly must be either by war or hunting. And thus much of +the difference between a master and a slave. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + + +[1256a] As a slave is a particular species of property, let us by +all means inquire into the nature of property in general, and the +acquisition of money, according to the manner we have proposed. In the +first place then, some one may doubt whether the getting of money is +the same thing as economy, or whether it is a part of it, or something +subservient to it; and if so, whether it is as the art of making +shuttles is to the art of weaving, or the art of making brass to that +of statue founding, for they are not of the same service; for the one +supplies the tools, the other the matter: by the matter I mean the +subject out of which the work is finished, as wool for the cloth and +brass for the statue. It is evident then that the getting of money is +not the same thing as economy, for the business of the one is to furnish +the means of the other to use them; and what art is there employed in +the management of a family but economy, but whether this is a part of +it, or something of a different species, is a doubt; for if it is +the business of him who is to get money to find out how riches and +possessions may be procured, and both these arise from various +causes, we must first inquire whether the art of husbandry is part of +money-getting or something different, and in general, whether the same +is not true of every acquisition and every attention which relates to +provision. But as there are many sorts of provision, so are the methods +of living both of man and the brute creation very various; and as it is +impossible to live without food, the difference in that particular makes +the lives of animals so different from each other. Of beasts, some +live in herds, others separate, as is most convenient for procuring +themselves food; as some of them live upon flesh, others on fruit, and +others on whatsoever they light on, nature having so distinguished +their course of life, that they can very easily procure themselves +subsistence; and as the same things are not agreeable to all, but one +animal likes one thing and another another, it follows that the lives +of those beasts who live upon flesh must be different from the lives of +those who live on fruits; so is it with men, their lives differ greatly +from each other; and of all these the shepherd's is the idlest, for they +live upon the flesh of tame animals, without any trouble, while they are +obliged to change their habitations on account of their flocks, which +they are compelled to follow, cultivating, as it were, a living farm. +Others live exercising violence over living creatures, one pursuing this +thing, another that, these preying upon men; those who live near lakes +and marshes and rivers, or the sea itself, on fishing, while others are +fowlers, or hunters of wild beasts; but the greater part of mankind live +upon the produce of the earth and its cultivated fruits; and the manner +in which all those live who follow the direction of nature, and labour +for their own subsistence, is nearly the same, without ever thinking +to procure any provision by way of exchange or merchandise, such are +shepherds, husband-men, [1256b] robbers, fishermen, and hunters: some +join different employments together, and thus live very agreeably; +supplying those deficiencies which were wanting to make their +subsistence depend upon themselves only: thus, for instance, the same +person shall be a shepherd and a robber, or a husbandman and a hunter; +and so with respect to the rest, they pursue that mode of life which +necessity points out. This provision then nature herself seems to have +furnished all animals with, as well immediately upon their first origin +as also when they are arrived at a state of maturity; for at the first +of these periods some of them are provided in the womb with proper +nourishment, which continues till that which is born can get food for +itself, as is the case with worms and birds; and as to those which bring +forth their young alive, they have the means for their subsistence for a +certain time within themselves, namely milk. It is evident then that we +may conclude of those things that are, that plants are created for the +sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men; the tame for our use +and provision; the wild, at least the greater part, for our provision +also, or for some other advantageous purpose, as furnishing us with +clothes, and the like. As nature therefore makes nothing either +imperfect or in vain, it necessarily follows that she has made all these +things for men: for which reason what we gain in war is in a certain +degree a natural acquisition; for hunting is a part of it, which it is +necessary for us to employ against wild beasts; and those men who being +intended by nature for slavery are unwilling to submit to it, on which +occasion such a. war is by nature just: that species of acquisition then +only which is according to nature is part of economy; and this ought to +be at hand, or if not, immediately procured, namely, what is necessary +to be kept in store to live upon, and which are useful as well for the +state as the family. And true riches seem to consist in these; and the +acquisition of those possessions which are necessary for a happy life is +not infinite; though Solon says otherwise in this verse: + + "No bounds to riches can be fixed for man;" + +for they may be fixed as in other arts; for the instruments of no art +whatsoever are infinite, either in their number or their magnitude; but +riches are a number of instruments in domestic and civil economy; it is +therefore evident that the acquisition of certain things according +to nature is a part both of domestic and civil economy, and for what +reason. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + + +There is also another species of acquisition which they [1257a] +particularly call pecuniary, and with great propriety; and by this +indeed it seems that there are no bounds to riches and wealth. Now many +persons suppose, from their near relation to each other, that this is +one and the same with that we have just mentioned, but it is not the +same as that, though not very different; one of these is natural, the +other is not, but rather owing to some art and skill; we will enter into +a particular examination of this subject. The uses of every possession +are two, both dependent upon the thing itself, but not in the same +manner, the one supposing an inseparable connection with it, the other +not; as a shoe, for instance, which may be either worn, or exchanged +for something else, both these are the uses of the shoe; for he who +exchanges a shoe with some man who wants one, for money or provisions, +uses the shoe as a shoe, but not according to the original intention, +for shoes were not at first made to be exchanged. The same thing holds +true of all other possessions; for barter, in general, had its original +beginning in nature, some men having a surplus, others too little of +what was necessary for them: hence it is evident, that the selling +provisions for money is not according to the natural use of things; for +they were obliged to use barter for those things which they wanted; but +it is plain that barter could have no place in the first, that is to +say, in family society; but must have begun when the number of those +who composed the community was enlarged: for the first of these had all +things in common; but when they came to be separated they were obliged +to exchange with each other many different things which both parties +wanted. Which custom of barter is still preserved amongst many barbarous +nations, who procure one necessary with another, but never sell +anything; as giving and receiving wine for corn and the like. This +sort of barter is not contradictory to nature, nor is it any species of +money-getting; but is necessary in procuring that subsistence which is +so consonant thereunto. But this barter introduced the use of money, as +might be expected; for a convenient place from whence to import what you +wanted, or to export what you had a surplus of, being often at a great +distance, money necessarily made its way into commerce; for it is not +everything which is naturally most useful that is easiest of carriage; +for which reason they invented something to exchange with each other +which they should mutually give and take, that being really valuable +itself, should have the additional advantage of being of easy +conveyance, for the purposes of life, as iron and silver, or anything +else of the same nature: and this at first passed in value simply +according to its weight or size; but in process of time it had a certain +stamp, to save the trouble of weighing, which stamp expressed its value. +[1257b] + +Money then being established as the necessary medium of exchange, +another species of money-getting soon took place, namely, by buying +and selling, at probably first in a simple manner, afterwards with more +skill and experience, where and how the greatest profits might be made. +For which reason the art of money-getting seems to be chiefly conversant +about trade, and the business of it to be able to tell where the +greatest profits can be made, being the means of procuring abundance +of wealth and possessions: and thus wealth is very often supposed to +consist in the quantity of money which any one possesses, as this is the +medium by which all trade is conducted and a fortune made, others again +regard it as of no value, as being of none by nature, but arbitrarily +made so by compact; so that if those who use it should alter their +sentiments, it would be worth nothing, as being of no service for +any necessary purpose. Besides, he who abounds in money often wants +necessary food; and it is impossible to say that any person is in good +circumstances when with all his possessions he may perish with hunger. + +Like Midas in the fable, who from his insatiable wish had everything he +touched turned into gold. For which reason others endeavour to procure +other riches and other property, and rightly, for there are other riches +and property in nature; and these are the proper objects of economy: +while trade only procures money, not by all means, but by the exchange +of it, and for that purpose it is this which it is chiefly employed +about, for money is the first principle and the end of trade; nor are +there any bounds to be set to what is thereby acquired. Thus also there +are no limits to the art of medicine, with respect to the health which +it attempts to procure; the same also is true of all other arts; no line +can be drawn to terminate their bounds, the several professors of them +being desirous to extend them as far as possible. (But still the means +to be employed for that purpose are limited; and these are the limits +beyond which the art cannot proceed.) Thus in the art of acquiring +riches there are no limits, for the object of that is money and +possessions; but economy has a boundary, though this has not: for +acquiring riches is not the business of that, for which reason it should +seem that some boundary should be set to riches, though we see the +contrary to this is what is practised; for all those who get riches add +to their money without end; the cause of which is the near connection +of these two arts with each other, which sometimes occasions the one to +change employments with the other, as getting of money is their common +object: for economy requires the possession of wealth, but not on +its own account but with another view, to purchase things necessary +therewith; but the other procures it merely to increase it: so that some +persons are confirmed in their belief, that this is the proper object +of economy, and think that for this purpose money should be saved and +hoarded up without end; the reason for which disposition is, that they +are intent upon living, but not upon living well; and this desire being +boundless in its extent, the means which they aim at for that purpose +are boundless also; and those who propose to live well, often confine +that to the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense; so that as this also +seems to depend upon what a man has, all their care is to get money, +and hence arises the other cause for this art; for as this enjoyment is +excessive in its degree, they endeavour to procure means proportionate +to supply it; and if they cannot do this merely by the art of dealing in +money, they will endeavour to do it by other ways, and apply all their +powers to a purpose they were not by nature intended for. Thus, for +instance, courage was intended to inspire fortitude, not to get money +by; neither is this the end of the soldier's or the physician's art, +but victory and health. But such persons make everything subservient to +money-getting, as if this was the only end; and to the end everything +ought to refer. + +We have now considered that art of money-getting which is not necessary, +and have seen in what manner we became in want of it; and also that +which is necessary, which is different from it; for that economy which +is natural, and whose object is to provide food, is not like this +unlimited in its extent, but has its bounds. + + + + +CHAPTER X + + +We have now determined what was before doubtful, whether or no the art +of getting money is his business who is at the head of a family or a +state, and though not strictly so, it is however very necessary; for +as a politician does not make men, but receiving them from the hand of +nature employs them to proper purposes; thus the earth, or the sea, or +something else ought to supply them with provisions, and this it is the +business of the master of the family to manage properly; for it is not +the weaver's business to make yarn, but to use it, and to distinguish +what is good and useful from what is bad and of no service; and indeed +some one may inquire why getting money should be a part of economy when +the art of healing is not, as it is as requisite that the family should +be in health as that they should eat, or have anything else which is +necessary; and as it is indeed in some particulars the business both of +the master of the family, and he to whom the government of the state +is entrusted, to see after the health of those under their care, but in +others not, but the physician's; so also as to money; in some respects +it is the business of the master of the family, in others not, but of +the servant; but as we have already said, it is chiefly nature's, for +it is her part to supply her offspring with food; for everything finds +nourishment left for it in what produced it; for which reason +the natural riches of all men arise from fruits and animals. Now +money-making, as we say, being twofold, it may be applied to two +purposes, the service of the house or retail trade; of which the first +is necessary and commendable, the other justly censurable; for it has +not its origin in [1258b] nature, but by it men gain from each other; +for usury is most reasonably detested, as it is increasing our fortune +by money itself, and not employing it for the purpose it was originally +intended, namely exchange. + +And this is the explanation of the name (TOKOS), which means the +breeding of money. For as offspring resemble their parents, so usury +is money bred of money. Whence of all forms of money-making it is most +against nature. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + + +Having already sufficiently considered the general principles of this +subject, let us now go into the practical part thereof; the one is a +liberal employment for the mind, the other necessary. These things are +useful in the management of one's affairs; to be skilful in the nature +of cattle, which are most profitable, and where, and how; as for +instance, what advantage will arise from keeping horses, or oxen, or +sheep, or any other live stock; it is also necessary to be acquainted +with the comparative value of these things, and which of them in +particular places are worth most; for some do better in one place, some +in another. Agriculture also should be understood, and the management +of arable grounds and orchards; and also the care of bees, and fish, and +birds, from whence any profit may arise; these are the first and most +proper parts of domestic management. + +With respect to gaining money by exchange, the principal method of doing +this is by merchandise, which is carried on in three different ways, +either by sending the commodity for sale by sea or by land, or else +selling it on the place where it grows; and these differ from each other +in this, that the one is more profitable, the other safer. The second +method is by usury. The third by receiving wages for work done, and +this either by being employed in some mean art, or else in mere bodily +labour. There is also a third species of improving a fortune, that is +something between this and the first; for it partly depends upon +nature, partly upon exchange; the subject of which is, things that are +immediately from the earth, or their produce, which, though they bear +no fruit, are yet useful, such as selling of timber and the whole art of +metallurgy, which includes many different species, for there are various +sorts of things dug out of the earth. + +These we have now mentioned in general, but to enter into particulars +concerning each of them, though it might be useful to the artist, would +be tiresome to dwell on. Now of all the works of art, those are the most +excellent wherein chance has the least to do, and those are the meanest +which deprave the body, those the most servile in which bodily strength +alone is chiefly wanted, those most illiberal which require least skill; +but as there are books written on these subjects by some persons, as +by Chares the Panian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, upon husbandry and +planting; and by others on other matters, [1259b] let those who have +occasion consult them thereon; besides, every person should collect +together whatsoever he hears occasionally mentioned, by means of which +many of those who aimed at making a fortune have succeeded in their +intentions; for all these are useful to those who make a point of +getting money, as in the contrivance of Thales the Milesian (which was +certainly a gainful one, but as it was his it was attributed to +his wisdom, though the method he used was a general one, and would +universally succeed), when they reviled him for his poverty, as if the +study of philosophy was useless: for they say that he, perceiving by his +skill in astrology that there would be great plenty of olives that year, +while it was yet winter, having got a little money, he gave earnest for +all the oil works that were in Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a +low price, there being no one to bid against him; but when the season +came for making oil, many persons wanting them, he all at once let them +upon what terms he pleased; and raising a large sum of money by that +means, convinced them that it was easy for philosophers to be rich if +they chose it, but that that was not what they aimed at; in this manner +is Thales said to have shown his wisdom. It indeed is, as we have +said, generally gainful for a person to contrive to make a monopoly of +anything; for which reason some cities also take this method when they +want money, and monopolise their commodities. There was a certain person +in Sicily who laid out a sum of money which was deposited in his hand in +buying up all the iron from the iron merchants; so that when the dealers +came from the markets to purchase, there was no one had any to sell but +himself; and though he put no great advance upon it, yet by laying out +fifty talents he made an hundred. When Dionysius heard this he permitted +him to take his money with him, but forbid him to continue any longer in +Sicily, as being one who contrived means for getting money inconsistent +with his affairs. This man's view and Thales's was exactly the same; +both of them contrived to procure a monopoly for themselves: it is +useful also for politicians to understand these things, for many states +want to raise money and by such means, as well as private families, +nay more so; for which reason some persons who are employed in the +management of public affairs confine themselves to this province only. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + + +There are then three parts of domestic government, the masters, of +which we have already treated, the fathers, and the husbands; now the +government of the wife and children should both be that of free persons, +but not the [I259b] same; for the wife should be treated as a citizen of +a free state, the children should be under kingly power; for the male is +by nature superior to the female, except when something happens contrary +to the usual course of nature, as is the elder and perfect to the +younger and imperfect. Now in the generality of free states, the +governors and the governed alternately change place; for an equality +without any preference is what nature chooses; however, when one +governs and another is governed, she endeavours that there should be a +distinction between them in forms, expressions, and honours; according +to what Amasis said of his laver. This then should be the established +rule between the man and the woman. The government of children should +be kingly; for the power of the father over the child is founded in +affection and seniority, which is a species of kingly government; for +which reason Homer very properly calls Jupiter "the father of gods and +men," who was king of both these; for nature requires that a king should +be of the same species with those whom he governs, though superior in +some particulars, as is the case between the elder and the younger, the +father and the son. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + + +It is evident then that in the due government of a family, greater +attention should be paid to the several members of it and their virtues +than to the possessions or riches of it; and greater to the freemen +than the slaves: but here some one may doubt whether there is any other +virtue in a slave than his organic services, and of higher estimation +than these, as temperance, fortitude, justice, and such-like habits, or +whether they possess only bodily qualities: each side of the question +has its difficulties; for if they possess these virtues, wherein do +they differ from freemen? and that they do not, since they are men, +and partakers of reason, is absurd. Nearly the same inquiry may be made +concerning a woman and a child, whether these also have their proper +virtues; whether a woman ought to be temperate, brave, and just, and +whether a child is temperate or no; and indeed this inquiry ought to be +general, whether the virtues of those who, by nature, either govern or +are governed, are the same or different; for if it is necessary that +both of them should partake of the fair and good, why is it also +necessary that, without exception, the one should govern, the other +always be governed? for this cannot arise from their possessing these +qualities in different degrees; for to govern, and to be governed, are +things different in species, but more or less are not. And yet it is +wonderful that one party ought to have them, and the other not; for if +he who is to govern should not be temperate and just, how can he govern +well? or if he is to be governed, how can he be governed well? for he +who is intemperate [1260a] and a coward will never do what he ought: it +is evident then that both parties ought to be virtuous; but there is a +difference between them, as there is between those who by nature command +and who by nature obey, and this originates in the soul; for in this +nature has planted the governing and submitting principle, the virtues +of which we say are different, as are those of a rational and an +irrational being. It is plain then that the same principle may be +extended farther, and that there are in nature a variety of things which +govern and are governed; for a freeman is governed in a different manner +from a slave, a male from a female, and a man from a child: and all +these have parts of mind within them, but in a different manner. Thus +a slave can have no power of determination, a woman but a weak one, a +child an imperfect one. Thus also must it necessarily be with respect to +moral virtues; all must be supposed to possess them, but not in the +same manner, but as is best suited to every one's employment; on which +account he who is to govern ought to be perfect in moral virtue, for his +business is entirely that of an architect, and reason is the architect; +while others want only that portion of it which may be sufficient for +their station; from whence it is evident, that although moral virtue is +common to all those we have spoken of, yet the temperance of a man and +a woman are not the same, nor their courage, nor their justice, though +Socrates thought otherwise; for the courage of the man consists in +commanding, the woman's in obeying; and the same is true in other +particulars: and this will be evident to those who will examine +different virtues separately; for those who use general terms deceive +themselves when they say, that virtue consists in a good disposition of +mind, or doing what is right, or something of this sort. They do much +better who enumerate the different virtues as Georgias did, than those +who thus define them; and as Sophocles speaks of a woman, we think +of all persons, that their 'virtues should be applicable to their +characters, for says he, + + "Silence is a woman's ornament," + +but it is not a man's; and as a child is incomplete, it is evident that +his virtue is not to be referred to himself in his present situation, +but to that in which he will be complete, and his preceptor. In like +manner the virtue of a slave is to be referred to his master; for we +laid it down as a maxim, that the use of a slave was to employ him in +what you wanted; so that it is clear enough that few virtues are wanted +in his station, only that he may not neglect his work through idleness +or fear: some person may question if what I have said is true, whether +virtue is not necessary for artificers in their calling, for they often +through idleness neglect their work, but the difference between them +is very great; for a slave is connected with you for life, but the +artificer not so nearly: as near therefore as the artificer approaches +to the situation of a slave, just so much ought he to have of the +virtues of one; for a mean artificer is to a certain point a slave; but +then a slave is one of those things which are by nature what they are, +but this is not true [1260b] of a shoemaker, or any other artist. It is +evident then that a slave ought to be trained to those virtues which are +proper for his situation by his master; and not by him who has the power +of a master, to teach him any particular art. Those therefore are in the +wrong who would deprive slaves of reason, and say that they have only to +follow their orders; for slaves want more instruction than children, and +thus we determine this matter. It is necessary, I am sensible, for every +one who treats upon government, to enter particularly into the relations +of husband and wife, and of parent and child, and to show what are the +virtues of each and their respective connections with each other; what +is right and what is wrong; and how the one ought to be followed, and +the other avoided. Since then every family is part of a city, and each +of those individuals is part of a family, and the virtue of the parts +ought to correspond to the virtue of the whole; it is necessary, that +both the wives and children of the community should be instructed +correspondent to the nature thereof, if it is of consequence to the +virtue of the state, that the wives and children therein should be +virtuous, and of consequence it certainly is, for the wives are one half +of the free persons; and of the children the succeeding citizens are to +be formed. As then we have determined these points, we will leave +the rest to be spoken to in another place, as if the subject was now +finished; and beginning again anew, first consider the sentiments of +those who have treated of the most perfect forms of government. + + + + +BOOK II + + + + +CHAPTER I + + +Since then we propose to inquire what civil society is of all others +best for those who have it in their power to live entirely as they wish, +it is necessary to examine into the polity of those states which are +allowed to be well governed; and if there should be any others which +some persons have described, and which appear properly regulated, to +note what is right and useful in them; and when we point out wherein +they have failed, let not this be imputed to an affectation of wisdom, +for it is because there are great defects in all those which are already +established, that I have been induced to undertake this work. We will +begin with that part of the subject which naturally presents itself +first to our consideration. The members of every state must of necessity +have all things in common, or some things common, and not others, +or nothing at all common. To have nothing in common is evidently +impossible, for society itself is one species of [1261a] community; and +the first thing necessary thereunto is a common place of habitation, +namely the city, which must be one, and this every citizen must have a +share in. But in a government which is to be well founded, will it be +best to admit of a community in everything which is capable thereof, or +only in some particulars, but in others not? for it is possible that the +citizens may have their wives, and children, and goods in common, as +in Plato's Commonwealth; for in that Socrates affirms that all these +particulars ought to be so. Which then shall we prefer? the custom which +is already established, or the laws which are proposed in that treatise? + + + + +CHAPTER II + + +Now as a community of wives is attended with many other difficulties, so +neither does the cause for which he would frame his government in this +manner seem agreeable to reason, nor is it capable of producing that end +which he has proposed, and for which he says it ought to take place; nor +has he given any particular directions for putting it in practice. Now +I also am willing to agree with Socrates in the principle which he +proceeds upon, and admit that the city ought to be one as much as +possible; and yet it is evident that if it is contracted too much, it +will be no longer a city, for that necessarily supposes a multitude; so +that if we proceed in this manner, we shall reduce a city to a family, +and a family to a single person: for we admit that a family is one in a +greater degree than a city, and a single person than a family; so that +if this end could be obtained, it should never be put in practice, as it +would annihilate the city; for a city does not only consist of a large +number of inhabitants, but there must also be different sorts; for were +they all alike, there could be no city; for a confederacy and a city are +two different things; for a confederacy is valuable from its numbers, +although all those who compose it are men of the same calling; for this +is entered into for the sake of mutual defence, as we add an additional +weight to make the scale go down. The same distinction prevails between +a city and a nation when the people are not collected into separate +villages, but live as the Arcadians. Now those things in which a city +should be one are of different sorts, and in preserving an alternate +reciprocation of power between these, the safety thereof consists (as +I have already mentioned in my treatise on Morals), for amongst freemen +and equals this is absolutely necessary; for all cannot govern at the +same time, but either by the year, or according to some other regulation +or time, by which means every one in his turn will be in office; as +if the shoemakers and carpenters should exchange occupations, and not +always be employed in the same calling. But as it is evidently better, +that these should continue to exercise their respective trades; so also +in civil society, where it is possible, it would be better that the +government should continue in the same hands; but where it [1261b] is +not (as nature has made all men equal, and therefore it is just, be the +administration good or bad, that all should partake of it), there it is +best to observe a rotation, and let those who are their equals by turns +submit to those who are at that time magistrates, as they will, in their +turns, alternately be governors and governed, as if they were different +men: by the same method different persons will execute different +offices. From hence it is evident, that a city cannot be one in the +manner that some persons propose; and that what has been said to be the +greatest good which it could enjoy, is absolutely its destruction, which +cannot be: for the good of anything is that which preserves it. +For another reason also it is clear, that it is not for the best +to endeavour to make a city too much one, because a family is more +sufficient in itself than a single person, a city than a family; and +indeed Plato supposes that a city owes its existence to that sufficiency +in themselves which the members of it enjoy. If then this sufficiency is +so desirable, the less the city is one the better. + + + + +CHAPTER III + + +But admitting that it is most advantageous for a city to be one as much +as possible, it does not seem to follow that this will take place by +permitting all at once to say this is mine, and this is not mine (though +this is what Socrates regards as a proof that a city is entirely one), +for the word All is used in two senses; if it means each individual, +what Socrates proposes will nearly take place; for each person will +say, this is his own son, and his own wife, and his own property, and +of everything else that may happen to belong to him, that it is his own. +But those who have their wives and children in common will not say so, +but all will say so, though not as individuals; therefore, to use the +word all is evidently a fallacious mode of speech; for this word is +sometimes used distributively, and sometimes collectively, on account +of its double meaning, and is the cause of inconclusive syllogisms in +reasoning. Therefore for all persons to say the same thing was their +own, using the word all in its distributive sense, would be well, but is +impossible: in its collective sense it would by no means contribute to +the concord of the state. Besides, there would be another inconvenience +attending this proposal, for what is common to many is taken least care +of; for all men regard more what is their own than what others share +with them in, to which they pay less attention than is incumbent on +every one: let me add also, that every one is more negligent of what +another is to see to, as well as himself, than of his own private +business; as in a family one is often worse served by many servants than +by a few. Let each citizen then in the state have a thousand children, +but let none of them be considered as the children of that individual, +but let the relation of father and child be common to them all, and they +will all be neglected. Besides, in consequence of this, [1262a] whenever +any citizen behaved well or ill, every person, be the number what it +would, might say, this is my son, or this man's or that; and in +this manner would they speak, and thus would they doubt of the whole +thousand, or of whatever number the city consisted; and it would be +uncertain to whom each child belonged, and when it was born, who was to +take care of it: and which do you think is better, for every one to say +this is mine, while they may apply it equally to two thousand or ten +thousand; or as we say, this is mine in our present forms of government, +where one man calls another his son, another calls that same person +his brother, another nephew, or some other relation, either by blood +or marriage, and first extends his care to him and his, while another +regards him as one of the same parish and the same tribe; and it is +better for any one to be a nephew in his private capacity than a son +after that manner. Besides, it will be impossible to prevent some +persons from suspecting that they are brothers and sisters, fathers and +mothers to each other; for, from the mutual likeness there is between +the sire and the offspring, they will necessarily conclude in what +relation they stand to each other, which circumstance, we are informed +by those writers who describe different parts of the world, does +sometimes happen; for in Upper Africa there are wives in common who +yet deliver their children to their respective fathers, being guided +by their likeness to them. There are also some mares and cows which +naturally bring forth their young so like the male, that we can easily +distinguish by which of them they were impregnated: such was the mare +called Just, in Pharsalia. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + +Besides, those who contrive this plan of community cannot easily avoid +the following evils; namely, blows, murders involuntary or voluntary, +quarrels, and reproaches, all which it would be impious indeed to be +guilty of towards our fathers and mothers, or those who are nearly +related to us; though not to those who are not connected to us by any +tie of affinity: and certainly these mischiefs must necessarily happen +oftener amongst those who do not know how they are connected to each +other than those who do; and when they do happen, if it is among the +first of these, they admit of a legal expiation, but amongst the latter +that cannot be done. It is also absurd for those who promote a +community of children to forbid those who love each other from indulging +themselves in the last excesses of that passion, while they do not +restrain them from the passion itself, or those intercourses which are +of all things most improper, between a Father and a son, a brother and +a brother, and indeed the thing itself is most absurd. It is also +ridiculous to prevent this intercourse between the nearest relations, +for no other reason than the violence of the pleasure, while they think +that the relation of father and daughter, the brother and sister, is of +no consequence at all. It seems also more advantageous for the state, +that the husbandmen should have their wives and children in common than +the military, for there will be less affection [1262b] among them +in that case than when otherwise; for such persons ought to be under +subjection, that they may obey the laws, and not seek after innovations. +Upon the whole, the consequences of such a law as this would be directly +contrary to those things which good laws ought to establish, and which +Socrates endeavoured to establish by his regulations concerning women +and children: for we think that friendship is the greatest good which +can happen to any city, as nothing so much prevents seditions: and amity +in a city is what Socrates commends above all things, which appears +to be, as indeed he says, the effect of friendship; as we learn from +Aristophanes in the Erotics, who says, that those who love one another +from the excess of that passion, desire to breathe the same soul, and +from being two to be blended into one: from whence it would necessarily +follow, that both or one of them must be destroyed. But now in a city +which admits of this community, the tie of friendship must, from that +very cause, be extremely weak, when no father can say, this is my son; +or son, this is my father; for as a very little of what is sweet, being +mixed with a great deal of water is imperceptible after the mixture, so +must all family connections, and the names they go by, be necessarily +disregarded in such a community, it being then by no means necessary +that the father should have any regard for him he called a son, or +the brothers for those they call brothers. There are two things which +principally inspire mankind with care and love of their offspring, +knowing it is their own, and what ought to be the object of their +affection, neither of which can take place in this sort of community. As +for exchanging the children of the artificers and husbandmen with those +of the military, and theirs reciprocally with these, it will occasion +great confusion in whatever manner it shall be done; for of necessity, +those who carry the children must know from whom they took and to whom +they gave them; and by this means those evils which I have already +mentioned will necessarily be the more likely to happen, as blows, +incestuous love, murders, and the like; for those who are given from +their own parents to other citizens, the military, for instance, will +not call them brothers, sons, fathers, or mothers. The same thing +would happen to those of the military who were placed among the other +citizens; so that by this means every one would be in fear how to act +in consequence of consanguinity. And thus let us determine concerning a +community of wives and children. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + +We proceed next to consider in what manner property should be regulated +in a state which is formed after the most perfect mode of government, +whether it should be common or not; for this may be considered as a +separate question from what had been determined concerning [1263a] wives +and children; I mean, whether it is better that these should be held +separate, as they now everywhere are, or that not only possessions but +also the usufruct of them should be in common; or that the soil should +have a particular owner, but that the produce should be brought together +and used as one common stock, as some nations at present do; or on the +contrary, should the soil be common, and should it also be cultivated in +common, while the produce is divided amongst the individuals for their +particular use, which is said to be practised by some barbarians; or +shall both the soil and the fruit be common? When the business of +the husbandman devolves not on the citizen, the matter is much easier +settled; but when those labour together who have a common right of +possession, this may occasion several difficulties; for there may not +be an equal proportion between their labour and what they consume; and +those who labour hard and have but a small proportion of the produce, +will certainly complain of those who take a large share of it and do but +little for that. Upon the whole, as a community between man and man so +entire as to include everything possible, and thus to have all things +that man can possess in common, is very difficult, so is it particularly +so with respect to property; and this is evident from that community +which takes place between those who go out to settle a colony; for they +frequently have disputes with each other upon the most common occasions, +and come to blows upon trifles: we find, too, that we oftenest correct +those slaves who are generally employed in the common offices of the +family: a community of property then has these and other inconveniences +attending it. + +But the manner of life which is now established, more particularly when +embellished with good morals and a system of equal laws, is far superior +to it, for it will have the advantage of both; by both I mean properties +being common, and divided also; for in some respects it ought to be in +a manner common, but upon the whole private: for every man's attention +being employed on his own particular concerns, will prevent mutual +complaints against each other; nay, by this means industry will be +increased, as each person will labour to improve his own private +property; and it will then be, that from a principle of virtue they will +mutually perform good offices to each other, according to the proverb, +"All things are common amongst friends;" and in some cities there are +traces of this custom to be seen, so that it is not impracticable, and +particularly in those which are best governed; some things are by this +means in a manner common, and others might be so; for there, every +person enjoying his own private property, some things he assists his +friend with, others are considered as in common; as in Lacedaemon, where +they use each other's slaves, as if they were, so to speak, their own, +as they do their horses and dogs, or even any provision they may want in +a journey. + +It is evident then that it is best to have property private, but to make +the use of it common; but how the citizens are to be brought to it is +the particular [1263b] business of the legislator. And also with respect +to pleasure, it is unspeakable how advantageous it is, that a man should +think he has something which he may call his own; for it is by no means +to no purpose, that each person should have an affection for himself, +for that is natural, and yet to be a self-lover is justly censured; for +we mean by that, not one that simply loves himself, but one that loves +himself more than he ought; in like manner we blame a money-lover, +and yet both money and self is what all men love. Besides, it is very +pleasing to us to oblige and assist our friends and companions, as well +as those whom we are connected with by the rights of hospitality; and +this cannot be done without the establishment of private property, which +cannot take place with those who make a city too much one; besides, they +prevent every opportunity of exercising two principal virtues, modesty +and liberality. Modesty with respect to the female sex, for this virtue +requires you to abstain from her who is another's; liberality, which +depends upon private property, for without that no one can appear +liberal, or do any generous action; for liberality consists in imparting +to others what is our own. + +This system of polity does indeed recommend itself by its good +appearance and specious pretences to humanity; and when first proposed +to any one, must give him great pleasure, as he will conclude it to be +a wonderful bond of friendship, connecting all to all; particularly +when any one censures the evils which are now to be found in society, +as arising from properties not being common, I mean the disputes which +happen between man and man, upon their different contracts with each +other; those judgments which are passed in court in consequence of +fraud, and perjury, and flattering the rich, none of which arise from +properties being private, but from the vices of mankind. Besides, +those who live in one general community, and have all things in common, +oftener dispute with each other than those who have their property +separate; from the very small number indeed of those who have their +property in common, compared with those where it is appropriated, +the instances of their quarrels are but few. It is also but right to +mention, not only the inconveniences they are preserved from who live in +a communion of goods, but also the advantages they are deprived of; for +when the whole comes to be considered, this manner of life will be found +impracticable. + +We must suppose, then, that Socrates's mistake arose from the principle +he set out with being false; we admit, indeed, that both a family and a +city ought to be one in some particulars, but not entirely; for there +is a point beyond which if a city proceeds in reducing itself to one, it +will be no longer a city. + +There is also another point at which it will still continue to be a +city, but it will approach so near to not being one, that it will be +worse than none; as if any one should reduce the voices of those who +sing in concert to one, or a verse to a foot. But the people ought to +be made one, and a community, as I have already said, by education; +as property at Lacedaemon, and their public tables at Crete, were made +common by their legislators. But yet, whosoever shall introduce any +education, and think thereby to make his city excellent and respectable, +will be absurd, while he expects to form it by such regulations, and not +by manners, philosophy, and laws. And whoever [1264a] would establish +a government upon a community of goods, ought to know that he should +consult the experience of many years, which would plainly enough inform +him whether such a scheme is useful; for almost all things have already +been found out, but some have been neglected, and others which have been +known have not been put in practice. But this would be most evident, if +any one could see such a government really established: for it would be +impossible to frame such a city without dividing and separating it into +its distinct parts, as public tables, wards, and tribes; so that here +the laws will do nothing more than forbid the military to engage +in agriculture, which is what the Lacedaemonians are at present +endeavouring to do. + +Nor has Socrates told us (nor is it easy to say) what plan of government +should be pursued with respect to the individuals in the state where +there is a community of goods established; for though the majority +of his citizens will in general consist of a multitude of persons of +different occupations, of those he has determined nothing; whether the +property of the husbandman ought to be in common, or whether each person +should have his share to himself; and also, whether their wives and +children ought to be in common: for if all things are to be alike common +to all, where will be the difference between them and the military, or +what would they get by submitting to their government? and upon what +principles would they do it, unless they should establish the wise +practice of the Cretans? for they, allowing everything else to their +slaves, forbid them only gymnastic exercises and the use of arms. And if +they are not, but these should be in the same situation with respect to +their property which they are in other cities, what sort of a community +will there be? in one city there must of necessity be two, and those +contrary to each other; for he makes the military the guardians of the +state, and the husbandman, artisans, and others, citizens; and all those +quarrels, accusations, and things of the like sort, which he says are +the bane of other cities, will be found in his also: notwithstanding +Socrates says they will not want many laws in consequence of their +education, but such only as may be necessary for regulating the streets, +the markets, and the like, while at the same time it is the education of +the military only that he has taken any care of. Besides, he makes the +husbandmen masters of property upon paying a tribute; but this would +be likely to make them far more troublesome and high-spirited than the +Helots, the Penestise, or the slaves which others employ; nor has he +ever determined whether it is necessary to give any attention to them +in these particulars, nor thought of what is connected therewith, +their polity, their education, their laws; besides, it is of no little +consequence, nor is it easy to determine, how these should be framed so +as to preserve the community of the military. + +Besides, if he makes the wives common, while the property [1264b] +continues separate, who shall manage the domestic concerns with the same +care which the man bestows upon his fields? nor will the inconvenience +be remedied by making property as well as wives common; and it is absurd +to draw a comparison from the brute creation, and say, that the same +principle should regulate the connection of a man and a woman which +regulates theirs amongst whom there is no family association. + +It is also very hazardous to settle the magistracy as Socrates has +done; for he would have persons of the same rank always in office, which +becomes the cause of sedition even amongst those who are of no account, +but more particularly amongst those who are of a courageous and warlike +disposition; it is indeed evidently necessary that he should frame his +community in this manner; for that golden particle which God has mixed +up in the soul of man flies not from one to the other, but always +continues with the same; for he says, that some of our species have +gold, and others silver, blended in their composition from the moment of +their birth: but those who are to be husbandmen and artists, brass and +iron; besides, though he deprives the military of happiness, he says, +that the legislator ought to make all the citizens happy; but it +is impossible that the whole city can be happy, without all, or the +greater, or some part of it be happy. For happiness is not like +that numerical equality which arises from certain numbers when added +together, although neither of them may separately contain it; for +happiness cannot be thus added together, but must exist in every +individual, as some properties belong to every integral; and if the +military are not happy, who else are so? for the artisans are not, nor +the multitude of those who are employed in inferior offices. The state +which Socrates has described has all these defects, and others which are +not of less consequence. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + +It is also nearly the same in the treatise upon Laws which was writ +afterwards, for which reason it will be proper in this place to consider +briefly what he has there said upon government, for Socrates has +thoroughly settled but very few parts of it; as for instance, in what +manner the community of wives and children ought to be regulated, how +property should be established, and government conducted. + +Now he divides the inhabitants into two parts, husbandmen and soldiers, +and from these he select a third part who are to be senators and govern +the city; but he has not said whether or no the husbandman and artificer +shall have any or what share in the government, or whether they shall +have arms, and join with the others in war, or not. He thinks also +that the women ought to go to war, and have the same education as the +soldiers; as to other particulars, he has filled his treatise with +matter foreign to the purpose; and with respect to education, he has +only said what that of the guards ought to be. + +[1265a] As to his book of Laws, laws are the principal thing which that +contains, for he has there said but little concerning government; and +this government, which he was so desirous of framing in such a manner as +to impart to its members a more entire community of goods than is to be +found in other cities, he almost brings round again to be the same +as that other government which he had first proposed; for except the +community of wives and goods, he has framed both his governments alike, +for the education of the citizens is to be the same in both; they are in +both to live without any servile employ, and their common tables are to +be the same, excepting that in that he says the women should have common +tables, and that there should be a thousand men-at-arms, in this, that +there should be five thousand. + +All the discourses of Socrates are masterly, noble, new, and +inquisitive; but that they are all true it may probably be too much +to say. For now with respect to the number just spoken of, it must be +acknowledged that he would want the country of Babylonia for them, or +some one like it, of an immeasurable extent, to support five thousand +idle persons, besides a much greater number of women and servants. Every +one, it is true, may frame an hypothesis as he pleases, but yet it ought +to be possible. It has been said, that a legislator should have two +things in view when he frames his laws, the country and the people. He +will also do well, if he has some regard to the neighbouring states, if +he intends that his community should maintain any political intercourse +with them, for it is not only necessary that they should understand that +practice of war which is adapted to their own country, but to others +also; for admitting that any one chooses not this life either in +public or private, yet there is not the less occasion for their being +formidable to their enemies, not only when they invade their country, +but also when they retire out of it. + +It may also be considered whether the quantity of each person's property +may not be settled in a different manner from what he has done it in, +by making it more determinate; for he says, that every one ought to have +enough whereon to live moderately, as if any one had said to live well, +which is the most comprehensive expression. Besides, a man may live +moderately and miserably at the same time; he had therefore better +have proposed, that they should live both moderately and liberally; +for unless these two conspire, luxury will come in on the one hand, or +wretchedness on the other, since these two modes of living are the only +ones applicable to the employment of our substance; for we cannot say +with respect to a man's fortune, that he is mild or courageous, but we +may say that he is prudent and liberal, which are the only qualities +connected therewith. + +It is also absurd to render property equal, and not to provide for +the increasing number of the citizens; but to leave that circumstance +uncertain, as if it would regulate itself according to the number of +women who [1265b] should happen to be childless, let that be what it +would because this seems to take place in other cities; but the case +would not be the same in such a state which he proposes and those which +now actually unite; for in these no one actually wants, as the property +is divided amongst the whole community, be their numbers what they will; +but as it could not then be divided, the supernumeraries, whether they +were many or few, would have nothing at all. But it is more necessary +than even to regulate property, to take care that the increase of the +people should not exceed a certain number; and in determining that, +to take into consideration those children who will die, and also those +women who will be barren; and to neglect this, as is done in several +cities, is to bring certain poverty on the citizens; and poverty is the +cause of sedition and evil. Now Phidon the Corinthian, one of the oldest +legislators, thought the families and the number of the citizens should +continue the same; although it should happen that all should have +allotments at the first, disproportionate to their numbers. + +In Plato's Laws it is however different; we shall mention hereafter what +we think would be best in these particulars. He has also neglected in +that treatise to point out how the governors are to be distinguished +from the governed; for he says, that as of one sort of wool the warp +ought to be made, and of another the woof, so ought some to govern, and +others to be governed. But since he admits, that all their property may +be increased fivefold, why should he not allow the same increase to the +country? he ought also to consider whether his allotment of the houses +will be useful to the community, for he appoints two houses to each +person, separate from each other; but it is inconvenient for a person +to inhabit two houses. Now he is desirous to have his whole plan of +government neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but something between +both, which he calls a polity, for it is to be composed of men-at-arms. +If Plato intended to frame a state in which more than in any other +everything should be common, he has certainly given it a right name; +but if he intended it to be the next in perfection to that which he had +already framed, it is not so; for perhaps some persons will give the +preference to the Lacedaemonian form of government, or some other which +may more completely have attained to the aristocratic form. + +Some persons say, that the most perfect government should be composed +of all others blended together, for which reason they commend that +of Lacedaemon; for they say, that this is composed of an oligarchy, +a monarchy, and a democracy, their kings representing the monarchical +part, the senate the oligarchical; and, that in the ephori may be found +the democratical, as these are taken from the people. But some say, that +in the ephori is absolute power, and that it is their common meal and +daily course of life, in which the democratical form is represented. +It is also said in this treatise of [1266a] Laws, that the best form of +government must, be one composed of a democracy and a tyranny; though +such a mixture no one else would ever allow to be any government at all, +or if it is, the worst possible; those propose what is much better who +blend many governments together; for the most perfect is that which is +formed of many parts. But now in this government of Plato's there are +no traces of a monarchy, only of an oligarchy and democracy; though he +seems to choose that it should rather incline to an oligarchy, as is +evident from the appointment of the magistrates; for to choose them by +lot is common to both; but that a man of fortune must necessarily be a +member of the assembly, or to elect the magistrates, or take part in the +management of public affairs, while others are passed over, makes the +state incline to an oligarchy; as does the endeavouring that the +greater part of the rich may be in office, and that the rank of their +appointments may correspond with their fortunes. + +The same principle prevails also in the choice of their senate; the +manner of electing which is favourable also to an oligarchy; for all +are obliged to vote for those who are senators of the first class, +afterwards they vote for the same number out of the second, and then out +of the third; but this compulsion to vote at the election of senators +does not extend to the third and fourth classes and the first and second +class only are obliged to vote for the fourth. By this means he says +he shall necessarily have an equal number of each rank, but he is +mistaken--for the majority will always consist of those of the first +rank, and the most considerable people; and for this reason, that +many of the commonalty not being obliged to it, will not attend the +elections. From hence it is evident, that such a state will not consist +of a democracy and a monarchy, and this will be further proved by +what we shall say when we come particularly to consider this form of +government. + +There will also great danger arise from the manner of electing the +senate, when those who are elected themselves are afterwards to elect +others; for by this means, if a certain number choose to combine +together, though not very considerable, the election will always fall +according to their pleasure. Such are the things which Plato proposes +concerning government in his book of Laws. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + +There are also some other forms of government, which have been proposed +either by private persons, or philosophers, or politicians, all of which +come much nearer to those which have been really established, or now +exist, than these two of Plato's; for neither have they introduced the +innovation of a community of wives and children, and public tables for +the women, but have been contented to set out with establishing such +rules as are absolutely necessary. + +There are some persons who think, that the first object of government +should be to regulate well everything relating to private property; +for they say, that a neglect herein is the source of all seditions +whatsoever. For this reason, Phaleas the Chalcedonian first proposed, +that the fortunes of the citizens should be equal, which he thought was +not difficult to accomplish when a community was first settled, but +that it was a work of greater difficulty in one that had been long +established; but yet that it might be effected, and an equality of +circumstances introduced by these means, that the rich should give +marriage portions, but never receive any, while the poor should always +receive, but never give. + +But Plato, in his treatise of Laws, thinks that a difference in +circumstances should be permitted to a certain degree; but that no +citizen should be allowed to possess more than five times as much as the +lowest census, as we have already mentioned. But legislators who +would establish this principle are apt to overlook what they ought to +consider; that while they regulate the quantity of provisions which each +individual shall possess, they ought also to regulate the number of his +children; for if these exceed the allotted quantity of provision, the +law must necessarily be repealed; and yet, in spite of the repeal, it +will have the bad effect of reducing many from wealth to poverty, so +difficult is it for innovators not to fall into such mistakes. That an +equality of goods was in some degree serviceable to strengthen the bands +of society, seems to have been known to some of the ancients; for Solon +made a law, as did some others also, to restrain persons from possessing +as much land as they pleased. And upon the same principle there are laws +which forbid men to sell their property, as among the Locrians, unless +they can prove that some notorious misfortune has befallen them. They +were also to preserve their ancient patrimony, which custom being broken +through by the Leucadians, made their government too democratic; for +by that means it was no longer necessary to be possessed of a certain +fortune to be qualified to be a magistrate. But if an equality of goods +is established, this may be either too much, when it enables the people +to live luxuriously, or too little, when it obliges them to live +hard. Hence it is evident, that it is not proper for the legislator +to establish an equality of circumstances, but to fix a proper medium. +Besides, if any one should regulate the division of property in such a +manner that there should be a moderate sufficiency for all, it would +be of no use; for it is of more consequence that the citizen should +entertain a similarity of sentiments than an equality of circumstances; +but this can never be attained unless they are properly educated under +the direction of the law. But probably Phaleas may say, that this in +what he himself mentions; for he both proposes a equality of property +and one plan of education in his city. But he should have said +particularly what education he intended, nor is it of any service to +have this to much one; for this education may be one, and yet such as +will make the citizens over-greedy, to grasp after honours, or riches, +or both. Besides, not only an inequality of possessions, but also +of honours, will occasion [1267a] seditions, but this upon contrary +grounds; for the vulgar will be seditious if there be an inequality of +goods, by those of more elevated sentiments, if there is an equality of +honours. + + "When good and bad do equal honours share." + +For men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only (for which he +thinks an equality of goods would be a sufficient remedy, as they would +then have no occasion to steal cold or hunger), but that they may enjoy +what they desire, and not wish for it in vain; for if their desire extend +beyond the common necessaries of life, they were be wicked to gratify +them; and not only so, but if their wishes point that way, they will do +the same to enjoy those pleasures which are free from the alloy of pain. +What remedy then shall we find for these three disorders? And first, +to prevent stealing from necessity, let every one be supplied with a +moderate subsistence, which may make the addition of his own industry +necessary; second to prevent stealing to procure the luxuries of life, +temperance be enjoined; and thirdly, let those who wish for pleasure in +itself seek for it only in philosophy, all others want the assistance of +men. + +Since then men are guilty of the greatest crimes from ambition, and not +from necessity, no one, for instance aims at being a tyrant to keep him +from the cold, hence great honour is due to him who kills not a thief, +but tyrant; so that polity which Phaleas establishes would only be +salutary to prevent little crimes. He has also been very desirous to +establish such rules as will conduce to perfect the internal policy of +his state, and he ought also to have done the same with respect to +its neighbours and all foreign nations; for the considerations of the +military establishment should take place in planning every government, +that it may not be unprovided in case of a war, of which he has said +nothing; so also with respect to property, it ought not only to be +adapted to the exigencies of the state, but also to such dangers as may +arise from without. + +Thus it should not be so much as to tempt those who are near, and more +powerful to invade it, while those who possess it are not able to drive +out the invaders, nor so little as that the state should not be able to +go to war with those who are quite equal to itself, and of this he has +determined nothing; it must indeed be allowed that it is advantageous to +a community to be rather rich than poor; probably the proper boundary is +this, not to possess enough to make it worth while for a more powerful +neighbour to attack you, any more than he would those who had not so +much as yourself; thus when Autophradatus proposed to besiege Atarneus, +Eubulus advised him to consider what time it would require to take the +city, and then would have him determine whether it would answer, for +that he should choose, if it would even take less than he proposed, +to quit the place; his saying this made Autophradatus reflect upon the +business and give over the siege. There is, indeed, some advantage in an +equality of goods amongst the citizens to prevent seditions; and yet, +to say truth, no very great one; for men of great abilities will stomach +their being put upon a level with the rest of the community. For +which reason they will very often appear ready for every commotion and +sedition; for the wickedness of mankind is insatiable. For though +at first two oboli might be sufficient, yet when once it is become +customary, they continually want something more, until they set no +limits to their expectations; for it is the nature of our desires to be +boundless, and many live only to gratify them. But for this purpose the +first object is, not so much to establish an equality of fortune, as +to prevent those who are of a good disposition from desiring more than +their own, and those who are of a bad one from being able to acquire it; +and this may be done if they are kept in an inferior station, and not +exposed to injustice. Nor has he treated well the equality of goods, for +he has extended his regulation only to land; whereas a man's substance +consists not only in this, but also in slaves, cattle, money, and all +that variety of things which fall under the name of chattels; now there +must be either an equality established in all these, or some certain +rule, or they must be left entirely at large. It appears too by his +laws, that he intends to establish only a small state, as all the +artificers are to belong to the public, and add nothing to the +complement of citizens; but if all those who are to be employed in +public works are to be the slaves of the public, it should be done +in the same manner as it is at Epidamnum, and as Diophantus formerly +regulated it at Athens. From these particulars any one may nearly judge +whether Phaleas's community is well or ill established. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + + +Hippodamus, the son of Euruphon a Milesian, contrived the art of laying +out towns, and separated the Pireus. This man was in other respects +too eager after notice, and seemed to many to live in a very affected +manner, with his flowing locks and his expensive ornaments, and a coarse +warm vest which he wore, not only in the winter, but also in the +hot weather. As he was very desirous of the character of a universal +scholar, he was the first who, not being actually engaged in the +management of public affairs, sat himself to inquire what sort of +government was best; and he planned a state, consisting of ten thousand +persons, divided into three parts, one consisting of artisans, another +of husbandmen, and the third of soldiers; he also divided the lands into +three parts, and allotted one to sacred purposes, another to the public, +and the third to individuals. The first of these was to supply what was +necessary for the established worship of the gods; the second was to +be allotted to the support of the soldiery; and the third was to be +the property of the husbandman. He thought also that there need only be +three sorts of laws, corresponding to the three sorts of actions which +can be brought, namely, for assault, trespasses, or death. He ordered +also that there should be a particular court of appeal, into which +all causes might be removed which were supposed to have been unjustly +determined elsewhere; which court should be composed of old men chosen +for that purpose. He thought also [1268a] that they should not pass +sentence by votes; but that every one should bring with him a tablet, on +which he should write, that he found the party guilty, if it was so, but +if not, he should bring a plain tablet; but if he acquitted him of one +part of the indictment but not of the other, he should express that +also on the tablet; for he disapproved of that general custom already +established, as it obliges the judges to be guilty of perjury if they +determined positively either on the one side or the other. He also made +a law, that those should be rewarded who found out anything for the good +of the city, and that the children of those who fell in battle should be +educated at the public expense; which law had never been proposed by any +other legislator, though it is at present in use at Athens as well as in +other cities, he would have the magistrates chosen out of the people +in general, by whom he meant the three parts before spoken of; and that +those who were so elected should be the particular guardians of what +belonged to the public, to strangers, and to orphans. + +These are the principal parts and most worthy of notice in Hippodamus's +plan. But some persons might doubt the propriety of his division of the +citizens into three parts; for the artisans, the husbandmen, and the +soldiers are to compose one community, where the husbandmen are to have +no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, which would in a manner +render them slaves to the soldiery. It is also impossible that the whole +community should partake of all the honourable employments in it--for +the generals and the guardians of the state must necessarily be +appointed out of the soldiery, and indeed the most honourable +magistrates; but as the two other parts will not have their share in the +government, how can they be expected to have any affection for it? But +it is necessary that the soldiery should be superior to the other two +parts, and this superiority will not be easily gained without they are +very numerous; and if they are so, why should the community consist +of any other members? why should any others have a right to elect the +magistrates? Besides, of what use are the husbandmen to this community? +Artisans, 'tis true, are necessary, for these every city wants, and they +can live upon their business. If the husbandmen indeed furnished the +soldiers with provisions, they would be properly part of the community; +but these are supposed to have their private property, and to cultivate +it for their own use. Moreover, if the soldiers themselves are to +cultivate that common land which is appropriated for their support, +there will be no distinction between the soldier and the husbandman, +which the legislator intended there should be; and if there should be +any others who are to cultivate the private property of the husbandman +and the common lands of the military, there will be a fourth order in +the state which will have no share in it, and always entertain hostile +sentiments towards it. If any one should propose that the same persons +should cultivate their own lands and the public ones also, then there +would be a deficiency [1268b] of provisions to supply two families, +as the lands would not immediately yield enough for themselves and the +soldiers also; and all these things would occasion great confusion. + +Nor do I approve of his method of determining causes, when he would +have the judge split the case which comes simply before him; and thus, +instead of being a judge, become an arbitrator. Now when any matter +is brought to arbitration, it is customary for many persons to confer +together upon the business that is before them; but when a cause is +brought before judges it is not so; and many legislators take care +that the judges shall not have it in their power to communicate their +sentiments to each other. Besides, what can prevent confusion on the +bench when one judge thinks a fine should be different from what another +has set it at; one proposing twenty minae, another ten, or be it more +or less, another four, and another five; and it is evident, that in this +manner they will differ from each other, while some will give the whole +damages sued for, and others nothing; in this situation, how shall their +determinations be settled? Besides, a judge cannot be obliged to perjure +himself who simply acquits or condemns, if the action is fairly and +justly brought; for he who acquits the party does not say that he ought +not to pay any fine at all, but that he ought not to pay a fine of +twenty minae. But he that condemns him is guilty of perjury if he +sentences him to pay twenty minae while he believes the damages ought +not to be so much. + +Now with respect to these honours which he proposes to bestow on those +who can give any information useful to the community, this, though very +pleasing in speculation, is what the legislator should not settle, for +it would encourage informers, and probably occasion commotions in the +state. And this proposal of his gives rise also to further conjectures +and inquiries; for some persons have doubted whether it is useful or +hurtful to alter the established law of any country, if even for the +better; for which reason one cannot immediately determine upon what he +here says, whether it is advantageous to alter the law or not. We know, +indeed, that it is possible to propose to new model both the laws and +government as a common good; and since we have mentioned this subject, +it may be very proper to enter into a few particulars concerning it, for +it contains some difficulties, as I have already said, and it may appear +better to alter them, since it has been found useful in other sciences. + +Thus the science of physic is extended beyond its ancient bounds; so is +the gymnastic, and indeed all other arts and powers; so that one may lay +it down for certain that the same thing will necessarily hold good in +the art of government. And it may also be affirmed, that experience +itself gives a proof of this; for the ancient laws are too simple and +barbarous; which allowed the Greeks to wear swords in the city, and to +buy their wives of each [1269a]. other. And indeed all the remains of +old laws which we have are very simple; for instance, a law in Cuma +relative to murder. If any person who prosecutes another for murder can +produce a certain number of witnesses to it of his own relations, the +accused person shall be held guilty. Upon the whole, all persons ought +to endeavour to follow what is right, and not what is established; and +it is probable that the first men, whether they sprung out of the earth, +or were saved from some general calamity, had very little understanding +or knowledge, as is affirmed of these aborigines; so that it would be +absurd to continue in the practice of their rules. Nor is it, moreover, +right to permit written laws always to remain without alteration; for +as in all other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible to express +everything in writing with perfect exactness; for when we commit +anything to writing we must use general terms, but in every action there +is something particular to itself, which these may not comprehend; from +whence it is evident, that certain laws will at certain times admit of +alterations. But if we consider this matter in another point of view, it +will appear to require great caution; for when the advantage proposed is +trifling, as the accustoming the people easily to abolish their laws +is of bad consequence, it is evidently better to pass over some faults +which either the legislator or the magistrates may have committed; for +the alterations will not be of so much service as a habit of disobeying +the magistrates will be of disservice. Besides, the instance brought +from the arts is fallacious; for it is not the same thing to alter the +one as the other. For a law derives all its strength from custom, and +this requires long time to establish; so that, to make it an easy matter +to pass from the established laws to other new ones, is to weaken the +power of laws. Besides, here is another question; if the laws are to be +altered, are they all to be altered, and in every government or not, and +whether at the pleasure of one person or many? all which particulars +will make a great difference; for which reason we will at present drop +the inquiry, to pursue it at some other time. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + + +There are two considerations which offer themselves with respect to the +government established at Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in almost all +other states whatsoever; one is whether their laws do or do not promote +the best establishment possible? the other is whether there is anything, +if we consider either the principles upon which it is founded or the +executive part of it, which prevents the form of government that they +had proposed to follow from being observed; now it is allowed that in +every well-regulated state the members of it should be free from servile +labour; but in what manner this shall be effected is not so easy to +determine; for the Penestse have very often attacked the Thessalians, +and the Helots the Lacedaemonians, for they in a manner continually +watch an opportunity for some misfortune befalling them. But no such +thing has ever happened to the Cretans; the [1269b] reason for which +probably is, that although they are engaged in frequent wars with the +neighbouring cities, yet none of these would enter into an alliance with +the revolters, as it would be disadvantageous for them, who themselves +also have their villains. But now there is perpetual enmity between the +Lacedaemonians and all their neighbours, the Argives, the Messenians, +and the Arcadians. Their slaves also first revolted from the Thessalians +while they were engaged in wars with their neighbours the Acheans, the +Perrabeans, and the Magnesians. It seems to me indeed, if nothing else, +yet something very troublesome to keep upon proper terms with them; +for if you are remiss in your discipline they grow insolent, and think +themselves upon an equality with their masters; and if they are hardly +used they are continually plotting against you and hate you. It is +evident, then, that those who employ slaves have not as yet hit upon the +right way of managing them. + +As to the indulging of women in any particular liberties, it is hurtful +to the end of government and the prosperity of the city; for as a man +and his wife are the two parts of a family, if we suppose a city to be +divided into two parts, we must allow that the number of men and women +will be equal. + +In whatever city then the women are not under good regulations, we must +look upon one half of it as not under the restraint of law, as it +there happened; for the legislator, desiring to make his whole city +a collection of warriors with respect to the men, he most evidently +accomplished his design; but in the meantime the women were quite +neglected, for they live without restraint in every improper indulgence +and luxury. So that in such a state riches will necessarily be in +general esteem, particularly if the men are governed by their wives, +which has been the case with many a brave and warlike people except +the Celts, and those other nations, if there are any such, who openly +practise pederasty. And the first mythologists seem not improperly to +have joined Mars and Venus together; for all nations of this character +are greatly addicted either to the love of women or of boys, for which +reason it was thus at Lacedaemon; and many things in their state were +done by the authority of the women. For what is the difference, if the +power is in the hands of the women, or in the hands of those whom they +themselves govern? it must turn to the same account. As this boldness of +the women can be of no use in any common occurrences, if it was ever so, +it must be in war; but even here we find that the Lacedaemonian women +were of the greatest disservice, as was proved at the time of the Theban +invasion, when they were of no use at all, as they are in other cities, +but made more disturbance than even the enemy. + +The origin of this indulgence which the Lacedaemonian women enjoy is +easily accounted for, from the long time the men were absent from home +upon foreign expeditions [1270a] against the Argives, and afterwards the +Arcadians and Messenians, so that, when these wars were at an end, their +military life, in which there is no little virtue, prepared them to obey +the precepts of their law-giver; but we are told, that when Lycurgus +endeavoured also to reduce the women to an obedience to his laws, upon +their refusal he declined it. It may indeed be said that the women were +the causes of these things, and of course all the fault was theirs. But +we are not now considering where the fault lies, or where it does not +lie, but what is right and what is wrong; and when the manners of the +women are not well regulated, as I have already said, it must not only +occasion faults which are disgraceful to the state, but also increase +the love of money. In the next place, fault may be found with his +unequal division of property, for some will have far too much, others +too little; by which means the land will come into few hands, which +business is badly regulated by his laws. For he made it infamous for any +one either to buy or sell their possessions, in which he did right; but +he permitted any one that chose it to give them away, or bequeath them, +although nearly the same consequences will arise from one practice as +from the other. It is supposed that near two parts in five of the whole +country is the property of women, owing to their being so often sole +heirs, and having such large fortunes in marriage; though it would +be better to allow them none, or a little, or a certain regulated +proportion. Now every one is permitted to make a woman his heir if he +pleases; and if he dies intestate, he who succeeds as heir at law gives +it to whom he pleases. From whence it happens that although the country +is able to support fifteen hundred horse and thirty thousand foot, the +number does not amount to one thousand. + +And from these facts it is evident, that this particular is badly +regulated; for the city could not support one shock, but was ruined for +want of men. They say, that during the reigns of their ancient kings +they used to present foreigners with the freedom of their city, to +prevent there being a want of men while they carried on long wars; it is +also affirmed that the number of Spartans was formerly ten thousand; but +be that as it will, an equality of property conduces much to increase +the number of the people. The law, too, which he made to encourage +population was by no means calculated to correct this inequality; +for being willing that the Spartans should be as numerous as [1270b] +possible, to make them desirous of having large families he ordered that +he who had three children should be excused the night-watch, and that he +who had four should pay no taxes: though it is very evident, that while +the land was divided in this manner, that if the people increased there +must many of them be very poor. + +Nor was he less blamable for the manner in which he constituted the +ephori; for these magistrates take cognisance of things of the last +importance, and yet they are chosen out of the people in general; so +that it often happens that a very poor person is elected to that office, +who, from that circumstance, is easily bought. There have been many +instances of this formerly, as well as in the late affair at Andros. And +these men, being corrupted with money, went as far as they could to ruin +the city: and, because their power was too great and nearly tyrannical, +their kings were obliged to natter them, which contributed greatly to +hurt the state; so that it altered from an aristocracy to a democracy. +This magistracy is indeed the great support of the state; for the people +are easy, knowing that they are eligible to the first office in it; +so that, whether it took place by the intention of the legislator, +or whether it happened by chance, this is of great service to their +affairs; for it is necessary that every member of the state should +endeavour that each part of the government should be preserved, and +continue the same. And upon this principle their kings have always +acted, out of regard to their honour; the wise and good from their +attachment to the senate, a seat wherein they consider as the reward of +virtue; and the common people, that they may support the ephori, of whom +they consist. And it is proper that these magistrates should be chosen +out of the whole community, not as the custom is at present, which is +very ridiculous. The ephori are the supreme judges in causes of the last +consequence; but as it is quite accidental what sort of persons they may +be, it is not right that they should determine according to their own +opinion, but by a written law or established custom. Their way of life +also is not consistent with the manners of the city, for it is too +indulgent; whereas that of others is too severe; so that they cannot +support it, but are obliged privately to act contrary to law, that they +may enjoy some of the pleasures of sense. There are also great defects +in the institution of their senators. If indeed they were fitly trained +to the practice of every human virtue, every one would readily admit +that they would be useful to the government; but still it might be +debated whether they should be continued judges for life, to determine +points of the greatest moment, since the mind has its old age as well +as the body; but as they are so brought up, [1271a] that even the +legislator could not depend upon them as good men, their power must +be inconsistent with the safety of the state: for it is known that the +members of that body have been guilty both of bribery and partiality in +many public affairs; for which reason it had been much better if they +had been made answerable for their conduct, which they are not. But it +may be said the ephori seem to have a check upon all the magistrates. +They have indeed in this particular very great power; but I affirm that +they should not be entrusted with this control in the manner they are. +Moreover, the mode of choice which they make use of at the election of +their senators is very childish. Nor is it right for any one to solicit +for a place he is desirous of; for every person, whether he chooses it +or not, ought to execute any office he is fit for. But his intention was +evidently the same in this as in the other parts of his government. +For making his citizens ambitious after honours, with men of that +disposition he has filled his senate, since no others will solicit for +that office; and yet the principal part of those crimes which men are +deliberately guilty of arise from ambition and avarice. + +We will inquire at another time whether the office of a king is useful +to the state: thus much is certain, that they should be chosen from a +consideration of their conduct and not as they are now. But that the +legislator himself did not expect to make all his citizens honourable +and completely virtuous is evident from this, that he distrusts them as +not being good men; for he sent those upon the same embassy that were at +variance with each other; and thought, that in the dispute of the kings +the safety of the state consisted. Neither were their common meals at +first well established: for these should rather have been provided at +the public expense, as at Crete, where, as at Lacedaemon, every one was +obliged to buy his portion, although he might be very poor, and could by +no means bear the expense, by which means the contrary happened to what +the legislator desired: for he intended that those public meals should +strengthen the democratic part of his government: but this regulation +had quite the contrary effect, for those who were very poor could not +take part in them; and it was an observation of their forefathers, that +the not allowing those who could not contribute their proportion to the +common tables to partake of them, would be the ruin of the state. Other +persons have censured his laws concerning naval affairs, and not without +reason, as it gave rise to disputes. For the commander of the fleet is +in a manner set up in opposition to the kings, who are generals of the +army for life. + +[1271b] There is also another defect in his laws worthy of censure, +which Plato has given in his book of Laws; that the whole constitution +was calculated only for the business of war: it is indeed excellent to +make them conquerors; for which reason the preservation of the state +depended thereon. The destruction of it commenced with their victories: +for they knew not how to be idle, or engage in any other employment +than war. In this particular also they were mistaken, that though they +rightly thought, that those things which are the objects of contention +amongst mankind are better procured by virtue than vice, yet they +wrongfully preferred the things themselves to virtue. Nor was the public +revenue well managed at Sparta, for the state was worth nothing while +they were obliged to carry on the most extensive wars, and the subsidies +were very badly raised; for as the Spartans possessed a large extent of +country, they were not exact upon each other as to what they paid in. +And thus an event contrary to the legislator's intention took place; +for the state was poor, the individuals avaricious. Enough of the +Lacedaemonian government; for these seem the chief defects in it. + + + + +CHAPTER X + + +The government of Crete bears a near resemblance to this, in some few +particulars it is not worse, but in general it is far inferior in its +contrivance. For it appears and is allowed in many particulars the +constitution of Lacedaemon was formed in imitation of that of Crete; +and in general most new things are an improvement upon the old. For they +say, that when Lycurgus ceased to be guardian to King Charilles he +went abroad and spent a long time with his relations in Crete, for the +Lycians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians; and those who first settled +there adopted that body of laws which they found already established by +the inhabitants; in like manner also those who now live near them have +the very laws which Minos first drew up. + +This island seems formed by nature to be the mistress of Greece, for it +is entirely surrounded by a navigable ocean which washes almost all the +maritime parts of that country, and is not far distant on the one side +from Peloponnesus, on the other, which looks towards Asia, from Triopium +and Rhodes. By means of this situation Minos acquired the empire of +the sea and the islands; some of which he subdued, in others planted +colonies: at last he died at Camicus while he was attacking Sicily. +There is this analogy between the customs of the Lacedaemonians and +the Cretans, the Helots cultivate the grounds [1272a] for the one, the +domestic slaves for the other. Both states have their common meals, and +the Lacedaemonians called these formerly not _psiditia_ but _andpia_, +as the Cretans do; which proves from whence the custom arose. In this +particular their governments are also alike: the ephori have the same +power with those of Crete, who are called _kosmoi_; with this difference +only, that the number of the one is five, of the other ten. The senators +are the same as those whom the Cretans call the council. There was +formerly also a kingly power in Crete; but it was afterwards dissolved, +and the command of their armies was given to the _kosmoi_. Every one +also has a vote in their public assembly; but this has only the power of +confirming what has already passed the council and the _kosmoi_. + +The Cretans conducted their public meals better than the Lacedaemonians, +for at Lacedaemon each individual was obliged to furnish what was +assessed upon him; which if he could not do, there was a law which +deprived him of the rights of a citizen, as has been already mentioned: +but in Crete they were furnished by the community; for all the corn and +cattle, taxes and contributions, which the domestic slaves were obliged +to furnish, were divided into parts and allotted to the gods, the +exigencies of the state, and these public meals; so that all the men, +women, and children were maintained from a common stock. The legislator +gave great attention to encourage a habit of eating sparingly, as very +useful to the citizens. He also endeavoured, that his community might +not be too populous, to lessen the connection with women, by introducing +the love of boys: whether in this he did well or ill we shall have some +other opportunity of considering. But that the public meals were better +ordered at Crete than at Lacedaemon is very evident. + +The institution of the _kosmoi_, was still worse than that of the +ephori: for it contained all the faults incident to that magistracy and +some peculiar to itself; for in both cases it is uncertain who will be +elected: but the Lacedaemonians have this advantage which the others +have not, that as all are eligible, the whole community have a share +in the highest honours, and therefore all desire to preserve the state: +whereas among the Cretans the _kosmoi_ are not chosen out of the people +in general, but out of some certain families, and the senate out of the +_kosmoi_. And the same observations which may be made on the senate at +Lacedaemon may be applied to these; for their being under no control, +and their continuing for life, is an honour greater than they merit; and +to have their proceedings not regulated by a written law, but left to +their own discretion, is dangerous. (As to there being no insurrections, +although the people share not in the management of public affairs, this +is no proof of a well-constituted government, as the _kosmoi_ have no +opportunity of being bribed like the ephori, as they live in an [1272b] +island far from those who would corrupt them.) But the method they take +to correct that fault is absurd, impolitic, and tyrannical: for very +often either their fellow-magistrates or some private persons conspire +together and turn out the _kosmoi_. They are also permitted to resign +their office before their time is elapsed, and if all this was done by +law it would be well, and not at the pleasure of the individuals, which +is a bad rule to follow. But what is worst of all is, that general +confusion which those who are in power introduce to impede the ordinary +course of justice; which sufficiently shows what is the nature of the +government, or rather lawless force: for it is usual with the principal +persons amongst them to collect together some of the common people and +their friends, and then revolt and set up for themselves, and come +to blows with each other. And what is the difference, if a state is +dissolved at once by such violent means, or if it gradually so alters in +process of time as to be no longer the same constitution? A state like +this would ever be exposed to the invasions of those who were powerful +and inclined to attack it; but, as has been already mentioned, its +situation preserves it, as it is free from the inroads of foreigners; +and for this reason the family slaves still remain quiet at Crete, while +the Helots are perpetually revolting: for the Cretans take no part in +foreign affairs, and it is but lately that any foreign troops have +made an attack upon the island; and their ravages soon proved the +ineffectualness of their laws. And thus much for the government of +Crete. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + + +The government of Carthage seems well established, and in many respects +superior to others; in some particulars it bears a near resemblance +to the Lacedaemonians; and indeed these three states, the Cretans, the +Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians are in some things very like +each other, in others they differ greatly. Amongst many excellent +constitutions this may show how well their government is framed, that +although the people are admitted to a share in the administration, the +form of it remains unaltered, without any popular insurrections, worth +notice, on the one hand, or degenerating into a tyranny on the +other. Now the Carthaginians have these things in common with the +Lacedaemonians: public tables for those who are connected together by +the tie of mutual friendship, after the manner of their Phiditia; they +have also a magistracy, consisting of an hundred and four persons, +similar to the ephori, or rather selected with more judgment; for +amongst the Lacedaemonians, all the citizens are eligible, but amongst +the Carthaginians, they are chosen out of those of the better sort: +there is also some analogy between the king and the senate in both these +governments, though the Carthaginian method of appointing their kings +is best, for they do not confine themselves to one family; nor do +they permit the election to be at large, nor have they any regard to +seniority; for if amongst the candidates there are any of greater merit +than the rest, these they prefer to those who may be older; for as their +power is very extensive, if they are [1273a] persons of no account, +they may be very hurtful to the state, as they have always been to +the Lacedaemonians; also the greater part of those things which become +reprehensible by their excess are common to all those governments which +we have described. + +Now of those principles on which the Carthaginians have established +their mixed form of government, composed of an aristocracy and +democracy, some incline to produce a democracy, others an oligarchy: for +instance, if the kings and the senate are unanimous upon any point in +debate, they can choose whether they will bring it before the people or +no; but if they disagree, it is to these they must appeal, who are not +only to hear what has been approved of by the senate, but are finally +to determine upon it; and whosoever chooses it, has a right to speak +against any matter whatsoever that may be proposed, which is not +permitted in other cases. The five, who elect each other, have very +great and extensive powers; and these choose the hundred, who are +magistrates of the highest rank: their power also continues longer than +any other magistrates, for it commences before they come into office, +and is prolonged after they are out of it; and in this particular the +state inclines to an oligarchy: but as they are not elected by lot, but +by suffrage, and are not permitted to take money, they are the greatest +supporters imaginable of an aristocracy. + +The determining all causes by the same magistrates, and not orae in one +court and another in another, as at Lacedaemon, has the same influence. +The constitution of Carthage is now shifting from an aristocracy to an +oligarchy, in consequence of an opinion which is favourably entertained +by many, who think that the magistrates in the community ought not to +be persons of family only, but of fortune also; as it is impossible +for those who are in bad circumstances to support the dignity of their +office, or to be at leisure to apply to public business. As choosing men +of fortune to be magistrates make a state incline to an oligarchy, +and men of abilities to an aristocracy, so is there a third method of +proceeding which took place in the polity of Carthage; for they have +an eye to these two particulars when they elect their officers, +particularly those of the highest rank, their kings and their generals. +It must be admitted, that it was a great fault in their legislator not +to guard against the constitution's degenerating from an aristocracy; +for this is a most necessary thing to provide for at first, that those +citizens who have the best abilities should never be obliged to do +anything unworthy their character, but be always at leisure to serve the +public, not only when in office, but also when private persons; for if +once you are obliged to look among the wealthy, that you may have men at +leisure to serve you, your greatest offices, of king and general, +will soon become venal; in consequence of which, riches will be more +honourable than virtue and a love of money be the ruling principle in +the city-for what those who have the chief power regard as honourable +will necessarily be the object which the [1273b] citizens in general +will aim at; and where the first honours are not paid to virtue, +there the aristocratic form of government cannot flourish: for it +is reasonable to conclude, that those who bought their places should +generally make an advantage of what they laid out their money for; as +it is absurd to suppose, that if a man of probity who is poor should be +desirous of gaining something, a bad man should not endeavour to do the +same, especially to reimburse himself; for which reason the magistracy +should be formed of those who are most able to support an aristocracy. +It would have been better for the legislature to have passed over the +poverty of men of merit, and only to have taken care to have ensured +them sufficient leisure, when in office, to attend to public affairs. + +It seems also improper, that one person should execute several offices, +which was approved of at Carthage; for one business is best done by one +person; and it is the duty of the legislator to look to this, and not +make the same person a musician and a shoemaker: so that where the state +is not small it is more politic and more popular to admit many persons +to have a share in the government; for, as I just now said, it is not +only more usual, but everything is better and sooner done, when one +thing only is allotted to one person: and this is evident both in the +army and navy, where almost every one, in his turn, both commands and +is under command. But as their government inclines to an oligarchy, they +avoid the ill effects of it by always appointing some of the popular +party to the government of cities to make their fortunes. Thus they +consult this fault in their constitution and render it stable; but +this is depending on chance; whereas the legislator ought to frame his +government, that there the no room for insurrections. But now, if there +should be any general calamity, and the people should revolt from their +rulers, there is no remedy for reducing them to obedience by the laws. +And these are the particulars of the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the +Carthaginian governments which seem worthy of commendation. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + + +Some of those persons who have written upon government had never any +share in public affairs, but always led a private life. Everything +worthy of notice in their works we have already spoke to. Others +were legislators, some in their own cities, others were employed in +regulating the governments of foreign states. Some of them only composed +a body of laws; others formed the constitution also, as Lycurgus; and +Solon, who did both. The Lacedaemonians have been already mentioned. +Some persons think that Solon was an excellent legislator, who could +dissolve a pure oligarchy, and save the people from that slavery which +hung over them, and establish the ancient democratic form of government +in his country; wherein every part of it was so framed as to be well +adapted to the whole. In the senate of Areopagus an oligarchy was +preserved; by the manner of electing their [1274a] magistrates, an +aristocracy; and in their courts of justice, a democracy. + +Solon seems not to have altered the established form of government, +either with respect to the senate or the mode of electing their +magistrates; but to have raised the people to great consideration in the +state by allotting the supreme judicial department to them; and for this +some persons blame him, as having done what would soon overturn that +balance of power he intended to establish; for by trying all causes +whatsoever before the people, who were chosen by lot to determine them, +it was necessary to flatter a tyrannical populace who had got this +power; which contributed to bring the government to that pure democracy +it now is. + +Both Ephialtes and Pericles abridged the power of the Areopagites, the +latter of whom introduced the method of paying those who attended +the courts of justice: and thus every one who aimed at being popular +proceeded increasing the power of the people to what we now see it. But +it is evident that this was not Solon's intention, but that it arose +from accident; for the people being the cause of the naval victory +over the Medes, assumed greatly upon it, and enlisted themselves +under factious demagogues, although opposed by the better part of the +citizens. He thought it indeed most necessary to entrust the people +with the choice of their magistrates and the power of calling them to +account; for without that they must have been slaves and enemies to the +other citizens: but he ordered them to elect those only who were persons +of good account and property, either out of those who were worth five +hundred medimns, or those who were called xeugitai, or those of the +third census, who were called horsemen. + +As for those of the fourth, which consisted of mechanics, they were +incapable of any office. Zaleucus was the legislator of the Western +Locrians, as was Charondas, the Catanean, of his own cities, and those +also in Italy and Sicily which belonged to the Calcidians. Some persons +endeavour to prove that Onomacritus, the Locrian, was the first person +of note who drew up laws; and that he employed himself in that business +while he was at Crete, where he continued some time to learn the +prophetic art: and they say, that Thales was his companion; and that +Lycurgus and Zaleucus were the scholars of Thales, and Charondas of +Zaleucus; but those who advance this, advance what is repugnant to +chronology. Philolaus also, of the family of the Bacchiades, was a +Theban legislator. This man was very fond of Diocles, a victor in +the Olympic games, and when he left his country from a disgust at an +improper passion which his mother Alithoe had entertained for him, and +settled at Thebes, Philolaus followed him, where they both died, and +where they still show their tombs placed in view of each other, but so +disposed, that one of them looks towards Corinth, the other does not; +the reason they give for this is, that Diodes, from his detestation of +his mother's passion, would have his tomb so placed that no one could +see Corinth from it; but Philolaus chose that it might be seen from his: +and this was the cause of their living at Thebes. [1274b] + +As Philolaus gave them laws concerning many other things, so did he upon +adoption, which they call adoptive laws; and this he in particular did +to preserve the number of families. Charondas did nothing new, except +in actions for perjury, which he was the first person who took into +particular consideration. He also drew up his laws with greater elegance +and accuracy than even any of our present legislators. Philolaus +introduced the law for the equal distribution of goods; Plato that for +the community of women, children, and goods, and also for public tables +for the women; and one concerning drunkenness, that they might observe +sobriety in their symposiums. He also made a law concerning their +warlike exercises; that they should acquire a habit of using both hands +alike, as it was necessary that one hand should be as useful as the +other. + +As for Draco's laws, they were published when the government was already +established, and they have nothing particular in them worth mentioning, +except their severity on account of the enormity of their punishments. +Pittacus was the author of some laws, but never drew up any form of +government; one of which was this, that if a drunken man beat any person +he should be punished more than if he did it when sober; for as +people are more apt to be abusive when drunk than sober, he paid no +consideration to the excuse which drunkenness might claim, but regarded +only the common benefit. Andromadas Regmus was also a lawgiver to the +Thracian talcidians. There are some laws of his concerning murders and +heiresses extant, but these contain nothing that any one can say is new +and his own. And thus much for different sorts of governments, as well +those which really exist as those which different persons have proposed. + + + + +BOOK III + + + + +CHAPTER I + + +Every one who inquires into the nature of government, and what are its +different forms, should make this almost his first question, What is a +city? For upon this there is a dispute: for some persons say the city +did this or that, while others say, not the city, but the oligarchy, +or the tyranny. We see that the city is the only object which both the +politician and legislator have in view in all they do: but government +is a certain ordering of those who inhabit a city. As a city is a +collective body, and, like other wholes, composed of many parts, it is +evident our first inquiry must be, what a citizen is: for a city is a +certain number of citizens. So that we must consider whom we ought to +call citizen, and who is one; for this is often doubtful: for every one +will not allow that this character is applicable to the same person; for +that man who would be a citizen in a republic would very often not be +one in an oligarchy. We do not include in this inquiry many of those who +acquire this appellation out of the ordinary way, as honorary persons, +for instance, but those only who have a natural right to it. + +Now it is not residence which constitutes a man a citizen; for in this +sojourners and slaves are upon an equality with him; nor will it be +sufficient for this purpose, that you have the privilege of the laws, +and may plead or be impleaded, for this all those of different nations, +between whom there is a mutual agreement for that purpose, are allowed; +although it very often happens, that sojourners have not a perfect right +therein without the protection of a patron, to whom they are obliged to +apply, which shows that their share in the community is incomplete. In +like manner, with respect to boys who are not yet enrolled, or old men +who are past war, we admit that they are in some respects citizens, +but not completely so, but with some exceptions, for these are not yet +arrived to years of maturity, and those are past service; nor is +there any difference between them. But what we mean is sufficiently +intelligible and clear, we want a complete citizen, one in whom there +is no deficiency to be corrected to make him so. As to those who are +banished, or infamous, there may be the same objections made and the +same answer given. There is nothing that more characterises a complete +citizen than having a share in the judicial and executive part of the +government. + +With respect to offices, some are fixed to a particular time, so that +no person is, on any account, permitted to fill them twice; or else +not till some certain period has intervened; others are not fixed, as a +juryman's, and a member of the general assembly: but probably some one +may say these are not offices, nor have the citizens in these capacities +any share in the government; though surely it is ridiculous to say that +those who have the principal power in the state bear no office in it. +But this objection is of no weight, for it is only a dispute about +words; as there is no general term which can be applied both to the +office of a juryman and a member of the assembly. For the sake of +distinction, suppose we call it an indeterminate office: but I lay it +down as a maxim, that those are citizens who could exercise it. Such +then is the description of a citizen who comes nearest to what all those +who are called citizens are. Every one also should know, that of the +component parts of those things which differ from each other in species, +after the first or second remove, those which follow have either nothing +at all or very little common to each. + +Now we see that governments differ from each other in their form, +and that some of them are defective, others [1275b] as excellent as +possible: for it is evident, that those which have many deficiencies +and degeneracies in them must be far inferior to those which are without +such faults. What I mean by degeneracies will be hereafter explained. +Hence it is clear that the office of a citizen must differ as +governments do from each other: for which reason he who is called +a citizen has, in a democracy, every privilege which that station +supposes. In other forms of government he may enjoy them; but not +necessarily: for in some states the people have no power; nor have they +any general assembly, but a few select men. + +The trial also of different causes is allotted to different persons; as +at Lacedaemon all disputes concerning contracts are brought before some +of the ephori: the senate are the judges in cases of murder, and so on; +some being to be heard by one magistrate, others by another: and thus +at Carthage certain magistrates determine all causes. But our former +description of a citizen will admit of correction; for in some +governments the office of a juryman and a member of the general assembly +is not an indeterminate one; but there are particular persons appointed +for these purposes, some or all of the citizens being appointed jurymen +or members of the general assembly, and this either for all causes and +all public business whatsoever, or else for some particular one: and +this may be sufficient to show what a citizen is; for he who has a right +to a share in the judicial and executive part of government in any +city, him we call a citizen of that place; and a city, in one word, is +a collective body of such persons sufficient in themselves to all the +purposes of life. + + + + +CHAPTER II + + +In common use they define a citizen to be one who is sprung from +citizens on both sides, not on the father's or the mother's only. Others +carry the matter still further, and inquire how many of his ancestors +have been citizens, as his grandfather, great-grandfather, etc., but +some persons have questioned how the first of the family could prove +themselves citizens, according to this popular and careless definition. +Gorgias of Leontium, partly entertaining the same doubt, and partly in +jest, says, that as a mortar is made by a mortar-maker, so a citizen is +made by a citizen-maker, and a Larisssean by a Larisssean-maker. This +is indeed a very simple account of the matter; for if citizens are so, +according to this definition, it will be impossible to apply it to the +first founders or first inhabitants of states, who cannot possibly claim +in right either of their father or mother. It is probably a matter of +still more difficulty to determine their rights as citizens who are +admitted to their freedom after any revolution in the state. As, for +instance, at Athens, after the expulsion of the tyrants, when Clisthenes +enrolled many foreigners and city-slaves amongst the tribes; and the +doubt with respect to them was, not whether they were citizens or no, +but whether they were legally so or not. Though indeed some persons may +have this further [1276a] doubt, whether a citizen can be a citizen +when he is illegally made; as if an illegal citizen, and one who is +no citizen at all, were in the same predicament: but since we see some +persons govern unjustly, whom yet we admit to govern, though not justly, +and the definition of a citizen is one who exercises certain offices, +for such a one we have defined a citizen to be, it is evident, that a +citizen illegally created yet continues to be a citizen, but whether +justly or unjustly so belongs to the former inquiry. + + + + +CHAPTER III + + +It has also been doubted what was and what was not the act of the city; +as, for instance, when a democracy arises out of an aristocracy or a +tyranny; for some persons then refuse to fulfil their contracts; as if +the right to receive the money was in the tyrant and not in the state, +and many other things of the same nature; as if any covenant was founded +for violence and not for the common good. So in like manner, if anything +is done by those who have the management of public affairs where a +democracy is established, their actions are to be considered as the +actions of the state, as well as in the oligarchy or tyranny. + +And here it seems very proper to consider this question, When shall we +say that a city is the same, and when shall we say that it is different? + +It is but a superficial mode of examining into this question to begin +with the place and the people; for it may happen that these may be +divided from that, or that some one of them may live in one place, and +some in another (but this question may be regarded as no very knotty +one; for, as a city may acquire that appellation on many accounts, +it may be solved many ways); and in like manner, when men inhabit one +common place, when shall we say that they inhabit the same city, or that +the city is the same? for it does not depend upon the walls; for I can +suppose Peloponnesus itself surrounded with a wall, as Babylon was, and +every other place, which rather encircles many nations than one city, +and that they say was taken three days when some of the inhabitants +knew nothing of it: but we shall find a proper time to determine this +question; for the extent of a city, how large it should be, and whether +it should consist of more than one people, these are particulars that +the politician should by no means be unacquainted with. This, too, is a +matter of inquiry, whether we shall say that a city is the same while +it is inhabited by the same race of men, though some of them are +perpetually dying, others coming into the world, as we say that a river +or a fountain is the same, though the waters are continually changing; +or when a revolution takes place shall we [1276b] say the men are the +same, but the city is different: for if a city is a community, it is a +community of citizens; but if the mode of government should alter, and +become of another sort, it would seem a necessary consequence that the +city is not the same; as we regard the tragic chorus as different from +the comic, though it may probably consist of the same performers: thus +every other community or composition is said to be different if the +species of composition is different; as in music the same hands produce +different harmony, as the Doric and Phrygian. If this is true, it is +evident, that when we speak of a city as being the same we refer to the +government there established; and this, whether it is called by the +same name or any other, or inhabited by the same men or different. +But whether or no it is right to dissolve the community when the +constitution is altered is another question. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + +What has been said, it follows that we should consider whether the +same virtues which constitute a good man make a valuable citizen, or +different; and if a particular inquiry is necessary for this matter we +must first give a general description of the virtues of a good citizen; +for as a sailor is one of those who make up a community, so is a +citizen, although the province of one sailor may be different from +another's (for one is a rower, another a steersman, a third a boatswain, +and so on, each having their several appointments), it is evident that +the most accurate description of any one good sailor must refer to +his peculiar abilities, yet there are some things in which the same +description may be applied to the whole crew, as the safety of the ship +is the common business of all of them, for this is the general centre of +all their cares: so also with respect to citizens, although they may +in a few particulars be very different, yet there is one care common to +them all, the safety of the community, for the community of the citizens +composes the state; for which reason the virtue of a citizen has +necessarily a reference to the state. But if there are different sorts +of governments, it is evident that those actions which constitute the +virtue of an excellent citizen in one community will not constitute it +in another; wherefore the virtue of such a one cannot be perfect: but we +say, a man is good when his virtues are perfect; from whence it follows, +that an excellent citizen does not possess that virtue which constitutes +a good man. Those who are any ways doubtful concerning this question +may be convinced of the truth of it by examining into the best formed +states: for, if it is impossible that a city should consist entirely of +excellent citizens (while it is necessary that every one should do well +in his calling, in which consists his excellence, as it is impossible +that all the citizens should have the same [1277a] qualifications) it +is impossible that the virtue of a citizen and a good man should be the +same; for all should possess the virtue of an excellent citizen: for +from hence necessarily arise the perfection of the city: but that every +one should possess the virtue of a good man is impossible without +all the citizens in a well-regulated state were necessarily virtuous. +Besides, as a city is composed of dissimilar parts, as an animal is of +life and body; the soul of reason and appetite; a family of a man and +his wife--property of a master and a slave; in the same manner, as a +city is composed of all these and many other very different parts, it +necessarily follows that the virtue of all the citizens cannot be the +same; as the business of him who leads the band is different from the +other dancers. From all which proofs it is evident that the virtues of +a citizen cannot be one and the same. But do we never find those virtues +united which constitute a good man and excellent citizen? for we say, +such a one is an excellent magistrate and a prudent and good man; but +prudence is a necessary qualification for all those who engage in public +affairs. Nay, some persons affirm that the education of those who are +intended to command should, from the beginning, be different from other +citizens, as the children of kings are generally instructed in riding +and warlike exercises; and thus Euripides says: + + "... No showy arts Be mine, but teach me what the state requires." + +As if those who are to rule were to have an education peculiar to +themselves. But if we allow, that the virtues of a good man and a +good magistrate may be the same, and a citizen is one who obeys the +magistrate, it follows that the virtue of the one cannot in general be +the same as the virtue of the other, although it may be true of some +particular citizen; for the virtue of the magistrate must be different +from the virtue of the citizen. For which reason Jason declared that +was he deprived of his kingdom he should pine away with regret, as not +knowing how to live a private man. But it is a great recommendation to +know how to command as well as to obey; and to do both these things well +is the virtue of an accomplished citizen. If then the virtue of a good +man consists only in being able to command, but the virtue of a good +citizen renders him equally fit for the one as well as the other, the +commendation of both of them is not the same. It appears, then, that +both he who commands and he who obeys should each of them learn their +separate business: but that the citizen should be master of and +take part in both these, as any one may easily perceive; in a family +government there is no occasion for the master to know how to perform +the necessary offices, but rather to enjoy the labour of others; for to +do the other is a servile part. I mean by the other, the common family +business of the slave. + +There are many sorts of slaves; for their employments are various: of +these the handicraftsmen are one, who, as their name imports, get their +living by the labour of their hands, and amongst these all mechanics are +included; [1277b] for which reasons such workmen, in some states, were +not formerly admitted into any share in the government; till at length +democracies were established: it is not therefore proper for any man +of honour, or any citizen, or any one who engages in public affairs, to +learn these servile employments without they have occasion for them for +their own use; for without this was observed the distinction between a +master and a slave would be lost. But there is a government of another +sort, in which men govern those who are their equals in rank, and +freemen, which we call a political government, in which men learn to +command by first submitting to obey, as a good general of horse, or a +commander-in-chief, must acquire a knowledge of their duty by +having been long under the command of another, and the like in every +appointment in the army: for well is it said, no one knows how to +command who has not himself been under command of another. The virtues +of those are indeed different, but a good citizen must necessarily be +endowed with them; he ought also to know in what manner freemen ought +to govern, as well as be governed: and this, too, is the duty of a good +man. And if the temperance and justice of him who commands is different +from his who, though a freeman, is under command, it is evident that the +virtues of a good citizen cannot be the same as justice, for instance +but must be of a different species in these two different situations, as +the temperance and courage of a man and a woman are different from each +other; for a man would appear a coward who had only that courage which +would be graceful in a woman, and a woman would be thought a talker who +should take as large a part in the conversation as would become a man of +consequence. + +The domestic employments of each of them are also different; it is the +man's business to acquire subsistence, the woman's to take care of it. +But direction and knowledge of public affairs is a virtue peculiar to +those who govern, while all others seem to be equally requisite for both +parties; but with this the governed have no concern, it is theirs to +entertain just notions: they indeed are like flute-makers, while those +who govern are the musicians who play on them. And thus much to show +whether the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same, +or if it is different, and also how far it is the same, and how far +different. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + +But with respect to citizens there is a doubt remaining, whether those +only are truly so who are allowed to share in the government, or whether +the mechanics also are to be considered as such? for if those who are +not permitted to rule are to be reckoned among them, it is impossible +that the virtue of all the citizens should be the same, for these also +are citizens; and if none of them are admitted to be citizens, where +shall they be ranked? for they are neither [1278a] sojourners nor +foreigners? or shall we say that there will no inconvenience arise from +their not being citizens, as they are neither slaves nor freedmen: +for this is certainly true, that all those are not citizens who are +necessary to the existence of a city, as boys are not citizens in the +same manner that men are, for those are perfectly so, the others under +some conditions; for they are citizens, though imperfect ones: for +in former times among some people the mechanics were either slaves or +foreigners, for which reason many of them are so now: and indeed the +best regulated states will not permit a mechanic to be a citizen; but +if it be allowed them, we cannot then attribute the virtue we have +described to every citizen or freeman, but to those only who are +disengaged from servile offices. Now those who are employed by one +person in them are slaves; those who do them for money are mechanics +and hired servants: hence it is evident on the least reflection what is +their situation, for what I have said is fully explained by appearances. +Since the number of communities is very great, it follows necessarily +that there will be many different sorts of citizens, particularly +of those who are governed by others, so that in one state it may be +necessary to admit mechanics and hired servants to be citizens, but in +others it may be impossible; as particularly in an aristocracy, where +honours are bestowed on virtue and dignity: for it is impossible for +one who lives the life of a mechanic or hired servant to acquire the +practice of virtue. In an oligarchy also hired servants are not admitted +to be citizens; because there a man's right to bear any office is +regulated by his fortune; but mechanics are, for many citizens are very +rich. + +There was a law at Thebes that no one could have a share in the +government till he had been ten years out of trade. In many states the +law invites strangers to accept the freedom of the city; and in some +democracies the son of a free-woman is himself free. The same is also +observed in many others with respect to natural children; but it is +through want of citizens regularly born that they admit such: for these +laws are always made in consequence of a scarcity of inhabitants; so, +as their numbers increase, they first deprive the children of a male or +female slave of this privilege, next the child of a free-woman, and last +of all they will admit none but those whose fathers and mothers were +both free. + +That there are many sorts of citizens, and that he may be said to be as +completely who shares the honours of the state, is evident from what +has been already said. Thus Achilles, in Homer, complains of Agamemnon's +treating him like an unhonoured stranger; for a stranger or sojourner is +one who does not partake of the honours of the state: and whenever the +right to the freedom of the city is kept obscure, it is for the sake of +the inhabitants. [1278b] From what has been said it is plain whether the +virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same or different: +and we find that in some states it is the same, in others not; and also +that this is not true of each citizen, but of those only who take the +lead, or are capable of taking the lead, in public affairs, either alone +or in conjunction with others. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + +Having established these points, we proceed next to consider whether one +form of government only should be established, or more than one; and if +more, how many, and of what sort, and what are the differences between +them. The form of government is the ordering and regulating of the city, +and all the offices in it, particularly those wherein the supreme power +is lodged; and this power is always possessed by the administration; but +the administration itself is that particular form of government which +is established in any state: thus in a democracy the supreme power is +lodged in the whole people; on the contrary, in an oligarchy it is in +the hands of a few. We say then, that the form of government in these +states is different, and we shall find the same thing hold good in +others. Let us first determine for whose sake a city is established; +and point out the different species of rule which man may submit to in +social life. + +I have already mentioned in my treatise on the management of a family, +and the power of the master, that man is an animal naturally formed +for society, and that therefore, when he does not want any foreign +assistance, he will of his own accord desire to live with others; not +but that mutual advantage induces them to it, as far as it enables each +person to live more agreeably; and this is indeed the great object +not only to all in general, but also to each individual: but it is not +merely matter of choice, but they join in society also, even that they +may be able to live, which probably is not without some share of merit, +and they also support civil society, even for the sake of preserving +life, without they are grievously overwhelmed with the miseries of it: +for it is very evident that men will endure many calamities for the sake +of living, as being something naturally sweet and desirable. It is easy +to point out the different modes of government, and we have already +settled them in our exoteric discourses. The power of the master, though +by nature equally serviceable, both to the master and to the slave, yet +nevertheless has for its object the benefit of the master, while the +benefit of the slave arises accidentally; for if the slave is destroyed, +the power of the master is at an end: but the authority which a man +has over his wife, and children, and his family, which we call domestic +government, is either for the benefit of those who are under subjection, +or else for the common benefit of the whole: but its particular object +is the benefit of the governed, as we see in other arts; in physic, for +instance, and the gymnastic exercises, wherein, if any benefit [1279a] +arise to the master, it is accidental; for nothing forbids the master of +the exercises from sometimes being himself one of those who exercises, +as the steersman is always one of the sailors; but both the master of +the exercises and the steersman consider the good of those who are under +their government. Whatever good may happen to the steersman when he is +a sailor, or to the master of the exercises when he himself makes one at +the games, is not intentional, or the object of their power; thus in all +political governments which are established to preserve and defend the +equality of the citizens it is held right to rule by turns. Formerly, as +was natural, every one expected that each of his fellow-citizens should +in his turn serve the public, and thus administer to his private good, +as he himself when in office had done for others; but now every one is +desirous of being continually in power, that he may enjoy the advantage +which he makes of public business and being in office; as if places were +a never-failing remedy for every complaint, and were on that account so +eagerly sought after. + +It is evident, then, that all those governments which have a common good +in view are rightly established and strictly just, but those who have +in view only the good of the rulers are all founded on wrong principles, +and are widely different from what a government ought to be, for they +are tyranny over slaves, whereas a city is a community of freemen. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + +Having established these particulars, we come to consider next the +different number of governments which there are, and what they are; and +first, what are their excellencies: for when we have determined this, +their defects will be evident enough. + +It is evident that every form of government or administration, for the +words are of the same import, must contain a supreme power over the +whole state, and this supreme power must necessarily be in the hands +of one person, or a few, or many; and when either of these apply their +power for the common good, such states are well governed; but when the +interest of the one, the few, or the many who enjoy this power is alone +consulted, then ill; for you must either affirm that those who make +up the community are not citizens, or else let these share in the +advantages of government. We usually call a state which is governed by +one person for the common good, a kingdom; one that is governed by +more than one, but by a few only, an aristocracy; either because the +government is in the hands of the most worthy citizens, or because it +is the best form for the city and its inhabitants. When the citizens at +large govern for the public good, it is called a state; which is also +a common name for all other governments, and these distinctions are +consonant to reason; for it will not be difficult to find one person, +or a very few, of very distinguished abilities, but almost impossible to +meet with the majority [1279b] of a people eminent for every virtue; +but if there is one common to a whole nation it is valour; for this is +created and supported by numbers: for which reason in such a state +the profession of arms will always have the greatest share in the +government. + +Now the corruptions attending each of these governments are these; a +kingdom may degenerate into a tyranny, an aristocracy into an oligarchy, +and a state into a democracy. Now a tyranny is a monarchy where the good +of one man only is the object of government, an oligarchy considers +only the rich, and a democracy only the poor; but neither of them have a +common good in view. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + + +It will be necessary to enlarge a little more upon the nature of each +of these states, which is not without some difficulty, for he who would +enter into a philosophical inquiry into the principles of them, and not +content himself with a superficial view of their outward conduct, must +pass over and omit nothing, but explain the true spirit of each of them. +A tyranny then is, as has been said, a monarchy, where one person has +an absolute and despotic power over the whole community and every member +therein: an oligarchy, where the supreme power of the state is lodged +with the rich: a democracy, on the contrary, is where those have it who +are worth little or nothing. But the first difficulty that arises from +the distinctions which we have laid down is this, should it happen that +the majority of the inhabitants who possess the power of the state (for +this is a democracy) should be rich, the question is, how does this +agree with what we have said? The same difficulty occurs, should it ever +happen that the poor compose a smaller part of the people than the rich, +but from their superior abilities acquire the supreme power; for this is +what they call an oligarchy; it should seem then that our definition +of the different states was not correct: nay, moreover, could any one +suppose that the majority of the people were poor, and the minority +rich, and then describe the state in this manner, that an oligarchy +was a government in which the rich, being few in number, possessed the +supreme power, and that a democracy was a state in which the poor, being +many in number, possessed it, still there will be another difficulty; +for what name shall we give to those states we have been describing? I +mean, that in which the greater number are rich, and that in which the +lesser number are poor (where each of these possess the supreme power), +if there are no other states than those we have described. It seems +therefore evident to reason, that whether the supreme power is vested +in the hands of many or few may be a matter of accident; but that it +is clear enough, that when it is in the hands of the few, it will be +a government of the rich; when in the hands of the many, it will be a +government of the poor; since in all countries there are many poor and +few rich: it is not therefore the cause that has been already assigned +(namely, the number of people in power) that makes the difference +between the two governments; but an oligarchy and democracy differ in +this from each other, in the poverty of those who govern in the one, +and the riches I28oa of those who govern in the other; for when the +government is in the hands of the rich, be they few or be they more, it +is an oligarchy; when it is in the hands of the poor, it is a democracy: +but, as we have already said, the one will be always few, the other +numerous, but both will enjoy liberty; and from the claims of wealth and +liberty will arise continual disputes with each other for the lead in +public affairs. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + + +Let us first determine what are the proper limits of an oligarchy and +a democracy, and what is just in each of these states; for all men have +some natural inclination to justice; but they proceed therein only to +a certain degree; nor can they universally point out what is absolutely +just; as, for instance, what is equal appears just, and is so; but not +to all; only among those who are equals: and what is unequal appears +just, and is so; but not to all, only amongst those who are unequals; +which circumstance some people neglect, and therefore judge ill; the +reason for which is, they judge for themselves, and every one almost is +the worst judge in his own cause. Since then justice has reference to +persons, the same distinctions must be made with respect to persons +which are made with respect to things, in the manner that I have already +described in my Ethics. + +As to the equality of the things, these they agree in; but their dispute +is concerning the equality of the persons, and chiefly for the reason +above assigned; because they judge ill in their own cause; and also +because each party thinks, that if they admit what is right in some +particulars, they have done justice on the whole: thus, for instance, +if some persons are unequal in riches, they suppose them unequal in the +whole; or, on the contrary, if they are equal in liberty, they suppose +them equal in the whole: but what is absolutely just they omit; for +if civil society was founded for the sake of preserving and increasing +property, every one's right in the city would be equal to his fortune; +and then the reasoning of those who insist upon an oligarchy would be +valid; for it would not be right that he who contributed one mina should +have an equal share in the hundred along with him who brought in all the +rest, either of the original money or what was afterwards acquired. + +Nor was civil society founded merely to preserve the lives of its +members; but that they might live well: for otherwise a state might +be composed of slaves, or the animal creation: but this is not so; for +these have no share in the happiness of it; nor do they live after their +own choice; nor is it an alliance mutually to defend each other from +injuries, or for a commercial intercourse: for then the Tyrrhenians and +Carthaginians, and all other nations between whom treaties of commerce +subsist, would be citizens of one city; for they have articles +to regulate their exports and imports, and engagements for mutual +protection, and alliances for mutual defence; but [1280b] yet they +have not all the same magistrates established among them, but they are +different among the different people; nor does the one take any care, +that the morals of the other should be as they ought, or that none of +those who have entered into the common agreements should be unjust, or +in any degree vicious, only that they do not injure any member of the +confederacy. But whosoever endeavours to establish wholesome laws in +a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of each individual who +composes it; from whence it is evident, that the first care of him who +would found a city, truly deserving that name, and not nominally so, +must be to have his citizens virtuous; for otherwise it is merely an +alliance for self-defence; differing from those of the same cast which +are made between different people only in place: for law is an agreement +and a pledge, as the sophist Lycophron says, between the citizens of +their intending to do justice to each other, though not sufficient to +make all the citizens just and good: and that this is fact is evident, +for could any one bring different places together, as, for instance, +enclose Megara and Corinth in a wall, yet they would not be one city, +not even if the inhabitants intermarried with each other, though this +inter-community contributes much to make a place one city. Besides, +could we suppose a set of people to live separate from each other, but +within such a distance as would admit of an intercourse, and that there +were laws subsisting between each party, to prevent their injuring one +another in their mutual dealings, supposing one a carpenter, another +a husbandman, shoemaker, and the like, and that their numbers were ten +thousand, still all that they would have together in common would be a +tariff for trade, or an alliance for mutual defence, but not the same +city. And why? not because their mutual intercourse is not near enough, +for even if persons so situated should come to one place, and every one +should live in his own house as in his native city, and there should be +alliances subsisting between each party to mutually assist and prevent +any injury being done to the other, still they would not be admitted +to be a city by those who think correctly, if they preserved the same +customs when they were together as when they were separate. + +It is evident, then, that a city is not a community of place; nor +established for the sake of mutual safety or traffic with each other; +but that these things are the necessary consequences of a city, although +they may all exist where there is no city: but a city is a society of +people joining together with their families and their children to live +agreeably for the sake of having their lives as happy and as independent +as possible: and for this purpose it is necessary that they should live +in one place and intermarry with each other: hence in all cities there +are family-meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and public entertainments to +promote friendship; for a love of sociability is friendship itself; +so that the end then for which a city is established is, that the +inhabitants of it may live happy, and these things are conducive to that +end: for it is a community of families and villages for the sake of a +perfect independent life; that is, as we have already said, for the sake +of living well and happily. It is not therefore founded for the purpose +of men's merely [1281a] living together, but for their living as men +ought; for which reason those who contribute most to this end deserve to +have greater power in the city than those who are their equals in family +and freedom, but their inferiors in civil virtue, or those who excel +them in wealth but are below them in worth. It is evident from what +has been said, that in all disputes upon government each party says +something that is just. + + + + +CHAPTER X + + +It may also be a doubt where the supreme power ought to be lodged. +Shall it be with the majority, or the wealthy, with a number of proper +persons, or one better than the rest, or with a tyrant? But whichever +of these we prefer some difficulty will arise. For what? shall the +poor have it because they are the majority? they may then divide among +themselves, what belongs to the rich: nor is this unjust; because truly +it has been so judged by the supreme power. But what avails it to point +out what is the height of injustice if this is not? Again, if the many +seize into their own hands everything which belongs to the few, it is +evident that the city will be at an end. But virtue will never destroy +what is virtuous; nor can what is right be the ruin of the state: +therefore such a law can never be right, nor can the acts of a tyrant +ever be wrong, for of necessity they must all be just; for he, from his +unlimited power, compels every one to obey his command, as the multitude +oppress the rich. Is it right then that the rich, the few, should have +the supreme power? and what if they be guilty of the same rapine and +plunder the possessions of the majority, that will be as right as the +other: but that all things of this sort are wrong and unjust is evident. +Well then, these of the better sort shall have it: but must not then all +the other citizens live unhonoured, without sharing the offices of the +city; for the offices of a city are its honours, and if one set of men +are always in power, it is evident that the rest must be without honour. +Well then, let it be with one person of all others the fittest for it: +but by this means the power will be still more contracted, and a greater +number than before continue unhonoured. But some one may say, that it is +wrong to let man have the supreme power and not the law, as his soul is +subject to so many passions. But if this law appoints an aristocracy, or +a democracy, how will it help us in our present doubts? for those things +will happen which we have already mentioned. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + + +Other particulars we will consider separately; but it seems proper to +prove, that the supreme power ought to be lodged with the many, rather +than with those of the better sort, who are few; and also to explain +what doubts (and probably just ones) may arise: now, though not one +individual of the many may himself be fit for the supreme power, yet +when these many are joined together, it does not follow but they may be +better qualified for it than those; and this not separately, but as a +collective body; as the public suppers exceed those which are given at +one person's private expense: for, as they are many, each person brings +in his share of virtue and wisdom; and thus, coming together, they are +like one man made up of a multitude, with many feet, many hands, +and many intelligences: thus is it with respect to the manners and +understandings of the multitude taken together; for which reason the +public are the best judges of music and poetry; for some understand +one part, some another, and all collectively the whole; and in this +particular men of consequence differ from each of the many; as they +say those who are beautiful do from those who are not so, and as fine +pictures excel any natural objects, by collecting the several beautiful +parts which were dispersed among different originals into one, although +the separate parts, as the eye or any other, might be handsomer than in +the picture. + +But if this distinction is to be made between every people and every +general assembly, and some few men of consequence, it may be doubtful +whether it is true; nay, it is clear enough that, with respect to a few, +it is not; since the same conclusion might be applied even to brutes: +and indeed wherein do some men differ from brutes? Not but that nothing +prevents what I have said being true of the people in some states. The +doubt then which we have lately proposed, with all its consequences, may +be settled in this manner; it is necessary that the freemen who compose +the bulk of the people should have absolute power in some things; but as +they are neither men of property, nor act uniformly upon principles +of virtue, it is not safe to trust them with the first offices in the +state, both on account of their iniquity and their ignorance; from +the one of which they will do what is wrong, from the other they will +mistake: and yet it is dangerous to allow them no power or share in the +government; for when there are many poor people who are incapable of +acquiring the honours of their country, the state must necessarily have +many enemies in it; let them then be permitted to vote in the public +assemblies and to determine causes; for which reason Socrates, and some +other legislators, gave them the power of electing the officers of the +state, and also of inquiring into their conduct when they came out of +office, and only prevented their being magistrates by themselves; +for the multitude when they are collected together have all of them +sufficient understanding for these purposes, and, mixing among those of +higher rank, are serviceable to the city, as some things, which alone +are improper for food, when mixed with others make the whole more +wholesome than a few of them would be. + +But there is a difficulty attending this form of government, for it +seems, that the person who himself was capable of curing any one who +was then sick, must be the best judge whom to employ as a physician; but +such a one must be himself a physician; and the same holds true in every +other practice and art: and as a physician ought [1282a] to give an +account of his practice to a physician, so ought it to be in other arts: +those whose business is physic may be divided into three sorts, the +first of these is he who makes up the medicines; the second prescribes, +and is to the other as the architect is to the mason; the third is he +who understands the science, but never practises it: now these three +distinctions may be found in those who understand all other arts; nor +have we less opinion of their judgment who are only instructed in the +principles of the art than of those who practise it: and with respect +to elections the same method of proceeding seems right; for to elect a +proper person in any science is the business of those who are skilful +therein; as in geometry, of geometricians; in steering, of steersmen: +but if some individuals should know something of particular arts and +works, they do not know more than the professors of them: so that even +upon this principle neither the election of magistrates, nor the censure +of their conduct, should be entrusted to the many. + +But probably all that has been here said may not be right; for, to +resume the argument I lately used, if the people are not very brutal +indeed, although we allow that each individual knows less of these +affairs than those who have given particular attention to them, yet when +they come together they will know them better, or at least not worse; +besides, in some particular arts it is not the workman only who is the +best judge; namely, in those the works of which are understood by those +who do not profess them: thus he who builds a house is not the only +judge of it, for the master of the family who inhabits it is a better; +thus also a steersman is a better judge of a tiller than he who made +it; and he who gives an entertainment than the cook. What has been said +seems a sufficient solution of this difficulty; but there is another +that follows: for it seems absurd that the power of the state should be +lodged with those who are but of indifferent morals, instead of those +who are of excellent characters. Now the power of election and censure +are of the utmost consequence, and this, as has been said, in some +states they entrust to the people; for the general assembly is the +supreme court of all, and they have a voice in this, and deliberate in +all public affairs, and try all causes, without any objection to the +meanness of their circumstances, and at any age: but their treasurers, +generals, and other great officers of state are taken from men of great +fortune and worth. This difficulty also may be solved upon the same +principle; and here too they may be right, for the power is not in the +man who is member of the assembly, or council, but the assembly itself, +and the council, and the people, of which each individual of the whole +community are the parts, I mean as senator, adviser, or judge; for which +reason it is very right, that the many should have the greatest powers +in their own hands; for the people, the council, and the judges are +composed of them, and the property of all these collectively is more +than the property of any person or a few who fill the great offices of +the state: and thus I determine these points. + +The first question that we stated shows plainly, that the supreme +power should be lodged in laws duly made and that the magistrate or +magistrates, either one or more, should be authorised to determine those +cases which the laws cannot particularly speak to, as it is impossible +for them, in general language, to explain themselves upon everything +that may arise: but what these laws are which are established upon the +best foundations has not been yet explained, but still remains a matter +of some question: but the laws of every state will necessarily be like +every state, either trifling or excellent, just or unjust; for it is +evident, that the laws must be framed correspondent to the constitution +of the government; and, if so, it is plain, that a well-formed +government will have good laws, a bad one, bad ones. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + + +Since in every art and science the end aimed at is always good, so +particularly in this, which is the most excellent of all, the founding +of civil society, the good wherein aimed at is justice; for it is this +which is for the benefit of all. Now, it is the common opinion, that +justice is a certain equality; and in this point all the philosophers +are agreed when they treat of morals: for they say what is just, and to +whom; and that equals ought to receive equal: but we should know how +we are to determine what things are equal and what unequal; and in +this there is some difficulty, which calls for the philosophy of the +politician. Some persons will probably say, that the employments of the +state ought to be given according to every particular excellence of each +citizen, if there is no other difference between them and the rest of +the community, but they are in every respect else alike: for justice +attributes different things to persons differing from each other in +their character, according to their respective merits. But if this is +admitted to be true, complexion, or height, or any such advantage will +be a claim for a greater share of the public rights. But that this is +evidently absurd is clear from other arts and sciences; for with respect +to musicians who play on the flute together, the best flute is not given +to him who is of the best family, for he will play never the better for +that, but the best instrument ought to be given to him who is the best +artist. + +If what is now said does not make this clear, we will explain it still +further: if there should be any one, a very excellent player on the +flute, but very deficient in family and beauty, though each of them are +more valuable endowments than a skill in music, and excel this art in a +higher degree than that player excels others, yet the best flutes ought +to be given to him; for the superiority [1283a] in beauty and fortune +should have a reference to the business in hand; but these have none. +Moreover, according to this reasoning, every possible excellence might +come in comparison with every other; for if bodily strength might +dispute the point with riches or liberty, even any bodily strength might +do it; so that if one person excelled in size more than another did in +virtue, and his size was to qualify him to take place of the other's +virtue, everything must then admit of a comparison with each other; for +if such a size is greater than virtue by so much, it is evident another +must be equal to it: but, since this is impossible, it is plain that it +would be contrary to common sense to dispute a right to any office in +the state from every superiority whatsoever: for if one person is slow +and the other swift, neither is the one better qualified nor the other +worse on that account, though in the gymnastic races a difference in +these particulars would gain the prize; but a pretension to the offices +of the state should be founded on a superiority in those qualifications +which are useful to it: for which reason those of family, independency, +and fortune, with great propriety, contend with each other for them; for +these are the fit persons to fill them: for a city can no more consist +of all poor men than it can of all slaves But if such persons are +requisite, it is evident that those also who are just and valiant are +equally so; for without justice and valour no state can be supported, +the former being necessary for its existence, the latter for its +happiness. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + + +It seems, then, requisite for the establishment of a state, that all, or +at least many of these particulars should be well canvassed and inquired +into; and that virtue and education may most justly claim the right of +being considered as the necessary means of making the citizens happy, as +we have already said. As those who are equal in one particular are not +therefore equal in all, and those who are unequal in one particular +are not therefore unequal in all, it follows that all those governments +which are established upon a principle which supposes they are, are +erroneous. + +We have already said, that all the members of the community will dispute +with each other for the offices of the state; and in some particulars +justly, but not so in general; the rich, for instance, because they +have the greatest landed property, and the ultimate right to the soil is +vested in the community; and also because their fidelity is in general +most to be depended on. The freemen and men of family will dispute the +point with each other, as nearly on an equality; for these latter have +a right to a higher regard as citizens than obscure persons, for +honourable descent is everywhere of great esteem: nor is it an improper +conclusion, that the descendants of men of worth will be men of worth +themselves; for noble birth is the fountain of virtue to men of family: +for the same reason also we justly say, that virtue has a right to put +in her pretensions. Justice, for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary +to society, that all others must yield her the precedence. + +Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the few; +and they may say, that if, when collectively taken, they are compared +with them, they are stronger, richer, and better than they are. But +should it ever happen that all these should inhabit the [1283b] same +city, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as the many, such as +usually make up the community, I ask, will there then be any reason to +dispute concerning who shall govern, or will there not? for in every +community which we have mentioned there is no dispute where the supreme +power should be placed; for as these differ from each other, so do those +in whom that is placed; for in one state the rich enjoy it, in others +the meritorious, and thus each according to their separate manners. Let +us however consider what is to be done when all these happen at the same +time to inhabit the same city. If the virtuous should be very few in +number, how then shall we act? shall we prefer the virtuous on account +of their abilities, if they are capable of governing the city? or should +they be so many as almost entirely to compose the state? + +There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those who claim +the honours of government: for those who found them either on fortune or +family have nothing which they can justly say in their defence; since +it is evident upon their principle, that if any one person can be found +richer than all the rest, the right of governing all these will be +justly vested in this one person. In the same manner, one man who is +of the best family will claim it from those who dispute the point upon +family merit: and probably in an aristocracy the same dispute might +arise on the score of virtue, if there is one man better than all the +other men of worth who are in the same community; it seems just, by the +same reasoning, that he should enjoy the supreme power. And upon this +principle also, while the many suppose they ought to have the supreme +command, as being more powerful than the few, if one or more than one, +though a small number should be found stronger than themselves, these +ought rather to have it than they. + +All these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles +are justly founded on which these persons would establish their right to +the supreme power; and that all men whatsoever ought to obey them: +for with respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their +fortune, they might have justly some objection to make; for nothing +hinders but that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better +or richer than the few, not as individuals, but in their collective +capacity. + +As to the doubt which some persons have proposed and objected, we may +answer it in this manner; it is this, whether a legislator, who would +establish the most perfect system of laws, should calculate them for +the use of the better part of the citizens, or the many, in the +circumstances we have already mentioned? The rectitude of anything +consists in its equality; that therefore which is equally right will be +advantageous to the whole state, and to every member of it in common. + +Now, in general, a citizen is one who both shares in the government and +also in his turn submits to be governed; [1284a] their condition, it is +true, is different in different states: the best is that in which a man +is enabled to choose and to persevere in a course of virtue during his +whole life, both in his public and private state. But should there be +one person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon degree of virtue, +though not enough to make up a civil state, so that the virtue of the +many, or their political abilities, should be too inferior to come in +comparison with theirs, if more than one; or if but one, with his only; +such are not to be considered as part of the city; for it would be doing +them injustice to rate them on a level with those who are so far their +inferiors in virtue and political abilities, that they appear to them +like a god amongst men. From whence it is evident, that a system of laws +must be calculated for those who are equal to each other in nature and +power. Such men, therefore, are not the object of law; for they are +themselves a law: and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to +include them in the penalties of a law: for probably they might say what +Antisthenes tells us the lions did to the hares when they demanded to +be admitted to an equal share with them in the government. And it is on +this account that democratic states have established the ostracism; for +an equality seems the principal object of their government. For which +reason they compel all those who are very eminent for their power, their +fortune, their friendships, or any other cause which may give them too +great weight in the government, to submit to the ostracism, and leave +the city for a stated time; as the fabulous histories relate the +Argonauts served Hercules, for they refused to take him with them in the +ship Argo on account of his superior valour. For which reason those who +hate a tyranny and find fault with the advice which Periander gave to +Thrasybulus, must not think there was nothing to be said in its defence; +for the story goes, that Periander said nothing to the messenger in +answer to the business he was consulted about, but striking off those +ears of corn which were higher than the rest, reduced the whole crop to +a level; so that the messenger, without knowing the cause of what was +done, related the fact to Thrasybulus, who understood by it that he must +take off all the principal men in the city. Nor is this serviceable to +tyrants only; nor is it tyrants only who do it; for the same thing is +practised both in oligarchies and democracies: for the ostracism has in +a manner nearly the same power, by restraining and banishing those who +are too great; and what is done in one city is done also by those who +have the supreme power in separate states; as the Athenians with respect +to the Samians, the Chians, and the Lesbians; for when they suddenly +acquired the superiority over all Greece, they brought the other states +into subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them. +The King of Persia also very often reduces the Medes and Babylonians +when they assume upon their former power: [1284b] and this is a +principle which all governments whatsoever keep in their eye; even those +which are best administered, as well as those which are not, do it; +these for the sake of private utility, the others for the public good. + +The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences; for +a painter would not represent an animal with a foot disproportionally +large, though he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the +shipwright make the prow or any other part of the vessel larger than it +ought to be; nor will the master of the band permit any who sings +louder and better than the rest to sing in concert with them. There is +therefore no reason that a monarch should not act in agreement with +free states, to support his own power, if they do the same thing for the +benefit of their respective communities; upon which account when there +is any acknowledged difference in the power of the citizens, the reason +upon which the ostracism is founded will be politically just; but it is +better for the legislator so to establish his state at the beginning as +not to want this remedy: but if in course of time such an inconvenience +should arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such correction. Not that +this was the use it was put to: for many did not regard the benefit of +their respective communities, but made the ostracism a weapon in the +hand of sedition. + +It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and +useful to the individual, though probably it is as clear that it is not +entirely just: for in a well-governed state there may be great doubts +about the use of it, not on account of the pre-eminence which one may +have in strength, riches, or connection: but when the pre-eminence is +virtue, what then is to be done? for it seems not right to turn out and +banish such a one; neither does it seem right to govern him, for that +would be like desiring to share the power with Jupiter and to govern +him: nothing then remains but what indeed seems natural, and that is for +all persons quietly to submit to the government of those who are thus +eminently virtuous, and let them be perpetually kings in the separate +states. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + + +What has been now said, it seems proper to change our subject and to +inquire into the nature of monarchies; for we have already admitted them +to be one of those species of government which are properly founded. And +here let us consider whether a kingly government is proper for a city or +a country whose principal object is the happiness of the inhabitants, +or rather some other. But let us first determine whether this is of one +kind only, or more; [1285a] and it is easy to know that it consists of +many different species, and that the forms of government are not the +same in all: for at Sparta the kingly power seems chiefly regulated by +the laws; for it is not supreme in all circumstances; but when the king +quits the territories of the state he is their general in war; and all +religious affairs are entrusted to him: indeed the kingly power with +them is chiefly that of a general who cannot be called to an account for +his conduct, and whose command is for life: for he has not the power +of life and death, except as a general; as they frequently had in +their expeditions by martial law, which we learn from Homer; for when +Agamemnon is affronted in council, he restrains his resentment, but when +he is in the field and armed with this power, he tells the Greeks: + + "Whoe'er I know shall shun th' impending fight, + To dogs and vultures soon shall be a prey; For death is mine...." + +This, then, is one species of monarchical government in which the kingly +power is in a general for life; and is sometimes hereditary, sometimes +elective: besides, there is also another, which is to be met with among +some of the barbarians, in which the kings are invested with powers +nearly equal to a tyranny, yet are, in some respects, bound by the laws +and the customs of their country; for as the barbarians are by nature +more prone to slavery than the Greeks, and those in Asia more than those +in Europe, they endure without murmuring a despotic government; for +this reason their governments are tyrannies; but yet not liable to be +overthrown, as being customary and according to law. Their guards also +are such as are used in a kingly government, not a despotic one; for the +guards of their kings are his citizens, but a tyrant's are foreigners. +The one commands, in the manner the law directs, those who willingly +obey; the other, arbitrarily, those who consent not. The one, therefore, +is guarded by the citizens, the other against them. + +These, then, are the two different sorts of these monarchies, and +another is that which in ancient Greece they called _aesumnetes_; which +is nothing more than an elective tyranny; and its difference from that +which is to be found amongst the barbarians consists not in its not +being according to law, but only in its not being according to the +ancient customs of the country. Some persons possessed this power for +life, others only for a particular time or particular purpose, as the +people of Mitylene elected Pittacus to oppose the exiles, who were +headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet, as we learn from a poem +of his; for he upbraids the Mitylenians for having chosen Pittacus for +their tyrant, and with one [1285b] voice extolling him to the skies who +was the ruin of a rash and devoted people. These sorts of government +then are, and ever were, despotic, on account of their being tyrannies; +but inasmuch as they are elective, and over a free people, they are also +kingly. + +A fourth species of kingly government is that which was in use in the +heroic times, when a free people submitted to a kingly government, +according to the laws and customs of their country. For those who were +at first of benefit to mankind, either in arts or arms, or by collecting +them into civil society, or procuring them an establishment, became the +kings of a willing people, and established an hereditary monarchy. +They were particularly their generals in war, and presided over their +sacrifices, excepting such only as belonged to the priests: they were +also the supreme judges over the people; and in this case some of them +took an oath, others did not; they did, the form of swearing was by +their sceptre held out. + +In ancient times the power of the kings extended to everything +whatsoever, both civil, domestic, and foreign; but in after-times they +relinquished some of their privileges, and others the people assumed, so +that, in some states, they left their kings only the right of presiding +over the sacrifices; and even those whom it were worth while to call +by that name had only the right of being commander-in-chief in their +foreign wars. + +These, then, are the four sorts of kingdoms: the first is that of the +heroic times; which was a government over a free people, with its rights +in some particulars marked out; for the king was their general, their +judge, and their high priest. The second, that of the barbarians; which +is an hereditary despotic government regulated by laws: the third is +that which they call aesumnetic, which is an elective tyranny. The +fourth is the Lacedaemonian; and this, in few words, is nothing more +than an hereditary generalship: and in these particulars they differ +from each other. There is a fifth species of kingly government, which is +when one person has a supreme power over all things whatsoever, in +the manner that every state and every city has over those things which +belong to the public: for as the master of a family is king in his own +house, so such a king is master of a family in his own city or state. + + + + +CHAPTER XV + + +But the different sorts of kingly governments may, if I may so say, +be reduced to two; which we will consider more particularly. The last +spoken of, and the Lacedaemonian, for the chief of the others are placed +between these, which are as it were at the extremities, they having less +power than an absolute government, and yet more than the Lacedaemonians; +so that the whole matter in question may be reduced to these two points; +the one is, whether it is advantageous to the citizens to have the +office of general continue in one person for life, and whether it should +be confined to any particular families or whether every one should be +eligible: the other, whether [1286a] it is advantageous for one person +to have the supreme power over everything or not. But to enter into the +particulars concerning the office of a Lacedaemonian general would be +rather to frame laws for a state than to consider the nature and utility +of its constitution, since we know that the appointing of a general is +what is done in every state. Passing over this question then, we will +proceed to consider the other part of their government, which is +the polity of the state; and this it will be necessary to examine +particularly into, and to go through such questions as may arise. + +Now the first thing which presents itself to our consideration is this, +whether it is best to be governed by a good man, or by good laws? Those +who prefer a kingly government think that laws can only speak a general +language, but cannot adapt themselves to particular circumstances; for +which reason it is absurd in any science to follow written rule; and +even in Egypt the physician was allowed to alter the mode of cure which +the law prescribed to him, after the fourth day; but if he did it sooner +it was at his own peril: from whence it is evident, on the very same +account, that a government of written laws is not the best; and yet +general reasoning is necessary to all those who are to govern, and it +will be much more perfect in those who are entirely free from passions +than in those to whom they are natural. But now this is a quality which +laws possess; while the other is natural to the human soul. But some +one will say in answer to this, that man will be a better judge of +particulars. It will be necessary, then, for a king to be a lawgiver, +and that his laws should be published, but that those should have no +authority which are absurd, as those which are not, should. But whether +is it better for the community that those things which cannot possibly +come under the cognisance of the law either at all or properly should be +under the government of every worthy citizen, as the present method is, +when the public community, in their general assemblies, act as judges +and counsellors, where all their determinations are upon particular +cases, for one individual, be he who he will, will be found, upon +comparison, inferior to a whole people taken collectively: but this +is what a city is, as a public entertainment is better than one man's +portion: for this reason the multitude judge of many things better than +any one single person. They are also less liable to corruption from +their numbers, as water is from its quantity: besides, the judgment of +an individual must necessarily be perverted if he is overcome by anger +or any other passion; but it would be hard indeed if the whole community +should be misled by anger. Moreover, let the people be free, and they +will do nothing but in conformity to the law, except only in those cases +which the law cannot speak to. But though what I am going to propose may +not easily be met with, yet if the majority of the state should happen +to be good men, should they prefer one uncorrupt governor or many +equally good, is it not evident that they should choose the many? But +there may be divisions among [1286b] these which cannot happen when +there is but one. In answer to this it may be replied that all their +souls will be as much animated with virtue as this one man's. + +If then a government of many, and all of them good men, compose an +aristocracy, and the government of one a kingly power, it is evident +that the people should rather choose the first than the last; and this +whether the state is powerful or not, if many such persons so alike +can be met with: and for this reason probable it was, that the first +governments were generally monarchies; because it was difficult to find +a number of persons eminently virtuous, more particularly as the world +was then divided into small communities; besides, kings were appointed +in return for the benefits they had conferred on mankind; but such +actions are peculiar to good men: but when many persons equal in virtue +appeared at the time, they brooked not a superiority, but sought after +an equality and established a free state; but after this, when they +degenerated, they made a property of the public; which probably gave +rise to oligarchies; for they made wealth meritorious, and the honours +of government were reserved for the rich: and these afterwards turned +to tyrannies and these in their turn gave rise to democracies; for +the power of the tyrants continually decreasing, on account of their +rapacious avarice, the people grew powerful enough to frame and +establish democracies: and as cities after that happened to increase, +probably it was not easy for them to be under any other government than +a democracy. But if any person prefers a kingly government in a state, +what is to be done with the king's children? Is the family also to +reign? But should they have such children as some persons usually have, +it will be very detrimental. It may be said, that then the king who +has it in his power will never permit such children to succeed to his +kingdom. But it is not easy to trust to that; for it is very hard and +requires greater virtue than is to be met with in human nature. There is +also a doubt concerning the power with which a king should be entrusted: +whether he should be allowed force sufficient to compel those who do +not choose to be obedient to the laws, and how he is to support his +government? for if he is to govern according to law and do nothing of +his own will which is contrary thereunto, at the same time it will +be necessary to protect that power with which he guards the law, This +matter however may not be very difficult to determine; for he ought to +have a proper power, and such a one is that which will be sufficient +to make the king superior to any one person or even a large part of the +community, but inferior to the whole, as the ancients always appointed +guards for that person whom they created aesumnetes or tyrant; and some +one advised the Syracusians, when Dionysius asked for guards, to allow +him such. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + + +[1287a] We will next consider the absolute monarch that we have just +mentioned, who does everything according to his own will: for a king +governing under the direction of laws which he is obliged to follow does +not of himself create any particular species of government, as we have +already said: for in every state whatsoever, either aristocracy or +democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life; and there are many +who entrust the administration of affairs to one person only; such is +the government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the same at Opus. As for an +absolute monarchy as it is called, that is to say, when the whole state +is wholly subject to the will of one person, namely the king, it seems +to many that it is unnatural that one man should have the entire rule +over his fellow-citizens when the state consists of equals: for nature +requires that the same right and the same rank should necessarily take +place amongst all those who are equal by nature: for as it would be +hurtful to the body for those who are of different constitutions to +observe the same regimen, either of diet or clothing, so is it with +respect to the honours of the state as hurtful, that those who are equal +in merit should be unequal in rank; for which reason it is as much +a man's duty to submit to command as to assume it, and this also by +rotation; for this is law, for order is law; and it is more proper that +law should govern than any one of the citizens: upon the same principle, +if it is advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular +persons, they should be appointed to be only guardians, and the servants +of the laws, for the supreme power must be placed somewhere; but they +say, that it is unjust that where all are equal one person should +continually enjoy it. But it seems unlikely that man should be able to +adjust that which the law cannot determine; it may be replied, that the +law having laid down the best rules possible, leaves the adjustment and +application of particulars to the discretion of the magistrate; besides, +it allows anything to be altered which experience proves may be better +established. Moreover, he who would place the supreme power in mind, +would place it in God and the laws; but he who entrusts man with it, +gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; for +passion influences those who are in power, even the very best of men: +for which reason law is reason without desire. + +The instance taken from the arts seems fallacious: wherein it is said to +be wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that it +would be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in physic; +for these do nothing contrary to reason from motives of friendship +but earn their money by curing the sick, whereas those who have the +management of public affairs do many things through hatred or favour. +And, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be observed, that +whenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been persuaded by +his enemies to be guilty of any foul practice to him in his profession, +he then rather chooses to apply to books for his cure: and not only this +[1287b] but even physicians themselves when they are ill call in other +physicians: and those who teach others the gymnastic exercises, +exercise with those of the same profession, as being incapable from +self-partiality to form a proper judgment of what concerns themselves. +From whence it is evident, that those who seek for what is just, seek +for a mean; now law is a mean. Moreover; the moral law is far superior +and conversant with far superior objects than the written law; for the +supreme magistrate is safer to be trusted to than the one, though he is +inferior to the other. But as it is impossible that one person should +have an eye to everything himself, it will be necessary that the supreme +magistrate should employ several subordinate ones under him; why then +should not this be done at first, instead of appointing one person in +this manner? Besides, if, according to what has been already said, the +man of worth is on that account fit to govern, two men of worth are +certainly better than one: as, for instance, in Homer, "Let two together +go:" and also Agamemnon's wish; "Were ten such faithful counsel mine!" +Not but that there are even now some particular magistrates invested +with supreme power to decide, as judges, those things which the law +cannot, as being one of those cases which comes not properly under its +jurisdiction; for of those which can there is no doubt: since then laws +comprehend some things, but not all, it is necessary to enquire and +consider which of the two is preferable, that the best man or the best +law should govern; for to reduce every subject which can come under the +deliberation of man into a law is impossible. + +No one then denies, that it is necessary that there should be some +person to decide those cases which cannot come under the cognisance of +a written law: but we say, that it is better to have many than one; +for though every one who decides according to the principles of the law +decides justly; yet surely it seems absurd to suppose, that one person +can see better with two eyes, and hear better with two ears, or do +better with two hands and two feet, than many can do with many: for we +see that absolute monarchs now furnish themselves with many eyes and +ears and hands and feet; for they entrust those who are friends to +them and their government with part of their power; for if they are not +friends to the monarch, they will not do what he chooses; but if they +are friends to him, they are friends also to his government: but a +friend is an equal and like his friend: if then he thinks that such +should govern, he thinks that his equal also should govern. These are +nearly the objections which are usually made to a kingly power. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + + +Probably what we have said may be true of some persons, but not of +others; for some men are by nature formed to be under the government of +a master; others, of a king; others, to be the citizens of a free state, +just and useful; but a tyranny is not according to nature, nor the other +perverted forms of government; for they are contrary to it. But it +is evident from what has been said, that among equals it is neither +advantageous nor [1288a] right that one person should be lord over all +where there are no established laws, but his will is the law; or where +there are; nor is it right that one who is good should have it over +those who are good; or one who is not good over those who are not good; +nor one who is superior to the rest in worth, except in a particular +manner, which shall be described, though indeed it has been already +mentioned. But let us next determine what people are best qualified +for a kingly government, what for an aristocratic, and what for a +democratic. And, first, for a kingly; and it should be those who are +accustomed by nature to submit the civil government of themselves to a +family eminent for virtue: for an aristocracy, those who are naturally +framed to bear the rule of free men, whose superior virtue makes them +worthy of the management of others: for a free state, a war-like people, +formed by nature both to govern and be governed by laws which admit the +poorest citizen to share the honours of the commonwealth according +to his worth. But whenever a whole family or any one of another shall +happen so far to excel in virtue as to exceed all other persons in the +community, then it is right that the kingly power should be in them, or +if it is an individual who does so, that he should be king and lord of +all; for this, as we have just mentioned, is not only correspondent +to that principle of right which all founders of all states, whether +aristocracies, oligarchies, or democracies, have a regard to (for +in placing the supreme power they all think it right to fix it to +excellence, though not the same); but it is also agreeable to what +has been already said; as it would not be right to kill, or banish, or +ostracise such a one for his superior merit. Nor would it be proper +to let him have the supreme power only in turn; for it is contrary to +nature that what is highest should ever be lowest: but this would be +the case should such a one ever be governed by others. So that there can +nothing else be done but to submit, and permit him continually to +enjoy the supreme power. And thus much with respect to kingly power in +different states, and whether it is or is not advantageous to them, and +to what, and in what manner. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + + +Since then we have said that there are three sorts of regular +governments, and of these the best must necessarily be that which is +administered by the best men (and this must be that which happens to +have one man, or one family, or a number of persons excelling all the +rest in virtue, who are able to govern and be governed in such a manner +as will make life most agreeable, and we have already shown that the +virtue of a good man and of a citizen in the most perfect government +will be the same), it is evident, that in the same manner, and for those +very qualities which would procure a man the character of good, any +one would say, that the government of a state was a well-established +aristocracy or kingdom; so that it will be found to be education and +[1288b] morals that are almost the whole which go to make a good man, +and the same qualities will make a good citizen or good king. + +These particulars being treated of, we will now proceed to consider +what sort of government is best, how it naturally arises, and how it +is established; for it is necessary to make a proper inquiry concerning +this. + + + + +BOOK IV + + + + +CHAPTER I + + +In every art and science which is not conversant in parts but in some +one genus in which it is complete, it is the business of that art alone +to determine what is fitted to its particular genus; as what particular +exercise is fitted to a certain particular body, and suits it best: for +that body which is formed by nature the most perfect and superior to +others necessarily requires the best exercise-and also of what one kind +that must be which will suit the generality; and this is the business of +the gymnastic arts: and although any one should not desire to acquire +an exact knowledge and skill in these exercises, yet it is not, on that +account, the less necessary that he who professes to be a master and +instruct the youth in them should be perfect therein: and we see that +this is what equally befalls the healing, shipbuilding, cloth-making, +and indeed all other arts; so that it evidently belongs to the same art +to find out what kind of government is best, and would of all others be +most correspondent to our wish, while it received no molestation from +without: and what particular species of it is adapted to particular +persons; for there are many who probably are incapable of enjoying the +best form: so that the legislator, and he who is truly a politician, +ought to be acquainted not only with that which is most perfect +imaginable, but also that which is the best suited to any given +circumstances. There is, moreover, a third sort, an imaginary one, and +he ought, if such a one should be presented to his consideration, to be +able to discern what sort of one it would be at the beginning; and, when +once established, what would be the proper means to preserve it a long +time. I mean, for instance, if a state should happen not to have the +best form of government, or be deficient in what was necessary, or not +receive every advantage possible, but something less. And, besides all +this, it is necessary to know what sort of government is best fitting +for all cities: for most of those writers who have treated this subject, +however speciously they may handle other parts of it, have failed in +describing the practical parts: for it is not enough to be able to +perceive what is best without it is what can be put in practice. It +should also be simple, and easy for all to attain to. But some seek only +the most subtile forms of government. Others again, choosing [1289a] +rather to treat of what is common, censure those under which they live, +and extol the excellence of a particular state, as the Lacedaemonian, +or some other: but every legislator ought to establish such a form of +government as from the present state and disposition of the people who +are to receive it they will most readily submit to and persuade the +community to partake of: for it is not a business of less trouble to +correct the mistakes of an established government than to form a new +one; as it is as difficult to recover what we have forgot as to learn +anything afresh. He, therefore, who aspires to the character of a +legislator, ought, besides all we have already said, to be able to +correct the mistakes of a government already established, as we have +before mentioned. But this is impossible to be done by him who does +not know how many different forms of government there are: some persons +think that there is only one species both of democracy and oligarchy; +but this is not true: so that every one should be acquainted with the +difference of these governments, how great they are, and whence they +arise; and should have equal knowledge to perceive what laws are best, +and what are most suitable to each particular government: for all +laws are, and ought to be, framed agreeable to the state that is to be +governed by them, and not the state to the laws: for government is a +certain ordering in a state which particularly respects the magistrates +in what manner they shall be regulated, and where the supreme power +shall be placed; and what shall be the final object which each community +shall have in view; but the laws are something different from what +regulates and expresses the form of the constitution-it is their office +to direct the conduct of the magistrate in the execution of his office +and the punishment of offenders. From whence it is evident, that the +founders of laws should attend both to the number and the different +sorts of government; for it is impossible that the same laws should be +calculated for all sorts of oligarchies and all sorts of democracies, +for of both these governments there are many species, not one only. + + + + +CHAPTER II + + +Since, then, according to our first method in treating of the different +forms of government, we have divided those which are regular into three +sorts, the kingly, the aristocratical, the free states, and shown +the three excesses which these are liable to: the kingly, of becoming +tyrannical; the aristocratical, oligarchical; and the free state, +democratical: and as we have already treated of the aristocratical and +kingly; for to enter into an inquiry what sort of government is best +is the same thing as to treat of these two expressly; for each of +them desires to be established upon the principles of virtue: and as, +moreover, we have already determined wherein a kingly power and an +aristocracy differ from each other, and when a state may be said to be +governed by a king, it now remains that we examine into a free state, +and also these other governments, an oligarchy, a democracy, and a +[1289b] tyranny; and it is evident of these three excesses which must be +the worst of all, and which next to it; for, of course, the excesses of +the best and most holy must be the worst; for it must necessarily happen +either that the name of king only will remain, or else that the king +will assume more power than belongs to him, from whence tyranny will +arise, the worst excess imaginable, a government the most contrary +possible to a free state. The excess next hurtful is an oligarchy; for +an aristocracy differs much from this sort of government: that which is +least so is a democracy. This subject has been already treated of by one +of those writers who have gone before me, though his sentiments are not +the same as mine: for he thought, that of all excellent constitutions, +as a good oligarchy or the like, a democracy was the worst, but of all +bad ones, the best. + +Now I affirm, that all these states have, without exception, fallen into +excess; and also that he should not have said that one oligarchy was +better than another, but that it was not quite so bad. But this question +we shall not enter into at present. We shall first inquire how many +different sorts of free states there are; since there are many +species of democracies and oligarchies; and which of them is the most +comprehensive, and most desirable after the best form of government; or +if there is any other like an aristocracy, well established; and also +which of these is best adapted to most cities, and which of them is +preferable for particular persons: for, probably, some may suit better +with an oligarchy than a democracy, and others better with a democracy +than an oligarchy; and afterwards in what manner any one ought to +proceed who desires to establish either of these states, I mean every +species of democracy, and also of oligarchy. And to conclude, when we +shall have briefly gone through everything that is necessary, we will +endeavour to point out the sources of corruption, and stability, in +government, as well those which are common to all as those which are +peculiar to each state, and from what causes they chiefly arise. + + + + +CHAPTER III + + +The reason for there being many different sorts of governments is this, +that each state consists of a great number of parts; for, in the first +place, we see that all cities are made up of families: and again, of +the multitude of these some must be rich, some poor, and others in the +middle station; and that, both of the rich and poor, some will be used +to arms, others not. We see also, that some of the common people are +husbandmen, others attend the market, and others are artificers. There +is also a difference between the nobles in their wealth, and the dignity +in which they live: for instance, in the number of horses they breed; +for this cannot be supported without a large fortune: for which reason, +in former times, those cities whose strength consisted in horse became +by that means oligarchies; and they used horse in their expeditions +against the neighbouring cities; as the Eretrians the Chalcidians, the +Magnetians, who lived near the river Meander, and many others in Asia. +Moreover, besides the difference of fortune, there is that which arises +from family and merit; or, if there are any other distinctions [1290a] +which make part of the city, they have been already mentioned in +treating of an aristocracy, for there we considered how many parts each +city must necessarily be composed of; and sometimes each of these have a +share in the government, sometimes a few, sometimes more. + +It is evident then, that there must be many forms of government, +differing from each other in their particular constitution: for the +parts of which they are composed each differ from the other. For +government is the ordering of the magistracies of the state; and these +the community share between themselves, either as they can attain them +by force, or according to some common equality which there is amongst +them, as poverty, wealth, or something which they both partake of. There +must therefore necessarily be as many different forms of governments as +there are different ranks in the society, arising from the superiority +of some over others, and their different situations. And these seem +chiefly to be two, as they say, of the winds: namely, the north and +the south; and all the others are declinations from these. And thus in +politics, there is the government of the many and the government of +the few; or a democracy and an oligarchy: for an aristocracy may be +considered as a species of oligarchy, as being also a government of the +few; and what we call a free state may be considered as a democracy: as +in the winds they consider the west as part of the north, and the east +as part of the south: and thus it is in music, according to some, who +say there are only two species of it, the Doric and the Phrygian, and +all other species of composition they call after one of these names; and +many people are accustomed to consider the nature of government in the +same light; but it is both more convenient and more correspondent to +truth to distinguish governments as I have done, into two species: one, +of those which are established upon proper principles; of which there +may be one or two sorts: the other, which includes all the different +excesses of these; so that we may compare the best form of government to +the most harmonious piece of music; the oligarchic and despotic to the +more violent tunes; and the democratic to the soft and gentle airs. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + +We ought not to define a democracy as some do, who say simply, that it +is a government where the supreme power is lodged in the people; for +even in oligarchies the supreme power is in the majority. Nor should +they define an oligarchy a government where the supreme power is in the +hands of a few: for let us suppose the number of a people to be thirteen +hundred, and that of these one thousand were rich, who would not permit +the three hundred poor to have any share in the government, although +they were free, and their equal in everything else; no one would say, +that this government was a democracy. In like manner, if the poor, when +few in number, should acquire the power over the rich, though more than +themselves, no one would say, that this was an oligarchy; nor this, when +the rest who are rich have no share in the administration. We should +rather say, that a democracy is when the supreme power is in the [1290b] +hands of the freemen; an oligarchy, when it is in the hands of the rich: +it happens indeed that in the one case the many will possess it, in +the other the few; because there are many poor and few rich. And if the +power of the state was to be distributed according to the size of the +citizens, as they say it is in Ethiopia, or according to their beauty, +it would be an oligarchy: for the number of those who are large and +beautiful is small. + +Nor are those things which we have already mentioned alone sufficient +to describe these states; for since there are many species both of a +democracy and an oligarchy, the matter requires further consideration; +as we cannot admit, that if a few persons who are free possess the +supreme power over the many who are not free, that this government is a +democracy: as in Apollonia, in Ionia, and in Thera: for in each of these +cities the honours of the state belong to some few particular families, +who first founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because they are +superior in numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at Colophon; for +there the majority had large possessions before the Lydian war: but a +democracy is a state where the freemen and the poor, being the majority, +are invested with the power of the state. An oligarchy is a state where +the rich and those of noble families, being few, possess it. + +We have now proved that there are various forms of government and have +assigned a reason for it; and shall proceed to show that there are +even more than these, and what they are, and why; setting out with the +principle we have already laid down. We admit that every city consists +not of one, but many parts: thus, if we should endeavour to comprehend +the different species of animals we should first of all note those parts +which every animal must have, as a certain sensorium, and also what is +necessary to acquire and retain food, as a mouth and a belly; besides +certain parts to enable it to move from place to place. If, then, these +are the only parts of an animal and there are differences between them; +namely, in their various sorts of stomachs, bellies, and sensoriums: to +which we must add their motive powers; the number of the combinations of +all these must necessarily make up the different species of animals. +For it is not possible that the same kind of animal should have any +very great difference in its mouth or ears; so that when all these are +collected, who happen to have these things similar in all, they make up +a species of animals of which there are as many as there are of these +general combinations of necessary parts. + +The same thing is true of what are called states; for a city is not made +of one but many parts, as has already been often said; one of which is +those who supply it with provisions, called husbandmen, another called +mechanics, [1291a] whose employment is in the manual arts, without which +the city could not be inhabited; of these some are busied about what is +absolutely necessary, others in what contribute to the elegancies and +pleasures of life; the third sort are your exchange-men, I mean by these +your buyers, sellers, merchants, and victuallers; the fourth are your +hired labourers or workmen; the fifth are the men-at-arms, a rank not +less useful than the other, without you would have the community slaves +to every invader; but what cannot defend itself is unworthy of the name +of a city; for a city is self-sufficient, a slave not. So that when +Socrates, in Plato's Republic, says that a city is necessarily composed +of four sorts of people, he speaks elegantly but not correctly, and +these are, according to him, weavers, husbandmen, shoe-makers, and +builders; he then adds, as if these were not sufficient, smiths, +herdsmen for what cattle are necessary, and also merchants and +victuallers, and these are by way of appendix to his first list; as if +a city was established for necessity, and not happiness, or as if a +shoe-maker and a husbandman were equally useful. He reckons not the +military a part before the increase of territory and joining to the +borders of the neighbouring powers will make war necessary: and even +amongst them who compose his four divisions, or whoever have any +connection with each other, it will be necessary to have some one to +distribute justice, and determine between man and man. If, then, the +mind is a more valuable part of man than the body, every one would +wish to have those things more regarded in his city which tend to the +advantage of these than common matters, such are war and justice; to +which may be added council, which is the business of civil wisdom (nor +is it of any consequence whether these different employments are filled +by different persons or one, as the same man is oftentimes both a +soldier and a husbandman): so that if both the judge and the senator are +parts of the city, it necessarily follows that the soldier must be +so also. The seventh sort are those who serve the public in expensive +employments at their own charge: these are called the rich. The eighth +are those who execute the different offices of the state, and without +these it could not possibly subsist: it is therefore necessary that +there should be some persons capable of governing and filling the places +in the city; and this either for life or in rotation: the office of +senator, and judge, of which we have already sufficiently treated, are +the only ones remaining. If, then, these things are necessary for a +state, that it may be happy and just, it follows that the citizens who +engage in public affairs should be men of abilities therein. [1291b] +Several persons think, that different employments may be allotted to the +same person; as a soldier's, a husbandman's, and an artificer's; as also +that others may be both senators and judges. + +Besides, every one supposes himself a man of political abilities, and +that he is qualified for almost every department in the state. But the +same person cannot at once be poor and rich: for which reason the most +obvious division of the city is into two parts, the poor and rich; +moreover, since for the generality the one are few, the other many, they +seem of all the parts of a city most contrary to each other; so that as +the one or the other prevail they form different states; and these are +the democracy and the oligarchy. + +But that there are many different states, and from what causes they +arise, has been already mentioned: and that there are also different +species both of democracies and oligarchies we will now show. Though +this indeed is evident from what we have already said: there are also +many different sorts of common people, and also of those who are +called gentlemen. Of the different sorts of the first are husbandmen, +artificers, exchange-men, who are employed in buying and selling, +seamen, of which some are engaged in war, some in traffic, some in +carrying goods and passengers from place to place, others in fishing, +and of each of these there are often many, as fishermen at Tarentum and +Byzantium, masters of galleys at Athens, merchants at AEgina and Chios, +those who let ships on freight at Tenedos; we may add to these those who +live by their manual labour and have but little property; so that they +cannot live without some employ: and also those who are not free-born +on both sides, and whatever other sort of common people there may be. +As for gentlemen, they are such as are distinguished either by their +fortune, their birth, their abilities, or their education, or any +such-like excellence which is attributed to them. + +The most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from that +equality which prevails in it: for this is what the law in that state +directs; that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than the rich; +nor that the supreme power shall be lodged with either of these, but +that both shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as some persons +suppose, are chiefly to be found in a democracy, it must be most so +by every department of government being alike open to all; but as the +people are the majority, and what they vote is law, it follows that such +a state must be a democracy. This, then, is one species thereof. Another +is, when the magistrates are elected by a certain census; but this +should be but small, and every one who was included in it should be +eligible, but as soon as he was below it should lose that right. [1292a] +Another sort is, in which every citizen who is not infamous has a share +in the government, but where the government is in the laws. Another, +where every citizen without exception has this right. Another is like +these in other particulars, but there the people govern, and not the +law: and this takes place when everything is determined by a majority of +votes, and not by a law; which happens when the people are influenced by +the demagogues: for where a democracy is governed by stated laws there +is no room for them, but men of worth fill the first offices in the +state: but where the power is not vested in the laws, there demagogues +abound: for there the people rule with kingly power: the whole composing +one body; for they are supreme, not as individuals but in their +collective capacity. + +Homer also discommends the government of many; but whether he means this +we are speaking of, or where each person exercises his power separately, +is uncertain. When the people possess this power they desire to be +altogether absolute, that they may not be under the control of the law, +and this is the time when flatterers are held in repute. Nor is there +any difference between such a people and monarchs in a tyranny: for +their manners are the same, and they both hold a despotic power over +better persons than themselves. For their decrees are like the others' +edicts; their demagogues like the others' flatterers: but their greatest +resemblance consists in the mutual support they give to each other, the +flatterer to the tyrant, the demagogue to the people: and to them it is +owing that the supreme power is lodged in the votes of the people, +and not in the laws; for they bring everything before them, as their +influence is owing to their being supreme whose opinions they entirely +direct; for these are they whom the multitude obey. Besides, those who +accuse the magistrates insist upon it, that the right of determining on +their conduct lies in the people, who gladly receive their complaints as +the means of destroying all their offices. + +Any one, therefore, may with great justice blame such a government as +being a democracy, and not a free state; for where the government is +not in the laws, then there is no free state, for the law ought to be +supreme over all things; and particular incidents which arise should be +determined by the magistrates or the state. If, therefore, a +democracy is to be reckoned a free state, it is evident that any such +establishment which centres all power in the votes of the people cannot, +properly speaking, be a democracy: for their decrees cannot be general +in their extent. Thus, then, we may describe the several species of +democracies. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + +Of the different species of oligarchies one is, when the right to the +offices is regulated by a certain census; so that the poor, although the +majority, have no share in it; while all those who are included therein +take part in the management of public affairs. Another sort is, when +[1292b] the magistrates are men of very small fortune, who upon any +vacancy do themselves fill it up: and if they do this out of the +community at large, the state approaches to an aristocracy; if out of +any particular class of people, it will be an oligarchy. Another sort of +oligarchy is, when the power is an hereditary nobility. The fourth is, +when the power is in the same hands as the other, but not under the +control of law; and this sort of oligarchy exactly corresponds to a +tyranny in monarchies, and to that particular species of democracies +which I last mentioned in treating of that state: this has the +particular name of a dynasty. These are the different sorts of +oligarchies and democracies. + +It should also be known, that it often happens that a free state, where +the supreme power is in the laws, may not be democratic, and yet in +consequence of the established manners and customs of the people, may +be governed as if it was; so, on the other hand, where the laws may +countenance a more democratic form of government, these may make the +state inclining to an oligarchy; and this chiefly happens when there +has been any alteration in the government; for the people do not easily +change, but love their own ancient customs; and it is by small degrees +only that one thing takes place of another; so that the ancient laws +will remain, while the power will be in the hands of those who have +brought about a revolution in the state. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + +It is evident from what has been said, that there are as many different +sorts of democracies and oligarchies as I have reckoned up: for, of +necessity, either all ranks of the people which I have enumerated must +have a share in the government, or some only, and others not; for when +the husbandmen, and those only who possess moderate fortunes, have the +supreme power, they will govern according to law; for as they must get +their livings by their employs, they have but little leisure for public +business: they will therefore establish proper laws, and never call +public assemblies but when there is a necessity for them; and they will +readily let every one partake with them in the administration of public +affairs as soon as they possess that fortune which the law requires for +their qualification: every one, therefore, who is qualified will have +his share in the government: for to exclude any would be to make the +government an oligarchy, and for all to have leisure to attend +without they had a subsistence would be impossible: for these reasons, +therefore, this government is a species of democracy. Another species is +distinguished by the mode of electing their magistrates, in which every +one is eligible, to whose birth there are no objections, provided he is +supposed to have leisure to attend: for which reason in such a democracy +the supreme power will be vested in the laws, as there will be nothing +paid to those who go to the public assemblies. A third species is where +every freeman has a right to a share in the government, which he will +not accept for the cause already assigned; for which reason here also +the supreme power will be in the law. The fourth species [1293a] of +democracy, the last which was established in order of time, arose when +cities were greatly enlarged to what they were at first, and when the +public revenue became something considerable; for then the populace, on +account of their numbers, were admitted to share in the management of +public affairs, for then even the poorest people were at leisure to +attend to them, as they received wages for so doing; nay, they were more +so than others, as they were not hindered by having anything of their +own to mind, as the rich had; for which reason these last very often did +not frequent the public assemblies and the courts of justice: thus the +supreme power was lodged in the poor, and not in the laws. These are +the different sorts of democracies, and such are the causes which +necessarily gave birth to them. + +The first species of oligarchy is, when the generality of the state are +men of moderate and not too large property; for this gives them leisure +for the management of public affairs: and, as they are a numerous body, +it necessarily follows that the supreme power must be in the laws, and +not in men; for as they are far removed from a monarchical government, +and have not sufficient fortune to neglect their private affairs, while +they are too many to be supported by the public, they will of course +determine to be governed by the laws, and not by each other. But if the +men of property in the state are but few, and their property is large, +then an oligarchy of the second sort will take place; for those who have +most power will think that they have a right to lord it over the others; +and, to accomplish this, they will associate to themselves some who have +an inclination for public affairs, and as they are not powerful enough +to govern without law, they will make a law for that purpose. And if +those few who have large fortunes should acquire still greater power, +the oligarchy will then alter into one of the third sort; for they will +get all the offices of the state into their own hands by a law which +directs the son to succeed upon the death of his father; and, +after that, when, by means of their increasing wealth and powerful +connections, they extend still further their oppression, a monarchical +dynasty will directly succeed wherein men will be supreme, and not the +law; and this is the fourth species of an oligarchy correspondent to the +last-mentioned class of democracies. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + +There are besides two other states, a democracy and an oligarchy, one +of which all speak of, and it is always esteemed a species of the +four sorts; and thus they reckon them up; a monarchy, an oligarchy, a +democracy, and this fourth which they call an aristocracy. There is +also a fifth, which bears a name that is also common to the other four, +namely, a state: but as this is seldom to be met with, it has escaped +those who have endeavoured to enumerate the different sorts of +governments, which [1293b] they fix at four only, as does Plato in his +Republic. + +An aristocracy, of which I have already treated in the first book, is +rightly called so; for a state governed by the best men, upon the most +virtuous principles, and not upon any hypothesis, which even good men +may propose, has alone a right to be called an aristocracy, for it is +there only that a man is at once a good man and a good citizen; while in +other states men are good only relative to those states. Moreover, there +are some other states which are called by the same name, that differ +both from oligarchies and free states, wherein not only the rich but +also the virtuous have a share in the administration; and have therefore +acquired the name of aristocracies; for in those governments wherein +virtue is not their common care, there are still men of worth and +approved goodness. Whatever state, then, like the Carthaginians, +favours the rich, the virtuous, and the citizens at large, is a sort +of aristocracy: when only the two latter are held in esteem, as at +Lacedaemon, and the state is jointly composed of these, it is a virtuous +democracy. These are the two species of aristocracies after the first, +which is the best of all governments. There is also a third, which is, +whenever a free state inclines to the dominion of a few. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + + +It now remains for us to treat of that government which is particularly +called a free state, and also of a tyranny; and the reason for my +choosing to place that free state here is, because this, as well +as those aristocracies already mentioned, although they do not seem +excesses, yet, to speak true, they have all departed from what a perfect +government is. Nay, they are deviations both of them equally from other +forms, as I said at the beginning. It is proper to mention a tyranny the +last of all governments, for it is of all others the least like one: +but as my intention is to treat of all governments in general, for this +reason that also, as I have said, will be taken into consideration in +its proper place. + +I shall now inquire into a free state and show what it is; and we shall +the better understand its positive nature as we have already described +an oligarchy and a democracy; for a free state is indeed nothing more +than a mixture of them, and it has been usual to call those which +incline most to a democracy, a free state; those which incline most to +an oligarchy, an aristocracy, because those who are rich are generally +men of family and education; besides, they enjoy those things which +others are often guilty of crimes to procure: for which reason they are +regarded as men of worth and honour and note. + +Since, then, it is the genius of an aristocracy to allot the larger +part of the government to the best citizens, they therefore say, that +an oligarchy is chiefly composed of those men who are worthy and +honourable: now it [1294a] seems impossible that where the government +is in the hands of the good, there the laws should not be good, but bad; +or, on the contrary, that where the government is in the hands of the +bad, there the laws should be good; nor is a government well constituted +because the laws are, without at the same time care is taken that they +are observed; for to enforce obedience to the laws which it makes is one +proof of a good constitution in the state-another is, to have laws well +calculated for those who are to abide by them; for if they are improper +they must be obeyed: and this may be done two ways, either by their +being the best relative to the particular state, or the best absolutely. +An aristocracy seems most likely to confer the honours of the state on +the virtuous; for virtue is the object of an aristocracy, riches of an +oligarchy, and liberty of a democracy; for what is approved of by the +majority will prevail in all or in each of these three different states; +and that which seems good to most of those who compose the community +will prevail: for what is called a state prevails in many communities, +which aim at a mixture of rich and poor, riches and liberty: as for +the rich, they are usually supposed to take the place of the worthy and +honourable. As there are three things which claim an equal rank in the +state, freedom, riches, and virtue (for as for the fourth, rank, it is +an attendant on two of the others, for virtue and riches are the origin +of family), it is evident, that the conjuncture of the rich and the poor +make up a free state; but that all three tend to an aristocracy more +than any other, except that which is truly so, which holds the first +rank. + +We have already seen that there are governments different from a +monarchy, a democracy, and an oligarchy; and what they are, and wherein +they differ from each other; and also aristocracies and states properly +so called, which are derived from them; and it is evident that these are +not much unlike each other. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + + +We shall next proceed to show how that government which is peculiarly +called a state arises alongside of democracy and oligarchy, and how it +ought to be established; and this will at the same time show what are +the proper boundaries of both these governments, for we must mark out +wherein they differ from one another, and then from both these compose +a state of such parts of each of them as will show from whence they were +taken. + +There are three different ways in which two states may be blended and +joined together; for, in the first place, all those rules may be adopted +which the laws of each of them have ordered; as for instance in the +judicial department, for in an oligarchy the rich are fined if they do +not come to the court as jurymen, but the poor are not paid for their +attendance; but in democracies they are, while the rich are not fined +for their neglect. Now these things, as being common to both, are fit +to be observed in a free [1294b] state which is composed of both. This, +then, is one way in which they may be joined together. In the second +place, a medium may be taken between the different methods which each +state observes; for instance, in a democracy the right to vote in the +public assembly is either confined by no census at all, or limited by a +very small one; in an oligarchy none enjoy it but those whose census is +high: therefore, as these two practices are contrary to each other, a +census between each may be established in such a state. In the third +place, different laws of each community may be adopted; as, for +instance, as it seems correspondent to the nature of a democracy, that +the magistrates should be chosen by lot, but an aristocracy by vote, and +in the one state according to a census, but not in the other: let, then, +an aristocracy and a free state copy something from each of them; let +them follow an oligarchy in choosing their magistrates by vote, but a +democracy in not admitting of any census, and thus blend together the +different customs of the two governments. But the best proof of a happy +mixture of a democracy and an oligarchy is this, when a person may +properly call the same state a democracy and an oligarchy. It is evident +that those who speak of it in this manner are induced to it because both +these governments are there well blended together: and indeed this +is common to all mediums, that the extremes of each side should be +discerned therein, as at Lacedaemon; for many affirm that it is a +democracy from the many particulars in which it follows that form of +government; as for instance, in the first place, in the bringing up of +their children, for the rich and poor are brought up in the same manner; +and their education is such that the children of the poor may partake of +it; and the same rules are observed when they are youths and men, there +is no distinction between a rich person and a poor one; and in their +public tables the same provision is served to all. The rich also wear +only such clothes as the poorest man is able to purchase. Moreover, with +respect to two magistracies of the highest rank, one they have a right +to elect to, the other to fill; namely, the senate and the ephori. +Others consider it as an oligarchy, the principles of which it follows +in many things, as in choosing all their officers by vote, and not by +lot; in there being but a few who have a right to sit in judgment on +capital causes and the like. Indeed, a state which is well composed of +two others ought to resemble them both, and neither, Such a state ought +to have its means of preservation in itself, and not without; and when I +say in itself, I do not mean that it should owe this to the forbearance +of their neighbours, for this may happen to a bad government, but to +every member of the community's not being willing that there should be +the least alteration in their constitution. Such is the method in which +a free state or aristocracy ought to be established. + + + + +CHAPTER X + + +It now remains to treat of a tyranny; not that there is [1295a] much +to be said on that subject, but as it makes part of our plan, since +we enumerated it amongst our different sorts of governments. In the +beginning of this work we inquired into the nature of kingly government, +and entered into a particular examination of what was most properly +called so, and whether it was advantageous to a state or not, and what +it should be, and how established; and we divided a tyranny into two +pieces when we were upon this subject, because there is something +analogous between this and a kingly government, for they are both of +them established by law; for among some of the barbarians they elect a +monarch with absolute power, and formerly among the Greeks there were +some such, whom they called sesumnetes. Now these differ from each +other; for some possess only kingly power regulated by law, and +rule those who voluntarily submit to their government; others rule +despotically according to their own will. There is a third species of +tyranny, most properly so called, which is the very opposite to kingly +power; for this is the government of one who rules over his equals and +superiors without being accountable for his conduct, and whose object is +his own advantage, and not the advantage of those he governs; for which +reason he rules by compulsion, for no freemen will ever willingly submit +to such a government. These are the different species of tyrannies, +their principles, and their causes. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + + +We proceed now to inquire what form of government and what manner +of life is best for communities in general, not adapting it to that +superior virtue which is above the reach of the vulgar, or that +education which every advantage of nature and fortune only can furnish, +nor to those imaginary plans which may be formed at pleasure; but to +that mode of life which the greater part of mankind can attain to, +and that government which most cities may establish: for as to those +aristocracies which we have now mentioned, they are either too perfect +for a state to support, or one so nearly alike to that state we now +going to inquire into, that we shall treat of them both as one. + +The opinions which we form upon these subjects must depend upon one +common principle: for if what I have said in my treatise on Morals is +true, a happy life must arise from an uninterrupted course of virtue; +and if virtue consists in a certain medium, the middle life must +certainly be the happiest; which medium is attainable [1295b] by +every one. The boundaries of virtue and vice in the state must also +necessarily be the same as in a private person; for the form of +government is the life of the city. In every city the people are divided +into three sorts; the very rich, the very poor, and those who are +between them. If this is universally admitted, that the mean is best, it +is evident that even in point of fortune mediocrity is to be preferred; +for that state is most submissive to reason; for those who are very +handsome, or very strong, or very noble, or very rich; or, on the +contrary; those who are very poor, or very weak, or very mean, with +difficulty obey it; for the one are capricious and greatly flagitious, +the other rascally and mean, the crimes of each arising from their +different excesses: nor will they go through the different offices +of the state; which is detrimental to it: besides, those who excel in +strength, in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know how nor are +willing to submit to command: and this begins at home when they are +boys; for there they are brought up too delicately to be accustomed to +obey their preceptors: as for the very poor, their general and excessive +want of what the rich enjoy reduces them to a state too mean: so that +the one know not how to command, but to be commanded as slaves, the +others know not how to submit to any command, nor to command themselves +but with despotic power. + +A city composed of such men must therefore consist of slaves and +masters, not freemen; where one party must hate, and the other +despise, where there could be no possibility of friendship or political +community: for community supposes affection; for we do not even on the +road associate with our enemies. It is also the genius of a city to be +composed as much as possible of equals; which will be most so when the +inhabitants are in the middle state: from whence it follows, that that +city must be best framed which is composed of those whom we say are +naturally its proper members. It is men of this station also who will be +best assured of safety and protection; for they will neither covet what +belongs to others, as the poor do; nor will others covet what is theirs, +as the poor do what belongs to the rich; and thus, without plotting +against any one, or having any one plot against them, they will live +free from danger: for which reason Phocylides wisely wishes for the +middle state, as being most productive of happiness. It is plain, then, +that the most perfect political community must be amongst those who are +in the middle rank, and those states are best instituted wherein these +are a larger and more respectable part, if possible, than both the +other; or, if that cannot be, at least than either of them separate; +so that being thrown into the balance it may prevent either scale from +preponderating. + +It is therefore the greatest happiness which the citizens can enjoy to +possess a moderate and convenient fortune; for when some possess too +much, and others nothing at [1296a] all, the government must either be +in the hands of the meanest rabble or else a pure oligarchy; or, from +the excesses of both, a tyranny; for this arises from a headstrong +democracy or an oligarchy, but very seldom when the members of the +community are nearly on an equality with each other. We will assign a +reason for this when we come to treat of the alterations which different +states are likely to undergo. The middle state is therefore best, as +being least liable to those seditions and insurrections which disturb +the community; and for the same reason extensive governments are least +liable to these inconveniences; for there those in a middle state are +very numerous, whereas in small ones it is easy to pass to the two +extremes, so as hardly to have any in a medium remaining, but the +one half rich, the other poor: and from the same principle it is that +democracies are more firmly established and of longer continuance than +oligarchies; but even in those when there is a want of a proper number +of men of middling fortune, the poor extend their power too far, abuses +arise, and the government is soon at an end. + +We ought to consider as a proof of what I now advance, that the best +lawgivers themselves were those in the middle rank of life, amongst whom +was Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was not +a king, and Charondas, and indeed most others. What has been said will +show us why of so many free states some have changed to democracies, +others to oligarchies: for whenever the number of those in the middle +state has been too small, those who were the more numerous, whether the +rich or the poor, always overpowered them and assumed to themselves the +administration of public affairs; from hence arose either a democracy +or an oligarchy. Moreover, when in consequence of their disputes and +quarrels with each other, either the rich get the better of the poor, or +the poor of the rich, neither of them will establish a free state; +but, as the record of their victory, one which inclines to their own +principles, and form either a democracy or an oligarchy. + +Those who made conquests in Greece, having all of them an eye to the +respective forms of government in their own cities, established either +democracies or oligarchies, not considering what was serviceable to the +state, but what was similar to their own; for which reason a government +has never been established where the supreme power has been placed +amongst those of the middling rank, or very seldom; and, amongst a few, +one man only of those who have yet been conquerors has been persuaded +to give the preference to this order of [1296b] men: it is indeed an +established custom with the inhabitants of most cities not to desire an +equality, but either to aspire to govern, or when they are conquered, to +submit. + +Thus we have shown what the best state is, and why. It will not be +difficult to perceive of the many states which there are, for we have +seen that there are various forms both of democracies and oligarchies, +to which we should give the first place, to which the second, and in +the same manner the next also; and to observe what are the particular +excellences and defects of each, after we have first described the best +possible; for that must be the best which is nearest to this, that worst +which is most distant from the medium, without any one has a particular +plan of his own which he judges by. I mean by this, that it may happen, +that although one form of government may be better than another, yet +there is no reason to prevent another from being preferable thereunto in +particular circumstances and for particular purposes. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + + +After what has been said, it follows that we should now show what +particular form of government is most suitable for particular persons; +first laying this down as a general maxim, that that party which desires +to support the actual administration of the state ought always to be +superior to that which would alter it. Every city is made up of quality +and quantity: by quality I mean liberty, riches, education, and family, +and by quantity its relative populousness: now it may happen that +quality may exist in one of those parts of which the city is composed, +and quantity in another; thus the number of the ignoble may be greater +than the number of those of family, the number of the poor than that of +the rich; but not so that the quantity of the one shall overbalance the +quality of the other; those must be properly adjusted to each other; for +where the number of the poor exceeds the proportion we have mentioned, +there a democracy will rise up, and if the husbandry should have +more power than others, it will be a democracy of husbandmen; and the +democracy will be a particular species according to that class of +men which may happen to be most numerous: thus, should these be the +husbandmen, it will be of these, and the best; if of mechanics and those +who hire themselves out, the worst possible: in the same manner it may +be of any other set between these two. But when the rich and the noble +prevail more by their quality than they are deficient in quantity, there +an oligarchy ensues; and this oligarchy may be of different species, +according to the nature of the prevailing party. Every legislator in +framing his constitution ought to have a particular regard to those in +the middle rank of life; and if he intends an oligarchy, these should +be the object of his laws; if a democracy, to these they should be +entrusted; and whenever their number exceeds that of the two others, or +at least one of them, they give [1297a] stability to the constitution; +for there is no fear that the rich and the poor should agree to conspire +together against them, for neither of these will choose to serve the +other. If any one would choose to fix the administration on the widest +basis, he will find none preferable to this; for to rule by turns is +what the rich and the poor will not submit to, on account of their +hatred to each other. It is, moreover, allowed that an arbitrator is the +most proper person for both parties to trust to; now this arbitrator is +the middle rank. + +Those who would establish aristocratical governments are mistaken not +only in giving too much power to the rich, but also in deceiving the +common people; for at last, instead of an imaginary good, they must feel +a real evil, for the encroachments of the rich are more destructive to +the state than those of the poor. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + + +There are five particulars in which, under fair pretences, the rich +craftily endeavour to undermine the rights of the people, these are +their public assemblies, their offices of state, their courts of +justice, their military power, and their gymnastic exercises. With +respect to their public assemblies, in having them open to all, but in +fining the rich only, or others very little, for not attending; with +respect to offices, in permitting the poor to swear off, but not +granting this indulgence to those who are within the census; +with respect to their courts of justice, in fining the rich for +non-attendance, but the poor not at all, or those a great deal, and +these very little, as was done by the laws of Charondas. In some +places every citizen who was enrolled had a right to attend the public +assemblies and to try causes; which if they did not do, a very heavy +fine was laid upon them; that through fear of the fine they might avoid +being enrolled, as they were then obliged to do neither the one nor the +other. The same spirit of legislation prevailed with respect to their +bearing arms and their gymnastic exercises; for the poor are excused if +they have no arms, but the rich are fined; the same method takes place +if they do not attend their gymnastic exercises, there is no penalty on +one, but there is on the other: the consequence of which is, that the +fear of this penalty induces the rich to keep the one and attend the +other, while the poor do neither. These are the deceitful contrivances +of oligarchical legislators. + +The contrary prevails in a democracy; for there they make the poor a +proper allowance for attending the assemblies and the courts, but give +the rich nothing for doing it: whence it is evident, that if any one +would properly blend these customs together, they must extend both the +pay and the fine to every member of the community, and then every one +would share in it, whereas part only now do. The citizens of a free +state ought to [1297b] consist of those only who bear arms: with respect +to their census it is not easy to determine exactly what it ought to be, +but the rule that should direct upon this subject should be to make it +as extensive as possible, so that those who are enrolled in it make up +a greater part of the people than those who are not; for those who are +poor, although they partake not of the offices of the state, are willing +to live quiet, provided that no one disturbs them in their property: but +this is not an easy matter; for it may not always happen, that those who +are at the head of public affairs are of a humane behaviour. In time +of war the poor are accustomed to show no alacrity without they have +provisions found them; when they have, then indeed they are willing to +fight. + +In some governments the power is vested not only in those who bear arms, +but also in those who have borne them. Among the Malienses the state was +composed of these latter only, for all the officers were soldiers who +had served their time. And the first states in Greece which succeeded +those where kingly power was established, were governed by the military. +First of all the horse, for at that time the strength and excellence of +the army depended on the horse, for as to the heavy-armed foot they were +useless without proper discipline; but the art of tactics was not known +to the ancients, for which reason their strength lay in their horse: but +when cities grew larger, and they depended more on their foot, greater +numbers partook of the freedom of the city; for which reason what we +call republics were formerly called democracies. The ancient governments +were properly oligarchies or kingdoms; for on account of the few persons +in each state, it would have been impossible to have found a sufficient +number of the middle rank; so these being but few, and those used to +subordination, they more easily submitted to be governed. + +We have now shown why there are many sorts of governments, and others +different from those we have treated of: for there are more species of +democracies than one, and the like is true of other forms, and what are +their differences, and whence they arise; and also of all others +which is the best, at least in general; and which is best suited for +particular people. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + + +We will now proceed to make some general reflections upon the +governments next in order, and also to consider each of them in +particular; beginning with those principles which appertain to each: now +there are three things in all states which a careful legislator ought +well to consider, which are of great consequence to all, and which +properly attended to the state must necessarily be happy; and according +to the variation of which the one will differ from the other. The first +of these is the [1298a] public assembly; the second the officers of the +state, that is, who they ought to be, and with what power they should be +entrusted, and in what manner they should be appointed; the third, the +judicial department. + +Now it is the proper business of the public assembly to determine +concerning war and peace, making or breaking off alliances, to enact +laws, to sentence to death, banishment, or confiscation of goods, and to +call the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office. Now +these powers must necessarily be entrusted to the citizens in general, +or all of them to some; either to one magistrate or more; or some to +one, and some to another, or some to all, but others to some: to entrust +all to all is in the spirit of a democracy, for the people aim at +equality. There are many methods of delegating these powers to the +citizens at large, one of which is to let them execute them by turn, and +not altogether, as was done by Tellecles, the Milesian, in his state. In +others the supreme council is composed of the different magistrates, +and they succeed to the offices of the community by proper divisions of +tribes, wards, and other very small proportions, till every one in his +turn goes through them: nor does the whole community ever meet together, +without it is when new laws are enacted, or some national affair is +debated, or to hear what the magistrates have to propose to them. +Another method is for the people to meet in a collective body, but +only for the purpose of holding the comitia, making laws, determining +concerning war or peace, and inquiring into the conduct of their +magistrates, while the remaining part of the public business is +conducted by the magistrates, who have their separate departments, and +are chosen out of the whole community either by vote or ballot. Another +method is for the people in general to meet for the choice of the +magistrates, and to examine into their conduct; and also to deliberate +concerning war and alliances, and to leave other things to the +magistrates, whoever happen to be chosen, whose particular employments +are such as necessarily require persons well skilled therein. A fourth +method is for every person to deliberate upon every subject in public +assembly, where the magistrates can determine nothing of themselves, and +have only the privilege of giving their opinions first; and this is the +method of the most pure democracy, which is analogous to the proceedings +in a dynastic oligarchy and a tyrannic monarchy. + +These, then, are the methods in which public business is conducted in a +democracy. When the power is in the hands of part of the community +only, it is an oligarchy and this also admits of different customs; for +whenever the officers of the state are chosen out of those who have a +moderate fortune, and these from that circumstance are many, and +when they depart not from that line which the law has laid down, but +carefully follow it, and when all within the census are eligible, +certainly it is then an oligarchy, but founded on true principles of +government [1298b] from its moderation. When the people in general do +not partake of the deliberative power, but certain persons chosen for +that purpose, who govern according to law; this also, like the first, +is an oligarchy. When those who have the deliberative power elect each +other, and the son succeeds to the father, and when they can supersede +the laws, such a government is of necessity a strict oligarchy. When +some persons determine on one thing, and others on another, as war and +peace, and when all inquire into the conduct of their magistrates, and +other things are left to different officers, elected either by vote or +lot, then the government is an aristocracy or a free state. When some +are chosen by vote and others by lot, and these either from the people +in general, or from a certain number elected for that purpose, or if +both the votes and the lots are open to all, such a state is partly an +aristocracy, partly a free government itself. These are the different +methods in which the deliberative power is vested in different states, +all of whom follow some regulation here laid down. It is advantageous to +a democracy, in the present sense of the word, by which I mean a state +wherein the people at large have a supreme power, even over the laws, to +hold frequent public assemblies; and it will be best in this particular +to imitate the example of oligarchies in their courts of justice; for +they fine those who are appointed to try causes if they do not attend, +so should they reward the poor for coming to the public assemblies: +and their counsels will be best when all advise with each other, the +citizens with the nobles, the nobles with the citizens. It is also +advisable when the council is to be composed of part of the citizens, to +elect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both ranks. It is also +proper, if the common people in the state are very numerous, either not +to pay every one for his attendance, but such a number only as will make +them equal to the nobles, or to reject many of them by lot. + +In an oligarchy they should either call up some of the common people to +the council, or else establish a court, as is done in some other states, +whom they call pre-advisers or guardians of the laws, whose business +should be to propose first what they should afterwards enact. By this +means the people would have a place in the administration of public +affairs, without having it in their power to occasion any disorder in +the government. Moreover, the people may be allowed to have a vote +in whatever bill is proposed, but may not themselves propose anything +contrary thereto; or they may give their advice, while the power of +determining may be with the magistrates only. It is also necessary to +follow a contrary practice to what is established in democracies, +for the people should be allowed the power of pardoning, but not +of condemning, for the cause should be referred back again to the +magistrates: whereas the contrary takes place in republics; for the +power of pardoning is with the few, but not of condemning, which is +always referred [1299a] to the people at large. And thus we determine +concerning the deliberative power in any state, and in whose hands it +shall be. + + + + +CHAPTER XV + + +We now proceed to consider the choice of magistrates; for this branch of +public business contains many different Parts, as how many there shall +be, what shall be their particular office, and with respect to time how +long each of them shall continue in place; for some make it six months, +others shorter, others for a year, others for a much longer time; or +whether they should be perpetual or for a long time, or neither; for +the same person may fill the same office several times, or he may not be +allowed to enjoy it even twice, but only once: and also with respect to +the appointment of magistrates, who are to be eligible, who is to choose +them, and in what manner; for in all these particulars we ought properly +to distinguish the different ways which may be followed; and then to +show which of these is best suited to such and such governments. + +Now it is not easy to determine to whom we ought properly to give the +name of magistrate, for a government requires many persons in office; +but every one of those who is either chosen by vote or lot is not to be +reckoned a magistrate. The priests, for instance, in the first place; +for these are to be considered as very different from civil magistrates: +to these we may add the choregi and heralds; nay, even ambassadors are +elected: there are some civil employments which belong to the citizens; +and these are either when they are all engaged in one thing, as when as +soldiers they obey their general, or when part of them only are, as in +governing the women or educating the youth; and also some economic, for +they often elect corn-meters: others are servile, and in which, if they +are rich, they employ slaves. But indeed they are most properly called +magistrates, who are members of the deliberative council, or decide +causes, or are in some command, the last more especially, for to command +is peculiar to magistrates. But to speak truth, this question is of +no great consequence, nor is it the province of the judges to decide +between those who dispute about words; it may indeed be an object of +speculative inquiry; but to inquire what officers are necessary in a +state, and how many, and what, though not most necessary, may yet be +advantageous in a well-established government, is a much more useful +employment, and this with respect to all states in general, as well as +to small cities. + +In extensive governments it is proper to allot one employment to one +person, as there are many to serve the public in so numerous a society, +where some may be passed over for a long time, and others never be in +office but once; and indeed everything is better done which has the +whole attention of one person, than when that [1299b] attention is +divided amongst many; but in small states it is necessary that a few of +the citizens should execute many employments; for their numbers are so +small it will not be convenient to have many of them in office at the +same time; for where shall we find others to succeed them in turn? Small +states will sometimes want the same magistrates and the same laws as +large ones; but the one will not want to employ them so often as the +other; so that different charges may be intrusted to the same person +without any inconvenience, for they will not interfere with each +other, and for want of sufficient members in the community it will be +necessary. If we could tell how many magistrates are necessary in every +city, and how many, though not necessary, it is yet proper to have, we +could then the better know how many different offices one might assign +to one magistrate. It is also necessary to know what tribunals in +different places should have different things under their jurisdiction, +and also what things should always come under the cognisance of the same +magistrate; as, for instance, decency of manners, shall the clerk of the +market take cognisance of that if the cause arises in the market, and +another magistrate in another place, or the same magistrate everywhere: +or shall there be a distinction made of the fact, or the parties? as, +for instance, in decency of manners, shall it be one cause when it +relates to a man, another when it relates to a woman? + +In different states shall the magistrates be different or the same? +I mean, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a +monarchy, the same persons shall have the same power? or shall it +vary according to the different formation of the government? as in an +aristocracy the offices of the state are allotted to those who are well +educated; in an oligarchy to those who are rich; in a democracy to the +freemen? Or shall the magistrates differ as the communities differ? +For it may happen that the very same may be sometimes proper, sometimes +otherwise: in this state it may be necessary that the magistrate have +great powers, in that but small. There are also certain magistrates +peculiar to certain states--as the pre-advisers are not proper in a +democracy, but a senate is; for one such order is necessary, whose +business shall be to consider beforehand and prepare those bills which +shall be brought before the people that they may have leisure to +attend to their own affairs; and when these are few in number the state +inclines to an oligarchy. The pre-advisers indeed must always be few +for they are peculiar to an oligarchy: and where there are both +these offices in the same state, the pre-adviser's is superior to +the senator's, the one having only a democratical power, the other an +oligarchical: and indeed the [1300a] power of the senate is lost in +those democracies, in which the people, meeting in one public assembly, +take all the business into their own hands; and this is likely to happen +either when the community in general are in easy circumstances, or when +they are paid for their attendance; for they are then at leisure often +to meet together and determine everything for themselves. A magistrate +whose business is to control the manners of the boys, or women, or who +takes any department similar to this, is to be found in an aristocracy, +not in a democracy; for who can forbid the wives of the poor from +appearing in public? neither is such a one to be met with in an +oligarchy; for the women there are too delicate to bear control. And +thus much for this subject. Let us endeavour to treat at large of the +establishment of magistrates, beginning from first principles. Now, they +differ from each other in three ways, from which, blended together, +all the varieties which can be imagined arise. The first of these +differences is in those who appoint the magistrates, the second consists +in those who are appointed, the third in the mode of appointment; and +each of these three differ in three manners; for either all the citizens +may appoint collectively, or some out of their whole body, or some out +of a particular order in it, according to fortune, family, or virtue, or +some other rule (as at Megara, where the right of election was amongst +those who had returned together to their country, and had reinstated +themselves by force of arms) and this either by vote or lot. Again, +these several modes may be differently formed together, as some +magistrates may be chosen by part of the community, others by the whole; +some out of part, others out of the whole; some by vote, others by lot: +and each of these different modes admit of a four-fold subdivision; for +either all may elect all by vote or by lot; and when all elect, they may +either proceed without any distinction, or they may elect by a certain +division of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through the +whole community: and some magistrates may be elected one way, and others +another. Again, if some magistrates are elected either by vote or lot +of all the citizens, or by the vote of some and the lot of some, or +some one way and some another; that is to say, some by the vote of all, +others by the lot of all, there will then be twelve different methods +of electing the magistrates, without blending the two together. Of +these there are two adapted to a democracy; namely, to have all the +magistrates chosen out of all the people, either by vote or lot, or +both; that is to say, some of them by lot, some by vote. In a free state +the whole community should not elect at the same time, but some out of +the whole, or out of some particular rank; and this either by lot, or +vote, or both: and they should elect either out of the whole community, +or out of some particular persons in it, and this both by lot and vote. +In an oligarchy it is proper to choose some magistrates out of the whole +body of the citizens, some by vote, some by lot, others by both: by lot +is most correspondent to that form of government. In a free aristocracy, +some magistrates [1300b] should be chosen out of the community in +general, others out of a particular rank, or these by choice, those +by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the magistrates should be chosen out of +certain ranks, and by certain persons, and some of those by lot, others +by both methods; but to choose them out of the whole community is not +correspondent to the nature of this government. It is proper in an +aristocracy for the whole community to elect their magistrates out of +particular persons, and this by vote. These then are all the different +ways of electing of magistrates; and they have been allotted according +to the nature of the different communities; but what mode of proceeding +is proper for different communities, or how the offices ought to be +established, or with what powers shall be particularly explained. I mean +by the powers of a magistrate, what should be his particular province, +as the management of the finances or the laws of the state; for +different magistrates have different powers, as that of the general of +the army differs from the clerk of the market. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + + +Of the three parts of which a government is formed, we now come to +consider the judicial; and this also we shall divide in the same manner +as we did the magisterial, into three parts. Of whom the judges shall +consist, and for what causes, and how. When I say of whom, I mean +whether they shall be the whole people, or some particulars; by for what +causes I mean, how many different courts shall be appointed; by how, +whether they shall be elected by vote or lot. Let us first determine how +many different courts there ought to be. Now these are eight. The +first of these is the court of inspection over the behaviour of the +magistrates when they have quitted their office; the second is to punish +those who have injured the public; the third is to take cognisance of +those causes in which the state is a party; the fourth is to decide +between magistrates and private persons, who appeal from a fine laid +upon them; the fifth is to determine disputes which may arise concerning +contracts of great value; the sixth is to judge between foreigners, and +of murders, of which there are different species; and these may all be +tried by the same judges or by different ones; for there are murders +of malice prepense and of chance-medley; there is also justifiable +homicide, where the fact is admitted, and the legality of it disputed. + +There is also another court called at Athens the Court of Phreattae, +which determines points relating to a murder committed by one who has +run away, to decide whether he shall return; though such an affair +happens but seldom, and in very large cities; the seventh, to determine +causes wherein strangers are concerned, and this whether they are +between stranger and stranger or between a stranger and a citizen. The +eighth and last is for small actions, from one to five drachma's, or a +little more; for these ought also to be legally determined, but not to +be brought before the whole body of the judges. But without entering +into any particulars concerning actions for murder, and those wherein +strangers are the parties, let us particularly treat of those courts +which have the jurisdiction of those matters which more particularly +relate to the affairs of the community and which if not well conducted +occasion seditions and commotions in the state. Now, of necessity, +either all persons must have a right to judge of all these different +causes, appointed for that purpose, either by vote or lot, or all of +all, some of them by vote, and others by lot, or in some causes by vote, +in others by lot. Thus there will be four sorts of judges. There [1301a] +will be just the same number also if they are chosen out of part of the +people only; for either all the judges must be chosen out of that part +either by vote or lot, or some by lot and some by vote, or the judges in +particular causes must be chosen some by vote, others by lot; by which +means there will be the same number of them also as was mentioned. +Besides, different judges may be joined together; I mean those who are +chosen out of the whole people or part of them or both; so that all +three may sit together in the same court, and this either by vote, +lot, or both. And thus much for the different sorts of judges. Of these +appointments that which admits all the community to be judges in all +causes is most suitable to a democracy; the second, which appoints that +certain persons shall judge all causes, to an oligarchy; the third, +which appoints the whole community to be judges in some causes, but +particular persons in others, to an aristocracy or free state. + + + + +BOOK V + + + + +CHAPTER I + + +We have now gone through those particulars we proposed to speak of; it +remains that we next consider from what causes and how alterations +in government arise, and of what nature they are, and to what the +destruction of each state is owing; and also to what form any form of +polity is most likely to shift into, and what are the means to be +used for the general preservation of governments, as well as what are +applicable to any particular state; and also of the remedies which +are to be applied either to all in general, or to any one considered +separately, when they are in a state of corruption: and here we ought +first to lay down this principle, that there are many governments, all +of which approve of what is just and what is analogically equal; and yet +have failed from attaining thereunto, as we have already mentioned; thus +democracies have arisen from supposing that those who are equal in one +thing are so in every other circumstance; as, because they are equal +in liberty, they are equal in everything else; and oligarchies, from +supposing that those who are unequal in one thing are unequal in all; +that when men are so in point of fortune, that inequality extends to +everything else. Hence it follows, that those who in some respects are +equal with others think it right to endeavour to partake of an equality +with them in everything; and those who are superior to others endeavour +to get still more; and it is this more which is the inequality: thus +most states, though they have some notion of what is just, yet are +almost totally wrong; and, upon this account, when either party has not +that share in the administration which answers to his expectations, he +becomes seditious: but those who of all others have the greatest right +to be so are the last that are; namely, those who excel in virtue; +for they alone can be called generally superior. There are, too, some +persons of distinguished families who, because they are so, disdain to +be on an equality with others, for those esteem themselves noble who +boast of their ancestors' merit and fortune: these, to speak truth, are +the origin and fountain from whence seditions arise. The alterations +which men may propose to make in governments are two; for either they +may change the state already established into some other, as when +they propose to erect an oligarchy where there is a democracy; or a +democracy, or free state, where there is an oligarchy, or an aristocracy +from these, or those from that; or else, when they have no objection +to the established government, which they like very well, but choose to +have the sole management in it themselves; either in the hands of a few +or one only. They will also raise commotions concerning the degree in +which they would have the established power; as if, for instance, the +government is an oligarchy, to have it more purely so, and in the same +manner if it is a democracy, or else to have it less so; and, in like +manner, whatever may be the nature of the government, either to extend +or contract its powers; or else to make some alterations in some parts +of it; as to establish or abolish a particular magistracy, as some +persons say Lysander endeavoured to abolish the kingly power in Sparta; +and Pausanias that of the ephori. Thus in Epidamnus there was an +alteration in one part of the constitution, for instead of the philarchi +they established a senate. It is also necessary for all the magistrates +at Athens; to attend in the court of the Helisea when any new magistrate +is created: the power of the archon also in that state partakes of the +nature of an oligarchy: inequality is always the occasion of sedition, +but not when those who are unequal are treated in a different manner +correspondent to that inequality. Thus kingly power is unequal when +exercised over equals. Upon the whole, those who aim after an equality +are the cause of seditions. Equality is twofold, either in number or +value. Equality in number is when two things contain the same parts or +the same quantity; equality in value is by proportion as two exceeds +one, and three two by the same number-thus by proportion four exceeds +two, and two one in the same degree, for two is the same part of four +that one is of two; that is to say, half. Now, all agree in what is +absolutely and simply just; but, as we have already said they dispute +concerning proportionate value; for some persons, if they are equal in +one respect, think themselves equal in all; others, if they are superior +in one thing, think they may claim the superiority in all; from whence +chiefly arise two sorts of governments, a democracy and an oligarchy; +for nobility and virtue are to be found only [1302a] amongst a few; +the contrary amongst the many; there being in no place a hundred of +the first to be met with, but enough of the last everywhere. But to +establish a government entirely upon either of these equalities is +wrong, and this the example of those so established makes evident, +for none of them have been stable; and for this reason, that it is +impossible that whatever is wrong at the first and in its principles +should not at last meet with a bad end: for which reason in some things +an equality of numbers ought to take place, in others an equality in +value. However, a democracy is safer and less liable to sedition than an +oligarchy; for in this latter it may arise from two causes, for either +the few in power may conspire against each other or against the +people; but in a democracy only one; namely, against the few who aim +at exclusive power; but there is no instance worth speaking of, of +a sedition of the people against themselves. Moreover, a government +composed of men of moderate fortunes comes much nearer to a democracy +than an oligarchy, and is the safest of all such states. + + + + +CHAPTER II + + +Since we are inquiring into the causes of seditions and revolutions +in governments, we must begin entirely with the first principles from +whence they arise. Now these, so to speak, are nearly three in number; +which we must first distinguish in general from each other, and +endeavour to show in what situation people are who begin a sedition; +and for what causes; and thirdly, what are the beginnings of political +troubles and mutual quarrels with each other. Now that cause which of +all others most universally inclines men to desire to bring about a +change in government is that which I have already mentioned; for those +who aim at equality will be ever ready for sedition, if they see those +whom they esteem their equals possess more than they do, as well as +those also who are not content with equality but aim at superiority, if +they think that while they deserve more than, they have only equal with, +or less than, their inferiors. Now, what they aim at may be either just +or unjust; just, when those who are inferior are seditious, that they +may be equal; unjust, when those who are equal are so, that they may +be superior. These, then, are the situations in which men will be +seditious: the causes for which they will be so are profit and honour; +and their contrary: for, to avoid dishonour or loss of fortune by +mulcts, either on their own account or their friends, they will raise +a commotion in the state. The original causes which dispose men to the +things which I have mentioned are, taken in one manner, seven in number, +in another they are more; two of which are the same with those that +have been already mentioned: but influencing in a different manner; +for profit and honour sharpen men against each other; not to get the +possession of them for themselves (which was what I just now supposed), +but when they see others, some justly, others [1302b] unjustly, +engrossing them. The other causes are haughtiness, fear, eminence, +contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state. There are +also other things which in a different manner will occasion revolutions +in governments; as election intrigues, neglect, want of numbers, a too +great dissimilarity of circumstances. + + + + +CHAPTER III + + +What influence ill-treatment and profit have for this purpose, and how +they may be the causes of sedition, is almost self-evident; for when the +magistrates are haughty and endeavour to make greater profits than their +office gives them, they not only occasion seditions amongst each other, +but against the state also who gave them their power; and this their +avarice has two objects, either private property or the property of the +state. What influence honours have, and how they may occasion sedition, +is evident enough; for those who are themselves unhonoured while they +see others honoured, will be ready for any disturbance: and these things +are done unjustly when any one is either honoured or discarded contrary +to their deserts, justly when they are according to them. Excessive +honours are also a cause of sedition when one person or more are greater +than the state and the power of the government can permit; for then +a monarchy or a dynasty is usually established: on which account the +ostracism was introduced in some places, as at Argos and Athens: though +it is better to guard against such excesses in the founding of a state, +than when they have been permitted to take place, to correct them +afterward. Those who have been guilty of crimes will be the cause of +sedition, through fear of punishment; as will those also who expect an +injury, that they may prevent it; as was the case at Rhodes, when the +nobles conspired against the people on account of the decrees they +expected would pass against them. Contempt also is a cause of sedition +and conspiracies; as in oligarchies, where there are many who have +no share in the administration. The rich also even in democracies, +despising the disorder and anarchy which will arise, hope to better +themselves by the same means which happened at Thebes after the battle +of Oenophyta, where, in consequence of bad administration, the democracy +was destroyed; as it was at Megara, where the power of the people was +lost through anarchy and disorder; the same thing happened at Syracuse +before the tyranny of Gelon; and at Rhodes there was the same sedition +before the popular government was overthrown. Revolutions in state will +also arise from a disproportionate increase; for as the body consists +of many parts, it ought to increase proportion-ably to preserve its +symmetry, which would otherwise be destroyed; as if the foot was to +be four cubits long, and the rest of the body but two palms; it might +otherwise [1303a] be changed into an animal of a different form, if it +increase beyond proportion not only in quantity, but also in disposition +of parts; so also a city consists of parts, some of which may often +increase without notice, as the number of poor in democracies and free +states. They will also sometimes happen by accident, as at Tarentum, a +little after the Median war, where so many of the nobles were killed in +a battle by the lapygi, that from a free state the government was turned +into a democracy; and at Argos, where so many of the citizens were +killed by Cleomenes the Spartan, that they were obliged to admit several +husbandmen to the freedom of the state: and at Athens, through the +unfortunate event of the infantry battles, the number of the nobles was +reduced by the soldiers being chosen from the list of citizens in +the Lacedaemonian wars. Revolutions also sometimes take place in +a democracy, though seldomer; for where the rich grow numerous or +properties increase, they become oligarchies or dynasties. Governments +also sometimes alter without seditions by a combination of the meaner +people; as at Hersea: for which purpose they changed the mode of +election from votes to lots, and thus got themselves chosen: and by +negligence, as when the citizens admit those who are not friends to +the constitution into the chief offices of the state, which happened +at Orus, when the oligarchy of the archons was put an end to at the +election of Heracleodorus, who changed that form of government into a +democratic free state. By little and little, I mean by this, that very +often great alterations silently take place in the form of government +from people's overlooking small matters; as at Ambracia, where the +census was originally small, but at last became nothing at all, as if a +little and nothing at all were nearly or entirely alike. That state +also is liable to seditions which is composed of different nations, till +their differences are blended together and undistinguishable; for as a +city cannot be composed of every multitude, so neither can it in every +given time; for which reason all those republics which have hitherto +been originally composed of different people or afterwards admitted +their neighbours to the freedom of their city, have been most liable +to revolutions; as when the Achaeans joined with the Traezenians +in founding Sybaris; for soon after, growing more powerful than the +Traezenians, they expelled them from the city; from whence came the +proverb of Sybarite wickedness: and again, disputes from a like cause +happened at Thurium between the Sybarites and those who had joined with +them in building the city; for they assuming upon these, on account of +the country being their own, were driven out. And at Byzantium the new +citizens, being detected in plots against the state, were driven out of +the city by force of arms. The Antisseans also, having taken in those +who were banished from Chios, afterwards did the same thing; and +also the Zancleans, after having taken in the people of Samos. The +Appolloniats, in the Euxine Sea, having admitted their sojourners to +the freedom of their city, were troubled with seditions: and the +Syracusians, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having enrolled +[1303b] strangers and mercenaries amongst their citizens, quarrelled +with each other and came to an open rupture: and the people of +Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalcidians, were the greater +part of them driven out of the city by them. Many persons occasion +seditions in oligarchies because they think themselves ill-used in not +sharing the honours of the state with their equals, as I have already +mentioned; but in democracies the principal people do the same because +they have not more than an equal share with others who are not equal +to them. The situation of the place will also sometimes occasion +disturbances in the state when the ground is not well adapted for one +city; as at Clazomene, where the people who lived in that part of the +town called Chytrum quarrelled with them who lived in the island, and +the Colophonians with the Notians. At Athens too the disposition of the +citizens is not the same, for those who live in the Piraeus are more +attached to a popular government than those who live in the city +properly so called; for as the interposition of a rivulet, however +small, will occasion the line of the phalanx to fluctuate, so any +trifling disagreement will be the cause of seditions; but they will not +so soon flow from anything else as from the disagreement between virtue +and vice, and next to that between poverty and riches, and so on in +order, one cause having more influence than another; one of which that I +last mentioned. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + +But seditions in government do not arise for little things, but from +them; for their immediate cause is something of moment. Now, trifling +quarrels are attended with the greatest consequences when they arise +between persons of the first distinction in the state, as was the +case with the Syracusians in a remote period; for a revolution in the +government was brought about by a quarrel between two young men who were +in office, upon a love affair; for one of them being absent, the other +seduced his mistress; he in his turn, offended with this, persuaded his +friend's wife to come and live with him; and upon this the whole city +took part either with the one or the other, and the government was +overturned: therefore every one at the beginning of such disputes ought +to take care to avoid the consequences; and to smother up all quarrels +which may happen to arise amongst those in power, for the mischief lies +in the beginning; for the beginning is said to be half of the business, +so that what was then but a little fault will be found afterwards to +bear its full proportion to what follows. Moreover, disputes between men +of note involve the whole city in their consequences; in Hestiaea, +after the Median war: two brothers having a dispute about their paternal +estate; he who was the poorer, from the other's having concealed part +of the effects, and some money which his father had found, engaged the +popular party on his side, while the other, who was rich, the men of +fashion. And at Delphos, [1304a] a quarrel about a wedding was the +beginning of all the seditions that afterwards arose amongst them; for +the bridegroom, being terrified by some unlucky omen upon waiting +upon the bride, went away without marrying her; which her relations +resenting, contrived secretly to convey some sacred money into his +pocket while he was sacrificing, and then killed him as an impious +person. At Mitylene also, a dispute, which arose concerning a right +of heritage, was the beginning of great evils, and a war with the +Athenians, in which Paches took their city, for Timophanes, a man +of fortune, leaving two daughters, Doxander, who was circumvented in +procuring them in marriage for his two sons, began a sedition, and +excited the Athenians to attack them, being the host of that state. +There was also a dispute at Phocea, concerning a right of inheritance, +between Mnasis, the father of Mnasis, and Euthucrates, the father of +Onomarchus, which brought on the Phoceans the sacred war. The government +too of Epidamnus was changed from a quarrel that arose from an intended +marriage; for a certain man having contracted his daughter in marriage, +the father of the young person to whom she was contracted, being archon, +punishes him, upon which account he, resenting the affront, associated +himself with those who were excluded from any share in the government, +and brought about a revolution. A government may be changed either into +an oligarchy, democracy, or a free state; when the magistrates, or any +part of the city acquire great credit, or are increased in power, as the +court of Areopagus at Athens, having procured great credit during the +Median war, added firmness to their administration; and, on the other +hand, the maritime force, composed of the commonalty, having gained the +victory at Salamis, by their power at sea, got the lead in the state, +and strengthened the popular party: and at Argos, the nobles, +having gained great credit by the battle of Mantinea against the +Lacedaemonians, endeavoured to dissolve the democracy. And at Syracuse, +the victory in their war with the Athenians being owing to the common +people, they changed their free state into a democracy: and at Chalcis, +the people having taken off the tyrant Phocis, together with the nobles, +immediately seized the government: and at Ambracia also the people, +having expelled the tyrant Periander, with his party, placed the +supreme power in themselves. And this in general ought to be known, +that whosoever has been the occasion of a state being powerful, whether +private persons, or magistrates, a certain tribe, or any particular part +of the citizens, or the multitude, be they who they will, will be the +cause of disputes in the state. For either some persons, who envy them +the honours they have acquired, will begin to be seditious, or they, +on account of the dignity they have acquired, will not be content with +their former equality. A state is also liable to commotions when those +parts of it which seem to be opposite to each other approach to an +[1304b] equality, as the rich and the common people; so that the part +which is between them both is either nothing at all, or too little to be +noticed; for if one party is so much more powerful than the other, as +to be evidently stronger, that other will not be willing to hazard the +danger: for which reason those who are superior in excellence and virtue +will never be the cause of seditions; for they will be too few for that +purpose when compared to the many. In general, the beginning and the +causes of seditions in all states are such as I have now described, and +revolutions therein are brought about in two ways, either by violence or +fraud: if by violence, either at first by compelling them to submit to +the change when it is made. It may also be brought about by fraud in +two different ways, either when the people, being at first deceived, +willingly consent to an alteration in their government, and are +afterwards obliged by force to abide by it: as, for instance, when the +four hundred imposed upon the people by telling them that the king +of Persia would supply them with money for the war against the +Lacedaemonians; and after they had been guilty of this falsity, they +endeavoured to keep possession of the supreme power; or when they are +at first persuaded and afterwards consent to be governed: and by one of +these methods which I have mentioned are all revolutions in governments +brought about. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + +We ought now to inquire into those events which will arise from these +causes in every species of government. Democracies will be most subject +to revolutions from the dishonesty of their demagogues; for partly, by +informing against men of property, they induce them to join together +through self-defence, for a common fear will make the greatest enemies +unite; and partly by setting the common people against them: and this is +what any one may continually see practised in many states. In the island +of Cos, for instance, the democracy was subverted by the wickedness +of the demagogues, for the nobles entered into a combination with +each other. And at Rhodes the demagogues, by distributing of bribes, +prevented the people from paying the trierarchs what was owing to them, +who were obliged by the number of actions they were harassed with to +conspire together and destroy the popular state. The same thing was +brought about at Heraclea, soon after the settlement of the city, by +the same persons; for the citizens of note, being ill treated by them, +quitted the city, but afterwards joining together they returned and +overthrew the popular state. Just in the same manner the democracy +was destroyed in Megara; for there the demagogues, to procure money by +confiscations, drove out the nobles, till the number of those who were +banished was considerable, who, [1305a] returning, got the better of the +people in a battle, and established an oligarchy. The like happened at +Cume, during the time of the democracy, which Thrasymachus destroyed; +and whoever considers what has happened in other states may perceive the +same revolutions to have arisen from the same causes. The demagogues, +to curry favour with the people, drive the nobles to conspire together, +either by dividing their estates, or obliging them to spend them on +public services, or by banishing them, that they may confiscate the +fortunes of the wealthy. In former times, when the same person was both +demagogue and general, the democracies were changed into tyrannies; and +indeed most of the ancient tyrannies arose from those states: a reason +for which then subsisted, but not now; for at that time the demagogues +were of the soldiery; for they were not then powerful by their +eloquence; but, now the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers +are at present the demagogues; but, as they are unqualified to act in +a military capacity, they cannot impose themselves on the people as +tyrants, if we except in one or two trifling instances. Formerly, too, +tyrannies were more common than now, on account of the very extensive +powers with which some magistrates were entrusted: as the prytanes at +Miletus; for they were supreme in many things of the last consequence; +and also because at that time the cities were not of that very great +extent, the people in general living in the country, and being employed +in husbandry, which gave them, who took the lead in public affairs, an +opportunity, if they had a turn for war, to make themselves tyrants; +which they all did when they had gained the confidence of the people; +and this confidence was their hatred to the rich. This was the case of +Pisistratus at Athens, when he opposed the Pediaci: and of Theagenes in +Megara, who slaughtered the cattle belonging to the rich, after he +had seized those who kept them by the riverside. Dionysius also, for +accusing Daphnseus and the rich, was thought worthy of being raised to a +tyranny, from the confidence which the people had of his being a popular +man in consequence of these enmities. A government shall also alter from +its ancient and approved democratic form into one entirely new, if +there is no census to regulate the election of magistrates; for, as the +election is with the people, the demagogues who are desirous of being in +office, to flatter them, will endeavour with all their power to make the +people superior even to the laws. To prevent this entirely, or at least +in a great measure, the magistrates should be elected by the tribes, and +not by the people at large. These are nearly the revolutions to which +democracies are liable, and also the causes from whence they arise. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + +There are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a +revolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the people are ill used, for +then every individual is ripe for [1305b] sedition; more particularly if +one of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis, at +Naxus, who was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also which +arise from different causes will differ from each other; for sometimes +a revolution is brought about by the rich who have no share in the +administration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and this +happened at Massilia, Ister, Heraclea, and other cities; for those who +had no share in the government ceased not to raise disputes till they +were admitted to it: first the elder brothers, and then the younger +also: for in some places the father and son are never in office at the +same time; in others the elder and younger brother: and where this is +observed the oligarchy partakes something of a free state. At Ister it +was changed into a democracy; in Heraclea, instead of being in the +hands of a few, it consisted of six hundred. At Cnidus the oligarchy +was destroyed by the nobles quarrelling with each other, because the +government was in the hands of so few: for there, as we have just +mentioned, if the father was in office, the son could not; or, if there +were many brothers, the eldest only; for the people, taking advantage of +their disputes, elected one of the nobles for their general, and got the +victory: for where there are seditions government is weak. And formerly +at Erithria, during the oligarchy of the Basilides, although the state +flourished greatly under their excellent management, yet because the +people were displeased that the power should be in the hands of so +few, they changed the government. Oligarchies also are subject to +revolutions, from those who are in office therein, from the quarrels of +the demagogues with each other. The demagogues are of two sorts; one +who flatter the few when they are in power: for even these have their +demagogues; such was Charicles at Athens, who had great influence over +the thirty; and, in the same manner, Phrynichus over the four hundred. +The others are those demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy, +and flatter the people: such were the state-guardians at Larissa, who +flattered the people because they were elected by them. And this will +always happen in every oligarchy where the magistrates do not elect +themselves, but are chosen out of men either of great fortune or certain +ranks, by the soldiers or by the people; as was the custom at Abydos. +And when the judicial department is not in the hands of the supreme +power, the demagogues, favouring the people in their causes, overturn +the government; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus: and also when +some desire to contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands; for +those who endeavour to support an equality are obliged to apply to the +people for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions +when the nobility spend their fortunes by luxury; for such persons are +desirous of innovations, and either endeavour to be tyrants themselves +or to support others in being so, as [1306a] Hypparinus supported +Dionysius of Syracuse. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a +colony of Chalcidians, and when they came set them to quarrel with +the rich: and at AEgina a certain person who brought an action against +Chares attempted on that account to alter the government. Sometimes they +will try to raise commotions, sometimes they will rob the public, and +then quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who endeavour +to detect them; which was the case at Apollonia in Pontus. But if the +members of an oligarchy agree among themselves the state is not very +easily destroyed without some external force. Pharsalus is a proof of +this, where, though the place is small, yet the citizens have great +power, from the prudent use they make of it. An oligarchy also will be +destroyed when they create another oligarchy under it; that is, when the +management of public affairs is in the hands of a few, and not equally, +but when all of them do not partake of the supreme power, as happened +once at Elis, where the supreme power in general was in the hands of a +very few out of whom a senate was chosen, consisting but of ninety, who +held their places for life; and their mode of election was calculated to +preserve the power amongst each other's families, like the senators at +Lacedaemon. An oligarchy is liable to a revolution both in time of +war and peace; in war, because through a distrust in the citizens the +government is obliged to employ mercenary troops, and he to whom they +give the command of the army will very often assume the tyranny, as +Timophanes did at Corinth; and if they appoint more than one general, +they will very probably establish a dynasty: and sometimes, through fear +of this, they are forced to let the people in general have some share in +the government, because they are obliged to employ them. In peace, +from their want of confidence in each other, they will entrust the +guardianship of the state to mercenaries and their general, who will +be an arbiter between them, and sometimes become master of both, which +happened at Larissa, when Simos and the Aleuadae had the chief power. +The same thing happened at Abydos, during the time of the political +clubs, of which Iphiades' was one. Commotions also will happen in an +oligarchy from one party's overbearing and insulting another, or +from their quarrelling about their law-suits or marriages. How their +marriages, for instance, will have that effect has been already shown: +and in Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights upon the +same account. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person +being condemned by the court; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man's +being guilty of adultery; [1306b] the punishment indeed which Eurytion +suffered at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed: as was +that at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have them +publicly bound in the pillory. Many revolutions also have been brought +about in oligarchies by those who could not brook the despotism which +those persons assumed who were in power, as at Cnidus and Chios. Changes +also may happen by accident in what we call a free state and in an +oligarchy; wheresoever the senators, judges, and magistrates are chosen +according to a certain census; for it often happens that the highest +census is fixed at first; so that a few only could have a share in +the government, in an oligarchy, or in a free state those of moderate +fortunes only; when the city grows rich, through peace or some other +happy cause, it becomes so little that every one's fortune is equal to +the census, so that the whole community may partake of all the honours +of government; and this change sometimes happens by little and little, +and insensible approaches, sometimes quicker. These are the revolutions +and seditions that arise in oligarchies, and the causes to which they +are owing: and indeed both democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter, +not into governments of a contrary form, but into those of the same +government; as, for instance, from having the supreme power in the law +to vest it in the ruling party, or the contrariwise. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + +Commotions also arise in aristocracies, from there being so few persons +in power (as we have already observed they do in oligarchies, for in +this particular an aristocracy is most near an oligarchy, for in both +these states the administration of public affairs is in the hands of +a few; not that this arises from the same cause in both, though herein +they chiefly seem alike): and these will necessarily be most likely to +happen when the generality of the people are high-spirited and think +themselves equal to each other in merit; such were those at Lacedasmon, +called the Partheniae (for these were, as well as others, descendants +of citizens), who being detected in a conspiracy against the state, were +sent to found Tarentum. They will happen also when some great men are +disgraced by those who have received higher honours than themselves, to +whom they are no ways inferior in abilities, as Lysander by the kings: +or when an ambitious man cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the +reign of Agesilaus, was chief in a conspiracy against the Spartans: +and also when some are too poor and others too rich, which will most +frequently happen in time of war; as at Lacedaemon during the Messenian +war, which is proved by a poem of Tyrtaeus, [1307a] called "Eunomia;" +for some persons being reduced thereby, desired that the lands might +be divided: and also when some person of very high rank might still be +higher if he could rule alone, which seemed to be Pausanias's intention +at Lacedaemon, when he was their general in the Median war, and Anno's +at Carthage. But free states and aristocracies are mostly destroyed from +want of a fixed administration of public affairs; the cause of which +evil arises at first from want of a due mixture of the democratic and +the oligarchic parts in a free state; and in an aristocracy from the +same causes, and also from virtue not being properly joined to power; +but chiefly from the two first, I mean the undue mixture of the +democratic and oligarchic parts; for these two are what all free +states endeavour to blend together, and many of those which we call +aristocracies, in this particular these states differ from each other, +and on this account the one of them is less stable than the other, for +that state which inclines most to an oligarchy is called an aristocracy, +and that which inclines most to a democracy is called a free state; on +which account this latter is more secure than the former, for the wider +the foundation the securer the building, and it is ever best to live +where equality prevails. But the rich, if the community gives them rank, +very often endeavour to insult and tyrannise over others. On the whole, +whichever way a government inclines, in that it will settle, each party +supporting their own. Thus a free state will become a democracy; an +aristocracy an oligarchy; or the contrary, an aristocracy may change +into a democracy (for the poor, if they think themselves injured, +directly take part with the contrary side) and a free state into an +oligarchy. The only firm state is that where every one enjoys that +equality he has a right to and fully possesses what is his own. And what +I have been speaking of happened to the Thurians; for the magistrates +being elected according to a very high census, it was altered to a +lower, and they were subdivided into more courts, but in consequence of +the nobles possessing all the land, contrary to law; the state was too +much of an oligarchy, which gave them an opportunity of encroaching +greatly on the rest of the people; but these, after they had been well +inured to war, so far got the better of their guards as to expel every +one out of the country who possessed more than he ought. Moreover, as +all aristocracies are free oligarchies, the nobles therein endeavour to +have rather too much power, as at Lacedaemon, where property is now in +the hands of a few, and the nobles have too much liberty to do as they +please and make such alliances as they please. Thus the city of the +Locrians was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius; which state was +neither a democracy nor well-tempered aristocracy. But an aristocracy +chiefly approaches to a secret change by its being destroyed by degrees, +as we [1307b] have already said of all governments in general; and this +happens from the cause of the alteration being trifling; for whenever +anything which in the least regards the state is treated with contempt, +after that something else, and this of a little more consequence, will +be more easily altered, until the whole fabric of government is entirely +subverted, which happened in the government of Thurium; for the law +being that they should continue soldiers for five years, some young +men of a martial disposition, who were in great esteem amongst their +officers, despising those who had the management of public affairs, +and imagining they could easily accomplish their intention, first +endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having it lawful to +continue the same person perpetually in the military, perceiving that +the people would readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates who +are called counselors first joined together with an intention to oppose +it but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief that if +that law was not repealed they would permit the management of all other +public affairs to remain in their hands; but afterwards, when they +endeavoured to restrain some fresh alterations that were making, they +found that they could do nothing, for the whole form of government was +altered into a dynasty of those who first introduced the innovations. In +short, all governments are liable to be destroyed either from within or +from without; from without when they have for their neighbour a state +whose policy is contrary to theirs, and indeed if it has great power the +same thing will happen if it is not their neighbour; of which both +the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians are a proof; for the one, +when conquerors everywhere destroyed the oligarchies; the other the +democracies. These are the chief causes of revolutions and dissensions +in governments. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + + +We are now to consider upon what the preservation of governments in +general and of each state in particular depends; and, in the first +place, it is evident that if we are right in the causes we have assigned +for their destruction, we know also the means of their preservation; for +things contrary produce contraries: but destruction and preservation are +contrary to each other. In well-tempered governments it requires as much +care as anything whatsoever, that nothing be done contrary to law: and +this ought chiefly to be attended to in matters of small consequence; +for an illegality that approaches insensibly, approaches secretly, as in +a family small expenses continually repeated consume a man's income; +for the understanding is deceived thereby, as by this false argument; if +every part is little, then the whole is little: now, this in one sense +is true, in another is false, for the whole and all the parts together +are large, though made up of small parts. The first therefore of +anything is what the state ought to guard against. In the next place, +no credit ought to be given to those who endeavour to deceive the people +with false pretences; for they will be [1308a] confuted by facts. The +different ways in which they will attempt to do this have been already +mentioned. You may often perceive both aristocracies and oligarchies +continuing firm, not from the stability of their forms of government, +but from the wise conduct of the magistrates, both towards those who +have a part in the management of public affairs, and those also who +have not: towards those who have not, by never injuring them; and also +introducing those who are of most consequence amongst them into office; +nor disgracing those who are desirous of honour; or encroaching on the +property of individuals; towards those who have, by behaving to each +other upon an equality; for that equality which the favourers of a +democracy desire to have established in the state is not only just, +but convenient also, amongst those who are of the same rank: for which +reason, if the administration is in the hands of many, those rules which +are established in democracies will be very useful; as to let no one +continue in office longer than six months: that all those who are of +the same rank may have their turn; for between these there is a sort +of democracy: for which reason demagogues are most likely to arise up +amongst them, as we have already mentioned: besides, by this means both +aristocracies and democracies will be the less liable to be corrupted +into dynasties, because it will not be so easy for those who are +magistrates for a little to do as much mischief as they could in a +long time: for it is from hence that tyrannies arise in democracies +and oligarchies; for either those who are most powerful in each state +establish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the one, the dynasties in the +other, or the chief magistrates who have been long in power. Governments +are sometimes preserved not only by having the means of their corruption +at a great distance, but also by its being very near them; for those who +are alarmed at some impending evil keep a stricter hand over the state; +for which reason it is necessary for those who have the guardianship of +the constitution to be able to awaken the fears of the people, that they +may preserve it, and not like a night-guard to be remiss in protecting +the state, but to make the distant danger appear at hand. Great care +ought also to be used to endeavour to restrain the quarrels and disputes +of the nobles by laws, as well as to prevent those who are not already +engaged in them from taking a part therein; for to perceive an evil +at its very first approach is not the lot of every one, but of the +politician. To prevent any alteration taking place in an oligarchy or +free state on account of the census, if that happens to continue the +same while the quantity of money is increased, it will be useful to take +a general account of the whole amount of it in former times, to compare +it with the present, and to do this every year in those cities where the +census is yearly, [1308b] in larger communities once in three or five +years; and if the whole should be found much larger or much less than it +was at the time when the census was first established in the state, +let there be a law either to extend or contract it, doing both these +according to its increase or decrease; if it increases making the census +larger, if it decreases smaller: and if this latter is not done in +oligarchies and free states, you will have a dynasty arise in the one, +an oligarchy in the other: if the former is not, free states will +be changed into democracies, and oligarchies into free states or +democracies. It is a general maxim in democracies, oligarchies, +monarchies, and indeed in all governments, not to let any one acquire a +rank far superior to the rest of the community, but rather to endeavour +to confer moderate honours for a continuance than great ones for a short +time; for these latter spoil men, for it is not every one who can bear +prosperity: but if this rule is not observed, let not those honours +which were conferred all at once be all at once taken away, but rather +by degrees. But, above all things, let this regulation be made by the +law, that no one shall have too much power, either by means of his +fortune or friends; but if he has, for his excess therein, let it be +contrived that he shall quit the country. Now, as many persons promote +innovations, that they may enjoy their own particular manner of living, +there ought to be a particular officer to inspect the manners of every +one, and see that these are not contrary to the genius of the state +in which he lives, whether it may be an oligarchy, a democracy, or any +other form of government; and, for the same reason, those should be +guarded against who are most prosperous in the city: the means of doing +which is by appointing those who are otherwise to the business and the +offices of the state. I mean, to oppose men of account to the common +people, the poor to the rich, and to blend both these into one body, and +to increase the numbers of those who are in the middle rank; and +this will prevent those seditions which arise from an inequality of +condition. But above all, in every state it is necessary, both by the +laws and every other method possible, to prevent those who are employed +by the public from being venal, and this particularly in an oligarchy; +for then the people will not be so much displeased from seeing +themselves excluded from a share in the government (nay, they will +rather be glad to have leisure to attend their private affairs) as at +suspecting that the officers of the state steal the public money, then +indeed they are afflicted with double concern, both because they are +deprived of the honours of the state, and pillaged by those who enjoy +them. There is one method of blending together a democracy and an +aristocracy, [1309a] if office brought no profit; by which means both +the rich and the poor will enjoy what they desire; for to admit all to +a share in the government is democratical; that the rich should be +in office is aristocratical. This must be done by letting no public +employment whatsoever be attended with any emolument; for the poor will +not desire to be in office when they can get nothing by it, but had +rather attend to their own affairs: but the rich will choose it, as +they want nothing of the community. Thus the poor will increase their +fortunes by being wholly employed in their own concerns; and the +principal part of the people will not be governed by the lower sort. +To prevent the exchequer from being defrauded, let all public money be +delivered out openly in the face of the whole city, and let copies of +the accounts be deposited in the different wards tribes, and divisions. +But, as the magistrates are to execute their offices without any +advantages, the law ought to provide proper honours for those who +execute them well. In democracies also it is necessary that the rich +should be protected, by not permitting their lands to be divided, nor +even the produce of them, which in some states is done unperceivably. It +would be also better if the people would prevent them when they offer to +exhibit a number of unnecessary and yet expensive public entertainments +of plays, music, processions, and the like. In an oligarchy it is +necessary to take great care of the poor, and allot them public +employments which are gainful; and, if any of the rich insult them, to +let their punishment be severer than if they insulted one of their own +rank; and to let estates pass by affinity, and not gift: nor to permit +any person to have more than one; for by this means property will be +more equally divided, and the greater part of the poor get into better +circumstances. It is also serviceable in a democracy and an oligarchy +to allot those who take no part in public affairs an equality or a +preference in other things; the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an +oligarchy: but still all the principal offices in the state to be filled +only by those who are best qualified to discharge them. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + + +There are three qualifications necessary for those who fill the +first departments in government; first of all, an affection for the +established constitution; second place, abilities every way completely +equal to the business of their office; in the third, virtue and justice +correspondent to the nature of that particular state they are placed in; +for if justice is not the same in all states, it is evident that there +must be different species thereof. There may be some doubt, when all +these qualifications do not in the same persons, in what manner the +choice shall be made; as for instance, suppose that one person is +an accomplished general, but a bad man and no friend to the [1309b] +constitution; another is just and a friend to it, which shall one +prefer? we should then consider of two qualities, which of them the +generality possess in a greater degree, which in a less; for which +reason in the choice of a general we should regard his courage more than +his virtue as the more uncommon quality; as there are fewer capable of +conducting an army than there are good men: but, to protect the state +or manage the finances, the contrary rule should be followed; for these +require greater virtue than the generality are possessed of, but only +that knowledge which is common to all. It may be asked, if a man has +abilities equal to his appointment in the state, and is affectionate to +the constitution, what occasion is there for being virtuous, since +these two things alone are sufficient to enable him to be useful to +the public? it is, because those who possess those qualities are often +deficient in prudence; for, as they often neglect their own affairs, +though they know them and love themselves, so nothing will prevent their +serving the public in the same manner. In short, whatsoever the laws +contain which we allow to be useful to the state contributes to its +preservation: but its first and principal support is (as has been often +insisted upon) to have the number of those who desire to preserve it +greater than those who wish to destroy it. Above all things that ought +not to be forgotten which many governments now corrupted neglect; +namely, to preserve a mean. For many things seemingly favourable to a +democracy destroy a democracy, and many things seemingly favourable to +an oligarchy destroy an oligarchy. Those who think this the only virtue +extend it to excess, not considering that as a nose which varies a +little from perfect straightness, either towards a hook nose or a +flat one, may yet be beautiful and agreeable to look at; but if this +particularity is extended beyond measure, first of all the properties of +the part is lost, but at last it can hardly be admitted to be a nose at +all, on account of the excess of the rise or sinking: thus it is with +other parts of the human body; so also the same thing is true with +respect to states; for both an oligarchy and a democracy may something +vary from their most perfect form and yet be well constituted; but if +any one endeavours to extend either of them too far, at first he will +make the government the worse for it, but at last there will be no +government at all remaining. The lawgiver and the politician therefore +should know well what preserves and what destroys a democracy or an +oligarchy, for neither the one nor the other can possibly continue +without rich and poor: but that whenever an entire equality of +circumstances [1310a] prevails, the state must necessarily become of +another form; so that those who destroy these laws, which authorise an +inequality in property, destroy the government. It is also an error in +democracies for the demagogues to endeavour to make the common people +superior to the laws; and thus by setting them at variance with the +rich, dividing one city into two; whereas they ought rather to speak +in favour of the rich. In oligarchies, on the contrary, it is wrong to +support those who are in administration against the people. The oaths +also which they take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they +now are; for, at present, in some places they swear, "I will be adverse +to the common people, and contrive all I can against them;" whereas they +ought rather to suppose and pretend the contrary; expressing in their +oaths, that they will not injure the people. But of all things which I +have mentioned, that which contributes most to preserve the state is, +what is now most despised, to educate your children for the state; for +the most useful laws, and most approved by every statesman, will be of +no service if the citizens are not accustomed to and brought up in +the principles of the constitution; of a democracy, if that is by law +established; of an oligarchy, if that is; for if there are bad morals +in one man, there are in the city. But to educate a child fit for the +state, it must not be done in the manner which would please either those +who have the power in an oligarchy or those who desire a democracy, but +so as they may be able to conduct either of these forms of governments. +But now the children of the magistrates in an oligarchy are brought up +too delicately, and the children of the poor hardy with exercise +and labour; so that they are both desirous of and able to promote +innovations. In democracies of the purest form they pursue a method +which is contrary to their welfare; the reason of which is, that they +define liberty wrong: now, there are two things which seem to be the +objects of a democracy, that the people in general should possess the +supreme power, and all enjoy freedom; for that which is just seems to +be equal, and what the people think equal, that is a law: now, their +freedom and equality consists in every one's doing what they please: +that is in such a democracy every one may live as he likes; "as his +inclination guides," in the words of Euripides: but this is wrong, for +no one ought to think it slavery to live in subjection to government, +but protection. Thus I have mentioned the causes of corruption in +different states, and the means of their preservation. + + + + +CHAPTER X + + +It now remains that we speak of monarchies, their causes of corruption, +and means of preservation; and indeed almost the same things which have +been said of other governments happen to kingdoms and tyrannies; for a +kingdom partakes of an aristocracy, a tyranny of the worst species of an +oligarchy and democracy; for which reason it is the worst that man +can submit to, as being composed of two, both of which are bad, and +collectively retains all the corruptions and all the defects of both +these states. These two species of monarchies arise from principles +contrary to each other: a kingdom is formed to protect the better sort +of people against the multitude, and kings are appointed out of those, +who are chosen either for their superior virtue and actions flowing from +virtuous principles, or else from their noble descent; but a tyrant is +chosen out of the meanest populace; an enemy to the better sort, that +the common people may not be oppressed by them. That this is true +experience convinces us; for the generality of tyrants were indeed mere +demagogues, who gained credit with the people by oppressing the nobles. +Some tyrannies were established in this manner after the cities were +considerably enlarged--others before that time, by kings who exceeded +the power which their country allowed them, from a desire of governing +despotically: others were founded by those who were elected to the +superior offices in the state; for formerly the people appointed +officers for life, who came to be at the head of civil and religious +affairs, and these chose one out of their body in whom the supreme power +over all the magistrates was placed. By all these means it was easy +to establish a tyranny, if they chose it; for their power was ready at +hand, either by their being kings, or else by enjoying the honours of +the state; thus Phidon at Argos and other tyrants enjoyed originally the +kingly power; Phalaris and others in Ionia, the honours of the state. +Pansetius at Leontium, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens, +Dionysius at Syracuse, and others, acquired theirs by having been +demagogues. A kingdom, as we have said, partakes much of the nature of +an aristocracy, and is bestowed according to worth, as either virtue, +family, beneficent actions, or these joined with power; for those who +have been benefactors to cities and states, or have it in their powers +to be so, have acquired this honour, and those who have prevented a +people from falling into slavery by war, as Codrus, or those who have +freed them from it, as Cyrus, or the founders of cities, or settlers of +colonies, as the kings of Sparta, Macedon, and Molossus. A king desires +to be the guardian of his people, that those who have property may be +secure in the possession of it, and that the people in general meet with +no injury; but a tyrant, as has been often said, has no regard to the +common good, except for his own advantage; his only object is pleasure, +but a king's is virtue: what a tyrant therefore is ambitious of +engrossing is wealth, but a king rather honour. The guards too of a king +are citizens, a tyrant's foreigners. + +That a tyranny contains all that is bad both in a democracy and an +oligarchy is evident; with an oligarchy it has for its end gain, as the +only means of providing the tyrant with guards and the luxuries of life; +like that it places no confidence in the people; and therefore deprives +them of the use of arms: it is also common to them both to persecute the +populace, to drive them out of the city and their own habitations. With +a democracy it quarrels with the nobles, and destroys them both +publicly and privately, or drives them into banishment, as rivals and +an impediment to the government; hence naturally arise conspiracies +both amongst those who desire to govern and those who desire not to be +slaves; hence arose Periander's advice to Thrasybulus to take off the +tallest stalks, hinting thereby, that it was necessary to make away with +the eminent citizens. We ought then in reason, as has been already +said, to account for the changes which arise in a monarchy from the +same causes which produce them in other states: for, through injustice +received, fear, and contempt, many of those who are under a monarchical +government conspire against it; but of all species of injustice, +injurious contempt has most influence on them for that purpose: +sometimes it is owing to their being deprived of their private fortunes. +The dissolution too of a kingdom and a tyranny are generally the same; +for monarchs abound in wealth and honour, which all are desirous to +obtain. Of plots: some aim at the life of those who govern, others at +their government; the first arises from hatred to their persons; which +hatred may be owing to many causes, either of which will be sufficient +to excite their anger, and the generality of those who are under the +influence of that passion will join in a conspiracy, not for the sake +of their own advancement, but for revenge. Thus the plot against +the children of Pisistratus arose from their injurious treatment of +Harmodius's sister, and insulting him also; for Harmodius resenting the +injury done to his sister, and Aristogiton the injury done to Harmodius. +Periander the tyrant of Ambracia also lost his life by a conspiracy, for +some improper liberties he took with a boy in his cups: and Philip was +slain by Pausanias for neglecting to revenge him of the affront he had +received from Attains; as was Amintas the Little by Darda, for insulting +him on account of his age; and the eunuch by Evagoras the Cyprian in +revenge for having taken his son's wife away from him.... + +Many also who have had their bodies scourged with stripes have, through +resentment, either killed those who caused them to be inflicted or +conspired against them, even when they had kingly power, as at Mitylene +Megacles, joining with his friends, killed the Penthelidee, who used +to go about striking those they met with clubs. Thus, in later times, +Smendes killed Penthilus for whipping him and dragging him away from +his wife. Decamnichus also was the chief cause of the conspiracy against +Archelaus, for he urged others on: the occasion of his resentment was +his having delivered him to Euripides the poet to be scourged; for +Euripides was greatly offended with him for having said something of the +foulness of his breath. And many others have been killed or conspired +against on the same account. Fear too is a cause which produces the +same effects, as well in monarchies as in other states: thus Artabanes +conspired against Xerxes through fear of punishment for having hanged +Darius according to his orders, whom he supposed he intended to pardon, +as the order was given at supper-time. Some kings also have been [1312a] +dethroned and killed in consequence of the contempt they were held in by +the people; as some one conspired against Sardanapalus, having seen him +spinning with his wife, if what is related of him is true, or if not of +him, it may very probably be true of some one else. Dion also conspired +against Dionysius the Younger, seeing his subjects desirous of a +conspiracy, and that he himself was always drunk: and even a man's +friends will do this if they despise him; for from the confidence he +places in them, they think that they shall not be found out. Those +also who think they shall gain his throne will conspire against a king +through contempt; for as they are powerful themselves, and despise the +danger, on account of their own strength, they will readily attempt it. +Thus a general at the head of his army will endeavour to dethrone the +monarch, as Cyrus did Astyages, despising both his manner of life and +his forces; his forces for want of action, his life for its effeminacy: +thus Suthes, the Thracian, who was general to Amadocus, conspired +against him. Sometimes more than one of these causes will excite men +to enter into conspiracies, as contempt and desire of gain; as in the +instance of Mithridates against Ariobarzanes. Those also who are of a +bold disposition, and have gained military honours amongst kings, will +of all others be most like to engage in sedition; for strength and +courage united inspire great bravery: whenever, therefore, these join +in one person, he will be very ready for conspiracies, as he will easily +conquer. Those who conspire against a tyrant through love of glory +and honour have a different motive in view from what I have already +mentioned; for, like all others who embrace danger, they have only glory +and honour in view, and think, not as some do, of the wealth and pomp +they may acquire, but engage in this as they would in any other noble +action, that they may be illustrious and distinguished, and destroy a +tyrant, not to succeed in his tyranny, but to acquire renown. No doubt +but the number of those who act upon this principle is small, for we +must suppose they regard their own safety as nothing in case they should +not succeed, and must embrace the opinion of Dion (which few can do) +when he made war upon Dionysius with a very few troops; for he said, +that let the advantage he made be ever so little it would satisfy him to +have gained it; and that, should it be his lot to die the moment he had +gained footing in his country, he should think his death sufficiently +glorious. A tyranny also is exposed to the same destruction as all other +states are, from too powerful neighbours: for it is evident, that an +opposition of principles will make them desirous of subverting it; +and what they desire, all who can, do: and there is a principle of +opposition in one state to another, as a democracy against a tyranny, as +says Hesiod, "a potter against a potter;" for the extreme of a democracy +is a tyranny; a kingly power against an aristocracy, from their +different forms of government--for which reason the Lacedaemonians +destroyed many tyrannies; as did the Syracusians during the prosperity +of their state. Nor are they only destroyed from without, but also +from within, when those who have no share in the power bring about a +revolution, as happened to Gelon, and lately to Dionysius; to the first, +by means of Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, who nattered Gelon's +son, and induced him to lead a life of pleasure, that he himself might +govern; but the family joined together and endeavoured to support the +tyranny and expel Thrasybulus; but those whom they made of their party +seized the opportunity and expelled the whole family. Dion made war +against his relation Dionysius, and being assisted by the people, first +expelled and then killed him. As there are two causes which chiefly +induce men to conspire against tyrants, hatred and contempt, one of +these, namely hatred, seems inseparable from them. Contempt also is +often the cause of their destruction: for though, for instance, those +who raised themselves to the supreme power generally preserved it; but +those who received it from them have, to speak truth, almost immediately +all of them lost it; for, falling into an effeminate way of life, they +soon grew despicable, and generally fell victims to conspiracies. Part +of their hatred may be very fitly ascribed to anger; for in some cases +this is their motive to action: for it is often a cause which impels +them to act more powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater +obstinacy against those whom they attack, as this passion is not under +the direction of reason. Many persons also indulge this passion through +contempt; which occasioned the fall of the Pisistratidae and many +others. But hatred is more powerful than anger; for anger is accompanied +with grief, which prevents the entrance of reason; but hatred is free +from it. In short, whatever causes may be assigned as the destruction +of a pure oligarchy unmixed with any other government and an extreme +democracy, the same may be applied to a tyranny; for these are divided +tyrannies. + +Kingdoms are seldom destroyed by any outward attack; for which reason +they are generally very stable; but they have many causes of subversion +within; of which two are the principal; one is when those who are +in power [1313a] excite a sedition, the other when they endeavour to +establish a tyranny by assuming greater power than the law gives them. +A kingdom, indeed, is not what we ever see erected in our times, but +rather monarchies and tyrannies; for a kingly government is one that +is voluntarily submitted to, and its supreme power admitted upon great +occasions: but where many are equal, and there are none in any respect +so much better than another as to be qualified for the greatness and +dignity of government over them, then these equals will not willingly +submit to be commanded; but if any one assumes the government, either by +force or fraud, this is a tyranny. To what we have already said we shall +add, the causes of revolutions in an hereditary kingdom. One of these +is, that many of those who enjoy it are naturally proper objects of +contempt only: another is, that they are insolent while their power is +not despotic; but they possess kingly honours only. Such a state is soon +destroyed; for a king exists but while the people are willing to obey, +as their submission to him is voluntary, but to a tyrant involuntary. +These and such-like are the causes of the destruction of monarchies. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + + +Monarchies, in a word, are preserved by means contrary to what I have +already mentioned as the cause of their destruction; but to speak to +each separately: the stability of a kingdom will depend upon the power +of the king's being kept within moderate bounds; for by how much the +less extensive his power is, by so much the longer will his government +continue; for he will be less despotic and more upon an equality of +condition with those he governs; who, on that account, will envy him the +less. + +It was on this account that the kingdom of the Molossi continued so +long; and the Lacedaemonians from their government's being from the +beginning divided into two parts, and also by the moderation introduced +into the other parts of it by Theopompus, and his establishment of the +ephori; for by taking something from the power he increased the duration +of the kingdom, so that in some measure he made it not less, but bigger; +as they say he replied to his wife, who asked him if he was not ashamed +to deliver down his kingdom to his children reduced from what he +received it from his ancestors? No, says he, I give it him more lasting. +Tyrannies are preserved two ways most opposite to each other, one of +which is when the power is delegated from one to the other, and in this +manner many tyrants govern in their states. Report says that Periander +founded many of these. There are also many of them to be met with +amongst the Persians. What has been already mentioned is as conducive +as anything can be to preserve a tyranny; namely, to keep down those who +are of an aspiring disposition, to take off those who will not submit, +to allow no public meals, no clubs, no education, nothing at all, but +to guard against everything that gives rise to high spirits or mutual +confidence; nor to suffer the learned meetings of those who are at +leisure to hold conversation with each other; and to endeavour by every +means possible to keep all the people strangers to each other; for +knowledge increases mutual confidence; and to oblige all strangers to +appear in public, and to live near the city-gate, that all their actions +may be sufficiently seen; for those who are kept like slaves seldom +entertain any noble thoughts: in short, to imitate everything which the +Persians and barbarians do, for they all contribute to support slavery; +and to endeavour to know what every one who is under their power does +and says; and for this purpose to employ spies: such were those women +whom the Syracusians called potagogides Hiero also used to send out +listeners wherever there was any meeting or conversation; for the people +dare not speak with freedom for fear of such persons; and if any one +does, there is the less chance of its being concealed; and to endeavour +that the whole community should mutually accuse and come to blows with +each other, friend with friend, the commons with the nobles, and the +rich with each other. It is also advantageous for a tyranny that all +those who are under it should be oppressed with poverty, that they may +not be able to compose a guard; and that, being employed in procuring +their daily bread, they may have no leisure to conspire against their +tyrants. The Pyramids of Egypt are a proof of this, and the votive +edifices of the Cyposelidse, and the temple of Jupiter Olympus, built by +the Pisistratidae, and the works of Polycrates at Samos; for all these +produced one end, the keeping the people poor. It is necessary also to +multiply taxes, as at Syracuse; where Dionysius in the space of five +years collected all the private property of his subjects into his own +coffers. A tyrant also should endeavour to engage his subjects in a war, +that they may have employment and continually depend upon their general. +A king is preserved by his friends, but a tyrant is of all persons the +man who can place no confidence in friends, as every one has it in his +desire and these chiefly in their power to destroy him. All these things +also which are done in an extreme democracy should be done in a tyranny, +as permitting great licentiousness to the women in the house, that they +may reveal their husbands' secrets; and showing great indulgence to +slaves also for the same reason; for slaves and women conspire not +against tyrants: but when they are treated with kindness, both of them +are abettors of tyrants, and extreme democracies also; and the people +too in such a state desire to be despotic. For which reason flatterers +are in repute in both these: the demagogue in the democracy, for he is +the proper flatterer of the people; among tyrants, he who will servilely +adapt himself to their humours; for this is the business of [1314a] +flatterers. And for this reason tyrants always love the worst of +wretches, for they rejoice in being flattered, which no man of a liberal +spirit will submit to; for they love the virtuous, but flatter none. Bad +men too are fit for bad purposes; "like to like," as the proverb says. A +tyrant also should show no favour to a man of worth or a freeman; for he +should think, that no one deserved to be thought these but himself; for +he who supports his dignity, and is a friend to freedom, encroaches upon +the superiority and the despotism of the tyrant: such men, therefore, +they naturally hate, as destructive to their government. A tyrant +also should rather admit strangers to his table and familiarity than +citizens, as these are his enemies, but the others have no design +against him. These and such-like are the supports of a tyranny, for +it comprehends whatsoever is wicked. But all these things may be +comprehended in three divisions, for there are three objects which a +tyranny has in view; one of which is, that the citizens should be of +poor abject dispositions; for such men never propose to conspire against +any one. The second is, that they should have no confidence in each +other; for while they have not this, the tyrant is safe enough from +destruction. For which reason they are always at enmity with those of +merit, as hurtful to their government; not only as they scorn to be +governed despotically, but also because they can rely upon each other's +fidelity, and others can rely upon theirs, and because they will not +inform against their associates, nor any one else. The third is, that +they shall be totally without the means of doing anything; for no one +undertakes what is impossible for him to perform: so that without power +a tyranny can never be destroyed. These, then, are the three objects +which the inclinations of tyrants desire to see accomplished; for all +their tyrannical plans tend to promote one of these three ends, that +their people may neither have mutual confidence, power, nor spirit. +This, then, is one of the two methods of preserving tyrannies: the other +proceeds in a way quite contrary to what has been already described, +and which may be discerned from considering to what the destruction of +a kingdom is owing; for as one cause of that is, making the government +approach near to a tyranny, so the safety of a tyranny consists in +making the government nearly kingly; preserving only one thing, namely +power, that not only the willing, but the unwilling also, must be +obliged to submit; for if this is once lost, the tyranny is at an end. +This, then, as the foundation, must be preserved: in other particulars +carefully do and affect to seem like a king; first, appear to pay a +great attention [1314b] to what belongs to the public; nor make such +profuse presents as will offend the people; while they are to supply +the money out of the hard labour of their own hands, and see it given +in profusion to mistresses, foreigners, and fiddlers; keeping an exact +account both of what you receive and pay; which is a practice some +tyrants do actually follow, by which means they seem rather fathers of +families than tyrants: nor need you ever fear the want of money while +you have the supreme power of the state in your own hands. It is also +much better for those tyrants who quit their kingdom to do this than to +leave behind them money they have hoarded up; for their regents will +be much less desirous of making innovations, and they are more to be +dreaded by absent tyrants than the citizens; for such of them as he +suspects he takes with him, but these regents must be left behind. He +should also endeavour to appear to collect such taxes and require such +services as the exigencies of the state demand, that whenever they are +wanted they may be ready in time of war; and particularly to take care +that he appear to collect and keep them not as his own property, but the +public's. His appearance also should not be severe, but respectable, so +that he should inspire those who approach him with veneration and not +fear; but this will not be easily accomplished if he is despised. If, +therefore, he will not take the pains to acquire any other, he ought to +endeavour to be a man of political abilities, and to fix that opinion of +himself in the judgment of his subjects. He should also take care not to +appear to be guilty of the least offence against modesty, nor to suffer +it in those under him: nor to permit the women of his family to treat +others haughtily; for the haughtiness of women has been the ruin of many +tyrants. With respect to the pleasures of sense, he ought to do directly +contrary to the practice of some tyrants at present; for they do not +only continually indulge themselves in them for many days together, but +they seem also to desire to have other witnesses of it, that they may +wonder at their happiness; whereas he ought really to be moderate in +these, and, if not, to appear to others to avoid them-for it is not the +sober man who is exposed either to plots or contempt, but the drunkard; +not the early riser, but the sluggard. His conduct in general should +also be contrary to what is reported of former tyrants; for he ought to +improve and adorn his city, so as to seem a guardian and not a tyrant; +and, moreover., always to [1315a] seem particularly attentive to the +worship of the gods; for from persons of such a character men entertain +less fears of suffering anything illegal while they suppose that he who +governs them is religious and reverences the gods; and they will be less +inclined to raise insinuations against such a one, as being peculiarly +under their protection: but this must be so done as to give no occasion +for any suspicion of hypocrisy. He should also take care to show such +respect to men of merit in every particular, that they should not think +they could be treated with greater distinction by their fellow-citizens +in a free state. He should also let all honours flow immediately from +himself, but every censure from his subordinate officers and judges. It +is also a common protection of all monarchies not to make one person too +great, or, certainly, not many; for they will support each other: but, +if it is necessary to entrust any large powers to one person, to take +care that it is not one of an ardent spirit; for this disposition is +upon every opportunity most ready for a revolution: and, if it should +seem necessary to deprive any one of his power, to do it by degrees, +and not reduce him all at once. It is also necessary to abstain from all +kinds of insolence; more particularly from corporal punishment; which +you must be most cautious never to exercise over those who have a +delicate sense of honour; for, as those who love money are touched to +the quick when anything affects their property, so are men of honour and +principle when they receive any disgrace: therefore, either never employ +personal punishment, or, if you do, let it be only in the manner in +which a father would correct his son, and not with contempt; and, upon +the whole, make amends for any seeming disgrace by bestowing greater +honours. But of all persons who are most likely to entertain designs +against the person of a tyrant, those are chiefly to be feared and +guarded against who regard as nothing the loss of their own lives, so +that they can but accomplish their purpose: be very careful therefore +of those who either think themselves affronted, or those who are dear +to them; for those who are excited by anger to revenge regard as nothing +their own persons: for, as Heraclitus says, it is dangerous to fight +with an angry man who will purchase with his life the thing he aims at. +As all cities are composed of two sorts of persons, the rich and the +poor, it is necessary that both these should find equal protection from +him who governs them, and that the one party should not have it in their +power to injure the other; but that the tyrant should attach to himself +that party which is the most powerful; which, if he does, he will have +no occasion either to make his slaves free, or to deprive citizens of +their arms; for the strength of either of the parties added to his +own forces will render him superior to any conspiracy. It would be +superfluous to go through all particulars; for the rule of conduct which +the tyrant ought to pursue is evident enough, and that is, to affect to +appear not the tyrant, but the king; the guardian of those he governs, +not their plunderer, [1315b] but their protector, and to affect +the middle rank in life, not one superior to all others: he should, +therefore, associate his nobles with him and soothe his people; for his +government will not only be necessarily more honourable and worthy of +imitation, as it will be over men of worth, and not abject wretches who +perpetually both hate and fear him; but it will be also more durable. +Let him also frame his life so that his manners may be consentaneous +to virtue, or at least let half of them be so, that he may not be +altogether wicked, but only so in part. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + + +Indeed an oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments of the shortest +duration. The tyranny of Orthagoras and his family at Sicyon, it is +true, continued longer than any other: the reason for which was, that +they used their power with moderation, and were in many particulars +obedient to the laws; and, as Clisthenes was an able general, he never +fell into contempt, and by the care he took that in many particulars his +government should be popular. He is reported also to have presented a +person with a crown who adjudged the victory to another; and some say +that it is the statue of that judge which is placed in the forum. + +They say also, that Pisistratus submitted to be summoned into the court +of the Areopagites. The second that we shall mention is the tyranny of +the Cypselidse, at Corinth, which continued seventy-seven years and +six months; for Cypselus was tyrant there thirty years, Periander +forty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Georgias, three years; the +reason for which was, that Cypselus was a popular man, and governed +without guards. Periander indeed ruled like a tyrant, but then he was an +able general. The third was that of the Pisistradidae at Athens; but it +was not continual: for Pisistratus himself was twice expelled; so that +out of thirty-three years he was only fifteen in power, and his son +eighteen; so that the whole time was thirty-three years. Of the rest +we shall mention that of Hiero, and Gelo at Syracuse; and this did not +continue long, for both their reigns were only eighteen years; for +Gelo died in the eighth year of his tyranny, and Hiero in his tenth. +Thrasybulus fell in his eleventh month, and many other tyrannies have +continued a very short time. We have now gone through the general cases +of corruption and [1316a] means of preservation both in free states and +monarchies. In Plato's Republic, Socrates is introduced treating upon +the changes which different governments are liable to: but his discourse +is faulty; for he does not particularly mention what changes the best +and first governments are liable to; for he only assigns the general +cause, of nothing being immutable, but that in time everything will +alter [***tr.: text is unintelligible here***] he conceives that nature +will then produce bad men, who will not submit to education, and in +this, probably, he is not wrong; for it is certain that there are some +persons whom it is impossible by any education to make good men; but +why should this change be more peculiar to what he calls the best-formed +government, than to all other forms, and indeed to all other things +that exist? and in respect to his assigned time, as the cause of the +alteration of all things, we find that those which did not begin +to exist at the same time cease to be at the same time; so that, if +anything came into beginning the day before the solstice, it must alter +at the same time. Besides, why should such a form of government be +changed into the Lacedaemonian? for, in general, when governments alter, +they alter into the contrary species to what they before were, and +not into one like their former. And this reasoning holds true of other +changes; for he says, that from the Lacedaemonian form it changes into +an oligarchy, and from thence into a democracy, and from a democracy +into a tyranny: and sometimes a contrary change takes place, as from a +democracy into an oligarchy, rather than into a monarchy. With respect +to a tyranny he neither says whether there will be any change in it; or +if not, to what cause it will be owing; or if there is, into what other +state it will alter: but the reason of this is, that a tyranny is an +indeterminate government; and, according to him, every state ought to +alter into the first, and most perfect, thus the continuity and circle +would be preserved. But one tyranny often changed into another; as +at Syria, from Myron's to Clisthenes'; or into an oligarchy, as was +Antileo's at Chalcas; or into a democracy, as was Gelo's at Syracuse; or +into an aristocracy, as was Charilaus's at Lacedaemon, and at Carthage. +An oligarchy is also changed into a tyranny; such was the rise of most +of the ancient tyrannies in Sicily; at Leontini, into the tyranny of +Panaetius; at Gela, into that of Cleander; at Rhegium into that of +Anaxilaus; and the like in many other cities. It is absurd also to +suppose, that a state is changed into an oligarchy because those who are +in power are avaricious and greedy of money, and not because those who +are by far richer than their fellow citizens think it unfair that those +who have nothing should have an equal share in the rule of the state +with themselves, who possess so much-for in many oligarchies it is not +allowable to be employed in money-getting, and there are many laws to +prevent it. But in Carthage, which is a democracy, money-getting is +creditable, and yet their form of government remains unaltered. It is +also absurd to say, that in an oligarchy there are two cities, one of +the poor and another of the rich; for why should this happen to them +more than to the Lacedaemonians, or any other state where all possess +not equal property, or where all are not equally good? for though no +one member of the community should be poorer than he was before, yet +a democracy might nevertheless change into an oligarchy; if the rich +should be more powerful than the poor, and the one too negligent, and +the other attentive: and though these changes are owing to many causes, +yet he mentions but one only, that the citizens become poor by luxury, +and paying interest-money; as if at first they were all rich, or the +greater part of them: but this is not so, but when some of those who +have the principal management of public affairs lose their fortunes, +they will endeavour to bring about a revolution; but when others do, +nothing of consequence will follow, nor when such states do alter is +there any more reason for their altering into a democracy than any +other. Besides, though some of the members of the community may not have +spent their fortunes, yet if they share not in the honours of the state, +or if they are ill-used and insulted, they will endeavour to raise +seditions, and bring about a revolution, that they may be allowed to do +as they like; which, Plato says, arises from too much liberty. Although +there are many oligarchies and democracies, yet Socrates, when he is +treating of the changes they may undergo, speaks of them as if there was +but one of each sort. + + + + +BOOK VI + + + + +CHAPTER I + + +We have already shown what is the nature of the supreme council in the +state, and wherein one may differ from another, and how the different +magistrates should be regulated; and also the judicial department, and +what is best suited to what state; and also to what causes both the +destruction and preservation of governments are owing. + +As there are very many species of democracies, as well as of other +states, it will not be amiss to consider at the same time anything which +we may have omitted to mention concerning either of them, and to allot +to each that mode of conduct which is peculiar to and advantageous for +them; and also to inquire into the combinations of all these different +modes of government which we [1317a] have mentioned; for as these are +blended together the government is altered, as from an aristocracy to +be an oligarchy, and from a free state to be a democracy. Now, I mean +by those combinations of government (which I ought to examine into, but +have not yet done), namely, whether the deliberative department and the +election of magistrates is regulated in a manner correspondent to an +oligarchy, or the judicial to an aristocracy, or the deliberative part +only to an oligarchy, and the election of magistrates to an aristocracy, +or whether, in any other manner, everything is not regulated according +to the nature of the government. But we will first consider what +particular sort of democracy is fitted to a particular city, and also +what particular oligarchy to a particular people; and of other states, +what is advantageous to what. It is also necessary to show clearly, not +only which of these governments is best for a state, but also how +it ought to be established there, and other things we will treat of +briefly. + +And first, we will speak of a democracy; and this will at the same +time show clearly the nature of its opposite which some persons call +an oligarchy; and in doing this we must examine into all the parts of +a democracy, and everything that is connected therewith; for from the +manner in which these are compounded together different species of +democracies arise: and hence it is that they are more than one, and of +various natures. Now, there are two causes which occasion there being so +many democracies; one of which is that which we have already mentioned; +namely, there being different sorts of people; for in one country the +majority are husbandmen, in another mechanics, and hired servants; if +the first of these is added to the second, and the third to both of +them, the democracy will not only differ in the particular of better or +worse, but in this, that it will be no longer the same government; the +other is that which we will now speak of. The different things which are +connected with democracies and seem to make part of these states, do, +from their being joined to them, render them different from others: this +attending a few, that more, and another all. It is necessary that he who +would found any state which he may happen to approve of, or correct one, +should be acquainted with all these particulars. All founders of states +endeavour to comprehend within their own plan everything of nearly the +same kind with it; but in doing this they err, in the manner I have +already described in treating of the preservation and destruction of +governments. I will now speak of these first principles and manners, and +whatever else a democratical state requires. + + + + +CHAPTER II + + +Now the foundation of a democratical state is liberty, and people have +been accustomed to say this as if here only liberty was to be found; for +they affirm that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But one +part of liberty is to govern and be governed alternately; for, according +to democratical justice, equality is measured by numbers, and not by +worth: and this being just, it is necessary that the supreme power +should be vested in the people at large; and that what the majority +determine should be final: so that in a democracy the poor ought to have +more power than the rich, as being the greater number; for this is one +mark of liberty which all framers of a democracy lay down as a criterion +of that state; another is, to live as every one likes; for this, they +say, is a right which liberty gives, since he is a slave who must live +as he likes not. This, then, is another criterion of a democracy. Hence +arises the claim to be under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any +account, any otherwise than by rotation, and that just as far only as +that person is, in his turn, under his also. This also is conducive to +that equality which liberty demands. These things being premised, and +such being the government, it follows that such rules as the following +should be observed in it, that all the magistrates should be chosen out +of all the people, and all to command each, and each in his turn all: +that all the magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those +offices only which required some particular knowledge and skill: that no +census, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man for any +office: that none should be in the same employment twice, or very few, +and very seldom, except in the army: that all their appointments should +be limited to a very short time, or at least as many as possible: +that the whole community should be qualified to judge in all causes +whatsoever, let the object be ever so extensive, ever so interesting, or +of ever so high a nature; as at Athens, where the people at large judge +the magistrates when they come out of office, and decide concerning +public affairs as well as private contracts: that the supreme power +should be in the public assembly; and that no magistrate should be +allowed any discretionary power but in a few instances, and of no +consequence to public business. Of all magistrates a senate is best +suited to a democracy, where the whole community is not paid for giving +their attendance; for in that case it loses its power; for then the +people will bring all causes before them, by appeal, as we have +already mentioned in a former book. In the next place, there should, if +possible, be a fund to pay all the citizens--who have any share in the +management of public affairs, either as members of the assembly, judges, +and magistrates; but if this cannot be done, at least the magistrates, +the judges the senators, and members of the supreme assembly, and also +those officers who are obliged to eat at a common table ought to be +paid. Moreover, as an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of +family, fortune, and education; so, on the contrary, a democracy is a +government in the hands of men of no birth, indigent circumstances, and +mechanical employments. In this state also no office [1318a] should be +for life; and, if any such should remain after the government has been +long changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to +diminish the power; and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things, +then, appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established on that +principle of justice which is homogeneous to those governments; that is, +that all the members of the state, by number, should enjoy an equality, +which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government of the +people: for it seems perfectly equal that the rich should have no more +share in the government than the poor, nor be alone in power; but that +all should be equal, according to number; for thus, they think, the +equality and liberty of the state best preserved. + + + + +CHAPTER III + + +In the next place we must inquire how this equality is to be procured. +Shall the qualifications be divided so that five hundred rich should be +equal to a thousand poor, or shall the thousand have equal power with +the five hundred? or shall we not establish our equality in this manner? +but divide indeed thus, and afterwards taking an equal number both out +of the five hundred and the thousand, invest them with the power of +creating the magistrates and judges. Is this state then established +according to perfect democratical justice, or rather that which is +guided by numbers only? For the defenders of a democracy say, that that +is just which the majority approve of: but the favourers of an oligarchy +say, that that is just which those who have most approve of; and that we +ought to be directed by the value of property. Both the propositions are +unjust; for if we agree with what the few propose we erect a tyranny: +for if it should happen that an individual should have more than the +rest who are rich, according to oligarchical justice, this man alone +has a right to the supreme power; but if superiority of numbers is to +prevail, injustice will then be done by confiscating the property of the +rich, who are few, as we have already said. What then that equality is, +which both parties will admit, must be collected from the definition +of right which is common to them both; for they both say that what the +majority of the state approves of ought to be established. Be it so; but +not entirely: but since a city happens to be made up of two different +ranks of people, the rich and the poor, let that be established which +is approved of by both these, or the greater part: but should there be +opposite sentiments, let that be established which shall be approved +of by the greater part: but let this be according to the census; for +instance, if there should be ten of the rich and twenty of the poor, and +six of the first and fifteen of the last should agree upon any measure, +and the remaining four of the rich should join with the remaining five +of the poor in opposing it, that party whose census when added together +should determine which opinion should be law, and should these happen +to be equal, it should be regarded as a case similar to an assembly or +court of justice dividing equally upon any question that comes before +them, who either determine it by lot or some such method. But although, +with [1318b] respect to what is equal and just, it may be very difficult +to establish the truth, yet it is much easier to do than to persuade +those who have it in their power to encroach upon others to be guided +thereby; for the weak always desire what is equal and just, but the +powerful pay no regard thereunto. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + +There are four kinds of democracies. The best is that which is composed +of those first in order, as we have already said, and this also is the +most ancient of any. I call that the first which every one would place +so, was he to divide the people; for the best part of these are the +husbandmen. We see, then, that a democracy may be framed where the +majority live by tillage or pasturage; for, as their property is +but small, they will not be at leisure perpetually to hold public +assemblies, but will be continually employed in following their own +business, not having otherwise the means of living; nor will they be +desirous of what another enjoys, but will rather like to follow their +own business than meddle with state affairs and accept the offices of +government, which will be attended with no great profit; for the major +part of mankind are rather desirous of riches than honour (a proof of +this is, that they submitted to the tyrannies in ancient times, and do +now submit to the oligarchies, if no one hinders them in their usual +occupations, or deprives them of their property; for some of them soon +get rich, others are removed from poverty); besides, their having the +right of election and calling their magistrates to account for their +conduct when they come out of office, will satisfy their desire of +honours, if any of them entertain that passion: for in some states, +though the commonalty have not the right of electing the magistrates, +yet it is vested in part of that body chosen to represent them: and it +is sufficient for the people at large to possess the deliberative power: +and this ought to be considered as a species of democracy; such was that +formerly at Mantinsea: for which reason it is proper for the democracy +we have been now treating of to have a power (and it has been usual for +them to have it) of censuring their magistrates when out of office, +and sitting in judgment upon all causes: but that the chief magistrates +should be elected, and according to a certain census, which should vary +with the rank of their office, or else not by a census, but according +to their abilities for their respective appointments. A state thus +constituted must be well constituted; for the magistracies will be +always filled with the best men with the approbation of the people; +who will not envy their superiors: and these and the nobles should +be content with this part in the administration; for they will not be +governed by their inferiors. They will be also careful to use their +power with moderation, as there are others to whom full power is +delegated to censure their conduct; for it is very serviceable to the +state to have them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do +whatsoever they choose; for with such a liberty there would be no check +to that evil particle there is in every one: therefore it is [1319a] +necessary and most for the benefit of the state that the offices thereof +should be filled by the principal persons in it, whose characters are +unblemished, and that the people are not oppressed. It is now evident +that this is the best species of democracy, and on what account; because +the people are such and have such powers as they ought to have. To +establish a democracy of husbandmen some of those laws which were +observed in many ancient states are universally useful; as, for +instance, on no account to permit any one to possess more than a certain +quantity of land, or within a certain distance from the city. Formerly +also, in some states, no one was allowed to sell their original lot of +land. They also mention a law of one Oxylus, which forbade any one to +add to their patrimony by usury. We ought also to follow the law of +the Aphutaeans, as useful to direct us in this particular we are now +speaking of; for they having but very little ground, while they were +a numerous people, and at the same time were all husbandmen, did not +include all their lands within the census, but divided them in such a +manner that, according to the census, the poor had more power than +the rich. Next to the commonalty of husbandmen is one of shepherds and +herdsmen; for they have many things in common with them, and, by their +way of life, are excellently qualified to make good soldiers, stout in +body, and able to continue in the open air all night. The generality of +the people of whom other democracies are composed are much worse than +these; for their lives are wretched nor have they any business with +virtue in anything they do; these are your mechanics, your exchange-men, +and hired servants; as all these sorts of men frequent the exchange and +the citadel, they can readily attend the public assembly; whereas the +husbandmen, being more dispersed in the country, cannot so easily meet +together; nor are they equally desirous of doing it with these others! +When a country happens to be so situated that a great part of the land +lies at a distance from the city, there it is easy to establish a good +democracy or a free state for the people in general will be obliged to +live in the country; so that it will be necessary in such a democracy, +though there may be an exchange-mob at hand, never to allow a legal +assembly without the inhabitants of the country attend. We have shown in +what manner the first and best democracy ought to be established, and it +will be equally evident as to the rest, for from these we [1319b] should +proceed as a guide, and always separate the meanest of the people from +the rest. But the last and worst, which gives to every citizen without +distinction a share in every part of the administration, is what few +citizens can bear, nor is it easy to preserve for any long time, unless +well supported by laws and manners. We have already noticed almost every +cause that can destroy either this or any other state. Those who have +taken the lead in such a democracy have endeavoured to support it, and +make the people powerful by collecting together as many persons as they +could and giving them their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally +born, and also if either of their parents were citizens, that is to say, +if either their father or mother; and this method is better suited to +this state than any other: and thus the demagogues have usually managed. +They ought, however, to take care, and do this no longer than the common +people are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and +then stop; for, if they proceed still further, they will make the +state disorderly, and the nobles will ill brook the power of the common +people, and be full of resentment against it; which was the cause of +an insurrection at Cyrene: for a little evil is overlooked, but when it +becomes a great one it strikes the eye. It is, moreover, very-useful in +such a state to do as Clisthenes did at Athens, when he was desirous of +increasing the power of the people, and as those did who established the +democracy in Cyrene; that is, to institute many tribes and fraternities, +and to make the religious rites of private persons few, and those +common; and every means is to be contrived to associate and blend the +people together as much as possible; and that all former customs be +broken through. Moreover, whatsoever is practised in a tyranny +seems adapted to a democracy of this species; as, for instance, the +licentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the children; for this to +a certain degree is useful in such a state; and also to overlook every +one's living as they choose; for many will support such a government: +for it is more agreeable to many to live without any control than as +prudence would direct. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + +It is also the business of the legislator and all those who would +support a government of this sort not to make it too great a work, or +too perfect; but to aim only to render it stable: for, let a state be +constituted ever so badly, there is no difficulty in its continuing a +few days: they should therefore endeavour to procure its safety by +all those ways which we have described in assigning the causes of the +preservation and destruction of governments; avoiding what is hurtful, +and by framing such laws, written and unwritten, as contain those things +which chiefly tend to the preservation of the state; nor to suppose that +that is useful either for a democratic or [1320a] an oligarchic form of +government which contributes to make them more purely so, but what will +contribute to their duration: but our demagogues at present, to flatter +the people, occasion frequent confiscations in the courts; for which +reason those who have the welfare of the state really at heart should +act directly opposite to what they do, and enact a law to prevent +forfeitures from being divided amongst the people or paid into the +treasury, but to have them set apart for sacred uses: for those who +are of a bad disposition would not then be the less cautious, as their +punishment would be the same; and the community would not be so ready to +condemn those whom they sat in judgment on when they were to get nothing +by it: they should also take care that the causes which are brought +before the public should be as few as possible, and punish with the +utmost severity those who rashly brought an action against any one; for +it is not the commons but the nobles who are generally prosecuted: for +in all things the citizens of the same state ought to be affectionate to +each other, at least not to treat those who have the chief power in +it as their enemies. Now, as the democracies which have been lately +established are very numerous, and it is difficult to get the common +people to attend the public assemblies without they are paid for it, +this, when there is not a sufficient public revenue, is fatal to the +nobles; for the deficiencies therein must be necessarily made up by +taxes, confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice: +which things have already destroyed many democracies. Whenever, then, +the revenues of the state are small, there should be but few public +assemblies and but few courts of justice: these, however, should have +very extensive jurisdictions, but should continue sitting a few days +only, for by this means the rich would not fear the expense, although +they should receive nothing for their attendance, though the poor did; +and judgment also would be given much better; for the rich will not +choose to be long absent from their own affairs, but will willingly +be so for a short time: and, when there are sufficient revenues, a +different conduct ought to be pursued from what the demagogues at +present follow; for now they divide the surplus of the public money +amongst the poor; these receive it and again want the same supply, while +the giving it is like pouring water into a sieve: but the true patriot +in a democracy ought to take care that the majority of the community are +not too poor, for this is the cause of rapacity in that government; he +therefore should endeavour that they may enjoy perpetual plenty; and +as this also is advantageous to the rich, what can be saved out of the +public money should be put by, and then divided at once amongst the +poor, if possible, in such a quantity as may enable every one of them to +purchase a little field, and, if that cannot be done, at least to give +each of them enough to procure the implements [1320b] of trade and +husbandry; and if there is not enough for all to receive so much at +once, then to divide it according to tribes or any other allotment. In +the meantime let the rich pay them for necessary services, but not be +obliged to find them in useless amusements. And something like this +was the manner in which they managed at Carthage, and preserved the +affections of the people; for by continually sending some of their +community into colonies they procured plenty. It is also worthy of a +sensible and generous nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and +supplying them with what is necessary, induce them to work; or to +imitate the conduct of the people at Tarentum: for they, permitting the +poor to partake in common of everything which is needful for them, gain +the affections of the commonalty. They have also two different ways of +electing their magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, others by +lot; by the last, that the people at large may have some share in the +administration; by the former, that the state may be well governed: the +same may be accomplished if of the same magistrates you choose some by +vote, others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which democracies +ought to be established. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + +What has been already said will almost of itself sufficiently show how +an oligarchy ought to be founded; for he who would frame such a state +should have in his view a democracy to oppose it; for every species of +oligarchy should be founded on principles diametrically opposite to some +species of democracy. + +The first and best-framed oligarchy is that which approaches near to +what we call a free state; in which there ought to be two different +census, the one high, the other low: from those who are within the +latter the ordinary officers of the state ought to be chosen; from the +former the supreme magistrates: nor should any one be excluded from a +part of the administration who was within the census; which should be +so regulated that the commonalty who are included in it should by means +thereof be superior to those who have no share in the government; for +those who are to have the management of public affairs ought always to +be chosen out of the better sort of the people. Much in the same manner +ought that oligarchy to be established which is next in order: but as to +that which is most opposite to a pure democracy, and approaches nearest +to a dynasty and a tyranny, as it is of all others the worst, so it +requires the greatest care and caution to preserve it: for as bodies of +sound and healthy constitutions and ships which are well manned and +well found for sailing can bear many injuries without perishing, while +a diseased body or a leaky ship with an indifferent crew cannot support +the [1321a] least shock; so the worst-established governments want most +looking after. A number of citizens is the preservation of a democracy; +for these are opposed to those rights which are founded in rank: on +the contrary, the preservation of an oligarchy depends upon the due +regulation of the different orders in the society. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + +As the greater part of the community are divided into four sorts of +people; husbandmen, mechanics, traders, and hired servants; and as those +who are employed in war may likewise be divided into four; the horsemen, +the heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed, and the sailor, where the +nature of the country can admit a great number of horse; there a +powerful oligarchy may be easily established: for the safety of the +inhabitants depends upon a force of that sort; but those who can support +the expense of horsemen must be persons of some considerable fortune. +Where the troops are chiefly heavy-armed, there an oligarchy, inferior +in power to the other, may be established; for the heavy-armed are +rather made up of men of substance than the poor: but the light-armed +and the sailors always contribute to support a democracy: but where the +number of these is very great and a sedition arises, the other parts of +the community fight at a disadvantage; but a remedy for this evil is +to be learned from skilful generals, who always mix a proper number of +light-armed soldiers with their horse and heavy-armed: for it is with +those that the populace get the better of the men of fortune in an +insurrection; for these being lighter are easily a match for the horse +and the heavy-armed: so that for an oligarchy to form a body of troops +from these is to form it against itself: but as a city is composed of +persons of different ages, some young and some old, the fathers should +teach their sons, while they were very young, a light and easy exercise; +but, when they are grown up, they should be perfect in every warlike +exercise. Now, the admission of the people to any share in the +government should either be (as I said before) regulated by a census, or +else, as at Thebes, allowed to those who for a certain time have ceased +from any mechanic employment, or as at Massalia, where they are chosen +according to their worth, whether citizens or foreigners. With respect +to the magistrates of the highest rank which it may be necessary to +have in a state, the services they are bound to do the public should be +expressly laid down, to prevent the common people from being desirous +of accepting their employments, and also to induce them to regard their +magistrates with favour when they know what a price they pay for their +honours. It is also necessary that the magistrates, upon entering into +their offices, should make magnificent sacrifices and erect some public +structure, that the people partaking of the entertainment, and seeing +the city ornamented with votive gifts in their temples and public +structures, may see with pleasure the stability of the government: add +to this also, that the nobles will have their generosity recorded: but +now this is not the conduct which those who are at present at the head +of an oligarchy pursue, but the contrary; for they are not more desirous +of honour than of gain; for which reason such oligarchies may more +properly be called little democracies. Thus [1321b] we have explained on +what principles a democracy and an oligarchy ought to be established. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + + +After what has been said I proceed next to treat particularly of the +magistrates; of what nature they should be, how many, and for what +purpose, as I have already mentioned: for without necessary magistrates +no state can exist, nor without those which contribute to its dignity +and good order can exist happily: now it is necessary that in small +states the magistrates should be few; in a large one, many: also to +know well what offices may be joined together, and what ought to be +separated. The first thing necessary is to establish proper regulators +in the markets; for which purpose a certain magistrate should be +appointed to inspect their contracts and preserve good order; for of +necessity, in almost every city there must be both buyers and sellers to +supply each other's mutual wants: and this is what is most productive +of the comforts of life; for the sake of which men seem to have joined +together in one community. A second care, and nearly related to the +first, is to have an eye both to the public and private edifices in +the city, that they may be an ornament; and also to take care of all +buildings which are likely to fall: and to see that the highways are +kept in proper repair; and also that the landmarks between different +estates are preserved, that there may be no disputes on that account; +and all other business of the same nature. Now, this business may be +divided into several branches, over each of which in populous cities +they appoint a separate person; one to inspect the buildings, another +the fountains, another the harbours; and they are called the inspectors +of the city. A third, which is very like the last, and conversant nearly +about the same objects, only in the country, is to take care of what +is done out of the city. The officers who have this employment we call +inspectors of the lands, or inspectors of the woods; but the business +of all three of them is the same. There must also be other officers +appointed to receive the public revenue and to deliver it out to those +who are in the different departments of the state: these are called +receivers or quaestors. There must also be another, before whom all +private contracts and sentences of courts should be enrolled, as well +as proceedings and declarations. Sometimes this employment is divided +amongst many, but there is one supreme over the rest; these are called +proctors, notaries, and the like. Next to these is an officer whose +business is of all others the most necessary, and yet most difficult; +namely, to take care that sentence is executed upon those who are +condemned; and that every one pays the fines laid on him; and also to +have the charge of those who are in prison. [1322a] This office is very +disagreeable on account of the odium attending it, so that no one will +engage therein without it is made very profitable, or, if they do, +will they be willing to execute it according to law; but it is most +necessary, as it is of no service to pass judgment in any cause without +that judgment is carried into execution: for without this human society +could not subsist: for which reason it is best that this office should +not be executed by one person, but by some of the magistrates of the +other courts. In like manner, the taking care that those fines which +are ordered by the judges are levied should be divided amongst different +persons. And as different magistrates judge different causes, let the +causes of the young be heard by the young: and as to those which are +already brought to a hearing, let one person pass sentence, and another +see it executed: as, for instance, let the magistrates who have the care +of the public buildings execute the sentence which the inspectors of +the markets have passed, and the like in other cases: for by so much the +less odium attends those who carry the laws into execution, by so much +the easier will they be properly put in force: therefore for the same +persons to pass the sentence and to execute it will subject them to +general hatred; and if they pass it upon all, they will be considered +as the enemies of all. Thus one person has often the custody of the +prisoner's body, while another sees the sentence against him executed, +as the eleven did at Athens: for which reason it is prudent to separate +these offices, and to give great attention thereunto as equally +necessary with anything we have already mentioned; for it will certainly +happen that men of character will decline accepting this office, and +worthless persons cannot properly be entrusted with it, as having +themselves rather an occasion for a guard than being qualified to guard +others. This, therefore, ought by no means to be a separate office from +others; nor should it be continually allotted to any individuals, but +the young men; where there is a city-guard, the youths ought in turns +to take these offices upon them. These, then, as the most necessary +magistrates, ought to be first mentioned: next to these are others no +less necessary, but of much higher rank, for they ought to be men of +great skill and fidelity. These are they who have the guard of the city, +and provide everything that is necessary for war; whose business it is, +both in war and peace, to defend the walls and the gates, and to take +care to muster and marshal the citizens. Over all these there are +sometimes more officers, sometimes fewer: thus in little cities there is +only one whom they call either general or polemarch; but where there are +horse and light-armed troops, and bowmen, and sailors, they sometimes +put distinct commanders over each of these; who again have others under +them, according to their different divisions; all of which join together +to make one military body: and thus much for this department. Since some +of the magistrates, if not all, have business with the public money, +it is necessary that there should be other officers, whose employment +should be nothing else than to take an account of what they have, and +correct any mismanagement therein. But besides all these magistrates +there is one who is supreme over them all, who very often has in his own +power the disposal of the public revenue and taxes; who presides over +the people when the supreme power is in them; for there must be some +magistrate who has a power to summon them together, and to preside as +head of the state. These are sometimes called preadvisers; but where +there are many, more properly a council. These are nearly the civil +magistrates which are requisite to a government: but there are other +persons whose business is confined to religion; as the priests, and +those who are to take care of the temples, that they are kept in proper +repair, or, if they fall down, that they may be rebuilt; and whatever +else belongs to public worship. This charge is sometimes entrusted to +one person, as in very small cities: in others it is delegated to many, +and these distinct from the priesthood, as the builders or keepers of +holy places, and officers of the sacred revenue. Next to these are +those who are appointed to have the general care of all those public +sacrifices to the tutelar god of the state, which the laws do not +entrust to the priests: and these in different states have different +appellations. To enumerate in few words the different departments of +all those magistrates who are necessary: these are either religion, +war, taxes, expenditures, markets, public buildings, harbours, highways. +Belonging to the courts of justice there are scribes to enroll private +contracts; and there must also be guards set over the prisoners, others +to see the law is executed, council on either side, and also others to +watch over the conduct of those who are to decide the causes. Amongst +the magistrates also may finally be reckoned those who are to give their +advice in public affairs. But separate states, who are peculiarly happy +and have leisure to attend to more minute particulars, and are very +attentive to good order, require particular magistrates for themselves; +such as those who have the government of the women; who are to see the +laws are executed; who take care of the boys and preside over their +education. To these may be added those who have the care of their +gymnastic exercises, [1323a] their theatres, and every other public +spectacle which there may happen to be. Some of these, however, are not +of general use; as the governors of the women: for the poor are obliged +to employ their wives and children in servile offices for want of +slaves. As there are three magistrates to whom some states entrust the +supreme power; namely, guardians of the laws, preadvisers, and senators; +guardians of the laws suit best to an aristocracy, preadvisers to an +oligarchy, and a senate to a democracy. And thus much briefly concerning +all magistrates. + + + + +BOOK VII + + + + +CHAPTER I + + +He who proposes to make that inquiry which is necessary concerning what +government is best, ought first to determine what manner of living is +most eligible; for while this remains uncertain it will also be equally +uncertain what government is best: for, provided no unexpected accidents +interfere, it is highly probable, that those who enjoy the best +government will live the most happily according to their circumstances; +he ought, therefore, first to know what manner of life is most desirable +for all; and afterwards whether this life is the same to the man and +the citizen, or different. As I imagine that I have already sufficiently +shown what sort of life is best in my popular discourses on that +subject, I think I may very properly repeat the same here; as most +certainly no one ever called in question the propriety of one of the +divisions; namely, that as what is good, relative to man, may be divided +into three sorts, what is external, what appertains to the body, and +what to the soul, it is evident that all these must conspire to make +a man happy: for no one would say that a man was happy who had no +fortitude, no temperance, no justice, no prudence; but was afraid of the +flies that flew round him: nor would abstain from the meanest theft if +he was either hungry or dry, or would murder his dearest friend for +a farthing; and also was in every particular as wanting in his +understanding as an infant or an idiot. These truths are so evident that +all must agree to them; though some may dispute about the quantity and +the degree: for they may think, that a very little virtue is sufficient +for happiness; but for riches, property, power, honour, and all such +things, they endeavour to increase them without bounds: but to such we +reply, that it is easy to prove from what experience teaches us in these +cases, that these external goods produce not virtue, but virtue them. +As to a happy life, whether it is to be found in pleasure or virtue or +both, certain it is, that those whose morals are most pure, and whose +understandings are best cultivated, will enjoy more of it, although +their fortune is but moderate than those do who own an exuberance of +wealth, are deficient in those; and this utility any one who reflects +may easily convince himself of; for whatsoever is external has its +boundary, as a machine, and whatsoever is useful in its excess is either +necessarily hurtful, or at best useless to the possessor; but every good +quality of the soul the higher it is in degree, so much the more useful +it is, if it is permitted on this subject to use the word useful as well +as noble. It is also very evident, that the accidents of each subject +take place of each other, as the subjects themselves, of which we allow +they are accidents, differ from each other in value; so that if the soul +is more noble than any outward possession, as the body, both in itself +and with respect to us, it must be admitted of course that the best +accidents of each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it is for the +sake of the soul that these things are desirable; and it is on this +account that wise men should desire them, not the soul for them. Let us +therefore be well assured, that every one enjoys as much happiness as he +possesses virtue and wisdom, and acts according to their dictates; since +for this we have the example of GOD Himself, _who is completely happy, +not from any external good, but in Himself, and because such is His +nature_. For good fortune is something different from happiness, as every +good which depends not on the mind is owing to chance or fortune; but +it is not from fortune that any one is wise and just: hence it follows, +that that city is happiest which is the best and acts best: for no one +can do well who acts not well; nor can the deeds either of man or city +be praiseworthy without virtue and wisdom; for whatsoever is just, or +wise, or prudent in a man, the same things are just, wise, and prudent +in a city. + +Thus much by way of introduction; for I could not but just touch upon +this subject, though I could not go through a complete investigation +of it, as it properly belongs to another question: let us at present +suppose so much, that a man's happiest life, both as an individual and +as a citizen, is a life of virtue, accompanied with those enjoyments +which virtue usually procures. If [1324a] there are any who are not +convinced by what I have said, their doubts shall be answered hereafter, +at present we shall proceed according to our intended method. + + + + +CHAPTER II + + +It now remains for us to say whether the happiness of any individual +man and the city is the same or different: but this also is evident; for +whosoever supposes that riches will make a person happy, must place the +happiness of the city in riches if it possesses them; those who prefer a +life which enjoys a tyrannic power over others will also think, that the +city which has many others under its command is most happy: thus also +if any one approves a man for his virtue, he will think the most worthy +city the happiest: but here there are two particulars which require +consideration, one of which is, whether it is the most eligible life +to be a member of the community and enjoy the rights of a citizen, or +whether to live as a stranger, without interfering in public affairs; +and also what form of government is to be preferred, and what +disposition of the state is best; whether the whole community should be +eligible to a share in the administration, or only the greater part, and +some only: as this, therefore, is a subject of political examination +and speculation, and not what concerns the individual, and the first of +these is what we are at present engaged in, the one of these I am not +obliged to speak to, the other is the proper business of my present +design. It is evident that government must be the best which is so +established, that every one therein may have it in his power to act +virtuously and live happily: but some, who admit that a life of virtue +is most eligible, still doubt which is preferable a public life of +active virtue, or one entirely disengaged from what is without and +spent in contemplation; which some say is the only one worthy of a +philosopher; and one of these two different modes of life both now +and formerly seem to have been chosen by all those who were the most +virtuous men; I mean the public or philosophic. And yet it is of no +little consequence on which side the truth lies; for a man of sense +must naturally incline to the better choice; both as an individual and a +citizen. Some think that a tyrannic government over those near us is +the greatest injustice; but that a political one is not unjust: but that +still is a restraint on the pleasures and tranquillity of life. Others +hold the quite contrary opinion, and think that a public and active life +is the only life for man: for that private persons have no opportunity +of practising any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged +in public life the management of the [1324b] state. These are their +sentiments; others say, that a tyrannical and despotical mode of +government is the only happy one; for even amongst some free states the +object of their laws seems to be to tyrannise over their neighbours: so +that the generality of political institutions, wheresoever dispersed, +if they have any one common object in view, have all of them this, +to conquer and govern. It is evident, both from the laws of the +Lacedaemonians and Cretans, as well as by the manner in which they +educated their children, that all which they had in view was to make +them soldiers: besides, among all nations, those who have power enough +and reduce others to servitude are honoured on that account; as were the +Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls: with some there are laws to +heighten the virtue of courage; thus they tell us that at Carthage they +allowed every person to wear as many rings for distinction as he had +served campaigns. There was also a law in Macedonia, that a man who had +not himself killed an enemy should be obliged to wear a halter; among +the Scythians, at a festival, none were permitted to drink out of +the cup was carried about who had not done the same thing. Among the +Iberians, a warlike nation, they fixed as many columns upon a man's tomb +as he had slain enemies: and among different nations different things +of this sort prevail, some of them established by law, others by custom. +Probably it may seem too absurd to those who are willing to take this +subject into their consideration to inquire whether it is the business +of a legislator to be able to point out by what means a state may govern +and tyrannise over its neighbours, whether they will, or will not: for +how can that belong either to the politician or legislator which is +unlawful? for that cannot be lawful which is done not only justly, but +unjustly also: for a conquest may be unjustly made. But we see nothing +of this in the arts: for it is the business neither of the physician nor +the pilot to use either persuasion or force, the one to his patients, +the other to his passengers: and yet many seem to think a despotic +government is a political one, and what they would not allow to be just +or proper, if exercised over themselves, they will not blush to exercise +over others; for they endeavour to be wisely governed themselves, but +think it of no consequence whether others are so or not: but a despotic +power is absurd, except only where nature has framed the one party for +dominion, the other for subordination; and therefore no one ought to +assume it over all in general, but those only which are the proper +objects thereof: thus no one should hunt men either for food or +sacrifice, but what is fit for those purposes, and these are wild +animals which are eatable. + +Now a city which is well governed might be very [1325a] happy in itself +while it enjoyed a good system of laws, although it should happen to be +so situated as to have no connection with any other state, though its +constitution should not be framed for war or conquest; for it would then +have no occasion for these. It is evident therefore that the business of +war is to be considered as commendable, not as a final end, but as the +means of procuring it. It is the duty of a good legislator to examine +carefully into his state; and the nature of the people, and how they may +partake of every intercourse, of a good life, and of the happiness which +results from it: and in this respect some laws and customs differ from +others. It is also the duty of a legislator, if he has any neighbouring +states to consider in what manner he shall oppose each of them, or what +good offices he shall show them. But what should be the final end of the +best governments will be considered hereafter. + + + + +CHAPTER III + + +We will now speak to those who, while they agree that a life of virtue +is most eligible, yet differ in the use of it addressing ourselves to +both these parties; for there are some who disapprove of all political +governments, and think that the life of one who is really free is +different from the life of a citizen, and of all others most eligible: +others again think that the citizen is the best; and that it is +impossible for him who does nothing to be well employed; but that +virtuous activity and happiness are the same thing. Now both parties in +some particulars say what is right, in others what is wrong, thus, that +the life of a freeman is better than the life of a slave is true, for +a slave, as a slave, is employed in nothing honourable; for the common +servile employments which he is commanded to perform have nothing +virtuous in them; but, on the other hand, it is not true that a +submission to all sorts of governments is slavery; for the government of +freemen differs not more from the government of slaves than slavery and +freedom differ from each other in their nature; and how they do has been +already mentioned. To prefer doing of nothing to virtuous activity is +also wrong, for happiness consists in action, and many noble ends are +produced by the actions of the just and wise. From what we have already +determined on this subject, some one probably may think, that supreme +power is of all things best, as that will enable a man to command very +many useful services from others; so that he who can obtain this ought +not to give it up to another, but rather to seize it: and, for this +purpose, the father should have no attention or regard for the son, or +the son for the father, or friend for friend; for what is best is most +eligible: but to be a member of the community and be in felicity is +best. What these persons advance might probably be true, if the supreme +good was certainly theirs who plunder and use violence to others: but +it is [1325b] most unlikely that it should be so; for it is a mere +supposition: for it does not follow that their actions are honourable +who thus assume the supreme power over others, without they were by +nature as superior to them as a man to a woman, a father to a child, a +master to a slave: so that he who so far forsakes the paths of virtue +can never return back from whence he departed from them: for amongst +equals whatever is fair and just ought to be reciprocal; for this is +equal and right; but that equals should not partake of what is equal, or +like to like, is contrary to nature: but whatever is contrary to nature +is not right; therefore, if there is any one superior to the rest of the +community in virtue and abilities for active life, him it is proper to +follow, him it is right to obey, but the one alone will not do, but must +be joined to the other also: and, if we are right in what we have now +said, it follows that happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that +both with respect to the community as well as the individual an active +life is the happiest: not that an active life must necessarily refer to +other persons, as some think, or that those studies alone are practical +which are pursued to teach others what to do; for those are much more +so whose final object is in themselves, and to improve the judgment and +understanding of the man; for virtuous activity has an end, therefore +is something practical; nay, those who contrive the plan which others +follow are more particularly said to act, and are superior to the +workmen who execute their designs. But it is not necessary that states +which choose to have no intercourse with others should remain inactive; +for the several members thereof may have mutual intercourse with each +other; for there are many opportunities for this among the different +citizens; the same thing is true of every individual: for, was it +otherwise, neither could the Deity nor the universe be perfect; to +neither of whom can anything external separately exist. Hence it is +evident that that very same life which is happy for each individual is +happy also for the state and every member of it. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + +As I have now finished what was introductory to this subject, and +considered at large the nature of other states, it now remains that I +should first say what ought to be the establishment of a city which one +should form according to one's wish; for no good state can exist without +a moderate proportion of what is necessary. Many things therefore +ought to be forethought of as desirable, but none of them such as are +impossible: I mean relative to the number of citizens and the extent +of the territory: for as other artificers, such as the weaver and the +shipwright, ought to have such materials as are fit for their work, +since so much the better they are, by so much [1326a] superior will the +work itself necessarily be; so also ought the legislator and politician +endeavour to procure proper materials for the business they have in +hand. Now the first and principal instrument of the politician is the +number of the people; he should therefore know how many, and what they +naturally ought to be: in like manner the country, how large, and what +it is. Most persons think that it is necessary for a city to be large to +be happy: but, should this be true, they cannot tell what is a large one +and what a small one; for according to the multitude of the inhabitants +they estimate the greatness of it; but they ought rather to consider its +strength than its numbers; for a state has a certain object in view, and +from the power which it has in itself of accomplishing it, its greatness +ought to be estimated; as a person might say, that Hippocrates was a +greater physician, though not a greater man, than one that exceeded him +in the size of his body: but if it was proper to determine the strength +of the city from the number of the inhabitants, it should never be +collected from the multitude in general who may happen to be in it; +for in a city there must necessarily be many slaves, sojourners, and +foreigners; but from those who are really part of the city and properly +constitute its members; a multitude of these is indeed a proof of a +large city, but in a state where a large number of mechanics inhabit, +and but few soldiers, such a state cannot be great; for the greatness of +the city, and the number of men in it, are not the same thing. This too +is evident from fact, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to +govern properly a very numerous body of men; for of all the states which +appear well governed we find not one where the rights of a citizen are +open to an indiscriminate multitude. And this is also evident from the +nature of the thing; for as law is a certain order, so good law is of +course a certain good order: but too large a multitude are incapable of +this, unless under the government of that DIVINE POWER which comprehends +the universe. Not but that, as quantity and variety are usually +essential to beauty, the perfection of a city consists in the largeness +of it as far as that largeness is consistent with that order already +mentioned: but still there is a determinate size to all cities, as well +as everything else, whether animals, plants, or machines, for each of +these, if they are neither too little nor too big, have their +proper powers; but when they have not their due growth, or are badly +constructed, as a ship a span long is not properly a ship, nor one of +two furlongs length, but when it is of a fit size; for either from its +smallness or from its largeness it may be quite useless: so is it with +a city; one that is too small has not [1326b] in itself the power of +self-defence, but this is essential to a city: one that is too large is +capable of self-defence in what is necessary; but then it is a nation +and not a city: for it will be very difficult to accommodate a form +of government to it: for who would choose to be the general of such +an unwieldy multitude, or who could be their herald but a stentor? The +first thing therefore necessary is, that a city should consist of such +numbers as will be sufficient to enable the inhabitants to live +happily in their political community: and it follows, that the more the +inhabitants exceed that necessary number the greater will the city be: +but this must not be, as we have already said, without bounds; but what +is its proper limit experience will easily show, and this experience is +to be collected from the actions both of the governors and the governed. +Now, as it belongs to the first to direct the inferior magistrates and +to act as judges, it follows that they can neither determine causes +with justice nor issue their orders with propriety without they know the +characters of their fellow-citizens: so that whenever this happens not +to be done in these two particulars, the state must of necessity be +badly managed; for in both of them it is not right to determine too +hastily and without proper knowledge, which must evidently be the case +where the number of the citizens is too many: besides, it is more easy +for strangers and sojourners to assume the rights of citizens, as they +will easily escape detection in so great a multitude. It is evident, +then, that the best boundary for a city is that wherein the numbers are +the greatest possible, that they may be the better able to be sufficient +in themselves, while at the same time they are not too large to be under +the eye and government of the magistrates. And thus let us determine the +extent of a city. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + +What we have said concerning a city may nearly be applied to a country; +for as to what soil it should be, every one evidently will commend it +if it is such as is sufficient in itself to furnish what will make the +inhabitants happy; for which purpose it must be able to supply them +with all the necessaries of life; for it is the having these in plenty, +without any want, which makes them content. As to its extent, it should +be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at their ease with freedom +and temperance. Whether we have done right or wrong in fixing this limit +to the territory shall be considered more minutely hereafter, when +we come particularly to inquire into property, and what fortune is +requisite for a man to live on, and how and in what manner they ought +to employ it; for there are many doubts upon this question, while each +party insists upon their own plan of life being carried to an excess, +the one of severity, the other of indulgence. What the situation of the +country should be it is not difficult to determine, in some particulars +respecting that we ought to be advised by those who are skilful in +military affairs. It should be difficult of access to an enemy, but +easy to the inhabitants: and as we said, that the number of [1327a] +inhabitants ought to be such as can come under the eye of the +magistrate, so should it be with the country; for then it is easily +defended. As to the position of the city, if one could place it to one's +wish, it is convenient to fix it on the seaside: with respect to +the country, one situation which it ought to have has been already +mentioned, namely, that it should be so placed as easily to give +assistance to all places, and also to receive the necessaries of life +from all parts, and also wood, or any other materials which may happen +to be in the country. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + +But with respect to placing a city in the neighbourhood of the sea, +there are some who have many doubts whether it is serviceable or hurtful +to a well-regulated state; for they say, that the resort of persons +brought up under a different system of government is disserviceable +to the state, as well by impeding the laws as by their numbers; for a +multitude of merchants must necessarily arise from their trafficking +backward and forward upon the seas, which will hinder the well-governing +of the city: but if this inconvenience should not arise, it is evident +that it is better, both on account of safety and also for the easier +acquisition of the necessaries of life, that both the city and the +country should be near the sea; for it is necessary that those who are +to sustain the attack of the enemy should be ready with their assistance +both by land and by sea, and to oppose any inroad, both ways if possible +but if not, at least where they are most powerful, which they may +do while they possess both. A maritime situation is also useful for +receiving from others what your own country will not produce, and +exporting those necessaries of your own growth which are more than you +have occasion for; but a city ought to traffic to supply its own wants, +and not the wants of others; for those who themselves furnish an open +market for every one, do it for the sake of gain; which it is not proper +for a well-established state to do, neither should they encourage such +a commerce. Now, as we see that many places and cities have docks and +harbours lying very convenient for the city, while those who frequent +them have no communication with the citadel, and yet they are not too +far off, but are surrounded by walls and such-like fortifications, it is +evident, that if any good arises from such an intercourse the city will +receive it, but if anything hurtful, it will be easy to restrain it by +a law declaring and deputing whom the state will allow to have an +intercourse with each other, and whom not. As to a naval power, it is by +no means doubtful that it is necessary to have one to a certain degree; +and this not only for the sake of the [1327b] city itself, but also +because it may be necessary to appear formidable to some of the +neighbouring states, or to be able to assist them as well by sea as +by land; but to know how great that force should be, the health of the +state should be inquired into, and if that appears vigorous and enables +her to take the lead of other communities, it is necessary that her +force should correspond with her actions. As for that multitude of +people which a maritime power creates, they are by no means necessary to +a state, nor ought they to make a part of the citizens; for the mariners +and infantry, who have the command, are freemen, and upon these depends +a naval engagement: but when there are many servants and husbandmen, +there they will always have a number of sailors, as we now see happens +to some states, as in Heraclea, where they man many triremes, though +the extent of their city is much inferior to some others. And thus we +determine concerning the country, the port, the city, the sea, and a +maritime power: as to the number of the citizens, what that ought to be +we have already said. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + +We now proceed to point out what natural disposition the members of the +community ought to be of: but this any one will easily perceive who +will cast his eye over the states of Greece, of all others the most +celebrated, and also the other different nations of this habitable +world. Those who live in cold countries, as the north of Europe, are +full of courage, but wanting in understanding and the arts: therefore +they are very tenacious of their liberty; but, not being politicians, +they cannot reduce their neighbours under their power: but the Asiatics, +whose understandings are quick, and who are conversant in the arts, are +deficient in courage; and therefore are always conquered and the +slaves of others: but the Grecians, placed as it were between these +two boundaries, so partake of them both as to be at the same time both +courageous and sensible; for which reason Greece continues free, and +governed in the best manner possible, and capable of commanding the +whole world, could they agree upon one system of policy. Now this is the +difference between the Grecians and other nations, that the latter have +but one of these qualities, whereas in the former they are both happily +blended together. Hence it is evident, that those persons ought to be +both sensible and courageous who will readily obey a legislator, the +object of whose laws is virtue. As to what some persons say, that the +military must be mild and tender to those they know, but severe and +cruel to those they know not, it is courage which [1328a] makes any one +lovely; for that is the faculty of the soul which we most admire: as +a proof of this, our resentment rises higher against our friends and +acquaintance than against those we know not: for which reason Archilaus +accusing his friends says very properly to himself, Shall my friends +insult me? The spirit of freedom and command also is what all inherit +who are of this disposition for courage is commanding and invincible. It +also is not right for any one to say, that you should be severe to those +you know not; for this behaviour is proper for no one: nor are those who +are of a noble disposition harsh in their manners, excepting only to the +wicked; and when they are particularly so, it is, as has been already +said, against their friends, when they think they have injured them; +which is agreeable to reason: for when those who think they ought to +receive a favour from any one do not receive it, beside the injury done +them, they consider what they are deprived of: hence the saying, "Cruel +are the wars of brothers;" and this, "Those who have greatly loved +do greatly hate." And thus we have nearly determined how many the +inhabitants of a city ought to be, and what their natural disposition, +and also the country how large, and of what sort is necessary; I say +nearly, because it is needless to endeavour at as great accuracy in +those things which are the objects of the senses as in those which are +inquired into by the understanding only. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + + +As in natural bodies those things are not admitted to be parts of them +without which the whole would not exist, so also it is evident that in +a political state everything that is necessary thereunto is not to be +considered as a part of it, nor any other community from whence one +whole is made; for one thing ought to be common and the same to the +community, whether they partake of it equally or unequally, as, for +instance, food, land, or the like; but when one thing is for the benefit +of one person, and another for the benefit of another, in this there is +nothing like a community, excepting that one makes it and the other +uses it; as, for instance, between any instrument employed in making any +work, and the workmen, as there is nothing common between the house and +the builder, but the art of the builder is employed on the house. Thus +property is necessary for states, but property is no part of the state, +though many species of it have life; but a city is a community of +equals, for the purpose of enjoying the best life possible: but the +happiest life is the best which consists in the perfect practice of +virtuous energies: as therefore some persons have great, others little +or no opportunity of being employed in these, it is evident that this +is the cause of the difference there is between the different cities and +communities there are to be found; for while each of these endeavour to +acquire what is best by various and different means, they give [1328b] +rise to different modes of living and different forms of government. We +are now to consider what those things are without which a city cannot +possibly exist; for what we call parts of the city must of necessity +inhere in it: and this we shall plainly understand, if we know the +number of things necessary to a city: first, the inhabitants must +have food: secondly, arts, for many instruments are necessary in life: +thirdly, arms, for it is necessary that the community should have an +armed force within themselves, both to support their government against +those of their own body who might refuse obedience to it, and also +to defend it from those who might attempt to attack it from without: +fourthly, a certain revenue, as well for the internal necessities of +the state as for the business of war: fifthly, which is indeed the chief +concern, a religious establishment: sixthly in order, but first of all +in necessity, a court to determine both criminal and civil causes. These +things are absolutely necessary, so to speak, in every state; for a city +is a number of people not accidentally met together, but with a purpose +of ensuring to themselves sufficient independency and self-protection; +and if anything necessary for these purposes is wanting, it is +impossible that in such a situation these ends can be obtained. It is +necessary therefore that a city should be capable of acquiring all these +things: for this purpose a proper number of husbandmen are necessary to +procure food, also artificers and soldiers, and rich men, and priests +and judges, to determine what is right and proper. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + + +Having determined thus far, it remains that we consider whether all +these different employments shall be open to all; for it is possible +to continue the same persons always husbandmen, artificers, judges, +or counsellors; or shall we appoint different persons to each of those +employments which we have already mentioned; or shall some of them be +appropriated to particulars, and others of course common to all? but +this does not take place in every state, for, as we have already said, +it is possible that all may be common to all, or not, but only common to +some; and this is the difference between one government and another: +for in democracies the whole community partakes of everything, but in +oligarchies it is different. + +Since we are inquiring what is the best government possible, and it is +admitted to be that in which the citizens are happy; and that, as we +have already said, it is impossible to obtain happiness without virtue; +it follows, that in the best-governed states, where the citizens are +really men of intrinsic and not relative goodness, none of them should +be permitted to exercise any mechanic employment or follow merchandise, +as being ignoble and destructive to virtue; neither should they be +husband-[1329a] men, that they may be at leisure to improve in virtue +and perform the duty they owe to the state. With respect to the +employments of a soldier, a senator, and a judge, which are evidently +necessary to the community, shall they be allotted to different persons, +or shall the same person execute both? This question, too, is easily +answered: for in some cases the same persons may execute them, in +others they should be different, where the different employments require +different abilities, as when courage is wanting for one, judgment for +the other, there they should be allotted to different persons; but when +it is evident, that it is impossible to oblige those who have arms +in their hands, and can insist on their own terms, to be always under +command; there these different employments should be trusted to one +person; for those who have arms in their hands have it in their option +whether they will or will not assume the supreme power: to these two +(namely, those who have courage and judgment) the government must be +entrusted; but not in the same manner, but as nature directs; what +requires courage to the young, what requires judgment to the old; for +with the young is courage, with the old is wisdom: thus each will be +allotted the part they are fit for according to their different merits. +It is also necessary that the landed property should belong to these +men; for it is necessary that the citizens should be rich, and these are +the men proper for citizens; for no mechanic ought to be admitted to the +rights of a citizen, nor any other sort of people whose employment is +not entirely noble, honourable, and virtuous; this is evident from the +principle we at first set out with; for to be happy it is necessary +to be virtuous; and no one should say that a city is happy while he +considers only one part of its citizens, but for that purpose he ought +to examine into all of them. It is evident, therefore, that the landed +property should belong to these, though it may be necessary for them to +have husbandmen, either slaves, barbarians, or servants. There remains +of the different classes of the people whom we have enumerated, the +priests, for these evidently compose a rank by themselves; for neither +are they to be reckoned amongst the husbandmen nor the mechanics; for +reverence to the gods is highly becoming every state: and since the +citizens have been divided into orders, the military and the council, +and it is proper to offer due worship to the gods, and since it is +necessary that those who are employed in their service should have +nothing else to do, let the business of the priesthood be allotted +to those who are in years. We have now shown what is necessary to the +existence of a city, and of what parts it consists, and that husbandmen, +mechanic, and mercenary servants are necessary to a city; but that +the parts of it are soldiers and sailors, and that these are always +different from those, but from each other only occasionally. + + + + +CHAPTER X + + +It seems neither now nor very lately to have been known [1329b] to those +philosophers who have made politics their study, that a city ought to +be divided by families into different orders of men; and that the +husbandmen and soldiers should be kept separate from each other; +which custom is even to this day preserved in Egypt and in Crete; also +Sesostris having founded it in Egypt, Minos in Crete. Common meals seem +also to have been an ancient regulation, and to have been established +in Crete during the reign of Minos, and in a still more remote period +in Italy; for those who are the best judges in that country say that +one Italus being king of AEnotria., from whom the people, changing their +names, were called Italians instead of AEnotrians, and that part of +Europe was called Italy which is bounded by the Scylletic Gulf on the +one side and the Lametic on the other, the distance between which +is about half a day's journey. This Italus, they relate, made the +AEnotrians, who were formerly shepherds, husbandmen, and gave them +different laws from what they had before, and to have been the first who +established common meals, for which reason some of his descendants still +use them, and observe some of his laws. The Opici inhabit that part +which lies towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, who both now are and formerly +were called Ausonians. The Chones inhabited the part toward Iapigia and +the Ionian Sea which is called Syrtis. These Chones were descended +from the AEnotrians. Hence arose the custom of common meals, but the +separation of the citizens into different families from Egypt: for the +reign of Sesostris is of much higher antiquity than that of Minos. As +we ought to think that most other things were found out in a long, nay, +even in a boundless time (reason teaching us that want would make us +first invent that which was necessary, and, when that was obtained, then +those things which were requisite for the conveniences and ornament of +life), so should we conclude the same with respect to a political state; +now everything in Egypt bears the marks of the most remote antiquity, +for these people seem to be the most ancient of all others, and to have +acquired laws and political order; we should therefore make a proper +use of what is told us of them, and endeavour to find out what they have +omitted. We have already said, that the landed property ought to belong +to the military and those who partake of the government of the state; +and that therefore the husbandmen should be a separate order of people; +and how large and of what nature the country ought to be: we will first +treat of the division of the land, and of the husbandmen, how many and +of what sort they ought to be; since we by no means hold that property +ought to be common, as some persons have said, only thus far, in +friendship, it [1330a] should be their custom to let no citizen want +subsistence. As to common meals, it is in general agreed that they are +proper in well-regulated cities; my reasons for approving of them shall +be mentioned hereafter: they are what all the citizens ought to partake +of; but it will not be easy for the poor, out of what is their own, to +furnish as much as they are ordered to do, and supply their own house +besides. The expense also of religious worship should be defrayed by the +whole state. Of necessity therefore the land ought to be divided into +two parts, one of which should belong to the community in general, the +other to the individuals separately; and each of these parts should +again be subdivided into two: half of that which belongs to the public +should be appropriated to maintain the worship of the gods, the other +half to support the common meals. Half of that which belongs to the +individuals should be at the extremity of the country, the other half +near the city, so that these two portions being allotted to each person, +all would partake of land in both places, which would be both equal and +right; and induce them to act in concert with greater harmony in any war +with their neighbours: for when the land is not divided in this manner, +one party neglects the inroads of the enemy on the borders, the other +makes it a matter of too much consequence and more than is necessary; +for which reason in some places there is a law which forbids the +inhabitants of the borders to have any vote in the council when they are +debating upon a war which is made against them as their private interest +might prevent their voting impartially. Thus therefore the country ought +to be divided and for the reasons before mentioned. Could one have one's +choice, the husbandmen should by all means be slaves, not of the same +nation, or men of any spirit; for thus they would be laborious in +their business, and safe from attempting any novelties: next to these +barbarian servants are to be preferred, similar in natural disposition +to these we have already mentioned. Of these, let those who are +to cultivate the private property of the individual belong to that +individual, and those who are to cultivate the public territory belong +to the public. In what manner these slaves ought to be used, and for +what reason it is very proper that they should have the promise of their +liberty made them, as a reward for their services, shall be mentioned +hereafter. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + + +We have already mentioned, that both the city and all the country should +communicate both with the sea and the continent as much as possible. +There are these four things which we should be particularly desirous of +in the position of the city with respect to itself: in the first place, +health is to be consulted as the first thing necessary: now a city +which fronts the east and receives the winds which blow from thence is +esteemed most healthful; next to this that which has a northern position +is to be preferred, as best in winter. It should next be contrived that +it may have a proper situation for the business of government and for +defence in war: that in war the citizens may [1330b] have easy access +to it; but that it may be difficult of access to, and hardly to be taken +by, the enemy. In the next place particularly, that there may be plenty +of water, and rivers near at hand: but if those cannot be found, very +large cisterns must be prepared to save rain-water, so that there may +be no want of it in case they should be driven into the town in time of +war. And as great care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, +the first thing to be attended to is, that the city should have a good +situation and a good position; the second is, that they may have good +water to drink; and this not be negligently taken care of; for what +we chiefly and most frequently use for the support of the body must +principally influence the health of it; and this influence is what the +air and water naturally have: for which reason in all wise governments +the waters ought to be appropriated to different purposes, and if they +are not equally good, and if there is not a plenty of necessary water, +that which is to drink should be separated from that which is for other +uses. As to fortified places, what is proper for some governments is +not proper for all; as, for instance, a lofty citadel is proper for a +monarchy and an oligarchy; a city built upon a plain suits a democracy; +neither of these for an aristocracy, but rather many strong places. As +to the form of private houses, those are thought to be best and most +useful for their different purposes which are distinct and separate +from each other, and built in the modern manner, after the plan of +Hippodamus: but for safety in time of war, on the contrary, they should +be built as they formerly were; for they were such that strangers could +not easily find their way out of them, and the method of access to +them such as an enemy could with difficulty find out if he proposed +to besiege them. A city therefore should have both these sorts of +buildings, which may easily be contrived if any one will so regulate +them as the planters do their rows of vines; not that the buildings +throughout the city should be detached from each other, only in some +parts of it; thus elegance and safety will be equally consulted. With +respect to walls, those who say that a courageous people ought not to +have any, pay too much respect to obsolete notions; particularly as +we may see those who pride themselves therein continually confuted by +facts. It is indeed disreputable for those who are equal, or nearly so, +to the enemy, to endeavour to take refuge within their walls--but since +it very often happens, that those who make the attack are too powerful +for the bravery and courage of those few who oppose them to resist, +if you would not suffer the calamities of war and the insolence of the +enemy, it must be thought the part of a good soldier to seek for safety +under the shelter and protection of walls more especially since so many +missile weapons and machines have been most ingeniously invented to +besiege cities with. Indeed to neglect surrounding a city with a wall +would be similar to choosing a country which is easy of access to an +enemy, or levelling the eminences of it; or as if an individual should +not have a wall to his house lest it should be thought that the owner +of it was a coward: nor should this be left unconsidered, that those who +have a city surrounded with walls may act both ways, either as if it had +or as if it had not; but where it has not they cannot do this. If this +is true, it is not only necessary to have walls, but care must be taken +that they may be a proper ornament to the city, as well as a defence +in time of war; not only according to the old methods, but the modern +improvements also: for as those who make offensive war endeavour by +every way possible to gain advantages over their adversaries, so should +those who are upon the defensive employ all the means already known, and +such new ones as philosophy can invent, to defend themselves: for those +who are well prepared are seldom first attacked. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + + +As the citizens in general are to eat at public tables in certain +companies, and it is necessary that the walls should have bulwarks and +towers in proper places and at proper distances, it is evident that +it will be very necessary to have some of these in the towers; let the +buildings for this purpose be made the ornaments of the walls. As to +temples for public worship, and the hall for the public tables of +the chief magistrates, they ought to be built in proper places, and +contiguous to each other, except those temples which the law or the +oracle orders to be separate from all other buildings; and let these be +in such a conspicuous eminence, that they may have every advantage of +situation, and in the neighbourhood of that part of the city which +is best fortified. Adjoining to this place there ought to be a large +square, like that which they call in Thessaly The Square of Freedom, in +which nothing is permitted to be bought or sold; into which no mechanic +nor husbandman, nor any such person, should be permitted to enter, +unless commanded by the magistrates. It will also be an ornament to this +place if the gymnastic exercises of the elders are performed in it. It +is also proper, that for performing these exercises the citizens should +be divided into distinct classes, according to their ages, and that the +young persons should have proper officers to be with them, and that the +seniors should be with the magistrates; for having them before their +eyes would greatly inspire true modesty and ingenuous fear. There ought +to be another square [1331b] separate from this for buying and selling, +which should be so situated as to be commodious for the reception +of goods both by sea and land. As the citizens may be divided into +magistrates and priests, it is proper that the public tables of +the priests should be in buildings near the temples. Those of the +magistrates who preside over contracts, indictments, and such-like, and +also over the markets, and the public streets near the square, or some +public way, I mean the square where things are bought and sold; for I +intended the other for those who are at leisure, and this for necessary +business. The same order which I have directed here should be observed +also in the country; for there also their magistrates such as the +surveyors of the woods and overseers of the grounds, must necessarily +have their common tables and their towers, for the purpose of protection +against an enemy. There ought also to be temples erected at proper +places, both to the gods and the heroes; but it is unnecessary to dwell +longer and most minutely on these particulars--for it is by no means +difficult to plan these things, it is rather so to carry them into +execution; for the theory is the child of our wishes, but the practical +part must depend upon fortune; for which reason we shall decline saying +anything farther upon these subjects. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + + +We will now show of what numbers and of what sort of people a government +ought to consist, that the state may be happy and well administered. +As there are two particulars on which the excellence and perfection of +everything depend, one of these is, that the object and end proposed +should be proper; the other, that the means to accomplish it should be +adapted to that purpose; for it may happen that these may either agree +or disagree with each other; for the end we propose may be good, but in +taking the means to obtain it we may err; at other times we may have +the right and proper means in our power, but the end may be bad, +and sometimes we may mistake in both; as in the art of medicine the +physician does not sometimes know in what situation the body ought to +be, to be healthy; nor what to do to procure the end he aims at. In +every art and science, therefore, we should be master of this knowledge, +namely, the proper end, and the means to obtain it. Now it is evident +that all persons are desirous to live well and be happy; but that some +have the means thereof in their own power, others not; and this either +through nature [1332a] or fortune; for many ingredients are necessary to +a happy life; but fewer to those who are of a good than to those who are +of a bad disposition. There are others who continually have the means +of happiness in their own power, but do not rightly apply them. Since +we propose to inquire what government is best, namely, that by which +a state may be best administered, and that state is best administered +where the people are the happiest, it is evident that happiness is a +thing we should not be unacquainted with. Now, I have already said in +my treatise on Morals (if I may here make any use of what I have there +shown), that happiness consists in the energy and perfect practice of +virtue; and this not relatively, but simply; I mean by relatively, what +is necessary in some certain circumstances; by simply, what is good and +fair in itself: of the first sort are just punishments, and restraints +in a just cause; for they arise from virtue and are necessary, and on +that account are virtuous; though it is more desirable that neither any +state nor any individual should stand in need of them; but those actions +which are intended either to procure honour or wealth are simply good; +the others eligible only to remove an evil; these, on the contrary, are +the foundation and means of relative good. A worthy man indeed will bear +poverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents with a noble mind; +but happiness consists in the contrary to these (now we have already +determined in our treatise on Morals, that he is a man of worth who +considers what is good because it is virtuous as what is simply good; it +is evident, therefore, that all the actions of such a one must be worthy +and simply good): this has led some persons to conclude, that the cause +of happiness was external goods; which would be as if any one should +suppose that the playing well upon the lyre was owing to the instrument, +and not to the art. It necessarily follows from what has been said, +that some things should be ready at hand and others procured by the +legislator; for which reason in founding a city we earnestly wish that +there may be plenty of those things which are supposed to be under the +dominion of fortune (for some things we admit her to be mistress over); +but for a state to be worthy and great is not only the work of fortune +but of knowledge and judgment also. But for a state to be worthy it is +necessary that those citizens which are in the administration should +be worthy also; but as in our city every citizen is to be so, we must +consider how this may be accomplished; for if this is what every one +could be, and not some individuals only, it would be more desirable; for +then it would follow, that what might be done by one might be done +by all. Men are worthy and good three ways; by nature, by custom, by +reason. In the first place, a man ought to be born a man, and not any +other animal; that is to say, he ought to have both a body and soul; but +it avails not to be only born [1332b] with some things, for custom +makes great alterations; for there are some things in nature capable of +alteration either way which are fixed by custom, either for the better +or the worse. Now, other animals live chiefly a life of nature; and in +very few things according to custom; but man lives according to reason +also, which he alone is endowed with; wherefore he ought to make all +these accord with each other; for if men followed reason, and were +persuaded that it was best to obey her, they would act in many respects +contrary to nature and custom. What men ought naturally to be, to make +good members of a community, I have already determined; the rest of +this discourse therefore shall be upon education; for some things are +acquired by habit, others by hearing them. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + + +As every political community consists of those who govern and of those +who are governed, let us consider whether during the continuance of +their lives they ought to be the same persons or different; for it +is evident that the mode of education should be adapted to this +distinction. Now, if one man differed from another as much, as we +believe, the gods and heroes differ from men: in the first place, being +far their superiors in body; and, secondly, in the soul: so that the +superiority of the governors over the governed might be evident beyond +a doubt, it is certain that it would be better for the one always to +govern, the other always to be governed: but, as this is not easy to +obtain, and kings are not so superior to those they govern as Scylax +informs us they are in India, it is evident that for many reasons it is +necessary that all in their turns should both govern and be governed: +for it is just that those who are equal should have everything alike; +and it is difficult for a state to continue which is founded in +injustice; for all those in the country who are desirous of innovation +will apply themselves to those who are under the government of the rest, +and such will be their numbers in the state, that it will be impossible +for the magistrates to get the better of them. But that the governors +ought to excel the governed is beyond a doubt; the legislator therefore +ought to consider how this shall be, and how it may be contrived that +all shall have their equal share in the administration. Now, with +respect to this it will be first said, that nature herself has directed +us in our choice, laying down the selfsame thing when she has made some +young, others old: the first of whom it becomes to obey, the latter +to command; for no one when he is young is offended at his being under +government, or thinks himself too good for it; more especially when he +considers that he himself shall receive the same honours which he +pays when he shall arrive at a proper age. In some respects it must be +acknowledged that the governors and the governed are the same, in others +they are different; it is therefore necessary that their education +should be in [1333a] some respect the same, in others different: as they +say, that he will be a good governor who has first learnt to obey. Now +of governments, as we have already said, some are instituted for the +sake of him who commands; others for him who obeys: of the first sort is +that of the master over the servant; of the latter, that of freemen over +each other. Now some things which are commanded differ from others; not +in the business, but in the end proposed thereby: for which reason many +works, even of a servile nature, are not disgraceful for young freemen +to perform; for many things which are ordered to be done are not +honourable or dishonourable so much in their own nature as in the end +which is proposed, and the reason for which they are undertaken. Since +then we have determined, that the virtue of a good citizen and good +governor is the same as of a good man; and that every one before he +commands should have first obeyed, it is the business of the legislator +to consider how his citizens may be good men, what education is +necessary to that purpose, and what is the final object of a good life. +The soul of man may be divided into two parts; that which has reason in +itself, and that which hath not, but is capable of obeying its dictates: +and according to the virtues of these two parts a man is said to be +good: but of those virtues which are the ends, it will not be difficult +for those to determine who adopt the division I have already given; for +the inferior is always for the sake of the superior; and this is equally +evident both in the works of art as well as in those of nature; but that +is superior which has reason. Reason itself also is divided into +two parts, in the manner we usually divide it; the theoretic and the +practical; which division therefore seems necessary for this part also: +the same analogy holds good with respect to actions; of which those +which are of a superior nature ought always to be chosen by those who +have it in their power; for that is always most eligible to every one +which will procure the best ends. Now life is divided into labour and +rest, war and peace; and of what we do the objects are partly necessary +and useful, partly noble: and we should give the same preference to +these that we do to the different parts of the soul and its actions, +as war to procure peace; labour, rest; and the useful, the noble. The +politician, therefore, who composes a body of laws ought to extend his +views to everything; the different parts of the soul and their actions; +more particularly to those things which are of a superior nature and +ends; and, in the same manner, to the lives of men and their different +actions. + +They ought to be fitted both for labour and war, but rather [1333b] for +rest and peace; and also to do what is necessary and useful, but rather +what is fair and noble. It is to those objects that the education of the +children ought to tend, and of all the youths who want instruction. All +the Grecian states which now seem best governed, and the legislators who +founded those states, appear not to have framed their polity with a view +to the best end, or to every virtue, in their laws and education; but +eagerly to have attended to what is useful and productive of gain: and +nearly of the same opinion with these are some persons who have written +lately, who, by praising the Lacedaemonian state, show they approve of +the intention of the legislator in making war and victory the end of +his government. But how contrary to reason this is, is easily proved by +argument, and has already been proved by facts (but as the generality of +men desire to have an extensive command, that they may have everything +desirable in the greater abundance; so Thibron and others who have +written on that state seem to approve of their legislator for having +procured them an extensive command by continually enuring them to +all sorts of dangers and hardships): for it is evident, since the +Lacedemonians have now no hope that the supreme power will be in their +own hand, that neither are they happy nor was their legislator wise. +This also is ridiculous, that while they preserved an obedience to their +laws, and no one opposed their being governed by them, they lost the +means of being honourable: but these people understand not rightly +what sort of government it is which ought to reflect honour on the +legislator; for a government of freemen is nobler than despotic power, +and more consonant to virtue. Moreover, neither should a city be thought +happy, nor should a legislator be commended, because he has so trained +the people as to conquer their neighbours; for in this there is a +great inconvenience: since it is evident that upon this principle every +citizen who can will endeavour to procure the supreme power in his own +city; which crime the Lacedaemonians accuse Pausanias of, though he +enjoyed such great honours. + +Such reasoning and such laws are neither political, useful nor true: but +a legislator ought to instil those laws on the minds of men which are +most useful for them, both in their public and private capacities. The +rendering a people fit for war, that they may enslave their inferiors +ought not to be the care of the legislator; but that they may not +themselves be reduced to slavery by others. In [1334a] the next place, +he should take care that the object of his government is the safety +of those who are under it, and not a despotism over all: in the third +place, that those only are slaves who are fit to be only so. Reason +indeed concurs with experience in showing that all the attention which +the legislator pays to the business of war, and all other rules which +he lays down, should have for their object rest and peace; since most +of those states (which we usually see) are preserved by war; but, after +they have acquired a supreme power over those around them, are ruined; +for during peace, like a sword, they lose their brightness: the fault of +which lies in the legislator, who never taught them how to be at rest. + + + + +CHAPTER XV + + +As there is one end common to a man both as an individual and a citizen, +it is evident that a good man and a good citizen must have the same +object in view; it is evident that all the virtues which lead to rest +are necessary; for, as we have often said, the end of war is peace, of +labour, rest; but those virtues whose object is rest, and those also +whose object is labour, are necessary for a liberal life and rest; for +we want a supply of many necessary things that we may be at rest. A city +therefore ought to be temperate, brave, and patient; for, according to +the proverb, "Rest is not for slaves;" but those who cannot bravely face +danger are the slaves of those who attack them. Bravery, therefore, and +patience are necessary for labour, philosophy for rest, and temperance +and justice in both; but these chiefly in time of peace and rest; for +war obliges men to be just and temperate; but the enjoyment of pleasure, +with the rest of peace, is more apt to produce insolence; those indeed +who are easy in their circumstances, and enjoy everything that can +make them happy, have great occasion for the virtues of temperance and +justice. Thus if there are, as the poets tell us, any inhabitants in +the happy isles, to these a higher degree of philosophy, temperance, and +justice will be necessary, as they live at their ease in the full plenty +of every sensual pleasure. It is evident, therefore, that these virtues +are necessary in every state that would be happy or worthy; for he who +is worthless can never enjoy real good, much less is he qualified to +be at rest; but can appear good only by labour and being at war, but +in peace and at rest the meanest of creatures. For which reason virtue +should not be cultivated as the Lacedaemonians did; for they did not +differ from others in their opinion concerning the supreme good, but in +[1334b] imagining this good was to be procured by a particular virtue; +but since there are greater goods than those of war, it is evident +that the enjoyment of those which are valuable in themselves should be +desired, rather than those virtues which are useful in war; but how and +by what means this is to be acquired is now to be considered. We have +already assigned three causes on which it will depend; nature, custom, +and reason, arid shown what sort of men nature must produce for this +purpose; it remains then that we determine which we shall first begin by +in education, reason or custom, for these ought always to preserve the +most entire harmony with each other; for it may happen that reason may +err from the end proposed, and be corrected by custom. In the first +place, it is evident that in this as in other things, its beginning +or production arises from some principle, and its end also arises from +another principle, which is itself an end. Now, with us, reason and +intelligence are the end of nature; our production, therefore, and our +manners ought to be accommodated to both these. In the next place, as +the soul and the body are two distinct things, so also we see that the +soul is divided into two parts, the reasoning and not-reasoning, with +their habits which are two in number, one belonging to each, namely +appetite and intelligence; and as the body is in production before the +soul, so is the not-reasoning part of the soul before the reasoning; and +this is evident; for anger, will and desire are to be seen in children +nearly as soon as they are born; but reason and intelligence spring up +as they grow to maturity. The body, therefore, necessarily demands our +care before the soul; next the appetites for the sake of the mind; the +body for the sake of the soul. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + + +If then the legislator ought to take care that the bodies of the +children are as perfect as possible, his first attention ought to be +given to matrimony; at what time and in what situation it is proper that +the citizens should engage in the nuptial contract. Now, with respect +to this alliance, the legislator ought both to consider the parties and +their time of life, that they may grow old at the same part of time, and +that their bodily powers may not be different; that is to say, the man +being able to have children, but the woman too old to bear them; or, on +the contrary, the woman be young enough to produce children, but the man +too old to be a father; for from such a situation discords and disputes +continually arise. In the next place, with respect to the succession of +children, there ought not to be too great an interval of time between +them and their parents; for when there is, the parent can receive no +benefit from his child's affection, or the child any advantage from his +father's protection; [1335a] neither should the difference in years be +too little, as great inconveniences may arise from it; as it prevents +that proper reverence being shown to a father by a boy who considers him +as nearly his equal in age, and also from the disputes it occasions in +the economy of the family. But, to return from this digression, care +ought to be taken that the bodies of the children may be such as will +answer the expectations of the legislator; this also will be affected +by the same means. Since season for the production of children is +determined (not exactly, but to speak in general), namely, for the man +till seventy years, and the woman till fifty, the entering into the +marriage state, as far as time is concerned, should be regulated by +these periods. It is extremely bad for the children when the father +is too young; for in all animals whatsoever the parts of the young are +imperfect, and are more likely to be productive of females than males, +and diminutive also in size; the same thing of course necessarily holds +true in men; as a proof of this you may see in those cities where the +men and women usually marry very young, the people in general are very +small and ill framed; in child-birth also the women suffer more, and +many of them die. And thus some persons tell us the oracle of Traezenium +should be explained, as if it referred to the many women who were +destroyed by too early marriages, and not their gathering their fruits +too soon. It is also conducive to temperance not to marry too soon; for +women who do so are apt to be intemperate. It also prevents the bodies +of men from acquiring their full size if they marry before their growth +is completed; for this is the determinate period, which prevents any +further increase; for which reason the proper time for a woman to marry +is eighteen, for a man thirty-seven, a little more or less; for when +they marry at that time their bodies are in perfection, and they will +also cease to have children at a proper time; and moreover with respect +to the succession of the children, if they have them at the time which +may reasonably be expected, they will be just arriving into perfection +when their parents are sinking down under the load of seventy years. +And thus much for the time which is proper for marriage; but moreover +a proper season of the year should be observed, as many persons do now, +and appropriate the winter for this business. The married couple ought +also to regard the precepts of physicians and naturalists, each of whom +have treated on these [1335b] subjects. What is the fit disposition of +the body will be better mentioned when we come to speak of the education +of the child; we will just slightly mention a few particulars. Now, +there is no occasion that any one should have the habit of body of a +wrestler to be either a good citizen, or to enjoy a good constitution, +or to be the father of healthy children; neither should he be infirm or +too much dispirited by misfortunes, but between both these. He ought to +have a habit of labour, but not of too violent labour; nor should that +be confined to one object only, as the wrestler's is; but to such things +as are proper for freemen. These things are equally necessary both for +men and women. Women with child should also take care that their diet is +not too sparing, and that they use sufficient exercise; which it will be +easy for the legislator to effect if he commands them once every day +to repair to the worship of the gods who are supposed to preside over +matrimony. But, contrary to what is proper for the body, the mind ought +to be kept as tranquil as possible; for as plants partake of the nature +of the soil, so does the child receive much of the disposition of the +mother. With respect to the exposing or bringing up of children, let +it be a law, that nothing imperfect or maimed shall be brought +up,.......... As the proper time has been pointed out for a man and a +woman to enter into the marriage state, so also let us determine +how long it is advantageous for the community that they should have +children; for as the children of those who are too young are imperfect +both in body and mind, so also those whose parents are too old are weak +in both: while therefore the body continues in perfection, which (as +some poets say, who reckon the different periods of life by sevens) +is till fifty years, or four or five more, the children may be equally +perfect; but when the parents are past that age it is better they should +have no more. With respect to any connection between a man and a woman, +or a woman and a man, when either of the parties are betrothed, let +it be held in utter detestation [1336a] on any pretext whatsoever; +but should any one be guilty of such a thing after the marriage is +consummated, let his infamy be as great as his guilt deserves. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + + +When a child is born it must be supposed that the strength of its body +will depend greatly upon the quality of its food. Now whoever will +examine into the nature of animals, and also observe those people who +are very desirous their children should acquire a warlike habit, will +find that they feed them chiefly with milk, as being best accommodated +to their bodies, but without wine, to prevent any distempers: those +motions also which are natural to their age are very serviceable; and +to prevent any of their limbs from being crooked, on account of their +extreme ductility, some people even now use particular machines that +their bodies may not be distorted. It is also useful to enure them to +the cold when they are very little; for this is very serviceable for +their health; and also to enure them to the business of war; for which +reason it is customary with many of the barbarians to dip their children +in rivers when the water is cold; with others to clothe them very +slightly, as among the Celts; for whatever it is possible to accustom +children to, it is best to accustom them to it at first, but to do it +by degrees: besides, boys have naturally a habit of loving the cold, on +account of the heat. These, then, and such-like things ought to be the +first object of our attention: the next age to this continues till +the child is five years old; during which time it is best to teach him +nothing at all, not even necessary labour, lest it should hinder his +growth; but he should be accustomed to use so much motion as not to +acquire a lazy habit of body; which he will get by various means and by +play also: his play also ought to be neither illiberal nor too laborious +nor lazy. Their governors and preceptors also should take care what sort +of tales and stories it may be proper for them to hear; for all these +ought to pave the way for their future instruction: for which reason +the generality of their play should be imitations of what they are +afterwards to do seriously. They too do wrong who forbid by laws +the disputes between boys and their quarrels, for they contribute to +increase their growth--as they are a sort of exercise to the body: +for the struggles of the heart and the compression of the spirits give +strength to those who labour, which happens to boys in their disputes. +The preceptors also ought to have an eye upon their manner of life, and +those with whom they converse; and to take care that they are never +in the company of slaves. At this time and till they are seven [1336b] +years old it is necessary that they should be educated at home. It +is also very proper to banish, both from their hearing and sight, +everything which is illiberal and the like. Indeed it is as much the +business of the legislator as anything else, to banish every indecent +expression out of the state: for from a permission to speak whatever is +shameful, very quickly arises the doing it, and this particularly with +young people: for which reason let them never speak nor hear any such +thing: but if it appears that any freeman has done or said anything that +is forbidden before he is of age to be thought fit to partake of the +common meals, let him be punished by disgrace and stripes; but if a +person above that age does so, let him be treated as you would a +slave, on account of his being infamous. Since we forbid his speaking +everything which is forbidden, it is necessary that he neither sees +obscene stories nor pictures; the magistrates therefore are to take care +that there are no statues or pictures of anything of this nature, except +only to those gods to whom the law permits them, and to which the law +allows persons of a certain age to pay their devotions, for themselves, +their wives, and children. It should also be illegal for young persons +to be present either at iambics or comedies before they are arrived at +that age when they are allowed to partake of the pleasures of the table: +indeed a good education will preserve them from all the evils which +attend on these things. We have at present just touched upon this +subject; it will be our business hereafter, when we properly come to +it, to determine whether this care of children is unnecessary, or, +if necessary, in what manner it must be done; at present we have only +mentioned it as necessary. Probably the saying of Theodoras, the tragic +actor, was not a bad one: That he would permit no one, not even the +meanest actor, to go upon the stage before him, that he might first +engage the ear of the audience. The same thing happens both in our +connections with men and things: what we meet with first pleases best; +for which reason children should be kept strangers to everything which +is bad, more particularly whatsoever is loose and offensive to good +manners. When five years are accomplished, the two next may be very +properly employed in being spectators of those exercises they will +afterwards have to learn. There are two periods into which education +ought to be divided, according to the age of the child; the one is from +his being seven years of age to the time of puberty; the other from +thence till he is one-and-twenty: for those who divide ages by the +number seven [1337a] are in general wrong: it is much better to follow +the division of nature; for every art and every instruction is intended +to complete what nature has left defective: we must first consider if +any regulation whatsoever is requisite for children; in the next place, +if it is advantageous to make it a common care, or that every one should +act therein as he pleases, which is the general practice in most cities; +in the third place, what it ought to be. + + + + +BOOK VIII + + + + +CHAPTER I + + +No one can doubt that the magistrate ought greatly to interest himself +in the care of youth; for where it is neglected it is hurtful to the +city, for every state ought to be governed according to its particular +nature; for the form and manners of each government are peculiar to +itself; and these, as they originally established it, so they usually +still preserve it. For instance, democratic forms and manners a +democracy; oligarchic, an oligarchy: but, universally, the best manners +produce the best government. Besides, as in every business and art there +are some things which men are to learn first and be made accustomed to, +which are necessary to perform their several works; so it is evident +that the same thing is necessary in the practice of virtue. As there is +one end in view in every city, it is evident that education ought to be +one and the same in each; and that this should be a common care, and +not the individual's, as it now is, when every one takes care of his own +children separately; and their instructions are particular also, each +person teaching them as they please; but what ought to be engaged in +ought to be common to all. Besides, no one ought to think that any +citizen belongs to him in particular, but to the state in general; for +each one is a part of the state, and it is the natural duty of each part +to regard the good of the whole: and for this the Lacedaemonians may be +praised; for they give the greatest attention to education, and make +it public. It is evident, then, that there should be laws concerning +education, and that it should be public. + + + + +CHAPTER II + + +What education is, and how children ought to be instructed, is what +should be well known; for there are doubts concerning the business of +it, as all people do not agree in those things they would have a child +taught, both with respect to their improvement in virtue and a happy +life: nor is it clear whether the object of it should be to improve +the reason or rectify the morals. From the present mode of education +we cannot determine with certainty to which men incline, whether to +instruct a child in what will be useful to him in life; or what tends to +virtue, and what is excellent: for all these things have their separate +defenders. As to virtue, there is no particular [1337b] in which they +all agree: for as all do not equally esteem all virtues, it reasonably +follows that they will not cultivate the same. It is evident that what +is necessary ought to be taught to all: but that which is necessary +for one is not necessary for all; for there ought to be a distinction +between the employment of a freeman and a slave. The first of these +should be taught everything useful which will not make those who know +it mean. Every work is to be esteemed mean, and every art and every +discipline which renders the body, the mind, or the understanding of +freemen unfit for the habit and practice of virtue: for which reason all +those arts which tend to deform the body are called mean, and all those +employments which are exercised for gain; for they take off from the +freedom of the mind and render it sordid. There are also some liberal +arts which are not improper for freemen to apply to in a certain degree; +but to endeavour to acquire a perfect skill in them is exposed to the +faults I have just mentioned; for there is a great deal of difference +in the reason for which any one does or learns anything: for it is not +illiberal to engage in it for one's self, one's friend, or in the cause +of virtue; while, at the same time, to do it for the sake of another +may seem to be acting the part of a servant and a slave. The mode of +instruction which now prevails seems to partake of both parts. + + + + +CHAPTER III + + +There are four things which it is usual to teach children--reading, +gymnastic exercises, and music, to which (in the fourth place) some add +painting. Reading and painting are both of them of singular use in life, +and gymnastic exercises, as productive of courage. As to music, some +persons may doubt, as most persons now use it for the sake of pleasure: +but those who originally made it part of education did it because, +as has been already said, nature requires that we should not only be +properly employed, but to be able to enjoy leisure honourably: for this +(to repeat what I have already said) is of all things the principal. +But, though both labour and rest are necessary, yet the latter is +preferable to the first; and by all means we ought to learn what we +should do when at rest: for we ought not to employ that time at play; +for then play would be the necessary business of our lives. But if this +cannot be, play is more necessary for those who labour than those who +are at rest: for he who labours requires relaxation; which play will +supply: for as labour is attended with pain and continued exertion, it +is necessary that play should be introduced, under proper regulations, +as a medicine: for such an employment of the mind is a relaxation to +it, and eases with pleasure. [1338a] Now rest itself seems to partake of +pleasure, of happiness, and an agreeable life: but this cannot be theirs +who labour, but theirs who are at rest; for he who labours, labours for +the sake of some end which he has not: but happiness is an end which +all persons think is attended with pleasure and not with pain: but all +persons do not agree in making this pleasure consist in the same thing; +for each one has his particular standard, correspondent to his own +habits; but the best man proposes the best pleasure, and that which +arises from the noblest actions. But it is evident, that to live a life +of rest there are some things which a man must learn and be instructed +in; and that the object of this learning and this instruction centres in +their acquisition: but the learning and instruction which is given for +labour has for its object other things; for which reason the ancients +made music a part of education; not as a thing necessary, for it is not +of that nature, nor as a thing useful, as reading, in the common course +of life, or for managing of a family, or for learning anything as useful +in public life. Painting also seems useful to enable a man to judge +more accurately of the productions of the finer arts: nor is it like +the gymnastic exercises, which contribute to health and strength; for +neither of these things do we see produced by music; there remains for +it then to be the employment of our rest, which they had in view who +introduced it; and, thinking it a proper employment for freemen, to them +they allotted it; as Homer sings: + + "How right to call Thalia to the feast:" + +and of some others he says: + + "The bard was call'd, to ravish every ear:" + +and, in another place, he makes Ulysses say the happiest part of man's +life is + + "When at the festal board, in order plac'd, They hear the song." + +It is evident, then, that there is a certain education in which a child +may be instructed, not as useful nor as necessary, but as noble and +liberal: but whether this is one or more than one, and of what sort they +are, and how to be taught, shall be considered hereafter: we are now got +so far on our way as to show that we have the testimony of the ancients +in our favour, by what they have delivered down upon education--for +music makes this plain. Moreover, it is necessary to instruct children +in what is useful, not only on account of its being useful in itself, +as, for instance, to learn to read, but also as the means of acquiring +other different sorts of instruction: thus they should be instructed +in painting, not only to prevent their being mistaken in purchasing +pictures, or in buying or selling of vases, but rather as it makes +[1338b] them judges of the beauties of the human form; for to be always +hunting after the profitable ill agrees with great and freeborn +souls. As it is evident whether a boy should be first taught morals or +reasoning, and whether his body or his understanding should be first +cultivated, it is plain that boys should be first put under the care of +the different masters of the gymnastic arts, both to form their bodies +and teach them their exercises. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + +Now those states which seem to take the greatest care of their +children's education, bestow their chief attention on wrestling, though +it both prevents the increase of the body and hurts the form of it. This +fault the Lacedaemonians did not fall into, for they made their children +fierce by painful labour, as chiefly useful to inspire them with +courage: though, as we have already often said, this is neither the +only thing nor the principal thing necessary to attend to; and even with +respect to this they may not thus attain their end; for we do not find +either in other animals, or other nations, that courage necessarily +attends the most cruel, but rather the milder, and those who have the +dispositions of lions: for there are many people who are eager both +to kill men and to devour human flesh, as the Achaeans and Heniochi in +Pontus, and many others in Asia, some of whom are as bad, others worse +than these, who indeed live by tyranny, but are men of no courage. Nay, +we know that the Lacedaemonians themselves, while they continued those +painful labours, and were superior to all others (though now they are +inferior to many, both in war and gymnastic exercises), did not acquire +their superiority by training their youth to these exercises, +but because those who were disciplined opposed those who were not +disciplined at all. What is fair and honourable ought then to take place +in education of what is fierce and cruel: for it is not a wolf, nor any +other wild beast, which will brave any noble danger, but rather a good +man. So that those who permit boys to engage too earnestly in these +exercises, while they do not take care to instruct them in what is +necessary to do, to speak the real truth, render them mean and vile, +accomplished only in one duty of a citizen, and in every other respect, +as reason evinces, good for nothing. Nor should we form our judgments +from past events, but from what we see at present: for now they have +rivals in their mode of education, whereas formerly they had not. That +gymnastic exercises are useful, and in what manner, is admitted; for +during youth it is very proper to go through a course of those which +are most gentle, omitting that violent diet and those painful exercises +which are prescribed as necessary; that they may not prevent the growth +of the body: and it is no small proof that they have this effect, that +amongst the Olympic candidates we can scarce find two or three who have +gained a victory both when boys and men: because the necessary exercises +they went through when young deprived them of their strength. When they +have allotted three years from the time of puberty to other parts of +education, they are then of a proper age to submit to labour and a +regulated diet; for it is impossible for the mind and body both to +labour at the same time, as they are productive of contrary evils to +each other; the labour of the body preventing the progress of the mind, +and the mind of the body. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + +With respect to music we have already spoken a little in a doubtful +manner upon this subject. It will be proper to go over again more +particularly what we then said, which may serve as an introduction to +what any other person may choose to offer thereon; for it is no easy +matter to distinctly point out what power it has, nor on what accounts +one should apply it, whether as an amusement and refreshment, as sleep +or wine; as these are nothing serious, but pleasing, and the killers of +care, as Euripides says; for which reason they class in the same order +and use for the same purpose all these, namely, sleep, wine, and music, +to which some add dancing; or shall we rather suppose that music tends +to be productive of virtue, having a power, as the gymnastic exercises +have to form the body in a certain way, to influence the manners so as +to accustom its professors to rejoice rightly? or shall we say, that it +is of any service in the conduct of life, and an assistant to prudence? +for this also is a third property which has been attributed to it. Now +that boys are not to be instructed in it as play is evident; for those +who learn don't play, for to learn is rather troublesome; neither is +it proper to permit boys at their age to enjoy perfect leisure; for to +cease to improve is by no means fit for what is as yet imperfect; but it +may be thought that the earnest attention of boys in this art is for +the sake of that amusement they will enjoy when they come to be men and +completely formed; but, if this is the case, why are they themselves +to learn it, and not follow the practice of the kings of the Medes and +Persians, who enjoy the pleasure of music by hearing others play, and +being shown its beauties by them; for of necessity those must be +better skilled therein who make this science their particular study +and business, than those who have only spent so much time at it as was +sufficient just to learn the principles of it. But if this is a reason +for a child's being taught anything, they ought also to learn the art of +cookery, but this is absurd. The same doubt occurs if music has a power +of improving the manners; for why should they on this account themselves +learn it, and not reap every advantage of regulating the passions or +forming a judgment [1339b] on the merits of the performance by hearing +others, as the Lacedaemonians; for they, without having ever learnt +music, are yet able to judge accurately what is good and what is +bad; the same reasoning may be applied if music is supposed to be the +amusement of those who live an elegant and easy life, why should they +learn themselves, and not rather enjoy the benefit of others' skill. +Let us here consider what is our belief of the immortal gods in this +particular. Now we find the poets never represent Jupiter himself as +singing and playing; nay, we ourselves treat the professors of these +arts as mean people, and say that no one would practise them but a +drunkard or a buffoon. But probably we may consider this subject more +at large hereafter. The first question is, whether music is or is not +to make a part of education? and of those three things which have +been assigned as its proper employment, which is the right? Is it to +instruct, to amuse, or to employ the vacant hours of those who live at +rest? or may not all three be properly allotted to it? for it appears +to partake of them all; for play is necessary for relaxation, and +relaxation pleasant, as it is a medicine for that uneasiness which +arises from labour. It is admitted also that a happy life must be an +honourable one, and a pleasant one too, since happiness consists in both +these; and we all agree that music is one of the most pleasing things, +whether alone or accompanied with a voice; as Musseus says, "Music's the +sweetest joy of man;" for which reason it is justly admitted into every +company and every happy life, as having the power of inspiring joy. +So that from this any one may suppose that it is necessary to instruct +young persons in it; for all those pleasures which are harmless are not +only conducive to the final end of life, but serve also as relaxations; +and, as men are but rarely in the attainment of that final end, they +often cease from their labour and apply to amusement, with no further +view than to acquire the pleasure attending it. It is therefore useful +to enjoy such pleasures as these. There are some persons who make play +and amusement their end, and probably that end has some pleasure annexed +to it, but not what should be; but while men seek the one they accept +the other for it; because there is some likeness in human actions to the +end; for the end is pursued for the sake of nothing else that attends +it; but for itself only; and pleasures like these are sought for, not +on account of what follows them, but on account of what has gone before +them, as labour and grief; for which reason they seek for happiness in +these sort of pleasures; and that this is the reason any one may easily +perceive. That music should be pursued, not on this account only, but +also as it is very serviceable during the hours of relaxation from +labour, probably no [1340a] one doubts; we should also inquire whether +besides this use it may not also have another of nobler nature--and we +ought not only to partake of the common pleasure arising from it (which +all have the sensation of, for music naturally gives pleasure, therefore +the use of it is agreeable to all ages and all dispositions); but also +to examine if it tends anything to improve our manners and our souls. +And this will be easily known if we feel our dispositions any way +influenced thereby; and that they are so is evident from many other +instances, as well as the music at the Olympic games; and this +confessedly fills the soul with enthusiasm; but enthusiasm is an +affection of the soul which strongly agitates the disposition. Besides, +all those who hear any imitations sympathise therewith; and this when +they are conveyed even without rhythm or verse. Moreover, as music is +one of those things which are pleasant, and as virtue itself consists in +rightly enjoying, loving, and hating, it is evident that we ought not +to learn or accustom ourselves to anything so much as to judge right and +rejoice in honourable manners and noble actions. But anger and mildness, +courage and modesty, and their contraries, as well as all other +dispositions of the mind, are most naturally imitated by music and +poetry; which is plain by experience, for when we hear these our very +soul is altered; and he who is affected either with joy or grief by the +imitation of any objects, is in very nearly the same situation as if he +was affected by the objects themselves; thus, if any person is pleased +with seeing a statue of any one on no other account but its beauty, it +is evident that the sight of the original from whence it was taken +would also be pleasing; now it happens in the other senses there is no +imitation of manners; that is to say, in the touch and the taste; in the +objects of sight, a very little; for these are merely representations of +things, and the perceptions which they excite are in a manner common +to all. Besides, statues and paintings are not properly imitations of +manners, but rather signs and marks which show the body is affected by +some passion. However, the difference is not great, yet young men ought +not to view the paintings of Pauso, but of Polygnotus, or any other +painter or statuary who expresses manners. But in poetry and music there +are imitations of manners; and this is evident, for different harmonies +differ from each other so much by nature, that those who hear them are +differently affected, and are not in the same disposition of mind when +one is performed as when another is; the one, for instance, occasions +grief 13406 and contracts the soul, as the mixed Lydian: others soften +the mind, and as it were dissolve the heart: others fix it in a firm +and settled state, such is the power of the Doric music only; while the +Phrygian fills the soul with enthusiasm, as has been well described by +those who have written philosophically upon this part of education; for +they bring examples of what they advance from the things themselves. The +same holds true with respect to rhythm; some fix the disposition, others +occasion a change in it; some act more violently, others more liberally. +From what has been said it is evident what an influence music has over +the disposition of the mind, and how variously it can fascinate it: +and if it can do this, most certainly it is what youth ought to be +instructed in. And indeed the learning of music is particularly adapted +to their disposition; for at their time of life they do not willingly +attend to anything which is not agreeable; but music is naturally one +of the most agreeable things; and there seems to be a certain connection +between harmony and rhythm; for which reason some wise men held the soul +itself to be harmony; others, that it contains it. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + +We will now determine whether it is proper that children should be +taught to sing, and play upon any instrument, which we have before made +a matter of doubt. Now, it is well known that it makes a great deal of +difference when you would qualify any one in any art, for the person +himself to learn the practical part of it; for it is a thing very +difficult, if not impossible, for a man to be a good judge of what he +himself cannot do. It is also very necessary that children should have +some employment which will amuse them; for which reason the rattle of +Archytas seems well contrived, which they give children to play with, +to prevent their breaking those things which are about the house; for +at their age they cannot sit still: this therefore is well adapted to +infants, as instruction ought to be their rattle as they grow up; hence +it is evident that they should be so taught music as to be able to +practise it. Nor is it difficult to say what is becoming or unbecoming +of their age, or to answer the objections which some make to this +employment as mean and low. In the first place, it is necessary for them +to practise, that they may be judges of the art: for which reason this +should be done when they are young; but when they are grown older the +practical part may be dropped; while they will still continue judges of +what is excellent in the art, and take a proper pleasure therein, from +the knowledge they acquired of it in their youth. As to the censure +which some persons throw upon music, as something mean and low, it is +not difficult to answer that, if we will but consider how far we propose +those who are to be educated so as to become good citizens should be +instructed in this art, [1341a] and what music and what rhythms they +should be acquainted with; and also what instruments they should play +upon; for in these there is probably a difference. Such then is the +proper answer to that censure: for it must be admitted, that in some +cases nothing can prevent music being attended, to a certain degree, +with the bad effects which are ascribed to it; it is therefore clear +that the learning of it should never prevent the business of riper +years; nor render the body effeminate, and unfit for the business of war +or the state; but it should be practised by the young, judged of by the +old. That children may learn music properly, it is necessary that they +should not be employed in those parts of it which are the objects of +dispute between the masters in that science; nor should they perform +such pieces as are wondered at from the difficulty of their execution; +and which, from being first exhibited in the public games, are now +become a part of education; but let them learn so much of it as to be +able to receive proper pleasure from excellent music and rhythms; and +not that only which music must make all animals feel, and also slaves +and boys, but more. It is therefore plain what instruments they should +use; thus, they should never be taught to play upon the flute, or any +other instrument which requires great skill, as the harp or the like, +but on such as will make them good judges of music, or any other +instruction: besides, the flute is not a moral instrument, but rather +one that will inflame the passions, and is therefore rather to be used +when the soul is to be animated than when instruction is intended. Let +me add also, that there is something therein which is quite contrary to +what education requires; as the player on the flute is prevented from +speaking: for which reason our forefathers very properly forbade the use +of it to youth and freemen, though they themselves at first used it; for +when their riches procured them greater leisure, they grew more animated +in the cause of virtue; and both before and after the Median war their +noble actions so exalted their minds that they attended to every part of +education; selecting no one in particular, but endeavouring to collect +the whole: for which reason they introduced the flute also, as one +of the instruments they were to learn to play on. At Lacedaemon the +choregus himself played on the flute; and it was so common at Athens +that almost every freeman understood it, as is evident from the tablet +which Thrasippus dedicated when he was choregus; but afterwards they +rejected it as dangerous; having become better judges of what tended to +promote virtue and what did not. For the same reason many of the ancient +instruments were thrown aside, as the dulcimer and the lyre; as also +those which were to inspire those who played on them with pleasure, and +which required a nice finger and great skill to play well on. What the +ancients tell us, by way of fable, of the flute is indeed very rational; +namely, that after Minerva had found it, she threw it away: nor are they +wrong who say that the goddess disliked it for deforming the face of him +who played thereon: not but that it is more probable that she rejected +it as the knowledge thereof contributed nothing to the improvement of +the mind. Now, we regard Minerva as the inventress of arts and sciences. +As we disapprove of a child's being taught to understand instruments, +and to play like a master (which we would have confined to those who are +candidates for the prize in that science; for they play not to improve +themselves in virtue, but to please those who hear them, and gratify +their importunity); therefore we think the practice of it unfit for +freemen; but then it should be confined to those who are paid for doing +it; for it usually gives people sordid notions, for the end they have +in view is bad: for the impertinent spectator is accustomed to make them +change their music; so that the artists who attend to him regulate their +bodies according to his motions. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + +We are now to enter into an inquiry concerning harmony and rhythm; +whether all sorts of these are to be employed in education, or whether +some peculiar ones are to be selected; and also whether we should +give the same directions to those who are engaged in music as part of +education, or whether there is something different from these two. +Now, as all music consists in melody and rhythm, we ought not to be +unacquainted with the power which each of these has in education; and +whether we should rather choose music in which melody prevails, or +rhythm: but when I consider how many things have been well written upon +these subjects, not only by some musicians of the present age, but also +by some philosophers who are perfectly skilled in that part of music +which belongs to education; we will refer those who desire a very +particular knowledge therein to those writers, and shall only treat +of it in general terms, without descending to particulars. Melody is +divided by some philosophers, whose notions we approve of, into moral, +practical, and that which fills the mind with enthusiasm: they also +allot to each of these a particular kind of harmony which naturally +corresponds therewith: and we say that music should not be applied to +one purpose only, but many; both for instruction and purifying the soul +(now I use the word purifying at present without any explanation, but +shall speak more at large of it in my Poetics); and, in the third place, +as an agreeable manner of spending the time and a relaxation from the +uneasiness of the mind. [1342a] It is evident that all harmonies are to +be used; but not for all purposes; but the most moral in education: but +to please the ear, when others play, the most active and enthusiastic; +for that passion which is to be found very strong in some souls is to be +met with also in all; but the difference in different persons consists +in its being in a less or greater degree, as pity, fear, and enthusiasm +also; which latter is so powerful in some as to overpower the soul: and +yet we see those persons, by the application of sacred music to soothe +their mind, rendered as sedate and composed as if they had employed +the art of the physician: and this must necessarily happen to the +compassionate, the fearful, and all those who are subdued by their +passions: nay, all persons, as far as they are affected with those +passions, admit of the same cure, and are restored to tranquillity with +pleasure. In the same manner, all music which has the power of purifying +the soul affords a harmless pleasure to man. Such, therefore, should be +the harmony and such the music which those who contend with each other +in the theatre should exhibit: but as the audience is composed of two +sorts of people, the free and the well-instructed, the rude the mean +mechanics, and hired servants, and a long collection of the like, there +must be some music and some spectacles to please and soothe them; for as +their minds are as it were perverted from their natural habits, so +also is there an unnatural harmony, and overcharged music which is +accommodated to their taste: but what is according to nature gives +pleasure to every one, therefore those who are to contend upon the +theatre should be allowed to use this species of music. But in education +ethic melody and ethic harmony should be used, which is the Doric, as we +have already said, or any other which those philosophers who are skilful +in that music which is to be employed in education shall approve of. +But Socrates, in Plato's Republic, is very wrong when he [1342b] permits +only the Phrygian music to be used as well as the Doric, particularly as +amongst other instruments he banishes the flute; for the Phrygian music +has the same power in harmony as the flute has amongst the instruments; +for they are both pathetic and raise the mind: and this the practice +of the poets proves; for in their bacchanal songs, or whenever they +describe any violent emotions of the mind, the flute is the instrument +they chiefly use: and the Phrygian harmony is most suitable to these +subjects. Now, that the dithyrambic measure is Phrygian is allowed by +general consent; and those who are conversant in studies of this sort +bring many proofs of it; as, for instance, when Philoxenus endeavoured +to compose dithyrambic music for Doric harmony, he naturally fell back +again into Phrygian, as being fittest for that purpose; as every one +indeed agrees, that the Doric music is most serious, and fittest to +inspire courage: and, as we always commend the middle as being between +the two extremes, and the Doric has this relation with respect to other +harmonies, it is evident that is what the youth ought to be instructed +in. There are two things to be taken into consideration, both what is +possible and what is proper; every one then should chiefly endeavour to +attain those things which contain both these qualities: but this is to +be regulated by different times of life; for instance, it is not easy +for those who are advanced in years to sing such pieces of music as +require very high notes, for nature points out to them those which are +gentle and require little strength of voice (for which reason some who +are skilful in music justly find fault with Socrates for forbidding the +youth to be instructed in gentle harmony; as if, like wine, it would +make them drunk, whereas the effect of that is to render men bacchanals, +and not make them languid): these therefore are what should employ those +who are grown old. Moreover, if there is any harmony which is proper for +a child's age, as being at the same time elegant and instructive, as the +Lydian of all others seems chiefly to be-These then are as it were the +three boundaries of education, moderation, possibility, and decorum. + + + + + +INDEX + + + ACHILLES, 76 + + Act of the city, what, 69 + + Actions, their original spring, i + + Administration, 76; + whether to be shared by the whole community, 203 + + AEsumnetes, 96 + + AEthiopia, in what manner the power of the state is there regulated, 112 + + Alterations in government, whence they arise, 142; + what they are, 143 + + Ambractia, the government of, changed, 151 + + Andromadas Reginus, a lawgiver to the Thracian Calcidians, 65 + + Animals, their different provisions by nature, 14; + intended by nature for the benefit of man, 14; + what constitutes their different species, 113 + + Animals, tame, why better than wild, 8 + + Arbitrator and judge, their difference, 49 + + Architas his rattle, 248 + + Areopagus, senate of, 63 + + Argonauts refuse to take Hercules with them, 93 + + Aristocracies, causes of commotions in them, 157; + chief cause of their alteration, 158; + may degenerate into an oligarchy, 79 + + Aristocracy, what, 78; + treated of, 120; + its object, 121 + + Art, works of, which most excellent, 20 + + Artificers and slaves, their difference, 24 + + Assemblies, public, advantageous to a democracy, 134 + + Assembly, public, its proper business, 133 + + Athens, different dispositions of the citizens of, 149 + + Barter, its original, 15 + + Being, what the nature of every one is, 3 + + Beings, why some command, others obey, 2 + + Body by nature to be governed, 8; + requires our care before the soul, 232 + + Calchis, the government of, changed, 151 + + Calcidians, 65 + + Carthaginian government described, 60 + + Census in a free state should be as extensive as possible, 131; + how to be altered, 162 + + Charondas supposed to be the scholar of Zaleucus, 64 + + Child, how to be managed when first born, 235; + should be taught nothing till he is five years old, 235; + how then to be educated, 236 + + Children, the proper government of, 22; + what their proper virtues, 23; + what they are usually taught, 240 + + Cities, how governed at first, 3; + what, 3; + the work of nature, 3; + prior in contemplation to a family, or an individual, 4 + + Citizen, who is one? 66, 68; + should know both how to command and obey, 73 + + Citizens must have some things in common, 26; + should be exempted from servile labour, 51; + privileges different in different governments, 68; + if illegally made, whether illegal, 69; + who admitted to be, 75; + in the best states ought not to follow merchandise, 216 + + City, may be too much one, 27, 35; + what, 66, 82; + when it continues the same, 70; + for whose sake established, 76; + its end, 83; + of what parts made up, 113; + best composed of equals, 126 + + City of the best form, what its establishment ought to be, 149; + wherein its greatness consists, 149; + may be either too large or too small, 209; + what should be its situation, 211; + whether proper near the sea, 211; + ought to be divided by families into different sorts of men, 218 + + City and confederacy, their difference, 37; + wherein it should be one, 27 + + Command amongst equals should be in rotation, 101 + + Common meals not well established at Lacedaemon-well at Crete, 56; + the model from whence the Lacedaemonian was taken, 56; + inferior to it in some respects, 56 + + Community, its recommendations deceitful, 34; + into what people it may be divided, 194 + + Community of children, 29, 30; + inconveniences attending it, 31 + + Community of goods, its inconveniences, 28; + destructive of modesty and liberality, 34 + + Community of wives, its inconveniences, 27 + + Contempt a cause of sedition, 146 + + Courage of a man different from a woman's, 74 + + Courts, how many there ought to be, 140 + + Courts of justice should be few in a small state, 192 + + Cretan customs similar to the Lacedasmonian, 57; + assembly open to every citizen, 58 + + Cretans, their power, 58; + their public meals, how conducted 58 + + Crete, the government of, 57; + description of the island of 57 + + Customs at Carthage, Lacedaemon, and amongst the Scythians and + Iberians, concerning those who had killed an enemy, 204, 205 + + Dadalus's statues, 6. + + Delphos, an account of a sedition there, 150 + + Demagogues, their influence in a democracy, 116. + + Democracies, arose out of tyrannies, 100; + whence they arose, 142; + when changed into tyrannies, 153; + their different sorts, 184, 188; + general rules for their establishment, 185; + should not be made too perfect, 191 + + Democracy, what, 79, 80; + its definition, 112, 113; + different sorts of, 115, 118; + its object, 122; + how subverted in the Isle of Cos, 152 + + Democracy and aristocracy, how they may be blended together, 163 + + Democratical state, its foundation, 184 + + Despotic power absurd, 205 + + Dion, his noble resolution, 171 + + Dionysius, his taxes, 175 + + Dissolution of kingdoms and tyrannies, 169 + + Domestic employments of men and women different, 74 + + Domestic government, its object, 77 + + Domestic society the first, 3 + + Draco, 65 + + Dyrrachium, government of, 101 + + Economy and money-getting, difference, 17 + + Education necessary for the happiness of the city, 90; + of all things most necessary to preserve the state, 166; + what it ought to be, 166; + the objects of it, 228, 229; + should be taken care of by the magistrate, and correspond to + the nature of government, 238; + should be a common care, and regulated by laws, 238 + + Employment, one to be allotted to one person in an extensive government, 136 + + Employments in the state, how to be disposed of, 88-90; + whether all should be open to all, 216 + + Ephialtes abridges the power of the senate of Areopagus, 63 + + Ephori, at Sparta, their power too great, 54; + improperly chosen, 54; + flattered by their kings, 54; + the supreme judges, 55; + manner of life too indulgent, 55 + + Epidamnus, an account of a revolution there, 150 + + Equality, how twofold, 143; + in a democracy, how to be procured, 186 + + Euripides quoted, 72 + + Family government, of what it consists, 5 + + Father should not be too young, 232 + + Females and slaves, wherein they differ, 2; + why upon a level amongst barbarians, 3 + + Forfeitures, how to be applied, 192 + + Fortune improper pretension for power, 91 + + Freemen in general, what power they ought to have, 86 + + Free state treated of, 121; + how it arises out of a democracy and oligarchy, 122, 123 + + Friendship weakened by a community of children, 31 + + General, the office of, how to be disposed of, 98 + + Gods, why supposed subject to kingly government, 3 + + Good, relative to man, how divided, 201 + + Good and evil, the perception of, necessary to form a family and a city, 4 + + Good fortune something different from happiness, 202 + + Government should continue as much as possible in the same hands, 28; + in what manner it should be in rotation, 28; + what, 66; + which best, of a good man or good laws, 98; + good, to what it should owe its preservation, 124; + what the best, 225 + + Government of the master over the slave sometimes reciprocally useful, ii + + Governments, how different from each other, 67; + whether more than one form should be established, 76; + should endeavour to prevent others from being too powerful-- + instances of it, 93; + how compared to music, in; + in general, to what they owe their preservation, 160 + + Governments, political, regal, family, and servile, their difference + from each other, i + + Governors and governed, whether their virtues are the same or different, 23; + whether they should be the same persons or different, 227 + + Grecians, their superiority over other people, 213 + + Guards of a king natives, 96,168; + of a tyrant foreigners, 96, 168 + + Gymnastic exercises, when to be performed, 223; + how far they should be made a part of education, 242, 243 + + Happiness, wherein it consists, 207 + + Happy life, where most likely to be found, 202 + + Harmony, whether all kinds of it are to be used in education, 251 + + Helots troublesome to the Lacedaemonians, 87 + + Herdsmen compose the second-best democracy, 189 + + Hippodamus, an account of, 46; + his plan of government, 46, 47: + objected to, 47, 48 + + Homer quoted, 95, 116 + + Honours, an inequality of, occasions seditions, 44 + + Horse most suitable to an oligarchy, 195 + + Houses, private, their best form, 221 + + Human flesh devoured by some nations, 242 + + Husbandmen compose the best democracy, 189; + will choose to govern according to law, 118 + + Husbandry, art of, whether part of money-getting, 13 + + Instruments, their difference from each other, 6; + wherein they differ from possessions, 6 + + Italy, its ancient boundary, 218 + + Jason's declaration, 72 + + Judge should not act as an arbitrator, 48, 49; + which is best for an individual, or the people in general, 98, 99 + + Judges, many better than one, 102; + of whom to consist, 102; + how many different sorts are necessary, 141 + + Judicial part of government, how to be divided, 140 + + Jurymen, particular powers sometimes appointed to that office, 68 + + Justice, what, 88; + the course of, impeded in Crete, 59; + different in different situations, 74 + + King, from whom to be chosen 60; + the guardian of his people 168 + + King's children, what to be done with, 100 + + King's power, what it should be 100; + when unequal, 143 + + Kingdom, what, 78 + + Kingdoms, their object, 167; + how bestowed, 168; + causes of their dissolution, 173; + how preserved, 173 + + Kingly government in the heroic times, what, 96 + + Kingly power regulated by the laws at Sparta in peace, 95; + absolute in war, 95 + + Kings formerly in Crete, 58; + their power afterwards devolved to the kosmoi, 58; + method of electing them at Carthage, 60 + + Knowledge of the master and slave different from each other, ii + + Kosmoi, the power of, 58; + their number, 58; + wherein inferior to the ephori, 58; + allowed to resign their office before their time is elapsed, 59 + + Lacedamonian customs similar to the Cretan, 57 + + Lacedaemonian government much esteemed, 41; + the faults of it, 53-56; + calculated only for war, 56; + how composed of a democracy and oligarchy, 124 + + Lacedaemonian revenue badly raised, 56, 57 + + Lacedaemonians, wherein they admit things to be common, 33 + + Land should be divided into two parts, 219 + + Law makes one man a slave, another free, 6; + whether just or not, 9; + at Thebes respecting tradesmen, 75; + nothing should be done contrary to it, 160 + + Law and government, their difference, 107, 108 + + Laws, when advantageous + to alter them, 49,50, 52; + of every state will be like the state, 88; + whom they should be calculated for, 92; + decide better than men, 101; + moral preferable to written, 102; + must sometimes bend to ancient customs, 117; + should be framed to the state, 107; + the same suit not all governments, 108 + + Legislator ought to know not only what is best, but what is practical, n + + Legislators should fix a proper medium in property, 46 + + Liberty, wherein it partly consists, 184, 185 + + Life, happy, owing to a course of virtue, 125; + how divided, 228 + + Locrians forbid men to sell their property, 43 + + Lycophron's account of law, 82 + + Lycurgus gave over reducing the women to obedience, 53; + made it infamous for any one to sell his possessions, 53; + some of his laws censured, 54; + spent much time at Crete, 57; + supposed to be the scholar of Thales, 64 + + Lysander wanted to abolish the kingly power in Sparta, 143 + + Magistrate, to whom that name is properly given, 136 + + Magistrates, when they make the state incline to an oligarchy, 61; + when to an aristocracy, 61; + at Athens, from whom to be chosen, 64; + to determine those causes which the law cannot be applied to, 88; + whether their power is to be the same, or different + in different communities, 137; + how they differ from each other, 138; + in those who appoint them, 138; + should be continued but a short time in democracies, 161; + how to be chosen in a democracy, 185; + different sorts and employments, 196 + + Making and using, their difference, 6 + + Malienses, their form of government, 131 + + Man proved to be a political animal, 4; + has alone a perception of good and evil, 4; + without law and justice the worst of beings, 5 + + Master, power of, whence it arises, as some think, 5 + + Matrimony, when to be engaged in, 232 + + Meals, common, established in Crete and Italy, 218; + expense of, should be defrayed by the whole state, 219 + + Mechanic employments useful for citizens, 73 + + Mechanics, whether they should be allowed to be citizens, 74, 75; + cannot acquire the practice of virtue, 75; + admitted to be citizens in an oligarchy, 75 + + Medium of circumstances best, 126 + + Members of the community, their different pretences to the employments + of the state, 90; + what natural dispositions they ought to be of, 213 + + Men, some distinguished by nature for governors, others to be governed, 7; + their different modes of living, 13; + worthy three ways, 226 + + Merchandise, three different ways of carrying it on, 20 + + Middle rank of men make the best citizens, 127; + most conducive to the preservation of the state, 128; + should be particularly attended to by the legislators, 130 + + Military, how divided, 194 + + Mitylene, an account of a dispute there, 150 + + Monarch, absolute, 100 + + Monarchies, their nature, 95, 96; + sometimes elective, 95; + sometimes hereditary, 95; + whence they sometimes arise, 146; + causes of corruption in them, 167; + how preserved, 173 + + Money, how it made its way into commerce, 16; + first weighed, 16; + afterwards stamped, 16; + its value dependent on agreement, 16; + how gained by exchange, 19 + + Money--getting considered at large, 17, 18 + + Monopolising gainful, 21; sometimes practised by cities, 21 + + Monopoly of iron in Sicily, a remarkable instance of the profit of it, 21 + + Music, how many species of it, in; + why a part of education, 240; + how far it should be taught, 242, 243; + professors of it considered as mean people, 244; + imitates the disposition of the mind, 246; + improves our manners, 246; + Lydian, softens the mind, 247; + pieces of, difficult in their execution, not to be taught to children, 249 + + Nature requires equality amongst equals, 101 + + Naval power should be regulated by the strength of the city, 212 + + Necessary parts of a city, what, 215 + + Nobles, the difference between them, no; + should take care of the poor, 193 + + Oath, an improper one in an oligarchy, 166 + + Officers of state, who they ought to be, 135; + how long to continue, 135; + who to choose them, 136 + + Offices, distinction between them, 67; + when subversive of the rights of the people, 130 + + Offspring, an instance of the likeness of, to the sire, 30 + + Oligarchies arise where the strength of the state consists in horse, no; + whence they arose, 142 + + Oligarchy admits not hired servants to be citizens, 75; + its object, 79; + what, 79, 81; + its definition, 112; + different sorts of, 117, 119; + its object, 122; + how it ought to be founded, 195 + + Onomacritus supposed to have drawn up laws, 64 + + Ostracism, why established, 93, 146; + its power, 93; + a weapon in the hand of sedition, 94 + + Painting, why it should be made a part of education, 241 + + Particulars, five, in which the rights of the people will be undermined, 130 + + Pausanias wanted to abolish the ephori, 143 + + People, how they should be made one, 35; + of Athens assume upon their victory over the Medes, 64; + what best to submit to a kingly government, 104; + to an aristocratic, 104; + to a free state, 104; + should be allowed the power of pardoning, not of condemning, 135 + + Periander's advice to Thrasy-bulus, 93, 169 + + Pericles introduces the paying of those who attended the court of justice, 64 + + Philolaus, a Theban legislator, quits his native country, 64 + + Phocea, an account of a dispute there, 150 + + Physician, his business, 86 + + Physicians, their mode of practice in Egypt, 98; + when ill consult others, 102 + + Pittacus, 65 + + Plato censured, 180 + + Poor excused from bearing arms and from gymnastic exercises in + an oligarchy, 131; + paid for attending the public assemblies in a democracy, 131 + + Power of the master, its object, 77 + + Power, supreme, where it ought to be lodged, 84; + why with the many, 85, 87 + + Powers of a state, different methods of delegating them to the citizens, + 132-134 + + Preadvisers, court of, 135 + + Priesthood, to whom to be allotted, 217 + + Prisoners of war, whether they may be justly made slaves, 9 + + Private property not regulated the source of sedition, 42; + Phaleas would have it equal, 42; + how Phaleas would correct the irregularities of it, 43; + Plato would allow a certain difference in it, 43 + + Property, its nature, 12; + how it should be regulated, 32, 33; + the advantages of having it private, 34; + what quantity the public ought to have, 44; + ought not to be common, 219 + + Public assemblies, when subversive of the liberties of the people, 130 + + Public money, how to be divided, 193 + + Qualifications necessary for those who are to fill the first departments + in government, 164 + + Quality of a city, what meant by it, 129 + + Quantity, 129 + + Rest and peace the proper objects of the legislator, 230 + + Revolutions in a democracy, whence they arise, 152; + in an oligarchy, 156 + + Rich fined in an oligarchy for not bearing arms and attending the + gymnastic exercises, 131; + receive nothing for attending the public assemblies in a democracy, 131 + + Rights of a citizen, whether advantageous or not, 203 + + Seditions sometimes prevented by equality, 45; + their causes, 144-146; + how to be prevented, 163 + + Senate suits a democracy, 185 + + Shepherds compose the second-best democracy, 189 + + Slave, his nature and use, 6; + a chattel, 7; + by law, how, 9 + + Slavery not founded in nature but law, as some think, 6 + + Slaves, an inquiry into the virtues they are capable of, 23; + difficult to manage properly, 51; + their different sorts, 73 + + Society necessary to man, 77 + + Society, civil, the greatest blessing to man, 4; + different from a commercial intercourse, 82 + + Socrates, his mistakes on government, Book II. passim; + his division of the inhabitants, 38; + would have the women go to war, 38; + Aristotle's opinion of his discourses, 38; + his city would require a country of immeasurable extent, 39; + his comparison of the human species to different kinds of metals, 40; + his account of the different orders of men in a city imperfect, 3 + + Sojourners, their situation, 66 + + Solon's opinion of riches, 14; + law for restraining property, 43; + alters the Athenian government, 63 + + Soul by nature the governor over the body, and in what manner, 8; + of man how divided, 228, 231 + + Speech a proof that man was formed for society, 4 + + State, each, consists of a great number of parts, 109; + its disproportionate increase the cause of revolutions, 147; + firm, what, 159 + + Stealing, how to be prevented, 44 + + Submission to government, when it is slavery, 206 + + Supreme power should be ultimately vested in the laws, 101 + + Syracuse, the government of, languid, 151 + + Temperance in a man different from a woman, 74 + + Temples, how to be built, 223 + + Thales, his contrivance to get money, 21; + supposed to be the companion of Onomacritus, 64 + + Things necessary to be known for the management of domestic affairs, 19, 20; + necessary in the position of a city, 220 + + Tribunals, what different things they should have under their + jurisdictions, 137 + + Tyrannies, how established, 168; + how preserved, 174, 176; + of short duration, 180; + instances thereof, 180 + + Tyranny, what, 79; + not natural, 103; + whence it arises, 108; + treated of, 124; + contains all that is bad in all governments, 125 + + Tyrant, from whom usually chosen, 167; + his object, 168; + his guards, 168 + + Tyrants, many of them originally enjoyed only kingly power, 168; + the causes of their being conspired against, 169, 170; + always love the worst of men, 175 + + Uses of possessions, two, 15 + + Usury detested, 19 + + Venality to be guarded against, IDS + + Village, what, 3 + + Virtue of a citizen has reference to the state, 71; + different in different governments, 71 + + Virtues different in different persons, 23, 24; + whether the same constitute a good man and a valuable citizen, 71 + + Walls necessary for a city, 222 + + War, what is gained by it in some degree a natural acquisition, 14; + not a final end, 205, 229 + + Wife, the proper government of, 22 + + Women, what their proper virtue, 23; + not to be indulged in improper liberties, 52; + had great influence at Lacedaemon, 52; + of great disservice to the Lacedemonians, 52; + why indulged by them, 53; + their proper time of marrying, 233; + how to be managed when with child, 234 + + Zaleucus, legislator of the Western Locrians, 64; + supposed to be the scholar of Thales, 64 + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Politics, by Aristotle + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK POLITICS *** + +***** This file should be named 6762.txt or 6762.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/6/7/6/6762/ + +Produced by Eric Eldred + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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