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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Politics, by  Aristotle
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+Title: Politics
+       A Treatise on Government
+
+Author: Aristotle
+
+Release Date: October, 2004  [EBook #6762]
+[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule]
+[This file was first posted on January 24, 2003]
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+Edition: 10
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+Language: English
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+Character set encoding: ASCII
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+[Note: The paper edition from which this etext was made was
+titled "A Treatise on Government", but it is better known
+as "The Politics", or "Politics".]
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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, POLITICS ***
+
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+This eBook was produced by Eric Eldred.
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+
+A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT
+
+TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK OF
+
+ARISTOTLE
+
+BY WILLIAM ELLIS, A.M.
+
+LONDON &.TORONTO PUBLISHED BY J M DENT & SONS LTD.
+&.IN NEW YORK BY E.  P.  DUTTON &. CO
+
+FIRST ISSUE OF THIS EDITION 1912 REPRINTED 1919, 1923, 1928
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+The Politics of Aristotle is the second part of a treatise of which
+the Ethics is the first part. It looks back to the Ethics as the
+Ethics looks forward to the Politics. For Aristotle did not separate,
+as we are inclined to do, the spheres of the statesman and the
+moralist. In the Ethics he has described the character necessary for
+the good life, but that life is for him essentially to be lived in
+society, and when in the last chapters of the Ethics he comes to the
+practical application of his inquiries, that finds expression not in
+moral exhortations addressed to the individual but in a description of
+the legislative opportunities of the statesman. It is the legislator's
+task to frame a society which shall make the good life possible.
+Politics for Aristotle is not a struggle between individuals or
+classes for power, nor a device for getting done such elementary tasks
+as the maintenance of order and security without too great
+encroachments on individual liberty. The state is "a community of
+well-being in families and aggregations of families for the sake of a
+perfect and self-sufficing life." The legislator is a craftsman whose
+material is society and whose aim is the good life.
+
+In an early dialogue of Plato's, the Protagoras, Socrates asks
+Protagoras why it is not as easy to find teachers of virtue as it is
+to find teachers of swordsmanship, riding, or any other art.
+Protagoras' answer is that there are no special teachers of virtue,
+because virtue is taught by the whole community. Plato and Aristotle
+both accept the view of moral education implied in this answer. In a
+passage of the Republic (492 b) Plato repudiates the notion that the
+sophists have a corrupting moral influence upon young men. The public
+themselves, he says, are the real sophists and the most complete and
+thorough educators. No private education can hold out against the
+irresistible force of public opinion and the ordinary moral standards
+of society. But that makes it all the more essential that public
+opinion and social environment should not be left to grow up at
+haphazard as they ordinarily do, but should be made by the wise
+legislator the expression of the good and be informed in all their
+details by his knowledge. The legislator is the only possible teacher
+of virtue.
+
+Such a programme for a treatise on government might lead us to expect
+in the Politics mainly a description of a Utopia or ideal state which
+might inspire poets or philosophers but have little direct effect upon
+political institutions. Plato's Republic is obviously impracticable,
+for its author had turned away in despair from existing politics. He
+has no proposals, in that dialogue at least, for making the best of
+things as they are. The first lesson his philosopher has to learn is
+to turn away from this world of becoming and decay, and to look upon
+the unchanging eternal world of ideas. Thus his ideal city is, as he
+says, a pattern laid up in heaven by which the just man may rule his
+life, a pattern therefore in the meantime for the individual and not
+for the statesman. It is a city, he admits in the Laws, for gods or
+the children of gods, not for men as they are.
+
+Aristotle has none of the high enthusiasm or poetic imagination of
+Plato. He is even unduly impatient of Plato's idealism, as is shown by
+the criticisms in the second book. But he has a power to see the
+possibilities of good in things that are imperfect, and the patience
+of the true politician who has learned that if he would make men what
+they ought to be, he must take them as he finds them. His ideal is
+constructed not of pure reason or poetry, but from careful and
+sympathetic study of a wide range of facts. His criticism of Plato in
+the light of history, in Book II. chap, v., though as a criticism it
+is curiously inept, reveals his own attitude admirably: "Let us
+remember that we should not disregard the experience of ages; in the
+multitude of years, these things, if they were good, would certainly
+not have been unknown; for almost everything has been found out,
+although sometimes they are not put together; in other cases men do
+not use the knowledge which they have." Aristotle in his Constitutions
+had made a study of one hundred and fifty-eight constitutions of the
+states of his day, and the fruits of that study are seen in the
+continual reference to concrete political experience, which makes the
+Politics in some respects a critical history of the workings of the
+institutions of the Greek city state. In Books IV., V., and VI.  the
+ideal state seems far away, and we find a dispassionate survey of
+imperfect states, the best ways of preserving them, and an analysis of
+the causes of their instability. It is as though Aristotle were
+saying: "I have shown you the proper and normal type of constitution,
+but if you will not have it and insist on living under a perverted
+form, you may as well know how to make the best of it." In this way
+the Politics, though it defines the state in the light of its ideal,
+discusses states and institutions as they are. Ostensibly it is merely
+a continuation of the Ethics, but it comes to treat political
+questions from a purely political standpoint.
+
+This combination of idealism and respect for the teachings of
+experience constitutes in some ways the strength and value of the
+Politics, but it also makes it harder to follow. The large nation
+states to which we are accustomed make it difficult for us to think
+that the state could be constructed and modelled to express the good
+life. We can appreciate Aristotle's critical analysis of
+constitutions, but find it hard to take seriously his advice to the
+legislator. Moreover, the idealism and the empiricism of the Politics
+are never really reconciled by Aristotle himself.
+
+It may help to an understanding of the Politics if something is said
+on those two points.
+
+We are accustomed since the growth of the historical method to the
+belief that states are "not made but grow," and are apt to be
+impatient with the belief which Aristotle and Plato show in the powers
+of the lawgiver. But however true the maxim may be of the modern
+nation state, it was not true of the much smaller and more
+self-conscious Greek city. When Aristotle talks of the legislator, he
+is not talking in the air. Students of the Academy had been actually
+called on to give new constitutions to Greek states. For the Greeks
+the constitution was not merely as it is so often with us, a matter of
+political machinery. It was regarded as a way of life. Further, the
+constitution within the framework of which the ordinary process of
+administration and passing of decrees went on, was always regarded as
+the work of a special man or body of men, the lawgivers.  If we study
+Greek history, we find that the position of the legislator corresponds
+to that assigned to him by Plato and Aristotle. All Greek states,
+except those perversions which Aristotle criticises as being "above
+law," worked under rigid constitutions, and the constitution was only
+changed when the whole people gave a commission to a lawgiver to draw
+up a new one. Such was the position of the AEsumnetes, whom Aristotle
+describes in Book III. chap, xiv., in earlier times, and of the pupils
+of the Academy in the fourth century. The lawgiver was not an ordinary
+politician. He was a state doctor, called in to prescribe for an
+ailing constitution. So Herodotus recounts that when the people of
+Cyrene asked the oracle of Delphi to help them in their dissensions,
+the oracle told them to go to Mantinea, and the Mantineans lent them
+Demonax, who acted as a "setter straight" and drew up a new
+constitution for Cyrene. So again the Milesians, Herodotus tells us,
+were long troubled by civil discord, till they asked help from Paros,
+and the Parians sent ten commissioners who gave Miletus a new
+constitution. So the Athenians, when they were founding their model
+new colony at Thurii, employed Hippodamus of Miletus, whom Aristotle
+mentions in Book II, as the best expert in town-planning, to plan the
+streets of the city, and Protagoras as the best expert in law-making,
+to give the city its laws. In the Laws Plato represents one of the
+persons of the dialogue as having been asked by the people of Gortyna
+to draw up laws for a colony which they were founding. The situation
+described must have occurred frequently in actual life. The Greeks
+thought administration should be democratic and law-making the work of
+experts. We think more naturally of law-making as the special right of
+the people and administration as necessarily confined to experts.
+
+Aristotle's Politics, then, is a handbook for the legislator, the
+expert who is to be called in when a state wants help. We have called
+him a state doctor. It is one of the most marked characteristics of
+Greek political theory that Plato and Aristotle think of the statesman
+as one who has knowledge of what ought to be done, and can help those
+who call him in to prescribe for them, rather than one who has power
+to control the forces of society. The desire of society for the
+statesman's advice is taken for granted, Plato in the Republic says
+that a good constitution is only possible when the ruler does not want
+to rule; where men contend for power, where they have not learnt to
+distinguish between the art of getting hold of the helm of state and
+the art of steering, which alone is statesmanship, true politics is
+impossible.
+
+With this position much that Aristotle has to say about government is
+in agreement. He assumes the characteristic Platonic view that all men
+seek the good, and go wrong through ignorance, not through evil will,
+and so he naturally regards the state as a community which exists for
+the sake of the good life. It is in the state that that common seeking
+after the good which is the profoundest truth about men and nature
+becomes explicit and knows itself. The state is for Aristotle prior to
+the family and the village, although it succeeds them in time, for
+only when the state with its conscious organisation is reached can man
+understand the secret of his past struggles after something he knew
+not what. If primitive society is understood in the light of the
+state, the state is understood in the light of its most perfect form,
+when the good after which all societies are seeking is realised in its
+perfection. Hence for Aristotle as for Plato, the natural state or the
+state as such is the ideal state, and the ideal state is the
+starting-point of political inquiry.
+
+In accordance with the same line of thought, imperfect states,
+although called perversions, are regarded by Aristotle as the result
+rather of misconception and ignorance than of perverse will. They all
+represent, he says, some kind of justice. Oligarchs and democrats go
+wrong in their conception of the good. They have come short of the
+perfect state through misunderstanding of the end or through ignorance
+of the proper means to the end. But if they are states at all, they
+embody some common conception of the good, some common aspirations of
+all their members.
+
+The Greek doctrine that the essence of the state consists in community
+of purpose is the counterpart of the notion often held in modern times
+that the essence of the state is force. The existence of force is for
+Plato and Aristotle a sign not of the state but of the state's
+failure. It comes from the struggle between conflicting misconceptions
+of the good. In so far as men conceive the good rightly they are
+united. The state represents their common agreement, force their
+failure to make that agreement complete.  The cure, therefore, of
+political ills is knowledge of the good life, and the statesman is he
+who has such knowledge, for that alone can give men what they are
+always seeking.
+
+If the state is the organisation of men seeking a common good, power
+and political position must be given to those who can forward this
+end. This is the principle expressed in Aristotle's account of
+political justice, the principle of "tools to those who can use them."
+As the aim of the state is differently conceived, the qualifications
+for government will vary. In the ideal state power will be given to
+the man with most knowledge of the good; in other states to the men
+who are most truly capable of achieving that end which the citizens
+have set themselves to pursue. The justest distribution of political
+power is that in which there is least waste of political ability.
+
+Further, the belief that the constitution of a state is only the
+outward expression of the common aspirations and beliefs of its
+members, explains the paramount political importance which Aristotle
+assigns to education. It is the great instrument by which the
+legislator can ensure that the future citizens of his state will share
+those common beliefs which make the state possible. The Greeks with
+their small states had a far clearer apprehension than we can have of
+the dependence of a constitution upon the people who have to work it.
+
+Such is in brief the attitude in which Aristotle approaches political
+problems, but in working out its application to men and institutions
+as they are, Aristotle admits certain compromises which are not really
+consistent with it.
+
+1. Aristotle thinks of membership of a state as community in pursuit
+of the good. He wishes to confine membership in it to those who are
+capable of that pursuit in the highest and most explicit manner. His
+citizens, therefore, must be men of leisure, capable of rational
+thought upon the end of life. He does not recognise the significance
+of that less conscious but deep-seated membership of the state which
+finds its expression in loyalty and patriotism. His definition of
+citizen includes only a small part of the population of any Greek
+city. He is forced to admit that the state is not possible without the
+co-operation of men whom he will not admit to membership in it, either
+because they are not capable of sufficient rational appreciation of
+political ends, like the barbarians whom he thought were natural
+slaves, or because the leisure necessary for citizenship can only be
+gained by the work of the artisans who by that very work make
+themselves incapable of the life which they make possible for others.
+"The artisan only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a
+slave," and the slave is only a living instrument of the good life. He
+exists for the state, but the state does not exist for him.
+
+2. Aristotle in his account of the ideal state seems to waver between
+two ideals. There is the ideal of an aristocracy and the ideal of what
+he calls constitutional government, a mixed constitution. The
+principle of  "tools to those who can use them" ought to lead him, as
+it does Plato, to an aristocracy. Those who have complete knowledge of
+the good must be few, and therefore Plato gave entire power in his
+state into the hands of the small minority of philosopher guardians.
+It is in accordance with this principle that Aristotle holds that
+kingship is the proper form of government when there is in the state
+one man of transcendent virtue. At the same time, Aristotle always
+holds that absolute government is not properly political, that
+government is not like the rule of a shepherd over his sheep, but the
+rule of equals over equals. He admits that the democrats are right in
+insisting that equality is a necessary element in the state, though he
+thinks they do not admit the importance of other equally necessary
+elements. Hence he comes to say that ruling and being ruled over by
+turns is an essential feature of constitutional government, which he
+admits as an alternative to aristocracy. The end of the state, which
+is to be the standard of the distribution of political power, is
+conceived sometimes as a good for the apprehension and attainment of
+which "virtue" is necessary and sufficient (this is the principle of
+aristocracy), and sometimes as a more complex good, which needs for
+its attainment not only "virtue" but wealth and equality. This latter
+conception is the principle on which the mixed constitution is based.
+This in its distribution of political power gives some weight to
+"virtue," some to wealth, and some to mere number. But the principle
+of  "ruling and being ruled by turns" is not really compatible with an
+unmodified principle of  "tools to those who can use them." Aristotle
+is right in seeing that political government demands equality, not in
+the sense that all members of the state should be equal in ability or
+should have equal power, but in the sense that none of them can
+properly be regarded simply as tools with which the legislator works,
+that each has a right to say what will be made of his own life. The
+analogy between the legislator and the craftsman on which Plato
+insists, breaks down because the legislator is dealing with men like
+himself, men who can to some extent conceive their own end in life and
+cannot be treated merely as means to the end of the legislator. The
+sense of the value of  "ruling and being ruled in turn" is derived
+from the experience that the ruler may use his power to subordinate
+the lives of the citizens of the state not to the common good but to
+his own private purposes. In modern terms, it is a simple,
+rough-and-ready attempt to solve that constant problem of politics,
+how efficient government is to be combined with popular control. This
+problem arises from the imperfection of human nature, apparent in
+rulers as well as in ruled, and if the principle which attempts to
+solve it be admitted as a principle of importance in the formation of
+the best constitution, then the starting-point of politics will be
+man's actual imperfection, not his ideal nature.  Instead, then, of
+beginning with a state which would express man's ideal nature, and
+adapting it as well as may be to man's actual shortcomings from that
+ideal, we must recognise that the state and all political machinery
+are as much the expression of man's weakness as of his ideal
+possibilities. The state is possible only because men have common
+aspirations, but government, and political power, the existence of
+officials who are given authority to act in the name of the whole
+state, are necessary because men's community is imperfect, because
+man's social nature expresses itself in conflicting ways, in the clash
+of interests, the rivalry of parties, and the struggle of classes,
+instead of in the united seeking after a common good. Plato and
+Aristotle were familiar with the legislator who was called in by the
+whole people, and they tended therefore to take the general will or
+common consent of the people for granted. Most political questions are
+concerned with the construction and expression of the general will,
+and with attempts to ensure that the political machinery made to
+express the general will shall not be exploited for private or
+sectional ends.
+
+Aristotle's mixed constitution springs from a recognition of sectional
+interests in the state. For the proper relation between the claims of
+"virtue," wealth, and numbers is to be based not upon their relative
+importance in the good life, but upon the strength of the parties
+which they represent. The mixed constitution is practicable in a state
+where the middle class is strong, as only the middle class can mediate
+between the rich and the poor. The mixed constitution will be stable
+if it represents the actual balance of power between different classes
+in the state. When we come to Aristotle's analysis of existing
+constitutions, we find that while he regards them as imperfect
+approximations to the ideal, he also thinks of them as the result of
+the struggle between classes. Democracy, he explains, is the
+government not of the many but of the poor; oligarchy a government not
+of the few but of the rich. And each class is thought of, not as
+trying to express an ideal, but as struggling to acquire power or
+maintain its position. If ever the class existed in unredeemed
+nakedness, it was in the Greek cities of the fourth century, and its
+existence is abundantly recognised by Aristotle. His account of the
+causes of revolutions in Book V. shows how far were the existing
+states of Greece from the ideal with which he starts. His analysis of
+the facts forces him to look upon them as the scene of struggling
+factions. The causes of revolutions are not described as primarily
+changes in the conception of the common good, but changes in the
+military or economic power of the several classes in the state. The
+aim which he sets before oligarchs or democracies is not the good
+life, but simple stability or permanence of the existing constitution.
+
+With this spirit of realism which pervades Books IV., V., and VI. the
+idealism of Books I., II., VII., and VIII. is never reconciled.
+Aristotle is content to call existing constitutions perversions of the
+true form. But we cannot read the Politics without recognising and
+profiting from the insight into the nature of the state which is
+revealed throughout. Aristotle's failure does not lie in this, that he
+is both idealist and realist, but that he keeps these two tendencies
+too far apart. He thinks too much of his ideal state, as something to
+be reached once for all by knowledge, as a fixed type to which actual
+states approximate or from which they are perversions. But if we are
+to think of actual politics as intelligible in the light of the ideal,
+we must think of that ideal as progressively revealed in history, not
+as something to be discovered by turning our back on experience and
+having recourse to abstract reasoning. If we stretch forward from what
+exists to an ideal, it is to a better which may be in its turn
+transcended, not to a single immutable best. Aristotle found in the
+society of his time men who were not capable of political reflection,
+and who, as he thought, did their best work under superintendence. He
+therefore called them natural slaves. For, according to Aristotle,
+that is a man's natural condition in which he does his best work. But
+Aristotle also thinks of nature as something fixed and immutable; and
+therefore sanctions the institution of slavery, which assumes that
+what men are that they will always be, and sets up an artificial
+barrier to their ever becoming anything else. We see in Aristotle's
+defence of slavery how the conception of nature as the ideal can have
+a debasing influence upon views of practical politics. His high ideal
+of citizenship offers to those who can satisfy its claims the prospect
+of a fair life; those who fall short are deemed to be different in
+nature and shut out entirely from approach to the ideal.
+
+                                                         A. D.
+LINDSAY.
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+First edition of works (with omission of Rhetorica, Poetica, and
+second book of OEconomica), 5 vols. by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1495-8;
+re-impression supervised by Erasmus and with certain corrections by
+Grynaeus (including Rhetorica and Poetica), 1531, 1539, revised 1550;
+later editions were followed by that of Immanuel Bekker and Brandis
+(Greek and Latin), 5 vols. The 5th vol. contains the Index by Bonitz,
+1831-70; Didot edition (Greek and Latin), 5 vols. 1848-74.
+
+ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS: Edited by T. Taylor, with Porphyry's
+Introduction, 9 vols., 1812; under editorship of J. A. Smith and W. D.
+Ross, 1908.
+
+Later editions of separate works:
+
+De Anima: Torstrik, 1862; Trendelenburg, 2nd edition, 1877, with
+English translation, E. Wallace, 1882; Biehl, 1884, 1896; with
+English, R. D. Hicks, 1907.
+
+Ethica : J. S. Brewer (Nicomachean), 1836; W. E. Jelf, 1856; J. E. T.
+Rogers, 1865; A. Grant, 1857-8, 1866, 1874, 1885; E. Moore, 1871,
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+1880, revised by O. Apelt, 1903; A. Grant, 1885; I. Bywater
+(Nicomachean), 1890; J. Burnet, 1900.
+
+Historia Animalium : Schneider, 1812; Aubert and Wimmer, 1860,
+Dittmeyer, 1907.
+
+Metaphysica:  Schwegler, 1848;  W. Christ, 1899.
+
+Organon: Waitz, 1844-6.
+
+Poetica: Vahlen, 1867, 1874, with Notes by E. Moore, 1875; with
+English translation by E. R. Wharton, 1883, 1885; Uberweg, 1870, 1875;
+with German translation, Susemihl, 1874; Schmidt, 1875; Christ, 1878;
+I. Bywater, 1898; T. G. Tucker, 1899.
+
+De Republics, Atheniensium: Text and facsimile of Papyrus, F. G.
+Kenyon, 1891, 3rd edition, 1892; Kaibel and Wilamowitz - Moel-lendorf,
+1891, 3rd edition, 1898; Van Herwerden and Leeuwen (from Kenyon's
+text), 1891; Blass, 1892, 1895, 1898, 1903; J. E. Sandys, 1893.
+
+Politica: Susemihl, 1872; with German, 1878, 3rd edition, 1882;
+Susemihl and Hicks, 1894, etc.; O. Immisch, 1909.
+
+Physica:  C. Prantl, 1879.
+
+Rhetorica: Stahr, 1862; Sprengel (with Latin text), 1867; Cope and
+Sandys, 1877; Roemer, 1885, 1898.
+
+ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF ONE OR MORE WORKS: De Anima (with Parva
+Naturalia), by W. A. Hammond, 1902. Ethica: Of Morals to Nicomachus,
+by E. Pargiter, 1745; with Politica, by J. Gillies, 1797, 1804, 1813;
+with Rhetorica and Poetica, by T. Taylor, 1818, and later editions.
+Nicomachean Ethics, 1819; mainly from text of Bekker, by D. P. Chase,
+1847; revised 1861, and later editions/with an introductory essay by
+G. H. Lewes (Camelot Classics), 1890; re-edited by J. M. Mitchell (New
+Universal Library), 1906, 1910; with an introductory essay by Prof.
+J.H. Smith (Everyman's Library), 1911; by R.W.Browne (Bohn's Classical
+Library), 1848, etc.; by R. Williams, 1869, 1876; by W. M. Hatch and
+others (with translation of paraphrase attributed to Andronicus of
+Rhodes), edited by E. Hatch, 1879; by F, H. Peters, 1881; J. E. C.
+Welldon, 1892; J. Gillies (Lubbock's Hundred Books), 1893. Historia
+Animalium, by R. Creswell (Bohn's Classical Library), 1848; with
+Treatise on Physiognomy, by T. Taylor, 1809. Metaphysica, by T.
+Taylor, 1801; by J. H. M'Mahon (Bohn's Classical Library), 1848.
+Organon, with Porphyry's Introduction, by O. F. Owen (Bohn's Classical
+Library), 1848. Posterior Analytics, E. Poste, 1850; E. S. Bourchier,
+1901; On Fallacies, E. Poste, 1866. Parva Naturalia (Greek and
+English), by G. R. T. Ross, 1906; with De Anima, by W. A. Hammond,
+1902. Youth and Old Age, Life and Death and Respiration, W. Ogle,
+1897. Poetica, with Notes from the French of D'Acier, 1705; by H. J.
+Pye, 1788, 1792; T. Twining, 1789,1812, with Preface and Notes by H.
+Hamilton, 1851; Treatise on Rhetorica and Poetica, by T. Hobbes
+(Bohn's Classical Library), 1850; by Wharton, 1883 (see Greek
+version), S. H. Butcher, 1895, 1898, 3rd edition, 1902; E. S.
+Bourchier, 1907; by Ingram Bywater, 1909. De Partibus Animalium, W.
+Ogle, 1882. De Republica Athenientium, by E. Poste, 1891; F. G.
+Kenyon, 1891; T. J. Dymes, 1891. De Virtutibus et Vitiis, by W.
+Bridgman, 1804. Politica, from the French of Regius, 1598; by W.
+Ellis, 1776, 1778, 1888 (Morley's Universal Library), 1893 (Lubbock's
+Hundred Books); by E. Walford (with AEconomics, and Life by Dr.
+Gillies) (Bohn's Classical Library), 1848; J. E. C. Welldon, 1883; B.
+Jowett, 1885; with Introduction and Index by H. W. C. Davis, 1905;
+Books i. iii. iv. (vii.) from Bekker's text by W. E. Bolland, with
+Introduction by A. Lang, 1877. Problemata (with writings of other
+philosophers), 1597, 1607, 1680, 1684, etc. Rhetorica: A summary by T.
+Hobbes, 1655 (?), new edition, 1759; by the translators of the Art of
+Thinking, 1686, 1816; by D. M. Crimmin, 1812; J. Gillies, 1823; Anon.
+1847; J. E. C. Welldon, 1886; R. C. Jebb, with Introduction and
+Supplementary Notes by J. E. Sandys, 1909 (see under Poetica and
+Ethica). Secreta Secretorum (supposititious work), Anon. 1702; from
+the Hebrew version by M. Gaster, 1907, 1908. Version by Lydgate and
+Burgh, edited by R. Steele (E.E.T.S.), 1894, 1898.
+
+LIFE, ETC.: J. W. Blakesley, 1839; A Crichton (Jardine's Naturalist's
+Library), 1843; J. S. Blackie, Four Phases of Morals, Socrates,
+Aristotle, etc., 1871; G. Grote, Aristotle, edited by A. Bain and G.
+C. Robertson, 1872, 1880; E. Wallace, Outlines of the Philosophy of
+Aristotle, 1875, 1880; A. Grant (Ancient Classics for English
+readers), 1877; T. Davidson, Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals
+(Great Educators), 1892.
+
+
+
+
+A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER  I
+
+
+As we see that every city is a society, and every society Ed. is
+established for some good purpose; for an apparent [Bekker 1252a] good
+is the spring of all human actions; it is evident that this is the
+principle upon which they are every one founded, and this is more
+especially true of that which has for its object the best possible,
+and is itself the most excellent, and comprehends all the rest. Now
+this is called a city, and the society thereof a political society;
+for those who think that the principles of a political, a regal, a
+family, and a herile government are the same are mistaken, while they
+suppose that each of these differ in the numbers to whom their power
+extends, but not in their constitution: so that with them a herile
+government is one composed of a very few, a domestic of more, a civil
+and a regal of still more, as if there was no difference between a
+large family and a small city, or that a regal government and a
+political one are the same, only that in the one a single person is
+continually at the head of public affairs; in the other, that each
+member of the state has in his turn a share in the government, and is
+at one time a magistrate, at another a private person, according to
+the rules of political science. But now this is not true, as will be
+evident to any one who will consider this question in the most
+approved method. As, in an inquiry into every other subject, it is
+necessary to separate the different parts of which it is compounded,
+till we arrive at their first elements, which are the most minute
+parts thereof; so by the same proceeding we shall acquire a knowledge
+of the primary parts of a city and see wherein they differ from each
+other, and whether the rules of art will give us any assistance in
+examining into each of these things which are mentioned.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+Now if in this particular science any one would attend to its original
+seeds, and their first shoot, he would then as in others have the
+subject perfectly before him; and perceive, in the first place, that
+it is requisite that those should be joined together whose species
+cannot exist without each other, as the male and the female, for the
+business of propagation; and this not through choice, but by that
+natural impulse which acts both upon plants and animals also, for the
+purpose of their leaving behind them others like themselves. It is
+also from natural causes that some beings command and others obey,
+that each may obtain their mutual safety; for a being who is endowed
+with a mind capable of reflection and forethought is by nature the
+superior and governor, whereas he whose excellence is merely corporeal
+is formect to be a slave; whence it follows that the different state
+of master [1252b] and slave is equally advantageous to both. But there
+is a natural difference between a female and a slave: for nature is
+not like the artists who make the Delphic swords for the use of the
+poor, but for every particular purpose she has her separate
+instruments, and thus her ends are most complete, for whatsoever is
+employed on one subject only, brings that one to much greater
+perfection than when employed on many; and yet among the barbarians, a
+female and a slave are upon a level in the community, the reason for
+which is, that amongst them there are none qualified by nature to
+govern, therefore their society can be nothing but between slaves of
+different sexes. For which reason the poets say, it is proper for the
+Greeks to govern the barbarians, as if a barbarian and a slave were by
+nature one. Now of these two societies the domestic is the first, and
+Hesiod is right when he says, "First a house, then a wife, then an ox
+for the plough," for the poor man has always an ox before a household
+slave. That society then which nature has established for daily
+support is the domestic, and those who compose it are called by
+Charondas _homosipuoi_, and by Epimenides the Cretan _homokapnoi_; but
+the society of many families, which was first instituted for their
+lasting, mutual advantage, is called a village, and a village is most
+naturally composed of the descendants of one family, whom some persons
+call homogalaktes, the children and the children's children thereof:
+for which reason cities were originally governed by kings, as the
+barbarian states now are, which are composed of those who had before
+submitted to kingly government; for every family is governed by the
+elder, as are the branches thereof, on account of their relationship
+thereunto, which is what Homer says, "Each one ruled his wife and
+child;" and in this scattered manner they formerly lived. And the
+opinion which universally prevails, that the gods themselves are
+subject to kingly government, arises from hence, that all men formerly
+were, and many are so now; and as they imagined themselves to be made
+in the likeness of the gods, so they supposed their manner of life
+must needs be the same. And when many villages so entirely join
+themselves together as in every respect to form but one society, that
+society is a city, and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the end
+and perfection of government: first founded that we might live, but
+continued that we may live happily. For which reason every city must
+be allowed to be the work of nature, if we admit that the original
+society between male and female is; for to this as their end all
+subordinate societies tend, and the end of everything is the nature of
+it. For what every being is in its most perfect state, that certainly
+is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house:
+besides, whatsoever produces the final cause and the end which we
+[1253a] desire, must be best; but a government complete in itself is
+that final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident that a city is
+a natural production, and that man is naturally a political animal,
+and that whosoever is naturally and not accidentally unfit for
+society, must be either inferior or superior to man: thus the man in
+Homer, who is reviled for being "without society, without law, without
+family." Such a one must naturally be of a quarrelsome disposition,
+and as solitary as the birds. The gift of speech also evidently proves
+that man is a more social animal than the bees, or any of the herding
+cattle: for nature, as we say, does nothing in vain, and man is the
+only animal who enjoys it. Voice indeed, as being the token of
+pleasure and pain, is imparted to others also, and thus much their
+nature is capable of, to perceive pleasure and pain, and to impart
+these sensations to others; but it is by speech that we are enabled to
+express what is useful for us, and what is hurtful, and of course what
+is just and what is unjust: for in this particular man differs from
+other animals, that he alone has a perception of good and evil, of
+just and unjust, and it is a participation of these common sentiments
+which forms a family and a city. Besides, the notion of a city
+naturally precedes that of a family or an individual, for the whole
+must necessarily be prior to the parts, for if you take away the whole
+man, you cannot say a foot or a hand remains, unless by equivocation,
+as supposing a hand of stone to be made, but that would only be a dead
+one; but everything is understood to be this or that by its energic
+qualities and powers, so that when these no longer remain, neither can
+that be said to be the same, but something of the same name. That a
+city then precedes an individual is plain, for if an individual is not
+in himself sufficient to compose a perfect government, he is to a city
+as other parts are to a whole; but he that is incapable of society, or
+so complete in himself as not to want it, makes no part of a city, as
+a beast or a god. There is then in all persons a natural impetus to
+associate with each other in this manner, and he who first founded
+civil society was the cause of the greatest good; for as by the
+completion of it man is the most excellent of all living beings, so
+without law and justice he would be the worst of all, for nothing is
+so difficult to subdue as injustice in arms: but these arms man is
+born with, namely, prudence and valour, which he may apply to the most
+opposite purposes, for he who abuses them will be the most wicked, the
+most cruel, the most lustful, and most gluttonous being imaginable;
+for justice is a political virtue, by the rules of it the state is
+regulated, and these rules are the criterion of what is right.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+SINCE it is now evident of what parts a city is composed, it will be
+necessary to treat first of family government, for every city is made
+up of families, and every family [1253b] has again its separate parts
+of which it is composed. When a family is complete, it consists of
+freemen and slaves; but as in every subject we should begin with
+examining into the smallest parts of which it consists, and as the
+first and smallest parts of a family are the master and slave, the
+husband and wife, the father and child, let us first inquire into
+these three, what each of them may be, and what they ought to be; that
+is to say, the herile, the nuptial, and the paternal. Let these then
+be considered as the three distinct parts of a family: some think that
+the providing what is necessary for the family is something different
+from the government of it, others that this is the greatest part of
+it; it shall be considered separately; but we will first speak of a
+master and a slave, that we may both understand the nature of those
+things which are absolutely necessary, and also try if we can learn
+anything better on this subject than what is already known. Some
+persons have thought that the power of the master over his slave
+originates from his superior knowledge, and that this knowledge is the
+same in the master, the magistrate, and the king, as we have already
+said; but others think that herile government is contrary to nature,
+and that it is the law which makes one man a slave and another free,
+but that in nature there is no difference; for which reason that power
+cannot be founded in justice, but in force.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+Since then a subsistence is necessary in every family, the means of
+procuring it certainly makes up part of the management of a family,
+for without necessaries it is impossible to live, and to live well. As
+in all arts which are brought to perfection it is necessary that they
+should have their proper instruments if they would complete their
+works, so is it in the art of managing a family: now of instruments
+some of them are alive, others inanimate; thus with respect to the
+pilot of the ship, the tiller is without life, the sailor is alive;
+for a servant is as an instrument in many arts. Thus property is as an
+instrument to living; an estate is a multitude of instruments; so a
+slave is an animated instrument, but every one that can minister of
+himself is more valuable than any other instrument; for if every
+instrument, at command, or from a preconception of its master's will,
+could accomplish its work (as the story goes of the statues of
+Daedalus; or what the poet tells us of the tripods of Vulcan, "that
+they moved of their own accord into the assembly of the gods "), the
+shuttle would then weave, and the lyre play of itself; nor would the
+architect want servants, or the [1254a] master slaves. Now what are
+generally called instruments are the efficients of something else, but
+possessions are what we simply use: thus with a shuttle we make
+something else for our use; but we only use a coat, or a bed: since
+then making and using differ from each other in species, and they both
+require their instruments, it is necessary that these should be
+different from each other. Now life is itself what we use, and not
+what we employ as the efficient of something else; for which reason
+the services of a slave are for use. A possession may be considered in
+the same nature as a part of anything; now a part is not only a part
+of something, but also is nothing else; so is a possession; therefore
+a master is only the master of the slave, but no part of him; but the
+slave is not only the slave of the master, but nothing else but that.
+This fully explains what is the nature of a slave, and what are his
+capacities; for that being who by nature is nothing of himself, but
+totally another's, and is a man, is a slave by nature; and that man
+who is the property of another, is his mere chattel, though he
+continues a man; but a chattel is an instrument for use, separate from
+the body.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+But whether any person is such by nature, and whether it is
+advantageous and just for any one to be a slave or no, or whether all
+slavery is contrary to nature, shall be considered hereafter; not that
+it is difficult to determine it upon general principles, or to
+understand it from matters of fact; for that some should govern, and
+others be governed, is not only necessary but useful, and from the
+hour of their birth some are marked out for those purposes, and others
+for the other, and there are many species of both sorts. And the
+better those are who are governed the better also is the government,
+as for instance of man, rather than the brute creation: for the more
+excellent the materials are with which the work is finished, the more
+excellent certainly is the work; and wherever there is a governor and
+a governed, there certainly is some work produced; for whatsoever is
+composed of many parts, which jointly become one, whether conjunct or
+separate, evidently show the marks of governing and governed; and this
+is true of every living thing in all nature; nay, even in some things
+which partake not of life, as in music; but this probably would be a
+disquisition too foreign to our present purpose. Every living thing in
+the first place is composed of soul and body, of these the one is by
+nature the governor, the other the governed; now if we would know what
+is natural, we ought to search for it in those subjects in which
+nature appears most perfect, and not in those which are corrupted; we
+should therefore examine into a man who is most perfectly formed both
+in soul and body, in whom this is evident, for in the depraved and
+vicious the body seems [1254b] to rule rather than the soul, on
+account of their being corrupt and contrary to nature. We may then, as
+we affirm, perceive in an animal the first principles of herile and
+political government; for the soul governs the body as the master
+governs his slave; the mind governs the appetite with a political or a
+kingly power, which shows that it is both natural and advantageous
+that the body should be governed by the soul, and the pathetic part by
+the mind, and that part which is possessed of reason; but to have no
+ruling power, or an improper one, is hurtful to all; and this holds
+true not only of man, but of other animals also, for tame animals are
+naturally better than wild ones, and it is advantageous that both
+should be under subjection to man; for this is productive of their
+common safety: so is it naturally with the male and the female; the
+one is superior, the other inferior; the one governs, the other is
+governed; and the same rule must necessarily hold good with respect to
+all mankind. Those men therefore who are as much inferior to others as
+the body is to the soul, are to be thus disposed of, as the proper use
+of them is their bodies, in which their excellence consists; and if
+what I have said be true, they are slaves by nature, and it is
+advantageous to them to be always under government. He then is by
+nature formed a slave who is qualified to become the chattel of
+another person, and on that account is so, and who has just reason
+enough to know that there is such a faculty, without being indued with
+the use of it; for other animals have no perception of reason, but are
+entirely guided by appetite, and indeed they vary very little in their
+use from each other; for the advantage which we receive, both from
+slaves and tame animals, arises from their bodily strength
+administering to our necessities; for it is the intention of nature to
+make the bodies of slaves and freemen different from each other, that
+the one should be robust for their necessary purposes, the others
+erect, useless indeed for what slaves are employed in, but fit for
+civil life, which is divided into the duties of war and peace; though
+these rules do not always take place, for slaves have sometimes the
+bodies of freemen, sometimes the souls; if then it is evident that if
+some bodies are as much more excellent than others as the statues of
+the gods excel the human form, every one will allow that the inferior
+ought to be slaves to the superior; and if this is true with respect
+to the body, it is still juster to determine in the same manner, when
+we consider the soul; though it is not so easy to perceive the beauty
+of [1255a] the soul as it is of the body. Since then some men are
+slaves by nature, and others are freemen, it is clear that where
+slavery is advantageous to any one, then it is just to make him a
+slave.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+But it is not difficult to perceive that those who maintain the
+contrary opinion have some reason on their side; for a man may become
+a slave two different ways; for he may be so by law also, and this law
+is a certain compact, by which whatsoever is taken in battle is
+adjudged to be the property of the conquerors: but many persons who
+are conversant in law call in question this pretended right, and say
+that it would be hard that a man should be compelled by violence to be
+the slave and subject of another who had the power to compel him, and
+was his superior in strength; and upon this subject, even of those who
+are wise, some think one way and some another; but the cause of this
+doubt and variety of opinions arises from hence, that great abilities,
+when accompanied with proper means, are generally able to succeed by
+force: for victory is always owing to a superiority in some
+advantageous circumstances; so that it seems that force never prevails
+but in consequence of great abilities. But still the dispute
+concerning the justice of it remains; for some persons think, that
+justice consists in benevolence, others think it just that the
+powerful should govern: in the midst of these contrary opinions, there
+are no reasons sufficient to convince us, that the right of being
+master and governor ought not to be placed with those who have the
+greatest abilities. Some persons, entirely resting upon the right
+which the law gives (for that which is legal is in some respects
+just), insist upon it that slavery occasioned by war is just, not that
+they say it is wholly so, for it may happen that the principle upon
+which the wars were commenced is unjust; moreover no one will say that
+a man who is unworthily in slavery is therefore a slave; for if so,
+men of the noblest families might happen to be slaves, and the
+descendants of slaves, if they should chance to be taken prisoners in
+war and sold: to avoid this difficulty they say that such persons
+should not be called slaves, but barbarians only should; but when they
+say this, they do nothing more than inquire who is a slave by nature,
+which was what we at first said; for we must acknowledge that there
+are some persons who, wherever they are, must necessarily be slaves,
+but others in no situation; thus also it is with those of noble
+descent: it is not only in their own country that they are Esteemed as
+such, but everywhere, but the barbarians are respected on this account
+at home only; as if nobility and freedom were of two sorts, the one
+universal, the other not so. Thus says the Helen of Theodectes:
+
+  "Who dares reproach me with the name of slave? When from the
+immortal gods, on either side, I draw my lineage."
+
+Those who express sentiments like these, shew only that they
+distinguish the slave and the freeman, the noble and the ignoble from
+each other by their virtues and their [1255b] vices; for they think it
+reasonable, that as a man begets a man, and a beast a beast, so from a
+good man, a good man should be descended; and this is what nature
+desires to do, but frequently cannot accomplish it. It is evident then
+that this doubt has some reason in it, and that these persons are not
+slaves, and those freemen, by the appointment of nature; and also that
+in some instances it is sufficiently clear, that it is advantageous to
+both parties for this man to be a slave, and that to be a master, and
+that it is right and just, that some should be governed, and others
+govern, in the manner that nature intended; of which sort of
+government is that which a master exercises over a slave. But to
+govern ill is disadvantageous to both; for the same thing is useful to
+the part and to the whole, to the body and to the soul; but the slave
+is as it were a part of the master, as if he were an animated part of
+his body, though separate. For which reason a mutual utility and
+friendship may subsist between the master and the slave, I mean when
+they are placed by nature in that relation to each other, for the
+contrary takes place amongst those who are reduced to slavery by the
+law, or by conquest.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+
+It is evident from what has been said, that a herile and a political
+government are not the same, or that all governments are alike to each
+other, as some affirm; for one is adapted to the nature of freemen,
+the other to that of slaves. Domestic government is a monarchy, for
+that is what prevails in every house; but a political state is the
+government of free men and equals. The master is not so called from
+his knowing how to manage his slave, but because he is so; for the
+same reason a slave and a freeman have their respective appellations.
+There is also one sort of knowledge proper for a master, another for a
+slave; the slave's is of the nature of that which was taught by a
+slave at Syracuse; for he for a stipulated sum instructed the boys in
+all the business of a household slave, of which there are various
+sorts to be learnt, as the art of cookery, and other such-like
+services, of which some are allotted to some, and others to others;
+some employments being more honourable, others more necessary;
+according to the proverb, "One slave excels another, one master excels
+another:" in such-like things the knowledge of a slave consists. The
+knowledge of the master is to be able properly to employ his slaves,
+for the mastership of slaves is the employment, not the mere
+possession of them; not that this knowledge contains anything great or
+respectable; for what a slave ought to know how to do, that a master
+ought to know how to order; for which reason, those who have it in
+their power to be free from these low attentions, employ a steward for
+this business, and apply themselves either to public affairs or
+philosophy: the knowledge of procuring what is necessary for a family
+is different from that which belongs either to the master or the
+slave: and to do this justly must be either by war or hunting. And
+thus much of the difference between a master and a slave.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+
+[1256a] As a slave is a particular species of property, let us by all
+means inquire into the nature of property in general, and the
+acquisition of money, according to the manner we have proposed. In the
+first place then, some one may doubt whether the getting of money is
+the same thing as economy, or whether it is a part of it, or something
+subservient to it; and if so, whether it is as the art of making
+shuttles is to the art of weaving, or the art of making brass to that
+of statue founding, for they are not of the same service; for the one
+supplies the tools, the other the matter: by the matter I mean the
+subject out of which the work is finished, as wool for the cloth and
+brass for the statue. It is evident then that the getting of money is
+not the same thing as economy, for the business of the one is to
+furnish the means of the other to use them; and what art is there
+employed in the management of a family but economy, but whether this
+is a part of it, or something of a different species, is a doubt; for
+if it is the business of him who is to get money to find out how
+riches and possessions may be procured, and both these arise from
+various causes, we must first inquire whether the art of husbandry is
+part of money-getting or something different, and in general, whether
+the same is not true of every acquisition and every attention which
+relates to provision. But as there are many sorts of provision, so are
+the methods of living both of man and the brute creation very various;
+and as it is impossible to live without food, the difference in that
+particular makes the lives of animals so different from each other. Of
+beasts, some live in herds, others separate, as is most convenient for
+procuring themselves food; as some of them live upon flesh, others on
+fruit, and others on whatsoever they light on, nature having so
+distinguished their course of life, that they can very easily procure
+themselves subsistence; and as the same things are not agreeable to
+all, but one animal likes one thing and another another, it follows
+that the lives of those beasts who live upon flesh must be different
+from the lives of those who live on fruits; so is it with men, their
+lives differ greatly from each other; and of all these the shepherd's
+is the idlest, for they live upon the flesh of tame animals, without
+any trouble, while they are obliged to change their habitations on
+account of their flocks, which they are compelled to follow,
+cultivating, as it were, a living farm. Others live exercising
+violence over living creatures, one pursuing this thing, another that,
+these preying upon men; those who live near lakes and marshes and
+rivers, or the sea itself, on fishing, while others are fowlers, or
+hunters of wild beasts; but the greater part of mankind live upon the
+produce of the earth and its cultivated fruits; and the manner in
+which all those live who follow the direction of nature, and labour
+for their own subsistence, is nearly the same, without ever thinking
+to procure any provision by way of exchange or merchandise, such are
+shepherds, husband-men, [1256b] robbers, fishermen, and hunters: some
+join different employments together, and thus live very agreeably;
+supplying those deficiencies which were wanting to make their
+subsistence depend upon themselves only: thus, for instance, the same
+person shall be a shepherd and a robber, or a husbandman and a hunter;
+and so with respect to the rest, they pursue that mode of life which
+necessity points out. This provision then nature herself seems to have
+furnished all animals with, as well immediately upon their first
+origin as also when they are arrived at a state of maturity; for at
+the first of these periods some of them are provided in the womb with
+proper nourishment, which continues till that which is born can get
+food for itself, as is the case with worms and birds; and as to those
+which bring forth their young alive, they have the means for their
+subsistence for a certain time within themselves, namely milk. It is
+evident then that we may conclude of those things that are, that
+plants are created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake
+of men; the tame for our use and provision; the wild, at least the
+greater part, for our provision also, or for some other advantageous
+purpose, as furnishing us with clothes, and the like. As nature
+therefore makes nothing either imperfect or in vain, it necessarily
+follows that she has made all these things for men: for which reason
+what we gain in war is in a certain degree a natural acquisition; for
+hunting is a part of it, which it is necessary for us to employ
+against wild beasts; and those men who being intended by nature for
+slavery are unwilling to submit to it, on which occasion such a. war
+is by nature just: that species of acquisition then only which is
+according to nature is part of economy; and this ought to be at hand,
+or if not, immediately procured, namely, what is necessary to be kept
+in store to live upon, and which are useful as well for the state as
+the family. And true riches seem to consist in these; and the
+acquisition of those possessions which are necessary for a happy life
+is not infinite; though Solon says otherwise in this verse:
+
+  "No bounds to riches can be fixed for man;"
+
+for they may be fixed as in other arts; for the instruments of no art
+whatsoever are infinite, either in their number or their magnitude;
+but riches are a number of instruments in domestic and civil economy;
+it is therefore evident that the acquisition of certain things
+according to nature is a part both of domestic and civil economy, and
+for what reason.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+
+There is also another species of acquisition which they [1257a]
+particularly call pecuniary, and with great propriety; and by this
+indeed it seems that there are no bounds to riches and wealth. Now
+many persons suppose, from their near relation to each other, that
+this is one and the same with that we have just mentioned, but it is
+not the same as that, though not very different; one of these is
+natural, the other is not, but rather owing to some art and skill; we
+will enter into a particular examination of this subject. The uses of
+every possession are two, both dependent upon the thing itself, but
+not in the same manner, the one supposing an inseparable connection
+with it, the other not; as a shoe, for instance, which may be either
+worn, or exchanged for something else, both these are the uses of the
+shoe; for he who exchanges a shoe with some man who wants one, for
+money or provisions, uses the shoe as a shoe, but not according to the
+original intention, for shoes were not at first made to be exchanged.
+The same thing holds true of all other possessions; for barter, in
+general, had its original beginning in nature, some men having a
+surplus, others too little of what was necessary for them:  hence it
+is evident, that the selling provisions for money is not according to
+the natural use of things; for they were obliged to use barter for
+those things which they wanted; but it is plain that barter could have
+no place in the first, that is to say, in family society; but must
+have begun when the number of those who composed the community was
+enlarged: for the first of these had all things in common; but when
+they came to be separated they were obliged to exchange with each
+other many different things which both parties wanted. Which custom of
+barter is still preserved amongst many barbarous nations, who procure
+one necessary with another, but never sell anything; as giving and
+receiving wine for corn and the like. This sort of barter is not
+contradictory to nature, nor is it any species of money-getting; but
+is necessary in procuring that subsistence which is so consonant
+thereunto. But this barter introduced the use of money, as might be
+expected; for a convenient place from whence to import what you
+wanted, or to export what you had a surplus of, being often at a great
+distance, money necessarily made its way into commerce; for it is not
+everything which is naturally most useful that is easiest of carriage;
+for which reason they invented something to exchange with each other
+which they should mutually give and take, that being really valuable
+itself, should have the additional advantage of being of easy
+conveyance, for the purposes of life, as iron and silver, or anything
+else of the same nature: and this at first passed in value simply
+according to its weight or size; but in process of time it had a
+certain stamp, to save the trouble of weighing, which stamp expressed
+its value. [1257b]
+
+Money then being established as the necessary medium of exchange,
+another species of money-getting spon took place, namely, by buying
+and selling, at probably first in a simple manner, afterwards with
+more skill and experience, where and how the greatest profits might be
+made. For which reason the art of money-getting seems to be chiefly
+conversant about trade, and the business of it to be able to tell
+where the greatest profits can be made, being the means of procuring
+abundance of wealth and possessions: and thus wealth is very often
+supposed to consist in the quantity of money which any one possesses,
+as this is the medium by which all trade is conducted and a fortune
+made, others again regard it as of no value, as being of none by
+nature, but arbitrarily made so by compact; so that if those who use
+it should alter their sentiments, it would be worth nothing, as being
+of no service for any necessary purpose. Besides, he who abounds in
+money often wants necessary food; and it is impossible to say that any
+person is in good circumstances when with all his possessions he may
+perish with hunger.
+
+Like Midas in the fable, who from his insatiable wish had everything
+he touched turned into gold. For which reason others endeavour to
+procure other riches and other property, and rightly, for there are
+other riches and property in nature; and these are the proper objects
+of economy: while trade only procures money, not by all means, but by
+the exchange of it, and for that purpose it is this which it is
+chiefly employed about, for money is the first principle and the end
+of trade; nor are there any bounds to be set to what is thereby
+acquired. Thus also there are no limits to the art of medicine, with
+respect to the health which it attempts to procure; the same also is
+true of all other arts; no line can be drawn to terminate their
+bounds, the several professors of them being desirous to extend them
+as far as possible. (But still the means to be employed for that
+purpose are limited; and these are the limits beyond which the art
+cannot proceed.) Thus in the art of acquiring riches there are no
+limits, for the object of that is money and possessions; but economy
+has a boundary, though this has not: for acquiring riches is not the
+business of that, for which reason it should seem that some boundary
+should be set to riches, though we see the contrary to this is what is
+practised; for all those who get riches add to their money without
+end; the cause of which is the near connection of these two arts with
+each other, which sometimes occasions the one to change employments
+with the other, as getting of money is their common object: for
+economy requires the possession of wealth, but not on its own account
+but with another view, to purchase things necessary therewith; but the
+other procures it merely to increase it: so that some persons are
+confirmed in their belief, that this is the proper object of economy,
+and think that for this purpose money should be saved and hoarded up
+without end; the reason for which disposition is, that they are intent
+upon living, but not upon living well; and this desire being boundless
+in its extent, the means which they aim at for that purpose are
+boundless also; and those who propose to live well, often confine that
+to the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense; so that as this also seems
+to depend upon what a man has, all their care is to get money, and
+hence arises the other cause for this art; for as this enjoyment is
+excessive in its degree, they endeavour to procure means proportionate
+to supply it; and if they cannot do this merely by the art of dealing
+in money, they will endeavour to do it by other ways, and apply all
+their powers to a purpose they were not by nature intended for. Thus,
+for instance, courage was intended to inspire fortitude, not to get
+money by; neither is this the end of the soldier's or the physician's
+art, but victory and health. But such persons make everything
+subservient to money-getting, as if this was the only end; and to the
+end everything ought to refer.
+
+We have now considered that art of money-getting which is not
+necessary, and have seen in what manner we became in want of it; and
+also that which is necessary, which is different from it; for that
+economy which is natural, and whose object is to provide food, is not
+like this unlimited in its extent, but has its bounds.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+
+We have now determined what was before doubtful, whether or no the art
+of getting money is his business who is at the head of a family or a
+state, and though not strictly so, it is however very necessary; for
+as a politician does not make men, but receiving them from the hand of
+nature employs them to proper purposes; thus the earth, or the sea, or
+something else ought to supply them with provisions, and this it is
+the business of the master of the family to manage properly; for it is
+not the weaver's business to make yarn, but to use it, and to
+distinguish what is good and useful from what is bad and of no
+service; and indeed some one may inquire why getting money should be a
+part of economy when the art of healing is not, as it is as requisite
+that the family should be in health as that they should eat, or have
+anything else which is necessary; and as it is indeed in some
+particulars the business both of the master of the family, and he to
+whom the government of the state is entrusted, to see after the health
+of those under their care, but in others not, but the physician's; so
+also as to money; in some respects it is the business of the master of
+the family, in others not, but of the servant; but as we have already
+said, it is chiefly nature's, for it is her part to supply her
+offspring with food; for everything finds nourishment left for it in
+what produced it; for which reason the natural riches of all men arise
+from fruits and animals. Now money-making, as we say, being twofold,
+it may be applied to two purposes, the service of the house or retail
+trade; of which the first is necessary and commendable, the other
+justly censurable; for it has not its origin in [1258b] nature, but by
+it men gain from each other; for usury is most reasonably detested, as
+it is increasing our fortune by money itself, and not employing it for
+the purpose it was originally intended, namely exchange.
+
+And this is the explanation of the name (TOKOS), which means the
+breeding of money. For as offspring resemble their parents, so usury
+is money bred of money. Whence of all forms of money-making it is most
+against nature.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+
+Having already sufficiently considered the general principles of this
+subject, let us now go into the practical part thereof; the one is a
+liberal employment for the mind, the other necessary. These things
+are useful in the management of one's affairs; to be skilful in the
+nature of cattle, which are most profitable, and where, and how; as
+for instance, what advantage will arise from keeping horses, or oxen,
+or sheep, or any other live stock; it is also necessary to be
+acquainted with the comparative value of these things, and which of
+them in particular places are worth most; for some do better in one
+place, some in another. Agriculture also should be understood, and the
+management of arable grounds and orchards; and also the care of bees,
+and fish, and birds, from whence any profit may arise; these are the
+first and most proper parts of domestic management.
+
+With respect to gaining money by exchange, the principal method of
+doing this is by merchandise, which is carried on in three different
+ways, either by sending the commodity for sale by sea or by land, or
+else selling it on the place where it grows; and these differ from
+each other in this, that the one is more profitable, the other safer.
+The second method is by usury. The third by receiving wages for work
+done, and this either by being employed in some mean art, or else in
+mere bodily labour. There is also a third species of improving a
+fortune, that is something between this and the first; for it partly
+depends upon nature, partly upon exchange; the subject of which is,
+things that are immediately from the earth, or their produce, which,
+though they bear no fruit, are yet useful, such as selling of timber
+and the whole art of metallurgy, which includes many different
+species, for there are various sorts of things dug out of the earth.
+
+These we have now mentioned in general, but to enter into particulars
+concerning each of them, though it might be useful to the artist,
+would be tiresome to dwell on. Now of all the works of art, those are
+the most excellent wherein chance has the least to do, and those are
+the meanest which deprave the body, those the most servile in which
+bodily strength alone is chiefly wanted, those most illiberal which
+require least skill; but as there are books written on these subjects
+by some persons, as by Chares the Panian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian,
+upon husbandry and planting; and by others on other matters, [1259b]
+let those who have occasion consult them thereon; besides, every
+person should collect together whatsoever he hears occasionally
+mentioned, by means of which many of those who aimed at making a
+fortune have succeeded in their intentions; for all these are useful
+to those who make a point of getting money, as in the contrivance of
+Thales the Milesian (which was certainly a gainful one, but as it was
+his it was attributed to his wisdom, though the method he used was a
+general one, and would universally succeed), when they reviled him for
+his poverty, as if the study of philosophy was useless: for they say
+that he, perceiving by his skill in astrology that there would be
+great plenty of olives that year, while it was yet winter, having got
+a little money, he gave earnest for all the oil works that were in
+Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a low price, there being no one
+to bid against him; but when the season came for making oil, many
+persons wanting them, he all at once let them upon what terms he
+pleased; and raising a large sum of money by that means, convinced
+them that it was easy for philosophers to be rich if they chose it,
+but that that was not what they aimed at; in this manner is Thales
+said to have shown his wisdom. It indeed is, as we have said,
+generally gainful for a person to contrive to make a monopoly of
+anything; for which reason some cities also take this method when they
+want money, and monopolise their commodities. There was a certain
+person in Sicily who laid out a sum of money which was deposited in
+his hand in buying up all the iron from the iron merchants; so that
+when the dealers came from the markets to purchase, there was no one
+had any to sell but himself; and though he put no great advance upon
+it, yet by laying out fifty talents he made an hundred. When Dionysius
+heard this he permitted him to take his money with him, but forbid him
+to continue any longer in Sicily, as being one who contrived means for
+getting money inconsistent with his affairs. This man's view and
+Thales's was exactly the same; both of them contrived to procure a
+monopoly for themselves: it is useful also for politicians to
+understand these things, for many states want to raise money and by
+such means, as well as private families, nay more so; for which reason
+some persons who are employed in the management of public affairs
+confine themselves to this province only.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+
+There are then three parts of domestic government, the masters, of
+which we have already treated, the fathers, and the husbands; now the
+government of the wife and children should both be that of free
+persons, but not the [I259b] same; for the wife should be treated as a
+citizen of a free state, the children should be under kingly power;
+for the male is by nature superior to the female, except when
+something happens contrary to the usual course of nature, as is the
+elder and perfect to the younger and imperfect. Now in the generality
+of free states, the governors and the governed alternately change
+place; for an equality without any preference is what nature chooses;
+however, when one governs and another is governed, she endeavours that
+there should be a distinction between them in forms, expressions, and
+honours; according to what Amasis said of his laver. This then should
+be the established rule between the, man and the woman. The government
+of children should be kingly; for the power of the father over the
+child is founded in affection and seniority, which is a species of
+kingly government; for which reason Homer very properly calls Jupiter
+"the father of gods and men," who was king of both these; for nature
+requires that a king should be of the same species with those whom he
+governs, though superior in some particulars, as is the case between
+the elder and the younger, the father and the son.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+
+It is evident then that in the due government of a family, greater
+attention should be paid to the several members of it and their
+virtues than to the possessions or riches of it; and greater to the
+freemen than the slaves: but here some one may doubt whether there is
+any other virtue in a slave than his organic services, and of higher
+estimation than these, as temperance, fortitude, justice, and
+such-like habits, or whether they possess only bodily qualities: each
+side of the question has its difficulties; for if they possess these
+virtues, wherein do they differ from freemen? and that they do not,
+since they are men, and partakers of reason, is absurd. Nearly the
+same inquiry may be made concerning a woman and a child, whether these
+also have their proper virtues; whether a woman ought to be temperate,
+brave, and just, and whether a child is temperate or no; and indeed
+this inquiry ought to be general, whether the virtues of those who, by
+nature, either govern or are governed, are the same or different; for
+if it is necessary that both of them should partake of the fair and
+good, why is it also necessary that, without exception, the one should
+govern, the other always be governed? for this cannot arise from their
+possessing these qualities in different degrees; for to govern, and to
+be governed, are things different in species, but more or less are
+not. And yet it is wonderful that one party ought to have them, and
+the other not; for if he who is to govern should not be temperate and
+just, how can he govern well? or if he is to be governed, how can he
+be governed well? for he who is intemperate [1260a] and a coward will
+never do what he ought: it is evident then that both parties ought to
+be virtuous; but there is a difference between them, as there is
+between those who by nature command and who by nature obey, and this
+originates in the soul; for in this nature has planted the governing
+and submitting principle, the virtues of which we say are different,
+as are those of a rational and an irrational being. It is plain then
+that the same principle may be extended farther, and that there are in
+nature a variety of things which govern and are governed; for a
+freeman is governed in a different manner from a slave, a male from a
+female, and a man from a child: and all these have parts of mind
+within them, but in a different manner. Thus a slave can have no power
+of determination, a woman but a weak one, a child an imperfect one.
+Thus also must it necessarily be with respect to moral virtues; all
+must be supposed to possess them, but not in the same manner, but as
+is best suited to every one's employment; on which account he who is
+to govern ought to be perfect in moral virtue, for his business is
+entirely that of an architect, and reason is the architect; while
+others want only that portion of it which may be sufficient for their
+station; from whence it is evident, that although moral virtue is
+common to all those we have spoken of, yet the temperance of a man and
+a woman are not the same, nor their courage, nor their justice, though
+Socrates thought otherwise; for the courage of the man consists in
+commanding, the woman's in obeying; and the same is true in other
+particulars: and this will be evident to those who will examine
+different virtues separately; for those who use general terms deceive
+themselves when they say, that virtue consists in a good disposition
+of mind, or doing what is right, or something of this sort. They do
+much better who enumerate the different virtues as Georgias did, than
+those who thus define them; and as Sophocles speaks of a woman, we
+think of all persons, that their 'virtues should be applicable to
+their characters, for says he,
+
+  "Silence is a woman's ornament,"
+
+but it is not a man's; and as a child is incomplete, it is evident
+that his virtue is not to be referred to himself in his present
+situation, but to that in which he will be complete, and his
+preceptor. In like manner the virtue of a slave is to be referred to
+his master; for we laid it down as a maxim, that the use of a slave
+was to employ him in what you wanted; so that it is clear enough that
+few virtues are wanted in his station, only that he may not neglect
+his work through idleness or fear: some person may question if what I
+have said is true, whether virtue is not necessary for artificers in
+their calling, for they often through idleness neglect their work, but
+the difference between them is very great; for a slave is connected
+with you for life, but the artificer not so nearly: as near therefore
+as the artificer approaches to the situation of a slave, just so much
+ought he to have of the virtues of one; for a mean artificer is to a
+certain point a slave; but then a slave is one of those things which
+are by nature what they are, but this is not true [1260b] of a
+shoemaker, or any other artist. It is evident then that a slave ought
+to be trained to those virtues which are proper for his situation by
+his master; and not by him who has the power of a master, to teach him
+any particular art. Those therefore are in the wrong who would deprive
+slaves of reason, and say that they have only to follow their orders;
+for slaves want more instruction than children, and thus we determine
+this matter. It is necessary, I am sensible, for every one who treats
+upon government, to enter particularly into the relations of husband
+and wife, and of parent and child, and to show what are the virtues of
+each and their respective connections with each other; what is right
+and what is wrong; and how the one ought to be followed, and the other
+avoided. Since then every family is part of a city, and each of those
+individuals is part of a family, and the virtue of the parts ought to
+correspond to the virtue of the whole; it is necessary, that both the
+wives and children of the community should be instructed correspondent
+to the nature thereof, if it is of consequence to the virtue of the
+state, that the wives and children therein should be virtuous, and of
+consequence it certainly is, for the wives are one half of the free
+persons; and of the children the succeeding citizens are to be formed.
+As then we have determined these points, we will leave the rest to be
+spoken to in another place, as if the subject was now finished; and
+beginning again anew, first consider the sentiments of those who have
+treated of the most perfect forms of government.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK  II
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+Since then we propose to inquire what civil society is of all others
+best for those who have it in their power to live entirely as they
+wish, it is necessary to examine into the polity of those states which
+are allowed to be well governed; and if there should be any others
+which some persons have described, and which appear properly
+regulated, to note what is right and useful in them; and when we point
+out wherein they have failed, let not this be imputed to an
+affectation of wisdom, for it is because there are great defects in
+all those which are already 'established, that I have been induced to
+undertake this work. We will begin with that part of the subject which
+naturally presents itself first to our consideration. The members of
+every state must of necessity have all things in common, or some
+things common, and not others, or nothing at all common. To have
+nothing in common is evidently impossible, for society itself is one
+species of [1261a] community; and the first thing necessary thereunto
+is a common place of habitation, namely the city, which must be one,
+and this every citizen must have a share in. But in a government which
+is to be well founded, will it be best to admit of a community in
+everything which is capable thereof, or only in some particulars, but
+in others not? for it is possible that the citizens may have their
+wives, and children, and goods in common, as in Plato's Commonwealth;
+for in that Socrates affirms that all these particulars ought to be
+so. Which then shall we prefer? the custom which is already
+established, or the laws which are proposed in that treatise?
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+Now as a community of wives is attended with many other difficulties,
+so neither does the cause for which he would frame his government in
+this manner seem agreeable to reason, nor is it capable of producing
+that end which he has proposed, and for which he says it ought to take
+place; nor has he given any particular directions for putting it in
+practice. Now I also am willing to agree with Socrates in the
+principle which he proceeds upon, and admit that the city ought to be
+one as much as possible; and yet it is evident that if it is
+contracted too much, it will be no longer a city, for that necessarily
+supposes a multitude; so that if we proceed in this manner, we shall
+reduce a city to a family, and a family to a single person: for we
+admit that a family is one in a greater degree than a city, and a
+single person than a family; so that if this end could be obtained, it
+should never be put in practice, as it would annihilate the city; for
+a city does not only consist of a large number of inhabitants, but
+there must also be different sorts; for were they all alike, there
+could be no city; for a confederacy and a city are two different
+things; for a confederacy is valuable from its numbers, although all
+those who compose it are men of the same calling; for this is entered
+into for the sake of mutual defence, as we add an additional weight to
+make the scale go down. The same distinction prevails between a city
+and a nation when the people are not collected into separate villages,
+but live as the Arcadians. Now those things in which a city should be
+one are of different sorts, and in preserving an alternate
+reciprocation of power between these, the safety thereof consists (as
+I have already mentioned in my treatise on Morals), for amongst
+freemen and equals this is absolutely necessary; for all cannot govern
+at the same time, but either by the year, or according to some other
+regulation or time, by which means every one in his turn will be in
+office; as if the shoemakers and carpenters should exchange
+occupations, and not always be employed in the same calling. But as it
+is evidently better, that these should continue to exercise their
+respective trades; so also in civil society, where it is possible, it
+would be better that the government should continue in the same hands;
+but where it [1261b] is not (as nature has made all men equal, and
+therefore it is just, be the administration good or bad, that all
+should partake of it), there it is best to observe a rotation, and let
+those who are their equals by turns submit to those who are at that
+time magistrates, as they will, in their turns, alternately be
+governors and governed, as if they were different men: by the same
+method different persons will execute different offices. From hence it
+is evident, that a city cannot be one in the manner that some persons
+propose; and that what has been said to be the greatest good which it
+could enjoy, is absolutely its destruction, which cannot be: for the
+good of anything is that which preserves it. For another reaton also
+it is clear, that it is not for the best to endeavour to make a city
+too much one, because a family is more sufficient in itself than a
+single person, a city than a family; and indeed Plato supposes that a
+city owes its existence to that sufficiency in themselves which the
+members of it enjoy. If then this sufficiency is so desirable, the
+less the city is one the better.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+But admitting that it is most advantageous for a city to be one as
+much as possible, it does not seem to follow that this will take place
+by permitting all at once to say this is mine, and this is not mine
+(though this is what Socrates regards as a proof that a city is
+entirely one), for the word All is used in two senses; if it means
+each individual, what Socrates proposes will nearly take place; for
+each person will say, this is his own son, and his own wife, and his
+own property, and of everything else that may happen to belong to him,
+that it is his own. But those who have their wives and children in
+common will not say so, but all will say so, though not as
+individuals; therefore, to use the word all is evidently a fallacious
+mode of speech; for this word is sometimes used distributively, and
+sometimes collectively, on account of its double meaning, and is the
+cause of inconclusive syllogisms in reasoning.  Therefore for all
+persons to say the same thing was their own, using the word all in its
+distributive sense, would be well, but is impossible: in its
+collective sense it would by no means contribute to the concord of the
+state. Besides, there would be another inconvenience attending this
+proposal, for what is common to many is taken least care of; for all
+men regard more what is their own than what others share with them in,
+to which they pay less attention than is incumbent on every one: let
+me add also, that every one is more negligent of what another is to
+see to, as well as himself, than of his own private business; as in a
+family one is often worse served by many servants than by a few. Let
+each citizen then in the state have a thousand children, but let none
+of them be considered as the children of that individual, but let the
+relation of father and child be common to them all, and they will all
+be neglected. Besides, in consequence of this, [1262a] whenever any
+citizen behaved well or ill, every person, be the number what it
+would, might say, this is my son, or this man's or that; and in this
+manner would they speak, and thus would they doubt of the whole
+thousand, or of whatever number the city consisted; and it would be
+uncertain to whom each child belonged, and when it was born, who was
+to take care of it: and which do you think is better, for every one to
+say this is mine, while they may apply it equally to two thousand or
+ten thousand; or as we say, this is mine in our present forms of
+government, where one man calls another his son, another calls that
+same person his brother, another nephew, or some other relation,
+either by blood or marriage, and first extends his care to him and
+his, while another regards him as one of the same parish and the same
+tribe; and it is better for any one to be a nephew in his private
+capacity than a son after that manner. Besides, it will be impossible
+to prevent some persons from suspecting that they are brothers and
+sisters, fathers and mothers to each other; for, from the mutual
+likeness there is between the sire and the offspring, they will
+necessarily conclude in what relation they stand to each other, which
+circumstance, we are informed by those writers who describe different
+parts of the world, does sometimes happen; for in Upper Africa there
+are wives in common who yet deliver their children to their respective
+fathers, being guided by their likeness to them. There are also some
+mares and cows which naturally bring forth their young so like the
+male, that we can easily distinguish by which of them they were
+impregnated: such was the mare called Just, in Pharsalia.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+Besides, those who contrive this plan of community cannot easily avoid
+the following evils; namely, blows, murders involuntary or voluntary,
+quarrels, and reproaches, all which it would be impious indeed to be
+guilty of towards our fathers and mothers, or those who are nearly
+related to us; though not to those who are not connected to us by any
+tie of affinity: and certainly these mischiefs must necessarily happen
+oftener amongst those who do not know how they are connected to each
+other than those who do; and when they do happen, if it is among the
+first of these, they admit of a legal expiation, but amongst the
+latter that cannot be done. It is also absurd for those who promote a
+community of children to forbid those who love each other from
+indulging themselves in the last excesses of that passion, while they
+do not restrain them from the passion itself, or those intercourses
+which are of all things most improper, between a Father and a son, a
+brother and a brother, and indeed the thing itself is most absurd. It
+is also ridiculous to prevent this intercourse between the nearest
+relations, for no other reason than the violence of the pleasure,
+while they think that the relation of father and daughter, the brother
+and sister, is of no consequence at all. It seems also more
+advantageous for the state, that the husbandmen should have their
+wives and children in common than the military, for there will be less
+affection [1262b] among them in that case than when otherwise; for
+such persons ought to be under subjection, that they may obey the
+laws, and not seek after innovations. Upon the whole, the consequences
+of such a law as this would be directly contrary to those things which
+good laws ought to establish, and which Socrates endeavoured to
+establish by his regulations concerning women and children: for we
+think that friendship is the greatest good which can happen to any
+city, as nothing so much prevents seditions: and amity in a city is
+what Socrates commends above all things, which appears to be, as
+indeed he says, the effect of friendship; as we learn from
+Aristophanes in the Erotics, who says, that those who love one another
+from the excess of that passion, desire to breathe the same soul, and
+from being two to be blended into one: from whence it would
+necessarily follow, that both or one of them must be destroyed. But
+now in a city which admits of this community, the tie of friendship
+must, from that very cause, be extremely weak, when no father can say,
+this is my son; or son, this is my father; for as a very little of
+what is sweet, being mixed with a great deal of water is imperceptible
+after the mixture, so must all family connections, and the names they
+go by, be necessarily disregarded in such a community, it being then
+by no means necessary that the father should have any regard for him
+he called a son, or the brothers for those they call brothers. There
+are two things which principally inspire mankind with care and love of
+their offspring, knowing it is their own, and what ought to be the
+object of their affection, neither of which can take place in this
+sort of community.  As for exchanging the children of the artificers
+and husbandmen with those of the military, and theirs reciprocally
+with these, it will occasion great confusion in whatever manner it
+shall be done; for of necessity, those who carry the children must
+know from whom they took and to whom they gave them; and by this means
+those evils which I have already mentioned will necessarily be the
+more likely to happen, as blows, incestuous love, murders, and the
+like; for those who are given from their own parents to other
+citizens, the military, for instance, will not call them brothers,
+sons, fathers, or mothers. The same thing would happen to those of the
+military who were placed among the other citizens; so that by this
+means every one would be in fear how to act in consequence of
+consanguinity. And thus let us determine concerning a community of
+wives and children.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+We proceed next to consider in what manner property should be
+regulated in a state which is formed after the most perfect mode of
+government, whether it should be common or not; for this may be
+considered as a separate question from what had been determined
+concerning [1263a] wives and children; I mean, whether it is better
+that these should be held separate, as they now everywhere are, or
+that not only possessions but also the usufruct of them should be in
+common; or that the soil should have a particular owner, but that the
+produce should be brought together and used as one common stock, as
+some nations at present do; or on the contrary, should the soil be
+common, and should it also be cultivated in common, while the produce
+is divided amongst the individuals for their particular use, which is
+said to be practised by some barbarians; or shall both the soil and
+the fruit be common? When the business of the husbandman devolves not
+on the citizen, the matter is much easier settled; but when those
+labour together who have a common right of possession, this may
+occasion several difficulties; for there may not be an equal
+proportion between their labour and what they consume; and those who
+labour hard and have but a small proportion of the produce, will
+certainly complain of those who take a large share of it and do but
+little for that. Upon the whole, as a community between man and man so
+entire as to include everything possible, and thus to have all things
+that man can possess in common, is very difficult, so is it
+particularly so with respect to property; and this is evident from
+that community which takes place between those who go out to settle a
+colony; for they frequently have disputes with each other upon the
+most common occasions, and come to blows upon trifles: we find, too,
+that we oftenest correct those slaves who are generally employed in
+the common offices of the family: a community of property then has
+these and other inconveniences attending it.
+
+But the manner of life which is now established, more particularly
+when embellished with good morals and a system of equal laws, is far
+superior to it, for it will have the advantage of both; by both I mean
+properties being common, and divided also; for in some respects it
+ought to be in a manner common, but upon the whole private: for every
+man's attention being employed on his own particular concerns, will
+prevent mutual complaints against each other; nay, by this means
+industry will be increased, as each person will labour to improve his
+own private property; and it will then be, that from a principle of
+virtue they will mutually perform good offices to each other,
+according to the proverb, "All things are common amongst friends;" and
+in some cities there are traces of this custom to be seen, so that it
+is not impracticable, and particularly in those which are best
+governed; some things are by this means in a manner common, and others
+might be so; for there, every person enjoying his own private
+property, some things he assists his friend with, others are
+considered as in common; as in Lacedaemon, where they use each other's
+slaves, as if they were, so to speak, their own, as they do their
+horses and dogs, or even any provision they may want in a journey.
+
+It is evident then that it is best to have property private, but to
+make the use of it common; but how the citizens are to be brought to
+it is the particular [1263b] business of the legislator.  And also
+with respect to pleasure, it is unspeakable how advantageous it is,
+that a man should think he has something which he may call his own;
+for it is by no means to no purpose, that each person should have an
+affection for himself, for that is natural, and yet to be a self-lover
+is justly censured; for we mean by that, not one that simply loves
+himself, but one that loves himself more than he ought; in like manner
+we blame a money-lover, and yet both money and self is what all men
+love. Besides, it is very pleasing to us to oblige and assist our
+friends and companions, as well as those whom we are connected with by
+the rights of hospitality; and this cannot be done without the
+establishment of private property, which cannot take place with those
+who make a city too much one; besides, they prevent every opportunity
+of exercising two principal virtues, modesty and liberality. Modesty
+with respect to the female sex, for this virtue requires you to
+abstain from her who is another's; liberality, which depends upon
+private property, for without that no one can appear liberal, or do
+any generous action; for liberality consists in imparting to others
+what is our own.
+
+This system of polity does indeed recommend itself by its good
+appearance and specious pretences to humanity; and when first proposed
+to any one, must give him great pleasure, as he will conclude it to be
+a wonderful bond of friendship, connecting all to all; particularly
+when any one censures the evils which are now to be found in society,
+as arising from properties not being common, I mean the disputes which
+happen between man and man, upon their different contracts with each
+other; those judgments which are passed in court in consequence of
+fraud, and perjury, and flattering the rich, none of which arise from
+properties being private, but from the vices of mankind. Besides,
+those who live in one general community, and have all things in
+common, oftener dispute with each other than those who have their
+property separate; from the very small number indeed of those who have
+their property in common, compared with those where it is
+appropriated, the instances of their quarrels are but few. It is also
+but right to mention, not only the inconveniences they are preserved
+from who live in a communion of goods, but also the advantages they
+are deprived of; for when the whole comes to be considered, this
+manner of life will be found impracticable.
+
+We must suppose, then, that Socrates's mistake arose from the
+principle he set out with being false; we admit, indeed, that both a
+family and a city ought to be one in some particulars, but not
+entirely; for there is a point beyond which if a city proceeds in
+reducing itself to one, it will be no longer a city.
+
+There is also another point at which it will still continue to be a
+city, but it will approach so near to not being one, that it will be
+worse than none; as if any one should reduce the voices of those who
+sing in concert to one, or a verse to a foot. But the people ought to
+be made one, and a community, as I have already said, by education; as
+property at Lacedsemon, and their public tables at Crete, were made
+common by their legislators. But yet, whosoever shall introduce any
+education, and think thereby to make his city excellent and
+respectable, will be absurd, while he expects to form it by such
+regulations, and not by manners, philosophy, and laws. And whoever
+[1264a] would establish a government upon a community of goods,
+ought to know that he should consult the experience of many years,
+which would plainly enough inform him whether such a scheme is useful;
+for almost all things have already been found out, but some have been
+neglected, and others which have been known have not been put in
+practice. But this would be most evident, if any one could see such a
+government really established: for it would be impossible to frame
+such a city without dividing and separating it into its distinct
+parts, as public tables, wards, and tribes; so that here the laws will
+do nothing more than forbid the military to engage in agriculture,
+which is what the Lacedaemonians are at present endeavouring to do.
+
+Nor has Socrates told us (nor is it easy to say) what plan of
+government should be pursued with respect to the individuals in the
+state where there is a community of goods established; for though the
+majority of his citizens will in general consist of a multitude of
+persons of different occupations, of those he has determined nothing;
+whether the property of the husbandman ought to be in common, or
+whether each person should have his share to himself; and also,
+whether their wives and children ought to be in common: for if all
+things are to be alike common to all, where will be the difference
+between them and the military, or what would they get by submitting to
+their government? and upon what principles would they do it, unless
+they should establish the wise practice of the Cretans? for they,
+allowing everything else to their slaves, forbid them only gymnastic
+exercises and the use of arms. And if they are not, but these should
+be in the same situation with respect to their property which they are
+in other cities, what sort of a community will there be? in one city
+there must of necessity be two, and those contrary to each other; for
+he makes the military the guardians of the state, and the husbandman,
+artisans, and others, citizens; and all those quarrels, accusations,
+and things of the like sort, which he says are the bane of other
+cities, will be found in his also: notwithstanding Socrates says they
+will not want many laws in consequence of their education, but such
+only as may be necessary for regulating the streets, the markets, and
+the like, while at the same time it is the education of the military
+only that he has taken any care of. Besides, he makes the husbandmen
+masters of property upon paying a tribute; but this would be likely to
+make them far more troublesome and high-spirited than the Helots, the
+Penestise, or the slaves which others employ; nor has he ever
+determined whether it is necessary to give any attention to them in
+these particulars, nor thought of what is connected therewith, their
+polity, their education, their laws; besides, it is of no little
+consequence, nor is it easy to determine, how these should be framed
+so as to preserve the community of the military.
+
+Besides, if he makes the wives common, while the property [1264b]
+continues separate, who shall manage the domestic concerns with the
+same care which the man bestows upon his fields? nor will the
+inconvenience be remedied by making property as well as wives common;
+and it is absurd to draw a comparison from the brute creation, and
+say, that the same principle should regulate the connection of a man
+and a woman which regulates theirs amongst whom there is no family
+association.
+
+It is also very hazardous to settle the magistracy as Socrates has
+done; for he would have persons of the same rank always in office,
+which becomes the cause of sedition even amongst those who are of no
+account, but more particularly amongst those who are of a courageous
+and warlike disposition; it is indeed evidently necessary that he
+should frame his community in this manner; for that golden particle
+which God has mixed up in the soul of man flies not from one to the
+other, but always continues with the same; for he says, that some of
+our species have gold, and others silver, blended in their composition
+from the moment of their birth: but those who are to be husbandmen and
+artists, brass and iron; besides, though he deprives the military of
+happiness, he says, that the legislator ought to make all the citizens
+happy; but it is impossible that the whole city can be happy, without
+all, or the greater, or some part of it be happy. For happiness is not
+like that numerical equality which arises from certain numbers when
+added together, although neither of them may separately contain it;
+for happiness cannot be thus added together, but must exist in every
+individual, as some properties belong to every integral; and if the
+military are not happy, who else are so? for the artisans are not, nor
+the multitude of those who are employed in inferior offices. The state
+which Socrates has described has all these defects, and others which
+are not of less consequence.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+It is also nearly the same in the treatise upon Laws which was writ
+afterwards, for which reason it will be proper in this place to
+consider briefly what he has there said upon government, for Socrates
+has thoroughly settled but very few parts of it; as for instance, in
+what manner the community of wives and children ought to be regulated,
+how property should be established, and government conducted.
+
+Now he divides the inhabitants into two parts, husbandmen and
+soldiers, and from these he select a third part who are to be senators
+and govern the city; but he has not said whether or no the husbandman
+and artificer shall have any or what share in the government, or
+whether they shall have arms, and join with the others in war, or not.
+He thinks also that the women ought to go to war, and have the same
+education as the soldiers; as to other particulars, he has filled his
+treatise with matter foreign to the purpose; and with respect to
+education, he has only said what that of the guards ought to be.
+
+[1265a] As to his book of Laws, laws are the principal thing which
+that contains, for he has there said but little concerning government;
+and this government, which he was so desirous of framing in such a
+manner as to impart to its members a more entire community of goods
+than is to be found in other cities, he almost brings round again to
+be the same as that other government which he had first proposed; for
+except the community of wives and goods, he has framed both his
+governments alike, for the education of the citizens is to be the same
+in both; they are in both to live without any servile employ, and
+their common tables are to be the same, excepting that in that he says
+the women should have common tables, and that there should be a
+thousand men-at-arms, in this, that there should be five thousand.
+
+All the discourses of Socrates are masterly, noble, new, and
+inquisitive; but that they are all true it may probably be too much to
+say. For now with respect to the number just spoken of, it must be
+acknowledged that he would want the country of Babylonia for them, or
+some one like it, of an immeasurable extent, to support five thousand
+idle persons, besides a much greater number of women and servants.
+Every one, it is true, may frame an hypothesis as he pleases, but yet
+it ought to be possible. It has been said, that a legislator should
+have two things in view when he frames his laws, the country and the
+people. He will also do well, if he has some regard to the
+neighbouring states, if he intends that his community should maintain
+any political intercourse with them, for it is not only necessary that
+they should understand that practice of war which is adapted to their
+own country, but to others also; for admitting that any one chooses
+not this life either in public or private, yet there is not the less
+occasion for their being formidable to their enemies, not only when
+they invade their country, but also when they retire out of it.
+
+It may also be considered whether the quantity of each person's
+property may not be settled in a different manner from what he has
+done it in, by making it more determinate; for he says, that every one
+ought to have enough whereon to live moderately, as if any one had
+said to live well, which is the most comprehensive expression.
+Besides, a man may live moderately and miserably at the same time; he
+had therefore better have proposed, that they should live both
+moderately and liberally; for unless these two conspire, luxury will
+come in on the one hand, or wretchedness on the other, since these two
+modes of living are the only ones applicable to the employment of our
+substance; for we cannot say with respect to a man's fortune, that he
+is mild or courageous, but we may say that he is prudent and liberal,
+which are the only qualities connected therewith.
+
+It is also absurd to render property equal, and not to provide for the
+increasing number of the citizens; but to leave that circumstance
+uncertain, as if it would regulate itself according to the number of
+women who [1265b] should happen to be childless, let that be what it
+would because this seems to take place in other cities; but the case
+would not be the same in such a state which he proposes and those
+which now actually unite; for in these no one actually wants, as the
+property is divided amongst the whole community, be their numbers what
+they will; but as it could not then be divided, the supernumeraries,
+whether they were many or few, would have nothing at all. But it is
+more necessary than even to regulate property, to take care that the
+increase of the people should not exceed a certain number; and in
+determining that, to take into consideration those children who will
+die, and also those women who will be barren; and to neglect this, as
+is done in several cities, is to bring certain poverty on the
+citizens; and poverty is the cause of sedition and evil. Now Phidon
+the Corinthian, one of the oldest legislators, thought the families
+and the number of the citizens should continue the same; although it
+should happen that all should have allotments at the first,
+disproportionate to their numbers.
+
+In Plato's Laws it is however different; we shall mention hereafter
+what we think would be best in these particulars. He has also
+neglected in that treatise to point out how the governors are to be
+distinguished from the governed; for he says, that as of one sort of
+wool the warp ought to be made, and of another the woof, so ought some
+to govern, and others to be governed. But since he admits, that all
+their property may be increased fivefold, why should he not allow the
+same increase to the country? he ought also to consider whether his
+allotment of the houses will be useful to the community, for he
+appoints two houses to each person, separate from each other; but it
+is inconvenient for a person to inhabit two houses. Now he is desirous
+to have his whole plan of government neither a democracy nor an
+oligarchy, but something between both, which he calls a polity, for it
+is to be composed of men-at-arms. If Plato intended to frame a state
+in which more than in any other everything should be common, he has
+certainly given it a right name; but if he intended it to be the next
+in perfection to that which he had already framed, it is not so; for
+perhaps some persons will give the preference to the Lacedaemonian
+form of government, or some other which may more completely have
+attained to the aristocratic form.
+
+Some persons say, that the most perfect government should be composed
+of all others blended together, for which reason they commend that of
+Lacedsemon; for they say, that this is composed of an oligarchy, a
+monarchy, and a democracy, their kings representing the monarchical
+part, the senate the oligarchical; and, that in the ephori may be
+found the democratical, as these are taken from the people. But some
+say, that in the ephori is absolute power, and that it is their common
+meal and daily course of life, in which the democratical form is
+represented. It is also said in this treatise of [1266a] Laws, that
+the best form of government must, be one composed of a democracy and a
+tyranny; though such a mixture no one else would ever allow to be any
+government at all, or if it is, the worst possible; those propose what
+is much better who blend many governments together; for the most
+perfect is that which is formed of many parts. But now in this
+government of Plato's there are no traces of a monarchy, only of an
+oligarchy and democracy; though he seems to choose that it should
+rather incline to an oligarchy, as is evident from the appointment of
+the magistrates; for to choose them by lot is common to both; but that
+a man of fortune must necessarily be a member of the assembly, or to
+elect the magistrates, or take part in the management of public
+affairs, while others are passed over, makes the state incline to an
+oligarchy; as does the endeavouring that the greater part of the rich
+may be in office, and that the rank of their appointments may
+correspond with their fortunes.
+
+The same principle prevails also in the choice of their senate; the
+manner of electing which is favourable also to an oligarchy; for all
+are obliged to vote for those who are senators of the first class,
+afterwards they vote for the same number out of the second, and then
+out of the third; but this compulsion to vote at the election of
+senators does not extend to the third and fourth classes and the first
+and second class only are obliged to vote for the fourth. By this
+means he says he shall necessarily have an equal number of each rank,
+but he is mistaken--for the majority will always consist of those of
+the first rank, and the most considerable people; and for this reason,
+that many of the commonalty not being obliged to it, will not attend
+the elections. From hence it is evident, that such a state will not
+consist of a democracy and a monarchy, and this will be further proved
+by what we shall say when we come particularly to consider this form
+of government.
+
+There will also great danger arise from the manner of electing the
+senate, when those who are elected themselves are afterwards to elect
+others; for by this means, if a certain number choose to combine
+together, though not very considerable, the election will always fall
+according to their pleasure. Such are the things which Plato proposes
+concerning government in his book of Laws.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+
+There are also some other forms of government, which have been
+proposed either by private persons, or philosophers, or politicians,
+all of which come much nearer to those which have been really
+established, or now exist, than these two of Plato's; for neither have
+they introduced the innovation of a community of wives and children,
+and public tables for the women, but have been contented to set out
+with establishing such rules as are absolutely necessary.
+
+There are some persons who think, that the first object of government
+should be to regulate well everything relating to private property;
+for they say, that a neglect herein is the source of all seditions
+whatsoever. For this reason, Phaleas the Chalcedonian first proposed,
+that the fortunes of the citizens should be equal, which he thought
+was not difficult to accomplish when a community was first settled,
+but that it was a work of greater difficulty in one that had been long
+established; but yet that it might be effected, and an equality of
+circumstances introduced by these means, that the rich should give
+marriage portions, but never receive any, while the poor should always
+receive, but never give.
+
+But Plato, in his treatise of Laws, thinks that a difference in
+circumstances should be permitted to a certain degree; but that no
+citizen should be allowed to possess more than five times as much as
+the lowest census, as we have already mentioned. But legislators who
+would establish this principle are apt to overlook what they ought to
+consider; that while they regulate the quantity of provisions which
+each individual shall possess, they ought also to regulate the number
+of his children; for if these exceed the allotted quantity of
+provision, the law must necessarily be repealed; and yet, in spite of
+the repeal, it will have the bad effect of reducing many from wealth
+to poverty, so difficult is it for innovators not to fall into such
+mistakes. That an equality of goods was in some degree serviceable to
+strengthen the bands of society, seems to have been known to some of
+the ancients; for Solon made a law, as did some others also, to
+restrain persons from possessing as much land as they pleased. And
+upon the same principle there are laws which forbid men to sell their
+property, as among the Locrians, unless they can prove that some
+notorious misfortuue has befallen them. They were also to preserve
+their ancient patrimony, which custom being broken through by the
+Leucadians, made their government too democratic; for by that means it
+was no longer necessary to be possessed of a certain fortune to be
+qualified to be a magistrate. But if an equality of goods is
+established, this may be either too much, when it enables the people
+to live luxuriously, or too little, when it obliges them to live hard.
+Hence it is evident, that it is not proper for the legislator to
+establish an equality of circumstances, but to fix a proper medium.
+Besides, if any one should regulate the division of property in such a
+manner that there should be a moderate sufficiency for all, it would
+be of no use; for it is of more consequence that the citizen should
+entertain a similarity of sentiments than an equality of
+circumstances; but this can never be attained unless they are properly
+educated under the direction of the law. But probably Phaleas may say,
+that this in what he himself mentions; for he both proposes a equality
+of property and one plan of education in his city. But he should have
+said particularly what education he intended, nor is it of any
+service to have this to much one; for this education may be one, and
+yet such as will make the citizens over-greedy, to grasp after
+honours, or riches, or both. Besides, not only an in equality of
+possessions, but also of honours, will occasion [1267a] seditions, but
+this upon contrary grounds; for the vulgar will be seditious if there
+be an inequality of goods, by those of more elevated sentiments, if
+there is an equality of honours.
+
+  "When good and bad do equal honours share."
+
+For men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only (for which he
+thinks an equality of goods would be a sufficient remedy, as they
+would then have no occasion to steal cold or hunger), but that they
+may enjoy what the desire, and not wish for it in vain;   for if their
+desire extend beyond the common necessaries of life, they were be
+wicked to gratify them; and not only so, but if their wishes point
+that way, they will do the same to enjoy those pleasures which are
+free from the alloy of pain. What remedy then shall we find for these
+three disorder; and first, to prevent stealing from necessity, let
+every one be supplied with a moderate subsistence, which  may make the
+addition of his own industry necessary; second to prevent stealing to
+procure the luxuries of life, temperance be enjoined;  and thirdly,
+let those who wish for pleasure in itself seek for it only in
+philosophy, all others want the assistance of men.
+
+Since then men are guilty of the greatest crimes from ambition, and
+not from necessity, no one, for instance aims at being a tyrant to
+keep him from the cold, hence great honour is due to him who kills not
+a thief, but tyrant; so that polity which Phaleas establishes would
+only be salutary to prevent little crimes. He has also been very
+desirous to establish such rules as will conduce to perfect the
+internal policy of his state, and he ought also to have done the same
+with respect to its neighbours and all foreign nations; for the
+considerations of the military establishment should take place in
+planning every government, that it may not be unprovided in case of a
+war, of which he has said nothing; so also with respect to property,
+it ought not only to be adapted to the exigencies of the state, but
+also to such dangers as may arise from without.
+
+Thus it should not be so much as to tempt those who are near, and more
+powerful to invade it, while those who possess it are not able to
+drive out the invaders, nor so little as that the state should not be
+able to go to war with those who are quite equal to itself, and of
+this he has determined nothing;  it must indeed be allowed that it is
+advantageous to  a community to be rather rich than poor; probably the
+proper boundary is this, not to possess enough to make it worth while
+for a more powerful neighbour to attack you, any more than he would
+those who had not so much as yourself;   thus when Autophradatus
+proposed to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus advised him to consider what
+time it would require to take the city, and then would have him
+determine whether it would answer, for that he should choose, if it
+would even take less than he proposed, to quit the place;  his saying
+this made Autophradatus reflect upon the business and give over the
+siege. There is, indeed, some advantage in an equality of goods
+amongst the citizens to prevent seditions; and yet, to say truth, no
+very great one;  for men of great abilities will stomach their being
+put upon a level with the rest of the community.    For which reason
+they will very often appear ready for every commation and sedition;
+for the wickedness of mankind is insatiable.    For though at first
+two oboli might be sufficient, yet when once it is become customary,
+they continually want something more, until they set no limits to
+their expectations;  for it is the nature of our desires to be
+boundless, and many live only to gratify them. But for this purpose
+the first object is, not so much to establish an equality of fortune,
+as to prevent those who are of a good disposition from desiring more
+than their own, and those who are of a bad one from being able to
+acquire it; and this may be done if they are kept in an inferior
+station, and not exposed to injustice. Nor has he treated well the
+equality of goods, for he has extended his regulation only to land;
+whereas a man's substance consists not only in this, but also in
+slaves, cattle, money, and all that variety of things which fall under
+the name of chattels; now there must be either an equality established
+in all these, or some certain rule, or they must be left entirely at
+large. It appears too by his laws, that he intends to establish only a
+small state, as all the artificers are to belong to the public, and
+add nothing to the complement of citizens; but if all those who are to
+be employed in public works are to be the slaves of the public, it
+should be done in the same manner as it is at Epidamnum, and as
+Diophantus formerly regulated it at Athens. From these particulars any
+one may nearly judge whether Phaleas's community is well or ill
+established.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+
+Hippodamus, the son of Euruphon a Milesian, contrived the art of
+laying out towns, and separated the Pireus. This man was in other
+respects too eager after notice, and seemed to many to live in a very
+affected manner, with his flowing locks and his expensive ornaments,
+and a coarse warm vest which he wore, not only in the winter, but also
+in the hot weather. As he was very desirous of the character of a
+universal scholar, he was the first who, not being actually engaged in
+the management of public affairs, sat himself to inquire what sort of
+government was best; and he planned a state, consisting of ten
+thousand persons, divided into three parts, one consisting of
+artisans, another of husbandmen, and the third of soldiers; he also
+divided the lands into three parts, and allotted one to sacred
+purposes, another to the public, and the third to individuals. The
+first of these was to supply what was necessary for the established
+worship of the gods; the second was to be allotted to the support of
+the soldiery; and the third was to be the property of the husbandman.
+He thought also that there need only be three sorts of laws,
+corresponding to the three sorts of actions which can be brought,
+namely, for assault, trespasses, or death. He ordered also that there
+should be a particular court of appeal, into which all causes might be
+removed which were supposed to have been unjustly determined
+elsewhere; which court should be composed of old men chosen for that
+purpose. He thought also [1268a] that they should not pass sentence by
+votes; but that every one should bring with him a tablet, on which he
+should write, that he found the party guilty, if it was so, but if
+not, he should bring a plain tablet; but if he acquitted him of one
+part of the indictment but not of the other, he should express that
+also on the tablet; for he disapproved of that general custom already
+established, as it obliges the judges to be guilty of perjury if they
+determined positively either on the one side or the other. He also
+made a law, that those should be rewarded who found out anything for
+the good of the city, and that the children of those who fell in
+battle should be educated at the public expense; which law had never
+been proposed by any other legislator, though it is at present in use
+at Athens as well as in other cities, he would have the magistrates
+chosen out of the people in general, by whom he meant the three parts
+before spoken of; and that those who were so elected should be the
+particular guardians of what belonged to the public, to strangers, and
+to orphans.
+
+These are the principal parts and most worthy of notice in
+Hippodamus's plan. But some persons might doubt the propriety of his
+division of the citizens into three parts; for the artisans, the
+husbandmen, and the soldiers are to compose one community, where the
+husbandmen are to have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor
+land, which would in a manner render them slaves to the soldiery. It
+is also impossible that the whole community should partake of all the
+honourable employments in it--for the generals and the guardians of
+the state must necessarily be appointed out of the soldiery, and
+indeed the most honourable magistrates; but as the two other parts
+will not have their share in the government, how can they be expected
+to have any affection for it? But it is necessary that the soldiery
+should be superior to the other two parts, and this superiority will
+not be easily gained without they are very numerous; and if they are
+so, why should the community consist of any other members? why should
+any others have a right to elect the magistrates? Besides, of what use
+are the husbandmen to this community? Artisans, 'tis true, are
+necessary, for these every city wants, and they can live upon their
+business. If the husbandmen indeed furnished the soldiers with
+provisions, they would be properly part of the community; but these
+are supposed to have their private property, and to cultivate it for
+their own use.  Moreover, if the soldiers themselves are to cultivate
+that common land which is appropriated for their support, there will
+be no distinction between the soldier and the husbandman, which the
+legislator intended there should be; and if there should be any others
+who are to cultivate the private property of the husbandman and the
+common lands of the military, there will be a fourth order in the
+state which will have no share in it, and always entertain hostile
+sentiments towards it. If any one should propose that the same persons
+should cultivate their own lands and the public ones also, then there
+would be a deficiency [1268b] of provisions to supply two families, as
+the lands would not immediately yield enough for themselves and the
+soldiers also; and all these things would occasion great confusion.
+
+Nor do I approve of his method of determining causes, when he would
+have the judge split the case which comes simply before him; and thus,
+instead of being a judge, become an arbitrator. Now when any matter is
+brought to arbitration, it is customary for many persons to confer
+together upon the business that is before them; but when a cause is
+brought before judges it is not so; and many legislators take care
+that the judges shall not have it in their power to communicate their
+sentiments to each other. Besides, what can prevent confusion on the
+bench when one judge thinks a fine should be different from what
+another has set it at; one proposing twenty minae, another ten, or be
+it more or less, another four, and another five; and it is evident,
+that in this manner they will differ from each other, while some will
+give the whole damages sued for, and others nothing; in this
+situation, how shall their determinations be settled? Besides, a judge
+cannot be obliged to perjure himself who simply acquits or condemns,
+if the action is fairly and justly brought; for he who acquits the
+party does not say that he ought not to pay any fine at all, but that
+he ought not to pay a fine of twenty minae. But he that condemns him
+is guilty of perjury if he sentences him to pay twenty minae while he
+believes the damages ought not to be so much.
+
+Now with respect to these honours which he proposes to bestow on those
+who can give any information useful to the community, this, though
+very pleasing in speculation, is what the legislator should not
+settle, for it would encourage informers, and probably occasion
+commotions in the state. And this proposal of his gives rise also to
+further conjectures and inquiries; for some persons have doubted
+whether it is useful or hurtful to alter the established law of any
+country, if even for the better; for which reason one cannot
+immediately determine upon what he here says, whether it is
+advantageous to alter the law or not. We know, indeed, that it is
+possible to propose to new model both the laws and government as a
+common good; and since we have mentioned this subject, it may be very
+proper to enter into a few particulars concerning it, for it contains
+some difficulties, as I have already said, and it may appear better to
+alter them, since it has been found useful in other sciences.
+
+Thus the science of physic is extended beyond its ancient bounds; so
+is the gymnastic, and indeed all other arts and powers; so that one
+may lay it down for certain that the same thing will necessarily hold
+good in the art of government. And it may also be affirmed, that
+experience itself gives a proof of this; for the ancient laws are too
+simple and barbarous; which allowed the Greeks to wear swords in the
+city, and to buy their wives of each [1269a]. other. And indeed all
+the remains of old laws which we have are very simple; for instance, a
+law in Cuma relative to murder. If any person who prosecutes another
+for murder can produce a certain number of witnesses to it of his own
+relations, the accused person shall be held guilty. Upon the whole,
+all persons ought to endeavour to follow what is right, and not what
+is established; and it is probable that the first men, whether they
+sprung out of the earth, or were saved from some general calamity, had
+very little understanding or knowledge, as is affirmed of these
+aborigines; so that it would be absurd to continue in the practice of
+their rules. Nor is it, moreover, right to permit written laws always
+to remain without alteration; for as in all other sciences, so in
+politics, it is impossible to express everything in writing with
+perfect exactness; for when we commit anything to writing we must use
+general terms, but in every action there is something particular to
+itself, which these may not comprehend; from whence it is evident,
+that certain laws will at certain times admit of alterations. But if
+we consider this matter in another point of view, it will appear to
+require great caution; for when the advantage proposed is trifling, as
+the accustoming the people easily to abolish their laws is of bad
+consequence, it is evidently better to pass over some faults which
+either the legislator or the magistrates may have committed; for the
+alterations will not be of so much service as a habit of disobeying
+the magistrates will be of disservice. Besides, the instance brought
+from the arts is fallacious; for it is not the same thing to alter the
+one as the other. For a law derives all its strength from custom, and
+this requires long time to establish; so that, to make it an easy
+matter to pass from the established laws to other new ones, is to
+weaken the power of laws.  Besides, here is another question; if the
+laws are to be altered, are they all to be altered, and in every
+goverment or not, and whether at the pleasure of one person or many?
+all  which  particulars  will   make   a   great difference;  for
+which reason we will at present drop the inquiry, to pursue it at some
+other time.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+
+There are two considerations which offer themselves with respect to
+the government established at Lacedsemon and Crete, and indeed in
+almost all other states whatsoever; one is whether their laws do or do
+not promote the best establishment possible? the other is whether
+there is anything, if we consider either the principles upon which it
+is founded or the executive part of it, which prevents the form of
+government that they had proposed to follow from being observed; now
+it is allowed that in every well-regulated state the members of it
+should be free from servile labour; but in what manner this shall be
+effected is not so easy to determine; for the Penestse have very often
+attacked the Thessalians, and the Helots the Lacedaemonians, for they
+in a manner continually watch an opportunity for some misfortune
+befalling them. But no such thing has ever happened to the Cretans;
+the  [1269b] reason for which probably is, that although they are
+engaged in frequent wars with the neighbouring cities, yet none of
+these would enter into an alliance with the revolters, as it would be
+disadvantageous for them, who themselves also have their villains. But
+now there is perpetual enmity between the Lacedaemonians and all their
+neighbours, the Argives, the Messenians, and the Arcadians. Their
+slaves also first revolted from the Thessalians while they were
+engaged in wars with their neighbours the Acheans, the Perrabeans, and
+the Magnesians. It seems to me indeed, if nothing else, yet something
+very troublesome to keep upon proper terms with them; for if you are
+remiss in your discipline they grow insolent, and think themselves
+upon an equality with their masters; and if they are hardly used they
+are continually plotting against you and hate you. It is evident,
+then, that those who employ slaves have not as yet hit upon the right
+way of managing them.
+
+As to the indulging of women in any particular liberties, it is
+hurtful to the end of government and the prosperity of the city; for
+as a man and his wife are the two parts of a family, if we suppose a
+city to be divided into two parts, we must allow that the number of
+men and women will be equal.
+
+In whatever city then the women are not under good regulations, we
+must look upon one half of it as not under the restraint of law, as it
+there happened; for the legislator, desiring to make his whole city a
+collection of warriors with respect to the men, he most evidently
+accomplished his design; but in the meantime the women were quite
+neglected, for they live without restraint in every improper
+indulgence and luxury. So that in such a state riches will necessarily
+be in general esteem, particularly if the men are governed by their
+wives, which has been the case with many a brave and warlike people
+except the Celts, and those other nations, if there are any such, who
+openly practise pederasty. And the first mythologists seem not
+improperly to have joined Mars and Venus together; for all nations of
+this character are greatly addicted either to the love of women or of
+boys, for which reason it was thus at Lacedaemon; and many things in
+their state were done by the authority of the women. For what is the
+difference, if the power is in the hands of the women, or in the hands
+of those whom they themselves govern? it must turn to the same
+account. As this boldness of the women can be of no use in any common
+occurrences, if it was ever so, it must be in war; but even here we
+find that the Lacedaemonian women were of the greatest disservice, as
+was proved at the time of the Theban invasion, when they were of no
+use at all, as they are in other cities, but made more disturbance
+than even the enemy.
+
+The origin of this indulgence which the Lacedaemonian women enjoy is
+easily accounted for, from the long time the men were absent from home
+upon foreign expeditions [1270a] against the Argives, and afterwards
+the Arcadians and Messenians, so that, when these wars were at an end,
+their military life, in which there is no little virtue, prepared them
+to obey the precepts of their law-giver; but we are told, that when
+Lycurgus endeavoured also to reduce the women to an obedience to his
+laws, upon their refusal he declined it. It may indeed be said that
+the women were the causes of these things, and of course all the fault
+was theirs. But we are not now considering where the fault lies, or
+where it does not lie, but what is right and what is wrong; and when
+the manners of the women are not well regulated, as I have already
+said, it must not only occasion faults which are disgraceful to the
+state, but also increase the love of money. In the next place, fault
+may be found with his unequal division of property, for some will have
+far too much, others too little; by which means the land will come
+into few hands, which business is badly regulated by his laws. For he
+made it infamous for any one either to buy or sell their possessions,
+in which he did right; but he permitted any one that chose it to give
+them away, or bequeath them, although nearly the same consequences
+will arise from one practice as from the other. It is supposed that
+near two parts in five of the whole country is the property of women,
+owing to their being so often sole heirs, and having such large
+fortunes in marriage; though it would be better to allow them none, or
+a little, or a certain regulated proportion. Now every one is
+permitted to make a woman his heir if he pleases; and if he dies
+intestate, he who succeeds as heir at law gives it to whom he pleases.
+From whence it happens that although the country is able to support
+fifteen hundred horse and thirty thousand foot, the number does not
+amount to one thousand.
+
+And from these facts it is evident, that this particular is badly
+regulated; for the city could not support one shock, but was ruined
+for want of men. They say, that during the reigns of their ancient
+kings they used to present foreigners with the freedom of their city,
+to prevent there being a want of men while they carried on long wars;
+it is also affirmed that the number of Spartans was formerly ten
+thousand; but be that as it will, an equality of property conduces
+much to increase the number of the people. The law, too, which he made
+to encourage population was by no means calculated to correct this
+inequality; for being willing that the Spartans should be as numerous
+as [1270b] possible, to make them desirous of having large families he
+ordered that he who had three children should be excused the
+night-watch, and that he who had four should pay no taxes: though it
+is very evident, that while the land was divided in this manner, that
+if the people increased there must many of them be very poor.
+
+Nor was he less blamable for the manner in which he constituted the
+ephori; for these magistrates take cognisance of things of the last
+importance, and yet they are chosen out of the people in general; so
+that it often happens that a very poor person is elected to that
+office, who, from that circumstance, is easily bought. There have been
+many instances of this formerly, as well as in the late affair at
+Andros. And these men, being corrupted with money, went as far as they
+could to ruin the city: and, because their power was too great and
+nearly tyrannical, their kings were obliged to natter them, which
+contributed greatly to hurt the state; so that it altered from an
+aristocracy to a democracy. This magistracy is indeed the great
+support of the state; for the people are easy, knowing that they are
+eligible to the first office in it; so that, whether it took place by
+the intention of the legislator, or whether it happened by chance,
+this is of great service to their affairs; for it is necessary that
+every member of the state should endeavour that each part of the
+government should be preserved, and continue the same. And upon this
+principle their kings have always acted, out of regard to their
+honour; the wise and good from their attachment to the senate, a seat
+wherein they consider as the reward of virtue; and the common people,
+that they may support the ephori, of whom they consist. And it is
+proper that these magistrates should be chosen out of the whole
+community, not as the custom is at present, which is very ridiculous.
+The ephori are the supreme judges in causes of the last consequence;
+but as it is quite accidental what sort of persons they may be, it is
+not right that they should determine according to their own opinion,
+but by a written law or established custom. Their way of life also is
+not consistent with the manners of the city, for it is too indulgent;
+whereas that of others is too severe; so that they cannot support it,
+but are obliged privately to act contrary to law, that they may enjoy
+some of the pleasures of sense. There are also great defects in the
+institution of their senators. If indeed they were fitly trained to
+the practice of every human virtue, every one would readily admit that
+they would be useful to the government; but still it might be debated
+whether they should be continued judges for life, to determine points
+of the greatest moment, since the mind has its old age as well as the
+body; but as they are so brought up, [1271a] that even the legislator
+could not depend upon them as good men, their power must be
+inconsistent with the safety of the state: for it is known that the
+members of that body have been guilty both of bribery and partiality
+in many public affairs; for which reason it had been much better if
+they had been made answerable for their conduct, which they are not.
+But it may be said the ephori seem to have a check upon all the
+magistrates. They have indeed in this particular very great power; but
+I affirm that they should not be entrusted with this control in the
+manner they are.  Moreover, the mode of choice which they make use of
+at the election of their senators is very childish. Nor is it right
+for any one to solicit for a place he is desirous of; for every
+person, whether he chooses it or not, ought to execute any office he
+is fit for. But his intention was evidently the same in this as in the
+other parts of his government. For making his citizens ambitious after
+honours, with men of that disposition he has filled his senate, since
+no others will solicit for that office; and yet the principal part of
+those crimes which men are deliberately guilty of arise from ambition
+and avarice.
+
+We will inquire at another time whether the office of a king is useful
+to the state: thus much is certain, that they should be chosen from a
+consideration of their conduct and not as they are now. But that the
+legislator himself did not expect to make all his citizens honourable
+and completely virtuous is evident from this, that he distrusts them
+as not being good men; for he sent those upon the same embassy that
+were at variance with each other; and thought, that in the dispute of
+the kings the safety of the state consisted. Neither were their common
+meals at first well established: for these should rather have been
+provided at the public expense, as at Crete, where, as at Lacedaemon,
+every one was obliged to buy his portion, although he might be very
+poor, and could by no means bear the expense, by which means the
+contrary happened to what the legislator desired: for he intended that
+those public meals should strengthen the democratic part of his
+government: but this regulation had quite the contrary effect, for
+those who were very poor could not take part in them; and it was an
+observation of their forefathers, that the not allowing those who
+could not contribute their proportion to the common tables to partake
+of them, would be the ruin of the state. Other persons have censured
+his laws concerning naval affairs, and not without reason, as it gave
+rise to disputes. For the commander of the fleet is in a manner set up
+in opposition to the kings, who are generals of the army for life.
+
+[1271b] There is also another defect in his laws worthy of censure,
+which Plato has given in his book of Laws; that the whole constitution
+was calculated only for the business of war: it is indeed excellent to
+make them conquerors; for which reason the preservation of the state
+depended thereon. The destruction of it commenced with their
+victories: for they knew not how to be idle, or engage in any other
+employment than war. In this particular also they were mistaken, that
+though they rightly thought, that those things which are the objects
+of contention amongst mankind are better procured by virtue than vice,
+yet they wrongfully preferred the things themselves to virtue. Nor was
+the public revenue well managed at Sparta, for the state was worth
+nothing while they were obliged to carry on the most extensive wars,
+and the subsidies were very badly raised; for as the Spartans
+possessed a large extent of country, they were not exact upon each
+other as to what they paid in. And thus an event contrary to the
+legislator's intention took place; for the state was poor, the
+individuals avaricious. Enough of the Lacedaemonian government; for
+these seem the chief defects in it.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+
+The government of Crete bears a near resemblance to this, in some few
+particulars it is not worse, but in general it is far inferior in its
+contrivance. For it appears and is allowed in many particulars the
+constitution of Lacedaemon was formed in imitation of that of Crete;
+and in general most new things are an improvement upon the old. For
+they say, that when Lycurgus ceased to be guardian to King Charilles
+he went abroad and spent a long time with his relations in Crete, for
+the Lycians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians; and those who first
+settled there adopted that body of laws which they found already
+established by the inhabitants; in like manner also those who now live
+near them have the very laws which Minos first drew up.
+
+This island seems formed by nature to be the mistress of Greece, for
+it is entirely surrounded by a navigable ocean which washes almost all
+the maritime parts of that country, and is not far distant on the one
+side from Peloponnesus, on the other, which looks towards Asia, from
+Triopium and Rhodes. By means of this situation Minos acquired the
+empire of the sea and the islands; some of which he subdued, in others
+planted colonies: at last he died at Camicus while he was attacking
+Sicily. There is this analogy between the customs of the
+Lacedaemonians and the Cretans, the Helots cultivate the grounds
+[1272a] for the one, the domestic slaves for the other. Both states
+have their common meals, and the Lacedaemonians called these formerly
+not _psiditia_ but _andpia_, as the Cretans do; which proves from
+whence the custom arose. In this particular their governments are also
+alike: the ephori have the same power with those of Crete, who are
+called _kosmoi_; with this difference only, that the number of the one
+is five, of the other ten. The senators are the same as those whom the
+Cretans call the council.  There was formerly also a kingly power in
+Crete; but it was afterwards dissolved, and the command of their
+armies was given to the _kosmoi_.  Every one also has a vote in their
+public assembly; but this has only the power of confirming what has
+already passed the council and the _kosmoi_.
+
+The Cretans conducted their public meals better than the
+Lacedaemonians, for at Lacedsemon each individual was obliged to
+furnish what was assessed upon him; which if he could not do, there
+was a law which deprived him of the rights of a citizen, as has been
+already mentioned: but in Crete they were furnished by the community;
+for all the corn and cattle, taxes and contributions, which the
+domestic slaves were obliged to furnish, were divided into parts and
+allotted to the gods, the exigencies of the state, and these public
+meals; so that all the men, women, and children were maintained from a
+common stock. The legislator gave great attention to encourage a habit
+of eating sparingly, as very useful to the citizens. He also
+endeavoured, that his community might not be too populous, to lessen
+the connection with women, by introducing the love of boys: whether in
+this he did well or ill we shall have some other opportunity of
+considering. But that the public meals were better ordered at Crete
+than at Lacedaemon is very evident.
+
+The institution of the _kosmoi_, was still worse than that of the
+ephori: for it contained all the faults incident to that magistracy
+and some peculiar to itself; for in both cases it is uncertain who
+will be elected: but the Lacedae-monians have this advantage which the
+others have not, that as all are eligible, the whole community have a
+share in the highest honours, and therefore all desire to preserve the
+state: whereas among the Cretans the _kosmoi_ are not chosen out of
+the people in general, but out of some certain families, and the
+senate out of the _kosmoi_. And the same observations which may be
+made on the senate at Lacedaemon may be applied to these; for their
+being under no control, and their continuing for life, is an honour
+greater than they merit; and to have their proceedings not regulated
+by a written law, but left to their own discretion, is dangerous. (As
+to there being no insurrections, although the people share not in the
+management of public affairs, this is no proof of a well-constituted
+government, as the _kosmoi_ have no opportunity of being bribed like
+the ephori, as they live in an [1272b] island far from those who would
+corrupt them.) But the method they take to correct that fault is
+absurd, impolitic, and tyrannical: for very often either their
+fellow-magistrates or some private persons conspire together and turn
+out the _kosmoi_. They are also permitted to resign their office
+before their time is elapsed, and if all this was done by law it would
+be well, and not at the pleasure of the individuals, which is a bad
+rule to follow. But what is worst of all is, that general confusion
+which those who are in power introduce to impede the ordinary course
+of justice; which sufficiently shows what is the nature of the
+government, or rather lawless force: for it is usual with the
+principal persons amongst them to collect together some of the common
+people and their friends, and then revolt and set up for themselves,
+and come to blows with each other. And what is the difference, if a
+state is dissolved at once by such violent means, or if it gradually
+so alters in process of time as to be no longer the same constitution?
+A state like this would ever be exposed to the invasions of those who
+were powerful and inclined to attack it; but, as has been already
+mentioned, its situation preserves it, as it is free from the inroads
+of foreigners; and for this reason the family slaves still remain
+quiet at Crete, while the Helots are perpetually revolting: for the
+Cretans take no part in foreign affairs, and it is but lately that any
+foreign troops have made an attack upon the island; and their ravages
+soon proved the ineffectualness of their laws. And thus much for the
+government of Crete.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+
+The government of Carthage seems well established, and in many
+respects superior to others; in some particulars it bears a near
+resemblance to the Lacedaemonians; and indeed these three states, the
+Cretans, the Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians are in some things
+very like each other, in others they differ greatly. Amongst many
+excellent constitutions this may show how well their government is
+framed, that although the people are admitted to a share in the
+administration, the form of it remains unaltered, without any popular
+insurrections, worth notice, on the one hand, or degenerating into a
+tyranny on the other. Now the Carthaginians have these things in
+common with the Lacedaemonians: public tables for those who are
+connected together by the tie of mutual friendship, after the manner
+of their Phiditia; they have also a magistracy, consisting of an
+hundred and four persons, similar to the ephori, or rather selected
+with more judgment; for amongst the Lacedaemonians, all the citizens
+are eligible, but amongst the Carthaginians, they are chosen out of
+those of the better sort: there is also some analogy between the king
+and the senate in both these governments, though the Carthaginian
+method of appointing their kings is best, for they do not confine
+themselves to one family; nor do they permit the election to be at
+large, nor have they any regard to seniority; for if amongst the
+candidates there are any of greater merit than the rest, these they
+prefer to those who may be older; for as their power is very
+extensive, if they are [1273a] persons of no account, they may be very
+hurtful to the state, as they have always been to the Lacedaemonians;
+also the greater part of those things which become reprehensible by
+their excess are common to all those governments which we have
+described.
+
+Now of those principles on which the Carthaginians have established
+their mixed form of government, composed of an aristocracy and
+democracy, some incline to produce a democracy, others an oligarchy:
+for instance, if the kings and the senate are unanimous upon any point
+in debate, they can choose whether they will bring it before the
+people or no; but if they disagree, it is to these they must appeal,
+who are not only to hear what has been approved of by the senate, but
+are finally to determine upon it; and whosoever chooses it, has a
+right to speak against any matter whatsoever that may be proposed,
+which is not permitted in other cases. The five, who elect each other,
+have very great and extensive powers; and these choose the hundred,
+who are magistrates of the highest rank: their power also continues
+longer than any other magistrates, for it commences before they come
+into office, and is prolonged after they are out of it; and in this
+particular the state inclines to an oligarchy: but as they are not
+elected by lot, but by suffrage, and are not permitted to take money,
+they are the greatest supporters imaginable of an aristocracy.
+
+The determining all causes by the same magistrates, and not orae in
+one court and another in another, as at Lacedaemon, has the same
+influence. The constitution of Carthage is now shifting from an
+aristocracy to an oligarchy, in consequence of an opinion which is
+favourably entertained by many, who think that the magistrates in the
+community ought not to be persons of family only, but of fortune also;
+as it is impossible for those who are in bad circumstances to support
+the dignity of their office, or to be at leisure to apply to public
+business. As choosing men of fortune to be magistrates make a state
+incline to an oligarchy, and men of abilities to an aristocracy, so is
+there a third method of proceeding which took place in the polity of
+Carthage; for they have an eye to these two particulars when they
+elect their officers, particularly those of the highest rank, their
+kings and their generals. It must be admitted, that it was a great
+fault in their legislator not to guard against the constitution's
+degenerating from an aristocracy; for this is a most necessary thing
+to provide for at first, that those citizens who have the best
+abilities should never be obliged to do anything unworthy their
+character, but be always at leisure to serve the public, not only when
+in office, but also when private persons; for if once you are obliged
+to look among the wealthy, that you may have men at leisure to serve
+you, your greatest offices, of king and general, will soon become
+venal; in consequence of which, riches will be more honourable than
+virtue and a love of money be the ruling principle in the city-for
+what those who have the chief power regard as honourable will
+necessarily be the object which the [1273b] citizens in general will
+aim at; and where the first honours are not paid to virtue, there the
+aristocratic form of government cannot flourish: for it is reasonable
+to conclude, that those who bought their places should generally make
+an advantage of what they laid out their money for; as it is absurd to
+suppose, that if a man of probity who is poor should be desirous of
+gaining something, a bad man should not endeavour to do the same,
+especially to reimburse himself; for which reason the magistracy
+should be formed of those who are most able to support an aristocracy.
+It would have been better for the legislature to have passed over the
+poverty of men of merit, and only to have taken care to have ensured
+them sufficient leisure, when in office, to attend to public affairs.
+
+It seems also improper, that one person should execute several
+offices, which was approved of at Carthage; for one business is best
+done by one person; and it is the duty of the legislator to look to
+this, and not make the same person a musician and a shoemaker: so that
+where the state is not small it is more politic and more popular to
+admit many persons to have a share in the government; for, as I just
+now said, it is not only more usual, but everything is better and
+sooner done, when one thing only is allotted to one person: and this
+is evident both in the army and navy, where almost every one, in his
+turn, both commands and is under command. But as their government
+inclines to an oligarchy, they avoid the ill effects of it by always
+appointing some of the popular party to the government of cities to
+make their fortunes. Thus they consult this fault in their
+constitution and render it stable; but this is depending on chance;
+whereas the legislator ought to frame his government, that there the
+no room for insurrections. But now, if there should be any general
+calamity, and the people should revolt from their rulers, there is no
+remedy for reducing them to obedience by the laws. And these are the
+particulars of the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian
+governments which seem worthy of commendation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+
+Some of those persons who have written upon government had never any
+share in public affairs, but always led a private life. Everything
+worthy of notice in their works we have already spoke to. Others were
+legislators, some in their own cities, others were employed in
+regulating the governments of foreign states. Some of them only
+composed a body of laws; others formed the constitution also, as
+Lycurgus; and Solon, who did both. The Lacedaemonians have been
+already mentioned. Some persons think that Solon was an excellent
+legislator, who could dissolve a pure oligarchy, and save the people
+from that slavery which hung over them, and establish the ancient
+democratic form of government in his country; wherein every part of it
+was so framed as to be well adapted to the whole. In the senate of
+Areopagus an oligarchy was preserved; by the manner of electing their
+[1274a] magistrates, an aristocracy; and in their courts of justice, a
+democracy.
+
+Solon seems not to have altered the established form of government,
+either with respect to the senate or the mode of electing their
+magistrates; but to have raised the people to great consideration in
+the state by allotting the supreme judicial department to them; and
+for this some persons blame him, as having done what would soon
+overturn that balance of power he intended to establish; for by trying
+all causes whatsoever before the people, who were chosen by lot to
+determine them, it was necessary to flatter a tyrannical populace who
+had got this power; which contributed to bring the government to that
+pure democracy it now is.
+
+Both Ephialtes and Pericles abridged the power of the Areopagites, the
+latter of whom introduced the method of paying those who attended the
+courts of justice: and thus every one who aimed at being popular
+proceeded increasing the power of the people to what we now see it.
+But it is evident that this was not Solon's intention, but that it
+arose from accident; for the people being the cause of the naval
+victory over the Medes, assumed greatly upon it, and enlisted
+themselves under factious demagogues, although opposed by the better
+part of the citizens. He thought it indeed most necessary to entrust
+the people with the choice of their magistrates and the power of
+calling them to account; for without that they must have been slaves
+and enemies to the other citizens: but he ordered them to elect those
+only who were persons of good account and property, either out of
+those who were worth five hundred medimns, or those who were called
+xeugitai, or those of the third census, who were called horsemen.
+
+As for those of the fourth, which consisted of mechanics, they were
+incapable of any office. Zaleucus was the legislator of the Western
+Locrians, as was Charondas, the Catanean, of his own cities, and those
+also in Italy and Sicily which belonged to the Calcidians. Some
+persons endeavour to prove that Onomacritus, the Locrian, was the
+first person of note who drew up laws; and that he employed himself in
+that business while he was at Crete, where he continued some time to
+learn the prophetic art: and they say, that Thales was his companion;
+and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were the scholars of Thales, and
+Charondas of Zaleucus; but those who advance this, advance what is
+repugnant to chronology. Philolaus also, of the family of the
+Bacchiades, was a Theban legislator. This man was very fond of
+Diocles, a victor in the Olympic games, and when he left his country
+from a disgust at an improper passion which his mother Alithoe had
+entertained for him, and settled at Thebes, Philolaus followed him,
+where they both died, and where they still show their tombs placed in
+view of each other, but so disposed, that one of them looks towards
+Corinth, the other does not; the reason they give for this is, that
+Diodes, from his detestation of his mother's passion, would have his
+tomb so placed that no one could see Corinth from it; but Philolaus
+chose that it might be seen from his: and this was the cause of their
+living at Thebes. [1274b]
+
+As Philolaus gave them laws concerning many other things, so did he
+upon adoption, which they call adoptive laws; and this he in
+particular did to preserve the number of families. Charondas did
+nothing new, except in actions for perjury, which he was the first
+person who took into particular consideration. He also drew up his
+laws with greater elegance and accuracy than even any of our present
+legislators. Philolaus introduced the law for the equal distribution
+of goods; Plato that for the community of women, children, and goods,
+and also for public tables for the women; and one concerning
+drunkenness, that they might observe sobriety in their symposiums. He
+also made a law concerning their warlike exercises; that they should
+acquire a habit of using both hands alike, as it was necessary that
+one hand should be as useful as the other.
+
+As for Draco's laws, they were published when the government was
+already established, and they have nothing particular in them worth
+mentioning, except their severity on account of the enormity of their
+punishments. Pittacus was the author of some laws, but never drew up
+any form of government; one of which was this, that if a drunken man
+beat any person he should be punished more than if he did it when
+sober; for as people are more apt to be abusive when drunk than sober,
+he paid no consideration to the excuse which drunkenness might claim,
+but regarded only the common benefit. Andromadas Regmus was also a
+lawgiver to the Thracian talcidians. There are some laws of his
+concerning murders and heiresses extant, but these contain nothing
+that any one can say is new and his own. And thus much for different
+sorts of governments, as well those which really exist as those which
+different persons have proposed.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK  III
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+Every one who inquires into the nature of government, and what are its
+different forms, should make this almost his first question, What is a
+city? For upon this there is a dispute: for some persons say the city
+did this or that, while others say, not the city, but the oligarchy,
+or the tyranny. We see that the city is the only object which both the
+politician and legislator have in view in all they do: but government
+is a certain ordering of those who inhabit a city. As a city is a
+collective body, and, like other wholes, composed of many parts, it is
+evident our first inquiry must be, what a citizen is: for a city is a
+certain number of citizens. So that we must consider whom we ought to
+call citizen, and who is one; for this is often doubtful: for every
+one will not allow that this character is applicable to the same
+person; for that man who would be a citizen in a republic would very
+often not be one in an oligarchy. We do not include in this inquiry
+many of those who acquire this appellation out of the ordinary way, as
+honorary persons, for instance, but those only who have a natural
+right to it.
+
+Now it is not residence which constitutes a man a citizen; for in this
+sojourners and slaves are upon an equality with him; nor will it be
+sufficient for this purpose, that you have the privilege of the laws,
+and may plead or be impleaded, for this all those of different
+nations, between whom there is a mutual agreement for that purpose,
+are allowed; although it very often happens, that sojourners have not
+a perfect right therein without the protection of a patron, to whom
+they are obliged to apply, which shows that their share in the
+community is incomplete. In like manner, with respect to boys who are
+not yet enrolled, or old men who are past war, we admit that they are
+in some respects citizens, but not completely so, but with some
+exceptions, for these are not yet arrived to years of maturity, and
+those are past service; nor is there any difference between them. But
+what we mean is sufficiently intelligible and clear, we want a
+complete citizen, one in whom there is no deficiency to be corrected
+to make him so. As to those who are banished, or infamous, there may
+be the same objections made and the same answer given. There is
+nothing that more characterises a complete citizen than having a share
+in the judicial and executive part of the government.
+
+With respect to offices, some are fixed to a particular time, so that
+no person is, on any account, permitted to fill them twice; or else
+not till some certain period has intervened; others are not fixed, as
+a juryman's, and a member of the general assembly: but probably some
+one may say these are not offices, nor have the citizens in these
+capacities any share in the government; though surely it is ridiculous
+to say that those who have the principal power in the state bear no
+office in it. But this objection is of no weight, for it is only a
+dispute about words; as there is no general term which can be applied
+both to the office of a juryman and a member of the assembly. For the
+sake of distinction, suppose we call it an indeterminate office: but I
+lay it down as a maxim, that those are citizens who could exercise it.
+Such then is the description of a citizen who comes nearest to what
+all those who are called citizens are. Every one also should know,
+that of the component parts of those things which differ from each
+other in species, after the first or second remove, those which follow
+have either nothing at all or very little common to each.
+
+Now we see that governments differ from each other in their form, and
+that some of them are defective, others [1275b] as excellent as
+possible: for it is evident, that those which have many deficiencies
+and degeneracies in them must be far inferior to those which are
+without such faults. What I mean by degeneracies will be hereafter
+explained. Hence it is clear that the office of a citizen must differ
+as governments do from each other: for which reason he who is called a
+citizen has, in a democracy, every privilege which that station
+supposes. In other forms of government he may enjoy them; but not
+necessarily: for in some states the people have no power; nor have
+they any general assembly, but a few select men.
+
+The trial also of different causes is allotted to different persons;
+as at Lacedaemon all disputes concerning contracts are brought before
+some of the ephori: the senate are the judges in cases of murder, and
+so on; some being to be heard by one magistrate, others by another:
+and thus at Carthage certain magistrates determine all causes. But our
+former description of a citizen will admit of correction; for in some
+governments the office of a juryman and a member of the general
+assembly is not an indeterminate one; but there are particular persons
+appointed for these purposes, some or all of the citizens being
+appointed jurymen or members of the general assembly, and this either
+for all causes and all public business whatsoever, or else for some
+particular one: and this may be sufficient to show what a citizen is;
+for he who has a right to a share in the judicial and executive part
+of government in any city, him we call a citizen of that place; and a
+city, in one word, is a collective body of such persons sufficient in
+themselves to all the purposes of life.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+In common use they define a citizen to be one who is sprung from
+citizens on both sides, not on the father's or the mother's only.
+Others carry the matter still further, and inquire how many of his
+ancestors have been citizens, as his grandfather, great-grandfather,
+etc., but some persons have questioned how the first of the family
+could prove themselves citizens, according to this popular and
+careless definition. Gorgias of Leontium, partly entertaining the same
+doubt, and partly in jest, says, that as a mortar is made by a
+mortar-maker, so a citizen is made by a citizen-maker, and a
+Larisssean by a Larisssean-maker. This is indeed a very simple account
+of the matter; for if citizens are so, according to this definition,
+it will be impossible to apply it to the first founders or first
+inhabitants of states, who cannot possibly claim in right either of
+their father or mother. It is probably a matter of still more
+difficulty to determine their rights as citizens who are admitted to
+their freedom after any revolution in the state. As, for instance, at
+Athens, after the expulsion of the tyrants, when Clisthenes enrolled
+many foreigners and city-slaves amongst the tribes; and the doubt with
+respect to them was, not whether they were citizens or no, but whether
+they were legally so or not. Though indeed some persons may have this
+further [1276a] doubt, whether a citizen can be a citizen when he is
+illegally made; as if an illegal citizen, and one who is no citizen at
+all, were in the same predicament: but since we see some persons
+govern unjustly, whom yet we admit to govern, though not justly, and
+the definition of a citizen is one who exercises certain offices, for
+such a one we have defined a citizen to be, it is evident, that a
+citizen illegally created yet continues to be a citizen, but whether
+justly or unjustly so belongs to the former inquiry.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+It has also been doubted what was and what was not the act of the
+city; as, for instance, when a democracy arises out of an aristocracy
+or a tyranny; for some persons then refuse to fulfil their contracts;
+as if the right to receive the money was in the tyrant and not in the
+state, and many other things of the same nature; as if any covenant
+was founded for violence and not for the common good. So in like
+manner, if anything is done by those who have the management of public
+affairs where a democracy is established, their actions are to be
+considered as the actions of the state, as well as in the oligarchy or
+tyranny.
+
+And here it seems very proper to consider this question, When shall we
+say that a city is the same, and when shall we say that it is
+different?
+
+It is but a superficial mode of examining into this question to begin
+with the place and the people; for it may happen that these may be
+divided from that, or that some one of them may live in one place, and
+some in another (but this question may be regarded as no very knotty
+one; for, as a city may acquire that appellation on many accounts, it
+may be solved many ways); and in like manner, when men inhabit one
+common place, when shall we say that they inhabit the same city, or
+that the city is the same? for it does not depend upon the walls; for
+I can suppose Peloponnesus itself surrounded with a wall, as Babylon
+was, and every other place, which rather encircles many nations than
+one city, and that they say was taken three days when some of the
+inhabitants knew nothing of it: but we shall find a proper time to
+determine this question; for the extent of a city, how large it should
+be, and whether it should consist of more than one people, these are
+particulars that the politician should by no means be unacquainted
+with. This, too, is a matter of inquiry, whether we shall say that a
+city is the same while it is inhabited by the same race of men, though
+some of them are perpetually dying, others coming into the world, as
+we say that a river or a fountain is the same, though the waters are
+continually changing; or when a revolution takes place shall we
+[1276b] say the men are the same, but the city is different: for if a
+city is a community, it is a community of citizens; but if the mode of
+government should alter, and become of another sort, it would seem a
+necessary consequence that the city is not the same; as we regard the
+tragic chorus as different from the comic, though it may probably
+consist of the same performers: thus every other community or
+composition is said to be different if the species of composition is
+different; as in music the same hands produce different harmony, as
+the Doric and Phrygian. If this is true, it is evident, that when we
+speak of a city as being the same we refer to the government there
+established; and this, whether it is called by the same name or any
+other, or inhabited by the same men or different. But whether or no it
+is right to dissolve the community when the constitution is altered is
+another question.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+What has been said, it follows that we should consider whether the
+same virtues which constitute a good man make a valuable citizen, or
+different; and if a particular inquiry is necessary for this matter we
+must first give a general description of the virtues of a good
+citizen; for as a sailor is one of those who make up a community, so
+is a citizen, although the province of one sailor may be different
+from another's (for one is a rower, another a steersman, a third a
+boatswain, and so on, each having their several appointments), it is
+evident that the most accurate description of any one good sailor must
+refer to his peculiar abilities, yet there are some things in which
+the same description may be applied to the whole crew, as the safety
+of the ship is the common business of all of them, for this is the
+general centre of all their cares: so also with respect to citizens,
+although they may in a few particulars be very different, yet there is
+one care common to them all, the safety of the community, for the
+community of the citizens composes the state; for which reason the
+virtue of a citizen has necessarily a reference to the state. But if
+there are different sorts of governments, it is evident that those
+actions which constitute the virtue of an excellent citizen in one
+community will not constitute it in another; wherefore the virtue of
+such a one cannot be perfect: but we say, a man is good when his
+virtues are perfect; from whence it follows, that an excellent citizen
+does not possess that virtue which constitutes a good man. Those who
+are any ways doubtful concerning this question may be convinced of the
+truth of it by examining into the best formed states: for, if it is
+impossible that a city should consist entirely of excellent citizens
+(while it is necessary that every one should do well in his calling,
+in which consists his excellence, as it is impossible that all the
+citizens should have the same [1277a] qualifications) it is impossible
+that the virtue of a citizen and a good man should be the same; for
+all should possess the virtue of an excellent citizen: for from hence
+necessarily arise the perfection of the city: but that every one
+should possess the virtue of a good man is impossible without all the
+citizens in a well-regulated state were necessarily virtuous. Besides,
+as a city is composed of dissimilar parts, as an animal is of life and
+body; the soul of reason and appetite; a family of a man and his
+wife--property of a master and a slave; in the same manner, as a city
+is composed of all these and many other very different parts, it
+necessarily follows that the virtue of all the citizens cannot be the
+same; as the business of him who leads the band is different from the
+other dancers. From all which proofs it is evident that the virtues of
+a citizen cannot be one and the same. But do we never find those
+virtues united which constitute a good man and excellent citizen? for
+we say, such a one is an excellent magistrate and a prudent and good
+man; but prudence is a necessary qualification for all those who
+engage in public affairs. Nay, some persons affirm that the education
+of those who are intended to command should, from the beginning, be
+different from other citizens, as the children of kings are generally
+instructed in riding and warlike exercises; and thus Euripides says:
+
+  "... No showy arts Be mine, but teach me what the state requires."
+
+As if those who are to rule were to have an education peculiar to
+themselves. But if we allow, that the virtues of a good man and a good
+magistrate may be the same, and a citizen is one who obeys the
+magistrate, it follows that the virtue of the one cannot in general be
+the same as the virtue of the other, although it may be true of some
+particular citizen; for the virtue of the magistrate must be different
+from the virtue of the citizen. For which reason Jason declared that
+was he deprived of his kingdom he should pine away with regret, as not
+knowing how to live a private man. But it is a great recommendation to
+know how to command as well as to obey; and to do both these things
+well is the virtue of an accomplished citizen. If then the virtue of a
+good man consists only in being able to command, but the virtue of a
+good citizen renders him equally fit for the one as well as the other,
+the commendation of both of them is not the same. It appears, then,
+that both he who commands and he who obeys should each of them learn
+their separate business: but that the citizen should be master of and
+take part in both these, as any one may easily perceive; in a family
+government there is no occasion for the master to know how to perform
+the necessary offices, but rather to enjoy the labour of others; for
+to do the other is a servile part. I mean by the other, the common
+family business of the slave.
+
+There are many sorts of slaves; for their employments are various: of
+these the handicraftsmen are one, who, as their name imports, get
+their living by the labour of their hands, and amongst these all
+mechanics are included; [1277b] for which reasons such workmen, in
+some states, were not formerly admitted into any share in the
+government; till at length democracies were established: it is not
+therefore proper for any man of honour, or any citizen, or any one who
+engages in public affairs, to learn these servile employments without
+they have occasion for them for their own use; for without this was
+observed the distinction between a master and a slave would be lost.
+But there is a government of another sort, in which men govern those
+who are their equals in rank, and freemen, which we call a political
+government, in which men learn to command by first submitting to obey,
+as a good general of horse, or a commander-in-chief, must acquire a
+knowledge of their duty by having been long under the command of
+another, and the like in every appointment in the army: for well is it
+said, no one knows how to command who has not himself been under
+command of another. The virtues of those are indeed different, but a
+good citizen must necessarily be endowed with them; he ought also to
+know in what manner freemen ought to govern, as well as be governed:
+and this, too, is the duty of a good man. And if the temperance and
+justice of him who commands is different from his who, though a
+freeman, is under command, it is evident that the virtues of a good
+citizen cannot be the same as justice, for instance but must be of a
+different species in these two different situations, as the temperance
+and courage of a man and a woman are different from each other; for a
+man would appear a coward who had only that courage which would be
+graceful in a woman, and a woman would be thought a talker who should
+take as large a part in the conversation as would become a man of
+consequence.
+
+The domestic employments of each of them are also different; it is the
+man's business to acquire subsistence, the woman's to take care of it.
+But direction and knowledge of public affairs is a virtue peculiar to
+those who govern, while all others seem to be equally requisite for
+both parties; but with this the governed have no concern, it is theirs
+to entertain just notions: they indeed are like flute-makers, while
+those who govern are the musicians who play on them. And thus much to
+show whether the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the
+same, or if it is different, and also how far it is the same, and how
+far different.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+But with respect to citizens there is a doubt remaining, whether those
+only are truly so who are allowed to share in the government, or
+whether the mechanics also are to be considered as such? for if those
+who are not permitted to rule are to be reckoned among them, it is
+impossible that the virtue of all the citizens should be the same, for
+these also are citizens; and if none of them are admitted to be
+citizens, where shall they be ranked? for they are neither [1278a]
+sojourners nor foreigners? or shall we say that there will no
+inconvenience arise from their not being citizens, as they are neither
+slaves nor freedmen: for this is certainly true, that all those are
+not citizens who are necessary to the existence of a city, as boys are
+not citizens in the same manner that men are, for those are perfectly
+so, the others under some conditions; for they are citizens, though
+imperfect ones: for in former times among some people the mechanics
+were either slaves or foreigners, for which reason many of them are so
+now: and indeed the best regulated states will not permit a mechanic
+to be a citizen; but if it be allowed them, we cannot then attribute
+the virtue we have described to every citizen or freeman, but to those
+only who are disengaged from servile offices.  Now those who are
+employed by one person in them are slaves; those who do them for money
+are mechanics and hired servants: hence it is evident on the least
+reflection what is their situation, for what I have said is fully
+explained by appearances. Since the number of communities is very
+great, it follows necessarily that there will be many different sorts
+of citizens, particularly of those who are governed by others, so that
+in one state it may be necessary to admit mechanics and hired servants
+to be citizens, but in others it may be impossible; as particularly in
+an aristocracy, where honours are bestowed on virtue and dignity: for
+it is impossible for one who lives the life of a mechanic or hired
+servant to acquire the practice of virtue. In an oligarchy also hired
+servants are not admitted to be citizens; because there a man's right
+to bear any office is regulated by his fortune; but mechanics are, for
+many citizens are very rich.
+
+There was a law at Thebes that no one could have a share in the
+government till he had been ten years out of trade. In many states the
+law invites strangers to accept the freedom of the city; and in some
+democracies the son of a free-woman is himself free. The same is also
+observed in many others with respect to natural children; but it is
+through want of citizens regularly born that they admit such: for
+these laws are always made in consequence of a scarcity of
+inhabitants; so, as their numbers increase, they first deprive the
+children of a male or female slave of this privilege, next the child
+of a free-woman, and last of all they will admit none but those whose
+fathers and mothers were both free.
+
+That there are many sorts of citizens, and that he may be said to be
+as completely who shares the honours of the state, is evident from
+what has been already said. Thus Achilles, in Homer, complains of
+Agamemnon's treating him like an unhonoured stranger; for a stranger
+or sojourner is one who does not partake of the honours of the state:
+and whenever the right to the freedom of the city is kept obscure, it
+is for the sake of the inhabitants. [1278b] From what has been said it
+is plain whether the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is
+the same or different: and we find that in some states it is the
+same, in others not; and also that this is not true of each citizen,
+but of those only who take the lead, or are capable of taking the
+lead, in public affairs, either alone or in conjunction with others.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+Having established these points, we proceed next to consider whether
+one form of government only should be established, or more than one;
+and if more, how many, and of what sort, and what are the differences
+between them. The form of government is the ordering and regulating of
+the city, and all the offices in it, particularly those wherein the
+supreme power is lodged; and this power is always possessed by the
+administration; but the administration itself is that particular form
+of government which is established in any state: thus in a democracy
+the supreme power is lodged in the whole people; on the contrary, in
+an oligarchy it is in the hands of a few. We say then, that the form
+of government in these states is different, and we shall find the same
+thing hold good in others. Let us first determine for whose sake a
+city is established; and point out the different species of rule which
+man may submit to in social life.
+
+I have already mentioned in my treatise on the management of a family,
+and the power of the master, that man is an animal naturally formed
+for society, and that therefore, when he does not want any foreign
+assistance, he will of his own accord desire to live with others; not
+but that mutual advantage induces them to it, as far as it enables
+each person to live more agreeably; and this is indeed the great
+object not only to all in general, but also to each individual: but it
+is not merely matter of choice, but they join in society also, even
+that they may be able to live, which probably is not without some
+share of merit, and they also support civil society, even for the sake
+of preserving life, without they are grievously overwhelmed with the
+miseries of it: for it is very evident that men will endure many
+calamities for the sake of living, as being something naturally sweet
+and desirable. It is easy to point out the different modes of
+government, and we have already settled them in our exoteric
+discourses. The power of the master, though by nature equally
+serviceable, both to the master and to the slave, yet nevertheless has
+for its object the benefit of the master, while the benefit of the
+slave arises accidentally; for if the slave is destroyed, the power of
+the master is at an end: but the authority which a man has over his
+wife, and children, and his family, which we call domestic government,
+is either for the benefit of those who are under subjection, or else
+for the common benefit of the whole: but its particular object is the
+benefit of the governed, as we see in other arts; in physic, for
+instance, and the gymnastic exercises, wherein, if any benefit [1279a]
+arise to the master, it is accidental; for nothing forbids the master
+of the exercises from sometimes being himself one of those who
+exercises, as the steersman is always one of the sailors; but both the
+master of the exercises and the steersman consider the good of those
+who are under their government. Whatever good may happen to the
+steersman when he is a sailor, or to the master of the exercises when
+he himself makes one at the games, is not intentional, or the object
+of their power; thus in all political governments which are
+established to preserve and defend the equality of the citizens it is
+held right to rule by turns. Formerly, as was natural, every one
+expected that each of his fellow-citizens should in his turn serve the
+public, and thus administer to his private good, as he himself when in
+office had done for others; but now every one is desirous of being
+continually in power, that he may enjoy the advantage which he makes
+of public business and being in office; as if places were a
+never-failing remedy for every complaint, and were on that account so
+eagerly sought after.
+
+It is evident, then, that all those governments which have a common
+good in view are rightly established and strictly just, but those who
+have in view only the good of the rulers are all founded on wrong
+principles, and are widely different from what a government ought to
+be, for they are tyranny over slaves, whereas a city is a community of
+freemen.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+
+Having established these particulars, we come to consider next the
+different number of governments which there are, and what they are;
+and first, what are their excellencies: for when we have determined
+this, their defects will be evident enough.
+
+It is evident that every form of government or administration, for the
+words are of the same import, must contain a supreme power over the
+whole state, and this supreme power must necessarily be in the hands
+of one person, or a few, or many; and when either of these apply their
+power for the common good, such states are well governed; but when the
+interest of the one, the few, or the many who enjoy this power is
+alone consulted, then ill; for you must either affirm that those who
+make up the community are not citizens, or else let these share in the
+advantages of government. We usually call a state which is governed by
+one person for the common good, a kingdom; one that is governed by
+more than one, but by a few only, an aristocracy; either because the
+government is in the hands of the most worthy citizens, or because it
+is the best form for the city and its inhabitants. When the citizens
+at large govern for the public good, it is called a state; which is
+also a common name for all other governments, and these distinctions
+are consonant to reason; for it will not be difficult to find one
+person, or a very few, of very distinguished abilities, but almost
+impossible to meet with the majority [1279b] of a people eminent for
+every virtue; but if there is one common to a whole nation it is
+valour; for this is created and supported by numbers: for which reason
+in such a state the profession of arms will always have the greatest
+share in the government.
+
+Now the corruptions attending each of these governments are these; a
+kingdom may degenerate into a tyranny, an aristocracy into an
+oligarchy, and a state into a democracy. Now a tyranny is a monarchy
+where the good of one man only is the object of government, an
+oligarchy considers only the rich, and a democracy only the poor; but
+neither of them have a common good in view.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+
+It will be necessary to enlarge a little more upon the nature of each
+of these states, which is not without some difficulty, for he who
+would enter into a philosophical inquiry into the principles of them,
+and not content himself with a superficial view of their outward
+conduct, must pass over and omit nothing, but explain the true spirit
+of each of them. A tyranny then is, as has been said, a monarchy,
+where one person has an absolute and despotic power over the whole
+community and every member therein: an oligarchy, where the supreme
+power of the state is lodged with the rich: a democracy, on the
+contrary, is where those have it who are worth little or nothing. But
+the first difficulty that arises from the distinctions which we have
+laid down is this, should it happen that the majority of the
+inhabitants who possess the power of the state (for this is a
+democracy) should be rich, the question is, how does this agree with
+what we have said? The same difficulty occurs, should it ever happen
+that the poor compose a smaller part of the people than the rich, but
+from their superior abilities acquire the supreme power; for this is
+what they call an oligarchy; it should seem then that our definition
+of the different states was not correct: nay, moreover, could any one
+suppose that the majority of the people were poor, and the minority
+rich, and then describe the state in this manner, that an oligarchy
+was a government in which the rich, being few in number, possessed the
+supreme power, and that a democracy was a state in which the poor,
+being many in number, possessed it, still there will be another
+difficulty; for what name shall we give to those states we have been
+describing? I mean, that b which the greater number are rich, and that
+in which the lesser number are poor (where each of these possess the
+supreme power), if there are no other states than those we have
+described. It seems therefore evident to reason, that whether the
+supreme power is vested in the hands of many or few may be a matter of
+accident; but that it is clear enough, that when it is in the hands of
+the few, it will be a government of the rich; when in the hands of the
+many, it will be a government of the poor; since in all countries
+there are many poor and few rich: it is not therefore the cause that
+has been already assigned (namely, the number of people in power) that
+makes the difference between the two governments; but an oligarchy and
+democracy differ in this from each other, in the poverty of those who
+govern in the one, and the riches I28oa of those who govern in the
+other; for when the government is in the hands of the rich, be they
+few or be they more, it is an oligarchy; when it is in the hands of
+the poor, it is a democracy: but, as we have already said, the one
+will be always few, the other numerous, but both will enjoy liberty;
+and from the claims of wealth and liberty will arise continual
+disputes with each other for the lead in public affairs.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+
+Let us first determine what are the proper limits of an oligarchy and
+a democracy, and what is just in each of these states; for all men
+have some natural inclination to justice; but they proceed therein
+only to a certain degree; nor can they universally point out what is
+absolutely just; as, for instance, what is equal appears just, and is
+so; but not to all; only among those who are equals: and what is
+unequal appears just, and is so; but not to all, only amongst those
+who are unequals; which circumstance some people neglect, and
+therefore judge ill; the reason for which is, they judge for
+themselves, and every one almost is the worst judge in his own cause.
+Since then justice has reference to persons, the same distinctions
+must be made with respect to persons which are made with respect to
+things, in the manner that I have already described in my Ethics.
+
+As to the equality of the things, these they agree in; but their
+dispute is concerning the equality of the persons, and chiefly for the
+reason above assigned; because they judge ill in their own cause; and
+also because each party thinks, that if they admit what is right in
+some particulars, they have done justice on the whole: thus, for
+instance, if some persons are unequal in riches, they suppose them
+unequal in the whole; or, on the contrary, if they are equal in
+liberty, they suppose them equal in the whole: but what is absolutely
+just they omit; for if civil society was founded for the sake of
+preserving and increasing property, every one's right in the city
+would be equal to his fortune; and then the reasoning of those who
+insist upon an oligarchy would be valid; for it would not be right
+that he who contributed one mina should have an equal share in the
+hundred along with him who brought in all the rest, either of the
+original money or what was afterwards acquired.
+
+Nor was civil society founded merely to preserve the lives of its
+members; but that they might live well:  for otherwise a state might
+be composed of slaves, or the animal creation: but this is not so; for
+these have no share in the happiness of it; nor do they live after
+their own choice; nor is it an alliance mutually to defend each other
+from injuries, or for a commercial intercourse: for then the
+Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all other nations between whom
+treaties of commerce subsist, would be citizens of one city; for they
+have articles to regulate their exports and imports, and engagements
+for mutual protection, and alliances for mutual defence; but [1280b]
+yet they have not all the same magistrates established among them, but
+they are different among the different people; nor does the one take
+any care, that the morals of the other should be as they ought, or
+that none of those who have entered into the common agreements should
+be unjust, or in any degree vicious, only that they do not injure any
+member of the confederacy. But whosoever endeavours to establish
+wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of
+each individual who composes it; from whence it is evident, that the
+first care of him who would found a city, truly deserving that name,
+and not nominally so, must be to have his citizens virtuous; for
+otherwise it is merely an alliance for self-defence; differing from
+those of the same cast which are made between different people only in
+place: for law is an agreement and a pledge, as the sophist Lycophron
+says, between the citizens of their intending to do justice to each
+other, though not sufficient to make all the citizens just and good:
+and that this is fiact is evident, for could any one bring different
+places together, as, for instance, enclose Megara and Corinth in a
+wall, yet they would not be one city, not even if the inhabitants
+intermarried with each other, though this inter-community contributes
+much to make a place one city. Besides, could we suppose a set of
+people to live separate from each other, but within such a distance as
+would admit of an intercourse, and that there were laws subsisting
+between each party, to prevent their injuring one another in their
+mutual dealings, supposing one a carpenter, another a husbandman,
+shoemaker, and the like, and that their numbers were ten thousand,
+still all that they would have together in common would be a tariff
+for trade, or an alliance for mutual defence, but not the same city.
+And why? not because their mutual intercourse is not near enough, for
+even if persons so situated should come to one place, and every one
+should live in his own house as in his native city, and there should
+be alliances subsisting between each party to mutually assist and
+prevent any injury being done to the other, still they would not be
+admitted to be a city by those who think correctly, if they preserved
+the same customs when they were together as when they were separate.
+
+It is evident, then, that a city is not a community of place; nor
+established for the sake of mutual safety or traffic with each other;
+but that these things are the necessary consequences of a city,
+although they may all exist where there is no city: but a city is a
+society of people joining together with their families and their
+children to live agreeably for the sake of having their lives as happy
+and as independent as possible: and for this purpose it is necessary
+that they should live in one place and intermarry with each other:
+hence in ail cities there are family-meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and
+public entertainments to promote friendship; for a love of sociability
+is friendship itself; so that the end then for which a city is
+established is, that the inhabitants of it may live happy, and these
+things are conducive to that end: for it is a community of families
+and villages for the sake of a perfect independent life; that is, as
+we have already said, for the sake of living well and happily. It is
+not therefore founded for the purpose of men's merely [1281a] living
+together, but for their living as men ought; for which reason those
+who contribute most to this end deserve to have greater power in the
+city than those who are their equals in family and freedom, but their
+inferiors in civil virtue, or those who excel them in wealth but are
+below them in worth. It is evident from what has been said, that in
+all disputes upon government each party says something that is just.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+
+It may also be a doubt where the supreme power ought to be lodged.
+Shall it be with the majority, or the wealthy, with a number of proper
+persons, or one better than the rest, or with a tyrant? But whichever
+of these we prefer some difficulty will arise. For what? shall the
+poor have it because they are the majority? they may then divide among
+themselves, what belongs to the rich: nor is this unjust; because
+truly it has been so judged by the supreme power. But what avails it
+to point out what is the height of injustice if this is not? Again, if
+the many seize into their own hands everything which belongs to the
+few, it is evident that the city will be at an end. But virtue will
+never destroy what is virtuous; nor can what is right be the ruin of
+the state: therefore such a law can never be right, nor can the acts
+of a tyrant ever be wrong, for of necessity they must all be just; for
+he, from his unlimited power, compels every one to obey his command,
+as the multitude oppress the rich. Is it right then that the rich, the
+few, should have the supreme power? and what if they be guilty of the
+same rapine and plunder the possessions of the majority, that will be
+as right as the other: but that all things of this sort are wrong and
+unjust is evident. Well then, these of the better sort shall have it:
+but must not then all the other citizens live unhonoured, without
+sharing the offices of the city; for the offices of a city are its
+honours, and if one set of men are always in power, it is evident that
+the rest must be without honour. Well then, let it be with one person
+of all others the fittest for it: but by this means the power will be
+still more contracted, and a greater number than before continue
+unhonoured. But some one may say, that it is wrong to let man have the
+supreme power and not the law, as his soul is subject to so many
+passions. But if this law appoints an aristocracy, or a democracy, how
+will it help us in our present doubts? for those things will happen
+which we have already mentioned.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+
+Other particulars we will consider separately; but it seems proper to
+prove, that the supreme power ought to be lodged with the many, rather
+than with those of the better sort, who are few; and also to explain
+what doubts (and probably just ones) may arise: now, though not one
+individual of the many may himself be fit for the supreme power, yet
+when these many are joined together, it does not follow but they may
+be better qualified for it than those; and this not separately, but as
+a collective body; as the public suppers exceed those which are given
+at one person's private expense: for, as they are many, each person
+brings in his share of virtue and wisdom; and thus, coming together,
+they are like one man made up of a multitude, with many feet, many
+hands, and many intelligences: thus is it with respect to the manners
+and understandings of the multitude taken together; for which reason
+the public are the best judges of music and poetry; for some
+understand one part, some another, and all collectively the whole; and
+in this particular men of consequence differ from each of the many; as
+they say those who are beautiful do from those who are not so, and as
+fine pictures excel any natural objects, by collecting the several
+beautiful parts which were dispersed among different originals into
+one, although the separate parts, as the eye or any other, might be
+handsomer than in the picture.
+
+But if this distinction is to be made between every people and every
+general assembly, and some few men of consequence, it may be doubtful
+whether it is true; nay, it is clear enough that, with respect to a
+few, it is not; since the same conclusion might be applied even to
+brutes: and indeed wherein do some men differ from brutes? Not but
+that nothing prevents what I have said being true of the people in
+some states. The doubt then which we have lately proposed, with all
+its consequences, may be settled in this manner; it is necessary
+that the freemen who compose the bulk of the people should have
+absolute power in some things; but as they are neither men of
+property, nor act uniformly upon principles of virtue, it is not safe
+to trust them with the first offices in the state, both on account of
+their iniquity and their ignorance; from the one of which they will do
+what is wrong, from the other they will mistake: and yet it is
+dangerous to allow them no power or share in the government; for when
+there are many poor people who are incapable of acquiring the honours
+of their country, the state must necessarily have many enemies in it;
+let them then be permitted to vote in the public assemblies and to
+determine causes; for which reason Socrates, and some other
+legislators, gave them the power of electing the officers of the
+state, and also of inquiring into their conduct when they came out of
+office, and only prevented their being magistrates by themselves; for
+the multitude when they are collected together have all of them
+sufficient understanding for these purposes, and, mixing among those
+of higher rank, are serviceable to the city, as some things, which
+alone are improper for food, when mixed with others make the whole
+more wholesome than a few of them would be.
+
+But there is a difficulty attending this form of government, for it
+seems, that the person who himself was capable of curing any one who
+was then sick, must be the best judge whom to employ as a physician;
+but such a one must be himself a physician; and the same holds true in
+every other practice and art: and as a physician ought [1282a] to give
+an account of his practice to a physician, so ought it to be in other
+arts: those whose business is physic may be divided into three sorts,
+the first of these is he who makes up the medicines; the second
+prescribes, and is to the other as the architect is to the mason; the
+third is he who understands the science, but never practises it: now
+these three distinctions may be found in those who understand all
+other arts; nor have we less opinion of their judgment who are only
+instructed in the principles of the art than of those who practise it:
+and with respect to elections the same method of proceeding seems
+right; for to elect a proper person in any science is the business of
+those who are skilful therein; as in geometry, of geometricians; in
+steering, of steersmen: but if some individuals should know something
+of particular arts and works, they do not know more than the
+professors of them: so that even upon this principle neither the
+election of magistrates, nor the censure of their conduct, should be
+entrusted to the many.
+
+But probably all that has been here said may not be right; for, to
+resume the argument I lately used, if the people are not very brutal
+indeed, although we allow that each individual knows less of these
+affairs than those who have given particular attention to them, yet
+when they come together they will know them better, or at least not
+worse; besides, in some particular arts it is not the workman only who
+is the best judge; namely, in those the works of which are understood
+by those who do not profess them: thus he who builds a house is not
+the only judge of it, for the master of the family who inhabits it is
+a better; thus also a steersman is a better judge of a tiller than he
+who made it; and he who gives an entertainment than the cook. What has
+been said seems a sufficient solution of this difficulty; but there is
+another that follows: for it seems absurd that the power of the state
+should be lodged with those who are but of indifferent morals, instead
+of those who are of excellent characters. Now the power of election
+and censure are of the utmost consequence, and this, as has been said,
+in some states they entrust to the people; for the general assembly is
+the supreme court of all, and they have a voice in this, and
+deliberate in all public affairs, and try all causes, without any
+objection to the meanness of their circumstances, and at any age: but
+their treasurers, generals, and other great officers of state are
+taken from men of great fortune and worth. This difficulty also may be
+solved upon the same principle; and here too they may be right, for
+the power is not in the man who is member of the assembly, or council,
+but the assembly itself, and the council, and the people, of which
+each individual of the whole community are the parts, I mean as
+senator, adviser, or judge; for which reason it is very right, that
+the many should have the greatest powers in their own hands; for the
+people, the council, and the judges are composed of them, and the
+property of all these collectively is more than the property of any
+person or a few who fill the great offices of the state: and thus I
+determine these points.
+
+The first question that we stated shows plainly, that the supreme
+power should be lodged in laws duly made and that the magistrate or
+magistrates, either one or more, should be authorised to determine
+those cases which the laws cannot particularly speak to, as it is
+impossible for them, in general language, to explain themselves upon
+everything that may arise: but what these laws are which are
+established upon the best foundations has not been yet explained, but
+still remains a matter of some question: but the laws of every state
+will necessarily be like every state, either trifling or excellent,
+just or unjust; for it is evident, that the laws must be framed
+correspondent to the constitution of the government; and, if so, it is
+plain, that a well-formed government will have good laws, a bad one,
+bad ones.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+
+Since in every art and science the end aimed at is always good, so
+particularly in this, which is the most excellent of all, the founding
+of civil society, the good wherein aimed at is justice; for it is this
+which is for the benefit of all. Now, it is the common opinion, that
+justice is a certain equality; and in this point all the philosophers
+are agreed when they treat of morals: for they say what is just, and
+to whom; and that equals ought to receive equal: but we should know
+how we are to determine what things are equal and what unequal; and in
+this there is some difficulty, which calls for the philosophy of the
+politician. Some persons will probably say, that the employments of
+the state ought to be given according to every particular excellence
+of each citizen, if there is no other difference between them and the
+rest of the community, but they are in every respect else alike: for
+justice attributes different things to persons differing from each
+other in their character, according to their respective merits. But if
+this is admitted to be true, complexion, or height, or any such
+advantage will be a claim for a greater share of the public rights.
+But that this is evidently absurd is clear from other arts and
+sciences; for with respect to musicians who play on the flute
+together, the best flute is not given to him who is of the best
+family, for he will play never the better for that, but the best
+instrument ought to be given to him who is the best artist.
+
+If what is now said does not make this clear, we will explain it still
+further: if there should be any one, a very excellent player on the
+flute, but very deficient in family and beauty, though each of them
+are more valuable endowments than a skill in music, and excel this art
+in a higher degree than that player excels others, yet the best flutes
+ought to be given to him; for the superiority [1283a] in beauty and
+fortune should have a reference to the business in hand; but these
+have none. Moreover, according to this reasoning, every possible
+excellence might come in comparison with every other; for if bodily
+strength might dispute the point with riches or liberty, even any
+bodily strength might do it; so that if one person excelled in size
+more than another did in virtue, and his size was to qualify him to
+take place of the other's virtue, everything must then admit of a
+comparison with each other; for if such a size is greater than virtue
+by so much, it is evident another must be equal to it: but, since this
+is impossible, it is plain that it would be contrary to common sense
+to dispute a right to any office in the state from every superiority
+whatsoever: for if one person is slow and the other swift, neither is
+the one better qualified nor the other worse on that account, though
+in the gymnastic races a difference in these particulars would gain
+the prize; but a pretension to the offices of the state should be
+founded on a superiority in those qualifications which are useful to
+it: for which reason those of family, independency, and fortune, with
+great propriety, contend with each other for them; for these are the
+fit persons to fill them: for a city can no more consist of all poor
+men than it can of all slaves But if such persons are requisite, it is
+evident that those also who are just and valiant are equally so; for
+without justice and valour no state can be supported, the former being
+necessary for its existence, the latter for its happiness.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+
+It seems, then, requisite for the establishment of a state, that all,
+or at least many of these particulars should be well canvassed and
+inquired into; and that virtue and education may most justly claim the
+right of being considered as the necessary means of making the
+citizens happy, as we have already said. As those who are equal in one
+particular are not therefore equal in all, and those who are unequal
+in one particular are not therefore unequal in all, it follows that
+all those governments which are established upon a principle which
+supposes they are, are erroneous.
+
+We have already said, that all the members of the community will
+dispute with each other for the offices of the state; and in some
+particulars justly, but not so in general; the rich, for instance,
+because they have the greatest landed property, and the ultimate right
+to the soil is vested in the community; and also because their
+fidelity is in general most to be depended on. The freemen and men of
+family will dispute the point with each other, as nearly on an
+equality; for these latter have a right to a higher regard as citizens
+than obscure persons, for honourable descent is everywhere of great
+esteem: nor is it an improper conclusion, that the descendants of men
+of worth will be men of worth themselves; for noble birth is the
+fountain of virtue to men of family: for the same reason also we
+justly say, that virtue has a right to put in her pretensions.
+Justice, for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary to society, that
+all others must yield her the precedence.
+
+Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the
+few; and they may say, that if, when collectively taken, they are
+compared with them, they are stronger, richer, and better than they
+are. But should it ever happen that all these should inhabit the
+[1283b] same city, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as
+the many, such as usually make up the community, I ask, will there
+then be any reason to dispute concerning who shall govern, or will
+there not? for in every community which we have mentioned there is no
+dispute where the supreme power should be placed; for as these differ
+from each other, so do those in whom that is placed; for in one state
+the rich enjoy it, in others the meritorious, and thus each according
+to their separate manners. Let us however consider what is to be done
+when all these happen at the same time to inhabit the same city. If
+the virtuous should be very few in number, how then shall we act?
+shall we prefer the virtuous on account of their abilities, if they
+are capable of governing the city? or should they be so many as almost
+entirely to compose the state?
+
+There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those who
+claim the honours of government: for those who found them either on
+fortune or family have nothing which they can justly say in their
+defence; since it is evident upon their principle, that if any one
+person can be found richer than all the rest, the right of governing
+all these will be justly vested in this one person. In the same
+manner, one man who is of the best family will claim it from those who
+dispute the point upon family merit: and probably in an aristocracy
+the same dispute might arise on the score of virtue, if there is one
+man better than all the other men of worth who are in the same
+community; it seems just, by the same reasoning, that he should enjoy
+the supreme power. And upon this principle also, while the many
+suppose they ought to have the supreme command, as being more powerful
+than the few, if one or more than one, though a small number should be
+found stronger than themselves, these ought rather to have it than
+they.
+
+All these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles
+are justly founded on which these persons would establish their right
+to the supreme power; and that all men whatsoever ought to obey them:
+for with respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their
+fortune, they might have justly some objection to make; for nothing
+hinders but that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better
+or richer than the few, not as individuals, but in their collective
+capacity.
+
+As to the doubt which some persons have proposed and objected, we may
+answer it in this manner; it is this, whether a legislator, who would
+establish the most perfect system of laws, should calculate them for
+the use of the better part of the citizens, or the many, in the
+circumstances we have already mentioned? The rectitude of anything
+consists in its equality; that therefore which is equally right will
+be advantageous to the whole state, and to every member of it in
+common.
+
+Now, in general, a citizen is one who both shares in the government
+and also in his turn submits to be governed; [1284a] their condition,
+it is true, is different in different states: the best is that in
+which a man is enabled to choose and to persevere in a course of
+virtue during his whole life, both in his public and private state.
+But should there be one person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon
+degree of virtue, though not enough to make up a civil state, so that
+the virtue of the many, or their political abilities, should be too
+inferior to come in comparison with theirs, if more than one; or if
+but one, with his only; such are not to be considered as part of the
+city; for it would be doing them injustice to rate them on a level
+with those who are so far their inferiors in virtue and political
+abilities, that they appear to them like a god amongst men. From
+whence it is evident, that a system of laws must be calculated for
+those who are equal to each other in nature and power. Such men,
+therefore, are not the object of law; for they are themselves a law:
+and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to include them in
+the penalties of a law: for probably they might say what Antisthenes
+tells us the lions did to the hares when they demanded to be admitted
+to an equal share with them in the government. And it is on this
+account that democratic states have established the ostracism; for an
+equality seems the principal object of their government. For which
+reason they compel all those who are very eminent for their power,
+their fortune, their friendships, or any other cause which may give
+them too great weight in the government, to submit to the ostracism,
+and leave the city for a stated time; as the fabulous histories relate
+the Argonauts served Hercules, for they refused to take him with them
+in the ship Argo on account of his superior valour. For which reason
+those who hate a tyranny and find fault with the advice which
+Periander gave to Thrasybulus, must not think there was nothing to be
+said in its defence; for the story goes, that Periander said nothing
+to the messenger in answer to the business he was consulted about, but
+striking off those ears of corn which were higher than the rest,
+reduced the whole crop to a level; so that the messenger, without
+knowing the cause of what was done, related the fact to Thrasybulus,
+who understood by it that he must take off all the principal men in
+the city. Nor is this serviceable to tyrants only; nor is it tyrants
+only who do it; for the same thing is practised both in oligarchies
+and democracies: for the ostracism has in a manner nearly the same
+power, by restraining and banishing those who are too great; and what
+is done in one city is done also by those who have the supreme power
+in separate states; as the Athenians with respect to the Samians, the
+Chians, and the Lesbians; for when they suddenly acquired the
+superiority over all Greece, they brought the other states into
+subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them. The
+King of Persia also very often reduces the Medes and Babylonians when
+they assume upon their former power: [1284b] and this is a principle
+which all governments whatsoever keep in their eye; even those which
+are best administered, as well as those which are not, do it; these
+for the sake of private utility, the others for the public good.
+
+The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences; for
+a painter would not represent an animal with a foot disproportionally
+large, though he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the
+shipwright make the prow or any other part of the vessel larger than
+it ought to be; nor will the master of the band permit any who sings
+louder and better than the rest to sing in concert with them. There is
+therefore no reason that a monarch should not act in agreement with
+free states, to support his own power, if they do the same thing for
+the benefit of their respective communities; upon which account when
+there is any acknowledged difference in the power of the citizens, the
+reason upon which the ostracism is founded will be politically just;
+but it is better for the legislator so to establish his state at the
+beginning as not to want this remedy: but if in course of time such an
+inconvenience should arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such
+correction. Not that this was the use it was put to: for many did not
+regard the benefit of their respective communities, but made the
+ostracism a weapon in the hand of sedition.
+
+It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and
+useful to the individual, though probably it is as clear that it is
+not entirely just: for in a well-governed state there may be great
+doubts about the use of it, not on account of the pre-eminence which
+one may have in strength, riches, or connection: but when the
+pre-eminence is virtue, what then is to be done? for it seems not
+right to turn out and banish such a one; neither does it seem right to
+govern him, for that would be like desiring to share the power with
+Jupiter and to govern him: nothing then remains but what indeed seems
+natural, and that is for all persons quietly to submit to the
+government of those who are thus eminently virtuous, and let them be
+perpetually kings in the separate states.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+
+What has been now said, it seems proper to change our subject and to
+inquire into the nature of monarchies; for we have already admitted
+them to be one of those species of government which are properly
+founded. And here let us consider whether a kingly government is
+proper for a city or a country whose principal object is the happiness
+of the inhabitants, or rather some other. But let us first determine
+whether this is of one kind only, or more; [1285a] and it is easy to
+know that it consists of many different species, and that the forms of
+government are not the same in all: for at Sparta the kingly power
+seems chiefly regulated by the laws; for it is not supreme in all
+circumstances; but when the king quits the territories of the state he
+is their general in war; and all religious affairs are entrusted to
+him: indeed the kingly power with them is chiefly that of a general
+who cannot be called to an account for his conduct, and whose command
+is for life: for he has not the power of life and death, except as a
+general; as they frequently had in their expeditions by martial law,
+which we learn from Homer; for when Agamemnon is affronted in council,
+he restrains his resentment, but when he is in the field and armed
+with this power, he tells the Greeks:
+
+  "Whoe'er I know shall shun th' impending fight,   To dogs and
+vultures soon shall be a prey;   For death is mine.  . . ."
+
+This, then, is one species of monarchical government in which the
+kingly power is in a general for life; and is sometimes hereditary,
+sometimes elective: besides, there is also another, which is to be met
+with among some of the barbarians, in which the kings are invested
+with powers nearly equal to a tyranny, yet are, in some respects,
+bound by the laws and the customs of their country; for as the
+barbarians are by nature more prone to slavery than the Greeks, and
+those in Asia more than those in Europe, they endure without murmuring
+a despotic government; for this reason their governments are
+tyrannies; but yet not liable to be overthrown, as being customary and
+according to law. Their guards also are such as are used in a kingly
+government, not a despotic one; for the guards of their kings are his
+citizens, but a tyrant's are foreigners. The one commands, in the
+manner the law directs, those who willingly obey; the other,
+arbitrarily, those who consent not. The one, therefore, is guarded by
+the citizens, the other against them.
+
+These, then, are the two different sorts of these monarchies, and
+another is that which in ancient Greece they called _aesumnetes_;
+which is nothing more than an elective tyranny; and its difference
+from that which is to be found amongst the barbarians consists not in
+its' not being according to law, but only in its not being according
+to the ancient customs of the country. Some persons possessed this
+power for life, others only for a particular time or particular
+purpose, as the people of Mitylene elected Pittacus to oppose the
+exiles, who were headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet, as we
+learn from a poem of his; for he upbraids the Mitylenians for having
+chosen Pittacus for their tyrant, and with one [1285b] voice extolling
+him to the skies who was the ruin of a rash and devoted people. These
+sorts of government then are, and ever were, despotic, on account of
+their being tyrannies; but inasmuch as they are elective, and over a
+free people, they are also kingly.
+
+A fourth species of kingly government is that which was in use in the
+heroic times, when a free people submitted to a kingly government,
+according to the laws and customs of their country. For those who were
+at first of benefit to mankind, either in arts or arms, or by
+collecting them into civil society, or procuring them an
+establishment, became the kings of a willing people, and established
+an hereditary monarchy. They were particularly their generals in war,
+and presided over their sacrifices, excepting such only as belonged to
+the priests: they were also the supreme judges over the people; and in
+this case some of them took an oath, others did not; they did, the
+form of swearing was by their sceptre held out.
+
+In ancient times the power of the kings extended to everything
+whatsoever, both civil, domestic, and foreign; but in after-times they
+relinquished some of their privileges, and others the people assumed,
+so that, in some states, they left their kings only the right of
+presiding over the sacrifices; and even those whom it were worth while
+to call by that name had only the right of being commander-in-chief in
+their foreign wars.
+
+These, then, are the four sorts of kingdoms : the first is that of the
+heroic times; which was a government over a free people, with its
+rights in some particulars marked out; for the king was their general,
+their judge, and their high priest. The second, that of the
+barbarians; which is an hereditary despotic government regulated by
+laws: the third is that which they call aesumnetic, which is an
+elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedaemonian; and this, in few
+words, is nothing more than an hereditary generalship: and in these
+particulars they differ from each other. There is a fifth species of
+kingly government, which is when one person has a supreme power over
+all things whatsoever, in the manner that every state and every city
+has over those things which belong to the public: for as the master of
+a family is king in his own house, so such a king is master of a
+family in his own city or state.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+
+But the different sorts of kingly governments may, if I may so say, be
+reduced to two; which we will consider more particularly. The last
+spoken of, and the Lacedaemonian, for the chief of the others are
+placed between these, which are as it were at the extremities, they
+having less power than an absolute government, and yet more than the
+Lacedaemonians; so that the whole matter in question may be reduced to
+these two points; the one is, whether it is advantageous to the
+citizens to have the office of general continue in one person for
+life, and whether it should be confined to any particular families or
+whether every one should be eligible: the other, whether [1286a] it is
+advantageous for one person to have the supreme power over everything
+or not. But to enter into the particulars concerning the office of a
+Lacedaemonian general would be rather to frame laws for a state than
+to consider the nature and utility of its constitution, since we know
+that the appointing of a general is what is done in every state.
+Passing over this question then, we will proceed to consider the other
+part of their government, which is the polity of the state; and this
+it will be necessary to examine particularly into, and to go through
+such questions as may arise.
+
+Now the first thing which presents itself to our consideration is
+this, whether it is best to be governed by a good man, or by good
+laws? Those who prefer a kingly government think that laws can only
+speak a general language, but cannot adapt themselves to particular
+circumstances; for which reason it is absurd in any science to follow
+written rule; and even in Egypt the physician was allowed to alter the
+mode of cure which the law prescribed to him, after the fourth day;
+but if he did it sooner it was at his own peril: from whence it is
+evident, on the very same account, that a government of written laws
+is not the best; and yet general reasoning is necessary to all those
+who are to govern, and it will be much more perfect in those who are
+entirely free from passions than in those to whom they are natural.
+But now this is a quality which laws possess; while the other is
+natural to the human soul. But some one will say in answer to this,
+that man will be a better judge of particulars. It will be necessary,
+then, for a king to be a lawgiver, and that his laws should be
+published, but that those should have no authority which are absurd,
+as those which are not, should. But whether is it better for the
+community that those things which cannot possibly come under the
+cognisance of the law either at all or properly should be under the
+government of every worthy citizen, as the present method is, when the
+public community, in their general assemblies, act as judges and
+counsellors, where all their determinations are upon particular cases,
+for one individual, be he who he will, will be found, upon comparison,
+inferior to a whole people taken collectively: but this is what a city
+is, as a public entertainment is better than one man's portion: for
+this reason the multitude judge of many things better than any one
+single person. They are also less liable to corruption from their
+numbers, as water is from its quantity: besides, the judgment of an
+individual must necessarily be perverted if he is overcome by anger or
+any other passion; but it would be hard indeed if the whole community
+should be misled by anger. Moreover, let the people be free, and they
+will do nothing but in conformity to the law, except only in those
+cases which the law cannot speak to. But though what I am going to
+propose may not easily be met with, yet if the majority of the state
+should happen to be good men, should they prefer one uncorrupt
+governor or many equally good, is it not evident that they should
+choose the many? But there may be divisions among [1286b] these which
+cannot happen when there is but one. In answer to this it may be
+replied that all their souls will be as much animated with virtue as
+this one man's.
+
+If then a government of many, and all of them good men, compose an
+aristocracy, and the government of one a kingly power, it is evident
+that the people should rather choose the first than the last; and this
+whether the state is powerful or not, if many such persons so alike
+can be met with: and for this reason probable it was, that the first
+governments were generally monarchies; because it was difficult to
+find a number of persons eminently virtuous, more particularly as the
+world was then divided into small communities; besides, kings were
+appointed in return for the benefits they had conferred on mankind;
+but such actions are peculiar to good men: but when many persons equal
+in virtue appeared at the time, they brooked not a superiority, but
+sought after an equality and established a free state; but after this,
+when they degenerated, they made a property of the public; which
+probably gave rise to oligarchies; for they made wealth meritorious,
+and the honours of government were reserved for the rich: and these
+afterwards turned to tyrannies and these in their turn gave rise to
+democracies; for the power of the tyrants continually decreasing, on
+account of their rapacious avarice, the people grew powerful enough to
+frame and establish democracies: and as cities after that happened to
+increase, probably it was not easy for them to be under any other
+government than a democracy. But if any person prefers a kingly
+government in a state, what is to be done with the king's children? Is
+the family also to reign? But should they have such children as some
+persons usually have, it will be very detrimental. It may be said,
+that then the king who has it in his power will never permit such
+children to succeed to his kingdom. But it is not easy to trust to
+that; for it is very hard and requires greater virtue than is to be
+met with in human nature. There is also a doubt concerning the power
+with which a king should be entrusted: whether he should be allowed
+force sufficient to compel those who do not choose to be obedient to
+the laws, and how he is to support his government? for if he is to
+govern according to law and do nothing of his own will which is
+contrary thereunto, at the same time it will be necessary to protect
+that power with which he guards the law, This matter however may not
+be very difficult to determine; for he ought to have a proper power,
+and such a one is that which will be sufficient to make the king
+superior to any one person or even a large part of the community, but
+inferior to the whole, as the ancients always appointed guards for
+that person whom they created aesumnetes or tyrant; and some one
+advised the Syracusians, when Dionysius asked for guards, to allow him
+such.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+
+[1287a] We will next consider the absolute monarch that we have just
+mentioned, who does everything according to his own will: for a king
+governing under the direction of laws which he is obliged to follow
+does not of himself create any particular species of government, as we
+have already said: for in every state whatsoever, either aristocracy
+or democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life; and there are
+many who entrust the administration of affairs to one person only;
+such is the government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the same at Opus. As
+for an absolute monarchy as it is called, that is to say, when the
+whole state is wholly subject to the will of one person, namely the
+king, it seems to many that it is unnatural that one man should have
+the entire rule over his fellow-citizens when the state consists of
+equals: for nature requires that the same right and the same rank
+should necessarily take place amongst all those who are equal by
+nature: for as it would be hurtful to the body for those who are of
+different constitutions to observe the same regimen, either of diet or
+clothing, so is it with respect to the honours of the state as
+hurtful, that those who are equal in merit should be unequal in rank;
+for which reason it is as much a man's duty to submit to command as to
+assume it, and this also by rotation; for this is law, for order is
+law; and it is more proper that law should govern than any one of  the
+citizens: upon the same principle, if it is advantageous to place the
+supreme power in some particular persons, they should be appointed to
+be only guardians, and the servants of the laws, for the supreme power
+must be placed somewhere; but they say, that it is unjust that where
+all are equal one person should continually enjoy it. But it seems
+unlikely that man should be able to adjust that which the law cannot
+determine; it may be replied, that the law having laid down the best
+rules possible, leaves the adjustment and application of particulars
+to the discretion of the magistrate; besides, it allows anything to be
+altered which experience proves may be better established. Moreover,
+he who would place the supreme power in mind, would place it in God
+and the laws; but he who entrusts man with it, gives it to a wild
+beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; for passion
+influences those who are in power, even the very best of men: for
+which reason law is reason without desire.
+
+The instance taken from the arts seems fallacious: wherein it is said
+to be wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that
+it would be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in
+physic; for these do nothing contrary to reason from motives of
+friendship but earn their money by curing the sick, whereas those who
+have the management of public affairs do many things through hatred or
+favour. And, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be observed,
+that whenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been
+persuaded by his enemies to be guilty of any foul practice to him in
+his profession, he then rather chooses to apply to books for his cure:
+and not only this [1287b] but even physicians themselves when they are
+ill call in other physicians: and those who teach others the gymnastic
+exercises, exercise with those of the same profession, as being
+incapable from self-partiality to form a proper judgment of what
+concerns themselves. From whence it is evident, that those who seek
+for what is just, seek for a mean; now law is a mean. Moreover; the
+moral law is far superior and conversant with far superior objects
+than the written law; for the supreme magistrate is safer to be
+trusted to than the one, though he is inferior to the other. But as it
+is impossible that one person should have an eye to everything
+himself, it will be necessary that the supreme magistrate should
+employ several subordinate ones under him; why then should not this be
+done at first, instead of appointing one person in this manner?
+Besides, if, according to what has been already said, the man of worth
+is on that account fit to govern, two men of worth are certainly
+better than one: as, for instance, in Homer, "Let two together go:"
+and also Agamemnon's wish;  "Were ten such faithful counsel mine!" Not
+but that there are even now some particular magistrates invested with
+supreme power to decide, as judges, those things which the law cannot,
+as being one of those cases which comes not properly under its
+jurisdiction; for of those which can there is no doubt: since then
+laws comprehend some things, but not all, it is necessary to enquire
+and consider which of the two is preferable, that the best man or the
+best law should govern; for to reduce every subject which can come
+under the deliberation of man into a law is impossible.
+
+No one then denies, that it is necessary that there should be some
+person to decide those cases which cannot come under the cognisance of
+a written law: but we say, that it is better to have many than one;
+for though every one who decides according to the principles of the
+law decides justly; yet surely it seems absurd to suppose, that one
+person can see better with two eyes, and hear better with two ears, or
+do better with two hands and two feet, than many can do with many: for
+we see that absolute monarchs now furnish themselves with many eyes
+and ears and hands and feet; for they entrust those who are friends to
+them and their government with part of their power; for if they are
+not friends to the monarch, they will not do what he chooses; but if
+they are friends to him, they are friends also to his government: but
+a friend is an equal and like his friend: if then he thinks that such
+should govern, he thinks that his equal also should govern. These are
+nearly the objections which are usually made to a kingly power.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII
+
+
+Probably what we have said may be true of some persons, but not of
+others; for some men are by nature formed to be under the government
+of a master; others, of a king; others, to be the citizens of a free
+state, just and useful; but a tyranny is not according to nature, nor
+the other perverted forms of government; for they are contrary to it.
+But it is evident from what has been said, that among equals it is
+neither advantageous nor [1288a] right that one person should be lord
+over all where there are no established laws, but his will is the law;
+or where there are; nor is it right that one who is good should have
+it over those who are good; or one who is not good over those who are
+not good; nor one who is superior to the rest In worth, except in a
+particular manner, which shall be described, though indeed it has been
+already mentioned. But let us next determine what people are best
+qualified for a kingly government, what for an aristocratic, and what
+for a democratic. And, first, for a kingly; and it should be those who
+are accustomed by nature to submit the civil government of themselves
+to a family eminent for virtue: for an aristocracy, those who are
+naturally framed to bear the rule of free men, whose superior virtue
+makes them worthy of the management of others: for a free state, a
+war-like people, formed by nature both to govern and be governed by
+laws which admit the poorest citizen to share the honours of the
+commonwealth according to his worth. But whenever a whole family or
+any one of another shall happen so far to excel in virtue as to exceed
+all other persons in the community, the n it is right that the kingly
+power should be in them, or if it is an individual who does so, that
+he should be king and lord of all; for this, as we have just
+mentioned, is not only correspondent to that principle of right which
+all founders of all states, whether aristocracies, oligarchies, or
+democracies, have a regard to (for in placing the supreme power they
+all think it right to fix it to excellence, though not the same); but
+it is also agreeable to what has been already said; as it would not be
+right to kill, or banish, or ostracise such a one for his superior
+merit. Nor would it be proper to let him have the supreme power only
+in turn; for it is contrary to nature that what is highest should ever
+be lowest: but this would be the case should such a one ever be
+governed by others.  So that there can nothing else be done but to
+submit, and permit him continually to enjoy the supreme power. And
+thus much with respect to kingly power in different states, and
+whether it is or is not advantageous to them, and to what, and in what
+manner.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER  XVIII
+
+
+Since then we have said that there are three sorts of regular
+governments, and of these the best must necessarily be that which is
+administered by the best men (and this must be that which happens to
+have one man, or one family, or a number of persons excelling all the
+rest in virtue, who are able to govern and be governed in such a
+manner as will make life most agreeable, and we have already shown
+that the virtue of a good man and of a citizen in the most perfect
+government will be the same), it is evident, that in the same manner,
+and for those very qualities which would procure a man the character
+of good, any one would say, that the government of a state was a
+well-established aristocracy or kingdom; so that it will be found to
+be education and [1288b] morals that are almost the whole which go to
+make a good man, and the same qualities will make a good citizen or
+good king.
+
+These particulars being treated of, we will now proceed to consider
+what sort of government is best, how it naturally arises, and how it
+is established; for it is necessary to make a proper inquiry
+concerning this.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK IV
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+In every art and science which is not conversant in parts but in some
+one genus in which it is complete, it is the business of that art
+alone to determine what is fitted to its particular genus; as what
+particular exercise is fitted to a certain particular body, and suits
+it best: for that body which is formed by nature the most perfect and
+superior to others necessarily requires the best exercise-and also of
+what one kind that must be which will suit the generality; and this is
+the business of the gymnastic arts: and although any one should not
+desire to acquire an exact knowledge and skill in these exercises, yet
+it is not, on that account, the less necessary that he who professes
+to be a master and instruct the youth in them should be perfect
+therein: and we see that this is what equally befalls the healing,
+shipbuilding, cloth-making, and indeed all other arts; so that it
+evidently belongs to the same art to find out what kind of government
+is best, and would of all others be most correspondent to our wish,
+while it received no molestation from without: and what particular
+species of it is adapted to particular persons; for there are many who
+probably are incapable of enjoying the best form: so that the
+legislator, and he who is truly a politician, ought to be acquainted
+not only with that which is most perfect imaginable, but also that
+which is the best suited to any given circumstances. There is,
+moreover, a third sort, an imaginary one, and he ought, if such a one
+should be presented to his consideration, to be able to discern what
+sort of one it would be at the beginning; and, when once established,
+what would be the proper means to preserve it a long time. I mean, for
+instance, if a state should happen not to have the best form of
+government, or be deficient in what was necessary, or not receive
+every advantage possible, but something less. And, besides all this,
+it is necessary to know what sort of government is best fitting for
+all cities: for most of those writers who have treated this subject,
+however speciously they may handle other parts of it, have failed in
+describing the practical parts: for it is not enough to be able to
+perceive what is best without it is what can be put in practice. It
+should also be simple, and easy for all to attain to. But some seek
+only the most subtile forms of government. Others again, choosing
+[1289a] rather to treat of what is common, censure those under which
+they live, and extol the excellence of a particular state, as the
+Lacedaemonian, or some other: but every legislator ought to establish
+such a form of government as from the present state and disposition of
+the people who are to receive it they will most readily submit to and
+persuade the community to partake of: for it is not a business of less
+trouble to correct the mistakes of an established government than to
+form a new one; as it is as difficult to recover what we have forgot
+as to learn anything afresh. He, therefore, who aspires to the
+character of a legislator, ought, besides all we have already said, to
+be able to correct the mistakes of a government already established,
+as we have before mentioned. But this is impossible to be done by him
+who does not know how many different forms of government there are:
+some persons think that there is only one species both of democracy
+and oligarchy; but this is not true: so that every one should be
+acquainted with the difference of these governments, how great they
+are, and whence they arise; and should have equal knowledge to
+perceive what laws are best, and what are most suitable to each
+particular government: for all laws are, and ought to be, framed
+agreeable to the state that is to be governed by them, and not the
+state to the laws: for government is a certain ordering in a state
+which particularly respects the magistrates in what manner they shall
+be regulated, and where the supreme power shall be placed; and what
+shall be the final object which each community shall have in view; but
+the laws are something different from what regulates and expresses the
+form of the constitution-it is their office to direct the conduct of
+the magistrate in the execution of his office and the punishment of
+offenders. From whence it is evident, that the founders of laws should
+attend both to the number and the different sorts of government; for
+it is impossible that the same laws should be calculated for all sorts
+of oligarchies and all sorts of democracies, for of both these
+governments there are many species, not one only.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+Since, then, according to our first method in treating of the
+different forms of government, we have divided those which are regular
+into three sorts, the kingly, the aristocratical, the free states,
+and shown the three excesses which these are liable to: the kingly, of
+becoming tyrannical; the aristocratical, oligarchical; and the free
+state, democratical: and as we have already treated of the
+aristocratical and kingly; for to enter into an inquiry what sort of
+government is best is the same thing as to treat of these two
+expressly; for each of them desires to be established upon the
+principles of virtue: and as, moreover, we have already determined
+wherein a kingly power and an aristocracy differ from each other, and
+when a state may be said to be governed by a king, it now remains that
+we examine into a free state, and also these other governments, an
+oligarchy, a democracy, and a [1289b] tyranny; and it is evident of
+these three excesses which must be the worst of all, and which next to
+it; for, of course, the excesses of the best and most holy must be the
+worst; for it must necessarily happen either that the name of king
+only will remain, or else that the king will assume more power than
+belongs to him, from whence tyranny will arise, the worst excess
+imaginable, a government the most contrary possible to a free state.
+The excess next hurtful is an oligarchy; for an aristocracy differs
+much from this sort of government: that which is least so is a
+democracy.  This subject has been already treated of by one of those
+writers who have gone before me, though his sentiments are not the
+same as mine: for he thought, that of all excellent constitutions, as
+a good oligarchy or the like, a democracy was the worst, but of all
+bad ones, the best.
+
+Now I affirm, that all these states have, without exception, fallen
+into excess; and also that he should not have said that one oligarchy
+was better than another, but that it was not quite so bad. But this
+question we shall not enter into at present. We shall first inquire
+how many different sorts of free states there are; since there are
+many species of democracies and oligarchies; and which of them is the
+most comprehensive, and most desirable after the best form of
+government; or if there is any other like an aristocracy, well
+established; and also which of these is best adapted to most cities,
+and which of them is preferable for particular persons: for, probably,
+some may suit better with an oligarchy than a democracy, and others
+better with a democracy than an oligarchy; and afterwards in what
+manner any one ought to proceed who desires to establish either of
+these states, I mean every species of democracy, and also of
+oligarchy. And to conclude, when we shall have briefly gone through
+everything that is necessary, we will endeavour to point out the
+sources of corruption, and stability, in government, as well those
+which are common to all as those which are peculiar to each state, and
+from what causes they chiefly arise.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+The reason for there being many different sorts of governments is
+this, that each state consists of a great number of parts; for, in the
+first place, we see that all cities are made up of families: and
+again, of the multitude of these some must be rich, some poor, and
+others in the middle station; and that, both of the rich and poor,
+some will be used to arms, others not. We see also, that some of the
+common people are husbandmen, others attend the market, and others are
+artificers. There is also a difference between the nobles in their
+wealth, and the dignity in which they live: for instance, in the
+number of horses they breed; for this cannot be supported without a
+large fortune: for which reason, in former times, those cities whose
+strength consisted in horse became by that means oligarchies; and they
+used horse in their expeditions against the neighbouring cities; as
+the Eretrians the Chalcidians, the Magnetians, who lived near the
+river Meander, and many others in Asia. Moreover, besides the
+difference of fortune, there is that which arises from family and
+merit; or, if there are any other distinctions [1290a] which make part
+of the city, they have been already mentioned in treating of an
+aristocracy, for there we considered how many parts each city must
+necessarily be composed of; and sometimes each of these have a share
+in the government, sometimes a few, sometimes more.
+
+It is evident then, that there must be many forms of government,
+differing from each other in their particular constitution: for the
+parts of which they are composed each differ from the other. For
+government is the ordering of the magistracies of the state; and these
+the community share between themselves, either as they can attain them
+by force, or according to some common equality which there is amongst
+them, as poverty, wealth, or something which they both partake of.
+There must therefore necessarily be as many different forms of
+governments as there are different ranks in the society, arising from
+the superiority of some over others, and their different situations.
+And these seem chiefly to be two, as they say, of the winds: namely,
+the north and the south; and all the others are declinations from
+these. And thus in politics, there is the government of the many and
+the government of the few; or a democracy and an oligarchy: for an
+aristocracy may be considered as a species of oligarchy, as being also
+a government of the few; and what we call a free state may be
+considered as a democracy: as in the winds they consider the west as
+part of the north, and the east as part of the south: and thus it is
+in music, according to some, who say there are only two species of it,
+the Doric and the Phrygian, and all other species of composition they
+call after one of these names; and many people are accustomed to
+consider the nature of government in the same light; but it is both
+more convenient and more correspondent to truth to distinguish
+governments as I have done, into two species: one, of those which are
+established upon proper principles; of which there may be one or two
+sorts: the other, which includes all the different excesses of these;
+so that we may compare the best form of government to the most
+harmonious piece of music; the oligarchic and despotic to the more
+violent tunes; and the democratic to the soft and gentle airs.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+We ought not to define a democracy as some do, who say simply, that it
+is a government where the supreme power is lodged in the people; for
+even in oligarchies the supreme power is in the majority. Nor should
+they define an oligarchy a government where the supreme power is in
+the hands of a few: for let us suppose the number of a people to be
+thirteen hundred, and that of these one thousand were rich, who would
+not permit the three hundred poor to have any share in the government,
+although they were free, and their equal in everything else; no one
+would say, that this government was a democracy. In like manner, if
+the poor, when few in number, should acquire the power over the rich,
+though more than themselves, no one would say, that this was an
+oligarchy; nor this, when the rest who are rich have no share in the
+administration. We should rather say, that a democracy is when the
+supreme power is in the [1290b] hands of the freemen; an oligarchy,
+when it is in the hands of the rich: it happens indeed that in the one
+case the many will possess it, in the other the few; because there are
+many poor and few rich. And if the power of the state was to be
+distributed according to the size of the citizens, as they say it is
+in Ethiopia, or according to their beauty, it would be an oligarchy:
+for the number of those who are large and beautiful is small.
+
+Nor are those things which we have already mentioned alone sufficient
+to describe these states; for since there are many species both of a
+democracy and an oligarchy, the matter requires further consideration;
+as we cannot admit, that if a few persons who are free possess the
+supreme power over the many who are not free, that this government is
+a democracy: as in Apollonia, in Ionia, and in Thera: for in each of
+these cities the honours of the state belong to some few particular
+families, who first founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because
+they are superior in numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at
+Colophon; for there the majority had large possessions before the
+Lydian war: but a democracy is a state where the freemen and the poor,
+being the majority, are invested with the power of the state. An
+oligarchy is a state where the rich and those of noble families, being
+few, possess it.
+
+We have now proved that there are various forms of government and have
+assigned a reason for it; and shall proceed to show that there are
+even more than these, and what they are, and why; setting out with the
+principle we have already laid down. We admit that every city consists
+not of one, but many parts: thus, if we should endeavour to comprehend
+the different species of animals we should first of all note those
+parts which every animal must have, as a certain sensorium, and also
+what is necessary to acquire and retain food, as a mouth and a belly;
+besides certain parts to enable it to move from place to place. If,
+then, these are the only parts of an animal and there are differences
+between them; namely, in their various sorts of stomachs, bellies, and
+sensoriums: to which we must add their motive powers; the number of
+the combinations of all these must necessarily make up the different
+species of animals. For it is not possible that the same kind of
+animal should have any very great difference in its mouth or ears; so
+that when all these are collected, who happen to have these things
+similar in all, they make up a species of animals of which there are
+as many as there are of these general combinations of necessary parts.
+
+The same thing is true of what are called states; for a city is not
+made of one but many parts, as has already been often said; one of
+which is those who supply it with provisions, called husbandmen,
+another called mechanics, [1291a] whose employment is in the manual
+arts, without which the city could not be inhabited; of these some are
+busied about what is absolutely necessary, others in what contribute
+to the elegancies and pleasures of life; the third sort are your
+exchange-men, I mean by these your buyers, sellers, merchants, and
+victuallers; the fourth are your hired labourers or workmen; the fifth
+are the men-at-arms, a rank not less useful than the other, without
+you would have the community slaves to every invader; but what cannot
+defend itself is unworthy of the name of a city; for a city is
+self-sufficient, a slave not. So that when Socrates, in Plato's
+Republic, says that a city is necessarily composed of four sorts of
+people, he speaks elegantly but not correctly, and these are,
+according to him, weavers, husbandmen, shoe-makers, and builders; he
+then adds, as if these were not sufficient, smiths, herdsmen for what
+cattle are necessary, and also merchants and victuallers, and these
+are by way of appendix to his first list; as if a city was established
+for necessity, and not happiness, or as if a shoe-maker and a
+husbandman were equally useful. He reckons not the military a part
+before the increase of territory and joining to the borders of the
+neighbouring powers will make war necessary: and even amongst them who
+compose his four divisions, or whoever have any connection with each
+other, it will be necessary to have some one to distribute justice,
+and determine between man and man. If, then, the mind is a more
+valuable part of man than the body, every one would wish to have those
+things more regarded in his city which tend to the advantage of these
+than common matters, such are war and justice; to which may be added
+council, which is the business of civil wisdom (nor is it of any
+consequence whether these different employments are filled by
+different persons or one, as the same man is oftentimes both a soldier
+and a husbandman): so that if both the judge and the senator are parts
+of the city, it necessarily follows that the soldier must be so also.
+The seventh sort are those who serve the public in expensive
+employments at their own charge: these are called the rich. The eighth
+are those who execute the different offices of the state, and without
+these it could not possibly subsist: it is therefore necessary that
+there should be some persons capable of governing and filling the
+places in the city; and this either for life or in rotation: the
+office of senator, and judge, of which we have already sufficiently
+treated, are the only ones remaining. If, then, these things are
+necessary for a state, that it may be happy and just, it follows that
+the citizens who engage in public affairs should be men of abilities
+therein. [1291b] Several persons think, that different employments may
+be allotted to the same person; as a soldier's, a husbandman's, and an
+artificer's; as also that others may be both senators and judges.
+
+Besides, every one supposes himself a man of political abilities, and
+that he is qualified for almost every department in the state. But the
+same person cannot at once be poor and rich: for which reason the most
+obvious division of the city is into two parts, the poor and rich;
+moreover, since for the generality the one are few, the other many,
+they seem of all the parts of a city most contrary to each other; so
+that as the one or the other prevail they form different states; and
+these are the democracy and the oligarchy.
+
+But that there are many different states, and from what causes they
+arise, has been already mentioned: and that there are also different
+species both of democracies and oligarchies we will now show. Though
+this indeed is evident from what we have already said: there are also
+many different sorts of common people, and also of those who are
+called gentlemen. Of the different sorts of the first are husbandmen,
+artificers, exchange-men, who are employed in buying and selling,
+seamen, of which some are engaged in war, some in traffic, some in
+carrying goods and passengers from place to place, others in fishing,
+and of each of these there are often many, as fishermen at Tarentum
+and Byzantium, masters of galleys at Athens, merchants at AEgina and
+Chios, those who let ships on freight at Tenedos; we may add to these
+those who live by their manual labour and have but little property; so
+that they cannot live without some employ: and also those who are not
+free-born on both sides, and whatever other sort of common people
+there may be. As for gentlemen, they are such as are distinguished
+either by their fortune, their birth, their abilities, or their
+education, or any such-like excellence which is attributed to them.
+
+The most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from
+that equality which prevails in it: for this is what the law in that
+state directs; that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than
+the rich; nor that the supreme power shall be lodged with either of
+these, but that both shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as
+some persons suppose, are chiefly to be found in a democracy, it must
+be most so by every department of government being alike open to all;
+but as the people are the majority, and what they vote is law, it
+follows that such a state must be a democracy. This, then, is one
+species thereof. Another is, when the magistrates are elected by a
+certain census; but this should be but small, and every one who was
+included in it should be eligible, but as soon as he was below it
+should lose that right. [1292a] Another sort is, in which every
+citizen who is not infamous has a share in the government, but where
+the government is in the laws. Another, where every citizen without
+exception has this right. Another is like these in other particulars,
+but there the people govern, and not the law: and this takes place
+when everything is determined by a majority of votes, and not by a
+law; which happens when the people are influenced by the demagogues:
+for where a democracy is governed by stated laws there is no room for
+them, but men of worth fill the first offices in the state: but where
+the power is not vested in the laws, there demagogues abound: for
+there the people rule with kingly power: the whole composing one body;
+for they are supreme, not as individuals but in their collective
+capacity.
+
+Homer also discommends the government of many; but whether he means
+this we are speaking of, or where each person exercises his power
+separately, is uncertain. When the people possess this power they
+desire to be altogether absolute, that they may not be under the
+control of the law, and this is the time when flatterers are held in
+repute. Nor is there any difference between such a people and monarchs
+in a tyranny: for their manners are the same, and they both hold a
+despotic power over better persons than themselves. For their decrees
+are like the others' edicts; their demagogues like the others'
+flatterers: but their greatest resemblance consists in the mutual
+support they give to each other, the flatterer to the tyrant, the
+demagogue to the people: and to them it is owing that the supreme
+power is lodged in the votes of the people, and not in the laws; for
+they bring everything before them, as their influence is owing to
+their being supreme whose opinions they entirely direct; for these are
+they whom the multitude obey. Besides, those who accuse the
+magistrates insist upon it, that the right of determining on their
+conduct lies in the people, who gladly receive their complaints as the
+means of destroying all their offices.
+
+Any one, therefore, may with great justice blame such a government as
+being a democracy, and not a free state; for where the government is
+not in the laws, then there is no free state, for the law ought to be
+supreme over all things; and particular incidents which arise should
+be determined by the magistrates or the state. If, therefore, a
+democracy is to be reckoned a free state, it is evident that any such
+establishment which centres all power in the votes of the people
+cannot, properly speaking, be a democracy: for their decrees cannot be
+general in their extent. Thus, then, we may describe the several
+species of democracies.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+Of the different species of oligarchies one is, when the right to the
+offices is regulated by a certain census; so that the poor, although
+the majority, have no share in it; while all those who are included
+therein take part in the management of public affairs. Another sort
+is, when [1292b] the magistrates are men of very small fortune, who
+upon any vacancy do themselves fill it up: and if they do this out of
+the community at large, the state approaches to an aristocracy; if out
+of any particular class of people, it will be an oligarchy. Another
+sort of oligarchy is, when the power is an hereditary nobility. The
+fourth is, when the power is in the same hands as the other, but not
+under the control of law; and this sort of oligarchy exactly
+corresponds to a tyranny in monarchies, and to that particular species
+of democracies which I last mentioned in treating of that state: this
+has the particular name of a dynasty. These are the different sorts of
+oligarchies and democracies.
+
+It should also be known, that it often happens that a free state,
+where the supreme power is in the laws, may not be democratic, and yet
+in consequence of the established manners and customs of the people,
+may be governed as if it was; so, on the other hand, where the laws
+may countenance a more democratic form of government, these may make
+the state inclining to an oligarchy; and this chiefly happens when
+there has been any alteration in the government; for the people do not
+easily change, but love their own ancient customs; and it is by small
+degrees only that one thing takes place of another; so that the
+ancient laws will remain, while the power will be in the hands of
+those who have brought about a revolution in the state.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+It is evident from what has been said, that there are as many
+different sorts of democracies and oligarchies as I have reckoned up:
+for, of necessity, either all ranks of the people which I have
+enumerated must have a share in the government, or some only, and
+others not; for when the husbandmen, and those only who possess
+moderate fortunes, have the supreme power, they will govern according
+to law; for as they must get their livings by their employs, they have
+but little leisure for public business: they will therefore establish
+proper laws, and never call public assemblies but when there is a
+necessity for them; and they will readily let every one partake with
+them in the administration of public affairs as soon as they possess
+that fortune which the law requires for their qualification: every
+one, therefore, who is qualified will have his share in the
+government: for to exclude any would be to make the government an
+oligarchy, and for all to have leisure to attend without they had a
+subsistence would be impossible: for these reasons, therefore, this
+government is a species of democracy. Another species is distinguished
+by the mode of electing their magistrates, in which every one is
+eligible, to whose birth there are no objections, provided he is
+supposed to have leisure to attend: for which reason in such a
+democracy the supreme power will be vested in the laws, as there will
+be nothing paid to those who go to the public assemblies. A third
+species is where every freeman has a right to a share in the
+government, which he will not accept for the cause already assigned;
+for which reason here also the supreme power will be in the law. The
+fourth species [1293a] of democracy, the last which was established in
+order of time, arose when cities were greatly enlarged to what they
+were at first, and when the public revenue became something
+considerable; for then the populace, on account of their numbers, were
+admitted to share in the management of public affairs, for then even
+the poorest people were at leisure to attend to them, as they received
+wages for so doing; nay, they were more so than others, as they were
+not hindered by having anything of their own to mind, as the rich had;
+for which reason these last very often did not frequent the public
+assemblies and the courts of justice: thus the supreme power was
+lodged in the poor, and not in the laws. These are the different sorts
+of democracies, and such are the causes which necessarily gave birth
+to them.
+
+The first species of oligarchy is, when the generality of the state
+are men of moderate and not too large property; for this gives them
+leisure for the management of public affairs: and, as they are a
+numerous body, it necessarily follows that the supreme power must be
+in the laws, and not in men; for as they are far removed from a
+monarchical government, and have not sufficient fortune to neglect
+their private affairs, while they are too many to be supported by the
+public, they will of course determine to be governed by the laws, and
+not by each other. But if the men of property in the state are but
+few, and their property is large, then an oligarchy of the second sort
+will take place; for those who have most power will think that they
+have a right to lord it over the others; and, to accomplish this, they
+will associate to themselves some who have an inclination for public
+affairs, and as they are not powerful enough to govern without law,
+they will make a law for that purpose. And if those few who have large
+fortunes should acquire still greater power, the oligarchy will then
+alter into one of the third sort; for they will get all the offices of
+the state into their own hands by a law which directs the son to
+succeed upon the death of his father; and, after that, when, by means
+of their increasing wealth and powerful connections, they extend still
+further their oppression, a monarchical dynasty will directly succeed
+wherein men will be supreme, and not the law; and this is the fourth
+species of an oligarchy correspondent to the last-mentioned class of
+democracies.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+
+There are besides two other states, a democracy and an oligarchy, one
+of which all speak of, and it is always esteemed a species of the four
+sorts; and thus they reckon them up; a monarchy, an oligarchy, a
+democracy, and this fourth which they call an aristocracy. There is
+also a fifth, which bears a name that is also common to the other
+four, namely, a state: but as this is seldom to be met with, it has
+escaped those who have endeavoured to enumerate the different sorts of
+governments, which [1293b] they fix at four only, as does Plato in his
+Republic.
+
+An aristocracy, of which I have already treated in the first book, is
+rightly called so; for a state governed by the best men, upon the most
+virtuous principles, and not upon any hypothesis, which even good men
+may propose, has alone a right to be called an aristocracy, for it is
+there only that a man is at once a good man and a good citizen; while
+in other states men are good only relative to those states. Moreover,
+there are some other states which are called by the same name, that
+differ both from oligarchies and free states, wherein not only the
+rich but also the virtuous have a share in the administration; and
+have therefore acquired the name of aristocracies; for in those
+governments wherein virtue is not their common care, there are still
+men of worth and approved goodness. Whatever state, then, like the
+Carthaginians, favours the rich, the virtuous, and the citizens at
+large, is a sort of aristocracy: when only the two latter are held in
+esteem, as at Lacedaemon, and the state is jointly composed of these,
+it is a virtuous democracy. These are the two species of aristocracies
+after the first, which is the best of all governments. There is also a
+third, which is, whenever a free state inclines to the dominion of a
+few.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+
+It now remains for us to treat of that government which is
+particularly called a free state, and also of a tyranny; and the
+reason for my choosing to place that free state here is, because this,
+as well as those aristocracies already mentioned, although they do not
+seem excesses, yet, to speak true, they have all departed from what a
+perfect government is. Nay, they are deviations both of them equally
+from other forms, as I said at the beginning. It is proper to mention
+a tyranny the last of all governments, for it is of all others the
+least like one: but as my intention is to treat of all governments in
+general, for this reason that also, as I have said, will be taken into
+consideration in its proper place.
+
+I shall now inquire into a free state and show what it is; and we
+shall the better understand its positive nature as we have already
+described an oligarchy and a democracy; for a free state is indeed
+nothing more than a mixture of them, and it has been usual to call
+those which incline most to a democracy, a free state; those which
+incline most to an oligarchy, an aristocracy, because those who are
+rich are generally men of family and education; besides, they enjoy
+those things which others are often guilty of crimes to procure: for
+which reason they are regarded as men of worth and honour and note.
+
+Since, then, it is the genius of an aristocracy to allot the larger
+part of the government to the best citizens, they therefore say, that
+an oligarchy is chiefly composed of those men who are worthy and
+honourable: now it [1294a] seems impossible that where the government
+is in the hands of the good, there the laws should not be good, but
+bad; or, on the contrary, that where the government is in the hands of
+the bad, there the laws should be good; nor is a government well
+constituted because the laws are, without at the same time care is
+taken that they are observed; for to enforce obedience to the laws
+which it makes is one proof of a good constitution in the
+state-another is, to have laws well calculated for those who are to
+abide by them; for if they are improper they must be obeyed: and this
+may be done two ways, either by their being the best relative to the
+particular state, or the best absolutely. An aristocracy seems most
+likely to confer the honours of the state on the virtuous; for virtue
+is the object of an aristocracy, riches of an oligarchy, and liberty
+of a democracy; for what is approved of by the majority will prevail
+in all or in each of these three different states; and that which
+seems good to most of those who compose the community will prevail:
+for what is called a state prevails in many communities, which aim at
+a mixture of rich and poor, riches and liberty: as for the rich, they
+are usually supposed to take the place of the worthy and honourable.
+As there are three things which claim an equal rank in the state,
+freedom, riches, and virtue (for as for the fourth, rank, it is an
+attendant on two of the others, for virtue and riches are the origin
+of family), it is evident, that the conjuncture of the rich and the
+poor make up a free state; but that all three tend to an aristocracy
+more than any other, except that which is truly so, which holds the
+first rank.
+
+We have already seen that there are governments different from a
+monarchy, a democracy, and an oligarchy; and what they are, and
+wherein they differ from each other; and also aristocracies and states
+properly so called, which are derived from them; and it is evident
+that these are not much unlike each other.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+
+We shall next proceed to show how that government which is peculiarly
+called a state arises alongside of democracy and oligarchy, and how it
+ought to be established; and this will at the same time show what are
+the proper boundaries of both these governments, for we must mark out
+wherein they differ from one another, and then from both these compose
+a state of such parts of each of them as will show from whence they
+were taken.
+
+There are three different ways in which two states may be blended and
+joined together; for, in the first place, all those rules may be
+adopted which the laws of each of them have ordered; as for instance
+in the judicial department, for in an oligarchy the rich are fined if
+they do not come to the court as jurymen, but the poor are not paid
+for their attendance; but in democracies they are, while the rich are
+not fined for their neglect. Now these things, as being common to
+both, are fit to be observed in a free [1294b] state which is composed
+of both. This, then, is one way in which they may be joined together.
+In the second place, a medium may be taken between the different
+methods which each state observes; for instance, in a democracy the
+right to vote in the public assembly is either confined by no census
+at all, or limited by a very small one; in an oligarchy none enjoy it
+but those whose census is high: therefore, as these two practices are
+contrary to each other, a census between each may be established in
+such a state. In the third place, different laws of each community may
+be adopted; as, for instance, as it seems correspondent to the nature
+of a democracy, that the magistrates should be chosen by lot, but an
+aristocracy by vote, and in the one state according to a census, but
+not in the other: let, then, an aristocracy and a free state copy
+something from each of them; let them follow an oligarchy in choosing
+their magistrates by vote, but a democracy in not admitting of any
+census, and thus blend together the different customs of the two
+governments. But the best proof of a happy mixture of a democracy and
+an oligarchy is this, when a person may properly call the same state a
+democracy and an oligarchy. It is evident that those who speak of it
+in this manner are induced to it because both these governments are
+there well blended together: and indeed this is common to all mediums,
+that the extremes of each side should be discerned therein, as at
+Lacedaemon; for many affirm that it is a democracy from the many
+particulars in which it follows that form of government; as for
+instance, in the first place, in the bringing up of their children,
+for the rich and poor are brought up in the same manner; and their
+education is such that the children of the poor may partake of it; and
+the same rules are observed when they are youths and men, there is no
+distinction between a rich person and a poor one; and in their public
+tables the same provision is served to all. The rich also wear only
+such clothes as the poorest man is able to purchase. Moreover, with
+respect to two magistracies of the highest rank, one they have a right
+to elect to, the other to fill; namely, the senate and the ephori.
+Others consider it as an oligarchy, the principles of which it follows
+in many things, as in choosing all their officers by vote, and not by
+lot; in there being but a few who have a right to sit in judgment on
+capital causes and the like. Indeed, a state which is well composed of
+two others ought to resemble them both, and neither, Such a state
+ought to have its means of preservation in itself, and not without;
+and when I say in itself, I do not mean that it should owe this to the
+forbearance of their neighbours, for this may happen to a bad
+government, but to every member of the community's not being willing
+that there should be the least alteration in their constitution. Such
+is the method in which a free state or aristocracy ought to be
+established.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+
+It now remains to treat of a tyranny; not that there is [1295a] much
+to be said on that subject, but as it makes part of our plan, since we
+enumerated it amongst our different sorts of governments. In the
+beginning of this work we inquired into the nature of kingly
+government, and entered into a particular examination of what was most
+properly called so, and whether it was advantageous to a state or not,
+and what it should be, and how established; and we divided a tyranny
+into two pieces when we were upon this subject, because there is
+something analogous between this and a kingly government, for they are
+both of them established by law;   for among some of the barbarians
+they elect a monarch with absolute power, and formerly among the
+Greeks there were some such, whom they called sesumnetes.     Now
+these differ from each other; for some possess only kingly power
+regulated by law, and rule those who voluntarily submit to their
+government;  others rule despotically according to their own will.
+There is a third species of tyranny, most properly so called, which is
+the very opposite to kingly power; for this is the government of one
+who rules over his equals and superiors without being accountable for
+his conduct, and whose object is his own advantage, and not the
+advantage of those he governs; for which reason he rules by
+compulsion, for no freemen will ever willingly submit to such a
+government.   These are the different species of tyrannies, their
+principles, and their causes.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+
+We proceed now to inquire what form of government and what manner of
+life is best for communities in general, not adapting it to that
+superior virtue which is above the reach of the vulgar, or that
+education which every advantage of nature and fortune only can
+furnish, nor to those imaginary plans which may be formed at pleasure;
+but to that mode of life which the greater part of mankind can attain
+to, and that government which most cities may establish:   for as to
+those aristocracies which we have now mentioned, they are either too
+perfect for a state to support, or one so nearly alike to that state
+we now going to inquire into, that we shall treat of them both as one.
+
+The opinions which we form upon these subjects must depend upon one
+common principle:   for if what I have said in my treatise on Morals
+is true, a happy life must arise from an uninterrupted course of
+virtue;   and if virtue consists in a certain medium, the middle life
+must certainly be the happiest; which medium is attainable [1295b] by
+every one. The boundaries of virtue and vice in the state must also
+necessarily be the same as in a private person; for the form of
+government is the life of the city. In every city the people are
+divided into three sorts; the very rich, the very poor, and those who
+are between them.  If this is universally admitted, that the mean is
+best, it is evident that even in point of fortune mediocrity is to be
+preferred; for that state is most submissive to reason; for those who
+are very handsome, or very strong, or very noble, or very rich; or, on
+the contrary; those who are very poor, or very weak, or very mean,
+with difficulty obey it; for the one are capricious and greatly
+flagitious, the other rascally and mean, the crimes of each arising
+from their different excesses: nor will they go through the different
+offices of the state; which is detrimental to it: besides, those who
+excel in strength, in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know
+how nor are willing to submit to command: and this begins at home when
+they are boys; for there they are brought up too delicately to be
+accustomed to obey their preceptors: as for the very poor, their
+general and excessive want of what the rich enjoy reduces them to a
+state too mean: so that the one know not how to command, but to be
+commanded as slaves, the others know not how to submit to any command,
+nor to command themselves but with despotic power.
+
+A city composed of such men must therefore consist of slaves and
+masters, not freemen; where one party must hate, and the other
+despise, where there could be no possibility of friendship or
+political community: for community supposes affection; for we do not
+even on the road associate with our enemies. It is also the genius of
+a city to be composed as much as possible of equals; which will be
+most so when the inhabitants are in the middle state: from whence it
+follows, that that city must be best framed which is composed of those
+whom we say are naturally its proper members. It is men of this
+station also who will be best assured of safety and protection; for
+they will neither covet what belongs to others, as the poor do; nor
+will others covet what is theirs, as the poor do what belongs to the
+rich; and thus, without plotting against any one, or having any one
+plot against them, they will live free from danger: for which reason
+Phocylides wisely wishes for the middle state, as being most
+productive of happiness. It is plain, then, that the most perfect
+political community must be amongst those who are in the middle rank,
+and those states are best instituted wherein these are a larger and
+more respectable part, if possible, than both the other; or, if that
+cannot be, at least than either of them separate; so that being thrown
+into the balance it may prevent either scale from preponderating.
+
+It is therefore the greatest happiness which the citizens can enjoy to
+possess a moderate and convenient fortune; for when some possess too
+much, and others nothing at [1296a] all, the government must either be
+in the hands of the meanest rabble or else a pure oligarchy; or, from
+the excesses of both, a tyranny; for this arises from a headstrong
+democracy or an oligarchy, but very seldom when the members of the
+community are nearly on an equality with each other. We will assign a
+reason for this when we come to treat of the alterations which
+different states are likely to undergo. The middle state is therefore
+best, as being least liable to those seditions and insurrections which
+disturb the community; and for the same reason extensive governments
+are least liable to these inconveniences; for there those in a middle
+state are very numerous, whereas in small ones it is easy to pass to
+the two extremes, so as hardly to have any in a medium remaining, but
+the one half rich, the other poor: and from the same principle it is
+that democracies are more firmly established and of longer continuance
+than oligarchies; but even in those when there is a want of a proper
+number of men of middling fortune, the poor extend their power too
+far, abuses arise, and the government is soon at an end.
+
+We ought to consider as a proof of what I now advance, that the best
+lawgivers  themselves  were those in the middle rank of life, amongst
+whom was Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was
+not a king, and Charondas, and indeed most others. What has been said
+will show us why of so many free states some have changed to
+democracies, others to oligarchies: for whenever the number of those
+in the middle state has been too small, those who were the more
+numerous, whether the rich or the poor, always overpowered them and
+assumed to themselves the administration of public affairs; from hence
+arose either a democracy or an oligarchy.  Moreover, when in
+consequence of their disputes and quarrels with each other, either the
+rich get the better of the poor, or the poor of the rich, neither of
+them will establish a free state; but, as the record of their victory,
+one which inclines to their own principles, and form either a
+democracy or an oligarchy.
+
+Those who made conquests in Greece, having all of them an eye to the
+respective forms of government in their own cities, established either
+democracies or oligarchies, not considering what was serviceable to
+the state, but what was similar to their own; for which reason a
+government has never been established where the supreme power has been
+placed amongst those of the middling rank, or very seldom; and,
+amongst a few, one man only of those who have yet been conquerors has
+been persuaded to give the preference to this order of [1296b] men: it
+is indeed an established custom with the inhabitants of most cities
+not to desire an equality, but either to aspire to govern, or when
+they are conquered, to submit.
+
+Thus we have shown what the best state is, and why. It will not be
+difficult to perceive of the many states which there are, for we have
+seen that there are various forms both of democracies and oligarchies,
+to which we should give the first place, to which the second, and in
+the same manner the next also; and to observe what are the particular
+excellences and defects of each, after we have first described the
+best possible; for that must be the best which is nearest to this,
+that worst which is most distant from the medium, without any one has
+a particular plan of his own which he judges by. I mean by this, that
+it may happen, that although one form of government may be better than
+another, yet there is no reason to prevent another from being
+preferable thereunto in particular circumstances and for particular
+purposes.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+
+After what has been said, it follows that we should now show what
+particular form of government is most suitable for particular persons;
+first laying this down as a general maxim, that that party which
+desires to support the actual administration of the state ought always
+to be superior to that which would alter it. Every city is made up of
+quality and quantity: by quality I mean liberty, riches, education,
+and family, and by quantity its relative populousness: now it may
+happen that quality may exist in one of those parts of which the city
+is composed, and quantity in another; thus the number of the ignoble
+may be greater than the number of those of family, the number of the
+poor than that of the rich; but not so that the quantity of the one
+shall overbalance the quality of the other; those must be properly
+adjusted to each other; for where the number of the poor exceeds the
+proportion we have mentioned, there a democracy will rise up, and if
+the husbandry should have more power than others, it will be a
+democracy of husbandmen; and the democracy will be a particular
+species according to that class of men which may happen to be most
+numerous: thus, should these be the husbandmen, it will be of these,
+and the best; if of mechanics and those who hire themselves out, the
+worst possible: in the same manner it may be of any other set between
+these two. But when the rich and the noble prevail more by their
+quality than they are deficient in quantity, there an oligarchy
+ensues; and this oligarchy may be of different species, according to
+the nature of the prevailing party. Every legislator in framing his
+constitution ought to have a particular regard to those in the middle
+rank of life; and if he intends an oligarchy, these should be the
+object of his laws; if a democracy, to these they should be entrusted;
+and whenever their number exceeds that of the two others, or at least
+one of them, they give [1297a] stability to the constitution; for
+there is no fear that the rich and the poor should agree to conspire
+together against them, for neither of these will choose to serve the
+other. If any one would choose to fix the administration on the widest
+basis, he will find none preferable to this; for to rule by turns is
+what the rich and the poor will not submit to, on account of their
+hatred to each other. It is, moreover, allowed that an arbitrator is
+the most proper person for both parties to trust to; now this
+arbitrator is the middle rank.
+
+Those who would establish aristocratical governments are mistaken not
+only in giving too much power to the rich, but also in deceiving the
+common people; for at last, instead of an imaginary good, they must
+feel a real evil, for the encroachments of the rich are more
+destructive to the state than those of the poor.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+
+There are five particulars in which, under fair pretences, the rich
+craftily endeavour to undermine the rights of the people, these are
+their public assemblies, their offices of state, their courts of
+justice, their military power, and their gymnastic exercises. With
+respect to their public assemblies, in having them open to all, but in
+fining the rich only, or others very little, for not attending; with
+respect to offices, in permitting the poor to swear off, but not
+granting this indulgence to those who are within the census; with
+respect to their courts of justice, in fining the rich for
+non-attendance, but the poor not at all, or those a great deal, and
+these very little, as was done by the laws of Charondas. In some
+places every citizen who was enrolled had a right to attend the public
+assemblies and to try causes; which if they did not do, a very heavy
+fine was laid upon them; that through fear of the fine they might
+avoid being enrolled, as they were then obliged to do neither the one
+nor the other. The same spirit of legislation prevailed with respect
+to their bearing arms and their gymnastic exercises; for the poor are
+excused if they have no arms, but the rich are fined; the same method
+takes place if they do not attend their gymnastic exercises, there is
+no penalty on one, but there is on the other: the consequence of which
+is, that the fear of this penalty induces the rich to keep the one and
+attend the other, while the poor do neither. These are the deceitful
+contrivances of oligarchical legislators.
+
+The contrary prevails in a democracy; for there they make the poor a
+proper allowance for attending the assemblies and the courts, but give
+the rich nothing for doing it: whence it is evident, that if any one
+would properly blend these customs together, they must extend both the
+pay and the fine to every member of the community, and then every one
+would share in it, whereas part only now do. The citizens of a free
+state ought to [1297b] consist of those only who bear arms: with
+respect to their census it is not easy to determine exactly what it
+ought to be, but the rule that should direct upon this subject should
+be to make it as extensive as possible, so that those who are enrolled
+in it make up a greater part of the people than those who are not; for
+those who are poor, although they partake not of the offices of the
+state, are willing to live quiet, provided that no one disturbs them
+in their property: but this is not an easy matter; for it may not
+always happen, that those who are at the head of public affairs are of
+a humane behaviour. In time of war the poor are accustomed to show no
+alacrity without they have provisions found them; when they have, then
+indeed they are willing to fight.
+
+In some governments the power is vested not only in those who bear
+arms, but also in those who have borne them. Among the Malienses the
+state was composed of these latter only, for all the officers were
+soldiers who had served their time. And the first states in Greece
+which succeeded those where kingly power was established, were
+governed by the military. First of all the horse, for at that time the
+strength and excellence of the army depended on the horse, for as to
+the heavy-armed foot they were useless without proper discipline; but
+the art of tactics was not known to the ancients, for which reason
+their strength lay in their horse: but when cities grew larger, and
+they depended more on their foot, greater numbers partook of the
+freedom of the city; for which reason what we call republics were
+formerly called democracies. The ancient governments were properly
+oligarchies or kingdoms; for on account of the few persons in each
+state, it would have been impossible to have found a sufficient number
+of the middle rank; so these being but few, and those used to
+subordination, they more easily submitted to be governed.
+
+We have now shown why there are many sorts of governments, and others
+different from those we have treated of: for there are more species of
+democracies than one, and the like is true of other forms, and what
+are their differences, and whence they arise; and also of all others
+which is the best, at least in general; and which is best suited for
+particular people.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+
+We will now proceed to make some general reflections upon the
+governments next in order, and also to consider each of them in
+particular; beginning with those principles which appertain to each:
+now there are three things in all states which a careful legislator
+ought well to consider, which are of great consequence to all, and
+which properly attended to the state must necessarily be happy; and
+according to the variation of which the one will differ from the
+other. The first of these is the [1298a] public assembly; the second
+the officers of the state, that is, who they ought to be, and with
+what power they should be entrusted, and in what manner they should be
+appointed; the third, the judicial department.
+
+Now it is the proper business of the public assembly to determine
+concerning war and peace, making or breaking off alliances, to enact
+laws, to sentence to death, banishment, or confiscation of goods, and
+to call the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office.
+Now these powers must necessarily be entrusted to the citizens in
+general, or all of them to some; either to one magistrate or more; or
+some to one, and some to another, or some to all, but others to some:
+to entrust all to all is in the spirit of a democracy, for the people
+aim at equality. There are many methods of delegating these powers to
+the citizens at large, one of which is to let them execute them by
+turn, and not altogether, as was done by Tellecles, the Milesian, in
+his state. In others the supreme council is composed of the different
+magistrates, and they succeed to the offices of the community by
+proper divisions of tribes, wards, and other very small proportions,
+till every one in his turn goes through them: nor does the whole
+community ever meet together, without it is when new laws are enacted,
+or some national affair is debated, or to hear what the magistrates
+have to propose to them. Another method is for the people to meet in a
+collective body, but only for the purpose of holding the comitia,
+making laws, determining concerning war or peace, and inquiring into
+the conduct of their magistrates, while the remaining part of the
+public business is conducted by the magistrates, who have their
+separate departments, and are chosen out of the whole community either
+by vote or ballot. Another method is for the people in general to meet
+for the choice of the magistrates, and to examine into their conduct;
+and also to deliberate concerning war and alliances, and to leave
+other things to the magistrates, whoever happen to be chosen, whose
+particular employments are such as necessarily require persons well
+skilled therein. A fourth method is for every person to deliberate
+upon every subject in public assembly, where the magistrates can
+determine nothing of themselves, and have only the privilege of giving
+their opinions first; and this is the method of the most pure
+democracy, which is analogous to the proceedings in a dynastic
+oligarchy and a tyrannic monarchy.
+
+These, then, are the methods in which public business is conducted in
+a democracy. When the power is in the hands of part of the community
+only, it is an oligarchy and this also admits of different customs;
+for whenever the officers of the state are chosen out of those who
+have a moderate fortune, and these from that circumstance are many,
+and when they depart not from that line which the law has laid down,
+but carefully follow it, and when all within the census are eligible,
+certainly it is then an oligarchy, but founded on true principles of
+government [1298b] from its moderation. When the people in general do
+not partake of the deliberative power, but certain persons chosen for
+that purpose, who govern according to law; this also, like the first,
+is an oligarchy. When those who have the deliberative power elect each
+other, and the son succeeds to the father, and when they can supersede
+the laws, such a government is of necessity a strict oligarchy. When
+some persons determine on one thing, and others on another, as war and
+peace, and when all inquire into the conduct of their magistrates, and
+other things are left to different officers, elected either by vote or
+lot, then the government is an aristocracy or a free state. When some
+are chosen by vote and others by lot, and these either from the people
+in general, or from a certain number elected for that purpose, or if
+both the votes and the lots are open to all, such a state is partly an
+aristocracy, partly a free government itself. These are the different
+methods in which the deliberative power is vested in different states,
+all of whom follow some regulation here laid down. It is advantageous
+to a democracy, in the present sense of the word, by which I mean a
+state wherein the people at large have a supreme power, even over the
+laws, to hold frequent public assemblies; and it will be best in this
+particular to imitate the example of oligarchies in their courts of
+justice; for they fine those who are appointed to try causes if they
+do not attend, so should they reward the poor for coming to the public
+assemblies: and their counsels will be best when all advise with each
+other, the citizens with the nobles, the nobles with the citizens. It
+is also advisable when the council is to be composed of part of the
+citizens, to elect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both
+ranks. It is also proper, if the common people in the state are very
+numerous, either not to pay every one for his attendance, but such a
+number only as will make them equal to the nobles, or to reject many
+of them by lot.
+
+In an oligarchy they should either call up some of the common people
+to the council, or else establish a court, as is done in some other
+states, whom they call pre-advisers or guardians of the laws, whose
+business should be to propose first what they should afterwards enact.
+By this means the people would have a place in the administration of
+public affairs, without having it in their power to occasion any
+disorder in the government. Moreover, the people may be allowed to
+have a vote in whatever bill is proposed, but may not themselves
+propose anything contrary thereto; or they may give their advice,
+while the power of determining may be with the magistrates only. It is
+also necessary to follow a contrary practice to what is established in
+democracies, for the people should be allowed the power of pardoning,
+but not of condemning, for the cause should be referred back again to
+the magistrates: whereas the contrary takes place in republics; for
+the power of pardoning is with the few, but not of condemning, which
+is always referred [1299a] to the people at large. And thus we
+determine concerning the deliberative power in any state, and in whose
+hands it shall be.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+
+We now proceed to consider the choice of magistrates; for this branch
+of public business contains many different Parts, as how many there
+shall be, what shall be their particular office, and with respect to
+time how long each of them shall continue in place; for some make it
+six months, others shorter, others for a year, others for a much
+longer time; or whether they should be perpetual or for a long time,
+or neither; for the same person may fill the same office several
+times, or he may not be allowed to enjoy it even twice, but only once:
+and also with respect to the appointment of magistrates, who are to be
+eligible, who is to choose them, and in what manner; for in all these
+particulars we ought properly to distinguish the different ways which
+may be followed; and then to show which of these is best suited to
+such and such governments.
+
+Now it is not easy to determine to whom we ought properly to give the
+name of magistrate, for a government requires many persons in office;
+but every one of those who is either chosen by vote or lot is not to
+be reckoned a magistrate. The priests, for instance, in the first
+place; for these are to be considered as very different from civil
+magistrates: to these we may add the choregi and heralds; nay, even
+ambassadors are elected: there are some civil employments which belong
+to the citizens; and these are either when they are all engaged in one
+thing, as when as soldiers they obey their general, or when part of
+them only are, as in governing the women or educating the youth; and
+also some economic, for they often elect corn-meters: others are
+servile, and in which, if they are rich, they employ slaves. But
+indeed they are most properly called magistrates, who are members of
+the deliberative council, or decide causes, or are in some command,
+the last more especially, for to command is peculiar to magistrates.
+But to speak truth, this question is of no great consequence, nor is
+it the province of the judges to decide between those who dispute
+about words; it may indeed be an object of speculative inquiry; but to
+inquire what officers are necessary in a state, and how many, and
+what, though not most necessary, may yet be advantageous in a
+well-established government, is a much more useful employment, and
+this with respect to all states in general, as well as to small
+cities.
+
+In extensive governments it is proper to allot one employment to one
+person, as there are many to serve the public in so numerous a
+society, where some may be passed over for a long time, and others
+never be in office but once; and indeed everything is better done
+which has the whole attention of one person, than when that [1299b]
+attention is divided amongst many; but in small states it is necessary
+that a few of the citizens should execute many employments; for their
+numbers are so small it will not be convenient to have many of them in
+office at the same time; for where shall we find others to succeed
+them in turn? Small states will sometimes want the same magistrates
+and the same laws as large ones; but the one will not want to employ
+them so often as the other; so that different charges may be intrusted
+to the same person without any inconvenience, for they will not
+interfere with each other, and for want of sufficient members in the
+community it will be necessary. If we could tell how many magistrates
+are necessary in every city, and how many, though not necessary, it is
+yet proper to have, we could then the better know how many different
+offices one might assign to one magistrate. It is also necessary to
+know what tribunals in different places should have different things
+under their jurisdiction, and also what things should always come
+under the cognisance of the same magistrate; as, for instance, decency
+of manners, shall the clerk of the market take cognisance of that if
+the cause arises in the market, and another magistrate in another
+place, or the same magistrate everywhere: or shall there be a
+distinction made of the fact, or the parties? as, for instance, in
+decency of manners, shall it be one cause when it relates to a man,
+another when it relates to a woman?
+
+In different states shall the magistrates be different or the same? I
+mean, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a
+monarchy, the same persons shall have the same power? or shall it vary
+according to the different formation of the government? as in an
+aristocracy the offices of the state are allotted to those who are
+well educated; in an oligarchy to those who are rich; in a democracy
+to the freemen? Or shall the magistrates differ as the communities
+differ? For it may happen that the very same may be sometimes proper,
+sometimes otherwise: in this state it may be necessary that the
+magistrate have great powers, in that but small. There are also
+certain magistrates peculiar to certain states--as the pre-advisers
+are not proper in a democracy, but a senate is; for one such order is
+necessary, whose business shall be to consider beforehand and prepare
+those bills which shall be brought before the people that they may
+have leisure to attend to their own affairs; and when these are few in
+number the state inclines to an oligarchy. The pre-advisers indeed
+must always be few for they are peculiar to an oligarchy: and where
+there are both these offices in the same state, the pre-adviser's is
+superior to the senator's, the one having only a democratical power,
+the other an oligarchical: and indeed the [1300a] power of the senate
+is lost in those democracies, in which the people, meeting in one
+public assembly, take all the business into their own hands; and this
+is likely to happen either when the community in general are in easy
+circumstances, or when they are paid for their attendance; for they
+are then at leisure often to meet together and determine everything
+for themselves. A magistrate whose business is to control the manners
+of the boys, or women, or who takes any department similar to this, is
+to be found in an aristocracy, not in a democracy; for who can forbid
+the wives of the poor from appearing in public? neither is such a one
+to be met with in an oligarchy; for the women there are too delicate
+to bear control. And thus much for this subject. Let us endeavour to
+treat at large of the establishment of magistrates, beginning from
+first principles. Now, they differ from each other in three ways, from
+which, blended together, all the varieties which can be imagined
+arise. The first of these differences is in those who appoint the
+magistrates, the second consists in those who are appointed, the third
+in the mode of appointment; and each of these three differ in three
+manners; for either all the citizens may appoint collectively, or some
+out of their whole body, or some out of a particular order in it,
+according to fortune, family, or virtue, or some other rule (as at
+Megara, where the right of election was amongst those who had returned
+together to their country, and had reinstated themselves by force of
+arms) and this either by vote or lot. Again, these several modes may
+be differently formed together, as some magistrates may be chosen by
+part of the community, others by the whole; some out of part, others
+out of the whole; some by vote, others by lot: and each of these
+different modes admit of a four-fold subdivision; for either all may
+elect all by vote or by lot; and when all elect, they may either
+proceed without any distinction, or they may elect by a certain
+division of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through
+the whole community: and some magistrates may be elected one way, and
+others another. Again, if some magistrates are elected either by vote
+or lot of all the citizens, or by the vote of some and the lot of
+some, or some one way and some another; that is to say, some by the
+vote of all, others by the lot of all, there will then be twelve
+different methods of electing the magistrates, without blending the
+two together. Of these there are two adapted to a democracy; namely,
+to have all the magistrates chosen out of all the people, either by
+vote or lot, or both; that is to say, some of them by lot, some by
+vote. In a free state the whole community should not elect at the same
+time, but some out of the whole, or out of some particular rank; and
+this either by lot, or vote, or both: and they should elect either out
+of the whole community, or out of some particular persons in it, and
+this both by lot and vote. In an oligarchy it is proper to choose some
+magistrates out of the whole body of the citizens, some by vote, some
+by lot, others by both: by lot is most correspondent to that form of
+government. In a free aristocracy, some magistrates [1300b] should be
+chosen out of the community in general, others out of a particular
+rank, or these by choice, those by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the
+magistrates should be chosen out of certain ranks, and by certain
+persons, and some of those by lot, others by both methods; but to
+choose them out of the whole community is not correspondent to the
+nature of this government. It is proper in an aristocracy for the
+whole community to elect their magistrates out of particular persons,
+and this by vote. These then are all the different ways of electing of
+magistrates; and they have been allotted according to the nature of
+the different communities; but what mode of proceeding is proper for
+different communities, or how the offices ought to be established, or
+with what powers shall be particularly explained. I mean by the powers
+of a magistrate, what should be his particular province, as the
+management of the finances or the laws of the state; for different
+magistrates have different powers, as that of the general of the army
+differs from the clerk of the market.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+
+Of the three parts of which a government is formed, we now come to
+consider the judicial; and this also we shall divide in the same
+manner as we did the magisterial, into three parts. Of whom the judges
+shall consist, and for what causes, and how. When I say of whom, I
+mean whether they shall be the whole people, or some particulars; by
+for what causes I mean, how many different courts shall be appointed;
+by how, whether they shall be elected by vote or lot. Let us first
+determine how many different courts there ought to be. Now these are
+eight. The first of these is the court of inspection over the
+behaviour of the magistrates when they have quitted their office; the
+second is to punish those who have injured the public; the third is to
+take cognisance of those causes in which the state is a party; the
+fourth is to decide between magistrates and private persons, who
+appeal from a fine laid upon them; the fifth is to determine disputes
+which may arise concerning contracts of great value; the sixth is to
+judge between foreigners, and of murders, of which there are different
+species; and these may all be tried by the same judges or by different
+ones; for there are murders of malice prepense and of chance-medley;
+there is also justifiable homicide, where the fact is admitted, and
+the legality of it disputed.
+
+There is also another court called at Athens the Court of Phreattae,
+which determines points relating to a murder committed by one who has
+run away, to decide whether he shall return; though such an affair
+happens but seldom, and in very large cities; the seventh, to
+determine causes wherein strangers are concerned, and this whether
+they are between stranger and stranger or between a stranger and a
+citizen. The eighth and last is for small actions, from one to five
+drachma's, or a little more; for these ought also to be legally
+determined, but not to be brought before the whole body of the judges.
+But without entering into any particulars concerning actions for
+murder, and those wherein strangers are the parties, let us
+particularly treat of those courts which have the jurisdiction of
+those matters which more particularly relate to the affairs of the
+community and which if not well conducted occasion seditions and
+commotions in the state. Now, of necessity, either all persons must
+have a right to judge of all these different causes, appointed for
+that purpose, either by vote or lot, or all of all, some of them by
+vote, and others by lot, or in some causes by vote, in others by lot.
+Thus there will be four sorts of judges. There [1301a] will be just
+the same number also if they are chosen out of part of the people
+only; for either all the judges must be chosen out of that part either
+by vote or lot, or some by lot and some by vote, or the judges in
+particular causes must be chosen some by vote, others by lot; by which
+means there will be the same number of them also as was mentioned.
+Besides, different judges may be joined together; I mean those who are
+chosen out of the whole people or part of them or both; so that all
+three may sit together in the same court, and this either by vote,
+lot, or both. And thus much for the different sorts of judges. Of
+these appointments that which admits all the community to be judges in
+all causes is most suitable to a democracy; the second, which appoints
+that certain persons shall judge all causes, to an oligarchy; the
+third, which appoints the whole community to be judges in some causes,
+but particular persons in others, to an aristocracy or free state.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK V
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+We have now gone through those particulars we proposed to speak of; it
+remains that we next consider from what causes and how alterations in
+government arise, and of what nature they are, and to what the
+destruction of each state is owing; and also to what form any form of
+polity is most likely to shift into, and what are the means to be used
+for the general preservation of governments, as well as what are
+applicable to any particular state; and also of the remedies which are
+to be applied either to all in general, or to any one considered
+separately, when they are in a state of corruption: and here we ought
+first to lay down this principle, that there are many governments, all
+of which approve of what is just and what is analogically equal; and
+yet have failed from attaining thereunto, as we have already
+mentioned; thus democracies have arisen from supposing that those who
+are equal in one thing are so in every other circumstance; as, because
+they are equal in liberty, they are equal in everything else; and
+oligarchies, from supposing that those who are unequal in one thing
+are unequal in all; that when men are so in point of fortune, that
+inequality extends to everything else. Hence it follows, that those
+who in some respects are equal with others think it right to endeavour
+to partake of an equality with them in everything; and those who are
+superior to others endeavour to get still more; and it is this more
+which is the inequality: thus most states, though they have some
+notion of what is just, yet are almost totally wrong; and, upon this
+account, when either party has not that share in the administration
+which answers to his expectations, he becomes seditious: but those who
+of all others have the greatest right to be so are the last that are;
+namely, those who excel in virtue; for they alone can be called
+generally superior. There are, too, some persons of distinguished
+families who, because they are so, disdain to be on an equality with
+others, for those esteem themselves noble who boast of their
+ancestors' merit and fortune: these, to speak truth, are the origin
+and fountain from whence seditions arise. The alterations which men
+may propose to make in governments are two; for either they may change
+the state already established into some other, as when they propose to
+erect an oligarchy where there is a democracy; or a democracy, or free
+state, where there is an oligarchy, or an aristocracy from these, or
+those from that; or else, when they have no objection to the
+established government, which they like very well, but choose to have
+the sole management in it themselves; either in the hands of a few or
+one only. They will also raise commotions concerning the degree in
+which they would have the established power; as if, for instance, the
+government is an oligarchy, to have it more purely so, and in the same
+manner if it is a democracy, or else to have it less so; and, in like
+manner, whatever may be the nature of the government, either to extend
+or contract its powers; or else to make some alterations in some parts
+of it; as to establish or abolish a particular magistracy, as some
+persons say Lysander endeavoured to abolish the kingly power in
+Sparta; and Pausanias that of the ephori.  Thus in Epidamnus there was
+an alteration in one part of the constitution, for instead of the
+philarchi they established a senate.  It is also necessary for all the
+magistrates at Athens; to attend in the court of the Helisea when any
+new magistrate is created: the power of the archon also in that state
+partakes of the nature of an oligarchy: inequality is always the
+occasion of sedition, but not when those who are unequal are treated
+in a different manner correspondent to that inequality. Thus kingly
+power is unequal when exercised over equals. Upon the whole, those who
+aim after an equality are the cause of seditions. Equality is twofold,
+either in number or value. Equality in number is when two things
+contain the same parts or the same quantity; equality in value is by
+proportion as two exceeds one, and three two by the same number-thus
+by proportion four exceeds two, and two one in the same degree, for
+two is the same part of four that one is of two; that is to say, half.
+Now, all agree in what is absolutely and simply just; but, as we have
+already said they dispute concerning proportionate value; for some
+persons, if they are equal in one respect, think themselves equal in
+all; others, if they are superior in one thing, think they may claim
+the superiority in all; from whence chiefly arise two sorts of
+governments, a democracy and an oligarchy; for nobility and virtue are
+to be found only [1302a] amongst a few; the contrary amongst the many;
+there being in no place a hundred of the first to be met with, but
+enough of the last everywhere. But to establish a government entirely
+upon either of these equalities is wrong, and this the example of
+those so established makes evident, for none of them have been stable;
+and for this reason, that it is impossible that whatever is wrong at
+the first and in its principles should not at last meet with a bad
+end: for which reason in some things an equality of numbers ought to
+take place, in others an equality in value. However, a democracy is
+safer and less liable to sedition than an oligarchy; for in this
+latter it may arise from two causes, for either the few in power may
+conspire against each other or against the people; but in a democracy
+only one; namely, against the few who aim at exclusive power; but
+there is no instance worth speaking of, of a sedition of the people
+against themselves. Moreover, a government composed of men of moderate
+fortunes comes much nearer to a democracy than an oligarchy, and is
+the safest of all such states.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+Since we are inquiring into the causes of seditions and revolutions in
+governments, we must begin entirely with the first principles from
+whence they arise. Now these, so to speak, are nearly three in number;
+which we must first distinguish in general from each other, and
+endeavour to show in what situation people are who begin a sedition;
+and for what causes; and thirdly, what are the beginnings of political
+troubles and mutual quarrels with each other. Now that cause which of
+all others most universally inclines men to desire to bring about a
+change in government is that which I have already mentioned; for those
+who aim at equality will be ever ready for sedition, if they see those
+whom they esteem their equals possess more than they do, as well as
+those also who are not content with equality but aim at superiority,
+if they think that while they deserve more than, they have only equal
+with, or less than, their inferiors. Now, what they aim at may be
+either just or unjust; just, when those who are inferior are
+seditious, that they may be equal; unjust, when those who are equal
+are so, that they may be superior. These, then, are the situations in
+which men will be seditious: the causes for which they will be so are
+profit and honour; and their contrary: for, to avoid dishonour or loss
+of fortune by mulcts, either on their own account or their friends,
+they will raise a commotion in the state. The original causes which
+dispose men to the things which I have mentioned are, taken in one
+manner, seven in number, in another they are more; two of which are
+the same with those that have been already mentioned: but influencing
+in a different manner; for profit and honour sharpen men against each
+other; not to get the possession of them for themselves (which was
+what I just now supposed), but when they see others, some justly,
+others [1302b] unjustly, engrossing them. The other causes are
+haughtiness, fear, eminence, contempt, disproportionate increase in
+some part of the state. There are also other things which in a
+different manner will occasion revolutions in governments; as election
+intrigues, neglect, want of numbers, a too great dissimilarity of
+circumstances.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+What influence ill-treatment and profit have for this purpose, and how
+they may be the causes of sedition, is almost self-evident; for when
+the magistrates are haughty and endeavour to make greater profits than
+their office gives them, they not only occasion seditions amongst each
+other, but against the state also who gave them their power; and this
+their avarice has two objects, either private property or the property
+of the state. What influence honours have, and how they may occasion
+sedition, is evident enough; for those who are themselves unhonoured
+while they see others honoured, will be ready for any disturbance: and
+these things are done unjustly when any one is either honoured or
+discarded contrary to their deserts, justly when they are according to
+them. Excessive honours are also a cause of sedition when one person
+or more are greater than the state and the power of the government can
+permit; for then a monarchy or a dynasty is usually established: on
+which account the ostracism was introduced in some places, as at Argos
+and Athens: though it is better to guard against such excesses in the
+founding of a state, than when they have been permitted to take place,
+to correct them afterward. Those who have been guilty of crimes will
+be the cause of sedition, through fear of punishment; as will those
+also who expect an injury, that they may prevent it; as was the case
+at Rhodes, when the nobles conspired against the people on account of
+the decrees they expected would pass against them. Contempt also is a
+cause of sedition and conspiracies; as in oligarchies, where there are
+many who have no share in the administration. The rich also even in
+democracies, despising the disorder and anarchy which will arise, hope
+to better themselves by the same means which happened at Thebes after
+the battle of Oenophyta, where, in consequence of bad administration,
+the democracy was destroyed; as it was at Megara, where the power of
+the people was lost through anarchy and disorder; the same thing
+happened at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelon; and at Rhodes there
+was the same sedition before the popular government was overthrown.
+Revolutions in state will also arise from a disproportionate increase;
+for as the body consists of many parts, it ought to increase
+proportion-ably to preserve its symmetry, which would otherwise be
+destroyed; as if the foot was to be four cubits long, and the rest of
+the body but two palms; it might otherwise [1303a] be changed into an
+animal of a different form, if it increase beyond proportion not only
+in quantity, but also in disposition of parts; so also a city consists
+of parts, some of which may often increase without notice, as the
+number of poor in democracies and free states. They will also
+sometimes happen by accident, as at Tarentum, a little after the
+Median war, where so many of the nobles were killed in a battle by the
+lapygi, that from a free state the government was turned into a
+democracy; and at Argos, where so many of the citizens were killed by
+Cleomenes the Spartan, that they were obliged to admit several
+husbandmen to the freedom of the state: and at Athens, through the
+unfortunate event of the infantry battles, the number of the nobles
+was reduced by the soldiers being chosen from the list of citizens in
+the Lacedaemonian wars.  Revolutions also sometimes take place in a
+democracy, though seldomer; for where the rich grow numerous or
+properties increase, they become oligarchies or dynasties. Governments
+also sometimes alter without seditions by a combination of the meaner
+people; as at Hersea: for which purpose they changed the mode of
+election from votes to lots, and thus got themselves chosen: and by
+negligence, as when the citizens admit those who are not friends to
+the constitution into the chief offices of the state, which happened
+at Orus, when the oligarchy of the archons was put an end to at the
+election of Heracleodorus, who changed that form of government into a
+democratic free state. By little and little, I mean by this, that very
+often great alterations silently take place in the form of government
+from people's overlooking small matters; as at Ambracia, where the
+census was originally small, but at last became nothing at all, as if
+a little and nothing at all were nearly or entirely alike. That state
+also is liable to seditions which is composed of different nations,
+till their differences are blended together and undistinguishable; for
+as a city cannot be composed of every multitude, so neither can it in
+every given time; for which reason all those republics which have
+hitherto been originally composed of different people or afterwards
+admitted their neighbours to the freedom of their city, have been most
+liable to revolutions; as when the Achaeans joined with the
+Traezenians in founding Sybaris; for soon after, growing more powerful
+than the Traezenians, they expelled them from the city; from whence
+came the proverb of Sybarite wickedness: and again, disputes from a
+like cause happened at Thurium between the Sybarites and those who had
+joined with them in building the city; for they assuming upon these,
+on account of the country being their own, were driven out. And at
+Byzantium the new citizens, being detected in plots against the state,
+were driven out of the city by force of arms. The Antisseans also,
+having taken in those who were banished from Chios, afterwards did the
+same thing; and also the Zancleans, after having taken in the people
+of Samos. The Appolloniats, in the Euxine Sea, having admitted their
+sojourners to the freedom of their city, were troubled with seditions:
+and the Syracusians, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having
+enrolled [1303b] strangers and mercenaries amongst their citizens,
+quarrelled with each other and came to an open rupture: and the people
+of Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalcidians, were the
+greater part of them driven out of the city by them. Many persons
+occasion seditions in oligarchies because they think themselves
+ill-used in not sharing the honours of the state with their equals, as
+I have already mentioned; but in democracies the principal people do
+the same because they have not more than an equal share with others
+who are not equal to them. The situation of the place will also
+sometimes occasion disturbances in the state when the ground is not
+well adapted for one city; as at Clazomene, where the people who lived
+in that part of the town called Chytrum quarrelled with them who lived
+in the island, and the Colophonians with the Notians. At Athens too
+the disposition of the citizens is not the same, for those who live in
+the Piraeus are more attached to a popular government than those who
+live in the city properly so called; for as the interposition of a
+rivulet, however small, will occasion the line of the phalanx to
+fluctuate, so any trifling disagreement will be the cause of
+seditions; but they will not so soon flow from anything else as from
+the disagreement between virtue and vice, and next to that between
+poverty and riches, and so on in order, one cause having more
+influence than another; one of which that I last mentioned.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+But seditions in government do not arise for little things, but from
+them; for their immediate cause is something of moment. Now, trifling
+quarrels are attended with the greatest consequences when they arise
+between persons of the first distinction in the state, as was the case
+with the Syracusians in a remote period; for a revolution in the
+government was brought about by a quarrel between two young men who
+were in office, upon a love affair; for one of them being absent, the
+other seduced his mistress; he in his turn, offended with this,
+persuaded his friend's wife to come and live with him; and upon this
+the whole city took part either with the one or the other, and the
+government was overturned: therefore every one at the beginning of
+such disputes ought to take care to avoid the consequences; and to
+smother up all quarrels which may happen to arise amongst those in
+power, for the mischief lies in the beginning; for the beginning is
+said to be half of the business, so that what was then but a little
+fault will be found afterwards to bear its full proportion to what
+follows. Moreover, disputes between men of note involve the whole city
+in their consequences; in Hestiaea, after the Median war: two brothers
+having a dispute about their paternal estate; he who was the poorer,
+from the other's having concealed part of the effects, and some money
+which his father had found, engaged the popular party on his side,
+while the other, who was rich, the men of fashion. And at Delphos,
+[1304a] a quarrel about a wedding was the beginning of all the
+seditions that afterwards arose amongst them; for the bridegroom,
+being terrified by some unlucky omen upon waiting upon the bride, went
+away without marrying her; which her relations resenting, contrived
+secretly to convey some sacred money into his pocket while he was
+sacrificing, and then killed him as an impious person. At Mitylene
+also, a dispute, which arose concerning a right of heritage, was the
+beginning of great evils, and a war with the Athenians, in which
+Paches took their city, for Timophanes, a man of fortune, leaving two
+daughters, Doxander, who was circumvented in procuring them in
+marriage for his two sons, began a sedition, and excited the Athenians
+to attack them, being the host of that state. There was also a dispute
+at Phocea, concerning a right of inheritance, between Mnasis, the
+father of Mnasis, and Euthucrates, the father of Onomarchus, which
+brought on the Phoceans the sacred war. The government too of
+Epidamnus was changed from a quarrel that arose from an intended
+marriage; for a certain man having contracted his daughter in
+marriage, the father of the young person to whom she was contracted,
+being archon, punishes him, upon which account he, resenting the
+affront, associated himself with those who were excluded from any
+share in the government, and brought about a revolution. A government
+may be changed either into an oligarchy, democracy, or a free state;
+when the magistrates, or any part of the city acquire great credit, or
+are increased in power, as the court of Areopagus at Athens, having
+procured great credit during the Median war, added firmness to their
+administration; and, on the other hand, the maritime force, composed
+of the commonalty, having gained the victory at Salamis, by their
+power at sea, got the lead in the state, and strengthened the popular
+party: and at Argos, the nobles, having gained great credit by the
+battle of Mantinea against the Lacedaemonians, endeavoured to dissolve
+the democracy. And at Syracuse, the victory in their war with the
+Athenians being owing to the common people, they changed their free
+state into a democracy: and at Chalcis, the people having taken off
+the tyrant Phocis, together with the nobles, immediately seized the
+government: and at Ambracia also the people, having expelled the
+tyrant Periander, with his party, placed the supreme power in
+themselves. And this in general ought to be known, that whosoever has
+been the occasion of a state being powerful, whether private persons,
+or magistrates, a certain tribe, or any particular part of the
+citizens, or the multitude, be they who they will, will be the cause
+of disputes in the state. For either some persons, who envy them the
+honours they have acquired, will begin to be seditious, or they, on
+account of the dignity they have acquired, will not be content with
+their former equality. A state is also liable to commotions when those
+parts of it which seem to be opposite to each other approach to an
+[1304b] equality, as the rich and the common people; so that the part
+which is between them both is either nothing at all, or too little to
+be noticed; for if one party is so much more powerful than the other,
+as to be evidently stronger, that other will not be willing to hazard
+the danger: for which reason those who are superior in excellence and
+virtue will never be the cause of seditions; for they will be too few
+for that purpose when compared to the many. In general, the beginning
+and the causes of seditions in all states are such as I have now
+described, and revolutions therein are brought about in two ways,
+either by violence or fraud: if by violence, either at first by
+compelling them to submit to the change when it is made. It may also
+be brought about by fraud in two different ways, either when the
+people, being at first deceived, willingly consent to an alteration in
+their government, and are afterwards obliged by force to abide by it:
+as, for instance, when the four hundred imposed upon the people by
+telling them that the king of Persia would supply them with money for
+the war against the Lacedaemonians; and after they had been guilty of
+this falsity, they endeavoured to keep possession of the supreme
+power; or when they are at first persuaded and afterwards consent to
+be governed: and by one of these methods which I have mentioned are
+all revolutions in governments brought about.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+We ought now to inquire into those events which will arise from these
+causes in every species of government. Democracies will be most
+subject to revolutions from the dishonesty of their demagogues; for
+partly, by informing against men of property, they induce them to join
+together through self-defence, for a common fear will make the
+greatest enemies unite; and partly by setting the common people
+against them: and this is what any one may continually see practised
+in many states. In the island of Cos, for instance, the democracy was
+subverted by the wickedness of the demagogues, for the nobles entered
+into a combination with each other. And at Rhodes the demagogues, by
+distributing of bribes, prevented the people from paying the
+trierarchs what was owing to them, who were obliged by the number of
+actions they were harassed with to conspire together and destroy the
+popular state. The same thing was brought about at Heraclea, soon
+after the settlement of the city, by the same persons; for the
+citizens of note, being ill treated by them, quitted the city, but
+afterwards joining together they returned and overthrew the popular
+state. Just in the same manner the democracy was destroyed in Megara;
+for there the demagogues, to procure money by confiscations, drove out
+the nobles, till the number of those who were banished was
+considerable, who, [1305a] returning, got the better of the people in
+a battle, and established an oligarchy. The like happened at Cume,
+during the time of the democracy, which Thrasymachus destroyed; and
+whoever considers what has happened in other states may perceive the
+same revolutions to have arisen from the same causes. The demagogues,
+to curry favour with the people, drive the nobles to conspire
+together, either by dividing their estates, or obliging them to spend
+them on public services, or by banishing them, that they may
+confiscate the fortunes of the wealthy. In former times, when the same
+person was both demagogue and general, the democracies were changed
+into tyrannies; and indeed most of the ancient tyrannies arose from
+those states: a reason for which then subsisted, but not now; for at
+that time the demagogues were of the soldiery; for they were not then
+powerful by their eloquence; but, now the art of oratory is
+cultivated, the able speakers are at present the demagogues; but, as
+they are unqualified to act in a military capacity, they cannot impose
+themselves on the people as tyrants, if we except in one or two
+trifling instances. Formerly, too, tyrannies were more common than
+now, on account of the very extensive powers with which some
+magistrates were entrusted: as the prytanes at Miletus; for they were
+supreme in many things of the last consequence; and also because at
+that time the cities were not of that very great extent, the people in
+general living in the country, and being employed in husbandry, which
+gave them, who took the lead in public affairs, an opportunity, if
+they had a turn for war, to make themselves tyrants; which they all
+did when they had gained the confidence of the people; and this
+confidence was their hatred to the rich. This was the case of
+Pisistratus at Athens, when he opposed the Pediaci: and of Theagenes
+in Megara, who slaughtered the cattle belonging to the rich, after he
+had seized those who kept them by the riverside. Dionysius also, for
+accusing Daphnseus and the rich, was thought worthy of being raised to
+a tyranny, from the confidence which the people had of his being a
+popular man in consequence of these enmities. A government shall also
+alter from its ancient and approved democratic form into one entirely
+new, if there is no census to regulate the election of magistrates;
+for, as the election is with the people, the demagogues who are
+desirous of being in office, to flatter them, will endeavour with all
+their power to make the people superior even to the laws. To prevent
+this entirely, or at least in a great measure, the magistrates should
+be elected by the tribes, and not by the people at large. These are
+nearly the revolutions to which democracies are liable, and also the
+causes from whence they arise.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+There are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a
+revolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the people are ill used, for
+then every individual is ripe for [1305b] sedition; more particularly
+if one of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis,
+at Naxus, who was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also
+which arise from different causes will differ from each other; for
+sometimes a revolution is brought about by the rich who have no share
+in the administration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and
+this happened at Massilia, Ister, Heraclea, and other cities; for
+those who had no share in the government ceased not to raise disputes
+till they were admitted to it: first the elder brothers, and then the
+younger also: for in some places the father and son are never in
+office at the same time; in others the elder and younger brother: and
+where this is observed the oligarchy partakes something of a free
+state. At Ister it was changed into a democracy; in Heraclea, instead
+of being in the hands of a few, it consisted of six hundred. At Cnidus
+the oligarchy was destroyed by the nobles quarrelling with each other,
+because the government was in the hands of so few: for there, as we
+have just mentioned, if the father was in office, the son could not;
+or, if there were many brothers, the eldest only; for the people,
+taking advantage of their disputes, elected one of the nobles for
+their general, and got the victory: for where there are seditions
+government is weak. And formerly at Erithria, during the oligarchy of
+the Basilides, although the state flourished greatly under their
+excellent management, yet because the people were displeased that the
+power should be in the hands of so few, they changed the government.
+Oligarchies also are subject to revolutions, from those who are in
+office therein, from the quarrels of the demagogues with each other.
+The demagogues are of two sorts; one who flatter the few when they are
+in power: for even these have their demagogues; such was Charicles at
+Athens, who had great influence over the thirty; and, in the same
+manner, Phrynichus over the four hundred. The others are those
+demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy, and flatter the people:
+such were the state-guardians at Larissa, who flattered the people
+because they were elected by them. And this will always happen in
+every oligarchy where the magistrates do not elect themselves, but are
+chosen out of men either of great fortune or certain ranks, by the
+soldiers or by the people; as was the custom at Abydos. And when the
+judicial department is not in the hands of the supreme power, the
+demagogues, favouring the people in their causes, overturn the
+government; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus: and also when some
+desire to contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands; for
+those who endeavour to support an equality are obliged to apply to the
+people for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions
+when the nobility spend their fortunes by luxury; for such persons are
+desirous of innovations, and either endeavour to be tyrants themselves
+or to support others in being so, as [1306a] Hypparinus supported
+Dionysius of Syracuse. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a
+colony of Chal-cidians, and when they came set them to quarrel with
+the rich: and at AEgina a certain person who brought an action against
+Chares attempted on that account to alter the government. Sometimes
+they will try to raise commotions, sometimes they will rob the public,
+and then quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who
+endeavour to detect them; which was the case at Apollonia in Pontus.
+But if the members of an oligarchy agree among themselves the state is
+not very easily destroyed without some external force. Pharsalus is a
+proof of this, where, though the place is small, yet the citizens have
+great power, from the prudent use they make of it. An oligarchy also
+will be destroyed when they create another oligarchy under it; that
+is, when the management of public affairs is in the hands of a few,
+and not equally, but when all of them do not partake of the supreme
+power, as happened once at Elis, where the supreme power in general
+was in the hands of a very few out of whom a senate was chosen,
+consisting but of ninety' who held their places for life; and their
+mode of election was calculated to preserve the power amongst each
+other's families, like the senators at Lacedaemon. An oligarchy is
+liable to a revolution both in time of war and peace; in war, because
+through a distrust in the citizens the government is obliged to employ
+mercenary troops, and he to whom they give the command of the army
+will very often assume the tyranny, as Timophanes did at Corinth; and
+if they appoint more than one general, they will very probably
+establish a dynasty: and sometimes, through fear of this, they are
+forced to let the people in general have some share in the government,
+because they are obliged to employ them. In peace, from their want of
+confidence in each other, they will entrust the guardianship of the
+state to mercenaries and their general, who will be an arbiter between
+them, and sometimes become master of both, which happened at Larissa,
+when Simos and the Aleuadae had the chief power. The same thing
+happened at Abydos, during the time of the political clubs, of which
+Iphiades' was one.  Commotions also will happen in an oligarchy from
+one party's overbearing and insulting another, or from their
+quarrelling about their law-suits or marriages. How their marriages,
+for instance, will have that effect has been already shown: and in
+Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights upon the same
+account. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person
+being condemned by the court; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man's
+being guilty of adultery; [1306b] the punishment indeed which Eurytion
+suffered at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed: as was
+that at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have
+them publicly bound in the pillory. Many revolutions also have been
+brought about in oligarchies by those who could not brook the
+despotism which those persons assumed who were in power, as at Cnidus
+and Chios. Changes also may happen by accident in what we call a free
+state and in an oligarchy; wheresoever the senators, judges, and
+magistrates are chosen according to a certain census; for it often
+happens that the highest census is fixed at first; so that a few only
+could have a share in the government, in an oligarchy, or in a free
+state those of moderate fortunes only; when the city grows rich,
+through peace or some other happy cause, it becomes so little that
+every one's fortune is equal to the census, so that the whole
+community may partake of all the honours of government; and this
+change sometimes happens by little and little, and insensible
+approaches, sometimes quicker. These are the revolutions and seditions
+that arise in oligarchies, and the causes to which they are owing: and
+indeed both democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter, not into
+governments of a contrary form, but into those of the same government;
+as, for instance, from having the supreme power in the law to vest it
+in the ruling party, or the contrariwise.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+
+Commotions also arise in aristocracies, from there being so few
+persons in power (as we have already observed they do in oligarchies,
+for in this particular an aristocracy is most near an oligarchy, for
+in both these states the administration of public affairs is in the
+hands of a few; not that this arises from the same cause in both,
+though herein they chiefly seem alike): and these will necessarily be
+most likely to happen when the generality of the people are
+high-spirited and think themselves equal to each other in merit; such
+were those at Lacedasmon, called the Partheniae (for these were, as
+well as others, descendants of citizens), who being detected in a
+conspiracy against the state, were sent to found Tarentum. They will
+happen also when some great men are disgraced by those who have
+received higher honours than themselves, to whom they are no ways
+inferior in abilities, as Lysander by the kings: or when an ambitious
+man cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the reign of Agesilaus,
+was chief in a conspiracy against the Spartans: and also when some are
+too poor and others too rich, which will most frequently happen in
+time of war; as at Lacedaemon during the Messenian war, which is
+proved by a poem of Tyrtaeus, [1307a] called "Eunomia;" for some
+persons being reduced thereby, desired that the lands might be
+divided: and also when some person of very high rank might still be
+higher if he could rule alone, which seemed to be Pausanias's
+intention at Lacedaemon, when he was their general in the Median war,
+and Anno's at Carthage. But free states and aristocracies are mostly
+destroyed from want of a fixed administration of public affairs; the
+cause of which evil arises at first from want of a due mixture of the
+democratic and the oligarchic parts in a free state; and in an
+aristocracy from the same causes, and also from virtue not being
+properly joined to power; but chiefly from the two first, I mean the
+undue mixture of the democratic and oligarchic parts; for these two
+are what all free states endeavour to blend together, and many of
+those which we call aristocracies, in this particular these states
+differ from each other, and on this account the one of them is less
+stable than the other, for that state which inclines most to an
+oligarchy is called an aristocracy, and that which inclines most to a
+democracy is called a free state; on which account this latter is more
+secure than the former, for the wider the foundation the securer the
+building, and it is ever best to live where equality prevails. But the
+rich, if the community gives them rank, very often endeavour to insult
+and tyrannise over others. On the whole, whichever way a government
+inclines, in that it will settle, each party supporting their own.
+Thus a free state will become a democracy; an aristocracy an
+oligarchy; or the contrary, an aristocracy may change into a democracy
+(for the poor, if they think themselves injured, directly take part
+with the contrary side) and a free state into an oligarchy. The only
+firm state is that where every one enjoys that equality he has a right
+to and fully possesses what is his own. And what I have been speaking
+of happened to the Thurians; for the magistrates being elected
+according to a very high census, it was altered to a lower, and they
+were subdivided into more courts, but in consequence of the nobles
+possessing all the land, contrary to law; the state was too much of an
+oligarchy, which gave them an opportunity of encroaching greatly on
+the rest of the people; but these, after they had been well inured to
+war, so far got the better of their guards as to expel every one out
+of the country who possessed more than he ought. Moreover, as all
+aristocracies are free oligarchies, the nobles therein endeavour to
+have rather too much power, as at Lace-daemon, where property is now
+in the hands of a few, and the nobles have too much liberty to do as
+they please and make such alliances as they please. Thus the city of
+the Locrians was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius; which state
+was neither a democracy nor well-tempered aristocracy. But an
+aristocracy chiefly approaches to a secret change by its being
+destroyed by degrees, as we [1307b] have already said of all
+governments in general; and this happens from the cause of the
+alteration being trifling; for whenever anything which in the least
+regards the state is treated with contempt, after that something else,
+and this of a little more consequence, will be more easily altered,
+until the whole fabric of government is entirely subverted, which
+happened in the government of Thurium; for the law being that they
+should continue soldiers for five years, some young men of a martial
+disposition, who were in great esteem amongst their officers,
+despising those who had the management of public affairs, and
+imagining they could easily accomplish their intention, first
+endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having it lawful to
+continue the same person perpetually in the military, perceiving that
+the people would readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates who
+are called counsellers first joined together with an intention to
+oppose it but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief
+that if that law was not repealed they would permit the management of
+all other public affairs to remain in their hands; but afterwards,
+when they endeavoured to restrain some fresh alterations that were
+making, they found that they could do nothing, for the whole form of
+government was altered into a dynasty of those who first introduced
+the innovations.  In short, all governments are liable to be destroyed
+either from within or from without; from without when they have for
+their neighbour a state whose policy is contrary to theirs, and indeed
+if it has great power the same thing will happen if it is not their
+neighbour; of which both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians are a
+proof; for the one, when conquerors everywhere destroyed the
+oligarchies; the other the democracies. These are the chief causes of
+revolutions and dissensions in governments.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+
+We are now to consider upon what the preservation of governments in
+general and of each state in particular depends; and, in the first
+place, it is evident that if we are right in the causes we have
+assigned for their destruction, we know also the means of their
+preservation; for things contrary produce contraries: but destruction
+and preservation are contrary to each other. In well-tempered
+governments it requires as much care as anything whatsoever, that
+nothing be done contrary to law: and this ought chiefly to be attended
+to in matters of small consequence; for an illegality that approaches
+insensibly, approaches secretly, as in a family small expenses
+continually repeated consume a man's income; for the understanding is
+deceived thereby, as by this false argument; if every part is little,
+then the whole is little: now, this in one sense is true, in another
+is false, for the whole and all the parts together are large, though
+made up of small parts. The first therefore of anything is what the
+state ought to guard against. In the next place, no credit ought to be
+given to those who endeavour to deceive the people with false
+pretences; for they will be [1308a] confuted by facts. The different
+ways in which they will attempt to do this have been already
+mentioned. You may often perceive both aristocracies and oligarchies
+continuing firm, not from the stability of their forms of government,
+but from the wise conduct of the magistrates, both towards those who
+have a part in the management of public affairs, and those also who
+have not: towards those who have not, by never injuring them; and also
+introducing those who are of most consequence amongst them into
+office; nor disgracing those who are desirous of honour; or
+encroaching on the property of individuals; towards those who have, by
+behaving to each other upon an equality; for that equality which the
+favourers of a democracy desire to have established in the state is
+not only just, but convenient also, amongst those who are of the same
+rank: for which reason, if the administration is in the hands of many,
+those rules which are established in democracies will be very useful;
+as to let no one continue in office longer than six months: that all
+those who are of the same rank may have their turn; for between these
+there is a sort of democracy: for which reason demagogues are most
+likely to arise up amongst them, as we have already mentioned:
+besides, by this means both aristocracies and democracies will be the
+less liable to be corrupted into dynasties, because it will not be so
+easy for those who are magistrates for a little to do as much mischief
+as they could in a long time: for it is from hence that tyrannies
+arise in democracies and oligarchies; for either those who are most
+powerful in each state establish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the
+one, the dynasties in the other, or the chief magistrates who have
+been long in power.  Governments are sometimes preserved not only by
+having the means of their corruption at a great distance, but also by
+its being very near them; for those who are alarmed at some impending
+evil keep a stricter hand over the state; for which reason it is
+necessary for those who have the guardianship of the constitution to
+be able to awaken the fears of the people, that they may preserve it,
+and not like a night-guard to be remiss in protecting the state, but
+to make the distant danger appear at hand. Great care ought also to be
+used to endeavour to restrain the quarrels and disputes of the nobles
+by laws, as well as to prevent those who are not already engaged in
+them from taking a part therein; for to perceive an evil at its very
+first approach is not the lot of every one, but of the politician. To
+prevent any alteration taking place in an oligarchy or free state on
+account of the census, if that happens to continue the same while the
+quantity of money is increased, it will be useful to take a general
+account of the whole amount of it in former times, to compare it with
+the present, and to do this every year in those cities where the
+census is yearly, [1308b] in larger communities once in three or five
+years; and if the whole should be found much larger or much less than
+it was at the time when the census was first established in the state,
+let there be a law either to extend or contract it, doing both these
+according to its increase or decrease; if it increases making the
+census larger, if it decreases smaller: and if this latter is not done
+in oligarchies and free states, you will have a dynasty arise in the
+one, an oligarchy in the other: if the former is not, free states will
+be changed into democracies, and oligarchies into free states or
+democracies. It is a general maxim in democracies, oligarchies,
+monarchies, and indeed in all governments, not to let any one acquire
+a rank far superior to the rest of the community, but rather to
+endeavour to confer moderate honours for a continuance than great ones
+for a short time; for these latter spoil men, for it is not every one
+who can bear prosperity: but if this rule is not observed, let not
+those honours which were conferred all at once be all at once taken
+away, but rather by degrees. But, above all things, let this
+regulation be made by the law, that no one shall have too much power,
+either by means of his fortune or friends; but if he has, for his
+excess therein, let it be contrived that he shall quit the country.
+Now, as many persons promote innovations, that they may enjoy their
+own particular manner of living, there ought to be a particular
+officer to inspect the manners of every one, and see that these are
+not contrary to the genius of the state in which he lives, whether it
+may be an oligarchy, a democracy, or any other form of government;
+and, for the same reason, those should be guarded against who are most
+prosperous in the city: the means of doing which is by appointing
+those who are otherwise to the business and the offices of the state.
+I mean, to oppose men of account to the common people, the poor to the
+rich, and to blend both these into one body, and to increase the
+numbers of those who are in the middle rank; and this will prevent
+those seditions which arise from an inequality of condition. But above
+all, in every state it is necessary, both by the laws and every other
+method possible, to prevent those who are employed by the public from
+being venal, and this particularly in an oligarchy; for then the
+people will not be so much displeased from seeing themselves excluded
+from a share in the government (nay, they will rather be glad to have
+leisure to attend their private affairs) as at suspecting that the
+officers of the state steal the public money, then indeed they are
+afflicted with double concern, both because they are deprived of the
+honours of the state, and pillaged by those who enjoy them. There is
+one method of blending together a democracy and an aristocracy,
+[1309a] if office brought no profit; by which means both the rich and
+the poor will enjoy what they desire; for to admit all to a share in
+the government is democratical; that the rich should be in office is
+aristocratical. This must be done by letting no public employment
+whatsoever be attended with any emolument; for the poor will not
+desire to be in office when they can get nothing by it, but had rather
+attend to their own affairs: but the rich will choose it, as they want
+nothing of the community. Thus the poor will increase their fortunes
+by being wholly employed in their own concerns; and the principal part
+of the people will not be governed by the lower sort. To prevent the
+exchequer from being defrauded, let all public money be delivered out
+openly in the face of the whole city, and let copies of the accounts
+be deposited in the different wards tribes, and divisions. But, as the
+magistrates are to execute their offices without any advantages, the
+law ought to provide proper honours for those who execute them well.
+In democracies also it is necessary that the rich should be protected,
+by not permitting their lands to be divided, nor even the produce of
+them, which in some states is done unperceivably. It would be also
+better if the people would prevent them when they offer to exhibit a
+number of unnecessary and yet expensive public entertainments of
+plays, music, processions, and the like. In an oligarchy it is
+necessary to take great care of the poor, and allot them public
+employments which are gainful; and, if any of the rich insult them, to
+let their punishment be severer than if they insulted one of their own
+rank; and to let estates pass by affinity, and not gift: nor to permit
+any person to have more than one; for by this means property will be
+more equally divided, and the greater part of the poor get into better
+circumstances. It is also serviceable in a democracy and an oligarchy
+to allot those who take no part in public affairs an equality or a
+preference in other things; the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an
+oligarchy: but still all the principal offices in the state to be
+filled only by those who are best qualified to discharge them.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+
+There are three qualifications necessary for those who fill the first
+departments in government; first of all, an affection for the
+established constitution; second place, abilities every way completely
+equal to the business of their office; in the third, virtue and
+justice correspondent to the nature of that particular state they are
+placed in; for if justice is not the same in all states, it is evident
+that there must be different species thereof. There may be some doubt,
+when all these qualifications do not in the same persons, in what
+manner the choice shall be made; as for instance, suppose that one
+person is an accomplished general, but a bad man and no friend to the
+[1309b] constitution; another is just and a friend to it, which shall
+one prefer? we should then consider of two qualities, which of them
+the generality possess in a greater degree, which in a less; for which
+reason in the choice of a general we should regard his courage more
+than his virtue as the more uncommon quality; as there are fewer
+capable of conducting an army than there are good men: but, to protect
+the state or manage the finances, the contrary rule should be
+followed; for these require greater virtue than the generality are
+possessed of, but only that knowledge which is common to all. It may
+be asked, if a man has abilities equal to his appointment in the
+state, and is affectionate to the constitution, what occasion is there
+for being virtuous, since these two things alone are sufficient to
+enable him to be useful to the public? it is, because those who
+possess those qualities are often deficient in prudence; for, as they
+often neglect their own affairs, though they know them and love
+themselves, so nothing will prevent their serving the public in the
+same manner. In short, whatsoever the laws contain which we allow to
+be useful to the state contributes to its preservation: but its first
+and principal support is (as has been often insisted upon) to have the
+number of those who desire to preserve it greater than those who wish
+to destroy it. Above all things that ought not to be forgotten which
+many governments now corrupted neglect; namely, to preserve a mean.
+For many things seemingly favourable to a democracy destroy a
+democracy, and many things seemingly favourable to an oligarchy
+destroy an oligarchy.  Those who think this the only virtue extend it
+to excess, not considering that as a nose which varies a little from
+perfect straightness, either towards a hook nose or a flat one, may
+yet be beautiful and agreeable to look at; but if this particularity
+is extended beyond measure, first of all the properties of the part is
+lost, but at last it can hardly be admitted to be a nose at all, on
+account of the excess of the rise or sinking: thus it is with other
+parts of the human body; so also the same thing is true with respect
+to states; for both an oligarchy and a democracy may something vary
+from their most perfect form and yet be well constituted; but if any
+one endeavours to extend either of them too far, at first he will make
+the government the worse for it, but at last there will be no
+government at all remaining. The lawgiver and the politician therefore
+should know well what preserves and what destroys a democracy or an
+oligarchy, for neither the one nor the other can possibly continue
+without rich and poor: but that whenever an entire equality of
+circumstances [1310a] prevails, the state must necessarily become of
+another form; so that those who destroy these laws, which authorise an
+inequality in property, destroy the government. It is also an error in
+democracies for the demagogues to endeavour to make the common people
+superior to the laws; and thus by setting them at variance with the
+rich, dividing one city into two; whereas they ought rather to speak
+in favour of the rich. In oligarchies, on the contrary, it is wrong to
+support those who are in administration against the people. The oaths
+also which they take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they
+now are; for, at present, in some places they swear, "I will be
+adverse to the common people, and contrive all I can against them;"
+whereas they ought rather to suppose and pretend the contrary;
+expressing in their oaths, that they will not injure the people. But
+of all things which I have mentioned, that which contributes most to
+preserve the state is, what is now most despised, to educate your
+children for the state; for the most useful laws, and most approved by
+every statesman, will be of no service if the citizens are not
+accustomed to and brought up in the principles of the constitution; of
+a democracy, if that is by law established; of an oligarchy, if that
+is; for if there are bad morals in one man, there are in the city. But
+to educate a child fit for the state, it must not be done in the
+manner which would please either those who have the power in an
+oligarchy or those who desire a democracy, but so as they may be able
+to conduct either of these forms of governments. But now the children
+of the magistrates in an oligarchy are brought up too delicately, and
+the children of the poor hardy with exercise and labour; so that they
+are both desirous of and able to promote innovations. In democracies
+of the purest form they pursue a method which is contrary to their
+welfare; the reason of which is, that they define liberty wrong: now,
+there are two things which seem to be the objects of a democracy, that
+the people in general should possess the supreme power, and all enjoy
+freedom; for that which is just seems to be equal, and what the people
+think equal, that is a law: now, their freedom and equality consists
+in every one's doing what they please: that is in such a democracy
+every one may live as he likes; "as his inclination guides," in the
+words of Euripides: but this is wrong, for no one ought to think it
+slavery to live in subjection to government, but protection. Thus I
+have mentioned the causes of corruption in different states, and the
+means of their preservation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+
+It now remains that we speak of monarchies, their causes of
+corruption, and means of preservation; and indeed almost the same
+things which have been said of other governments happen to kingdoms
+and tyrannies; for a kingdom partakes of an aristocracy, a tyranny of
+the worst species of an oligarchy and democracy; for which reason it
+is the worst that man can submit to, as being composed of two, both of
+which are bad, and collectively retains all the corruptions and all
+the defects of both these states. These two species of monarchies
+arise from principles contrary to each other: a kingdom is formed to
+protect the better sort of people against the multitude, and kings are
+appointed out of those, who are chosen either for their superior
+virtue and actions flowing from virtuous principles, or else from
+their noble descent; but a tyrant is chosen out of the meanest
+populace; an enemy to the better sort, that the common people may not
+be oppressed by them. That this is true experience convinces us; for
+the generality of tyrants were indeed mere demagogues, who gained
+credit with the people by oppressing the nobles. Some tyrannies were
+established in this manner after the cities were considerably
+enlarged--others before that time, by kings who exceeded the power
+which their country allowed them, from a desire of governing
+despotically: others were founded by those who were elected to the
+superior offices in the state; for formerly the people appointed
+officers for life, who came to be at the head of civil and religious
+affairs, and these chose one out of their body in whom the supreme
+power over all the magistrates was placed. By all these means it was
+easy to establish a tyranny, if they chose it; for their power was
+ready at hand, either by their being kings, or else by enjoying the
+honours of the state; thus Phidon at Argos and other tyrants enjoyed
+originally the kingly power; Phalaris and others in Ionia, the honours
+of the state. Pansetius at Leontium, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus
+at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and others, acquired theirs by
+having been demagogues. A kingdom, as we have said, partakes much of
+the nature of an aristocracy, and is bestowed according to worth, as
+either virtue, family, beneficent actions, or these joined with power;
+for those who have been benefactors to cities and states, or have it
+in their powers to be so, have acquired this honour, and those who
+have prevented a people from falling into slavery by war, as Codrus,
+or those who have freed them from it, as Cyrus, or the founders of
+cities, or settlers of colonies, as the kings of Sparta, Macedon, and
+Molossus. A king desires to be the guardian of his people, that those
+who have property may be secure in the possession of it, and that the
+people in general meet with no injury; but a tyrant, as has been often
+said, has no regard to the common good, except for his own advantage;
+his only object is pleasure, but a king's is virtue: what a tyrant
+therefore is ambitious of engrossing is wealth, but a king rather
+honour. The guards too of a king are citizens, a tyrant's foreigners.
+
+That a tyranny contains all that is bad both in a democracy and an
+oligarchy is evident; with an oligarchy it has for its end gain, as
+the only means of providing the tyrant with guards and the luxuries of
+life; like that it places no confidence in the people; and therefore
+deprives them of the use of arms: it is also common to them both to
+persecute the populace, to drive them out of the city and their own
+habitations. With a democracy it quarrels with the nobles, and
+destroys them both publicly and privately, or drives them into
+banishment, as rivals and an impediment to the government; hence
+naturally arise conspiracies both amongst those who desire to govern
+and those who desire not to be slaves; hence arose Periander's advice
+to Thrasybulus to take off the tallest stalks, hinting thereby, that
+it was necessary to make away with the eminent citizens. We ought then
+in reason, as has been already said, to account for the changes which
+arise in a monarchy from the same causes which produce them in other
+states: for, through injustice received, fear, and contempt, many of
+those who are under a monarchical government conspire against it; but
+of all species of injustice, injurious contempt has most influence on
+them for that purpose: sometimes it is owing to their being deprived
+of their private fortunes. The dissolution too of a kingdom and a
+tyranny are generally the same; for monarchs abound in wealth and
+honour, which all are desirous to obtain. Of plots: some aim at the
+life of those who govern, others at their government; the first arises
+from hatred to their persons; which hatred may be owing to many
+causes, either of which will be sufficient to excite their anger, and
+the generality of those who are under the influence of that passion
+will join in a conspiracy, not for the sake of their own advancement,
+but for revenge. Thus the plot against the children of Pisistratus
+arose from their injurious treatment of Harmodius's sister, and
+insulting him also; for Harmodius resenting the injury done to his
+sister, and Aristogiton the injury done to Harmodius. Periander the
+tyrant of Ambracia also lost his life by a conspiracy, for some
+improper liberties he took with a boy in his cups: and Philip was
+slain by Pausanias for neglecting to revenge him of the affront he had
+received from Attains; as was Amintas the Little by Darda, for
+insulting him on account of his age; and the eunuch by Evagoras the
+Cyprian in revenge for having taken his son's wife away from him ....
+
+Many also who have had their bodies scourged with stripes have,
+through resentment, either killed those who caused them to be
+inflicted or conspired against them, even when they had kingly power,
+as at Mitylene Megacles, joining with his friends, killed the
+Penthelidee, who used to go about striking those they met with clubs.
+Thus, in later times, Smendes killed Penthilus for whipping him and
+dragging him away from his wife. Decamnichus also was the chief cause
+of the conspiracy against Archelaus, for he urged others on: the
+occasion of his resentment was his having delivered him to Euripides
+the poet to be scourged; for Euripides was greatly offended with him
+for having said something of the foulness of his breath. And many
+others have been killed or conspired against on the same account. Fear
+too is a cause which produces the same effects, as well in monarchies
+as in other states: thus Artabanes conspired against Xerxes through
+fear of punishment for having hanged Darius according to his orders,
+whom he supposed he intended to pardon, as the order was given at
+supper-time. Some kings also have been [1312a] dethroned and killed in
+consequence of the contempt they were held in by the people; as some
+one conspired against Sardanapalus, having seen him spinning with his
+wife, if what is related of him is true, or if not of him, it may very
+probably be true of some one else. Dion also conspired against
+Dionysius the Younger, seeing his subjects desirous of a conspiracy,
+and that he himself was always drunk: and even a man's friends will do
+this if they despise him; for from the confidence he places in them,
+they think that they shall not be found out. Those also who think they
+shall gain his throne will conspire against a king through contempt;
+for as they are powerful themselves, and despise the danger, on
+account of their own strength, they will readily attempt it. Thus a
+general at the head of his army will endeavour to dethrone the
+monarch, as Cyrus did Astyages, despising both his manner of life and
+his forces; his forces for want of action, his life for its
+effeminacy: thus Suthes, the Thracian, who was general to Amadocus,
+conspired against him. Sometimes more than one of these causes will
+excite men to enter into conspiracies, as contempt and desire of gain;
+as in the instance of Mithridates against Ariobarzanes. Those also who
+are of a bold disposition, and have gained military honours amongst
+kings, will of all others be most like to engage in sedition; for
+strength and courage united inspire great bravery: whenever,
+therefore, these join in one person, he will be very ready for
+conspiracies, as he will easily conquer. Those who conspire against a
+tyrant through love of glory and honour have a different motive in
+view from what I have already mentioned; for, like all others who
+embrace danger, they have only glory and honour in view, and think,
+not as some do, of the wealth and pomp they may acquire, but engage in
+this as they would in any other noble action, that they may be
+illustrious and distinguished, and destroy a tyrant, not to succeed in
+his tyranny, but to acquire renown. No doubt but the number of those
+who act upon this principle is small, for we must suppose they regard
+their own safety as nothing in case they should not succeed, and must
+embrace the opinion of Dion (which few can do) when he made war upon
+Dionysius with a very few troops; for he said, that let the advantage
+he made be ever so little it would satisfy him to have gained it; and
+that, should it be his lot to die the moment he had gained footing in
+his country, he should think his death sufficiently glorious. A
+tyranny also is exposed to the same destruction as all other states
+are, from too powerful neighbours: for it is evident, that an
+opposition of principles will make them desirous of subverting it; and
+what they desire, all who can, do: and there is a principle of
+opposition in one state to another, as a democracy against a tyranny,
+as says Hesiod, "a potter against a potter;" for the extreme of a
+democracy is a tyranny; a kingly power against an aristocracy, from
+their different forms of government--for which reason the
+Lacedaemonians destroyed many tyrannies; as did the Syracusians during
+the prosperity of their state. Nor are they only destroyed from
+without, but also from within, when those who have no share in the
+power bring about a revolution, as happened to Gelon, and lately to
+Dionysius; to the first, by means of Thrasybulus, the brother of
+Hiero, who nattered Gelon's son, and induced him to lead a life of
+pleasure, that he himself might govern; but the family joined together
+and endeavoured to support the tyranny and expel Thrasybulus; but
+those whom they made of their party seized the opportunity and
+expelled the whole family. Dion made war against his relation
+Dionysius, and being assisted by the people, first expelled and then
+killed him. As there are two causes which chiefly induce men to
+conspire against tyrants, hatred and contempt, one of these, namely
+hatred, seems inseparable from them. Contempt also is often the cause
+of their destruction: for though, for instance, those who raised
+themselves to the supreme power generally preserved it; but those who
+received it from them have, to speak truth, almost immediately all of
+them lost it; for, falling into an effeminate way of life, they soon
+grew despicable, and generally fell victims to conspiracies. Part of
+their hatred may be very fitly ascribed to anger; for in some cases
+this is their motive to action: for it is often a cause which impels
+them to act more powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater
+obstinacy against those whom they attack, as this passion is not under
+the direction of reason. Many persons also indulge this passion
+through contempt; which occasioned the fall of the Pisistratidae and
+many others. But hatred is more powerful than anger; for anger is
+accompanied with grief, which prevents the entrance of reason; but
+hatred is free from it. In short, whatever causes may be assigned as
+the destruction of a pure oligarchy unmixed with any other government
+and an extreme democracy, the same may be applied to a tyranny; for
+these are divided tyrannies.
+
+Kingdoms are seldom destroyed by any outward attack; for which reason
+they are generally very stable; but they have many causes of
+subversion within; of which two are the principal; one is when those
+who are in power [1313a] excite a sedition, the other when they
+endeavour to establish a tyranny by assuming greater power than the
+law gives them. A kingdom, indeed, is not what we ever see erected in
+our times, but rather monarchies and tyrannies; for a kingly
+government is one that is voluntarily submitted to, and its supreme
+power admitted upon great occasions: but where many are equal, and
+there are none in any respect so much better than another as to be
+qualified for the greatness and dignity of government over them, then
+these equals will not willingly submit to be commanded; but if any one
+assumes the government, either by force or fraud, this is a tyranny.
+To what we have already said we shall add, the causes of revolutions
+in an hereditary kingdom. One of these is, that many of those who
+enjoy it are naturally proper objects of contempt only: another is,
+that they are insolent while their power is not despotic; but they
+possess kingly honours only. Such a state is soon destroyed; for a
+king exists but while the people are willing to obey, as their
+submission to him is voluntary, but to a tyrant involuntary. These and
+such-like are the causes of the destruction of monarchies.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+
+Monarchies, in a word, are preserved by means contrary to what I have
+already mentioned as the cause of their destruction; but to speak to
+each separately: the stability of a kingdom will depend upon the power
+of the king's being kept within moderate bounds; for by how much the
+less extensive his power is, by so much the longer will his government
+continue; for he will be less despotic and more upon an equality of
+condition with those he governs; who, on that account, will envy him
+the less.
+
+It was on this account that the kingdom of the Molossi continued so
+long; and the Lacedaemonians from their government's being from the
+beginning divided into two parts, and also by the moderation
+introduced into the other parts of it by Theopompus, and his
+establishment of the ephori; for by taking something from the power he
+increased the duration of the kingdom, so that in some measure he made
+it not less, but bigger; as they say he replied to his wife, who asked
+him if he was not ashamed to deliver down his kingdom to his children
+reduced from what he received it from his ancestors? No, says he, I
+give it him more lasting. Tyrannies are preserved two ways most
+opposite to each other, one of which is when the power is delegated
+from one to the other, and in this manner many tyrants govern in their
+states. Report says that Periander founded many of these. There are
+also many of them to be met with amongst the Persians. What has been
+already mentioned is as conducive as anything can be to preserve a
+tyranny; namely, to keep down those who are of an aspiring
+disposition, to take off those who will not submit, to allow no public
+meals, no clubs, no education, nothing at all, but to guard against
+everything that gives rise to high spirits or mutual confidence; nor
+to suffer the learned meetings of those who are at leisure to hold
+conversation with each other; and to endeavour by every means possible
+to keep all the people strangers to each other; for knowledge
+increases mutual confidence; and to oblige all strangers to appear in
+public, and to live near the city-gate, that all their actions may be
+sufficiently seen; for those who are kept like slaves seldom entertain
+any noble thoughts: in short, to imitate everything which the Persians
+and barbarians do, for they all contribute to support slavery; and to
+endeavour to know what every one who is under their power does and
+says; and for this purpose to employ spies: such were those women whom
+the Syracusians called potagogides Hiero also used to send out
+listeners wherever there was any meeting or conversation; for the
+people dare not speak with freedom for fear of such persons; and if
+any one does, there is the less chance of its being concealed; and to
+endeavour that the whole community should mutually accuse and come to
+blows with each other, friend with friend, the commons with the
+nobles, and the rich with each other. It is also advantageous for a
+tyranny that all those who are under it should be oppressed with
+poverty, that they may not be able to compose a guard; and that, being
+employed in procuring their daily bread, they may have no leisure to
+conspire against their tyrants. The Pyramids of Egypt are a proof of
+this, and the votive edifices of the Cyposelidse, and the temple of
+Jupiter Olympus, built by the Pisistratidae, and the works of
+Polycrates at Samos; for all these produced one end, the keeping the
+people poor. It is necessary also to multiply taxes, as at Syracuse;
+where Dionysius in the space of five years collected all the private
+property of his subjects into his own coffers. A tyrant also should
+endeavour to engage his subjects in a war, that they may have
+employment and continually depend upon their general. A king is
+preserved by his friends, but a tyrant is of all persons the man who
+can place no confidence in friends, as every one has it in his desire
+and these chiefly in their power to destroy him. All these things also
+which are done in an extreme democracy should be done in a tyranny, as
+permitting great licentiousness to the women in the house, that they
+may reveal their husbands' secrets; and showing great indulgence to
+slaves also for the same reason; for slaves and women conspire not
+against tyrants: but when they are treated with kindness, both of them
+are abettors of tyrants, and extreme democracies also; and the people
+too in such a state desire to be despotic. For which reason flatterers
+are in repute in both these: the demagogue in the democracy, for he is
+the proper flatterer of the people; among tyrants, he who will
+servilely adapt himself to their humours; for this is the business of
+[1314a] flatterers. And for this reason tyrants always love the worst
+of wretches, for they rejoice in being flattered, which no man of a
+liberal spirit will submit to; for they love the virtuous, but flatter
+none. Bad men too are fit for bad purposes; "like to like," as the
+proverb says. A tyrant also should show no favour to a man of worth or
+a freeman; for he should think, that no one deserved to be thought
+these but himself; for he who supports his dignity, and is a friend to
+freedom, encroaches upon the superiority and the despotism of the
+tyrant: such men, therefore, they naturally hate, as destructive to
+their government. A tyrant also should rather admit strangers to his
+table and familiarity than citizens, as these are his enemies, but the
+others have no design against him. These and such-like are the
+supports of a tyranny, for it comprehends whatsoever is wicked. But
+all these things may be comprehended in three divisions, for there are
+three objects which a tyranny has in view; one of which is, that the
+citizens should be of poor abject dispositions; for such men never
+propose to conspire against any one. The second is, that they should
+have no confidence in each other; for while they have not this, the
+tyrant is safe enough from destruction. For which reason they are
+always at enmity with those of merit, as hurtful to their government;
+not only as they scorn to be governed despotically, but also because
+they can rely upon each other's fidelity, and others can rely upon
+theirs, and because they will not inform against their associates, nor
+any one else. The third is, that they shall be totally without the
+means of doing anything; for no one undertakes what is impossible for
+him to perform: so that without power a tyranny can never be
+destroyed. These, then, are the three objects which the inclinations
+of tyrants desire to see accomplished; for all their tyrannical plans
+tend to promote one of these three ends, that their people may neither
+have mutual confidence, power, nor spirit. This, then, is one of the
+two methods of preserving tyrannies: the other proceeds in a way quite
+contrary to what has been already described, and which may be
+discerned from considering to what the destruction of a kingdom is
+owing; for as one cause of that is, making the government approach
+near to a tyranny, so the safety of a tyranny consists in making the
+government nearly kingly; preserving only one thing, namely power,
+that not only the willing, but the unwilling also, must be obliged to
+submit; for if this is once lost, the tyranny is at an end. This,
+then, as the foundation, must be preserved: in other particulars
+carefully do and affect to seem like a king; first, appear to pay a
+great attention [1314b] to what belongs to the public; nor make such
+profuse presents as will offend the people; while they are to supply
+the money out of the hard labour of their own hands, and see it given
+in profusion to mistresses, foreigners, and fiddlers; keeping an exact
+account both of what you receive and pay; which is a practice some
+tyrants do actually follow, by which means they seem rather fathers of
+families than tyrants: nor need you ever fear the want of money while
+you have the supreme power of the state in your own hands. It is also
+much better for those tyrants who quit their kingdom to do this than
+to leave behind them money they have hoarded up; for their regents
+will be much less desirous of making innovations, and they are more to
+be dreaded by absent tyrants than the citizens; for such of them as he
+suspects he takes with him, but these regents must be left behind. He
+should also endeavour to appear to collect such taxes and require such
+services as the exigencies of the state demand, that whenever they are
+wanted they may be ready in time of war; and particularly to take care
+that he appear to collect and keep them not as his own property, but
+the public's. His appearance also should not be severe, but
+respectable, so that he should inspire those who approach him with
+veneration and not fear; but this will not be easily accomplished if
+he is despised. If, therefore, he will not take the pains to acquire
+any other, he ought to endeavour to be a man of political abilities,
+and to fix that opinion of himself in the judgment of his subjects. He
+should also take care not to appear to be guilty of the least offence
+against modesty, nor to suffer it in those under him: nor to permit
+the women of his family to treat others haughtily; for the haughtiness
+of women has been the ruin of many tyrants. With respect to the
+pleasures of sense, he ought to do directly contrary to the practice
+of some tyrants at present; for they do not only continually indulge
+themselves in them for many days together, but they seem also to
+desire to have other witnesses of it, that they may wonder at their
+happiness; whereas he ought really to be moderate in these, and, if
+not, to appear to others to avoid them-for it is not the sober man who
+is exposed either to plots or contempt, but the drunkard; not the
+early riser, but the sluggard. His conduct in general should also be
+contrary to what is reported of former tyrants; for he ought to
+improve and adorn his city, so as to seem a guardian and not a tyrant;
+and, moreover., always to [1315a] seem particularly attentive to the
+worship of the gods; for from persons of such a character men
+entertain less fears of suffering anything illegal while they suppose
+that he who governs them is religious and reverences the gods; and
+they will be less inclined to raise insinuations against such a one,
+as being peculiarly under their protection: but this must be so done
+as to give no occasion for any suspicion of hypocrisy. He should also
+take care to show such respect to men of merit in every particular,
+that they should not think they could be treated with greater
+distinction by their fellow-citizens in a free state. He should also
+let all honours flow immediately from himself, but every censure from
+his subordinate officers and judges.  It is also a common protection
+of all monarchies not to make one person too great, or, certainly, not
+many; for they will support each other: but, if it is necessary to
+entrust any large powers to one person, to take care that it is not
+one of an ardent spirit; for this disposition is upon every
+opportunity most ready for a revolution: and, if it should seem
+necessary to deprive any one of his power, to do it by degrees, and
+not reduce him all at once. It is also necessary to abstain from all
+kinds of insolence; more particularly from corporal punishment; which
+you must be most cautious never to exercise over those who have a
+delicate sense of honour; for, as those who love money are touched to
+the quick when anything affects their property, so are men of honour
+and principle when they receive any disgrace: therefore, either never
+employ personal punishment, or, if you do, let it be only in the
+manner in which a father would correct his son, and not with contempt;
+and, upon the whole, make amends for any seeming disgrace by bestowing
+greater honours. But of all persons who are most likely to entertain
+designs against the person of a tyrant, those are chiefly to be feared
+and guarded against who regard as nothing the loss of their own lives,
+so that they can but accomplish their purpose: be very careful
+therefore of those who either think themselves affronted, or those who
+are dear to them; for those who are excited by anger to revenge regard
+as nothing their own persons: for, as Heraclitus says, it is dangerous
+to fight with an angry man who will purchase with his life the thing
+he aims at. As all cities are composed of two sorts of persons, the
+rich and the poor, it is necessary that both these should find equal
+protection from him who governs them, and that the one party should
+not have it in their power to injure the other; but that the tyrant
+should attach to himself that party which is the most powerful; which,
+if he does, he will have no occasion either to make his slaves free,
+or to deprive citizens of their arms; for the strength of either of
+the parties added to his own forces will render him superior to any
+conspiracy. It would be superfluous to go through all particulars; for
+the rule of conduct which the tyrant ought to pursue is evident
+enough, and that is, to affect to appear not the tyrant, but the king;
+the guardian of those he governs, not their plunderer, [1315b] but
+their protector, and to affect the middle rank in life, not one
+superior to all others: he should, therefore, associate his nobles
+with him and soothe his people; for his government will not only be
+necessarily more honourable and worthy of imitation, as it will be
+over men of worth, and not abject wretches who perpetually both hate
+and fear him; but it will be also more durable. Let him also frame his
+life so that his manners may be consentaneous to virtue, or at least
+let half of them be so, that he may not be altogether wicked, but only
+so in part.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+
+Indeed an oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments of the
+shortest duration. The tyranny of Orthagoras and his family at Sicyon,
+it is true, continued longer than any other: the reason for which was,
+that they used their power with moderation, and were in many
+particulars obedient to the laws; and, as Clisthenes was an able
+general, he never fell into contempt, and by the care he took that in
+many particulars his government should be popular. He is reported also
+to have presented a person with a crown who adjudged the victory to
+another; and some say that it is the statue of that judge which is
+placed in the forum.
+
+They say also, that Pisistratus submitted to be summoned into the
+court of the Areopagites. The second that we shall mention is the
+tyranny of the Cypselidse, at Corinth, which continued seventy-seven
+years and six months; for Cypselus was tyrant there thirty years,
+Periander forty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Georgias, three
+years; the reason for which was, that Cypselus was a popular man, and
+governed without guards. Periander indeed ruled like a tyrant, but
+then he was an able general. The third was that of the Pisistradidae
+at Athens; but it was not continual: for Pisistratus himself was twice
+expelled; so that out of thirty-three years he was only fifteen in
+power, and his son eighteen; so that the whole time was thirty-three
+years. Of the rest we shall mention that of Hiero, and Gelo at
+Syracuse; and this did not continue long, for both their reigns were
+only eighteen years; for Gelo died in the eighth year of his tyranny,
+and Hiero in his tenth. Thrasybulus fell in his eleventh month, and
+many other tyrannies have continued a very short time. We have now
+gone through the general cases of corruption and [1316a] means of
+preservation both in free states and monarchies. In Plato's Republic,
+Socrates is introduced treating upon the changes which different
+governments are liable to: but his discourse is faulty; for he does
+not particularly mention what changes the best and first governments
+are liable to; for he only assigns the general cause, of nothing being
+immutable, but that in time everything will alter [***tr.: text is
+unintelligible here***]       he conceives that nature will then
+produce bad men, who will not submit to education, and in this,
+probably, he is not wrong; for it is certain that there are some
+persons whom it is impossible by any education to make good men; but
+why should this change be more peculiar to what he calls the
+best-formed government, than to all other forms, and indeed to all
+other things that exist? and in respect to his assigned time, as the
+cause of the alteration of all things, we find that those which did
+not begin to exist at the same time cease to be at the same time; so
+that, if anything came into beginning the day before the solstice, it
+must alter at the same time. Besides, why should such a form of
+government be changed into the Lacedaemonian? for, in general, when
+governments alter, they alter into the contrary species to what they
+before were, and not into one like their former.  And this reasoning
+holds true of other changes; for he says, that from the Lacedaemonian
+form it changes into an oligarchy, and from thence into a democracy,
+and from a democracy into a tyranny: and sometimes a contrary change
+takes place, as from a democracy into an oligarchy, rather than into a
+monarchy. With respect to a tyranny he neither says whether there will
+be any change in it; or if not, to what cause it will be owing; or if
+there is, into what other state it will alter: but the reason of this
+is, that a tyranny is an indeterminate government; and, according to
+him, every state ought to alter into the first, and most perfect, thus
+the continuity and circle would be preserved. But one tyranny often
+changed into another; as at Syria, from Myron's to Clisthenes'; or
+into an oligarchy, as was Antileo's at Chalcas; or into a democracy,
+as was Gelo's at Syracuse; or into an aristocracy, as was Charilaus's
+at Lacedsemon, and at Carthage. An oligarchy is also changed into a
+tyranny; such was the rise of most of the ancient tyrannies in Sicily;
+at Leontini, into the tyranny of Panaetius; at Gela, into that of
+Cleander; at Rhegium into that of Anaxilaus; and the like in many
+other cities. It is absurd also to suppose, that a state is changed
+into an oligarchy because those who are in power are avaricious and
+greedy of money, and not because those who are by far richer than
+their fellow citizens think it unfair that those who have nothing
+should have an equal share in the rule of the state with themselves,
+who possess so much-for in many oligarchies it is not allowable to be
+employed in money-getting, and there are many laws to prevent it. But
+in Carthage, which is a democracy, money-getting is creditable, and
+yet their form of government remains unaltered. It is also absurd to
+say, that in an oligarchy there are two cities, one of the poor and
+another of the rich; for why should this happen to them more than to
+the Lacedaemonians, or any other state where all possess not equal
+property, or where all are not equally good? for though no one member
+of the community should be poorer than he was before, yet a democracy
+might nevertheless change into an oligarchy; if the rich should be
+more powerful than the poor, and the one too negligent, and the other
+attentive: and though these changes are owing to many causes, yet he
+mentions but one only, that the citizens become poor by luxury, and
+paying interest-money; as if at first they were all rich, or the
+greater part of them: but this is not so, but when some of those who
+have the principal management of public affairs lose their fortunes,
+they will endeavour to bring about a revolution; but when others do,
+nothing of consequence will follow, nor when such states do alter is
+there any more reason for their altering into a democracy than any
+other. Besides, though some of the members of the community may not
+have spent their fortunes, yet if they share not in the honours of the
+state, or if they are ill-used and insulted, they will endeavour to
+raise seditions, and bring about a revolution, that they may be
+allowed to do as they like; which, Plato says, arises from too much
+liberty. Although there are many oligarchies and democracies, yet
+Socrates, when he is treating of the changes they may undergo, speaks
+of them as if there was but one of each sort.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK  VI
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+We have already shown what is the nature of the supreme council in the
+state, and wherein one may differ from another, and how the different
+magistrates should be regulated; and also the judicial department, and
+what is best suited to what state; and also to what causes both the
+destruction and preservation of governments are owing.
+
+As there are very many species of democracies, as well as of other
+states, it will not be amiss to consider at the same time anything
+which we may have omitted to mention concerning either of them, and to
+allot to each that mode of conduct which is peculiar to and
+advantageous for them; and also to inquire into the combinations of
+all these different modes of government which we [1317a] have
+mentioned; for as these are blended together the government is
+altered, as from an aristocracy to be an oligarchy, and from a free
+state to be a democracy. Now, I mean by those combinations of
+government (which I ought to examine into, but have not yet done),
+namely, whether the deliberative department and the election of
+magistrates is regulated in a manner correspondent to an oligarchy, or
+the judicial to an aristocracy, or the deliberative part only to an
+oligarchy, and the election of magistrates to an aristocracy, or
+whether, in any other manner, everything is not regulated according to
+the nature of the government. But we will first consider what
+particular sort of democracy is fitted to a particular city, and also
+what particular oligarchy to a particular people; and of other states,
+what is advantageous to what. It is also necessary to show clearly,
+not only which of these governments is best for a state, but also how
+it ought to be established there, and other things we will treat of
+briefly.
+
+And first, we will speak of a democracy; and this will at the same
+time show clearly the nature of its opposite which some persons call
+an oligarchy; and in doing this we must examine into all the parts of
+a democracy, and everything that is connected therewith; for from the
+manner in which these are compounded together different species of
+democracies arise: and hence it is that they are more than one, and of
+various natures. Now, there are two causes which occasion there being
+so many democracies; one of which is that which we have already
+mentioned; namely, there being different sorts of people; for in one
+country the majority are husbandmen, in another mechanics, and hired
+servants; if the first of these is added to the second, and the third
+to both of them, the democracy will not only differ in the particular
+of better or worse, but in this, that it will be no longer the same
+government; the other is that which we will now speak of. The
+different things which are connected with democracies and seem to make
+part of these states, do, from their being joined to them, render them
+different from others: this attending a few, that more, and another
+all. It is necessary that he who would found any state which he may
+happen to approve of, or correct one, should be acquainted with all
+these particulars. All founders of states endeavour to comprehend
+within their own plan everything of nearly the same kind with it; but
+in doing this they err, in the manner I have already described in
+treating of the preservation and destruction of governments. I will
+now speak of these first principles and manners, and whatever else a
+democratical state requires.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+Now the foundation of a democratical state is liberty, and people have
+been accustomed to say this as if here only liberty was to be found;
+for they affirm that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But
+one part of liberty is to govern and be governed alternately; for,
+according to democratical justice, equality is measured by numbers,
+and not by worth: and this being just, it is necessary that the
+supreme power should be vested in the people at large; and that what
+the majority determine should be final: so that in a democracy the
+poor ought to have more power than the rich, as being the greater
+number; for this is one mark of liberty which all framers of a
+democracy lay down as a criterion of that state; another is, to live
+as every one likes; for this, they say, is a right which liberty
+gives, since he is a slave who must live as he likes not. This, then,
+is another criterion of a democracy. Hence arises the claim to be
+under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any account, any
+otherwise than by rotation, and that just as far only as that person
+is, in his turn, under his also. This also is conducive to that
+equality which liberty demands. These things being premised, and such
+being the government, it follows that such rules as the following
+should be observed in it, that all the magistrates should be chosen
+out of all the people, and all to command each, and each in his turn
+all: that all the magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those
+offices only which required some particular knowledge and skill: that
+no census, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man
+for any office: that none should be in the same employment twice, or
+very few, and very seldom, except in the army: that all their
+appointments should be limited to a very short time, or at least as
+many as possible: that the whole community should be qualified to
+judge in all causes whatsoever, let the object be ever so extensive,
+ever so interesting, or of ever so high a nature; as at Athens, where
+the people at large judge the magistrates when they come out of
+office, and decide concerning public affairs as well as private
+contracts: that the supreme power should be in the public assembly;
+and that no magistrate should be allowed any discretionary power but
+in a few instances, and of no consequence to public business. Of all
+magistrates a senate is best suited to a democracy, where the whole
+community is not paid for giving their attendance; for in that case
+it; loses its power; for then the people will bring all causes before
+them, by appeal, as we have already mentioned in a former book. In the
+next place, there should, if possible, be a fund to pay all the
+citizens--who have any share in the management of public affairs,
+either as members of the assembly, judges, and magistrates; but if
+this cannot be done, at least the magistrates, the judges the
+senators, and members of the supreme assembly, and also those officers
+who are obliged to eat at a common table ought to be paid. Moreover,
+as an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of family, fortune,
+and education; so, on the contrary, a democracy is a government in the
+hands of men of no birth, indigent circumstances, and mechanical
+employments. In this state also no office [1318a] should be for life;
+and, if any such should remain after the government has been long
+changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to diminish
+the power; and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things, then,
+appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established on that
+principle of justice which is homogeneous to those governments; that
+is, that all the members of the state, by number, should enjoy an
+equality, which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government
+of the people: for it seems perfectly equal that the rich should have
+no more share in the government than the poor, nor be alone in power;
+but that all should be equal, according to number; for thus, they
+think, the equality and liberty of the state best preserved.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+In the next place we must inquire how this equality is to be procured.
+Shall the qualifications be divided so that five hundred rich should
+be equal to a thousand poor, or shall the thousand have equal power
+with the five hundred? or shall we not establish our equality in this
+manner? but divide indeed thus, and afterwards taking an equal number
+both out of the five hundred and the thousand, invest them with the
+power of creating the magistrates and judges. Is this state then
+established according to perfect democratical justice, or rather that
+which is guided by numbers only? For the defenders of a democracy say,
+that that is just which the majority approve of: but the favourers of
+an oligarchy say, that that is just which those who have most approve
+of; and that we ought to be directed by the value of property. Both
+the propositions are unjust; for if we agree with what the few propose
+we erect a tyranny: for if it should happen that an individual should
+have more than the rest who are rich, according to oligarchical
+justice, this man alone has a right to the supreme power; but if
+superiority of numbers is to prevail, injustice will then be done by
+confiscating the property of the rich, who are few, as we have already
+said. What then that equality is, which both parties will admit, must
+be collected from the definition of right which is common to them
+both; for they both say that what the majority of the state approves
+of ought to be established. Be it so; but not entirely: but since a
+city happens to be made up of two different ranks of people, the rich
+and the poor, let that be established which is approved of by both
+these, or the greater part: but should there be opposite sentiments,
+let that be established which shall be approved of by the greater
+part: but let this be according to the census; for instance, if there
+should be ten of the rich and twenty of the poor, and six of the first
+and fifteen of the last should agree upon any measure, and the
+remaining four of the rich should join with the remaining five of the
+poor in opposing it, that party whose census when added together
+should determine which opinion should be law, and should these happen
+to be equal, it should be regarded as a case similar to an assembly or
+court of justice dividing equally upon any question that comes before
+them, who either determine it by lot or some such method. But
+although, with [1318b] respect to what is equal and just, it may be
+very difficult to establish the truth, yet it is much easier to do
+than to persuade those who have it in their power to encroach upon
+others to be guided thereby; for the weak always desire what is equal
+and just, but the powerful pay no regard thereunto.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+There are four kinds of democracies. The best is that which is
+composed of those first in order, as we have already said, and this
+also is the most ancient of any. I call that the first which every one
+would place so, was he to divide the people; for the best part of
+these are the husbandmen. We see, then, that a democracy may be framed
+where the majority live by tillage or pasturage; for, as their
+property is but small, they will not be at leisure perpetually to hold
+public assemblies, but will be continually employed in following their
+own business, not having otherwise the means of living; nor will they
+be desirous of what another enjoys, but will rather like to follow
+their own business than meddle with state affairs and accept the
+offices of government, which will be attended with no great profit;
+for the major part of mankind are rather desirous of riches than
+honour (a proof of this is, that they submitted to the tyrannies in
+ancient times, and do now submit to the oligarchies, if no one hinders
+them in their usual occupations, or deprives them of their property;
+for some of them soon get rich, others are removed from poverty);
+besides, their having the right of election and calling their
+magistrates to account for their conduct when they come out of office,
+will satisfy their desire of honours, if any of them entertain that
+passion: for in some states, though the commonalty have not the right
+of electing the magistrates, yet it is vested in part of that body
+chosen to represent them: and it is sufficient for the people at large
+to possess the deliberative power: and this ought to be considered as
+a species of democracy; such was that formerly at Mantinsea: for which
+reason it is proper for the democracy we have been now treating of to
+have a power (and it has been usual for them to have it) of censuring
+their magistrates when out of office, and sitting in judgment upon all
+causes: but that the chief magistrates should be elected, and
+according to a certain census, which should vary with the rank of
+their office, or else not by a census, but according to their
+abilities for their respective appointments. A state thus constituted
+must be well constituted; for the magistracies will be always filled
+with the best men with the approbation of the people; who will not
+envy their superiors: and these and the nobles should be content with
+this part in the administration; for they will not be governed by
+their inferiors. They will be also careful to use their power with
+moderation, as there are others to whom full power is delegated to
+censure their conduct; for it is very serviceable to the state to have
+them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do whatsoever
+they choose; for with such a liberty there would be no check to that
+evil particle there is in every one: therefore it is [1319a] necessary
+and most for the benefit of the state that the offices thereof should
+be filled by the principal persons in it, whose characters are
+unblemished, and that the people are not oppressed. It is now evident
+that this is the best species of democracy, and on what account;
+because the people are such and have such powers as they ought to
+have. To establish a democracy of husbandmen some of those laws which
+were observed in many ancient states are universally useful; as, for
+instance, on no account to permit any one to possess more than a
+certain quantity of land, or within a certain distance from the city.
+Formerly also, in some states, no one was allowed to sell their
+original lot of land. They also mention a law of one Oxylus, which
+forbade any one to add to their patrimony by usury. We ought also to
+follow the law of the Aphutaeans, as useful to direct us in this
+particular we are now speaking of; for they having but very little
+ground, while they were a numerous people, and at the same time were
+all husbandmen, did not include all their lands within the census, but
+divided them in such a manner that, according to the census, the poor
+had more power than the rich. Next to the commonalty of husbandmen is
+one of shepherds and herdsmen; for they have many things in common
+with them, and, by their way of life, are excellently qualified to
+make good soldiers, stout in body, and able to continue in the open
+air all night. The generality of the people of whom other democracies
+are composed are much worse than these; for their lives are wretched
+nor have they any business with virtue in anything they do; these are
+your mechanics, your exchange-men, and hired servants; as all these
+sorts of men frequent the exchange and the citadel, they can readily
+attend the public assembly; whereas the husbandmen, being more
+dispersed in the country, cannot so easily meet together-nor are they
+equally desirous of doing it with these others! When a country happens
+to be so situated that a great part of the land lies at a distance
+from the city, there it is easy to establish a good democracy or a
+free state for the people in general will be obliged to live in the
+country; so that it will be necessary in such a democracy, though
+there may be an exchange-mob at hand, never to allow a legal assembly
+without the inhabitants of the country attend. We have shown in what
+manner the first and best democracy ought to be established, and it
+will be equally evident as to the rest, for from these we [1319b]
+should proceed as a guide, and always separate the meanest of the
+people from the rest. But the last and worst, which gives to every
+citizen without distinction a share in every part of the
+administration, is what few citizens can bear, nor is it easy to
+preserve for any long time, unless well supported by laws and manners.
+We have already noticed almost every cause that can destroy either
+this or any other state. Those who have taken the lead in such a
+democracy have endeavoured to support it, and make the people powerful
+by collecting together as many persons as they could and giving them
+their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally born, and also if
+either of their parents were citizens, that is to say, if either their
+father or mother; and this method is better suited to this state than
+any other: and thus the demagogues have usually managed. They ought,
+however, to take care, and do this no longer than the common people
+are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and then
+stop; for, if they proceed still further, they will make the state
+disorderly, and the nobles will ill brook the power of the common
+people, and be full of resentment against it; which was the cause of
+an insurrection at Cyrene: for a little evil is overlooked, but when
+it becomes a great one it strikes the eye. It is, moreover,
+very-useful in such a state to do as Clisthenes did at Athens, when he
+was desirous of increasing the power of the people, and as those did
+who established the democracy in Cyrene; that is, to institute many
+tribes and fraternities, and to make the religious rites of private
+persons few, and those common; and every means is to be contrived to
+associate and blend the people together as much as possible; and that
+all former customs be broken through. Moreover, whatsoever is
+practised in a tyranny seems adapted to a democracy of this species;
+as, for instance, the licentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the
+children; for this to a certain degree is useful in such a state; and
+also to overlook every one's living as they choose; for many will
+support such a government: for it is more agreeable to many to live
+without any control than as prudence would direct.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+It is also the business of the legislator and all those who would
+support a government of this sort not to make it too great a work, or
+too perfect; but to aim only to render it stable: for, let a state be
+constituted ever so badly, there is no difficulty in its continuing a
+few days: they should therefore endeavour to procure its safety by all
+those ways which we have described in assigning the causes of the
+preservation and destruction of governments; avoiding what is hurtful,
+and by framing such laws, written and unwritten, as contain those
+things which chiefly tend to the preservation of the state; nor to
+suppose that that is useful either for a democratic or [1320a] an
+oligarchic form of government which contributes to make them more
+purely so, but what will contribute to their duration: but our
+demagogues at present, to flatter the people, occasion frequent
+confiscations in the courts; for which reason those who have the
+welfare of the state really at heart should act directly opposite to
+what they do, and enact a law to prevent forfeitures from being
+divided amongst the people or paid into the treasury, but to have them
+set apart for sacred uses: for those who are of a bad disposition
+would not then be the less cautious, as their punishment would be the
+same; and the community would not be so ready to condemn those whom
+they sat in judgment on when they were to get nothing by it: they
+should also take care that the causes which are brought before the
+public should be as few as possible, and punish with the utmost
+severity those who rashly brought an action against any one; for it is
+not the commons but the nobles who are generally prosecuted: for in
+all things the citizens of the same state ought to be affectionate to
+each other, at least not to treat those who have the chief power in it
+as their enemies. Now, as the democracies which have been lately
+established are very numerous, and it is difficult to get the common
+people to attend the public assemblies without they are paid for it,
+this, when there is not a sufficient public revenue, is fatal to the
+nobles; for the deficiencies therein must be necessarily made up by
+taxes, confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice:
+which things have already destroyed many democracies.  Whenever, then,
+the revenues of the state are small, there should be but few public
+assemblies and but few courts of justice: these, however, should have
+very extensive jurisdictions, but should continue sitting a few days
+only, for by this means the rich would not fear the expense, although
+they should receive nothing for their attendance, though the poor did;
+and judgment also would be given much better; for the rich will not
+choose to be long absent from their own affairs, but will willingly be
+so for a short time: and, when there are sufficient revenues, a
+different conduct ought to be pursued from what the demagogues at
+present follow; for now they divide the surplus of the public money
+amongst the poor; these receive it and again want the same supply,
+while the giving it is like pouring water into a sieve: but the true
+patriot in a democracy ought to take care that the majority of the
+community are not too poor, for this is the cause of rapacity in that
+government; he therefore should endeavour that they may enjoy
+perpetual plenty; and as this also is advantageous to the rich, what
+can be saved out of the public money should be put by, and then
+divided at once amongst the poor, if possible, in such a quantity as
+may enable every one of them to purchase a little field, and, if that
+cannot be done, at least to give each of them enough to procure the
+implements [1320b] of trade and husbandry; and if there is not enough
+for all to receive so much at once, then to divide it according to
+tribes or any other allotment. In the meantime let the rich pay them
+for necessary services, but not be obliged to find them in useless
+amusements. And something like this was the manner in which they
+managed at Carthage, and preserved the affections of the people; for
+by continually sending some of their community into colonies they
+procured plenty. It is also worthy of a sensible and generous nobility
+to divide the poor amongst them, and supplying them with what is
+necessary, induce them to work; or to imitate the conduct of the
+people at Tarentum: for they, permitting the poor to partake in common
+of everything which is needful for them, gain the affections of the
+commonalty. They have also two different ways of electing their
+magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, others by lot; by the last,
+that the people at large may have some share in the administration; by
+the former, that the state may be well governed: the same may be
+accomplished if of the same magistrates you choose some by vote,
+others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which democracies ought
+to be established.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+What has been already said will almost of itself sufficiently show how
+an oligarchy ought to be founded; for he who would frame such a state
+should have in his view a democracy to oppose it; for every species of
+oligarchy should be founded on principles diametrically opposite to
+some species of democracy.
+
+The first and best-framed oligarchy is that which approaches near to
+what we call a free state; in which there ought to be two different
+census, the one high, the other low: from those who are within the
+latter the ordinary officers of the state ought to be chosen; from the
+former the supreme magistrates: nor should any one be excluded from a
+part of the administration who was within the census; which should be
+so regulated that the commonalty who are included in it should by
+means thereof be superior to those who have no share in the
+government; for those who are to have the management of public affairs
+ought always to be chosen out of the better sort of the people. Much
+in the same manner ought that oligarchy to be established which is
+next in order: but as to that which is most opposite to a pure
+democracy, and approaches nearest to a dynasty and a tyranny, as it is
+of all others the worst, so it requires the greatest care and caution
+to preserve it: for as bodies of sound and healthy constitutions and
+ships which are well manned and well found for sailing can bear many
+injuries without perishing, while a diseased body or a leaky ship with
+an indifferent crew cannot support the [1321a] least shock; so the
+worst-established governments want most looking after. A number of
+citizens is the preservation of a democracy; for these are opposed to
+those rights which are founded in rank: on the contrary, the
+preservation of an oligarchy depends upon the due regulation of the
+different orders in the society.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+
+As the greater part of the community are divided into four sorts of
+people; husbandmen, mechanics, traders, and hired servants; and as
+those who are employed in war may likewise be divided into four; the
+horsemen, the heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed, and the sailor,
+where the nature of the country can admit a great number of horse;
+there a powerful oligarchy may be easily established: for the safety
+of the inhabitants depends upon a force of that sort; but those who
+can support the expense of horsemen must be persons of some
+considerable fortune. Where the troops are chiefly heavy-armed, there
+an oligarchy, inferior in power to the other, may be established; for
+the heavy-armed are rather made up of men of substance than the poor:
+but the light-armed and the sailors always contribute to support a
+democracy: but where the number of these is very great and a sedition
+arises, the other parts of the community fight at a disadvantage; but
+a remedy for this evil is to be learned from skilful generals, who
+always mix a proper number of light-armed soldiers with their horse
+and heavy-armed: for it is with those that the populace get the better
+of the men of fortune in an insurrection; for these being lighter are
+easily a match for the horse and the heavy-armed: so that for an
+oligarchy to form a body of troops from these is to form it against
+itself: but as a city is composed of persons of different ages, some
+young and some old, the fathers should teach their sons, while they
+were very young, a light and easy exercise; but, when they are grown
+up, they should be perfect in every warlike exercise. Now, the
+admission of the people to any share in the government should either
+be (as I said before) regulated by a census, or else, as at Thebes,
+allowed to those who for a certain time have ceased from any mechanic
+employment, or as at Massalia, where they are chosen according to
+their worth, whether citizens or foreigners. With respect to the
+magistrates of the highest rank which it may be necessary to have in a
+state, the services they are bound to do the public should be
+expressly laid down, to prevent the common people from being desirous
+of accepting their employments, and also to induce them to regard
+their magistrates with favour when they know what a price they pay for
+their honours. It is also necessary that the magistrates, upon
+entering into their offices, should make magnificent sacrifices and
+erect some public structure, that the people partaking of the
+entertainment, and seeing the city ornamented with votive gifts in
+their temples and public structures, may see with pleasure the
+stability of the government: add to this also, that the nobles will
+have their generosity recorded: but now this is not the conduct which
+those who are at present at the head of an oligarchy pursue, but the
+contrary; for they are not more desirous of honour than of gain; for
+which reason such oligarchies may more properly be called little
+democracies. Thus [1321b] we have explained on what principles a
+democracy and an oligarchy ought to be established.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+
+After what has been said I proceed next to treat particularly of the
+magistrates; of what nature they should be, how many, and for what
+purpose, as I have already mentioned: for without necessary
+magistrates no state can exist, nor without those which contribute to
+its dignity and good order can exist happily: now it is necessary that
+in small states the magistrates should be few; in a large one, many:
+also to know well what offices may be joined together, and what ought
+to be separated. The first thing necessary is to establish proper
+regulators in the markets; for which purpose a certain magistrate
+should be appointed to inspect their contracts and preserve good
+order; for of necessity, in almost every city there must be both
+buyers and sellers to supply each other's mutual wants: and this is
+what is most productive of the comforts of life; for the sake of which
+men seem to have joined together in one community. A second care, and
+nearly related to the first, is to have an eye both to the public and
+private edifices in the city, that they may be an ornament; and also
+to take care of all buildings which are likely to fall: and to see
+that the highways are kept in proper repair; and also that the
+landmarks between different estates are preserved, that there may be
+no disputes on that account; and all other business of the same
+nature. Now, this business may be divided into several branches, over
+each of which in populous cities they appoint a separate person; one
+to inspect the buildings, another the fountains, another the harbours;
+and they are called the inspectors of the city.  A third, which is
+very like the last, and conversant nearly about the same objects, only
+in the country, is to take care of what is done out of the city. The
+officers who have this employment we call inspectors of the lands, or
+inspectors of the woods; but the business of all three of them is the
+same. There must also be other officers appointed to receive the
+public revenue and to deliver it out to those who are in the different
+departments of the state: these are called receivers or quaestors.
+There must also be another, before whom all private contracts and
+sentences of courts should be enrolled, as well as proceedings and
+declarations. Sometimes this employment is divided amongst many, but
+there is one supreme over the rest; these are called proctors,
+notaries, and the like. Next to these is an officer whose business is
+of all others the most necessary, and yet most difficult; namely, to
+take care that sentence is executed upon those who are condemned; and
+that every one pays the fines laid on him; and also to have the charge
+of those who are in prison. [1322a] This office is very disagreeable
+on account of the odium attending it, so that no one will engage
+therein without it is made very profitable, or, if they do, will they
+be willing to execute it according to law; but it is most necessary,
+as it is of no service to pass judgment in any cause without that
+judgment is carried into execution: for without this human society
+could not subsist: for which reason it is best that this office should
+not be executed by one person, but by some of the magistrates of the
+other courts. In like manner, the taking care that those fines which
+are ordered by the judges are levied should be divided amongst
+different persons. And as different magistrates judge different
+causes, let the causes of the young be heard by the young: and as to
+those which are already brought to a hearing, let one person pass
+sentence, and another see it executed: as, for instance, let the
+magistrates who have the care of the public buildings execute the
+sentence which the inspectors of the markets have passed, and the like
+in other cases: for by so much the less odium attends those who carry
+the laws into execution, by so much the easier will they be properly
+put in force: therefore for the same persons to pass the sentence and
+to execute it will subject them to general hatred; and if they pass it
+upon all, they will be considered as the enemies of all. Thus one
+person has often the custody of the prisoner's body, while another
+sees the sentence against him executed, as the eleven did at Athens:
+for which reason it is prudent to separate these offices, and to give
+great attention thereunto as equally necessary with anything we have
+already mentioned; for it will certainly happen that men of character
+will decline accepting this office, and worthless persons cannot
+properly be entrusted with it, as having themselves rather an occasion
+for a guard than being qualified to guard others. This, therefore,
+ought by no means to be a separate office from others; nor should it
+be continually allotted to any individuals, but the young men; where
+there is a city-guard, the youths ought in turns to take these offices
+upon them. These, then, as the most necessary magistrates, ought to be
+first mentioned: next to these are others no less necessary, but of
+much higher rank, for they ought to be men of great skill and
+fidelity. These are they who have the guard of the city, and provide
+everything that is necessary for war; whose business it is, both in
+war and peace, to defend the walls and the gates, and to take care to
+muster and marshal the citizens.  Over all these there are sometimes
+more officers, sometimes fewer: thus in little cities there is only
+one whom they call either general or polemarch; but where there are
+horse and light-armed troops, and bowmen, and sailors, they sometimes
+put distinct commanders over each of these; who again have others
+under them, according to their different divisions; all of which join
+together to make one military body: and thus much for this department.
+Since some of the magistrates, if not all, have business with the
+public money, it is necessary that there should be other officers,
+whose employment should be nothing else than to take an account of
+what they have, and correct any mismanagement therein. But besides all
+these magistrates there is one who is supreme over them all, who very
+often has in his own power the disposal of the public revenue and
+taxes; who presides over the people when the supreme power is in them;
+for there must be some magistrate who has a power to summon them
+together, and to preside as head of the state. These are sometimes
+called preadvisers; but where there are many, more properly a council.
+These are nearly the civil magistrates which are requisite to a
+government: but there are other persons whose business is confined to
+religion; as the priests, and those who are to take care of the
+temples, that they are kept in proper repair, or, if they fall down,
+that they may be rebuilt; and whatever else belongs to public worship.
+This charge is sometimes entrusted to one person, as in very small
+cities: in others it is delegated to many, and these distinct from the
+priesthood, as the builders or keepers of holy places, and officers of
+the sacred revenue. Next to these are those who are appointed to have
+the general care of all those public sacrifices to the tutelar god of
+the state, which the laws do not entrust to the priests: and these in
+different states have different appellations. To enumerate in few
+words the different departments of all those magistrates who are
+necessary: these are either religion, war, taxes, expenditures,
+markets, public buildings, harbours, highways. Belonging to the courts
+of justice there are scribes to enroll private contracts; and there
+must also be guards set over the prisoners, others to see the law is
+executed, council on either side, and also others to watch over the
+conduct of those who are to decide the causes. Amongst the magistrates
+also may finally be reckoned those who are to give their advice in
+public affairs. But separate states, who are peculiarly happy and have
+leisure to attend to more minute particulars, and are very attentive
+to good order, require particular magistrates for themselves; such as
+those who have the government of the women; who are to see the laws
+are executed; who take care of the boys and preside over their
+education. To these may be added those who have the care of their
+gymnastic exercises, [1323a] their theatres, and every other public
+spectacle which there may happen to be. Some of these, however, are
+not of general use; as the governors of the women: for the poor are
+obliged to employ their wives and children in servile offices for want
+of slaves. As there are three magistrates to whom some states entrust
+the supreme power; namely, guardians of the laws, preadvisers, and
+senators; guardians of the laws suit best to an aristocracy,
+preadvisers to an oligarchy, and a senate to a democracy. And thus
+much briefly concerning all magistrates.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK  VII
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+He who proposes to make that inquiry which is necessary concerning
+what government is best, ought first to determine what manner of
+living is most eligible; for while this remains uncertain it will also
+be equally uncertain what government is best: for, provided no
+unexpected accidents interfere, it is highly probable, that those who
+enjoy the best government will live the most happily according to
+their circumstances; he ought, therefore, first to know what manner of
+life is most desirable for all; and afterwards whether this life is
+the same to the man and the citizen, or different. As I imagine that I
+have already sufficiently shown what sort of life is best in my
+popular discourses on that subject, I think I may very properly repeat
+the same here; as most certainly no one ever called in question the
+propriety of one of the divisions; namely, that as what is good,
+relative to man, may be divided into three sorts, what is external,
+what appertains to the body, and what to the soul, it is evident that
+all these must conspire to make a man happy: for no one would say that
+a man was happy who had no fortitude, no temperance, no justice, no
+prudence; but was afraid of the flies that flew round him: nor would
+abstain from the meanest theft if he was either hungry or dry, or
+would murder his dearest friend for a farthing; and also was in every
+particular as wanting in his understanding as an infant or an idiot.
+These truths are so evident that all must agree to them; though some
+may dispute about the quantity and the degree: for they may think,
+that a very little virtue is sufficient for happiness; but for riches,
+property, power, honour, and all such things, they endeavour to
+increase them without bounds: but to such we reply, that it is easy to
+prove from what experience teaches us in these cases, that these
+external goods produce not virtue, but virtue them. As to a happy
+life, whether it is to be found in pleasure or virtue or both, certain
+it is, that those whose morals are most pure, and whose understandings
+are best cultivated, will enjoy more of it, although their fortune is
+but moderate than those do who own an exuberance of wealth, are
+deficient in those; and this utility any one who reflects may easily
+convince himself of; for whatsoever is external has its boundary, as a
+machine, and whatsoever is useful in its excess is either necessarily
+hurtful, or at best useless to the possessor; but every good quality
+of the soul the higher it is in degree, so much the more useful it is,
+if it is permitted on this subject to use the word useful as well as
+noble. It is also very evident, that the accidents of each subject
+take place of each other, as the subjects themselves, of which we
+allow they are accidents, differ from each other in value; so that if
+the soul is more noble than any outward possession, as the body, both
+in itself and with respect to us, it must be admitted of course that
+the best accidents of each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it
+is for the sake of the soul that these things are desirable; and it is
+on this account that wise men should desire them, not the soul for
+them. Let us therefore be well assured, that every one enjoys as much
+happiness as he possesses virtue and wisdom, and acts according to
+their dictates; since for this we have the example of GOD Himself, WHO
+IS COMPLETELY HAPPY, NOT FROM ANY EXTERNAL GOOD; BUT IN HIMSELF, AND
+BECAUSE SUCH IS HIS NATURE. For good fortune is something different
+from happiness, as every good which depends not on the mind is owing
+to chance or fortune; but it is not from fortune that any one is wise
+and just: hence it follows, that that city is happiest which is the
+best and acts best: for no one can do well who acts not well; nor can
+the deeds either of man or city be praiseworthy without virtue and
+wisdom; for whatsoever is just, or wise, or prudent in a man, the same
+things are just, wise, and prudent in a city.
+
+Thus much by way of introduction; for I could not but just touch upon
+this subject, though I could not go through a complete investigation
+of it, as it properly belongs to another question: let us at present
+suppose so much, that a man's happiest life, both as an individual and
+as a citizen, is a life of virtue, accompanied with those enjoyments
+which virtue usually procures. If  [1324a] there are any who are not
+convinced by what I have said, their doubts shall be answered
+hereafter, at present we shall proceed according to our intended
+method.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+It now remains for us to say whether the happiness of any individual
+man and the city is the same or different: but this also is evident;
+for whosoever supposes that riches will make a person happy, must
+place the happiness of the city in riches if it possesses them; those
+who prefer a life which enjoys a tyrannic power over others will also
+think, that the city which has many others under its command is most
+happy: thus also if any one approves a man for his virtue, he will
+think the most worthy city the happiest: but here there are two
+particulars which require consideration, one of which is, whether it
+is the most eligible life to be a member of the community and enjoy
+the rights of a citizen, or whether to live as a stranger, without
+interfering in public affairs; and also what form of government is to
+be preferred, and what disposition of the state is best; whether the
+whole community should be eligible to a share in the administration,
+or only the greater part, and some only: as this, therefore, is a
+subject of political examination and speculation, and not what
+concerns the individual, and the first of these is what we are at
+present engaged in, the one of these I am not obliged to speak to, the
+other is the proper business of my present design. It is evident that
+government must be the best which is so established, that every one
+therein may have it in his power to act virtuously and live happily:
+but some, who admit that a life o! virtue is most eligible, still
+doubt which is preferable a public life of active virtue, or one
+entirely disengaged from what is without and spent in contemplation;
+which some say is the only one worthy of a philosopher; and one of
+these two different modes of life both now and formerly seem to have
+been chosen by all those who were the most virtuous men; I mean the
+public or philosophic. And yet it is of no little consequence on which
+side the truth lies; for a man of sense must naturally incline to the
+better choice; both as an individual and a citizen. Some think that a
+tyrannic government over those near us is the greatest injustice; but
+that a political one is not unjust: but that still is a restraint on
+the pleasures and tranquillity of life.  Others hold the quite
+contrary opinion, and think that a public and active life is the only
+life for man: for that private persons have no opportunity of
+practising any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged in
+public life the management of the [1324b] state. These are their
+sentiments; others say, that a tyrannical and despotical mode of
+government is the only happy one; for even amongst some free states
+the object of their laws seems to be to tyrannise over their
+neighbours: so that the generality of political institutions,
+wheresoever dispersed, if they have any one common object in view,
+have all of them this, to conquer and govern. It is evident, both from
+the laws of the Lacedaemonians and Cretans, as well as by the manner
+in which they educated their children, that all which they had in view
+was to make them soldiers: besides, among all nations, those who have
+power enough and reduce others to servitude are honoured on that
+account; as were the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls: with
+some there are laws to heighten the virtue of courage; thus they tell
+us that at Carthage they allowed every person to wear as many rings
+for distinction as he had served campaigns. There was also a law in
+Macedonia, that a man who had not himself killed an enemy should be
+obliged to wear a halter; among the Scythians, at a festival, none
+were permitted to drink out of the cup was carried about who had not
+done the same thing. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, they fixed
+as many columns upon a man's tomb as he had slain enemies: and among
+different nations different things of this sort prevail, some of them
+established by law, others by custom.  Probably it may seem too absurd
+to those who are willing to take this subject into their consideration
+to inquire whether it is the business of a legislator to be able to
+point out by what means a state may govern and tyrannise over its
+neighbours, whether they will, or will not: for how can that belong
+either to the politician or legislator which is unlawful? for that
+cannot be lawful which is done not only justly, but unjustly also: for
+a conquest may be unjustly made. But we see nothing of this in the
+arts: for it is the business neither of the physician nor the pilot to
+use either persuasion or force, the one to his patients, the other to
+his passengers: and yet many seem to think a despotic government is a
+political one, and what they would not allow to be just or proper, if
+exercised over themselves, they will not blush to exercise over
+others; for they endeavour to be wisely governed themselves, but think
+it of no consequence whether others are so or not: but a despotic
+power is absurd, except only where nature has framed the one party for
+dominion, the other for subordination; and therefore no one ought to
+assume it over all in general, but those only which are the proper
+objects thereof: thus no one should hunt men either for food or
+sacrifice, but what is fit for those purposes, and these are wild
+animals which are eatable.
+
+Now a city which is well governed might be very [1325a] happy in
+itself while it enjoyed a good system of laws, although it should
+happen to be so situated as to have no connection with any other
+state, though its constitution should not be framed for war or
+conquest; for it would then have no occasion for these. It is evident
+therefore that the business of war is to be considered as commendable,
+not as a final end, but as the means of procuring it. It is the duty
+of a good legislator to examine carefully into his state; and the
+nature of the people, and how they may partake of every intercourse,
+of a good life, and of the happiness which results from it: and in
+this respect some laws and customs differ from others. It is also the
+duty of a legislator, if he has any neighbouring states to consider in
+what manner he shall oppose each of them' or what good offices he
+shall show them. But what should be the final end of the best
+governments will be considered hereafter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+We will now speak to those who, while they agree that a life of virtue
+is most eligible, yet differ in the use of it addressing ourselves to
+both these parties; for there are some who disapprove of all political
+governments, and think that the life of one who is really free is
+different from the life of a citizen, and of all others most eligible:
+others again think that the citizen is the best; and that it is
+impossible for him who does nothing to be well employed; but that
+virtuous activity and happiness are the same thing. Now both parties
+in some particulars say what is right, in others what is wrong, thus,
+that the life of a freeman is better than the life of a slave is true,
+for a slave, as a slave, is employed in nothing honourable; for the
+common servile employments which he is commanded to perform have
+nothing virtuous in them; but, on the other hand, it is not true that
+a submission to all sorts of governments is slavery; for the
+government of freemen differs not more from the government of slaves
+than slavery and freedom differ from each other in their nature; and
+how they do has been already mentioned. To prefer doing of nothing to
+virtuous activity is also wrong, for happiness consists in action, and
+many noble ends are produced by the actions of the just and wise. From
+what we have already determined on this subject, some one probably may
+think, that supreme power is of all things best, as that will enable a
+man to command very many useful services from others; so that he who
+can obtain this ought not to give it up to another, but rather to
+seize it: and, for this purpose, the father should have no attention
+or regard for the son, or the son for the father, or friend for
+friend; for what is best is most eligible: but to be a member of the
+community and be in felicity is best. What these persons advance might
+probably be true, if the supreme good was certainly theirs who plunder
+and use violence to others: but it is [1325b] most unlikely that it
+should be so; for it is a mere supposition: for it does not follow
+that their actions are honourable who thus assume the supreme power
+over others, without they were by nature as superior to them as a man
+to a woman, a father to a child, a master to a slave: so that he who
+so far forsakes the paths of virtue can never return back from whence
+he departed from them: for amongst equals whatever is fair and just
+ought to be reciprocal; for this is equal and right; but that equals
+should not partake of what is equal, or like to like, is contrary to
+nature: but whatever is contrary to nature is not right; therefore, if
+there is any one superior to the rest of the community in virtue and
+abilities for active life, him it is proper to follow, him it is right
+to obey, but the one alone will not do, but must be joined to the
+other also: and, if we are right in what we have now said, it follows
+that happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that both with
+respect to the community as well as the individual an active life is
+the happiest: not that an active life must necessarily refer to other
+persons, as some think, or that those studies alone are practical
+which are pursued to teach others what to do; for those are much more
+so whose final object is in themselves, and to improve the judgment
+and understanding of the man; for virtuous activity has an end,
+therefore is something practical; nay, those who contrive the plan
+which others follow are more particularly said to act, and are
+superior to the workmen who execute their designs. But it is not
+necessary that states which choose to have no intercourse with others
+should remain inactive; for the several members thereof may have
+mutual intercourse with each other; for there are many opportunities
+for this among the different citizens; the same thing is true of every
+individual: for, was it otherwise, neither could the Deity nor the
+universe be perfect; to neither of whom can anything external
+separately exist. Hence it is evident that that very same life which
+is happy for each individual is happy also for the state and every
+member of it.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+As I have now finished what was introductory to this subject, and
+considered at large the nature of other states, it now remains that I
+should first say what ought to be the establishment of a city which
+one should form according to one's wish; for no good state can exist
+without a moderate proportion of what is necessary. Many things
+therefore ought to be forethought of as desirable, but none of them
+such as are impossible: I mean relative to the number of citizens and
+the extent of the territory: for as other artificers, such as the
+weaver and the shipwright, ought to have such materials as are fit for
+their work, since so much the better they are, by so much [1326a]
+superior will the work itself necessarily be; so also ought the
+legislator and politician endeavour to procure proper materials for
+the business they have in hand. Now the first and principal instrument
+of the politician is the number of the people; he should therefore
+know how many, and what they naturally ought to be: in like manner the
+country, how large, and what it is. Most persons think that it is
+necessary for a city to be large to be happy: but, should this be
+true, they cannot tell what is a large one and what a small one; for
+according to the multitude of the inhabitants they estimate the
+greatness of it; but they ought rather to consider its strength than
+its numbers; for a state has a certain object in view, and from the
+power which it has in itself of accomplishing it, its greatness ought
+to be estimated; as a person might say, that Hippocrates was a greater
+physician, though not a greater man, than one that exceeded him in the
+size of his body: but if it was proper to determine the strength of
+the city from the number of the inhabitants, it should never be
+collected from the multitude in general who may happen to be in it;
+for in a city there must necessarily be many slaves, sojourners, and
+foreigners; but from those who are really part of the city and
+properly constitute its members; a multitude of these is indeed a
+proof of a large city, but in a state where a large number of
+mechanics inhabit, and but few soldiers, such a state cannot be great;
+for the greatness of the city, and the number of men in it, are not
+the same thing. This too is evident from fact, that it is very
+difficult, if not impossible, to govern properly a very numerous body
+of men; for of all the states which appear well governed we find not
+one where the rights of a citizen are open to an indiscriminate
+multitude. And this is also evident from the nature of the thing; for
+as law is a certain order, so good law is of course a certain good
+order: but too large a multitude are incapable of this, unless under
+the government of that DIVINE POWER which comprehends the universe.
+Not but that, as quantity and variety are usually essential to beauty,
+the perfection of a city consists in the largeness of it as far as
+that largeness is consistent with that order already mentioned: but
+still there is a determinate size to all cities, as well as everything
+else, whether animals, plants, or machines, for each of these, if they
+are neither too little nor too big, have their proper powers; but when
+they have not their due growth, or are badly constructed, as a ship a
+span long is not properly a ship, nor one of two furlongs length, but
+when it is of a fit size; for either from its smallness or from its
+largeness it may be quite useless: so is it with a city; one that is
+too small has not [1326b] in itself the power of self-defence, but
+this is essential to a city: one that is too large is capable of
+self-defence in what is necessary; but then it is a nation and not a
+city: for it will be very difficult to accommodate a form of
+government to it: for who would choose to be the general of such an
+unwieldy multitude, or who could be their herald but a stentor? The
+first thing therefore necessary is, that a city should consist of such
+numbers as will be sufficient to enable the inhabitants to live
+happily in their political community: and it follows, that the more
+the inhabitants exceed that necessary number the greater will the city
+be: but this must not be, as we have already said, without bounds; but
+what is its proper limit experience will easily show, and this
+experience is to be collected from the actions both of the governors
+and the governed.  Now, as it belongs to the first to direct the
+inferior magistrates and to act as judges, it follows that they can
+neither determine causes with justice nor issue their orders with
+propriety without they know the characters of their fellow-citizens:
+so that whenever this happens not to be done in these two particulars,
+the state must of necessity be badly managed; for in both of them it
+is not right to determine too hastily and without proper knowledge,
+which must evidently be the case where the number of the citizens is
+too many: besides, it is more easy for strangers and sojourners to
+assume the rights of citizens, as they will easily escape detection in
+so great a multitude. It is evident, then, that the best boundary for
+a city is that wherein the numbers are the greatest possible, that
+they may be the better able to be sufficient in themselves, while at
+the same time they are not too large to be under the eye and
+government of the magistrates. And thus let us determine the extent of
+a city.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+What we have said concerning a city may nearly be applied to a
+country; for as to what soil it should be, every one evidently will
+commend it if it is such as is sufficient in itself to furnish what
+will make the inhabitants happy; for which purpose it must be able to
+supply them with all the necessaries of life; for it is the having
+these in plenty, without any want, which makes them content. As to its
+extent, it should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at
+their ease with freedom and temperance. Whether we have done right or
+wrong in fixing this limit to the territory shall be considered more
+minutely hereafter, when we come particularly to inquire into
+property, and what fortune is requisite for a man to live on, and how
+and in what manner they ought to employ it; for there are many doubts
+upon this question, while each party insists upon their own plan of
+life being carried to an excess, the one of severity, the other of
+indulgence. What the situation of the country should be it is not
+difficult to determine, in some particulars respecting that we ought
+to be advised by those who are skilful in military affairs. It should
+be difficult of access to an enemy, but easy to the inhabitants: and
+as we said, that the number of [1327a] inhabitants ought to be such as
+can come under the eye of the magistrate, so should it be with the
+country; for then it is easily defended. As to the position of the
+city, if one could place it to one's wish, it is convenient to fix it
+on the seaside: with respect to the country, one situation which it
+ought to have has been already mentioned, namely, that it should be so
+placed as easily to give assistance to all places, and also to receive
+the necessaries of life from all parts, and also wood, or any other
+materials which may happen to be in the country.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+But with respect to placing a city in the neighbourhood of the sea,
+there are some who have many doubts whether it is serviceable or
+hurtful to a well-regulated state; for they say, that the resort of
+persons brought up under a different system of government is
+disserviceable to the state, as well by impeding the laws as by their
+numbers; for a multitude of merchants must necessarily arise from
+their trafficking backward and forward upon the seas, which will
+hinder the well-governing of the city: but if this inconvenience
+should not arise, it is evident that it is better, both on account of
+safety and also for the easier acquisition of the necessaries of life,
+that both the city and the country should be near the sea; for it is
+necessary that those who are to sustain the attack of the enemy should
+be ready with their assistance both by land and by sea, and to oppose
+any inroad, both ways if possible but if not, at least where they are
+most powerful, which they may do while they possess both. A maritime
+situation is also useful for receiving from others what your own
+country will not produce, and exporting those necessaries of your own
+growth which are more than you have occasion for; but a city ought to
+traffic to supply its own wants, and not the wants of others; for
+those who themselves furnish an open market for every one, do it for
+the sake of gain; which it is not proper for a well-established state
+to do, neither should they encourage such a commerce. Now, as we see
+that many places and cities have docks and harbours lying very
+convenient for the city, while those who frequent them have no
+communication with the citadel, and yet they are not too far off, but
+are surrounded by walls and such-like fortifications, it is evident,
+that if any good arises from such an intercourse the city will receive
+it, but if anything hurtful, it will be easy to restrain it by a law
+declaring and deputing whom the state will allow to have an
+intercourse with each other, and whom not. As to a naval power, it is
+by no means doubtful that it is necessary to have one to a certain
+degree; and this not only for the sake of the [1327b] city itself, but
+also because it may be necessary to appear formidable to some of the
+neighbouring states, or to be able to assist them as well by sea as by
+land; but to know how great that force should be, the health of the
+state should be inquired into, and if that appears vigorous and
+enables her to take the lead of other communities, it is necessary
+that her force should correspond with her actions. As for that
+multitude of people which a maritime power creates, they are by no
+means necessary to a state, nor ought they to make a part of the
+citizens; for the mariners and infantry, who have the command, are
+freemen, and upon these depends a naval engagement: but when there are
+many servants and husbandmen, there they will always have a number of
+sailors, as we now see happens to some states, as in Heraclea, where
+they man many triremes, though the extent of their city is much
+inferior to some others. And thus we determine concerning the country,
+the port, the city, the sea, and a maritime power: as to the number of
+the citizens, what that ought to be we have already said.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+
+We now proceed to point out what natural disposition the members of
+the community ought to be of: but this any one will easily perceive
+who will cast his eye over the states of Greece, of all others the
+most celebrated, and also the other different nations of this
+habitable world. Those who live in cold countries, as the north of
+Europe, are full of courage, but wanting in understanding and the
+arts: therefore they are very tenacious of their liberty; but, not
+being politicians, they cannot reduce their neighbours under their
+power: but the Asiatics, whose understandings are quick, and who are
+conversant in the arts, are deficient in courage; and therefore are
+always conquered and the slaves of others: but the Grecians, placed as
+it were between these two boundaries, so partake of them both as to be
+at the same time both courageous and sensible; for which reason Greece
+continues free, and governed in the best manner possible, and capable
+of commanding the whole world, could they agree upon one system of
+policy. Now this is the difference between the Grecians and other
+nations, that the latter have but one of these qualities, whereas in
+the former they are both happily blended together. Hence it is
+evident, that those persons ought to be both sensible and courageous
+who will readily obey a legislator, the object of whose laws is
+virtue.-As to what some persons say, that the military must be mild
+and tender to those they know, but severe and cruel to those they know
+not, it is courage which [1328a] makes any one lovely; for that is the
+faculty of the soul which we most admire: as a proof of this, our
+resentment rises higher against our friends and acquaintance than
+against those we know not: for which reason Archilaus accusing his
+friends says very properly to himself, Shall my friends insult me? The
+spirit of freedom and command also is what all inherit who are of this
+disposition for courage is commanding and invincible. It also is not
+right for any one to say, that you should be severe to those you know
+not; for this behaviour is proper for no one: nor are those who are of
+a noble disposition harsh in their manners, excepting only to the
+wicked; and when they are particularly so, it is, as has been already
+said, against their friends, when they think they have injured them;
+which is agreeable to reason: for when those who think they ought to
+receive a favour from any one do not receive it, beside the injury
+done them, they consider what they are deprived of: hence the saying,
+"Cruel are the wars of brothers;" and this, "Those who have greatly
+loved do greatly hate." And thus we have nearly determined how many
+the inhabitants of a city ought to be, and what their natural
+disposition, and also the country how large, and of what sort is
+necessary; I say nearly, because it is needless to endeavour at as
+great accuracy in those things which are the objects of the senses as
+in those which are inquired into by the understanding only.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+
+As in natural bodies those things are not admitted to be parts of them
+without which the whole would not exist, so also it is evident that in
+a political state everything that is necessary thereunto is not to be
+considered as a part of it, nor any other community from whence one
+whole is made; for one thing ought to be common and the same to the
+community, whether they partake of it equally or unequally, as, for
+instance, food, land, or the like; but when one thing is for the
+benefit of one person, and another for the benefit of another, in this
+there is nothing like a community, excepting that one makes it and the
+other uses it; as, for instance, between any instrument employed in
+making any work, and the workmen, as there is nothing common between
+the house and the builder, but the art of the builder is employed on
+the house. Thus property is necessary for states, but property is no
+part of the state, though many species of it have life; but a city is
+a community of equals, for the purpose of enjoying the best life
+possible: but the happiest life is the best which consists in the
+perfect practice of virtuous energies: as therefore some persons have
+great, others little or no opportunity of being employed in these, it
+is evident that this is the cause of the difference there is between
+the different cities and communities there are to be found; for while
+each of these endeavour to acquire what is best by various and
+different means, they give [1328b] rise to different modes of living
+and different forms of government. We are now to consider what those
+things are without which a city cannot possibly exist; for what we
+call parts of the city must of necessity inhere in it: and this we
+shall plainly understand, if we know the number of things necessary to
+a city: first, the inhabitants must have food: secondly, arts, for
+many instruments are necessary in life: thirdly, arms, for it is
+necessary that the community should have an armed force within
+themselves, both to support their government against those of their
+own body who might refuse obedience to it, and also to defend it from
+those who might attempt to attack it from without: fourthly, a certain
+revenue, as well for the internal necessities of the state as for the
+business of war: fifthly, which is indeed the chief concern, a
+religious establishment: sixthly in order, but first of all in
+necessity, a court to determine both criminal and civil causes. These
+things are absolutely necessary, so to speak, in every state; for a
+city is a number of people not accidentally met together, but with a
+purpose of ensuring to themselves sufficient independency and
+self-protection; and if anything necessary for these purposes is
+wanting, it is impossible that in such a situation these ends can be
+obtained. It is necessary therefore that a city should be capable of
+acquiring all these things: for this purpose a proper number of
+husbandmen are necessary to procure food, also artificers and
+soldiers, and rich men, and priests and judges, to determine what is
+right and proper.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+
+Having determined thus far, it remains that we consider whether all
+these different employments shall be open to all; for it is possible
+to continue the same persons always husbandmen, artificers, judges, or
+counsellors; or shall we appoint different persons to each of those
+employments which we have already mentioned; or shall some of them be
+appropriated to particulars, and others of course common to all? but
+this does not take place in every state, for, as we have already said,
+it is possible that all may be common to all, or not, but only common
+to some; and this is the difference between one government and
+another: for in democracies the whole community partakes of
+everything, but in oligarchies it is different.
+
+Since we are inquiring what is the best government possible, and it is
+admitted to be that in which the citizens are happy; and that, as we
+have already said, it is impossible to obtain happiness without
+virtue; it follows, that in the best-governed states, where the
+citizens are really men of intrinsic and not relative goodness, none
+of them should be permitted to exercise any mechanic employment or
+follow merchandise, as being ignoble and destructive to virtue;
+neither should they be husband-[1329a] men, that they may be at
+leisure to improve in virtue and perform the duty they owe to the
+state. With respect to the employments of a soldier, a senator, and a
+judge, which are evidently necessary to the community, shall they be
+allotted to different persons, or shall the same person execute both?
+This question, too, is easily answered: for in some cases the same
+persons may execute them, in others they should be different, where
+the different employments require different abilities, as when courage
+is wanting for one, judgment for the other, there they should be
+allotted to different persons; but when it is evident, that it is
+impossible to oblige those who have arms in their hands, and can
+insist on their own terms, to be always under command; there these
+different employments should be trusted to one person; for those who
+have arms in their hands have it in their option whether they will or
+will not assume the supreme power: to these two (namely, those who
+have courage and judgment) the government must be entrusted; but not
+in the same manner, but as nature directs; what requires courage to
+the young, what requires judgment to the old; for with the young is
+courage, with the old is wisdom: thus each will be allotted the part
+they are fit for according to their different merits. It is also
+necessary that the landed property should belong to these men; for it
+is necessary that the citizens should be rich, and these are the men
+proper for citizens; for no mechanic ought to be admitted to the
+rights of a citizen, nor any other sort of people whose employment is
+not entirely noble, honourable, and virtuous; this is evident from the
+principle we at first set out with; for to be happy it is necessary to
+be virtuous; and no one should say that a city is happy while he
+considers only one part of its citizens, but for that purpose he ought
+to examine into all of them. It is evident, therefore, that the landed
+property should belong to these, though it may be necessary for them
+to have husbandmen, either slaves, barbarians, or servants. There
+remains of the different classes of the people whom we have
+enumerated, the priests, for these evidently compose a rank by
+themselves; for neither are they to be reckoned amongst the husbandmen
+nor the mechanics; for reverence to the gods is highly becoming every
+state: and since the citizens have been divided into orders, the
+military and the council, and it is proper to offer due worship to the
+gods, and since it is necessary that those who are employed in their
+service should have nothing else to do, let the business of the
+priesthood be allotted to those who are in years. We have now shown
+what is necessary to the existence of a city, and of what parts it
+consists, and that husbandmen, mechanic, and mercenary servants are
+necessary to a city; but that the parts of it are soldiers and
+sailors, and that these are always different from those, but from each
+other only occasionally.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+
+It seems neither now nor very lately to have been known [1329b] to
+those philosophers who have made politics their study, that a city
+ought to be divided by families into different orders of men; and that
+the husbandmen and soldiers should be kept separate from each other;
+which custom is even to this day preserved in Egypt and in Crete; also
+Sesostris having founded it in Egypt, Minos in Crete. Common meals
+seem also to have been an ancient regulation, and to have been
+established in Crete during the reign of Minos, and in a still more
+remote period in Italy; for those who are the best judges in that
+country say that one Italus being king of AEnotria., from whom the
+people, changing their names, were called Italians instead of
+AEnotrians, and that part of Europe was called Italy which is bounded
+by the Scylletic Gulf on the one side and the Lametic on the other,
+the distance between which is about half a day's journey. This Italus,
+they relate, made the AEnotrians, who were formerly shepherds,
+husbandmen, and gave them different laws from what they had before,
+and to have been the first who established common meals, for which
+reason some of his descendants still use them, and observe some of his
+laws. The Opici inhabit that part which lies towards the Tyrrhenian
+Sea, who both now are and formerly were called Ausonians. The Chones
+inhabited the part toward Iapigia and the Ionian Sea which is called
+Syrtis. These Chones were descended from the AEnotrians. Hence arose
+the custom of common meals, but the separation of the citizens into
+different families from Egypt: for the reign of Sesostris is of much
+higher antiquity than that of Minos. As we ought to think that most
+other things were found out in a long, nay, even in a boundless time
+(reason teaching us that want would make us first invent that which
+was necessary, and, when that was obtained, then those things which
+were requisite for the conveniences and ornament of life), so should
+we conclude the same with respect to a political state; now everything
+in Egypt bears the marks of the most remote antiquity, for these
+people seem to be the most ancient of all others, and to have acquired
+laws and political order; we should therefore make a proper use of
+what is told us of them, and endeavour to find out what they have
+omitted. We have already said, that the landed property ought to
+belong to the military and those who partake of the government of the
+state; and that therefore the husbandmen should be a separate order of
+people; and how large and of what nature the country ought to be: we
+will first treat of the division of the land, and of the husbandmen,
+how many and of what sort they ought to be; since we by no means hold
+that property ought to be common, as some persons have said, only thus
+far, in friendship, it [1330a] should be their custom to let no
+citizen want subsistence. As to common meals, it is in general agreed
+that they are proper in well-regulated cities; my reasons for
+approving of them shall be mentioned hereafter: they are what all the:
+citizens ought to partake of; but it will not be easy for the poor,
+out of what is their own, to furnish as much as they are ordered to
+do, and supply their own house besides. The expense also of religious
+worship should be defrayed by the whole state. Of necessity therefore
+the land ought to be divided into two parts, one of which should
+belong to the community in general, the other to the individuals
+separately; and each of these parts should again be subdivided into
+two: half of that which belongs to the public should be appropriated
+to maintain the worship of the gods, the other half to support the
+common meals. Half of that which belongs to the individuals should be
+at the extremity of the country, the other half near the city, so that
+these two portions being allotted to each person, all would partake of
+land in both places, which would be both equal and right; and induce
+them to act in concert with greater harmony in any war with their
+neighbours: for when the land is not divided in this manner, one party
+neglects the inroads of the enemy on the borders, the other makes it a
+matter of too much consequence and more than is necessary; for which
+reason in some places there is a law which forbids the inhabitants of
+the borders to have any vote in the council when they are debating
+upon a war which is made against them as their private interest might
+prevent their voting impartially. Thus therefore the country ought to
+be divided and for the reasons before mentioned. Could one have one's
+choice, the husbandmen should by all means be slaves, not of the same
+nation, or men of any spirit; for thus they would be laborious in
+their business, and safe from attempting any novelties: next to these
+barbarian servants are to be preferred, similar in natural disposition
+to these we have already mentioned. Of these, let those who are to
+cultivate the private property of the individual belong to that
+individual, and those who are to cultivate the public territory belong
+to the public. In what manner these slaves ought to be used, and for
+what reason it is very proper that they should have the promise of
+their liberty made them, as a reward for their services, shall be
+mentioned hereafter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+
+We have already mentioned, that both the city and all the country
+should communicate both with the sea and the continent as much as
+possible. There are these four things which we should be particularly
+desirous of in the position of the city with respect to itself: in the
+first place, health is to be consulted as the first thing necessary:
+now a city which fronts the east and receives the winds which blow
+from thence is esteemed most healthful; next to this that which has a
+northern position is to be preferred, as best in winter. It should
+next be contrived that it may have a proper situation for the business
+of government and for defence in war: that in war the citizens may
+[1330b] have easy access to it; but that it may be difficult of access
+to, and hardly to be taken by, the enemy. In the next place
+particularly, that there may be plenty of water, and rivers near at
+hand: but if those cannot be found, very large cisterns must be
+prepared to save rain-water, so that there may be no want of it in
+case they should be driven into the town in time of war. And as great
+care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, the first thing
+to be attended to is, that the city should have a good situation and a
+good position; the second is, that they may have good water to drink;
+and this not be negligently taken care of; for what we chiefly and
+most frequently use for the support of the body must principally
+influence the health of it; and this influence is what the air and
+water naturally have: for which reason in all wise governments the
+waters ought to be appropriated to different purposes, and if they are
+not equally good, and if there is not a plenty of necessary water,
+that which is to drink should be separated from that which is for
+other uses. As to fortified places, what is proper for some
+governments is not proper for all; as, for instance, a lofty citadel
+is proper for a monarchy and an oligarchy; a city built upon a plain
+suits a democracy; neither of these for an aristocracy, but rather
+many strong places. As to the form of private houses, those are
+thought to be best and most useful for their different purposes which
+are distinct and separate from each other, and built in the modern
+manner, after the plan of Hippodamus: but for safety in time of war,
+on the contrary, they should be built as they formerly were; for they
+were such that strangers could not easily find their way out of them,
+and the method of access to them such as an enemy could with
+difficulty find out if he proposed to besiege them. A city therefore
+should have both these sorts of buildings, which may easily be
+contrived if any one will so regulate them as the planters do their
+rows of vines; not that the buildings throughout the city should be
+detached from each other, only in some parts of it; thus elegance and
+safety will be equally consulted. With respect to walls, those who say
+that a courageous people ought not to have any, pay too much respect
+to obsolete notions; particularly as we may see those who pride
+themselves therein continually confuted by facts. It is indeed
+disreputable for those who are equal, or nearly so, to the enemy, to
+endeavour to take refuge within their walls--but since it very often
+happens, that those who make the attack are too powerful for the
+bravery and courage of those few who oppose them to resist, if you
+would not suffer the calamities of war and the insolence of the enemy,
+it must be thought the part of a good soldier to seek for safety under
+the shelter and protection of walls more especially since so many
+missile weapons and machines have been most ingeniously invented to
+besiege cities with. Indeed to neglect surrounding a city with a wall
+would be similar to choosing a country which is easy of access to an
+enemy, or levelling the eminences of it; or as if an individual should
+not have a wall to his house lest it should be thought that the owner
+of it was a coward: nor should this be left unconsidered, that those
+who have a city surrounded with walls may act both ways, either as if
+it had or as if it had not; but where it has not they cannot do this.
+If this is true, it is not only necessary to have walls, but care must
+be taken that they may be a proper ornament to the city, as well as a
+defence in time of war; not only according to the old methods, but the
+modern improvements also: for as those who make offensive war
+endeavour by every way possible to gain advantages over their
+adversaries, so should those who are upon the defensive employ all the
+means already known, and such new ones as philosophy can invent, to
+defend themselves: for those who are well prepared are seldom first
+attacked.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+
+As the citizens in general are to eat at public tables in certain
+companies, and it is necessary that the walls should have bulwarks and
+towers in proper places and at proper distances, it is evident that it
+will be very necessary to have some of these in the towers; let the
+buildings for this purpose be made the ornaments of the walls. As to
+temples for public worship, and the hall for the public tables of the
+chief magistrates, they ought to be built in proper places, and
+contiguous to each other, except those temples which the law or the
+oracle orders to be separate from all other buildings; and let these
+be in such a conspicuous eminence, that they may have every advantage
+of situation, and in the neighbourhood of that part of the city which
+is best fortified. Adjoining to this place there ought to be a large
+square, like that which they call in Thessaly The Square of Freedom,
+in which nothing is permitted to be bought or sold; into which no
+mechanic nor husbandman, nor any such person, should be permitted to
+enter, unless commanded by the magistrates. It will also be an
+ornament to this place if the gymnastic exercises of the elders are
+performed in it. It is also proper, that for performing these
+exercises the citizens should be divided into distinct classes,
+according to their ages, and that the young persons should have proper
+officers to be with them, and that the seniors should be with the
+magistrates; for having them before their eyes would greatly inspire
+true modesty and ingenuous fear. There ought to be another square
+[1331b] separate from this for buying and selling, which should be so
+situated as to be commodious for the reception of goods both by sea
+and land. As the citizens may be divided into magistrates and priests,
+it is proper that the public tables of the priests should be in
+buildings near the temples. Those of the magistrates who preside over
+contracts, indictments, and such-like, and also over the markets, and
+the public streets near the square, or some public way, I mean the
+square where things are bought and sold; for I intended the other for
+those who are at leisure, and this for necessary business. The same
+order which I have directed here should be observed also in the
+country; for there also their magistrates such as the surveyors of the
+woods and overseers of the grounds, must necessarily have their common
+tables and their towers, for the purpose of protection against an
+enemy. There ought also to be temples erected at proper places, both
+to the gods and the heroes; but it is unnecessary to dwell longer and
+most minutely on these particulars--for it is by no means difficult to
+plan these things, it is rather so to carry them into execution; for
+the theory is the child of our wishes, but the practical part must
+depend upon fortune; for which reason we shall decline saying anything
+farther upon these subjects.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+
+We will now show of what numbers and of what sort of people a
+government ought to consist, that the state may be happy and well
+administered. As there are two particulars on which the excellence and
+perfection of everything depend, one of these is, that the object and
+end proposed should be proper; the other, that the means to accomplish
+it should be adapted to that purpose; for it may happen that these may
+either agree or disagree with each other; for the end we propose may
+be good, but in taking the means to obtain it we may err; at other
+times we may have the right and proper means in our power, but the end
+may be bad, and sometimes we may mistake in both; as in the art of
+medicine the physician does not sometimes know in what situation the
+body ought to be, to be healthy; nor what to do to procure the end he
+aims at. In every art and science, therefore, we should be master of
+this knowledge, namely, the proper end, and the means to obtain it.
+Now it is evident that all persons are desirous to live well and be
+happy; but that some have the means thereof in their own power, others
+not; and this either through nature [1332a] or fortune; for many
+ingredients are necessary to a happy life; but fewer to those who are
+of a good than to those who are of a bad disposition. There are others
+who continually have the means of happiness in their own power, but do
+not rightly apply them. Since we propose to inquire what government is
+best, namely, that by which a state may be best administered, and that
+state is best administered where the people are the happiest, it is
+evident that happiness is a thing we should not be unacquainted with.
+Now, I have already said in my treatise on Morals (if I may here make
+any use of what I have there shown), that happiness consists in the
+energy and perfect practice of virtue; and this not relatively, but
+simply; I mean by relatively, what is necessary in some certain
+circumstances; by simply, what is good and fair in itself: of the
+first sort are just punishments, and restraints in a just cause; for
+they arise from virtue and are necessary, and on that account are
+virtuous; though it is more desirable that neither any state nor any
+individual should stand in need of them; but those actions which are
+intended either to procure honour or wealth are simply good; the
+others eligible only to remove an evil; these, on the contrary, are
+the foundation and means of relative good. A worthy man indeed will
+bear poverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents with a noble
+mind; but happiness consists in the contrary to these (now we have
+already determined in our treatise on Morals, that he is a man of
+worth who considers what is good because it is virtuous as what is
+simply good; it is evident, therefore, that all the actions of such a
+one must be worthy and simply good): this has led some persons to
+conclude, that the cause of happiness was external goods; which would
+be as if any one should suppose that the playing well upon the lyre
+was owing to the instrument, and not to the art. It necessarily
+follows from what has been said, that some things should be ready at
+hand and others procured by the legislator; for which reason in
+founding a city we earnestly wish that there may be plenty of those
+things which are supposed to be under the dominion of fortune (for
+some things we admit her to be mistress over); but for a state to be
+worthy and great is not only the work of fortune but of knowledge and
+judgment also. But for a state to be worthy it is necessary that those
+citizens which are in the administration should be worthy also; but as
+in our city every citizen is to be so, we must consider how this may
+be accomplished; for if this is what every one could be, and not some
+individuals only, it would be more desirable; for then it would
+follow, that what might be done by one might be done by all. Men are
+worthy and good three ways; by nature, by custom, by reason. In the
+first place, a man ought to be born a man, and not any other animal;
+that is to say, he ought to have both a body and soul; but it avails
+not to be only born [1332b] with some things, for custom makes great
+alterations; for there are some things in nature capable of alteration
+either way which are fixed by custom, either for the better or the
+worse. Now, other animals live chiefly a life of nature; and in very
+few things according to custom; but man lives according to reason
+also, which he alone is endowed with; wherefore he ought to make all
+these accord with each other; for if men followed reason, and were
+persuaded that it was best to obey her, they would act in many
+respects contrary to nature and custom.  What men ought naturally to
+be, to make good members of a community, I have already determined;
+the rest of this discourse therefore shall be upon education; for some
+things are acquired by habit, others by hearing them.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+
+As every political community consists of those who govern and of those
+who are governed, let us consider whether during the continuance of
+their lives they ought to be the same persons or different; for it is
+evident that the mode of education should be adapted to this
+distinction. Now, if one man differed from another as much, as we
+believe, the gods and heroes differ from men: in the first place,
+being far their superiors in body; and, secondly, in the soul: so that
+the superiority of the governors over the governed might be evident
+beyond a doubt, it is certain that it would be better for the one
+always to govern, the other always to be governed: but, as this is not
+easy to obtain, and kings are not so superior to those they govern as
+Scylax informs us they are in India, it is evident that for many
+reasons it is necessary that all in their turns should both govern and
+be governed: for it is just that those who are equal should have
+everything alike; and it is difficult for a state to continue which is
+founded in injustice; for all those in the country who are desirous of
+innovation will apply themselves to those who are under the government
+of the rest, and such will be their numbers in the state, that it will
+be impossible for the magistrates to get the better of them. But that
+the governors ought to excel the governed is beyond a doubt; the
+legislator therefore ought to consider how this shall be, and how it
+may be contrived that all shall have their equal share in the
+administration. Now, with respect to this it will be first said, that
+nature herself has directed us in our choice, laying down the selfsame
+thing when she has made some young, others old: the first of whom it
+becomes to obey, the latter to command; for no one when he is young is
+offended at his being under government, or thinks himself too good for
+it; more especially when he considers that he himself shall receive
+the same honours which he pays when he shall arrive at a proper age.
+In some respects it must be acknowledged that the governors and the
+governed are the same, in others they are different; it is therefore
+necessary that their education should be in [1333a] some respect the
+same, in others different: as they say, that he will be a good
+governor who has first learnt to obey. Now of governments, as we have
+already said, some are instituted for the sake of him who commands;
+others for him who obeys: of the first sort is that of the master over
+the servant; of the latter, that of freemen over each other. Now some
+things which are commanded differ from others; not in the business,
+but in the end proposed thereby: for which reason many works, even of
+a servile nature, are not disgraceful for young freemen to perform;
+for many things which are ordered to be done are not honourable or
+dishonourable so much in their own nature as in the end which is
+proposed, and the reason for which they are undertaken. Since then we
+have determined, that the virtue of a good citizen and good governor
+is the same as of a good man; and that every one before he commands
+should have first obeyed, it is the business of the legislator to
+consider how his citizens may be good men, what education is necessary
+to that purpose, and what is the final object of a good life. The soul
+of man may be divided into two parts; that which has reason in itself,
+and that which hath not, but is capable of obeying its dictates: and
+according to the virtues of these two parts a man is said to be good:
+but of those virtues which are the ends, it will not be difficult for
+those to determine who adopt the division I have already given; for
+the inferior is always for the sake of the superior; and this is
+equally evident both in the works of art as well as in those of
+nature; but that is superior which has reason. Reason itself also is
+divided into two parts, in the manner we usually divide it; the
+theoretic and the practical; which division therefore seems necessary
+for this part also: the same analogy holds good with respect to
+actions; of which those which are of a superior nature ought always to
+be chosen by those who have it in their power; for that is always most
+eligible to every one which will procure the best ends. Now life is
+divided into labour and rest, war and peace; and of what we do the
+objects are partly necessary and useful, partly noble: and we should
+give the same preference to these that we do to the different parts of
+the soul and its actions, as war to procure peace; labour, rest; and
+the useful, the noble. The politician, therefore, who composes a body
+of laws ought to extend his views to everything; the different parts
+of the soul and their actions; more particularly to those things which
+are of a superior nature and ends; and, in the same manner, to the
+lives of men and their different actions.
+
+They ought to be fitted both for labour and war, but rather [1333b]
+for rest and peace; and also to do what is necessary and useful, but
+rather what is fair and noble. It is to those objects that the
+education of the children ought to tend, and of all the youths who
+want instruction. All the Grecian states which now seem best governed,
+and the legislators who founded those states, appear not to have
+framed their polity with a view to the best end, or to every virtue,
+in their laws and education; but eagerly to have attended to what is
+useful and productive of gain: and nearly of the same opinion with
+these are some persons who have written lately, who, by praising the
+Lacedaemonian state, show they approve of the intention of the
+legislator in making war and victory the end of his government. But
+how contrary to reason this is, is easily proved by argument, and has
+already been proved by facts (but as the generality of men desire to
+have an extensive command, that they may have everything desirable in
+the greater abundance; so Thibron and others who have written on that
+state seem to approve of their legislator for having procured them an
+extensive command by continually enuring them to all sorts of dangers
+and hardships): for it is evident, since the Lacedemonians have now no
+hope that the supreme power will be in their own hand, that neither
+are they happy nor was their legislator wise. This also is ridiculous,
+that while they preserved an obedience to their laws, and no one
+opposed their being governed by them, they lost the means of being
+honourable: but these people understand not rightly what sort of
+government it is which ought to reflect honour on the legislator; for
+a government of freemen is nobler than despotic power, and more
+consonant to virtue. Moreover, neither should a city be thought happy,
+nor should a legislator be commended, because he has so trained the
+people as to conquer their neighbours; for in this there is a great
+inconvenience: since it is evident that upon this principle every
+citizen who can will endeavour to procure the supreme power in his own
+city; which crime the Lacedaemonians accuse Pausanias of, though he
+enjoyed such great honours.
+
+Such reasoning and such laws are neither political, useful nor true:
+but a legislator ought to instil those laws on the minds of men which
+are most useful for them, both in their public and private capacities.
+The rendering a people fit for war, that they may enslave their
+inferiors ought not to be the care of the legislator; but that they
+may not themselves be reduced to slavery by others. In [1334a] the
+next place, he should take care that the object of his government is
+the safety of those who are under it, and not a despotism over all: in
+the third place, that those only are slaves who are fit to be only so.
+Reason indeed concurs with experience in showing that all the
+attention which the legislator pays to the business of war, and all
+other rules which he lays down, should have for their object rest and
+peace; since most of those states (which we usually see) are preserved
+by war; but, after they have acquired a supreme power over those
+around them, are ruined; for during peace, like a sword, they lose
+their brightness: the fault of which lies in the legislator, who never
+taught them how to be at rest.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+
+As there is one end common to a man both as an individual and a
+citizen, it is evident that a good man and a good citizen must have
+the same object in view; it is evident that all the virtues which lead
+to rest are necessary; for, as we have often said, the end of war is
+peace, of labour, rest; but those virtues whose object is rest, and
+those also whose object is labour, are necessary for a liberal life
+and rest; for we want a supply of many necessary things that we may be
+at rest. A city therefore ought to be temperate, brave, and patient;
+for, according to the proverb, "Rest is not for slaves;" but those who
+cannot bravely face danger are the slaves of those who attack them.
+Bravery, therefore, and patience are necessary for labour, philosophy
+for rest, and temperance and justice in both; but these chiefly in
+time of peace and rest; for war obliges men to be just and temperate;
+but the enjoyment of pleasure, with the rest of peace, is more apt to
+produce insolence; those indeed who are easy in their circumstances,
+and enjoy everything that can make them happy, have great occasion for
+the virtues of temperance and justice. Thus if there are, as the poets
+tell us, any inhabitants in the happy isles, to these a higher degree
+of philosophy, temperance, and justice will be necessary, as they live
+at their ease in the full plenty of every sensual pleasure. It is
+evident, therefore, that these virtues are necessary in every state
+that would be happy or worthy; for he who is worthless can never enjoy
+real good, much less is he qualified to be at rest; but can appear
+good only by labour and being at war, but in peace and at rest the
+meanest of creatures. For which reason virtue should not be cultivated
+as the Lacedaemonians did; for they did not differ from others in
+their opinion concerning the supreme good, but in [1334b] imagining
+this good was to be procured by a particular virtue; but since there
+are greater goods than those of war, it is evident that the enjoyment
+of those which are valuable in themselves should be desired, rather
+than those virtues which are useful in war; but how and by what means
+this is to be acquired is now to be considered. We have already
+assigned three causes on which it will depend; nature, custom, and
+reason, arid shown what sort of men nature must produce for this
+purpose; it remains then that we determine which we shall first begin
+by in education, reason or custom, for these ought always to preserve
+the most entire harmony with each other; for it may happen that reason
+may err from the end proposed, and be corrected by custom. In the
+first place, it is evident that in this as in other things, its
+beginning or production arises from some principle, and its end also
+arises from another principle, which is itself an end. Now, with us,
+reason and intelligence are the end of nature; our production,
+therefore, and our manners ought to be accommodated to both these. In
+the next place, as the soul and the body are two distinct things, so
+also we see that the soul is divided into two parts, the reasoning and
+not-reasoning, with their habits which are two in number, one
+belonging to each, namely appetite and intelligence; and as the body
+is in production before the soul, so is the not-reasoning part of the
+soul before the reasoning; and this is evident; for anger, will and
+desire are to be seen in children nearly as soon as they are born; but
+reason and intelligence spring up as they grow to maturity.  The body,
+therefore, necessarily demands our care before the soul; next the
+appetites for the sake of the mind; the body for the sake of the soul.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+
+If then the legislator ought to take care that the bodies of the
+children are as perfect as possible, his first attention ought to be
+given to matrimony; at what time and in what situation it is proper
+that the citizens should engage in the nuptial contract. Now, with
+respect to this alliance, the legislator ought both to consider the
+parties and their time of life, that they may grow old at the same
+part of time, and that their bodily powers may not be different; that
+is to say, the man being able to have children, but the woman too old
+to bear them; or, on the contrary, the woman be young enough to
+produce children, but the man too old to be a father; for from such a
+situation discords and disputes continually arise. In the next place,
+with respect to the succession of children, there ought not to be too
+great an interval of time between them and their parents; for when
+there is, the parent can receive no benefit from his child's
+affection, or the child any advantage from his father's protection;
+[1335a] neither should the difference in years be too little, as great
+inconveniences may arise from it; as it prevents that proper reverence
+being shown to a father by a boy who considers him as nearly his equal
+in age, and also from the disputes it occasions in the economy of the
+family. But, to return from this digression, care ought to be taken
+that the bodies of the children may be such as will answer the
+expectations of the legislator; this also will be affected by the same
+means. Since season for the production of children is determined (not
+exactly, but to speak in general), namely, for the man till seventy
+years, and the woman till fifty, the entering into the marriage state,
+as far as time is concerned, should be regulated by these periods. It
+is extremely bad for the children when the father is too young; for in
+all animals whatsoever the parts of the young are imperfect, and are
+more likely to be productive of females than males, and diminutive
+also in size; the same thing of course necessarily holds true in men;
+as a proof of this you may see in those cities where the men and women
+usually marry very young, the people in general are very small and ill
+framed; in child-birth also the women suffer more, and many of them
+die. And thus some persons tell us the oracle of Traezenium should be
+explained, as if it referred to the many women who were destroyed by
+too early marriages, and not their gathering their fruits too soon. It
+is also conducive to temperance not to marry too soon; for women who
+do so are apt to be intemperate. It also prevents the bodies of men
+from acquiring their full size if they marry before their growth is
+completed; for this is the determinate period, which prevents any
+further increase; for which reason the proper time for a woman to
+marry is eighteen, for a man thirty-seven, a little more or less; for
+when they marry at that time their bodies are in perfection, and they
+will also cease to have children at a proper time; and moreover with
+respect to the succession of the children, if they have them at the
+time which may reasonably be expected, they will be just arriving into
+perfection when their parents are sinking down under the load of
+seventy years. And thus much for the time which is proper for
+marriage; but moreover a proper season of the year should be observed,
+as many persons do now, and appropriate the winter for this business.
+The married couple ought also to regard the precepts of physicians and
+naturalists, each of whom have treated on these [1335b] subjects. What
+is the fit disposition of the body will be better mentioned when we
+come to speak of the education of the child; we will just slightly
+mention a few particulars.    Now, there is no occasion that any one
+should have the habit of body of a wrestler to be either a good
+citizen, or to enjoy a good constitution, or to be the father of
+healthy children;   neither should he be infirm or too much dispirited
+by misfortunes, but between both these.    He ought to have a habit of
+labour, but not of too violent labour;   nor should that be confined
+to one object only, as the wrestler's is; but to such things as are
+proper for freemen.    These things are equally necessary both for men
+and women.    Women with child should also take care that their diet
+is not too sparing, and that they use sufficient exercise; which it
+will be easy for the legislator to effect if he commands them once
+every day to repair to the worship of the gods who are supposed to
+preside over matrimony.    But, contrary to what is proper for the
+body, the mind ought to be kept as tranquil as possible; for as plants
+partake of the nature of the soil, so does the child receive much of
+the disposition of the mother.    With respect to the exposing or
+bringing up of children, let it be a law, that nothing imperfect or
+maimed shall be brought up, ..........    As the proper time has been
+pointed out for a man and a woman to enter into the marriage state, so
+also let us determine how long it is advantageous for the community
+that they should have children; for as the children of those who are
+too young are imperfect both in body and mind, so also those whose
+parents are too old are weak in both: while therefore the body
+continues in perfection, which (as some poets say, who reckon the
+different periods of life by sevens) is till fifty years, or four or
+five more, the children may be equally perfect; but when the parents
+are past that age it is better they should have no more. With respect
+to any connection between a man and a woman, or a woman and a man,
+when either of the parties are betrothed, let it be held in utter
+detestation [1336a] on any pretext whatsoever; but should any one be
+guilty of such a thing after the marriage is consummated, let his
+infamy be as great as his guilt deserves.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII
+
+
+When a child is born it must be supposed that the strength of its body
+will depend greatly upon the quality of its food. Now whoever will
+examine into the nature of animals, and also observe those people who
+are very desirous their children should acquire a warlike habit, will
+find that they feed them chiefly with milk, as being best accommodated
+to their bodies, but without wine, to prevent any distempers: those
+motions also which are natural to their age are very serviceable; and
+to prevent any of their limbs from being crooked, on account of their
+extreme ductility, some people even now use particular machines that
+their bodies may not be distorted. It is also useful to enure them to
+the cold when they are very little; for this is very serviceable for
+their health; and also to enure them to the business of war; for which
+reason it is customary with many of the barbarians to dip their
+children in rivers when the water is cold; with others to clothe them
+very slightly, as among the Celts; for whatever it is possible to
+accustom children to, it is best to accustom them to it at first, but
+to do it by degrees: besides, boys have naturally a habit of loving
+the cold, on account of the heat. These, then, and such-like things
+ought to be the first object of our attention: the next age to this
+continues till the child is five years old; during which time it is
+best to teach him nothing at all, not even necessary labour, lest it
+should hinder his growth; but he should be accustomed to use so much
+motion as not to acquire a lazy habit of body; which he will get by
+various means and by play also: his play also ought to be neither
+illiberal nor too laborious nor lazy. Their governors and preceptors
+also should take care what sort of tales and stories it may be proper
+for them to hear; for all these ought to pave the way for their future
+instruction: for which reason the generality of their play should be
+imitations of what they are afterwards to do seriously. They too do
+wrong who forbid by laws the disputes between boys and their quarrels,
+for they contribute to increase their growth--as they are a sort of
+exercise to the body: for the struggles of the heart and the
+compression of the spirits give strength to those who labour, which
+happens to boys in their disputes. The preceptors also ought to have
+an eye upon their manner of life, and those with whom they converse;
+and to take care that they are never in the company of slaves. At this
+time and till they are seven [1336b] years old it is necessary that
+they should be educated at home. It is also very proper to banish,
+both from their hearing and sight, everything which is illiberal and
+the like. Indeed it is as much the business of the legislator as
+anything else, to banish every indecent expression out of the state:
+for from a permission to speak whatever is shameful, very quickly
+arises the doing it, and this particularly with young people: for
+which reason let them never speak nor hear any such thing: but if it
+appears that any freeman has done or said anything that is forbidden
+before he is of age to be thought fit to partake of the common meals,
+let him be punished by disgrace and stripes; but if a person above
+that age does so, let him be treated as you would a slave, on account
+of his being infamous. Since we forbid his speaking everything which
+is forbidden, it is necessary that he neither sees obscene stories nor
+pictures; the magistrates therefore are to take care that there are no
+statues or pictures of anything of this nature, except only to those
+gods to whom the law permits them, and to which the law allows persons
+of a certain age to pay their devotions, for themselves, their wives,
+and children.  It should also be illegal for young persons to be
+present either at iambics or comedies before they are arrived at that
+age when they are allowed to partake of the pleasures of the table:
+indeed a good education will preserve them from all the evils which
+attend on these things. We have at present just touched upon this
+subject; it will be our business hereafter, when we properly come to
+it, to determine whether this care of children is unnecessary, or, if
+necessary, in what manner it must be done; at present we have only
+mentioned it as necessary. Probably the saying of Theodoras, the
+tragic actor, was not a bad one: That he would permit no one, not even
+the meanest actor, to go upon the stage before him, that he might
+first engage the ear of the audience. The same thing happens both in
+our connections with men and things: what we meet with first pleases
+best; for which reason children should be kept strangers to everything
+which is bad, more particularly whatsoever is loose and offensive to
+good manners. When five years are accomplished, the two next may be
+very properly employed in being spectators of those exercises they
+will afterwards have to learn. There are two periods into which
+education ought to be divided, according to the age of the child; the
+one is from his being seven years of age to the time of puberty; the
+other from thence till he is one-and-twenty: for those who divide ages
+by the number seven [1337a] are in general wrong: it is much better to
+follow the division of nature; for every art and every instruction is
+intended to complete what nature has left defective: we must first
+consider if any regulation whatsoever is requisite for children; in
+the next place, if it is advantageous to make it a common care, or
+that every one should act therein as he pleases, which is the general
+practice in most cities; in the third place, what it ought to be.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK   VIII
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+No one can doubt that the maigstrate ought greatly to interest himself
+in the care of youth; for where it is neglected it is hurtful to the
+city, for every state ought to be governed according to its particular
+nature; for the form and manners of each government are peculiar to
+itself; and these, as they originally established it, so they usually
+still preserve it. For instance, democratic forms and manners a
+democracy; oligarchic, an oligarchy: but, universally, the best
+manners produce the best government. Besides, as in every business and
+art there are some things which men are to learn first and be made
+accustomed to, which are necessary to perform their several works; so
+it is evident that the same thing is necessary in the practice of
+virtue. As there is one end in view in every city, it is evident that
+education ought to be one and the same in each; and that this should
+be a common care, and not the individual's, as it now is, when every
+one takes care of his own children separately; and their instructions
+are particular also, each person teaching them as they please; but
+what ought to be engaged in ought to be common to all. Besides, no one
+ought to think that any citizen belongs to him in particular, but to
+the state in general; for each one is a part of the state, and it is
+the natural duty of each part to regard the good of the whole: and for
+this the Lacedaemonians may be praised; for they give the greatest
+attention to education, and make it public. It is evident, then, that
+there should be laws concerning education, and that it should be
+public.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+What education is, and how children ought to be instructed, is what
+should be well known; for there are doubts concerning the business of
+it, as all people do not agree in those things they would have a child
+taught, both with respect to their improvement in virtue and a happy
+life: nor is it clear whether the object of it should be to improve
+the reason or rectify the morals. From the present mode of education
+we cannot determine with certainty to which men incline, whether to
+instruct a child in what will be useful to him in life; or what tends
+to virtue, and what is excellent: for all these things have their
+separate defenders. As to virtue, there is no particular [1337b] in
+which they all agree: for as all do not equally esteem all virtues, it
+reasonably follows that they will not cultivate the same. It is
+evident that what is necessary ought to be taught to all: but that
+which is necessary for one is not necessary for all; for there ought
+to be a distinction between the employment of a freeman and a slave.
+The first of these should be taught everything useful which will not
+make those who know it mean. Every work is to be esteemed mean, and
+every art and every discipline which renders the body, the mind, or
+the understanding of freemen unfit for the habit and practice of
+virtue: for which reason all those arts which tend to deform the body
+are called mean, and all those employments which are exercised for
+gain; for they take off from the freedom of the mind and render it
+sordid. There are also some liberal arts which are not improper for
+freemen to apply to in a certain degree; but to endeavour to acquire a
+perfect skill in them is exposed to the faults I have just mentioned;
+for there is a great deal of difference in the reason for which any
+one does or learns anything: for it is not illiberal to engage in it
+for one's self, one's friend, or in the cause of virtue; while, at the
+same time, to do it for the sake of another may seem to be acting the
+part of a servant and a slave. The mode of instruction which now
+prevails seems to partake of both parts.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+There are four things which it is usual to teach children--reading,
+gymnastic exercises, and music, to which (in the fourth place) some
+add painting.   Reading and painting are both of them of singular use
+in life, and gymnastic exercises, as productive of courage.   As to
+music, some persons may doubt, as most persons now use it for the sake
+of pleasure:  but those who originally made it part of education did
+it because, as has been already said, nature requires that we should
+not only be properly employed, but to be able to enjoy leisure
+honourably: for this (to repeat what I have already said) is of all
+things the principal.    But, though both labour and rest are
+necessary, yet the latter is preferable to the first; and by all means
+we ought to learn what we should do when at rest:  for we ought not to
+employ that time at play; for then play would be the necessary
+business of our lives. But if this cannot be, play is more necessary
+for those who labour than those who are at rest: for he who labours
+requires relaxation; which play will supply: for as labour is attended
+with  pain  and   continued  exertion, it is necessary that play
+should be introduced, under proper regulations, as a medicine: for
+such an employment of the mind is a relaxation to it, and eases with
+pleasure. [1338a] Now rest itself seems to partake of pleasure, of
+happiness, and an agreeable life:   but this cannot be theirs who
+labour, but theirs who are at rest;  for he who labours, labours for
+the sake of some end which he has not:  but happiness is an end which
+all persons think is attended with pleasure and not with pain:  but
+all persons do not agree in making this pleasure consist in the same
+thing; for each one has his particular standard, correspondent to his
+own habits; but the best man proposes the best pleasure, and that
+which arises from the noblest actions. But it is evident, that to live
+a life of rest there are some things which a man must learn and be
+instructed in; and that the object of this learning and this
+instruction centres in their acquisition:   but the learning and
+instruction which is given for labour has for its object other things;
+for which reason the ancients made music a part of education; not as a
+thing necessary, for it is not of that nature, nor as a thing useful,
+as reading, in the common course of life, or for managing of a family,
+or for learning anything as useful in public life. Painting also seems
+useful to enable a man to judge more accurately of the productions of
+the finer arts: nor is it like the gymnastic exercises, which
+contribute to health and strength; for neither of these things do we
+see produced by music; there remains for it then to be the employment
+of our rest, which they had in view who introduced it; and, thinking
+it a proper employment for freemen, to them they allotted it; as Homer
+sings:
+
+   "How right to call Thalia to the feast:" and of some others he
+says:
+
+   "The bard was call'd, to ravish every ear:"
+
+and, in another place, he makes Ulysses say the happiest part of man's
+life is
+
+   "When at the festal board, in order plac'd, They hear the song."
+
+It is evident, then, that there is a certain education in which a
+child may be instructed, not as useful nor as necessary, but as noble
+and liberal: but whether this is one or more than one, and of what
+sort they are, and how to be taught, shall be considered hereafter: we
+are now got so far on our way as to show that we have the testimony of
+the ancients in our favour, by what they have delivered down upon
+education--for music makes this plain. Moreover, it is necessary to
+instruct children in what is useful, not only on account of its being
+useful in itself, as, for instance, to learn to read, but also as the
+means of acquiring other different sorts of instruction: thus they
+should be instructed in painting, not only to prevent their being
+mistaken in purchasing pictures, or in buying or selling of vases, but
+rather as it makes [1338b] them judges of the beauties of the human
+form; for to be always hunting after the profitable ill agrees with
+great and freeborn souls. As it is evident whether a boy should be
+first taught morals or reasoning, and whether his body or his
+understanding should be first cultivated, it is plain that boys should
+be first put under the care of the different masters of the gymnastic
+arts, both to form their bodies and teach them their exercises.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+Now those states which seem to take the greatest care of their
+children's education, bestow their chief attention on wrestling,
+though it both prevents the increase of the body and hurts the form of
+it. This fault the Lacedaemonians did not fall into, for they made
+their children fierce by painful labour, as chiefly useful to inspire
+them with courage: though, as we have already often said, this is
+neither the only thing nor the principal thing necessary to attend to;
+and even with respect to this they may not thus attain their end; for
+we do not find either in other animals, or other nations, that courage
+necessarily attends the most cruel, but rather the milder, and those
+who have the dispositions of lions: for there are many people who are
+eager both to kill men and to devour human flesh, as the Achaeans and
+Heniochi in Pontus, and many others in Asia, some of whom are as bad,
+others worse than these, who indeed live by tyranny, but are men of no
+courage. Nay, we know that the Lacedaemonians themselves, while they
+continued those painful labours, and were superior to all others
+(though now they are inferior to many, both in war and gymnastic
+exercises), did not acquire their superiority by training their youth
+to these exercises, but because those who were disciplined opposed
+those who were not disciplined at all. What is fair and honourable
+ought then to take place in education of what is fierce and cruel: for
+it is not a wolf, nor any other wild beast, which will brave any noble
+danger, but rather a good man. So that those who permit boys to engage
+too earnestly in these exercises, while they do not take care to
+instruct them in what is necessary to do, to speak the real truth,
+render them mean and vile, accomplished only in one duty of a citizen,
+and in every other respect, as reason evinces, good for nothing. Nor
+should we form our judgments from past events, but from what we see at
+present: for now they have rivals in their mode of education, whereas
+formerly they had not. That gymnastic exercises are useful, and in
+what manner, is admitted; for during youth it is very proper to go
+through a course of those which are most gentle, omitting that violent
+diet and those painful exercises which are prescribed as necessary;
+that they may not prevent the growth of the body: and it is no small
+proof that they have this effect, that amongst the Olympic candidates
+we can scarce find two or three who have gained a victory both when
+boys and men: because the necessary exercises they went through when
+young deprived them of their strength. When they have allotted three
+years from the time of puberty to other parts of education, they are
+then of a proper age to submit to labour and a regulated diet; for it
+is impossible for the mind and body both to labour at the same time,
+as they are productive of contrary evils to each other; the labour of
+the body preventing the progress of the mind, and the mind of the
+body.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+With respect to music we have already spoken a little in a doubtful
+manner upon this subject. It will be proper to go over again more
+particularly what we then said, which may serve as an introduction to
+what any other person may choose to offer thereon; for it is no easy
+matter to distinctly point out what power it has, nor on what accounts
+one should apply it, whether as an amusement and refreshment, as sleep
+or wine; as these are nothing serious, but pleasing, and the killers
+of care, as Euripides says; for which reason they class in the same
+order and use for the same purpose all these, namely, sleep, wine, and
+music, to which some add dancing; or shall we rather suppose that
+music tends to be productive of virtue, having a power, as the
+gymnastic exercises have to form the body in a certain way, to
+influence the manners so as to accustom its professors to rejoice
+rightly? or shall we say, that it is of any service in the conduct of
+life, and an assistant to prudence? for this also is a third property
+which has been attributed to it. Now that boys are not to be
+instructed in it as play is evident; for those who learn don't play,
+for to learn is rather troublesome; neither is it proper to permit
+boys at their age to enjoy perfect leisure; for to cease to improve is
+by no means fit for what is as yet imperfect; but it may be thought
+that the earnest attention of boys in this art is for the sake of that
+amusement they will enjoy when they come to be men and completely
+formed; but, if this is the case, why are they themselves to learn it,
+and not follow the practice of the kings of the Medes and Persians,
+who enjoy the pleasure of music by hearing others play, and being
+shown its beauties by them; for of necessity those must be better
+skilled therein who make this science their particular study and
+business, than those who have only spent so much time at it as was
+sufficient just to learn the principles of it. But if this is a reason
+for a child's being taught anything, they ought also to learn the art
+of cookery, but this is absurd. The same doubt occurs if music has a
+power of improving the manners; for why should they on this account
+themselves learn it, and not reap every advantage of regulating the
+passions or forming a judgment [1339b] on the merits of the
+performance by hearing others, as the Lacedaemonians; for they,
+without having ever learnt music, are yet able to judge accurately
+what is good and what is bad; the same reasoning may be applied if
+music is supposed to be the amusement of those who live an elegant and
+easy life, why should they learn themselves, and not rather enjoy the
+benefit of others' skill. Let us here consider what is our belief of
+the immortal gods in this particular. Now we find the poets never
+represent Jupiter himself as singing and playing; nay, we ourselves
+treat the professors of these arts as mean people, and say that no one
+would practise them but a drunkard or a buffoon. But probably we may
+consider this subject more at large hereafter. The first question is,
+whether music is or is not to make a part of education? and of those
+three things which have been assigned as its proper employment, which
+is the right? Is it to instruct, to amuse, or to employ the vacant
+hours of those who live at rest? or may not all three be properly
+allotted to it? for it appears to partake of them all; for play is
+necessary for relaxation, and relaxation pleasant, as it is a medicine
+for that uneasiness which arises from labour. It is admitted also that
+a happy life must be an honourable one, and a pleasant one too, since
+happiness consists in both these; and we all agree that music is one
+of the most pleasing things, whether alone or accompanied with a
+voice; as Musseus says, "Music's the sweetest joy of man;" for which
+reason it is justly admitted into every company and every happy life,
+as having the power of inspiring joy. So that from this any one may
+suppose that it is necessary to instruct young persons in it; for all
+those pleasures which are harmless are not only conducive to the final
+end of life, but serve also as relaxations; and, as men are but rarely
+in the attainment of that final end, they often cease from their
+labour and apply to amusement, with no further view than to acquire
+the pleasure attending it. It is therefore useful to enjoy such
+pleasures as these. There are some persons who make play and amusement
+their end, and probably that end has some pleasure annexed to it, but
+not what should be; but while men seek the one they accept the other
+for it; because there is some likeness in human actions to the end;
+for the end is pursued for the sake of nothing else that attends it;
+but for itself only; and pleasures like these are sought for, not on
+account of what follows them, but on account of what has gone before
+them, as labour and grief; for which reason they seek for happiness in
+these sort of pleasures; and that this is the reason any one may
+easily perceive. That music should be pursued, not on this account
+only, but also as it is very serviceable during the hours of
+relaxation from labour, probably no [1340a] one doubts; we should also
+inquire whether besides this use it may not also have another of
+nobler nature--and we ought not only to partake of the common pleasure
+arising from it (which all have the sensation of, for music naturally
+gives pleasure, therefore the use of it is agreeable to all ages and
+all dispositions); but also to examine if it tends anything to improve
+our manners and our souls. And this will be easily known if we feel
+our dispositions any way influenced thereby; and that they are so is
+evident from many other instances, as well as the music at the Olympic
+games; and this confessedly fills the soul with enthusiasm; but
+enthusiasm is an affection of the soul which strongly agitates the
+disposition. Besides, all those who hear any imitations sympathise
+therewith; and this when they are conveyed even without rhythm or
+verse. Moreover, as music is one of those things which are pleasant,
+and as virtue itself consists in rightly enjoying, loving, and hating,
+it is evident that we ought not to learn or accustom ourselves to
+anything so much as to judge right and rejoice in honourable manners
+and noble actions. But anger and mildness, courage and modesty, and
+their contraries, as well as all other dispositions of the mind, are
+most naturally imitated by music and poetry; which is plain by
+experience, for when we hear these our very soul is altered; and he
+who is affected either with joy or grief by the imitation of any
+objects, is in very nearly the same situation as if he was affected by
+the objects themselves; thus, if any person is pleased with seeing a
+statue of any one on no other account but its beauty, it is evident
+that the sight of the original from whence it was taken would also be
+pleasing; now it happens in the other senses there is no imitation of
+manners; that is to say, in the touch and the taste; in the objects of
+sight, a very little; for these are merely representations of things,
+and the perceptions which they excite are in a manner common to all.
+Besides, statues and paintings are not properly imitations of manners,
+but rather signs and marks which show the body is affected by some
+passion. However, the difference is not great, yet young men ought not
+to view the paintings of Pauso, but of Polygnotus, or any other
+painter or statuary who expresses manners. But in poetry and music
+there are imitations of manners; and this is evident, for different
+harmonies differ from each other so much by nature, that those who
+hear them are differently affected, and are not in the same
+disposition of mind when one is performed as when another is; the one,
+for instance, occasions grief 13406 and contracts the soul, as the
+mixed Lydian: others soften the mind, and as it were dissolve the
+heart: others fix it in a firm and settled state, such is the power of
+the Doric music only; while the Phrygian fills the soul with
+enthusiasm, as has been well described by those who have written
+philosophically upon this part of education; for they bring examples
+of what they advance from the things themselves. The same holds true
+with respect to rhythm; some fix the disposition, others occasion a
+change in it; some act more violently, others more liberally. From
+what has been said it is evident what an influence music has over the
+disposition of the mind, and how variously it can fascinate it: and if
+it can do this, most certainly it is what youth ought to be instructed
+in. And indeed the learning of music is particularly adapted to their
+disposition; for at their time of life they do not willingly attend to
+anything which is not agreeable; but music is naturally one of the
+most agreeable things; and there seems to be a certain connection
+between harmony and rhythm; for which reason some wise men held the
+soul itself to be harmony; others, that it contains it.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+We will now determine whether it is proper that children should be
+taught to sing, and play upon any instrument, which we have before
+made a matter of doubt. Now, it is well known that it makes a great
+deal of difference when you would qualify any one in any art, for the
+person himself to learn the practical part of it; for it is a thing
+very difficult, if not impossible, for a man to be a good judge of
+what he himself cannot do. It is also very necessary that children
+should have some employment which will amuse them; for which reason
+the rattle of Archytas seems well contrived, which they give children
+to play with, to prevent their breaking those things which are about
+the house; for at their age they cannot sit still: this therefore is
+well adapted to infants, as instruction ought to be their rattle as
+they grow up; hence it is evident that they should be so taught music
+as to be able to practise it. Nor is it difficult to say what is
+becoming or unbecoming of their age, or to answer the objections which
+some make to this employment as mean and low. In the first place, it
+is necessary for them to practise, that they may be judges of the art:
+for which reason this should be done when they are young; but when
+they are grown older the practical part may be dropped; while they
+will still continue judges of what is excellent in the art, and take a
+proper pleasure therein, from the knowledge they acquired of it in
+their youth. As to the censure which some persons throw upon music, as
+something mean and low, it is not difficult to answer that, if we will
+but consider how far we propose those who are to be educated so as to
+become good citizens should be instructed in this art, [1341a] and
+what music and what rhythms they should be acquainted with; and also
+what instruments they should play upon; for in these there is probably
+a difference. Such then is the proper answer to that censure: for it
+must be admitted, that in some cases nothing can prevent music being
+attended, to a certain degree, with the bad effects which are ascribed
+to it; it is therefore clear that the learning of it should never
+prevent the business of riper years; nor render the body effeminate,
+and unfit for the business of war or the state; but it should be
+practised by the young, judged of by the old.  That children may learn
+music properly, it is necessary that they should not be employed in
+those parts of it which are the objects of dispute between the masters
+in that science; nor should they perform such pieces as are wondered
+at from the difficulty of their execution; and which, from being first
+exhibited in the public games, are now become a part of education; but
+let them learn so much of it as to be able to receive proper pleasure
+from excellent music and rhythms; and not that only which music must
+make all animals feel, and also slaves and boys, but more. It is
+therefore plain what instruments they should use; thus, they should
+never be taught to play upon the flute, or any other instrument which
+requires great skill, as the harp or the like, but on such as will
+make them good judges of music, or any other instruction: besides, the
+flute is not a moral instrument, but rather one that will inflame the
+passions, and is therefore rather to be used when the soul is to be
+animated than when instruction is intended. Let me add also, that
+there is something therein which is quite contrary to what education
+requires; as the player on the flute is prevented from speaking: for
+which reason our forefathers very properly forbade the use of it to
+youth and freemen, though they themselves at first used it; for when
+their riches procured them greater leisure, they grew more animated in
+the cause of virtue; and both before and after the Median war their
+noble actions so exalted their minds that they attended to every part
+of education; selecting no one in particular, but endeavouring to
+collect the whole: for which reason they introduced the flute also, as
+one of the instruments they were to learn to play on. At Lacedaemon
+the choregus himself played on the flute; and it was so common at
+Athens that almost every freeman understood it, as is evident from the
+tablet which Thrasippus dedicated when he was choregus; but afterwards
+they rejected it as dangerous; having become better judges of what
+tended to promote virtue and what did not. For the same reason many of
+the ancient instruments were thrown aside, as the dulcimer and the
+lyre; as also those which were to inspire those who played on them
+with pleasure, and which required a nice finger and great skill to
+play well on. What the ancients tell us, by way of fable, of the flute
+is indeed very rational; namely, that after Minerva had found it, she
+threw it away: nor are they wrong who say that the goddess disliked it
+for deforming the face of him who played thereon: not but that it is
+more probable that she rejected it as the knowledge thereof
+contributed nothing to the improvement of the mind. Now, we regard
+Minerva as the inventress of arts and sciences. As we disapprove of a
+child's being taught to understand instruments, and to play like a
+master (which we would have confined to those who are candidates for
+the prize in that science; for they play not to improve themselves in
+virtue, but to please those who hear them, and gratify their
+importunity); therefore we think the practice of it unfit for freemen;
+but then it should be confined to those who are paid for doing it; for
+it usually gives people sordid notions, for the end they have in view
+is bad: for the impertinent spectator is accustomed to make them
+change their music; so that the artists who attend to him regulate
+their bodies according to his motions.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+
+We are now to enter into an inquiry concerning harmony and rhythm;
+whether all sorts of these are to be employed in education, or whether
+some peculiar ones are to be selected; and also whether we should give
+the same directions to those who are engaged in music as part of
+education, or whether there is something different from these two.
+Now, as all music consists in melody and rhythm, we ought not to be
+unacquainted with the power which each of these has in education; and
+whether we should rather choose music in which melody prevails, or
+rhythm: but when I consider how many things have been well written
+upon these subjects, not only by some musicians of the present age,
+but also by some philosophers who are perfectly skilled in that part
+of music which belongs to education; we will refer those who desire a
+very particular knowledge therein to those writers, and shall only
+treat of it in general terms, without descending to particulars.
+Melody is divided by some philosophers, whose notions we approve of,
+into moral, practical, and that which fills the mind with enthusiasm:
+they also allot to each of these a particular kind of harmony which
+naturally corresponds therewith: and we say that music should not be
+applied to one purpose only, but many; both for instruction and
+purifying the soul (now I use the word purifying at present without
+any explanation, but shall speak more at large of it in my Poetics);
+and, in the third place, as an agreeable manner of spending the time
+and a relaxation from the uneasiness of the mind. [1342a] It is
+evident that all harmonies are to be used; but not for all purposes;
+but the most moral in education: but to please the ear, when others
+play, the most active and enthusiastic; for that passion which is to
+be found very strong in some souls is to be met with also in all; but
+the difference in different persons consists in its being in a less or
+greater degree, as pity, fear, and enthusiasm also; which latter is so
+powerful in some as to overpower the soul: and yet we see those
+persons, by the application of sacred music to soothe their mind,
+rendered as sedate and composed as if they had employed the art of the
+physician: and this must necessarily happen to the compassionate, the
+fearful, and all those who are subdued by their passions: nay, all
+persons, as far as they are affected with those passions, admit of the
+same cure, and are restored to tranquillity with pleasure. In the same
+manner, all music which has the power of purifying the soul affords a
+harmless pleasure to man. Such, therefore, should be the harmony and
+such the music which those who contend with each other in the theatre
+should exhibit: but as the audience is composed of two sorts of
+people, the free and the well-instructed, the rude the mean mechanics,
+and hired servants, and a long collection of the like, there must be
+some music and some spectacles to please and soothe them; for as their
+minds are as it were perverted from their natural habits, so also is
+there an unnatural harmony, and overcharged music which is
+accommodated to their taste: but what is according to nature gives
+pleasure to every one, therefore those who are to contend upon the
+theatre should be allowed to use this species of music. But in
+education ethic melody and ethic harmony should be used, which is the
+Doric, as we have already said, or any other which those philosophers
+who are skilful in that music which is to be employed in education
+shall approve of. But Socrates, in Plato's Republic, is very wrong
+when he [1342b] permits only the Phrygian music to be used as well as
+the Doric, particularly as amongst other instruments he banishes the
+flute; for the Phrygian music has the same power in harmony as the
+flute has amongst the instruments; for they are both pathetic and
+raise the mind: and this the practice of the poets proves; for in
+their bacchanal songs, or whenever they describe any violent emotions
+of the mind, the flute is the instrument they chiefly use: and the
+Phrygian harmony is most suitable to these subjects. Now, that the
+dithyrambic measure is Phrygian is allowed by general consent; and
+those who are conversant in studies of this sort bring many proofs of
+it; as, for instance, when Philoxenus endeavoured to compose
+dithyrambic music for Doric harmony, he naturally fell back again into
+Phrygian, as being fittest for that purpose; as every one indeed
+agrees, that the Doric music is most serious, and fittest to inspire
+courage: and, as we always commend the middle as being between the two
+extremes, and the Doric has this relation with respect to other
+harmonies, it is evident that is what the youth ought to be instructed
+in. There are two things to be taken into consideration, both what is
+possible and what is proper; every one then should chiefly endeavour
+to attain those things which contain both these qualities: but this is
+to be regulated by different times of life; for instance, it is not
+easy for those who are advanced in years to sing such pieces of music
+as require very high notes, for nature points out to them those which
+are gentle and require little strength of voice (for which reason some
+who are skilful in music justly find fault with Socrates for
+forbidding the youth to be instructed in gentle harmony; as if, like
+wine, it would make them drunk, whereas the effect of that is to
+render men bacchanals, and not make them languid): these therefore are
+what should employ those who are grown old. Moreover, if there is any
+harmony which is proper for a child's age, as being at the same time
+elegant and instructive, as the Lydian of all others seems chiefly to
+be-These then are as it were the three boundaries of education,
+moderation, possibility, and decorum.
+
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+ACHILLES, 76
+
+Act of the city, what, 69
+
+Actions, their original spring, i
+
+Administration, 76; 
+    whether to be shared by the whole community, 203
+
+AEsumnetes, 96
+
+AEthiopia, in what manner the power of the state is there regulated, 112
+
+Alterations in government, whence they arise, 142; 
+    what they are, 143
+
+Ambractia, the government of, changed, 151
+
+Andromadas Reginus, a lawgiver to the Thracian Calcidians, 65
+
+Animals, their different provisions by nature, 14; 
+    intended by nature for the benefit of man, 14; 
+    what constitutes their different species, 113
+
+Animals, tame, why better than wild, 8
+
+Arbitrator and judge, their difference, 49
+
+Architas his rattle, 248
+
+Areopagus, senate of, 63
+
+Argonauts refuse to take Hercules with them, 93
+
+Aristocracies, causes of commotions in them, 157; 
+    chief cause of their alteration, 158; 
+    may degenerate into an oligarchy, 79
+
+Aristocracy, what, 78; 
+    treated of, 120; 
+    its object, 121
+
+Art, works of, which most excellent, 20
+
+Artificers and slaves, their difference, 24
+
+Assemblies, public, advantageous to a democracy, 134
+
+Assembly, public, its proper business, 133
+
+Athens, different dispositions of the citizens of, 149
+
+Barter, its original, 15
+
+Being, what the nature of every one is, 3
+
+Beings, why some command, others obey, 2
+
+Body by nature to be governed, 8; 
+    requires our care before the soul, 232
+
+Calchis, the government of, changed, 151
+
+Calcidians, 65
+
+Carthaginian government described, 60
+
+Census in a free state should be as extensive as possible, 131; 
+    how to be altered, 162
+
+Charondas supposed to be the scholar of Zaleucus, 64
+
+Child, how to be managed when first born, 235; 
+    should be taught nothing till he is five years old, 235; 
+    how then to be educated, 236
+
+Children, the proper government of, 22; 
+    what their proper virtues, 23;
+    what they are usually taught, 240
+
+Cities, how governed at first, 3; 
+    what, 3; 
+    the work of nature, 3; 
+    prior in contemplation to a family, or an individual, 4
+
+Citizen, who is one? 66, 68; 
+    should know both how to command and obey, 73
+
+Citizens must have some things in common, 26; 
+    should be exempted from servile labour, 51; 
+    privileges different in different governments, 68;
+    if illegally made, whether illegal, 69; 
+    who admitted to be, 75; 
+    in the best states ought not to follow merchandise, 216
+
+City, may be too much one, 27, 35; 
+    what, 66, 82; 
+    when it continues the same, 70; 
+    for whose sake established, 76; 
+    its end, 83; 
+    of what parts made up, 113; 
+    best composed of equals, 126
+
+City of the best form, what its establishment ought to be, 149; 
+    wherein its greatness consists, 149; 
+    may be either too large or too small, 209;
+    what should be its situation, 211; 
+    whether proper near the sea, 211;
+    ought to be divided by families into different sorts of men, 218
+
+City and confederacy, their difference, 37; 
+    wherein it should be one, 27
+
+Command amongst equals should be in rotation, 101
+
+Common meals not well established at Lacedaemon-well at Crete, 56; 
+    the model from whence the Lacedaemonian was taken, 56; 
+    inferior to it in some respects, 56
+
+Community, its recommendations deceitful, 34; 
+    into what people it may be divided, 194
+
+Community of children, 29, 30; 
+    inconveniences attending it, 31
+
+Community of goods, its inconveniences, 28; 
+    destructive of modesty and liberality, 34
+
+Community of wives, its inconveniences, 27
+
+Contempt a cause of sedition, 146
+
+Courage of a man different from a woman's, 74
+
+Courts, how many there ought to be, 140
+
+Courts of justice should be few in a small state, 192
+
+Cretan customs similar to the Lacedasmonian, 57; 
+    assembly open to every citizen, 58
+
+Cretans, their power, 58; 
+    their public meals, how conducted 58
+
+Crete, the government of, 57; 
+    description of the island of 57
+
+Customs at Carthage, Lacedse-mon, and amongst the Scythians and
+Iberians, concerning those who had killed an enemy, 204, 205
+
+Dadalus's statues, 6.
+
+Delphos, an account of a sedition there, 150
+
+Demagogues, their influence in a democracy, 116.
+
+Democracies, arose out of tyrannies, 100; 
+    whence they arose, 142; 
+    when changed into tyrannies, 153; 
+    their different sorts, 184, 188; 
+    general rules for their establishment, 185; 
+    should not be made too perfect, 191
+
+Democracy, what, 79, 80; 
+    its definition, 112, 113; 
+    different sorts of, 115, 118; 
+    its object, 122; 
+    how subverted in the Isle of Cos, 152
+
+Democracy and aristocracy, how they may be blended together, 163
+
+Democratical state, its foundation, 184
+
+Despotic power absurd, 205
+
+Dion, his noble resolution, 171
+
+Dionysius, his taxes, 175
+
+Dissolution of kingdoms and tyrannies, 169
+
+Domestic employments of men and women different, 74
+
+Domestic government, its object, 77
+
+Domestic society the first, 3
+
+Draco, 65
+
+Dyrrachium, government of, 101
+
+Economy and money-getting, difference, 17
+
+Education necessary for the happiness of the city, 90; 
+    of all things most necessary to preserve the state, 166; 
+    what it ought to be, 166;
+    the objects of it, 228, 229; 
+    should be taken care of by the magistrate, and correspond to 
+        the nature of government, 238; 
+    should be a common care, and regulated by laws, 238
+
+Employment, one to be allotted to one person in an extensive government, 136
+
+Employments in the state, how to be disposed of, 88-90; 
+    whether all should be open to all, 216
+
+Ephialtes abridges the power of the senate of Areopagus, 63
+
+Ephori, at Sparta, their power too great, 54; 
+    improperly chosen, 54;
+    flattered by their kings, 54; 
+    the supreme judges, 55; 
+    manner of life too indulgent, 55
+
+Epidamnus, an account of a revolution there, 150
+
+Equality, how twofold, 143; 
+    in a democracy, how to be procured, 186
+
+Euripides quoted, 72
+
+Family government, of what it consists, 5
+
+Father should not be too young, 232
+
+Females and slaves, wherein they differ, 2; 
+    why upon a level amongst barbarians, 3
+
+Forfeitures, how to be applied, 192
+
+Fortune improper pretension for power, 91
+
+Freemen in general, what power they ought to have, 86
+
+Free state treated of, 121; 
+    how it arises out of a democracy and oligarchy, 122, 123
+
+Friendship weakened by a community of children, 31
+
+General, the office of, how to be disposed of, 98
+
+Gods, why supposed subject to kingly government, 3
+
+Good, relative to man, how divided, 201
+
+Good and evil, the perception of, necessary to form a family and a city, 4
+
+Good fortune something different from happiness, 202
+
+Government should continue as much as possible in the same hands, 28; 
+    in what manner it should be in rotation, 28; 
+    what, 66; 
+    which best, of a good man or good laws, 98; 
+    good, to what it should owe its preservation, 124; 
+    what the best, 225
+
+Government of the master over the slave sometimes reciprocally useful, ii
+
+Governments, how different from each other, 67; 
+    whether more than one form should be established, 76; 
+    should endeavour to prevent others from being too powerful--
+    instances of it, 93; 
+    how compared to music, in; 
+    in general, to what they owe their preservation, 160
+
+Governments, political, regal, family, and servile, their difference
+from each other, i
+
+Governors and governed, whether their virtues are the same or different, 23; 
+    whether they should be the same persons or different, 227
+
+Grecians, their superiority over other people, 213
+
+Guards of a king natives, 96,168; 
+    of a tyrant foreigners, 96, 168
+
+Gymnastic exercises, when to be performed, 223; 
+    how far they should be made a part of education, 242, 243
+
+Happiness, wherein it consists, 207
+
+Happy life, where most likely to be found, 202
+
+Harmony, whether all kinds of it are to be used in education, 251
+
+Helots troublesome to the Lacedaemonians, 87
+
+Herdsmen compose the second-best democracy, 189
+
+Hippodamus, an account of, 46; 
+    his plan of government, 46, 47: 
+    objected to, 47, 48
+
+Homer quoted, 95, 116
+
+Honours, an inequality of, occasions seditions, 44
+
+Horse most suitable to an oligarchy, 195
+
+Houses, private, their best form, 221
+
+Human flesh devoured by some nations, 242
+
+Husbandmen compose the best democracy, 189; 
+    will choose to govern according to law, 118
+
+Husbandry, art of, whether part of money-getting, 13
+
+Instruments, their difference from each other, 6; 
+    wherein they differ from possessions, 6
+
+Italy, its ancient boundary, 218
+
+Jason's declaration, 72
+
+Judge should not act as an arbitrator, 48, 49; 
+    which is best for an individual, or the people in general, 98, 99
+
+Judges, many better than one, 102; 
+    of whom to consist, 102;  
+    how many different sorts are necessary, 141
+
+Judicial part of government, how to be divided, 140
+
+Jurymen, particular powers sometimes appointed to that office, 68
+
+Justice, what, 88; 
+    the course of, impeded in Crete, 59; 
+    different in different situations, 74
+
+King, from whom to be chosen 60; 
+    the guardian of his people 168
+
+King's children, what to be done with, 100
+
+King's power, what it should be 100; 
+    when unequal, 143
+
+Kingdom, what, 78 
+
+Kingdoms, their object, 167;
+    how bestowed, 168; 
+    causes of their dissolution, 173; 
+    how preserved, 173
+
+Kingly government in the heroic times, what, 96
+
+Kingly power regulated by the laws at Sparta in peace, 95; 
+    absolute in war, 95
+
+Kings formerly in Crete, 58; 
+    their power afterwards devolved to the kosmoi, 58; 
+    method of electing them at Carthage, 60
+
+Knowledge of the master and slave different from each other, ii
+
+Kosmoi, the power of, 58; 
+    their number, 58; 
+    wherein inferior to the ephori, 58; 
+    allowed to resign their office before their time is elapsed, 59
+
+Lacedamonian customs similar to the Cretan, 57
+
+Lacedaemonian government much esteemed, 41; 
+    the faults of it, 53-56;
+    calculated only for war, 56; 
+    how composed of a democracy and oligarchy, 124
+
+Lacedaemonian revenue badly raised, 56, 57
+
+Lacedaemonians, wherein they admit things to be common, 33
+
+Land should be divided into two parts, 219
+
+Law makes one man a slave, another free, 6; 
+    whether just or not, 9;
+    at Thebes respecting tradesmen, 75; 
+    nothing should be done contrary to it, 160
+
+Law and government, their difference, 107, 108 
+
+Laws, when advantageous
+to alter them, 49,50, 52; 
+    of every state will be like the state, 88;
+    whom they should be calculated for, 92; 
+    decide better than men, 101;
+    moral preferable to written, 102; 
+    must sometimes bend to ancient customs, 117; 
+    should be framed to the state, 107; 
+    the same suit not all governments, 108
+
+Legislator ought to know not only what is best, but what is practical, n
+
+Legislators should fix a proper medium in property, 46
+
+Liberty, wherein it partly consists, 184, 185
+
+Life, happy, owing to a course of virtue, 125; 
+    how divided, 228
+
+Locrians forbid men to sell their property, 43
+
+Lycophron's account of law, 82
+
+Lycurgus gave over reducing the women to obedience, 53; 
+    made it infamous for any one to sell his possessions, 53; 
+    some of his laws censured, 54;
+    spent much time at Crete, 57; 
+    supposed to be the scholar of Thales, 64
+
+Lysander wanted to abolish the kingly power in Sparta, 143
+
+Magistrate, to whom that name is properly given, 136
+
+Magistrates, when they make the state incline to an oligarchy, 61; 
+    when to an aristocracy, 61; 
+    at Athens, from whom to be chosen, 64; 
+    to determine those causes which the law cannot be applied to, 88; 
+    whether their power is to be the same, or different 
+        in different communities, 137; 
+    how they differ from each other, 138; 
+        in those who appoint them, 138; 
+    should be continued but a short time in democracies, 161; 
+    how to be chosen in a democracy, 185; 
+    different sorts and employments, 196
+
+Making and using, their difference, 6
+
+Malienses, their form of government, 131
+
+Man proved to be a political animal, 4; 
+    has alone a perception of good and evil, 4; 
+    without law and justice the worst of beings, 5
+
+Master, power of, whence it arises, as some think, 5
+
+Matrimony, when to be engaged in, 232
+
+Meals, common, established in Crete and Italy, 218; 
+    expense of, should be defrayed by the whole state, 219
+
+Mechanic employments useful for citizens, 73
+
+Mechanics, whether they should be allowed to be citizens, 74, 75; 
+    cannot acquire the practice of virtue, 75; 
+    admitted to be citizens in an oligarchy, 75
+
+Medium of circumstances best, 126
+
+Members of the community, their different pretences to the employments
+of the state, 90; 
+    what natural dispositions they ought to be of, 213
+
+Men, some distinguished by nature for governors, others to be governed, 7; 
+    their different modes of living, 13; 
+    worthy three ways, 226
+
+Merchandise, three different ways of carrying it on, 20
+
+Middle rank of men make the best citizens, 127; 
+    most conducive to the preservation of the state, 128; 
+    should be particularly attended to by the legislators, 130
+
+Military, how divided, 194
+
+Mitylene, an account of a dispute there, 150
+
+Monarch, absolute, 100
+
+Monarchies, their nature, 95, 96; 
+    sometimes elective, 95; 
+    sometimes hereditary, 95; 
+    whence they sometimes arise, 146; 
+    causes of corruption in them, 167; 
+    how preserved, 173
+
+Money, how it made its way into commerce, 16; 
+    first weighed, 16;
+    afterwards stamped, 16; 
+    its value dependent on agreement, 16; 
+    how gained by exchange, 19
+
+Money - getting considered at large, 17, 18
+
+Monopolising gainful, 21; sometimes practised by cities, 21
+
+Monopoly of iron in Sicily, a remarkable instance of the profit of it, 21
+
+Music, how many species of it, in; 
+    why a part of education, 240; 
+    how far it should be taught, 242, 243; 
+    professors of it considered as mean people, 244; 
+    imitates the disposition of the mind, 246; 
+    improves our manners, 246; 
+    Lydian, softens the mind, 247; 
+    pieces of, difficult in their execution, not to be taught to children, 249
+
+Nature requires equality amongst equals, 101
+
+Naval power should be regulated by the strength of the city, 212
+
+Necessary parts of a city, what, 215
+
+Nobles, the difference between them, no; 
+    should take care of the poor, 193
+
+Oath, an improper one in an oligarchy, 166
+
+Officers of state, who they ought to be, 135; 
+    how long to continue, 135;
+    who to choose them, 136
+
+Offices, distinction between them, 67; 
+    when subversive of the rights of the people, 130
+
+Offspring, an instance of the likeness of, to the sire, 30
+
+Oligarchies arise where the strength of the state consists in horse, no;
+    whence they arose, 142
+
+Oligarchy admits not hired servants to be citizens, 75; 
+    its object, 79;
+    what, 79, 81; 
+    its definition, 112; 
+    different sorts of, 117, 119; 
+    its object, 122; 
+    how it ought to be founded, 195
+
+Onomacritus supposed to have drawn up laws, 64
+
+Ostracism, why established, 93, 146; 
+    its power, 93; 
+    a weapon in the hand of sedition, 94
+
+Painting, why it should be made a part of education, 241
+
+Particulars, five, in which the rights of the people will be undermined, 130
+
+Pausanias wanted to abolish the ephori, 143
+
+People, how they should be made one, 35; 
+    of Athens assume upon their victory over the Medes, 64; 
+    what best to submit to a kingly government, 104; 
+    to an aristocratic, 104; 
+    to a free state, 104; 
+    should be allowed the power of pardoning, not of condemning, 135
+
+Periander's advice to Thrasy-bulus, 93, 169
+
+Pericles introduces the paying of those who attended the court of justice, 64
+
+Philolaus, a Theban legislator, quits his native country, 64
+
+Phocea, an account of a dispute there, 150
+
+Physician, his business, 86
+
+Physicians, their mode of practice in Egypt, 98; 
+    when ill consult others, 102
+
+Pittacus, 65
+
+Plato censured, 180
+
+Poor excused from bearing arms and from gymnastic exercises in 
+an oligarchy, 131; 
+    paid for attending the public assemblies in a democracy, 131
+
+Power of the master, its object, 77
+
+Power, supreme, where it ought to be lodged, 84; 
+    why with the many, 85, 87
+
+Powers of a state, different methods of delegating them to the citizens, 
+132-134
+
+Preadvisers, court of, 135
+
+Priesthood, to whom to be allotted, 217
+
+Prisoners of war, whether they may be justly made slaves, 9
+
+Private property not regulated the source of sedition, 42; 
+    Phaleas would have it equal, 42; 
+    how Phaleas would correct the irregularities of it, 43; 
+    Plato would allow a certain difference in it, 43
+
+Property, its nature, 12; 
+    how it should be regulated, 32, 33; 
+    the advantages of having it private, 34; 
+    what quantity the public ought to have, 44; 
+    ought not to be common, 219
+
+Public assemblies, when subversive of the liberties of the people, 130
+
+Public money, how to be divided, 193
+
+Qualifications necessary for those who are to fill the first departments
+in government, 164
+
+Quality of a city, what meant by it, 129
+
+Quantity, 129
+
+Rest and peace the proper objects of the legislator, 230
+
+Revolutions in a democracy, whence they arise, 152; 
+    in an oligarchy, 156
+
+Rich fined in an oligarchy for not bearing arms and attending the
+gymnastic exercises, 131; 
+    receive nothing for attending the public assemblies in a democracy, 131
+
+Rights of a citizen, whether advantageous or not, 203
+
+Seditions sometimes prevented by equality, 45; 
+    their causes, 144-146;
+    how to be prevented, 163
+
+Senate suits a democracy, 185
+
+Shepherds compose the second-best democracy, 189
+
+Slave, his nature and use, 6; 
+    a chattel, 7; 
+    by law, how, 9
+
+Slavery not founded in nature but law, as some think, 6
+
+Slaves, an inquiry into the virtues they are capable of, 23; 
+    difficult to manage properly, 51; 
+    their different sorts, 73
+
+Society necessary to man, 77
+
+Society, civil, the greatest blessing to man, 4; 
+    different from a commercial intercourse, 82
+
+Socrates, his mistakes on government, Book II. passim; 
+    his division of the inhabitants, 38; 
+    would have the women go to war, 38; 
+    Aristotle's opinion of his discourses, 38; 
+    his city would require a country of immeasurable extent, 39; 
+    his comparison of the human species to different kinds of metals, 40; 
+    his account of the different orders of men in a city imperfect, 3
+
+Sojourners, their situation, 66
+
+Solon's opinion of riches, 14; 
+    law for restraining property, 43; 
+    alters the Athenian government, 63
+
+Soul by nature the governor over the body, and in what manner, 8; 
+    of man how divided, 228, 231
+
+Speech a proof that man was formed for society, 4
+
+State, each, consists of a great number of parts, 109; 
+    its disproportionate increase the cause of revolutions, 147; 
+    firm, what, 159
+
+Stealing, how to be prevented, 44
+
+Submission to government, when it is slavery, 206
+
+Supreme power should be ultimately vested in the laws, 101
+
+Syracuse, the government of, languid, 151
+
+Temperance in a man different from a woman, 74
+
+Temples, how to be built, 223
+
+Thales, his contrivance to get money, 21; 
+    supposed to be the companion of Onomacritus, 64
+
+Things necessary to be known for the management of domestic affairs, 19, 20; 
+    necessary in the position of a city, 220
+
+Tribunals, what different things they should have under their
+jurisdictions, 137
+
+Tyrannies, how established, 168; 
+    how preserved, 174, 176;
+    of short duration, 180; 
+    instances thereof, 180
+
+Tyranny, what, 79; 
+    not natural, 103; 
+    whence it arises, 108; 
+    treated of, 124; 
+    contains all that is bad in all governments, 125
+
+Tyrant, from whom usually chosen, 167; 
+    his object, 168; 
+    his guards, 168
+
+Tyrants, many of them originally enjoyed only kingly power, 168; 
+    the causes of their being conspired against, 169, 170; 
+    always love the worst of men, 175
+
+Uses of possessions, two, 15 
+
+Usury detested, 19
+
+Venality to be guarded against, IDS
+
+Village, what, 3
+
+Virtue of a citizen has reference to the state, 71; 
+    different in different governments, 71
+
+Virtues different in different persons, 23, 24; 
+    whether the same constitute a good man and a valuable citizen, 71
+
+Walls necessary for a city, 222
+
+War, what is gained by it in some degree a natural acquisition, 14; 
+    not a final end, 205, 229
+
+Wife, the proper government of, 22
+
+Women, what their proper virtue, 23; 
+    not to be indulged in improper liberties, 52; 
+    had great influence at Lacedaemon, 52; 
+    of great disservice to the Lacedemonians, 52; 
+    why indulged by them, 53; 
+    their proper time of marrying, 233; 
+    how to be managed when with child, 234
+
+Zaleucus, legislator of the Western Locrians, 64; 
+    supposed to be the scholar of Thales, 64
+
+
+
+
+
+
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