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diff --git a/old/67318-0.txt b/old/67318-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 58a36f7..0000000 --- a/old/67318-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,22763 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the War in the Peninsula, -vol. 1 of 6., by Maj-Gen Sir W.F.P. Napier - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: History of the War in the Peninsula, vol. 1 of 6. - History of the War in the Peninsula and the South of France from - the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1 of 6 - -Author: Maj-Gen Sir W.F.P. Napier - -Release Date: February 4, 2022 [eBook #67318] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA, VOL. 1 OF 6. *** - - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. - - A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example Oct^r or 26^{th}. - - When indicating an underline, a horizontal parenthesis symbol is - denoted by several equal signs =====. - - Omitted text is indicated by three asterisks, * * *. - - Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been - placed at the end of the book. - - All changes noted in the CORRIGENDA have been applied to the etext. - - With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings - of place names have not been changed. - - The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font. - - The LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS was created by the transcriber and has been - placed in the public domain. - - Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - WAR IN THE PENINSULA - - AND IN THE - - SOUTH OF FRANCE, - - FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. - - BY - - W. F. P. NAPIER, C. B. - - LT. COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT. - - VOL. I. - - LONDON: - JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET. - - MDCCCXXVIII. - - - - - TO - - FIELD-MARSHAL - - THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. - - This History I dedicate to your Grace, because I have served long - enough under your command to feel, why the Soldiers of the Tenth - Legion were attached to Cæsar. - - W. F. P. NAPIER. - - - - -PREFACE. - - -For six years the Peninsula was devastated by the war of -independence. The blood of France, Germany, England, Portugal, and -Spain, was shed in the contest; and in each of those countries, -authors, desirous of recording the sufferings, or celebrating the -valour of their countrymen, have written largely touching that -fierce struggle. It may therefore happen that some will demand, why -I should again relate “a thrice-told tale?” I answer, that two men -observing the same object, will describe it diversely, following -the point of view from which either beholds it. That which in the -eyes of one is a fair prospect, to the other shall appear a barren -waste, and yet neither may see aright! Wherefore, truth being the -legitimate object of history, I hold it better that she should be -sought for by many than by few, lest, for want of seekers, amongst -the mists of prejudice and the false lights of interest, she be -lost altogether. - -That much injustice has been done, and much justice left undone, -by those authors who have hitherto written concerning this war, I -can assert from personal knowledge of the facts. That I have been -able to remedy this without falling into similar errors, is more -than I will venture to assume; but I have endeavoured to render -as impartial an account of the campaigns in the Peninsula as the -feelings which must warp the judgment of a contemporary historian -will permit. - -I was an eye-witness to many of the transactions that I relate; and -a wide acquaintance with military men has enabled me to consult -distinguished officers, both French and English, and to correct -my own recollections and opinions by their superior knowledge. -Thus assisted, I was encouraged to undertake the work, and I offer -it to the world with the less fear because it contains original -documents, which will suffice to give it interest, although it -should have no other merit. Many of those documents I owe to the -liberality of marshal Soult, who, disdaining national prejudices, -with the confidence of a great mind, placed them at my disposal, -without even a remark to check the freedom of my pen. I take this -opportunity to declare that respect which I believe every British -officer who has had the honour to serve against him feels for his -military talents. By those talents the French cause in Spain was -long upheld, and after the battle of Salamanca, if his counsel had -been followed by the intrusive monarch, the fate of the war might -have been changed. - -Military operations are so dependent upon accidental circumstances, -that to justify censure it should always be shown that an -unsuccessful general has violated the received maxims and -established principles of war. By that rule I have been guided; but -to preserve the narratives unbroken, my own observations are placed -at the end of certain transactions of magnitude, where their real -source being known they will pass for as much as they are worth, -and no more: when they are not well supported by argument, I freely -surrender them to the judgment of abler men. - -Of those transactions which, commencing with “the secret treaty of -Fontainebleau” ended with “the Assembly of Notables” at Bayonne, -little is known except through the exculpatory and contradictory -publications of men interested to conceal the truth; and to me it -appears that the passions of the present generation must subside, -and the ultimate fate of Spain be known, before that part of the -subject can be justly and usefully handled. I have, therefore, -related no more of those political affairs than would suffice to -introduce the military events that followed, neither have I treated -largely of the disjointed and ineffectual operations of the native -armies; for I cared not to swell my work with apocryphal matter, -and neglected the thousand narrow winding currents of Spanish -warfare; to follow that mighty stream of battle which, bearing the -glory of England in its course, burst the barriers of the Pyrenees, -and left deep traces of its fury in the soil of France. - -The Spaniards have boldly asserted, and the world has believed, -that the deliverance of the Peninsula was the work of their hands: -this assertion so contrary to the truth I combat. It is unjust to -the fame of the British general, injurious to the glory of the -British arms. Military virtue is not the growth of a day, nor is -there any nation so rich and populous, that, despising it, can rest -secure. The imbecility of Charles IV., the vileness of Ferdinand, -and the corruption of Godoy, were undoubtedly the proximate causes -of the calamities that overwhelmed Spain; but the primary cause, -that which belongs to history, was the despotism arising from the -union of a superstitious court and a sanguinary priesthood, which, -repressing knowledge and contracting the public mind, sapped the -foundation of all military as well as civil virtues, and prepared -the way for invasion. No foreign potentate would have attempted to -steal into the fortresses of a great kingdom, if the prying eyes, -and the thousand clamorous tongues belonging to a free press, were -ready to expose his projects, and a well-disciplined army present -to avenge the insult; but Spain being destitute of both, was -first circumvented by the wiles, and then ravaged by the arms, of -Napoleon. She was deceived and fettered because the public voice -was stifled, but she was scourged and torn because her military -institutions were decayed. - -From the moment that an English force took the field, the Spaniards -ceased to act as principals in a contest carried on in the heart -of their country, and involving their existence as an independent -nation; they were self-sufficient, and their pride was wounded -by insult; they were superstitious, and their religious feelings -were roused to fanatic fury by an all-powerful clergy, who feared -to lose their own rich endowments; but after the first burst of -indignation the cause of independence created little enthusiasm. -Horrible barbarities were exercised on those French soldiers -that sickness or the fortune of war exposed to the rage of the -invaded, and a dreadful spirit of personal hatred was kept alive -by the exactions and severe retaliations of the invaders, but no -great and general exertion to drive the latter from the soil was -made, or at least none was sustained with steadfast courage in the -field. Manifestoes, decrees, and lofty boasts, like a cloud of -canvas covering a rotten hull, made a gallant appearance, but real -strength and firmness were nowhere to be found. - -The Spanish insurrection presented indeed a strange spectacle; -patriotism was seen supporting a vile system of government; a -popular assembly working for the restoration of a despotic monarch; -the higher classes seeking a foreign master; the lower armed in -the cause of bigotry and misrule. The upstart leaders secretly -abhorring freedom, yet governing in her name, trembled at the -democratic activity they had themselves excited. They called forth -all the bad passions of the multitude, but repressed the patriotism -that would regenerate as well as save. The country suffered the -evils, without enjoying the benefits, of a revolution! Tumults and -assassinations terrified and disgusted the sensible part of the -community; a corrupt administration of the resources extinguished -patriotism, and neglect ruined the armies: the peasant-soldier, -usually flying at the first onset, threw away his arms and returned -to his home, or, attracted by the license of the _partidas_, joined -the banners of men who, for the most part originally robbers, -were as oppressive to the people as the enemy. The _guerilla_ -chiefs would, in their turn, have been quickly exterminated, but -that the French, pressed by lord Wellington’s battalions, were -obliged to keep in large masses. This was the secret of Spanish -constancy! Copious supplies from England, and the valour of the -Anglo-Portuguese troops, these were the supports of the war! and -it was the gigantic vigour with which the duke of Wellington -resisted the fierceness of France, and sustained the weakness of -three inefficient cabinets, that delivered the Peninsula. Faults -he committed, and who in war has not? but his reputation stands -upon a sure foundation, a simple majestic structure, that envy -cannot undermine, nor the meretricious ornaments of party panegyric -deform. The exploits of his army were great in themselves, and -great in their consequences: abounding with signal examples of -heroic courage and devoted zeal, they should neither be disfigured -nor forgotten, being worthy of more fame than the world has yet -accorded them--worthy also of a better historian. - - - - -TABLE OF CONTENTS. - - - BOOK I. - - - CHAPTER I. - - INTRODUCTION _Page_ 1 - - CHAPTER II. - - Dissensions in the Spanish court--Secret treaty and convention - of Fontainebleau--Junot’s army enters Spain--Dupont’s - and Moncey’s corps enter Spain--Duhesme’s corps enters - Catalonia--Insurrections of Aranjuez and Madrid--Charles the - fourth abdicates--Ferdinand proclaimed king--Murat marches to - Madrid--Refuses to recognise Ferdinand as king--The sword of - Francis the first delivered to the French general--Savary arrives - at Madrid--Ferdinand goes to Bayonne--Charles the fourth goes to - Bayonne--The fortresses of St. Sebastian, Figueras, Pampeluna, - and Barcelona, treacherously seized by the French--Riot at - Toledo, 23d April--Tumult at Madrid, 2d of May--Charles the - fourth abdicates a second time in favour of Napoleon--Assembly - of notables at Bayonne--Joseph Buonaparte declared king of - Spain--Arrives at Madrid. 12 - - CHAPTER III. - - Council of Castile refuses to take the oath of - allegiance--Supreme junta established at Seville--Marquis - of Solano murdered at Cadiz, and the Conde d’Aguilar - at Seville--Intercourse between Castaños and sir Hew - Dalrymple--General Spencer and admiral Purvis offer to co-operate - with the Spaniards--Admiral Rossily’s squadron surrenders to - Morla--General insurrection--Massacre at Valencia--Horrible - murder of Filanghieri. 32 - - CHAPTER IV. - - New French corps formed in Navarre--Duhesme fixes himself at - Barcelona--Importance of that city--Napoleon’s military plan and - arrangements. 45 - - CHAPTER V. - - First operations of marshal Bessieres--Spaniards defeated at - Cabeçon, at Segovia, at Logroño, at Torquemada--French take St. - Ander--Lefebre Desnouettes defeats the Spaniards on the Ebro, on - the Huecha, on the Xalon--First siege of Zaragoza--Observations. 62 - - CHAPTER VI. - - Operations in Catalonia--General Swartz marches against the - town of Manresa, and general Chabran against Taragona--French - defeated at Bruch--Chabran recalled--Burns Arbos--Marches - against Bruch--Retreats--Duhesme assaults Gerona--Is repulsed - with loss--Action on the Llobregat--General insurrection - of Catalonia--Figueras blockaded--General Reille relieves - it--First siege of Gerona--The marquis of Palacios arrives in - Catalonia with the Spanish troops from the Balearic isles, - declared captain-general under St. Narcissus, re-establishes - the line of the Llobregat--The count of Caldagues forces the - French lines at Gerona--Duhesme raises the siege and returns - to Barcelona--Observations--Moncey marches against Valencia, - defeats the Spaniards at Pajaso, at the Siete Aguas, and at - Quarte--Attacks Valencia, is repulsed, marches into Murcia, - forces the passage of the Xucar, defeats Serbelloni at San - Felippe, arrives at San Clemente--Insurrection at Cuenca, - quelled by general Caulincourt--Observations 74 - - CHAPTER VII. - - Second operations of Bessieres--Blake’s and Cuesta’s armies unite - at Benevente--Generals disagree--Battle of Rio Seco--Bessieres’ - endeavours to corrupt the Spanish generals fail--Bessieres - marches to invade Gallicia, is recalled, and falls back to - Burgos--Observations 101 - - CHAPTER VIII. - - Dupont marches against Andalusia, forces the bridge of Alcolea, - takes Cordoba--Alarm at Seville--Castaños arrives, forms a new - army--Dupont retreats to Andujar, attacks the town of Jaen--Vedel - forces the pass of Despeñas Perros, arrives at Baylen--Spanish - army arrives on the Guadalquivir--General Gobert defeated and - killed--Generals Vedel and Darfour retire to Carolina--General - Reding takes possession of Baylen--Dupont retires from - Andujar--Battle of Baylen--Dupont’s capitulation, eighteen - thousand French troops lay down their arms--Observations--Joseph - holds a council of war, resolves to abandon Madrid--Impolicy of - so doing 112 - - - BOOK II. - - CHAPTER I. - - The Asturian deputies received with enthusiasm in - England---Ministers precipitate--Imprudent choice of - agents--Junot marches to Alcantara, joined by the Spanish - contingent, enters Portugal, arrives at Abrantes, pushes on to - Lisbon--Prince regent emigrates to the Brazils, reflections - on that transaction--Dangerous position of the French - army--Portuguese council of regency--Spanish contingent well - received--General Taranco dies at Oporto, is succeeded by the - French general Quesnel--Solano’s troops retire to Badajos--Junot - takes possession of the Alemtejo and the Algarves; exacts - a forced loan; is created duke of Abrantes; suppresses the - council of regency; sends the flower of the Portuguese army to - France--Napoleon demands a ransom from Portugal--People unable - to pay it--Police of Lisbon--Junot’s military position; his - character; political position--People discontented--Prophetic - eggs--Sebastianists---The capture of Rossily’s squadron known - at Lisbon--Pope’s nuncio takes refuge on board the English - fleet--Alarm of the French 136 - - CHAPTER II. - - Spanish general Belesta seizes general Quesnel and retires to - Gallicia--Insurrection at Oporto--Junot disarms and confines the - Spanish soldiers near Lisbon--General Avril’s column returns to - Estremos--General Loison marches from Almeida against Oporto; is - attacked at Mezam Frias; crosses the Douero; attacked at Castro - d’Año; recalled to Lisbon--French driven out of the Algarves--The - fort of Figueras taken--Abrantes and Elvas threatened--Setuval - in commotion--General Spencer appears off the Tagus--Junot’s - plan--Insurrection at Villa Viciosa suppressed--Colonel - Maransin takes Beja with great slaughter of the patriots--The - insurgents advance from Leria, fall back--Action at Leria--Loison - arrives at Abrantes--Observations on his march--French army - concentrated--The Portuguese general Leite, aided by a Spanish - corps, takes post at Evora--Loison crosses the Tagus; defeats - Leite’s advanced guard at Montemor--Battle of Evora--Town taken - and pillaged--Unfriendly conduct of the Spaniards--Loison reaches - Elvas; collects provisions; is recalled by Junot--Observations 155 - - CHAPTER III. - - Political and military retrospect--Mr. Fox’s conduct contrasted - with that of his successors--General Spencer sent to the - Mediterranean--Sir John Moore withdrawn from thence; arrives in - England; sent to Sweden--Spencer arrives at Gibraltar--Ceuta, - the object of his expedition--Spanish insurrection diverts - his attention to Cadiz; wishes to occupy that city--Spaniards - averse to it--Prudent conduct of sir Hew Dalrymple and lord - Collingwood--Spencer sails to Ayamonte; returns to Cadiz; sails - to the mouth of the Tagus; returns to Cadiz--Prince Leopold of - Sicily and the duke of Orleans arrive at Gibraltar--Curious - intrigue--Army assembled at Cork by the whig administration, - with a view to permanent conquest in South America, the - only disposable British force--Sir A. Wellesley takes the - command--Contradictory instructions of the ministers--Sir John - Moore returns from Sweden; ordered to Portugal--Sir Hew Dalrymple - appointed commander of the forces--Confused arrangements made by - the ministers 169 - - CHAPTER IV. - - Sir A. Wellesley quits his troops and proceeds to Coruña--Junta - refuse assistance in men, but ask for and obtain money--Sir - Arthur goes to Oporto; arranges a plan with the bishop; proceeds - to the Tagus; rejoins his troops; joined by Spencer; disembarks - at the Mondego; has an interview with general Freire d’Andrada; - marches to Leria--Portuguese insurrection weak--Junot’s position - and dispositions--Laborde marches to Alcobaça, Loison to - Abrantes--General Freire separates from the British--Junot quits - Lisbon with the reserve--Laborde takes post at Roriça--Action of - Roriça--Laborde retreats to Montachique--Sir A. Wellesley marches - to Vimiero--Junot concentrates his army at Torres Vedras 187 - - CHAPTER V. - - Portuguese take Abrantes--Generals Ackland and Anstruther - land and join the British army at Vimiero--Sir Harry - Burrard arrives--Battle of Vimiero--Junot defeated--Sir Hew - Dalrymple arrives--Armistice--Terms of it--Junot returns to - Lisbon--Negotiates for a convention--Sir John Moore’s troops - land--State of the public mind in Lisbon--The Russian admiral - negotiates separately--Convention concluded--the Russian fleet - surrenders upon terms--Conduct of the people at Lisbon--The - Monteiro Mor requires sir Charles Cotton to interrupt the - execution of the convention--Sir John Hope appointed commandant - of Lisbon; represses all disorders--Disputes between the French - and English commissioners--Reflections thereupon 207 - - CHAPTER VI. - - The bishop and junta of Oporto aim at the supreme power; - wish to establish the seat of government at Oporto; their - intrigues; strange proceedings of general Decken; reflections - thereupon--Clamour raised against the convention in England - and in Portugal; soon ceases in Portugal--The Spanish general - Galluzzo refuses to acknowledge the convention; invests fort - Lalippe; his proceedings absurd and unjustifiable--Sir John - Hope marches against him; he alters his conduct--Garrison of - Lalippe--March to Lisbon--Embarked--Garrison of Almeida; march - to Oporto; attacked and plundered by the Portuguese--Sir Hew - Dalrymple and sir Harry Burrard recalled to England--Vile conduct - of the daily press--Violence of public feeling--Convention, - improperly called, of Cintra--Observations--On the action of - Roriça--On the battle of Vimiero--On the convention 236 - - - BOOK III. - - CHAPTER I. - - Comparison between the Portuguese and Spanish people--The general - opinion of French weakness and Spanish strength and energy, - fallacious--Contracted policy of the English cabinet--Account - of the civil and military agents employed--Many of them act - without judgment--Mischievous effects thereof--Operations of - the Spanish armies after the battle of Baylen--Murcian army - arrives at Madrid--Valencian army marches to the relief of - Zaragoza--General Verdier raises the siege--Castaños enters - Madrid--Contumacious conduct of Galluzzo--Disputes between - Blake and Cuesta--Dilatory conduct of the Spaniards--Sagacious - observation of Napoleon--Insurrection at Bilbao; quelled by - general Merlin--French corps approaches Zaragoza--Palafox - alarmed, threatens the council of Castille--Council of war held - at Madrid--Plan of operations--Castaños unable to march from want - of money--Bad conduct of the junta of Seville--Vigorous conduct - of major Cox--Want of arms--Extravagant project to procure them 269 - - CHAPTER II. - - Internal political transactions--Factions in Gallicia, - Asturias, Leon, and Castile--Flagitious conduct of the junta - of Seville--Mr. Stuart endeavours to establish a northern - cortes--Activity of the council of Castile, proposes a supreme - government agreeable to the public--Local juntas become generally - odious--Cortes meet at Lugo, declare for a central and supreme - government--Deputies appointed--Clamours of the Gallician junta - and bishop of Orense--Increasing influence of the council - of Castile--Underhand proceedings of the junta of Seville, - disconcerted by the quickness of the Baily Valdez--Character - of Cuesta, he denies the legality of the northern cortes, - abandons the line of military operations, returns to Segovia, - arrests the Baily Valdez and other deputies from Lugo--Central - and supreme government established at Aranjuez, Florida Blanca - president--Vile intrigues of the local juntas--Cuesta removed - from the command of his army, ordered to Aranjuez--Popular - feeling in favour of the central junta, vain and interested - proceedings of that body, its timidity, inactivity, and folly, - refuses to name a generalissimo--Foreign relations--Mr. Canning - leaves Mr. Stuart without any instructions for three months--Mr. - Frere appointed envoy extraordinary, &c. 292 - - CHAPTER III. - - Political position of Napoleon; he resolves to crush the - Spaniards; his energy and activity; marches his armies - from every part of Europe towards Spain; his oration to - his soldiers--Conference at Erfurth--Negotiations for - peace--Petulant conduct of Mr. Canning--160,000 conscripts - enrolled in France--Power of that country--Napoleon’s speech to - the senate--He repairs to Bayonne--Remissness of the English - cabinet--Sir John Moore appointed to lead an army into Spain; - sends his artillery by the Madrid road, and marches himself by - Almeida--The central junta impatient for the arrival of the - English army--Sir David Baird arrives at Coruña; is refused - permission to disembark his troops--Mr. Frere and the marquis - of Romana arrive at Coruña; account of the latter’s escape - from the Danish Isles--Central junta resolved not to appoint a - generalissimo--Gloomy aspect of affairs 315 - - CHAPTER IV. - - Movements of the Spanish generals on the Ebro, their absurd - confidence, their want of system and concert--General opinion - that the French are weak--Real strength of the king--Marshal Ney - and general Jourdan join the army--Military errors of the king - exposed by Napoleon, who instructs him how to make war--Joseph - proposes six plans of operation--Observations thereupon 342 - - CHAPTER V. - - Position and strength of the French and Spanish armies--Blake - moves from Reynosa to the Upper Ebro; sends a division to - Bilbao; French retire from that town--Ney quits his position - near Logroña, and retakes Bilbao--The armies of the centre and - right approach the Ebro and the Aragon--Various evolutions--Blake - attacks and takes Bilbao--Head of the grand French army arrives - in Spain--The Castilians join the army of the centre--The - Asturians join Blake--Apathy of the central junta--Castaños - joins the army; holds a conference with Palafox; their dangerous - position; arrange a plan of operations--The Spaniards cross the - Ebro--The king orders a general attack--Skirmish at Sanguessa, - at Logroño, and Lerim--The Spaniards driven back over the - Ebro--Logroño taken--Colonel Cruz, with a Spanish battalion, - surrenders at Lerim--Francisco Palafox, the military deputy, - arrives at Alfaro; his exceeding folly and presumption; controls - and insults Castaños--Force of the French army increases - hourly; how composed and disposed--Blake ascends the valley of - Durango--Battle of Zornosa--French retake Bilbao--Combat at - Valmaceda--Observations 361 - - - BOOK IV. - - CHAPTER I. - - Napoleon arrives at Bayonne--Blake advances towards Bilbao--The - count Belvedere arrives at Burgos--The first and fourth corps - advance--Combat of Guenes--Blake retreats--Napoleon at Vittoria; - his plan--Soult takes the command of the second corps--Battle - of Gamonal--Burgos taken--Battle of Espinosa--Flight from - Reynosa--Soult overruns the Montagna de St. Ander, and - scours Leon--Napoleon fixes his head-quarters at Burgos, - changes his front, lets 10,000 cavalry loose upon Castile and - Leon--Marshals Lasnes and Ney directed against Castaños--Folly - of the central junta--General St. Juan occupies the pass of the - Somosierra--Folly of the generals on the Ebro--Battle of Tudela 385 - - CHAPTER II. - - Napoleon marches against the capital; forces the pass of - the Somosierra--St. Juan murdered by his men--Tumults in - Madrid--French army arrives there; the Retiro stormed--Town - capitulates--Remains of Castaños’s army driven across the Tagus; - retire to Cuenca--Napoleon explains his policy to the nobles, - clergy, and tribunals of Madrid--His vast plans, enormous - force--Defenceless state of Spain 407 - - CHAPTER III. - - Sir John Moore arrives at Salamanca; hears of the battle of - Espinosa--His dangerous position; discovers the real state of - affairs; contemplates a hardy enterprise; hears of the defeat - at Tudela; resolves to retreat; waits for general Hope’s - division--Danger of that general; his able conduct--Central junta - fly to Badajos--Mr. Frere, incapable of judging rightly, opposes - the retreat; his weakness and levity; insults the general; sends - colonel Charmilly to Salamanca--Manly conduct of sir John Moore; - his able and bold plan of operations 425 - - CHAPTER IV. - - British army advances towards Burgos--French outposts surprised - at Rueda--Letter from Berthier to Soult intercepted--Direction - of the march changed--Mr. Stuart and a member of the junta - arrive at head-quarters--Arrogant and insulting letter of Mr. - Frere--Noble answer of sir John Moore--British army united at - Majorga; their force and composition--Inconsistent conduct of - Romana; his character--Soult’s position and forces; concentrates - his army at Carrion--Combat of cavalry at Sahagun--The British - army retires to Benevente--The emperor moves from Madrid, passes - the Guadarama, arrives at Tordesillas, expects to interrupt - the British line of retreat, fails--Bridge of Castro Gonzalo - destroyed--Combat of cavalry at Benevente--General Lefebre - taken--Soult forces the bridge of Mansilla, takes Leon--The - emperor unites his army at Astorga; hears of the Austrian war; - orders marshal Soult to pursue the English army, and returns to - France 450 - - CHAPTER V. - - Sir John Moore retreats towards Vigo; is closely - pursued--Miserable scene at Bembibre--Excesses at Villa - Franca--Combat at Calcabellos--Death of general Colbert--March - to Nogales--Line of retreat changed from Vigo to Coruña--Skilful - passage of the bridge of Constantino; skirmish there--The army - halts at Lugo--Sir John Moore offers battle; it is not accepted; - he makes a forced march to Betanzos; loses many stragglers; - rallies the army; reaches Coruña--The army takes a position; two - large stores of powder exploded--Fleet arrives in the harbour; - army commences embarking--Battle of Coruña--Death of sir John - Moore--His character 473 - - CHAPTER VI. - - Observations--The conduct of Napoleon and that of the English - cabinet compared--The emperor’s military dispositions - examined--Propriety of sir John Moore’s operations - discussed--Diagram, exposing the relative positions of Spanish, - French, and English armies--Propriety of sir John Moore’s retreat - discussed, and the question whether he should have fallen back - on Portugal or Gallicia investigated--Sir John Moore’s judgment - defended; his conduct calumniated by interested men for party - purposes--Eulogised by marshal Soult, by Napoleon, by the duke of - Wellington 502 - - -APPENDIX. - - No. - - 1. Observations on Spanish affairs by Napoleon _Page_ i - - 2. Notes on Spanish affairs ditto v - - 3. Ditto ditto ditto xiii - - 4. Ditto ditto ditto xvii - - 5. Ditto ditto ditto xxiii - - 6. Plan of campaign by king Joseph xxvi - - 7. Five Sections, containing four letters from Berthier to - general Savary--One from marshal Berthier to king Joseph xxx - - 8. Four letters.--Mr. Drummond to sir A. Ball--Ditto to sir - Hew Dalrymple--Sir Hew Dalrymple to lord Castlereagh--Lord - Castlereagh to sir Hew Dalrymple xxxv - - 9. Two letters from sir Arthur Wellesley to sir Harry Burrard xxxvii - - 10. Articles of the convention for the evacuation of Portugal xlii - - 11. Three letters from brigadier-general Von Decken to sir Hew - Dalrymple xlvi - - 12. Two letters.--General Leite to sir Hew Dalrymple--Sir Hew - Dalrymple to lieutenant-general Hope li - - 13. Nine Sections, containing justificatory extracts from sir - John Moore’s correspondence.--Section 1st. Want of money--2d. - Relating to roads--3d. Relating to equipments and supplies--4th. - Relating to the want of information--5th. Relating to the conduct - of the local juntas--6th. Central junta--7th. Relating to the - passive state of the people--8th. Miscellaneous liii - - 14. Justificatory extracts from sir John Moore’s - correspondence lxviii - - 15. Despatch from the conde de Belvedere relative to the battle - of Gamonal lxxi - - 16. Extract of a letter from the duke of Dalmatia to the author ib. - - 17. Letters from Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere lxxii - - 18. Return of British troops embarked for Portugal and Spain lxxviii - - 19. Return of killed, &c. sir Arthur Wellesley’s army lxxix - - 20. British order of battle--Roriça ib. - - 21. British order of battle--Vimiero lxxx - - 22. Return of sir Hew Dalrymple’s army ib. - - 23. Embarkation return of the French under Junot lxxxi - - 24. Detail of troops--Extracted from a minute made by the duke - of York ib. - - 25. Order of battle--Sir John Moore’s army--Return of ditto - December 19th, 1808 lxxxii - - 26. Especial return of loss during sir John Moore’s campaign lxxxiii - - 27. States of the Spanish armies lxxxiv - - 28. Five sections, containing returns of the French armies in - Spain and Portugal lxxxvi - - 29. Three letters from lord Collingwood to sir Hew Dalrymple xc - - - - -LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS - - _Explanatory Sketch_ of the BATTLE OF BAYLEN. 124 - - _SKETCH OF THE_ COMBAT OF RORIÇA. 203 - - _SKETCH OF THE_ BATTLE OF VIMIERO. 216 - - _Explanatory Sketch_ of the CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL 258 - - _Explanatory Sketch_ of the FRENCH & SPANISH POSITIONS 372 - - _Explanatory Sketch_ of BLAKE’S POSITION 382 - - _SKETCH OF THE_ BATTLE OF CORUÑA 498 - - _Plate VIII_ 516 - - - - -NOTICE. - - -Of the manuscript authorities consulted for this history, those -marked with the letter S. the author owes to the kindness of -marshal Soult. - -For the notes dictated by Napoleon, and the plans of campaign -sketched out by king Joseph, he is indebted to his grace the duke -of Wellington. - -The returns of the French army were extracted from the original -half monthly statements presented by marshal Berthier to the -emperor Napoleon. - -Of the other authorities it is unnecessary to say more than that -the author had access to the original papers, with the exception of -Dupont’s memoir, of which a copy only was obtained. - - - - -CORRIGENDA. - - Page 92, line 27, _for_ Agnas, _read_ Aguas. - 202, __ 30, __ Catlin’s, Craufurd’s, _read_ Catlin Craufurd’s. - 214, __ 32, __ above ridge, _read_ ridge above. - 215, __ 2, __ deep, _read_ steep. - 256, __ 17, __ Alhambra, _read_ Alhandra. - 274, __ 9, __ of the first class _to be erased: - it is an error_. - 289, __ 27, __ tlme, _read_ time. - 343, __ 7, __ Orma, _read_ Osma. - 365, __ 16, __ Carella, _read_ Corella. - 374, __ 1, __ Montejo, _read_ Montijo. - 381, __ 9, __ were, _read_ was. - 394, __ 11, __ Sahugan, _read_ Sahagun. - 424, __ 30, __ wnose, _read_ whose. - 425, __ 3, __ communications, _read_ communication. - 428, __ 6, __ transports, _read_ transport. - 426, __ 1, __ {one hundred thousand, _read_ one hundred and - { seventy thousand. - 464, __ 20, __ fine plain, _read_ plain. - 468, __ 26, __ six guns, _read_ two guns. - 481, __ 2, __ {who, having turned Villa Franca and scoured - { the valley of the Syl, _read_ who, after - { turning Villa Franca and scouring the valley - { of the Syl. - 483, __ 21, __ three or four hundred, _read_ three and four - hundred. - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - PENINSULAR WAR. - - - - -BOOK I. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -[Sidenote: Introduction.] - -The hostility of the European aristocracy caused the enthusiasm of -republican France to take a military direction, and forced that -powerful nation into a course of policy which, however outrageous -it might appear, was in reality one of necessity. Up to the treaty -of Tilsit, the wars of France were essentially defensive; for the -bloody contest that wasted the continent so many years was not a -struggle for pre-eminence between ambitious powers, not a dispute -for some accession of territory, nor for the political ascendancy -of one or other nation, but a deadly conflict to determine whether -aristocracy or democracy should predominate; whether equality -or privilege should henceforth be the principle of European -governments. - -The French revolution was pushed into existence before the hour -of its natural birth. The power of the aristocratic principle was -too vigorous and too much identified with that of the monarchical -principle, to be successfully resisted by a virtuous democratic -effort, much less could it be overthrown by a democracy rioting in -innocent blood, and menacing destruction to political and religious -establishments, the growth of centuries, somewhat decayed indeed, -yet scarcely showing their grey hairs. The first military events -of the revolution, the disaffection of Toulon and Lyons, the civil -war of La Vendee, the feeble, although successful resistance made -to the duke of Brunswick’s invasion, and the frequent and violent -change of rulers whose fall none regretted, were all proofs -that the French revolution, intrinsically too feeble to sustain -the physical and moral force pressing it down, was fast sinking -when the wonderful genius of Buonaparte, baffling all reasonable -calculation, raised and fixed it on the basis of victory, the only -one capable of supporting the crude production. - -Sensible, however, that the cause he upheld was not sufficiently -in unison with the feelings of the age, Napoleon’s first care -was to disarm or neutralize monarchical and sacerdotal enmity, -by restoring a church establishment, and by becoming a monarch -himself. Once a sovereign, his vigorous character, his pursuits, -his talents, and the critical nature of the times, inevitably -rendered him a despotic one; yet while he sacrificed political -liberty, which to the great bulk of mankind has never been more -than a pleasing sound, he cherished with the utmost care political -equality, a sensible good, that produces increasing satisfaction as -it descends in the scale of society; but this, the real principle -of his government, the secret of his popularity, made him the -people’s monarch, not the sovereign of the aristocracy; hence, Mr. -Pitt called him, “the child and the champion of democracy,” a truth -as evident as that Mr. Pitt and his successors were the children -and the champions of aristocracy; hence also the privileged -classes of Europe consistently transferred their natural and -implacable hatred of the French revolution to his person, for they -saw that in him innovation had found a protector; that he alone -had given pre-eminence to a system so hateful to them, and that he -really was what he called himself, “the State.” - -The treaty of Tilsit, therefore, although it placed Napoleon in -a commanding situation with regard to the potentates of Europe, -unmasked the real nature of the war, and brought him and England, -the respective champions of equality and privilege, into more -direct contact; peace could not be between them while both were -strong, and all that the French emperor had hitherto gained only -enabled him to choose his future field of battle. - -When the catastrophe of Trafalgar forbade him to think of invading -England, his fertile genius conceived the plan of sapping her naval -and commercial strength, by depriving her of the continental market -for her manufactured goods; he prohibited the reception of English -wares in any part of the continent, and he exacted from allies and -dependants the most rigid compliance with his orders; but this -“continental system,” as it was called, became inoperative when -French troops were not present to enforce his commands. It was thus -in Portugal, where British influence was really paramount, although -the terror inspired by the French arms seemed at times to render -this doubtful; fear however is momentary, self-interest lasting, -and Portugal was but an unguarded province of England. - -[Sidenote: Monsieur de Champagny’s Report, 21st Oct. 1807.] - -From Portugal and Gibraltar, English goods freely passed into -Spain; and to check this traffic by force was not easy, and -otherwise impossible. Spain stood nearly in the same position with -regard to France that Portugal did to England; a warm feeling -of friendship for the enemy of Great Britain was the natural -consequence of the unjust seizure of the Spanish frigates in a time -of peace; but although this rendered the French cause popular in -Spain, and that the court of Madrid was from weakness subservient -to the French Emperor, nothing could induce the people to refrain -from a profitable contraband trade; they would not pay that respect -to the wishes of a foreign power, which they refused to the -regulations of their own government; neither was the aristocratical -enmity to Napoleon asleep in Spain. A proclamation issued by the -Prince of Peace previous to the battle of Jena, although hastily -recalled when the result of that conflict was known, sufficiently -indicated the tenure upon which the friendship of the Spanish court -was to be held. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon, in Las Casas, vol. ii. 4th part.] - -This state of affairs drew the French Emperor’s attention towards -the Peninsula; a chain of remarkable circumstances fixed it there, -and induced him to remove the reigning family, and to place his -brother Joseph on the throne of Spain. He thought that the people -of that country, sick of an effete government, would be quiescent -under such a change; and although it should prove otherwise, the -confidence he reposed in his own fortune, unrivalled talents, -and vast power, made him disregard the consequences, while the -cravings of his military and political system, the danger to be -apprehended from the vicinity of a Bourbon dynasty, and above all -the temptations offered by a miraculous folly which outrun even his -desires, urged him to a deed, that well accepted by the people of -the Peninsula, would have proved beneficial; but being enforced -contrary to their wishes, was unhallowed either by justice or -benevolence. - -In an evil hour, for his own greatness and the happiness of -others, he commenced this fatal project; founded in violence, -executed with fraud and cruelty, it spread desolation through the -fairest portions of the Peninsula; it was calamitous to France and -destructive to himself. The conflict between his hardy veterans -and the bloody vindictive race he insulted, assumed a character of -unmitigated ferocity disgraceful to human nature; for the Spaniards -did not fail to defend their just cause with hereditary cruelty, -and the French army struck a terrible balance of barbarous actions. - -Napoleon observed with surprise the unexpected energy of the -people, and bent his whole force to the attainment of his object; -while England coming to the assistance of the Peninsula employed -all her resources to frustrate his efforts. Thus the two leading -nations of the world were brought into contact at a moment when -both were disturbed by angry passions, eager for great events, and -possessed of surprising power. - -The extent and population of the French empire, including the -kingdom of Italy, the confederation of the Rhine, the Swiss -Cantons, the Duchy of Warsaw, and the dependent states of -Holland and Naples, enabled Buonaparte through the medium of the -conscription to array an army, in number nearly equal to the great -host that followed the Persian of old against Greece; like that -multitude also his troops were gathered from many nations, but they -were trained in a Roman discipline, and ruled by a Carthaginian -genius. The organization[1] of Napoleon’s army was simple, the -administration vigorous, the manipulations well contrived. The -French officers, accustomed to success, were bold, enterprising, -of great reputation, and feared accordingly. By a combination of -discipline and moral excitement, admirably adapted to the mixed -nature of his troops, the Emperor had created a power that appeared -to be resistless, and, in truth, it would have been so, if applied -to one great object at a time; but this the ambition of the man, or -rather the force of circumstances, would not permit. - -[Sidenote: Exposé de l’Empire, 1807-8-9-13.] - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoirs, Las Casas, 7th part.] - -[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s letters, vide Appendix.] - -The ships of France were chained up in her harbours, and her naval -strength was rebuked, but not destroyed; inexhaustible resources -for building vessels, vast marine establishments, a coast line -of many thousand miles, and the creative genius of Napoleon were -nursing up a navy, formidable as a secondary arm; and the war then -pending between the United States and Great Britain promised to -nurture its growth, and to increase its efficacy. - -[Sidenote: Exposé, 1808-9. Napoleon, in Las Casas, vol. ii. 4th -part.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid. 6th part.] - -Maritime commerce was indeed fainting in France, but her internal -and continental traffic was robust; her manufactures were rapidly -improving; her debt was small; her financial operations conducted -on a prudent plan, and with exact economy. The supplies were all -raised within the year without any very great pressure of taxation, -and from a sound metallic currency; thus there seemed to be no -reasonable doubt, that any war undertaken by Napoleon might be by -him brought to a favourable termination. - -On the other hand, England, omnipotent at sea, was little regarded -as a military power. Her enormous debt was yearly increasing in an -accelerated ratio; and this necessary consequence of anticipating -the resources of the country, and dealing in a factitious currency, -was fast eating into the vital strength of the state; for although -the merchants and great manufacturers were thriving from the -accidental circumstances of the times, the labourers were suffering -and degenerating in character; pauperism and its sure attendant -crime were spreading over the land, and the population was fast -splitting into distinct classes,--the one rich and arbitrary, the -other poor and discontented: the former composed of those who -profited, the latter of those who suffered by the war. Of Ireland -it is unnecessary to speak; her wrongs and her misery, peculiar and -unparalleled, are too well known, and too little regarded, to call -for remark. - -This general comparative statement, so favourable to France, -would however be a false criterion of the relative strength of -the belligerents, with regard to the approaching struggle in -the Peninsula. A cause manifestly unjust is a heavy weight upon -the operations of a general: it reconciles men to desertion--it -sanctifies want of zeal--is a pretext for cowardice--renders -hardships more irksome, dangers more obnoxious, and glory less -satisfactory to the mind of the soldier. Now the invasion of the -Peninsula, whatever might have been its real original, was an act -of violence on the part of Napoleon repugnant to the feelings of -mankind. The French armies were burthened with a sense of its -iniquity, the British troops exhilarated by a contrary sentiment. -All the continental nations had smarted under the sword of -Napoleon, but, with the exception of Prussia, none were crushed; a -common feeling of humiliation, the hope of revenge, and the ready -subsidies of England, were bonds of union among their governments -stronger than the most solemn treaties. France could only calculate -on their fears, England was secure in their self-love. - -The hatred to what were called French principles was at this -period in full activity. The privileged classes of every country -hated Napoleon, because his genius had given stability to the -institutions that grew out of the revolution, because his victories -had baffled their calculations, and shaken their hold of power. As -the chief of revolutionary France he was constrained to continue -his career until the final accomplishment of her destiny, and -this necessity, overlooked by the great bulk of mankind, afforded -plausible ground for imputing insatiable ambition to the French -government and to the French nation, of which ample use was made. -Rapacity, insolence, injustice, cruelty, even cowardice, were -said to be inseparable from the character of a Frenchman; and, -as if such vices were nowhere else to be found, it was more than -insinuated that all the enemies of France were inherently virtuous -and disinterested. Unhappily history is but a record of crimes, -and it is not wonderful that the arrogance of men, buoyed up by -a spring-tide of military glory, should, as well among allies, -as among vanquished enemies, have produced sufficient disgust to -ensure a ready belief in any accusation, however false and absurd. - -Napoleon was the contriver and the sole support of a political -system that required time and victory to consolidate; he was the -connecting link between the new interests of mankind and what of -the old were left in a state of vigour; he held them together -strongly, but he was no favourite with either, and consequently -in danger from both. His power, unsanctified by time, depended -not less upon delicate management than upon vigorous exercise; he -had to fix the foundations of, as well as to defend, an empire, -and he may be said to have been rather peremptory than despotic. -There were points of administration with which he durst not -meddle even wisely, much less arbitrarily; customs, prejudices, -and the dregs of the revolutionary licence interfered with his -policy, and rendered it complicated and difficult. It was not so -with his inveterate adversaries; the delusion of parliamentary -representation enabled the English government safely to exercise an -unlimited power over the persons and the property of the nation, -and through the influence of an active and corrupt press they -exercised nearly the same power over the public mind. - -The vast commerce of England, penetrating by a thousand channels -(open or secret) as it were into every house on the face of the -globe, supplied unequalled sources of intelligence. The spirit -of traffic, which seldom acknowledges the ties of country, was -universally on the side of Great Britain, and those twin curses, -paper-money and public credit, so truly described as “strength in -the beginning but weakness in the end,” were recklessly used by -statesmen whose policy regarded not the interests of posterity. -Such were the adventitious causes of England’s power; and her -natural, legitimate resources were many and great. - -If any credit is to be given to the census, the increasing -population of the United Kingdom, amounted at this period to nearly -twenty millions: France reckoned but twenty-seven millions when -Frederick the Great declared that if he were her king, “not a gun -should be fired in Europe without his leave.” - -The French army was undoubtedly very formidable from numbers, -discipline, skill, and bravery; but contrary to the general -opinion, the British army was inferior to it in none of these -points save the first, and in discipline it was superior, because -a national army will always bear a sterner code than a mixed force -will suffer. With the latter, the military not the moral crimes -can be punished; men will submit to death for a breach of great -regulations which they know by experience to be useful, but the -constant restraint of petty though wholesome rules they will escape -from by desertion, or resist by mutiny, when the ties of custom -and country are removed; for the disgrace of bad conduct attaches -not to them, but to the nation under whose colours they serve; -great indeed is that genius that can keep men of different nations -firm to their colours, and preserve a rigid discipline at the same -time. Napoleon’s military system was, from this cause, inferior -to the British, which, if it be purely administered, combines the -solidity of the Germans with the rapidity of the French, excluding -the mechanical dulness of the one, and the dangerous vivacity of -the other; yet, before the campaign in the Peninsula had proved its -excellence in every branch of war, the English army was absurdly -under-rated in foreign countries, and absolutely despised in its -own. It was reasonable to suppose that it did not possess that -facility of moving in large bodies which long practice had given -to the French; but the individual soldier was (and is still) most -falsely stigmatized as deficient in intelligence and activity, the -officers ridiculed, and the idea that a British could cope with a -French army, even for a single campaign, considered chimerical. - -The English are a people very subject to receive and to cherish -false impressions; proud of their credulity as if it were a -virtue, the majority will adopt any fallacy, and cling to it with a -tenacity proportioned to its grossness. Thus an ignorant contempt -for the British soldiery had been long entertained, before the ill -success of the expeditions in 1794 and 1799 appeared to justify the -general prejudice. The true cause of those failures was not traced, -and the excellent discipline afterwards introduced and perfected by -the duke of York was despised. England, both at home and abroad, -was, in 1808, scorned as a military power, when she possessed, -without a frontier to swallow up large armies in expensive -fortresses, at least two hundred thousand[2] of the best equipped -and best disciplined soldiers in the universe, together with an -immense recruiting establishment, and through the medium of the -militia, the power of drawing upon the population without limit. -It is true that of this number many were necessarily employed in -the defence of the colonies, but enough remained to compose a -disposable force greater than that with which Napoleon won the -battle of Austerlitz, and double that with which he conquered -Italy. In all the materials of war, the superior ingenuity and -skill of the English mechanics were visible, and that intellectual -power that distinguishes Great Britain amongst the nations, in -science, arts, and literature, was not wanting to her generals in -the hour of danger. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -[Sidenote: Nellerto.[3]] - -[Sidenote: Vide Doblado’s Letters.] - -For many years antecedent to the French invasion, the royal family -of Spain was distracted with domestic quarrels; the son’s hand was -against his mother, the father’s against his son, and the court was -a scene of continual broils, under cover of which artful men, as -is usual in such cases, pushed their own interest forward, while -they seemed to act only for the sake of the party whose cause they -espoused. Charles IV. attributed this unhappy state of his house to -the intrigues of his sister-in-law, the queen of the Two Sicilies. -He himself, a weak and inefficient old man, was governed by his -wife, and she again by don Manuel Godoy, of whose person she was -enamoured even to folly. From the rank of a simple gentleman of the -Royal Guards, this person had, through her influence, been raised -to the highest dignities; and the title of Prince of the Peace was -conferred upon a man whose name must be for ever connected with one -of the bloodiest wars that fill the page of history. - -Ferdinand prince of the Asturias, naturally hated this favourite, -and the miserable death of his young wife, his own youth and -apparently forlorn condition created such an interest in his -favour, that the people partook of his feelings; and the disunion -of the royal family extending its effects beyond the precincts -of the court, involved the nation in ruin. Those who know how a -Spaniard hates, will readily comprehend why Godoy, who was really -a mild, good-natured man, although a sensual and corrupt one, has -been so overloaded with imprecations, as if he, and he alone, had -been the cause of the disasters of Spain. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon in Las Casas.] - -[Sidenote: Nellerto.] - -The canon, Escoiquiz, a daring and subtile politician, appears to -have been the chief of Ferdinand’s party; finding the influence -of the Prince of the Peace too strong, he looked for support in a -powerful quarter; and under his tuition, Ferdinand wrote upon the -11th of October, 1807, to the emperor Napoleon; in this letter -he complained of the influence which bad men had obtained over -his father, prayed for the interference of the “hero destined -by Providence,” so run the text, “to save Europe and to support -thrones;” asked an alliance by marriage with the Buonaparte family, -and finally desired that his communication might be kept secret -from his father, lest it should be taken as a proof of disrespect. -To this letter he received no answer, and fresh matter of quarrel -being found by his enemies at home, he was placed in arrest, and -upon the 29th of October, Charles denounced him to the Emperor -as guilty of treason, and of having projected the assassination -of his own mother. Napoleon caught eagerly at this pretext for -interfering in the domestic policy of Spain, and thus the honour -and independence of a great people were placed in jeopardy by the -squabbles of two of the most worthless persons in the nation. - -Some short time before this, Godoy, either instigated by an -ambition to found a dynasty, or fearing that the death of the king -would expose him to the vengeance of Ferdinand, had made proposals -to the French court to concert a plan for the conquest and division -of Portugal, promising the assistance of Spain, on condition that -a principality for himself should be set apart from the spoil. -At least such is the turn given by Napoleon to this affair; but -the article which provided an indemnification for the king of -Etruria a minor, who had just been obliged to surrender his Italian -dominions to France, renders it very doubtful if the first offer -came from Godoy. That, however, is a point of small interest, -for Napoleon eagerly adopted the project if he did not propose -it; and the advantages were all on his side. Under the pretext -of supporting his army in Portugal, he might fill Spain with his -troops; the dispute between the father and the son, now referred to -his arbitration, placed the golden apples within his reach, and he -resolved to gather the fruit if he had not planted the tree. - -A secret treaty was immediately concluded at Fontainebleau, between -marshal Duroc on the part of France, and Eugenio Izquerdo on the -part of Spain. This treaty, together with a convention dependant -on it, was signed the 27th, and ratified by Napoleon on the 29th -of October; the contracting parties agreeing to the following -conditions. - -The house of Braganza to be driven forth of Portugal, and that -kingdom divided into three portions, of which the province of Entre -Minho e Duero and the town of Oporto, forming one, was to be given -as an indemnification to the dispossessed king of Etruria, and to -be called the kingdom of North Lusitania. - -The Alemtejo and the Algarves to be erected into a principality for -Godoy, who taking the title of prince of the Algarves, was still to -be in some respects dependant upon the Spanish crown. - -The central provinces of Estremadura, Beira, and the Tras os -Montes, together with the town of Lisbon, to be held in deposit -until a general peace, and then to be exchanged under certain -conditions for English conquests. - -The ultra-marine dominions of the exiled family to be equally -divided between the contracting parties, and in three years at -the longest, the king of Spain to be gratified with the title of -Emperor of the Two Americas. Thus much for the treaty. The terms of -the convention were: - -That France should employ 25,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Spain -24,000 infantry, 30 guns, and 3,000 cavalry. - -The French contingent to be joined at Alcantara by the Spanish -cavalry, artillery, and one-third of the infantry, and from thence -to march at once to Lisbon. Of the remaining Spanish infantry -10,000 were to take possession of the Entre Minho e Duero and -Oporto, and 6,000 were to invade Estremadura and the Algarves. -In the mean time a reserve of 40,000 men was to be assembled at -Bayonne, ready to take the field by the 20th of November, if -England should interfere, or the Portuguese people resist. - -If the king of Spain or any of his family joined the troops, the -chief command was to be vested in the person so joining, but with -that exception, the French general was to be obeyed whenever the -armies of the two nations came into contact, and during the march -through Spain the French soldiers were to be fed by that country, -but paid by their own government. - -The revenues of the conquered provinces were to be administered -by the general actually in possession, and for the benefit of the -nation in whose name the province was held. - -Although it is evident that this treaty and convention favoured -Napoleon’s ulterior operations in Spain, by enabling him to mask -his views, and introduce large bodies of men into that country -without creating much suspicion of his real intention; it does not -follow, as some authors have asserted, that they were contrived by -the emperor for the sole purpose of rendering the Spanish royal -family odious to the world, and by this far-fetched expedient to -prevent other nations from taking an interest in their fate when he -should find it convenient to apply the same measure of injustice to -his associates that they had accorded to the family of Braganza. - -[Sidenote: Voice from St. Helena, vol. ii.] - -To say nothing of the weakness of such a policy, founded as it -must be on the error that governments acknowledge the dictates of -justice at the expense of their supposed interests; it must be -observed that Portugal was intrinsically a great object. History -does not speak of the time when the inhabitants of that country -were deficient in spirit; the natural obstacles to an invasion had -more than once frustrated the efforts of large armies, and the long -line of communication between Bayonne and the Portuguese frontier -could only be supported by Spanish co-operation. Add to this, the -facility with which England could, and the probability that she -would, succour her ancient ally, and the reasonable conclusion -is, that Napoleon’s first intentions were in accordance with the -literal meaning of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and that his -subsequent proceedings were the result of new projects conceived as -the wondrous imbecility of the Spanish Bourbons became manifest. - -Again, the convention provided for the organization of a large -Spanish force, to be stationed in the north and south of Portugal, -that is, in precisely the two places from whence they could most -readily march to the assistance of their country, if it was -invaded; and in fact the division of the marquis of Solano in the -south, and that of general Taranco in the north of Portugal, did -afterwards (when the Spanish insurrection broke out) form the -strength of the Andalusian and Gallician armies, the former of -which gained the victory at Baylen, while the latter contended for -it, although ineffectually, at Rio Seco. - -The French force destined to invade Portugal was already assembled -at Bayonne, under the title of the first army of the Garonne. It -was commanded by general Junot, a young man of a bold ambitious -disposition, but of greater reputation for military talent than he -was able to support. The men were principally conscripts, and ill -fitted to endure the hardships which awaited them. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault, Exp. du Portugal.] - -At first, by easy marches and in small divisions, Junot led his -army through Spain; the inhabitants were by no means friendly -to their guests; but whether from any latent fear of what was -to follow, or from a dislike of foreign soldiers common to all -secluded people, does not clearly appear. When the head of the -columns reached Salamanca, Junot halted, intending to complete the -organization of his troops in that rich country, and there to await -the most favourable moment for penetrating the sterile frontier -which guarded his destined prey; but political events marched -faster than his calculations, and fresh instructions from the -emperor prescribed an immediate advance upon Lisbon. Junot obeyed, -and the family of Braganza, at his approach, fled to the Brazils. -The series of interesting transactions which attended this invasion -will be treated of hereafter; at present I must return to Spain -already bending to the first gusts of that hurricane, which was -soon to sweep over her with such destructive violence. - -[Sidenote: Nellerto.] - -[Sidenote: Historia de la Guerra contra Nap.] - -The accusation of treason and intended parricide, preferred by -Charles IV. against his son Ferdinand, gave rise to some judicial -proceedings which ended in the submission of the latter; and -Ferdinand being absolved of the imputed crime, wrote a letter to -his father and mother, acknowledging his own faults, but accusing -the persons who surrounded him of being the instigators of deeds -which he abhorred. The intrigues of his advisers, however, -continued, and the plans of Napoleon advanced as a necessary -consequence of the divisions in the Spanish court. - -[Sidenote: Return of the French army. Appendix.] - -[Sidenote: Journal of Dupont’s Operations MSS.] - -By the terms of the convention of Fontainebleau, forty thousand men -were to be held in reserve at Bayonne; but a greater number were -assembled on different points of the frontier; and in the course -of December, two corps had entered the Spanish territory, and were -quartered in Vittoria, Miranda, Briviesca, and the neighbourhood. -The one, commanded by general Dupont, was called the second army -of observation of the “Gironde.” The other, commanded by marshal -Moncey, took the title of the army of observation of the “Côte -d’Ocean.” In the gross they amounted to fifty-three thousand men, -of which above forty thousand were fit for duty; and in the course -of the month of December, Dupont advanced to Valladolid, while a -reinforcement for Junot, four thousand seven hundred in number, -took up their quarters at Salamanca. - -[Sidenote: Notes of Napoleon. Appendix, No. 2.] - -It thus appeared as if the French troops were quietly following the -natural line of communication between France and Portugal; but in -reality Dupont’s position cut off the capital from all intercourse -with the northern provinces, while Moncey secured the direct road -from Bayonne to Madrid. Small divisions under different pretexts -continually reinforced these two bodies, and through the Eastern -Pyrenees twelve thousand men, commanded by general Duhesme, -penetrated into Catalonia, and established themselves in Barcelona. - -In the mean time the dispute between the king and his son, or -rather between the Prince of the Peace and the advisers of -Ferdinand, was brought to a crisis by insurrections at Aranjuez -and Madrid, which took place upon the 17th, 18th, and 19th of -March, 1808. The old king, deceived by intrigues, or frightened at -the difficulties which surrounded him, had determined, as it is -supposed by some, to quit Spain, and, in imitation of his brother -of Portugal, to retire from the turmoil of European politics, and -take refuge in his American dominions. Certain it is that every -thing was prepared for a flight to Seville, when the prince’s -grooms commenced a tumult, in which the populace of Aranjuez -joined, and were only pacified by the assurance that no journey was -in contemplation. - -Upon the 18th the people of Madrid, following the example of -Aranjuez, sacked the house of the obnoxious favourite, Manuel -Godoy. Upon the 19th the riots recommenced in Aranjuez: the Prince -of the Peace secreted himself from the fury of the mob; but his -retreat being discovered, he was maltreated, and on the point of -being killed, when the soldiers of the royal guard rescued him. -Upon the 18th Charles IV., terrified by the violent proceedings of -his subjects, abdicated. This event was proclaimed at Madrid on -the 20th, and Ferdinand was declared king, to the great joy of the -nation at large: little did the people know what they rejoiced at, -time has since taught them that the fable of the frogs and their -monarch had its meaning. - -During these transactions, Murat, grand duke of Berg, who had -taken the command of all the French troops in Spain, quitted his -quarters at Aranda de Duero, passed the Somosierra, and entered -Madrid the 23d, with Moncey’s corps and a fine body of cavalry, -Dupont at the same time deviating from the road to Portugal, -crossed the Duero and occupied Segovia, the Escurial, and Aranjuez. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon in Las Casas.] - -Ferdinand arrived at Madrid on the 24th, but was not recognised by -Murat as king; nevertheless, at the demand of that powerful guest, -he surrendered the sword of Francis I., which was delivered with -much ceremony to the French general. Charles, who had sent a paper -to Murat, declaring that his abdication had been the result of -force, wrote also to Napoleon in the same strain; and this state -of affairs being unexpected by the emperor, he employed general -Savary to conduct his plans, which appear to have been considerably -deranged by the vehemence of the people, and the precipitation of -Murat in taking possession of the capital. - -Before Savary’s arrival, don Carlos the brother of Ferdinand, -departed from Madrid hoping to meet the emperor Napoleon, whose -presence in that city was confidently expected; and upon the 10th -of April, Ferdinand, having first appointed a supreme junta, of -which his uncle, don Antonio, was president, and Murat a member, -commenced his own remarkable journey to Bayonne, the true causes of -which certainly have not yet been developed; and perhaps when they -shall be known, some petty personal intrigue may be found to have -had a greater share in producing it, than the grand machinations -attributed to Napoleon, who could not have anticipated, much less -have calculated, a great political measure upon such a surprising -example of weakness. - -The people everywhere manifested their repugnance to this journey; -at Vittoria they cut the traces of Ferdinand’s carriage, and at -different times several gallant men offered, at the risk of their -lives, to carry him off, in defiance of the French troops quartered -along the road. But Ferdinand, unmoved by their entreaties and -zeal, and regardless of the warning contained in a letter that he -received at this period from Napoleon (who, withholding the title -of majesty, sharply reproved him for his past conduct, and scarcely -expressed a wish to meet him), continued his progress, and on the -20th of April, 1808, found himself a prisoner in Bayonne. In the -mean time Charles, who, under the protection of Murat, had resumed -his rights, and obtained the liberty of Godoy, quitted Spain, and -also threw himself, his cause, and kingdom, into the hands of the -emperor. - -These events were in themselves quite enough to urge a more -cautious people than the Spaniards into action; but other measures -had been pursued, which proved beyond the possibility of doubt, -that the country was destined to be the spoil of the French. -The troops of that nation had been admitted without reserve or -precaution into the different fortresses upon the Spanish frontier, -and, taking advantage of this hospitality to forward the views of -their chief, they got possession, by various artifices, of the -citadels of St. Sebastian in Guipuscoa, of Pampeluna in Navarre, -and of that of Figueras, and the forts of Monjuik, and citadel of -Barcelona in Catalonia; and thus, under the pretence of mediating -between the father and the son, in a time of profound peace, a -foreign force was suddenly established in the capital--on the -communications--and in the principal frontier fortresses; its -chief was admitted to a share of the government, and a fiery, -proud, and jealous nation was laid prostrate at the feet of a -stranger, without a blow being struck, without one warning voice -being raised, without a suspicion being excited in sufficient time -to guard against those acts, upon which all were gazing in stupid -amazement. - -It is idle to attribute this surprising event to the subtlety of -Napoleon’s policy, to the depth of his deceit, or to the treachery -of Godoy. Such a fatal calamity could only be the result of bad -government, and a consequent degradation of public feeling; and -it matters but little to those who wish to derive a lesson from -experience, whether it be a Godoy or a Savary that strikes the -last bargain of corruption, the silly father or the rebellious son -that signs the final act of degradation and infamy. Fortunately, -it is easier to oppress the people of all countries, than to -destroy their generous feelings; when all patriotism is lost among -the upper classes, it may still be found among the lower. In the -Peninsula it was not found, but started into life, and with a -fervour and energy that ennobled even the wild and savage form in -which it appeared; nor was it the less admirable that it burst -forth attended by many evils. The good feeling displayed was the -people’s own; their cruelty, folly, and perverseness, were the -effects of bad government. - -There are many reasons why Napoleon should have meddled with the -interior affairs of Spain; there seems to be no good one for his -manner of doing it. It is true that the Spanish Bourbons could -never have been sincere friends to France while Buonaparte held -the sceptre, and the moment that the fear of his power ceased to -operate, it was quite certain that their apparent friendship would -change to active hostility; the proclamation issued by the Spanish -cabinet just before the battle of Jena, is evidence of this -feeling; but if the Bourbons were his enemies, it did not follow -that the people sympathised with their rulers. The resources of the -country were, it is said, already at his disposal; but that availed -him little, as the corruption and weakness of the administration -had reduced those resources to the lowest ebb. His great error -was, that he looked only to the court, and treated the nation with -contempt. Had Napoleon taken care to bring the people and their -government into hostile contact first,--and how many points of -contact would not such a government have afforded!--instead of -appearing as the treacherous arbitrator in a domestic quarrel, he -would have been hailed as the deliverer of a great people. - -[Sidenote: Journal of Dupont’s Operations. MSS.] - -The journey of Ferdinand, the liberation of Godoy, and the flight -of Charles, the appointing Murat to be a member of the governing -Junta, and the movements of the French troops, who were advancing -from all parts towards Madrid, roused the indignation of the -Spanish people; tumults and assassinations had taken place in -various parts; and at Toledo a serious riot occurred on the 23d -of April; the peasants joined the inhabitants of the town, and it -was only by the advance of a division of infantry and some cavalry -of Dupont’s corps (then quartered at Aranjuez) that order was -restored. The agitation of the public mind, however, increased, the -French troops were all young men, or rather boys, taken from the -last conscription, and disciplined after they had entered Spain, -their youth and apparent feebleness excited the contempt of the -Spaniards, who pride themselves much upon individual prowess; and -the swelling indignation at last broke out. - -[Sidenote: Memoir of Azanza and O’Farril.] - -Upon the 2d of May, a carriage being prepared (as the people -supposed) to convey don Antonio, the uncle of Ferdinand, to -France, a crowd collected about it, and their language indicated -a determination not to permit the last of the royal family to -be spirited away: the traces of the carriage were cut, and loud -imprecations against the French burst forth on every side. At that -moment, colonel La Grange, an aide-de-camp of Murat’s, appearing -amongst them, was assailed and maltreated; in an instant the -whole city was in commotion, and the French soldiers expecting no -violence, were taken unawares and killed in every quarter: above -seven hundred fell. The hospital was attacked by the populace; but -the attendants and the sick beat them off; and the alarm having -spread to the camp outside the town, the French cavalry came to the -assistance of their countrymen by the gate of Alcala; while general -Lanfranc, with a column of three thousand infantry, descending from -the heights on the north-west quarter, entered the Calle Ancha de -Bernardo. As this column crossed the street of Maravelles, in which -the arsenal was situated, two Spanish officers, named Daois and -Velarde, who were in a state of great excitement, discharged some -guns upon the passing troops, and were immediately put to death -by the voltigeurs; meanwhile, the column, continuing its march, -released, as it advanced, several superior French officers, who -were in a manner besieged in the houses by the mob. The cavalry at -the other end of the town, treating the affair as a tumult, and not -as an action, made some hundred prisoners; and by the exertions -of marshal Moncey, general Harispe, Gonzalvo O’Farril, and some -others, order was soon restored. - -After night-fall, the peasantry of the neighbourhood came armed and -in considerable numbers towards the city, and the French guards at -the different gates firing upon them, killed twenty or thirty, and -wounded others, some few were also crushed to death or lamed by the -cavalry in the morning. - -In the first moment of irritation, Murat ordered all the prisoners -to be tried by a military commission, which condemned them to -death; but the municipality interfered, and represented to that -prince the extreme cruelty of visiting this angry ebullition of -an injured and insulted people with such severity. Murat admitted -the weight of their arguments, and forbade any executions on the -sentence; but it is said that general Grouchy, in whose immediate -power the prisoners remained, exclaiming that his own life had been -attempted! that the blood of the French soldiers was not to be -spilt with impunity! and that the prisoners having been condemned -by a council of war, ought and should be executed! proceeded to -shoot them in the Prado; and forty were thus slain before Murat -could cause his orders to be effectually obeyed. The next day -some of the Spanish authorities having discovered that a colonel -commanding the imperial guards still retained a number of prisoners -in the barracks, applied to the duke of Berg to have them released. -Murat consented to have those prisoners also enlarged: but the -colonel getting intelligence of what was passing, and being enraged -at the loss of so many choice soldiers, put forty-five of the -captives to death before the order could arrive to stay his bloody -proceedings[4]. - -Such were nearly the circumstances that attended this celebrated -tumult, in which the wild cry of Spanish warfare was first heard; -but as many authors, adopting without hesitation all the reports of -the day, have represented it sometimes as a wanton and extensive -massacre on the part of the French, at another as a barbarous -political stroke to impress a dread of their power, I think it -necessary to make the following observations. - -[Sidenote: Manifesto of the council of Castile. Page 28.] - -[Sidenote: Surgical Campaigns of Baron Larrey.] - -That it was commenced by the Spaniards is undoubted: their fiery -tempers, the irritation produced by passing events, and the habits -of violence which they had acquired by their late successful -insurrection against Godoy, rendered an explosion inevitable. But -if the French had secretly stimulated this disposition, and had -prepared in cold blood to make a terrible example, undoubtedly -they would have prepared some check on the Spanish soldiers of -the garrison, and they would scarcely have left their hospital -unguarded; still less have arranged the plan so that their own -loss should far exceed that of the Spaniards; and surely nothing -would have induced them to relinquish the profit of such policy -after having suffered all the injury. Yet marshal Moncey and -general Harispe were actively engaged in restoring order; and it is -certain that, including the peasants shot outside the gates, the -executions on the Prado and in the barracks of the imperial guards, -the whole number of Spaniards slain did not amount to one hundred -and twenty persons, while more than seven hundred French fell. Of -the imperial guards seventy men were wounded, and this fact alone -would suffice to prove that there was no premeditation on the part -of Murat; for if he was base enough to sacrifice his own men with -such unconcern, he would not have exposed the select soldiers of -the French empire in preference to the conscripts who abounded in -his army. The affair itself was certainly accidental, and not very -bloody for the patriots, but policy induced both sides to attribute -secret motives, and to exaggerate the slaughter. The Spaniards -in the provinces, impressed with an opinion of French atrocity, -were thereby excited to insurrection on the one hand; and, on the -other, the French, well aware that such an impression could not -be effaced by an accurate relation of what did happen, seized the -occasion to convey a terrible idea of their power and severity; -but, while it is the part of history to reduce such amplifications, -it is impossible to remain unmoved in recording the gallantry and -devotion of a populace that could thus dare to assail the force -commanded by Murat, rather than abandon one of their princes; such, -however, was the character of the lower classes of Spain throughout -this war; fierce, confident, and prone to sudden and rash actions, -they had an intuitive perception of all that was great and noble, -but were miserably weak in execution. - -The commotion of the 2d of May was the forerunner of insurrections -in every part of Spain, few of which were so honourable to the -actors as that of Madrid. Unprincipled villains hailed this -opportunity of directing the passions of the multitude, and, under -the mask of patriotism, turned the unthinking fury of the people -against whoever it pleased them to rob or to destroy: pillage, -massacres, assassinations, cruelties of the most revolting kind -were everywhere perpetrated; and the intrinsic goodness of the -cause was disfigured by the enormities committed at Cadiz, Seville, -Badajos, and other places, but chiefly at Valencia, pre-eminent in -barbarity at a moment when all were barbarous! The first burst -of popular feeling being thus misdirected, and the energy of the -people wasted in assassinations; lassitude and fear succeeded to -the insolence of tumult at the approach of real danger; for it -is one thing to shine in the work of butchery, and another to -establish that discipline which can alone sustain the courage of -the multitude in the hour of trial. - -To cover the suspicious measure of introducing more troops than -the terms of the convention warranted, a variety of reports -relative to the ultimate intentions of the French emperor had been -propagated: at one time Gibraltar was to be besieged, and officers -were despatched to examine the Mediterranean coasts of Spain -and Barbary; at another, Portugal was to become the theatre of -great events, and a mysterious importance was attached to all the -movements of the French armies, with a view to deceive a court that -fear and sloth disposed to the belief of any thing but the truth, -and to impose upon a people whose unsuspicious ignorance was at -first mistaken for tameness. - -In the mean time, active agents were employed to form a French -party at the capital; but as the insurrections of Aranjuez and -Madrid discovered the fierceness of the Spanish character, Napoleon -enjoined more caution and prudence upon his lieutenants than the -latter were disposed to practise. In fact, Murat’s precipitation -was the cause of hastening the discovery of his master’s real views -before they were ripe for execution; for Dupont’s first division -and cavalry crossed the Duero as early as the 14th of March, and -upon the 10th of April occupied Aranjuez, while his second and -third divisions took post at the Escurial and at Segovia; thus -encircling the capital while Moncey’s corps occupied it. Hence an -intention to control the provincial government left by Ferdinand -became manifest, and the riot at Toledo, although promptly quelled -by the interference of the French troops, indicated the state of -the public mind before the explosion at Madrid had placed the -parties in a state of direct hostility. - -Murat seems to have been intrusted with only a half confidence, -and as his natural impetuosity urged him to play a rash rather -than a timid part, he appeared with the air of a conqueror before -a ground of quarrel was laid; not that he acted entirely without -grounds, for a letter addressed to him about this time by Napoleon, -contained the following instructions: “_The duke of Infantado has -a party in Madrid; they will attack you; dissipate them, and seize -the government._” But Murat’s policy, as his after life proved, was -too coarse and open for such difficult affairs. - -At Bayonne the political events kept pace with those of Madrid. -Charles IV. having reclaimed his rights in presence of Napoleon, -sent orders to the infant, don Antonio, to resign his office, the -presidency of the governing junta, to Murat, who, at the same time, -received the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom: this -appointment, and the restoration of Charles to the regal dignity, -were proclaimed in Madrid, with the acquiescence of the council of -Castile, on the 10th of May; but five days previous to that period, -the old monarch had again resigned his sceptre into the hands of -Napoleon, and Ferdinand and himself were consigned, with large -pensions, to the tranquillity of private life. - -The throne of Spain being now vacant, the right to fill it was -assumed by the French emperor, in virtue of the cession made by -Charles IV. He desired that a king might be chosen from his own -family, and after some hesitation upon the part of the council of -Castile, that body, in concert with the municipality of Madrid, and -the governing junta, declared that their choice had fallen upon -Joseph Buonaparte, at that time king of Naples. Cardinal Bourbon, -primate of Spain, first cousin of Charles IV., and archbishop of -Toledo, not only acceded to this arrangement, but actually wrote -to Napoleon a letter testifying his adhesion to the new order of -things. - -As it was easy to foretel the result of the election, the king of -Naples was already journeying towards Bayonne, and arrived there -on the 7th of June. The principal men of Spain were also invited -to meet in that town upon the 15th, with a view to obtain their -assent to a constitution prepared by Napoleon. At this meeting, -called “the Assembly of Notables,” ninety-one Spaniards of eminence -appeared, and, first accepting Joseph as their king, proceeded to -discuss the constitution in detail, and after several sittings -adopted it, and swore to maintain its provisions. Thus finished the -first part of this eventful drama. - -The new constitution was calculated to draw forth the resources -of Spain: compared to the old system it was a blessing, and it -would have been received as such under different circumstances; -but now arms were to decide its fate, for in every province of -Spain the cry of war had been raised. In Catalonia, in Valencia, in -Andalusia, Estremadura, Gallicia, and the Asturias, the people were -gathering, and fiercely declaring their determination to resist -French intrusion. - -But Joseph, apparently contented with the acquiescence of the -ninety-one notables, and trusting to the powerful support of -his brother, crossed the frontier on the 9th of July; and on -the 12th arrived at Vittoria. The inhabitants still nourishing -the discontent caused by Ferdinand’s journey to Bayonne, seemed -disposed to hinder Joseph’s entrance; but their opposition did not -break out into actual violence, and the next morning he continued -his progress by Miranda del Ebro, Breviesca, Burgos, and Buitrago. -The 20th of July he entered Madrid, and upon the 24th he was -proclaimed king of Spain and the Indies, with all the solemnities -usual upon such occasions; not hesitating to declare himself -the enemy of eleven millions of people, the object of a whole -nation’s hatred; calling, with a strange accent, from the midst -of foreign bands, upon that fierce and haughty race, to accept of -a constitution which they did not understand, and which few of -them had ever heard of; his only hope of success resting on the -strength of his brother’s arms; his claims upon the consent of an -imbecile monarch, and the weakness of a few pusillanimous nobles, -in contempt of the rights of millions now arming to oppose him. -This was the unhallowed part of the enterprise; this it was that -rendered his offered constitution odious, covered it with a leprous -skin, and drove the noble-minded far from the pollution of its -touch! - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: Memoir of O’Farril, and Azanza.] - -Joseph being proclaimed king, required the council of Castile to -take the oath of allegiance prescribed by the constitution; but -with unexpected boldness, that body, hitherto obedient, met his -orders with a remonstrance. War, virtually declared on the 2d of -May, was at this time raging in all parts of the peninsula, and the -council was secretly apprized that a great misfortune had befallen -the French arms. It was no longer a question between Joseph and -some reluctant public bodies, but an awful struggle between -great nations; and how the spirit of insurrection breaking forth -simultaneously in every province was nourished in each, until it -acquired the consistence of regular warfare, I shall now relate. - -Just before the tumult of Aranjuez, the marquis of Solano y Socoro, -commanding the Spanish auxiliary force in the Alentejo, received -orders from Godoy to withdraw from that country with his division, -and to post it on the frontier of Andalusia, to cover the projected -journey of Charles IV. Napoleon was aware of these orders, but -would not interrupt their execution. Solano quitted Portugal -without difficulty, and in the latter end of May, observing the -general agitation, repaired to his government of Cadiz, where a -French squadron[5], under admiral Rossily, had just before taken -refuge from the English fleet. As Solano passed through Seville -(that city being in a state of great ferment), he was required to -put himself at the head of an insurrection in favour of Ferdinand -VII. He refused, and passed on to his own government; but there -also the people were ripe for a declaration against the French; -and a local government having been in the mean time established -at Seville, the members at once assumed the title of the “Supreme -Junta of Spain and the Indies,” declared war in form against the -intrusive monarch, commanded all men between the ages of sixteen -and forty-five to take arms, called upon the troops of the camp -of St. Roch to acknowledge their authority, and ordered Solano -to attack the French squadron. That unfortunate man hesitated -to commit his country in a war with a power whose strength and -means he was better acquainted with than the temper of his own -countrymen, and was instantly murdered: he died with a courage -worthy of his amiable and unblemished character. There is too much -reason to believe that his death was coolly projected, and that the -junta at Seville sent an agent to Cadiz for the express purpose of -exciting the populace to commit this odious assassination. - -This foul stain upon the cause was intensely deepened by the -perpetration of similar or worse deeds in every part of the -kingdom. At Seville the conde d’Aguilar was dragged from his -carriage, and, without even the imputation of guilt, inhumanly -butchered; and here again it is said that the mob were instigated -by a leading member of the junta, count Gusman de Tilly, a man -described as “capable of dishonouring a whole nation by his -crimes,” while his victim was universally admitted to be virtuous -and accomplished. - -[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s correspondence.] - -As early as April, general Castaños (then commanding the camp of -St. Roch) had entered into communication with sir Hew Dalrymple, -the governor of Gibraltar; he was resolved to seize any -opportunity that offered to resist the French, and he appears -to have been the first, if not the only Spaniard, who united -patriotism with prudent calculation, readily acknowledging the -authority of the junta of Seville, and stifling the workings of -self-interest with a virtue by no means common to his countrymen -at that period. When the insurrection first broke out, admiral -Purvis, commanded the British squadron off Cadiz, and in concert -with general Spencer (who happened to be in that part of the world -with five thousand men), offered to co-operate with Solano, if he -would assail the French ships of war in the harbour: upon the death -of that unfortunate man, this offer was renewed and pressed upon -don Thomas Morla, his successor; but he, for reasons hereafter -to be mentioned, refused all assistance, and reduced the hostile -ships himself. Castaños, on the contrary, united closely with all -the British commanders, and obtained from them supplies of arms, -ammunition, and money; and at the insistence of sir Hew Dalrymple, -the merchants of Gibraltar advanced a loan for the service of the -Spanish patriots[6]. - -[Sidenote: Moniteur. Azanza an O’Farril. Nellerto.] - -Meanwhile the assassinations at Cadiz and Seville were imitated -in every part of Spain; hardly can a town be named in which -some innocent and worthy persons were not slain. Grenada had -its murders; Carthagena rivalled Cadiz in ruthless cruelty; and -Valencia was foul with slaughter. Don Miguel de Saavedra, the -governor of that city, was killed, not in the fury of the moment, -for he escaped the first danger and fled, but being pursued and -captured, was brought back and deliberately sacrificed. Balthazar -Calvo, a canon of the church of St. Isidro, then commenced a -massacre of the French residents. For twelve days unchecked he -traversed the streets of Valencia, followed by a band of fanatics, -brandishing their knives, and filling all places with blood: many -hundred helpless people fell the victims of his thirst for murder; -and at last, emboldened by the impunity he enjoyed, Calvo proceeded -to threaten the junta itself; but there his career was checked. -Those worthy personages, who (with the exception of Mr. Tupper, the -English consul, then a member), had calmly witnessed his previous -violence, at once found the means to crush his power when their own -safety was concerned. The canon, being in the act of braving their -authority, was seized by stratagem, imprisoned, and soon afterwards -strangled, together with two hundred of his band. - -The conde de Serbelloni, captain-general of the province, placed -himself at the head of the insurrection, and proceeded to organise -an army; and at the same time the old count Florida Blanca assumed -the direction of the Murcian patriots, and those two kingdoms acted -cordially together. - -In Catalonia the occupation of Barcelona impeded the development of -the popular effervescence, but the feeling was the same, and the -insurrection breaking out at the town of Manresa, soon spread to -all the unfettered parts of the province. - -In Aragon the arrival of don Joseph Palafox kindled the fire of -patriotism; he had escaped from Bayonne, and his family were -greatly esteemed in a country where it was of the noblest among a -people absurdly vain of their ancient descent. The captain-general, -fearful of a tumult, ordered Palafox to quit the province. This -circumstance, joined to some appearance of mystery in his escape, -inflamed the passions of the multitude; they surrounded his abode, -and forced him to put himself at their head: the captain-general -was displaced and confined, some persons were murdered, and a junta -was formed. Palafox was considered by his companions as a man of -slender capacity and great vanity, and there is nothing in his -exploits to create a doubt of the justness of this opinion. It was -not Palafox that upheld the glory of Aragon, it was the spirit of -the people, which he had not excited, and could so little direct, -that for a long time after the commencement of the first siege, he -was kept a sort of prisoner in Zaragoza; and evident distrust of -his courage and fidelity was displayed by the population which he -is supposed to have ruled. - -The example of Aragon aroused the Navarrese, and Logroño became the -focus of an insurrection which extended along most of the valleys -of that kingdom. In the northern and western provinces the spirit -of independence was equally fierce, and as decidedly pronounced, -accompanied also by the same brutal excesses. In Badajos the conde -de la Torre del Frenio was butchered by the populace, and his -mangled carcass dragged through the streets in triumph. At Talavera -de la Reyna, the corregidor with difficulty escaped a similar -fate by a hasty flight. Leon presented a wide, unbroken scene of -anarchy. In Valladolid, and all the great towns, the insurgent -patriots laid violent hands upon every person who did not instantly -concur in their wishes, and pillage was added to murder. - -Gallicia seemed to hold back for a moment; but the example of -Leon, and the arrival of an agent from the Asturias, where the -insurrection was in full force, produced a general movement. -Filanghieri, the governor of Coruña, an Italian by birth, was -by a tumultuous crowd called upon to exercise the rights of -sovereignty, and to declare war in form against the French: like -every man of sense in Spain, he was unwilling to commence such an -important revolution upon such uncertain grounds; the impatient -populace instantly attempted his life, which was then saved by -the courage of an officer of his staff; but his horrible fate -was only deferred. He was a man of talent, sincerely attached to -Spain, and he exerted himself with success in establishing a force -in the province: no suspicion of guilt seems to have attached to -his conduct, and his death marks the temper of the times and the -inherent ferocity of the people. A part of the regiment of Navarre -seized him at Villa Franca del Bierzo, planted the ground with -their bayonets, and then tossing him in a blanket, let him fall on -the points thus disposed, and there leaving him to struggle, they -dispersed and retired to their own homes. - -The Asturians were the first who proclaimed their indefeasible -right of choosing a new government when the old one ceased to -afford them protection. Having established a local junta, and -invested it with all the functions of royalty, they declared war -against the French, and despatched deputies to England to solicit -assistance. - -In Biscay and the Castiles, fifty thousand bayonets overawed the -great towns; but the peasantry commenced a war in their own manner -against the stragglers and the sick, and thus a hostile chain -surrounding the French army was completed in every link. - -This universal and nearly simultaneous effort of the Spanish people -was beheld by the rest of Europe with astonishment and admiration: -astonishment at the energy thus suddenly put forth by a nation -hitherto deemed unnerved and debased; admiration at the devoted -courage of an act, which, seen at a distance, and its odious -parts unknown, appeared with all the ideal beauty of Numantian -patriotism. In England the enthusiasm was unbounded; dazzled -at first with the splendour of such an agreeable, unlooked-for -spectacle, men of all classes gave way to the impulse of a generous -sympathy, and forgot, or felt disinclined to analyse, the real -causes of this apparently magnanimous exertion. But without wishing -to detract from the merit of the Spanish people, and certainly that -merit was very great, it may be fairly doubted if the disinterested -vigour of their character was the true source of their resistance. -Constituted as modern states are, with little in their systems of -government or education which conduces to nourish intense feelings -of patriotism, it would be miraculous indeed if such a result was -obtained from the pure virtue of a nation, which for two centuries -had groaned under the pressure of civil and religious despotism. -It was, in fact, produced by several co-operating causes, many of -which were any thing but commendable. - -The Spanish character, with relation to public affairs, is -distinguished by inordinate pride and arrogance. Dilatory and -improvident, the individual as well as the mass, all possess an -absurd confidence that every thing is practicable which their -heated imagination suggests; once excited, they can see no -difficulty in the execution of a project, and the obstacles they -encounter are attributed to treachery; hence the sudden murder -of so many virtuous men at the commencement of this commotion. -Kind and warm in his attachments, but bitter in his anger, the -Spaniard is patient under privations, firm in bodily suffering, -prone to sudden passion, vindictive, bloody, remembering insult -longer than injury, and cruel in his revenge. With a strong natural -perception of what is noble, his promise is lofty, but as he -invariably permits his passions to get the mastery of his reason, -his performance is mean. - -In the progress of this war the tenacity of vengeance peculiar to -the nation supplied the want of cool, persevering intrepidity; -but it was a poor substitute for that essential quality, and -led rather to deeds of craft and cruelty than to daring acts of -patriotism. Now the abstraction of the royal family, and the -unexpected pretension to the crown, so insultingly put forth by -Napoleon, aroused all the Spanish pride. The tumults of Madrid -and Aranjuez had agitated the public mind, and prepared it for a -violent movement, and the protection afforded by the French to -the obnoxious Godoy increased the ferment of popular feeling: -a dearly cherished vengeance was thus frustrated at the moment -of its expected accomplishment, and the disappointment excited -all that fierceness of anger which with Spaniards is, for the -moment, uncontrollable. Just then the tumult of Madrid, swollen -and distorted, wrought the people to frenzy, and they arose with -one accord, not to meet a danger the extent of which they had -calculated, and were prepared, for the sake of independence, to -confront, but to gratify the fury of their hearts, and to slake -their thirst of blood. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoires, Campagne d’Italie, Venise.] - -During Godoy’s administration the property of the church had been -trenched upon, and it was evident, from the example of France -and Italy, that, under the new system, that operation would be -repeated. This was a matter that involved the interests, and, -of course, stimulated the activity of a multitude of monks and -priests, who found no difficulty in persuading an ignorant and -bigoted people that the aggressive stranger was also the enemy -of religion and accursed of God; hence processions, miracles, -prophecies, distribution of reliques, and the appointment of saints -to the command of the armies, were freely employed to fanaticize -the mass of the patriots. In every part of the peninsula the -clergy were distinguished for their active zeal, and monks or -friars were leaders in the tumults, or at the side of those who -were instigating them to barbarous actions. Buonaparte found the -same cause produce similar effects during his early campaigns in -Italy; and if the shape of that country had been as favourable for -protracted resistance, and that a like support had been afforded to -them by Great Britain, the heroes of Spain would have been rivalled -by modern Romans! - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -The continental system of mercantile exclusion was another spring -of this complicated machinery. It threatened to lessen the already -decayed commerce of the maritime towns; but the contraband trade, -which has always been carried on in Spain to an incredible extent, -was certain of destruction; and with that trade the fate of one -hundred thousand excise and custom-house officers was involved. -It required but a small share of penetration to perceive, that -a system of armed revenue officers, organized after the French -manner, and stimulated by a vigorous administration, would -quickly put an end to the smuggling, which was, in truth, only a -consequence of the monopolies and internal restrictions upon the -trade of one province with another--vexations abolished by the -constitution of Bayonne: hence all the activity and intelligence -of the merchants engaged in foreign trade, and all the numbers and -lawless violence of the smugglers, were enlisted in the cause of -the country, and swelled the ranks of the insurgent patriots; and -hence also the readiness of the Gibraltar merchants to advance the -loan before spoken of. - -The state of civilisation in Spain was likewise exactly suited to -an insurrection: if the people had been a little more enlightened, -they would have joined the French; if very enlightened, the -invasion could not have happened at all; but, in a country where -the comforts of civilized society are less needed, and therefore -less attended to than in any other part of Europe, where the warmth -and dryness of the climate render it no sort of privation or even -inconvenience to sleep for the greatest part of the year in the -open air, and where the universal custom is to go armed, it was not -difficult for any energetic man to assemble and keep together large -masses of the credulous peasantry. No story could be too gross -for their belief, if it agreed with their wishes. “Es verdad, los -dicen,” “It is true, they say it,” is the invariable answer of a -Spaniard if a doubt is expressed of the truth of an absurd report. -Of temperate habits, possessing little furniture, and generally -hoarding all the gold he can get, the Spanish peasant is less -concerned for the loss of his house than the inhabitant of another -country would be: the effort that he makes in relinquishing his -abode must not be measured by the scale of an Englishman’s exertion -in a like case; and once engaged in an adventure, the lightness of -his spirits, and the brilliancy of his sky, make it a matter of -indifference to the angry Spanish peasant whither he wanders. - -[Sidenote: Historia de la Guerra contra Napoleon.] - -The evils which had afflicted the country previous to the period of -the French interference was another cause which tended to prepare -the Spaniards for violence, and aided in turning that violence -against the intruders. Famine, oppression, poverty, and disease, -the loss of commerce, and unequal taxation, had pressed sorely -upon them; for such a system the people could not be enthusiastic; -but they were taught to believe, that Godoy was the sole author of -the misery they suffered, and that Ferdinand would redress their -grievances; and as the French were the strenuous protectors of the -former, and the oppressors of the latter, it was easy to add this -bitterness to their natural hatred of the domination of a stranger; -and it was so done. - -Such were the principal causes which combined to produce this -surprising revolution, from which so many great events flowed, -without one man of eminent talent being cast up to control or -direct the spirit which was thus accidentally excited. Nothing -proves more directly the heterogeneous nature of the feelings and -interests which were united together than this last fact, which -cannot be attributed to a deficiency of natural talent, for the -genius of the Spanish people is notoriously ardent, subtle, and -vigorous; but there was no common bond of feeling which a great man -could lay hold of to influence large masses. Persons of sagacity -perceived very early that the Spanish revolution, like a leafy -shrub in a violent gale of wind, greatly agitated but disclosing -only slight unconnected stems, afforded no sure hold for the -ambition of a master-spirit, if such there were. It was clear that -the cause would fail unless supported by England, and then England -would direct all, and not suffer her resources to be wielded for -the glory of an individual, whose views and policy might hereafter -thwart her own; nor was it difficult to perceive that the downfall -of Napoleon, not the regeneration of Spain, was the object of her -cabinet. - -The explosion of public feeling was fierce in its expression, -because political passions will always be vehement at the first -moment of their appearance among a people new to civil commotion, -and unused to permit their heat to evaporate in public discussions. -The result was certainly a wonderful change in the affairs of -Europe; it seems yet undecided whether that change has been for the -better or for the worse. In the progress of their struggle, the -Spaniards developed more cruelty than courage, more violence than -intrepidity, more personal hatred of the French than enthusiasm for -their own cause. They opened indeed a wide field for the exertions -of others; they presented a fulcrum upon which a lever was rested -that moved the civilised world; but assuredly the presiding genius, -the impelling power, came from another quarter. Useful accessories -they were, but as principals they displayed neither wisdom, spirit, -nor skill sufficient to resist the prodigious force by which they -were assailed. If they appeared at first heedless of danger, it was -not because they were prepared to perish rather than submit, but -that they were reckless of provoking a power whose terrors they -could not estimate, and in their ignorance despised. - -It is, however, not surprising that great expectations were -at first formed of the heroism of the Spaniards, and those -expectations were greatly augmented by their agreeable qualities. -There is not upon the face of the earth a people so attractive in -the friendly intercourse of society: their majestic language, fine -persons, imposing dress and lively imaginations, the inexpressible -beauty of the women, and the air of romance which they throw -over every action, and infuse into every feeling, all combine to -delude the senses and to impose upon the judgment. As companions -they are incomparably the most agreeable of mankind; but danger -and disappointment attend the man who, confiding in their promises -and energy, ventures upon a difficult enterprise. “Never do to-day -what you can put off until to-morrow,” is the favourite proverb in -Spain, and, unlike most proverbs, it is rigidly attended to. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -The commotion of Aranjuez had undeceived the French emperor; -he perceived that he was engaged in a delicate enterprise, and -that the people he had to deal with were any thing but tame and -quiescent under insult. Determined, however, to persevere, he -pursued his political intrigues, and, without relinquishing the -hope of a successful termination to the affair by such means, he -arranged a profound plan of military operations, and so distributed -his forces, that, at the moment when Spain was pouring forth her -swarthy bands, the masses of the French army were concentrated upon -the most important points, and combined in such a manner, that, -from their central position they had the power of overwhelming each -separate province, no three of which could act in concert without -first beating a French corps; and if any of the Spanish armies -succeeded in routing a French force, the remaining corps of the -latter could unite without difficulty, and retreat without danger. -It was the skill of this disposition which enabled seventy thousand -men, covering a great extent of country, to brave the simultaneous -fury of a whole nation: an army less ably distributed would have -been trampled under foot, and lost amidst the tumultuous uproar of -eleven millions of people. - -[Sidenote: Historia de la Guerra contra Napoleon Buonaparte.] - -The inconvenience in a political point of view that would have -arisen from suffering a regular army to take the field was evident. -To have been able to characterise the opposition of the Spanish -people as a partial insurrection of peasants, instigated by some -evil-disposed persons to act against the wishes of the respectable -part of the nation, would have given some colour to the absorbing -darkness of the invasion: but to have permitted that which was at -first an insurrection of peasants to take the form and consistence -of regular armies and methodical warfare, would have been a -military error, and dangerous in the extreme. Napoleon, who well -knew that scientific war is only a wise application of force, -laughed at the delusion of those who regarded the want of a regular -army as a favourable circumstance, and who hailed the undisciplined -peasant as the more certain defender of the country. He knew that -a general insurrection can never last long, that it is a military -anarchy, and incapable of real strength: he knew that it was the -disciplined battalions of Valley Forge, not the volunteers of -Lexington, that established American independence; that it was -the veterans of Arcole and Marengo, not the republicans of Valmy, -that fixed the fate of the French revolution; and consequently his -efforts were directed to hinder the Spaniards from drawing together -any great body of regular soldiers; an event that might easily -happen, for the gross amount of the organized Spanish force was, -in the month of May, about one hundred and twenty-seven thousand -men of all arms. Fifteen thousand of these were in Holstein, under -the marquis of Romana, but twenty thousand were already partially -concentrated in Portugal. The remainder, in which were comprised -eleven thousand Swiss and thirty thousand militia, were dispersed -in various parts of the kingdom, principally in Andalusia. Besides -this force, there was a sort of local reserve called the urban -militia, much neglected, and indeed more a name than a reality. -Nevertheless the advantage of such an institution was considerable; -men were to be had in abundance: and as the greatest difficulty in -a sudden crisis is to prepare the frame-work of order, it was no -small resource to find a plan of service ready, the principle of -which was understood by the people. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s notes. Appendix, No. 3.] - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal. MSS.] - -The French army in the Peninsula about the same period, although -amounting to eighty thousand men, exclusive of those under Junot -in Portugal, had not more than seventy thousand capable of active -operations; the remainder were sick or in depôts. The possession -of the fortresses, the central position, and the combination of -this comparatively small army, gave it great strength; but it had -also many points of weakness; it was made up of the conscripts -of different nations, French, Swiss, Italians, Poles, and even -Portuguese, whom Junot had expatriated, partly to strengthen -the French army, partly to weaken the nation which he held in -subjection; and it is a curious fact, that some of them remained -in Spain until the end of the war. A few of the imperial guards -were also employed, and here and there an old regiment of the line -was mixed with the young troops to give them consistence; but -with these exceptions the French army must be considered as a raw -levy fresh from the plough and unacquainted with discipline: so -late even as the month of August many of the battalions had not -completed the first elements of their drill, and if they had not -been formed upon good skeletons, the difference between them and -the insurgent peasantry would have been very trifling. This fact -explains, in some measure, the otherwise incomprehensible checks -and defeats which the French sustained at the commencement of the -contest, and it likewise proves how little of vigour there was in -Spanish resistance at the moment of the greatest enthusiasm. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s notes, Appendix, No. 2.] - -In the distribution of these troops Napoleon attended principally -to the security of Madrid. The capital city, and the centre of -all interests, its importance was manifest, and the great line -of communication between it and Bayonne was early and constantly -covered with troops. But the imprudence with which the grand -duke of Berg brought up the corps of Moncey and Dupont to the -capital, the manner in which those corps were posted, cutting off -the communication between the northern and southern provinces, -and the haughty impolitic demeanour assumed by that prince, drew -on the crisis of affairs before the time was ripe, and obliged -the French monarch to hasten the advance of other troops, and to -make a greater display of his force than was consistent with his -policy; for Murat’s movement, while it threatened the Spaniards -and provoked their hostility, placed the French army in an -isolated position, leaving the long line of communication with -France unprovided with soldiers and requiring fresh battalions -to fill up the void thus discovered; and this circumstance -generated additional anger and suspicion at a very critical -period of time. To supply the chasm left by Moncey’s advance, -the formation of a new corps was commenced in Navarre, and by -successive reinforcements so increased; that in June it amounted -to twenty-three thousand men, who were placed under the command of -marshal Bessieres, and took the title of the “army of the Western -Pyrenees.” - -Bessieres, at the first appearance of the commotion, fixed his -head quarters at Burgos and occupied Vittoria, Miranda de Ebro, -and other towns, placing posts in his front towards Leon; this -position, while it protected the line from Bayonne to the capital, -enabled him to awe the Asturias and Biscay, and (by giving him -the command of the valley of the Duero,) to keep the kingdom of -Leon and the province of Segovia in check. The town and castle of -Burgos, being put into a state of defence, contained his dépôts, -and became the centre and pivot of his operations; while some -intermediate posts and the fortresses connected him with Bayonne, -where a reserve of twenty thousand men was formed under general -Drouet, then commanding the eleventh military division of France. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s notes, Appendix, No. 2.] - -[Sidenote: Duhesme’s Instructions, Jan. 28th. Vide St. Cyr.] - -By the convention of Fontainebleau, the emperor was entitled to -send forty thousand men into the northern parts of Spain. The right -thus acquired was grossly abused, but the exercise of it being -expected, created at first but little alarm. It was different -on the eastern frontier: Napoleon had never intimated a wish to -pass forces by Catalonia; neither the treaty nor the convention -authorized such a measure, nor could the pretence of supporting -Junot in Portugal be advanced as a mask. Nevertheless, so early -as the 9th of February, eleven thousand infantry, sixteen hundred -cavalry, and eighteen pieces of artillery, under the command of -general Duhesme, crossed the frontier at La Jonquera, and marched -upon Barcelona, leaving a detachment at the town of Figueras, -the strong citadel of which commands the principal pass of the -mountains. Arrived at Barcelona, Duhesme prolonged his residence -there under the pretext of waiting for instructions from Madrid, -relative to a pretended march upon Cadiz; but his secret orders -were, to obtain exact information concerning the Catalonian -fortresses, dépôts, and magazines,--to ascertain the state of -public feeling,--to preserve a rigid discipline,--scrupulously to -avoid giving any offence to the Spaniards, and to enter into close -communication with marshal Moncey, at that time commanding the -whole of the French army in the north of Spain. - -The political affairs were even then beginning to indicate serious -results, and as soon as Duhesme’s report was received, and the -troops in the north were in a condition to execute their orders, -he was directed to seize upon the citadel of Barcelona, and the -fort of Monjuick. The citadel was obtained by stratagem; the fort, -one of the strongest in the world, was surrendered by the governor -Alvarez. That brave and worthy officer, knowing the baseness of -his court, was certain that he would receive no support from that -quarter, and did not resist the demand of the French general, who -having failed to surprise the vigilance of the garrison, impudently -insisted upon a surrender of the place. Alvarez consented to -relinquish his charge, although he felt the disgrace of his -situation so acutely that, it is said, he had some thoughts of -springing a mine beneath a French detachment during the conference; -but his mind, unequal to the occasion, betrayed his spirit, and he -sunk, oppressed by the force of unexpected circumstances. - -What a picture of human weakness do these affairs present; the -boldest men shrinking from the discharge of their trust like the -meanest cowards, and the wisest following the march of events, -confounded and without a rule of action! If such a firm man, as -Alvarez afterwards proved himself to be, could think the disgrace -of surrendering his charge at the demand of an insolent and -perfidious guest a smaller misfortune than the anger of a miserable -court, what must the state of public feeling have been, and how -can those men who, like O’Farril and Azanza, served the intruder -be with justice blamed, if, amidst the general stagnation, they -could not perceive the elements of a salutary tempest? At the view -of such scenes Napoleon might well enlarge his ambitious designs, -his fault was not in the projection, but in the rough execution -of his plan; another combination would have ensured success, and -the resistance he encountered only shows, that nations as well as -individuals are but the creatures of circumstances, at one moment -weak, trembling, and submissive; at another proud, haughty, and -daring; every novel combination of events has an effect upon public -sentiment distinct from, and often at variance, with what is called -national character. - -The treacherous game played at Barcelona was renewed at Figueras, -and with equal success; the citadel of that place fell into the -hands of the detachment left there, and thus a free entrance, and -a secure base of operations, was established in Catalonia, and the -magazines of Barcelona being filled, Duhesme, whose corps took the -name of the “army of the Eastern Pyrenees,” concluded that his task -was well accomplished. - -The affair was indeed a momentous one, and Napoleon earnestly -looked for its termination before the transactions at Madrid could -give an unfavourable impression of his ulterior intentions; he saw -the importance which, under certain circumstances, a war would -confer upon Barcelona. With an immense population, great riches, -a good harbour, and almost impregnable defences, that town might -be called the key of the south of France or Spain, just as it -happened to be in the possession of the one or the other nation. -The proximity of Sicily, where a large British force was kept in a -state of constant preparation, made it more than probable that if -hostilities broke out between himself and the Spaniards, an English -army would be quickly carried to Barcelona, and a formidable -systematic war be established upon the threshold of France. Such -an occurrence would have been fatal to his projects, he felt the -full extent of the danger, and at the risk of rendering abortive -the efforts to create a French party at Madrid, guarded against it -by this open violation of Spanish independence; but the peril of -exposing Barcelona to the English was too imminent to leave room -for hesitation. - -Thirty or forty thousand British troops occupying an entrenched -camp in front of that town, supported by a powerful fleet, and -having reserve magazines and dépôts in Sicily and the Spanish -islands, might have been so wielded as to give ample occupation -to a hundred and fifty thousand enemies. Under the protection of -such an army, the Spanish levies might have been organised and -instructed, and as the actual numbers assembled could have been -at all times easily masked, increased, or diminished, and the -fleet ready to co-operate, the south of France (from whence all -the provisions of the enemy must have been drawn) would have been -exposed to descents, and have sustained all the inconvenience of -actual hostilities. The Spanish provinces of Valencia, Murcia, and -even Andalusia, being thus covered, the war would have been drawn -to a head, and concentrated about Catalonia, the most warlike, -rugged, and sterile portion of Spain. But Duhesme’s success -having put an end to this danger, the affairs of Barcelona sunk -into comparative insignificance. Nevertheless, the emperor kept -a jealous watch upon that quarter, the corps employed there was -increased to twenty-two thousand men, the general commanding it -corresponded directly with Napoleon, and Barcelona was made the -centre of a system complete in itself, and distinct from that -which held the other corps, rolling round Madrid as their point of -attraction. - -The capital of Spain is situated in a sort of basin, formed by -a semicircular range of mountains, which under the different -denominations of the Sierra de Guadarama, the Carpentanos, and the -Sierra de Guadalaxara, sweep in one unbroken chain from east to -west, touching the Tagus at either end of an arch, of which that -river is the chord. - -All direct communications between Madrid and France, or between the -former and the northern provinces of Spain, must necessarily pass -over one or other of those Sierras, which are separated from the -great range of the Pyrenees by the valley of the Ebro, and from the -Biscayan and Asturian mountains by the valley of the Duero. - -The four principal roads which lead from France directly upon -Madrid are, first, the royal causeway, which passing the frontier -at Irun runs under St. Sebastian, and then through a wild and -mountainous country (full of dangerous defiles) to the Ebro, -crosses that river by a stone bridge at Miranda, and leads upon -Burgos, from which town it turns short to the left, is carried over -the Duero at Aranda, and soon after encountering the Carpentanos -and the Sierra de Guadalaxara, penetrates them by the strong pass -of the Somosierra, and descends upon the capital. Vittoria stands -in a plain about half way between St. Sebastian and Burgos. - -The second, which is inferior to the first, commences at St. Jean -Pied de Port, and unites at Pampelona: it runs through Taffalla, -crosses the Ebro at Tudela, and enters the basin of Madrid by the -eastern range of the Sierra de Guadalaxara, where the declination -of the mountains presents a less rugged barrier than the snowy -summits of the northern and western part of the chain. - -The third threads the Pyrenees by the way of Jaca, passes the Ebro -at Zaragoza, and uniting with the second, likewise crosses the -Guadalaxara ridge. - -The fourth is the great route from Perpignan by Figueras and Gerona -to Barcelona; from this latter town it leads by Cervera and Lerida -to Zaragoza. - -Hence Zaragoza, the capital of Aragon, one of the great dépôts of -Spain for arms and ammunition, and at that time containing fifty -thousand inhabitants, was a strategetical point of importance. An -army in position there could operate on either bank of the Ebro, -intercept the communication between the armies of the Eastern and -Western Pyrenees, and block three out of the four great roads -leading upon Madrid; if the French had occupied it in force, their -army in the capital would have been free and unconstrained in -its operations, and might have acted with more security against -Valencia; and the dangerous importance of the united armies of -Gallicia and Leon would also have been diminished, when the -road of Burgos ceased to be the only line of retreat from the -capital. Nevertheless, Napoleon neglected Zaragoza at first, -because that having no citadel, a small body of troops could not -control the inhabitants, and a large force would have created -suspicion too soon, and perhaps have prevented the success of -the attempts against Pampelona and Barcelona (objects of still -greater importance); neither was the heroic defence which that city -afterwards made within a reasonable calculation. - -The grand duke of Berg and the duke of Rovigo remained at Madrid, -and from that central point appeared to direct the execution of -the French emperor’s projects; but he distrusted their judgment, -and exacted the most detailed information of every movement and -transaction. - -In the course of June, Murat, who was suffering from illness, -quitted Spain, leaving behind him a troubled people, and a name for -cruelty which was foreign to his character. Savary remained the -sole representative of the new monarch: his situation was delicate; -he was in the midst of a great commotion; upon every side he beheld -the violence of insurrection and the fury of an insulted nation; it -behoved him, therefore, to calculate with coolness and to execute -with vigour. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes’ War in Catalonia, 1st Part.] - -Each Spanish province had its own junta of government; but -although equally enraged, they were not equally dangerous in their -anger. The attention of the Catalonians was completely absorbed -by Duhesme’s operations; but the soldiers of the regiments which -composed the Spanish garrisons of Barcelona, Monjuick, and -Figueras, quitting their ranks after the seizure of those places, -flocked to the patriotic standards in Murcia and Valencia. The -greatest part belonged to the Spanish and Walloon guards, and -they formed a good basis for an army which the riches of the two -provinces and the arsenal of Carthagena afforded ample military -resources to equip. - -The French had, however, nothing to fear from any direct movement -of this army against Madrid, as such an operation could only bring -on a battle; but if by a march towards Zaragoza, the Valencians had -united with the Aragonese and then operated against the line of -communication with France, the insurrection of Catalonia would have -been supported, and a point of union for three great provinces -fixed. In the power of executing this project lay the sting of the -Valencian insurrection. To besiege Zaragoza and prevent such a -junction was the remedy. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Letters, vide Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -The importance of Andalusia was greater; the division of regular -troops which under the command of the unhappy Solano had been -withdrawn from Portugal, was tolerably disciplined; a large -veteran force was assembled at the camp of St. Roque under general -Castaños; and the garrisons of Ceuta, Algeziras, Cadiz, Granada, -and other places being united, the whole formed a considerable -mass of troops; while a superb cannon foundry at Seville, and -the arsenal of Cadiz, furnished the means of equipment and the -materials for a train of artillery. An active intercourse was -maintained between the patriots and the English: the juntas of -Granada, Jaen, and Cordova admitted the supremacy of the junta -of Seville, and the army of Estremadura consented to obey their -orders. The riches of the province, its distance from Madrid, the -barrier of the Sierra Morena, which like a strong wall covered -Andalusia, and favoured the insurrection, afforded the means -of establishing a systematic war, and drawing together all the -scattered elements of resistance in the southern and western -provinces of Spain and Portugal; but this danger, although pregnant -with future consequences, was not immediate: there was no line of -offensive movement against the flank or rear of the French army -open to the Andalusian patriots, and a march to the front against -Madrid would have been tedious and dangerous; the true policy of -the Andalusians was palpably defensive. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault. Exped. Portugal.] - -In Estremadura the activity and means of the junta were not at -first sufficient to excite much attention; but in Leon, Old -Castile, and Gallicia, a cloud was gathering that threatened a -perilous storm. Don Gregorio Cuesta was captain-general of the two -former kingdoms: inimical to popular movements, and of a haughty -resolute disposition, he at first checked the insurrection with a -rough hand; by this conduct he laid the foundation for quarrels -and intrigues, which afterwards impeded the military operations, -and split the northern provinces into factions; finally, however, -he joined the side of the patriots. Behind him the kingdom of -Gallicia, under the direction of Filanghieri, had prepared a -large and efficient force. It was composed of the strong and -disciplined body of troops which, under the command of Tarranco, -had taken possession of Oporto, and after that general’s death -had returned with general Belesta to Gallicia. The garrisons -of Ferrol and Coruña and a number of soldiers, flying from the -countries occupied by the French, swelled the regular army, the -agents of Great Britain were actively employed in blowing the flame -of insurrection; money, arms, and clothing, were poured into the -province through their hands; Coruña afforded an easy and direct -intercourse with England, and a strict connexion was maintained -between the Gallician and Portuguese patriots. - -The facility of establishing the base of a regular systematic war -in Gallicia was therefore as great as in Andalusia, the resources -perhaps greater on account of the proximity of Great Britain, and -the advantage of position at this time was essentially in favour -of Gallicia, because the sources of her strength were equally -well covered from the direct line of the French operations, and -the slightest offensive movement upon her part threatened the -communications of the French army in Madrid, and endangered -the safety of any corps marching from the capital against the -southern provinces. To be prepared against the Gallician forces -was, therefore, a matter of pressing importance; a defeat from -that quarter would have been felt in all parts of the army; and -no considerable or sustained operation could have been undertaken -against the other insurgent forces until the strength of Gallicia -had been first broken. - -In Biscay and the Asturias the want of regular troops and fortified -towns, and the contracted shape of those provinces, placed them -completely within the power of the French, who had nothing to fear -as long as they could maintain possession of the sea-ports. - -From this sketch it results that Savary, in classing the dangers of -his situation, should have rated Gallicia and Leon in the first, -Zaragoza in the second, Andalusia in the third, and Valencia in -the fourth rank, and by that scale he should have regulated his -operations. It was thus Napoleon looked at the affair, but the duke -of Rovigo, wavering in his opinions, neglected or misunderstood the -spirit of his instructions, lost the control of the operations, and -sunk amidst the confusion which he had himself created. - -Nearly fifty thousand men and eighty guns were disposable for -offensive operations in the beginning of June: collected into one -mass such an army was more than sufficient to crush any or all -of the insurgent armies combined; but it was necessary to divide -it and to assail several points at the same time; in doing this -the safety of each minor body depended upon the stability of the -central point from whence it emanated; and again the security of -that centre depended upon the strength of its communications with -France; in other words, Bayonne was the base of operations against -Madrid, and this town in turn became the base of operations -against Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia. - -To combine all the movements of a vast plan which would embrace -the operations against Catalonia, Aragon, Biscay, the Asturias, -Gallicia, Leon, Castille, Andalusia, Murcia, and Valencia, in -such a simple manner that the corps of the army working upon one -principle might mutually support and strengthen each other, and at -the same time preserve their communication with France, was the -great problem to be solved. Napoleon felt that it required a master -mind, and from Bayonne he put all the different armed masses in -motion himself, and with the greatest caution; for it is a mistaken -notion, although one very generally entertained, that he plunged -headlong into this contest without precaution, as having to do with -adversaries he despised. - -In his instructions to the duke of Rovigo he says, “_In a war of -this sort it is necessary to act with patience, coolness, and upon -calculation._” “_In civil wars it is the important points only -which should be guarded, we must not go to all places_;” and he -inculcates the doctrine that to spread the troops over the country -without the power of uniting upon emergency would be a dangerous -and useless display of activity. The principle upon which he -proceeded may be illustrated by the comparison of a closed hand -thrust forward and the fingers afterwards extended: as long as -the solid part of the member was securely fixed and guarded, the -return of the smaller portions of it and their flexible movement -was feasible and without great peril; but a wound given to the -hand or arm not only endangered that part but paralyzed the action -of the whole limb. Hence all the care and attention with which -his troops were arranged along the road to Burgos; hence all the -measures of precaution already described, such as the seizure of -the fortresses, and the formation of the reserves at Bayonne. - -The insurrection having commenced, Bessieres was ordered to put -Burgos into a state of defence,--to detach a division of four -or five thousand men under general Lefebre Desnouettes against -Zaragoza,--to keep down the insurgents of Biscay, Asturias, and Old -Castille,--and to watch the army assembling in Gallicia; he was -likewise enjoined to occupy and watch with jealous care the port -of St. Ander and the coast towns. At the same time a reinforcement -of nine thousand men was preparing for Duhesme, which, it was -supposed, would enable him to tranquillize Catalonia, and -co-operate with a division marching from Madrid against Valencia. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s notes, Appendix, No. 2.] - -The reserve under general Drouet was nourished by drafts from the -interior: it supplied Bessieres with reinforcements, and afforded -a detachment of four thousand men to watch the openings of the -valleys of the Pyrenees, especially towards the castle of Jaca, -which was in possession of the Spanish insurgents. A smaller -reserve was established at Perpignan, and another detachment -watched the openings of the eastern frontier. All the generals -commanding corps, or even detachments, were directed to correspond -daily with general Drouet. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Moncey’s Operations. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s notes, Appendix, No. 1.] - -The security of the rear being thus provided for, the main body at -Madrid commenced offensive operations. Marshal Moncey was directed, -with part of his corps upon Cuenca, to intercept the march of the -Valencian army upon Zaragoza, and general Dupont, with ten thousand -men, marched towards Cadiz; the remainder of his and Moncey’s -troops were kept in reserve and distributed in various parts of La -Mancha and the neighbourhood of Madrid. Napoleon likewise directed, -that Segovia should be occupied and put in a state of defence, that -a division (Gobert’s) of Moncey’s corps should co-operate with -Bessieres on the side of Valladolid, and that moveable columns -should scour the country in rear of the acting bodies, and unite -again at stated times upon points of secondary interest. Thus -linking his operations together, Napoleon hoped, by grasping as it -were the ganglia of the insurrection, to paralyze its force, and -reduce it to a few convulsive motions which would soon subside. -The execution of his plan failed in the feebler hands of his -lieutenants, but it was well conceived, and embraced every probable -immediate chance of war, and even provided for the distant and -uncertain contingency of an English army landing upon the flanks or -rear of the corps at either extremity of the Pyrenean frontier. - -Military men would do well to reflect upon the prudence which -the French emperor displayed upon this occasion. Not all his -experience, his power, his fortune, nor the contempt which he felt -for the prowess of his adversaries, could induce him to relax in -his precautions; every chance was considered, and every measure -calculated with as much care and circumspection as if the most -redoubtable enemy was opposed to him. The conqueror of Europe was -as fearful of making false movements before an army of peasants, as -if Frederick the Great had been in his front, and yet he failed! -Such is the uncertainty of war! - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -All the insurrections of the Spanish provinces took place nearly -at the same period; the operations of the French divisions were, -of course, nearly simultaneous; I shall, therefore, narrate their -proceedings separately, classing them by the effect each produced -upon the stability of the intrusive government in Madrid, and -commencing with the - - -FIRST OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL BESSIERES. - -[Sidenote: Moniteur. Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.] - -That officer had scarcely fixed his quarters at Burgos when a -general movement of revolt took place. On his right, the bishop of -St. Ander excited the inhabitants of the diocese to take arms. In -his rear, a mechanic assembled some thousand armed peasants at the -town of Logroño. In front, five thousand men took possession of the -Spanish artillery dépôt at Segovia; an equal number assembling at -Palencia armed themselves from the royal manufactory at that place, -and advanced to the town of Torquemada; while general Cuesta, with -some regular troops and a body of organized peasantry, posted -themselves on the Pisuerga at Cabeçon. - -Bessieres immediately divided his disposable force, which was not -more than twelve thousand men, into several columns, and traversed -the country in all directions, disarming the towns and interrupting -the combinations of the insurgents; while a division of Dupont’s -corps, under general Frere, marched from the side of Madrid to aid -his operations. General Verdier attacked Logroño on the 6th of -June, dispersed the peasantry, and put the leaders to death after -the action. General Lasalle, departing from Burgos with a brigade -of light cavalry, passed the Pisuerga, fell upon the Spaniards at -Torquemada on the 7th, broke them, and pursuing with a merciless -sword, burnt that town, and entered Palencia on the 8th. - -Meanwhile Frere defeated the Spanish force at Segovia taking -thirty pieces of artillery; and general Merle marching through the -country lying between the Pisuerga and the Douero with a division -of infantry, joined Lasalle at Dueñas on the 12th. From thence -they proceeded to Cabeçon, where Cuesta accepted battle, and was -overthrown, with much slaughter, the loss of his artillery, and -several thousand musquets. The flat country being thus subdued, -Lasalle’s cavalry remained to keep it under; but Merle, marching -northward, commenced operations, in concert with general Ducos, -against the province of St. Ander. On the 20th, the latter general -drove the Spaniards from the pass of Soncillo; the 21st, he forced -the pass of Venta de Escudo, and descending the valley of the -river Pas, approached St. Ander; on the 22d, Merle, after some -resistance, penetrated by Lantueño, and followed the course of -the Besaya to Torre La Vega, then turning to his right entered -St. Ander on the 23d; and Ducos arriving at the same time, the -town submitted, and the bishop fled with the greatest part of the -clergy. The authorities of Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, and -St. Ander, were compelled to send deputies to take the oath of -allegiance to Joseph. - -By these operations, the above-named provinces were completely -disarmed, and so awed by the activity of Bessieres, that no further -insurrections took place, and his cavalry raised contributions -and collected provisions without the least difficulty. Frere’s -division then returned to Toledo, and from thence marched to San -Clemente, on the borders of Murcia. The imprudence of Cuesta, and -the general deficiency of talent and judgment manifested by the -Spaniards throughout these proceedings, were very remarkable. - -[Sidenote: Cavallero.] - -While Bessieres thus broke the northern insurrections, the march -of general Lefebre Desnouettes against the province of Aragon -brought on the first siege of Zaragoza. Palafox being declared -captain-general, recalled the retired officers into service; a -number of volunteers repaired to him from distant parts, and the -soldiers and officers who could escape from Pampelona and Madrid -joined his standard, and among others the officers of engineers -employed in the school of Alcala. With their assistance his forces -were rapidly organized, and many battalions were formed and posted -at different points on the roads leading towards Navarre. The baron -de Versage, an officer of the Walloon guards, occupied Calatayud -with a regiment composed of students who were volunteers; he raised -more men in that quarter, kept up a communication with the juntas -of Soria and Siguenza, and covered the powder-mills in Villa -Felice. The arsenal of Zaragoza supplied the patriots with arms. At -Tudela the people broke down the bridge over the Ebro, and Palafox -detached five hundred fuzileers to assist them in defending the -passage of that river. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Lefebre’s Operations. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Moniteur. Victoire et Conquêtes des Français.] - -[Sidenote: Cavallero.] - -In this situation of affairs Lefebre commenced his march from -Pampelona the 7th of June, at the head of three or four thousand -infantry, some field batteries, and a regiment of Polish cavalry. -On the 9th he forced the passage of the Ebro, put the leaders of -the insurrection to death after the action, and then continued his -movement by the right bank to Mallen. Palafox, with ten thousand -infantry, two hundred dragoons, and eight pieces of artillery, -awaited him there in a position behind the Huecha. The 13th, -Palafox was overthrown; the 14th, the French reached the Xalon; -another combat and another victory carried Lefebre across that -river; and the 15th, he was on the Huerba, in front of the heroic -city. - - -FIRST SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA. - -[Sidenote: Cavallero.] - -[Sidenote: Siege of Zaragoza.] - -Zaragoza contained at that period fifty thousand inhabitants; -situated on the right bank of the Ebro, it was connected with -a suburb on the opposite side by a handsome stone bridge. The -immediate vicinity is flat, and on the side of the suburb low and -marshy. The small river Huerba, running through a deep cleft, cuts -the plain on the right bank, and taking its course close to the -walls, falls into the Ebro nearly opposite to the mouth of the -Gallego, which, descending from the mountains on the opposite side, -cuts the plain on the left bank. The convent of St. Joseph, built -on the right of the Huerba, covered a bridge over that torrent; -and, at the distance of cannon-shot, a step of land commenced, -which, gradually rising, terminated at eighteen hundred yards from -the convent, in a hill called the Monte Torrero. On this hill, -which commanded all the plain and overlooked the town, several -storehouses and workshops, built for the use of the canal, were -entrenched, and occupied by twelve hundred men. The canal itself, -a noble work, formed a water carriage without a single lock from -Tudela to Zaragoza. The city, surrounded by a low brick wall, -presented no regular defences, and possessed very few guns in a -state fit for service, but the houses were strongly constructed, -some of stone, others of brick; they were mostly of two stories -high, each story being vaulted so as to be nearly proof against -fire; and the massive walls of the convents, rising like castles -all round the circuit as well as inside the place, were to be seen -crowded with armed men. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Lefebre’s Operations. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Cavallero.] - -Such was Zaragoza when Lefebre Desnouettes first appeared before -it: his previous movements had cut the direct communication with -Calatayud, and obliged the baron Versage to retire to Belchite -with the volunteers and several thousand fresh levies. Palafox -occupied the olive groves and houses on the step of land between -the convent of St. Joseph and Monte Torrero; but his men, cowed by -their previous defeats, were easily driven from thence on the 16th, -and the town was closely invested on the right bank of the Ebro. -Indeed so great was the terror and confusion of the Spaniards, that -some of the French penetrated without difficulty into the street -of St. Engracia, and the city was on the point of being taken -that day, for Palafox, accompanied by his brother Francisco, an -aide-de-camp, and one hundred dragoons, under pretence of seeking -succour, endeavoured to go forth on the side of the suburb at the -moment when the French were entering on the side of Engracia; but -the plebeian leaders being suspicious of his intentions, would not -suffer him to depart without a guard of infantry, and Tio Jorge[7] -accompanied him to watch his conduct and to ensure his return. It -was a strange proceeding, and ill-timed, that the chief should thus -fly out at one gate while the enemy was pressing in at another, -when the streets were filled with clamour, the dismayed garrison -making little or no resistance, and all things in confusion. -Zaragoza was that day on the very verge of destruction, when -the French, either fearful of an ambuscade, or ignorant of their -advantages, retired, and the people, as if inspired, changing from -the extreme of terror to that of courage, suddenly fell to casting -up defences, piercing loop-holes in the walls of the houses, -constructing ramparts with sand-bags, and working with such vigour, -that, under the direction of their engineers, in twenty-four -hours they put the place in a condition to withstand an assault. -Whereupon Lefebre confining his operations to the right bank of -the Ebro, established posts close to the gates, and waited for -reinforcements. - -[Sidenote: Cavallero.] - -Meanwhile Palafox crossing the Ebro at Pina, joined Versage at -Belchite, and having collected seven or eight thousand men, and -four pieces of artillery, gained the Xalon in rear of the French; -from thence he proposed to advance through Epila and endeavour -to relieve Zaragoza by a battle. His officers, struck with the -imprudence of this measure, resisted his authority, and prepared to -retire to Valencia. Palafox, ignorant of war, and probably awed by -Tio Jorge, expressed his determination to fight, saying, with an -imposing air, “that those who feared danger might retire.” Touched -with shame, all agreed to follow him to Epila; and he advanced: but -two French regiments, detached by Lefebre, met him on the march, -and a combat commencing at nine in the evening, the Spaniards were -unable to form any order of battle, and, notwithstanding their -superior numbers, were defeated with the loss of three thousand -men. Palafox, who did not display that firmness in danger which -his speech promised, must have fled early, as he reached Calatayud -in the night, although many of his troops arrived there unbroken -the next morning. After this disaster, Palafox, leaving Versage at -Calatayud to make fresh levies, returned himself, with all the -beaten troops that he could collect, to Belchite, and from thence -regained Zaragoza on the 2d of July. Meanwhile Lefebre had taken -the Monte Torrero by assault on the 27th of June. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Lefebre’s Operations. MSS.] - -The 29th or 30th, general Verdier arrived on the Huerba with a -division of infantry, and a large train of battering artillery; and -the besiegers being now nearly twelve thousand strong, attacked -the convents of St. Joseph and the Capuchins on the same day that -Palafox returned; the first assault on St. Joseph’s failed, the -second succeeded; but the Capuchins, after some fighting, was set -fire to by the Spaniards and abandoned. All this time the suburb -was left open and free for the besieged. But Napoleon blamed this -mode of attack, and sent orders to throw a bridge across the -Ebro,--to press the siege on the left bank,--and to profit of the -previous success by raising a breaching battery in the convent of -St. Joseph. A bridge was accordingly constructed at St. Lambert, -two hundred yards above the town, and two attacks were carried on -at the same time. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 2.] - -Hitherto the French troops employed in Aragon formed a part of -marshal Bessieres’ corps, but the emperor now directed Lefebre to -repair with his brigade to reinforce that marshal, and constituting -the ten thousand men who remained with Verdier a separate corps, -gave this last general the command of it, and promised him -reinforcements. Verdier continued to press the siege as closely as -his numbers would permit, but, all around him, the insurgents were -rapidly organising small armies, and threatened to enclose him in -his camp. This obliged him to send detachments against them: and -it is singular, that with so few men, while daily fighting with -the besieged, he should have been able to scour the country, and -put down the insurrection, as far as Lerida, Barbastro, Tudela, -Jacca, and Calatayud; the garrison of Pampelona only assisting -him from the side of Navarre. In one of these expeditions the -powder-mills of Villa Felice, thirty miles distant, were destroyed, -and the baron Versage being defeated, was forced to retire with his -division towards Valencia. - -[Sidenote: Cavallero.] - -During the course of July, Verdier made several assaults on the -gate of El Carmen, and others on the Portillo, but he was repulsed -in all. The besieged having been reinforced by the regiment of -Estremadura, composed of eight hundred old soldiers, in return -made a sally with two thousand men to retake the Monte Torrero, -but they were beaten, with the loss of their commander; regular -approaches were then commenced by the French against the quarter -of St. Engracia and the castle of Aljaferia. The 2d of August, the -besieged were again reinforced by two hundred men of the Spanish -guard and volunteers of Aragon, who brought some artillery with -them; the French likewise were strengthened by two old regiments of -the line, which increased their numbers to fifteen thousand men. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Cavallero.] - -On the 3d of August, the breaching batteries opened against St. -Engracia and Aljaferia; the mortar batteries threw shells at the -same time, and a Spanish magazine of powder blowing up in the -Cosso (a public walk formed on the line of the ancient Moorish -ramparts), destroyed several houses, and killed many of the -defenders. The place was then summoned to surrender on terms, but -Palafox having rejected all offers, on the 4th of August the town -was stormed through a breach in the convent of St. Engracia; the -French penetrated to the Cosso, and a confused and terrible scene -ensued. Some defended the houses, some drew up in the streets, -some fled by the suburb to the country, where the French cavalry -fell upon them; cries of treason were every where heard, and became -the signal for assassinations; all seemed lost, when a column of -the assailants seeking the way to the bridge over the Ebro, got -entangled in the Arco de Cineja, a long crooked street, and being -attacked in that situation, were driven back to the Cosso; others -began to plunder, and the Zaragozans recovering courage, fought -with desperation, and set fire to the convent of Francisco. At -the close of day the French were in possession of one side of the -Cosso, and the Spaniards of the other. A hideous and revolting -spectacle was exhibited during the action; the public hospital -being taken and fired, the madmen confined there issued forth among -the combatants, muttering, shouting, singing, and moping, according -to the character of their disorder, while drivelling idiots mixed -their unmeaning cries with the shouts of contending soldiers. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Lefebre’s Operations. MSS.] - -The Spaniards now perceived, that with courage the town might still -be defended; and from that day the fighting was murderous and -constant, one party endeavouring to take, the other to defend the -houses. In this warfare, where skill was nearly useless, Verdier’s -force was too weak to make a rapid progress; and events disastrous -to the French arms taking place in other parts of Spain, he -received, about the 10th of August, orders from the king to raise -the siege, and retire to Logroña. Of this operation I shall speak -in due time. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. Mere professional skill and enterprise do not constitute a -great general. Lefebre Desnouettes, by his activity and boldness, -with a tithe of their numbers, defeated the insurgents of -Aragon in several actions, and scoured the open country; but the -same Lefebre, wanting the higher qualities of a general, failed -miserably where that intuitive sagacity that reads passing events -aright was required. There were thousands in the French army who -could have done as well as him; probably not three who could -have reduced Zaragoza, and yet it is manifest that Zaragoza owed -her safety to accident, and that the desperate resistance of the -inhabitants was more the result of chance than of any peculiar -virtue. - -2º. The feeble defence made at Mallen, at the Xalon; at the Monte -Torrero, at Epila; the terror of the besieged on the 16th, when -the French penetrated into the town; the flight of Palafox under -the pretence of seeking succour, nay, the very assault which in -such a wonderful manner called forth the energy of the Zaragozans, -and failed only because the French troops plundered, and missing -the road to the bridge, missed that to victory at the same time, -proves, that the fate of the city was determined by accident in -more than one of those nice conjunctures which men of genius know -how to seize, but others leave to the decision of fortune. - -3º. However, it must be acknowledged that Lefebre and Verdier, -especially the latter, displayed both vigour and talent; for it was -no mean exploit to quell the insurrections to a distance of fifty -miles on every side, at the same time investing double their own -numbers, and pushing the attack with such ardour as to reduce to -extremity a city so defended. - -4º. The current romantic tales of women rallying the troops, and -leading them forward at the most dangerous periods of this siege, -I have not touched upon, and may perhaps be allowed to doubt, -although it is not unlikely that when suddenly environed with -horrors, the delicate sensitiveness of women driving them to a kind -of phrensy, might produce actions above the heroism of men; and in -patient suffering their superior fortitude is manifest; wherefore I -neither wholly believe, nor will deny, their exploits at Zaragoza; -merely remarking that for a long time afterwards Spain swarmed with -heroines, clothed in half uniforms, and loaded with weapons. - -[Sidenote: Cavallero.] - -5º. The two circumstances that principally contributed to the -success of the defence were, first, the bad discipline of the -French soldiers; and secondly, the system of terror which was -established by the Spanish leaders, whoever those leaders were. -Few soldiers can be restrained from plunder when a town is taken -by assault; yet there is no period when the chances of war are -so sudden and so decisive, none where the moral responsibility -of a general is so great. Will military regulations alone secure -the necessary discipline at such a moment? The French army are -not deficient in a stern code, and the English army, taken -altogether, is probably the best regulated of modern times; but -here it is seen that Lefebre failed to take Zaragoza in default -of discipline; and in the course of this work it will appear that -no wild horde of Tartars ever fell with more licence upon their -rich effeminate neighbours than did the English troops upon the -Spanish towns taken by storm. The inference to be drawn is, that -national institutions alone will produce that moral discipline -necessary to make a soldier capable of fulfilling his whole duty; -yet a British statesman[8] was not ashamed to declare in parliament -that the worst men make the best soldiers; and this odious, -narrow-minded, unworthy maxim, had its admirers. That a system -of terror was at Zaragoza successfully employed to protract the -defence is undoubted. The commandant of Monte Torrero, ostensibly -for suffering himself to be defeated, but according to some, for -the gratification of private malice, was tried and put to death; -and a general of artillery was in a more summary manner killed -without any trial; the chief engineer, a man of skill and undaunted -courage, was arbitrarily imprisoned; and the slightest word or even -gesture of discontent, was punished with instant death. A stern -band of priests and plebeian leaders, in whose hands Palafox was a -tool, ruled with such furious energy, that resistance to the enemy -was less dangerous than disobedience to their orders. Suspicion was -the warrant of death, and this system once begun, ceased not until -the town was taken in the second siege. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. - - -[Sidenote: Cabanes, 1st Part.] - -When Barcelona fell into the power of the French, the Spanish -garrison amounted to nearly four thousand men; but Duhesme daily -fearing a riot in the city, connived at their escape in parties, -and even sent the regiment of Estremadura (which was eight hundred -strong) entire to Lerida, where, strange to relate, the gates were -shut against it; and thus, discarded by both parties, it made its -way into Zaragoza during the siege of that place. Many thousand -citizens also fled from Barcelona, and joined the patriotic -standards in the neighbouring provinces. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 2.] - -[Sidenote: Cabanes, 1st Part.] - -After the first ebullition at Manresa, the insurrection of -Catalonia lingered awhile; but the junta of Gerona continued to -excite the people to take arms, and it was manifest that a general -commotion approached; and this was a serious affair, for there -were in the beginning of June, including those who came out of -Barcelona, five thousand veteran troops in the province, and in the -Balearic islands above ten thousand. Sicily contained an English -army, and English fleets covered the Mediterranean. Moreover, by -the constitution of Catalonia, the whole of the male population fit -for war are obliged to assemble at certain points of each district -with arms and provisions, whenever the alarum bell, called the -_somaten_, is heard to ring; hence the name of _somatenes_; and -these warlike peasants, either from tradition or experience, are -well acquainted with the military value of their mountain holds. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -[Sidenote: Victoire et Conquestes des Francois.] - -[Sidenote: Foy.] - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -Hostilities soon commenced; Duhesme, following his instructions -from Bayonne, detached general Chabran and five thousand two -hundred men, with orders to secure Tarragona and Tortosa, to -incorporate the Swiss regiment of Wimpfen with his own troops, -and to aid marshal Moncey in an attack on Valencia. At the same -time general Swartz having more than three thousand men, Swiss, -Germans, and Italians, under his command, was detached by the -way of Martorel and Montserrat to Manresa, with orders to raise -contributions, to put down the insurrection, and to destroy the -powder mills at the last town; then to get possession of Lerida, -and to incorporate all the Swiss troops found there in his own -brigade, placing five hundred men in the citadel; after which -he was to penetrate into Aragon, and to co-operate with Lefebre -against Zaragoza. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -These two columns quitted Barcelona the 3d and the 4th of June. -A heavy rain induced Swartz to stop all the 5th at Martorel: the -6th he resumed his march, but without any military precautions, -although the object of his expedition was known, and the somaten -ringing out among the hills, the peasants of eight districts were -assembled in arms; these men took a resolution to defend the -pass of Bruch, and the most active of the Manresa and Igualada -districts, assisted by a few old soldiers, immediately repaired -there, and posted themselves on the rocks. Swartz coming on in a -careless manner, a heavy but distant fire opened from all parts -on his column, and created a little confusion, but order was soon -restored, and the Catalans being beaten from their strong holds, -were pursued for four or five miles along the main road. At Casa -Mansana, where a cross road leads to Manresa, one part broke away, -the others continued their flight to Igualada. Swartz, a man -evidently destitute of talent, halted at the very moment when his -success was complete, and the road to Manresa open; the Catalans -seeing his hesitation first rallied in the rear of Casa Mansana, -then returned to the attack, and drove the advanced guard back -upon the main body. The French general became alarmed, formed a -square, and retired hastily towards Esparraguéra, followed and -flanked by clouds of somatenes, whose courage and numbers increased -every moment; at Esparraguéra, which was a long single street, -the inhabitants had prepared an ambush; but Swartz, who arrived -at twilight, getting intelligence of their design, passed to the -right and left of the houses, and continuing his flight reached -Martorel the 7th, having lost a gun and many men by this inglorious -expedition, from which he returned in such disorder, and with his -soldiers so discouraged, that Duhesme thought it necessary to -recall Chabran from Tarragona. - -The country westward of the Llobregat is rugged and difficult -for an army, yet Chabran reached Tarragona on the 8th without -encountering an enemy; but when he attempted to return, the line -of his march was intercepted by the insurgents, who took post at -Vendrill, Arbos, and Villa Franca, and spread themselves along the -banks of the Llobregat. As he approached Vendrill the somatenes -fell back to Arbos, but a skirmish commencing at this latter place, -the Catalans were defeated. Chabran set fire to the town, and -proceeded to Villa Franca. Here the excesses so common at this time -among the Spaniards were not spared; the governor, an old man, -and several of his friends, were murdered, and the perpetrators -of these crimes, as might be expected, made little or no defence -against the enemy. - -Meanwhile general Lechi moved out of Barcelona, and acting in -concert with Swartz’s brigade, which marched from Martorel, cleared -the banks of the Llobregat, and formed a junction at San Felice -with Chabran on the 11th. The latter, after a day’s rest, having -his division completed by the brigade of Swartz, marched against -Manresa to repair the former disgrace; he arrived at Bruch the -14th, but the somatenes were also there, and assisted by some -regular troops with artillery. Finding that in a partial skirmish -he made no impression, Chabran, more timid even than Swartz, took -the extraordinary resolution of retreating, or rather flying from -those gallant peasants, who pursued him with scoffs and a galling -fire back to the very walls of Barcelona. - -This success spurred on the insurrection; Gerona, Rosas, -Hostalrich, and Tarragona prepared for defence. The somatenes -assembling in the Ampurdan obliged the French commandant to quit -the town of Figueras, and shut himself up with three hundred men in -the citadel, while others gathering between the Ter and the Besos, -intercepted all communication between France and Barcelona. - -In this predicament Duhesme resolved to make a sudden attempt on -Gerona, and for this purpose drew out six thousand of his best -troops, and eight pieces of artillery; but as the fortress of -Hostalrich stood in the direct road, he followed the coast line, -and employed a French privateer, then in the harbour, to attend -his march. The somatenes got intelligence of his designs: one -multitude took possession of the heights of Moncada, which are six -miles from Barcelona, and overhang the road to Hostalrich; another -multitude was posted on the ridge of Mongat, which, at the same -distance from Barcelona, abuts on the sea; an intrenched castle, -with a battery of fifteen guns, protected their left, and their -right was slightly connected with the people at Moncada. - -The 17th, Duhesme, after some false show to hide his real attack, -fell upon the castle of Mongat, where the greater mass of the -Catalans being posted, were defeated with slaughter; a detachment -from Barcelona dispersing those of Moncada at the same time. - -The 18th, the town of Mattaro being taken was plundered, although a -few cannon-shot only had been fired in its defence. The somatenes -were also defeated at the pass of San Pol. The 19th, the French -halted at San Tione, but at nine o’clock on the morning of the -20th, they appeared before the walls of Gerona. - -This town, built on the right bank of the Ter, is cut in two by -the Oña. To the eastward it is confined by strong rocky hills, -whose points filling the space between the right bank of the Oña -and the Ter, overlook the town at different distances. Fort Mont -Jouy, a regular fortification, crowned the nearest hill or table -land, at five hundred yards distance, and three forts (that of the -Constable, of queen Anne, and of the Capuchins), being connected by -a ditch and rampart, formed one irregular outwork, a thousand yards -in length, and commanding all the ridge to the south-east. The -summit of this ridge is five, eight, and twelve hundred yards from -Gerona, and sixteen hundred from Fort Mont Jouy, being separated -from the latter by the narrow valley and stream of the Gallegan. -South-west, between the left of the Oña and the Ter, the country, -comparatively flat, is, however, full of hollows and clefts close -to the town. The body of the place on that side was defended by a -ditch and five regular bastions connected by a wall with towers. To -the west the city was covered by the Ter, and on the east fortified -by a long wall with towers having an irregular bastion at each -extremity, and some small detached works placed at the opening of -the valley of Gallegan. Three hundred of the regiment of Ultonia -and some artillerymen composed the garrison of Gerona, but they -were assisted by volunteers and by the citizens; and the somatenes -also assembled on the left of the Ter to defend the passage of that -river. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -Duhesme, after provoking some cannon-shot from the forts, occupied -the village of St. Eugenia in the plain, and making a feint as -if to pass the Ter by the bridge of Salt, engaged the somatenes -in a useless skirmish. Great part of the day was spent by him in -preparing ladders for an attack; but at five o’clock in the evening -the French artillery opened from the heights of Palau, and a column -crossing the Oña passed between the outworks and the town, threw -out a detachment to keep the garrison of the former in check, and -assaulted the gate of El Carmen. This attempt failed completely -and with great loss to the assailants. Two hours afterwards -another column, advancing by the plain on the left of the Oña, -made an assault on the bastion of Santa Clara, but with so little -arrangement, or discipline, that the storming party moved forward -without their ladders, and although the hollows favoured them so -much that they arrived under the walls without being perceived, and -that the Neapolitan colonel Ambrosio, with a few others, actually -gained the ramparts by means of the single ladder brought up, the -confusion was too great to be remedied. And a detachment of the -regiment of Ultonia coming from the other side of the town, charged -the assailants, bayoneted those who were upon the walls, and drove -the rest back. Another feeble effort made after dark likewise -failed. - -Duhesme tried some useless negotiations on the following day; but -dreading a longer absence from Barcelona, broke up on the 22d, and -returned by forced marches. As he passed Mattaro he left Chabran -with some troops in that town. Meanwhile the victorious somatenes -of Bruch had descended the Llobregat, rallied those of the lower -country, and getting artillery from Taragona and other fortresses, -planted batteries at the different passages of the river, and -entrenched a line from San Boy to Martorel. Regular officers now -took the command of the peasants; colonel Milans assembled a body -at Granollers; don Juan Claros put himself at the head of the -peasants of the Ampurdan; and colonel Baget took the command of -those at Bruch. - -General Chabran, after a few days’ rest at Mattaro, made a foraging -excursion through the district of El Vallés. Milans, who held the -valley of the Congosta, encountered him near Granollers; both sides -claimed the victory, but Chabran retired to Barcelona, and Milans -remained on the banks of the Besos. The 30th Duhesme caused the -somatenes on the Llobregat to be attacked; general Lechi menaced -those at the bridge of Molinos del Rey, while the brigades of -Bessieres and Goullus, crossing at San Boy, surprised a battery -at that point and turned the whole line. Lechi then crossed the -river by the bridge of Molinos, ascended the left bank, took -all the artillery, burnt several villages, killed a number of -the somatenes, and put the rest to flight. They rallied again, -however, at Bruch and Igualada, and returning the 6th of July, -infested the immediate vicinity of Barcelona, taking possession of -all the hills between San Boy and Moncada, and connecting their -operations with colonel Milans. Other parties collected between the -Besos and the Ter, and extended the line of insurrection to the -Ampurdan; Juan Claros occupied the flat country about Rosas, and -the French garrison of Figueras having burnt the town, were blocked -up in the fort of San Fernando by two thousand somatenes of the -Pyrenees. A nest of Spanish privateers was formed in Palamos Bay, -and two English frigates, the Imperieuse and the Cambrian, watched -the coast from Rosas to Barcelona. - -A supreme junta being now established at Lerida, opened an -intercourse with Aragon, Valencia, Seville, Gibraltar, and the -Balearic islands, and decreed that forty tercios or regiments of -one thousand men, to be selected from the somatenes, should be paid -and organized as regular troops, and that forty others should be -kept in reserve, but without pay. - -[Sidenote: Foy’s History.] - -[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s despatch, Aug. 27.] - -[Sidenote: Foy’s History.] - -This state of affairs being made known to Napoleon through the -medium of the moveable columns watching the valleys of the eastern -Pyrenees, he ordered general Reille, commanding the reserve at -Perpignan, to take the first soldiers at hand and march to the -relief of Figueras, after which, his force being increased by -drafts from the interior of France, to nine thousand men, he was -to assault Rosas and to besiege Gerona. The emperor imagined, that -the fall of the latter place would induce the surrender of Lerida, -and would so tranquillize Catalonia, that five thousand men might -again be detached towards Valencia. On receiving this order, Reille -with two battalions of Tuscan recruits, conducted a convoy safely -to Figueras and raised the blockade, but not without difficulty, -for his troops were greatly terrified and could scarcely be kept -to their colours. He relieved the place the 10th of July, and the -same day Duhesme, who had been preparing for a second attack on -Gerona, quitted Barcelona with six thousand infantry, some cavalry, -a battering train of twenty-two pieces, and a great number of -country carriages to transport his ammunition and stores, general -Lechi remaining in the city with five thousand men. Meanwhile -Reille having victualled Figueras and received a part of his -reinforcements, proceeded to invest Rosas; but he had scarcely -appeared before it when Juan Claros raised the country in his rear; -and Captain Otway, of the Montague, landing with some marines, -joined the migueletes: the French were forced to retire, and lost -two hundred men in their retreat. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr. Campaign in Catalonia.] - -Duhesme pursued his march by the coast, whereupon the somatenes -of that part broke up the road in his front; Milans hung upon his -left, and lord Cochrane, with the Imperieuse frigate and some -Spanish vessels, cannonaded his right flank. In this dilemma he -remained five days in front of Arenas de Mar; and then dividing -his forces, sent one part across the mountains by Villagorguin, -and another by St. Iscle; the first made an attempt on Hostalrich, -but failed; the second beat away colonel Milans and dispersed -the somatenes of the Tordera; finally, Duhesme united his people -before Gerona on the 22d, but he had lost many carriages during the -march. The 23d he passed the Ter and dispersed the migueletes that -guarded the left bank. The 24th general Reille coming from Figueras -with six thousand men, took post at Puente Mayor, and the town was -invested with a line extending from that point by the heights of -San Miguel to the Monte Livio; from Monte Livio by the plain to the -bridge of Salt, and from thence along the left bank of the Ter to -Sarria. The garrison consisting of five hundred migueletes and four -hundred of the regiment of Ultonia, was reinforced on the 25th by -thirteen hundred of the regiment of Barcelona, who entered the town -with two guns. All the defences were in bad repair, but the people -were resolute. The night of the 27th, a French column passing the -valley of Galligan, gained the table land of Fort Mont Jouy, and -made lodgements in three towers of masonry which the Spaniards -had abandoned in the first moment of surprise. This advantage -elated Duhesme so much, that he resolved, without consulting his -engineers, to break ground on that side. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes’ History.] - -[Sidenote: Cabanes’ History, 2d Part.] - -At this period a great change in the affairs of Catalonia took -place; the insurrection had hitherto been confined to the exertions -of the unorganised somatenes and was without system; but now -a treaty between lord Collingwood, who commanded the British -navy in the Mediterranean, and the marquis of Palacios, who was -captain-general of the Balearic isles, having been concluded, the -Spanish fleet and the troops in Minorca, Majorca, and Ivica, became -disposable for the service of the patriots. Palacios immediately -sent thirteen hundred to the port of San Felice di Quixols to -reinforce the garrison of Gerona. These men entered that city, as -we have seen, on the 25th, and Palacios himself disembarked four -thousand others at Tarragona on the 22d, together with thirty-seven -pieces of artillery; an event that excited universal joy, and -produced a surprising eagerness to fight the French. - -[Sidenote: St Cyr.] - -[Sidenote: Cabanes’ History, 2d Part.] - -The supreme junta immediately repaired to Tarragona, declared -Palacios their president, and created him commander-in-chief, -subject, however, to the tutelar saint Narcissus, who was appointed -generalissimo of the forces by sea and land, and the ensigns of -authority, with due solemnity, placed on his coffin. The first -object with Palacios was to re-establish the line of the Llobregat. -To effect this, the count of Caldagues, with eighteen hundred men -and four guns, marched from Tarragona in two columns, the one -moving by the coast way to San Boy, and the other by the royal -road, through Villafranca and Ordal. Caldagues, in passing by -the bridge of Molino del Rey, established a post there, and then -ascending the left bank, fixed his quarters at Martorel, where -colonel Baget joined him with three thousand migueletes of the new -levy. - -[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s despatches.] - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -The Llobregat runs within a few miles of Barcelona, but the right -bank being much the steepest, the lateral communications easier, -and the heights commanding a distinct view of every thing passing -on the opposite side; the line taken by Caldagues was strong, and -the country in his rear rough, full of defiles, and very fitting -for a retreat after the loss of a battle. General Lechi, thus -hemmed in on the west, was also hampered on the north, for the -mountains filling all the space between the Llobregat and the -Besos, approach in tongues as near as two and three miles from -Barcelona; and the somatenes of the Manresa and Valls districts -occupied them, and skirmished daily with the French outposts. -Beyond the Besos, which bounds Barcelona on the eastward, a lofty -continuous ridge extending to Hostalrich, runs parallel to, and at -the distance of two or three miles from the sea coast, separating -the main and the marine roads, and sending its shoots down to the -water’s edge. This ridge also swarmed with somatenes, who cut off -all communication with Duhesme, and lay in leaguer round the castle -of Mongat, in which were eighty or ninety French. The Cambrian and -the Imperieuse frigates blockaded the harbour of Barcelona; and, on -the 31st of July, lord Cochrane having brought his vessel alongside -of Mongat, landed his marines, and, in concert with the somatenes, -took it, blew up the works, and rolled the rocks and ruins down -in such a manner as to destroy the road. Thus, at the very moment -that Duhesme commenced the siege of Gerona, he was cut off from his -own base of operations, and the communication between Figueras and -general Reille’s division, was equally insecure, for the latter’s -convoys were attacked the 28th of July, the 3d of August, and so -fiercely on the 6th, that a Neapolitan battalion was surrounded, -and lost one hundred and fifty men. - -Palacios, whose forces increased daily, wished to make an effort in -favour of Gerona, and with this view sent the count of Caldagues, -at the head of three or four thousand men (part migueletes, part -regulars), to interrupt the progress of the siege, intending to -follow himself with greater forces. Caldagues left Martorel the -evening of the 6th, marched by Tarrasa, Sabadell, Granollers, and -San Celoni, and reached Hostalrich the morning of the 10th; there -his force was increased to five thousand men and four guns. The -13th, he entered Llagostera; the 14th Castellar, a small place -situated behind the ridges that overlook Gerona, and only five -miles from the French camps. Don Juan Claros, with two thousand -five hundred migueletes, mixed with some Walloon and Spanish guards -from Rosas, met him at Castellar, as did also colonel Milans with -eight hundred somatenes. - -Caldagues having opened a communication with the junta of Gerona, -found that Fort Mont Jouy was upon the point of surrendering, and -that the French, who were ignorant of his approach, had, contrary -to good discipline, heaped their forces in the plain between the -left of the Oña and the Ter, but only kept a slender guard on the -hills, while a single battalion protected the batteries raised -against Mont Jouy. Being an enterprising man, Caldagues resolved to -make an immediate effort for the relief of the place, and, after a -careful observation on the 15th, divided his forces, and the 16th -fell, with several columns, on the weakest part of the besiegers’ -line. The garrison sallied forth at the same time from Mont Jouy, -and the French guards being taken between two fires, were quickly -overpowered, and driven first to the Puente Mayor and finally over -the Ter. The Spaniards re-formed on the hills, expecting to be -attacked; but Duhesme and Reille remained quiet until dark, then -breaking up the siege, they fled away, the one to Figueras, the -other to Barcelona, leaving both artillery and stores behind. - -Duhesme endeavoured to pass along the coast, but, on his arrival -at Callella, he discovered that the road was cut by ditches, that -an English frigate was prepared to rake his columns on the march, -and that all the heights were occupied by the somatenes; whereupon, -destroying his ammunition, throwing his remaining artillery over -the rocks, and taking to by-ways in the mountains, he forced a -passage through the midst of the somatenes to Mongat, where general -Lechi met him the 20th, and covered his retreat into Barcelona. -Thus ended Duhesme’s second attempt against Gerona. - -OBSERVATION 1.--Three great communications pierce the Pyrenean -frontier of Catalonia, leading directly upon Barcelona. - -The first, or Puycerda road, penetrates between the sources of the -Segre and the Ter. - -The second, or Campredon road, between the sources of the Ter and -the Fluvia. - -The third, or Figueras road, between the sources of the Muga and -the sea-coast. - -The first and second unite at Vicque; the second and third are -connected by a transverse road running from Olot, by Castle Follit, -to Gerona; the third also dividing near the latter town, leads with -one branch through Hostalrich, and with the other follows the line -of the coast. After the union of the first and second at Vicque, -a single route pursues the stream of the Besos to Barcelona, thus -turning the Muga, the Fluvia, the Ter, the Tordera, Besos, and an -infinity of minor streams, that, descending from the mountains, in -their rapid course to the Mediterranean, furrow all the country -between the eastern Pyrenees and Barcelona. The third, which is the -direct and best communication between Perpignan and the capital of -Catalonia, crosses all the above-named rivers, whose deep channels -and sudden floods offer serious obstacles to the march of an army. - -All these roads, with the exception of that from Olot to Gerona, -are separated by craggy ridges of mountains scarcely to be -passed by troops; and the two first leading through wild and -savage districts, are incommoded by defiles, and protected by a -number of old castles and walled places, more or less capable of -resistance. The third, passing through many rich and flourishing -places, is however completely blocked to an invader by the strong -fortresses of Figueras and Rosas on the Muga, of Gerona on the -Ter, and Hostalrich on the Tordera. Palamos and several castles -likewise impede the coast road, which is moreover skirted by rocky -mountains, and exposed for many leagues to the fire of a fleet. -Such is Catalonia, eastward and northward of Barcelona. - -On the west, at five or six miles distance, the Llobregat cuts it -off from a rough and lofty tract, through which the Cardena, the -Noga, the Foix, Gaya, Anguera, and Francoli rivers, break in deep -channels, descending in nearly parallel lines to the coast, and -the spaces between being gorged with mountains, and studded with -fortified places which command all the main roads. The plains and -fertile valleys are so few and contracted, that Catalonia may, -with the exception of the rich parts about Lerida and the Urgel, -be described as a huge mass of rocks and torrents, incapable of -supplying subsistence even for the inhabitants, whose prosperity -depends entirely upon manufactures and commerce. - -Barcelona, the richest and most populous city in Spain, is the -heart of the province, and whoso masters it, if he can hold it, -may suck the strength of Catalonia away. A French army, without a -commanding fleet to assist, can scarcely take or keep Barcelona; -the troops must be supplied by regular convoys from France; -the fortresses on the line of communication must be taken and -provisioned, and the active intelligent population of the country -must be beaten from the rivers, pursued into their fortresses, and -warred down by exertions which none but the best troops are capable -of: for the Catalans are robust, numerous, and brave enough after -their own manner. - -OBSERVATION 2d.--It follows from this exposition, that Duhesme -evinced a surprising want of forethought and military sagacity, -in neglecting to secure Gerona, Hostalrich, and Tarragona, with -garrisons, when his troops were received into those places. It was -this negligence that rendered the timid operations of Swartz and -Chabran capital errors; it was this that enabled some poor injured -and indignant peasants to kindle a mighty war, and in a very few -weeks obliged Napoleon to send thirty thousand men to the relief of -Barcelona. - -[Sidenote: St Cyr.] - -OBSERVATION 3d.--Duhesme was experienced in battles, and his energy -and resources of mind have been praised by a great authority; but -undoubtedly an absence of prudent calculation and arrangement, a -total neglect of military discipline, marked all his operations in -Catalonia; witness his mode of attack on Gerona, the deficiency -of ladders, and the confusion of the assaults. Witness also his -raising of the second siege, and absolute flight from Caldagues, -whose rash enterprise, although crowned with success, should have -caused his own destruction. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 2.] - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -In those affairs it is certain Duhesme displayed neither talent -nor vigour; but in the severities he exercised at the sacking of -Mattaro, in the burning of villages, which he executed to the -extreme verge of, if not beyond what the harshest laws of war will -justify, an odious energy was apparent, and as the ardour of the -somatenes was rather increased than repressed by these vigorous -proceedings, his conduct may be deemed as impolitic as it was -barbarous. - -OBSERVATION 4th.--In Catalonia all the inherent cruelty of the -Spaniards was as grossly displayed as in any other province of -Spain. The Catalans were likewise vain and superstitious; but their -courage was higher, their patriotism purer, and their efforts -more sustained; the somatenes were bold and active in battle, -the population of the towns firm, and the juntas apparently -disinterested. The praise merited and bestowed upon the people of -Zaragoza is great; but Gerona more justly claims the admiration of -mankind; for the Aragonese troops were by Lefebre driven from the -open country in crowds to their capital, and little was wanted to -induce them to surrender at once; it was not until the last hour -that, gathering courage from despair, the people of Zaragoza put -forth all their energy: whereas those of Gerona, although attacked -by a greater force, and possessing fewer means of defence, without -any internal system of terror to counterbalance their fear of the -enemy, manfully and successfully resisted from the first. The -people of Zaragoza rallied at their hearthstone; those of Gerona -stood firm at the porch. But quitting these matters, I must now, -following the order I have marked out, proceed to relate the -occurrences in Valencia. - - -OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL MONCEY. - -The execution of Calvo and his followers changed the horrid aspect -of the Valencian insurrection; the spirit of murder was checked, -and the patriotic energy assumed a nobler appearance. Murcia and -Valencia were united as one province; and towards the end of June, -nearly thirty thousand men, armed and provided with artillery, -attested the resources of these rich provinces, and the activity of -their chiefs. The Valencians then conceived the plan of marching -to the assistance of the Aragonese; but Napoleon had already -prescribed the measures which were to render such a movement -abortive. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Moncey’s Operations. MSS.] - -An order, dated the 30th of May, directed Moncey to move, with a -column of ten thousand men, upon Cuenca; from that point he was to -watch the country comprised between the lower Ebro and Carthagena, -and he was empowered to act against the city of Valencia if -he judged it fitting to do so. The position of Cuenca was -advantageous; a short movement from thence to the left would place -Moncey’s troops upon the direct line between Valencia and Zaragoza, -and enable him to intercept all communication between those towns; -and a few marches to the right placed him upon the junction of the -roads leading from Carthagena and Valencia to Madrid. If Moncey -thought it essential to attack Valencia, the division of general -Chabran was to co-operate from the side of Catalonia. By this -combination the operations of Lefebre Desnouettes at Zaragoza, and -those of Duhesme in Catalonia, were covered from the Valencians; -and at the same time the flank of the French army at Madrid was -protected on the side of Murcia. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -The 6th of June Moncey marched from Aranjuez by Santa Cruz, -Tarancon, Carascoso, and Villa del Orma, and reached Cuenca the -11th. There he received information of the rapid progress of the -insurrection, of the state of the Valencian army, and of the -projected movement to relieve Zaragoza; he immediately resolved to -make an attempt against the city of Valencia, and wrote to general -Chabran, whom he supposed to be at Tortosa, directing him to march -upon Castellon de la Plana, a town situated at some distance -eastward of the river Guadalaviar. Moncey himself proposed, by a -march through Requeña, to clear the country westward of that river, -and fixed upon the 25th of June as the latest period at which -the two columns were to communicate in the immediate vicinity of -Valencia. - -Halting from the 11th to the 16th at Cuenca, he marched the 17th to -Tortola, the 18th to Buenaches, the 19th to Matilla, the 20th to -Minglanilla, and the 21st to Pesquiera. From Buenaches to Pesquiera -no inhabitants were to be seen; the villages were deserted, and -either from fear or hatred, every living person fled before his -footsteps. At length, a Swiss regiment, some of the Spanish guards, -and a body of armed peasantry, made a stand at the bridge of -Pajaso, upon the river Cabriel; the manner in which the country -had been forsaken, the gloomy and desolate marches, and the sudden -appearance of an armed force ready to dispute this important pass, -prognosticated a desperate conflict; but the event belied the -omens; and scarcely any resistance was made; the French easily -forced the passage of the bridge; the peasants fled, and the Swiss -and Spanish guards came over to the side of the victors. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -Moncey informed general Chabran of this success, and appointed the -27th and 28th for a junction under the walls of Valencia. The next -day he took a position at Otiel; but hearing that the defeated -patriots had rallied and being reinforced, were, to the number -of ten or twelve thousand, intrenching themselves upon his left, -he quitted the direct line of march to attack them in their post -of Cabreras, which was somewhat in advance of the Siete Aguas. -The Spanish position was of extraordinary strength, the flanks -rested upon steep rocky mountains, and the only approach to the -front was through a long narrow defile, formed by high scarped -rocks, whose tops, inaccessible from the French side, were covered -with the armed peasantry of the neighbourhood. A direct assault -upon such a position could not succeed, and general Harispe was -directed to turn it by the right, while the cavalry and artillery -occupied the attention of the Spaniards in front; after overcoming -many obstacles offered by the impracticable nature of the ground, -Harispe reached the main body of the Spaniards, and then easily -defeated them, taking all their cannon, ammunition, and baggage. -This action, which took place upon the 24th, freed the left flank -of Moncey’s army, and he resumed his march upon the direct road -to Valencia. The 25th he was at the Venta de Buñol, the 26th in -advance of Chieva, and the 27th he arrived in front of Valencia. - -A complete circuit of the ancient walls was in existence, and all -the approaches were commanded by works which had been hastily -repaired or newly raised by the inhabitants; the citadel was in a -tolerable state of defence, and the population were preparing for -a vigorous resistance. A city containing eighty thousand people, -actuated by the most violent passions, cannot be easily overcome, -and the Valencians derived additional strength from the situation -of their town, built as it was upon low ground, and encircled with -numerous canals and cuts, made for the purposes of irrigation; -the deep ditches of the place were filled with water, so that no -approach could be made by the small force under Moncey except -against the gates. It is said that the marshal had corrupted a -smuggler, who promised to betray the city during the heat of the -assault, and it is probable that some secret understanding of that -kind induced the French commander to make an attempt which would -otherwise have been rash and unmilitary. - -Don Joseph Caro, a brother of the marquis of Romana, was with -four thousand men entrenched behind the canal of the Guadalaviar, -which was five miles in advance of the city gates. The village of -Quarte, and some thickly planted mulberry trees, helped to render -this post very strong; and when Moncey attacked it upon the 27th, -he met with a vigorous resistance. Caro was, however, beaten, and -chased into the city, with the loss of some cannon, and on the 28th -the French drove in the outposts, and occupied all the principal -avenues of the town. - -However enthusiastic the patriots were while their enemy was at -a distance, his near approach filled them with terror, and it -is possible that a vigorous assault might have succeeded at the -first moment of consternation. But the favourable opportunity, -if it really existed, quickly passed away; Padre Rico, a friar -distinguished by his resolution, traversing the streets, with a -cross in one hand and a sword in the other, aroused the sinking -spirit and excited the fanaticism of the multitude; the fear of -retaliation for the massacre of the French residents, and the -certainty that Moncey’s troops were few, powerfully seconded his -efforts; and as it is usual for undisciplined masses of people to -pass suddenly from one extreme to another, fear was soon succeeded -by enthusiasm. - -After disposing his field-pieces on the most favourable points, and -while the impression of the first defeat was still fresh, Moncey -summoned the governor to surrender. But the latter answered, “That -he would defend the city.” The French guns then opened upon the -place; the heavy guns of the Spaniards, however, soon overpowered -them, and a warm skirmish ensuing about the houses of the suburbs -and the vicinity of the gates, the Valencians so obstinately -resisted, that when the night fell, not only no serious impression -had been made upon the defences, but the assailants were repulsed -with loss at every point. The situation of the French marshal -became delicate; the persons sent to seek Chabran could gain no -intelligence of that general’s movements; the secret connexions in -the town, if any there were, had failed; the ammunition was nearly -expended, and the army was encumbered with seven or eight hundred -wounded men, and among them the general of engineers. Moncey, -swayed by these embarrassments, relinquished his attack, and fell -back to Quarte on the 29th, being harassed by Caro and the populace -in his retreat. - -When it is considered that in a great city only a small number -of persons can estimate justly the immense advantages of their -situation, and the comparative weakness of the enemy, it must be -confessed that the spirit displayed by the Valencians upon this -occasion was very great; unfortunately it ended there, nothing -worthy of such an energetic commencement was afterwards performed, -although very considerable armies were either raised or maintained -in the province. - -[Sidenote: Journal of Moncey.] - -At Quarte Moncey, hearing that the captain-general, Serbelloni, -was marching upon Almanza to intercept the communication with -Chieva and Buñol, resolved to relinquish the line of Cuenca, and -to attack Serbelloni before he could quit the kingdom of Murcia. -This vigorous resolution he executed with great celerity; for, -directing the head of his column towards Torrente, he continued his -march until night, halting a short distance from that town. And a -forced march the next day brought him near Alcira, only one league -from the river Xucar; from his bivouac at that place he despatched -advice to general Chabran of this change of affairs. - -In the mean time the conde de Serbelloni, surprised in the midst of -his movement, and disconcerted in his calculations by the decision -and rapidity of Moncey, took up a position to defend the passage -of the Xucar; the line of that river is strong, and offers many -advantageous points of resistance; but the Spaniards imprudently -occupied both banks, and in this exposed situation were attacked -upon the morning of the 1st of July; the division on the French -side was overthrown, and the passage forced without loss of time. -Serbelloni then retired to the heights of San Felice, which covered -the main road leading from Alcira to Almanza, hoping to secure the -defiles in front of the latter town before the enemy could arrive -there; but Moncey was again too quick for him; for leaving San -Felice to his left, he continued his march on another route, and -by a strenuous exertion seized upon the gorge of the defiles near -Almanza late in the night of the 2d; the Spanish troops in the mean -time approached his position, but were dispersed at day-break on -the 3d, and some of their guns captured; the road being now open, -Moncey entered the town of Almanza the same day. The 4th he took -post at Bonete. The 5th near Chinchilla, and the 6th at Albacete, -where he got intelligence that general Frere, who should have been -at St. Clemente with a division, was gone towards Mequeña. - -To explain this movement it is necessary to observe that when -Dupont marched towards Andalusia, and Moncey against Valencia, the -remaining divisions of their corps were employed by Savary to scour -the country in the neighbourhood of Madrid, and to protect the rear -and connect the operations of those generals; thus general Gobert, -who, following Napoleon’s orders, should have been at Valladolid, -was sent with the third division of Dupont towards Andalusia; and -general Frere (commanding the second division of Moncey’s), who -should have been at San Clemente, a central point, from whence -he could gain the road leading from Seville to La Mancha, and -intercept the communication between Valencia and Cuenca, or seize -upon the point of junction where the route from Carthagena and -Murcia falls into the road of Valencia, was sent by Requeña to -reinforce Moncey. - -Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Cuenca rose in arms, and being -joined by a force of seven or eight thousand peasants, overpowered -and destroyed a French detachment left in that town. The duke of -Rovigo, fearing that Moncey’s column would be compromised by this -insurrection, ordered general Caulaincourt, then at Taracon, to -quell it with a force composed of cavalry and some provisional -battalions. Caulaincourt arrived in front of Cuenca on the evening -of the 3d of July; finding the insurgents in position, he attacked -and dispersed them with great slaughter, and the town being -deserted by the inhabitants, was given up to pillage. - -[Sidenote: Foy’s History.] - -In the mean time, Frere, who had quitted San Clemente upon the -26th, made his way to Requeña; there he received intelligence of -Caulaincourt’s success, and that Moncey had passed the Xucar; -whereupon, retracing his steps, he returned to San Clemente, his -troops being wearied, sickly, and exhausted by these long and -useless marches in the heats of summer. Moncey now re-organized his -forces, and prepared artillery and other means for a second attempt -against Valencia; but he was interrupted by Savary, who, alarmed -at the advance of Cuesta and Blake, recalled Frere towards Madrid, -and Moncey, justly offended that Savary, inflated with momentary -power, should treat him with so little ceremony, broke up from San -Clemente, and likewise returned by the way of Ocaña to the capital. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 7.] - -1º. The result of marshal Moncey’s campaign being published by the -Spaniards as a great and decisive failure, produced extravagant -hopes of final success; a happy illusion if the chiefs had not -partaken of it, and pursued their wild course of mutual flattery -and exaggeration, without reflecting that in truth there was -nothing very satisfactory in the prospect of affairs. Moncey’s -operation was in the nature of a moveable column; the object of -which was to prevent the junction of the Valencian army with the -Aragonese. The attempt upon the town of Valencia was a simple -experiment, which, if successful, would have produced great -effects, but having failed, the evil resulting was but trifling in -a military point of view. Valencia was not the essential object of -the expedition, and the fate of the general campaign depended upon -the armies in Old Castile. - -2º. It was consoling that a rich and flourishing town had not -fallen into the power of the enemy; but at the same time a want of -real nerve in the Spanish insurrection was visible. The kingdoms -of Murcia and Valencia acted in concert, and contained two of -the richest sea-port towns in the Peninsula; their united force -amounted to thirty thousand organised troops, exclusive of the -armed peasants in various districts; and the populace of Valencia -were deeply committed by the massacre of the French residents. Here -then, if in any place, a strenuous resistance was to be expected; -nevertheless, marshal Moncey, whose whole force was at first only -eight thousand French, and never exceeded ten thousand men, -continued marching and fighting without cessation for a month, -during which period he forced two of the strongest mountain passes -in the world, crossed several large and difficult rivers, carried -the war into the very streets of Valencia; and being disappointed -of assistance from Catalonia, extricated his division from a -difficult situation, after having defeated his opponents in five -actions, killed and wounded a number of them, equal in amount to -the whole of his own force, and made a circuit of above three -hundred miles through a hostile and populous country, without -having sustained any serious loss, without any desertion from the -Spanish battalions incorporated with his own, and what was of more -importance, having those battalions much increased by desertions -from the enemy. In short, the great object of the expedition -had been attained, the plan of relieving Zaragoza was entirely -frustrated, and the organization of an efficient Spanish force -retarded. - -3º. Moncey could hardly have expected to succeed against the town -of Valencia; for to use Napoleon’s words, “_a city, with eighty -thousand inhabitants, barricadoed streets, and artillery placed at -the gates, cannot be_ TAKEN BY THE COLLAR.” - -4º. General Frere’s useless march to Requeña was very hurtful to -the French; and the duke of Rovigo was rated by the emperor for his -want of judgment upon the occasion; “it was a folly,” the latter -writes, “to dream of reinforcing Moncey; because if that marshal -failed in taking the city by a sudden assault, it became an affair -of artillery; and twenty thousand men, more or less, would not -enable him to succeed.” “Frere could do nothing at Valencia, but he -could do a great deal at San Clemente; because from that post he -could support either Madrid or general Dupont.” - -5º. Moncey was slightly blamed by the emperor for not halting -within a day’s march of Valencia, in order to break the spirit of -the people, and make them feel the weight of the war; but this -opinion was probably formed upon an imperfect knowledge of the -local details. The marshal’s line of operations from Cuenca was -infested by insurgent bands, his ammunition was nearly exhausted, -he could hear nothing of Chabran’s division, and the whole force -of Murcia was collecting upon his flank and rear. The country -behind him was favourable for his adversaries, and his army was -encumbered by a number of wounded men; it was surely prudent under -such circumstances, to open his communication again with Madrid as -quickly as possible. - -By some authors, the repulse at Valencia has been classed with -the inglorious defeat of Dupont at Baylen; but there was a wide -difference between those events, the generals, and the results. -Moncey, although an old man, was vigorous, active, and decided; -and the check he received produced little effect. Dupont was -irresolute, slow, and incapable, if not worse, as I shall hereafter -show; but before describing his campaign, I must narrate the -operations of the Gallician army. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -OPERATIONS OF BESSIERES AGAINST BLAKE AND CUESTA. - - -While the moveable columns of Bessieres’ corps ranged over the -Asturian and Biscayan mountains, and dispersed the insurgent -patriots of those provinces, Cuesta, undismayed by his defeat at -Cabezon, collected another army at Benevente, and, in concert with -the Gallician forces, prepared to advance again towards Burgos. - -Filanghieri, the captain-general of Gallicia, had organised the -troops in that kingdom without difficulty, because the abundant -supplies poured in from England were beginning to be felt; and -patriotism is never more efficacious than when supported by large -sums of money. Taranco’s soldiers joined to the garrisons of Ferrol -and Coruña were increased, by new levies, to twenty-five thousand -men, organised in four divisions, and being well equipped, and -provided with a considerable train of artillery, were assembled -at Manzanal, a strong post in the mountains, twelve miles behind -Astorga. - -The situation of that city offered great advantages to the -Spaniards; the old Moorish walls which surrounded it were complete, -and susceptible of being strengthened, so as to require a regular -siege; but a siege could not be undertaken by a small force, while -the army of Gallicia was entrenched at Manzanal, and while Cuesta -remained at Benevente; neither could Bessieres, with any prudence, -attack the Gallicians at Manzanal while Cuesta was at Benevente, -and while Astorga contained a strong garrison. Filanghieri appears -to have had some notion of its value, for he commenced forming an -entrenched camp in the mountains; but being slain by his soldiers, -don Joachim Blake succeeded to the command, and probably fearing a -similar fate if the army remained stationary, left one division at -Manzanal, and with the remainder marched towards Benevente to unite -with Cuesta. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Bessieres’ Operations. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 2.] - -On the French side, marshal Bessieres collected his scattered -columns at Palencia; his plan, founded upon instructions from -Bayonne, was to make a rapid movement against Cuesta, in the hope -of beating him, while Blake was still behind Leon; then wheeling -to his right, to attack and drive the Gallicians back to the -mountains, to overrun the flat country with his numerous cavalry, -to open a communication with Portugal, and after receiving certain -reinforcements then preparing for him, to subdue Gallicia, or -assist Junot, as might seem most fitting at the time. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -At this period the king was on his journey to Madrid, and the -military system of Napoleon was brought to its first great crisis; -for unless Bessieres was successful, there could be no sure footing -for the French in the capital, and as Madrid was the base of -Moncey’s and Dupont’s operations, the farther prosecution of their -plans depended upon the result of the approaching struggle in the -plains of Leon. Napoleon, foreseeing this crisis, had directed -Savary to occupy Segovia, to send general Gobert’s division -to Valladolid, and to hold Vedel’s and Frere’s, the one in La -Mancha, a few marches from the capital, and the other at San -Clemente, a central point connecting Moncey, Dupont, and Madrid. -But Savary, unable to estimate justly the relative importance of -the different operations, sent Vedel and Gobert into Andalusia to -reinforce Dupont, when he should rather have recalled the latter -to the northern side of the Sierra Morena; he caused Frere, as -we have seen, to quit San Clemente, and march by Requeña against -Valencia, at the moment when Moncey was retiring from that city -through Murcia to San Clemente, and thus dispersed and harassed his -reserves by long marches to the south without any definite object -when the essential interests were at stake in the north; and now, -struck with fear at the approach of Cuesta and Blake, whose armies -he had hitherto disregarded, he precipitately recalled Frere, -Vedel, Gobert, and even Dupont to Madrid, too late to take part -with Bessieres in the coming battle, but exactly timed to frustrate -Moncey’s projects, and, as we shall hereafter find, to ensure the -ruin of Dupont. In this manner steering his vessel before every -wind that blew, he could not fail of storms. - -Greatly was Napoleon discontented with these errors; he relied, -and with reason, on the ability of Bessieres for a remedy; but to -Savary he sent the following instructions, dated the 13th of July: - -“_The French affairs in Spain would be in an excellent state if -Gobert’s division had marched upon Valladolid, and Frere’s had -occupied San Clemente, with a moveable column, three or four -marches upon the route of general Dupont. Gobert having been -directed upon Dupont, Frere being with Moncey, harassed and -enfeebled by marches and countermarches, the position of the -French army is become less advantageous._ - -“_Marshal Bessieres is this day at Medina del Rio Seco with fifteen -thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; the 15th or 16th he -will attack Benevente, open a communication with Portugal, drive -the rebels into Gallicia, and seize upon Leon. If his operations -succeed thus, and in a brilliant manner, the position of the French -army will again be as good as it was._ - -“_If general Cuesta retires from Benevente without fighting, he -will move by Zamora and Salamanca to gain Avila and Segovia, -certain that then Bessieres cannot pursue him, as, in that case, -he would be menaced by the army of Gallicia, whose advanced guard -is at Leon. The general who commands at Madrid must then be able -to assemble six or seven thousand men and march upon Cuesta; the -citadel of Segovia must be occupied by three or four hundred -convalescents, with some guns and six weeks biscuit. It was a great -fault not to have occupied this citadel when the major-general -ordered it; of all the possible positions, Segovia is the most -dangerous for the army; the capital of a province, situated between -two routes, it deprives the army of all its communications, and the -enemy once posted in the citadel, the French army cannot dislodge -him. Three or four hundred convalescents, a good commandant, and a -squad of artillery, will render the castle of Segovia impregnable -for some time, and will insure to the army the important position -of Segovia._ - -“_If general Cuesta throws himself into Gallicia without fighting -or suffering a defeat, the position of the army will become -better; of course it will be still better if he does so after -having suffered a defeat._ - -“_If marshal Bessieres faces Cuesta at Benevente without attacking -him, or if he is repulsed by him, his object will always be to -cover Burgos, and to hold the enemy in check as long as possible; -he could, perhaps, be reinforced with the three hundred troops of -the line which accompany the king, but then there would be no room -for hesitation. If Bessieres retires without a battle, he must be -reinforced instantly with six thousand men. If he retreats after -a battle wherein he has suffered great loss, it will be necessary -to make great dispositions; to recall Frere, Gobert, Caulaincourt, -and Vedel by forced marches to Madrid; to withdraw Dupont into the -Sierra Morena, or even bring him nearer to Madrid (keeping him -always, however, seven or eight marches off), then crush Cuesta -and all the Gallician army, while Dupont will serve as an advanced -guard to hold the army of Andalusia in check._” - -Before Bessieres could collect his troops, Blake effected a -junction with Cuesta at Benevente. Three plans were open to those -generals: - -1º. To remove into the mountains, and take a position covering -Gallicia. - -2º. To maintain the head of the Gallician army in advance of -Astorga, while Cuesta, with his Castilians, pushing by forced -marches through Salamanca and Avila, reached Segovia. - -3º. To advance farther into the plains, and try the fate of a -battle. - -This last plan was rash, seeing that Bessieres was well provided -with horsemen, and that the Spaniards had scarcely any; but -Cuesta, assuming the chief command, left a division at Benevente -to protect his stores, and advanced, much against Blake’s wishes, -with twenty-five thousand infantry (regular troops), a few hundred -cavalry, and from twenty to thirty pieces of artillery, in the -direction of Palencia. His march, as we have seen, dismayed Savary. -To use Napoleon’s expressions, he who had been “_hitherto acting -as if the army of Gallicia was not in existence_,” now acted “_as -if Bessieres was already beaten_;” but that marshal, firm and -experienced, rather than risk an action of such importance with -insufficient means, withdrew even the garrison from the important -post of St. Ander, and having quickly collected fifteen thousand -men and thirty pieces of artillery at Palencia, moved forward on -the 12th of July to the encounter. His line of battle consisted of -two divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, and twenty-four -guns, his reserve was formed of four battalions and some horse -grenadiers of the imperial guards, with six pieces of artillery. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Bessieres’ Operations.] - -The 13th he halted at Ampudia and Torre de Mormojon, from thence -advancing on the 14th in two columns, he drove in an advanced guard -of one hundred and fifty Spanish cavalry, and arrived about nine -o’clock in front of Rio Seco, where Cuesta’s army was drawn up like -a heavy domestic animal awaiting the spring of some active wild -beast. - - -BATTLE OF RIO SECO. - -The first line of the Spaniards was posted along the edge of a step -of land, with an abrupt fall towards the French; the heaviest guns -were distributed along the front. The second line, composed of -the best troops, strengthened, or rather weakened, by seventeen -or eighteen thousand peasants, was displayed at a great distance -behind the first; the town of Rio Seco was in rear of the centre. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Bessieres’ Operations.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -Bessieres was at first startled at their numbers, and doubted -if he should attack; but soon perceiving the vice of Cuesta’s -disposition, he ordered general Lasalle to make a feint against the -front with the light cavalry, while he himself marching obliquely -to the right, outstretched the left of the Spaniards, and suddenly -thrust Merle’s and Mouton’s divisions and the imperial guards, -horse and foot, between their lines, and threw the first into -confusion; at that moment Lasalle charging furiously, the Spanish -front went down at once, and fifteen hundred dead bodies strewed -the field; but the victor’s ranks were disordered, and Cuesta made -a gallant effort to retrieve the day, for, supported by the fire of -all his remaining artillery, he fell with his second line upon the -French, and with his right wing broke in boldly and took six guns; -but his left hanging back, the flank of the right was exposed. -Bessieres, with great readiness, immediately charged on this naked -flank with Merle’s division and the horse grenadiers, while the -fourteenth provisionary regiment made head against the front; a -fierce short struggle ensued; and the Spaniards were overborne, -were broken and dispersed; meanwhile the first line rallied in -the town of Rio Seco, but were a second time defeated by Mouton’s -division, and fled over the plains, pursued by the light cavalry, -and suffering severely in their flight. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers.] - -From five to six thousand Spaniards were killed and wounded on the -field, and twelve hundred prisoners, eighteen guns, and a great -store of ammunition, remained in the hands of the French. The -vanquished sought safety in all directions, but chiefly on the side -of Benevente. Blake and Cuesta separated in wrath with each other, -the former making for the mountains of Gallicia, the latter towards -Leon, and the division left at Benevente dispersed. - -The French, who had lost fifty killed and three hundred wounded, -remained at Rio Seco all the 15th; the 16th they advanced to -Benevente, where they found many thousand English muskets and vast -quantities of ammunition, clothing, and provisions. - -The communication with Portugal was now open, and Bessieres at -first resolved to give his hand to Junot; but hearing that the -fugitives were likely to rally on the side of Leon, he pursued -them by the road of Villa-fere. On his march, learning that Cuesta -was gone to Mayorga, he turned aside to that place, and on the 22d -captured there another great collection of stores; for, the Spanish -general, with the usual improvidence of his nation, had established -all his magazines in the open towns of the flat country. - -After this Bessieres entered the city of Leon and remained there -until the 29th, during which time he received the submission of -the municipality, and prepared to carry the war into Gallicia. The -junta of Castile and Leon, whose power had hitherto been restrained -by Cuesta, now retired to Puente-Ferrada and assumed supreme -authority, and the quarrel between the generals becoming rancorous, -they sided with Blake. This appearing to Bessieres a favourable -occasion to tamper with the fidelity of those chiefs; he sent his -prisoners back, and endeavoured, by offering the vice-royalty of -Mexico to the one, and by reasoning on the hopeless state of the -insurrection, and the promise of rank and honours to the other, to -shake the loyalty of both; but neither would listen to him. - -This failing, he marched to Puente Orvigo the 31st, intending to -break into Gallicia, but he was suddenly recalled from thence to -protect the retreat of the king from Madrid. Dupont had surrendered -with a whole army in Andalusia, the court was in consternation, the -victory of Rio Seco was rendered fruitless; and Bessieres retracing -his steps to Mayorga, took a defensive position near that town. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. As Blake was overruled by Cuesta he is not responsible for the -errors of this short campaign; but the faults were gross on both -sides, and it seems difficult to decide whether Savary or Cuesta -made the greatest number. - -2º. If the former had sent Gobert’s division to Valladolid, -Bessieres would have had twenty-two thousand men and forty pieces -of artillery in the field, a force not at all too great, when it -is considered that the fate of three French armies depended upon -the success of a battle to which Cuesta might have brought at least -double that number. The latter having determined upon an offensive -movement, disregarded the powerful cavalry of his enemy, chose -a field of battle precisely in the country where that arm would -have the greatest advantage, and when he should have brought every -man to bear upon the quarter which he did attack, he displayed -his ignorance of the art of war by fighting the battle of Rio -Seco with twenty-five thousand men only, and leaving ten thousand -disciplined troops guarding positions in his rear, which could not -be approached until he himself was first beaten. Neither was the -time well chosen for his advance; had he waited a few days the port -of St. Ander would have been attacked by eight English frigates -and a detachment of Spanish troops under the command of general -da Ponte, an enterprise that would have distracted and weakened -Bessieres, but which was relinquished in consequence of the battle -of Rio Seco. - -3º. Once united to Blake, Cuesta’s real base of operations was -Gallicia, and he should have kept all his stores within the -mountains, and not have heaped them up in the open towns of the -flat country, exposed to the marauding parties of the enemy, or -covered, as in the case of Benevente, by strong detachments which -weakened his troops in the field and confined him to a particular -line of operations in the plain. - -4º. The activity and good sense of marshal Bessieres overbalanced -the errors of Savary; and the victory of Rio Seco was of infinite -importance, because as we have seen a defeat in that quarter -would have shaken the French military system to its centre and -have obliged the king, then on his journey to Madrid, to halt at -Vittoria, until the distant divisions of the army were recalled to -the capital, and a powerful effort made to crush the victorious -enemy. Napoleon’s observations are full of strong expressions of -discontent at the imprudence of his lieutenant. “_A check given -to Dupont_,” he says, “_would have a slight effect, but a wound -received by Bessieres would give a locked jaw to the whole army. -Not an inhabitant of Madrid, not a peasant of the valleys that does -not feel that the affairs of Spain are involved in the affair of -Bessieres; how unfortunate, then, that in such a great event you -have wilfully given the enemy twenty chances against yourself._” -When he heard of the victory he exclaimed that it was the battle of -Almanza, and that Bessieres had saved Spain. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 3.] - -The prospect was indeed very promising; the king had arrived in -Madrid, bringing with him the veteran brigade of general Rey and -some of the guards, and all fears upon the side of Leon being -allayed, the affairs of Andalusia alone were of doubtful issue; for -Zaragoza, hard pushed by Verdier, was upon the point of destruction -in despite of the noble courage of the besieged; nor did the -subjugation of Andalusia appear in reason a hard task, seeing that -Moncey was then at San Clemente, and from that point threatened -Valencia without losing the power of succouring Dupont, and Frere’s -and Caulincourt’s troops were disposable for any operation. The -French army possessed the centre, and the Spaniards were dispersed -upon a variety of points on the circumference without any connexion -with each other, and in force only upon the side of Andalusia. - -5º. The great combinations of the French emperor were upon the -point of being crowned with success, when a sudden catastrophe -overturned his able calculations and raised the sinking hopes of -the Spaniards. It was the campaign in Andalusia which produced -such important effects, and it offers one of the most interesting -and curious examples recorded by history of the vicissitudes of -war; for there disorder unaccompanied by superior valour triumphed -over discipline; inexperienced officers were successful against -practised generals; and a fortuitous combination of circumstances -enabled the Spaniards, without any skill, to defeat in one day an -immense plan wisely arranged, embracing a variety of interests, and -until that moment happily conducted in all its parts. This blow, -which felled Joseph from his throne, marked the French army with a -dishonourable scar, the more conspicuous, because it was the only -one of its numerous wounds that misbecame it. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA. - - -[Sidenote: Journal of Dupont’s Operations. MS.] - -General Dupont received orders to march against Cadiz with a -column, composed of two Swiss regiments (Preux and Reding), taken -from the Spanish army, a French division of infantry under general -Barbou, a division of cavalry commanded by general Fresia, a marine -battalion of the imperial guards, and eighteen pieces of artillery. -Three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, drawn -from the army of Portugal, were to join him in Andalusia, and he -was to incorporate among his troops three other Swiss regiments, -quartered in that province. - -The latter end of May he traversed La Mancha, entered the Sierra -Morena, by the pass of Despeñas Perros, and proceeded by Carolina -and Baylen to Andujar, where he arrived the 2d of June; there he -was informed that a supreme junta of government was established at -Seville, that minor juntas ruled in Granada, Jaen, and Cordoba, -that war was formally declared against the French, that the whole -of Andalusia was in arms, and the Swiss regiments ranged under the -Spanish banners, and finally, that general Avril, commanding the -detachment expected from Portugal, had halted in Tavora, and was -preparing to return to Lisbon. - -Alarmed by this intelligence, Dupont wrote to Murat and Savary to -demand reinforcements, and in the mean time closed up the rear of -his columns, and established an hospital in Andujar. The 6th he -crossed the Guadalquivir, and continued his march towards Cordoba, -following the left bank of the river. Two leagues from that ancient -city the road recrossed the Guadalquivir by a long stone bridge, -at the furthest end of which stood the village of Alcolea. The -French general arrived there at day-break on the 7th, but his -further progress was opposed by the Spanish general Echevaria, who, -having fortified the head of the bridge, manned the works, placed -twelve guns in battery on the right bank, and drawn together three -thousand regular troops, and ten thousand new levies and smugglers, -occupied the village, and was prepared to dispute the passage of -the river. A small reserve remained in a camp close to Cordoba, and -a cloud of armed peasants from the side of Jaen were also gathered -on the hills behind the French army, ready to fall on its rear when -the bridge should be attacked. - -Dupont having observed this disposition, placed the cavalry, -the Swiss regiments, and the marine battalion in reserve facing -to the hills, and with the division of Barbou stormed the head -of the bridge. The Spaniards, making a feeble resistance, were -driven across the river, and their whole line immediately fled to -the camp at Cordoba. The multitude on the hills descended during -the battle, but were beaten back by the cavalry with loss, and -the French general, leaving the marine battalion at Alcolea to -secure the bridge, marched with the rest of his forces to complete -the victory. At his approach the Spaniards abandoned their new -position, took refuge in the town, and being summoned to surrender, -opened a fire of musketry from the walls, whereupon the French -bursting the gates with their field-pieces, broke into the town, -and after a short and confused fight Echevaria’s men fled in -disorder along the Seville road, and were pursued by the cavalry. -As the inhabitants took no part in the contest, and received the -French without any signs of aversion, the town was protected from -pillage, and Dupont fixing his quarters there, sent his patroles as -far as Ecija without meeting with an enemy. - -[Sidenote: Nellerto.] - -In Seville the news of this disaster, and the arrival of fugitives, -struck such a terror, that the junta were only prevented from -retiring to Cadiz by their dread of the populace, and even -entertained thoughts of abandoning Spain altogether, and flying to -South America. Castaños, who a few days before had been declared -captain-general of the armies, was at this time in march with -seven thousand troops of the line from San Roque; being called to -Seville, he arrived there on the 9th, and after a short conference -with the junta proceeded to take the command of Echevaria’s forces, -the greater part of which were reassembled at Carmona, but in such -confusion and so moody that he returned immediately, and having -persuaded the president Saavedra to accompany him, fixed his -head-quarters at Utrera, where he gathered two or three thousand -regulars from the nearest garrisons, and directing the new levies -to repair to him, hastened the march of his own men from St. -Roche. He also pressed general Spencer to disembark, and take up a -position with the British forces at Xeres; but Spencer, for reasons -hereafter to be mentioned, sailed to Ayamonte, a circumstance that -augmented a general distrust of the English prevailing at the time, -and which was secretly fomented by Morla, and by several members of -the junta. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.] - -At this moment Andalusia was lost if Dupont had advanced; his -inactivity saved it: instead of pushing his victory, he wrote to -Savary for reinforcements, and to general Avril, desiring that he -would without delay come to his assistance, but he himself remained -in Cordoba, overwhelmed with imaginary dangers and difficulties; -for although Castaños had in a few days collected at Carmona and -Utrera seven or eight thousand regulars, and above fifty thousand -new levies, and that Dupont’s letters were intercepted and -brought to him, such was the condition of affairs that, resigning -all thoughts of making a stand, he had, under the pretence of -completing the defences of Cadiz, embarked the heavy artillery and -stores at Seville, and was prepared, if Dupont should advance, to -burn the timbers and harness of his field artillery, and to retreat -to Cadiz. - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Papers.] - -Meanwhile continuing the organization of his forces, he filled up -the old regiments with new levies, and formed fresh battalions, in -which he was assisted by two foreigners, the marquis de Coupigny, -a crafty French emigrant, of some experience in war, and Reding, -a Swiss, a bold, enterprising, honest man, but without judgment, -and of very moderate talents as an officer. Castaños wished to -adopt a defensive plan, to make Cadiz his place of arms, and to -form an entrenched camp, where he hoped to be joined by ten or -twelve thousand British troops, and, in security, to organize and -discipline a large army; but, in reality, he had merely the name -and the troubles of a commander-in-chief, without the power; for -Morla was his enemy, and the junta containing men determined to -use their authority for their own emolument and the gratification -of private enmity, were jealous lest Castaños should control their -proceedings, and thwarted him; humouring the caprice and insolence -of the populace, and meddling with affairs foreign to the matter in -hand. - -As the numbers at Utrera increased, the general confidence -augmented, and a retreat was no longer contemplated: plans were -laid to surround Dupont in Cordoba; one detachment of peasants, -commanded by regular officers, was sent to occupy the passes of -the Sierra Morena, leading into Estremadura; another marched -from Grenada, accompanied by a regiment of the line, to seize -Carolina, and cut off the communication with La Mancha; a third, -under colonel Valdecanas, proposed to attack the French in Cordoba -without any assistance, and this eagerness for action was increased -by a knowledge of the situation of affairs in Portugal, and by -rumours exaggerating the strength of Filanghieri and Cuesta. It was -believed that the latter had advanced to Valladolid, and offered -Murat the option of abiding an attack, or retiring immediately to -France by stated marches, and that, alarmed at Cuesta’s power, the -grand duke was fortifying the Retiro. - -These reports, so congenial to the wishes and vanity of the -Andalusians, caused the plan proposed by Castaños to be rejected; -and when Dupont’s despatches magnifying his own danger, and -pressing in the most urgent manner for reinforcements were again -intercepted and brought to head-quarters, it was resolved to -attack Cordoba immediately; but Dupont’s fears outstripped their -impatience. - -[Sidenote: Journal of Dupont’s Operations.] - -After ten days of inactivity, by which he lost the immediate fruit -of his victory at Alcolea,--the lead in an offensive campaign, and -all the imposing moral force of the French reputation in arms, -Dupont, finding that, instead of receiving direct reinforcements -from Savary, he must wait until Moncey, having first subdued -Valencia, could aid him by the circuitous route of Murcia, resolved -to fall back to Andujar. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s notes, Appendix, No. 1.] - -[Sidenote: Whittingham. Journal of Dupont.] - -[Sidenote: Foy’s History.] - -[Sidenote: Victoire et Conquêtes.] - -He commenced his retreat the 17th of June, being followed as far -as Carpio by the advanced guard of the Andalusians, under general -Coupigny. Along the line of march, and in the town of Andujar, -where he arrived the evening of the 18th, he found terrible proofs -of Spanish ferocity; his stragglers had been assassinated, and his -hospital taken, the sick, the medical attendants, the couriers, -the staff officers, in fine, all who had the misfortune to be -weaker than the insurgents, were butchered, with circumstances of -extraordinary barbarity; upwards of four hundred men had perished -in this miserable manner since the fight of Alcolea. The fate -of colonel Renè was horrible; he had been sent on a mission to -Portugal previous to the breaking out of hostilities; and was on -his return, travelling in the ordinary mode, without arms, attached -to no army, engaged in no operations of war, but being recognised -as a Frenchman he was seized, mutilated, and then placed between -two planks and sawed alive. - -Dupont now collected provisions, and prepared to maintain himself -in Andujar until he should be reinforced; but wishing to punish -the city of Jaen, from whence the bands had come that murdered his -sick, he sent captain Baste, a naval officer, with a battalion of -infantry and some cavalry, to accomplish that object. The French -soldiers, inflamed by the barbarity of their enemies, inflicted a -severe measure of retaliation, for it is the nature of cruelty to -reproduce itself in war; and for this reason, although the virtue -of clemency is to all persons becoming, it is peculiarly so to an -officer, the want of it leading to so many and such great evils. - -The Andalusian army having remained quiet, Dupont, who knew that -Vedel’s division, escorting a large convoy for the army, was -marching through La Mancha, sent captain Baste with a second -detachment to clear the pass of Despeñas Perros which was occupied -by insurgents and smugglers from Grenada to the number of three -thousand: the pass itself was of incredible strength, and the -Spaniards had artillery, and were partially entrenched; but their -commander, a colonel of the line, deserted to the enemy, and before -Baste could arrive, Vedel forced the road without difficulty and -reached Carolina. He posted a detachment there to keep open the -communication with La Mancha, and then descended himself to Baylen, -a small town sixteen miles from Andujar. - -[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal.] - -[Sidenote: Foy’s History.] - -Meanwhile other insurgents from Grenada having arrived at Jaen were -preparing to move by the Linhares road to Carolina and Despeñas -Perros. General Cassagne, with a brigade of Vedel’s division, -marched against them the 29th of June, and after fighting on the -2nd and 3d of July, he took possession of Jaen, and drove the -Grenadans back with considerable slaughter, but lost two hundred -men himself, and returned on the 25th to Baylen. Notwithstanding -these successes, and that Vedel brought reinforcements for Barbou’s -division and the cavalry, Dupont’s fears increased. His position -at Andujar covered the main road from Seville to Carolina; but -eight miles lower down the river it could be turned by the bridge -of Marmolexo, and sixteen miles higher up by the roads leading -from Jaen to the ferry of Mengibar and Baylen; and beyond that -line by the roads from Jaen and Grenada to Uzeda, Linhares, and -the passes of El Rey and the Despeñas Perros. The dryness of -the season had also rendered the Guadalquivir fordable in many -places. The regular force under Castaños was daily increasing in -strength, the population around was actively hostile, and the -young French soldiers were drooping under privations and the heat -of the climate. Six hundred were in hospital, and the whole were -discouraged. It is in such situations that the worth of a veteran -is found: in battle the ardour of youth often appears to shame -the cool indifference of the old soldier, but when the strife -is between the malice of fortune and fortitude, between human -endurance and accumulating hardships, the veteran becomes truly -formidable, when the young soldier resigns himself to despair. - -After the actions at Jaen, both sides remained quiet until the 14th -of July, on which day general Gobert, who should have been at Rio -Seco with Bessieres, arrived at Carolina with the greatest part of -a division, the next day he joined Vedel at Baylen, and the latter -general pushed on a brigade, under general Leger Bellair, to watch -the ferry of Mengibar, and it was full time, for the Spanish army -was already on the opposite bank of the river. - -[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence.] - -When Dupont’s retreat from Cordoba had frustrated the plan of the -Spaniards to surround him, Castaños returned to his old project -of a rigorous defensive system. The junta at first acquiesced, -but being unsettled in their policy, and getting intelligence of -Vedel’s march, they ordered Castaños to attack Dupont at Andujar -before the reinforcements could arrive. The regular troops were -about twenty-five thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. A -very heavy train of artillery, and large bodies of armed peasantry, -commanded by officers of the line, attended the army; the numbers, -of course, varied from day to day, but the whole multitude that -advanced towards the Guadalquivir could not have been less than -fifty thousand men, hence the intelligence that Vedel had actually -arrived did not much allay the general fierceness. Castaños, -however, was less sanguine than the rest, and learning that -Spencer had just returned to Cadiz with his division, he once more -requested him to land and advance to Xeres, to afford a point of -retreat in the event of a disaster; the English general consented -to disembark, but refused to advance further than Port St. Mary. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -The 1st of July the Spanish army occupied a position extending from -Carpio to Porcuñas; the 11th a council of war being held, it was -resolved that Reding’s division should cross the Guadalquivir at -the ferry of Mengibar, and gain Baylen; that Coupigny should cross -at Villa Nueva, and support Reding; and that Castaños, with the -other two divisions, advancing to the heights of Argonilla, should -attack Andujar in front, while Reding and Coupigny should descend -from Baylen and attack it in the rear. Some detachments of light -troops under colonel Cruz were ordered to pass the Guadalquivir by -Marmolexo, and to seize the passes leading through the Morena to -Estremadura. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal.] - -[Sidenote: Foy.] - -The 13th, Reding, with the first division, and three or four -thousand peasantry, marched towards Mengibar; and Coupigny, with -the second division, took the road of Villa Nueva. The 15th, -Castaños crowned the heights of Argonilla, in front of Andujar, -with two divisions of infantry, and a multitude of irregular -troops. Coupigny skirmished with the French picquets at Villa -Nueva; and Reding crossing the river at Mengibar, attacked Leger -Bellair; but Vedel came to the assistance of the latter, and -Reding recrossed to the left bank. When Dupont saw the heights -of Argonilla covered with Spanish troops, he sent to Vedel for a -brigade of infantry, broke down the bridge of Marmolexo, occupied -some works that he had thrown up to cover the bridge of Andujar, -put a garrison in an old tower built over one of the arches, and -drew the remainder of his troops up in position on the bank of the -river; his cavalry being posted in the plain behind the town, with -posts watching the fords above and below the position. - -[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -The 15th, Castaños merely cannonaded the bridge; the 16th, colonel -Cruz crossed with four thousand men near Marmolexo, and fell upon -Dupont’s rear, while Castaños attacked him in front. Cruz was -beaten, and chased into the mountains by a single battalion, and a -few discharges checked Castaños. Meanwhile, Vedel, either thinking -all safe at Baylen, or mistaking Dupont’s meaning, instead of -sending a brigade, marched during the night of the 15th with his -whole division. The next day Reding again passed the Guadalquivir, -and attacked Leger Bellair. General Gobert, who had just arrived -at Baylen, marched to the latter’s assistance; the combat became -hot, Gobert fell mortally wounded, and the French retired to -Baylen. General Darfour succeeded Gobert, and as Reding did not -follow up his success, Darfour gave credit to a report that the -Spanish general was moving by the Linhares road upon Carolina, and -imprudently fell back to the latter town. - -While this was passing, Dupont, already offended by Vedel’s -over-zeal, heard of Gobert’s death, and obliged the former to -return during the nights of the 16th and 17th, to Baylen, with -orders to secure that important point; but Vedel also fell into the -same error as Darfour, and marched the 18th to Carolina. Reding, -who had never moved from Mengibar, being now joined by Coupigny, -profited of this occasion to seize Baylen, and throwing out a -detachment on the side of Carolina, drew up in position facing -Andujar; his numbers, including the armed peasants, being about -twenty thousand. - -[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal.] - -The armies were thus interlaced in a singular manner: Dupont being -posted between Castaños and Reding; and Reding between Dupont and -Vedel’s division: the affair became one of time; Castaños rested -tranquilly in his camp, apparently ignorant of Reding’s situation; -Dupont, more alive to what was passing, silently quitted Andujar -on the evening of the 18th, marched all night, and at day-break -came to Rio de las Tiedras, a torrent with rugged banks, two miles -from the Spanish position, in front of Baylen. Reding’s ground -was strong, intersected with deep ravines, and planted with olive -trees. Dupont hoping that Vedel would return upon the Spanish rear, -and having no choice, passed the Tiedras, and leaving Barbou with -a few battalions on that stream to keep Castaños in check, if he -should arrive during the action, attacked Reding. - -[Sidenote: Whittingham.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -For some time the French appeared to be gaining ground; but, -fatigued with a long night march, and unable to force the principal -points, they became discouraged; the Swiss brigade went over to -the enemy; and at two o’clock, after losing about two thousand, -killed and wounded, Dupont yielded to his destiny, and sent to -desire a suspension of hostilities, with a view to a convention. -Reding, who could hardly maintain his position, willingly acceded -to the proposal. At this moment Barbou was attacked by general La -Pena, who arrived on the Tiedras with a third Spanish division; -for Castaños, when he had discovered Dupont’s retreat eight hours -after the latter had quitted his position, sent half the troops in -pursuit, and remained with the rest at Andujar. - -[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes.] - -[Sidenote: Foy.] - -[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal. MSS.] - -Vedel having heard the cannonade as early as three o’clock in -the morning, quitted Carolina at five o’clock, and marched in -the direction of Baylen. The continued sound of artillery became -more distinct as he advanced, and left no doubt of the fact of -Dupont’s division being seriously engaged, notwithstanding which he -halted at Guarroman, two Spanish leagues from Baylen, and remained -inactive for seven hours. At three o’clock in the evening, when the -firing had long ceased, he put himself in motion again, and coming -upon the rear of Reding’s troops, enveloped and made prisoners a -battalion of the detached corps which was posted by that general -to watch the road leading from Carolina. These troops relying upon -the faith of the armistice just agreed upon with Dupont, made no -resistance; and Vedel being informed of what was passing, released -them, and awaited the result of this singular crisis. - -[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes.] - -One Villontreys, an officer of the emperor’s staff, opened the -negotiation with Reding, by whom he was referred to Castaños then -at Andujar; thither generals Chabert and Marescot repaired on -the 20th. They demanded permission for the whole army to retire -peaceably upon Madrid; and Castaños was at first inclined to grant -this as the most certain and ready mode of freeing Andalusia -from the French, and gaining time for further preparations; -but Savary’s letter to Dupont, written just before the battle -of Rio Seco, to recall him to the defence of the capital, -being intercepted, was brought at this moment to the Spanish -head-quarters, and changed the aspect of affairs. A convention was -no longer in question; Dupont’s troops were required to lay down -their arms and to become prisoners of war, on condition of being -sent to France by sea. Vedel’s troops were likewise required to -surrender on condition of being sent to France with the others, -but not to be considered as prisoners of war: and these terms were -accepted. - -Meanwhile Vedel, informed, in the night of the 20th, by Dupont, of -this unexpected change, had retreated to Carolina. Castaños hearing -of it, menaced Dupont with death if Vedel did not return; and the -latter understanding that he was included in the capitulation, came -back to Baylen and surrendered. - -[Sidenote: Foy’s History.] - -Thus, above eighteen thousand French soldiers laid down their arms -on the 22d, before a raw army incapable of resisting half that -number if the latter had been led by an able man. Nor did this end -the disgraceful affair; but, as if to show to what extent folly -and fear combined will carry men, captain Villontrey’s, with a -Spanish escort, passed the Sierra Morena, and traversing La Mancha -to within a short distance of Toledo, gathered up the escorts, the -hospital attendants, and the detachments left by Dupont in that -province, and constituting them prisoners under the capitulation, -sent them to Andujar; and this unheard of proceeding was quietly -submitted to by men who belonged to that army which for fifteen -years had been the terror of Europe--a proof how much the firmness -of soldiers depends upon the character of their immediate chief. - -[Illustration: _Explanatory Sketch_ of the BATTLE OF BAYLEN. - -_London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street._] - -The capitulation, shameful in itself, was shamefully broken. The -French troops, instead of being sent to France, were maltreated, -and numbers of them murdered in cold blood, especially at Lebrixa, -where above eighty officers were massacred in the most cowardly -manner. Although armed only with their swords, they kept the -assassins for some time at bay, and gathering in a company, upon an -open space in the town, endeavoured to save their lives, but a fire -from the neighbouring houses was kept up until the last of those -unfortunate gentlemen fell. - -[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes.] - -No distinction was made between Dupont’s and Vedel’s troops; -all who survived the march to Cadiz, after being exposed to -every species of indignity, were cast into some hulks, where the -greatest number perished in lingering torments: a few hundreds, -rendered desperate by their situation, contrived to escape, some -years afterwards, by cutting the cables of their prison-ship, -and drifting, under a heavy fire, and in the midst of a storm, -upon a lee-shore, where two-thirds of them were picked up by -their countrymen at that time blockading Cadiz. Dupont himself -was permitted to return to France, and to take with him all -the generals; and it is curious that general Privé, who had -remonstrated strongly against the capitulation, and pressed Dupont -on the field to force a passage through Reding’s army, was the only -one left behind. - -Don Thomas Morla, after a vain attempt to involve lord Collingwood -and sir Hew Dalrymple in the disgraceful transaction, formally -defended the conduct of the junta in breaking the capitulation; his -reasoning was worthy of the man who so soon afterwards betrayed his -own country with the same indifference to honour that he displayed -on this occasion. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -[Sidenote: Return of the French army. Appendix.] - -1º. The gross amount of Dupont’s corps when it first entered -Spain was about twenty-four thousand men, with three thousand -five hundred horses; of these twenty-one thousand were fit for -duty. It was afterwards strengthened by a provisionary regiment of -cuirassiers, a marine battalion of the guard, and the two Swiss -regiments of Preux and Reding. It could not therefore have been -less than twenty-four thousand fighting men when Dupont arrived in -Andalusia, and as the whole of Vedel’s, and the greatest part of -Gobert’s division, had joined before the capitulation, and that -eighteen thousand men laid down their arms at Baylen, Dupont must -have lost by wounds, desertion, and deaths in hospital or the -field, above four thousand men. - -2º. The order which directed this corps upon Cadiz was despatched -from Bayonne before the Spanish insurrection broke out; it was -therefore strange that Dupont should have persevered in his -march when he found affairs in such a different state from that -contemplated by Napoleon at the time the instructions for this -expedition were framed. If the emperor considered it necessary to -reinforce the division which marched under Dupont’s own command, -with a detachment from the army in Portugal before the insurrection -broke out, it was evident that he never could have intended that -that general should blindly follow the letter of his orders, when -a great and unexpected resistance was opposed to him, and that -the detachment of Portugal was unable to effect a junction. The -march to Cordoba was therefore an error, and it was a great error, -because Dupont confesses in his memoir that he advanced under the -conviction that his force was too weak to obtain success, and, -consequently, having no object, his operations could only lead to a -waste of lives. - -3º. At Cordoba, Dupont remained in a state of torpor for ten days; -this was the second error of a series which led to his ruin: he -should either have followed up his victory and attacked Seville -in the first moment of consternation, or he should have retired -to Andujar while he might do so without the appearance of being -compelled to it. If he had followed the first plan, the city would -inevitably have fallen before him, and thus time would have been -gained for the arrival of the 2d and 3d division of his corps. - -[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal of Operations.] - -4º. It may be objected that ten thousand men durst not penetrate so -far into a hostile country; but at Alcolea, Dupont boasts of having -defeated forty thousand men without any loss to himself; from such -armies then he had nothing to fear, and the very fact of his having -pushed his small force between the multitudes that he defeated upon -the 7th, proves that he despised them. “He retired from Cordoba,” -he says in his memoir, “because to fight a battle when victory can -be of no use is against all discretion;” but to make no use of a -victory when it is gained comes to the same thing; and he should -never have moved from Andujar unless with the determination of -taking Seville. - -5º. Those errors were, however, redeemable; the position behind -the Guadalquivir, the checks given to the patriots at Jaen after -the arrival of Vedel at Carolina upon the 27th, and above all the -opportune junction of Gobert at the moment when Castaños and -Reding appeared in front of the French line, proved that it was not -fortune but common sense that deserted Dupont on this occasion, -for the Spanish forces being divided and extended from Andujar to -Mengibar were exposed to be beaten in detail; but their adversary -was indulgent to them, and amidst the mass of errors committed upon -both sides, this false disposition appeared like an act of wisdom, -and being successful was stamped accordingly. - -6º. At Mengibar a variety of roads branch off leading to Jaen, to -Linhares, to Baylen and other places. From Andujar, a road nearly -parallel to the Guadalquivir runs to the ferry of Mengibar and -forms the base of a triangle, of which Baylen may be taken as the -apex. From this latter town to the ferry is about six miles, from -the ferry to Andujar is about eighteen, from the latter to Baylen -the distance may be sixteen miles. Fifteen miles above Baylen the -town of Carolina, situated in the gorge of the Sierra Morena, was -the point of communication with La Mancha, and the line of retreat -for the French in the event of a defeat, hence Baylen, not Andujar, -was the pivot of operations. - -[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal. MS.] - -7º. The French force was inferior in number to that under Castaños, -yet Dupont disseminated his divisions upon several points. The -natural results followed. The Spaniards, although the most -unwieldy body, took the lead and became the assailants; the French -divisions were worn out by useless marches; the orders of their -chief were mistaken or disobeyed; one position being forced, -another was of necessity abandoned; confusion ensued, and finally -Dupont says he surrendered with _eighteen thousand_ men, because -his fighting force was reduced to _two thousand_: such an avowal -saves the honour of his soldiers, but destroys his own reputation -as a general. The first question to ask is, what became of the -remainder? Why had he so few when ten thousand of his army never -fired a shot? It must be confessed that Dupont, unless a worse -explanation can be given of his conduct, was incapable to the last -degree. - -8º. There were two plans, either of which promised a reasonable -chance of success, under the circumstances in which the French -army was placed on the 14th. 1st. To abandon Andujar, send all -the incumbrances into La Mancha, secure the passes, unite the -fighting men at Carolina, and fall in one mass upon the first corps -of Spaniards that advanced; the result of such an attack could -hardly have been doubtful; but if, contrary to all probability, the -Spaniards had been successful, the retreat of the French was open -and safe. 2dly. To secure Carolina by a detachment, and placing -small bodies in observation at Andujar and the ferry of Mengibar, -to unite the army on the 15th at Baylen, and in that central -position await the enemy. If the two corps of the Spanish army had -presented themselves simultaneously upon both roads, the position -was strong for battle and the retreat open; if one approached -before the other, each might have been encountered and crushed -separately. Dupont had a force more than sufficient for this -object, and fortune was not against him. - -9º. The direction in which Reding marched was good, but it should -have been followed by the whole army. The heights of Argonilla -would have screened the march of Castaños, and a few troops with -some heavy guns left in front of the bridge of Andujar, would -have sufficed to occupy Dupont’s attention. If the latter general -had attacked Castaños upon the morning of the 16th, when Vedel’s -division arrived from Baylen, the fourteen thousand men thus -united by accident would easily have overthrown the two Spanish -divisions in front of Andujar; and Reding, if he had lost an -hour in retreating to Jaen, might have been taken in flank by -the victorious troops, and in front by Gobert, and so destroyed. -Instead of availing himself of this opening, the French general -sent Vedel back to Baylen, and followed himself the day after; -being encountered by Reding, he vainly hoped that the divisions -(which with so much pains he had dispersed) would reunite to -relieve him from his desperate situation; it is difficult to say -why those divisions did not arrive during the battle, and more -difficult to assign to each person a just portion of censure where -all were to blame. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.] - -10º. In the action Dupont clung tenaciously to the miserable -system of dividing his forces; his only chance of safety was to -force Reding before Castaños could arrive upon the Tiedras; it was -therefore a wretched misapplication of rules to have a reserve -watching that torrent, and to fight a formal battle with a first -and second line and half a dozen puny columns of attack. An -energetic officer would have formed his troops in a dense mass and -broken at once through the opposing force upon the weakest point; -there are few armies so good, that such an assault would not open -a passage through them; seven thousand infantry with cavalry and -artillery is a powerful column of attack, and the Spanish line -could not have withstood it for a moment. The battle should have -been one of half an hour; Dupont, by his ridiculous evolutions, -made it one of ten hours, and yet so badly did the patriots fight, -that in all that time not a single prisoner or gun fell into their -hands, and the fact of Reding’s entering at all into a convention, -proves his fears for the final result. It is truly astonishing that -Dupont, who, from his rank, must have been well acquainted with -Napoleon’s Italian campaigns, should have caught so little of the -spirit of his master. And then the inexplicable capitulation of -Vedel after his retreat was actually effected! Vedel, who might -have given battle and disputed the victory by himself without -any great imprudence! Joseph called Dupont’s capitulation a -“_defection_;” perhaps he was right. - -11º. Castaños, although active in preparation, discovered but -little talent in the field, his movements were slow, uncertain, -and generally false: the attempt to turn the French position at -Andujar by detaching four thousand men across the river was ill -conceived and badly supported; it was of that class of combinations -to which the separate march of Reding’s corps belonged. To the -latter general the chief honour of the victory is due; yet, if -Vedel had returned from Carolina upon the 19th, with the rapidity -which the occasion required, Reding would have repented taking post -at Baylen. It was undoubtedly a bold energetic step; but instead of -remaining at that place, he should have descended instantly upon -the rear of Dupont, leaving a corps of observation to delay the -march of Vedel. Time not being taken into his calculation, Reding -acted like a bold but rash and unskilful officer. Fortune, however, -favoured his temerity, and with her assistance war is but a child’s -play. - -[Sidenote: Foy’s History.] - -Intelligence of the capitulation of Baylen was secretly spread -among the Spaniards in Madrid as early as the 23d or 24th of -July, but the French, although alarmed by rumours of some great -disaster, were unable to acquire any distinct information, -until the king sent two divisions into La Mancha to open the -communication; these troops arriving at Madrilejos, one hundred and -twenty miles from Baylen, met captain Villontreys with his Spanish -escort collecting prisoners, and apparently intending to proceed in -his task to the very gates of Madrid. The extent of the disaster -thus became known, and the divisions retraced their steps. Joseph -called a council of war on the 29th, and Savary, enlightened by -the instructions of Napoleon, proposed to unite all the French -forces, to place a small garrison in the Retiro, and to fall upon -the Spanish armies in succession as they advanced towards the -capital; but a dislike to the war was prevalent amongst the higher -ranks of the French army. The injustice of it was too glaring; and -the reasons for a retreat, which might perchance induce Napoleon -to desist, being listened to with more complacency than Savary’s -proposal, it was resolved to abandon Madrid and retire behind the -Ebro. - -The king commenced this operation on the 1st of August, marching -by the Somosierra; while Bessieres posted at Mayorga, covered -the movement until the court reached Burgos, and then fell back -himself. In a short time the French invaders were all behind the -Ebro, the siege of Zaragoza was raised, and the triumphant cry of -the Spaniards was heard throughout Europe. - -The retreat of the king was undoubtedly hasty and ill-considered; -whether as a military or political measure it was unwise. -Bessieres, with seventeen thousand victorious troops and forty -pieces of artillery, paralized the northern provinces, the Spanish -army of Andalusia was too distant from that of Valencia to concert -a combined movement, and if they had formed a junction their united -force could not have exceeded forty thousand fighting men, ill -provided, and commanded by jealous independent chiefs. Now the -king, without weakening Bessieres’s corps too much, could have -collected twenty thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and -eighty pieces of artillery, and the battle of Rio Seco shows what -such an army could have effected. Every motive of prudence and of -honour called for some daring action to wipe off the ignominy of -Baylen. - -Let it be conceded that Joseph could not have maintained himself -in Madrid; the line of the Duero was the true position for -the French army. Taking Aranda as a centre, and occupying the -Somosierra, Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, Burgos, and Soria on -the circumference; two ordinary marches would have carried the -king to the succour of any part of his position, and the northern -provinces would thus have been separated from the southern; for -Blake durst not have made a flank march to the Guadarama, Castaños -durst not have remained in the basin of Madrid, and the siege of -Zaragoza might have been continued, because from Aranda to Zaragoza -the distance is not greater than from Valencia or from Madrid, and -from Soria it is only three marches; hence the king could have -succoured Verdier in time if the Valencians attacked him, and it -was impossible for Castaños to have arrived at Zaragoza under a -month; now by taking up the line of the Ebro, Napoleon’s plan of -separating the provinces, and confining each to its own exertions, -was frustrated, and Joseph virtually resigned the throne; for -however doubtful the prudence of opposing the French might have -been considered before the retreat, it became imperative upon all -Spaniards to aid the energy of the multitude, when that energy was -proved to be efficient. - -In this manner Napoleon’s first effort against Spain was -frustrated; not that he had miscalculated either the difficulties -of his task, or the means to overcome them; for although Bessieres -was the only general who perfectly succeeded in his operations, -the plan of the emperor was so well combined, that it required -the destruction of a whole army to shake it at all, and even when -the king, by committing the great faults of abandoning Madrid -and raising the siege of Zaragoza, had given the utmost force to -Dupont’s catastrophe; the political position only of the French was -weakened, their military hold of the country was scarcely loosened, -and the Spaniards were unable to follow up their victory. - -The moral effect of the battle of Baylen was surprising: it was -one of those minor events which, insignificant in themselves, are -the cause of great changes in the affairs of nations. The defeat -of Rio Seco, the preparations of Moncey for a second attack on -Valencia, the miserable plight of Zaragoza, the desponding view -taken of affairs by the ablest men of Spain, and, above all, the -disgust and terror excited among the patriots by the excesses of -the populace, weighed heavy against the Spanish cause. One victory -more, and probably the moral as well as the physical force of -Spain would have been crushed; but the battle of Baylen, opening -as it were a new crater for the Spanish fire, all their pride, -and vanity, and arrogance burst forth, the glory of past ages -seemed to be renewed, every man conceived himself a second Cid, -and perceived in the surrender of Dupont, not the deliverance of -Spain, but the immediate conquest of France. “We are much obliged -to our good friends the English,” was a common phrase among them -when conversing with the officers of Sir John Moore’s army; “we -thank them for their good-will, and we shall have the pleasure -of escorting them through France to Calais: the journey will be -pleasanter than a long voyage, and we shall not give them the -trouble of fighting the French; we shall, however, be pleased at -having them as spectators of our victories.” This absurd confidence -might have led to great things if it had been supported by wisdom, -activity, or valour; but it was “a voice, and nothing more.” - - - - -BOOK II. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -The uninterrupted success that for so many years attended the arms -of Napoleon, gave him a moral influence doubling his actual force. -Exciting at once terror, admiration, and hatred, he absorbed the -whole attention of an astonished world, and openly or secretly all -men acknowledged the power of his wonderful genius. The continent -bowed before him, and even in England an increasing number of -absurd and virulent libels on his person and character indicated -the growth of secret fear. His proceedings against the Peninsula -were, in truth, viewed at first with anxiety rather than with the -hope of arresting their progress; yet when the full extent of the -injustice became manifest, the public mind was vehemently excited, -and a sentiment of some extraordinary change being about to take -place in the affairs of the world prevailed among all classes of -society; suddenly the Spanish people rose against the man that all -feared; and the admiration which energy and courage exact, even -from the base and timid, became enthusiastic in a nation conscious -of the same virtues. - -No factious feelings interfered to check this enthusiasm: the party -in power, anxious to pursue a warlike system necessary to their -own political existence, saw with joy that the stamp of justice -and high feeling would, for the first time, be affixed to their -policy. The party out of power having always derided the impotence -of the ancient dynasties, and asserted that regular armies alone -were insufficient means of defence, could not consistently refuse -their approbation to a struggle originating with, and carried on -entirely by the Spanish multitude. The people at large exulted that -the manifest superiority of plebeian virtue and patriotism was -acknowledged. - -The arrival of the Asturian deputies was, therefore, universally -hailed as an auspicious event. Their wishes were forestalled, their -suggestions were attended to with eagerness; their demands were so -readily complied with, and the riches of England were so profusely -tendered to them by the ministers, that it can scarcely be doubted -that the after arrogance and extravagance of the Spaniards arose -from the manner in which their first applications were met; for -there is a way of conferring a favour that appears like accepting -one: and this secret being discovered by the English cabinet, the -Spaniards soon demanded as a right what they had at first solicited -as a boon. In politics it is a grievous fault to be too generous; -gratitude, in state affairs, is unknown; and as the appearance of -disinterested kindness never deceives, it should never be assumed. - -The capture of the Spanish frigates had placed Great Britain and -Spain in a state of hostility without a declaration of war. The -invasion of Napoleon produced a friendly alliance between those -countries without a declaration of peace, for the cessation of -hostilities was not proclaimed until long after succours had been -sent to the juntas. - -The ministers seemed, by their precipitate measures, to be more -afraid of losing the assistance of the Spaniards than prepared -to take the lead in a contest which could only be supported by -the power and riches of Great Britain. Instead of adopting a -simple and decisive policy towards Spain, instead of sending a -statesman of high rank and acknowledged capacity to sustain the -insurrection, and to establish the influence of England by a -judicious application of money and other supplies, the ministers -employed a number of obscure men in various parts of the Peninsula -who, without any experience of public affairs, were empowered to -distribute succours of all kinds at their own discretion. Instead -of sifting carefully the information obtained from such agents, -and consulting distinguished military and naval officers in the -arrangement of some comprehensive plan of operations which, being -well understood by those who were to execute it, might be supported -vigorously, the ministers formed crude projects, and parcelled out -the forces in small expeditions, without any definite object in -view, altering their plans with every idle report, and changing the -commanders as lightly as the plans. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Letters.] - -[Sidenote: Lord W. Bentinck’s ditto.] - -Entering into formal relations with every knot of Spanish -politicians that assumed the title of a supreme junta, the -government dealt with unsparing hands enormous supplies at the -demand of those self-elected authorities, yet took no assurance -that the succours should be justly applied, but, with affected -earnestness, disclaimed all intention of interfering with the -internal arrangements of the Spaniards, when the ablest men of -Spain expected and wished for such an interference to repress -the folly and violence of their countrymen, and when England was -entitled, both in policy and justice, not only to interfere, -but to direct the councils of the insurgents. The latter had -solicited and obtained her assistance; the cause was become common -to both nations, and their welfare demanded, that a prudent, just, -and vigorous interference on the part of the most powerful and -enlightened, should prevent that cause from being ruined by a few -ignorant and conceited men, accidentally invested with authority. - -[Sidenote: Vide Instructions for sir Thos. Dyer, &c. &c.] - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, Section 5th.] - -The numbers and injudicious choice of military agents were also -the source of infinite mischief; selected, as it would appear, -principally because of their acquaintance with the Spanish -language; few of those agents had any knowledge of war beyond the -ordinary duties of a regiment; there was no concert among them, for -there was no controlling power vested in any, but each did that -which seemed good to him. Readily affecting to consult men whose -inexperience rendered them amenable, and whose friendship could -supply the means of advancing their own interests in a disorganised -state of society, the Spanish generals received the agents with a -flattering and confidential politeness, that diverted the attention -of the latter from the true objects of their mission. Instead of -ascertaining the real numbers and efficiency of the armies, they -adopted the inflated language and extravagant opinions of the -chiefs, with whom they lived; and their reports gave birth to most -erroneous notions of the relative strength and situation of the -contending forces in the Peninsula. Some exceptions there were; but -the ministers seemed to be better pleased with the sanguine than -with the cautious, and made their own wishes the measure of their -judgments. Accordingly, enthusiasm, numbers, courage, and talent, -were gratuitously found for every occasion; but money, arms, and -clothing, were demanded incessantly, and supplied with profusion; -the arms were, however, generally left in their cases to rot, or to -fall into the hands of the enemy; the clothing seldom reached the -soldier’s back, and the money, in all instances misapplied, was in -some, embezzled by the authorities, into whose hands it fell, and -in others employed to create disunion, and to forward the private -views of the juntas, at the expense of the public welfare. It is -a curious fact, that from the beginning to the end of the war, an -English musket was rarely to be seen in the hands of a Spanish -soldier. But it is time to quit this subject, and to trace the -progress of Junot’s invasion of Portugal, that the whole circle of -operations in the Peninsula being completed, the reader may take a -general view of the situation of all parties, at the moment when -sir Arthur Wellesley, disembarking at the Mondego, commenced those -campaigns which form the proper subject of this history. - - -INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY JUNOT. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -Peremptory orders obliged Junot to commence operations at an -unfavourable time of year, and before his preparations were -completed. In his front the roads were nearly impracticable, and a -part of his troops were still in the rear of Salamanca. Hence, his -march from that town to Alcantara (where he effected his junction -in the latter end of November, with the part of the Spanish force -that was to act under his immediate orders) was very disastrous, -and nearly disorganized his inexperienced army. - -The succours he expected to receive at Alcantara were not -furnished, and the repugnance of the Spanish authorities to aid -him, was the cause of so much embarrassment, that his chief -officers doubted the propriety of continuing operations under -the accumulating difficulties of his situation; but Junot’s -firmness was unabated. He knew that no English force had landed at -Lisbon, and the cowardice of the Portuguese court was notorious. -Encouraged by these considerations, he undertook one of those hardy -enterprises which astound the mind by their success, and leave -the historian in doubt if he should praise the happy daring, or -stigmatise the rashness of the deed. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -Without money, without transport, without ammunition sufficient -for a general action, with an auxiliary force of Spaniards by -no means well disposed to aid him, Junot, at the head of a raw -army, penetrated the mountains of Portugal on the most dangerous -and difficult line by which that country can be invaded. He was -ignorant of what was passing in the interior; he knew not if he -was to be opposed, nor what means were prepared to resist him; but -trusting to the inertness of the Portuguese government, to the -rapidity of his own movements, and to the renown of the French -arms, he made his way through Lower Beira, and suddenly appeared -in the town of Abrantes, a fearful and unexpected guest. There he -obtained the first information of the true state of affairs. Lisbon -was tranquil, and the Portuguese fleet was ready to sail, but the -court still remained on shore. On hearing this, Junot, animated by -the prospect of seizing the prince regent, pressed forward, and -reached Lisbon in time to see the fleet, having the royal family -on board, clearing the mouth of the Tagus. One vessel dragged -astern within reach of a battery, the French general himself fired -a gun at her; and on his return to Lisbon, meeting some Portuguese -troops, he resolutely commanded them to form an escort for his -person, and thus attended, passed through the streets of the -capital. Nature alone had opposed his progress; yet such were the -hardships his army had endured, that of a column which had numbered -twenty-five thousand in its ranks, two thousand tired grenadiers -only entered Lisbon with their general; fatigue, and want, and -tempests, had scattered the remainder along two hundred miles of -rugged mountains, inhabited by a warlike and ferocious peasantry, -well acquainted with the strength of their fastnesses, and proud -of many successful defences made by their fore-fathers against -former invaders. Lisbon itself contained three hundred thousand -inhabitants, and fourteen thousand regular troops were collected -there. A powerful British fleet was at the mouth of the harbour; -the commander, sir Sydney Smith, had urged the court to resist, and -offered to land his seamen and marines to aid in the defence of -the town; but his offers were declined; and the people, disgusted -with the pusillanimous conduct of their rulers, and confounded -by the strangeness of the scene, evinced no desire to impede the -march of events. Thus three weak battalions sufficed to impose a -foreign yoke upon this great capital, and illustrated the truth of -Napoleon’s maxim:--_that in war the moral is to the physical force -as three parts to one_. - -The prince regent, after having at the desire of the French -government, expelled the British factory, ordered the British -minister plenipotentiary away from his court, sequestered British -property, and shut the ports of Portugal against British merchants; -after having degraded himself and his nation by performing every -submissive act which France could devise to insult his weakness, -was still reluctant to forego the base tenure by which he hoped -to hold his crown. Alternately swayed by fear and indolence, -a miserable example of helpless folly, he lingered until the -reception of a Moniteur, announcing that “_the house of Braganza -had ceased to reign_,” awoke all the energy he was capable of. At -that time lord Strangford, the British minister plenipotentiary, -had resigned all hope of persuading the royal family to emigrate; -but sir Sydney Smith, seizing the favourable moment, threatened to -commence hostilities if the emigration should be longer delayed; -and thus urged, the prince regent of Portugal, the old queen his -mother, and the rest of the royal family, had embarked on the 27th; -and quitting the Tagus on the 29th of November[9], sailed for the -Brazils, a few hours only before Junot arrived with his slight -escort of grenadiers. - -This celebrated emigration was beneficial to the Brazils in the -highest degree, and of vast importance to England in two ways, -for it ensured great commercial advantages, and it threw Portugal -completely into her power in the approaching conflict; but it -was disgraceful to the prince, insulting to the brave people he -abandoned, and impolitic, inasmuch as it obliged men to inquire how -far subjects were bound to a monarch who deserted them in their -need? how far the nation could belong to a man who did not belong -to the nation? - -It has been observed by political economists, that where a gold -and paper currency circulate together, if the paper be depreciated -it will drag down the gold with it, and deteriorate the whole -mass; but that after a time, the metal revolts from this unnatural -state, and asserts its own intrinsic superiority. So a privileged -class, corrupted by power and luxury, drags down the national -character; but there is a point when the people, like the gold, no -longer suffering such a degradation, will separate themselves with -violence from the vices of their effeminate rulers. Before that -time arrives a nation may appear to be sunk in hopeless lethargy, -when it is really capable of great and noble exertions. Thus it was -with the Portuguese, who were at this time unjustly despised by -enemies, and mistrusted by friends. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -[Sidenote: Foy.] - -The invading army, in pursuance of the convention of Fontainebleau, -was divided into three corps; the central one, composed of the -French troops, and a Spanish division, under general Caraffa, had -penetrated by the two roads, which from Alcantara lead, the one by -Pedragoa, the other by Sobreira Formosa; but at Abrantes, Caraffa’s -division separated from the French, and took possession of Thomar. -Meanwhile the right, under general Taranco, marching from Gallicia -established themselves at Oporto, and the marquis of Solano, with -the left, entered the Alemtejo, and fixed his quarters at Setuval. -The Spanish troops did not suffer on their route; but such had been -the distress of the French army, that three weeks afterwards it -could only muster ten thousand men under arms, and the privations -encountered on the march led to excesses which first produced that -rancorous spirit of mutual hatred, so remarkable between the French -and Portuguese. Young soldiers always attribute their sufferings -to the ill-will of the inhabitants; it is difficult to make them -understand that a poor peasantry have nothing to spare; old -soldiers, on the contrary, blame nobody, but know how to extract -subsistence in most cases without exciting enmity. - -Junot passed the month of December in collecting his army, securing -the great military points about Lisbon, and in preparations to -supplant the power of a council of regency, to whom the prince at -his departure had delegated the sovereign authority. As long as the -French troops were scattered on the line of march, and that the -fortresses were held by Portuguese garrisons, it would have been -dangerous to provoke the enmity, or to excite the activity of this -council, and the members were treated with studious respect; but -they were of the same leaven as the court they emanated from, and -the quick resolute proceedings of Junot soon deprived them of any -importance conferred by the critical situation of affairs during -the first three weeks. - -[Sidenote: Return of the French army. Appendix, No. 28.] - -The Spanish auxiliary forces were well received in the north and -in the Alemtejo; but general Taranco dying soon after his arrival -at Oporto, the French general Quesnel was sent to command that -province. Junot had early taken possession of Elvas, and detached -general Maurin to the Algarves, with sixteen hundred men; and, when -Solano was ordered by his court to withdraw from Portugal, nine -French battalions and the cavalry, under the command of Kellerman, -took possession of the Alemtejo also, and occupied the fortress -of Setuval. At the same time Junot replaced Caraffa’s division -at Thomar by a French force, and distributed the former in small -bodies, at a considerable distance from each other, on both sides -of the Tagus, immediately round Lisbon. - -[Sidenote: Foy.] - -The provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau were unknown to -the Portuguese, a circumstance that procured the Spanish troops -a better reception than the French; but that treaty was now no -longer regarded by Junot, whose conduct plainly discovered that he -considered Portugal to be a possession entirely belonging to France. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -When all his stragglers were come up, his army recovered from its -fatigues, and that he knew that a reinforcement of five thousand -men had arrived at Salamanca on its march to Lisbon, Junot -proceeded more openly to assume the chief authority; he commenced -by exacting a forced loan of two hundred thousand pounds, and not -only interfered with the different departments of state, but put -Frenchmen into all the lucrative offices; and his promises and -protestations of amity became loud and frequent in proportion to -his encroachments and the increase of his power. At last being -created by Napoleon duke of Abrantes, he threw off all disguise, -suppressed the council of regency, seized the reins of government -himself, and while he established many useful regulations, made the -nation sensibly alive to the fact that he was a despotic conqueror. - -The flag and the arms of Portugal were replaced by those of France; -and of the Portuguese army, eight thousand men were selected and -sent from the kingdom, under the command of the marquis d’Alorna -and Gomez Frere, two noblemen of the greatest reputation for -military talent among the native officers. Five thousand more -were attached to the divisions of Junot’s army, and the rest were -disbanded. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -[Sidenote: Foy.] - -An extraordinary contribution of four millions sterling, decreed by -Napoleon, was then demanded, under the curious title of a ransom -for the state; this sum was exorbitant, and Junot prevailed on the -emperor to reduce it one half. He likewise on his own authority -accepted the forced loan, the confiscated English merchandise, the -church plate, and the royal property, in part payment; but the -people were still unable to raise the whole amount, for the court -had before taken the greatest part of the church plate and bullion -of the kingdom, and had also drawn large sums from the people, -under the pretext of defending the country, with which treasure -they departed, leaving the public functionaries, the army, private -creditors, and even domestic servants, unpaid. - -But although great discontent and misery prevailed, the -tranquillity of Lisbon, during the first month after the arrival of -the French, was remarkable; no disturbance took place, the populace -were completely controlled by the activity of a police, established -under the prince regent’s government by the count de Novion, a -French emigrant, and continued by Junot on an extended scale. - -No capital city in Europe suffers so much as Lisbon from the want -of good police regulations, and the French general conferred -an unmixed benefit on the inhabitants by giving more effect to -Novion’s plans; yet so deeply rooted is the prejudice in favour -of ancient customs, that no act of the duke of Abrantes gave the -Portuguese more offence than his having the streets cleansed, and -the wild dogs (that infested them by thousands) killed. A French -serjeant, distinguished by his zeal in destroying those disgusting -and dangerous animals, was in revenge assassinated. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -In the course of March and April, Junot’s military system was -completed; the arsenal of Lisbon, one of the finest establishments -of the kind in Europe, contained all kinds of naval and military -stores in abundance, and ten thousand excellent workmen in every -branch of business appertaining to war; hence the artillery, the -carriages, the ammunition, and all the minor equipments of the -army, were soon renewed and put in the best possible condition, -and the hulks of two line-of-battle ships, three frigates, and -seven lighter vessels of war, were refitted, armed, and moored -across the river to defend the entrance, and to awe the town. The -army itself, perfectly recovered from its fatigues, reinforced, -and better disciplined, was grown confident in its chief from the -success of the invasion, and being well fed and clothed, was become -a fine body of robust men, capable of any exertion. In March it was -re-organized in three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. -General La Borde commanded the first, general Loison the second, -general Travot the third, general Margaron the fourth, and general -Taviel directed the artillery. General Kellerman commanded in -the Alemtejo, general Quesnel at Oporto, general Maurin in the -Algarves, and Junot himself in Lisbon. - -The fortresses of Faro in Algarve, of Almeida, of Elvas, La Lippe, -St. Lucie, Setuval, Palmela, and those between Lisbon and the mouth -of the Tagus, of Ericia and Peniché, were furnished with French -garrisons; and Estremos, Aldea-Gallegos, Santarem, and Abrantes -were occupied, and put in such a state of defence as their decayed -ramparts would permit. - -[Sidenote: Return of the French army. Appendix, No. 28.] - -The whole army, including the French workmen and marines attached -to it, amounted to above fifty thousand men, of which above -forty-four thousand were fit for duty; that is to say, fifteen -thousand five hundred Spaniards, five thousand Portuguese, and -twenty-four thousand four hundred French. - - Of the latter 1000 were in Elvas and La Lippe, - 1000 in Almeida, - 1000 in Peniché, - 1600 in the Algarves, - 2892 in Setuval, - 750 in Abrantes, - 450 cavalry were kept in Valencia - d’Alcantara, in Spanish Estremadura, - and 350 distributed in the proportion of - -fifteen men to a post, guarded the lines of communication which -were established from Lisbon to Elvas, and from Almeida to Coimbra. -Above fifteen thousand men remained disposable. - -Thus Lisbon, the capital, containing all the civil, military, and -naval, and the greatest part of the commercial establishments, the -only fine harbour, two-eighths of the population, and two-thirds -of the riches of the whole kingdom, was secured by the main body, -which formed the centre, while on the circumference a number -of strong posts gave support to the operations of the moveable -column. By this disposition, the garrison of Peniché commanded the -only harbour between the Tagus and the Mondego, in which a large -disembarkation of English troops could take place; and the little -port of Figueras, which was held by a small garrison, blocked the -mouth of the latter river; while the division at Thomar secured -all the great lines of communication to the north-east, and in -conjunction with the garrison of Abrantes, commanded both sides of -the Zezere. - -From Abrantes to Estremos and Elvas, and from the former to -Setuval, the lines of communication were short, and through an open -country, suitable for the operations of the cavalry, which was all -quartered on the south bank of the Tagus. Thus, without breaking up -the mass of the army, the harbours were sealed against the English, -and a great and rich tract was enclosed by posts, and rendered so -pervious to the troops, that any insurrection could be reached -by a few marches, and immediately crushed. The connexion between -the right and left banks of the Tagus at Lisbon was secured, and -the entrance to the port defended by the vessels of war which had -been refitted and armed. A light squadron was also prepared to -communicate with South America, and nine Russian line of battle -ships, and a frigate under the command of admiral Siniavin, which -had taken refuge some time before from the English fleet, were of -necessity engaged in the defence of the harbour, and formed an -unwilling, but not an unimportant auxiliary force. - -These military arrangements were Junot’s own, and suitable enough -if his army had been unconnected with any other; but they clashed -with the general views of Napoleon, who regarded the force in -Portugal only as a division of troops, to be rendered subservient -to the general scheme of subjecting the Peninsula; wherefore, -in the month of May, he ordered that general Avril, with three -thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, should -co-operate with Dupont in Andalusia, and that general Loison, with -four thousand infantry, should proceed to Almeida, and from thence -co-operate with Bessieres in the event of an insurrection taking -place in Spain. - -General Thiebault complains of this order as injurious to Junot, -ill combined, and the result of a foolish vanity that prompted the -emperor to direct all the armies himself; yet it would be difficult -to show that the arrangement was faulty. Avril’s division, if he -had not halted at Tavora, for which there was no reason, would -have ensured the capture of Seville, and if Dupont’s defeat had -not rendered the victory of Rio Seco useless, Loison’s division -would have been eminently useful in controlling the country behind -Bessieres, in case the latter invaded Gallicia; and it was well -placed to intercept the communication between the Castilian and the -Estremaduran armies. Thus the emperor’s combinations, if they had -been fully executed, would have brought seventy thousand men to -bear on the defence of Portugal. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon in Las Casas.] - -[Sidenote: Foy.] - -Such was the military attitude of the French in May; their -political situation was far from being so favourable. Junot’s -natural capacity was very considerable; but it was neither enlarged -by study, nor strengthened by mental discipline. Of intemperate -habits, indolent in business, yet prompt and brave in action, -quick to give offence, ready to forget an injury; at one moment -a great man, the next below mediocrity, Junot was at all times -unsuited to the task of conciliating and governing a people like -the Portuguese, who, with passions as sudden and vehement as his -own, retain a sense of injury or insult with incredible tenacity; -otherwise, although he had many difficulties to encounter, and -his duty towards France was in some instances incompatible with -good policy towards Portugal, he was not without resources for -establishing a strong French interest. But he possessed neither the -ability nor disposition to soothe a nation that, without having -suffered a defeat, was suddenly bowed to a foreign yoke. - -[Sidenote: Foy.] - -The pride and the poverty of the Portuguese, and the influence -of ancient usages, interfered with Junot’s policy. The monks and -friars, and most of the nobility, were inimical to his sway; and -all the activity of the expelled British factory, and the secret -warfare of spies and writers in the pay of England, were directed -to undermine his plans, and to render him and his nation odious; -but on the other hand, he was in possession of the government and -of the capital, he had a fine army, and he could offer novelty so -dear to the multitude, and he had the name and the fame of Napoleon -to assist him. The promises of power are always believed by the -many; and there were abundance of grievances to remedy, and wrongs -to redress in Portugal. And such a strong feeling existed among the -best educated men (and especially at the universities) of dislike -to the Braganza family, and in favour of a reformed system, that -steps were actually taken to have prince Eugene declared king of -Portugal; and we shall find hereafter, that this spirit was not -extinguished at a much later date. - -With these materials, and the military vanity of the Portuguese -to work upon, Junot might have established a powerful French -interest; and under an active government, the people would not long -have regretted the loss of an independence that had no wholesome -breathing amidst the corrupt stagnation of the old system. But the -arrogance of a conqueror, and the necessities of an army, which -was to be subsisted and paid by an impoverished people, soon gave -rise to all kinds of oppression; private abuses followed close -upon the heels of public rapacity, and insolence left its sting to -rankle in the wounds of the injured. The malignant humours broke -out in quarrels and assassinations, and the severe punishments that -ensued, many of them unjust and barbarous in the highest degree, -created rage, not terror; for the nation had not tried its strength -in battle, and would not believe that it was weak. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -The ports were rigorously blockaded by the English fleet, the -troubles in Spain interrupted the commerce in grain, by which -Portugal had been usually supplied from that country, and the -unhappy people suffered under the triple pressure of famine, -war-contributions, and a foreign yoke. With all external aliment -thus cut off, and a hungry army gnawing at its vitals, the nation -could not remain tranquil; and although the first five months of -Junot’s government was, with the exception of a slight tumult at -Lisbon (when the arms of Portugal were taken down), undisturbed -by commotion, the whole country was soon ripe for a general -insurrection. The harvest, however, proved remarkably fine, and -Junot hailed the prospect of returning plenty, as a relief from -his principal difficulty; but as one danger disappeared, another -presented itself. The Spanish insurrection excited the hopes of -the Portuguese; agents from the neighbouring juntas communicated -secretly with the Spanish generals in Portugal. The capture of the -French fleet in Cadiz became known, assassinations multiplied; -the pope’s nuncio fled on board the English fleet, and all things -tended to a general explosion. The English agents were of course -actively engaged in promoting this spirit; and the appearance of -two English fleets at different points of the coast, having troops -on board, produced great alarm among the French, and augmented the -impatient fierceness of the Portuguese. - -Among the various ways in which the people discovered their -hatred of the invaders, one was very characteristic: an egg was -marked with certain letters by a chemical process, and then -placed in a nest; being taken from thence, it was exhibited, -and created a great sensation; the letters were interpreted to -indicate the speedy coming of don Sebastian, king of Portugal, -who, like Arthur of romantic memory, was supposed to be hidden -in a secret island, waiting for the destined period when he was -to re-appear and restore his country to her ancient glory. The -trick was turned against the contrivers; other eggs prophesied in -the most impatriotic manner, but the belief of the Sebastianists -lost nothing of its zeal; many people, and those not of the most -uneducated classes, were often observed upon the highest points of -the hills, casting earnest looks towards the ocean, in the hopes of -descrying the island in which their long lost hero was detained. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -The first serious blow was struck at Oporto; the news of what -had taken place all over Spain was known there in June. General -Bellesta, the chief Spanish officer, immediately took an honourable -and resolute part. He made the French general Quesnel, with his -staff, prisoners; after which, calling together the Portuguese -authorities, he declared that they were free to act as they judged -most fitting for their own interests, and then marched to Gallicia -with his army and captives. - -The opinions of the leading men at Oporto were divided upon the -great question of resistance; but, after some vicissitudes, the -boldest side was successful, and the insurrection, although at -one moment quelled by the French party, was finally established -in Oporto, and soon extended along the banks of the Duero and the -Minho, and to those parts of Beira which lie between the Mondego -and the sea-coast. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -Junot being informed of this event, perceived that no time was -to be lost in disarming the Spanish regiments quartered in the -neighbourhood of Lisbon; but this was not an easy operation. -Carraffa’s division was above six thousand men, and without -employing the garrisons of the citadel and forts of Lisbon, it -was difficult to collect an equal force of French. The suspicions -of the Spanish regiments had been already excited, they were -reluctant to obey the French generals, and one quartered at Alcacer -de Sal had actually resisted the orders of the general-in-chief -himself. To avoid a tumult was the great object, because in Lisbon -fifteen thousand Gallicians were ordinarily engaged as porters and -water-carriers, and if a popular movement had been excited, these -men would naturally have assisted their countrymen. Notwithstanding -these difficulties, Junot, in the night of that day upon which he -received the information of Bellesta’s defection, arranged all his -measures; and the next day the Spanish troops being, under various -pretexts, assembled in such numbers, and in such places, that -resistance became impossible, they yielded to necessity, and were -disarmed, and placed on board the hulks in the Tagus: eight hundred -of the regiment of Murcia and three hundred of that of Valencia -only escaping. Thus Junot in the course of twenty-four hours, -and with very little bloodshed, succeeded, by his promptness and -dexterity, in averting a very serious danger. - -The decision and success of this stroke against the Spanish -division produced considerable effect, but not sufficient to -prevent the insurrection from becoming general; all couriers, -and officers carrying orders or commanding small posts of -communications, were suddenly cut off, and Junot, reduced by a -single blow from fifty to twenty-eight thousand men, found himself -isolated, and dependent upon his individual resources, and the -courage of his soldiers, for the maintenance of his conquest, and -even for the preservation of his army. - -The Russian squadron indeed contained six thousand seamen and -marines, but, while they consumed a great quantity of provisions, -it was evident, from certain symptoms, that they could not be -depended upon as useful allies, except in the case of an English -fleet attempting to force the entrance of the river. In this -situation the duke of Abrantes at first thought of seizing -Badajos, with a view to secure still more effectually the best -line of retreat into Spain, but the Spanish army of Estremadura -had assembled there, under the command of general Galuzzo, and -frustrated that scheme. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -General Avril’s column having failed to effect its junction with -Dupont, returned to Estremos, and it is probable that Junot never -intended that it should be otherwise; for no great efforts appear -to have been made by Avril to attain the object of the march. -Loison was in the north, but orders were sent to him, to repair -with his column to Oporto and assume the command of that city. Upon -the 5th of June, one day previous to Bellesta’s defection, Loison -had arrived at Almeida, and upon the 12th had made himself master -of Fort Conception, a strong, but ill-placed Spanish fortification -on the frontier. The commandant being partly persuaded, and partly -frightened into a surrender of his charge, retired, with his -garrison, to Ciudad Rodrigo. - -Upon receipt of the despatch which directed him to march to Oporto, -Loison quitted Almeida, and endeavoured to penetrate into the -province of Entre Minho e Duero by the route of Amarante, but -his division was too weak to force his way through such a strong -country (where the population was in full insurrection), and to -take a great city, and it was possible that general Bellesta -might have returned and fallen upon his flank. Swayed by these -reasons, Loison advanced cautiously, and without vigour. Being -slightly opposed at the position of Mezam Frias, and hearing that -his baggage had been attacked at the same time by insurgents in -his rear, he fell back at once upon Villa Real, there he engaged -in another trifling skirmish, and then quitting his first route, -crossed the Douero at Lamego, and marched to Castro d’Airo, being -harassed on the road by the armed peasantry of the mountains -skirting his line of march. At Castro d’Airo he faced about, and -dispersed the assailants with some slaughter, and then continued -his movement to Celerico without further molestation; at Celerico a -body of insurgents fled without firing a shot; and Loison dividing -his troops, sent one half to Trancoso, and with the other marched -to Guarda, intending to scour that part of the country, and to -put down the insurrection; but at this time he received one of -twenty-five despatches sent by Junot for the purpose of recalling -him to Lisbon; all the rest had been intercepted. Loison, upon the -receipt of this despatch, returned to Almeida the 1st of July. -Leaving his sick, his wounded, and weak men there, and making up -the garrison to the number of twelve hundred and fifty, he removed -all the palisades, guns, and materials from Fort Conception, -completely ruined the defences of that place, and then prosecuted -his march to Lisbon by the route of Guarda. - -While these events were passing in the north, another insurrection -took place in the south: general Maurin commanded in the Algarves; -and some Portuguese artillerymen and other native troops were -attached to the French brigade under his orders. A rising of the -people commenced in the neighbourhood of Faro, and soon extended -to that town, and along the coast. Maurin was confined to his bed -by illness, and fell into the hands of the insurgents; colonel -Maransin supplied his place, but the country was too extensive -to be controlled by sixteen hundred men. The Portuguese soldiers -went over to their countrymen: the Spaniards from Andalusia -threatened to move across the Guadiana, and general Spencer, with -five thousand British soldiers, appeared off Ayamonte. Maransin -immediately fell back in haste upon Mertola, leaving part of his -baggage, his military chest, his accounts, and above a hundred -prisoners, besides killed and wounded, in the hands of the -patriots. At Mertola he was safe; and general Spencer merely landed -a few officers, and ordered rations for five thousand men; while -the Portuguese wisely remained within the range of the mountains -which protect the northern frontier of Algarve. - -The circle was now closing fast round Junot; emissaries from Oporto -excited the people to rise as far as Coimbra. At that town a small -French post was easily overpowered, and a junta formed; from thence -new efforts spread the flame to Condexa, Pombal, and Leria; and a -student of the Coimbra university, named Zagalo, with considerable -address and boldness, got possession of the small, but important -fort of Figueras, at the mouth of the Mondego; the commandant (a -Portuguese officer), with a hundred men, capitulated; the terms -were broken, but no violence seems to have been committed upon the -prisoners. - -On the other side, Abrantes was threatened by the insurgents -of the valley of the Zezere; and the Spaniards, under Galuzzo, -crossed the Guadiana at Juramenha, and occupied that place and -Campo Mayor. Kellerman’s head-quarters were at Elvas; a great, -although confused body of men menaced his position, but, supported -by the strength of the town and Fort La-Lyppe, he easily maintained -himself. Avril remained unmolested at Estremos, and Evora, held by -a small garrison, was tranquil; but the neighbourhood of Setuval -was in commotion; the populace of Lisbon was unquiet; and at this -critical moment general Spencer, whose force report magnified to -ten thousand men, appeared at the mouth of the Tagus. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -Junot held a council of war. After hearing the opinions of the -principal general officers, he decided on the following plan: 1º. -To collect the sick in such hospitals as could be protected by -the ships of war. 2º. To secure the Spanish prisoners by moving -the hulks in which they were confined as far as possible from the -city. 3º. To arm and provision the fortresses of Lisbon, and to -remove the powder from the magazines to the ships. 4º. To abandon -all the other fortresses in Portugal with the exception of Setuval, -Almeida, Elvas, and Peniché, and, finally, to concentrate the -army in Lisbon. In the event of bad fortune, the duke of Abrantes -determined to defend the capital as long as he was able, and then -to cross the Tagus, make way by the left bank upon Elvas, and from -thence retreat to Madrid, Valladolid, or Segovia, as he might find -expedient. This well-conceived plan was not executed, the first -alarm soon died away, Spencer returned to Cadiz, and when the -insurrection was grappled with, it proved to be more noisy than -dangerous. - -Kellerman recalled Maransin from Mertola and prepared himself to -march to Lisbon, but the inhabitants of the town of Villa Viciosa -having risen against a company of French troops quartered there, -the latter took refuge in an old castle, and defended themselves -until Kellerman sent general Avril from Estremos to succour them; -this the latter effected without difficulty; the Portuguese fled -the moment he appeared, and a very few were killed in the pursuit. -But the town of Beja followed the example of Villa Viciosa, and -colonel Maransin, who was preparing to retire from Mertola, being -informed of it, marched in that direction with such rapidity, that -he passed over forty miles in eighteen hours, and falling suddenly -upon the patriots, defeated them with considerable slaughter, -himself losing thirty killed and fifty wounded: the town was -pillaged, and some houses were burned. - -General Thiebault writes, that an obstinate combat took place -in the streets, but the Portuguese never made head for a -moment against a strong body, during the whole course of the -insurrection. How, indeed, was it possible for a collection of -miserable peasants, armed with scythes, pitchforks, a few old -fowling pieces, and a little bad powder, under the command of -some ignorant countryman or fanatic friar, to maintain a battle -against an efficient and active corps of French soldiers? For there -is this essential difference to be observed in judging between -the Spanish and Portuguese insurrections; the Spaniards had many -great and strong towns free from the presence of the French, and -large provinces in which to collect and train forces at a distance -from the invaders; but in Portugal the naked peasants were forced -to go to battle the instant even of assembling. The loss which -Maransin sustained must have arisen from the stragglers (who in a -consecutive march of forty miles would have been numerous) having -been cut off and killed by the peasantry. This blow, however, -quieted the Alentejo for the moment, and Kellerman having cleared -the neighbourhood of Elvas from the Spanish parties, placed a -commandant in La-Lyppe, and concentrated the detachments under -Maransin and Avril, proceeded towards Lisbon. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -[Sidenote: Accursio de Neves.] - -The duke of Abrantes was in great perplexity; the intercepting -of his couriers and isolated officers had been followed by the -detection of all his spies, and he was exposed, without assistance, -to every report which the fears of his army, or the ingenuity of -the people, could give birth to. Now there are few nations that can -pretend to vie with the Portuguese and Spaniards in the fabrication -of plausible reports: among those current, the captivity of -Loison was one; but nothing was certainly known except that the -insurgents from the valley of the Mondego were marching towards -Lisbon. General Margaron was therefore ordered to disperse them, -and, if possible, to open a communication with general Loison: he -advanced, with three thousand men and six pieces of artillery, to -Leria, whither the patriots had retired in disorder when they heard -of his approach. The greater part dispersed at once, but those who -remained were attacked on the 5th of July, and a scene similar to -that of Beja ensued; the French boasted of victory, the insurgents -called it massacre and pillage. - -In a combat with armed peasantry, it is difficult to know where the -fighting ceases and the massacre begins: men dressed in peasants’ -clothes are observed firing, and moving about, without order, from -place to place; when do they cease to be enemies? They are more -dangerous when single than together; they can hide their muskets -in an instant and appear peaceable; the soldier passes and is -immediately shot from behind. - -The example at Leria did not however deter the people of Thomar -from declaring against the French; and the neighbourhood of -Alcobaça rose at the same time. Thus Margaron was placed between -two new insurrections at the moment he had quelled one. English -fleets, with troops on board, were said to be hovering off the -coast, and the most alarming reports relative to Loison were -corroborated, his safety was despaired of, when suddenly authentic -intelligence of his arrival at Abrantes revived the spirits of the -general-in-chief and the army. - -After arranging all things necessary for the security of Almeida, -Loison had quitted that town the 2d of July, at the head of three -thousand four hundred and fifty men, and arrived at Abrantes upon -the 8th, having in seven days passed through Guarda, Atalaya, -Sarsedas, Corteja, and Sardoval. During this rapid march he -dispersed several bodies of insurgents that were assembled on the -line of his route, especially at Guarda and Atalaya. It has been -said that twelve hundred bodies were stretched upon the field of -battle near the first town; this is absurd beyond all measure. -Twelve hundred slain would give, at a low average, five thousand -wounded: six thousand two hundred killed and wounded by a corps -of three thousand four hundred and fifty men, in half an hour! -and this without cavalry or artillery, and among fastnesses that -vie in ruggedness with any in the world! The truth is, that the -peasants, terrified by the reports that Loison himself spread to -favour his march, fled on all sides, and if two hundred and fifty -Portuguese were killed and wounded during the whole passage, it was -the utmost. The distance from Almeida to Abrantes is more than a -hundred and eighty miles, the greatest part is a mountain pathway -rather than a road, and the French were obliged to gather their -provisions from the country as they passed; now, to forage, to -fight several actions, to pursue active peasants well acquainted -with the country so closely as to destroy them by thousands, and to -march a hundred and eighty miles over bad roads, and all in seven -days, is impossible. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.] - -The whole French army was now concentrated; the insurrection at -Alcobaça had been quelled by Kellerman, and that of Thomar was also -quieted, but the insurgents from Oporto were gathering strength -at Coimbra; the last of the native soldiers deserted the French -colours; the Spanish troops at Badajos, strengthened by a body of -Portuguese fugitives, and commanded by one Moretti, were preparing -to enter the Alentejo, which was again in commotion: the English -admiral had opened a communication with the insurgents on the side -of Setuval, and the patriots were also assembled in considerable -numbers at Alcacer do Sal. - -In this dilemma Junot resolved to leave the northern people quiet -for a while, and to bend his force against the Alentejo, because -that was his line of retreat upon Spain; from thence only he could -provision the capital, and there also his cavalry could act with -the most effect. Accordingly, Loison, with seven thousand infantry, -twelve hundred cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery, crossed the -Tagus the 25th of July, and marched by Os Pegoens, Vendanovas, and -Montemor. At the latter place he defeated an advanced guard, which -fled to Evora, where the Portuguese general Leite had assembled -the mass of the insurgents; and assisted by three or four thousand -Spanish troops under Moretti, had taken a position to cover the -town. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12.] - -When Loison came up he directed Margaron and Solignac to turn the -flanks of the patriots, and fell upon their centre himself. The -Spanish auxiliaries performed no service, and the Portuguese soon -took to flight, but there was a great and confused concourse; a -strong cavalry was let loose upon them, and many being cut off -from the main body, were driven into the town, which had been -deserted by the principal inhabitants. There, urged by despair, -they endeavoured to defend the walls and the streets for a few -moments, but were soon overpowered, the greater part slain, and -the houses pillaged. The French lost about two or three hundred -men, but the number of the Portuguese and Spaniards that fell was -very considerable; and disputes having arisen between the troops of -those nations, the latter ravaged the country in their retreat with -more violence than the French. - -Loison, after resting two days at Evora, proceeded to Elvas, and -drove away the numerous Spanish parties which had long infested the -neighbourhood of that fortress, and were become extremely obnoxious -to friends and enemies. His detachments scoured the country round, -and were accumulating provisions to form great magazines at Elvas, -when their labours were suddenly interrupted by a despatch from the -duke of Abrantes, directing Loison to return to the right bank of -the Tagus. The British army, so long expected, had descended upon -the coast, and manly warfare reared its honest front amidst the -desolating scenes of insurrection. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -1º. This expedition to the Alentejo was an operation of military -police, rather than a campaign. Junot wished to repress the spirit -of insurrection by sudden and severe examples. The actions of -general Loison were therefore of necessity harsh, but they have -been represented as a series of massacres and cruelties of the most -revolting nature, because he himself disseminated such stories -in order to increase the terror which it was the object of his -expedition to create; and the credulity of the nation that produced -the Sebastianists was not easily shocked. The Portuguese eagerly -listened to tales so derogatory to their enemies and congenial -to their own revengeful disposition. The anecdotes of French -barbarity current for two years after the convention of Cintra, -were notoriously false. The same story being related by persons -remote from each other, is no argument of their truth. The reports -that Loison was captured on his march from Almeida, reached Junot -through fifty different channels; there were men to declare that -they had beheld him bound with cords, others to tell how he had -been entrapped, some named the places he had been carried through -in triumph, and his habitual and characteristic expressions were -quoted. The story was complete and the parts were consistent; yet -the whole was not only false, but the rumour had not even the -slightest foundation of truth. - -2º. The Portuguese accounts of the events of this period are but -angry amplifications of every real or pretended act of French -barbarity and injustice, and the crimes of individuals are made -matter of accusation against the whole army. The French accounts -are more plausible, but scarcely more safe as authorities, seeing -that they are written by men, who being for the most part actors in -the scenes they describe, are naturally concerned to defend their -own characters: their military vanity also has had its share in -disguising the simple facts of the insurrection; for willing to -enhance the merit of the troops, they have exaggerated the number -of the insurgents, the obstinacy of the combats, and the loss of -the patriots. English party writers, greedily fixing upon such -relations, have changed the name of battle into massacre; and thus -prejudice, conceit, and clamour, have combined, to violate the -decorum of history, and to perpetuate error. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon in Las Casas.] - -3º. It would, however, be an egregious mistake to suppose, that -because the French were not monsters, there existed no cause for -the acrimony with which their conduct has been assailed. The duke -of Abrantes, although not cruel, nor personally obnoxious to the -Portuguese, was a sensual and violent person, and his habits were -expensive; such a man is always rapacious, and as the character -of the chief influences the manners of those under his command, -it may be safely assumed that his vices were aped by many of his -followers. Now the virtuous general Travot was esteemed, and his -person respected, even in the midst of tumult, by the Portuguese, -while Loison was scarcely safe from their vengeance when surrounded -by his troops. The execrations poured forth at the mere mention of -“the bloody Maneta,” as, from the loss of his hand, he was called, -proves that he must have committed many heinous acts; and Kellerman -appears to have been as justly stigmatised for rapacity, as Loison -was for violence. - -4º. It has been made a charge against the French generals, that -they repressed the hostility of the Portuguese and Spanish peasants -by military executions; but in doing so they only followed the -custom of war, and they are not justly liable to reproof, save -where they may have carried their punishments to excess, and -displayed a wanton spirit of cruelty. All armies have an undoubted -right to protect themselves when engaged in hostilities. An -insurrection of armed peasants is a military anarchy. Men in such -circumstances cannot be restrained within the bounds of civilised -warfare; they will murder stragglers, torture prisoners, destroy -hospitals, poison wells, and break down all the usages that soften -the enmities of modern nations. They wear no badge of an enemy, -and their devices cannot, therefore, be guarded against in the -ordinary mode. Their war is one of extermination, and it must -be repressed by terrible examples, or the civilized customs of -modern warfare must be discarded, and the devastating system of -the ancients revived. Hence, the usage of refusing quarter to an -armed peasantry, and burning their villages, however unjust and -barbarous it may appear at first view, is founded upon a principle -of necessity, and is in reality a vigorous infliction of a partial -evil, to prevent universal calamity. But however justifiable it may -be in theory, no wise man will hastily resort to it, and no good -man will carry it to any extent. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.] - -The subjugation of Portugal was neither a recent nor a secret -project of Napoleon’s. His intentions with respect to the house of -Braganza were known in 1806 to Mr. Fox, who sent lord Roslyn, lord -St. Vincent, and general Simcoe on a politico-military mission to -Lisbon, instructing them not only to warn the court that a French -force destined to invade Portugal was assembling at Bayonne, but to -offer the assistance of an English army to repel the danger. The -cabinet of Lisbon affected to disbelieve the information, Mr. Fox -died during the negotiation, and the war with Prussia diverting -Napoleon’s attention to more important objects, he withdrew his -troops from Bayonne. The tory administration, which soon after -overturned the Grenville party, thought no further of the affair, -or at least did not evince as much foresight and ready zeal as -their predecessors. They kept, indeed, a naval force off Lisbon, -under the command of sir Sydney Smith; but their views seem to -have been confined to the emigration of the royal family, and they -intrusted the conduct of the negotiations to lord Strangford, -a young man of no solid influence or experience. Suddenly, the -Russian squadron, under admiral Siniavin, took refuge in the Tagus, -and this unexpected event produced in the British cabinet an -activity which the danger of Portugal had not been able to excite. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.] - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Journal, MS.] - -It was supposed, that as Russia and England were in a state of -hostility, the presence of the Russian ships would intimidate -the prince regent, and prevent him from passing to the Brazils, -wherefore sir Charles Cotton, an admiral of higher rank than sir -Sydney Smith, was sent out with instructions to force the entrance -of the Tagus, and to attack admiral Siniavin. To ensure success, -general Spencer, then upon the point of sailing with five thousand -men upon a secret expedition, was ordered to touch at Lisbon, and -sir John Moore, with ten thousand men, was withdrawn from Sicily, -and directed to aid the enterprise; but before the instructions -for the commanders were even written, the prince regent was on his -voyage to the Brazils, and Junot ruled in Lisbon. - -Sir John Moore, however, arrived at Gibraltar, but hearing nothing -of sir Sydney Smith, nor of general Spencer, proceeded to England, -and reached Spithead the 31st of December, from whence, after a -detention of four months, he was despatched upon that well-known -and eminently foolish expedition to Sweden, which ended in such -an extraordinary manner, and which seems from the first to have -had no other object than to keep an excellent general and a superb -division of troops at a distance from the only country where their -services were really required. - -Meanwhile, general Spencer’s armament, long baffled by contrary -winds, and once forced back to port, was finally dispersed in a -storm, and a part arrived at Gibraltar by single ships the latter -end of January. Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of that fortress, -being informed, on the 5th of February, that a French fleet had -just passed the strait, and run up the Mediterranean, became -alarmed for Sicily, then scantily furnished with troops, and caused -the first comers to proceed to that island the 11th. General -Spencer, whose instructions were to attack Ceuta, arrived on the -10th of March, and the deficiency in his armament being supplied -by a draft from the garrison of Gibraltar, a council was held -for the purpose of arranging the plan of attack: the operation -was, however, thought to be impracticable, and consequently -relinquished. General Spencer would then have carried the remainder -of his troops to Sicily, but the insurrection in Spain broke out -at the moment and altered his determination. In the relation -of Dupont’s campaign, I have already touched upon Spencer’s -proceedings at Cadiz; but in this place it is necessary to give -a more detailed sketch of those occurrences, which, fortunately, -brought him back to the coast of Portugal at the moment when sir -Arthur Wellesley was commencing the campaign of Vimiero. - -[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Correspondence. MS.] - -When the French first entered Spain, general Castaños commanded the -Spanish troops at St. Roque; in that situation he was an object -of interest to Napoleon, who sent two French officers privately -to sound his disposition. Castaños secretly resolving to oppose -the designs of the emperor, thought those officers were coming -to arrest him, and at first determined to kill them, and fly to -Gibraltar; but soon discovering his mistake, he treated them -civilly, and prosecuted his original plans. Through the medium -of one Viale, a merchant of Gibraltar, he opened a communication -with sir Hew Dalrymple, and the latter, who had been closely -watching the progress of events, encouraged him in his views, and -not only promised assistance, but recommended several important -measures, such as the immediate seizure of the French squadron in -Cadiz, the security of the Spanish fleet at Minorca, and a speedy -communication with South America. But before Castaños could -mature his plans, the insurrection took place at Seville, and he -acknowledged the authority of the junta. - -Meanwhile Solano arrived at Cadiz, and general Spencer, in -conjunction with admiral Purvis, pressed him to attack the French -squadron, and offered to assist if he would admit the English -troops into the town. Solano’s mind was, however, not made up -to resist the invaders, and expressing great displeasure at the -proposal to occupy Cadiz, he refused to treat at all with the -British. This was not unexpected by sir Hew; he knew that most -of the Spaniards were mistrustful of the object of Spencer’s -expedition, and the offer was made without his concurrence; thus a -double intercourse was carried on between the British and Spanish -authorities; the one friendly and confidential between sir Hew -and Castaños, the other of a character proper to increase the -suspicions of the Spaniards; and when it is considered that Spain -and England were nominally at war, that the English commanders were -acting without the authority of their government, that the troops -which it was proposed to introduce into Cadiz were in that part -of the world for the express purpose of attacking Ceuta, and had -already taken the island of Perexil, close to that fortress, little -surprise can be excited by Solano’s conduct. - -[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Correspondence.] - -His death intervening, general Morla succeeded to the command, -and Spencer and Purvis renewed their offers; but Morla likewise -declined their assistance, and having himself forced the French -squadron to surrender, by a succession of such ill-directed -attacks, that some doubt was entertained of his wish to succeed, he -commenced a series of low intrigues calculated to secure his own -personal safety, while he held himself ready to betray his country -if the French should prove the strongest. After the reduction of -the enemy’s ships, the people were inclined to admit the English -troops, but the local junta, swayed by Morla’s representations, -were averse to it, and he, while confirming this disposition, -secretly urged Spencer to persevere in his offer, saying that he -looked entirely to the English troops for the future defence of -Cadiz; and thus dealing, he passed with the people for an active -patriot, yet made no preparations for resistance, and by his double -falsehoods preserved a fair appearance both with the junta and the -English general. - -With these affairs sir Hew Dalrymple did not meddle, he early -discovered that Morla was an enemy of Castaños, and having more -confidence in the latter, carried on the intercourse at first -established between them without reference to the transactions -at Cadiz. He also supplied the Spanish general with arms and two -thousand barrels of powder, and placing an English officer near -him as a military correspondent, sent another in the capacity of a -political agent to the supreme junta at Seville. - -Castaños being appointed commander-in-chief of the Andalusian army, -as I have before related, rallied Echevaria’s troops, and asked -for the co-operation of the British force; he had no objection -to their entering Cadiz, but he preferred having them landed at -Almeria to march to Xeres. General Spencer, however, confined his -offers to the occupation of Cadiz; and when Morla pretended that to -fit out the Spanish fleet was an object of immediate importance, -colonel sir George Smith, an officer employed by general Spencer to -conduct the negotiations, promised on his own authority, money to -pay the Spanish seamen, who were then in a state of mutiny. Lord -Collingwood and sir Hew Dalrymple refused to fulfil this promise, -and the approach of Dupont causing Morla to wish Spencer’s troops -away, he persuaded that general to sail to Ayamonte, under the -pretence of preventing Avril’s division from crossing the Guadiana, -although he knew well that the latter had no intention of doing so. - -The effect produced upon colonel Maransin by the appearance of -the British force off Ayamonte has been already noticed. General -Thiebault says, that Spencer might have struck an important blow -at that period against the French; but the British troops were -unprovided with any equipment for a campaign, and to have thrown -five thousand infantry, without cavalry and without a single -place of arms, into the midst of an enemy who occupied all the -fortresses, and who could bring twenty thousand men into the field, -would have been imprudent to the greatest degree. General Spencer, -who had by this time been rejoined by his detachment from Sicily, -only made a demonstration of landing, and having thus materially -aided the insurrection, returned to Cadiz, from whence he was -almost immediately summoned to Lisbon, to execute a new project, -which proved to be both ill-considered and fruitless. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Canning to lord Castlereagh, 28th Dec. 1807.] - -[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.] - -[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Correspondence.] - -Sir Charles Cotton, after superseding sir Sydney Smith, had -blockaded the mouth of the Tagus with the utmost rigour, expecting -to force the Russian squadron to capitulate for want of provisions. -This scheme, which originated with lord Strangford, never had -the least chance of success; but the privations and misery of -the wretched inhabitants was so greatly aggravated thereby, that -Junot had recourse to various expedients to abate the rigour of -the blockade with regard to them, and among others, employed a -Portuguese, named Sataro, to make proposals to the English admiral. -This man at first pretended that he came without the privity of the -French, and in the course of the communications that followed, sir -Charles was led to believe that only four thousand French troops -remained in Lisbon. Under this erroneous impression, he requested -that general Spencer might be sent to him, for the purpose of -attacking the enemy while they were so weak. Spencer, by the advice -of sir Hew Dalrymple and lord Collingwood, obeyed the summons, but -on his arrival was led to doubt the correctness of the admiral’s -information. Instead of four thousand, it appeared that there could -not be much less than fifteen thousand French in or near Lisbon; -and the attack was of course relinquished. When Spencer returned to -Cadiz, Castaños again pressing him to co-operate with the Spanish -forces, he so far consented, as to disembark them at the port St. -Mary, and even agreed to send a detachment to Xeres; but being -deceived by Morla, who still gave him hopes of finally occupying -Cadiz, he resolved to keep the greater part close to that city. - -At this period the insurrection of Andalusia attracted all the -intriguing adventurers in the Mediterranean towards Gibraltar and -Seville, and the confusion of Agramant’s camp would have been -rivalled, if the prudent firmness of sir Hew Dalrymple had not -checked the first efforts of those political pests; but among the -perplexing follies of the moment, one deserves particular notice, -on account of some curious circumstances that attended it, the full -explanation of which I must, however, leave to other historians, -who may perhaps find in that and the like affairs, a key to that -absurd policy, which in Sicily so long sacrificed the welfare of -two nations to the whims and follies of a profligate court. - -[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Correspondence.] - -The introduction of the salique law had long been a favourite -object with the Bourbons of Spain; but the nation at large -would never agree to change the ancient rule of succession, -which admitted females to the throne. The project was, however, -secretly revived by some of the junta at this moment, and the -party favouring the salique law wished to offer the regency to the -prince of Sicily, who (Ferdinand and his brothers dying without -sons) would, under that law, have succeeded, to the prejudice of -the princess of the Brazils. The chevalier Robertoni, a Sicilian -agent, appeared early at Gibraltar, and from thence (as if under -the auspices of England), attempted to forward the views of his -court; but sir Hew Dalrymple, being accidentally informed that the -British cabinet disapproved of the object of his mission, sent -him away. Meanwhile Castaños, deceived by some person engaged -in the intrigue, was inclined to support the pretensions of the -Sicilian prince to the regency, and proposed to make use of sir Hew -Dalrymple’s name to give weight to his opinions; a circumstance -which must have created great jealousy in Spain, if sir Hew had not -promptly refused his sanction. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -After that, the affair seemed to droop for a moment; but in -the middle of July an English man of war suddenly appeared at -Gibraltar, having on board prince Leopold of Sicily, and a complete -court establishment of chamberlains with their keys, and ushers -with their white wands. The duke of Orleans, who attended his -brother-in-law the prince, made no secret of his intention to -negotiate for the regency of Spain, and openly demanded that he -should be received into Gibraltar. Sir Hew, foreseeing all the -mischief of this proceeding, promptly refused to permit the prince, -or any of his attendants, to land; and the captain of the ship, -whose orders were merely to carry him to Gibraltar, refused to take -him back to Sicily. To relieve his royal highness from this awkward -situation, sir Hew consented to receive him as a guest, provided -that he divested himself of his public character, and that the duke -of Orleans departed instantly from the fortress. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -Sir William Drummond, the British envoy at Palermo; Mr. Viale; -and the duke of Orleans were the ostensible contrivers of this -notable scheme, by which, if it had succeeded, a small party in -a local junta would have appointed a regency for Spain, paved -the way for altering the laws of succession in that country, -established their own sway over the other juntas, and created -interminable jealousy between England, Portugal, and Spain; but -with whom the plan originated does not very clearly appear. Sir -William Drummond’s representations induced sir Alexander Ball to -provide the ship of war, nominally for the conveyance of the duke -of Orleans, but in reality for prince Leopold, with whose intended -voyage sir Alexander does not appear to have been made acquainted. -That the prince should have desired to be regent of Spain was -natural, but that he should have been conveyed to Gibraltar in a -British ship of the line, when the English government disapproved -of his pretensions, was really curious. Sir William Drummond -could scarcely have proceeded such lengths in an affair of so -great consequence, without secret instructions from some member -of his own government, yet lord Castlereagh expressed unqualified -approbation of sir Hew’s decisive conduct upon the occasion! -Did the ministers act at this period without any confidential -communication with each other? or was lord Castlereagh’s policy -secretly and designedly thwarted by one of his colleagues? But it -is time to quit this digression and turn to - - -THE PROCEEDINGS IN PORTUGAL. - -The bishop of Oporto being placed at the head of the insurrectional -junta of that town, claimed the assistance of England. “We hope,” -said he, “for an aid of three hundred thousand cruzado novas; of -arms and accoutrements complete, and of cloth for forty thousand -infantry and for eight thousand cavalry; three thousand barrels of -cannon powder, some cargoes of salt fish, and other provisions, -and an auxiliary body of six thousand men at least, including some -cavalry.” This extravagant demand would lead to the supposition -than an immense force had been assembled by the prelate, yet he -could never at any time have put five thousand organized men in -motion against the French, and had probably not even thought of any -feasible or rational mode of employing the succours he demanded; -but the times were favourable for extravagant demands, and his were -not rejected by the English ministers, who sent agents to Oporto -and other parts, with power to grant supplies. The improvident -system adopted for Spain being thus extended to Portugal, produced -precisely the same effects, that is, cavils, intrigues, waste, -insubordination, and inordinate vanity and ambition among the -ignorant upstart men of the day. - -[Sidenote: Par^y. Pap^s. L^d. Castle^h. to S. A. Well^y. 21st June, -1808.] - -More than half a year had now elapsed since Napoleon first poured -his forces into the Peninsula; every moment of that time was marked -by some extraordinary event, and one month had passed since a -general and terrible explosion, shaking the unsteady structure -of diplomacy to pieces, had left a clear space for the shock of -arms; yet the British cabinet was still unacquainted with the real -state of public feeling in the Peninsula and with the Spanish -character; and although possessing a disposable army, of at least -eighty thousand excellent troops, was totally unsettled in its -plans, and unprepared for any vigorous effort. Agents were indeed -despatched to every accessible province; the public treasure was -scattered with heedless profusion, and the din of preparation -was heard in every department; but the bustle of confusion is -easily mistaken for the activity of business; time removing the -veil of official mystery covering those transactions, has exposed -all their dull and meagre features; and it is now clear that the -treasure was squandered without judgment, and the troops dispersed -without meaning. Ten thousand exiled to Sweden proved the truth of -Oxenstern’s address to his son; as many more idly kept in Sicily -were degraded into the guards of a vicious court; Gibraltar was -unnecessarily filled with fighting men; and general Spencer, with -five thousand excellent soldiers, being doomed to wander between -Ceuta, Lisbon, and Cadiz, was seeking, like the knight of La -Mancha, for a foe to combat. - -A considerable force remained in England; but it was not ready -for service, when the minister resolved to send an expedition to -the Peninsula, and nine thousand men collected at Cork by other -hands and for other purposes, formed the only disposable army for -immediate operations. The Grey and Grenville administration, so -remarkable for unfortunate military enterprises, had assembled -this handful of men with a view to permanent conquests in South -America, upon what principle of policy it is not necessary -to inquire, but such undoubtedly was the intention of that -administration; perhaps in imitation of the Roman senate, who -sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at the gates of the city. -The tory administration relinquished this scheme of conquest, -and directed sir Arthur Wellesley to inform general Miranda, the -military adventurer of the day, not only that he must cease to -expect assistance, but that all attempts to separate the colonies -of Spain from the parent state would be discouraged by the English -government. Thus the troops assembled at Cork became available, -and sir Arthur Wellesley being appointed to command them, sailed -on the 12th of July, to commence that long and bloody contest in -the Peninsula which he was destined to terminate in such a glorious -manner. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1808.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid. L^d. Castle^h. to S. A. Well^y. 30th June.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid. L^d. Castle^h. to g^l. Spenc^r. 28th and 30th -June.] - -[Sidenote: D^o. to ad^l. Purvis, 28th June.] - -Two small divisions were soon after ordered to assemble for -embarkation at Ramsgate and Harwich, under the command of generals -Anstruther and Acland, but a considerable time elapsed before they -were ready to sail; and a singular uncertainty in the views of the -ministers at this period subjected all the military operations to -perpetual and mischievous changes. General Spencer, supposed to -be at Gibraltar, was directed to repair to Cadiz, and wait for -sir Arthur’s orders; and the latter was permitted to sail under -the impression that Spencer was actually subject to his command; -but other instructions empowered Spencer at his own discretion to -commence operations in the south, without reference to sir Arthur -Wellesley’s proceedings; and admiral Purvis, who, after lord -Collingwood’s arrival, had no separate command, was also authorised -to undertake any enterprise in that quarter, and even to control -the operations of sir Arthur Wellesley by calling for the aid of -his troops, that general being enjoined to “pay all due obedience -to any such requisition!” Yet sir Arthur himself was informed, that -“the accounts from Cadiz were bad;” that “no disposition to move -either there or in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar was visible,” and -that “the cabinet were unwilling he should go far to the southward, -whilst the spirit of exertion appeared to reside more to the -northward.” Again the admiral, sir Charles Cotton, was informed -that sir Arthur Wellesley was to co-operate with him in a descent -at the mouth of the Tagus; but sir Arthur himself had no definite -object given for his own operations, although his instructions -pointed to Portugal, and thus in fact no one officer, naval or -military, knew exactly what his powers were, with the exception -of admiral Purvis, who, being only second in command for his own -service, was really authorised to control all the operations of the -land forces, provided he directed them to that quarter which had -been declared unfavourable for any operations at all. - -[Sidenote: Par^y. Pap^s. L^d. Castle^h. to S. A. Well^y. 30th June, -1808.] - -In recommending Portugal as the fittest field of action, the -ministers were chiefly guided by the advice of the Asturian -deputies; although having received sir Hew Dalrymple’s despatches -to a late date, their own information must have been more -recent and more extensive than any that they could obtain from -the deputies, who had left Spain at the commencement of the -insurrection, and were ill informed of what was passing in their -own province, utterly ignorant of the state of any other part -of the Peninsula, and under any circumstances were incapable of -judging rightly in such momentous affairs. - -[Sidenote: Par^y. Pap^s. L^d. Castle^h. to S. A. Well^y. 30th June, -1808.] - -The inconsistent orders of the ministers were well calculated to -introduce all manner of confusion, and to prevent all vigour -of action, but more egregious conduct followed. In sir Arthur -Wellesley’s instructions, although they were vague and undefined, -as to immediate military operations, it was expressly stated that -the intention of the government was to enable Portugal and Spain -to throw off the French yoke, and ample directions were given to -him as to his future political conduct in the Peninsula. He was -informed how to demean himself in any disputes that might arise -between the two insurrectional nations, how to act with relation -to the settlement of the supreme authority during the interregnum; -and directed to facilitate communications between the colonies -and the mother country, and to offer his good offices to arrange -any differences between them. The terms upon which Great Britain -would acquiesce in any negotiation between Spain and France were -stated, and finally he was empowered to recommend the establishment -of a paper system in the Peninsula, as a good mode of raising -money, and attaching the holders of it to the national cause. The -Spaniards were not, however, sufficiently civilized to adopt this -recommendation, and barbarously preferred gold to credit at a time -when no man’s life, or faith, or wealth, or power, was worth a -week’s purchase. Sir Hew Dalrymple was at this time also commanded -to furnish sir Arthur with every information that might be of use -to the latter in his operations. - -[Sidenote: Ibid. L^d. Castle^h. to S. H. Dalrymple, 28th June, -1808.] - -When the tenor of these instructions, and the great Indian -reputation enjoyed by sir Arthur Wellesley are considered, it is -not possible to doubt that he was first chosen as the fittest man -to conduct the armies of England at this important conjuncture; yet -scarcely had he sailed when he was superseded, not to make room -for a man whose fame and experience might have justified such a -change, but by an extraordinary arrangement, which can hardly be -attributed to mere vacillation of purpose, he was reduced to the -fourth rank in that army, for the future governance of which, he -had fifteen days before received the most extended instructions. - -Sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the chief command, and sir -John Moore, who had suddenly and unexpectedly returned from the -Baltic, (having by his firmness and address saved himself and his -troops from the madness of the Swedish monarch), was, with marked -disrespect, directed, to place himself under the orders of sir -Harry Burrard and proceed to Portugal. Thus two men, comparatively -unknown and unused to the command of armies, superseded the only -generals in the British service whose talents and experience were -indisputable. The secret springs of this proceeding are not so deep -as to baffle investigation; but that task scarcely belongs to the -general historian, who does enough when he exposes the effects of -envy, treachery, and base cunning, without tracing those vices home -to their possessors. - -[Sidenote: Ibid. L^d. Castle^h. to S. A. Well^y. 15th July, 1808.] - -Notwithstanding these changes in the command, the uncertainty -of the minister’s plans continued. The same day that sir Hew -Dalrymple was appointed to be commander-in-chief, a despatch, -containing the following project of campaign, was sent to sir -Arthur Wellesley: “The motives which have induced the sending so -large a force to that quarter[10] are, 1st. to provide effectually -for an attack upon the Tagus; and, 2dly, to have such an additional -force disposable beyond what may be indispensably requisite for -that operation, as may admit of a detachment being made to the -southward, either with a view to secure Cadiz, if it should -be threatened by the French force under general Dupont, or to -co-operate with the Spanish troops in reducing that corps, if -circumstances should favour such an operation, or any other that -may be concerted. His Majesty is pleased to direct that the _attack -upon the Tagus should be considered as the first object to be -attended to_. As the whole force, of which a statement is enclosed, -when assembled, will amount to not less than thirty thousand, _it -is considered that both services may be provided for amply_. The -precise distribution, as between Portugal and Andalusia, both as to -time and proportion of force, must depend upon circumstances, to be -judged of on the spot; and should it be deemed advisable to fulfil -the assurance which lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple appears -to have given to the supreme junta of Seville[11], under the -authority of my despatch of (no date), that it was the intention of -his majesty to employ a corps of 10,000 men to co-operate with the -Spaniards in that quarter. A corps of this magnitude may, I should -hope, be detached without prejudice to the main operation against -the Tagus, and may be reinforced, according to circumstances, -after the Tagus has been secured. But if, previous to the arrival -of the force under orders from England, Cadiz should be seriously -threatened, it must rest with the senior officer of the Tagus, at -his discretion to detach, upon receiving a requisition to that -effect, such an amount of force as may place that important place -out of the reach of immediate danger, _even though it should for -the time suspend operations against the Tagus_[12].” - -In England at this period, personal enmity to Napoleon, and violent -party prejudices, had so disturbed the judgments of men relative to -that monarch, that any information speaking of strength or success -for him, was regarded with suspicion even by the ministers, who, -as commonly happens in such cases, becoming the dupes of their own -practices, listened with complacency to all those tales of mutiny -among his troops, disaffection of his generals, and insurrections -in France, which the cunning or folly of their agents transmitted -to them. Hence sprung such projects as the one above, the false -calculations of which may be exposed by a short comparative -statement. - -The whole English force was not much above thirty thousand men, -distributed off Cadiz, off the coast of Portugal, on the eastern -parts of England, and in the channel. The French force in Spain -and Portugal was about a hundred and twenty thousand men: they -possessed all the Portuguese, and most of the Spanish fortresses. - -The English army had no reserve, no fixed plan, and it was to be -divided, and to act upon a double line of operations. The French -had a strong reserve at Bayonne, and the grand French army of four -hundred thousand veterans was untouched, and ready to succour the -troops in the Peninsula if they required it. - -Happily, this visionary plan was in no particular followed by the -generals entrusted with the conduct of it. A variety of causes -combined to prevent the execution. The catastrophe of Baylen marred -all the great combinations of the French emperor; fortune drew the -scattered divisions of the English army together, and the decisive -vigour of sir Arthur Wellesley sweeping away these cobweb projects, -obtained all the success that the bad arrangements of the ministers -would permit. - -In the next chapter, resuming the thread of the history, I shall -relate the proceedings of the first British campaign in the -Peninsula; but I judged it necessary first to make an exposition -of the previous preparations and plans of the cabinet, lest the -reader’s attention not being fully awakened to the difficulties -cast in the way of the English generals by the incapacity of the -government, should, with hasty censure, or niggard praise, do the -former injustice; for, as a noble forest hides many noisome swamps -and evil things, so the duke of Wellington’s laurels have covered -the innumerable errors of the ministers. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.] - -A few days after sailing from Cork, sir Arthur Wellesley quitting -the fleet, repaired in a frigate to Coruña, where he arrived the -20th of July, and immediately held a conference with the members of -the Gallician junta, by whom he was informed of the battle of Rio -Seco; but the account was glossed over in the Spanish manner, and -the issue of that contest had caused no change in their policy, if -policy that may be called, which was but a desire to obtain money -and to avoid personal inconvenience; they rejected all succour in -men, but earnestly pressed for arms and gold; and even while the -conference went on, the last was supplied, for an English frigate -entered the harbour with two hundred thousand pounds for their -use. Whereupon, the junta recommended that the British troops -should be employed in the north of Portugal, and promising to aid -them by sending a Spanish division to Oporto, supported their -recommendation by an incorrect statement of the number of men, -Spanish and Portuguese, who, they asserted, were in arms near that -city, and by a still more inaccurate estimate of the forces under -Junot; and in this manner persuaded sir Arthur not to land in their -province. Yet, at the moment they were rejecting the assistance of -the British troops, the whole kingdom of Gallicia was lying at the -mercy of marshal Bessieres, and there were neither men nor means to -impede the progress of his victorious army. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.] - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.] - -Mr. Charles Stuart, appointed to reside as British envoy near the -junta, landed at Coruña, and sir Arthur Wellesley proceeded to -Oporto, where he found colonel Browne, an active and intelligent -officer, who had been sent there a short time before to collect -intelligence, and to distribute supplies. From his information it -appeared, that no Spanish troops were in the north of Portugal, and -that all the Portuguese force was upon the Mondego, to the south of -which river the insurrection had spread. A French division of eight -thousand men was supposed to be in their front, and some great -disaster was expected, for, to use colonel Browne’s words, “with -every good will in the people, their exertions were so short lived, -and with so little combination, that there was no hope of their -being able to resist the advance of the enemy;” in fact, only five -thousand regulars and militia, half armed, and associated with ten -or twelve thousand peasants without any arms, were in the field at -all. A large army was, however, made out upon paper by the bishop -of Oporto, who, having assembled his civil and military coadjutors -in council, proposed various plans of operation for the allied -forces, none of which sir Arthur was inclined to adopt; but after -some discussion it was finally arranged that the prelate and the -paper army should look to the defence of the Tras os Montes against -Bessieres, and that the five thousand soldiers on the Mondego -should co-operate with the British forces. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.] - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s and lord Collingwood’s -Correspondence.] - -This being settled, sir Arthur Wellesley hastened to consult with -sir Charles Cotton relative to the descent at the mouth of the -Tagus, which had so long haunted the imaginations of the ministers. -The strength of the French, the bar of the river, the disposition -of the forts, and the difficulty of landing in the immediate -neighbourhood, occasioned by the heavy surf playing upon all the -undefended creeks and bays, convinced him that such an enterprise -was unadvisable, if not impracticable. There remained the -alternative of landing to the north of Lisbon at such a distance as -to avoid the danger of a disputed disembarkation, or of proceeding -to the southward to join general Spencer, and commence operations -in that quarter against Dupont. Sir Arthur Wellesley decided -against the latter, which promised no good result while Junot held -Portugal, and Bessieres hung on the northern frontier. He foresaw -that the jealousy of the Spaniards, evinced by their frequent -refusal to admit English troops into Cadiz, would assuredly bring -on a tedious negotiation, and waste the season of action before the -army could obtain a place of arms, or that the campaign must be -commenced without any secure base of operations. Nothing was then -known of the Spanish troops, except that they were inexperienced; -but without good aid from them it would have been idle with -fourteen thousand men to take the field against twenty thousand -strongly posted in the Sierra Morena and communicating freely with -the main body of the French army. A momentary advance was useless; -and if the campaign was protracted, the line of operations running -nearly parallel to the frontier of Portugal, would have required a -covering army on the Guadiana to watch the movements of Junot. - -The double line of operations, proposed by lord Castlereagh, was -contrary to all military principle, and as Spencer’s despatches -announced that his division was at St. Mary’s, near Cadiz, and -disengaged from any connexion with the Spaniards (a fortunate -circumstance scarcely to have been expected), sir Arthur sent him -orders to sail to the mouth of the Mondego, whither he himself -also repaired, and joined the fleet having his own army on board. -Off the Mondego he received the despatches announcing sir Hew -Dalrymple’s appointment and the sailing of sir John Moore’s troops. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.] - -This mortifying intelligence did not relax his activity; he -directed fast sailing vessels to look out for Anstruther’s -armament, and to conduct it to the Mondego, and having heard of -Dupont’s capitulation, resolved, without waiting for general -Spencer’s arrival, to disembark his own troops and commence the -campaign--a determination that marked the cool decisive vigour of -his character; for, although sure that (in consequence of Dupont’s -defeat) Bessieres would not enter Portugal, his information led -him to estimate Junot’s own force at sixteen to eighteen thousand -men, a number, indeed, below the truth, yet sufficient to make -the hardiest general pause before he disembarked with only nine -thousand men, and without any certainty that his fleet could remain -even for a day in that dangerous offing, at a moment also when -another man was coming to profit from any success that might be -obtained, and when a failure would have ruined his own reputation -in the estimation of the English public, always ready to deride the -skill of an Indian general. - -It was difficult to find a good point of disembarkation, for the -coast of Portugal from the Minho to the Tagus, presents, with few -exceptions, a rugged and dangerous shore; all the harbours formed -by the rivers have bars, that render most of them difficult of -access even for boats, and with the slightest breeze from the -sea-board a terrible surf breaks along the whole line of coast -and forbids all approach, and when the south wind, which commonly -prevails from August to the winter months, blows, a more dangerous -shore is not to be found in any part of the world. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.] - -The small peninsula of Peniché, about seventy miles northward of -the Lisbon Rock, alone offered a safe and accessible bay, perfectly -adapted for a disembarkation, but the anchorage was completely -within range of the fort, which contained a hundred guns and a -garrison of a thousand men. The next best place was the Mondego -river, and as the little fort of Figueras, taken, as I have before -related, by the student Zagalo, and now occupied by English -marines, secured a free entrance, sir Arthur commenced landing his -troops there on the 1st of August. The weather was calm, but the -operation was so difficult that it was not completed before the -5th. At that moment, by a singular good fortune, general Spencer -arrived; he had not received sir Arthur’s orders, but with great -promptitude had sailed for the Tagus the moment Dupont surrendered, -and by sir Charles Cotton had been directed to the Mondego. The -united forces, however, only amounted to twelve thousand three -hundred men, because the fourth veteran battalion being destined -for Gibraltar was left on board the ships. - -The army being on shore, the British general repaired to Montemor -Velho to confer with don Bernardim Freire de Andrada, the -Portuguese commander-in-chief. The latter proposed that the troops -of the two nations should relinquish all communication with the -coast, and throwing themselves into the heart of Beira, commence -an offensive campaign; he promised ample stores of provisions; -but sir Arthur having already discovered the weakness of the -insurrection, placed no reliance on those promises. He supplied -Freire with five thousand stand of arms and ammunition, but refused -to separate from his ships; and seeing clearly that the insurgents -were unable to give any real assistance, he resolved to act with -reference to the probability of their deserting him in danger. -The Portuguese general, disappointed at this refusal, reluctantly -consented to join the British army, but he pressed sir Arthur to -hasten to Leria, lest a large magazine filled, as he affirmed, -with provisions for the use of the British army, should fall into -the enemy’s hands. After this the two generals separated, and the -necessary preparations for a march being completed, the advanced -guard of the English army quitted the banks of the Mondego on -the 9th, taking the road to Leria. The 10th sir Arthur Wellesley -followed with the main body, and thus commenced the - - -FIRST CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL. - -His plan embraced three principal objects: - -1º. To hold on by the sea coast, as well for the sake of his -supplies as to avoid the drain upon his weak army, which the -protection of magazines on shore would occasion, and also to cover -the disembarkation of the reinforcements expected from England. - -2º. To keep his troops in a mass, that he might strike an important -blow. - -3º. To strike that blow as near Lisbon as possible, that the -affairs of Portugal might be quickly brought to a crisis. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.] - -He possessed very good military surveys of the ground in the -immediate neighbourhood of Lisbon, and he was anxious to carry -on his operations in a part of the country where he could avail -himself of this resource; but the utter inexperience of his -commissariat staff, and the want of cavalry, rendered his movements -slow, and obliged him to be extremely circumspect, especially as -the insurrection, although a generous, was but a feeble effort, -and its prolongation rather the result of terror than of hope. The -blow had been hastily struck in the moment of suffering, and the -patriots, conscious of weakness, trembled when they reflected on -their own temerity. - -[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.] - -From the English stores Bernardim Freire had received arms and -equipments complete for five thousand soldiers, yet his army at -Leria did not exceed six thousand men of all arms fit for action; -and besides this force, there were in all the provinces north -of the Tagus only three thousand infantry, under the command of -the marquis of Valladeres, half of whom were Spaniards. Hence -it appears, that nothing could be more insignificant than the -insurrection, nothing more absurd than the lofty style adopted -by the junta of Oporto in their communications with the British -ministers. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -Upon the other side, Junot, who received information of the -English descent in the Mondego as early as the 2d, was extremely -embarrassed by the distance of his principal force, and the hostile -disposition of the inhabitants of Lisbon. He also was acquainted -with the disaster of Dupont, and exaggerated notions of the -essential strength of the Portuguese insurgents were generated in -his own mind and in the minds of his principal officers. - -The patriots of the Alemtejo and Algarves, assisted by some -Spaniards, and animated by the manifestos and promises assiduously -promulgated from the English fleet, had once more assembled at -Alcacer do Sal, from whence they threatened the garrisons of -St. Ubes and the French posts on the south bank of the Tagus, -immediately opposite to Lisbon. The capital itself was very -unquiet; the anticipation of coming freedom was apparent in -the wrathful looks and stubborn manners of the populace, and -superstition was at work to increase the hatred and the hopes -of the multitude. It was at this time that the prophetic eggs, -denouncing death to the French, and deliverance to the Portuguese, -appeared; but less equivocal indications of approaching danger were -to be drawn from the hesitations of Junot, who, wavering between -his fear of an insurrection in Lisbon, and his desire to check the -immediate progress of the British army, gave certain proof of an -intellect yielding to the pressure of events. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -At this period Loison, with between seven and eight thousand men, -was in the neighbourhood of Estremos, two thousand five hundred men -were in the fortresses of Elvas and Almeida, a few hundred were -at Abrantes, a thousand were in Santarem, and the same number in -Peniché. General Thomieres, with a brigade, was in the vicinity -of Alcobaca, and the remainder were quartered in Lisbon and on a -circuit round, including both sides of the river. The Tagus itself -was guarded on the north bank by the forts of Cascaes, St. Antonio, -St. Julians, Belem, and the citadel, between each of which smaller -works kept up a continued line of offence against ships entering -by the northern passage of the harbour. On the southern bank fort -Bugio, built upon a low sandy point, crossed its fire with St. -Julians in the defence of the entrance. Upon the heights of Almada -or Palmela, stood the fort of Palmela. St. Ubes and Traffaria -completed the posts occupied by the French on that side. The -communication between the north and south banks was kept up by the -refitted Portuguese ships of war, by the Russian squadron, and by -the innumerable boats, most of them very fine and large, with which -the Tagus is covered. - -Such being the situation of the army on the 3d, Junot ordered -Loison to march by Portalegre and Abrantes, and from thence effect -a junction with general Laborde, who, with three thousand infantry, -five or six hundred cavalry, and five pieces of artillery, quitted -Lisbon upon the 6th, and proceeded by Villa Franca, Rio Mayor, and -Candeiros, charged to observe the movements of the British, and to -cover the march of Loison, with whom he expected to form a junction -at Leria. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -Junot himself remained in Lisbon with a view of controlling the -inhabitants by his presence. He embarked all the powder from -the magazines, took additional precautions to guard his Spanish -prisoners, and put the citadel and forts into a state of siege; but -disquieted by the patriots assembled at Alcacer do Sal, he sent -general Kellerman with a moveable column to disperse them, and to -scour the country between that place and Setuval, ordering him to -withdraw the garrison from the latter, to abandon all the French -posts on the south of the Tagus except Palmela, and to collect -the whole force in one mass on the heights of Almada, where an -entrenched camp had been already commenced; but general Kellerman -had scarcely departed when two English regiments, the one from -Madeira, the other from Gibraltar, arriving off the bar of Lisbon, -distracted anew the attention of the French, and increased the -turbulence of the populace, and in this state of perplexity the -duke of Abrantes lingered until the 15th, when the progress of sir -Arthur Wellesley forced him to assume the command of the army in -the field. - -Loison entered Abrantes the 9th, and Laborde arrived at Candeiros -the same day; from that point he could with facility carry his -division upon Alcobaca and Leria, or form a junction with Loison -upon the side of Santarem. - -The armies on both sides were now in that state of attraction -towards each other, which indicates an approaching shock. In the -French camps the news of Bessieres’ victory at Rio Seco became -known, and produced a short-lived exultation; and at the same -moment intelligence of Joseph’s flight from Madrid reached the -British army, and increased their confidence of victory. The 10th, -Loison halted at Abrantes, and Laborde moved to Alcobaca, where he -was joined by Thomieres and the garrison of Peniché. - -[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.] - -Sir Arthur’s advanced guard also entered Leria, and was there -joined by Bernardim Freire and the Portuguese army, who immediately -seized the magazine without making any distribution to the British -troops. The main body of the latter arrived the 11th, and the whole -marched in advance upon the 12th. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -Laborde employed the 11th and 12th in looking for a position in the -neighbourhood of Battalha; but the ground was too extensive for -his numbers, and at the approach of the English, he fell back in -the night of the 12th to Obidos, a small town, with an old Moorish -castle situated on a gentle eminence in the middle of a valley. -Having occupied Obidos with his picquets, and placed a small -detachment at the windmill of Brilos, three miles in front, he -retired the 14th to Roriça, a village four miles to the southward, -situated at the intersection of the roads leading to Torres Vedras, -to Montachique, and to Alcoentre, and overlooking the whole valley -of Obidos. - -This position enabled him to preserve his communication with Loison -open, but as it uncovered Peniché, the fourth Swiss regiment, -with the exception of the flank companies, was sent to regarrison -that important point, and at the same time three hundred men were -detached to the right by Bombarral, Cadaval, and Segura, to obtain -intelligence of Loison. - -That general, having made a demonstration on the side of Thomar -the 11th, ascertained that Leria was in the hands of the British, -and fell back the same day upon Torres Novas, then following the -course of the Tagus he arrived at Santarem upon the 13th, but in -such an exhausted state, that he was unable to renew his march -until the 15th. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s first movement had thus cut -the line of communication between Loison and Laborde, caused a loss -of several forced marches to the former, and obliged the latter to -risk an action with more than twice his own numbers. - -As the hostile troops approached each other, the Portuguese chiefs -became alarmed, notwithstanding the confident language of their -public manifestos and the bombastic style of their conversation, an -internal conviction that a French army was invincible pervaded all -ranks of the patriots. The leaders, aware of their own deficiency, -and incredulous of the courage of the English soldiers, dreaded -the being committed in a decisive contest, because a defeat (which -they expected) would deprive them of all hope to make terms with -the victors, whereas by keeping five or six thousand men together, -they could at any time secure themselves by a capitulation. The -junta of Oporto also, who were already aiming at supreme authority, -foresaw that in the event of a successful battle, it would be more -advantageous for their particular views, to be provided with an -army untouched and entirely disconnected with a foreign general, -and Freire being well instructed in the secret designs of his -party, resolved not to advance a step beyond Leria; but, to cover -his real motives, he required the British commander to supply him -with provisions, choosing to forget the magazine which he had just -appropriated to himself, and as readily forgetting the formal -promises of the bishop of Oporto, who had undertaken to feed the -English army. - -This extraordinary demand, that an auxiliary force just disembarked -should nourish the native soldiers, instead of being itself fed -by the people, was met by sir Arthur Wellesley with a strong -remonstrance. He easily penetrated the secret motive which caused -it, but feeling that it was important to have a respectable -Portuguese force acting in conjunction with his own, he first -appealed to the honour and patriotism of Freire, and warmly -admonished him, that he was going to forfeit all pretension to -either, by permitting the British army to fight without his -assistance; but this argument had no effect upon don Bernardim. He -parried the imputations against his spirit and zeal by pretending -that his intention was to operate independently on the line of the -Tagus; and after some further discussion, sir Arthur, as a last -effort, changed his tone of rebuke to one of conciliation, and -recommended to him not to risk his troops by an isolated march, but -to keep in the rear of the British, and wait for the result of the -first battle. This advice was so agreeable to Freire, that at the -solicitation of captain Trant, a military agent, he consented to -leave fourteen hundred infantry, and two hundred and fifty cavalry, -under the immediate command of the English general. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -The defection of the native force was a serious evil. It shed -an injurious moral influence, and deprived sir Arthur of the -aid of troops whose means of gaining intelligence, and whose -local knowledge, might have compensated for his want of cavalry. -Nevertheless, continuing his own march, his advanced guard entered -Caldas the 15th, and that day also Junot reluctantly quitted -Lisbon, with a reserve composed of two thousand infantry, six -hundred cavalry, and ten pieces of artillery, carrying with him his -grand parc of ammunition, and a military chest, containing forty -thousand pounds. General Travot was left at Lisbon, with above -seven thousand men, of which number two battalions were formed of -stragglers and convalescents. He occupied both sides of the Tagus, -distributing two thousand men in Palmela, the Bugio fort, and on -the heights of Almada, in order to protect the shipping from the -insurgents of the Alemtejo, who, under the orders of the Monteiro -Mor, were again gathering at Setuval. A thousand French he kept -on board the vessels of war, to guard the Spanish prisoners and -the spare powder; with two thousand four hundred he garrisoned the -citadel and supported the police. A thousand were distributed in -the forts of Belem, St. Julians, Cascaes, and Ericeia (the last -named place is situated to the northward of the rock of Lisbon, and -commands a small harbour a few miles west of Mafra), and a thousand -were at Santarem, protecting a large depôt of stores; thus, if the -garrisons of Elvas, Peniché, and Almeida be included, nearly one -half of the French army was, by Junot’s combinations, rendered -inactive, and those in the field were divided into three parts, -without any certain point of junction in advance, yet each too weak -singly to sustain an action. The duke of Abrantes seems to have -reigned long enough in Portugal to forget that he was merely the -chief of an advanced corps, whose safety depended upon activity and -concentration. - -The French reserve was transported to Villa Franca by water, from -whence it was to march to Otta; but the rope ferry-boat of Saccavem -being removed by the natives, it cost twenty-four hours to throw -a bridge across the creek at that place. On the 17th the troops -were on their march, when Junot hastily recalled them to Villa -Franca. This retrograde movement was occasioned by a report that -the English had landed near the capital. When the falsehood of this -rumour became known, the reserve resumed the road to Otta, under -the command of general Thiebault, Junot himself pushing forward -to Alcoentre, where he found Loison, and assumed the personal -direction of that general’s division. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Despatch.] - -During this time, sir Arthur Wellesley was pressing La Borde. The -15th he caused the post at Brilos to be attacked, and the piquets -to be driven out of Obidos. Two companies of the 95th, and two of -the 5th battalion, 60th, were employed in the former operation; -they carried the windmill without loss, but pursued the retiring -enemy with such inconsiderate eagerness, that at the distance -of three miles from their support, they were outflanked by two -superior bodies of French, and were only saved by the opportune -advance of general Spencer. Two officers and twenty-seven men were -killed and wounded in this slight affair, which gave a salutary -check to the rashness, without lowering the confidence of the -troops. - -The 16th Laborde’s position was examined. The road from Caldas to -Obidos runs through a valley, formed by the ramifications of the -Monte Junto. The high table land upon which Roriça is situated -closed this valley to the southward, and Laborde’s division being -posted on a small plain immediately in front of that village, -completely overlooked the country as far as Obidos. All the -favourable points of defence in the valley, and on the nearest -hills on each side, were occupied by small detachments. One mile in -the rear, a steep ridge extending about three quarters of a mile -from east to west, and parallel to the French position, offered a -second line of great strength. The main road led by a deep defile -over this ridge, which was called the height of Zambugeira, or -Columbeira, and beyond it, very lofty mountains rose abruptly, -stretching from the sea-coast to the Tagus like a wall, and filling -all the space between that river and the ocean down to the rock of -Lisbon. - -The valley leading from Obidos to Roriça was bounded on the left -by a succession of ridges that rose the one above the other like -steps, until they were lost in the great mass of the Sierra de -Baragueda, itself a shoot from the Monte-junto. - -Laborde’s situation was becoming truly embarrassing. Loison was -at Alcoentre, and the reserve was at Villa Franca; that is one -and two marches distant from Roriça. If he retired upon Torres -Vedras, his communication with Loison would be lost. To fall back -on Montachique was to expose the line of Torres Vedras and Mafra. -To march upon Alcoentre, and unite with Loison, was to open the -shortest road to Lisbon (that of Montachique) for the British army; -and to remain at Roriça, it was necessary to fight three times his -own force. - -Animated, however, by the danger, encouraged by the local -advantages of his position, and justly confident in his own -talents, Laborde resolved to abide his enemy’s assault, in the -feeble hope that Loison might arrive during the action. - - -COMBAT OF RORIÇA. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley attacked upon the 17th. - -Early in the morning of that day, a dense mass, consisting of -thirteen thousand four hundred and eighty infantry, four hundred -and seventy cavalry, and eighteen guns, issued from Obidos, and -soon afterwards broke into three distinct columns of battle. - -The left, commanded by lieutenant-general Ferguson, was composed of -his own and major-general Bowe’s brigades of infantry, reinforced -by two hundred and fifty riflemen, forty cavalry, and six guns, -forming a total of four thousand nine hundred combatants. They -marched by the crests of the hills adjoining the Sierra de -Baragueda, being destined to turn the right flank of Laborde’s -position, and to oppose the efforts of Loison, if that general (who -was supposed to be at Rio Mayor) should appear during the action. - -The column of the right, under captain Trant, composed of a -thousand Portuguese infantry, and fifty horse of the same nation, -moved by the village of St. Amias, with the intention of turning -the left flank of the French. - -The centre column, nine thousand in number, with twelve guns, was -commanded by sir Arthur in person, and marched straight against the -enemy by the village of Mahmed. It was composed of generals Hill’s, -Nightingale’s, Catlin Craufurd’s, and Fane’s brigades of British -infantry, four hundred cavalry, two hundred and fifty of which were -Portuguese, and four hundred light troops of the same nation. - -As this column advanced, general Fane’s brigade, extending to its -left, drove back the French skirmishers, and connected the march -of Ferguson’s division with the centre. When the latter approached -the elevated plain upon which Laborde was posted, general Hill, -who moved upon the right of the main road, being supported by -the cavalry, and covered by the fire of his light troops, pushed -forward rapidly to the attack. On his left general Nightingale -displayed a line of infantry, preceded by the fire of nine guns. -Craufurd’s brigade, and the remaining pieces of artillery, formed a -reserve. - -At this moment, Fane’s riflemen crowned the nearest hills on the -right flank of the French; the Portuguese troops showed the head -of a column beyond St. Amias upon the enemy’s left, and general -Ferguson was seen descending from the higher grounds in the rear of -Fane. Laborde’s position appeared desperate; but with the coolness -and dexterity of a practised warrior, he evaded the danger, -and covered by his excellent cavalry, fell back rapidly to the -heights of Zambugeira. A fresh disposition of the English became -indispensable to dislodge him from that formidable and well chosen -post. - -Colonel Trant continued his march, and turned the left of the new -field of battle. - -Ferguson and Fane being united, were directed to penetrate by the -mountains, and outflank the French right. - -[Illustration: _SKETCH OF THE_ COMBAT OF RORIÇA. 17^{th} August -1808.] - -Generals Hill and Nightingale advanced against the front, which was -of singular strength, and only to be approached by narrow paths -winding through deep ravines. A swarm of skirmishers starting -forward, plunged into the passes, and spreading to the right and -left, won their way with extreme difficulty among the rocks and -tangled evergreens that overspread the steep ascent; with still -greater difficulty the supporting columns followed, and their -formation was soon disordered in the confined and rugged passes. -The hollows echoed with a continued roll of musketry; the shouts -of the advancing troops were loudly answered by the enemy, and the -curling smoke that broke out from the sides of the mountain marking -the progress of the assailants, showed how stoutly the defence was -maintained. Laborde, watching anxiously for the arrival of Loison, -gradually slackened his hold on the left, but clung tenaciously -to the right, in the hope of yet effecting a junction with that -general. The ardour of the 9th and 29th regiments, who led the -attack, favoured this skilful conduct. They pressed forward with -such vigour, as to force the two strongest passes and reach the -plain above, long before the flank movements of Ferguson and Trant -had shaken the credit of the position, the 29th first arrived -in disorder at the top; ere they could form, a French battalion -came forward at a rapid pace, poured in their fire, and breaking -gallantly through the midst of the English regiment, slew the -colonel and many others, and made the major and fifty or sixty men -prisoners; but the 29th were not to be overthrown. They rallied, -and being joined by the 9th, the colonel of which also fell in this -bitter fight, maintained their dangerous footing. Laborde, who -brought every arm into action at the proper time and place, made -repeated efforts to destroy these regiments before they could be -supported; failing in that, he yet gained time to withdraw his left -wing and to rally it upon the centre and right; but the English -troops were gathering thickly on the upper ground, and general -Ferguson, who had at first taken an erroneous direction towards the -centre, now regained the true line, and was rapidly passing the -right flank of the position. The French general, seeing that the -day was lost, commenced a retreat by alternate masses, protecting -his movements by vigorous charges of cavalry. At the village of -Zambugeira he made another desperate stand, but the English troops -bore on him too heavily to be resisted, and thus disputing the -ground, he fell back to the Quinta de Bugagliera, there he halted -until his detachments on the side of Segura had rejoined him, and -then taking to the narrow pass of Ruña he marched all night to gain -the position of Montechique, leaving three guns on the field of -battle, and the road to Torres Vedras open for the victors. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 19.] - -The loss of the French was six hundred killed and wounded; -among the latter was Laborde himself. The British also suffered -considerably; two lieutenant-colonels and nearly five hundred men -being killed, taken, or wounded, and as not more than four thousand -men were actually engaged, this hard fought action was very -honourable to both sides. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s evidence. Court of Inquiry.] - -The firing ceased a little after four o’clock, and sir Arthur -getting intelligence that Loison’s division was at Bombaral, -only five miles distant, took up a position for the night in an -oblique line to that which he had just forced, his left resting -upon a height near the field of battle, and his right covering the -road to Lourinham. Believing that Loison and Laborde had effected -their junction at the Quintade Bugagliera, and that both were -retiring to Montechique, he resolved to march the next morning to -Torres Vedras; but before night-fall he was informed that general -Anstruther’s and general Acland’s[13] divisions, accompanied by -a large fleet of store ships, were off the coast, the dangerous -nature of which rendered it necessary to provide for their safety -by a quick disembarkation. He therefore changed his plans, and -resolved to seek for some convenient post, that, being in advance -of his present position, would likewise enable him to cover the -landing of these reinforcements. The vigour of Laborde’s defence -had also an influence upon this occasion; before an enemy so bold -and skilful no precaution could be neglected with impunity. - -The 18th sir Arthur marched to Lourinham, and Junot at the same -time quitting Cereal with Loison’s division, crossed the line of -Laborde’s retreat, and pushed for Torres Vedras, which he reached -in the evening of the same day. The 19th being joined by Laborde, -and the 20th by his reserve, he re-organized his army, and prepared -for a decisive battle. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -The day on which the combat of Roriça was fought the insurgents -attacked Abrantes, and the feeble garrison being ill commanded, -gave way, and was destroyed. - -The 19th sir Arthur Wellesley took up a position at Vimiero, a -village near the sea-coast, and from thence sent a detachment to -cover the march of general Anstruther’s brigade, which had, with -great difficulty and some loss, been that morning landed on an open -sandy beach called the bay of Maceira. - -The French cavalry scoured the neighbouring country, carried off -some of the women from the rear of the camp, and hemmed the army -round so closely that no information of Junot’s position could be -obtained. - -In the night of the 20th, general Acland’s brigade was also -disembarked, and this reinforcement increased the army to sixteen -thousand fighting men, with eighteen pieces of artillery, exclusive -of Trant’s Portuguese and of two British regiments, under general -Beresford, which were with the fleet at the mouth of the Tagus. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -Estimating Junot’s whole force at eighteen thousand men, sir Arthur -Wellesley judged, that after providing for the security of Lisbon, -the French general could not bring more than fourteen thousand -into the field; he designed, therefore, not only to strike the -first blow, but to follow it up, so as to prevent the enemy from -rallying and renewing the campaign upon the frontier. In this view -he had, before quitting the Mondego, written to sir Harry Burrard, -giving an exact statement of his own proceedings and intentions, -and recommending that sir John Moore, with his division, should -disembark at the Mondego, and march without delay to Santarem, by -which he would protect the left of the army, block the line of -the Tagus, and at the same time threaten the French communication -between Lisbon and Elvas, and that without danger, because Junot -would be forced to defend Lisbon against the coast army, or if, -relinquishing the capital, he endeavoured to make way to Almeida -by Santarem, the ground there was so strong that sir John Moore -might easily maintain it against any efforts. Moreover, the -marquis of Valladeres commanded three thousand men at Guarda, and -general Freire, with five thousand men, was at Leria, and might be -persuaded to support the British at Santarem. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s evidence. Court of Inquiry.] - -The distance from Vimiero to Torres Vedras was about nine miles; -but although the number and activity of the French cavalry -completely shrouded Junot’s position, it was known to be strong, -and very difficult of approach, by reason of a long defile through -which the army must penetrate in order to reach the crest of the -mountain. There was, however, a road leading between the sea-coast -and Torres Vedras, which, turning Junot’s position, opened a way -to Mafra. Sir Arthur possessed very exact military surveys of the -country through which that road led, and he projected, by a forced -march, on the 21st to turn the position of Torres Vedras, and to -gain Mafra with a strong advanced guard, while the main body, -seizing some advantageous heights a few miles short of that town, -would be in a position to intercept the French line of march to -Montachique. The army was reorganized during the 20th in eight -brigades of infantry, and four weak squadrons of cavalry, and every -preparation was made for the next day’s enterprise; but at that -critical period of the campaign the ministerial arrangements, which -provided three commanders-in-chief, began to work. - -Sir Harry Burrard arrived in a frigate off the bay of Maceira, and -sir Arthur was checked in the midst of his operations on the eve of -a decisive battle. Having repaired on board the frigate, he made -his report of the situation of affairs, and renewed his former -recommendation relative to the disposal of sir John Moore’s troops; -but Burrard, who had previously resolved to bring the latter down -to Maceira, condemned this project, and forbid any offensive -movement until the whole army should be concentrated; whereupon sir -Arthur returned to his camp. - -The ground occupied by the army, although very extensive, and not -very clearly defined as a position, was by no means weak. The -village of Vimiero, situated in a valley through which the little -river of Maceira flows, contained the parc and commissariat stores. -The cavalry and the Portuguese were on a small plain close behind -the village, and immediately in its front a rugged isolated height, -with a flat top, commanded all the ground to the southward and -eastward for a considerable distance. - -Upon this height Fane’s and Anstruther’s brigades of infantry with -six guns were posted, the left of Anstruther’s occupied a church -and churchyard which blocked a road leading over the extremity of -the height to the village, the right of Fane’s rested on the edge -of the other extremity of the hill, the base of which was washed by -the Maceira. - -A mountain that commenced at the coast swept in a half circle -close behind the right of the hill upon which these brigades were -posted, and commanded, at rather long artillery range, all its -upper surface. Eight guns, and the first, second, third, fourth, -and eighth brigades of infantry, occupied this mountain, which -was terminated on the left by a deep ravine that divided it from -another strong and narrow range of heights over which the road -from Vimiero to Lourinham passed. The right of these last heights -also overtopped the hill in front of the village, but the left, -bending suddenly backward, after the form of a crook, returned to -the coast, and ended in a lofty cliff. There was no water upon this -range, and some piquets only were placed there. - -The troops being thus posted, on the night of the 20th, about -twelve o’clock, sir Arthur was aroused by a German officer of -dragoons, who galloped into the camp, and with some consternation -reported, that Junot, at the head of twenty thousand men, was -coming on to the attack, and distant but one hour’s march. The -general, doubting the accuracy of this gentleman’s information, -merely sent out some patrolles, and warned the piquets and guards -to be upon the alert. Before daybreak, according to the British -custom, the troops were under arms; the sun rose, and no enemy was -perceived; but at seven o’clock a cloud of dust was observed beyond -the nearest hills, and at eight o’clock an advanced guard of horse -was seen to crown the heights to the southward, and to send forward -scouts on every side. Scarcely had this body been discovered, when -a force of infantry, preceded by other cavalry, was descried moving -along the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham, and threatening -the left of the British position; column after column followed in -order of battle, and it soon became evident that the French were -coming down to fight, but that the right wing of the English was -not their object. The second, third, fourth, and eighth brigades -were immediately directed to cross the valley behind the village, -and to take post on the heights before-mentioned as being occupied -by the piquets only. As those brigades reached the ground, the -second and third were disposed in two lines facing to the left, -and consequently forming a right angle with the prolongation of -Fane and Anstruther’s front. The fourth and eighth brigades were to -have furnished a third line; but before the latter could reach the -summit the battle commenced. From the flank of all these troops, -a line of skirmishers was thrown out upon the face of the descent -towards the enemy; the cavalry was drawn up in the plain a little -to the right of the village of Vimiero; and the fifth brigade and -the Portuguese were detached to the returning part of the crook to -cover the extreme left, and to protect the rear of the army. The -first brigade under general Hill remained on the mountain which the -others had just quitted, and formed a support for the centre and a -reserve for the whole. - -The ground between the two armies was so wooded and broken, that -after the French had passed the ridge where they had been first -descried, no correct view of their movements could be obtained; and -the British being so weak in cavalry were forced to wait patiently -until the columns of attack were close upon them. Junot had quitted -Torres Vedras the evening of the 20th, intending to fall on the -English army at day-break; but the difficulty of the defile in his -front retarded his march for many hours and fatigued his troops. -When he first came in sight of the position of Vimiero, the British -order of battle appeared to him as being on two sides of an -irregular triangle, the apex of which formed by the hill in front -of the village, was well furnished with men, while the left face -appeared naked, for he could only see the piquets on that side, and -the passage of the four brigades across the valley was hidden from -him. Concluding, then, that the principal force was in the centre, -he resolved to form two connected attacks, the one against the -apex, the other against the left face; for he thought that the left -of the position was an accessible ridge, whereas a deep ravine, -trenched as it were along the base, rendered it utterly impervious -to an attack, except at the extremity, over which the road from -Torres Vedras to Lourinham passed. Junot had nearly fourteen -thousand fighting men organized in four divisions, of which three -were of infantry and one of cavalry, with twenty-three pieces of -artillery, but of small calibre. Each division was composed of two -brigades, and at ten o’clock, all being prepared, he commenced the - - -BATTLE OF VIMIERO. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -[Sidenote: Foy.] - - -Laborde marched with one brigade against the centre; general -Brennier led another against the left; Loison’s division followed -in the same order at a short distance. Kellerman, whose division -(called the reserve) was composed of grenadiers, moved in one body -behind Loison, and the cavalry under Margaron, about thirteen -hundred in number, was divided, a part being on the right of -Brennier, and the remainder in rear of the reserve. The artillery -was distributed among the columns, and opened their fire whenever -the ground was favourable for their practice. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s despatch.] - -Junot designed that Laborde’s and Brennier’s attacks should be -simultaneous, but the latter coming unexpectedly upon the ravine -before mentioned as protecting the left, got entangled among the -rocks and water courses, and Laborde alone engaged Anstruther’s -brigade under a heavy and destructive fire of artillery that played -on his front and flank, for the eighth brigade being then in the -act of mounting the heights where the left was posted, observing -the advance of the columns against the centre, halted, and opened a -battery on their right flank. Junot, perceiving this failure in his -combinations, ordered Loison to support Laborde’s attack with one -brigade of his division, and directed general Solignac, with the -other, to turn the ravine in which Brennier was entangled, and to -fall upon the extremity of the English line. - -Loison and Laborde formed one grand and two secondary columns -of attack; of the latter, the one advanced against Fane’s -brigade, while the other endeavoured to penetrate by a road which -passed between the ravine and the church on the extreme left of -Anstruther; but the principal column, headed by Laborde in person, -and preceded by a multitude of light troops, mounted the face of -the hill with great fury and loud cries; the English skirmishers -were forced in upon the lines in a moment, and the French masses -arrived at the summit; but, shattered by a terrible fire of the -artillery, and breathless from their exertions, and in this state, -first receiving a discharge of musketry from the fiftieth regiment -at the distance of half pistol shot, they were vigorously charged -in front and flank, and overthrown. At the same time Fane’s brigade -repulsed the attack on their side, and colonel Taylor, with the -very few horsemen he commanded, passing out by the right, rode -fiercely among the confused and retreating troops, and scattered -them with great execution. Margaron’s cavalry seeing this, came -suddenly down upon Taylor, who was there slain, and the half of -his feeble squadron cut to pieces, and Kellerman taking advantage -of this check, threw one half of the reserve into a pine wood, that -flanked the line of retreat followed by the beaten troops, and with -the other endeavoured to renew the attack by the road leading to -the church, where the forty-third regiment were engaged in a hot -skirmish among some vineyards. - -The grenadiers coming on at a brisk pace, beat back the advanced -companies of the forty-third; but to avoid the artillery that swept -their left, they dipped a little into the ravine, and were taken -on the other flank by the guns of the eighth and fourth brigades, -and at the same time the forty-third rallying in a mass, broke down -upon the head of the column at a moment when the narrowness of the -way and the discharges of the artillery had somewhat disordered its -formation, a short yet desperate fight took place; the enemy were -repulsed in disorder, but the regiment suffered very severely. - -The French being now wholly discomfited in the centre, and the -woods and hollows filled with their wounded and straggling men, -retired up the edge of the ravine in a direction almost parallel -to the British line, and left the road from Vimiero to Torres -Vedras open to their opponents; but sir Arthur Wellesley strictly -forbade any pursuit at that moment, partly because the grenadiers -in the pine wood flanked the line of the French retreat, and partly -because Margaron’s horsemen, riding stiffly between the two armies, -were not to be lightly meddled with. Meanwhile, (Brennier being -still hampered in the ravine), general Solignac passed along the -crest of the ridge above, and came upon general Ferguson’s brigade, -which was posted at the left of the English position. But where the -French expected to find a weak flank, they encountered a front of -battle on a depth of three lines protected by steep declivities -on either side; a powerful artillery swept away their foremost -ranks, and on their right the fifth brigade and the Portuguese -were seen marching by a distant ridge towards the Lourinham road -and threatening the rear. Ferguson instantly taking the lead, bore -down upon the enemy, the ridge widened as the English advanced, -and the regiments of the second line running up in succession, -increased the front, and constantly filled the ground. The French -falling fast under the fire drew back fighting, until they reached -the declivity of the ridge, and their cavalry made several efforts -to check the advancing troops, but the latter were too compact to -be disturbed by these attempts. Solignac himself was carried from -the field severely wounded, and his retiring column, continually -outflanked on the left, was cut off from the line of retreat, and -thrown into the low ground about the village of Perenza. There six -guns were captured, and general Ferguson leaving the eighty-second -and seventy-first regiments to guard them, was continuing to press -the disordered columns, when Brennier having at last cleared the -ravine, came suddenly in upon those two regiments, and re-took -the artillery. His success was but momentary; the surprised -troops rallied upon the higher ground, poured in a heavy fire of -musquetry, and with a shout returning to the charge, overthrew -him and recovered the guns. Brennier himself was wounded and made -prisoner, and Ferguson having completely separated the French -brigades from each other, would have forced the greatest part of -Solignac’s to surrender, if an unexpected order had not obliged -him to halt, and then the discomfited troops re-forming under -the protection of their cavalry with admirable quickness and -steadiness, made an orderly retreat, and were soon united to the -broken brigades which were falling back from the attack on the -centre. - -Brennier, who, the moment he was taken, was brought to sir Arthur -Wellesley, eagerly demanded if the reserve under Kellerman had -yet charged, and sir Arthur, ascertaining from other prisoners -that it had, was then satisfied that all the enemy’s attacks were -exhausted, and that no considerable body of fresh troops could be -hidden among the woods and hollows in his front. It was only twelve -o’clock, the battle was already won; thirteen guns were in his -possession, for seven had been taken in the centre; the fourth and -eighth brigades had suffered very little; the Portuguese, the fifth -and the first brigades had not fired a shot, and the latter was two -miles nearer to Torres Vedras than any part of the French army, -which was moreover in great confusion. The relative numbers before -the action were considerably in favour of the English; and the -result of the action had increased that disparity. A portion of sir -Arthur’s army had defeated the enemy when entire; a portion then -could effectually follow up his victory, and he resolved with the -five brigades on the left to press Junot closely, and driving him -over the Sierra da Baragueda, force him upon the Tagus, while Hill, -Anstruther, and Fane, seizing the defile of Torres Vedras, should -push on to Montachique and cut him off from Lisbon. - -[Illustration: _SKETCH OF THE_ BATTLE OF VIMIERO. 21^{st} August -1808.] - -If this able and decisive operation had been executed, Junot -would probably have lost all his artillery, and several thousand -stragglers, and being buffeted and turned at every point, would -have been glad to seek safety under the guns of Almeida or Elvas, -and even that he could only have accomplished because sir John -Moore’s troops were not landed at the Mondego. But sir Harry -Burrard, who was present during the action, although partly from -delicacy, and partly from approving of sir Arthur’s arrangements, -he had not hitherto interfered, now assumed the chief command. From -him, the order which arrested Ferguson in his victorious career had -emanated, by him further offensive operations were forbidden, and -he resolved to wait in the position of Vimiero until the arrival of -sir John Moore. The adjutant-general Clinton and colonel Murray, -the quarter-master-general, supported sir Harry Burrard’s views, -and sir Arthur’s earnest representations could not alter his -determination. - -[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry.] - -Sir Harry’s decision was certainly erroneous, but error is common -in an art which at best is but a choice of difficulties. The -circumstances of the moment were imposing enough to sway most -generals; for although the French were beaten in the attacks, -they rallied with surprising quickness under the protection of a -strong and gallant cavalry; sir Harry knew that his own artillery -carriages were so shaken as to be scarcely fit for service; that -the draft horses were few and bad, and that the commissariat parc -on the plain was in the greatest confusion. The hired Portuguese -carmen were making off with their carriages in all directions; the -English cavalry was totally destroyed, and finally, general Spencer -had discovered a line of fresh troops on the ridge behind that -occupied by the French army. Weighing all these things in his mind -with the caution natural to age, Burrard was reluctant to hazard -the fortune of the day upon what he deemed a perilous throw. - -The duke of Abrantes, who had displayed all that reckless courage -to which he originally owed his elevation, profited by this -unexpected cessation of the battle, and re-formed his broken -infantry. Twelve hundred fresh men joined him at the close of the -contest, and, covered by his cavalry, he retreated with order -and celerity until he regained the command of the pass of Torres -Vedras, so that when the day closed, the relative position of the -two armies was the same as on the evening before. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -One general, thirteen guns, and several hundred prisoners fell into -the hands of the victors, and the total loss of the French was -estimated at three thousand men, an exaggeration, no doubt, but it -was certainly above two thousand, for their closed columns had been -exposed for more than half an hour to sweeping discharges of grape -and musquetry, and the dead lay thickly together. General Thiebault -indeed reduces the number to eighteen hundred, and asserts that the -whole amount of the French army did not much exceed twelve thousand -men, from which number he deducts nearly three thousand for the -sick, the stragglers, and all those other petty drains which form -the torment of a general-in-chief. But when it is considered -that this army was composed of men selected and organized into -provisionary battalions expressly for the occasion; that one half -had only been in the field for a fortnight, and that the whole had -enjoyed three days rest at Torres Vedras, it is evident that the -number of absentees bears too great a proportion to the combatants. -A French order of battle found upon the field gave a total of -fourteen thousand men present under arms, of which thirteen hundred -were cavalry, and this amount agrees too closely with other -estimates, and also with the observations made at the time, to -leave any reasonable doubt of its authenticity or correctness. - -[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry.] - -The arrangements made by sir Harry Burrard did not remain in force -a long time. Early on the morning of the 22d, sir Hew Dalrymple -disembarked and assumed the chief command. Thus, in the short space -of twenty-four hours, during which a battle was fought, the army -fell successively into the hands of three men, who, coming from -different quarters, with different views, habits, and information, -had not any previous opportunity of communing even by letter, so as -to arrange a common plan of operations; and they were now brought -together at a critical moment, when it was more than probable they -must all disagree, and that the public service must suffer from -that want of vigour which is inherent to divided councils; for -when sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the command, sir Arthur -Wellesley was privately recommended to him by the minister as a -person who should be employed with more than usual confidence; -and this unequivocal hint was backed up with too much force by -the previous reputation and recent exploits of the latter, not -to produce some want of cordiality; for sir Arthur could not do -otherwise than take the lead in discussing affairs of which he had -more than laid the foundation, and sir Hew would have forfeited all -claims to independence in his command, if he had not exercised the -right of judging for himself between the conflicting opinions of -his predecessors. - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.] - -[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry.] - -After receiving information upon the most important points, and -taking a hasty view of the situation of the army; although the -wounded were still upon the ground, and that the wains of the -commissariat were employed in removing them, sir Hew decided -to advance upon the 23d, and gave orders to that effect; but, -at the same time, he entirely agreed in opinion with sir Harry -Burrard, that the operation was a perilous one, which required -the concentration of all the troops, and the application of all -his means, to bring to a good conclusion; and for this reason he -did not rescind the order directing sir John Moore to fall down to -Maceira. This last measure was disapproved of by sir Arthur, who -observed that the provisions on shore would not supply more than -eight or nine days consumption for the troops already at Vimiero; -that the country would be unable to furnish any assistance, and -that the fleet could not be calculated upon as a resource because -the first of the gales common at that season of the year would -certainly send it away from the coast, if it did not destroy a -great portion of it. Sir Hew thought the evil of having the army -separated, would be greater than the chance of distress from such -events. His position was certainly difficult; the bishop of Oporto -had failed in his promise of assisting the troops with draft -cattle, as indeed he did in all his promises. Both the artillery -and commissariat were badly supplied with mules and horses; the -cavalry was a nullity; and the enemy was, with the exception of -his immediate loss in killed and wounded, suffering nothing from -his defeat, which, we have seen, did not deprive him of a single -position necessary to his defence. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -Sir Hew, while weighing this state of affairs, was informed that -general Kellerman, escorted by a strong body of cavalry, was at -the outposts, and demanded an interview. It appears, that Junot -having regained Torres Vedras and occupied Mafra with half his -army, received news from Lisbon that gave him great uneasiness: -the symptoms of an immediate explosion in that city threatened him -with destruction, and he hastened to extricate himself while there -was yet time. Sending forward a false account of a victory, he -followed it up by a reinforcement for the garrison, and immediately -afterwards called a council of war to advise with upon the measures -fittest to pursue towards the English. It is an old and a sound -remark, that “a council of war never fights,” and Kellerman’s -mission was the result of the above consultation. - -[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.] - -That general being conducted to the quarters of the -commander-in-chief, demanded a cessation of arms, and proposed -the ground-work of a convention under which Junot offered to -evacuate Portugal without further resistance. Nothing could be -more opportune than this proposition, and sir Hew Dalrymple -readily accepted of it as an advantage which would accrue, without -any drawback to the general cause of the Peninsula. He knew, -from a plan of operations sketched by the chief of the French -engineers, colonel Bory de St Vincent, and taken by the Portuguese, -that Junot possessed several very strong positions in front of -Lisbon, and that a retreat either upon Almeida, or across the -river upon Elvas, was not only within the contemplation of that -general, but considered in this report as a matter of course, and -perfectly easy of execution. Hence the proposed convention was -an unexpected advantage offered in a moment of difficulty, and -the only subject for consideration was the nature of the articles -proposed by Kellerman as a basis for the treaty. Sir Hew was of -necessity ignorant of many important details which bore upon the -question, and he naturally had recourse to sir Arthur Wellesley for -information. The latter, taking an enlarged view of the question -in all its bearings, coincided with the opinion of the former as -to the sound policy of agreeing to a convention by which a strong -French army would be quietly got out of a country that it had -complete military possession of, and by which not only a great -moral effect in favour of the general cause would be produced, but -likewise an actual gain made both of men and time, for the farther -prosecution of the war in Spain. By the convention, he observed, - -1º. That a kingdom would be liberated, with all its fortresses, -arsenals, &c., and that the excited population of the Peninsula -might then be pushed forward in the career of opposition to France, -under the most favourable circumstances. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -2º. That the Spanish army of Estremadura, which contained the most -efficient body of cavalry in the Peninsula, (being first reinforced -with the four or five thousand Spanish soldiers who were prisoners -on board the vessels in the Tagus), would be enabled to unite with -the other patriot armies at a critical period, when every addition -of force must tend to increase the confidence, and forward the -impulse, which the victory of Baylen, and the flight of Joseph, -had given to the Spaniards; and, finally, that the sacrifice of -lives to be expected in carrying the French positions in Portugal, -all the difficulties of reducing the fortresses, and the danger -of losing a communication with the fleet, would be avoided by -this measure; the result of which would be as complete as the -most sanguine could expect from the long course of uncertain and -unhealthy operations which must follow a rejection of the proposal. -But, completely coinciding, as he did, with the commander-in-chief, -as to the utility of the measure itself, he differed with him as -to the mode of proceeding, and a long discussion (in which sir H. -Burrard took a part) followed the opening of Kellerman’s mission. -Sir Arthur’s first objection was, that, in point of form, Kellerman -was merely entitled to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. But -sir Hew Dalrymple judged, that as the good policy and the utility -of the convention were recognised, it would be unwise to drive the -French to the wall for the sake of a trivial ceremony. Wherefore -the proposition was accepted, and the basis of a definitive treaty -was arranged, subject, however, to the final approbation of sir -Charles Cotton, without whose concurrence it was not to be binding. - -Articles 1st and 2d declared the fact of the armistice, and -provided for the mode of future proceedings. - -Article 3d indicated the river Sizandre as the line of demarcation -between the two armies. The position of Torres Vedras to be -occupied by neither. - -Article 4th. Sir Hew Dalrymple engaged to have the Portuguese -included in the armistice, and their boundary line was to extend -from Leria to Thomar. - -Article 5th declared, that the French were not to be considered as -prisoners of war, and that themselves and their property, public -and private, were, without any detainder, to be transported to -France. To this article sir Arthur objected, as affording a cover -for the abstraction of Portuguese property. General Kellerman -replied, that it was to be taken in its fair sense of property -justly obtained; and upon this assurance it was admitted. - -Article 6th provided for the protection of individuals. It -guaranteed from political persecution all French residents, all -subjects of powers in alliance with France, and all Portuguese who -had served the invaders, or become obnoxious for their attachment -to them. - -Article 7th stipulated for the neutrality of the port of Lisbon as -far as the Russian fleet was concerned. At first Kellerman proposed -to have the Russian fleet guaranteed from capture, with leave to -return to the Baltic; but this was peremptorily refused; and -indeed the whole proceeding was designed to entangle the Russians -in the French negotiation, that in case the armistice should be -broken, the former might be forced into a co-operation with the -latter. - -Sir Arthur strenuously opposed this article: he argued, 1º, that -the interests of the two nations were not blended, and that they -stood in different relations towards the British army. 2º. That it -was an important object to keep them separate, and that the French -general, if pressed, would leave the Russians to their fate. 3º. -That as the British operations had not been so rapid and decisive -as to enable them to capture the fleet before the question of -neutrality could be agitated, the right of the Russians to such -protection was undoubted, and in the present circumstances it was -desirable to grant it, because, independent of the chances of -their final capture, they would be prevented from returning to the -Baltic, which in fact constituted their only point of interest when -disengaged from the French negotiation; but, that viewed as allies -of the latter, they became of great weight. Lastly, that it was an -affair which concerned the Portuguese, Russians, and British, but -with which the French could have no right to interfere. - -Sir Hew finding that the discussion of this question became -lengthened, and considering that sir Charles Cotton alone could -finally decide, admitted the article merely as a form, without -acquiescing in the propriety of it. - -Article 8th provided, that all guns of French calibre, and the -horses of the cavalry, were to be likewise transported to France. - -Article 9th stipulated, that forty-eight hours notice should be -given of the rupture of the armistice. - -To this article also sir Arthur objected; he considered it -unnecessary for the interests of the British army, and favourable -to the French, because if hostilities recommenced, the latter would -have forty-eight hours to make arrangements for their defence, for -the passage of the Tagus, and for the co-operation of the Russian -fleet. Upon the other hand, sir Hew thought it was an absolute -advantage to gain time for the preparations of the British army, -and for the arrival of sir John Moore’s reinforcements. - -By an additional article it was provided, that all the fortresses -held by the French, which had not capitulated before the 25th of -August, should be given up to the British, and the basis of a -convention being thus arranged, general Kellerman returned to his -chief, and colonel George Murray was ordered to carry the proposed -articles to the English admiral. - -Previous to his landing, sir Hew had received none of the letters -addressed to him by sir Arthur Wellesley, he had met with no person -during his voyage from whom he could obtain authentic information -of the state of affairs, and his time had been completely occupied -since his arrival by the negotiations with Kellerman; he was -consequently ignorant of many details of importance. The day after -Kellerman’s departure, don Bernardim Freire Andrada the Portuguese -commander-in-chief, came to remonstrate against the armistice -just concluded. Now, from the circumstances before-mentioned, it -so happened that sir Hew was utterly ignorant of the existence of -don Bernardim or his army at the time the armistice was discussed, -and it was therefore difficult for him to manage this interview -with propriety, because Andrada had some plausible, although no -real ground of complaint. His remonstrances were, however, merely -intended for the commencement of an intrigue, to which I shall -hereafter revert. - -[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.] - -Colonel Murray soon reached the fleet, and presented the articles -of convention to sir Charles Cotton, but the latter refused to -concur therein, and declared that he would himself conduct a -separate treaty for the Russian ships. With this answer colonel -Murray returned on the 24th, having first, in reply to a question -put by the French officer who accompanied him on board the -Hibernia, declared that nothing had passed between him and sir -Charles Cotton which ought to preclude further negotiation. Sir Hew -Dalrymple was now urged by sir Arthur Wellesley to give notice, -without further explanation, that hostilities would recommence, -and to leave it to general Junot to renew propositions, if he -chose to do so, separately from the Russians. But sir Hew felt -himself in honour bound, by colonel Murray’s observation to the -French officer, not to take advantage of the occasion; and he -likewise felt disinclined to relinquish a negotiation which, from -certain circumstances, he deemed upon the point of being crowned -with success. He therefore despatched colonel Murray to Lisbon, -with directions, to inform Junot of the admiral’s objection, and -to give notice of the consequent rupture of the armistice, Murray -himself being provided, however, with full powers to enter into and -conclude a definitive treaty upon a fresh basis. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Proc^{gs}. C^t. of Inquiry.] - -The army was, at the same time, pushed forward to Ramalhal, and -sir John Moore’s troops commenced landing at Maceira Bay. When -the order to repair to that place first reached them, a part had -been already disembarked in the Mondego, and had to be re-shipped. -This and contrary winds detained them for four days, and when they -arrived at Maceira great difficulty was encountered, and some loss -was sustained, in the getting of them ashore, an operation effected -only by five days of incessant exertion on the part of the navy, -for the boats were constantly swamped by the surf, and such was -its fury that not more than thirty remained fit for service at the -conclusion. - -On the 27th, information was received from colonel Murray that a -fresh treaty was in agitation upon an admissible basis. On the -28th, the army took a new position, a part occupying Torres Vedras, -and the remainder being placed in the rear of that town. - -Meanwhile in Lisbon the agitation of the public mind was -excessively great, hope and fear were magnified by the obscurity of -affairs, and the contradictory news which was spread by the French, -and by those who held communication with the country, increased -the anxious feelings of joy or grief almost to phrensy. Junot made -every effort to engage admiral Siniavin in the negotiation, and -the necessity by which the latter was forced to put his ships in a -hostile and guarded attitude, contributed powerfully to control the -populace, and to give strength to an opinion, industriously spread, -that he would make common cause with the French. Siniavin had, -however, no intention of this kind, and very early gave notice that -he would treat separately. - -The French, thus left to themselves, rested their hopes upon -their own dexterity, and brought all the ordinary machinery of -diplomatic subtlety into play. Among other schemes, Junot opened a -separate communication with sir Hew Dalrymple at the moment when -colonel Murray, invested with full powers, was engaged in daily -conferences with general Kellerman, and the difficulty of coming to -a conclusion was much increased by the natural sources of suspicion -and jealousy incident to such a singular transaction, where two -foreign nations were seen bargaining, and one of them honestly -bargaining, for the goods and interests of a third, yet scarcely -hinting even at the existence of the latter. The French were the -weakest party, and having of course the most to dread, put forward -claims which they knew could not be complied with, in order to -preserve the vital questions untouched. On the other hand, the -Portuguese leaders being relieved from all fear of a signal defeat, -were loudly remonstrating against the terms of the convention, -and taking advantage of the opportunity to attack some patroles -of the French, passed the bounds of demarcation, and threatened -the line of the Tagus by Santarem. This movement, and the breach -of faith in attacking the patroles, were promptly and distinctly -disavowed by sir Hew; but they kept suspicion awake, and the mutual -misunderstandings arose at last to such a height, that Junot, -seeming for a moment to recover all his natural energy, threatened -to burn the public establishments, and to make his retreat good -at the expense of the city; a menace which nothing could have -prevented him from executing. Finally, however, a definitive treaty -was concluded at Lisbon on the 30th, and soon afterwards ratified -in form. - -[Sidenote: Vide Appendix, No. 10.] - -This celebrated convention, improperly called “of Cintra,” -consisted of twenty-two original, and three supplementary articles, -upon the expediency of many of which, sir Arthur Wellesley and -the commander-in-chief disagreed; but as their disagreement had -reference to the details and not to the general principle, the -historical importance is not sufficient to call for remark. -An informality on the part of Junot caused some delay in the -ratification of the instrument; but the British army marched -notwithstanding to take up the position near Lisbon, assigned to -it by the 11th article of the treaty. - -On the march, sir Hew Dalrymple met two Russian officers, who were -charged to open a separate negotiation for the Russian squadron. -The British general refused to receive their credentials, and -referred them to sir Charles Cotton. Baffled in this attempt to -carry on a double treaty (for a naval one was already commenced), -Siniavin, whose conduct appears to have been weak, was forced to -come to a conclusion with the English admiral. At first he claimed -the protection of a neutral port; but singly he possessed none of -that weight which circumstances had given him before the convention -with Junot, and his claim was answered by an intimation, that a -British flag was flying on the forts at the mouth of the Tagus; and -this was true, for the third and forty-second regiments, under the -command of major-general Beresford, had landed and taken possession -of them, in virtue of the convention, and the British colours were -hoisted instead of the Portuguese. Foiled by this proceeding, the -justice of which is somewhat doubtful, Siniavin finally agreed to -surrender, upon the following terms: - -1º. The Russian ships, with their sails, stores, &c. to be held by -England, as a deposit, until six months after the conclusion of a -peace between the two governments of the contracting parties. - -2º. The admiral, officers, and seamen, without any restriction -as to their future services, to be transported to Russia, at the -expense of the British government. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.] - -Two additional articles were, subsequently to the ratification of -the original treaty, proposed by the Russians, and assented to by -the English admiral. The first stipulated that the imperial flag -should be displayed, even in the British harbours, as long as -the Russian admiral remained on board. The second provided that -the ships themselves and their stores should be delivered again -at the appointed time, in the same state as when surrendered. The -rights of the Portuguese were not referred to; but sir Charles -Cotton individually was justified by his instructions in this -breach of neutrality, for by them he was authorised to make prize -of the Russian fleet, which thus suffered all the inconvenience of -hostilities, and its commander the shame of striking his colours -without having violated in any manner the relations of amity in -which his nation stood with regard to the Portuguese. On the -other hand, for the sake of a few old and decaying ships, the -British government made an injudicious display of contempt for -the independence of their ally, as, with singular inconsistency, -they permitted the officers and crews, the real strength of the -squadron, to return to the Baltic, although scarcely a year had -elapsed since the national character was defiled to extinguish in -that quarter the existence of a navy inimical to Great Britain. - -[Sidenote: Par^y. Pap^s. 1809. Admiralty Instructions to sir C. -Cotton, 16th April, 1808.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid. Mr. Well^y. Pole to sir C. Cotton, 17th Sept. -1808.] - -This inconsistency belonged wholly to the ministers; for the two -original articles of the treaty only were confirmed by them, and -they were copied verbatim from the Admiralty instructions delivered -to sir Charles Cotton four months previous to the transaction. Yet -that officer, by the very men who had framed those instructions, -was, with matchless inconsistency, rebuked, for having adopted a -new principle of maritime surrender! - -The 2d of September head-quarters were established at Oyeras. The -right of the army occupied the forts at the mouth of the river, the -left rested upon the heights of Bellas. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -The French army being concentrated in Lisbon, posted their piquets -and guards as if in front of an enemy, and at night the sentries -fired upon whoever approached their posts; the police disbanded -of their own accord, and the city became a scene of turbulence, -anarchy, and crime. Notwithstanding the presence of their enemies, -the inhabitants of the capital testified their joy, and evinced -their vengeful feelings in a remarkable manner; they refused to -sell any provisions, or to deal in any manner with the French, -they sung songs of triumph in their hearing, and in their sight -fabricated thousands of small lamps for the avowed purpose of -illuminating the streets at their departure. The doors of many -of the houses occupied by the troops were marked in one night; -men were observed bearing in their hats lists of Portuguese or -Frenchmen designed for slaughter, and the quarters of Loison were -threatened with a serious attack. Yet amidst all this disorder -and violence, general Travot, and some others of the French army, -fearlessly and safely traversed the streets, unguarded save by -the reputation of their just and liberal conduct when in power; a -fact extremely honourable to the Portuguese, and conclusive of the -misconduct of Loison. Junot himself was menaced by an assassin, but -he treated the affair with magnanimity, and, in general, he was -respected, although in a far less degree than Travot. The dread of -an explosion, which would have compromised at once the safety of -the French army and of the city, induced Junot to hasten the period -when an English division was to occupy the citadel and take charge -of the public tranquillity. - -Emissaries from the junta of Oporto fomented the disposition of -the populace to commit themselves by an attack upon the French; -the convention was reprobated, and endeavours were fruitlessly -made to turn the tide of indignation even against the English, as -abettors of the invaders. The judge of the people, an energetic, -but turbulent fellow, issued an inflammatory address calling for -a suspension of the treaty, and designating the French as robbers -and as insulters of religion. The Monteiro Mor, who commanded a -rabble of peasantry which he dignified with the title of an army, -had taken possession of the south bank of the Tagus, and from his -quarters issued a protest against the convention, the execution -of which he had the audacity to call upon sir Charles Cotton to -interrupt. The latter sent his communications to sir Hew Dalrymple, -who treated them with the contemptuous indignation they merited. - -Sir John Hope being appointed the English commandant of Lisbon, -took possession of the castle of Belem on the 10th, and of the -citadel on the 12th, and, by his firm and vigorous conduct, soon -reduced the effervescence of the public mind, and repressed the -disorders which had arisen to a height that gave opportunity for -the commission of any villany. The duke of Abrantes, with his -staff, embarked the 13th. The first division of his army sailed the -15th, it was followed by the second and third divisions, and on the -30th all the French, except the garrisons of Elvas and Almeida, -were out of Portugal. - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.] - -The execution of the convention had not been carried on thus far -without much trouble and contestation. Lord Proby, the English -commissioner appointed to carry the articles of the treaty into -effect, was joined by major-general Beresford on the 5th, and their -united labours were scarcely sufficient to meet the exigencies -of a task in the prosecution of which disputes hourly arose. -Anger, the cupidity of individuals, and opportunity, combined -to push the French beyond the bounds of honour and decency, and -several gross attempts were made to appropriate property which -no interpretation of the stipulations could give a colour to; -amongst the most odious were the abstraction of manuscripts and -rare specimens of natural history from the national museum, and the -invasion of the deposito publico, or funds of money awaiting legal -decision for their final appropriation. Those dishonest attempts -were met and checked with a strong hand, and at last a committee, -consisting of an individual of each of the three nations, was -appointed by the commissioners on both sides. Their office was to -receive reclamations, to investigate them, and to do justice by -seizing upon all contraband baggage embarked by the French. This -measure was attended with excellent effect. It must, however, be -observed, that the loud complaints and violence of the Portuguese, -and the machinations of the bishop of Oporto, seem to have excited -the suspicions of the British, and influenced their actions more -than the real facts warranted; for the national character of the -Portuguese was not then understood, nor the extent to which they -supplied the place of true reports, by the fabrication of false -ones, generally known. Writers have not been wanting to exaggerate -the grounds of complaint. The English have imputed fraud, and -evasions of the most dishonourable kind to the French, and the -latter have retorted by accusations of gratuitous insult and breach -of faith, asserting that their soldiers when on board the British -ships were treated with cruelty in order to induce them to desert. -It would be too much to affirm that all the error was on one side, -but it does appear reasonable and consonant to justice to decide, -that as the French were originally aggressors and acting for -their own interest, and that the British were interfering for the -protection of the Portuguese, any indecorous zeal upon the part -of the latter, if not commendable, was certainly more excusable -than in their opponents. Upon the ground of its being evidently -impossible for him to know what was doing in his name, the British -commissioners acquitted Junot of any personal impropriety of -conduct, and his public orders, which denounced severe punishments -for such malpractices, corroborated this testimony; yet Kellerman, -in his communications with sir Hew Dalrymple, did not scruple to -insinuate matter to the duke’s disadvantage. But, amidst all these -conflicting accusations, the British commander’s personal good -faith and scrupulous adherence to justice has never been called in -question. - -To define the exact extent to which each party should have pushed -their claims is not an easy task; but an impartial investigator -would begin by carefully separating the original rights of the -French from those rights which they acquired by the convention. -Much of the subsequent clamour in England against the authors -of that treaty sprung from the error of confounding these -essentially distinct grounds of argument. Conquest being the sole -foundation of the first, defeat, if complete, extinguished them, -if incomplete, nullified a part only. Now the issue of the appeal -to arms not having been answerable to the justice of the cause, -an agreement ensued, by which a part was sacrificed for the sake -of the remainder, and upon the terms of that agreement the whole -question of right hinges. If the French were not prisoners of war, -it follows that they had not forfeited their claims founded on the -right of conquest, but they were willing to exchange an insecure -tenure of the whole for a secure tenure of a part. The difficulty -consisted in defining exactly what was conceded, and what should be -recovered from them. With respect to the latter, the restitution -of plunder acquired anterior to the convention was clearly out -of the question: if officially made, it was part of the rights -bargained for, and if individually, to what tribunal could the -innumerable claims which would follow such an article be referred? -Abstract notions of right in such matters are misplaced. If an army -surrenders at discretion, the victors may say with Brennus, “Woe to -the vanquished;” but a convention implies some weakness, and must -be weighed in the scales of prudence, not in those of justice. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -The interview that took place at Vimiero between don Bernardim -Freire d’Andrada and sir Hew Dalrymple has been already noticed as -the commencement of an intrigue of some consequence. The Portuguese -general objected at the time to the armistice just concluded -with Kellerman, ostensibly upon general grounds, but really, as -it appeared, to sir Hew, because the bishop and junta of Oporto -were not named in the instrument. At the desire of Freire, one -Ayres Pinto de Souza was received at the English head-quarters -as the protector of Portuguese interests during the subsequent -negotiation. He was soon apprised that a treaty for a definitive -convention was on foot, and both himself and his general were -invited to state their views and wishes before any further steps -were taken. Neither of them took any notice of this invitation, but -when the treaty was concluded clamoured loudly against it. - -The British army was, they said, an auxiliary force, and should -only act as such; nevertheless it had assumed the right of treating -with the French for Portuguese interests. A convention had been -concluded which protected the enemy from the punishment due to -his rapine and cruelty. It was more favourable than the strength -of the relative parties warranted; no notice had been taken of -the Portuguese government, or of the native army in the Alemtejo. -Men who were obnoxious to their countrymen for having aided the -invaders were protected from a just vengeance, and finally the -fortresses were bargained for, as acquisitions appertaining to -the British army; a circumstance which must inevitably excite -great jealousy both in Portugal and Spain, and injure the general -cause, by affording an opportunity for the French emissaries to -create disunion among the allied nations. They dwelt upon the -importance of the native forces, the strength of the insurrection, -and insinuated that separate operations were likely to be carried -on notwithstanding the treaty. Noble words often cover pitiful -deeds: this remonstrance, apparently springing from the feelings of -a patriot whose heart was ulcerated by the wrongs his country had -sustained, was but a cloak for a miserable interested intrigue. - -The bishop of Oporto, a meddling ambitious priest, had early -conceived the project of placing himself at the head of the -insurrectional authorities, and transferring the seat of government -from Lisbon to Oporto. He was aware that he should encounter great -opposition, and he hoped that by inveigling the English general to -countenance these pretensions, he might, with the aid of Freire’s -force and his own influence, succeed in the object of his wishes. -With this view he wrote a letter to sir Charles Cotton, dated the -4th of August, in which was enclosed (as the letter describes it) -“The form of government with which they (the junta of Oporto) -meant to govern Portugal when the city of Lisbon should be free -from the French.” This letter, together with its enclosure, being -transmitted to sir Arthur Wellesley, he placed them among other -public documents in the hands of sir Hew Dalrymple when the latter -first landed at Maceira. In the document itself it was declared -that “The body of government had taken the glorious resolution -of restoring the Portuguese monarchy in all its extent, and of -restoring the crown of Portugal to its lawful sovereign, don -Juan VI., their prince, who was actually living in his estates -of Brazil;” but this “glorious resolution” was burthened with -many forms and restrictions; and although the junta professed the -intention of restoring a regency, they provided, “that if this new -regency should be interrupted by a new invasion of the French, -(which God forbid!) or by _any other thing_, this government -will immediately take the government on themselves, and exercise -the authority and jurisdiction which it has done ever since its -institution.” - -Thus prepared for some cabal, sir Hew Dalrymple was at no loss -for an answer to Freire’s remonstrance. He observed, that if the -government of Portugal had not been mentioned in the treaty, -neither had that of England nor that of France. The convention was -purely military, and for the present concerned only the commanders -in the field. With regard to the occupation of the fortresses, and -the fact of the British army being an auxiliary force, the first -was merely a measure of military precaution absolutely necessary, -and the latter was in no way rendered doubtful by any act which -had been committed; he sir Hew was instructed by his government to -assist in restoring the prince regent of Portugal to his lawful -rights, without any secret or interested motives; finally, the -Portuguese general had been invited to assist in the negotiations, -and if he had not done so, the blame rested with himself. And to -this sir Hew might have justly added, that the conduct of Freire in -withdrawing his troops at the most critical moment of the campaign, -by no means entitled him to assume a high tone towards those whom -he had so disgracefully deserted in the hour of danger. - -The Portuguese general was silenced by this plain and decided -answer; but the English general was quickly convinced that the -bishop and his coadjutors, however incapable of conducting great -affairs, were experienced plotters. In his first interview with -Andrada, sir Hew Dalrymple had taken occasion to observe, that -“no government lawfully representing the prince regent actually -existed in Portugal.” In fact, a junta, calling itself independent, -was likewise established in Algarvé, and the members of the -regency legally invested by the prince with supreme authority -were dispersed, and part of them in the power of the French. This -observation, so adverse to the prelate’s views, was transmitted to -him by Freire, together with a copy of the armistice. The junta -were well aware that a definite convention, differing materially -from the armistice, was upon the point of being concluded, and that -the refusal of sir Charles Cotton to concur in the latter, had -rendered it null and void; but preserving silence on that point, -the bishop forwarded the copy of the armistice to the chevalier -Da Souza, Portuguese minister in London, accompanied by a letter -filled with invectives and misrepresentations of its provisions. -The chevalier placed this letter with its inclosures, in the hands -of Mr. Canning the English secretary of state for foreign affairs, -and at the same time delivered to him an official note in which, -adopting the style of the prelate and junta, he spoke of them as -the representatives of his sovereign, and the possessors of the -supreme power in Portugal. - -But the efforts of the party were not confined to formal -communications with the ministers; the daily press teemed with -invectives against the English general’s conduct, and ex-parte -statements, founded on the provisions of an armistice that was -never concluded, being thus palmed upon the public, (always hasty -in judging of such matters), a prejudice against the convention -was raised before either the terms of, or the events which led to -it, were known. For, sir Hew, forgetting the ordinary forms of -official intercourse, neglected to transmit information to his -government until fifteen days after the commencement of the treaty, -and the ministers, unable to contradict or explain any of Souza’s -assertions, were placed in a mortifying situation, by which their -minds were irritated and disposed to take a prejudiced view of the -real treaty. Meanwhile the bishop pretended to know nothing of the -convention, hence the silence of Freire during the negotiations; -but those once concluded, a clamour was, by the party, raised -in Portugal, similar to that which they had already excited in -England; and thus both nations appeared to be equally indignant at -the conduct of the general, when, in fact, his proceedings were -unknown to either. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 11.] - -It would appear that the bishop had other than Portuguese -coadjutors. The baron Von Decken, a Hanoverian officer, was -appointed one of the military agents at Oporto: he was subject to -sir Hew Dalrymple’s orders, but as his mission was of a detached -nature, he was also to communicate directly with the secretary -of state in England. Von Decken arrived at Oporto upon the 17th -August, and the same evening, in concert with the bishop, concocted -a project admirably adapted to forward the views of the latter; -they agreed that the prelate was the fittest person to be at the -head of the government, and that as he could not, or pretended -that he could not, quit Oporto, the seat of government ought to be -transferred to that city. But two obstacles to this arrangement -were foreseen; first, the prince regent at his departure had -nominated a regency, and left full instructions for the filling -up of vacancies arising from death or other causes; secondly, the -people of Lisbon and of the southern provinces would certainly -resist any plan for changing the seat of government. To obviate -these difficulties, Von Decken wrote largely in commendation of -the proposed arrangement, vilifying the conduct of the regency, -and urging sir Hew not only to give his sanction to the ambitious -project, but to employ the British troops in controlling the -people of Lisbon should they attempt to frustrate the bishop’s -plans. To conciliate the members of the regency, it was proposed -to admit a portion of them into the new government, and Francisco -Noronha, Francisco da Cunha, the Monteiro Mor, and the principal -Castro, were named as being the only men who were faithful to -their sovereign. Now the last had accepted the office of ministre -des cultes under the French, and was consequently unfaithful; but -he was the brother of the bishop, Castro being legitimately born. -Under the pretext of sparing the feelings of the people of Lisbon, -it was further proposed to appoint a Portuguese commandant, subject -to the British governor, but with a native force under his orders, -to conduct all matters of police; and the bishop took the occasion -to recommend a particular general for that office. Finally, civil -dissension and all its attendant evils were foretold as the -consequences of rejecting this plan. - -Sir Hew Dalrymple’s answer was peremptory and decisive. He -reprimanded general Von Decken, and at once put an end to the -bishop’s hopes of support from the English army. - -This second offence, for sir Hew’s answer did not reach Oporto -until after Freire’s report had arrived there, completed the -mortification of the bishop and the junta; they set no bounds to -their violence. Efforts were made to stimulate the populace of -Lisbon to attack not only the French but the English, in the hope -that the terrible scene which must have ensued would effectually -prevent the re-establishment of the old regency, and at the same -time render the transfer of the seat of government to Oporto an -easy task. Hence the outrageous conduct of the Monteiro Mor and -of the judge of the people, and the former’s insolent letter -calling upon sir Charles Cotton to interrupt the execution of the -convention. - -The 3d of September, sir Hew Dalrymple received instructions -from home relative to the formation of a new regency, which were -completely at variance with the plan arranged between the bishop -and general Von Decken, yet no difficulty attended the execution. -Here, as in the case of prince Leopold, we are arrested by the -singularity of the transaction. Is it likely that general Von -Decken should plunge into such a delicate and important affair in -one hour after his arrival at Oporto, if he had not been secretly -authorised by some member of the English cabinet; and are we to -seek for a clue to these mysteries in that shameful Machiavelian -policy that soon afterwards forced lord Castlereagh to defend his -public measures by a duel? - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 23.] - -The usual fate of plans laid by men more cunning than wise, -attended the bishop of Oporto’s projects; he was successful for -a moment in rendering the convention of Cintra odious to the -Portuguese, but the great mass of the people soon acknowledged -with gratitude the services rendered them by the English, and -rejoiced at the fulfilment of a treaty that freed their country -at once from the invaders; and well might they rejoice when they -beheld above twenty-five thousand bold and skilful soldiers -reluctantly quitting the strong holds of the kingdom, and to the -last maintaining the haughty air of an army unsubdued, and capable -on the slightest provocation of resorting once more to the decision -of battle. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12.] - -The Portuguese people were contented; but the Spanish general -Galluzzo appears to have favoured the views of the Oporto faction. -Detachments of his troops, and Portuguese refugees (principally -from the northern provinces), commanded by a Spaniard, were acting -in conjunction with the insurgents of the Alemtejo. Many disputes -arose between the two nations, as I have already related, and the -Spaniards treated Portugal as a conquered country, they denied -the authority of the Portuguese general Leite, who was not of the -bishop’s party; they insulted him personally, seized his military -chest at Campo Mayor, and in all things acted with the utmost -violence and rapacity. Galluzzo himself was required by his own -government to join the Spanish armies concentrating on the Ebro; -but instead of obeying, he collected his forces near Elvas, and -when he heard of the convention concluded at Lisbon, invested Fort -Lalippe, and refused to permit the execution of the treaty relative -to that impregnable fortress. Colonel Girod de Novillard commanded -the French garrison, and profiting from its situation, had -compelled the inhabitants of Elvas to shut their gates against the -Spaniards, and to supply the fort daily with provisions. Galluzzo’s -proceedings were also manifestly absurd in a military point of -view; his attacks were confined to a trifling bombardment of -Lalippe from an immense distance, and the utmost damage sustained, -or likely to be sustained by that fortress, was the knocking away -the cornices and chimneys of the governor’s house, every other part -being protected by bomb proofs of the finest masonry. - -Through lord Burghersh, who had been appointed to communicate with -the Spanish troops in Portugal, Galluzzo was early in September -officially informed of the articles of the convention, and also -that the troops of his nation confined on board the hulks at -Lisbon, were by that treaty released, and would be clothed and -armed and sent to Catalonia. Upon the 5th of September, sir Hew -Dalrymple wrote to the Spaniard, repeating the substance of the -first communication, and requesting that his detachments might be -withdrawn from the Alemtejo where they were living at the expense -of the people. Galluzzo took no notice of either communication; -he pretended that he had opened his fire against Lalippe before -the date of the convention; that no third party had a right to -interfere, and that he would grant no terms to the garrison, nor -permit any but Portuguese to enter the fort. At this very moment -the Spanish armies on the Ebro were languishing for cavalry, which -he alone possessed; and his efforts were so despised by Girod that -the latter made no secret of his intention, (if the fate of the -French army at Lisbon should render such a step advisable), to blow -up the works, and march openly through the midst of Galluzzo’s -troops. - -Colonel Ross, with the 20th regiment, being appointed by sir Hew to -receive the fort from colonel Girod, and to escort the garrison to -Lisbon under the terms of the convention, sent a flag of truce to -the French. Major Colborne, who carried it, was furnished with an -autograph letter from Kellerman, and was received by Girod with -civility; but the latter refused to surrender his post without more -complete proof of the authenticity of the treaty; and with the -view of acquiring that, he proposed that a French officer should -proceed to Lisbon to verify the information; not that he affected -to doubt the truth of Colborne’s information, but that he would not -surrender his charge while the slightest doubt, capable of being -removed, was attached to the transaction; and so acting he did -well, and like a good soldier. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12.] - -General Dearey, who commanded the investing force, was persuaded -to grant a truce for six days, to give time for the journey of the -officers appointed to go to Lisbon; but on their return it was -not without great difficulty and delay that they were permitted -to communicate with colonel Girod, and no argument could prevail -upon the obstinate Galluzzo to relinquish the siege. After a warm -intercourse of letters, sir Hew Dalrymple was forced to order -sir John Hope to advance to Estremos with a considerable body of -troops, for the purpose of giving weight to his remonstrances, or, -if pushed to extremity, of forcing the Spaniard to desist from -his unwarrantable pretensions. It must be observed that Galluzzo -was not only putting aside the convention by which he profited -himself, but also violating the independence of the Portuguese -who desired his absence from their territory; and he was likewise -setting at naught the authority of his own government, for the -army of Estremadura pretended to act under the orders of the junta -of Seville: and Laguna, an accredited agent of that junta, was at -this moment receiving from sir Hew Dalrymple the Spanish prisoners -liberated by the effect of the convention, together with money, -arms, &c., to prepare them for immediate service in Catalonia, -whither they were also to be transported in British vessels. One -more effort was however made to persuade this intractable man to -submit to reason, before recourse was had to violent measures which -must have produced infinite evil. Colonel Graham repaired upon -the 25th of September to Badajos, and his arguments being backed -up by the near approach of the powerful division under Hope, were -successful, and this troublesome affair ended in an amicable manner. - -[Sidenote: Appendix to col. De Bosset’s Parga, p. 134.] - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -Colonel Girod evacuated the forts, and his garrison proceeded to -Lisbon, attended by the 52d regiment as an escort. The rival troops -agreed very well together, striving to out-do each other by the -vigour and the military order of their marches; but the Swiss and -French soldiers did not accord, and many of the latter wished to -desert. At Lisbon the whole were immediately embarked; but the -transports being detained for some time in the river, major de -Bosset, an officer of the Chasseurs Britanniques, contrived to -persuade near a thousand of the men to desert, who were afterwards -received into the British service. Girod de Novillard complained of -this as a breach of the convention, and it must be confessed that -it was an equivocal act, yet one common to all armies, and if done -simply by persuasion, very excusable. - -The garrison of Almeida surrendered that fortress without any -delay, and being marched to Oporto, were proceeding to embark, when -the populace rose and would have slain them if great exertions had -not been made by the British officers to prevent such a disgraceful -breach of faith. The escort was weak, but resolute to sustain -the honour of their nation, by firing upon the multitude if the -circumstances became desperate. Nevertheless several of the French -soldiers were assassinated, and in spite of every effort the -baggage was landed, and the whole plundered; the excuse being that -church plate was to be found amongst it, an accusation easily made, -difficult to be disproved to the satisfaction of a violent mob, and -likely enough to be true. - -This tumult gives scope for reflection upon the facility with which -men adapt themselves to circumstances, and regulate their most -furious passions, by the scale of self-interest. In Oporto, the -suffering, in consequence of the invasion, was trifling compared -to the misery endured in Lisbon; yet the inhabitants of the former -were much more outrageous in their anger. In Lisbon, the very -persons who had inflicted the worst evils upon the people were -daily exposed, more or less, to violence, yet suffered none; while -in Oporto it was with extreme difficulty that men, until that -moment unseen of the multitude, were rescued from their frantic -revenge. In both cases fear regulated the degree of hatred shown, -and we may conclude from hence, that national insurrections however -spontaneous and vehement, if the result of hatred only, will never -successfully resist an organized force, unless the mechanical -courage of discipline be grafted upon the first enthusiasm. - -While the vexatious correspondence with Galluzzo was going on, sir -Hew Dalrymple renewed his intercourse with Castaños, and prepared -to prosecute the war in Spain. The Spanish prisoners, about four -thousand in number, were sent to Catalonia; and the British -army was cantoned principally in the Alemtejo along the road to -Badajos, but some officers were despatched to examine the roads -through Beira with a view to a movement on that line; and general -Anstruther was directed to repair to the fortress of Almeida, for -the purpose of regulating every thing which might concern the -passage of the army, if it should be found necessary to enter Spain -by that route. Lord William Bentinck was also despatched to Madrid, -having instructions to communicate with the Spanish generals and -with the central junta, and to arrange with them the best line of -march, the mode of providing magazines, and the plan of campaign. -But in the midst of these affairs, and before the garrison of Elvas -arrived at Lisbon, sir Hew Dalrymple was called home to answer for -his conduct relative to the convention. The command then devolved -upon sir Harry Burrard, but after holding it for a few days he -also returned to England, there to abide the fury of the most -outrageous and disgraceful public clamour that was ever excited by -the falsehoods of base and venal political writers. - -The editors of the daily press adopting all the misrepresentations -of the Portuguese minister, and concluding that the silence of -government was the consequence of its dissatisfaction at the -convention, broke forth with such a torrent of rabid malevolence, -that all feelings of right and justice were overborne, and the -voice of truth stifled by their obstreperous cry. Many of the -public papers were printed with mourning lines around the text -which related to Portuguese affairs; all called for punishment, and -some even talked of death to the guilty, before it was possible to -know if any crime had been committed; the infamy of the convention -was the universal subject of conversation, a general madness seemed -to have seized all classes, and, like the Athenians after the sea -fight of Arginusæ, the English people if their laws would have -permitted the exploit, were ready to condemn their generals to -death for having gained a victory! - -A court of inquiry was assembled at Chelsea to inquire into the -transactions relating to the armistice and the definite convention. -Sir Arthur Wellesley, sir Harry Burrard, sir Hew Dalrymple, and -the principal generals engaged at Vimiero, were called before it. -A minute investigation of all the circumstances took place, and -a detailed report was made by the board; at the end of which, it -was stated that no further judicial measures seemed to be called -for. This report was not satisfactory to the government, and the -members of the court were required to state individually whether -they approved or disapproved of the armistice and convention. -It then appeared that four approved, and three disapproved, of -the convention. Among the latter the earl of Moira distinguished -himself by a laboured criticism, which, however, left the pith of -the question entirely untouched. The proceedings of the board were -dispassionate and impartial but the report was not luminous; a -circumstance to be regretted, because the rank and reputation of -the members were sufficiently great to secure them from the revenge -of party, and no set of men were ever more favourably placed for -giving a severe and just rebuke to popular injustice. - -Thus ended the last act of the celebrated convention of Cintra, the -very name of which will always be a signal record of the ignorant -and ridiculous vehemence of the public feeling; for the armistice, -the negotiations, the convention itself, and the execution of its -provisions, were all commenced, conducted, and concluded, at the -distance of thirty miles from Cintra, with which place they had -not the slightest connexion, political, military, or local[14]! - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -RORIÇA. - -1º. General Thiebault says, that the scattered state of the French -army, in the beginning of August, rendered its situation desperate; -but that the slowness of sir Arthur Wellesley saved it. Others -again have accused the latter of rashness and temerity. Neither of -these censures appear to be well founded. It is true that Junot’s -army was disseminated; but to beat an army in detail, a general -must be perfectly acquainted with the country he is to act in, well -informed of his adversary’s movements, and rapid in his own. Now -rapidity in war depends as much upon the experience of the troops -as upon the energy of the chief; and the English army was raw, the -staff and commissariat mere novices, the artillery scantily and -badly horsed, few baggage or draft animals were to be obtained -in the country, and there were only a hundred and eighty cavalry -mounted. Such impediments are not to be removed in a moment, and -therein lies the difference betwixt theory and practice, between -criticism and execution. - -2º. To disembark the army without waiting for the reinforcements -was a bold but not a rash measure. Sir Arthur Wellesley knew that -the French troops were very much scattered, although he was not -aware of the exact situation of each division, and from the bishop -of Oporto’s promises, he had reason to expect good assistance from -the Portuguese, who would have been discouraged if he had not -landed at once. Weighing these circumstances he was justified -in disembarking his troops, and the event proved that he was -right, for he had full time to prepare his army, his marches were -methodical, and he was superior in numbers to his enemy in each -battle. His plans were characterized by a due mixture of enterprise -and caution well adapted to his own force, and yet capable of being -enlarged without inconvenience when the reinforcement should arrive. - -3º. In the action of Roriça there was a great deal to admire, and -some grounds for animadversion. The movement against Laborde’s -first position was well conceived and executed; but the subsequent -attack against the heights of Zambugeira was undoubtedly faulty. -The march of Ferguson’s and Trant’s divisions would have dislodged -Laborde from that strong ridge without any attack on the front. It -is said that such was sir Arthur’s project; but that some mistake -in the orders caused general Ferguson to alter the direction of -his march from the flank to the centre; this if true, does not -excuse the error; because the commander-in-chief being present at -the attack in front, might have restrained it until Ferguson had -recovered the right direction. It is more probable that sir Arthur -did not expect any very vigorous resistance, and wishing to press -the French in their retreat pushed on the action too fast, and -Laborde, who was unquestionably no ordinary general, made the most -of both time and circumstances. - -4º. Towards the close of the day when the French had decidedly -taken to the mountains, the line of Loison’s march was in the power -of the English general. If he had sent two thousand men in pursuit -of Laborde, left one thousand to protect the field of battle, and -with the remaining ten thousand marched against Loison, whose -advanced guard could not have been far off; it is probable that the -latter would have been surprised and totally defeated, and at all -events he could only have saved himself by a hasty retreat, which -would have broken Junot’s combinations and scattered his army in -all directions. - -5º. Sir Arthur Wellesley marched to Lourinham to cover the -immediate disembarkation of his reinforcements and stores, and -this was prudent, because a south-west wind would in one night -have sent half the fleet on shore in a surf unequalled for fury; -and such was the difficulty of a disembarkation, that a detachment -from the garrison of Peniché would have sufficed to frustrate it. -The existence of a French reserve estimated by report at four -thousand men, was known; but its situation was unknown, and it -might have been on the coast line; hence great danger to Anstruther -if he attempted a landing without being covered, greater still if -he remained at sea. The reasons then for the march to Lourinham -were cogent, and perhaps outweighed the advantages of attacking -Loison; but it seems to have been an error not to have occupied -Torres Vedras on the 18th; as the disembarkation of Anstruther’s -force would have been equally secured, while the junction of the -French army, and the consequent battle of Vimiero would have been -prevented. - -6º. It is an agreeable task to render a just tribute of applause to -the conduct of a gallant although unsuccessful enemy; and there is -no danger of incurring the imputation of ostentatious liberality in -asserting that Laborde’s operations were exquisite specimens of the -art of war. The free and confident manner in which he felt for his -enemy, the occupation of Brilos, Obidos, and Roriça in succession, -by which he delayed the final moment of battle, and gained time -for Loison; the judgment and nice calculation with which he -maintained the position of Roriça, and the obstinacy with which he -defended the heights of Zambugeira, were all proofs of a consummate -knowledge of war and a facility of command rarely attained. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s evidence. Court of Inquiry.] - -7º. Sir Arthur Wellesley estimated Laborde’s numbers at six -thousand men, and his estimation was corroborated by the -information gained from a wounded French officer during the action. -It is possible that at Alcobaça they might have been so many, but -I have thought it safer to rate them at five thousand, for the -following reasons: first, it is at all times very difficult to -judge of an enemy’s force by the eye, and it is nearly impossible -to do so correctly when he is skilfully posted, and as in the -present case, desirous of appearing stronger than he really was; -secondly, the six hundred men sent on the 14th to Peniché, and -three companies employed on the 16th and 17th to keep open the -communication with Loison by Bombaral, Cadaval, and Segura must -be deducted; thirdly, Laborde himself after the convention, -positively denied that he had so many as six thousand. General -Thiebault indeed says, that only one thousand nine hundred were -present under arms; but this assertion is certainly inaccurate, and -very injurious to the credit of general Laborde, because it casts -ridicule upon a really glorious deed of arms. It is surprising that -a well-informed and able writer should disfigure an excellent work -by such trifling. - - -VIMIERO. - -1º. The battle of Vimiero was merely a short combat, but it led -to important results because Junot was unable to comprehend the -advantages of his situation. Profitable lessons may however be -drawn from every occurrence in war, and Vimiero is not deficient in -good subjects for military speculation. - -2º. To many officers the position of the British appeared weak from -its extent, and dangerous from its proximity to the sea, into which -the army must have been driven if defeated. The last objection is -well founded, and suggests the reflection that it is unsafe to -neglect the principles of the art even for a moment. The ground -having been occupied merely as a temporary post, without any view -to fighting a battle, the line of retreat by Lourinham was for -the sake of a trifling convenience left uncovered a few hours. -The accidental arrival of sir Harry Burrard arrested the advanced -movement projected by sir Arthur Wellesley for the 21st, and in the -mean time Junot took the lead, and had he been successful upon the -left, there would have been no retreat for the British army. - -3º. The extent of the position at Vimiero, although considerable -to a small army, was no cause of weakness, because the line of -communication from the right to the left was much shorter and much -easier for the British defence than it was for the French attack, -and the centre was very strong and perfectly covered the movement -of the right wing. Sir Arthur, when he placed the bulk of the -combatants in that quarter, did all that was possible to remedy the -only real defect in his position, that of having no line of retreat. - -4º. The project of seizing Torres Vedras and Mafra at the close -of the battle, was one of those prompt daring conceptions that -distinguish great generals, and it is absurd to blame sir Harry -Burrard for not adopting it. Men are not gifted alike, and even -if the latter had not been confirmed in his view of the matter -by the advice of his staff, there was in the actual situation -of affairs ample scope for doubt; the facility of executing sir -Arthur’s plan was not so apparent on the field of battle as it -may be in the closet. The French cavalry was numerous, unharmed, -and full of spirit. Upon the distant heights behind Junot’s army, -a fresh body of infantry had been discovered by general Spencer, -and the nature of the country prevented any accurate judgment of -its strength being formed. The gun carriages of the British army -were very much shaken, and they were so badly and so scantily -horsed, that doubts were entertained if they could keep up with the -infantry in a long march. The commissariat was in great confusion, -and the natives, as we have seen, were flying with the country -transport. The Portuguese troops gave no promise of utility, and -the English cavalry was destroyed. To overcome obstacles in the -pursuit of a great object is the proof of a lofty genius; but -the single fact that a man of sir George Murray’s acknowledged -abilities was opposed to the attempt, at once exonerates sir Harry -Burrard’s conduct from censure, and places the vigour of sir Arthur -Wellesley’s in the strongest light. It was doubtless ill-judged -of the former (aware as he was of the ephemeral nature of his -command) to interfere at all with the dispositions of a general who -was in the full career of victory, and whose superior talents and -experience were well known; but it excites indignation to find a -brave and honourable veteran borne to the earth as a criminal, and -assailed by the most puerile shallow writers, merely because his -mind was not of the highest class. Sir Arthur Wellesley himself was -the first to declare before the court of inquiry that sir Harry -Burrard had decided upon fair military reasons. - - -GENERAL PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN. - -1º. Although double lines of operation are generally -disadvantageous and opposed to sound principles, the expediency -of landing sir John Moore’s troops at the mouth of the Mondego, -and pushing them forward to Santarem, was unquestionable, and -unless the probable consequences of such a movement are taken into -consideration, sir Arthur Wellesley’s foresight cannot be justly -appreciated. - -Lisbon, situated near the end of the tongue of land lying between -the sea-coast and the Tagus, is defended to the northward by vast -mountains, that rising in successive and nearly parallel ranges, -end abruptly in a line extending from Torres Vedras to Alhandra on -the Tagus. As these ridges can only be passed at certain points -by an army, the intersections of the different roads form so many -strong positions. - -The great mass of the Monte Junto appears to lead perpendicularly -on to the centre of the first ridge; but stopping short at a -few miles distance, sends a rugged shoot called the Sierra de -Barragueda in a slanting direction towards Torres Vedras, from -which it is only divided by a deep defile. - -From this conformation it results, that an army marching from the -Mondego to Lisbon, must either pass behind the Monte Junto, and -follow the line of the Tagus, or keeping the western side of that -mountain, come upon the position of Torres Vedras. - -If sir Arthur Wellesley had adopted the first line of operations, -his subsistence must have been drawn by convoys from the Mondego, -the enemy’s numerous cavalry would have cut his communications, -and in that state he would have had to retreat, or to force the -positions of Alhandra, Alverca, and finally the heights of Bellas, -a strong position the right flank of which was covered by the -creek of Saccavem, and the left flank by the impassable Sierra -dos Infiernos. On the other line Torres Vedras was to be carried, -and then Mafra or Montechique, following the direction of Junot’s -retreat. If Mafra was forced (and neither it nor Montechique could -be turned), a line of march, by Cassim and Quelus, upon Lisbon -would have been opened to the victors; but that route, besides -being longer than the road through Montechique and Loures, would, -while it led the English army equally away from the fleet, have -entangled it among the fortresses of Ereceira, Sant Antonio, -Cascaes, St. Julians, and Belem. Again, supposing the position of -Montechique to be stormed, the heights of Bellas offered a third -line of defence, and lastly, the citadel and forts of Lisbon itself -would have sufficed to cover the passage of the river, and a -retreat upon Elvas would have been secure. - -Thus it is certain, that difficulties of the most serious nature -awaited the English army while acting on a single line of -operations; and the double line proposed by sir Arthur was strictly -scientific. For if sir John Moore, disembarking at the Mondego, -had marched first to Santarem and then to Saccavem, he would have -turned the positions of Torres Vedras and Montechique, and then sir -Arthur on the other side would have turned the heights of Bellas -by the road of Quelus. Junot’s central situation could not in this -case have availed him, because the distance between the British -corps would be more than a day’s march, and their near approach -to Lisbon would have caused an insurrection of the populace. The -duke of Abrantes must either have abandoned that capital and fallen -vigorously upon sir John Moore, with a view to overwhelm him and -gain Almeida or Elvas, or he must have concentrated his forces, -and been prepared to cross the Tagus if he lost a battle in front -of Lisbon. In the first case, the strength of the country afforded -Moore every facility for a successful resistance, and sir Arthur’s -corps would have quickly arrived upon the rear of the French. In -the second case, Junot would have had to fight superior numbers, -with an inveterate populace in his rear, and if, fearing the result -of such an encounter he had crossed the Tagus, and pushed for -Elvas, sir John Moore’s division could likewise have crossed the -river, and harassed the French in their retreat. - -[Sidenote: Captain Poulteney Malcolm’s Evidence. Court of Inquiry.] - -2º. The above reasoning being correct, it follows, that to -re-embark sir John Moore’s army after it had landed at the Mondego, -and to bring it down to Maceira bay, was an error which (no -convention intervening) might have proved fatal to the success -of the campaign. This error was rendered more important by the -danger incurred from the passage; for, as the transports were not -sea-worthy, the greatest part would have perished had a gale of -wind come on from the south-west. - -[Illustration: _Explanatory Sketch_ of the CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL in -August 1808. - -_London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street._] - -3º. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s project of seizing Mafra by a rapid -march on the morning of the 21st, was exceedingly bold; its -successful execution would have obliged Junot to make a hurried -retreat by Enxara dos Cavalleiros to Montechique, at the risk of -being attacked in flank during his march; or if he had moved by -the longer route of Ruña and Sobral, it is scarcely to be doubted -that the British army would have reached Lisbon before the French. -But was it possible so to deceive an enemy inured to warfare, -as to gain ten miles in a march of sixteen? was it possible to -evade the vigilance of an experienced general, who, being posted -only nine miles off, possessed a formidable cavalry, the efforts of -which could neither be checked nor interrupted by the small escort -of horse in the British camp? was it in fine possible, to avoid a -defeat during a flank march along a road crossed and interrupted -by a river and several deep gullies, which formed the beds of -mountain torrents? These are questions which naturally occur to -every military man. The sticklers for a rigid adherence to system -would probably decide in the negative. Sir Arthur Wellesley was -however, not only prepared to try at the time, but he afterwards -deliberately affirmed that, under certain circumstances of ground -an operation of that kind would succeed; and to investigate such -questions is the best study for an officer. - -4º. A night march is the most obvious mode of effecting such -an enterprise, but not always the best in circumstances where -expedition is required; and great generals have usually preferred -the day-time, trusting to their own skill in deceiving the enemy -while their army made a forced march to gain the object in view. -Thus, Turenne at Landsberg was successful against the archduke -Leopold in broad daylight, and Cæsar in a more remarkable manner -overreached Afranius and Petrieus near Lerida. Nor were the -circumstances at Vimiero unfavourable to sir Arthur Wellesley. He -might have pushed a select corps of light troops, his cavalry, the -marines of the fleet, the Portuguese auxiliaries, and a few field -pieces, to the entrance of the defile of Torres Vedras before -daybreak, with orders to engage the French outposts briskly, and -to make demonstrations as for a general attack. There is no doubt -that such a movement if skilfully conducted, would have completely -occupied the enemy’s attention, while the main body of the army -marching in great coats, and hiding the glitter of their arms, -might have profited from the woods and hollows through which the -by-road to Mafra led, and gained such a start as would have insured -the success of the enterprise. - -Let us, however, take a view of the other side; let us suppose -that Junot, instructed by his spies and patroles, or divining the -intention of the British general, held the masking division in -check with a small force, and carrying the remainder of his army -by the Puente de Roll, or some other cross road (and there were -several) against the flank of the English, had fallen upon the -latter while in march, hemmed in as they would be between the sea -and the mountains, and entangled among hollows and torrents. What -then would have been the result? History answers, by pointing to -Condé and the battle of Senef. It must however be confessed, that -it could be no ordinary general that conceived such a project, and, -notwithstanding the small numbers of the opposing armies, success -would have ranked sir Arthur high among the eminent commanders -of the world, if he had never performed any other exploit. “The -statue of Hercules, cast by Lysippus, although only a foot high, -expressed,” says Pliny, “the muscles and bones of the hero more -grandly than the colossal figures of other artists.” - -5º. So many circumstances combine to sway the judgment of an -officer in the field which do not afterwards appear of weight, that -caution should always be the motto of those who censure the conduct -of an unfortunate commander; nevertheless, the duke of Abrantes’ -faults, during this campaign, were too glaring to be mistaken. -He lingered too long at Lisbon; he was undecided in his plans; -he divided his army unnecessarily; and he discovered no skill on -the field of battle. The English army having landed affairs were -brought to a crisis, and Junot had only two points to consider. -Could the French forces under his command defend Portugal without -assistance? and if not, how were its operations to be made most -available for furthering Napoleon’s general plans against the -Peninsula? The first point could not be ascertained until a battle -with sir Arthur had been tried. The second evidently required that -Junot should keep his army concentrated, preserve the power of -retreating into Spain, and endeavour to engage the British troops -in the sieges of Elvas and Almeida. If the two plans had been -incompatible, the last was certainly preferable to the chance of -battle in a country universally hostile. But the two plans were not -incompatible. - -6º. The pivot of Junot’s movements was Lisbon; he had therefore -to consider how he might best fall upon and overthrow the English -army, without resigning the capital to the Portuguese insurgents -during the operation. He could not hope to accomplish the first -effectually without using the great mass of his forces, nor to -avoid the last except by skilful management, and the utmost -rapidity. Now the citadel and forts about Lisbon were sufficiently -strong to enable a small part of the French army to control the -populace, and to resist the insurgents of the Alemtejo for a few -days. The Russian admiral, although not hostile to the Portuguese, -or favourable to the French, was forced by his fear of the -English, to preserve a guarded attitude, and in point of fact, did -materially contribute to awe the multitude, who could not but look -upon him as an enemy. The Portuguese ships of war which had been -fitted out by Junot, were floating fortresses requiring scarcely -any garrisons, and yet efficient instruments to control the city, -without ceasing to be receptacles for the Spanish prisoners, and -safe depôts for powder and arms which might otherwise have fallen -into the power of the populace. Wherefore, instead of delaying -so long in the capital, instead of troubling himself about the -assemblage of Alcacer do Sal, instead of detaching Laborde with a -weak division to cover the march of Loison; Junot should have taken -the most vigorous resolutions in respect to Lisbon the moment he -heard of the English descent. He should have abandoned the left -bank of the Tagus, with the exception of Palmela and the Bugio, -which were necessary to the safety of his shipping; he should have -seized upon the principal families of the capital as hostages for -the good behaviour of the rest; and he should have threatened and -been prepared to bombard the city if refractory; then leaving -nothing more than the mere garrisons of the citadel, forts, and -ships behind him, have proceeded, not to Leria, which was too near -the enemy to be a secure point of junction with Loison, but to -Santarem, where both corps might have been united without danger -and without fatigue. General Thomieres, in the mean time, putting -a small garrison in Peniché, could have watched the movement of -the British general, and thus from eighteen to twenty thousand men -would have been assembled at Santarem by the 13th at farthest, and -from thence one march would have brought the whole to Batalha, -near which place the lot of battle might have been drawn without -trembling. - -7º. If it proved unfavourable to the French, the ulterior object of -renewing the campaign on the frontier was in no manner compromised. -The number of large boats that Lisbon can always furnish, would -have sufficed to transport the beaten army over the Tagus from -Santarem in a few hours, especially if the stores had been embarked -before Junot moved towards Batalha, and the French army, once in -the Alemtejo with a good garrison in Abrantes, could not have been -followed until the forts at the mouth of the Tagus were reduced, -and the fleet sheltered in the river. Thus, long before the British -could have appeared in force in the Alemtejo, the fortress of Elvas -would have been provisioned from the magazines collected by Loison -after the battle of Evora, and the campaign could have been easily -prolonged until the great French army, coming from Germany crushed -all opposition. - -The above is not a theory broached after the event. That Junot -would attempt something of the kind, was the data upon which the -English general formed his plans; the intercepted memoir of colonel -Bory de St. Vincent, treated such an operation as a matter of -course, and Junot’s threats during the negotiation prove that he -was not ignorant of his own resources; but his mind was depressed, -and his desponding mood was palpable to those around him. It is a -curious fact, that Sattaro, the Portuguese agent, who, for some -purpose or other was in the British camp, told sir Arthur Wellesley -before the battle of Vimiero, that Junot would willingly evacuate -Portugal upon terms. - -[Sidenote: Thiebault.] - -8º. When the French, being fourteen thousand in number, occupied -Torres Vedras, that position was nearly impregnable. Seventeen -thousand British could scarcely have carried it by force; but they -might have turned it in a single march by the coast road; yet -Junot neither placed a detachment on that side nor kept a vigilant -watch by his patroles. Now, if sir Arthur Wellesley’s intended -movement had not been arrested by orders from Burrard, it must have -succeeded, because Junot was entangled in the defiles of Torres -Vedras from six o’clock in the evening of the 20th, until late in -the morning of the 21st. The two armies would thus have changed -camps in the space of a few hours without firing a shot: Junot -would have lost Lisbon, and have been placed in the most ridiculous -situation. - -9º. In the battle, the duke of Abrantes showed great courage, but -no talent. His army was inferior in numbers, yet he formed two -separate attacks, an evident error that enabled sir Arthur to beat -him in detail without difficulty. And it was the less excusable, -because the comparatively easy nature of the ground over which the -road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham led, and the manner in which -the English army was heaped to the right when the position first -opened to the view of the French general, plainly indicated the -true line of attack. Junot should, with all his forces concentrated -for one effort, have fallen in upon the left of his opponent’s -position; if victorious, the sea would have swallowed those who -escaped his sword. If repulsed, his retreat was open, and his loss -could not have been so great in a well-conducted single effort, as -it was in the ill-digested, unconnected attacks that took place. - -10º. The rapidity with which the French soldiers rallied, and -recovered their order after such a severe check, was admirable, but -their habitual method of attacking in column cannot be praised. -Against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians, it may have been -successful, but against the British it must always fail, because -the English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well -disciplined, to wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and -sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet. - -11º. The column is undoubtedly excellent for all movements short -of the actual charge, but as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to -resist the open formation of the Roman legion, so will the close -column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a good line -aided by artillery. The natural repugnance of men to trample on -their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, -and the whistling of the cannon-shots as they tear open the -ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of -attacking columns, which, blinded by smoke, unstedfast of footing, -and bewildered by words of command coming from a multitude of -officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, -nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the -confusion: no example of courage can be useful, no moral effect -can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the -head, which is often firm, and even victorious at the moment when -the rear is flying in terror. Nevertheless, well managed columns -are the very soul of military operations; in them is the victory, -and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat. The secret -consists in knowing when and where to extend the front. - - -ARMISTICE. CONVENTION. - -1º. It is surprising, that Junot having regained Torres Vedras, -occupied Mafra, and obtained an armistice, did not profit by -the terms of the latter to prepare for crossing the Tagus and -establishing the war on the frontiers. Kellerman ascertained -during his negotiation, that sir John Moore was not arrived; and -it was clear, that until he did arrive the position of Montechique -could neither be attacked nor turned. There was nothing in the -armistice itself, nor the way in which it had been agreed to, which -rendered it dishonourable to take such an advantage. The opening -thus left for Junot to gain time, was sir Arthur Wellesley’s -principal objection to the preliminary treaty. - -2º. With regard to the convention, although some of its provisions -were objectionable in point of form, and others imprudently worded, -yet taken as a whole, it was a transaction fraught with prudence -and wisdom. Let it be examined upon fair military and political -grounds; let it even be supposed for the sake of argument, that sir -Arthur unimpeded by sir Harry Burrard, had pursued his own plan, -and that Junot, cut off from Lisbon and the half of his forces -had been driven upon the Tagus, he was still master of flying to -Almeida or Elvas: the thousand men left in Santarem would have -joined him in the Alemtejo, or fallen down to the capital; and -what then would have been the advantages that could render the -convention undesirable? - -[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 22.] - -The British army, exclusive of sir John Moore’s division, had -only provisions, or transport for provisions, sufficient to last -for ten or twelve days, and the fleet was the only resource when -that supply should be exhausted. But a gale from any point between -the southward and north-west, would have driven the ships away or -have cast them on a lee-shore. Hence an indispensable preliminary -measure would have been to open the mouth of the Tagus as a -security for the fleet; but without occupying Cascaes, Bugio, and -St. Julians, that was impossible. To take the last-named fort would -have required ten days’ open trenches at the least, and the heavy -artillery must have been landed in some of the small creeks, and -dragged by force of men over the mountains, because the artillery -horses were scarcely able to draw the field guns, and the country -was incapable of supplying assistance of that kind. In the mean -time, the French troops in Lisbon, and those upon the heights of -Almada and in the men-of-war, retiring tranquilly through the -Alemtejo, would have united with Junot; or if he had fallen back -upon Almeida, they could have retired upon Elvas and La-Lyppe. In -this argument the Russians have not been considered, but whatever -his secret wishes might have been, Siniavin must have joined the -French or surrendered his squadron in a disgraceful manner. This -would have increased Junot’s force by six thousand men; and it may -here be observed, that even after the arrival of sir John Moore, -only twenty-five thousand British infantry were fit for duty. - -Let it be supposed that the forts were taken, the English fleet in -the river, the resources of Lisbon organized, and the battering -guns and ammunition necessary for the siege of Elvas transported -to Abrantes by water. Seventy miles of land remained to traverse, -and then three months of arduous operations in the sickly season, -and in the most pestilent of situations, would have been the -certain consequences of any attempt to reduce that fortress. Did -the difficulty end there? No! Almeida remained, and in the then -state of the roads of Portugal, and taking into consideration only -the certain and foreseen obstacles, it is not too much to say, -that six months more would have been wasted before the country -could be entirely freed from the invaders. But long before that -period Napoleon’s eagles would have soared over Lisbon again. The -conclusion is inevitable; the convention was a great and solid -advantage for the allies, a blunder on the part of the French. - -With the momentary exception of Junot’s threat to burn Lisbon if -his terms were not complied with, we look in vain for any traces of -that vigour which urged the march from Alcantara; we are astonished -to perceive the man, who, in the teeth of an English fleet, in -contempt of fourteen thousand Portuguese troops, and regardless of -a population of three hundred thousand souls, dared, with a few -hundred tired grenadiers, to seize upon Lisbon, so changed in half -a year, so sunk in energy, that, with twenty-five thousand good -soldiers, he declined a manly effort, and resorted to a convention -to save an army which was really in very little danger. But such -and so variable is the human mind, the momentary slave of every -attraction, yet ultimately true to self-interest. When Junot -entered Portugal, power, honours, fame, emolument, nay, even a -throne, was within his reach, and toil and danger were overlooked -in such gorgeous society; but when he proposed the convention he -was only with the latter companions; fame flitted at a distance, -and he easily persuaded himself that prudence and vigour could -not be yoked together. A saying attributed to Napoleon perfectly -describes the convention in a few words. “I was going to send Junot -before a council of war, but, fortunately, the English tried their -generals, and saved me the pain of punishing an old friend!” - - - - -BOOK III. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -The convention of Cintra being followed by the establishment of a -regency at Lisbon, the plans of the bishop and junta of Oporto were -disconcerted, and Portugal was restored to a state of comparative -tranquillity; for the Portuguese people being of a simple -character, when they found their country relieved from the presence -of a French army, readily acknowledged the benefit derived from the -convention, and refused to listen to the pernicious counsels of the -factious prelate and his mischievous coadjutors. - -Thus terminated what may be called the convulsive struggle of -the Peninsular war. Up to that period a remarkable similarity -of feeling and mode of acting betrayed the common origin of the -Spanish and Portuguese people. A wild impatience of foreign -aggression, extravagant pride, vain boasting, and a passionate -reckless resentment, were common to both nations; but there the -likeness ceased, and the finer marks of national character which -had been impressed upon them by their different positions in the -political world, became distinctly visible. - -Spain, holding from time immemorial a high rank among the great -powers, and more often an oppressor than oppressed, haughtily -rejected all advice. Unconscious of her actual weakness and -ignorance, and remembering only her former dignity, she -ridiculously assumed an attitude which would scarcely have suited -her in the days of Charles V.; while Portugal, always fearing the -ambition of a powerful neighbour, and relying for safety as much -upon her alliances as upon her own intrinsic strength, was from -habit inclined to prudent calculation, and readily submitted to the -direction of England. The turbulence of the first led to defeat and -disaster; the docility and patience of the second were productive -of the most beneficial results. - -The difference between these nations was, however, not immediately -perceptible, and at the period of the convention the Portuguese -were despised, while a splendid triumph was anticipated for the -Spaniards. It was affirmed and believed, that from every quarter -enthusiastic multitudes of the latter were pressing forward to -complete the destruction of a baffled and dispirited enemy; the -vigour, the courage, the unmatched spring of Spanish patriotism, -was in every man’s mouth, and Napoleon’s power and energy seemed -weak in opposition. Few persons doubted the truth of such tales, -and yet nothing could be more unsound, more eminently fallacious, -than the generally-entertained opinion of French weakness and of -Spanish strength. The resources of the former were unbounded, -almost untouched; those of the latter were too slender even to -support the weight of victory. In Spain the whole structure of -society was shaken to pieces by the violence of an effort which -merely awakened the slumbering strength of France: foresight, -promptitude, arrangement, marked the proceedings of Napoleon; -but with the Spaniards the counsels of prudence were punished as -treason; and personal interests, every where springing up with -incredible force, wrestled against the public good. At a distance, -the insurrection appeared of towering proportions and mighty -strength; but in truth it was a fantastic object, stained with -blood, and tottering from weakness, and the helping hand of England -alone was stretched forth for its support; all other assistance -was denied, for the continental powers, although nourishing secret -hopes of profit from the struggle, with calculating policy, turned -coldly from the patriots’ cause. The English cabinet was indeed -sanguine, and resolute to act; but the ministers while anticipating -success in a preposterous manner, displayed little industry and -less judgment in their preparations for the struggle; nor does it -appear that the real freedom of the Peninsula was much considered -in their councils. They contemplated this astonishing insurrection, -as a mere military opening through which Napoleon might be -assailed, and they neglected, or rather feared, to look towards the -great moral consequences of such a stupendous event, consequences -which were in truth above their reach of policy. They were neither -able nor willing to seize such a singularly propitious occasion for -conferring a benefit upon mankind. - -It is however certain, that this opportunity for restoring the -civil strength of a long degraded people, by a direct recurrence -to first principles, was such as had seldom been granted to a -sinking nation. Enthusiasm was aroused without the withering -curse of faction; and the multitude were ready to follow whoever -chose to lead. The weight of ancient authority was, by a violent -external shock, thrown off. The ruling power fell from the hands -of the few, and was caught by the many, without the latter having -thereby incurred the odium of rebellion, or excited the malice -of mortified grandeur. There was nothing to deter the cautious, -for there was nothing to pull down. The foundation of the social -structure was laid bare, and all the materials were at hand for -building a rare and noble monument of human genius and virtue. The -architect alone was wanting. No anxiety to ameliorate the moral -or physical condition of the people in the Peninsula was evinced -by the ruling men of England, and if any existed amongst those of -Spain, it evaporated in puerile abstract speculations. Napoleon -indeed offered the blessing of regeneration in exchange for -submission, but in that revolting form accompanied by the evils of -war, it was rejected; and amidst the clamorous pursuit of national -independence, the independence of man was trampled under foot. The -mass of the Spanish nation, blinded by personal hatred, thought -only of revenge. The leaders, arrogant and incapable, neither -sought nor wished for any higher motive of action: without unity of -design, devoid of arrangement, their policy was mean and personal, -their military efforts were abortive, and a rude unscientific -warfare disclosed at once the barbarous violence of Spanish -character, and the utter decay of Spanish institutions. - -After Joseph’s retreat from Madrid, the insurrection of Spain may -be said to have ceased; from that period it became a war between -France and the Peninsula; the fate of the latter was intrusted to -organised bodies of men, and as the first excitement subsided, -and danger seemed to recede, all the meaner passions resumed -their empire; but the transactions of that memorable period -which intervened between the battles of Baylen and Coruña were -exceedingly confused, and the history of them must necessarily -partake somewhat of that confusion. - -The establishment of a central supreme junta, the caprices of -the Spanish generals, and their interminable disputes, the -proceedings of the French army before the arrival of the emperor, -the operations of the grand army after his arrival, and the -campaign of the British auxiliary force, form so many distinct -actions, connected it is true by one great catastrophe, yet each -attended by a number of minor circumstances of no great historical -importance taken separately, but when combined, showing the extent -and complicated nature of the disease which destroyed the energy of -Spain. - -For the advantage of clearness therefore, it will be necessary to -sacrifice chronological order; and as frequent reference must be -made to the proceedings of a class of men whose interference had -a decided, and in many cases a very disastrous influence upon the -affairs of that period, I shall first give a brief account of the -English agents, under which denomination both civil and military -men were employed, but the distinction was rather nominal than -real; for, generally speaking, each person assumed the right of -acting in both capacities. - -The envoy, Mr. Charles Stuart, was the chief of the civil agents; -the persons subordinate to him were, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Duff, and -others, consuls and vice-consuls. - -Mr. Stuart sailed with sir A. Wellesley, and was left at Coruña -when that officer touched there, previous to the operations in -Portugal. - -Mr. Hunter was stationed at Gihon in the Asturias. - -Mr. Duff proceeded to Cadiz, and the others in like manner were -employed at different ports. They were all empowered to distribute -money, arms, and succours of clothing and ammunition: but the want -of system and forethought in the cabinet was palpable from the -injudicious zeal of the inferior agents, each of whom conceived -himself competent to direct the whole of the political and -military transactions. Mr. Stuart was even put to some trouble in -establishing his right to control their proceedings. - -The military agents were of two classes: those sent from England by -the government, and those employed by the generals abroad. - -Sir Thomas Dyer, assisted by major Roche and captain Patrick, -proceeded to the Asturias. The last officer remained at Oviedo, -near the junta of that province. Major Roche was sent to the -head-quarters of Cuesta, and sir Thomas Dyer after collecting some -information, returned to England. - -Colonel Charles Doyle having organized the Spanish prisoners at -Portsmouth, sailed with them to Coruña. He was accompanied by -captain Carrol and captain Kennedy. During the passage a singular -instance of turbulent impatience occurred: the prisoners, who had -been released, armed, and clothed by England, and who had been -as enthusiastic in their expressions of patriotism as the most -sanguine could desire, mutinied, seized the transports, carried -them into different ports in the Peninsula, disembarked, and -proceeded each to his own home. - -Colonel Browne was despatched to Oporto, and a major Green to -Catalonia. - -Those employed by the generals commanding armies were captain -Whittingham, who was placed by sir Hew Dalrymple, near general -Castaños, on the first appearance of the insurrection. He -accompanied the head-quarters of the Andalusian army until the -battle of Tudela put an end to his functions. Major Cox (appointed -also by sir Hew Dalrymple) remained near the junta of Seville. The -talents and prudent conduct of this officer were of great service. -It would have been fortunate if all the persons employed as agents -had acted with as much judgment and discretion. All the above named -gentlemen were in full activity previous to the commencement of the -campaign in Portugal. - -When the convention of Cintra opened a way for operations in Spain, -sir Hew Dalrymple sent lord William Bentinck to Madrid, that he -might arrange a plan of co-operation with the Spanish generals, and -transmit exact intelligence of the state of affairs. Such a mission -was become indispensable. Up to the period of lord William’s -arrival in Madrid, the military intelligence received was very -unsatisfactory. The letters from the armies contained abundance of -commonplace expressions relative to the enthusiasm and patriotism -visible in Spain. Vast plans were said to be under consideration, -some in progress of execution, and complete success was confidently -predicted; but, by some fatality, every project proved abortive or -disastrous, without lowering the confidence of the prognosticators, -or checking the mania for grand operations, which seemed to be the -disease of the moment. - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Papers. MS.] - -The English minister confirmed the appointment of lord William -Bentinck, and at the same time re-organized the system of the -military agents; by marking out certain districts and appointing a -general officer to superintend each. Thus, major-general Broderick -was sent to Gallicia. Major-general Leith, with a large staff, -proceeded to the Asturias. Major-general Sontag went to Portugal. -The scope of general Leith’s mission was wide; Biscay, Castille, -Leon, and even Catalonia were placed under his superintendence, and -he appears to have had instructions to prepare the way for the -disembarkation of an English army on the coast of Biscay. At the -same time sir Robert Wilson was furnished with arms, ammunition, -and clothing for organizing three or four thousand men levied by -the bishop of Oporto. He took with him a large regimental staff, -and a number of Portuguese refugees, and succeeded in forming a -partizan corps, afterwards known by the title of the Lusitanian -legion. - -Brigadier-general Decken, a German, having been first destined for -Spain, was countermanded at sea, and directed to Oporto, where -he arrived on the 17th of August, and immediately commenced that -curious intrigue which has been already mentioned in the campaign -of Vimiero. - -When sir John Moore assumed the command of the army, he sent -colonel Graham to reside at the Spanish head-quarters on the Ebro, -and directed lord William Bentinck to remain at Madrid to forward -the arrangements for commencing the campaign. Lord William found -in Mr. Stuart an able coadjutor, and in the letters of these two -gentlemen, and the correspondence of major Coxe, then at Seville, -is to be found the history of the evils which at this period -afflicted unhappy Spain, and ruined her noble cause. - -The power of distributing supplies, and the independent nature -of their appointments, gave to those military agents immediately -employed by the minister an extraordinary influence, and it was -very injudiciously exercised. They forgot the real objects of their -mission, and in many cases took a leading part in affairs with -which it was not politic in them to have meddled at all. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Letters. MS.] - -Colonel Doyle having left captain Kennedy at Coruña, and placed -captain Carrol at the head-quarters of Blake’s army, repaired in -person to Madrid, where he was received with marked attention, -and obtained the rank of a general officer in the Spanish service -for himself, and that of lieutenant-colonel for captains Carrol -and Kennedy. From colonel Doyle’s letters it appears that he had -a large share in conducting many important measures, such as the -arrangement of a general plan of operations, and the formation of a -central and supreme government. He seems to have attached himself -principally to the duke of Infantado, a young man of moderate -capacity, but with a strong predilection for those petty intrigues -which constituted the policy of the Spanish court. Captain -Whittingham gained the confidence of general Castaños to such a -degree that he was employed by him to inspect the different Spanish -corps on the Ebro early in September, and to report upon their -state of efficiency previous to entering upon the execution of the -plan laid down for the campaign. Notwithstanding the favourable -position in which these officers stood, it does not appear that -either of them obtained any clear idea of the relative strength -of the contending forces, and their opinions, invariably and even -extravagantly sanguine, were never borne out by the result. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Letters. MS. Lord W. Bentinck’s Letters. -MS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13. section 6.] - -The Spaniards were not slow to perceive the advantages of -encouraging the vanity of inexperienced men who had the control -of enormous supplies; but while all outward demonstrations of -respect and confidence were by them lavished upon subordinate -functionaries, and especially upon those who had accepted of rank -in their service, the most strenuous exertions of lord William -Bentinck and Mr. Stuart were insufficient to procure the adoption -of a single beneficial measure, or even to establish the ordinary -intercourse of official business. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Correspondence. MS.] - -The leading Spaniards wished to obtain a medium through which to -create a false impression of the state of affairs, and thus to -secure supplies and succours from England without being fettered -in the application of them. The subordinate agents answered this -purpose, and satisfied with their docility, the generals were far -from encouraging the residence of more than one British agent -at their head-quarters. Captain Birch, an intelligent engineer -officer, writing from Blake’s camp, says, “General Broderick is -expected here; but I have understood that the appearance of a -British general at these head-quarters to accompany the army might -give jealousy. General Blake is not communicative, but captain -Carrol appears to be on the best footing with him and his officers, -and captain Carrol tells me that he informs him of more than he -does any of his generals.” - -The object was perfectly accomplished; nothing could be more -widely different than Spanish affairs, judged of by the tenor of -the military agent’s reports, and Spanish affairs when brought -to the test of battle. The fault did not attach so much to the -agents as to the ministers who selected them. It was difficult for -inexperienced men to avoid the snare. Living with the chiefs of -armies actually in the field, being in habits of daily intercourse -with them, holding rank in the same service, and dependent upon -their politeness for every convenience, the agent was in a manner -forced to see as the general saw, and to report as he wished. A -simple spy would have been far more efficacious! - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers. MSS.] - -Sir John Moore, perceiving the evil tendency of such a system, -recalled all those officers who were under his immediate control, -and strongly recommended to ministers that only one channel of -communication should exist between the Spanish authorities and the -British army. He was convinced of the necessity of this measure, -by observing, that each of the military agents considered the -events passing under his own peculiar cognizance as the only -occurrences of importance. Some of those officers even treated sir -Hew Dalrymple and himself as persons commanding auxiliary bodies of -men which might be moved, divided, and applied at the requisition -of every inferior agent, and the forces of the British empire, a -mere accessory aid, placed at their own disposal. Thus general -Leith says: “Whatever may be the plan of operations, and whatever -the result, I beg leave, in the strongest manner, to recommend -to your consideration the great advantage of ordering all the -disposable force of horse or car artillery, and light infantry, -mounted on horses or mules of the country, without a moment’s delay -to move on Palencia, where the column or columns will receive -such intelligence as may enable them to give the most effectual -co-operation.” - -Captain Whittingham, at the same period, after mentioning the wish -of general Castaños that some British cavalry should join him, -says, “I cannot quit this subject without once more repeating, that -the efforts of the cavalry will decide the fate of the campaign.” -And again: “Should it be possible for your excellency to send one -thousand or fifteen hundred horse, the advantages that would result -are incalculable.” While one of these pressing recommendations came -from Oviedo, the other from Tudela, colonel Doyle, writing from -Madrid, thus expresses himself: “Certain it is, that if your army -were here, the French would evacuate Spain before you got within -a week’s march of them; indeed, even the light cavalry and two -thousand light troops sent on cars, to keep up with the cavalry, to -show our friends the nature of outpost duty, would, I think, decide -the question.”--“A respectable corps of British troops, landed -in Catalonia, would so impose, that I have no doubt of the good -effects.” - -This last proposition relative to Catalonia was a favourite plan of -all the leading men at Madrid; so certain were they of success on -the Ebro, that finding no British force was likely to be granted -for that purpose, they withdrew eight or nine thousand men from the -army near Tudela, and directed them upon Lerida. - -Thus much I have thought it necessary to relate about the agents, -and now quitting that subject, I shall narrate - - -THE OPERATIONS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BATTLE -OF BAYLEN. - -When that victory caused Joseph to abandon Madrid, the patriotic -troops, guided by the caprice of the generals, moved in a variety -of directions, without any fixed object in view, and without the -slightest concert. Indeed all persons seemed to imagine that the -war was at an end, and that rejoicing and triumph alone ought to -occupy the minds of good Spaniards. - -[Sidenote: Cavallero.] - -The Murcian and Valencian army separated. General Llamas, with -twelve thousand infantry, and a few cavalry, took the road to -Madrid, and arrived there before any of the other generals. General -St. Marc, a Fleming by birth, with greater propriety, carried the -Valencians to the relief of Zaragoza. On the road he joined his -forces with those of the baron de Versage, and the united troops, -amounting to sixteen thousand, entered Zaragoza on the 15th, one -day after Verdier and Lefebre had broken up the siege and retired -to Tudela. The French left their heavy guns and many stores behind -them. The Valencians and Arragonese pursued, and on the 19th their -advanced guard overtook the retiring force, but were beaten by the -French cavalry. On the 20th Lefebre abandoned Tudela and took a -position at Milagro. On the 21st, St. Marc and Versage occupied -Tudela. The peasantry of the valleys, encouraged by the approach -of a regular army, and by the successful defence of Zaragoza, -assembled on the left flank of the French, and threatened their -communications. Meanwhile Palafox gave himself up to festivity -and rejoicing, and did not even begin to repair the defences of -Zaragoza until the end of the month. He assumed supreme authority, -and in various ways discovered the most inordinate and foolish -presumption; and among other acts he decreed that no Arragonese -should henceforward be liable to the punishment of death for any -crime. - -[Sidenote: Cox’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -The army of Andalusia was the most efficient body of men in arms -throughout Spain: it contained thirty thousand regular troops, -provided with a good train of artillery, and flushed with recent -victory; but they were constrained to remain idle by the junta of -Seville, who detained them to aid in asserting its own supremacy -over the other juntas of Andalusia, and even brought back a part to -Seville to assist in an ostentatious triumph. It was not until a -full month after the capitulation of Dupont, that Castaños made his -entry into the capital, at the head of a single division of seven -thousand men, another of the same force being left at Toledo, and -the rest of his army quartered at Puerto del Rey, St. Helena, and -Carolina, in the Sierra Morena. - -The infantry of the Estremaduran army was at first composed of -new levies; but it was afterwards strengthened by the Walloon and -royal guards, and sir Hew Dalrymple supplied general Galluzzo -with every needful equipment. According to the stipulations of -a treaty between the juntas of Seville and Badajos, the cavalry -was to be placed under the command of Castaños; it was in number -about four thousand, and with the exception of Cuesta, no other -Spanish general possessed any efficient body of horsemen. Orders -and entreaties, and even the intervention of sir Hew Dalrymple, -were resorted to by the council of Castille, the generals and -the military agents, to induce Galluzzo to send this body of -cavalry forward to the capital; but he remained deaf to their -representations, and occupied himself, as we have seen, in -thwarting the execution of the convention of Cintra by a pretended -siege of fort La Lippe. - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s papers. MS.] - -The Spanish captives, released by that treaty, were clothed, armed, -and sent to Catalonia in British transports; and sir Hew Dalrymple, -at the same time, forwarded ten thousand musquets, and ammunition -in proportion, for the service of the Catalans. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s letters.] - -It has been before stated that one thousand five hundred -Spaniards, commanded by the marquis of Valladeras, co-operated -with the Portuguese during the campaign of Vimiero. But they never -penetrated beyond Guarda, and being destitute of money, were -reduced to great distress; they could not subsist where they were, -nor yet march away. From this dilemma, sir Hew, by a timely advance -of ten thousand dollars, relieved them, and Valladeras joined -Blake. That general, after the defeat of Rio Seco, separated the -Gallician army from the army commanded by Cuesta, and sheltered -himself from the pursuit of Bessieres in the mountains behind -Astorga. His reserve division had not been engaged in the battle, -and the resources of the province, aided by the succours from -England, were sufficient, to place him again at the head of thirty -thousand infantry. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.] - -When Bessieres retreated after the defeat of Baylen, Blake occupied -Leon, Astorga, and the pass of Mansanal: farther into the plains -he durst not venture without cavalry. At this time Cuesta, with -one thousand five hundred dragoons, was at Arevalo, and the -junta of Castille and Leon, having taken refuge at Ponteferrada, -commanded him to transfer his horsemen to Blake’s army; but Cuesta, -an arbitrary old man, exasperated by his defeat, and his mind -rankling from his quarrel with Blake, instead of obeying retired to -Salamanca, collected eight or ten thousand peasants, armed them, -and then annulled the proceedings of the junta, and threatened -the members with punishment for resisting his authority as -captain-general. On the other hand Blake protected them, and while -the generals disputed, three thousand French cavalry descending the -Douero, scoured the plains, and raised contributions in the face of -both their armies. - -[Sidenote: Capt. Carrol’s letters.] - -Blake finding that the obstinacy of Cuesta was invincible, quitted -his cantonments early in September, and skirting the plains on the -north-east, carried his army by forced marches to the Montagna St. -Ander, a small rugged district, dividing Biscay from the Asturias. -The junta of the latter province had received enormous and very -timely succours from England, but made no exertions answerable -to the amount of the assistance granted, or to the strength and -importance of the district. Eighteen thousand men were said to be -in arms, but only ten thousand were promised to Blake, and but -eight thousand joined his army. - -In Catalonia the war was conducted by both sides without much -connexion, or dependance on the movements of the main armies; and -at this period it had little influence on the general plan of -campaign. - -Thus, it appears, that one month after the capitulation of Dupont, -only nineteen thousand infantry without cavalry, and those under -the command of more than one general, were collected at Madrid; -that only sixteen thousand men were in line upon the Ebro, and -that the remainder of the Spanish armies, (exclusive of that in -Catalonia computed at eleven thousand men,) were many days’ march -from the enemy, and from one another. The chiefs at discord with -their respective juntas, and at variance among themselves, were -inactive, or as in the case of Galluzzo, doing mischief. - -The feeble and dilatory operations of the armies, were partly -owing to the ineptitude of the generals; but the principal causes -were the unbounded vanity, arrogance, and selfishness of the local -governments, among whom the juntas of Gallicia and Seville were -remarkable for their ambition. The time which should have been -passed in concerting measures for pushing the victory of Baylen was -spent by them in devising schemes to ensure the permanency of their -own power, and the money and resources, both of England and Spain, -were applied to further this pernicious object. In every part of -the country a spirit of interested violence prevailed; the ardour -of patriotism was chilled, and the exertions of sensible men were -rendered nugatory, or served as a signal for their own destruction. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4.] - -The argument to be drawn from this state of affairs is conclusive -against the policy of Joseph’s retreat. Without drafting a man -from the garrisons of Pampeluna, Tortosa, and St. Sebastian; -without interfering with the moveable columns employed on -the communications of Biscay and Navarre; that monarch drew -together about fifty thousand good troops, in twenty days after -he had abandoned his capital. At the head of such a force, or -even of two-thirds of it, he might have bid defiance to the -inactive, half-organized, and scattered Spanish armies. It was -so necessary to have maintained himself in Madrid, that scarcely -any disproportion of numbers should have induced him to abandon -it without an effort; but the disaster of Dupont had created -in Joseph’s mind a respect for Spanish prowess, while from his -sagacious brother it drew the following observation: “_The whole of -the Spanish forces are not capable of beating twenty-five thousand -French in a reasonable position._” The error of abandoning the -capital would, if the Spaniards had been capable of pursuing any -general plan of action, been fatal; but as if the stone of Cadmus -had been cast among them, the juntas turned upon one another in -hate, and forgot the common enemy. - -Ferdinand was again proclaimed king of Spain, and the pomp and -rejoicing attendant on this event put an end to all business, -except that of intrigue. Castaños assumed the title of -captain-general of Madrid. This step seems to have been taken -by him, partly to forward his being appointed generalissimo, -and partly with a view to emancipate himself from the injurious -control of the Seville junta; for, although the authority of the -captains-general had been superseded in most of the provinces by -the juntas, it was not universally the case. Castaños expected, -and with reason, to be appointed generalissimo of the Spanish -armies; but he was of an indolent disposition, and it soon -became manifest that until a central and supreme government was -established, such a salutary measure would not be adopted. In the -mean time the council of Castille, although not generally popular -with the people, and hated by the juntas, was accepted as the -provisional head of the state in the capital; but its authority -was merely nominal, and the necessity of showing some front to the -enemy seems to have been the only link of connexion between the -Spanish armies. - -The evil consequences flowing from this want of unity were soon -felt. Scarcely had the French quitted Madrid, when the people of -Biscay prepared to rise. Such an event, if prudently conducted and -well supported, would have been of incalculable advantage; but the -nicest arrangement, and the utmost prudence, were necessary to -insure success, for the Biscayans had neither arms nor ammunition, -the French were close to them, and the nearest Spanish force was -the feeble Asturian levy. A previous junction of Blake’s army -with the latter was indispensable; that once effected, and due -preparation made, the insurrection of Biscay, protected by forty -thousand regular troops, and supplied from the sea-board with money -and stores, would have forced the French to abandon the Ebro or to -fight a battle, which Blake might have risked with little danger, -provided that the Andalusian, Murcian, Valencian, and Arragonese -troops assembling about Tudela, were prepared to move at the same -time against the left flank of the enemy. But in every point of -view it was an event pregnant with important consequences, and the -impatience of the Biscayans should have been restrained rather -than encouraged; yet the duke of Infantado, colonel Doyle, and -others, at Madrid, made strenuous efforts to hasten the explosion. -The crude manner in which they conducted this serious affair is -exposed in the following extracts from colonel Doyle’s despatches: - -“I proposed to general Blake that he should send officers to Biscay -to stir up the people there, and into the Asturias to beg that of -their 15,000 men, 8,000 might be pushed into Biscay to Bilbao, to -assist the people, who were all ready, and only waited for arms -and ammunition, for both of which I wrote to Mr. Hunter at Gihon, -and learned from him that he had sent a large supply of both, -and some money to Bilbao, where already 14,000 men had enrolled -themselves. The remainder of the Asturians I begged might instantly -occupy the passes from Castille into the Asturias and Biscay, that -is to say, from Reynosa in the direction of Bilbao.” Some days -after he says,--“My measures in Biscay and Asturias have perfectly -succeeded; the reinforcements of arms, ammunition, and men (5,000 -stand of arms, and ammunition in proportion) have reached Bilbao -in safety, and the Asturians have taken possession of the passes I -pointed out, so that we are all safe in that part of the world.” - -In this fancied state of security affairs remained until the -16th of August; general Blake was still in the mountains of -Gallicia, the English succours arrived in the port of Bilbao, and -the explosion took place. General Merlin, with three thousand -grenadiers, immediately came down on the unfortunate Biscayans; -Bilbao was taken, and to use the emphatic expression of king -Joseph, “the fire of insurrection was quenched with the blood -of twelve hundred men.” Fortunately, the stores were not landed, -and the vessels escaped from the river. Thus, at a blow, one of -the principal resources which Blake had a right to calculate upon -in his future operations was destroyed; and although the number -admitted by the Spaniards to have fallen was less than the above -quotation implies, the spirit of resistance was severely checked, -and the evil was unmixed and deplorable. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.] - -[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Letters. MSS.] - -This unfortunate event, however, created little or no sensation -beyond the immediate scene of the catastrophe. Triumphs and -rejoicings occupied the people of Madrid and Zaragoza, and it is -difficult to say how long the war would have been neglected, if -Palafox had not been roused by the re-appearance of a French corps, -which re-took Tudela, and pushed on to the vicinity of Zaragoza -itself. This movement took place immediately after the expedition -against Bilbao, and was intended to suppress the insurrection -of the valleys, and to clear the left flank of the French army. -Palafox thus roughly aroused, wrote intemperately to the council -of Castille, commanding that all the troops in the capital should -be forwarded to the Ebro, and menacing the members personally for -the delay which had already occurred. Being a young man without -any weight of character, and his remonstrances being founded only -upon his own danger, and not supported by any general plan or clear -view of affairs, the presumptuous tone of his letters gave general -offence; they were chiefly aimed at Castaños, who was not under his -command; and moreover, the junta of Seville refused to pay or to -subsist the Andalusian army if it moved beyond the capital before -a central government should be established; at the same time -resorting to every kind of intrigue, to retard, if not entirely to -prevent, the execution of the latter measure. - -[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Letters. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Letters. Parliamentary Papers.] - -It was, however, necessary to do something, and a council of all -the generals commanding armies was held at Madrid on the 5th of -September. Castaños, Llamas, Cuesta, the duke of Infantado, and -some others assembled; Blake gave his proxy to the duke, and -Palafox was represented by a colonel of his own staff. Cuesta -proposed that a commander-in-chief should be appointed: the others -were too jealous to adopt this proposal, but they agreed to pursue -the following plan of operations. - -Llamas, with the Murcians, to occupy Tarascona, Agreda, and -Borja. La-Peña, with the two divisions of Andalusia already in -the capital, to march by Soria, and take possession of Logroña -and Najera. The other divisions of that army to follow in due -time. When La-Peña should be established in Logroña, Llamas was to -advance to Cascante, Corella, and Calahorra. - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Corresp^{ce}. Doyle’s Letters. Cox’s -D^o.] - -When this united force (to be called the army of the centre) was -once securely fixed in its positions, Palafox, under whose command -St. Marc’s division acted, was to push forward to Sanguessa by the -left bank of the Ebro, and to turn the enemy on the Aragon river. -In the mean time it was hoped that Blake would arrive at Palencia, -and form his junction with the Asturians. Cuesta promised to -march upon Burgo del Osma, and to fill up the space between Blake -and the army of the centre. The head of La-Peña’s column was to -be at Soria on the 17th of September, and the junta confidently -expected that this vicious plan, in which every sound military -principle was violated, and the enemy’s troops, considered with -regard to position, as a fixed immoveable mass, would cause the -total destruction of the French army. The only fear entertained -was, that a hasty flight into France would save it from Spanish -vengeance! Thus captain Whittingham, echoing the sentiments of the -Spanish generals with reference to this plan, writes, “As far as my -poor judgment leads me, I am satisfied that if the French persist -in maintaining their present position, we shall, in less than six -weeks, have a second edition of the battle of Baylen!” But to -enable La-Peña and Llamas to march, pecuniary aid was requisite. -There was a difficulty in raising money at Madrid, and the maritime -provinces intercepted all the English supplies. In this dilemma, -colonel Doyle drew bills upon the English treasury, and upon -the government at Seville, making the latter payable out of two -millions of dollars, just transmitted to the junta through Mr. Duff. - -It is probable that such an unprincipled body would not have -hesitated to dishonour the bills, but major Coxe, before they -were received, made energetic remonstrances upon the subject -of the wants of the army; at first he received a haughty and -evasive answer, but his representations were strongly seconded by -a discovery made by the junta, that a plot against their lives, -supposed to have been concocted at Madrid, was on the eve of -execution. In fact, they had become hateful from their domineering -insolence and selfishness, and the public feeling was strongly -against them. Alarmed for the consequences, they sent off 200,000 -dollars to Madrid, and published a manifesto, in which they -inserted a letter, purporting to be from themselves to Castaños, -dated on the 8th, and giving him full powers to act as he judged -fitting for the public good. Their objects were to pacify the -people, and to save their own dignity, by appearing to have acted -voluntarily; but Castaños published the letter in Madrid with its -true date of the 11th, and then it became manifest, that to major -Coxe’s remonstrance, and not to any sense of duty, this change of -conduct was due. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -Doyle’s bills having been negotiated, the troops were put in -motion, and 40,000 fresh levies were enrolled, but the foresight -and activity of Napoleon in disarming the country had been so -effectual, that only 3,200 firelocks could be procured. A curious -expedient then presented itself to the imagination of the duke of -Infantado, and other leading persons in Madrid: colonel Doyle, at -their desire, wrote to sir Hew Dalrymple in the name of the supreme -council, to request that _the firelocks of Junot’s army, and the -arms of the Portuguese people_, might be forwarded to the frontier, -and from thence carried by post to Madrid; a novel proposition, -and made at a time when England had already transmitted to Spain -160,000 muskets; a supply considerably exceeding the whole number -of men organized throughout the country; 50,000 of these arms had -been sent to Seville, but the junta shut them up in the arsenals, -and left the armies defenceless; for to neglect or misuse real -resources, and to fasten with avidity upon the most extravagant -projects, is peculiarly Spanish. No other people could have thought -of asking for a neighbouring nation’s arms at such a conjuncture; -no other than Spanish rulers could have imagined the absurdity of -supplying their levies (momentarily required to fight upon the -Ebro) with the arms of a French army still unconquered in Portugal. -But this project was only one among many proofs afforded at the -time, that Cervantes was as profound an observer as he was a witty -reprover of the extravagance of his countrymen. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -INTERNAL POLITICAL TRANSACTIONS. - - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Letters. Parliamentary Papers.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Letters. MS.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -With the military affairs thus mismanaged, the civil and political -transactions proceeded step by step, and in the same crooked path. -Short as the period was between the first breaking forth of the -insurrection, and the arrival of Mr. Stuart at Coruña, it was -sufficient to create disunion of the worst kind. The juntas of -Leon, of the Asturias, and of Gallicia, were at open discord, and -those provinces were again split into parties, hating each other -with as much virulence as if they had been of a hundred years -growth. The money and other supplies sent by the English ministers -were considered, by the authorities into whose hands they fell, as -a peculiar donation to themselves, and appropriated accordingly. -The junta of one province would not assist another with arms when -there was a surplus, nor permit their troops to march against the -enemy beyond the precincts of the particular province in which they -were first organized. The ruling power was in the hands of the -provincial nobility and gentry, men of narrow contracted views, -unused to business, proud, arrogant--as extreme ignorance suddenly -clothed with authority will always be--and generally disposed to -employ their newly-acquired power in providing for their relations -and dependants at the expense of the common cause, which with -them was quite subordinate to the local interests of their own -particular province. Hence a jealousy of their neighbours regulated -the proceedings of all the juntas, and the means they resorted -to for increasing their own, or depressing a rival government’s -influence, were equally characterised by absurdity and want of -principle. The junta of Gallicia did their utmost to isolate that -province, as if with a view to a final separation from Spain and -a connexion with Portugal. They complained, as of an injury, that -the army of Estremadura had obeyed the orders of the junta of -Seville; they at once struck up an independent alliance with the -junta and bishop of Oporto, and sent troops, as we have seen, -under Valladeras, to aid the war in Portugal, but, at the same -time, refused to unite in any common measure of defence with the -provinces of Castille, until a formal treaty of alliance between -them was negotiated, signed, and ratified. In the mean time their -selfishness and incapacity created so much disgust in their own -district, that plots were formed to overthrow their authority. The -bishops of Orense and St. Jago became their decided enemies; and -the last-named prelate, an intriguing man, secretly endeavoured to -draw Blake, with the army, into his views, and even wrote to him, -to desire that he would lead the forces against the government of -Coruña; but the junta having intercepted the letters, arrested the -bishop. Their own stability and personal safety were however still -so insecure, that many persons applied to Mr. Stuart to aid in -changing the form of government by force. The Asturians were even -worse, they refused to assist Blake when his army was suffering, -although the stores required by him, and supplied by England, were -rotting in the harbours where they were first landed. Money also -that was sent out in the Pluto frigate for the use of Leon was -detained at Gihon, and Leon itself never raised a single soldier -for the cause: and thus, only two months after the first burst of -the insurrection, corruption, intrigue, and faction even to the -verge of civil war, were raging in the northern parts of Spain. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 5.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Pap^{rs}. Coxe’s Correspond^{ce}.] - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Papers. Coxe’s Correspondence. -Appendix, No. 13, section 5.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -The same passions were at work in the south, and the same -consequences followed. The junta of Seville, still less scrupulous -than that of Gallicia, made no secret of their ambitious views; -they stifled all local publications, and even suppressed the public -address of Florida Blanca, who, as president of the Murcian junta, -had recommended the formation of a supreme central government. They -wasted their time in vain and frivolous disputes, and neglecting -every concern of real importance, sacrificed the general welfare to -views of private advantage and interest. They made promotions in -the army without regard to public opinion or merit; they overlaid -all real patriotism; bestowed on their own creatures places of -emolument, to the patronage of which they had not a legal right; -and even usurped the royal prerogative of appointing canons in -the church, for their cupidity equalled their ambition. They -intercepted, as I have already related, the pecuniary supplies -necessary to enable the army to act; they complained that La -Mancha and Madrid, in whose defence they said “_their_ troops -were sacrificing themselves,” did not subsist and supply the -force under Castaños; under the pretence of forming a nucleus for -disciplining thirty thousand levies as a reserve, they retained -five battalions at Seville, and, having by this draft weakened the -army in the field, they neglected the rest, and never raised a -man. The canonries filled up by them had been vacant for several -years, and the salaries attached to those offices were appropriated -to the public service. The junta now applied the money to their -own and their creatures’ emolument; and at one period they appear -to have contemplated an open partition of the funds received -from England among themselves. Against this flagitious junta also -the public indignation was rife; a plot was formed to assassinate -the members; the municipal authorities remonstrated with them, -the archbishop of Toledo protested against their conduct, and the -junta of Grenada refused to acknowledge their supremacy; but so -great was their arrogance, so unprincipled their ambition, that the -decided and resolute opposition of Castaños alone prevented them -from commencing a civil war, and marching the victorious army of -Baylen against the refractory Granadans. Such was the real state of -Spain, and such the patriotism of the juntas, who were at this time -filling Europe with the sound of their own praise. - -[Sidenote: Stuart’s Correspondence. Parliamentary Papers.] - -In the northern parts Mr. Stuart endeavoured to reduce this chaos -of folly and wickedness to some degree of order, and to produce -that unity of design and action without which it was impossible to -resist the mighty adversary that threatened the independence of -the Peninsula. He judged that to reduce the conflicting passions -of the moment, a supreme authority, upon which the influence -of Great Britain could be brought to bear with full force, was -indispensable. To convoke the ancient cortez of the realm appeared -to him the most certain and natural method of drawing the strength -and energy of the nation into one compact mass; but there the -foresight of Napoleon interfered; by an able distribution of the -French forces, all direct communication between the northern and -southern provinces was intercepted. Bessieres, Dupont and Moncey at -that time occupied a circle round Madrid, and would have prevented -the local governments of the north from uniting with those of -the southern, if they had been inclined to do so. An union of the -nearest provinces, to be called the northern cortez, then suggested -itself to Mr. Stuart as a preliminary step, which would ensure the -convocation of a general assembly when such a measure should become -practicable. Accordingly he strenuously urged its adoption, but his -efforts, at first, produced no good results. It was in vain that -he represented the danger of remaining in a state of anarchy when -so many violent passions were excited, and such an enemy was in -the heart of the country. It was in vain that he pointed out the -difficulties, that the want of a supreme authority fastened on the -intercourse with the British cabinet, which could not enter into -separate relations with every provincial junta. The Spaniards, -finding that the supplies were not withheld, that their reputation -for patriotism was not lowered in England by actions which little -merited praise, finding, in short, that the English cabinet was -weak enough to gorge their cupidity, flatter their vanity, and -respect their folly, they assented to all Mr. Stuart’s reasoning, -but forwarded none of his propositions, and continued to nourish -the disorders that, cancer-like, were destroying the common cause. - -The jarring interests which agitated the northern provinces were -not even subdued by the near approach of danger. The result of -the battle of Rio Seco rather inflamed than allayed the violence -of party feeling. If Bessieres had not been checked in his -operations by the disaster of Dupont, he would have encountered -few obstacles in establishing Joseph’s authority in Gallicia and -Old Castile. The enthusiasm of those provinces never rose to a -great pitch; Bessieres was prepared to use address as well as -force, and among the factions he must doubtless have found support. -The reinforcements continually arriving from France would have -enabled him to maintain his acquisition, and then the ability of -the emperor’s dispositions would have become apparent; for while -Bessieres held Gallicia, and Dupont hung on the southern frontier -of Portugal with twenty-five thousand men, Junot could have -securely concentrated his army in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, -and have rendered an English disembarkation on the coast nearly -impracticable. - -[Sidenote: Azanza and O’Farril, Mem.] - -The whole of the French monarch’s combinations were overturned by -the disgraceful capitulation of Baylen, and when Joseph evacuated -Madrid a fresh impulse was given to the spirit of the people; -but, unfortunately for Spain, as a wider scope for ambition was -obtained, the workings of self-interest increased, fresh parties -sprung up, and new follies and greater absurdities stifled the -virtue of the country, and produced irremediable confusion, ending -in ruin. The fact of Dupont’s capitulation was made known to the -council of Castile before king Joseph was informed of it, and -the council, foreseeing all the consequences of such an event, -immediately refused, as I have already related, to promulgate -officially his accession to the throne. Joseph permitted this act -of obedience to pass without much notice. He was naturally averse -to violence, and neither he, nor his brother Napoleon, did at any -period of the contest for Spain constrain a Spaniard to accept or -retain office under the intrusive government. Joseph went further; -before he abandoned Madrid, he released his ministers from their -voluntary oath of allegiance to himself, and left them free to -choose their party once more. Don Pedro Cevallos and the marquis -of Pinuelo changed with, what appeared to them, changing fortune; -but five others remained steadfast, preferring an ameliorated -government under a foreign prince to what they believed to be -a hopeless struggle, but which, if successful, they knew must -end in a degrading native despotism; perhaps, also, a little -swayed by their dislike to England, and by the impossibility of -obtaining that influence among their countrymen which, under other -circumstances, their talents and character would have ensured. - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Papers. Coxe’s Correspondence.] - -The boldness of the council of Castille was not publicly chastised -by the intruding monarch, but secretly he punished the members by -a dexterous stroke of policy. General Grouchy wrote to Castaños, -saying, that circumstances had arisen which required the presence -of the French troops in another quarter, and he invited the Spanish -general to take immediate possession of Madrid for the preservation -of public tranquillity. This communication gave rise to an opinion -that the French were going to evacuate Spain; a report so congenial -to the vanity and indolence of the Spaniards was greedily received, -and contributed among other causes to the subsequent supineness -of the nation in preparing for its defence; thus by appealing to -Castaños, and affecting to treat the council of Castille as a -body who had lost their influence with the nation, Joseph gave a -handle to their enemies which the latter failed not to lay hold -of. The juntas dreaded that the influence of such a body would -destroy their own; that of Gallicia would not communicate with -them, affirming that, individually, the members were attached to -the French, and that, collectively, they had been the most active -instrument of the usurper’s government. The junta of Seville -endeavoured not only to destroy the authority of the existing -members, but to annul that of the council, as an acknowledged -tribunal of the state. The council, however, was not wanting to -itself, the individuals composing it did not hesitate to seize the -reins of government the moment the French had departed; and the -prudence with which they preserved tranquillity in the capital, and -prevented all re-action, proves that they were not without merit; -and forms a striking contrast to the conduct of the provincial -juntas, under whose savage sway every kind of excess was committed, -and even encouraged. - -Aware of the hostility they had to encounter, the members of the -council lost no time in forming a party to support themselves. Don -Arias Mon y Velarde, dean or president for the time being, wrote -a circular letter to the local juntas, pointing out the necessity -of establishing a central and supreme power, and proposing that -deputies from each province, or nation, as they were sometimes -called, should repair to Madrid, and there concert with the council -the best mode of carrying such a measure into effect. If this -proposal had been adopted, all power would inevitably have fallen -into the hands of the proposers. Confessedly the first public body -in the state, and well acquainted with the forms of business; the -council must necessarily have had a preponderating influence in -the assembly of delegates, and it appeared so reasonable that it -should take the lead, when an efficient authority was required to -direct the violence of the people in a useful channel, before the -moment of safety was passed; that all the juntas trembled at the -prospect of losing their misused power. The minor ones submitted, -and agreed to send deputies. The stronger and more ambitious felt -that subtlety would avail more than open opposition to the project. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Cox’s Correspon^{ce}. Appendix, No. 13, section 5.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.] - -The council followed up this blow by the publication of a -manifesto, containing an accurate detail of the events of the -revolution, defending the part taken by its members, and claiming a -renewal of the confidence formerly reposed in them by the nation. -This important state paper was so ably written, that a large -party, especially at Valladolid, was immediately formed in favour -of its authors; and the junta of Seville were so sensible of the -increasing influence of the council, that they intercepted a copy -of this manifesto, addressed to sir Hew Dalrymple, and strictly -suppressed all writings favourable to the formation of a supreme -central authority. Nothing they dreaded more; but it was no longer -possible to resist the current, which had set strongly in favour of -such a measure. The juntas, however they might oppose its progress, -could not openly deny the propriety of it, and in every province, -individuals of talent and consideration called for a change in the -Hydra polity, which oppressed the country, and was inefficient -against the enemy. Every British functionary, civil or military, -in communication with the Spaniards, also urged the necessity of -concentrating the executive power. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -The provincial juntas were become universally odious. Some of the -generals alone, who had suddenly risen to command under their -rule, were favourable to them; but Palafox was independent, -as a captain-general, whose power was confirmed by success; -Castaños openly declared that he would no longer serve under -their control, and Cuesta was prepared to put them down by -force, and to re-establish the royal audienzas and the authority -of the captains-general according to the old practice. In this -state of affairs, the retreat of Bessieres’ army freed the -communication with the southern parts, and removed all excuse for -procrastination. The juntas of Gallicia, Castille, Leon, and the -Asturias, gave way to the unceasing remonstrances of Mr. Stuart, -and at his instance agreed to meet in cortez, at Lugo; Gallicia, -however, first insisted upon a formal ratification of the treaty -with Castille already mentioned. - -When the moment of assembling arrived, the Asturians, without -assigning any reason, refused to fulfil the engagement they had -entered into, and the three remaining juntas held the session -without them. The bishop of Orense, and the junta of Gallicia, were -prepared to assert the supremacy of that province over the others, -but the Baily Valdez of Castille, an able and disinterested man, -being chosen president of the convocation, proposed, on the first -day of assembly, that deputies should be appointed to represent -the three provinces in a supreme junta, to be assembled in some -central place, for the purpose of convoking the ancient cortez of -the whole kingdom according to the old forms, and of settling the -administration of the interior, and the future succession to the -throne. This proposition was immediately carried by the superior -number of the Castillians and Leonese; but the bishop of Orense -protested against it, and the Gallician members strongly opposed -an arrangement, by which their province was placed on the same -footing as others, a glaring injustice (in their opinion) when the -numbers of the Gallician army were taken into consideration; for -the local feeling of ambition was uppermost, and the general cause -disregarded. The other party answered, with great force, that the -Gallician army was paid, armed, and clothed, by England, and fed by -Castille and Leon. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.] - -Meanwhile the influence of the council of Castille greatly -increased, and the junta of Seville, quickened by fear, took the -lead in directing what they could not prevent. The convocation -of the cortez they knew would be fatal to their own existence; -wherefore, in a public letter, addressed to the junta of Gallicia, -dated one day previous to the circular of don Arias Mon, but -evidently written after the receipt of the latter, they opposed the -assembling of the cortez on the ground that it was “the prerogative -of the king to convoke that body, and if it was called together by -any other authority, the provinces would not obey.” “There would -be no unanimity.” The futility of this argument is apparent. The -question was not one of form, but of expediency. If the nation was -in favour of such a step, (and after facts proved that the people -were not opposed to it) the same necessity which constituted the -right of the junta to declare war against the French, (another -prerogative of the monarch) would have sufficed to legalize the -convocation of the national assembly. But their sole object was -to preserve their own power. They maintained that the juntas, -being chosen by the nation, were the only legitimate depositaries -of authority, and that to members of their own bodies only could -any of that authority be delegated; and adopting thereupon the -suggestion contained in the letter of Arias Mon, they proposed that -two deputies from each supreme junta should repair, not to Madrid, -but to Ciudad Real, or Almagro, and at the moment of meeting should -be in fact constituted governors-general of the kingdom, and as -such obeyed. Nevertheless, the local governments were, with due -subordination to the central junta, to retain and exercise in -their own provinces all the authority with which they had already -invested themselves. Thus they had only to choose subservient -deputies, and their power would be more firmly fixed than before. - -This arrangement would, doubtless, have been readily adopted by -the junta of Gallicia; but the rapidity with which Valdez carried -his proposition, prevented that cause of discord from being added -to the numerous disputes which already distracted the northern -provinces. Mr. Stuart, impelled by the political tide, proceeded -onward to Madrid, observing, wherever he passed, the same violence -of local party feeling, and the general disgust occasioned by the -conduct of the oligarchical provincial governments. Pride, vanity, -corruption, and improvidence, were every where obtrusively visible. - -[Sidenote: Stuart’s Correspondence.] - -The dispute between Blake and Cuesta, which was raging at the -period of the battle of Rio Seco, a period when division was -most hurtful to the military operations, was now allayed between -the generals; but their political partizans waged war with more -bitterness than ever, as if with the intent to do the greatest -possible mischief, by continuing the feud among the civil branches -of the government, when union was most desirable in that quarter. -The seeds of division had taken deep root. The Baily Valdez chosen, -as I have said, a deputy to the supreme junta, was obnoxious to -general Cuesta, a man not to be offended with impunity when he had -power to punish. - -Don Gregorio Cuesta was haughty and incredibly obstinate. He -had been president of the council of Castille, and he was -captain-general of Castille and Leon when the insurrection first -broke out. Disliking all revolutionary movements, although as -inimical to a foreign domination as any of his countrymen, he -endeavoured to repress the public effervescence, and to maintain -the tranquillity of the country at the risk of losing his life -as a traitor. He was an honest man, insomuch as the Spanish and -French interests being put in competition, he would aid the former, -but, between his country’s cause and his own passions, he was -not honest. He disliked, and with reason, the sway of the local -juntas, and with consistency of opinion, he wished to preserve the -authority of the captains-general and the royal audienzas, both -of which had been overturned by the establishment of those petty -governments; but, sullen and ferocious in his temper, he supported -his opinion with an authority and severity which had no guide but -his own will, and he was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to -exercise military influence over the supreme, as well as over the -subordinate juntas. He had himself appointed one for Leon and -Castille as a sort of council, subordinate to the authority of -captain-general; but, after the battle of Rio Seco, the members -fled to Ponteferrada, assumed the supreme authority, and putting -themselves under the protection of his enemy Blake, disregarded -Cuesta’s orders, and presumed to command him, their superior, to -deliver up his cavalry to the former general; wherefore he annulled -all their proceedings at Ponteferrada, and now asserting that the -election of Valdez and his colleagues was void, as being contrary -to the existing laws, he directed new juntas to be assembled in a -manner more conformable to existing usages, and a fresh election to -be made. - -His mandates were disregarded; Valdez and the other deputies -proceeded in defiance of them towards the place appointed for -the assembly of the central and supreme government, and Cuesta, -in return, without hesitation, abandoned the operations of the -campaign, which, in the council of war held at Madrid, he had -promised to aid, and falling back to Segovia with twelve thousand -men, seized the deputies, and shut up Valdez a close prisoner in -the tower of that place, declaring his intention to try him by -a military tribunal for disobedience; and such was the disorder -of the times, that Cuesta was not without plausible arguments to -justify this act of stubborn violence; for the original election of -members to form the junta of Castille and Leon had been any thing -but legal; several districts had been omitted altogether in the -representation of those kingdoms, many deputies had been chosen by -the city of Leon alone, and Valdez was named president, although -neither a native nor a proprietor, and for those reasons ineligible -to be a deputy at all. The kingdom of Leon also had appointed -representatives for those districts in Castille which were under -the domination of the French, and when the enemy retired, the -Castillians in vain demanded a more equitable arrangement. - -However, amidst all this confusion and violence, the plan of -uniting to form a central government gained ground all over the -kingdom. Seville, Catalonia, Arragon, Murcia, Valencia, and -Asturias, appointed their deputies. Fresh disputes relative to the -place of assembly now arose, but after some time it was agreed to -meet at Aranjuez. This royal residence was chosen contrary to the -wishes of many, and notably against the opinion of Jovellanos, -an eloquent person, and of great reputation for integrity, but -of a pertinacious temper, unsuitable to the times. He urged that -the capital was the meetest spot; but he was answered, that the -turbulent disposition of the inhabitants of Madrid would impede the -formation of a government, and that the same objection would exist -against the choice of any other large town. It is extraordinary -that such an argument should be held in Spain at a moment when the -people were, in all the official and public papers, represented as -perfectly enthusiastic, and united in one common sacred pursuit, -and in the British parliament were denominated the “universal -Spanish nation!” - -[Sidenote: Cox’s Correspondence.] - -To seek thus for protection in a corner, instead of manfully and -confidently identifying themselves with the people, and courting -publicity, augured ill for the intentions of the deputies, nor -was the augury belied by the event. The junta of Seville, who had -so bitterly reviled the council of Castille, for having partially -submitted to the usurper, had, notwithstanding, chosen for their -own deputies, don Vincente Hore, a known creature of the prince of -peace, and the count de Tilly Gusman, who was under the stigma of -a judicial sentence for robbery. Hore declined the appointment; -but Tilly, braving the public disgust, repaired to Aranjuez, and -his place as resident with the head-quarters of the Andalusian -army was filled up by Miñiano, another member of the junta, who -received an enormous salary for performing the mischievous duties -of that office. The instructions given by the different provinces -to the deputies were to confine their deliberations and votes to -such subjects as they should, from time to time, receive directions -from their constituents to treat of. Seville again took the lead -in this fraudulent policy, and when public indignation and the -remonstrances of some right-minded persons, obliged the juntas -of that town and of Valencia to rescind these instructions, both -substituted secret orders of the same tenor; in short the greater -part of the deputies were the mere tools of the juntas; agents, -watching over the interests of their employers, and (conscious of -demerit) anxious to hide themselves from the just indignation of -the public until they had consolidated their power; hence the -dislike to large towns and the intrigues for fixing the government -at Aranjuez. - -Count Florida Blanca, a man in the last stage of decrepitude, was -chosen first president in rotation for three months, and all idea -of choosing an independent executive was abandoned; Jovellanos -proposed to establish a regency selected from their own body; but -his plan was rejected on the ground that the members were not -authorised to delegate their powers even to one another. It was -palpable that the juntas had merely appeared to comply with the -public wish for a central government, but were determined not to -part with one iota of their own real power. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. Col. Graham’s ditto.] - -The first act of authority executed by the assembly was, however, -a necessary assertion of its own dignity, which had been violated -in the case of Valdez. Cuesta, who was personally unpopular, -and feared by the central, as well as by the provincial juntas, -was summoned to release his captive, and to repair to Aranjuez, -that cognizance might be taken of his proceedings; he was at -the same time denounced by the juntas of Castille and Leon as a -traitor, and exposed to great danger of popular commotion. At -first Cuesta haughtily repelled the interference of Castaños and -Florida Blanca, but finally he was forced to bend, and after a -sharp correspondence with Mr. Stuart, whose influence was usefully -employed to strengthen the central government, he released his -prisoner, and quitting the command of the army, appeared at -Aranjuez. No formal proceedings were had upon the case; but after -much mutual recrimination, Valdez was admitted to the exercise -of his functions, and the old general was detained at the seat -of government, a kind of state prisoner at large, until, for the -misfortune of his country, he was, by subsequent events, once more -placed at the head of an army. - -About this time lord William Bentinck joined Mr. Stuart at Madrid. -Perfectly coinciding in opinions, they laboured earnestly to give -a favourable turn to affairs, by directing the attention of the -central junta, to the necessity of military preparations, and -active exertion for defence; but the picture of discord, folly, -and improvidence exhibited in the provinces, was here displayed -in more glaring colours. The lesser tribunals being called upon -to acknowledge the authority of the assembled deputies, readily -obeyed; but the council of Castille, reluctant to submit, and -too weak to resist, endeavoured to make terms; they were forced, -however, to an unconditional submission. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -A good management of the revenue, a single chief for the army, and, -above all, the total suppression of the provincial juntas, were -the three objects of public anxiety. With respect to the army, no -doubt was at first entertained that Castaños would be appointed -commander-in-chief; his services entitled him to the office, and -his general moderation and conciliating manners fitted him for -it at a time when so much jealousy was to be soothed and so many -interests to be reconciled. The past expenditure of the money -received from England was also a subject of great importance, and -it was loudly required that an account of its disbursement should -be demanded of the local juntas, and a surrender of the residue -instantly enforced. These just expectations lasted but a short -time; scarcely were the deputies assembled, when every prospect of -a vigorous administration was blasted. Dividing themselves into -sections, answering in number to the departments of state under the -old king, they appointed a secretary not chosen from their own -body, to each, and declared all and every one of these sections, -supreme and independent, having equal authority. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers.] - -Florida Blanca informed Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck that -Castaños would be named generalissimo, and the latter was even -appointed to confer with him upon the plan of campaign for the -British troops, then marching from Portugal to the assistance of -the Spaniards. The necessity of having a single chief at the head -of the armies was imperious, and acknowledged by every individual, -military or civil; yet such was the force of jealousy, and so -stubborn were the tools of the different juntas, that all the -exertions of Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck, and all the -influence of the British cabinet, failed to get one appointed. -The generals were all confirmed in their separate and independent -commands, the old and miserable system of the Dutch deputies in -Marlborough’s time, and of the commissaries of the convention, -during the French revolution, was partially revived, and the -expressed wishes of the English government were totally disregarded -at a time when it had supplied Spain with two hundred thousand -musquets, clothing, ammunition of all kinds in proportion, and -ten millions of dollars. Such ample succours, if rightly managed, -ought to have secured to the English cabinet unlimited influence; -but as the benefits came through one set of persons, and the -demands through another, the first were taken as of right, the -last unheeded, and the resources of Great Britain were wasted -without materially improving the condition of Spain; the armies -were destitute, the central government was without credit, and -notwithstanding the ample subsidies, contracted a large debt. - -[Sidenote: Stuart’s Corresp^{ce}. Lord W. Bentinck’s Ditto.] - -[Sidenote: Lord W. Bentinck’s Corresp^{ce}. Appendix, No. 13, -section 6.] - -The provincial juntas were still permitted to retain their power -within their own districts, and the greatest timidity marked all -the proceedings of the central government in relation to those -obnoxious bodies. Attentive, however, to their own interests, the -members of the supreme junta decreed, 1st. that their persons -should be inviolable; 2d. that the president should have the title -of highness, with a salary of 25,000 crowns a year; 3d. that each -of the deputies, taking the title of excellency, should have a -yearly salary of 5,000 crowns; and lastly, that the collective -body should be addressed by the title of majesty. Thinking that -they were now sufficiently confirmed in power to venture upon a -public entry into Madrid, the junta made preparations to ensure a -favourable reception from the populace. They resolved to declare a -general amnesty, to lower the duties on tobacco, and to fling large -sums among the people during the procession; but, in the midst of -all this pomp and vanity, the presence of the enemy on the soil -was scarcely remembered, and the details of business were totally -neglected, a prominent evil that extended to the lowest branches -of administration. Self-interest, indeed, produced abundance of -activity, but every department, almost every man, seemed struck -with torpor when the public welfare was at stake; and withal, an -astonishing presumption was common to the highest and the lowest. - -[Sidenote: Lord W. Bentinck’s Corresp^{ce}.] - -To supply the place of a generalissimo, a council or board of -general officers was projected, on whose reports the junta proposed -to regulate the military operations. Castaños was destined to be -president; but some difficulty arising relative to the appointment -of the other members, the execution of the plan was deferred, with -the characteristic remark “that when the enemy was driven across -the frontier, Castaños would have leisure to take his seat.” The -idea of a defeat, the possibility of failure, never entered their -minds; the government evincing neither apprehension, nor activity, -nor foresight, were contented if the people believed the daily -falsehoods they promulgated relative to the enemy; and the people, -equally presumptuous, were content to be so deceived; in fine, all -the symptoms of a ruined cause were already visible to discerning -eyes. The armies neglected even to nakedness, and the soldier’s -constancy under privations cruelly abused; disunion, cupidity, -incapacity, in the higher orders; the patriotic ardour visibly -abating among the lower classes; the rulers grasping, improvident, -and boasting; the enemy powerful; the people insubordinate, and -the fighting men without arms or bread; as a whole, and in all -its parts, the government unfitted for its task; cumbrous and -ostentatious, its system, to use the comprehensive words of Mr. -Stuart, “was neither calculated to inspire courage nor to increase -enthusiasm.” - -The truth of this picture will be recognized by men who are yet -living, and whose exertions were as incessant as unavailing to -remedy those evils at the time. It will be recognized by the -friends of a great man, who fell a victim to the folly and base -intrigues of the day; and finally, it will be recognized by that -general and army, who, afterwards winning their own unaided way -through Spain, found that to trust Spaniards in war was to lean -against a broken reed. To others it may appear exaggerated; for -without having seen it is difficult to believe the extent of a -disorder that paralized the enthusiasm of a whole people. - - -EXTERNAL POLITICAL RELATIONS OF SPAIN. - -At first these were of necessity confined to a few foreign courts; -England, Sicily, and Portugal; the rest of the Old World was either -subject to Buonaparte or directly under his influence; but in the -New World it was different: the Brazils, after the emigration of -the royal family of Braganza, became important under every point -of view, and relations were established between the junta and -that court, that afterwards under the cortez created considerable -interest, and threatened serious embarrassments to the operations -of the duke of Wellington. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Corresp^{ce}. MS. Sir Hew Dalrymple.] - -The ultra-marine possessions of Spain were, of course, a matter -of great anxiety to both sides; Napoleon’s activity balanced the -natural preponderance of the mother country. The slowness of the -local juntas, or rather their want of capacity to conduct such an -affair, gave the enemy a great advantage. It was only owing to the -exertions of Mr. Stuart in the north, and of sir Hew Dalrymple -and lord Collingwood in the south, that, after the insurrection -broke out, vessels were despatched to South America to confirm -the colonists in their adherence to Spain, and to arrange the -mode of securing the resources of those great possessions for the -parent state. The hold which Spain retained over her colonies was, -however, very slight; her harsh restrictive system had long before -weakened the attachment of the South Americans; the expedition of -Miranda, although unsuccessful, had kindled a fire which could -not be extinguished; and it was apparent to all able statesmen, -that Spain must relinquish her arbitrary mode of governing, or -relinquish the colonies altogether; the insurrection at home only -rendered this more certain; every argument, every public manifesto -put forth in Europe, to animate the Spaniards against foreign -aggression, told against them in America. Yet for a time the latter -transmitted the produce of the mines, and many of the natives -served in the Spanish armies. - -Napoleon, notwithstanding his activity, and the offers which he -made of the vice-royalty of Mexico to Cuesta, Castaños, Blake, -and probably to others residing in that country, failed to -create a French party of any consequence. The Americans were -unwilling to plunge into civil strife for a less object than -their own independence: the arrogance and injustice of Old Spain, -however, increased, rather than diminished, under the sway of the -insurrectional government, and at last, as it is well known, a -general rebellion of the South American states established the -independence of the fairest portion of the globe, and proved, how -little the abstract love of freedom influenced the resistance of -the old country to Napoleon. - -The intercourse with the English court, which had been hitherto -carried on through the medium of the deputies, who first arrived in -London to claim assistance, was now placed upon a regular footing. -The deputies, at the desire of Mr. Canning, were recalled, and -admiral Apodaca was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister -plenipotentiary at St. James’s, and Mr. John Hookham Frere was -accredited, with the same diplomatic rank, near the central junta. - -Mr. Stuart, whose knowledge of the state of the country, whose -acquaintance with the character of the leading persons, and -whose able and energetic exertions had so much contributed to -the formation of a central government, was superseded by this -injudicious appointment, and thus a great political machine, -with every wheel in violent action, was, at the critical moment, -left without any controlling power or guiding influence; for Mr. -Stuart, who, on his own responsibility, had quitted Coruña, and -repaired to Madrid, and had remitted the most exact and important -information of what was passing, remained for three months without -receiving a single line from Mr. Canning, approving or disapproving -of his proceedings, or giving him instructions how to act at this -important crisis: a strange remissness, indicating the bewildered -state of the ministers, who slowly and with difficulty followed, -when they should have been prepared to lead. Their tardy abortive -measures demonstrated, how wide the space between a sophist and a -statesman, and how dangerous to a nation is that public feeling -which, insatiable of words, disregards the actions of men, -esteeming more the interested eloquence and wit of an orator like -Demades, than the simple integrity, sound judgment, and great -exploits, of a general like Phocion. - -Such were the preparations made by Spain in September and October, -to meet the exigencies of a period replete with danger and -difficulty. It would be instructive to contrast the exertions of -the “enthusiastic Spaniards” during these three months of their -insurrection, with the efforts of “discontented France,” in the -hundred days of Napoleon’s second reign. The junta were, however, -not devoid of ambition, for even before the battle of Baylen, that -of Seville was occupied with a project of annexing the Algarves -to Spain, and the treaty of Fontainebleau was far from being -considered as a dead letter. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: Letter to Murat. Las Casas.] - -The French emperor, although surprised and chagrined at the -disgrace which, for the first time, his armies had sustained, was -nothing dismayed by a resistance which he had early contemplated -as not improbable. With a piercing glance he had observed the -efforts of Spain, and calculated the power of foreign influence -in keeping alive the spirit of resistance. Assigning a just value -to the succours which England could afford, he foresaw the danger -which might accrue, if he suffered an insurrection of peasants, -that had already dishonoured the glory of his arms, to attain the -consistency of regular government, to league with powerful nations, -and to become disciplined troops. - -To defeat the raw levies which the Spaniards had hitherto opposed -to his soldiers, was an easy matter, but it was necessary to crush -them to atoms, that a dread of his invincible power might still -pervade the world, and the secret influence of his genius remain -unabated. The constitution of Bayonne would, he was aware, weigh -heavy in the scale against those chaotic governments, neither -monarchical, nor popular, nor aristocratic, nor federal, which the -Spanish revolution was throwing up; but before the benefit of that -could be felt by the many, before he could draw any advantages from -his moral resources, it was necessary to develop all his military -strength. The moment was critical and dangerous. He was surrounded -by enemies whose pride he had wounded, but whose means of offence -he had not destroyed. If he bent his forces against the Peninsula, -England might again excite the continent to arms, and Russia and -Austria once more banding together, might raise Prussia and renew -the eternal coalitions. The designs of Austria, although covered by -the usual artifices of that cunning rapacious court, were not so -hidden but that, earlier or later, a war from that quarter was to -be expected as a certain event. - -[Sidenote: Baron Fain’s Campaign. 1813.] - -The inhabitants of Prussia, subdued and oppressed, could not be -supposed tranquil: the secret societies, that, under the name of -Tugenbunde, Gymnasiasts, and other denominations, have since been -persecuted by those who were then glad to avail themselves of -such assistance, were just beginning to disclose their force and -plans. A baron de Nostiz, Stein, the Prussian counsellor of state, -generals Sharnhost and Gneizenau, and colonel Schill, appear to -have been the principal contrivers and patrons of these societies, -so characteristic of Germans, who, regular and plodding, even to a -proverb in their actions, possess the most extravagant imaginations -of any people on the face of the earth. Whatever the ulterior -views of these associations may have been, at this period they -were universally inimical to the French, their intent was to drive -the latter over the Rhine, and they were a source of peril to the -emperor, the more to be feared, as the extent of their influence -could not be immediately ascertained. - -Russia also, little injured by her losses, was more powerful -perhaps from her defeats, because more enlightened as to the cause -of them: Napoleon felt, that the hostility of such a great empire -would require all his means to repel, and that, consequently, his -Spanish operations must be confined in a manner unsuitable to -the fame of his arms. Of a long-sighted policy he had, however, -prepared the means of obviating this danger, by drawing the emperor -of Russia into a conference at Erfurth, whither the French monarch -repaired, confident in the resources of his genius for securing the -friendship of the czar. - -At this period, it may be truly said, that Napoleon supported the -weight of the world; every movement of his produced a political -convulsion; yet so sure, so confident was he, of his intellectual -superiority, that he sought but to gain one step, and doubted not -to overcome all resistance, and preserve his ascendancy. Time was -to him victory; if he gained the one, the other followed. Sudden -and prompt in execution, he prepared for one of those gigantic -efforts which have stamped this age with the greatness of antiquity. - -His armies were scattered over Europe. In Italy, in Dalmatia, on -the Rhine, the Danube, the Elbe; in Prussia, Denmark, Poland, his -legions were to be found. Over that vast extent, above five hundred -thousand disciplined men maintained the supremacy of France. From -those bands he drew the imperial guards, the select soldiers of the -warlike nation he governed, and the terror of the other continental -troops. The veterans of Jena, of Austerlitz, of Friedland, reduced -in number, but of confirmed hardihood, were collected into one -corps, and marched towards Spain. A host of cavalry, unequalled for -enterprise and knowledge of war, were also directed against that -devoted land, and a long train of gallant soldiers followed, until -two hundred thousand men, accustomed to battle, had penetrated -the gloomy fastnesses of the western Pyrenees. Forty thousand -men of inferior reputation, drawn from the interior of France, -from Naples, from Tuscany, and from Piedmont, were assembled at -Perpignan. - -The march of this multitude was incessant, and as they passed the -capital, Napoleon, neglectful of nothing which could excite their -courage and swell their military pride, addressed to them one of -those nervous orations that shoot like fire to the heart of a real -soldier. In the tranquillity of peace it may seem inflated, but on -the eve of battle it is thus a general should speak. - -“Soldiers! after triumphing on the banks of the Vistula and the -Danube, with rapid steps you have passed through Germany. This -day, without a moment of repose, I command you to traverse France. -Soldiers! I have need of you! The hideous presence of the leopard -contaminates the peninsula of Spain and Portugal. In terror he must -fly before you. Let us bear our triumphal eagles to the pillars of -Hercules, there also we have injuries to avenge! Soldiers! you have -surpassed the renown of modern armies, but have you yet equalled -the glory of those Romans who, in one and the same campaign, were -victorious upon the Rhine and the Euphrates, in Illyria and upon -the Tagus! A long peace, a lasting prosperity, shall be the reward -of your labours. A real Frenchman could not, ought not, to rest -until the seas are free and open to all. Soldiers! all that you -have done, all that you will do, for the happiness of the French -people and for my glory, shall be eternal in my heart!” - -Thus saying, he caused his troops to proceed towards the frontiers -of Spain, and himself hastened to meet the emperor Alexander at -Erfurth. Their conference, conducted upon the footing of intimate -friendship, produced a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, -and the fate of Spain was, by the one, with calm indifference, -abandoned to the injustice of the other. - -The accession of strength which this treaty, and the manifest -personal partiality of Alexander, gave to the French emperor, -inspired him perhaps with the idea, that the English cabinet would, -if a fair occasion offered, gladly enter into negotiations for a -general peace. The two emperors wrote a joint letter to the king -of England. “The circumstances of Europe had,” they said, “brought -them together; their first thought was to yield to the wish and -the wants of every people, and to seek, in a speedy pacification, -the most efficacious remedy for the miseries which oppressed all -nations. The long and bloody war which had torn the continent was -at an end, without the possibility of being renewed. Many changes -had taken place in Europe, many states had been overthrown; the -cause was to be found in the state of agitation and misery in -which the stagnation of maritime commerce had placed the greatest -nations: still greater changes might yet take place, and all of -them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace, then, -was, at once, the interest of the people of the continent, as it -was the interest of the people of Great Britain. We entreat your -majesty,” they concluded, “we unite to entreat your majesty to -listen to the voice of humanity, to silence that of the passions; -to seek, with the intention of arriving at that object, to -conciliate all interests, and thus preserve all powers which exist, -ensure the happiness of Europe and of this generation, at the head -of which Providence has placed us.” - -To this joint letter Mr. Canning replied by two letters to the -French and Russian ministers, accompanied by an official note. -In that addressed to the Russian, he observed, that “however -desirous the king might be to reply personally to the emperor, -he was prevented, by the unusual mode of communication adopted, -which had deprived it of a private and personal character. It was -impossible to pay that mark of respect to the emperor, without at -the same time acknowledging titles which he had never acknowledged. -The proposition for peace would be communicated to Sweden, and to -the existing government of Spain. It was necessary that his majesty -should receive an immediate assurance, that France acknowledged -the government of Spain as a party to the negotiation. That such -was the intention of the emperor could not be doubted, when the -lively interest manifested by his imperial majesty for the welfare -and dignity of the Spanish monarchy was recollected. No other -assurance was wanted, that the emperor could not have been induced -to sanction by his concurrence or approbation, usurpations, the -principles of which were not less unjust than their example was -dangerous to all legitimate sovereigns.” - -The letter addressed to Mons. de Champagny, duke of Cadore, merely -reiterated the claim for Sweden and Spain being admitted as parties -to the negotiation. The official note commenced by stating the -king’s desire for peace, on terms consistent with his honour, his -fidelity to his engagements, and the permanent repose of Europe. -The miserable condition of the continent, the convulsions it had -experienced, and those with which it was threatened, were not -imputable to his majesty. If the cause of so much misery was to be -found in the stagnation of commercial intercourse, although his -majesty could _not be expected to hear with unqualified regret_, -that the system devised for the destruction of the commerce of -his subjects had recoiled upon its authors or its instruments; -yet, as it was neither the disposition of his majesty, nor in the -character of the people over whom he reigned to rejoice in the -privations and unhappiness even of the nations which were combined -against him, he anxiously desired the termination of the sufferings -of the continent. The note, after stating that the progress of the -war had imposed new obligations upon Great Britain, claimed for -Sicily, for Portugal, for Sweden, and for Spain, a participation -in the negotiations. Treaties, it stated, existed with the three -first, which bound them and England in peace and war. With Spain -indeed no formal instrument had yet been executed, but the ties -of honour were, to the king of England, as strong as the most -solemn treaties; wherefore it was assumed, that the central junta, -or government of Spain, was understood to be a party to any -negotiation, in which his majesty was invited to engage. - -The reply of Russia was peremptory. The claims of the sovereigns, -allies of Great Britain, she would readily admit. But the -insurgents of Spain, Russia would not acknowledge as an independent -power. The Russians (and England, it was said, could recollect -one particular instance) had always been true to this principle; -moreover, the emperor had acknowledged Joseph Buonaparte as king -of Spain, and was united to the French emperor for peace and for -war; he was resolved not to separate his interests from those of -Napoleon. After some further arguments touching the question, the -reply concluded by offering to treat upon the basis of the “uti -possidetis,” and the respective power of the belligerent parties, -or upon _any basis_; for the conclusion of an honourable, just, and -equal peace. - -The insulting tone of Mr. Canning’s communication produced an -insulting reply from monsieur de Champagny, which also finished -by proposing the “uti possidetis” as a basis for a treaty, and -expressing a hope, that without losing sight of the inevitable -results of the force of states, it would be remembered, that -between great powers there could be no solid peace but that which -was equal and honourable for both parties. Upon the receipt of -these replies, the English minister broke off the negotiations, and -all chance of peace vanished; but previous to the conclusion of -this remarkable correspondence, Napoleon had returned to Paris. - -[Sidenote: O’Meara. Voice from St. Helena. Vol. 2.] - -What his real views in proposing to treat were, it is difficult -to determine; he could not have expected that Great Britain -would relinquish the cause of Spain, he must therefore have been -prepared to make some arrangement upon that head, unless the whole -proceeding was an artifice to sow distrust among his enemies. -The English ministers asserted that it was so; but what enemies -were they among whom he could create this uneasy feeling? Sweden, -Sicily, Portugal! the notion as applied to them was absurd; it is -more probable that he was sincere. He said so at Saint Helena, and -the peculiar circumstances of the period at which the conferences -of Erfurth took place, warrant a belief in that assertion. The -menacing aspect of Austria, the recent loss of Portugal, the -hitherto successful insurrection of Spain, the secret societies -of Germany, the desire of consolidating the Polish dominions, and -placing, while he might, a barrier to the power of Russia on that -side, the breach which the events of the Peninsula made in his -continental system of excluding British goods, and the commercial -distresses of Europe, were cogent reasons for a peace, they -might well cause him to be suspicious of the future, and render -him anxious for an excuse to abandon an unjust contest, in which -he could not fail to suffer much, and to risk more than he could -gain. In securing the alliance of Russia, he only disentangled a -part of the Gordian knot of politics; to cut the remainder with his -sword was at this conjuncture a task which even he might have been -doubtful of. The fact that his armies were marching upon Spain, -proves nothing to the contrary of this supposition. Time was to him -of the utmost consequence. His negotiations proving abortive, it -would have been too late to have reinforced his troops on the Ebro; -and the event evinced the prudence of his measures in that respect. -The refusal to admit the Spaniards as a party to the conferences -for peace is scarcely more conclusive; to have done that would have -been to resign the weapon in his hands before he entered the lists. -That England could not abandon the Spaniards is unquestionable; -but that was not a necessary consequence of continuing the -negotiations. There was a bar put to the admission of a Spanish -diplomatist, but no bar was thereby put to the discussion of -Spanish interests; the correspondence of the English minister would -not of necessity have compromised Spanish independence, it need not -have relaxed in the slightest degree the measures of hostility, -nor retarded the succours preparing for the patriots; and when -we consider the great power of Napoleon’s arms, the subtlety and -force of his genius, the good fortune which had hitherto attended -his progress in war, and the vast additional strength which the -alliance of Russia conferred at the moment, and when, to oppose -all this, we contrast the scanty means of Spain, and the confusion -into which she was plunged, it does appear as if her welfare would -have been better consulted by an appeal to negotiation rather -than to battle. It is true that Austria was arming; but Austria -had been so often conquered, was so sure to abandon the cause of -the patriots, and every other cause when pressed, so certain to -sacrifice every consideration of honour or faith to the suggestions -of self-interest, that the independence of Spain through the medium -of war could only be regarded as the object of uncertain hope, a -prize to be gained, if gained at all, by wading through torrents -of blood, and sustaining every misery that famine, and the fury -of devastating armies could inflict. To avoid, if possible, such -dreadful evils by negotiating was surely worth trial, and the -force of justice, when urged by the minister of a great nation, -would have been difficult to withstand; no power, no ambition can -resist it and be safe. But such an enlarged mode of proceeding was -not in accord with the shifts and subterfuges that characterized -the policy of the day[15], when it was thought wise to degrade -the dignity of such a correspondence by a ridiculous denial of -Napoleon’s titles; and praiseworthy to render a state paper, in -which such serious interests were discussed, offensive and mean -by miserable sarcasms, evincing the pride of an author more than -the gravity of a statesman. Mr. Whitbread declared in the House of -Commons that he saw no reason for refusing to treat with France at -that period; and although public clamour afterwards induced him to -explain away this expression, he had no reason to be ashamed of it; -for if the opinion of Cicero, that an unfair peace is preferable to -the justest war, was ever worthy of attention, it was so at this -period, when the success of Spain was doubtful, her misery certain, -her salvation only to be obtained through the baptism of blood! - -[Sidenote: Imperial Decree, 11th Sept. 1808.] - -Upon the 18th of October Napoleon returned to Paris, secure of the -present friendship and alliance of Russia, but uncertain of the -moment when the stimulus of English subsidies would quicken the -hostility of Austria into life; but if his peril was great, his -preparations to meet it were likewise enormous. First he called out -two conscriptions, of which the one taken from the classes of 1806, -7, 8, and 9, afforded eighty thousand men arrived at maturity; -these were destined to replace the veterans directed against Spain. - -The second conscription, taken from the class of 1810, also -produced eighty thousand, which were disposed of as reserves in the -dépôts of France. - -The force in Germany was concentrated on the side of Austria. -Denmark was evacuated, and one hundred thousand soldiers were -withdrawn from the Prussian states. - -The army of Italy was powerfully reinforced, and placed under the -command of prince Eugene, who was assisted by marshal Massena. -Murat also, who had succeeded Joseph in the kingdom of Naples, was -directed to assemble a Neapolitan army on the shores of Calabria, -and to threaten Sicily. In short, no measures that prudence could -suggest were neglected by this wonderful man, to whom the time -required by Austria for the mere preparation of a campaign seemed -sufficient for the subjection of the whole Peninsula. - -[Sidenote: Exposé de l’Empire, 1808.] - -The session of the legislative body was opened on the 24th of -October; the emperor, in his speech from the throne, after giving a -concise sketch of the political situation of Europe, touched upon -Spain. “In a few days I go,” said he, “to put myself at the head of -my armies, and, with the aid of God, to crown the king of Spain in -Madrid, and to plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon,” and then -departing from Paris he repaired to Bayonne; but the labours of his -ministers continued; their speeches and reports, more elaborately -explicit than usual, exposed the vast resources of France, and -were well calculated to impress upon the minds of men the danger -of provoking the enmity of such a powerful nation. From those -documents it appeared that the expenses of the year, (including -the interest of the national debt), being between twenty-nine and -thirty millions sterling, were completely covered by the existing -taxes, drawn from a metallic currency, and that no fresh burthens -would be laid upon the nation. Numerous public works were in -progress, internal trade, and that commerce which was carried on by -land, were flourishing, and nearly one million of men were in arms! - -The readiness with which Mr. Canning broke off the negotiation -of Erfurth, and defied this stupendous power, would lead to the -supposition that on the side of Spain at least he was prepared to -encounter it with some chance of success; but no trace of a matured -plan is to be found in the instructions to the generals commanding -in Portugal previous to the 25th of September, nor was the project -then adopted one which discovered any adequate knowledge of the -force of the enemy, or of the state of affairs. Indeed the conduct -of the cabinet relative to the Peninsula was scarcely superior to -that of the central junta itself. Several vague projects, or rather -speculations, were communicated to the generals in Portugal, but -in none of them was the strength of the enemy alluded to, in none -was there a settled plan of operations visible. It was evident -that the prodigious activity of the emperor was not taken into -consideration, and that a strange delusion relative to his power, -or to his intentions existed among the English ministers. - -[Sidenote: L^d. Castle^s. Despatch. Par^y. Pap^s.] - -It was the 6th of October before a despatch, containing the first -determinate plan of campaign, arrived at Lisbon. Thirty thousand -infantry and five thousand cavalry were to be employed in the north -of Spain; of these numbers ten thousand were to be embarked at the -English ports, and the remainder were to be composed of regiments, -drafted from the army then in Portugal. Lieutenant-general sir John -Moore was appointed to command the whole, and he was authorised -(at his own discretion) to effect a junction by a voyage round the -coast, or by a march through the interior. He chose the latter, 1º. -because a voyage at that season of the year would have been tedious -and precarious; 2º. because the intention of sir Hew Dalrymple had -been to enter Spain by Almeida, and the few arrangements which that -general had power to make were made with a view to such a march; -and 3º. because he was informed that the province of Gallicia was -scarcely able to equip the force coming from England, under the -command of lieutenant-general sir David Baird. Sir John Moore was -directed to take the field with the troops under his own immediate -command without delay; and he was to fix upon some place either -in Gallicia or on the borders of Leon for concentrating the -whole army. The specific plan of operations was to be concerted -afterwards with the Spanish generals. - -This was a light and idle proceeding, promising no good result, -for the Ebro was to be the theatre of war. The head of the great -French host coming from Germany was already in the passes of the -Pyrenees, and the local difficulties impeding the English general’s -progress were abundant, and of a nature to render that which was -ill begun, end worse, and that which was well arranged, fail. To be -first in the field is a great and decided advantage; but here the -plan of operations was not even arranged, when the enemy’s first -blows were descending. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, sections 1st and 3d.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 1st.] - -Sir John Moore had, indeed, much to execute, and with little -help. First, he was to organize an army of raw soldiers; then, -in a poor and unsettled country, just relieved from the pressure -of a harsh and griping enemy, he was to procure the transport -necessary for his stores, ammunition, and even for the conveyance -of the officers’ baggage. Assisted by an experienced staff, such -obstacles do not very much impede a good general; but here, few, -if any, of the officers, except the commander-in-chief, had served -a campaign; and every branch of the administration, civil and -military, was composed of new men, very zealous and willing, but -ignorant of a service, where no energy can prevent the effects of -inexperience from being severely felt. The roads through Portugal -were very bad; the rainy season, so baleful to an army, was upon -the point of setting in; time pressed sorely, it was essential to -be quick, but gold, that turns the wheels of war, was wanting; and -this, at all times a great evil, was the more grievously felt at -the moment, inasmuch as the Portuguese, accustomed to fraud on the -part of their own government, and to forced contributions by the -French, could not readily be persuaded that an army of foreigners, -paying with promises alone, might be trusted; nor was this natural -suspicion allayed by observing, that while the general and his -troops were thus kept without money, all the subordinate agents -dispersed throughout the country were amply supplied. Sir David -Baird, who, with his portion of troops, was to land at Coruña, -and to equip in a country already exhausted by Blake’s army, was -likewise encompassed with difficulties. From Coruña to the nearest -point where he could effect a junction with the forces marching -from Lisbon was two hundred miles, and he also was without money. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 4th.] - -No general-in-chief was appointed to command the Spanish armies; -nor was sir John Moore referred by the English ministers to any -person with whom he could communicate at all, much less concert -a plan of operations for the allied forces. He was unacquainted -with the views of the Spanish government, he was uninformed of -the numbers, composition, or situation of the troops with which -he was to act, as well as those with whom he was to contend, and -25,000_l._ in his military chest, and his own genius, constituted -his resources for a campaign, which would probably lead the army -far from the coast, and from all its means of supply. He was first -to unite the scattered portions of his forces by a winter march of -three hundred miles; another three hundred were to be passed before -he reached the Ebro; then he was to concert a plan of operations -with generals acting each independent of the other; their corps -reaching from the northern sea-coast to Zaragoza; themselves -jealous and quarrelsome, their men insubordinate, differing in -customs, discipline, language, and religion from the English, -and despising all foreigners; and this was to be accomplished in -time to defeat an enemy who was already in the field, accustomed -to great movements, and conducted by the most rapid and decided -of men. It must be acknowledged that the ministers’ views were -equally vast and inconsiderate, and their miscalculations are the -more remarkable, as there was not wanting a man in the highest -military situation to condemn their plan at the time, and to -propose a better. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 24.] - -The duke of York, in a formal minute drawn up for the information -of the government, observed, that the Spanish armies being -unconnected, and occupying a great extent of ground, were weak. -That the French being concentrated, and certain of reinforcements, -were strong. That there could be no question of the relative value -of Spanish and French troops, and that, consequently, the allies -might be beaten before the British could arrive at the scene of -action; the latter would then unaided have to meet the French army; -hence it was essential to provide a sufficient number of troops to -meet such an emergency; that number he judged should not be less -than sixty thousand men, and by a detailed statement, he proved -that such a number could have been furnished without detriment to -any other service. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s letters. MS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 6th.] - -At this period, also, the effects of that incredible folly and -weakness which marked all the proceedings of the central junta, -were felt throughout Spain. In any other country the conduct of the -government would have been attributed to insanity. So apathetic -with respect to the enemy as to be contemptible; so active in -pursuit of self-interest as to become hateful. The junta was -occupied in devising how to render itself at once despotic and -popular; how to excite enthusiasm and check freedom of expression; -how to enjoy the luxury of power without its labour; how to acquire -great reputation without trouble; how to be indolent and victorious -at the same moment. Fear prevented it from removing to Madrid -after every preparation had been made for a public entrance into -that capital. The members passed decrees, repressing the liberty -of the press on the ground of the deceptions practised upon the -public; but themselves never hesitated to deceive the British -agents, the generals, the government, and their own countrymen, -by the most flagitious falsehoods upon every subject, whether -of greater or less importance. They hedged their own dignity -round, with ridiculous and misplaced forms opposed to the vital -principle of an insurrectional government; they devoted their -attention to abstract speculations, recalled the exiled Jesuits, -and inundated the country with long and laboured state papers, -but left the pressing business of the moment to shift for itself. -Every application on the part of lord William Bentinck and Mr. -Stuart, even for an order to expedite a common courier, was met by -difficulties and delays, and it was necessary to have recourse to -the most painful solicitations to obtain the slightest attention; -nor did that mode always succeed. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 3.] - -Sir John Moore strenuously grappled with the difficulties besetting -him: well knowing the value of time in military transactions, he -urged forward the preparations with all possible activity. He -was very desirous, that troops who had a journey of six hundred -miles to make previous to meeting the enemy, should not, at the -commencement, be overwhelmed by the torrents of rain which in -Portugal descend at this period with such violence as to destroy -the shoes, ammunition, and accoutrements of a soldier, and render -him almost unfit for service. The Spanish generals recommended -that the line of march should be conducted by Almeida, Ciudad -Rodrigo, Salamanca, Valladolid, and Burgos, and that the magazines -for the campaign should be formed at one of the latter towns; -and as this coincided with the previous preparations, the army -was organized in three columns, two of which were directed upon -Almeida, by the routes of Coimbra and Guarda, and the third, -comprising the artillery, the cavalry, and the regiments quartered -in the Alemtejo, was destined to move by Alcantara, upon Ciudad -Rodrigo. Almeida itself was chosen for a place of arms, and all the -reserve-stores and provisions were forwarded there, as time and -circumstances would permit; but the want of money, the unsettled -state of the country, and the inexperience of the commissariat, -rendered it difficult to procure the means of transport even for -the light baggage of the regiments, although the quantity of the -latter was reduced so much as to create discontent. One Sattaro -(the same person who has been already mentioned as an agent of -Junot’s in the negotiation with sir Charles Cotton) engaged to -supply the army, but dishonestly failing in his contract, so -embarrassed the operations, that the general resigned all hope of -being able to move with more than the light baggage, the ammunition -necessary for immediate use, and a scanty supply of medicines. -The formation of the magazines at Almeida was also retarded, and -the future subsistence of the troops was thus thrown upon a raw -commissariat, unprovided with money. The general, however, relying -upon its increasing experience, and upon the activity of lord -William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, did not delay his march, but -sent agents to Madrid and other places to make contracts, and to -endeavour to raise money, for such was the policy of the ministers, -that they supplied the Spaniards with gold, and left the English -army to get it back in loans. - -Many of the regiments were actually in movement when an -unexpected difficulty forced the commander-in-chief to make a -fresh disposition of the troops. The state of the Portuguese roads -north of the Tagus was unknown; the native officers and the people -declared that they were impracticable for artillery. The opinion -of colonel Lopez, a military commissary, sent by the Spanish -government to facilitate the march of the British, coincided with -this information, and the reports of one of the most intelligent -and enterprising of the officers of the quarter-master-general’s -department, who were employed to examine the lines of route, -corroborated the general opinion[16]. Junot, indeed, with infinite -pains, had carried his guns along these roads, but his carriages -had been broken, and the batteries rendered unserviceable by the -operation. In this dilemma, sir John Moore reluctantly determined -to send his artillery and cavalry by the south bank of the Tagus, -to Talavera de la Reyna, from whence they might gain Naval -Carneiro, the Escurial, the pass of the Guadarama mountains, -Espiñar, Arevalo, and Salamanca. He would have marched the -whole army by the same route, if this disagreeable intelligence -respecting the northern roads had been obtained earlier; but when -the arrangements were all made for the supplies to go to Almeida, -and when most of the regiments were actually in movement towards -that town, it was too late to alter their destination. - -This separation of the artillery violated a great military -principle, which prescribes that the point of concentration -for an army should be beyond the reach of the enemy. But it -was a matter of apparent necessity, and, moreover, no danger -was apprehended from the offensive operations of an adversary -represented to be incapable of maintaining his own line of defence. -Valladolid and Burgos were considered by the Spaniards as safe -places for the English magazines, and sir John Moore shared so -much of the universal confidence in the Spanish enthusiasm and -courage, as to suppose that Salamanca would not be an insecure -point of concentration for his columns, under the protection of -such numerous patriotic armies as were said to be on the Ebro. -One brigade of six-pounders he retained with the head-quarters, -the remainder of his artillery, twenty-four pieces; the cavalry, -amounting to a thousand troopers; the great parc of the army, -containing many hundred carriages, and escorted by three thousand -infantry, he sent by the road of Talavera, under the command of sir -John Hope, an officer qualified by his talents, firmness, and zeal, -to conduct the most important enterprises. - -The rest of the army marched in three columns, the first by -Alcantara, the second by Abrantes, the third by Coimbra, in the -direction of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; and with such energy did -the general overcome all obstacles, that the whole of the troops -were in movement, and head-quarters quitted Lisbon by the 26th -of October, just twenty days after the receipt of the despatch -which appointed him to the chief command; a surprising diligence, -but rendered necessary by the pressure of circumstances. “The -army,” to use his own words, “run the risk of finding itself in -front of the enemy with no more ammunition than the men carried in -their pouches:” “but had I waited,” he adds, “until every thing -was forwarded, the troops would not have been in Spain until the -spring, and I trust that the enemy will not find out our wants as -soon as they will feel the effects of what we have.” - -The Spaniards, however, who expected “every body to fly except -themselves,” thought him slow, and were impatient, and from -every quarter indeed letters arrived, pressing him to advance. -Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, witnesses of the sluggish -incapacity of the Spanish government, judged that such a support -was absolutely necessary to sustain the reeling strength of Spain. -The supreme government were even awakened for a moment. Hitherto, -as a mask for its ignorance, it had treated the French power -with contempt, and the Spanish generals and the people echoed -the sentiments of the government: but now, a letter addressed by -the governor of Bayonne to general Jourdan, stating, that sixty -thousand infantry, and seven thousand cavalry, would reinforce the -French armies between the 16th of October and the 16th of November, -was intercepted, and made the junta feel that a crisis for which it -was unprepared was approaching. With the folly usually attendant on -improvidence, these men, who had been so slow themselves, required -that others should be supernaturally quick when danger pressed. - -[Sidenote: Capt. Kennedy’s Letter. Par^y. Pap^s.] - -In the mean time sir David Baird’s forces arrived at Coruña. Lord -William Bentinck had given intimation of their approach, and the -central junta had repeatedly assured him, that every necessary -order was given, and that every facility would be afforded, for -the disembarkation and supply of the troops. This was untrue; -no measures of any kind had been taken, no instructions issued, -and no preparations were made. The junta of Coruña disliked the -personal trouble of a disembarkation in that port, and in the hope -that Baird would be driven to another, refused him permission to -land, until a communication was had with Aranjuez; but fifteen -days elapsed before an answer could be obtained from a government, -who were daily pestering sir John Moore with complaints of the -tardiness of his march. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 1. -Sir J. Moore to lord Castlereagh, 27th Oct.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 5 and 6.] - -Sir David Baird came without money, sir John could only give him -8000_l._, a sum which might have been mistaken for a private -loan, if the fact of its being public property were not expressly -mentioned. But at this time Mr. Frere, the plenipotentiary, arrived -at Coruña, with two millions of dollars, intended for the use of -the Spaniards; and while such large sums, contrary to the earnest -recommendations of Mr. Stuart and major Cox, were lavished in that -quarter, the penury of the English general obliged him to borrow -from the funds in Mr. Frere’s hands. Thus assisted, the troops were -put in motion; but, wanting all the equipments essential to an -army, they were forced to march by half battalions, conveying their -scanty stores on country cars, hired from day to day, nor was that -meagre assistance obtained but at great expense, and by compliance -with a vulgar mercenary spirit predominant among the authorities of -Gallicia. The junta frequently promised to procure the carriages, -but did not; the commissaries pushed to the wall by the delay, -offered an exorbitant remuneration: the cars were then forthcoming, -and the procrastination of the government proved to be a concerted -plan, to defraud the military chest. In fine, the local rulers were -unfriendly, crafty, fraudulent, the peasantry suspicious, fearful, -rude, disinclined towards strangers, and indifferent to public -affairs. A few shots only were required to render theirs a hostile -instead of a friendly greeting. - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Correspondence.] - -With Mr. Frere came a fleet, conveying a Spanish force, under the -marquis of Romana. When the insurrection first broke forth, that -nobleman commanded fourteen or fifteen thousand troops, who were -serving with the French armies. How to recover this disciplined -body of men from the enemy was a subject of early anxiety with -the junta of Seville; and Castaños, in his first intercourse with -sir Hew Dalrymple, signified his wish that the British government -should adopt some mode of apprising Romana, that Spain was in -arms, and should endeavour to extricate him and his army from the -toils of the enemy. A gentleman named M’Kenzie was employed by the -English ministers to conduct the enterprise; the Spanish troops -were quartered in Holstein, Sleswig, Jutland, and the islands of -Funen, Zealand, and Langeland; Mr. M’Kenzie, through the medium -of one Robertson, a catholic priest, opened a communication with -Romana. Neither the general, nor the soldiers he commanded, -hesitated, and a judicious plan being concerted, sir Richard -Keats, with a squadron detached from the Baltic fleet, suddenly -appeared off Nyborg, in the island of Funen. A majority of the -Spanish regiments quartered in Sleswig immediately seized all the -Danish craft in the different harbours of that coast, and pushed -across the channel to Funen, where Romana, with the assistance of -Keats, had already seized the port and castle of Nyborg without -opposition, save from a small ship of war that was moored across -the mouth of the harbour. From Nyborg Romana passed to Langeland, -and there awaited the arrival of sir James Saumarez with the -English fleet, on board of which he embarked with about nine -thousand five hundred men. Of the remainder, some were disarmed, or -overawed by the Danish troops in Zealand, and some did not escape -from Sleswig. This enterprise was conducted with prudent activity, -and the unhesitating patriotism of the Spanish soldiers was very -honourable, but the danger was trifling; Mr. Robertson incurred -the most. Romana, after touching at England, repaired to Coruña; -his troops did not, however, land at that port, but after a while -coasted to St. Andero, and being there disembarked, and equipped -from the English stores, proceeded by divisions to join Blake’s -army in Biscay. - -Among the various subjects calling for sir John Moore’s attention, -there was none of greater interest than the appointment of a -generalissimo to the Spanish armies. Impressed with the imminent -danger of procrastination, or uncertainty in such a matter, he -desired lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart to urge the central -government with all their force upon that head; to lord Castlereagh -he represented the injury that must accrue to the cause, if the -measure was delayed, and he proposed to go himself to Madrid, -with a view of adding weight to his representations. Subsequent -events, which left him no time for the journey, frustrated this -intention, and there seems no reason to imagine, that his personal -remonstrances would have weighed with a government, described -by Mr. Stuart, after a thorough experience of their qualities, -as, “never having made a single exertion for the public good, -neither rewarding merit nor punishing guilt,” and being for all -useful purposes “absolutely null.” The junta’s dislike to a single -military chief was not an error of the head, and reason is of -little avail against the suggestions of self-interest. - -The march of the British troops was as rapid as the previous -preparations had been. Head-quarters reached Almeida on the 8th of -November. The infantry were already assembled at that town. The -condition of the men was superb, and their discipline exemplary; -on that side all was well, but from the obstacles encountered by -sir David Baird, and the change of direction in the artillery, -it was evident, that no considerable force could be brought into -action before the end of the month. Meanwhile, the Spaniards were -hastening events. Despatches from lord William Bentinck announced -that the enemy remained stationary on the Ebro, although reinforced -by ten thousand men; that Castaños was about to cross that river -at Tudela; and that the army of Aragon was moving by Sor upon -Roncevalles, with a view to gain the rear of the French, while -Castaños assailed their left flank. The general, judging that such -movements would bring on a battle, the success of which must be -very doubtful, became uneasy for his own artillery: his concern -was increased by observing, that the guns might have kept with the -other columns; “and if any thing adverse happens, I have not,” he -wrote to general Hope, “necessity to plead; the road we are now -travelling, that by Villa Velha and Guarda, is practicable for -artillery. The brigade under Wilmot has already reached Guarda, and -as far as I have already seen, the road presents few obstacles, and -those easily surmounted; this knowledge was, however, only acquired -by our own officers; when the brigade was at Castello Branco, -it was not certain if it could proceed.” Wherefore, he desired -Hope no longer to trust any reports, but seek a shorter line, by -Placentia, across the mountains to Salamanca. - -Up to this period, all reports from the agents, all information -from the government at home, all communications public and private, -coincided upon one subject. _The Spaniards were an enthusiastic, -a heroic people, a nation of unparalleled energy! their armies -were brave; they were numerous; they were confident! one hundred -and eighty thousand men were actually in line of battle, extending -from the sea-coast of Biscay to Zaragoza; the French, reduced to -a fourth of this number, cooped up in a corner, shrunk from an -encounter; they were deserted by the emperor; they were trembling; -they were spiritless!_ Nevertheless, the general was somewhat -distrustful; he perceived the elements of disaster in the divided -commands, and the lengthened lines of the Spaniards; and early in -October he had predicted the mischief that such a system would -produce. “As long as the French remain upon the defensive,” he -observed, “it will not be so much felt; but the moment an attack -is made, some great calamity must ensue.” However, he was not -without faith in the multitude and energy of the patriots, when he -considered the greatness of their cause. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 7.] - -Castaños was at this time pointed out by the central junta as -the person with whom to concert a plan of campaign, and sir John -Moore, concluding that it was a preliminary step towards making -that officer generalissimo, wrote to him in a conciliatory style, -well calculated to ensure a cordial co-operation. This was an -encouraging event; the English general believed it to be the -commencement of a better system, and looked forward with more hope -to the opening of the war; but this favourable state soon changed. -Far from being created chief of all, Castaños was superseded in the -command he already held, the whole folly of the Spanish character -broke forth, and confusion and distress followed. But even at -that moment clouds were arising in a quarter, which had hitherto -been all sunshine. The military agents, as the crisis approached, -lowered their tone of confidence, they no longer dwelt upon the -enthusiasm of the armies; they admitted, that the confidence of the -troops was sinking, and that even in numbers they were inferior to -the French. In truth, it was full time to change their note, for -the real state of affairs could no longer be concealed, and a great -catastrophe was at hand; but what of wildness in their projects, or -of skill in the enemy’s; what of ignorance, vanity, and presumption -in their generals; what of fear among their soldiers; and what -of fortune in the events; combined to hasten the ruin of the -Spaniards, and how that ruin was effected, I, quitting the English -army for a time, will now relate. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -In the preceding chapters I have exposed the weakness, the -folly, the improvidence of Spain, and shown how the bad passions -and sordid views of her leaders were encouraged by the unwise -prodigality of England. I have dissected the full boast and meagre -preparations of the governments in both countries; laying bare the -bones and sinews of the insurrection; and by comparing their loose -and feeble structure with the strongly knitted frame and large -proportions of the enemy, prepared the reader for the inevitable -issue of a conflict between such ill-matched champions. In the -present book, I shall recount the sudden and terrible manner in -which the Spanish armies were overthrown, and the tempestuous -progress of the French emperor. - -But previous to relating these disasters I must revert to the -period immediately following the retreat of king Joseph, and trace -those early operations of the French and Spanish forces which, like -a jesting prologue to a deep tragedy, unworthily ushered in the -great catastrophe. - - -CAMPAIGN OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE -EMPEROR. - -After general Cuesta was removed from the command, and that the -junta of Seville was, by major Cox, forced to disgorge so much of -the English subsidy as sufficed for the immediate relief of the -troops in Madrid, all the Spanish armies closed upon the Ebro. - -[Sidenote: General Broderick’s Correspondence.] - -General Blake, reinforced by eight thousand Asturians, established -his base of operations at Reynosa, opened a communication with the -English vessels off the port of St. Andero, and directed his views -towards Biscay. - -The Castillian army, conducted by general Pignatelli, resumed its -march upon Burgo del Osma and Logroña. - -[Sidenote: Capt. Whittingham’s.] - -The two divisions of the Andalusian troops under Lapeña, and the -Murcian division of general Llamas, advanced to Taranzona and -Tudela. - -[Sidenote: Colonel Doyle’s.] - -Palafox, with the Aragonese and Valencian divisions of St. Marc, -operated from the side of Zaragoza. - -[Sidenote: Castaños’s Vindication.] - -Fourteen or fifteen thousand of the Estremaduran troops were -drafted, and placed under the conduct of the conde de Belvedere, a -weak youth, not twenty years of age. They were at first directed -upon Logroña, as forming part of Castaños’s command, but finally, -as we shall find, received another destination. - -[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence.] - -Between these armies there was neither concert nor connexion; -their movements were regulated by some partial view of affairs, or -by the silly caprices of the generals, who were ignorant of each -other’s plans, and little solicitous to combine operations. The -weak characters of many of the chiefs, the inexperience of all, -and the total want of system, opened a field for intriguing men, -and invited unqualified persons to interfere in the direction of -affairs. Thus we find colonel Doyle making a journey to Zaragoza, -and priding himself upon having prevailed with Palafox to detach -seven thousand men to Sanguessa; and captain Whittingham, without -any knowledge of Doyle’s interference, earnestly dissuading the -Spaniards from such an enterprise. The first affirmed, that the -movement would “turn the enemy’s left flank, threaten his rear, -and have the appearance of cutting off his retreat.” The second -argued, that Sanguessa, being seventy miles from Zaragoza, and -only a few leagues from Pampeluna, the detachment would itself be -cut off. Doyle judged that it would draw the French from Caparosa -and Milagro, and expose those points to Llamas and La-Peña; that -it would force the enemy to recall the reinforcements said to be -marching against Blake, and enable that general to form a junction -with the Asturians, when he might, with forty thousand men, possess -himself of the Pyrenees; and if the French army, estimated at -thirty-five thousand men, did not fly, cut it off from France, or -by moving on Miranda, sweep clear Biscay and Castille. Palafox, -pleased with this plan, sent Whittingham to inform Llamas and -La-Peña, that O’Neil would, with six thousand men, march on the -15th of September to Sanguessa. Those generals disapproved of the -movement as dangerous, premature, and at variance with the plan -arranged in the council of war held at Madrid. Palafox, regardless -of their opinion, persisted. O’Neil occupied Sanguessa, drew the -attention of the enemy, and was immediately driven across the -Alagon river. - -[Sidenote: Ld. W. Bentinck’s Correspond^{ce}. MS.] - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence. MS.] - -In this manner all their projects, characterized by a profound -ignorance of war, were lightly adopted and as lightly abandoned, or -ended in disasters; yet victory was more confidently anticipated, -than if consummate skill had presided over the arrangements; and -this vain-glorious feeling, extending to the military agents, was -by them propagated in England, where the fore-boasting was nearly -as loud, and as absurd, as in the Peninsula. The delusion was -universal; even lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, deceived by -the curious consistency of the Spanish falsehoods, doubted if -the French army was able to maintain its position, and believed -that the Spaniards had obtained a moral ascendancy in the field. -Drunk with vanity and folly, the leading Spaniards in the capital, -feeling certain that the “remnants,” as they were called, of the -French army on the Ebro, estimated at from thirty-five to forty -thousand men, would be immediately destroyed, proposed that the -British army should be directed upon Catalonia, and when they found -that this proposal was not acceded to, they withdrew ten thousand -men from the Murcian division, and sent them to the neighbourhood -of Lerida. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.] - -The natural pride and arrogance of the Spaniards were greatly aided -by the timid and false operations of king Joseph. Twenty days after -the evacuation of Madrid, that monarch was at the head of above -fifty thousand fighting men, exclusive of eight thousand employed -to maintain the communications, and to furnish the garrisons of -Pampeluna, Tolosa, Irun, St. Sebastian, and Bilbao. - -The French army of Catalonia, seventeen thousand in number, was, -as we have seen, distinct from the king’s command; but a strong -reserve, assembled at Bayonne, under general Drouet, supplied him -with reinforcements, and was itself supported by drafts from the -depôts in the interior of France. - -Six thousand men, divided into several moveable columns, watched -the openings of the Pyrenees, from St. Jean Pied de Port to -Rousillon, and guarded the frontier from Spanish incursions; and a -second reserve, composed of Neapolitans, Tuscans, and Piedmontese, -was commenced at Belgarde, with a view of supporting Duhesme in -Catalonia. - -How the king quelled the nascent insurrection at Bilbao, and -how he dispersed the insurgents of the valleys in Aragon, I have -already related. After those operations the French army was -re-organized and divided into three grand divisions and a reserve. -Marshal Bessieres retained the command of the right wing; marshal -Moncey assumed that of the left; and marshal Ney arriving at this -period from Paris, took charge of the centre; while the reserve, -chiefly composed of detachments from the imperial guard, remained -near the person of the king. The old republican general, Jourdan, -a man whose day of glory belonged to another era, re-appeared upon -the military stage, and filled the office of major-general to the -army. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s notes. Appendix, Nos. 4 and 5.] - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of the king’s operations. MS.] - -With such a force, and so assisted, there was nothing in Spain, -turn which way he would, capable of opposing king Joseph’s march; -but the incongruity of a camp with a court is always productive of -indecision and of error; the truncheon does not fit every hand, and -the French army soon felt the inconvenience of having at its head -a monarch who was not a warrior. Joseph remained on the defensive; -but he did not understand the force of the maxim, “_that offensive -movements are the foundation of a good defence_.” He held Bilbao, -but he abandoned Tudela contrary to the advice of the generals -who had conducted the operations on that side, and in its place -Milagro, a small town, situated upon the rivers Arga and Aragon, -just above their confluence with the Ebro, was by him chosen as -the position of battle for the left wing. As long as Bessieres -held Burgos in force, his cavalry commanded the valley of the -Douero, menaced Palencia and Valladolid, and scouring the plains, -kept Blake and Cuesta in check. Instead of reinforcing a post so -advantageous, the king relinquished Burgos as a point beyond his -line of defence, and Bessieres’ troops were posted in successive -divisions behind it, as far as Puente Lara on the Ebro. Ney’s force -lined that river down to Logroña; the reserve was quartered behind -Miranda; and Trevino, a small obscure place, was chosen as the -point of battle, for the right and centre. In this disadvantageous -situation the army, with some trifling changes, remained from the -middle of August until late in September. During that time the -artillery and carriages of transport were repaired, magazines were -collected, the cavalry remounted, and the preparations made for an -active campaign when the reinforcements should arrive from Germany. - -The line of resistance thus offered to the Spaniards, evinced -a degree of timidity which the relative strength of the armies -by no means justified; the left of the French evidently leaned -towards the great communication with France, and seemed to -refuse the support of Pampeluna. Tudela was abandoned, and -Burgos resigned to the enterprise of the Spaniards. All this -indicated fear, a disposition to retreat if the enemy advanced. -The king complained with what extreme difficulty he obtained -intelligence; yet he neglected by forward movements to feel for his -adversaries. Wandering as it were in the dark, he gave a loose to -his imagination, and conjuring up a phantom of Spanish strength, -which had no real existence, anxiously waited for the development -of their power, while they were exposing their weakness by a -succession of the most egregious blunders. - -Joseph’s errors did not escape the animadversion of his brother, -whose sagacity enabled him, although at a distance, to detect, -through the glare of the insurrection, all the inefficiency of the -Spaniards; but, despising them as soldiers, he dreaded the moral -effect produced by their momentary success, and he was preparing -to crush the rising hopes of his enemies. Joseph’s retreat, and -subsequent position, therefore, displeased him; and he desired his -brother to check the exultation of the patriots, by acting upon a -bold and well-considered plan, of which he sent him the outline. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.] - -His notes, dictated upon the occasion, are replete with genius, -and evince his absolute mastery of the art of war. “It was too -late,” he said, “to discuss the question, whether Madrid should -have been retained or abandoned? Idle to consider, if a position, -covering the siege of Zaragoza, might not have been formed; useless -to examine, if the line of the Douro was not better than that of -the Ebro for the French army. The line of the Ebro was actually -taken, and it must be kept; to advance from that river without a -fixed object would create indecision; this would bring the troops -back again, and produce an injurious moral effect; but why abandon -Tudela? Why relinquish Burgos? Those towns were of note, and of -reputation; the possession of them gave a moral influence, and -moral force constituted two-thirds of the strength of armies. -Tudela and Burgos had also a relative importance; the first -possessing a stone bridge, was on the communication of Pampeluna -and Madrid. It commanded the canal of Zaragoza. It was the capital -of a province. When the army resumed offensive operations, their -first enterprise would be the siege of Zaragoza; from that town to -Tudela, the land carriage was three days, but the water carriage -was only fourteen hours; wherefore to have the besieging artillery -and stores at Tudela was the same as to have them at Zaragoza. If -the Spaniards got possession of the former, all Navarre would be -in a state of insurrection, and Pampeluna exposed. Tudela then was -of vast importance; but Milagro was of none. It was an obscure -place, without a bridge, and commanding no communication; in -short, it was without interest, defended nothing! led to nothing! -A river,” said this great commander, “though it should be as -large as the Vistula, and as rapid as the Danube at its mouth, -is nothing, unless there are good points of passage, and a head -quick to take the offensive. The Ebro as a defence was less than -nothing, a mere line of demarcation! and Milagro was useless. The -enemy might neglect it, be at Estella, and from thence gain Tolosa, -before any preparation could be made to receive him; he might -come from Soria, from Logroña, or from Zaragoza. Again, Burgos -was the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, -a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army. -To occupy it in force, and offensively, would threaten Palencia, -Valladolid, Aranda, and even Madrid. It is necessary,” observed -the emperor, “to have made war a long time to conceive this. It is -necessary to have made a number of offensive enterprises to know -how much the smallest event, or even indication, encourages or -discourages, and decides the adoption of one enterprise instead of -another.” “In short, if the enemy occupies Burgos, Logroña, and -Tudela, the French army will be in a pitiful position. It is not -known if he has left Madrid; you are ignorant of what has become -of the Gallician army, and we have reason to suspect that it may -have been directed upon Portugal; in such a state to take up, -instead of a bold, menacing, and honourable position like Burgos, -a confined shameful one like Trevino, is to say to the enemy, you -have nothing to fear, go elsewhere, we have made our dispositions -to go farther, or we have chosen our ground to fight; come there, -without fear of being disturbed. But what will the French general -do if the enemy marches the next day upon Burgos? Will he let the -citadel of that town be taken by six thousand insurgents? or if the -French have left a garrison in the castle, how can four or five -hundred men retire in such a vast plain? and, from that time, all -is gone; the enemy master of the citadel, it cannot be retaken; if, -on the contrary, we should guard the citadel, we must give battle -to the enemy, because it cannot hold out more than three days, and -if we wish to fight a battle, why should Bessieres abandon the -ground where we wish to fight? These dispositions appear badly -considered, and when the enemy shall march, our troops will meet -with such an insult as will demoralize them if there are only -insurgents or light troops advancing against them. If fifteen -thousand insurgents enter into Burgos, retrench themselves in the -town, and occupy the castle, it will be necessary to calculate a -march of several days to enable us to post ourselves there, and to -retake the town, which cannot be done without some inconvenience. -If, during the time, the real attack is upon Logroña or Pampeluna, -we shall have made countermarches without use, which will have -fatigued the army. If we hold it with cavalry only, is it not to -say we do not intend stopping, and to invite the enemy to come -there? It was the first time,” he said, “that an army had quitted -all its offensive positions to take up a bad defensive line, and -to affect to choose its field of battle, when the thousand and -one combinations which might take place, and the distance of the -enemy, did not leave a probability of being able to foresee if the -battle would take place at Tudela, between Tudela and Pampeluna, -between Soria and the Ebro, or between Burgos and Miranda;” and -then followed an observation which may be studied with advantage -by those authors who, unacquainted with the simplest rudiments -of military science, censure the conduct of a general, and are -pleased, from some obscure nook, to point out his errors to the -world; authors who, profoundly ignorant of the numbers, situation, -and resources of the opposing armies, pretend, nevertheless, to -detail with great accuracy the right method of executing the most -difficult and delicate operations of war. As the rebuke of Turenne, -who frankly acknowledged to Louvois that he could pass the Rhine at -a particular spot if the latter’s finger were a bridge, has been -lost upon such men, perhaps the more recent opinion of Napoleon may -be disregarded. “But it is not permitted,” says that consummate -general, “_it is not permitted, at the distance of three hundred -leagues, and without even a state of the situation of the army, to -direct what should be done_!” - -After having thus protected himself from the charge of presumption, -the emperor proceeded to recommend certain dispositions for the -defence of the Ebro. The Spaniards, he said, were not to be feared -in the field; twenty-five thousand French in a good position would -suffice to beat all their armies united, and this opinion he -deduced from the events of Dupont’s campaign, of which he gave a -short analysis. Let Tudela, he said, be retrenched if possible, at -all events it should be occupied in force, and offensively towards -Zaragoza. Let the general commanding there collect provisions on -all sides; secure the boats, with a view to future operations when -the reinforcements should arrive, and maintain his communication -with Logroña by the right bank if he can, but certainly by the -left. Let his corps be considered as one of observation; if a -body of insurgents only approach, he may fight them, or keep them -constantly on the defensive by his movements against their line or -against Zaragoza. If regular troops attack him, and he is forced -across the Ebro, let him then manœuvre about Pampeluna until the -general-in-chief has made his dispositions for the main body. In -this manner no prompt movement upon Estella and Tolosa can take -place, and the corps of observation will have amply fulfilled -its task. Let marshal Bessieres, with all his corps united, and -reinforced by the light cavalry of the army, encamp in the wood -near Burgos; let the citadel be well occupied, the hospital, the -dépôts, and all encumbrances sent over the Ebro; let him keep in -a condition to manœuvre, be under arms every day at three o’clock -in the morning, and remain until the return of his patroles. He -should send parties to a great extent, as far as two days’ march. -Let the corps of the centre be placed at Miranda and Briviesca, -and all the encumbrances be likewise sent across the Ebro behind -Vittoria. This corps should be under arms every morning, and send -patroles by the road of Soria, and wherever the enemy may be -expected. It must not be lost sight of, that these two corps, being -to be united, they should be connected as little as possible with -Logroña, and consider the left wing as a corps detached, having -a line of operations upon Pampeluna, and a separate part to act. -Tudela is preserved as a post contiguous to the line. Be well on -the defensive, he continues, in short, make war, that is to say, -get information from the alcaldes, the curates, the posts, the -chiefs of convents, and the principal proprietors, you will then be -perfectly informed; the patroles should always be directed upon -the side of Soria, and of Burgos, upon Palencia, and upon the side -of Aranda. They could thus form three posts of interception, and -send three reports of men arrested; these men should be treated -well, and dismissed, after they had given the information desired -of them. Let the enemy then come, and we can unite all our forces; -hide our marches from him, and fall upon his flank at the moment he -is meditating an offensive movement. - -With regard to the minor details, the emperor thus expressed -himself: “Soria is not, I believe, more than two short marches from -the actual position of the army; that town has constantly acted -against us; an expedition sent there to disarm it, to take thirty -of the principal people as hostages, and to obtain provisions, -would have a good effect. It would be useful to occupy St. Ander. -It will be of advantage to move by the direct road of Bilbao to -St. Ander. It will be necessary to occupy and disarm Biscay and -Navarre. Every Spaniard taken in arms there should be shot[17]. -The manufactories of arms at Palencia should be watched, to hinder -them from working for the rebels. The port of Pancorbo should be -armed and fortified with great activity; ovens, and magazines of -provisions and ammunition, should be placed there. Situated nearly -half way between Madrid and Bayonne, it is an intermediate post -for the army, and a point of support for troops operating towards -Gallicia. The interest of the enemy,” he resumes, “is to mask his -forces. By hiding the true point of attack, he operates in such -a manner, that the blow he means to strike is never indicated in -a positive way, and the opposing general can only guess it by a -well-matured knowledge of his own position, and of the mode in -which he makes his offensive system act, to protect his defensive -system. We have no accounts of what the enemy is about; it is said -that no news can be obtained, as if this case was extraordinary in -an army, as if spies were common: they must do in Spain, as they do -in other places. Send parties out. Let them carry off, sometimes -the priest, sometimes the alcalde, the chief of a convent, the -master of the post or his deputy, and, above all, the letters. Put -them under arrest until they speak. Question them twice each day, -or keep them as hostages. Charge them to send foot messengers, -and to get news. When we know how to take measures of vigour and -force, it is easy to get news. All the posts, all the letters, must -be intercepted. The single motive of procuring intelligence will -be sufficient to authorise a detachment of four or five thousand -men, who will go into a great town, will take the letters from -the post, will seize the richest citizens, their letters, papers, -gazettes, &c. It is beyond doubt, that even in the French lines, -the inhabitants are all informed of what passes; of course, out -of that line, they know more; what, then, should prevent you from -seizing the principal men? Let them be sent back again without -being ill treated. It is a fact, that when we are not in a desert, -but in a peopled country, if the general is not well instructed, -it is because he is ignorant of his trade. The services which the -inhabitants render to an enemy’s general, are never given from -affection, nor even to get money. The truest method to obtain them -is by safeguards and protections to preserve their lives, their -goods, their towns, or their monasteries!” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.] - -Joseph, although by no means a dull man, seems to have had no -portion of his brother’s martial genius, and the operations -recommended by the latter did not appear to the king to be -applicable to the state of affairs. He did not adopt them, but -proposed others; in discussing which, he thus defended the policy -of his retreat from Madrid. - -“When the _defection_ of twenty-two thousand men (Dupont’s) caused -the king to quit the capital, the disposable troops remaining were -divided in three corps: that immediately about his person; that -of marshal Bessieres; and that of general Verdier, then besieging -Zaragoza: but these bodies were spread over a hundred leagues of -ground, and with the last the king had little or no connexion. -His first movement was to unite the two former at Burgos, and -afterwards to enter into communication with the third. The line of -defence on the Ebro was adopted.” This operation Joseph affirmed -to have been dictated by sound reason.--Because “when the events -of Andalusia foreboded a regular and serious war, prudence did -not permit three corps, the strongest of which was only eighteen -thousand men, to separate to a greater distance than six days’ -march, in the midst of eleven millions of people in a state of -hostility. But fifty thousand French could defend with success a -line of sixty leagues, guarding the two grand communications of -Burgos and Tudela, against enemies who had not, up to that period, -been able to carry to either point above twenty-five thousand men; -because fifteen thousand French could be united upon either.” - -Joseph was dissatisfied with Napoleon’s plans, and preferred his -own. The disposable troops at his command, exclusive of those in -Bilbao, were fifty thousand; these he distributed as follows. -The right wing occupied Burgos, Pancorbo, and Puente Lara. The -centre was posted between Haro and Logroña; the left extended from -Logroña to Tudela; the latter town was not occupied. He contended -that this arrangement, at once offensive and defensive, might be -advantageously continued, if the great army directed upon Spain -arrived in September, since it tended to refit the army already -there, and menaced the enemy; but that it could not be prolonged -until November, because in three months the Spaniards must make -a great progress, and would very soon be in a state to take the -offensive with grand organized corps, obedient to a central -administration, which would have time to form in Madrid. Every -thing announced, he said, that the month of October was one of -those decisive epochs which gave to the party who knew how to -profit from it, the priority of movements and success, the progress -of which it was difficult to calculate. - -In this view of affairs, the merits of six projects were discussed -by the king. - -First. To remain in the actual position. This was declared to -be unsustainable, because the enemy could attack the left with -forty thousand, the centre with forty thousand, the right with as -many. Tudela and Navarre, as far as Logroña, required twenty-five -thousand men to defend them. Burgos could not be defended but by an -army in a state to resist the united forces of Blake and Cuesta, -which would amount to eighty thousand men, and it was doubtful -if the twenty thousand bayonets which could be opposed, could -completely beat them; if they did not, the French would be harassed -by the insurgents of the three provinces (Biscay, Navarre, and -Guipuscoa), who would interpose between the left wing and France. - -Second project. To carry the centre and reserve by Tudela, towards -Zaragoza or Almazan; united with the left, they would amount to -thirty thousand men, who might seek for, and, doubtless, would -defeat the enemy, if he was met with on that side. In the meantime, -the right wing, leaving garrisons in the citadel of Burgos and the -fort of Pancorbo, could occupy the enemy, and watch any movements -in the Montagna St. Ander, or disembarkations that might take place -at the ports; but this task was considered difficult, because -Pancorbo was not the only defile accessible to artillery. Three -leagues from thence, another road led upon Miranda, and there was a -third passage over the point of the chain which stretched between -Haro and Miranda. - -Third project. To leave the defence of Navarre to the left wing. -To carry the centre, the reserve, and the right wing, to Burgos, -and to beat the enemy before he could unite; an easy task, as the -French would be thirty thousand strong. Meanwhile, Moncey could -keep the Spaniards in check on the side of Tudela, or if unable to -do that, he was to march up the Ebro, by Logroña and Briviesca, -and join the main body. The communication with France would be -thus lost, but the army might maintain itself until the arrival of -the emperor. A modification of this project proposed that Moncey, -retiring to the entrenched camp of Pampeluna, should there await -either the arrival of the emperor, or the result of the operations -towards Burgos. - -Fourth project. To pass the Ebro in retreat, and to endeavour -to tempt the enemy to fight in the plain between that river and -Vittoria. - -Fifth project. To retire, supporting the left upon Pampeluna, the -right upon Montdragon. - -Sixth project. To leave garrisons, with the means of a six weeks’ -defence, in Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, Pancorbo, and Burgos. To -unite the rest of the army march against the enemy, attack him -wherever he was found, and then wait either near Madrid or in that -country, into which the pursuit of the Spaniards, or the facility -of living, should draw the army. This plan relinquished the -communications with France entirely, but it was said that the grand -army could easily open them again, and the troops already in Spain -would be sufficiently strong to defy all the efforts of the enemy, -to disconcert all his projects, and to wait in a noble attitude the -general impulse which would be given by the arrival of the emperor. - -Of all these projects the last was the favourite with the king, who -strongly recommended it, and asserted, that if it was followed, -affairs would be more prosperous when the emperor arrived than -could be expected from any other plan. Marshal Ney and general -Jourdan approved of it; but it would appear that Napoleon had -other views, and too little confidence in his brother’s military -judgment, to intrust so great a matter to his guidance. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. It is undoubted, that there must always be some sympathy -of genius in the man who is to execute another’s conception in -military affairs. Without that species of harmony between their -minds, the thousand accidental occurrences and minor combinations -which must happen contrary to expectation, will inevitably -embarrass the executor to such a degree, that he will be unable -to see the most obvious advantages, and in striving to unite the -plan he has received with his own views, he will adopt neither, but -steer an unsteady reeling course between both, and fail of success. -The reason of this appears to be, that a strong, and, if the term -may be used, inveterate attention must be fixed upon certain great -principles of action in war, to enable a general to disregard the -minor events and inconveniences which cross his purpose; minor they -are to the great object, but in themselves sufficient to break down -the firmness and self-possession of any but extraordinary men. - -2º. The original memoir from which Joseph’s projects have been -extracted is so blotted and interlined, that it would be unfair -to consider it as a matured production. The great error which -pervades it, is the conjectural data upon which he founds his -plans, and the little real information which he appears to have had -relative to the Spanish forces, views, or interior policy. Thus he -was prepared to act upon the idea, that the central junta would -be able and provident; the parties united, and the armies strong -and well administered; none of which things really took place. -Again, he estimated Cuesta and Blake’s armies at eighty thousand, -and considered them as one body; but they were never united at -all, and if they had, they would scarcely have amounted to sixty -thousand. The bold idea of throwing himself into the interior came -too late; he should have thought of that before he quitted Madrid, -or at least before the central government was established at that -capital. His operations might have been successful against the -miserable armies opposed to him; against good and moveable troops -they would not, as the emperor’s admirable notes prove. - -The first project, wanting those offensive combinations discussed -by Napoleon, was open to all his objections, as being timid and -incomplete. The second was crude and ill-considered, for, according -to the king’s estimate of the Spanish force, thirty thousand men on -each wing might oppose the heads of his columns, sixty thousand -could still have been united at Logroña, pass the Ebro, excite an -insurrection in Navarre, Guipuscoa, and Biscay, seize Tolosa and -Miranda, and fall upon the rear of the French army, which thus -cut in two, and its communications intercepted, would have been -extremely embarrassed. The third was not better judged. Burgos -as an offensive post, protecting the line of defence, was very -valuable, and to unite a large force there was so far prudent; but -if the Spaniards retired, and refused battle with their left, while -the centre and right operated by Logroña and Sanguessa, what would -have been the result? the French right must without any definite -object either have continued to advance, or remained stationary -without communication, or returned to fight a battle for those -very positions which they had just quitted. The fourth depended -entirely upon accident, and is not worth argument. The fifth was -an undisguised retreat. The sixth was not applicable to the actual -situation of affairs. The king’s force was no longer an independent -body, it was become the advanced guard of the great army, marching -under Napoleon. It was absurd, therefore, to contemplate a decisive -movement, without having first matured a plan suitable to the whole -mass that was to be engaged in the execution. In short, to permit -an advanced guard to determine the operations of the main body, was -to reverse the order of military affairs, and to trust to accident -instead of design. It is curious, that while Joseph was proposing -this irruption into Spain, the Spaniards and the military agents of -Great Britain were trembling lest he should escape their power by a -precipitate flight. “_War is not a conjectural art!_” - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -The emperor overruled the offensive projects of the king, and the -latter was forced to distribute the centre and right wing in a -manner more consonant to the spirit of Napoleon’s instructions; but -he still neglected to occupy Tudela, and covered his left wing by -the Aragon river. - -[Sidenote: Journal of the king’s operations, MS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 28.] - -The 18th of September the French army was posted in the following -manner: - - Right wing. Marshal } Three divisions of infantry in front of - Bessieres. 15,595 } Pancorbo, at Briviesca, Santa Maria, - under arms. } and Cuba; light cavalry behind Burgos. - - Centre. Marshal Ney. } - 13,756 under arms. } Logroña, Nalda, and Najera. - - Left wing. Marshal } Milagro, Lodosa, Caparosa, and Alfaro. - Moncey. 16,636 } The garrison of Pampeluna was also - under arms. } under Moncey’s command. - - Reserve of the king. } - Gen. Saligny. 5,413. } - } - Imperial guard. } - Gen. Dorsenne. 2,423. } Miranda, Haro, and Puente Lara. - ------ } - Total 7,833. - - Garrisons. 6,004. Pampeluna. - Gen. Monthion. 1,500. Bilbao. - - { Composed of small garrisons and moveable - Gen. La Grange. 6,979. { columns, guarding the communications - { of Biscay, Alava, and Guipuscoa. - - Grand reserve. - Moveable cols. 1,984. } - Stationary. 20,005. } Bayonne, and watching the valleys of - ------ } the Pyrenees opening into Navarre. - Total, comm. by } - Gen. Drouet, 21,989. } - - -Total 90,289 present under arms, exclusive of the troops in -Catalonia. Hence the communication being secured, the fortresses -garrisoned, and the fort of Pancorbo armed, there remained above -fifty thousand sabres and bayonets disposable on a line of battle -extending from Bilbao to Alfaro. - -To oppose this formidable force the Spanish troops were divided -into three principal masses, denominated the armies of the right, -centre, and left. - - Infantry. Cavalry. Guns. 1st Line. - - The first, composed of the - divisions of St. Marc and } - O’Neil, numbered about 17,500 500 24 } - The second, composed of the } Men. Guns. - divisions of La Pena, Llamas, } - and Caro 26,000 1,300 36 } 75,400 86 - The third, consisting entirely } - of Gallicians, about 30,000 100 26 } - - - 2d Line. - In the second line the Castillians were } - at Segovia 12,000 } - The Estremadurans at Talavera 13,000 } - Two Andalusian divisions were in } 57,000 - La Mancha 14,000 } - And the Asturians (posted at Llanes) were } - called 18,000 } - -This estimate, founded upon a number of contemporary returns and -other documents, proves the monstrous exaggerations put forth at -this time to deceive the Spanish people and the English government. -The Spaniards pretended that above one hundred and forty thousand -men in arms were threatening the French positions on the Ebro, -whereas less than seventy-six thousand were in line of battle, and -those exceedingly ill-armed and provided. The right, under Palafox, -held the country between Zaragoza and Sanguessa, on the Aragon -river; the centre, under Castaños, occupied Borja, Taranzona, and -Agreda; the left, under Blake, was posted at Reynosa, near the -sources of the Ebro. - -The relative position of the French and Spanish armies was very -disadvantageous for the latter. From the right to the left of their -line, that is, from Reynosa to Zaragoza, was twice the distance -between Bayonne and Vittoria, and the roads more difficult; -the reserve under Drouet was consequently in closer military -communication with king Joseph’s army, than the Spanish wings were -with another. The patriots were acting without concert upon double -external lines of operation, and against an enemy far superior in -quickness, knowledge, and organization, and even in numbers. The -French were superior in cavalry, and the base of their operations -rested on three great fortresses, Bayonne, St. Sebastian, and -Pampeluna; and they could in three days carry the centre and the -reserve to either flank, and unite thirty thousand combatants -without drawing a man from their garrisons. The Spaniards held -but one fortress (Zaragoza), and being disseminated in corps -under different generals of equal authority, they could execute -no combined movement with rapidity or precision, nor under any -circumstances could they unite more than 40,000 men at any given -point. - -[Sidenote: Corresp^{ce}. of Captain Carrol.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: General Broderick.] - -In this situation of affairs, general Blake, his army organized -in six divisions (each five thousand strong), of which four were -numbered, and the other two called the advanced guard, and the -reserve, broke up from Reynosa on the 17th of September. One -division advanced on the side of Burgos, to cover the march of the -main body, which, threading the valley of Villarcayo, turned the -right of marshal Bessieres, and reached the Ebro. Two divisions -occupied Traspaderna and Frias, and established a post at Oña, on -the right bank of that river; a third division took a position at -Medina, and a fourth held the town of Erran and the Sierra of that -name. A fifth halted in the town of Villarcayo, to preserve the -communication with Reynosa, and at the same time, 8,000 Asturians -under general Acevedo, quitted the camp at Llanes, and advanced -to St. Ander. General Broderick now arrived in the Spanish camp; -Blake importuned him for money, and obtained it, but treated -him otherwise with great coldness, and withheld all information -relative to the movements of the army. - -[Sidenote: Corresp^{ce}. of general Leith.] - -[Sidenote: Journal of the king’s operations, MS.] - -English vessels hovering on the coast were prepared to supply the -Biscayans with arms and ammunition, and general Blake thought -himself in a situation to revive the insurrection in that province, -and to extend it to Guipuscoa. With this view he detached his -4th division, and five guns, under the command of the marquis of -Portazgo, to attack general Monthion at Bilbao. The king getting -knowledge of the march of this division, ordered a brigade from his -right wing to fall on its flank by the valley of Orduña, and caused -general Merlin to reinforce Monthion by the valley of Durango. -Bessieres aided these dispositions by a demonstration on the side -of Frias, but the combination was made too late. Portazgo was -already master of Bilbao. Monthion retired on the 20th to Durango, -and Bessieres fell back with his corps to Miranda, Haro, and Puente -Lara, having first injured the defences of Burgos. - -[Sidenote: Correspondence of gen. Leith.] - -The king took post with the reserve at Vittoria. Marshal Ney -immediately abandoned his position on the Ebro, and carried his -whole force by a rapid march to Bilbao, where he arrived on the -evening of the 26th. At the same time, general Merle’s division -executed a combined movement from Miranda upon Osma and Barbaceña. -Portazgo being overmatched, occupied the heights above Bilbao, -until nightfall, and then retreated to Valmaceda, where he found -the third division, for Blake had changed his position, and now -occupied Frias with his right, Quincoes with his centre, and -Valmaceda with his left. In this situation, holding the passes of -the mountain, he awaited the arrival of the Asturians, who were -marching by the valley of Villarcayo. All the Spanish artillery -remained in the town of that name, being guarded by a division of -infantry. Thus the second effort to raise Biscay failed of success. - -[Sidenote: Journal of the king’s operations. MS.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -In the mean time, O’Neil, following colonel Doyle’s plan before -mentioned, entered Sanguessa, and was beaten out of it again, with -the loss of two guns. However, the Castillian army approached -the Ebro by the road of Soria. General La-Peña occupied Logroña, -Nalda, and Najera. Llamas and Caro occupied Corella, Cascante, -and Calahorra, and O’Neil took post in the mountains, on the left -bank of the Aragon facing Sanguessa. The peasantry of the valleys -assembled in considerable numbers, and the country between Zaragoza -and the Aragon river appeared to be filled with troops. Marshal -Moncey withdrew from the Ebro, and took a position, with his left -flank at the pass of Sanguessa, his centre at Falces, and his right -at Estella. Ney, leaving Merlin with three thousand men at Bilbao, -returned to the Ebro; but finding that Logroña was occupied in -force by the Spaniards, halted at Guardia on the 5th of October, -and remained in observation. - -[Sidenote: Journal of the king’s operations. MS.] - -On the 4th the king and Bessieres, at the head of Mouton’s and -Merle’s divisions, quitted Miranda, and advanced along the road -of Osma, with the intention of feeling for Blake on the side of -Frias and Medina, but the Spaniards were in force at Valmaceda. -Joseph, deceived by false information, imagined that they were -again in march towards Bilbao, and pushed on to Lodio, with -the intention of attacking Blake during his movement. At Lodio -the king ascertained the truth and halted. He was uneasy about -Moncey, and therefore returned to Murquia on the 7th. In that -town he left Merle to protect the rear of the troops at Bilbao, -and proceeded to Miranda with the division of Mouton. On the -12th, Blake, still intent upon the insurrection of Biscay, placed -a division at Orduña, and attacked Bilbao with fifteen thousand -men. Merlin retired fighting up the valley of Durango as far as -Zornosa, but being joined there by general Verdier, at the head -of six battalions, he turned and checked the pursuit. At this -time the leading columns of the great French army were passing -the Spanish frontier, and Laval’s division advanced to Durango. -Sebastiani, with six thousand men, relieved Merle at Murquia; the -latter repaired to Miranda, and Verdier returned to Vittoria. -Marshal Lefebre, duke of Dantzic, assumed the command of the three -divisions posted at Durango. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers.] - -[Sidenote: Vindication of Castaños.] - -On the Spanish side, the marquis of Romana’s division disembarked -on the 9th at St. Ander, and being completely equipped and provided -from the English stores, the infantry, eight thousand in number, -proceeded by slow marches to join Blake. The Asturians halted -at Villarcayo; but the Estremaduran army, under the conde de -Belvedere, was put in motion, and the Castillian forces arrived -upon the Ebro. The first and third divisions of the Andalusian army -were on the march from La Mancha, and Castaños, quitting Madrid, -proceeded towards Tudela. All things announced the approach of a -great crisis. Yet such was the apathy of the supreme junta, that -the best friends of Spain hoped for a defeat, as the only mode of -exciting sufficient energy in the government to save the state, -and by some it was thought, that even that sharp remedy would be -insufficient. A momentary excitement was, however, caused by the -intercepted letter to Jourdan before spoken of. The troops in the -second line were ordered to proceed to the Ebro by forced marches, -letters were written pressing for the advance of the British army, -and Castaños was enjoined to drive the enemy, without delay, beyond -the frontier; but this sudden fury of action ended with those -orders. Sir David Baird’s corps was detained in the transports at -Coruña, waiting for permission to land; no assistance was afforded -to sir John Moore, and although the subsidies already paid by -England amounted to ten millions of dollars, and that Madrid was -rich, and willing to contribute to the exigencies of the moment, -the central junta, although complaining of the want of money, would -not be at the trouble of collecting patriotic gifts, and left the -armies “to all the horrors of famine, nakedness, and misery.” The -natural consequence of such folly and wickedness ensued; the people -ceased to be enthusiastic, and the soldiers deserted in crowds. - -[Sidenote: General Broderick’s Letter. Par^y. Pap^s.] - -[Sidenote: Birch’s Letters to Leith. MS.] - -The conduct of the generals was scarcely less extraordinary. -Blake had voluntarily commenced the campaign without magazines, -and without any plan, except that of raising the provinces of -Biscay and Guipuscoa. With the usual blind confidence of a -Spaniard, he pressed forward, ignorant of the force or situation -of his adversaries, never dreaming of a defeat, and so little -experienced in the detail of command, that he calculated upon the -ordinary quantity of provision contained in an English frigate, -which cruised off the coast, as a resource for his army, if the -country should fail to supply him with subsistence. His artillery -had only seventy rounds for each gun, his men were without great -coats, many without shoes, and the snow was beginning to fall -in the mountains. That he was able to make any impression is a -proof that king Joseph possessed little military talent: the -French marshals, from the habitude of war, were able to baffle -Blake without difficulty, but the stratagetical importance of the -valley of Orduña they did not appreciate, or he would have been -destroyed. The lesson given by Napoleon, when he defeated Wurmser -in the valley of the Brenta, might have been repeated, under more -favourable circumstances, at Orduña and Durango; but if genius was -asleep with the French, it was dead with the Spaniards. - -As long as Blake remained between Frias and Valmaceda his position -was tolerably secure from an attack, because the Montagna St. -Ander is exceedingly rugged, and the line of retreat by Villacayo -was open; but he was cooped up in a corner, and ill-placed for -offensive movements, which were the only operations he thought -of. Instead of occupying Burgos, and repairing the citadel, he -descended on Bilbao with the bulk of his army, thereby discovering -his total ignorance of war; for several great valleys, the upper -parts of which were possessed by the French, met near that town, -and it was untenable. The flank of his army was exposed to an -attack from the side of Orduña, and his line of retreat was always -in the power of Bessieres. To protect his flank and rear, Blake -detached largely, but that weakened the main body without obviating -the danger, nor did he make amends for his bad dispositions by -diligence, for his movements were slow, his attacks without vigour, -and his whole conduct displayed temerity without decision, and -rashness without enterprise. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 27.] - -The armies of the centre and right were not better conducted. -Castaños, having quitted Madrid on the 8th of October, arrived at -Tudela on the 17th, and on the 20th held a conference with Palafox -at Zaragoza. The aggregate of their forces did not much exceed -forty-five thousand men, of which from two to three thousand were -cavalry. Sixty pieces of artillery followed the divisions, and the -whole was posted in the following manner: - - -ARMY OF THE CENTRE, 27,000. - -General Pignatelli, with ten thousand Castillian infantry, one -thousand five hundred cavalry, and fourteen guns, at Logroña. - -General Grimarest, with the second division of Andalusia, five -thousand men, at Lodosa. - -General La-Peña, with the fourth division, five thousand infantry, -at Calahorra. - -The parc of artillery, and a division of infantry, four thousand, -at Centruenigo. - -The remainder at Tudela and the neighbouring villages. - - -ARMY OF ARAGON, 18,000. - -O’Neil, with seven thousand five hundred men, held Sos, Lumbar, and -Sanguessa. - -Thirty miles in the rear, St. Marc occupied Exca, with five -thousand five hundred men. - -Palafox, with five thousand men, remained in Zaragoza. - -The Ebro rolled between these two corps. Taken as one army, their -front lines occupied two sides of an irregular triangle, of which -Tudela was the apex, and Sanguessa and Logroña the extremities of -the base. Those points being taken as the chord, the rivers Ebro -and Aragon meeting at Milagro, describe, in their double course, an -arc, the convex of which was opposed to the Spaniards. The streams -of the Ega, the Arga, and the Zidasco rivers, descending from the -Pyrenees in parallel courses, cut the chord of this arc at nearly -equal distances, and fall, the two first into the Ebro, and the -last into the Aragon. All the roads leading from Pampeluna to the -Ebro follow the course of those torrents. - -Marshal Moncey’s right was at Estella on the Ega, his centre held -Falces and Tafalla on the Arga and the Zidasco, his left was in -front of Sanguessa on the Aragon. The bridges of Olite and Peralta -were secured by advanced parties, and Caparosa, where there was -another bridge, he occupied in force. In this situation he could -operate freely between the torrents, which intersected his line; -he commanded all the roads leading to the Ebro, and he could, from -Caparosa, at any moment, issue forth against the centre of the -Spanish armies. Now from Tudela to Sanguessa is fifty miles, from -Tudela to Logroña is sixty miles, but from Tudela to Caparosa is -only twelve miles of good road; wherefore, the extremities of the -Spanish line were above one hundred miles, or six days’ march from -each other, while a single day would have sufficed to unite the -French within two hours’ march of the centre. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.] - -[Sidenote: Colonel Graham’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Col. Doyle’s Correspondence.] - -The weakness of the Spaniards’ position is apparent. If Palafox, -crossing the Aragon at Sanguessa, advanced towards Pampeluna, -Moncey would be on his left flank and rear; if he turned against -Moncey, the garrison of Pampeluna would fall upon his right. If -Castaños, to favour the attack of Palafox, crossed the Ebro at -Logroña, Ney, being posted at Guardia, was ready to take him in -flank; if the two wings endeavoured to unite, their line of march -was liable to be intercepted at Tudela by Moncey, and the rear of -Castaños attacked by Ney, who could pass the Ebro at Logroña or -Lodosa. If they remained stationary, they might easily be beaten -in detail. Any other than Spanish generals would have been filled -with apprehension on such an occasion. But Palafox and Castaños, -heedless of their own danger, tranquilly proceeded to arrange a -plan of offensive operations singularly absurd. They agreed that -the army of the centre, leaving a division at Lodosa and another -at Calahorra, should make a flank march to the right, and take a -position along the Aragon, the left to be at Tudela, the right at -Sanguessa; that is, with less than twenty thousand men to occupy -fifty miles of country close to a powerful enemy. In the meantime, -Palafox, with the Aragonese, crossing the river at Sanguessa, was -to extend in an oblique line to Roncesvalles, covering the valleys -of Talay, Escay, and Roncal, with his centre, and reinforcing his -army by the armed inhabitants, who were ready to flock to his -standard. Blake was invited to operate, in combination with them, -by Guipuscoa, and to pass in the rear of the whole French army, so -as to unite with Palafox, and thus cut off the enemy’s retreat into -France, and intercept his reinforcements at the same time. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of the king’s operations, MS.] - -Castaños returned to Tudela on the 23d, and proceeded to Logroña -on the 25th; the grand movement being to commence on the 27th. -But on the 21st, Grimarest had pushed forward strong detachments -across the Ebro to Mendavia, Andosilla, Sesma, and Carcur, and -one over the Ega to Lerim. The Castillian outposts also occupied -Viana on the left bank of the Ebro. The Aragonese divisions were -already closing upon Sanguessa, and a multitude of peasants crowded -to the same place in the hope of obtaining arms and ammunition. -Moncey, deceived by this concourse of persons, estimated the force -in Sanguessa at twenty thousand, when, in fact, it was only eight -thousand regular troops. His report, and the simultaneous movements -of the Spaniards on both extremities, made the king to apprehend a -triple attack from Logroña, Lodosa, and Sanguessa. He immediately -reinforced Ney with a division (Merlin’s) of Bessieres’ corps, and -directed him to clear the left bank of the Ebro, while a second -division (Bonnet’s) of Bessieres descended the right bank from Haro -to Briones. A division of Moncey’s corps, stationed at Estella, -received orders to follow the course of the Ega, and second Ney’s -operations; and a part of the garrison of Pampeluna, posted at -Montreal and Salinas, was commanded to advance upon Nardues, and -make a demonstration against Sanguessa. - -[Illustration: _Explanatory Sketch_ of the FRENCH & SPANISH -POSITIONS _the 26^{th} Oct^r. 1808_. - -_London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street._] - -[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence. MS.] - -[Sidenote: Colonel Graham’s Correspondence. MS.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -When Castaños arrived at Logroña these operations were in full -activity. Ney had advanced on the 24th, driven back the Castillian -outposts, crowned the height opposite that town on the 25th, and -was cannonading the Spaniards’ position. On the 26th, he renewed -his fire briskly until twelve o’clock, at which time Castaños, -after giving Pignatelli strict orders to defend his post unless -he was turned by a force descending the right bank of the Ebro, -proceeded himself to Lodosa and Calahorra. As the road winded by -the river, the Spanish general was exposed to the fire of light -troops posted in a wood on the opposite side, but escaped without -injury. Meanwhile the French from Estella falling down the Ega, -drove the Spanish parties out of Mendavia, Andosilla, Carcur, and -Sesma; and Grimarest retired from Lodosa to La Torre with such -precipitation, that he left colonel Cruz, a valuable officer, -with a light battalion, and some volunteers, at Lerim. A -squadron of cavalry escaped, but Cruz, with the infantry, being -surrounded in a convent, was, after a creditable resistance, taken. -Pignatelli, regardless of Castaños’ orders, retired from Logroña, -and abandoned all his guns at the foot of the Sierra de Nalda, only -a few miles from the enemy, then crossing the mountains gained -Centruenigo in such disorder, that his men continued to arrive for -twenty-four hours consecutively. On the right, O’Neil skirmished -with the garrison of Pampeluna, and lost six men killed, and eight -wounded; but, in the Spanish fashion, announced, that, after a -hard action of many hours, the enemy was completely overthrown. -On the 27th, Merlin’s division rejoined Bessieres at Miranda, and -Bonnet, retiring from Briones, took post in front of Pancorbo. -Castaños, incensed at the ill conduct of the Castillians, dismissed -Pignatelli, and incorporated his troops with the Andalusian -divisions. Fifteen hundred men of the latter, commanded by the -Conde de Cartoajal, being sent back to Nalda, recovered the lost -guns, and brought them safe to Centruenigo. - -[Sidenote: Castaños’ Vindication.] - -[Sidenote: Colonel Graham’s Correspondence. MS.] - -[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence. MS.] - -Internal dissensions succeeded to external troubles. Palafox -arrogantly censured Castaños, and a cabal, of which general -Coupigny appears to have been the principal mover, was formed -against the latter. The junta, exasperated that Castaños had not -already driven the enemy beyond the frontier, encouraged his -traducers, and circulated slanderous accusations themselves, as -if his inaction alone enabled the French to remain in Spain. Don -Francisco Palafox, brother of the captain-general, and a member -of the supreme junta, was sent to head-quarters avowedly to -facilitate, but really to interfere with, and control the military -operations. He arrived at Alfaro on the 29th, accompanied by -Coupigny and the conde de Montijo, a turbulent, factious man, -shallow and vain, but designing and unprincipled. Castaños waited -upon the representative of the government, and laid before him the -denuded state of the army, and the captain-general, Palafox, coming -up from Zaragoza, a council of war was held at Tudela on the 5th of -November. The rough manner in which the troops were driven from the -left bank of the Ebro was not sufficient to divert the attention -of the Spanish generals from the grand project of gaining the rear -of the French army. The council agreed to persevere, although -certain advice was received that the enemy were strengthened by -thirty thousand fresh men. Deeming it, however, fitting, that Blake -should act the first, it was resolved to await his time, but, as an -intermediate operation, it was agreed that the army of the centre, -leaving six thousand men at Calahorra, and a garrison at Tudela, -should cross the Ebro and attack Caparosa. French parties were, -however, pushed as far as Voltierra, and in the skirmishes which -ensued, the conduct of the Castillian battalions was discreditable. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -Joseph Palafox returned to Zaragoza, and the deputy separated -himself from Castaños. The loss sustained by desertion and the -previous combats was considerable, but some Murcian levies, and a -part of the first and third Andalusian divisions joined the army -of the centre, which now mustered twenty-six thousand infantry, -and nearly three thousand cavalry under arms, with fifty or sixty -pieces of artillery. The positions of the army extended from -Calahorra, by Haro, to Tudela. La-Peña held the first town with -five thousand men; Grimarest and Caro commanded eight thousand -at the second; and head-quarters, with thirteen thousand five -hundred men, were fixed in the last. Cartoajal remained with eleven -hundred in the Sierra de Nalda, and eight hundred were posted at -Ansejo. - -[Sidenote: Graham’s Correspondence. MS.] - -[Sidenote: Castaños’ Vindication]. - -[Sidenote: Graham’s Correspondence. MS.] - -In pursuance of the plan arranged, the troops were in movement to -cross the Ebro, when despatches from Blake announced that he had -met with some disaster on the 31st, the extent of which he did not -communicate. This news arrested the attack; and the preposterous -transactions that ensued, resembled the freaks of Caligula rather -than the operations of real war. First, it was arranged that the -army should abandon Tudela, and take a position in two lines, -the extremities of the one to rest on Calahorra and Amedo, the -second to extend from Alfaro to Fitero. The deputy ordered O’Neil, -with the army of Aragon, to occupy the latter of these lines -forthwith, but O’Neil refused to stir without instructions from -the captain-general. This was on the 9th, on the 10th the plan was -changed. Castaños fixed his head-quarters at Centruenigo, and the -deputy proposed that O’Neil should descend the right bank of the -Aragon river, and attack Caparosa in the rear; that the troops in -Tudela should attack it in front; and that a division should make -a demonstration of passing the Ebro in boats, opposite to Milagro, -in order to favour this attack. Castaños assented. On the 12th a -division assembled opposite Milagro, and La-Peña with two divisions -marched against Caparosa. Suddenly, the whimsical deputy sent -them orders to repair to Lodosa, forty miles higher up the Ebro, -and attack the bridge at that place, while Grimarest crossing in -the boats at Calahorra, should ascend the left bank of the Ebro, -and take it in rear. La-Peña and Villarcayo, confounded by this -change, wrote to Castaños for an explanation. This was the first -intimation that the latter, who was lying sick at Centruenigo, -received of the altered dispositions. He directed his lieutenants -to obey; but being provoked beyond endurance, wrote sharply to the -junta, demanding to know who was to command the army; and after -all this insolence and vapouring on the part of Francisco Palafox, -no operation took place at all. He declared, that his intention -was merely to make a demonstration, ordered the troops to their -quarters, and then, without assigning any reason, deprived La-Peña -of his command, and appointed Cartoajal in his place. - -[Sidenote: Vindication of Castaños.] - -It was at this time that sir John Moore’s letter arrived; but -Castaños, no longer master of his own operations, could ill concert -a plan of campaign with the general of another army. He could not -even tell what troops were to be at his nominal disposal; for the -Estremaduran force, originally destined for his command, was now -directed by the junta upon Burgos, and the remainder of his own -first and third division was detained in Madrid. His enemies, -especially Montijo, were active in spreading reports to his -disadvantage; the deserters scattered over the country declared -that all the generals were traitors, and the people of the towns -and villages, deceived by the central junta, and excited by false -rumours, respected neither justice nor government, and committed -the most scandalous excesses. - -Blake’s situation was not more prosperous. - -The road from Bayonne to Vittoria was encumbered with the advancing -columns of the great French army. An imperial decree, issued early -in September, commanded that the troops already in Spain should -be incorporated with the grand army then marching from Germany. -The united forces were to compose eight divisions, called “Corps -d’Armée,” an institution analogous to the Roman legion, because -each “Corps d’Armée,” although adapted to act with facility as -a component part of a large army, was also provided with light -cavalry, a parc, and train of artillery, engineers, sappers, and -miners, and a complete civil administration, to enable it to take -the field as an independent force. The imperial guards and the -heavy cavalry of the army were not included in this arrangement; -the first had a constitution of their own, and at this time all the -heavy cavalry, and all the artillery, not attached to the “Corps -d’Armée,” were formed into a large reserve. As the columns arrived -in Spain, they were united to the troops already there, and the -whole was disposed conformably to the new organization. - - Marshal Victor, duke of Belluno, commanded the first corps. - Marshal Bessieres, duke of Istria second corps. - Marshal Moncey, duke of Cornegliano third corps. - Marshal Lefebre, duke of Dantzic fourth corps. - Marshal Mortier, duke of Treviso fifth corps. - Marshal Ney, duke of Elchingen sixth corps. - General St. Cyr seventh corps. - General Junot, duke of Abrantes eighth corps. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of the king’s operations, MS.] - -The seventh corps was appropriated to Catalonia; the remainder were -in the latter end of October assembled or assembling in Navarre and -Biscay. General Merlin, with a division, held Zornosa, and observed -Blake, who remained tranquilly at Bilbao. Two divisions of the -fourth corps occupied Durango and the neighbouring villages. One -division and the light cavalry of the first corps was at Vittoria, -a second division of the same corps guarded the bridge of Murguia -on the river Bayas, and commanded the entrance to the valley of -Orduña. Haro, Puente Lara, Miranda, and Pancorbo were maintained -by the infantry of the king’s body guard and the second corps, and -the light cavalry of the latter covered the plains close up to -Briviesca. - -The reinforcements were daily crowding up to Vittoria, and the -king, restrained by the emperor’s orders to a rigorous system -of defence, occupied himself with the arrangements attendant on -such an immense accumulation of force, and left Blake in quiet -possession of Bilbao. The latter mistook this apparent inactivity -for timidity; he was aware that reinforcements, in number equal -to his whole army, had joined the enemy; but, with wonderful -rashness, he resolved to press forward, and readily agreed to -attempt a junction with Palafox, in the rear of the French -position. At this time Romana’s infantry were approaching Bilbao, -and the Estremadurans were in march for Burgos; but the country -was nearly exhausted of provisions; both armies felt the scarcity, -and desertion prevailed among the Spaniards. The Biscayans, twice -abandoned, were fearful of a third insurrection. Prudence dictated -a retreat towards Burgos. Blake resolved to advance. - -[Sidenote: Carrol’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Brodrick’s Correspondence.] - -Having posted general Acevedo with the Asturians and the second -division at Orduña, he left a battalion at Miravelles, to preserve -the communication with Bilbao, and the 24th of October marched -himself at the head of seventeen thousand fighting men, divided in -three columns, to attack Zornosa. The right ascended the valley -of Durango by Galdacano, the centre by Larabezua, the left by -Rigoytia; at the same time general Acevedo penetrated through the -mountains of Gorbea by Ozoco and Villaro, with a view to seize -Manares and St. Antonia d’Urquitiola. It was intended by this -operation to cut the communication between Miranda on the Ebro, -and the town of Durango, and thus to intercept the retreat of -marshal Ney, and oblige him to surrender with sixteen thousand men; -for Blake was utterly ignorant of his adversary’s position, and -imagined that he had only two corps to deal with. He believed that -the king, with one, was in his front at Durango and Mont Dragon, -and that Ney, with the other, was at Miranda, when in fact, the -latter was at that moment attacking Pignatelli at Logroña. As the -Spanish army approached Zornosa, Merlin abandoned the town, and -drew up on some heights in the rear. Bad weather, and the want -of provisions, checked further operations until the 25th. On the -evening of that day, the Spanish division at Rigoytia attempted to -turn the right flank of the French. At the same time Blake marched -against the centre and left, and Merlin fell back to Durango. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of the king’s operations, MS.] - -The duke of Dantzic, alarmed by these movements, concentrated his -whole force, consisting of two divisions of infantry (Sebastiani’s -and Laval’s), and a Dutch brigade at Durango; his third division -(Valence’s) being yet in France. The king reinforced him with a -division of the first corps (Villatte’s), and ordered Merlin’s -troops, which were composed of detachments, to join their -respective regiments. From the 25th to the 30th the armies -remained quiet; but at day-break on the 31st, the Spaniards were -formed in order of battle, five miles beyond Zornosa, and close -to the enemy’s position. The vanguard drew up across the road to -Durango; the reserve at some distance in the rear. The third and -fourth divisions occupied the intermediate space, so disposed as -to outflank the others, in a chequer shape. The first division -occupied a height on the left of the road, and behind the reserve. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Carrol’s Correspondence.] - -The duke of Dantzic, apprised by the previous movements, that -he was going to be attacked, became impatient; the state of the -atmosphere prevented him from discovering the order of march, or -the real force of the Spaniards; he knew that Blake had the power -of uniting nearly fifty thousand men, and concluding that such a -force was in his front, he resolved to anticipate his adversaries -by a sudden and vigorous assault. In fact, the Spanish generals -were so little guided by the rules of war, that before their -incapacity was understood, their very errors being too gross for -belief contributed to their safety. Blake had commenced a great -offensive movement, intending to beat the troops in his front, and -to cut off and capture Ney’s corps of sixteen thousand men. In six -days, although unopposed, he advanced less than fifteen miles, and -so disposed his forces, that out of thirty-six thousand men, he -concentrated only seventeen thousand infantry, without artillery, -upon the field of battle! - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -[Sidenote: Leith’s Correspondence. MS.] - -The duke of Dantzic, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, -formed in three columns of attack, descended the heights of -Durango. A thick fog covering the mountain sides, filled all the -valleys; and a few random shots alone indicated the presence of the -hostile armies. Suddenly Villatte’s division appeared close to the -Spanish vanguard; and with a brisk onset forced it back upon the -third division. Sebastiani’s and Leval’s followed in succession; a -fire of artillery, to which Blake could make no reply, opened along -the road: the day cleared, and the Spanish army, heaped in confused -masses, was, notwithstanding the example of personal courage given -by Blake, and the natural strength of the country, driven from one -position to another. At mid-day it was beyond Zornosa, and at three -o’clock in full flight for Bilbao, which place it gained in a state -of great confusion during the night. The next day Blake crossed -the Salcedon, and took a position at Nava. The duke of Dantzic -pursued as far as Guenes, and then leaving general Villatte, with -seven thousand men, to observe the enemy, returned to Bilboa. -Twelve vessels, laden with English stores, were in the river, but -contrived to escape. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -The king was displeased with the precipitancy of marshal Lefebre, -but endeavoured to profit from the result. The division of the -first corps, stationed at Murguia, was ordered to descend the -valley of Orduña, as far as Amurio, to aid the operations of the -fourth corps. At the same time, Mouton’s division was detached from -the second corps towards Barbareña, from whence it was, according -to circumstances, either to join the troops in the valley of -Orduña, or to watch Medina and Quincoes, and press Blake in his -retreat, if he retired by Villarcayo. The French were ignorant -of the situation of general Acevedo. On the day of the action at -Zornosa, that general was at Villaro, from whence he endeavoured -to rejoin Blake, by marching to Valmaceda. He reached Miravalles, -in the valley of Orduña, on the 3d, at the moment when the head -of the French troops coming from Murguia appeared in sight. After -a slight skirmish, the latter thinking they had to deal with the -whole of Blake’s army, retired to Orduña, and Acevedo immediately -pushed for the Salcedon river. Villatte first got notice of his -march, and dividing his own troops, posted one half at Orantia, on -the road leading from Miravalles to Nava, the other on the road to -Valmaceda, thus intercepting the line of retreat. - -[Sidenote: Captain Carrol.] - -Blake, who was informed of Acevedo’s danger, in the night of the -4th, with great decision and promptitude, instantly passed the -bridge of Nava, and at daybreak crowned the heights of Orantia -with three divisions, meaning to fall suddenly upon the French; -but they were aware of his intention, and sending a detachment -to occupy Gordujuela, a pass in the mountains, leading to Bilbao, -rejoined Villatte on the Valmaceda road. Five Spanish divisions and -some of Romania’s troops were now assembled at Orantia: Blake left -two in reserve, detached one against Gordujuela, and marched with -the other two against the French position. Villatte was overpowered -and driven across the Salcedon; but rallied on the left bank and -renewed the action. At this moment Acevedo appeared in sight; he -sent two battalions by a circuit to gain the rear of the French, -and with the remainder joined in the combat. Villatte retired -fighting, and encountering the two battalions in his retreat, broke -through them, and reached Guenes, but not without considerable -loss of men, and he also left one gun and part of his baggage in -the hands of the Spaniards. Thus ended a series of operations and -combats, which had lasted for eleven days. - -[Illustration: _Explanatory Sketch_ of BLAKE’S POSITION _at the -Battle of Zornoza_. - -_London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street._] - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. The duke of Dantzic’s attack at Zornosa was founded upon -false data; it was inconsistent with the general plan of the -campaign, hasty, ill-combined, and feebly followed up. It was an -unpardonable fault to leave Villatte without support, close to an -army that had met with no signal defeat, and that was five times -his strength. The march of Victor’s division was too easily checked -at Miravalles. For five days, general Acevedo, with at least eight -thousand men, was wandering unmolested in the midst of the French -columns, and finally escaped without any extraordinary effort. - -2º. General Blake’s dispositions, with the exception of his -night-march from Nava to Orantia, will, if studied, afford -useful lessons in an inverse sense. From the 24th of October to -the 4th of November, he omitted no error that the circumstances -rendered it possible to commit; and then, as if ashamed of the -single judicious movement that occurred, he would not profit by -it. Romana’s infantry being partly arrived, and the remainder in -the vicinity of Nava, the whole Spanish army was, contrary to all -reasonable expectation, concentrated; Blake had then above thirty -thousand fighting men united in one mass, harassed, but not much -discouraged, and the conde de Belvedere, with twelve thousand -infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery, -was close to Burgos. - -If Blake had been at all acquainted with the principles of his -art, he would have taken advantage of Villatte’s retreat, to -march by Espinosa, and Villarcayo, to the upper Ebro; from thence -have gained Burgos; brought up the artillery from Reynosa; united -Belvedere’s troops to his own; opened a communication with the -English army; and in that position, with a plentiful country behind -him, his retreat open, and his army provided with cavalry, he might -have commenced a regular system of operations; but with incredible -obstinacy and want of judgment, he determined to attack Bilbao -again, and to renew the ridiculous attempt to surround the French -army and unite with Palafox at the foot of the Pyrenees. - -[Sidenote: Lord W. Bentinck’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, Sect. 8.] - -Such were the commanders, the armies, the rulers, upon whose -exertions the British cabinet relied for the security of sir John -Moore’s troops, during their double march from Lisbon and Coruña. -It was in such a state of affairs that the English ministers, -anticipating the speedy and complete destruction of the French -forces in Spain, were sounding the trumpet for an immediate -invasion of France! Of France, defended by a million of veteran -soldiers, and governed by the mightiest genius of two thousand -years! As if the vast military power of that warlike nation had -suddenly become extinct; as if Baylen were a second Zama, and -Hannibal flying to Adrumetum instead of passing the Iberus! But -Napoleon, with an execution more rapid than other men’s thoughts, -was already at Vittoria, and his hovering eagles cast a gloomy -shadow over Spain. - - - - -BOOK IV. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of the king’s operations, MS.] - -After the opening of the legislative sessions, the emperor -quitted Paris, and repaired to Bayonne. He arrived there on the -3d of November. It was his intention that the presumption of the -Spanish generals should be encouraged by a strict defensive system -until the moment, when the blow he was prepared to strike, could -fall with the greatest effect. The precipitate attack at Zornosa -displeased him, and he was also dissatisfied with the subsequent -measures of the king. He thought that the safety of Mouton’s -division would be compromised between the armies of Blake and the -conde de Belvedere. To prevent any accident, he judged it necessary -that Bessieres should advance with the whole of the second corps to -Burgos; that marshal Victor should march by Amurio to Valmaceda; -and that marshal Le-Febre should immediately renew his attack on -that position, from the side of Bilbao. These dispositions were -executed, and thus at the very moment when Blake was leading his -harassed and starving troops back to Bilbao, two corps, amounting -to fifty thousand men, were in full march to meet him, and a third -had already turned his right flank, and was on his rear. - -[Sidenote: Captain Carrol’s Corresp^{ce}.] - -[Sidenote: General Leith’s Corresp^{ce}.] - -The Spanish general advanced from Valmaceda on the 7th, and -thinking that only fifteen hundred men were in Guenes, prepared to -surround them. Two divisions making a circuit to the left, passed -through Abellana and Sopoerte, with a view to gain the bridge of -Sodupe, in the rear of Guenes, while two other divisions attacked -that position in front; the remainder of the army followed at -some distance. The advanced guard of the 4th corps was in Guenes, -and after an action of two hours, the Spaniards were thrown into -confusion; but the night saved them from a total rout. The same -day, one of their flanking divisions was encountered and beaten -near Sopoerte, and the retreat of the other being intercepted on -the side of Abellana, it was forced to make for Portagalete on -the sea-coast, and from thence to St. Andero. Blake’s eyes being -now opened a little to the peril of his situation, he resolved to -retreat to Espinosa de los Monteros, a strong mountain position, -two days’ march in the rear; intending to rest his troops there, -and to draw supplies from the magazines at Reynosa. Retreating -during the night to Valmaceda, he gained Nava on the 8th, and -finally reached Espinosa on the 9th. The remainder of Romana’s -infantry came up during this retreat, and the whole army was, with -the exception of the division cut off at Abellana, concentrated in -a strong position, which covered the intersection of the roads from -St. Andero, Villarcayo, and Reynosa. - -Napoleon, accompanied by the dukes of Dalmatia and Montebello, -quitted Bayonne the morning of the 8th, and reached Vittoria in -the evening. He was met by the civil and military chiefs at the -gates of the town; but refusing to go to the house prepared for his -reception, he jumped off his horse, entered the first small inn -that he observed, and calling for his maps, and a report of the -situation of the armies on both sides, proceeded to study the plan -of his campaign. - -The first and fourth corps, after uniting at Valmaceda, had -separated again at Nava on the 9th, Victor pursuing the track of -Blake, and Lefebre marching upon Villarcayo by Medina. The second -corps was concentrating at Briviesca, the third corps occupied -Tafalla, Peraltes, Caparosa, and Estrella. The sixth corps, the -guards, and the reserve, were distributed from Vittoria to Miranda, -and a division, under the command of general La Grange, was at -Guardia, connecting the positions of the third and sixth corps. The -fifth corps was still behind the frontier, and the eighth composed -of the troops, removed from Portugal by the convention of Cintra, -was marching from the French sea-ports, where it had disembarked. - -On the Spanish side, the conde de Belvedere was at Burgos, Castaños -and Palafox, unknowing of their danger, were planning to cut off -the French army, and Blake was flying to Espinosa. The English army -were scattered from Coruña to Talavera de la Reyna. - -[Sidenote: S. Marshal Soult’s Operations, MSS.] - -In two hours the emperor had arranged his plans. Moncey was -directed to leave a division in front of Pampeluna, to observe -the Spaniards on the Aragon, to concentrate the remainder of the -third corps at Lodosa, and to remain on the defensive until further -orders. Lagrange was reinforced by Colbert’s brigade of light -cavalry from the sixth corps, and directed upon Logroña. The first -and fourth corps were to press Blake without intermission. The -sixth to march towards Aranda de Douero. The duke of Dalmatia was -appointed to command the 2d corps, and ordered to fall headlong -upon the conde de Belvedere. The emperor, with the imperial guards -and the reserve, followed the movement of the second corps. - -These instructions being issued, the enormous mass of the French -army was put in motion with a celerity that marked the vigour of -Napoleon’s command. Marshal Soult having departed on the instant -for Briviesca, arrived there at day-break on the 9th, received -the second corps from the hands of Bessieres, and in a few hours, -the divisions composing it were in full march for the terrace of -Monasterio, which overlooks the plains of Burgos. Head-quarters -were established there, and, during the night, general Franceschi’s -brigade of light cavalry took the road of Zaldueño to Arlanzon, -having orders to cross the river of that name, and descending the -left bank, to cut the communication of the Spaniards with Madrid, -and to prevent them from rallying at the convent of the Chartreuse, -if defeated near Burgos. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -At four o’clock on the morning of the 10th, the French were in -march from Monasterio, and at six o’clock general Lassalle’s -cavalry reached Villa Fria. The conde de Belvedere, being informed -of their approach, posted the Spanish army at Gamonal, and taking -four thousand infantry, eight guns, and the whole of his cavalry, -fell upon Lassalle. The latter skirmished for a while, and then -following his orders, retired slowly to Rio Bena. At eight -o’clock, the French infantry, which had advanced by two roads, was -reunited at this town, and immediately pushed forward on Villa -Fria. Belvedere was soon driven back upon Gamonal, and the Spanish -army was discovered in line of battle. The right occupied a wood, -leaving a clear space of some extent between it and the river -Arlazon. The left was posted in the walled park of Vellimer. Thirty -pieces of artillery covered the front, and seven or eight thousand -armed peasants were arrayed on the heights, immediately behind -the regular troops. These latter amounted to eleven thousand one -hundred and fifty infantry, and eleven hundred and fifty cavalry, -following a field state of their numbers, found after the action. -This was the best army at that time in Spain; it was composed of -the Walloon and Spanish guards, the regiments of Mayorca, Zafra, -and Valencia de Alcantara; the hussars of Valencia, the royal -carbineers, and some volunteers of good families. It was completely -equipped, and armed principally from the English stores; but its -resistance was even more feeble than that made by the half-famished -peasants of Blake’s force. - - -BATTLE OF GAMONAL. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 15.] - -General Lassalle, with the light cavalry, led down upon the Spanish -right, and filled the plain between the river and the wood. At -the same moment the Spanish artillery opened along the whole of -their line, and the French infantry formed in columns of regiments -arrived. Mouton’s division, composed of old soldiers, broke at once -into the wood at a charging pace. General Bonnet followed closely, -but so rapid and effectual was the assault of Mouton’s veterans, -that Bonnet’s troops never fired a shot. The Spaniards fled in -disorder, the left wing, although not attacked, followed the -example of the right, and the whole mass, victors and vanquished, -rushed into the town of Burgos with extraordinary violence and -uproar. At the same moment, Bessieres, who retained the command -of all the heavy cavalry, passed at full gallop toward the Madrid -road, where it crosses the Arlazon, sabring the fugitives, and -taking all the guns which had escaped Mouton’s vehement attack; -and on the other side of the river, Franceschi was seen to cut in -pieces some Catalonian light troops stationed there, and to bar -all hopes of flight. Never was a defeat more instantaneous, or -more complete. Two thousand five hundred Spaniards were killed; -twenty guns, thirty ammunition waggons, six pair of colours, and -nine hundred men, were taken on the field. Four thousand musquets -were found unbroken, and the fugitives were dispersed far and -wide. Belvedere himself escaped to Lerma, where he arrived in the -evening of the day on which the battle was fought. Meeting some -battalions, principally composed of volunteers, on their march to -join his army, he retired with them to Aranda de Douero during -the night; but first, with true Spanish exaggeration, wrote a -despatch, in which he asserted, that the French were repulsed in -two desperate attacks; but that after thirteen hours hard fighting, -they succeeded in a third. - -All the ammunition and stores of the Spanish army were captured in -Burgos; and the indefatigable marshal Soult, who was still upon -the post-horse, which he mounted at Briviesca; not content with -travelling from Bayonne to Burgos, taking the latter town, and -gaining a decisive victory within the space of fifty hours; now -rallied his corps, and detaching one column in pursuit on the side -of Lerma, and another towards Valencia and Valladolid, marched -himself with a third, on the very day of the battle, towards -Reynosa, where he hoped to intercept Blake’s line of retreat to the -plains of Leon. - -[Sidenote: Carrol’s Corresp^{ce}.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -This last-mentioned general reached Espinosa, as we have seen, on -the evening of the 9th, with six divisions, including Romana’s -infantry, who also dragged with them six guns of a small calibre. -The separation of the fourth division at Abellana, the deserters, -and the losses sustained in battle, had reduced the army below -twenty-five thousand fighting men. The parc of ammunition and the -artillery, guarded by two thousand infantry, were behind Reynosa, -at Aquilar del Campo, on the road to Leon. Blake’s position was -strong, and he hoped to remain in it for some days unmolested. -His left wing, composed of the Asturians, and the first division, -occupied some heights which covered the road of St. Andero. The -centre, consisting of the third division and the reserve, formed -a line across the road of Reynosa, which led through Espinosa -directly to the rear. The second division was established on a -commanding height, a little on the right hand of the town; Romana’s -infantry were posted in a wood, two miles in advance of the right; -and the vanguard, with six guns, formed a reserve behind the centre -of the position. - - -BATTLE OF ESPINOSA. - -At two o’clock in the afternoon of the 10th, the head of marshal -Victor’s columns drove back Romana’s infantry[18], and seized -the wood; but the Spaniards, reinforced by the third division, -renewed the combat. A second French column, however, opened its -fire upon the Spanish centre, thus weakened by the advance of the -third division; and at the same time some light troops ascending -the heights on the left, menaced that wing of Blake’s army. The -contest on the right was maintained with vigour, and the Spaniards, -supported by the fire of the six guns in their centre, appeared -to be gaining ground, when the night closed and put an end to -the action, leaving the French in possession of the wood, and of -a ridge of hills, which, at the distance of a cannon-shot, run -parallel to the centre of the position. Generals St. Roman and -Riquielmé were mortally wounded this day on the Spanish side. - -At daylight the next morning, Victor, who had relieved his left -with fresh troops during the night, renewed the attack. General -Maison throwing out a cloud of skirmishers along the front of the -Spanish centre and left wing, under cover of their fire, passed -rapidly to his own right, and fell upon the Asturians and the first -division. Blake, observing this movement, detached a column of -grenadiers to reinforce the latter, and advanced in person with -three regiments from the centre to take Maison in flank during -his march. It was too late. Three Asturian generals fell at the -first fire, and the troops of that kingdom fled without waiting -for the enemy. They were soon followed by the first division, and -Maison, continuing his course without a check, intercepted the line -of retreat by St. Andero, and also that by the town of Espinosa. -In the mean time, the French troops posted on the parallel ridge -before spoken of, attacked the centre, and the division in the wood -advancing against the right of the Spaniards, their whole army gave -way in terrible confusion and distress, and crowded towards the -river Trueba, which encircled the rear of the position. Some tried -the fords, some rushed to the town, others fled to the right and -left; but the weather was bad, the roads deep, the country rugged -and difficult, and the overthrow was fatal. Those who escaped went -to their own provinces, carrying dismay into the remotest parts -of Gallicia, Asturias, Leon, and Castille. The guns, the baggage, -and ammunition, fell into the hands of the French. Blake himself -reached Reynosa on the 12th, and there rallied about seven thousand -fugitives, but without arms, without spirit, and without hope. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -The line of retreat by Aguilar del Campo, where his artillery -remained, was still open to him; and he proposed to remain at -Reynosa as long as the enemy would permit him; to restore order, -and then to retire through Leon upon sir David Baird’s division, -the head of which was now near Astorga. But his total ignorance -of the French operations and strength again misled him. He looked -only to the side of Espinosa, and already Soult’s cavalry was upon -his line of retreat, and the duke of Dantzic was hastening by -the valley of Villarcayo towards Reynosa. Upon the 13th, he was -attacked by the advanced guard of the second corps, and being now -utterly confounded, he fled with four or five thousand men through -the valley of Cabuerniga, and took refuge at Arnedo, in the heart -of the Asturian mountains. There the marquis of Romana joined him, -and assumed the command of all that remained of the unfortunate -army of the left. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -Blake being thus disposed of, the fourth French corps, after a -halt of a few days to refresh the troops, took the road of Carrion -and Valladolid; but Soult recalling his detachments, concentrated -the second corps at Reynosa, seized St. Ander, and captured a -quantity of English stores; leaving a division there under general -Bonnet, he then spread his columns over the whole of the Montagna, -pursuing, attacking, and dispersing every body of Spaniards that -yet held together, capturing their baggage, and filling all places -with alarm. After some partial actions with unconnected parties, -every thing military belonging to the patriots was driven over -the snowy barrier of the Asturian hills; and Soult having left a -detachment at St. Vincent de Barqueira, scoured the banks of the -Deba, took the town of Potes, and overrun Leon with his cavalry as -far as Sahagun and Saldaña. Meanwhile the duke of Belluno quitting -Espinosa, joined the emperor, whose head-quarters were fixed at -Burgos, after the defeat of Belvedere. - -The battles of Espinosa and Gamonal, and the subsequent operations -of marshal Soult, laid the north of Spain prostrate, and secured -the whole coast from St. Sebastian to the frontier of the Asturias. -By a judicious arrangement of small garrisons, and moveable -columns, the provinces of Guipuscoa, Navarre, Biscay, and the -Baston de Laredo were fettered; the communication of the army -with France could no longer be endangered by insurrections in the -rear; and the wide and fertile plains of Old Castille and Leon -were thrown open to the French, and forbidden to the separated -divisions of the British army. These great advantages, the result -of Napoleon’s admirable combinations, the fruits of ten days of -active exertion, obtained so easily, and yet so decisive of the -fate of the campaign, prove the weakness of the system upon which -the Spanish and British governments were at this time acting; if -that can be called a system where no one general knew what another -had done--was doing--or intended to do. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.] - -Burgos, instead of Vittoria, was now become the pivot of -operations, and the right of his army being secured, the emperor -prepared to change his front, and bear down against the armies -of Castaños and Palafox, with a similar impetuosity; but it was -first necessary to ascertain the exact situation of the British -force. Napoleon believed that it was concentrated at Valladolid, -and he detached three divisions of cavalry and twenty-four -pieces of artillery, by Lerma and Palencia, with orders to cross -the Douero, to turn the flank of the English, threaten their -communications with Portugal, and thus force them to retire. It was -soon discovered that the heads of their columns had not penetrated -beyond Salamanca and Astorga, and that many days must elapse before -they could be concentrated, and in a condition to act offensively. -Certain of this fact, the emperor let loose his three divisions -of cavalry, and eight thousand horsemen sweeping over the plains, -vexed all Leon and Castille. The authorities showed no firmness; -the captain-general, Pignatelli, fled in consternation; the people -submissive and fearful, displayed no enthusiasm, and disconcerted -by the rapid movements of the French, spread a thousand confused -and contradictory reports. The incursions of the cavalry extended -to the neighbourhood of Astorga, to Benevente, Zamora, Toro, -Tordesillas, and even to the vicinity of Salamanca. Such was the -fear, or the apathy of the inhabitants, that thirty dragoons were -sufficient to raise contributions at the gates of the largest -towns; and after the overthrow of Espinosa was known, ten troopers -could safely traverse the country in any direction. - -The front of the French army being now changed, the second -corps, hitherto the leading column of attack, became a corps of -observation, covering the right flank, and protecting the important -point of Burgos, where large magazines were establishing, and upon -which the reinforcements continually arriving from France were -directed. The exact situation of the other corps was as follows: -The first corps, the guards, and a part of the reserve, were -at Burgos; and Ney, with the sixth, occupied Aranda de Douero; -the march of his force from the Ebro had been made with a view -to intercept the army of Estremadura on the side of Madrid; but -the sudden destruction of that body of troops having rendered -this precaution useless, Ney was equally well placed to cut the -communication of Castaños with the capital. General Lagrange -occupied Logroña, and Moncey, with three divisions of infantry -and his light cavalry, was at Lodosa. The Spanish army of the -centre was consequently turned and cut off from Madrid even before -Castaños was aware that the campaign had commenced. - -[Sidenote: Baron Larrey’s Surgical Campaigns.] - -In passing the mountains near Tolosa, marshal Lasnes, duke of -Montebello, fell from his horse, and was left at Vittoria; his -hurts were dangerous, but a rapid and interesting cure being -effected by wrapping him in the skin of a sheep newly slain, the -emperor directed him to assume the command of Lagrange’s division -and Colbert’s light cavalry, to unite them with the third corps -at Lodosa, and to fall upon Castaños in front. At the same time -he ordered Ney to ascend the course of the Douero with the light -cavalry and two divisions of the sixth corps, to connect his left -with the right of Lasnes, and to gain Agreda by the road of Osma -and Soria, from whence he could intercept the retreat of Castaños, -and place himself on the rear of the Spanish army. To support this -operation, the first corps, and Latour Maubourg’s division of -heavy cavalry being drawn from the reserve, proceeded by Lerma and -Aranda, and from thence slowly followed the direction of Ney’s -march. The emperor, with the guards, and the remainder of the -reserve, continued at Burgos, the citadel was repaired and armed, -magazines were formed, and arrangements made to render it the great -dépôt of the army. All the reinforcements coming from France were -directed upon this town, and proclamations were issued assuring the -country people of protection if they would be tranquil and remain -in their houses. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart. Lord W. Bentinck. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -Ten days had now elapsed since Napoleon, breaking forth from -Vittoria, had deluged the country with his troops, and each day -was marked by some advantage gained over the Spaniards; but these -misfortunes were still unknown at Tudela and disregarded at the -capital. The remnants of Belvedere’s army having rallied in the -pass of the Somosierra and on the side of Segovia, the troops -belonging to the army of the centre, which had been detained in -Madrid, were forwarded to the former place, and those left behind -from Cuesta’s levies were ordered to the latter. General St. Juan, -an officer of high reputation, took the command at the Somosierra, -general Heredia repaired to Segovia, and an intermediate camp of -detachments being formed at Sepulveda, the men thus collected were, -by the junta, magnified into a great army sufficient to protect -Madrid. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -That the left wing of the French army was still upon the Ebro, -the central junta attributed, not to the enemy’s strength, but to -the dilatory proceedings of Castaños, and depriving him of the -command, they gave it to Romana, precisely at the moment when it -was impossible for the latter to reach the army he was to lead. The -junta wanted a battle, and, uncorrected by Blake’s destruction, -doubted not of victory. - -[Sidenote: Castaños’ Vindication.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Colonel Graham’s Corresp^{ce}. MSS.] - -The proceedings at Tudela were also worthy of the times; there the -madness of the generals, and the folly of the deputy, increased -rather than abated. The freaks of Francisco Palafox, and their -ridiculous termination on the 12th of November, I have already -related. A few days sufficed to give birth to new plans equally -absurd, but more dangerous, as the crisis approached nearer. -This time Castaños took the lead. He knew upon the 10th that the -Estremaduran army was at Burgos, and that the French were marching -on that town; from that moment, despairing of the junction of the -British army, and likewise of his own first and third divisions, -which were in Madrid, he sent orders to Belvedere to unite himself -with Blake; but his letters never reached that officer, who was -defeated before they were written, and Castaños, feeling that -he himself was in a dangerous position, and that some decided -measure was required, conceived so extraordinary a plan, that it -would be difficult to credit it upon any authority but his own. -He proposed to carry the army of the centre, reduced in numbers -and ill-disciplined as it was, by the Concha de Haro and Soria, -towards Burgos, and to fall upon the emperor’s rear guard; and, -as a preliminary step, he determined to beat the army in his -front; but Palafox had also a plan, of attacking Moncey on the -side of Sanguessa, and the first measure necessary was to combine -these double operations. It was agreed that Caparosa should be -garrisoned by four thousand infantry, that the bridge head at that -place should be fortified, and that O’Neil should be reinforced at -Sanguessa by detachments from the centre until his force amounted -to nineteen thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. He was -then to break down the bridge, place guards at all the passages -on the Aragon, and by a flank march gain Caparosa, cross the -river, and threaten Peraltes and Olite on the 17th; but on the -18th turning suddenly to the left to get in rear of Lodosa, while -general La-Peña and Coupigny, marching from Centruenigo, should -attack Moncey in front. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -This great movement was openly talked of at the head-quarters -of the Spanish generals for several days before its execution, -and these extraordinary commanders, who were ignorant of Blake’s -disasters, announced their intention of afterwards marching towards -Vittoria to lighten the pressure on that officer if he should be in -difficulty, or if (as his despatches of the 5th had assured them) -he was successful, then to join in a general pursuit. Castaños, -however, concealed his real project, which was to move by the -Concha de Haro towards Burgos. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: Castaños’ Vindication.] - -It was found impossible to procure a sufficient number of boats -to lay a bridge over the Ebro at Alfaro: thus the reinforcements -intended for O’Neil were forced to make a circuit by Tudela, and -lost three or four days. On the 14th O’Neil arrived at Caparosa, -after breaking the bridge of Sanguessa; the 15th the reinforcements -joined him. On the 17th, the day appointed for the execution of -the plan, Castaños received notice of his own dismissal from the -command, but he persevered in his project; La-Peña and Coupigny -were put in motion to pass the bridges of Logroña and Lodosa, -and the fords between them; but general O’Neil, instead of -executing his part, first refused to stir without an order from -Joseph Palafox who was at Zaragoza, and then changing his ground, -complained that he was without bread. Castaños besought him to move -upon the 18th, urging the necessity of the measure, and the danger -of delay. But the deputy, Palafox, who had hitherto approved -of the project, suddenly quitted the head-quarters, and went to -Caparosa, from whence, in concert with O’Neil, he wrote to demand a -farther reinforcement from the centre, of six thousand infantry and -some more cavalry, without which, they affirmed, that it would be -dangerous to pass the Aragon river. Castaños preserved his temper, -invited the deputy to return to the right bank of the Ebro, and -opposed the demand for more troops on the ground of the delay it -would cause; but now the captain-general Palafox, agreeing with -neither side, proposed a new plan. It is difficult to say how long -these strange disputes would have continued if an umpire had not -interposed, whose award was too strongly enforced to be disregarded. - -[Sidenote: Castaños’ Vindication.] - -[Sidenote: Castaños’ Account of the Battle of Tudela.] - -Castaños was with the divisions of Coupigny and La-Peña at -Calahorra on the 19th, when he received information that a French -corps was advancing upon Logroña. It was Lasnes’, with Lagrange’s -and Colbert’s troops, but the Spaniard concluded it to be Ney, for -he was ignorant of the changes which had taken place since the 8th -of the month. It was likewise reported, that Moncey, whose force -he estimated at twelve thousand, when it really was above twenty -thousand, had concentrated at Lodosa, and, at the same time, the -bishop of Osma announced that twelve thousand men, under Dessolles, -were marching from the side of Aranda de Douero. On the 21st, the -intelligence that Dessolles had passed Almazan, and that Moncey -was in motion, was confirmed. Then Castaños, relinquishing his -offensive projects, prepared to retire, and it was full time. For -marshal Ney, who left Aranda on the 19th, had passed Almazan on -the 20th, dispersed several small bands of insurgents, and entered -Soria on the 21st, so that when Castaños determined to fall back -on the 21st, his flank was already turned, and his retreat upon -Madrid in the enemy’s power. His artillery was at Centruenigo, and -a large detachment of his army was with O’Neil at Caparosa. - -[Sidenote: Castaños’ Official Account of the Battle of Tudela.] - -During the night of the 21st and 22d he retired to the heights -which extend from Tudela by Cascante, Novellas, Taranzona, and -Monteguda. The advanced guard of Lasnes was in sight of the -Spanish rear-guard at Calahorra on the morning of the 22d. At -this moment the only supply of money which the central junta had -yet transmitted for the use of the army arrived at Tudela, and, -to complete the picture of distracted councils, O’Neil refused to -fall back from Caparosa without the orders of the captain-general. -The latter, however, fortunately arrived at Tudela in person, and -a conference taking place between him and Castaños the same day, -they agreed that the Aragonese army should cross the Ebro, and -occupy the heights over Tudela, while the rest of the troops should -stretch away in line as far as Taranzona; but in defiance of all -orders, entreaties, or reasoning, the obstinate O’Neil remained in -an olive wood on the right bank of the river during the night of -the 22d, leaving the key of the position open to the enemy. - -[Sidenote: Ibid, and his Vindication.] - -A council of war was held, but the discussion was turbulent, and -the opinions were discordant. Palafox insisted on the defence of -Aragon, as the principal, or rather the only object to be attended -to, and he wished the whole army to pass to the left bank of the -Ebro, and confine its operations to the protection of Zaragoza on -that side, a proposal which alone was sufficient to demonstrate his -total incapacity for military affairs. Castaños reasoned justly -against this absurdity, but the important moments passed in -useless disputation, and the generals came to no conclusion. - -In the meantime, marshal Lasnes, bringing with him a division of -the sixth corps (Maurice Mathieu’s), which had just arrived from -France, concentrated above thirty thousand infantry, four or five -thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery, at Lodosa on the -22d, and marching by Alfaro, appeared, at eight o’clock in the -morning of the 23d, in front of the Spanish outposts, close to -Tudela, just at the moment when the Aragonese were passing the -bridge and ascending their position. From forty to fifty guns were -distributed along the front of the Spanish army, which, numbering -about forty-five thousand fighting men, was extended on a range -of easy hills from Tudela to Taranzona, a distance of more than -ten miles. Two divisions of the army of the centre connected the -Aragonese with the fourth division, which occupied Cascante. Three -divisions were in Taranzona, and there were no intermediate posts -between these scattered bodies. The weakness attendant on such an -arrangement being visible to the enemy at the first glance, Lasnes -hastened to make his dispositions, and at nine o’clock commenced - - -THE BATTLE OF TUDELA. - -General Morlot, with one division, attacked the heights above -the town. Maurice Mathieu, supported by the cavalry, of Lefebre -Desnouettes, assailed the centre, and general Lagrange advanced -against Cascante. The whole of the artillery followed the columns -of attack. The Aragonese resisted Morlot with vigour, and even -pressed him in the plain at the foot of the hills, but Maurice -Mathieu having gained possession of an olive wood, and a small -ridge which was connected with the centre of the Spanish position, -after some sharp fighting pierced the line, and Lefebre, breaking -through the opening with his cavalry, wheeled up to his left, and -threw the right wing into hopeless confusion. The defeated soldiers -fled towards the bridge of Tudela, pursued by the victorious -horsemen. In the meantime La-Peña, descending from Cascante with -the fourth division, drove in Lagrange’s advanced guard of cavalry, -and pressed forward briskly; but being met at a charging pace by -the infantry, was beaten, and fell back to Taranzona, where three -divisions remained during the whole of the action, which, strictly -speaking, was confined to the heights above Tudela. Palafox, with -the right wing and the centre, fled to Zaragoza with such speed -that some of the fugitives are said to have arrived there the same -evening. - -When La-Peña was driven back upon Taranzona, the four divisions -of the left wing commenced an orderly retreat towards Borja, but -some cavalry, detached by Ney from the side of Soria, coming in -sight, the Spaniards got into confusion; a magazine blew up, and -in the midst of the disorder cries of treason were heard, the -columns dissolved in a few moments, the road to Borja was covered -with a disorganised multitude; and so ended the celebrated battle -of Tudela, in which forty thousand men were beaten and dispersed -by an effort that, being in itself neither very vigorous nor -well sustained, was nevertheless sufficient for its purpose, and -demonstrative of the incapacity of Spanish generals, and the want -of steadiness in Spanish soldiers. - -[Sidenote: Eleventh Bulletin. Victoires et Conquêtes.] - -Several thousand prisoners, thirty pieces of artillery, and all -the ammunition and baggage, fell into the hands of the French, -who rated the killed and wounded very high. The total loss may -be estimated at eight or nine thousand men. Fifteen thousand -escaped to Zaragoza; a detachment of two thousand, under the Conde -de Cartoajal and general Lille, left in the mountains of Nalda, -were cut off by the result of the action, and two divisions, whose -numbers were increased by fugitives from the others, were rallied -at Calatayud on the 25th, but they were half starved and mutinous. - -[Sidenote: Castaños’ Account of the Battle of Tudela, and -Vindication.] - -At Calatayud, Castaños received two despatches from the central -junta, virtually restoring him to the command. For the first -empowered him to unite the Aragonese army with his own; and the -second, informing him that St. Juan was at the Somosierra, required -his co-operation with that general to protect the capital. The -battle of Tudela disposed of the first despatch, the second induced -Castaños to march by Siguenza upon Madrid. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -[Sidenote: Eleventh Bulletin.] - -In the meantime, Napoleon, recalling the greatest part of his -cavalry from the open country of Castille, left seven or eight -thousand men in Burgos, and fixed his head-quarters at Aranda de -Douero on the 23d. From the difficulty of transmitting despatches -through a country in a state of insurrection, intelligence of the -victory at Tudela only reached him on the 26th. He was exceedingly -discontented that Castaños should have escaped the hands of Ney. -That marshal had been instructed to reach Soria by the 21st, to -remain there until Lasnes should be in front of the Spaniards, and -then to pass by Agreda, and intercept the retreat of the latter. - -On the evening of the 21st, general Jomini and colonel D’Esmenard, -staff officers of the sixth corps, arrived at Soria with an escort -of eighty cavalry. That town is situated upon a rocky height, with -a suburb below, and the conde de Cartoajal, who was retiring from -the mountain of Nalda, happening to be in the upper part, the -magistrates endeavoured to entrap the French officers. The latter -were met at dusk by the municipality, and invited to enter the town -with great appearance of cordiality; but their suspicions were -excited, and the plan failed. Cartoajal marched during the night, -and the next day the sixth corps occupied the place. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -General Jomini, whose profound knowledge of the theory of war -enabled him to judge accurately of the events which were likely to -occur, urged Ney to continue his march upon Calatayud, without any -rest; but the marshal, either offended with the heat of Jomini’s -manner, or from some other cause, resolved to follow the letter of -his instructions, and remained at Soria the 23d and 24th, merely -sending out some light cavalry on the side of Medina Celi and -Agreda. On the 25th he marched to the latter town; the 26th he -crossed the field of battle, passing through Cascante. The 27th, -he arrived, with one division, at Mallen, a town situated between -Tudela and Zaragoza, his advanced guard being at Arlazon on the -Zilo. - -To the erroneous direction and dilatory nature of these movements, -Castaños owed the safety of the troops, which were reassembled -at Calatayud. Ney must have been acquainted with the result of -the battle on the 25th, and it is remarkable that he should have -continued on the road towards Agreda, when a single march by Medina -Celi would have brought him upon the line of retreat from Calatayud -to Siguenza. By some writers these errors have been attributed to -Ney’s jealousy of marshal Lasnes; by others it has been asserted -that the plunder of Soria detained him. The falsehood of the latter -charge is evident from the fact, that, with the exception of a -requisition for some shoes and great coats, no contribution was -exacted from Soria, and no pillage took place at all; and with -respect to the former accusation, a better explanation may be found -in the peculiar disposition of this extraordinary man, who was -notoriously indolent, and unlearned in the abstract science of war. -It was necessary for him to see, in order to act; his character -seemed to be asleep until some eminent danger aroused all the -marvellous energy and fortitude with which nature had endowed him. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -The success at Tudela fell short of what Napoleon had a right to -expect from his previous dispositions, but it sufficed to break -the Spanish strength on that side, and to lay the kingdoms of -Aragon and Navarre, and the province of New Castille, as bare as -the northern part of Spain was laid by the victory of Espinosa. -From the frontiers of France to those of Portugal, from the -sea-coast to the Tagus, the country was now overwhelmed. Madrid, -Zaragoza, and the British army, indeed, lifted their heads a little -way above the rising waters, but the eye looked in vain for an -efficient barrier against the flood, which still poured on with -unabated fury. The divided, weak state of the English troops led -the emperor to conclude that sir John Moore would instantly retire -into Portugal. Lasnes he commanded to pursue Palafox, to seize -the important position of Monte Toreño, to summon Zaragoza, and -to offer a complete amnesty to all persons in the town, without -reservation, thus bearing testimony to the gallantry of the first -defence. His own attention was fixed on Madrid. That capital was -the rallying point of all the broken Spanish, and of all his own -pursuing divisions, and it was the centre of all interests, a -commanding height from whence a beneficial stream of political -benefits might descend to allay, or a driving storm of war pour -down to extinguish, the fire of insurrection. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -The French patroles sent towards the Somosierra ascertained, on the -21st, that above six thousand men were entrenching themselves in -the gorge of the mountains; that a small camp at Sepulveda blocked -the roads leading upon Segovia; and that general Heredia was -preparing to secure the passes of the Guadarama. Napoleon, however, -having resolved to force the Somosierra, and reach the capital -before Castaños could arrive there, ordered Ney to pursue the army -of the centre without intermission, and directed the fourth corps -to continue its march from Carion by Palencia, Valladolid, Olmedo, -and Segovia. - -The movement of this corps is worthy of the attention of military -men. We shall find it confusing the spies and country people; -overawing the flat country of Leon and Castile; protecting the -right flank of the army; menacing Gallicia and Salamanca; keeping -the heads of Moore’s and Baird’s columns from advancing, and -rendering it dangerous for them to attempt a junction; threatening -the line of Hope’s march from the Tagus to the Guadarama; -dispersing Heredia’s corps, and finally turning the pass of -Somosierra, without ever ceasing to belong to the concentric -movement of the great army upon Madrid. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -The time lost in transmitting the intelligence of the victory -at Tudela was productive of serious consequences. The officer -despatched with these fresh instructions, found Ney and Moncey -(Lasnes remained sick at Tudela), each advanced two days’ march in -the wrong direction. - -The first, as we have seen, was at Mallen, preparing to attack -Zaragoza; the second was at Almunio, near Calatayud, pursuing -Castaños. They were consequently obliged to countermarch, and -during the time thus lost, the people of Zaragoza recovering from -the consternation into which they were at first thrown by the -appearance of the flying troops, made arrangements for a vigorous -defence. Castaños also escaped to Siguenza, without any further -loss than what was inflicted in a slight action at Burvieca, where -general Maurice Mathieu’s division came up with his rear-guard. - -The emperor quitted Aranda on the 28th with the guards, the -first corps, and the reserve, and marched towards Somosierra. -Head-quarters were at Boucequillas on the 29th. A detachment sent -to attack the camp at Sepulveda failed, with a loss of fifty or -sixty men; but the Spaniards, struck with a panic after the action, -quitted their post, which was very strong, and fled in disorder -towards Segovia. The 30th, the French advanced guard reached -the foot of the Somosierra. General St. Juan, whose force now -amounted to ten or twelve thousand men, was judiciously posted; -sixteen pieces of artillery, planted in the neck of the pass, -swept the road along the whole ascent, which was exceedingly steep -and favourable for the defence. The infantry were advantageously -placed on the right and left, in lines, one above another, and some -entrenchments made in the more open parts strengthened the whole -position. - - -PASSAGE OF THE SOMOSIERRA. - -At day-break, three French battalions attacked St. Juan’s right, -three more assailed his left, and as many marched along the -causeway in the centre, six guns supported the last column. The -French wings soon spread over the mountain side, and commenced a -warm skirmishing fire. At this moment Napoleon arrived. He rode -into the mouth of the pass, and attentively examined the scene -before him. The infantry were making no progress; a thick fog mixed -with smoke hung upon the ascent; suddenly, as if by inspiration, he -ordered the Polish lancers of his guard to charge up the causeway, -and seize the Spanish battery. The first squadron was thrown into -confusion, by a fire which levelled the foremost ranks. General -Krazinski rallied them in a moment, and under cover of the smoke, -and the thick vapours of the morning, the regiment, with a fresh -impetus, proceeded briskly up the mountain, sword in hand. As those -gallant horsemen passed, all the Spanish infantry fired, and fled -from the entrenchments on each side, towards the summit of the -causeway; so that, when the Poles fell in among the gunners, and -took the battery, the whole Spanish army was in flight, abandoning -arms, ammunition, baggage, and a number of prisoners. - -This surprising exploit, in the glory it conferred upon one party, -and the disgrace it heaped upon the other, can hardly be paralleled -in the annals of war. It is indeed almost incredible, even to -those who are acquainted with Spanish armies, that a position, in -itself nearly impregnable, and defended by twelve thousand men, -should, without any panic, but merely from a deliberate sense of -danger, be abandoned, at the wild charge of a few squadrons, which -two companies of good infantry would have effectually stopped. Yet -some of the Spanish regiments so shamefully beaten here, had been -victorious at Baylen a few months before; and general St. Juan’s -dispositions at Somosierra were far better than Reding’s at the -former battle; but thus absolutely does Fortune govern in war! - -The charge of the Poles, viewed as a simple military operation, -was extravagantly foolish, but taken as the result of Napoleon’s -sagacious estimate of the real value of Spanish troops, and his -promptitude in seizing the advantage, offered by the smoke and fog -that clung to the side of the mountain, it was a felicitous example -of intuitive genius. - -[Sidenote: Col. Graham’s Correspond^{ce}.] - -The routed troops were pursued towards Buitrago by the French -cavalry. St. Juan himself broke through the French on the side -of Sepulveda, and gained the camp of Heredia at Segovia; but the -cavalry of the fourth corps approached, and the two generals -crossing the Guadarama, united some of the fugitives from -Somosierra, on the Madrid side of the mountains, and endeavoured to -enter that capital. The appearance of a French patrole terrified -the vile cowards that followed them; the multitude once more fled -to Talavera de la Reyna, and there consummated their intolerable -villany by murdering their unfortunate general, and fixing his -mangled body to a tree; after which, dispersing, they carried -dishonour and fear into their respective provinces. - -The Somosierra being forced, the imperial army came down from the -mountains; the sixth corps hastened up from the side of Alcala and -Guadalaxara; the central junta fled from Aranjuez; and the remnant -of the forces under Castaños, being intercepted on the side of -Madrid, and pressed by Ney in the rear, turned towards the Tagus. -The junta, while flying with indecent haste, spread a thousand -false reports, and with more than ordinary pertinacity, endeavoured -to deceive the people and the English general; a task, in which -they were strongly aided by the weak credulity of Mr. Frere, the -British plenipotentiary, who accompanied them in their flight to -Badajos. Mr. Stuart, with greater discretion and firmness, remained -at Madrid until the enemy had actually commenced the investment of -that town. - -[Sidenote: Castaños’ Vindication.] - -The army of the centre, after the combat of Burvieca, had continued -its retreat unmolested by Ney. The time lost, in the false movement -upon Mallen, was never recovered. The Spaniards escaped the sword, -but their numbers daily diminished; their sufferings increased, and -their insubordination kept pace with their privations. At Alcazar -del Rey, Castaños resigned the command to general La-Peña, and -proceeded to Truxillo himself, with an escort of thirty infantry -and fifteen dragoons, a number scarcely sufficient to protect his -life from the ferocity of the peasants, who were stirred up and -prepared, by the falsehoods of the central junta, and the villany -of the deserters, to murder him. - -Madrid was in a state of anarchy seldom equalled. A local and -military junta were formed, to conduct the defence; the inhabitants -took arms, a multitude of peasants from the neighbourhood entered -the place, and the regular forces, commanded by the marquis of -Castellar, amounted to six thousand men, with a train of sixteen -guns. The pavement was taken up, the streets were barricadoed, the -houses were pierced, and the Retiro, a weak irregular work, which -commanded the city, was occupied in strength. Don Thomas Morla, and -the prince of Castelfranco, were the chief men in authority. The -people demanded ammunition, and when they received it, discovered, -or said, that it was mixed with sand. Some person accused the -marquis of Perales, a respectable old general, of the deed; a mob -rushed to his house, murdered him, and dragged his body about the -streets. Many others of inferior note fell victims to this fury, -for no man was safe, none durst assume authority to control, none -durst give honest advice; the houses were thrown open, the bells of -the convents and churches rung incessantly, and a band of ferocious -armed men traversed the streets in all the madness of popular -insurrection. - -Eight days had now elapsed since the first preparations for -defence were made; each day the public effervescence increased, -the dominion of the mob became more decisive, their violence more -uncontrollable, and the uproar was extreme, when, on the morning -of the 2d of December, three heavy divisions of French cavalry -suddenly appeared on the high ground to the north-west, and like a -dark cloud overhung the troubled city. - -[Sidenote: Fourteenth Bulletin.] - -At twelve o’clock the emperor himself arrived, and the duke of -Istria, by his command, summoned the town. The officer employed -was upon the point of being massacred by the irregulars, when -the Spanish soldiers, ashamed of such conduct, rescued him. This -determination to resist was, notwithstanding the fierceness -displayed at the gates, very unpalatable to many of the -householders, numbers of whom escaped from different quarters; -deserters also came over to the French, and Napoleon, while waiting -for his infantry, examined all the weak points of the city. - -Madrid was for many reasons incapable of defence. First, there -were no bulwarks; secondly, the houses, although strong and well -built, were not like many Spanish towns, fire proof; thirdly, there -were no outworks, and the heights on which the French cavalry were -posted, the palace, and the Retiro, completely commanded the city; -fourthly, the perfectly open country around would have enabled -the French cavalry to discover and cut off all convoys, and no -precaution had been taken to provide subsistence for the hundred -and fifty thousand people contained within the circuit of the place. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3.] - -The desire of the central junta, that this metropolis should risk -the horrors of a storm, was equally silly and barbarous. Their own -criminal apathy had deprived Madrid of the power of procrastinating -its defence until relieved from without, and there was no sort -of analogy between the situation of Zaragoza and this capital. -Napoleon knew this well; he was not a man to plunge headlong into -the streets of a great city, among an armed and excited population; -he knew that address in negotiation, a little patience, and a -judicious employment of artillery, would soon reduce the most -outrageous to submission, and he had no wish to destroy the capital -of his brother’s kingdom. - -[Sidenote: Fourteenth Bulletin.] - -In the evening the infantry and artillery arrived; they were posted -at the most favourable points; the night was clear and bright, the -French camp was silent and watchful; but the noise of tumult was -heard from every quarter of the city, as if some mighty beast was -struggling and howling in the toils. - -At midnight a second summons was sent through the medium of a -prisoner. The captain-general Castellar attempted to gain time by -an equivocal reply, but he failed in his object. The French light -troops then stormed some houses, and one battery of thirty guns -opened against the Retiro, while another threw shells from the -opposite quarter, to distract the attention of the inhabitants. - -The Retiro, situated on a rising ground, was connected with a range -of buildings erected on the same side of the Prado, a public walk -which nearly encircled the town. Some of the principal streets -opened into the Prado nearly opposite to those buildings. In the -morning a practicable breach being made in the Retiro wall, the -difference between military courage and ferocity became apparent, -for Villatte’s division breaking in easily, routed the garrison, -and pursuing its success, seized the public buildings above spoken -of, crossed the Prado, gained the barriers erected at the entrance -of the streets, and took possession of the immense palace of the -duke of Medina Celi, which was in itself the key to the city on -that side. This vigorous commencement created great terror, and the -town was summoned for the third time. - -In the afternoon, Morla and another officer came out to demand -a suspension of arms, necessary, they said, to persuade the -people to surrender. Being admitted to the emperor’s presence, he -addressed Morla in terms of great severity; he reproached him for -his scandalous conduct towards Dupont’s army. “Injustice and bad -faith,” he exclaimed, “always recoil upon those who are guilty -of either.” This saying was well applied to that Spaniard, and -Napoleon himself confirmed its philosophic truth in after times. -“The Spanish ulcer destroyed me,” was an expression of deep anguish -which escaped from him in his own hour of misfortune. - -Morla returned to the town: his story was soon told: before six -o’clock the next morning Madrid must surrender or perish. A -division of opinion arose; the violent excitement of the populace -was considerably abated, but the armed peasantry from the country, -and the poorest inhabitants, still demanded to be led against -the enemy. A constant fire was kept up from the houses in the -neighbourhood of the Prado; the French general Maison was wounded, -and general Bruyeres was killed; but the disposition to fight -became each moment weaker, and Morla and Castelfranco prepared a -capitulation. The captain-general Castellar refused to sign it, and -as the town was only invested on one side, he effected his escape -with the regular troops during the night, carrying with him sixteen -guns. The people now sunk into a quiescent state, and at eight -o’clock in the morning of the 4th, Madrid surrendered. - -That Morla was a traitor there is no doubt, and his personal -cowardice was excessive; but Castelfranco appears to have been -rather weak and ignorant than treacherous, and certainly the -surrender of Madrid was no proof of his guilt; that event was -inevitable. The boasting uproar of the multitude when they are -permitted to domineer for a few days is not enthusiasm. The retreat -of Castellar with the troops of the line during the progress of -the negotiation was the wisest course to pursue, and proves that -he acquiesced in the propriety of surrendering. That the people -neither could nor would defend the city is quite evident, for it -is incredible that Morla and Castelfranco should have been able to -carry through a capitulation in so short a period, if the generals, -the regular troops, the armed peasantry, and the inhabitants, had -been all, or even a part of them, determined to resist. - -The emperor, cautious of giving offence to a population so lately -and so violently excited, carefully provided against any sudden -reaction, and preserved the strictest discipline. A soldier of -the imperial guard was shot in one of the squares for having a -plundered watch in his possession. The infantry were placed in -barracks and convents, and the cavalry were kept ready to scour -the streets at the first alarm. The Spaniards were disarmed, and -Napoleon fixed his own quarters at Chamartin, a country house four -miles from Madrid. In a few days every thing presented the most -tranquil appearance; the shops were opened, the public amusements -recommenced, and the theatres were frequented. The inhabitants of -capital cities are easily moved, and easily calmed; self-interest -and the pursuit of pleasure unfit them for noble and sustained -efforts; they can be violent, ferocious, cruel, but are seldom -constant and firm. - -It was during this operation that La-Peña, after escaping from -the sixth corps, arrived at Guadalaxara with about five thousand -men. On the 2d, the dukes of Infantado and Albuquerque having -left Madrid, joined him, and on the 4th, Venegas came up with -two thousand men. While the generals were hesitating what course -to pursue, Napoleon being apprized of their vicinity, directed -Bessieres with sixteen squadrons upon Guadalaxara, supporting him -by Ruffin’s division of the first corps. At the approach of the -cavalry, the main body retired through the hills by Sanctorcaz -towards Aranjuez, and the artillery crossed the Tagus at Sacedon. -Ruffin’s division immediately changed its direction, and cut the -Spaniards off from La Mancha by the line of Ocaña. A mutiny among -the Spanish troops having forced La-Peña to resign his command, the -duke of Infantado was chosen in his place, the army crossed the -Tagus at several points, and after some slight actions with the -advanced cavalry of the French, this miserable body of men finally -saved themselves at Cuenca. Many deserters and fugitives, and the -brigades of Cartoajal and Lilli, which had escaped the different -French columns, also arrived there, and the duke proceeded to -organize another army. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.] - -In the mean time the fourth French corps reached Segovia, passed -the Guadarama, dispersed some armed peasants assembled at the -Escurial, and then marched toward Almaraz, to attack general -Galluzzo, who, having assembled five or six thousand men to defend -the left bank of the Tagus, was, with the usual skill of a Spanish -general, occupying a line of forty miles. The first corps entered -La Mancha; Toledo immediately shut its gates, and the junta of that -town publicly proclaimed their resolution to bury themselves under -the ruins of the city; but at the approach of a French division, -betrayed the most contemptible cowardice. - -Thus, six weeks had sufficed to dissipate the Spanish armies; -the glittering bubble bursted, and a terrible reality remained. -From St. Sebastian to the Asturias, from the Asturias to Talavera -de la Reina, from Talavera to the gates of the noble city of -Zaragoza, all was submission, and beyond that boundary all was -apathy or dread. Ten thousand French soldiers could safely (as far -as regarded the Spaniards) have marched from one extremity of the -Peninsula to the other. - -After the fall of Madrid, king Joseph remained at Burgos, issuing -proclamations, and carrying on a sort of underplot, through the -medium of his native ministers. The views of the latter being -naturally turned towards the Spanish interests as distinct from the -French, a source of infinite mischief to Joseph’s cause was opened; -for that monarch, anxious to please and conciliate his subjects, -ceased to be a Frenchman without becoming a Spaniard. At this time -Napoleon assumed and exercised all the rights of conquest; and -it is evident, from the tenor of his speeches, proclamations, and -decrees, that some ulterior project, in which the king’s personal -interests were not concerned, was contemplated by him. It appeared -as if he wished the Spaniards to offer the crown to himself a -second time, that he might obtain a plausible excuse for adopting a -new line of policy by which to attract the people, or at least to -soften their pride, which was now the main obstacle to his success. - -[Sidenote: Moniteur.] - -An assemblage of the nobles, the clergy, the corporations, and the -tribunals of Madrid, waited upon him at Chamartin, and presented an -address, in which they expressed their desire to have Joseph among -them again. The emperor’s reply was an exposition of the principles -upon which Spain was to be governed, and offers a fine field for -reflection upon the violence of those passions which induce men -to resist positive good, and eagerly seek for danger, misery, and -death, rather than resign their prejudices. - -“I accept,” said he, “the sentiments of the town of Madrid. I -regret the misfortunes that have befallen it, and I hold it as a -particular good fortune that I am enabled, under the circumstances -of the moment, to spare that city, and to save it from yet greater -misfortunes. - -“I have hastened to take measures fit to tranquillize all classes -of citizens, knowing well that to all people, and to all men, -uncertainty is intolerable. - -“I have preserved the religious orders; but I have restrained -the number of monks. No sane person can doubt that they are too -numerous. Those who are truly called to this vocation by the grace -of God will remain in their convents; those who have lightly -adopted their vocation, or from worldly motives, will have their -existence secured among the secular ecclesiastics, from the -surplus of the convents. I have provided for the wants of the most -interesting and useful of the clergy, the parish priests. - -“I have abolished that tribunal against which Europe and the age -alike exclaimed. Priests ought to guide consciences; but they -should not exercise any exterior and corporal jurisdiction over men. - -“I have taken the satisfaction which was due to myself and to my -nation, and the part of vengeance is completed. Ten[19] of the -principal criminals bend their heads before her; but for all others -there is absolute and entire pardon. - -“I have suppressed the rights usurped by the nobles during civil -wars, when the kings have been too often obliged to abandon their -own rights to purchase tranquillity and the repose of their people. - -“I have suppressed the feudal rights; and every person can now -establish inns, mills, ovens, weirs, and fisheries, and give free -play to their industry; only observing the laws and customs of the -place. The self-love, the riches, and the prosperity of a small -number of men, was more hurtful to your agriculture than the heats -of the dog days. - -“As there is but one God, there should be in one estate but -one justice; wherefore all the particular jurisdictions having -been usurped, and being contrary to the national rights, I have -destroyed them. I have also made known to all persons that which -each can have to fear, and that which they may hope for. - -“The English armies I will drive from the Peninsula. Zaragoza, -Valencia, Seville, shall be reduced either by persuasion or by the -force of arms. - -“There is no obstacle capable of retarding for any length of time -the execution of my will. But that which is above my power, is to -constitute the Spaniards a nation, under the orders of the king, -if they continue to be imbued with the principle of division, -and of hatred towards France, such as the English partizans and -the enemies of the continent have instilled into them. I cannot -establish a nation, a king, and the Spanish independence, if that -king is not sure of the affection and fidelity of his subjects. - -“The Bourbons can never again reign in Europe. The divisions in the -royal family were concerted by the English. It was not either king -Charles or his favorite, but the duke of Infantado, the instrument -of England, that was upon the point of overturning the throne. -The papers recently found in his house prove this; it was the -preponderance of England that they wished to establish in Spain. -Insensate project! which would have produced a land war without -end, and caused torrents of blood to be shed. - -“No power influenced by England can exist upon the continent. If -any desire it, their desire is folly, and sooner or later will -ruin them. I shall be obliged to govern Spain, and it will be -easy for me to do it by establishing a viceroy in each province. -However, I will not refuse to concede my rights of conquest to the -king, and to establish him in Madrid, when the thirty thousand -citizens assemble in the churches, and on the holy sacrament -take an oath, not with the mouth alone, but with the heart, and -without any jesuitical restriction, ‘to be true to the king, to -love and to support him.’ Let the priests from the pulpit and in -the confessional, the tradesmen in their correspondence and their -discourses, inculcate these sentiments in the people; then I will -relinquish my rights of conquest, then I will place the king -upon the throne, and I will take a pleasure in showing myself the -faithful friend of the Spaniards. - -“The present generation may differ in opinions; too many passions -have been excited; but your descendants will bless me as the -regenerator of the nation: they will mark my sojourn among you as -memorable days, and from those days they will date the prosperity -of Spain. These are my sentiments: go, consult your fellow -citizens, choose your part, but do it frankly, and exhibit only -true colours.” - -The dispositions now made by Napoleon indicated a vast plan of -operations. It would appear that he intended to invade Gallicia, -Andalusia, and Valencia, by his lieutenants, and to carry his arms -to Lisbon in person. Upon the 20th December the sixth corps, the -guards, and the reserve, were assembled under his own immediate -control. The first corps was stationed at Toledo, but the light -cavalry attached to it scoured the roads leading to Andalusia, up -to the foot of the Sierra Morena. The fourth corps was at Talavera, -on the march towards the frontier of Portugal. The second corps -was on the Carrion river, preparing to advance against Gallicia. -The eighth corps was broken up; the divisions composing it ordered -to join the second, and Junot, who commanded it, repaired to the -third corps, to supply the place of marshal Moncey, who was called -to Madrid for a particular service; doubtless an expedition against -Valencia. The fifth corps, which had arrived at Vittoria, was -directed to reinforce the third, then employed against Zaragoza. -The seventh was always in Catalonia. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 28.] - -Vast as this plan of campaign appears, it was not beyond the -emperor’s means; for without taking into consideration his own -genius, activity, and vigour, he counted on his muster-rolls, above -three hundred and thirty thousand men, and above sixty thousand -horses; above two hundred pieces of field artillery followed -the corps to battle, and as many more remained in reserve. Of -this monstrous army, two hundred and fifty-five thousand men, -and fifty thousand horses, were actually under arms, with their -different regiments; thirty-two thousand were detached or in -garrisons, preserving tranquillity in the rear, and guarding the -communications of the active force. The remainder were in hospital, -and so slight had been the resistance of the Spanish armies, that -only nineteen hundred prisoners were to be deducted from this -multitude. Of the whole host, two hundred and thirteen thousand -were native Frenchmen, the residue were Poles, Germans, and -Italians. - -Of the disposable troops, thirty-five thousand men and five -thousand horses were appropriated to Catalonia, and about the same -number to the siege of Zaragoza. Above one hundred and eighty -thousand men, and forty thousand horses, were therefore available -for any enterprise, without taking a single man from the service of -the lines of communication. - -What was there to oppose this fearful array? What consistency or -vigour in the councils? What numbers? What discipline and spirit -in the armies of Spain? What enthusiasm among the people? What was -the disposition, the means? What the activity of the allies of -that country? The answers to these questions demonstrate, that the -fate of the Peninsula hung at this moment upon a thread, and that -the deliverance of that country was due to other causes than the -courage, the patriotism, or the constancy of the Spaniards. - -[Sidenote: Infantado’s Letters. Narrative of Moore’s Campaign.] - -First, with regard to their armies. The duke of Infantado resided -among, rather than commanded, a few thousand wretched fugitives at -Cuenca, destitute, mutinous, and cowed in spirit. At Valencia there -was no army, for that which belonged to the province was shut up in -Zaragoza, and dissensions had arisen between Palafox and the local -junta in consequence. - -[Sidenote: Stuart’s and Frere’s Letters.] - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Moore’s Papers.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, Section 5.] - -The passes of the Sierra Morena were occupied by five thousand raw -levies, hastily made by the junta of Seville, after the defeat of -St. Juan. Galluzzo, who had undertaken to defend the Tagus, with -six thousand timid and ill-armed soldiers, was at this time in -flight, having been suddenly attacked and defeated at Almaraz by a -detachment of the fourth corps. Romana was near Leon, at the head -of eighteen or twenty thousand runaways, collected by him after the -dispersion at Reynosa; but of this number only five thousand were -armed, and none were subordinate or capable of being disciplined; -for when checked for misconduct, the marquis complained that they -deserted. In Gallicia there was no army; in the Asturias, the local -government were so corrupt, so faithless, and so oppressive, that -the spirit of the people was crushed, and patriotism reduced to a -name. - -[Sidenote: Stuart.] - -The central junta, having first repaired to Badajos, were -terrified, and fled from thence to Seville, and their inactivity -was more conspicuous in this season of adversity than before, -and contrasted strangely with the pompous and inflated language -of their public papers. Their promises were fallacious, their -incapacity glaring, their exertions ridiculous and abortive; and -the junta of Seville, still actuated by their own ambitious views, -had now openly reassumed all their former authority. - -In short, the strength and spirit of Spain was broken, the -enthusiasm was null, except in a few places, and the emperor was, -with respect to the Spaniards, perfectly master of his operations. -He was in the centre of the country; he held the capital; the -fortresses; the command of the great lines of communication between -the provinces; and on the wide military horizon, no dark cloud -intercepted his view, save the heroic city of Zaragoza on the one -side, and a feeble British army on the other. Sooner or later, he -observed, and with truth, that the former must fall; it was an -affair of artillery calculation. The latter, he naturally supposed -to be in full retreat for Portugal; but the fourth corps were -nearer to Lisbon than the British general; a hurried retreat alone -could bring the latter in time to that capital, and consequently -no preparations for defence could be made sufficient to arrest the -sixty thousand Frenchmen which the emperor could carry there at the -same moment. The subjugation of Spain appeared inevitable, when -the genius and vigour of one man frustrated Napoleon’s plans at -the very moment of execution; and the Austrian war breaking out at -the instant, drew the master-spirit from the scene of contention. -England then put forth all her vast resources; fortunately -those resources were wielded by a general equal to the task of -delivering the Peninsula, and it was delivered. But through what -changes of fortune; by what unexpected helps; by what unlooked-for -and extraordinary events; under what difficulties; and by whose -perseverance, and in despite of whose errors, let posterity judge; -for in that judgment only will impartiality and justice be found. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -The 20th of December, Napoleon became aware that sir John Moore -(having relinquished his communication with Lisbon, and adopted a -new one upon Coruña) was menacing the French line of operations on -the side of Burgos. This intelligence obliged him to suspend all -his designs against the south of Spain and Portugal, and to fix his -whole attention upon - - -THE OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY. - -The reasons which induced the English general to divide his army, -and to send general Hope with one column by the Tagus, while the -other marched under his own personal command, by Almeida and Ciudad -Rodrigo, have been already related; as likewise the arrangements -which brought sir David Baird to Coruña, without having permission -to land his troops, and without money to equip them, when they were -at last suffered to disembark. - -The 8th of November, sir John Moore being at Almeida, on the -frontier of Portugal, his artillery was at Truxillo, in Spanish -Estremadura, and sir David Baird’s division was at Coruña. - -General Blake, pursued by fifty thousand enemies, was that day -flying from Nava to Espinosa, and Castaños and Palafox were -quarrelling at Tudela. - -The conde de Belvedere was at Burgos, with thirteen thousand bad -troops. - -Napoleon was at Vittoria with a hundred and seventy thousand good -troops. - -At this time the letters of lord William Bentinck and colonel -Graham, exposing all the imprudence of the Spanish generals, being -received, created uneasiness in the mind of sir John Moore; he -already foresaw that his junction with the other divisions of -his army might be impeded by the result of an action, which the -Spaniards appeared to be courting, contrary to all sound policy; -but as no misfortune had yet befallen them, he continued his march, -hoping, “that all the bad which might happen, would not happen.” - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Journal, MSS.] - -The 11th he crossed the frontier of Spain, and marched to Ciudad -Rodrigo; on that day Blake was completely discomfited at Espinosa, -and the Estremaduran army beaten the day before at Gamonal, was -utterly ruined and dispersed. - -The 13th, the head of the British columns entered Salamanca, at -the moment when Blake’s fugitive force was finally disorganized -at Reynosa, leaving the first, second, and fourth French corps, -amounting to near seventy thousand men, free to act against any -quarter. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 14.] - -Sir John Moore participated at first in the universal belief, -that the nation was enthusiastic, and fixed in a determination to -dispute every step with the invaders; even after he had detected -the exaggerations of the military agents, and perceived the want -of capacity in the Spanish generals and rulers, he trusted that -the spirit of the people would compensate for their deficiency -of skill, and his mind was bent upon succouring them with all -his power; what then was his surprise to find, that the defeat -of the conde de Belvedere, an event which laid Castille open to -the incursions of the enemy, which uncovered the march of the -British, and compromised their safety, had created no sensation -among the people; that the authorities had spread no alarm, taken -no precautions, delivered out no arms, although many thousands -were stored in the principal towns, and neither encouraged the -inhabitants by proclamations, nor enrolled any of them for defence? -He himself was informed of this important occurrence a full week -after it had happened, and then through a single official channel. -Valladolid was but three marches from Salamanca, and only four -thousand British troops had arrived in the latter town; if the -enemy had advanced in force, a retreat upon Ciudad Rodrigo would -have become inevitable. The general, therefore, assembled the -local authorities, explained to them the danger of his position, -and endeavoured to excite their ardour; his exhortations produced -no effect, either upon the junta or the people; the latter loudly -declared their detestation of the invaders, but remained tranquil; -the former were timid and stupid. The first feeling of indignation -against the French was exhausted, and there was nothing to supply -its place; the fugitives from the armies passed daily, without -shame, and without reproach from their countrymen. Notwithstanding -this unfavourable appearance, sir John Moore resolved not to retire -until forced to do so; but hastening the arrival of his own rear -divisions, he sent orders to sir David Baird and to sir John Hope -to concentrate their troops, yet to be prepared for a retreat if -the enemy advanced. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Frere’s Letter to the Junta.] - -In this state he remained until the 18th, his army was closing -up, and the French cavalry withdrew from Valladolid to Placentia. -But the news of Blake’s defeat now reached Salamanca, not by -rumour, or by any direct communication from the Montagna St. -Ander, but through Mr. Stuart, eight days subsequent to the date -of the action; the central junta did not even inform the minister -plenipotentiary until thirty hours after having received official -intelligence of it themselves. - -The want of transport and supplies obliged the British to march -in small and successive divisions. It was, therefore, the 23d of -November before the centre, consisting of twelve thousand infantry, -and a battery of six guns, were concentrated at Salamanca. On that -day Castaños and Palafox were defeated at Tudela, their armies -scattered without a chance of rallying again in the field, and the -third and sixth French corps became disposable. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.] - -The emperor, victorious on both flanks, and with a fresh base of -operations fixed at Burgos, was free to move, with the guards -and the reserve, either against Madrid or in the direction of -Salamanca; and detachments of his army were already in possession -of Valladolid; the very town which, a few days before, the -Spanish government had indicated for the base of sir John Moore’s -operations, and the formation of his magazines. - -The 26th the head of sir David Baird’s column was in Astorga, but -the rear extended beyond Lugo. The head of general Hope’s division -was at the Escurial, the rear at Talavera. The second French corps -was on the Deba, threatening Leon and the Asturias; the cavalry -covered the plains; the fourth corps was descending by Carrion and -Valladolid, to seize the pass of the Guadarama; and the emperor -himself was preparing to force the Somosierra. - -From this summary of contemporary events, it is evident, that -notwithstanding sir John Moore had organised, equipped, supplied, -and carried his troops four hundred miles in the space of six -weeks, he was too late in the field. The campaign was decided -against the Spaniards before the British had, strictly speaking, -entered Spain as an army; it is also certain, that if, instead of -being at Salamanca, Escurial, and Astorga, on the 23d, the troops -had been united at Burgos on the 8th, such was the weakness of -the Spanish forces, the strength of the enemy, and such the skill -with which Napoleon directed his movements, that a difficult and -precarious retreat was the utmost favour that could be expected -from Fortune by the English general. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, sect. 1 and 4.] - -The situation in which he was placed on his arrival at Salamanca, -gave rise to serious reflections in the mind of sir John Moore. He -had been sent forward without a plan of operations, or any data -upon which to found one. By his instructions he was merely directed -to open communication with the Spanish authorities, for the purpose -of “framing the plan of campaign;” but general Castaños, with -whom he was desired to correspond, was superseded immediately -afterwards, and the marquis of Romana, his successor, was engaged -in rallying the remains of Blake’s force in the Asturias, at a -distance of two hundred miles from the only army with which any -plan of co-operation could be formed, and of whose proceedings -he was as ignorant as sir John Moore. No channel of intelligence -had been pointed out to the latter, and as yet a stranger in the -country, and without money, he could not establish any certain -one for himself. It was the will of the people of England, and -the orders of the government, that he should push forward to the -assistance of the Spaniards; and he had done so, without magazines, -and without money to form them; trusting to the official assurance -of the minister, that above a hundred thousand Spanish soldiers -covered his march, and that the people were enthusiastic and -prepared for any exertion to secure their deliverance; but he found -them supine and unprepared; the French cavalry, in parties as weak -as twelve men, traversed the country, and raised contributions, -without difficulty or opposition. This was the state of Castille. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, sect. 5 and 6.] - -The letters of Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck amply exposed -the incapacity, selfishness, and apathy of the supreme government -at Aranjuez. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -The correspondence of colonel Graham painted in the strongest -colours the confusion of affairs on the Ebro, the jealousy, the -discord of the generals, the worse than childish folly of the -deputy, Palafox, and his creatures. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -Sir David Baird’s experience proved, that in Gallicia the people -were as inert as in Castille and Leon, and the authorities more -absurd and more interested. General Hope expressed a like opinion -as to the ineptitude of the central junta; and even the military -agents, hitherto so sanguine, had lowered their tone of exultation -in a remarkable manner. - -The real force of the enemy was unknown to sir John Moore, but he -knew that it could not be less than eighty thousand fighting men, -and that thirty thousand more were momentarily expected, and might -have arrived; he knew that Blake and the conde de Belvedere were -totally defeated, and that Castaños must inevitably be so if he -hesitated to retreat. - -The only conclusion to be drawn from these facts was, that the -Spaniards were unable, or unwilling, to resist the enemy, and -that the British would have to support the contest alone, unless -they could form a junction with Castaños, before the latter was -entirely discomfited and destroyed; but there was no time for such -an operation, and the first object was, to unite the parcelled -divisions of the English army. From Astorga to Salamanca was four -marches, from Salamanca to the Escurial was six marches; but it -would have required five days to close up the rear upon Salamanca, -six days to enable Hope to concentrate at the Escurial, and sixteen -to enable Baird to assemble at Astorga. Under twenty days it would -have been impossible for the English army to unite and act in a -body; and to have advanced in their divided state would have been -equally contrary to military principle and to common sense. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 14.] - -A retreat, although it was prescribed by the rules of scientific -war, and in unison with the instructions of the government, which -forbad the general to commit his troops in any serious affair, -before the whole were united, would have been (while the Spanish -army of the centre still held the field) ungenerous, and the idea -was repugnant to the bold and daring spirit of Moore. Rather than -resort to such a remedy for the false position his government had -placed him in, he contemplated a hardy and dangerous enterprise, -such as none but great minds are capable of. He proposed, if he -could draw the extended wings of his army together in good time, to -abandon all communication with Portugal, and throwing himself into -the heart of Spain, to rally Castaños’ army (if it yet existed) -upon his own, to defend the southern provinces, and trust to the -effect which such an appeal to the patriotism and courage of the -Spaniards would produce. But he considered that the question was -not purely military; the Spanish cause was not one which could be -decided by the marches of a few auxiliary troops; its fate rested -on the vigour of the rulers, the concert of the generals, the -unity of the exertions, and the fixed resolution of the people to -suffer all privations, and die rather than submit. To sir John -Moore it appeared doubtful that such a spirit, or the means of -creating it, existed, and more doubtful that there was capacity in -the government to excite or to direct it when aroused. No men of -talent had yet appeared, and good-will was in itself nothing if -improperly treated. - -With the English plenipotentiary, who had just superseded Mr. -Stuart near the central junta, the general had been directed by the -ministers to communicate upon all important points, and to receive -with deference his opinion and advice. The present was an occasion -to which those instructions were peculiarly applicable. Mr. Frere -had come fresh from the English government, he was acquainted with -its views, and he was in the most suitable position to ascertain -what degree of elasticity the Spanish cause really possessed. The -decision of the question belonged as much to him as to the general; -it involved the whole policy of the English cabinet with respect -to Spain. As a simple operation of war the proposed movement was -rash; all the military and many political reasons called for a -retreat upon Portugal, which would take the army back upon its own -resources, ensure its concentration, increase its strength, protect -British interests, and leave it free either to return to Spain -if a favourable opportunity should occur, or to pass by sea to -Andalusia, and commence the campaign in the south. - -Such were the reflections that induced sir John Moore to solicit -Mr. Frere’s opinion upon the general policy of the proposed -operation, but in so doing he never had the least intention of -consulting him upon the mode of executing the military part, of -which he conceived himself to be the best judge. - -While awaiting the reply, he directed sir David Baird, if the -enemy showed no disposition to molest him, to push the troops on -to Salamanca as fast as they should arrive at Astorga. Sir David -was proceeding to do so, when Blake advised him that a considerable -French force was collecting at Rio Seco and Ampudia with a view -of interrupting the march. This arrested the movement, and Baird, -after destroying some of his stores at Astorga, fell back to Villa -Franca. As sir John Moore’s information led him to believe that -Blake’s report was false, he recalled Baird; but valuable time was -thus lost. It was the march of the fourth corps, then traversing -the line from Carrion to the Guadarama, that gave rise to the -contradictory intelligence. - -At this time, the various changes in the French positions, and the -continual circulation of their light cavalry through the plains, -bewildered the spies and the peasants. The force of the enemy on -different points also confused the higher agents, who, believing -the greatest amount of the invading army to be from a hundred -to a hundred and twenty thousand men, could never reconcile the -reports with this standard, and therefore concluded that Napoleon -exaggerated his real numbers to create terror. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 14.] - -Sir John Moore wrote to Mr. Frere on the 27th of November, and the -arrangements for the execution of his project were all prepared. -Baird was to march by Benevente on the 1st, Hope was to move on -Tordesillas, and the force at Salamanca was to advance to Zamora -and Toro; but in the night of the 28th, a despatch from Mr. Stuart -made known the disaster at Tudela. This changed the aspect of -affairs; the question proposed to Mr. Frere was no longer doubtful; -the projected movement had been founded upon _the chance of -rallying the Spanish armies behind the Tagus_; a hazardous and -daring experiment when first conceived; but now that Castaños had -no longer an army, now that the strength of Spain was utterly -broken, to have persisted in it would have been insanity. The -French could be over the Tagus before the British, and there were -no Spanish armies to rally. The defeat at Tudela took place the -23d of November; Baird’s brigades could not be united at Astorga -before the 5th of December, and to concentrate the whole of the -army at Salamanca required a flank march of several days over an -open plain; an operation not to be thought of, within a few marches -of a skilful enemy who possessed such an overwhelming force of -artillery and cavalry. As long as Castaños and Palafox kept the -field there was reason to believe that the French stationed at -Burgos would not make any serious attempt on the side of Astorga, -but that check being now removed, an unmilitary flank march would -naturally draw their attention, and bring them down upon the -parcelled divisions of the English troops. The object of succouring -the Spaniards called for great but not for useless sacrifices. -The English general was prepared to confront any danger and to -execute any enterprise which held out a chance of utility, but he -also remembered that the best blood of England was committed to -his charge, that not an English army, but the very heart, the pith -of the military power of his country was in his keeping, it was -entrusted to his prudence, and his patriotism spurned the idea of -seeking personal renown by betraying that sacred trust. - -The political reasons in favour of marching towards Madrid, -scarcely balanced the military objections before the battle of -Tudela; but after that event, the latter acquiring double force, -left no room for hesitation in the mind of any man capable of -reasoning at all; and sir John Moore resolved to fall back into -Portugal. He ordered sir David Baird to regain Coruña or Vigo, and -to carry his troops by sea to Lisbon; but wishing, if possible, -to unite with Hope before the retrograde movement commenced, he -directed Baird to show a bold front for a few days in order to -attract the enemy’s attention. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 5.] - -The negligence, the false intelligence, the frauds, the opposition -approaching to hostility, experienced by sir David Baird during -his march from Coruña, had so reduced that general’s hopes, that -he prepared to retreat without reluctance. He was in direct -communication with Romana, but the intercourse between them had -rather confirmed than weakened the impression on sir David’s -mind, that it was impossible to depend upon the promises, the -information, or the judgment of any Spanish general. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers. Hope’s Letters.] - -In the meantime, Napoleon forced the Somosierra, and summoned -Madrid. The supreme junta fled to Badajos. St. Juan was murdered -at Talavera. The remnant of Castaños’s army was driven towards -the Tagus; and as the fourth corps approached Segovia, sir John -Hope’s situation became very critical. His column, consisting of -three thousand infantry, nine hundred cavalry, the artillery, and -the great parc of ammunition had been obliged, from the want of -money and supplies, to move in six divisions, each being a day’s -march behind the other. At Almaraz, Hope endeavoured to discover -a way across the mountains to Ciudad Rodrigo; a road did exist, -but the peasants and muleteers declared it to be impracticable -for carriages, and consequently unfit for the convoy. The truth of -their assertions was much doubted; but sir John was daily losing -horses from the glanders, and, with a number but just sufficient to -drag his guns and convoy along a good road, he feared to explore a -difficult passage over the Sierras. - -[Sidenote: Lord W. Bentinck’s Letters.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 6.] - -When his leading division had reached Talavera, don Thomas Morla, -then secretary at war, anxious to have the troops more minutely -divided, proposed that the regiments should march through Madrid in -ten divisions on as many successive days, the first to reach the -capital on the 22d of November, which would exactly have brought -the convoy into the jaws of the French army. Hope immediately -repaired in person to Madrid, held a conference with Morla, and -quickly satisfied himself that every thing was in confusion, and -that the Spanish government had neither arranged a general plan, -nor was capable of conducting one. Convinced of this unfortunate -truth, he paid no attention to Morla’s proposition, but carried his -troops at once to the Escurial by the road of Naval Carnero. At the -Escurial he halted to close up the rear, and to obtain bullocks to -assist in dragging the parc over the Guadarama. The 28th he crossed -the mountain, and entered the open flat country. The 28th and 29th -the infantry and guns were at Villa Castin and St. Antonia, the -parc being at Espinar, and the cavalry advanced on the road to -Arevalo. General Heredia was still at Segovia. The duke of Dantzic -was at Valladolid and Placentia, and his patroles were heard of at -Coca, only a few miles from Arevalo. - -[Sidenote: General Hope’s Reports. MS.] - -In the course of the day a despatch from Mr. Stuart announced the -catastrophe at Tudela, and the flight from the camp of Sepulveda. -At the same time the outposts of cavalry in the front reported -that four hundred French horse were at Olmedo, only twelve -miles from Arevalo, and that four thousand others were in the -neighbourhood. The scouts at St. Garcia, on the right, also tracked -the French again at Añaya, near Segovia. The general’s situation -was now truly embarrassing. If he fell back to the Guadarama, the -army at Salamanca would be without ammunition or artillery. If he -advanced, it must be by a flank march of three days, with a heavy -convoy, over a flat country, and within a few hours march of a -very superior cavalry. If he delayed where he was even for a few -hours, the French on the side of Segovia might get between him and -the pass of Guadarama, and then, attacked in front, flank, and -rear, he would be reduced to the shameful necessity of abandoning -his convoy and guns to save his men in the mountains of Avila. A -man of less intrepidity and calmness would have been ruined; but -Hope, as enterprising as he was prudent, without any hesitation -ordered the cavalry to throw out parties cautiously towards the -French, and to maintain a confident front if the latter approached; -then moving the infantry and guns from Villacastin, and the convoy -from Espinosa by cross roads to Avila, he continued his march -day and night until they reached Peneranda: the cavalry covering -this movement closed gradually to the left, and finally occupied -Fontiveros on the 2d of December. - -The infantry and the draft animals were greatly fatigued, but the -danger was not over; the patroles reported, that the enemy, to the -number of ten thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and forty -guns, were still in Olmedo. This was the eternal fourth corps, -which thus traversing the country, continually crossed the heads -of the English columns, and seemed to multiply the forces of the -French at all points. Hope now drew his infantry and cavalry up -in position, but obliged the artillery and the convoy to proceed -without rest to Alba de Tormes, where a detachment from Salamanca -met them, and covered their march to that town. This vigorous and -skilful operation concluded, the division remained at Peneranda, -collected its stragglers, and pushed outposts to Medina del Campo, -Madrigal, and Torecilla, while the fourth corps unwittingly pursued -its march to the Guadarama. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Narrative of Moore’s Campaign.] - -Sir John Moore’s resolution to retreat upon Portugal created a -great sensation at Madrid and at Aranjuez. The junta feared, and -with reason, that such a palpable proof of the state to which their -negligence and incapacity had reduced the country would endanger -their authority, and perhaps their lives; and although they were -on the point of flying to Badajos themselves, they were anxious -that others should rush headlong into danger. Morla, and those who, -like him, were prepared to abandon the cause of their country, -felt mortified at losing an opportunity of commemorating their -defection by a signal act of perfidy. The English plenipotentiary -was surprised and indignant that a general of experience and -reputation should think for himself, and decide upon a military -operation without a reference to his opinion. Mr. Frere, although -a person of some scholastic attainments, greatly overrated his own -talent for public affairs. He was ill qualified for the duties of -his situation, which at this moment required temper, sagacity, and -judgment. He had come out to Spain impressed with false notions of -what was passing in that country, and clinging tenaciously to the -pictures of his imagination, he resented the intrusion of reason, -and petulantly spurned at facts. The defeat of the conde de -Belvedere at Gamonal, a defeat that broke the centre of the Spanish -line, uncovered the flank and rear of Castaños’s army, opened a way -to Madrid, and rendered the concentration of the British divisions -unsafe, if not impossible; he curiously called the “unlucky affair -of the 10th at Burgos.” After the battle of Tudela he estimated the -whole French army on the side of Burgos and Valladolid at eleven -thousand men, when they were above one hundred thousand; and yet, -with information so absurdly defective, he was prompt to interfere -with, and eager to control, the military combinations of the -general, although they were founded upon the true and acknowledged -principles of the art of war. - -[Sidenote: Moore’s Papers. Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Moore’s Papers. Frere’s Correspondence.] - -While sir John Moore was anxiously watching the dangerous -progress of sir John Hope, he was suddenly assailed by the -representations and remonstrances of all these offended, mortified, -and disappointed persons. The question of retiring was, by the -defeat of Tudela, rendered so purely military, and the necessity -of it was so palpable, that the general, although anticipating -some expressions of discontent from the Spanish government, was -totally unprepared for the torrent of puerile impertinencies with -which he was overwhelmed. Morla, a subtle man, endeavoured first -to deceive Mr. Stuart; by treating the defeat of Castaños lightly, -and stating officially that he had saved the greatest part of his -army at Siguenza, and was on the march to join St. Juan at the -Somosierra; to this he added, that there were only small bodies of -French cavalry in the flat country of Castille and Leon, and no -force on that side capable of preventing the junction of sir John -Moore’s division. This was on the evening of the 30th. The emperor -had forced the pass of the Somosierra on that morning, and the -duke of Dantzic was at Valladolid. The same day Mr. Frere, writing -from Aranjuez, (in answer to the general’s former communication, -and before he was acquainted with his intention to fall back), -deprecated a retreat upon Portugal, and asserted, that the -enthusiasm of the Spaniards was unbounded, except in Castille and -Leon, where he admitted they were more passive than they should be. -He even stated, that twenty thousand men were actually assembled -in the vicinity of the capital, and that Castaños was falling -back upon them; that reinforcements were arriving daily from the -southern provinces, and that the addition of the British army would -form a force greatly superior to any the French could bring against -that quarter, in sufficient time. It was certain, he said, that -the latter were very weak, and would be afraid to advance, while -the whole country, from the Pyrenees to the capital, was in arms -upon their left flank. Rumours also were rife that the conscription -had been resisted, and this was the more probable, because every -great effort made by France was accompanied by weakness and -internal disturbance; and a pastoral letter of the bishop of -Carcassonne seemed to imply that it was so at that time. “Good -policy, therefore, required, that the French should be attacked -before their reinforcements joined them, as any success obtained -at that moment would render a conscription for a third attempt -infinitely difficult, if not impracticable; but if, on the other -hand,” said this inconsiderate person, “the French are allowed, -with their present forces, to retain their present advantages, and -to wait the completion of their conscription, they would pour into -Spain, with a number of troops which would give them immediate -possession of the capital and the central provinces.” Two days -after the date of this letter, the emperor was actually at the -capital; and Mr. Frere, notwithstanding the superior Spanish force -which his imagination had conjured up, was, with the junta, flying -in all haste from those very central provinces: France remaining, -meanwhile, strong, and free from internal dissension. This rambling -letter was not despatched when the general’s intention to fall back -upon Portugal was made known to Mr. Frere; but the latter thought -it so admirably calculated to prevent a retreat, that he forwarded -it, accompanied by a short explanatory note, which was offensive in -style, and indicative of a petulant disposition. - -[Sidenote: Moore’s Papers.] - -At this time, don Augustin Bueno and don Ventura Escalente arrived -at head-quarters. These two generals were deputed by the junta -to remonstrate against sir John Moore’s intended retreat; and -they justified the choice of their employers, being in folly and -presumptuous ignorance the very types of the government they -represented. They began by asserting, that St. Juan, with twenty -thousand men under his command, had so fortified the pass of the -Somosierra, that it could not be forced by any number of enemies, -and then affirming that reinforcements were daily joining him, -they were proceeding to create immense Spanish armies, when the -general stopped their garrulity by introducing colonel Graham, -who had been a witness of the dispersion of Castaños’s army, and -had just left the unfortunate St. Juan at Talavera, surrounded -by the villanous runagates, who murdered him the next day. It -may be easily supposed, that such representations and from such -men could have no weight with the commander of an army; in fact, -the necessity of retreating was rendered more imperious by these -glaring proofs that the junta and the English plenipotentiary were -totally ignorant of what was passing around them. But Napoleon was -now in full career; he had raised a hurricane of war, and directing -its fury as he pleased, his adversaries were obliged to conform -their movements to his, and as the circumstances varied from hour -to hour, the determination of one moment was rendered useless in -the next. - -The appearance of the French cavalry in the plains of Madrid -sent the junta and Mr. Frere headlong to Badajos; but the people -of Madrid, as we have seen, shut their gates, and displayed the -outward signs of a resolution to imitate Zaragoza. The neighbouring -peasants flocked in to aid the citizens, and a military junta -(composed of the duke of Infantado, the prince of Castel Franco, -the marquis of Castellar, and don Thomas Morla) was appointed to -manage the defence. Morla now resolved to make a final effort to -involve the British army in the destruction of his own country, and -as the duke of Infantado was easily persuaded to quit Madrid on a -mission to the army of the centre, the traitor was left sole master -of the town, because the duke and himself only had any influence -with that armed mob, which had murdered the marquis of Perales, and -filled the city with tumult. - -When the French emperor summoned the junta to surrender, Morla, in -concert with the prince of Castel Franco, addressed a paper to sir -John Moore, in which it was stated that twenty-five thousand men -under Castaños, and ten thousand from the Somosierra, were marching -in all haste to the capital, where forty thousand others were in -arms; but that, apprehending an increase of force on the enemy’s -side, the junta hoped that the English army would either march to -the assistance of the capital, or take a direction to fall upon the -rear of the French, and not doubting that the English general had -already formed a junction with Blake’s army, they hoped he would -be quick in his operations. This paper was sent by a government -messenger to Salamanca; but ere he could reach that place, Morla, -who had commenced negotiations, before the despatch was written, -capitulated, and Napoleon was in Madrid. This communication -alone would not have been sufficient to arrest sir John Moore’s -retrograde movement. He was become too well acquainted with what -facility Spanish armies were created on paper, to rely on any -statement of their numbers; but Mr. Stuart also expressed a belief -that Madrid would make a vigorous resistance, and the tide of false -information having set in with a strong current, every moment -brought fresh assurances that a great spirit had arisen. - -On the day that Morla’s communication arrived, there also appeared -at head-quarters one Charmilly, a French adventurer. This man, who -has been since denounced in the British parliament as an organizer -of assassination in St. Domingo, and a fraudulent bankrupt in -London, came as the confidential agent of Mr. Frere. He had been -in Madrid during the night of the 1st, and left it (immediately -after having held a conference with Morla), on the morning of the -2d. Taking the road to Talavera, he met with the plenipotentiary, -to whom he spoke with enthusiasm of the spirit and preparations -of the inhabitants in the capital. Mr. Frere readily confided in -him, and imparting his own views, not only intrusted this stranger -with letters to the British general, but charged him with a mission -to obstruct the retreat into Portugal. Thus instructed, Charmilly -hastened to Salamanca, and presented Mr. Frere’s first missive, in -which that gentleman, after alluding to former representations, -and to the information of which colonel Charmilly was the bearer, -viz. the enthusiasm in the capital, made a formal remonstrance, to -the effect that propriety and policy demanded an immediate advance -of the British to support this generous effort. Charmilly also -demanded a personal interview, which was granted; but sir John -Moore having some suspicion of the man, whom he had seen before, -listened to his tale of the enthusiasm and vigorous character -displayed at Madrid, with an appearance of coldness that baffled -the penetration of the adventurer, who retired under the impression -that a retreat was certain. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 7.] - -For many years so much ridicule had been attached to the name of -an English expedition, that weak-headed men claimed a sort of -prescriptive right to censure without regard to subordination, the -conduct of their general. It had been so in Egypt, where a cabal -was formed to deprive lord Hutchinson of the command; it had been -so at Buenos Ayres, at Ferrol, and in Portugal. It was so at this -time in sir John Moore’s army; and it will be found in the course -of this work, that the superlative talents, vigour, and success -of the duke of Wellington, could not even at a late period of the -war secure him from such vexatious folly. The three generals who -commanded the separate divisions of the army, and who were in -consequence acquainted with all the circumstances of the moment, -were perfectly agreed as to the propriety of a retreat; but in -other quarters indecent murmurs were so prevalent among officers -of rank as to call for rebuke. Charmilly, ignorant of the decided -character of the general-in-chief, concluded that this temper was -favourable to the object of his mission, and presented a second -letter, which Mr. Frere had charged him to deliver, should the -first fail of effect. The purport of it was to desire that if -sir John Moore still persisted in his intention of retreating, -“_the bearer might be previously examined before a council of -war_,” in other words, that Mr. Frere, convinced of sir John -Moore’s incapacity and want of zeal, was determined to control -his proceedings even by force. And this to a British general of -long experience and confirmed reputation, and by the hands of a -foreign adventurer!! The indignation of a high spirit at such a -foolish, wanton insult, may be easily imagined. He tore the letter -in pieces, and ordered Charmilly to quit the cantonments of the -British army without delay. His anger, however, soon subsided. -Quarrels among the servants of the public could only prove -detrimental to his country, and he put his personal feelings on -one side. The information brought by Charmilly, separated from the -indecorum of his mission, was in itself important. It confirmed -the essential fact, that Madrid was actually resisting, and that -the spirit and energy of the country was awaking. Hitherto his own -observation had led sir John Moore to doubt, if the people took -sufficient interest in the cause to make any effectual effort; all -around himself was apathetic and incapable, and his correspondents, -with the exception of Mr. Frere, nay, even the intercepted letters -of French officers, had agreed in describing the general feeling of -the country as subsiding into indifference. To use his own words, -“_Spain was without armies, generals, or a government_.” But now -the fire essential to the salvation of the nation appeared to be -kindling, and Moore feeling conscious of ability to lead a British -army, hailed the appearance of an enthusiasm which promised success -to a just cause, and a brilliant career of glory to himself. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 14.] - -That the metropolis should thus abide the fury of the conqueror -was surprising. It was a great event and full of promise. The -situation of the army was likewise improved; general Hope’s -junction was accomplished, and as the attention of the French was -turned toward Madrid, there was no reason to doubt that Baird’s -junction could likewise be effected. On the other hand, there -was no certainty, that the capital would remain firm when danger -pressed, none that it would be able to resist, none that the -example would spread; yet without it did so, nothing was gained, -because it was only by an union of heart and hand throughout -the whole country, that the great power of the French could be -successfully resisted. - -In a matter so balanced, sir John Moore, as might be expected from -an enterprising general, adopted the boldest and most generous -side. He ordered sir David Baird to concentrate his troops at -Astorga, and he himself prepared for an advance; but as he remained -without any further information of the fate of Madrid, he sent -colonel Graham to obtain intelligence of what was passing, and to -carry his answer to Morla. This resolution being taken, he wrote -to Mr. Frere, calmly explaining the reasons for his past conduct, -and those which actuated him in forming a fresh plan of operation. -“I wish anxiously,” said this noble-minded man in conclusion, -“I wish anxiously, as the king’s minister, to continue upon the -most confidential footing with you, and I hope as we have but one -interest, the public welfare, though we occasionally see it in -different aspects, that this will not disturb the harmony which -should subsist between us. Fully impressed as I am with these -sentiments, I shall abstain from any remarks upon the two letters -from you delivered to me last night and this morning by colonel -Charmilly, or on the message which accompanied them. I certainly -at first did feel and expressed much indignation at a person like -him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you -to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say they never will -be created towards you again.” - -The plan of operations now occupied his mind. The Somosierra and -the Guadarama were both in possession of the enemy, no direct -movement could therefore be made towards Madrid; besides, the rear -of Baird’s troops was still several marches behind Astorga, and -a general movement on the side of the capital could not commence -before the 12th of the month. Zaragoza, the general knew, was -determined to stand a second siege, and he had the guarantee of the -first that it would be an obstinate stand. He had received from -the junta of Toledo a formal assurance of their resolution to bury -themselves under the ruins of the town sooner than submit; and he -was informed from several quarters that the southern provinces were -forwarding crowds of fresh levies. Romana at this time also was -in correspondence with him, and with the usual exaggeration of a -Spaniard, declared his ability to aid him with an army of twenty -thousand men. Upon this data sir John Moore formed a plan, bearing -the stamp of genuine talent and enterprise, whether it be examined -as a political or a military measure. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 14.] - -He supposed the French emperor to be more anxious to strike a -heavy blow against the English, and to shut them out of Spain, -than to overrun any particular province, or get possession of any -town in the Peninsula. He resolved, therefore, to throw himself -upon the communications of the French army, hoping, if fortune -was favourable, to inflict a severe loss upon the troops which -guarded them before aid could arrive. If Napoleon, suspending -his operations against the south, should detach largely, Madrid -would thereby be succoured; if he did not detach largely, the -British could hold their ground. Sir John Moore knew well that -a great commander would in such a case be more likely to unite -his whole army, and fall upon the troops which thus ventured to -place themselves on his line of operations. But, to relieve the -Spaniards at a critical moment, and to give time for the southern -provinces to organise their defence and recover courage, he was -willing thus to draw the whole of the enemy upon himself. He felt -that in doing so, he compromised the safety of his own army, that -he must glide along the edge of a precipice, that he must cross a -gulf on a rotten plank; but he also knew the martial qualities of -his soldiers, he had confidence in his own genius; and the occasion -being worthy of a great deed, he dared essay it even against -Napoleon. - -Colonel Graham returned on the 9th, bringing the first intimation -of the capitulation of the capital. He had been able to proceed -no further than Talavera, where he encountered two members of the -supreme junta. By them he was told that the French, being from -twenty to thirty thousand strong, possessed the Retiro, but that -the people retained their arms, and that La-Peña, with thirty -thousand men of the army of the centre, was at Guadalaxara; that -fourteen thousand of St. Juan’s and Heredia’s forces were assembled -at Almaraz, and that Romana, with whom they anxiously desired that -sir John Moore would unite, had likewise an army of thirty thousand -fighting men. Finally, they assured colonel Graham that the most -energetic measures were in activity wherever the enemy’s presence -did not control the patriots. - -Mortifying as it was to find that Madrid, after so much boasting, -should have held out but one day, the event itself did not destroy -the ground of sir John Moore’s resolution to advance. Undoubtedly -it was so much lost; it diminished the hope of arousing the nation, -and it increased the danger of the British army by letting loose a -greater number of the enemy’s troops; but as a diversion for the -south it might still succeed; and as long as there was any hope, -the resolution of the English general was fixed, to prove that he -would not abandon the cause even when the Spaniards were abandoning -it themselves. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -The forward movement of the British army commenced on the 11th -of December. Sir John Moore’s first intention was to march with -his own and Hope’s division to Valladolid, with a view to cover -the advance of his stores and to protect the junction of sir -David Baird’s troops, the rear of which was still several marches -behind Astorga. The preparations for a retreat upon Portugal were, -however, continued, and sir David was ordered to form magazines -at Benevente, Astorga, Villa Franca, and Lugo. This arrangement -secured two lines of operation, and permitted a greater freedom of -action. - -The 13th, head-quarters were at Alaejos. Two brigades, and the -cavalry under lord Paget at Toro. General Hope was at Torrecilla. -The cavalry under brigadier-general Charles Stewart, was at Rueda; -having the night before surprised a French post of fifty infantry -and thirty dragoons, killing or taking almost the whole number. The -prisoners declared that in the French army it was believed that the -English were retreating to Portugal. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 4.] - -At Alaejos an intercepted despatch of the prince of Neufchatel was -brought to head-quarters; the contents were important enough to -change the direction of the march. It was addressed to the duke -of Dalmatia. Madrid was said to be perfectly tranquil, the shops -opened, and the public amusements going forward as in a time of -profound peace. The fourth corps of the army was at Talavera, on -its way towards Badajos; this movement, it was observed, would -force the English to retire to Portugal, if, contrary to the -emperor’s belief, they had not already done so. The fifth corps -were on the march to Zaragoza, and the eighth to Burgos. The duke -was directed to drive the Spaniards into Gallicia, to occupy Leon, -Benevente, and Zamora, and to keep the flat country in subjection, -for which purpose his two divisions of infantry, and the cavalry -brigades of Franceschi and Debelle, were considered sufficient. -It is remarkable that the first correct information of the -capitulation of Madrid should have been acquired by the perusal of -this document, ten days after the event had taken place; nor is it -less curious, that while Mr. Frere’s letters were filled with vivid -descriptions of Spanish enthusiasm, Napoleon should have been so -convinced of their passiveness as to send this important despatch -by an officer, who rode post, without an escort and in safety, -until his abusive language to the postmaster at Valdestillos -created a tumult, by which he lost his life. Captain Waters, an -English officer sent to obtain intelligence, happening to arrive -in that place, heard of the murder, and immediately purchased -the despatch for twenty dollars. The accidental information thus -obtained was the more valuable, that neither money nor patriotism -had induced the Spaniards to bring any intelligence of the enemy’s -situation, and each step the army had hitherto made was in the dark. - -It was now certain that Burgos was or would be strongly protected, -and that Baird’s line of march was unsafe if Soult, following these -instructions, advanced. On the other hand, as the French appeared -to be ignorant of the British movements, there was some chance of -surprising and beating the second corps before Napoleon could come -to its succour. Hope immediately passed the Douero at Tordesillas, -and directed his march upon Villepando; head-quarters were removed -to Toro, and Valderas was given as the point of junction to Baird’s -division, the head of which was now at Benevente. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers. MSS.] - -The 16th, Mr. Stuart arrived at Toro, accompanied by don F^e. X^r. -Caro, a member of the Spanish government, who brought two letters, -the one from the junta, the other from Mr. Frere. That from the -junta complained, that when Romana proposed to unite fourteen -thousand picked men to the British army, with a view to make a -forward movement, his offer had been disregarded, and a retreat -determined upon, in despite of his earnest remonstrances; this -retreat they declared to be uncalled for, and highly impolitic, -“as the enemy was never so near his ruin as in that moment.” If -the Spanish and British armies should unite, they said, it would -give “liberty to the Peninsula,” that “Romana, with his fourteen -thousand select men,” was still ready to join sir John Moore, and -that “thirty thousand fresh levies would in a month be added to the -ranks of the allied force.” - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -This tissue of falsehoods, for Romana had approved of the intention -to retreat, and never had above six thousand men armed, was -addressed to Mr. Frere, and by him transmitted to the general, -together with one from himself, which, in allusion to the retreat -upon Portugal, contained the following extraordinary passages: “I -mean the immense responsibility with which you charge yourself by -adopting, upon a supposed military necessity, a measure which must -be followed by immediate, if not final, ruin to our ally, and by -indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources you are -entrusted.” “I am unwilling to enlarge upon a subject in which -my feelings must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence, -which, with such an interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to -excite, but this much I must say, that if the British army had been -sent abroad for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible -mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not -firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the -measures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely -fulfilled their purpose.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 7.] - -These letters were dated at Truxillo; for the junta, not thinking -themselves safe at Badajos, had proceeded so far on their way to -Seville. On that side the French had continued to advance, the -remnants of the Spanish armies to fly, and every thing bore the -most gloomy appearance. Mr. Frere knew this. In a subsequent letter -he acknowledged that the enthusiasm was extinguished, and a general -panic commencing, at the moment when he was penning these offensive -passages. He was utterly ignorant of the numbers, the situation, -and the resources of the enemy, but he formed hypotheses, and upon -the strength of them insulted sir John Moore, and compromised the -interests of his country; and in this manner the British general, -while struggling with unavoidable difficulties, had his mind -harassed by a repetition of remonstrances and representations in -which common sense, truth, and decency were alike disregarded. On -this occasion he furnished a remarkable instance of the control he -exercised over his personal feelings, when the public welfare was -at stake. As Mr. Frere had acknowledged the receipt of a letter of -the 10th, it was probable that he had also received the general’s -answer (written before the 10th) to the communication made through -Charmilly; but as he did not say so, Sir John Moore took advantage -of the omission, and with singular propriety and dignity thus -replied to him: “With respect to your letter delivered to me at -Toro by Mr. Stuart, I shall not remark upon it. It is in the style -of the two which were brought to me by colonel Charmilly, and -consequently was answered by my letter of the 6th, of which I send -you a duplicate; that subject is I hope at rest!” - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers. Col Symes’ Corresp^{ce}.] - -[Sidenote: Gen. Leith.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 5.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, Section 7.] - -At Toro sir John Moore ascertained that Romana, although aware -of the advance of the British, and engaged to support them, was -retiring into Gallicia. That nobleman, nominally commander-in-chief -of the Spanish armies, was at the head of a few thousand miserable -soldiers; for the Spaniards, with great ingenuity, contrived to -have no general when they had an army, and no army when they had -a general. After the dispersion of Blake’s people at Reynosa, -Romana rallied about five thousand men at Renedo, in the valley -of Cabernigo, and endeavoured to make a stand on the borders of -the Asturias, but without any success, for the vile conduct of -the Asturian junta, joined to the terror created by the French -victories, had completely subdued the spirit of the peasantry, and -ruined the resources of that province. Romana complained that, -when checked for misconduct, his soldiers quitted their standards; -indeed that any should have been found to join their colours is -to be admired; for among the sores of Spain there were none more -cankered, more disgusting, than the venality, the injustice, the -profligate corruption of the Asturian authorities, who, without a -blush, openly divided the English subsidies, and defrauded, not -only the soldiers of their pay and equipments, but the miserable -peasants of their hire, doubling the wretchedness of poverty, and -deriding the misery they occasioned by pompous declarations of -their own virtue. From the Asturias the marquis led the remnants -of Blake’s force to Leon about the period of sir John Moore’s -arrival at Salamanca; like others, he had been deceived as to the -real state of the country, and at this time repented that he had -returned to Spain. - -Romana was a person of talent, quickness, and information, but -disqualified by nature for military command; a lively principle of -error pervaded all his notions of war; no man ever bore the title -of a general who was less capable of directing an army, neither -was he exempt from the prevailing weakness of his countrymen. At -this moment, when he had not the strength to stand upright, his -letters were teeming with gigantic offensive projects, and although -he had before approved of the intention to retreat, he was now as -ready to urge a forward movement, promising to co-operate with -twenty thousand soldiers when he could scarcely muster a third -of that number of men, who, half armed, were hardly capable of -distinguishing their own standards; and at the very time he made -the promise, he was retiring into Gallicia; not that he meant to -deceive, for he was as ready to advance as to retreat, but this -species of boasting is inherent in his nation, and Romana was a -true Spaniard. - -It has been asserted that Caro offered the chief command of the -Spanish armies to sir John Moore, and that the latter refused it; -this is not true: Caro had no power to do so, and if he had, there -were no armies to command; but that gentleman in his interview -either was, or affected to be, satisfied of the soundness of the -English general’s views, and ashamed of the folly of the junta. - -The 18th, head-quarters were at Castro Nuevo; from that place -sir John Moore wrote to Romana, informing him of his intention -to fall upon Soult, desiring his co-operation, and requesting -that the Marquis would, according to his own plan given to the -British minister in London, reserve the Asturias for his line of -communication, and leave the Gallicias open to the British. - -The army was now in full march, Baird was at Benevente, Hope -at Villapando; the cavalry scoured the country on the side of -Valladolid, and in several successful skirmishes took a number of -prisoners. The French could be no longer ignorant of the march, and -the English general brought forward his columns rapidly. On the -20th the whole of the forces were united; the cavalry at Melgar -Abaxo, and the infantry at Mayorga, and as much concentrated as -the necessity of obtaining cover in a country devoid of fuel, and -deep with snow, would permit. The weather was exceedingly severe, -and the marches long, but a more robust set of men never took -the field: their discipline was admirable, and there were very -few stragglers; the experience of one or two campaigns alone was -wanting to make a perfect army. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 25.] - -The number was however small; nominally it was nearly thirty-five -thousand, but four regiments were still in Portugal, and three more -were left by sir David Baird at Lugo and Astorga. One thousand six -hundred and eighty-seven men were detached, and four thousand and -five were in hospital. The actual number present under arms on -the 19th of December was only nineteen thousand and fifty-three -infantry, two thousand two hundred and seventy-eight cavalry, and -one thousand three hundred and fifty-eight gunners, forming a total -of twenty-three thousand five hundred and eighty-three men, with -sixty pieces of artillery: the whole being organized in three -divisions, a reserve, and two light brigades of infantry, and one -division of cavalry. Of the artillery four batteries were attached -to the infantry, and two to the cavalry; one was kept in reserve. - -Romana, who had been able to bring forward very few men, promised -to march in two columns by Almanzer and Guarda, and sent some -information of the enemy’s position; but sir John Moore depended -little upon his intelligence, when he found him, even so late -as the 19th of December (upon the faith of information from the -junta), representing Madrid as still holding out; and when the -advanced posts were already engaged at Sahagun, proposing an -interview at Benevente to arrange the plan of operations. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MS.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -On the French side, Soult’s corps was concentrating on the -Carrion. After the rapid and brilliant success of this marshal -at the opening of the campaign, his corps was ordered to remain -on the defensive until the movements against Tudela and Madrid -were completed; the despatches commanding him to recommence his -offensive operations were, as we have seen, intercepted on the -12th, but on the 16th he became acquainted with the advance of the -English army. At that period general Bonnet’s division occupied -Barquera de San Vincente and Potes, on the Deba; and watched some -thousand Asturians that Ballasteros had collected near Llanes. -Merle’s and Mermet’s divisions were on the Carrion; Franceschi’s -dragoons at Valladolid; and general Debelle’s at Sahagun. The -whole formed a total of sixteen or seventeen thousand infantry, -and twelve hundred cavalry, present under arms, of which only -eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry could, without -uncovering the important post of St. Andero, be opposed to the -advance of the British. Soult, alarmed at this disparity of force, -required general Mathieu Dumas, commandant at Burgos, to direct all -the divisions and detachments passing through that town, (whatever -might be their original destination) upon the Carrion; and this -decisive conduct was approved of by the emperor. The 21st, Bonnet’s -division remaining on the Deba, Mermet’s occupied the town of -Carrion; Merle’s was at Saldaña; and Franceschi’s cavalry retired -from Valladolid to Riberos de la Cuesca. Debelle’s continued at -Sahagun, and thirteen hundred dragoons, under general Lorge, -arrived at Palencia from Burgos. - -Meanwhile, the fifteenth and tenth British hussars quitting Melgar -Abaxo during the night, arrived close to Sahagun before daylight -on the 21st; the tenth marched straight to the town, the fifteenth -turned it by the right, and endeavoured to cut off the enemy, but -meeting with a patrole, the alarm was given, and when lord Paget, -with four hundred of the fifteenth, arrived at the rear of the -village, he was opposed by a line of six hundred French dragoons. -The tenth not being in sight, the fifteenth, after a few movements, -charged, broke the enemy’s line, and pursued them for some -distance. Fifteen to twenty killed, two lieutenant-colonels, and -eleven other officers, with a hundred and fifty-four men prisoners, -were the result of this affair, which lasted about twenty minutes. -Debelle then retired to Santerbas. - -The English infantry occupied Sahagun, and head-quarters were -established there. Romana remained at Mancilla, and it was evident -that no assistance could be expected from him; the truth was, -that ashamed of exposing the weakness and misery of his troops, -he kept away, for, after all his promises, he could not produce -six thousand fighting men; his letters, however, were, as usual, -extremely encouraging. _The French force in Spain was exceedingly -weak, Palafox had not been defeated at Tudela, Soult, including -Sonnet’s division, had scarcely nine thousand men of all arms. -It was an object to surround and destroy him before he could be -succoured_--and other follies of this nature. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -The English troops having outmarched their supplies, halted the -22d and 23d. Soult, whose intention was to act on the defensive, -hastened the march of the reinforcements from the side of Burgos, -and being fearful for his communication with Placentia, abandoned -Saldaña on the 23d, and concentrated his infantry at Carrion. -Debelle’s cavalry again advanced to Villatilla and Villacuenda, -Franceschi remained at Riberos, the dragoons of general Lorge -occupied Paredes, and general Dumas pushed on the divisions of the -eighth corps, of which, Laborde’s was already arrived at Palencia, -and Loison’s and Heudelet’s followed at the distance of two days’ -march; but these last were very weak. - -Sir John Moore’s plan was to move during the night of the 23d, -so as to arrive at Carrion by daylight on the 24th, to force the -bridge, and afterwards ascending the river, fall upon the main body -of the enemy, which his information led him to believe was still -at Saldaña. This attack was however but a secondary object, his -attention was constantly directed towards Madrid. He might beat -the corps in his front, but the victory could be of little use -beyond the honour of the day, for the eighth and third corps were -too near to admit of farther success. The whole operation, was one -of time, a political bait to tempt the emperor, whose march from -Madrid must be the signal for a retreat that sooner or later was -inevitable. To draw Napoleon from the south was the great object, -but it behoved the man to be alert that interposed between the lion -and his prey. - -The 23d, Romana gave notice that the French were in motion on the -side of Madrid. The night of the 23d the troops were in march -towards Carrion, when Romana’s intelligence was confirmed by the -general’s spies; all their reports agreed that the whole French -army was in movement to crush the English. The fourth corps had -been halted at Talavera, the third at Vittoria, the eighth was -closing up to reinforce the second, and the emperor in person was -marching towards the Guadarama; the principal objects of sir John -Moore’s advance were thus attained. The siege of Zaragoza was -delayed, the southern provinces were allowed to breathe, and it now -remained for him to prove, by a timely retreat, that this offensive -operation, although hazardous, was not the result of improvident -rashness, nor weakness of mind, but the hardy enterprise of a -great commander acting under peculiar circumstances: as a military -measure, his judgment condemned it; as a political one, he thought -it of doubtful advantage, because Spain was really passive, but -he was willing to give the Spaniards an opportunity of making -one more struggle for independence. That was done. If they could -not, or would not profit of the occasion, if their hearts were -faint or their hands feeble, the shame and the loss were their -own; the British general had done enough, enough for honour, -enough for utility, more than enough for prudence; but the madness -of the times required it. His army was already on the verge of -destruction, the enemy’s force was hourly increasing in his front; -the first symptoms of a retreat would bring it headlong on; and -in the meantime the emperor threatened the line of communications -with Gallicia, and by the rapidity of his march left no time for -consideration. - -After the first burst, by which he swept the northern provinces, -and planted his standards on the banks of the Tagus, that monarch -had put all the resources of his subtle genius into activity, -endeavouring to soften the public mind, and by engrafting benefits -on the terror his victories had created, to gain over the people; -but, at the same time, he was gathering in his extended wings, and -preparing for a new flight, which would have carried him over the -southern kingdoms of the Peninsula, and given him the rocks of -Lisbon as a resting-place for his eagles. - -Madrid was tranquil; Toledo, notwithstanding her heroic promises, -never shut her gates; one division of the first corps occupied that -town, another was in Ocaña, and the light cavalry scoured the whole -of La Mancha, even to the borders of Andalusia. The fourth corps, -and Milhaud’s and Lasalle’s horsemen, were at Talavera preparing -to march to Badajos, and sixty thousand men, with one hundred and -fifty guns and fifteen days’ provisions in carts, were reviewed at -the gates of Madrid upon the 19th. Three days afterwards they were -in full march to intercept the line of sir John Moore’s retreat. - -The emperor was informed of that general’s advance on the 21st; -in an instant the Spaniards, their juntas, and their armies were -dismissed from his thoughts; the different corps were arrested in -their movements, ten thousand men were left to control the capital, -and on the evening of the 22d, fifty thousand men were at the foot -of the Guadarama. A deep snow choked the passes of the Sierra, and, -after twelve hours of ineffectual toil, the advanced guards were -still on the wrong side; the general commanding reported that the -road was impracticable, but Napoleon, rebuking him fiercely, urged -the columns to another attempt, and the passage of the mountain was -effected amidst storms of hail and drifting sleet. The cold and -fatigue being so intense that many soldiers and draft animals died -during the two days that the operation lasted. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -Personally urging on the troops with unceasing vehemence the -emperor arrived at Villacastin, fifty miles from Madrid, on the -24th, and the 26th he was at Tordesillas with the guards and the -divisions of La-Pisse and Dessolles. The dragoons of La Houssaye -were at Valladolid on the same day, and marshal Ney, with the sixth -corps, was at Rio Seco. From Tordesillas Napoleon communicated with -Soult, informed him of these movements, and concluded his despatch -thus: “_Our cavalry scouts are already at Benevente. If the English -pass to-day in their position, they are lost; if on the contrary, -they attack you with all their force, retire one day’s march: the -farther they proceed the better for us. If they retreat, pursue -them closely_;” and then, full of hope, he hastened to Valderas, -but had the mortification to learn that, notwithstanding his rapid -march, having scarcely rested night or day, he was twelve hours too -late. The British were across the Esla! - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -In fact Soult was in full pursuit when this letter was written, -for sir John Moore, who was well aware of his real situation, had -given orders to retreat the moment the intelligence of Napoleon’s -march from Madrid reached him. The heavy baggage and stores had -been immediately moved to the rear; but the reserve, the light -brigades, and the cavalry remained at Sahagun, the latter pushing -their patroles up to the enemy’s lines and skirmishing, with a view -to hide the retrograde march. The 24th, general Hope, with two -divisions, fell back by the road of Mayorga, and general Baird, -with another, by that of Valencia de San Juan, where there was a -ferry-boat to cross the Esla river. The marquis of Romana undertook -to guard the bridge of Mansilla. The enemy’s dragoons, under Lorge, -arrived the same day at Frechilla, and the division of Laborde at -Paredes. The 25th the general-in-chief, with the reserve and light -brigades, followed the route of Hope’s column to Valderas; the 26th -Baird passed the Esla at Valencia, and took post on the other side, -but with some difficulty, for the boat was small, the fords deep, -and the river rising. The troops, under the commander-in-chief, -approached the bridge of Castro Gonzalo early in the morning of the -26th. The stores and baggage were a long time passing, a dense fog -intercepted the view, and so nicely timed was the march that the -scouts of the imperial horsemen were already infesting the flank -of the column, and even carried off some of the baggage. The left -bank of the river being high, and completely commanding the bridge, -the second light brigade, under general Robert Crawfurd, and two -guns, were posted on that side to protect the passage, for the -cavalry were still on the march from Sahagun, and Soult, aware of -the retreat, was pressing forward vigorously. When lord Paget had -passed Mayorga he discovered a strong body of horse, appertaining -to Ney’s corps, embattled on a swelling mound close to the road. -The soil was deep, and soaked with snow and rain. Two squadrons of -the tenth riding stiffly against the enemy, mounted the hill, and, -notwithstanding the superiority of numbers and position, overthrew -him, killed twenty men, and took a hundred prisoners. This was a -bold and hardy action; but the English cavalry had been engaged -more or less for twelve successive days, and with such fortune and -bravery that above five hundred prisoners had already fallen into -their hands, and their leaders being excellent, their confidence -was unbounded. From Mayorga lord Paget proceeded to Benevente, -but the duke of Dalmatia, with great judgment, directed his march -towards Astorga by the road of Mancilla; and Romana, leaving three -thousand men and two guns to defend the bridge at that place, fell -back to Leon. - -Thus by a critical march, sir John Moore had recovered his -communications with Astorga and so far baffled the emperor; but -his position was by no means safe, or even tenable. The town of -Benevente, a rich open place, remarkable for a small but curious -Moorish palace or castle containing a fine collection of ancient -armour, is situated in a plain that, extending from the Gallician -mountains to the neighbourhood of Burgos, appeared to be boundless. -On the left it was skirted by the hills near the town of Leon, -which was enclosed with walls, and capable of resisting a sudden -assault. The river Esla winded through the plain about four miles -in front of Benevente, and the bridge of Castro Gonzalos was the -key to the town, but the right bank of the Esla, as I have before -observed, was completely commanded from the further side, and there -were many fords. Eighteen miles higher up, at Valencia de San Juan, -a shorter road from Mayorga to Astorga, crossed the river by the -ferry-boat, and at Mancilla, the passage being only defended by -Spaniards, was, in a manner, open to Soult, for Romana had not -destroyed the arches of the bridge. In this exposed situation -sir John Moore resolved to remain no longer than was necessary to -clear out his magazines at Benevente, and to cover the march of his -stores; but the road to Astorga by Leon being much shorter than -that through Benevente, he wrote to Romana to request that he would -maintain himself at Leon as long as he could; hearing also that the -marquis intended to retreat into Gallicia, sir John repeated his -desire to have that road left open for the English army. Romana, -who assented to both these requests, had a great rabble with him, -and as Leon was a walled place, and that a number of citizens and -volunteers were willing, and even eager, to fight, the town might -have made a formidable resistance. Sir John Moore hoped that it -would do so, and gave orders to break down the bridge at Castro -Gonzalo in his own front, the moment the stragglers and baggage -should have passed. - -At this time the bad example of murmuring given by officers of -high rank had descended lower; many regimental officers neglected -their duty, and what with the dislike to a retreat, the severity of -the weather, and the inexperience of the army, the previous fine -discipline of the troops was broken down. Very disgraceful excesses -had been committed at Valderas, and the general issued severe -orders, justly reproaching the soldiers for their evil deeds, and -appealing to the spirit of the men and of the officers, to amend -them. - -On the night of the 26th, the chasseurs of the imperial guard rode -close up to the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, and captured some women -and baggage[20]. The 27th, the cavalry and the stragglers being -all over the river, general Crawfurd commenced the destruction of -the bridge; torrents of rain and snow were descending; and half the -troops worked while the other half kept the enemy at bay from the -heights on the left bank, for the cavalry scouts of the imperial -guard were spread over the plain. At ten o’clock at night a large -party following some waggons endeavoured to pass the piquets -and gallop down to the bridge; that failing, a few dismounted, -and extending to the right and left, commenced a skirmishing -fire, while others remained ready to charge, if the position of -the troops, which they expected to ascertain by this scheme, -should offer an opportunity; but the event did not answer their -expectations. This anxiety to interrupt the work induced general -Crawfurd to destroy two arches of the bridge, and to blow up the -connecting buttress; but the masonry was so solid and difficult -to pierce, that it was not until twelve o’clock in the night of -the 28th that all the preparations were completed. The troops -then descended the heights on the left bank, and passing with the -greatest silence by single files over planks laid across the broken -arches, gained the other side without loss; an instance of singular -good fortune, for the night was dark and tempestuous; the river -rising rapidly with a roaring noise, was threatening to burst over -the planks, and the enemy was close at hand. To have resisted an -attack in such an awkward situation would have been impossible, but -happily the retreat of the troops was undiscovered, and the mine -being sprung with good effect, Crawfurd marched to Benevente, where -the cavalry and the reserve still remained[21]. - -The army gained two days rest at Benevente, but as very little -could be done to remove the stores, the greater part of them were -destroyed. The troops were, and had been from the first, without -sufficient transport, the general was without money to procure -it, and the ill-will of the Spaniards, and the shuffling conduct -of the juntas, added infinitely to these difficulties. The 28th, -Hope’s and Fraser’s divisions marched to Labaneza; and the 29th, -to Astorga, where Baird’s division joined them from Valencia San -Juan. On the same day the reserve and Crawfurd’s brigade quitted -Benevente, but the cavalry remained in the town, leaving parties to -watch the fords of the Esla. Soon after daybreak, general Lefebre -Desnouettes, seeing only a few cavalry posts on the great plain, -rather hastily concluded that there was nothing to support them, -and crossing the river at a ford a little way above the bridge with -six hundred horsemen of the imperial guards, he advanced into the -plain. The piquets at first retired fighting, but being joined -by a part of the third German hussars, they charged the leading -French squadrons with some effect. General C. Stewart then took the -command, and the ground was obstinately disputed. At this moment -the plain was covered with stragglers, and baggage-mules, and -followers of the army; the town was filled with tumult; the distant -piquets and vedettes were seen galloping in from the right and -left; the French were pressing forward boldly, and every appearance -indicated that the enemy’s whole army was come up and passing the -river. Lord Paget ordered the tenth hussars to mount and form -under the cover of some houses at the edge of the town; he desired -to draw the enemy, whose real situation he had detected at once, -well into the plain before he attacked. In half an hour, every -thing being ready, he gave the signal: the tenth hussars galloped -forward, the piquets, that were already engaged, closed together, -and the whole charged. In an instant the scene changed: the enemy -were seen flying at full speed towards the river, and the British -close at their heels; the French squadrons, without breaking their -ranks, plunged into the stream, and gained the opposite heights, -where, like experienced soldiers, they wheeled instantly, and -seemed inclined to come forward a second time; but a battery of -two guns being opened upon them, after a few rounds they retired. -During the pursuit in the plain, an officer was observed separating -from the main body, and making towards another part of the river; -being followed, and refusing to stop when overtaken, he was cut -across the head and brought in a prisoner. He proved to be general -Lefebre. - -[Sidenote: Surgical Campaigns.] - -Although the imperial guards were outnumbered in the end, they -were very superior at the commencement of this fight, which was -handsomely contested on both sides. The British lost fifty men -killed and wounded; the French left fifty-five killed and wounded -on the field, and seventy prisoners, besides the general and -other officers. According to baron Larrey, seventy other wounded -men escaped, making a total loss of above two hundred excellent -soldiers. Lord Paget maintained his posts on the Esla under an -occasional cannonade until the evening, and then withdrew to La -Baneza. - -[Sidenote: Bulletin.] - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MS.] - -While these things were passing, Napoleon arrived at Valderas, -Ney at Villaton, and Lapisse at Toro; the French troops were worn -down with fatigue, yet the emperor still urged them forward. The -duke of Dalmatia, he said, would intercept the retreat of the -English at Astorga, and their labours would be finally rewarded; -but the destruction of the bridge of Castro Gonzalo was so well -accomplished, that twenty-four hours were required to repair it, -and the fords were now impassable. It was the 30th before Bessieres -could cross the Esla; but on that day he passed through Benevente -with nine thousand cavalry, and bent his course towards La Baneza. -The same day, Franceschi forced the bridge of Mansilla de las -Mulas by a single charge of his light horsemen, and captured the -artillery and one half of the division left by Romana to protect -it. The latter immediately abandoned Leon and many stores. The 31st -the duke of Dalmatia entered that town without firing a shot, and -the duke of Istria, with his cavalry, took possession of La Baneza; -the advanced posts were pushed forward to the Puente d’Orvigo on -one side, and the Puente de Valembre on the other. - -The rear of the English army was still in Astorga, the -head-quarters having arrived there on the day before. In the -preceding month large stores had been gradually brought up to -that town by sir David Baird, and as there were no means of -transport to remove them, orders were given, after supplying the -immediate wants of the army, to destroy them; but Romana, who would -neither defend Leon nor Mansilla, had, contrary to his promises, -pre-occupied Astorga with his fugitive army; and when the English -divisions marched in, such a tumult and confusion arose, that no -orders could be executed with regularity, no distribution made, -nor the destruction of the stores be effected. The disorder thus -unexpectedly produced was very detrimental to the discipline of -the troops, which the unwearied efforts of the general had partly -restored. The resources which he had depended on for the support -of his soldiers became mischievous, and contributed to disorganise -instead of nourishing them, and he had the farther vexation to hear -Romana the principal cause of this misfortune, proposing, (with -an army unable to resist a thousand light infantry), to commence -offensive operations and plans, in comparison of which the visions -of don Quixote were wisdom. - -The 31st, the light brigades separated from the army at Bonillas, -and bent their course by cross roads towards Orense and Vigo. This -detachment was made to lessen the pressure on the commissariat, -and to cover the flanks of the army. Fraser’s and Hope’s divisions -entered Villa Franca, Baird’s division was at Bembibre. The -reserve, with the head-quarters, halted at Cambarros, a village six -miles from Astorga, but the cavalry fell back in the night to the -same place, and then the reserve marched to Bembibre. - -The marquis of Romana, after doing so much mischief by crossing the -line of march, left his infantry to wander as they pleased, and -retired with his cavalry and guns to the valley of the Mincio. - -Upon the 1st of January the emperor took possession of Astorga. -On that day seventy thousand French infantry, ten thousand -cavalry, and two hundred pieces of artillery, after many days of -incessant marching, were there united. The congregation of this -mighty force, while it evinced the power and energy of the French -monarch, attested also the genius of the English general, who, -with a handful of men, had found the means to arrest the course -of the conqueror, and to draw him, with the flower of his army, -to this remote and unimportant part of the Peninsula, at the -moment when Portugal, and the fairest provinces of Spain, were -prostrate beneath the strength of his hand. That Spain, being in -her extremity, sir John Moore succoured her, and in the hour of -weakness intercepted the blow which was descending to crush her, -no man of candour and honesty can deny. For what troops, what -preparations, what courage, what capacity, was there in the south -to have resisted, even for an instant, the progress of a man, who, -in ten days, and in the depth of winter, crossing the snowy ridge -of the Carpentinos, had traversed two hundred miles of hostile -country, and transported fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga -in a shorter time than a Spanish diligence would have taken to -travel the same distance? - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MS.] - -This stupendous march was rendered fruitless by the quickness of -his adversary; but Napoleon, though he had failed to destroy the -English army, resolved, nevertheless, to cast it forth of the -Peninsula, and being himself recalled to France by tidings that -the Austrian storm was ready to burst, he fixed upon the duke of -Dalmatia to continue the pursuit, adding for this purpose three -divisions of cavalry, and three of infantry to his former command; -but of these last, the two commanded by generals Loison and -Heudelet, were several marches in the rear, and general Bonnet’s -remained always in the Montagna de St. Ander; hence the whole -number bearing arms, which the duke led immediately to the pursuit, -was about twenty-five thousand men, of which four thousand two -hundred were cavalry[22]. The guns were fifty-four. Loison’s and -Heudelet’s divisions, however, followed him by forced marches, and -he was supported by marshal Ney with the sixth corps, wanting its -third division; but mustering above sixteen thousand men under -arms, (the flower of the French army), together with thirty-seven -pieces of artillery. Thus including Laborde, Heudelet, and Loison’s -division, nearly sixty thousand men and ninety-one guns were put on -the track of the English army. - -The emperor returned to Valladolid, where he received the addresses -of the notables and deputies from Madrid and the great towns, and -strove, by promises and other means, to win the good opinion of the -public. Appointing Joseph to be his lieutenant-general, he allotted -separate provinces for each “_corps d’armée_,” and directing the -imperial guard to return to France; after three days he departed -himself with scarcely any escort, but with a speed that frustrated -the designs that (as some say) the Spaniards had formed against his -person. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -The duke of Dalmatia, a general, who, if the emperor be excepted, -was no wise inferior to any of his nation, commenced his pursuit -of the English army with a vigour that marked his eager desire to -finish the campaign in a manner suitable to the brilliant opening -at Gamonal. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MS.] - -The main body of his troops followed the route of Foncevadon and -Ponteferrada, a second column took the road of Cambarros and -Bembibre, and general Franceschi, with the light cavalry, entering -the valley of the Syl, ascended the course of that river, and -turned the position of Villa Franca del Bierzo. Thus sir John -Moore, after having twice baffled the emperor’s combinations, was -still pressed in his retreat with a fury that seemed to increase -every moment. The separation of his light brigades, a measure -which he adopted, after the advice of his quarter-master-general, -weakened the army by three thousand men; but he still possessed -nineteen thousand of all arms, good soldiers to fight, and strong -to march, yet by the disorders at Valderas and Astorga, much shaken -in their discipline; for the general’s exertions to restore order -and regularity were by many officers slightly seconded, and by some -with scandalous levity disregarded. - -There was no choice but to retreat. The astonishing rapidity with -which the emperor had brought up his overbearing numbers, and -thrust the English army into Gallicia, had rendered the natural -strength of the country unavailing. The resources were few, even -for an army in winter quarters, and for a campaign in that season, -there were none at all. All the draft cattle that could be procured -would scarcely have supplied the means to transport ammunition for -two battles, but the French, sweeping the rich plains of Castille -with their powerful cavalry, might have formed magazines at Astorga -and Leon, and from thence have been supplied in abundance, while -the English were starving. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, sections 2 and 8.] - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers. MSS.] - -Before he advanced from Salamanca, sir John Moore, foreseeing -that his movement must sooner or later end in a retreat, had sent -officers to examine the roads of Gallicia and the harbours which -offered the greatest advantages for embarkation. By the reports of -those officers, which arrived from day to day, and by the state -of the magazines he had directed to be formed, his measures were -constantly regulated. The magazines of Astorga, Benevente, and -Labaneza, we have seen, were, by untoward circumstances, and the -deficiency of transport, rendered of no avail beyond the momentary -supply they afforded; and part of their contents falling into the -enemy’s hands, gave him some cause of triumph; but those at Villa -Franca and Lugo contained about fourteen days’ consumption; and -there were other small magazines formed on the line of Orenze and -Vigo; more than this could not have been accomplished. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 28.] - -It was now only the fifteenth day since sir John Moore had left -Salamanca, and already the torrent of war, diverted from the south, -was foaming among the rocks of Gallicia. Nineteen thousand British -troops, posted in strong ground, might have offered battle to very -superior numbers; but where was the use of merely fighting an -enemy who had three hundred thousand men in Spain? Nothing could -be gained by such a display of courage; but the English general, -by a quick retreat, might reach his ships unmolested, embark, and -carrying his army from the narrow corner in which it was cooped, to -the southern provinces, establish there a good base of operations, -and renew the war under favourable circumstances. It was by this -combination of a fleet and army, that the greatest assistance -could be given to Spain, and the strength of England become most -formidable. A few days’ sailing would carry the troops to Cadiz; -but six weeks’ constant marching would not bring the French army -from Gallicia to that neighbourhood. The northern provinces were -broken, subdued in spirit, and possessed few resources. The -southern provinces had scarcely seen an enemy, were rich and -fertile, and there also was the seat of government. Sir John Moore -reasoned thus, and resolved to fall down to the coast and embark, -with as little loss or delay as might be. Vigo, Coruña, and Ferrol -were the principal harbours; and their relative advantages could -not be determined except by the reports of the engineers, none of -which were yet received, so rapidly had the crisis of affairs come -on; but as those reports could only be obtained from day to day, -the line of retreat became of necessity subject to daily change. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 2d, see colonel Carmichael -Smith’s report.] - -When the duke of Dalmatia took the command of the pursuing army, -Hope’s and Fraser’s divisions were, as I have said, at Villa -Franca, sir David Baird’s at Bembibre, the reserve and cavalry -at Cambarros, six miles from Astorga. Behind Cambarros the -mountains of Gallicia rose abruptly, but there was no position, -because, after the first rise at the village of Rodrigatos, the -ground continually descended to Calcabellos, a small town, only -four miles from Villa Franca, and the old road of Foncevadon and -Ponteferrada, which turned the whole line, was choked with the -advancing columns of the enemy. The reserve and the cavalry marched -during the night to Bembibre: on their arrival Baird’s division -proceeded to Villa Franca, but the immense wine-vaults of Bembibre -had such temptations, that many hundred of his men remained behind -inebriated; the followers of the army crowded the houses, and a -number of Romana’s disbanded men were mixed with this heterogeneous -mass of marauders, drunkards, muleteers, women, and children; the -weather was dreadful, and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of -the general-in-chief, when the reserve marched the next morning, -the number of those unfortunate wretches was not diminished. -Leaving a small guard to protect them, sir John Moore proceeded -to Calcabellos; but scarcely had the reserve marched out of the -village, when some French cavalry appeared. In a moment the road -was filled with the miserable stragglers, who came crowding after -the troops, some with loud shrieks of distress and wild gestures, -others with brutal exclamations; many, overcome with fear, threw -away their arms. Those who preserved theirs were too stupidly -intoxicated to fire; and kept reeling to and fro, alike insensible -to their danger and to their disgrace. The enemy’s horsemen -perceiving this confusion, bore down at a gallop, broke through the -disorderly mob, cutting to the right and left as they passed, and -riding so close to the columns, that the infantry were forced to -halt in order to check their audacity. - -At Calcabellos the reserve took up a position, and the -general-in-chief went on to Villa Franca. In that town great -excesses had been committed by the preceding divisions; the -magazines were plundered, the bakers driven away from the ovens, -the wine stores forced, and the commissaries prevented from making -the regular distributions; the doors of the houses were broken, -and the scandalous insubordination of the soldiers proved that a -discreditable relaxation of discipline on the part of the officers -had taken place. The general immediately arrested this disorder, -caused one man taken in the act of plundering a magazine to be -shot in the market-place, and issued severe orders to prevent a -recurrence of such inexcusable conduct, after which he returned to -the reserve at Calcavellos. - -The Guia, a small, but at this season of the year a deep stream, -run through that town, and was crossed by a stone bridge. On the -Villa Franca side, a lofty ridge, rough with vineyards and stone -walls, was occupied by two thousand five hundred infantry, with -a battery of six guns. Four hundred[23] riflemen and about the -same number of cavalry were posted on a hill two miles beyond the -river, to watch the two roads of Bembibre and Foncevadon. The 3d of -January, a little after noon, the French general Colbert approached -this hill with six or eight squadrons; but observing the ground -behind Calcabellos strongly occupied, he demanded reinforcements. -Marshal Soult, believing that the English did not mean to make a -stand, sent orders to Colbert to charge without delay; and the -latter, stung by the message, obeyed with precipitate fury. From -one of those errors so frequent in war, the British cavalry, -thinking a greater force was riding against them, retired at speed -to Calcabellos. The riflemen, who, following their orders, had -withdrawn when the French first came in sight, were just passing -the bridge, when a crowd of staff officers, the cavalry, and the -enemy, came in upon them in one mass; in the confusion thirty or -forty men were taken, and Colbert crossing the river, charged -on the spur up the road. The remainder of the riflemen threw -themselves into the vineyards, and permitting the enemy to approach -within a few yards, suddenly opened such a deadly fire, that the -greatest number of the French horsemen were killed on the spot, -and among the rest Colbert himself. His fine martial figure, his -voice, his gestures, and, above all, his daring valour had excited -the admiration of the British, and a general feeling of sorrow was -predominant when the gallant soldier fell. The French voltigeurs -now crossed the river; a few of the 52d regiment descended from -the upper part of the ridge to the assistance of the riflemen, and -a sharp skirmish commenced, in which two or three hundred men of -both sides were killed or wounded: towards evening Merle’s division -of infantry appeared on the hills in front of the town, and made -a demonstration of crossing the river opposite to the left of -the English position; but the battery of the latter checked this -movement, and night coming on the combat ceased. - -From Villa Franca to Lugo the road led through a rugged country; -the cavalry were therefore sent on to the latter town at once. -During the night the French patroles broke in upon the rifle -piquets, and wounded some men, but were beaten back without being -able to discover that the English troops had abandoned the position. - -The reserve reached Herrerias, a distance of eighteen miles, on the -morning of the 5th. Baird’s division was at Nogales, Hope’s and -Fraser’s near Lugo. At Herrerias, sir John Moore, who constantly -directed the movements of the rear-guard himself, received the -first reports of the engineers relative to the harbours. It -appeared that Vigo, besides its greater distance, offered no -position to cover the embarkation, but Coruña and Betanzos did. -This induced him to relinquish his first intention of going to -Vigo, and made him regret the absence of his light brigades. The -transports were now ordered round from Vigo to Coruña; and in the -mean time the general sent orders to the leading division to halt -at Lugo, his intention being to rally the army there, to restore -discipline, and to offer battle to the enemy if he was inclined to -accept it. - -These orders were carried to sir David Baird by one of the -aides-de-camp of the commander-in-chief; but sir David forwarded -them by a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost the despatch. -This blameable irregularity was ruinous to general Fraser’s troops: -in lieu of resting two days at Lugo, that general unwittingly -pursued his toilsome journey towards St. Jago de Compostella, and -then returned without food or rest, losing by this pilgrimage -above four hundred stragglers. The 4th, the reserve reached -Nogales, having by a forced march of thirty-six miles gained -twelve hours’ start of the enemy. At the entrance of this village -they met a large convoy, consisting of English clothing, shoes, -and ammunition; intended for Romana’s army but moving towards the -enemy; a circumstance perfectly characteristic of the Spanish mode -of conducting public affairs. There was a bridge at Nogales which -the engineers failed to destroy; but this was a matter of little -consequence, as the river was fordable above and below; indeed -the general was unwilling, unless for some palpable advantage, -which seldom presented itself, to injure the communications of a -country that he was unable to serve. The bridges were commonly very -solidly constructed, and the arches having very little span, could -be rendered passable again in a shorter time than they could be -destroyed. - -At this period of the retreat the road was crowded with stragglers -and baggage; the peasantry, although armed, did not molest the -French; but fearing both sides alike, drove their cattle and -carried off their effects into the mountains on each side of the -line of march; even there the villanous marauders contrived to -find them, and in some cases were by the Spaniards killed; a just -punishment for quitting their colours. Under the most favourable -circumstances, the tail of a retreating force exhibits terrible -scenes of distress; and on the road near Nogales, the followers -of the army were dying fast from cold and hunger. The soldiers, -barefooted, harassed, and weakened, by their excesses at Bembibre -and Villa Franca, were dropping to the rear by hundreds. Broken -carts, dead animals, and the piteous appearance of women with -children, struggling or falling exhausted in the snow, completed a -picture of war, which, like Janus, has a double face. - -Towards evening the French recovered their lost ground, and passed -Nogales, galling the rear-guard with a continual skirmish; and -here it was that dollars to the amount of twenty-five thousand -pounds were abandoned. This small sum was kept near head-quarters -to answer sudden emergencies, and the bullocks that drew it being -tired, the general, who could not save the money without risking -an ill-timed action, had it rolled down the side of the mountain; -part of it was gathered by the enemy, part by the Gallician -peasants[24]. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -This day also, general Franceschi, who after turning Villa Franca -and scouring the valley of the Syl, had ascended the banks of the -Minho with his cavalry, fell into the line of march at Becerea, and -rejoined the French army. Towards evening the reserve approached -Constantino; the French were close upon the rear, and a hill within -pistol shot of the bridge offered them such an advantage, that -there was little hope to effect the passage without great loss. -The general caused the riflemen and artillery to take possession -of the hill, under cover of which the remainder of the reserve -hastily passed across the river without being perceived by the -enemy, who were unusually cautious, and not aware of the vicinity -of the bridge; the guns then descended at a trot, the riflemen -followed, and when the French, now undeceived, came up at a brisk -pace, the passage was effected, and a good line of battle formed -at the other side; a fight commenced, but notwithstanding that the -assailants were continually reinforced as their columns of march -arrived, general Paget maintained the post with two regiments until -nightfall, and then retired to Lugo, in front of which the whole -army was assembled. A few of the French cavalry showed themselves -on the 6th, but the infantry did not appear. - -The 7th, sir John Moore, in a general order, gave a severe but just -rebuke to the officers and soldiers for their previous want of -discipline, and at the same time announced his intention to offer -battle. It has been well said, that a British army may be gleaned -in a retreat, but cannot be reaped. Whatever may be their misery, -the soldiers will always be found clean at review, and ready at a -fight. Scarcely was this order issued, when the line of battle, so -attenuated before, was filled with vigorous men, full of confidence -and valour. Fifteen hundred had fallen in action, or dropped to -the rear; but as three fresh battalions left by sir David Baird in -his advance to Astorga had joined the army between Villa Franca -and Lugo, nineteen thousand combatants were still under arms when -the French columns appeared in sight. The right of the English -position was in comparatively flat ground, and partially protected -by a bend of the Minho. The centre was amongst vineyards, with -low stone walls. The left, which was somewhat withdrawn, rested -on the mountains, being supported and covered by the cavalry. It -was the intention of the general to engage deeply with his right -and centre before he closed with his left wing, in which he had -posted the flower of his troops, hoping thus to bring on a decisive -battle, and trusting to the valour of the men to handle the enemy -in such sort as that he should be glad to let the army continue its -retreat unmolested. Other hope than this, to re-embark the troops -without loss, there was none, except by stratagem; for Soult, an -experienced general, commanding soldiers habituated to war, might -be tempted, but could never be forced to engage in a decisive -battle among those rugged mountains, where whole days would pass in -skirmishing, without any progress being made towards crippling an -adversary. - -It was mid-day before the French marshal arrived in person at the -head of ten or twelve thousand men; the remainder of his power -followed in some disarray; for the marches had not been so easy -but that many even of the oldest soldiers had dropped behind. As -the French columns came up, they formed in order of battle along -a strong mountainous ridge fronting the English. The latter were -not distinctly seen, from the inequalities of the ground, and -Soult feeling doubtful if they were all before him, took four -guns, and some squadrons commanded by colonel Lallemande, advanced -towards the centre, and opened a fire, which was soon silenced by -a reply from fifteen pieces. The marshal being then satisfied that -something more than a rear guard was in his front, retired. About -an hour after he made a feint on the right, and at the same time -sent a column of infantry and five guns against the left. On that -side the three regiments which had lately joined were drawn up. The -French pushed the outposts hard, and were gaining the advantage; -when the English general-in-chief arriving, rallied the light -troops, and with a vigorous charge broke the adverse column, and -treated it very roughly in the pursuit. The estimated loss of the -French was between three and four hundred men. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] - -As it was now evident that the British meant to give battle, the -duke of Dalmatia hastened the march of Laborde’s division, which -was still in the rear, and requested marshal Ney, who was then at -Villa Franca, to detach a division of the sixth corps by the Val -des Orres to Orense. Ney, however, merely sent some troops into the -valley of the Syl, and pushed his advanced posts in front as far as -Nogales, Poyo, and Dancos. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -At daybreak on the 8th the two armies were still embattled. On the -French side, seventeen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, -and fifty pieces of artillery were in line, but Soult deferred -the attack until the 9th. On the English part, sixteen thousand -infantry, eighteen hundred cavalry, and forty pieces of artillery, -impatiently awaited the assault, and blamed their adversary for -delaying a contest which they ardently desired; but darkness fell -without a shot having being fired, and with it fell the English -general’s hope to engage his enemy on equal terms. - -What was to be done? assail the French position? remain another -day in expectation of a battle? or, in secrecy, gain a march, -get on board without being molested, or at least obtain time to -establish the army in a good situation to cover the embarkation? -The first operation was warranted neither by present nor by future -advantages, for how could an inferior army expect to cripple a -superior one, posted as the French were, on a strong mountain, -with an overbearing cavalry to protect their infantry should the -latter be beaten; and when twenty thousand fresh troops were at -the distance of two short marches in the rear. The British army -was not provided to fight above one battle. There were no draught -cattle, no means of transporting reserve ammunition, no magazines, -no hospitals, no second line, no provisions. A defeat would have -been ruin, a victory useless. A battle is always a serious affair; -but two battles under such circumstances, though both should be -victories, would have been destruction. - -But why fight at all, after the army had been rallied, and the -disasters of the march from Astorga had been remedied? What, if -beating first Soult and then Ney, the British had arrived once more -above Astorga, with perhaps ten thousand infantry, and half as -many hundred cavalry? From the mountains of Gallicia their general -might have cast his eyes as far as the Sierra Morena, without -being cheered by the sight of a single Spanish army; none were -in existence to aid him, none to whom he might give aid. Even Mr. -Frere acknowledged that at this period six thousand ill-armed men -collected at Despeñas Peros formed the only barrier between the -French and Seville, and sir John Moore was sent out not to waste -English blood in fruitless battles, but to assist the universal -Spanish nation! - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.] - -The second proposition was decided by the state of the magazines; -there was not bread for another day’s consumption remaining in -the stores at Lugo. It was true that the army was in heart for -fighting, but distressed by fatigue and bad weather, and each -moment of delay increased privations that would soon have rendered -it inefficient for a campaign in the south, which was the only -point where its services could now be effectual. For two whole days -sir John Moore had offered battle; this was sufficient to rally -the troops, to restore order, and to preserve the reputation of -the army. Lugo was strong ground in itself, but it did not cover -Coruña. The road leading from Orense to St. Jago de Compostella -turned it; the French ought to have been on that line, and there -was no reason to suppose that they were not. Soult, we have seen, -pressed Ney to follow it. It was then impossible to remain at Lugo, -and useless if it had been possible. - -The general adopted the third plan, and prepared to decamp in the -night; he ordered the fires to be kept bright, and exhorted the -troops to make a great exertion, which he trusted would be the last -required of them. - -The country immediately in the rear of the position was intersected -by stone walls and a number of intricate lanes; precautions were -taken to mark the right tracks, by placing bundles of straw -at certain distances, and officers were appointed to guide the -columns. At ten o’clock the troops silently quitted their ground, -and retired in excellent order; but a moody fortune pursued sir -John Moore throughout this campaign, baffling his prudence, and -thwarting his views, as if resolved to prove the unyielding -firmness of his mind. A terrible storm of wind and rain, mixed -with sleet, commenced as the army broke up from the position; the -marks were destroyed, and the guides lost the true direction; only -one of the divisions happily gained the main road, the other two -were bewildered, and when daylight broke, the rear columns were -still near to Lugo. The fatigue, the depression of mind, occasioned -by this misfortune, and the want of shoes, broke the order of -the march, and the stragglers were, becoming numerous, when -unfortunately, one of the generals commanding a leading division, -thinking to relieve the men during a halt which took place in the -night, desired them to take refuge from the weather in some houses -a little way off the road. Complete disorganization followed this -imprudent act: from that moment it became impossible to make the -soldiers of the division keep their ranks; plunder succeeded, the -example was infectious, and what with real suffering, and evil -propensity encouraged by this error of inexperience, the main body -of the army, which had _bivouaced_ for six hours in the rain, -arrived at Betanzos on the evening of the 9th, in a state very -discreditable to its discipline. - -[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative.] - -The commander-in-chief, with the reserve and the cavalry, as -usual, covered the march; in the course of it he ordered several -bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers failed of success -in every attempt. Fortunately, the enemy did not come up with -the rear before the evening, and then only with their cavalry, -otherwise many prisoners must have fallen into their hands. The -number of stragglers uncovered by the passage of the reserve was -so numerous, that being pressed by the enemy’s horse, they united -in considerable bodies and repulsed them, a signal proof that the -disorder was occasioned as much by insubordination in the regiments -as by the fatigue of the march. - -The reserve, commanded by general Edward Paget, an officer -distinguished during the retreat by his firmness, ability, and -ardent zeal, remained in position, during the night, a few miles -from Betanzos. The rest of the army was quartered in that town, -and as the enemy could not gather in strength on the 10th; the -commander-in-chief halted that day, and the cavalry passed from the -rear-guard to the head of the column. - -The 11th, the French interrupted those employed to destroy the -bridge of Betanzos; the twenty-eighth regiment repulsed the -skirmishers, but the bridge, though constructed of wood, was only -partially destroyed. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 26.] - -In the meantime sir John Moore assembled the army in one solid -mass. The loss of men in the march from Lugo to Betanzos had been -greater than that in all the former part of the retreat, added to -all the waste of the movement in advance and the loss sustained -in the different actions: nevertheless fourteen thousand infantry -were still in column, and by an orderly march to Coruña under the -personal direction of the commander-in-chief, demonstrated, that -inattention and the want of experience in the officers was the true -cause of those disorders which had afflicted the army far more -than the sword of the enemy or the rigour of the elements. - -As the troops approached Coruña the general’s looks were directed -towards the harbour; an open expanse of water painfully convinced -him, that to Fortune at least he was no way beholden; contrary -winds detained the fleet at Vigo, and the last consuming exertion -made by the army was thus rendered fruitless! The men were now put -into quarters, and their leader awaited the progress of events. -Three divisions occupied the town and suburbs, the reserve was -posted with its left at the village of El Burgo, and its right -on the road of St. Jago de Compostella. For twelve days these -hardy soldiers had covered the retreat, during which time they -had traversed eighty miles of road in two marches, passed several -nights under arms in the snow of the mountains, were seven times -engaged with the enemy, and they now assembled at the outposts, -having fewer men missing from the ranks (including those who had -fallen in battle) than any other division in the army. An admirable -instance of the value of good discipline, and a manifest proof of -the malignant injustice with which sir John Moore has been accused -of precipitating his retreat beyond the measure of human strength. - -The bridge of El Burgo was immediately destroyed, and an engineer -was sent to blow up that of Cambria, situated a few miles up the -Mero river; this officer was mortified at the former failures, and -so anxious to perform his duty in an effectual manner, that he -remained too near the mine, and was killed by the explosion; but -there was also a bridge at Celas, two leagues higher up, and at -that place Franceschi’s cavalry crossed on the 12th, intercepted -some stores coming from St. Jago, and made a few prisoners. - -The town of Coruña, although sufficiently strong to oblige an -enemy to break ground before it, was weakly fortified, and to -the southward commanded by some heights close to the walls. Sir -John Moore caused the land front to be repaired and strengthened, -and also disarmed the sea face of the works, and occupied the -citadel. The inhabitants cheerfully and honourably joined in the -labour, although they were fully aware that the English intended -to embark, and that they compromised their own safety by aiding -the operation. Such flashes of light from the dark cloud which at -this moment covered Spain may startle the mind of the reader, and -make him doubt if the Spaniards could have been so insufficient to -their own defence as they have been represented in the course of -this history. I can only answer, that the facts were as I have told -them, and that it was such paradoxical indications of character -that deceived the world at this time, and induced men to believe -that the reckless daring defiance of the power of France so loudly -proclaimed by the patriots, would be strenuously supported. Of -proverbially vivid imagination and quick resentments, the Spaniards -feel and act individually rather than nationally; and during this -war, that which appeared to be in them constancy of purpose, was in -reality a repetition of momentary fury, a succession of electric -sparks generated by a constant collision with the French army, and -daily becoming fainter as custom reconciled them to those injuries -and insults which are commonly the attendants of war. - -Procrastination and improvidence are the besetting sins of the -nation: at this moment a large magazine of arms and ammunition was -in Coruña; these stores had been sent in the early part of the -preceding year from England, and they were still unappropriated -and unregarded by a nation infested with three hundred thousand -enemies, and possessing a hundred thousand soldiers unclothed and -without weapons. - -Three miles from the town, four thousand barrels of powder were -piled in a magazine built upon a hill; a smaller quantity, -collected in another storehouse, was at some distance from the -first: to prevent these magazines from falling a prey to the -enemy, they were both exploded on the 13th. The inferior one blew -up with a terrible noise and shook the houses in the town; but -when the train reached the great store, there ensued a crash like -the bursting forth of a volcano, the earth trembled for miles, -the rocks were torn from their bases, and the agitated waters -rolled the vessels as in a storm; a vast column of smoke and dust, -shooting out fiery sparks from its sides, arose perpendicularly -and slowly to a great height, and then a shower of stones, and -fragments of all kinds, bursting out of it with a roaring sound, -killed several persons who remained too near the spot. A stillness, -only interrupted by the lashing of the waves on the shore, -succeeded, and the business of the war went on. - -The ground in front of Coruña is impracticable for cavalry, and -as the horses still left alive were generally foundered, and that -it was impossible to embark them all in the face of an enemy, -a great number were reluctantly ordered to be shot. These poor -animals, already worn down and feet broken, would otherwise have -been distributed among the French cavalry, or used as draft cattle, -until by procrastinated sufferings of the nature they had already -endured, they should be killed. - -The enemy were now collecting in force on the Mero, and it -became necessary to choose a position of battle. A chain of rocky -elevations commencing on the sea-coast, north-west of the place, -and ending on the Mero just behind the village of El Burgo, offered -an advantageous line of defence; covered by a branch of the -Mero, which, washing a part of the base, would have obliged the -enemy to advance by the road of Compostella; but this ridge was -too extensive for the English army, and if not wholly occupied, -the French might have turned it by the right, and moved along a -succession of eminences to the very gates of Coruña. There was no -alternative but to take post on an inferior range, enclosed as -it were within the other, and completely commanded by it within -cannon-shot. - -The French army had been so exhausted by continual toil, that it -was not completely assembled on the Mero before the 12th. The -infantry took post opposite El Burgo; the cavalry of La Houssaye -lined the river as far as the ocean, and Franceschi, as we have -seen, crossed at the bridge of Celas, seven miles higher up. The -14th, the bridges of El Burgo being rendered practicable for -artillery, two divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, passed -the river. To cover this march some guns opened on the English -posts at El Burgo, but were soon silenced by a superior fire. The -same evening, the transports from Vigo hove in sight, and soon -after entered the harbour of Coruña, and the dismounted cavalry, -the sick, all the best horses, and fifty-two pieces of artillery, -were embarked during the night; eight British, and four Spanish -guns, were, however, retained on shore ready for action. - -[Sidenote: Noble’s Expedition de Galice.] - -The 15th, La Borde’s division arrived, and the French occupied the -great ridge enclosing the British position, placing their right on -the intersection of the roads leading from St. Jago and Betanzos, -and their left upon a rocky eminence which overlooked both lines. -Towards evening, their cavalry, supported by some light troops, -extended towards the left, and a slight skirmish took place in -the valley below. At the same time the English piquets opposite -the right of the French, got engaged, and being galled by the -fire of two guns, colonel M’Kenzie of the fifth, at the head of -some companies, endeavoured to seize the battery; but a line of -infantry, hitherto concealed by some stone walls, arose, and poured -in such a fire of musketry, that the colonel was killed, and his -men forced back with loss. - -[Sidenote: Noble’s Expedition de Galice.] - -In the course of the night, marshal Soult with great difficulty -established a battery of eleven guns, (eight and twelve-pounders,) -on the rocks which formed the left of his line of battle. Laborde’s -division was posted on the right; half of it occupied the high -ground, the other half was placed on the descent towards the river. -Merle’s division was in the centre. Mermet’s division formed -the left. The position was covered in front of the right by the -villages of Palavia Abaxo, and Portosa, and in front of the centre -by a wood; the left was strongly posted on the rugged heights where -the great battery was established. The distance from that battery -to the right of the English line was about twelve hundred yards, -and, midway, the little village of Elvina was held by the piquets -of the latter nation. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Letter to L^d. Castle^h.] - -The late arrival of the transports, the increasing force of the -enemy, and the disadvantageous nature of the ground, augmented the -difficulty and danger of the embarkation so much, that several -general officers proposed to the commander-in-chief, that he should -negotiate for leave to retire to his ships upon terms. There was -little chance of such a proposal being agreed to by the enemy, and -there was no reason to try. The army had suffered, but not from -defeat; its situation was dangerous, but far from desperate; and -the general would not consent to remove the stamp of energy and -prudence which marked his retreat, by a negotiation that would have -given an appearance of timidity and indecision to his previous -operations, as opposite to their real character as light is to -darkness. His high spirit and clear judgment revolted at the idea, -and he rejected the degrading advice without hesitation. - -All the encumbrances of the army were shipped in the night of the -15th and on the morning of the 16th, and every thing was prepared -to withdraw the fighting men as soon as the darkness would permit -them to move without being perceived. The precautions taken -would, without doubt, have insured the success of this difficult -operation, but a more glorious event was destined to give a -melancholy but graceful termination to the campaign. About two -o’clock in the afternoon a general movement along the French line -gave notice of the approaching - - -BATTLE OF CORUÑA. - -[Sidenote: Vide Plan of the Battle.] - -The British infantry, fourteen thousand five hundred strong, -occupied the inferior range of hills already spoken of. The right -was formed by Baird’s division, and, from the oblique direction of -the ridge, approached the enemy, while the centre and left were -of necessity withheld in such a manner that the French battery on -the rocks raked the whole of the line. General Hope’s division, -crossing the main road, prolonged the line of the right’s wing, -and occupied strong ground abutting on the muddy bank of the -Mero. A brigade from Baird’s division remained in column behind -the extremities of his line, and a brigade of Hope’s was posted on -different commanding points behind the left wing. The reserve was -drawn up near Airis, a small village situated in the rear of the -centre. This last point commanded the valley which separated the -right of Baird’s division from the hills occupied by the French -cavalry; the latter were kept in check by a regiment detached -from the reserve, and a chain of skirmishers extending across the -valley connected this regiment with the right of Baird’s line. -General Fraser’s division remaining on the heights immediately -before the gates of Coruña, was prepared to advance to any point, -and also watched the coast road. These dispositions were as able -as the unfavourable nature of the ground would admit of, but the -advantage was all on the enemy’s side. His light cavalry, under -Franceschi, reaching nearly to the village of St. Christopher, a -mile in the rear of Baird’s division, obliged sir John Moore to -weaken his front by keeping back Fraser’s division until Soult’s -plan of attack should be completely developed. There was, however, -one circumstance to compensate for these disadvantages. In the -Spanish stores were found many thousand English muskets; the troops -exchanged their old rusty and battered arms for these new ones; -their ammunition also was fresh, and their fire was therefore very -superior to their adversary’s in proportion to the numbers engaged. - -General Laborde’s division being come up, the French force could -not be less than twenty thousand men; and the duke of Dalmatia -having made his arrangements, did not lose any time in idle -evolutions, but distributing his lighter guns along the front of -his position, opened a heavy fire from the battery on his left, -and instantly descended with three solid masses to the assault. A -cloud of skirmishers led the way, and the British piquets being -driven back in disorder, the village of Elvina was carried by the -first column, which afterwards dividing, one half pushed on against -Baird’s front, the other turned his right by the valley. The second -column made for the centre. The third engaged the left by the -village of Palavia Abaxo. The weight of the French guns overmatched -the English six-pounders, and their shot swept the position to the -centre. - -Sir John Moore observing, that, according to his expectations, the -enemy did not show any body of infantry beyond that which, moving -up the valley, outflanked Baird’s right, ordered general Paget -to carry the reserve to where the detached regiment was posted, -and, as he had before arranged with him, to turn the left of the -French attack and menace the great battery. Then directing Fraser’s -division to support Paget, he threw back the fourth regiment, -which formed the right of Baird’s division, opened a heavy fire -upon the flank of the troops penetrating up the valley, and with -the fiftieth and forty-second regiments met those breaking through -Elvina. - -[Sidenote: Moore’s Narrative.] - -The ground about that village was intersected by stone walls and -hollow roads; a severe, scrambling fight ensued, but in half an -hour the French were borne back with great loss. The fiftieth -regiment entered the village with them, and after a second struggle -drove them for some distance beyond it. Meanwhile the general -bringing up a battalion of the brigade of guards to fill the space -in the line left vacant by those two regiments, the forty-second -mistook his intention, and retired, and at that moment the enemy, -being reinforced, renewed the fight beyond the village, the officer -commanding the fiftieth[25] was wounded and taken prisoner, and -Elvina became the scene of a second struggle; this being observed -by the commander-in-chief, who directed in person the operations -of Baird’s division, he addressed a few animating words to the -forty-second, and caused it to return to the attack. General Paget, -with the reserve, now descended into the valley, and the line of -skirmishers being thus supported, vigorously checked the advance -of the enemy’s troops in that quarter, while the fourth regiment -galled their flank. At the same time the centre and left of the -army also became engaged; sir David Baird was severely wounded, and -a furious action ensued along the line, in the valley, and on the -hills. - -[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative. Hardinge’s Letter.] - -Sir John Moore, while earnestly watching the result of the fight -about the village of Elvina, was struck on the left breast by a -cannon shot; the shock threw him from his horse with violence; he -rose again in a sitting posture; his countenance unchanged, and -his stedfast eye still fixed upon the regiments engaged in his -front; no sigh betrayed a sensation of pain; but in a few moments, -when he was satisfied that the troops were gaining ground, his -countenance brightened, and he suffered himself to be taken to the -rear. Then was seen the dreadful nature of his hurt; the shoulder -was shattered to pieces, the arm was hanging by a piece of skin, -the ribs over the heart broken, and bared of flesh, and the muscles -of the breast torn into long strips, which were interlaced by their -recoil from the dragging of the shot. As the soldiers placed him in -a blanket his sword got entangled, and the hilt entered the wound. -Captain Hardinge, a staff officer, who was near, attempted to take -it off, but the dying man stopped him, saying, “_It is as well as -it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with me._” And -in that manner, so becoming to a soldier, Moore was borne from the -fight. - -During this time the army was rapidly gaining ground. The reserve, -overthrowing every thing in the valley, and obliging La Houssaye’s -dragoons (who had dismounted) to retire, turned the enemy’s left, -and even approached the eminence upon which the great battery -was posted. On the left, colonel Nicholls, at the head of some -companies of the fourteenth, carried Palavio Abaxo (which general -Foy defended but feebly), and in the centre, the obstinate dispute -for Elvina terminated in favour of the British; so that when the -night set in their line was considerably advanced beyond the -original position of the morning, and the French were falling back -in confusion. - -If at this time general Fraser’s division had been brought into -action along with the reserve, the enemy could hardly have escaped -a signal overthrow; for the little ammunition Soult had been able -to bring up was nearly exhausted, the river Mero, with a full tide, -was behind him, and the difficult communication by the bridge of El -Burgo was alone open for a retreat. On the other hand, to continue -the action in the dark was to tempt fortune, for the French were -still the most numerous, and their ground was strong. The disorder -they were in offered such a favourable opportunity to get on -board the ships, that sir John Hope, upon whom the command of the -army had devolved, satisfied with having repulsed the attack, -judged it more prudent to pursue the original plan of embarking -during the night, and this operation was effected without delay; -the arrangements being so complete that neither confusion nor -difficulty occurred. - -[Illustration: _SKETCH OF THE_ BATTLE OF CORUÑA 16^{th}. Jan^y. -1808.] - -The piquets kindling a number of fires, covered the retreat of the -columns, and were themselves withdrawn at daybreak, and embarked, -under the protection of general Hill’s brigade, which was posted -near the ramparts of the town. When the morning dawned, the French, -observing that the British had abandoned their position, pushed -forward some battalions to the heights of St. Lucie, and about -mid-day succeeded in establishing a battery, which playing upon the -shipping in the harbour, caused a great deal of disorder among the -transports. Several masters cut their cables, and four vessels went -ashore; but the troops being immediately removed by the men of -war’s boats, the stranded vessels were burnt, and the whole fleet -at last got out of harbour. General Hill’s brigade then embarked -from the citadel; but general Beresford, with a rear guard, still -kept possession of that work until the 18th, when the wounded being -all put on board, his troops likewise embarked[26]. The inhabitants -faithfully maintained the town against the French, and the fleet -sailed for England. - -Thus ended the retreat to Coruña; a transaction which, up to this -day, has called forth as much of falsehood and malignity as servile -and interested writers could offer to the unprincipled leaders of a -base faction, but which posterity will regard as a genuine example -of ability and patriotism. - -[Sidenote: Captain’s Hardinge’s Letter.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative.] - -From the spot where he fell, the general who had conducted it -was carried to the town by a party of soldiers. The blood flowed -fast, and the torture of his wound increased; but such was the -unshaken firmness of his mind, that those about him judging -from the resolution of his countenance that his hurt was not -mortal, expressed a hope of his recovery. Hearing this, he looked -stedfastly at the injury for a moment, and then said, “_No, I feel -that to be impossible._” Several times he caused his attendants -to stop and turn him round, that he might behold the field of -battle, and when the firing indicated the advance of the British he -discovered his satisfaction, and permitted the bearers to proceed. -Being brought to his lodgings the surgeons examined his wound, but -there was no hope; the pain increased, and he spoke with great -difficulty. At intervals he asked if the French were beaten, and -addressing his old friend colonel Anderson, he said, “_You know -that I always wished to die this way._” Again he asked if the -enemy were defeated, and being told they were, observed, “_It is -a great satisfaction to me to know we have beaten the French._” -His countenance continued firm, and his thoughts clear; once only, -when he spoke of his mother, he became agitated. He inquired after -the safety of his friends, and the officers of his staff, and he -did not even in this moment forget to recommend those whose merit -had given them claims to promotion. His strength was failing fast, -and life was just extinct, when, with an unsubdued spirit, as -if anticipating the baseness of his posthumous calumniators, he -exclaimed, “_I hope the people of England will be satisfied! I hope -my country will do me justice!_” The battle was scarcely ended, -when his corpse, wrapped in a military cloak, was interred by the -officers of his staff in the citadel of Coruña. The guns of the -enemy paid his funeral honours, and Soult, with a noble feeling of -respect for his valour, raised a monument to his memory. - -Thus ended the career of sir John Moore, a man whose uncommon -capacity was sustained by the purest virtue, and governed by a -disinterested patriotism more in keeping with the primitive than -the luxurious age of a great nation. His tall graceful person, his -dark searching eyes, strongly defined forehead, and singularly -expressive mouth, indicated a noble disposition and a refined -understanding. The lofty sentiments of honour habitual to his -mind, adorned by a subtle playful wit, gave him in conversation an -ascendancy that he could well preserve by the decisive vigour of -his actions. He maintained the right with a vehemence bordering -upon fierceness, and every important transaction in which he was -engaged increased his reputation for talent, and confirmed his -character as a stern enemy to vice, a stedfast friend to merit, a -just and faithful servant of his country. The honest loved him, -the dishonest feared him; for while he lived, he did not shun but -scorned and spurned the base, and, with characteristic propriety, -they spurned at him when he was dead. - -A soldier from his earliest youth, he thirsted for the honours of -his profession, and feeling that he was worthy to lead a British -army, hailed the fortune that placed him at the head of the troops -destined for Spain. The stream of time passed rapidly, and the -inspiring hopes of triumph disappeared, but the austerer glory -of suffering remained; with a firm heart he accepted that gift -of a severe fate, and confiding in the strength of his genius, -disregarded the clamours of presumptuous ignorance; opposing sound -military views to the foolish projects so insolently thrust upon -him by the ambassador, he conducted a long and arduous retreat with -sagacity, intelligence, and fortitude. No insult could disturb, no -falsehood deceive him, no remonstrance shake his determination; -fortune frowned without subduing his constancy; death struck, and -the spirit of the man remained unbroken when his shattered body -scarcely afforded it a habitation. Having done all that was just -towards others, he remembered what was due to himself. Neither -the shock of the mortal blow, nor the lingering hours of acute -pain which preceded his dissolution, could quell the pride of his -gallant heart, or lower the dignified feeling with which (conscious -of merit) he asserted his right to the gratitude of the country he -had served so truly. - -If glory be a distinction, for such a man death is not a leveller! - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -OBSERVATIONS. - - -GENERAL VIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN. - -Mr. Canning, in an official communication to the Spanish deputies -in London, observed, that “the conduct of the campaign in -Portugal was unsatisfactory, and inadequate to the brilliant -successes with which it opened.” In the relation of that campaign -it has been shown how little the activity and foresight of the -cabinet contributed to those successes, and the following short -analysis will prove that, with respect to the campaign in Spain, -the proceedings of the ministers were marked by tardiness and -incapacity. - -Joseph abandoned Madrid the 3rd of August, and on the 11th of the -same month the French troops from the most distant parts of Europe -were in motion to remedy the disasters in the Peninsula. - -The 1st of September a double conscription, furnishing one hundred -and sixty thousand men, was called out to replace the troops -withdrawn from Poland and Germany. - -The 4th of September the emperor announced to the senate, that -“he was resolved to push the affairs of the Peninsula with the -greatest activity, and to destroy the armies which the English had -disembarked in that country.” - -The 11th, the advanced guard of the army coming from Germany -reached Paris, and was there publicly harangued by the emperor. - -The 8th of November he burst into Spain at the head of three -hundred thousand men, and the 5th of December not a vestige of the -Spanish armies remaining, he took possession of Madrid. - -Now the Asturian deputies arrived in London the 6th of June. - -The 20th of August (the battle of Vimiero being then unfought, and, -consequently, the fate of the campaign in Portugal uncertain,) -the English minister invited sir Hew Dalrymple to discuss three -plans of operations in Spain, each founded upon data utterly -false, and all objectionable in the detail. He also desired that -sir Arthur Wellesley should go to the Asturias to ascertain what -facilities that country offered for the disembarkation of an -English army; and the whole number of troops disposable for the -campaign (exclusive of those already in Portugal) he stated to be -twenty thousand, of which one half was in England and the other -in Sicily. He acknowledged that no information yet received had -enabled the cabinet to decide as to the application of the forces -at home, or the ulterior use to be made of those in Portugal, -yet, with singular rashness, the whole of the southern provinces, -containing the richest cities, finest harbours, and most numerous -armies, were discarded from consideration, and sir Hew Dalrymple, -who was well acquainted with that part of Spain, and in close and -friendly correspondence with the chiefs, was directed to confine -his attention to the northern provinces, of which he knew nothing. - -The reduction of Junot’s army in Portugal, and the discomfiture -of Joseph’s on the Ebro, were regarded as certain events. The -observations of the minister were principally directed, not to the -best mode of attacking, but to the choice of a line of march that -would ensure the utter destruction or captivity of the whole French -army; nay, elated with extravagant hopes and strangely despising -Napoleon’s power, he instructed lord William Bentinck to urge the -central junta to an invasion of France, as soon as the army on the -Ebro should be annihilated. - -Thus it appears that the English ministers were either profoundly -ignorant of the real state of affairs, or that with a force -scattered in England, Portugal, and Sicily, and not exceeding -forty-five thousand men, they expected in one campaign, first to -subdue twenty-six thousand French under Junot, and then destroying -eighty thousand under Joseph, to turn the tide of war, and to -invade France. - -The battle of Vimiero took place, and sir Arthur Wellesley -naturally declined a mission more suitable to a staff captain than -a victorious commander; but before sir Hew’s answer, exposing the -false calculations of the minister’s plans, could be received in -England, a despatch, dated the 2d of September, announced the -resolution of the government to employ an army in the northern -provinces of Spain, and directed twenty thousand men to be held -in readiness to unite with other forces to be sent from England; -nevertheless, this project also was so immature, that no intimation -was given how the junction was to be effected, whether by sea or -land; nor had the ministers even ascertained that the Spaniards -would permit English troops to enter Spain at all; for three weeks -later, lord William Bentinck, writing from Madrid, says, “I had an -interview with Florida Blanca: he expressed his surprise that there -should be a doubt of the Spaniards wishing for the assistance of -the English army.” Such also was the confusion at home, that lord -Castlereagh repeatedly expressed his fears lest the embarkation of -Junot’s troops should have “absorbed all the means of transport” -in the Tagus, when a simple reference to the transport office in -London would have satisfied him, that although the English army -should also be embarked, there would still remain a surplus of -twelve thousand tons. - -When the popular cry arose against the convention of Cintra, the -generals in chief were recalled in succession, as rapidly as they -had been appointed; the despatches addressed to one generally fell -into the hands of his successor; but the plans of the ministers -becoming at last mature, on the 6th of October sir John Moore was -finally appointed to lead the forces into Spain. At this period -the head of the grand French army was already in the passes of the -Pyrenees, and the hostile troops on the Ebro coming to blows. The -Spaniards were weak and divided, and the English were forty marches -from the scene of action; yet, said the minister to sir John -Moore, “there will be full time to concert your plan of operations -with the Spanish generals before the equipment of your army can -be completed.” Was this the way to oppose Napoleon! Could such -proceedings lead to ought but disaster! It has been said, that sir -Hew Dalrymple’s negligence was the cause of this delay; that he -should have had the troops in readiness: but that general could not -prudently incur the expense of equipping for a march, an army that -was likely to be embarked; he could not, in short, divine the plans -of the ministers before they were formed; and it is evident that -the error attaches entirely to the government. - -The incapacity of the Spanish generals has been already -sufficiently exposed by occasional observations in the narrative; -their faults, glaring and fatal, call for no further remark; but -the exact combinations, the energy and rapidity of the French -emperor, merit the most careful examination; his operations were -not, as they have been generally considered, a pompous display of -power, to create an appearance of conquest that was unreal, not a -mere violent irruption with a multitude of men, but a series of -skilful and scientific movements, worthy of so great a general and -politician. It is true that his force was immense, and that the -Spaniards were but contemptible soldiers; but he never neglected -the lessons of experience, nor deviated from the strictest rules -of art. With astonishing activity, and when we consider the state -of his political relations on the continent, we may add, with -astonishing boldness, he first collected ample means to attain his -object, then deceiving his enemies with regard to his numbers, -position, and intentions, and choosing his time with admirable -judgment, he broke through the weak part of their line, and seized -Burgos, a central point, which enabled him to envelop and destroy -the left wing of the Spaniards before their right could hear of his -attack, the latter being itself turned by the same movement, and -exposed to a like fate. This position also enabled him to menace -the capital, to keep the English army in check, and to cover the -formation of those magazines and stores which were necessary to -render Burgos the base and pivot of further operations. - -Napoleon’s forces were numerous enough to have attacked Castaños -and Palafox, while Blake was being pursued by the first and fourth -corps; but trusting nothing to chance, he waited for twelve days, -until the position of the English army was ascertained, the -strength of the northern provinces quite broken, and a secure -place of arms established. Then leaving the second corps to cover -his communications, and sending the fourth corps into the flat -country, to coast, as it were, the heads of the English columns -on his right, and to turn the passes of the Carpentino mountains, -he caused the Spanish right wing to be destroyed, and himself -approached the capital, at a moment when not a vestige of a -national army was left, when he had good reason to think that the -English were in full retreat, when the whole of his own corps were -close at hand, and consequently when the greatest moral effect -could be produced, and the greatest physical power concentrated -at the same time to take advantage of it. Napoleon’s dispositions -were indeed surprisingly skilful; for although marshal Lefebre’s -precipitation at Zornoza, by prolonging Blake’s agony, lost six -days of promise, it is certain that reverses in battle could -neither have checked the emperor, nor helped the Spaniards. - -For if Soult had been beaten at Gamonal, Napoleon was close at hand -to support the second corps, and the sixth corps would have fallen -upon the flank and rear of the Spaniards. - -If the first corps had been defeated at Espinosa, the second and -fourth corps, and the emperor’s troops, would have taken Blake in -flank and rear. - -If Lasnes had been defeated at Tudela, he could have fallen back on -Pampeluna; the fifth and eighth corps were marching to support him, -and the sixth corps would have taken the Spaniards in flank. - -If the emperor had been repulsed at the Somosierra, the sixth corps -would have turned that position by Guadalaxara, and the fourth -corps by Guadarama. - -If sir John Moore had retreated on Portugal, the fourth corps was -nearer to Lisbon than he was. - -If he had overthrown Soult, the fifth and eighth corps were ready -to sustain that marshal, and Napoleon, with fifty thousand men, -as we have seen, was prepared to cut the British line of retreat -into Gallicia. In short, no possible event could have divided the -emperor’s forces, and he constantly preserved a central position -that enabled him to unite his masses in sufficient time to repair -any momentary disaster. By a judicious mixture of force and -policy also, he obliged Madrid to surrender in two days, and thus -prevented the enthusiasm which would doubtless have arisen if the -capital had been defended for any time, and the heart burnings if -it had been stormed. The second sweep that he was preparing to make -when sir John Moore’s march called off his attention from the south -would undoubtedly have put him in possession of the remaining great -cities of the Peninsula. Then the civil benefits promised in his -decrees and speeches would have produced their full effect, and the -result may be judged of by the fact that in 1811 and 12, Andalusia -and Valencia were under the able administration of marshals Soult -and Suchet, as tranquil and submissive as any department of France, -and the former even raised numerous Spanish battalions, and -employed them not only to preserve the public peace, but to chase -and put down the guerillas of the neighbouring provinces. - -Sir John Moore’s talents saved the Peninsula from this great -danger, and here perhaps a military error of Napoleon’s may be -detected. Forgetting that war is not a conjectural art, he took for -granted that the English army was falling back to Portugal, and -without ascertaining that it was so, acted upon the supposition. -This apparent negligence, so unlike his usual circumspection, leads -to the notion, that through Morla he might have become acquainted -with the peculiar opinions and rash temper of Mr. Frere, and -trusted that the treacherous arts of the Spaniard, in conjunction -with the presumptuous disposition of the plenipotentiary, would so -mislead the English general, as to induce him to carry his army to -Madrid, and thus deliver it up entire and bound. It was an error; -but Napoleon could be deceived or negligent only for a moment. -With what vigour he recovered himself, and hastened to remedy his -error! How instantaneously he relinquished his intentions against -the south, turned his face away from the glittering prize, and -bent his whole force against the only man among his adversaries -that had discovered talent and decision! Let those who have seen -the preparations necessary to enable a small army to act, even -on a pre-conceived plan, say what uncontrollable energy that man -possessed, who, suddenly interrupted in such great designs, could, -in the course of a few hours, put fifty thousand men in movement -on a totally new line of operations, and in the midst of winter -execute a march of two hundred miles with a rapidity hardly to be -equalled under the most favourable circumstances. - -The indefatigable activity of the duke of Dalmatia greatly -contributed to the success of the whole campaign, and it is a -remarkable circumstance, that Soult and Napoleon, advancing from -different bases, should have so combined their movements, that -(after marching, the one above a hundred, and the other two hundred -miles, through a hostile country) they effected their junction -at a given point, and at a given hour, without failure; and it -is no less remarkable that such a decided and well-conducted -operation should have been baffled by a general at the head of an -inexperienced army. - - -OBSERVATIONS ON SIR JOHN MOORE’S RETREAT. - -When Sylla, after all his victories, styled himself a happy, -rather than a great general, he discovered his profound knowledge -of the military art. Experience had taught him that the urgent -speed of one legion, the inactivity of another, the obstinacy, -the ignorance, or the treachery of a subordinate officer, -was sufficient to mar the best concerted plan, nay, that the -intervention of a shower of rain, an unexpected ditch, or any -apparently trivial accident, might determine the fate of a whole -army. It taught him that the vicissitudes of war are so many, that -disappointment will attend the wisest combinations; that a ruinous -defeat, the work of chance, often closes the career of the boldest -and most sagacious of generals; and that to judge of a commander’s -conduct by the event alone, is equally unjust and unphilosophical, -a refuge for vanity and ignorance. - -These reflections seem to be peculiarly applicable to sir John -Moore’s campaign, which has by sundry writers been so unfairly -discussed. Many of the subsequent disasters of the French can now -be distinctly traced to the operations of the British army. It -can be demonstrated that the reputation of that excellent man was -basely sacrificed at the period of his death, and that the virulent -censures passed upon his conduct have been as inconsiderate as they -were unmerited and cruel. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Journal, MSS.] - -The nature of the commands held by sir John Moore in the years -1807-8-9, forced him into a series of embarrassments from which few -men could have extricated themselves. After refusing the charge -of the absurd expedition to Egypt in 1806, which ended, as he -judged it must do, unfavourably, he succeeded to the command of -the troops in Sicily, a situation which immediately involved him -in unpleasant discussions with the queen of Naples and the British -envoy: discussions to which the subsequent well-known enmity -of the cabinet of that day may be traced. By his frank conduct, -clear judgment, and firm spirit, he obtained an influence over the -wretched court of Palermo that promised the happiest results. The -queen’s repugnance to a reform was overcome, the ministers were -awed, and the miserable intrigues of the day were for the time -put down. The Sicilian army was reorganized, and a good military -system was commenced under the advice of the British general. This -promising state of affairs lasted but a short time; the Russian -fleet put into the Tagus, the French threatened Portugal, and -Sicily was no longer considered! Sir John Moore was ordered to -quit that island, and to assemble a large force at Gibraltar for -a specific service; but the troops to be gathered were dispersed -in the Mediterranean from Egypt to the straits, and their junction -could not be effected at all unless the English ambassador at -Constantinople should succeed in bringing a negotiation then -pending between the Turks and Russians to a happy issue. The -special service in question had two objects, 1º. to aid sir Sydney -Smith in carrying off the royal family of Portugal to the Brazils; -and 2º. to take possession of Madeira; but neither were made known -to the general before his arrival at Gibraltar, which was not -until after Junot had taken possession of Lisbon. Sir John Moore -then (following his instructions) proceeded home, and thus our -interests in Sicily were again abandoned to the vices and intrigues -of the court of Palermo. On the passage he crossed general Spencer -going with a force against Ceuta, and soon after he had reached -England, he was despatched to Sweden, without any specific object, -and with such vague instructions, that an immediate collision with -the unfortunate Gustavus was the consequence. Having with much -dexterity and judgment withdrawn himself and his army from the -capricious violence of that monarch, sir John was superseded and -sent to Portugal, with the third rank in an army which at that time -no man had such good claims to command as himself[27]. - -The good fortune of England was never more conspicuous than at this -period, when her armies and fleets were thus bandied about, and -a blind chance governed the councils at home. For first a force -collected from all parts of the Mediterranean was transported to -the Baltic sea, at a time when an expedition composed of troops -which had but a short time before come back from the Baltic were -sailing from England to the Mediterranean. An army intended to -conquer South America was happily assembled in Ireland at the -moment when an unexpected event called for their services in -Portugal, and a division destined to attack the Spaniards at -Ceuta arrived at Gibraltar at the instant when the insurrection -of Andalusia fortunately prevented them from making an attempt -that would have materially aided Napoleon’s schemes against the -Peninsula. Again, three days after sir John Moore had withdrawn -his army from Sweden, orders arrived to employ it in carrying -off the Spanish troops under Romana, an operation for which it -was not required, and which would have retarded, if not entirely -frustrated, the campaign in Portugal; nor was it the least part of -that fortune, that in such long continued voyages in bad seasons, -no disaster befell those huge fleets thus employed in bearing the -strength of England from one extremity of Europe to the other. - -After the convention of Cintra, sir John Moore was again placed -at the head of an army; an appointment unexpected by him, for -the frank and bold manner in which he expressed himself to the -ministers on his return from Gottingen left him little to hope; -but the personal good-will of the king, and other circumstances, -procured him this command. Thus, in a few months after he had -quitted Sweden, Moore, with an army not exceeding twenty-four -thousand men, was in the heart of Spain, opposed to Napoleon, who -having passed the Pyrenees at the head of three hundred and thirty -thousand men, could readily bring two hundred thousand to bear on -the British; a vast disproportion of numbers, and a sufficient -answer to all the idle censures passed upon the retreat to Coruña. - -The most plausible grounds of accusation against sir John Moore’s -conduct rest on three alleged errors: - -1st. That he divided his forces. - -2dly. That he advanced against Soult. - -3dly. That he made a precipitate and unnecessary retreat. - -When a general, aware of the strength of his adversary, and of -the resources to be placed at his own disposal, arranges a plan -of campaign, he may be strictly judged by the rules of art; but -if, as in the case of sir John Moore, he is suddenly appointed to -conduct important operations without a plan being arranged, or the -means given to arrange one, then it is evident that his capacity -or incapacity must be judged of, by the energy he displays, the -comprehensive view he takes of affairs, and the rapidity with which -he accommodates his measures to events, that the original vice of -his appointment will not permit him to control. - -The first separation of the English army was the work of the -ministers, who sent sir David Baird to Coruña. The after separation -of the artillery was sir John Moore’s act; the reasons for which -have been already stated; but it is worth while to examine what -the effect of that measure was, and what it might have been; -and here it may be observed, that, although a brigade of light -six-pounders did accompany the troops to Almeida, the road was -_not practicable_; for the guns were in some places let down the -rocks by ropes, and in others, carried over the difficult places; -a practicable affair with one brigade; but how could the great -train of guns and ammunition waggons that accompanied sir John Hope -have passed such places without a loss of time that would have -proved more injurious to the operations than the separation of the -artillery? - -The advance of the army was guided by three contingent cases, -any one of which arising would have immediately influenced the -operations; 1º. Blake on the left, or Castaños and Palafox upon the -right, might have beaten the French, and advanced to the Pyrenees. -2º. They might have maintained their position on the Ebro. 3º. -The arrival of reinforcements from France might have forced the -Spaniards to fall back upon the upper Douero, on one side, and to -the mountains of Guadalaxara on the other. In the first case, there -was no risk in marching by divisions towards Burgos, which was the -point of concentration given by the British and Spanish ministers. -In the second case, the army could safely unite at Valladolid; and -in the third case, if the division of sir David Baird had reached -Toro early in November (and this it was reasonable to expect, as -that general arrived at Coruña the 13th of October), the retrograde -movement of the Spanish armies would probably have drawn the -English to the Guadarama, as a safe and central point between -the retiring Spanish wings. Now the artillery marching from the -Alemtejo by the roads of Talavera and Naval Carnero, to Burgos, -would pass over one hundred and two Spanish leagues. To Aranda de -Douero, eighty-nine leagues. To Valladolid, ninety-two leagues. -While the columns that marched by Almeida and Salamanca would pass -over one hundred and sixteen leagues to Burgos, and ninety-eight -to Valladolid. Wherefore supposing the Spaniards successful, or -even holding their own, the separation of the artillery was an -advantage, and if the Spaniards were driven back, their natural -line of retreat would have brought them towards Madrid, Blake by -Aranda to the Somosierra, and Castaños and Palafox by Siguenza -and Tarancon, to cover the capital, and to maintain an interior -communication between the Somosierra and the Henares river. The -British artillery would then have halted at Espinar, after a march -of only eighty leagues, and Baird and Moore’s corps uniting at -Salamanca early in November, might, by a flank march to Arevalo, -have insured the concentration of the whole army. - -[Illustration: _Plate VIII_ - -_To Face Page 516_ - -_London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street._] - -Thus, in the three anticipated cases, the separation of the -artillery was prudent, and promised to be advantageous. There was -indeed a fourth case, that which really happened. All the Spanish -armies were dispersed in an instant!--utterly effaced! but sir -John Moore could not have divined such a catastrophe, while his -ears were ringing with the universal clamour about the numbers and -enthusiasm of the patriots; and if he had foreseen even a part of -such disasters, he would never have advanced from Portugal. With -the plans of the Spanish government he was unacquainted; but he -was officially informed that above one hundred and forty thousand -Spanish soldiers were between him and a feeble dispirited enemy; -and as the intercepted letter from the governor of Bayonne stated -that reinforcements would only arrive between the 18th of October -and the 18th of November, it was reasonable to suppose that the -French would not commence offensive operations before the latter -period, and that ample time would be afforded to concentrate the -English troops under the protection of the Spanish armies. If -sir John Moore could have suspected the delusion under which the -British government acted, the incredible folly of the central junta -and the Spanish generals, or the inaccuracy of the military agents, -if he could have supposed that the Spanish armies were weak in -numbers, weaker in spirit, and destitute of food and clothing; or -that, while the Spanish authorities were pressing him to advance, -they would wantonly detain sir David Baird’s troops seventeen -days on board the transports; if he could have imagined all this, -undoubtedly his arrangements ought and would have been different; -his army would have been kept together, and the road through Coria, -however difficult, would have been preferred to a divided march. - -The dangerous and absurd position of the Spanish armies, and the -remote situation of the British troops in October, may be explained -by the annexed diagram. Lisbon being taken as a centre, and the -distance A between Lisbon and Coruña being the radius, let a circle -passing through Madrid be described. Let the tangential line C -be drawn perpendicular to the radius A, meeting the secant B at -Sanguessa. - -The extreme right of the Spaniards was posted at Sanguessa. -Castaños was at Calahorra, and Blake was near Durango, but the -main body of the French was at Vittoria; and not only divided the -Spaniards, but was actually twenty-five miles nearer to Burgos and -Valladolid, (the points of concentration for Moore’s and Baird’s -corps) than either Castaños or Blake, and seventy-five miles nearer -than Palafox. - -The 10th, the emperor struck the first blow, by beating Belvedere -and seizing Burgos. Sir David Baird did not march from Coruña until -the 12th, and did not bring up the whole of his troops to Astorga -before the 4th of December; hence it is clear, that whatever road -the artillery had taken, the British army could not have averted -the ruin of the Spaniards. Let us suppose the troops assembled at -Salamanca on the 13th of November. They must have advanced either -to Valladolid or to Madrid. If to Valladolid, the emperor was at -Burgos with the imperial guards, ten or twelve thousand cavalry, -and a hundred pieces of artillery. The first corps was within a -day’s march, the second and fourth corps within three marches, and -the sixth corps within two marches. Above a hundred thousand French -soldiers could, therefore, have been concentrated in three days; -and it is to be observed that sir John Moore never had twenty-five -thousand in the field. - -It is said, he might have gone to Madrid: in that case the -separation of the artillery was a decided advantage, and the -separation of Baird’s corps (which was not the general’s -arrangement) was the error. The army could not have marched from -Salamanca to Madrid in less than seven days; on the 21st of -November then, twenty-four thousand British soldiers could have -been collected in the capital; but the fourth French corps, which -reached Segovia the 1st of December, would have cut off their -communication with Portugal, and the emperor with forty thousand -men was at Aranda de Douero. Castaños was defeated on the 23d; -the remnants of his army were only at Guadalaxara about the 1st -of December, and the sixth corps was in full pursuit of them. The -English general must then have done one of three things; advanced -to the relief of Castaños’s retreating army, joined St. Juan at -the Somosierra, or retreated across the Tagus. In the first case, -the emperor would have forced the Somosierra, and uniting with the -fourth corps, have placed sixty thousand men upon sir John Moore’s -rear; in the second case, the sixth and fourth corps, turning both -his flanks, would have effected a junction behind the Somosierra, -and cut him off from Madrid, while Napoleon, with forty thousand -men, assailed him in front. To retreat over the Tagus was to adopt -the southern provinces for a new base of operations, and might -have been useful if the Spaniards would have rallied round him -with enthusiasm and courage; but would they have done so when the -emperor was advancing with his enormous force? After-experience -proves that they would not. The duke of Dalmatia, in 1810, with an -army very inferior to that under Napoleon, reached the gates of -Cadiz without a serious blow being struck to oppose him, and at -this time the people of the south were reckless of the opportunity -procured for them by sir John Moore’s march on Sahagun; but, it -has been said, that twenty-four thousand British troops acting -vigorously, could have checked the emperor, and raised the courage -of the Spaniards. To such an observation I will oppose a fact. In -1815, Napoleon crossed the Sambre with one hundred and fifteen -thousand men, and the two hundred and ten thousand regular troops -in his front, among which were more than thirty thousand English, -could with difficulty stop his progress after four days’ fighting, -in three of which he was successful. - -If sir John Moore, at a subsequent period, was willing to risk -the danger of a movement on the capital, it was because he was -misinformed of the French strength, and the Spaniards were -represented to be numerous and confident; he was also unacquainted -with the defeat at Tudela. His object was, by assisting Castaños, -to arouse the spirit of the patriots: and nothing more strongly -evinces his hardihood and prompt judgment, for, in his letter to -Mr. Frere, he distinctly stated the danger to be incurred, and -carefully separating the military from the political reasons, only -proposed to venture the army if the envoy was satisfied that the -Spanish government and people would answer to such an appeal, and -that the British cabinet would be willing to incur the risk for -such an object. If he did not follow up his own proposal, it was -because he had discovered that the army of Castaños was, not simply -defeated, but destroyed; because the Somosierra had been forced by -a charge of cavalry, and because the passes of the Guadarama, on -his line of march to Madrid, were seized by the enemy before his -own army could be concentrated. - -Why then did he not retreat into Portugal? Because Napoleon, having -directed the mass of his forces against the capital, the British -army was enabled to concentrate; because Madrid shut her gates; -because Mr. Frere and the Spanish authorities deceived him by false -information; because the solemn declaration of the junta of Toledo, -that they would bury themselves under the ruins of that town rather -than surrender, joined to the fact that Zaragoza was fighting -heroically, seemed to guarantee the constancy and vigour of that -patriotic spirit which was apparently once more excited; because -the question was again become political, and it was necessary to -satisfy the English people, that nothing was left undone to aid a -cause which they had so much at heart; and, finally, because the -peculiar position of the French army at the moment, afforded the -means of creating a powerful diversion in favour of the southern -provinces. These are the unanswerable reasons for the advance -towards Sahagun. In the details of execution, that movement may -be liable to some trifling objections; perhaps it would have been -better to have carried the army on the 21st at once to Carrion -and neglected Sahagun and Saldanha; but in its stratagetical and -political character it was well conceived and well timed, hardy and -successful. - -The irritating interference that sir John Moore was called upon -to repel, and the treachery and the folly, equal in its effects -to treachery, that he was obliged to guard against, have been -sufficiently dwelt upon already; but before discussing the retreat -from Astorga, it may be of some military interest to show that the -line of Portugal, although the natural one for the British army -to retire upon, was not at this period necessarily either safe or -useful, and that greater evils than those incurred by a retreat -through Gallicia would probably have attended a retrograde march -upon Lisbon. - -The rugged frontier of Portugal lying between the Douero and the -Tagus, is vulnerable in many points to an invading army of superior -force. It may be penetrated between the Douero and Pinhel, and -between Pinhel and Guarda, by roads leading into the valleys of -the Zezere and the Mondego. Between the Sierra de Estrella and -the Sierra de Gata, by the road from Alfayates to Sabugal and -Penamacor, or that by Guarda and Coria. Again, it may be pierced -between the Sierra de Gata and the Tagus by Idanha Velha, Castello -Branco, and Sobreira Formosa; and from the Tagus to the Guadiana, -a distance of about twenty leagues, the Alentejo presents an open -country without any strong fortress, save Lalippe, which may be -disregarded and passed without danger. - -Sir John Moore commenced his forward movement from Salamanca on the -12th of December, and at that period, the fourth corps being at -Talavera de la Reyna, was much nearer to Lisbon than the British -army was, and the emperor was preparing to march on that capital -with the sixth corps, the guards, and the reserve. He could, as -the duke of Berwick did, penetrate by both sides of the Tagus, and -what was to prevent him from reaching Lisbon before the British -force, if the latter had retreated from Salamanca? he marched on -a shorter line and a better road; he could supply his troops by -requisitions, a system that, however fatal it may be in the end, is -always advantageous at first. Sir John Moore must, from a scanty -military chest, have purchased his supplies from a suspicious -peasantry, rendered more distrustful by the retreat. In Lisbon, sir -John Craddock commanded six thousand infantry and two hundred and -fifty-eight cavalry; but the provisional government, who had only -organized a few ill-composed battalions, were so inactive, that it -was not until the 8th of December that a proclamation, calling on -the people to arm, was issued. In the arsenal there were scarcely -musquets and equipments for eight thousand men, and the new levies -were only required to assemble when Portugal should be actually -invaded. Sir Robert Wilson, indeed, having with great activity -organized about two thousand of the Lusitanian legion, marched in -the middle of December from Oporto; but this was all that could -be opposed to an army more numerous, more favourably situated for -invasion, and incomparably better commanded than that with which -Massena invaded the country in 1810. Thus it may be affirmed, -that if a retreat from Lisbon was advisable, before Napoleon took -Madrid, it was not a safe operation after that event, and it is -clear that sir John Moore neither lightly nor injudiciously adopted -the line of Gallicia. - -The arguments of those who deny the necessity of falling back, even -behind the Esla, are scarcely worth notice; a simple reference to -the numbers under the emperor, and the direction of his march, -is sufficient to expose their futility; but the necessity of the -continued, and as it has been unjustly called, the precipitate -retreat to Coruña, may not be quite so obvious. The advance to -Sahagun was intended to create a diversion, and give the Spaniards -an opportunity of making head in the south; but although it -succeeded in drawing away the enemy, the Spaniards did not make any -head. The central junta displayed no energy or wisdom; a few slight -demonstrations by the marquis of Palacios, on the side of the -Sierra Morena, and by the duke of Infantado on the side of Cuenca, -scarcely disturbed the first corps which remained in La Mancha; -ten thousand men were sufficient to maintain Madrid in perfect -tranquillity, and a part of the fourth corps even marched from -Talavera by Placentia on Salamanca. By the letters of Mr. Stuart, -and the reports of his own spies, sir John Moore was informed -of all these disheartening circumstances; but the intelligence -arrived slowly and at intervals, and he, hoping that the Spaniards -would finally make an effort, announced his intention to hold the -Gallicias; but Mr. Stuart’s correspondence deprived him of that -hope; and the presence of the emperor, the great amount of his -force, and the vehemence with which he pressed forward, confirmed -the unhappy truth that nothing could be expected from the south. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, sect. 2.] - -Sir John Moore could not with twenty-three thousand men maintain -himself against the whole French army, and until he reached -Astorga his flanks were always exposed. From thence, however, he -retreated in comparative security; but the natural strength of the -country between that town and Coruña misled persons of shallow -judgment, who have since inconsiderately advanced many vague -accusations, such as that passes where a hundred men could stop an -army were lightly abandoned; that the retreat was a flight, and -the general’s judgment clouded by the danger of his situation. -There might be some foundation for such observations if military -commanders were like prize-fighters, bound to strike always at the -front; but as long as armies are dependent for their subsistence -and ammunition upon lines of communication, the safety of their -flanks and rear must be considered as of consequence. Sir John -Moore was perfectly aware that he could fight any number of men -in some of the mountainous positions on the road to Coruña; but -unless he could make a permanent defence, such battles would have -been worse than useless, and a permanent defence was impossible, -inasmuch as there were none but temporary magazines nearer than -Coruña, and there were neither carriages of transport, nor money -to procure them; a severe winter had just set in, and the province -being poor, and the peasantry disinclined to aid the troops, few -resources could be drawn from the country itself, neither was -there a single position between Astorga and Coruña which could -be maintained for more than a few days against a superior force, -for that of Rodrigatos could be turned by the old road leading to -Villa Franca, Villa Franca itself by the valley of the Syl, and -from thence the whole line to Coruña might be turned by the road -of Orense, which also led directly to Vigo, and until he reached -Nogales, sir J. Moore’s intention was to retire to Vigo. The French -could have marched through the richest part of Gallicia to St. -Jago and Coruña on the left, or from the Asturias, by the way of -Mondonedo, on the right. If it be asked why they did not do so? -the answer is prompt. The emperor having quitted the army, the -jealousies and misunderstandings usual between generals of equal -rank impeded the operations. A coolness subsisted between marshal -Ney and the duke of Dalmatia, and without entering into the grounds -of their difference it is plain that, in a military point of view, -the judgment of the latter was the soundest. The former committed -a great error by remaining at Villa Franca instead of pushing his -corps, or a part of it, (as recommended by Soult) along the valley -of Orense to St. Jago de Compostella. The British army would have -been lost if the sixth corps had reached Coruña before it; and -what would have been the chances in the battle if three additional -French divisions had been engaged? - -Granting, therefore, that the troops could have been nourished -during the winter, Villa Franca, Nogales, Constantino, and Lugo, -were not permanently defensible by an army whose base of operations -was at Coruña. Hence it was that sir John Moore resolved to regain -his ships with the view to renew the war in the south, and Hannibal -himself could have done no more. Nor was the mode of executing the -retreat at all unbecoming the character of an able officer. - -Lord Bacon observes, that “honourable retreats are no ways inferior -to brave charges, as having less of fortune, more of discipline, -and as much of valour.” That is an honourable retreat in which -the retiring general loses no trophies in fight, sustains every -charge without being broken, and finally, after a severe action, -re-embarks his army in the face of a superior enemy without being -seriously molested. It would be honourable to effect this before -a foe only formidable from numbers, but it is infinitely more -creditable, when the commander, while struggling with bad weather -and worse fortune, has to oppose veterans with inexperienced -troops, and to contend against an antagonist of eminent ability, -who scarcely suffers a single advantage to escape him during -his long and vigorous pursuit. All this sir John Moore did, and -finished his work by a death as firm and glorious as any that -antiquity can boast of. - -Put to lord Bacon’s test, in what shall the retreat to Coruña be -found deficient? something in discipline perhaps, but that fault -does not attach to the general. Those commanders who have been -celebrated for making fine retreats were in most instances well -acquainted with their armies; and Hannibal, speaking of the elder -Scipio, derided him, although a brave and skilful man, for that, -being unknown to his own soldiers, he should presume to oppose -himself to a general who could call to each man under his command -by name: thus inculcating, that, unless troops be trained in the -peculiar method of a commander, the latter can scarcely achieve any -thing great. Now sir John Moore had a young army suddenly placed -under his guidance, and it was scarcely united, when the superior -numbers of the enemy forced it to a retrograde movement under very -harassing circumstances; he had not time, therefore, to establish -a system of discipline, and it is in the leading events, not the -minor details, that the just criterion of his merits is to be -sought for. - -Was the retreat uncalled for? Was it unnecessarily precipitate? -Was any opportunity of crippling the enemy lost? Was any weakness -to be discovered in the personal character of the general? These -are the questions that sensible men will ask; the first has been -already examined, the second is a matter of simple calculation. -The rear guard quitted Astorga on the 1st of January; on the 3rd, -it repulsed the enemy in a sharp skirmish at Calcabelos; the 6th -it rejoined the main body at Lugo, having three times checked -the pursuers during the march. It was unbroken, and lost no gun, -suffered no misfortune; the whole army offered battle at Lugo -for two successive days, it was not accepted, and the retreat -recommencing, the troops reached Betanzos on the morning of the -10th, and Coruña on the 11th; thus in eleven days, three of which -were days of rest, a small army passed over a hundred and fifty -miles of good road. Now Napoleon, with fifty thousand men, left -Madrid on the 22d of December, the 28th he was at Villapando, -having performed a march, on bad roads, of a hundred and sixty-four -miles in seven days. The retreat to Coruña was consequently not -precipitate, unless it can be shown, that it was unnecessary to -retreat at all beyond Villa Franca, neither can it be asserted, -that any opportunity of crippling the enemy was lost. To fight a -battle was the game of the French marshal, and if any censure will -apply to his able campaign, it is that he delayed to attack at -Lugo; victorious or beaten, the embarrassments of his adversary -must have been increased; sir John Moore must have continued his -retreat encumbered with the wounded, or the latter must have been -abandoned without succour in the midst of winter. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 26.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -At Coruña the absence of the fleet necessarily brought on a battle; -that it was honourable to the British troops is clear from the -fact that they embarked without loss after the action; and that it -was absolutely necessary to embark notwithstanding the success, is -as certain a proof how little advantage could have been derived -from any battle fought farther inland, and how prudently sir John -Moore acted in declining an action the moment he had rallied his -army at Lugo, and restored that discipline which the previous -movements had shaken; but, notwithstanding the clamour with which -this campaign has been assailed, as if no army had ever yet -suffered such misfortunes, it is certain that the nominal loss -was small, the real loss smaller, and that it sinks into nothing -when compared with the advantages gained. An army which, after -marching in advance or retreat above five hundred miles before -an enemy of immensely superior force, has only lost, including -those killed in battle, four thousand men, or a sixth part of its -numbers, cannot be said to have suffered severely, nor would the -loss have been so great but for the intervention of the accidental -occurrences mentioned in the narrative. Night marches are seldom -happy; that from Lugo to Betanzos cost the army in stragglers more -than double the number of men lost in all the preceding operations; -nevertheless the reserve in that, as in all the other movements, -suffered little; and it is a fact, that the light brigades detached -by the Vigo road, which were not pursued, made no forced marches, -slept under cover, and were well supplied, left, in proportion -to their strength, as many men behind as any other part of the -army; thus accumulating proof upon proof that inexperience was -the primary and principal cause of the disorders which attended -the retreat. Those disorders were sufficiently great, but many -circumstances contributed to produce an appearance of suffering -and disorganization which was not real. The intention of sir John -Moore was, to have proceeded to Vigo, in order to restore order -before he sailed for England: instead of which the fleet steered -home directly from Coruña; a terrible storm scattered it; many -ships were wrecked, and the remainder, driving up the channel, were -glad to put into any port. The soldiers, thus thrown on shore, were -spread from the Land’s End to Dover. Their haggard appearance, -ragged clothing, and dirty accoutrements, things common enough in -war, struck a people only used to the daintiness of parade, with -surprise; the usual exaggerations of men just escaped from perils -and distresses were increased by the uncertainty in which all were -as to the fate of their comrades; a deadly fever, the result of -anxiety, and of the sudden change from fatigue to the confinement -of a ship, filled the hospitals at every port with officers and -soldiers, and thus the miserable state of sir John Moore’s army -became the topic of every letter, and a theme for every country -newspaper along the coast. The nation, at that time unused to great -operations, forgot that war is not a harmless game, and judging of -the loss positively, instead of comparatively, was thus disposed -to believe the calumnies of interested men, who were eager to cast -a shade over one of the brightest characters that ever adorned the -country. Those calumnies triumphed for a moment; but Moore’s last -appeal to his country for justice will be successful. Posterity, -revering and cherishing his name, will visit such of his odious -calumniators as are not too contemptible to be remembered with a -just and severe retribution; for thus it is that time freshens -the beauty of virtue and withers the efforts of baseness; and if -authority be sought for in a case where reason speaks so plainly, -future historians will not fail to remark, that the man whose -talents exacted the praises of Soult, of Wellington, and of -Napoleon, could be no ordinary soldier. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.] - -“Sir John Moore,” says the first, “took every advantage that the -country afforded to oppose an active and vigorous resistance, -and he finished, by dying in a combat that must do credit to his -memory.” - -[Sidenote: Vivian’s Conversations at Elba.] - -[Sidenote: Voice from St. Helena] - -Napoleon more than once affirmed, that if he committed a few -trifling errors they were to be attributed to his peculiar -situation, for that his talents and firmness alone had saved the -English army from destruction. - -“In sir John Moore’s campaign,” said the duke of Wellington, “I -can see but one error; when he advanced to Sahagun he should have -considered it as a movement of retreat, and sent officers to the -rear to mark and prepare the halting-places for every brigade; -but this opinion I have formed after long experience of war, and -especially of the peculiarities of a Spanish war, which must have -been seen to be understood; finally, it is an opinion formed after -the event.” - - - - -APPENDIX. - - - - -APPENDIX. - - The following five Notes, dictated by the emperor Napoleon, - and signed by general Bertrand, were found in king Joseph’s - portfolio, at the battle of Vittoria. - - -No. I. - -OBSERVATIONS ADDRESSÉES AU GÉNÉRAL SAVARY SUR LES AFFAIRES -D’ESPAGNE. - - _Le 13 Juillet, 1808._ - -1^{ere} _Observation_.--Les affaires des Français en Espagne -seroient dans une excellente position si la division Gobert avait -marché sur Valladolid, et si la division Frère eut occupé San -Clemente, ayant une colonne mobile à trois ou quatre journées sur -la route du général Dupont. - -Le g^{al} Gobert ayant été dirigé sur le général Dupont, le g^{al} -Frère étant avec le maréchal Moncey, harassé et affaibli par des -marches et des contremarches, la position de l’armée Française est -devenue moins belle. - -2^e _Observation_.--Le maréchal Bessières est aujourd’hui à -Medina del Rio Secco avec 15 mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie, -artillerie. Le 15 ou le 16, il attaquera Bénavente, se mettra en -communication avec le Portugal, jettera les rebelles en Galice, et -s’emparera de Léon. Si toutes les opérations réussissent ainsi, -et d’une manière brillante, la position de l’armée Française -redeviendra ce qu’elle était. - -Si le général Cuesta se retire de Bénavente sans combattre, il -se retirait sur Zamora, Salamanque, pour venir gagner Avila et -Segovia, certain qu’alors le maréchal Bessières ne pourrait point -le poursuivre, puisque, dans cette supposition, il serait menacé -par l’armée de Galice, dont l’avant-garde est réunie à Léon. - -Alors il faut que le général qui commande à Madrid puisse -promptement réunir 6 à 7000 hommes pour marcher sur le général -Cuesta. Il faut que la citadelle de Ségovie soit occupée par -quelques pièces de canon, trois à 400 convalescens, avec six -semaines de biscuit. - -C’est une grande faute de n’avoir pas occupé cette citadelle, quand -le major-général l’a mandé. De toutes les positions possibles, -Ségovie est la plus dangereuse pour l’armée: capitale d’une -province, assise entre les deux routes, elle ôterait a l’armée -toutes ses communications, et l’ennemi une fois posté dans cette -citadelle, l’armée Française ne pourrait plus l’en déloger. Trois -ou 400 convalescens et un bon chef de bataillon, une escouade -d’artillerie, rendront le château de Ségovie imprégnable pendant -bien de tems, et assureront à l’armée l’importante position de -Ségovie. - -Si le général Cuesta se jette en Galice, sans combattre, sans -éprouver de défaite, la position de l’armée devient toujours -meilleure; à plus forte raison, s’il est jetté en Galice après -avoir éprouvé une forte défaite. - -3^e _Observation_.--Si le maréchal Bessières, arrivé devant -Bénavente, reste en présence sans attaquer le g^{al} Cuesta, ou -s’il est repoussé, son but sera toujours de couvrir Burgos, en -tenant le plus possible l’ennemi en échec; il peut être renforcé -de 3000 hommes de troupes de ligne, qui accompagnent le roi, mais -alors il n’y a point à hésiter. Si le maréchal Bessières a fait -une marche rétrograde sans bataille, il faut sur le champ lui -envoyer 6000 hommes de renforts. S’il a fait son mouvement après -une bataille, où il ait éprouvé de grandes pertes, il faudra faire -de grandes dispositions: rappeller à marche forcée sur Madrid le -g^{al} Frère, le g^{al} Caulaincourt, le g^{al} Gobert, le g^{al} -Vedel, et laisser le g^{al} Dupont sur les montagnes de la Sierra -Morena, ou le rapprocher même de Madrid, en le tenant toujours, -cependant, à sept ou huit marches, afin de pouvoir écraser le -g^{al} Cuesta et toute l’armée de Galice, pendant que le g^{al} -Dupont servira d’avant-garde pour tenir l’armée d’Andalousie en -échec. - -4^e _Observation_.--Si le général Dupont éprouvait un échec, cela -serait de peu de conséquence. Il n’aurait d’autre résultat que de -lui faire repasser les montagnes; mais le coup qui serait porté au -maréchal Bessières serait un coup porté au cœur de l’armée, qui -donnerait le _tetanos_, et qui se ferait sentir à toutes les points -extrêmes de l’armée. Voilà pourquoi il est très malheureux que -toutes les dispositions ordonnées n’aient pas été suivis. L’armée -du maréchal Bessières devrait se trouver avoir au moins huite mille -hommes de plus, afin qu’il n’y eut aucune espèce de chance contre -l’armée du maréchal Bessières. - -La vraie manière de renforcer le général Dupont, ce n’est pas -de lui envoyer des troupes, mais c’est d’envoyer des troupes -au maréchal Bessières. Le général Dupont et le général Vedel -sont suffisans pour se maintenir dans les positions qu’ils ont -retranchés; et si le maréchal Bessières avait été renforcé, et -l’armée de Galice écrasée, le général Dupont immédiatement après se -trouverait dans la meilleure position, non seulement par des forces -qu’on pourrait alors lui envoyer, mais encore par la situation -morale des affaires. Il n’y a pas un habitant de Madrid, pas un -paysan des vallées qui ne sente que toutes les affaires d’Espagne -aujourd’hui sont dans l’affaire du maréchal Bessières. Combien -n’est-il pas malheureux que dans cette grande affaire on se soit -donné volontairement 20 chances contre soi. - -_5^e Observation_.--L’affaire de Valence n’a jamais été d’aucun -considération. Le maréchal Moncey seul était suffisant. C’était une -folie que de songer à le secourir. Si le m^{al} Moncey ne pouvait -pas prendre Valence, 20 mille hommes de plus ne le lui auraient pas -fait prendre, parcequ’alors c’était un affaire d’artillerie, et non -une affaire d’hommes: car on ne prend pas d’un coup de collier une -ville de 80 ou 100 mille âmes, qui a barricadé ses rues, mis de -l’artillerie à toutes les portes et dans toutes les maisons. Or, -dans cette hypothèse, le m^{al} Moncey était suffisant pour former -une colonne mobile, faire face à l’armée de Valence, et faire -sentir dans toute leur force les horreurs de la guerre. - -Le g^{al} Frère ne pouvait donc rien pour faire prendre Valence, -et le g^{al} Frère pouvait beaucoup posté à San Clemente, soit -qu’il dût revenir à Madrid, soit qu’il dût prendre une position -intermédiaire pour secourir le g^{al} Dupont. - -C’était une autre erreur que de songer à faire aller le m^{al} -Moncey à Valence pour ensuite le faire marcher en Murcie et sur -Grenade. C’était vouloir fondre ce corps d’armée en détail et sans -fruit. Comme le dit fort bien le général Dupont, il valait mieux -lui envoyer directement un régiment que de lui envoyer trois dans -cette direction là. - -Dans les guerres civiles ce sont les points importans qu’il faut -garder: il ne faut pas aller partout. Si cependant on a dirigé le -m^{al} Moncey sur Valence, c’était à une époque où la situation des -affaires n’était pas la même; c’était lorsque l’armée de Valence -pouvait envoyer en Catalogne ou à Saragosse comme elle en menaçait. - -6^e _Observation_.--Le but de tous les efforts de l’armée doit -être de conserver Madrid. C’est là qu’est tout. Madrid ne peut -être menacé que par l’armée de Galice. Elle peut l’être aussi -par l’armée de l’Andalousie, mais d’une manière beaucoup moins -dangereux, parcequ’elle est simple et directe, et que par toutes -les marches que fait le g^{al} Dupont sur ses derrières, il -se renforce. Les généraux Dupont et Vedel étaient suffisans, -ayant plus de 20,000 hommes; le m^{al} Bessières ne l’est pas -proportionnellement, vû que sa position est plus dangereuse. Un -échec que recevrait le g^{al} Dupont serait peu de chose; un échec -que recevrait le m^{al} Bessières serait plus considérable et se -ferait sentir à l’extremité de la ligne. - -_Résumé._--Faire reposer et rapprocher de Madrid le g^{al} Frère, -le g^{al} Caulaincourt, le g^{al} Gobert, afin qu’ils puissent -arriver à Madrid avant le g^{al} Cuesta, si celui-ci battait le -m^{al} Bessières. Immédiatement après l’événement qui aura lieu -le 15 ou le 16, prendre un part selon les événemens qui auront eu -lieu, et dans le but d’écraser l’armée ennemie en Galice. - -Si le maréchal Bessières a eu grand succès, sans éprouver de -grandes pertes, tout sera bien dans la direction actuelle. S’il -a un succès après avoir éprouvé beaucoup de pertes, il faut se -mettre en mésure de le renforcer. S’il se tient en observation -sans attaquer, il faut le renforcer. S’il a été défait et bien -battu, il faut se concentrer et rassembler toutes ses troupes -dans le cercle de sept ou huit journées de Madrid, et étudier les -dispositions dans les différentes directions pour savoir où placer -les avant-gardes, afin de profiter de l’avantage qu’on a d’être -au milieu, pour écraser successivement avec toutes ses forces les -divers corps de l’ennemi. Si on n’ordonne pas sur le champ au -g^{al} Dupont de repasser les montagnes, c’est qu’on espère que -malgré la faute faite, le m^{al} Bessières a la confiance (qu’on -partage) qu’à la rigueur il est suffisant pour écraser l’ennemi. -Le m^{al} Bessières a eu le bon esprit de tellement réunir toutes -ses forces, qu’il n’a pas même laissé un seul homme à St. Ander. -Quelqu’ avantage qu’il y eut à laisser là un millier d’hommes, il a -senti qu’un millier d’hommes pouvait décider sa victoire. - -Quant à la division du g^{al} Verdier devant Saragosse, elle a -rempli aux trois quarts son but. Elle a désorganisé tous les -Arragoniens, a porté le découragement parmi eux, les a reduits à -défendre les maisons de leur capitale, a soumis tous les environs, -a bloqué la ville, et réuni tous les moyens pour s’en emparer sans -que cela devienne trop conteux. - -Voilà l’esprit de la guerre d’Espagne. - - * * * * * - -Dictated by the emperor Napoleon. Taken at the battle of Vittoria. - -No. II. - -NOTE POUR LE ROI D’ESPAGNE. - - _Bayonne, le Juillet, 1808._ - -L’armée d’Espagne a son quartier général à Madrid; voici sa -composition actuelle: - - -1º. _Corps des Pyrénées Occidentales._ - -Le maréchal Bessières commande le corps des Pyrénées Occidentales, -qui est fort de 23 mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie, artillerie, -occupe la place de St. Sebastian, les trois Biscays, les montagnes -de St. Ander, la place de Burgos, et est chargée de combattre -l’armée ennemie des Asturies et de Galice. - -Toutes les troupes sont en mouvement pour composer l’armée de la -manière suivante. - - { {le 4^e reg^t d’infanterie } - { {legère } - {1^{ere} _brigade_, { 15^e d’infanterie de } - {le g^{al} Reynaud. { ligne } - { {1^{er} bat^{on} de Paris en} - { {marche } - { } - {total 3000 hom. présens sous les armes, } - Division { et 6 pièces de canon, ci 3000 h^{es} } - du g^{al} {(_Cette brigade marche sur Bénévent._) } 5100 h^{es} - Mouton. {2^e _brigade_, {2^e reg^t d’infanterie legère } - {le g^{al} Rey. {12^e idem } - {total 2100 hommes et 6 pièces de } - { canon, ci 2100 } - {(_Cette brigade est à Burgos avec le roi, } - { et doit joindre sa division._) } - ---- - À reporter 5100 h^{es} - - - De l’autre part 5100 h^{es} - - {Brigade d’Armagnac 1800 } - Division {Brigade Gaulois 1800 } - du g^{al} {Brigade Sabathier 2800 } 8400 h^{es} - Merle. {Brigade Ducos 2000 } - ---- - Total 8400 h^{es} - et 16 pièces de canon. - - Garde. {Infanterie 1900 h^{es} - {et 6 pièces de canon. - (_Toutes ces troupes marchent sur Bénévent._) - {10^e de chasseurs 450 } - {22^e id. 450 } - {Garde 300 } - {(_Ces troupes marchent } - { sur Bénévent._) } - {Escadrons de dragons 200 } - Cavalerie. {(_Ces escadrons sont } - { en marche et ont dépassé } 1950 h^{es} - { et ont dépassé la frontière._) } - {26^e de chasseurs 450 } - {(_Arrivant à Bayonne sous peu } - { de jours._) } - { ---- } - { Total de la cavalerie 1950 h^{es} - { ==== - -Les forces actives du maréchal Bessières sont donc de 17,000 -h^{es}. Il n’en a guère que 15,000 pour l’affaire de Bénévent. - -S’il obtenait à Bénévent et à Léon un grand succès contre l’armée -de Galice, peut-être serait-il convenable pour profiter de la -victoire et de la terreur des premiers moments de se jetter dans la -Galice. Toutesfois, il devrait d’abord prendre position à Léon, en -s’emparant de la plaine, jettant l’ennemi dans les montagnes, et -interceptant au moins à Astorga la communication de la grande route. - - _Garnison de Burgos_.--Il y a dans le château - de Burgos une garnison _de dépôt_[28] 600 h^{es} - ------ - À reporter 17,950 h^{es} - ------ - - - De l’autre part 17,950 h^{es} - - _Colonne du général Bonnet._--Il y a encore à } - Burgos le g^{al} de division Bonnet, faisant partie } - du corps du m^{al} Bessières: ce g^{al} va avoir } - sous ses ordres une colonne mobile de 1200 } - hommes, pour maintenir la tranquillité dans } - la ville et ses environs. Cette colonne est composée } - comme il suit: } - } - 4^e bataillon du 118^e, formant 450 h^{es} } - (_Actuellement existant à Burgos._) } - } - 3^e bataillon du dépôt g^{al} actuellement } - à Vittoria 450 } 1500 h^{es} - } - 2 comp^{ies} du 4^e d’infanterie legère, } - formant un petit bataillon 400 } - (_En marche, ayant passé la frontière._) } - ---- } - 1300 h^{es} } - Escadron de dragons (en marche) 200 } - 2 pièces de canon en marche } - ---- } - 1500 h^{es} } - ==== } - - _Colonne d’Aranda._--Cette colonne, formée du 1^{er} - bataillon de marche, fort de 1000 h^{es} et de 4 - pièces de canon, peut se réunir au bésoin avec la - colonne du g^{al} Bonnet: elles doivent assurer la - communication jusqu’aux montagnes en avant - d’Aranda, ci 1000 h^{es} - - _Colonne de Vittoria._--Le général de brigade - Monthion, et le colonel Barerre, occupent Vittoria - avec une colonne composée comme il suit: - - 2 compagnies du 15^e de ligne, formant un petit - bataillon de 300 h^{es} - Le 2^e bat^{on} du 12^e d’infanterie legère 600 - Le 2^e bat^{on} du 2^e id. 600 - ---- - (Ce qui fait en infanterie) 1500 h^{es} - 1 escadron de dragons (en marche) 200 - 2 pièces de canon. - ---- - (Tous ces corps sont en marche) 1700 ci 1700 - ------ - À reporter 22,150 h^{es} - - - De l’autre part 22,150 h^{es} - - _Garnison de St. Sebastian._--Le général Thouvenot - commande à St. Sebastian avec mille - hommes de garnison, ci 1000 - ------ - _Recapitulation._--Le corps du m^{al} Bessières - est de 23,150 - Et 36 pièces de canon. ====== - -Les détachemens et troisièmes bataillons des corps qui sont aux -divisions actives du m^{al} Bessières pourront sous 15 jours le -réjoindre, vû qu’ils seront remplacés à Vittoria et à Burgos par -d’autres corps. - - -2º. _Arragon._ - -Jusqu’à cette heure les troupes qui sont en Arragon, faisaient -partie du corps des Pyrénées Occidentales. Mais le corps des -Pyrénées Occidentales se portant sur la Galice, il devient -indispensable d’en faire une division à part. - -Aujourd’hui, ce commandement comprend Pampelune, la Navarre, et -les troupes qui forment le siège de Saragosse, sous les ordres du -général Verdier. - -Ces troupes sont divisées en quatre brigades, et sont composées -ainsi qu’il suit: - - 3 regimens d’infanterie de ligne de la Vistule, ayant - sous les armes 3600 h^{es} - Les 4^{e}, 6^{e} et 7^{e} bataillons de marche 1500 - Le 3^{e} bataillon du 14^{e} provisoire 1300 - Le 1^{er} regiment supplementaire 900 - Les 47^{e}, 15^{e} et 70^{e} 1600 - Un bataillon des gardes nationales d’élite 600 - ----- - Total. 9500 h^{es} - La cavalerie consiste dans un regiment de - lanciers Polonais 700 } 1100 - Plus un escadron de marche 400 } - - _À Pampelune_ le g^{al} Dagout commande. - Indépendamment d’une dépôt de 800 hommes, (ci 800 - formant 800 la garnison de la citadelle; il a - une colonne mobile composée du 1^{er} bataillon - de marche du Portugal, du troisième bataillon du - 118^{e}, fort de 650 hommes, et d’un escadron de - dragons, ce qui forme un total de 1400 hommes - disposibles pour se porter sur tous les points - de la Navarre, et sur - ------ - À reporter 11,400 - - - De l’autre part 11,400 - Et les communications de Saragosse, pour y mettre - l’ordre: ci 1,400 - Artillerie 200 - ------ - Il y a donc en cernement en Arragon et en Navarre 13,000 - ====== - -Aussitôt que Saragosse sera pris, et que le corps de l’Arragon -sera constitué, il sera nécessaire de fairer entrer au corps -du mar^l Bessières le bataillon du 47^e, celui du 15^e, et les -trois bataillons du 14^e provisoire; ce qui augmentera le m^{al} -Bessières de deux mille hommes, afin de tenir les corps réunis. -Il est possible qu’on fasse partir de Bayonne le 19,300 hommes de -bonnes troupes de ligne, pour se diriger sur Saragosse et enlever -la prise de cette place, si toutefois elle n’est pas encore prise. - -Si Saragosse était pris, le corps du m^{al} Bessières pourrait -être renforcé de ces trois mille hommes d’élite et de 2000 hommes -du corps de Saragosse, ce qui lui ferait un corps nombreux pour la -campagne de Galice. - -Indépendamment de Saragosse, les rebelles occupent la ville de Jaca -et plusieurs points dans les vallées. À tous les débouchés des -vallées en France il y a un général de brigade avec une colonne -mobile. On attendra la prise de Saragosse pour entrer dans ces -vallées et y marcher dans les deux sens. En général l’esprit des -vallées est bon; mais des troupes de contrebandiers que les chefs -des rebelles ont enrégimentés les vexent. - - -3º. _Catalogne._ - -Le général Duhesme occupe Barcelone, qui est une place qui a deux -très belles forteresses, qui la dominent. C’est la plus grande -ville de la monarchie. - -Le général Duhesme a deux divisions, la division Chabran et la -division Lechi, formant 11,000 h^{es} d’infanterie, 1600 h^{es} de -cavalerie et 18 pièces de canon. - -Le général Duhesme a eu plusieurs événemens; il a brulé un grand -nombre de villages, et maintenu en respect le pays à 15 lieues à la -ronde. - -La ville de Géronne, n’ayant pas été occupée, les insurgés de la -Catalogne ont établis là leur Junte, d’où ils donnent le mouvement -au reste de la province. 2000 insurgés assiégeaint le fort de -Figuéras. On y avait heureusement laissé 300 Français: ils ont -été obligés de tirer beaucoup de coups de canon et de bruler le -village. - -Le g^{al} de division Reille, avec deux bataillons Toscans; a -marché sur Figuéras, l’a débloqué, le 6 du mois, et y a fait -entrer une grande quantité de vivres, dont on manquait. Le 10, il -réunissait sa division, qui arrivait de divers points de la France; -il avait déjà 6000 hommes, et il doit avoir aujourd’hui 9000 -h^{es}; il doit s’assurer de Roses et marcher sur Géronne, établir -ses communications avec le général Duhesme et ensemble pacifier la -Catalogne. - - Les forces réunies des généraux Duhesme et Reille - s’élevent donc à 22,000 h^{es} - Ainsi le corps des Pyrénées Occidentales est fort de 23,000 - Celui d’Arragon, de 13,000 - Celui de Catalogne, de 22,000 - ------ - Total 68,000 h^{es}. - ====== - -Nous venons de faire connaître la situation de l’armée dans les -provinces de la Biscaye, de St. Ander, de la Castille, de la -Navarre, de l’Arragon et de la Catalogne; c’est à dire, sur toute -la frontière de France. - -Voici actuellement la situation dans les autres points: - -Les deux corps qui se sont rendus à Madrid sous les ordres du -général Dupont et du m^{al} Moncey portaient, et portent encore; -le premier, le nom de corps d’observation de la Gironde, commandé -par le g^{al} Dupont; le second, le nom de corps d’observation des -Côtés de l’Océan, commandé par le m^{al} Moncey. - -_Le corps d’observation de la Gironde_ est composé de trois -divisions: deux sont en Andalousie avec le général Dupont; la -3^{eme}, celle du général Frere, doit être à present à San Clemente. - -_Le corps d’observation des Côtés de l’Océan_ est composé également -de trois divisions. La première est avec le maréchal Moncey, -sous Valence: les deux autres sont à Madrid, et disséminés en -differentes colonnes, pour maintenir la communication avec le -général Dupont. Les états de situation vous feront connaître la -force de ces divisions: mais on peut en général les considérer les -unes dans les autres comme fortes de 6000 hommes présens sous les -armes. - -Il y a _à Madrid_ deux bataillons de la garde, formant 1000 hommes, -et à-peu-près 900 hommes de cavalerie de la garde. - -Ainsi il y a _à Madrid_, et du côté _de Valence_ et _de -l’Andalousie_, la valeur de 40,000 hommes d’infanterie, huit mille -hommes de cavalerie et 80 pièces de canon attelées. - -_Le général Junot_ a en Portugal trois divisions, formant présens -sous les armes, compris son artillerie, sa cavalerie, 23 mille -hommes[29]. - -Telle est la situation de l’armée en Espagne et en Portugal. - -1^{ere} _Observation._--Les événemens qui se passent aujourd’hui et -demain amélioreront beaucoup la situation de toutes les affaires, -en jettant dans la Galice le général Cuesta, en lui ôtant ses -communications avec l’Estramadure, Madrid et l’Andalousie, en -assurant nôtre communication avec le Portugal, et en assurant la -soumission des provinces de Salamanque, Zamora, Toro, &^a. - -La manière dont ces événemens auront lieu décideront à entrer sur -le champ en Galice, à soumettre les Asturies, ou à différer encore -quelques jours. - -2^e _Observation._--La Navarre et la Biscaye se sont maintenues -tranquilles. - -En Arragon le plat pays a été soumis, les rebelles ont été battus -plusieurs fois; avec deux seuls bataillons, 8 à 10 mille insurgés -ont été détruits ou dispersés; le découragement est à dernier point -parmi eux. Ils se sont défendus dans leurs maisons à Saragosse; -on les a bombardé; on leur a fait beaucoup de mal; on achève -aujourd’hui de bloquer la ville en jettant un pont sur l’Ebre. Une -fois cette ville soumise, il n’y a pas de doute que tout l’Arragon -ne devienne tranquille. Une partie des troupes sera cependant -nécessaire pour maintenir la province; une petite partie pourra -aider à la soumission de la Catalogne. La partie qui est nécessaire -pour le bien du service du maréchal Bessières ira le rejoindre. -Ainsi cet événement équivaudra à un secours considérable. - -3^{eme} _Observation._--La première opération du général Reille -a débloqué Figuères: il soumet à présent tous les environs. Il -ne tardera pas sans doute à s’emparer de Géronne et à établir sa -communication par terre avec le général Duhesme. La reduction de -Géronne éntamera probablement celle de Lerida; on pourra avoir -alors une colonne de deux trois ou mille hommes, qu’on dirigera par -Tortose sur Valence. - -4^{eme} _Observation._--On n’a point de nouvelles de l’expédition -de Valence, et le maréchal Moncey a huit mille hommes. Avec ces -forces il n’a rien à craindre. Il peut ne pas prendre la ville, qui -est très grande, si les paysans s’y sont renfermés et ne craignent -point de la ruiner: mais le m^{al} Moncey se maintiendra dans le -plat pays, occupera les revoltés, qu’il empêchera de se porter -ailleurs, et fera porter au pays tout le poids de la guerre. - -_5^e Observation._--On compte que le général Dupont a aujourd’hui -près de 20,000 hommes. Si les opérations du maréchal Bessières -réussissent bien, il n’y aura pas d’inconvénient à appuyer encore -le général Dupont et à lui permettre de reprendre l’offensive. -Ainsi les deux points importans, et où on fera une véritable guerre -reglée, sont la Galice et l’Andalousie, parceque les troupes du -camp de St. Roche, de Cadiz, des Algarves, sont près de 25 mille -hommes, qu’elles ont pris parti pour la sedition de Seville en -Andalousie, et que tout ce qui était à Porto a pris parti pour les -rebelles de Galice. - -Le point le plus important de tous est celui du m^{al} Bessières, -comme on l’a déjà vu dans la note qu’on a envoyé. On doit tout -faire pour que ce corps n’éprouve aucun mouvement rétrograde, aucun -échec; celui du général Dupont vient après. - -Les affaires de Saragosse sont au 3^e ordre; celles de Valence ne -sont qu’en 4^{me}. - -Voilà la véritable situation des affaires militaires du royaume. - -Il parait convenable de former dans l’Arragon une division de -10 à 12 mille hommes que pourra commander le g^{al} Verdier. Il -devra corréspondre directément avec l’état major du roi, avec le -m^{al} Bessières (pour s’éntendre), avec le g^{al} Duhesme pour se -concerter, et avec le général de la 11^e division militaire, qui -se tiendra à Bayonne, afin de connaître toujours la situation de -cette frontière. Son commandement doit embrasser la Navarre et tout -l’Arragon. - -Alors l’armée sera composée du corps des Pyrénées Occidentales, de -la division de l’Arragon (il est inutile d’en faire un corps), du -corps de la Catalogne composé de trois divisions, y compris celle -du général Reille, et des six divisions que forment les corps -d’observation de la Gironde et des Côtés de l’Océan. - -Cela fera à-peu-près 12 divisions réunies et en outre un certain -nombre de petites colonnes mobiles et de garnisons. - - * * * * * - -Dictated by the emperor Napoleon. Taken at Vittoria. - -No. III. - -NOTE SUR LA POSITION ACTUELLE DE L’ARMÉE EN ESPAGNE. - - _Bayonne, le 21 Juillet, 1808._ - -_1^{ere} Observation._--La bataille de Medina del Rio Secco a -mis les affaires de l’armée dans la meilleure situation. Le -maréchal Bessières ne donne plus aucune inquiétude, et toutes les -sollicitudes doivent se tourner du côté du général Dupont. - -_2^{de} Observation._--Dans la position actuelle des affaires, -l’armée Française occupe le centre; l’ennemi, un grand nombre de -points de la circonférence. - -_3^{me} Observation._--Dans une guerre de cette nature, il faut du -sang froid, de la patience, et du calcul; et il ne faut pas épuiser -les troupes en fausses marches et contremarches; il ne faut pas -croire, quand on a fait une fausse marche de trois à quatre jours, -qu’on l’aie réparé par une contremarche: c’est ordinairement deux -fautes au lieu d’une. - -_4^{me} Observation._--Toutes les opérations de l’armée ont -réussies jusqu’à cette heure, autant qu’elles devaient réussir. -Le général Dupont s’est maintenu au-delà des montagnes, et dans -le bassin de l’Andalousie; trois fois il a défait les insurgés. -Le maréchal Moncey a défait les insurgés à Valence; il n’a -pas pu prendre la ville, ce qui est une chose qui n’est pas -extraordinaire. Peut-être eût-on pu désirer qu’il eût pu se camper -à une journée de la ville, comme a fait le général Dupont; mais, -enfin, qu’il soit à une journée ou à cinq, comme à Saint Clément, -la différence n’est pas très grande. En Arragon, on a battu sur -tous les points, et dans toutes les circonstances, l’ennemi, et -porté le découragement partout. Saragosse n’a pas été pris; il est -aujourd’hui cerné; et une ville de 40 à 50 mille âmes, défendue -par une mouvement populaire, ne se prend qu’avec du tems et de la -patience. Les histoires des guerres sont pleins des catastrophes -des plus considérables pour avoir brusqué et s’être enfourré dans -les rues étroites des villes. L’exemple de Buenos Ayres, et des 12 -milles Anglais d’élite qui y ont péri, en est une preuve. - -_5^{me} Observation._--Ainsi la position de l’armée est bonne, -le maréchal Moncey étant à Saint Clément, ou environs, et les -généraux Gobert et Vedel réunis au général Dupont en Andalousie; ce -serait une faute, à moins d’incidents et d’un emploie immédiat, à -donner à ces troupes dans un autre point, que de concentrer toutes -les troupes trop près de Madrid. L’incertitude des événemens du -maréchal Bessières, et les 25 chances qu’il avoit contre lui sur -cent, pouvaient déterminer à faire arrêter la marche de toutes les -troupes qui s’éloignaient de la capitale, afin que les colonnes -pussent être rappellés à Madrid si le maréchal Bessières était -battu, et pussent arriver dans cette ville avant l’ennemi; mais -ce serait une faute si on eut fait retrograder ces colonnes, et -si on eut agi comme si le maréchal Bessières avait été battu, -lorsque quelques jours avant on agissait comme si l’armée de Galice -n’existait pas. 500 chevaux et 1800 hommes d’infanterie dirigés -sur Valladolid étaient tous ce qu’il fallait. Si cette colonne -était partie trois jours plutôt, elle y serait arrivé le 15. Le -maréchal Bessières a été vainqueur, et avait pour être vainqueur -75 chances contre 25; mais la fatigue qu’on a donné à l’armée, et -les mouvemens rétrogrades qu’on a ordonné inutilement, puisque même -le maréchal Bessières battu, on avait 8 à 10 jours pour réunir -l’armée, ont fait un mal moral et physique. Il faut espérer que -la nouvelle de la victoire arrivée à tems aura mis l’état major à -même d’arrêter toute mouvement sur Madrid, et que chaque colonne se -trouvera plus près du point où elle doit se trouver. - -_6^{me} Observation._--Dans la situation actuelle des affaires, le -plus important de tous est le général Dupont. On doit lui envoyer -le reste de la division Gobert, et employer d’autres troupes pour -maintenir la communication; il faut tenir la tête de la division du -maréchal Moncey, sur Saint Clement, et menacer toujours la province -de Valence. Si le maréchal Bessières a battu sans effort, et avec -peu de perte, l’armée de Galice, et a eu moins de huit milles -hommes engagés, il n’y a pas de doute qu’avec 20 milles le général -Dupont ne culbute tout ce qu’il a devant lui. - -_7^{me} Observation._--La brigade du général Rey rend à l’armée -plus qu’elle n’a perdu par le détachement qui a été fait sur -Valladolid. Toutes les probabilitées humaines sont que le maréchal -Bessières n’a plus besoin d’aucun renfort, du moins pour être -maître de toute la Castille et du royaume de Léon. Ce n’est que -lorsqu’on aura reçu la nouvelle de ce qu’il aura fait à Bénévent et -à Léon qu’on pourra décider s’il doit attaquer la Galice. - -_8^{me} Observation._--Le général Verdier, en Arragon, a cerné -Saragosse: le 14^{eme} et le 44^{eme} de ligne partent demain pour -s’y rendre. Les partis Français vont jusqu’à moitié chemin de -Lerida, de Barbastro, et de Jaca. Dans dix jours toute l’artillerie -sera arrivée. Cette belle et bonne brigade de troupes de ligne -porte à près de quinze mille hommes l’armée du général Verdier. Il -est probable que Saragosse tombera bientôt, et que les deux tiers -de ces 15 milles hommes deviendrons disposibles. - -_9^{eme} Observation._--Ainsi le corps du maréchal Bessières a -pris l’offensive, il est depuis sa victoire renforcé de la brigade -Lefebre et de la brigade Gaulois; il est donc dans le cas de -conserver l’offensive. Le corps du général Verdier en Arragon -a battu partout les insurgés, a cerné la ville avec des forces -beaucoup moindres; il vient d’être considérablement renforcé; ainsi -il peut donner une nouvelle activité aux opérations du siège, et -conserver son activité offensive sur les deux rives de l’Ebre. -Le corps de Catalogne a joliment agi, ayant pour point d’appui -Barcelonne, l’ajonction sera faite aujourd’hui ou demain devant -Géronne, avec le gén^l Reille. - -_10^{eme} Observation._--Voilà pour les trois corps d’armée situés -du côté de la France. La communication de Madrid avec la France -est important sous tous les points de vue. Il faut donc que les -colonnes qui viennent d’être organisées à Burgos et à Vittoria et -qui seront journellement renforcées et augmentées, soient laissées -dans ces stations. - -Ci joint la note de la formation de ces colonnes. Elles sont -presque toutes composées de 3^{eme} bataillons et de conscrits, -mais avec de bons cadres; 15 à 20 jours de stations à Burgos et à -Vittoria les mettront à-peu-près à l’école de bataillon. Ce serait -une très grande faute que de rappeller trop tôt ces troupes pour -en renforcer les cadres principaux; il faut attendre jusqu’à ce -qu’on ait pu les remplacer à Vittoria et à Burgos par de nouvelles -troupes. - -_11^{eme} Observation._--Il n’y a donc rien à craindre du côté du -maréchal Bessières, ni dans le nord de la Castille, ni dans le -royaume de Léon. - -Il n’y a rien à craindre en Arragon; Saragosse tombera un jour plus -tôt ou un jour plus tard. - -Il n’y a rien à craindre en Catalogne. - -Il n’y a rien à craindre pour les communications de Burgos à -Bayonne, moyennant les deux colonnes organisées dans ces deux -villes, et qui seront renforcées. S’il y avait des événemens en -Biscaye, la force qui se réunit à Bayonne, formant une réserve, -seroit suffisante pour mettre tout en ordre. - -S’il arrive à Burgos quelque événement trop considérable pour -que la colonne mobile qui est à Burgos puisse y mettre ordre, le -maréchal Bessières ne sera pas assez loin pour ne pouvoir faire un -détachement. - -Le général Monthion a la surveillance de toutes les Biscayes. Le -général Bonnet à Burgos est chargé de maintenir la communication -de Vittoria avec le maréchal Bessières et avec Madrid. Il est -nécessaire que ces deux généraux correspondent tous les jours -entr’eux et avec le général Drouet, qui est laissé en réserve à -Bayonne, de même que le gén^l Verdier de Saragosse et le gén^l -Dagoult de Pampelune doivent correspondre tous les jours avec -le général Drouet à Bayonne, et avec Madrid, par le canal de -Bayonne et de Vittoria: jusqu’à ce que les communications directes -soient rétablies, un courier partant de Madrid peut se rendre -par Vittoria, Tolosa, Pampelune, devant Saragosse. Le seul point -important donc aujourd’hui est le général Dupont. Si l’ennemi -parvenait jamais à s’emparer des défiles de la Sierra Morena, il -serait difficile de l’en chasser; il faut donc renforcer le gén^l -Dupont, de manière qu’il ait 25 mille hommes, compris ce qu’il -faudra pour gardes les passages des montagnes et une partie du -chemin de La Manche. Il pourra disposer les troupes de manière que -le jour où il voudra attaquer, la brigade de deux à trois mille -hommes, destinée à garder les montagnes, arrive au camp du gén^l -Dupont à marches forcées, et soit successivement remplacée par les -colonnes qui seraient en arrière, de sorte que le gén^l Dupont ait -pour le jour de la bataille plus de 23 mille hommes à mettre en -ligne. - -Une fois qu’on aura bien battu l’ennemi, une partie des troupes se -dissipera, et selon que la victoire sera plus ou moins décidée, -on pourra faire continuer le mouvement à d’autres troupes sur le -général Dupont. - -_12^{eme} Observation._--Saragosse pris, on aura des troupes -disposibles, soit pour renforcer l’armée de Catalogne, soit pour -marcher sur Valence de concert avec le maréchal Moncey, soit pour -renforcer le maréchal Bessières et marcher en Galice, si après la -victoire qu’il a déjà remporté, et celle qu’il remportera à Léon, -il ne croit pas assez fort pour s’y porter d’abord. - -_13^{eme} Observation._--Il serait important de choisir deux -points intermédiaires entre Andujar et Madrid, pour pouvoir y -laisser garnison permanente, un commandant, un dépôt de cartouches, -munitions, canons, magazins de biscuit, des fours, du farine, -et un hôpital, de sorte que 3 à 400 hommes défendent le magazin -et l’hôpital contre toute une insurrection. Il est difficile de -croire qu’il n’y ait point quelque château ou donjon, pouvant être -retranché promptement et propre à cela. C’est par ce seul moyen -qu’on peut raccourcir la ligne d’opération, et être sur d’avoir -toutes les trois ou quatre grandes marches, une manutention et un -point de repos. - -_14^{eme} Observation._--En résumé, le partage de l’armée parait -devoir être celui-ci: - - Corps de Catalogne, tel qu’il existe à-peu-près 20,000 h^{es}. - - Corps d’Arragon, tel qu’il existe à-peu-près 15 mille - hommes, jusqu’à ce que Saragosse soit pris 15,000 - - Corps du maréchal Bessières, ce qu’il - a à-peu-près 17,000 - - Colonne de Burgos 2,000 - - Colonne de Vittoria 2,000 - - Garnison de St. Sebastian 1,500 - - Corps d’Aranda 1,000 - ------ - Total du corps du mar^l Bessières. 24,000 h^{es}. - -Après la prise de Saragosse, lorsque les affaires de Catalogne -seront un peu appaisées, on pourra, selon les circonstances, ou -renforcer le maréchal Bessières, ou renforcer le général Dupont, ou -entreprendre l’opération de Valence. - -Aujourd’hui, le seul point qui menace, où il faut promptement avoir -un succès, c’est du côté du général Dupont, avec 25 mille hommes -infanterie, cavalerie, et artillerie comprise: il a beaucoup plus -qu’il ne faut pour avoir de grands résultats; à la rigueur, avec 21 -mille hommes présent sur le champ de bataille, il peut hardiment -prendre l’offensive, il ne sera pas battu, et il aura pour lui plus -de 80 chances. - - * * * * * - -Dictated by Napoleon. Taken at Vittoria. - -No. IV. - -NOTE SUR LES AFFAIRES D’ESPAGNE. - - _St. Cloud, le 30 août, 1808._ - -_1^{ere} Observation._--Dans la position de l’armée d’Espagne on a -à craindre d’être attaqué sur le droite par l’armée de Galice, sur -le centre par l’armée venant de Madrid, sur le gauche par l’armée -venant de Saragosse et Valence. Ce serait une grande faute que -de laisser l’armée de Saragosse et de Valence prendre position à -Tudela. - -Tudela doit être occupé, parceque c’est une position honorable, et -Milagro une position obscure. - -Tudela est sur les communications de Pampelune, a un beau pont -en pierre, est l’aboutissant d’un canal sur Saragosse. C’est une -position offensive sur Saragosse telle que l’ennemi ne peut pas -la négliger; cette position seule couvre la Navarre. En gardant -Tudela, on garde une grande quantité de bateaux, qui nous seront -bientôt nécessaires pour le siège de Saragosse. - -Si l’ennemi était maître de Tudela, toute la Navarre s’insurgerait, -l’ennemi pourrait arriver à Estella, en négligeant la position de -Milagro et en coupant la communication avec Pampelune. - -D’Estella il serait sur Tolosa; il y serait sans donner le tems de -faire les dispositions convenables; il n’est pas à craindre, au -contraire, que l’ennemi fasse aucune opération sur Pampelune; tant -que nous aurons Tudela, il serait lui-même coupé sur Saragosse. - -Le général qui commande à Tudela peut couvrir les hauteurs -de redoutes; si c’est une armée d’insurgés, s’en approcher -et la battre, la tenir constamment sur le defensive par les -reconnoissances et ses mouvemens sur Saragosse. - -Et si, au lieu de cela, une partie de l’armée de ligne Espagnole -marchait sur Tudela, le général Français repassera l’Ebre, s’il y -est forcé, disputera le terrein sur Pampelune, et donnera le tems -au général en chef de l’armée Française de prendre ses mésures. Ce -corps d’observation remplira alors son but, et aucune opération -prompte sur Tolosa ni Estella n’est à craindre. - -Au lieu qu’en occupant la position de Milagro, l’ennemi sera à -Estella, le même jour qu’on l’apprendra au quartier général. Si -on occupe Tudela, il faut s’y aider de redoutes, et s’y établir, -n’y conserver aucune espèce d’embarras, et les tenir tous dans -Pampelune. Si l’ennemi l’occupe, il faut l’en chasser, et s’y -établir; car dans l’ordre défensif, ce serait une grande faute, qui -entrainerait de fâcheuses consequences. - -_2^e Observation._--La position de Burgos était également -importante à tenir, comme ville de haute réputation, comme centre -de communication et de rapports. - -Delà des partis non seulement de cavalerie, mais encore de deux -ou de trois mille hommes d’infanterie, et même quatre ou cinq -mille hommes en échelons peuvent poster les premières patrouilles -d’housards dans toutes les directions jusqu’à deux marches, et -parfaitement informés de tout ce qui ce fait, en instruire le -quartier général, de manière que si l’ennemi se présente en force -sur Burgos, les différentes divisions puissent à temps s’y porter -pour le soutenir et livrer la bataille, ou si cela n’est pas jugé -convenable, éclairer les mouvemens de l’ennemi, lui laisser croire -qu’on veut se porter sur Burgos, et pouvoir ensuite faire sa -retraite pour se porter ailleurs. - -Un corps de 12 à 15 mille hommes ne prend-il pas 20 positions dans -la journée au seul commandement d’un adjudant major? et nos troupes -seraient-elles devenues des levées en masse, qu’il faudroit placer -15 jours d’avance dans les positions où on voudroit qu’elles se -battent? - -Si cela eut été jugé ainsi, le corps du maréchal Bessières eut -pris la position de Miranda ou de Briviesca; mais lorsque l’ennemi -est encore à Madrid, lorsqu’on ignore où est l’armée de Galice, -et qu’on a le soupçon que les rebelles pourront employer une -partie de leurs efforts contre le Portugal, prendre, au lieu -d’une position menaçante, offensive, honorable comme Burgos, une -position honteuse, borgne comme Trevino, c’est dire à l’ennemi, -“Vous n’avez rien à craindre; portez vous ailleurs; nous avons -fait nos dispositions pour aller plus loin, ou bien nous avons -choisi un champ de bataille pour nous battre; venez ici, vous ne -craignez pas d’être inquiétés.” Mais que fera le général Français, -si l’on marche demain sur Burgos? laissera-t-il prendre par 6,000 -insurgés la citadelle de cette ville, ou si les Français ont -laissés garnison dans le château (car on ignore la position et la -situation de l’armée), comment une garnison de 4, 6, ou 800 hommes -se retira-t-elle dans une si vaste plaine? Et des lors c’est comme -s’il n’y avoit rien: l’ennemi maître de cette citadelle, on ne la -reprendra plus. - -Si, au contraire, on veut garder la citadelle, on veut donc livrer -bataille à l’ennemi; car cette citadelle ne peut pas tenir plus de -trois jours; et si on veut livrer bataille à l’ennemi, pourquoi -le ma^l. Bessières abandonne-t-il le terrein où on veut livrer -bataille? - -Ces dispositions paraissent mal raisonneés, et quand l’ennemi -marchera on fera essuyer à l’armée un affront qui demoralisera -les troupes, n’y eut-il que des corps légers ou des insurgés qui -marchassent. - -En résumé, la position de Burgos devait être gardée; tous les jours -à trois heures du matin on devait être sous les armes, et à une -heure du matin il devait partir des reconnaissances dans toutes -les directions. On devait ainsi recueillir des nouvelles à huit ou -dix lieux à la ronde, pour qu’on peut prendre ensuite le parti que -les circonstances indiqueraient. - -C’est la première fois qu’il arrive à une armée de quitter toutes -les positions offensives, pour se mettre dans de mauvaises -positions défensives, d’avoir l’air de choisir des champs de -bataille, lorsque l’éloignement de l’ennemi, les mille et une -combinaisons différentes qui peuvent avoir lieu, ne laissent point -la probabilité de prévoir si la bataille aura lieu à Tudela, entre -Tudela et Pampelune, entre Soria et l’Ebre, ou entre Burgos et -Miranda. - -La position de Burgos, tenue en force et d’une manière offensive, -menace Palencia, Valladolid, Aranda. Madrid même. Il faut avoir -longtems fait la guerre pour la concevoir; il faut avoir entrepris -un grand nombre d’opérations offensives pour savoir comme le -moindre événement ou indice encourage ou décourage, décide une -opération ou une autre. - -En deux mots, si 15 mille insurgés entrent dans Burgos, se -retranchent dans la ville, et occupent le château, il faut calculer -une marche de plusieurs jours pour pouvoir s’y poster et reprendre -la ville; ce qui ne sera pas sans quelque inconvenient; si pendant -ce tems-là la véritable attaque est sur Logroño ou Pampelune, on -aura fait des contremarches inutiles, qui auront fatigué l’armée; -et enfin, si l’ennemi occupe Logroño, Tudela, et Burgos, l’armée -Française serait dans une triste et mauvaise position. - -Quand on tiens à Burgos de la cavalerie sans infanterie, n’est-ce -pas dire à l’ennemi qu’on ne veut pas y tenir; n’est-ce pas -l’engager à y venir? Burgos a une grande influence dans le monde -par son nom, dans la Castille parceque c’en est la capitale, dans -les opérations parcequ’elle donne une communication directe avec -St. Ander. Il n’est pas permis à 300 lieues, et n’ayant pas même -un état de situation de l’armée, de prescrire ce qu’on doit faire; -mais on doit dire que si aucune force majeure ne l’empêche, il faut -occuper Burgos et Tudela. - -Le corps détaché de Tudela a son mouvement assuré sur Pampelune, -a la rôle de garder la Navarre, a ses ennemis à tenir en échec, -Saragosse et tous les insurgés. Il était plus que suffisant -pour surveiller Tudela, l’Ebre, et Pampelune, pour dissiper les -rassemblemens s’il n’y avait que des insurgés, contenir l’ennemi, -donner des renseignemens, et retarder la marche sur Pampelune. Si -au lieu des insurgés, c’est l’armée ennemie qui marche de ce côté, -il suffit encore pour donner le tems à l’armée de Burgos, à celle -de Miranda, de marcher réunie avec 36 mille hommes, soit pour -prendre l’offensive, soit pour prendre en flanc l’ennemi qui marche -sur Pampelune, soit pour se replier et rentrer dans la Navarre, si -toute l’armée ennemie avait pris cette direction. - -Si ces observations paraissent bonnes et qu’on les adopte, que -l’ennemi n’ait encore montré aucun plan, il faut que le général -qui commande le corps de Sarragosse fasse construire quelque -redoutes autour de Tudela, pour favoriser ses champs de bataille, -réunisse des vivres de tous les côtés, et soit là dans une position -offensive sur Sarragosse en maintenant sa communication avec -Logroño par sa droite, mais au moins par la rive gauche de l’Ebre. -Il faut que le maréchal Bessières, avec tout son corps, renforcé -de la cavalerie légère, soit campé dans le bois près Burgos, la -citadelle bien occupée; que tous les hôpitaux, les dépôts, les -embarras soient au delà de l’Ebre; qu’il soit là en position de -manœuvrer, tous les jours, à trois heures du matin, sous les armes, -jusqu’au retour de toutes les reconnaissances, et éclairant le -pays dans la plus grande étendue; que le corps du ma^l Moncey soit -à Miranda et à Briviesca, tous ses embarras et hôpitaux derrière -Vittoria, toujours en bataille avant le jour, et envoyant des -reconnaissances sur Soria et les autres directions de l’ennemi. - -Il ne faut pas perdre de vue que les corps des maréchaux Bessières -et Moncey, devant être réunis, il faut se lier le moins possible -avec Logroño, et cependant considérer le corps du général Lefebre -comme un corps détaché, qui a une ligne d’opération particulière -sur Pampelune et un rôle séparé; vouloir conserver Tudela comme une -partie contigue de la ligne, c’est se desseminer beaucoup. Enfin, -faire la guerre, c’est à dire, avoir des nouvelles par les curés, -les alcaldes, les chefs de couvent, les principaux proprietaires, -les postes: on sera alors parfaitement informé. - -Les reconnaissances qui tous les jours se dirigeront du côté de -Soria, de Burgos, sur Palencia, et du côté d’Aranda, peuvent -former tous les jours trois postes d’interception, trois rapports -d’hommes arrêtés, qu’on traitera bien, et qu’on rélachera quand -ils auront donné les renseignemens qu’on desire. On verra alors -venir l’ennemi, on pourra réunir toutes ses forces, lui dérober -des marches, et tomber sur ses flancs au moment ou il meditera un -projet offensif. - -_3^{me} Observation._--L’armée Espagnole d’Andalousie étoit -peu nombreuse. Toutes les Gazettes Anglaises, et les rapports -de l’officier Anglais qui était au camp, nous le prouvent. -L’inconcevable ineptie du général Dupont, sa profonde ignorance -des calculs d’un général en chef, son tâtonnement, l’ont perdu. -18 mille hommes ont posé les armes, six mille seulement se sont -battus, et encore ces 6000 hommes que le gen^l Dupont a fait battre -à la pointe du jour, après les avoir fait marcher toute la nuit, -étaient un contre trois. Malgré tout cela, l’ennemi c’est si mal -battu, qu’il n’a pas fait un prisonnier, pris une pièce de canon, -gagné un pouce de terrein, et l’armée de Dupont est restée intacte -dans sa position; ce qui sans doute a été un malheur; car il eût -mieux valu que cette division eût été mise en déroute, éparpillée, -et détruite, puisque les divisions Vedel et Dufour, au lieu de se -rendre par la capitulation, auraient fait leur retraite. Comment -ces deux divisions ont-elles été comprises dans la capitulation? -c’est par la lâcheté insultante et l’imbécilité des hommes qui ont -négocié, et qui porteront sur l’échaffaud la peine de ce grand -crime national. - -Ce que l’ont vient de dire prouve que les Espagnols ne sont pas -à craindre; toutes les forces Espagnols ne sont pas capables de -culbuter 25 mille Français, dans une position raisonnable. - -Depuis le 12 jusqu’au 19, le général Dupont n’a fait que des -bêtises, et malgré tout cela, s’il n’avait pas fait la faute de -se séparer de Vedel, et qu’il eût marché avec lui, les Espagnols -auraient été battus et culbutés. A la guerre les hommes ne sont -rien, c’est un homme qui est tout. Jusqu’à cette heure nous -n’avons trouvé ces exemples que dans l’histoire de nos ennemis: -aujourd’hui, il est fâcheux que nous puissions les trouver dans la -nôtre. - -Une rivière, fût-elle aussi large que la Vistule, aussi rapide que -le Danube à son emboucheur, n’est rien si on n’a des débouchés sur -l’autre rive, et une tête prompte à reprendre l’offensive. Quand à -l’Ebre, c’est moins que rien; on ne la regarde que comme une trace. - -Dans toutes ces observations, on a parlé dans la position où se -trouvait l’armée du 20 au 26, lorsqu’elle n’avait nulle part -nouvelle de l’ennemi. - -Si on continue à ne prendre aucune mésure pour avoir des nouvelles, -on n’apprendra que l’armée de ligne Espagnol est arrivée sur Tudela -et Pampelune, qu’elle est sur les communications, sur Tolosa, que -lorsqu’elle y sera déjà rendue. On a fait connaître dans la note -précédente comment on faisait à la guerre pour avoir des nouvelles. -Si la position de Tudela est occupée par l’ennemi, on ne voit pas -que l’Ebre soit tenable. Comment a-t-on évacué Tudela, lorsqu’on -avait mandé dans des notes précédentes qu’il fallait garder -ce point, et que l’opinion même des généraux qui venaient de -Sarragosse étaient d’occuper cette importante position. - - * * * * * - -Dictated by Napoleon. Taken at Vittoria. - -No. V. - -NOTE SUR LES AFFAIRES D’ESPAGNE. - - _St. Cloud, Août, 1808._ - -_1^{ere} Observation._--Tudela est importante sous plusieurs -points de vue: il a un pont sur l’Ebre, et protège parfaitement la -Navarre: c’est le point d’intersection du canal qui va à Sarragosse. - -Les convois d’artillerie et de vivres mettent pour se rendre de -Pampelune à Tudela trois jours, de Tudela à Sarragosse trois jours. -Mais en se servant du canal, on va de Tudela à Sarragosse en 14 -heures. Lorsque donc les vivres, les hôpitaux, sont à Tudela, c’est -comme s’ils étaient à Sarragosse. - -La première opération qui doit faire l’armée lorsqu’elle reprendra -son système d’offensive, et qu’elle sera forte de tous ses moyens, -ce doit être d’invester et de prendre Sarragosse; et si cette ville -résiste comme elle l’a fait la première fois, en donner un exemple -qui retentisse dans toute l’Espagne. - -Une vingtaine de pièces de 12 de campagne, une vingtaine -d’obsusiers de six pièces de campagne, une douzaine de mortières, -et une douzaine de pièces de 16 et de 24, parfaitement -approvisionée, seront nécessaires, ainsi que des mineurs pour -remplir ce but. - -Il n’est aucun de ces bouches de feu qui doive consommer son -approvisionement de campagne. - -Un approvisionement extraordinaire de 80 mille coups de canon, -bombes ou obus, parait nécessaire pour prendre cette ville. - -II faudrait donc, pour ne pas retarder la marche de la grande -armée, 15 jours avant qu’elle ne puisse arriver, commencer le -transport de Pampeluna à Tudela, et que dans les 48 heures après -l’investissement de Sarragosse, l’artillerie y arrivât sur des -bâteux, de manière que quatre jours après on put commencer trois -attaques à la fois, et avoir cette ville en peu de jours, ce qui -serait une partie des succès, en y employant 25 à 30 mille hommes, -ou plus s’il était nécessaire. - -On suppose que, si l’ennemi a pris position entre Madrid et Burgos, -il aura été battu. - -Il faut donc occuper Tudela. Ce point est tellement important -qu’il serait à desirer qu’on put employer un mois à le fortifier -et à s’y retrancher de manière qu’un millier d’hommes avec 8 à 10 -pièces de canon s’y trouvassent en sûreté et à l’abri de toutes les -insurrections possibles. Il ne faut pas surtout souffrir que les -revoltés s’y retranchât; ce serait deux sièges au lieu d’une; et -il serait impossible de prendre Sarragosse avant d’avoir Tudela, à -cause du canal. - -On trouvera ci-joint des observations du colonel Lacoste sur -Tudela; puisque les localités empêchent de penser à le fortifier, -il eût été utile de l’occuper au lieu de Milagro, qui n’aboutit à -rien. - -2^{de}. Soria n’est je crois qu’à deux petits marches des positions -actuelles de l’armée. Cette ville s’est constamment mal comportée. -Une expedition qui se porterait sur Soria, la désarmerait, en -prendrait une trentaine d’hommes des plus considerables, qu’on -enverrait en France pour ôtages, et qui enfin lui ferait fournir -des vivres pour l’armée, serait d’un bon effet. - -3^{me}. Une troisième opération qui serait utile serait -l’occupation de St. Ander. Il serait bien avantageux qu’elle put ce -faire par la route directe de Bilbao à St. Ander. - -4^{me}. Il faut s’occuper de désarmer la Biscaye et la Navarre; -c’est un point important; tout Espagnol pris les armes à la main -doit être fusillé. - -Il faut veiller sur la fabrique d’armes de Palencia, ne point -laisser travailler les ouvriers pour les rebelles. - -Le fort de Pancorvo doit être armé et fortifie avec la plus grande -activité. Il doit y avoir dans ce fort des fours, des magazins de -bouches et de guerre. Situé presqu’à mi-chemin de Bayonne à Madrid, -c’est une poste intermédiare pour l’armée, et un point d’appui pour -les opérations de la Galicie. - -Il y a dans l’armée plus de généraux qu’il n’en faut; deux seraient -nécessaires au corps qui était sous Sarragosse. Les généraux de -division La Grange, Belliard, et Grandjean sont sans emploi, et -tous trois bons généraux. - -Il faut renvoyer, le plus promptement possible, le regiment et le -général Portugais pour joindre leurs corps à Grenobles, où il doit -se former. - -5^{me}. On ne discutera pas ici si la ligne de l’Ebre est bonne, si -elle a la configuration requise pour être défendu avec avantage. - -On discutera encore moins si on eût pu ne pas evacuer Madrid, -conserver la ligne du Duero, ou prendre une position qui eût -couvert le siège de Sarragosse et eût permis d’attendre que cette -ville fut prise; toutes ces questions sont oiseuses. - -Nous nous contenterons de dire, puisqu’on a pris la ligne de -l’Ebre, que les troupes s’y desout et s’y reposent, qu’elle a au -moins l’avantage que le pays est plus sain, étant plus élevé, et -qu’on peut y attendre que les chaleurs soient passées. - -Il faut surtout ne point quitter cette ligne sans avoir un projet -déterminé, qui ne laisse aucune incertitude dans les opérations à -suivre. Ce serait un grand malheur de quitter cette ligne pour être -ensuite obligé de la reprendre. - -A la guerre les trois quarts sont des affaires morales; la balance -des forces réelles n’est que pour un autre quart. - -6^{me}. En gardant la ligne de l’Ebre il faut que le général ait -bien prévu tout ce que l’ennemi peut faire dans tous les hypothèses. - -L’ennemi peut se présenter devant Burgos, partir de Soria, et -marcher sur Logroño, ou, en partant de Sarragosse, se porter -sur Estella, et menacer ainsi Tolosa. Il faut, dans tous ces -hypothèses, qu’il n’y ait point un longtems perdu en déliberations, -qu’on puisse se ployer de sa droite à sa gauche, et de sa gauche -à sa droite, sans faire aucun sacrifice. Car dans des manœuvres -combinées, les tâtonnements, l’irrésolution qui naissent des -nouvelles contradictoires qui se succedent rapidement, conduisent à -des malheurs. - -Cette diversion de Sarragosse sur Tolosa est une des raisons qui a -longtems fait penser que la position de Tudela devait être gardée, -soit sur la rive droite, soit avec la faculté de repasser sur la -rive gauche. Elle est offensive sur Sarragosse, elle previent à tem -de tous les mouvemens qui pourraient se faire de ce côté. - -7^{me}. Une observation qu’il n’est pas hors de propos de faire -ici c’est, que l’ennemi, qui a intérêt de masquer ses forces, en -cachant le véritable point de son attaque, opère de manière que le -coup qu’il veut porter n’est jamais indiqué d’une manière positive, -et le général ne peut deviner que par la connaissance bien -approfondie de sa position, et la manière dont il fait entrer son -système offensive, pour proteger et garantir son système défensive. - -8^{me}. On n’a point de renseignements sur ce que fait l’ennemi. -On dit toujours qu’on ne peut pas avoir des nouvelles, comme si -cette position était extraordinaire dans une armée, comme si on -trouvait ordinairement des éspions. Il faut en Espagne, comme -partout ailleurs, envoyer des parties qui enlevent tantôt le curé -ou l’alcalde, tantôt un chef de couvent ou le maître de poste, et -surtout toutes les lettres, quelquefois le maître de la poste, aux -douanes, ou celui qui en fait les fonctions, ou les met aux arrêts -jusqu’à ce qu’ils parlent, en les faisant interroger deux fois -par jour; on les garde en ôtage, et on les charge d’envoyer des -piétons, et de donner des nouvelles. - -Quand on saura prendre des mésures de force et de vigueur, on aura -des nouvelles; il faut intercepter toutes les postes, toutes les -lettres. - -Le seul motif d’avoir des nouvelles peut determiner à faire un gros -détachement de quatre à cinq milles hommes, qui se portent dans une -grande ville, prennent les lettres à la poste, se saississent des -citoyens les plus aisés de leurs lettres, papiers, gazettes, etc. - -Il est hors de doute que même dans la ligne des Français les -habitants sont tous informés de ce qui se passe: à plus forte -raison hors de la ligne. Qui empêche donc, qu’on prenne les hommes -marquants, et qu’on les renvoyé ensuite sans les maltraiter? - -Il est donc de fait, lorsqu’on n’est point dans un désert, et qu’on -est dans un pays peuple, que si le general n’est pas instruit, -c’est qu’il n’a pas su prendre les mésures convenables pour l’être. - -Les services que les habitants rendent à un général ennemi, ils ne -le font jamais par affection, ni même pour avoir de l’argent; les -plus réels qu’on obtient c’est pour avoir de sauve-gardes, et de -protections; c’est pour conserver ses biens, ses jours, sa ville, -son monastère. - - * * * * * - - The original of the following memoir is a rough draft, written by - king Joseph. It has many erasures and interlineations, and was - evidently composed to excuse his retreat from Madrid. The number - of the French troops was undoubtedly greater than is here set - down, unless the infantry alone be meant. - -No. VI. - -Lorsqu’on a quitté Madrid a la nouvelle de _la defection_ d’un -corps de vingt-deux mille hommes, il y avoit dans Madrid dix-sept -mille hommes, au corps du maréchal Bessières quinze mille cinq -cent, au corps de Sarragosse onze mille sept cent: l’armée se -composait done de quarante-cinq mille hommes; mais ces trois corps -étaient distans entre eux de près de cent lieus. La première idée -fut de réunir le corps de Madrid à celui de Léon, à Burgos, et par -suite d’entrer en communication avec celui de Sarragosse, avec -lequel l’état major de Madrid n’avoit jamais eu aucune relation -directe, et dont il ignorait absolument la situation et la -composition. - -Vingt jours après sa sortie de Madrid le roi s’est trouvé à la -tête d’une armée de cinquante mille hommes. Le feu de la sedition -n’a pas pu se communiquer sur les points parcourus par les trois -corps d’armée alors réunis; les communications avec la France out -été gardées; l’insurrection de Bilbao a été eteinte dans le sang -de 1200 insurgés. Peu de jours après, 20,000 d’entre eux réunis -a 60 lieus delà, à Tudela, à l’autre extrémité de la ligne, out -été dispersés et poursuivis rigoureusement. Les provinces de la -Biscaye, de Burgos, et le royaume de Navarre ont été contenus. Une -organization intérieure a prepare les moyens de nourrir l’armée, -d’approvisionner les places de Pampelune, St. Sebastien, les -forts de Pancorvo et de Burgos, en rendant le moins insupportable -possible à ces provinces cette charge évidemment disproportionnée à -leurs moyens. - -Le matériel de l’artillerie a été réparé et mis en état d’agir, -l’armée réorganisée, les hommes et les chevaux sont aujourd’hui en -bon état. - -C’est ainsi que s’est passé le mois d’Août et partie de Septembre. -Les renforts arrivés de France ont à peine indemnisé l’armée -des pertes qu’elle a éprouvés par les maladies et le siège de -Sarragosse. - -Voici sa force, et son organisation actuelle: - -Le corps de droite, commandé par m^r le mar^{al} Bessières, est -forte de 18,000 hommes. - -Celui de gauche, commandé par m^r le mar^{al} Moncey, est de 18,000 -hommes. - -Celui du centre, aux ordres de m^r le mar^{al} Ney, est de onze -mille hommes. - -La reserve du roi est de quatre mille hommes[30]. - -Le corps de droite occupe le pays depuis Burgos jusqu’à Pancorvo, -et Ponte de Lara. - -Le corps de gauche depuis Tudela jusqu’à Logroño. - -Le corps du centre depuis Logroño jusqu’à Haro. - -La reserve Miranda. - -La nouvelle position prise par l’armée depuis que les événemens de -l’Andalousie avaient fait présager une guerre réelle en Espagne, -était évidemment commandée par les simples notions de la saine -raison, qui ne pouvait permettre sa séparation à plus de dix jours -de marche, de trois corps d’armée, dont le plus fort n’arrivait -pas à 18,000 hommes, au milieu d’une nation de onze millions -d’habitans, qui se déclarait ennemi, et se mettait universellement -en état de guerre. - -Cinquante mille Français ont pu se tenir avec succès sur une ligne -de plus de 60 lieus, gardant les deux grandes communications de -Burgos et de Tudela contre des ennemis qui n’ont pu jusqu’ici -porter sur l’un ou l’autre de ces points plus de 25,000 hommes; -puisque 15,000 Français pouvaient être réunis sur l’une ou l’autre -de ces deux communications principales en 24 heures. - -Si les corps d’armée dirigés sur l’Espagne devaient arriver dans -le mois de Septembre, ce système défensif et offensif à la fois se -continuerait avec avantage, puisqu’il tend à refaire l’armée, à -attendre celle qui doit arriver, et continue à menacer l’ennemi; -mais il ne saurait se prolonger jusqu’au mois de Novembre. L’ennemi -n’a pu rester trois mois sans faire de grands progrès; bientôt il -sera en état de prendre l’offensif avec de grands corps organisés, -obéissans à une administration centrale, qui aura eu le tems de se -former à Madrid. Tout nous annonce que le mois d’Octobre est une -de ces époques décisives qui donne à celui qui sait s’en emparer -la priorité des mouvemens et des succès dont la progression est -incalculable. - -Quel est le parti à prendre dans la position où se trouve l’armée, -et avec l’assurance qu’elle a? de voir entrer en Espagne dans le -mois de Novembre deux cent mille Français. - -Six manières de voir se présentent à l’esprit. - -1^{ere}. D’essayer de rester encore dans l’état où l’on est. - -Ce système est évidemment insoutenable. De Tudela à Burgos et -à Bilbao il y a plus de 60 lieus. L’ennemi pourra attaquer la -gauche de cette ligne avec quarante mille hommes, la droite avec -quarante mille hommes, le centre avec des forces égales. Tudela -et la Navarre jusqu’à Logroño demandent 25,000 hommes pour être -défendues. Burgos ne peut être défendue que par une armée en état -de résister aux forces réunis de MM. Blake, Cuesta, qui peuvent -présenter 80,000 hommes. Il est douteux que les 20,000 bayonettes -qu’il serait possible de leur presente puissent les battre -complètement. Si le succès est douteux, ces 20,000 hommes seront -harcelés par les insurgés, qui pourront alors soulever les trois -provinces, les séparer totalement d’avec le corps de gauche et de -la France. - -2^{de}. Porter le corps du centre et la reserve par Tudela au -devant de l’ennemi sur la route de Sarragosse, ou sur celle -d’Albazan; on réunirait ainsi 30,000 hommes, on chercherait -l’ennemi, et nul doute on le battrait si on le rencontrait de ce -côté. - -Le maréchal Bessières serait chargé d’observer la grande -communication de Burgos à Miranda, laisserait garnison dans le -château de Burgos, dans le fort de Pancorvo, occuperait l’ennemi, -surveillerait les mouvemens des montagnes de Reynosa, les -débarquemens possibles de Santander. Sa tâche serait difficile -si l’on considère que le défilé de Pancorvo n’est pas le seul -accessible à l’artillerie, qu’à trois lieus delà on arrive sur -Miranda par une route practicable à l’artillerie, que quelques -lieus plus loin l’Ebre offre un troisième passage sur le point de -la chaîne qu’il traverse entre Haro et Miranda. - -3^{eme}. Laisser le maréchal Moncey à la défence de la Navarre, et -se porter avec le corps du centre et la reserve sur Burgos. Réuni -au maréchal Bessières on pourroit chercher l’ennemi, et attaquer -avec avantage, on marcherait à lui avec trente mille hommes, et on -n’attendrait pas qu’il fut réuni avec toutes ses forces. Il serait -peut-être possible de donner pour instruction au maréchal Moncey, -dans le cas ou il serait débordé sur sa gauche, et qu’il ne verrait -pas probabilité de battre l’ennemi, de faire un mouvement par sa -droite, et se porter par Logroño sur Briviesca, où il se réunirait -au reste de l’armée. Dans ce cas, la Navarre s’insurgerait, les -communications avec la France seraient coupées, mais l’armée -réunie dans la plaine serait assez forte pour attendre les corps -qui arrivent de France, et qui seront assez forts pour pénétrer -partout. Il serait aussi possible que, dans tous les cas, le -maréchal Moncey se maintienne dans le camp retranché de Pampelune; -manœuvrant autour de cette place, il y attendrait le résultat des -opérations des deux corps d’armée qui auraient été au devant de -l’ennemi dans la plaine de Burgos, et l’arrivée des corps de la -grande armée. - -4^{eme}. Passer l’Ebre, et chercher à amener l’ennemi à une -bataille dans la plaine que est entre Vittoria et l’Ebre. - -5^{eme}. Se retirer appuyant sa gauche sur Pampelune, et sa droite -dans les montagnes de Mondragone. - -6^{eme}. Laisser une garnison en état de se défendre pendant six -semaines à Pampelune, St. Sebastien, Pancorvo, et Burgos, réunir -le reste de l’armée, marcher à la rencontre de l’ennemi sur l’une -ou l’autre des grandes communications, le battre partout où on le -trouverait, attendre, ou près de Madrid, ou dans le pays où les -mouvemens de l’ennemi et la possibilité de vivre aurait porté -l’armée, les troupes de France; on abandonnerait ses derrières, -ses communications; mais la grande armée serait assez forte pour -en ouvrir pour elle-même. Et quant à l’armée qui est en Espagne, -réunie ainsi elle serait en état de braver tous les efforts, de -déconcerter tous les projets de l’ennemi, et d’attendre dans une -noble attitude le mouvement général qui sera imprimé par vôtre -majesté lors de l’arrivée de toutes les troupes dans ce pays. - -De tous les projets le dernier parait preférable; il est plus noble -et aussi sur que le 5^{eme}. - -Ces deux projets sont seuls entiers absolument offensif ou -absolument défensif. On peut les regarder, l’un et l’autre, comme -propres à assurer la conservation de l’armée jusqu’à l’arrivée des -renforts. Le dernier a sur l’autre l’avantage d’arrêter le progrès -de l’ordre nouveau qui s’établit en Espagne; il est plus digne des -troupes Françaises, et du frère de vôtre majesté. Il est aussi sur -que celui de la sévère et honteuse défensive proposée par l’article -cinq. Je l’ai communiqué au mar^{al} Jourdan et au mar^{al} Ney, -qui l’un et l’autre sont de cet avis. Je ne doute point que les -autres maréchaux ne partagent leur opinion. - -Au premier Octobre je puis avoir la réponse de V. M., et même -avant, puisque je lui ai manifesté cette opinion par ma lettre du -14 Septembre. - -Si V. M. approuve ce plan, il sera possible qu’elle n’ait pas de -mes nouvelles jusqu’à l’arrivée des troupes; mais je suis convaincu -qu’elle trouvera les affaires dans une bien meilleure situation -qu’en suivant aucun des autres cinq projets. - -_Miranda, le 16 Sept. 1808._ - - * * * * * - -No. VII. - -S. EXTRAIT DE LA LETTER DU MAJOR GÉNÉRAL AU GÉNÉRAL SAVARY, À -MADRID. - - _Bayonne, 12^e Juillet, 1808._ - -_Section 1._--J’ai rendu compte à l’empereur, général, de vôtre -lettre du 8^{me}. S. M. trouve que vous vous étes dégarni de trop -de monde à Madrid, que vous avez fait marcher trop de troupes au -secours du g^{al} Dupont, qu’on ne doit pas agir offensivement -jusqu’à ce que les affaires de la Galice soient éclairées. De -tous les points de l’armée, général, le plus important est la -Galice, parceque c’est la seule province qui ait réellement conclu -un traité avec l’Angleterre. La division de ligne des troupes -Espagnoles qui était à Oporto s’est joint à celle qui était en -Galice, et enfin par la position de cette province extrêmement -près de l’Angleterre. Indépendamment de ces considérations, la -position la rend encore plus interessante; car les communications -de l’armée se trouveraient compromises si le maréchal Bessières -n’avait pas un entier succès, et il faudrait bien alors reployer -toutes vos troupes, et marcher isolément au secours du maréchal -Bessières. Encore une fois, général, vous vous étes trop dégarni -de Madrid, et si un bon régiment de cuirassiers, quelque pièces -d’artillerie, et 1000 à 1200 hommes d’infanterie avaient pu arriver -à l’appui du maréchal Bessières, le 14, cela lui aurait été d’un -éminent secours. _Q’importe que Valence soit soumis? Q’importe -que Sarragosse soit soumis?_ Mais, général, le moindre succès de -l’ennemi du côté de la Galice aurait des inconvéniens immenses. -Instruit comme vous l’étiez des forces du général Cuesta, de la -désertion de troupes d’Oporto, &^a.... S. M. trouve que pour bién -manœuvrer il aurait fallu vous arranger de manière à avoir du 12^e -au 15^e 8000 hommes pour renforcer le maréchal Bessières. Une fois -nos derrières debarassées, et cette armée de Galice détruite, tout -le reste tombe et se soumit de soi-même, &c. &c. - - -S. EXTRAIT DE LA LETTRE, &c. - - _Bayonne, 13 Juillet, 1808._ - -_Section 2._--Nous recevons vos lettres du 9^e et du 10^e, général. -L’empereur me charge de vous faire connaître que si le général -Gobert était à Valladolid, le général Frère à San Clemente ayant -une colonne dans la Manche, si 300 à 400 convalescens, un bon -commandant, 4 pièces de canon, un escouade d’artillerie, et vingt -mille rations de biscuit étaient dans le château de Ségovie, -la position de l’armée serait superbe et à l’abri de toute -sollicitude. La conduite du général Frère ne parait pas claire. Let -nouvelles qu’il a eues de maréchal Moncey paraissent apocryphes. -Il est possible que ses 8000 hommes et son artillerie n’aient -pas été suffisans pour enlever la ville de Valence. Cela étant, -le maréchal Moncey ne l’enleverait pas d’avantage avec 20,000 -hommes, parcequ’alors c’est une affaire de canons et de mortiers, -&^a. &^a.... _Valence est comme la Catalogne et l’Arragon; ces -trois points sont secondaires._ Les deux vrais points importans -sont le général Dupont et particulièrement le maréchal Bessières, -parceque le premier a devant lui le corps du camp de St. Roch et -le corps de Cadiz, et le maréchal Bessières parcequ’il a devant -lui les troupes de la Galice et celles qui etaient à Oporto. Le -général Dupont a près de 20,000 hommes; il ne peut pas avoir contre -lui un pareil nombre de troupes; il a déjà obtenu des succès -très marquans, et au pis aller il ne peut être contraint qu’à -repasser les montagnes, ce qui n’est qu’un événement de guerre. -Le maréchal Bessières est beaucoup moins fort que le général -Dupont, et les troupes Espagnoles d’Oporto et de la Galice sont -plus nombreuses que celles de l’Andalousie, et les troupes de la -Galice n’ont pas encore été entamées. Enfin le moindre insuccés du -maréchal Bessières intercepte tous les communications de l’armée -et compromettrait même sa sûreté. Le général Dupont se bat pour -Andujar, et le maréchal Bessières se bat pour les communications -de l’armée et pour les opérations les plus importans aux affaires -d’Espagne, &c. &c. - - -S. EXTRAIT DE LA LETTRE, &c. &c. - - _Bayonne, 18 Juillet, 1808, à dix heures du soir._ - -_Section 3._--Je reçois, général, vos lettres du 14. L’aide-de-camp -du maréchal Moncey a donné à sa majesté tous les détails sur ce -qui s’est passé. La conduite du maréchal a été belle. Il a bien -battu les rebelles en campagne. Il est tout simple qu’il n’ait pu -entrer à Valence; c’étoit une affaire de mortiers et de pièces de -siège. Sa position à San Clement est bonne, de là il est à même de -remarcher sur Valence. De reste, général, _l’affaire de Valence -est une affaire du second ordre, même celle de Sarragosse_, qui -cependant est plus importante. L’affaire du maréchal Bessières -était d’un intérêt majeur pour les affaires d’Espagne, et la -première après cette affaire c’est celle du général Dupont, et -c’est le moment de laisser le général Gobert suivre la route. Le -maréchal Moncey se repose; le général Reille marche sur Gironne: -ainsi trois colonnes pourront marcher ensemble sur Valence; le -corps du général Reille, celui de Sarragosse, et celui du maréchal -Moncey, ce qui formera les 20,000 hommes que ce maréchal croit -nécessaire. Mais l’empereur, général, trouve que vous avez tort -de dire qu’il n’y a rien été fait depuis six semaines. On a battu -les rassemblemens de la Galice, de St. Ander, ceux d’Arragon et de -Catalogne, qui dans leur aveuglement croyaient qu’ils n’avaient -qu’à marcher pour détruire les Français: le maréchal Moncey, les -généraux Duhesme, Dupont, Verdier, ont fait de bonne besogne, et -tous les hommes sensés en Espagne ont changé dans le fonds de leur -opinion, et voient avec la plus grande peine l’insurrection. Au -reste, général, les affaires d’Espagne sont dans la situation la -plus prospère depuis la bataille de Medina del Rio Seco, &c. &c. Le -14^e et le 44^e arrivent demain; après demain ils partent pour le -camp de Sarragosse; _non pas que ces troupes puissent avancer la -reddition, qui est une affaire de canon_, mais elles serviraient -contre les insurgés de Valence, s’ils voulaient renforcer ceux de -Sarragosse. Enfin, si le général Gobert et les détachemens qui -sont à moitié chemin pour rejoindre le général Dupont font juger à -ce général qu’il a des forces suffisantes pour battre le général -Castaños, il faut qu’elles continuent leur direction, et qu’il -attaque l’ennemi, s’il croit devoir le faire, &^a. &^a. - -(Cette lettre a été ecrite le jour de la bataille de Baylen.) - - -EXTRAIT DE LA LETTRE, &^a. - - _Bourdeaux, 3 Août, 1818._ - -_Section 4._--Les événemens du général Dupont sont une chose sans -exemple, et la rédaction de sa capitulation est de niveau avec -la conduite tenue jusqu’à cette catastrophe. L’empereur pense -qu’on n’a pas tenue compte du vague de la rédaction de l’acte, en -permettant que les corps en échellons sur la communication entre -vous et le général Dupont aient marché pour se rendre aux Anglais: -car on ne doit pas presumer qu’ils aient la loyauté de laisser -passer les troupes qui s’embarquent. Comme vous ne parlez pas de -cela, on pense que vous avez retiré ces échellons sur Madrid. Après -avoir lu attentivement la rélation du général Dupont, on voit qu’il -n’a capitulé que le lendemain de la bataille, et que les corps des -généraux Vedel et Dufour, qui se trouvent compris pour quelque -chose dans la capitulation (on ne sait pourquoi), ne se sont pas -battus. Par la relation même du général Dupont, tout laisse penser -que l’armée du général Castaños n’était pas à beaucoup près aussi -forte qu’on le dit, et qu’il avait réuni à Baylen tout ce qu’il -avait de forces. S. M. ne lui calcule pas plus de 25,000 hommes -de troupes de ligne et plus de 15,000 paysans. Par la lettre du -général Belliard _il parait que l’ordre est donné de lever le siège -de Sarragosse_, ce qui serait prématuré; car vous comprendrez qu’il -n’est pas possible qu’on ne laisse un corps d’armée, qui couvre -Pampelune, et contienne la Navarre, sans quoi l’ennemi peut cerner -Pampelune, insurger la Navarre, et alors la communication de -France par Tolosa serait coupée, et l’ennemi sur les derrières de -l’armée. Supposant l’ennemi réuni à Pampelune, la ville bloquée, il -peut se trouver en cinq à six marches sur les derrières de Burgos. -L’armée qui assiège Sarragosse est donc à-peu-près nécessaire pour -contenir la Navarre, les insurgés de l’Arragon et de Valence, et -pour empêcher de percer sur nôtre flanc gauche; car si, comme -le dit le général Belliard, le général Verdier se porte avec -ses troupes à Logroño, en jetant 2000 hommes dans Pampelune, la -communication de Bayonne, qu’eut sur le champ être interceptée le -général Verdier, serait mieux à Tudela qu’à Logroño. Si le général -Castaños s’avance, et que vous puissiez lui livrer la bataille, -on ne peut en prévoir que les plus heureux résultats: mais de la -manière dont il a marché vis-à-vis du général Dupont, tout donne -à croire qu’il mettra la plus grande circonspection dans ses -mouvemens. Si par le canal des parlementaires l’on peut établir une -suspension d’armes sans que le roi y soit pour rien en apparence, -cette espèce d’armistice pourrait se rompre en se prévenant de part -et d’autre huit jours d’avance, donnant aux Français la ligne du -Duero passant par Almazan pour joindre l’Ebre. Cette suspension -d’armes, que les insurgés pourraient regarder comme avantageuse, -afin de s’organiser à Madrid ne nous serait pas défavorable, -parcequ’on verrait pendant ce temps l’organisation que prendraient -les parties insurgés de l’Espagne, et ce que veut la nation, &c. &c. - - -LE MAJOR GÉNÉRAL AU ROI D’ESPAGNE. - - _Nantes, 11 Août, 1808._ - -_Section 5._--Sire, le général Savary ni vos ministres Azanza et -Urquijo ne sont arrivés: il parait qu’il y a des rassemblemens à -Bilbao d’après les nouvelles que nous recevons. S. M. pense qu’il -est important d’y faire marcher le plutôt possible une colonne pour -y rétablir l’ordre. _V. M. sait que la moitié de Sarragosse était -en nôtre pouvoir, et que sous peu on esperait avoir le reste de -la ville. Lorsque le général Belliard a donné l’ordre de lever le -siège, il eût été à désirer que cet ordre fut conditionnel, comme -cela paraissait être l’intention de V. M., ainsi qu’on le voit dans -sa correspondance; c’est à dire, que le siège ne fut levé que dans -le cas où l’on n’aurait pas cru être maître de la ville avant cinq -ou six jours._ Cela aurait présenté des circonstances meilleurs; -car si le général Verdier évacu en entier la Navarre et l’Arragon, -il est à craindre que la Navarre ne s’insurge, et Pampelune ne -tarderait pas à être cernée. J’ai mandé à V. M. que déjà des corps -entiers de la grande armée sont en mouvement pour se rendre en -poste en Espagne. Les dispositions les plus vigoureuses sont prises -de tous côtés, et _dans six semaines ou deux mois l’Espagne sera -soumise_. L’empereur, qui continue à jouir d’une bonne santé, -quoiqu’il soit très occupé, part dans une heure pour continuer sa -route sur Angers, Tours, et Paris. V. M. doit être persuadée que -toutes nos pensées sont sur elle et sur l’armée qu’elle commande. - - * * * * * - -No. VIII. - -LETTER FROM MR. DRUMMOND TO SIR ALEXANDER BALL. - - _Palermo, July 4th, 1808._ - - MY DEAR SIR, - -His highness the duke of Orleans has applied to me to write to you -on a subject about which he appears to be extremely interested. I -take it for granted that you are acquainted with all the events -which have lately happened in Spain. The duke thinks that the -appearance of a member of the house of Bourbon in that country -might be acceptable to the Spaniards, and of great service to the -common cause. In this I perfectly concur with his highness, and if -you be of the same opinion you will probably have no objection to -send a ship here to carry his highness to Gibraltar. He himself is -exceedingly sanguine. We have letters from London down to the 5th -of June. Portugal has followed the example of Spain, and Lisbon is -probably now in other hands: an invitation has been sent to sir -Charles Cotton. - - (Signed) WILLIAM DRUMMOND. - -P.S. “* * *” - - -MR. DRUMMOND TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE. - - _Palermo, July 24th, 1808._ - - DEAR SIR, - -This letter will be delivered to you by his royal highness prince -Leopold, second son of the king of the Two Sicilies. This prince -goes immediately to Gibraltar to communicate immediately with the -loyal Spaniards, and to notify to them that his father will accept -the regency, if they desire it, until his nephew Ferdinand the -Seventh be delivered from captivity. Don Leopold and his cousin the -duke of Orleans will offer themselves as soldiers to the Spaniards, -and will accept such situations as may be given to them suitable to -their illustrious rank. If their visit should not be acceptable to -the Spaniards, don Leopold will return to Sicily, and his serene -highness the duke of Orleans will proceed to England. Being of -opinion that the appearance of an infant of Spain may be of the -greatest utility at the present crisis, and in all events can -hardly be productive of harm, I have urged his Sicilian majesty to -determine upon this measure, which I conceive to be required at his -hands, in consequence of the manifesto of Palafox, which you have -probably seen. At the distance of 1000 miles, however, we cannot be -supposed to be accurately informed here of many circumstances with -which you probably may be intimately acquainted; prince Leopold -therefore will be directed to consult with you, and to follow your -advice, which I have no doubt you will readily and cheerfully give -him. I take the liberty at the same time of recommending him to -your care and protection. - - (Signed) WM. DRUMMOND. - - -EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR HEW DALRYMPLE TO LORD CASTLEREAGH. - - _Gibraltar, August 10th, 1808._ - - MY LORD, - -Last night the Thunderer arrived here, having on board the duke of -Orleans, the second prince of the Two Sicilies, and a considerable -number of noblemen and others, the suite of the latter. As the ship -came to anchor at a late hour, I had not the honour of seeing the -duke of Orleans until near ten at night, when he came accompanied -by captain Talbot. The duke first put into my hands a letter from -Mr. Drummond, as captain Talbot did a despatch from sir Alexander -Ball, copies of which I have the honour to enclose. As the latter -seemed bulky, I did not immediately open it, and therefore did not -immediately remark that sir Alexander Ball _did not seem aware_ -that the prince of the Two Sicilies was coming down, much less that -he meditated establishing his residence at Gibraltar for the avowed -purpose of negotiating for the regency of Spain. Of this object -the duke of Orleans made no mystery, and proceeded to arrange the -time and manner of the prince’s reception in the morning, and the -accommodation that should be prepared for him, suited to his rank, -and capable of containing his attendants. I took early occasion -first to remark the ill effect this measure might produce in Spain -at the moment when the establishment of a central government had -become obviously necessary, and would naturally lead to much -intrigue and disunion, until the sentiments of the people and the -armies (which would naturally assemble for the purpose of expelling -the enemy from their territory) should be pronounced.... - - -EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM LORD CASTLEREAGH TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE. - - _Downing Street, Nov. 4th, 1808._ - -“I have great pleasure, however, in assuring you that the measures -pursued by you on that delicate and important subject” (the -unexpected arrival of prince Leopold and the duke of Orleans at -Gibraltar) “received his majesty’s entire approbation.” - -* * * - - (Signed) CASTLEREAGH. - - * * * * * - -No. IX. - -SIR A. WELLESLEY TO SIR HARRY BURRARD. - - _Head-quarters, at Lavos, August 8th, 1808._ - - SIR, - -Having received instructions from the secretary of state that you -were likely to arrive on the coast of Portugal with a corps of -10,000 men, lately employed in the north of Europe under the orders -of sir John Moore, I now submit to you such information as I have -received regarding the general state of the war in Portugal and -Spain, and the plan of operations which I am about to carry into -execution. - -The enemy’s force at present in Portugal consists, as far as I am -able to form an opinion, of from 16,000 to 18,000 men, of which -number there are about 500 in the fort of Almeida, about the same -number in Elvas, about 6 or 800 in Peniché, and 16 or 1800 in -the province of Alemtejo, at Setuval, &c.; and the remainder are -disposable for the defence of Lisbon, and are in the forts of St. -Julian and Cascaes, in the batteries along the coast as far as the -Rock of Lisbon, and the old citadel of Lisbon, to which the enemy -have lately added some works. - -Of the force disposable for the defence of Lisbon, the enemy have -lately detached a corps of about 2000, under general Thomieres, -principally I believe to watch my movements, which corps is now -at Alcobaça; and another corps of 4000 men, under gen^l. Loison, -was sent across the Tagus into Alemtejo on the 26th of last month, -the object of which detachment was to disperse the Portuguese -insurgents in that quarter, to force the Spanish corps, consisting -of about 2000 men, which had advanced into Portugal as far as Evora -from Estremadura, to retire, and then to be enabled to add to -the force destined for the defence of Lisbon the corps of French -troops which had been stationed at Setuval and in the province of -Alemtejo; at all events Loison’s corps will return to Lisbon, and -the French corps disposable for the defence of that place will -probably be about 14,000 men, of which at least 3000 must be left -in the garrisons and forts on the coast and in the river. - -The French army under Dupont, in Andalusia, surrendered on the 20th -of last month to the Spanish army under Castaños; so that there are -now no French troops in the south of Spain. The Spanish army of -Gallicia and Castille, to the northward, received a check at Rio -Seco, in the province of Valladolid, on the 14th of July, from a -French corps supposed to be under the command of general Bessieres, -which had advanced from Burgos. - -The Spanish troops retired on the 15th to Benevente, and I -understand there has since been an affair between the advanced -posts in that neighbourhood, but I am not certain of it; nor am I -acquainted with the position of the Spanish army, or of that of the -French, since the 14th July. When you will have been a short time -in this country, and will have observed the degree to which the -deficiency of real information is supplied by the circulation of -unfounded reports, you will not be surprised at my want of accurate -knowledge on these subjects. - -It is however certain that nothing of importance has occurred in -that quarter since the 14th July; and from this circumstance I -conclude that the corps called Bessieres attacked the Spanish army -at Rio Seco solely with a view to cover the march of king Joseph -Buonaparte to Madrid, where he arrived on the 21st July. Besides -their defeat in Andalusia, the enemy, as you may probably have -heard, have been beat off in an attack upon Sarragossa, in Arragon, -in another upon the city of Valencia (in both of which it is said -that they have lost many men); and it is reported that in Catalonia -two of their detachments have been cut off, and that they have -lost the fort of Figueras in the Pyrenees, and that Barcelona is -blockaded. Of these last-mentioned actions and operations I have -seen no official accounts, but the report of them is generally -circulated and believed; and at all events, whether these reports -are founded or otherwise, it is obvious that the insurrection -against the French is general throughout Spain; that large bodies -of Spaniards are in arms; amongst others, in particular, an army -of 20,000 men, including 4000 cavalry, at Almaraz on the Tagus in -Estremadura, and that the French cannot carry on their operations -by means of small corps. I should imagine from their inactivity, -and from the misfortunes they have suffered, that they have not -the means of collecting a force sufficiently large to oppose the -progress of the insurrection and the efforts of the insurgents, -and to afford supplies to their different detached corps, or that -they find that they cannot carry on their operations with armies so -numerous as they must find it necessary to employ without magazines. - -In respect to Portugal, the whole kingdom, with the exception of -the neighbourhood of Lisbon, is in a state of insurrection against -the French; their means of resistance are, however, less powerful -than those of the Spaniards, their troops had been completely -dispersed, their officers had gone off to the Brazils, and their -arsenals pillaged, or in the power of the enemy, and their revolt -under the circumstances in which it has taken place is still more -extraordinary than that of the Spanish nation. - -The Portuguese may have in the northern part of the kingdom about -10,000 men in arms, of which number 5000 are to march with me -towards Lisbon. The remainder, with a Spanish detachment of about -1500 men which came from Gallicia, are employed in a distant -blockade of Almeida, and in the protection of Oporto, which is now -the seat of government. - -The insurrection is general throughout Alemtejo and Algarve to the -southward, and Entre Minho et Douero and Trasasmontes and Beira -to the northward; but for want of arms the people can do nothing -against the enemy. - -Having consulted sir C. Cotton, it appeared to him and to me that -the attack proposed upon Cascaes bay was impracticable, because -the bay is well defended by the fort of Cascaes and the other -works constructed for its defence, and the ships of war could not -approach sufficiently near to silence them. The landing in the -Passa d’Arcos in the Tagus could not be effected without silencing -fort St. Julian, which appeared to be impracticable to those who -were to carry that operation into execution. - -There are small bays within which might admit of landing troops, -and others to the northward of the rock of Lisbon, but they are -all defended by works which must have been silenced; they are -of small extent, and but few men could have landed at the same -time. There is always a surf on them which affects the facility -of landing at different times so materially, as to render it very -doubtful whether the troops first landed could be supported in -sufficient time by others, and whether the horses for the artillery -and cavalry, and the necessary stores and provisions could be -landed at all. These inconveniences attending a landing in any of -the bays near the rock of Lisbon would have been aggravated by -the neighbourhood of the enemy to the landing-place, and by the -exhausted state of the country in which the troops would have been -landed. It was obviously the best plan, therefore, to land in the -northern parts of Portugal, and I fixed upon Mondego bay as the -nearest place which afforded any facility for landing, excepting -Peniché, the landing-place of which peninsula is defended by a -fort occupied by the enemy, which it would be necessary to attack -regularly in order to place the ships in safety. - -A landing to the northward was farther recommended, as it would -ensure the co-operation of the Portuguese troops in the expedition -to Lisbon. The whole of the corps placed under my command, -including those under the command of general Spencer, having -landed, I propose to march on Wednesday, and I shall take the road -by Alcobaça and Obidos, with a view to keep up my communication by -the sea-coast, and to examine the situation of Peniché, and I shall -proceed towards Lisbon by the route of Mafra, and by the hills to -the northward of that city. - -As I understand from the secretary of state that a body of troops -under the command of brigadier-general Ackland may be expected -on the coast of Portugal before you arrive, I have written to -desire he will proceed from hence along the coast of Portugal to -the southward; and I propose to communicate with him by the means -of captain Bligh of the Alfred, who will attend the movements of -the army with a few transports, having on board provisions and -military stores. I intend to order brigadier-general Ackland to -attack Peniché, if I should find it necessary to obtain possession -of that place, and if not, I propose to order him to join the -fleet stationed off the Tagus, with a view to disembark in one -of the bays near the rock of Lisbon as soon as I shall approach -sufficiently near to enable him to perform that operation. If I -imagined that general Ackland’s corps was equipped in such a manner -as to be enabled to move from the coast, I should have directed him -to land at Mondego, and to march upon Santarem, from which station -he would have been at hand either to assist my operations, or to -cut off the retreat of the enemy, if he should endeavour to make it -either by the north of the Tagus and Almeida, or by the south of -the Tagus and Elvas; but as I am convinced that general Ackland’s -corps is intended to form a part of some other corps which is -provided with a commissariat, that he will have none with him, -and consequently that his corps must depend upon the country; and -as no reliance can be placed upon the resources of this country, -I have considered it best to direct the general’s attention to -the sea-coast; if, however, the command of the army remained in -my hands, I should certainly land the corps which has lately been -under the command of sir John Moore at Mondego, and should move it -upon Santarem. I have the honour to enclose a return of the troops, -&c. &c. - - (Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY. - - -SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO SIR HARRY BURRARD. - - _Camp at Lugar, 8 miles north of Lerya, August 10, 1808._ - - SIR, - -Since I wrote to you on the 8th inst. I have received letters -from Mr. Stuart and colonel Doyle at Corunna, of which I enclose -copies. From them you will learn the state of the war in that part -of Spain, and you will observe that Mr. Stuart and colonel Doyle -are of opinion that marshal Bessieres will take advantage of the -inefficiency of the Gallician army under general Blake to detach -a corps to Portugal to the assistance of general Junot; we have -not heard yet of that detachment, and I am convinced it will not -be made till king Joseph Buonaparte will either be reinforced to -such a degree as to be in safety in Madrid, or till he shall have -effected his retreat into France, with which view it is reported -that he left Madrid on the 29th of last month. - -I conceive, therefore, that I have time for the operations which I -propose to carry on before a reinforcement can arrive from Leon, -even supposing that no obstacles would be opposed to its march in -Spain or Portugal; but it is not probable that it can arrive before -the different reinforcements will arrive from England; and as -marshal Bessieres had not more than 20,000 men in the action at Rio -Seco on the 14th July, I conceive that the British troops, which -will be in Portugal, will be equal to contend with any part of that -corps which he may detach. - -The possibility that, in the present state of affairs, the -French corps at present in Portugal may be reinforced, affords -an additional reason for taking the position of Santarem, which -I apprised you in my letter of the 8th I should occupy, if the -command of the army remained in my hands after the reinforcements -should arrive. If you should occupy it, you will not only be in the -best situation to support my operations, and to cut off the retreat -of the enemy, but if any reinforcements of French troops should -enter Portugal, you will be in the best situation to collect your -whole force to oppose him, &c. &c. - - (Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY. - - * * * * * - -No. X. - -ARTICLES OF THE DEFINITIVE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF -PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH ARMY. - -The generals commanding in chief, &c. &c. being determined to -negotiate, &c. &c. - -Article 1. All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal -occupied by the French troops shall be given up to the British army -in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of -the present convention. - -Art. 2. The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms -and baggage, they shall not be considered as prisoners of war, and -on their arrival in France they shall be at liberty to serve. - -Art. 3. The English government shall furnish the means of -conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any -of the ports of France between Rochefort and L’Orient inclusively. - -Art. 4. The French army shall carry with it all its artillery -of French calibre, with the horses belonging thereunto, and the -tumbrils supplied with 60 rounds per gun: all other artillery, -arms, and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals, -shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state -in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the -convention. - -Art. 5. The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, -and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the -army; that is to say, its military chest, and carriages attached -to the field commissariat and field hospital; or shall be allowed -to dispose of such part of the same on its account, as the -commander-in-chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like -manner, all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose -of their private property of every description, with full security -hereafter for the purchasers. - -Art. 6. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the -generals and other officers of all ranks. It is however fully -understood that the means of conveyance for horses, at the disposal -of the British commanders, are very limited; some additional -conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon. The number of -horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed 600, and the -number embarked by the staff shall not exceed 200. At all events -every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the -horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked. - -Art. 7. In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place -in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed -of the garrisons of the places, of the cavalry, the artillery, -the sick, and the equipment of the army. The first division shall -embark within seven days of the date of the ratification, or sooner -if possible. - -Art. 8. The garrison of Elvas and its forts, and of Peniché and -Palmela, will be embarked at Lisbon. That of Almeida at Oporto, or -the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by -British commissaries, charged with providing for their subsistence -and accommodation. - -Art. 9. All the sick and wounded who cannot be embarked with the -troops are intrusted to the British army. They are to be taken care -of whilst they remain in this country at the expense of the British -government, under the condition of the same being reimbursed -by France when the final evacuation is effected. The English -government will provide for their return to France, which will take -place by detachments of about one hundred and fifty or two hundred -men at a time. A sufficient number of French medical officers shall -be left behind to attend them. - -Art. 10. As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to -France shall have disembarked in the harbours specified, or in any -other of the ports of France to which stress of weather may force -them, every facility shall be given them to return to England -without delay, and security against capture until their arrival in -a friendly port. - -Art. 11. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and -within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army -will approach within three leagues of the capital, and will be so -placed as to leave about one league between the two armies. - -Art. 12. The forts of St. Julien, the Bugio, and Cascaes, shall -be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the -convention. Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and -batteries as far as the lazaretto or Trafaria on one side, and -fort St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on -the embarkation of the 2d division; as shall also the harbour -and all armed vessels in it of every description, with their -rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of Elvas, -Almeida, Peniché, and Palmela, shall be given up as soon as the -British troops can arrive to occupy them. In the meantime the -general-in-chief of the British army will give notice of the -present convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to -the troops before them, in order to put a stop to all further -hostilities. - -Art. 13. Commissioners shall be named on both sides to regulate and -accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon. - -Art. 14. Should there arise doubts as to the meaning of any -article, it will be explained favourably to the French army. - -Art. 15. From the date of the ratification of the present -convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims -whatever, of the French government against subjects of Portugal, -or any other individuals residing in this country, founded on -the occupation of Portugal by the French troops, in the month of -December, 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled; and -all sequestration laid upon their property, moveable or immoveable, -are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the -proper owners. - -Art. 16. All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or -alliance, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this -country, shall be protected; their property of every kind, moveable -and immoveable, shall be respected; and they shall be at liberty -either to accompany the French army or to remain in Portugal. In -either case their property is guaranteed to them, with the liberty -of retaining or of disposing of it, and passing the produce of the -sale thereof into France, or any other country where they may fix -their residence; the space of one year being allowed them for that -purpose. It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this -arrangement, only however in as far as regards leaving the port, -and that none of the stipulations above mentioned can be made the -pretext of any commercial speculations. - -Art. 17. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for -his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this -country by the French army; and all those who have continued in -the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations -under the French government, are placed under the protection of the -British commanders; they shall sustain no injury in their persons -or property; it not having been at their option to be obedient or -not to the French government, they are also at liberty to avail -themselves of the stipulations of the 16th article. - -Art. 18. The Spanish troops detained on board ship, in the port of -Lisbon, shall be given up to the commander-in-chief of the British -army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French -subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in -Spain without having been taken in battle, or in consequence of -military operations, but on occasion of the occurrences of the 29th -of last May, and the days immediately following. - -Art. 19. There shall be an immediate exchange established for all -ranks of prisoners made in Portugal since the commencement of the -present hostilities. - -Art. 20. Hostages of the rank of field officers shall be mutually -furnished, on the part of the British army and navy, and on that -of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present -convention. The officer of the British army shall be restored on -the completion of the articles which concern the army; and the -officer of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in -their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the -French army. - -Art. 21. It shall be allowed to the general-in-chief of the French -army to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present -convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British admiral to -convey him to Bourdeaux or Rochefort. - -Art. 22. The British admiral will be invited to accommodate his -excellency the commander-in-chief and the other principal officers -of the French army on board ships of war. - -Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of August, 1808. - - (Signed) GEORGE MURRAY, quarter-master-general. - KELLERMAN, le général de division. - - -ADDITIONAL ARTICLES. - -Art. 1. The individuals in the civil employment of the army, made -prisoners either by the British troops or by the Portuguese, in -any part of Portugal, will be restored, as is customary, without -exchange. - -Art. 2. The French army shall be subsisted from its own magazines -up to the day of embarkation. The garrisons up to the day of the -evacuation of the fortresses. The remainder of the magazines shall -be delivered over in the usual forms to the British government, -which charges itself with the subsistence of the men and horses -of the army from the above mentioned periods till their arrival -in France, under the condition of being reimbursed by the French -government for the excess of the expense beyond the estimation to -be made by both parties, of the value of the magazines delivered -up to the British army. The provisions on board the ships of war -in the possession of the French army will be taken on account by -the British government, in like manner with the magazines of the -fortresses. - -Art. 3. The general commanding the British troops will take the -necessary measures for re-establishing the free circulation of the -means of subsistence between the country and the capital. - -Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of August, 1808. - - (Signed) GEORGE MURRAY, quarter-master-general. - KELLERMAN, le général de division. - - Ratified, &c. &c. - - * * * * * - -No. XI. - -1st. LETTER FROM BARON VON DECKEN TO THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE -ARMY IN PORTUGAL. - - _Oporto, August 18th, 1808._ - - SIR, - -The bishop of Oporto having expressed to me his wish to see me in -private, in order to make me an important communication, which -he desired to be kept secret, I went to his palace last night at -a late hour. The bishop told me that he had taken the government -of Portugal in his hands to satisfy the wish of the people, but -with the intention to re-establish the government of his lawful -sovereign; and he hoped that his majesty the king of Great Britain -had no other point in view in sending troops to this country. After -having given him all possible assurance on that head, the bishop -continued, that as the prince regent, in leaving Portugal, had -established a regency for the government of this country during his -absence, he considered it his duty to resign the government into -the hands of that regency as soon as possible. My answer was, that -I had no instruction from my government on that head, but that I -begged him to consider whether the cause of his sovereign would not -be hurt in resigning the government into the hands of a regency -which, from its having acted under the influence of the French, -had lost the confidence of the nation, and whether it would not be -more advisable for him to keep the government until the pleasure of -the prince regent was known. The bishop allowed that the regency -appointed by the prince regent did not possess the confidence of -the people, that several members of it had acted in such a manner -as to show themselves as friends and partisans of the French, and -that, at all events, all the members of the late regency could -not be re-established in their former power; but he was afraid -that the provinces of Estramadura, Alemtejo, and Algarvé, would -not acknowledge his authority if the British government did not -interfere. After a very long conversation, it was agreed that I -should inform our ministers with what the bishop had communicated -to me, and in order to lose no time in waiting for an answer, the -bishop desired me to communicate the same to you, expressing a wish -that you would be pleased to write to him an official letter, in -order to express your desire that he might continue the government -until the pleasure of his sovereign was known, for the sake of the -operations of the British and Portuguese troops under your command. - -The secretary of the bishop, who acted as interpreter, told me -afterwards in private, that the utmost confusion would arise from -the bishop resigning the government at this moment, or associating -with people who were neither liked nor esteemed by the nation. - -I beg leave to add, that although the bishop expressed the -contrary, yet it appeared to me that he was not averse to his -keeping the government in his hands, if it could be done by the -interference of our government. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. - - (Signed) FREDERICK VON DECKEN, brig. gen. - - -2d. DITTO TO DITTO. - - _Oporto, August 22, 1808._ - - SIR, - -Your excellency will have received the secret letter which I had -the honour to send you by brigadier-general Stuart, on the 18th, -respecting the communication of his excellency the bishop of Oporto -relative to his resignation of the government into the hands of -the regency established by the prince regent.--In addition to what -I have had the honour to state upon that subject, I beg leave to -add, that his excellency the bishop has this day desired me to make -your excellency aware, in case it might be wished that he should -keep the government in his hands until the pleasure of the prince -regent may be known, that he could not leave Oporto; and the seat -of government must in that case necessarily remain in this town. -His excellency the bishop thinks it his duty to inform you of this -circumstance as soon as possible, as he foresees that the city of -Lisbon will be preferred for the seat of government, as soon as -the British army have got possession of it. If the seat of the -temporary government should remain at Oporto, the best method to -adopt with respect to the other provinces of Portugal appears to -be, to cause them to send deputies to that place for the purpose of -transacting business relative to their own provinces; in the same -manner as the provinces of Entre Douro y Minho and Tras los Montes -now send their representatives. One of the principal reasons why -his excellency the bishop can only accede to continue at the head -of the government under the condition of remaining at Oporto is, -because he is persuaded that the inhabitants of this town will not -permit him to leave it, unless by order of the prince regent. It -might also be advisable to keep the seat of government at Oporto, -as it may be supposed that Lisbon will be in a state of great -confusion for the first two months after the French have left it. I -have the honour to be, sir, &c. &c. - - (Signed) FREDERICK VON DECKEN, brig. gen. - - -3d. - - _Oporto, August 28._ - - SIR, - -Your excellency will have received my secret letters of the 18th -and 22d instant relative to the temporary government of this -kingdom. His excellency the bishop of Oporto has received lately -deputies from the province of Alemtejo and the kingdom of Algarve. -Part of Estremadura, viz. the town of Leria has also submitted -to his authority, and it may be therefore said that the whole -kingdom of Portugal has acknowledged the authority of the temporary -government, of which the bishop of Oporto is at the head, with the -exception of Lisbon and the town of Setubal (St. Ubes). Although -the reasons why these towns have not yet acknowledged the authority -of the temporary government may be explained by their being in -possession of the French, yet the bishop is convinced that the -inhabitants of Lisbon will refuse to submit to the temporary -government of Oporto, in which they will be strongly supported -by the members of the former regency established by the prince -regent, who of course will be very anxious to resume their former -power. The bishop in assuming the temporary government complied -only with the wishes of the people: he was sure that it was the -only means of saving the country; but having had no interest of his -own in view, he is willing to resign the authority which he has -accepted with reluctance, as soon as he is convinced that it can -be done without hurting the cause of his sovereign, and throwing -the country into confusion. There is every reason to apprehend that -the inhabitants of the three northern provinces of Portugal will -never permit the bishop to resign the government, and submit to the -former regency. They feel extremely proud of having first taken to -arms, and consider themselves as the deliverers and saviours of -their country; and as the inhabitants of Lisbon will be as much -disinclined to submit to the temporary government of Oporto; a -division of the provinces, which will excite internal commotion, -will naturally follow, if not supported by your excellency. It -has appeared to me that the best way to reconcile these opposite -parties would be in endeavouring to unite the present government -at Oporto with such of the members of the former regency who have -not forfeited by their conduct the confidence of the people; and -having opened my idea to the bishop, his answer was, that he would -not object to it if proposed by you. I therefore take the liberty -of suggesting, that the difficulty above mentioned would be in a -great measure removed if your excellency would be pleased to make -it known after Lisbon has surrendered, that until the pleasure -of the prince regent was known, you would consider the temporary -government established at Oporto as the lawful government, with -the addition of the four members of the late regency, who have -been pointed out to me by the bishop as such who have behaved -faithfully to their sovereign and country; viz. _don Francisco -Noronha_, _Francisco da Cunha_, _the Monteiro Mor_, _and the -principal Castro_. These members to be placed at the head of the -different departments, and to consider the bishop as the president, -whose directions they are to follow, a plan which will meet with -the less difficulty, as the president of the former regency, named -by the prince regent, has quitted Portugal, and is now in France. -The circumstance that Lisbon is now in a state of the greatest -confusion will furnish a fair pretext for fixing the seat of the -temporary government in the first instance at Oporto, to which -place the gentlemen above named would be ordered to repair without -loss of time, and to report themselves to the bishop. Independent -of the reasons which I had the honour of stating to your excellency -in my letter of the 22d instant, why it is impossible for the -bishop to leave Oporto, I must beg leave to add, that, from what I -understand, the greater part of the inhabitants of Lisbon are in -the French interest, and that it will require a garrison of British -troops to keep that city in order. The bishop of Oporto, although -convinced of the necessity of considering Lisbon at present as -a military station, and of placing a British commandant and a -British garrison there, yet from a desire that the feelings of the -inhabitants might be wounded as little as possible, wishes that you -would be pleased to put also some Portuguese troops in garrison at -Lisbon, together with a Portuguese commandant, who, though entirely -under the orders of the British governor, might direct the police -in that town, or at least be charged with putting into execution -such orders as he may receive from the British governor under that -head. If your excellency should be pleased to approve of this -proposal, the bishop thinks brigadier Antonio Pinto Bacelar to be -the properest officer of those who are now with the Portuguese -army to be stationed at Lisbon, and who might also be directed -to organise the military force of the province of Estremadura. -The bishop is fully convinced that the temporary government of -the country cannot exist without the support of British troops: -he hopes that our government will leave a corps of 6000 men in -Portugal after the French have been subdued, until the Portuguese -troops may be sufficiently organised and disciplined to be able to -protect their own government. I have the honour to be, sir, your -most obedient and humble servant, - - FREDERICK VON DECKEN, brig. gen. - - * * * * * - -No. XII. - -(Translation.) - -LETTER FROM GENERAL LEITE TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE. - - MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND MOST EXCELLENT SIR, - -Strength is the result of union, and those who have reason to be -grateful should be most urgent in their endeavours to promote -it. I therefore feel it to be my duty to have recourse to your -excellency to know how I should act without disturbing the union -so advantageous to my country. The supreme junta of the Portuguese -government established at Oporto, which I have hitherto obeyed as -the representatives of my sovereign, have sent me orders by an -officer, dated the 1st instant, to take possession of the fortress -of Elvas as soon as it shall be evacuated. After having seen those -same Spaniards who got possession of our strong places as friends, -take so much upon themselves as even to prevent the march of the -garrison which I had ordered to replace the losses sustained in -the battle of Evora, which deprived me of the little obedience -that was shown by the city of Beja, always favoured by the Spanish -authorities; after having seen the Portuguese artillery which was -saved after the said battle taken possession of by those same -Spaniards, who had lost their own, without being willing even to -lend me two three-pounders to enable me to join his excellency -the Monteiro Mor; after having the arms which were saved from the -destructive grasp of the common enemy made use of by those same -Spaniards, _who promised much and did nothing_; after having seen a -Spanish brigadier dispute my authority at Campo Mayor, where I was -president of the junta, and from whence his predecessor had taken -away 60,000 crowns without rendering any account; in a word, after -having seen the march of these Spaniards marked by the devastation -of our fields, and the country deserted to avoid the plunder of -their light troops, I cannot for a moment mistake the cause of the -orders given by the supreme junta of Oporto. A corps of English -troops having yesterday passed Estremos, on their road to Elvas, -knowing that in a combined army no officer should undertake any -operation which may be intended for others, thereby counteracting -each other, I consulted lieutenant-general Herre (Hope), who has -referred me to your excellency, to whom in consequence I send -lieut.-colonel the marquis of Terney, my quarter-master-general, -that he may deliver you this letter, and explain verbally every -thing you may wish to know which relates to my sovereign and the -good of my country, already so much indebted to the English nation. - - God preserve your excellency many years. - - (Signed) FRANCISCO DE PAULO LEITE, lieut.-general. - - (Dated) _Estremos, 16th September, 1808_. - To the most illustrious and most excellent - sir Hew Dalrymple. - - -EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR HEW DALRYMPLE TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL -SIR JOHN HOPE. - - _Head-quarters, Benefico, 25th Sept. 1808._ - - SIR, - -Impediments having arisen to the fulfilment of that article of -the convention which relates to the cession of Elvas by the -French to the British army, in consequence of the unexpected and -unaccountable conduct of the commander in chief of the army of -Estremadura, in bombarding that place, and endeavouring to impose -upon the French garrison terms of capitulation different from -those which were agreed upon by the British and French generals -in chief; and as the British corps sent to take possession of -the above fortress, and to hold it in the name of the prince -regent until reinforced by a body of Portuguese troops, is not -of sufficient strength to preclude the possibility of insult, -should the general above mentioned persevere in the contemptuous -and hostile disposition he has hitherto shown; I have therefore -thought it advisable to order the remainder of your division, and -general Paget’s advanced guard, to cross the Tagus, and to occupy -cantonments as near as possible to the place above mentioned. In -the mean time colonel Graham is gone to Badajos to expostulate with -general Galluzzo on the singular and very inexplicable line of -conduct he has seen cause to adopt.... - - * * * * * - -No. XIII. - -JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN MOORE’S AND OTHER -CORRESPONDENCE. - - -SECTION I.--RELATING TO WANT OF MONEY. - -_Sir John Moore to lord William Bentinck, October 22, 1808._ - -“Sir David Baird has unfortunately been sent out without money. He -has applied to me, and I have none to give him.” ... “I undertake -my march in the hope that some will arrive; if it does not, it will -add to the number of a great many distresses.” - -_Sir John Moore to general Hope, October 22, 1808._ - -“Baird has sent his aide-de-camp Gordon to me: he is without money, -and his troops only paid to September. He can get none at Coruña.” - -_Sir John Moore to sir David Baird, October 22, 1808._ - -“We are in such want of money at this place that it is with -difficulty I have been able to spare 8000l., which went to you in -the Champion this day.” - -_Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, October 27._ - -“It is upon the general assurance of the Spanish government that I -am leading the army into Spain without any established magazines. -In this situation nothing is more essentially requisite than money, -and unfortunately we have been able to procure very little here.” - -_Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, November 10, 1808._ - -“I understand from sir David Baird that you were kind enough to -lend him 40,000_l._ from the money you brought with you from -England. We are in the greatest distress for money. I doubt if -there is wherewithal after the 24th of this month to pay the troops -their subsistence.” - -_Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Nov. 24, 1808._ - -“I am without a shilling of money to pay, and I am in daily -apprehension that from the want of it our supplies will be -stopped. It is impossible to describe the embarrassments we are -thrown into from the want of that essential article.” - - -SECTION II.--RELATING TO ROADS. - -_Sir John Moore to general Anstruther, at Almeida, dated Lisbon, -October 12, 1808._ - -“A division under Beresford is marching upon Coimbra, and a part -of it will proceed on to Oporto or not, as information is received -from you, that the road from thence to Almeida is or is not -practicable. Some officers of the Spanish engineers, employed in -the quarter-master-general’s department, with commissaries, are -sent from Madrid to obtain information on the subjects you will -want with respect to roads, subsistence, &c. &c. from Almeida to -Burgos.” - -_Sir John Moore to lord William Bentinck, October 22, 1808._ - -“Colonel Lopez has no personal knowledge of this part of Spain; but -what he has told me accords with other information I had before -received, that the great Madrid road was the only one by which -artillery could travel; the French brought theirs from Ciudad -Rodrigo to Alcantara, but by this _it was destroyed_.” ... “The -difficulty of obtaining correct information of roads, and the -difficulties attending the subsistence of troops through Portugal, -are greater than you can believe.” - -_Sir John Hope to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 20._ - -“I sent Wills of the engineers by Placentia to Salamanca, and -before this time I suppose he may have made his report to you of -the roads from the Tagus at Almaraz and Puente de Cardinal to -Salamanca.” ... “Delancy is upon this road, and I have directed him -to communicate with you at Salamanca, as soon as possible.” - -_Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Oct. 27, 1808._ - -“I am under the necessity of sending lieutenant-general Hope, -with the artillery, &c. by the great road leading from Badajos to -Madrid, as _every information_ agreed that no other was fit for the -artillery.” - -_Substance of a report from captain Carmichael Smyth of the -engineers, 26th December, 1808._ - -“The country round about Astorga is perfectly open, and affords no -advantage whatsoever to a small corps to enable it to oppose a -large force with any prospect of success. In retreating, however, -towards Villa Franca, at the distance of about two leagues from -Astorga, the hills approaching each other form some strong ground; -and the high ground in particular in the rear of the village of -Rodrigatos appears at first sight to offer a most advantageous -position. One very serious objection presents itself nevertheless -to our making a stand near Rodrigatos, or indeed at any position -before we come to the village of Las Torres (about one league from -Bembibre), as the talus, or slope of the ground, from Manzanal -(close to Rodrigatos) until Las Torres, would be in favour of -an enemy should we be forced at Rodrigatos, and we should be -consequently obliged to retreat down hill for nearly two leagues, -the enemy having every advantage that such a circumstance would -naturally give them. - -“From Las Torres to Bembibre the ground becomes more open, but with -the disadvantage, however, of the slope being still against us. -From Bembibre to Villa Franca there is great variety of ground, -but no position that cannot easily be turned, excepting the ground -in the rear of Calcavellos, and about one league in front of -Villafranca. This is by far the strongest position between Astorga -and Villafranca. It is also necessary to add, that the position -at Rodrigatos can easily be turned by the Foncevadon road (which, -before the establishment of the Camina real, was the high road -towards Coruña). This is not the case with the position in front -of Villafranca, as the Foncevadon road joins the Camina real at -Calcavallos in front of the proposed position.” - - -SECTION III.--RELATING TO EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. - -_Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, October 9, 1808._ - -“At this instant the army is without equipment of any kind, either -for the carriage of the light baggage of regiments, artillery -stores, commissariat stores, or other appendages of an army, and -not a magazine is formed on any of the routes by which we are to -march.” - -_Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Oct. 18, 1808._ - -“In none of the departments is there any want of zeal, but in -some of the important ones there is much want of experience.” ... -“I have no hope of getting forward at present with more than the -light baggage of the troops, the ammunition immediately necessary -for the service of the artillery, and a very scanty supply of -medicines.” - -_Sir John Moore’s Journal._ - -“My anxiety is to get out of the rugged roads of Portugal before -the rains.” - -_Sir John Moore to lord William Bentinck, Oct. 22, 1808._ - -“The season of the year admitting of no delay, there was a -necessity for beginning the march, and trusting for information -and supplies as we get on unfortunately our commissariat is -inexperienced, and a **** of a contractor, Mr. Sattaro, has -deceived us.” - -_Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, October 29, 1808._ - -“The want of provisions for the men and forage for the horses has -been one of the most serious obstacles we have had to contend with. -Nor do I at present feel at all easy upon that subject.”--“The -horses are suffering very severely, both for want of proper -accommodations and food.” ... “From lord Castlereagh’s letter, I -was led to expect that every preparation for our equipment had -been made previous to our leaving England; I need hardly say how -different the case was, and how much I have been disappointed.” - -_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, November 17, 1808._ - -“The continued slowness of the junta is the only explanation I can -offer for the want of proper arrangements on the routes for the -reception of the English troops.” - - -SECTION IV.--RELATING TO THE WANT OF INFORMATION. - -_Sir John Moore’s Journal, November 28, 1808._ - -“I am not in communication with any of the (Spanish) generals, and -neither know their plans nor those of the government. No channel of -information has been opened to me, and I have no knowledge of the -force or situation of the enemy, but what, as a stranger, I pick -up.” - -_Ditto, Salamanca._ - -“It is singular that the French have penetrated so far -(Valladolid), and yet no sensation has been made upon the -people. They seem to remain quiet, and the information was not -known through any other channel but that of a letter from the -captain-general of the province to me.” - -_Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Astorga, Nov. 19, 1808._ - -“The local authorities have not only failed in affording us the -least benefit in that respect (supplies), but have neglected to -give us any kind of information as to the proceedings of the armies -or the motions of the enemy.” - -_Ditto, Astorga, 23d November._ - -“It is clearly apparent how very much exaggerated the accounts -generally circulated of the strength of the Spanish armies have -been.” ... “It is very remarkable that I have not procured the -least intelligence, or received any sort of communication from any -of the official authorities at Madrid, or either of the Spanish -generals.” - -_Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Villafranca, Dec. 12, 1808._ - -“I also enclose a letter from the marquis of Romana; you will be -fully able to appreciate the degree of reliance that may be placed -on the _verbal_ communication made to him by the extraordinary -courier from Madrid. It was from the same kind of authority that he -desired the information he conveyed to me of a supposed brilliant -affair at Somosierra, which turned out to be an inconsiderable -skirmish altogether undeserving of notice.” - -_Colonel Graham to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808._ - -“The deputies sent over knew nothing but just concerning their own -provinces and _pour se faire valoir_, they exaggerated every thing; -for example, those of the Asturias talked louder than any body, -and Asturias as yet has never produced a man to the army; thus -government, with all their wish to get information (which cannot be -doubted), failed in the proper means.” - -_Lord Wm. Bentinck to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 20, 1808._ - -“I must at the same time take the liberty of stating my belief, -that reliance cannot be placed upon the correctness of information, -even if such information should not be kept back, which does not -come through the channel of a British officer. It is the choice of -officers, rather than the system, that seems to have failed.” - -_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 19, 1808._ - -“In your direct communications with Spanish generals, you must, -however, be contented with their version of the state of affairs, -which I do not think can always be relied on, because they only put -matters in the view in which they wish you to see them.” - -_Ditto, Nov. 29._ - -“The calculation of force which the junta hope may be united in -the army under your command will be as follows, if no impediment -prevents the different corps reaching the points selected for their -junction.” - - _Remarks by the author._ - - British 35,000 They were only 23,500. - La Romana 20,000 ... only 5000 armed. - San Juan 15,000 Totally dispersed. - Levies from the south, say 10,000 None ever arrived. - ------ - 80,000 Real total, 28,500. - ------ - -_Lieut. Boothby, royal engineers, to sir John Moore, La Puebla, -Jan. 1, 1809._ - -“I shall consider of any means that may more completely ensure -the earliest information of the enemy’s movements towards this -quarter; but the Spaniards are the most difficult people in the -world to employ in this way, they are so slow, so talkative, and so -credulous.” - - -SECTION V.--RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF THE LOCAL JUNTAS. - -_Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Coruña, Oct. 24, 1808._ - -“The answer of the supreme government to our application as read by -Mr. Frere last night in the presence of the junta of this province, -is certainly very different from what I expected. Instead of -expressing an anxiety to promote our views and dissatisfaction at -the impediments thrown in the way of our measures by the Gallician -government, it merely permits us to land here in the event of its -being found impracticable to send us by sea to St. Andero, and -directs that if our disembarkation takes place, it should be made -in detachments of 2000 or 3000 men each! to be successively pushed -on into Castille, without waiting for the necessary equipment of -mules and horses.” - -_Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Coruña, Nov. 7._ - -“We have received no sort of assistance from the government.” - -_Ditto, Astorga, Nov. 19._ - -“Had the Spanish government afforded us any active assistance, the -state of our equipments would have been much more advanced.” - -_Colonel Graham to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808._ - -“All this instead of at once appointing the fittest men in the -country to be ministers, looks much like private interest and -patronage being the objects more than the public good.” - -_Colonel Graham to sir John Moore, Tudela, Nov. 9, 1808._ - -“_It is hoped_ that the Arragonese army will come over to fill it” -(the line) “up, but being an independent command, no order has yet -been sent. An express went after Palafox, who will return here this -morning, and _then, it is hoped_, that he will send an order to -general O’Neil at Sanguessa to march instantly; and _further, it is -hoped_, that general O’Neil will obey this order without waiting -for one from his immediate chief, Palafox, the captain-general of -Arragon, who is at Zaragoza; at all events, there is a loss of -above 24 hours by the happy system of independent commands, which -may make the difference of our having 18,000 men more or less in -the battle that may be fought whenever the French are ready.” ... -“Making me compliments of there being no secrets with their allies, -they” (the members of the council of war) “obliged me to sit down, -which I did for a quarter of an hour, enough to be quite satisfied -of the miserable system established by this junta” ... “In short, I -pitied poor Castaños and poor Spain, and came away disgusted to the -greatest degree.” - -_Col. Graham to Lord W. Bentinck, Centruenigo, Nov. 13, 1808._ - -“If any thing can make the junta sensible of the absurdity of their -conduct this will. It would indeed have been more felt if a great -part of the division had been lost, as might well have happened. -But the difficulty of passing so many men with artillery, and in -small boats, and the time that would have been required so great, -that I can hardly persuade myself these people can be so foolish -as ever seriously to have entertained the idea. But with whatever -intentions, whether merely as a pretence for assuming the command -for the purpose of irritating Castaños; whether from the silly -vanity of exercising power, and doing something which, if by great -good luck it had succeeded, might have proved what might be done -with a more active commander; or whether from a real conviction -of the excellence of the scheme, it must be equally evident to -every military man, indeed to every man of common sense, that it -is impossible things can succeed in this way; and then the junta -itself interferes, and to worse purpose.” - -_Castaños’s Vindication._ - -“The nation is deceived in a thousand ways; as an example, it -believed that our armies were greatly superior to those of -the enemy, reckoning 80,000 men that of the centre, when your -excellencies” (the junta) “knew that it only amounted to 26,000 -men.” ... “Madrid possessed money and riches; the nobles and loyal -inhabitants of that capital wished to give both the one and the -other; but whilst the armies were suffering the horrors of famine, -naked, and miserable, the possessions and jewels of the good -Spaniards remained quiet in Madrid, that they might be soon seized -by the tyrant, as they were in the end.” - -_Stuart’s Despatch, August 7, 1808._ - -“No province shares the succours granted by Great Britain, although -they may not be actually useful to themselves. No gun-boats have -been sent from Ferrol to protect St. Ander or the coast of Biscay; -and the Asturians have in vain asked for artillery from the dépôts -of Gallicia. The stores landed at Gihon, and not used by the -Asturians, have remained in that port and in Oviedo, although they -would have afforded a seasonable relief to the army of general -Blake. The money brought by the Pluto for Leon, which has not -raised a man, remains in the port where it was landed.” - -_Major Cox to sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, August 3, 1808._ - -“I freely confess that I cannot help feeling some degree of -apprehension that this great and glorious cause may be ruined by -the baneful effects of jealousy and division.” - -_Major Cox to sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, August 27._ - -“The fact is, their” (the junta of Seville) “attention has been for -some time past so much occupied by vain and frivolous disputes, and -by views of private interest and advantage, that they seem to have -neglected entirely every concern of real importance, and almost -to have lost sight of the general interests of the country.” ... -“A million of dollars have, I understand, been sent out.” ... “It -certainly would not be prudent to intrust so large a sum to the -management of the temporary government of a particular province, -without having a sufficient security for its proper application. -My own opinion is, that the less money which is given to them the -better, until the general government is formed. This junta have -shown too evident signs of a wish to aggrandize themselves, and -a disinclination to afford those aids to other provinces, which -they had it in their power to grant, not to afford just grounds -of suspicion, that their boasted loyalty and patriotism have at -times been mixed with unworthy considerations of self-interest and -personal advantage.” - -_Ditto, Sept. 5._ - -“By Mr. Duff’s present instructions, he would have had no option” -(distributing the money), “even though the _iniquitous project of -partition_, which your excellency knows was once contemplated, were -still in existence.” - -_Ditto, Sept. 7._ - -“A dispute between the two juntas” (Seville and Grenada), “which -had nearly been productive of the most serious consequences, -and would probably have ended in open hostility, had it not -been prevented by the moderate, but decided conduct, of general -Castaños.” - -_Ditto, Sept. 10._ - -“The supreme junta of Seville have latterly manifested very -different views, and, I am sorry to say, they seem almost to have -lost sight of the common cause, and to be wholly addicted to their -particular interests: instead of directing their efforts to the -restoration of their legitimate sovereign and the established form -of national government, they are seeking the means of fixing the -permanency of their own, and endeavouring to separate its interests -from those of the other parts of Spain. To what other purpose can -be attributed the order given to general Castaños, not to march -on any account beyond Madrid? To what the instructions given to -their deputy, don Andrea Miñiano, to uphold the authority, and -preserve the integrity of the junta of Seville; to distinguish the -army to which he is attached by the name of the army of Andalusia; -to preserve constantly the appellation, and not to receive any -orders but what came directly from this government? And above all, -what other motive could induce the strong and decided measure of -enforcing obedience to those orders, by withholding from general -Castaños the means of maintaining his troops, in case of his -refusing to comply with them?”--“What has been the late occupation -of the junta of Seville? Setting aside the plans which were formed -for augmenting the Spanish army in these provinces, and neglecting -the consideration of those which have been proposed in their stead, -their attention has been taken up in the appointment of secretaries -to the different departments, in disposing of places of emolument, -in making promotions in the army, appointing canons in the church, -and instituting orders of knighthood. Such steps as these make -their designs too evident.” - -_Captain Carrol to sir David Baird, Llanes, Dec. 17, 1808._ - -“This province” (Asturias), “the first to declare war with France, -has, during seven months, taken no steps that I can discover to -make arrangements against the event of the enemy’s entering the -province.” ... “What has been done with the vast sums of money -that came from England, you will naturally ask? Plundered and -misapplied: every person who had or has any thing to do with money -concerns endeavouring to keep in hand all he can, and be ready, let -affairs turn out as they may, to help himself.” - -_Lord William Bentinck to sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, Sept. 19, -1808._ - -“Notwithstanding the professions of the Junta, their conduct has -evidently fallen short of them, and I think it would be very -desirable that more money should not fall into their hands.” - -_Major Cox to sir H. Dalrymple, Seville, 10 July and 27th do._ - -“The proclamation of Florida Blanca was received here some time -ago, but was carefully suppressed by the government.” - -Other publications containing maxims similar to those inculcated -by the proclamation of Florida Blanca have appeared, but are -suppressed here with equal care. - - -SECTION VI.--CENTRAL JUNTA. - -_Lord Wm. Bentinck to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808._ - -“I am sorry to say that the new government do not seem to proceed -with the despatch and energy which the critical situation of the -country demands.” - -_Ditto to sir H. Burrard, Madrid, Oct. 8._ - -“In my last letter I adverted to the inactivity and apparent -supineness which prevailed in the central council in regard to the -military, as well as to the other business of the government.” - -_Ditto to sir John Moore, Nov. 8._ - -“But it is upon the spot where the exact state of the armies, -and the extraordinary inefficiency of the government, whose past -conduct promises so little for the future, are known, that the -danger must be the more justly appreciated.” ... “The most simple -order, however urgent the case, cannot be obtained from the -government without a difficulty, solicitation, and delay, that is -quite incredible.” - -_Sir John Hope to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 20, 1808._ - -“It is perfectly evident that they” (the junta) “are altogether -without a plan as to their future military operations, either in -the case of success or misfortune. Every branch is affected by the -disjointed and inefficient construction of their government.” - -_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 18, 1808._ - -“Lord William Bentinck, as well as myself, have made repeated -representations, and I have given in paper after paper to obtain -something like promptitude and vigour; but though loaded with fair -promises in the commencement, we scarcely quit the members of the -junta before their attention is absorbed in petty pursuits and the -wrangling which impedes even the simplest arrangements necessary -for the interior government of a country.” ... “In short, we are -doing what we can, not what we wish; and I assure you we have -infamous tools to work with.” - -_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Seville, Jan. 2, 1809._ - -“Morla’s treason is abused, but passed over; and the arrival of -money from Mexico, which is really the arrival of spoil for the -French, seems to have extinguished every sentiment the bad views -and the desperate state of things ought to have created.” - -_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Jan. 10, 1809._ - -“Castaños, Heredia, Castelar, and Galluzzo, are all here. These -unfortunate officers are either prisoners or culprits, waiting the -decision of government on their conduct in the late transactions. -If the state of affairs should allow the government to continue in -existence they will probably wait many months, for no determination -is to be expected from people who have in no one instance punished -guilt or rewarded merit since they ruled the country. The junta -indeed, to say the truth, is at present absolutely null, and -although they represent the sovereign authority I have never -witnessed the exercise of their power for the public good.” - -_Mr. Frere to sir John Moore. Las Santos, Dec. 16, 1808._ - -“The subject of the ships in Cadiz had not escaped me, but I -thought it so _very dangerous_ to suggest to the junta any idea -except that of living and dying on Spanish ground, that I avoided -the mention of any subject that could seem to imply that I -entertain any other prospects.” - - -SECTION VII.--RELATING TO THE PASSIVE STATE OF THE PEOPLE. - -_Sir John Moore’s Journal, Dec. 9, 1808._ - -“In this part the people are passive. We find the greatest -difficulty to get people to bring in information.” - -_Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere. Sahagun, Dec. 23, 1808._ - -“If the Spaniards are enthusiastic or much interested in this -cause, their conduct is the most extraordinary that was ever -exhibited.” - -_Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Dec. 31, 1808, Astorga._ - -“I arrived here yesterday, where, contrary to his promise, and to -my expectation, I found the marquis la Romana, with a great part -of his troops. Nobody can describe his troops to be worse than he -does, and he complains as much as we do of the indifference of the -inhabitants, his disappointment at their want of enthusiasm; and -said to me in direct terms, that had he known how things were, he -neither would have accepted the command nor have returned to Spain. -With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements which are -quite absurd, and then returns to the helpless state of his army -and of the country.” - -_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Nov. 17, 1808._ - -“The tranquillity of Madrid is truly wonderful.” - -_Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Dec. 6._ - -“Destitute as we are of magazines, and without receiving even a -show of assistance either from the government or inhabitants of the -country, who, on the contrary, in many instances, even thwarted our -plans and measures; we could not have advanced without exposing -ourselves to almost certain destruction.” - -_Sir David Baird to lord Castlereagh, Nov. 22, 1808, Astorga._ - -“Major Stuart of the 95th regiment, who was despatched in front -of this place to obtain information, reports that the inhabitants -appear perfectly depressed by their losses, and seem to abandon all -hope of making a successful resistance.” - -_Captain Carrol to sir John Moore, Dec. 17, 1808._ - -“On my arrival at Oviedo all was confusion and dismay; the -confidence between the people, the army, and the junta destroyed.” -... “Is it to be expected that the peasantry can be as hearty in -the cause of patriotism as if they were treated with justice.” - -_Lieut. Boothby to sir J. Moore. La Puebla, Jan. 1. 1809._ - -“The Spanish soldiers now here (about 700) are merely on their way -to the marquis de la Romana; and as to any neighbouring passes, -there are no people whom I can call upon to occupy them, or should -expect to defend them, however naturally strong they may be, for -I see no people who are thinking of the enemy’s advance with any -sentiments beyond passive dislike, and hopes of protection from God -and the English army.” - -_The prince of Neufchatel to the duke of Dalmatia, Dec. 10, 1808._ - -“The city of Madrid is quite tranquil, the shops are all open, the -public amusements are resumed.” - -_General Thouvenot to the prince of Neufchatel. St. Sebastian, 29th -Nov. 1808._ - -“The successes obtained by the armies of the emperor, and those -which are also foreseen, begin to make a sensible impression upon -the authorities of the country, who become from day to day more -affable towards the French, and more disposed to consider the king -as their legitimate sovereign.” - -_The commandant Meslin to the prince of Neufchatel. Vittoria, 29th -Nov. 1808._ - -“The public feeling is still bad, still incredulous of our -successes.” ... “As to the tranquillity of the country, it appears -certain.” - -_Mr. Frere to sir John Moore. Merida, Dec. 14, 1808._ - -“A thousand barriers would be interposed against that deluge of -panic which sometimes overwhelms a whole nation, and of which at -one time I was afraid I saw the beginning in this country.” ... -“_The extinction of the popular enthusiasm in this country_, and -the means which exist for reviving it, would lead to a very long -discussion.” - - -Section VIII.--Miscellaneous. - -_Lord Collingwood to sir H. Dalrymple. Ocean, Cadiz, June 23, 1808._ - -“At Minorca and Majorca they describe themselves to be strong, and -having nothing to apprehend. However, they made the proposal for -entering into a convention with us for their defence, and in the -course of it demanded money, arms, and the protection of the fleet. -When, in return for them, it was required that their fleet should -be given up to us, to be held for their king Ferdinand, or that -a part of them should join our squadron against the enemy, they -rejected all those proposals: so that whatever we did for them was -to be solely for the honour of having their friendship.” - -_Captain Whittingham to sir Hew Dalrymple, June 12, 1808._ - -“12th June. I returned to Xerez at three o’clock, A.M. The -general sent for me and requested I would go without delay to -Gibraltar, and inform lieut.-general sir Hew Dalrymple that he at -present occupied Carmona with 3000 men (regulars), having his -head-quarters at Utrera, where his regular force would amount to -12,000 men; that it was not his intention to attempt to defend -Seville; that the heavy train of artillery, consisting of 80 -pieces, was already embarked for Cadiz, under the pretext that they -were wanting for the defence of its works; and that every thing was -prepared for burning the harness, timbers, &c. &c. of the field -pieces; that he intended to fall gradually back upon Cadiz, if -forced to retreat; and that he did not at present desire that any -English troops should be landed till their numbers should amount to -8 or 10,000 men, lest the ardour of the people should oblige him to -commence an offensive system of warfare before the concentration of -a considerable Spanish and English force should afford reasonable -hopes of success.” - -_Capt. Whittingham to sir H. Dalrymple. Utrera, June 29, 1808._ - -“The president approved of the idea, condemned the policy which -had led Spain to attempt to establish manufactories by force, and -showed clearly that the result had been the loss of a considerable -branch of the revenue, the increase of smuggling, and consequently -an enormous expense, in the payment of nearly _one hundred -thousand_ custom or rather excise officers, distributed about -the country, and the ruin of numberless families seduced by the -prospect of immediate profit to engage in illicit traffic.” - -_Lord William Bentinck to sir H. Dalrymple. Madrid, Oct. 2, 1808._ - -“A passage of lord Castlereagh’s letter, of which I received -from you a copy, instructed you, if possible, to ascertain the -intentions of the Spanish government after the expulsion of -the French. Though not positively directed by you to ask this -information, yet the occasion appeared to make the question so -natural, and seemingly of course, and even necessary, that I -availed myself of it, and gave to general Castaños, to be laid -before count Florida Blanca, a memorandum, of which I enclose a -copy, marked A.” - -_Extract from the copy marked_ A. - -“It seems probable in such case that no diversion could be more -effectual or more formidable to Buonaparte than the march of a -large combined British and Spanish army over the Pyrenees, into -that part of France where there are no fortified places to resist -their passage into the very heart of the country, and into that -part where great disaffection is still believed to exist.” - -_Major Fletcher, royal engineers, to sir John Moore. Betanzos, Jan. -5, 1809._ - -“I have the honour to report to your excellency that, in obedience -to your orders, I have examined the neck of land between the -harbour of Ferrol and the bridge of Puente de Humo. This ground -does not appear to possess any position that has not several -defects.” ... “I did not find any ground so decidedly advantageous, -and containing a small space, as to render it tenable for the -vanguard of an army to cover the embarkation of the main body.” ... -“I should have sent this report much sooner, but found it -impossible to procure post horses until my arrival at Lugo, and -since that time I have had very bad ones.” - -_Ditto to Ditto. Coruña, Jan. 6, 1809._ - -“I am therefore led to suggest, that as Coruña is fortified, -reveted, and tolerably flanked (though the ground about it is -certainly not favourable), as it could not be carried by a -coup-demain if properly defended, as it contains a great quantity -of cover for men; and as, even against artillery, it might make -resistance for some days, it may be worth consideration whether, -under present circumstances, it may not be desirable to occupy it -in preference to the peninsula of Betanzos, should the army not -turn off for Vigo.” - - * * * * * - -No. XIV. - -JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN MOORE’S CORRESPONDENCE. - -_Sir J. Moore to Mr. Frere. Salamanca, Nov. 27, 1808._ - -“The movements of the French give us little time for discussion. -As soon as the British army has formed a junction I must, upon the -supposition that Castaños is either beaten or retreated, march upon -Madrid, and throw myself into the heart of Spain, and thus run all -risks and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation, or I must fall -back upon Portugal.” ... “The movement into Spain is one of greater -hazard, as my retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain. -I shall be entirely in the power of the Spaniards, but perhaps -this is worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain are -thought to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover -from their defeats; and by collecting in the south be able, with -the aid of the British army, to resist, and finally repel, the -formidable attack which is prepared against them.” - -_Sir John Moore’s Journal. Salamanca, Nov. 30, 1808._ - -“In the night of the 28th I received an express from Mr. Stuart, at -Madrid, containing a letter from lieut.-colonel Doyle, announcing -the defeat of Castaños’s army near Tudela. They seem to have made -but little resistance, and are, like Blake’s, flying; this renders -my junction with Baird so hazardous that I dare not attempt it; -but even were it made, what chance has this army, now that all -those of Spain are beaten, to stand against the force which must -be brought against it. The French have 80,000 in Spain, and 30,000 -were to arrive in 20 days from the 15th of this month. As long as -Castaños’s army remained there was a hope, but I now see none. I am -therefore determined to withdraw the army.” - -_Ditto, Dec. 9._ - -“After Castaños’s defeat, the French marched for Madrid, the -inhabitants flew to arms, barricaded their streets, and swore to -die rather than submit. This has arrested the progress of the -French, and Madrid still holds out; this is the first instance -of enthusiasm shown; there is a chance that the example may be -followed, and the people be roused; in which case there is still -a chance that this country may be saved. Upon this chance I have -stopt Baird’s retreat, and am taking measures to form our junction -whilst the French are wholly occupied with Madrid. We are bound -not to abandon the cause as long as there is hope; but the courage -of the populace of Madrid may fail, or at any rate they may not be -able to resist; in short, in a moment things may be as bad as ever, -unless the whole country is animated and flock to the aid of the -capital, and in this part the people are passive.” - -_Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh. Salamanca, Dec. 10, 1808._ - -“I certainly think the cause desperate, because I see no determined -spirit any where, unless it be at Zaragoza. There is however a -chance, and whilst there is that I think myself bound to run all -risks to support it I am now differently situated from what I was -when Castaños was defeated: I have been joined by general Hope, the -artillery, and all the cavalry (lord Paget, with three regiments, -is at Toro); and my junction with sir David Baird is secure, though -I have not heard from him since I ordered him to return to Astorga.” - -_Ditto to Ditto, Dec. 12._ - -“I shall threaten the French communications and create a diversion, -if the Spaniards can avail themselves of it; but the French have in -the north of Spain from 80 to 90,000 men, and more are expected. -Your lordship may therefore judge what will be our situation if the -Spaniards do not display a determination very different from any -they have shown hitherto.” - -_Sir John Moore’s journal. Sahagan, Dec. 24, 1808._ - -“I gave up the march on Carrion, which had never been undertaken -but with the view of attracting the enemy’s attention from the -armies assembling in the south, and in the hope of being able to -strike a blow at a weak corps, whilst it was still thought the -British army was retreating into Portugal; for this I was aware -I risked infinitely too much, but something I thought was to be -risked for the honour of the service, and to make it apparent that -we stuck to the Spaniards long after they themselves had given up -their cause as lost.” - -_Sir J. Moore to lord Castlereagh. Coruña, Jan. 13, 1808._ - -“Your lordship knows that had I followed my own opinion, as a -military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. -The Spanish armies were then beaten; there was no Spanish force to -which we could unite; and from the character of the government, and -the disposition of the inhabitants, I was satisfied that no efforts -would be made to aid us, or favour the cause in which they were -engaged. I was sensible, however, that the apathy and indifference -of the Spaniards would never have been believed; that had the -British been withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been -imputed to their retreat; and it was necessary to risk this army to -convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that -the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make -any efforts for themselves. It was for this reason that I marched -to Sahagun. As a diversion it has succeeded. I brought the whole -disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been -allowed to follow it, without a single movement being made by any -of what the Spaniards call armies to favour its retreat.” - - * * * * * - -No. XV. - -This despatch from the count of Belvedere to the count of Florida -Blanca, relative to the battle of Gamonal, is an example of the -habitual exaggerations of the Spanish generals. - -(Translation.) - -Since my arrival at Burgos I have been attacked by the enemy: in -two affairs I repulsed him; but to-day, after having sustained -his fire for thirteen hours, he charged me with double my force, -besides cavalry, as I believe he had three thousand of the latter, -and six thousand infantry at least, and I have suffered so much -that I have retired on Lerma, and mean to assemble my army at -Aranda de Douero. I have sustained a great loss in men, equipage, -and artillery; some guns have been saved, but very few. Don Juan -Henestrosa, who commanded in the action, distinguished himself, and -made a most glorious retreat; but as soon as the cavalry attacked, -all was confusion and disorder. I shall send your excellency the -particulars by an officer when they can be procured. The volunteers -of Zafra, of Sezena, of Valentia, and the first battalion of -infantry of Truxillo, and the provincials of Badajoz, had not -arrived at Burgos, and consequently I shall be able to sustain -myself at Aranda, but they are without cartridges and ammunition. I -lament that the ammunition in Burgos could not be brought off. The -enemy followed me in small numbers: I am now retiring (10 P.M.), -fearing they may follow me in the morning. I yesterday heard from -general Blake, that he feared the enemy would attack him to-day, -but his dispositions frustrated the enemy’s designs, beginning the -action at eleven at night. - - (Signed) CONDE DE BELVEDERE. - - * * * * * - -No. XVI. - -EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE AUTHOR. - -“Dans la même lettre que vous m’avez fait l’honneur de m’écrire -vous me priez aussi, monsieur, de vous donner quelques lumières -sur la poursuite de Mr. le général sir John Moore, quand il fit -sa retraite sur la Corogne en 1809. Je ne pense pas que vous -désiriez des détails sur cette operation, car ils doivent vous être -parfaitement connus, mais je saisirai avec empressement l’occasion -que vous me procurez pour rendre à la mémoire de sir John Moore -le témoignage que ses dispositions furent toujours les plus -convenables aux circonstances, et qu’en profittant habillement des -avantages que les localités pouvaient lui offrir pour seconder sa -valeur, il m’opposa partout la resistance la plus énergique et la -mieux calculée; c’est ainsi qu’il trouva une mort glorieuse devant -la Corogne, au milieu d’un combat qui doit honorer son souvenir.” - -“_Paris, ce 15 Novembre, 1824._” - - * * * * * - -No. XVII. - -LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE. - - _London, Dec. 10, 1808._ - - “SIR, - -“The messenger, Mills, arrived here yesterday with your despatches, -No. 19 to No. 26 inclusive; and at the same time advices were -received from lieutenant-general sir David Baird, dated on the -29th ultimo at Astorga, which state that general to have received -intelligence from sir John Moore of the complete defeat of -general Castaños’s army, and of the determination taken by sir -John Moore, in consequence, to fall back upon Portugal, while sir -David Baird is directed by sir John Moore to re-embark his troops, -and to proceed to the Tagus. Thus at the same moment at which I -receive from you the caution entertained in your No. 20, that a -retreat into Portugal would be considered by the central junta -as indicating an intention to abandon the cause of Spain, his -majesty’s government receive the information that this measure has -actually been adopted, but under circumstances, which, it is to be -supposed, could not have been in the contemplation of the central -junta. To obviate, however, the possibility of such an impression, -as you apprehend, being produced upon the Spanish government by the -retreat of the British armies, I lose no time in conveying to you -his majesty’s commands, that you should forthwith give the most -positive assurance, that the object of this retreat is no other -than that of effecting in Portugal the junction which the events -of the war have unfortunately rendered impracticable in Spain, -with the purpose of preparing the whole army to move forward again -into Spain whenever, and in whatever direction their services -may be best employed in support of the common cause. In proof of -this intention, you will inform the Spanish government, that an -additional reinforcement of cavalry is at this moment sailing -for Lisbon, and that the British army in Portugal will be still -further augmented, if necessary, so as to make up a substantive -and effective force adequate to any operation, for which an -opportunity may be offered in the centre or south of Spain, -according to the course which the war may take. But while you make -this communication to the Spanish government, it is extremely -necessary that you should accompany it with a distinct and pressing -demand for the communication to you and to the British general of -whatever be the plan of operations of the Spanish armies. Sir John -Moore complains that he had not received the slightest intimation -of any such plan at the date of his last despatch of the 20th -ultimo; and I am afraid the appointment which you mention in your -No. 20 of general Morla to discuss with the British commanders the -mode of co-operation between the British and Spanish armies will -not have taken place till after the defeat of the Spanish armies -will have entirely disposed of that question for the present. The -language of sir David Baird, with respect to defect of information, -is precisely the same as that of sir John Moore. Sir D. Baird has -indeed had the advantage of some intercourse with the marquis de -la Romana; but the marquis de la Romana himself does not appear to -have been in possession of any part of the views of his government, -nor to have received any distinct account of the numbers, state, -or destination even, of either of the armies which he was himself -appointed to command. The British government has most cautiously -and scrupulously abstained from interfering in any of the counsels -of the junta, or presuming to suggest to them, by what plan they -should defend their country. But when the question is as to the -co-operation of a British force, they have a right, and it is their -duty to require, that some plan should have been formed, and being -formed, should be communicated to the British commander, in order -that he may judge of, and (if he shall approve), may be prepared -to execute the share intended to be assigned to him. You will -recollect, that the army which has been appropriated by his majesty -to the defence of Spain and Portugal is not merely a considerable -part of the disposeable force of this country: it is, in fact, the -British army. The country has no other force disposeable. It may -by a great effort reinforce the army for an adequate purpose; but -another army it has not to send. The proposals, therefore, which -are made somewhat too lightly for appending parts of this force, -sometimes to one of the Spanish armies, sometimes to another, and -the facility with which its services are called for, wherever the -exigency of the moment happens to press, are by no means suited to -the nature of the force itself, or consonant to the views, with -which his majesty has consented to employ it in Spain. You are -already apprised by my former despatch (enclosing a copy of general -Moore’s instructions), that the British army must be kept together -under its own commander, must act as one body for some distinct -object, and on some settled plan. - -“It will decline no difficulty, it will shrink from no danger, -when, through that difficulty and danger, the commander is enabled -to see his way to some definite purpose. But, in order to this, it -will be necessary that such purpose should have been previously -arranged, and that the British army should not again be left as -that of sir John Moore and sir David Baird have recently been, in -the heart of Spain, without one word of information, except such as -they could pick up from common rumour, of the events passing around -them. Previously, therefore, to general sir John Moore’s again -entering Spain, it will be expected that some clear exposition -should be made to him of the system upon which the Spaniards intend -to conduct the war; the points which they mean to contest with -the advancing enemy, and those which, if pressed by a series of -reverse, they ultimately propose to defend. - -“The part assigned to the British army in the combined operation -must be settled with sir John Moore, and he will be found not -unambitious of that in which he may be opposed most directly to the -enemy. The courage and constancy displayed by the junta, under the -first reverses, are in the highest degree worthy of admiration.[31] -And if they shall persevere in the same spirit, and can rouse the -country to adequate exertions, there is no reason to despair of the -ultimate safety of Spain. But it is most earnestly to be hoped, -that the same confidence which they appear to have placed in the -ability of their armies, under Blake and Castaños, to resist the -attacks of the enemy, will not be again adopted as their guide, -again to deceive them in the ulterior operations of the war. It is -to be hoped that they will weigh well their really existing means -of defence against the means of attack on the part of the enemy, -and that if they find them unequal to maintain a line of defence as -extended, as they have hitherto attempted to maintain, they will at -once fall back to that point, wherever it may be, at which they can -be sure that their stand will be permanent, and their resistance -effectual. It is obvious, that unless they can resist effectually -in the passes of the Guadarama, or in the Sierra Morena, the -ultimate point of retreat, after a series of defeats more or less -numerous and exhausting, according as they shall the sooner or the -later make up their minds to retreat, is Cadiz. Supported by Cadiz -on one side, and by the fortress of Gibraltar on the other, the -remaining armies of Spain might unquestionably make such a stand, -as no force which France could bring against them could overpower; -and the assistance of the British army would be in this situation -incalculably augmented by the communication with Gibraltar and the -sea. I am aware of the jealousy with which the mention of a British -force of any sort coupled with the name of Cadiz will be received. -But the time seems to be arrived at which we must communicate with -each other (the Spanish government and England) without jealousy -or reserve. His majesty has abjured, in the face of the world, -any motive of interested policy,--you are authorised to repeat in -the most solemn manner, if necessary, that abjuration. But if in -the midst of such sacrifices and such exertions as Great Britain -is making for Spain; if after having foregone all objects of -partial benefit, many of which the state of Spain (if we had been -so ungenerous as to take that advantage of it) would have brought -within our reach, the fair opinion of the British government -cannot be received without suspicion; there is little hope of real -cordiality continuing to subsist under reverses and misfortunes, -such as Spain must but too surely expect, and such as are at all -times the tests of sincerity and confidence. It is the opinion of -the British government that the last stand (if all else fails) must -be made at Cadiz. It is the opinion of the British government, -that this stand will be made in vain _only_ if the necessity of -resorting to it is too late acknowledged, and the means of making -it effectually not providently prepared. It is the opinion of the -British government, that on no account should the naval means of -Spain be suffered to fall into the hands of France, or those of -France to be recovered by her. It is their opinion that this may be -prevented, but to prevent it, the object must be fairly looked at -beforehand; and it is hoped that a spirit of distrust unworthy both -of those who entertain it, and of those with respect to whom it is -entertained, will not be suffered to interfere between an object of -so great importance and the means of ensuring its accomplishment. -It is absolutely necessary to lose no time in bringing this -subject fairly before the Spanish government, and if in doing so, -you should see either in M. Cevallos or in count Florida Blanca -marks of that distrust and suspicion which must fatally affect any -measure of co-operation between the British and Spanish forces, -it will be right that you should at once anticipate the subject, -and you are at liberty to communicate this despatch _in extenso_, -as the surest mode of proving the openness with which the British -government is desirous of acting, and the disdain which it would -feel of any imputation upon its disinterestedness and sincerity. -But while this object is thus to be stated to the central -government, it is not to this object alone that the services of -the British army are to be appropriated. The commander-in-chief -will have both the authority and the inclination to listen to any -proposal for any other practicable undertaking. And it is only in -the event of no such object or undertaking being presented to him -in Spain, that he is directed to confine himself to the defence of -Portugal. I am, &c. &c. &c. - - (Signed) “GEORGE CANNING.” - - -EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE, OF THE SAME -DATE AS THE ABOVE. - - _December 10, 1808._ - -“The timely preparation of the fleets of France and Spain, now in -the harbour of Cadiz, is also a point to be pressed by you with -earnestness, but at the same time with all the delicacy which -belongs to it. In the event of _an emigration to America_ it is -obvious that this preparation should be made beforehand. And in the -case of this project not being adopted, and of a resolution being -taken to defend Cadiz to the utmost, it would still be desirable -that the fleets should be prepared for removal to Minorca, in -order to be out of the reach of any use which the disaffected in -Cadiz (of whom general Morla is represented to have expressed -considerable apprehensions), might be disposed to make of them for -compromise with the enemy.” - - -EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE. - - _December 11, 1808._ - - “SIR, - -“Complaints have been justly made of the manner in which the -British troops, particularly those under sir David Baird, have been -received in Spain. - -“The long detention of sir David Baird’s corps on board the -transports at Coruña may but too probably have contributed to -render the difficulties of a junction between the two parts of -the British army insurmountable, by giving the enemy time to -advance between them. In addition to this it is stated, that -there was a total want of preparation for supply of any sort, and -the unwillingness with which those supplies appear to have been -administered, have undoubtedly occasioned as much disappointment -as inconvenience to the British commanders. Unless some change -is effected in these particulars when the army again moves into -Spain, the advance of the British troops through that country will -be attended with more difficulty than a march through a hostile -country.” - - * * * * * - -No. XVIII. - -RETURN OF BRITISH TROOPS EMBARKED FOR PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, IN 1808. - -Extracted from the adjutant-general’s returns. - - |Artil.|Caval.|Infantry.|Total. | - +------+------+---------+-------+ - | 357 | 349 | 8688 | 9394 |Commanded by sir A. Wellesley; embarked - | | | | | at Cork the 15th, 16th, and - | | | | | 17th June, 1808; sailed 12th July; - | | | | | landed at Mondego, August 1st. - | | | | | - | 379 | ... | 4323 | 4702 |Commanded by generals Ackland and| - | | | | | Anstruther; embarked at Harwich, - | | | | | July 18th and 19th; landed at Maceira, - | | | | | August 20th, 1808.| - | | | | | - | 66 | ... | 4647 | 4713 |Commanded by general Spencer; embarked - | | | | | at Cadiz; landed at Mondego, - | | | | | August 3d - | | | | | - | 712 | 563 | 10,049 |11,324 |Commanded first by sir John Moore, - | | | | | secondly by sir Harry Burrard; - | | | | | embarked at Portsmouth, April, - | | | | | 1808; sailed to the Baltic; returned - | | | | | and sailed to Portugal, July 31st; - | | | | | landed at Maceira, August 29th. - | | | | | - | ... | 672 | ..... | 672 |Landed at Lisbon, Dec. 31st, 1808. - | | | | | - | 186 | ... | 943 | 1129 |Embarked at Gibraltar; sailed Aug. - | | | | | 14th; landed at the Tagus in September. - | | | | | - | 94 | ... | 929 | 1023 |Commanded by gen. Beresford; embarked - | | | | | at Madeira; sailed Aug. 17th; - | | | | | landed at the Tagus in September. - | | | | | - | ... | 672 | ..... | 672 |Commanded by general C. Stewart; - | | | | | embarked at Gravesend; landed at - | | | | | Lisbon, September 1st. - | | | | | - | 798 | ... | 10,271 |11,069 |Commanded by sir D. Baird; embarked - | | | | | at Falmouth; sailed Oct. - | | | | | 9th; arrived at Coruña, 13th Oct.; - | | | | | landed 29th ditto. - | | | | | - | ... | ... | 1622 | ..... |Two regiments sent round to Lisbon - | | | | | from sir D. Baird’s force. - | | | | | - | ... | 2021 | ..... | 2021 |Commanded by lord Paget; embarked - | | | | | at Portsmouth; landed at Coruña, - | | | | | October 30th. - +------+------+---------+-------+ - | 2592 | 4277 | 41,472 |46,719 | - | | | | | - | | | | 1622 |Add two regiments sent to Lisbon from - | | | +-------+ Coruña. - | | | |48,341 |Grand total, of which 800 were - | | | | | artificers, waggon train, and - | | | | | commissariat. - - * * * * * - -No. XIX. - -RETURNS OF KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING, OF THE ARMY UNDER THE -COMMAND OF SIR A. WELLESLEY. - - Key: K, killed; W, wounded; M, missing. - +-----------------------+-----------------------+------+ - 1808. | _Officers._ | _Men._ | | - August. | K | W | M | K | W | M | Tot. | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+ - 15th. Brillos | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 21 | 29 | - 17th. Roriça | 4 | 19 | 4 | 66 | 316 | 70 | 479 | - 21st. Vimiero | 4 | 35 | 2 | 131 | 499 | 49 | 720 | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+ - Grand total | | | | | | | | - for | 9 | 55 | 6 | 198 | 820 | 140 | 1228 | - the campaign. | | | | | | | | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+ - - * * * * * - -No. XX. - -BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE. RORIÇA, 17th AUG. 1808. - - Extracted from the adjutant-general’s states. - - Regiments. - { {5th } } - {1st brigade, maj.-gen. Hill, {9th } 2780 } - { {38th } } - { } - Right {3d ditto, maj.-gen. Nightingale, {29th } 1722 } 7246 - wing. { {82d } } - { } - { {45th } } - {5th ditto, C. Crawfurd, {50th } 2744 } - { {91st } } - - {4th brigade, brig.-gen. Bowes, {6th } 1829 } - { {32d } } - { } - { {36th } } - Left {2d ditto, maj.-gen. Ferguson, {40th } 2681 } 5846 - wing. { {71st } } - { } - { 6th ditto (light), {95th, 2d bn. } 1336 } - { brig.-gen. Fane, {60th, 5th, bn. } } - - Artillery, 18 guns, 6 and 9 lbs. 660 660 - Cavalry 240 240 - ------ - Total British 13,992 - - { Infantry of the line, 1000 } - Portuguese, col. Trant, { Light Troops, 400 } 1,650 - { Cavalry, 250 } - ------ - Grand total, British and Portuguese, - including sick men, &c. &c. 15,642 - - * * * * * - -No. XXI. - -BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE. VIMIERO, 21st AUG. 1808. - -Extracted from the adjutant-general’s states. - - Regiments. - Right { { 5th } } - wing. { 1st brigade, gen. Hill, { 9th } 2780 } 2780 - { { 38th } } - - { { 50th } } - { 6th ditto, brig.-gen. Fane, { 60th } 2293 } - { { 95th, 2d bn} } - { } - Centre. { { 9th } } 4953 - { 7th ditto, brig.-gen. Anstruther, { 43d, 2d bn } 2660 } - { { 52d, 2d bn } } - { { 97th } } - - { { 36th } } - { 2d brigade, maj.-gen. Ferguson, { 40th } 2681 } - { { 71st } } - { } - Left { 3d ditto, maj.-gen. Nightingale, { 29th } 1722 } - wing. { { 82d } } 7612 - { } - { 4th ditto, brig.-gen Bowes, { 6th } 1829 } - { { 32d } } - { } - { 8th ditto, maj.-gen. Ackland, { 2d } } - { { 20th } 1380 } - - - { { 45th } } - Reserve.{ 5th brigade, brig.-gen. C. Crawfurd, { 50th } 2744 } 2744 - { { 91st } } - - Artillery, 18 guns, 6 and 9lbs. 660 660 - Cavalry, 20th light dragoons, 240 240 - ------ - Total British 18,989 - - Portuguese, col. Trant, {Infantry, 1400 1,650 - {Cavalry, 250 - ------ - Grand total, including sick, wounded, and missing, 20,639 - - * * * * * - -No. XXII. - -RETURN OF SIR HEW DALRYMPLE’S ARMY, OCT. 1, 1808. - -Head-quarters, Bemfica. - - +--------------+-------------+------------+--------+ - |Fit for duty. | Hospital. | Detached. | Total.| - +--------------+-------------+------------+--------+ - Cavalry | 1402 | 128 | 28 | 1558 | - Artillery | 2091 | 146 | 6 | 2243 | - Infantry | 25,678 | 3196 | 454 | 29,328 | - +--------------+-------------+------------+--------+ - Total | 29,171 | 3470 | 488 | | - +--------------+-------------+------------+--------+ - Grand total, including artificers, waggon train, &c. &c. | 33,129 | - +--------+ - - * * * * * - -No. XXIII. - -EMBARKATION RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY UNDER GENERAL JUNOT. - - +------------------------------------------------------------+ - |Key: Of=Officers.; Hor=Horses.; Hosp.=Hospit^l.; | - | Pris.=Prison^s; Cr.=Criminals. | - +---------------+-----------+----------+-----------------+---+ - | | | Absent | | | - | Present under | | without | | | - | arms. | Detached. | pay. | Total. |Cr.| - +---+------+----+--+----+---+--+----+--+---+--+------+---+---+ - | | | | | | | Hosp. | Pris.| | | | | - | Of| Men |Hor |Of| Men|Hor|Of| Men|Of|Men|Of| Men |Hor|Men| - ---------+---+------+----+--+----+---+--+----+--+---+--+------+---+---+ - Infantry |273|15,860|....|52|2078| 0|46|3281|17|895|..|22,635| ..| 13| - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Cavalry | 48| 1722|1176|..| 1| 1|..| 195| 1|...|..| 1974| ..| ..| - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Artillery| 21| 1015| 472|..| 6| ..|..|....|..|...|..| 1121| ..| ..| - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Engineers| 14| ....|....|..|....| ..|..|....| 3|...|..| 17| ..| ..| - ---------+---+------+----+--+----+---+--+----+--+---+--+------+---+---+ - - Guns 10 8 lbs. } - 16 4 lbs. } 35 - Howitzers 4 6 inch. } - - Grand total 25,747 men, 1655 horses, and 35 pieces of artillery. - - Note.--On the staff of each division there are - - 1 General of division. 1 Inspector of reviews. - 2 Generals of brigade. 1 Commissary of engineers. - 7 Aides-de-camp. 2 Officers of engineers. - - Artillery { 1 General. - { 4 Colonels. - { 2 Chefs de bataillon. - - Engineers { 1 Colonel. }The remainder in the divisions. - { 2 Captains. } - - * * * * * - -No. XXIV. - -THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT FROM A MINUTE MADE BY HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE -DUKE OF YORK IN 1808 - -Proves that sixty thousand men could have been provided for the -campaign of 1808-9 in _Spain_, without detriment to other services. - - “There are present in Portugal, - Cavalry 1640 } 31,446 - Infantry 34 battalions 29,806 } - - “Under orders to embark, { Cavalry 3410 } 14,829 - { Infantry 11,419 } - ------ - Total. 46,275 - ------ - - “Of this force the 20th dragoons and 8 battalions should remain - in Portugal. The disposeable force would then be - - Cavalry. Infantry. - - From Portugal 1313 23,575 - Under orders 3200 11,419 - Force to be drawn from Sicily 8000 - -------------- - Total 4513 42,994 - - “To this may be added four reg^s of cav^{ry} - And the two brigades of guards 2560 2434 - -------------- - Grand total 7073 45,428 - -------------- - - “When to this you add 4 battalions of infantry, which may be - spared, and the artillery, it will form a corps of above sixty - thousand rank and file.” - - Note.--The detail of names and strength of the regiments are - omitted to save space. - - * * * * * - -No. XXV. - -ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY UNDER THE COMMAND OF SIR JOHN MOORE. - - _2d Division._ _3d Division._ _1st Division._ - Lt.-gen. Hope. Lt.-gen. Fraser. Lt.-gen. Baird. - | | | - Brigades. Brigades. Brigades. - 1st. 2d. 3d. 1st. 2d. 1st. 2d. 3d. - | | | | | | | | - 4 batts. 3 batts. 3 batts. 4 batts. 3 batts. 2 batts. 3 batts. 3 batts. - - _2d Flank Brigade._ _Reserve._ _1st Flank Brigade._ - German. - Br.-gen. Alten. M.-gen. Paget. Col. B. Crawford. - | | | - 2 Battalions. Brigades. 3 Battalions. - 1st. 2d. - | | - 3 batts. 2 batts. - - _Cavalry._ _Artillery._ - Lord Paget. Col. Harding. - | | - Brigades. 11 Brigades. - 1st. 2d. | - | | 66 Pieces. - 3 reg^s. 2 reg^s. - -_Return of sir John Moore’s army, Dec. 19, 1808, extracted from the -adjutant-general’s morning state of that day._ - - +--------+----------+----------+--------+ - |Fit for | Hospital.| Detached.| Total.| - | duty. | | | | - +--------+----------+----------+--------+ - Cavalry | 2278 | 182 | 794 | 3254 | - Artillery | 1358 | 97 | ... | 1455 | - Infantry | 22,222 | 3756 | 893 | 26,871 | - +--------+----------+----------|--------+ - | 25,858 | 4035 | 1687 | 31,580 | - | | - Deduct | 2275 | Men composing { 3d reg. left in Portugal. - | | four battalions, viz. { 76th } Between Villa - +--------+ { 51st } Franca and - | | Total number { 59th } Lugo. - | 23,583 | under arms. - +--------+ - -Note.--Of 66 guns 42 were attached to the divisions, the remainder -in reserve, with the exception of one brigade of 3 lbs. - - * * * * * - -No. XXVI. - -The following General Return, extracted from especial regimental -reports, contains the whole number of non-commissioned officers and -men, cavalry and infantry, lost during sir John Moore’s campaign: - - Total. - Lost at or previous to the arrival of { Cavalry, 95 } 1397 - the army at the position of Lugo, { Infantry, 1302 } - - Of this number 200 were left in the wine-vaults of Bembibre, - and nearly 500 were stragglers from the troops that marched - to Vigo. - - Lost between the departure of the army } - from Lugo and the embarkation at } Cavalry, 9 } - Coruña, } Infantry, 2627 } 2636 - ---- - Grand total 4033 - -Of the whole number above 800 contrived to escape to Portugal, and -being united with the sick left by the regiments in that country, -they formed a corps of 1876 men, which being re-embodied under the -name of the battalions of detachments, did good service at Oporto -and Talavera. - -The pieces of artillery abandoned during the retreat were six -3-pounders. - -These guns were landed at Coruña without the general’s knowledge; -they never went beyond Villa Franca, and, not being horsed, were -thrown down the rocks when the troops quitted that town. - -The guns used in the battle of Coruña were spiked and buried in the -sand, but the French discovered them. - -N.B.--Some errors may have crept into the regimental states, in -consequence of the difficulty of ascertaining exactly where each -man was lost, but the inaccuracies could not affect the total -amount above fifty men more or less. - - * * * * * - -No. XXVII. - -The following states of the Spanish armies are not strictly -accurate, because the original reports from whence they have -been drawn were generally very loose, and often inconsistent and -contradictory. Nevertheless, it is believed that the approximation -is sufficiently close for any useful purpose. - - -STATE I. - -_Army of Andalusia._ - - 1808. Armed peasantry. Regulars. - 19th July, Baylen Unknown 29,000 - { Madrid, } - 1st Sept. { La Mancha, } -- 30,000 - { Sierra Morena, } - - -STATE II. - -Numbers of the Spanish armies in October, 1808, according to the -reports transmitted to sir John Moore by the military agents. - - Armed peasantry, - incorporated - Regulars. with the - regular troops. - - Troops upon the Ebro, - and in Biscay, 75,000 70,000 145,000 - In Catalonia, 20,000 -- 20,000 - In march from Aragon - to Catalonia, 10,000 -- 10,000 - Ditto new levies - from Grenada, 10,000 10,000 - In the Asturias, 18,000 -- 18,000 - -------- ------- - Total 123,000 80,000 - ------- - Grand total 203,000 - - -STATE III. - -Real numbers of the Spanish armies in line of battle, in the months -of October, November, and December, 1808. - -_1st Line._ - - Cavalry. Infantry. Guns. - Army of Palafox, 550 17,500 20 } Defeated and dispersed - Army of Castaños, 2,200 24,500 48 } at Tudela. - Army of Blake, 100 30,000 26 } Ditto at the battles - Army of Romana, 1,404 8,000 25 } of Zornoza and - Asturians, -- 8,000 -- } Espinosa. - Army of count Belvedere, 1,150 11,150 30 Ditto at Gamonal. - ------ ------ --- - Total 5,404 99,150 149 - - Deduct Romana’s cavalry } - and guns, which never } 1,404 -- 25 - came into the line of } - battle } - ----- ------ --- - Total, brought into 1st } - line of battle } 4,000 99,150 124 103,150 - -_2d Line._ - - Infantry. Cavalry. {Were beaten at the - { Somosierra 30th Nov.; - General St Juan’s { murdered their general - division, 12,000 -- { at Talavera, Dec. 7th, - { and dispersed. - - Fugitives from Gamonal, } {Fled from Segovia and - commanded by general } 4,000 -- { Sepulveda, Dec. 2d, and - Heredia, } { dispersed at Talavera, - { 7th. - - Fugitives from Blake’s } {Beaten at Mancilla, 29th - army, re-organised } 6,000 1,400 { Dec.; retired into - by Romana, } { Gallicia. Infantry - { dispersed there. - - Asturian levies under } 5,000 -- Were not engaged. - Ballesteros, } - - Fugitives assembled } {Defeated and dispersed, - by Galluzzo behind } 6,000 -- { 24th Dec., by the 4th - the Tagus, } { corps, at Almaraz. - ------ ------ - Total, brought into } - 2d line, } 33,000 1,400 - - * * * * * - - To cover Moore’s advance there were on the Ebro, in Biscay, - and in the Asturias, according to the Spanish and the - military agents reports 173,000 - The real number brought into the field was 103,150 - ------- - Exaggeration 69,850 - -Note.--The real amount includes the sick in the field hospitals. - - * * * * * - -No. XXVIII. - -SECTION I.--STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY CALLED THE FIRST PART OF THE -ARMY OF SPAIN, DATED OCT. 1, 1808. - - Head-quarters, Vittoria. - - King Joseph, commander-in-chief. - - General Jourdan, major-general. General Belliard, chief of the staff. - Recapitulation, extracted from the imperial states, signed by the - prince of Neufchatel. - - Officers included, present under arms. - Men. Horses. - Division imperial guard, commanded by gen. Dorsenne 2423 786 - Do. reserve cavalry, imperial gendarmes, } - and other troops } Gen. Saligny 5417 944 - Corps of marshal Bessieres 15,595 2923 - Do. marshal Ney 13,756 2417 - Do. marshal Moncey 16,636 } 22,640 3132 - Garrison of Pampeluna 6004 } - - Garrisons of Vittoria, Bilbao, St. Sebastian,} - Tolosa, Montdragon, Salinas, Bergara, } Gen. - Villa Real, Yrun, and other places of less } Lagrange 8479 1458 - note } - - { Gen. Drouet } - Troops disposeable at Bayonne and the { commanding } 20,005 5196 - vicinity, or in march upon that { 11th military } - place { division. } - - Do. employed as moveable columns in the } - defence of the frontier from Bayonne } 6042 261 - to Belgarde } - - In Catalonia, gen. Duhesme 10,142 1638 - Fort of Fernando Figueras, gen. Reille 4027 557 - Division of gen. Chabot 1434 -- - ------- ----- - Total 110,660 19,312 - ------- ------ - -Note.--At this period the Spaniards and the military agents always -asserted that the French had only from 35 to 45,000 men of all -weapons. - - -STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY, CALLED “THE SECOND PART OF THE ARMY OF -SPAIN,” OCTOBER 1, 1808. - -This army, composed of the troops coming from the grand army and -from Italy, was by an imperial decree, dated 7th September, divided -into six corps and a reserve. - - Present under arms. - Men. Horses. - 1st corps, marshal Victor, duke of Belluno 29,547 5552 - 5th Do. Mortier, duke of Treviso 24,405 3495 - 6th Do. destined for Ney, duke of Elchingen 22,694 3945 - Infantry of the viceroy of Spain’s guards 1213 ... - Cavalry ditto 456 551 - 1st division of dragoons 3695 3994 - 2d ditto 2940 3069 - 3d ditto 2020 2238 - 4th ditto 3101 3316 - 5th ditto 2903 3068 - Division of general Sebastiani 5808 185 - 5th regiment of dragoons 556 531 - German division 6067 381 - Polish ditto 6818 ... - Dutch brigade 2280 751 - Westphalian light horse 522 559 - General Souham’s division 7259 ... - Ditto Pino’s ditto 6803 ... - 24th regiment of dragoons 664 731 - Regiment of royal Italian chasseurs 560 512 - Regiment of Napoleon’s dragoons 500 474 - Artillery and engineers in march for Perpignan 1706 1430 - ------- ------ - Total of 2d part 132,530 34,786 - Total of 1st part 110,660 19,312 - ------- ------ - 243,190 54,098 - ------- ------ - Grand total 243,190 men and 54,098 horses. - - -SECTION II.--GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, OCTOBER -10th, 1808. - - KEY: - Hosp. = Hospital. - Pr. = Prisoners. - Hor. = Horses. - CH = Cav. Hors. (Cavalry Horses) - AH = Art. Hors. (Artillery Horses) - Inf. = Infantry. - - +--------------+-----------+------+----+---------------------+ - |Present under | Detached. | Hosp.| Pr.| Effective. | - | arms. | | | | | - +-------+------+------+----+------+----+-------+------+------+ - | Men. | Hor.| Men. |Hor.| Men. |Men.| Men. | CH | AH | - 1st corps, | | | | | | | | | | - duke of | | | | | | | | | | - Belluno, | 28,797| 5615| 2201| 219| 2939| ..| 33,937| 3329| 2501| - | | | | | | | | | | - 2d do. | | | | | | | | | | - -- Istria,| 20,093| 3219| 7394|1199| 5536| 30| 33,054| 3616| 802| - | | | | | | | | | | - 3d do. | | | | | | | | | | - -- | | | | | | | | | | - Cornegliano,| 18,867| 3186|11,082|2472| 7522| 219| 37,690| 4537| 821| - | | | | | | | | | | - 4th do. | | | | | | | | | | - -- Dantzic,| 22,859| 2410| 955| 40| 2170| ..| 25,984| 1791| 659| - | | | | | | | | | | - 5th do. | | | | | | | | | | - -- Treviso,| 24,552| 3833| 188| 6| 1971| 2| 26,713| 1805| 2034| - | | | | | | | | | | - 6th do. | | | | | | | | | | - -- | | | | | | | | | | - Elchingen, | 29,568| 4304| 3381| 257| 5051| 33| 38,033| 2465| 2096| - | | | | | | | | | | - 7th do. | | | | | | | | | | - general | | | | | | | | | | - St. Cyr, | 35,657| 5254| 1302| 198| 4948| 200| 42,107| 4045| 1404| - | | | | | | | | | | - 8th do. | | | | | | | | | | - duke of | | | | | | | | | | - Abrantes, | 19,059| 2247| 2137| 1| 3528|1006| 25,730| 1776| 472| - | | | | | | | | | | - Reserve, | 34,924|23,604| 3533| 733| 3553| 392| 42,382|21,225| 3112| - | | | | | | | | | | - 1st hussars | | | | | | | | | | - and 27th | | | | | | | | | | - chasseurs, | 1,424| 1463| 256| 208| 74| ..| 1,754| 1675| ..| - | | | | | | | | | | - Artillery | | | | | | | | | | - and | | | | | | | | | | - engineers | | | | | | | | | | - in march, | | | | | | | | | | - coming from| | | | | | | | | | - Germany, | 3,446| 958| 107| ..| ..| ..| 3,446| ..| 958| - | | | | | | | | | | - Moveable | | | | | | | | | | - columns for| | | | | | | | | | - the defence| | | | | | | | | | - of the | | | | | | | | | | - frontiers | | | | | | | | | | - of France, | 8,588| 477| 107| ..| 146| 19| 8,860| 268| 209| - +-------+------+------+----+------+----+-------+------+------+ - Total |247,834|56,567|32,536|5329|37,419|1901|319,690|46,828|15,068| - +-------+------+------+----+------+----+-------+------+------+ - - +-----------------------------------+-----------+------+ - | Under arms. | Detached. | Hosp.| - +-------------+-------------+-------+------+----+------+ - | Artillery. | Cavalry. | Inf. | | | | - | Men. | Hor. | Men. | Hor. | Men. | Men. |Hor.| Men. | - +------+------+------+------+-------+------+----+------+ - Of this number | | | | | | | | | - {French, |17,868|15,107|34,172|35,761|152,770|29,647|5052|31,401| - {Auxiliaries | 1,503| 968| 4,782| 4,831| 36,739| 2,889| 277| 6,018| - +------+------+------+------+-------+------+----+------+ - Total |19,371|16,075|38,954|40,592|189,509|32,536|5329|37,419| - +------+------+------+------+-------+------+----+------+ - - +-----+---------------------+ - | Pr. | Effective. | - +-----+-------+------+------+ - | | | | | - | | | | | - | Men.| Men. | CH | AH | - +-----+-------+------+------+ - Of this number | | | | | - {French, | 1771|267,629|41,565|14,253| - {Auxiliaries | 130| 52,061| 5,261| 819| - +-----+-------+------+------+ - Total | 1901|319,690|46,828|15,068| - +-----+-------+------+------+ - Grand total 319,690 men and 61,896 horses. - - -SECTION III.--STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF SPAIN, THE EMPEROR -NAPOLEON COMMANDING IN PERSON, 25th OCTOBER, 1808. - - 1148 Officers of the staff. 298 Battalions. 184 Squadrons. - - ---------------+-------------+-------+------+----------------------- - | | | | Grand total. - Present under | Detached. | Hosp. | Pr. | - arms. | | | | - Total, | | | | Cavalry Artil. - Men. Horses.| Men. Horses.| Men. | Men. | Men. horses. horses. - 249,046 55,759|33,438 4943 |34,558 | 1892 | 318,934 45,242 15,498 - - Grand total 318,934 men and 60,740 horses. - - -STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON COMMANDING, -15th NOVEMBER, 1808. - - Officers of the staff, 1064. Battalions, 290. Squadrons, 181. - - --------------+--------------+-------+-------+---------------------- - | | | | Grand total. - Present under | Detached. | Hosp. | Pr. | - arms. | | | | - Total, | | | | Cavalry Artil. - Men. Horses.| Men. Horses.| Men. | Men. | Men. horses. horses. - 255,876 52,430|32,245 8295 | 4517 | 1995 | 335,223 43,920 16,808 - - Grand total 335,223 men, and 60,728 horses. - - -SECTION IV.--THE STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN PORTUGAL, JANUARY 1st, -1808. - - Extracted from the imperial returns. - General Junot, commander-in-chief. - General Thiebault, chief of the staff. - - 1st division, general De Laborde, } - 2d ditto, general Loison, } 26 battalions, 7 squadrons. - 3d ditto, general Travot, } - Cavalry, general Kellerman, } - - 10 guns of 8 lbs. } - 22 ditto 4 lbs. } 36 pieces. - 4 6 inch howitzers. } - - Present under arms. Effective. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. - 16,190 1,114 24,735 1,377 - At Salamanca, or in march to } - join the army in Portugal. } 4,795 1,296 4,795 1,296 - ------ ------ ------ ------ - Total 20,985 2,310 29,530 2,673 - - -STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN PORTUGAL, 23d MAY, 1808. - - Under arms. |Detached. Hosp. | Effective. - Men. Horses.|Men.Horses. Men. | Men. Horses. Art. - French, 24,446 2789 | -- -- 2449 | 29,684 3586 629 - Spanish division } - of gen. Quesnel,} 9281 101 | 1087 -- 651 | 11,019 -- -- - Do. gen. Caraffa, 6309 844 | 174 13 141 | 6,624 13 -- - Portuguese troops, 4621 483 | 570 234 116 | 5,307 234 -- - ------ ---- | ---- --- ---- | ------ ---- --- - Total 38,657 4217 | 1831 247 3357 | 52,634 3835 629 - - Grand total 52,634 men, 4454 horses, and 36 guns. - - -SECTION V.--STATE OF THE “2d ARMY OF OBSERVATION OF THE GIRONDE,” -1st FEB. 1808, SPAIN. - - General Dupont, commanding. - 20 battalions, and 1 division of cavalry. - Head-quarters Valladolid. - - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Effective. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Horses. - - 20,729 2884 1303 334 2277 24,309 3218 - - Total 24,309 men, and 3218 horses. - - -SECTION VI.--STATE OF THE “ARMY OF OBSERVATION DE COTÉ D’OCEAN,” -1st FEB. 1808, SPAIN. - - Marshal Moncey, commanding. - Head-quarters, Vittoria. - - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Effective. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Horses. - - 21,878 2547 2144 -- 4464 28,486 2547 - - Train of the guard 225 509 - - Grand total 28,711 men, and 3301 horses. - - * * * * * - -No. XXIX. - -The following letters from lord Collingwood did not come into my -possession before the present volume was in the press. It will be -seen that they corroborate many of the opinions and some of the -facts that I have stated, and they will doubtless be read with the -attention due to the observations of such an honourable and able -man. - - -TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE. - - _Ocean, Gibraltar, 30th August, 1808._ - - MY DEAR SIR, - -I have been in great expectation of hearing of your progress with -the army, and hope the first account will be of your success -whenever you move. I have heard nothing lately of Junot at Cadiz; -but there have been accounts not very well authenticated, that -Joseph Buonaparte, in his retiring to France, was stopped by the -mass rising in Biscay, to the amount of 14,000 well-armed men, -which obliged him to return to Burgos, where the body of the French -army was stationed. - -At Saragossa the French, in making their fourteenth attack upon -the town, were defeated, repulsed with great loss, and had retired -from it. There is a deputy here from that city with a commission -from the marquis de Palafox to request supplies. The first aid upon -their list is for 10 or 15,000 troops. The deputy states they have -few regulars in the province, and the war has hitherto been carried -on by all being armed. In this gentleman’s conversation I observe, -what I had before remarked in others, that he had no view of Spain -beyond the kingdom of Aragon; and in reply to the observations I -made on the necessity of a central government, he had little to -say, as if that had not yet been a subject of much consideration. -I have great hope that general Castaños, Cuesta, and those -captains-general who will now meet at Madrid will do something -effectual in simplifying the government. In a conversation I had -with Morla on the necessity of this, he seemed to think the juntas -would make many difficulties, and retain their present power as -long as they could. - -I hope, my dear sir, you will give some directions about this -puzzling island (_Perexil_), which it appears to me will not be -of any future use; but the people who are on it will suffer much -in the winter, without habitations, except tents; I conceive the -purpose for which it was occupied is past, and will probably never -return; whenever they quit it, they should bring the stores away as -quietly as possible; for if I am not mistaken, the emperor has an -intention to keep them, and will remonstrate against them going. I -hope you have received good accounts from lady Dalrymple, &c. - - * * * * * - -I am to sail to-day for Toulon, where every thing indicates an -intention in the French to sail. Mr. Duff brought a million of -dollars to Seville, and has instructions to communicate with the -junta; but he appears to me to be too old to do it as major Cox -has done: he is still there, and I conclude will wait for your -instructions. Mr. Markland would accept with great thankfulness the -proposal you made to him to go to Valencia. - - I beg my kind regards, &c. - COLLINGWOOD. - -P. S. Prince Leopold is still here, and I understand intends to -stay until he hears from England. I have given passports for -Dupont and a number of French officers to go to France on parole, -ninety-three in number. General Morla was impatient to get them out -of the country. The Spaniards were much irritated against them; -they were not safe from their revenge, except in St. Sebastian’s -castle. - - -TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE. - - _Ocean, off Toulon, October 18, 1808._ - - MY DEAR SIR, - -I have received the favour of your letters of the 27th August and -5th September, and beg to offer you my sincere congratulations on -the success of the British army in Portugal, which I hope will have -satisfied the French that they are not those invincible creatures -which Buonaparte had endeavoured to persuade them they were. - -It is a happy event to have rescued Portugal from the government of -France, and their carrying off a little plunder is a matter of very -secondary consideration; perhaps it may have the good effect of -keeping up the animosity of the Portuguese who suffer, and incite -them to more resistance in future. - -The great business now is to endeavour to establish that sort of -government, and organise that sort of military force, which may -give security to the country; and the great difficulty in Portugal -will be to find men who are of ability to place at the head of the -several departments, who have patriotism to devote themselves to -its service, and vigour to maintain its independence. In a country -exhausted like Portugal, it will require much ingenious expedient -to supply the want of wealth and of every thing military. If it -is not found in the breasts of those to whom the people look up, -Portugal will remain in a hapless and uncertain state still. - -I have not heard from sir Charles Cotton how he settled his -terms with the Russian admiral; but as he has got possession of -the ships to be sent to England, they cannot but be good: the -hoisting the English flag on the fort which surrendered to our -troops, I conclude, would be explained to the Portuguese as not to -be understood as taking possession by England for other purpose -than to be restored to its prince, as was done at Madeira; but in -this instance it ought to have been thought necessary to deprive -Siniavin of the argument he would have used of the neutrality of -the Portuguese flag, with whom his nation was not at _war_. - -I left Cadiz the moment every thing in that quarter was pacific; -and Mr. Duff arrived there with a million of dollars for their use: -this money was sent to the junta of Seville, where I am afraid -there are many members unworthy of the trust. - -I have only heard once from Cox since I left that quarter. -After getting the money, father Gil seemed to have dropt his -communications with major C., and their discussions were not of -a nature to excite much public interest; they consisted more in -private bickerings than of grave consult for the public weal. Tilly -seems to have been entirely disappointed in his project, both in -respect to the annexation of southern Portugal to Andalusia and the -pension of 12,000 dollars for his service in the supreme council: -of those you will be informed by major Cox. I am afraid I related -the proceedings to his majesty’s ministers of events which were -passing almost under my eye, and gave my opinion on them with -too great freedom; I mean with a freedom that is not usual; but -they were facts of which, without being possessed, his majesty’s -ministers could not have a knowledge of the real state of affairs -in Spain; and the sentiments those facts inspired were necessary -to explain my motives and the rule of conduct which I pursued. -And still I consider the great and only danger to which Spain is -now exposed is the supposition that the whole nation is possessed -of the same patriotism which, in Andalusia, Aragon, and Valencia, -led to such glorious results. It is far otherwise: there are not -many Castaños, nor Cuestas, nor Palafox’s; and take from Spain the -influence of the clergy, and its best source of power would be -lost: wherever this influence is least, the war is languid. - -I wrote to you some time since to represent the state of Catalonia. -Nothing can be more indifferent to the cause than they appear -to be; yet the common peasantry have not less spirit nor less -desire to repel their enemy. They have no leaders. Palacio, the -captain-general, stays at Villa Franca, west of Barcelona, talking -of what he intends to do; and the people speak of him as either -wanting zeal in their cause or ability to direct them; while the -French from Barcelona and Figueras do just what they please. When -the French attacked Gerona he did nothing to succour it. The -greatest discomfiture they suffered was from lord Cochrane, who, -while they were employed at the siege, blew up the road, making -deep trenches in a part where the fire of his ships could be -brought upon; and when they came there he drove them from their -guns, killed many, and took some cannon. - -The French fleet is here quite ready for sea, and I am doing all -that is in my power to meet them when they do come out. It is -an arduous service: the last ten days we have had gales of wind -incessantly: the difficulty of keeping a sufficient squadron is -very great. I think the storms from those Alpine mountains are -harder than in England, and of more duration. - -I beg my best regards to captain Dalrymple, and my sincerest wishes -for every success to attend you. - - I am, my dear sir Hew, - Your obedient and most humble servant, - COLLINGWOOD. - -P. S. In the letter which I wrote to you on the state of Catalonia -I represented the necessity of sending a body of British troops to -Catalonia. There is no other prospect of the French being kept in -any bounds. The avenues to France are as open now as at any time -they have been. I have kept a ship always at Rosas Bay; her marines -have garrisoned the castle, and her company assisted in repairing -the works. The French appear to have designs on that place. The -presence of the English alone prevents them. If 18,000 men were -here of our army I think they would make Mr. Palacio come forward -and put the whole country into activity, which till then I don’t -think they ever will be. - - COLLINGWOOD. - -They want an English resident at Gerona, that they may have -somebody to apply to for succour.... - -[The rest torn off in the original.] - - -TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE. - - _Ocean, off Minorca, April 8, 1809._ - - MY DEAR SIR, - -I received the favour of your letter a few days ago, which gave me -great pleasure, after all the trouble and vexations you have had, -to hear you were all well. - -I was exceedingly sorry when I saw the angry mood in which the -convention in Portugal was taken up, even before the circumstances -which led to it were at all known. Before our army landed in -Portugal the French force was reported to be very small. I remember -its being said that a body of 5000 troops were all that was -necessary to dispossess Junot. I conclude the same sort of report -went to England; and this, with the victory that was obtained, led -people to expect the extermination of the few French which were -supposed to be there; and when once the idea is entertained people -shut their eyes to difficulties. - -I remember what you told me, the last time I saw you off Cadiz, of -the communications which might be made to you by an officer who -possessed the entire confidence of ministers. I thought then, that -whatever ministers had to communicate to a commander-in-chief, -could not be done better than by themselves; for intermediate -communications are always in danger of being misunderstood, and -never fail to cause doubts and disturb the judgment. I hope now it -is all over, and your uneasiness on that subject at an end. - -My labours I think will never cease. I am worn down by fatigue of -my mind; with anxiety and sorrow; my health is very much impaired; -and while our affairs require an increased energy, I find myself -less able to conduct them, from natural causes. I give all my -thoughts and time, but have interruptions, from my weak state of -body, which the service will scarcely admit of. I never felt the -severity of winter more than this last. They were not gales of -wind, but hurricanes; and the consequence is, that the fleet has -suffered very much, and many of the ships very infirm. I would not -have kept the sea so long, because I know the system of blockading -must be ruinous to our fleet at last; and in no instance that I -can recollect has prevented the enemy from sailing. In the spring -we are found all rags, while they, nursed through the tempest, are -all trim. I would not have done it; but what would have become -of me if, in my preserving the ships, the French had sailed and -effected any thing in any quarter? The clamour would have been -loud, and they would have sought only for the cause in my treachery -or folly, for none can understand that there is any bad weather in -the Mediterranean. The system of blockade is ruinous; but it has -continued so long, and so much to the advantage of the mercantile -part of the nation, that I fear no minister will be found bold -enough to discontinue it. We undertake nothing against the enemy, -but seem to think it enough to prevent him taking our brigs: his -fleet is growing to a monstrous force, while ours every day gives -more proof of its increasing decrepitude. - -Of the Spaniards I would not say much; I was never sanguine in -the prospect of success, and have no reason to change my opinion: -the lower class of people, those who are under the influence of -priests, would do any thing were they under proper direction; but -directors are difficult to be found. There is a canker in the -state: none of the superior orders are serious in their resistance -to the French, and have only taken a part against them thus far -from the apprehension of the resentment of the people. I believe -the junta is not free from the taint of the infection, or would -they have continued Vives Don Miguel in high and important command -after such evident proofs as he gave of want of loyalty? I do not -know what is thought of Infantado in England; but in my mind, -the man, the duke (for his rank has a great deal to do with it), -who would seat himself in Buonaparte’s council at Bayonne, sign -his decrees, which were distributed in Spain, and then say he was -forced to do it, is not the man who will do much in maintaining -the glory or the independence of any country, no such man should -be trusted now. The French troops are mostly withdrawn from Spain, -except such as are necessary to hold certain strong posts, and -enable them to return without impediment. Figueras, Barcelona, and -Rosas, are held here in Catalonia, and of course the country quite -open to them. Will the Spaniards dispossess them? The junta does -not seem to know any thing of the provinces at a distance from -them. At Tarragona the troops are ill clothed, and without pay; -on one occasion they could not march against the enemy, having no -shoes; and yet at Cadiz they have 51 millions of dollars. Cadiz -seems to be a general depôt of every thing they can get from -England. If they are not active the next two months Spain is lost. - -I hope lady Dalrymple, &c. &c. - - I ever am, my dear sir, - Your very faithful and obedient servant, - COLLINGWOOD. - - - END OF VOL. I. - - - LONDON: - PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] For a description of this organization, the reader is referred -to the “Precis des Evénemens Militaires, par Mathieu Dumas;” a work -of infinite labour and research, in which the military story of ten -years is told with unrivalled simplicity and elegance. - -[2] - - Viz.:-- about 30,000 Cavalry, - 6,000 Foot Guards, - 170,000 Infantry of the line, - 14,000 Artillery. - ------- - Total, 220,000 - -Of these, between 50 and 60,000 were employed in the Colonies and -in India; the remainder were disposable, because from 80 to 100,000 -militia, differing from the regular troops in nothing but the -name, were sufficient for the home duties. If to this force we add -30,000 marines, the military power of England must be considered -prodigious. - -[3] The anagram of Llorente. - -[4] I think it necessary to state, in addition to the authorities -quoted in the margin, that I have derived my information from -officers, some French, some Italian, who were present in the tumult -of the 2d of May. On the veracity of my informants I have the -firmest reliance; their accounts agreed well, and the principal -facts were confirmed by the result of my personal inquiries at -Madrid in the year 1812. - -[5] Five sail of the line and one frigate. - -[6] Forty-two thousand dollars. - -[7] Tio Jorge and Tio Marin, which may be rendered goodman Jorge, -and goodman Marin, were two of the real chiefs whose energy saved -Zaragoza in the first siege. - -[8] The late Lord Melville. - -[9] This transaction furnishes an example of the imprudence of -being precipitate in granting public honours. Lord Strangford’s -despatch relative to the emigration was written (as it is -confidently asserted) not at Lisbon, but at Salt Hill, in the -presence of sir James Yeo. His lordship (unintentionally of -course) impressed the ministers with an idea that to his personal -exertions the emigration should be attributed; whereas the prince -regent of Portugal, yielding to the vigorous negotiations of -sir Sydney Smith, not only embarked on the 27th, _before_ lord -Strangford arrived at Lisbon, but actually sailed without his -lordship’s having had any official interview with his royal -highness, and consequently without having had any opportunity to -advance or retard the emigration. The English ministers, eager -to testify their satisfaction at that event, conferred the red -riband, not upon sir Sydney Smith, who had succeeded, but upon lord -Strangford, who had failed! a result that his lordship could not -have anticipated, or he would undoubtedly have written his despatch -at Lisbon when the facts were fresh on his mind, and when he could -have more forcibly described the admiral’s share in the transaction. - -[10] The coast of Portugal. - -[11] This is a remarkable instance of ministerial confusion; -the despatch from sir Hew Dalrymple referred to as giving this -“assurance,” not only made no mention of a promise to the junta of -Seville, but the junta itself was not in existence at the time his -despatch was written. - -[12] The occupation of Cadiz was a favourite project with the -English government at this period. They were not discouraged by -Spencer’s unsuccessful efforts to gain admittance, nor by the -representations of sir Hew Dalrymple, who had grounds for believing -that any attempt to introduce British troops there, would bring -down the greater part of Castaños’ army to oppose it by force; nor -by the consideration that in a political view such a measure would -give a subject for misrepresentation to the enemy’s emissaries, -and that, in a military view, the burthen of Cadiz would clog all -general operations in Portugal. - -[13] The ministers were so intent upon occupying Cadiz, and so -little acquainted with the state of public feeling in Andalusia, -that one of those generals carried with him his appointment as -governor of that city. - -[14] Yet lord Byron has gravely asserted in prose and verse that -the convention was signed at the marquis of Marialva’s house at -Cintra; and the author of “The Diary of an Invalid,” improving upon -the poet’s discovery, detected the stains of the ink spilt by Junot -upon the occasion. - -[15] There is good reason to believe, that a silly intrigue carried -on through the medium of the princess of Tour and Taxis with -Talleyrand, and some others, who were even then ready to betray -Napoleon, was the real cause of the negotiation having been broken -off by Mr. Canning. - -[16] Sir Walter Scott, in his Life of Napoleon, inaccurately -asserts, that sir John Moore, “sent ten thousand men, under sir -David Baird, by sea, to Coruña,” and that “_the general science -of war, upon the most extended scale_, seems to have been so -little understood or practised by the English generals at this -time, that instead of the country being carefully reconnoitred -by officers of skill, the march of the army was arranged by such -hasty and inaccurate information as could be collected from the -peasants. _By their reports general Moore was induced to divide -his army_”----What “_the general science of war upon an extended -scale_” may mean, I cannot pretend to say; but that sir David Baird -was sent by the government from England direct to Coruña, and that -sir John Moore _was not induced_ by the reports of the peasants to -divide his army, may be ascertained by a reference to the Appendix, -No. 13, section 2. - -[17] Navarre and Biscay being within the French line of defence, -the inhabitants were, according to the civilians, de facto French -subjects. - -[18] In the winter of 1812, captain Hill, of the royal navy, was -sent to Cronstadt to receive Spanish prisoners who had been taken -by the Russians. Of five thousand Spaniards that were delivered -to him, above four thousand were men who had escaped with Romana -from the Danish isles in 1808. Captives at Espinosa, they had -entered the French ranks, served in Napoleon’s continental wars, -and being made prisoners by the Russians in the retreat from -Moscow, were once more brought back to Spain in English vessels. -This is a curious commentary upon the silly stories that have been -promulgated relative to the desperate fighting of Blake’s army, and -the devoted courage with which, _Spartan-like_, Romana’s soldiers -died to a man upon the field of battle. - - MEN. - Landed at Gihon, 9th October, 1808 9,404 - Deduct cavalry, which never joined Blake’s army 1,404 - ----- - 8,000 - Prisoners delivered to captain Hill 4,500 - ----- - 3,500 - -Now, if we make allowance, 1º. For natural and violent deaths -during four years of service under Napoleon, 2º. For those who -might not have been taken by the Russians, and if we believe that -some _might possibly have escaped from Espinosa alive_, the number -of Spartans will probably be thought not to have exceeded the -classical number of 300. - -[19] Dukes of Infantado, of Hijar, Medina Celi, and Ossuna; -marquis Santa Cruz; counts Fernan, Miñez, and Altamira; prince of -Castello Franco, Pedro Cevallos, and the bishop of St. Ander, were -proscribed, body and goods, as traitors to France and Spain. - -[20] The following remarkable instance of courage and discipline -deserves to be recorded. John Walton, a native of the south of -Ireland, and Richard Jackson, an Englishman, were posted in a -hollow road on the plain beyond the bridge, and at a distance from -their piquet. If the enemy approached, one was to fire, run back to -the brow of the hill, and give notice if there were many or few; -the other was to maintain his ground. A party of cavalry following -a hay cart stole up close to these men, and suddenly galloped in, -with a view to kill them and surprise the post. Jackson fired, -but was overtaken, and received twelve or fourteen severe wounds -in an instant; he came staggering on, notwithstanding his mangled -state, and gave the signal. Walton, with equal resolution and more -fortune, defended himself with his bayonet, and wounded several of -the assailants, who retreated, leaving him unhurt; but his cap, -his knapsack, his belts, and his musquet were cut in above twenty -places, and his bayonet was bent double, his musquet covered with -blood, and notched like a saw from the muzzle to the lock. Jackson -escaped death during the retreat, and finally recovered of his -wounds. - -[21] Several thousand infantry slept in the long galleries of an -immense convent built round a square; the lower corridors were -filled with the horses of the cavalry and artillery, so thickly -stowed that it was scarcely possible for a single man to pass them, -and there was but one entrance. Two officers returning from the -bridge, being desirous to find shelter for their men, entered the -convent, and with horror perceived that a large window shutter -being on fire, and the flame spreading to the rafters above, in -a few moments the straw under the horses would ignite, and six -thousand men and animals would inevitably perish in the flames. -One of the officers, (captain Lloyd, of the forty-third,) a man of -great activity, strength, and presence of mind, made a sign to his -companions to keep silence, and springing on to the nearest horse, -run along the backs of the others until he reached the flaming -shutter, which he tore off its hinges and cast out of the window; -then returning quietly, awakened some of the soldiers, and cleared -the passage without creating any alarm, which in such a case would -have been as destructive as the flames. Captain Lloyd was a man of -more than ordinary talents; his character has been forcibly and -justly depicted in that excellent little work called the “_Life of -a Sergeant_.” - -[22] - - Lorges’s dragoons 1,400 - La Houpaye’s ditto 1,450 - Franceschi’s light cavalry 1,350 - ----- - Total 4,200 - -[23] Ninety-fifth regiment. - -[24] I am aware that the returns laid before Parliament in 1809 -make the sum 60,000_l._, and the whole loss during the campaign -nearly 77,000_l._; but it is easier to make an entry of one sum -for a treasury return, than to state the details accurately. The -money agents were, like the military agents, acting independently, -and all losses went down under the head of abandoned treasure. My -information is derived from officers actually present, and who all -agree that the only treasure abandoned was that at Nogales, and -that the sum was 25,000_l._ When it was ordered to be rolled over -the brink of the hill, two guns, and a battalion of infantry, were -actually engaged with the enemy to protect it, and some person in -whose charge the treasure was, exclaiming, “it is _money_!” the -general replied, “so are shot and shells.” The following anecdote -will show how such accidents may happen in war. An officer had -charge of the cars that drew this treasure; in passing a village, -a lieutenant of the fourth regiment observing that the bullocks -were exhausted, took the pains to point out where fresh and strong -animals were to be found, and advised that the tired ones should -be exchanged for others more vigorous, which were close at hand; -but the escorting officer, either ignorant of, or indifferent to -his duty, took no notice of this recommendation, and continued his -march with the exhausted cattle. - -[25] The author’s eldest brother. He was returned amongst the -killed. When the French renewed the attack at Elvina he was, with -a few men, somewhat in advance of the village, for the troops -were broken into small parties by the vineyard walls and narrow -lanes. Being hurt, he endeavoured to return, but the enemy coming -down, he was stabbed, and thrown to the ground with five wounds; -and death appeared inevitable, when a French drummer rescued him -from his assailants, and placed him behind a wall. A soldier with -whom he had been struggling, irritated to ferocity, returned to -kill him, but was prevented by the drummer. The morning after -the battle the duke of Dalmatia being apprised of major Napier’s -situation, had him conveyed to good quarters, and with a kindness -and consideration very uncommon, wrote to Napoleon, desiring that -his prisoner might not be sent to France, which (from the system of -refusing exchanges) would have been destruction to his professional -prospects. The marshal also obtained for the drummer the decoration -of the legion of honour. The events of the war obliged Soult to -depart in a few days from Coruña, but he recommended major Napier -to the attention of marshal Ney; and that marshal also treated his -prisoner with the kindness of a friend rather than the rigour of -an enemy, for he quartered him with the French consul, supplied -him with money, gave him a general invitation to his house on -all public occasions, and refrained from sending him to France. -Nor did marshal Ney’s kindness stop there; for when the flag of -truce arrived, and that he became acquainted with the situation of -major Napier’s family, he suddenly waved all forms, and instead -of answering the inquiry by a cold intimation of his captive’s -existence, sent him, and with him the few English prisoners taken -in the battle, at once to England, merely demanding that none -should serve until regularly exchanged. I should not have dwelt -thus long upon the private adventures of an officer, but that -gratitude demands a public acknowledgment of such generosity, and -the demand is rendered imperative by the after misfortunes of -marshal Ney. The fate of that brave and noble-minded man is well -known. He who had fought five hundred battles for France, not one -against her, was shot as a traitor! - -[26] The loss of the English army was never officially returned, -but was estimated by sir John Hope at about eight hundred. The -French loss I have no accurate account of. I have heard from -French officers that it was above three thousand men; this number, -I confess, appears to me exaggerated; but that it was very great -I can readily believe. The arms of the British were all new, the -ammunition quite fresh, and it is well known that, whether from the -peculiarity of our musquets, the physical strength and coolness of -the men, or both combined, the fire of an English line is at all -times the most destructive known. The nature of the ground also -prevented any movement of the artillery on either side; hence the -French columns in their attacks were exposed to a fire of grape -which they could not return, because of the distance of their -batteries. - -[27] Sir John Moore’s sentiments upon this occasion are expressed -in the following letter, which displays the pure and elevated -patriotism that distinguished him through life, and rendered his -death heroic. - - “Portsmouth, 23d July, 1808. - - “MY LORD, - - “I am this instant honoured with your lordship’s letter (by - messenger) of yesterday’s date. As I have already had the honour - to express my sentiments to your lordship fully at my last - interview, it is, I think, unnecessary to trouble you with a - repetition of them now. - - “I am about to proceed on the service on which I have been - ordered, and it shall be my endeavour to acquit myself with - the same zeal by which I have ever been actuated when employed - in the service of my country. The communication which it has - been thought proper to make to his majesty cannot fail to give - me pleasure; I have the most perfect reliance on his majesty’s - justice, and shall never feel greater security than when my - conduct, my character, and my honour, are under his majesty’s - protection. - - “I have the honour to be, &c. &c. - - (Signed) “JOHN MOORE. - - “To the Right Honourable Viscount Castlereagh.” - -[28] Note.--These two words are added in Napoleon’s own -hand-writing. - -[29] _Note by the author._--This calculation was made under the -supposition that general Avril had joined Dupont. - -[30] On ne comprend pas dans ces celculs les garnisons de -Pampelune, St. Sebastien, Vittoria, Tolosa, Bilbao, &c.: il n’est -pas question non plus de l’armée de Catalogne. - -[31] The extract which follows this letter furnishes a curious -comment on this passage. - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - In Note No. XXV in the Appendix, horizontal parentheses have been - replaced by a vertical bar |. - - Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been - corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within - the text and consultation of external sources. - - Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, - when a predominant preference was found in the original book. - - In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, some - corrections to accents have been made silently; primarily é for e, - and e for é. Incorrect spelling has been left unchanged. - - The city of Logroña is mentioned 35 times; the city of Logroño 17 - times. They are undoubtably the same city; the text has not been - changed. Castille is mentioned 43 times; Castile 15 times. They are - undoubtably the same region; the text has not been changed. - - Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, - and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. - - Corrigenda: - ‘the first class’ replaced by ‘of the first class’. - page number ‘436’ replaced by ‘426’. - - Main text: - Pg 34: ‘at the instance’ replaced by ‘at the insistence’. - Pg 78: ‘were also dedefeated’ replaced by ‘were also defeated’. - Pg 151: ‘Genaral Thiebault’ replaced by ‘General Thiebault’. - Pg 162: ‘give birth too’ replaced by ‘give birth to’. - Pg 163: ‘Guarda, Attalaya’ replaced by ‘Guarda, Atalaya’. - Pg 165: ‘into the towu’ replaced by ‘into the town’. - Pg 189: ‘Wellelley decided’ replaced by ‘Wellesley decided’. - Pg 200: ‘the 5th batallion’ replaced by ‘the 5th battalion’. - Pg 294: ‘force under Cataños’ replaced by ‘force under Castaños’. - Pg 315: ‘to develope all’ replaced by ‘to develop all’. - Pg 344: ‘to recal the’ replaced by ‘to recall the’. - Pg 346: ‘to another æra’ replaced by ‘to another era’. - Pg 356: ‘or Albazan; united’ replaced by ‘or Almazan; united’. - Pg 361: ‘Pyrennes opening’ replaced by ‘Pyrenees opening’. - Pg 363: ‘being desseminated’ replaced by ‘being disseminated’. - Pg 367: ‘and Giupuscoa. With’ replaced by ‘and Guipuscoa. With’. - Pg 400: ‘at Calahora on’ replaced by ‘at Calahorra on’. - Pg 484: ‘or, in secresy’ replaced by ‘or, in secrecy’. - Pg 506: ‘to envelope and’ replaced by ‘to envelop and’. - Pg 517: ‘If to Valladodid’ replaced by ‘If to Valladolid’. - Pg 519: ‘the Somosierrra had’ replaced by ‘the Somosierra had’. - - Appendix: - Pg ix: Missing word ‘Et’ inserted into ‘Et les communications ...’. - Pg xl: ‘route of Maffra’ replaced by ‘route of Mafra’. - Pg lxiii: ‘my last last letter’ replaced by ‘my last letter’. - Pg lxix: ‘barricadoed their’ replaced by ‘barricaded their’. - Pg lxxxii, in Note XXV : ‘bat^{ns}’ replaced by ‘batts.’. - Pg lxxxv: ‘by Galluzo behind’ replaced by ‘by Galluzzo behind’. - Pg lxxxix: ‘general Kellermann’ replaced by ‘general Kellerman’. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA, VOL. 1 OF 6. *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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