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diff --git a/old/67293-0.txt b/old/67293-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index d5beea3..0000000 --- a/old/67293-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2415 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Sixth Marine Division, by James R. -Stockman - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: The Sixth Marine Division - -Author: James R. Stockman - -Release Date: January 31, 2022 [eBook #67293] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Brian Coe, David King, and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net. (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive.) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SIXTH MARINE -DIVISION *** - - - - - - The Sixth Marine Division - - - - - THE SIXTH MARINE DIVISION - - _Prepared By_ - - James R. Stockman - Captain, U. S. Marine Corps - - HISTORICAL DIVISION - HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS - - - - -[Illustration: Map 1. Movements of the 6th Marine Division.] - - - - -[Illustration: Map 2. Okinawa Shima. Area Captured by 6th Marine -Division. 1 April-21 June.] - - - - - 1. ORIGIN - - -Last of the famous Marine divisions of World War II, the Sixth was -activated on 7 September 1944 on Guadalcanal, the same island that the -First Marine Division had landed on exactly twenty five months before. -Although the Sixth Marine Division was new in name, the elements that -composed it were, for the most part, as old as the war itself. From the -First Provisional Brigade that had fought so notably on Guam came two -regiments: the Fourth Marines and the Twenty Second Marines. The other -regiment of the new division came from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, -where it was organized, with the exception of its First Battalion, by -Colonel Victor F. Bleasdale from handpicked officers and men. - -In command of the new division was Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, -USMC, who had had a varied and colorful career in this war. He had -trained the Ninth Marines, afterwards a part of the Third Marine -Division, and was later Assistant Division Commander of the First Marine -Division during the Gloucester operation in New Britain. When the -landings on Guam were made in July of 1944, General Shepherd (then a -Brigadier) was in command of the First Provisional Marine Brigade. His -Brigade, consisting of the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines plus -reinforcing elements, fought notably on Guam and received the Navy Unit -Commendation for its excellent record. - -The Assistant Division Commander was Brigadier General William T. -Clement, USMC, another colorful figure. On the staff of Admiral Thomas -Hart in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war, General Clement -(then a Colonel) left Corregidor on a submarine. Later he served in -London, and for a while was Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools at -Quantico before returning to the Pacific. - -Of the three regiments the Twenty Second Marines was the oldest. It was -formed at San Diego in June, 1942, and the following month left for -Samoa where it remained as a part of the defense force until the fall of -1943. After an extensive training period the regiment left Samoa and -sailed to the island of Hawaii to prepare for the Marshalls Campaign. -During the Kwajalein phase it acted as a reserve and after the rapid -capture of Roi and Namur by the Fourth Marine Division, the Twenty -Second Marines, in accordance with the resulting speed-up in the Central -Pacific timetable, went on to assault Eniwetok in the Western Marshalls. -After a brief but bloody fight for Eniwetok, the regiment seized and -occupied numerous adjoining islands. From Eniwetok the Twenty Second -Marines went to Guadalcanal and trained there for the Guam Campaign. On -21 July 1944, the regiment landed on Guam on W-Day as a part of the -First Provisional Brigade. It drove inland against heavy resistance and -then turned to seal off Orote Peninsula. In conjunction with the Fourth -Marines, the Twenty Second drove the length of the peninsula and -destroyed the enemy emplaced there. - -Activated on 8 January 1944, the Fourth Marines was formed from veteran -units—the four Marine Raider Battalions. It took its name from the -famous Marine regiment that had been lost on Bataan. Its officers and -men had seen action at Tulagi, Guadalcanal, Makin, New Georgia, -Bougainville; later at Guam, and abreast of the Twenty Second Marines -the new regiment received as such, its baptism of fire, when it landed -on 21 July 1944. After fighting its way inland and seizing Mt. Alifan, -the regiment joined the Twenty Second to reduce heavily defended Orote -Peninsula. The Fourth Marines had been on one operation previous to -Guam; it had seized the island of Emirau in the St. Matthias Group, and -although the operation was bloodless, it was a triumph in planning and -execution. - -On 1 May 1944, the major part of the Twenty Ninth Marines was activated -at Camp Lejeune, New River, North Carolina. Two battalions were formed -from the pick of officers and men in the eastern part of the United -States at that time. These battalions were composed of some veterans but -the greater part had no previous combat experience. With reinforcing -elements, the regiment (less its First Battalion) crossed the United -States by rail and sailed to Guadalcanal in August. The First Battalion -joined the regiment on Guadalcanal in early October. It had been -activated from Second Marine Division troops on Hawaii in February, -1944. First called the Second Separate Infantry Battalion, it trained -for a brief time on Hawaii and then went to Saipan for that operation, -attached to the Second Division. Landing on D-Day the battalion, now -called the First Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines, was attached to the -Eighth Marines and to it fell the task of capturing Mt. Tapotchau, the -commanding terrain on Saipan. Its losses were heavy—over 60%—and the -battalion therefore was not used in the Tinian operation, which -followed. - -From the reinforcing elements of the First Provisional Brigade were -formed, in large part, the Sixth Tank Battalion, Sixth Pioneer -Battalion, the Sixth Engineer Battalion, and the division’s artillery -regiment, the Fifteenth Marines. - - - - - 2. TRAINING AND PREPARATIONS - - -When the Sixth Marine Division began its training program for its -first—and only—operation, it had several initial advantages: Over two -thirds of its officers and men were veterans, well schooled in the ways -of the wily Japanese; it started off with the experience gained from -nearly four years of war; the structure of the entire division was -organized to benefit from this experience. Through October, 1944, and on -into February, 1945, the division trained vigorously. Special emphasis -was placed on individual marksmanship, combat firing exercises employing -all weapons and arms, night problems, flame-thrower-demolition teams, -tank-infantry problems, and air-ground problems. Training was concluded -with an eight day division problem illustrating tactical principles for -large unit employment. All through the training period General Shepherd -strove to indoctrinate his division with the spirit of attack; that it -was cheaper to drive ahead in unrelenting assault than to hesitate -trying to find easier ways of achieving the objective while troops -remained in contact with the enemy. This indoctrination was to pay -dividends on Okinawa when forward progress seemed impossible. - - - - - 3. MOVEMENT TO TARGET - - -During the period 1-6 March 1945, the Sixth Marine Division was aboard -ship engaged in amphibious landing rehearsals for the Okinawa operation. -On the first day troops practiced debarkation and deployment of landing -craft; on the next two days the two assault regiments, the Fourth and -Twenty Second, landed on the beaches of Guadalcanal and practiced -limited maneuvers ashore. Then followed a critique and on the next day -there was a full-scale dress rehearsal. Although limited in their -extent, the rehearsals were quite satisfactory. - -After breaking camp ashore, the division re-embarked to sail for the -staging area, Ulithi, on 15 March. At Ulithi, a little atoll in the -Caroline Islands, the division joined the enormous task force assembling -there for the invasion of Okinawa. Training was carried out aboard ship -and final preparations made for the target. By now the troops were aware -of their destination and the force designated to land there. They were -told that the Sixth Marine Division would land simultaneously with, and -on the left of, the First Marine Division, as a part of the III -Amphibious Corps. South of the Marines a corps of Army, the XXIV, would -land. Both of the corps were components of a larger force—the new Tenth -Army. - -On the way to Ulithi, while there, and on the way to the target the men -were given a thorough briefing. General Shepherd made it plain that -every man should know not only his assigned task, but that of his own -unit, and of adjacent units, as well as the general scheme of maneuver. -In the briefing aboard ship the men learned that Okinawa had a -population of some 450,000 civilians; that there were roughly 70,000 -Japanese soldiers on the island. They also learned something about its -geography, its towns, roads, rivers and terrain. - -While at Ulithi the troops were taken ashore on the little island of Mog -Mog for rest and rehabilitation. During the staging period assault -troops were transferred to LST’s for the last part of the journey. On 27 -March the Sixth Marine Division left Ulithi, loaded in 13 APA’s, 24 -LST’s and one LSD, and encountered heavy rains and cooler weather as the -convoy moved north. - - - - - 4. OKINAWA - - -Easter Sunday, 1 April 1945, was Love-Day for the Okinawa operation. -With the bright clear dawn came enemy planes but the invading -armada—over 1400 ships—drove off or destroyed the attacking planes. From -the transports the troops could only see small portions of the island; -the preliminary bombardment from the naval task force and the bombs from -our planes, diving through the clouds, raised a haze of smoke and dust -that covered most of the area behind the landing beaches. - -Forming into long waves, the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines, loaded in -amphibious tractors, churned toward the beaches, over the coral reef, -and landed at 0837. Every man went in with the expectation that this -beachhead, like Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo, would be a bloody one; they -were surprised but not entirely relieved to find virtually no enemy -opposition to the landing. Rapidly, units organized and moved inland and -up across the terraced fields that led to Yontan Airfield. By noon the -Fourth Marines had seized Yontan and the Twenty Second Marines were -advancing as rapidly on the left. By late afternoon the two regiments -had reached a line tentatively set to be reached on the second day and -as yet had not found the enemy. To the left of the Twenty Second Marines -lay a little peninsula jutting out to the northwest, named Zampa Misaki. -It seemed likely that an enemy force might be there; General Shepherd -requested III Amphibious Corps to release from its reserve one battalion -of the Twenty Ninth Marines. The First Battalion was released to -division and placed to protect the division’s left flank. Troops dug in -for the night with mixed emotions. Everyone was extremely grateful that -the landing had not been a bloody one; still there was a certain -apprehension felt: Where was the enemy? When would he attack? - -Love-Day had been successful beyond the wildest hopes; the division was -ashore safely, in a good position, and had already secured its first -objective. Yontan Airfield was firmly in our hands and had not been -badly damaged. The enemy defensive positions constructed to guard the -field were strangely empty. Casualties were negligible; the landing had -been easy. - -Now the Sixth Marine Division moved rapidly to cut the island in two. In -conjunction with the First Marine Division which was making the main -effort, the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines drove quickly to the east -and, despite some opposition from small isolated enemy pockets, reached -the east coast on 4 April. Turning to the north, the division began to -seize the Ishikawa Isthmus. Averaging nearly 7000 yards each day the -troops pushed up the isthmus and by 7 April had reached Nago at the base -of Motobu Peninsula. - - - - - 5. BATTLE FOR MOTOBU - - -It was General Shepherd’s plan to have the Twenty Second and Fourth -continue the drive up the mainland of Okinawa until Hedo Misaki was -seized. To destroy the enemy known to be on Motobu, the General -committed the Twenty Ninth Marines, which had been in Corps reserve -during the first four days of the operation. For the time being, the -Fourth Marines was held as a reserve near the base of the peninsula. -Patrolling continued. - -Many captured enemy soldiers and civilians had stated that the main -Japanese defensive force was in southern Okinawa but that a force of -about 3000 men, commanded by a Colonel Udo, was somewhere up north, -probably on Motobu. Aerial observation and photo terrain studies -confirmed indications that there was a sizeable enemy force on the -peninsula. On 8 April the Twenty Ninth Marines moved out in three -columns, one along the south coast, one along the north coast and one up -the center toward the town of Itomi. At first progress was rapid and -there were few contacts made; it was noted, however, that all inland -trails were mined or blocked. The coast roads had numerous roadblocks -and tank traps. By 10 April the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, was at -Toguchi and had been hit by enemy artillery fire near Awa. Near Toguchi, -on the Manna road, it had contacted Udo’s force. West of Itomi the First -Battalion was also in contact with what was apparently the same force. -Meanwhile the Second Battalion had captured the enemy midget submarine -base at Unten Ko but had encountered no appreciable resistance. - -During the next three days the battalions were in almost constant -contact with Udo’s forces. Ambushes were frequent but the enemy could -not be engaged in any decisive action. It was clear that he was engaged -in guerrilla-type warfare and wanted to harass our troops but was trying -to avoid a meeting engagement. By 13 April the enemy position was -definitely fixed as being in the Mt. Yaetake area; it was known that he -had considerable artillery, mortars, and a few naval guns emplaced in -hidden positions in the wild and rugged mountain mass. - -Mt. Yaetake provided Colonel Udo with ideal ground for defensive -positions. Here he had unlimited observation in every direction; it was -impossible to attack him without warning. The rugged character of the -terrain prohibited the use of mechanized support in the reduction of his -positions. - -While the Twenty Ninth Marines were fixing the enemy position and -determining its character and strength, General Shepherd saw that he -would need additional troops to destroy Udo’s force. His tactical -decision was to move the Fourth Marines, less the Third Battalion, to -Sakimotobu on the western side of the peninsula and attach to it the -Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines which was near by. Then he ordered -a coordinated attack for 14 April with the Fourth Marines driving into -Yaetake in an easterly direction while the Twenty Ninth Marines, with -two battalions, near Itomi, attacked to the west and southwest. Udo -would be hit from front and rear. - -[Illustration: Map 3. 4th Marines Battle for Mt. Yaetake.] - -On 14 April the Fourth Marines, commanded by Colonel Alan Shapley with -the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, attached, moved rapidly inland to -seize the first high ground from which to launch the attack on Mt. -Yaetake. The Twenty Ninth Marines found enemy dispositions to its front -in such strength and on such unfavorable ground, that it was virtually -impossible to attack in a southwesterly direction. - -Resuming the attack on 15 April the Fourth Marines drove up the -approaches to Mt. Yaetake; fighting was bitter with one battalion -commander killed and several company commanders casualties. The First -Battalion, Fourth Marines, seized a key hill mass southwest of the -Yaetake peak against heavy resistance. Over rugged terrain the Twenty -Ninth Marines continued to advance into the rear of Udo’s position -against intermittent resistance. - -[Illustration: Map 4. Battle for Mt. Yaetake.] - -Next day, 16 April, the Sixth Marine Division prepared to attack the -enemy from three sides. The First Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, -which had been in immediate reserve near Awa, was ordered to advance to -the north to close the gap between the two attacking regiments. After a -day of extremely hard fighting the Fourth Marines seized Mt. Yaetake and -held it despite an all-out Banzai charge. Meanwhile, the Twenty Ninth -Marines, now under Colonel William J. Whaling, USMC, had swung its front -to the west and north, destroying fixed emplacements and enemy groups as -it moved. - -With Udo’s force caught in the jaws of a giant nutcracker, and driven -from the commanding ground in its position, the Fourth Marines changed -its tactics. Colonel Shapley ordered his two left battalions, facing -east, to initiate a holding attack on 17 April, while the two right -battalions drove down from Mt. Yaetake to the north with the mission of -seizing the Manna Road. The situation on this day then, was for the two -battalions to sweep down a corridor formed by the First and Second -Battalions, Twenty Ninth, on the east and the Second Battalion, Fourth -Marines, and Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, on the west. Down from -Yaetake and through the corridor swept the First and Third Battalions, -Fourth Marines, mopping up enemy remnants as they went. Nightfall saw -both regiments on the first hills south of the Toguchi-Itomi road, the -road that ran through Manna. - -On 19 April the Sixth Marine Division began a coordinated drive to -secure the high ground remaining between the Toguchi-Itomi road and the -north coast of the peninsula. On the left was the Fourth Marines; next -to it, the First and Second Battalions, Twenty Ninth Marines. From -Toguchi, the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth moved by truck to Itomi and -struck out through the hills toward the highest hill mass in the -northern part of Motobu, which was seized next morning. On 20 April, the -drive continued and both regiments reached the north coast without -difficulty. Little opposition had been found in this last sweep, but it -was known that several hundred enemy troops had escaped from Motobu and -were somewhere in northern Okinawa. - -The battle for Motobu had challenged the Sixth Division with mountain -warfare of the most rugged sort. It was costly: the Sixth Marine -Division lost 207 men killed, 757 wounded and 6 missing in action. In -contrast, the enemy lost 2,014 men killed. Captured enemy material -included 11 field pieces of 75 and 150-mm. calibre, two six-inch naval -cannon and large numbers of mortars, machine guns and 20-mm. dual -purpose guns. - -While the other two regiments were fighting on Motobu, the Twenty Second -Marines, commanded by Colonel Merlin F. Schneider, USMC, continued its -march up the northern part of the mainland. On 13 April the Second -Battalion moved by forced march to seize Hedo Misaki, the northern tip -of the island. Scattered resistance was encountered during the march. -Upon occupying Hedo Misaki, the regiment sent patrols down the east -coast and on 19 April, patrols from the north and south met on the east -coast at Aha. By 20 April all of Okinawa north of the original landing -beaches had been secured by the Sixth Marine Division; it was known, -however, that several small enemy groups still remained at large. - -The first of these isolated enemy groups to be located was one -consisting of about 200 men. It was contacted by the First Battalion, -Twenty Second Marines, near Taniyo-take, a hill mass southeast of Motobu -Peninsula. After two days of heavy fighting most of the enemy band was -destroyed although a few escaped to join another remnant of the Motobu -action. By 27 April this group had been located and from Hentona two -battalions of the Twenty Second Marines advanced toward the suspected -area in a forced night march. Meanwhile from Kawada the Third Battalion, -Fourth Marines hurried inland and made contact by noon. After -considerable maneuvering, the battalion outflanked the enemy and forced -him to fight on unfavorable ground. Most of the group was destroyed; a -handful escaped. - - - - - 6. BATTLE FOR NAHA - - -During the latter part of April the Tenth Army had found its XXIV Corps -heavily engaged in southern Okinawa. It was decided that the III -Amphibious Corps would be assigned the western half of the southern line -on about 7 May. It was further decided that on 1 May the First Marine -Division would be attached to the XXIV Corps and committed in the -vicinity of Machinato Airfield. Its mission was clear out the Jichaku -plateau area and then strike toward Shuri, the core of the Japanese -defensive position. The Sixth Marine Division would then be committed on -the right of the First Division. - -All through the last week in April, the Sixth Division patrolled and -garrisoned northern Okinawa. Preparations were made for the move to the -south. The regiments rested, re-equipped themselves and received -replacements. During the month of April the division had traveled over -84 miles, seized 436 square miles of enemy territory, captured 46 -prisoners and killed nearly 2,500 of the enemy. In the same period the -division had lost 236 men killed and 1,061 wounded in action. - -On 2 May the division began to move southward to assembly areas near -Chibana, east of the original landing beaches. The responsibility for -the defense of northern Okinawa passed from the Sixth Marine Division to -the Twenty Seventh Infantry Division on 4 May. - -According to Tenth Army order, the III Amphibious Corps was to assume -responsibility for the western portion of the southern front on 7 May. -The First Marine Division was already committed and was fighting to -secure the high ground north and northeast of the Asa River. The Sixth -Marine Division was ordered to commit one regimental combat team on the -right of the First Division on 8 May. General Shepherd chose the Twenty -Second Marines to be committed first. Its mission was to cross the Asa -and seize the first high ground to the south. From here, the division -could attack to carry out its mission, which was: To seize Naha and the -line of the Kokuba River in its zone of action, to assist the First -Marine Division by fire and maneuver, and to protect the Corps’ right -(west) flank. - -[Illustration: Map 5. Final Drive. Motobu Peninsula.] - -All during the fighting on Motobu, the men of the Sixth Marine Division -had heard stories of the fighting down south. They knew that the Tenth -Army had uncovered the main Japanese defensive positions; that the enemy -had chosen rough hilly ground across a narrow part of the island. The -enemy was well dug in on a high and broken hill mass which took its name -from its geographical center—Shuri. The line, or series of lines really, -ran from north of Naha through Shuri to Yonabaru on the east coast. They -had heard that the XXIV Corps had run into a virtual stalemate; that -some sixty thousand of the enemy were offering fierce resistance from -concealed positions; that the enemy was using mortars and artillery on -an unprecedented scale; and that the enemy troops in southern Okinawa -were excellent soldiers, well disciplined, and well prepared to fight a -long and costly campaign. Before the second week in May had passed the -men were certain that none of the stories were exaggerated. - -In the new zone of action, the Sixth Marine Division launched its first -attack when it sent the Twenty Second Marines across the Asa River in -the early morning hours of 10 May. Patrols had crossed the river on the -previous day and reconnoitered the ground to its immediate south. The -only bridge across the river in this sector had been totally destroyed. -Through the night of 9-10 May, the Sixth Engineer Battalion worked to -construct a footbridge. Although the little bridge was finally completed -in time for the pre-dawn attack, a group of the enemy carrying -demolitions packs succeeded in destroying themselves and a section of -the bridge before many of the Marines got across. - -At 0330, 10 May, the First and Third Battalions of the Twenty Second -Marines crossed the Asa; the First waded across upstream on the -regiment’s left, while the Third started to use the footbridge. When it -was destroyed, the battalion was forced to go upstream and wade across. -At first enemy resistance was light, but as the Japanese became aware of -this threat to their left flank, opposition became fierce. Despite heavy -artillery, mortar, and small arms fire, the troops moved on up the first -ridges. By nightfall, and after a day of heavy casualties, a bridgehead -1400 yards wide and about 400 yards deep had been established. - -Next morning the reserve battalion of the Twenty Second Marines, the -Second, was committed to cover the left flank of the First which was -fighting to reduce an enemy stronghold on a formidable coral hill -southeast of Asa village. When flanking action failed to secure the -hill, the troops withdrew so that naval gunfire from the USS -Indianapolis could be utilized. In the meantime the engineers labored -under sporadic enemy fire to construct a Bailey Bridge across the Asa, -where the footbridge had been. About noon the structure was completed -and tanks roared across to support the troops. With the added fire power -of the tanks, the First Battalion attacked the hill again, this time -successfully. Over on the right, the Third Battalion fought for three -hours before capturing the precipitous cliff area in its zone of action. - -On 12 May the Twenty Second Marines, with all three battalions in the -line, continued to advance despite increasing enemy resistance. Not only -was the regiment receiving fire from its front, but also from the left -flank, where the enemy in his positions on Wana Ridge and the Shuri -heights could observe troop movements and bring fire to bear at an -instant’s notice. As it became apparent that the division’s left was -becoming open, General Shepherd ordered the Third Battalion, Twenty -Ninth Marines into the line to protect the east flank. It was quite -plain that another regiment would have to be committed if the momentum -of advance were to be maintained. - -Next day, the Sixth Marine Division continued the attack with the Second -Battalion, Twenty Second Marines and the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, -in assault. About three hundred yards was all that could be gained due -to heavy enemy resistance. In the late afternoon the other two -battalions of the Twenty Ninth Marines moved up behind the Third, and -prepared to go into the assault on 14 May. - -By this time General Shepherd had discovered the following: (1) In -attempting to outflank the Shuri line, the Sixth Marine Division had -uncovered the western anchor of the enemy’s main defensive position; (2) -Three terrain features, heavily fortified and manned, and mutually -supporting formed this anchor; (3) Unprotected but heavily guarded -corridors led into each of these terrain features. (4) There was no -ground offering covered routes of approach, from which these terrain -features could be assaulted; (5) the three terrain features (later -called Horseshoe Ridge, Sugar Loaf Hill, and Half Moon Hill) would be -held by the enemy at all costs; if they were lost, the enemy’s main -position at Shuri would be outflanked; (6) The battle efficiency of the -Twenty Second Marines was seriously impaired; It had lost over 800 men -killed or wounded since crossing the Asa; (7) Naha, the capital city of -Okinawa, lay open in front of the Twenty Second Marines, but it could -not be seized until the Sugar Loaf defensive position, Horseshoe Ridge, -and the Half Moon were reduced and cleared of enemy. - -[Illustration: Map 6. Attack of 2nd Bn., 22nd Marines.] - -Commanding the surrounding countryside, Sugar Loaf Hill was the apex of -a triangle. All three elements of the triangle were mutually supporting: -Horseshoe Ridge and the Half Moon covered Sugar Loaf; from Sugar Loaf -the enemy could cover the other two with fire; all three terrain -features were, in turn, under observation and fire from Shuri. Troops -attacking any one of the three hills would be subjected immediately to -fire from the other two. There was no room for extended maneuver; on the -right of the division was the sea; on the left the zone of the First -Marine Division, which offered no protection or cover. - -Late in the afternoon of 14 May the Second Battalion, Twenty Second, -attempted a tank-infantry assault, and despite heavy 47-mm. fire that -drove the tanks back, succeeded in getting a few men from “G” Company up -on the top of Sugar Loaf. The attack caught the Japanese by surprise, -but only momentarily; during the night, they reorganized to launch an -attack next morning that drove the Second Battalion back from the ground -immediately to the north of Sugar Loaf, and finally spread over into the -zone of the Twenty Ninth Marines. This counterattack, in approximately -battalion strength, started a day of the bitterest fighting yet seen by -the Twenty Second Marines. The desperate character that the fight now -assumed was indicative of the enemy’s resolve to hold the Sugar Loaf -system regardless of the cost. Two battalions of the Twenty Ninth, the -First and Third, encountered the same bitter fighting that was -experienced by the First and Second Battalions, Twenty Second. In the -corridor leading to the Half Moon, the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, -finally reduced an enemy pocket that had been bypassed but had become so -troublesome as to prevent further advance. To the left, the First -Battalion was fighting in the low ground north of the Half Moon. During -the afternoon of this day, 15 May, the Third Battalion, Twenty Second -Marines, moved up to relieve the Second Battalion which had lost over -400 men in the last three days. Over on the division’s right, the First -Battalion of the Twenty Second drove down the long ridge overlooking the -Asato, but could advance no further due to heavy fire from the Horseshoe -and Sugar Loaf. - -All during the night of 15-16 May the enemy used his mortars and -artillery to interdict the front lines, causing light casualties. Early -next morning the Sixth Marine Division, with the Twenty Second and -Twenty Ninth regiments in assault, again attacked to seize the Sugar -Loaf—Half Moon positions. Heavy enemy fire greeted the attack; from near -the town of Takamotoji the enemy commenced to fire, although that area -had been quiet previously. It was apparent that the enemy was moving in -replacements and additional troops to bolster the Sugar Loaf system. -Working its way into position on the left of the regimental front, the -Third Battalion, Twenty Second Marines prepared to assault Sugar Loaf -Hill. Behind tanks, and after an intense artillery barrage, the -battalion advanced rapidly up the pitted north slope of the hill in the -face of extremely heavy fire from enemy mortars, grenades, and automatic -weapons. Several times the battalion reached the top of the hill and -closed with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting only to be driven back. -Finally, with losses steadily mounting, the battalion was forced to -withdraw. - -Hope was held for a while on this day that the Twenty Ninth Marines -might seize Half Moon Hill. Closely supported by tanks, troops moved -forward slowly and reached the edge of the ridge by late afternoon. -Before they could organize defensive positions, or dig in, the enemy -poured so much fire in from Shuri, Sugar Loaf, and the reverse slopes of -the Half Moon, that the troops had to withdraw under the cover of smoke. -Casualties were extremely heavy. - -This day, 16 May, was perhaps the bitterest day of the entire Okinawa -Campaign for the Sixth Marine Division. With all the strength at their -command, two regiments had attacked without apparent success. A week of -steady fighting had reduced the offensive capabilities of the Twenty -Second Marines so General Shepherd now shifted the burden of attack to -the Twenty Ninth, leaving the Twenty Second to hold where it was. - -Before the Twenty Ninth Marines began the attack of 17 May, the enemy in -the Sugar Loaf area was subjected to a terrific bombardment which -included 16-inch shells from the main batteries of battleships, 8-inch -howitzer shells, and 1000-pound aerial bombs. With tanks in close -support and immediately behind a heavy and continuing artillery barrage, -the First and Third Battalions, Twenty Ninth Marines edged their way to -the northern edge of Half Moon Hill. Finally the Third Battalion seized -a slim foothold on the north-western edge of the hill but intense enemy -fire made the position untenable and the troops were forced to withdraw. -Meanwhile “E” Company of the Second Battalion was attempting a flanking -attack around the east side of Sugar Loaf Hill. Despite heavy enemy -mortar barrages and grenade fire, the company drove to the top of the -hill three times; each time the enemy counterattacked and drove the men -off. Finally at 1830 in the last vestige of light, the company mustered -strength enough to assault the hill again. This time when it reached the -top it beat off an enemy counterattack, but had so few men left, and so -many wounded to be evacuated, that it had to pull back to better ground -for the night. - -At dusk, but while there was still enough light to be seen, the enemy -attempted to reinforce Sugar Loaf and began to move his troops in the -open. Almost immediately twelve battalions of our artillery took the -enemy troops under time-on-target fire and inflicted such heavy losses -that the reinforcement threat was broken up. While the Half Moon and -Sugar Loaf still remained in enemy hands, the division had made gains -that were not yet perceptible. There was no way of knowing as yet the -extent of the enemy’s losses. So far, he had been able to move in enough -reinforcements to counter our attacks, but his losses had reached the -point where he could no longer readily replace them. Meanwhile, the -Twenty Ninth Marines had got into position for the final attack, which -was to be launched next day. - -[Illustration: Map 7. 29-Th Marines Secure Sugar Loaf.] - -At 0830, 18 May, the First and Third Battalions, Twenty Ninth again -assaulted the enemy on the Half Moon. After a foothold was established -the fighting resolved itself into a slugging match, and this enabled the -Second Battalion to make its move. It first attempted to encircle Sugar -Loaf with tanks but enemy mines, 47-mm. fire, and artillery fire -disabled six tanks and drove the rest back. - -[Illustration: Map 8. Attack of 4-Th Marines.] - -Next, the Second Battalion launched a combined tank-infantry assault on -Sugar Loaf, working the tanks, closely supported by troops, around each -flank of the hill simultaneously. One tank accompanied by troops, edged -its way around the west side of the hill and commenced firing into the -enemy’s reverse slope defenses. Then, as the enemy moved to repel this -threat, another tank worked its way around the east side of the hill and -emptied its machine guns into the backs of the defenders of Sugar Loaf. -In the ensuing pandemonium troops swarmed all over the hill and, after -an hour of heavy fighting, the hill was firmly held by Marines. “F” -Company was sent to seize the Horseshoe and reduce the mortar positions -there that were firing on Sugar Loaf. The company moved rapidly across -the intervening ground, climbed up on the Horseshoe, and engaged the -enemy in a hand grenade battle. During the night the enemy -counterattacked and drove “F” Company back to Sugar Loaf but could not -regain the lost hill. Over on the left of the zone of action of the -Twenty Ninth Marines, the First and Third Battalions held their -positions at the base of the Half Moon, despite heavy enemy fire. For -the action during the period 14-19 May, the Twenty Ninth Marines, and -attached units, were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. - -In order to exploit the recently won gains General Shepherd ordered the -Fourth Marines fresh after a two weeks’ rest, to relieve the Twenty -Ninth on 19 May. On the right of the division’s front, the Twenty Second -Marines remained in position, but were in no condition to continue the -attack. After relieving the Twenty Ninth Marines, the Fourth prepared to -attack next day to seize the upper reaches of the Asato River. The night -of 19 May saw the enemy making full use of his mortars and artillery but -casualties were light. Next morning the Fourth Marines attacked -Horseshoe Ridge and managed to seize a part of it. While the fighting -raged, the enemy on the Shuri Hill mass turned his weapons and hit the -flank of the Fourth with heavy fire. At 2130, following a terrific -90-mm. mortar barrage, the enemy commenced to counterattack with Sugar -Loaf as the objective. Centering on the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines, -the counterattack continued until midnight. During this time naval star -shells kept the critical area illuminated and six battalions of -artillery fired to break up the counterattack. Before the enemy was -driven back, it was necessary to commit part of the regimental reserve. -In this unsuccessful counterattack, the enemy lost nearly 300 killed -while the Fourth Marines only lost 1 man killed and 19 wounded. - -On 21 May the Fourth Marines made slight gains in the interior of -Horseshoe Ridge but the foothold on the Half Moon could not be expanded. -Until Shuri fell it would be virtually impossible to take the Half Moon -in its entirety. It was futile to attack on the left. Now the emphasis -was shifted to the regiment’s right and on the morning of 22 May the -front lines advanced slowly to the Asato. - -Employing a holding attack on the extreme left of the division front, -General Shepherd was ready to exploit his gains. After a thorough -reconnaissance of the ground just across the Asato, the Fourth Marines -moved two battalions across the river during the afternoon of 23 May and -ran into determined enemy resistance. The position of the Fourth -Marines, while not precarious, was extremely difficult. Two attempts to -bridge the Asato had failed; all food, water and ammunition had to be -carried across by hand. The past three days had brought unusually heavy -rains and the entire division zone of action was a sea of mud. Wading -through mud ankle deep, stretcher bearers had a hard time getting the -wounded back to evacuation points north of the rear. Few vehicles could -negotiate the morass of mud that characterized the area. These rains -were to continue until the last of May. - -[Illustration: Map 9. Attack of Fourth Marines. Asato River Area.] - -On 25 May the Fourth Marines resumed the attack and seized most of the -north-south ridge line west of Machishi. About a company of the enemy -counterattacked during the night and spent its force in the sector of -the Third Battalion. While the Fourth Marines were moving into the -eastern outskirts of Naha, the Division Reconnaissance Company crossed -the Asato near its mouth and penetrated the urban portion of Naha west -of the north-south canal. Enemy resistance was very light; only a few -snipers harassed the company. Next day, with the heavy rain still -falling, the Fourth Marines confined its efforts to vigorous patrolling. -The reconnaissance company moved 300 yards further into Naha. - -Unmistakable signs on 26 May pointed toward a Japanese withdrawal from -the Shuri position. In order to determine the extent of the withdrawal -to the front of the Sixth Marine Division, all units commenced -patrolling. Part of the Second Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, crossed -the Asato and passed through the Reconnaissance Company while pushing -farther into Naha. The city was almost a total wreck. Only a few -buildings around the outskirts remained standing and these were badly -damaged. During the day the Fourth Marines sent patrols over 300 yards -forward of the lines and found only light opposition. - -Again General Shepherd reoriented his attack; he ordered the Twenty -Second Marines to complete the capture of Naha and be prepared to -advance through the hills that overlook the Kokuba River from the north. -At the same time, he ordered the Twenty Ninth Marines to relieve the -Fourth, and to be prepared to continue the attack to the southeast -toward the Shichina hills. On 28 May the Twenty Ninth Marines commenced -to relieve the Fourth Marines; at the same time, the Twenty Second -Marines completed the capture of urban Naha, the part that lies to the -west of the north-south canal. - -Initially, the Twenty Ninth Marines were to carry out a holding attack -while supporting the Twenty Second Marines by fire. On 29 May, with the -Twenty Ninth Marines holding on its left, the Twenty Second Marines -crossed the north-south canal and commenced to fight through the low -hills that lead to Shichina, and parallel the Kokuba River. The attack -moved rapidly at first on the right but the enemy rear guard, stationed -in the hills to the front of the two regiments, began to resist more -fiercely, and it wasn’t until 1 June that the two regiments were able to -clean out the enemy in the Shichina area; now the division could look -down from its position above the Kokuba and see the Naha-Yonabaru -cross-island highway. Across the river, troops could see destroyed -materiel abandoned by the enemy in his hasty withdrawal to the south. - -The Twenty Second Marines rested now for the first time since crossing -the Asa River on 10 May. For this period the regiment, and its attached -units, was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. In the drive from the -Asa to the Kokuba casualties had been heavy. - - - - - 7. BATTLE FOR OROKU - - -After the seizure of Naha and the area to its east the Sixth Marine -Division prepared to continue its drive to the south by making an -amphibious landing on Oroku. General Shepherd ordered his Division -Reconnaissance Company, a flexible group that worked under G-2 or G-3 as -the situation demanded, to cross the estuary during the night of 1-2 -June and reconnoiter possible landing beaches as well as explore the -area inland where the beachhead would be established. Using plastic -boats, the company made its reconnaissance and returned to Naha at 0300, -2 June, to report that the northern part of Oroku Peninsula was occupied -by the enemy but not in great strength. - -The plan for the reduction of enemy forces on Oroku was simple and -complete; it left the Japanese no alternatives except to surrender or -die. The Fourth Marines were to make a dawn landing on 4 June and as the -beachhead expanded, the Twenty Ninth Marines were to go in on the left -of the Fourth. With two regiments attacking abreast, the plan called for -the other regiment, the Twenty Second Marines, to throw a cordon-like -line across the base of the peninsula in conjunction with the First -Marine Division as it crossed both forks of the Kokuba river and drove -south. Then with the Twenty Second facing northwest and preventing the -enemy from escaping, the two assault regiments would drive east and -southeast to exterminate the enemy defenders of Oroku. - -After the rainy weather of the last week in May and the first few days -in June, the Sixth Marine Division faced a tremendous logistical -problem. Initially the assault regiments would have to be supplied by -amphibious craft over the same route used for the landing. As the attack -moved to the southeast, there was a chance that the Naha Estuary could -be bridged by using little Ona Yama island, which lay in the center of -the estuary, almost equidistant from Naha and Oroku. There were a few of -the enemy on Ono Yama; these would have to be killed before the -engineers could commence their bridging efforts. Simultaneously then, -with the landing of the Fourth Marines on Oroku, the Sixth -Reconnaissance Company was ordered to land on, and secure, Ono Yama. All -through 2-3 June amphibious trucks (DUKWS) and tractors carried supplies -and equipment over impassable roads to the beach at Naha where the -landing was to be launched. - -[Illustration: Map 10. Beachhead On Oroku.] - -Before dawn, 4 June, the preliminary bombardment commenced on Oroku and -Ono Yama. At 0551, the Fourth Marines landed two battalions without any -great difficulty. Early enemy resistance was light and the troops moved -rapidly inland. At 1000 the Twenty Ninth Marines commenced to load a -battalion to send across to join the Fourth. In the meantime, the -Division Reconnaissance Company had landed on Ono Yama and killed a -handful of Japanese. - -Defending Oroku were mixed troops. There were some regular units, some -Okinawa Home Guardsmen, and some were naval and air personnel from units -stationed at Naha Port, and Naha Airfield. The rough character of the -terrain on Oroku, with the exception of the flat ground around the -airfield, lent itself to the defenders. From carefully prepared cave -positions they could use the machine guns, 40 and 20-mm. antiaircraft -guns that had been stripped from the defenses of the airfield. This -enemy group on Oroku, some 5000 strong, had resigned themselves to -making a last ditch stand on the peninsula. Initially, however, the -amphibious landing of the Fourth Marines caught them by surprise. With -the advance of the First Division across the Kokuba toward Itoman, the -enemy apparently decided that Oroku would be attacked from its base, not -its northwest tip, and was originally deployed to fight off any thrust -from the base. - -[Illustration: Map 11. Front Lines On Oroku.] - -It was indeed unfortunate then, that because of two factors beyond its -control, the Sixth Marine Division was not afforded the opportunity of -really capitalizing on its tactical surprise to the enemy. The rainy -weather through the latter part of May and early June had made Oroku -extremely muddy. What few roads there were that led inland from the -landing beaches were either mined or had sections blown out so that our -tanks could not use them. The rice paddies, fields and hills, ankle to -knee deep with mud, were heavily mined, precluding the possibility of -tank movement and causing the infantry to move with utmost caution. At a -time when speed could have meant rapid gains, the division found itself -forced to let the rifle companies fight as best they could and without -many of their supporting arms. The brief respite gained by the enemy -allowed him to redeploy his forces to resist the attack of the Fourth -and Twenty Ninth Marines. - -[Illustration: Map 12. Last Pocket of Resistance on Oroku.] - -It wasn’t until 13 June that the enemy forces on Oroku were destroyed. -The Fourth Marines, after landing on 4 June, had seized the first hills -inland and then as the Twenty Ninth came in on the left, the Fourth -secured Naha Airfield and drove to the southeast in an encircling -maneuver. Facing the enemy from the east, the Twenty Second Marines kept -him bottled up and harassed his rear. On the left, driving down the long -ridge that parallels the estuary, the Twenty Ninth moved slowly. In the -extreme broken terrain that characterized Oroku, the enemy resisted -fiercely using all the weapons at his command to prevent the advancing -Marines from crossing the numerous compartments, and denying them the -use of the corridors. - -The advance was slow and the action costly. In addition to his automatic -weapons, small arms, grenade discharges and mortars, the enemy had -320-mm. spigot mortars and artillery. Cut off, surrounded, and assaulted -from all sides, the enemy was exacting a final price for the peninsula. -It was not until 12 June that the first real break in his carefully -coordinated defense became apparent. On this day, converging forces of -the Fourth Marines and the Twenty Ninth had the enemy completely -encircled. From his positions, the enemy could look to the northwest and -see the Twenty Ninth; turning to the south, he could see the Fourth -Marines driving in on his flank; behind him was the Twenty Second -Marines, moving in slowly to complete his doom. - -During the afternoon of 12 June, some enemy groups came out waving white -surrender flags. Others refused to surrender and pressed grenades to -their stomachs. Still others allowed themselves to be killed while -offering only feeble resistance. In most, the will to live was gone; -they were resigned to their fate. Next day, 861 Japanese were killed and -73 taken prisoner. - -Before the capture of Oroku could be called complete, there remained to -be taken the small island of Senaga Shima. After a heavy preliminary -bombardment, the Sixth Division’s Reconnaissance Company, with a company -from the Twenty Ninth Marines attached, landed on the island and quickly -seized it. Only two of the enemy were found and killed but many fine -coastal guns were captured. Now the battle for Oroku was over. The enemy -had resisted bitterly, 1,608 Marines were killed or wounded in the -capture of the peninsula, and thirty of our tanks were lost. During the -ten days of fighting the Sixth Marine Division had killed almost 5,000 -Japanese and had captured nearly 200. For its excellent work in landing -on the peninsula, seizing the airdrome and then driving around the -enemy’s position to overwhelm him from the flank, the Fourth Marines was -awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. - - - - - 8. END OF CAMPAIGN - - -On 15 June the III Amphibious Corps instructed the Sixth Marine Division -to be prepared to pass through the right of the First Marine Division on -Mezado Ridge on 17 June. The mission assigned the Sixth Marine Division -was to seize Kuwanga Ridge, part of Ibaru Ridge, and the Kiyamu Gusuku -hill mass. Although their plight was hopeless, the enemy still held out -in the southernmost part of Okinawa, evidently intent upon exacting as -stiff a price, in terms of lives, as possible before being destroyed. -Like a trapped animal, the Japanese were resisting bitterly and from -their positions on the hills and ridges, were delaying the attackers as -long as possible. - -With its zone of action limited in width, the Sixth Division committed -the Twenty Second Marines at 0300, 17 June. To reach Mezado Ridge, the -regiment had to advance past Kunishi through open ground swept by enemy -fire. During the hours of daylight, the First Division, fighting on -Kunishi and Mezado Ridge, was forced to use tanks to supply the front -lines and evacuate the wounded. By moving before daylight the Twenty -Second Marines had little difficulty in reaching positions from which to -launch an attack to secure Mezado Ridge. After an intense preliminary -artillery, naval gunfire, and aerial bombardment on Mezado Ridge, Hill -69 and Kuwanga Ridge, the First and Third Battalions attacked at 0730. -The advance was slow and difficult due to increasing enemy resistance. -With every weapon at his command the enemy brought fire to bear on the -assault battalions. By late afternoon the attack had moved up on the -western part of Mezado Ridge; the Third Battalion had captured the key -high ground around Hill 69, and could see Kuwanga Ridge to the south. - -Next morning, 18 June, the Twenty Second Marines continued the attack, -passing the Second Battalion through the Third, which was left to mop up -in its immediate area. Against heavy resistance the Second Battalion -advanced to Kuwanga Ridge and by late afternoon had a firm hold on the -ridge. While moving through the Mezado Area to inspect his regiment’s -attack, Colonel H. C. Roberts, USMC, the Commanding Officer of the -Twenty Second Marines, was shot through the heart by a sniper. - -Although the Second Battalion had a foothold on Kuwanga Ridge, it could -not hold the entire length of the ridge, some 1800 yards, and General -Shepherd decided to move up a battalion of the Fourth Marines on the -left in order to hold the ridge through the night. On the next day he -could continue the attack to the south with a fresh regiment. - -Early in the morning of 19 June, the Fourth Marines with the First and -Third Battalions abreast, assaulted Ibaru Ridge and, after a brisk -fight, had seized the ridge by noon. After a hasty reorganization on the -ridge, the regiment attacked again, this time to capture the -Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass. Immediately upon leaving Ibaru the Fourth -Marines ran into heavy enemy fire from mortars emplaced behind the hill -mass and machine guns firing from concealed positions on it. Just before -dark the regiment succeeded in gaining a small foot hold on the high -plateau of the hill mass. During the afternoon the little island just -offshore from Nagasuku was seized by a quickly assembled task force -consisting of three amphibious tractors, two 37-mm. platoons and a War -Dog platoon. In the brief action 20 Japanese soldiers were killed and 8 -taken prisoner. - -On 19 June the Sixth Marine Division committed two battalions of the -Twenty Ninth Marines on the right of the Fourth Marines in preparation -for a final assault to seize the 5000 square yards of ground remaining. -Next day at 0700 both regiments attacked, the Twenty Ninth to drive to -the coast, and the Fourth to complete the seizure of the Kiyamu-Gusuku -Ridge. Against light opposition, the Twenty Ninth Marines advanced -rapidly and reached the southern coast. Harassing long range fire from -the regiment’s left caused few casualties. The enemy in this sector -began to surrender. An LCI, equipped with a loud-speaker, moved along -the coast calling to the remaining Japanese to give themselves up. Over -700 Japanese officers and men surrendered during the day. - -[Illustration: Map 13. Battle for Ara-Saki Peninsula.] - -Meanwhile over on the division’s left, the Fourth Marines were engaged -in a bloody fight to secure Kiyamu-Gusuku Ridge. From their positions in -the hill mass the Japanese resisted desperately with intense mortar and -small arms fire. After a day of bitter fighting the Second Battalion -captured Hill 80, the peak of the hill mass, but the remainder of the -ground was still held by the enemy. - -Resuming its attack on 21 June the Fourth Marines turned from frontal -assaults and flanking attacks to a double envelopment from the rear. -Early in the morning the two flank battalions sent companies around -either extremity of the ridge and at 0800 struck the enemy’s rear in a -coordinated attack. For two hours the enemy fought back bitterly but -could not halt the assaulting Marines. With the fall of the -Kiyamu-Gusuku Ridge all organized resistance in the Sixth Marine -Division’s zone of action ceased. - -During all but thirteen of the eighty two days that the Okinawa Campaign -lasted, the Sixth Marine Division was committed and actively engaged. -Credited to the division were 23,000 Japanese killed and over 3,500 -captured. The division had captured over two thirds of Okinawa and had -repeatedly fought the enemy on his own terms, and his own ground. During -this operation the Sixth Marine Division had taken heavy losses; 400 -officers and 7,822 enlisted men were either killed or wounded. In the -drive from the Asa River to the Kokuba, the division had lost the -equivalent of a regiment of men. Not included in the above figures are -men lost due to non-battle casualties, sickness, or combat fatigue. - -After reaching the southern coast the Sixth Division turned to retrace -its steps back to the Kokuba, mopping up enemy remnants at it went. - -The first week in July found the Sixth Marine Division busy with -preparations for the trip to the new base camp on Guam. On 4 July there -was an impressive ceremony held to dedicate the division cemetery. -Although the division was preparing to leave Okinawa, it paused briefly -to pay its respects to those of its members who would have to remain -forever behind. In the last paragraph of the special order of -dedication, General Shepherd admonished his men as follows: - -“As this cemetery is dedicated to the dead and to the past that they -made glorious by their heroic sacrifices, let there be in the minds of -the members of this division the resolve to dedicate their future -efforts to speeding the impending final defeat of the enemy to the end -that there will no longer be occasion for the sacrifice that the honored -dead of our division were called upon to make on this island.” - - - - - 9. GUAM - - -On 16 July General Shepherd and his staff arrived at Guam and set up his -new command post. By direction of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, a base -camp had been built for the Sixth Marine Division on Guam. As soon as -the units had moved into their new areas, construction was begun on -chapels and recreation facilities. A division training order was issued -on 23 July outlining a program to last from 6 August to 15 December -1945. - -On 26 July General Shepherd published a letter of gratitude from the -people of Guam to the officers and men of the Sixth Marine Division. -Written on the occasion of “Guam Liberation Day”, 21 July, one year -after the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines had landed on the bloody -beaches near Agat, the letter, signed by several leading Guamanians said -in part: - -“On behalf of the people of Guam we take this opportunity, as a token of -everlasting gratitude, to extend our greetings and felicitations to you, -the officers and men of the First Provisional Brigade which formed the -nucleus of the Sixth Marine Division, with its supporting arms and -services, on the first anniversary of D-Day. - -“Through popular request, the twenty first of July has been designated -as ‘Guam Liberation Day’. It is fitting and proper that we renew and -reaffirm our loyalty and devotion to our mother country and the cause -for which she stands.” - -With general preparations for future combat operations against the enemy -underway, the Sixth Marine Division launched an intensive training -program in August. The main effort of the division was diverted, -however, from 11-15 August to preparing and mounting out Task Group Able -for the forthcoming occupation of Yokosuka Naval Base. This task group -was a headquarters command headed by Brigadier General William T. -Clement which was superimposed over the Fourth Marines (Reinforced), -under the command of Lt. Col. Fred D. Beans. On 16 August, Task Group -Able departed from Guam and three days later joined the Third Fleet. - -As a part of the Fleet Landing Force, Task Group Able landed at Yokosuka -Naval Base and Airfield on 30 August. There was no opposition to the -landing. Here it remained as a part of the Sixth Marine Division until -late in November when it passed from the administrative control of the -division to that of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Its general duties -consisted of demilitarizing the Naval area of responsibility, and in -providing security for the Naval Base and Airfield. On 20 September, all -reinforcing elements of the Fourth Marines and its superior command, -Task Force Able Headquarters, returned to Guam, leaving the regiment -under the operational control of the Eighth Army. By January the force -had been reduced to the Third Battalion; the other two battalions, -Weapons Company, and Headquarters and Service Company departed for the -U. S. to be disbanded. Later a reduced regimental headquarters group -left for Tsingtao to rejoin the division. - - - - - 10. TSINGTAO - - -During the month of September the Sixth Marine Division prepared for an -operation, the forthcoming occupation of Tsingtao, China. From 2 October -until 11 October the division was aboard ship en route to China and -commenced unloading at Tsingtao on the latter date. - -While aboard the division command ship en route to Tsingtao, General -Shepherd stated the general mission of his command: - -“Our mission is to land and occupy Tsingtao and the adjacent Tsangkou -Airfield; to assist local authorities in maintaining order and in -preventing disease and starvation; to release, care for, and evacuate -Recovered Allied Military personnel and Allied internees; to cooperate -with Chinese Central Government forces; to accept, when necessary, local -surrender of Japanese forces, as authorized by higher authority, and to -assist the Chinese in effecting the disarming and confining of these -forces.” - -The city of Tsingtao, with 1,300,000 inhabitants is situated on a -promontory on the southern coast of Shantung Peninsula. It is regarded -as one of the finest ports in China, and is second only to Shanghai as a -textile manufacturing center. When the division landed, it found the -citizens of Tsingtao to be a polyglot group: Communist agents, former -Nazis, White Russians, Koreans, Japanese civilians, Japanese military -personnel, Europeans, Eurasians, and Chinese. - -Politically, Tsingtao, as the most coveted city on Shantung Peninsula, -was a hotbed of intrigue and strife. The Communists, with a stronghold -at Chefoo, hoped to gain control of the peninsula, and the city. -Resisting them were Japanese troops, protecting rail lines leading into -the city. Here too, were independent factions ostensibly aligned with -the Chungking government. Still in evidence, but ineffective, were -puppet groups. At large, but not easily identified with either Chungking -or Yennan, were small groups of brigands which terrorized Tsingtao -despite the Mayor and his poorly trained and discipined troops. - -Most of the interior of the Shantung Peninsula was controlled by -Communists; their only access to the sea was at the port of Chefoo. -Early in the month of October an emissary from the Commander-in-Chief of -the Liberation Army of the Communists entered the harbor and sought an -audience with General Shepherd. Permission was granted and a letter was -presented which proposed, in essence, passive collaboration between the -Marines and the Communists. Offering to enter the city to “restore -order” by killing puppet troops, that is those troops who professed -allegiance to Chiang Kai-Shek’s Chinese Central Government, the -Communists promised not to disturb the Marines of the Sixth Division. To -this General Shepherd replied firmly that he would have no part in a -fratricidal war between factions in China, and that his combat veterans -could prevent any disorders in the city. - -Obviously, the Communist forces had hoped to gain complete control of -the Shantung Peninsula at the cessation of hostilities through the -surrender of Japanese troops to them. - -One of the earliest problems to confront the men of the Sixth Marine -Division in Tsingtao was a financial one, the fluctuating rate of -exchange. With inflation rampant, attempts to stabilize the exchange at -one American dollar to 2,000 Chinese Federal Reserve Bank dollars -failed. Black markets flourished for a while and speculation in local -currency helped to make that currency unstable. Food was plentiful but -there was a shortage of coal. - -Law and order was more a matter of theory than practice. Throughout -October uniformed Chinese perpetrated many small crimes against both the -Japanese and German residents. These usually consisted of breaking into -houses, threatening the occupants with rifles or pistols, and stealing -jewelry, silver, or small valuables. Marine roving patrols remedied this -situation. It wasn’t long before the Sixth Marine Division found itself -regarded as the guardian of minority groups within the city. - -The morning of 25 October found the Twenty Second Marines, the Twenty -Ninth Marines, the Sixth Tank Battalion, the Sixth Engineers, the Sixth -Marine Division Headquarters Battalion, and other troops, marching out -to the race track at the edge of Tsingtao to witness the surrender -ceremony of the Japanese to representatives of the United States and -Chinese Central Governments. - -At 1100 the ceremony began. For the Japanese, Maj. General Eiji Nagano, -commanding officer of the Japanese 5th Independent Mixed Brigade, -stepped up on the platform and affixed his signature to copies of the -surrender document. After laying his sword on the table Nagano withdrew -to rejoin his staff, who immediately followed his example. On the -platform representing the United States was General Shepherd who signed -his name next. Lt. Gen. Yen Nien Li, deputy commander of the 11th War -Area and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek’s personal representative, signed -for the Chinese Central Government. - -The surrender document stated that all Japanese forces in the Tsingtao -area were to surrender unconditionally to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek -and that all equipment and records were to be turned over to the Allies -in good condition. Civilian internees and prisoners of war were to be -released immediately. General Shepherd, as Commanding General of the -Sixth Marine Division, was named as Chiang’s authorized representative. - -By the end of October, the division had settled to its routine duties. -Guards had been established over American properties and Japanese -warehouses; patrols were maintained throughout the non-Chinese sections -of the city. A new training program was started. Special Services -distributed athletic gear and arranged athletic events; in addition, an -education program had been started. The division began to make plans for -withdrawal as soon as the 8th Chinese National Army arrived. By 23 -November, before a lapse occurred, 6,701 Japanese military personnel and -877 Japanese civilians had been evacuated to Japan. Along with the -repatriation of the Japanese, many members of the division were -“repatriated” to the United States through rotation as point scores -dropped. - -During the month of December the Sixth Marine Division continued its -duties in Tsingtao; 7,827 military and 18,390 civilian Japanese were -repatriated. Near the end of the month Major General A. F. Howard, USMC, -arrived to relieve Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC, as -Commanding General of the Sixth Marine Division. - -Gradually many of the functions of the division were absorbed by the 8th -Chinese National Army and the division turned to schools and training -prior to deactivation on 1 April, when from its units the Third Marine -Brigade was formed. - -The career of the Sixth Marine Division had been relatively brief, a few -days less than nineteen months, but in that short time the division had -won a respected position among the fighting divisions of this war. For -its excellent work on Okinawa the division was warmly commended by both -Lt. General Roy S. Geiger, Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, and -the late Lt. General Simon B. Buckner, Commanding General, Tenth Army. -To each of the three infantry regiments of the Sixth Marine Division, -the Twenty Second Marines, the Twenty-Ninth Marines and the Fourth -Marines, went the highly coveted Presidential Unit Citation. While it -lived, the division not only upheld all the proud traditions of the -Marine Corps, but added to the impressive record of brave deeds long -associated with the Corps. - - - - - APPENDICES - - - - - APPENDIX “A” - - - _Copy_ - - - UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS - Office of the Commanding General - Second Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force - c/o Fleet Post Office - San Francisco, California - - 26 September 1944 - - From: The Commanding General. - To: The Commanding General, 6th Marine Division. - Subject: Services rendered by personnel of 1st Battalion, 29th - Marines. - -1. I wish to express my appreciation of the heroic part played by the -officers and men of the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines (Reinf), while -attached to the 2d Marine Division, in the defeat of the Japanese forces -on Saipan. - -2. This battalion landed on the Japanese base of Saipan, Marianas -Islands, on D-day, 15 June 1944, and immediately upon landing was -attached to CT-8 and subsequently committed to front-line action on the -original beachhead. For a period of twenty days until the zone of action -of this division was completely secured, it occupied front-line -positions, participating in attacks against most determined resistance -over the most difficult terrain the island offered. During this entire -period, due to tactical considerations and the nature of enemy -resistance, it was at no time relieved from its front-line positions. In -its advance over very difficult terrain, including the main ridge of -Mount Tapotchau, the commanding terrain feature of the island, it -successfully repulsed numerous counter-attacks and overcame many pockets -of inordinately tenacious enemy resistance, including heavy machine gun -and mortar fire. - -3. In its advance it suffered very heavy casualties. Despite these -losses, this battalion continued its attacks and advances with unabating -vigor and persistence. - -4. It has been a pleasure to have under my command these officers and -men who were of inestimable value to the success of the operation as a -part of the 2d Marine Division, Reinforced. The parent organization of -the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines can well be proud of the accomplishments -of this battalion during the Saipan operation. - - /s/ T. E. Watson - T. E. WATSON - - - - - First Endorsement 8 October 1944 - - HEADQUARTERS, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, IN THE FIELD - - From: The Commanding General. - - To: The Commanding Officer, Twenty-ninth Marines, Reinforced. - -_Copy_ - -Subject: Services rendered by personnel of 1st Battalion, Twenty-ninth -Marines, Reinforced. - -1. Forwarded. - -2. This is a fine tribute to the 1st Battalion, Twenty-ninth Marines, -Reinforced, and will be an inspiration to the remainder of your -excellent regiment. - -LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR. - - - - - 2d Endorsement 11 October 1944 - - HEADQUARTERS, 29th MARINES, REINF., SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, - IN THE FIELD - - From: The Commanding Officer. - - To: The Commanding Officer, First Battalion, 29th - Marines, Reinf. - - Subject: Services rendered by personnel of the First Battalion, - 29th Marines, Reinf. - -1. Forwarded with congratulations. - -2. The Commanding Officer takes pleasure in forwarding this letter from -the Commanding General, Second Marine Division, In the Field, commending -you and your men for heroic and valiant services at Saipan. - -3. It is a source of gratification for me to receive this report, and to -welcome your splendid unit to this regiment. - -VICTOR F. BLEASDALE - - - - - _Copy_ - - HEADQUARTERS, TWENTY-NINTH MARINES REINFORCED, - SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, IN THE FIELD. - - 16 November 1944 - - REGIMENTAL MEMORANDUM - - Combat Record of the First Battalion, - 29th Marines. - - _NUMBER 129 1944_ - -1. The article, “BATTALION ON SAIPAN” by War Correspondent Robert -Sherrod, appearing in the October 1944 issue of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE -describes the splendid part played in the conquest of Saipan during June -and July 1944, by the battalions of the Sixth Marine Regiment. However, -in addition to his description of the fighting done by the battalions of -the Sixth Marine Regiment, Mr. Sherrod includes the following reference -to the magnificent achievements of the First Battalion, Twenty-ninth -Marines: - - “And none of them (battalions of the Sixth Marine Regiment) - approached the rather appalling losses incurred by an extra - battalion formed of detachments from each of the nine regular - battalions of the Second Division. This heroic battalion, the First - Battalion, Twenty-ninth Marine Regiment, commanded first by - Lieutenant Colonel Guy E. Tannyhill and later by Lieutenant Colonel - Rathvon McC. Tompkins (until he was also wounded near the end of the - battle), faced the fearsome task of taking the 1,554-foot peak of - Mount Tapotchau, the highest point on Saipan. Like good Marines, - Colonel Tompkins’ men never faltered in their assignment, but there - were only about 200 left in the battalion when the battle ended. The - United States can thank its lucky stars for such picked men who are - not afraid to die; without them it is difficult to see how the - Pacific war would even now be advanced as far as Tarawa, which is - 2,000 miles to the rear.” - -2. The officers and men of the 29th Marines are very proud of the -splendid reputation already established by our First Battalion. - - VICTOR F. BLEASDALE, - Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps - Commanding - - - - -THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - -WASHINGTON - -The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the - -FIRST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE - -for service as follows: - -“For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces, during -the invasion of Guam, Marianas Islands, from July 21 to August 10, 1944. -Functioning as a combat unit for the first time, the First Provisional -Marine Brigade forced a landing against strong hostile defenses and well -camouflaged positions, steadily advancing inland under the relentless -fury of the enemy’s heavy artillery, mortar and small arms fire to -secure a firm beachhead by nightfall. Executing a difficult turning -movement to the north, this daring and courageous unit fought its way -ahead yard by yard through mangrove swamps, dense jungles and over -cliffs and, although terrifically reduced in strength under the enemy’s -fanatical counterattacks, hunted the Japanese in caves, pillboxes and -foxholes and exterminated them. By their individual acts of gallantry -and their indomitable fighting teamwork throughout this bitter and -costly struggle, the men of the First Provisional Marine Brigade aided -immeasurably in the restoration of Guam to our sovereignty.” - - /S/ JAMES FORRESTAL - Secretary of the Navy. - -All personnel serving in the First Provisional Marine Brigade, comprised -of: Headquarters Company; Brigade Signal Company; Brigade Military -Police Company; 4th Marines, Reinforced; 22nd Marines, Reinforced; Naval -Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 515, and 4th Platoon, 2nd Marine -Ammunition Company, during the above mentioned period are hereby -authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon. - - - - - _COPY_ - - 1990-10-10 - 018/159 - - HEADQUARTERS - SIXTH MARINE DIVISION - IN THE FIELD - - 22 April 1945. - - S.O.—78-45: - -1. The Commanding General takes pleasure in announcing that all -organized enemy resistance in the central and northern part of OKINAWA -was overcome on April 20, 1945. - -2. Within a period of twenty days, the Sixth Marine Division effected a -landing on a hostile shore, captured an important airdrome, and fought -its way over rugged terrain against enemy resistance a distance of 84 -miles securing an area of 436 square miles of Japanese territory. Over -2200 enemy dead have been counted in addition to the capture of large -numbers of assorted weapons and quantities of military stores. - -3. The Sixth Marine Division may well be proud of its achievements. Its -units have operated in combat with distinction. The attack and seizure -of precipitous Mt. YAETAKE on MOTOBU Peninsula will stand out in our -history as an example of courage and determination of the individual -Marine to surmount impassable terrain defended by a well organized and -fanatical foe. Your accomplishments have demonstrated a standard of -proficiency in battle equal to any unit in the Fleet Marine Force. - -4. In addition to the fighting ability of the assault troops, the -Commanding General commends the supporting units for their untiring and -efficient operation which enabled the attack to maintain its momentum -throughout the operation. Artillery, Tanks, Engineers, Shore Party, -Medical and Service elements of the division all contributed their share -to bring the campaign to a successful and rapid conclusion. - -5. The Sixth Marine Division has lived up to the highest traditions of -the Marine Corps and can proudly take its place among the other famous -Marine organizations which have brought glory and honor to our -illustrious Corps. - -6. In rejoicing over our recently achieved victory, we should not forget -to honor our fallen comrades and those who have suffered wounds in -battle. The loss of those who made the supreme sacrifice is deeply -mourned by all who survived. The memory of their sacrifice will remain -with us always. - - /S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR. - Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, - Commanding, Sixth Marine Division. - - _COPY_ - - - - - _COPY_ - - 1990-10-10 - 018/125 17 May 1945. - - HEADQUARTERS - SIXTH MARINE DIVISION - IN THE FIELD - - SO: 120-45 - -1. The Commanding General wishes to commend the Twenty-second Marines -for their outstanding performance of duty during the period from 8 May -1945 to the present date. - -2. On 8 May 1945, the Twenty-second Marines was assigned the extreme -right flank of the Third Amphibious Corps zone of action. At that time -the forward line in this sector ran from the west coast inland just -south of Machinato airfield. The enemy positions facing them were -recognized to be of an extremely formidable nature and had withstood -attack for many days. - -Undeterred by the grim prospects confronting them the Twenty-second -Marines upon receiving the order to attack, immediately began a -determined skillful advance to the south. - -The regiment rapidly forced its way to the Asa-Kwan estuary and upon -reaching that formidable natural barrier, unhesitatingly forded the fire -swept water course and established a firm bridgehead on the southern -side. - -The following day, the attack was resumed, this time against the enemy -main line of resistance lodged on commanding ground honeycombed with -tunnels, caves, and pillboxes. In the face of devastating artillery, -mortar and machine gun fire, the regiment unhesitatingly hammered its -way up the fanatically defended slopes and by its persistent, dogged -determination breached the enemy defenses and seized the tactically -important high ground overlooking Naha. - -Since the seizure of this important area, the regiment has demonstrated -its tenacity in holding ground gained against repeated enemy -counter-attacks and counter-landings. - -3. The Sixth Marine Division looks with pride on the accomplishments of -the Twenty-second Marines. The esprit de corps, courageous -determination, and outstanding fighting ability of this regiment is -worthy of the greatest praise. - -4. Let us not forget that these achievements have not been without cost. -The glory gained belongs equally to those who so unsparingly gave their -lives in the performance of their duty. The battle is not yet won, and -hard fighting lies ahead, but it behooves those who remain to resolve to -maintain the inspired standards established by the recent -accomplishments of this regiment. - - /S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR. - Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, - Commanding, Sixth Marine Division. - - _COPY_ - - - - - _COPY_ - - 1990-10-10 - 018/125 - - HEADQUARTERS - SIXTH MARINE DIVISION - IN THE FIELD - - 19 May 1945 - - SO: 125-45 - - Reference: (a) ComTransronTwelve ltr to CG, 6th Mar Div. - serial #318, dated 15 April 1945. - -1. Reference (a) is quoted below for the information of all members of -this command: - - “1. During the period from 1 to 10 April 1945 inclusive the Shore - Party of the SIXTH Marine Division worked in closest cooperation and - harmony with Transport Squadron TWELVE (Transport Group ABLE), ships - under its operational control, and with all elements of the Navy - beach and control parties of the squadron. During this period some - 51,920 tons of cargo were landed on and handled over the reef and - sent to dumps and dispersal areas in the rear. At no time were the - beaches allowed to become congested with cargo to the detriment of - progress in general cargo unloading. At the end of the unloading - period all cargo was clear of the beach areas, beaches were clean - and free of wreckage, cargo nets and life preservers had been - salvaged and returned to ships, and Garrison Shore and Beach Parties - were completely stationed, well instructed in their duties and fully - functioning. - - “2. At no time, night or day, did unloading operations completely - cease on RED and GREEN Beaches. Upon ‘all clear’ after RED alert, - work was resumed promptly. At all times men were made available over - and beyond the normal demands whenever an emergency of one type or - another arose. At no time was there any complaint that the men were - too tired to work:—that they were tired goes without question, but - that they carried on is a tribute to their physical stamina, the - morale of the individual marine, and to the quality of their - leadership. - - “3. Commander Transport Squadron TWELVE (Commander Transport Group - ABLE) strongly urges that the Commanding General, SIXTH Marine - Division publish this appreciation of the superb work done by his - Shore Party to all hands in his division so that all may know that - their Shore Party contributed very materially to their recent - success. It can be said in all truth that the SIXTH Marine Division - Shore Party is the best in every respect so far seen in this war, - and its organization, equipment and functioning deserve close study - as a model for future operations. - - “4. —— - - “5. —— - - “6. In conclusion may we in Transport Squadron TWELVE express the - hope that at some future date we may be so fortunate as to serve - with the SIXTH Marine Division again. Everywhere we found splendid - cooperation, a thorough knowledge of what you wanted to do and a - keen appreciation of our own problems which enabled us to solve - often vexing details in a highly satisfactory manner. We know that - we have seen the best examples of the ship-to-shore movement to - date, and we leave you with highest regards and best wishes for your - continued success. - - H. B. KNOWLES” - - - - -_COPY_ - -OFFICERS AND MEN - -OF THE SIXTH MARINE DIVISION - -(Message read to all troops the day before landing on Okinawa) - -“Within the next few hours our division will land on Japanese soil—the -doorway to the enemy’s country. It is an honor to be among the first to -bring the war to the Japanese homeland. - -“The Sixth Marine Division is ready for the task to which it is -assigned. During the past months of training, we have perfected our -technique and forged our battle-seasoned regiments and battalions into a -hard-hitting offensive team, inbued with the will to win. - -“When the day of battle comes, I have every confidence that you will -strike with the force of a crusader, symbolized by the sword emblazoned -on our shield, and bring victory and glory to our Corps and Country. - -“I extend to each of you my sincere good wishes. May God in His infinite -mercy bless our cause and protect us all.” - - (Signed) LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR. - Major General, U. S. Marine Corps - Commanding Sixth Marine Division - - - - - _COPY_ - - 1990-10-10 - 015/210 - - HEADQUARTERS - SIXTH MARINE DIVISION - IN THE FIELD - - 13 June 1945. - - SO: 146-45 - -1. The Commanding General takes pleasure in transmitting to all units of -the Sixth Marine Division the following dispatch from the Commanding -General, III Amphibious Corps: - - “THE CORPS COMMANDER COMMENDS THE 6TH MARDIV ON THE CAPTURE OF OROKU - PENINSULA X CONTINUING OPERATIONS AFTER THE HARD FOUGHT BATTLES IN - WHICH THE DIVISION PENETRATED THE WESTERN DEFENSES OF SHURI AND - CAPTURED THE CITY OF NAHA IT QUICKLY EXECUTED AN AMPHIBIOUS - OPERATION ORGANIZED AND MOUNTED UNDER THE HANDICAP OF ADVERSE - WEATHER AND DIFFICULT LOGISTIC CONDITIONS X FIGHTING ITS WAY INLAND - OVER VERY UNFAVORABLE AND RUGGED TERRAIN IT WRESTED STRONGLY - FORTIFIED HILL AND CAVE POSITIONS FROM AN ENEMY DETERMINED TO FIGHT - TO THE BITTER END AND WELL EQUIPPED WITH AUTOMATIC AND SUPPORTING - WEAPONS X THE INDOMITABLE SPIRIT AND PROFESSIONAL SKILL DISPLAYED BY - THE 6TH MARDIV WILL BE A SOURCE OF PRIDE AND GRATIFICATION TO ALL - MARINES” - -2. Every officer and man in the Sixth Marine Division may be justly -proud of the accomplishments attained during the past ten days fighting -on the OROKU PENINSULA. Through your indomitable courage and -determination to overcome all obstacles, you have again demonstrated the -superior fighting qualities for which this division has become famous. - - /S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR. - Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, - Commanding, Sixth Marine Division. - - - - - _COPY_ - - 1990-10-15 - 015/210 - - HEADQUARTERS - SIXTH MARINE DIVISION - IN THE FIELD - - 14 June 1945. - - MEMO: 126-45 - -1. The Commanding General takes pleasure in transmitting to all units of -the Sixth Marine Division the following dispatch from Lieutenant General -Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., U. S. Army, Commanding General, 10th Army: - - “MY COMPLIMENTS TO YOU AND ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR COMMAND FOR A WELL - CONDUCTED AND SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN SECURING THE OROKU PENINSULA - AND DESTROYING A LARGE ENEMY GARRISON THEN IN STRONG AND WELL - FORTIFIED POSITIONS, THUS CONTRIBUTING MATERIALLY TO THE SUCCESS OF - THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN” - -2. The above message is truly indicative of the wide recognition and -admiration gained by every officer and man of the Sixth Marine Division. -The esprit de corps, persistent, dogged determination, and outstanding -fighting ability demonstrated during the seizure of Oroku Peninsula are -worthy of the greatest praise. The Commanding General congratulates each -individual for his accomplishments. - - /S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR., - Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, - Commanding, Sixth Marine Division. - -_COPY_ - - - - -_COPY_ - - 1990-10-10 - 046/171 - - HEADQUARTERS - SIXTH MARINE DIVISION - IN THE FIELD - - 21 June 1945. - - SO: 155-45 - -1. Organized resistance within the Sixth Marine Division zone of action -ended today. In the 82 days which have passed since the division landed -on the YONTAN beaches much ground has been gained, many Japs killed and -numerous localities of great importance to our nation have been -captured. These continuing successes have only been realized through the -superb performance of duty on the part of every unit throughout the -division. The aggressive conduct of units in contact with the enemy -coupled with the tireless support rendered by units behind the lines, -both tactical and logistical, are in keeping with the indomitable -fighting spirit of which this division is so justly proud. Every officer -and man may look upon the activities of the past three months as a hard -job superbly accomplished. - - /S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR., - Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, - Commanding, Sixth Marine Division. - -_COPY_ - - - - -_COPY_ - - 1355 - 015-214 - - HEADQUARTERS - SIXTH MARINE DIVISION - IN THE FIELD - - 23 June 1945. - - SO: 158-45. - -1. The Commanding General takes pleasure in quoting to all officers and -men of the Sixth Marine Division the following message from the -Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps: - - “UPON THE COMPLETION OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE IN OKINAWA I COMMEND - ALL UNITS OF THE III PHIB CORPS FOR THEIR INDOMITABLE SPIRIT IN - OVERCOMING ENEMY RESISTANCE AND FURNISHING SERVICES AND SUPPORT TO - THE FIGHTING MEN X AS A TEAM YOU ALL WERE SUPERB AND DISPLAYED THE - SPIRIT AND PROFESSIONAL SKILL WHICH WILL CARRY US TO TOKYO X” - -2. The outstanding fighting ability demonstrated by combat troops of -this division, together with the excellent performance of duty by -supporting units during the past three months, will stand out as an -example of courage and determination of the individual Marine to -surmount all obstacles and defeat a well-organized and fanatical foe. -The Sixth Marine Division has lived up to the highest traditions of the -Marine Corps and may well be proud of its outstanding achievements. - - /S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR., - Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, - Commanding, Sixth Marine Division. - -_COPY_ - - - - - 1990-10-50 - 048-214 - - HEADQUARTERS - SIXTH MARINE DIVISION - IN THE FIELD - - 27 June 1945. - - SO: 164-45. - -1. The Commanding General proudly quotes to all units of the Sixth -Marine Division the following message from the Commanding General, Tenth -Army: - - “THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 10TH ARMY, TAKES GREAT PLEASURE IN - FORWARDING THE FOLLOWING DISPATCH DTG 221645 JUNE 45 QUOTE FROM: - COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS TO: COMGENTEN X OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE - MARINE CORPS PROUDLY SEND CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND THE FORCES - UNDER YOUR COMMAND FOR YOUR SPLENDID VICTORY AT OKINAWA X THE 10TH - ARMY IN COMPLETING THE INITIAL CHAPTER OF ITS HISTORY CARRIED THE - WAR TO THE THRESHOLD OF THE EMPIRE X WE EXTEND OUR BEST WISHES FOR - YOUR CONTINUED SUCCESS AND THE GALLANT TROOPS AT OKINAWA WE SAY WELL - DONE” - -2. In addition to the above official dispatch, the Commanding General -takes pleasure in quoting the following excerpt from a personal letter -recently received from the Commandant of the Marine Corps: - - “I wish to write you personally to say what marvelous work your - division has done.—— - - “I want you, your officers and men, to know how deeply grateful we - at home here are that we belong to the same outfit that has been - doing the fighting out there. - - A. A. VANDEGRIFT” - -3. Every officer and man of the Sixth Marine Division may justly be -proud of these words of praise from our Commandant. To have been a -member of the Sixth Marine Division on Okinawa is an honor which cannot -be excelled. You have all lived up to the highest traditions of the -Marine Corps. - - /S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR., - Major General, U. S. Marine Corps, - Commanding, Sixth Marine Division. - -_COPY_ - - - - - APPENDIX “B” - SIXTH MARINE DIVISION COMMAND LIST - - - From 7Sep44 to 31Mar46 - - =Division Commander=: - - Brig. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC - 7-11Sept44. - Maj. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. USMC - 12Sept44 to 23Dec45. - Maj. Gen. Archie F. Howard, USMC - 24Dec45 to 31Mar46. - - =Assistant Division Commander=: - Brig. Gen. William T. Clement, USMC - 11Nov44 to 31Mar46. - - =Chief of Staff=: - Col. John T. Walker, USMC - 7Sept to 16Nov44. - Col. John C. McQueen, USMC - 17Nov44 to 16Feb46. - Col. Harry E. Dunkelberger, USMC - 17Feb to 31Mar46. - - =Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1=: - Major Addison B. Overstreet, USMCR - 7Sept44 to 22Jul45. - Col. Karl K. Louther, USMC - 23Jul to 17Nov45. - Lt. Col. Frederick Belton, USMC - 18Nov45 to 31Mar46. - - =Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2=: - Lt. Col. August Larson, USMC - 7Sept to 30Sept44. - Major William R. Watson, Jr., USMCR - 1Oct to 9Nov44. - Lt. Col. Thomas E. Williams, USMCR - 10Nov44 to 16Feb46. - Lt. Col. Carl V. Larsen, USMC - 17Feb to 31Mar46. - - =Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3=: - Lt. Col. Thomas A. Culhane, Jr., USMC - 7Sept to 10Nov44. - Lt. Col. Victor H. Krulak, USMC - 11Nov44 to 26Oct45. - Lt. Col. Wayne H. Adams, USMC - 27Oct to 31Dec45. - Lt. Col. George W. Killen, USMC - 1Jan to 31Mar46. - - =Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4=: - Lt. Col. August Larson, USMC - 1Oct44 to 17May45. - Lt. Col. Wayne H. Adams, USMC - 18May45 to 31Dec45. - Lt. Col. Samuel R. Shaw, USMC - 1Jan to 31Mar46. - - =CO Hq Bn=: - Lt. Col. Floyd A. Stephenson, USMC - (Activated 25Sept44) - 25Sept44 to 31Mar46. - - =CO Service Troops=: - Lt. Col. Floyd A. Stephenson, USMC - (Activated 24Oct44) - 24Oct to 11Nov44. - Col. William W. Orr, USMC - 12Nov44 to 3Dec45. - - =CO 6th Motor Transport Bn=: - Major Ernest H. Gould, USMCR - (Activated 23Sept44) - 23Sept44 to 30Mar45. - Lt. Col. Ernest H. Gould, USMCR - 30Mar to 24Jul45. - Lt. Col. Robert E. McCook, USMC - 25Jul45 to 31Mar46. - - =CO 6th Service Bn=: - Lt. Col. Floyd A. Stephenson, USMC - (Activated 24Oct44) - 24Oct to 12Nov44. - Major Charles N. Hulvey, Jr., USMCR - 13Nov to 17Dec44. - Lt. Col. Erma A. Wright, USMC - 18Dec44 to 26Jan45. - Lt. Col. George B. Bell, USMC - 27Jan to 26Mar45. - Lt. Col. Alexander N. Entringer, USMC - 27Mar45 to 19Mar46. - Lt. Col. Robert E. McCook, USMC - 20-31Mar46. - - =CO 6th Medical Bn=: - Lt. Comdr. John S. Cowan, USN(MC) - (Activated 24Nov44) - 24Nov44 to 18Jun45. - Commander John S. Cowan, USN(MC) - 19Jun45 to 27Jan46. - Lt. Comdr. Rich H. Pembroke, USNR(MC) - 28Jan to 26Mar46. - - =CO 6th Engineer Bn=: - Capt. Wm. C. McLaughlin, USMC - (Activated 1Nov44) - 1-13Nov44. - Major Elliot B. Robertson, USMC - 14Nov to 28Dec44. - Major Paul F. Sackett, USMCR - 29Dec44 to 23Jul45. - Major Robert S. Mayo, USMC - 24-31Jul45. - Major Paul F. Sackett, USMCR - 1Aug to 22Sept45. - Lt. Col. Orin C. Bjornsrud, USMC - 23Sept45 to 25Mar46. - - =CO 6th Pioneer Bn=: - Lt. Col. Samuel R. Shaw, USMC - (Activated 10Nov44) - 10Nov44 to 10May45. - Major John G. Dibble, USMC - 11May to 22Jun45. - Lt. Col. Samuel R. Shaw, USMC - 23Jun to 21Oct45. - Lt. Col. Harry A. Schmitz, USMC - 22Oct45 to 31Mar46. - - =CO 6th Tank Bn=: - Major Harry T. Milne, USMC - 29Sept to 16Oct44. - Lt. Col. Robert L. Denig, Jr., USMC - 17Oct44 to 26Mar46. - - =CO 15th Marines=: - Col. Wilburt S. Brown, USMC - (Activated 23Oct44) - 23Oct to 17Nov44. - Lt. Col. Robert B. Luckey, USMC - 18Nov to 23Dec44. - Col. Robert B. Luckey, USMC - 24Dec44 to 15Mar46. - - =CO 4th Marines=: - Col. Alan Shapley, USMC - 7Sept44 to 3Jul45. - Lt. Col. Fred D. Beans, USMC - 4Jul45 to 28Jan46. - - =CO 22d Marines=: - Col. Merlin F. Schneider, USMC - (Activated Jun42) - 7Sept44 to 16May45. - Col. Harold C. Roberts, USMC - 17May to 18Jun45. - Lt. Col. August Larson, USMC - 19-24Jun45. - Col. John D. Blanchard, USMC - 25Jun45 to 31Mar46. - - =CO 29th Marines=: - Col. Victor F. Bleasdale, USMC - (Activated 1May44) - 7Sept44 to 14Apr45. - Col. William J. Whaling, USMC - 15Apr45 to 31Mar46. - - - - - APPENDIX “C” - Sixth Marine Division Insignia - -The basic design for the shoulder patch of the Sixth Marine Division was -submitted by Colonel Victor Bleasdale of the Twenty Ninth Marines. The -design as finally adopted, incorporated ideas of Corporal Michael W. -Pawl and Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. The artist who actually -drew and colored the design was Lieutenant George Thompson. - -The outside diameter of the patch is three inches and the diameter of -the inner circle is two and one fourth inches. Embroidered on the red -outer border are the words Melanesia—Micronesia—Orient. Superimposed -upon a crusader sword in the center of the patch is a one and a quarter -inch block numeral “6”, two inches long. The shading of the “6” is in -the same color as the outer border. The “6” and the lettering of the -words on the border is golden yellow. Cobalt blue is the color of the -center background and the crusader sword is silver white. - -To commemorate the fighting in the Solomons of the Raider Battalions, -from which the Fourth Regiment was formed, the word Melanesia was -chosen. Similarly, the word Micronesia commemorates the fighting of the -Twenty Second Marines at Eniwetok, the First Provisional Brigade on -Guam, and the First Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines, at Saipan. - -The board of officers, representing all units of the division, which -adopted the patch selected the word Orient for two reasons: First, -because China was the home of the old Fourth Marine Regiment, lost in -the early days of the war on Bataan. The Raider Battalions were the -units used to reactivate the Fourth Marines. The second reason advanced -by the board was, that it was their belief that in its final stages, the -war against Japan would have to be fought in the Orient. It is -significant that the division took part in the last campaign, which was -fought on Okinawa, and, as predicted, in the Orient. - -The crusader’s sword was chosen as a symbol of the Sixth Marine -Division’s crusade against the tyrannical principles of the axis powers. - -In a special order, dated 17 October 1944, General Shepherd brought the -insignia into official existence. - - - - - ● Transcriber’s Notes: - ○ Text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_). - ○ Footnotes have been moved to follow the lectures in which they are - referenced. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SIXTH MARINE DIVISION *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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